



The Australian National University
Pacific Research Monograph Number Two

Villagers at war: some Papua New Guinean experiences in World War II

Neville K Robinson



Villagers at war



Map 1 Papua New Guinea

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New Guinean experiences
in World War II**

Neville K Robinson

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Canberra 1981

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Neville Keith Robinson was born during World War II in Georgetown, Guyana. He was educated at Queen's College, the University College of West Indies, and the Universities of London and Papua New Guinea. After seven years of secondary school teaching in Buyana, he moved to Papua New Guinea. He worked at the Educational Materials Centre at the University of Papua New Guinea and was later appointed to the lecturing staff of Port Moresby Teachers College. He was senior lecturer in Social Studies and is at present Deputy Principal.

Summary

Papua New Guinea was a theatre of warfare between the armed forces of the Allies and Japan from 4 January 1942 to 6 September 1945. Three places - the Toaripi area, Hanuabada and Butibam - were studied in order to assess the impact of the war on the lives of Papuans and New Guineans. The outline for this book is based on documentary sources, especially ANGAU patrol reports and the War Diary; it is fleshed out by oral evidence obtained during interviews with groups and individuals who took part in the war. The work of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) which governed the Allied-occupied parts of Papua New Guinea during the war, its relations with the civilian population and its effect on their lives are also studied.

The war enabled many Papuans and New Guineans to gain self-confidence, to see virtue in co-operation within ethnic groups and to set 'developmental' goals which could be attained by group effort.

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Neville K. Robinson.

Preface

In 'War, race and loyalty in New Guinea 1939-45', a paper delivered at the Second Waigani Seminar (1968), Professor K.S. Inglis examined the concept of the Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angel in Papua New Guinea during World War II. He quoted from the writings of European observers of the war, then asked 'What did native people think of all these events?' and also stated 'Historians so far have not written much about native response to the war.' (Inglis, 1969.) It is my purpose to look principally at their side of the war in Papua New Guinea, by attempting to record the war-time experiences of three discrete groups of local people on the mainland of Papua New Guinea.

First, I set out to gather oral information from local people about their experiences during the war. I then consulted the Official Histories, the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) patrol reports and the ANGAU War Diary to put this locally-derived evidence into the official context of the war. Lastly, I conducted oral interviews and correspondence with those expatriates who served in ANGAU or the Army in Papua and New Guinea. Their comments and observations on my progress reports gave a further perspective to my account and served to confirm and elucidate previous material or to question and contradict the testimony of the original informants. This book is based mainly on the oral evidence of both local and expatriate informants.

I selected three areas in which to conduct my field work. Each area had an experience distinct from that of the other two. They are five Toaripi villages close to the mouth of the Lakekamu River in the Gulf District; Hanuabada on the outskirts of Port Moresby in the Central District; and Butibam on the outskirts of Lae in the Morobe District.

I devised a questionnaire which I administered in 1970 - first of all to selected undergraduates at the University of Papua New Guinea and to teacher trainees at the Port Moresby Teachers College. The general theme of my questions was what was thought of the war by informants ranging from literate readers of the *Papuan Villager* to villagers whose

area was visited by the war and villagers who saw nothing of the war. The questions investigated the villagers' notions of what the conflict was about, the villagers' perceptions of black American soldiers and of their relations generally with soldiers, the Royal Papuan Constabulary (RPC) and ANGAU. The questions sought the testimony of men who evaded the ANGAU agent, of deserters and of those who carried for the Japanese forces. I also attempted to discover whether the Japanese were more disagreeable as masters than the Australians. I tried to make the questions open-ended. From the responses I gleaned information which I followed up in my field work. Tertiary students also provided me with the names of potential informants in the villages I planned to visit. Students helped me to translate my interviews on field trips. My field work was conducted in five languages, Toaripi in the Gulf, Motu in Hanuabada, Yabim and Pidgin in Butibam and English wherever possible. I used a tape-recorder most of the time and also took notes during my interviews.

I spent one fortnight interviewing villagers in the Toaripi area. In addition I have interviewed Toaripi residents in three settlements of Port Moresby; Sabama, Gorobe and Sinake (Waigani Swamp) and at the 9-Mile Quarry. Hanuabada is close to Port Moresby so I was able to visit informants often. I visited Butibam twice for short spells of three days and one week. In addition I also conducted interviews in Wau, Madang, Bulolo, Kokoda, Popondetta, Finschhafen and Alotau.

One serious problem of collecting oral evidence is that much of the information is likely to be repetitive. Attempts to interview a cross-section of a village community are sometimes foiled by the fact that some articulate villagers are very eager to step forward and tell all the war stories. I found it was best to conduct a single group interview at which any villager who cared could tell his story, which was translated simultaneously. At the conclusion of this group interview I would decide which informants were most likely to be useful at a second interview in private. There were several second interviews and it was also necessary to hold second interviews when there was a conflict in testimony. It was prudent to have my tape-recordings of interviews checked for accuracy by an independent interpreter. There were three instances when this double-checking revealed serious errors and bias in the original simultaneous translations.

Villagers in general were always eager to speak with me about the war and they encouraged, prompted and corrected one another in the telling of their war stories. Most expatriates I approached were equally keen but a few ANGAU men flatly refused to speak to me about the war. Many expatriates wrote very useful comments on my progress reports; others asked to be excused from expressing any written opinions.

My documentary research was conducted at the Papua New Guinea National Archives, the New Guinea Collection at the University of Papua New Guinea, the Ela Beach Library at Port Moresby, the National Library, Canberra, and the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.

Abbreviations

AC	Armed constable
ADO	Assistant District Officer
AIB	Allied Intelligence Bureau
AIF	Australian Imperial Forces
AMF	Australian Military Forces
ANGAU	Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit
CRE	Commander Royal Engineers
DAAG	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General
DAQMG	Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General
DDS	Director of District Services
DO	District Officer
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HQ	Headquarters
LHQ	Land Headquarters
LMS	London Missionary Society
L of C	Line of Communication
MD	Military district
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NGAU	New Guinea Administrative Unit
NGF	New Guinea Force
NGIB	New Guinea Infantry Battalion
NGVR	New Guinea Volunteer Rifles
NLO	Native labour overseer
NMO	Native medical orderly
NRO	Native Regulations Ordinance
OC	Officer commanding
OIC	Officer in charge
PAU	Papuan Administrative Unit
PCB	Production Control Board
PIB	Papuan Infantry Battalion
PO	Patrol Officer
PR	Patrol Report
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RPC	Royal Papuan Constabulary
RSL	Returned Servicemen's League
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
WO	Warrant Officer

Chapter 1

World War II in Papua New Guinea

In 1941 both the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea were under the control of the Commonwealth of Australia but each had its own administration. World War II broke out between Britain, France and Germany in September 1939. It was the Japanese attack on the American base of Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 that brought the threat of war to Papua and New Guinea. At that time nearly all the trained soldiers, sailors and airmen of Australia were in the Middle East and Malaya. Australia sought aid from America and 4500 troops were sent to Australia by 22 December. They were followed by an Infantry Division in February 1942 and 36,000 support troops in May 1942.

Early in 1941 both a military and a civil administration existed in Port Moresby, Papua. The area was known as the Eighth Military District. On 4 January 1942 Japanese planes bombed Rabaul and on 23 January their forces occupied that town. Most of the garrison of 1400 Australian troops surrendered to 5300 Japanese. Once Rabaul was lost, reinforcements were sent from Australia to Port Moresby as it was clear it would now become a vital base in the defence of the Australian mainland.

The Japanese attacked Port Moresby from the air on the night of 3 February 1942. This was the first of over 100 air-raids on Port Moresby. Three weeks later daylight raids began and Japanese air attacks increased in intensity until effective counter-measures became possible.

On 8 March 1942 the Japanese landed their forces unopposed at Lae and Salamaua on the north coast of New Guinea. The only Australian troops were two companies of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR). This force of 450 Europeans had the task of active patrolling and harassment of the enemy. They came from the ranks of pre-war planters and officials in New Guinea.

With civilian government gone, the NGVR became the only representatives of the law and order previously maintained by the administration. They assumed responsibility for several thousand indentured labourers, recruited from many districts besides the Morobe District, who could not return home. These labourers became the first carriers to be recruited in the cause of the Allies.

Coastwatching was another task performed by pre-war planters, officials and servicemen in New Guinea. A coast-watcher was trained in the rudiments of observation and reporting on enemy movements. L.G. Vial, who hid in the hills behind Salamaua for six months, observed Japanese flights from Lae and reported them by radio to Port Moresby, thus enabling Royal Australian Air Force fighter pilots to intercept them. Coastwatchers spoke the language of the local people or a lingua franca and knew how to live off the land. The existence of coastwatchers and the NGVR was precarious, particularly with regard to food supplies. Supplies were sent by schooner from Port Moresby to the mouth of the Lakekamu River and then by doubled-hulled canoes up-stream to Bulldog, from where long lines of carriers took these supplies 120 miles over mountains and hills to Wau.

By the middle of March 1942 there were between 4000 and 5000 troops defending Port Moresby and the coastal areas of Papua. These were the poorly trained and dispirited members of the 30th Brigade of Militia. Increasing numbers of American servicemen arrived in both Territories at this time. These included an Engineer Unit of black soldiers. On 17 April the 2nd/5th Independent Company arrived in Port Moresby. This unit was to be sent to the Wau-Salamaua area to form the nucleus of a new guerilla group called 'Kanga Force' which would include members of the NGVR.

Early in May 1942 the Japanese attempted to invade Port Moresby by sea. It was their intention to land at an adjacent beach and then to march on the town. The invasion fleet was turned back at the Battle of the Coral Sea which lasted from 4-9 May. This battle was conducted by aircraft from carriers of the Japanese and American fleets. Port Moresby, the vital Australian base in New Guinea, was given a respite.


Kanga Force was flown into Wau on 23 May after the Battle of the Coral Sea. The force now comprised 700 men. Four hundred and fifty were fresh troops and 250 were weary members of the NGVR. The function of the Force was surveillance and harassment of the enemy based at Salamaua and Lae.

In June, the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB), a small force of 300 Papuans with European Officers, was sent to patrol from Kokoda on the foothills of the Owen Stanley Range to Awala where the hills flattened towards the coastal plains of the Northern District. They were sent on this mission because the Japanese had shown an earlier interest in Buna and Gona. 'Maroubra Force' was the name given to this reconnaissance detachment. Later, the 39th Battalion, which was rated as the best of the militia troops available in Port Moresby, was given the task of occupying with the PIB the Buna area and constructing an all-weather airstrip at Dobodura. On 7 July members of the 39th Battalion belatedly set out from Port Moresby for Kokoda. It was planned to assemble 3200 men eventually in the Buna area.

When the forward elements of the 39th Battalion had reached Awala, Japanese troops landed between Buna and Gona, their transport ships surviving Allied bombing attacks. This was on the night of 21 July. One thousand, eight hundred Japanese landed, and they quickly pushed back the 39th Battalion and the PIB. By infiltration and outflanking movements the Japanese forced the 39th Battalion to retreat from Kokoda on 29 July. The airfield, which was used for the landing of reinforcements to the 39th Battalion from Port Moresby, was thus lost to the Allies. The inexperienced militia fell back on Deniki, and then to Alola. Meanwhile Kokoda became the Japanese forward base and supplies and reinforcements were brought up. More Japanese troops were also landed from Rabaul.

The Japanese had every intention of marching on Port Moresby across the Kokoda Track, which was a very rough trail over inhospitable jungle terrain with a series of ridges rising from 300 ft to 7000 ft. For their advance across the bush track in August, they mustered 13,500 troops between Kokoda and Buna.

The 21st Brigade of the 7th Division of the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) arrived in Port Moresby on 13 August and was sent along the Kokoda Track (soon to be called the Kokoda Trail) to support the retreating 39th Battalion. Supplying the troops and removing the wounded were among the greatest problems of this campaign. Carriers or bearers who were recruited along the Trail were used but many of them were in poor physical condition and ground portorage was inadequate for the Army's needs. 'Biscuit bombers', the transport planes which dropped supplies from the air, were used but there was



Map 2 The Kokoda Track. Source: McCarthy, 1959.

great wastage of material. When Kokoda was lost, Lieut. H.T. Kienzle of ANGAU, who had been responsible for developing the trail and was in charge of securing labour for the Army, went to Port Moresby to impress on Major General Morris the need for more carriers. Because the Australian supply system partially collapsed, essential tools never reached the soldiers and their withdrawal became inevitable. Two AIF battalions defended Myola for six days and then withdrew. Headquarters in Port Moresby suggested by September that a last stand should be made at Ioribaiwa, just eight miles from Uberi.

There were 6000 Allied troops in the Milne Bay area by the first week of August 1942. Their task had been to construct several airstrips and to protect the harbour against Japanese invasion. The military formation of this area was known as Milne Force. As the Australian troops retreated on the Kokoda Trail, AIF reinforcements were sent from Port Moresby to Milne Bay so that at the end of August there were 7500 members of the AIF and AMF, 600 of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and 1350 American troops there. On 26 August, at the same time that the Japanese launched a general offensive at Kokoda, they also landed hundreds of troops at Ahioma on the northern side of Milne Bay. These invaders were resisted by companies of the 61st Battalion.

The Japanese used two tanks in their advance on KB mission on the north west corner of the Bay and their invasion ships commanded the bay. Australian troops on the ground were helped in their resistance by Kittyhawk fighter planes which destroyed some of the Japanese barges. Most of the fighting at Milne Bay was done at night in rain and mud. In this campaign, Japanese soldiers not only shot their wounded but also committed many atrocities against Milne Bay villagers. On 7 September, having failed to take control of any of the airstrips at Milne Bay, the Japanese forces withdrew. This small battle had lasted only eleven days but it was a welcome decisive victory on land for the Australians.

On the Kokoda Trail the Japanese had advanced as far as Ioribaiwa, 30 air miles from Port Moresby, by 15 September. For ten days the military position was static, then reinforcements of fresh Australian troops were sent to Imita Ridge and the next phase of the Kokoda campaign began. For the counter-offensive the Allies had secured two twenty-five pound guns and strong patrolling was begun in the Imita Ridge area. A United States regiment was also sent on a pioneering trek across Papua to attack the Japanese forces from the rear.

On 26 September a heavy counter-attack was launched on the Japanese positions. They retired quickly across the Owen Stanleys. Nauro, Menari, Efofi, Kagi and Myola were recaptured in quick succession. The wounded Australians were evacuated by air from Myola. Kokoda was recaptured on 2 November and the Australian flag was hoisted there (with due ceremony) on 3 November. Kokoda became once more a centre for Australian air-lifts of supplies and evacuation of the wounded. The Japanese forces were pushed back to the coast by 30 November. Their positions at Buna, Gona and Sanananda were well protected and tenaciously defended.

While these three beach-heads were besieged, fresh Japanese troops were brought from Rabaul by destroyers. As the Allies tried to wrest the three strongholds from the Japanese, their casualty figures mounted alarmingly. Malaria, which was a great killer throughout the entire Kokoda campaign, continued to reduce the numbers of the Allies. Gona finally fell on 9 December, Buna on 2 January and Sanananda on 22 January 1943. The Australian 6th and 7th Divisions and the 126th Division had finally cleared the Japanese from Papua.

In the Wau-Salamaua area, Kanga Force had headquarters at Wau, Bulolo and Bulwa. These commandos staged raids on Japanese positions at Lae and Salamaua which were successful but which also resulted in sharp Japanese retaliation. Mubo, Komiatum, Wau and Bulolo were bombed in revenge and the Japanese undertook active patrolling to reduce the effectiveness of the NGVR. One serious result of this Japanese response was the desertion of the labour and carrier forces who had worked for the Allies. Kanga Force depended solely on the Bulldog Lines of Communications for their supply of stores and this line could not produce a steady flow. So long as coastwatchers and scouts could maintain supplies of trade goods such as salt and razor blades they could live off the land and win the support of enough people to hold back the general populace from wholly supporting the Japanese.

The Japanese advance in the Mubo area however was so strong that Wau and Bulolo were burnt out and abandoned by the commando unit because it seemed impossible to hold the Bulolo Valley any longer. The main section of Kanga Force retreated to Kudjeru in the mountains and the rest remained in the Markham Valley.

Kanga Force was reinforced on 4 October by 2nd/7th Independent Company. On 11 January 1943 Kanga Force attacked

Mubo. Four days later the 17th Infantry Brigade reached Wau and prepared to defend it against an anticipated Japanese assault. The Japanese made their way to Wau by a little-known jungle track on 28 January. They were strongly resisted by troops of the 5th, 6th and 7th Battalions whose reserve companies were flown in from Port Moresby and went immediately into action. Timely air support helped the Australians to win this battle for the Wau Valley. The Japanese forces withdrew to Mubo on 9 February. Any possibility of the Japanese moving in strength on Wau was shattered by an Allied air attack on a Japanese convoy on 28 February 1943. This convoy was taking 6900 troops from Rabaul to reinforce Lae. On 1 and 2 March the Allies demonstrated their superior air power by sinking four destroyers and the eight transport vessels. Only 950 Japanese troops reached Lae.

Before the Japanese retreat from Wau, construction began on a jeep road of 60 miles from Bulldog to Wau. The purpose of this road was to improve the supply position for the projected assault on Lae. The 14th, 9th and the 2nd/16th Field Companies were employed on this project.

The Allies chose Salamaua as a major objective in their advance on the Markham Valley. Salamaua was made to appear a very important strategic place so the Japanese would send reinforcements there from Lae. This they did. First Nassau Bay was occupied on 30 June by the Allies, then Lababia Ridge and Mubo were recaptured. After a campaign of seven months, Salamaua was recaptured by the Allies on 11 September 1943.

The attack on Lae was planned on a comparatively grand scale. On 5 September, the US 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment and a detachment of 2nd/4th Australian Field Regiment was dropped on Nadzab airstrip. In all, 302 Allied aircraft converged on Nadzab that day. Engineers rapidly prepared the old airstrip to receive transport planes. By 9 September the 7th Division had assembled a large enough task force to advance on Lae. The 9th Division had succeeded in landing three brigades on the beaches 50 miles east of Lae by 6 September. Their advance on Lae was held up for five days by the swollen Busu River which had to be bridged.

The Japanese garrison of 9000 troops fled from this Allied pincer movement on Lae, most of them crossing the Finisterre Mountains to reach the north-east coast. At the same time, Japanese reinforcements were sent from Madang to Finschhafen. Lae was taken on 16 September by the 7th Division.

Finschhafen, with two good harbours and a small airfield, was a strongly held Japanese position and two days after the fall of Lae the 9th Division was sent there to land at Scarlet Beach. The hazards of the landing were increased by the fact that some of the troops disembarked at the wrong beaches, and savage fighting occurred. At the same time, Militia of the 22nd Battalion were sent overland to Hopoi to converge on the Japanese at Finschhafen. There was strong resistance from the enemy garrison who yielded Finschhafen on 2 October. They withdrew to their stronghold of Sattelberg, a high peak in the Cromwell Ranges about six miles west of Scarlet Beach. From there the enemy launched a counter-attack on Finschhafen. A Tank Battalion was introduced by the Allies to thwart the Japanese advance from Sattelberg. On 25 November the Allies captured Sattelberg and began to push the Japanese forces up the coast to the north.

The Americans moved to block the coastal withdrawal route of the Japanese. The 126th US Regiment landed at Saidor on 2 January 1944. Their position was so strong that the retreating Japanese of the 20th and 51st Divisions undertook a difficult march inland rather than fight. Sio was captured by the Australians on 15 January. At that time it was estimated that there were 7000 Japanese troops between Sio and Saidor. Patrols of the PIB probed for the Japanese and in time over 1000 of the enemy were found dead on the tracks. Their forced march to Madang over inhospitable country together with a lack of rest and rations and weakness from disease had severely reduced their ranks.

After the recapture of Lae, two brigades of the 7th Division were concentrated in the Markham Valley and, with a Company of the PIB, moved on Kaiapit. The Australians took Kaiapit on 20 September. An advance party then moved on Gusap. There was no opposition from the Japanese in the Ramu Valley and early in October the 21st Brigade established its headquarters at Dumpu. The swiftly retreating Japanese were attacked in the Kesawai area and their strong raiding parties were forced to retreat into their base camps.

The next big engagement was at Shaggy Ridge, a razor-backed spur about 5000 feet high, which lay between Kankiryō and Kumbarum. Reinforcements of the 7th Division were flown from Port Moresby for this battle for the heights; Kankiryō Saddle commanded the track leading to Bogadjim on the north coast. The Japanese lost Shaggy Ridge and Kankiryō on 1 February 1944, after a short and vigorous clash of arms.

Madang was the next Allied objective. The major obstacle in achieving this was the Gogol River which was crossed with the help of the Americans. The 67/60th Battalion of the 15th Brigade routed the Japanese rear-guard and occupied a deserted Madang on 24 April 1944. Alexishafen was found similarly deserted two days later. In eight months the Huon Peninsula, Finschhafen, the Markham and Ramu Valleys had been cleared of the enemy. Now that the coastal harbours were under control, the American forces at Saidor made a long hop by sea to Aitape, landing there successfully on 22 April.

Early in 1944, the Japanese forces still retained control of Bougainville, New Britain and New Ireland. In March the Allies captured the outer islands of New Ireland, Emirau, Green and Treasury Islands. These islands would be used by the American forces to develop air fields and ports.

Bougainville had been occupied by the Japanese since March 1942 and they had built several airfields there. In October 1944 the 3rd Division AIF arrived on Bougainville to take over control from the 14th US Corps. The Australians had as their objectives the defence of the beachhead already gained at Torokina, and the gaining of information about the number of Japanese on Bougainville. Their plan was to attack the Japanese in three sectors, in the north, in the south and in the centre. The Japanese were mainly concentrated in the south-west of Bougainville. By December 1944 all three Allied assaults were underway. On 29 November the 9th Battalion had captured Little George Hill, a military objective in the central sector. The action in the central sector was mainly to prevent the Japanese from approaching Torokina by the Numa Numa Trail, a cross-island route which linked Torokina on the west with Numa Numa on the east coast. In Northern Bougainville the Australians planned to force the enemy into the narrow Bonis Peninsula and to prevent them from reinforcing their troops to the south. After initial resistance the Japanese abandoned the Soraken Peninsula, leaving an area of considerable garden cultivation which had been used for their subsistence. The 11th Brigade was unable to defeat the forces in the Japanese strongholds in the Buri Bay and Ratsua areas. The enemy remained in these base fortifications until the war ended on 15 August 1945.

In the southern sector of Bougainville the 3rd Division had as its major objective the taking of Mawaraka on the coast and Mosigettaga, a valuable garden area a few miles inland. When patrols of the Allies reached Mawaraka in

mid-January 1945 the Japanese had already left. The PIB dispersed remnants of Japanese troops in the Motupena Point area. Mosigetta was cleared in mid-February. The 3rd Division advanced towards Buin but progress along the Buin and Commando Roads was severely hampered by wet weather. By 9 July, however, the Australians had pushed the Japanese across the Mivo River. Very heavy rainfall brought active operations to a stand-still for one month. Before the Allied advance could be resumed Japan surrendered. This was a mopping-up campaign and the Australian forces were well supplied and actively engaged the enemy on all fronts.

Since the Japanese seized New Britain in 1942, parties of Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) made up of pre-war residents of New Guinea had been very active in the control area of the island. The AIB had used armed villagers to help in gathering information about the Japanese and had harassed the enemy until they had been cleared from the north coast to Ulamona and the western end of Wide Bay on the south. In October 1944 the Allies estimated there were 38,000 Japanese troops in New Britain (there were far more, 69,000). The Japanese objective in New Britain seemed to be the defence of Rabaul, their main operational base. There were extensive areas under cultivation just outside Rabaul, and in Rabaul there was a system of shelters and stores of provisions underground

In December 1943 American formations had landed at Cape Gloucester and Arawe at the western and south-western ends of New Britain. They captured a number of vital airfields and controlled the north coast as far as Talasea and Hoskins on Kimbe Bay.

In September 1944 Jacquinot Bay on the south coast was explored and a site found for a divisional base. At the same time, another base area was selected in the Talasea-Hoskins area. Australian troops began to relieve the American occupation troops in West New Britain in October and the 5th Division was given the task of defending New Britain. Active patrolling was begun in an advance towards a line running between Wide Bay and Open Bay.

On the north coast Japanese strength was increasing and they attacked an Australian patrol in late January 1945 and swiftly withdrew. On the south coast the advance of the 19th Battalion caused the enemy to withdraw from Kamandran. A company of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion (NGIB)

spear-headed the crossing of the Mevelo River and the attack on Waitavalo Plantation which was captured on 17 March. As a result of these successful patrols the northern and southern sectors of the Australian forces made contact and effectively cut off the Japanese in Rabaul from the remainder of New Britain. There was no more fighting and after Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 the 4th Brigade of the 11th Division made the initial landing at Rabaul.

When troops of the American 41st and 32nd Divisions landed at Aitape in April 1944, their immediate objectives were to hold Aitape airfield, extend it for bombers to use and to secure the naval base. The Americans were joined by RAAF fighter planes and successfully resisted the desperate Japanese assaults on their positions from May to July. The Japanese were very short of rations and ammunition and were attempting to join with their forces at Sarni in Western New Guinea. Failing in their attempt the Japanese withdrew eastwards to Wewak.

The Australian 6th Division took over the Aitape area in October 1944 and began mopping-up operations. It was estimated there were 24,000 enemy troops in the area from Aitape to the Sepik River, mainly in the coastal area between the Danmap and Sepik Rivers and inland south of the divide in the Sepik and Maprik Valley areas. The 17th Brigade searched for the enemy in the inland sector, displacing them between Bitika and Ami and by 22 February 1945 they had reached Bulamita. Maprik was cleared of the enemy by 21 April after many fierce small actions.

The chief objective of the drive along the coast first by the 19th Brigade and later by the 16th Brigade was to recapture Wewak. There was heavy fighting at Nambut Hill midway between Aitape and Wewak in early February 1945. The 16th Brigade took But on 17 March. The area around Dagua was strongly defended but this too was captured and later Hawain was taken. On 11 May 1945 Wewak fell to the Australians.

During the nine month Sepik Campaign Australian forces had seized every strategic point of sea, land and air between Aitape and Wewak. On the inland sector their forces had cleared the Japanese from an area of 3000 square miles.

Chapter 2

ANGAU in Papua: recruitment and treatment of labour and the administration of villages, 1942-1945

ANGAU, the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, was set up on 10 April 1942 by combining the Papuan Administrative Unit and the New Guinea Administrative Unit.¹ Both these units were created in the period of confusion after the Japanese bombing of Port Moresby. Their major tasks were government, law and order, the management of indigenous affairs, the deployment of native labour and the effective marshalling of expert local intelligence (P. Ryan, 1969: 531-48).

Initially ANGAU consisted of two Services, District Services and Production Services, under the direct command of New Guinea Force.² For most of this chapter we shall deal with the work of District Services which carried the operational and administrative burdens of both Territories. Production Services produced the food required by the local people, transport for the personnel of District Services and those working the plantations and also technical direction.

ANGAU expanded with time (Coady, 1963, 3(3):24). A new separate Native Labour Section took over these duties from District Services, handling native labour right down to the front line (P. Ryan, 1969:543). An administrative instruction of 7 February 1944 altered the establishment of ANGAU so that it conformed to the organisation of a Division with a General Officer Commanding and possessing three branches,

¹Ryan (1969:547). There is divergence of opinion on the date of the merger. McCarthy (1959:43) gives the date as 21 March 1942. This date is used also by Coady (1963:24). Ryan bases his dates on the ANGAU War Diary.

²Conference of officers of HQ and officers of Districts staff, Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944. ANGAU Organisation and Policy.

General ('G'), Staff administration ('A') and Quartermaster ('Q'). The next change was the creation of three Regional Headquarters on 8 April 1944. The regions were the Northern, Southern and Islands. Each had a regional commander but these headquarters remained subordinate to General Headquarters. In 1944 increases were also made in the Field Staffs of District Services and of Medical Services. HQ ANGAU was responsible for the administration of the PIB and New Guinea Infantry Battalions when they were not in an operational role and maintained all records for Australian and local personnel. HQ ANGAU was also responsible for the provision of recruits to the local battalions and the keeping up to strength of the Depot Battalion from which reinforcements were selected by the commanding officers of the battalions (Coady, 1963:24).

After the Japanese invasion, production ceased on the rubber and copra plantations, particularly in Papua. When the Japanese were pushed back in Papua, owners of plantations applied to return to Papua and bring their plantations back to production. Major General B.M. Morris refused to consider their return. In the meantime ANGAU took over the running of the neglected plantations. In mid-1943 ANGAU was relieved of its production function by the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board which was set up under National Security Regulations.

The Production Control Board (PCB) was responsible not to the Army but to the Minister for External Territories (Cleland, 1969:209-10 and P. Ryan, 1969:546-7). Its Chairman was Brigadier D.M. Cleland, who simultaneously was DA and QMG, ANGAU. The PCB dealt only with those products where substantial interests and investments were involved - copra and rubber. Smaller but sometimes vital undertakings - e.g. sawmilling and rice - were left to ANGAU. The Board's main functions were the procurement of native labour and allotment of it to plantations, the supply of food, clothing and other necessities to the plantations and the sale of produce. ANGAU however remained the authority responsible for the recruitment and administration of native labour and for its maintenance and welfare. ANGAU District Services Instruction No.9 ordered District Services personnel to inspect regularly the plantation labour used by the PCB. Though Inspectors could deal at once with complaints made by employers against labourers, they had to refer to HQ any complaints made by labourers. The PCB also set up and ran trade stores to give the working population a spending outlet for their wages.

Table 1

Functions and organisation HQ ANGAU, 10 June 1943

		GOC (General Officer Commanding)								
		RPC	General Staff (Int. Officer)		DA + QMG (Deputy Adjutant + Quartermaster General)					
HEADQUARTERS	Staff	'A' Branch AAG (Asst. Adjutant General) and Staff			'Q' Branch AQMG (Asst. Quartermaster General) and Staff					
	Services	Medical Service ADMS (Asst. Director Med. Services) and Staff	Legal Service LSO (Legal Staff Officer)	Finance Section Paymaster and Staff attached	District Services ADDS (Asst. Dir. of Dist. Services) and Staff	Native Labour DAQMG (NL) (Dep.Asst.- Quartermaster- Gen. and staff)	Sup.+ Stores Section Offr I/C Maintenance Sub-section	Marine Section Offr I/C Providor Sub-section	Postal Section Attached Ships crews Sub-section	
Field Staff		District Staffs District Officer							Civil Administration	
		Native Policemen	Medical Assistants		ADO's PO's and Staff	Officers I/C NL (Native Labour) NLO's	Trade Store Assistants		Plantation Staff	Production

Source: Rigo 1/3 Administration Organisation 1941-43. Current Information, Appendix 'A' to Admin. Instruction.

At the very start of the emergency the Officer commanding ANGAU at Port Moresby instructed District Officers to recruit labourers for a certain number of plantations.³ In instructing them to have the labourers ready for immediate or imminent departure to places of employment, Lieut. K.C. McMullen acknowledged -

it is realised since the commencement of Military Administration, certain areas, particularly in the West, have been very heavily recruited - probably beyond the percentage that can be safely recruited. District Officers are reminded that while it is their duty to do everything possible to further the War effort, the native population must be safe-guarded.

District Officers, who considered any area had been so heavily recruited as to have reached a danger point, were directed to submit full particulars at once and recommend that no further units be recruited from the area. District Standing Orders then being completed required that

- (1) not more than 25% of the adult male population of a village may be recruited, and -
- (2) labourers are to be employed in their home districts, and these instructions are to be observed from this date.

Exceptions to (2) will have to be made to provide for the Port Moresby labour pool, rubber tappers and other skilled labour, but the majority of the labourers should be indentured in their own districts, though they can be employed in a district adjacent to their own if they are in easy walking distance of the villages.

The Native Labour Ordinance was repealed and the Native Labour Order substituted. Under the latter wages were as follows. The minimum monthly wage was 5s. and for a labourer who had completed three years service it was 6s. If a labourer did heavy work his wage was 8s.. The maximum wage was 10s. but with the approval of the Director of District Services wages of up to £5.0.0 were paid. Ordinary plantation work was considered 'heavy labour' and plantation

³Rigo 18/2 Recruits permanent and casual 1942/45. Extract from a Circular Instruction to all District Officers, ANGAU.

labourers were paid 6s. and 7s. per month. Labourers previously employed by the Papuan Administration at wages higher than those in the new scale continued to be paid at the old rate until the Native Labour Order came into force. It was decided to pay them off and re-engage them if they desired to sign on under the new lower scale. Where it was considered desirable Papuan labourers were recommended for wages in excess of 10s. per month.⁴

From the outset of the war it was anticipated that labour would have to be raised in ways hitherto untried. When Lieut. A.H. Baldwin of PAU outlined his plans in March 1942 to raise native labour he said: '*Force majeure*' is an unpalatable method of recruitment and should only be used as a last alternative, but used it must be if necessary'. He reasoned that 'This is a total war, and it may be necessary to make our methods in respect of Native Labour total to achieve the desired result'. He proposed that any labour so recruited should be used in 'safe' areas and as far as possible labour for danger zones should be voluntary.⁵

ANGAU's military and civil policy in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea was set out in September 1942 in a letter by Major General Morris.⁶ The military policy was that ANGAU had to meet all the requirements of the fighting services operating in each District. This included the provision of scouts, intelligence reporters, coastwatchers, carriers or labourers, the collection of wounded and the assisting of crashed airmen. In the military administration of Papua New Guinea, areas of Papua formerly known as 'Divisions' and 'Districts' were changed to 'Districts' and 'Sub-districts' and the titles 'District Officer' and 'Assistant District Officer' replaced 'Resident Magistrate' and 'Assistant Resident Magistrate' (Coady, 1963, 3(3):24). The first duty of District Officers was to supply these requirements of the fighting services 'even if a temporary sacrifice of native interests is involved'. ANGAU's aim was to help in ejecting the enemy from Papua and New Guinea so that 'as soon as may be, we may

⁴Rigo 18/2 Recruits permanent and casual 1942/45. Extracts from a Circular Instruction to all District Officers, ANGAU.

⁵ANGAU War Diary, February-April 1942:Appendix 12B. Native Labour Council. (War Diary is abbreviated thus W/D).

⁶Patrol Reports - Central District, 1942-44. Rigo 1/3 No. 10/1, 19 September 1942. (Patrol Reports is abbreviated thus P/R).

be left to carry on with normal government'. ANGAU's civil policy required that District Officers should ensure that their Districts were regularly and energetically patrolled. At 31 December 1943 the following was the organisation of the Lakekamu and Moresby Districts. The Lakekamu District had its Headquarters at Kairuku and sub-stations at Kerema, Terapo and Goilala and a Police Post at Kambisi. The Moresby District had its Headquarters at Port Moresby, a sub-station at Rigo and Police Posts at Manumanu and Tupuselei. Policing the Territory and the maintenance of law and order were of the highest importance.⁷

The value to our cause of a loyal law-abiding native population cannot be over estimated. Valuable work can be done by all members of District staff in creating and fostering propaganda amongst the natives.

District Staff were told to

Point out the benevolent native policy which existed in the past under British rule, the fact that the enemy has already impressed large numbers of natives for unpaid labour, has forcibly removed

⁷Law enforcement by ANGAU. The following sorts of charges were laid against Papuans in the period 1942-45:

- Disobeying a lawful order (in that he came to Moresby without a pass and tried to use an old one).
- Disobeying a lawful order by a magistrate in that they came in to a forbidden settlement, to wit, Port Moresby operational area.
- Disobeying a lawful [order] in that being under the age of 14 years they came into Moresby without permission.
- Did behave in a disrespectful manner to Colonel Wilkinson of US Army.
- Desertion.
- Being in possession of part of an AMF uniform.
- Did wear uniform without authority.
- Did sell articles supplied to him as rations.
- Did procure articles supplied to (another native).
- Did steal three bottles of kerosine the property of ANGAU.
- Bartering rations.
- Being in possession of ammunition.
- Did not show reasonable diligence.

(Source: Casebook for Native Matters of Central Division 1942-43, p.50.)

them from their villages, has transported them overseas and has even put them in the front of the battle without any regard for their safety, leaving the wounded to lie where he has dropped.

It was acknowledged that 'national patriotism cannot be expected from the primitive native' but that it should be impressed upon him that it was in his interest to assist the Allied cause so that normal life would return soon. A comment by a District Officer which was borne out by later events was pencilled on a copy of this circular letter. This comment showed the level of concern for the future welfare of the labour that would be the back-bone of the Kokoda campaign and the building of the road from Bulldog to Wau.

It is most important that carriers receive sufficient rations - even too much food would be a better fault, under the present circumstances, than too little and would to a large extent, in my opinion, avoid desertions. Carrier load should not exceed 40 lbs.⁸

An indication of the kinds of urgent tasks ANGAU officers had to perform comes from a report written one month after the bombing of Port Moresby in February 1942. The Officer-in-Charge, Rigo Station, Lieut. B.W. Faithorn, had to undertake a patrol to the coastal area east of Port Moresby to let coastal people know of the *change* of administration and the determination of the government to maintain law and order.⁹ One danger of the break-down of law and order was murder of strangers, as in the case of a released or escaped prisoner known as 'Mr Worth' from Badili jail who was murdered by people of Kerepuna (Keapara). The villagers of Domara were preparing to attack the Kerepunas so the District Officer stepped in. It was his task to prove that law and order was being maintained and he was determined to put down with a strong hand any attempt by villagers to take the law into their own hands. He summoned all the Village Constables and Councillors of the Aroma District and told them the government was functioning as usual. His primary purpose in patrolling had been to allay rumours that the government had ceased and in this he reported success.

⁸ P/R Central District, 1942-44, Rigo 1/3 No.10/1, 19 September 1942.

⁹ P/R Central District, 1942-44, Rigo No.1, 18 March 1942. Patrol to Kaparoko, Hula, Kerepuna and Aroma. See p.17, fn.7.

Many 'irregular' things were happening along the eastern coast. For example, a Papuan sergeant of the PIB¹⁰ detachment in Rigo was rounding up plantation labourers at Kalo.¹¹ He had instructed an armed constable to shoot a village pig and was holding 'court' - handing down a decision in a civil claim case. Lieut. Faithorn noted, 'I am of the opinion that Sgt. (K) is a menace and exercising a bad influence on natives when acting away from European supervision'. While on this patrol Lieut. Faithorn was instructed by radio to collect shotguns from villagers and he did so. Later in the war, hasty confiscation of shotguns was deplored. 'Guns were taken from natives in 1942, but no records have been kept, nor have guns been labelled ... In some cases I believe the officer or officers, who took the guns, gave the individuals [*sic*] natives concerned receipts.'¹² On his way back to Port Moresby he took into custody a light Chevrolet utility truck being conveyed to a coastal village on a canoe.¹³ However, he resisted a very strong inclination to confiscate large supplies of rice and flour being sent to Hula from Port Moresby. 'I suspect looting ... but ... I am satisfied that the natives paid cash for the food supplies.' He also arrested several runaway armed constables. He encountered a sergeant of the Royal Papuan Constabulary (RPC)¹⁴ who could produce no letter or authority to show that he was on leave.¹⁵ This man was ordered to go into Port Moresby but he disobeyed and the District Officer took his clothes from him. A number of plantation labourers were rounded up and sent into Port Moresby as well.

There was clearly a state of unrest pervading parts of the Central District after the bombing of Port Moresby.

¹⁰In July 1942 this NCO penetrated deep into Japanese lines in the Lae-Salamaua area to seek information for his HQ. He was awarded the Military Medal (Granter, 1970:49-52).

¹¹P/R Central District, 1942-44, Rigo No.1, 18 March 1942.

¹²P/R Central District, 1941-44, Rigo No.18, 26 June 1945. This letter was written by an ADO.

¹³P/R Central District, 1942-44, Rigo No.1, 18 March 1942.

¹⁴This sergeant, later a Sergeant-Major in the RPC, died on 2 October 1972. He was the longest serving member of the PNG Police Force. *PNG Post Courier*, 5 October 1972.

¹⁵See also Sweeting (1970:702) on irregularities that followed the first air-raid on Port Moresby.

The Patrol was a timely one. The natives were showing signs of restlessness and were under the impression that there was no Government. I soon disabused their minds on the idea. Every opportunity was taken to impress the natives with the fact that there was a Government. A strong Government. An Army Government. That they would be protected as heretofore but that they would have to work harder than before. That they would have to make roads and aerodromes if it was considered necessary.¹⁶

Lieut. Baldwin who set up the native labour pool in Port Moresby in March 1942 also saw his main aim as the establishing of confidence in the Administration. If a bombing raid temporarily dispersed a labour group, quick and efficient collection of the runaways was essential. He cited the instance when a wharf labour group scattered after a raid and could not be picked up after the raid because Sgt. Chambers, the overseer, had no transport and the labour had fled to Hanuabada and thence to Porebada.¹⁷

One of the major tasks of Patrol Officers throughout 1942 was to recruit labourers to work for the Army. A letter written in mid-July to W/O Rosser revealed the pressing nature of the emergency.¹⁸ He was instructed by Capt. B.W. Faithorn to recruit seventy-five fit labourers for one, two or three years of general labour. This was the tone of the letter to him - 'If the natives do not wish to volunteer they are to be conscripted to work for twelve months anywhere in the Territory'. Specific instruction was given that a certain villager of Saroa be recruited. 'If he does not volunteer conscript him like the others.' Eleven days later this letter was followed by another stating 'Please treat this matter as urgent and recruit the 75 labourers immediately. *No doubt you have heard about and understand the present military situation.* These natives must be recruited even if it means leaving the station without a white officer

¹⁶P/R Central District, 1942-44, Rigo No.1, 18 March 1942.

¹⁷W/D February-April 1942, Appendix 12B, Native Labour Council.

¹⁸P/R Central District, 1942-45, Rigo 18/2/41/5. Recruits permanent and casual, 17 July 1942.

for a few days.'¹⁹ By August, Patrol Reports revealed that recruitment over the previous six months had taken a severe toll of certain villages in the Central District. '... populations are down to a dangerous level.'²⁰ Yet a month later an instruction to a Patrol Officer stated:

You are required to recruit for Kokoda Road all available able-bodied natives living in the villages under your control. Visiting natives, and natives of the District not employed are to be recruited and signed-on for one year in accordance with Native Labour Ordinance No.6 of 1942 ... Kokoda Road has priority over all labour demanded. The need for carriers is urgent, therefore recruiting must be carried out forthwith.²¹

This letter gives a clear picture of the broad sweep of the recruitment officer. Virtually any male in a village being visited by an ANGAU officer could be impressed into Army Service. In April 1943 W/O Blencowe left many 'B' class labourers in the villages around Moresby. 'Only those who we thought would stand up to the Kokoda Track were recruited.'²² Later some officers revealed misgivings about recruitment. In December 1944, Lieut. R.M. Geelan wrote that he 'felt rather uncomfortable about removing so many natives' from their villages. However both he and the villagers realised that 'present conditions dictate the manner in which all of us shall act'.²³ An ANGAU officer, D.M. Rutledge, ADO at Kerema, accused some of his colleagues of being too tender about recruitment. In a letter he charged Lieut. Geelan with 'over-statement coupled with personal feelings' on the subject of recruitment. Rutledge observed that 'all officers who in 1942/43 had to recruit without

¹⁹ P/R Central District, 1942-45, Rigo 18/2/41/5. Recruits permanent and casual. 28 July 1942.

²⁰ P/R Central District, 1942-45, Rigo 18/2/3/2. Recruits permanent and casual. 8 August 1942. See Table 2.

²¹ P/R Central District, 1941-46, Rigo 18/4, No.42/5. Wages Authority and Instructions. 17 September 1942. (Capt. B.W. Faithorn, D.O.)

²² P/R Port Moresby District, 1942-44, No.11, 6 April 1943.

²³ P/R Gulf District, 1944-45, Kerema No.4, 9/12/44.

regard to feelings rather tend nowadays to be over lenient towards prospective recruits'. Patrol Officers often brought census books up to date, showing each villager's contract since February 1942. With the census book an officer could check to 'see what natives are playing the game and which are permanently humbugging'.²⁴

In a letter to District Officers throughout Papua and New Guinea in December 1942 the GOC ANGAU laid down the following general lines of propaganda to be used with the native population.²⁵ District Officers were to point out 'what a bastard' the Japanese was, he had treated villagers badly, was a brutal task master and was responsible for the present disruption of village life. The Japanese wished to steal their land, he was a sorcerer and a pagan. District Officers were to compare the Japanese treatment with what Australians had done before and would do again. Before the war, Australians had provided food, medical services and trade goods, maintained law and order, paid their employees for work done and had recognised native rights. The Allies could not lose and their great strength and success at Milne Bay and Gona revealed this. With native help they would win even more quickly. Villagers were offered incentives to assist the Allies, there were rewards for information, food and help to those who deserted from the enemy. But there was also punishment for deliberate and uncompelled assistance to the enemy. District Officers were to keep alive the idea of 'Government' and they were to explain that the white civilian population had withdrawn because it was unprepared for the Japanese attack. District Officers were to avoid ridicule of the Japanese as an opponent and were not to make exaggerated claims about allied strength. Lastly they were not to forecast the date by which the enemy would be overthrown.²⁶

Papuans also took their part in spreading propaganda. In September 1942 a party of seven members of the RPC who were storytellers in their own villages was sent on a trip to Australia escorted by an ANGAU Warrant Officer.²⁷ The

²⁴P/R Gulf District, 1944-45, Kerema No.4, 19.12.1944.

²⁵W/D November-December 1942, Appendix 61. Letter from GOC, ANGAU, to all District Officers. 20/12/1942.

²⁶W/D, op. cit.

²⁷Visit of New Guinea Native Police to Australia for propaganda purposes - object to hold the native population of Papua and New Guinea staunchly pro-ally and anti-Japanese - 1942. File 431/8/3, 506/10-195/2.

Table 2

Recruitment of labour by ANGAU

Enlistment and employment of Papuans and New Guineans by the Allied Forces. There were no accurate totals of numbers of labourers indentured since February 1942. The approximate estimate is:

Papua	24,500
Territory of New Guinea	<u>25,000</u>
	<u>49,500</u>

Indentured labour strengths at monthly periods January 1942-
November 1945.

	1942	1943	1944	1945
January	38	17,884	28,909	32,657
February	260	18,932	31,058	32,280
March	686	20,622	32,632	31,839
April	1,346	22,489	37,130	35,029
May	1,478	23,646	37,879	35,852
June	2,033	25,468	35,958	36,210
July	3,354	25,815	37,158	36,382
August	4,947	27,169	37,074	35,269
September	7,417	27,671	36,956	33,959
October	11,104	28,165	33,751	31,091
November	13,874	28,178	31,690	13,813
December	<u>16,563</u>	<u>27,522</u>	<u>33,788</u>	-
Monthly average	5,258	24,463	34,499	32,217

Source: Enlistment and Employment - conditions of service -
Administrative Instructions and Organisation of
File 419/5/23.

purpose of the journey arranged by the AIB was to impress the Papuans with the large Naval, Military and Air resources of Australia. No publicity was given to the visit. The police visited Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. They were shown troops on parade, airfields and factories. This was to create the impression that Australia was one vast armed camp and that the allies must in the long run win. Special attention was to be given to a visit to ordnance stores since 'the natives' seat of emotions are in his stomach and vast quantities of food cannot fail to impress'. A simple propaganda theme was presented, of the British as pacifists and of the Japanese as deceitful, land-hungry warmongers. All the white men who had left New Guinea for Australia were making arms, aeroplanes or warships and they would come back to overwhelm the Japanese. The major aims of this propaganda were to keep the local population staunchly pro-ally and anti-Japanese, to enlist their aid in intelligence operations as guides and for sabotage and to deny it to the enemy, to reduce the likelihood of hysteria and to make the local population confident of an ultimate allied victory. Gramophone recordings were made in Australia in Pidgin, Motu and other dialects. These recordings were later to be played in New Guinea on portable gramophones of which a number existed in various villages. The propaganda contained in the recording would spread from village to village and 'sink in' as gospel to be repeated with growing exaggeration by every mouth.²⁸

In the middle stages of the war, ANGAU officers on patrol took with them a propaganda letter 'To Village Constables and Councillors in all parts of Papua', written by Major-General B.M. Morris, the GOC ANGAU. Patrol Officer G.R. Wearne when setting out on patrol in 1944 was instructed:

Please stop in all main villages, assemble all Village Constables and Councillors and villagers and read this letter to them. Please see that everyone thoroughly understands the letter. Make a note of these recordings in your report, and your impressions of the reception.²⁹

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ P/R Kerema Gulf District, 1943-44. Letter from ADO Capt. M.J. Healy to PO G.R. Wearne.

In this letter which was supposed to be read 'with due ceremony',³⁰ the GOC introduced himself as 'your Governor'. Papuans were told they were 'British' and that Britain was a great nation which included Englishmen, Australians and Papuans. 'The Japanese did not care whose the land was so long as they could take it.' This question was asked, 'How does this war affect the New Guinean and Papuan natives?'. The answer was,

Sometimes the fighting takes place among their villages and for a time the Japanese have occupied part of their country. We are sorry about this but it is the Japanese who have caused all the trouble ... But if the natives wish to keep their land and have all their happiness come back to them they must do everything they can to deserve it.

A contrast was then drawn between the Japanese fashion of taking villagers' property without payment, working the villagers without payment or proper food and the

British fashion of feeding people and healing their sores ... you know when we have natives working for us we house them well, feed them well, look after them when they are sick and pay them for their work.

Villagers were exhorted 'you must help us to beat the Japanese and bring the good times back again'. Another question followed 'How can you help us?'. The answer was:

We do not ask you to fight the Japanese unless you are soldiers of the King like the RPC and PIB but we want your strong young men to work.

Villagers were told that in England, Australia and America white men and women too were working day and night in the war effort. 'So we want you to work too. Aerodromes must be built, roads must be made, houses must be built, stores must be carried, malaria must be kept down.' By draining swamps and waterholes to prevent mosquitoes from breeding the Australian and American soldiers would be prevented from getting malaria. 'So the natives who keep them from getting malaria are helping in the war against the

³⁰P/R Western District, Daru, 1942-44.

Japanese. So it is with making aerodromes and houses and carrying stores and growing food.' Everyone was urged to work hard:

... we know too that the harder every soldier fights and the harder every native works so much the sooner will we beat the Japanese and finish the war ... those of you who are still living in your villages must work harder at your gardens and at your houses than ever you did before. You must look after the houses and gardens of those men who are away at work. The Government will help you in every way but it will not help those who do not in every way try to do things for themselves.

The unspoken questions which may have nagged many villagers' minds were then answered. 'You want to know when your men, your sons and brothers will come back to you. They will come back when the work is done. It is no good half doing anything.' A simple analogy was drawn between growing food properly and conducting the war thoroughly.

We must pursue [the Japanese] wherever we go and beat them thoroughly so that never again will they be strong enough to come back and try again to take this country for themselves. This is the reason why, although you do not see much of the fighting about you now, it is still necessary for your strong men to work for the Government and to re-engage from time to time until the war is won.

The GOC conceded that villagers might have been confused at what was going on.

Some of you are wondering whether you should do different things because of the war. Whether you should leave your villages with your women and children, whether you should make bigger gardens and so on. I cannot give the same answer to all these questions to the people all over New Guinea. But your Government Officer will tell you when he visits the village on patrol. That is the time to ask and then you must do what he says.

If patrols were few and far between, the village constable or Councillor was to travel to the nearest Government Officer to seek his advice. In conclusion the GOC stated that the war involved hardship and separation for him as well. Some white people had not seen their wives and children for years. He promised nevertheless that:

When the war is won ... the natives of New Guinea will be able to return to villages, back to their wives and children and live in the good fashion as they did before the War.

The reading of this propaganda letter produced the required response in the case of the patrol referred to.³¹ The Patrol Officer was greeted with many questions touching on almost every phase of the letter showing they had paid attention throughout.

Perhaps the feature that struck them more than any other was the reference to the King remaining in London during the bombings. This act seemed to be the most daring that they had been told about, and the reading was delayed several times whilst they commented upon it.

When Patrol Officer Wearne reported success his superior Capt. Healey commented:

It is pleasing to know that this (GOC's letter) was well received. Natives from these villages played a prominent part on the Kokoda Trail, whilst those who remained in the villages have a keen appreciation of what the war means. The general interest displayed at each reading of the letter should find expression in a still keener interest in current affairs.³²

On a patrol to the Sogeri area in June 1944, Patrol Officer R. Galloway read the GOC's letter and its news 'was received with great satisfaction by all who heard'.³³ After

³¹P/R Kerema Gulf District No.11, 1943/44. (W/O II G.R. Wearne.)

³²P/R Kerema Gulf District, No.11, 1943-44. Covering memorandum to District Officer.

³³P/R 1942-44 Port Moresby, 26 of 43/44, Sogeri Area June.

the reading of the letter the villagers were asked what they thought about the war and their future. They were in a position to appreciate the fact that fighting had finished in Papua because of their position close to the Kokoda Track. He quoted one villager's statement which he regarded as expressing the desires of all villages visited.

We are glad that the war is over in Papua for when the Japanese came we were all frightened and ran away and hid in the bush. We do not want the Japanese, for they are bad men. We are happy that the Australians are here, for they came to Papua a long time ago, and we are used to them and their ways. After the war we want to remain peacefully in our villages. Some of our boys who wish to, will go to work on plantations, and the others will look after villages.

The phrase 'pep talk' is often used in Patrol Reports. In a letter a District Officer congratulated one of his subordinates on his excellent 'pep talk' given in Police Motu.³⁴ Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy often called villagers together and gave them war news. He felt 'If these people are told once in a while how the news is in general, and that they are all playing a part in the war effort, they seem to take more interest in their various jobs'.³⁵

Major-General Morris often visited labour camps and spoke to the labourers about the war. In October 1942 he visited Hula and Rigo to address the labourers. This was followed by visits to Koitaki in February 1943, to Daru, Lake Kutubu and Kila labour camp in August 1943, and to the Markham District in September 1943. His address at Kila was translated by Major A. Baldwin and in July 1943 Major J.H. Jones made a Pidgin broadcast on behalf of Major-General Morris. When Motuan broadcasts were inaugurated over 9PA on 21 May 1944 the GOC gave an introductory talk to all natives of Papua. On 31 May 1944 the GOC's address to native officials of the Territory of New Guinea was forwarded to the Island and Northern Regions for distribution to areas under administrative control.³⁶

³⁴P/R Gulf District 1943-44.

³⁵P/R 15 of 1943-44 Patrol 24 August-1 September 1943.

³⁶W/D October 1942 Appendix 48B, 26 February 1943, August 1943 Appendix 177, August 1943 Appendix 167, September 1943 Appendix 228, July 1943 Appendix 160, and May 1944 Vol.3, Appendix V.

Many of the officers working for ANGAU had previously worked in New Guinea and at times the communication of propaganda presented a problem.³⁷ One Patrol Officer on his progress through villages played gramophone records in Motu made by some Papuans who had visited Australia a short time before. The records were supplemented with talks and explanations by an interpreter, who had accompanied the party to Australia. The villagers were also lectured on the purpose of the War, Australian victories, and the natives' duties. The people listened attentively but 'it was apparent that much of it was incomprehensible to their simple minds'. The same Patrol Officer was helped later in his lecturing by a pastor of the London Missionary Society (LMS). In his report the Officer stated that the people were very interested in the war but more particularly in the well-being of their menfolk at Bulldog and the question of leave for them to pay short visits to their homes. He suggested to his superior officer that permission be given to the pastor who helped him to visit the Bulldog area and talk with the labourers there. This would be of great value as some misunderstanding existed as to the terms of the labourers' employment.

Another Officer in commenting on 'native morale' reported that he spoke with village constables and councillors and offered advice at every village he visited.³⁸ They had been attentive. Poor reception on the radio, however, spoilt one Motu broadcast to which villagers were listening. This Officer had explained broadly to villagers about 'the Jap snake-in-the-grass attack, his "bush-dingo" code of ethics, his ill-treatment of natives, his ruthlessness and cruelty as against the Government's consideration and fair-dealing firmness and their present victories, having recovered from a surprise attack and driven him out of the country'. He thought such details to groups were more likely to command respect in those who lived by their physical strength. His report concluded with the self-satisfied observation that 'Natives never ask any questions'.

Another Patrol Officer while out on a census patrol made use of the opportunity to address assembled villagers on the progress of the war and to read items of war news in Motu from '*Papua Orena*'.³⁹

³⁷ P/R Gulf District 24.6.43.

³⁸ P/R Gulf District No.18, 44/45, 21.3.45.

³⁹ P/R Gulf District No.19, 1944-45, 9/3/45. No copies of '*Papua Orena*' have been found by the author.

Patrol Officers sometimes spoke to school children as well, paying particular attention to those who had not attended school for some time.

In every case I pointed out that the Government had decreed that all children should attend school and that the punishment for failing to do so was imprisonment. On the return trip the mission teachers reported a much improved attendance although some children had not responded to my instructions.

Patrol Officer G.R. Wearne attributed the poor attendance at Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) mission schools to the absence of European supervision and the difficult attitudes of children and their parents.

I was told that they refused to send their children to school because the missions did not pay them for attending. Also the children themselves consider that they should have one prolonged holiday because 'it is war time'. (The phrase 'This is Army-time' or 'This is war-time' is often used by local informants in speaking about the war.)

This Officer gathered the whole village together and warned the parents that the punishment for refusing to send their children to school was a term of imprisonment and that it would be carried out should they be reported again.⁴⁰

When Lieut. Ireland was despatched by Major A.C. Hall on a Patrol to the Koiari area in September 1944 his tasks included the following: to see that tracks were maintained along the main signal line, to check on the number of males available for work as carriers and to recruit some males bearing in mind that no more than 30 per cent of eligible males should be recruited; he was also to read and explain the GOC's letter to all villagers, to check the census and alter where necessary, to give a concise report on the conditions of houses and gardens and to try and elicit from the villagers their outlook regarding the war. He was not to issue orders that could not be enforced by NRO's and he

⁴⁰P/R Kerema Gulf District, Kerema No.5, 1943-44.

was to investigate complaints about bamboo and goru palm taken by the Army.⁴¹ His patrol instructions clearly show the desire of ANGAU to combine its operational role with that of maintaining normal routine administration.

One of the tasks ANGAU officers had in the war was to prevent trading of Army rations by villagers and troops. It was reported that at Tupuselei the wife of the village constable was selling rice, sugar and biscuits to villagers of Hula and Kerepuna. Pari villagers and soldiers from Three Mile were also reported to be trading in rations. Villagers of the Rigo sub-district were warned several times not to buy or accept army rations unless it was their weekly ration or given to them legitimately.⁴² W/O R.J. Stevenson stopped a convoy of canoes for Alaguni and Kerepuna which had been to Tupuselei and Port Moresby. These canoes were loaded with rations of rice, sugar, biscuits, army rations, clothes, benzine drums and empty tins. The Officer confiscated a lot of the goods but had to let a lot go and noted the names of those people whose goods he had taken. He then 'told everybody the correct way to go about getting rations and trading with soldiers for their own protection'. He commented that 'Tupuselei people apparently want watching'.⁴³ In October 1942 Major J.H. McDonald, the DO at Port Moresby, stated 'Soldiers are unlawfully trading Army rations and it is so prevalent in and around Port Moresby that natives are imprisoned without the option of a fine'.⁴⁴

In June 1945 Lieut. R. Galloway visited the Koiari area (Mt Victoria) to work on compensation claims. His task was to let all the villagers know of the scheme whereby they were to be compensated for loss or damage to property or loss of life or injury arising out of causes 'attributable to the existence of a state of war'. He examined the claimant and his or her witnesses thoroughly. The claims covered such items as houses, gardens, pigs, dogs, various articles purchased from stores before 1942, dance regalia

⁴¹P/R Port Moresby 1944-46. Patrol Koiari area 4 September 1944.

⁴²P/R Rigo 13/2. Letter to District Officer Port Moresby from Lieut. C. Bowman, ADO, 2 February 1943.

⁴³P/R Rigo 2/2. Airfields, 27 January 1943.

⁴⁴P/R Rigo 14/2, June 1942-August 1945. Civil Claims. 21 October 1942.

and shell ornaments. Valuations were placed on the articles on a replacement cost basis of the same article. Lieut. Galloway suggested in his report that monetary compensation seemed most reasonable as all their houses had been rebuilt and gardens remade. He suggested that pigs lost be replaced since there were few pigs in the villages, also that when mother of pearl ornaments were lost an ornament similar to the one lost would be a satisfactory replacement.⁴⁵

When Lieut. R. Galloway was engaged on compensation claims in the Owen Stanleys (Mesime) on 15 August 1945 he received an urgent message to return to Itiki to contact the DO. He went to Itiki and learnt of the Allied victory. He rang Kila and was told to set to and arrange victory celebrations for the Koiaris to mark the war's conclusion. The routine part of his patrol was temporarily abandoned.⁴⁶ It was not often that patrol officers had the chance to organise such a pleasant activity in the village.

At times, Patrol Officers had to be reminded by ANGAU of how to conduct themselves while on patrol and to treat villagers reasonably. In February 1945 a complaint made to ANGAU by villagers of the Rigo Sub-District that old men, women and children had been forced to carry bamboo from the Kemp Welch River to Rigo prompted Major Lambden, the District Officer, to issue a statement to prevent the recurrence of previous abuses. The District Officer saw to it that villagers were advised that

young boys, old men, women and girls will not be compelled to perform manual labour for the Administration but they may volunteer to do so and will be paid a fair and reasonable rate, either in cash or in kind.

Villagers were also advised that their property when acquired would be paid for.⁴⁷

⁴⁵P/R 1944-45. Port Moresby N/6. 1944-45, Appendix C. Native Compensation.

⁴⁶P/R Port Moresby, 1944-46, No.2.

⁴⁷Letter to A/ADO, Rigo Sub-District from Major W.J. Lambden, District Officer.

ANGAU also issued a Circular Administrative Instruction to all District Services staff in April 1943 dealing with the conduct of officers on patrol. The reason was that an officer on patrol who had been unable to get people to line in a number of villages had destroyed the villagers' gardens and killed their pigs. In one case 100 villagers were held as hostages, in another several huts were burned.⁴⁸ ANGAU field staff were warned that there was no excuse for such actions and that any person who offended in this respect would be dealt with. This sort of behaviour confirms the general comment expressed in Papuan villages that ANGAU men were often ruthless and thus feared by the villagers.

The misconduct of officers on patrol was the subject of much comment and enquiry in ANGAU patrol reports. In 1943 a medical assistant Kau Laka lodged a complaint against a 'Mr Hicks' of ANGAU. Laka accused him of making trouble for all Aroma people. On one occasion Mr Hicks had launched a search for deserters at Pelagai in the middle of the night. In his night raid he and a New Guinean policeman had fired shots and had pushed in the doors of houses and entered them. The noise of the raiding party had frightened the old men, women and children who had run away into the bush.

On another occasion Mr Hicks and the same New Guinean policeman had interrupted a dance at Maopa by firing four shots. They had frightened all the dancers and some villagers ran into the bush. A few of the young female dancers were arrested and kept in jail for three weeks. When Mr Hicks

⁴⁸W/D 7 April 1943. District Services. In the war zone in New Guinea ANGAU or AIB men working in forward areas acted very similarly. When Captain Howlett and W/O Ryan were on patrol in the Markham Valley in June 1943 they

descended suddenly on the village of Hamdingan and had the whole populace locked inside the large new church before they realised what had happened. We selected sufficient carriers from them for our purpose, and kept them under guard all night. The women brought us plenty of food when they saw we had their men in custody.

Report of Huon Peninsula 25/4/1943-23/6/1943. W/O P.A. Ryan.

apprehended deserters they were kept in handcuffs.⁴⁹ On one occasion Mr Hicks had put a canoe in jail as well! When a man from Pelagai died at Port Moresby his relatives at Pelagai had made a feast. Mr Hicks arrested the deceased man's uncle but no reason was given. When that man's son protested about the handcuffing of his father in jail Mr Hicks was 'wild' and punched the protestor Wari Laka on the mouth.⁵⁰

A complaint was laid against two ANGAU officers by an Aroma villager. He accused Messrs Bowman and Hicks of confiscating two of his pigs, a sling bag, a coat, a singlet, one rami, two knives, one belt and a tin of meat. He was arrested, handcuffed and 'got a stick across the backside'. For a week Mr Bowman, two police constables and three Councillors used a torchlight to look inside the houses of Aroma men and women as they slept naked. The complainant claimed that Mr Bowman had ordered the police that 'if any Aroma boys don't like to carry they were to shoot them straightaway. All the village people heard this order'.⁵¹

Major L. Austen commented on the conduct of Sgt. Hicks who had done 'remarkably well' at arresting deserters but had made 'a few errors through ignorance'. Major Austen pointed out that 'women cannot be arrested and kept in detention for a week or so without a trial'. The sergeant had no authority to try offenders and should have taken care not to issue orders where the persons disobeying could not be proceeded against. Sgt. Hicks was a newcomer to Papua and could not distinguish an ordinary dance from a death dance. A death dance could only be stopped by force and the result would be to make the people concerned sullen and defiant. RPC Sevene was proceeded against for firing shots in Aroma Village and thereby antagonising the villagers. In summing up, Major Austen observed:

It should always be kept in mind by officers that the Aroma require very firm but tactful handling. In the past they have considered themselves as most conversant with Native Regulations and therefore take a firm stand if they have a good

⁴⁹ P/R Rigo 14/2 June 1942-August 1945. Civil Claims 25.2.1943.

⁵⁰ P/R Rigo, op. cit.

⁵¹ P/R Rigo 14/2 June 1942-August 1945. Civil Claims Complaints by Aroma people 5 March 1943 (Major L. Austen, DO).

case, and also in the past they have always had access to the District Office Moresby by-passing Rigo.⁵²

A serious complaint was brought by Vele Ruave, an ordained pastor of the London Missionary Society (LMS), against an ANGAU signaller in the Hula area. This pastor complained that when he visited Gabuone the villagers were afraid to attend their monthly Communion Service. The villagers were about to build a house for three signallers at Gabuone. The pastor then wrote a letter to the signallers explaining it was Communion Sunday and he had instructed his parishioners to attend Church. On receipt of the letter one un-named signaller abused the pastor, used foul language, threatened to punch and handcuff him (even sending for the village constable to bring the handcuffs) and threatened him with pack-drill which consisted of carrying a heavy bag of copra round a village enclosure. This form of punishment, it was alleged, was sometimes inflicted on small boys as well. When the signaller threatened to jail the pastor, the latter asked his permission to get in touch with Rev. H.J. Short. The signaller then said Rev. Short would be put in jail with him. The pastor was further humiliated by being made to stand at the corner of a building for a considerable time. Later he was submitted to a harangue on the tenets of the SDA religion and was told that LMS teaching was all wrong. The two other signallers took no part in this alleged ill-treatment but made no attempt to restrain their colleague.⁵³

Two Pari villagers deserted from carrying cargo in the Rigo area because of threatening behaviour by two ANGAU officers.

While resting on the track, we were threatened by W/O Ryan, who said 'If you don't get up, I will shoot you!' This made us afraid so after delivering our goods at Sirimo, we ran away to our village with intent to report the matter to HQ.

⁵²P/R Rigo 14/2, June 1942-August 1945. Civil Claims 21 March 1943.

⁵³P/R Rigo 14/2, June 1942-August 1945. Civil Claims 8/5/42. Signallers Gabuone allegations of ill treatment of natives.

W/O Ryan denied the accusation. 'At no time have I used firearms as a means of threat'. Despite this denial the DDS, Major S. Elliott Smith, wrote to the DO Rigo asking that the complaint be investigated. His final remark on the subject was 'Under no circumstances is the use of firearms to be resorted to as a means of threat'.⁵⁴

In December 1942 two deserters from the Rigo Sub-district laid a complaint against two 'taubadas' named 'Jim' and 'Jack'. 'Jim' had thrown away their rice while they were preparing their morning meal and had ordered them to carry their cargo while they were hungry. That same day the carriers had stopped at a creek for a drink of water but 'Jack' had put a cartridge in his rifle and pointed it at them saying he would shoot the lot of them. The carriers were all very frightened and some of them escaped. The following day 'Jack' kicked their rice away as it was being cooked just as 'Jim' had done the previous day. This was too much for these two carriers who deserted and reported the series of incidents at Aroma Police Post. They also reported that the 'doctor boy' for the carriers had deserted to see the Magistrate at Rigo 'because the taubadas would not send the sick boys back for medicine'.⁵⁵

Twenty-three labourers who deserted from Doa plantation in December 1942 said they ran away because the manager had been hitting them and making them work while sick.⁵⁶ When Major W.H. Thompson visited plantations in July 1944 he warned all managers that assaults by Europeans must stop. Mr Nevitt who acted as Inspector for the owners of the plantations promised to give strict orders regarding this matter. No serious cases were discovered so no legal action was taken. One deserting labourer charged that he had been punched on the face by Lieut. Corke, an assistant manager. The assault was unprovoked so no action was taken against the labourer. In general, relations between employers and their plantation workers were very good.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ibid. Civil Claims 13.10.1942, 10.11.1942 and 10.11.1942.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Civil Claims 11.12.1942.

⁵⁶ P/R 1942-44, Port Moresby No.7, File 48/3-7 (Cpl. J. Blencowe P/O).

⁵⁷ The old managers who had returned to the Kanosia and Hisiu plantations were Messrs Ross, Provan, McKenna, Hutchinson, Tealby and Moreton. P/R Central District Kairuku No.2 of 1944-45, Patrol to Kanosia and Hisiu Plantations.

While some ANGAU officers were in the habit of striking labourers or threatening them in the villages or on patrol, others made false promises. It was reported to ANGAU HQ that some Native Labour Overseers were encouraging their labour gangs to work hard by saying, 'come on boys, finish the job and then you can go home and cease work for the rest of the war'. In a Circular Memorandum, all District Services staff were advised not to make such stupid promises, the effects of which could be so damaging. Disciplinary action would be taken against any officer who made such promises. Furthermore field staff were to forewarn all labourers at the signing of their contracts that if circumstances required it they were liable to be re-engaged for a further period. Whenever possible however labourers would be returned home for a spell of two weeks' leave before starting another contract.⁵⁸

When Capt. Faithorn, the District Officer for Port Moresby, visited Hula in August 1942, their Chief Councillor Piki asked about ANGAU's 'breach of faith in connection with the period of engagement for work'. In his reply Capt. Faithorn pointed out to the villagers that white men were fighting in Papua New Guinea to protect the local people. The role of the latter was to carry rations and to support the fighting troops.

I sympathised with them in their concern for their young men carrying up the Kokoda Road and regretted our breach of faith in not sending their boys home on the expiry of their contracts ... I made no sugary promises and I know they understand all I said to them and that they appreciated the position.⁵⁹

A little later on the villagers handed over £102.1.3 as a gift to Major-General Morris. It was accepted as Hula's contribution to the war loan.

At the ANGAU Conference in February 1944 the ADMS said the medical side was the most unsatisfactory side of ANGAU administration. The Chairman, Brigadier Cleland, understood this remark to mean that it was the one feature of ANGAU administration in which there was the biggest field to cover.⁶⁰

⁵⁸W/D 6 April 1943 District Services.

⁵⁹W/D July-August 1942, Appendix 34. See Appendix 1a for native casualties, honours and awards.

⁶⁰Conference of officers of HQ and officers of District Staff Port Moresby, 9-12 February 1944.

When Major J.M. Mack wrote his Medical Appreciation for May 1943 he listed a dozen major diseases with which ANGAU Medical Services had to deal. These diseases were malaria, hookworm, tropical ulcers, tuberculosis, gonorrhoea, leprosy, granuloma venereum, dysentery, pneumonia, scabies, beri beri and 'New Guinea mouth'. He pressed for an extension of Gemo Island Native Hospital so as to create facilities for the training of European Medical Assistants and Native Medical Orderlies. Eighty medical assistants were allowed for in the War Establishment but only forty-seven were available; of these ten were on leave and six were being trained at Gemo Hospital. In describing the kind of personnel required he stated:

There is a big difference between a good Medical Assistant and a good one who can handle natives on patrol, by this is meant it is little use being a good EMA when you go into a village and all the natives take to the bush or hide their sick from you as they are prone to do. Control of natives is one of these intangible faculties especially as regards to medical work.⁶¹

ANGAU had only seventy-four NMO's though the War Establishment allowed a quota of 261. Steps would soon be taken to recruit and train more NMO's.

Malaria was almost universal and Major Mack considered it too much for ANGAU to attempt to eradicate. He proposed that with the collaboration of District Officers, villages sited in malarious areas should be removed to more suitable localities. Tuberculosis was a disease of some concern especially around the Port Moresby area where it was increasing rapidly. Nine deaths took place in May 1943 at Gemo. It was planned to establish a TB colony at some distance from Gemo where patients could be safely segregated. Pneumonia was a serious disease among Papuans, with a high mortality, especially when they were working at high altitudes in the cold, often on a poor diet.

All native diets were deficient in Vitamin A which may have accounted for their susceptibility to respiratory infections. There were sporadic outbreaks, often with a high death toll, of dysentery, which was of two types - bacillary and amoebic. Scabies was fairly common among Papuans especially in labour lines.⁶²

⁶¹W/D May 1943, Appendix 117.

⁶²Ibid.

The system formerly used by the Territory of New Guinea was followed by ANGAU in the selection of its Patrol Officers. When ANGAU recruited field staff it looked for young, capable men of good physique and character with a scholastic background. Successful applicants were also required to show an interest in native administration. Operational requirements precluded ANGAU from adopting the same intensive and extensive study to which Territory of New Guinea appointees were subject. The comparatively stringent requirements of the Patrol Officers' Selection Board were necessary because in addition to the prospect of taking part in operations, appointees would in due course be required to undertake the care and welfare of the local population, maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice. Cadets and other members of the Field Staff were expected to have a grounding in preventive medicine and hygiene as well as a knowledge of agriculture.⁶³ The District Services Staff were built up from three sources, those members of the previous Administrations who had entered ANGAU, residents of the Territories who were not members of the public service and members of the forces with no pre-war experience of Papua or New Guinea. Candidates of the third category appeared before a selection board at ANGAU HQ where they were examined closely as to their qualifications and suitability.⁶⁴ Up to 31 December 1943, 133 applicants for appointment as Patrol Officers appeared before the Selection Board. Of these applicants, forty-three were selected and posted for duty as Patrol Officers.

Prior to commencing the performance of his duties a selected Patrol Officer was trained in his duties and accompanied experienced officers on patrol. They were not permitted to take charge of an administrative patrol until the District Officer of that District was satisfied with his ability to do so.⁶⁵

⁶³ W/D February 1944, Staff.

⁶⁴ Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of Districts Staff Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944.

⁶⁵ File ANGAU 1/10/1 January 1944 District Services. See Appendix 1b and 1c for original appointments to ANGAU and growth of personnel.

Those appointed were not always satisfactory. Capt. J.R. Black, the ADO at Madang, described as 'completely inexperienced' a subordinate who had had a job thrust on him that 'would tax the resources of an experienced Civil Administration District Services official'. Besides his inexperience, the junior officer was 'unable to speak Pidgin'. Capt. Black proposed that ANGAU 'should be staffed by native experts'. He discounted the usefulness of two lieutenants in his district because they were

not physically fit and apart from this aspect have not the temperamental qualifications that fit them for ANGAU. Sergeant (A) is a Militia appointee with no previous Territorial experience and no particular flair for the work. He has not the educational qualification for appointment under civil administration. Further other recent ANGAU appointees in the district although they have been in the Territory for some years have not great knowledge of natives and restricted knowledge of pidgin, some are considerably over due for leave and are consequently stale.⁶⁶

A similar sort of concern was shown by the District Officer for Port Moresby when he commented on a native labour overseer who worked at Manumanu 'Cpl. (B) will however, be brought in shortly for training as it is inadvisable to have this untrained inexperienced Patrol Officer out on his own too long'.⁶⁷

One of Brigadier Cleland's first tasks on joining ANGAU in March 1943 was to weld the staff of ANGAU into a corporate whole. In his opinion there were differences in outlook and methods between men who had served in the New Guinea Administration and those who had served in the Papuan Administration. The New Guinea officer had the more practical approach which resulted from a succession of administrators who were professional soldiers, whereas the Papuan officer was imbued with a more liberal attitude arising from the policies of Sir William MacGregor and Sir Hubert Murray. There were also army officers who had come into ANGAU with their specialist knowledge, who did not have much interest in the Territory. In Brigadier Cleland's opinion they all worked into a cohesive and efficient team ultimately (Cleland, 1969:210-11).

⁶⁶ P/R Madang 1943-44, DS 3/10, 4.2.1943.

⁶⁷ P/R Port Moresby, DS 2/4 98/49-3A/43 No.6, 1943-44, 8 August 1944.

The task of ANGAU was redefined after its reorganisation. Administrative Instruction No.24 of 7 February 1944 gave the formation, objectives and direction of ANGAU. ANGAU was 'a formation of the Australian Army under Command of HQ New Guinea Force and as such its functions are twofold:

Operational

(a) To take its place in the Order of Battle and operate against the enemy in accordance with any orders of HQ N.G.F. or of the particular Commander of the area in which ANGAU personnel may be located, including US Commanders where U.S. Forces are operating in any part of the Territories.

Administrative

(b) To carry on the Civil Administration of the Territories including control of the natives, administration of justice and the education of the natives (Cleland, 1969:210-11).

In the second phase of his address at the ANGAU Conference of February 1944, Brigadier Cleland considered this question: 'What then is our task?'. He said:

It is clear and definite, namely that all of us in our own respective spheres must apply ourselves assiduously to Civil Administration in its fullest sense. It must be our goal to apply to the development of the country and to the maintenance and welfare of its peoples a sound progressive policy of betterment ... The test of any progressive policy is that - 'is it in the best interests of the country and its people?'.⁶⁸

However at the same Conference the GOC, Major-General Morris, stressed that it was forced on ANGAU and would be forced on ANGAU in certain areas to make native administration take a back seat because of operational necessities. 'We are all desperately keen to do the best for the native peoples who have been placed in our charge.' Unfortunately however his hopes for a better deal for the villagers had to be discarded temporarily. Villagers noted no difference whatever in ANGAU's pressure on them to serve the Army.

⁶⁸ Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of Districts Staffs, Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944. ANGAU Organisation and Policy.

There appears to be no documentary evidence of ANGAU resisting Army demands for more labour until April 1945 (P.Ryan, 1972:22). An earlier investigation in 1943 had effected certain reforms and reduced the labour force engaged in frivolous tasks in base areas.

On 30 October 1945 a provisional civil administration was set up in the Territories south of the Markham River. It was to be extended as operations made possible. On 24 June 1946 the provisional civil administration took control of the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain and the military administration of ANGAU ended (P.Ryan, 1972:22).


Chapter 3

The Toaripi villages in the War

This chapter is concerned with the people of five villages in the Toaripi area of the Gulf District, more than 120 miles from Port Moresby. The Toaripi live in eight villages scattered along the coast of the Papuan Gulf between Maipora Creek and the Kapuri River and in one village situated approximately twenty miles up the Kapuri River. It is commonly thought that the name 'Toaripi' was given to the whole group by the first missionary, James Chalmers (D. Ryan, 1965:2). All of these Toaripi settlements stem from the villages of Mirihæ and Uritai, which at the time of contact adjoined each other at the mouth of the Lakekamu River (D. Ryan, 1970:3). Since then wash-aways in the estuary and the increase in population have caused the Toaripi people to disperse to the limits of their territory. There were 2100 Toaripi people in 1920 (D. Ryan, 1970:3). In 1928 the Lakekamu River changed its course and washed away a large portion of Mirihæ, and spoiled sago land. This disaster forced people to take up residence in fishing and gardening hamlets which grew into the present-day permanent villages.

James Chalmers of the LMS had set up a station in the Toaripi villages in 1884 and mission work has continued without a break since then. The Toaripi area has not attracted commercial enterprise and European business ventures have generally been small, one-man trading operations. In 1909 there was a gold rush to the Lakekamu field near Bulldog, eighty miles up the river, and the Toaripi villages were the jumping-off point for miners and their equipment. The rush soon petered out and the only apparent effects on the Toaripi area were thefts of garden food by labourers running away from the gold fields (D. Ryan, 1965:11-12).

The first thirty-seven years of contact were uneventful. There was little violence offered the missionaries except for the murder of a Polynesian mission teacher by people from inland villages. Inter-village warfare died out quickly, the LMS continued its work unmolested and ceremonies and trading voyages continued apparently unchanged.



Map 3 Gulf of Papua showing the Lakekamu River and Toaripi villages.

In August 1920 a head tax of £1 Aust. a year on all able bodied adult males on the coastline and six miles inland in the Gulf Division was introduced (*Papua Annual Report, 1920-21:22*). Many young men signed up as indentured labourers so that they would be able to obtain the necessary money. Before that, people in the area between Cape Cupola and Cape Possession had been reluctant to go away to work (D. Ryan, 1965: 33). Youths in the same age group (*heatao*) who had previously been initiated together now signed up for contract labour together. It was not possible for Papuans to engage in non-contract labour and the laws of the Territory defined the number of times a labourer was permitted to sign up before being returned home. Thus, going away to work became the pattern, after which a man returned home, generally staying there. Even when it became possible for Papuans to engage in casual labour only a few Toaripi stayed away from home for long periods (D. Ryan, 1970:14).

The five Toaripi villages we are concerned with are from west to east Isapeape, Uritai, Mirivase, Lalapipi and Popo. Popo consists of three rural villages on the Kapuri River, Luluapo, Nikafiru and Kaisova. Except for Popo these are coastal villages and their boundaries extend four to five miles up the Tauri and Lakekamu Rivers to where Moveave land begins.

News of the outbreak of World War II in Europe did not affect the lives of Toaripi villagers, but when Japan entered the war matters took a different turn. When air-raids on Port Moresby began, commercial life stopped. Stores, offices and plantations were closed down. A false air-raid alarm on 23 January 1942 had already caused many panic-stricken workers to take to the bush.

When raids began in earnest, labourers were told to make their way home as fast as they could. The labourers from the Toaripi area who were in Port Moresby area needed no urging. They walked along the beaches of the Central District and of the Gulf until they got home. H.A. Brown records it was an astonishing spectacle to see this long procession of men as far as the eye could see for hour after hour trudging wearily westwards (Brown, 1956:190). The first comers were given all the surplus food in the villages, the rest had to keep on moving as best they could despite their hunger. When the strangers had gone and only the Toaripi remained in their home villages, difficulties with food supply continued. Much larger numbers of men had taken to working away from home in

the years just before the war and the sudden influx into villages of such men placed a great strain on supplies of garden produce. The Toaripi were fortunately spared the devastation suffered by areas that were battlefields; but the war made its demands upon them and many able-bodied men were taken into the service of ANGAU.

At the start of the war, Wau had become an evacuation centre for all those civilians in New Guinea who had remained in the Morobe goldfields and nearby areas. When aircraft could no longer fly unescorted from Wau to Port Moresby with refugees it became clear that the stranded Europeans and Chinese at Wau would have to travel overland to the Papuan coast. There was already a mule track of fifteen miles from Wau to Kudjeru, two days' walk away. From Kudjeru to Bulldog a primitive and dangerous prospectors' track passed through Kukukuku country. To help the refugees, two surveyors, Fox and Ballam, who knew the track, set out for Bulldog with a small party, building camps at intervals from Wau to Bulldog, each capable of housing forty people. As a result of their pioneering trip, 250 refugees from New Guinea were able to use the track to Bulldog to reach Port Moresby (McCarthy, 1959:58).

In the period between March 1942 and January 1943 the Bulldog Track was used to supply provisions to the NGVR and Kanga Force which were resisting the Japanese in the Lae-Salamaua area. General T.A. Blamey directed in early December 1942 that a jeep road between Bulldog and Wau be constructed along the route of the Eloa River. This was one of the most ambitious engineering projects ever undertaken by the Australian Army. The Japanese threat to Wau was acute in January 1943 and this made the task of road construction more urgent. When Lieut. Col. Reinhold, Chief Engineer 11th Division (AIF), was posted to Bulldog in March 1943, General Blamey expressed the hope that the road to Wau would be completed in four months, to help the Allies mount a big offensive against Lae (McCarthy, 1959:578-9). Lieut. Fox and 400 labourers proceeded to Bulldog on 9 December 1942. Road construction began in the first week of January 1943. Already 1000 labourers were being used as carriers from Bulldog to Wau (Reinhold, 1946:4).

Four hundred and eighty labourers with ANGAU supervisors began grubbing and clearing from the Bulldog end. It took eight months to clear the carrier track, build a pilot track for the jeep road, then construct a single motor transport

road. On 23 August 1943 a 'triumphant' procession of four-wheeled drive vehicles travelled from Edie Creek right through to Bulldog, a journey of fifty-eight miles (Reinhold, 1946:24). At its peak 200 jeep and trailer loads got through to Wau. It is against this background that we should see the war-time experiences of the villagers from the Toaripi area.

The best remembered aspect of the war for Toaripi villagers was the constant compulsory recruitment of men for work on the Bulldog Trail. Men from the Gulf Division of Papua were referred to in Patrol Reports as 'difficult labour' and it was officially proposed by Lieut. A.H. Baldwin to recruit them last as they could be best handled when an organised labour group and Police Headquarters had been established.¹ Major W.H. Thompson, the District Officer of the Lakekamu District, had a poor opinion of the labourers from the Kerema Sub-district, classing them amongst 'the most troublesome, self-opinionated and recalcitrant in the whole Territory'.²

There was a demand for carriers from Baimuru River in the Delta to the St Joseph's River (Angabunga) in the Central District. Officers of ANGAU patrolled through the villages and sent the able-bodied men wherever the Army required help. Uritai carriers recalled the names of Lieut. Atkinson, Capt. Healey, Mr Preece and Mr Amooore as early recruiters from ANGAU. An interpreter from Moveave called Miria Elavo accompanied them. At first men with large families were exempted, later on everybody was recruited.

When considering whom to recruit in the Lakekamu District, ANGAU officers at first tried not to denude the villages of able-bodied men. Lieut. R.G. Ormsby reported in December 1942 that

there are some men in the villages whom I consider would be better away at work. I refer mainly to young bachelors, who with so many husbands away at work, are likely to become a source of considerable trouble in their villages. I suggest that a gradual effort be made to send these young men to work and if possible to

¹W/D February, April 1942. Appendix 12B. Native Labour Control, 1 March 1942.

²Central District, 1944-47, Kairuku, 17 June 1944.

replace them in their villages by some of the men with large families away at Bulldog.³

At the start of recruitment in February 1942 it was intended that Toaripi labourers should work for six months at a time at Bulldog. On their return home the villagers of Biaru and Lese were to work as their replacements. In December, however, newly recruited labourers were informed they would have to work 'for an indefinite period'.⁴

In March 1942 over 200 Europeans and Chinese from Lae, Salamaua and Kavieng were evacuated from the Wau-Bulolo Valley. They walked along the trail from Wau to Bulldog and then travelled by canoe down the Lakekamu River to Terapo. The Toaripi and Moveave villagers were called upon to supply canoes for this evacuation and also native foods. One villager, Kake Sevesevita, said the people of Mirivase were not happy with ANGAU because they had supplied them with paddles and canoes and ANGAU had spoiled them. The canoes had not been returned to their owners and when payment was asked for, they were jailed at Terapo and told not to ask for money.

An ANGAU officer in a Patrol Report in May 1942 asked what payment was going to be made for the work done between February and May 1942 by the villagers from Moveave to Motu Motu (Uritai) who had been 'constantly called upon to perform work without recompense'.⁵ This report confirms the evidence of the local informant about the commandeering of canoes.

Now almost the whole population of the area is in some way concerned with and making for the Lakekamu Base. Carriers and canoes have been supplied. Building materials prepared and buildings erected at Terapo and Bulldog. Large quantities of native foods, mostly sago which involves the employment of women in the manufacture, are being constantly brought in. The village life is totally disrupted. It is rank bad administration if these conditions are allowed to prevail indefinitely.

³P/R Kairuku No.1 of 1943, 1 January 1943. Lieut. R.G. Ormsby.

⁴Ibid.

⁵P/R Gulf District, 1942.

He dismissed the argument that it was the Papuans' country and thus they should do something for it. Papuan efforts were vital to the success of a portion of the New Guinea campaign. Munitions workers (in Australia) did not do their job for nothing. He queried,

Why then is the native expected to toil daily without reward? I realise the necessity for the work but I also write without fear that we are making a rod of discontent and distrust for our own backs if we do not shortly do something to re-imburse the people. That the present situation of co-operation and amity exists, on the surface at any rate, is a credit to the native peoples concerned and reflects in no small way on the untiring energies and aptitude for the onerous work as shown by Lieut. Atkinson.

He asked that ANGAU headquarters give consideration to well deserved payment for the services of a 'dependent and subject people', warning that this form of 'slavery' could only lead towards distrust and discontent, rich soil for a fifth columnist to cultivate treachery. Major W.H. Thompson, the District Officer, responded to this fervent appeal. He stated in his June 1942 report that Lieut. Atkinson had been instructed to let the Kairuku office know how much money was required for the purchase of sago from the villagers, the hire of canoes and other work done for the Administration since Major Stanfield's force went up the river. 'There is of course no intention of not paying for their work and supplies ...'⁶ Later Major Thompson himself went to Uritai and Moveave to pay villagers for transport work on the Lakekamu.⁷

When the Australian Army came to the Gulf of Papua one camp was set up at Lalapipi and another at Mirivase at the mouth of the Lakekamu River. The people of these two villages were evacuated and settled at Paiho hamlet nearly two miles away to the southeast. The Lakekamu River was frequently used to send supplies of equipment to Bulldog camp.

⁶W/D May-June 1942, DO's report, Mekeo and Gulf Districts.

⁷W/D July 1942, Appendix 32.

Terapo was, in pre-war days, a Roman Catholic mission station on land which stretched from the Lakekamu to the Tauri River. The Army took over a portion of the station and made it their base camp. It was a staging-camp where supplies were transferred to barges going up-river to Bulldog. ANGAU headquarters was at Mirikarakara, 200 yards down-river on the opposite bank. Until 18 January 1943 Terapo remained the headquarters for the Bulldog Line of Communication, then the headquarters was shifted to Bulldog.⁸

The routine of recruitment by ANGAU was as follows. Fit males were chosen by members of ANGAU Field Staff and submitted to medical examination to determine their fitness.⁹ A contract was signed and issues given in accordance with the prescribed scale. The labourer was then handed over to the Native Labour Section for allotment to his task. During the term of his contract the labourer was to be housed, fed, clothed and cared for medically in accordance with the principles of the suspended administration. On the completion of the period of his employment, he was to be repatriated to his village by District Services Section and Native Labour Section acting together.

Recruitment in the Gulf villages started in February 1942.¹⁰ In April 1942 in the Kerema area

a call was made for labour, fifty being the objective but then so eager were these natives to get work, that over two hundred and fifty offered and were accepted. They were all despatched to the plantation in the Kanosia District where I understand they are giving good service.¹¹

By September 1942 the position was that 'almost all fit men have been taken from this area (Kerema) for work at Lakekamu, those remaining being too old or too young'.

When he was recruiting in September 1942 a Patrol Officer reported very little trouble in 'collecting all able boys for work on the Lakekamu'. He was apprehensive at the start of

⁸W/D 18 January 1943, District Services.

⁹W/D January 1944, District Services, DS 1/17.

¹⁰P/R Gulf District, Sub-District Kerema C16, 1942-43.

¹¹P/R Gulf District, Sub-District of Kerema, 1942.

his patrol. 'Many of these boys incidently have never left their own area for work and the greater percentage having the fear of war, trouble was expected.' He had explained to them 'that the sooner they worked, the sooner the war would be won, and then they could go back to their normal way of living'. After this, 'all was understood'.¹²

Recruitment was not always simple and on occasions officers would be compelled to take a firm line. Early in 1942 Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy had gone to the Orokolo and Vailala Districts and called for 100 men to go to work in Port Moresby.

There was no response and all had to be selected by me and sent off under escort, even then some escaped. After that there was an order sent out from this office [Kerema] that all natives of this district would have to go to work, somewhere or other and that they should all be prepared for this. A month or so later, patrols went out and within a period of two weeks recruited almost one thousand natives for work at Lakekamu. This confirms my belief that these natives will respond to force and command, but they will not be coaxed. Recruiting for plantation work would be easier, but these natives of the Kerema District do not like the idea of ...¹³

The sentiments expressed by this Patrol Officer about the need for coercion are supported by Toaripi villagers who quoted several instances of compulsion during recruitment early in the war.

However Patrol Officer Hardy reported that 'Of late months, recruiting of natives has been much easier and although there are very few volunteers for work outside the district, once selected ... the native generally makes no attempt to escape'.

It would take as long as two or three weeks to recruit labour.¹⁴ On a recruiting patrol an ANGAU officer would be

¹² Ibid.

¹³ P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 26 November 1942. Incomplete, following page is missing.

¹⁴ P/R Gulf District Kerema, No.14 of 1943-44.

accompanied by carriers, an interpreter and police. Police were described in Patrol Reports as Armed Constables or members of the RPC. A recruiting officer might be instructed to 'see if you can get any recruits for the PIB'.¹⁵ Several Patrol Reports refer to recruiting for the PIB. The best labour or 'A' class labour was sent first to the Kokoda Trail and later to the Lakekamu Line of Communication.¹⁶ 'C' class labour was left with the older people in the villages to perform routine tasks. In July 1942 Major W.H. Thompson reported on the war effort in his District.

The transport up the river and the land transport from Bulldog to Wau has fallen for the most part on this District. Besides this we have sent a hundred to the Port Moresby Pool. Of course the natives will have to work at whatever part of the war effort becomes their lot to help, but there will be a shortage of labour unless the demand slackens.¹⁷

A detailed report was made in January 1943 of a patrol which set out from Kerema to recruit labour for the lines of communications on the Lakekamu River.¹⁸ The Patrol Officer discussed his task with the Assistant District Officer at Iopoi and obtained rations and instructions. He then travelled by launch to Uritai. One Armed Constable had been sent ahead the previous day with instructions to

Have all boys from villages Lalapipi, Mirivase, Uritai and Mirihae (Isapeape) assembled at Uritai. Soon after my arrival recruiting of these boys commenced. All villages except Mirihae were checked off as it was too late to finish this village. Names and particulars of boys recruited in the afternoon would be listed during the evening, and forwarded to Lieut. Atkinson at Iopoi the following day.

The following day all the recruits were assembled and told where and why they were going to work.

¹⁵ P/R Gulf District Kerema, No.19 of 1943-44.

¹⁶ P/R Kerema 2-11 April 1943.

¹⁷ W/D July-August 1942, Appendix 32, DO's Report Kairuku

¹⁸ P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 22 January 1943.

It was pointed out to them that while the war was around these parts that everybody had to hop in and do their bit, and the sooner they did so, the sooner they would be able to return and live their normal and peaceful life just as others would when it was all over. When they had heard this and realised that it was the only possible thing to do they accepted the whole thing cheerfully and went off happy knowing that they would do a good job. They were then forwarded per canoes under escort of an AC (armed constable) to Iopoi with a letter to OC Lieut. Atkinson with names and particulars of same. There were only a few available canoes as most of them had been impressed by the Army for service on the Lakekamu River.

When some more carriers were brought in from Kairuku the officer had to spend some time obtaining further transport for them to be sent to Iopoi. 'The rest of the morning was spent in recruiting boys from Mirihae village. These were forwarded at 2.00pm. In the afternoon worked on the Census, and checking the whereabouts of various boys.'¹⁹ The officer experienced

no difficulty in the recruiting of these villages. In fact the majority of the boys once they realised the cause of our fight went off to work with a smile, and even after the men folk had departed, the village people were contented with things in general as they knew why their men folk were going to work.²⁰

When the recruiting officer set out for Kukipi by launch, his police proceeded along the beach to the same village. They were to inform all males from Kailapi and Kukipi villages to assemble at Kukipi. On this officer's arrival all the males were assembled at the barracks. Their names were called straight away and they were recruited for work at Bulldog. At night the officer 'made lists and particulars of boys recruited during the day and who would

¹⁹ P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 22 January 1943.

²⁰ Ivaraharia Ikui confirmed that Angau officers constantly repeated that if they did not become carriers the Japanese soldiers would destroy Papua New Guinea. See Appendix 2a.

be going off to Iopoi the following day'. The 'carriers' went sent by canoes and by a launch which was going to Iopoi for repairs.²¹

On occasion some males of 'taxable standard' attempted to evade lining, presumably from fear of being recruited. Most of these were rounded up and in cases of deliberate failure to line after being warned to do so, were fined. Another way of evading recruitment was to feign incapacity.

In January 1943 Lieut. R.G. Ormsby reported 'I have not yet checked the census for the coastal villages but I understand from Lieut. Atkinson at Terapo that all the villages except Biarua and Lese have been more or less fully recruited'. A patrol to the Toaripi villages in February 1943 by Lieut. G.P. Hardy was described as 'a routine recruiting patrol for villages previously left untouched as a reserve for emergencies'. The villages may have been 'expecting the call for some time and were fully prepared for it'. Those who were recruited 'went to work with a smile'. The Assistant District Officer (ADO), Capt. R.G. Ormsby, undertook to furnish the District Officer at Kairuku with

appropriate figures as to the percentage of able-bodied males recruited ... I think it probable that there are a number of youths suitable for rubber-tapping left in the village, and possibly some other 'B' class labour as well. Those that are not needed for sago growing will probably be recruited shortly.²²

The Lakekamu District was throughout the war the most heavily recruited in Papua. 'A state of mild famine' was reported there in 1943 (Mair, 1948:191). In March 1943 a Patrol Officer worked on the census of Uritai, Mirihae, Mirivase, Kailape and Kukipi. The number of recruits from this area was very large, ranging from 10 per cent to over 30 per cent of the population in respective villages (see Table 3). These figures enabled the officer to find the whereabouts or reported whereabouts of deserters originally recruited from these villages.

²¹P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 22 January 1943.

²²Material quoted in the last two paragraphs is from the following reports: D/S 30/3/15, 1942-43; P/R Kairuku No.1, 1 January 1943; P/R DS 30/3/17, 1943-44; and P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44.

Table 3

Village populations March 1943

Village	Men in the village	Adult women in the village	Recruits on the line
Uritai	113	168	88
Mirihae	67	104	80
Mirivase	19	26	14

Source: Extract from P/R Kerema, No.13, 1943-44. (W/O G.R.Wearne)

When the Lakekamu Line of Communication was established the Army used 30-foot canoes and launches to travel the eighty miles to Bulldog. As soon as the Army could secure outboard engines these were attached to canoes. There were a few staging posts set up by ANGAU along the Lakekamu at Grimm Point, Kovu and Otomai. Craft travelling on the river usually stopped at each camp. The first groups of carriers who went to Bulldog claimed that it took almost a month to paddle there. (This is an exaggeration; they simply meant it took a long time.) The first ANGAU officer in charge of Terapo, K.C. Atkinson, said the barges left Terapo and stopped at the first staging point at the end of one day, at Grimm Point on the second day and on the third day reached Bulldog. Thus by barge the journey took three days. By canoe it could take four days if one was lucky but never as long as two weeks. It was the custom of this officer to leave Terapo at one o'clock in the morning because that time was cooler for paddling and the villagers knew the river well. It was also safer to paddle in the dark because there was less risk of being spotted by Japanese planes.

The barges of the First Australian Water-Transport Company were loaded with supplies at Terapo or at Mirivase. The goods which they took to Bulldog were brought from Port Moresby by ships like the *Royal Endeavour*, the *Lena Gladys* and the *Gawa*.²³ Though canoes often travelled at night

²³Legg, 1963:26-32 gives a description of Parer's journey along the route of the Lakekamu Line of Communication. It was the subject of a Parer film 'The Strangest Supply Route of the War'. (June-July 1942).

the barges travelled in the daytime. There were no markers along the river to indicate sandbanks and the upper reaches of the Lakekamu River were so shallow that barges sometimes ran aground. In June 1943 an ANGAU Sergeant erected beacons at the mouth of the Tauri River. The mouth of the Lakekamu was often made treacherous by the formation of sandbanks. In October 1942 four villagers were lost when their canoe which was carrying cargo for ANGAU capsized at the mouth of the river.²⁴ In July 1944 the *Gawa* was stranded there while carrying Major Thompson, the District Officer, on an inspection patrol. He completed his tour by canoe.²⁵ Despite its treacherous nature a 100-ton barge once crossed the bar and was towed to Bulldog.

Big logs called '*tola sofa*' were always floating in the river when the river was flooded and had to be cut with axes or destroyed with dynamite (Reinhold, 1946:24-5, 33). This destruction of logs was to reduce the numbers of accidents with logs in which barges bent their propellers or damaged their engines. If a barge broke down it would be towed to Terapo where there was an Army machine shop run by several mechanics with local labourers as helpers.

An indication of the mode of travel and time taken in travelling is given by a Patrol Report written in June 1943 by Lieut. C.H. Rich, the ADO at Bulldog, who made an inspection journey down the Lakekamu River to Terapo. He set out in a small de-snagging launch from Bulldog at 1200 hours and at Otomai he transferred to a barge at 1350 hours. He stopped for a short while at Grimm Point and reached Kovu at 2000 hours. He took another barge to Terapo two days later and found ANGAU personnel awaiting transport to Port Moresby. He boarded a launch to Mirivase and inspected the launches impressed some time previously by ANGAU. High tides made his travel difficult. Returning to Terapo he instructed Lieut. Montgomery to have thirty-four new recruits sent upstream to Bulldog 'by the first available opportunity'. On his return journey Lieut. Rich left Terapo at 1100 hours (approx.) in the launch *Kutubu* and arrived at Kovu at 1700 hours. The following day he left Kovu at 0500 hours stopping at Grimm Point to inspect a new camp site. He arrived at Bulldog at 1700 hours.²⁶

²⁴W/D October 1942, Appendix 49. Report by Lieut. G.F. Neilsen.

²⁵P/R Central District 1944-45, Kairuku No.1, 7 July 1944.

²⁶P/R Lakekamu, Kairuku No.6, 30/3/37, 1943-44.

In the early days of the Lakekamu Line of Communication when most of the river transport was by canoe and arrival of rations was very erratic, sago was needed to feed the labourers. During 1942 sago was bought at Vailala and sent by sea to Terapo. Both Lieut. Atkinson and Lieut. Rich radioed the ADO at Kerema requesting fifty 'B' class labourers and their wives for sago making.²⁷

Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy commented on his efforts to recruit thirty married couples to make sago at Kovu on the Lakekamu Line of Communication.

At first it was not very welcomed as they [sago making couples] had heard of how bad the mosquitoes were in these places, the women folk had not ventured inland very far and it would be strange to them to go and work in another place outside their own fields. However, when the position was put before them clearly, suitable couples were not very hard to obtain ... I think once they have jumped the first hurdle, and are supplied with mosquito nets which is an important factor that they will settle down and do the job well. This sago making is very important as besides the ordinary rations given to the boys on the line, sago is their main diet.

The District Officer at Kairuku, Major W.H. Thompson, showed a measure of concern for the welfare of sago makers at Kovu. In a covering memorandum to the Patrol Report of Lieut. G.P. Hardy he asked ANGAU Headquarters whether mosquito nets could be obtained

somewhere or somehow. To ask the natives to take their wives up the mosquito-infested Lakekamu River to make sago, and not give them the very necessary protection of a mosquito net is not right. Send some rolls of cheese cloth or something and I will get them made up into nets. 500 nets or the material for same should be sent to Terapo as soon as possible.²⁸

²⁷P/R 1943-44, Gulf District Kerema, 26 November 1942 and 16 April 1943.

²⁸P/R 1943-44, Gulf District Kerema, 16 April 1943.

One problem about wild sago was that its yield was small compared with that of cultivated sago. By June 1943 Kovu had outlived its importance. The sago palms were getting very scarce and labourers had to travel a considerable distance before starting work. Lieut. C.H. Rich, the ANGAU ADO who closed down Kovu as a sago making camp in June 1943, wrote: 'the ration position in general, both at Base and the forward area is now well in hand'.²⁹ He decided to close the camp rather than move it to a new site as he firmly believed the male labour at least could be employed on more useful and urgent jobs. He paid out £147 in wages to male and female casual labour and arrangements were made to send the women folk and their children back to their villages. The seventy-odd male labourers were sent upsteam to the Bulldog Base Area. They were to be employed for two months on a special task, the construction of the Kunimaipa-Base Area Tramline. When the camp was cleared a caretaker and his wife were left in charge. Kovu served from then on as a staging camp.³⁰

Bulldog, which is on the Tiveri River, an important branch of the Lakekamu River, was first established as a gold mining camp in pre-war days. It was named after a launch called 'The Bulldog' which was stranded on the bank of the Tiveri following a period of heavy rain (Humphries, 1923:70-71). There was a small airstrip at Bulldog. During the war this strip was used by aircraft of the Air/Sea Rescue Squadron or to bring in Army VIP's. Once a DC3 had landed there after being hit on taking off from Wau. It was repaired and flown off after being stripped of everything not essential. Bulldog's main purpose was as a supply base for troops at Wau, five days' trek away across the Kuper Range. Bulldog had a labour force of engineers known to the villagers as 'CRE',³¹ Australian soldiers and villagers from the Toaripi, Kairuku, Moveave and Orokolo areas.

Some of the labourers at Bulldog did general work around the base camp but at the start the majority of them carried stores and supplies along the track to Wau. Later

²⁹P/R No.6 Lakekamu, Kairuku, 1943-44 D/S 30/3/7.

³⁰P/R No.6 Lakekamu of 1943-44 D/S 30/3/7.

³¹CRE means Commander Royal Engineers. Lieut. Col. Reinhold was the CRE of Milne Force Australian Division (AIF) which undertook the reconnaissance, survey and construction of Bulldog-Wau Road (Reinhold, 1946:5).

on most labourers were used on road construction. Barges came from Terapo daily with stores of food and military equipment. One authority states that the labour force along the Bulldog Track was about 1825 construction workers and 524 carriers at the peak of its activity in July 1943.³²

The labourers slept in long huts made of bush material with twenty to twenty-five workers sharing a hut. There was not electricity for labourers at Bulldog and they used an improvised lamp called a 'Tiniharo'. This was a 16-ounce fruit tin which was filled with kerosene; a piece of rami material or blanket served as a wick.

Though it rained often in the Bulldog area the Tiveri River became quite shallow in the dry season. This created some measure of difficulty in the middle of 1943 when the river fell so low that barges could not reach Bulldog and all cargo had to be unloaded at the junction of the Tiveri and the Lakekamu. This delayed the urgent task of completing the motor road to Wau. To make it simpler to transfer the cargo, the Kunimaipa-Base area tramline was laid from the mouth of the Tiveri to Bulldog. There was a hasty rounding-up of available villagers to lay the tramline and when Kovu, the sago-making camp, was closed the seventy males there were sent to work on the special new task. The tramline was barely finished when the rains came and there was no longer any need for it.

The track to Wau started at 100 feet above sea level at Bulldog and wound through Dead Chinaman, Middle Camp, Waterbung, Waterdry, Kudjeru, Winima and Kaisekik, to Wau. There were several high sections of this track across the Ekuti Range including Ecclestone Saddle which was 9466 feet high and Johnson Gap which was 8000 feet high. The mossy forest in the bitterly cold upper regions was a contrast to the sweltering heat of the lowlands. Rainfall in the mountains was between 150 inches and 200 inches a year (Reinhold, 1946:9). R. Watson, an ANGAU overseer who described part of the Bulldog track, said Dead Chinaman was on flat ground an easy half-day's walk from Bulldog. Walking time was four and


³² Reinhold, 1946:53. *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-45*, vol.VI, Airfield and Base Development, p.162, states nearly 2000 were employed by July 1943. W/D August 1943 reports 3022 as the labour strength on the Bulldog Road. In December 1942 Capt. Baldwin gave 1450 as Native Labour figures for Bulldog at 30 December 1942 (W/D. December 1942).

a half hours to Dead Chinaman, four hours to Middle Camp (Centre Camp), five hours to Waterbung, five and a half hours to Waterdry, five hours to Kudjeru, five hours to Winima and five hours to Kaisenik. The average rate of walking was eight miles a day. It was possible to walk straight through to Waterbung in one day. Waterdry was at the top of the range on the border between Papua and New Guinea. This area was Kukukuku country, a no-man's land for coastal people.

Lieut. C.H. Rich, the ADO at Bulldog, gave a fairly detailed description of sections of the carrier track in May 1943. From Centre Camp the track crossed the Eloa River and led uphill, in places almost vertical. Fox's Gap stood at 6000 feet but there was a further climb to Gorge camp. In Lieut. Rich's opinion carriers working on this section of the track were 'certainly doing a man's job' in very cold and wet weather. From Gorge Camp the track led up a steep spur approximately 8000 feet high then dipped into the Gorge, only to rise again on the opposite side. It was very cold at Eloa Basin, which was Lieut. Col. Reinhold's headquarters, and four blankets were not sufficient to keep Lieut. Rich warm. In his opinion it was a cheerless place. From Eloa Basin he walked to Ecclestone's Gap and over an 'abominable track' to Johnson's Gap. For the most part the track led through eerie moss forests 'where a false step would easily result in a broken limb or other serious injury'. There the sun was visible for only two hours per day owing to the ever present clouds and mist. The track from Johnson's Gap led through timbered country down the slopes of Mt Wau to Camp No.7. From there on to Edie Creek he followed a road that was boggy in places but the going was 'reasonably easy'. A jeep road linked Edie Creek and Wau.³³

When carriers arrived at Bulldog they were told they would have to carry loads daily 'from Monday to Sunday'. They were awakened at 5am, ate at 5.45am and the carrier line was drawn up and the roll taken at 7am. 'Boss-boys' would be in attendance. The task of the boss-boy was to look after carriers in the camps. They never accompanied them on the march. The 'cargoes' were packed in drums, boxes and bags and weighed on spring scales. The containers were weighed to ensure that no carrier was overloaded and to reduce

³³P/R Central District. Kairuku No.1, Lakekamu District, May 1943.



Map 4 Bulldog-Wau Road. Based on McCarthy, 1959.

pilfering.³⁴ The Toaripi carriers readily admitted that they stole regularly from the stores they carried. J. Lillyman said carriers even stole dangerous items such as detonators which they hid in their laplaps. Cargo was weighed at Bulldog, Centre Camp and at Kudjeru. As far as possible loads were one-man loads but a box of ammunition would be a two-man load.

Normally a line of carriers consisted of sixty men who carried one ton of supplies.³⁵ Sixty carriers left Bulldog daily, spending the first night at Fox's Camp, the second night at Middle Camp, the third night at Waterbung and the fourth night at Kudjeru. If it was too cold at Kudjeru they would go up to Kudjeru and return to Waterbung to sleep. Carriers always had a day's rest after that.

When the carrier line was climbing in cold country the men were issued with 'cold shirts' or pullovers. Cold shirts were thick flannel shirts issued by the Army. In the early days of the war many Toaripi carriers went right through to Wau. Such a journey would take six to seven days and was made if there was special cargo such as mail.

It was the official policy to keep Papuans on the Papuan side of the boundary line but this was broken in the early period. When the NGVR were able to organize the New Guinea labour who were stranded in the Morobe goldfields into carrier lines the Papuan carriers stopped at Kudjeru. The New Guinea carriers were Buangs, Sepiks and Warias. After the Japanese landing at Buna in July 1942 many New Guineans from Rabaul escaped from the enemy and made their way to Wau by way of the Waria. They too were engaged as carriers by the NGVR. Nine NGVR troops were transferred to ANGAU early in 1942. They were stationed at the various camps on the routes to the Markham River and Mubo. It was their duty to exhort the carrier lines, see they were fed properly and that there was no pilfering of carrier loads. All the men selected were

³⁴U. Beier, 1969. Page 34 refers to stealing on the line. In one instance a policeman in conniving at the thefts because the carriers were hungry said 'This is not our war'.

³⁵Weights of carrier loads - bag of rice 112 lb, 1 tin of biscuits 50 lb, 1 box of ammunition 50 lb. Full bags of rice were carried by two men and wheatmeal in 40 lb drums.

experienced Native Labour Overseers.³⁶

In August 1942 pack mules and pack horses were being broken in for use on the Bulldog Line of Communication. Capt. H.R. Niall, the District Officer at Wau, requested the supply of more saddles. With the use of mules he hoped to do away with a lot of the carrying being performed by native labour.³⁷

In April 1943 the system of carrying on the Bulldog Line of Communication was changed. Previously Papuan carriers had set out from Bulldog and completed the entire journey to Centre Camp or beyond. This method had made it necessary for carriers to take extra blankets and warm clothing for the high altitudes. With the new system the journey was divided into sections, each stage being a reasonable one day return trip. The advantages of the new system were that a good meal and weather-proof quarters awaited the carrier at the 'finish' of his day. This knowledge served as a spur to make him complete his journey as soon as possible and thus avoid the possibility of the cargo being soaked by the afternoon rains.³⁸

The Toaripi carriers had no idea of the exact distances they travelled but they were aware that the terrain through which they passed was dominated by the fierce Kukukukus. Some carriers recalled that on their journey they were never far from a river and despite the Army shirts they were wearing they were always cold and wet. Kudjeru was the coldest place they could remember. At Waterbung there were many waterfalls and a great deal of noise from the falling water.

They knew that 'Dead Chinaman' was named after a Chinese refugee who died on the track while fleeing from Wau. Of the Kukukukus, carriers said they could not speak Pidgin well. The District Officer of the Lakekamu District, Major Thompson, said of the Kukukukus '... unlike most bush natives, the Kukukukus are not afraid of ghosts by night and are famed

³⁶The names of some of these ANGAU NLO's were W/O Bannon, W/O Crawford, W/O O'Kane, Cpl McCabe, Cpl Griffiths and 2 Parers, P/R No.13, Lakekamu, 1943-44.

³⁷W/D July-August 1942, Appendix 37.

³⁸P/R Central District. Kairuku No.1, Lakekamu District, May 1943.

for night raids'. He advised Lieut. E.G. Hicks to keep a guard on his camp at night.³⁹ J. Lillyman said the labourers were scared of the Kukukukus and it was important to keep troops out of Kukukuku gardens lest there should be any incidents. Kukukuku gardens were perched on the ridges from Dead Chinaman to Middle Camp.

Those carriers who reached Wau returned with bags of sweet potatoes which were grown by ANGAU in the Wau valley. ANGAU converted Wau into a food production centre for carriers and troops.⁴⁰ By August 1942 ANGAU controlled all gardening activities at Wau. Gardens were also maintained at Bulolo and Bulwa. Large native food farms were maintained, 100 tons of kau-kau were harvested monthly from the Wau gardens alone. One year later the production of 'Native foods' at Wau was 10,935 lbs and assorted vegetables 24,398 lbs.⁴¹

The stores of potatoes collected by the carriers were deposited in small quantities at each camp along the route as the carriers returned to their base. It was normal for carriers to return at a faster rate than when they went on the onward journey because they had a lighter load.

Occasionally the carriers took their time about returning because they knew that to return quickly simply meant a prompt dispatch with yet another cargo. The policemen who accompanied them and were armed, would try to hurry them up but the carriers threatened them saying they would fight if not allowed to take their time. Carriers did not get on well with the police, part of whose task was to protect them through Kukukuku country on the way to Wau. There was a clash in 1942 between police and Kukukukus in which one Kukukuku was killed. In August 1943 two members of the RPC, L/Cpl Oroongo and Constable Kager were murdered by Kukukukus near Dead Chinaman Camp.

Carriers complained that the policemen always chased after them calling, 'walkabout, walkabout'. This was resented

³⁹P/R Kairuku No.15, 1944-45.

⁴⁰W/D July-August 1942, Appendix 37. Extract from District Officer's Report, Markham Area, 28 August 1942.

⁴¹W/D 31 August 1943. War Production.

⁴²P/R Kairuku No.14, 1944-45, and W/D 20 August 1943, District Services.

because policemen carried no loads but had weapons like shotguns and rifles. An ANGAU officer, K.C. Atkinson, disagreed with the carriers' opinion that there was hostility between carriers and police. In his opinion, except in cases where disciplinary action was taken, the carriers were very friendly with police. The police provided a valuable service escorting carriers through Kukukuku country. J. Lillyman, an ANGAU overseer, agreed with the carriers, saying there was hostility between carriers and police and it was conventional to have a tough man from a different area to keep the carriers in line. A lone European in the bush relied to a great extent on his police to protect him.

A good policeman could make a great deal of difference to the success of a patrol.

To Cpl Kari should go much of the credit for the fact that we arrived without losing a great part of our cargo. The natives had several times attempted to throw down their loads and run away, but he had always forestalled them. In the latter stages of the walk he had relieved each carrier in turn of his load for a few miles, to enable him to have a rest, and carried the cargo himself in addition to his rifle and heavy pack. He was a stern disciplinarian and ruled the police with a rod of iron, but his enormous strength of both physique and character were an inspiration to all of us.⁴³

An incident which most Toaripi carriers recalled clearly was the bombing of Bulldog. This was the only enemy action taken against this District. Labourers were performing various tasks in the base area when the bombs dropped. The great majority of labourers hid in the bush, others jumped into the river or crawled into 44 gallon drums for safety. A young man from Moveave, Epe Para Haro, was hit by shrapnel and died. Another man, Meaporo of Oaipu was critically injured. An ANGAU patrol report written very shortly after the bombing gave the date of the bombing as Wednesday, 2 June 1943. This was very close to the date given by Ivaraharia Ikui, a cook at Bulldog who estimated that it was a Thursday, in the first week of June 1943. The date of the bombing is not given in the Official History. C.F. Coady (1962:42)

⁴³Report on Huon Peninsula 25/4/43-23/6/43, W/O P.A. Ryan.

gives the date of the bombing as 2 June 1943. Bulldog airfield and native quarters were attacked by sixteen Japanese aircraft. W.J. Reinhold (1946:30) confirms this date.

Bulldog was bombed at approximately 1055 hours. Bombers strafed and bombed the area.⁴⁴ A warning from Terapo was received at the same time the planes were sighted, so there was little time in which to take cover. It is possible that the Japanese pilots mistook the hospital and labour quarters for Administrative Headquarters since those were the main targets. The hospital at Bulldog had concrete paths leading from the various buildings and so attracted attention.

In his report on the bombing Lieut. C.H. Rich, the ADO at Bulldog, stated that two labourers had died and six were injured, two seriously and four slightly. Two Europeans also sustained minor injuries. Before the raid there were almost 400 labourers at Bulldog, at the conclusion there were only twenty. Included in the 400 labourers were 200 hospital patients, half of whom were convalescing. No police or medical orderlies left the area. Of the two fatalities only Epe of Moveave was recognisable, while the other labourer had his head blown off. Both bodies were buried at Bulldog. Five of the injured were stretcher cases and were sent to Port Moresby.⁴⁵ As a result of the raid it was decided to move the hospital and ANGAU Headquarters to Dead Chinaman, leaving only thirty to fifty labourers in the Bulldog area to unload barges. Labourers quarters at Bulldog were shifted into the bush, well away from the airstrip. Lieut. Rich decided to travel downstream to Terapo, or further if need be, in an attempt to return as many deserters as possible.

On Thursday, 3 June, Lieut. Rich sent a radio message to Warrant Officer Amoore at Terapo instructing him to 'hold all natives endeavouring to pass that point'.⁴⁶ Sergeant

⁴⁴W/D June 1943, Appendix 124. Report of enemy raid on Bulldog area. Lieut. C.H. Rich, ADO.

⁴⁵W/D 11 June 1943. Carriers from Kaipi say Pisae Wapope was also injured.

⁴⁶P/R Central District No.2 Lakekamu. Bulldog L/C P/R 1943-44 D/S 2/3.

Bonning of the 14th Field Company stationed at Otomai managed to apprehend 120 deserters and Warrant Officer Marlay and two armed constables were sent by road to Otomai to take charge of them. By that time Lieut. Rich found 143 deserters being held at Otomai by the police. Realising that the labourers had been scared by the bombing he lined them, explained the circumstances of the war and gave them a general 'pep talk' and advice on how to take cover in the event of further raids. Lieut. Rich commended Sergeant Bonning on behalf of ANGAU for the excellent work done:

Firstly in being able to hold these natives without violence, and secondly for attending to their needs as regards food, accommodation and medical assistance to ex-hospital patients and also three wounded natives who managed to reach this point. This N.C.O. showed great tact and sympathy.

As Lieut. Rich proceeded downstream by barge he noticed several abandoned rafts on the bank and assumed that they belonged to fleeing labourers who had substituted them for canoes they had stolen from the de-snagging parties. Only one deserter was found at Grimm Point and he was put on a barge travelling up-river and told to report to Bulldog.

At Kovu, the sago-making place, Sgt Banfield reported that he held nine deserters but that quite a number had ignored his instructions and had continued on downstream. The nine deserters, with a boss boy in charge of them, were placed on a barge going upstream to Bulldog. Two hours after leaving Kovu Lieut. Rich put two armed constables ashore with instructions to use the back track to Popo to collect any deserters they could find and to rejoin him at the mouth of the Kapuri River. On his way to Terapo Lieut. Rich passed two barges loaded with men going to Bulldog. He later learnt there were forty-nine deserters on board. When he arrived at Terapo, Warrant Officer Amore reported that he had apprehended and returned these deserters.

Lieut. Rich took a launch on Saturday, 5 June, and visited Moveave village. He sought the parents of a labourer who died.

Interviewed Epe's parents, Epe was one of the lads killed in the raid, the father was very distracted and refused food, he is however,

being attended to by the Rev. Brown. I comforted him as much as possible and explained that in times like this such news was more or less to be expected. A most difficult thing for the natives to realise especially as all their former experiences with Europeans were of a friendly nature and a serious view taken of unlawful killings.

The following day Lieut. Rich instructed two ANGAU NCO's, Sgt. Hayes and Cpl. Hancock, to proceed with two armed constables to Kerema and to apprehend any deserters they came across. Later the armed constables who were sent to Popo reported with three deserters. Lieut. Rich walked to Oiapu instructing councillors and the village constable at Iokea along the way to continue the search for deserters. At Oiapu he delivered

a lengthy harangue in which I explained the necessity of close co-operation in all respects, emphasising the disastrous results of a breakdown in the supply line. The crime of harbouring run-aways was also emphatically stressed.

At Iokea he assembled the entire village and gave a long speech in which he explained the seriousness of the position. 'Propaganda photos received from headquarters were used for demonstration purposes, and advice as to the best methods of taking cover, should the occasion ever arise.' Later on the District Officer at Kairuku sent the patrol thirty-nine deserters from the Kairuku Sub-district and they all moved off to Lalapipi. The NCO's who went to Kerema returned with twelve deserters. A large barge was used to take the numerous deserters upstream to Terapo, where transport for the voyage further upstream was arranged. The total number of deserters apprehended on this patrol, including those from Kairuku, numbered 124.

In his general remarks on this patrol Lieut. Rich pointed out,

I should like to mention that no punishment whatsoever was inflicted on any of the natives who ran away as a result of the raid. Except perhaps in one or two cases it was their first experience in the horrors of war as practised by Europeans. The damage done and casualties

inflicted in the rain are by no means a true indication of the vicious nature of the attack, which was confined to a very small area. The rattle of machine gun fire and crash of bombs at such close quarters are sufficient to demoralise most people so it can be readily understood why the natives who are ignorant to [*sic*] those things, obeyed their natural instincts and fled. No difficulty was experienced in persuading them to return to duty, and having now experienced a raid I feel confident that future raids will not have the same disastrous results.

It was estimated later that 636 men deserted after the bombing and that by 11 June 512 had been apprehended and returned to Bulldog. On 13 June W/O II Amooore at Terapo sent a signal to ANGAU Headquarters that the few outstanding deserters would be arrested by village councillors, that the matter of rounding up of deserters was well in hand and he was returning to Bulldog with a further 120 deserters. Three weeks after the bombing of Bulldog an ANGAU officer from Kerema made a routine patrol from his station and one of the objects of his patrol was the arrest of a few outstanding deserters. On the completion of this patrol the Assistant District Officer at Kerema commented

The patrol was highly successful in every way. Practically all outstanding deserters were apprehended, sent to Kerema and either punished or returned to their work. All were deserters that had left their work, immediately following the attack on Bulldog.⁴⁷

Carriers often deserted from the carrier line between Bulldog and Wau. Of 1950 labourers employed on the Lakekamu Line of Communications in April/May 1943, 200 were reported as deserters, but quite a number had indentured for six months and had a legal right to return to their villages. When W/O G.R. Wearne did a census in March 1943 he found that a number of 'deserters' were in their villages with passes for exemption from service on medical grounds. Many

⁴⁷ Material quoted in the last two paragraphs is from the following reports: P/R Central District No.2 Lakekamu Bulldog L/C P/R 1943. D/S 2/3 3-14 June 1943, W/D 13 June 1943, Terapo, and P/R No.2 Kerema Gulf District, 1943-44, No.16/9/62.

ANGAU patrols in 1942 and 1943 had as their principle objective 'The apprehension of deserters ...' Throughout 1943 instructions to Patrol Officers setting out on patrol included reminders to 'Keep your eyes open for deserters, if you find any, see that they are returned to Bulldog under escort or brought here (Kerema)'.⁴⁸

It was normal procedure for ANGAU to compile a list of known deserters to circulate to Sub-district Officers and patrol posts.⁴⁹ The method of pulling in deserters while on patrol was as follows. The Patrol Officer would call the village constables, councillors and relations of known deserters together. He would explain to them it was known that these deserters were hiding in the bush and villagers would be given the chance to send word out for the carriers concerned to come in and report. The Patrol Officer would explain to the assembled villagers that every time a carrier deserted from the line it was one man less to help the army in its vast undertaking. It also meant much extra work for the village constables and councillors and much waste of time for the government which had to go and chase them, if the constables were unsuccessful. These tactics produced the desired results. 'Some of the Village Constables and Councillors had the arresting part down to a fine art'. In most areas village constables did their utmost to apprehend deserters but were sometimes severely hindered by relations who naturally wished to keep a deserter with them as long as possible. However if deserters took their wives and went to inland villages or to another District it was very hard to trace them.

The most thorough discussion of desertion in ANGAU patrol reports was conducted by Lieut. R.G. Ormsby, the ADO at Kerema, who later was commended by his superior, Capt. M.J. Healey, for reducing the incidence of desertion in the Kerema Sub-district. To him, desertion consisted of two offences, firstly running away from work and secondly evasion of apprehension by the labourer in his own District. Lieut. Ormsby suggested at first that the only way to stop 'unjustified mass desertions' was by effective punishment.

⁴⁸P/R Central District Kairuku, 1943-44, No.1 Lakekamu District; P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44; P/R Central District, 1942-43, letter to District Officer, Kairuku, 30/10/42 D/S 30/3/6; and P/R Gulf District No.1, Kerema 16/a, 30 June 1943.

⁴⁹P/R Gulf District 9/8/43.

Later he added a further preventive 'quick apprehension'. Unfortunately the latter was not easy to achieve, because it sometimes took too long for lists of deserters to reach Kairuku and many deserters succeeded in spending at least a week and frequently a month in their villages before the District Officer was aware of the fact. This measure of success encouraged deserters to risk punishment to achieve the same result on the next occasion. Lieut. Ormsby summarised his thinking on desertion in early 1943 in this way:

There is no doubt that the question of stopping desertions is one that requires serious attention as the delays and extra work involved are very considerable. Two aspects must be considered; firstly the adjustment of any just complaints by the native and the ensuring that as far as possible he realises the necessity for him to work; secondly the effective punishment of any deliberate desertions without justification.⁵⁰

In October 1942, the District Officer of the Lakekamu District commented 'These desertions would not be so numerous without some good reason and the whole position there requires investigation in my opinion'.⁵¹ There was therefore constant questioning by Patrol Officers of deserters as to the reasons why they had left the line. The reasons labourers gave for desertion reveal a great deal about the conditions of work on the Bulldog Line of Communication. As a result of their exhaustive enquiries many proposals were put forward by ANGAU personnel for the betterment of working conditions on the Bulldog track.

One inquiry by Lieut. J. O'Malley into the reasons for desertion revealed it had 'nothing to do whatever with war fear' but was related to poor treatment, being overloaded and not being fed properly.⁵² They were receiving the right quantity of food but not at the right time. They were being compelled to carry while tired and hungry on the road. Some labourers in December 1942 claimed they deserted from the

⁵⁰P/R Kairuku No.1, 1943, 1/1/1943 and No.17, 1943-44, 17/1/1943.

⁵¹P/R Central District 1942-43. Letter to District Officer, Kairuku 30/10/43 D/S 30/3/6.

⁵²P/R Central District 1942-43, Kairuku D/S 30/3/6, 30/10/1942.

line because mosquito nets and blankets were confiscated from them. Further questioning revealed this was merely 'a convenient excuse'. The loss of blankets would have been keenly felt. When New Guinea labourers were recalled from work on the road in August 1943, a Patrol Officer noted once again the Papuans have had to return to the bitterly cold climate which they detest'. Other labourers deserted in order to see their wives for a week or so and reckoned it was well worth the punishment.⁵³ R. Watson, an ANGAU overseer, said 'family commitments' caused men to desert even in dangerous areas. Another reason for desertion was that they had to carry continually seven days a week and were given no rest between trips.⁵⁴ Many deserters pleaded ill-health as an excuse for desertion.⁵⁵ Deserters however were also likely to contract pneumonia from sleeping in the bush. At times desertion was caused by false rumours. Labourers constantly received news about their villages through the 'bush wireless'. Carriers were often travelling between the coast and Bulldog so there was a stream of news, including distorted reports from their homes. Discontent was also caused if there was a continual shortage of tobacco, rami material and other incidental commodities.⁵⁶

Two good descriptions of general working conditions on the Bulldog Track were given in July 1943. One description was by Major J.M. Mack, the Assistant Director Medical Services, and the other was Cpl. N.A. Scott, a Native Labour Overseer. When Major Mack visited the line of communications

⁵³ P/R Central District, 1942-43, No.13 Lakekamu, August 1943, and Kairuku No.1 of 1943, 1/1/1943.

⁵⁴ P/R Central District, 1942-43. Letter to District Officer, Kairuku 30/10/1942. The GOC ANGAU pencilled a note on this P/R. 'We issued conditions for the Kokoda L of C. Did these go to Bulldog L of C?' In August 1942 ANGAU issued instructions that carriers on the Kokoda Trail were to receive one day of rest per week, two tins of meat per week as a complement to ordinary rations and a shirt and blanket issue. W/D July-August 1942.

⁵⁵ D/S 2/3 Letter to Assistant Adjutant General (Districts) Admin. Headquarters.

⁵⁶ P/R Gulf District No.2 Kerema Sub-District 16/9/62, P/R Port Moresby No.22 22/1/1944, and P/R Lakekamu Kairuku No.10 1943/44 D/S 30/3/11.

he commented that the general health of the labourers appeared good except at Heinan's Camp on the Bulldog Road at approximately 10,000 feet. There the cold was intense and labourers suffered considerably, working in slush and mud often up to their calves. The cold and wet produced cracked feet and there had been quite a few desertions. He considered these conditions to be very hard for labourers who had no shoes and no hats and whose waterproof capes could not prevent cold water running down their necks. Their food appeared fair but was often in short supply owing to the lack of transport. It was Major Mack's opinion that labourers should not work in such places. He stressed that in future campaigns the Supply Corps must take even greater care to see that the native ration scale was kept complete,

... the native does not understand the difficulties of war, all he is interested in is a full stomach and any undue hardship in that regard will almost certainly lead to inefficiency of carriers, desertions and a risk of them going over to the enemy.⁵⁷

Cpl. Scott stated that the section of the road between Bulldog and Dead Chinaman was in a very bad state because of heavy rain. The side tracks were full of mud and water and very slippery. The timber on the road was in places floating on the flood water. This part of the track was 'very hard walking'. Petty discontent was voiced by labourers at Centre Camp. They were short of tobacco and sugar and requested that a trade store be set up.⁵⁸ This would have done much to keep the labourers in a happier frame of mind. 'Most of them have some money and are in need of many little items that are always included in the make up of a contented native.'

Labourers on the road between Fox's Camp and Centre Camp asked to be issued with more blankets, rami material and for the setting up of a trade store. Cpl. Scott was very critical of the Native Hospital at Centre Camp because it was too small, was only partly roofed and had no sides. Some of the labourers at this camp had been away from their villages for two years and longed to see their families again. In his general remarks Cpl. Scott suggested that men with five children or more should be sent back home on the termination

⁵⁷ W/D July 1943, Appendix 163 Medical Appreciation.

⁵⁸ P/R Lakekamu, Kairuku No.10, 1943-44 D/S 30/3/11.

of their contracts. In January and in April 1943 a number of labourers were on leave in their villages. Their return home 'brightened things up' for the labourers. Lieut. G.P. Hardy commented 'Like ourselves the boys, if they get a break once in a while, it makes all the difference in the world'. They told him they were all contented with their work and were being fed well.⁵⁹

J. Lillyman who was an ANGAU overseer agreed that the food situation on the line was critical. He explained that the fighting forces at Wau had the first call on all available rations. The ration scale was adequate but food was short. He himself was reduced to eating grass and leaves to supplement his diet of tinned meat, rice and biscuits. Later he contracted beri-beri.⁶⁰ K.C. Atkinson contradicted this allegation about shortage of food saying that from the start there was enough food. There was plenty of rice and sago but no vegetables. Sago, the traditional diet of the Toaripi villagers, was eaten mainly at Bulldog since large amounts could not be taken on the track. Carriers were issued three 12-ounce tins of meat a week, one pound of rice a day, 8 to 12 ounces of wheatmeal and sugar, tea, matches and soap weekly. A group of about twenty men would choose a cook who prepared the mid-day and evening meals. Generally there was little time for breakfast and it was up to the individual cook to overcome this in the best way possible. This is confirmed by complaints of carriers who stated 'the cooks line up to get our food, but by the time he has collected it, we have already moved off'.⁶¹ Some cooks made a cake with flour which carriers chewed on the way to start work. Other carriers ate their meals on the job, still others ate one big meal at the end of the day. When they were in colder areas they were issued cod liver oil mixed with tomato juice.

In order to improve the morale of labourers on the Lines of Communication it was decided to permit the Rev. S. Dewdney and the Rev. H.A. Brown to visit Bulldog to contact villagers working there. These two missionaries could give the working

⁵⁹ P/R Kerema Gulf District No.11, 1943-44 and P/R Gulf District Kerema, 1943-44.

⁶⁰ Cases of scurvy were reported at Bulldog and Edie Creek. W/D Sept. 1943 Appendix 1.

⁶¹ P/R Central District, Kairuku 30/10/1942.

men news of their wives and friends. 'It would mean a much more contented labour force and desertions, at times caused by false rumours, would be considerably reduced.'⁶² Deserters who complained of working a 7-day week were advised by Lieut. L. O'Malley to complain to the ANGAU officers at Terapo (Lieut. Norris) or Bulldog (Lieut. Atkinson) rather than desert.⁶³

It was suggested that to give labourers a chance of complaining there should be quarterly labour inspections of the carriers' working conditions.⁶⁴ These inspections could be conducted by an ADO not connected with the Line of Communication.

This would be no reflection on government officials connected with the line but would reassure the native mind that they were being taken an interest in. It would also help stop deserters from putting over lame excuses and generally prove advantageous.

It was also suggested that carriers must be given regular meals if possible.

All the carriers were coastal men and working in a mountain area was hard. The average weight for their loads should not have exceeded 45 lbs.⁶⁵ It was noted that some deserters did not appear to have been suitable for carrying. When unfit labourers were called on to do work which was too heavy for them the result was either sickness or desertion or both. There was a need for a doctor to examine new recruits before they were sent up-stream and for an experienced doctor on the line itself to weed out the malingerers from those genuinely ill. Bulldog itself had a very unhealthy reputation and this, coupled with the mountain carrying, was producing a high mortality rate.⁶⁶ Uritai

⁶²P/R Gulf District No.2 Kerema Sub-District 16/9/62. Men with families heard '... many exaggerated rumours of conditions in their villages and are always the first to desert'. P/R Lakekamu, Kairuku No.10 of 1943-44.

⁶³P/R Central District, 1942-44, Kairuku 30/10/1942.

⁶⁴P/R Kairuku No.1 of 1943. January 1943.

⁶⁵P/R Central District, 1942-43. Kairuku 30/10/1942.

⁶⁶P/R Central District, Kairuku No.1, 1943 D/S 30/3/15.

carriers told of two men from Uritai, Aparave Everevita and Pisae Miavo, who died on the Bulldog Line of Communication. Unfortunately just when the labour force on the Line of Communication was increased for work on the new road, Captain Curtis, the Medical Officer, was taken away.⁶⁷ The subject of the health of carriers was also raised on the Kalamazoo Line of Communication. It was recommended that the Controller of Native Labour there be issued with medical stores for the care and preservation of the labourers and that yeast be included in the native ration scale in order to offset beri-beri.⁶⁸

At the time when the Native Labour Section repatriated 1492 workers from the Wau-Labu area (period ending 25 May 1944) this observation was made about the health of ANGAU labour: 'Health of native labour on the whole remained good - care being at all times paid to hygiene and sanitation. Cases of meningitis were reported at 3 August'. In April 1944 ten deaths were recorded among native labour and in May thirty-four deaths. The commonest killers were meningitis (9), pneumonia (11) and TB (5).⁶⁹

Lieut. Ormsby made several suggestions about ways to stop desertion from the Line of Communication. He suggested the provision of tokens for bona fide travellers so deserters could be promptly identified, that fines be levied in pigs, that there be corporal punishment of deserters in public, the introduction of special prisons and of regulations to penalise people who assisted deserters.⁷⁰ Village constables and councillors should be warned to look out for deserters passing through their territory 'on their way home'. It was difficult to stop deserters since they would sometimes claim to be going on a 'government message' or that their contracts has been finalised. In one instance a group of deserters had produced

⁶⁷ Covering memorandum to Assistant Adjutant General (District) Admin. Headquarters DS/2/3.

⁶⁸ Letter from Major, ANGAU HQ to 126 Regiment USA P/R Central District, 1941-43, Rigo 1/3 Administration and Organisation. Current Information. 5 October 1942.

⁶⁹ W/D Vol. III Appendix C.

⁷⁰ P/R Kairuku, 1943-44, 17/1/1943, P/R Kairuku No.1, 1943-44, 1/1/1943, and P/R Central District Kairuku Sub-District, 1942-43 3/3/17.

a paper which they claimed was an urgent letter for Kairuku. However the councillor was able to read and soon 'exploded' this story. A token could be carried by all genuine travellers and should be produced at ferries and villages. Lieut. Ormsby suggested the issue of used shotgun cartridges. Any 'apparent labourers' without this 'frank' could be taken to the nearest ANGAU office for investigation. He believed that fines levied in pigs or on other articles dear to the native heart might serve a purpose for a while, though not in all cases. Corporal punishment administered in public was also viewed as an effective deterrent. If necessary, its use could be restricted to certain areas and by officers of a certain rank. If all justices were allowed to order it where necessary there would be little if any abuse of this power. Evasion of apprehension by a deserter in his District was best dealt with on the spot. Two ANGAU officers, T. Grahamslaw and K. Atkinson, have confirmed in personal communications and correspondence that canings 'on the spot' were a most effective form of deterrent to desertion.

Lieut. Ormsby believed that imprisonment under the usual conditions was not a sufficient punishment as many labourers would welcome it as a change from carrying.⁷¹ He suggested the introduction of special prisons near to the various Lines of Communication where the most rigorous conditions, including pack-drill, should be constantly enforced. Gaol sentences should be short so that on their release the offenders could spread the news of its hardship, later on sentences could be lengthened. He had worked in New Guinea before the war and he referred colleagues with New Guinea experience to the 'wonderful effort the Wewak gaol under Warrant Officer Allen had as a crime deterrent'. There the prisoners had broken up coral under a blazing sun. Something along these lines with experienced gaolers and warders would soon solve the problem.⁷² Lieut. Ormsby also

⁷¹When Major W.H. Thompson inspected the Kerema gaol in June 1944 there were fifty-four short-term prisoners there, mostly deserters. The Judicial Case Book revealed the majority of cases to be 'Desertion'. P/R Central District Kairuku 1944-47. 17 June 1944. In order to stop the labour drift from the Port Moresby pool of recruited labour a temporary gaol was built. W/D Feb.-April 1942. Appendix 12B Native Labour Control.

⁷²P/R Kairuku No.1, 1943-44. 1/1/1943.

favoured the provision of a fine and imprisonment for the same offence. There should be a sliding scale of fines varying with the time the deserter had been at liberty and the imprisonment could be varied according to the facts of the actual desertion.⁷³ Lastly Lieut. Ormsby suggested the passing of an additional regulation making any villager who harboured or aided a deserter, or failed to assist a village constable or ANGAU officer in apprehending a deserter, guilty of an offence.⁷⁴

The carriers in the Toaripi area gave a clear description of the major punishment inflicted when a carrier deserted from the line. When Fave Hiovake of Uritai deserted he was arrested in his village and sent back to Bulldog where he was caned by a police sergeant called Latu Erevai. Policemen held Fave's arms and legs over a 44-gallon drum and he was caned in public. Most of the Toaripi carriers estimated that a deserter would receive between twelve and thirty strokes of the cane. They reported that every man who was beaten fell unconscious and had to spend a day or two in the aid post. Beier refers to drum beatings in which a fire was lit in a 44-gallon drum. When the drum was hot the carriers were put across it so they had their chest scalded (Beier, 1969:34). K.C. Atkinson contradicted the Toaripi carriers' accounts of punishment. He stated that no one was held down on the drum by the police and that summary punishment was not deliberately meted out in public but merely on the spot. He knew of no one falling unconscious while being punished. Atkinson had himself never ordered more than six strokes of the cane. He also regarded Sgt. Nato (Latu)⁷⁵ as one of his best policemen. An ANGAU overseer, Chris Lega,

⁷³P/R Central District, Kairuku Sub-District, 1942-43 D/S 30/3/17.

⁷⁴A marginal note next to the topic of 'assisting deserters' stated that a provision for this was made in Native Labour Ordinance - Section 84, Volume III, p.696. P/R Kairuku No.17, 1943-44 D.S 30/3/17, 18 February 1943. A month later it was stated that 'Standing orders are being amended to include Section 84 of Native Labour Ordinance (Papua)'. Covering memorandum from Assistant Adjutant General (Districts) to District Officer, Kairuku. P/R Kairuku, 1943-44, D/S 2/3/257, 14 March 1943.

⁷⁵RPC Sgt. Nato is mentioned in several ANGAU Patrol Reports e.g. P/R No.6, Lakekamu, Kairuku, 1943-44.

was known as 'Master Twenty' because that was the minimum number of strokes he would order.⁷⁶ J. Lillyman described the reports of beatings as exaggerated. He had seen boss boys give six strokes of the cane for serious offences like throwing away cargo or dumping cargo and sitting down. For refusal to carry the normal penalty was a punch on the ear.

The Toaripi carriers said other forms of punishment were digging of drains, cutting grass and the performance of pack-drill. In pack-drill an offender would carry a weight such as a bag of rice at a running pace for a specified time, usually for six hours. A carrier called Kari Karava was punished in this way. Lieut. Atkinson also denied this report about pack-drill. He said such punishment was never meted out to carriers but only to army personnel. A further punishment referred to was the tying of the offender in a bag which was hung from a mango tree and the offender would be given twenty to thirty strokes of the cane while he was in the bag. One carrier said he heard this had happened at Kerema to his uncle. None of the Toaripi carriers referred to fines of £2.0.0 or imprisonment in special gaols.⁷⁷

Many Toaripi carriers said that ANGAU personnel were strict and often spoke 'strong words' to them. The carriers resented the constant scolding or arbitrary punishment they might receive for what to them seemed trivial offences such as being late for meals. They alleged they were forced to wear ramis and if they put on khaki shirts and shorts they were compelled to take them off. They also said their garments and possessions were constantly searched for money or gifts and that these too were confiscated.⁷⁸ An ANGAU overseer, J. Lillyman, agreed with their story about searches. These searches were justified because carriers stole

⁷⁶ Informant L.R. Healy in a statement made while giving a paper on 'The ANGAU Army Government'. 8/11/1974.

⁷⁷ U.Beier (1969:34) describes varying treatment of deserters. Some deserters were warned, others were severely beaten. Some were marched along the beach in handcuffs. One multiple deserter was tied up in a canoe and made to sit in the sun for a whole day.

⁷⁸ V.Eri, 1970, p.18 and p.77, gives examples of the manner in which Europeans addressed villagers of the Moveave area. Returning carriers told stories of harsh treatment by ANGAU, 'just like calaboose'.

detonators, knives and other potentially dangerous articles. After the fighting at Wau some carriers had taken valuables and money from the persons of the dead soldiers. He said contact between ANGAU personnel and labour on the line was functional; there were no abstractions involved.

Few carriers had direct contact with Allied soldiers. Whenever they did meet them an ANGAU official was close by to keep the soldiers apart from the carriers. Carriers saw American troops when they worked at Lae and Salamaua. They said they got on well with them and they recalled that both black and white troops stood up for them when ANGAU officers called them 'boys'. The Americans had said 'They should not call you boys, you are men already'. The carriers also liked the American troops because they spoke with them in a friendly fashion, paid good prices for carvings and always welcomed them into their camps to eat or even to sleep. They liked black troops because they had the same colour of skin. One carrier Towope Tovatoa disappeared from the carrier line at Lae and there is a firmly held belief among surviving Toaripi carriers that he put on an army uniform and boarded a plane for the United States.⁷⁹ Carriers could not understand why ANGAU did not want them to mix with Australian troops. The official reason for the maintenance of this barrier was the presence of endemic infections in the labourers. A general medical instruction was issued by the Adjutant-General in March 1943. It stated that local troops and carriers should be accommodated in camps well away from white troop concentrations, that sick labourers should be held only in native hospitals, that Papuan or New Guinean orderlies should not be employed in service hospitals and that the local villagers should be segregated from diseases such as measles, chicken pox, pneumonia and other respiratory infections. Lastly local troops and carriers were not to overcrowd their sleeping quarters. This instruction was intended to protect local people from the diseases listed above and also to protect Allied soldiers from tropical diseases like malaria, dysentery and hookworm (Walker, 1962:279).

When the able-bodied Toaripi men went to work on the Bulldog Lines of Communication their wives and children and old or unfit men remained in the villages. Families were very sad to lose their menfolk. ANGAU kept the villagers

⁷⁹ See Appendix 2b.

busy by instructing them to make *biri* for houses at Terapo. The nipa palm which grew in the swamps furnished the fronds for this enterprise. All the Toaripi villagers made *biri* and it was taken by canoe to Terapo where the Army had agreed to pay them two shillings a bundle. The sale of *biri* produced fair sums of money. Ivurisa Eravo said she got no money for making *biri* but received supplies of foodstuff from ANGAU. The old people and 'C' class labour were also put to work on jobs like repairing or rebuilding new rest houses or police barracks for government officers on patrol.⁸⁰ Villagers also had to provide firewood and food for RPC members on patrol. Occasionally they were given a special task such as salvaging parts of a wrecked bomber or guiding a party of soldiers to the position of a crashed plane. This happened in August 1943 when a plane crashed near Popo village.⁸¹

Capt. M.J. Healy patrolled from Kerema to Terapo in September 1942 but decided not to visit the Toaripi villages. He reasoned that

At this particular time it does not seem wise to go dabbling into village matters as all the population both male and female are doing work of some kind or other for the Lines of Communication at Iopoi and unnecessary interference from Kerema might only cause complications that would be highly undesirable.⁸²

During the war, Patrol Officers concentrated on recruitment for operational purposes but wherever time permitted they attended to village administration. On their

⁸⁰ P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 2-11 April 1943. Savaiviri on the Lakekamu River was 'in a shocking condition' when W/O Wearne visited it in March 1944. The explanation was that the ANGAU officers at Terapo had made such heavy demands on this and other villages in the vicinity for the supply of *biri* that the villagers were unable to make repairs to their houses. The ANGAU officers had overlooked the delapidation during the time in which the *biri* was supplied. P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44, 17-25 March.

⁸¹ P/R Kerema, 17.1.1943, Kairuku No.1, 1943 and Kerema, 9.8.1943.

⁸² P/R Gulf District, Kerema, 1942.

patrols through the beach villages of the Toaripi area by launch, on foot and by push bike they attended to a large number of tasks. Officers checked on the physical condition of the beach villages, on their cleanliness and the state of the fences, bridges, tracks and roads. They kept a close eye on erosion which was a major problem for beach villages.

In November 1942 Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy reported that the people who were left in the Toaripi villages carried on very well and the only things which were different from normal times were that the building of houses and heavy work about the villages were on a reduced scale and that villages were much quieter. On the whole the old men and unfit men seemed quite happy.

In June 1944 Capt. B.W. Faithorn reported that attendances at the various mission schools were 'quite satisfactory'. In his opinion the teachers were doing a good job despite the shortages of school equipment. He stressed to village councillors the importance of education for 'the children of to-day' and asked them to see that the pupils attended school regularly. W/O Wearne had reported earlier that only at Kárama was there any complaint against recalcitrant school children. Wearne noted with surprise that a number of young people spoke English. 'No doubt, contact with troops and the Lakekamu (Bulldog) Line of Communication had developed the use of the Mother Tongue'.⁸³ When carriers returned from Lae many spoke Pidgin but very few had learnt English. In the far western villages of the Gulf District Lieut. Bergin had pointed out to Rev. S. Dewdney in 1943 that though it was most desirable for education to continue, owing to the absence of menfolk on war work, school children should be told to assist as far as possible with the domestic and agricultural aspects of village life. There was a chronic shortage of adult carriers to help beach patrols so ANGAU depended to some extent on 'youths and lads' for carrying in the beach villages.⁸⁴

In January 1943 Cpl. G.R. Wearne patrolled through several Toaripi villages on the way from Kerema to Terapo. He reported that

⁸³P/R Gulf District, 1943-44, Kerema 26 March 1942; P/R Kerema No.14, 9 June 1944; and P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44.

⁸⁴P/R Kerema, 1943-44, 26.6.1943 and 30.6.1943.

The villages were generally in a clean condition although the fences needed repairing in several places. These villagers were all prepared for the patrol and the fences were immediately repaired.⁸⁵

When Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy inspected villages in the Lakekamu District in March 1942, he commented adversely on their condition.

This district has become very slack in its duties and nearly all villages were exceptionally untidy. However those concerned were reminded by a little work, and afterwards it was explained to them that keeping their villages clean and tidy was for their own good as if they were not, sickness would come about.

However, he acknowledged that 'Village life in general seems to be running along quite smoothly'.⁸⁶ On questioning village constables at villages where houses were badly in need of repair, Sgt. B. Hayes was told that most of the men had gone to Bulldog and that there were only old men, women and children left.⁸⁷

Patrol Officers regularly threatened to take strong disciplinary action against neglectful villagers. Lieut. E. G. Hicks took firm action when he found a village in an unsatisfactory condition.

All village people, under police supervision, were immediately ordered to clean the village area of rubbish. A house-to-house inspection showed a decided improvement.

In July 1943 Cpl. Wearne reported that

In most cases these villages are almost entirely denuded of adult males except for the school children and the old men. Despite these difficulties, the villages were in good condition and well looked after.

⁸⁵P/R Kerema, Gulf District No.11, 17-22 January 1943.

⁸⁶P/R 1943-44, Gulf District, 2-11 April 1943.

⁸⁷P/R Kerema, 6.6.1943.

Wages paid to labourers on the Bulldog Lines of Communication were distributed to their wives and families in the villages. On his patrol through the Toaripi villages in July 1943, Cpl. Wearne sought the relatives of labourers on the Bulldog Lines of Communication. As he paid relatives at Uamai he

explained to the recipients the source of the money and told the people generally that their sons and brothers were doing work of first class importance, the result of which will assist in the final expulsion of the enemy from the island thereby bringing peace and re-union of their menfolk nearer.⁸⁸

By December 1943, the over-recruitment of fit male labour in the Lakekamu District brought about by operational necessity had resulted in a general deterioration of village gardens, roads and houses. The villagers had however 'responded well to advice and encouragement given them by the the District Staffs', and were growing sufficient food for their own requirements. ANGAU kept a constant watch on the maintenance of food supplies in villages and some villages even held feasts during wartime.⁸⁹

Two Patrol Officers reported in early 1944 that there was an adequate supply of food in the Toaripi villages. W/O G.R. Wearne reported that the food supply was plentiful, even in villages with a swampy hinterland. In these villages every available piece of high land was used for agricultural development and a fine system of drains was maintained to meet the contingencies of tides and rains.⁹⁰ Capt. B.W. Faithorn observed that the Gulf villager was not an agriculturist. Though he planted small areas of the most suitable land with bananas, taros and sweet potatoes this was only a sideline because his staple diet was sago. Faithorn reported that sago was in abundance. Furthermore because the Gulf villager lived on the coast with creeks all around him he

⁸⁸Material quoted in the last two paragraphs is from the following reports: W/D Report District Services, December 1943, and P/R Kerema, 1942-45, Lakekamu 8 of 1943-44.

⁸⁹W/d Report District Services, December 1943; P/R 1943-44 Gulf District, Kerema, 16 April 1943, covering memorandum to DO; and P/R Kairuku No.1, 1943.

⁹⁰P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44.

was able to catch fish, crabs and prawns. 'The Gulf native is free from the fear of want therefore there is no necessity for him to become an agriculturist.'⁹¹ These accounts are contradicted by H.A. Brown who on a number of occasions had to report shortages of food in the villages to ANGAU. Coastal villages were further away from their sago supplies, only Popo was conveniently situated in this respect. Hasu Morauta said some children died at Uritai because there was a shortage of food. There were also too few canoes left in the village for the women to use.

Patrol reports show that the authorities actively encouraged the trade of sago for pots in the Lakekamu District. Major Thompson loaned the launch *Gawa* to take Chiria clay pots to Mirivase to trade for sago and in December 1944 he sent Pinu villagers to Mirivase to buy sago with their own cash. ANGAU transported the sago back to Pinu for the villagers. (Chiria is a village on Yule Island.)⁹²

A number of physical changes were made by the Army to the villages of the Toaripi area. Engineers built wharves, bridges, sheds and camps both at Mirivase and Lalapipi. The Army Engineers at Mirivase constructed a groyne in the sea in 1943. In the opinion of Major Thompson this may have been laid out in the right direction at the time of construction but by 1944 the bar at the Lakekamu had made its seasonal shift and had silted up the whole mouth of the river. Major Thompson described the bar as 'a sad trial' when his launch ran aground on it. He described the groyne as a 'foolish and idiotic contraption' which was fast vanishing by the action of the sea. Fortunately no one had 'fooled about' with the Tauri River bar about ten miles west of the Lakekamu so it was possible to enter the Tauri and use the channel which linked it to the Lakekamu a few miles from the coast.⁹³ Ivaraharia Ikui saw the 'fence' on his return to the coast and he felt its purpose was to prevent logs and trees from being washed on Mirivase beach. The current was forced to go through a channel to the mouth of the river. H.A. Brown says that many villagers were astounded by the way Army engineers worked quietly and purposefully to erect this giant pig-fence.

⁹¹P/R Kerema No.14, 9 June 1944.

⁹²Covering memo P/R Kerema No.4, 1944-45, 3 January 1945.

⁹³P/R Kairuku No.1, 1944-45, Appendix B, 7 July 1944.

Labourers on the Line of Communication were eligible for one or two weeks leave in the middle of a two-year contract. When despatched to their villages on leave they usually carried a leave pass which stated the duration of their leave. As soon as their leave was over they had to report to Terapo, to be sent back on the line. Patrol reports show that in January and in April 1943 a number of labourers were on leave in their home areas. Their presence in the villages 'brightened things up' for the labourers. They told the Patrol Officer who met them that they were all contented with their work and were being fed well. Very few carriers had the opportunity to return home and many had to content themselves with writing 'shoals of letters' to their families. H.A. Brown was asked by ANGAU to censor the labourers' mail. He recalls the letters revealed a very keen sense of curiosity and a capacity to observe and describe in great detail their experiences while in New Guinea.

On occasion a Patrol Officer would be instructed to collect labourers whose leave had expired. Patrol instructions on 30 June 1943 to Cpl. Wearne stated '... you will collect and bring back to this station [a number of labourers]. They have been on a month's leave and are due back at work on 30th. Take list, its on a blue paper.'⁹⁴ If a villager reappeared in his village without an official paper to say he was on leave or that he had fallen sick it meant he was a deserter. In August 1943, Patrol Officer Hardy gave instructions to village constables and councillors 'to arrest any boy who could not prove that he wasn't a deserter'.⁹⁵ Village constables and the RPC kept an eye on all the villages for deserters returning home.

It was the village constable's job to question any man as to why he was in the village. If a man was a deserter he would be sent to report to the nearest patrol post where he would be gaoled until transport was available to take him back to his place of work. Often relatives hid deserters from the village constable, taking food secretly to him in the bush and not letting anyone else in the village know that he had returned. In this way a deserter could spend up to a week at home without getting caught. To counteract this protection of runaways, Patrol Officers would visit the

⁹⁴ P/R Kerema No.1, 1943-44.

⁹⁵ P/R Kerema, 9 August 1943.

villages and gather the relatives of known deserters together as well as the village constable and the councillors. The officers would tell them that it was their job to help the government to arrest deserters. By this means many deserters were persuaded to give themselves up. While on patrol in January 1944 W/O Wearne 'enquired into the possible whereabouts of deserters but in almost every case was told by the village constables or councillors that as far as they knew the boys were still at their places of employment'.⁹⁶

It was the duty of the village constable to keep his villagers working for the government. He usually enjoyed the support of ANGAU officials when he was efficient. Lieut. Geelan 'tried to back up' the authority of village policemen and councillors 'where deserved', and he thought it had a good effect.⁹⁷ Villagers recalled that the constable often used a cane to get people out of their houses to do their work for ANGAU. ANGAU officers delegated authority to village constables and most of them worked hard to see their tasks were completed.

Capt. B.W. Faithorn reported in June 1944 that village constables were doing their duty as well as could be expected under prevailing conditions.

There have been cases of Neglect of Duty reported and these have been dealt with in an appropriate manner. A general warning was given to all Village Constables against harbouring deserters and concealing serious crimes.⁹⁸

After Major Thompson had inspected the villages from Kairuku to Kerema in July 1944, he asked in his report when the uniforms for village constables would be forthcoming. Some village constables' uniforms were in rags and tatters, a result of no issue for nearly three years. In Major Thompson's opinion this was bad from an administrative point of view. He found it 'strange that we can get RPC uniforms, which are the same as the village constable's except for the red bands round the edges of sulu and jumper, but we cannot clothe our village police.' He reported that most of the

⁹⁶ P/R Kerema, 9 August 1943 and No.11, January 1944.

⁹⁷ P/R Gulf District 1944-45, Kerema No.1.

⁹⁸ P/R Kerema No.14. Patrol from Kerema to Mirivase, 9 June 1944.

village constables were of a good type and carrying out their duties well.⁹⁹

Though most village constables were 'good men' one complaint was laid by the villagers of Hamuhamu against Village Constable Jack of Moveave 'who lays claim to the "kingship" of Toaripi'. W/O Wearne observed that VC Jack had amassed much wealth and prestige in the previous twelve to eighteen months and that Jack gave the impression that his decisions over-rode all others.¹

To improve the work done by village constables, a village constable training school was set up by the District Officer, Purari, at Kikori Station. Other parts of Papua had tried the same system with 'excellent results'. The village constables spent a month on the station after which they returned to their villages knowing why ANGAU staff paid so much attention to hygiene and sanitation.

Experience has shown that when village officials have been taught the benefits resulting from proper attention to these matters they will carry out orders issued by Patrol Officers cheerfully and well, instead of regarding them as so much unnecessary trouble for themselves and their people.²

Several requests were made by women of the beach villages for their menfolk to be returned from 'their government work'³ because of family responsibilities. So great was the concern of some wives for their husbands' welfare that they visited the government stations at Kerema or at Terapo to ask the ANGAU officers when their menfolk would be returning. At Kerema Capt. Healy would advise them that ANGAU could not tell them anything but that when the war was over their husbands would be sent home. Indentured men had at least to serve out their contracts. Dago Morea, the clerk at Kerema, had copies of men's contracts so was able to say whether there would be a wait of two weeks or two months before they expired. He recalled that the wives were usually satisfied with what they were told.

⁹⁹P/R Kairuku No.1, 1944-45, 7 July 1944.

¹ P/R Kerema No.13, 1943-44.

² W/D July 1945 Appendix HQ A27, Vol.4, Commander's Report.

³ P/R Kairuku, Patrol of Lieut. O'Connor and Cpl. Scott, March 1943.

Official reports show that arrangements were being made in May 1944 to return a group of 250 indentured men from the 'Tauri River area' to their coastal villages.⁴ They were kept in Lae pending the arrival of sea transport to take them home. Capt. B.W. Faithorn reported that the return home of more and more indentured labourers released from the Army on medical or other grounds helped Toaripi village life to return to normal. In June 1944 he anticipated the return of the majority of the working men. 'When the thousand odd Kerema natives from the Wau-Wampit area arrive and are paid off the lingering traces of discontent should disappear.'⁵ In July 1944 Major Thompson made a speech to keep up the morale of the Toaripi villagers. At Uritai he told a crowd that rumours of a general massacre at Lae of labourers from their district were groundless. By chance Major Humphries confirmed this statement in his broadcast which a large crowd heard at the police post. In the opinion of Major Thompson the villages on the Toaripi coast were clean and well-fenced in July 1944 but there were some dilapidated houses. He commented that

All the native wanted was to get his young men, or a fair quota of them, back from work to help him get his houses and gardens in order, to repair fences, etc. Then he would wish to be left alone in peace for a year or two. Personally I trust that he can be. The people generally looked very healthy and multitudes of brown babies could be seen toddling about in every village.⁶

The carriers returned to their villages in batches. They were all taken to Yule Island by ship and some were paid there. Others had to go to Kerema to draw their pay. When the menfolk returned there was rejoicing in the villages but also sadness for those who had fallen sick and died in the war. Many songs about their experiences were composed by the carriers (see Appendix 2b). Some carriers looked very healthy and strong but others seemed very ill and weak. Though patrol reports reveal some labourers were paid none of the Uritai informants acknowledged that he was paid during

⁴W/D May 1944 Vol.3, Appendix C. Native Labour Section Activities.

⁵P/R Kerema No.14, 9 June 1944.

⁶P/R Kairuku No.1, 1944-45, 7 July 1944.

the days of carrying. Some men spent their money on a variety of goods. These included forks, spoons, hair oil, watches, kit bags, civilian shirts, women's clothes, bush knives, hammers, saws, chisels, mirrors, handkerchiefs, blankets, towels, cigarettes, bowls and cooking pots. Others collected their pay and hurried home. Both Kairuku and Kerema had well-stocked ANGAU trade stores but comparatively few men bought anything. They collected their pay at Kerema from Capt. Healey or Lieut. Atkinson and sped off to their villages. They resented greatly the previous action of ANGAU officers who had searched their gear and confiscated gifts and money they brought with them when they arrived from Lae. Some carriers were able to hide their gifts in the bush or in holes on the beach. Some were unfortunate in that other carriers stole their hidden possessions.⁷

When the menfolk returned to the Toaripi villages in mid-1944 there was a shortage of food. Gardens which had been planted in 1942 were yielding very poorly in their third year. A monotonous diet of sago was the only food the villagers had until newly planted gardens began to bear. Some clans gathered together what greens and vegetables they could and held small feasts for their returned men. In August Capt. J. Ross attended a dance at Uritai, the first since the labourers had returned. In his report he stated the villages were now well off for labour because the Wau Line of Communication labourers had returned. He reported that most local activity was confined to the improvement of gardens which he expected would be followed by the improvement of villages. Capt. Ross prepared a requisition for vegetable seeds to be distributed to villages and he urged that the requisition be favourably considered.⁸ An official comment in July 1945 described the general effect of the labourers' return to their villages. The 'general remarks' of a District Services Report stated that the repatriation of many time-expired labourers to their village sites had improved the morale of the people.

⁷ Dago Morea said carriers bearing notes from the donors of their gifts were allowed to keep them. V. Eri, 1970, pp.163-70, gives a description of the carriers' return journey, life on board ship, the confiscation of their valuables and their songs about the war. There is a very close correlation between the experiences of the Moveave men as recorded in this novel and the evidence of the Uritai informants.

⁸ P/R Kairuku, 1944-45, 28 August 1944.

They are now realising that the promises made in the early days of 1942-43 are being honoured even if at a later date than anticipated. Those who have returned are busily reconstructing their villages and opening new garden areas.⁹

The returned carriers spent part of their leisure time telling stories about their experiences during the war and about the new groups of people they met in New Guinea. Before the war Papuans had rarely crossed the border. The returned men sang the new songs they had composed about their experiences in the war and they grumbled that the war was a 'bad time' because it had spoiled their lives and had made them waste three years. They complained that 10/- a month for carrying was a pittance. They claimed that after the war, the 'fighting men' (PIB) were far better looked after than the carriers were.¹⁰ Many carriers who spoke about the war transmitted to their audiences strong impressions about their friendliness with Allied soldiers, their acquisition of new tastes in food and dress and a deep hatred for the RPC and ANGAU. 'Only bossboys were friends of Angau.'

Few carriers knew of the shortages of food in their home villages or appreciated the fact that ANGAU had on occasion fed their families in their absence. Whereas some villagers were content to remain in their home villages others, having seen new places, were inclined to leave the dull routine of village life. The latter signed up to work on plantations or in Port Moresby, Lae and Rabaul.¹¹

Brief reports on the state of the Toaripi villages were written by Lieut. E.G. Hicks who patrolled from Cape Possession to Hamuhamu (Tauri River).¹² He reported that Sirivoa,

⁹ W/D July 1945. District Services. DS SI 1/1/15.

¹⁰ Moveave village, which was close to the coastal villages, supplied many members of 'A' company in the PIB. The members of this company gained several decorations and a great deal of praise was showered on the soldiers by ANGAU as a result. This may partly account for the jealousy of the carriers.

¹¹ Lieut. Geelan noted that some youths 'welcomed a chance for a walkabout'. P/R No.4 Kerema, 1944-45.

¹² P/R Gulf District, 1944-45, No.19 Kairuku, 10 May 1945. See Table 4.

Iakere and Mokoia, three hamlets in the Popo group, had combined to form a new village called Mikafiru across the Kapuri River from the old Mokoia site. Two villages, Duruapo and Kaisova, were building a new combined village called Luluapo on a site selected by Lieut. Bergin, OIC Mirivase. Both villages were in an early stage of construction so all dwellings were temporary. The previous village constable of Popo, V.C. Avasa, was in charge of Luluapo and a new village constable, Pissaroti, was appointed to control Mikafiru. The rest house and barracks for the RPC were of a good standard.

During the time of the Bulldog-Wau Line of Communication Lalapipi residents were moved to Paiho and units of the Army occupied the village. The villagers returned by May 1945 to their old village site at the mouth of the Lakekamu and had completed the building of a new village. Lieut. Hicks reported that it was well laid out and 'a considerable achievement'. The few villagers remaining at Paiho were ordered to return to their former villages of Lalapipi and Mirivase. Lieut. Hicks considered Village Constable Hahaue Alavao to be an energetic and helpful official.

The condition of Isapeape (Mirihae) left much to be desired in Lieut. Hicks' opinion. He anticipated that the work of repair and reconstruction was about to be undertaken because there were stacks of newly cut timber in the village. Isapeape was subject to occasional flooding at high tides, but that was the only site available. Lieut. Hicks stated that with a little more interest and industry on the part of the villagers and their Village Constable Tatiava, Isapeape could be made quite a picturesque village.

When the original site of Mirivase village was taken over by the Army (1st Australian Water Transport Company) the villagers of Mirivase were dispersed between Paiho and Uritai in numerous small beach hamlets. This situation was unsatisfactory from the point of view of effective administration so Lieut. Hicks called a meeting of all Mirivase villagers. He proposed that these villagers regroup themselves to establish a new village. The villagers erected a new residence, a native hospital and many other buildings in the new village.¹³ The villagers seemed reluctant at first to leave their scattered hamlets but after considerable

¹³P/R Kerema No.8, 1944-45.

discussion and consideration of all aspects of the move it was decided that the new village be set up near the ocean beach on the site of a small hamlet known as Mirivase proper. The villagers recognised that it was unwise to rebuild on the old village site (Mirivase Police Post) as with each successive flooding of the Lakekamu a greater area was washed away. In the six months prior to May 1945 seventy-five yards of what was once Mirivase was washed away. Under the leadership of Village Constable Pukari of Uritai, residents of the previously scattered hamlets commenced removing old dwellings at Paiho and elsewhere.

Uritai (Motu Motu) was the largest of the Toaripi villages visited by Lieut. Hicks. The greater part of the village was subject to flooding at 'king' tides while the ocean was encroaching on the narrow isthmus on which the village was built. Families had begun to erect houses extending along the beach to the east. Where houses were found to be in need of repair Lieut. Hicks issued instructions that work be done immediately. There were probably more single men available in Uritai than in any other village in the sub-district of Kerema. Yet Uritai did not conform to the satisfactory standard of other villages he had visited. Lieut. Hicks regarded Uritai villagers as lazy and unco-operative. He said the task of being village constable there would not be an easy one. At the time of Lieut. Hicks' visit Village Constable Pukari Kakare was in Kerema Native Hospital recovering from head injuries sustained a few weeks previously when he was attacked while trying to arrest gamblers in the village.¹⁴

Lieut. A.L. Robson was distressed by the state of the Toaripi villages and the activities of the people in April 1945. He deplored the very low level of 'civic responsibility' in the villages he visited.

¹⁴ P/R Gulf District, 1944-45, No.19 Kairuku, 10 May 1945. V.C. Pukari was sentenced to one month imprisonment at hard labour for assault in the court of Native Matters by Lieut. E.G. Hicks in March 1945. P/R Kairuku, 1944-45, 9 March 1945. In April 1945 Lieut. A.L. Robson commented that 'this district is very fortunate in having some very good men east of Kerema, particularly the V.C's of Uritai and Lalapipi ...' P/R Kerema No.8, 1944-45.

Table 4
Census of Toaripi villages

	Vital statistics - March 1945					Total
	Indent- ured Labour	Male Children	Female Children	Male Adults	Female Adults	
Mikafiru	6	31	24	34	32	127
Luluapo	5	45	36	43	48	177
Lalapipi	4	36	25	35	35	135
Mirivase	6	27	37	29	27	126
Uritai	34	166	170	184	199	753
Isapeape	33	118	96	122	122	491

Source: Extract from P/R No.19, Kairuku 1944-45 (Lieut. E.G. Hicks).

It is quite apparent that owing to the laxity allowed throughout the war years (mainly because of the large number of natives away from the village under C/E) that the people have come to regard poor housing, broken fencing and uncut pathways as the quite natural thing for the government to inspect. Lieut. Hicks ... and myself ... have issued many orders to endeavour to rectify this state of affairs. At present along the east coast there are a good number of males home in the villages and I consider that they should be made to live up to their responsibility.

At the time Lieut. Robson visited the villages he found very few men were inclined to 'sign on' for labour. He reasoned that

In this area there is a lot of money in circulation within the villages and therefore whilst this state of affairs exists, there is

very little incentive for the males to seek employment.¹⁵

In the following months Patrol Officers continued to be busy examining and settling compensation claims for the destruction of canoes, sago palms and coconut trees by the Army. They also checked on the claims for pay by returned labourers.¹⁶

A great deal of effort and expense went into the building of the Bulldog Road. Its construction took a toll from surveyor, engineer, labourer and carrier alike. The capture of Salamaua, Lae and Nadzab during 1943 and their development into effective bases resulted in the almost total elimination of the Bulldog Road as a medium of overland supply to ground forces in later operations. It did provide the means of supply to Australian troops engaged in establishing a two-brigade capacity rest camp at Wau while the roads from Salamaua and Lae were being developed but its value as a strategic route had declined. The constant and extensive maintenance necessary to keep the Bulldog Road usable was not justified by its military usefulness and it was discontinued about the middle of February 1944. Construction of the Bulldog Road was a typical example of the need in wartime for an expenditure of effort far in excess of the eventual utilization value of the project to ensure flexibility of operations in an emergency. It was pointed out in July 1950 that the same logistical support could have been provided better or more quickly by 25 C-4 air transports.¹⁷

The Toaripi people were engaged in operational tasks in an area where no battles took place. They carried loads on an unknown track and then built a road which quickly outlived its usefulness. This accounts for the general lack of recognition of the part they played in the war effort of Papua New Guinea.

¹⁵ P/R Kerema No.8, 1944-45.

¹⁶ 'I think the majority of the claims are genuine - it has been admitted that the native labour records of natives employed in the Terapo-Bulldog area were extremely muddled and haphazard - desertions were the order of the day - natives changed places without knowledge of the overseers ...'
P/R No.6 Kerema, June/July 1946.

¹⁷ Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945. Vol.VI, Airfield and Base Development, p.162.

Chapter 4

Hanuabada in the War

Hanuabada is the name given to a group of villages on the western side of Port Moresby and less than a mile from town. It is of mixed Motu and Koita origin. The Western Motu villages are Poreporena, Tanobada and Elevala. Hohodae and Kuriu are Koita villages. The title Hanuabada is often given to the largest and most densely populated village - Poreporena.¹ In September 1941 the population of the Hanuabada villages was 2300 or more (Williams, 1941:52).


When Japan entered World War II on 7 December 1941, Port Moresby was a small town with a few hundred European inhabitants and a tiny garrison. Soldiers had arrived in March 1939 and had erected guns on Paga Hill commanding the approaches to Basilisk Passage. One Hohodae villager, Daera Ganiga, joined the 13th Heavy Battery of the Australian Military Forces.

Hanuabadans worked as clerks in several government offices, in trade stores, at Steamships and B.P's and others worked at the Government Printer and the *Papuan Courier*. While on the job these men were in a favourable position to learn about the outbreak of war from any Europeans who took them into their confidence. Morea Morea Hila, who worked in the Government Secretary's office, was told 'there will be a war soon', and was given strict instructions not to tell

¹Minute Paper No. AN 128/40 gave the population of Hanuabada in August 1940 as:

Hohodae	223
Poreporena	1122
Tanobada	329
Elevala	<u>602</u>
	2276

(Resident Magistrate, Central District)



Map 5 Papuan coast from Vabukori to Ala'ala showing villages where Motuan refugees stayed.

anyone lest it should make people afraid. He kept it a secret from his wife. The secrecy seems strange in the light of the coverage of the war given by the *Papuan Villager* from 1939 to 1941. The *Papuan Villager* was a monthly newspaper edited by the Government Anthropologist, F.E. Williams, and published by the Government Printer. Issues from March to November 1941 advised on air raid precautions, blackouts, news of the European war, the importance of Japan as a military power and the possibility of war being declared by Japan.

About three months after Morea Morea Hila learnt about the war, F.E. Williams visited Hanuabada and spoke to everyone at a big gathering near Peter Vagi's house. Loa Daera learnt about the war while working at the *Papuan Courier* but he thought of it only in terms of Germany fighting against England. He never imagined that Papua would be involved, yet when the PIB was formed in June 1940 he joined. The Administration had invited Papuans to volunteer and because he was a single man he enlisted. Revo Peter learnt about the war by reading the *Papuan Villager*, which was supplied to all schools. Gaba Tutara learnt about the war from Morea Morea Hila who used to read copies of the *Papuan Villager* to members of the Gunina Idibana clan. It is clear that several literate Hanuabadans were aware of the war in Europe but it is not clear how widely stories or rumours of the war were circulated within the village. Loa Daera recalls discussing the war with his neighbours.

Few people in Hanuabada knew of the existence of a radio service in Papua in 1941, although there is conflict of evidence on this issue. Informants recalled that there was a radio station, but said it did *not* broadcast. A possible explanation is that few radio sets existed and since the programs would be in English, villagers might have assumed the programs were from Australia. Mr Percy Chatterton, who owned a radio before the war, says AWA ran a commercial broadcasting station 4PM (Stuart, 1970:340). There were groups of people who were completely dependent for any news of the war on better informed villagers. Everyone in Hanuabada noticed that 'well over a hundred troops' were in Port Moresby and they referred to them as '8th M.D.' Villagers saw the troops erecting guns on the hill behind Government House, on Touaguba Hill, Napa Napa Hill, at Taurama and on hills around the town up to twelve miles away. The temporary HQ of 8th MD was J.R. Clay's building in Port Moresby.

In the middle of 1941 the Resident Magistrate, W.R. Humphries, visited Hanuabada, called a meeting of the villagers and told them about the air raid siren and the need for blackouts. The village councillors were told to instruct the Hanuabada people to dig trenches which were three and a half to four feet deep and six feet long. A large family would have to dig a bigger trench or an L-shaped one. Villagers helped one another to dig these trenches, which were located on rising ground about 150-200 yards from the houses. At that time most of the houses of Hanuabada were over the water. Villagers were told that short blasts on the air-raid siren at the power-house meant that enemy planes were approaching and this would be a signal to shelter in their trenches. They were to stay in their shelters until they heard an 'all-clear' whistle. There were several rehearsals in Hanuabada of how to get into the trenches during an air raid.

The Resident Magistrate told the constables to see that villagers did not have too many lights on at night. Villagers remember periods of blackout in 1941 when not only the lights of Hanuabada were put out but the Europeans in town turned off theirs as well. While Hanuabadans were being told to prepare themselves for an air attack, Australian soldiers were formed into a Home Defence Unit to protect their property in case of an air raid. Some Europeans were detailed to work as medical assistants as well.

F.E. Williams was asked by the Government Secretary on 5 March 1941 to set up an organisation to look after air-raid precautions and to complete arrangements for a complete evacuation of civilians. For seven and a half months Mr Williams worked to set up such an organisation. A civilian Air Raid Precaution (ARP) pamphlet was published. It gave advice on shelter from high explosive bombs, air raid signals, lighting restrictions and fire precautions. Batches of ARP pamphlets were sent to missions and government stations and copies were distributed to all householders in Port Moresby. ARP posters were also posted in prominent places in all dwellings and business premises.

From March to September 1941 the *Papuan Courier* published appeals for volunteers, lists of personnel, notices and reports of blackouts and advice regarding bomb protection and fire prevention (Williams, 1941). There were three trial blackouts, on 20, 26 June and 10 July 1941. During the first blackout electric light and power were cut off but in the second and third trials no power was cut off except for

street and wharf lights. It was left to householders to switch off their own lights or blackout their doors and windows. 'The natives of Poreporena and Koki-Kila Kila responded very well. In the first area they were controlled by the Resident Magistrate directing Village Police and Councillors.' The weak point in the blackouts was the alarm system, as the power house whistle was inaudible on Ela Beach and could not be relied on to reach Konedobu or even be heard all through the town. A new siren with a sound radius of five miles was ordered. The actual air-raid alarm and all-clear signals were respectively a series of five-second blasts with 3-second intervals and continuous long blasts. At the sounding of the alarm everyone with a shelter was supposed to duck into it. Of the native villages Mr Williams stated 'It is to be feared that, if attacked with fire-bombs, the native villages will "go up" despite all precautions'. Arrangements were made to supply two sandbags apiece to the dwellings of Poreporena; bags were drawn from stocks at Headquarters, and filled and distributed by the villagers under the supervision of their village constables and councillors. The following procedure for using sandbags was recommended to villagers. They were to pick up the sandbag (two-thirds full and tied at the opening) by the tied end and one of the bottom corners and drop or place it on the bomb, then to tip one of the floor planks and allow the bomb and sandbag to fall into the sea.

An aid post was organised to deal with possible casualties among Poreporena villagers. It was sited in a schoolroom and was under the charge of Sister A. Cole. A class of twenty young men was given a course of first aid dressing by Sister Fairhall and they were examined by Dr A. J. May in stretcher drill, bandaging and other practical work. All passed their exams. The Revs D.E. Ure and N.C. Watt and Miss R. Colledge remained at Metoreia to help the villagers in the event of evacuation.

In March 1941 the Australian Government issued instructions that European women and children not engaged in essential work should be encouraged to leave unobtrusively. Residents of Hanuabada observed that towards the end of 1941 all the European women and children were leaving on ships for Australia and that some men travelled with them. On 12 December 1941, shortly after Japanese hostilities began, orders for the compulsory evacuation of these civilians had been virtually completed, though some women engaged in nursing

and missionary services still remained. Villagers did not know how close the war was to Papua and could not understand the movements of ships to and from Australia (Williams, 1941). It was recalled that Percy Chatterton of the London Missionary Society stayed on in Papua. Mr Chatterton affirms that all male LMS missionaries remained. Their wives and the unmarried female missionaries were evacuated to Australia, but this was a mission and not a government decision. All through February 1942 every European who 'could beg, borrow or steal a boat throughout the Territory left'. Many passed through Daru. It was officially estimated that 200 left before the end of February 1942.²

All the Hanuabada villagers recall air attacks on Port Moresby. Rarua Tau recalls three air-raid warnings, the first in the day and the second and third at night.³ A big bombing raid on Port Moresby took place at 3a.m. on 3 February 1942.⁴ The air-raid siren sounded and villagers heard the planes overhead. When the first bomb dropped they ran from their homes. Bombs from the Japanese planes fell in the harbour and on Ela Beach. Morea Morea Hila ran with his family of four to their shelter which was 200 yards from his house. When the family got in he pulled a piece of iron roofing over the opening. No one else entered his shelter but he believed no one would have objected to sharing a trench with others. Morea Dago, who had taken his wife to Porebada two weeks before the bombing, said that in the confusion caused by the bombing villagers ran screaming helter-skelter. While some entered their own shelters or other people's, others hid in the bushes on the high ground.

There is divergence of evidence about the evacuation of Hanuabada. Some villagers said they were told to prepare in case of any bombing and were ready to travel in their canoes.

²W/D November-December 1942, Appendix 69, Annual Report Fly River Division.

³Paull (1958:14) refers to a false air-raid alarm during the day on 23 January 1942, the very day the Japanese occupied Rabaul.

⁴This time is generally agreed on by informants. Six aircraft, four in arrowhead formation, one in the lead and one in the rear, bombed from 8000 feet in clear moonlight. A similar raid of seven aircraft occurred on 5 February (Sweeting, 1970:701).

Others had no canoes and were at a loss to know how to flee their village. The next morning a number of men with canoes put their families on board and sailed away as soon as they could 'on the first tide' to the villages in the west. Some canoes had to be paddled, others had sails, large canoes were tied together. Those men whose canoes were in poor repair got out their tools and hastily started to make them seaworthy. A major concern was to shift the women, children and the feeble from the village. Villagers left their domestic animals behind and took with them essential materials which they would need like carpentry tools, axes and knives. A number of people without canoes took as much of their belongings as they could carry on their backs and set out on foot for Porebada. Others waited hopefully for friends to return with canoes. Those who sailed away first deposited their passengers at Porebada and returned for other families. Stronger men came back for 'heavy stuff' like sewing machines and for the pigs and dogs. Loa Daera, who was then in the PIB, entered the village with other soldiers from Hanuabada and they told their relatives to 'move along'. Mr W.R. Humphries visited the village and told Councillor Peter Vagi that the village people were all to leave and were not to wait for a second air attack. A Mr Willis said 'Tell your people to clear this place'.

Hanuabadans made haste by road and water for the villages of Porebada and Boera and a few reached Manumanu. Nou Goreu had no canoe and with a few other people who lacked transport waited at the water's edge for returning craft. Eventually a canoe took Nou and his family to Gemo Island. That night some canoes took the remaining Hanuabadans from Gemo Island to Porebada. It took two days and two nights to clear Hanuabada of its people. Some villagers stayed on, however, as Papuan Administrative Unit (PAU) clerks. It was claimed that the Government sent the *Royal Endeavour* to aid in the evacuation of people but it is possible that this refers to the second evacuation from Porebada to Hisiu Point. There was no informant on the boat when it took people from Hanuabada.

Villagers were sad to leave their homes and their treasured possessions and gardens. Many people cried at leaving but they were so scared of the war and of further bombing raids that they were glad to go to a safe place. In Appendix 3a there is a detailed account of one villager's evacuation.

At first the majority of Hanuabadans stayed at Porebada, though a few families had sped on to Manumanu. While refugees were staying at Porebada, officers of the PAU visited the village in February and March to recruit able-bodied men. In April PAU officers told the Hanuabadans to shift once more for their own safety because they were still too close to Port Moresby. Two reasons were advanced by the residents. Firstly several planes were flying over Porebada and one was shot down over the village; secondly troops were too near and their women-folk might be molested.

Troops were sometimes a source of annoyance to villagers. American soldiers visited Boteka by lorry in December 1942 and tried to interfere with the women. When Patrol Officer J. Blencowe visited Haima he met two black soldiers in the village. He told them 'the area was out of bounds to troops and if they came again, they would be reported to the 12-Mile, where they work'. The villagers also complained that American soldiers (white) had held them up at pistol point and ordered them to give them some women. When they refused the soldiers left. Patrol Officer Blencowe suggested that a circular be sent to the Commanding Officers of American Units in the area of Laloki aerodrome and the Waigani and Koha villages warning personnel that those villages were out of bounds to troops and they were not to interfere with the villagers.⁵ One of the chief troubles of the OIC Native Labour Post in the Bootless area was the handling of black Americans who roamed about the villages looking for women. In the opinion of Capt. B.W. Faithorn the soldiers met with little success because generally speaking the women were afraid of them. Capt. Faithorn instructed the OIC at Bootless to move circumspectly in dealing with the black soldiers and to do nothing to antagonise them or disrupt the harmonious relations existing between USA authorities and ANGAU.⁶ Major Lambden, the District Officer Port Moresby, reported in January 1943 that he had not had any complaints that troops

⁵ P/R Port Moresby No.7, 1942-44, file 48/3-7. Among the routine orders of ANGAU in 1944 there was one stating: 'All native villages and including Chinese settlements and gardens are out of bounds to all ranks, with the exception of those members who, on account of their special duties, are required to visit or pass through such areas'. Rigo 18/11, December 1943-May 1945. Village Natives General, 5 June 1944.

⁶ W/D July-August 1942, Appendix 34, extract from file, Rigo.

had interfered with village women. However, there were complaints to him from male villagers that troops, particularly black soldiers, had tried to entice their women away for immoral purposes.⁷

The evacuees were ordered to Hisiu Point and a party of fast canoes set out. The weather was bad, 'south-easterlies were blowing hard', and five or six canoes capsized and the passengers lost all their goods. Because of the choppy seas a few families changed course and stopped at Manumanu at the entrance to Galley Reach. PAU then altered its plan and villagers were sent to settle at Manumanu instead. Morea Morea Hila, who had worked at Sapphire Creek for three months, was told by PAU officers to go to Porebada and tell all the villagers 'living within the boundary' to shift to Manumanu. These villages were Porebada, Boera and Koderika. When all the evacuees were sent up to the Hisiu-Kanosia area, the District Boundary was temporarily altered to enable the District Officer, Lakekamu, to control the position. By mid-August 1943 the need for this had passed and steps were taken to bring the proper boundary back from Cape Suckling to Mt Scratchley. This meant that the evacuees came once more within the Moresby District.⁸ The total population of the evacuee villages was 3870 in May 1942 and 800 more were expected.⁹ Hanuabadan refugees settled at Hisiu Point, Aroa Plantation, Manumanu and Kanosia. Some of the people of Elevala and of Poreporena went to Manumanu. Other Elevala people went to Kanosia. Other groups from Poreporena went to Aroa Plantation and a few to Hisiu Point. The villagers of Manumanu lived on the land, unlike the Hanuabadans who had lived over water. The two groups were closely related because Manumanu was founded by Hanuabadans. It was emphasised frequently by informants that there was no ill-feeling between the two major groups of Motu people in the evacuee village. The Hanuabadans were warmly welcomed and there was no strife during their stay. One informant claims there was no inter-marriage either, but this has been contradicted. Some marriages took place towards the end of the period of evacuation.¹⁰

⁷P/R Port Moresby, 1943-44, No.7, 4 January 1943.

⁸P/R Port Moresby, 1942-44, letter from DAQMG ANGAU to Capt. E.N. Chester, Obu Plantation, 14 August 1943.

⁹W/D May-June 1942, Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

¹⁰See Appendix 3b for list of people who were married.

Some villagers felt life at Manumanu was pleasant and that ANGAU took good care of the evacuees. Others said it was the worst kind of life they could think of. There were complaints about the water, which was brackish and which compelled the evacuees to travel up to Vanapa River with drums in search of palatable drinking water. At low tide good fresh water came out of the Galley Reach and Toutou River but these were both tidal and were not satisfactory in the southeast season.¹¹ There were mosquitoes and no nets were supplied, so sleep at night was very difficult. Kevau Raho said his family had nets, because Elevala in pre-war days was plagued by mosquitoes from Gabi. There were crocodiles in the Vanapa River, and villagers stated that though children were not injured many animals lost their lives in the water at night. In a report which confirmed these complaints, Patrol Officer G. Baskett referred to Manumanu mosquitoes: 'Village clean, people orderly, though troubled a great deal by the mosquitoes'. He said water was available from wells and rivers. These wells were sunk all along the stretch of country between Hisiu and Manumanu so there was plenty of water for everybody.¹² This report criticised the choice of Manumanu: 'This is not a very suitable site for a station, the main drawbacks being the lack of good water and the presence of numerous mosquitoes'. The writer blamed the number of mosquitoes on the existence of a large banana plantation nearby and said even the water from the wells was 'half-salt'. Patrol Officer Baskett recommended the provision of more gauze wire for the erection of a mosquito-proof room at the police post. No mention was made of the provision of nets for the villagers.

A further critical observation of Manumanu was that the tides there were always high and dangerous. 'King tides' flooded Manumanu in April 1944 and caused some destruction. At low tide the sand bars made navigation difficult.¹³ The evacuees had no gardens in the village at the start and there were reports of hunger and suffering. Several older people and infants died in the early period of the evacuation. Manumanu was very mosquito ridden and it is possible that malaria killed some of the evacuees. In 1942 the sole

¹¹W/D May-June 1942, Appendix 25; Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

¹²P/R Port Moresby, 1942-44, No.6/43-44, 8 August 1943; W/D May-June 1942, Appendix 25: Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

¹³W/D April 1944, Vol.3; P/R Port Moresby, No.11, 1942-44, 6 April 1943.

official reference made to the poor health of the evacuees was 'There have been no epidemics of any kind in the whole District, except for a mild one of whooping cough among the evacuees in the Hisiu area'. However there were two medical assistants patrolling all the settlements.¹⁴ There was an official report that the evacuees of Pari village suffered a heavy death rate in 1943-44 when forty-eight residents died.¹⁵ In February 1944 Major Austen, in speaking of native welfare in Papua, stated that the health of the Moresby evacuees was poor. He speculated that the evacuation was perhaps responsible for the increased number of deaths among the older people and small children.¹⁶ Many of the older Motu evacuees seemed depressed and demoralized and did not easily shake off colds or pleurisy.

When the evacuees arrived at Manumanu they shared houses with their friends and relatives among the Manumanu people. Manumanu was host to villagers from Roku, Koderika, Boera, Porebada and Hanuabada.¹⁷ Later the Hanuabada councillors told their people to go up the Vanapa River to collect fronds of the nipa palm to make *biri* for the walls and roofs of houses. Later the Hanuabadans built semi-permanent houses some distance away from the Manumanu villagers.

When the Hanuabadans began to build their bush material houses an ANGAU officer noticed what good work they were doing with the thatch. Soon after ANGAU HQ sent word to this officer, Lieut. Chambers, that all the evacuees were to make *biri* from the fronds of the nipa palm. This would be used to construct labourers' houses in Port Moresby. The evacuees set to work making *biri* for which some claimed they were not paid. Because the evacuees were not able to be self-supporting, ANGAU undertook to feed them as soon as the *biri*-making got underway. A patrol report shows that payments were made for *biri*-making; Lieut. F.G. Baskett paid out moneys due to various villagers.

¹⁴W/D November-December 1942, Appendix 61, extracts from Annual Reports, Lakekamu District, 1942.

¹⁵P/R No.1, 1944-45, July 1944.

¹⁶Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of District Staff (ANGAU), 7-12 February 1944.

¹⁷W/D May 1942, Vol.3, Appendix V.

In the early days of the evacuation the Hanuabadans had no time to make gardens as they were making *biri* all the time and their garden lands were some distance away from the village. This *biri*-making was later fixed for four days a week - two days being set aside for gardening. Eventually *biri*-making was stopped altogether and gardening took place on four days a week and fishing one day. Nine men were employed to fish from time to time. It was reported that the waters around Manumanu were not very clear and the fishing was poor so there was very little fresh fish available to supplement the tinned meat. Major Austen recommended in February 1944 that either a special weekly fat supplement should be issued to the evacuees or that coconuts be bought from the nearby plantations from the private companies to feed them.

Major Austen stated in February 1944 that the evacuees stationed at Manumanu had the worst time of all the evacuees in respect of supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables.¹⁸ Evacuees were constantly encouraged to get fresh food from their gardens at Hisiu: 'It is essential that children get some fresh root food and fruit to keep them healthy'. An ANGAU officer in October 1943 stated:

Although there is plenty of food in the Doura area, it is very difficult to have same transported to Manumanu. The most obvious way is down the Vanapa River, but this is blocked by two huge log jams which dynamite has failed to shift.

Patrol Officer F.G. Baskett took up a load of bananas for the evacuees in October 1943 and labourers at Veia were requested to take a load of fresh food to Manumanu.

In August 1943 evacuee villagers travelled five miles each way to collect leaves to make *biri*. Production was 2000 sheets a week and forty-four labourers worked at the enterprise. Two native labour overseers were posted to Manumanu to control *biri* production.¹⁹ Boats travelled often to Manumanu and took on loads of *biri* for the army in Port

¹⁸ P/R Port Moresby, 1942-44, No.6, 8 August 1943, Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of District Staff (ANGAU), 7-12 February 1944.

¹⁹ P/R Port Moresby 1942-44, August 1943; No.22, 22 January 1944, No.18, 22 October 1943; No.6, 1943-44, 8 August 1943; covering memorandum to P/R No.6, 8 August 1943.

Moresby. Hanuabadans recalled that the *Royal Endeavour* called at Manumanu and Aroa to deliver their rations.²⁰

The first storeman at Manumanu was Morea Morea Hila. Before opening the ration store he went from house to house in the evacuee village to check on the size of the families. He then made a list of families and 'home groups'. He estimated that he had to provide rations for an average of 200 Hanuabada families totalling over 1800 people. A ration ticket system was used, and 2650 people received rations from three points, Hisiu, Aroa River and Manumanu.²¹

The ration store was made of timber and measured 25 feet by 30 feet. It was padlocked at night but in three years no one tried to break into it. Evacuee rations consisted of white rice, army biscuits, wheatmeal, 'bully beef', margarine, salt and sugar. Neither flour nor kerosene was stocked at the ration stores. The assistants were Igua Pepe, Guba Hila, Morea Igotalani and Nou Goreu who later became the storeman. A pannikin was used to measure the rations which were issued daily to heads of families.

The first storeman said that infants under 18 months got no rations, that children from 18 months to 5 years got $\frac{1}{2}$ lb rice rations per issue and children over 5 years got 1 lb rice rations per issue. One recipient of rations, Virobo Tamasi, said rations like rice, sugar and wheatmeal were measured by the cup and that army biscuits were counted.

There were two ration scales for evacuee villagers: one was for councillors and village constables, the other was for other evacuees. Councillors and constables were given weekly:

Wheatmeal and/or flour	7 lb
Rice	4 lb
Sugar	1 lb
Meat or fish	1 lb
Biscuits	1 lb

²⁰Names of boats which plied this route were: *Muliama*, *Royal Endeavour*, *Vailala*, *Chinsurah*, *Gawa*, *Nanona*, *H and S*, *Ronald S*, *Maira*, *Rasputin*. The *Royal Endeavour* took on 3200 sheets and 300 bundles of *biri* in one day's loading in August 1943. P/R Port Moresby 1943-44, No.6, 8 August 1943.

²¹W/D May-June 1942, Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

Vegetable extract (supplementary)	4 oz
Salt	2 oz
Soap	4 oz
Tobacco	2 sticks
Matches	1 box

4 lb of sweet potatoes or other root crop could be substituted for 1 lb of rice; $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb of dry sago were a substitute for 1 lb rice also.

All other evacuees were given daily rice and/or wheatmeal at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb to adults and $\frac{3}{4}$ lb to children. They also received weekly

Meat or fish	1 lb to adults only
Sugar	1 lb to adults and children
Salt	2 oz to adults and children ²²

Villagers started to gather outside the ration store at 7a.m. and the storeman would call their names from his list at 8a.m. When rations were issued they were stored in a basin or a medium-sized flour or rice bag. At times the storeman had to wait until dark for workers who came in late from their tasks of gardening, cutting nipa leaves or timber on the Vanapa River. Morea Morea Hila knew everyone in the evacuee village and it was not possible for people to pretend they had not received their issue of rations. On Saturdays two days' rations were issued. When the stock ran low Morea Morea Hila would ring Capt. O'Connor, the ANGAU officer at Aroa River, and order more supplies. Stock was ordered every third week.

Villagers agreed that ANGAU supplied them with plenty of rations and that the store never seemed to be short of food. Lieut. Chambers and Capt. O'Connor had warned the evacuees they were not to sell or barter their rations. Despite this repeated warning, several evacuee villagers secretly traded rations with people from the Kabadi villages or Kairuku for fresh vegetables and valuables. Many evacuees kept asking Lieut. Chambers for permission to set up a 'canteen' as they seemed to have plenty of money and nothing on which to spend it.²³

²²File on Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, Rigo, 21 April (no year): Leo Austen, D.O. Moresby 11/4.

²³W/D May-June 1942: Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

When they were in Hanuabada the villagers had tended small gardens on the high ground at Badihagwa and at Laloki, in which they had grown yams, bananas and tapioca. Several of them had fished for *lobu* (mullet) and other fish inside the reef off Daugo Island, and for dugong as well. A very few evacuees were fortunate enough to secure land from Manumanu people and they started gardens in which they grew melons, yams, *taitu* (stringy yams) and manioc. By May 1942 corn was already sprouting and Lieut. Chambers predicted there would be good crops of bananas, tapioca and pumpkins.²⁴ Their major problems there were an acute shortage of land and frequent flooding by high tides.²⁵ Some Elevala villagers settled at Kanosia where they cultivated large gardens. They never suffered any shortage of their traditional fresh vegetables or fruit.

From 21 to 23 January 1943 a conference was held at Port Moresby between village councillors, the Assistant Adjutant General (Dist.) of ANGAU and the District Officer, Moresby.²⁶ A number of decisions was reached following these discussions. There was no possibility of the Hanuabada evacuees returning to their village, nor was there any

²⁴W/D May-June 1942, Appendix 25: Report of Lieut. D. Chambers.

²⁵Major Austen acknowledged in February 1944 that the majority of evacuee sites were not suitable for the permanent residence of evacuees. Furthermore the temporary houses were built too close together and were overcrowded (Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of District Staff (ANGAU), 7-12 February 1944). W/O J. Blencowe suggested that conditions which made a village suitable for evacuees were a coconut grove, an easily accessible supply of water and ground for gardens (P/R Port Moresby 1942-44, No.11, 5 April 1943). Lieut. B.W. Faithorn proposed in 1942 that a new site be found for Korobosea and Kila Kila evacuees on the Kemp Welch River. One advantage of the site was that 'the evacuees will be under the immediate protection of Government influence' (P/R Rigo, Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, Central Division).

²⁶File on Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, Rigo. Letter from Major S. Elliot-Smith, AAG (Dist.) to DO Kairuku, DO Moresby, 29 January 1943.

possibility of their leaving Manumanu and Hisiu for Boera or Porebada. However the evacuees would be moved back to their own lands as soon as the opportunity permitted. An undertaking was made to pay compensation for homes destroyed or damaged at Hanuabada. Permission was given for the evacuees to go fishing and collecting shell fish on the reef near to Haidana and Daugo Islands but no one was allowed to go ashore east of Lea Lea except for the purpose of obtaining fresh water. Evacuees at Hisiu were given Saturday and Sunday free to enable them to fish on the reef. Hanuabada men were free to visit Hanuabada on legitimate business at any time but had to report to the ADO at Hisiu before departure and to report to the District Officer on arrival at Moresby. They were not to make any stops on the way into town. Females were not allowed to visit Port Moresby except in cases of urgency and had to report their arrival to the District Officer. ANGAU undertook to try to increase the rations of rice and/or wheatmeal until the evacuees' gardens began to produce. Meat would only be provided when fish was not available. Biscuits, tobacco and matches would not be supplied to the evacuees. The councillors were to decide what was a fair price for ten strips of sewn *biri* each 6 ft long and if the Army wished to pay that price, payment would be made in cash. Evacuees who had had their shotguns confiscated would be compensated if their guns could not be returned by ANGAU. There would be no compulsion to make female evacuees go to work on plantations. Before an unmarried girl was taken on to work on a plantation her parents or guardians would be consulted. Similarly before a wife could start working her husband's permission would be sought. In all cases ANGAU undertook to respect the wishes of the parents, guardians or husband.²⁷

When Hanuabada was evacuated, it was occupied by the PIB, the RPC and ANGAU labour lines. It was estimated that 900 men lived there. They remained there until 1945. The labourers who lived in the village were attached to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. They cleared airstrips, cut down trees, dug drains, built houses, cleared the foreshore, collected rubbish and did odd jobs in the town, at Nine Mile and Sapphire Creek. This work force had been gathered from all over Papua from as far west as the Western District and as far east as Aroma. Many labourers had run away from

²⁷ File on Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, Rigo. Letter from Major S. Elliot-Smith, AAG (Dist.) to DO Kairuku, DO Moresby, 29 January 1943.

Moresby after the first air-raid warning but some had returned when PAU recruitment started. All Hanuabadans knew that their village was 'occupied by working boys from other places' who were in the employ of PAU, and later ANGAU. A number of Hanuabadans also returned to work and live in their own village.

Officers of PAU went to Porebada and Boera to recruit able-bodied men to help the Army. Morea Morea Hila volunteered to work and was sent to Sapphire Creek as a clerk. In his opinion PAU did not 'recruit'. It was left to the villagers to decide for themselves whether or not they wished to help in the war effort. The earliest labour recruits were not medically examined. Later on they were and the unfit were returned to their homes. It was a new thing to Hanuabadans to be asked to work for an organisation like PAU. 'People did not know how they would treat us during the war.' They wondered whether they would be looked after properly and be given adequate food. No agreements or contracts were signed with PAU.

When PAU changed to ANGAU, recruitment continued at Manumanu. Villagers who feared recruitment hid for two days in the mangroves until the patrols left the evacuee village. Eventually these very men were caught and 'signed on' for a period which was in some cases as short as one month. Boatloads of ANGAU recruits were sent from Manumanu to Port Moresby to help in the war effort.

Many informants say it was compulsory to 'sign on' and that RPC were usually present so there was no choice. This compulsion is understandable because in July 1942 the Japanese were pressing their attack on the north coast of Papua. The people of Hanuabada joined the work force of ANGAU in many capacities, and several joined the PIB. Villagers worked as carriers, mechanics, medical orderlies and assistants, laundry men, clerks, carpenters, storemen, drivers, cooks and crewmen²⁸ on board coastal ships. Their womenfolk worked on coconut plantations and helped make *biri* for ANGAU. When the evacuees were at Manumanu the ANGAU officer at Aroa plantation asked the councillors to send a dozen young girls to do light work on the plantation. These girls collected coconuts, heaped them together, cut them open, dried them in the sun, scraped out the copra and then smoked and bagged

²⁸ See Appendices 3c, 3d, 3e and 3f.

the copra. A Mr Doyle was in charge of them and they were given 'good rations' and a wage of 8s. a month. The girls worked for a month at a time at Aroa, then were replaced by a new group.

Some Hanuabada fishermen were sent to Port Moresby to fish for ANGAU. They used dynamite to catch mullet off Fisherman's Island. Dugong were caught inside the reef when the fishermen used nets. One fisherman lost his life through an accident while using dynamite.²⁹

PAU had compiled a list of workers after the first air-raid and this was later used by ANGAU to help in selecting skilled workers like clerks, medical assistants and orderlies, machinists and telephone technicians. Villagers recall that Major A. Baldwin was in charge of the Native Labour Section of ANGAU which actively recruited labour for the war effort. Heni Noho was a casual labourer for ANGAU during the war. He earned 10s. with rations per month. He helped to build the aerodrome at Rorona. He said labourers 'lined' at 6a.m. and were sent about their various tasks by 8a.m. They had a break for lunch at noon and resumed at 1.30p.m., stopping work at 4.30p.m. At night they played cards. In most labour camps card playing at night was permitted or even encouraged since it kept the labourers awake and presumably alert. This was useful in case of an air-raid and also maintained morale. Card playing was also the favourite pastime of the Hanuabada evacuees.³⁰ Heni ate very well on the labour line. To him, life as a casual labourer was 'all right' but he feared the war. He recalled that men who deserted were searched for and imprisoned if caught. His labour compound was fenced with barbed wire and to enter or leave one had to present a 'field pass' to the RPC guard at the gate.

²⁹ See Appendix 3F. P/O J. Blencowe noted that at Lea Lea village American troops hired canoes to go out fishing, using hand grenades as dynamite. He described the practice as illegal and warned that it posed a danger to native people. P/R Port Moresby 1942-44, No.11, 6 April 1943. In December 1943 the W/D reported 'Boys blown up with dynamite while fishing'.

³⁰ The ADO at Hula, Lieut. G.P. Brown, reported in February 1944 that 'the natives of [Hula] are constantly playing cards'. He set out to catch them and often sent police to raid the village and apprehend the offenders. File on Law and Justice 1944-45, 1 February 1944.

There were two fires in Hanuabada village during the war, and these occurred on 15³¹ and 30 May 1943.³² Most villagers recall only one fire - the latter one - which was really a big fire. One version about its origin is that the fire started around the area of Botai clan and burned to the east and west. There was a fair wind, 'a south-easterly' blowing and this helped spread the flames. A PIB corporal from Moveave who was stationed in Hanuabada was an eye-witness. His version is that someone threw a lighted cigarette away and it 'went the wrong way' and fell on the bush material roof of a neighbouring house. All the soldiers were awake at the time (7p.m.) but they failed to stop the fire. It eventually burned itself out at midnight after destroying the greater part of the village. The soldier also referred to the strong wind which fanned the flames.

A Hanuabadan in the PIB who was on leave at Manumanu when the fire took place gives the date of the fire as May or June 1943. He said that ANGAU labourers were cooking in their houses and one of them accidentally set a house on fire. The blaze began in the area of Apau clan and spread towards Hohodae and Tanobada. At the end the only houses left standing were between Kahanamona and Hohodae.

The most commonly repeated story is that the fire was started as a result of a mistake in which benzine was used instead of kerosine. Rarua Tau says a man who was lighting a lamp made a mistake with the fuel. He says it started in the Apau clan area. The majority of villagers believe the fire took place less than a year after their departure for Manumanu, that is around March or April 1943. A minority contends that it took place towards the end of the war, perhaps as late as 1945. The Rev. P. Chatterton said it occurred within a year of the evacuation of the village.

Gari Morea was a Hanuabadan who worked with the Navy at Napa Napa. He gave the date of the fire as 1943 and said he saw the blaze at 8p.m. Hanuabadans working at Napa Napa wept bitterly as they saw their homes burning. When the

³¹W/D May 1943, Appendix 95, Fire Report by Quarter Master General, ANGAU, 21 May 1943.

³²W/D May 1943, Appendix 112, Fire Report by Quarter Master General, ANGAU, 2 June 1943. Stuart (1970:142) refers to the fire in Hanuabada but gives no date.

news of the fire reached Manumanu the evacuees were very sad for days at the loss of their homes and treasured possessions. There were official ANGAU reports of both fires in Hanuabada. The first and smaller fire took place at 1815 hours on 15 May 1943. It occurred in the transport line of the Supply and Stores Section and was discovered by two soldiers. The fire was caused by a labourer who placed a hurricane lantern in the store where 44-gallon drums of petrol were kept. The damage to equipment and property amounted to £96.13s.5d. The transport office was damaged and the personal issues of a warrant officer were destroyed. There was not sufficient water in Hanuabada to handle a fire caused by burning fuel. Three Europeans were slightly injured in the fire.³³

The second fire took place at about 1835 hours on 30 May 1943. Major Normoyle, the OC of the RPC, discovered it. It was very hard to control and the 'natural elements' hindered the efforts of the fire-fighters. The entire native population of the village was evacuated and rations, medical stores and tools were removed from the burning buildings. The 2/2 Australian Dock Operations Company were largely responsible for fighting the fire which was brought under control at 2115 hours on 30 May and finally extinguished at 0500 hours the following day. A labourer called Dedewa-Abau employed by the Army admitted to having accidentally spilt kerosene near to a cooking fire in a hut. The damage was considerable. Army stores and equipment valued at £245.5s. and 132 village houses with an estimated value of £4000 were destroyed. A copy of the plan of the village with the houses numbered was submitted with a survey of the destruction but it is missing from the War Diary.³⁴

Some of the Hanuabada evacuees abused the permission granted by ANGAU to travel along the coast. In September 1942 it was reported that ten Hanuabada families who were given permission by the ADO Hisiu to visit Kapa Kapa had settled there permanently. Steps were taken by ANGAU to return them to Manumanu.³⁵ There were other general abuses

³³W/D May 1943, Appendix 95, Fire Report by Quarter Master General, ANGAU, 21 May 1943.

³⁴W/D May 1943, Appendix 112, Fire Report by Quarter Master General, ANGAU, 2 June 1943 and letter to ADDS from ADO, Port Moresby District, 1 June 1943.

³⁵File on Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, Rigo, 11 September 1942.

by coastal villagers related to travel. Some took no food on their visits to Port Moresby and requested rations from ANGAU HQ. ANGAU decided it would only issue rations to travellers on official business, e.g. court witnesses.³⁶ Major A.C. Hall advised all patrol officers in the Central District to ensure that travellers took sufficient food with them. In order to stop the unauthorised travel of womenfolk into Port Moresby it was decided in July 1944 that if the rules were broken 'consideration will be given to further recruiting one male native from her particular village for general labour'.³⁷

While the Hanuabada evacuees were at Manumanu the pastor Taunao Agarau and his assistants kept the LMS school going. The teachers were Siake Heni, Raho Kevau and Lawrence Taunao. Mr Percy Chatterton, the LMS missionary at Delena, visited the evacuee school and commented favourably on the efforts they were making despite an acute shortage of teaching material. There were some Roman Catholics among the evacuees and the Sisters of the Catholic Mission from Yule Island made periodical visits to the evacuees at Manumanu during 1942 and 1943. A bush material house was built for them as there was no accommodation for them at Manumanu.³⁸

A report by Camilla Wedgewood stated that in the Port Moresby District the LMS schools continued to function in the face of great difficulties (Wedgewood, 1944:5). There was a shortage of essential supplies like reading books, exercise books, slates and blackboards. She reported that evacuee villages showed this deficiency most markedly. Educational movements like the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides

³⁶ File on Village Natives General, Rigo, December 1943-May 1945, 18 November 1944.

³⁷ File on Station Labour, Rigo, May 1944-October 1945, 18 July 1944.

³⁸ P/R Port Moresby, No.21, May 1944. Later on there was some friction between the LMS and the Catholic Mission as a result of this issue. When the evacuees left the village the bush material home for the sisters was demolished. The Catholic Missionary Father Boell tried to persuade the Manumanu people to rebuild the house. Rev. Chatterton feared the government would enforce this work. Major Thompson pointed out there could be no transfers of land until Civil Administration returned. The LMS had had a teacher at Manumanu for fifty years and they did not welcome any encroachment on their congregation.

became dormant in the war because the European women teachers had left Papua. Wedgewood also stated that though mission teachers were exempt from recruitment an appreciable number of young men who would have spent another two years at school were recruited. She cited a further adverse effect of recruitment: the school children, especially the girls, were needed to help in the gardens and this caused irregular attendance.

The Poreporena church was a source of much comfort to the evacuees while they were at Manumanu. The pastor conducted services as usual, baptised new members and towards the end of the war married many couples.³⁹

Though they were well fed by ANGAU at Manumanu, Aroa, Hisiu and Kanosia, the evacuees longed to return to their own village site and to their own gardens. Petitions were made by the councillors to ANGAU that they be allowed to return but ANGAU was in no haste to return them. Major Austen observed in February 1944 that 'It is very noticeable how the numbers of troops are lessening in Moresby ...'⁴⁰ On the other hand he said: 'Of course, the presence of Negroes in the Moresby area makes it undesirable for the people to return to Malara Point and Idlers Bay'.⁴¹ At the ANGAU Conference in February 1944 Major Austen outlined his proposals for the general rehabilitation of Papuan evacuees:

There is no existing legislation in the Territory of Papua for compensation of any kind to natives ... There are many natives who have suffered injuries or death, due directly or indirectly to the war, and some form of compensation must be made but each case will have to be taken individually.

He warned that

Many [villagers] have lost their homes altogether. If they are allowed to return to their former lands they will find no homes left to live in.... Those who came from near Moresby will find it

³⁹See Appendix 3b.

⁴⁰Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of District Staff (ANGAU), 7-12 February 1944.

⁴¹There was an evacuee camp at Malara Point. W/D June 1944, Vol.3, Appendix A.

difficult to obtain firewood for cooking the food. All this calls for compensation of some kind.

Major Austen recommended the setting up of a Native Compensation Board to hear and deal with all native claims for compensation due to war damage and suggested that the Board should have the power to assess the amount due and arrange for payment as soon as assessment was made. Major Austen dealt specifically with the return of the Hanuabadans.

If the Hanuabada people are not to be allowed to return to their former village sites care should be taken to see they are placed on suitable lands that will not cause too much discontent. As far as garden lands go they should be given extra Crown lands in exchange for land taken over for military or commercial purposes. Again, if these garden lands are any distance from the sites of their villages they should be allowed to buy trucks to get them to and from their villages and to bring in their garden produce. Again, in fixing the sites of the new villages (if the people are not allowed to return to their former sites), distance from the town should be taken into consideration as most of the Hanuabada adult males work in the township of Moresby.⁴²

He also suggested that the government should supply all the *biri*-leaf for roofing and flooring for the houses, and that free transport should be arranged for bringing in the posts and native materials required in the rebuilding. The set-up of the new villages should be a matter for the government in consultation with the councillors. He proposed that iron roofs be prohibited and that no evacuees be allowed to return to their permanent homes until the housing was completed. Lastly he speculated on whether in time Port Moresby would be proclaimed an 'Open Town'. By this he probably meant a town which imposed no restrictions on entry or residence by villagers.

In 1945 the Hanuabadan villagers were taken by the *Royal Endeavour* from Manumanu to Malara which was close to

⁴²Conference of Officers of HQ and Officers of District Staff (ANGAU), 7-12 February 1944.

Idlers Bay and about twelve miles from Port Moresby. Mr J. Frame was the officer in charge at Malara camp. The evacuees planted gardens and remained at Malara long enough to reap one crop of yams and tapioca. At the same time as they planted their gardens ANGAU reduced their rations. These rations were halved from 1 August 1945.⁴³ Among the evacuees' rations was sago, which was purchased by ANGAU at Kerema.⁴⁴

An inspection in July 1945 of the gardens the evacuees had established at Malara revealed that though the areas planted were extensive the soil was 'not first-class' and so insufficient foodstuff was being produced to make the people self-supporting. A District Services report had commented: 'enough food should be obtained from them to allow for a 50% reduction of army issues as from 1 August'. The reasoning was that 'if rationing is continued no serious effort will be made by these "sophisticates" to make themselves self-supporting'. An undertaking was made 'to ensure that there will be no cases of hardship. These villagers must realise their responsibilities and be strongly urged to become as independent as possible.' The officer in charge at Malara found it difficult to keep the villagers up to the mark in regard to maintaining their gardens. He had had to 'drive them' because they were reluctant to do further planting at Malara since they felt it would soon be time to return to their home village. Realising that the evacuees would work more willingly on their own gardens than on 'foreign ground' the District Officer, Major Hall, gave them permission in July to make gardens on their own lands behind old Hanuabada village.⁴⁵

In September 1945 the GOC ANGAU paid a special visit to Malara village to bid farewell to 'this large and representative group of Motu people' before his departure for the new ANGAU HQ in Lae. His visit was very much appreciated by the

⁴³Circular letter to P/O Malara from D0 Major A.C.Hall, File Rigo 18/2, Refugee Natives and Native Evacuees, 2 June 1945.

⁴⁴W/D September 1945, District Services; W/D Vol.4, Appendix 4Q A27, July 1945; and District Services DS/SI, 1-31 July, 1945.

⁴⁵W/D Vol.4, Appendix 4Q A27, July 1945. In January 1945 Lieut. H.K.Steen had instructed the Kila Kila evacuees at Tavai to enlarge and improve their gardens but by July nothing was done. Lieut. Steen reported that 'in the near future when evacuee rations are stopped these people will have very little food'. P/R Port Moresby 1944-46, July 1945.

villagers. The Poreporena choir presented the GOC with an illuminated address, as did the village councillors whose representative, Gavera Arua, made a speech expressing appreciation for all the GOC had done for them.⁴⁶

Late in 1945 Major A.C. Hall visited Malara and told the evacuees to return to Hanuabada because the war was over. Before the actual return and for four years after that the representatives of the evacuees were engaged in endless negotiations with the new Provisional Administration about matters of urgent concern to them.

The new Administrator, Mr J.K. Murray, and ten of his advisors met with the Poreporena village councillors on 3 December 1945 to discuss several issues raised by the council.⁴⁷ The following replies were made to requests. The District Officer had prepared a plan of the new layout of the proposed village in Hanuabada and for a new type of house. The RPC were to vacate their premises in the village by 17 December 1945. The councillors were told shotgun permits were not hereditary but a promise was made to issue additional gun permits in the near future. No decision could be reached for about six months on the subject of the removal to Bootless Inlet of the petrol installations at Hanuabada. The Administrator undertook to look into the matter of furnishing the councillors with a map which defined the boundaries of their village reserve.

The Navy was already engaged in mine-sweeping and when more mine sweepers became available they would clean up the areas which prevented villagers from freely using the waters of the harbour. A request would be made for the Navy to speed up its mine-sweeping. It was agreed that the Kila trade store was too far away for villagers. A promise was made to open a native trade store in Hanuabada within three days (by 6 December 1945) using Steamships Company's building as that company was not yet ready to begin trading. The PCB would operate all trade stores until an Australian Government decision was made on the matter. Enquiries would be made to decide whether villagers owning vehicles could get petrol and at what price.

⁴⁶W/D September 1945, Commanders Report.

⁴⁷Present were Messrs Lonergan, Melrose, J.Taylor, E.Taylor, E.Bignold, Dr Sinclair, Lieut. Col. Hogbin, Messrs Humphries and Lowney. Native Affairs File No.20.

The villagers returned on 17 December 1945 to their village and found members of the RPC still there (Belshaw, 1957:139). ANGAU supplied them with tents which they pitched on the high ground between Queenie's Store (Steamships of Hanuabada) and Gabi. They were all glad to return home, yet there was sadness too as they recalled those who died in the preceeding three years nine months.

During their period of evacuation, Hanuabadans wrote a number of songs which reveal their sentiments at the time. Morea Mea, a member of the PIB, composed *Raisi*, a song which has since become well known in Papua. It comments on the monotony of the diet of rice during the war. Morea Morea Hila, who became a councillor after the war, composed *Poreporena Hanuabada* and *Bese Veridia* which respectively tell of the evacuation of Poreporena people by way of Porebada to Manumanu and of the longing of Hanuabadans to re-enter their Motu village. William Gavera wrote *Poreporena Tawmui* which also tells of the evacuation of Poreporena by its people and their joy at being reunited after living 'in some strange places'.⁴⁸

In order to discuss matters of concern to Hanuabadans after the war, a meeting was arranged for 29 January 1946 between Administrator J.K. Murray and the village councillors.⁴⁹ The items on the agenda give a picture of the kinds of things the returned villagers were anxious about. The topics included war damage claims, the supply of water to Elevala and Tanobada, the removal of Peter Vagi's temporary house from its position across the oil pipe line running through Poreporena, the removal of all temporary houses at Hanuabada as soon as the village was rebuilt, the postponement of the return of Tanobada villagers for a few months, the desire of Elevala villagers to separate their village from Poreporena and the banning of trucks, other than native-owned trucks, from the villages.

Hanuabadans should have been happy to be back but their return was clouded by high food prices, their not having their shotguns and a general dilatoriness by the Administration in paying them compensation and rebuilding their homes.

⁴⁸ See Appendices 3g and 3h.

⁴⁹ File No.20, Native Affairs: Agenda for meeting which village councillors desire to have with His Honour the Administrator.

On the other hand P/O J.V. Walker commented favourably on the morale of these villagers to the west and east of Port Moresby who had recently returned to their prewar village sites:

They are very happy and contented. The outlook of the children is very noticeable. The return to their original homes is having a good effect upon them. They are far more cheerful than when I saw them two and a half years ago, in the evacuee villages at Papa.⁵⁰

A telegram sent by the Hanuabada Village Council to the Minister for External Territories in June 1946 stated that they were looking forward eagerly to his Administration starting work on their village soon. The council said that at a meeting held the previous night it was declared that some 'pre-war white people were trying to spoil' the reconstruction of their village. The council did not want the return of the 'old fashion government' but preferred the new government to stay.

The Administrator Col. J.K. Murray supported the request of the council for their village to be rebuilt. He sent the following cable to the Minister for Territories in June 1946:

Councillors interviewed me this morning and wish me to inform you they wish new Hanuabada village approved by Minister commenced earliest date possible. They request that in view of fire risk Papuan type roofing be replaced by coloured fibro cement with which I now concur. Some additional expense involved.⁵¹

The issue of trade stores was a particularly sore one for villagers returning from evacuee camps. A letter written by Oala Dagora to Col. J.K. Murray showed that there was dissatisfaction among villagers about the services offered by PCB stores.

Sir,

On behalf of the people of Porebada, Papa and

⁵⁰File No.20, Native Affairs.

⁵¹File No.20, Native Affairs 27/6/1946.

Lea Lea villages we wish to tell Your Honour we do not want the P.C.B. Stores at Port Moresby and Kila. We want the Steamships Trading Company to open their stores at Port Moresby and they tell us they want to sell.⁵²

In his reply Col. Murray said that he was 'really proud of the good work the Production Control Board stores have done during a most difficult time'. He would try to have more trade stores opened in the near future but it was very hard to obtain goods because factories were still making war goods. There were not enough ships to take the goods to Papua. The Australian Government still had to decide whether the government or trading companies would run the new stores yet to be opened.⁵³

In a letter to Col. J.K. Murray the Hanuabada Village Council complained about the unsatisfactory prices in the PCB store.⁵⁴ The council submitted a list showing the price of articles before the war and at 29 March 1946, and they asked for an adjustment. This was their comparison between prewar and postwar commodity prices in Port Moresby:

Rice	prewar per 100 lb cost 18s.6d.:	29.3.46 37s.
Flour	prewar per 150 lb cost 27s.6d.:	29.3.46 50s.
Sugar	prewar per 70 lb cost 17s.6d.:	29.3.46 32s.6d.
Tobacco	prewar per 4 sticks cost 1s. :	29.3.46 2s.
Bread	prewar per 2 lb loaf cost 6d.:	29.3.46 1s.

The Deputy Prices Commissioner, Mr Hughes, advised Col. Murray that Papuans were getting higher prices in May 1946 for their product of fish, bananas, pawpaws and pineapples than they received before the war. Col. Murray pointed out in his reply to the council that the PCB had done good work. He explained that manufacturers had not yet changed over to making peace-time goods and there was insufficient shipping available. A decision would be made by the Australian Government whether trade stores were to be privately run or government run in the future.⁵⁵ His reply was very similar to the one he had given earlier to Oala Dagora.

⁵²File No.20, Native Affairs.

⁵³File No.20, Native Affairs: Letter from J.K. Murray, 27 November 1945.

⁵⁴File No.20, Native Affairs.

⁵⁵File No.20, Native Affairs.

In June 1946 Hanuabada councillors were given official answers to a list of questions they had previously asked.⁵⁶ It was not possible to tell them when work on the rebuilding of Hanuabada village would commence but everything to speed it up was being done. The DDS and NA had yet to complete preliminary work on war damage claims. On its completion villagers would be invited to submit their claims for compensation. The government's policy on shotguns was that permits should be issued sparingly and that existing permits should continue and be renewed during the lifetime of the holder. New permits would be issued for six months to persons recommended by the village constable and approved by the District Officer. In villages of up to 100 persons which were not near to towns three permits would be issued. In villages of over 100 and under 300 people, two permits would be issued. Large villages or groups of villages like Hanuabada, in close proximity to towns, would be restricted to one permit per 100 villagers. The Navy had been consulted about the submarine net and it was understood that ships were going to remove the mines. The government was prepared to remove the native labour ration store to another site but it cautioned councillors to think of the inconvenience it might create for villagers: hundreds of womenfolk might be obliged to carry rations for some distance. It was explained once more that the chief reasons for rising prices were the war and the time taken to change factories from wartime production. The government could not remove the duty on goods sold to villagers. It was, however, making a new law to control trade with native people. The purpose of the new law was to assist native people.

As late as March 1950, residents of Hanuabada were still submitting claims for compensation for building materials allegedly lost or destroyed as a result of the war.⁵⁷ The District Officer, Mr Healy, rejected the claims of all those residents who were being given new houses since he believed the latter were a just and equitable compensation for the loss of prewar houses and extra building material. To those Hanuabadans who no longer lived in the village there was a choice of a cash compensation in lieu of rehousing under the Reconstruction Scheme. Several villagers accepted cash compensation.

⁵⁶File No.20, Native Affairs: Agenda for meeting of councillors of Hanuabada village.

⁵⁷DDS and NA 1950-56, 38.2.1, War Damage Compensation Policy: Claims by Hanuabada natives, 16 March 1950.

Fabricated claims for war damage compensation were sometimes submitted. A Hanuabadan who was only thirteen years old at the time he sustained an alleged loss of property submitted a very late false claim. Two councillors and the claimant's step-father were of the opinion that it was a complete fabrication. The claim was rejected and the District Officer recommended a strong censuring of the culprit.⁵⁸

The Reconstruction Scheme covered only those Hanuabadan villagers who lost their prewar houses.⁵⁹ It was estimated in March 1950 that there were about 200 families who did not own houses before the war. They were to be given an opportunity to purchase or rent new houses in the village. Some of these families had had their building materials destroyed in the war. Where approved it was proposed that their compensation payments be kept as a credit towards the purchase or rental of new homes. Mr Healy was unwilling to pay out any cash on claims since he believed he would 'be flooded with large claims from opportunists not entitled to compensation' and dealing with these would severely hamper his administrative work.⁶⁰

The cost of each new house was from £375 to £400, for a building 36 feet x 18 feet in size. They were made of solid timber with corrugated roofs. There was one large front room and a front verandah. Most houses were built on piles over the sea. There was no room for adequate spacing between houses if the new sites corresponded to traditional ones but there was no difficulty about extending the village 'concertina' fashion. As a result only the centre houses were on traditional sites, but the remaining *iduhu*⁶¹ were in correct residential order. Some houses were built on land where the owner had a site and so wished it. There was no provision

⁵⁸ DDS and NA 1950-56, DS 38/2/1, Native Compensation Central District: War Damage Compensation Claim, D. Lohia Roni of Hanuabada, 31 July 1950.

⁵⁹ DDS and NA 1950-56, 38/2/1, War Damage Compensation Policy: Claims by Hanuabada Natives, 16 March 1950.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ An *iduhu* is a social unit consisting of one or more lines of houses built on piles over the sea, at an angle to the coast, inhabited by people who give themselves an *iduhu* name (Belshaw, 1957:97-8).

for a kitchen, interior walls, wash places or lavatories, and in practically every case owners added these fittings as their resources - mainly scrap iron and timber and odd paint - permitted (Belshaw, 1957:97-8).

World War II had a very significant effect on the lives of the villagers of Hanuabada. It dislocated them from their home area and their way of life and exposed them to new experiences and new people. At first the urban villagers shared the nervousness and fear of the white people in Port Moresby, caused by the threat of Japanese air raids. When the first big air raid did occur the villagers were evacuated in stages to Manumanu and the beaches beyond the Galley Reach. They remained away for more than three and a half years, during which period their traditional gardens were overgrown and a great fire destroyed their homes and the remainder of their possessions. At Manumanu they were well fed by ANGAU yet longed for their traditional food. They made contact with troops both black and white and traded with them. The womenfolk of the refugee village worked as hard as their men in making *biri* and on the coconut plantations. The evacuees did not mind hard work but described ANGAU discipline as strict. The men who were the earliest carriers on the Kokoda Track complained that they were not paid for their services. The PIB members from Hanuabada played a minor role in resisting the Japanese advance on the capital and later helped in mopping-up operations on Bougainville.⁶² They learnt much about Army discipline and the handling of arms and met Europeans who were soldiers like themselves in the field and in camps. One veteran Daera Ganiga, resented the use of the phrase 'Fuzzy Wuzzy' to describe the carriers, and felt they should be referred to by their names.

There is a measure of bitterness and dissatisfaction among some veterans of the PIB over the matter of their entitlements to war benefits. Medical orderlies from Hanuabada tended the carriers on the Kokoda Trail and the wounded of the Allies. Clerks from Hanuabada did responsible office and field work for ANGAU, particularly in the keeping of stores and recruitment of labour. Hanuabadans recall the war as a time of grave disruption for the villagers, a 'bad time' in some respects but a 'good time' in that it afforded many villagers a chance to eat lots of 'European' food, to travel outside of their immediate home area and to help in the war

⁶² See Appendix 3h.

effort of Papua and the British Empire. When the war ended they encountered severe frustration in getting their village rebuilt. Rather than deal with local officials they sent many letters and telegrams to the new Administrator. They had great faith in his administration and looked to him to protect their interests in the postwar years.


Chapter 5

Butibam in the war


Butibam, a village of about 700 people, lies one mile east of Lae. It is on the eastern bank of the Bumbu River. Butibam is the westernmost of the villages in the Kawa language group which is centred on Bukaua, a large group of villages halfway between Lae and Finschhafen. It is divided into two sections. The larger section, Butibam Number One, lies along the two main roads leading out of Lae across the Lower Bumbu River bridge. The smaller section is Butibam Number Two or Ahi-Hingali and is separated from Butibam Number One by a 50-yard stretch of scrub.

Before the Japanese invasion of New Guinea, villagers in Butibam had a small range of occupations. Some tended gardens, others worked in the town for private companies, many worked as teachers for the Lutheran Mission and one was a pastor. Several villagers were evangelists. In 1935, fifteen were sent to help round the Mt Hagen Lutheran Mission Station. Lae had an airstrip and the town had become mildly prosperous as a result of its contact with the Wau and Bulolo gold fields. Malahang Mission Station also had an airstrip from 1936 which was the centre of the Lutheran aviation service. So Butibam was placed between two air terminals.

Gebob Masawa was one of the young men absent from his village when the war started. Gebob was still at Bulolo when the Japanese bombed Lae. The kiap at Wau, H.R. Niall, sent away all the labourers from the Morobe area without paying them. Gebob returned home and found 'everybody' was moving inland towards the Busu River about ten miles from Butibam. They had heard news of the war so they fled to the bush. The labourers from Wau, Bulolo and Salamaua collected at Labu Butu. Many were armed with rifles and they compelled the Labu people to ferry them across the mouth of the Markham River and landed at Wagang (Sipaia). It is not known where



Map 6 The Huon Gulf showing Lae and the coastal villages. Based on Dexter, 1961.



Map 7 Villages in the Lae area. Based on Willis, 1974.

they got the rifles.¹ (Sipaia is the pidgin name given to Wagang because a Japanese warship caught fire close to that village and was beached there.) Villagers returned to their gardens and built themselves bush homes. Some went to Po'akop and others to Kamkumun and stayed there for two years.

Poebu Jonathan was working as a switchboard operator at Bulolo when Lae was bombed. He did not know what had happened in Butibam but he returned and stayed there for a while. A kiap called Mr 'Blue' engaged him as a crewman on boats taking soldiers from Finschhafen to Lae. While he was working at this job the Japanese landed at Lae. When the Japanese came to Butibam they crowded the place (*fulap nogut*) so Poebu and others left and hid in the bush at Wagang and made new gardens.

In 1941 two young villagers, Karo Ahi and Gware Poang, were attending the mission school at Bukaua, 35 miles down the coast from Lae towards Finschhafen. They had returned home for the Christmas holidays in 1941 and when the Japanese planes began to bomb Lae early in 1942 they were still in the village. Karo was very frightened by the number of the planes and the noise of their guns and bombs. The great noise made by the bombing was new to everybody in the village. Moses Nasinom said his ancestors fought with bows and arrows and made no noise. Bogan Ahi said that villagers who did not know about the war were so surprised by the noise that they stopped whatever they were doing, whether fishing or gardening, and went home to look for their children. The schoolboys returned to school at Bukaua where Rev. Stephan Lehner was in charge. Lehner was one of three German missionaries who stayed on during the Japanese occupation. The other two were Decker and Wagner. The Australian Government had interned all the other German missionaries and sent them to Australia. There were also two New Guinean teachers there, Kleophas and Kitombing. The students looked after their white mission teacher, dug holes, cut down coconut trees and wove leaves and grass into covers for their shelters. There were enough shelters for 100 pupils and they took shelter whenever enemy planes flew overhead.

¹J.J.Murphy (letter) says few civilian villagers 'got off' with arms. Some police decamped in mufti in the confusion and a number of these had their rifles with them.

Kising Tikandu (who is crippled) was working for the Vacuum Oil Company when the Japanese first bombed Lae on 21 January 1942. Sixty Japanese planes bombed the town for an hour (McCarthy, 1962:54).² He hid in a pit, later returning to Butibam to check on his family's safety. His family was all right and Kising went back to Lae. One informant stated that the Japanese bombing killed one man and his wife in Butibam, but Apo Amala says the first Japanese bombing did not affect Butibam. Kising found that the bombs had done a great deal of damage in Lae and his European friends were bathed in mud so he got some hot water to help them clean themselves. After the bombing the Europeans in Lae ran away to Wau and boarded planes for Port Moresby. Kising helped some soldiers to fill drums with petrol which later were hidden in the bush. A European called Horst fired at the drums in an attempt to destroy them. He was arrested by soldiers and flown to Port Moresby.³ Kising continued to work with the Europeans in Lae until they knew the Japanese would invade Lae. Kising had some forewarning of the Japanese invasion from his employer, Mr Moran, who sent him home late one night.⁴ The next day, 8 March 1942, the Japanese invaded Lae.

Those Europeans who had fled into the bush hid in the Butibam area and met with Kising, Kamdaring, Samuel and Nagong. Poebu Jonathan said the Europeans were Mr Blue and Mr Bloxham. Lawrence (1964:123) refers to Capt. 'Blue', G.C. Harris. The Europeans told the villagers when they gathered together that they were to help the Japanese soldiers as much as was necessary but to help the Europeans also by

²The Japanese planes attacked houses with corrugated iron roofing. Villagers who were fishing ran home with the fish-bags still tied around their waists (letter from Mrs Holzknacht, 10/12/1975).

³This is hard to follow because petrol stocks were deliberately destroyed in the scorched earth policy adopted by the NGVR (McCarthy, 1962:57). J.J.Murphy (letter) cannot recall any arrest, he says an NGVR rear section tried to destroy a petroleum dump by rifle fire.

⁴Lawrence (1964:48-9) said 'The Administration made every effort to preserve calm among natives by hiding news of European war from them. All local preparations were kept secret, especially the Coast Watching Service, a group of officers and settlers willing to stay in their area in the event of attack and report enemy movements.'

giving them food so they could remain close to Lae. Their advice was 'If the Japanese call you, shoot your pigs or cut your coconuts, don't say anything. It is something caused by the war.'⁵ The Europeans promised they would return with planes to recapture Lae. Apo Amala contradicted this evidence. He said Mr Blue told villagers they were not to help the Japanese by working as carriers for them.⁶

The villagers noted how quickly Europeans withdrew from Lae. 'The Englishmen and Australians who lived for many years in New Guinea tried to find ways to send their families to Port Moresby or to Australia.' The Europeans who remained behind in the Butibam area were called coastwatchers and one of their tasks was to help the workers from Lae by sending them home. Many New Guinean labourers from Wau and Bulolo were so scared that they ran everywhere. Coastwatchers told them that food was stored in Butibam. The NGVR and the coastwatchers had collected food, rice and meat in Butibam and these were stored in the house of the tultul Ahi Yomkwa who was put in charge of issuing the rations.⁷ The food was guarded very closely because it belonged to the Administration. Parties of refugee labourers who had run away from Wau and Bulolo were fed and then they went home to their villages.

Mr H.R. Niall was ADO at Wau in December 1941 when the Japanese entered the war. At this time the New Guinea Administration was on the point of shifting its Headquarters from Rabaul to Lae and Sir Walter McNicoll, the Administrator, and two departmental heads were transferred to Lae and Salamaua to establish the new capital. Sir Walter was sick and had to leave Lae, but before he left he handed Mr Niall the Prime Minister's code and told him that all officers were now completely on their own as the administration had broken down and he was unsure where his subordinates were.

⁵ Lieut. Harris commended the good work of Signaller R.Chugg and Sgt. Emery of NGVR in maintaining contact in the Lae area: W/D July-August 1942, Markham.

⁶ J.J.Murphy (letter) says the general instruction to villagers was 'Mind your P's and Q's, don't antagonise the Japs. We won't ask you to do things that are dangerous to you. But voluntary assistance and information to the Japs is treason.'

⁷ Karo Ahi, whose father was tultul, gave the following names of coastwatchers: Mr Cunningham, Mr 'Blue', Mr Whittaker and Mr Bob Emery. All were plantation overseers of Lae. Capt. Whittaker was in charge of the NGVR detachment at Lae.

Shortly after the Japanese bombed Wau and Salamaua Mr Niall was promoted to District Officer and NGAU was formed.

When NGAU was formed there was no question of restarting the mining which had ceased in the Wau-Bulolo areas and there were thousands of labourers who had been left behind by their employers. They were taken under the wing of NGAU and Mr Niall personally went to places of employment to tell all labourers from the Morobe area to go home. He promised to see they were paid later on. He estimated that 90 per cent of the Morobe labourers returned to their villages in the Finschhafen, Waria, Wain and Markham area. Those who came from New Britain, New Ireland and the Sepik were invited to stay on and NGAU promised to look after them. Only a few chose to leave Wau. These 'foreign natives' were told to plant gardens in the Wau-Bulolo valley to ensure they would have food supplies if compelled to remain at Wau for the duration of the war.

After the formation of ANGAU all the 'foreign natives' were signed on as carriers to help the Commando Company and NGVR to resist the Japanese occupation forces. ANGAU issued each labourer with a small aluminium disc with a number which was hung around their necks. Registers with the name and village of the labourer corresponding to the numbers were kept by ANGAU. Mr Niall stated it was a matter of great satisfaction to him that when the Allies recaptured Lae in September 1943 ANGAU was able to pay off nearly every labourer signed on in the early days.

The 'soldiers' to whom Butibam villagers referred were members of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles which was formed from the ranks of employers of labour, such as miners and plantation supervisors. The NGVR had an outpost opposite Kirkland's Crossing on the Markham and from their watching posts launched an attack on the Japanese outpost at Heaths plantation and another on Salamaua.⁸ They used their employees as guides and carriers. Though the foreign natives were advised to stay in the Wau area, a few left and travelled to the coast around Lae and Salamaua, where they were pressed into service by the Japanese Occupation Forces.

⁸P.Ryan (1959:24-5) refers to the effective patrolling by forward elements of the NGVR in the earlier part of 1942. Scouts patrolled to the outskirts of Lae and on one or two occasions went among the Japanese at Lae airstrip. Kirkland's outpost was on the south side of the Markham. J.J.Murphy (letter) says they were 2/5th Independent Company raids.

ANGAU Patrol Officers in the Markham Valley were a holding and patrolling force. They went around the back of Lae to the Finschhafen area to maintain contact with the villagers and to find out about Japanese movements. There had been a lot of ill-feeling against Australians at the outbreak of war in New Guinea because employers in many places had just walked off and had not bothered to pay wages due.⁹ ANGAU had the task of keeping indentured labourers loyal to the Australian side after this bad start.

There was no period of interregnum after the Europeans withdrew from Lae. The Japanese were on their heels early the next morning. A 'full battalion' of Japanese marched through the streets of Lae looking for the Australians. They entered Butibam in the morning and searched the village. In Finschhafen the invading Japanese asked 'Any Americans? Any Americans?' To the villagers the Japanese were new faces and they were afraid because these strangers wore uniforms. The invaders were not welcome in Butibam and as they entered the village most of the villagers still there vacated their homes. Some bachelors and young married men remained in Butibam.

When the Japanese entered Butibam the luluai Ahi Nandu and the tultul Ahi Yomkwa were not in the village. These officials of the former government had fled into the bush. Not finding any Australians in the village, the Japanese troops marched through Ampo and checked the missionaries' houses there. The Japanese sent scouts into the village later and that very afternoon over 100 of their soldiers marched into Butibam. The next day the Japanese returned again and during the time of their occupation they made constant visits to the village. Gradually villagers who had fled into the bush emerged to collect coconuts, betelnut and personal possessions.

Philemon Balob was a pastor of the Lae Congregation when the war broke out. He was called by Rev. Lehner to join him at Hopoi in 1942 and he stayed there for twelve months. Before he left Butibam he buried the money belonging to the church, and the money was never discovered by the Japanese.

⁹ Alan Leadley (1974) refers to the words of Paliau during the trials of New Guinean collaborators, 'They escaped themselves ... They did not care for contracts or our lives at all.'

It is not easy to say what opinions the villagers of Butibam had of the Japanese before they met them. The villagers had asked their kiaps 'Who are the Japanese?' Kiaps had cautioned them not to do anything to upset the newcomers. Several villagers were fearful about how they might be treated. Mr Niall acknowledged that villagers were told by ANGAU officers that the Japanese would rape their women. He himself had issued such a warning.

Mr Niall had no superior officer after the District Officer for Markham and the ailing Administrator of New Guinea left Salamaua. He acted on his own initiative and gave advice to the people living close to Lae. He told them to stay in their villages and not to attempt to fight the Japanese. If they were compelled they ought to give the Japanese food but they were not to actively co-operate with them. They were not to show the Japanese the tracks leading to Wau. In Mr Niall's opinion the villagers followed his advice because they had little choice. Many would have expected the Australians to return and punish 'collaborators'.¹⁰

There were three classes of Japanese forces in the Lae area. They were distinguished by marks on their caps, which were an anchor, a star and a book. Most patrols were comprised of the Navy troops wearing the anchor (Kaigun). Those with the star on their hats were medical troops and a number of them were Christians who occasionally attended Lutheran Mission services. The third group who had the mark of a book on their hats were fierce and were called Digugung. Villagers got along well with Kaigun but left their village whenever Digugung came. The kempitai was distinguished by the straps he wore across his chest, a red mark on his hat and a long curved sword. In the opinion of Gedisa Tingase this sword was used for cutting off Europeans' heads. He alleged that carriers who worked with the Japanese said that numerous Europeans were executed in this manner.

A description of the dress of Japanese troops was given by W/O P.A. Ryan in June 1943, in an ANGAU patrol report.

¹⁰ It was only during the first few months of Japanese occupation that close communication was maintained before the Japanese left Butibam for a safer and remote camp. Roberts does not feel the villagers gave more than average co-operation (letter from A.A.Roberts, 7/11/75).

All were clothed in green uniforms with soft khaki caps. The leader wore a white topee helmet with the army star insignia in the front. Most of them were wearing a coat of similar colouring and material to the Australian pattern gas capes, but the length of these capes came only between knee and thigh. All except the leader wore rubber soled shoes, the leader wearing Australian pattern boots with the iron shod heel.

They were armed with rifles, sub-machine guns and the officer carried a pistol. Each man carried a pack and a kit bag.¹¹

If the villagers were fearful at first of the Japanese they had to overcome this fear in order to re-enter their homes to secure necessities. It is possible that their next reaction to the invaders was a passive one. It is clear that no villagers were openly defiant of the 'new order'.¹² In the beginning, the Japanese did not change the routine of the daily existence of villagers. They introduced new administrative machinery in the form of the kempitai (military policeman or MP) who lived in the village and through him they controlled not only villagers but their own troops. (*Oli hetman belong Japan oli kolim kempi.*) Though no villagers willingly offered to help the Japanese those who were asked to serve co-operated. Several villagers helped the Japanese troops to take food to the Japanese camps. Some helpers joined the Japanese and carried loads to Salamaua and even to Papua.

Opinions vary about how far the villagers accommodated themselves to the invaders. 'A native of, say, Wagun village close to Lae, could safely be treated as an enemy' (P. Ryan, 1960:94).¹³ Though some Japanese threatened Butibam villagers and took food, coconuts and pigs by force, others were reported to be kind, understanding individuals who made the

¹¹ Report of Huon Peninsula, 25/4/1943-23/6/1943. One object of the patrol was to secure information regarding enemy activity and movement in Lae and in the Huon Peninsula.

¹² Alan Leadley (1974) quotes a Japanese officer-in-charge of District Civil Administration 'I don't think the Tolais welcomed the Japanese soldiers and freely co-operated with them when they occupied Rabaul ...'

¹³ Mrs H. Holzknicht (11/11/75) considers this an unjust and unfair judgment by Ryan.

villagers feel safe. Friendly attitudes appeared to make the villagers less fearful of the new rulers. Behind the friendliness, however, there was always the shadow of force that could be used against them.

Poalu David who was nicknamed 'Saburo San' by the Japanese military police was among the first three men who were called on to serve the Japanese. The other two were Poebu Jonathan and Tambo Mandai.¹⁴ Poalu said that the kempitai Saka Kiba rode a white horse into the village and called out to the three of them to follow him. He gave them varied tasks. They collected vegetables and fruits like pawpaws and bananas, cleaned roads, fished and hunted for fresh meat such as wild pigs and cows. The Lutheran Mission at Ampo had kept cows and these ran astray in the bush when the war began, so Poalu and his colleagues were sent to hunt them. A Chinese family was invited by a Gwabadik man to take refuge at Bumsi and the whole Chinese community followed. The three villagers visited Bumsi with the kempitai to check on the Chinese refugees who were camped there. After seeing them they collected food and gave it to the Chinese. At first the Chinese got rations of oil, dripping and tinned fish from the Japanese. Later this was reduced to rice and a little salt (P.Ryan, 1960:118). Poalu did not know what his nickname Saburo meant. It is doubtful whether he liked the name.¹⁵ The other two men were nicknamed as well. Poebu was called Momatoro San (Lion) and Mandai was called Kogatoro San. The three of them were not given hats, arm bands, sticks, uniforms or numbers which were the insignia of the former regime. All they were given were nicknames. (*Oli kolim naem tasol long mipela, nogat hat, nogat yunafom.*)¹⁶ Poalu was happy working for the Japanese. Apo Amala, however, said that Poebu Jonathan, Agi Nagawe and himself were given half laplaps and rations of rice, cigarettes and tinned meat after a day's work. Certain village men were chosen by the Japanese as hunters, cooks and fishermen. They used dynamite to catch fish in the Busu River and they carried water from the Bumbu River to the village to cook the fish. These men were given

¹⁴ Mandai who was from Madang was married to a girl from Butibam. He is deceased.

¹⁵ Much amusement was aroused by the discussion of Poalu's nickname during the interview.

¹⁶ They only gave us a name, we got no hats or special clothes.

numbers and wore white armbands with red markings. The armbands protected these workers from punishment by the troops. The names of these helpers given after some reluctance were Titi, Tamandu and Natu. Poebu pointed out that villagers only helped the Japanese for a short while. Furthermore, the Japanese did not train anyone from Butibam to fight.

Apo Amala was given a task by a high-ranking Japanese soldier called Hamasaki. Hamasaki wore four stars on his uniform. In Gedisa Tingasa's opinion he may have been at one time the chief of all Japanese operations in the Huon Gulf. He had worked in prewar days at Rabaul as a ship-builder. He had returned to Japan and was sent back to Rabaul with the Japanese occupation troops because he was familiar with the land and people of New Guinea and was a good pidgin speaker. Hamasaki acted as an interpreter in Butibam and was the man in charge of buying food.¹⁷

Apo travelled in a barge to villages of the coastal area such as Busama and Singaua and traded salt and tobacco for foodstuffs. The barge would leave Voco Point at 6a.m. and as it stopped along the coast Poebu, Agi Nagawe and Hamasaki would go ashore. The luluai and tultul would gather the villagers together, then the Japanese would trade biscuits, sticks of tobacco, rice and sugar for fresh food from the villagers. If the Japanese ran out of trade goods they paid in coin. These Japanese coins were so light that if you dropped one on the floor it made no sound. (*Narapeka kain em e no hevi e silva.*) Apo didn't know whether the coins had any value. Trading also took place inland as well. At Musom, a village in the valley of the Busu River 14 miles from Lae, Peter Ryan discovered Japanese newspapers and a Japanese kerosene bottle, which clearly indicated trading was taking place along the river (P.Ryan, 1960:109). An ANGAU patrol report in 1944 stated that most trading with the Japanese was done with coin, which the Markham villagers described as 'something that's not heavy, but like the leaf

¹⁷ Feldt (1970:101) p.134 refers to a prewar Japanese resident of Bougainville called Tashira who was experienced in handling villagers. He collected all the Kieta villagers he could in 1942 and told them the war was over for them, the Japanese were in complete possession and the few Europeans left did not matter. At Finschhafen there was a Capt. Hirata and a prewar Japanese resident who acted as interpreters.

of a tree'.¹⁸ There was no store where villagers could spend this money so they had a lot of cash when the Japanese had left the area. Later when the Americans came they exchanged boxes of cigarettes for Japanese money.

There was no Japanese trade store in Lae but there were warehouses in which the troops kept goods which came in on large boats. There was a bulk store near Chinatown in a shelter beneath Mount Lunamen. The food in the bulk store was from the market which was held on the bank of the Bumbu River, near the present Bumbu Bridge. Villagers sold green vegetables, pawpaws and other fruit to the Japanese at the market and were paid in coin.

Hamasaki told the Butibam villagers that they had no government because the Australians had run away. The Japanese made all the Chinese in Lae register with the new administration. Each Chinese was issued with an identification card and was required to report to HQ weekly. To many villagers it seemed as if the Japanese had come to stay.¹⁹ At a meeting of Luluais and tultuls of the villages of Kamkumun, Yanga, Wagang and Butibam, Hamasaki told the local officials of the former administration that he knew them from prewar days and that he was their new 'kiap'. He said that if Japanese troops stole pigs or garden food or misbehaved, the villagers were to report this to him and the soldiers would be punished. Hamasaki would enter Butibam in the afternoon on his motor bike and villagers with complaints would report to him. The offending soldier would be made to kneel three times before the kempitai Nakang Gawa (also referred to as the police master) began to question him. If the kempitai found the soldier guilty he would knock the offender all over his body with the flat side of the blade of his long sword. He might deliver between six and ten strokes. All Japanese soldiers were afraid of the kempitai. At Finschhafen the CO Japanese forces used a cane to punish soldiers for minor offences. Major offenders would be punished by caning, and they were also sent to the front line. Whereas Poalu David referred to the kempitai as Saka Kiba, Apo Amala called him Nakang Gawa.²⁰

¹⁸P/R North Markham, 3/4/1944.

¹⁹'You can never be too sure of these Kanakas. If they reckon the Japs have won the war, they'll all be on their side just as they abandoned the Germans to come over to us 30 years ago.' (P.Ryan, 1960:72.)

²⁰They seemed to be referring to the same man but there was no agreement on his name.

Butibam villagers recalled three instances when the Japanese meted out punishment to local residents. Kamakang, a young villager, was accused of knowing about the Americans and failing to report his information to the Japanese. A villager picked up a stout piece of wood and struck Kamakang four times across the head to get him to reveal where the Americans were. Poebu Jonathan told Hamasaki that Kamakang was innocent and he released him. Kamakang did meet secretly with coastwatcher Bob Emery, so also did Hiob, a Kamkumung man. A mixed-race man called Peter Ah Tun was punished in Butibam by the Japanese. Peter Ah Tun was described as the unofficial leader and spokesman for the Chinese refugees. He was tied to a coconut tree because he was accused of owning a radio transmitter. He was suspected of being in touch with Australians. He secretly met Peter Ryan during the Japanese occupation. He reported that he had been kept in handcuffs and leg-irons in the Lae gaol because some villagers told the Japanese he was spying for the Australians (P. Ryan, 1960: 115-16). Poebu persuaded the Japanese that Ah Tun was innocent and the troops released him.

To Apo Amala, Hamasaki was a good boss for Butibam village because he knew the *place-tok* and he prevented the Japanese troops from becoming 'bigheads'. Hamasaki helped solve the villagers' problems but he refused to tell villagers how the war was going. The Kempitai Nakang Gawa stopped soldiers from stealing and treated the villagers well. Apo liked the Japanese because they were 'kind and just'. Apo was described by another villager as a fluent speaker of Japanese who served in 1951 as a guide for Japanese search-parties looking for their war dead.

Quite a different story is told by Kamdring Samuel Misah, Kising Tikandu, Philemon Balob and Poebu Jonathan. Samuel said villagers were not treated properly by the Japanese and that the Japanese did as they wished in the village. They stole pigs and chickens and if the owners protested or tried to get their possessions back, the Japanese would threaten them with their rifles. Acts of misconduct by the Japanese such as raiding gardens, shooting pigs and mission cattle occurred at Bukaua after Japanese supplies were cut off. At Finschhafen when 'things went bad', the Japanese rooted out the villagers' gardens, killed pigs and chased the villagers. Samuel was afraid of the Japanese. On one occasion he emerged from the bush and returned to his home to collect coconuts and a saucepan. A Japanese approached him and asked who owned the pigs under the house. The soldier enquired whether

Samuel wished to sell the pigs but he was too scared to answer so he let the pigs go for nothing. This was not a demand for food and payment was offered, yet fear of the Japanese made Samuel give away his prized possessions.

Kising Tikandu said villagers were not very happy when the Japanese were there because they treated the villagers very badly. They prevented them from entering the town lest they should observe the Japanese camps and report to coast-watchers. Chinese tradesmen were taken into Lae on occasion to work for the Japanese (P.Ryan, 1960:69). Guards were placed in the village and though Japanese often came there, villagers never went into the town. Kising said the troops killed pigs and stole coconuts at will, and threatened villagers with rifles if they protested. 'Every demand was backed up by guns ... the gun was always there.' As a result of this threatening behaviour villagers were frightened so they let the soldiers do as they wished. Kising knew of Hamasaki and his role in the village as a go-between yet he stuck to his story about the misconduct of the Japanese troops. Philemon Balob was at Bukaua for most of the occupation yet he agreed with the story told by Kising that the Japanese stole food and were a nuisance. He said if villagers protested at Japanese misconduct they were thrashed. Balob said there was a lot of food in Butibam but the Japanese took so much that many villagers got no food at all. Poebu Jonathan claimed that the Japanese took pigs, entered the village gardens and stole taro, sugar-cane, bananas and tomatoes. They stole and treated the people of Butibam badly and spoilt their lives. Poebu said when the Japanese stole their food the villagers had to go to their friends in Talec, Apo and Tickering to beg for food and firewood. It is possible that as a result of complaints, the kempitai was brought to the village in order to see that the soldiers behaved themselves.

When it was time for Hamasaki to leave, another high-ranking Japanese, Nagamora, who lived in New Ireland in pre-war days, was sent to Lae. Mr Niall recalls Nagamora as a Japanese who lived at Talasea, was in Salamaua during the war and used to send messages to him. He did not disclose their content. Nagamora's duties included teaching the village children how to count and to sing in Japanese. Several villagers recalled the Japanese words for a variety of fruit and vegetables and they counted up to twenty in Japanese. Nagong Kwalam, Piebu and Apo seemed the most fluent Japanese speakers (*Oahaiio Hamasaki-san, Sayonara*

Hamasaki-san).²¹ There was no formal school but it is quite likely that had they stayed longer the Japanese would have established schools. At Bukaua a number of friendly Japanese started to teach Gedisa Tingasa the mission teacher a few words of Japanese and to count. They also taught the school children some songs.²²

For the period that they were in Butibam the Japanese commanded complete obedience. One explanation given was that the villagers had no weapons and a bighead could do no good because he would be struck (*kilim*). If any villagers tried to act as guerrillas the entire village might come to harm. The villagers had no clear idea of the number of Japanese in Lae. It is probable that the Japanese did not have a large army camp because at the start Lae was merely an air base and staging point to Salamaua. The Japanese were evenly dispersed in Lae and their centres controlled different parts of the town. One section of the Japanese forces had its headquarters where the Lae Golf Club now stands. The Lutheran Mission at Ampo across the Bumbu River was a centre of Japanese occupation. The missionary's residence was used as a medical headquarters and all the smaller outbuildings for the patients. There was an original force of 2500 troops which grew to 6000 when Lae was attacked by the Allies. The Japanese had defensive points as far out as Heaths Plantation. Communications between Lae and Butibam were easy; the road was open in all weather and the Japanese rode motor bikes and horses. The Japanese sent out patrols of a dozen troops, comprising one NCO and his platoon to Boana, Nadzab and Chivasing at two-monthly intervals.²³

Some villagers were disgusted and angered at the Japanese custom of burning bodies on a pile of firewood on the beach, as the villagers always buried their dead.²⁴ No Butibam

²¹ Good day Mr Hamasaki, Good-bye Mr Hamasaki.

²² Michael Somare (1970:31) the first Prime Minister of PNG, learned to count in a Japanese school.

²³ ... the Nips stick pretty much to Lae and around the coast, though they've been patrolling up the Markham Valley road a lot more lately' (P.Ryan, 1960:16).

²⁴ The Gejammec group reported that the Japanese killed their own wounded when in retreat, but one survivor was helped by the villagers (letter from Mrs Holzknicht, 10/12/75).

informant commented critically on the personal habits of the Japanese.²⁵ There were no complaints about their eating habits, whether they wasted food or whether their personal hygiene was poor. When Peter Ryan entered a village where Japanese had spent the previous night he found their troops had covered the verandah of the house where they slept with excreta (P.Ryan, 1960:170). The villagers of Bukaua were very worried about contracting dysentery because dysentery had affected the Japanese soldiers in their village. Nelson Wazob from Munum complained that the Japanese fouled any area where they ate. Numerous ANGAU patrol reports comment on their general lack of hygiene. The Japanese were also most imprudent with food and other stores. They would make dumps for stores and arms in the bush, taking little or no precautions against damage by weather. Many Japanese were said to have died from dysentery from eating 'questionable' foods, e.g. pawpaw leaves. (P/R Madang 1943-44. Interrogation of Kobura.) Villagers had ample opportunity to observe the Japanese in company and Japanese soldiers ate with them, shared things with them and spoke with them. The main foods of the Japanese were flour and rice. They also ate a type of little biscuit, a sort of curry and very small smoked fish like eels.

The troops never interfered with village girls in Butibam and no one knew of the birth of any part-Japanese babies. No special attempts were made to keep the girls hidden from the troops. Credit was given to Hamasaki for keeping the soldiers well-disciplined. Peter Ah Tun said the Japanese did not molest the Chinese women (P.Ryan, 1960: 118). It was not the Japanese custom to interfere with village women. Gedisa Tingasa said some troops did make overtures to the women at Bukaua but that village men did not allow contact. He alleged that in Madang there were part-Japanese babies. Mr Niall said that ANGAU, bearing in mind the rape of Nanking, had warned the coastal villagers that their womenfolk would be raped and the men shot. He agreed that the Allied propaganda was proved wrong in this respect. He conceded that the Japanese were very good to the village women and there were only one or two isolated cases of molestation. In his opinion this was due to the discipline

²⁵ Japanese soldiers would urinate and defaecate in full view of Tolai women. Their practice on the Gazelle of cremating dead (and dying) soldiers on huge funeral pyres shocked most of the Tolais who witnessed it (Leadley, 1974).

of the Japanese army and fear of revenge by the villagers.²⁶

In Mr Niall's opinion the Japanese had very little propaganda of their own. They could not speak pidgin and communicated with New Guinean villagers as little as possible. He knew the Japanese did a bit of trading with villagers but he believed they had difficulty in determining which New Guineans were friendly to their cause. His opinion was based on reports from New Guinean spies whom the Allies sent in from Gabensis to tend sweet potato gardens near the Lae airstrip.²⁷ There is much evidence, however, that the Japanese did preach propaganda and worked at converting New Guineans to their cause.

A Japanese document captured in West New Britain in 1944 indicated the principles by which the Japanese conducted their relations with New Guinea villagers. The document was a special speech addressed to the captains or chosen men of each village. It stated that if a villager failed to obey a captain's order he was to be reported to the kempitai (Military Police Unit) for punishment. The kempitai had the right to catch and punish any villagers, white people or Japanese soldiers who did wrong things. If Japanese soldiers stole food the kempi should be told about it. The villagers were also warned not to overcharge Japanese soldiers for vegetables. If villagers saw Englishmen, Australians, Chinese, Filipinos or Malays in their area they were to report this sighting, or better still to catch the man and bring him to the kempi. Any letters, clothes or gun belonging to the Australians should be handed in. If any American or English airmen parachuted into their area the kempi was to be told. Villagers were cautioned not to make fires in their houses at night. They were to go into the bush in the day and return to their houses at night to sleep. Lastly villagers were encouraged to grow more food.²⁸

²⁶ One of the forbidden things for a soldier was a relationship with local or Asiatic women. This was a law strictly obeyed by Japanese troops on the Gazelle (Leadley, 1974).

²⁷ It is unlikely that Japanese troops would have tolerated the presence of 'foreign' villagers in the vicinity of their airstrip at Lae. A man called Sawang from Wagang spied on the Japanese for the Australians (Dexter, 1961: 355-6).

²⁸ HQ Northern Region: Attachment to Report from Arawe by J. McLeod.

A further enemy document gave the reason why the Japanese were in New Guinea.²⁹ They had come to kill the English and Australians. Villagers were asked whether their former masters ever ate supper with them around the table. It was pointed out that villagers could not go into their master's room during mealtimes. The document spoke of Japanese and kanakas as brothers who ate together. A promise was made to teach villagers to make rice, guns and knives and to read and write, so it was the villagers' duty to help the Japanese army. The reward for helping the Japanese was to be beautiful clothes and sweet rice. However, there was punishment or prison or beheading for those who helped the English. Villagers were reminded that the Japanese were their brothers and the Japanese army was the strongest and kindest in the world.³⁰

Japanese propaganda was often preached to a captive audience of villagers, who would be assembled where practicable and addressed. The main theme was to stress that the Allies were completely routed from New Guinea, Papua and Australia, that the numerous planes were Japanese and their bombing was only practice as there were no Allied troops left to bomb. Promises were made that in the future villagers were to receive shoes and any other clothing they wished. The Japanese promised to set up factories for the villagers alone in which they would produce cars, planes, ships and submarines, all for their own use. The ANGAU patrol officer who reported this evidence commented: 'This highly imaginative native Utopia was the main theme of the propaganda and though many natives were sceptical the majority placed some faith in it.'³¹

In May 1943 villagers from the area surrounding Boana gathered at Boana to meet with a patrol of forty Japanese troops from Lae. The villagers had been summoned by the (Kate) mission teachers who had accompanied the Japanese from Lae and who assisted them in every way possible, obtaining native foods and securing information about roads. The Japanese patrol distributed free among the assembled

²⁹ Alan Leadley (1974) outlines the five main tasks of the Minseibu, the Japanese civil administration on New Britain and New Ireland.

³⁰ HQ Northern Region: Attachment to Report from Arawe by J. McLeod.

³¹ P/R Madang 1943-44: Interrogation of Kobura by W/O F.C. Monk.

villagers a large supply of trade goods, e.g. sugar, salt, haversacks, mirrors in fancy shapes and matches. There was no tobacco or lava lava (laplap material).

W/O P.A. Ryan reported in June 1942 that Japanese 'propaganda among natives seems to be giving highly successful results'. The Japanese were employing Chinese and Malays who were competent pidgin speakers and had some experience and understanding of the villagers. Nearly every enemy patrol was accompanied by one such interpreter. Ryan conceded that

It is impossible to say whether these people are in all cases willingly co-operating with the enemy: nevertheless they are serving the enemy's purpose. An even greater factor in the success of enemy propaganda is the great co-operation of the mission teachers.³²

He charged the mission teachers with hypocrisy and wholehearted assistance of the enemy. A mission teacher accompanied every Japanese patrol. The teachers did not carry cargo but acted in the capacity of police. Ryan speculated that 'Their ability to put enemy propaganda to natives in the way best calculated to bring it home to the native mind must make them invaluable'. Japanese propaganda, as Ryan described it, stressed that the Australian government was finished, all the patrol officers had run away and that there were few 'British' left in New Guinea apart from a few at Wau and at Port Moresby. The Japanese also stressed their superior numbers, pointing out (with truth) that they moved about with safety because of their numbers, while the

³² Report of Huon Peninsula, 24/4/1943-23/6/1943, W/O P.A. Ryan. A.A. Roberts said that many of the Lutheran Missionaries who controlled the mission teachers in the years just before 1939 had arrived from Germany after Nazi control was fully established. He assumed that these younger missionaries had instilled anti-British thoughts in the minds of the local mission trainee teachers (letter from A.A. Roberts 7/11/75). Roberts brought a full plane-load of missionaries out to be interned in Australia. Boana Mission in 1939 had a small printing press for the distribution of Nazi propaganda. Mrs Holzknicht (11/11/75) says it appears that the men with Ryan were only too ready to report that a 'Mission teacher' was along..

only Australians in the area were forced to hide.³³ 'The irrefutable truth of this often caused us embarrassment.'³⁴ Ryan stated that the Japanese used another line of propaganda that was hard to counter. They had told the villagers that when New Guineans died their spirits went to Japan and that the spirits of all their ancestral dead were living in Japan. The Japanese had threatened to give these spirits 'a bad time' unless the villagers looked after the Japanese. This story of the Japanese was readily believed, showing that old superstitions were 'not a whit diminished'. In Ryan's opinion it was natural that enemy propaganda should be successful in areas where the enemy were in strength and the few officers of the previous government were reduced to hiding in the bush and relying on the goodwill of villagers for their very existence.³⁵

ANGAU conducted its own counter-propaganda. Its officers in forward areas were instructed by the GOC, ANGAU, Major-General Morris, to pass on this personal message to luluais and tultuls in forward positions in the Markham area in July 1943:

- A. To those villages whose officials and people have helped our parties and have endeavoured to deceive and obstruct the enemy - a message that their loyalty had been noted, that I trust that it will continue and that, some time in the future, their reward will assuredly come.
- B. To those villages, on the other hand, that have betrayed our soldiers and native police and have willingly helped the enemy - a message that their actions have been noted. They have broken the law and they will surely be brought to trial. I know that the enemy are at present strong in their areas and that our numbers

³³ J.J. Murphy (letter) says the Allied version was that Australians were 'lying in wait' and keeping their soldiers, who were on the way, fully informed of Japanese dispositions.

³⁴ Villagers challenged Ryan on this issue. They pointed out there were more Japanese in Lae alone than there were white men in the whole of New Guinea before the war, therefore the Japanese must be stronger (P. Ryan, 1960:95).

³⁵ Report of Huon Peninsula, 25/4/1943-23/6/1943.

there are not many, but the time will come when we shall come back in strength. Tell the natives that the Japanese came to one part of New Guinea. The natives of that part thought that the Government was finished for all time so they helped the enemy and killed some of our soldiers. We told them that we would come back and that they would be brought to trial. We did come back, the culprits have been tried and already five of them have been hanged by the neck until they were dead. Let the people of Ofofragen and Chivasing and Waimeriba know of this. If they have done wrong their only chance of mitigation of punishment is to give up their disloyalty and their help to the enemy. We shall return.³⁶

Mr Niall had also made broadcasts to the people of the Morobe District, such as:

This is Master Niall. I'm still here at Wau. Now we are winning the war, there's a temporary set back. In the meantime be neutral. Don't go and actively assist the Japs. We know the Japs have got command of your part of the country but don't assist them or we'll be very annoyed later on. We're going to win the war.

In September 1943, there were many fights between Allied and Japanese aircraft over Lae. Villagers recall the continual bombing of Lae by Allied aircraft. They were warned to be careful about lighting fires, because a naked light might attract a plane. No lamps were lit and no food was cooked at night. Villagers also found it hard to sleep at night. During the bombing of the Japanese positions the enemy could not easily maintain discipline over the villagers.

ANGAU officers stated that leaflets in pidgin dropped by Allied planes did much to nullify the effects of Japanese

³⁶W/D 12 July 1943, Appendix 155 Natives - Propaganda. Some of the Allied propaganda was ignored. In the Wain area pamphlets written in pidgin were dropped from aircraft. These pamphlets told the villagers not to clear the tracks. When Peter Ryan climbed the Saruwaged Ranges he found villagers had cleared a road which was 12 feet and even 20 feet wide in some places (P.Ryan, 1960:215).

propaganda though the reading or discussing of the leaflets had to be done secretly as the Japanese announced they would behead anyone found with these pamphlets.³⁷ The air raids were themselves very good propaganda for the Allies because they showed the Allies were getting stronger. Bombing raids did a lot of damage, destroying troops' rations and stores of petrol. As a result of the intense bombing the Japanese brought their stores in by submarine at night (P.Ryan, 1960: 117).

Hamasaki had warned the Butibam villagers that the Australians and Americans were coming and there would be fierce fighting in Lae. Karo Ahi recalls this as a very noisy time as 'planes kept on coming'. The noise of the bombing of Lae was clearly heard by villagers at Gain village in the Busu Valley more than thirty miles from Lae (P.Ryan, 1960:46). Many of the villagers fled into the bush close to Bumayong and slept in temporary shelters at Tickering, or in huts at the beach towards Busu River. Others crossed the Busu River and settled in a sheltered spot. Some villagers were fed up with the long walk and sometimes stayed in the village, as on the night it was bombed. Though they had been told not to make fires at night an old man who was sick made a fire and an Allied plane bombed the village at about 2a.m. Four people died and one woman was seriously injured. Those who died were Nagong Yankawak and his wife, Mokwang Apo, Busulum Tape and a youth Singom Yanam Saking. Kawawe Awase, who was injured in the calf, was treated by a Japanese doctor and she is still alive. The good work of this doctor was praised by several informants. Samuel Misah was also injured by the bomb and his wife nursed him back to health in about five days.

Villagers of Butibam recalled the landing of Australians and Americans after the air fights over Lae. One informant stated that some Allied soldiers landed in submarines at Malahang, others came by warships and that black Americans landed at Nadzab in planes. None of the villagers knew about the paratroopers who landed at Nadzab. The attitude of villagers to the 'liberation forces' seems to have been

³⁷P/R Madang 1943-44. Allied aircraft dropped leaflets over all the Bukaua villages advising local people to run off into the hills and leave the Japanese. Many villagers obeyed the Allied warnings. Gedisa Tingese the teacher was tried by a Japanese court on suspicion of advising the people to flee but was acquitted.

mixed. Gedisa Tingasa said villagers generally were overjoyed when the Japanese retreated; they were tired of them and of war-time conditions. They believed the return of the Allies meant good times would come back again. They would be able to rebuild their villages and get on with living. Their one big regret was that during the war so many New Guineans had been killed. They saw the return of the Allies also as the end of the time of killing and so they were happy.

Whereas Philemon Balob and Kamdring Samuel Misah welcomed their deliverers from the Japanese, Apo Amala and Poalu David didn't really mind who came. Patrol reports of ANGAU officers who went to the Hube Region of the Huon Peninsula noted a distinct attitude of indifference to the return of the Allies. Perhaps those villagers who had worked for the Japanese were nervous or anxious about their fate after Lae was retaken.

When W/O S.L. Ashton visited the coastal region of the Huon Peninsula in April 1944 he reported: 'I received instant respect and prompt obedience to all my orders. Possibly owing to my mature age, but more likely due to respect to the old time Master.' The village officials gave him willing and great assistance on his patrol once it was clearly evident the Allies held the upper hand. One luluai expressed this opinion concisely to W/O Ashton:

We thought the Japanese could beat you when you left these places, so we went their way. Afterwards when you bombed and bombed we were doubtful, so we made up our mind to sit in the middle but when you hunt them from these places we will know that you are the stronger.³⁸

Few villagers in Butibam wished to discuss the case of Tuya, who was hanged as a traitor.³⁹ Mr Niall stated that three 'traitors' were hanged at the end of 1943; two were

³⁸P/R North Markham 1943-44, 3/4/33. 'Until it became clear who was going to win the war, a sensible politician would speak softly to both sides' (P.Ryan, 1960:77).

³⁹Butibam villagers regard the whole occurrence as very regrettable. Tuya was a headstrong fellow; in any case he was not from Butibam so he did not concern them (letter from Mrs Holzkecht, 13/11/75).

guides from Butibam and one from Chivasing. He said Chivasing villagers gave evidence at the trial of Tuya. They alleged Tuya was one of two guides from Butibam who led a Japanese patrol to Chivasing where Capt. L.F. Howlett was killed. The other guide from Butibam was not named. He said that Tuya's name was known and Tuya was arrested shortly after the Allies recaptured Lae. He denied that the hanging was public, saying it took place in Malahang gaol. Mr Niall believed no one in Butibam should feel disgraced or embarrassed about the hanging because the 'traitors were no-hopers'.

The following is the official story. Tuya was charged with the wilful murder of Capt. L.F. Howlett of the AIB.⁴⁰ On 21 June 1943 Capt. Howlett, W/O P.A. Ryan and a party of seventeen police and personal servants were on patrol in the Markham area. When they approached Chivasing village at about 3p.m. they asked several villagers if Japanese were about. The villagers said there were no Japanese in the village. When only a short way from the village the party was fired on by the Japanese. Capt. Howlett was wounded in the shoulder and fell to the ground. Tuya was in the village and took part in the ambush. He was armed with a rifle and when Capt. Howlett fell Tuya rushed out and hit him on the head with his rifle butt, thereby breaking the butt. Capt. Howlett was carried into Chivasing where he was later shot through the head by Tuya.⁴¹

In his defence Tuya stated that the Japanese ordered him to murder Capt. Howlett. 'I shot the master because I was afraid that if I did not do so the Japs would shoot me.'⁴²

The Legal Officer of New Guinea Force expressed the opinion that the judgment of death against Tuya was legally justified. He however agreed with the recommendation of the District Officer that even though a guilty sentence should

⁴⁰ 506/1/4 File dealing with trials held by Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, for various civil offences committed by natives, 1943-44.

⁴¹ 506/1/4 File dealing with trials held by Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, for various offences committed by natives, 1943-44. (See also P.Ryan, 1960:232-3.)

⁴² 'Circumstances had made shrewd politicians of these [Morobe] natives, for they were caught between two opposing forces and were determined to side with the ultimate winners' (P.Ryan, 1960:95).

be confirmed against Tuya his punishment should be a term of imprisonment with hard labour. The grounds for commuting the sentence were that the accused acted out of fear that if he did not shoot as he was ordered to do he would himself be a victim, that Tuya had rendered good service to the Allies when he assisted an NGVR expedition to New Britain to evacuate parties of 2/22 Battalion in 1942 and that the conditions prevailing at the time were of utter confusion, and the native people found themselves at the mercy of a ruthless nation who beheaded, bayoneted and shot them at the slightest provocation.⁴³

Tuya was executed on 13 February 1944, on the edge of a clearing close to the Native Gaol at Yanga. A formal scaffold had been erected. Four European officials and 1300 villagers from the Wain, Bukaua, Markham River and Salamaua areas were present. The villagers faced the scaffold which was surrounded by a guard of twelve RPC with fixed bayonets.

Before he was executed Tuya was visited by Capt. R.G. Ormsby and he asked to see the tultul of his village. Capt. Ormsby told the prisoner that he was about to be hanged as a lawful penalty for the murder of Capt. Howlett and that he was getting no more than his just deserts. To this the prisoner replied 'true'. Tuya was marched to the top of the scaffold where he addressed the assembled villagers. He said that although he was being hanged for the crime the real responsibility lay with the tultul of Butibam who had urged him to assist the Japanese. Tuya's death was instantaneous.

Capt. Ormsby then addressed the assembled villagers, outlining the crime and pointing out that the retribution was a just one, and that in all cases where government laws were defied punishment was inevitable. Referring to Tuya's last words he added that no matter whom he blamed for leading him astray, the evidence left no doubt that he had committed the murder of his own free will and that afterwards he had boasted of his achievement.

When the villagers of Butibam, Kamkumung and Hengali arrived an hour later Capt. Ormsby repeated his address to them. Their absence from the execution was the subject of a further report from the ADO. Tuya's body was buried in the old Yanga village cemetery.⁴⁴

⁴³ 506/1/4 File dealing with trials ...

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Mr R.G. Ormsby, who played the role of sheriff in regard to Tuya, said sentence of death was passed by a District Officer Major A.A. Roberts and was confirmed by the New Guinea Force. He said when the Butibam villagers arrived at Malahang one 'Tom' (a pseudonym) was held in custody as being responsible for their deliberate failure to attend on time. Mr Ormsby stated that Tom was denounced from the scaffold by Tuya as the ring-leader of the pro-Japanese efforts in Butibam. Tom had used his influence to delay the rest of the villagers who were attending the hanging by telling them the wrong time. In Mr Ormsby's opinion there was a lot of independent evidence that Tom had been an active and willing collaborator with the Japanese. In his opinion Tom was probably guilty of being an accessory to a number of other crimes but this may have been extremely difficult to prove. Mr Ormsby was satisfied it would have been possible to obtain evidence against Tom since he was not universally popular in his village. He alleged that there were two factions in Butibam and that the luluai Kahata would have been against Tom. It was possible to charge Tom but the Australian policy was not to protract matters which had arisen during the Japanese occupation.⁴⁵ Tom was sent to gaol for six months on the charge of 'failing to obey a lawful order to attend at a certain time'.⁴⁶

Some villagers disclaimed Tuya, asserting that 'Tuya was really not from Butibam but from Wagang'. Some villagers even said there was no trial. Melchior said the villagers could not do anything because they knew there would not be any justice after the war and that the kiaps were the only ones who ran affairs and made decisions. To Melchior, the kiap was everything, police officer, post master and judge. ANGAU had issued an instruction that all the people of Butibam were to attend Tuya's hanging. When they got to Malahang it was too late, Tuya was already dead. Melchior

⁴⁵This point has been independently confirmed by Mr H.R. Niall.

⁴⁶Personal interview R.G.Ormsby, 27-28/10/1971. Mr Roberts has denied taking part in the trial; he said Mr Ormsby could have confused him with Major J.Macdonald who he believed had Supreme Court powers in that area for a short period. Mr Roberts said there were in 1945 faint but unsubstantiated rumours of unnecessary help given to the Japanese by the tultul. As far as he knew this was not investigated and no action was taken (letter from A.A. Roberts, 7/11/75).

said that one ANGAU officer was so annoyed that they disobeyed him by coming late that he locked some of them up.⁴⁷ Melchior's explanation for their late arrival was that transport was difficult and they had to walk from Bumayong (where the school is today) to Malahang. It is possible they were reluctant to watch Tuya being hanged in public. Melchior gave the time of the hanging as 9 o'clock on a Sunday in 1944. Tuya was buried by prisoners while villagers stood by. His grave was swept away many years later when the Busu River flooded the cemetery.

Naka Nasu and Poebu Jonathan told the most complete story about Tuya. They were fellow-prisoners at Malahang gaol in 1944. They said he was hanged because he helped to guide Japanese soldiers to Nadzab. This fact was noted by Mr Bob Emery and some soldiers at Camp Diddy. Tuya had joined the Japanese police and shot an Australian soldier at Chivasing twice with a Japanese rifle. Arong, a village man from Wagang, reported it to the authorities. They claimed that two other men were gaoled as well for working with the Japanese as guides. These men were Petero⁴⁸ from Kavieng and Kepigea from Chivasing but both escaped from the Malahang gaol. All three had expected to be hanged. Poebu alleged that after Kepigea got away his mother was executed by a pre-war Lae resident instead. He also claimed that Kepigea served a prison sentence in Rabaul.

Both Naka and Poebu stated that Tuya was hanged on Sunday at 9 o'clock. They said 'Masta Niall' and 'Masta Tom' had summoned all the villagers from miles around, to come and see Tuya be hanged. The day before the execution Tuya was blind-folded and was placed in a separate room. When Naka and Poebu returned from their prison labour they found out what had happened and were so sad that they cried all night. Tuya told them from his room that God knew men could take his body but not his soul.

⁴⁷ The 'Salamauas' were also late; this angered Elia Bumbu, in spite of the police urging them, the sun was hot and they had to get sugarcane for the road (letter from Mrs Holzknécht, 11/11/75).

⁴⁸ An ANGAU patrol report referred to Petero alias Anton as 'an escapee from Lae gaol'. Lieut. J. Rae sent two of his police to arrest Petero who was armed but his American companions warned him of their approach and he escaped (P/R No.8, Saidor, Madang District, Appendix B, Alleged escapee from Lae gaol).

Amaria Gaya, who was also in prison at the same time, stated that when Tuya cried in the prison that night they all cried. In the morning a fence was put up around the scaffold and Poebu, Naka and Amaria served cold water to the thirsty condemned man. Tuya was then blindfolded, handcuffed and the three of them remained inside the fence while Tuya was hanged.

Despite the denials of many informants in Butibam it is clear that several villagers in the Lae area helped bear arms and carry information for the Japanese forces. When W/O P. Ryan sent two of his policemen to spy on a Japanese patrol in May 1943 they were betrayed at Wampangan by a

mission native from Lae, whose name is not known, and two Wagun natives called Tuya and Yuma, both of whom spent most of their time in peacetime, in the Lae gaol. They led about 20 Japanese to the house where the two police were sleeping, and the enemy opened fire on the house with rifles, light machine guns ... It is requested that the names of these two Wagun natives be borne in mind for future reference when our forces occupy Lae.⁴⁹

After Capt. Howlett was murdered at Chivasing Capt. L.G. Kyngdon, ADO Wampit, reported in June 1943 to ANGAU HQ that

the matter of the Chivasing natives is causing me some concern, as it appears certain that they organised the Jap ambush which killed Capt. Howlett and are reported to have said they will deal similarly with any European who goes to their village.⁵⁰

ANGAU reports quote a Japanese document which indicates that a 'native army' was being trained in August 1943 to gather more information on the Allies on the right bank of the Markham River. For this purpose the Lae Gendarmerie (Kempai) Tai Commander in Nasawabam was to complete the training of this army and form a roving defence of the left bank of the Markham.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Report of Huon Peninsula, 25/4/1943-23/6/1943.

⁵⁰ W/D 24 June 1943, Markham.

⁵¹ P/R North Markham 1943-44. OP Order No.2 Markham Point, 11 August 1943.

In September 1943 fifteen Japanese native police were sent by plane from Nadzab to Port Moresby by ANGAU. The letter written by Major Niall which accompanied them stated

It would appear that these natives were being trained by 1st class private Nakanisi of the Japanese army at Kaiapit. They were with the Japs when our troops contacted the enemy at Kaiapit. They deny having been issued with rifles and ammunition but state that they were given instructions while using sticks as rifles, and used stones to represent hand grenades ... They were handed to me for questioning as Prisoners of War, by DAAG, 7 Aust. Division, I consider them to be British subjects turned traitor.⁵²

When W/O P. Ryan was patrolling in the Markham in June 1943 he questioned two villagers he met about the movements of Allied troops. They were very well informed about the strength and movement of all the Australian patrols in the area. Ryan said Markham villagers were

a channel through which much valuable information may reach the enemy, especially if they are permitted as at present, to spend half of their time on the north and half on the south bank of the river.⁵³

Mr Niall said when ANGAU was operating from Wau the Japanese sent information through friendly villagers to carriers telling them to run away. They said carriers would be killed by bombing and that ANGAU would treat them harshly. As a result ANGAU had to be very tactful in its handling of carriers in forward areas and feed them as well as possible. There was always a risk that the carriers would go off and join the Japanese who were making very tempting promises to them.

In W/O Ryan's opinion the black mission teachers were the most active sympathisers of the Japanese occupation. He felt the relaxation of the non-existence of government control allowed the black mission teachers to assert great power over their followers. He acknowledged that they did good work but claimed they were also anti-European and particularly anti-government in outlook. This hostile complex amounted

⁵²North Markham 1943-44, Japanese Native Police 29/9/1943.

⁵³Report from Huon Peninsula, 25/4/1943-23/6/1943.

to a mania. They urged villagers not to carry cargo, not to show NGVR patrols the roads and not to provide the police with food. He said luluais and tultuls were reduced to mere figureheads, mouth-pieces of the teachers. Ryan quoted an instance when the mission teacher at Worin pestered the tultul to burn his official hat and destroy the village book. This the official refused to do and when Ryan visited the village the tultul wore his hat and produced the village book. A further serious allegation was made by Ryan against mission teachers. He discovered that the tultul of Kalasa was taking a group of twenty-five women around the villages in his area for the sexual satisfaction of the mission teachers.⁵⁴

When the Japanese were driven out of the Finschhafen area they conducted a propaganda campaign similar to that of the Allies two years before. They told the villagers not to assist the Allies, that they would be back in force and would drive the Australians right out, and when this came about, anyone who had assisted the Americans or Australians would be killed.⁵⁵

Everyone in Butibam knew that Tuya was hanged when the Allies returned to Lae. Poalu David alleged that other village men were punished by ANGAU as well. He said those who helped the Japanese by doing small jobs were caught and gaoled by ANGAU for short terms. One 'helper' - Agi Nagawe - was gaoled for several months then was released to serve with the NGIB. He was killed in action in Wewak. Many so-called 'collaborators' of the Japanese were gaoled and given the option either to join the 'Allied war effort' or stay in gaol. Karo Ahi said that ANGAU officers entered their camp on the Busu River and thrashed Tuya and Agi for working with the Japanese. He also said Amaria Gaya who had worked as a Japanese carrier was imprisoned on his return from Salamaua. Poalu was tried by a 'Masta Tom' (probably T.G.Aitchison) and was sent home when he explained to the Court that his task was merely that of following the Japanese officer on the white horse around the village. Mr Niall disagreed with all these stories.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Report of Huon Peninsula, 23/4/1943-23/6/1943.

⁵⁵ P/R Morobe District 1943-44, Patrol to the Hube and Kotte Sub-Divisions, 15 March 1944.

⁵⁶ J.J.Murphy (letter) says 'Niall is right. There were some "treason" cases and murders. However some individual soldiers not always ANGAU, did their own "justice" thing in a potpourri of paybacks, ingratiations, justifications and first-in-manships.'

In answer to enquiries about the 'good name' of their village, one former Japanese supporter said Butibam had a 'good name' before the war and after the war it still had a good name. Villagers did not hear any gossip about 'disloyal' villages like Busama or Chivasing and it seemed that events outside did not concern them.⁵⁷ It is not clear whether Butibam engaged in any rivalry with other villages or whether its villagers were suspicious of other villages. It was alleged by an ANGAU official that Bumbu, the paramount luluai of Busama who was awarded a Loyal Service Medal, stayed the night in Butibam before Tuya's hanging and said afterwards that 'Tuya deserved it'.

When the Allied liberation forces entered Lae, Butibam was shifted from its site to the far bank of the Busu River, about 7 miles away. For two years the Australian Army occupied the original village. A considerable number of barracks were erected in the area by the army. This was not the first shift for the villagers, who previously had stayed at kunai patch called Poa'akop. The site of their village in 1943 and 1944 was Lo'sang where villagers from Yanga and Wagang also stayed. Some people from Wagang and Yanga also stayed at Tickering and Tali camps. Schoolboys at Lo'sang were sent to Ampo to attend the mission school. Gradually their parents moved closer to Lae and camped at Buala between Kamkumung and Butibam villages. Eventually, in 1947, they returned to Butibam.

Butibam informants recall their period of evacuation at the end of the war as one when they were very dependent on ANGAU for food. Their gardens were not bombed during the war but because they were shifted 10 miles away from their original village site they were supplied for several months with tinned meat and fish, rice, biscuits and sugar. In time the villagers planted new gardens and eventually sold crops of cabbages, tomatoes, cucumbers and pawpaws to ANGAU. ANGAU meant 'help' to them. Philemon Balob said: 'ANGAU helped our people. If we were unhappy or had no food ANGAU helped us by giving us food. After we villagers had settled down, the Europeans went away.'

⁵⁷ Patrol Officer Bloxham was offered the sum of £35 by inhabitants of Busama to 'restore the good name of Busama' (P/R Salamaua, 1943-45, Salamaua Coastal, 6 October 1944).

To the older villagers ANGAU meant men like 'Masta Tom' and Messrs Niall, McCarthy, Ormsby, Hicks, Taylor, Murphy and Penglase, Patrol Officers or ADOs of the prewar New Guinea administration. Many villagers liked ANGAU and welcomed the return of their pidgin-speaking European kiaps. They knew them from before the war and so were not frightened.

Samuel Misah said ANGAU helped the refugee villagers with food and gave them medical attention but also that ANGAU was a fence (*banis*) between villagers and troops. ANGAU kept 'foreign' natives from the village. Many of the villagers were recruited to help in the war effort, serving as carriers, policemen and soldiers. Bogen Ahi said the villagers resented recruitment because ANGAU simply lined them up, leaving out the younger adults and old people, and said 'we want this fellow and this one'.

Karo Ahi became a carrier for ANGAU, then was promoted to the rank of boss boy. He carried a gun and grenades for the first time in his life when he travelled to Madang. He was keen to become a soldier and joined NGIB, but he soon returned to Lae to look after his children when a relative called Hamala begged him to return. He then worked for the Australian Water Transport Company in Lae until 1945.

Gebob Masawa was engaged in September 1943 by an ANGAU kiap as a house-boy. Gebob later went to Labu where a number of Butibam villagers were recruited and trained as soldiers of the 1st Battalion NGIB. Three Tolais and four Sepiks enlisted at the same time as Gebob. He was a signaller and full corporal in D Company at Nadzab. This company went by an American ship to Madang where they spent three days. Gebob then moved on to Talasea and spent the rest of 1944 fighting in the bush. Later he sailed with other black soldiers and an Australian detachment to Rabaul, where he saw the Australian soldiers giving the Japanese prisoners of war work to do. In April 1946 Gebob returned to Lae.

Peobu Jonathan worked for an ANGAU kiap at Lae, and was then sent to Madang. He became an evangelist after the war. Samuel Misah worked for ANGAU as a carrier. He first worked between Lae and Nadzab, then he went to Madang. He recalled that the conditions of work were very bad. They worked from 6a.m. to 6p.m., did not eat properly and had little sleep. They had one day of rest in ten. Some carriers got hurt and a few died. No one really minded the hardship because it was war-time. Because they were under contract, desertion

was punishable. Samuel's boss boy, Michael, was empowered to give six strokes of the cane to any carrier who made trouble. A regular source of trouble was overstaying of leave by carriers who went home. At Madang, Samuel and two other men used dynamite to kill fish for the troops. Samuel returned to Lae in April 1945.

Apo Amala went to work as a house-boy for Mr Stanley Blake, his prewar employer. He was issued with a shot-gun and killed one Japanese at Boana. As a result he was sent to the police depot at Sogeri to train for the PIB. He won a prize for target-shooting and became a lance-corporal. When NGIB was formed he was transferred from PIB. He was unhappy about the change because his shoulder stripe was removed and sewn on the right 'leg' of his lap lap. To salute an officer Apo raised his right leg rather than his right arm. Later Apo joined other local soldiers in protesting to Colonel Edwards about having to wear a khaki lap lap rather than a pair of shorts. They said if Australia wanted New Guineans to join the NGIB the soldiers must be treated in the same way as Australian and American troops.⁵⁸ Apo was promoted to sergeant, won a medal at Arawe and later received two service stars. Apo was awarded the Loyal Service Medal for his valuable service at Arawe while on a patrol to Itne River. He saved £900 in cash and some personal belongings of an ANGAU party which was cut off from their main force by the Japanese. On one occasion Apo killed four Japanese with his Owen gun, returning with valuable papers from an enemy lieutenant. The recommendation for the award stated: 'It is considered that the aggressive spirit and loyal conduct displayed by this native is worthy of suitable recognition'.⁵⁹ Apo wears his medal to ANZAC Day parades but he is unhappy about not receiving a pension book. He felt, however, that compared to the carriers he and his fellow soldiers got a fair reward for their war service.

⁵⁸ Personal interview, 27 October 1971. Barrett (1969:495-6) refers to the 'follies' committed by authorities as they set up 2nd NGIB and the resultant demonstration by aggrieved soldiers. In pre-war days sanitary workers had worn a distinguishing mark on their lap laps. There could be no greater insult to the soldiers. J.J. Murphy (letter) says New Guineans after contact with the matey Australian troops did not like the attempt to 'keep them in their place' as of yore.

⁵⁹ W/D, February 1944. Recommendation by GOC ANGAU for Loyal Service Medals (Natives).

Villagers who were not recruited by ANGAU to help in the war effort sold fruit, coconuts, handicraft work and grass skirts made by the women to the troops in Lae. The Army set up a market place next to ANGAU Headquarters in the town. The villagers got good prices for their craft work. Samuel Misah said the market was the only place where villagers could meet Allied troops in Lae since the only villagers permitted in Army camps were those who worked there. Kising Tikandu claimed that villagers moved freely among the soldiers during the day. He said wherever the soldiers went they called villagers to come to sit and eat with them. He acknowledged that there was a law about staying away from soldiers but both soldiers and villagers ignored it. Both Australians and Americans had plenty of contact with the villagers but the Americans were the favourites. Youths were given rides on Army trucks and jeeps and generally the Americans had better 'public relations' with the villagers. There was a shortage of cigarettes and stick tobacco in Butibam during the war. Americans liked Japanese money so villagers readily exchanged their notes for cigarettes. The villagers recalled that the black soldiers were big, muscular fellows. Zure Zurecnoc said Finschhafen villagers saw black soldiers as big, black, sturdy brothers. The American troops told villagers at Finschhafen, 'Look, Australians are not good people. They are not treating you well. They are too slow in building up your country.' Kamakang spoke favourably of black soldiers. They were 'brown men in a white man's uniform' who dressed like Europeans and were driving big machines, using guns and speaking English. He also said ANGAU did not want the villagers to meet the black soldiers and tried to keep them out of the villages. However, when villagers met black soldiers in town they would try to talk with them and were kind to one another because they recognized they were the 'same skin'.

American troops did not interfere with the village women. It seemed that any trouble came from 'foreign' natives, the working men from other districts like the Sepik who wanted to take village girls as their wives. Some men just grabbed the girls they wanted. When ANGAU employees were involved an ANGAU officer would have to decide whether a man who took a woman would be allowed to keep her. Philemon Balob said relations between the villagers and outsiders were good and there was much intermarriage as a result. Lae villagers were a group of people who were proud of their access to the sea and considered themselves cleaner, more sophisticated and superior to other groups. However, they welcomed the new

people from other places. To Philemon Balob, intermarriage was what brought Papuans and New Guineans together.

The events of the war that Butibam villagers recall most readily are the continual bombing of Lae and the fights between aircraft overhead. Villagers witnessed the sinking of a Japanese cargo vessel the *Tanna Maru* which is still visible in the Huon Gulf. Philemon Balob said there used to be substantial numbers of relics such as American trucks abandoned in the bush and on the beach. The trucks on the beach have been covered with sand and those in the bush are overgrown by plants. Several barges and small landing craft are now rusting on the beaches. Today few relics can be found in the village, although there are iron implements and bits of scrap iron. The amount of war material left in the Markham Valley close to Lae is now almost negligible.

When the war was over, coconut trees, sago palms, and houses had been destroyed. ANGAU paid War Damage Compensation through Mr Niall and a Mr Powell.⁶⁰ Kising Tikandu, at whose home many interviews were conducted, had a slab of cement, most likely from an army building, laid close to his property. Similar slabs of concrete can be found everywhere in the village, and they effectively prevent anything growing. One villager complained that he only received half his compensation money (*hap pe tasol*). Apo Amala was paid £50 compensation for his house, coconuts, garden, pigs and boxes. His wife was compensated for a fish net. It was alleged that no compensation money was paid for the villagers who were killed by Allied bombing.

To Kising Tikandu war was really bad because he and the other villagers did not lead a good life in those years. They could neither sleep nor eat well. Poalu David said war was bad for the villagers because it destroyed their homes, gardens and their 'way of life'. He was happy when the war ended because it was the end of a period of hardship and unhappiness for villagers in Butibam. Ahipum Poang considered conditions were bad during the war, no one enjoyed it or got anything from it. Karo Ahi felt the war was a good thing because after it finished villagers got good schools, while today the country has grown stronger and has its own Army.

⁶⁰ H.I.Hogbin (1951) pp.20-21 summarizes the principal recommendations for compensation claims made in the Barry Report, pp.302-3 gives a list of typical War Damage Claims in Busama.

Apo Amala said the war changed the habits of his people. Before the war few villagers drank tea but many acquired the taste for tea during the war.

The events of the war jolted the villagers of Butibam from their settled prewar existence and submitted them to a degree of anxiety and tension previously unknown. They were at risk both from the invading forces of Japanese and the Allies as was shown by the extensive damage done to Lae by bombing. Generally they were well treated by the Japanese, problems only arose when the food situation of the Japanese gradually got worse. It does not appear from the evidence collected that the war created divisions in the village nor does it seem as if those who were chosen by the new rulers used their influence to persecute their fellow villagers. The men who served the Japanese during their occupation do not seem the butt of condemnation or hostility today. Two of the 'helpers', Poalu David and Poebu Jonathan, do not seem to be taken very seriously by their fellow-villagers. Stephen and Karo Ahi felt that Mr Ormsby, the hangman of Tuya, continued to hate the Ahi family because their uncle had been disobedient and had not turned up on time at the hanging. Bart Philemon alleged that one unnamed man changed sides during the war, first supporting the Japanese, then the Australians. He was threatened with hanging and ran away from prison.

Villagers spoke defensively when asked about their co-operation or collaboration with the Japanese. One villager said 'Some villagers helped the Japanese but did not stay with the enemy for long'. Another villager said 'More of our people helped the Australians and Americans than ever helped the Japanese'. The word 'loyal' loses its meaning in reference to villagers who were overwhelmed by an alien government not of their choosing. The people of Butibam wished to remain neutral at the start but the Japanese had guns and swords and the means to punish anyone who disobeyed orders. The Australian Administration of New Guinea had fallen in 1942 in the same way as the German Administration which was overthrown in 1914. No New Guinean could be sure the prewar kiaps would ever return. The older villagers welcomed the return of the Allies and the prewar kiaps of ANGAU whom they described as *Masta bilong mipela bilong bipo* but other villagers were as neutral to them as they had been to the Japanese. Some kiaps saw in everybody who was not with them wholeheartedly some sort of 'disloyal kanaka' whose action may have been masterminded by a mission teacher-

traitor.⁶¹ When ANGAU started to recruit carriers in the village, they had no choice but to join the Allied war effort. Several villagers chose to join the PIB and NGIB, some for adventure, others for the good pay and still others because their friends had enlisted.⁶²

The war allowed New Guineans to meet Papuans for the first time. Before the war whenever a kiap took Papuan policemen to New Guinea the village would be cleared and no contact was permitted between Papuans and New Guineans. (It is curious that a Papuan Patrol Officer should find it necessary to visit Butibam with his policemen.) The Mekeos were the first Papuans the people of Butibam ever met. They noted that the Mekeos had 'big hair' and that their lap laps were pointed towards their ankles. The first contact between the two groups was unpleasant because the Mekeos started to cut down coconut trees in Butibam. This caused a great deal of annoyance in the village. Papuan carriers and soldiers entered Lae in great numbers as the Australian forces pushed back the Japanese. As a result of these meetings some Papuans, particularly from the Gulf, chose to return to Lae after the war. The villagers of Butibam travelled away from home during the war to a far greater extent than they ever had done before the war. The effect of this travel and their new contacts was to widen their horizons and give them a clearer picture of the place of their village in Papua and New Guinea.

⁶¹Loyalty and treachery are misnomers, such descriptions merely obscure the issue, which was that the Gazelle natives were unaware of the war as an occasion which presented a choice (Leadley, 1974).

⁶²Many so-called collaborators were jailed, they were given the option either to join the 'Allied war effort' or stay in gaol (letter from Mrs Holzknacht, 11/11/75).

Chapter 6

Conclusions

War on the scale of the Japanese conflict with Australia and America was a new and traumatic experience to those villagers of Papua and New Guinea who were directly affected. Throughout this inquiry there was a thread of consistency in the evidence of informants about the dislocation, anxiety, and hardships of the years 1942-45.

Hanuabada villagers were forewarned about the war and knew more than either of the other two groups about its causes and the sequence of events in Europe and the Pacific. The villagers of the Toaripi area were totally unaware of the reasons for the war; it took them by surprise and their understanding of it is limited. Butibam villagers were given a very short, sharp warning of the war when Rabaul fell and Europeans resident in Rabaul escaped to the Morobe District. The Butibam villagers had a clear understanding of the war as it affected them but were unable to follow events elsewhere while the Japanese occupied Lae.

Hanuabada before the war was a Motu and Koita village growing slowly more modern in the shadow of Port Moresby. Hanuabadans attended the LMS school and learned to read and write simple English in the upper grades. Several villagers read the *Papuan Villager*, a newspaper in simple English which reported the major events of the war in Europe. Many informants recall that this newspaper was a reliable source of information.

Hanuabadans who were clerks in government offices and at business places in Port Moresby met and mixed with Europeans, some of whom spoke openly with them about the war in Europe. Hanuabadans were drilled in air-raid precautions and black-out procedures and dug trenches in anticipation of an enemy attack. Their exposure to enemy bombing was very brief. One Hanuabadan joined an Australian artillery unit as a gunner, and later many saw service with the PIB.

Because of their relative 'sophistication', Hanuabadans observed the war and recalled its events in a different light from that of the other two groups of local informants. They identified strongly with the Australian army and showed commitment to the war effort to overthrow the Japanese.

Toaripi villagers lived more than 120 miles from Port Moresby. Many attended the LMS schools and were literate in Toaripi. A number of Toaripis worked as wharf labour in Port Moresby but the majority remained in their villages on the south coast. The Toaripi labourers in Port Moresby fled after the first bombing of the town and spread the news of the outbreak of war among their fellow villagers. At the same time government officials tried to prevent people from discussing the war. The Toaripi recalled that soon after the bombing of Port Moresby Chinese and European refugees had come down the Lakekamu River after an overland trip from Wau. The Toaripis could see no connection however between the bombing of Port Moresby and the sudden arrival of hundreds of refugees from New Guinea. At about the same time ANGAU started recruiting able-bodied men, sending them up river to Terapo and Bulldog. The army also commandeered Toaripi canoes for service on the Lakekamu River.

Their initial confusion and bewilderment at the start of the war accounts for the nature of the Toaripi villagers' stories which are described by one informant as 'a series of whinges and groans'. Few Toaripis volunteered for the PIB and there is no record of their subscribing money to War Savings Certificates. Though they took part in war service the Toaripis give the general impression of not being very involved in the war.

Butibam villagers remember that European women and children were sent away from Lae in December 1941 and January 1942. After Rabaul fell to the Japanese, Lae was made ready for an air attack. The villagers dug slit trenches and hid there when Lae was bombed in its turn. Those Butibam villagers who were employed in the gold fields at Edie Creek, Wau and Bulolo returned quickly to Butibam after the Japanese air attacks on the gold fields. The departing officials of the New Guinea administration advised Butibam villagers not to resist the Japanese invasion but warned that the Japanese might rape their womenfolk. In the very early stages these villagers maintained contact with coastwatchers. The Butibam villagers were the only informants who knew about the work of coastwatchers in the war.

Only those Hanuabadans in the PIB who served on the Kokoda Track had any direct contact with the enemy. Other Hanuabadans learned about the Japanese at second-hand from the propaganda photographs, broadcasts and phonograph records of ANGAU, from the army newspapers and the war stories which circulated in labour camps.

Very few Toaripi villagers had direct contact with the Japanese. Few of their menfolk were medical assistants or members of the PIB. Only a small number of Toaripis worked on the Kokoda Track. ANGAU propaganda campaigns conducted through the coastal villages were meant to motivate the villagers and to inform them about the enemy. This effort had little lasting effect since few Toaripi villagers could recall the broadcasts or talks. The failure of these efforts may account for the generally weak understanding shown by Toaripi informants of the war and their role in it as indentured labour. Though they had many experiences they were to a large extent unable to place events in a framework of time.

Of the three groups of villagers only the people of Butibam had prolonged face to face contact with the enemy. They lived in a war zone, experienced Japanese bombing at the start of the war before the enemy invaded Lae, and even more severe bombing when the Allied air forces were preparing to retake Lae. When Wau was bombed their area was crowded by hundreds of labourers who went 'bush' there to avoid the enemy. They learnt to live with their new 'masters' during the occupation and later when the Allies recaptured Lae one of their number was tried and hanged by ANGAU for his complicity in the murder of an Australian. After the war they lived on the edge of the devastated town with an army camp of more than 50,000 troops which created yet another kind of problem for them. Their experiences in the war zone were far more memorable than those of the other two groups.

When the 2000 people of Hanuabada evacuated their village they went first to Porebada and then to Manumanu, Hisiu and Aroa, where ANGAU fed them. Throughout the war their major contact with the outside world was through ANGAU. The village constable would blow his whistle and everyone gathered around the village radio. As the news was broadcast Nou Goreu interpreted it. In this way Hanuabadans learnt both the good and bad news of the war. ANGAU actively encouraged the spread of war news in the evacuee village. Some residents of the evacuee village felt their life at Manumanu was

enjoyable because there was no fear of hunger and they were safe from the conflict. There were occasions when the siren sounded in the village and the refugees had to turn out their lamps because of an aerial fight. Other residents recalled life at Manumanu as the worst they could think of. They were not on their own land, housing was short, the soil was sandy, there were swarms of mosquitoes and fleas and there was an acute shortage of garden food. A number of older villagers died at Manumanu. Lohia Kohu lost his father, uncle, grandfather and son at Manumanu. Evacuees contracted TB, pleurisy, dysentery, malaria and skin diseases and of those who survived many lost weight. Rev. P. Chatterton recalls there was an 'above normal' death rate at Manumanu which, in his view, was due largely to the 'rough conditions'. He said some of the sick people were TB patients who had left Gemo Hospital after the crash of an Australian plane there. An attack in December 1941 by the Japanese on some Catalina flying boats moored at Gemo Island also frightened patients away. There was no ill feeling between the two groups of Motuans at Manumanu but there was precious little garden land to spare. The song *Raisi* refers to the monotonous diet of rice which was the staple food of Hanuabadan labourers and villagers in those days. Villagers missed their garden produce and fish and grew tired of tinned meat. There is an air of nostalgia and melancholy in all Motuan songs about the war which reflects the extent of their longing to return to their home area. The songs emphasised the 'good times' of the past and tended to be mournful.

Few babies were born in the evacuee village during the war time. While labourers worked in the towns or on the Kokoda Trail their wives stayed with their fathers-in-law. ANGAU restricted travel to Port Moresby. Many villagers were so scared of the war that they did not wish to visit Port Moresby. ANGAU policemen blew their whistles summoning those who remained to clean up their village. Generally the Motuans were proud of their village but some were upset if the constable beat them when they were ill. When it was time to leave Manumanu the evacuees were frustrated by having to stop half-way at Malara where once again land was not readily available for making gardens. The Koitabu people at Malara permitted only a few Hanuabadans to make gardens. At the same time the evacuees' rations were reduced by ANGAU to compel them to take up gardening seriously once again. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction caused by the abrupt reduction of their rations. They were eager to get home, yet ANGAU allowed them to travel only half way and

insisted that they become more self-supporting.

Before the war Hanuabada had been an unhealthy village of houses built close together where there were many cases of TB and leprosy. This had led to the opening of Gemo Island Hospital for the isolation of patients. While the Hanuabadans were away much of their village had burned down. The fire was caused by carelessness in the lighting of a lamp. C. Kimmorley states that many Europeans believe that the army burned the village as a hygiene measure. Hanuabadans at Napa Napa who could see their village burning claimed that no attempt was made to put out the fire because a strong southeast wind was blowing. This is not true; efforts were made by the authorities to bring the blaze under control. The news of the fire further lowered spirits of evacuees who were unhappy and depressed at Manumanu. Rev. P. Chatterton said that an air of hopelessness and depression prevailed among many of the older residents at Manumanu. As a missionary he worked to keep up the morale of the evacuees. He explained events to them so they did not become needlessly frightened.

Throughout the war the school children at Manumanu continued their education because of the resourcefulness of the two mission teachers who were exempt from war service and set up the school within weeks of getting to Manumanu. The school children learnt songs about the war at school. As pupils they began to see that what was happening in Papua was something special in their lives. H.F. Clark has commented that many mission teachers were excused from indentured service because being literate they could be employed by ANGAU to make lists of the names of deserters. Some teachers were awarded the Loyal Service Medal on the strength of this work though their citations do not mention the fact. None of the Hanuabadan informants seemed aware of this facet of teachers' work but it is plausible that teachers readily did this to further the Allied cause of winning the war.

One reaction of Hanuabadans to their recruitment by PAU then by ANGAU at the start of the war was concern about how they would be treated, whether they would be looked after properly and be given good food. Virobo Tamasi who was 'grabbed' by ANGAU and sent to carry cargo along the Kokoda Track claimed that local soldiers were treated differently from carriers. ANGAU was seen by many villagers as the new government in war-time. ANGAU men were the law-makers, the

providers of food and the police. To Kevau Raho ANGAU had 'power' and most of the time it was 'exercising forced labour on the people'. In his opinion if ANGAU wanted labourers to do anything they had to do it. Village informants perceived certain ANGAU personnel as 'bad men' and they readily listed their names. By 'bad' they meant harsh in their treatment of labourers. Whenever ANGAU men came to Manumanu the children ran away. Some of the adult men hid from ANGAU patrols until it was safe for them to emerge from the mangroves. In spite of this ruse many men were 'signed on' to work in Port Moresby. Men who hid were scolded when found and told they should be helping their country. Some villagers were reluctant to help in the war effort because they felt it was none of their business, it was a 'white man's war' and they did not understand how or why it took place.

One officer who was stationed at Manumanu was described by informants as the worst of the lot because he would thrash anyone, including women and children. A complaint was made about his rough behaviour to ANGAU HQ and he was warned that he could not assault the evacuees. Another ANGAU man who worked with indentured labour in Port Moresby and on the Kokoda Track was called a 'dangerous man' because he did not give labourers a chance if they made a mistake. Villagers at Manumanu were also promised that if they made trouble at Manumanu they would have to 'go straight to the front line'. No one was ever sent to the front line as a result of misbehaviour. Some ANGAU officers were regarded as 'fair' in their treatment of labourers. Lieut. G. Baskett, an officer from the Kwato mission, was friendly with the evacuees and helped them organise a choir and entertainment in the evacuee village. Rev. P. Chatterton recalls the Poreporena choir was formed by a Swiss called John Spychiger. Strong feelings against ANGAU were not confined to fear of recruitment but were stirred too when officers confiscated gifts of clothes or food that the evacuees received from soldiers. Despite this general strong feeling against ANGAU, some villagers spoke of ANGAU as 'good' and said it was actively helping the evacuees. Nou Goreu paid tribute to ANGAU. He was glad that ANGAU guided evacuees well during war-time and on their return to Hanuabada he said 'Thanks very much for this'. Guba Guba also perceived ANGAU as 'not bad'. In his opinion 'ANGAU saved the people and gave back the villagers their houses'. Both these men held positions of trust and responsibility in ANGAU so this may account for their favourable perceptions of the unit. They identified wholly with what was done by the government of the day.

H.A. Brown described ANGAU officers in Papua as the very people who were Resident Magistrates and Patrol Officers in pre-war days and who in his opinion continued to do much the same sort of things during the war as they had done before the war. These things were ordering villagers around, putting them in gaol and punishing them. Morea Morea Hila recalled that in pre-war days Papuans were sent to gaol very often. Rev. P. Chatterton said that during the war government in Papua was very much a case of 'Kiap law' and ANGAU officers were not guided 'by the book' because they had no book to which to refer. This was to some extent justified by the emergency conditions. ANGAU personnel however did many things which were not allowed under pre-war civilian law. Rev. Chatterton commented that the ANGAU officers who had worked in New Guinea brought their semi-military style of doing things to Papua. When they entered a village they ordered the Papuans to 'line' and spoke pidgin to them. The fact that some Papuans spoke standard English was a source of much irritation to officers from New Guinea. One officer went so far as to insist that he be addressed through a pidgin interpreter.

Several Hanuabadans performed skilled jobs for the army. A few villagers were employed in the printing of the *Moresby Army News Sheet* and later on *Guinea Gold*. Charles Rowley has said they were regarded as more reliable proof-readers than the Australians available. The men who did this work were accorded recognition by the army and had no quarrel with ANGAU. Though they may have had little appreciation of what type of war was approaching, a dozen Hanuabadans, mainly young unmarried men, had volunteered for service with the PIB. Loa Daera and other members of the PIB would tell their fellow villagers what was happening on the war fronts when they went home for leave. Daera Ganiga always talked proudly of the war to other people. The PIB members held their heads high, proud that they had given a hand in the war effort. ANGAU had so motivated them that they helped their land in its hour of need. When the war ended the PIB were dissatisfied with their treatment. They said later all they got out of the war was the chance to meet new people and see new places. In a petition to the RSL Congress in 1969 several veterans asked for a better deal but their appeal was turned down. Daera Ganiga said many of his colleagues were so disappointed at their failure that they threw away their Pacific Stars. They had been proud of daily serving 'King and Country' in rain and in mud without proper food but they were not proud of this 'something nothing, just a medal'.

H.E. Clark considered that Papuan servicemen were luckier than many Australians in that their names and numbers were engraved on their war medals. When he got his medal he had to apply to have his name and number engraved on it. J.K. McCarthy stated that indigenous servicemen and police were given no demobilization pay. Sixteen years after the war these men were offered what was in his opinion an inferior type of pension and repatriation benefits. This came too late in many cases. McCarthy believed local soldiers and police regarded war medals and decorations as mere useless ornaments and would have thought that some payment in cash should go with them. He speculated that most would willingly pawn them if facilities were available in Papua New Guinea.

At Manumanu the evacuees lived under strict rules laid down by ANGAU. One of the rules related to their rations and to trading in general. In those days villagers considered rations more valuable than money. Rations were not supposed to be bartered or traded with anyone yet villagers often traded rations secretly for garden food if they had the opportunity. They had to take care that neither ANGAU nor the village constable caught them trading goods. Soldiers of the American and Australian forces often visited the villages of Manumanu and Malara. The soldiers were 'good people' who paid 'good money' for their curios. Villagers say they got on very well with both black and white troops. Villagers were surprised to see black American soldiers. Members of the PIB wore ramis but the black Americans wore trousers. After the war Hanuabadans started to wear shorts to work though they wore ramis in the village. There was a complaint by villagers that any gifts received from the troops had to be hidden from ANGAU. If they were caught with gifts these were confiscated and the offenders would be caned as well. An ANGAU rule they found irksome was that male villagers required a permit to travel into the Port Moresby military district. If men travelled to Port Moresby and ANGAU discovered they had purchased goods a search was made and the goods taken away. Nou Goreu was unaware that his fellow villagers were even allowed to travel to Port Moresby. He remembered that on one occasion Capt. O'Connor had summoned some Porebada councillors before him and berated them for travelling to Port Moresby.

Rev. P. Chatterton stated that relations between black soldiers and the villagers of Kabadi, Rorona and Kanosia were quite good in his opinion yet there were no part-black

American babies born in these villages. He recalls that no fear or apprehension was displayed by the villagers towards the soldiers. Routine instructions reveal that ANGAU feared the effect that well-dressed, well-paid and educated black Americans might have on native populations. The black American had the precise effect many feared. Villagers saw him handling machinery, performing unusual tasks and at times working with or even directing the activities of white soldiers. ANGAU feared this exposure might stir up 'wrong' ideas among the local people.

J.K. McCarthy refuted the common statement that black soldiers got on well with villagers. He argued that he was not biased but it should be remembered that the black American soldier in 1942 was regarded by his white counterpart as an inferior. Black soldiers did not mix with Papua New Guinea natives because their colour was 'a bit too close to home'. Furthermore village men did not particularly admire the black troops. Rev. D. Ure also commented that Papuans were very colour-conscious. Once when Rev. Ure was covered in dust after a long jeep ride to a Papuan village he was mistaken for a black soldier and treated with indifference and contempt by the villagers. Kevau Raho said that at Malara soldiers used money and food to seduce women but the latter ran away. J. Lillyman justified the searching of camps and personal property by ANGAU on the grounds that Allied troops often gave away Army property and reported it as having been stolen. There was a risk that besides Army shirts and trousers, dangerous articles such as knuckledusters, knives, grenades, revolvers and detonators could be given to simple villagers and could cause grave personal injury. J. Stratigos offered a different explanation for confiscation by ANGAU of American gifts. It was necessary to avoid dissatisfaction arising through reports filtering back to native troops in other areas where there were no American troops who expected the same treatment from Australian troops.

The village constable at Manumanu was given the responsibility of looking for deserters who returned to their village. Some informants claimed that no one from their village deserted from the Kokoda Trail. This is clearly not true. Heni Noho deserted from Laloki and hid at Lea Lea and Lohia Gabe deserted from Sogeri. Both were arrested and Gabe was gaoled at Sogeri. Virobo Tamasi described one incident when two deserters were cruelly punished at Manumanu by two members of the RPC. Revo Peter, a member of the PIB, tried in vain

to intervene. It is unlikely that there was much desertion from the Kokoda Track by Hanuabadans. This may be because Hanuabadan carriers were responsible and informed men who understood the importance of their task, or it could have been because of their terror that if they deserted they would have to make their way through hostile Koiari country to return home. Grahamslaw (1971) has described the escape of a Mekeo deserter from an attack by inland Koiaris on the Owen Stanley Range. Eight Mekeos had escaped from the carrier line but only one survived a spear attack by Koiaris. Death may have been the fate of other coastal carriers who deserted on the Kokoda Track and were never heard of again.

One incident at Manumanu that evacuees recall was the punishment by ANGAU of one of their councillors. He was publicly caned for an alleged marital misdemeanour. While some villagers reacted fatalistically to his whipping, others felt he deserved what he got. This caning caused some embarrassment in the evacuee village and is not spoken of openly. The caning was ordered by the same ANGAU officer whom informants described as the 'worst of the lot'.

During the war Hanuabada villagers made contact with several new groups of people. They encountered New Guinea patrol officers who worked for ANGAU, who spoke pidgin and had a very different style of dealing with villagers from that of the prewar Resident Magistrates. Papuans gained an awareness of what life in New Guinea was like through ANGAU officers. Australian soldiers befriended carriers, soldiers and labourers whom they met on the Kokoda Trail, in the Port Moresby District or the evacuee village. Villagers noted a marked difference in the attitude to them of combat troops and ANGAU personnel. The troops bore no responsibility towards villagers and were relaxed and open in their dealings with them. ANGAU officers, because they were in charge of maintaining law and order, always seemed strict in the eyes of the villagers. The attitude of villagers to ANGAU was a mixture of respect and fear. In prewar days they had learnt that whatever a white government officer said must be obeyed. It was recalled that in war-time village constables were very powerful because they were supported by government officers. Constables got the evacuees to clean the place because important visitors were expected and at night, if there was an air-raid warning, the constables checked to see there were no fires near houses. Gaol sentences were a constant threat used by constables against reluctant villagers. Generally Hanuabadans regarded themselves as law-abiding people. This

did not prevent them from spending their time and money gambling. The money they won at gambling was used to buy axes, knives, forks and gardening tools. Despite their sophistication these villagers failed to see that fraternisation with ANGAU officers was not possible. They also would not admit that a man carrying out his duty in war-time can seem quite ruthless.

J.K. McCarthy commented that 'there is always the bully in war and in peace' and that one should not generalise from isolated incidents of cruelty by ANGAU officers. He acknowledged that 'some white bastards' took care that carriers and conscripted villagers were stripped of anything useful they might have acquired. He cautioned that oral evidence collected in the 1970s may have been unduly influenced by the passing of thirty years and the 'anti-kiap' attitude of the 1960s. C. Champion said that he knew that 'natives invariably tell you what they think will please you'.

Hanuabadan villagers were overjoyed when it was time to return to their home area. They had constantly talked about their village and longed to return to it. The villagers who had remained in the Port Moresby military area were happy to see the evacuees returning but were saddened by the thought of the number of friends and relatives who had died while away from the village. To children who had grown up at Manumanu it was a new experience to go back to Hanuabada about which their elders had spoken so much. The children realised that they belonged to a particular place and had only been away temporarily. On their return the councillors held meetings to discuss the rebuilding of their village. They petitioned the provisional government to use modern materials for the reconstruction which did not start till 1950. Nou Goreu credits Gavera Arua with the decision to refuse to accept houses of native material. Rev. P. Chatterton believes that the promise by ANGAU to rebuild Hanuabada was kept largely as a result of the constant pressure the councillors exerted on the new Administrator, Col. J.K. Murray, and on Mr Ward, the Minister for External Territories.

During the first year of the war the Hanuabadans who had to work in Port Moresby lived in constant fear of being bombed. The evacuees at Manumanu were anxious about the safety of their relatives working on the Kokoda Track and in the Military District. To most villagers the war was 'bad'. Villagers were so scared that they wished to stay close to

their families all the time. Men who would have preferred to stay with their families were, however, pressed into the war effort and were subjected to a harsh discipline which they said did not exist under prewar civil administration. Exaggerated promises were made to labourers by some labour overseers in order to spur them on to greater efforts. Australian soldiers promised that their country would be generous to Papuans after the war. This raised false hopes in some labourers' hearts. Hanuabadan informants found it hard to point to any concrete benefits got as a result of war. When Hanuabadans talk of the war they are sad as they recollect their losses, their fears and anxieties, the harshness of ANGAU and the disappointments following on the promises which were made to them.

When the war began the officers of PAU and later ANGAU started to recruit able-bodied men from the Toaripi coastal villages near the mouth of the Lakekamu River. H.A. Brown said there was no friction at this early stage because the Toaripis were well acquainted with Lieut. Atkinson who was a prewar Patrol Officer. At first men with large families were exempted from recruitment but later on every able-bodied man was recruited. Villagers from Mirivase and Lalapipi were evacuated respectively to Uritai and to Paiho. The army then occupied the vacant villages.

The newly recruited labourers were sent by canoe up the Lakekamu River to Bulldog Camp. In the period 1910-16 and for a brief period in the 1930s when the goldfield was being worked there had been much traffic along the river and many Toaripi villagers knew the river well. Their canoes were used to take the advance parties of labourers to Bulldog. One of the earliest tasks of the men who went to Bulldog was to convey the 250 refugees from New Guinea down the Lakekamu to the coast. Bulldog was upgraded to a large camp and arrangements made to use the coastal carriers to supply the rear-guard Australian forces in the Wau area. The initial stages of the operation were marked by much improvisation and an unbalanced diet for the carriers. Food was short in the early period of the war and at first the labourers ate only sago. There was a great need for fresh food and coconuts in the early stages. Later a sago-making camp was set up at Komu close to Bulldog and teams of married couples were settled there to cut down and process the wild sago. However the yield was small and a year later Komu was closed. Carriers who worked in the early stages from Bulldog to Wau recall severe hunger and the hardship of being always cold

and wet. H.A. Brown agreed that at the start all arrangements on the Lines were *ad hoc* in nature. J.K. McCarthy reasoned that hardship and hunger are part of war and not necessarily the result of calculated cruelty. He feared that some informants tended to overstress this aspect. K.C. Atkinson argued that the ration scale was quite adequate though food was short. J. Lillyman said Europeans on the Line were on the same diet as the carriers and that both groups ate grass and leaves to supplement their diet of bully beef, rice and biscuits. J. Stratigos said there were good catches of salmon in the upper reaches of the Lakekamu near Bulldog and this protein was a welcome variation to their normal fare of bully beef and dry biscuits. P. Ryan described the official ration scale in use early in the war as 'utterly inadequate'. He said common sense alone showed it was inadequate and that rations of rice, flour and three tins of meat had a vitamin content of 'just about nil'. He referred to its condemnation by LHQ Directorate of Medical Services and pointed out there was a dramatic decline in sickness rates when proper food was given.

J. Lillyman commented that people of the Gulf were physically not strong, that being sago eaters they had no stamina. J. Stratigos stated in contrast that ANGAU labourers were good physical specimens. H.A. Brown regarded the Toaripis as good physical specimens who needed constant medical attention because they came from malarious areas. Despite their physical strength there was much hardship involved in carrying cargo across the mountainous track to Wau. The carriers had neither mosquito nets to protect them in the lower reaches of the river nor blankets for protection against the bitterly cold nights of the mountains. To H.E. Clarke however these grievances were 'little more than a bitch by a few disgruntled carriers from the Malalaua area. Really their task was a sinecure compared with jobs done by others in the Buna, Gona and Kokoda Trail campaigns.' In contrast R. Watson described the Bulldog Track as 'the toughest carrying ever asked of anybody in this country'. Watson conceded that on the Bulldog Track there was less risk of enemy attack whereas on the Kokoda Track you could get shot.

The Toaripi carriers were involved in an operation of lifting tons of cargo from Bulldog to Wau in five or six days. There was no alternative to the carrier line and troops in the Wau-Mubo area depended entirely on the line getting the cargo through. Between March 1942 and September 1943, no one

in Papua New Guinea could predict the future with any certainty. Until August 1942 at Milne Bay the Allies had scored no land victories against the Japanese.

The overseers who supervised the carriers between Bulldog and Wau were determined not to let the Japanese forces reach Wau. So the overseers drove the carriers on because there was an emergency which had to be dealt with.

The Toaripi labourers did not know much of what was going on in the war. They could not evade the ANGAU authorities who commandeered their canoes, who recruited them and who gave the tasks of making nipa palm roofing to the womenfolk left in the villages. New Guinea was in danger from the Japanese invaders but it was difficult to convince villagers from coastal Papua, who could not follow what was going on, that their task of carrying cargo to Wau was crucial and that if they failed to do their duty they too could soon be in grave danger. Desertion on the Bulldog Line was constant and with the bombing of Bulldog reached epidemic proportions.

In the villages routine activities were maintained as much as possible but there were no festivities and no feasting because of the absence of menfolk. ANGAU forbade feasting since it wasted food. LMS pastors who were the school teachers were exempt from carrying, so mission schools went on without a hitch. Because their primary schooling had been maintained during the war, several Toaripi children were in a position to take advantage of secondary schooling at Sogeri when it opened in 1944.

K.C. Atkinson alleged that 'procuring' of women for the purposes of prostitution was one of the offences for which Toaripi villagers were charged during the war. Many crimes are listed by ANGAU in the case-book but 'procuring' is not one of the crimes noted. It is possible that some carriers complained to Capt. Atkinson on the mere suspicion that their wives were not behaving in the village. H.A. Brown says that the village elders saw to it that the womenfolk behaved themselves and there was no moral laxity in the absence of their husbands. In any case there were mainly old men and invalids and little risk of seduction existed. Moreover adultery was a serious crime and the social climate in the villages was against it. J. Stratigos said that to the credit of the Australian troops at no time did he hear of any instances in which the troops were involved with

village women, though in his opinion opportunities must have presented themselves readily. Villagers themselves stated that though Australian troops visited their villages often there were no instances of troops fraternising with their women. One carrier alleged that among the prisoners at Terapo gaol there were young men who had committed adultery with carriers' wives. H.A. Brown said that at the end of the war an army officer travelled to the Toaripi area to check whether there were any babies fathered by troops but he could find none.

Most informants hold strong opinions about 'discipline' on the Bulldog Line. They quoted several incidents of harsh punishment which amounted to cruelty and they charged that ANGAU officers, the RPC and boss boys bullied them and drove them daily. H.A. Brown confirmed the testimony of the carriers about harsh punishment. He was sure this did not persist for the entire period. Their recollections of how they felt drew much adverse comment from other expatriate informants. E.G. Hicks commented that carriers' accounts were one-sided and did not give credit to those Australians who had their duty to perform and that certainly not all Australians were given to the cruel inhumane practices of which carriers accused them. D.M. Fenbury acknowledged that 'stories of arrogant, highly paternalistic and unscrupulous behaviour' by ANGAU officers would be in some cases quite true. He pointed out that some ANGAU personnel when placed in certain situations where their conduct was not open to scrutiny were apt to vary widely in their conduct. Some officers were 'as racist as they come and on the make'. Some, particularly a few ex-miners, tried to pay off old scores. Two informants compared the testimonies of the Toaripi carriers with the evidence presented in Vincent Eri's novel, *The Crocodile*. R.R. Cole said that it appeared that the Toaripi carriers may have been the same informants as were used for *The Crocodile*. Cole said he was appalled to think that ANGAU officers could have conducted themselves in the Gulf as carriers alleged.

E.G. Hicks commented that having read *The Crocodile* he was not completely unprepared for many of the disappointments and misrepresentations of facts offered by the Toaripi carriers. J. Stratigos said in his opinion ANGAU labourers worked cheerfully enough but needed to be properly controlled. The ANGAU officers he saw on the Bulldog Track took their charge of labourers seriously and appeared to treat the carriers with understanding. Whilst they maintained strict

discipline, relationships between ANGAU personnel and the labourers appeared to him to be quite good. Some of his troops had learnt the language of the carriers and they stated that the morale of the carriers appeared good. He knew of no incidents of bad relations between ANGAU and labourers. H.A. Brown pointed out that Toaripis had to be approached tactfully; ordering around was not accepted. In his opinion they were not as tractable as the Motu people. J. Lillyman said that a new labour overseer who was obviously not a prewar resident would be 'tried out' by his labour line. Infrequently, overseers on the line would be attacked by their carriers. Any overseer who lost control of his line was punished by ANGAU by being sent elsewhere. Lillyman argued that Australians were not brutal people and that for refusal to carry, his own remedy was a punch on the ear; for serious infractions such as dumping cargo and sitting down, he would order six strokes of the cane. P. Ryan agreed that carriers were punished by 'flogging' and that 'flogging' was illegal and never sanctioned by ANGAU Headquarters and this went unrecorded. There were orders in the War Diary repeated at intervals forbidding the practice of flogging. J.K. McCarthy confirmed that corporal punishment was forbidden and said that no decent white troops would stand for it. He quoted an instance when a white man was 'cleaned up' by Australian soldiers when they saw him assaulting a native.

What carriers said about punishment was quite correct during the early stages of the Bulldog operation. When there was great pressure to hold Wau, the carriers were driven hard and discipline had to be very strict. Conditions relaxed considerably after Wau was successfully defended and they were further relaxed when the road to Wau was completed. C. Champion and J.K. McCarthy have suggested that the Toaripi carriers tried to outdo one another in telling stories of hardship, and that there is a tendency for villagers to tell researchers what it is anticipated they want to hear.

For coastal labourers, carrying loads in the mountains was not only hard but dangerous work because they had to traverse the 'no man's land' over which the fierce Kukukukus ranged. No village informants admitted to a fear of these wild tribesmen and were unaware of the precautions taken by soldiers or the RPC. They seemed unaware of the care taken not to antagonise the Kukukukus and to protect the carrier lines while passing through Kukukuku country. J. Stratigos

said carriers were mortally afraid of Kukukuku and would cease work as they moved inland with the comment 'Taubada, Kukukuku'. To reassure the carriers, soldiers would toss a few grenades into the bush. Most carriers who deserted did so before they entered Kukukuku country. The general evidence of the carriers has been criticised by J. Lillyman on the ground that though carriers had good memories they were really out of their depth in retelling their war stories. They lacked a frame of reference and so confused cause and effect. Further, he said events were occurring so quickly that their rapidity further confused issues. This criticism is partially correct. Labourers did, however, write letters to relatives and friends in their home villages. H.A. Brown who censored their mail has remarked on their capacity for observation and their understanding of what was going on around them. Villagers at home were told by letter of events on the Line and though there was no fighting to be reported a lot was said about relationships between carriers, the RPC, boss boys and labour overseers.

No reasonable ANGAU officers should have allowed a boss boy to inflict severe punishment on carriers, since ANGAU's intention was to move cargo into forward areas and not to disable carriers. J. Lillyman has confirmed that the boss boy was usually a big tough man from an area different from that of the carriers and he had to be a task master. The Toaripi carriers expressed strong feelings of hostility towards boss boys and the RPC because these minor officials had driven them hard. It is hard to see how carriers could be friendly with individuals who were charged with the authority to see that they did not steal and to prevent desertion and who moreover had the delegated authority to administer corporal punishment.

A group of Australian sappers built a groyne in 1943 off Mirivase village in order to keep clear the channel of the Lakekamu River. The Toaripis who were left at home had become accustomed to seeing large vessels coming to Terapo but they were surprised by the groyne. H.A. Brown said that to them it was a giant pig fence (see p.85). No official bothered to explain to the villagers why the groyne was being built. For weeks the villagers asked one another what was being constructed there. They noted that the soldiers worked together without a great deal of noise. Villagers at work talk a lot and encourage one another. The soldiers went about their task quietly using a pile driver to put in the stakes of the 'pig fence'. The villagers saw clearly what

could be achieved by co-operation and were impressed by the use of new sophisticated equipment.

The village constable was the key agent of ANGAU in the village. He was seen by many informants as part of an oppressive system which required them to work hard all the time for the army. In H.A. Brown's opinion the Toaripis felt New Guinean patrol officers were taking over ANGAU and attributed much of its harshness to them. There were not enough ANGAU officers to patrol all the villages so they were compelled to delegate responsibility to the village constables. Patrol Officers watched the constable critically to make sure he pulled his weight and carried out the government orders. The village constable was expected to round up deserters and hand them over to ANGAU, he kept up the supply of sago for labourers and ensured that the thatch required for the army was finished on time. Most village constables worked hard at their task because they knew, if they did not, they could be replaced by the Patrol Officer and a carrier could be released by ANGAU to become village constable.

Villagers fraternised readily with the Australian troops who went to their villages to buy grass skirts or souvenirs. Though they never saw black troops they were told about them and the news caused much excitement. The villagers learned from relations working at Labu and Lae that there were black Americans who spoke English, dressed like Europeans, drove jeeps and appeared to have all the skills which villagers normally associated with white people. Toaripi carriers conveyed the feeling to their fellow villagers that if black men from America could do these things, so too could they. There were instances when black soldiers came into conflict with ANGAU personnel by adopting a protective role over labourers. For Toaripis it was a completely new experience to see black men disagreeing with or standing up to white people. Both black and white soldiers disliked ANGAU and conveyed their loathing for the unit to many carriers. American soldiers generally ignored the regulations which ANGAU laid down to restrict fraternisation between villagers and troops. In spite of this, contact with troops occurred frequently and produced one of the results most feared by the Australians at the start of the war. The contact made villagers more aware of themselves and their rights, more questioning of authority and more willing to express their grievances openly.

One Toaripi villager had something good to say about ANGAU. Pukari Lakoko, a medical assistant who was well informed and occupied a responsible position did not identify strongly with the opinion of the carriers of the Toaripi coastal villages. In his opinion ANGAU was very kind and helped the village people. To Pukari ANGAU was 'good' for the people of the Gulf. The war helped Pukari see many parts of New Guinea and to meet new people and brought in its train good things like more schools and the university. He considered these were the fruits of war.

The Toaripi labourers returned from Lae to Kairuku and Kerema with many gifts from troops they had befriended in the American and Australian armies. ANGAU officers looked for and confiscated their gifts and this loss was felt very keenly. Throughout their indentureship on the Line the kit bags and lap laps of carriers had been subject to instant inspections. Now that they were being repatriated, further inspections and confiscation seemed too much to bear. There is no reason to believe that the ANGAU officers kept the confiscated items as so many carriers alleged.

On their return home most of the men who had been away looked fit and well. They were better rationed and received medical care in the latter stages of the war. However their own villages suffered from shortages of food. In their absence villagers had relied mainly on sago, few new gardens had been cleared by the women so on the return of the indentured men there was a need for more hard work. The men had to cut timber to rebuild or repair their houses, most of which were in a bad state of repair. Several months passed before the new gardens came into bearing so once again the men were subject to hunger. H.A. Brown said ANGAU rationed the villagers on the coast but no carriers acknowledged this help from ANGAU. Carriers enjoyed comradeship and a certain element of excitement by being away in war-time. For many, despite the mellowing of thirty years, the war meant foot-slogging, cold wet weather, hunger, strict discipline and the harsh punishment of ANGAU officers.

Before the war no Papuans were allowed into New Guinea but as a result of working on the Bulldog Track many Toaripis became familiar with the 'unknown place' for which a permit had been required to enter. After the war many Toaripis left their homes and migrated not only to Port Moresby but to Madang, Lae, Wewak, Rabaul and Goroka. Many of these

migrants were builders or artisans who had seen the opportunities that existed for them in New Guinea. In 1956 H.A. Brown toured the main centres in New Guinea and found that of the 1000 Papuans living in these towns 600 were from the Eastern Elema region between Kerema and Iokea. Though many Toaripi labourers had their money from the sale of souvenirs confiscated there was a great deal of cash in the Toaripi villages after the war. The wages of labourers, compensation money and the money villagers at home received for the sale of souvenirs amounted to a great sum in H.A. Brown's opinion. There were no trade stores and much of the cash was contributed to the Toaripi Association and later to the co-operative movement. Many returned villagers were like Posu Semesevita with grand ideas about new enterprises such as starting saw-mills and opening trade stores. Carpenters organised themselves as building contractors and worked in the towns on rebuilding homes and new offices. H.A. Brown says the Toaripis had always been independent-minded people; the war simply helped them to become more independent. They learnt one major lesson from the war, that people must work together towards an end. They saw the results achieved by combined endeavour on the Bulldog Track and at Lae. This encouraged them to take up the idea of working in co-operative societies. The war also helped to break down the barriers between villages. Before the war men who belonged to certain villages saw themselves only in parochial terms. As a result of the war villagers became more outward-looking and prepared to work with others as had never been done before. The Toaripis had turned their back on their traditional culture since the Vailala Madness in 1919, and the war confirmed this rejection and made them look forward with a certain measure of optimism.

The villagers of Butibam were so close to Lae that they were directly affected by the invasion of the Japanese in March 1942. For eighteen months they had to coexist with the Japanese, a new group of people who did not make extraordinary demands on them. Before the Japanese invasion villagers had hidden in the bush in fear but they could not remain there for ever. Slowly, as they emerged, they accommodated themselves to the ways and demands of their new 'kiaps'. The Japanese traded with the villagers and employed half a dozen of them to help with trading with other places, but generally they did not interfere in village life. Some Japanese told villagers that if Japan ran New Guinea, Japanese and New Guineans would be the same. They would not differentiate between the races. They taught the children flag

songs and how to count but they set up no village school. However, the Japanese sometimes behaved badly, seizing mission cows and goats for which they paid nothing.

The villagers of Butibam were Lutheran and the German missionaries had provided schooling there for several years before the war. Three elderly German missionaries stayed on in the Morobe District throughout the war. The Japanese never attempted to stop the villagers from worshipping in their church and they did not persuade them to follow the Japanese form of worship. To most villagers the Japanese were simply 'sitting down' in Lae, they had no one to fight with and few villagers found any fault with the Japanese. There were no reports of atrocities committed against the villagers. There were a few informants who complained about Japanese misconduct but they could not account for the presence of the kempitai in their village.

The Chinese population of Lae had not escaped the Japanese invasion and stayed in a camp near Butibam. They were often helped to secure food by Butibam villagers who generally favoured Chinese above Europeans for their comparative lack of racial prejudice. Two of the Chinese were in contact with Australian intelligence scouts, one of whom was eventually shot in the Markham Valley village of Chivasing. One New Guinean who accompanied the Japanese patrol that shot the Australian was later hanged for murder.

When the Allied planes began to bomb Lae the Japanese made strict rules which villagers had to obey. There was to be no lighting of fires and the village was to be kept dark at night. Villagers remember this period as one of great fear. They ate cold meals and in the darkness they could hear the Allied planes flying overhead. When the village was bombed and people were killed an elderly villager was blamed by the Japanese for showing a light from his house. No mention was made of any punishment being given for disobedience of this strict order.

Japanese troops entered the village at will but they behaved themselves. There was no attempt to seduce or take the womenfolk by force and if any soldier misbehaved he was summarily punished by being thrashed by the kempitai in full view of all the villagers (see p.139).

Several villagers say they expected the pre-war kiaps and Australian soldiers to return but there is no evidence

that they did anything constructive to resist the Japanese or to assist the Allies to return. Allied planes dropped leaflets over Lae but there is no evidence that villagers were courageous enough to collect them and read them. They feared Japanese punishment too much to do so. From the time of the occupation the Japanese permitted few villagers to go into Lae lest they should report what they saw there to Australian coastwatchers. No one tried to break this rule and sneak in to get a glimpse of what the Japanese were up to. The villagers of Butibam felt helpless in the face of a powerful Japanese force. They argue that they had no guns or swords and so they fatalistically waited for the Allies to regain Lae. When the Allied air attack grew stronger many of them took to the bush again and for several months lived in fear of their lives. When Lae was recaptured by the Allies most people had abandoned the village for the bush, where many fell sick since they lacked adequate medical attention.

When the Allied forces re-entered Lae the villagers of Butibam were shifted several miles away so that room could be made for the thousands of troops to be based there. ANGAU played a dual role in the life of the Butibam evacuee villagers. It not only recruited able-bodied men as carriers and general labour but also provided much needed medical attention and rations for the refugees left in the evacuee camp. Most villagers in Butibam had a favourable impression of ANGAU. This derives largely from its key role in rehabilitating them after the Japanese were driven out of Lae. In addition many of the pre-war kiaps with whom they were familiar returned to reassure them about the future.

When the war broke out most Butibam villagers who were working in other places returned home. Some villagers said that everyone worked together in the garden in those days. They were isolated from the influence of the Europeans of Lae and of the goldfields, and they rediscovered and took a renewed interest in some of their almost forgotten traditional practices. Yet Christianity in the villages survived the war. When the Lutheran missionaries Fricke and Maahs visited the Morobe District in 1944 they found the Lutheran congregation in Butibam very strong in their Christian faith. Villagers claim they felt more 'unity' as a result of their period of enforced isolation during the war. Several children were born and baptised during the war and the population increased despite shortages of food and the later effects of sickness.

When the troops of the American and Australian armies were based in Lae persistent attempts were made by ANGAU to prevent fraternisation between troops, particularly black American troops, and villagers. ANGAU could not keep all the soldiers out of the village and enterprising villagers sold curios and souvenirs in the army camps at Lae. Soldiers were curious about the villagers but there is no evidence of prostitution or that they molested the womenfolk. Some villagers saw the black American troops as big brothers. As in Papua, there were accounts of 'rough' arguments between ANGAU officers and black soldiers. American soldiers told villagers that Australia was too slow in building up New Guinea and was not treating its people well. Meanwhile ANGAU was making big promises to the people of New Guinea. It promised that hospitals, schools, and roads would be constructed after the war. New Guineans were told there would be changes and lots of money would be spent to develop their country. Many of the people in Butibam believed this would happen in return for the help New Guineans had given in winning the war.

War opened the eyes and minds of many Butibam villagers. They were made aware of the military might of nations like Japan, Australia, and America, they saw vast numbers of foreign people and more mechanised equipment than they could imagine was man-made. They were very impressed by the wealth of the countries which could produce these machines. Yet in Butibam there was no cargo cult after the war as there was in Madang, Manus, West New Britain and Finschhafen.

Because one of their number was hanged for complicity in a murder the people of Butibam acquired the reputation of having 'collaborated' with the Japanese, but they strongly deny this charge. They feel a sense of shame about the activities of the 'silly' villager who bore arms in the service of the Japanese; unlike the people of Busama the villagers of Butibam did not offer any money to the administration to 'restore their good name'. The overall effect of the war on them was to impress them with the might of great powers and their own weakness and inability to stand in the way of changes. The Japanese were the enemy but the villagers could not prevent the Japanese from landing in Lae and coming and going from their village as they pleased. Before the war ended they found themselves accused of collaborating with the enemy and were ordered to go and watch Tuya being hanged.

They were paid compensation for the destruction of houses and property in their village but they did not know how to spend it. Some bought motor cars and trucks, others set up trade stores without having any management skills. The money which they earned as labourers was spent in the Chinese trade stores. They did become more aware of themselves as a distinct group and were determined to resist encroachment on their land by outsiders. Many people from Butibam have since entered politics and the Ahi Association which has asked for compensation for land on which Lae now stands can perhaps be traced back to those days of war when the villagers found themselves isolated and threatened and had to reassess their place in the world.

Appendix 1a

Casualties, honours and awards
to Papuans and New Guineans in service with ANGAU

Casualties

Indentured natives killed by enemy action	46
Indentured natives died other causes	<u>1,962</u>
Total deaths	2,008
Indentured natives wounded by enemy action	<u>91</u>

Native medical orderlies

Total employed February 1942-November 1945

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
Papua	9	1	10
Territory of New Guinea	3	-	3
	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>

Royal Papuan Constabulary (later designated New Guinea Police Force)

	<u>Papua</u>	<u>TNG</u>	<u>Total</u>
Native police on strength	935	1,541	2,476
Total police enlisted during war period (Papua records not available)	(1,334)	(1,803)	(3,137)
Police discharged	357	213	570
Killed in action	7	21	28
Died natural causes	35	28	63

Natives enlisted in Forces (to 30 November 1945)

	<u>PIR</u>	<u>'M' Special Unit Infantry Battalion</u>	<u>Total</u>
Present strengths	2,756	10	2,766
Total enlistments			
Papua	1,806	-	1,806
TNG	<u>1,726</u>	<u>877</u>	<u>2,603</u>
	<u>3,532</u>	<u>877</u>	<u>4,409</u>

Enlistment and Employment - conditions of service - Administrative
Instructions and Organisation of File 419/5/23.

	PIR	'M' Special Unit Infantry Battalion	Total
Discharged			
Papuaans	555	-	555
TNG	97	859	956
	652	859	1,511
Killed in action			
Papuaans	20	--	20
TNG	18	5	23
	38	5	43
Died of wounds			
Papuaans	5	--	5
TNG	8	1	9
	13	1	14
Missing believed killed			
Papuaans	10	-	10
TNG		1	1
	10	1	11
Died - other causes			
Papuaans	42	-	42
TNG	21	1	22
	63	1	64
Wounded in action			
Papuaans	59	-	59
TNG	39	12	51
	98	12	110
Honours and awards (as at 16.4.1946)			
Native soldiers (PIR)			
Distinguished Conduct Medal		2	
Military Medal		11	
Mentioned in Despatches		4	
Honours and awards			
RPC, AIB and other natives			
George Medal		1	
MBE (Civil)		1	
BEM (Civil)		7	
PNG Police Valour Medal		23	
Loyal Service Medallion		294	

Appendix 1b

ANGAU - Administration and organisation, 17 May 1942

	Rank	Name	Appointment
Markham District (late Morobe Dist.)	T/Capt.	Niall, H.L.R.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Bloxham, A.A.	ADO
	"	Murphy, J.J.	"
	"	Pursehouse, L.	"
	WO Class 2		
	(Temp.)	Hicks, R.H.	PO
	"	Clark, J.F.	"
	"	Hill, G.M.	"
	"	Norris, C.M.K.	"
	"	Gluyas, A.D.	WO of Police
"	Clammer, R.C.	"	
Lakekamu District (late Gulf Division & Mekeo District in late Central Div.)	T/Capt.	Thompson, W.H.H.	DO
	A/Lieut.	O'Malley, Louis J.	ADO
	"	Healy, M.J.	"
	"	Moy, F.H.	"
	"	Toogood, G.W.	"
	"	Fox, C.W.G.	PO
	WO Class 2		
	(Temp.)	Round, C.W.S.	"
	"	Joycey, D.C.	Medical Asst
"	Mann, M.C.	"	
"	Bonner, J.B.	"	
Moresby District (late Central Division excl. Mekeo District)	A/Lieut.	Faithorn, B.W.	DO
	"	Millar, C.J.	ADO
	"	Chambers, D.G.N.	"
	"	Shand, F.N.W.	"
	"	Bowman, C.G.	PO
	WO Class 2		
	(Temp.)	Brown, J.F.F.	"
	"	Rosser, J.H.	"
	"	Brown, E.A.	WO of Police
	"	Gordon, W.A.	"
	"	Searle, G.H.	"
"	O'Malley, Leslie J.	Medical Asst	
"	Soblusky, R.A.	"	
"	Jolly, R.V.	"	
"	Matthews, A.N.	"	
Purari District (late Delta Div.)	A/Lieut.	Foldi, J.R.	DO
	WO Class 2		
	(Temp.)	Gallagher, C.D.P.	PO
	"	McKenzie, R.	Medical Asst
	"	Howard, J.	"
"	Healy, M.T.	"	

	Rank	Name	Appointment
Fly River District (late Western Division)	T/Capt.	Austen, L.	DO
	A/Lieut.	O'Donnell, G.C.	ADO
	"	Ethell, A.L.	PO
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Price, R.W.	"
	"	Wyborn, F.H.	"
	"	Frame, J. McA	"
	"	MacGregor, D.C.	Medical Asst
Headquarters	T/Capt.	May, A.J.	M. Officer
		Jensen, D.	Sen. Med. Asst
Sepik District	T/Capt.	Jones, J.H.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Bates, C.D.	ADO
	"	Hodgekiss, J.W.	"
	"	Milligan, J.S.	"
	"	Aitchison, T.G.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Taylor, J.L.	"
	A/Lieut.	White, J.P.	PO
	"	Searson, J.J.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Blood, N.B.N.	WO of Police
	"	Lambert, C.W.	Medical Asst
"	Fisher, L.J.M.	"	
Tufi District (late North- Eastern Div.)	T/Capt.	Champion, C.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Andersen, F.W.G.	ADO
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Rutledge, R.J.M.	PO
	"	Yoeman, S.H.	"
Ramu District (late Madang District)	T/Capt.	Penglase, N.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Black, J.R.	ADO
	"	Harris, G.C.	"
	"	Kyngdon, L.G.R.	"
	"	Neilsen, G.F.	PO
	"	Boyan, R.H.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Upson, T.W. Fowler,	WO of Police Medical Asst
Mambare District (late Northern Division)	T/Capt.	Grahamslaw, T.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Costelloe, J.A.	ADO
	"	Brewar, F.P.	"
	"	Graham, W.E.	"
	"	Champion, F.A.	"
	"	McKenna, J.B.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Brown, G.F.X.	PO
	A/Lieut.	Owen-Turner, E.A.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Bitmead, H.F.	Medical Asst
"	Barnes, D.S.	"	

	Rank	Name	Appointment
Trobriands District (part of late Eastern & South- eastern Division)	A/Lieut.	Timperley, A.	DO
	"	Whitehouse, E.	ADO
	"	Rutledge, D.F.M.	"
	Private	Stanton, E.A.	PO
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Middleton, F.I.	"
Samarai District (late East-Central & part of late Eastern Division)	T/Capt.	Rich, M.C.W.	DO
	A/Lieut.	Atkinson, K.C.	ADO
	"	Dishon, W.R.	"
	"	Ross, J.C.	PO
	"	Lees, C.H.G.	"
	WO Class 2 (Temp.)	Burchett, E.	Medical Asst

Appendix 1c

Growth of ANGAU personnel

	31.12.1942		31.12.1943		30.9.1944	
	Officers	Other ranks	Officers	Other ranks	Officers	Other ranks
Headquarters						
ANGAU	7	15+2/10	9	25+6/2	15	49
Administrative staff	19	102+7/93	26	196+8/82	34	278
Total Headquarters	26	118	35	221	49	327
Regional Headquarters					5	39
Administrative staff					42	133
Total (3) Regions					47	172
Field staff	81	227	134	835	192	862
		53/608		58/27		
Total all ANGAU staff	107	345	169	1,056	288	1,361

Appendix 2aTowope Tovatoa (a story by Rex Marere)

Towope Tovatoa was a carrier from Isapiape. The carriers went with ANGAU over to Lae and they were staying in tents at Malahang. When they were there the war was over and they were cleaning up the area. Towope was living with one of my uncles and they shared the same room. Some American soldiers picked my uncle to go and work around their mess. After he worked around the mess they asked him to go into the mess and they gave him some food. After eating the food they told him that he would be sent to America and he accepted it so they start dressing him. After dressing my uncle went outside. He waved to one of his friends but his friend couldn't recognise him. When he came close my uncle spoke to him and the friend got really surprised and started crying so my uncle changed his mind about going to America. So the two of them went back to where they were sleeping. At night they told Towope the news about what my uncle did during the day. Towope got an idea and the next day he reported sick and was sent to the hospital. On the way he was picked up by a truck and from there he was lost. This information was told to me by Lakoko Kaisava. He told me that this man took his place and was the first person that the Americans dressed.

Other versions of the story state that Towope is dead or that he boarded an aircraft for the USA. He left his carrier's disc on the airstrip. (Informants - Uritai carriers.)

Appendix 2bFirst of the carriers' songs

When the Toaripi carriers were paddling up to Bulldog one man by the name of Taurake Karikara stood up and started steering the canoe. Two other men named Marere Pou and Suru Maiauka thought he should not be standing like that to steer because they were not sailing. All the men were paddling except Taurake who was standing like a post, so the other two men started to compose a song about him.

Translation by Rex Marere

*Kake o lavai ve lave maea
'alavi tiviri' ve tola
Suka pavape o ---
Kake o opu ve mera maea
'oropai tiviri' ve tola
Suka pavape o ---*

He is standing like a post

*'Laiara lare' tola alavi
tiviri ve tola
Suka pavape o ---
'Mei fari tola' oropai tiviri
ve tola
Suka pavape o ---.*

He stands like a tree which is
beside the river bank.

He is like one of those trees there
standing beside the river bank

You are like one of those trees with
fruits on the river bank.

Carriers' songs

The men of the Toaripi area were picked to go to Bulldog. As they left their village by canoe all the women were standing on the river bank saying goodbye to their husbands. They waved their red grass skirts and the husbands waved back, lifting their paddles to them as they set off for Bulldog. This song was composed by Fava Heovake.

Translation by Rex Marere

<p><i>Lauru Susu o vita ve heaea ve Miaru poe ererea povope oo --- Lauko purumu o - a vai ve semese ve oroti poe ererea povope oo --- Miaru poe ererea pavope oo --- Oroti poe ererea pavope o ---</i></p>	<p>All the women were standing by the river bank for their husbands. All the children were standing by the river bank for their fathers. On the river bank all were standing On the canoe bank all were standing.</p>
<p><i>Ilava ve mavaro ova eovope Lauru Susu o vita ve heaea ve mai muku ovomae o avutiopo seseva o feravapo oo - Lauko purumu o avai ve semese ve mai muku furi mai o avuteope seseva o feravape o Ovo mae o avuteope seseva o feravape Furi mae o avuteope seseva o feravape</i></p>	<p>When the husbands looked back they saw their wives and children were waving to them The husbands saw that they were waving to them with colourful grass skirts Colourful grass skirts were waving to the husbands Colourful grass skirts waving.</p>

The following is sung to a traditional tune - *Evore*. The words were written by Hauka Tova on the return of the menfolk from the war.

*Epe ve iai-maea iai-kake sova-kake ita patei itipe a ...
Savora ve seara-maea mauru-kake popoe-kake ita patei itipe a ...
Iai-kake sova-kake ita patei itipe a ...*

*Ira ua Ovaro area-ape foreope-a kauru-kake popoe-kake ita patei itipe;
Ote ua Mairo a kiriape foreope-a iai-kake sova-kake ita patei itipe.*

*Iri ua Ovaro area-ape foreope-a Molala ve Moa tola va verei iauope;
Ote ua Mairo kiriape foreope-a Karei ve Aisa tola va verei iauope.*

Free translation: H.A. Brown

The Epe men arrived with the mates of their Savoripi clan;
The Savora men came in company with their friends of the Luipi clan;
They arrived in company with their mates of the Savoripi clan.

When the Luipi clan friends came the Ovaro clanswomen laughed and leapt about;
When the Savoripi clan friends arrived the Mairo clanswomen swayed their hips and danced about.

The Ovaro clanswomen laughed and leapt and then rested under Molala's Moa tree;
The Mairo clanswomen swayed their hips, danced, and then lay down under Karai's Aisa tree.

Notes

<i>Epe ... Savora</i>	honorific title for men of the Savoripi clan.
<i>mauru ... popoe</i>	associate terms used to identify the parts of the body of a Luiipi person.
<i>iai ... sova</i>	associate terms identifying the person as belonging to the Savoripi clan.
<i>iri ... ote</i>	associate terms that indicate that the person belongs to the Uaripi clan.
<i>Ovaro-Mairo (or Maito)</i>	honorific title for girls of the Uaripi clan.
<i>Moa Aisa tola</i>	tree totem of the Uaripi clan.
<i>kiriape</i>	used to parallel <i>area-ape</i> , literally 'buttocks'.

Appendix 3aRarua Tau's account of his evacuation

In 1942 the war broke out in Papua, February 1942. The Japs started bombing Port Moresby on the Sunday night at about 3 o'clock morning. Next morning, the people were moving around in the villages and talking one to another about war bombs and also preparing their canoes to move down to Porebada, Boera, Lealea and Manumanu villages.

The Harbour was full of canoes, sailing and some rowing with people crying and calling. I myself have no canoe to move my family with 5 children, 3 boys, 2 girls and 1 sister young, wife and myself. After that I ran up to see my wife's uncle if he got a canoe and he saw me and asked me how about your family and I replied no hope, just trying to find a canoe to move out from the village. He said go and bring all the children and sleeping gear, no other things allowed. I was very happy about what he told me. We were the last people to leave the village. At the Hunter Passage we met a canoe sent by the Porebada Missionary to pick us up and we went on board the other canoe. When we reached Porebada village, the Papuan Missionary came to take all our gear to his home.

I slept at Porebada Mission House for a night. The next day about 3 p.m. Mr A. Baldwin arrived at the Porebada village to take some men to 15 mile for labour work. I and my friend we slept there for a night. Next morning we were taken to the Labour Camp at 18 mile. Next morning Labour in charge rang the bell and blew the whistle and told us to stand in line so we did stand in line. An ANGAU officer came around and asked the people could they tell them the names of the places - i.e. departments they worked. After that some men were sent to labour work at the place now called Sogeri School, and some were sent to clear a new aerodrome called Durand Drome. During the week enemy planes came over and were bombing that area and other places too. After some days I was sent to work at the ANGAU Quartermaster store with Mr B. Wyatt.

After one year I was sent into Port Moresby Town to clean BP's store building and then all store goods were moved down from Sapphire Creek to town. I remained there until sent to Manumanu for 2 weeks leave and I was sent to District Officer Mr Faithorn on my return from my leave. In 1943 I joined the District Office as the Clerk, and made many war patrols with ANGAU officers inland to Koiari areas and coastal villages.

Appendix 3b

List of couples who were married in Motu refugee villages or just after the war. All the people in the left-hand column are from Hanuabada.

Korema Araidi	(F)	married	Kwaragu Vagi (Manumanu)
Maima Avie	(M)	married	Gaudi (Roku)
Gabe Bau	(F)	married	Nou Veau (Kabadi)
Dabu Dabu	(M)	married	Gou (Kabadi)
Boni Dihotani	(F)	married	Kevau Kino (Kanosia)
Sisia Dogodo	(M)	married	Gou (Kabadi)
Morea Doura	(M)	married	Toea Boe (Manumanu)
Bau Hekure	(M)	married	Hane Igo (Tatana)
Morea Igua	(M)	married	Gou (Kabadi)
Gavera Lohia	(M)	married	Mere (Dikana)
Heni Noho	(M)	married	Gerebuma Aubo (Manumanu)
Mose Raho	(M)	married	Mere Rabu (Manumanu)

Appendix 3cHanuabadans who joined the Papuan Infantry Battalion

The ranks they attained are in brackets.

	Loa Daera	(L/Cpl.)	379	Morea Mea	(Cpl.)
1049	Daera Ganiga	(Sgt.)		Lohia Mou	(L/Cpl.)
	Boko Hedu	(Pvte)	1080	Boge Nao	(Cpl.)
2015	Morea Kevau	(Sgt.)		transferred to PIB as a	
	Egahu Leke	(Pvte)		medical.	
1084	Gavera Mea	(Sgt.)		Eure Peter	(Pvte)
				Virobo Tamasi	(Pvte)

Ganiga and Peter were transferred from Royal Australian Artillery to PIB on 14 January 1942.

One Morea was transferred from AASC to PIB 22 January 1942.

(File on personal records of natives of Papua and New Guinea - medals and campaign stars) 80/1-391/18-506/5.

From 11 April 1942 Daera Ganiga was placed on the Married Role and entitled to draw one extra full ration for his wife.

The PIB was formed 1 June 1940, the original recruit was Samai. (Native soldiers - Enlistment and employment, Conditions of service, Administrative Institutions and Organisation of), 419/5/23 80/1 506/5.

No Papuans of mixed-race joined the PIB.

Appendix 3dHanuabadans who became native medical orderlies during World War II

Ova Boge, Hera Ganiga (he was an instructor),* Hoike Ganiga, Maku Hanua, Toua Kapena,* Igo Koai, Leke Koai,* Idau Maiva, Arua Morea, Boe Morea,* Oda Morea, Pipi Morea, Boko Havo,* Vikor Ova, Revo Peter, Vani Sarahu, Paul Towa, Boge Vai, Lahui Vai, Homoka Vani.

* Asterisks indicate these five men were trained in Sydney in 1933.

Appendix 3eHanuabadans who worked as clerks in ANGAU during World War II

Gavera Baru, Guba Boe, Tau Boe, Daroa Boga, Loa Daera (transferred from PIB to ANGAU), Loa Dia, Udu Dia, Toka Gaudi, Mea Gavera, Willie Gavera, Nou Goreu, Dai Hekure, Morea Morea Hila, Nao Igo, Raka Igo, Raka Ipi, Boe Kapena, Gavera Lohia, Vagi Mase, Bareu Morea, Dago Morea, Virobo Morea, Manoka Oape, Igua Pipi, Mase Rei, Rarua Tau, Lohia Udu.

Appendix 3fHanuabadans who died in World War II

Rei Frank - a fisherman. Dynamite blew up in his hand and decapitated him while he was fishing off Daugo Island.

Beri Kukuna - died of a serious illness.

Boga Toma and Keni Vani - crewmen on the *Mamutu* which sank on 7 August 1942.

The latter two men knew the coast from Kairuku to Daru so were chosen by ANGAU as crewmen. The *Mamutu* was taking mixed-race evacuees from Port Moresby to Daru when it was fired on by a Japanese submarine. William Griffin was the sole survivor. A nominal roll of the passengers and a full report dated 5 November 1942 is in an ANGAU Marine Section File in National Archives, Papua New Guinea.

Appendix 3gA selection of songs made during the war

Raisi by Morea Mea

*Raisi mo ianina lao hesiku
Dahaka bama ani bama moale?
Dina vada be dihomu
Do bainala. sinagu baina nanadaia
Dahaka e nadu.*

*Oh! Bogahisigu, lau madi-o!
Baina moale
Oh! Bogahisigu, lau madi-o!
Baina moale sinagu dainai*

Rice Translation by Kevau Raho

Tired of eating rice
What shall I eat to make me happy?
The sun has gone down
I'll go and ask mummy
What she cooked.

Oh! I am sorry for myself
Oh! I'll be happy
Sorry for myself
I'll be happy because of my mother.

*Tamagu e, aoma aita haoda
Sinagu na bea geigeimu
Bena adorahi baita lou mai
Baita nanadu vamu dainai
Maho be ianina mai moale
Badina vamu ida vada e nadua
Lalogu danu e me moale.*

Poreporena Hanuabada
by Morea Morea Hila

*Poreporena Hanuabada
(repeat Hanuabada)
Poreporena
(repeat Poreporena)
Hanuabada
Hanua namo herea*

*Diapani edia bomu
Diapani e (repeat) edia bomu,
Garina ia ta gari.*

*Manumaru konenai
Manumaru e (repeat) konenai
Eda ruma ta kara.*

*Porebada edia seseha
Porebada repeat) edia seseha,
Tanohova negadia.*

*Ita madi, ihabaida
Ita madi e bogahisida
Asi eda moale.*

Bese veridia
by Morea Morea Hila

*Bese veridia olalomai e,
Iurahenimai toana ame itaia e,
Alalomai oahisi ahisi anina e
Aina aroho loamu manu na heto
Emai rohokau gabuna Malara
binai
A lowmai ina ta hemoale
moale heboumu.*

Chorus:

*Lau so manu maroho loamu,
Eda hanuai do asina roho diho
Eda Dubu lalonai do asina
vareai'
O Motu Hanuai edena negai
bama vareai.*

Daddy come and let's go fishing
Mummy will go to the garden
In the evening we'll come back
We'll cook with the fish
You'll be happy to eat yams
Because its cooked with fish
My mind is satisfied.

Poreporena Hanuabada
Translation by Kevau Raho

Poreporena of Hanuabada
Very good village.

Japanese bombs
We were afraid of them.

At the beach of Manumaru
We built our homes.

Among the mangroves
At Porebada we dwelt.

Oh! Poor us!
We had no happiness.

All the tribesmen
Translation by Kevau Raho

For your remembrance of Tribesmen
We have seen your great love
But we are full of sorrow because
We fly about like birds
Here we landed at Malara

And are joyful together on our
return home.

Chorus:

I was flying about like a bird
Have not yet landed at our village
Have not yet entered our Church

Oh! When will I enter the Motu
village?

Poreporena besena

by Morea Morea Hila

Poreporena, Hanuabada hanua
namona.
Tatai tai henia mu Poreporena
hedoa
Madi ihabaina

Chorus:

Tatai heniāmu Poreporena
Poreporena o
Tatai heniāmu Poreporena
Madi ihabaina.

Poreporena besena gabu idau
idau ai
Tuari ese eluludia eroho
hedoa

Chorus:

Tatai henāmu Poreporena etc.

Poreporena besena e ha bouāia lou,
Kokoroku natuna bamona
Hanina henunai.

Chorus:

Tatai heniāmu Poreporena etc.

Poreporena tawmūi

by Willie Gavera

Poreporena tawmūi Ibowmūiai
Eda hanua Takohutania
Idau Sesehai ola ogorumu
Ema harihari tame hedavari lou.

Chorus:

Vara varamai e
Tame hedavari lou
Dirava dainai
Aita moale
Baine narida
Baine hakauda baine bamuda
Ela bona Poreporenai.

Children of Poreporena

Translation by Kevau Raho

Poreporena the big village and a
good village
We the people of Hanuabada cried for
our poor old Poreporena.

Chorus:

We are crying for Poreporena
Oh Poreporena, oh
We are crying for poor old Poreporena.

The children of Poreporena are
scattered in different places
The war had chased them away
And they mixed with other people.

Chorus:

We are crying for Poreporena etc.

The children of Poreporena have been
gathered together again
Like hen's chicks under its wings.

Chorus:

We are crying for Poreporena etc.

People of Poreporena

Translation by Kevau Raho

Everyone of you
We deserted our village
And have been dwelling among mangroves
along the coast
Till now we meet again.

Chorus:

Oh, our relatives
Now we meet again
Because of God's care
Let's be merry
He'll watch over us
He'll guide us, and accompany us
'Till we reach Poreporena.

Appendix 3hDaera Ganiga's experience in the Papuan Infantry Battalion

In 1938 I was joined with 13th Heavy Battery while the first Army came along in Port Poresby. I volunteered myself to fight against the local enemy. We were first of all attested before joining by the Doctor, inspection of body, watching if I'm fit to be a soldier. Of course I was joined - fitness. I carried out my duties with 13th Heavy Battery as I am Sgt. for Orderly Room - my job was a native clerk. I know this Commanding Officer by the name of Major Chambers, Lt. Cape - 2i/c for 13th Heavy Battery, other NCOs - Bombardier, Master - Gunners. I'm well knowing them as friends with me. 1938 I worked with them till the Japs occupied Rabaul. From then, I myself and other native soldiers were joined with 1st PIB. I was transferred. Then I carried out the duties of a soldier. We were all soldiers fighting for Port Moresby - native soldiers. I myself believed on that day, we are soldiers. We have to prepare as guardians for our land - Port Moresby. Till a Jap plane came along raiding our home Hanuabada. At that time it was February 1942 they dropped the bombs in Hanuabada village, next morning all Hanuabada were escaping and evacuated by canoes. They left home, with their families, left home and everything during that day. I myself with other native soldiers was guarding Port Moresby - in the streets, village and other parts of Port Moresby area. Militia force. People of 13th Heavy Battery the Europeans who used to look after 2 big guns - at Paga Hill (Port Moresby). We Papuan soldiers guarded Hanuabada and we had Major Logan as CO. He fell sick and was relieved of duties. The Major Watson and 5 or 6 Europeans, before some Europeans were transferred from the other Unit to join with us in 1942. We were training hard, practice with weapons, manning Bren(ny) gun. Tommy gun, .303 practice: doing and fixed it up. Still carried on with our soldiers life, drilling parade all sorts of things we did in the Battalion till the Japanese came along - to Rabaul. We Papuan soldiers on Kokoda. We all stand by and listened to Major Watson's order. Katue was there, all NCOs and Major stand by waiting in hiding for the enemy. They lay in wait. Our scouts kept going up and down to keep watch on them. Katue and soldiers still scouting the track. First lane - all soldiers told to get up, a very bad spot [position] we might hurt one another if we fired our arms. Two or 3 times we did this, then we took up final positions at Awala, just lay down watching them in proper position Major told us to be soldiers - we lay in extended line with our European Officers. When Katue reported back it was very near time now - Major gave us the order to stand by absolutely. When we looked up Japanese soldiers were advancing - with carriers in front - all those New Guinea natives. Major saw this through his binoculars, he ordered Don't shoot the carriers. - When I give you orders to take all your rifles, safety catch forward - we carried out the order. We lay in wait knowing the enemy was just ahead. Some of my PIB fellows were frightened. NCOs told us this is the time - we are soldiers and must follow orders. When Katue came along he asked Major Watson have you seen the enemy? He replied we have seen the enemy. Well, let us be ready before the order comes through. So we were all lying in wait for them. When the enemy was close we were given the order for rapid fire. At the same time he said 'fire', everybody was firing. European officers fired the Tommy guns. We soldiers used .303 rifles, some fired 7 rounds, others 8-9 rounds each before Major gave the order to run for our lives. Major said PIB run for life so we all stand in our positions and ran for life. We went till sun was setting and we

were struggling in the bush in the dark. We never knew where we find the track because it was the bush. The enemy was still firing where we had lain, they could see where we had stood by for them. We ran - left behind our ground-sheets and rations, where we lay in ambush for them. We found the road, followed the bush, some of our friends were found, Kumusi River - we saw some people there but all the villagers had run for their lives. We went to a 2nd station. Kumusi. We waited, some soldiers came along and found some others still in the bush till 3a.m. some more stragglers came in. We asked whether any more soldiers were to come along. They didn't know. People found it hard. Some boys came along the road, went overland from Port Moresby to Kokoda Trail. 1942 we left 9 mile Quarry, July 1942 overland to Kokoda, walked - about a week. We were training there and looked out at all the villages around Kokoda. Our HQ was Kokoda Station - companies broke up, everywhere they went in different companies, A, B & C with their officers and Bren coy. We are divided and posted everywhere at Kokoda to look out for the enemy. 1, 2, 3 weeks' time we saw the Jap battleships coming along. We then walked to Buna to help our soldiers. Some European soldiers in signal coy with PIB soldiers together guarded Buna station. I and my officers looked after Kokoda - we all moved to join PIB at Buna when Japs landed. Enemy landed from battleships in Buna Bay. It was a terrible day. It's the first time we saw battleships. CO told us we are soldiers we have sisters, brother in others parts of the country. I have to do something as a soldier. Everybody did what the CO told them to do. As the battleship came along the big gun was firing. Every soldier disappeared from Buna Station, both black and white soldiers ran for their lives because they destroyed Buna Station and the bushes. Our company was hiding. We heard the sounds coming along. We hid properly, no one was hurt - no injuries. Japanese were hunting and soldiers were coming down the shore. Only our scouts were hiding, they looked out they shot a lot of Japs who came along by launch and rubber dinghies, they were still firing and soldiers were coming down on them. After 3, 4 5 days the Japs were quite settled down in Buna. No village people stayed in Buna, they all ran for their lives. Only the Japanese with their native carriers stayed in Buna. They were in Buna Station ready to move up. The Japs spent a week in Buna then came along trying to get overland to take Kokoda. But we Papuan soldiers were hiding at Awala to attack them. Sgt. Katue and his section were sent out by the Major to look out for the Japs - the scouting soldiers could see a motor cycle coming with the Japanese soldiers. Some were riding along on bicycles. After Sgt. Bagita came along, he reported to Major Watson, Oh Major, Japanese are coming along. So Major asked him to report more fully what he saw. Bagita said he could see them moving with native carriers. That is when they were advancing sometimes, sometimes 4 or 8 came along till early morning. Officers told us to be ready for scouting too - scouts went and guarded their next station. We were safe - other fellows came in - we counted - we are all the same number. Major told us to be ready for kai - clean up the rifles and all those weapons we'd been firing - clean up. Some of us cooked food before the enemy came along. We ate Army biscuits in early a.m. Scouts moved along - went again and met a Jap scout, returned and reported. We finished our kai and quickly we were ready for the enemy coming in. We took our .303s with us and lay in position again. Major told us exactly when we must open fire. Some orders he gave us. Take your position. Scout came along too, took his position before the enemy arrived. Quarter of an hour - for the enemy to arrive. We saw their long track came along advance. We could see the Japanese. It's not coming one by one they came along - I couldn't say (how many) and it doesn't matter we are frightened - we look

at them - Major told us to wait till he gave the firing order - Major knew the 'mile' - gave us same order, safety catch forward, enemy came along - Rapid fire. Japs were surprised that we are seeing them, boys still carrying on firing exactly as the first time, some fired 9 rounds 6, 7. We killed a lot of Japs, laying on the track and we were running again for life. We came along by the bush, we looked for another station.

Appendix 4a

Pidgin address by WO N.M. Bird

After the Allies recaptured Lae, ANGAU patrol officers travelled around the Markham District to speak to the villagers. A typical address follows:

All listen to this. In the good times all boys could make contracts with their own Masters. They received blankets, shirts, tinned meat, rice, biscuits - a good ration - and at the end of their contract received their money and could go home. In those good times there were schools and there were things in plenty.

The Germans attacked our friends so we went to help them. We sent our ships, our aircraft, our soldiers and everything we had to fight the Germans. We had nothing left with which to fight. The Japanese knew this and thought that they could capture Australia and New Guinea easily. Australia had nothing with which to fight.

The Japanese captured Rabaul, Lae, Salamaua and part of Papua. As I have said before we could not stop them because we had sent everything to help our friends - all our ships, our aircraft and our soldiers. Later the Allies recalled their ships, aircraft and soldiers.

We have been able to fight back at the Japanese and then drove them from Papua and killed all the Japanese and then drove them from Salamaua to Lae. We hammered them properly. You saw the big line of Japanese who ran away from Lae because they were afraid of our soldiers. They ran like wild pigs trying to get to Sio and Madang. They were afraid of us. We caught the Japanese at Finschhafen and Madang and hammered them again. It is our turn now and we are going to make the Jap understand that he cannot humbug us or you.

The Kiap wants to see your village and to make sure that you are alright, that the Japs have not hurt you. The Kiap has come so if there are any Japanese in your land let me know and soldiers will come and kill them. When there are no more Japs in your place the soldiers will go looking for the Japs in other places. It won't be long now. (P/R North Markham 1943-44.)

Appendix 5aLocal informants on the Toaripi area

Date of interview is in brackets.

Havare Everevita	Uritai, born about 1914. Was first a carrier, later became a Medical Orderly. (10/12/1970)
Karava Harofere	Mirivase, born about 1900. Was a Councillor at Mirivase throughout the war. (10/12/1970)
Ivaraharia Ikui	Born about 1910. Was a cook at Grimm Point and Bulldog. (8/12/1970)
Laho Karukuru	Born about 1930. Interpreter. (10/12/1970)
Pukari Lakoko	Mirivase, born about 1910. Was a Medical Orderly on the Bulldog Track. (17/13/1970)
Koko Mairi	Lalapipi, born about 1920. Was a carrier. (10/12/1970)
Dago Morea	Hanuabada, born about 1906. Was a clerk at ANGAU sub-district office at Kerema during the war. (8/7/1971)
Memafu Ori	Uritai, born about 1900. Was a carrier early in the war, was promoted to rank of boss-boy, worked 3 years at Uritai. (9/12/1970)
Tapora Ori	Isapeape, born about 1920. Joined the PIB. Was promoted to Cpl. (7/12/1970 and 9/12/1970)
Kake Sevesevita	Isapeape, born about 1907. Remained in Mirivase during the war because he was sick. (9/12/1970)
Sala Tirea	Heavala, born about 1920. Was first a carrier, later became a crew member on a barge travelling the Lakekamu. (5/12/1970)
Makeu Tore	Iokea, born about 1919. Worked as a carpenter at Napa Napa. (19/10/1971)
Lovato Torea	Moveave, born about 1927. Joined the PIB. (19/10/1970)

Group from Uritai, mainly carriers, interviewed on 8/12/1970:

Laeke Sari Ako (boat crew), To Ake (boat crew), Eove Arifae, Ofae Arisa, Miri Aruare, Aeke Erava (medical), Mefereka Esarua, Soi Everevita, Isarua Fae, Pukari Farapo, Avasa Heovake (medical), Lare Kairu, Lare Karikuru, Sari Karikuru, Kauore Lelemiri, Siari Maiva, Sari Sarufa, Maere Sevese, Karu Sevesesari, Mora Tete, Karave Tuteteueta.

Group from Lalapipi, interviewed on 8/12/1970:

Seseve Ako, Hure Ito.

Appendix 5bLocal informants on Hanuabada village

Date of interview is in brackets.

Morea Arua	Elevala, born about 1910. Was at Manumanu for part of the war then worked at Kila labour camp. (4/8/1971)
Avaki Bani	Elevala, born about 1908. Worked as a rubber packer for ANGAU and PCB. (4/8/1971)
Loa Daera	Poreporena, born about 1925. Joined PIB, promoted to L/Cpl. (4/4/1971)
Morea Dago	Poreporena, born about 1916. Worked as a general labourer, then as a telephone technician. (8/7/1971)
Ranuinu Dogodo	Elevala, born about 1910. Worked at the ration store at Kanosia rubber plantation. (4/8/1971)
Gabriel Ehava	Moreave, born about 1908. Joined PIB. Promoted to Sgt. Awarded the Military Medal. (12/12/1970)
Kevau Gabe	Tanobada, born about 1910. Worked as a carpenter for ANGAU. (15/11/1970)
Daera Ganiga	Hohodae, born about 1910. Joined PIB. Promoted to Sgt. (4/4/1971)
Nou Goreu	Poreporena, born about 1910. Worked at the ration store at Manumanu. (17/3/1971 and 21/3/1971)
Guba Guba	Tanobada, born about 1920. Worked at the ration store in Hanuabada, later was in the Finance Office. (4/8/1971)
Morea Morea Hila	Poreporena, born about 1913. Worked first as Storeman at Manumanu, then as a clerk for ANGAU. (28/3/1971)
Boilai Ikau	Elevala, born about 1913. Worked as a general labourer at Laloki airfield, then for the Navy at Napa Napa. (4/8/1971)
Hení Noho	Tanobada, born about 1920. Worked as a casual labourer at Laloki. (15/11/1970)
Revo Peter	Poreporena, born about 1920. Attended a medical course at Sydney University. Son of Peter Vagi, a village leader. Worked as NMO on the Kokoda Trail. (14/3/1971)
Kevau Raho	Tanobada, born about 1938. Was a schoolboy, son of a school teacher at Manumanu. (30/5/1971 and 3/2/1971)
Virobo Tamasi	Poreporena, born about 1910. Was first a carrier on the Kokoda Trail. Later joined PIB. (14/3/1971)
Rarua Tau	Poreporena, born about 1908. Worked as a clerk for ANGAU. (3/6/1971)
Gaba Tutara	Poreporena, born about 1925. Was a general labourer for ANGAU. (14/3/1971)

Appendix 5cLocal informants on Butibam village

Date of interview is in brackets.

Bogen Ahi	Butibam, born about 1930. (27/10/1971)
Karo Ahi	Butibam, born about 1922. School boy at Hopoi when war broke out. Became a carrier for the Allies, then joined NGIB and later 1st Australian Water Transport Company. (12/4/1971 and 27/10/1971)
Stephen Ahi	Butibam, born about 1930. Interpreter. (27/10/1971)
Apo Amala	Butibam, born about 1924. Worked with the Japanese interpreter Hamasaki. Helped to trade along the coast in a barge. (26/10/1971)
Poalu David	Butibam, born about 1910. Worked as a 'helper' of the Japanese kempitai in Butibam. (27/10/1971)
Amaria Gaiya	Butibam, born about 1916. Was gaoled after the war for helping the Japanese. (27/10/1971)
Buala Gare	Butibam, born about 1920. Worked for the Allied Forces as a carpenter at Lae and Gusap. (26/10/1971)
Poebu Jonathan	Butibam, born about 1920. Worked as a 'helper' of the Japanese interpreter Hamasaki in Lae. (12/4/1971 and 26/10/1971)
Mutu Kamakang	Butibam, born about 1910. Worked as a carrier for the Allied forces. (26/10/1971)
Nagong Kwalam	Bukaua, born about 1912. Was a teacher at Ampo Mission. During the war he taught at Po'abong settlement. (26/10/1971)
Kabi Mande	Finschhafen, born about 1920. Was a carrier. (9/4/1971)
Gebob Masawa	Butibam, born about 1921. Joined NGIB when the Allies recaptured Lae. (12/4/1971)
Melchior	Butibam, born about 1920. Interjector during group interview. (27/10/1971)
Kamdring	Butibam, born about 1920. Was a carrier for ANGAU. Travelled to Madang. (12/4/1971 and 27/10/1971)
Josiah Nalusi	Butibam, born about 1920. Was a Lutheran mission teacher. (27/10/1971)
Philemon Balob Nando	Apo, born about 1900. Was a pastor of the Lutheran Congregation at Bukaua during the war. (26/10/1971)
Moses Nasinom	Butibam, born about 1923. (26/10/1971)
Stephen Nasinom	Butibam, born about 1903. (26/10/1971)
Naka Nasu	Butibam, born about 1913. Was in the Malahang gaol with Tuya. (26/10/1971)
Ahipum Poang	Butibam, born about 1920. Was a carrier for the Allies. (12/4/1971)

Somu Sigob Finschhafen, born about 1920. Was a member of AIB. Later joined the Police Force Band. (18/10/1970)

Kising Tikandu Butibam, born about 1906. Remained in Butibam throughout the war. (26/10/1971)

Gedisa Tingasa Labu Butu, born about 1909. Was a mission teacher before the war. Spent the war at Bukaua. (12/4/1971)

Nelson Wazob Munum, born about 1938. (20/11/1970)

Ninga Yamu Kaisenik, born about 1920. Accompanied units of NCVR on patrol. Was decorated with Loyal Service Medal. (25/10/1971)

Zure Zurecnoc Sattelberg, born about 1920. Joined ANGAU as a carrier after the recapture of Finschhafen. (22/9/1972)

Appendix 5d

List of expatriate informants

K.C. Atkinson Was a Patrol Officer at Kerema before the war. Worked as ADO on the Bulldog Line of Communications in its first year. (21/6/1971)

H.A. Brown Was LMS missionary at Moru from 1938. Stayed in the Lakekamu District for the period of the war. (30/4/1973)

P. Chatterton Was LMS schoolmaster and missionary who worked at Hanuabada for 14 years, then moved to Delena in 1939. As an educationist and missionary he had a good deal of contact with the Motu refugees. (22/2/1971)

H.I. Hogbin Was an anthropologist who was attached to the army as a member of the Directorate of Research. He surveyed the effects of the war on Busama village. (27/5/1971)

L. Hurrell Was a Patrol Officer in New Guinea before the war. Was in AIF and returned to Lae with the Allied Forces. Later became ADO at Busama. (24/10/1971)

J. Lillyman Was an ANGAU NLO on the Bulldog Track. (22/7/1971)

A. Matthews Was a prewar resident of Port Moresby and son of the Anglican pastor. Was drafted into the army in Port Moresby and worked as a medical assistant on the Kokoda Track. (25/9/1971)

H.L.R. Niall Was ADO at Wau before the war. Promoted to DO and remained in the Morobe District throughout the Japanese occupation. He returned to Lae with an advance party of the 7th Division AIF. (13/4/1971)

R. Ormsby Was a prewar Patrol Officer in New Guinea. Served as ADO at Kerema, Lae and Bougainville. (27/10/1971 and 28/10/1971)

C. Rowley Was an educationist attached to the AIF in New Guinea. (20/4/1971)

- Wan Jin Wah Was a refugee with other Chinese at Bumsi camp on the outskirts of Lae for the duration of the war. (26/10/1971)
- R. Watson Was one of the prewar Patrol Officers recalled to service in New Guinea by G.W.L. Townsend. Worked with the NGVR and Kanga Force patrols in the Mubo area before the capture of Lae. Later worked in Bougainville. (27/10/1971)
- I. Willis Has studied and written about Lae villages. (11/4/1971)

Appendix 5e

List of correspondents

The dates on which letters were written to the author are shown in brackets.

- T.G. Aitchison A prewar Patrol Officer in New Guinea. Served with ANGAU in the Morobe District. (26/6/1975)
- D. Barrett A prewar resident of New Guinea. Adjutant of 2 NGIB. Later a member of PIR. (4/11/1970)
- G. Baskett An ANGAU officer who served in Papua and had much contact with the Motu refugees at Manumanu. (30/1/1971, 4/6/1975, 25/6/1975)
- C. Champion Was ANGAU OIC Kokoda when war started. Later served at Oro Bay. Was a HQ Officer in Port Moresby. (6/4/1971)
- H.E. Clark An ANGAU officer in Papua. (6/6/1971)
- R.R. Cole An ANGAU officer in the Sepik District. (24/10/1970, 11/3/1971)
- G. Ehava A member of the PIB. (1/4/1971)
- D. Fenbury Member of ANGAU on Kokoda Track service, then in District Services unit in the Sepik. Attached to formations for operational purposes. Later worked in Finschhafen and Aitape. (15/3/1971, 24/1/1972)
- J. Gibbney Served in Australian army in New Guinea. (12/3/1971)
- T. Grahamslaw Was an ANGAU officer who served in the Northern District during the Kokoda Campaign. Was OIC Higturu during 1943. (25/1/1971, 4/4/1971)
- E.G. Hicks ANGAU officer who worked on the Lakekamu Line of Communication in its later stages. Based at Kerema. (18/4/1971)
- H.I. Hogbin Anthropologist and member of the Directorate of Research. Was in Lae at the time of rehabilitation of New Guinea villagers. (10/3/1971, 16/3/1971)
- Mrs H. Holzknrecht Daughter of an early Lutheran missionary to New Guinea. Was at Malolo pre war, interned in Australia when war broke out. She and her husband returned to New Guinea and served as missionaries until 1977. (11/11/75, 13/11/75, 10/12/75).

Kam Hong Member of the Chinese community in Madang when the war started. (4/6/1971)

C.W. Kimmorley Land Titles Commissioner, Port Moresby, 1971. (9/9/1971)

J. Kuder Bishop of the Lutheran Mission in New Guinea, 1971. Visited the Morobe District with Dr Fricke after the recapture of Lae. (10/5/1971)

Bert Lee Member of the NGVR at Wau. (8/5/1973)

J.K. McCarthy A prewar Patrol Officer. Stationed at Talasea when war broke out. Was a coastwatcher who helped rescue many Australian soldiers stranded in New Britain. (8/5/1971, 19/6/1975, 8/8/1975)

J.J. Murphy A pre-war patrol officer in New Guinea. Joined ANGAU. (1976 - personal communications in Chapter 5).

H.R. Niall ADO at Wau before the war. Later DO, then ANGAU Regional Commander, Northern Region. (25/11/1970)

C.H. Rich Senior officer of ANGAU at Bulldog Camp. (24/3/1971)

A.A. Roberts Patrol Officer in Morobe pre-war. Escaped from Rabaul. Coastwatcher in New Britain 1943-44. (7/11/75)

C.D. Rowley Educationist with the AIF. (2/12/1970, 16/3/1971)

D. Ryan Anthropologist who studied social change in the Toaripi coastal area. (27/4/1971)

P. Ryan Member of the AIB who worked for several months in the Markham during the Japanese occupation. (20/10/1970, 27/11/1970, 16/3/1971, 2/4/1971)

R.F. Salisbury Anthropologist who studied the experiences of Tolai people under Japanese occupation. (12/1/1970, 6/1/1971)

A.J. Stratigos Member of the army workshop unit on Lakekamu Line of Communication. (1/6/1971, 10/6/1971)

D. Ure LMS missionary at Hanuabada. Was air-raid warden for the area until the evacuation. Once accompanied a carrier line from Rigo to Buna. (5/1/1975)

D.H. Vertigan ANGAU Regional Commander of Northern Region. (15/6/1975)

I. Willis Researcher on Lae villages. (15/12/1970, 16/12/1970, 28/2/1972, 21/4/1972, 22/6/1972)



Plate 1. Villagers at the ANGAU trade store - Yule Island.



Plate 2. Major-General B.M. Morris, GOC, ANGAU, inspects a local detachment of the RPC at the RPC Barracks during a visit to Lae, New Guinea, 27 March 1944.




Plate 3. Officers of the ANGAU HQ held a 6-day conference on district administration with officers of the field staff. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 7 February 1944. Reading left to right: Lt. Col. S. Elliott-Smith, DDNL; Major V.F. James, DAAG; Lt. Col. K.A. Hall, AQMG; Brig. D.M. Cleland, DA & QMG; Major Gen. B.M. Morris, GOC; Major C. Normoyle, CO, RPC; Lt. Col. J.H. Jones, DDS & NA.



Plate 4. Supplies for Kanga Force, brought from Port Moresby in the schooner 'Royal Endeavour', being paddled up the Lakekamu River, Papua, in dug-out canoes to Bulldog Camp, July 1942. (A still photo taken from the film by Damien Parer, 'The Strangest Supply Route of the War'.)




Plate 5. Labourers and supplies being moved from Terapo to Bulldog by a barge of the 1st Australian Water Transport Group (small craft). Terapo, New Guinea, 30 June 1943.



Plate 6. Barges of 1st Australian Water Transport Company tied up at Grimm Point, Lakekamu River, 6 September 1943.



Plate 7. A carrier with a piece of road-making equipment negotiating a dangerous ledge near Ecclestone's Gap (above 9000 feet), 1943.



Plate 8. Labourers loading trucks with sand after bulldozers had cleared away overburden, Wau-Bulldog Road (later called the Reinhold Highway), New Guinea, 8 July 1943.



Plate 9. The Steele Falls section of the new Wau-Bulldog Road under construction where it runs along a cliff face of steeply inclined rock strata, New Guinea, 9 July 1944.



Plate 10. Long shot of groyne built by 2/4 Australian Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers, in order to divert the flow of the Lakekamu River. Mirivase, 7 September 1943.




Plate 11. Platen used to print 'Guinea Gold' by hand when the electric plant broke down. 'Guinea Gold' was the Army paper in New Guinea. Vaieke (left) and Boga (right) with Cpl. J. Mann of Papua.



Plate 12. Scene of Hanuabada a few hours after the fire which destroyed 132 village houses, 30 May 1943.



Plate 13. Within a few hours after a big fire had swept through the village of Hanuabada which housed 3000 labourers, the men had erected palm thatched lean-tos and were issued with tents. The labourers remained in a temporary village until other housing was provided.



Plate 14. Butibam village from the hill upon which the school is built, Lae, New Guinea, 27 November 1944.



Plate 15. Staff NCOs of 35/31 American Truck Company, which operated at Lae and Nadzab transporting American and Australian stores. Lae, New Guinea, 23 July 1945.




Plate 16. An officer of ANGAU acting as a magistrate after setting up court in Butibam village to try an offender. Lae, New Guinea, 27 November 1944.




Plate 17. Iosi, the school teacher at Butibam village, explaining a problem to a very shy girl in the class. This village was taken over by ANGAU to house and rehabilitate those villagers who had suffered during the Japanese occupation of the area. Lae, New Guinea, 27 November 1944.

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