


THE PHRASAL IMPLICATURE THEORY OF METAPHORS AND SLURS

Alper Yavuz

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2018

Full metadata for this thesis is available in
St Andrews Research Repository
at:

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this thesis:


<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13189>

This item is protected by original copyright

This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence

The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphors and Slurs

Alper Yavuz



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
at the University of St Andrews

March 2018

Candidate's declaration

I, Alper Yavuz, do hereby certify that this thesis, submitted for the degree of PhD, which is approximately 83,676 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

I was admitted as a research student at the University of St Andrews in September 2013.

I received funding from an organisation or institution and have acknowledged the funder(s) in the full text of my thesis.

Date 15th March 2018 Signature of candidate

Supervisor's declaration

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date Signature of supervisor

Permission for publication

In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand, unless exempt by an award of an embargo as requested below, that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that this thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use and that the library has the right to migrate this thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis.

I, Alper Yavuz, confirm that my thesis does not contain any third-party material that requires copyright clearance.

The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis:

Printed copy

No embargo on print copy.

Electronic copy

No embargo on electronic copy.

Date 15th March 2018

Signature of candidate

Date

Signature of supervisor

Underpinning Research Data or Digital Outputs

Candidate's declaration

I, Alper Yavuz, hereby certify that no requirements to deposit original research data or digital outputs apply to this thesis and that, where appropriate, secondary data used have been referenced in the full text of my thesis.

Date 15th March 2018 Signature of candidate

Abstract

This thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs.

In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3 introduces the notion of “phrasal implicature”, which will be used to explain phrase-level pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my theory of metaphor, which I call “phrasal implicature theory of metaphor” and discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various uses of slurs.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Cengiz Gündoğdu. My interest in philosophy started in his seminars at “İnsancıl Atölyesi” in İstanbul. I realised the significance of philosophy for the first time in these open-to-public seminars on history of philosophy and the place of philosophy in life.

Next, I would like to thank Ömer Naci Soykan, who encouraged me to become a philosopher while I was a Computer Science student. I have felt his support since then. His dedication to philosophy will be a guiding light for the rest of my career.

Many thanks to İlhan İnan, who was my Master’s thesis supervisor at Boğazici University in İstanbul. I am indebted to him for his profound impact in my initiation to philosophy of language. He has been a mentor, friend and role model for me.

I would like to thank Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, where I began working as a research assistant in 2008, for sponsoring my doctoral education. I am grateful to the chairs of the Philosophy Department Hakan Poyraz and Hasan Bülent Gözkân for permitting me to apply to the doctoral funding program of Turkish Council of Higher Education and the subsequent extensions. My research assistant friends Eylem Hacımuratoğlu, Egemen Kuşcu, Barış Aydoğan and Ekin Dedeoğlu had to undertake extra responsibilities when I was away. My special thanks go to them.

I spent three and a half wonderful years in St Andrews. I cannot imagine a better place to do a philosophy PhD, and I am not exaggerrating. The staff in the Philosophy Department were always helpful and friendly. Thanks to them and to all philosophy postgraduate community for creating such an inclusive work environment. I was lucky enough to be a member of Arché. In its inspiring atmosphere doing philosophy was great fun. I would like to thank all my Arché friends, but particularly to my office mates Ryo Ito, Fenner Tanswell, Caroline Touborg, Dan Healey and Alex Yates (almost an office mate).

My deepest thanks go to my supervisor Derek Ball, who was always extremely helpful and understanding all through the PhD period. He carefully read everything I wrote over and over again and gave me invaluable feedback. I am also indebted to my second supervisor Josh Dever. Every meeting with him was full of intellectual

pleasure, and his contributions to this thesis were always crucial.

I had the chance to discuss several aspects of my thesis with Emma Borg, Elisabeth Camp, Herman Cappelen, Robyn Carston, Aaron Cotnoir, Andy Egan, Berys Gaut, Simon Hope, Colin Johnston, Paula Rubio-Fernández, Josef Stern, and Michael Wheeler. I am grateful for their input.

I am sincerely thankful to Elisabeth Camp and Patrick Greenough, who kindly accepted to act as my PhD examiners. Their detailed comments on my thesis are of great importance for my future work.

I would like to express my immense gratitude to my friends Caroline Touborg, Wolfgang Sattler, Matt Cameron, Ravi Thakral, Poppy Mankowitz and Matt McKeever, who read parts of my thesis in its final phase and gave me extremely helpful feedback on its content and form.

Finally, I wish to thank my partner İpek Mine Sonakın, my parents Veysel and Tülin Yavuz, and my sister Özgül Yavuz for their love and support.

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved partner İpek Mine Sonakın and to my dear teacher Ömer Naci Soykan, who passed away on December 3rd, 2017.

Contents

1	Introduction	10
1.1	There are Phrasal Implicatures	11
1.2	Metaphorical Meaning is a Form of Phrasal Implicature	18
1.3	Slurring Generates Phrasal Implicatures	19
2	Common Claims about Metaphor	21
2.1	Grice on Metaphor	21
2.1.1	The Features of Conversational Implicatures	25
2.1.2	Flouting the Maxims: Metaphor and Irony	27
2.2	Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim	31
2.3	One-step Process Claim	37
2.4	The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated	46
3	Phrasal Implicature	53
3.1	Examples of Phrasal Implicatures	54
3.2	Theoretical Discussion	58
3.2.1	Previous Discussions concerning Subsentential Implicatures	59
3.2.1.1	Chierchia on Embedded Implicatures	61
3.2.1.2	Simons on Embedded Implications	63
3.2.2	My Proposal	67
3.2.2.1	Bart Geurts and Karen S. Lewis on the Gricean Reasoning at the Subsentential Level	68
3.2.2.2	A Gricean Approach to Subsententials	71
3.2.2.3	Maxims at the Subsentential Level	73
4	The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor	81
4.1	The Theory of Metaphor in General	81
4.1.1	Triggering of Phrasal Implicatures	82
4.1.2	The Basic Picture	87
4.1.3	Saliency	88

4.1.4	Question Under Discussion (QUD)	89
4.1.5	Emergent Property Problem	91
4.1.6	Systematic Interpretation?	94
4.1.7	Why not Semanticism?	95
4.2	Association Sequences	98
4.2.1	Common Ground	98
4.2.2	The Epistemological Character of Association Sequences	100
4.2.3	Wider Contexts	102
4.2.4	Associating with Phrases or Contents?	103
4.3	Claims about Metaphor Again	106
4.3.1	Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim	107
4.3.2	One-step Process Claim	109
4.3.3	The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated	110
4.4	Implicature Tests	111
4.4.1	Cancellability	111
4.4.2	Non-detachability	113
4.4.3	Non-conventionality	115
4.5	Special Cases	116
4.5.1	Metaphorical Use of Definite Descriptions	116
4.5.2	Adjectival Metaphors	117
4.5.3	The Metaphorical Use of Proper Names	117
4.5.4	Tautologous Metaphors	119
4.5.5	Metaphorical Metonymies	120
4.5.6	F is a Metaphor for G	124
4.5.7	Poetic Metaphors	124
5	What-is-said	129
5.1	What-is-said as Exact Wording	129
5.1.1	What-is-said and Direct Quotation	134
5.1.2	What-is-said and Demonstratives	137
5.1.3	Kent Bach on What-is-said	138
5.1.4	What-is-said and Metaphor	139
5.1.5	What-is-said and the Literal Proposition	142
5.2	A New Conception of Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction	143
5.2.1	Modularity Question	146

6	Pragmatic Rivals	149
6.1	Relevance Theory	149
6.1.1	Loose Talk and Metaphor	150
6.1.2	A Worry Concerning Metaphorical <i>Ad Hoc</i> Concepts	151
6.1.3	Two Problems with Relevance Theory	152
6.2	Borg's Defence of the Autonomy of Metaphors	155
6.3	Camp's Interactionist Theory of Metaphor	157
6.3.1	Characterizations	158
6.3.2	An Interactionist Theory of Metaphor	159
6.3.3	A Problem with Negated Metaphors	161
6.3.4	Unnecessary Complications	163
6.3.5	Cognitive Effects of Metaphor	168
7	On Slurring	173
7.1	What are Slurs?	174
7.2	The Features of Slurs	175
7.2.1	Group Expressions	175
7.2.2	Different Uses	176
7.2.2.1	Literal Negative Use	176
7.2.2.2	Literal Neutral Use	176
7.2.2.3	Literal Positive Use	177
7.2.2.4	Figurative (Non-literal) Negative Use	177
7.2.3	Projection and Embeddability	178
7.2.4	Descriptivity	179
7.3	Competing Views	180
7.3.1	Prohibitionism	180
7.3.2	Expressivism	183
7.3.3	Combinatorial Externalism	186
7.3.4	Conventional Implicature Accounts	193
7.4	Phrasal Implicature Theory of Slurs (PITS)	194
7.4.1	The Theory in General	194
7.4.2	The Features of Slurs Again	197
7.4.2.1	Group Expressions	197
7.4.2.2	Different Uses	197
7.4.2.3	Projection or Embeddability	199
7.4.2.4	Descriptivity	199
7.4.3	Conversational or Conventional?	200
7.4.3.1	Cancellability	202

7.4.3.2	Non-detachability	203
7.4.3.3	Non-conventionality	204
7.4.4	Further Issues	204
8	Conclusion	210

List of Figures

2.1	Grice's conception of sentence interpretation	25
2.2	Grice's construal of metaphor interpretation	28
4.1	My construal of metaphor interpretation	110
5.1	My conception of sentence interpretation	145
7.1	A classification of the current accounts of slurs	180
7.2	The scale of conventionality for implicatures	201

If there is someone tormented by
the cursed ambition of always
putting a whole book in one page, a
whole page in one phrase, and that
phrase in one word, it is myself.

Joseph Joubert, *Pensées*

Chapter 1

Introduction

In this dissertation, my aim is to develop a theory of metaphors and slurs. To accomplish that aim, I will defend three theses:

- (i) There are two ways of processing (interpreting) implicatures: (a) clausal (b) phrasal. Many types of implicatures can be processed in either way.
- (ii) Metaphorical meaning, as a form of implicature, is an example of phrasal implicature.
- (iii) Slurring involves phrasal implicatures. Various aspects of slurring can be explained with the help of this theoretical tool.

I will elaborate these theses, but before that, let me explain the crucial terminology. In grammar, the linguistic units which are ordered with respect to their level of operation from lower to higher are *word*, *phrase*, *clause*, and *sentence* (Huddleston and Pullum 2005, pp.12-3). In my discussion the contrast between phrases and clauses will be important. A *phrase* is usually defined as “a group of related words” whereas a *clause* is defined as “a group of related words that contains both a subject and a verb.” According to these definitions every clause is also a phrase.¹ However, I will ignore this technical detail and use the term “phrase” to mean the phrases that do not contain a subject or a verb. With this point in mind, let me state some examples: expressions such as “Plato”, “Plato’s dog”, or “the cat on the mat” are phrases, and “we left” or “when the film finished” are clauses. Unlike phrases, clauses can express complete thoughts and propositions.²

¹Syntacticians call clauses “Tense Phrases (TP)” (Carnie 2013, p.82).

²The definition of “clause” in grammar is not clear enough to decide for every expression whether it is a clause or not. For instance, it is not clear if “John is taller than” is a clause or not. But this problem is not going to matter; only clear cases of phrases and clauses will be relevant to my discussion.

Let me give a brief and introductory definition of an implicature. Implicature can be defined as the act of implying something beyond the literal meaning of an utterance or the object of that act. For instance, when a Labour Party electioneer utters the sentence “Jeremy Corbyn is a good and decent person”, the implicature is a request to vote for him.

Sentences can contain one or more clauses. Sentences which contain only one clause are called “simple sentences”. The discussion in Chapter 3 will make clear that clausal parts of a sentence can generate implicatures by themselves. For instance, the antecedent of a conditional can locally generate an implicature. This is a divergence from the classical Gricean picture, in which the unit of implicature generation is a sentence. Since sentences can contain more than one clause, taking the unit of implicature generation as clause is a revision of the classical picture. However, this revision does not go far enough. In my view, we need to accept the possibility of phrasal implicature. Therefore, I focus on the contrast between the implicatures phrases generate and those clauses generate. Given that simple sentences contain only one clause, using the terms “sentence” and “clause” (likewise “sentential” and “clausal”) interchangeably and seeing clausal implicatures as original Gricean sentential implicatures will not make any difference to my discussion. I will also use “utterance” as the short form of “utterance of a sentence or a clause.”

1.1 There are Phrasal Implicatures

We can now turn to the theses. What does it mean to process an implicature clausally or phrasally? Clausal processing of implicatures is the classical Gricean way of explaining how a hearer obtains implicatures. The hearer first calculates what-is-said by an utterance, and, assuming that the speaker of the utterance is cooperative,³ calculates what-is-implicated (if anything is implicated) based on what-is-said by the utterance and general contextual information. An example is as follows:

(1) Mary: Can you cook?⁴

John: I am French. (Recanati 2003b, p.5)⁵

In this talk exchange, John’s utterance does not answer Mary’s question directly, but there is no reason for her to think that he is non-cooperative. So, Mary needs

³This roughly means that the speaker is assumed to be truthful, informative, not misleading and so on.

⁴For convenience purposes, unless the example suggests otherwise, I will throughout this dissertation characterize the speakers as female and the hearers as male.

⁵Although John’s response seems to have a metaphorical flavour, following Recanati I will assume it as literal.

to infer John's answer to her question. Let us first assume that Mary's acquiring the implicature takes place at the clausal level. She first processes what John says. Given that it is not answering her question, she tries to infer from what-is-said and general contextual information what John's answer can be. She knows that having good taste is a piece of stereotypical information about the French. From this piece of information and what John says she arrives at the conclusion that John has implied that he can cook.

Almost everyone has assumed that implicature always works like this.⁶ But on my view there is an alternative. Phrasal processing of implicatures is an alternative explanation for obtaining implicatures. In order to enable this level of processing, in a typical case, at least one phrase in an utterance triggers the generation of the implicature. The calculation of this level of implicatures does not need the what-is-said by the whole utterance, which means the implicature can be obtained locally. The calculation can happen before the calculation of what-is-said.⁷ Thus, at this level of processing, the calculation of an implicature can be a parallel process to the calculation of what-is-said, unlike the clausal processing, in which these are two successive processes.

In a particular situation a phrase might be perceived as unexpected. Unexpected phrases trigger phrasal implicatures. A talk exchange takes place in a physical environment, at a certain time and location. These factors raise expectancy of certain phrases to be uttered. For instance a talk exchange in a football stadium will raise the expectancy of phrases such as "referee", "goal keeper", "manager", etc. Similarly the previously uttered sentences and phrases or the subject of a conversation will raise the expectancy of certain phrases to be uttered. For instance, a conversation about the 19th Century European history can raise the expectancy of phrases such as "Napoleon", "revolution", "trade union", etc. Thus, if some phrases are expected in a talk exchange, this means some others are unexpected. The unexpected phrases can cause interpreters to seek for the speaker's implications.

When a phrase triggers an implicature due to unexpectedness, the associations attached to the object or the kind that phrase designates are accessed. Among these associations, salient ones are automatically suggested. And among these salient associations, the interpreter tries to figure out which ones are both able to eliminate unexpectedness and intended by the speaker. The interpreter adopts these selected

⁶See, for instance, Davis (2014), a recent survey article on implicature. In this article, one can see that although some theorists raise problems about the classical Gricean way of calculating implicatures, nobody has suggested what I am going to argue for, namely the phrase-level calculation of implicatures.

⁷Later, I will argue that the what-is-said/what-is-meant distinction (or a parallel one) can also be made for phrases, but for now I just assume the classical clausal distinction.

associations as the speaker’s phrasal implicature. In the end, the interpreter simultaneously obtains two things: (i) what-is-said (in the Gricean sense), and (ii) a derivative clausal implicature, which is the original clause meaning with the phrasal implicatures substituted for phrase meanings. After this stage, the interpreter continues with the calculation of clausal implicatures (if there are any).⁸

At this point let me make some theoretical clarifications. For the sake of simplicity, I am going to make the following assumptions about the nature of meaning. My arguments would all go through in the same way under other assumptions. When I say the meaning of a phrase, I take it to be either an object or a kind (or a property). In other words, I assume for referring phrases that meaning is reference. I also take verb phrases as referring expressions. For instance, in “Aristotle taught Alexander”, “taught” refers to *teaching* as a category. I am using “object” and “particular” interchangeably. Similarly, I am using “kind” and “property” interchangeably as umbrella terms for the ontological categories that general terms refer to.⁹

Let us continue with further details on associations. I call associations attached to a particular or a kind the “association sequence” of that object or kind. The constituents in an association sequence are ordered from the most salient to the least. Every competent speaker has an association sequence attached to the meaning of every phrase they understand. For instance, if someone is asked to count ten of her associations with cars without being primed with any contextual clue, the order of this counting would typically reveal the first elements in her initial association sequence attached to the kind *car*, such as $\langle \textit{driver}, \textit{wheel}, \textit{accident}, \textit{family events}, \dots \rangle$.

Association sequences are dynamic data structures, because the order of the elements can be affected by contextual factors, due to changes in salience. What causes these changes are more or less the same factors that are mentioned above with respect to expectancy. We can say that what makes a phrase expected raises the salience of the object or kind that phrase designates. For example, a dining hall should increase the salience of eating-related kinds and objects in a talk exchange that takes place there. On the other hand, conversational factors can also affect the salience of a constituent, which is sometimes called “linguistic priming”. For in-

⁸Notice the difference between derivative clausal implicatures and clausal implicatures simpliciter. A derivative clausal implicature contains phrasal implicatures as its parts; it is an outcome of the phrasal level processing of implicatures. A clausal implicature simpliciter, however, is not based on phrasal implicatures; it is obtained through the classical Gricean way of implicature processing.

⁹In the literature these are known as the assumptions of the Russellian (or structured) proposition view, which is notably defended by Salmon (1986) and Soames (1987).

stance, the salience of *spoon* could increase after the utterance of the word “soup”.¹⁰ When the salience of an object or kind increases, associating it with an object or kind will be easier.

Different types of phrasal implicatures require association sequences which have different types of constituents. As I will argue in detail later, in interpreting metaphors and slurs, the constituents of association sequences are always descriptive features of the object or kind they are attached to. However, in the interpretation of other types of phrasal implicatures, non-descriptive constituents in association sequences can be needed. For example, when a phrase’s referent is considered unexpected¹¹, alternative referents can be parts of the association sequence of that unexpected referent. Scalar implicatures or loose talk can illustrate this idea. In a certain utterance context, the association sequence of a number n can contain other relevant alternatives such as *at least* n , *exactly* n , *at most* n . By the same token, in a certain utterance context, *round* can be attached to an association sequence in which roundnesses at different precision levels occur. Metonymy can be a further example for non-descriptive association sequences. In a certain context, when a referent is considered unexpected, a related but different referent can be accessed in the association sequence. For instance, in the famous “The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20” example¹², it can be said that a person is associated with *ham sandwich* and it enables us to speak of that person indirectly. Since my main aim in this thesis is to develop a theory of metaphors and slurs, in the rest of this thesis mostly the descriptive type of associations will be relevant. Thus, I will leave aside other types of phrasal implicatures and focus on phrasal implicatures in which descriptive associations play a part, and unless otherwise stated, by “association sequence” I will mean descriptive associations (i.e. associated features).

When a phrase meaning is accessed in a context and a linguistic environment, new elements might be added to the relevant association sequence or the order of the elements in it might change due to the change in salience. I suggest that in order to calculate the phrasal implicature, a hearer accesses the most salient association attached to the particular or kind the phrase designates, and then he continues accessing other elements in the association sequence until he thinks the unexpectedness is eliminated. Some of the elements in an association sequence can be called “stereotypical”, since they are shared by most of the competent speakers of a given language. On the other hand, there are also associations which are not commonly

¹⁰See Giora (2003).

¹¹I think one can plausibly claim that there are different types of unexpectedness. I will say more on unexpectedness in Section 4.1.1.

¹²See Nunberg (1979, p.149).

shared. For instance, someone might associate a particular colour with the kind *car* because his car is of that colour. This type of association might be called “individual” or “idiosyncratic”. The success of communication via phrasal implicatures depends on the conveyability of the elements in an association sequence. Hence, we can claim that for the communication of a phrasal implicature, an element’s being attached to the same particular or kind by the conversational participants is a necessary condition.

Salience is a psychological notion and the selection of salient associations in the calculation of phrasal implicatures is an automatic process. However, this is not the whole story. As I said above, inferential reasoning comes after this automatic process. The hearer infers the speaker’s intended phrasal meaning among these salient associations, and this inferential reasoning, I believe, is governed by Gricean principles. In Chapter 3, I will suggest some changes to adapt these principles to phrasal reasoning.

Let us see how John’s answer in the above example could generate phrasal implicatures. Mary is interpreting John’s utterance “I am French”. When she determines the meaning of the phrase “French”, she might find this phrase unexpected in a response to her question in the context of the talk exchange. This unexpectedness triggers her search for alternative meanings that can repair this unexpectedness. She accesses her association sequence of *French*. In the context of the talk exchange one of the most (if not *the* most) salient associations should be *good at cooking*. This association repairs the unexpectedness of the meaning of the phrase “French”. In the end, Mary obtains the sentence meaning *John is French*, and the implicated meaning *John is good at cooking*, which is the original sentence meaning where the trigger is replaced by the phrasal implicature, at the same stage of the interpretation. Then she draws a small inference and arrives at a clausal implicature *John can cook* as an answer to her question.

Why is this distinction important? The classical Gricean framework can be seen as a constitutive or a psychological explanation. In other words, the same framework can serve at two different levels: A constitutive level explanation concerns the question “What makes a certain meaning φ derivable?”, whereas a psychological explanation concerns the question “What does conversational participants do in order to derive φ ?” As we will see later, these two explanations might diverge. I will argue that clausal approach faces problems in either level. As for the problems at the constitutive level I will mostly focus on certain metaphorical clauses which do not seem explainable by a clausal approach. I will present these cases in Section 2.2. My suggestion for these problematic cases is that we need a phrasal approach.

As for the constitutive analysis of inferential communication, clausal implicature is a theoretical tool of great explanatory power. It enables a nice explanation of the different types of speaker meaning. However, as many theorists have pointed out, it is hard to claim that the Gricean framework works similarly well at the psychological level. The worry concerns the correspondence of this explanation to the psychological reality of inferential communication. Borg presents this worry in the following passage:

The first point to notice is that it [the Gricean account] obviously doesn't fit with first personal psychological content, for we often arrive at attributions of speaker meaning without consciously entertaining sentence meaning and then engaging in the kind of extended inferential reasoning Grice suggests. (...) we sometimes seem to be in a position to grasp pragmatically enriched speaker meaning *before* we are in a position to grasp literal sentence meaning. (Borg 2012, p.57)

Borg mentions three cases: sub-sentential assertion, metaphor comprehension, and scalar implicatures. If sub-sentential assertion is possible, or metaphorical and scalar implicatures are calculated before the calculation of the clausal meaning as a whole, it can be claimed that the clausal approach lacks the resources to explain the psychological reality of inferential communication. Note that this objection considers the clausal approach as a psychological explanation; it does not concern the approach as a constitutive theory. Thus, considering the psychology of communicative reasoning, this objection seems to favour the idea that a subsentential level of pragmatic process is needed.

For different cases, Recanati raises the same objection. Enrichment, loosening and meaning transfer, which are explained as forms of implicatures in the Gricean framework, are not experienced as inferential communication by ordinary speakers and hearers. So, the classical Gricean account, in his view, differs from our phenomenology of speech. He gives the following three sentences to exemplify these cases respectively:

- (2) Mary took out her key and opened the door.
- (3) The ATM swallowed my credit card.
- (4) The ham sandwich left without paying.

A normal hearer understands (2) as Mary opened the door with the key she took out. Thus, the meaning *opened the door* is enriched and becomes *opened the door*

with the key. In (3), the application of the term “swallowed” is loosened so that it is applicable to an ATM and a credit card. Finally, in (4), *the ham sandwich orderer* has replaced the expressed meaning *the ham sandwich*. Thus, in all these cases, although pragmatics intrude into the composition of clause meaning, these meaning extensions/changes are unconscious (in the sense that they are experienced as non-inferential), and hearers consider these meaning extensions/changes to be parts of utterance meaning (or what-is-said) (Recanati 2003b, p.23-7). Recanati’s “availability principle” formulates this intuition: “What is said must be intuitively accessible to the conversational participants (unless something goes wrong and they do not count as ‘normal interpreters’)” (Recanati 2003b, p.20). The argument goes as follows: If the conversational participants do consider the extended/changed propositions expressed by (2)-(4) to be what-is-said, then these propositions cannot be implicatures. Therefore, Gricean reasoning cannot explain this type of pragmatic reasoning.

Similar remarks can be made regarding the cases Borg mentions above (i.e. cases of sub-sentential assertion, metaphor comprehension, and scalar implicatures). Thus, it seems that the classical Gricean framework, which is based on only clausal implicatures, faces some substantial problems, which suggests the need for phrasal implicature as a theoretical tool. How is phrasal implicature helpful in dealing with these problems? As presented above, in this alternative approach, many implicatures can be calculated online in the sense that their calculation is parallel to the calculation of the clausal meaning. So, unlike clausal implicatures, phrasal implicatures do not require the meaning of the clause to be calculated first. That explains how an implicature based approach is possible for the cases Borg mentions. They can be explained in the Gricean framework, but as phrasal implicatures.

Recanati’s worries can also be rebutted in the same way. I agree with Recanati that in certain cases, there is a tension between normal speakers’ intuitions and the Gricean implicature account. But I disagree with his diagnosis. The contrast is not between inferential and non-inferential pragmatic processes, but rather between clausal and phrasal implicatures. Conversational participants do not experience phrasal implicatures as inferential because they are calculated in parallel to the interpretation of sentence. For the same reason conversational participants are more inclined to report phrasal implicatures as parts of literal meaning of the clause. However, this does not mean that the calculation of phrasal implicatures is not an inferential process. Although the hearers do not explicitly experience the inference all the time, it is hard to explain the cases Borg and Recanati mention as non-inferential interpretation. Of course, the demand of inferential reasoning is a matter

of degree. Metaphorical reasoning, for instance, typically requires more inferential reasoning than some cases such as the “ham sandwich” example above.

Note that I do not want to predict that certain types of implicatures are clausal and others are phrasal. I think this depends on the context. With sufficient background information many implicatures can be calculated at the phrase level. Recanati mentions (1) as a typical case of clausal implicature, but I do not want to make such categorical claims. As shown above, it is possible to process the implicature in this example at the phrase level. As for the constitutive level of explanation, however, it is easier to characterize phrasal implicatures. As I said above, if a proper part of a clause is replaced by a new implied meaning in the content of the utterance, we can characterize the implicature as phrasal.¹³

1.2 Metaphorical Meaning is a Form of Phrasal Implicature

My second thesis is that metaphorical meaning is a typical example of phrasal implicature. Again, I should emphasize that an implicature’s interpretation level depends on the context. But in light of psycholinguistic data, I believe it is legitimate to say that most and typical metaphors not only *can* be but also *are* interpreted as phrasal implicatures.

What makes metaphor a typical example of phrasal implicature? I think the answer to this question is the high degree of unexpectedness. Most (but not all) metaphors are perceived as highly unexpected in their given contexts. For instance, imagine an employee says “I am not a computer” to her boss. Since *computer* is not easily predicable to a person, this unexpectedness triggers the generation of phrasal implicatures. There might be other reasons for the triggering of implicatures. For example, one expects metaphorical language when one reads poetry. (I will say more on triggering later.) After the triggering, the rest of the metaphorical interpretation process is not different from the phrasal implicature calculation generally formulated above.

My account assumes normal speaker interpretation. What I mean by “normal speaker” might be clearer if I give examples of non-normal speakers. A non-native

¹³Although there are similarities between mine and Recanati’s views, as it will be clear later, the two views are essentially different. Recanati claims that subsentential pragmatic processes are automatic and non-inferential. For this reason, he believes, a Gricean explanation is not possible for this type of process. On the other hand, I argue that these processes are inferential (except overused and automatised cases), and Gricean framework (with some small revisions) has resources to explain them. I will turn to this in Section 3.2.1.

speaker, a child, or an adult who suffers from autism disorder are cases in point. These speakers might not interpret metaphors at the phrase level while normal speakers can do so. Thus, in particular cases not only contextual factors, but also the interpreter's ability comes into the picture.

My discussion of metaphor in this thesis is centred around three widespread claims in the literature on metaphor:

- (1) Despite initial appearances, the interpretation of metaphorical utterances¹⁴ differs from the typical Gricean implicatures in certain respects. (metaphor-implicature contrast claim)
- (2) At least some metaphorical utterances are processed (interpreted) as quickly as literal utterances. (one-step process claim)
- (3) However, we can still distinguish the contribution of the metaphorically interpreted words/phrases to the metaphorical meaning from their conventional meanings. (the claim that metaphorical meaning is implicated)

This thesis develops a view of metaphor that is designed to accommodate these three claims. I will suggest that if we can extend the traditional Gricean implicature model for utterances (clauses) to words/phrases and explain metaphors in this extended model, we will have a satisfactory pragmatic theory of metaphor.

It is not clear in Grice's writings whether he accepts subsentential implicatures, but most Grice scholars agree that an implicature requires a proposition to implicate.¹⁵ Although some philosophers have already suggested extending the Gricean framework to subsententials, which I will discuss later, their suggestion was confined to certain types of implicatures, such as scalar implicatures. No one, to my knowledge, has proposed a general theoretical tool for phrasal implicatures as I will do in this thesis. This tool allows us to explain certain phenomena which the Gricean framework is usually considered unable to explain.

1.3 Slurring Generates Phrasal Implicatures

Finally, let me briefly explain the third main idea of this thesis. I will argue that there is a striking similarity between metaphorical speaking and slurring. Indeed

¹⁴Here is some more terminology: I use "utterance" in one classical sense of the term, that is "a sentence paired with a context" (Levinson 1983, p.19). What I mean by "metaphorical utterance" is a sentence which is interpreted metaphorically by the conversational participants in a given context. This means it has literal+metaphorical meanings. "Literal utterance", on the other hand, means a sentence which is not interpreted metaphorically by the conversational participants in a given context.

¹⁵For example see Levinson (1983) and Recanati (2003a).

they exemplify the same linguistic mechanism of phrasal implicature. In a typical use of a slur s for derogation, a speaker uses s with the intention of attributing to her target certain negative features that she associates with the group s refers to. The mechanism of the attribution is phrasal implicature as described above; in other words, the negative features of slurs are not encoded as semantic content of the word, but implicated by the speaker. I will argue that the phrasal implicature approach to slurs enables us to explain different features and uses of slurs in a theoretically and intuitively attractive way.

In the following chapter, I will discuss in detail the three claims about metaphor that are mentioned above. In Chapter 3 and 4, I will develop phrasal implicature as a theoretical tool and present my theory of metaphor. I will also show how this theory is compatible with the claims mentioned above. In Chapter 5, in light of the previous discussions on phrasal implicatures and metaphors, I will propose a new conception of what-is-said. The comparison of the theory with three other pragmatic theories will be the subject of Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, I will discuss slurring and argue for a phrasal implicature theory of slurs.

Chapter 2

Common Claims about Metaphor

This chapter will examine three of the widely discussed claims made in the literature about metaphor. Since Grice's theories of implicature and metaphor are pertinent to these claims, I will first sketch out the Gricean view.

2.1 Grice on Metaphor

Grice suggests the following necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an utterer¹ to mean something:

「By uttering x , U meant that p 」 is true if and only if for some audience A , U uttered x intending:

- (a) A to believe that p ,
- (b) A to recognize that U intends (a), and
- (c) A 's recognition that U intends (a) to function, in part, as a reason for (a).²

Grice considers meaning a matter of the utterer's intention, which is comprised of a first-order intention of making the audience believe in a certain thought and a second-order intention which aims to make the audience recognize that the utterer has such a first-order intention.

Grice suggests a detailed analysis of utterance meaning, but for the purpose of this section I will assume that utterance meaning only consists of *what-is-said* and *what-is-implicated*.³ According to Grice, the notion of what-is-said corresponds

¹I will use "utterer" and "speaker" interchangeably.

²This formulation is originally due to Grice (1989, p.105) but I used a reformulation given by Neale (1992, pp.544-5).

³For a discussion of the details of Grice's analysis see Neale (1992, pp.523-4).

to the conventional meaning of words in that utterance. In addition to this, for “full identification” of what-is-said, disambiguation of the ambiguous expressions, reference assignment to the indexicals, and time of the utterance are required as well (Grice 1989, p.25).

Bach (1994, p.142) proposes that Grice’s notion of what-is-said corresponds to *structured propositions*. He refers to the passage where Grice says “*S* means ‘*p*’ in virtue of the particular meanings of the elements of *S*, their order, and their syntactical character” (Grice 1989, p.87). I accept Bach’s point. What Grice has in mind seems to be something in the same vein as structured propositions. The structured proposition view is a position about the nature of propositions. This view argues that propositions are complex entities which have constituents, and the constituents are bound in a certain syntax-like form (King 2016). I will henceforth assume that Gricean notion of what-is-said is structured in this sense.

As stated above, Grice associated the utterer’s meaning with the utterer’s intentions and, in addition, this idea holds for parts of the utterer’s meaning. In terms of the notion of what-is-said this means that an utterer cannot say something unintentionally. In situations where the utterer’s intended meaning diverges from the meaning of her utterance, Grice proposes the explanation that she does not say anything but she makes “as if to say” something (Grice 1989, p.30). This idea will be important in our later discussion of metaphor. Irony and metaphor typically exemplify this situation, but slips of the tongue and misused expressions should also be analysed similarly (Neale 1992, p.523).

The second constituent of a speaker’s total meaning is what-is-implicated, or the *implicature*. Implicature can be defined as “a set of non-logical inferences which contains conveyed messages which are meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense” (Huang 2007, p.27). Grice argued that implicature⁴ production is governed by the *Cooperative Principle*

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1989, p.26)

and four categories of maxims which work in accordance with it: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner.

⁴Unless otherwise stated I use the term “implicature” to mean only conversational implicature. There is also conventional implicature, which is generated by words such as “but”, “still” and “too”. For example, in the sentence “She was poor but she was honest”, the word “but” generates an implication that there is a contrast between being poor and being honest. Conventional implicature is not a part of what is said, because it does not contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance, but it is also not cancellable like conversational implicature (Grice 1989, p.88; Neale 1992, pp.521-2; Huang 2007, p.55). I discuss the cancellability feature of conversational implicatures below.

- (i) Quantity
 - (a) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
 - (b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- (ii) Quality (Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.)
 - (a) Do not say what you believe to be false.
 - (b) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- (iii) Relation⁵
 - (a) Be relevant.
- (iv) Manner (Supermaxim: Be perspicuous.)
 - (a) Avoid obscurity of expression.
 - (b) Avoid ambiguity.
 - (c) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
 - (d) Be orderly. (Grice 1989, pp.26-7)

Two points should be made about the list. First, Grice acknowledges that new items might be added to the list (Grice 1989, p.26), so he doesn't see it as a complete list. Secondly, as Bach points out, these maxims are neither sociological generalizations on communication nor normative principles of successful communication; rather, they are presumptions shared by participants of a conversation (Bach 2006, p.24).

The Cooperative Principle, in the Gricean framework, is always observed by speakers who want to convey a thought (except in situations such as lying and misleading). By contrast, it is possible to convey a thought either by observing or flouting maxims. But note that there are two levels of meaning according to Grice (what-is-said (or what-is-as-if-said) and what-is-implicated), and the observation of maxims can happen in either of them. In other words, if a cooperative speaker does not observe the maxims at the what-is-said level, it is presumed that she is observing them at the what-is-implicated level. It can be said that the Cooperative Principle connects the two levels of interpretation. If the speaker is cooperative, her utterance can meet the maxims at either level.⁶ The following talk exchange exemplifies these points:

⁵This maxim is commonly referred to as "maxim of Relevance" in the literature.

⁶Levinson (1983, pp.102-3) also mentions this point.

(1) Mary: Would you like to have some spaghetti bolognese?

John: I am vegetarian.

In this talk exchange, what John said is not a response to Mary's question; his response openly violates the maxim of Relevance and the maxim of Quantity (since he could have been more informative). Nevertheless, Mary has no reason to think that John is non-cooperative. Thus, John must be observing the maxims at another level. Mary considers the connection between John's utterance and the expected answer, and after a few inferences, in which *Vegeterians do not eat meat* and *Bolognese is a meat-based sauce* might feature as premises, she concludes that John does not want to have spaghetti bolognese.⁷

Grice's original definition of conversational implicature, which will be useful in our later discussion, is given in terms of the conversational maxims and the Cooperative Principle:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q , may be said to have conversationally implicated that q , provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in *those* terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989, pp.30-1)

A diagrammatic depiction of Grice's theory of meaning is shown in Figure 2.1. Although Grice does not explicitly use the labels "semantics" and "pragmatics" for the two linguistic systems he describes, I believe these labels suit them well. Semantics, then, takes a disambiguated sentence and the referents of context-sensitive terms as inputs, and generates what-is-said (or what-is-as-if-said). On the other hand, pragmatics takes what-is-said (or what-is-as-if-said) and the general contextual information as inputs and calculates what-is-implicated by virtue of certain inferences.

To repeat, in Grice's view, the conventional meaning of words (or phrases) composes what-is-said, and what-is-said (with the general contextual information) determines what-is-implicated. One problem that arises in this picture concerns the role of co-referring phrases in what-is-said. Grice is aware of this problem. He

⁷For more on this, see Levinson (1983, pp.102-3).



Figure 2.1: Grice’s conception of sentence interpretation

mentions the question of whether someone, who knows that Harold Wilson is the British Prime Minister (in 1967) says the same thing by uttering “Harold Wilson is a great man” and “The British Prime Minister is a great man” (Grice 1989, p.25). Similarly, does one’s uttering “The prime minister died” and “The prime minister passed away” in the same circumstance say the same thing? In general, the question is what happens when one can utter two different sentences that more or less mean the same thing in the same context. In this kind of case, Grice seems to think that changes in wording do not change what-is-said but that they can still affect the generation of implicatures based on the maxims of Manner. His view on this problem will be apparent in the discussion of the features of implicatures below. But before that note how the maxims of Manner damage the neatness of the schema depicted in Figure 2.1. Thus, in the Gricean picture, what determines what-is-implicated is not only what-is-said (with the general contextual information) but also how what-is-said is formulated. I will return to this issue again, and dedicate a chapter to what-is-said and the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

2.1.1 The Features of Conversational Implicatures

Grice points out five features of conversational implicatures. The first feature is *cancellability*. There are two forms of cancellation: One is the speaker’s adding a clause to eliminate an implicature. For instance if someone is asked where the elevator is, and she answers this by saying “It is near the men’s room, but I don’t know if it’s working” the added clause after “but” cancels the implicature to the effect that the elevator is functional (at least to the speaker’s knowledge). Another form is the implicit elimination of implicatures by a context: “(...) if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out” (Grice 1989, p.39). If a student says “I will meet with my supervisor”, in a normal context her audience will infer that she has a supervision meeting. However, in a scenario in which a student is waiting for her supervisor in front of a football stadium, her saying the same sentence does not imply a supervision meeting, but rather perhaps implicates that the student and the supervisor will watch a football game together.

The second feature of conversational implicatures is *non-detachability*. Grice puts it in the following way:

Insofar as the calculation that a particular conversational implicature is present requires, besides contextual and background information, only a knowledge of what has been said (or of the conventional commitment of the utterance), and insofar as the manner of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of Manner). (Grice 1989, p.39)

So, a conversational implicature which is not determined by the maxims of Manner cannot be dismissed by changing the wording while saying more or less the same thing, because “the implicature is attached to the semantic content of what is said, not to linguistic form” (Levinson 1983, p.116). For instance, suppose Mary asks John if Jane is coming to the party and in one scenario he says “I invited her” and in another “I asked her to come”. Although the wording is different, both utterances implicate that Jane is likely to come to the party.

The third feature is *non-conventionality*. Since in order to determine the conversational implicature, one first needs to know the conventional meaning of the expression, implicature cannot be a part of the conventional meaning of the expression. Grice puts it in the following way:

(...) since the calculation of the presence of a conversational implicature presupposes an initial knowledge of the conventional force of the expression the utterance of which carries the implicature, a conversational implicature will be a condition that is not included in the original specification of the expression’s conventional force. Though it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicature to become conventionalized, to suppose that this is so in a given case would require special justification. So, initially at least, conversational implicatures are not part of the meaning of the expressions to the employment of which they attach. (Grice 1989, p.39)

The fourth and fifth features are about the implicature’s being carried not by what-is-said alone but by what-is-said in a context and the possibility of indeterminacy (Grice 1989, pp.39-40).

The first three features will be important in the following chapters, because they provide implicature tests. In other words, in order to determine if a certain pragmatic phenomenon is a conversational implicature we can test if it is cancellable, non-detachable and non-conventional.

2.1.2 Flouting the Maxims: Metaphor and Irony

A speaker in a conversation may not fulfil a maxim for various reasons. Grice counts four:

- (a) She may want to deceive her audience and for this reason *violate* a maxim on purpose.
- (b) She may be in a position where she cannot cooperate with her audience, and therefore she *opts out* from a conversation.
- (c) A *clash* between two maxims may prevent her from fulfilling them at the same time.
- (d) She may blatantly *flout* a maxim, presuming her audience will notice this violation and draw an inference on why she does not fulfil the maxim, which gives rise to a *conversational implicature* (that is, the meaning the speaker implicated). (Grice 1989, p.30)

There is a difference between the third and fourth cases and the first two. In the first two cases, the Cooperative Principle is not observed. Although it is observed in the third case, the speaker is not in a position to comply with two or more maxims at the same time. A typical example is a situation in which a speaker cannot be informative enough for her audience due to her lack of knowledge about the question under discussion. So, in this case, the communication could be said to be successful but the outcome does not seem satisfactory for the conversational participants. The fourth case, on the other hand, is more interesting for the purpose of this thesis; here, the speaker either does not say anything but rather makes “as if to say” something, or she says something irrelevant to signal the implicature as it is the case in Grice’s famous reference letter example. However, according to Grice, cooperation still continues at the what-is-implicated level (Grice 1989, p.86; Neale 1992, p.26; Huang 2007, p.29). Irony and metaphor, in which the first maxim of Quality is flouted⁸, are typical examples of this fourth case.

⁸He categorizes meiosis and hyperbole also under the title of “Examples in which the first maxim of Quality [Do not say what you believe to be false.] is flouted” (Grice 1989, p.34).

Irony. X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says *X is a fine friend*. (Gloss: It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that what A has said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A knows that this is obvious to the audience. So, unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.)

Metaphor. Examples like *You are the cream in my coffee* characteristically involve categorial falsity, so the contradictory of what the speaker has made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a truism; so it cannot be *that* that such a speaker is trying to get across. The most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance. (Grice 1989, p.34)

One point which will be relevant to the later discussion is that Grice's conception of metaphorical interpretation, as other forms of implicature in his view, requires two distinct stages. In the first stage the literal meaning of the sentence, which is called what-is-as-if-said by Grice, is determined, and in the next stage the implicature or the metaphorical meaning is calculated. The order between the stages can be thought of as either logical or psychological. It depends on the aim of the explanation, as will be discussed in Section 2.3. The following diagram shows these stages:




Figure 2.2: Grice's construal of metaphor interpretation

Grice's characterization of irony and metaphor in the quoted passage above seems very strict. We can easily find counterexamples. For irony, Grice claims that the whole point for the utterer is to convey the opposite of what her utterance means. The utterance meaning is, as usual, the conventional meaning of the utterance. (Recall that in irony, the utterer does not say anything but she makes "as if to say" something. Thus, the utterer's meaning is only composed of the implicature she produces.) However, this might not be the case in certain situations. For example, suppose I am watching a film in the cinema with a friend and someone is talking at

the back of the cinema, and I say ironically “She has a lovely voice”. In this case the contradictory of my utterance will be “She does not have a lovely voice”, but this is not the thought I want to communicate. She might actually have a lovely voice but while I am watching a film it disturbs me regardless of its being lovely or not; so the thought I want to communicate should be “Her voice is disturbing me”.

As regards Grice’s characterization of metaphor we may distinguish three claims in the quotation above:

- (a) Metaphorical utterances contain obvious category mistakes.
- (b) When we negate a metaphorical utterance we obtain a trivially true utterance. Thus, unlike irony, negating a metaphorical utterance does not give us the pragmatic interpretation of the utterance.
- (c) If the utterance in question is an obvious category mistake and negation does not give a plausible pragmatic interpretation of the utterance, then it means that the audience will draw the inference that the speaker is pointing out a resemblance.

Again, due to Grice’s strict formulation, complications arise. The main problem is that the claim (a) does not hold for all metaphorical utterances. There are true metaphorical utterances which are usually exemplified by the following sentences in the literature:

- (2) Jesus is a carpenter.
- (3) Revolution is not a dinner party. (Mao Zedong)
- (4) I am not a computer.

These sentences are obviously metaphorical but in no way are they categorical mistakes.⁹ Thus, Grice’s claim (a) is mistaken. Claim (b) is also problematic. We cannot say in general that “the contradictory of what the speaker has made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a truism” since as the examples above show there are metaphorical utterances which do not make as if to say something false. More importantly they are strictly speaking true, and their negations are strictly speaking false. Even Grice’s own example, when it is negated, could be used metaphorically.

⁹Whether example (4) is a category mistake seems to be a controversial issue in the relevant literature. From the quotation about metaphor, we can see that according to Grice, the negation of a category mistake (or “a categorial falsity” in his terms) is a truism, therefore meaningful (Thanks to Caroline Touborg for pointing this out to me.). However, it is also possible to argue that if a sentence is a category mistake, its negation is also one. See, Magidor (2013) on these discussions. Nevertheless, the first two examples above, at least, are sufficient to make the point.

We can imagine that in an argument between a couple, one of them says “You’re not the cream in my coffee” to the other one and expresses the thought that they do not get along. Since this utterance is metaphorical but its contradictory is not a truism, claim (b) should be rejected as well. If claims (a) and (b) are false, the above formulation does not give the correct requirements for metaphoricity.¹⁰

As regards claim (c), Grice’s considering metaphorical utterances to be resemblance claims is also problematic. If a typical resemblance claim has the form of $\ulcorner a \text{ is like } F \urcorner$, then, for instance, what Romeo implicates by his famous utterance should be *Juliet is like the sun*. However, this claim seems different from what is intended. Romeo does not seem to invite his audience to make a comparison between Juliet and the sun, nor does he express any other relation between them. Rather he seems to assert something about Juliet, and predicates some features of her. One point that supports this view is the difference between ordinary, literal resemblance claims and these suggested metaphorical interpretations in the $\ulcorner a \text{ is like } F \urcorner$ form: the former are symmetrical, but the latter are not. For example, consider the following sentences:

- (5) London is like Paris.
- (6) Paris is like London.
- (7) Sydney Carton is like an amazingly good jackal.¹¹
- (8) An amazingly good jackal is like Sydney Carton.

While reversing (5) as (6) does not make much difference in terms of meaning, reversing (7) as (8) clearly does. Indeed, (8) sounds very bizarre as a comparison statement. This suggests that metaphorical utterances are not analysable as resemblance claims. Their predicative nature makes them asymmetrical.¹²

These problems do not provide conclusive reasons for rejecting Gricean account totally, because it is possible to reformulate it so as to avoid them. For instance, both for irony and metaphor, it can be suggested that these utterances either flout the maxim of Quality or the maxim of Relation. The idea of resemblance could also be elaborated so as to avoid the asymmetry problem.¹³ However, there are

¹⁰However, this might not be Grice’s aim. He might have wanted to give a general characterization of metaphoricity which seems to work for most metaphors. Leezenberg claims that Grice is aware of this problem, and for this reason he added “characteristically” in the quoted passage above (Leezenberg 2001, p.104).

¹¹This metaphor is from Dickens’s *A Tale of Two Cities*.

¹²For further discussion of the asymmetry of metaphorical utterances and defence of a more sophisticated simile theory, see Fogelin (2011), and for other problems related to resemblance based metaphor theories, see Davidson (1978).

¹³Indeed, Fogelin (2011) develops such an account.

some more fundamental problems which are claimed, in the literature, to stem from the difference in nature between the calculation of implicatures and metaphorical interpretation. I will next discuss these problems.

2.2 Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim

In Grice's definition of conversational implicature above, we see that only a proposition that is said (or as if said) can implicate another proposition. This requirement is often interpreted as the implicating proposition's being asserted (or as if asserted in "as if said" cases).¹⁴ For interpreting unembedded simple declarative sentences that are metaphorical, a conversational implicature explanation seems to be straightforwardly available. However, when a metaphorical sentence is embedded or occurs in a different grammatical mood such as interrogative, conditional or imperative, the difficulty of the conversational implicature explanation can be seen:

(9) John is a wolf

(10) Is John a wolf?

(11) Perhaps John is a wolf.

(12) If John is a wolf, his wife has good reason to be so afraid of him.

(13) Peter said that John is a wolf. (Leezenberg 2001, p.116)

Unlike (9), in (10), (11), (12) and (13) *John is a wolf* is not asserted (or as if asserted). Intuitively metaphorical meaning remains the same in all these examples, but the classical Gricean definition of conversational implicature is able to explain only the first one.

Wearing (2006) discusses the same problem in terms of belief attribution and disjunctive sentences:

(...) metaphorical interpretations, unlike typical conversational implicatures, can be embedded within the scope of logical and propositional attitude operators. For example, Mercutio might report to a friend, 'Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun', and it's pretty clear that he is not attributing to Romeo the belief that Juliet is identical to a celestial body. Similarly, suppose we know that an intellectually lazy student has been presented with a counterexample to his pet idea. In discussing his

¹⁴See Leezenberg (2001), Recanati (2003a) and Wearing (2006) for some examples of this interpretation.

projected reaction, I might say ‘He’ll shy away from confronting the idea or I’m a six-toed sloth’. Intuitively, my claim seems true. But its second disjunct is clearly false, and its first is a metaphor, so also literally false. It is only by interpreting the first disjunct metaphorically that the utterance could be true. The problem for the Gricean account is that conversational implicatures are implicated by what is said (i.e. by what is asserted). But embedded clauses and disjuncts are not independently asserted; only the sentences of which they are parts are asserted. So the metaphorical interpretation of an embedded metaphor is implicated by something that is not asserted, which is contrary to the very definition of a conversational implicature. (Wearing 2006, p.312-3)

Wearing makes two points in this quote. First, she seems to claim that embeddability distinguishes metaphors from typical implicatures. I disagree with this. A wide range of non-metaphorical implicatures are also embeddable. Consider the following talk exchange:

- (14) Mary: Why don’t you ask Linda out?
 John: She doesn’t like me.

Suppose in a similar context Mary reports John’s answer as “John believes that Linda doesn’t like him.” Here, belief of the implicatures generated by John’s utterance are also attributed to him (unless it is cancelled by the intonation of the utterance) since the embedded sentence is still able to implicate what it implicates in the original dialogue. For instance, if what is implicated by John’s utterance is the conditional claim *if John asks Linda out, she would say “no”*, it is still implicated when his sentence is embedded. Thus, embeddability does not distinguish metaphors from implicatures. However, Wearing’s second point poses a serious problem for Grice’s view on metaphor and his general theory of implicature. If only asserted parts of a sentence can generate implicatures and embedded clauses are not asserted, how can embedded clauses carry implicatures in the way exemplified above? Several theorists have suggested different types of fixes for this problem.¹⁵ This question and the suggested fixes will be discussed in detail. For the time being I should emphasize that embeddability is a general problem for the Gricean framework, but any metaphor theory which calls itself “Gricean” should also deal with this general problem.

Another difference between implicatures and metaphors is that the grammatical mood (e.g. imperative, indicative or subjunctive) of a metaphorical utterance is the

¹⁵For instance, see Chierchia (2004) and Simons (2010).

same as its interpretation but this is not always the case for implicatures (Camp 2003, p.209). For example, the indicative sentence “The gun is loaded” can be used to imply an imperative, such as “Don’t come any closer”. As I just mentioned, however this does not hold for all implicatures. Recall the “I am French” example above. There was no mood difference between this sentence and its implicature. The problem we should tackle is thus why some implicatures are metaphor-like but some others are not.

An objection to this claim can be raised¹⁶: There seem to be metaphorical statements whose grammatical mood is different from that of their interpretations. The following is a case in point:

(15) This gun is a snake, ready to bite.

A natural interpretation of this declarative sentence will be a warning (in a different grammatical mood) like:

(16) Don’t come any closer.

Hence, if (16) is the metaphorical interpretation of (15), this would amount to a counterexample to our claim. However, a closer analysis will show that there is another interpretive stage between (15) and (16). The output of this stage will be more or less equivalent to *this gun is dangerous, ready to shoot*. This is the metaphorical interpretation derived from the original utterance and it is also in the declarative mood. Thus, (15) is not a counterexample to the generalization that utterances and their metaphorical interpretations are in the same mood. The complexity in this example arises from the chain of reasoning which contains three elements: (i) The original sentence (declarative), (ii) its metaphorical interpretation (declarative) and (iii) the warning (imperative). In this chain of reasoning, the metaphorical interpretation is the element which implies the warning. Notice that a metaphorical interpretation is not itself metaphorical, but literal. Hence, there is nothing against our generalization in this example.

Related to the issue in example (15), many theorists have observed that in utterances which involve both a metaphor and an indirect speech act (such as irony), the interpretation of metaphor precedes that of the indirect speech act.¹⁷ Bezuidenhout (2001) discusses the following examples:

¹⁶Derek Ball raised this objection.

¹⁷Grice is among these theorists:

It is possible to combine metaphor and irony by imposing on the hearer two stages of interpretation. I say *You are the cream in my coffee*, intending the hearer to reach first the metaphor interpretant “You are my pride and joy” and then the irony interpretant “You are my bane.” (Grice 1989, p.34)

(17) Our piglet is getting dirty.

(18) She's the Taj Mahal.

Imagine two contexts: in the first, by uttering (17), a father is asking his partner to prevent their kid being dirty, and in the second a man utters (18), which is both metaphorical and ironical, to mean that the woman in question is not attractive. Bezuidenhout claims that in these types of utterances, there is an order of interpretation: metaphorical interpretation always comes first, and it serves as a “springboard” for further pragmatic processes. For instance in (17), the metaphorical expression “piglet” has to be interpreted before finding out what the father asks for. Similarly, in (18), the metaphorical interpretation, which can be *she's beautiful and attractive*, should be made before grasping the irony (Bezuidenhout 2001, pp.161-4). Stern (2000) makes a similar point. He classifies figures of speech metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy as M-figures and irony, meiosis, hyperbole, understatement, and overstatement as I-figures. He then arrives at the following conclusion: “(...) that whenever we have complex figurative interpretations, all M-figures are interpreted prior to I-figures, that the latter are conditioned on the former. There are ironic/hyperbolic, etc., interpretations or uses of metaphors/similes, synecdoches, etc., but no metaphorical/similaic, synecdochic interpretations or uses of ironies/hyperboles, etc” (Stern 2000, p.237). We can now formulate the problem. I-figures and indirect speech acts are classical examples of implicatures. If there is an asymmetry in the order of interpretation in utterances which involve both a metaphor (or another M-figure) and a typical case of implicature, this might mean that metaphorical interpretation is not a form of implicature. If a theory of metaphor argues for an implicature account, it should explain this asymmetry.

Let me summarize the discussion so far. In the classical Gricean approach, only something *said* or *as if said* (in the technical Gricean sense) is able to generate conversational implicatures. Most theorists interpret his notion of saying as assertion. So, assertion (or as if assertion) of the sentence meaning is seen to be the requirement for conversational implicatures. However, as the examples above suggest, in embedded contexts metaphorical sentences could be interpreted metaphorically without their sentence meanings being asserted (or as if asserted). Some theorists consider this observation a reason to reject the conversational implicature approach to metaphor.¹⁸ This observation, however, is not restricted to metaphors; it is also true for other implicatures. So, the problem is general and should be dealt with

¹⁸For instance, see Leezenberg (2001, pp.114-8).

in generality. Some other theorists have tried to fix this problem (although their approaches focus on non-metaphorical implicatures) by loosening the assertion condition and in this way applying the Gricean reasoning to embedded clauses. I will discuss these attempts in the next chapter. Secondly, we have discussed an observation that the mood of the sentence that expresses a metaphorical interpretation is never different than that of the original utterance that gives rise to the metaphorical interpretation. Thirdly, an observation about complex figurative interpretations was discussed. According to this, metaphorical interpretation always precedes the interpretation irony and other indirect speech acts. These are the observations a theory of metaphor should be able to explain. For now, I will continue with two serious problems for the classical Gricean implicature approach to metaphor.

The first problem I will discuss concerns certain metaphor examples which, on the classical Gricean implicature approach, do not seem explainable. Consider these two utterances:

(19) Some surgeons are butchers.

(20) Some butchers are surgeons.

The propositions these two utterances express are logically equivalent: $(\exists x)(Sx \& Bx) = (\exists x)(Bx \& Sx)$. Thus, if one believes that what-is-said by an utterance can be seen as the truth-conditional content of it, one should conclude that what-is-said by (19) and (20) are the same. However, as stated above, according to Grice, what-is-said seems to amount to more than the truth-conditional content. As Bach (1994) suggests, what Grice had in mind for what-is-said can be formulated as structured propositions. The followings are the structured propositions expressed by (19) and (20):

(21) $\langle \text{SOME}, \langle \text{CONJ}, \langle \langle x \text{ is a surgeon} \rangle, \langle x \text{ is a butcher} \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle$

(22) $\langle \text{SOME}, \langle \text{CONJ}, \langle \langle x \text{ is a butcher} \rangle, \langle x \text{ is a surgeon} \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle$

where SOME is the property of being a non-empty set, and CONJ is the truth function for conjunction. Since commutativity of conjunction is a law of classical logic, it is hard to claim that these propositions are not the same. Hence, we should accept that (19) and (20) express the same structured proposition, therefore what-is-said by them is the same.

If the two utterances say the same thing and if what-is-said generates what-is-implicated in the Gricean framework, how can they generate something very different? Obviously, (19) states something bad about surgeons, whereas (20) states

something good about butchers. What makes us arrive at these different implicatures, if these two sentences “say” (or “as if say”) the same thing? It does not seem possible for the classical Gricean view to explain how these two sentences generate different implicatures. Manner implicatures are exceptional but I do not think the difference can be explained by manner. In these utterances, there seem to be no manner difference that can trigger different implicatures.

Another serious problem for the classical Gricean approach to metaphor is to explain how certain semantically anomalous sentences, which arguably do not express propositions, can give rise to metaphorical implicatures. For instance, category mistakes are usually considered to exemplify semantic anomaly. The mainstream view on category mistakes is that they are meaningless.¹⁹ For instance when one says “Number 2 is hungry”, in a normal context, the anomaly would be considered a category mistake. If the meaningless view is right and category mistakes do not express propositions, then a problem arises for Grice’s theory of metaphor: Most metaphorical sentences, as Grice pointed out himself above, are cross-categorical. So, if they do not express propositions, how is the metaphorical meaning, as a form of implicature, calculated? Inferences to implicatures require full propositions in Grice’s view.

An account of category mistakes, which has recently gained ground, could help the classical Gricean approach. According to this view, category mistakes are meaningful. For instance, Magidor (2013) argues that category assumptions are pragmatic presuppositions and a mismatch in presuppositions can cause an utterance’s being infelicitous, but this does not amount to meaninglessness. Thus, on this view, uttering “Number 2 is hungry” in a normal context is infelicitous because the category assumptions of “number 2”, such as “being abstract”, do not match with the category assumptions of “is hungry”, which needs a concrete and animate object as its argument, but the utterance is still meaningful. So, expressing a category mistake does not prevent a sentence from generating implicatures, and metaphors which are literally taken category mistakes can be explained by the classical implicature approach to metaphor. I wish to remain neutral about this view, but I should at least admit that there is a way for the classical Gricean approach to avoid the problem of explaining how category mistakes can be interpreted metaphorically.

There is, however, another case of metaphor, which seems to be a stronger candidate for semantic anomaly. Proper names are often used metaphorically. Consider the following:

¹⁹The defenders of this view includes Russell, Ryle, Strawson and Evans. For references see Camp (2004) and Magidor (2013).

(23) The socialist movement needs another Lenin.

The speaker means that socialism needs another person who has the features which are commonly associated with Lenin. But it is not easy to spell out the literal meaning of the sentence. How can another instance of a person exist? There seems to be a semantic problem here. “Another” as a lexical item should apply to a general term but here finds a singular term as its argument. Notice that this problem is different from the problem that concerns category mistakes. In the category mistake cases, a feature or a kind is predicated of an object which cannot be an argument of that feature or kind, whereas the problem here arises because an object is used in the predicate position.

One way to explain this is to posit a different meaning for the term in question; that is, a proper name in predicate position refers to a concept. This is what Frege (1951, p.175) did, but this approach seems inconsistent with Grice’s own principle of Modified Occam’s Razor: “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Grice 1989, p.47). In my opinion, if multiplying the senses of proper names is unwanted, then the only way is to accept that using a proper name metaphorically causes semantic anomaly of the sentence. However, this poses another serious problem for the classical Gricean approach to metaphor. If a sentence is semantically anomalous and does not express a complete proposition, it is not possible to explain the metaphorical meaning it generates by using the classical Gricean framework.²⁰

2.3 One-step Process Claim

The second claim about metaphors concerns processing times. Classical pragmatic approaches (Gricean or Searlian²¹) seem to require a two-step process for the calculation of the pragmatic meaning. Consider the following talk exchange:

(24) Mary: Let’s play basketball.

John: I have an appointment with my supervisor.

Here, John’s response does not directly answer Mary’s question. Thus, Mary has to infer from his answer that he cannot do two things at the same time, therefore he will not play basketball. Clearly, Mary’s interpretation involves two steps, the first

²⁰One might think that the view which argues that names are predicates (predicativism) might be a way to explain this kind of use. However, predicativists are not interested in metaphorical uses of names; their discussion is mostly about the literal uses of names in different sentential positions, as Burge (1973, p.429) acknowledges. For this discussion, see also Fara (2015). I will say more on the metaphorical uses of names in the subsequent chapters.

²¹See Searle (1993).

step is to entertain the proposition expressed by John's utterance and the second is to obtain the implied meaning.

A critical question arises: What is the nature of these pragmatic explanations? Two approaches can be distinguished: They can be interpreted as the constitutive reconstruction or modelling of human communication. Or they can be seen as descriptions of how speakers and hearers psychologically process utterances.

Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015, Section 3), in their illuminating discussion of the relationship between pragmatics and processing, call the two approaches mentioned above “what-approach” (or “why-approach”) and “how-approach” respectively. These two approaches seek for different levels of explanations: the so-called W-level and the so-called H-level. Geurts and Rubio-Fernández illustrate what they mean by these levels with the example of a cash register. On the W-level, a cash register carries out mathematical operations such as addition, subtraction and multiplication. An explanation at this level concerns elementary number theory and number-theoretic features of these operations. An H-level explanation, in contrast, concerns the internal processes and states of the machine. There might be different ways to represent numbers in the machine and implement algorithms that are used for the operations. Geurts and Rubio-Fernández emphasize that for addition, for example, the representation of the operation in the machine should be “sufficiently faithful to the laws of addition” (Geurts and Rubio-Fernández 2015, p.453). So, an addition algorithm at the H-level need not be concerned with all the features of the operation at the W-level, only “a sufficiently faithful relation” is needed. These two-levels “constrain but don't determine one another”. In regard to theories, Geurts and Rubio-Fernández observe that a theory might serve at both levels. For instance, a proof-theoretic theory of human reasoning might serve at both-levels, whereas a semantic theory arguably serves at the W-level only, since it is not easy to see how the psychology of reasoning can be understood in terms of entailment relations (Geurts and Rubio-Fernández 2015, pp.454-5).

This type of distinction can be made in various areas. For example, syntactic well-formedness judgements of the speakers of a language can be explained either by a mathematical model (W-level), which involves phrase structure rules, or by a model which describes how a speaker processes a sentence in reality. These are two separate projects which should not be confused. Suppose we have two sentences *S* and *T*. A syntax model predicts at the W-level, for example, that the latter sentence has a more complex syntactic structure than the former. H-level observations, in contrast, might show that *T* is processed as easily as *S*. If these two types of explanation are not clearly distinguished, then one might think that H-level evidence is incompatible

with the W-level syntactic model. But there might be another explanation: After hearing over and over again sentences of the same syntactic structure, speakers might start to process them more quickly by pattern matching. So, in processing *S* and *T*, the speakers might not have to go through all steps as the syntax model predicts. Short-cut access to certain structures might enable them to skip certain steps in the model. But, that does not prove that our syntactic model is not adequate. If these two levels of explanation are distinguished, we see that the two ways of explaining the syntactic well-formedness judgements are not incompatible. They are just answering two different questions about the same phenomenon.

We can consider Grice's project in light of this discussion. It can be taken as a W-level project whose main question is "What makes a certain linguistic meaning φ derivable?", or it can be taken as a H-level project whose main question is "What do conversational participants do in order to derive φ ?" These two projects and questions should be distinguished carefully. Let us focus on the classical Gricean project and ask which of these approaches was Grice's intended approach. It seems that Grice's approach was a W-level one. Consider the following passage: "The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature" (Grice 1989, p.31).²² So, in Grice's view, a conversational implicature should always be explainable in the form of an argument. But that does not mean that conversational participants explicitly go through this argumentation all the time. They can grasp the conversational implicature intuitively, but it is always possible to express the derivation of the conversational implicature in an argument form.²³

Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015, p.449) emphasize the same point:

Its [the Gricean reasoning's] purpose is to make explicit why the hearer is *entitled* to draw certain inferences from the speaker's utterance, or what comes down to the same thing, why the speaker *commits* himself in certain ways by speaking as he does. These protracted trains of thought are hypothetical; they merely serve to unveil the pragmatic logic of a linguistic act.

They too consider Gricean pragmatics a W-level theory, which explains what speakers do and why they do it:

²²Emma Borg, in her talk in St Andrews in May 2016, pointed at the importance of this passage and made me aware of it.

²³See also Taylor (2001) for a similar conclusion.

Gricean pragmatics aims to provide a W-level account of communication, analysing speakers' and hearers' behaviour in terms of their propositional attitudes (what) and communicative goals (why) on the assumption that, by and large, speakers try to be cooperative. (Geurts and Rubio-Fernández 2015, p.457)

Kent Bach seems to agree as well that the Gricean framework is a W-level theory:

Grice did not intend his account of how implicatures are recognized as a psychological theory or even as a cognitive model. He intended it as a rational reconstruction. When he illustrated the ingredients involved in recognizing an implicature, he was enumerating the sorts of information that a hearer needs to take into account, at least intuitively, and exhibiting how this information is logically organized. He was not foolishly engaged in psychological speculation about the nature of or even the temporal sequence of the cognitive processes that implement that logic.²⁴ (Bach 2006, p.25)

The theorists we have seen so far have claimed that the Gricean theory has a W-level approach which gives a constitutive explanation that is independent from processing times and psycholinguistic data. Of course, the different levels of explanations constrain each other, but what I understand by constraining here is that explanations on the two levels should give the same output for a given input and context. That is, from either kind of explanation we expect to obtain the same implicature for a given sentence and context. A Gricean explanation can tell us about what the argumentation is, whereas a psycholinguistic explanation can describe the psychological mechanism of implicature processing. Thus, they both describe the route from the sentence to the implicature, but in different ways. The constraint here is for both kinds of explanation to predict the same implicature for a given sentence and a context as the other.

Not all theorists, however, agree on this. Anna Bezuidenhout, for instance, claims that empirical data can be relevant to the theoretical notions, such as what-is-said. Defending an empirically testable contextualist position, she criticizes Bach's minimalist version of what-is-said on this ground:

Bach suggests that psychological considerations are irrelevant to the discussion about what is said. (...) These [Bach's] complaints appear to rest on the mistaken belief that the contextualist's empirical account of

²⁴It seems we can understand this notion of "rational reconstruction" as how the speaker "could have meant *that* by saying *this*" when she is challenged (Camp 2008, fn.12).

pragmatic processing is solely an account about what a hearer must do to understand a speaker. But as I have tried to indicate above, the full empirical account offered by the contextualist would include a story both about comprehension and about production processes. If the minimal notion of what is said is bypassed both by speakers and hearers, this is surely relevant to an account of what is said. (Bach and Bezuidenhout 2002, pp.300-1)

What should we make of the discussion between Bach and Bezuidenhout? Is empirical data irrelevant to theoretical linguistics? I think the distinction Geurts and Rubio-Fernández made between W-level and H-level theories might of help. Bach considers Gricean reasoning a W-level theory, whereas Bezuidenhout seems to take it as an H-level one. Although Grice himself appears to have a W-level theory in mind, I think one could still use it at the H-level as Bezuidenhout's claim suggests. Thus, Gricean theory can serve at both W-level and H-level. The crucial point, however, is not to expect the same theoretical constituents at both levels. Theorists, for instance, can speak of what-is-said, as a theoretical notion, at both levels, but this does not mean that the term refers to the same thing at these levels. The two occurrences of the same term can have different (though related) theoretical functions on the different levels. As for the relation between these two theoretical functions of what-is-said, the most plausible explanation, in my opinion, is what Geurts and Rubio-Fernández suggest above: They "constrain but don't determine one another". I think this suggested relation between the theoretical constituents of the two levels is key to understanding the disagreement between Bach and Bezuidenhout. Bach does not accept any empirical constraint on the Gricean framework conceived as a W-level theory, whereas Bezuidenhout seems to want something more than a constraint. In her view an H-level explanation determines the performance of its W-level counterpart. And since Grice's theory fails to pass empirical tests, it should also be rejected as a W-level theory.

In the rest of this section, I will present some psycholinguistic data about metaphor processing. In light of the discussion above, I see the relevance of the psychological data as follows: a piece of psycholinguistic evidence cannot prove the Gricean framework taken as a W-level theory false. However, this does not mean that psycholinguistic evidence is completely irrelevant. I believe that psycholinguistic evidence cannot prove a W-level theory false, but it might help deciding between competing W-level theories. There might be several competing W-level theories which claim to explain the same phenomenon. In this type of case, other things being equal, the theory which is more compatible with the experimental data should

be chosen.²⁵ With regard to our discussion, I assume that experimental data can help us to decide between the classical Gricean theory and its rivals. If another W-level theory has the same explanatory power as the classical Gricean theory while corresponding even better to the psycholinguistic data, then this theory should be more appealing than the classical Gricean one.²⁶

What then does the psycholinguistic evidence show with respect to stages of metaphorical interpretation? Psycholinguistic evidence suggests that metaphorical utterances are processed in one step. Returning to example (24), where two successive interpretation stages are required, we can say that arriving at the idea that John will not play basketball should take more processing time than a one-step process of interpretation.²⁷

According to the two-step approach to interpreting metaphors, the literal meaning of a sentence should always be prior to the implied metaphorical meaning. The process of interpreting metaphorical utterances should consequently involve two successive stages and therefore take longer than the interpretation of literal utterances. However, psycholinguistic evidence suggests the opposite: For at least some sentences there is no significant processing time difference between their literal and metaphorical interpretations.

Ortony et al. (1978) is one of the earliest studies on the length of metaphor comprehension. They designed an experiment in which participants were given a number of vignettes. Each vignette is followed by either a metaphorical or literal sentence related to it. Participants first read a vignette, and then they are given the related sentence. For instance, the sentence “Regardless of the danger, the troops, marched on” is given after both of the following vignettes, and participants asked to push a button when they understand the meaning of the sentence:

Approaching the enemy infantry, the men were worried about touching

²⁵It is possible that in some other area the need for deciding between different W-level theories does not arise, but regarding the particular question I am interested in it does.

²⁶I am grateful to Josh Dever and Paula Rubio-Fernández for their help in clarifying my view on this problem.

²⁷Recanati (2003b, p.27) points out this feature of the Gricean view:

On his [Grice’s] view, disambiguation and saturation suffice to give us the literal interpretation of the utterance – what is literally said. All other pragmatic processes involved in the interpretation of the utterance are secondary and presuppose the identification of what is said. Interpretation is construed as a two-step procedure: (i) The interpreter accesses the literal interpretations of all constituents in the sentence and uses them to compute the proposition literally expressed, with respect to the context at hand; (ii) on the basis of this proposition and general conversational principles he or she infers what the speaker means (which may be distinct from what is said, that is, from the proposition literally expressed).

off landmines. They were very anxious that their presence would be detected prematurely. These fears were compounded by the knowledge that they might be isolated from their reinforcements. The outlook was grim.

The children continued to annoy their babysitter. She told the little boys she would not tolerate any more bad behavior. Climbing all over the furniture was not allowed. She threatened to spank them if they continued to stomp, run, and scream around the room. The children knew that her spankings hurt. (Ortony et al. 1978, p.467)

They also repeated the same experiment with keeping the context brief (such as just one sentence), and compared the participants' response times. Here is their conclusion:

These results indicate that while subjects took longer to interpret targets in metaphorical than in literal contexts in the short context condition, there was no significant difference between metaphors and literals in the long context condition. Thus, the process of first interpreting a sentence literally, then determining that such an interpretation does not fit the context, and finally computing the intended figurative meaning does not seem to always underlie the interpretation of figurative language. (Ortony et al. 1978, p.470)

Similar data is presented in Giora (2003, p.108). In an experiment, a Hebrew sentence is given to the subjects (native speakers of Hebrew) to read, after two different supporting contexts are suggested: one is supporting the literal interpretation, whereas the other is supporting the metaphorical interpretation.

- (25) In order to solve the math problem, the student broke her head [equivalent to the English "racked her brains"].
- (26) Because she was so careless when she jumped into the pool, the student broke her head.

The times it took the subjects to read these two sentences were measured but no significant difference could be observed (Giora 2003, p.108). This is an example of how a familiar (or partly conventionalized) metaphor is processed. Explaining this evidence in the two-step approach is not easy. If metaphorical utterances, unlike literal utterances, are processed in two stages, how can (25) and (26) take similarly long to read?

The same set of experiments also demonstrates that unfamiliar metaphors take longer to read. These data is compatible with the two-step processing view. Thus, the two-step approach seems to be able to explain only the interpretation of unfamiliar metaphors. However, the question why familiar and unfamiliar metaphors should be processed differently remains open in this view.

A more natural approach to the interpretation of this psycholinguistic evidence arising from reading times is to assume that the duration of a metaphorical interpretation changes gradually from the familiar metaphors to the unfamiliar ones. Processing times depend on how much reasoning a metaphor requires. The given evidence seems to be decently explainable if we assume that the process of metaphorical interpretation of a sentence takes place in parallel to and simultaneously with the process of its literal interpretation. Unlike the two-step approach to interpreting metaphors, in which there are successive interpretive processes, this will be a one-step process.

I should note that “one-step” does not mean “non-inferential”. If a speaker of English, for instance, interprets a sentence in one-step, this means he is able to acquire the total meaning (in Gricean terms what-is-said + what-is-meant) of the sentence without first interpreting the sentence meaning as a whole and drawing an inference in which the sentence meaning is a premise. Even so, on the suggested one-step interpretation he can still draw inferences from a phrasal meaning to another.²⁸

Some theorists also maintain that our ordinary phenomenology of metaphorical exchange supports the one-step process claim. For instance, according to Recanati, in order to count something as non-literal in the ordinary sense, the hearer of a talk exchange must infer the non-literal meaning by taking the literal meaning as an input, and this process should be transparent to him:

(...) for something to count as non-literal in the ordinary sense it must not only go beyond the conventional significance of the uttered words (...), but it must be felt as such: the language users must be aware that the conveyed meaning exceeds the conventional significance of the words. That condition I dub the ‘transparency condition’. It is satisfied whenever the conveyed meaning has a secondary character, as in conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts. (Recanati 2003b, p.75)

Recanati considers metaphors literal in the ordinary sense and metaphorical interpretation as a one-step procedure since it does not satisfy the transparency condition:

²⁸I will argue how this is possible in Chapter 3.

(...) if I say that the ATM swallowed my credit card, I speak metaphorically; there can be no real ‘swallowing’ on the part of an ATM, but merely something that resembles swallowing. Still, an ordinary hearer readily understands what is said by such an utterance, without going through a two-step procedure involving the prior computation of the ‘literal’ meaning of the utterance (whatever that may be) and a secondary inference to the actual meaning. (Recanati 2003b, p.76)²⁹

Note that the metaphor used to exemplify Recanati’s remark is a very familiar one. It is not clear that an ordinary hearer feels the same transparency with respect to unfamiliar metaphors such as “Language is the house of being (...)” (Heidegger). This metaphor might still be interpreted in one-step but the hearer might not feel the transparency. It seems there is no necessary connection between the transparency condition and the one-step interpretation. However, Recanati’s observation, if it is correct, still needs to be explained. Why is transparency felt at least for some metaphors? What makes the interpreters have this feeling?³⁰

Let us take stock and think about the lessons from the above discussion. In this section I first claimed that the classical pragmatic approach to implicature (and metaphor) requires two successive steps in which an implicature is inferred from the literal meaning of a sentence as a whole. Secondly, I discussed how this two-step structure should be interpreted. These steps can either be seen as W-level or H-level stages of utterance interpretation. Some theorists (such as Kent Bach) claim that the psychological explanation (H-level) is irrelevant to the W-level one. Grice, as a representative of the classical pragmatics, was only interested in the W-level project and had never done speculations on the psychology of human communication. In this view, a piece of psycholinguistic evidence cannot play a role in the evaluation of a constitutive (W-level) theory, let alone refute it. Some other theorists (such as Bezuidenhout), in contrast, claim that psycholinguistic evidence can be relevant to constructing a constitutive account of communication. For instance, she argues that what-is-said as a technical notion can be tested empirically. In her view, in order to decide between rival accounts one should take experimental results into account.

In this discussion I partly agree with Bach, but also accept some of the points Bezuidenhout makes. I agree with Bach that psycholinguistic evidence cannot refute a constitutive theory, such as Grice’s. I also accept that Grice’s project is a W-level

²⁹Guttenplan makes similar remarks: “(...) in the typical case, when we hear a metaphor utterance framed in familiar words, we have an unmediated sense of having understood it - a sense not unlike that when we hear an utterance with familiar words used in a straightforwardly literal way. I shall call this *transparency* (...)” (Guttenplan 2005, p.21).

³⁰I will say more on the relationship between one-step processing and the hearer’s internal experience in Chapter 4.

one, rather than a H-level one. However, separating the psycholinguistic and the constitutive analyses does not mean that the psycholinguistic evidence cannot play any role on evaluating a W-level theory. On this, I partially agree with Bezuidenhout. There is a sense in which psycholinguistic evidence can be relevant. Suppose two W-level theories of language make similar predictions. In this case, a piece of psycholinguistic evidence might be relevant so that the theory which fits in with the psycholinguistic data might be preferable. In sum, a piece of psycholinguistic evidence by itself cannot be decisive but can help in making decisions between two W-level theories.

Thirdly, in this section, I presented some psycholinguistic data and concluded that current psycholinguistic research suggests a gradable processing times for metaphors increasing from familiar metaphors to unfamiliar ones. I argued that this data is better compatible with the one-step process approach than the two-step approach.

2.4 The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated

The final claim I will discuss about metaphors concerns the level of metaphorical interpretation. Accepting the first and the second claims discussed above lead many theorists to believe that metaphorical meaning is not implicated. For instance Hills (1997, p.127) argues that metaphorical meaning “gets lodged” in metaphorical words:

(...) when I get one thing across by saying something else, my listener can't agree with, disagree with, or question, *the thing I get across* by using the standard devices for assenting to, dissenting from, or challenging *the something else* -what my words actually (literally) say. If, for instance, I disagree with Grice about Mr. X's philosophical potential, I can't properly register my disagreement by countering

Mr. X is punctual and has beautiful handwriting
with

That's not so.

No he doesn't.

The heck he does.

Yet if I disagree with what one is naturally taken to assert by uttering *Juliet is the sun* or *She's the cream in my coffee*,

That's not so.

No she isn't.

The heck she is.

seem entirely in order. So it would appear that Romeo's meaning gets lodged in Romeo's words in a way that Grice's meaning (in the letter of recommendation example) never gets lodged in Grice's words.

What Hills argues for is that metaphorical phrases receive new primary meanings, or, in his words, new primary meanings get lodged in metaphorical phrases. This means that the metaphorical interpretation of a phrase is not implicated, but it is said in the Gricean sense of "saying".

Bezuidenhout (2001) argues for a similar metaphor account. In her view, metaphorical meanings are not implicated: "We do not convey metaphorical meanings indirectly by directly saying something else" (Bezuidenhout 2001, p.156). What-is-said by a metaphorical phrase is contextually determined by a pragmatic process she calls "sense creation" (Bezuidenhout 2001, p.160).³¹

A notable defence of metaphorical meaning as literal meaning (i.e. it is not implicated in the Gricean sense) is put forward by the Relevance Theory. Relevance Theorists introduced a new notion called "explicature" in addition to the classical notion of implicature: "A proposition communicated by an utterance is an *explicature* if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance" (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.12). An explicature can be seen as the literal meaning of the utterance: "(...) what we are calling the explicature is close to what might be common-sensically described as the explicit content, or what is said, or the literal meaning of the utterance" (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.13). In their view, to put it crudely, subsentential pragmatic processes contribute to the explicature, whereas sentence-level pragmatic processes generate the implicatures. In this characterisation, the meanings of metaphorical phrases are parts of explicatures. In the generation of explicatures, the meaning of a word or an expression is modulated virtually in all of its occurrences. Context determines to what extent meaning modulation is required. Metaphor is just another type of meaning modulation, but (usually) a radical one. In (27), for instance, what Mary's word "magician" expresses is not the concept *MAGICIAN* but *MAGICIAN**.

(27) Mary: Ronaldo is a magician.

What is common in all these views is that metaphorical meaning is explicit in the sense that it is part of the proposition (or the literal meaning) the sentence expresses;

³¹Nogales (2012) argues for a similar view.

in other words metaphorical meaning is not implicated but conveyed directly.³²

I disagree with these theorists on the claim that metaphorical phrases get new literal (or primary) meanings. What misleads them seems to be the assumption that subsentential pragmatic processes are essentially different from those of sententials. They suppose that the output of the former type of process is always direct and explicit. In the next chapter I will argue against this assumption; I will argue that both types of process create implied meanings and can be explained by the same mechanism. But for now let us see why the view laid out above is not tenable. Here is the problem in brief: If a metaphorical interpretation is explicitly intended, it should be felicitous for a speaker to insist that her metaphorically used phrase is meaning something other than its conventional meaning. However, as Camp (2006a, p.298) has convincingly argued, it is always possible to press someone who speaks metaphorically to distinguish the literal meaning and what-is-implicated. Consider the following conversation:

(28) Mary: Ronaldo is a magician.

John: I didn't know he was interested in illusion.

Mary: No, I didn't mean that.

John: But you said that he is a magician.

Mary: I said so, but I was speaking metaphorically.³³

If this conversation sounds natural, it should be clear that Mary's response makes explicit that she has to make a distinction between what her words mean and what she means by implication. Therefore, metaphor should be a form of speaker meaning (or implicated meaning). Of course, not all similar talk exchanges sound natural:

(29) Romeo: Juliet is the sun.

Benvolio: I don't think she is 149.6 million km away from us.

Romeo: No, I didn't mean that.

³²Another defence of this position is Ludlow (2014). In fact his view is the most radical one: "(...) I will argue that the 'absolute' sense of a term (if it even exists) is not privileged but is simply one modulation among many — there is no core or privileged modulation" (Ludlow 2014, p.6). With regard to metaphors, the consequence of this theory is that there is no priority of MAGICIAN over MAGICIAN*; the latter does not derive from the former. This view is unacceptable for at least two reasons. First, if literal or conventional meaning "is not privileged" it will be impossible to tell which proposition is expressed by a sentence independent of a context. But this is clearly false. Independent of a context, it is very plausible to assume that "Ronaldo is a magician" expresses only the proposition that he is a magician as a profession. Secondly, in relation to the first reason, the entertainment of the conventional (or literal) meaning of a term is independent of contextual effects. As Giora (2003) shows, psycholinguistic evidence suggests that the conventional meaning of a term is always activated independent of contextual effects. So, it is privileged in this sense.

³³Camp (2006a, p.298) uses the sentence "Diotima is a midwife" as the example. She also shows that a similar scenario can be created when the speaker talks loosely (Camp 2006a, p.297).

Benvolio: But you said that she is the sun.

Romeo: I said so, but I was speaking metaphorically.

Benvolio's response in this talk exchange sounds strange because unlike Mary's first sentence in (28), "Juliet is the sun" expresses a category mistake. There is no reason for Benvolio to assume that Romeo makes a category mistake. But still, a non-cooperative hearer or a child under a certain age³⁴ might engage in such a conversation (Camp 2006a, p.298).³⁵ In sum, there is a possibility of pressing the speaker to identify different layers of meaning for all metaphorical utterances, and this seems a good piece of evidence in favour of making the distinction between phrase meaning and speaker meaning in metaphorical utterances.³⁶ Note that, this does not mean that the speaker is always committed to the literal proposition expressed by a metaphorical sentence. Mary is not committed to Ronaldo's being a magician as a profession, nor is Romeo committed to the identity of Juliet and the sun.

Now, I want to consider an objection which is based on ambiguity cases. Consider the following example:

(30) Mary: Barclays is a bank.

John: I didn't know it is the name of a riverside.

Mary: No, I didn't mean that.

³⁴For references on children's comprehension of metaphors, see Camp (2006c, p.157).

³⁵ The speaker can also insist on the literal meaning if she is not happy with the metaphorical interpretation her hearer arrives at. She can say that the metaphorical interpretation in question "only appears obvious given further interpretive assumptions that [s]he doesn't endorse (...)" (Camp 2008, p.17). The following revision of (28) illustrates this idea:

(5') Mary: Ronaldo is a magician.

John: No, he isn't that good.

Mary: No, I didn't mean that, he is literally interested in illusion.

In a discourse context which allows a metaphorical interpretation of a certain phrase, the speaker can insist on the literal meaning of her phrases. On the other hand, as (28) shows, a speaker cannot insist that her metaphorically used phrases "say" or "directly express" her intended metaphorical meaning. This suggests that we need to assume two layers of meaning for metaphorical phrases. One is literal and direct, whereas the other is metaphorical and implied. For the detailed discussion of this argument and several others on why metaphorical meaning is better thought as implied content, see Camp (2006a; 2008).

³⁶This seems to hold even for some idiomatic expressions. The classical view on idioms sees them as unstructured: "An idiom has no semantic structure; rather, it is a semantic primitive" (Davies 1982-1983, p.68). This view suggests that in an idiomatic expression such as "kick the bucket" the literal (or the conventional) meaning of the constituent words have no function, they are "frozen". However, as Egan (2008) argued, this classical view cannot be true since one can extend this idiomatic expression in the following way: "Livia didn't quite kick the bucket, but she took a good strong swing at it" (Egan 2008, p.395). Here, in order to extend the idiom, the conventional meaning of the words "kick" and "bucket" are relevant as well as the idiomatic meaning of the expression "kick the bucket". Thus, even for idioms one can make the distinction between the word meaning and the intended meaning.

John: But you said that it is a bank.

Mary: I said so, but I meant the financial institution meaning of the term.³⁷

This dialogue apparently exhibits a similar structure to that of the metaphor examples above. It can be said that there is a distinction between what Mary says and what she means. She said “bank”, this could either be “bank₁” (financial institution) or “bank₂” (riverside). Thus, there is a possibility to press the speaker to make a clarification on what she meant. Does this suggest a distinction between conventional meaning and what-is-implicated? In other words, are metaphorical interpretation and disambiguation similar in this respect? I think they are not. In disambiguation, it is clear that there is either an inference or some kind of decision making so as to determine the relevant meaning. However, disambiguation and metaphor interpretation are significantly different processes. In the latter the interpreted meaning is carried by the conventional meaning; the conventional meaning is the starting point of metaphorical interpretation. For instance in Romeo’s utterance, the hearer begins the interpretation by considering the meaning of “the sun” first. In the disambiguation case, however, there is no initial meaning. There are two homonymous words, “bank₁” and “bank₂” with two different meanings. What the hearer is supposed to do is to determine which word is used. Mary’s first sentence, therefore, in itself is incomplete, and the sign “bank” does not mean anything. Only after the disambiguation does a word (“bank₁” or “bank₂”) and a complete meaning arise for the hearer. Hence, unlike metaphors, ambiguity cases do not allow us to draw a distinction between the conventional meaning and what-is-implicated.

Stern (2000, p.74) points out another difference between ambiguity resolution and metaphorical interpretation:

Their [ambiguous words’] different senses are mutually independent in that knowledge of one does not require knowledge of the other, whereas knowledge of the metaphorical interpretation(s) of an expression does require knowledge of its literal interpretation (in whatever exact way).

This means that one can competently use one of the senses of an ambiguous phrase without being aware of the other sense, but the same possibility does not exist for metaphors. For instance, one cannot calculate the metaphorical meaning of “magician” in (27) without knowing its literal meaning.³⁸

³⁷This example was pointed out to me by Joel Smith in Manchester Open Minds XI Conference.

³⁸Moran (1997, p.252) points out the difference between metaphorical expressions and ambiguous expressions. In the latter cases, two (or more) meanings of an expression are usually irrelevant, whereas in the former cases there must be a relation between an expression’s literal and metaphorical meanings.

Many theorists in the literature have emphasized the “active” role of the literal meaning of an expression for its metaphorical interpretation. For instance Stern (2011, p.283) says “that a metaphorical use or interpretation depends on the literal meaning of the *word(s)* so used, i.e., the literal vehicle”. In his view, literal meaning’s being “active” plays a crucial role for certain things a metaphor can do such as to make people see something as another thing (Stern 2011, p.287).

Similarly, Moran (1997, p.253) points out a difficulty for defending an account of the change of meaning if we assume that literal meanings are active in metaphorical interpretation:

(...) dependence of the metaphorical on the literal is rather special, in ways that exacerbate difficulties with the view of metaphor as involving a change of meaning. For the first (literal) reading of the expression does not just provide clues to help you get to the second one, like a ladder that is later kicked away, but instead it remains somehow ‘active’ in the new metaphorical interpretation.

Carston also emphasizes the “lingering of the literal” in metaphor interpretation, and she especially emphasizes the role of the literal meaning of expressions in so-called extended metaphors where metaphors related to each other extend over a whole text or poem. (Carston 2010, p.307) These remarks provide a support for a literal meaning and implicated meaning distinction for metaphors. If the literal meaning of an expression is actively used in metaphorical interpretation and needed for a metaphor’s further uses and effects, we should keep this literal meaning separate from the metaphorical meaning of the expression. Therefore, we can talk about what is literally expressed and what-is-implicated by a metaphorical expression and by extension by a metaphorical utterance.³⁹

In this chapter, I presented three claims concerning metaphors. After outlining Grice’s theory of metaphor in Section 2.1, I presented some problems for the classical Gricean approach to metaphors in Section 2.2. Many theorists have pointed out the embeddability of metaphors and have claimed that embedded clauses in the Gricean

Camp (2006a, pp.298-9) points out another difference between metaphor (and loose talk) and “bank” like ambiguity cases. In the latter cases a speaker can insist that her intended interpretation is literally and directly (in the sense that not being implied) expressed, whereas this is not possible in the former cases.

³⁹Against different types of contextualisms, Camp (2016) argues that conventional meaning should always be part of the explanation on how interlocutors interpret each other’s utterances: “Conventional meaning constitutes a body of warranted mutual expectations about the contributions that expressions would make to the speech act that a speaker would undertake *if* she meant what she said. As such, conventional meaning is one important input to interpretation, even if it only rarely emerges as its output.” (Camp 2016, p.134)

framework cannot give rise to implicatures, since they are unasserted. One common reaction in the literature to this problem is to reject an implicature approach to metaphor. However, I argued that this is not a metaphor specific problem; some non-metaphorical implicatures are also embeddable and we need a general fix for this problem. But we can still ask about what makes metaphors uniformly embeddable. I will give an answer to this question. Similarly, in terms of grammatical mood, some implicatures are different in mood from the sentences which generate them, but some are not different. Metaphorical utterances, however, uniformly share the same mood with their interpretations. What is the cause of this uniformity? Another observation I have discussed in Section 2.2 is that the interpretation of a metaphor always precedes that of irony in complex figurative interpretations. If metaphorical and ironical meanings are both forms of implicatures, why is there a specific order? These are the questions a theory of metaphor is supposed to answer, and I will answer them in the subsequent chapters. In the same section, I have further discussed a serious problem for the classical Gricean approach to metaphors. I have given some metaphor examples which do not fit in the classical implicature framework even when they are not embedded. My conclusion was that all those examples suggest that a new construal of the notion of implicature is required. In Section 2.3, I have discussed some psycholinguistic evidence which demonstrates that some metaphors are processed as quickly as the corresponding literal interpretations. This suggests that at least some metaphors are processed in one-step, which means literal and metaphorical interpretations occur in parallel. My conclusion was that a metaphor theory built on a one-step interpretation of metaphors can nicely explain the interpretation of relatively familiar metaphors as well as unfamiliar metaphors by means of a single mechanism. Finally, in Section 2.4, I have argued against a view which explains metaphorical interpretation on the level of literal meaning (or what-is-said in the Gricean sense). I have, by contrast, defended the view that there is a distinction between the literal meaning and what-is-implicated in the case of metaphors, and that metaphorical interpretation, in this account, turns out to be a form of speaker meaning (or implicated meaning). These three claims will guide me in building a theory of metaphor in Chapter 4. In the next chapter I will introduce a distinction between clausal implicature and phrasal implicature.

Chapter 3

Phrasal Implicature

The main idea of the theory I am about to suggest is that a metaphorical meaning is a form of implicature based on phrasal meaning. To repeat, I use “phrase” to mean any proper syntactic constituent of a sentence. In order to argue for such a view, it is necessary to establish whether the Gricean theory of implicature allows phrase implicatures. Let me first give an initial characterization of phrasal implicatures. In a typical case, a phrasal implicature is triggered by a phrase, most of the time due to the unexpectedness of the phrase’s conventional meaning. The interpreter’s aim is to eliminate the unexpectedness. After the triggering, the interpreter seeks alternative meanings, but in order to do that she needs a sequence of associations attached to the conventional meaning of the phrase in question. These associations are basically salient properties and objects in a given context. These are automatically suggested, but the interpreter needs to select which ones are intended by the speaker and able to resolve unexpectedness. These selected associations are taken to be the speaker’s phrase meaning. This speaker’s meaning is what I call *phrasal implicature*.

Of course, if a part of a clause implies, one can assume that the clause as a whole also implicates.¹ So, a phrasal implicature brings about a clausal implicature, but a derivative one. From now on, I will ignore this derivative clausal implicatures and limit my discussion to the clausal implicatures which are based on the sentence meaning as a whole.

The characterization of my theory of metaphor will not be clear until all the technical notions in it are spelled out. I will discuss notions such as *unexpectedness* and *association sequences* in Chapter 4. In this chapter, my aim is to discuss whether there is room for phrasal implicatures in the Gricean framework.

Although Grice is not very explicit about whether implicature is essentially a

¹Given that the word “implicate” takes a clause, I am using the word “imply” for non-clausal implications.

propositional phenomenon, his basic definition of conversational implicature presented earlier, is given in terms of propositions. Does Grice's theory of implicature allow an extension of this definition from the level of propositions to the level of the parts of propositions? If we call Grice's original notion "clausal implicature", is there a room for phrasal implicatures? The mainstream view answers this question negatively. Here are two examples:

Implicatures are generated via an inference *whose input is the fact that the speaker has said that p*. Hence no implicature can be computed unless something has been said, some proposition expressed. In particular, no implicature can be computed at a sublocutionary level. We have to compute the truth-conditions first, so as to ascribe a definite content to the speaker's speech act, before we can infer anything from that speech act. (Recanati 2003a, p.300)

Implicitly for Grice and explicitly for John Searle (1969: 43), the output of decoding is normally a sense that is close to being fully propositional, so that only reference assignment is needed to determine what is said, and the main role of inference in comprehension is to recover what is implicated. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, pp.2-3)

I do not want to go into Gricean exegesis, but rather I will argue that the Gricean framework can be adapted so as to explain subsentential implications. For this, I will first discuss three linguistic phenomena which can naturally be considered examples of phrasal implicatures: Loose talk, slurs and speaker's reference. Secondly, I will explore the theoretical plausibility of the phrasal implicature.

3.1 Examples of Phrasal Implicatures

It is a plausible claim that some kind of subsentential pragmatic reasoning is needed when speakers form their sentences. The question is whether this subsentential pragmatic reasoning can be explained within the scope of the Gricean framework. My aim in this chapter is to show that this is possible; the Gricean framework has enough resources to explain subsentential pragmatic processes. To that end, I will develop the theoretical tool of phrasal implicature later in this chapter. In this section I will discuss certain examples, but I will not suggest a detailed phrase level analysis of them. I will try to give an intuitive idea about the kinds of cases where an analysis in terms of phrase-level implicatures seems to be an appealing alternative to the clause level implicature analysis.

Let us begin with loose talk. Although it is difficult to give a definition of loose talk, we can characterize it by giving some examples:

- (1) My mother lives 10 kilometers away from here.
- (2) Holland is flat.

In these examples, the speaker does not mean that her mother's house is *exactly* 10,000 meters away and that there are no bumps in Holland, but rather she means the house is *around* 10 kilometers away, and Holland is *largely* flat. There are several analyses of this phenomenon², but from the Gricean point of view we can distinguish two possible explanations: one is clausal and the other is phrasal. The former explanation is that the clause meaning itself implicates the intended meaning. For instance, in (2), the hearer processes the clause meaning *Holland is flat*, and infers from this (under the guidance of maxims and contextual effects) that the speaker means *Holland is roughly flat*. The phrasal explanation, in contrast, is that the meaning of the phrase "flat" implies *roughly flat* (again under the guidance of some pragmatic principles at work at subsentential level and contextual effects).³ The hearer does not need to process the clause meaning as a whole first to infer then from this the intended meaning. He rather processes the clause and calculates the intended meaning of the phrase in just one step. If the possibility of this latter type of interpretation is accepted, loose talk can be considered an example of phrasal implicature.⁴

Wearing (2006) has a worry concerning the Gricean analysis (either clausal or phrasal) of loose talk. She discusses Unger's (1975) view on absolute terms, and her objection applies to the Gricean approach to loose talk as well:

He [Unger] claims that whenever someone says that something is flat, she says that it is absolutely without bumps or dents or curves. Thus, virtually every time a speaker says 'X is flat', what she says is false. Hearers know what is meant, because they routinely take the speaker to mean something other than what she says.

On this account, it becomes exceedingly rare that we say anything true. If every use of the word 'flat' picks out the property of being

²For an influential non-Gricean account, see Carston (2002).

³Camp (2006a, p.301) also argues that loose talk should be classified as implication of word use.

⁴Note that the phrasal explanation does not rule out global contextual effects. It does not entail that a phrase in isolation conveys an implication, but rather a phrase taken in its context does this. Thus, for instance, if the loose sentence is qualified by some operators such as "strictly speaking" or "to a mathematical standard of precision", then phrasal implicatures can be cancelled. Similarly the general topic of a conversation can also cancel a phrasal implicature.

completely without bumps or curves, then almost every use of that term expresses a falsehood. (Wearing 2006, p.321)

From the Gricean point of view, one can address this worry in two ways. First, if saying is taken as asserting, it can be claimed that in loose talk, sentences are not said but as-if-said. However, the worry might continue. Since most of our sentences are loosely used, they turn out to be as-if-said sentences. One might not be happy with this consequence. But this does not seem to be a problem for the Gricean framework. In metaphor, irony, and many other figurative uses, speakers can successfully communicate true contents by as-if-saying something false. If the category of what-is-as-if-said makes sense for these uses, why would not it make sense for loose talk cases.

Second, it is possible to suggest a revision on the Gricean terminology and distinguish “saying” and “asserting”, as many theorists, such as Bach (2001), do.⁵ Thus, after this suggestion, it does not matter much if a speaker says something false by a loosely uttered sentence, given that she is not committed to the literal meaning of the sentence. What she asserts can still be true.

Another candidate for phrasal implicature are slurs. Slurs can be conceived as phrases generating implicatures. The following contains only a brief illustration of slurs. I discuss them in detail in Chapter 7. Let us think of the following utterance:

(3) John is a Boche.

One way of thinking about the pejorative aspect of this utterance is to think that the utterance implicates the following:

(4) John is cruel in virtue of being German.

An alternative way of thinking about the pejorative implication is to think that the expression “Boche” triggers the implication of the property *being cruel in virtue of being German*. So, again there are two possible explanations parallel to the ones for loose talk above, but it is at least plausible to think that the pejorative expression itself (strictly speaking its meaning) implies extra content. Therefore, we can think of it as an example of the phrasal implicature.

My third example concerns a distinction made by Kripke (1977). In discussing Donnellan’s classic example, Kripke distinguishes between the speaker’s reference and the semantic reference:

⁵Camp (2006a, p.302; 2012, p.604) also makes a distinction between what-is-said (or what-is-locuted as she calls it) and what-is-asserted.

In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a *general* intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The speaker's referent is given by a *specific* intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object. (Kripke 1977, p.264)

Suppose one mistakes Mary for Linda and utters "Linda looks pale". In this context, the speaker's reference and the semantic reference diverge; the speaker refers to Mary by uttering the name "Linda", however the semantic reference remains the same. If we consider the meanings of names to be their referents, we can say that the word meaning and the intended meaning diverge in this example. Again, two Gricean suggestions might explain this phenomenon. One can either say that the proposition *Linda looks pale* implies *Mary looks pale*, or rather say that the reference (or the meaning) of the term "Linda" implies Mary. If the latter, phrase level route, is taken, it amounts to an instance of phrasal implicature.⁶

This example might seem different from the others. One might think that it cannot be a form of implicature because the speaker does not intend to imply anything. She is not using a phrase to mean something else. She is just making a mistake. Similarly the hearer could recognize that the speaker does not intend to imply anything. But does the speaker's making a mistake prevent the generation of implicatures? In other words, is the speaker's awareness of the means of implication essential to the generation of an implicature? I think not. If we rethink Grice's definition of conversational implicature, repeated here, such a requirement is not assumed:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* has implicated that *q*, may be said to have conversationally implicated that *q*, provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, *q* is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say *p* (or doing so in *those* terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989, pp.30-1)

⁶In a more interesting case pointed out to me by Derek Ball, a speaker utters just "Linda" and discontinues her utterance for some reason (e.g. a heart attack). In this case, the hearer could still infer the intended referent (i.e. Mary), and I believe this possibility strengthens the plausibility of phrase level route.

Below, I will give a parallel definition of conversational implicature at the phrase level, but for now, we can generally say the following for this case: Upon seeing a phrase's meaning is not intended by a speaker, the hearer determines the intended meaning among the alternative meanings in the given context. Even if the speaker is unaware that she is not directly expressing but implying the meaning, she can still convey it, and the communication can still be successful.⁷

What is common in these examples is the following: A phrase causes the hearer to seek an alternative meaning in place of its conventional meaning. When the new meaning is plugged in, the obtained content will be different from the content that is expressed by the original utterance. This process intuitively suggests that an alternative explanation to the classical Gricean clausal explanation is possible. The shortcomings of the Gricean clausal explanation of metaphor, which we have discussed in Section 2.2, make the phrasal approach attractive. Moreover, other problems which we will see below such as the pragmatics of indefinites and embedded scalar implicatures also seem to lend support to the phrasal approach. Hence, extending the Gricean approach to phrases seems a plausible theoretical attempt. The next section will concern a theoretical discussion of this extension.

3.2 Theoretical Discussion

So far, I have made a distinction between clausal implicature and phrasal implicature. I will call the received Gricean view which only recognizes the former type of implicatures the “classical Gricean”, and my suggested account which recognizes both clausal and phrasal implicatures the “extended Gricean”. I have given three

⁷Metonymy can be another example in this section. I will say more on metonymy later.

Lexical sarcasm is another candidate for phrasal implicature. Camp (2012) explains lexical sarcasm as a local pragmatic process in the following way:

In cases of lexical sarcasm, as in

- (3) Because George has turned out to be such a diplomat, we've decided to transfer him to Payroll, where he'll do less damage.

the speaker undertakes an overall speech act whose illocutionary force is guided by the uttered sentence's grammatical mood in the usual way, and whose content is a compositional function of the standard meanings of its constituent terms plus local, lexically-focused pragmatic processes. The notable feature, of course, is that the operative 'local processes' include inverting the meaning of at least one expression. (Camp 2012, p.611)

Thus, in the example Camp gives, the sarcastic use of “diplomat” is locally interpreted to pragmatically mean something opposite relative to an evaluative scale. Camp likens lexical sarcasm to metaphor with respect to requiring word-based pragmatics. Twists and neologisms are also processed in a similar way to metaphor and lexical sarcasm. They all interact with the compositional machinery locally (Camp 2016, p.216). Hence, they are good candidates for phrasal implicature.

examples of phrasal implicatures. I will propose, in the next chapter, an extended Gricean theory of metaphor which puts metaphor under the category of phrasal implicature. Before that, I explain why I refer to phrasal implications as “implicatures” and why I consider the Gricean framework convenient to explain this type of implication. In other words, I explain why it is legitimate to claim that the theory I called “extended Gricean” is Gricean in spirit.

Prior to the discussion of extending the Gricean framework to phrases, I will present other attempts of extending the Gricean framework.

3.2.1 Previous Discussions concerning Subsentential Implicatures

Several theorists examined the possibility of applying Gricean reasoning to subsentential clauses and phrases.⁸ Recanati claims that the first extension of the notion of implicature is made by Grice himself. The original notion of conversational implicature has two features, availability and globality, according to Recanati. Generally speaking, availability is related to the hearer’s awareness of inferences in the calculation of implicatures, and globality is related to the post-propositional character of implicatures. Here are his definitions:

Availability:

What is said must be intuitively accessible to the conversational participants (unless something goes wrong and they do not count as ‘normal interpreters’). (Recanati 2003b, p.20)

Globality:

The second feature of conversational implicatures I want to draw attention to is the global, post-propositional character of implicatures. Implicatures are generated via an inference *whose input is the fact that the speaker has said that p*. Hence no implicature can be computed unless something has been said, some proposition expressed. In particular, no implicature can be computed at a sublocutionary level. We have to compute the truth-conditions first, so as to ascribe a definite content to the speaker’s speech act, before we can infer anything from that speech act. (Recanati 2003a, p.300)

Conventional implicature and scalar implicature are two cases in which neither availability nor globality are present. In Recanati’s view, falling within the scope of

⁸A common terminology in this discussion is calling implicatures that are computed after the semantic process of the whole sentence “global” and that are computed before this process “local” or “embedded”.

operators is an indication of locality (non-globality). His examples are as follows:

(5) Bill and Jane got married and had many children.

(6) Bill and Jane have three children.

In Grice's suggestion, (5) conventionally implicates that marriage happened before the birth of the children. (6) is interpreted as *Bill and Jane have exactly three children* (a scalar implicature). According to Recanati the alleged implicatures in these examples are calculated locally. In order to see this, he suggests two further examples in which locality of the interpretation is more apparent:

(7) Bill and Jane have three or four children.

(8) Every father feels happy if his daughter gets married and gives birth to a child; much less if she gives birth to a child and gets married.

In (7) the relevant interpretation is *Bill and Jane have exactly three or exactly four children* and the strengthening in Recanati's view occurs locally within the scope of disjunction. Similarly, in (8) the *and then* reading of "and" occurs in the antecedent of the conditional (Recanati 2003a, pp.300-1). Recanati concludes that since these conventional and scalar implicatures lack the availability and globality features, they should not be treated as proper implicatures. Either a semantic mechanism or a non-implicature-based pragmatic mechanism should be theoretically used in their explanations.

Conventional implicature⁹ seems to be a big departure for Grice, from his classical framework. This type of implicature does not have any of the features proposed by Grice. For example, they are *not* (easily) cancellable, *not* non-detachable and *not* non-conventional. So, why did Grice make such a move and argue for the existence of conventional implicatures? He could have said that this phenomenon does not fit in his model, and should be explained by some other mechanism. I think two important points motivated Grice's point of view. First, a conventional implicature is a form of speaker's meaning. One can make a difference between what the speaker has said and meant. For instance the speaker in (5) could have said that Bill and Jane got married *and then* had many children, but she did not. So, the speaker's uttering "and" but meaning something more than the literal meaning of the term (*and then*) indicate different levels of meaning. If conventional implicature is a form of speaker's meaning it is natural for Grice to think of it as a pragmatic phenomenon. The second point is related to why he conceives a conventional implication as a

⁹Similar things can be said about the scalar implicature.

form of implicature if it does not fit any of the criteria. Grice must see fitting these criteria as a matter of degree. Implicatures have different degrees of cancellability, non-detachability, non-conventionality and so on. Conventional implicatures have these features to the least degree, and conversational implicatures have them in various degrees. I believe if the distinction between conventional and conversational implicature is seen as not a categorical difference, but a matter of degree, we can obtain a unified picture of implicature. I will say more on the degradability of these features below.

3.2.1.1 Chierchia on Embedded Implicatures

Chierchia (2004) also explores the locality of scalar implicatures, but unlike Recanati he considers their being implicatures more seriously. In order to repair the problem related to unasserted local implicatures he argues for the following: “Implicatures are not computed *after* truth conditions of (root) sentences have been figured out; they are computed phrase by phrase in tandem with truth conditions (or whatever compositional semantics computes)” (Chierchia 2004, p.40). He contrasts global and local approaches to scalar implicatures in several different contexts. The globalist approach Chierchia contests suggests (10) as the calculation procedure for (9):

- (9) (a) Who is in that room?
 (b) John or Bill
 (c) John and Bill
- (10) i. The speaker said (9)b and not (9)c, which would have been also relevant
 ii. (9)c entails (9)b [*or* and *and* are part of a scale]
 iii. If the speaker had the info that (9)c, she/he would have said so [quantity]
 iv. The speaker has no evidence that (9)c holds
 v. The speaker is well informed
 Therefore,
 vi. It is unlikely/not the case that (9)c holds. (Chierchia 2004, p.42)

The first step of this procedure is determining the relevant alternatives, which are the other items on a scale. For example, if someone is said to earn \$200, then the set of relevant alternatives could be ...earn(\$100), earn(\$300), earn(\$400).... In this scale higher values entail the lower ones, since if someone is earning, for instance, \$300, it would be true to say that she is earning \$200. According to this view,

and and *or* can also be seen as parts of an information scale, because $\lceil p \text{ and } q \rceil$ asymmetrically entails $\lceil p \text{ or } q \rceil$ (Chierchia 2004, p.41-2).

If the phrase that triggers the scalar implicature is not embedded, the globalist approach works well. The problem arises in embedded contexts:

(11) John: “My colleague makes \$100 an hour.”

(12) John believes that his colleague makes \$100 an hour.

(12) is a natural way of reporting John’s words. According to the standard scalar implicature view, John’s utterance in (11) will have the implicature “My colleague makes *exactly* \$100 an hour”. The hearer will compute the implicature in (12) accordingly: “John believes that his colleague makes exactly \$100 an hour”. However the globalist calculation procedure sketched above fails to explain this. The entailment requirement in step (ii) cannot be fulfilled in an embedded context. A relevant alternative, for instance, “My colleague makes \$300 an hour” entails “My colleague makes \$100 an hour”, whereas the same entailment relation is not observed in the belief context: “John believes that his colleague makes \$300 an hour” does not entail “John believes that his colleague makes \$100 an hour.” Chierchia concludes that the implicature in (11) must be calculated locally (Chierchia 2004, p.45).

Another evidence against the globalist approach in Chierchia’s examination is the interaction of scalar implicatures and sentential connectives. Consider the following sentences:

(13) (a) (Right now) Mary is either working at her paper or seeing some of her students.

(b) Mary is either working at her paper or seeing some (though not all) of her students.

The interpretation of (13)a is (13)b. However, if we apply the global computation procedure we obtain the wrong result:

(14) (a) Mary is either working at her paper or seeing all of her students.

(b) It is not the case that [Mary is either working at her paper or seeing all of her students].

(c) Mary is not working at her paper.

If the relevant alternative to (13)a is (14)a, the implicature should be (14)b in the globalist approach, which means the scope of the negation operator is the whole utterance. But this has a wrong entailment, (14)c. The diagnosis made by Chierchia

is as follows: “(...) negation, in the globalist view, seems to wind up in the wrong place: it is expected to take scope over the whole disjunction, whereas we would want it to negate just the second disjunct of the alternative” (Chierchia 2004, p.46). He again considers the local calculation of scalar implicatures to be the solution.

Chierchia’s overall conclusion is the following: “(...) implicatures are introduced locally as soon as possible in the same order in which their trigger (the scalar terms) are introduced in the syntactic tree” (Chierchia 2004, p.47). In the same paper, he also formalizes his localist approach to scalar implicatures. According to Chierchia’s explanation, I believe, scalar implicatures turn out to be phrasal implicatures, examples of which were presented above. Although Chierchia does not say much about other types of implicatures, his approach paves the way for extending Gricean reasoning to subsententials.¹⁰

3.2.1.2 Simons on Embedded Implications

Another theorist, Simons (2010), also examines embedded scalar implicatures. She suggests extending the Gricean framework to subsententials clauses. However, comparing her approach with Chierchia’s, she does not see Chierchia’s suggestion as implicature-based in the Gricean sense:

In a very different approach, Gennaro Chierchia (2004) attempts to maintain (a version of) semantic compositionality by arguing that scalar implications are not in fact Gricean implicatures, but are generated by grammatical rule in the course of semantic composition. This allows him to maintain an overall Gricean perspective: first, conventional content and grammatical rules provide a literal content for an utterance. This content can then provide the input to a Gricean process of implicature calculation. (Simons 2010, p.143)

The reason behind Simons’ dissatisfaction with Chierchia’s solution seems to be her considering being clausal to be a must for implicatures. In her view, implicatures can be generated by parts of a sentence, only if the part is in a sentence form. Simons’ idea is less radical than Chierchia’s. She only tries to demonstrate that embedded clauses can also have implicatures. In her examination, the central problem she is interested in is an argument developed by Anscombe and Ducrot (1983) and quoted in Recanati (2003a, p.303):

¹⁰Another support for local processing of scalar implicatures comes from psycholinguistics experiments of Storto and Tanenhaus (2004). See Borg (2012, pp.59-60) for a brief description of the experiments.

- (a) Conversational implicatures are pragmatic consequences of an act of saying something.
- (b) An act of saying something can be performed only by means of a complete utterance, not by means of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional.
- (c) Hence, no implicature can be generated at the sub-locutionary level, i.e. at the level of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional.
- (d) To say that an implicature falls within the scope of a logical operator is to say that it is generated at the sub-locutionary level, viz. at the level of the clause on which the logical operator operates.
- (e) Hence, no implicature can fall within the scope of a logical operator.

For instance, consider the following sentences:

- (15) The old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared.
- (16) If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared, then Tom will be quite content. (Cohen 1971)

In (15), the order of events is implied¹¹. In other words, the implicated proposition is that the old king has died of a heart attack *and then* a republic has been declared. The antecedent of (16) seems to have the same implication. If a republic has been declared first and then the old king has died of a heart attack, Tom might not be content, and this seems compatible with the truth of (16) as Simons (2010, p.142) points out. This shows that the consequent of the sentence is evaluated after the implicature of the antecedent is calculated. However, this is a clear violation of the allegedly Gricean view exhibited above; that is only asserted clauses can generate implicatures. Simons' reaction to this tension is to reject the argument above. She claims that Gricean reasoning also applies to subordinate clauses:

The basis for the general case is that subordinate clauses do not serve merely to contribute to the propositional content expressed in an utterance. Typically, these clauses themselves serve identifiable discourse functions. Cooperativity requires these functions to be fulfilled as well as possible. To put this a different way: interpreters can pay attention to parts of sentences independently of the containing sentence, and can reason about why the speaker produced just that sentence-part in

¹¹Note that this is not a scalar implicature. So, subsentential implicatures are not always scalar ones.

attempting to convey her communicative intention. This reasoning, I suggest, is what gives rise to ‘local’ conversational inferences. (Simons 2010, p.145)

In order to elaborate on this idea, Simons needs to show how Gricean maxims can work for subordinate clauses. For instance, with respect to the first maxim of Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as is required”), the contribution of the speaker does not have to be an assertion in Simons’ view:

But suppose we read Quantity 1 this way: Provide as much information as is required *about the situation you are describing*. Or, utilizing the notion of strength: Provide the strongest description of the situation you aim to describe compatible with the requirements of relevance. The idea is this: a speaker’s choice of words is always an indication of some belief she has about the situation she is describing. In the case where the utterance describes this situation as actual, the beliefs in question will be beliefs about what is the case. In the case where the utterance describes the situation as hypothetical, or as merely possible or probable, or as the content of someone’s propositional attitude, the beliefs will be beliefs about what is possible or probable, or about another agent’s beliefs. Quantity 1, I suggest, enjoins the speaker to give the best – in many cases, strongest – characterization of the envisioned situation that is consistent with these beliefs. If the interpreter assumes that the speaker is abiding by this requirement, then she can apply Quantity 1 to the interpretation of non-asserted clauses. (Simons 2010, pp.152-3)

This new interpretation of the Quantity 1 enables Simons to explain embedded implicature cases above. She calls this type of implicature “intrusive”. The interpreter seeks the interpretation of the embedded clause “which maximizes the cooperativity of the speaker” (Simons 2010, p.157), and this can involve intrusive implicatures.

For my purpose, one important point in Simons’ discussion is that intrusive implicatures are transparent to global conversational effects. They are not generated in every contexts. The following sentence is a case in point:

(17) If some of my students fail the course, I’ll be unhappy.

In Simons’ view there is no local strengthening here; that is, the reading of the quantifier in the antecedent as “some but not all”, possible in a normal context, is blocked here (or cancelled, in Gricean terms) by the general contextual considerations since failure of either some or all of my students will make me unhappy

(Simons 2010, p.155). From this data, Simons concludes that “we must accept that global considerations can have local effects” (Simons 2010, p.158). What she means here by “global considerations” is to consider the interpretation of the conditional as a whole, and then determine the interpretation of the antecedent accordingly.

Let me briefly summarize the above discussion. According to the perceived Gricean view, only asserted sentences can have implicatures. I presented two views that challenge this received view. Simons argues that unasserted subordinate clauses can have implicatures as well. She believes that small modifications of the Gricean framework are sufficient to explain embedded implicatures. Chierchia, in contrast, defends a more radical view in which subsentential implicatures can be calculated phrase by phrase. His examination, however, is limited to scalar implicatures.

Scalar phrases are controversial linguistic phenomena. Apart from the implicature approach, there are also explanations which turn to information structure and grammar.¹² How about non-scalar implicatures? Can embedded clauses generate non-scalar implicatures? It seems they can. Let us think of Grice’s gas station example:

(18) A: I am out of petrol.

B: There is a garage round the corner. (Grice 1989, p.32)

Suppose *A* reports *B*’s words in the following way:

(19) Either he didn’t like me or there is a garage round the corner.

The second disjunct in (19) seems to carry the same implicatures as *B*’s utterance in (18), namely *the garage is open* and *it has petrol to sell*. If so, we can conclude that embeddability is not limited to scalar implicatures.

Of course not all theorists are sympathetic to extending Gricean reasoning to subsentential clauses. As said above, Recanati (2003a), for instance, claims that globality and the awareness of inference (“availability” in his terminology) are required conditions for conversational implicatures (Recanati 2003a, p.300). Since, local implications do not meet these conditions, they should not be seen as implicatures. Recanati’s suggestion is leaving Gricean theory intact and explaining the phenomenon in question within the framework of his truth-conditional pragmatics theory (Recanati 2003a, p.320).

Recanati also seems to reject conventional implicatures, for they do not meet his globality and availability conditions. In his view, conventional implicatures are not implicatures, and they are for the most part a subject matter for semantics

¹²See Lepore and Stone (2015, Section 8.3) for these approaches.

(Recanati 2003a, p.300). Similarly, another theorist, Bach, rejects that so-called conventional implicatures and scalar implicatures are implicatures (Bach 2006).

In this discussion I take Chierchia and Simons' side. I reject Recanati's truth-conditional pragmatics approach in face of the problem that I have discussed in Section 2.4 above. We need a literal meaning and what-is-implicated (implied) distinction even for words and his approach (and other similar approaches) does not satisfy this need. Between Chierchia and Simons, I will follow Chierchia's method. Simons' approach has some limitations. Although, she accepts that a hearer can pay attention to an embedded clause and calculate its implicatures locally, there seems to be no place for phrasal implicatures in her approach. When it comes to metaphors this causes problems of the kind mentioned in Section 2.2. Certain metaphors, whether they are embedded or not, do not seem explainable by the clausal approach. Thus, Simons' suggestion helps us explaining how embedded implicatures work in the Gricean framework but do not help us with metaphors.

Another problem Simons does not address is how certain implicatures can be calculated online, as a parallel process to the sentence interpretation. Simons seems to adhere to the two-step process account of implicatures. In her account, embedded clauses can generate implicatures, but the calculation of these implicatures still presupposes the clausal meaning as a whole. As discussed in Section 2.3, if metaphorical meaning is a form of implicature and metaphors can be processed in one step without presupposing the literal meaning of the sentence, then Simons' approach is not promising in developing an implicature-based theory of metaphor which can also work well at the psychological level.

In the next section, I will present my proposal about the subsentential implicatures in which I will follow Chierchia's suggestion that implicatures are "computed phrase by phrase in tandem with truth conditions". Although Chierchia's concern is only with scalar implicatures, I will generalize his thought to other types of subsentential implicatures.

3.2.2 My Proposal

In Section 3.2.1, I compared Chierchia's and Simons's accounts of embedded scalar implicatures, and I concluded that the former account, since it allows phrases to generate implicatures, is more preferable for my purposes. In this section, I will explore the possibility of extending Chierchia's approach to other (non-scalar) types of phrasal implicatures. Before that there are two similar views I will introduce.

3.2.2.1 Bart Geurts and Karen S. Lewis on the Gricean Reasoning at the Subsentential Level

Bart Geurts and Karen S. Lewis have separately defended a Gricean explanation for subsentential pragmatics. I see them as close allies to my view. Thus, let me introduce their views briefly.

Geurts (2010) argues that Gricean reasoning can explain different types of lexical interpretation:

(...) lexical interpretation tends to be viewed as a rather passive affair, the basic idea being that, in order to determine the meaning of a word, all the hearer has to do is look it up in his mental dictionary. The foregoing observations paint a rather different picture. Interpreting a word is very much an active process, in which the hearer continually has to select between large numbers of possible meanings and has to construct new meanings on the fly. The dynamics of this process is Gricean: the logic that underwrites the selection and construction of word meanings is similar to that of conversational implicatures. (Geurts 2010, p.184)¹³

What Geurts points out is the need for Gricean reasoning at the phrasal level. When forming a sentence, there might be several candidates for a constituent. A speaker should consider a candidate in terms of both its semantic contribution and the pragmatic inferences it causes in a given context, and she should choose the most appropriate candidate. The interpreter needs to go through similar reasoning in interpreting why a particular phrase is chosen by the speaker. I will develop these preliminary remarks below.

Lewis (2012) targets the dynamic semantic approaches. On a dynamic approach, the way in which a given expression would change the context is built in to the semantics of the expression. Accordingly, the semantic values of sentences are their context change potentials (CCPs). Against these approaches, Lewis argues that static semantics reinforced with a new interpretation of the Gricean framework will do better than dynamic approaches (Lewis 2012, p.314-5).

¹³Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015, p.447) also argue for the same idea:

In his writings on pragmatics, Grice confined his attention to one particular type of illocutionary act, namely assertions, and his choice of maxims mirrors this limitation. In particular, the Quality maxims, which urge the speaker to be truthful and have adequate evidence for his utterances, are obviously restricted in their application. However, it is equally obvious that Gricean pragmatics extends not only to other illocutionary acts, but also to such linguistic acts as the production and interpretation of words, grammatical constructions, and intonation contours (...)

One of the problems Dynamic Semantics is interested in is novelty. Consider the following:

- (20) a. A woman walked in.
 b. She ordered lunch.

It is clear in this example that the speaker, by uttering “a woman”, introduces a new referent into the discourse. This novelty feature, however, is not expressed in the traditional semantics of indefinites. The semantic value of an indefinite in traditional semantics is the existential quantifier, but the existential quantifier signals nothing about whether the person referred to in (20) has been mentioned previously in the discourse. Nevertheless, the indefinite seems to indicate a new referent has been introduced into the discourse for discussion. This and some other shortcomings of traditional semantics lead some theorists to adopt a dynamic approach. They argue for a new semantic system in which, the novelty feature of indefinites is captured directly in the semantics. The dynamic semantics approach identifies the semantic values of constituents of sentences with their CCPs. To put it crudely, the semantic value of an indefinite dictates that a new object is added to the discourse context (Lewis 2012, p.316-7).

The dynamic semantical solution to novelty is elegant but also radical, but it seems also theoretically costly. It suggests the elimination of the traditional semantics. If the solutions to the problems of traditional semantics can be found within the traditional framework, most theorists would find those solutions more appealing. Lewis argues for such traditional solutions. In her view, if the Gricean framework is extended to subsententials, we will obtain solutions to the problems within the scope of the classical semantics-pragmatics framework. The Gricean-style reasoning Lewis suggests for the novelty feature is the following:

Co-operative conversational participants, in an effort to track the conversation, may ask themselves how the speaker’s utterance of [(20)a] relates to the conversational context. Does the speaker want to convey information about a woman already under discussion, or is this woman novel to the discussion? If the speaker had wanted to pick out a particular woman already under discussion, she had a much better way to do so, one far less prone to interpretive error: she could have used a pronoun, definite description, demonstrative, or name. But the speaker didn’t do so. So unless there is some other clear reason for the speaker making an existential claim rather than one containing a definite expression, [(20)a] is indicative of a plan to convey information about a *new* woman under discussion. (Lewis 2012, p.327)

Lewis points out the need for the notion of non-propositional subsentential implicature. She calls the implication of novelty “the novelty implicature”. This implicature is cancellable. That is, in certain contexts the novelty of the object in question is not implied. Since only conversational implicatures are cancellable, we can conclude that the novelty implicature is a conversational one.

To summarise, I wish to quote the following passage from Lewis, in which she expresses her support for subsentential Gricean pragmatics clearly:

(...) I think the important question is to ask whether subsentential expressions have a conversational purpose. The basic idea in Gricean pragmatics is the co-operative principle, that conversational participants will make contributions appropriate to the purpose of the conversation, or stage of the conversation. If we accept that (at least certain) subsentential expressions make conversational contributions, then the same sort of reasoning that can be performed on the contents of full sentences can also be performed on the contents of subsentential expressions. Subsentential expressions do seem like the sorts of things that interlocutors can grasp and reason about, and I think that this gives us good reason to think that pragmatic effects occur based on sub-sentential expressions. (Lewis 2014, p.244)

Geurts and Lewis seem to be very promising allies to my project.¹⁴ In the next

¹⁴ Two theorists I need to mention here are Kenneth A. Taylor and Herbert H. Clark. Taylor discusses the problem of unarticulated constituents and concludes that it can be explained in terms of Gricean subpropositional pragmatics (Taylor 2001).

Clark (1983), in his classic piece of work “Making Sense of Nonce Sense” discusses the pragmatics of subsententials. Although he does not use the Gricean terminology, his view can be considered to be Gricean. On this view, there are different kinds of expressions which have “nonce sense”, that is, “do not possess a finite number of senses that can be listed in the parser’s lexicon.” (Clark 1983, p.298) (“A ‘parser’ is a device, either human or mechanical, that is designed to analyse a person’s utterances as a part of deciding what that person meant.” (Clark 1983, p.297)) Clark calls them “contextual expressions”. A contextual expression can possess a literal or direct meaning, but in different contexts it can mean non-denumerable different things. For example, the use of “teapot” in “He tried to teapot a policeman” is such an expression. It is a noun which literally have all teapots in its extension, but in this context, it is used as a verb to mean something else. This type of contextual expression is called “innovative denominal verb” (Clark 1983, p.301). Other types of contextual expressions include possessives and eponymous verbs such as “do a Napoleon” in “The photographer asked me to do a Napoleon for the camera” (Clark 1983, p.302-4).

Clark draws a parallel between contextual expressions and indirect illocutionary acts. They are similar in these five respects:

- (1) Simultaneous meanings (Two separate meanings are expressed: one is literal and direct, whereas the other is indirect)
- (2) Logical priority of direct use
- (3) Literalness of direct meaning

section, my aim is to develop and systematise their ideas, and in the next chapter I develop a metaphor account along these lines.

3.2.2.2 A Gricean Approach to Subsententials

As stated above, I call my theory of metaphor, which accommodates both clausal and phrasal implicatures, “extended Gricean”. Now the question is why I believe that the Gricean framework with some revisions can explain phrasal implications. What licences such a revision? In order to answer this question, what I need to do is to demonstrate how Gricean reasoning, principles (maxims) and linguistic tests for implicatures can be adapted to phrases.

First, let us see how a Gricean definition of utterance meaning can be adapted to phrases (x is a phrase below):

‘By uttering x , U (the utterer) meant e ’ is true if and only if for some audience A , U uttered x intending:

- (a) A to entertain e ,
- (b) A to recognize that U intends (a), and
- (c) A ’s recognition that U intends (a) to function, in part, as a reason for (a).

(4) Non-denumerability of indirect meanings

(5) Contextuality of indirect meanings (Clark 1983, p.320)

This parallelism, according to Clark, suggests that a model designed for indirect illocutionary acts can be applied to contextual expressions (Clark 1983, p.321). A speaker utters a sentence with a goal (or an intention). Similarly, we can think the utterance of each word as subgoals (Clark 1983, p.324). For instance, the subgoal of uttering an innovative denominal verb is formulated as follows:

In using an innovative denominal verb sincerely, the speaker means to denote:

- (a) the kind of situation
- (b) that he has good reason to believe
- (c) that on this occasion the listener can readily compute
- (d) uniquely
- (e) on the basis of their mutual knowledge
- (f) in such a way that the parent noun denotes one role in the situation, and the remaining surface arguments of the denominal verb denote other roles in the situation.

Here ‘situation’ is a cover term for states, events, and processes. (Clark 1983, p.321)

In conclusion, I can say that Clark’s suggestion on the pragmatics of certain subsententials is along the similar lines as what other theorists I discussed in this section suggest and what I will suggest below. The common motivation behind these suggestions is that a speaker utters a phrase with certain goals and intentions and the hearer tries to analyse the pragmatic significance of the uttered phrase by inferring the speakers’ goals and intentions with the help of the context.

Here, the only change we needed on the original definition is to replace “believe” with “entertain” in (a) since belief is a propositional attitude. The rest of the original definition remains intact (except using a different variable e for phrase meanings).

Next, we can continue with Gricean reasoning. A general formulation of a hearer’s reasoning is given by Levinson (1983, pp.113-4):

- (i) S [speaker] has said that p .
- (ii) There’s no reason to think S is not observing the maxims, or at least the co-operative principle.
- (iii) In order for S to say that p and be indeed observing the maxims or the co-operative principle, S must think that q .
- (iv) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed if S is to be taken to be co-operating.
- (v) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, thinking that q .
- (vi) Therefore S intends me to think that q , and in saying that p has implicated q .

This formulation is given in terms of utterance meanings (p in the above definition) but I see no difficulty in applying this reasoning to phrase meanings (e in the following definition):

- (i’) S [speaker] has used a phrase to mean e .
- (ii’) There’s no reason to think S is not observing the maxims, or at least the co-operative principle
- (iii’) In order for S to use a phrase to mean e and be indeed observing the maxims or the co-operative principle, S must entertain f .
- (iv’) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that her intending to mean f (instead of e) must be supposed if S is to be taken to be co-operating.
- (v’) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, entertaining f .
- (vi’) Therefore S intends me to entertain f , and in using a phrase to mean e has implied f .

In the original formulation small revisions are needed so as to adapt the steps to the phrasal reasoning. One change is substituting “to entertain” with “to think” in steps (iii’), (v’) and (vi’). Since thinking is generally considered to be thinking of a

proposition, I preferred a looser but essentially similar concept. For the same reason I replaced “say” with “using a phrase to mean”. Other changes are the obvious ones required in switching from the proposition talk to the subpropositional talk.¹⁵

I should emphasize that phrasal reasoning does not mean that phrases are taken in isolation. Phrases, in this type of reasoning, are evaluated against the surrounding linguistic environment. The linguistic environment restricts the set of possible implications.

The form of clausal reasoning nicely matches with that of phrasal reasoning. In one case, a sentence meaning implicates another sentence meaning, whereas in the other case a phrase meaning is implying another phrasal meaning. At two different linguistic levels the reasoning steps are parallel. Now the content of the steps should be examined. The crucial question concerns the reference to the Cooperative Principle and maxims in the third step. How are they adopted to phrases?

3.2.2.3 Maxims at the Subsentential Level

Let us first consider the Cooperative Principle and the quantity maxims:

CP: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk

¹⁵ Geurts and Rubio-Fernández (2015, pp.447-8) argue that similar Gricean reasoning is at work even in disambiguating lexical meanings:

(...) consider the word “chestnut”, which according to the OED has three established senses: it can be used to refer to (i) a glossy hard brown edible nut, (ii) the large European tree that produces the edible chestnut, or (iii) a horse of a reddish-brown or yellowish-brown colour. Now suppose the following sentence is uttered:

(3) The chestnuts are shedding their leaves.

This utterance will naturally give rise to the inference that the speaker is using “chestnut” in the second sense. What justifies this inference? In a nutshell, the answer is that the inference is justified because, in the context of (3), a cooperative speaker would not use the word in either of the other senses. Spelled out in more detail, following Grice’s schema:

- (4) – She has used the word “chestnut”;
 – there is no reason to suppose that she is not observing the Cooperative Principle;
 – she could not be doing this unless she intended to refer to trees of the genus *Castanea*, for this is one of the standard meanings of the word, and it fits our discourse purposes better than any of the others;
 – she knows (and knows that I know that she knows) that I can see that the supposition that she intends the word in this meaning is required;
 – she has done nothing to stop me thinking that this is so;
 – she intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that she intended to refer this type of tree;
 – and so this is what she has implied.

exchange in which you are engaged.

Quantity Maxims (QuanM):

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- (Grice 1989, p.26)

As Simons (2010, p.152) remarks, in these principles, the most common interpretation of the phrase “(conversational) contribution” is assertion. Conforming to the CP and QuanM, then, requires the speaker to make her conversational contribution be the strongest relevant assertion (in accordance with her beliefs). However as quoted above from Simons, there is another way of understanding QuanM. I re-quote the relevant section:

Provide as much information as is required *about the situation you are describing*. Or, utilizing the notion of strength: Provide the strongest description of the situation you aim to describe compatible with the requirements of relevance. The idea is this: a speaker’s choice of words is always an indication of some belief she has about the situation she is describing.

If we understand the QuanM in this way, a phrase’s informative contribution could also be considered to be being governed by QuanM. Analogous maxims at the phrasal level can be formulated in the following way:

Quantity Maxims (at the phrasal level) (QuanMP):

1. Choose the phrase whose contribution is as informative as is required.
2. Do not choose the phrase whose contribution is more informative than is required.

The phrase chosen should give the best (or the strongest) description of what it describes. For instance, if the speaker believes that John *loves* Mary, and there is no independent reason for her to opt out of the maxims, she should not use a weaker word such as “like” to describe the relation between John and Mary. This is a scalar implicature example, but I believe other types of phrasal implicatures can also exemplify this. Imagine a speaker who can felicitously use two different phrases, *a* and *b*, in a certain context, which are interchangeable in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentence. Suppose also the speaker, in this context, is capable of implying three features (say *f*, *g* and *h*) by using *a* and four features (say *f*, *g*, *h* and *i*) by using *b*. In this situation, if all these implications are relevant to the

situation the speaker is describing and accurate in the speaker's opinion, she should use the most informative phrase, namely *b*.¹⁶ This reasoning, I believe, illustrates an application of QuanMP to a non-scalar phrase.

Geurts (2010) also considers how analogous Quantity maxims can be formulated at the phrase level and suggests more restricted revisions:

(...) referential expressions are expected to be neither too general (\sim Quantity 1) nor too specific (\sim Quantity 2), since lack of specificity will render it impossible to identify the intended referent, while excessive specificity will result in moronic discourses like the following:

(25) Once Little Red Riding Hood's grandmother gave Little Red Riding Hood a little cap made of red velvet. Because it suited Little Red Riding Hood so well, and Little Red Riding Hood wanted to wear it all the time, Little Red Riding Hood came to be known as Little Red Riding Hood. (Geurts 2010, p.24)

I agree with him on the role of Quantity maxims in choosing appropriate descriptions in order to facilitate reference resolution, but the role of QuanMP is more than that. Consider non-descriptive phrases. Thus, how can a non-descriptive phrase fit in this account of QuanMP? For instance, names in one influential view, Millianism, are not descriptive at all. So, how are QuanMP applicable to names? The answer can be found by recalling the point that Gricean maxims can be effective at the level of semantic meaning or speaker's meaning (or both). If a name only picks out an object at the semantic meaning level, choosing one of the two names which pick out the same object does not make any difference as far as the semantic meaning is concerned. However, using different names might make a difference at the level of the speaker's meaning. For instance, consider the following sentences:

(21) Dr Jekyll has murdered Sir Carew.

(22) Mr Hyde has murdered Sir Carew.

Although Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde are the same person (in the story), and these two sentences are truth-conditionally equivalent, they might generate different implicatures. For instance, (21) might implicate that the hearer cannot go to Dr Jekyll's surgery anymore, but in the same context the same implicature might not be generated by (22). In this case, we can say that (21) fits in this situation better than (22) or the former describes the situation better than the other. Thus, a name can make

¹⁶The paradigmatic example of this type of informativeness is metaphor. After the discussion of metaphor in the next chapter, the informativeness of a phrase will be clear.

a contribution to the description of a situation. Understood this way, I believe, even a name's contribution to an utterance meaning can be seen as being governed by QuanMP.

Let us continue with the Quality maxims. The supermaxim is "Try to make your contribution one that is true", and the specific maxims are:

Quality Maxims (QualM):

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Clearly these maxims are intended to be working at the clause level. However, they seem to have phrasal effects. Since the sentence meaning is composed of phrase-meanings, in order for a sentence to be true, phrases in it should have certain qualities. One way to spell out this idea is to think about what features the parts of a proposition can hold that are analogous to truth. A natural candidate is *satisfiability*. The objects that satisfy a predicate can form a true proposition, and similarly the objects that do not satisfy a predicate can only form a false proposition. We have satisfiability for predicates as we have truth for propositions. Thus, we can define the practice of choosing the right phrase in terms of satisfiability relation. If one is to choose an object term, in order to make the sentence true, the referent of the object term must satisfy the predicate. On the other hand, if one is determining a predicate term and wants to obtain a true sentence, one must consider if the object of the sentence can satisfy the referent of the candidate predicate term. Non-referring terms, for example, can be clear examples for the violation of satisfiability since these terms cannot satisfy any predicate.¹⁷ The occurrence of a non-referring name or a general term in an affirmative sentence is sufficient to make it false (or at least non-true). Similarly, if one is asked about the colour of her car, satisfiability requires her to express the correct colour predicate which is satisfied by the object (i.e. the car).

Notice that Grice's original definition of the Quality maxims takes into account only what-is-said; it ignores what-is-implicated. This can cause certain problems. For example, these maxims allow someone to implicate something false or misleading even though she is only expressing her true belief which she has adequate evidence for. This is clearly against the intent of the CP. Hence, maxims should rule out this kind of possibility. Martinich presents the following case to exemplify the problem:

Suppose that Mr. Allworthy, who is the officer of a bank, is being considered for the position of bank president, and that in order to thwart

¹⁷Geurts (2010, p.24) also points out the relation between Quality maxims at the phrasal level and vacuous terms.

the appointment, Mr. Envious goes before the directors who are to make the decision and says, “It is possible that Allworthy will be arrested for embezzlement.” Now, what Envious says is true, since he has no guarantee that Allworthy will not be arrested, and hence his arrest is *possible* (though the possibility may charitably be described as remote); so Envious’s assertion conforms to maxim [QualM 1]. Moreover, he has evidence that is adequate to support his claim, since he knows that Allworthy is a bank officer, and that is a sufficient reason to believe it *possible* for him to be arrested for embezzlement; thus Envious’s assertion conforms to maxim [QualM 2] as well. And yet Envious has violated the Cooperation Principle by deceiving the directors (or at least trying to deceive them); he has falsely implied that Allworthy is a crook and that he, Envious, has evidence to that effect. (Martinich 1984, p.24)

Another example of this problem can be extracted from the discussion of belief attributions in Salmon (1986, p.116). One can truthfully utter the following:

(23) The Ancient Astronomer believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Since “Hesperus is Phosphorus” expresses a necessarily true proposition, the speaker will also have adequate evidence to make this claim. Hence, Grice’s two maxims of Quality are satisfied. However, making this claim is still misleading, because, as it is famously pointed out by Frege, ancient astronomers were unaware of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus.

Martinich suggests a revision of the Quality maxims so as to avoid this kind of problem:

Quality Maxims (Martinich version):

1. Do not say or imply what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say or imply that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(Martinich 1984, p.24)

I agree with Martinich. Considering Grice’s purpose in formulating the maxims, their scope seems narrower than intended. Speaker’s implications should also be taken into account in the formulation. Notice that, in the Quantity maxims Grice is careful enough to consider the speaker’s implications in his formulation. For this reason he uses “contribution” instead of “saying”. Contribution seems to involve both saying and implicating.

In light of this discussion we can now formulate analogous maxims for phrases:

Quality Maxims (at the phrasal level) (QualMP):

1. Do not use a phrase whose contribution makes what-is-said or what-is-implicated false.
2. Do not use a phrase whose contribution makes what-is-said or what-is-implicated something you are unsure of.¹⁸

The second QualMP might need some explanation. Think of a context in which the speaker is not sure about the total contribution (semantic meaning + implications) of a phrase. This phrase might mislead the hearers by eliciting their arriving at implications unintended by the speaker. I think the motivation behind the second QualMP is the same as that of QualM (at least the Martinich version). The latter expresses the idea that a speaker should not mislead her audience by saying (or implicating) something she does not have sufficient evidence for. The phrasal maxim, similarly, prescribes the speakers not to use phrases if they do not have sufficient evidence regarding the effect these phrases can make. Note that this does not mean that the second QualMP would only come into play in situations where one is not sure of what a word means. As I mentioned above the total contribution of a word is beyond the conventional meaning of the word; the phrasal implicatures that a hearer can obtain in the given context should also be thought of as the part of the total contribution of a word. For example, if a speaker realizes that her hearer can obtain certain implications that are not intended by her (the speaker) from the use of a word, the second QualMP requires her not to use that word.¹⁹

The third and fourth maxims seem to be straightforwardly applicable to phrases as well. The maxim of Relevance (or Relation) (MR) just says “Be relevant”. In describing a situation, a speaker should choose the contextually relevant phrases. For instance, when one is asked about the time, one can report the time at different levels of precision depending on the context. If one is asking the time in order to get a general idea, and the reporter knows this, he would normally report the time approximately. But if the asker needs more precision the reporter should behave accordingly. For instance, if a person who is boiling eggs asks the time, and the reporter is aware of the reason of the question, he should read and say the exact minute on his clock. This kind of situation exemplifies how the MR plays a role in one’s choosing the relevant phrase in forming one’s utterance. I should also note that I do not mean the speaker in this example makes a non-sentential assertion. This is a separate debate which I need not enter into.²⁰ The MR at the phrasal level

¹⁸In this formulation the classical Gricean sense of what-is-said is assumed.

¹⁹Of course, the other option is to use the word and cancel the unwanted implicatures.

²⁰See Stainton (2006) and Stanley (2000) for discussion.

only governs the selection of the relevant phrase, and if there is an assertion, it is made by the utterance as usual.

Finally, the fourth maxim is the maxim of Manner. The supermaxim is “Be perspicuous” and the specific maxims related to it as follows:

Maxim of Manner (MM):

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

For example, one should not use a word or phrase one normally does not use, such as “a piece of furniture to sit on” instead of “chair” unless one intends something different (such as sarcasm). This is governed by MM. This set of maxims is particularly compatible with the phrasal level of reasoning. Indeed, this compatibility might be claimed as a proof for the legitimacy of phrasal implicatures.

To summarize, I believe that employing the Gricean framework at the phrase level causes no major problems. Indeed, it is particularly straightforward. A speaker’s choice of phrases and a hearer’s interpretation of them seem to be governed by almost the same principles as that of utterances (or clauses). A helpful analogy can be made between the role of maxims in communication and fill in the blank questions for foreign language learners. Fill in the blank questions are produced by taking out a phrase from a sentence, and the examinees are expected to find the most appropriate phrase that can complete the sentence. Of course, there is usually more than one alternative, but the examinee’s aim is to find the most relevant phrase (MR) at the right specificity (and informativeness) level (QuanMP) and in the right form (MM) which makes the sentence true (QualMP). Note that the examinee is expected to take into account not only the semantic meaning of the phrase, but also the implications that the phrase might trigger. Thus, phrasal maxims guide the examinee in both her semantic and pragmatic evaluations.

Before concluding this chapter let me say a few things about the characteristics of the phrasal implicature. In a typical case, there are three theoretical stages in the calculation of phrasal implicatures:

- (i) A phrase in a sentence is considered unexpected, and this triggers the calculation of an implicature. The hearer seeks an alternative meaning in place of the meaning of the trigger phrase.
- (ii) The hearer determines an alternative meaning using the guidance of the maxims and Gricean reasoning at the phrasal level.

- (iii) When this alternative meaning is substituted for the meaning of the trigger phrase in the original utterance, a new content different from the one the original utterance expresses ensues.

What I wish to emphasize is that in phrasal implicatures the focus is on a phrasal meaning. The phrase triggers an implicature calculation, the candidate meanings are sought with the help of it, and when the new meaning is found, a new content is obtained by the replacement of the new meaning with this phrasal meaning. After all, a phrase is causally responsible for this process.

There is a similar form of implicature which should not be confused with the phrasal implicature. In some cases, although a phrase is causally responsible for the generation of an implicature, the implicature does not replace the meaning of the trigger phrase as it is laid out above. Conventional implicatures such as those triggered by “therefore” and “but” are cases in point. At first appearance these words might seem good cases of phrasal implicatures, but they are not. Although these phrases are causally responsible for the implicatures, the content of the implicature cannot be given just by replacing the implied meanings with their meaning. In other words, the implicatures these words generate are clausal ones. In order to see this clearly, let us consider Grice’s examples.

(24) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (Grice 1989, p.25)

(25) She was poor but she was honest. (Grice 1989, p.88)

In (24), the implicature is that his being brave follows from his being an Englishman; similarly in (25) the implicature is that there is a contrast between being poor and being honest. It is clear that these implicatures cannot be phrasal since they are not obtained just by replacing the phrases “therefore” and “but” in the original sentences. In conclusion, not all implicatures which are triggered by a phrase are phrasal implicature.

Theoretical discussion of phrasal implicatures cannot be complete without the examination of implicature tests suggested by Grice. I will examine these tests after I present my theory of metaphor. I believe metaphor is a paradigmatic example of phrasal implicatures and testing metaphorical implicatures against Gricean criteria will nicely illustrate the application of tests to phrases.

Chapter 4

The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor

In this chapter, I will first present my theory of metaphor in general and then deal with some details about the theory.

4.1 The Theory of Metaphor in General

Frege, in his discussion of concepts, makes an interesting remark:

(...) ‘there is only one Vienna’. We must not let ourselves be deceived because language often uses the same word now as a proper name, now as a concept-word; in our example, the numeral indicates that we have the latter; ‘Vienna’ is here a concept-word, like ‘metropolis’. Using it in this sense, we may say: ‘Trieste is no Vienna’. (Frege 1951, p.175)

Frege had never written on metaphors directly. However, this passage can clearly be seen as an undeveloped introductory remark on metaphorical uses. Surprisingly, even philosophers who write on metaphors overlook the metaphoricity of Frege’s example:

(...) probably any proper name has occasional flaccid uses. Frege (1892/1952a) offers a famous example: “Trieste is no Vienna,” where “Vienna” functions not as the name of a city, but as abbreviating a loose cluster of exciting cultural properties that Vienna has. In the same tone, on an occasion well remembered by American voters, 1988 Vice-Presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen told his rival Dan Quayle, “Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.” (Lycan 2008, p.47)

What Lycan overlooks is that the examples given by him and Frege contain typical metaphorical uses of proper names.¹ There are various syntactic forms in which a name can be used metaphorically. Some examples as follows:

- (1) Messi is the new Maradona.
- (2) He is the Hitler of our department.

What is common in all these examples is that a name is used to imply features which are associated with the object it denotes. So, Frege is right in believing that the features related to Vienna are in the picture (such as the feature *metropolis*), but he, I believe, unnecessarily assumes that names have more than one function. We can explain these uses without assuming a concept-word function for names. According to my theory, proper names, in their metaphorical uses, denote what they denote in their ordinary uses, namely an object. What is implied by the name (more precisely, by the meaning of the name) at the phrase level is more or less “a loose cluster of exciting cultural properties”.

In the rest of the section, I will first discuss how a phrasal implicature is triggered. After the presentation of the basics of my theory, the section will continue with the discussion of two theoretical notions my theory appeals to: salience and the question under discussion. Finally, I will take up two of the much-discussed problems in the metaphor literature, the so-called emergent property problem and the question concerning the systematicity of metaphorical interpretation.

4.1.1 Triggering of Phrasal Implicatures

What does it mean for an implicature to be able to be interpreted at the phrase level? Let me repeat the basic formulation: A phrasal implicature occurs in cases where a speaker uses a proper part of a sentence to mean something other than the semantic content of this proper part. In a typical case, the proper part which generates the phrasal implicature also does the triggering by itself. How does this happen?

For slurs, as an example, identifying the trigger is easy, since this type of implicature is conventionally caused by certain expressions, such as “boche”, which we have discussed earlier. Conversational implicatures, however, typically are not triggered conventionally. Thus, context is the only candidate to do the heavy lifting. Roughly speaking, contextual information includes every type of background information in

¹Of course, it cannot be said that metaphorical uses of names are overlooked by every theorist. For instance, Burge (1973, p.429), in his discussion of the predicative uses of names, acknowledges the metaphorical use and distinguishes it from other predicative uses.

the interpretation of a sentence. This information could originate from the ongoing discourse or from the other features of the situation.

Here is my suggestion for contextual triggering of phrasal implicatures: If a phrasal meaning is unexpected by the hearer in a certain discourse context, then the hearer might look for other salient features associated with the denotation of the unexpected phrase and try to make sense of the unexpectedness by substituting this salient feature (and possibly some others) with the meaning of the unexpected phrase in the original utterance content.²

At this point, I should make two clarifications on the notion of unexpectedness. First, there might be non-linguistic types of unexpectedness, such as seeing someone in an unexpected place. They can also trigger alternative explanations. But my focus will be linguistic unexpectedness, in which a part of a clause is considered unexpected and this unexpectedness triggers an alternative interpretation for (mostly) the trigger or (rarely) some other part of the utterance. Another thing I should emphasize is that not all triggers cause alternative explanations. I consider unexpectedness to be a cognitive notion which comes in degrees. Some low level of unexpectedness, for instance, might not trigger an alternative interpretation. The hearer might accept the utterance meaning as it is. Therefore, I assume that unexpectedness should exceed a threshold in hearer's mind in order to trigger an alternative interpretation.

A phrase might be perceived as unexpected for different reasons. It is plausible to think that when one asks a question she (most of the time) predicts a set of possible answers. A phrase might not fit in the hearer's predictions for various reasons. Consider the following examples:

- (3) How to *Russell* a Frege-Church (The title of one of David Kaplan's articles)
- (4) *No 10* states David Cameron will deliver on Scottish devolution promise.
- (5) This text *smells* of translation. (A direct translation of a Turkish saying which is used for poorly translated texts.)
- (6) JANE: I have a terrible cold. I need a *Kleenex*. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.19)

In (3), a proper name "Russell" occurs in a transitive verb position. Is this construction syntactically ill-formed? If it is, then this explicit ill-formedness might trigger

²I will qualify the unexpectedness requirement in a moment. It is not always the unexpectedness that triggers phrasal implicatures, but in most typical cases it is.

an alternative explanation of what the speaker is trying to say.³ The unexpectedness might also arise at the level of semantics. According to one influential theory of semantics, namely the functional application approach of Heim and Kratzer (1998, p.29), the semantic type of names is $\langle e \rangle$, and that of transitive verbs is $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$. So, a transitive verb takes an entity as an argument and outputs a function from entities to truth values. Obviously, in this framework a name cannot take anything as an argument, which seems to be the cause of semantic unexpectedness in (3).

(4) is an example of metonymy in which unexpectedness arises from “No 10” being the subject of the sentence. The sentence clearly does not say anything about a number. The hearer will easily fix this unexpectedness by finding a relevant interpretation for this phrase, such as *the UK government*. In (5) the trigger is a category mistake, since a text is not something odorous. Finally, (6) exemplifies loose talk in which the irrelevance of a specific brand triggers an alternative for “Kleenex” which could be something like *a piece of tissue*. In this example, the speaker does not exactly need a Kleenex; she utters the name of this brand, but what she means is just a piece of tissue paper.

The above are typical examples of triggering in metaphorical utterances. There are however some cases in which the triggering mechanism is more complicated than (3)-(6). Cases in point are sentences usually called “sentential metaphors” in which the entire sentence is claimed to receive a metaphorical interpretation. Consider the following example:

(7) A spectre is haunting Europe

That is the first part of the opening sentence of *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels, which expresses how communism is perceived by its opponents all over the Europe. There is no syntactic or semantic deviance in this sentence. How is that sentence recognized as metaphorical? I think the general context helps in this case. Since words such as “spectre” and “haunting” are not part of the usual vocabulary of a political text, they signal an alternative interpretation. However, so-called sentential metaphors seem to differ from other metaphors in their interpretation. I will discuss their interpretation in Section 4.5.5.

There are other cases which can be seen sentential metaphors but which seem to be more complicated. Consider this sentence:

(8) I grabbed my clothes, stumbled to the toilet and threw up over and over until the only thing left in my stomach was guilt. (Guardian - 14 Jan 2016)

³Note that to feel the unexpectedness, arriving at the end of the expression is not needed.

It seems difficult to determine the trigger here. At first one might find “guilt” unexpected and think of it as a trigger for metaphorical interpretation. However, it does not seem possible to interpret this phrase metaphorically in this sentential context; it is clearly used literally. Thus, the interpreter should look elsewhere to find the cause of unexpectedness. After some reflection one can see that the phrase “stomach” (or “the only thing left in my stomach”) is the trigger which needs to be interpreted metaphorically. This metaphorical utterance has an interesting structure. The metaphorically used part is “the only thing left in my stomach”. However, since this part is seemingly compatible with the beginning of the sentence (“ I grabbed my clothes, stumbled to the toilet and threw up over and over until”), determining it as a trigger requires some effort. Here, the stomach seems to represent or symbolize the mind; that is the hidden metaphor is something like “mind is stomach”. I call this type of metaphorical use “metaphorical metonymy” and discuss it in Section 4.5.5.

White (1996) claimed that sentential metaphors are generated by the conflation of two sentences. In fact he argued that the conflation of two sentences is essential to creating metaphors. In other words metaphor is essentially a sentential linguistic phenomenon in his view. I will argue against his view in Section 4.5.7, but as for the triggering question, I should accept that a hearer might need to process the sentence more than once in order to recognize a complicated trigger as in (8). Notice that the determination of the trigger after processing the sentence as a whole does not mean that the implicature is clausal. By processing the whole sentence the trigger phrase is determined, and the phrasal meaning that is implied by the trigger phrase is calculated. Thus, the implicature in question will be a phrasal one.

I do not want to claim that unexpectedness is a necessary condition for triggering metaphorical interpretation. Ironically, sometimes the expectation of metaphor mainly triggers it. For example, metaphors are heavily expected when one reads poetry or a poetical prose. Readers look for alternative interpretations for poetical phrases.⁴

Another example of metaphor expectation is the case in which a speaker begins her metaphorical utterance with the expression “metaphorically speaking”. When this expression occurs in a sentence, the hearer knows that the speaker wants him to look for metaphors in the rest of the sentence.

Of course there are also cases in which neither expectedness nor unexpectedness

⁴Searle (1993, p.103) makes a similar point: “There are various other [other than the defectiveness of the utterance – *my addition*] clues that we employ to spot metaphorical utterances. For example, when reading Romantic poets, we are on the lookout for metaphors, and some people we know are simply more prone to metaphorical utterances than others.”

help, such as so-called twice-apt metaphors.⁵ If someone utters “Oslo is a cold city” to describe the physical and psychological impact of the city on her, then it might be very difficult for her hearers to grasp both of the meanings. In this case she should signal her intention in some other way such as putting emphasis on “cold”.

Let me summarise my claims about unexpectedness. In a typical case, the interpretation of a phrasal implicature is triggered by the unexpectedness of the content of the phrase. In order to determine what the speaker means at the clausal level, the phrasal implicature should replace the content of the trigger phrase in the original utterance content; the rest of the utterance content remains intact. We can express this idea schematically as follows: Suppose that the content of the utterance is in the form of $\lceil a F s b \rceil$. If we assume that F causes the unexpectedness and the speaker implies G by uttering F , then the phrasal implicature will be G . But, as mentioned before, a phrasal implicature brings about a derivative clausal implicature. In our schematic example, the clausal implicature will be in the form of $\lceil a G s b \rceil$; G replaces F and the rest of the original utterance content is copied.⁶

I called this process “typical” for two reasons. First, there are the above-mentioned twice-apt metaphor cases, in which usually no constituent of the content of the utterance is considered unexpected. In these cases, the phrasal implicature is supposed to be signalled by intonation or by some other contextual clue. Secondly, this process assumes an ordinary discourse. Metaphor use in other contexts, such as poetry or fiction, might diverge from the standard picture in some respects. Reading a literary work, one normally expects more metaphorical uses than an ordinary discourse. Thus, expectation can also trigger metaphorical interpretation in certain contexts.

There are, of course, several types of unexpectedness. What I have in mind, as I mentioned above, is linguistic unexpectedness. Linguistic unexpectedness occurs when a proper part of a clause does not match syntactically or semantically with the rest of the clause. Surely one might say unexpected things in a discourse. For instance if a lecturer says strange things such as “I’m quitting my job and moving to Hawaii” or “I’m a CIA agent sent to spy on the UK Government”, those utterances would surprise the students. But these are different from the linguistic

⁵Hills (1997) coined the expression “twice-apt”.

⁶Let me make some clarifications about the notation I am using: (i) I use double quotation marks to mention words and phrases. (ii) I italicise expressions to refer to their contents. I also italicise expressions to emphasize them. The context (I hope) will make clear what the italics indicate. (iii) All variables are italicised as is the usual practice. (iv) Non bold capital letters are the variables for the phrases that generate phrasal implicatures. (v) Bold capital letters are the variables for both the contents of the phrases that generate phrasal implicatures and the features that are associated with these contents.

unexpectedness I have in mind. In these examples, no proper part of these utterances fails to match with the rest of the utterance or with the discourse topic.

4.1.2 The Basic Picture

The basic picture of my theory of metaphor, which I call “The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor”, is as follows. Consider a metaphorical utterance in this form:

(9) *a* is *F*.

The speaker, by uttering *F*, implies some contextually salient or accessible feature(s) which is (are) connected to the denotation of *F* in the association sequence shared by the speaker and her audience.⁷

An association sequence, basically, is a sequence of features, that are ordered by their saliences from the most salient to the least, associated with an object or a kind. In the case of metaphor, the constituents in an association sequence are always descriptive features. For instance, the association sequence attached to *F* could be in the following form: $\langle \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}, \dots \rangle$. I will say more on association sequences in Section 4.2, but for now I can say that an association sequence is a dynamic data structure in which the saliences of the features are affected by contextual factors.

In the first step of interpretation, the hearer finds out the trigger phrase *F* and accesses the association sequence that is attached to the denotation of *F*. At this stage all associations (or possible phrasal implications) are made available to the hearer without her effort in the order from the most salient to the least. Note that this is an automatic and non-inferential step of the interpretation.

Unlike step one, step two is inferential. If the features in an association sequence are possible implications of *F*, then we can see metaphorical interpretation as a process of trying to identify which of these possible implications are actually implied by the speaker.⁸ The hearer examines the features in the association sequence beginning with the most salient one. For instance, in the association sequence given above the hearer should first examine *G*. The question is to decide whether the speaker implies *G*. This decision is governed by (Gricean) principles of conversation. As I argued above in Section 3.2, the Gricean Cooperative Principle and maxims can be straightforwardly adapted so as to work at the phrase level. The hearer considers $\lceil a \text{ is } G \rceil$ and decides whether the meaning of this clause can be part of the

⁷I assume that singular terms denote objects and general terms denote kinds (or properties).

⁸Borg (2001) suggests a notion of conceptual framework for metaphorical interpretation. I will say more about her account in Chapter 6.

speaker meaning in the relevant discourse context. I say “part of” because more than one feature might be implied by the speaker. In that case, for instance, the whole speaker’s meaning could be in the form of $\lceil a \text{ is } G, A \text{ and } D \rceil$. On this consideration, the crucial point is distinguishing which features that are associated with the kind or object in question are commonly assumed by the discourse participants. An association sequence attached to an object or a kind that a person is considering at a given time can have various types of features; for instance private ideas or emotions might naturally be part of the association sequence.⁹ So, the hearer should first determine which features are parts of the meaning intended by the speaker. Clearly, the hearer’s private associations cannot be part of what the speaker implies. Thus, a feature should be checked against its being private or not. If private it should be dismissed. If it is not private, the hearer should then determine whether it can be part of the interpretation of the phrasal implicature in question. I think the Question Under Discussion (QUD) framework, presented in Roberts (2012), could help in this.¹⁰ If a discourse can be considered to be answering certain questions commonly accepted by a speaker and a hearer, these questions could restrict the hearer’s interpretation. The hearer examines a feature, and this feature can be accepted as a part of the metaphorical interpretation only if it can be part of an answer to the question under discussion. In other words, in order for a feature to be part of the metaphorical interpretation, when this feature is substituted with the lexical meaning of the phrase in the original content, the newly formed content should be an answer to the question under discussion?

4.1.3 Saliency

In this section, I will present some details of the notion of saliency. A very general definition of saliency is this: A piece of information is salient if it is foremost in one’s mind (Giora 2003, p.15). Saliency admits degrees. So a piece of information might be more salient than some other.

An association feature attached to a certain kind or object, as a piece of information, will be salient to some degree in one’s mind. For instance, the *male* feature attached to *surgeon* is more salient than the *female* feature. Giora (2003, pp.16-8) counts four parameters that can affect the saliency of a feature: frequency, familiarity, conventionality, and prototypicality/stereotypicality. A feature will be more salient if it is frequently accessed. For instance, the *money* feature attached to *bank* would be more salient than a less frequent feature such as *security*. Similarly,

⁹I make more fine-grained distinctions on this commonality and privacy issue below.

¹⁰I explain this framework below.

an unfamiliar feature would be less salient. For instance, *swift payment* is a less familiar, and therefore a less salient, feature associated with *bank*. Conventionalized features would also be easily accessible and therefore more salient. The *creativity* feature of *musician*, for instance, is a very conventional one. Finally, a prototypical or stereotypical feature would be more salient:

On encountering *bird*, comprehenders are more likely to access a prototypical (robin, sparrow) than a marginal (chicken, penguin) member of the category of birds, given similar frequency of occurrence and sometimes regardless of frequency of occurrence of real-life members. (Giora 2003, pp.17)

Context affects salience. That is, a piece of information can become more salient or less salient in a particular context. This facilitative or inhibitory function of context on salience is called priming. Let us focus on facilitative priming. A phrase that previously occurs in the discourse would prime the salience of related meanings (linguistic priming). For instance, introducing football player Ronaldo into the discourse would increase the salience of football related features. Similarly, an activity or object in the immediate environment would prime the salience of related features. For instance, watching a football game would also increase the salience of football related features (extra-linguistic priming).

There are many other details but I think this is sufficient to obtain a general idea about the notion of salience. In sum: the salience of a piece of information is the degree of its being foremost in one's mind. The features in one's association sequence attached to an object or a kind have their own saliences independent of a given context, however in a discourse context the linguistic and extra-linguistic factors can change the degree of the salience of a feature.

4.1.4 Question Under Discussion (QUD)

In principle, the search for possible implications can continue forever. Every salient feature might make some other features salient and a chain reaction might occur. However, there must be a cognitive limit in the search for possible implications. That is the hearer should stop at some point. The question is when the hearer is satisfied with his search. Let us explore if the QUD framework can be helpful on this question.

It can be said that the QUD framework aims to formalize the Gricean maxim of Relation. According to this framework, a discourse context contains a set of

questions “that have been accepted by the interlocutors and have not yet been satisfactorily answered” (Roberts 2004, p.215).

A question, in the QUD approach, denotes a set of propositions that are the possible answers to that question. A question Q1 (the superquestion) entails another question Q2 (the subquestion) iff every proposition that answers Q1 also answers Q2. This definition of entailment presupposes answering a question completely. When a question is answered completely, a further inquiry into that question is not required. That means the question is removed from the QUD set. However, a question can also be answered partially; a complete answer to a QUD will be a partial answer to its superquestion (Roberts 2004, pp.209-10).¹¹

When a question is accepted and added to the common ground, cooperative interlocutors form an intention to find out an answer to that question (Roberts 2004, p.209). In the QUD framework, relevance of an utterance is considered to be being relevant to a question. A declarative utterance is relevant to a question in the QUD set only if the utterance partially or completely answers the question.

A question need not be introduced explicitly. There are contextual cues, which signal the QUD; one of them is prosodic focus. According to Roberts, prosodic focus in English presupposes the type of question under discussion (Roberts 2012, p.8). Consider the following sentence:

(10) Mary loves John.

Which QUD (10) answers depends on the intonation. For instance (11) can be an answer to (12), whereas (13) can be an answer to (14). The subscript “F” stands for focus, which indicates intonational stress.¹²

(11) Mary loves [John]_F.

(12) Who does Mary love?.

(13) [Mary]_F loves John.

(14) Who loves John?

The QUD framework can be applied to the discourses that contain metaphors as well. We can say that metaphorical utterances presuppose a QUD. For instance, “Juliet is the sun” seems to presuppose a question like “What does Juliet mean to you?” in the given context. Imagine a dialogue in which Romeo answers this question with a literal (or less metaphorical) utterance:

¹¹By definition, a complete answer to a QUD is also a partial answer to it, but I ignore this for the sake of simplicity. Thus, by “partial answer”, I mean a non-complete answer.

¹²For the details of the relation between focus and information structure see Roberts (2012, Sec.2).

(15) What does Juliet mean to you?

Romeo: She is the warmth of my world, the beginning of my day.

Why does Romeo satisfy with these two features? If he reflects more, he could clearly find more features to count. What makes him think that mentioning two features is good enough as an answer to the question under discussion? A similar question can be raised for metaphorical utterances. Romeo utters “Juliet is the sun” and his interlocutor ends up with the interpretation that Juliet is the warmth of his world, the beginning of his day. Again the question is why does the interlocutor take this as a good enough answer to the question under discussion, which is what Juliet means to Romeo? The interlocutor could have extended her interpretation with some additional features. Many theorists in the metaphor literature considers this possibility of extending the interpretation to be a characteristic of metaphor:

When we try to say what a metaphor “means,” we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. (Davidson 1978, p.46)

Metaphorical discourse, for example, offers an open-ended invitation to find insights from seeing one domain, analogically, as another. (Lepore and Stone 2015, p.5)

I agree that a metaphorical interpretation can continue open-endedly. But the critical question here is whether this open-endedness is peculiar to metaphor interpretation. I think it is not. The problem lies in the relation between a question and its answer. Some wh-questions can be answered open-endedly. For instance, if Romeo is asked who Juliet is, he could convey a large number of descriptions about her. He can either make a literal utterance or a metaphorical one, but as far as the utterance is supposed to answer this question, it can continue open-endedly.

I am not able to present a criterion on how an interlocutor is satisfied with an answer to a QUD. My point is rather that the problem is not exclusive to metaphor. It is a general problem for both literal and metaphorical discourse, and an explanation should explore the phenomenon in general.

4.1.5 Emergent Property Problem

I think what I suggest for the second step in the description of the basic picture above, also proposes a solution to the problem related to the predicability of features in metaphorical discourse. This is an important problem which leads many theorists to the so-called interaction view of metaphor. Interactionists claim that metaphorical interpretation is a matter of the interaction between the subject and

the predicate of a metaphorical clause. The main motivation behind this idea is the apparent non-predicability of certain features in an association sequence. A simple example might clarify this idea:

(16) Sally is a block of ice. (Searle 1993)

Suppose the speaker by this utterance is aiming to give a description of Sally's attitudes toward other people, and she (the speaker) means *Sally is cold* in the sense that she is not friendly and sympathetic. The literal meaning of the phrase will make the *coldness* feature salient to the hearer. The coldness of ice is obviously physical coldness and there is no reason to predicate this feature of Sally. Thus, *Sally is cold* in the physical sense of "coldness" could not be an intention of the speaker if the hearer has recognized that the speaker's point is related to Sally's behaviour. So, the feature *coldness* should be dismissed by the hearer. However, another sense of "cold" is relevant. Thus an interactionist could say that *cold* should not be dismissed, but rather there needs to be an adjustment between the physical sense of the word "cold" and the behavioural sense of it.¹³ I will treat an interactionist account in Chapter 6, but for now we can consider the claim that in (16) an interaction (or comparison) takes place between the features of a block of ice and Sally. As a result of this interaction the physical coldness of a block of ice and the behavioural coldness of Sally are matched, and that gives us the intended meaning of the speaker. I think this type of account unnecessarily complicates metaphorical interpretation. In the theory I suggest, the dynamic structure of association sequences can easily explain what is going on in this example. Considering a feature in an association sequence might increase the salience of related features. In other words accessing a feature (even if that feature is dismissed in the end) might give other related features prominence. In this picture, in (16) there seems to be two features *cold*₁ and *cold*₂ for physical coldness and behavioural coldness, respectively. *Cold*₁ could be more salient at the beginning of the interpretation given that its relation to the kind *block of ice*. However the consideration of this feature makes *cold*₂ salient as well because these words are homophones. Thus, even after *cold*₁ is dismissed, *cold*₂ would come to forefront as another salient feature, and would be accepted as the speaker's meaning.

Homophony enables the interpretation in (16), but of course this is not always the case. Consider the following example:

(17) John is a bulldozer.

¹³MacMillan English Dictionary gives "not seeming friendly or sympathetic" as the second meaning of "cold".

Let us assume that the speaker implies *stubbornness* with “bulldozer”. Then a problem arises: Bulldozers are not entities that are characterised as stubborn. Thus, how is this anthropomorphic feature associated with the *bulldozer* kind? In other words, how does this feature emerge from the association sequence in question? This is called “emergent property problem” by some theorists.¹⁴ Let me first schematically show how my proposed account deals with this problem. Suppose a metaphorical utterance whose form is ‘ $\lceil a \text{ is } F \rceil$ ’, and the association sequence that is attached to \mathbf{F} is as follows: $\langle \mathbf{P}_1, \mathbf{P}_2, \mathbf{P}_3 \rangle$. Let us assume that these three features are not applicable to the denotation of a ; they will be examined anyway. In this examination, as said earlier, the entertainment of a feature can make new features that are associated with it salient. For instance, \mathbf{P}_1 can make three more features salient. If so, then the association sequence will look as follows: $\langle \mathbf{P}_1, \mathbf{P}_2, \mathbf{P}_3, \mathbf{P}_{1.1}, \mathbf{P}_{1.2}, \mathbf{P}_{1.3} \rangle$. Let us call these additional features “second order features”. They are so called because they are the associated features of an associated feature.¹⁵ In this way, the new features that are applicable to the denotation of a can emerge. Let us return to the “bulldozer” example and assume that these are the three features in the association sequence of *bulldozer*¹⁶: $\langle \textit{Pushes Aside Obstructions}, \textit{Crushing}, \textit{Dangerous to Bystanders} \rangle$. None of these three features is implied by the speaker. However, in the examination of these first-order features, new second-order features become more salient and are added to the association sequence. For instance, the entertainment of the feature *Pushes Aside Obstructions* can make the second-order feature *stubbornness* part of the association sequence. Then the association sequence will be $\langle \textit{Pushes Aside Obstructions}, \textit{Crushing}, \textit{Dangerous to Bystanders}, \textit{Stubborn} \rangle$. In this way, the hearer can access the speaker’s implied feature *stubbornness*.

Notice that there is nothing in this analysis against the observation that one cannot pass from the kind *bulldozer* to *stubbornness*. What makes the latter accessible are the first-order features. These first-order features are all abstracted from being the features of the bulldozer. For example, *Pushes Aside Obstructions* in itself is not a bulldozer specific feature, but rather it can be predicated of another object category. One can think of an ambitious person who pushes aside (literally) obstructions in front of her. In this manner, *stubbornness* becomes accessible. In conclusion, I think the framework I suggest can explain the emergent property problem in a simple way.

¹⁴Wilson and Carston (2008) and Wearing (2014) discuss this problem.

¹⁵The salience of a second-order feature can exceed a first-order feature, and in this way, the former can come to the fore in the association sequence. Thus, a second-order feature can be examined before the examination of all first-order features is finished. For the sake of simplicity, however, I do not take this possibility into account.

¹⁶I make benefit of Wilson and Carston’s (2008, p.32) analysis of this metaphor.

4.1.6 Systematic Interpretation?

It seems impossible to give an algorithmic explanation of how the speakers of a language determine the relevant interpretations of a metaphorical phrase. In fact, the idea of such an algorithm would go against the creativity of metaphorical uses, which is, I believe that a significant reason to employ metaphors. We can illustrate how novel a metaphorical implication can be by a scenario. Suppose John, Mary and Alex are three good friends. One day Alex loses a book he borrowed from the university library, upon which John and Mary tease him for his carelessness. A week after, however, the same thing happens to Mary, and John expresses his surprise in the following way:

(18) I can't believe you have Alexed the book.

Here, John uses Alex's name to mean something that happened to Alex a week before. One needs to be aware of what happened to Alex before to interpret this metaphor. A rule for how this metaphor is interpreted might say something like this: "One's name can stand for something that happened to him/her." However, if we count this as a rule, we would need thousands of rules of this type, which is obviously unacceptable.¹⁷ According to the theory I have outlined, the success of John's communicating his thought to Mary depends on the shared related parts of their individual association sequences associated with Alex and the hearer's (Mary's) heuristic (phrasal) inferential reasoning.

A very important note about these implied properties is that they need not have standard names; one can access them by demonstrative reference, by expressions such as "that sound", "that experience" and "that feeling". These are expressions which are usually thought to express "perceptual concepts" in the relevant literature. For instance, the excitement felt in starting school can be the feature *that excitement*, which is connected to the category *starting school* in our association sequence. One benefit of metaphorical speaking is the easy access to the unnamed features which are attached to clearly identified features.¹⁸

¹⁷I think this is a problem with Searle's account. He tries to give a list of the principles of metaphorical interpretation, but he concedes that even his very general eight principles should not be seen as complete (Searle 1993, p.104).

¹⁸Camp (2017, p.51) emphasizes the role of experientially and affectively loaded features in characterizing something in a certain way: "Characterizing also often involves attributing experientially -and affectively- loaded features —George walks or talks like *this*, it is fitting to feel *this* way around him— in a manner that brings those features to phenomenal consciousness and primes an ongoing association to the subject." In her view, metaphorical speaking allows us to predicate the features (including these affectively and experientially loaded ones) in some object or kind's characterization of another object or kind.

4.1.7 Why not Semanticism?

It is clear that the metaphorical content depends on the context of utterance. Is it still possible to develop a semantic theory of metaphor? Hills was one proponent of such an approach. I discussed his view in Section 2.4, and rejected it based on an argument by Camp (2006a). The gist of the argument was this:

(...) if the original speaker's utterance had genuinely 'lodged' a new metaphorical meaning in the words uttered, or even just had established a new, temporary use for them, then that meaning should necessarily be inherited by any later use of those same words in that same context which *responds* to the initial claim." (Camp 2006a, p.297)

But this was not the case for metaphorical utterances.

Two other semantic approaches to metaphor are Stern's and Leezenberg's. Let us consider the following examples given in Stern (2011, p.290)¹⁹:

(19) Every lover remembers *that first sun of his*

(20) Every lover remembers *that first sun whose bright light shined on him*

Stern remarks that the italicised complex demonstratives in these examples receive different metaphorical interpretations in different contexts. For instance in one context lovers remember the ones without whom they cannot live, whereas in another they remember the ones who give them pain. The denotations of these complex demonstratives co-vary with the quantified variable. However, it is impossible to get co-varying interpretations of these complex demonstratives. For instance, in one of the examples above, we cannot get the interpretation where some lovers remember the ones without whom they cannot live, but some other remember the ones who give them pain. Stern claims that this is a semantic constraint on metaphorical interpretation and it cannot be explained pragmatically:

The Contextualists' explanatory principles like loosening, broadening, or transfer do not bear on these kinds of constraints, showing that the interpretation of the metaphor cannot itself co-vary with the bound variable. Nor is it clear how we could tell a story employing Gricean conversational maxims, violations, and implicatures. (Stern 2011, p.291)

¹⁹Stern (2000) presents some arguments for why he thinks that metaphor should be explained semantically. See Camp (2005) for the discussion of these arguments, and see Stern (2006) for his responses.

Although I agree with Stern on his observation, I reject his diagnosis. There are purely pragmatic phenomena which behave as metaphors do in the scope of a quantifier. Imagine a scenario, in which someone enters a room where couples dance Scottish dance Cèilidh, but she mistakenly utters the following:

(21) Every girl loves *her tango partner*.

Here what the speaker means by using the complex demonstrative is different from the semantic meaning. What she means in this context is *her Cèilidh partner*. The denotation of this speaker's meaning will co-vary with the quantified variable. An interpreter will seek for a Cèilidh partner for every girl in the domain to interpret the speaker's meaning. In another context, for instance in which couples dance salsa, the interpretation of the complex demonstrative will be different. So, the interpretation of the speaker's meaning depends on the context. However, drawing a parallel with Stern's remark above, in the same context the interpretation of the speaker's meaning will not co-vary with the quantified variable. The interpreter will not seek Cèilidh partners for some girls and salsa partners for others. This example and Stern's example are parallel. Since it is clear that the speaker's meaning in this example is a pragmatic phenomenon, and this pragmatic phenomenon can be explained exactly as Stern suggests for his metaphorical case, we can conclude that Stern's argument is far from showing that the constraint in question supports a semantic approach to metaphor.

Leezenberg's (2001) semantic approach to metaphor posits a parameter called "thematic dimension" in the Kaplanian context. This parameter originally suggested by the linguist R. Bartsch. On Bartsch's view, many adjectives are not determinate in terms of which respect they are supposed to apply. For instance "good", "satisfactory" and "strong" are this kind of adjective. They are called "dimensionally weakly determined" adjectives. The dimension of "good" in the following sentence depends on the context of utterance:

(22) This book is good.

For instance, if the thematic dimension is "style", the truth-value of the sentence is evaluated with respect to this parameter (Leezenberg 2001, p.166).

In this theory, some expressions have internal thematic dimensions. The internal thematic dimensions are not easily overruled. For instance, the internal dimension of "mauve" is colour (Leezenberg 2001, p.166). Thematic dimensions are not asserted but contextually presupposed (Leezenberg 2001, p.167). They reduce the number of lexical items in our lexicon. We can express many different meanings in different contexts by using the same lexical item:

(...) most properties that can be captured in natural language are not named but expressed in discourse; that is, they are not necessarily defined once and for all in the model, but *constructed* by the application of thematic dimensions (Leezenberg 2001, pp.167-8)

According to Leezenberg, the notion of thematic dimension can explain metaphors. Here is the gist of his approach:

(...) the basic idea is simply that a metaphorical interpretation arises from the application of a property expression in a new thematic dimension d_n . In metaphorical interpretation, the internal dimension of an expression is overruled. To take a simple example:

(32) This is a swine.

In isolation from a context, (32) does not yet express any specific propositional content. The same sentence type may receive different literal and metaphorical interpretations, depending on both the referent of *this* and on the thematic dimension. By the very same (or at least a very similar) mechanism, contextual features determine both that *this* is interpreted as referring to, say, the extremely filthy person at whom the speaker is pointing, and that *swine* is interpreted in a thematic dimension other than a default dimension d_i of biological taxa. When interpreted in d_i , (32) is just false (indeed, false in all circumstances, given a context in which *this* refers to a human being); in d_n , however, it denotes the property of being filthy, and there, (32) is true if the person pointed at does in fact have that property. In other words, it is the thematic dimension that is the relevant contextual parameter in metaphorical interpretation: a property expression is interpreted in the contextually given dimension, which may, but need not, be at odds with its internal dimension. (Leezenberg 2001, pp.171-2)

Since the notion of thematic dimension is needed independently of metaphor in the semantic explanation of certain adjectives, according to Leezenberg, this is a good piece of evidence to show that metaphorical interpretation involves the general principles of semantic interpretation (Leezenberg 2001, p.172).

I think the analogy Leezenberg draws between the so-called dimensionally weakly determined adjectives and metaphors is problematic. As for the former, thematic dimensions just restrict the aspect of application. The adjective itself is still what is applied. For instance in (22), although “good” is applied in terms of style, it is still the same lexical item what is applied. In case of metaphor, however, it is not

the lexical item itself but a feature associated with it is what is applied. In (32), *being filthy* seems more of a feature that is associated with *swine* than a thematic dimension. It seems unintuitive to claim that the aspect of application of “swine” is restricted in this example. To see this better we can consider different types of metaphors. Recall the following example given in Section 4.1.6:

(18) I can’t believe you have Alexed the book.

Here, it is implausible to think that *losing a library book* or something like that is a thematic dimension in the application of the word “Alex”. It is clear that what happens here is not the restriction of the application of the property *Alex*, but rather the implication of a feature that is associated with Alex.

To conclude this section, I can say that Stern’s and Leezenberg’s approaches fail to show that metaphor is a semantic phenomenon. What seems to attract them to a semantic approach is the interaction of metaphor with the compositional machinery. In my phrasal implicature theory of metaphor, since the phrases imply metaphorical meanings, the implied metaphorical phrase meanings can compositionally interact with the rest of the clause they are embedded in. In this way, it is possible to show both the intuitive linguistic properties of metaphor and how it interacts with the compositional machinery in a pragmatic framework.

4.2 Association Sequences

Let us discuss some of the details of association sequences. First of all, an association sequence is always an association sequence of someone.²⁰ For example, John and Mary will have their own association sequences related to *the sun*. These are two separate entities.

Next, I would like to take up the epistemological issues related to association sequences. It is better to explore them in light of Stalnaker’s notion of common ground.

4.2.1 Common Ground

In this section, I wish to present Stalnaker’s notion of common ground briefly. This notion will become important when we are discussing the epistemological features of association sequences.

The common ground can be defined as the set of mutual assumptions shared by interlocutors in a discourse context. In other words, the common ground consists

²⁰When I use “association sequence” I mean *association sequence attached to an object or kind*.

of the propositions that are presupposed to be mutually accepted (Stalnaker 1999b, p.84). The interlocutors need not believe the propositions in the common ground. For the purposes of conversation,

[o]ne may make *assumptions*, and what is assumed may become part of the common ground, temporarily. One may *presume* that things are mutually believed without being sure that they are. That something is common belief may be a *pretense* – even a mutually recognized pretense. (Stalnaker 2002, p.704)

The common ground does not only contain first order mutually accepted information, but it also contains higher order information. Hence, if S is the speaker and H is the hearer, then p is mutually accepted to be common ground if and only if:

- S accepts p
- H accepts p
- S accepts that H accepts p
- H accepts that S accepts p
- S accepts that H accepts that S accepts p
- H accepts that S accepts that H accepts p
- And so on...

In Stalnaker's framework, a proposition is modelled as the set of possible worlds in which it is true, thus the common ground can be modelled as the set of sets of possible worlds. In an ideal situation, the aim of a conversation is to add new information to the common ground. One way of doing this is by way of assertion. The aim of asserting p is to add p to the common ground: "the essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the participants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed. This effect is avoided only if the assertion is rejected" (Stalnaker 1999b, p.86).

Another way of changing a context is to accommodate a presupposition. If it is explicit that by uttering u , a speaker S is presupposing a proposition p that is not in the common ground, and adding p to the common ground is mutually acceptable, then p is added to the common ground, or it is accommodated. For instance consider the following:

(23) My wife is a brain surgeon.

By uttering (23) the speaker presupposes that he has a wife and asserts that she is a brain surgeon. If the presupposition is not already a part of the common ground, it should be accommodated if there is no reason to doubt of the cooperativity of the speaker.

4.2.2 The Epistemological Character of Association Sequences

In one's association sequence there will be some *private* and some *shared* features.²¹ Private features are the features which depend on subjective experiences and beliefs related to the object or the kind in question. For instance, if one had a traffic accident while she was driving through Cupar, she might have a feature of *car accident* in her association sequence of *Cupar*. Until somebody becomes aware of this association, it will remain private. Many of one's emotional associations seem to be private. A shared feature, on the other hand, is a feature in one's association sequence whose existence (in that person's association sequence) is known by at least one other person. Thus, features are not essentially private or shared; private features can easily become shared when one tells somebody about them. Being private or shared are general epistemological properties of features in association sequences. They also have context specific properties: a feature can be *common* or *uncommon* relative to a context. If a feature in one's association sequence is accepted by the other participants of the discourse for the purposes of the conversation, this means the feature is common in the given context; otherwise it will be uncommon.

The reason why I am making these distinctions is that only common and thereby shared features are relevant in metaphorical speaking. In order for a speaker to communicate her metaphorical meaning successfully by using a certain phrase metaphorically, she has to be aware of whether the features that compose the metaphorical phrase meaning exist in her audience's association sequence that is attached to the kind or object the phrase denotes. Think of this schematic association sequence attached to *F* again: $\langle \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}, \dots \rangle$. We can say that if one refers to the kind or object *F* to mean the feature *G*, she has to know or be able to plausibly assume whether it is part of the relevant association sequence in her hearer's mind. By the same token, the hearer has to take into account which features in his association sequence are assumed by the speaker. We can say that the speaker and the hearer in a conversation assume a common association sequence attached to the objects and kinds relevant to the conversation. Hence, metaphorical communication requires a high level of cooperation.

What I am suggesting can be seen as adding a new section to the common ground.

²¹Stern (2000, p.109) calls them "idiosyncratic" and "normal" respectively.

What the speaker and hearer associate with (more precisely accept to associate with) each relevant object or kind will be part of this section of the common ground. Thus, we can give a description of this section of common ground in parallel to the propositional section: Let S be the speaker, H be the hearer and the association L be in the association sequence attached to the kind or object K . Then L will be part of the common ground if and only if:

- S accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that L is associated with K
- S accepts that H accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that S accepts that L is associated with K
- S accepts that H accepts that S accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that S accepts that H accepts that L is associated with K
- And so on...

This formulation is compatible with Stalnaker's original description of common ground. Here, the assumption is that a cooperative speaker and hearer are in implicit agreement on which features they associate with a particular kind (or an object). As said earlier, in one's associations with a kind or an object, there can be uncommon features about which the interlocutors in the given context are unaware of, and there can also be private features which are one's private associations that are not accessible for other people. Clearly, these uncommon and private features cannot be common ground. Only what is mutually known and accepted by the interlocutors in a context can be common ground.

An association sequence is also a dynamic structure. In a context it might be updated for various reasons. For example, upon seeing John's spilling coffee on his desk, the association sequence attached to him in Mary's mind might be updated so as to characterize him as clumsy, at least for a while. This is another parallelism with the Stalnaker's account of the common ground. A mutually observed fact can be presupposed to be common ground: "If a goat walked into the room, it would normally be presupposed, from that point, that there was a goat in the room" (Stalnaker 1999c, p.86). Another aspect of the dynamism of association sequences is that a participant in a metaphorical talk exchange should be able to adjust her association sequence attached to a kind or object to the cultural or contextual assumptions related to that kind or object. For example, if one is interpreting a

metaphorically used word such as “water” in a different culture, he or she should at least temporarily adopt the common association sequence features of *water* in that culture. Thus, a feature in an association sequence does not have to be representative of the belief of the agent. For ease of metaphorical interpretation one can assume certain features of a kind or an object without believing that that feature really exists. Searle offers an example that illustrates the point. Even an ethologist who knows that gorillas are shy and calm animals can interpret “Richard is a gorilla” as “Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth” (Searle 1993, pp.92-3). This also parallels Stalnaker’s common ground. As mentioned above, what is presupposed need not be actually believed. Similarly, for the purposes of conversation, one can presuppose that a feature associated with a kind or an object is common ground even if she does not believe that it is a feature of the kind or the object.

4.2.3 Wider Contexts

A question might arise from the discussion above. How is it possible to explain the metaphorical uses in indirect forms of communication, such as written texts in literature, poetry, philosophy or science? If these can be considered to be involving communicative acts, the writer (or poet) usually does not have direct contact with her readers. In these kinds of situations, how can a writer make assumptions about her readers’ association sequences? I think there is a way to explain these kinds of metaphorical uses in indirect communication. The main difference between published and not published communication is that in the former, the context should be thought to be wider. Since in a wide context a writer might not know all of her readers, metaphorical writing requires certain abstractions on association sequences. The writer or poet needs to presuppose certain associations, which are abstracted from the association sequences of the people she is supposed to address, to be common ground and use her phrases accordingly. This seems to me the only way for metaphorical writing to be effective (i.e., interpretable). Similarly, interpreters of a text or a poem should be aware of the association sequences that are assumed by the writer or the poet. The interpretation, therefore, might require looking into the cultural and historical background of the written text or poem.

Here I am assuming the typical relation between a writer and her work. Of course one can say that not all written works are produced for publication.²² Still, I think the writing process is not very different from the typical cases. We can say

²²Emily Dickinson’s poetry and Kafka’s novels can illustrate this point. Dickinson made no attempt to publish the majority of her poems. Similarly, Kafka only published a few of his works, and he wanted his friend Max Brod to destroy the rest of them after his death.

that in these cases the poet or the author pretends that her work will be read by someone. So, she still would consider an imaginary audience's associations.²³

4.2.4 Associating with Phrases or Contents?

Let me now discuss a theoretical choice I have made and a problem that might stem from this preference. An association sequence is a sequence of features associated with an object or a kind. When a word is used metaphorically, the association sequence attached to the denotation of the word is accessed by the interpreters. A complication seems to arise from this account. It is justly claimed that words which seem to have the same denotation might be used metaphorically to mean different things. For instance, Searle (1993, p.105) points out the differences among the metaphorical uses of “pig”, “hog” and “swine”, which are different names of the same kind.²⁴ If the association sequences are attached to kinds, synonymous words which denote the same kind should not be able to be used to imply different metaphorical meanings, but they are. So, what makes this possible?

In response to this problem, what I assume is that a kind or object might be attached to more than one association sequence. In the example above, the kind *pig* is attached to at least three different association sequences. Of course, these association sequences have common features, since they are characterizing the same kind, but there can be some significant differences. I believe, these significant differences make two or more different terms for the same entity worth having in our lexicon. They are signifying different characterizations. If one limits the semantic content of a word to its truth-conditional content, these words are semantically no different. Their substitution does not change the truth-value of the sentence they are part of. Thus, any difference synonymous words make should be at the pragmatic level.²⁵

²³An extreme case could be someone's talking to or writing something to herself. What would be the purpose of using metaphors or any other indirect communication form in this situation? In these cases, I think we could either say that the speaker/writer communicates with herself (or her future self) or accept that there is no communicative purpose here.

²⁴Camp (2012, p.295) emphasizes the same idea: “Metaphorical interpretation is a function of the particular expressions uttered, and not just of their semantic values.”

²⁵I think this one kind (or object) but different association sequences approach is along the lines of Salmon's (1986) solution to Frege's puzzle. Salmon claims that an agent might grasp the same proposition by means of different guises. In the belief attribution statements, although the way one takes a proposition is not part of the semantic content, it is pragmatically implicated. For this reason, in a given context, one of the two semantically equivalent belief attributions might be pragmatically more apt (and less misleading) than the other. For instance, one might understand the proposition that the sentence “Hesperus appears in the morning” expresses differently from the one “Phosphorus appears in the morning” expresses, though these two propositions are the same. The pragmatic difference explains why the belief in a single proposition can be attributed by one sentence but not the other. I can elaborate this idea by employing association sequences. If the direct reference theory, which is advocated by Salmon, is true, there is no semantic difference

Metaphorical use of fictional and mythological terms also requires explanation. Consider this:

(24) I am Anna Karenina. (Camp 2009, p.112)

In this example the name of a fictional character is used metaphorically. If fictional entities are non-denoting terms to what is the relevant association sequence attached? The ontology of fictional characters and speaking about them is a controversial issue in metaphysics and philosophy of language. I do not want to enter this discussion here. I will assume that there are fictional and mythological entities, and relevant association sequences can be considered to be their characterizations. Although there might be other solutions, for the simplicity, I prefer this option.

One might suggest attaching the association sequences to phrases, rather than objects and kinds. Indeed, this is what Stern (2006, pp.263-4; 2011, p.289) suggests. The metaphorical associations, in his view, are attached to phrases. In this way, he explains the differences in metaphorical interpretations of co-referential terms. This suggestion might seem attractive at first. Every phrase has its own association sequences: for instance, “swine” and “pig” carry different association sequences. The problem with fictional and mythological terms also does not arise for this suggestion. The association sequence is attached to the name “Anna Karenina”, not the fictional entity. This is a charming suggestion for people who do not like abstract entities. Despite these virtues, I reject Stern’s suggestion for at least two reasons. First of all, it does not seem plausible to me to think that these association sequences are attached to words. Considering our ordinary phenomenology, it should be said that when we are thinking about the associated features of encyclopaedias, for instance, we are not characterizing the word “encyclopaedia” but the kind *encyclopaedia*. The second problem is related to the link between a phrase and an association sequence. Stern seems to assume that every phrase is attached to just one set of associations. However, this cannot be true. There is no one-to-one correspondence between phrases and association sequences. Consider Kripke’s famous Paderewski example. In this example, Peter thinks that there are two Paderewskis, one is a pianist, and the other is a politician, and associates two different sets of beliefs with the name “Paderewski”. However, Peter is mistaken, and the pianist

between “Hesperus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. The only difference arises from the different association sequences the words “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” signal. When one learns that Hesperus is Phosphorus, the information she obtains, stems from the recognition of the fact that two association sequences are attached to the same object. In one association sequence the object is characterized as “the celestial body in the sky in the morning”, whereas in the other it is characterized as “the celestial body in the sky in the evening”. The recognition that these features belong to the same object explains how a new piece of information is obtained.

Paderewski and the politician Paderewski are the very same person (Kripke 2011, p.154). So, in this example, there is only one phrase, but Peter associates two different feature sequences with it. One phrase can be used in two different ways to access to two different association sequences Peter has in mind. If a phrase can have more than one set of associations, a problem similar to the above-mentioned one with co-referential terms arises.²⁶ It is not clear how Stern's suggestion on attaching association sequences to the phrases helps us in distinguishing two sequences attached to a phrase. In sum, I find Stern's idea both counter-intuitive and not helpful in all possible cases.²⁷

Another suggestion might be to think that association sequences are attached to the concepts of objects and kinds. For the purposes of the discussion, we can assume that concepts are mental representations of objects and kinds. Thus, in this suggestion, concepts, in a sense, link association sequences to objects and kinds. For instance, there is the kind *tiger*, its concept TIGER, and the association sequence that is attached to TIGER. This suggestion might also seem tempting for similar reasons mentioned in favour of the previous suggestion, but I do not accept it either. I will give three reasons. First, as mentioned above, proper names can be used metaphorically, which means that they are used to imply certain associations. I argued that names still refer to their ordinary referents in their metaphorical uses and association sequences are attached to the objects names refer to. How can the metaphorical uses of proper names be explained if one assumes that association sequences are attached to concepts? One would need to assume that there are individual concepts. Individual concepts are functions from possible worlds to individuals. So, for instance the individual concept expressed by "Winston Churchill" is a constant function which picks out the same individual, Winston Churchill, in all possible worlds (Abbott 2010, p.54). But what is the purpose of these concepts, if names are rigid? In other words, if the referent of a name is not determined by any concept related to a name, then what does the individual concept do?²⁸ Individual

²⁶Stern might reply that there is only one association set which features related to all different aspects of the man are attached to. This seems very implausible to me. If all associations related to a phrase are in the same chunk of associations, then a natural consequence of this idea is to assume that one has just one set of associations attached to all namesake people (for instance all Matthews) she knows. This consequence is unacceptable, I believe.

²⁷Glanzberg (2008) explores which types of linguistic elements get interpreted metaphorically and concludes that major lexical categories can be interpreted metaphorically whereas functional categories, such as determiners and tenses, cannot. This result seems to strengthen my position against Stern's. If metaphorical associations are attached to phrases, it is hard to find a principled basis why functional categories do not receive metaphorical interpretation. On the other hand, there is a straightforward explanation if we consider metaphorical associations attached to contents. Since phrases, such as "every", "the" and "some", are not referring expressions, they do not get metaphorical interpretations.

²⁸This is of course the direct-reference theoretic interpretation of rigidity. See Kaplan (1989)

concepts seem to be idle entities in terms of linguistics. Hence if one wants to argue that association sequences are attached to concepts, in order to explain the metaphorical use of proper names, one will need a theoretically problematic assumption that association sequences are attached to linguistically idle individual concepts.

Secondly, intuitively association sequences seem to be *about* objects and kinds.²⁹ Thinking that association sequences are attached to the concept of an object or a kind would amount to their being related to the object or the kind indirectly. I believe this indirectness clashes with the intuitive idea that these associated features say something about these objects or kinds. They do not seem to say something about concepts, but objects or kinds.

Thirdly and finally, if we attach association sequences to the concepts the appealing theoretical parallelism between clausal implicatures and phrasal implicatures would get lost. Recall that clausal implicatures are carried by propositions (or what-is-said in the Grice's original sense). If the Russellian conception of proposition is accepted, namely propositions are considered to be entities constituted by individuals and properties, it would follow that clausal implicatures are generated by a constitution of objects and properties (or kinds). On the other hand, phrasal implicatures are assumed to be generated by parts of propositions, and in this picture these parts can only be objects and kinds. If we think of association sequences as phrasal implicature candidates, it would be natural to think of them as attached to objects and kinds.

4.3 Claims about Metaphor Again

Let me recap briefly what I said on metaphorical interpretation above. According to the theory I defend, metaphorical interpretation requires answering two questions:

- (i) Which features are salient? This question is answered automatically without the interpreter's exerting any effort. Context and the lexical meaning of the phrase in question make certain associations salient.³⁰ These are parts of the association sequence attached to the kind or object the metaphorical phrase denotes. Among these easily accessible associations there might be private and uncommon ones; they should be dismissed. For this reason, the second

for details. For an alternative to the direct-reference view, which involves individual concepts, see Abbott (2010).

²⁹This is essentially the same objection as one of the objections I made against the view that sequences are associated with phrases.

³⁰To find a discussion on how context and lexical meaning affects salience of associations, see Giora (2003).

question is needed.

- (ii) Can the feature in question (say \mathbf{G}^{31}) be intended by the speaker (or the writer in written communication)? If not, dismiss it.

Since the examination of one feature can make other features salient, the order and the configuration of the association sequence can change after the examination of each feature. Thus, these questions should be repeated after the examination of each feature, and the interpreter will continue the process with the most salient unexamined feature in the possibly changed association sequence. Note that answering the second question involves reasoning, and the duration of metaphorical interpretation depends on the complexity of this reasoning and how many features are examined. In the end the interpreter will obtain his interpretation of the metaphor.

I can now discuss the theory in relation to the claims presented in Chapter 2.

4.3.1 Metaphor-Implicature Contrast Claim

The perceived problem with the Gricean view that metaphors and implicatures behave very differently relies on the classical Gricean theory of implicature. However, as I suggested above, we can naturally extend the Gricean theory of implicature to phrasal implications, which I call phrasal implicatures. This type of implicature allows implied meaning to compositionally connect with other parts of the sentence. For instance, when one utters “Sharp minds can easily see the problem here”, the phrasal implicatures that the metaphorical use of the word “sharp” generates, in a sense, replaces the word meaning. This implicature compositionally connects with both the content of “mind” and the content of the rest of the sentence.

The problems the classical Gricean account faces do not arise here. As discussed above, one of these problems concerns the embeddability of implicatures. Contrary to Grice’s definition, in which assertion of a sentence seems to be a precondition for its generating implicatures, certain implicatures turn out to be embeddable. One suggestion, as seen above, is to loosen the assertion condition, which amounts to allowing embedded clauses to generate implicatures. However, this suggestion is still not adequate to explain certain metaphors, since metaphorical meaning is implied by the use of phrases, rather than clauses. Recall the examples (19) and (20) from Chapter 2:

(19) Some surgeons are butchers.

(20) Some butchers are surgeons.

³¹In the schematic association sequence: $\langle \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}, \dots \rangle$

The problem for the classical Gricean account is to explain how these utterances can generate different implicatures in the same context if they express the same proposition. The phrasal approach can easily avoid this problem. In these utterances, although semantically the same proposition is expressed, different phrases are used metaphorically. In (19), the phrase “butcher” is used metaphorically, whereas in (20), it is the phrase “surgeon” that is used metaphorically. Other examples can be found but the main point here is that the clausal approach is not fine-grained enough to explain these implicatures; the phrasal approach is needed.

Similarly, the grammatical mood of the sentence is not affected by the metaphorical implication. In addition, we should note that the thematic structure of metaphorical sentence is also unaffected. This means, in a metaphorical utterance, such as “Revolution is not a dinner party”, whatever is implied by the phrase “a dinner party” should play the same thematic role as this phrase.³²

Another observation discussed earlier concerns the complex figurative interpretations. Recall that Stern (2000, p.237) classifies figurative uses as M-figures (metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy) and I-figures (irony, meiosis, hyperbole, understatement, and overstatement), and he observed that in a complex figurative interpretation, the interpretation of an M-figure always precedes that of an I-figure. Then, the problem was to explain this fixed order of interpretation. There seems to be a difference between these two classes of figures of language. In Stern’s view the difference lies in the distinction between semantic and post-semantic interpretation:

(M)-type figures are semantic interpretations, interpretations determined by the semantic structure of the language; whereas (I)-type figures are postsemantic, that is, *uses* of the semantic interpretations of sentences, namely, propositions, to yield further propositions. (Stern 2000, pp.237-8)

However, I have been arguing for a pragmatic account of metaphor. In my view, both M-figures and I-figures are pragmatic phenomena. The distinction, then, is that M-figures trigger phrasal implicatures, whereas I-figures trigger clausal ones. Only after the calculation of phrasal implicatures (if there are any), can we obtain an assertion (for a declarative sentence), which is able to trigger clausal implicatures.³³

³²Ludlow (2014, pp.161-2) also points out the facilitative function of thematic roles in interpretation of metaphors.

³³In the next chapter, I will discuss the stages of the interpretation of a clausal implicature. There, I hope, the relation between phrasal and clausal implicatures will be clear.

4.3.2 One-step Process Claim

The one-step process claim is similarly explainable in the Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor. Recall that I mentioned certain psycholinguistic experiments earlier and concluded that the duration of a metaphorical interpretation varies with respect to the complexity of the metaphor. By “complexity” I mean how much reasoning it requires. This will clearly be a matter of degree and a theory of metaphor should be able to explain this graduality. Classical pragmatic approaches predict one step literal interpretation and two successive sentential interpretation steps for the interpretation of a metaphor. However, there are pieces of evidence against this, which show that at least some metaphorical interpretations are as fast as literal interpretations. Thus, the classical pragmatic approaches have difficulty explaining these data. How can a metaphorical interpretation be that quick if the hearer first interprets the literal meaning of a sentence and infers the metaphorical meaning by taking the literal meaning as a premise in his reasoning?

The theory I defend does not face this problem. Since the metaphorical interpretation is acquired by processing the metaphorical phrase, it does not require a two-step sentence-level process. Metaphorical interpretation takes place at the phrasal level. In only one step, the metaphorical interpretation works as a parallel and simultaneous process to the literal interpretation of the sentence.

As said in Section 2.3, however, this difficulty does not disprove the classical Gricean account. There, I argued that the classical Gricean account, as a constitutive theory, cannot be contested with psychological evidence, but if we are to choose between two competing constitutive accounts, the one which is more compatible with the psychological data could be more preferable. Now, if the classical Gricean account and my Phrasal Implicature account are compared, the latter should be preferred since it is consistent with the empirical data.

The figure 4.1 shows a diagram of a typical metaphorical interpretation in one step. In this diagram, the calculations of metaphorical meaning and literal meaning are parallel processes. Literal meaning calculation consists of the interpretation of the sentence and the assignment of referents to the context-sensitive terms. During this calculation, if a metaphorical phrase is found, then the implicature of this phrase is determined and the rest of the sentence is copied to obtain the metaphorical meaning.

Let us now rethink Recanati’s remarks about the transparency condition. Recall that he claims that in order for something to count as non-literal, “the language users must be aware that the conveyed meaning exceeds the conventional significance of the words” (Recanati 2003b, p.75). And metaphor, in his view, is not non-




Figure 4.1: My construal of metaphor interpretation

literal since it does not meet the transparency condition. First of all, Recanati considers non-literality at the utterance level, where communicative reasoning takes an utterance meaning as an input. He argues that language users do not feel this kind of utterance-level reasoning in non-literality. However, the phrasal approach suggests a different explanation for non-literality, in which reasoning only needs a phrase meaning as an input. Indeed, this type of reasoning is more widespread than the non-literality cases. This extensiveness seems to be the reason why language users are not usually aware of the reasoning behind non-literality. Of course, the phrasal reasoning in literal language often demands less cognitive effort than that in figurative language. But the complexity of reasoning in metaphorical language also comes in degrees. It can be said that commonly used metaphors, such as Recanati's example "The ATM swallowed my credit card", are not very different from literal language in terms of the requirement of reasoning effort, therefore they are not felt as non-literal. However, this is not the case for all metaphors. To repeat the same example used above, for Heidegger's motto "Language is the house of being", it is hard to say that the interpreters "are not aware that the conveyed meaning exceeds the conventional significance of the words."

4.3.3 The Claim that Metaphorical Meaning is Implicated

The claim that metaphorical meaning is implicated is also compatible with my theory.³⁴ we have the literal phrase meanings and the metaphorical meanings, and this twofold conception allows retractions that are exemplified in Chapter 2. In passing, I should also note that one reason for speaking metaphorically could be a speaker's not wanting to commit herself to the communicated meaning. As noted

³⁴More precisely, metaphorical phrase meaning is *implied* and as a consequence a metaphorical clause meaning is *implicated*.

above, metaphorical speaking allows speakers to deny what is communicated and this might be seen as a tool for avoiding the responsibility attributed to the speaker in a talk exchange.

In sum, I can conclude that the theory presented in this chapter conforms to the intuitive ideas about metaphor which are discussed in Chapter 2. This strength derives from the distinctions made in Chapter 3.

4.4 Implicature Tests

In this section I will take up the question of implicature tests for phrasal implicatures. I will discuss three of them: cancellability, non-detachability and non-conventionality.

4.4.1 Cancellability

Cancellability is a feature of conversational implicatures, which shows that a conversational implicature can be eliminated either explicitly by the speaker or implicitly by the context of the utterance. It is often suggested as a test to determine whether a linguistic phenomenon is semantic or pragmatic. This is, perhaps, the most important test to see which part of the total meaning an utterance (or a phrase) conveys can be called implicature. Metaphor is an interesting case for the application of this test. Let us illustrate the test by considering Romeo's utterance "Juliet is the sun". Let us assume that Romeo is taken to imply these three features by using the phrase "the sun" metaphorically: (i) *the warmth of Romeo's world*, (ii) *the beginning of Romeo's day*, and (iii) *nourishing*.³⁵ Let us now assume that Romeo utters the following:

(25) Juliet is the sun, but I don't mean to say she is *nourishing*.

This is a successful cancellation of a part of the metaphorical meaning. In order to arrive at the conclusion that metaphorical meaning is cancellable, one might still not be satisfied with this type of partial cancellation and want to see a full cancellation example. Thus, the following objection can be raised: The full cancellation of a metaphorical meaning causes infelicity, and this overshadows the idea that metaphor is a pragmatic phenomenon. In order to see this, let us imagine that Romeo utters the following:

³⁵This paraphrase of the metaphor is given in Cavell (1998, pp.78-9).

- (26) Juliet is the sun, but I don't mean to say she is *the warmth of my world*, nor *the beginning of my day*, nor *nourishing*.

This utterance will clearly sound bad to the hearers. If Romeo did not mean these features, what did he mean by predicating of Juliet “the sun”? When everything implied by the phrase is cancelled, there only remains an obviously false proposition *Juliet is the sun*. Therefore, cancelling the metaphorical meaning completely might appear to cause infelicity. I think this claim hinges on a narrow conception of metaphor. For twice-apart metaphors, for instance, full cancellation is possible. Imagine one utters “Oslo is a cold city”, and the context permits the hearers to think that both literal and metaphorical meanings are intended: These meanings, respectively, are that the temperature in Oslo is usually low and that Oslo is repellent and unlikeable. If the speaker does not want to communicate the metaphorical meaning, she can cancel it:

- (27) Oslo is a cold city, but I don't mean to say it is *repellent* and *unlikeable*.

So, metaphorical meaning is fully cancellable in this case. Full cancellation causes infelicity only in cases where the utterance meaning is not intended by the speaker. Bezuidenhout (2002, p.84) makes a similar point:

- (41) She is the Taj Mahal.

The literal meaning of (41) by itself does not rule out a literal interpretation. After all, we sometimes use ‘she’ to refer to inanimate things such as ships, and it could be that (41) is to be interpreted as being about a ship named ‘the Taj Mahal’. However, given that ‘she’ refers to a woman and ‘the Taj Mahal’ refers to a certain building in India, we are constrained to find a metaphorical interpretation of (41). This metaphorical interpretation cannot be cancelled in favor of a literal one, given these interpretive constraints. This does not mean that it cannot be cancelled at all. It can be cancelled *in favor of another metaphorical interpretation*:

- (42) She is the Taj Mahal, and I don't mean that she is beautiful.

Rather, she is someone her countrymen are proud of.

Bezuidenhout's remark supports my point. If the literal interpretation of a sentence does not make sense and there is an available metaphorical interpretation, then the full cancellation of the metaphorical meaning causes infelicity. In those cases partial cancellation, or the cancellation of the metaphorical interpretation in

favour of another, is an option. One might not be happy with the partial cancellation and claim that a pragmatic interpretation must be fully cancellable in the way the Gricean cancellation test originally suggested; since metaphor does not pass the cancellation test in this strict sense it should not be seen as a form of implicature. I think there is a good reason to reject this claim. We can think of irony, as a typical pragmatic phenomenon, and observe a similar phenomenon there. In some contexts, cancelling the ironical meaning also leaves us with obviously false propositions. For example, imagine one utters the following in a context in which the tomatoes in question are obviously tasteless:

(28) These tomatoes are delicious, but I do not mean that they are tasteless.

In the given context, this utterance would be considered infelicitous as well. In other words, what is going on in the case where an implicature is not fully cancellable is that full cancellation would leave no way to interpret the speaker as being cooperative. In this respect, metaphor is similar to irony. When the proposition expressed by the utterance is obviously false in the given context, full cancellation of metaphorical or ironical meaning does not seem possible. Thus, if irony is accepted as a pragmatic phenomenon by most, although it is not fully cancellable in some cases, I see no reason not to think the same for metaphor.

In summary, metaphor, as an example of phrasal implicature, passes the cancellation test. In most metaphorical utterances, more than one association attached to the content of the metaphorical phrase can be implied. Some of these associations can be successfully cancelled by the speaker. If all the relevant features are cancelled and the remaining utterance meaning is trivially true or false (such as a category mistake), then the cancellation might seem infelicitous. However this is not peculiar to metaphor or phrasal implicature. For other pragmatic phenomena, such as irony, full cancellation is also not always felicitous. Besides, in cases where the utterance does not express a triviality, the full cancellation of phrasal implications does not cause infelicity. Cancellation in this type of case will be more important when we discuss slurs.

4.4.2 Non-detachability

As we have seen in Section 2.1, Grice argues for the non-detachability of implicatures, except those that are related to Manner maxims. That is, if the same (or very similar) meaning is expressed by two utterances which have differences in wording or grammatical structure, they should generate the same implicatures (except manner ones). Another way of putting Grice's claim is that quality, quantity and relevance

implicatures are linked to what is said, whereas manner implicatures are linked to how it is said. Thus, saying the same thing in different ways does not affect the former set of implicatures but it affects the latter. On the other hand, metaphorical implicatures and many other phrasal implicatures are affected by both what is said (in the classical Gricean sense) and how it is put. Therefore, metaphorical implicatures do not appear to pass the non-detachability test. Recall Searle's example about different metaphorical uses of the words "swine", "hog" and "pig". Although one can plausibly assume that these words refer to the same kind, they are signalling different associations, therefore interchanging them can cause pragmatic problems.

Is failure in the non-detachability test a substantial problem for my claim that phrasal implications are implicatures? I think it is not. First of all, not all implicatures are non-detachable. Manner implicatures are cases pointed out by Grice himself. Beyond that, conventional implicatures also seem to be non-detachable. Consider the classical example "She was poor but she was honest" again. In this example "but" conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between being poor and being honest. As Grice (1989, p.234) points out, this implicature is detachable; an utterance of "She was poor and she was honest" would not generate the same implicature, although, for Grice, these two utterances are equivalent in terms of what-is-said. So, there are exceptions to non-detachability test, and, I believe, phrasal implicature is one of them. The main reason that phrasal implicatures are detachable is that particular phrases suggest certain association sequences. In other words, speakers might signal that they want to imply certain associations by choosing a particular phrase. As discussed earlier, it is possible to attach more than one association sequence to an object or a kind where each association sequence corresponds to a different characterisation of the object or the kind. In some cases, among the different phrases which denote the same object or kind, it is conventional that one of them suggests a particular association sequence; this would make it difficult to imply the same association sequence by using a co-referential term. That's why phrasal implicatures are detachable. Substituting different phrases for each other, even though they denote the same object or kind, can result in pragmatic difference, since they can trigger different association sequences.

Let me clarify a point about conventionality. There is a difference between the conventionality of conventional implicatures and that of conventional triggering of certain association sequences by certain phrases. Conventional implicatures are conventional in both the triggering mechanism and the implicature that is generated. For example, "therefore", in every use of the term, implicates a relation of consequence. For this reason, conventional implicatures are not cancellable. On the other

hand, the conventionality in the sense that I discussed above concerns the capacity of a phrase more than its co-referential phrases to trigger a certain association sequence. In this type of case, it cannot be said that the triggering mechanism is fully conventional and automatic, because as said before, phrasal implicatures are cancellable. Again, it cannot be said that the content of the implicature is determined completely by convention. Although some features are more frequently implied across contexts than the others, they should not be seen as conventional implicatures. For instance, “pig” is more often used to imply *being gluttonous* than “swine”, but still it is possible to use the former metaphorically without implying *being gluttonous*.

Secondly, detachability could also be seen as a virtue of phrasal implicatures. As I argued above, there is a pragmatic solution to Frege’s puzzle, which presupposes the detachability of phrasal implicatures. According to this solution, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are not interchangeable in belief contexts (although they denote the same object) because of the difference in their pragmatic potentials.³⁶ In other words, an agent might signal different sets of associations with these words. A speaker might use them to generate two different sequences of phrasal implicatures. In virtue of detachability we have this intuitive solution for the puzzle.

In summary, in respect of non-detachability, phrasal implicatures are similar to manner implicatures. Not only the content of the phrase but also how the content is characterized is relevant to the generation of phrasal implicatures.³⁷

4.4.3 Non-conventionality

Let us first remember what the non-conventionality feature means:

(...) since the calculation of the presence of a conversational implicature presupposes an initial knowledge of the conventional force of the expression the utterance of which carries the implicature, a conversa-

³⁶In fact, in some cases two uses of the same phrase can also cause pragmatic problems. Recall Kripke’s Paderewski scenario. In this scenario two utterances of “Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent” might vary in terms of pragmatic felicity. Attributing to Peter a belief of Paderewski as a musician would be felicitous, whereas attributing to him a belief of Paderewski as a minister would be infelicitous.

³⁷Several theorists also pointed out that subsentential pragmatic phenomena are detachable. Karen S. Lewis, for example, argues that the content based reasoning is not fine-grained enough in order to explain certain subsentential linguistic phenomena, such as anaphora, and she concludes that “regardless of whether Grice himself thought so or not, it is reasonable to suppose that rational agents engaged in co-operative communicative activity reason based not only on the content of a sentence but also on the particular words used” (Lewis 2014, p.240). Similarly, Kent Bach argues that implicatures, which are pragmatically completed and expanded propositions, are detachable (Bach 1994, pp.136-7).

tional implicatum will be a condition that is not included in the original specification of the expression's conventional force. (Grice 1989, p.39)

Metaphor, as a form of phrasal implicature, clearly meets this condition. One needs the conventional meaning of a phrase in order to mean the association sequence attached to that meaning. For metaphorical phrases, conventional meaning can be either an object or a kind, and the features attached to it will be something completely separate from this conventional meaning.

To conclude this section, we can generally say that metaphor, as a case of phrasal implicature, has the features which Grice originally developed for utterance (or clause) level implicatures (aside from non-detachability). Using these features to test whether something is an implicature is analogous to doing so at clausal level. Phrasal implicatures are cancellable and non-conventional, but not non-detachable. I argued that, with respect to non-detachability, phrasal implicatures are more like manner implicatures.

4.5 Special Cases

Metaphorical utterances vary in terms of their grammatical structures. Most of the examples so far have been either in the form of $\lceil a \text{ is } F \rceil$ or $\lceil a \text{ is an } F \rceil$. These are the most frequently discussed forms of metaphor. However, there are many other forms of metaphors. In this section, my aim is not to give a full classification of metaphor, but rather to discuss certain interesting cases.³⁸

4.5.1 Metaphorical Use of Definite Descriptions

Statements in which a definite description is used metaphorically are open to different interpretations. Let us consider Louis XIV's utterance "I am the state". This sentence can implicate two different metaphorical meanings depending on what the definite description "the state" is taken to designate. It can be taken either referentially or attributively in Donnellan's terms; for the former, the interpreter will need to access associations that are attached to the object Louis XIV refers to by using "the state", whereas for the latter she should access the association sequences that are attached to the property (or kind) the definite description designates. If it is taken referentially, the metaphorically used phrase "the state" denotes an object, namely France, and Louis XIV attributes to himself some features in the association sequence attached to France. Suppose *being the protector of Catholics* is the

³⁸See Tirrell (1991) and Miller (1993) for classification suggestions.

only feature he meant. Then the metaphorical meaning would be *Louis XIV is the protector of Catholics*. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken to refer to a kind, then the features Louis XIV attributes to himself are chosen from the association sequence attached to the kind *the state*. Suppose the only association he meant is *being the lawmaker*. Then the metaphorical meaning would be *Louis XIV is the lawmaker*.

In the original context Louis XIV seems to have the latter interpretation in mind, but he could have meant the former one legitimately in another context.

4.5.2 Adjectival Metaphors

Let us illustrate this metaphor structure by an example:

(29) *Sharp* minds can easily see the proof of this theorem.

This example can easily be explained by the metaphor theory I argued for. In a normal context when a hearer processes the sentence he will notice the mismatch between the meaning of the word “sharp” and the rest of the sentence, and he will look for the implications of the property *sharp* that are intended by the speaker. For instance, if these implications are **F**, **G** and **H**, then the metaphorical meaning would be that (*F, G, H*) minds can easily see the proof of this theorem.

4.5.3 The Metaphorical Use of Proper Names

I have touched upon this type of use a few times before. I think the metaphorical use of proper names is one of the most instructive uses regarding the linguistic mechanism of metaphor. This is because of the difficulty of explaining the behaviour of names, as paradigmatic examples of referring terms, in a predicative position.

As seen above, Frege argues that an expression in predicate position cannot be a name, so, a naming expression in a predicate position is a concept-word. In other words, Frege claims that a word like “Vienna” is ambiguous between its proper name and concept-word uses. For example, in “Trieste is no Vienna”, the term “Vienna” does not refer to the city of Vienna but to the concept of Vienna, as the collection of features associated with Vienna. I argued against this view earlier, claiming that a naming expression in a predicate position still refers to an object. The speaker implies certain features by using a proper name in that position.

Another philosopher who examines this kind of use is Asher (2011). Asher considers metaphorical uses of proper names to be instances of coercion.³⁹ A typical

³⁹Although he characterizes these uses as loose talk.

example of coercion is the selection of an aspect of a kind or an object which has more than one aspect in predication. For example, the kind *book* has at least two aspects: one is the aspect of being a physical object and the other is that of being an information source. In order to represent different aspects in semantics, Asher assumes a rich hierarchy of types. According to the traditional view of semantic types (in extensional semantics), which dates back to Montague, there are only two basic types: *e* for entities, and *t* for truth values. Asher's account needs more basic types. For instance, in his account there are fine-grained types such as CAT, DOG, ANIMAL and APPLE. According to him, types can be seen as concepts, and since there are individual concepts, there are also individual types (Asher 2011, p.37). Consider these examples:

(30) You're no Jack Kennedy.

(31) He's an Einstein. (Asher 2011, p.309)

The types of proper names in these examples also have dual aspects. When the term is in subject position, the physical object aspect of the type is selected, whereas when it is in predicate position, the aspect which concerns the associated properties of the object is selected. In Asher's system, these associated properties are also represented as different types, which are the supertypes of the type of the proper name. For instance, SMART and CHARISMATIC are supertypes of EINSTEIN and JACK KENNEDY respectively. When a proper name is used in a predicate position, the type of the argument it takes and the context coerce the predicate to have a different type aspect to be selected than it usually has. As a result of the coercion, since associated features are encoded in the fine-grained type of the name, these encoded features are predicated of the subject in question.

I think Asher's account has some counter-intuitive results due to the claim that associated features are encoded semantically in the type of an object or a kind. Recall the following example that was discussed earlier:

(18) I can't believe you have Alexed the book.

If Asher's account is accepted, we will have to assume that a feature like *prone to lose library books* is encoded in the semantic type of "Alex". It seems highly implausible to me to consider a feature that is associated with a person in a narrow context for a short amount of time to be a part of the semantic type of the name of that person. For this reason, in my account, these features are pragmatically associated with an object or a kind. Another benefit of my pragmatic account is that positing another semantic function for proper names or assuming that they have dual-aspect types

is not needed. A proper name has the same semantic function, which is referring to an entity, when it used either literally or metaphorically. In their metaphorical uses, the intended meaning is conveyed by the implication of certain features that are associated with the objects that are referred to.

4.5.4 Tautologous Metaphors

Consider these examples:

(32) War is war.

(33) Life is life.

(34) Brexit means Brexit. (Theresa May)

These examples are particularly difficult cases for similarity based accounts, such as Fogelin (2011). Fogelin's figurative comparison theory, as he calls it, argues for two principles:

I The *literal* meaning of a metaphor of the form “ A is a φ ” is the same as the literal meaning of the counterpart simile of the form “ A is like a φ .”

II The *figurative* meaning of a metaphor of the form “ A is a φ ” is the same as the *figurative* meaning of the counterpart simile of the form “ A is like a φ .” (Fogelin 2011, p.31)

Hence, in Fogelin's view, metaphor and simile are the same linguistic phenomenon. A metaphorical statement is an elliptical form of its counterpart simile, and they express the same figurative meaning (this is a type of implicated meaning), which is “ A has a sufficiently large number of B 's salient features” (Fogelin 2011, p.76). This is indeed the definition of similarity he borrows from Tversky (1977), however he makes a distinction between literal and figurative similarity based on the notion of salience. In the latter type of similarity claim, only the “incongruent” features of B are considered. For instance, in this conception, “Churchill was (like) a bulldog” is a metaphor and figurative simile which calls for a figurative comparison, whereas, “Churchill looked like a bulldog” calls for a literal comparison (Fogelin 2011, pp.85-6).

Fogelin's account is essentially different from the one I argue for. He denies that some features are predicated of the subject in a metaphorical utterance, but rather claims that a metaphor is used to call attention to likeness between two seemingly dissimilar objects or kinds.

Let us now see how this account should analyse our examples (32) and (33):

(35) War is *like* war.

(36) Life is *like* life.

In no way are these analyses more explanatory than (32) and (33). What does it mean to say that something is similar to itself? Does Fogelin's suggestion as the implied meaning help: "*War* has a sufficiently large number of *war*'s salient features". Clearly not. Fogelin's account fails to give an explanation of this type of metaphor. Comparing something with itself either literally or figuratively does not make sense. The analysis of (34) sounds similarly bad, if not ungrammatical:

(37) Brexit means *like* Brexit.⁴⁰

The same problem arises for interactionist accounts of metaphor. Interactionists argue that metaphorical interpretation requires the interaction of two concepts (or characterizations) which are expressed by two terms (mostly subject and predicate terms). Although some interactionists (such as Camp (2003)) claim that a metaphorical statement expresses a predication, not a relation, the predicated meaning is still formed as a result of interaction, and it is not clear at all how interaction of a concept (or a characterization) with itself creates a new meaning.

Tautological metaphors are straightforwardly explained in my account. In these uses, speakers use one token of the same phrase literally and one token of it metaphorically. Metaphorical use requires interpreters to access the association sequences attached to the object or kind the phrase denotes. Thus, for instance, in (34), it is emphasized that Brexit means the associations that are attached to Brexit, which must be, in this context, commonly accepted, typical features of it. In this sense, tautologous metaphors are not very informative, but they are used to call attention to typical features of an object or kind in question.

4.5.5 Metaphorical Metonymies

Here is a definition of metonymy: "Metonymy is a cognitive and linguistic process through which we use one thing to refer to another" (Littlemore 2015).⁴¹ A classical example of metonymy is this:

⁴⁰Notice that the analysis of examples like "Sharp minds (...)" will also produce ungrammatical results — if they are analysable at all.

⁴¹This definition is slightly different from the one I assumed in my short discussion of metonymy in Chapter 1. There I claimed that the secondary referent of the metonymical phrase can be seen as one of the associations attached to the primary referent of the phrase. Since this difference does not make any difference to my discussion in this section, I will continue using Littlemore's definition.

(38) The ham sandwich left without paying.

In this example, the person who ordered a ham sandwich is referred to via the referent of the phrase “the ham sandwich”. So, the kind *ham sandwich* is the primary referent and the person who made the order herself is the secondary referent of the phrase.⁴²

As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, metonymy can be seen as an instance of phrasal implicature. In (38), for instance, *the ham sandwich* implies the person who ordered the ham sandwich. The main difference between metaphorical and metonymical phrasal implicatures concerns the association sequences; the constituents of the association sequences in the former case are always descriptive, whereas those in the latter case are not. As seen in (38) it can be an object, or one can also use a kind term to refer to another kind metonymically.

The relation between two referents (the primary and secondary referents in the terminology I used above) of a metonymy can be metaphorical. Imagine a scenario where there is a student riot in a university and a professor who is in favour of students’ rights expresses her support in the following way:

(39) The flowers are blooming.

Taken at face value, this utterance seems literal. However, thinking of it in the given context suggests a metaphorical interpretation. How is it interpreted metaphorically? It can be said that the professor refers to the students by using the phrase “the flowers”. Hence the following metaphor seems to be presupposed:

(40) The students are flowers.

And if we replace the subject of (39) with the metonymical referent, we also get the following metaphor:

(41) The students are blooming.

I call metonymies in which the relation between primary and secondary referents is metaphorical *metaphorical metonymies*.⁴³ Clearly, in a metaphorical metonymy, context plays a substantial role in the determination of the secondary referent. With

⁴²For the ease of discussion, I call the ordinary referent of the metonymical phrase the “primary referent” and its intended referent the “secondary referent”.

⁴³Camp (2013, pp.228-30) analyses them with appositives. For instance she analyses (23) as (23’):

(23) Confusion now hath made his masterpiece,

(23’) Confusion, who is an artist, now has made his masterpiece, which is this regicide.

Except use of a different technical tool, I think Camp’s analysis and mine are essentially the same.

the aid of this contextual support the professor can convey his intended meaning in (39).⁴⁴

What I call “metaphorical metonymies” are often referred to as “sentential metaphors” or “whole-sentence metaphors”.⁴⁵ I find this terminology misleading. In this type of use, not the whole sentence but its parts receive metaphorical interpretation, and, as seen in (39), more than one metaphor appears in the analysis. Two parts of the utterance in the example also have different functions, which seems to support my suggestion. The phrase “the flowers” helps us to find out what this utterance is about, whereas the interpretation of “blooming” enables us to see what this utterance says about its real subject.

Another example can illustrate why metaphorical metonymy is a more accurate explanation of the phenomenon than sentential metaphoricity:

(42) The bulldozer has brought the country into this condition.

This utterance communicates something about Margaret Thatcher with the aid of the phrase “the bulldozer”. This is also an example of metaphorical metonymy. Note that it is highly implausible to claim that there is a sentential or whole-sentence metaphor here. The utterance is completely literal except the phrase “the bulldozer”, which is metonymical. Only after the metonymical referent (secondary referent) is determined, does the existence of a metaphor, which is “Thatcher is a bulldozer”, become apparent. Hence, let alone being a whole-sentence metaphor, (42) is only indirectly metaphorical.⁴⁶

In light of the notion of metaphorical metonymy, we can observe a characteristic difference between metaphor and metonymy. Metaphor always occurs in the form of

⁴⁴A similar explanation can be found in Camp (2008, p.22): “In some cases, such as (3) [The hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw.], topic and frame are identified by way of some further trope, like metonymy. In other cases, as with noun phrases used metaphorically, the frame is provided directly by the words, and the topic is identified contextually.”

⁴⁵See, for instance Miller (1993) and Camp (2003).

⁴⁶Tirrell (1989, pp.21-2) makes a similar remark on implicit metaphors. She says that some metaphorical discourses presuppose an implicit metaphor. For instance the following poem by T. S. Eliot presupposes a metaphor like “the fog is a cat”, and “if the audience were unable to say to itself ‘the fog is a cat’ (or something quite similar) it would be barred from understanding the passage.”

The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window panes,
 The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the windowpanes,
 Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening,
 Lingered upon the pools that stand in drains,
 Let fall upon its back the soot that falls from chimneys,
 Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden leap,
 And seeing that it was a soft October night,
 Curled once about the house and fell asleep.

a predication. In a metaphor, always, the features that are associated with an object or kind are predicated of another object or kind.⁴⁷ On the other hand, metonymy provides the means to access an object or kind by using an object or kind as a mediator. For this reason, it is not a form of predication.⁴⁸

The use of interrelated metaphorical metonymies is often called “extended metaphor”. Poetical contexts are particularly rich in this type of use. For instance, Shakespeare extends his famous metaphor “Juliet is the sun” in the following way

(43) It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.

Arise, fair sun, and kill the envious moon,

Here, the metaphor in the first line helps us in resolving the metaphorical metonymy in the second line. There is a clear relation between the use of “sun” in the second line and the description of Juliet as *the sun* in the first line. A similar metaphorical metonymy is the use of “the moon”⁴⁹. Again we need the help of the first line in order to resolve the referent of the metonymy. In one interpretation, since Juliet is the sun, “the moon” metonymically refers to Rosaline.⁵⁰ So, we can say that there is a metaphor “Rosaline is the moon” behind the second line. There are of course different interpretations of these lines, but it seems to me that the only explicit metaphorical use in this line is the use of the phrase “kill”. The rest of the line contains metaphorical metonymies.

Generally speaking, a metonymically used phrase and its ordinary denotation function as a mediator in reference to the intended denotation. Think of the classical example (38). In addition to that, metaphorical metonymies have another function. After the resolution of metonymy, a metaphor, in which associations of the primary referent of the metonymy are predicated of its secondary referent, is obtained.

Before closing this section, let us see an example of an indefinite description used in a metaphorical metonymy:

(44) From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. (Churchill)

The phrase “an iron curtain” in this example is an indefinite description, but it is used referentially.⁵¹ This is another example of metaphorical metonymy, since

⁴⁷Of course, tautological metaphors, in which predication occurs with respect to the same object or kind, are exceptional.

⁴⁸As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, I believe that metonymy can be explained as a form of phrasal implicature, however I will not develop this idea here.

⁴⁹If we understand the phrase “the envious moon” as *the moon which is envious*.

⁵⁰For instance see Hills (1997, p.118).

⁵¹Derek Ball pointed out this example to me. For more on referentially used indefinite descriptions see Ludlow (2013).

the phrase is used to refer to something other than its ordinary referent and a metaphorical predication is intended. A simple example can provide further support for this analysis. Suppose that someone utters the following upon seeing her lover:

(45) I have seen a flower.

Here, we have again a referentially used indefinite description (“a flower”), which refers to the lover of the utterer metonymically and metaphorically describes her as a flower.

Going back to the original example (44), we see that the secondary referent of the metonymy is not easily determinable. Let us call it *C*. We then obtain two metaphors:

(46) *C* is an iron curtain.

(47) (...) *C* has descended across the continent.

In fact, this example illustrates an important function of metaphorical metonymy. Even in the cases where the secondary referent is not determinate, metaphorical metonymy enables us to talk about it and attribute certain features to it.

4.5.6 *F* is a Metaphor for *G*

In science, art and philosophy, it is very common to say that *F* is a metaphor for *G*. Here are some examples:

(48) A factory is a metaphor for a cell.

(49) Sleep is a metaphor for death.

(50) A blind watchmaker is a metaphor for God.

I think those uses do not cause any special problem for my account. They clearly intend to make a predication. For instance, in (48), the associations attached to the kind *factory* are predicated of the kind *cell*. So, in effect, these uses can be analysed in the ordinary basic form of metaphor, such as *A cell is a factory*, *Death is sleeping* and *God is a blind watchmaker*.

4.5.7 Poetic Metaphors

It can be said that the majority of theorists in the literature on metaphor start their analysis of the phenomenon with $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \urcorner$ type simple structures. The problem for them then is to extend their analysis to more complicated structures, which are often

called “poetic metaphors” since poetry is typically rich in complicated metaphors. However, not all theorists are happy with this order of explanation. Roger White, for instance, in his book *The Structure of Metaphor*, protests this approach:

(...) in metaphor, by combining words in an unusual way, we can do something highly creative, and succeed in saying something that we could not say without recourse to metaphor. At the very least, a starting point for a correct understanding of metaphor is an explicit understanding of the mode of combination of words in metaphor. Very little of that will emerge if we concentrate all our attention upon nothing but artificial examples which are all of this simple subject/predicate form. The usual procedure of developing your entire account of the language of metaphor by considering only *such* examples is in fact every bit as absurd as trying to construct a grammar of the English language by considering only sentences of the form ‘A is F’. (White 1996, p.2)

So, White develops his theory by primarily focusing on poetic (mostly Shakespearean) metaphors.

Another objection of White targets theories which consider parts of the sentences metaphorical. In his view, it is impossible to locate “a metaphorical phrase” in a complicated poetic context; he suggests that metaphor should be thought of as a sentential phenomenon. According to him “a metaphor is a sentence that may be regarded as a sentence that has arisen from the conflation of two other, grammatically analogous, sentences (...)” (White 1996, pp.79-80). Hence, a metaphor always presupposes two situations which are analogously described. The problem is to identify two descriptions for each metaphor. Let us see how White illustrates this idea:

(51) His unbookish Ielousie must construe poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours quite in the wrong.

The two descriptions that are conflated can be formulated as two open sentences:

(52) His x Ielousie must construe poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours quite in the wrong.

(53) Unbookish x must construe y quite in the wrong.

Then, “by making natural substitutions for” the variable in these open sentences, the following two sentences are obtained:

- (54) His uncultured jealousy must construe poor Cassio's smiles, gestures and light behaviours quite in the wrong.
- (55) The unbookish schoolboy must construe the Iliad quite in the wrong. (White 1996, p.106-7)

How does this analysis help us to understand what is communicated by the initial sentence (51)? Here is White's answer:

We may then think of the metaphor as having arisen as a result of conflating two such sentences, thereby establishing an analogical comparison between these two situations, inviting the reader to see the first situation, the situation actually being metaphorically described, in terms of the second situation. (White 1996, pp.107-8)

He also emphasizes that metaphor interpretation is a creative and in a sense special process:

If we think of the metaphor as having been constructed in this way by the user of metaphor, the interpreter of metaphor is confronted by the complementary, converse task, of reconstructing two such sentences from the actual text of the metaphor. In this way, communication by metaphor becomes a collaborative creative process, wherein the interpreter of metaphor is invited to perform an imaginative act of creation that seeks to emulate and re-create the original act of creation of the poet. (White 1996, p.108)

As the quotation above suggests, White sees metaphor as a special linguistic phenomenon. The theoretical tools he uses in his account are not the ones that can be used in the explanation of other linguistic phenomena. In order to support his view, he turns to poetic examples. However, metaphor is a much broader phenomenon than poetical examples. We come across metaphors of different complexity levels in science, art, philosophy and also in daily language. The problem is whether metaphors of complicated structure and metaphors of basic structure ($\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \urcorner$) can be explained in the same way. My focus on this thesis was mostly metaphors of simple structure. In the development of a theory, beginning with simple examples seems more sensible to me. But of course the theory should also be tested with complex examples. For this purpose, let me discuss how my account explains White's example (51). As White points out, the phrase "unbookish" seems to have a special role in the sentence. In the given context, the meaning of this phrase triggers accessing

to the association sequence attached to it. Among these associations, *uncultured* or another similar feature is expected to occur. Arriving at this feature amounts to the interpretation of metaphor. Secondly, White points out the description “poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours”. He maintains that the referent of this description should be thought of in light of Homer’s *the Iliad*. This description does not seem metaphorical to me since it is coherent with the rest of the sentence. Even so, let us accept White’s evaluation for now and assume that this phrase is used metaphorically. In this case, a metonymical relation suggests itself. That means the phrase “poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours” is used to say something of *the Iliad*. Then, a metaphor also seems to be obtained:

(56) Poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours are (like) *the Iliad*.

Thus, a feature that is associated with *the Iliad*, which is something like *difficult to interpret*, is predicated of *Poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours*. Is this essentially different from what White has in mind? I do not think so. What he argues is that metaphor makes one see a situation as another one, and (56) shows how metaphorical metonymies enable us to see one thing as another thing. The metonymy directs the reader to the hidden subject of the sentence, and the metaphor invites her to see *Poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours* as *the Iliad*.⁵² Thus, if White’s analysis can be given essentially by general theoretical tools, such as metonymy and phrasal implicature, why would we need his conflated sentences theory, which treats metaphor as a completely idiosyncratic linguistic phenomenon.

I think there is no categorical difference between poetic and ordinary metaphors; they can be explained by the same mechanism. However, that does not mean that poetry is not a special way of using language. Stern rightly argues for this point in the following passage:

(...) I do not, of course, mean to deny that there remain significant differences between the metaphors of poetry and of ordinary speech. But these differences are not a function of different underlying competencies. Instead they are a function of different uses of a common competence to create different effects and products, a difference like that between the literal language used to write a shopping list and that used to write the *Gettysburg Address* or *Critique of Pure Reason*. I would argue that as competent speakers, we all have a mastery of metaphor, but that only some of us are masters of metaphor. (Stern 2000, p.325 en.42)

⁵²Note that the direction of the predication in this example is different to the examples I discussed above, but I do not think there is a fixed direction of predication in metaphorical metonymies. Theoretically, it can work either way.

I completely agree with Stern on this point. It seems to me that the difference in complexity between the metaphors used in poetry and those used in other areas is a matter of degree. The former are usually thought to be more difficult to interpret. Of course, poets often want their poems to be interpreted creatively by their readers, and to this end, they benefit from ambiguities and intend open-ended interpretations. Metaphor is a convenient tool to this end.⁵³ However, ambiguities and open-ended interpretations are not unique to metaphor or more generally to figurative language. A poem, even written in completely literal language, can contain ambiguous and open-endedly interpretable lines. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that these are features of poetry, rather than those of literal or figurative language. Poetry pushes the communicative force of language use.⁵⁴

In summary, since metaphors are more common in poetry than other uses of language, and poetry often contains open-endedly interpretable lines, some theorists argue that open-endedness is essential to metaphor.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, I argued that this should be seen more of a characteristic of poetry rather than metaphor. Hence, instead of dividing metaphors into two categories as poetic and non-poetic, it is better to think of language use as poetic and non-poetic.

In this chapter, first I presented my theory of metaphor and discussed association sequences, an important theoretical tool I use in my presentation. Secondly, I reviewed the claims on metaphor, that I first introduced in Chapter 2, and showed how my theory is compatible with them. Thirdly, I discussed how implicature tests can be applied to phrasal implicatures. Finally, in Section 4.5, I considered whether different forms of metaphor can be explained by the theory I suggest.

The Phrasal Implicature Theory of Metaphor has certain consequences with respect to some general theoretical problems. I will discuss two of them, the identification of what-is-said and the semantics-pragmatics distinction, in the next chapter. After that, in Chapter 6 I will compare my metaphor theory with other pragmatic theories.

⁵³White's book contains excellent analyses how poets use metaphors in order to create ambiguities.

⁵⁴Bezuidenhout (2001, p.172) emphasizes that open-endedness is "not an embarrassment" of metaphorical interpretation: "Literal interpretation is just open-ended. Any difficult claim that requires the mastery of a lot of background information for its interpretation is likely to have an open-ended quality."

⁵⁵See for instance Lepore and Stone (2015, Chapter 10).

Chapter 5

What-is-said

Thus far I made some scattered remarks on the what-is-said/what-is-implicated and semantics/pragmatics distinctions. In this chapter, I will give more details on them.

There is a huge literature on what-is-said, but the discussion on what-is-said might sometimes seem like a terminological dispute. After all, there are different uses of “say” in English, therefore it is not easy to test ordinary people’s intuitions about what-is-said by an utterance. Despite these difficulties, there is a way to discuss the notion without being part of a verbal dispute: I think a theory of what-is-said can be explicit about what is expected from the notion of what-is-said: What are the theoretical desiderata? I will suggest two theoretical desiderata. First, what-is-said should be public and uncontroversial, at least in cases of successful communication. All pragmatic reasoning depends on and begins with what-is-said. Interlocutors arrive at conclusions by taking what-is-said as given. A controversy about what-is-said between interlocutors can cause communication to be unsuccessful. This desideratum can be satisfied provided that what-is-said is completely public for every discourse participant. Secondly, the information what-is-said represents should be fine-grained enough so that no pragmatically relevant information is lost. What-is-said enables pragmatic reasoning. In the Gricean style pragmatics, there is always an argument which shows how pragmatic information is calculated from what-is-said. Hence, in that type of argument, what-is-said should represent the pragmatically relevant information that is contributed by an utterance. In what follows, I will try to suggest a theory of what-is-said which satisfies these theoretical desiderata.

5.1 What-is-said as Exact Wording

My first idea is this: If context intervenes with respect to a linguistic process or the process is described as pragmatics, the outcome of this process (a proposition

or a part of a proposition) should not be called what-is-said. In my view, what-is-said should be exact wording. In other words, I reject the view, which is endorsed by many theorists, that what-is-said is the asserted proposition.¹ These are two examples:

(...) I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered. (Grice 1989, p.25)

If I may wax metaphysical in order to fix an image, let us think of the vehicles of evaluation - the what-is-said in a given context - as propositions. (Kaplan 1989, p.494)

According to these theorists, what-is-said is propositional. In contrast, I suggest a non-propositional (not content-based) conception of what-is-said. As I will detail below, in most cases, one might retrieve what-is-said from the expressed proposition, but this is not necessarily so. What is fundamental is the uttered sentence.

Why do I suggest such a conception of what-is-said? The main reason is, as I briefly discussed in Section 2.4, there is always a possibility to press the speakers to retreat to exact words they utter. Consider written laws or the communication in legal contexts. In these cases, the exact wording is often crucial. The shared information between parties in legal contexts can often be given only by exact wording.²

¹For declarative sentences

² Here is a vivid example from Oscar Pistorius trial:

Chief prosecutor Gerrie Nel- You still are one of the most recognized faces in the world, do you agree?

Oscar Pistorius- I agree my lady.

GN- You are a model for both disabled and able-bodied sportsmen all over the world.

OP- I think I was my lady. I've made a terrible mistake and...

GN- You made a mistake?

OP- That's correct.

GN- You killed a person, that's what you did, isn't it?

OP- I made a mistake.

GN- You killed Reeva Steenkamp, that's what you did.

OP- I made a mistake.

GN- You're repeating it three times – what was your mistake?

OP- My mistake was that I took Reeva's life my lady.

GN- You killed her! You shot and killed her! Won't you take responsibility for that?

OP- I did my lady.

GN- Then say it then, say yes – I shot and killed Reeva Steenkamp.

OP- I did my lady.

(<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/>

[oscar-pistorius-trial-athletes-cross-examination-begins-full-transcript-9248279.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/oscar-pistorius-trial-athletes-cross-examination-begins-full-transcript-9248279.html))

One can understand exact wording in a couple of different ways. For written communication, it can be seen as a mere string of characters or as a string of characters that have a syntactic structure. For oral communication, however, there are more options: Similar to written communication, exact wording can be seen as a mere string of sounds or as a syntactically structured string of sounds, but it can also involve intonation. One can argue that what-is-said should also encode intonation given that a speaker's intonation can license pragmatic inferences. I am sympathetic to this idea. In oral communication, a true what-is-said report should take intonation into account. Recall the discussion in Section 4.1.4. According to the QUD framework, “Mary loves [John]_F” and “[Mary]_F loves John” answer different discourse questions. Thus, for oral communication, exact wording should be fine grained enough so as to represent a speaker's intonational stress. As for the written communication, however, we do not have conventional, non technical tools to show intonational stress. It is not a practice of ordinary speakers to show intonational stress in their written “say” reports as linguists do. So, in some cases of written communication some pragmatically relevant information is lost. Suppose Sue orally says “[Mary]_F loves John”, but it is reported in a written message as “Sue says ‘Mary loves John’ ” or as “Sue says that Mary loves John”; some pragmatic information will clearly be lost in these what-is-said reports. For the sake of simplicity, I will leave intonational stress aside in the rest of the discussion. But the question about the syntactic structure remains. Is what-is-said as exact wording a linguistic entity that is syntactically structured or not? Here is my position: It seems to me that in attributing “saying” to a speaker we normally believe that the string of characters or sounds contains words that have a syntactic structure. For instance we would not report the sounds a dog makes with a “say” report, nor do we report the meaningless sounds a baby makes. So, what I understand from exact wording is a syntactically well-structured string of words (morphologically well-structured), which I simply call “a sentence” (or “a sentence fragment”). This does not mean that a sentence always expresses a complete proposition. As I have argued for earlier, a syntactically well-formed but semantically anomalous sentence can also trigger implicatures as is the case, for instance, in sentences that contain metaphorically used proper names. In sum, what-is-said as exact wording means a syntactically well-formed sentence or sentence fragment.

In this dialogue OP accepts that he took Reeva's life, and this is more or less the same as to accept that he *killed* her. But still, the prosecutor wants him to utter “I killed her”. Thus, in this context, I believe, nothing other than OP's exact words can accurately be claimed as what he says.

Characterizing what-is-said as exact wording enables us to represent an important piece of linguistic information that is communicated by a speaker. In addition, it gives us solid theoretical ground. Seeing some other output, in which context and pragmatics are involved as what-is-said, I believe, would be highly arbitrary. Exact wording corresponds to the most basic use of what-is-said. There is always a possibility to press interlocutors to accept that their exact wording is what they say in the most fundamental sense of the term. There is no more fundamental sense of “say” an interlocutor could be pressed to accept. It can be claimed that all uses of what-is-said other than exact wording are loose uses of the term. How should we understand looseness here? The following quote from Lewis can help to make my point: “Unless we give it some technical meaning, the locution ‘what is said’ is very far from univocal. It can mean the propositional content, in Stalnaker’s sense (...). It can mean the exact words. I suspect it can mean almost anything in between” (Lewis 1998, p.41). As Lewis points out one can be considered to be saying different things, from the exact wording to the propositional content; in fact it can be more than the propositional content. Taking “say” reports as a test for what-is-said, as Cappelen and Lepore (1997) illustrate, one can even use “say” to report the entailment or the implicature of the proposition expressed by an uttered sentence. Suppose Mary says “John leaves for Latvia next week”. If the reportee is not interested which country John is going, a reporter can correctly report Mary’s words as the following:

- (1) Mary said that John leaves for Europe next week.

Another example is irony. Suppose that after seeing a bad theatre performance Mary sarcastically utters “It was great”, and John reports her utterance as follows:

- (2) Mary said that the play was bad.

This would again be a correct report of Mary’s utterance in the given context. In sum, by a “say” report one can report something more than the propositional content of an utterance.³ If what-is-said by an utterance is considered equivalent to the complement of a “say” report we should accept that there are different uses of what-is-said. Hence, in the above quote Lewis is not right about one end of his what-is-said scale. But he was about the other end; there is no stricter sense of what-is-said other than the exact wording. If there is one literal, non-loose sense of what-is-said, Lewis’s quote suggests that it should be the exact wording.

³One can even report a whole book with a “say” report: In *Naming and Necessity* Kripke says that names are rigid designators.

I think my suggestion does not only provide a sound theoretical ground but is also intuitive. Speakers might be tempted to report something more than exact wording as what-is-said, but when they are pressed, they might retreat to exact wording.⁴ If all the steps of their reasoning on how they report what is said in a certain context are asked, they would need exact wording. An example can be helpful in spelling out these ideas. Consider the following dialogue in a tv news report between a tv presenter and a reporter who is reporting the prime minister's statement:

(3) Reporter: She said that the government was considering sanctions against Russia.

Presenter: Did she really say that?

Reporter: Well, in fact she said "We are considering sanctions against that country.", but it was clear in that context that she meant the government by "we" and Russia by "that country".

Here, pressing the reporter caused her to report the exact words the prime minister uttered. If the reporter is asked to reconstruct her reasoning in this example, it is clear that exact wording is needed as a premise:

(4) The primer minister said "We are considering sanctions against that country."

There is no reason to think that she is non-cooperative.

She mentioned Russia earlier in the conversation.

Therefore she must have meant Russia by using "that country".

She is talking about governmental issues.

She is the head of the government and she has right to talk on behalf of it.

Only the government can decide whether to impose sanctions against another country.

Therefore she must have meant the government by using "we".

Therefore what she meant was that the government is considering sanctions against Russia.

The discussion in Section 2.3, made a distinction between two different approaches to linguistics. One is interested in the constitutive reconstruction of speakers' linguistic behaviour, whereas the other is interested in the psychological reality of these constructions. The question of the speakers' internal phenomenology seems to be a question of the latter approach. So, the explanation based on what speakers report as what-is-said should be seen as an approach in the latter kind. The former

⁴There are uses in English which seem to favour exact wording as what-is-said such as "Did you mean what you said" or "I didn't mean what I said".

kind of approach, on the other hand, should reveal all implicit and explicit steps in speakers' reasoning. This kind of explanation, I think, would need a notion of what-is-said as exact wording.

A consequence of my suggested conception of what-is-said is to give up the idea that what-is-said always expresses a proposition, and gives us truth-conditions. Although, in most cases a complete proposition is expressed by what-is-said, there are certain cases in which what is expressed is not completely truth-conditional. For example, interrogative or imperative sentences, or sentence fragments, which do not express full propositions, can be subsumed under my suggested conception of what-is-said.

Now let us discuss how this conception of what-is-said meets the theoretical desiderata I presented above. First, exact wording is always public and uncontroversial. In normal situations, there will be no disagreement about exact wording. Secondly, as I have been arguing throughout this thesis, metaphor and many other subsentential pragmatic phenomena depend not only the content of a phrase but also on the way that content is expressed, i.e. the wording. A conception of what-is-said other than exact wording cannot represent how the semantic content is expressed. That would be the loss of a piece of pragmatically relevant information. For instance, what-is-said as the asserted proposition would not be a conception fine-grained enough to represent the way the content of an utterance is expressed. Hence, exact wording seems to be the right type of theoretical element that a pragmatic reasoning argument would take as a premise.⁵ In conclusion, what-is-said as exact wording satisfies the two theoretical desiderata I presented above.

5.1.1 What-is-said and Direct Quotation

Does this account reduce the report of what-is-said to direct quotation? I accept that it does. A direct quotation of the uttered sentence qualifies as an accurate report of what-is-said. One can ask about the relationship between “say that” reports and direct quotation. Consider these two utterances:

(5) John said that London is beautiful.

(6) John said “London is beautiful”.

These are two different ways of reporting what-is-said. If the interpreter is lucky enough, he can retrieve what-is-said from the proposition *London is beautiful* in (5), because even if the constituents of the sentence and the reported proposition have

⁵Something in the following form: “...” is said. So, the premise would still be a proposition.

one-to-one correspondence in this example, there is no guarantee that the reportee used the word “London” to refer to the city. She may have used “The smoke”, the nickname of the city, but the reporter may have still preferred to use the more common word “London” in her report. So, a correct retrieval of the what-is-said from a “say that” report is in principle possible, but there is no guarantee. On the other hand, direct quotation is a more powerful tool. Some parts of a sentence can be lost when the proposition is reported by “say that”. Demonstratives are cases in point. Suppose “I should have been in Edinburgh today” is uttered by John. The followings are two different reports of his words the next day:

- (7) John said that he should have been in Edinburgh yesterday.
- (8) John said “I should have been in Edinburgh today”.

From the proposition “said that” takes in (7), one cannot retrieve all the words John used. The information that the words “today” and “I” are used, for instance, is lost in the propositional report. So, at the proposition level, some information is lost, and thereby there is a difference between what-is-said and the reported proposition. Although “today” and “I” are parts of what-is-said, they cannot be represented in the reported proposition. One can only infer what-is-said from a “say that” report, if every uttered word is truly inferred from the proposition “say that” takes, but inferring an uttered word from the proposition (and as a result inferring what-is-said) should be seen as an inference to the best explanation, not as a deductive one.

It might be thought that the difference between what-is-said and the reported proposition is little and not very important. However, this theoretical difference becomes more significant in metaphor and other indirect speech forms. Similarly, this difference is important for the discussion of problems, such as Frege’s puzzle.

- (9) Hesperus is Hesperus.
- (10) Hesperus is Phosphorus.

These two sentences express the same proposition. As I discussed above, the explanation of how they can differ in informativeness is that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” can trigger different association sequences. This potential for triggering can only be given in what-is-said if wording remains intact.⁶

⁶Again Kripke’s Paderewski case needs more explanation. In this case two occurrences of the same word (and same meaning) can trigger different association sequences, therefore, even exact wording might not enough to give what-is-said in some cases. Different suggestions can be made to explain this case, but the essential point is to signal under which characterization of Paderewski the speaker made his utterance.

To conclude: going back to what-is-said reports, what-is-said can always be reported by direct quotation but not always so by “say that” reports, because it is not always possible to retrieve the uttered words from what is reported by this reporting phrase.

Similar things can be said for the “say” report of subsententials:

(11) John used a phrase to mean the prime minister

(12) John said “the prime minister”

These are two different ways of reporting John’s words. Again, demonstratives will help us to exhibit the strength of the direct quotation. Suppose John uttered “today” on a day and the following reports are made the next day.

(13) John used a phrase to mean yesterday.

(14) John said “today”.

In (13), it is impossible to retrieve which word John used exactly. He could have uttered a different phrase, such as “the present day”, but the report would have been the same. So, some information related to what-is-said is lost. For example, “today” and “present-day” might be used to trigger different phrasal implicatures, and these implicatures cannot be extracted from (13). In (14), however, in virtue of direct quotation no information is lost. The audience knows what word he used, and can extract other extra information implied by the use of the word. Thus, for subsententials, direct quotation is more powerful than “say that” report. Another example for the strength of direct quotation is reporting a phrase of another language:

(15) ?John used a phrase to mean le Premier ministre.

(16) John said “le Premier ministre”.⁷

To repeat, for pragmatic purposes we need not only the content of a phrase but also the phrase itself to determine which association sequence is intended by the speaker. Speakers sometimes use phrases from other languages in their speech, mostly for rhetorical purposes. One can only report this kind of use by direct quotation. Otherwise, mixing phrases from two different languages would cause marked sentences.

⁷Note that this is not against my claim above that we do not characterize meaningless sounds as what-is-said. Although this French phrase is not a phrase of English, the reporter believes that it is meaningful in another language. That’s why using “say” to report it sounds felicitous.

The discussion so far concerned declarative sentences, but my suggested notion of what-is-said encompasses sentences in other moods, such as imperative or interrogative. Indeed, this is a strength of my view. It seems very natural to talk about what one says when one uses a sentence in non-declarative mood. The following talk exchange illustrates this point:

- (17) A: Damn you!
 B: What did A say?
 C: A said “damn you!”

5.1.2 What-is-said and Demonstratives

Let us have a closer look at demonstratives. Kaplan famously claimed that demonstratives are rigid and directly referential expressions. He also pointed out the significance of the character-content distinction for demonstratives. A character, in his theory, is a function from a context to a content, and a content is a function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension. For instance the character of “today” is a function which takes the context of the word as an argument and yields the content function. Since this expression is rigid, whatever circumstances of evaluation the content function takes, it would yield the same extension, namely the day of the utterance. On the other hand, the content of a definite description, such as “the president of China”, would be the property *being the president of China*, which is equal to the function which takes circumstances of evaluation as arguments and yields the object which satisfies this property in the given circumstance of evaluation, namely the person who is the president of China.

Consider the scenario in which we enter a classroom and see the following sentence on the board:

- (18) There is no class today!

If one does not know when this sentence was written on the board, one would not know the content of “today” and by extension the content of the utterance as a whole. Since Kaplan identifies what-is-said with content, it turns out that one cannot know what-is-said in this scenario. In my approach, however, what-is-said is knowable. It is just the exact wording: “There is no class today”. I agree with Kaplan that one cannot know the proposition the sentence expresses without knowing the context, but I do not think that this lack prevents one knowing what-is-said.

In order to see the difference between what-is-said and the expressed proposition, let us consider French second person singular pronouns “tu” and “vous”. The latter

is preferred in formal contexts.⁸ Imagine the following two are uttered of the same person:

(19) Tu es le professeur.

(20) Vous êtes le professeur.

According to Kaplan, what-is-said by these two sentences are the same since they express the same proposition. However their pragmatic capacities are different. From (19) one can infer that the speaker has an intimate relationship with the professor, whereas this inference is not possible in (20).⁹ If an important theoretical function of what-is-said is to explain the possibility of different pragmatic inferences, we need a notion of what-is-said that can give pragmatic differences even at the level of demonstratives. Kaplan's notion of what-is-said is not fine-grained enough to perform this task.

5.1.3 Kent Bach on What-is-said

Kent Bach's view on what-is-said is close to mine in some respects. Let me discuss his view.

Bach makes a threefold saying/implicating distinction: (i) what-is-said, (ii) implicature, and (iii) what-is-implicated. In his view, the constituents of what-is-said match with those of syntax (Bach 1994, p.137). What-is-said in this account need not be propositional (Bach 1994, p.144). An incomplete proposition, what Bach calls "a propositional radical," can also serve as what-is-said. Bach argues that only certain types of intentions are relevant to what-is-said:

⁸Pronouns in some languages have particularly rich pragmatic capacities. For instance, in Japanese "pronouns are distinguished also with respect to sex of speaker, social status of referent and degree of intimacy with referent, so, for example, the second person pronoun *kimi* can be glossed 'you, addressed by this intimate male speaker'" (Levinson 1983, pp.69-70).

⁹Note that there is no manner difference between these two utterances in the sense of Grice's original formulation. Recall Grice's maxims of Manner: (i) Avoid obscurity of expression. (ii) Avoid ambiguity. (iii) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) (iv) Be orderly (Grice 1989, p.27). None of these explains the difference between (19) and (20). So, the pragmatic inferences these utterances licenses cannot be manner implicatures. However Grice, also mentions another category of implicature which seems relevant here: "There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite,' that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures" (Grice 1989, p.28). The implicature category that can be called "Politeness" might help us to explain pragmatic differences between (19) and (20). For instance, if in addition to the maxim "Be polite", another maxim like "Do not be more polite than is required" is added, we can explain how interlocutors arrive at the conclusions about intimacy. What is important for my purpose here is that the conception of what-is-said which is defended by Grice and Kaplan is unable to explain the implicatures that fall under the category of politeness. Like the manner implicatures in the original formulation, the explanation of politeness implicatures also needs the way an utterance is formulated.

When a speaker utters a given sentence in a given context, the only intention that is relevant to what he is saying is his semantic intention, i.e., his intention concerning the resolution of any ambiguities and the fixing of any indexical references. (Bach 2001, p.28)

The passing from what-is-said to implicature involves two processes called “completion” and “expansion”:

Completion and expansion are both processes whereby the hearer supplies missing portions of what is otherwise being expressed explicitly. With completion a propositional radical is filled in, and with expansion a complete but skeletal proposition is fleshed out. (Bach 1994, p.154)

What-is-implicated, on the other hand, is separate from what-is-said but inferred from it (Bach 1994, p.140).

Although Bach points out that what-is-said need not be propositional, he still considers what-is-said at the level of content. For this reason his view does not address my concerns presented above. One problem concerns names. If the contents of names are parts of what-is-said, this means that co-referential names make the same contribution to what-is-said. For instance, “Superman flies” and “Clark Kent flies” are the same in terms of what-is-said. However the pragmatic inferences they permit are different as I argued above. Another problem is related to pure indexicals. In Bach’s view, the content of pure indexicals enters into what-is-said (Bach 2005, p.39). Bach excludes demonstrative and impure indexicals from semantics since the resolution of their references requires speaker’s intentions. Thus, their contents cannot be part of what-is-said either. I argue for a more radical view than Bach. I think even the contents of pure indexicals cannot be parts of what-is-said. In a language there can be more than one pure indexical which have the same content, but trigger different associations. In this case, the content of these expressions would not give a clue about the pragmatic inferences the expressions trigger. Hence, if what-is-said is supposed to be a point of departure for pragmatic inferences, unlike what Bach suggests, their contents should not be seen as parts of what-is-said.

5.1.4 What-is-said and Metaphor

Metaphors are cases which strengthen my suggested radical minimalist conception of what-is-said.¹⁰ There are several cases to discuss on the relation between metaphor and reporting. Consider the following report:

¹⁰I will continue using sentences in declarative mood, but what I will say is also applicable to sentences in other moods.

(21) Romeo said that Juliet is the sun

Suppose Romeo has only meant the ordinary metaphorical meaning. In this case, there are two different interpretations of (21). One is that the reporter does not intend to report the metaphorical meaning, she only reports Romeo's words. For instance, the reporter might not be sure if Romeo's utterance is metaphorical, but anyway she can report his words. The second is that the reporter intends to report the metaphorical meaning, and since she does this again by using Romeo's original sentence in her report, she also reports Romeo's words as in the first interpretation above.

Here is another scenario. Suppose Romeo uttered (22) and his utterance is reported in (23):

(22) Juliet is warmth of my world, the beginning of my day and nourishing.

(23) Romeo said that Juliet is the sun.

The reporter here, does not report Romeo's words but the meaning Romeo conveys with the help of a metaphor. If someone presses her and asks if Romeo really said that, she should retreat from her claim and need to accept that he did not exactly say it. Note the difference between this report and the one in (21), where no retreat is needed even if the reporter is pressed.

For metaphors, I would like to argue again that what is basic among these different types of reports is the report of exact wording, which I call what-is-said. So, in the examples above, what-is-said by Romeo is "Juliet is the sun", and this can be reported either by a "say that" report as (23), in which what-is-said can be inferred from the embedded proposition without any loss of information, or by direct quotation as "Romeo said 'Juliet is the sun'".

As discussed before, Grice identifies what-is-said with the meaning the speaker commits herself, but this causes a problem in the case of metaphor. In the majority of metaphorical utterances, speakers do not commit themselves to the literal meaning of the uttered sentence. For instance, Romeo does not commit himself to the proposition *Juliet is the sun*, but to the proposition *Juliet is warmth of my world, the beginning of my day and nourishing*. We can explicate the difficulty Grice faces in the following way:

- (i) Metaphorical meaning is a form of implicature.
- (ii) What-is-said by an utterance generates the implicature.
- (iii) What-is-said requires the speaker's commitment.

- (iv) For metaphorical utterances, the only candidate for what-is-said is the utterance meaning, but in the majority of cases speakers do not commit themselves to utterance meanings.

In order to resolve this problem, Grice gives up (iii), and argues that in cases of metaphors, making as if saying is sufficient to generate metaphorical meaning as a form of implicature. In other words, speakers do not commit, but make as if commit themselves to utterance meaning in metaphors. This seems a very *ad hoc* move to me, because it is posited only to explain certain cases such as metaphor, irony and slip of the tongues. This problem is also pointed out by Bach (2001):

There was one respect in which Grice's favored sense of 'say' was a bit stipulative. For him saying something entails meaning it. This is why he used the locution 'making as if to say' to describe irony, metaphor, etc., since in these cases one does not mean what one appears to be saying. Here he seems to have conflated saying with stating. It is more natural to describe these as cases of saying one thing and meaning something else instead. That's what it is to speak nonliterally (at least if one does so intentionally). (...) Besides nonliterality, there are two other reasons for denying that saying something entails meaning it. A speaker can mean one thing but unintentionally say something else, owing to a slip of the tongue, a misuse of a word, or otherwise misspeaking. Also, one can say something without meaning anything at all, as in cases of translating, reciting, or rehearsing, where one utters a sentence with full understanding (one isn't just practicing one's pronunciation) but is not using it to communicate anything. (Bach 2001, p. 17)

I agree with Bach's criticism, but I take one more step than him. As I discussed in Section 5.1.3, my suggestion is to give up identifying what-is-said with the content of a sentence or a phrase.

Let us now discuss a possible objection related to the metaphorical use of proper names. As I mentioned above, on one plausible view, these cases can be seen as semantically ill-formed and that they do not express propositions when taken literally. In the conception of what-is-said as exact wording, even a semantically ill-formed sentence can be what-is-said.

Now, consider the following examples:

(24) Mary: John is no Einstein.

(25) Mary said that John is no Einstein.

(25) sounds like a good way of reporting (24). A question arises here: If the sentences in which a proper name is metaphorically used do not express propositions, why do speakers find both Mary's utterance and its report acceptable? It seems to me that the semantic problem in these cases are not recognized by the hearers because they can easily switch to the speaker's meaning and direct their attention to this implied meaning. In this explanation both (24) and (25) are semantically ill-formed. But the hearers focus on the phrasal implicature triggered by the use of "Einstein" (such as *smart*), and in a sense locally "fix" the semantic problem. Since this "fixing" is local -and to some extent conventionalized- these utterances sound good to the hearers. Thus, in my account, what-is-said by Mary in (24) is "John is no Einstein" (not a proposition) and what-is-implicated is something like *John is not smart* (a proposition).

To conclude, I believe that what-is-said as exact wording provides us a sound theoretical basis, and that wherever context involves in the interpretation of an expression or an utterance, we can make the distinction between what-is-said and what-is-meant. To this effect, I argued that what-is-said should be seen as a linguistic entity not an entity like a proposition, and that a "say that" report is not always a good guide to determine what-is-said. One can infer what-is-said from a "say that" report in some cases, but more natural and direct way of reporting what-is-said is direct quoting, by which even what-is-said by sentence fragments can be reported.

5.1.5 What-is-said and the Literal Proposition

In this picture of what-is-said, a question concerning the relevancy of the literal proposition arises. Is there a room for the literal proposition an utterance expresses? First of all, I should note the following: As said above, some utterances do not express a full proposition. Thus, in these cases, the question about the role of the literal proposition does not arise. In cases where a full proposition is expressed after the resolution of indexicals there are two possibilities: if no phrasal implicature is needed to be calculated, the literal proposition and what-is-asserted would be the same. Since the literal proposition is asserted, it can be said that the literal proposition has a theoretical role in the overall picture. However, we do not need it as a separate category; we have the category of what-is-asserted, and it applies to these cases. The second possibility is the one in which phrasal implicatures are calculated. Does the literal proposition have a theoretical role in these cases? In most cases the answer is "no"; the literal proposition has no theoretical role. The speaker does not commit herself to that proposition. The uttered sentence, namely

what-is-said, and what-is-asserted (for a declarative sentence) by using that sentence suffice to make the required theoretical distinctions.

However there are some exceptions to this general remark. One is the so-called twice-apt metaphors, which constitute a small proportion of metaphorical uses. In this type of metaphorical use, the speaker means both the literal and the metaphorical meaning of the utterance.

Another exceptional case is the paradigmatic (literal negative) use of slurs. I will discuss slurs in Chapter 7, but for my purpose here it is sufficient to mention that in the literal negative use of a slur, the speaker means both the literal meaning of the term and the negative features associated with the group in question. In this respect, literal negative use of slurs and twice-apt metaphors are very similar phenomena; literal proposition plays a theoretical role in their linguistic explanation.

To conclude, I can say that in the vast majority of phrasal implicature cases literal proposition has no theoretical role; because it is not meant. The uttered sentence and the asserted proposition that contains phrasal implicatures are sufficient to make theoretical distinctions. In few other cases, however, the speaker also means the literal proposition. In these cases three constituents are needed: (i) uttered sentence, (ii) asserted literal proposition, and (iii) the other proposition that contains phrasal implicatures.

5.2 A New Conception of Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

My second claim in this section concerns how semantics/pragmatics distinction can be redefined in accordance with my suggested notions of what-is-said and phrasal implicature. We need three systems — *Semantics*, *Pragmatics-1* and *Pragmatics-2* — which work together in utterance interpretation. Interpretation begins with a sentence, which I call what-is-said.¹¹ Semantics takes the sentence as an input and

¹¹ I have certain assumptions concerning disambiguation. Two types of ambiguity are relevant here: A sentence can be structurally ambiguous or its constituents can be lexically ambiguous. There are two ways to approach to the disambiguation process. One is to assume that utterance interpretation can have multiple outputs. According to this assumption, every lexical or structural ambiguity brings about a new interpretation. This option requires no theoretical elements to be added to the picture. The other option is to include ambiguity resolution as part of the utterance interpretation process. Lexical ambiguity should be resolved since association sequences are attached to the contents of phrases. Structural ambiguity should also be resolved since the output of Pragmatics-1 is supposed to be isomorphic with the uttered sentence. Including these ambiguity resolution processes would complicate the overall picture. For my purposes here, I do not need to compare these two options in depth. Either option would work well with my proposal concerning utterance interpretation, but for the sake of simplicity I prefer the first one.

produces *what-is-meant-1* in cooperation with Pragmatics-1. The latter has access to general contextual information and the association sequences attached to phrase meanings. Semantics turns to Pragmatics-1 for two purposes. First, it asks the contents of context-sensitive terms (such as indexicals). Secondly, Semantics passes the semantic meaning of a phrase to Pragmatics-1 in order to determine if a phrasal implicature is triggered. If it is, Pragmatics-1 calculates the phrasal implicature by accessing the relevant association sequence, and returns this implicature to Semantics. In the end, the phrasal implicature replaces the semantic meaning of the phrase locally, and thereby this cooperation between Semantics and Pragmatics-1 generates *what-is-meant-1*. What-is-said can be structurally different from *what-is-meant-1* only in the cases where the sentence contains a context-sensitive phrase or phrasal implicatures are triggered. I said “can be” because not all calculations of phrasal implicatures have structural effects. Consider a loose talk example: One says “Holland is flat” and means *Holland is roughly flat*; here, the structure of the proposition will be different from the uttered sentence because of the additional constituent *roughly*. But for the most metaphorical interpretations, the structure of the uttered sentence will be the same as the meant proposition. In these cases, we can also call *what-is-meant-1* *what-is-implicated-1*. In all other cases, *what-is-said* and *what-is-meant-1* will be structurally the same. What I mean by “structurally same” is that the syntactic structure of the sentence and the structure of the proposition are the same. In other words, every constituent in a syntax tree matches its denotation in the same order.¹²

If the sentence in question is a declarative one, it is possible to call *what-is-meant-1* *what-is-asserted*. *What-is-meant-1*, however, is more general than *what-is-asserted*, because there are non-assertive sentences, such as imperatives and questions, but it is still possible to talk about *what-is-meant* by them. The meaning of questions and imperatives is a controversial issue in semantics. I do not need to go into this discussion. My point is simple. In the framework I suggest, we can make *what-is-said*, *what-is-meant-1* distinction for questions and imperatives. For instance, if one utters “Is Juliet the sun”, *what-is-said* will be the sentence itself, whereas *what-is-meant-1* will be the question whether Juliet is the warmth of one’s world, the beginning of one’s day, etc. Clearly, this *what-is-meant-1* is not an assertion. The semantic analysis of this question is another issue, which is not relevant to my purposes here.

¹²Here I presuppose a certain view on propositions, which is often called “structured” or “Russellian” proposition view. Of course this is not the only view in the literature. According to another influential view propositions are modelled as sets of possible worlds. In this view, of course, *what-is-meant-1* would not have a structure.

There are cases which will complicate this picture. These are twice-apt metaphors in which a speaker means both the literal and metaphorical meaning of a phrase. Repeating an example we have seen earlier, suppose one utters “Oslo is a cold city” and use the phrase “cold” both literally and metaphorically to mean that the average temperature of the city is low and the city is psychologically unattractive. In this kind of case, we can say that what-is-meant-1 split into what-is-meant-1’ and what-is-meant-1”. The former corresponds to the literal meaning, whereas the latter to the metaphorical meaning. If the sentence contains an indexical, the content of this indexical should also be part of what-is-meant-1’.

The proportion of twice-apt metaphors in all metaphorical uses is very small, but there are some other similar linguistic phenomena. As mentioned earlier, literal negative use of slurs are like twice-apt metaphors in this respect. In these uses of slurs too, we need to recognize the split of what-is-meant-1 into what-is-meant-1’ and what-is-meant-1”. This point will be clearer after I discuss slurs later.

To sum up, split occurs in only twice-apt metaphors and similar phenomena such as literal negative uses of slurs. In all other cases there is no need for breaking what-is-meant-1. To repeat, in these cases literal proposition has no theoretical function, since the speaker does not commit herself to it. The uttered sentence, namely what-is-said and the propositional what-is-meant-1 suffice for making the theoretical distinctions.

After this initial stage of sentence interpretation, clausal implicatures are calculated. Pragmatics-2, which is more or less the classical Gricean system, is responsible for these calculations. It accesses general contextual information and generates implicatures. These implicatures can be called *what-is-meant-2* or *what-is-implicated-2* (in a case what-is-implicated-1 exists). The diagram 5.1 illustrates the overall system.




Figure 5.1: My conception of sentence interpretation

5.2.1 Modularity Question

Can semantics be considered a module in this picture? Let us discuss this question. Roughly speaking a module is a cognitive system which is responsible of processing an encapsulated body of information (Borg 2004, pp.80-1). Whether semantics is a module or not depends its relation with pragmatics. In the classical Gricean framework semantics turns out to be a module, because in this framework pragmatics deals only with the output of semantics, namely what-is-said (or what-is-as-if-said). Until semantics finishes its task, pragmatics is inactive. According to contextualists (e.g. Relevance Theorists, Truth-conditional Pragmatists), however, pragmatics radically intrudes into semantics. There is no pragmatic-free task for semantics, therefore it cannot be considered a module.

Although I agree with contextualists that pragmatics does a lot at the sub-sentential level, I do not think that pragmatics intrudes into semantics. The notion of phrasal implicature allows us to mark the difference between semantics and pragmatics at the level of phrases. Semantics processes an encapsulated body of information, but this encapsulated body of information is not a proposition but a phrase meaning. Pragmatics (Pragmatics-1 above) can also take phrase meanings as inputs and work on this type of meaning. Hence, we have phrase meanings and phrasal implicatures which are implied by these meanings. At the phrasal level, semantics and pragmatics can be seen as two different systems, and semantics can be thought of as a module. Borg discusses the same problem:

To put things crudely, it can't be the case that the language faculty remains entirely encapsulated until the point of outputting a sentence-level content. Rather the picture is one where the outputs of the language faculty are available at incremental levels, so that, as it were, other modules or central-processing systems can 'see' the construction of sentence-level meaning stage by stage and can utilize the sub-sentential fragments of meaning which are going into the construction of sentence-meaning. (Borg 2012, p.64 fn.8)

So far, what she suggests seems very similar to my conception. However, she continues as follows:

The modularity claim will then be that, although pragmatic and semantic interpretation processes run in parallel (rather than the kind of sequential picture seen in the original rendition of Grice's view above), with pragmatic processes able to operate on sub-sentential clauses before the semantic analysis of the sentence is complete, still no pragmatically

enhanced reading is permitted to feed back into the semantics module to effect the semantic analysis of the sentence.

Thus, Borg maintains that the road between semantics and pragmatics (pragmatics-1 in my picture) is a one-way road. Pragmatics can access the outputs of semantics but not vice versa. An immediate objection can be raised: Even if one rejects phrasal implicatures, at least for the denotations of indexicals semantics needs contextual input and pragmatic reasoning; determining the denotation of an indexical such as “that” cannot be a purely semantic process. However Borg’s system easily overcome this problem. In her conception of semantics, what indexicals contribute to truth-conditions are not objects or properties but rather singular concepts. Borg’s position is a completely internalist one. For instance, in this picture “cat” means CAT, which is an expression of the language of thought (LoT) or mentalese (Borg 2004, p.84). The singular concept as the truth-conditional contribution of an indexical is also an expression of LoT.

Borg turns to character-content distinction in order to show the difference between different indexicals. For instance in an utterance of “that’s mine”, the truth-conditional content is $\ulcorner \alpha \text{ is } \beta \urcorner$, where α and β are two singular concepts that are the contents of “that” and “mine” respectively. These two singular concepts have different “shapes” in Borg’s view. The characters of the two indexicals make them different, that is α is a THAT concept, whereas β is a SPEAKER concept (Borg 2004, pp.197-8).

I think Borg’s view suggests an elegant internalist framework. She can give the truth-conditions of sentences that contain indexicals without needing speaker’s intentions or any other type of world knowledge. But of course internalist semantics is not the only view in the literature. For instance, according to the direct-reference framework, which is one of the most popular views in the literature, the truth-conditional contents of indexicals are the objects or properties they denote. They give several arguments that support this position. Thus, semantics needs pragmatics for indexical resolution in this framework, which means the road between semantics and pragmatics in 5.1 should be open two-way.

Another reason for postulating two-way connection between semantics and pragmatics concerns compositionality. Pragmatics can access the contents of subsententials and calculate pragmatic meanings. However, it cannot be responsible of compositional connection of these pragmatic meanings. Building up complex meanings from simpler meanings is a task of semantics. So, without assuming that pragmatics feeds pragmatic meanings back to semantics, compositional connection of these meanings would be left unexplained.

To conclude, in the system I suggest, semantics is encapsulated and modular at the phrasal level. Semantics determines the contents of non-indexical phrase meanings and the characters of indexicals by itself, but it requires pragmatics (Pragmatics-1 in my picture) in order to resolve indexicals and to see if the speaker meant something else by using the contents of the phrases. If the speaker means something other than (or in addition to) the literal meaning, this meaning goes back to semantics, and the compositional machinery combines this meaning with the other parts of the utterance that have gone through the same process and outputs what-is-meant-1 (sometimes more than one).

Chapter 6

Pragmatic Rivals

There are several pragmatic approaches in the literature. In this chapter I will briefly examine three of them: Relevance Theory, Emma Borg's theory of metaphor which argues for the autonomy of metaphorical interpretation, and Elisabeth Camp's interactionist theory of metaphor.

6.1 Relevance Theory

The first theory I want to discuss is Relevance Theory (RT).¹ The relevance-theoretic approach is characterized by a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between literal and figurative language. In this view, concept modulation (or in relevance-theoretic terminology “*ad hoc* concept construction”) is a very pervasive phenomenon that occurs in almost every conversation. Speakers and hearers modulate word meanings for the purposes of conversation. This process is governed by the Principles of Relevance. “Relevance” is a property of all inputs to the human cognitive system and human cognition tends to maximize this property (Cognitive Principle of Relevance). Since communication is cognitively expensive, the optimality of Relevance is crucial in communication; in other words, a principle related to the optimality of relevance, which can be paraphrased as a least-effort but maximum information principle (Communicative Principle of Relevance), is working among the participants of a communication process: “Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.”²

¹The main works in which RT has been developed are Sperber and Wilson (1995), Carston (2002) and Wilson and Sperber (2012).

Although some theorists, such as Camp (2003, p.13), describe relevance-theoretic account of metaphor as semantics, I will adhere to the relevance theorists' own description and classify them as a pragmatic theory.

²These principles are introduced in Sperber and Wilson (1995, pp.260-1).

These two principles are basic assumptions of Relevance Theory in explaining communication in general and the communication of metaphors in particular. RT claims that each input of the human cognitive system, either from memory or from perception, is relevant to the agent to a certain degree and our cognitive mechanism is inclined to increase total relevancy. This means that the human cognitive system has an expectation to receive relevant information. Being an important resource of inputs, communication is also oriented by relevance principles. In this sense, interlocutors implicitly observe these principles. Speakers assure their hearers that their utterances (or other overt communication acts) are optimally relevant, namely they make great contextual effects for the smallest processing effort.

6.1.1 Loose Talk and Metaphor

Concept modulation is also governed by the Principles of Relevance; the limits of modulation are determined by them. A typical example of concept modulation is loose talk. When a speaker utters “Holland is flat”, the hearer constructs an *ad hoc* concept FLAT* by loosening the absolute concept FLAT. FLAT* is a concept under which not only exactly flat objects but also approximately flat objects fall. Thus, the word “flat” in this sentence does not express its conventional meaning, but its modulated meaning. In order to understand relevance-theoretic explanation of loose use, let us see how RT explains the interpretation of the utterance “The lecture starts at five o’clock”:

Suppose, for instance, you have a lecture one afternoon, but do not know exactly when it is due to start. You are told, ‘The lecture starts at five o’clock’. From this utterance, and in particular from the phrase ‘at five o’clock’, together with contextual premises, you can derive a number of implications that make the utterance relevant to you: that you will not be free to do other things between five and seven o’clock, that you should leave the library no later than 4.45, that it will be too late to go shopping after the lecture, and so on. None of these inferences depends on ‘five o’clock’ being strictly understood. There are inferences that depend on a strict interpretation (for instance, that the lecture will have begun by 5.01), but they do not contribute to the relevance of the utterance, and you do not draw them. According to the relevance-theoretic approach, you then take the speaker to be committed to the truth of a proposition that warrants just the implications you did derive, a proposition which might be paraphrased, say, as ‘The lecture starts

between five o'clock and ten past', but which you, the hearer, would have no need to try and formulate exactly in your mind. Note that if the speaker had uttered the more accurate 'between five o'clock and ten past' instead of the approximation 'at five o'clock', the overall effort required for comprehension would have been increased rather than reduced, since you would have had to process a longer sentence and a more complex meaning without any saving on the inferential level (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.21).

RT explains metaphor as a form of loose use, but a more radical one. When one says "My chiropractor is a magician", the *ad hoc* concept MAGICIAN* is constructed and the metaphorical term "magician" here, means *a person who can achieve extraordinary things*; my chiropractor does not fall under MAGICIAN, but MAGICIAN* (Wilson and Sperber 2012, pp.112-3).

6.1.2 A Worry Concerning Metaphorical *Ad Hoc* Concepts

Bezuidenhout (2001) is another theorist who argues that metaphorical interpretation is a case of *ad hoc* concept construction. As seen earlier in Section 2.4, Bezuidenhout and Relevance Theorists deny that the metaphorical meaning is implied. Rather, on their view, it is directly expressed, in the sense that it is the first meaning an interpreter arrives at. In other words the only meaning a metaphorical phrase explicitly expresses is the *ad hoc* concept constructed in the given context. Recall Hills' (1997) formulation of a similar approach to metaphorical meaning. On his view, metaphorical meanings "get lodged" in metaphorical words. But recall also Camp's objection that if this was the case, in the same context every subsequent use of a metaphorically used word would have received the same interpretation. But this is not the case (Camp 2006a, p.297).

I will raise a similar objection to RT and Bezuidenhout's *ad hoc* concept approach to metaphor. If the *ad hoc* concept expressed by a metaphorical phrase is the first, explicit, direct meaning, and it is "said" in the Gricean sense, in the same context, it should compositionally connect with other expressions in the same way. But this does not always happen. The following talk exchange illustrates this point:

(1) Romeo: Juliet is the sun.

Benvolio: Yes, but she is the British sun.

In *ad hoc* concept approach, "sun" in Romeo's utterance expresses the *ad hoc* concept SUN*. The extension of this concept is determined via the description

metaphorically meant. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the description in question is only “warm and nourishing”. Thus, all warm and nourishing things fall under SUN*. If this is the first, explicit and direct meaning of “sun” in this discourse context, then what we should expect from this meaning to be able to compositionally connect with the meaning of “British” in Benvolio’s response. But it does not make sense to apply “British” to *warm and nourishing*. This might force us to interpret “British” metaphorically, but there is no salient metaphorical interpretation for that. Here, it is clear that Benvolio uses the whole phrase “British sun” metaphorically. But the *ad hoc* concept SUN* is not a compositional part of this metaphorical meaning. Literally “British sun” is composed of the literal meanings of “British” and “sun”, but the metaphorical meaning intended by Benvolio is not composed of two *ad hoc* concepts BRITISH* and SUN*. Hence, when a phrase used metaphorically, later uses of it in the same context does not necessarily inherit the compositional value from the initial use. This does not seem to be an observation the *ad hoc* concept approach can easily explain. Note that in my phrasal implicature approach, since metaphorical meanings are implied, there is no requirement for the later uses of the term to inherit the initial metaphorical meaning.³

6.1.3 Two Problems with Relevance Theory

I have two more disagreements with the relevance-theoretic approach to metaphor. The first one is a general concern about the project. In this view, the possible interpretations are not determined by the principle of cooperation and the maxims working in accordance with it, but rather a cognitive principle. The speaker chooses the optimally relevant utterance to express her thought, and the hearer chooses the optimally relevant interpretation. However, the speaker and the hearer are two different cognitive agencies, and the optimal relevancies on both sides may not match. What guarantees the success of communication?

Let us discuss this issue further. In the classical Gricean picture, the speaker is supposed to build an argument. The conclusion of this argument is the thought she intends to implicate, and the premises involve the followings: (i) The content which is explicitly expressed (what-is-said in the Gricean sense), (ii) the Cooperative Principle and the maxims, and (iii) the contextual information which the speaker presupposes to be accessible to all interlocutors. In the same picture, the hearer’s aim is to reconstruct the speaker’s argument. What he is supposed to use in his argu-

³Tautologous metaphors such as “War is war” or “Brexit means Brexit” seem also problematic for the *ad hoc* concept approach to metaphor, given that the same word is supposed to directly and explicitly “say” two different things in the same sentence.

ment are: (i) The content which is explicitly expressed (what-is-said in the Gricean sense), (ii) the Cooperative Principle and the maxims, and (iii) the contextual information which the hearer presupposes that the speaker presupposes to be accessible to all interlocutors. If communication fails, the first point to check is the arguments the speaker constructs and the hearer reconstructs. These arguments might fail to match for a few reasons. For instance, one of them might not be valid. Or one of the peers might mistake the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. However, these are not likely possibilities. Since we assume that conversational participants are rational individuals, when the communication fails, the problem will be more likely caused by the mismatch between the speaker and the hearer's presuppositions about the contextual information. One should examine a communication problem by comparing the presuppositions about the context.

On the other hand, in RT's framework, the success of communication between two peers depends on a cognitive measure of Relevance. This notion of Relevance is very different from the Gricean maxim of Relevance. What Grice means by the maxim ("be relevant") is the requirement to say something related with the contextual information, that is accessible to conversational participants. For example, in one interpretation of this Gricean maxim as we have seen in Section 4.1.4, the interlocutors are supposed to answer certain questions in a given context, and a proposition that is expressed by an utterance would be considered relevant only if it partially or completely answers one of these questions. In contrast, the relevance-theoretic notion of Relevance is described as an input's being relevant not to a context but to an individual: "An input is *relevant* to an individual when it connects with available contextual assumptions to yield *positive cognitive effects*: for example, true contextual implications, or warranted strengthenings or revisions of existing assumptions" (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.6). Thus, the speaker puts her message into words so as to be optimally relevant for the hearer. The speaker, by uttering a sentence, not only conveys her message but also conveys the assumption that the message is optimally relevant. The hearer, similarly assumes that the input is optimally relevant for him and tries to figure out the interpretation which makes the uttered sentence optimally relevant for him. Wilson and Sperber describe this process as follows:

A hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic during online comprehension should proceed in the following way. The aim is to find an interpretation of the speaker's meaning that satisfies the presumption of optimal relevance. To achieve this aim, the hearer must enrich the decoded sentence meaning at the explicit level, and complement

it at the implicit level by supplying contextual assumptions which will combine with it to yield enough conclusions (or other positive cognitive effects) to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. What route should he follow in disambiguating, assigning reference, constructing a context, deriving conclusions, and so on? According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, he should follow a path of least effort, and stop at the first overall interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance. This is the key to relevance-theoretic pragmatics. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p.7)

As I mentioned above, the optimal relevancy judgements of the speaker and the hearer might not match. The speaker might think that a piece of information is optimally relevant for the hearer, but the hearer might think that it is not so for him. Or the two conversational participants might arrive at different interpretations which are optimally relevant for them. We are inclined to call these situations communication failures, however RT does not agree on this. As the quoted passage suggests, according to Wilson and Sperber, optimally relevant first interpretation is the correct interpretation. I find this idea very counter-intuitive.⁴ I think Gricean framework suggests a more plausible picture of human communication than the relevance-theoretic one. The fundamental problem with RT is that RT considers relevancy relevance for an agent instead of relevance to a context. Yielding positive cognitive effects is sufficient for an interpretation to be relevant and correct, but such a position of linguistic interpretation does not seem tenable.

The consequence of this discussion for metaphorical language should be clear. The problem about the relevance-theoretic approach to linguistic interpretation is also a problem for the interpretation of metaphors. In fact, the problem is more serious for metaphors. Since the interpretation of metaphors depends heavily on context and what a conversational participant associates with a kind or an object, the criterion of optimal relevancy is less likely to be successful as a criterion for correct interpretation. It seems that the more context dependent a linguistic phenomenon, the more likely the optimal relevancy fails to give the correct interpretation; an interpretation can yield positive cognitive effects but can still be incorrect.

My second disagreement with relevance theorists concerns their view that metaphorical meaning is not implicated. I touched on this issue in Section 4.3.3. Let me revisit it briefly. According to RT, a metaphorical concept is generated by the modulation of the concept the metaphorically used phrase expresses. This modulated *ad hoc* concept is part of the explicitly expressed proposition called “explicature”, which

⁴See Saul (2002) and Cappelen and Lepore (2007) for the discussion of similar problems.

RT claims to correspond to the literal meaning or Gricean what-is-said. Hence, the metaphorical meaning is not implicated. I argued against this position in Section 4.3.3. There I claimed that we can (and we should) distinguish what is explicitly expressed from what-is-implicated in metaphorical interpretation. An important piece of evidence that we *can* make this distinction is that when the suggestion for metaphorical interpretation by the speaker is not accepted by the hearer for some reason, she (the speaker) has to admit that what she explicitly expresses is different from what she means. The reason why we *should* make this distinction is that in metaphorical speaking, as several theorists have argued, literal or explicitly expressed meaning is essential for the interpretation of the metaphor and for the cases where metaphor is extended. Since, I presented all these arguments in detail in Section 4.3.3, I will not go into the other details here.

6.2 Borg's Defence of the Autonomy of Metaphors

The second theory I will explore is Emma Borg's theory of metaphor.⁵ Borg suggests a figurative interpretation function f , which takes the literal meaning of the uttered sentence p , the conceptual framework α , and the contextual input c as arguments and gives the set of metaphorical interpretations:

$$f^c \langle p, \alpha, c \rangle = \{p_1^c, \dots, p_n^c\}$$

The basic picture in which this function plays its role is as follows: A hearer processes the literal sentence with the aid of his conceptual framework and determines the possible interpretation set. He then reduces this set to the contextually relevant interpretations. The conceptual framework parameter, here, does a similar job to the one association sequences do in my phrasal implicature theory of metaphor. Borg makes a distinction between two types of conceptual framework. One is personal: every speaker of a language has his or her own conceptual framework. The second is an abstracted common framework which is shared by most of the speakers of a given language. These two bring about two different interpretation sets: Borg calls the first "Personal Interpretations (PI)" and the second "Metaphorical Interpretations (MI)". Everyone might arrive at personal (idiosyncratic) interpretations, but they should not be called metaphorical; metaphorical interpretations should not be private but

⁵Although she rejects pragmatic approach to metaphor, the commonalities her account have with other pragmatic accounts, I believe, allow us to categorize it with them.

commonly accessible (Borg 2001, pp.237-40).

One concern with the view so far is about the limitation of Borg's suggested notion of conceptual framework. I doubt that this abstracted conceptual framework can explain examples such as "I can't believe you have Alexed the book", which I discussed in Section 4.1.6 above, and other similar cases. In these examples, it is hard to claim that a common conceptual framework that is shared by most of the speakers of a language will be helpful. Borg seems to need a more fine-grained notion of conceptual framework.

I will now continue with a more important problem. Borg claims that metaphorical meaning is autonomous:

I want to claim that, although it is not wrong to come to entertain any member of MI in response to a metaphorical use of a sentence, some members of MI may be more *appropriate* than others. The hearer who interprets Romeo's utterance of "Juliet is the sun" as meaning that Juliet is a burning oppressor has not failed to understand the metaphor, though the interpretation she has settled upon is far from being the most appropriate in the context. It is in this sense that the user of metaphor has less recourse than the user of non-metaphorical language: a speaker may reject what purports to be a report of what she literally said as mistaken, but in the case of metaphor, where the putative report makes use of a member of MI, though not one the speaker had intended, she can object that the report is not appropriate, but cannot simply reject it as incorrect. This is just one aspect of the autonomy of metaphorical interpretation; another surfaces in the fact that p^* counts as a correct metaphorical interpretation of a sentence, s , just in case there is an open path from s to p^* in the cognitive framework of some proper part of members of the linguistic community.⁶ (Borg 2001, pp.240-1)

I strongly disagree with this claim. If metaphor is a meaning form, or at least has a communicative value, we cannot separate it from the speaker's communicative intentions. Meaning, whether it is semantic meaning or speaker's meaning, is a metaphysical phenomenon. It is fixed when the utterance is made. On the other hand, interpretation is an epistemological issue. The hearer's aim is to access what was meant by the sentence or by the speaker, and he can fail or succeed in doing this. However, the hearer's success or failure does not affect the determination of

⁶What she understands from "metaphorical interpretation" is metaphorical meaning; elsewhere (2001, p.237) she explicitly says this.

the meaning.⁷

A simple example might illustrate this idea. Suppose a teacher sees a note on the board of a lecture theatre saying “This module is a picnic”. The teacher might arrive at an interpretation upon seeing the sentence and imagining a context, but this should be a tentative one. She cannot be sure what “this module” and the metaphorical phrase “picnic” mean. She might be curious and pursue what was meant by the utterance. Suppose further that she finds the utterer and learns the intended meanings, but these meanings go against her initial interpretation. In this situation, what would the teacher say? Would she say “my interpretation was inappropriate” but not false or “my interpretation was incorrect (or false)”. For the phrase “this module”, she would surely say the latter. How about the metaphorical phrase? I think the latter also sounds more natural for that. In this sense, metaphorical language does not seem different from literal language. If this objection is plausible, we should reject Borg’s first remark on the autonomy of metaphorical meaning. The second remark is even less acceptable. From Borg’s suggestion it follows that a metaphorical utterance expresses unintended meanings. In other words, when meaning is in question, does appropriateness entail correctness? Imagine a context in which it is appropriate to assume that the pronoun “she” in “she is smart” might refer to ten different people. Does this mean that there are ten propositions expressed by this sentence, even if the speaker and the hearer are not aware nine of them? If it does not, why would we assume something similar for metaphorical meaning?⁸

To conclude, although I have sympathy for Borg’s general understanding of how metaphor functions, I disagree with her remarks on the autonomy of metaphorical meaning. Another essential difference between my approach and her is that her approach is clausal but mine is phrasal. The figurative function she postulates takes the literal meaning of the metaphorical sentence/clause as a whole, which makes her account a clausal one.

6.3 Camp’s Interactionist Theory of Metaphor

Elisabeth Camp’s theory is the third pragmatic theory I want to discuss. Camp’s theory is more sophisticated than the others particularly in terms of the cognitive

⁷Wittgenstein’s following remark seems to be along the same lines: “(...) every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning” (Wittgenstein 1958, p.80^e).

⁸Wearing (2006, fn.21) also expresses her disagreement with Borg on the role of the speaker’s intentions in the determination of a correct metaphorical interpretation.

aspects of metaphor, and for this reason, I will allocate more space for it.

6.3.1 Characterizations

I should first introduce the notion of characterization, which is central for Camp's theory of metaphor:

(...) we typically experience multiple properties instantiated together, first in particular individuals and again across individuals of certain kinds. We intuitively associate those properties in our thinking, forming what I call "characterizations" of individuals and kinds, which are roughly similar to what others have called "stereotypes" or "prototypes." (Camp 2006b, p.3)

Let us unpack this notion. Characterizations, according to Camp, are representations of given subjects. They contain beliefs and other attitudes about a subject (Camp 2003, pp.125-6). For instance, one's belief that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and one's belief that he was poisoned to death are two pieces of information in one's characterization of him. Furthermore, Camp does not consider this information set an undifferentiated chunk but as a highly structured entity, whose structure is determined by three parameters: *prominence*, *centrality* and *depth*. One feature of one's characterization of an individual or a kind might be more prominent (or salient) than the others in a given context and time. Centrality, on the other hand, is a property which is not easily affected by contextual factors. The centrality of a feature is its importance in the determination of other features, which can roughly be thought of as a causal determination. The third parameter, depth, is related to the resistance to change of a feature. For instance, if we perceive someone as a bigot, this is very likely be a deep (not easily changeable) feature in our characterization of that person (Camp 2003, pp.92-9).⁹

An important feature of characterizations is that a person does not have to commit herself to whether the subject in question really have the property attributed to it. One might know that the subject does not possess a property, but it might be the part of the characterization anyway if she believes that the property fits in the characterization. Camp calls this feature "fittingness" (Camp 2015, p.604). Fittingness is an important notion in terms of metaphorical interpretation. Searle's example of "Richard is a gorilla" exemplifies this point. Searle paraphrases this sentence as "Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth", and he thinks

⁹This parameter does not play an important role in the analysis of metaphors, so I will ignore it in the rest of the section.

this paraphrase is still valid even if ethological investigation shows that gorillas are in fact shy and sensitive animals (Searle 1993, pp.92-3). Thus, one's characterization of the gorilla may not entirely consist of the things one believes about gorillas.¹⁰

6.3.2 An Interactionist Theory of Metaphor

Camp commits herself to the so-called interaction theory of metaphor¹¹, according to which metaphorical meaning is determined via an interaction between the source and target (or governing and subject characterizations in Camp's terminology) terms.¹² The matching features determine the interpretation the metaphorical term receives. A brief explanation is given in the following passage:

(...) I believe, the speaker intends for her hearer to make his characterization of the subject under discussion as structurally isomorphic as possible, given limitations of conversational relevance, to the governing characterization indicated by the metaphorical term. In conversations where the speaker intends to make a determinate point, this merely requires identifying a few features in the subject characterization which can be matched to prominent features in the governing characterization. For richer, more "deeply meant" metaphors, however, the speaker wants his hearer to take the project of applying the governing characterization more seriously. (Camp 2006b, p.9)

According to Camp, in the interpretation of a metaphor which has the form $\lceil a \text{ is } F \rceil$, the speaker compares the characterizations of the denotations of the terms a and F , among the most prominent features in the characterization of a ,¹³ the ones

¹⁰The comparison of characterizations with concepts is not crucial in the coming discussion, however I will present some basics in order to clarify the notion: Characterizations are different from concepts in at least three respects. First, concepts are usually considered internally simple, whereas characterizations have highly complex structures. Secondly, concepts are compositionally combined to form complex concepts, but this is not the case for characterizations. Thirdly, concepts are tools to categorize individuals, and for this reason they are considered unvarying across persons and contexts. However characterizations need not be so (Camp 2003, pp.128-9).

Although characterizations are different from concepts, there is a sense they are intimately related; but this is a one directional relation: the existence of a characterization depends on the existence of the related concept. One may have a concept of an individual or a kind without having a characterization of it, but not vice versa.

¹¹For earlier interactionists, see Black (1954), Moran (1989).

¹²The source term is the term which receives metaphorical interpretation, and the target term is the term whose denotation is the subject of metaphorical predication. In a metaphorical utterance in $\lceil S \text{ is } P \rceil$ form, S and P are target and source terms respectively. Camp calls the characterization of the target term "subject characterization" and that of the source term "governing characterization".

¹³I show the variables for the denotation of the target term in bold on this page.

which most tightly match with the most prominent features in the characterization of F are selected (M -features), and they are again predicated of a (Camp 2003, p.208). In this picture, a worry about the informativeness of metaphorical utterances arises. The features that are predicated of a are already the features in the characterization of a . The predicate term F only serves for determining which of the a 's features are predicated of a . Thus, the interpretation of the metaphor does not make the hearer learn any new feature of a . It can be said that the speaker, by metaphorical speaking, just highlights certain features of a . Hence, the metaphor is not informative for the hearer.¹⁴ For instance, in “Juliet is the sun”, the features *The sun is the brightest celestial body* and *The sun's light is natural and original* in the governing characterization match with the features *Juliet is the most beautiful lady* and *Juliet's beauty is natural and original* in the subject characterization respectively (Camp 2003, p.182). In the end, the metaphorical interpretation will be *Juliet is the is the most beautiful lady and her beauty is natural and original*. However, since the matching features of the subject characterization are already constituents of the interpreter's characterization of Juliet, no new feature is added to this characterization. We can only say that some of the features of Juliet are emphasized.

Camp counts four ways in which a governing characterization feature match with a subject characterization feature. They can be (i) exactly the same or similar either (ii) hyperbolically (two features are on the same scale but have different degrees), (iii) analogically, or (iv) metaphorically (Camp 2003, pp.155-161). Leaving the details aside, in these four ways of matching the uninformativeness described above holds. However, Camp also allows feature introduction which makes informativeness possible:

In addition to these four ways in which features in the governing characterization can be matched to features already present in the subject characterization, it is also possible for features to be *introduced* into one's a -characterization [subject characterization]. Not just any feature can be so introduced. First, the introduced feature P must be quite prominent in our F -characterization [governing characterization]; it helps if P

¹⁴Besides predication, in Camp's account, metaphor has another important cognitive effect. When the governing characterization and the subject characterization is compared, the former restructures the latter: the parameters (centrality, prominence, depth) of the constituents in the governing characterization are transferred to the corresponding constituents in the subject characterization. In this way, the constituents that are not central or prominent in the subject characterization can become central or prominent. Camp calls this “aspectual effect of metaphor”, and argues that this is the same effect what some other theorists call “seeing things under a new light” (Camp 2006b, pp.8-9).

is one of the *only* prominent *F*-features. Second, *P* (or some suitably de-hyperbolized version of it) must be quite fitting for *a*, on our current characterization of it. Third, some contextual priming — typically but not universally, conversational principles and presuppositions — must lead us to expect that the aspect might introduce a feature in this way. So, for example, someone might utter

(2) Bill's a bulldozer

expecting her hearer to realize that the most prominent feature of bulldozers which could be fitting for a man of Bill's general character is not allowing anything to stand in his way. Understanding this, the hearer might introduce this feature into his characterization of Bill, where nothing like it previously existed. (Camp 2003, pp.161-2)

Thus, we can conclude that, in Camp's picture, metaphors can only be informative in a very limited sense, where the feature in question is "quite prominent", "quite fitting", and favoured heavily by the context.

6.3.3 A Problem with Negated Metaphors

In this picture, a problem with negation arises. Consider the following:

(2) Juliet is not the sun.

According to Camp, negation and the other constituents that complicate the syntactic structure, such as quantifiers, are external to metaphorical meaning. In other words, however complicated the syntactic structure is, the application of the governing characterization to the subject characterization comes first in metaphorical interpretation. Only after that are operators and quantifiers evaluated.

(7) Surgeons are butchers.

(8) Some butchers are surgeons.

(9) No man is an island.

(10) Most men are rapacious wolves.

(...)

In these cases, the aspect can still be 'read off' directly from the sentence uttered, and the *M*-features are still determined and predicated of the subject in just the same way as the basic cases (...). A case like (8) or (10) introduces one additional interpretive step, because of the

quantifier. The aspect itself in (8) simply applies our characterization of surgeons to our characterization of butchers in general, much as (7) does in reverse; the quantificational force is added back to the metaphorical interpretation of (8) after the *M*-features are determined. I believe (9) also works in the same way: first we apply our island-characterization to our characterization of humans, and then we take the speaker to be claiming that no man has the features thereby identified. (Camp 2003, p.217)

Let us now return the example. We can imagine two scenarios in which this sentence is uttered. In the first one, both interlocutors presuppose that Juliet is the most beautiful lady and that her beauty is natural and original. They also presuppose that the sun is the brightest celestial body and that the sun's light is natural and original. The speaker wants to deny those common presuppositions about Juliet and utters (2). In this scenario, the interpretation seems to happen in the way Camp predicts. First two characterizations interact and a content arises. Second the negation operator is applied.

In the second scenario, the two interlocutors presuppose that Juliet does not have those features mentioned above. That is, they presuppose that Juliet is *not* the most beautiful lady and that her beauty is *not* natural and original. The speaker wants to emphasize this point. Camp's framework, however, seems to fail to explain the metaphorical interpretation in this scenario. The hearer is supposed to interact the characterization of Juliet with that of the sun, which is the same as the first scenario. But this interaction will either give him no content, since the negated features above do not match with the features of the sun, or the hearer will try to match some secondary important features and arrive at an unintended interpretation.

A natural suggestion for this problem is to negate the governing characterization first and interact the characterization of Juliet with this negated governing characterization. This would give the interpreter right interpretation. However, characterizations in Camp's framework are structured entities, and it is not clear if the negation operator can be applied to a characterization.

In my phrasal implicature approach this problem does not arise. Logical operators and quantifiers can interact with phrasal implicatures as they can with phrase meanings, and the assumption that the determination of metaphorical content precedes the application of operators is not needed.

I will raise another objection for Camp. But before that I wish to point out three differences between Camp's and my views. First, Camp (2006a, p.301) distinguishes two types of what-is-merely-meant: meant by word-use and meant by

content-use. She categorizes metaphor and loose talk as meaning by word-use, and most other implicatures as meaning by content-use. However, what she understands from word-use seems different from my notion of phrasal implicature. In her theory of metaphor, interaction happens between subject and governing characterizations, and subject and governing terms are extracted from the literal interpretation of the sentence. Thus, metaphorical interpretation requires two successive stages: in the first stage, the hearer processes the literal meaning (what-is-said in the classical Gricean sense of the term), and then in the second stage he first identifies subject and governing characterizations, and after that he matches these characterizations in order to determine the meaning that the metaphorically used term receives. This requirement makes Camp's theory of metaphor a clausal implicature theory. A clausal implicature theory of metaphor, as I argued in Chapter 2, will have difficulties in the explanation of two claims: metaphor-implicature contrast claim and one-step process claim.

Secondly, let me briefly compare characterizations and association sequences. In the first place, I should express my sympathy for Camp's notion. I agree with the idea that our information about an individual is structured in a certain way, and Camp's description of this structure seems very plausible to me. However, I doubt that this structure is essential to metaphor interpretation. Recall that, in association sequences, the only required parameter is salience. The features are ordered with respect to their saliences.

Thirdly, in Camp's picture, a metaphorical utterance has two effects: a predication and the governing characterization's restructuring of the subject characterization. In her view, these two effects are inseparable, they are made by every metaphorical utterance. In my account, however, there is no necessary connection between these two effects; they are separable. I will discuss this in detail below.

6.3.4 Unnecessary Complications

Let me continue with another worry with Camp's theory of metaphor: to put it simply, the theory appears to be an overkill. Camp's main objective is to explain the cognitive aspect of metaphorical speaking, but to reach that objective, she develops an unnecessarily complicated theory. I believe that the theory I have argued for above gives a simpler account of metaphor, which is also able to explain the cognitive aspect. Besides its simplicity, my theory works within the limits of conventional theoretical tools in linguistics; it does not need a metaphor-specific theoretical tool such as "the interaction of subject and predicate". Thus, if there is a simpler theory which achieves the same objective, why would one endorse Camp's. I will discuss

how my theory gives an account of the cognitive aspect of metaphor, but before that I should first explain why I see Camp's theory as an overkill.

Let us return once again Romeo's utterance. As I noted earlier, Stanley Cavell paraphrases the metaphor in the following way:

- (3) Romeo means that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day begins with her; that only in her nourishment can he grow. (Cavell 1998, pp.78-9)

Here, there are three features that are attributed to Juliet; these are (with a little bit generalization) *being the warmth of one's world*, *beginning of one's day* and *being the nourishment in which one can grow*. However, Camp's analysis, as presented above, is different. In her analysis, for example, the feature *being the most beautiful lady* in Juliet's characterization matches with the feature *being the brightest celestial body* in the sun's characterization and thereby becomes a part of the metaphorical meaning. I believe there is no way to directly match *being the most beautiful lady* with *being the brightest celestial body*. It seems one can at most match the latter with *being the brightest*; and from this through the examination of the associations, first *being the most eye-catching* and from this *being the most beautiful lady* can be found. In short, not with direct matching but through the examination of a series of associations can one link the two features Camp mentions.

Let us now assume that the following five features occur in the characterization of the sun: (i) *being the warmth of one's world*, (ii) *beginning of one's day*, (iii) *being the nourishment in which one can grow*, (iv) *being the brightest celestial body*, and (v) *being burning hot*. In the interactionist picture, with comparing the features in the characterization of Juliet, (i)-(iii) match directly, (iv) also matches directly (but I doubt that directness), and finally (v) does not match at all. Hence, only the first four features contribute to the metaphorical interpretation. Now, I wish to suggest an alternative to this matching system. There is another way to see it. In my view, instead of matching, we can call what is going on in this picture an appropriateness or a relevancy test. So, in this alternative position, in the determination of the features that are supposed to be inferred from the metaphorical predicate term, the candidate features are tested against the subject term. In this way, the features that are only appropriate for (or relevant to) the subject are selected and become part of the metaphorical interpretation.¹⁵ Among the features of the the sun above,

¹⁵Searle (1993, p.107-8) makes a similar point against the interaction theories of metaphor. In his view, metaphorical interpretation involves inferring $\lceil S \text{ is } R \rceil$ from $\lceil S \text{ is } P \rceil$ in two stages. First, the set of R -candidates are determined, which are the features associated with P , and secondly this set is restricted with the help of S . S term plays no role in the first stage, and its role is only restricting in the second. However, interactionists, as Searle takes them, claim that the juxtaposition of S and P terms can generate new R -candidates which cannot be generated by considering P alone. He

(i)-(iii) directly pass the appropriateness test since they can be predicated of Juliet; (iv) does not pass the test by itself, but after a few inference steps, as presented above, a related feature which can pass the test is accessed; finally (v) cannot pass the appropriateness test at all. Thus, in this approach, only the first four features contribute to the metaphorical interpretation. Note that this appropriateness test is essentially different from what Camp suggest, namely characterization matching. The main difference concerns the direction of the process. In characterization matching, among the pragmatic features associated with the *subject*, only the ones that match with the pragmatic features associated with the predicate are selected, and these selected features are considered to be the metaphorical interpretation. On

agrees with interactionists that metaphorical utterances such as “Sam’s voice is sandpaper” and “Kant’s second argument for the transcendental deduction is so much sandpiper” involves different *R* terms but this does not mean the set of *R*-candidates is different in two examples. What makes the difference is that the different *S* terms in each example restricts the same set of *R*-candidates in a different way.

Beardsley’s objection to the interaction theory (or “comparison theory” as he calls it) is in the same vein:

Suppose the poet remarks, “My sweetheart is my Schopenhauer.” On the Comparison Theory we are to ask what his sweetheart and Schopenhauer have in common. But we don’t *know* his sweetheart, so how can we answer this question until he tells us, by the metaphor itself, what she is like? The correct question is what possible meanings of “Schopenhauer” can apply to the sweetheart, and are not ruled out by the context. (Beardsley 1962, p.296)

Camp responds to this objection:

Given an appropriate governing characterization, and armed with an essential description of the subject, we generally do have the resources needed to generate the most important matches between the two characterizations, and thereby to isolate the primary contents of the metaphorical speech act. Thus, suppose I don’t know anything about Romeo’s characterization of Juliet. Nonetheless, I can still discern from his tone and the context that he intends the utterance as a metaphorical compliment, that he is a lovelorn young man, and that Juliet is the object of his affection. From this, I can generate the essential description ‘girl who’s his beloved’, and with it at least a minimal characterization of Juliet. This puts me in a position to isolate at least the most important contents of Romeo’s claim, by introducing the relevant features as necessary. The more I know about his characterization, the richer my understanding can be, but even a relatively minimal grasp of his basic way of thinking about Juliet will enable me to interpret his utterance. Absent this grasp, however, I will not be able to understand him. (Camp 2003, pp.213-4)

I believe Camp’s response fails to show the need to compare or interact two characterizations. What she says seems reducible to Beardsley’s suggestion. Beardsley says the context restricts metaphorical predication, whereas Camp says this restriction is due to knowing the speaker’s intended characterization; but isn’t knowing what the speaker might think about the subject in question part of the context? As discussed in 4.2.2, what discourse participants commonly associate with an object or a kind (or how they commonly characterize them) can be modelled as part of the context set. Then, we can say that only the features that are part of the context set are relevant to metaphorical predication; in this sense, context restricts metaphorical predication. So, the role Camp wants the interaction of characterizations play seems to be reducible to the role of context. Then, why would we need the interaction?

the other hand, in what I suggest, pragmatic features associated with the *predicate* is tested against the subject. Roughly speaking, in Camp's picture, the pragmatic features of the subject is filtered by the predicate, whereas in the alternative picture I suggest, it is the other way around: the pragmatic features of the predicate is filtered by the subject.

Now my claim is that the appropriateness test is not peculiar to metaphor, but rather it is a general linguistic phenomenon. In many other cases, the pragmatic interpretation of the predicate is tested against the subject (or the argument the predicate takes) of the utterance. One case is exemplified by the following utterances:

(4) Mary and John are married.

(5) Mary and her brother are married.

(6) Mary and Ann are married.

Here, which pragmatic inferences the predicate term "married" licenses depends on the subject of the utterance. For example, in (4) an ordinary hearer makes the inference that they are *married with each other*, whereas in the other two, this inference is not licensed since siblings or two persons of the same gender (assuming that the same sex marriage is not legal in the context of the utterance) are not considered eligible for marriage.

Loose talk is another example for the phenomenon:

(7) Holland is flat.

(8) This road is flat.

(9) This table is flat.

Again, in these utterances, what level of precision the pragmatic interpretation of "flat" requires is determined via an appropriateness test against the subject of the utterance. A final example is Searle's famous "cut" examples:

(10) Bill cut the grass.

(11) The barber cut Tom's hair.

(12) Sally cut the cake.

(13) I just cut my skin.

(14) The tailor cut the cloth. (Searle 1980, p.221)

In these examples too, which inferences *cut* licences are determined with the help of the argument it takes. For instance, (12) licences the inference that the cutting is made by a knife, whereas (14) licenses the inference that it is made by scissors.

All these examples show that the linguistic phenomenon the interactionist explanation of metaphor turns to is seen in other places; which pragmatic inferences the predicate licenses are determined via checking the appropriateness of them for the subject. Hence, we can conclude that the phenomenon Camp and others call interaction is a general linguistic phenomenon which can be seen in cases other than metaphorical interpretation. Of course, there is a difference of degree between the interpretation of metaphors and the examples presented above. Metaphorical interpretation, particularly the interpretation of novel metaphors, involves more effortful reasoning than the other non metaphorical examples; the former often requires the examination of more candidate inferences than the latter. However, that does not mean that we have different linguistic phenomena in terms of testing the appropriateness of the pragmatic interpretation of the predicate with the help of the subject.

Metaphorically used verbs are another example of how Camp's interactionist approach suggests an overly complicated story. Consider the following example of Camp's:

(15) The chair plowed through the discussion.

According to Camp, actions and events have no independent characterizations, but their characterizations should depend on the characterizations of individuals:

Actions, events, and situations can also be characterized, but when they are, the characterization is derivative upon the characterizations of the (kinds of) individuals participating in them, and the former characterizations are less rich and complex than those of the individuals on which they are based. (Camp 2003, p.90)

The main reason for this is that only individuals have robust identity conditions that can carry characterizations (Camp 2003, p.90). When we accept this, the first problem we face in (15) is to find the subject and governing characterizations. In Camp's view, the subject characterization is the characterization of *the chair doing something to the discussion*. The creation of the governing characterization, however, is more complicated; it is created by considering the agents and objects which *plow*. In the end, the metaphorical interpretation is determined by matching these two characterizations in the usual way (Camp 2003, pp.223-4).

I think, again, there is a simpler way of explaining (15) without turning to Camp's theoretic presuppositions. It is not clear why one has to know agents and objects

that plow through something; one can simply know what kind of movement plowing is and associate certain features with it without knowing which agents and objects exemplify this type of movement. A hearer can interpret (15) by examining the associations of *plowing* and testing their appropriateness against the arguments of the verb, namely *the chair* and *the discussion*. Furthermore, metaphorical utterances can have different syntactic structures. Consider the following example:

(16) Sharp minds cut ideas easily. (Steinhart 2001, p.36)

In this example, metaphorically used terms are “sharp” and “cut”. Here, which characterizations interact? Does *being sharp* interact with *mind in a certain state* and *mind doing something to ideas* does so with the characterization that is abstracted from the agents and objects that cut? This looks like unnecessarily complicating a simple phenomenon. After all, we have two categories *sharpness* and *cutting* in (16), and one can easily find the intended interpretation by examining the features associated with them. Therefore, I hold that Camp’s view is too complicated.

6.3.5 Cognitive Effects of Metaphor

The complexity of Camp’s theory of metaphor is caused by a theoretical desideratum; what she is after is to develop a theory which can explain the propositional and non-propositional cognitive significance of metaphor. She considers seeing-as (or reframing) to be essential for metaphorical interpretation. As discussed above, Camp claims that in every metaphorical predication, the structure of the governing characterization is applied to the subject characterization and the former reframes the latter. She calls this the aspectual effect of metaphor (Camp 2006b, p.9).¹⁶ In Camp’s view, an interpretation of a metaphor always and essentially involves an aspectual effect. She argues that this is the case even for so-called “tired” or “dying” metaphors (Camp 2003, Section 5.3.5). For example, in order to interpret “John is a bulldozer” the hearer needs to match the characterizations of John and a bulldozer where the latter reframes the former. Since the hearer has to do this matching in order to determine the propositional content, the aspectual effect inevitably comes into the picture, and he sees John as a bulldozer. A related effect is what Camp calls

¹⁶Two other theorists who have noted the same point are Davidson and Moran:

Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. (Davidson 1978, p.47)

The understanding of a metaphor is taken to involve *seeing* one thing as another, and discussions of metaphor will often allude to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing an aspect.” (Moran 1989, p.89)

“complicity effect” following Moran (1989). In the example, the hearer inevitably sees John as how the speaker wants him to see. Given that the hearer is supposed to adopt (at least temporarily) the speaker’s subject and governing characterizations in order to calculate the speaker’s meaning, if the outcome of this adoption is disturbing (e.g. cruel or racist), the hearer will feel like an accomplice (Camp 2003, Section 5.4.4).

Let us examine these claims. First of all, I agree that seeing-as is an important cognitive phenomenon related to metaphor. We can consider this phenomenon in two different ways. First, it can be understood as the activation of images in hearer’s mind as a result of a metaphorical predication. For instance, if one is spoken of as “a bulldozer” or “the sun”, inevitably some related images are activated in the interpreter’s mind. Secondly, the phenomenon can be understood in Camp’s sense. It is reasonable to think that predicating many features related to a kind or an object of a subject leads to seeing the subject under a different aspect, and that these features causes a change or even a restructuring effect on the characterization of the subject. First of all, I wish to note that seeing-as, as a cognitive effect, can be caused by literal utterances.¹⁷ In the first sense of seeing-as, even a literal predication can generate an image in the hearer’s mind. Suppose one utters “John is an astronaut” literally; this utterance can make a hearer who knows John but does not know his profession imagine him in astronaut uniform. Or hearing “Mary is a surgeon”, one can naturally imagine Mary performing a surgical operation. Considering the second sense of seeing-as effect, we can again find examples in literal language. Suppose you have heard that a friend of yours has been using cocaine for a long time. This news might change your overall interpretation of his personality, his behaviour. In this case, the information you have about him will be restructured, you will *see* him *as* a cocaine-user. A single predication can manage to make a huge cognitive effect. Similarly, when one hears that John is an astronaut, one can predicate some of the features in one’s characterization of astronauts of John, even if this utterance is completely literal. In this way, he can see John under a new aspect. As regards the example “Mary is a surgeon”, again, the hearer can make inferences about the profession of surgery and predicate them of Mary. This piece of information can restructure everything the hearer believes about Mary. In sum, seeing-as effect is a pervasive phenomenon whose instances can be found in both metaphorical and literal discourses.

We can distinguish between two different literal utterance cases in terms of the speaker’s position in making her hearer access the features that are associated with

¹⁷See also Davies (1982-1983, pp.75-6) and Stern (2000, p. 283) on this.

the predicate of the utterance. Consider the following two talk exchanges:

(17) What is his profession?

John is an astronaut.

(18) Do you know if she is a busy person?

Mary is a surgeon.

Between these two literal talk exchanges, we can say that the response in (18), unlike the one in (17), forces the hearer to access the features he associates with surgeons; the hearer can not obtain the speaker's intention without accessing these features. Although only one of them facilitates the effect, in principle both responses can make the seeing-as effect. In (18), the response facilitates the occurrence of the effect by forcing the hearer make inferences about the predicate, but in principle the piece of information expressed by the response in (17) can still make the hearer see John under a different light. However, in none of the cases does the seeing-as effect necessarily happen. Facilitating the effect does not mean that it has to happen; the hearer can predicate some of the features that are associated with the denotation of the predicate term of the subject without seeing the subject under a new light. For instance, it is perfectly clear to me that, upon hearing the response in (18), one can access the features of surgeons that they are busy people, attribute *being busy* to Mary and suffice with this predication. There is no requirement that this piece of information restructures the hearer's set of beliefs about Mary.

I wish to argue the same against Camp's claim that seeing-as is a necessary part of metaphorical interpretation. Above I tried to show the linguistic problems Camp's interactionist theory faces. There I argued that an appropriateness or a relevancy test is sufficient to determine the features predicated of the subject, instead of the interaction of the subject and the governing characterizations. Along the similar vein, I believe that seeing-as or the restructuring effect is not a necessary effect of metaphors. As it is the case for literal language, occurrence of the seeing-as effect in metaphorical language is contingent. One can imagine a bulldozer upon hearing the utterance "John is a bulldozer", or the predication of the associations of *bulldozer* of John can cause the restructuring of the hearer's set of beliefs and make the hearer see John under a new aspect. However, I do not see any reason to think that these are essential for the interpretation of the metaphor. Here is my suggestion: since metaphorical language forces the hearers make inferences about the metaphorically used terms and enables the predication of various features, it is a very convenient tool to make the cognitive effect seeing-as, however one should not infer from this

that there is a necessary relation between metaphor and seeing-as.¹⁸

Let us return to the so-called complicity effect. It seems to me that this effect originates from the speaker's not saying but implying something. The hearer has to accompany the speaker's reasoning to understand what she means, and if the conclusion of this reasoning disturbs him, he might feel regret of his accompanying. For instance, suppose the speaker is implying that the hearer's best friend is stupid. After the calculation of the implicature, the hearer would feel regret for her cooperation. Thus, I think what is central to complicity effect is not metaphorical interpretation, but rather a general issue about speaker's meaning; implicature-based speaking is responsible for the complicity effect. Following Gricean "cooperation principle" we can call these "unwanted cooperation" cases. In order to interpret the speaker's utterance, the hearer automatically behaves cooperatively. In order to communicate the speaker's meaning, the cooperation between the speaker and the hearer is a requirement in the Gricean framework. In the end, if the outcome turns out to be disturbing for the hearer, he can regret from being cooperative and a case of unwanted cooperation occurs. A vivid description of this idea is presented by Wayne Booth:

The speaker has performed a task by yoking what the hearer had not yoked before, and the hearer simply cannot resist joining him; they thus perform an identical dance step, and the metaphor accomplishes at least part of its work even if the hearer then draws back and says, 'I shouldn't have allowed that!' (Booth 1978, p.54)

I think what Booth points out for metaphor holds also for other types of implicature based communication. When the interpretation of an implicature sounds disturbing, regretting the cooperation, it is reasonable to imagine the hearer saying "I shouldn't have allowed that".¹⁹

In this section, I discussed Camp's theory of metaphor. Although I have mostly focused on the differences, in fact there are significant similarities between her view and my phrasal implicature theory of metaphor. Both theories are essentially Gricean pragmatic accounts. There are also similarities between the formation of characterizations and that of association sequences. The main disagreement is about how the content of the metaphorical predicate is determined. I reject the idea that the content is determined via the interaction of the subject and the predicate of a metaphorical utterance. Rejecting the idea of interaction has consequences on Camp's observations about the cognitive significance of metaphor. As Camp pointed

¹⁸For more on this, see Stern (2000, Chap.7 Sect.VI-VII).

¹⁹I will return to the "complicity effect" when I discuss slurs.

out, seeing-as or reframing is an important cognitive effect metaphors can make, however, this does not mean that there is a necessary connection between this effect and the interpretation of a metaphor. Similarly, I argued that the so-called “complicity effect”, which is observed in metaphorical discourses, is not caused by the interaction of two characterizations, but rather by a general linguistic phenomenon, which I call “unwanted cooperation”.

Chapter 7

On Slurring

In recent years, slurs and pejoratives have increasingly attracted the attention of philosophers and linguists. While there are ethical, epistemological, and psychological dimensions to the recent discussions, linguists and philosophers of language have mostly been focused on how to theorize certain interesting linguistic and conversational features slurs exemplify. There are several different accounts of slurs in the literature. In my view, one of the crucial problems with these accounts is their overlooking of non-literal (or figurative) uses of these terms. This type of use can, I think, shed light on many seemingly problematic questions about the phenomenon. In keeping with the theme of the thesis, I will frequently refer to non-literal uses in this chapter.

Like I did for metaphors, in the explanation of slurs, I will use the theoretical tool of phrasal implicature, which I introduced in Chapter 3. With this tool, I believe, we can explain the linguistic functioning of slurring and its seemingly problematic features. In this respect, the account I will argue for is a deflationary one; slurring, like metaphorical speaking, is an instance of the general linguistic phenomenon of phrasal implicature.

In the first section I will discuss the general characteristics of slurs. In the second section I will continue with a classification of the current accounts of slurs, and why they fail to explain the general characteristics presented in the previous section. Next, I will argue for my own account and show how it deals with the problems other accounts fail to explain. Finally, in the fourth section I will discuss some further points and make my concluding remarks.

7.1 What are Slurs?

There are slightly different definitions of slurs, but I think the following one is a good general definition¹: “Slurring terms are expressions used to derogate persons and groups of persons on the basis of their ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, gender, occupation, and various other socially significant categories” (Jeshion 2013, p.232). Some examples are “Kraut”, “Boche”, “nigger”, “Chink”, “Polack” (race and nationality), “Kike” (religion), “faggot”, “dyke” (sexual orientation), “slut”, “bitch” (gender), “hooker”, “pimp” (profession), “commie”, “fascist”, “Nazi” (political view), “midget” (appearance), “scab”, “retard” etc. Although some theorists, such as Bach (Forthcoming) make a distinction between group slurs and personal slurs, it is hard to see a principled basis for this distinction. Almost all slurring terms are general terms, and they categorize their target in one way or other.

The slurs (or slurring terms) mentioned above are commonly used examples in the literature. However one should not limit slurring to the use of these words. If we define the effect slurring terms make as verbally derogating people on the basis of the group they belong to, we can call making this effect the speech-act of slurring. There are ways of slurring other than using slurs. For instance one can call someone “Shylock” with reference to the greedy and merciless character in Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice*. Even so-called neutral words can be used for slurring. A racist can slur someone by saying “Why are you being a Jew”.² Another example is Martin Luther King Jr’s complaint about his being called “boy” in jail.³ When a non-slur word is used for slurring, the speaker might need intonational stress to mark her meaning unless context makes slurring explicit.⁴

One should be careful, then, about the distinction between slurring as a speech-act and slurs. Slurs are conventional expressions, which can signal slurring, but one can slur without using slurs.⁵ On the other hand, as we will see below, there are utterances containing slurs which are not used for the purpose of slurring. Thus, we can consider slurs and expressions that are used for slurring to be two intersecting but not completely overlapping sets. I believe that in order to understand the linguistic phenomena about slurs and slurring, every region of the union of these

¹See Anderson and Lepore (2013b, pp.352-3) for a discussion about the definition of slurs.

²Poppy Mankowitz pointed out this example to me.

³This occurs in one of his letters which can be found here: <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-from-birmingham-city-jail-excerpts/>

⁴See Jeshion (2013, p.239) for a brief discussion. Camp (2013, p.339 fn.13) also mentions this type of use.

⁵Anderson and Lepore (2013b, pp.351-2) also emphasize this distinction.

two sets are worth examination. The account I will argue for will explain these phenomena with a single mechanism.

7.2 The Features of Slurs

Let us now explore some of the features of slurs.

7.2.1 Group Expressions

First of all, slurs are used to categorize people, in a similar way their neutral counterparts are used. For instance, the OED definition of “Chink” is “a Chinese person (derogatory)” and of “Kike” is “a vulgarly offensive name for a Jew”. So, although some theorists, as we will see in the next section, contest this idea, I think it is plausible to say that slurs refer to the group their neutral counterparts refer to. So, as Williamson (2009, p.149) points out, the following sentences have the same truth-value⁶:

- (1) Lessing was a German.
- (2) Lessing was a Boche.

Also, the following sentences turn out to be true in this conception:

- (3) All Germans are Boches.
- (4) All homosexuals are faggots.
- (5) All strike-breakers are scabs.

This claim might seem disturbing to many. After all, accepting that Lessing is a Boche could be perceived as attributing cruelty to him. However, if one can distinguish two functions of slurs, attributing negative features from speaking of a group, and one can see that these functions are effective in different linguistic levels, one can accept that (2) can be disturbing but true. This distinction enables us to capture an important intuition concerning the truth values of utterances containing slurs. Consider the following:

- (6) Yao is not a Jap, he is a Chink.

⁶Anderson and Lepore (2013a, p.26), Hornsby (2001, p.140), and Whiting (2013, pp.363-5) also endorse this claim.

It seems to me that most people would not judge this utterance false although they would find the language inappropriate. The following examples in Camp (2013, p.332) also illustrate the same point:

- (7) I'm glad we have so many *spics* at our school: they always bring the best food to our fund-raising functions.
- (8) I wonder whether *Japs* like to cuddle their babies as much as *Chinks* seem to.

However disturbing the slurs in these utterances are, it is hard to deny that these slurs are used to say something about the Hispanic, the Japanese and the Chinese people respectively. This piece of evidence supports the idea that slurs are group expressions.

7.2.2 Different Uses

I'd like to distinguish four different uses of slurs: (i) literal negative, (ii) literal neutral, (iii) literal positive, and (iv) figurative negative.

7.2.2.1 Literal Negative Use

This is the typical use of slurs. For example a racist's using the n-word to derogate black people is a literal negative use of the term. Camp (2013) and Jeshion (2013) call this and other types of derogatory uses of slurs "weapon use".⁷

7.2.2.2 Literal Neutral Use

This is the use of a slur in which the speaker does not have any negative or positive intention, but rather she takes the slurring word as a neutral group term. For instance, a non-native speaker's use of a slur without being aware of its derogatory implications should be considered a neutral use. A vivid example is given by the linguist Renée Blake:

I met a well-intentioned young adult from Brazil who loved Hip-Hop and was ecstatic to be in a place as diverse as New York. He remarked how happy he was to be in a city where there are all kinds of people like Whites, Asians, and Niggers. When I asked him why he used the N-word, he said, "that's what they [African American artists] say all

⁷This expression is due to Wayne C. Booth who originally used it as "weapon metaphor" to mean a metaphor "chosen to produce the greatest possible shock, with heightened contempt for the victim" (Booth 1978, p.53).

the time in the music.” And then he asked me, “What else do they call themselves?”⁸

As the quotation suggests the context gives clues to the intention of speaker and whether her use is neutral or not.

7.2.2.3 Literal Positive Use

This is the use of a slur (usually) by the members of the targeted group for each other. It is also commonly called “in-group use” or “appropriated use”. The way hip-hop singers use the n-word or some women use the word “bitch” exemplify this use. On the reasons of this kind of use, one suggestion is that the members of a group show their solidarity or friendship to the other members by using the slur which designates that group (Croom 2013, p.194; Anderson and Lepore 2013a, p.42). In this respect, they not only cancel the negative features commonly associated with the slur, but also express some positive features. Thus, if we consider slurring to be ascribing negative properties to a targeted group, then positive and neutral uses of slurs should not be counted as slurring.

Recall Camp’s examples (7) and (8). She claims that what these utterances exemplify is that in certain contexts, positive uses of slurs are possible even for out-group members. In her view, the speaker in (7) expresses his feeling of praise and that in (8) ascribes a positive property to Japanese people. Although most theorists do not share Camp’s intuition about this use, I am inclined to agree with her. This type of out-group use of slurs is both uncommon and risky, but still they might be seen as acceptable in a context where the speaker’s positive intention is overt.

7.2.2.4 Figurative (Non-literal) Negative Use

This is the use in which a slur is applied to a person or a group of people which is not in the extension of the category the slur expresses. Slurs can be used figuratively either for derogation or for positive purposes.⁹ There is no figurative neutral use of slurs. Neutral use is using a slur for only talking about the group in question. Since the figurative uses by definition does not target the group in question, figurative neutral use does not arise as an option.

It is easy to exemplify figurative negative use: think of a bigot’s calling someone “faggot” who she does not believe to be homosexual. This is also a weapon use.

⁸<https://africanamericanenglish.com/2010/09/10/the-n-word-who-you-callin-a/>

⁹As it will be clear when I lay out my view, I believe there is no difference between a figurative use of a slur and a metaphorical use of an ordinary phrase in terms of their linguistic mechanisms. So, the occurrences of “figurative” in this chapter can also be read as “metaphorical”.

One can come across with the figurative uses of slurs that occurs in contexts where the speaker has positive purposes. This can be illustrated by some examples from popular culture:

- (9) Green wogs, green wogs
 Our face don't fit
 Green wogs, green wogs
 We ain't no Brit

This is from a song called “White Noise” by an Northern Irish rock band Stiff Little Fingers. They use the slur “wog”, which means “a non-white person”, for Irish people.¹⁰ Another example for the same phenomenon can be John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s song title “Woman is the Nigger of the World”. The slurs in these examples are figuratively used to predicate negative features that are associated with the group the slur designates of another group with the intention of protesting the problems the latter group faces. Although the intention of the speaker is positive, these are still negative uses of slurs, since the features that are predicated are negative.

7.2.3 Projection and Embeddability

The derogatory aspect that slurs signal seems to project out when they are embedded. In other words, the derogatory aspect remains when the clause containing a slur occurs in a question or in the antecedent of a conditional, or it is embedded under the scope of modals, negation, propositional attitude verbs. Some examples are as follows:

- (10) Is Mary a dyke?
 (11) If Mary is a dyke, then she lied to John.
 (12) Mary might be a dyke.
 (13) Mary is not a dyke.
 (14) John believes that Mary is a dyke.

The last two examples deserve some attention. Negating an utterance should be a natural way to show disagreement. For example, if a bigot claims that Mary is a dyke, one should be able to reject this assertion by uttering (13). However, some theorists put forward that (13) is as offensive as the claim it rejects (Anderson

¹⁰Claire Field pointed out this example to me.

and Lepore 2013a, p.28; Camp 2013, p.330; Bolinger 2015, p.5; Bach Forthcoming, p.7). So, in their view, the negative aspect that a slur signals escapes from negation. Some other theorists, on the other hand, claim that utterances containing slurs can be negated successfully (Hornsby 2001, p.129; Hom 2008, pp.438-9).

I think both sides of this discussion capture an important intuition about slurs. In some contexts the negative aspect signalled by a slur projects out of negation, whereas in some others it does not. The reason is that there are different interpretations of a sentence like (13), and projection depends on the interpretation. The account I will argue for will suggest an explanation along these lines.

(14) poses a similar problem. Suppose John asserts that Mary is a dyke and a non-bigot wants to report John's belief. If she uttered something like "John believes that Mary is a lesbian", she would not be able to report John's belief thoroughly, since the negative aspect of his thought would be lost. However, if she uttered (14), then, according to most of the theorists, her utterance would be interpreted offensive as well.¹¹ Again, I think the data are not clear enough to make this claim. It is not difficult to create contexts in which an utterance like (14) is thought as non-offensive. I will come to this point later.

7.2.4 Descriptivity

As many theorists have argued for, it is possible to list certain descriptions which are somehow conveyed by a slur. These descriptions are different from the categorising property (being black, homosexual, a strike-breaker etc.) the slur expresses. Hom (2008, p.431), for instance, defines "Chink" in the following way: "ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, and ..., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and ..., all because of being Chinese". Similarly, Croom (2013, p.189) quotes Jabari Asim, who suggests "emotionally shallow, simple-minded, sexually licentious, and prone to laziness" as the descriptions the n-word signals.¹² Another example is from Dummett (1973, p.454) for the slur "Boche": "The condition for applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the consequences of its application are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans."

One piece of evidence for the descriptive content slurs signal is the figurative use of slurs introduced above. Unless one has a metaphor view like Davidson's, who argues that metaphors do not communicate anything propositional, one should

¹¹See, for instance, Anderson and Lepore (2013b, p.354) for a discussion.

¹²Croom (2013, p.198) also counts ten properties conveyed by "bitch".




Figure 7.1: A classification of the current accounts of slurs

accept that slurs are used figuratively to convey some descriptions rather than simply expressing a property of group membership.

Thinking about different uses of slurs and their descriptivity together leads us an important result: The descriptions slurs convey are defeasible. That is, the descriptive properties of a slur conveys are separable from the categorising property it conveys. This result will play a substantial role in the presentation of my argument.

7.3 Competing Views

In this section, I will discuss some popular accounts of slurs, and will raise certain objections to each of them. I will present my account in the next section.

The flow chart 7.1 classifies the current accounts of slurs with respect to their answers to four questions. Let us begin with the first question. This question asks if a speaker communicates something, which can be a content, an emotion or an attitude, by using a slur. In the literature, perhaps the only account which replies this question in the negative is Anderson and Lepore’s account *prohibitionism*.

7.3.1 Prohibitionism

The core idea of Anderson and Lepore’s (AL henceforth) account can be read in this passage:

Prohibitionism is simple and straightforward: slurs are prohibited words, and so, a violation of their prohibition might provoke offense. Further, their prohibition is ubiquitous; for example, embedding a slur inside a sentence does not immunize its users from transgression, even though sentential embedding can render semantic (as well as pragmatic) properties inert. This is because the prohibition, once put in place, is on every *occurrence* of the slur; and occurrences cannot be eradicated. (Anderson and Lepore 2013b, p.353)

In this view, the offensiveness of a slur does not originate from the semantics or pragmatics of the word, but just from its being prohibited. Declaring a word a slur, typically by the relevant individuals of the targeted group, is sufficient to make it a slur:

What's clear is that no matter what its history, no matter what it means or communicates, no matter who introduces it, regardless of its past associations, *once relevant individuals declare a word a slur, it becomes one*. By and large, those relevant individuals are targeted members, but they needn't be. (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, p.39)

Thus, in slurring what matters is not the content of the word, but the word itself (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, fn.39). When the prohibition on a word is violated, people for whom this prohibition matter are offended (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, fn.31).

This is Prohibitionism in a nutshell. Let us continue with the problems. First problem concerns the pre-prohibition period of the slurs. In this account, for instance, the derogatory uses of the n-word in the US before the mid-twentieth century do not turn out to be cases of slurring, since it was not prohibited back then (Jeshion 2013, fn.38). Whiting (2013, pp.368-9), along the same lines, points that in an imagined racist society, in which the n-word is not prohibited, it should still be count as a slur. This point is clearly against AL's claim.

AL claim that putting a slur between quotation marks can still cause offence. For this reason, new words, such as the "n-word", are coined in order to talk about a slur without using or mentioning it (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, p.37). I disagree with this claim. I think the quoted slurs should not be seen as offensive. A form of dislike seems to be at issue here. An example can illustrate this point. Imagine a single mum who dislikes her former husband. She might anyway need to talk to him on the phone, and so she needs to save the number on her phone. Since she is not happy to see his name on her contact list she saves his number as "my

son's father". She is not offended by the name, but just dislikes it. If someone uses the name, she could plausibly say that she does not want to hear it, however it would be odd for her if she says she is offended when she hears his name. I think the difference between dislike and offence is that the former does not need interlocutor's malicious intention, whereas the latter does. *A* might dislike *B*'s use of a word without thinking *B* wants to hurt *A*, but the same thing is not possible for offence. Of course, by "intention" I do not mean that there is always an occurrent malicious intention in one's using a slur. Probably there are or at least have been lots of people who use the n-word or "faggot" with no actively malicious intention — it's just the common way to talk in their community, which they have adopted without thinking about it. In these cases, it seems one can still find a use of a slur offensive. Thus, we need a weaker requirement of intention. A speaker, by using a slur, might not deliberately aim to communicate negative associations, but if she knows that the phrase she uses allows inferences to the negative associations in the given context, we can conclude that she intends to be offensive in this weak sense of intention. Clearly, if one is unaware of the negative associations her phrase signals, or she thinks that the context cancels negative associations, we can not attribute an offensive intention to her even in this weaker sense. In this situation an offensiveness claim would not be warranted. If we return to the problem about quoted slurs, we can conclude that the uneasiness slurs between quotation marks bring about seem to be a form of dislike, rather than a form of offence. I think a reasonable reaction to someone's putting a slur between quotation marks is to say that it is unpleasant to hear that word (or something along these lines), not that it is derogatory to mention that word.¹³

The controversy around the word "niggardly" (which means stingy or miserly) vividly illustrates my point. Although this word and the n-word are phonetically similar, their origins are completely different. Despite this fact, some might find an ordinary use of "niggardly" disturbing. This would be a reasonable reaction. However, according to the view I defend, finding an ordinary use of "niggardly" offensive would be a misplaced reaction.¹⁴ Of course, what I say here assumes an ordinary use of "niggardly". If one uses the word emphatically to signal that one

¹³AL draws an analogy between slurs and a symbol like swastika: "Slurs in this regard are like the swastika—a symbol with a benign history long before the Nazis, but whose appropriation so contaminated it that even historically incidental tokenings are charged and offensive to many (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, fn.33). Here again I think they are confusing dislike with offence. Suppose someone is visiting an historical (pre-Nazi period) site and come across a swastika. It seems to me that it would be inappropriate for her to say that she is offended, but she could naturally say that she does not like this symbol.

¹⁴A real case which supports my point can be seen here: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/williams/williams020499.htm>.

exploits the phonetic similarity between this word and the n-word, the evaluation should be different.

The third problem I want to discuss concerns an internal tension in AL's account. They acknowledge the difference between slurs and slurring as a speech act, and accept that slurring can be done with neutral words. (Anderson and Lepore 2013b, p.351) For instance "homosexual" can be used for slurring with an emphasis on it. But the word "homosexual" is not prohibited, so it cannot be a slur in AL's account. Their account suggests nothing on how neutral words can make the same effect as their "prohibited" counterparts. The use of slurs and slurring turn out to be two unrelated phenomena in Prohibitionism. This seems an implausible consequence. Intuitively, they are related phenomena, but Prohibitionism cannot explain both.

The fourth and final problem with Prohibitionism concerns figurative uses of slurs. As said above, the use of a slur offends those to whom its prohibition matters (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, fn.31). So, for instance, a use of "faggot" would offend someone if the prohibition on this word matters to her. However, figurative uses of slurs do not seem to fit in this explanation. Imagine a use of "faggot" for someone who is not homosexual and also does not care about the prohibition on the word. He could still be offended. AL's account seems to fail in explaining figurative uses.

These are serious problems for Prohibitionism. It seems saying "no" to the first question is not a tenable option. Let us continue with the accounts which answer the first question in the affirmative. The second question arises for these accounts: Does a speaker communicate something descriptive? On the "no" side, we see Expressivism and the Gesture Theory. I will focus on the former, but most of the objections to it will also apply to the latter.

7.3.2 Expressivism

A prominent defender of an expressivist account of slurs is Robin Jeshion. She argues for a three component semantics for slurs. The first is the truth-conditional component. A slur, in her view, refers to the group which its neutral counterpart refers to (Jeshion 2013, p.240). The second component is the expressivist one: "slurring terms are used to express contempt for members of a socially relevant group on account of their being in that group or having a group-defining property" (Jeshion 2013, p.240). This component is not descriptive. In other words, one cannot find a description that is equivalent to the expressive component of a slur. Finally, the third component is the identifying component. Jeshion claims that slurs ascribe a classificatory property as if this property is the defining property of the target's identity (Jeshion 2013, p.242).

Explaining derogatory variation among slurs is often mentioned as a problem for Expressivism by its critics.¹⁵ For instance, the n-word is considered more offensive than a slur like “Boche”. Jeshion deals with this problem and counts several possible sources for derogatory variation. One of them is the stereotypes associated with the group a slur refers to: “Since stereotypes of different groups are offensive in different degrees, the strength of offensiveness to slurs’ targets will vary with the slur” (Jeshion 2013, p.245). However, the role stereotypes play is perlocutionary in her view. Offensiveness caused by stereotypes is “exclusively pragmatic, often perlocutionary effects. As such, none obtains by virtue of conventional linguistic properties of slurring terms, i.e., meanings or conventional rules of use or conventional implicatures” (Jeshion 2013, p.245).

Let us turn to the problems of this account. First of all, the last two components seem theoretically obscure to me. It is hard to see what this expressivist dimension is. Jeshion claims that slurs and other expressives share the same semantic properties, but she also claims that unlike other expressives, expressive dimension of a slur is not mere feeling (Jeshion 2013, p.242). The best explanation she gives is as follows:

(...) contempt, like resentment, is a highly structured affectively- *and* normatively-guided moral attitude that is subject to evaluation for its appropriateness. As such, in using slurs, speakers not only express their own contempt for the target, but also implicitly represent (but still do not *say* or *assert* that) their targets as *worthy of* contempt. And because contempt is a moral attitude specifically held toward those one regards as inferior as persons, users of slurs thereby implicate that targets ought to be so-regarded as inferior. (Jeshion 2013, p.242)

Hence, in Jeshion’s view, a slur represents its target as “worthy of contempt” and contempt is a “highly structured” and “normatively guided” moral attitude. However, why we should think such a seemingly loaded attitude as having no descriptive content still remains puzzling.

A similar problem arises for the third component. In Jeshion’s suggested semantics for slurs, only the first component is relevant to the truth-condition of the sentence. That is, only this component is asserted. So, it is again obscure how the semantically encoded third component does all its job of identifying its target without asserting anything. Related to this third component Jeshion makes the following claim: “As a matter of their semantics, ‘Kike’, ‘Chink’, ‘Nigger’, ‘faggot’, ‘whore’ are used so as to signal that being Jewish, Chinese, black, gay, a prostitute identify

¹⁵See for instance Anderson and Lepore (2013b, p.358).

what its targets *are*” (Jeshion 2013, p.242). One may think that the italicized “are” in this quote means something like “are essentially” or “are by definition”. However, Jeshion rejects this interpretation:

In wielding slurs, racists, anti-Semites, and homophobes are not in the business of presenting their target’s group membership either as an essential, metaphysically necessary property, or as determining or explaining their other properties. Rather, they express that the target’s group membership is the, or among the, most central characteristic(s) for classifying what the target is, as a person, construed along a broadly moral dimension. (Jeshion 2013, p.242)

I find Jeshion’s third component similar to the parameter *centrality* in Camp’s notion of characterization.¹⁶ Understood in this way, the third component in the semantics of a slur signals that the first truth-conditional component is central, in other words, it is causally responsible of many other features the subject of the slur has. However, it is not clear why this semantic component is a peculiarity of slurs. For instance, when “astronaut”, “professor of philosophy”, or “Polish” are predicated of people, aren’t they identify what “their targets are”? Again we can see these as central features. One’s profession or one’s nationality is a central feature that can be considered causally responsible of many other features. If so, why slurs would have a special semantic component that other “identifying” phrases lack is not clear at all. Hence, Jeshion either has to build this third component into the semantics of all other identifying phrases, which would be found unacceptable by many, or she should explain how slurs are different from other identifying phrases.

A final problem with Jeshion’s Expressivism concerns in-group (or appropriated) uses and slurring with neutral words. In her view, for instance, in the early history of the n-word, black people used to use this word for each other with “the excision of the encoded contempt in exchange for an expression of solidarity” (Jeshion 2013, p.253). This earlier in-group use is an instance of non-literal use in her view. Since the word has been overused since then, eventually the word has become ambiguous between derogatory and in-group meanings. Two objections can be raised here: First, according to Jeshion’s explanation, there is no ambiguity in the early uses of the n-word. There is only one word and one semantic meaning, but the black people use the word in a different way in their community. They cancel or “excise” the encoded contempt. But, in Jeshion’s view, encoded contempt is one of the components of the semantics of slurs. Hence, there seem to be an internal tension

¹⁶See Section 6.3.1 about the centrality of a constituent in a characterization.

in Jeshion's picture. It is widely accepted that a semantic content of a phrase or a clause is not cancellable; cancellability is a feature of the pragmatic content. Jeshion might resist this objection by denying that to excise means to cancel. But then what does it mean? I cannot see any other option. Secondly, Jeshion's claim that slurs are ambiguous between their in-group and out-group uses seems a costly approach to the problem. Recall Grice's motto: "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." If Grice's advice is followed, an account of slurs which explains this phenomenon without appealing to ambiguity will be more attractive.

Jeshion's suggestion for the slurring with neutral words is along the same lines. She claims that a neutral counterparts of slurs, when they are used with contemptuous intonation, can be used for slurring. What is more, the semantics she suggests for the words in this way is the same as their counterpart slurs: "It is also highly plausible (...), that the semantic properties of such neutral counterparts when used with contemptuous intonation is the same as that of slurring terms" (Jeshion 2013, p.246). For example, "Chink" and "Chinese^C"¹⁷ have the same semantics. I find this suggestion very implausible. How intonation can change the semantics of a word is left unexplained by Jeshion. She neither refers to a theory which develops an account of this nor develops one by herself. On the contrary, Jeshion's observation, again, suggests a pragmatic approach to the phenomena. There are several pieces of research on how intonation affects pragmatic interpretation.¹⁸

To conclude this section, I think the general problem with Jeshion's account is the obscurity of the semantics she suggests, and its shortcomings to explain the non-paradigmatic uses of slurs. Let us then turn to the third question. If one accepts that slurs are used to express some descriptive content, and this descriptive content causes the derogation of the target group, this question asks if this content is encoded in the word semantically or not. We will continue with Hom's semantic account.¹⁹

7.3.3 Combinatorial Externalism

Hom argues for Combinatorial Externalism (CE). CE "is the view that racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate external, causal connection with racist institutions" (Hom 2008, p.431). What is a racist institution? In Hom's view, a racist institution has two components: (i) an ideology, (ii) a set of practices (Hom 2008, p.431). They

¹⁷Superscript *C* stands for contemptuous intonation.

¹⁸For instance, see Hirschberg (2004) and Roberts (2012).

¹⁹For practical reasons again I will not say much on other semantic accounts such as Camp's perspectivalism and Bach's Loaded Descriptivism.

determine the meaning of a slur. In other words, a use of a slur is causally connected to a certain ideology and its characterization of the group in question. CE argues that slurs express complex deontic prescriptions in the following form: “*ought be subject to $p^*_1 + \dots + p^*_n$ because of being $d^*_1 + \dots + d^*_n$ all because of being NPC** where p^*_1, \dots, p^*_n are deontic prescriptions derived from the set of racist practices, d^*_1, \dots, d^*_n are the negative properties derived from the racist ideology, and NPC* is the semantic value of the appropriate nonpejorative correlate of the epithet” (Hom 2008, p.431). To exemplify let me repeat the meaning of “Chink” Hom suggests: “ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, and ..., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and ..., all because of being Chinese” (Hom 2008, p.431).

According to this type of meaning definition, slurs have null extension; affirmative sentences containing slurs are false, and their negations are true.

An interesting consequence of this account is that all dictionary definitions turn out to be false or inaccurate since a typical dictionary definition of a slur s for a group G is “an offensive word for G s”.²⁰

Let us continue with the problems facing CE. First, CE rejects a common intuition among theorists that one can represent something true by using a slur. As we saw in Section 7.2.1, a sentence like “Lessing is a Boche” struck hearers offensive but true.²¹

The different uses of slurs pose a further problem for CE. Like Jeshion, Hom also argues that in-group (literal positive) uses bring a new meaning into existence. The use of n-word within the black community aims to sever the causal link between the word and the racial institution. Alternative anti-racist social institutions should be available for the in-group use to be successful. These institutions are needed because according to CE a different semantic meaning for a slur arises only if there is a social institution which provides it. So on this picture semantic meanings of slurs are causally connected to social institutions and an appropriated use needs a

²⁰Croom’s (2013) semantic account is similar in this respect. Croom argues that a slur should not be seen as a group word but rather encode a collection of negative properties. His account shares most of the problems I will raise.

²¹Camp (2013) discusses an imaginary scenario in which a racist utters the following:

(10) I bet you they hire a nigger and a dyke before they even consider a white guy.

And she makes the following remark: “A nonbigot should obviously refuse to accept such a bet, on the grounds that doing so would make him complicit in the derogation of blacks and lesbians. However, supposing that the bet *has* been accepted, it is clear what the payoff-determining contingency is: just whether the company hires an African-American and a lesbian (...)” Camp (2013, p.334).

new social institution in order to be successful. Hom calls the social institutions for appropriation “counter institutions”: “Counter-institutions seek to turn racist uses of epithets on their head. The point is not to wipe away derogatory force, but rather to defuse it, and put it to alternative uses that produce political and social effects in favor of the targeted group” (Hom 2008, p.438). This explanation seems to fail if we test it with certain cases. Consider a slave plantation in the 18th century. It is hard to say that there was an alternative anti-racist institution at that time. Even if we assume there was, a causal connection between this institution and the uses of the n-word in the plantation would be highly unlikely. But still we can easily imagine contexts in which slaves use this word within the group non-derogatorily. Hom might like to count a plantation as a small-scale social institution and insist on his explanation. However, this move would eventually causes social institutions boil down to conversational common grounds. In other words, it would be hard to see any principled basis to not consider every conversational context a small-scale social institution. And if that were so, a pragmatic approach would be more natural than Hom’s semantic explanation.

The slurring use of neutral words is also difficult to explain in the CE account. Like Jeshion, Hom might turn to intonation, but again it seems very odd to me for a semantic account to claim that intonation can change the semantics of a phrase.

The figurative use of slurs is another problematic use for CE. As we have discussed above, in the figurative uses the grouping function of a slur is not meant by the speaker; instead only the negative associations the slur signals is meant to be conveyed. In Hom’s account, the grouping feature and the other negative features of a slur are both encoded in the phrase, which means that all these features are inseparable. Then how can CE explain the figurative uses? Can appealing to the notion of cancellation help? For example, is it possible to claim that in the use of “Chink” for someone not Chinese, the grouping feature is cancelled? However this does not seem possible, because the grouping feature is semantically encoded and a part of semantic content is not cancellable. One may think that a Gricean approach might help CE in this problem. One can imagine the following explanation: If *A* calls *B* “faggot”, and it is common knowledge that *B* is not homosexual, then *A* is flouting one of Grice’s maxims (she is saying something she knows to be false), so hearers can reason that she must mean something else. Here, *A* does not mean the literal meaning of the slur but means something else. But what is this “something else”? It can be a set of features that are associated with the group of people in question. For example, for the slur “faggot”, this feature can *being effeminate*. But this feature is already part of the literal content of the slur. So, a strange situation

arises: *A* uses the slur figuratively, that is he does not mean its literal content, but at the same time she means a part of the literal content pragmatically. Picking up a part of the literal content and meaning it pragmatically sounds strange to me. I cannot imagine any other similar linguistic phenomenon. If this is an explanation CE favours, it does at least make their theory less elegant. If the descriptive content of a slur can be communicated pragmatically, why does CE complicate the story and build them into the semantic content? Thus, figurative uses remains a problem for CE; it is not clear at all if it can suggest a tenable explanation.

Another problem for CE concerns negation. As briefly mentioned in 7.2.3, many theorists pointed out that the offensiveness of a slur is preserved under negation. For instance (16) is said to be as offensive as (15):

(15) Yao is a Chink.

(16) Yao is not a Chink. He's a Jap. (Hom and May 2013, p.309)

According to CE, (16) is semantically equal to the following:

(17) It is not the case that Yao ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, and ..., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and ..., all because of being Chinese.

However, there seem no reason to perceive (17) offensive. Thus, offensiveness cannot be caused by the semantic content of the word.²² Hom and May (2013) turns to conversational implicature to respond to this objection: "Offensiveness can be linguistically triggered, because when speakers use predicates, they typically conversationally implicate their commitment to the non-null extensionality of the predicate" (Hom and May 2013, p.310). I think this response overcomes the difficulty regarding the offensiveness of (16). However, there is another problem. Imagine (16) is uttered by a racist, who wants to negate that Yao is Chinese but agrees on the rest of the descriptions of the Chink. How is this negation possible? Hom and May (2013, p.311) suggest the following explanation: Suppose the descriptions in the semantic analysis of "Chink" is given by three predicate letters, *F*, *G* and *H*, and *y* stands for Yao. Then the semantics of (15) would be $Fy \wedge Gy \wedge Hy$, and that of the first part of (16) would be $\neg Fy \vee \neg Gy \vee \neg Hy$. But then what (16) semantically expresses would be very uninformative. One can assert it in seven different belief situations.²³ Hom and May acknowledges this uninformative: "(...) the

²²This point was originally formulated by Whiting (2013, p.367).

²³Since there are three disjuncts, these situations are: TTT, TTF, TFT, TFF, FTT, FTF, FFT.

negation of (15) is consistent with a wide range of distribution of information, from the negation of all of the conjuncts to the negation of simply one of the conjuncts” (Hom and May 2013, p.311). Again, they turn to pragmatics to explain a racist’s position: “Thus, a racist who utters (16) implies that one of the conjuncts fails to hold—namely the characteristic mark of being Chinese. But *not* the rest” (Hom and May 2013, p.311). Here is the problem: If Hom and May accept that a speaker can imply her disagreement about one part of the disjunctive proposition a negative utterance expresses, we expect the same possibility for a positive utterance as well. This expectation is not a consequence of their theory or something they promise to satisfy, but it arises naturally. They suggest a conjunction of features as the semantics of a slur. Putting aside the suggested logical relation between these features, we can say that a slur expresses a group of features. With a negative utterance, one can mean a part of this group of features, but a positive utterance does not enable us to do this. But why? Uttering (15), one may not mean to predicate *good-at-laundrying* feature of Yao. But this does not seem possible in CE. Asserting that Yao is a Chink but cancelling some of the features *Chink* expresses is not an option. It is commonly assumed that the cancellation of the semantic content causes infelicity. Thus, CE does not provide the same expressive resources for (16) and (15). There is an asymmetry here.

In order to grasp the problem better, let us look at the other option that is available to Hom and May. Suppose CE analysed the propositions the utterances that contain slurs express as a disjunction of certain features. In that case, the analysis of (15) would be as follows: “Yao ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, *or* ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, *or* ..., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundrying, *or* ..., all because of being Chinese.” Furthermore, the semantics of (15) would be $Fy \vee Gy \vee Hy$, and that of the first part of (16) would be $\neg Fy \wedge \neg Gy \wedge \neg Hy$. Then, CE could claim that the positive utterances that contain a slur are “consistent with a wide range of distribution of information” and that the intended meaning (a part or the whole of the disjunction) is determined pragmatically. On the other hand, this time, the utterances in which a slur occurs in the scope of a negation operator would turn out to be *not* “consistent with a wide range of distribution of information”. In other words, it would not be possible for the speakers to negate only a part of the original proposition. Hence, there are two options in front of Hom and May; either the affirmative utterance that contain a slur or the negative one expresses a conjunctive proposition. They prefer choosing the former option. This choice seems arbitrary to me. Besides arbitrariness, the asymmetry problem arises

for both options; in either option there would be an asymmetry in the expressive resources of an affirmative utterance that contain a slur and its negation. This seems an odd consequence of the account. Why is it possible to deny only a part of the total meaning of a slur in the negative, but not to mean a part of it in the affirmative, or vice versa in the other option. I think this problem significantly reduces the elegance of the account.

A final problem for CE is related to its theoretical grounds. Hom argues for an externalist semantics. One might wonder why Hom needs externalism. Why isn't he an internalist? Hom answers this question while he is discussing the adequacy conditions of an account of slurs must satisfy. An account of slurs, in his view, must explain why the derogatory force of a slur is independent of the beliefs, attitudes, and intentions of the individual speakers. For this reason, one cannot use a dead slur such as "limey" to derogate someone: "The word no longer has any significant racist institution supporting it" (Hom 2008, p.433).

It seems difficult to explain "derogatory autonomy", the feature of slurs as CE calls it, in an internalist framework. Roughly speaking, according to internalism, the content of one's thought is determined only by the facts that are internal to the subject. According to Hom, slurs have a descriptive aspect, and the derogation they cause is independent of the intention and attitude of speakers. So in this picture, the use of a slur by someone who is not aware of the derogatory aspect (a literal neutral use) would still be perceived derogatory. This feature of slurs does not seem compatible with the standard internalism. In a literal neutral use of a slur, there would not be any derogatory content or intention in the speaker's mind. Thus, there would be nothing derogatory in the content of the speaker's thought according to internalism. In order to argue for autonomy, the derogatory content should be external to the subject. Hence, Hom has to argue for semantic externalism so as to account for derogatory autonomy.

Hom refers to Putnam and Kripke in defending his semantic externalism. Kripke / Putnam style externalism was developed as an alternative to descriptivist accounts of meaning, which claim that contents of names and (in one interpretation) kind terms are descriptions. I wish to argue that Hom's interpretation of Kripke / Putnam style externalism is incorrect. Let us focus on Kripke's view on rigid designators. A rigid designator designates the same entity in all possible worlds in which that entity exists. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke argues for two theses that are relevant to our discussion: (i) Certain general terms, such as "cat", "tiger", "gold", "water", "heat", "hot" and "red", are rigid designators (Kripke 1980, p.134). (ii) The description which fixes the reference of a general term "should not be regarded as a synonym

for the term” (Kripke 1980, p.135). There are two relevant questions on the theses: (i) Is a general term like “Chink” rigid? (ii) Can the description Hom suggests for “Chink” be synonymous with the term? There is a large literature on the first question. According to one plausible position, which is argued by LaPorte (2000), Salmon (2005), and Inan (2008), any general term introduced to a language by stipulation²⁴ will turn out to be rigid. Thus “Chink” is rigid.²⁵ Notice that the type of rigidity at issue here is *de jure* rigidity; that is rigidity by stipulation.²⁶ Thus, “chink” is *de jure* rigid. Regarding the second question Kripke’s own position is clear. He explicitly argues that a *de jure* rigid term cannot be synonymous with a description. Although CE argues that “Chink” and their suggested description for it have necessarily null extension, this does not mean they are synonymous. A moment’s reflection can show that being necessarily co-referential does not suffice for synonymy. For instance “ $2 + 2$ ” and “4” are necessarily co-referential, but they are not synonymous. Similarly, although “water” and “2 Hydrogen and 1 Oxygen” are necessarily co-referential, they are not synonymous. A *de jure* rigid term can only be synonymous with another *de jure* rigid term. In this sense, “Chink” and “ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards (...)” clearly cannot be synonymous, though they turn out to be co-referential in CE. The former is *de jure* rigid, whereas the latter can only be *de facto* rigid. So, CE’s claim about the content of “Chink” does not seem correct according to Kripkean approach to semantic externalism.

My point is this. CE claims to follow Putnam and Kripke’s semantic externalism, but CE’s interpretation of this externalist tradition seems mistaken. It is hard to argue that CE’s suggestion for the meaning of slurs is compatible with semantic externalism.

The alternative to semantic accounts are pragmatic ones. The fourth and final question concerns whether the implicature a slur triggers is a conversational one. The conventional implicature accounts say “no” to this question. Let us continue with them.

²⁴Usually in this form: Let *a* be the name of such and such.

²⁵See Cook (1980), Soames (2002, Chapter 9) and Devitt (2005) for the views who would argue against this.

²⁶Some descriptions are also rigid: such as the mathematical description “the first even number” or a description under the scope of the actuality operator. This type of rigidity is called *de facto*. See Kripke (1980, p.21 fn.21).

7.3.4 Conventional Implicature Accounts

Conventional Implicature accounts argue that slurs trigger conventional implicatures. There are two views on the content of the conventional implicature. Williamson (2009, p.149) maintains that “Lessing was a Boche” implies that Germans are cruel, whereas according to Whiting (2013, p.365), a slur conventionally implies a “a noncognitive attitude of contempt (or scorn or derision or...) for those whom the neutral counterpart applies.”

One problem with conventional implicature accounts is to explain literal neutral and literal positive uses. In these uses of slurs, the offensive implicature is not triggered. Since conventional implicatures are not cancellable, these accounts cannot turn to cancellation to explain literal neutral and literal positive uses. Instead, positing different meanings seem to be the only option for them (Whiting 2013, fn.12). But this option is both costly and counter-intuitive. It is costly because to repeat Grice’s principle “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Grice 1989, p.47). In other words if it is possible to explain a phenomenon without positing new senses, this explanation should be preferred over the one which posits new senses. As I will argue in the next section, there is such an option. Positing a new meaning is also counter-intuitive, because it is difficult to see how the word itself, such as the n-word, could mean two different things in the very same situation, in the mouth of a racist and a black person. The difference should be sought in the speakers’ intentions, and since intentions are at issue, a more natural approach to the phenomenon of literal neutral and literal positive uses would be a pragmatic one, rather than a semantic meaning-change one.

Another problem for conventional implicature accounts (especially Williamson’s account) that it assumes a determined content for what speakers’ mean by using a slur. But a speaker might mean various negative features by using a slur.²⁷ For instance, in an appropriate context one might mean *rudeness* instead of (or in addition to) *cruelty* by using the term “Boche”. Conventional implicature accounts do not seem to accommodate this variety of implicatures.

There are other problems, such as the slurring use of neutral words, but I will not discuss conventional implicature accounts any more. When I propose my conversational implicature account for slurs in the next section, I believe, the shortcomings of conventional implicature accounts will become clearer.

²⁷More on this below.

7.4 Phrasal Implicature Theory of Slurs (PITS)

In this section I will first introduce my theory of slurs in general. Next, I will discuss what is conversational and what is conventional in slurs. Finally, I will deal with some further issues about slurs.

7.4.1 The Theory in General

In order to develop my theory of slurs, I would first like to point out a striking similarity between slurs and metaphors. The following are various uses of slurs and their contexts:

(i) *Literal negative use*

Context → John is homosexual, Mary utters the following to derogate him:
“John is a faggot.”

(ii) *Literal positive (or neutral) use*

Context → John and Mary are the members of the same homosexual community and Mary utters the following: “John is a faggot.”

(iii) *Figurative negative use*

Context → John is not homosexual. Mary knows this but utters the following to derogate him: “John is a faggot.”

Similar metaphorical uses and their contexts are as follows:

(iv) *Twice apt metaphors*

Context → John is a magician (as a profession) and is extraordinarily good at car repairing. Mary knows his profession. She expresses this fact and also her admiration for his skill at car repairing metaphorically in the following way:
“John is a magician.”

(v) *Literal*

Context → John is a magician (as a profession) and Mary expresses this fact:
“John is a magician.”

(vi) *Only metaphorical*

Context → “John is not a magician (as a profession) and is extraordinary good at car repairing. Mary knows his profession. She wants to express only her admiration for his skill at car repairing metaphorically in the following way:
“John is a magician.”

These uses demonstrate that what is common between slurs and metaphors is the possibility of conveying two separable meanings by using one phrase. One of these two meanings is a kind or a property which is the ordinary referent of the phrase, and the other is composed of certain features that are associated with the referent of the phrase in a given context. If we call the first meaning M1 and the second M2, then we will see that in (i) and (iv) both M1 and M2 are communicated, in (ii) and (v) only M1 is communicated, and finally in (iii) and (vi) only M2 is communicated.²⁸

I think the parallels between metaphors and slurs suggest the following: Slurs trigger phrasal implicatures. In a typical derogation scenario, a speaker, by making an utterance in the form of $\ulcorner a \text{ is } S \urcorner$, predicates of the denotation of a the kind referred to by S and also ascribes (by implying) certain features that are associated with the kind to him.

On the other hand, to interpret an utterance containing a slur in the form of $\ulcorner a \text{ is } S \urcorner$, an interpreter tries to infer what the speaker implied by using S ; to do this she needs to determine which features in the association sequence attached to the referent of S are meant by the speaker. In a given context, associations are automatically suggested with respect to their saliences, from the most salient to the least. The hearer evaluates these associations starting with the most salient one. For instance, if the associations that are attached to a kind or an object are $\langle \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{A} \dots \rangle$, then the hearer will examine \mathbf{G} , \mathbf{D} , and \mathbf{A} in turn and try to determine if these features are meant by the speaker. The purpose of the speaker in uttering the sentence or the question under discussion the utterance is answering will determine when the interpretation process ends. The hearer stops examining new features in the association sequence when he thinks that the question under discussion is answered. These implying and interpreting processes take place in accordance with the maxims and the Cooperative Principle of Gricean reasoning at the phrasal level. We have discussed how these maxims and the principle should be understood in Chapter 3.

As said in the previous chapters, not all constituents in an association sequence are relevant to a given discourse context. Conversational participants can only benefit from associations that are mutually accepted (for the sake of conversation). Following Stalnaker (1999b, p.84; 1984, pp.79-80) we can formulate this idea as follows: Accepted associations (with an object or a kind) are what is taken by the speaker to be common ground of the participants in the conversation, what is treated

²⁸Slurs can occur not only in utterances in the declarative mood but also those in the interrogative, imperative and subjunctive moods. What I am suggesting can be applicable to latter moods as well, but for the sake of simplicity I will focus on the declarative mood.

as their common knowledge or mutual knowledge.

Common ground or mutual knowledge about associations can also be formulated in a Stalnakerian way. Repeating the formulation in Chapter 4, let S be the speaker, H be the hearer and the association L be an association related to the kind K . Then L is associated with K will be part of the common ground if and only if:

- S accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that L is associated with K
- S accepts that H accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that S accepts that L is associated with K
- S accepts that H accepts that S accepts that L is associated with K
- H accepts that S accepts that H accepts that L is associated with K
- And so on...

Thus, as all forms of successful communication, slurring also needs certain amount of mutuality among conversational participants.

In my account, which I call “Phrasal Implicature Theory of Slurs (PITS)”, the implications are not propositions but rather a set of features. So, for instance, “Himmler is a Boche” does not implicate that Germans are cruel as Williamson (2009, p.151) suggests. Rather, the meaning of the word “Boche” itself implies *cruelty* or some other feature. I think this is a better explanation. It does not seem clear to me that the racist utterer of “Himmler is Boche” is making a general claim about all Germans. Rather she makes two singular claims: one ascribes the property of being German to Himmler, and the other ascribes certain features she associates with the property of being German to Himmler. Although there is no general claim about all Germans, it is still possible to infer from the negative features that the utterer associates with being German that she has a racist characterization of Germans in mind. However, this should not be seen as something implicated by the speaker.

After showing similarities between metaphors and slurs let me point out a few differences. In my account the linguistic mechanism behind metaphors and slurs is the same, namely phrasal implicature, but slurs have some peculiarities. The first one concerns triggering. Metaphorical interpretation (the interpretation of M2 above) is typically triggered by the unexpectedness of a phrase in the given context, whereas slurs, due to their conventional role, do not need unexpectedness in

triggering M2.²⁹ However, unexpectedness can play a role in slurring. As noted above, slurring, as a speech-act, can be made with neutral counterparts. In these uses, intonation (in verbal communication) or some kind of unexpectedness might help speakers to convey their ideas. For instance one might say “Obama is black” in a conversation in which all participants know this is the case. So, the triviality of this utterance might trigger that the speaker is implying some negative features she associates with blacks.

Another difference between metaphors and slurs is that the features implied by using the latter are typically perceived as derogatory or offensive. Metaphors can be derogatory (e.g. “John is a pig”) but they need not be.

7.4.2 The Features of Slurs Again

Let us go back to the features of slurs that are introduced in Section 7.2, and discuss them against PITS.

7.4.2.1 Group Expressions

In PITS, slurs refer to kinds that are properties of a group of people. For instance, “Kike” refers to *Jewishness*, “dyke” refers to *lesbianism*, etc. Thus, the claims like that Jews are Kikes turn out to be true. In this respect, PITS is compatible with the dictionary definitions of slurs.

7.4.2.2 Different Uses

Since according to PITS, slurs are used to convey two separable meanings (M1 and M2), different uses are nicely explained.

Literal Negative Use In this use both M1 and M2 meant by the speaker. The content of M2 are negative features.

Literal Neutral Use In this type of use a speaker only means M1; M2 is contextually cancelled. Recall that explicit cancellation is not needed. Context itself may cancel an implicature as Grice pointed out: “(...) if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out.” (Grice 1989, p.39)

²⁹I will return the issue of conventionality later in the chapter.

Literal Positive Use In this type of use again both M1 and M2 are present, but this time the content of M2 is composed of positive features. So, literal negative and literal positive uses are distinguished with respect to whether the implied features are perceived as negative or positive. My account does not need to posit a different meaning for in-group uses of slurs. This is a significant theoretical advantage of my view; it does not multiply senses.

In this use, PITS assumes that the typical negative content of M2 is contextually cancelled, instead a new positive content for M2 is implied.

Conventional implicature accounts fail to explain literal neutral and literal positive uses, because these uses require the cancellation of the implicature, however conventional implicatures are not easily cancellable.

Figurative Negative Use Only M2 is meant in this type of use. That is, the speaker does not mean the literal meaning of the phrase (M1).

As I emphasized before, this type of use is crucial to decide between alternative theories. Most of the theories I discussed in the previous section fail to give a satisfactory explanation for it. For Prohibitism and Expressivism, since they reject that slurs are used to communicate descriptive content, it is very hard to give an account of why a speaker uses “faggot” but not any other slur for a (non-homosexual) target figuratively. If this person is asked, she would not say “I find this word more derogatory, because the prohibition on it is stricter than any other slur” nor she would say “This word expresses my hatred better than any other slur.”³⁰ Instead she would count the features she associates with the kind she describes as “faggots”, such as, *weakness*, *cowardice*, etc.

Hom’s semantic account CE also fails here. The descriptive content is encoded in words in his account. So, it does not seem possible for CE to separate descriptive content from M1 and ascribe them to a target.

The proponents of these accounts might resort to the following explanation: Figurative use is a different phenomenon, which an account of slurs should not be expected to explain. But, as I argued earlier, slurring is a more general phenomenon than the literal negative use of slurs. The use of neutral counterparts in slurring and the figurative uses of slurs suggest that there is a unique phenomenon. It seems natural to expect an account of slurs to propose a comprehensive mechanism to explain this phenomenon.

³⁰An expressionist might appeal to stereotypes and say that figuratively used slurs are offensive because of the stereotypes they trigger. I do not find this option tenable either. As I will argue for in Section 7.4.3, the negative features slurs trigger cannot be seen as completely conventional or stereotypical.

To explain the figurative uses of slurs, conventional implicature accounts (especially Williamson's version) seem more promising than the others since they also argue that there are two separable meanings one of which is implicated. However, as we have seen above they fail to explain literal neutral and positive uses.

7.4.2.3 Projection or Embeddability

As I discussed in the previous chapters, phrasal implicatures are embeddable. Regardless of how deeply they are embedded, they project if the context permits. In other words, when a hearer thinks that the speaker might mean more than the phrase's semantic meaning (or another meaning in the metonymy cases), he looks for phrasal implicatures. In this respect, embedding phrasal implicatures does not make any difference.

Slurs behave as other phrasal implicatures. Recall the following example:

(11) If Mary is a dyke, then why did she lie to John?

Hearing (11), an interpreter, by taking into account the context of the utterance, would figure out if the speaker implies something by using the slur. In this way, he would find out which type of use is intended by the speaker. If the hearer anticipates the implication of M2, she will calculate the phrasal implicature.

As noted earlier, theorists have disagreements on the data, particularly on those of reporting and negation. In my view, in a report of an utterance containing a slur, the negative phrasal implicatures do not always project. The decision whether the reporter means M2 depends on the context and the intentions of the reporter.

The problem with negation concerns determining which of the M1 and M2 (or both) is negated. Recall (13):

(13) Mary is not a dyke.

Here, this sentence can be used to mean the following three: (i) not M1, (ii) not M2, or (iii) not (M1 and M2). Out of a context, all are possible. I think this indeterminacy is the cause of various intuitions about the data. Again, I believe that deciding between (i)-(iii) depends on the context and the intentions of the reporter.

7.4.2.4 Descriptivity

PITS clearly meets the descriptivity observation. Slurs, in most typical uses, imply descriptive features that are ascribed to the target person(s).

7.4.3 Conversational or Conventional?

Let us continue with why PITS is on the conversational implicature side in the flow chart 7.1 above. Can we make the conversational-conventional distinction for phrasal implicatures? I think we can. For example, the features implied by using metaphors are mostly conversational, but there are also tired metaphors, whose implications can be said to be conventional. Like metaphors, the implications slurs trigger are characteristically conversational. As tired metaphors, however, when overused, conversational implications become conventional. If one asked to count one's associations triggered by "chink" or the n-word, one would probably give descriptions that are close to what Hom and Croom refer to.

It is clear that slurs are frequently used to convey conventionalized features. But it need not be so. Recall the description the n-word triggers that is quoted by Croom from Asim: Emotionally-shallow, simple-minded (...) Imagine a context in which the following racist comment is made by a pizza deliverer who has heard that a black customer ordered 3 large pizzas for himself:

(18) He's a nigger, this is normal for him.

It seems clear that one of the most salient negative features in this context is something like being gluttonous. Other features Asim mentions can also be thought to be parts of the speaker's implications, but the point is that the speaker is able to add other features conversationally to the set of conventional features.

Notice that there are two respects in which a slur might be conventional. First, it might be a convention that it triggers the search for some phrasal implicature or other. Secondly, it might be conventional that it is associated with a particular feature sequence. Slurs are conventional in the first sense, but only to a limited extent in the second.

I suggest that the difference between conventional and conversational implicatures is a matter of degree. There are thoroughly conventional implicatures, such as the ones triggered by conjunctions "but", "and", "therefore" etc. There are also thoroughly conversational implicatures, such as novel metaphors. On this scale slurs and ordinary metaphors should be seen as located between conventional and conversational implicatures.³¹ The diagram 7.2 illustrates the idea.

The richness of associations that slurs evoke varies out of a context. For example, an ordinary speaker could easily count several commonly associated features the n-

³¹Although the implicatures that slurs trigger are partly conventionalized and partly conversational in my account, they should still be conversational implicatures as it was shown in the diagram 7.1. My main reason is the cancellability of implications that slurs trigger. As noted above, conventional implicatures are not cancellable. I will discuss this feature of slurs below.




Figure 7.2: The scale of conventionality for implicatures

word, “faggot” or “bitch” evoke independent of a context. However, there are slurs like “midget”. The only descriptive feature it seems to evoke independent of a context can be something like being contemptible. Slurs like “midget” lead to some theorists to accept that these types of slurs are used like expressives (Camp 2013, p.347). I think the problem here is to think them *only* out of a context. It is true that “midget” does not signal a rich set of associations out of a context, but when the word is used in a certain context, one can clearly imply features other than being contemptible. Imagine a scenario in which a short person does not accept a challenge of arm wrestling, and the following is said of him:

(19) He’s a midget, what else could we expect from him.

Here, the speaker implies *being a coward* by using the slur. Hence, when there is no context what slurs signal are conventionalized stereotypical features. But if we consider them in a context, slurs have the potential to be used to conversationally imply more than the stereotypes. This behaviour of slurs confirms that slurs are located in the middle in the scale depicted as 7.2. With respect to stereotypical implications they are close to conventional implicatures, whereas with respect to implications that are peculiar to a discourse context, they are close to conversational implicatures.

To repeat, I believe that the difference between conventional and conversational implicatures is a matter of degree. As a result of overuse conversational implicatures might become conventionalized. What is more, as it is the case for dead metaphors, an implicature might evolve into a semantic meaning.³²

Let us now turn to the features of conversational implicatures and see if slurs meet these features.

³²Kripke’s following remark seems along the same lines: “I find it plausible that a diachronic account of the evolution of language is likely to suggest that what was originally a mere speaker’s reference may, if it becomes habitual in a community, evolve into a semantic reference” (Kripke 1977, p.271).

7.4.3.1 Cancellability

Conversational implicatures are cancellable, that means either the speaker or the context can eliminate them. Conventional implicature theorists claim that the implicatures triggered by slurs are not (easily or typically) cancellable (Williamson 2009, p.150; Whiting 2013, p.365). I disagree. I think there are two things these theorists miss. First, Bezuidenhout’s remark about metaphors is also applicable to slurs. Recall that she claims a metaphorical interpretation “can be cancelled *in favor of another metaphorical interpretation*” (Bezuidenhout 2001, p.183). Since in my view metaphors and slurs exemplify the same linguistic phenomenon, the interpretation of slurs should also be cancellable in the same way as a metaphorical interpretation is. The following utterance illustrates this point:

(20) He’s a faggot, but I don’t mean he’s weak, he is just slippery.

In this example, the speaker cancels one implicature in favour of another. Thus, this type of explicit cancellation of the implicatures that slurs trigger is possible. Secondly, there is also contextual cancellation. Recall Grice’s remark that an implicature “may be contextually canceled if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out” (Grice 1989, p.39). Among the uses of slurs I distinguished before, I think, literal neutral and literal positive uses exemplify this type of cancellation. In these uses, context makes it clear that the speaker does not mean anything bad unlike the paradigmatic literal negative use. We do not need to assume meaning change or any other extra theoretical move to explain these uses. Gricean notion of implicature cancellation nicely explains what is going on in the literal neutral and literal positive uses. When the context allows it, the implicature a slur triggers seems to be fully cancellable in this way. Consider the following neutral use example:

(21) The strike is unfair, it is good to be proud of being a scab.³³

Here, all negative implications “scab” triggers seem to be cancelled.³⁴ Of course, one’s intention is important for a hearer to decide whether the slur’s implicature is cancelled. For instance, if a person uses the word “Boche” with a racist intention but denies that she meant being cruel, she would add “hypocrisy to xenophobia” as Williamson (2009) notes.

³³Derek Ball pointed out this example to me.

³⁴Camp claims that expressions like “snitch” and “scab” cannot be used neutrally (Camp 2013, p.339). I do not see why it is so. For instance one’s saying “I am a snitch, but I can tell you why.” sounds like a neutral use to me.

A related feature of conversational implicatures is *reinforceability*. As Levinson (1983, p.120) points out, conversational implicatures when made explicit do not cause a feeling of redundancy or anomaly. For instance in the following example the implicature is naturally reinforceable:

(22) Some students are unhappy with the lecturer but not all.

On the other hand not all pragmatic phenomenon fulfils the reinforceability condition. Presupposition is a case in point. Reinforcement causes infelicity in the following example:

(23) *I have to pick up my sister at the airport and I have a sister.

Implicatures triggered by slurs also seem to be reinforceable:

(24) He is a nigger, I mean lazy and cruel.

To conclude, phrasal implicatures triggered by slurs are both cancellable and reinforceable. This is a good piece of evidence that they are conversational rather than conventional.

7.4.3.2 Non-detachability

According to Grice, if two utterances mean more or less the same thing in the same context, they generate the same implicatures (except manner implicatures). In other words, one cannot detach an implicature by changing the wording but meaning the same thing. This feature is called non-detachability. As noted above metaphors do not have this feature. Like them, slurs are also detachable. In a given context, if the n-word is replaced with “black” in the utterance “John is a nigger”, the implications might disappear.³⁵ We can arrive at the same conclusion as we did for metaphors: In order to determine what implicatures slurs generate not only the content of the phrase, but also how this content is expressed is needed.

Conventional implicature theorists Williamson (2009, p.150) and Whiting (2013, p.365) acknowledge that the implicatures triggered by slurs are detachable, and claim that it supports their view. I disagree with them. As I argued earlier, non-detachability, as a test for conversational implicature, has a lot of exceptions. Grice designed it for clausal implicatures, but even for them he had to exclude manner implicatures since they depend on the wording of an utterance. Scalar implicatures, whether they are treated at the clause level or the phrase level, are also detachable as Levinson (1983, p.119) points out.

³⁵I say “might” because as I argued before it is possible to make similar implications by using the neutral counterpart if the context is suitable.

Other theorists also argued that subsentential pragmatic reasoning should take into account not only the contents of the phrases but also phrases themselves. Recall Karen Lewis' remark that "it is reasonable to suppose that rational agents engaged in co-operative communicative activity reason based not only on the content of a sentence but also on the particular words used" (Lewis 2014, p.240). Similarly, Bach (1994, p.136-7) argues that the outcome of subsentential pragmatic processes, which he calls "implicature", is detachable.

Hence, as for the non-detachability test, I insist my earlier conclusion that phrasal implicatures which are triggered by metaphors or slurs should be considered like manner implicatures (or scalar implicatures). They are detachable but this does not prove that they are not conversational. Especially at the subsentential level, this feature has many exceptions.

7.4.3.3 Non-conventionality

Conversational implicatures should not be part of the conventional meaning of clauses or phrases. Implicatures that are triggered by slurs, as I argued above, are not part of the conventional meaning of slurs. Although, out of a context, a slur usually evokes certain strong stereotypical features associated with the kind it denotes, in a discourse context these features might be cancelled or some other features might be implied instead. Thus, I believe, this is a good piece of evidence that the implicatures triggered by slurs meet the condition of non-conventionality.

In this section, I have discussed why I consider the implicatures triggered by slurs to be conversational. Taking into account the intuitive features of slurs and the Gricean tests, it should be clear that these types of implicatures deserve more to be called conversational than conventional. But let me repeat once more, I do not believe that there is categorical difference between conventional and conversational implicatures, the difference is a matter of degree.

7.4.4 Further Issues

A widely accepted point is that slurring (literal and figurative negative uses of both slurs and their counterparts) disturbs not only their targets but also other non-bigoted hearers who are exposed to these uses. A simple explanation is that the negative implications are what disturb those hearers. However, there should be more in slurring, since the explicit expression of these negative implications seems less disturbing. Compare these two examples:

(25) John is a faggot.

(26) John is homosexual, therefore weak and cowardly.

There seem to be two reasons why (25) is perceived more disturbing than (26). First, as I noted earlier, expressing disagreement for (25) is more difficult than for (26). When (25) is negated, three different readings will be available ($\neg M1$, $\neg M2$, $\neg (M1 \& M2)$). This ambiguity discomforts the non-bigot; she means $\neg M2$ but the availability of the other readings makes her dissatisfied. Of course, if the context strongly supports the non-bigoted speaker's intention, then it will be safe to assume that the intended meaning is conveyed thoroughly, but most contexts are not so clear as to single out one reading decisively.

The second reason for disturbance concerns Ted Cohen's notion of intimacy. Cohen argues that metaphors and jokes increase the level of intimacy between the conversational participants. Cohen counts three aspects of this type of speech: "(1) the speaker issues a kind of concealed invitation; (2) the hearer expends a special effort to accept the invitation; and (3) this transaction constitutes the acknowledgment of a community" (Cohen 1978, p.8). Thus, first, the speaker does not express her idea explicitly but implies it. This can be seen as an invitation for interpretation; she invites her hearer to make an effort to interpret her utterance. Secondly, the interpreter recognizes the invitation, and tries to determine the speaker's intentions. This involves examining what the speaker takes to be common ground: what the speaker believes, what the speaker believes about the hearer's beliefs etc. (Cohen 1978, p.8) Thirdly, if the communication is successful, or in other words the metaphor or the joke is conveyed, the speaker and the hearer will further recognize that they are part of a community. Cohen notes this as follows: "The sense of close community results not only from the shared awareness that a special invitation has been given and accepted, but also from the awareness that not everyone could make that offer or take it up" (Cohen 1978, p.9). Hence, all these three aspects together exemplify how intimacy is established by metaphorically speaking and joking: invitation, acceptance of invitation, and becoming aware of the transaction.

One might think that establishing intimacy is always a good thing. Cohen warns against this thought; a hostile metaphor or a cruel joke can cause the hearer to be disturbed by the intimacy: "When the device is a hostile metaphor or a cruel joke requiring much background and effort to understand, it is all the more painful because the victim has been made a complicitor in his own demise. Do not, therefore, suppose that jokes are always for shared amusement, or metaphors always for communal insight" (Cohen 1978, p.9).³⁶

³⁶In the same vein, let me requote Wayne C. Booth's following remark: "The speaker has performed a task by yoking what the hearer had not yoked before, and the hearer simply cannot

I think Cohen's analysis can be straightforwardly extended to slurring. Slurring establishes intimacy between interlocutors. First, a speaker invites her hearer to interpret her slurring expressions. Secondly, the hearer accepts this invitation, and arrives at an interpretation by taking the speaker's beliefs into account. Finally, they become aware of the cooperation between them, or in Cohen's words they acknowledge that they are part of the same community. Note that accepting the invitation of interpretation should not be seen as a voluntary act. Being part of the conversation, the hearer has no choice but to interpret the speaker's words; in other words he has to cooperate. The consequence of this cooperation is felt in the last step. This is where a non-bigoted hearer finds himself in an unpleasant situation. He regrets that he has cooperated; he has been made complicit.³⁷

To sum up, I discussed the idea that slurring is more disturbing than communicating the relevant implications explicitly. I suggested two reasons for this: one concerns the difficulty to express disagreement after hearing a slurring utterance; this is due to the ambiguity in negation. The second concerns Cohen's intimacy effect. Like metaphorical speaking and joking, slurring establishes intimacy between interlocutors, and in the slurring case (as for hostile metaphors and cruel jokes) the intimacy is disturbing for non-bigoted hearers.

We can draw an analogy between the point I made and Stalnaker's notion of presupposition accommodation. Using his example, suppose that Phoebe utters the following sentence in a context where her addressee does not know that Phoebe has a cat:

(27) I can't come to the meeting – I have to pick up my cat at the veterinarian.

This utterance will be appropriate only if her addressee is able to infer that Phoebe has a cat. Thus, Phoebe does not assert but presuppose that she has a cat, and she also presupposes that her addressee presupposes that Phoebe has a cat. Similarly, Phoebe's addressee presupposes that Phoebe has a cat, assuming that Phoebe is a cooperative speaker. In this way, the proposition that Phoebe has a cat is added to the context set. This phenomenon is called "presupposition accommodation" (Stalnaker 1999c, p.103). What happens if a speaker presupposes something disturbing for her addressee? Stalnaker considers this possibility: "(...) if something controversial has been presupposed (either as a result of the speaker's misperception, or in a deliberate attempt to sneak something by the addressee) - then the context will

resist joining him; they thus perform an identical dance step, and the metaphor accomplishes at least part of its work even if the hearer then draws back and says, 'I shouldn't have allowed that!'" (Booth 1978, p.54).

³⁷See Camp (2013, pp.343-4) for her discussion of two types of complicity feeling that slurs cause.

become defective, and some backtracking and repair will be required” (Stalnaker 1999c, p.104). If the speaker presupposes something controversial or disturbing for the addressee, the presupposition is at least temporarily added to the context set. In order to show his disagreement, the addressee might want to negate the utterance which adds the presupposition to the context set, but this would not be fully successful since presuppositions are not part of the semantic content of the utterance. The negation will be ambiguous. For instance, if the addressee reacts to (27) with “No, that is false”, it would normally be understood that he means that Phoebe does not have to pick up her cat at the veterinarian. But this might mean two things: (i) Phoebe does not have to pick up her cat at the veterinarian for some reason, such as someone else has already taken it. (ii) Phoebe’s picking up her cat at the veterinarian cannot be a point in question because she does not have a cat. If the addressee meant (ii), he might find this ambiguity discomforting. It might be easier to see this problem in one of the notorious examples in the presupposition literature, such as “Have you stopped beating your wife”. Answering this question by saying “No” would be understood as “I haven’t stopped beating my wife”. However, someone who has never beaten his wife might find this situation uncomfortable, since this utterance can also mean that the addressee used to beat his wife. Why this felt discomfort is parallel to the one slurring causes should be clear now. In both cases, the ambiguity in the negated utterance disturbs the addressee. Of course, I do not mean that an unwanted presupposition and a slur is as disturbing as each other; I am just pointing out the linguistic mechanism that causes a certain type of disturbingness is the same in two cases. Slurs are usually considered to disturb people in various other ways. For instance, they often have a disturbing emotional effect on non-bigoted hearers for different reasons.³⁸

The unwanted intimacy problem also arises for presupposition accommodation. It can be said that presupposition accommodation, since it requires some cooperation, increases the intimacy between the speaker and the addressee. Here again, as Cohen stressed for metaphors, the addressee has to interpret the speaker’s words. In doing this, he has to assume that the presuppositions are added to the context set, for at least temporarily, and this has the consequence that the interlocutors acknowledge being part of the same community. If the presupposition in question is disturbing for the addressee, an unwanted cooperation situation, similar to the one in slurring, occurs and the addressee might feel complicit.

To sum up, I have suggested two reasons why communicating negative features

³⁸For a discussion of why metaphors and slurs are difficult to deny, see (Camp 2017, p.55), where she argues that perspectives (structured clusters of features that slurs and metaphors trigger) are presupposed, and therefore they escape “straightforward direct denials”.

by slurring is more disturbing than explicitly conveying these features. The first one concerns ambiguity. A negated utterance which contains a slur can have three different readings. Since the meaning of the non negated utterance is disturbing, this ambiguous negation does not satisfy the speaker of the negated utterance, and the disturbance does not disappear. As for the second reason, I argued that we can apply what Cohen suggests for metaphors to slurs: The interpretation of a slur also makes the speaker and the hearer more intimate. If the outcome of the interpretation turns out disturbing for the speaker, a situation which we can call “unwanted intimacy” or “unwanted cooperation” arises.

A final point I want to discuss in this section is the general characterisation of PITS. As I said at the beginning of the chapter, my theory is a deflationary one; slurring is explained by phrasal implicatures. In this thesis, I have discussed many examples of phrasal implicatures: metaphor, loose talk, etc. In fact, I wish to claim that the category of phrasal implicature is wider than these paradigmatic examples. Consider these utterances:

(28) Russia supports the Syrian government.

(29) Russia supports the Syrian regime.

In my view, these two utterances are semantically equivalent, for the phrases “government” and “regime” are semantically equal. Roughly, speaking this semantic meaning is equal to that of “administration”. However, these words trigger different phrasal implicatures. The user of “regime” would likely to imply an authoritarian administration, whereas such an implication will not be triggered by the use of “government”. One can easily find many other examples of phrasal implicature in natural language. Camp also points out that slurring falls under a general category of natural language:

(...) my suggestion is that slurs are akin to other expressions part of whose conventional function is not merely to refer or predicate, but to signal the speaker’s social, psychological, and/or emotional relation to that semantic value. Other perspectival expressions include formal and informal forms of address (e.g., ‘tu’/‘vous’) (Horn 2007), slang expressions (e.g., for parents, food, or genitals), and ethical and aesthetic ‘thick’ terms, such as ‘wanton’, ‘cowardly’, or ‘serene’. (Camp 2013, p.335)

Although some of the examples she gives might not be processed at the phrasal level, what she says is in the same vein. A similar point is made by Stanley:

(...) not only politics but also everyday discourse involve apparently innocent words that have the feature of slurs, namely, that whenever the words occur in a sentence, they convey the problematic content. The word “welfare,” in the American context, is not on any list of prohibited words. Yet the word “welfare” always conveys a problematic social meaning, whenever it is used. A sentence like “John believes that Bill is on welfare” still communicates a problematic social meaning. (Stanley 2015, pp.151-2)

Of course I am not in agreement with everything Stanley says here. As I argued before, I do not believe that the “problematic content” always projects out; instead one should take into account the context and the speaker’s intentions in order to decide on whether this extra content projects out. Despite this point, I strongly agree with Stanley’s point that many other words in everyday language “have the features of slurs”.

To conclude, the lesson from this chapter is that words (or subsentential expressions) can make more contribution to a discourse than it is widely thought. A speaker is able to imply many things by using just a word. Slurs and slurring, like metaphors, are paradigmatic examples of this general phenomenon.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

In this thesis, I argued for a pragmatic theory of metaphor, which uses familiar resources of language theory, except suggesting an extension of the notion of implicature to phrasal level implications, and then I applied this theory to slurs. Although its simplicity and conventionality, I believe, this theory nicely explains some popular observations about metaphors and slurs.

In Chapter 1, I briefly summarised the problem and introduced the three ideas I would argue for.

In Chapter 2, I examined three claims on metaphor. The first concerns an observation which says that there are differences between metaphors and ordinary implicatures; the second is based on an observation that metaphors are processed in one step by the speakers, unlike indirect speech-acts, which are processed in two successive steps; and finally the third claim is that metaphorical meaning is implicated. I concluded that I would develop a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims.

Chapter 3 introduced the notion of *phrasal implicature*, which is crucial for the rest of the discussion. In the classical Gricean picture, only a proposition can implicate another proposition. I argued that the Gricean framework can be used to explain subsentential implications. To this end, I called the cases where a speaker uses a phrase meaning to implicate another one “phrasal implicature”. In this chapter, I first presented some cases which can be seen as phrasal level implicatures, and then I discussed certain theorists’ views, which argue that the classical Gricean framework should be extended to subsententials. Finally, I made my claim on why phrasal level implications can be seen as implicatures and how the Gricean Cooperative Principle and maxims can be adapted to phrases.

In Chapter 4, I first presented my theory of metaphor and discussed certain notions and problems related to the theory. Secondly, I showed how my theory

of metaphor is compatible with the claims in Chapter 2. After discussing how the classical implicature tests should be understood for the subsentential pragmatic phenomena, in the final section of the chapter, I dealt with some special metaphorical uses, which are often thought to be test cases for a theory of metaphor, such as the so-called sentential metaphors and poetic metaphors.

Chapter 5 concerns the notion of what-is-said and the semantics-pragmatics distinction, two of the recent most popular discussions in philosophy of language. Given that the theory I had argued for in the previous chapters has some consequences for these discussions, I clarified my position on the notion of what-is-said and the semantics-pragmatics distinction in this chapter. Contrary to the popular what-is-said views in the literature, I argued that what-is-said should be seen as the uttered sentence itself.

In Chapter 6, I discussed the theories of metaphor that can be classified as pragmatic and compared them with my approach.

Finally, in Chapter 7, by showing the similarities between metaphors and slurs, I argued that a phrasal implicature approach can rightly explain slurs. In the chapter, I first presented certain features and uses of slurs and showed that none of the existing slur accounts is able to explain all of these features and uses. Then, I discussed how my Phrasal Implicature Theory of Slurs outperforms its rivals in explaining slurs (and their different uses and features) and slurring as a unique phenomenon.

Bibliography

- Abbott, Barbara (2010). *Reference*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, Luvell and Ernie Lepore (2013a). “Slurring Words”. In: *Noûs* 47.1, pp. 25–48.
- (2013b). “What Did You Call Me? Slurs as Prohibited Words”. In: *Analytic Philosophy* 54.3, pp. 350–363.
- Anscombe, Jean-Claude and Oswald Ducrot (1983). *L’Argumentation dans la Langue*. Brussels: Mardaga.
- Asher, Nicholas (2011). *Lexical Meaning in Context. A Web of Words*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bach, Kent (1994). “Conversational Implicature”. In: *Mind&Language* 9.2, pp. 124–162.
- (2001). “You Don’t Say?” In: *Synthese* 128, pp. 15–44.
- (2005). “Context ex *Machina*”. In: *Semantics versus Pragmatics*. Ed. by Zoltan Gendler Szabo. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–44.
- (2006). “The Top 10 Misconceptions about Implicature”. In: *Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning. Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Semantics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn*. Ed. by Betty J. Birner and Gregory Ward. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 21–30.
- (Forthcoming). “Loaded Words: On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Slurs”. In: *Bad Words*. Ed. by David Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bach, Kent and Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). “Distinguishing Semantics and Pragmatics”. In: *Meaning and Truth. Investigations in Philosophical Semantics*. Ed. by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier. New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press, LLC, pp. 284–309.
- Beardsley, Monroe C. (1962). “The Metaphorical Twist”. In: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 22.3, pp. 293–307.
- Bezuidenhout, Anne (2001). “Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor”. In: *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* XXV, pp. 156–186.

- (2002). “Truth-Conditional Pragmatics”. In: *Philosophical Perspectives* 16, pp. 105–134.
- Black, Max (1954). “Metaphor”. In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55, pp. 273–294.
- Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen (2015). “The Pragmatics of Slurs”. In: *Noûs*, pp. 1–24.
- Booth, Wayne C. (1978). “Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation”. In: *Critical Inquiry* 5.1, pp. 49–72.
- Borg, Emma (2001). “An Expedition Abroad: Metaphor, Thought, and Reporting”. In: *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* XXV, pp. 227–248.
- (2004). *Minimal Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2012). *Pursuing Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burge, Tyler (1973). “Reference and Proper Names”. In: *The Journal of Philosophy* 70.14, pp. 425–439.
- Camp, Elisabeth (2003). “Saying and Seeing-as. The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor”. Phd. University of California, Berkeley.
- (2004). “The Generality Constraint and Categorical Restrictions”. In: *The Philosophical Quarterly* 54.215, pp. 209–231.
- (2005). “Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context”. In: *Noûs* 39.4, pp. 715–731.
- (2006a). “Contextualism, Metaphor, and What is Said”. In: *Mind&Language* 21.3, pp. 280–309.
- (2006b). “Metaphor and That Certain ‘Je Ne Sais Quoi’”. In: *Philosophical Studies* 129.1, pp. 1–25.
- (2006c). “Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor”. In: *Philosophy Compass* 1 (2), pp. 154–170.
- (2008). “Showing, Telling, and Seeing. Metaphor and ”Poetic” Language”. In: *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 3, pp. 1–24.
- (2009). “Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor, Fiction, and Thought Experiments”. In: *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 33, pp. 107–130.
- (2012). “Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction”. In: *Noûs* 46.4, pp. 587–634.
- (2013). “Slurring Perspectives”. In: *Analytic Philosophy* 54.3, pp. 330–349.
- (2015). “Logical Concepts and Associative Characterizations”. In: *The Conceptual Mind. New Directions in the Study of Concepts*. Ed. by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 591–621.
- (2016). “Conventions’ Revenge: Davidson, Derangement, and Dormativity”. In: *Inquiry* 59.1, pp. 113–138.

- Camp, Elisabeth (2017). “Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Pre-supposition, and Pragmatics”. In: *Philosophical Studies* 174.1, pp. 47–64.
- Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore (1997). “On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning”. In: *Mind & Language* 2.3/4, pp. 278–296.
- (2007). “Relevance Theory and Shared Content”. In: *Pragmatics*. Ed. by Noel Burton-Roberts. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 115–135.
- Carnie, Andrew (2013). *Syntax. A Generative Introduction*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Carston, Robyn (2002). *Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- (2010). “Metaphor: Ad Hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images”. In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 110, pp. 297–323.
- Cavell, Stanley (1998). *Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chierchia, Gennaro (2004). “Scalar Implicatures, Polarity Phenomena, and the Syntax/Pragmatics Interface”. In: *Structures and Beyond. The Cartography of Syntactic Structures, Volume 3*. Ed. by Adriana Belletti. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–103.
- Clark, Herbert H. (1983). “Making Sense of Nonce Sense”. In: *The Process of Language Understanding*. Ed. by Giovanni B. Flores D’Arcais and R. J. Jarvella. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., pp. 291–331.
- Cohen, Jonathan (1971). “Some Remarks on Grice’s Views About the Logical Particles of Natural Language”. In: *Pragmatics of Natural Languages*. Ed. by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 50–68.
- Cohen, Ted (1978). “Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy”. In: *Critical Inquiry* 5.1, pp. 3–12.
- Cook, Monte (1980). “If ‘Cat’ is a Rigid Designator, What does it Designate?” In: *Philosophical Studies* 37, pp. 61–64.
- Croom, Adam M. (2013). “How to Do Things with Slurs: Studies in the Way of Derogatory Words”. In: *Language & Communication* 33, pp. 177–204.
- Davidson, Donald (1978). “What Metaphors Mean”. In: *Critical Inquiry* 5.1, pp. 31–47.
- Davies, Martin (1982-1983). “Idiom and Metaphor”. In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. New Series 83, pp. 67–85.

- Davis, Wayne (2014). "Implicature". In: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2014. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/implicature/>.
- Devitt, Michael (2005). "Rigid Application". In: *Philosophical Studies* 125, pp. 139–165.
- Dummett, Michael (1973). *Frege. Philosophy of Language*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
- Egan, Andy (2008). "Pretense for the Complete Idiom". In: *Noûs* 42.3, pp. 381–409.
- Fara, Delia Graff (2015). "Names are Predicates". In: *Philosophical Review* 124.1, pp. 59–117.
- Fogelin, Robert J. (2011). *Figuratively Speaking*. Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frege, Gottlob (1951). "On Concept and Object". Trans. by P. T. Geach. In: *Mind* 60.238, pp. 168–180.
- Geurts, Bart (2010). *Quantity Implicatures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Geurts, Bart and Paula Rubio-Fernández (2015). "Pragmatics and Processing". In: *Ratio* 28 (4), pp. 446–469.
- Giora, Rachel (2003). *On Our Mind. Salience, Context, and Figurative Language*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Glanzberg, Michael (2008). "Metaphor and Lexical Semantics". In: *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 3, pp. 1–47.
- Grice, Paul (1989). *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Guttenplan, Samuel (2005). *Objects of Metaphor*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer (1998). *Semantics in Generative Grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Hills, David (1997). "Aptness and Truth in Verbal Metaphor". In: *Philosophical Topics* 25.1, pp. 117–153.
- Hirschberg, Julia (2004). "Pragmatics and Intonation". In: *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. Ed. by Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Hom, Christopher (2008). "The Semantics of Racial Epithets". In: *The Journal of Philosophy* 105, pp. 416–440.
- Hom, Christopher and Robert May (2013). "Moral and Semantic Innocence". In: *Analytic Philosophy* 54.3, pp. 293–313.
- Horn, Laurence R. and Gregory Ward, eds. (2004). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

- Hornsby, Jennifer (2001). "Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think about Derogatory Words". In: *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 25, pp. 128–141.
- Huang, Yan (2007). *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum (2005). *A Student's Introduction to English Grammar*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inan, Ilhan (2008). "Rigid General Terms and Essential Predicates". In: *Philosophical Studies* 140, pp. 213–228.
- Jeshion, Robin (2013). "Expressivism and the Offensiveness of Slurs". In: *Philosophical Perspectives* 27 (1), pp. 231–259.
- Kaplan, David (1989). "Demonstratives. An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals". In: *Themes from Kaplan*. Ed. by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Wettstein Howard. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563.
- King, Jeffrey C. (2016). "Structured Propositions". In: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2016. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/propositions-structured/>.
- Kripke, Saul (1977). "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". In: *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* II, pp. 255–276.
- (2011). "A Puzzle about Belief". In: *Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers, Volume 1*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 125–161.
- Kripke, Saul A. (1980). *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- LaPorte, Joseph (2000). "Rigidity and Kind". In: *Philosophical Studies* 97.3, pp. 293–316.
- Leezenberg, Michiel (2001). *Contexts of Metaphor*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Lepore, Ernie and Matthew Stone (2015). *Imagination and Convention. Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, David (1998). "Index, Context, and Content". In: *Papers in Philosophical Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–44.
- Lewis, Karen S. (2012). "Discourse Dynamics, Pragmatics, and Indefinites". In: *Philosophical Studies* 158, pp. 313–342.
- (2014). "Do We Need Dynamic Semantics?" In: *Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning*. Ed. by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Littlemore, Jeannette (2015). *Metonymy: Hidden Shortcuts in Language, Thought and Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ludlow, Peter (2013). "Descriptions". In: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2013. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/descriptions/>.
- (2014). *Living Words. Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lycan, William G. (2008). *Philosophy of Language. A Contemporary Introduction*. 2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge.
- Magidor, Ofra (2013). *Category Mistakes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martinich, A. P. (1984). *Communication and Reference*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Miller, George A. (1993). "Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors". In: *Metaphor and Thought*. Ed. by Andrew Ortony. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moran, Richard (1989). "Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image, and Force". In: *Critical Inquiry* 16.1, pp. 87–112.
- (1997). "Metaphor". In: *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*. Ed. by Richard Moran. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 248–268.
- Neale, Stephen (1992). "Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language". In: *Linguistics and Philosophy* 15.5, pp. 509–559.
- Nogales, Patti D. (2012). "Metaphorical Content as What is Said". In: *Journal of Pragmatics* 44, pp. 997–1008.
- Nunberg, Geoffrey (1979). "The Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy". In: *Linguistic and Philosophy* 3.2, pp. 143–184.
- Ortony, Andrew, ed. (1993). 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ortony, Andrew, Diane L. Schallert, Ralph E. Reynolds, and Stephen J Antos (1978). "Interpreting Metaphors and Idioms: Some Effects of Context on Comprehension". In: *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 17 (4), pp. 465–477.
- Recanati, François (2003a). "Embedded Implicatures". In: *Philosophical Perspectives* 17 (1), pp. 299–332.
- (2003b). *Literal Metaling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, Craige (2004). "Context in Dynamic Interpretation". In: *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. Ed. by Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- (2012). "Information Structure in Discourse: Towards an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics". In: *Semantics & Pragmatics* 5, pp. 1–69.
- Salmon, Nathan (1986). *Frege's Puzzle*. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

- Salmon, Nathan (2005). "Are General Terms Rigid?" In: *Linguistic and Philosophy* 28, pp. 117–134.
- Saul, Jennifer M. (2002). "What is Said and Psychological Reality; Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists' Criticisms". In: *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25, pp. 347–372.
- Searle, John R. (1969). *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- (1980). "The Background of Meaning". In: *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics*. Ed. by John R. Searle and Bierwisch Manfred Kiefer Ferenc. Dordrecht: Holland, Boston: U.S.A., London: England: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 221–232.
- (1993). "Metaphor". In: *Metaphor and Thought*. Ed. by Andrew Ortony. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 83–111.
- Simons, Mandy (2010). "A Gricean View on Intrusive Implicatures". In: *Meaning and Analysis. New Essays on Grice*. Ed. by Klaus Petrus. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 138–169.
- Soames, Scott (1987). "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content". In: *Philosophical Topics* 15, pp. 47–87.
- (2002). *Beyond Rigidity. The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity*. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson (1995). *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Stainton, Robert J. (2006). *Words and Thoughts. Subsentences, Ellipsis, and the Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stalnaker, Robert (2002). "Common Ground". In: *Linguistic and Philosophy* 25, pp. 701–721.
- Stalnaker, Robert C. (1984). *Inquiry*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- ed. (1999a). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- (1999b). "Assertion". In: *Context and Content. Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought*. Ed. by Robert C. Stalnaker. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 78–95.
- (1999c). "On the Representation of Context". In: *Context and Content. Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought*. Ed. by Robert C. Stalnaker. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 96–113.
- Stanley, Jason (2000). "Context and Logical Form". In: *Linguistics and Philosophy* 23, pp. 391–434.
- (2015). *How Propaganda Works*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

- Steinhart, Eric (2001). *The Logic of Metaphor. Analogous Parts of Possible Worlds*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Stern, Josef (2000). *Metaphor in Context*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- (2006). “Metaphor, Literal, Literalism”. In: *Mind&Language* 21.3, pp. 243–279.
- (2011). “Metaphor and Minimalism”. In: *Philosophical Studies* 152.2, pp. 273–298.
- Storto, Gianluca and Michael K. Tanenhaus (2004). “Are Scalar Implicatures Computed Online?” In: *Proceedings of the Thirty-third Western Conference On Linguistics*. Ed. by Michal Temkin Martínez, Asier Alcázar, and Roberto Mayoral Hernández. Vol. 16. Fresno, California: Department of Linguistics California State University, Fresno, pp. 357–372.
- Taylor, Kenneth A. (2001). “Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus”. In: *Synthese* 128, pp. 45–61.
- Tirrell, Lynne (1989). “Extending: The Structure of Metaphor”. In: *Noûs* 23.1, pp. 17–34.
- (1991). “Reductive and Nonreductive Simile Theories of Metaphor”. In: *The Journal of Philosophy* 88.7, pp. 337–358.
- Tversky, Amos (1977). “Features of Similarity”. In: *Psychological Review* 84.4, pp. 327–352.
- Unger, Peter (1975). *Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wearing, Catherine (2006). “Metaphor and What is Said”. In: *Mind&Language* 21.3, pp. 310–332.
- (2014). “Interpreting Novel Metaphors”. In: *International Review of Pragmatics* 6, pp. 78–102.
- White, Roger (1996). *The Structure of Metaphor. The Way the Language of Metaphor Works*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Whiting, Daniel (2013). “It’s not What You Said, It’s the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures”. In: *Analytic Philosophy* 54.3, pp. 364–377.
- Williamson, Timothy (2009). “Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives”. In: *The Philosophy of David Kaplan*. Ed. by Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–158.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Robyn Carston (2008). “Metaphor and the ‘Emergent Property’ Problem: A Relevance-Theoretic Treatment”. In: *The Baltic Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 3, pp. 1–40.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber (2012). *Meaning and Relevance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958). *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe.
2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.