

READINGS IN NEW GUINEA HISTORY

By the same authors

A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW GUINEA

READINGS
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HISTORY

Edited by B. Jinks, P. Biskup, H. Nelson

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Brown, *Pioneer Missionary and Explorer: An Autobiography*, London 1908; The John Hopkins Press for an extract from *The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea*, Baltimore 1965, published for The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; The Macmillan Company of Australia Pty. Ltd. for an extract from F. W. Eggleston (Ed), *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea*, Melbourne 1928; Methuen and Co. Ltd. for an extract from K. Burrige, *Mambu*, London 1960; John Murray (Publishers) Ltd. for an extract from C. D. Mackellar, *Scented Isles and Coral Gardens*, London 1912; The Editor, New Guinea Research Unit of the A.N.U. for an extract from A. M. Healy, "Bulolo: A History of the Development of the Bulolo Region, New Guinea", *New Guinea Research Bulletin* No. 15, 1967; The Editor, *Papua New Guinea Journal of Education* for an extract from C. Ralph, "Some Notes on Education in German New Guinea 1884-1914", July 1965; Pacific Publications (Australia) Pty. Ltd. for extracts from articles in *Pacific Islands Monthly*, and from G. W. L. Townsend, *District Officer*, Sydney 1968, and J. Tudor, *Many a Green Isle*, Sydney 1966; Routledge Kegan Paul Ltd. for extracts from T. Bevan, *Toil, Travel and Discovery in British New Guinea*, London 1890, and H. I. Hogbin, *Transformation Scene*, London 1951; Mr. Olaf Ruhen for an extract from *Mountains in the Clouds*, Adelaide 1963; Sampson, Low, Marston & Co. Ltd. for extracts from L. M. d'Albertis, *What I Did and What I Saw*, London 1880, C. Lyne, *New Guinea: An Account of the Establishment of the Protectorate Over the Southern Shores of New Guinea*, London 1885, and W. Powell, *Wanderings in a Wild Country*, London 1883; The University of British Columbia for an extract from J. P. McAuley, "Australia's Future in New Guinea", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1953.

PREFACE

This collection of readings provides source material for students in history and social science. Few of the extracts can be readily found in either school or university libraries, but none is merely esoteric.

The readings are arranged in general chronological order, with separate chapters devoted to the parallel developments in Papua and the Territory of New Guinea. Brief narrative passages provide continuity between extracts and chapters.

The readings can be used in conjunction with *A Short History of New Guinea* and *New Guinea Government*, as well as most of the current books on Papua New Guinea. The first six chapters give details of social as well as administrative and economic issues. The latter section deals largely with policy during and since World War 2. Readers will find the change in the tone of writing about New Guinea and its people as illuminating as the contents of the various extracts.

Some minor technical changes have been made to some of the readings. Footnotes have been omitted and obvious spelling and typographical errors corrected. For the remainder, peculiarities of style and expression are unchanged.

The presentation of such a variety of material inevitably poses problems for the publishers and printers. In this respect, the editors of these readings have been particularly fortunate in receiving expert help. Mr. Bruce Semler has been a source of constant encouragement. Miss Jill Griffith has shown extraordinary patience in co-ordinating production and seeking permission to reprint material from many sources. Possibly the most disorganized manuscript ever prepared was edited by Mrs. Mary Maclean.



CHAPTER ONE

EARLY YEARS

I. FIRST CONTACTS

From the early sixteenth century European ships made sightings of the coasts of Papua and New Guinea. Parties seeking trade, gold, knowledge, food and fresh water, and men to convert to Christianity, made occasional contact with coastal people. Sometimes the meetings between the two groups were peaceful; on other occasions there was violence. Most of these contacts were brief, and doubtless many went unrecorded. But the best written accounts tell us what happened (necessarily from one point of view) and provide a picture of the people at the time of contact.

1. An Early Visit to Buka

In 1768 the Comte de Bougainville, sailing north-west from Choiseul Island, came close inshore.

From: C. de Fleurieu, *Discoveries of the French 1768 and 1769 to the South-East of New Guinea*, translated from the French, London, 1791, pp. 96-7.

In the afternoon three canoes put off, and came to reconnoitre our vessels, each of them carrying five or six negroes: when they came within musquet shot they stopped; and it was not till after they had staid there an hour, that our repeated invitations could prevail on them to come nearer. Some trifles which we threw to them, fastened to pieces of wood, contributed to give them a little confidence; after which they came up to the ship, showing some cocoanuts, and crying *Bouca, Bouca Onellé*: these words they repeated continually; and, after some time, we did the same, which seemed to give

them pleasure.* They did not stay long by the ship, but made signs that they would go and fetch us some coconuts: we applauded their design; but hardly had these treacherous men got to the distance of twenty paces, when one of them shot an arrow, which happily did not take place; they then rowed off as fast as possible, and we despised them too much to punish them.

These negroes were entirely naked: they have short woolly hair; their ears pierced and drawn down; and many had their hair stained red, and white spots painted on different part of their bodies. It appears from the redness of their teeth, that they chew the betel; and we had seen that the inhabitants of Choiseul Island use it also; for we found in their canoes small bags of the leaves, with areca and lime. We had from these bows of six feet long, and arrows armed with very hard wood. Their canoes are smaller than those of Warriors' Creek, and we were surprised at not seeing any similarity in their construction: the latter had the ends much lower; they are without out-riggers, but large enough to carry two men a-breast. This island, to which we gave the name of *Bouca*, seemed extremely well peopled, if we may judge from the multitude of huts with which it is covered, and by the signs of cultivation we perceived. A beautiful plain, on the declivity of a hill, planted entirely with cocoa and other trees, offered us the most pleasing prospect; and I was very desirous to find anchorage on this coast, but a contrary wind and a very rapid current bore us away visibly from it, towards the N.W.

2. Shots from H.M.S. *Rattlesnake*

By the nineteenth century it was widely believed that captains putting ashore in New Guinea waters risked savage attack. Before Captain Owen Stanley of the H.M.S. Rattlesnake left on his surveying voyage of the southern coast and islands in 1849 he was warned by the Admiralty to be constantly on guard against "the treacherous disposition of their inhabitants." Lieutenant C. B. Yule in the Bramble accompanied Owen Stanley. In August Yule was involved in a brief fight with people from the Orangerie Bay area of south-east Papua. John MacGillivray, the naturalist on the Rattlesnake, reported the incident.

From: *Narrative of the Voyage of the H.M.S. Rattlesnake*, London, 1852, Vol. 1, pp. 289-90.

*Buka Island had previously been visited by the Englishman, P. Carteret. The word 'Bouca' (Buka) means "what". Presumably the islanders were asking who the visitors were, or what they wanted.

When Lieut. Yule came on board we heard that since we left the Bramble near Dufaure Island to do the in-shore work, he had on one occasion an affray with natives in the neighbourhood of the Toulon Islands. When the Bramble was nearly becalmed close in-shore, several canoes with about thirty people, including several women and children, came off to barter. A small pig was handed up into the chains, but, owing to an unavoidable occurrence, no return was made for it, upon which the owner snatched the cap from off the head of a marine attending at the gangway. The canoe which had brought the pig then shoved off, and, on being directed by gestures to return the cap, one man stood up and poised his spear, and the others got their arms ready. Several musket shots were fired into the canoe from a distance of six or seven yards, but, regarding the effect, conflicting statements have been made. No resistance was attempted, as, after the first shot, some of the natives jumped into the water and all made off in confusion, which was further increased when a round shot was fired in the direction of a distant canoe coming out from the shore.

3. Rockets From d'Albertis

The Italian naturalist and explorer Luigi Maria d'Albertis believed in the use of rockets to frighten villagers. On numerous occasions he was involved in violent clashes with the people of the Fly River. He recorded that on 9 December 1875 on his first expedition up the Fly a dispute arose with some villagers near the mouth of the river.

From: L. M. d'Albertis, *New Guinea: What I Did and What I saw*, London, 1880, Vol. 2, pp. 24-5.

On reaching our boat, we descried in the distance two canoes, containing about ten men. Either for fear of us, or for obtaining of reinforcements, they immediately made for the opposite shore. After an hour and a half or two hours six large canoes, crammed full of men, armed and decorated for war, were seen coming up to us. The smaller canoes remained at a greater distance, but ranged in the same order as the larger. From their manner of approach it seemed to be their purpose to land on the island, whence, protected by the dense foliage, they could assail us with arrows. It was judged prudent not to let them carry this plan into execution; and when they arrived in front of us, at a distance of about two hundred and fifty yards, a few gun-shots, directed so as to frighten but not harm them,

made it clear that we disapproved of their project. Our first shots did not, however, avail, it seemed as if they would make a final attempt to reach the point of the island, and thus place themselves in safety. But one of two better-aimed shots at a canoe made the natives decide on flight. There was danger, however, that they might go and entrench themselves on some other part of the island; and to prevent this, Mr. Chester* descended with his troopers into the boat, and followed the natives, who made in terror for the right-hand shore, and, having reached it, abandoned arms and canoes, and fled into the forest. Mr. Chester, as a trophy of victory, towed one of the deserted canoes to the "Ellangowan," and it was then broken up for fuel for the engine. This canoe was made of a large tree trunk, neatly hollowed, without a paddle, and was about sixty feet long.

At night a blue light was kindled, and a rocket discharged in the direction of a village, probably inhabited by the people who had shown us fight. The island near which we cast anchor was named Attack Island.

4. Arrows From the Interior

D'Albertis' second voyage up the Fly in the Neva in 1877 was again marked by violent clashes. The encounter described here took place on 1 June just below D'Albertis Island on the lower Fly.

From: L. M. d'Albertis, *New Guinea: What I Did and What I Saw*, London, 1880, Vol. 2, pp. 248-50.

Before sunrise, when between sleeping and waking, I thought I heard a noise near the shore, somewhat different from that of a falling branch or the movement of an animal. I got up, and, listening attentively, it seemed to me that some persons were approaching. I ran to the poop to ascertain the cause of the strange noise, and found I was not mistaken. A man from the shore was trying to enter our boat, which was only a few yards distant. All were asleep on board, including the cook, who at that time ought to have been on the watch. I called my men to arms. My call was answered by a terrible cry and a hailstorm of arrows, which were heard, but not seen. I ordered my people to lie flat, and meanwhile I took a gun and fired at the man who was trying to get into the boat. The cries and the savage clamour

*H. M. Chester, police magistrate, Somerset, North Queensland.

of the natives showed me they intended to attack us suddenly. On account of the darkness I was not able to see those on land, but I saw those who were close to the poop of the "Neva." Other canoes were on our left. They meant a well premeditated attack. Repeating my order to my men to keep themselves out of the way of arrows, I directed Mr. Preston to reload the guns. Fortunately they were all loaded. I began to fire, and continued firing until the aggressor resolved to beat a retreat. Some guns were loaded with shot, and some with bullets; in reloading I made use of shot. I was not able to judge of the effect of my fire, on account of the darkness, but the canoes were in battle array before me, and I knew that many of my shots took effect. In twenty-five minutes our enemies had disappeared up a narrow passage on the opposite shore. Probably the battle had lasted longer than the natives desired, and I think, if they held out for about twenty minutes, it was because they were obliged to re-embark the people whom they had landed. Having counted the empty cartridges, I found that, with my ten central fire double-barrelled guns, I had fired 120 shots. The forest resumed its quiet. The dawn appeared, and the birds here and there began to salute the coming day. On our side we had only one Chinaman wounded. When I gave the order to stoop low, the poor man, by way of obeying, lowered his head indeed, but elevated his posteriors. The arrow which struck him had already spent a great deal of its force in traversing the tent, which was of strong linen; but, nevertheless, it penetrated the flesh an inch and a half. We tried to get the point out, and, although he had broken it, I extracted it easily. The arrow was of bone, and of the kind which is called poisoned. Lest it might really be so, I made use of a remedy which was perhaps too strong, but it was suggested by the danger of death. I first cleaned the wound thoroughly with cotton wool, wound round a pair of pincers; and afterwards washed it with carbonate of ammonia. The arrow extracted is finely worked, and painted black and red, and they had made use of a kind of cement to solder the pieces. It was like the one we found last year in the Cocomat village. As such arrows are not used by the people near the sea, I have given up the idea that our enemies are of the tribe of natives with whom we are on friendly terms, but I conclude that they are inhabitants of the interior.

When we examined the "Neva," we found she had been struck by forty-five arrows—seventeen of them in one square foot, just at the spot where I was firing. If they had been aimed only a few inches higher, I should probably not have been able to shoot so long, and I owe to the darkness and my good fortune the fact that I am alive to write the history of that night.

5. A Peaceful Visit

By contrast a number of encounters were remarkable for their peacefulness. In September, 1871 the Russian traveller and scientist, Nicolai Nicolaevitch Miklouho-Maclay, landed on the coast of Astrolabe Bay now in the Madang District. He lived there until December 1872. Frank S. Greenop described Maclay's first meeting with a man from New Guinea. While Greenop's outline of events is probably accurate, he may have had no evidence to support some of the details he supplies. Maclay was unarmed.

From: Frank S. Greenop, *Who Travels Alone*, Sydney, 1944, pp. 48-9, 55-6, 58.

Maclay stood in the clearing. A slight breeze whispered through the feathery palm-tops. A lonely silence accentuated the strangeness of his first entry into a New Guinea village. But there was nothing to be gained by standing in the brilliant sunshine savoring the colors of the vivid foliage, listening to the screeches of the new, strange birds, and speculating on the absence of the villagers. Apparently oblivious of possible lurking danger, Maclay turned again into the jungle. There he came suddenly face to face with his first Papuan.

Numb with fear, amazed at the sight of the pale-skinned visitor, the black man crouched. Never before had he seen a human dressed in clothes. The intruder was, to the Papuan, a terrifying sight.

Maclay stretched out his hand confidently and grasped the black hand of the stranger, who did not resist.

Pointing to himself the Russian said, "Maclay".

"Tui", said the Papuan, pointing to himself.

"Tui", repeated Maclay.

"Maclay", muttered Tui.

Pulling gently at the black hand which he still held, Maclay turned back towards the deserted village. Tui understood the stranger's meaning, and followed closely. Together they walked back into the village "square".

A house was built for Maclay and then the ship which brought him to New Guinea, the Vitiaz, left. Maclay's servants were a Swede and a Samoan.

. . . Before the smoke from the single funnel of the Vitiaz had disappeared Maclay and his two servants had walked up the beach to their new home, where they commenced to busy themselves, unpacking the equipment and provisions which were to be arranged in the store or set up for use. The natives of the coast, thrown into con-

fusion by the roar of the twenty-one gun salute, had scampered to the safety of the hills; but with the disappearance of the ship they came cautiously back, and seeing the three men working alone at the hut, they came down almost shyly, and stood around beyond the circle of land-mines watching.

Maclay entirely ignored their presence. He worked with every appearance of normality, persuading his assistants to follow his example . . .

Very soon they came down again to his hut, surrounded him as he went about his work, and without warning fired a shower of arrows which fell all around him, but did no harm.

A man with less will-power or more fear or quicker temper, might have felt justified in drawing a revolver and showing them that they could not do that kind of thing to him. But Maclay, with rare control and quick-minded logic, realised that if these men did not hit him with their arrows it was only because they had not intended to do so, for they had all, from childhood, been expert with these weapons. So, with nerves under complete control, Maclay stood, outwardly fearless, until they finished their exhibition; then he quietly turned his back on them and continued his work. The natives had been spectacular—he was not impressed. This simple action might well represent the hardest thing Maclay ever did—it might also be the most profitable.

Many times the villagers returned to Maclay and behaved in the same way

Eventually the people accepted Maclay. Greenop says that Maclay acted according to the following belief.

He realised that he was in a strange land, and that he was the stranger. Without arrogance towards the "savages", he was prepared to accept their outlook—that he was, in their eyes, an intruder; that they might fear his "magic" more than he feared their arrows; and that the important thing, in order to win their full confidence, was to avoid breaching their custom or code.

6. Joyful Encounter

The Reverend W. Wyatt Gill and the Reverend A. W. Murray of the London Missionary Society entered Manumanu village on the central Papuan coast with unrestrained enthusiasm in 1872; the result was a meeting as peaceful as that which occurred at Astrolabe Bay. The people of Manumanu may have heard about Europeans, but probably no European had entered the village before.

From: W. Wyatt Gill, *Life in the Southern Isles; or Scenes and Incidents in the South Pacific and New Guinea*, London, 1876, pp. 246-47

A sharp bend brought us into a well-built village, consisting of a single long street. Delighted at the never-to-be-forgotten sight, we literally ran for joy into the evidently populous settlement. Two chiefs, "Koko" and "Aua," met us and led us to a sort of council-house at the near end of the village, facing the long street. We rested ourselves on the verandah, the interior of the house being filled with the notables of Manumanu, whilst the space in front was crowded with men, women, and children. The people seemed perfectly harmless, and were immensely pleased with their visitors. We sat on the verandah, and gazed upon the good-natured crowd that soon filled the street. The only weapons we saw were two arrows in the hands of a little boy. On asking for water, the lad, misunderstanding the request, offered us the arrows, to the no small amusement of the bystanders, who readily supplied us with a couple of cocoa-nuts to drink.

We estimated the population of Manumanu at 900 or 1000.

7. Port Moresby Discovered

One of the most peaceful series of meetings between coastal people and visiting ships was that between Captain Moresby and his crew and the villagers of south-eastern Papua in 1873.

From: Captain John Moresby, *Discoveries and Surveys in New Guinea and the D'entrecasteaux Islands. A Cruise in Polynesia and Visits to the Pearlshelling stations in Torres Straits of H.M.S. Basilisk*, London, 1876, pp. 153-58.

At ten o'clock on Friday morning [21 February 1873], the "Basilisk" was off the opening we had found in the reef, henceforth to be known as Basilisk Passage, and from the foretop, whence every reef could be seen, I conned her through the passage into the still waters of Port Moresby to Jane Island, and past it into landlocked many-bayed Fairfax Harbour, where we anchored in five fathoms water. As we broke into these unknown waters I determined that the outer and inner harbours should bear these names of my father, the venerable admiral of the fleet.

Port Moresby, situated where coral and white sand has succeeded the low mangrove-covered coast, lies in latitude 9° 30' south, and longitude 147° 10' east. The entrance is good, and the land, which

is covered with many trees, rises gently on either side, to a considerable height. The inner, Fairfax Harbour, is an irregular basin surrounded by round-topped grassy hills, having the Australian gum-tree scattered over them, with rich valleys between. The depth of water is from between seven and four fathoms to within a few yards of the beach. The sides of the hills are well cultivated, and yield abundance of yams and taro.

We must have been a surprising sight to the natives, for they flocked on board in hundreds, eager and curious, chattering like monkeys, as they pointed out to each other the marvels that took their fancy

We went to visit one of the hill villages in the afternoon, going quite unarmed, such was our confidence in the people, and climbing a steep hillside sprinkled with gum trees, and covered with granite boulders and quartz, found ourselves overlooking a rich tropical valley, and saw the village on the opposite hillside amongst abundant trees. The thin rocky soil gave place as we began to descend the slope, to rich dark mould, from which grass sprang nearly shoulder high, varied with occasional clumps of splendid hard wood, tropical trees, and groups of the sago palm. Here and there spaces, some three acres in extent, were enclosed by stiff bamboo fences, and produced bananas, yams, and taro in profusion, although no effort seemed to be made to keep the weeds under. The bananas, which were nearly ripe, were tied up in leaves to save them from the flying foxes

All the valleys we travelled over were covered with rich grass, shoulder high, and had we possessed an army of Irish scythes, and an English market, we might have cut down our fortune. The hills on the north of the harbour are separated from a loftier range behind by extensive grass plains, abounding in water holes, well dotted over with timber, and having a rich black soil.

Nothing could exceed the kindness of the natives, in proof of which I will mention but one fact. Mr. Watts, one of our engineers, lost his way the evening before our visit to this village, and when beginning to grow anxious, fell in with a party of natives; far from attempting to take any advantage of his helplessness, they fed him, and took him to their village, making signs that they wished him to sleep there. Finding that he wanted to return to his companions, they offered to guide him, stipulating, however, that he should show himself off in the village first, and permit all the inhabitants to admire his white skin. This he did with a great deal of pleasure, placing himself on a verandah, to be handled and gazed at by scores of beholders.

The large village at the entrance to Port Moresby, which consists of two rows of well-built houses, separated by groves of cocoa-nut trees, was often visited by us. Its inhabitants, numbering perhaps 800 of all ages, were well fed, contented-looking people. The women seemed to busy themselves much in pottery, and moulded clay into large globe-shaped jars, which they baked slowly amongst the embers of wood fires. They use these jars much in their cookery, and I have partaken of a vegetable porridge cooked in them, consisting of mangrove fruit, taro, and yams, with cocoa-nut finely shred over all, and found it excellent. They are skilful in netting bags and fishing-nets, which they do so precisely in our mode that our men often took up their shuttles and went on with the net. These nets are made of the fibre of a small nettle-like plant, and are shaped like our English seine.

On one occasion an incident happened here which surprised us. A number of natives came on board, bringing with them a bundle of rushes, and knotting them together carefully measured the length and breadth of the ship. They evidently wished to preserve a record of the size, for they stowed the rush line away in their canoe with many signs of wonderment.

At most of the villages on this coast we observed that the men liked to hold our hands as we walked through, and they did not wish us to enter their houses; but if we pressed the point they yielded in this, and awaited us patiently outside. We used sometimes to sit and rest on the verandah or landing-place outside the door of the upper storey, and they would bring us fresh cocoa-nut milk, or some of the sago they had boiled for their meal. These people, and all the light-coloured Malay race of eastern New Guinea, are without bows and arrows. As far as Redscar Bay we saw toy bows amongst the children, but beyond that point the bow ceases altogether, till it reappears on the northern shores, west of Astrolobe Gulf. The houses visited by us all contained spears and stone weapons, some of the latter very well shaped and finished.

On Wednesday, 26th, Lieutenant Hayter returned, having made some soundings and diligently examined over fifty miles of coast, in which neither harbour nor river were to be seen. He confirmed our good opinion of the natives, saying that he had found them friendly on all occasions. Walking over the hills that evening, Dr. Goodman and I were much struck with the beauty of some parrots flying from tree to tree. The bodies were black, wings green, and heads and tails scarlet.

Next day was an anxious but successful one. I had set my heart on finding a passage for the ship by an inshore route between the

mainland and Barrier Reef back to the anchorage in Redscar Bay, so as to prove that Port Moresby might be reached thus, as well as through the opposite opening in the Barrier Reef which we had named Basilisk Passage. With Mr. Bentley by my side, therefore, I conned the ship from the foretop for twenty miles through the winding channel which we had previously discovered running between reefs, and giving us several times but three feet of water to spare under our keel. It was an anxious time, but we never touched, and dropped anchor safe and sound in Redscar Bay, having established the fact of the existence of a passage. What a miserable spot the bay seemed after lake-like, mountain-girt Port Moresby!—so dreary-looking, so exposed too to the full strength of the S.E. monsoon. And this anchorage, lying four miles out at sea, was the only one known on the S.E. coast of New Guinea till the discovery of Port Moresby. Was it any wonder if we were all inclined to exult a little?

8. The Port Breton Fiasco

Some European ventures were failures. In 1880 the French adventurer Marquis de Rays established the colony of New France on the south-western tip of New Ireland. Most of the settlers perished. Among those who survived (and remained in New Britain) were Father Couppé, the future Roman Catholic Bishop of Vunapope and Octave Mouton, a young Belgian.

From: S. W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea*, Philadelphia, 1943, pp. 292-8.

The short period of white occupation of New Guinea prior to German occupation saw but one attempt—and that abortive—at organized European colonization. Although this venture had no discernible effects of a permanent sort on the contemporary native societies, its tragic history undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to other colonial schemes—regardless of their honesty—and very probably served as a check to further European immigration into the region. By indirection, then, this undertaking inhibited more rapid development of this far corner of the western Pacific.

The difficulties in effecting organized settlement in a totally strange environment by people who were absolutely unfitted for work of this sort have seldom received more pointed illustration than in the Colony of Port Breton, a colony which never actually came into being. This was certainly the most cruel of all South Sea bubbles.

One man alone, Charles Bonaventure du Breul, Marquis de Rays,

must bear the burden of guilt for the financial failures, misery, and death which attended this huge fraud. This bogus French noble, born in Brittany in 1832, had spent adventurous years in the American West, Indo-China, Senegal, and Madagascar without achieving what he apparently most desired: fame and material success. In middle age he still cherished the dream of easily acquiring those desiderata in some distant land. The wave of imperialism which was then planting European flags and factories on undeveloped frontiers fired his imagination with dreams of colonial enterprises to bring him power and wealth. The unsettled condition of his homeland, aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, made the time propitious for launching such a venture. Seizing the opportunity, de Rays concocted a colonial scheme, the audacity of which served as a thick cloak to its falsity

The July 26, 1872 edition of *Le Petit Journal* carried the following announcement: "*Colonie libre de Port Breton. Terres a cinq francs l' hectare. Fortune rapide et assurée sans quitter son pays.*" The announcement concluded by stating that all communications were to be addressed directly to the Marquis. This was the beginning of an undertaking which grew on paper until, by wishful thinking, it became almost a reality. The divers means by which the Marquis enlisted support for this fictitious project offer valuable materials for an extensive study of propaganda, but may only be briefly mentioned here. No stone was left unturned to create an illusion of the enterprise's reality. Beautifully engraved land titles (on the finest bond) showing the busy commerce of a thriving port were issued. A bi-monthly journal, *La Nouvelle-France*, appeared at Marseilles containing gravures, maps of towns and plantations, and ecstatic descriptions of the country by alleged pioneers. Papers and articles were published which spoke of New France as if it were a prosperous, functioning colony. A crowning piece of deception was an octavo volume of 350 pages, written by a Belgian henchman of the Marquis, which painted a glowing but entirely imaginative picture of Port Breton

So thoroughly was the deception carried out that by 1879 over 3,000 subscribers had invested a total of several hundred thousand francs. The colony had officials, bonds, a journal, maps, and script. Joint-stock companies had been organized to develop plantations, to set up sugar refineries, and to exploit the alleged mineral wealth of the country. It was also announced that by making an additional subscription investors could remain in France and receive dividends. The actual work was to be carried on by indentured Malay and Chinese labor. The colony had, in fact, all the appurtenances of a

thriving state; all that was lacking was its existence.

During all of these operations the Marquis remained in Europe, and, communications being what they were at that time, no one fresh from New Ireland could disprove his lies. We are not told how the Marquis figured to prolong his fraudulent operations in case of their exposure. It is apparent, however, that he would not go out to his empire unless by some stroke of fortune it should prove a success. In 1879, goaded to action by the demands of his stockholders, he issued a call for colonists who would be transported for a certain sum to their future home to aid in the work of settlement. If volunteers who could not afford the passage money came forward, they would be transported at a nominal price. It was promised that after serving the "government" for five years they would receive lands and a four-room house of brick or stone, as well as wages. With this announcement the Marquis ceased to be simply a swindler and became a trafficker in human lives.

Between 1879 and 1882, four vessels were sent in succession to populate this miasmal eldorado of Port Breton. Of the one thousand-odd French, Belgian, Spanish, and Italian colonists who emigrated, less than seventy are said to have ever again seen their native lands.

Malicious forethought could not have chosen a more ill-favored spot for white settlement than Port Breton. Even the natives of southern New Ireland shunned it; it had never supported a large population. Since it had hardly a strip of arable soil between the rocky shore and the thickly forested mountains, they described it as a "*ples i no gat kaikai*." Cultivation of the land was further impeded by the torrential rains of the wet season, for this is one of the wettest spots in New Guinea. All in all the climate was dangerously unhealthy

Thus on the 14th of September, 1881, two years to the day after the first expedition had sailed from Europe, the members of the last expedition decided in assembly to seek the first means of transport away from the islands. Another six months passed before negotiations with the local planter, Farrell, were completed and arrangements made to carry those who were left to Australia.

There are few reminders in New Guinea today of the de Rays' expeditions. Several marked graves at Mioko, a little rusted machinery at Port Breton, and a huge grindstone on the beach are the only visible remains of these fruitless attempts to found a new empire. In the early 1880's a few men, refugees of the third and fourth expeditions, found employment with white planters and traders in the islands, but by the turn of the century only three of the thousand individuals who had come remained in the archipelago. Of

this number, two were employed by firms and the third, who had come as a boy with his father, was on his way toward becoming a prosperous planter.

De Rays' proposal to Christianize the natives had achieved its purpose in enlisting support, but only two missionaries were ever sent. They were attached to the third and fourth expeditions respectively. Finding no native groups in the vicinity among which they could work, and lacking assistants, these individuals accomplished no such results as were seen in villages under the dominance of the Wesleyan Mission. Their criticisms of the Marquis' fraud served, however, to call the attention of the Catholic church to this open field for missionary enterprise. The indirect result of their work was the creation of the Catholic Mission of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, in 1882, on the Gazelle Peninsula.

9. The Labour Trade

Some Papuans and New Guineans came into close contact with Europeans through the labour trade. Recruits were taken from Papua and New Guinea to work on plantations in Queensland, Fiji, Samoa and other islands. Most labourers were taken overseas in 1883 and 1884. After those years it was illegal to recruit in New Guinea waters for most overseas territories.

Not many of those who conducted the labour trade have left accounts of their work. One who did was W. T. Wawn, a defender of the trade who claimed that his book was closely based on the logs he kept during his captancy of several boats engaged in the trade.

From: W. T. Wawn, *The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour Trade*, London, 1893, pp. 295-6, 313, 436-40.

On the third day, April 28,* I engaged seventy-one men by 3 p.m., being even obliged to send back several who came off in the recruiting boats, as my licensed quota was made up. I had now 143 men and one woman on board; and, had I been able to carry them, I might have doubled that number in the course of the next twenty-four hours.

The excitement all along this part of the coast was intense. The boats were sometimes fairly rushed by men eager to get away, who tumbled in without waiting to be asked, and fought and struggled with such of their friends as strove to detain them. Many, who were afraid they might miss the opportunity, paddled off to the ship in

*1883, Duke of York Islands.

small canoes, or on bamboo catamarans. Several even swam off, with the aid of dry logs of wood.

Some of the older men, who disapproved of this wholesale exodus, also took to their canoes and chased the runaways.

All round the ship at least fifty canoes, carrying over a hundred men, were paddling about, chasing or being chased. There was an uproar of shouting, laughing, very likely swearing also, with prodigious splashing. Every now and then some young fellow, who had been cut off from the ship by his friends, would take a header. Diving down under the other canoes, he would not come up until close alongside, when he would seize a rope left conveniently hanging, and so would speedily clamber on deck.

There was no waiting for "pay", nor yet for any agreement with regard to the term of service in Queensland

They engaged themselves, of their own free will, to go to Queensland. So much for my legal right, now for the moral view.

By taking these men away from their island, and from a life of sloth, brutality, and cannibalism, they are improved intellectually, as well as physically, through contact with Europeans. It is said that they pick up the white man's vices. So they may, but a returned island labourer would look with contempt and aversion on the average Aneiteum [New Hebrides] native, with his thin veneer of Christianity

Aneiteum has been under the sway of Presbyterian missionaries for about thirty years. Now it has not been either war, emigration, or disease that has caused a diminution of numbers there. On the contrary, peace, idleness, and licentious habits have contributed to make the population dwindle away to a mere fraction of what it was.

To change an islander into a decent citizen of the world, he must be forced to work for his living after his dancing and fighting have been stopped. If he is allowed to remain idle, he becomes a very much worse subject—morally and physically, Christian or pagan—than the raw savage.

In more contemplative mood Wawn, at the end of his book, again attempts to justify his part in the trade.

As I sit in my room in Glass's Hotel, facing the wharves at Mackay, where the Borough Belle has been laid up for sale, I cast a retrospective glance on my experience of sixteen years past. I do not regret one single hour of it.

Notwithstanding all the tales of bloodshed, murder, and kidnapping, in connection with the labour trade, which have been dinned into the ears of the public, for the last few years especially, I

conscientiously affirm that it has been, in the main, equally beneficial to the colony and to the islanders themselves

What are now the conditions of the sugar industry and of the sea-ports of Queensland that depended on it? Since the trade has been stopped, will the islanders remain at home? No! Samoa and its German plantations, New Caledonia and its French ones, continue to employ them and reap the benefit of their labour. Has the trading of firearms to the islanders been stopped? No! again. The use of bows and arrows, and even of spears, has gone out of fashion in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Is. Every warrior now owns his British-made Snider and ammunition, sold to him by French or German recruiting vessels. These simply buy their recruits, even in the British Protectorate, from the chiefs and leading men of the tribes.

It may occur to my readers, from my not having made any mention of it, that the South Sea Islander in Queensland has been treated simply as a labouring animal, no attention being paid to his mental or moral education. But such has not been the case.

Private missions have been established in every district with good success

In this relation of my experiences in the Labour Trade, and of my voyages to the South Seas, I have confined myself strictly to facts. These have led me to the conclusion that the stoppage of the Polynesian Labour Trade, and, in consequence, the enormous loss of capital and development to the rich tropical land of Northern Queensland, was due to a purely political cry; that the public was grievously misled; that the so-called "Anti-Slavery" party—consisting almost entirely of southern men—know no more about plantation work in tropical Queensland and its labour requirements than an infant in arms!

10. Blackbirding and its Effects

During the 1880s the Queensland Government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into recruiting in New Guinea waters. The Commission decided that the labourers had been illegally recruited and were to be returned. H. H. Romilly was selected to organise the return of the Islanders in 1885. He had previously visited the islands of S.E. Papua where most of the recruits were taken and had a reasonable knowledge of the area and the conditions existing there at the time.

From: H. H. Romilly, *From My Verandah in New Guinea*, London, 1889, pp. 195, 202-6, 222.

The first ship to sail from Queensland was the *Lizzie*. The tactics employed were as follows. On anchoring at an island opposite to a village, the crew waited till the canoes came off with yams and pumpkins to trade. The natives were then enticed on board, and sometimes gave their consent to go to the white man's country for "one moon", sometimes for three, after being told they were going to Queensland to "see white man's country", and "to walk about". Some were invited on to the deck of the ship to take anything they wished, and then put under hatches, the men left in the canoes being ordered on board with threats of being shot if they refused to come. Once on board, the young and old were weeded out, and the rest told that if they attempted to escape they would be shot.

At Sud-Est a number of natives had been fishing, and returned on shore, where they camped. While they were asleep a boat from the *Lizzie* came ashore. The white men took the natives by the wrist, ordered them to the boat, and conveyed them on board ship, where they were confined in the hold till the *Lizzie* had gone out to sea.

During the examination of these men before the Commission they all asserted that if they had understood the length of time they were expected to remain in Queensland none of them would have gone

We now come to the cruise of the *Hopeful*, one long record of treachery and murder.

As this vessel has been the cause of more harm in estranging the natives from us than all the rest put together, I shall quote somewhat extensively from the Report in which her proceedings are described in what is, in the circumstances, very moderate language.

The two principal actors in the scenes I am going to describe—McNeill and Williams—were tried for their lives in Brisbane and sentenced to death. The Governor, however, exerted his prerogative of mercy, and the death sentences were commuted

At Bently Bay some young men were taken on board under threats of being shot if they refused, and afterwards McNeill wantonly set fire to the houses on shore. Several places were visited after this, and recruits obtained by violence at each. It was not until they reached Ferguson Island that bloodshed commenced. On seeing several canoes come out to trade with the ship, two boats were lowered: McNeill had charge of one, and Williams of the other. On seeing the boats, the natives in the canoes were afraid, and made for the shore. Two canoes were chased, one by each boat. When McNeill found that the canoe he was chasing was going too fast for him, and that he could not catch it, he stood up and fired at the native steering it. His bullet struck the steersman in the back of the

neck, and he fell into the canoe, dead; the same bullet struck the man next to him in the right shoulder, and he fell overboard and sank. All the other natives jumped overboard, the canoe was captured, and a hole knocked in its bottom with a tomahawk.

As the natives were swimming about, four of them were picked up by McNeill, and put under the thwarts of the boat. Williams during this time was not idle. He found that he was overhauling the canoe he was chasing, but they were making for a reef with shallow water on it, where his boat would not float; the boat, however, caught them up before they could reach it, and all the natives jumped into the sea. A rifle was fired, and one islander shot, while five others and a small boy were picked up by the boat. One of them, however, sprang out of the boat into the water; and on seeing this, Williams jumped on to the reef with a large knife in his hand, and as the man's head appeared again above water, he seized it by the hair, and bending the poor wretch's neck back, deliberately cut his throat. The body was then seen to sink into deep water.

The two boats then joined company to compare notes, and the little boy being no use as a recruit, was cast adrift on two coconuts, which were tied together and placed under his arms. He was seen to slip off them, and was drowned in the surf. One canoe still remained afloat; it contained the dead body of the steersman who McNeill had shot. Williams cut off the head, and the body was thrown overboard. In this manner eight natives were recruited at Fergusson Island. It seems not unnatural that, after the butcher's work Williams had been going through, one of the recruits should have deposed that he saw him change his trousers when he got on board, and hang them up in the rigging. Shortly after this episode the *Hopeful* went to Normanby Island, where they saw many natives. They were not to be tempted on board by offers of trade, and they were accordingly pursued into the bush. A man named Preston said he had shot two men, while Williams owned to having shot a boy. That same night two recruits escaped by swimming ashore. In the morning McNeill set fire to the village opposite which they were, though it was not the village to which these two fugitives belonged. On this occasion the natives rushed out of the bush with spears and stones, and began to fight.

Two of them were shot, and McNeill was speared in the thigh, while some of the other sailors were more or less injured by stones. On returning to the ship, McNeill merely remarked that there had been a fight, and no more questions were asked about it.

The rest of the cruise of the *Hopeful* is simply a repetition of running down canoes and dragging natives on board against their

will. At Harris Island murder was again committed. In attempting to seize a canoe, which came alongside to trade, one of the crew of the canoe struck a white man with a paddle.

A shot was fired into the canoe from the deck of the ship, and McNeill, standing up in his boat, which had been lowered, deliberately shot one of the natives. On this, another boat was lowered, and the surviving natives who had jumped into the water were picked up and taken on board. In the meantime there seems to have been some excitement in the hold of the vessel, as a man was sent down with a rope's-end to flog them into submission. Williams on this occasion, fired three shots at a boy swimming in the water, and the third shot killed him. It was for these murders at Harris Island that McNeill and Williams were tried before the Supreme Court at Brisbane.

At the time of their trial the full atrocity of the case was not known, nor did it come out in evidence. Had it done so, I think it probable that the extreme sentence of the law would have been carried out.

McNeill and Williams were released from gaol in 1890. Romilly gave his version of the effect of life in Queensland on the recruits:

It is a humiliating confession to have to make, but these same returned islanders are now the most hostile natives to whites in New Guinea.

So far as murders in these parts can be traced to any individual natives, these men will be found to have originated and carried out the idea. Whether they still think they have wrongs to avenge I cannot say. Their passion for head-hunting, and the superstition they attach to skulls, doubtless has something to do with it. But after a year in Queensland they seem to have reverted to their former savage state, and they have the advantage of possessing more knowledge of the ways of white men than their fellows, and are in consequence looked up to, to some extent, as men of superior intelligence and cunning. From whatever reason it may be, the natives at the present time are more difficult to deal with than I have ever known them before. They have to be most carefully watched, and everything they say or do must be viewed with suspicion.

11. The Development of Pidgin

One of the important results of the early visits of sailors and traders was the development of Pidgin.

From: R. F. Salisbury, "Pidgin's Respectable Past", *New Guinea*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1967, pp. 44-6.

The history of Pidgin has been a subject of considerable debate It has been stated that it was developed by Tolai workers in the Queensland sugar fields in the 1870's. My own researches into Tolai history enable me to confidently assert that this is an incorrect, if at first sight plausible guess. There is a vast literature, published and unpublished on Tolai history since 1870, and this permits a much better understanding of Pidgin to emerge.

Firstly, however, why is the guess a wrong one? Quite simply it is because very few Tolai went as labourers to Queensland—my own guess would be less than a hundred. Most labourers came from the New Hebrides and the Solomons. Attention turned to the New Guinea islands only in early 1883 (Wawn, *The South Sea Islanders and the Labour Trade*, 1893, 279-80). Wawn himself made the second recruiting voyage in 1883 and vividly describes how, with missionary advice, Tolai refused to sign on although New Irelanders flocked on board. There may have been five such voyages by November, 1883, to the Bismarck Archipelago, but Wawn did not return as it was "averred that the natives of these islands were an undersirable class of labourers (p. 310)". Recruiting around New Guinea was then focused on the Louisiade Archipelago, and in 1884 the German Government entirely forbade recruiting in its territory, except for plantations in Samoa.

Even fewer Tolai returned to the area they came from. Wawn returned some New Irelanders in 1884, but otherwise the record is silent, and I doubt if more than 20 Tolai returned from Queensland. True Powell (*Wanderings in a Wild Country*, 1883) reports an earlier kidnapping and taking to Australia of eight Tolai, the lone survivor of whom he returned in 1878. Wawn himself lived in Matupit and Nodup for a few weeks in 1873. These facts seem to have been misconstrued as meaning that labour recruiting went on before 1875. But Wawn in 1873 was trading (not recruiting) for the German company of Godeffroy, operating out of Samoa. Earlier yet, whalers and traders had used the Duke of York Islands as a safe harbour, and they may well have kidnapped the Tolai Powell mentions, as boatscrew (see below). The facts do not support any connection between Queensland plantations and New Guinea Pidgin.

In any case the historical record clearly shows that a trade language that we would recognise as Pidgin was spoken and understood in the New Guinea islands before recruiting for Queensland began. There are many travellers' accounts which report (with an

“English” spelling, it is true) the “quaint” speech of the local people. Many of these accounts are unpublished and include letters, diaries, and other papers of Rev. George Brown, Rev. Benjamin Danks, and Richard Parkinson located in the Mitchell Library in Sydney. The period 1875-1885 is well covered by them; the period 1885-1900 is covered more comprehensively, but with less illuminating detail, in the records of the Methodist Overseas Mission, of the Sacred Heart Mission and of the Deutsche Neu-Guinea Compagnie.

These reports show that the Pidgin spoken and understood by 1881, wherever traders were active, contained the following grammatical elements of modern Pidgin:—(1) the use of *-pela* to indicate either that the word is an adjective, or to indicate a plural pronoun, (2) the use of *-im* to indicate that a verb is transitive, (3) the use of *bilong* to indicate possession and most other adverbial relations, (4) *pinis* was used to indicate completion in verbs, (5) *save* was used to indicate habitual actions, (6) negation was expressed by inserting *no* before verbs. The vocabulary reported was almost exclusively English in origin with three major exceptions:—*kanaka* was used for “man”, *kakai* for “eat”, and *lotu* for “church” or “prayer”. One other possible non-English derivation is the word *pait*, as Brown reports Vunamami men saying “Missionary he no save fight him me fellow” when the sense could well be that of the Tolai word *pait*, which means “to hit”.

Doubts might be raised about the strength of this evidence. Most travellers spoke English (a few were German) and would be expected to record the parts of utterances which they understood, and to ignore elements from local languages. Travellers usually had some knowledge of other Pacific pidgins—Australian aboriginal pidgin, that used by whalers and traders in Polynesia and that used in Malayan and Chinese trade. Expectedly they would impose patterns from these pidgins in their writings; what they record may not be what New Guineans said, but what the travellers thought they said. This comment is valid, for many “native” speeches appear as complex English sentences with a few “-fellow’s” or “-save’s” thrown in to make things appear authentic. Romilly in 1881 says he was surprised to find several Trobrianders speaking “a little English”—presumably Pidgin. This is clearly an over-statement, and we shall never know how “naturalised” the Pidgin of the 1870’s and 1880’s had become by incorporating indigenous terms. What is clear, however, is that at this time Pidgin was a language of trade, brought by traders, whalers and their crews.

The origins of the traders and their crews were very mixed. At the top level were people like Thomas Farrell, the husband of Queen

Emma, who was herself part-Samoan, part-American, Germans like Hershheim, and even Belgians like Mouton who "made good" after the ill-fated Marquis de Rays' expedition. They employed or "staked" boat captains and local traders ranging from remittance men of the Irish nobility, to Australians, to Filipino and Malay mixed-race people and members of Queen Emma's extended family who were part-Samoan. The senior boatscrews were almost exclusively Malay, Filipino, Samoan, Fijian and other islanders. Crew members at first came from non-New Guinea islands, but increasingly over time were recruited locally. Thus the Trobrianders who spoke Pidgin by 1881 had learned it through trade with the German, Hershheim, who had found the Trobrianders an excellent source of yams for his workers. By 1881 his boatscrews were almost exclusively Tolai; Richard Parkinson employed only men from Buka, however.

This gives a relatively firm date by which Pidgin was established as a language of intercourse between New Guineans. Can we go further back to establish a date of first arrival? Brown, Danks, Powell and Hershheim, the first European residents, all point out how few people spoke Pidgin in 1875-8, and usually explain how their lone interpreter had in some special way learned the language. 1875 is thus an initial date for the establishment of Pidgin, but I would argue that rapid extension of its use did not occur until 1877. In 1875 traders in the Bismarck Archipelago sought mostly shell—turtle, trochus, etc.—and coconuts were unimportant. The copra boom here began in 1876, until by 1878 it was possible to say "copra is king". By then dozens of boats were in New Britain waters, shipping mainly to Samoa. In these formative years it would appear that the strongest non-English influence on Pidgin was Samoan. The Polynesian derivation of the basic words *kanaka*, *kaikai* and *taro* support this; the term *lotu* reflects Fijian influence in the spread of Methodism in New Guinea after 1875.

II. THE SOUTH SEA ISLAND MISSIONARIES

For many years the most numerous Christian missionaries in Papua and New Guinea were from training institutions in Melanesia and Polynesia, the South Sea Islanders. The first group who came from the Loyalty Islands in 1871 were placed in the Torres Strait area by S. Macfarlane and A. W. Murray. The Loyalty Islanders were Gucheng, Tepeso, Elia, Mataika, Keresiano, Wainaea, Simone, and Iosaia. (J. King, W. G. Lawes of Savage Island and New Guinea, 1909, p. 53) From Torres Strait the first station on the mainland, Katau, was temporarily established in 1872. Later in the same year six Rarotongans and their wives were landed at Manumanu by A. W. Murray and W. W. Gill. All six became well known: Piri, Rau, Anederea, Ruatoka, Adamu, and Eneri. Manumanu had to be abandoned, but four of the Rarotongans were moved to Port Moresby in 1873. When George Brown established the Methodist mission in the Bismarck Archipelago in 1875 he took with him nine Fijian and some Polynesian teachers. The Anglican mission employed a number of Melanesians who had been to Queensland as indentured labourers. The Lutherans, too, employed some South Sea evangelists.

1. Islanders Leave Home

The Islanders left their homes after scenes of intense emotion. The Rev. S. Macfarlane described the selection of the first Islanders.

From: S. Macfarlane, *Among the Cannibals of New Guinea*, London, 1888, p. 13.

I laid the matter before the students, native pastors, and church of Lifu, and asked for volunteers, giving them to understand plainly the dangerous character of the work, on account of the climate and the savages. Every native pastor on the island and student in the seminary offered himself for the work. We selected four experienced pastors and four of the best students, and had some glorious meetings in connection with their appointments and departure.

Chalmers wrote of the departure of the first group from Rarotonga. From: J. King, W. G. Lawes of Savage Island and New Guinea, London, 1909, quoting Chalmers, pp. 54-5.

At an early morning meeting, the church was crowded, and I proposed that we should pray that God would help us to select the best men for the very important undertaking. At that meeting several old men stood and said, 'Take us all; if we cannot learn the language to speak for Jesus, we can live for Him, and help the younger men in station work.' The enthusiasm was intense. Five men and their wives were selected, and from all the islands we had numerous offers of service. The time was drawing near when they must leave. Who that witnessed that 'setting apart' Sunday service at Avarua will ever forget it? Old men and women, young men and women, wept for real joy. That sobbed 'Amen' of the setting apart prayer of the whole assembly I hear now.

2. Influence of the Islanders

Often it was the Islanders who had the closest relationship with the village people; it was the Islanders who first learnt the local languages and did much of the early teaching and preaching. The influence of the Islanders on cultures in Papua and New Guinea was widespread. They attempted to impose their understanding of Christianity, and at the same time they introduced new forms of dancing, gardening, house and canoe building, handicrafts, fishing techniques and so on. Brown wrote of the influence of Mijieli Vakaloloma on Waira Village Duke of York Islands.

From: George Brown, *Pioneer Missionary and Explorer: An Autobiography*, London, 1908, pp. 199-200.

They saw that Mijieli planted the kind of food, sweet potatoes, which would grow best and give the earliest returns; so they began to follow his example and to plant little patches of their own. But the climax came when he took one of their own little yams and planted it in proper soil, and cared for it as the Fijians and Samoans know how to care for yams. Then when he dug up in due season some yams, of which they said, "One man could not carry two of them," the fame thereof went far and wide, and the men of Waira began to plant, and in a short time were able to sell large quantities of their surplus produce.

Other examples of the beneficial effect of the teachers' residence amongst the people were soon seen in the improved character of the

houses which they built. I noticed this more especially on New Ireland, where some of the natives built houses for themselves after the model of our teacher's house on that island.

3. Missionaries' Lives

There are a number of summaries of the lives of Island missionaries written by Chalmers.

From: Richard Lovett, *James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters*, London, 1914, pp. 173-4.

Pi was the first of the Rarotongan boys brought up under my care who desired to become a teacher. He was a quiet, good boy, and although not over quick, was a good plodder, and made progress. His father, Paniani, was a queer mixture, a man full of good intention, but weak, and ever stepping forward, only to drift back again. He gave his son gladly to the work of Christ, and he ever spoke of his son, who was for Christ's sake preparing for foreign work, as an honour to his father. After some years Pi wished to prepare for New Guinea. He married a quiet, intelligent girl, and they both lived happily with us. After four years of student life he and his wife were sent to New Guinea. No one could ever say an evil word of either of them. During all the years Pi was with us I never once heard his name connected with any evil.

He stayed with us for some time at Suau, and then I placed him at the Leocadie. But in a short time so many teachers died that I was forced to bring Pi back to take charge of Suau, and right well he did his work. There he lost his wife, and after some time he married the widow of one of our teachers, and she dying, he was again left a widower, and for a long time simply gave himself to his work. In 1885 he married the widow of one of the teachers murdered at Kalo,* but she only lived a short time, and in 1887, when on a visit to Port Moresby, Pi died. He was greatly mourned by the natives of the east end of New Guinea, for whose uplifting he had worked hard during ten years. He was quiet and lovable, and yet very firm. These were qualities not found in the New Guinea savages, yet thoroughly appreciated by them.

In 1878, at Suau, I translated a few hymns and two chapters of Mark's Gospel. For a long while these were all the literature we had to help us in our work. Pi gained a wonderfully correct knowledge of

*In 1881 four Islanders (including Anedera) and their families, and two men from Hula were killed at Kalo.

the language, and I urged him to translated the Gospel of Mark and to get the assistance of the most suitable natives. After a long time he finished the Gospel, revised and re-revised it, and then, accompanied by the natives who had helped him, brought the manuscript to me at Port Moresby, and we together again revised it, and then sent it to Sydney, where it was printed. The New Guinea Mission could do with many more men like Pi.

4. Death of Tauraki

A number of Islanders were killed.

From: Richard Lovett, *James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters*, London, 1914, pp. 296-7.

Tauraki, who was murdered, his wife and child and ten natives, left their homes one Sunday night about ten o'clock, and went down some distance to an island just at the mouth of a river*, and slept there, so as to be ready for an early start in the morning. They wished to ascend the river, and collect the bulb used in making the best arrowroot. Monday and Tuesday were spent in collecting this bulb. They returned down the river on Tuesday afternoon, and when approaching a bend they saw a large number of canoes, each with the fighting wisp in front. They tried to get back by another route, but that way was also blocked. They then just drifted down the stream, and the canoes closed on them. Tauraki's wife begged him to fire a shot from his fowling-piece or rifle, and thus to frighten the natives, but he would not. There was a contention amongst the enemy—some pleading that there should be no fighting, others declaring that they would murder the whole party. Hoping to make friends, the wife distributed some tobacco; but soon the arrows began to fly. Tauraki's child was wounded by an arrow. His wife was also wounded, and two natives fell dead. She had the fowling-piece in her hand, and fired, and the shot scared those near. Tauraki's party had two canoes lashed together, and some of their natives sprang overboard and got between the canoes. His wife with the child followed, and the husband stood up with several arrows sticking in him, and began firing his rifle. This scared the enemy, and they all plunged into the river. Those with Tauraki who were still alive, and his wife and child, got into the canoe, and paddled away. It was then getting dark, and they were a long way from home. Their great want was water, but they kept on, and about

*The Lakekamu.

midnight got to the beach near their own house. On landing the child expired. The teacher and wife were helped up to the house of Mr. Edelfelt, resident at Toaripi, who with his wife did everything possible for them. But on Saturday morning Tauraki died, the wife recovering.

Five natives of Motumotu who had been in Tauraki's canoe were dead. The attack was really made in order to kill the natives with him. If Tauraki would have consented to go on board one of the enemy's canoes, with his wife and child, all would have been well for them. But that he nobly refused to do, saying that he would stand by his friends, and if need be die with them. Eh, 'tis a sad, sad story. He was our very best teacher, and from him I hoped much. I leave next week to begin again our Motumotu work.

5. A Summary Punishment

In 1878 the Tolais killed a Methodist missionary, the Fijian Rev. Sailasa Naucukudi, and three teachers from the Pacific Islands. Rev. George Brown, the founder of the mission, led a punitive expedition against the culprits in which, according to Brown's account, two villagers were wounded. According to other reports about twelve villagers were killed and their village was burnt.

From: George Brown, *Pioneer—Missionary and Explorer: An Autobiography*, London, 1908, pp. 252, 255-61.

I prepared for this journey, and on April 8 was all ready to start next morning at daylight. I was sitting in the study at night, engaged in skinning a bird, when I became aware of one of the natives on the verandah looking in at the window. I looked up and saw that it was an old fellow called Kail, one of whose accomplishments was that of cutting up the bodies of men or pigs before or after the operation of cooking them. No man's features are more indelibly fixed in my mind than are those of that old man as he looked in at the window, and whilst he never stopped chewing his betel-nut said to me: "Have you heard the story?" To which I replied: "What story?" "Oh," he said, "we have just heard that the New Britain natives have murdered Sailasa and some of the teachers."

I made many inquiries as to the reasons which prompted the massacre, and the way in which it was carried out, but it was very difficult to get trustworthy information. The only reason we could find was that Taleli was jealous of the teachers going inland, as he

feared that by their means articles of trade would be carried to the people in the inland villages, who had hitherto been able to obtain them only from him. Then he knew that the teachers were unarmed, and that any attack upon them would not only be comparatively safe, but would also be profitable to the assailants, as they would be able to sell portions of the dead bodies to surrounding villages for native money. The general information was that the teachers were suddenly attacked as they were going through the long grass; that Timoti was the first one to be killed by a spear thrust, and that the rest were killed without much apparent resistance. Peni Luvu, however, was a very powerful young man, and from all that we heard he defended himself with great courage, and ultimately made his escape from his assailants, and succeeded in making his way down to Taleli's village, where he thought himself to be perfectly safe, as we all at that time regarded that chief as being very friendly towards us. The poor fellow was exhausted with his struggle, and asked for some water to drink. A cocoanut was brought to him, and we were told that as his head was thrown back in the act of drinking, Taleli nearly severed his head with one cut of the large knives used by the natives for cutting and clearing the scrub.

On Saturday, April 13, we returned to Port Hunter, and had to decide what course to pursue. I called a meeting of the few white residents who were on Duke of York, together with the teachers and some of the chiefs, and found that they were unanimous in the opinion that the only possible way to prevent a further sacrifice of life was to make a demonstration against the people in those villages where the massacre had been committed. It was felt by all that the lives of the teachers and their families who were still on New Britain were in imminent danger, as well as those of the traders. There was naturally great excitement amongst the natives at the success which they had achieved, and it was absolutely certain that none of the remaining families would escape. Mr. Powell, I find, in his book, *Wanderings in a Wild Country*, expresses this opinion very decidedly, and states that it was quite apparent to all that "if we wished to save our lives we must either fight, and fight well, or withdraw altogether from these islands at once. As this latter plan was impossible, the former was the only alternative, and Mr. Brown at last was obliged unwillingly to admit that it must be so."

Whilst we were talking to the natives on the beach, a number of canoes came from some adjoining villages and encircled us from seaward, so that our position was this. We were lying off the beach in two boats, Mr. Blohm and Mr. Young in one, and a teacher and myself in the other. On the beach were about five hundred natives

professed friendly, but whose actions were most suspicious, refusing to go into the bush, or to do any damage which might commit them with the other party. Behind us were some forty canoes, containing from four to eight men each, which were gradually approaching us from the sea. We pulled out and asked them what they meant, and they told us they had come to market. I replied that there would be no market that day, and strongly advised them to go home quietly. This they promised to do, but almost as soon as we went back they returned to their former position, and were gradually drawing nearer to us. Mr. Blohm and the natives repeatedly pointed out the dangerous position we were in, especially with regard to those canoes, and at last we determined to drive them away, which we did; and in about half an hour there was not a canoe to be seen. Only two men were wounded, and as they found out afterwards to belong to a town which was ostensibly friendly, I paid the wounded men so liberally that I think every man in the canoe was sorry that he had not been wounded also!

6. Criticism and Praise

The Islanders were frequently praised for their devotion, but they were criticised for their inadequate education and their aggressiveness towards Papuans and New Guineans.

From: A. K. Chignell, *An Outpost in Papua*, London, 1911, p. 40.

. . . . but without any disloyalty or unkindness to these black fellow-missionaries of mine, I may be allowed to call them very poorly educated men. They, and others like them, have done good work in the Mission, and they are doing it still. In the early days, before the white man had even begun to know and understand the nature of the New Guinea natives, the South Sea Islanders served as a bridge by which the strangers could approach each other. But these Melanesians, hardly emerged from savagery themselves, came to New Guinea from Queensland, and it would be unreasonable to expect much on the intellectual side from men whose only book-learning was picked up in the Kanaka Mission schools at the end of long days of labour on the sugar plantations.

W. Powell claimed that the Islanders sometimes misled their listeners.

From: W. Powell, *Wanderings in a Wild Country*, London, 1883, p. 146.

I myself heard one sermon that I think was anything but wise delivered before a chief of some note and a good muster of his tribe, by one of the Fijian teachers.

He was trying to explain how good a thing "lotu," or religion, was. He said:—

"See what the lotu has done for us—we have houses, we have a big ship to come and visit us, and bring us cloth, beads, &c. Mr. Brown has a big house and is a powerful chief; all this has lotu given us; then how good a thing lotu is—it is better than taboo.*"

I spoke to the chief afterwards, and he said, "If lotu will give all these things, then it can give taboo also; if they can show me how it will give me taboo I will go to lotu often." Thus a wrong impression was made by a well-intentioned man.

But Macfarlane pointed out that in spite of their limited opportunities some of the Islanders were well educated.

From: S. MacFarlane, *Among the Cannibals of New Guinea*, 1888, p. 139.

It must not be supposed however that our native teachers are, as a rule, uneducated. One of the eight Loyalty islanders with whom we commenced the New Guinea Mission in 1871, and who is still doing good service in that difficult field, where so many of his comrades have fallen around him, can speak and write four languages fluently, besides possessing a very fair knowledge of English, being able to read the English Bible, and write a tolerably good English letter. I have seen long letters which he has written to a Queensland magistrate, a friend of mine, which give evidence of a fair English education.

Chalmers, who frequently praised the Islanders, admitted that they sometimes 'bounced' the village people. (Chalmers was writing to a fellow missionary.)

From: R. Lovett, *James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters*, London, 1914, pp. 230-1.

April 3, 1885.

Dear Hutchin: Some of the teachers (Tahitian) are causing trouble. Because natives go fishing on Sunday their canoes are broken up. I have made the teachers pay for each canoe which they have

*Taboo or tambu is a type of shell money.

touched. A more serious charge, which I am now looking into, is that of firing off a gun on Sunday to frighten the natives, and in doing so three small shot lodged in a woman. Would that our teachers could see the folly of force, and try to work as the Great Master Himself did. They look down upon the New Guineans, and bounce them too much. They know my horror of any bounce, and detestation of any force, and they pay the natives not to tell me. I shall likely send some back next time the John Williams comes. Tell the young men that it is by kindness, meekness, and humility in Christ that the best work is done, and may those whom you send come resolved to work in his spirit. God help you, brother, to a right selection.

III. THE PROCLAMATION

In February 1883 Sir Thomas McIlwraith, the Premier of Queensland, instructed his Government's Agent-General in London to urge the Imperial Government to annex New Guinea to Queensland. Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, failed to respond to the Queensland government's demand and McIlwraith instructed H. M. Chester to annex eastern New Guinea.

1. Fears of Queensland Control

The missionary W. G. Lawes wrote a letter on 7 April 1883 describing the event and making clear his attitude towards annexation by Queensland.

From: R. Lovett, *James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters*, London, 1914, pp. 237-8.

On Tuesday last, the 3rd inst., the Government cutter from Thursday Island arrived here. Mr. Chester, the resident Police Magistrate of Thursday Island, was on board, and soon informed us of the object of his visit. He had been sent by the Queensland Government to take possession of New Guinea in the name of the Queen. Mr. Chester is an old friend of ours, especially of Mr. Chalmers. He showed us his instructions, according to which the Queensland Government had telegraphed home offering to bear the expense of New Guinea for a few years if annexed, and had received a reply accepting the proposal on those terms. Mr. Chester was immediately instructed by telegram to come here and take possession.

On Wednesday morning at ten o'clock Mr. Chester hoisted the Union Jack at our flagstaff, and it was saluted by the two guns of the Pearl.

After the ceremony Mr. Chester made a present to the natives, and we explained to them as best we could the nature of the proceedings. We cannot understand them ourselves. Annexation we were in a measure prepared for, although we did not wish it. But that

an Australian colony should be allowed to take this step is to us most surprising. Here is the largest island in the world, to which Fiji and even New Zealand are a mere nothing, annexed by a Police Magistrate who comes in a little tub of a cutter! There must be some mistake somewhere. We would much rather not be annexed by anybody, but if there was any probability of a foreign power taking possession of New Guinea, then let us have British rule: but as a Crown Colony, not as an appendage to Queensland. Nowhere in the world have aborigines been so basely and cruelly treated as in Queensland—the half has never been told—and are the natives of New Guinea to be handed over to the tender mercies of the men who have done these deeds?

2. In Support of Annexation

Some other representatives of missions working in the Pacific islands expressed their support for the extension of British control in the Pacific in a deputation to the Victorian Premier, James Service. Spokesmen for the Methodists, Presbyterians and the London Missionary Society were included in the deputation. Mr. James Balfour, a leading merchant, Presbyterian and Member of the Legislative Council, summed up their views in his introduction.

From: *Victorian Parliamentary Papers*, "Annexation of Islands in the Pacific . . .", Melbourne, 1883, p. 6.

EXTRACT FROM THE "ARGUS" NEWSPAPER OF 7th
JUNE, 1883.

The South Seas Islands

A large deputation, including a number of clergymen, waited on the Premier yesterday to urge him to do everything in his power to induce the Imperial Government to annex or accord its protection to the islands in the South Seas that are not at present under the dominion of any other power. Mr. Balfour, M.L.C., introduced the deputation

Mr. Balfour said that for many years those connected with the missions in the New Hebrides islands had seen the necessity for the annexation of those islands, or else for their being brought under the protection of the Empire. The iniquitous labour traffic was really not under control, and it had had the effect of almost bringing Christianity and civilization to a standstill. Movements in favour of annexation or protection had been repeated, but unsuccessful.

He assumed that Great Britain would either annex New Guinea or allow the colonies to do so; and the present seemed a good opportunity to urge the annexation of the other islands, which could be advocated not only from a missionary's, but from a statesman's point of view, for on these islands valuable products could be grown. Common humanity demanded the suppression of the labour traffic, about which there were numerous official reports, and which had lately been commented upon by Mr. Morrison,* an independent witness. The Wesleyan mission at New Britain was represented in the deputation. The missionaries there did not want annexation until the natives had been consulted. But the New Hebrides missionaries could speak confidently as to the desire for annexation of the natives there. Throughout these islands there was a great dread of other powers, but a great desire to be annexed to the British Empire.

3. Petition to Great Britain

In June the British Government said that Chester's ceremony had not made eastern New Guinea part of the British Empire. The Australasian colonies continued to press the Imperial Government to annex New Guinea, or at least declare a protectorate over those parts not claimed by the Dutch. In July the Agents General for New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, and Victoria presented their reasons to Lord Derby for wanting Britain to claim the islands of the western Pacific.

From: *Victorian Parliamentary Papers*, "Annexation of Islands in the Pacific . . .", Melbourne, 1883, p. 14.

It is true that fear of foreign intervention has been the immediate cause of this concerted action on the part of the Australasian Government; and this, we understood, seemed to your Lordship hardly adequate to justify a strong sense of present danger. We can assure you that our Governments would receive with a sense of great relief your Lordship's assurance that there is no foundation for our fears. But it is not only the apprehension of immediate foreign intervention that has influenced our Governments; nor would its removal change their opinion as to the necessity for making it impossible in the future. Other powerful reasons bring them

*G. E. Morrison had reported on the labour trade in the *Melbourne Age and Leader*.

together to urge upon the Imperial Government the necessity of a policy different from the one that has been pursued in the past; the conviction, indeed, that the state of things in the Western Pacific has at last become intolerable. We feel that we ought not to say this, without an attempt to trace the course of events that have led to so grave a declaration.

The case of New Guinea is very pressing, because whatever powers are given to the High Commissioner, they can, in the nature of things, be even less exercised there than in any of the other islands. New Guinea is in such close proximity to Queensland, that whatever is done there must affect Queensland more than anything that is done in the other islands could affect the rest of Australia or New Zealand. All the trade of Queensland with England and India by steam, passes through Torres Straits; regular steam communication is now established there; it is really indispensable not only that the Straits should be free to navigation, but that there should be no risk of a Foreign Power establishing a naval station there. Adventurous men are occupying portions of the New Guinea coast-line, and irregular settlement is sure to take place more and more. What has so often happened will happen again. Failing the colonisation of the great island under proper authority, adventurers will flock there who will neither show regard for the native inhabitants, nor be under any restraint among themselves; the evils and dangers which existed in Fiji will repeat themselves, only on a larger scale, and Queensland, of all the Australias, will suffer from them the most. This has been stated over and over again, in speeches in both Houses of the Imperial Parliament, by the Governments and Legislatures of Australasia, by the Royal Colonial Institute, and by private persons of high rank and experience in affairs, till we are almost ashamed to repeat it ourselves; yet it must be repeated for the danger is not far off and a pretence, but imminent and a reality. Surely the Imperial Government cannot continue to refuse so reiterated an appeal?

4. Whose Proclamation?

In November 1884 Commodore J. E. Erskine of the British Navy arrived in Port Moresby with instructions to proclaim a protectorate over south-eastern New Guinea. Erskine found that H. H. Romilly had already conducted a proclamation ceremony.

From: H. H. Romilly, *Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 1878-1891*, London, 1893, p. 202.

It may interest you to know that we have just finished hoisting the flag here, and a very imposing ceremony it was. I made rather an ass of myself, or rather other people made an ass of me, as I received a telegram from Lord Derby, giving me the limits of the Protectorate and other information about it, while I was kept in utter ignorance that the Commodore was coming up here with orders to hoist the flag himself.

We therefore came up here and did it before the Commodore arrived. However, it did not make much difference, as he did it all over again when he arrived.

5. A Picturesque Ceremony

Charles Lyne, the Sydney Morning Herald correspondent who saw Erskine proclaim the Protectorate, left a more detailed account.

From: C. Lyne, *New Guinea: An Account of the establishment of the British Protectorate over the southern shore of New Guinea*, London, 1885, pp. 1, 3-7.

COMMODORE ERSKINE, in H.M.S. *Nelson*, arrived at Port Moresby on Sunday, the 2nd of November, 1884, and the Union Jack now flies from the flagstaff at the mission station, the proclamation of a British Protectorate having been made with much ceremony on Thursday, November 6. . . . It was the Commodore's desire that the establishment of the Protectorate should be made known among as many of the native tribes as it was possible to visit, and to carry out that idea it was necessary that as many chiefs as could be induced to come should be got together, and that this should be done by H.M.S. *Nelson* visiting the various native centres along the south coast, and then, with the assistance of one or more of the other men-of-war, and the missionaries, collecting from around those centres the chiefs of the different tribes, and proclaiming the Protectorate in their presence. The first and principal ceremony, it was arranged, should take place at Port Moresby, and, accordingly, early on Tuesday, November 4, H.M.S. *Espiegle* and *Raven* left their anchorage for the purpose of collecting the chiefs of the branches of the Motu tribe and the tribes adjacent within a certain distance east and west of Port Moresby; the *Espiegle*, on board of which was the Rev. J. Chalmers, going east as far as Round Head, and the *Raven*, taking with her a native teacher, going west as far as Redscar Bay. The other chiefs were to be brought in overland by the Rev. W. G. Lawes. The *Espiegle* and *Raven* returned on the Wednesday, both

with chiefs on board, and the former with two who had been at war with each other the day before the vessel arrived, the quarrel having arisen through a dispute in reference to payment for a girl who had been stolen, and having ended with the killing and wounding of several natives and the burning of a village. On the Wednesday afternoon the chiefs and a number of other natives were brought on board H.M.S. *Nelson*, and a grand assembly took place, with a feast for the chiefs and an address from the Commodore, a presentation of gifts attractive to the native eye, and the firing of some of the ship's guns. The flags of various nations were hung over the quarter-deck in the form of an awning, and the officers wore frock coats and swords. Most of the chiefs were destitute of clothing, the mop-like hair and foreheads of some of them being bound round with bands of small shells, and the hair ornamented with tufts of feathers. Two or three wore old shirts, and one Boe Vagi, the chief of the Port Moresby natives, who was appointed by the Commodore to be the head chief of the Motu tribe, was dressed in a shirt, with a handkerchief round his loins, a red felt hat on his head (the hat having been given to him by Mr. Chester when the flag was hoisted in 1883), and some green leaves through the lobe of his left ear. Evidently he had been attired specially for the occasion, as his usual dress is as scanty as that of his fellows. There were in all about fifty of the chiefs, most of them being representatives of the Motu tribe; and, after having been permitted to look round the ship, they were directed by the missionaries, Messrs. Lawes and Chalmers, to seat themselves upon the deck. Then a great tub of boiled rice, sweetened with brown sugar, was brought on deck, and basins of this mixture were handed round to the chiefs, who received them, and devoured the rice with evident satisfaction. Ship biscuits were also served out, and the scene presented by the feasting savages, and by the grouping of the *Nelson's* officers and the parading of the blue-jackets on the opposite side of the deck—so that a photograph might be taken of the whole assembly—was exceedingly interesting and picturesque.

6. Erskine States a Policy

While the representatives were assembled on H.M.S. Nelson Erskine attempted to explain to them the meaning of the proclamation they were to hear the following morning. Lawes translated Erskine's speech into Motu. The statement made by Erskine on the Nelson has frequently been quoted as an expression of basic British policy in New Guinea.

From: C. Lyne, *New Guinea: An account of the establishment of the British Protectorate over the southern shores of New Guinea*, London, 1885, pp. 8-9.

I desire, on behalf of her Majesty the Queen, to explain to you the meaning of the ceremonial which you are about to witness. It is a proclamation that from this time forth you are placed under the protection of her Majesty's Government; that evil-disposed men will not be able to occupy your country, to seize your lands, or to take you away from your homes. I have been instructed to say to you that what you have seen done here to-day on board her Majesty's ship of war, and which will be done again to-morrow on shore, is to give you the strongest assurance of her Majesty's gracious protection of you, and to warn bad and evil-disposed men that if they attempt to do you harm they will be promptly punished by the officers of the Queen. Your lands will be secured to you; your wives and children will be protected. Should any injury be done to you, you will immediately inform her Majesty's officers, who will reside amongst you, and they will hear your complaints, and do you justice. You will look upon all white persons whom the Queen permits to reside amongst you as your friends and her Majesty's subjects. The Queen will permit nobody to reside here who does you injury. You will under no circumstances inflict punishment upon any white person; but if such person has done you wrong you will tell her Majesty's officers of that wrong, in order that the case may be fairly inquired into.

7. The Proclamation

The Protectorate was proclaimed on Thursday 6 November 1884.

From: C. Lyne, *New Guinea: An account of the establishment of the British Protectorate over the southern shores of New Guinea*, London, 1885, pp. 15, 22-3.

At half-past six next morning the landing of officers and men from the squadron for the purpose of publicly proclaiming the establishment of the Protectorate and hoisting the British flag commenced

PROCLAMATION.

“Proclamation on behalf of her Most Gracious Majesty Victoria, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India, establishing a Protectorate of her Most Gracious Majesty over a portion of New Guinea and the islands adjacent thereto.

“To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:

“Whereas it has become essential, for the protection of the lives and properties of the native inhabitants of New Guinea, and for the purpose of preventing the occupation of portions of that country by persons whose proceedings, unsanctioned by any lawful authority, might tend to injustice, strife, and bloodshed, and who, under the pretence of legitimate trade and intercourse, might endanger the liberties and possess themselves of the lands of such native inhabitants, that a British Protectorate should be established over a certain portion of such country and the islands adjacent thereto.

“And whereas her Majesty, having taken into her gracious consideration the urgent necessity of her protection to such inhabitants, has directed me to proclaim such protection in a formal manner at this place: Now, I, James Elphinstone Erskine, captain in the Royal Navy, and commodore of the Australian station, one of her Majesty’s naval aides-de-camp, do hereby, in the name of her Most Gracious Majesty, declare and proclaim the establishment of such Protectorate over such portions of the coast and the adjacent islands as is more particularly described in the schedule hereunto annexed.

“And I hereby proclaim and declare that no acquisition of land, whensoever or howsoever acquired, within the limits of the Protectorate hereby established, will be recognized by her Majesty; And I do hereby, on behalf of her Majesty, command and enjoin all persons whom it may concern to take notice of this proclamation.

“SCHEDULE.

“All that portion of the southern shores of New Guinea commencing from the boundary of that portion of the country claimed by the Government of the Netherlands on the 141st meridian of east longitude to East Cape, with all islands adjacent thereto south of East Cape to Kosman Island inclusive, together with the islands in the Goschen Straits.

“Given on board her Majesty’s ship *Nelson*, at the harbour of Port Moresby, on the 6th day of November, 1884.

“(Signed) JAMES ELPHINSTONE ERSKINE,
“Commodore.

“God Save the Queen.”

This was interpreted to the natives by the Rev. W. G. Lawes, who, at the request of Commodore Erskine, had translated it into the Motu language; and then, by direction of the Commodore, the

Union Jack was slowly raised to the truck of the flagstaff by Sub-Lieutenant Gaunt, who filled the position of Flag-Lieutenant of H.M.S. *Nelson*. The troops immediately presented arms, and as the flag was ascending the band played a bar of the National Anthem, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the *Nelson*, and the ships of war were almost instantaneously dressed with flags from stem to stern, the royal standard flying conspicuously from the *Nelson's* main. When the *Nelson* had saluted the flag and the firing had ceased, the troops fired a *feu-de-joie* of three rounds, the band playing a bar of the National Anthem after each of the first two rounds, and two bars after the third.

8. Fear of German Expansion

Now that the Protectorate had been declared many were still not satisfied. The Australian colonies were indignant because half of eastern New Guinea had been lost to Germany.

From: J. A. Froude, *Oceania or England and her Colonies*, London, 1886, pp. 84-5.

The Australians naturally enough regard themselves as the leading power in the South Pacific, and besides their own immense continent look on the adjacent islands as their proper inheritance. The Americans have their Monroe doctrine, prohibiting European nations from settling on their side of the Atlantic, except as American subjects. Australia—especially the ambitious, pushing Melbourne—which claims to be the leading State, had unconsciously come to a similar conclusion respecting all the neighbouring territory. The Australians meant it to be theirs as soon as they had leisure to occupy it; and to learn that close at their doors, as they said, the dreadful Bismarck contemplated a rival establishment had stirred them into a temper at the moment of my arrival

They saw at their doors, in the intended New Guinea settlement, German soldiers, German fleets, German competition with their trade, a great rival German influence menacing their wealth, their institutions, their independence. It was a thing too horrible to contemplate, a thing to be instantly denounced and resisted.

9. Traders not Impressed

Theodore Bevan, an explorer and trader, discussed the declaration of the Protectorate with Andrew Goldie, Port Moresby's first

store keeper. *Goldie and Bevan were not enthusiastic about the new Protectorate.*

From: T. Bevan, *Toil, Travel and Discovery in British New Guinea*, London, 1890, pp. 15-16.

In his speech on that occasion, as interpreted by the missionaries, Messrs. Lawes and Chalmers, Commodore Erskine informed the natives that they would be protected from "bad and evil-disposed men," and their lands secured to them. While approving of the latter provision (that is to say, within due limitations), Mr. Goldie and other respectable traders greatly resented the quasi-reflection upon themselves, and attributed it to the fact of the commodore being a simple dupe in the hands of the missionaries. In other ways the occasion had been signalized by gifts of tomahawks, calico, and tobacco to the natives—about the only feature of these rather numerous annexations, by-the-by, that they really did comprehend. At night they had been childishly frightened by displays of limelight, electric light, and fireworks from H.M.S. *Nelson*, and scared especially by blasts from the big ship's fog-horn; for (mistaking it for the barking of a great dog) they all ran away into the bush to hide, panic-struck.

Boi Vagi, a mission native (who had no real influence), had been constituted titular "king," and was given a naval officer's uniform and staff of office. It was, of course, very ridiculous to see a person so accoutred come crying up to one, with bare black feet, for "a bit of tobacco."

10. The Strategic Motive

Sir William MacGregor spoke of the motives of the Queensland Government in desiring annexation of New Guinea to a London audience in 1895.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXVI, 1894-95, p. 195.

It has sometimes been alleged that the Queenslanders wished to be able to transfer the natives of New Guinea to Queensland, and that this was the chief reason why that Colony urged annexation. No doubt there must have been men in Queensland who hoped they might be able to procure labourers in that way. But annexation was not the best way to obtain labourers from there, though it was the

only thing that could meet the political views of the men who guided the country and looked to its future. It may be pointed out that, previous to annexation, the Queensland planters had labourers from that territory, and that, by the terms of the agreement entered into with the Imperial Government, they were deliberately debarred from recruiting labourers in the Possession for at least the ten years it lasts.

More than half a score of years ago the man best able to speak on this point, Sir Thomas McIlwraith,* declared at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society that the desire for the annexation of British New Guinea did not spring from the wish to possess more land or to get natives to work on the sugar plantations of Queensland, as it was known that the natives of New Guinea, were not fitted for that work; but it arose simply for the purpose of preventing undesirable neighbours from coming near them.

*McIlwraith was the Premier of Queensland, 1879-1883 and in later periods. He authorised the attempted annexation by Queensland in 1883.

CHAPTER TWO

ESTABLISHING PAPUAN ADMINISTRATION

I. THE PROTECTORATE

General Sir Peter Scratchley was appointed Special Commissioner with the task of establishing an administration in the Protectorate.

1. A Formidable Task

G. S. Fort, Scratchley's private secretary, quoted the description of their arrival in Port Moresby by G. R. Askwith (another member of staff), and went on to state the aims of the new administration.

From: G. S. Fort, *Chance or Design, A Pioneer Looks Back*, London, 1942, pp. 44-5.

“We first caught sight of New Guinea early in the morning of August 28, 1885. A dim mountain line appeared, high in the clouds, gradually growing more and more distinct.

Every hour, as we drew near, the outlines of the coast sharpened, until its whole character could be clearly seen. Around us, white-crested billows were tossing on a deep blue sea, while close inshore, and stretching out from the entrance to the harbour, wherever the unseen coral reef broke the forces of the waves, calm water of vivid green contrasted sharply with the azure blue. Brown hills of varied heights, covered here and there with gum trees, rose abruptly from the water's edge, and above them towered the Astrolabe Mountains.

In the course of the day the *Governor Blackall* dropped anchor in the harbour opposite to Port Moresby.

On a low hill immediately rising from the sea stood a row of small houses, some thatched, and some roofed, in Australian fashion, with galvanized iron. Seven white people at that time represented the British Empire in the capital of the country: Mr. Anthony Musgrave, Assistant Deputy Commissioner; Mr. Lawes, a missionary; Mr. Lawes' son; Mr. Chalmers; and Mrs. Lawes, the only white woman in the island; Goldie, a storekeeper, and Hunter, who had married a native, completed the seven.

The only buildings in the place were those belonging to the one storekeeper and to the mission, upon whom all visitors were dependent for board and lodging."

This was the capital and centre of administration for a territory of some one hundred and fifty thousand square miles in extent, with a scattered white settlement of about twenty, and a native population of anything from two hundred thousand. Over this ill-balanced community the General had to maintain law and order, to protect the whites against the natives, and the latter in their turn against the whites, to prevent the natives from fighting and eating each other, to regulate trade and other matters; but for the carrying out of these duties, not even the nucleus of an administrative organization existed.

2. Scratchley, the People and the Country

After only three months in British New Guinea, Scratchley died of malaria. Before his death Scratchley had travelled widely and written an account of his activities and an outline for the future development of the Protectorate.

From: G. S. Fort, *Report on British New Guinea from Data and Notes by the Late Sir Peter Scratchley, 1886*, pp. 5, 7.

On arrival in New Guinea the subjects demanding immediate attention were—(1) The appointment of officers; (2) The establishment of a seat of Government; (3) The purchasing of land from the natives; (4) The erection of a house for the Government Resident. . . .

Port Moresby was established as the seat of Government, and the sole port of entry. The reasons for this selection were—(1) because it was the only place where any permanent attempt at civilisation had been made; (2) because of its comparative healthiness; (3) its

vicinity and easy access, especially for sailing vessels, to Cooktown, and a telegraph station.

A considerable area of land, comprising the best sites in the harbour and nearly the whole of the frontage to the sea, was, with but small difficulty, purchased from the natives. In summoning together the claimants for this land, and in obtaining their assent to parting with their property *in perpetuo*, and thus securing a sound title for the Government, the assistance rendered by the Mission was invaluable. A portion of this was set aside for Government buildings; part was reserved as a site for a future township, and a portion was also to be held as a native reserve.

Previous to the arrival of Sir Peter Scratchley at Port Moresby, the only houses were those belonging to the Mission and to a store-keeper of the name of Goldie. Consequently, all Government officials, and to a large extent all visitors also, were dependent upon the hospitality of the Mission for board and lodging. A site was, however, carefully selected by Sir Peter, on which a large two-roomed house, which had been ordered at Townsville, was erected. This is at present occupied by Captain Musgrave, and is the only Government residence in the island. By means of pipes laid on from a natural spring, the house, as well as the native village below, is amply supplied with water. A prison was also in the course of erection, and Captain Musgrave was instructed to collect materials for the building of a native bungalow. A small printing office was also established, and Regulations were printed, copies of which were sent to as many white traders as possible, and to the native teachers in each district.

Boevagi, the chief of the village, was formally recognised as chief of the district. He was instructed to refer all complaints, whether of a tribal nature or against white men, to the Special Commissioner. Twenty-five of the sub-chiefs of the district were summoned on board the "Governor Blackall," were presented with presents, and were told by Sir Peter Scratchley—firstly, that they were to regard the white men as their friend, whose presence would be to their advantage; secondly, that they were to regard Boevagi as their chief, to whom they were to refer in all cases requiring arbitration. . . .

It was a prominent item in Sir Peter Scratchley's policy to encourage as much as possible explorations, conducted upon a proper footing and under recognised leaders. Many persons applied for permits to explore who were totally unfit to do so, and whose attempt, had permits been granted them, would have been ruin to themselves, and would have made a breach in the relations with the natives which it might have taken years to heal. The following

remarks on this question appear in his note-book:—"All explorations must be methodical and systematic. No time must be fixed for the return of the exploring party, which should be composed of as few members as possible. No exploring party should act independently of the Government."

3. Traders are Killed

A number of traders had been killed by coastal villagers. Scratchley had to decide the cause of the violence and take measures to ensure that peace was maintained in the future.

From: G. S. Fort, *Report on British New Guinea From Data and Notes by the late Sir Peter Scratchley*, 1886, pp. 8, 9.

Six cases of white men who had been killed during the past two years on the New Guinea Coast were investigated. The results of these investigations went to show—

- (1) That the white men killed fell into two classes:—(a) Those who were killed for their individual crimes against native laws—either immorality, as in the case of Reid; or of unfair and unjust dealing, as in the case of Bob Lumse; or, in the case of Webb, for recklessly ignoring of tribal feuds and warfare. (b) Those who fell as victims to native superstitious ideas, and the demand for vengeance which the evils of the labour traffic had aroused, *vide* Frier and Miller's case.
- (2) That in every case, therefore, there was either direct or indirect aggressive provocation on the part of the whites against the blacks.
- (3) That, in the majority of cases, there was reckless disregard on the part of the murdered of warnings given. Frier refused to believe that the native boy who told him the natives had determined to kill him. Miller had been warned by Captain Bridge, of H.M.S. "Espiegle", and by Mr. Chalmers, not to go to Normanby Island.

So many and so various are the difficulties connected with the question of punishment, that to administer justice according to European notions for these outrages is impossible. A murder is committed, and a man-of-war proceeds to the spot. She finds that every person in the village has left, taking everything with them; by waiting a day or so, some of the men will return. They will not, however, fight; at the first sign of hostility they flee into the jungle,

where to pursue them would be fatal, as for every native caught ten white men might be speared. Should, however, the natives remain and consent to give evidence, such evidence is wholly unreliable, partly from the difficulty of interpretation and explanation, and partly also from the readiness with which, when they do understand, they will endeavour to adapt their statements to the leading idea or apparent wish of the questioner. Then, again, the native custom with regard to payment for murder, and their low estimate of human life, forms another difficulty. In the case of Miller, one of the murderers came off to the ship voluntarily, bringing his payment or *wergild* for the murder he had committed. . . . He was detained on board, but to have punished him with death, in the face of his having voluntarily paid what, according to his standard of justice, was a full penalty for his deed, would have been revenge and not justice.

. . . . the most effective police would be a selected crew of Samoans or Fijians, under the charge of an English officer, who would be constantly patrolling the coast. This force could also be utilised for the prevention of tribal warfare. It would of course be necessary that the officer in charge should send in a written report of his proceedings.

4. Port Moresby Takes Shape

From early 1886 until the appointment of William Macgregor, John Douglas, a former Premier of Queensland, was Special Commissioner. Douglas reported that "three centres of action" had been set up for "purposes of administration", a Western Division (controlled from Thursday Island), a Central Division and an Eastern Division. Some development had taken place in Port Moresby.

From: *British New Guinea Report for 1887*, p. 6.

. . . considerable improvements have been effected during the past year. The township of Granville has been formed at Paga Point, on a site which I think is likely to prove much more healthy than the neighbourhood of the native village where some rude European habitans have been erected. There is, moreover, deep water close in shore, and a jetty has been built which provides the requisite facilities for landing. Mr. Goldie has built a commodious store on ground which I have recommended shall be granted to him in lieu of that surrendered by him. The old store in the vicinity of the native village has been abandoned as such, and is now used as a native school-house. A building containing one large room, together with

four smaller rooms suitable for offices, has been erected close to the landing-place at Granville. The small rooms are at present used as a shipping office, post office, and store-rooms. The large room is made available as a reading-room, where *The Times*, the illustrated papers, the leading Australian journals, and a few periodicals can be seen. Here, also, it has been customary to hold service on Sundays for the white people of Port Moresby, at which the resident missionaries have always kindly assisted. A guest and accommodation house has also been erected on the rising ground above Mr. Goldie's store. It is built of wood and iron, and contains two good sitting-rooms and eight bedrooms, together with the usual offices, kitchens, and bath-room—the whole being surrounded by verandahs.

5. Lack of Aims and Means

Having acquired British New Guinea neither the British Government nor the Australian colonies had any clear idea what they should do with it.

From: *British New Guinea Report for 1888*, p. 11.

Hitherto tropical countries have been regarded as the home of the dark races. Australia, however, declares that tropical Australia is not for the dark races, and if this be so it may be concluded that British New Guinea, being now an appanage of Australia, is destined ultimately to be the habitation of a white race. This is at variance with all our previous colonial experience, but it has not yet been proved to be at variance with natural laws The immediate value of British New Guinea to Australia at the present time is the strategical advantage which the possession of the south coast gives us. Along that coast line, from Hall Sound to Pitt Bay, there is a series of magnificent natural harbours.

It is well both for British and Australian interests that the British flag flies on that coast.

The government in the Protectorate was handicapped by two important factors. First, the powers of the Special Commissioner were very limited. Fort recorded one interpretation.

From: G. S. Fort, *Chance or Design, A Pioneer Looks Back*, London, 1942, p. 35.

. . . before leaving London, he [Scratchley] had expressed his

doubts as to the exact significance of certain clauses in his Commission, but had been assured that they were adequate. After his arrival, however, he had submitted the document to the most eminent counsel in Australia, who were of the opinion that: "General Scratchley had at present no legal jurisdiction and authority of any kind, except such as he can exercise as a Deputy Commissioner for the Western Pacific; and in particular that he has no power to make any regulations having the force of law, or to impose or collect any taxes or licence fees upon exports, or imports, or otherwise to exercise any legislature or judicial functions in the Protectorate." There was no getting away from this legal opinion, which was to the effect that the General's Commission had been so badly drafted that it gave him no legal authority to put in force any administrative or executive act.

Second, there was always some doubt whether the Protectorate would be able to obtain its grant of \$30,000 from the Australasian Colonies. Scratchley had had difficulty and Douglas encountered similar problems.

From: *British New Guinea Report for 1887*, p. 5.

Early in the year I visited Brisbane, Melbourne, and Sydney, in order to receive the contributions then due on account of the Protectorate, in accordance with the proportionate amounts agreed to during the tenure in office of the late Sir Peter Scratchley. I received no contribution from South Australia, and this has led to a considerable amount of correspondence, copies of which have been duly forwarded to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies. I felt it to be my duty to endeavour to obtain a recognition from the contributing colonies of the deficiency thus accruing. Up to the present time, however, I have not been able to secure this, except from the Colony of Queensland.

II. SIR WILLIAM MACGREGOR

Dr. William MacGregor was appointed Administrator of British New Guinea in 1888; he became a K.C.M.G. in 1889; and his position was designated Lieutenant-Governor in 1895. MacGregor had acted as Governor and High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. After leaving British New Guinea in 1898 he became Governor of Lagos, Newfoundland and Queensland.

1. From Protectorate to Possession

On arrival in Port Moresby MacGregor proclaimed the change in status of British New Guinea from Protectorate to Possession. He informed the Governor of Queensland that the ceremony had been carried out.

From: *British New Guinea Annual Report for 1888/89.* p. 1.

Government House,
Granville, Port Moresby, 5th September, 1888

SIR,—I have the honour to report for your Excellency's information that I left Cooktown in H.M.S. "Opal" on the 1st September, and arrived here on the 4th.

2. At 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the same day there were assembled at Government House, Captain Bosanquet with the officers and men of H.M.S. "Opal", the officers of the Protectorate, and the European residents of the place, and about 200 natives, of whom the larger number belonged to the Port Moresby District. In the presence of these I read a Proclamation declaring the Protected Territory to be from that time a British Possession. I then read the Letters Patent, at the conclusion of which I briefly drew the attention of the audience to the importance of the event, and directed the Royal Standard to be hoisted, which was saluted by H.M.S. "Opal" with twenty-one guns. I then read my Commission and took from Captain Bosanquet, as the Senior Officer then present in the Queen's service, the oath of allegiance, and the oath of office as Administrator.

Lawes commented on the ceremony in a letter to R. Thompson, the Foreign Secretary of the London Missionary Society.

From: R. Lovett, *James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters*, London, 1914, p. 263.

British New Guinea is now a part of the Queen's dominions, and the people of it are as much her subjects as you and I. . . . There was not much display, and it was well there was not, for flag-hoisting must seem to the natives to be a white man's amusement. The function of the 4th was the tenth at which I had been present on New Guinea. It is getting monotonous.

2. Unwieldy Government Made to Work

The government established in the new colony appeared to be unwieldy. Macgregor described the government to the Colonial Institute in London at a meeting on 28 February 1895.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXVI, 1894-1895, pp. 194, 198-9.

It was under an arrangement entered into between the Imperial Government and the three Colonies of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland that the Queen's sovereignty was declared over British New Guinea on September 4, 1888. A government was then established which is provided, under Letters Patent, Royal Instructions, etc., with the ordinary legislative and executive powers conferred on other Crown Colonies. The peculiarity of British New Guinea in this respect is, that the three Australian Colonies mentioned above contribute each £5,000 a year to meet the expenses of the administration; besides this they find half the cost of maintenance of the British New Guinea Government steamer "Merrie England," the Imperial Government providing the other moiety. As these Colonies pay the cost of administration they are allowed to have a weighty voice in controlling the public affairs of the Possession. This is spoken through the Government of Queensland, to the Governor of which Colony correspondence is addressed in the first instance, instead of being sent direct to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

As the executive machinery of the Administration is more or less peculiar, it may be briefly pointed out what routine has been estab-

lished. It rests on a system framed and elaborated by Lord Knutsford, as Secretary of State, on this side, and by Sir Samuel Griffith as Premier of Queensland, on the other side. The drafts of laws and regulations, estimates of expenditure, requisitions for supplies, and official reports are sent to the Governor of Queensland, who in turn forwards them to the head of the Ministry of the Colony, who may submit papers to experts, to his colleagues, or to the other contributing Colonies, as the case may require. The Administrator is, in the exercise of legislative and administrative functions, to be guided by the instructions of the Governor of Queensland, and the Governor of Queensland is to consult his Executive Council on all British New Guinea matters. The views of the Cabinet, or Cabinets, are conveyed by the Governor to the Administrator, and the former transmits copies of the correspondence to the Secretary of State. This is the usual course; but the Administrator cannot, whatever guidance he may receive, proceed to pass laws affecting certain subjects without previously obtaining the assent of the Sovereign, such, for example, as laws for removing natives from the Possession or supplying them with arms and intoxicants. In case of emergency, or where he deems it necessary, the Administrator could of course address himself direct to the Secretary of State, but that is not likely to be often required, and it could not fail to cause delay in ordinary matters, and to break the continuity of correspondence. It will thus be seen that outside New Guinea the person who can most influence the ordinary administration of the Possession is the Premier of Queensland. In actual practice the arrangement has worked remarkably well. The truth is that the premiers of Queensland have all been business men of large experience, who have long before they occupied that position learned to dispose of official work, and to trust the colleagues with whom they co-operate.

3. A Strong Governor

Within New Guinea, MacGregor was assisted by an Executive Council made up of senior government officials and a Legislative Council which included the Executive Council and other appointed members. Despite the necessity to consult several governments and his Executive and Legislative Councils it is said that MacGregor, because of his character, still wielded considerable power. C. A. W. Monckton recorded a number of stories to illustrate MacGregor's strength and ability.

From: C. A. W. Monckton, *Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident Magistrate*, London, 1921, pp. 11-12.

. . . it was necessary for him [MacGregor], unless he was prepared to have a trained surveyor always with him on his expeditions, to have a knowledge of astronomy and surveying. This he took up with his usual vigour, and I once witnessed a little incident which showed, not only how perfect Sir William had made himself in the subject, but also his unbounded confidence in himself. We were lying off a small island about which a doubt existed as to whether it was within the waters of Queensland or New Guinea. The commander of the *Merrie England*, together with the navigating officer, took a set of stellar observations; the chief Government surveyor, together with an assistant surveyor, took a second set; and Sir William took a third. The ship's party and the surveyors arrived at one result, Sir William at a slightly different one; an ordinary man would have decided that four highly competent professional men must be right and he wrong; not so, however, MacGregor. "Ye are both wrong," was his remark, when their results were handed to him by the commander and surveyor. They demurred, pointing out that their observations tallied. "Do it again, ye don't agree with mine;" and sure enough Sir William proved right and they wrong. . . .

One little story about MacGregor, a story I have always loved, was that on one occasion while sitting in Legislative Council some member, bolder than usual, asked "What happens, your Excellency, should Council differ with your views?" "Man," replied Sir William, "the result would be the same."

4. Basic Legislation

One of MacGregor's first tasks in British New Guinea was to pass basic legislation controlling land and labour, protecting the people of the colony from what were thought to be the worst effects of European contact, and establishing the legal and financial framework of the administration.

From: *British New Guinea Annual Report for 1888/89*, pp. 6-7.

ORDINANCE NO. I. of 1888 prohibits supplying to natives in any manner firearms, ammunition, explosives, intoxicating liquor, or opium, under heavy penalties. It is also made illegal for natives to have these things in their possession. The Administrator may, however, give firearms to natives for self-defence and may after inquiry

grant permits in certain cases to natives to use firearms for ordinary purposes. Intoxicating liquor and opium may be given medicinally in cases of necessity, the burden of proving the existence of such necessity resting on the person that gives the liquor or opium to the native in question. . . .

9. ORDINANCE NO. II. of 1888 prohibits any person from purchasing land, or any interest in land, from any native. Natives are also forbidden to sell land or any interest therein; and any such transaction is further declared null and void. The Administrator may, however, purchase land in the public interest, after he has satisfied himself that the land is not required, or likely to be required, for native use. No instance of a violation of this law has come under the notice of the courts.

10. ORDINANCE III. of 1888 was passed to prevent the removal of the aboriginal natives of the Possession from their own districts. What constitutes a district may from time to time be fixed or altered by the Executive; but if any native lives in a place not included in a district as above, the district of such native is held to be within a radius of ten miles from his ordinary place of residence. To not impede the industrial employment of natives by traders and settlers, permits may be granted to employers having natives from other districts in their service before the passing of the Ordinance. Natives may also be engaged before a magistrate to serve on board any boat or vessel at all places within the boundaries of the Possession. They may further be removed from their own district to any other district in the Possession for the purposes of education, or the advancement of religious teaching. They may also be freely engaged in any capacity in connection with Her Majesty's Government in British New Guinea

11. ORDINANCE IV. of 1888 was passed to adopt the laws of Queensland as the Laws of British New Guinea, in so far as the same are applicable to the circumstances of the Possession, and not repugnant to any provision in its Constitution. It also provides for the establishment of Courts of Justice. From this general adoption of the Laws in force in Queensland certain exceptions are specified, chiefly having reference to the Constitution—Judicature, Supreme or District Courts, Fiscal Matters, Real Property, Municipalities, Schools and Churches, Trial by Jury, and Mining. Courts of Petty Sessions are established under this Ordinance. Each such court is presided over by a Resident Magistrate having the jurisdiction of a Police Magistrate in Queensland.

5. Strict Labour Law

The first labour regulations (Ordinance III of 1888) had been very restrictive, but as there was little demand for labour there was no great opposition from employers. In 1892 MacGregor explained the new regulations to intending settlers.

From: Sir William MacGregor, *Handbook of Information for Intending Settlers in British New Guinea*, Brisbane, 1892, p. 8.

The employment of native labourers is regulated by "*The Native Labour Ordinance of 1892*" Natives cannot be removed from the Possession except under such circumstances as are specially mentioned in that Ordinance. They can be engaged orally by an employer for periods not exceeding one month, provided that the natives are not employed ashore or afloat at a greater distance than twenty-five miles from their home.

They must be engaged before a magistrate if the period of engagement exceeds a month, or if they are to work at any place more than twenty-five miles from home. Natives may be engaged before a magistrate in any part of the Possession, to work in any other part.

Women cannot be engaged to work on board vessels. Persons not having a residence or place of business in the Possession cannot engage native labourers before a magistrate. The greatest period for which natives can be engaged as labourers under engagement is twelve months.

6. Safeguarding Papuans' Land

MacGregor was later to refer to the land legislation as "the palladium of Papua". MacGregor accepted that the Papuans were the owners of the land; a point he felt it was necessary to emphasise because the land rights of the Australian Aborigines had generally not been recognised in the Australian Colonies.

From: *British New Guinea Annual Report for 1888-89*, p. 24.

It cannot be sufficiently often repeated in connection with the land question in the Possession that the Papuans, as far as the country has been officially inspected, are agriculturists, and live in settled village communities. They are almost entirely dependent on their gardens for the means of existence, and on the fruits or products of certain trees growing on the tribal lands, bread-fruit, cycas,

hodava, figs, mangrove, sago, mangoes, etc. By hunting and fishing they sometimes supplement their vegetable fare; but these additions to their diet, though important in some districts, in no way weaken the assertion that, to use a figure of speech, the people are dependent on cultivation for their bread. As to the fixed nature of their settlement on the land, it may be observed that, although many village sites are clearly ancient, yet large numbers, if not the majority, are not very old. The village is not infrequently shifted from one site to another within a certain radius, but that does not imply a synchronous occupation of new or abandonment of old planting lands; the gardens will, speaking generally, be kept up at the same places as before, if there are no reasons of fear or force to necessitate a change. In short, certain tribes frequently shift the place of their abode from one part of their land to another; and sometimes, by permission, they build and plant on the lands of other tribes. All these mutations, however, only tend to confirm the fact of fixed proprietary rights in the soil.

7. Land For Settlers

Settlers wanting land could obtain it under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1890. Macgregor summarised its main provisions.

From: Sir William MacGregor, *Handbook of Information for Intending Settlers in British New Guinea*, Brisbane, 1892, p. 5.

Land cannot be leased or purchased from natives save by the Crown. Land for which a Crown grant has not been issued can therefore be bought or leased from the Government only. The Crown may either purchase or lease land from the natives, provided that the Administrator is satisfied that such land, or the use or usufruct thereof is not required nor likely to be required by the native owners. The Crown may also take possession of waste and vacant land. When the Crown acquires land by purchase, or takes possession of it as being waste and vacant, a deed attesting the acquisition is prepared and recorded in the office of the Registrar-General. All lands so dealt with are then legally Crown lands, for which a purchaser from the Government can obtain a Crown grant.

The Government may sell Crown land by private bargain or by public auction. If Crown land is sold by the Government by private bargain on the condition that the purchaser shall introduce some new industry in cultivating the land, and shall carry out some

specified extent of improvement within a given time, the price of the land alienated may be as low as two shillings and sixpence an acre. If no conditions as to improvements are imposed, the price to be paid for land cannot be less an acre than—

- (1) For agricultural land, 10s.;
- (2) For pastoral land, 2s.;
- (3) For land for trading or fishing purposes, £5;
- (4) For land for the planting of cocoanuts, 5s.

When a conditional sale is made by the Government a provisional Crown grant can be issued, which can be substituted by a Crown grant absolute, when the conditions of sale have been complied with.

Land in parcels not exceeding 50 acres can be purchased at £1 an acre, this payment being made in instalments extending over a period of five years.

Crown lands, or land in which the Crown possesses a leasehold interest, can be leased to applicants by the Government. If no improvement conditions are attached to a lease of agricultural land, the annual rent cannot be less than 1s. an acre; if the land is leased subject to improvement conditions, no rent may be payable for three years, but after that period the minimum rent would be 6d. an acre. Leases may also be granted with a purchasing clause.

Land suitable for planting coconut trees may be leased for sixty years. No rent may be payable for the first five years, but for the next five years it cannot be less than 6d. an acre, and for the remainder of the lease not less than 1s. an acre each year.

The Crown reserves all gold and silver in or under any land granted or leased.

From what precedes it may be seen that the Government will not, and cannot, deprive any native of his land.

8. MacGregor and White Settlers

There has been some doubt about MacGregor's attitude towards settlement by white planters. In 1895 he outlined his policy of economic development in the hands of both Europeans and Papuans. By the time he left New Guinea MacGregor was convinced that development would have to be in the hands of large companies. He supported the application of the New Guinea Land Syndicate for land and government assistance.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXVI, 1894-95, pp. 201, 204, 252.

. . . side by side with the planter, it is hoped that the native will become a useful cultivator on his own account. Practically all the pearls, sandal-wood, trepang, and copra exported now are got and prepared by the natives. The way they are taking to washing out gold on their own account on Sudest shows that they are apt enough to learn from Europeans. The products that are suited for the operations of Europeans would be largely suitable for the native also. If he sees once how to grow tea, coffee, vanilla, rice, sugar-cane, ginger, tobacco, and such things, he will soon imitate others when he learns that he can sell his produce. At present the areas growing cocoa-nuts are small, but this industry can be extended by both natives and Europeans to very large dimensions on the great length of coast line—over 3,500 miles on the mainland and the islands together. . . .

At present the total of the white population probably does not exceed three hundred. A great accession of numbers and of capital is therefore required to bring about the development so much desired. It may confidently be asserted that the public men of Australia connected with the direction of affairs in British New Guinea will maintain the policy and measures best suited to reach this great end, a policy that is based on fair and just treatment to the native race, while furthering in every possible way the settlement of Europeans in a manner that will continue to avoid racial conflict and hatred.

An effort was made lately by the Government of Queensland and that of British New Guinea to establish there a company prepared to carry on agricultural operations on a large scale. The scheme did not meet with the approval of the other contributing Colonies, and it has been disallowed by the Secretary of State, who of course in dealing with such matters has to take into consideration factors outside the scope of, or even totally unknown to, the Government of the Possession.

It is not likely that much will be done without the co-operation of companies of this kind; and it is very improbable that any company will adventure there without receiving considerable inducement to do so. The time has come in the history of the Colony when such operations should be facilitated and encouraged whenever favourable and reasonable opportunities present themselves for doing so. In this way the Colony could be made self-supporting in a very short time.

9. Company Development

Hubert Murray wrote of MacGregor's attitude to white settlement and development by large companies.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, pp. 17-18.

Sir William has been accused of discouraging settlement, one of the commonest of the many charges that are brought against all administrators, and it is true, as he himself admits, that he did discourage certain applications; one of these was an application for a million acres, another for half a million, and a third for a grant of 254,080 acres with freedom from customs duties. There can be no doubt, I think, that he was right in refusing such applications as these, but there was another class of settler whom he also discouraged, and that was the small farmer class. Of this class of applicant he says: "One could not entice such a man, ignorant as he is of tropical agriculture, to his ruin in the Possession; he has been uniformly discouraged." It is perhaps questionable whether his action was right in the case of this particular class; but personally I consider that, under the existing circumstances of the Territory, it was fully justified. That he finally, and in despair, encouraged and accepted the application of the New Guinea Land Syndicate was perhaps a mistake, according to Australian ideas, but, if so, it was a mistake which was caused entirely by his anxiety to promote settlement of some kind in the Possession.

This Syndicate consisted of a number of English capitalists who were anxious to develop the resources of British New Guinea, both agricultural and mineral, and indeed of every other kind, and their application eventually took the form of a Bill which was passed as an Ordinance—Ordinance I of 1898—and conferred on the Syndicate the right of purchasing 250,000 acres in fee simple, and other privileges of a rather unusual nature, such, e.g., as the sole right of purchase for a certain time of all available lands. This Ordinance, after a spirited controversy between the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir George Turner, Premier of Victoria, was finally disapproved by the Governments of the contributing Colonies, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, and never actually became law. The scheme of settlement outlined in the Ordinance is one that would never approve itself to Australian opinion, but it would be unjust to Sir William to suppose that it is the kind of colonization that he would have chosen. "The tropical settler was sought first," he says, "and would have been preferred; but as he was not obtainable a company had to be accepted."

10. British New Guinea to Pay for Itself

MacGregor accepted the general assumption of the time that the Colony should pay for itself. It was therefore necessary to stimulate development which could eventually be taxed to provide government revenue.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXVI, 1894-95, pp. 199-200.

It would be absurd to suppose that, even from the highest motives, these Colonies could go on paying £15,000 a year for all time for maintaining a paternal and philanthropic government in the Possession. The £15,000 represents the amount available for the ordinary expenses of the Administration. Last year the revenue was in round numbers about £6,000, representing nearly two-fifths of the expenditure on establishments and services, exclusive of the cost of maintenance of the steamer. That this burden must be reduced until it disappears may be accepted as a truism. This leads us at once to the question of the future prospects of the Possession. The first question is, What can be done with the country by Europeans and by the natives?

11. Armed Constabulary and Village Constables

In 1890 MacGregor established the Armed Native Constabulary. He became a great admirer of the work of the Constabulary.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXX, 1898-99, pp. 243-4.

The principal body of natives in regular employment is the armed constabulary, the rank and file of which is altogether native. The prestige of this force of about 110 men is now well established. It possesses a nucleus of experienced constables that have practically made this service their profession, and who lend to it solidity and confidence. It is kept up by voluntary enlistment, and there is now no difficulty in obtaining selected men as recruits. Members of this force and other native employees have often shown touching fidelity and confidence towards their officers; and they begin to display a proper loyalty towards their Queen, whose servants they say with pride they are. Recently some of them showed considerable enthusiasm over "the Queen's Mountain"—Mount Victoria—which they hold to be the special personal property of Her Majesty. The Secre-

tary of State has sanctioned the institution of a good service medal in connection with the force. It has already been well earned by a few men. The constabulary is quite trustworthy in every respect, and is amply sufficient to meet any calls likely to be made upon it in establishing order among new tribes, and in enforcing respect for law among those already under control. A much larger force could now be speedily raised by the Government should any emergency make this necessary.

Since the annexation of the Possession no bluejacket or marine has been landed to perform police duty, and in fact no ship of war has since then visited its western waters of the Possession; and during the ten years elapsed there has not been a soldier in the service of the colony. In the same period the constabulary have had to fight their own countrymen on many occasions, sometimes when to each of them there were opposed twenty or thirty of the best bowmen in the world. They never met with a reverse. As a matter of simple fact the administration has practically had to subdue by force almost every district now under control. This has chiefly been done through the constabulary. These facts sufficiently attest the value of the force.

In addition to the Armed Constabulary MacGregor had Village Constables appointed.

From: *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXVI 1894-95, pp. 213-14.

The regulation for the appointment of village constables is of very great importance. Its object is to create a force of rural policemen to deal with cases in their own villages, principally coming under the native regulations. It was quite manifest that a force of armed constabulary could never be maintained sufficiently large to deal with such cases as petty theft in every village. A resident of the place can operate in such matters with better effect. Their cost to the Government will be about thirty-five shillings a man a year, consisting of two suits of uniform, and one pound in money. About four score of these are on duty already, and many of them have done excellent service. Not a few of them are men that were imprisoned for breaches of the law committed at a time when they did not know any better. Some of them have served in the constabulary. They are not provided with arms, and of course require to be watched closely and to be taught by magistrates, but they already form one of the most important institutions in the colony.

12. Violent Clashes on Patrol

MacGregor won the admiration of his companions for the energy and determination he displayed as a traveller in difficult conditions. He ascended many of the navigable rivers of British New Guinea, he climbed Mt. Victoria and he crossed the island in the east from coast to coast. Much of his exploration was carried out as part of his concern with matters of administration in remote parts of the colony. In his reports there is ample evidence of the hardships faced by early patrols and the violence of many clashes between the government and the newly contacted people. In June 1897 MacGregor led a patrol inland from Tamata station.

From: *British New Guinea Annual Report for 1896/97*, pp. 32-3.

As I was ill of fever when we started, and as the path was bad on account of the heavy rain that had fallen recently, we camped about four miles beyond the two empty villages. As I was too ill to be able to reach our destination next day, I sent the sergeant ahead at mid-day with all the constables except four, in order to surprise the natives if possible. I followed in the afternoon at a slower pace. The road all day was over ground consisting uniformly of a ridge and a swamp. The swamp was sometimes not easy to cross; but in the afternoon we came to a part of the country where bamboos about 1 to 1½ inches in diameter grow into dense thickets. The natives had cut down large trees across the path and blocked the whole by masses of this bamboo, so that it was not easy, by climbing, creeping, and crawling, to get past some mile or two of these obstructions.

I was unable, on account of fever, to reach the villages on the 8th, and had to camp in the forest again and resume the journey next morning. At many places the natives had taken advantage of the presence of large quantities of "lawyer" cane, of the most thorny sort, to block the path with these. On the 9th I reached the villages before noon. The whole of the country between the Apochi villages and the Gira consists of ridges separated by narrow swamps.

Some women and children were captured, but released. Several days later a patrol by members of the Armed Constabulary came across a group of men who were thought to have killed John Green, the Resident Magistrate.

. . . a skirmish immediately began, which ended in two of the bushmen being shot dead. It had been learned from one of the prisoners in the morning that the warriors that massacred Mr. Green and his men were all or nearly all in this party. The fact of our

sending back the female prisoners during the day seemed to lead the braves of the tribe to think we were afraid, and at sundown one could hear some orator haranguing them before they set out for the Wade gardens. The constables were, however, by no means afraid, but speedily drove them into the river. One constable was so close on one of them when they reached the river that both fell into the edge of it down a bank about 5 feet high. The bushman got up first, and had his spear already nearly raised to kill the constable when a brother constable shot the spearman dead at a distance of about 3 feet. Next day we kept quiet indoors, without fire, to give out the appearance that we had returned to the Mambare. The patrols went out again at night to watch the gardens, but their experience of the previous evening had determined the natives not to cross again to our side of the river.

On the 14 June the main fighting force was found.

The natives were met with near where they were expected to be, and a fight at once began, in which the bush warriors soon had to flee, leaving four of their number shot dead, and throwing away spears, shields, tomahawks, &c. It did not appear to me desirable to push matters any further at that time. It was very certain that these warriors would not again pursue the constabulary. They were completely humiliated in the eyes of the other tribes. With time and good management their pacification and settlement may be effected through the intervention of friendly tribes, and the ringleaders still at large may be delivered up. Time was also passing, so I decided to leave the district for the present. Next day there was a flood in the river, and of this we took advantage to descend to the sea. All natives below Wade were friendly, and wished to sell us food; even those of Tetu made advances to us this time. We met a boat in the river, above Tetu, from the "Merrie England," which had arrived from Port Moresby. We could not, however, get out of the river that day on account of the heavy breakers on the bar. It was very plain that the natives had been much impressed by seeing that my party had gone up the Mambare, crossed from the Upper Mambare to the Upper Gira, and descended the latter, thus going right round the country where most of their villages are situated. They were certainly left strongly disposed to be friendly.

13. Hubert Murray's Opinion

From the relative calm of the days of 'peaceful penetration', Murray wrote of MacGregor's patrolling.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua To-Day*, London, 1925, pp. 21-2.

Anyone reading the old reports must be struck by the difference between the language then used in describing the steps taken to extend the Government influence, and the language which would now be used by an officer in detailing an encounter which he might have had with some new tribe in the far interior. Thus, for instance, it was necessary in 1890 to go to Kabadi in order to "curb the natives of that tribe," and, as a result, "the chief was taken to Port Moresby in irons," and "the district was completely subjected to authority." In 1891 "the powerful tribes of Mekeo would not submit to Government authority without a preliminary struggle."¹ In 1893 "the subjection of Aroma may be regarded as complete. They fully and entirely admit the superiority of the Government." In 1894 the people of Darava (Table Bay) were followed up by the Constabulary, "but declined a regular pitched battle,"² and in 1897-8 "the arrogant tribes" of the Upper Brown River "are reduced to peace."

Nowadays the incidents would probably be exactly the same (except that the chief would perhaps not be taken to Port Moresby in irons), but they would be described in a different way, and this difference is not solely due to the prevalence of a less formal style of writing; it indicates, in my opinion, an entirely different conception of the task before the Government. We know that the Government party must win in the end, whatever hardship and even loss of life may be involved in the process, and the reason that we no longer talk of "arrogant tribes" and "pitched battles" is that such language seems to us rather out of proportion to the task we have in hand. But in the old days this was not so. The issue really was regarded as doubtful; no one quite knew what he was "up against," and the newly formed Armed Constabulary were to some extent an unknown quantity. Even as late as 1904, when I arrived in the Possession, it was considered rash to force an issue with the natives of the Purari Delta, and when this district was visited by the Acting Administrator in 1903 it was thought unwise to enter any of the villages without an express invitation.

14. Spheres of Mission Influence

When MacGregor arrived in British New Guinea two missions had commenced work, the London Missionary Society and the

¹Annual Report, 1891-2, p. xvi.

²Annual Report, 1893-4, p. xviii.

Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart. At a meeting in Port Moresby in 1890 'spheres of influence' were allocated to the Methodist and Anglican churches and the London Missionary Society.

From: *British New Guinea Annual Report of 1889/90*, p. 19.

Both the English Church and the Wesleyan Church have decided to take up missionary work in the Possession. The Rev. A. Maclaren visited New Guinea on behalf of the former, and the Rev. George Brown on behalf of the latter. These gentlemen met the Rev. W. G. Lawes and the Rev. James Chalmers at Port Moresby, where they resolved to divide the field of labour, so that the Wesleyan mission should occupy the whole of the Louisiade and Dentrecaesteaux groups of islands, and the part of the mainland from East Cape to Cape Ducie; the Anglican mission the whole of the north-east coast from Cape Ducie to the northern boundary; the London Missionary Society all the south coast, excluding the portion taken up by the missionaries of the Society of the Sacred Heart. This is as good an arrangement as could have been come to. The two new missions were happy in the selection of their representatives for the settlement of these matters; and it can be seen that the veteran missionaries of the original mission have met their fellow-workers in the most generous spirit, seeking only the best interests of the native population.

15. Importance of Missions

After he left New Guinea MacGregor spoke of the work of the missions.

From: Sir William MacGregor, "British New Guinea", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. XXX, 1898-99, pp. 247-9.

Mission work is of such value and importance in the Colony that it must be noticed in any general account of it. Considerable development has taken place lately in each one of the four missions. Formerly none of them were enthusiastic in teaching English to the natives, but this attitude has been considerably modified, a matter of much moment seeing that the education of the young, so far as this is attended to at all, is entirely in the hands of the missions, and is carried on at the expense of mission funds. The London Missionary Society clearly leads the way, at the present time, in teaching English, in which language exclusively several of their schools are now con-

ducted. The others are beginning to teach English also, but the very superficial acquaintance of many of the teachers with this language, and the total ignorance of others, makes this branch a difficult one for all the missions. Additions have been made to each staff, and a number of new stations have been opened. In regard to these, the policy of the Government has been all through to find, where possible, sufficient land for each station to grow its own food. Excellent training institutions for preparing native teachers are now in full operation in the districts of the London Missionary Society and of the Wesleyan Mission. Material for this is also being prepared by the Anglican mission. It seems to be recognised by these missions that the Colony can only by the employment of the natives themselves ever be completely evangelised, just in the way the Government can govern the country only through native policemen and native employés. . . .

Three of the four missions have strictly confined themselves to their own districts; but the fourth has shown a decided tendency to establish itself where there are already teachers of a different denomination. There are, of course, in the districts of each of the four numerous tribes totally unprovided with teachers

There are in the Possession about thirty thousand natives under the direct influence of the missions. But missionary influence permeates sometimes to a considerable distance beyond the actual working sphere of a teacher. It is not uncommon to meet with a new tribe that never saw a teacher, but in which the chief spokesmen will announce that "they belong to the missionary," whose name even they do not know. In this untaught zone missionary influence is always on the right side, though it is not strong, and in spite of the *bizarre* ideas of those that profess it when they deem it advantageous to do so. It is not improbable that the total number of natives that have felt the presence of the missions amounts to some 50,000. During the ten years' existence of the Government of the Possession, no member of any mission lost his life by violence. Before that time the London Society, the pioneer mission, suffered heavy and deplorable loss in that way.

16. MacGregor Looks Back

In the Introduction to J. H. P. Murray's book, MacGregor reviewed the early history of British New Guinea and his years at the head of the administration.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, pp. 21-8.

I have been invited by Mr. Murray to write a few words of introduction to his book on Papua. As I spent the best ten years of my life—less six months on leave of absence—in that country, it will naturally always possess an interest for me. . . .

In 1883 Sir Thomas MacIlwraith sent my old and revered friend, H. M. Chester, J.P., then Resident at Thursday Island, to annex the eastern half of New Guinea. . . .

The reasons for this step were given afterwards by Sir Thomas MacIlwraith in these words:—

“Federation among the Colonies was the first step towards the confederation of the Empire. On that account he looked back with pride on the action that Queensland had taken (with regard to New Guinea). It did not spring from a paltry desire to get more land, for they already had 400,000,000 acres, with a population of only 300,000; nor from a wish to get niggers to work on the sugar plantations, because they knew that the natives of New Guinea were not fitted for the work, but simply for the purpose of preventing bad neighbours from coming near them, and in order to become part and parcel of the British Empire.” . . .

We went to New Guinea solely and simply to serve our own ends, and this fact should never be forgotten in dealing with the natives of that country.

The Queen’s sovereignty was finally declared over British New Guinea by the First Administrator, September 4, 1888, with the usual formalities, to whom the oaths of office and allegiance were administered by the present Governor of South Australia, His Excellency Sir Hort Day Bosanquet, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., &c., then in command of H.M.S. *Opal*, which had been ordered by Admiral Fairfax to transport the Administrator to Port Moresby.

The Queen’s sovereignty was thus declared over a new country with a superficial area exceeding 90,000 square miles, without a single soldier or policeman to support the new administration. The guaranteed revenue was £15,000 a year. This may, perhaps, be regarded with some right as the first political example of “peaceful penetration.”

Captain Bosanquet was a sailor, but he understood perfectly the position of a government that existed only in a proclamation. The position of the Administrator was not unlike that of a man dropped into deep water with his hands tied behind his back, and is worth recalling on account of some winged words of Captain Bosanquet, who frankly informed me he was specially instructed to not land any men for police or similar duty in the possession; “but,” he added, “if I see you fellows beset anywhere with your back to a wall, I shall

not look on with indifference." I shall always remember those few words with sincere gratitude, and treasure them as worthy of a British sailor.

The great tasks before one were: First of all to consider the form in which legislation should be initiated and carried out, so that when the proper time came New Guinea should become part of federated Australia, with a native population intact, without which the possession would be useless. There was, of course, no legislature to begin with. The most important laws were those that dealt with land. The Land Law was drafted by me, but was very carefully revised by Sir Samuel Griffith, with whom, on this fundamental question, I was in complete accord. It is the palladium of Papua. I understand that it is claimed that the Land Laws as now modified in Papua are held up as being a model, on liberal principles. It may reasonably be doubted whether land laws that do not grant titles in fee simple are liberal or not. But that is a mere matter of academical detail compared to the security of native tenure provided by the original Land Law of Papua, for which the natives of that country owe a debt of gratitude to the Right Honourable Sir Samuel Griffith, without whose concurrence it could never have been passed. I understand that in certain quarters it is now thought the native had too much consideration in that settlement, and that he now begins to take full advantage of his position. If that is so, it may be regarded as a pleasant proof of vitality in the race, and a dawning power to look after their own interests. For my part, I am bound to say I had no difficulty in obtaining any land required in the possession.

The Land Laws were buttressed by others that were absolutely effective against liquor, opium, &c. In recent years I have had many applications for copies of the native code of laws prepared in New Guinea.

The establishment of courts, of a constabulary, of Government departments, were all matters of some difficulty and anxiety. There was also much labour in preparing the twenty or thirty native dialects that were printed during the first decade of the administration. This will be understood from the fact that I spent three days in a new tribe before I could find out in their language the words "What is that?"

It has, I am informed, become customary to regard exploration as the characteristic of the first decade of the existence of Papua. Exploration as apart from administration was indulged in only once. It has been shown by experience that exploring expeditions, sent from Australia or elsewhere, too frequently ended in collision with the natives, and it was decided that a Government expedition should proceed to the top of Mount Victoria, which it was thought would

put a stop to others from outside. This had the desired result. All other explorations were on an administrative basis, but administration does not appeal to the imagination like exploration. The best work of an administrator is seldom heard of, because it is not spectacular. I have often received thanks and congratulations for the accomplishment of tasks that required force; but only once have I been thanked by a Secretary of State for peacefully composing trouble that threatened to develop into civil war.

Mr. Murray, with characteristic modesty, does not discuss the question of missions in Papua, because he professes to not have sufficient detailed knowledge of their working. I cannot advance that plea.

The two finest and best institutions I left in New Guinea were the constabulary and village police, and the missions. The great distinguishing feature of the four missions of Papua is the division of the country into four specified working areas. The fundamental ideas in that were: to prevent overlapping; and to not confuse the native mind by conflicting doctrine and practice. No attempt at encroachment was ever encouraged or facilitated by the Government, which was, however, always ready to procure land required for any new settlement, without regard to Church or sect. To encourage mission work in every possible way was considered a sacred duty by the Government. To not do so would, indeed, have been a complete departure from the principles on which British or English colonisation first originated.

British New Guinea was indeed fortunate in her early missionaries. No book on New Guinea would be complete without the names of such men as the intellectual G. W. Lawes, D.D., of Glasgow University, and of the Rev. James Chalmers, both of the pioneer London Missionary Society.

The active, courageous, earnest, and versatile Bishop Verjus, of the Sacred Heart Mission, deserves to be remembered. He was succeeded by the large-minded Dr. Ginocchi, a most enlightened man, and perhaps the greatest scholar I have known.

Then came the Church of England Mission, represented by the Rev. Albert Maclaren, a man that read a portion of his Greek New Testament every day; a man whose large heart brought him into direct sympathy with the native. His early death was a great loss to New Guinea.

Last to arrive was the Methodist Mission, under the permanent chairmanship of the Rev. W. Bromilow, D.D., of Aberdeen University, a splendid administrator, a devoted Christian teacher, and a strong man.

Perhaps no missionaries did more good in New Guinea than Mrs.

Lawes and Mrs. Bromilow, two ladies that should always be remembered with affection by the natives of Port Moresby and Dobu.

It has always been to me a great consolation that during the first ten years of administration in British New Guinea, no missionary, white or black, male or female, ever lost his or her life through violence. I do not even remember of one having been attacked by natives.¹

No Governor was ever served by a more loyal or more willing and capable staff of officers than I had in New Guinea. What Papua owes to some of them now, alas, dead and gone, may some day be put in black and white. I fear too much of their work has been put to my credit.

I cannot but add a word of appreciation of the natives of the country. They are at first shy, but when they are won over they are absolutely faithful. They soon learn to trust a European, and, when they do so, they will freely expose their life for him. The bravest man I have ever known was a Papuan. Their capabilities for civilisation are great. In short, they are the most valuable asset of Papua.

That they will receive fair and just treatment so long as Mr. Murray rules over Papua, I fully believe. Had it been otherwise I should never have written this introduction.

¹It may be mentioned in this connection that in all the journeys made by me in New Guinea we never lost a human life. True, we had some twenty or thirty men wounded in encounters with different tribes, but none killed, though the constabulary and others had at times to face hostile hordes armed with spear, club, and bow and arrow. Perhaps the most formidable of all were slingers, when posted on vantage-ground, as on the north-east coast, and once on Goodenough Island. As to this last place it may be noticed that there have been lately several amusing articles in English newspapers on an expedition sent out to explore that island, which is represented as practically inaccessible to Europeans. The truth is that a tribe of the Goodenough Islanders did once, a good few years ago, show fight. But they never gave any trouble after the constabulary went behind them and camped for some time on the top of the island, whence was procured the finest collection of beetles obtained in any part of New Guinea. The expedition will probably be surprised to find some good Christians on Goodenough Island.

III. GAORIBARI AND JUSTICE

On 8 April 1901 James Chalmers, Oliver Tomkins and ten Papuans were killed at Goaribari Island in the Gulf of Papua. The death of the mission party at Goaribari and the events which followed dominated the history of British New Guinea in the early years of the twentieth century. In May 1901 Sir George Le Hunte, the Administrator, led a punitive expedition to Goaribari. Le Hunte returned to Goaribari in March 1902 and obtained the skull of James Chalmers. A third expedition was led by Christopher Robinson, Chief Judicial Officer and Acting Administrator, in March 1904. Again a conflict occurred and a number of people from Goaribari were shot. Numerous accounts of what happened at Goaribari in 1904 were published, 'some being of a sensational nature'; and the Australian Government appointed Charles E. R. Murray, a New South Wales judge, to conduct a Royal Commission in Sydney. The following extracts are from the "Royal Commission of Inquiry respecting the collision between the natives of Goaribari Island, British New Guinea, and the Government party on the steam yacht Merrie England, on the 6th of March, 1904."

1. Events Seen from the Niue

Chalmers and his party landed from the Niue which was also threatened and left to get help.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission on the Affray at Goaribari Island, British New Guinea, 6 March 1904," *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 9, 10.

2. During the afternoon of the 7th of April, 1901, the London Missionary Society's Schooner, "Niue" arrived at Goaribari Island. This Island is situated in the Gulf of Papua, on the southern shore of the Western Division of British New Guinea; it lies opposite to the mouth of the Omati River, one of the many channels by which the parent stream, the Aird River, discharges its waters into the ocean. Situated at a distance of about a mile from the mainland, it is easy of access, by means of canoes, to the native Papuans, of whom

between 3,000 and 3,500 have made it their home. These natives dwell in a number of small villages, the two principal of which, Dopima and Turotere, lie close to the landward or northern shore of the island. In one of his reports Sir George Le Hunte states, that "the locality is one which has a very bad reputation; the population is large and savage."

3. Very soon after her arrival, the schooner "Niue" was surrounded by natives in canoes, who clamorously invited the Missionaries to visit in their villages, which Dr. Chalmers, who was in charge of the party, promised to do.

5. Without waiting for breakfast, Dr. Chalmers went ashore in his whaleboat, accompanied by the Rev. O. F. Tomkins, nine native mission students, and Navagi, chief of Ipisia. The majority of the natives, in their canoes, accompanied Dr. Chalmers party, who had stated that it was their intention to return in time for breakfast.

6. Some of the natives stayed with the schooner, at her anchorage; and, after the whaleboat's party had been seen to land and disappear into the village of Dopima, in spite of the efforts of the captain (a Rarotongan) and the crew (Papuan of Kiwai island), who had been trying to pacify them by making them presents of tobacco and other "trade," they boarded and looted her, but without attempting to kill any of the crew. They then returned on shore.

7. The whaleboat at Dopima had, during this time, been noticed to come out a little from the shore; but neither Dr. Chalmers nor Mr. Tomkins were then in her; and, soon after, she was seen to return to the shore, as if those in her had been prevented from leaving.

8. As the natives began to return to the schooner, and there was a danger of their seizing her, the captain took advantage of a breeze which sprang up opportunely, weighed anchor, and stood further out.

9. At this time some of the natives on shore were noticed to be making certain signals; which, the Kiwai men in the "Niue" told the captain, meant that the party which had gone to Dopima had been killed, and that their heads had been cut off.

10. As the canoes, which had sheered off when the schooner was got under weigh, tried again to close with the vessel, the captain took her further out, and anchored; but later in the evening he went still further out into the gulf to secure a safer anchorage, owing to the shallowness of the water. Next morning he returned to Goaribari Island by the western channel; but, as he could see nothing of Dr. Chalmers' party, he left to report the matter at Daru and Port Moresby, arriving at the latter port on the 27th of April.

2. Kemeris Account

When Le Hunte led the punitive expedition to Goaribari in May 1901 a prisoner, Kemeris, was taken. A member of the Armed Constabulary was able to speak with Kemeris and through him the first account of what had happened to Chalmers and his companions was obtained.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission on the Affray at Goaribari Island, British New Guinea, 6 March 1904", *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, p. 99.

1. The name of the village I was captured in is Dopima. I, however, belong to Dubumuba, a village on Baiba Bari Island. I, myself, was not present at the massacre; only the big men of the village went. I have, however, heard all about it. My father, Marawa, sent me to Dopima to get a tomahawk to build a canoe. The name of the village you camped in the first night is Turotere. The first suggestion for massacring the L.M.S. party came from Garopo, off whose village, Dopima, the "Niue" was anchored. Word was at once sent round that night to villages in the vicinity to come to help. It is the usual custom for people of the surrounding villages, when a large boat is sighted, to congregate in one place. The following villages were implicated;—Dopima, Turotere, Bai-ia, Aidio, Eheubi, Goari-ubi, Aimaha, Gewari-Bari, Ubo-Oho, Dubumuba. The next morning all the canoes went off and persuaded Messrs. Chalmers and Tomkins and party to come on shore in the whaleboat. Some of the natives remained to loot the "Niue". When they got on shore Messrs. Chalmers and Tomkins and a few boys entered the long house, the rest of the boys remaining to guard the boat. These last however, were also enticed inside the house on pretence of giving them something to eat. The signal for a general massacre was given by knocking simultaneously from behind both Messrs. Chalmers and Tomkins on the head with stone clubs. This was performed in the case of the former by Iake of Turotere, in that of the latter by Arau-u of Turotere. Kaiture, of Dopima, then stabbed Mr. Chalmers in the right side with a cassowary dagger; and then Mururoa cut off his head. Ema cut off Mr. Tomkins' head. They both fell senseless at the first blow of the club. Some names of men concerned in the murder of the rest of the party are; Baibi, Adade, Emai, Utuamu, and Amuke, all of Dopima; also Wahaga and Ema, both of Turotere.

2. All the heads were immediately cut off. We, however, lost one man, Gahibai, of Dopima. He was running to knock a big man (Note.—This must be Navagi, chief of Ipisia) on the head, when the

latter snatched a stone club from a man standing near, and killed Gahibai. He (Navagi) was, however, immediately overpowered. The other boys were too small to make any resistance. In the meantime, the people in canoes left at the "Niue" had come back, after looting her of all the tomahawks, etc. This party was led by Kaitiri, of Dopima. Finding the party on shore dead, it was determined to go back to the "Niue" and kill those on board. However, the "Niue" got underweigh, and left, so they could not accomplish their purpose. I think that the crew of the "Niue" were frightened at the noise on shore. Then Pakara, of Aimaha, called out to the people to come and break up the boat, which had been taken right inside the creek, it being high water. This was done, and the pieces were divided amongst people from the various villages. Pakara is the man who followed and talked to you in the Aimaha Creek for a long time.

3. Directly the heads had been cut off the bodies, some men cut the latter up and handed the pieces over to the women to cook, which they did, mixing the flesh with sago. They were eaten the same day.

4. Gebai has got Mr. Chalmers' head at Dopima, and Mahikaha has got Mr. Tomkins' head at Turotere. The rest of the heads are divided amongst various individuals. Anybody having a new head would naturally, on seeing strange people coming to the village, hide them away in the bush, and leave only the old skulls in the houses. The same applies to the loot from the "Niue".

5. As regards the skulls in the houses, those having artificial noses attached to them are of people who have died natural deaths; those that have no noses attached have been killed.

3. Le Hunte and a "Cruel Set of Savages"

Charles Murray, the Royal Commissioner, summarised Le Hunte's description of his first visit to Goaribari after the 'massacre'.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission", pp. 11-12.

13. Immediately on receipt of the news brought by the "Niue," the Administrator of the Possession, Sir George Le Hunte, made preparations for a punitive expedition; he arrived at Goaribari Island on the 2nd May in the Government yacht "Merrie England," accompanied by the "Ruby," a launch, and the s.s. "Parua," a vessel sent by the Queensland Government with a small party of soldiers, to assist.

14. . . . The following extract will show how he [Le Hunte] regarded his relation to the native:—"I gave orders that we were not to begin hostilities, but that, directly the natives began to fire their arrows at us, we should return it with rifle fire at once; and that on no account if they called out "peace" ("miro") was any answer to be given, as I had no intention of misleading them as to the nature of our visit; and I accept in the fullest measure the entire responsibility for this and every other step that was taken; and none were taken except by my explicit orders. I was perfectly clear that what I determined to do was right and necessary. I was not on an exploring expedition, using every effort to conciliate the natives and avoid collision, even refraining from retaliation of dangerous attacks, as many a time our officers and men have bravely done. I had come to meet face to face a cruel set of savages, who, we were now satisfied, had committed a treacherous massacre of a defenceless and peaceful party of white men and natives, whom they had invited ashore; and had looted and nearly secured their vessel and its crew; and I was determined that, if they attacked my force first, they should reap the result immediately; at the same time, none were to be shot at who were running away or not engaged in the attack. I considered this to be of greater importance than getting to a hand-to-hand fight and killing more men and taking prisoners. The first lesson I intended to teach them was the immediate result of firing arrows within striking distance of any of my party."

15. Continuing his account, Sir George Le Hunte states that when his boats reached land at the villages of Dopima and Turotere the natives fired arrows at them; the signal to attack was therefore immediately given, and the boats' crews instantly opened fire with their rifles. The natives fled, and the punitive party occupied the villages. It was estimated that thirty-four of the natives were killed during these operations; and on this subject the Administrator writes:—"I should be hypocritical were I to say that I deplored the loss of life on this occasion. I deplore the necessity for taking it at all, and I am very glad it was not greater; but it was inevitable, and the natives brought it on themselves, and I believe conscientiously that they deserved it

I had to decide now what punishment I ought to inflict on all those villages which I had reason to believe were implicated or connected in any way with the dreadful tragedy; and I, at length, after careful consideration, decided to visit them all with one or other of our parties and burn down the huts, but not to touch any of the ordinary dwelling-houses of the married men with their women and children. I consulted those of my officers who I knew were sym-

pathetic and experienced with natives; and we came to the conclusion that it was the right thing to do under the circumstances; but, while I took their opinion, the decision was mine, and I was entirely responsible for it It is a form of punishment which I have always condemned, as it usually punishes most the weakest portion of the community—the women and children and the sick; but, by burning these huts only, the punishment would fall only on the fighting men. The houses are made of sago-palm, and can be rebuilt; but, of course, with a considerable amount of time and labour. The blow to the prestige of the village would be greatly felt; and that is of more weight, in this case, than the material loss of the buildings. It was necessary, in my opinion, to leave a lesson behind me which would not only be felt by those punished, but the report of which would spread amongst their neighbours far and wide It only remained, then, to carry it into effect, and I gave instructions accordingly I also decided to destroy several of the large war canoes—dug outs, without outriggers.”

On his second visit to Goaribari in March 1902 Le Hunte said that he came not to make friends with the people of Dopima and Turotere, but to re-establish communication with them. He warned them that he still intended to arrest the leaders in the attack on the missionaries and he wanted the skull of the victims to be given to the government. A skull, said to be that of Chalmers, was obtained. Le Hunte reported that he had questioned a number of people at Goaribari and as a result he had concluded that perhaps only ten had been killed by the punitive expedition of the previous year.

4. Robinson at Goaribari

Judge Robinson arrived at Goaribari in March 1904. With him on the Merrie England were a number of other officials and about forty members of the Armed Constabulary. The events of the 6 March were summarised by Murray, the Royal Commissioner.

From: “Report of the Royal Commission”, p. 15.

31. On . . . Sunday, the 6th, early in the morning, while the ship was lying at anchor, heading about N.W., between the mainland and Goaribari Island, a large number of natives, variously estimated, even as high as 600, came out to the vessel in their canoes. They seemed to have more confidence than on the Saturday. Some of them came on board; and a small amount of trading was done

between them and the crew, native weapons being bartered for tobacco, knives etc. Iake was induced to come on board; Ema had been near the ship in his canoe, but had apparently gone back to the shore. Shortly after the natives came on board, Iake, and a number of the others, were seized. Almost at the same time some of the native police opened fire with their carbines on the natives in their canoes lying round about, from which arrows had been discharged at the ship; the firing was joined in by the Acting-Administrator, and, to a small extent, by a few of the officers and crew. The natives retreated at once, but several were killed or wounded. In a few minutes the firing ceased.

5. Robinson's Suicide

Some of the accounts of Robinson's expedition which circulated in British New Guinea and in Australia suggested that Robinson had gone to Goaribari intending to use force and that large numbers of people (over 100) had been shot. On 16 June 1904 Captain F. R. Barton, who had been appointed Acting Administrator, wrote to Robinson informing him that a Royal Commission was to be held.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission", p. 16.

34. On the morning of the 20th June Captain Barton and a Mr. Manning* were awakened soon after seven o'clock by the continued barking of a dog. They rose to see what was the matter, met on the verandah, and saw something which attracted their attention lying on the grass near a flagstaff. On walking closer they found it was Judge Robinson, still breathing, but mortally wounded by a shot in the forehead; he had a revolver in his hand. They sent at once to the Government Medical Officer, Dr. Craigen; but before he arrived Mr. Robinson was dead. At the inquest, which followed in the ordinary course, the Court found "That Christopher Stansfeld Robinson . . . committed suicide whilst temporarily insane."

6. Robinson's Statements

Before he died Robinson wrote two letters in which he denied most of the rumours circulating about his conduct. Robinson claimed that his aim had been to arrest as many of the four leaders as he

*G. O. Manning was Private Secretary to Captain Barton.

could and recover Tomkins' skull. Robinson concluded his first letter:

From: "Report of the Royal Commission", p. 43.

To sum up, I was of the opinion, and am of the opinion still, that the firing was both justifiable and necessary. I think now that in the excitement which prevailed a good many more shots were fired than would have been if everyone who took part had remained cool and collected; but there are few who can remain unaffected by the excitement and confusion which naturally prevail under circumstances such as I have attempted to describe. My mind was greatly oppressed by the responsibility and anxiety of the matter in hand; and I do not suppose that there was a man on board who was more excited and disturbed by what happened than I. I have since realised that the whole affair was ill-considered, and that I made mistakes which nothing can rectify.

I have now given to Your Excellency as full an account of this affray as I can: and I have only to repeat that no blame can rightly be attributable to anyone in connection with it save myself only. I was primarily in authority, and as I am solely responsible for the course which was followed, I am also responsible for the consequences of it.

I have, etc.

(Signed) CHRIS. S. ROBINSON

However, in his first report Robinson had made clear his attitude to the people of Goaribari.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission", p. 42.

On our way there, through Constable Uria, by questioning him, I confirmed the report that I already had, of the ghoulish habits of these natives; and he freely admitted the general practice among them of devouring, not only their enemies slain in fight, but also the bodies of their relations and friends who die from natural causes. He explained that an old man like himself would not be eaten in such a case, for the reason, he added, that his flesh would be too dry. It is a custom among them, he said, for mothers to devour their young children when they die. For such inhuman creatures one cannot but have a feeling of intense loathing; and it would seem hopeless to expect much good from people so abandoned.

7. Royal Commission Blames Robinson

The Report of the Royal Commission concluded that the people of Goaribari had no intention of attacking the ship; they had fired arrows at the Merrie England only when they saw the prisoners seized. The Report said that most accounts of the number killed were exaggerated, although there had been much more shooting than was necessary. It found Robinson responsible.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission", pp. 18-19.

42. The evidence as to the time the shooting lasted varies greatly—from a little over a minute to a quarter of an hour; and there is a great discrepancy as to the number of shots fired. The excitement of the moment partly accounts for this; partly, too, the unconscious, or barely conscious, inclination of different minds to either minimise or aggravate the seriousness of the whole affair. Probably, as Mr. Bruce¹ thinks, seven minutes was about the actual time that elapsed from the first shot till the last; and Mr. Bruce's evidence indicates that seventy shots were fired by the police, or, at any rate, out of the ammunition served out to them; and, if there be added to these, in accordance with Mr. Jiear's² evidence, the number of cartridges, 175 (the whole of their supply at hand), expended by the Daru Contingent, and also those used by the Acting Administrator and the other Europeans, then some 260 shots would appear to have been discharged.

43. Out of these shots a number would, of course, be ineffective, especially as the native Police on board were very bad marksmen, with the exception of the seven men of the Daru detachment, who were fair shots. From the whole of the evidence on the subject it would appear that at least eight natives were killed on the spot. Considering the vitality of savages, and the chances of non-fatal, as compared with fatal, wounds, from fire-arms badly and indiscriminately aimed, it is probable that the more or less seriously wounded amounted to at least some low multiple of eight. . . .

46. Unfortunately, there is no doubt that the firing continued too long, whatever view is taken of the original justification for it. After all attempts at shooting at the ship had ceased, and when the natives were in full flight, shots were fired at retreating canoes and at swimmers trying to escape

If the Acting Administrator had been able to give his own account . . . he may have thrown some new light upon his action. As

¹W. C. Bruce was the Commandant of the Armed Constabulary.

²A. H. Jiear was the Resident Magistrate for the Western Division.

it is, the fault, as he puts it himself, must rest with him; but it is one rather of over zeal and want of judgment than of anything approaching to conscious or wilful departure from the absolutely straight path befitting the high offices which he held.

IV. SEARCH FOR A POLICY

The Australian Commonwealth was formed in 1901, but the Government had little time to concern itself with affairs in Papua. Administrators came and went and dissatisfaction within the colony grew. For several years Australia showed little sign of producing a policy.

1. Papua at a Standstill

Atlee Hunt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, visited Papua in 1905. He was not impressed by what he saw; there was still no basic law controlling the colony.

From: Atlee Hunt, "Report on British New Guinea, 1905," *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, p. 16.

So far as expansion is concerned, the Possession is now at a standstill, and the reason generally assigned for this is the suspense occasioned by the delay in passing the Papua Bill by the Federal Parliament. It is said that before people will invest their industry or their money in a new country they require to have some idea of the character of the Government and the laws under which they will live, and so long as uncertainty exists on these points the present stagnation must be expected to continue.

2. The Papua Act

The Papua Act was passed in 1905 and proclaimed in Port Moresby on 1 September 1906. The Act aimed 'to provide for the acceptance of British New Guinea as a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth, and for the Government thereof'. In effect, the Act was the constitution of the colony.

From: *The Papua Act 1906*.

5. The Possession of British New Guinea is hereby declared to be

accepted by the Commonwealth as a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth, by the name of the Territory of Papua

The Lieutenant-Governor.

10. There shall be a Lieutenant-Governor of the Territory, who shall be charged with the duty of administering the government thereof on behalf of the Commonwealth

17.—(1.) The Lieutenant-Governor may in the name of the Governor-General appoint all necessary judges, magistrates, and other officers of the Territory, who shall, unless otherwise provided by law, hold their offices during the pleasure of the Governor-General.

(2.) Every such appointment shall be temporary until approved by the Governor-General

20. The Lieutenant-Governor may make and execute under the Public Seal of the Territory, in the name and on behalf of the King, grants and dispositions of any land within the Territory which may be lawfully granted or disposed of in the name of the King, but so that—

(a) no freehold estate in any such land shall be granted or disposed of

21.—(7.) No person shall supply to any native by sale gift or in any other way either directly or indirectly any intoxicating liquor and any person offending against the provisions of this sub-section shall be liable on conviction in a summary manner to a fine of not less than Twenty pounds and not exceeding Two hundred pounds and to imprisonment for any term not less than one month and not exceeding two years.

Provided that it shall not be an offence under this sub-section for any person, for any urgent cause or necessity (the burden of proof whereof shall rest upon him) to administer intoxicating liquor to a native for purely medical purposes and without recompense or remuneration

The Executive Council.

22.—(1.) There shall be an Executive Council for the Territory, to advise and assist the Lieutenant-Governor.

(2.) The members of the Executive Council shall be officers of the Territory, and shall not exceed six in number. They shall be appointed by the Governor-General, and shall hold their places in the Executive Council during his pleasure

27. The Lieutenant-Governor only shall be entitled to submit questions to the Executive Council for advice or decision; but if the

Lieutenant-Governor declines to submit any question to the Council when requested in writing by any member so to do, that member may require that his written request, together with the answer of the Lieutenant-Governor thereto, be recorded on the minutes.

28.—(1.) The Lieutenant-Governor may in any case, if he thinks fit, act in opposition to the advice or decision of the Executive Council; but in that case he shall forthwith fully report the matter to the Minister with his reasons for his action.

(2.) In any case any member of the Executive Council may require that the grounds of advice or opinion which he gives upon any question be recorded at length

Division 2.—The Legislative Council.

29.—(1.) There shall be a Legislative Council for the Territory.

(2.) The Legislative Council shall consist of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the members of the Executive Council, together with such non-official members as the Governor-General appoints under the Seal of the Commonwealth, or as the Lieutenant-Governor, in pursuance of instructions from the Governor-General, appoints under the Public Seal of the Territory.

(3.) So long as the white resident population is less than two thousand the number of non-official members shall be three; but when the white resident population is two thousand or more an additional non-official member shall be appointed for each one thousand of such population in excess of one thousand.

Provided that the total number of non-official members shall not exceed twelve

35. An Ordinance, vote, resolution, or question, the object or effect of which is to dispose of or charge any part of the revenue of the Territory, shall not be proposed in the Legislative Council except by the Lieutenant-Governor, unless its proposal has been expressly allowed or directed by him.

36. Subject to this Act, the Legislative Council shall have power to make Ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of the Territory

41. The Lieutenant-Governor shall not assent to any Ordinance of any of the following classes, unless the Ordinance contains a clause suspending its operation until the signification of the Governor-General's pleasure thereon;—

(1) Any Ordinance for divorce.

(2) Any Ordinance dealing with the granting or disposal of Crown lands.

- (3) Any Ordinance whereby any lease or grant of land or money or any donation or gratuity is made to himself.
- (4) Any Ordinance which appears inconsistent with the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom or of the Commonwealth.
- (5) Any Ordinance interfering with the discipline or control of the naval or military forces of the King.
- (6) Any Ordinance of an extraordinary nature or importance, whereby the King's prerogative, or the rights or property of subjects of the King not residing in the Territory, or the trade or shipping of any part of the King's Dominions may be prejudiced.
- (7) Any Ordinance relating to the sale or disposition of or dealing with lands by aboriginal natives of the Territory.
- (8) Any Ordinance relating to native labour, or providing for the deportation of aboriginal natives from the Territory, or from one part of the Territory to another.
- (9) Any Ordinance relating to the supply of arms, ammunition, explosives, intoxicants, or opium to natives.
- (10) Any Ordinance relating to the introduction or immigration of aboriginal natives of Australia, Asia, Africa, or any island of the Pacific.
- (11) Any Ordinance containing provisions from which the assent of the Sovereign or of the Governor-General has once been withheld, or which the Sovereign or the Governor-General disallowed.

3. A Wealth of Advice

The Australian Government in its search for a policy for its new Territory had advice from three official reports; by Atlee Hunt, Staniforth Smith and the Royal Commission of 1906. Hunt stated that in the years before British New Guinea came under the control of the Commonwealth there had been no clearly defined policy. He considered the possible goals that could be adopted by the Commonwealth.

From: Atlee Hunt, "Report on British New Guinea, 1905", *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 5-7.

In attempting to form an estimate of the measure of progress made since British New Guinea became a possession of the British Crown, one is met by the difficulty of ascertaining the purposes which the Government have attempted to accomplish. So far as I am

aware, no definite policy for the government of New Guinea has ever been laid down. In the past, different Administrators have been appointed to control the Government of the Possession, and have carried on their work under the supervision, more or less loosely exercised, of Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria. These officers have greatly extended the influence and power of the Government, but beyond the preservation of peace among the natives and the promotion of their welfare generally, it is not apparent that they have been working in furtherance of any well-defined object.

It will be generally agreed that the time has now arrived when a goal should be set up to the attainment of which the Government officials should be instructed to employ their best endeavours

In the following paragraphs I set out different policies that have at various times been suggested:—

- (a) Having achieved ownership, to remain content with the fact that foreign nations may not use the territory as a base from which operations against Australia might be organized and conducted.

This is impracticable. Apart from other questions, ownership involves responsibilities towards the inhabitants which cannot be evaded by any civilized nation.

- (b) To hand over to a chartered company.

While such a proposal would perhaps relieve the Government of much trouble, and possibly some cost, it is not here recommended for consideration, much less for adoption. The experience of other countries has shown that such companies are not too anxious to promote the welfare of their native subjects, which should be our paramount consideration. Moreover, elsewhere the tendency against such delegation of responsibility by the principal governing authority appears to be growing, and there is no reason why Australia should abnegate its duties in favour of a corporation whose main desire would be to obtain substantial dividends.

- (c) To limit Government interference to the preservation of peace among the natives.

This course has been suggested, but I do not think its adoption practicable, or, if practicable, expedient. It would be expensive, being all outlay with no revenue, and as will be shown subsequently, not in the best interests of the natives themselves.

- (d) To leave the natives alone as far as possible, interfering not at all with their modes of life, habits, and superstitions, the Government limiting its interposition to cases where it becomes necessary to secure protection for white settlers.

This is, roughly speaking, the policy in the Solomon Islands and certain other places in the South Pacific; but it does not completely fulfil our duty to the natives. These people are fellow-subjects of our own, and they ought not, in my opinion, to be allowed to remain uncivilized, in a state of perpetual enmity with one another, and at full liberty to prosecute their savage and, to our minds, inhuman practices, without hindrance.

(e) To promote the settlement of European families.

It has been urged that the Government ought to take steps to promote the introduction into New Guinea of young married Australians with a small capital, who might take up land and establish permanent homesteads for themselves.

New Guinea cannot be fairly advocated as a country for white men to settle in. The class of immigrant that I have mentioned is the very kind of man of whom Australia stands in need herself, and in Australia such a man can reasonably hope to found a home and raise a family. The evil effects of the climate of New Guinea have perhaps been exaggerated, but there can be no doubt that, on the whole, the place is not so healthy as most parts of Australia. Residents assert that most men who remain there any time get fever, and some die from it; white women certainly do not thrive. There are a small number of wives of residents in the Possession, but though some have been fortunate enough to remain immune, it is stated that their stamina is undoubtedly weakened, and the prospects, supposing continuous residence, of healthy offspring are not good. The climate is apparently not so unhealthy as it was, and it may be that as the development of the country proceeds, the liability to fever will diminish, as it has done in the Gulf country of Queensland, but the time is distant when it can be hoped that many Europeans will be able to regard the country as a suitable place in which to establish themselves permanently.

(f) To encourage the development of the country under European auspices by the employment of imported capital to be expended under European direction, employing native labour, and at the same time extend the influence of the Government until the whole Possession is brought under control.

These appear the ends which ought to be aimed at

4. The Use to be Made of Papuans

Hunt was uncertain how many Papuans there were; he could only state that estimates varied from 300,000 to 1,000,000. But he

decided that it would be to the benefit of the Papuans if they became labourers on European owned plantations.

From: Atlee Hunt, "Report on British New Guinea, 1905", *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, p. 11.

It is stated that the ordinary New Guinea man is growing lazier.

Formerly he was a well-occupied person. The constant risk of having to fight for his very life compelled him to keep constantly in good training, and to practice assiduously with his bow or spear or club. Now tribal wars are at an end, and he retires to rest at night unprotected by sentries or guards, in the certainty that no midnight foe will disturb his slumbers. The occupation of the builder of the huge war canoe is gone, as is that of the stone club maker, who frequently gave even years to the perfecting of a solitary weapon. The cutting of scrub is performed by the aid of steel tomahawks in one-fourth the time taken when the only tool was a blunt-edged stone axe, and the substitution of barbed fish-hooks for the primitive affairs of bone and thorn has lessened the labours of the fisherman. Consequently, the native has more time on his hands, more leisure to indulge in smoking, or in chewing the betel nut. The climate is not one that induces voluntary exertion, and unless he can be induced to cultivate new wants and employ himself in regular labour, it is certain that the native will deteriorate physically, and with physical degeneracy moral decay will make swift advance.

How this decadence is to be prevented is one of the most difficult problems to be faced by the local Executive.

5. The Europeans' Task

Europeans would come to the Territory, Hunt thought, if a land law was passed making land easy to obtain and the Papuans would be made to work by taxing them. But Hunt warned that Australia would have to provide increased revenue and even then development might be slow.

From: Atlee Hunt, "Report on British New Guinea, 1905," *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, p. 19, 28.

There is nothing in the prospects of New Guinea to warrant extravagant optimism; on the contrary, I foresee that there may be many disappointments and losses, but if these are minimized, as they may be by wise action on the part of the Government, no

reason exists why the Possession should not progress, slowly perhaps, but constantly towards a solid and substantial prosperity.

Hunt concluded his Report with a re-statement of the two 'duties' which he believed were imposed on Australia by the acquisition of British New Guinea.

. . . the one to our dark-skinned fellow subjects—to give them the advantages of civilization, divesting them so far as we are able from the evils that too often follow in their train; the second to ourselves—to make the fullest use of the goodly heritage it is our privilege to possess.

6. The Example of Malaya

Staniforth Smith was elected to the Senate in the first Commonwealth Parliament. When he wrote his Report he had already visited Papua on two occasions; his Report became a statement of how Australian policy could ensure that the economic development of Papua followed the pattern set by richer tropical colonies.

From: Senator Staniforth Smith, "Report on the Federated Malay States and Java; their systems of government, methods of administration, and economic development, 1906", *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 20-1.

The Federated Malay States, although not much more than one quarter the size of Papua, present in many respects a striking analogy to our territory

The natural conditions and the period of British occupation in both the territories show such a striking resemblance that an enquiry as to reasons for the enormous dissimilarity in their economic development is a matter of the greatest interest and importance to the Australian people. On the one hand we find a small British protectorate so administered that the growth of its trade, commerce, and industries has been phenomenal, and its revenue greater than that of any other protectorate or any Crown colony in the British Empire, while in Papua there is no development, and there are no industries except a little desultory gold mining. The revenue is falling instead of expanding, and now constitutes less than one-half the cost of administration.

The Federated Malay States have been extremely fortunate in possessing exceptionally able administrators, such as Mr. J. W. Birch, Sir Hugh Low, and Sir Frank Swettenham, whose whole

energies have been devoted to opening up the country and developing its latent wealth. There is a popular movement to erect a handsome statue to the memory of the first-named at the town of Ipoh. In Papua, with the exception of the term of office of Sir William McGregor, the Government has been merely a Big Policeman, maintaining excellent law and order, extending the administration and treating the natives with kindness and consideration, but doing nothing whatever towards removing those obstacles to settlement that private enterprise is powerless to accomplish. In fact, the harassing laws and regulations, the absence of information and assistance, combined with the natural inaccessibility of the country, have defeated all efforts of would-be colonists to develop the possession.

7. Economic Development

Smith was confident that a wide variety of tropical products could be grown in Papua. He wrote about rubber and listed his recommendations to ensure the effective development of Papua.

From: Staniforth Smith, "Report, 1906", pp. 26, 29, 62.

At the present phenomenal price of rubber the returns from a first-class plantation of well-grown para trees are something like 300 per cent. per annum on the capital invested, and there is, therefore, little reason for surprise that many tropical countries are smitten with rubber fever So far as our information goes there is no country better suited for rubber growing than Papua. It possesses an immense area of rich, well drained soil, rising from the sea level to an altitude of 800 feet, and the rainfall is heavy and evenly distributed

As a result of this practical knowledge and investigation, I now submit, in detail, a policy that I believe will develop the natural resources of Papua, and bring us in line with our more progressive neighbours, without necessitating larger financial sacrifices on behalf of the Commonwealth:—

1. *Land Laws.*—The inauguration of liberal land laws by the grant of perpetual leases to settlers with quick possession. A peppercorn rental to be charged for the first ten or fifteen years. These leases should be subject to revaluation at stated periods, at the "unimproved or scrub" value of the land, and also subject to improvement conditions. This system of land tenure is in operation in the Federated Malay States.

2. *Transportation*.—The immediate opening up of bridle tracks for pack-mule carriage to places where European settlement exists, and to places where such settlement is prevented by inaccessibility. The tracks most frequented to be gradually succeeded by roads for vehicular traffic as occasion permits.

3. *Director of Agriculture*.—The appointment, without delay, of a thoroughly practical expert in tropical plantation work, as the Director of Agriculture, at a salary of from £400 to £500 a year.

4. *Report by an Expert*.—We should request the Government of either Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, or the Straits Settlements, to allow their Director of Agriculture to visit Papua and report upon its general plantation possibilities, and those industries that should be specially encouraged. Such a report would be exceedingly valuable as emanating from one with presumably higher qualifications than those possessed by our Director, considering the wide divergence in their remuneration. The Federated Malay States last year obtained in this way a valuable report from Dr. Willis, the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens in Ceylon; the former possession merely defraying his travelling and other expenses.

5. *Government Experimental Stations and Nurseries*.—The creation of two experimental stations and nurseries—one near the sea level, to be started as soon as possible; the other to be established later at a considerable elevation.

6. *Government Plantations*.—Plantations of rubber and coconuts near the sea level, and plantations of cinchona, camphor, and gutta percha at an elevation. These to be worked in conjunction with the experimental stations.

8. "Lethargy", Labour and Education

Like Hunt, Smith hoped that the economic development of Papua could be brought about without causing the people to suffer.

From: Staniforth Smith, "Report, 1906", pp. 66-68.

Our first and most sacred duty is to protect the rights and privileges of the natives, and to use every means possible to promote their true welfare. To this end, I would recommend that the following principles should be incorporated in our general policy regarding native Government:—

1. The natives should be confirmed in the possession of all the lands they at present occupy, or are likely to require, by hereditary succession as in Java.

2. The natives should not be subjected to any special taxation, at least until they possess sufficient assets to meet the impost without entailing hardship. Any departure from this principle would inevitably result in forced labour for the benefit of their employers. They at present pay at least two-thirds of the general taxation.

3. The natives should be directed to plant coconuts and other edible crops entirely for their own use and the use of their children. An ordinance enacted by Sir William McGregor is already in existence to this effect, although it has not been generally enforced since he left.

4. The natives should be directed to keep open the paths between their villages. This is also the subject of an existing ordinance, although it is not always enforced.

5. The natives should not be allowed to receive advances or to borrow money unless the consent of the Government is obtained in each case, nor should they be allowed to pledge their labour, their land, or their chattels, for any purpose whatsoever unless under Government sanction. This matter forms the subject of legislation in certain British Possessions in the Pacific.

6. Every planter should be required to keep a medicine chest supplied with simple remedies for the most prevalent complaints of the natives. The indentured labourers should be regularly inspected by the local magistrate or assistant magistrate, and an inquiry held if there are any complaints of ill-treatment or neglect. It should also be insisted that their huts are rain-proof, and erected in a healthy position, and that the floor is raised some feet from the ground. . . .

NATIVE EDUCATION.

This leads me to the larger question of native education. The finances would not admit of anything like the establishment of State schools, and this class of education can be well left in the hands of the missionaries. I am strongly of opinion that industrial education is more beneficial to the Papuans (who are in a comparatively primitive stage of evolution) than a knowledge of the three "r's." At the same time I do not wish to disparage in any way the valuable work that is being accomplished by the missionaries, many of whom combine industrial with scholastic education.

The most dangerous symptom in the life of the Papuan native is his ever increasing lethargy, which unless checked will lead to mental and physical deterioration. A native, who has obtained a school education is less inclined to manual work than his unsophisticated brother; he is inclined to class himself with the white man, and as the latter never undertakes manual work, such as is done by

natives, the tendency is for the educated native to look down on this class of labour.

9. Optimistic Royal Commissioners

In August 1906 three men were appointed to conduct a Royal Commission in British New Guinea: Colonel J. A. Kenneth Mackay, a Member of the New South Wales Legislative Council; William E. Parry Okeden, who had been Commissioner of Police in Queensland; and Charles E. Herbert, a judge and Government Resident in the Northern Territory. The three Commissioners arrived in Port Moresby in September and travelled widely, taking evidence from many witnesses before leaving the Territory in November. The Report of the Royal Commissioners supported the optimism of Smith rather than the restraint of Hunt.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the present conditions, including the methods of Government, of the Territory of Papua, and the best means for their improvement, 1907", *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, p. X, XI, XII.

. . . in the opinion of Your Commissioners the hour has struck for the commencement of a vigorous forward policy, so far as white settlement is concerned. . . the soil of Papua is rich, virgin, and easily worked, while its infinite variety makes the successful cultivation of almost all tropical products possible. Climatically, it may unhesitatingly be said that the country has been much maligned, and Your Commissioners have no hesitation in stating that in this respect it will compare not unfavourably with any other tropical Possession of the British Empire. It is true there are very bad patches, and that, particularly in the Northern Division, an alarming mortality has prevailed in the past; but it must not be forgotten that this took place among officials whose duties led them into the worst parts, and diggers, who, in search of gold, accepted risks which need never be taken by agriculturists. We believe that even the worst areas, when cleared of mosquito harbors and opened to the sunlight by cultivation, will, as in Northern Queensland, become at least comparatively healthy. But at the present moment there is no necessity for settlers to risk their health in creating better conditions for a later generation. Papua possesses thousands of acres where a man who exercises ordinary care may live with no serious risk to his health. Thanks to the Owen Stanley Range, which runs through practically the whole length of the island, easily accessible altitudes suitable for hill

stations are always available for dwellers on the coast from Port Moresby to Samarai. It is on the rich lands lying between these points, and running back beyond the Astrolabe Range, and along the course of the Kemp Welch River, and on the land behind Fyfe Bay, and stretching to Milne Harbor, that Your Commissioners hope to see the first concentration of white settlement.

Save in the immediate vicinity of Port Moresby and along a narrow strip of the coast line on either side of it, the rainfall of Papua is regular and generous, while as a naturally-watered country it stands almost without a rival. Streams, ever flowing, and pure as the sources from which they come, are to be met with every few miles, and, unlike those of most tropical countries, their waters can be used with perfect safety in their natural state.

So far, the gold discovered in Papua has been almost all alluvial, but there is every reason to believe that in the ranges whence this gold must have come, reefs will yet be discovered . . . geological formations give promise that other valuable minerals will yet be discovered, and Your Commissioners have every hope that, given proper encouragement, mining will yet provide employment for a large number of men.

10. Labour—An Asset and a Virtue

Another asset the Commissioners saw in Papua was the Papuans. It was essential for the salvation of the Papuans, the Commissioners believed, that the Papuan become a labourer for the white settler.

From: "Royal Commission Report, 1907", pp. XII, XIII.

But no matter how fruitful the soil of Papua may be, or how rich the deposits beneath its surface, Your Commissioners recognise that, owing to its tropical climate, it would be idle to ask white men to attempt its development if an ample and suitable unskilled labour supply was non-existent. Fortunately, this problem has not to be faced, for here the question of importing coloured labour need never arise, owing to the plentiful local supply, and mines and plantations can consequently be worked under natural conditions in no way antagonistic to the policy of the Australian Commonwealth.

. . . To-day, thanks to imported implements, the Papuans can do what little labour he finds necessary with less exertion and in half the time formerly demanded; so, not by the path of gradual and natural development, but as a consequence of trade tomahawks and knives, the native has stepped—in the short space of twenty years—

from the stone into the iron age. This transition would have been too sudden, the gap to be bridged too wide, for beings of far more advanced mentality to have faced successfully. Naturally, the Papuan has failed. He can now obtain sufficient food at the cost of much less personal exertion than formerly, and having no fear of hostile attack, need not attend to his physical development; while, at the same time, his desires and wants have remained those of the stone age. Consequently, the net result of hurling him into the iron period has been to render him more effeminate, and correspondingly indolent and wanting in proper manly self-reliance.

To awake the Papuan from his lotus-eaters' dream is an imperative and immediate necessity if he is to be saved from the fate of most aboriginal races. White settlement has created new wants and aspirations among the black races of South Africa; Your Commissioners believe it will in Papua. To satisfy the wants so created, money will be required. Money can only be obtained either by working for others or for himself; *ergo*, the native must, by an inflexible law, either become more industrious, or remain impervious to the temptations of the white man's stores. The history of all native peoples of similar development gives a direct negative to this last supposition. Consequently, Your Commissioners suggest the encouragement of white settlement as one of the surest and most practical methods of arresting the present indolent, apathetic state into which Government protection is sinking a race capable of a more useful and worthy destiny.

11. A "Useful Dependence"

The Commissioners thought the white settlers and the Papuans should develop a 'useful dependence'. The evidence of Mr. Rochford, a mine owner of Woodlark and Yodda, was quoted to show how he had brought about 'the most desirable relations' between himself and his labourers.

From: "Royal Commission Report, 1907", p. XIV.

He says—

"In working boys there are three principal rules I work on—

1st. I see that they are well fed, and have a good camp.

2nd. I don't nag, am not brutal, nor do I expect them to work like machines.

3rd. I allow no familiarities. Let the boys respect you, and when you give an order see that it is carried out."

With these remarks Your Commissioners are entirely in accord, and fully believe that if the two races share a useful dependence upon each other, the development of the country must be the inevitable result, but that to bring this about the white race must recognise its obligations to the black, when we believe the primitive race will realize its true position, and, in return for receiving a fullest measure of justice, will gradually own towards the higher race an affectionate respect.

12. "Vigorous Forward Policy"

The Report of the Royal Commissioners included numerous recommendations designed to foster the 'vigorous forward policy' of economic development the Commissioners advocated.

From: "Royal Commission Report, 1907", pp. CXXIV, CXXV, CXXVI.

The following is a list of the principal recommendations which have been made in this Report, with marginal references to the pages on which they are made:—

- That settlement in its earlier stages should be concentrated in the most suitable districts.
- That encouragement be given to men of larger means to develop the West.
- That an expert in tropical agriculture be appointed.
- That four Government plantations be established, and that the prisons be removed thereto, and prison labour utilized thereon.
- That an expert in timber be appointed to inspect and report upon the timber possibilities of the country.
- That all unalienated Papuan land be declared Crown land, that the Government be given power to compulsorily purchase land from the natives, which is not required by them.
- That the natives in settled districts, as shall be proclaimed, be compelled to mark off their land—all unmarked land to be declared Crown land.
- That all land which the natives are willing to sell should be at once purchased.

. . . .

That minerals on native-owned land be declared the property of the Crown, and legislation passed to provide for mining therefor.

That a Geologist be appointed to explore—with a party of miners—the country for minerals.

That a Government system of labour-recruiting be established.

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That the teaching of English be made compulsory in Mission Schools.

That native children be compelled to attend schools at which English is taught.

.

That a Tariff preference be given by Australia to Papuan products.

CHAPTER THREE

HUBERT MURRAY

I. MURRAY AND THE 1906 ROYAL COMMISSION

One of the most important witnesses to appear before the Royal Commission of 1906 was John Hubert Plunkett Murray. Born in New South Wales in 1861, Murray was educated in Australia and England. He showed outstanding ability as a scholar and athlete, but on his return to Australia he practised law without great success. He served in the Boer War and came to Papua as Chief Judicial Officer in 1904. From 1908 until his death at Samarai in February 1940 he was Lieutenant-Governor of Papua. By the time he died he had established a reputation as a great colonial administrator.

1. The Murray Family

Sir Terence Aubrey Murray, pastoralist and President of the New South Wales Legislative Council, had five children; Leila, Evelyn, Aubrey, Hubert and Gilbert. Hubert and Gilbert were the sons of Terence's second wife, Agnes. Gilbert, who was appointed Professor of Greek at Oxford in 1908, wrote of the family:

From: Gilbert Murray, *An Unfinished Autobiography*, London, 1960, pp. 25-6.

We were none of us exactly eccentric except Leila; but we had, I suppose, certain common characteristics due to our birth and upbringing. In later life, when after long separations two of us happened to meet, we nearly always found ourselves in agreement about current controversies. The Irish background had something

to do with it. We tended to be 'agin the Government' whatever the government might be. 'Pity is a rebel passion' and we were apt to be rather passionately on the side of those likely to be oppressed. Of course we were all Home Rulers. We suspected British governments of behaving elsewhere as they had behaved to the Catholics in Ireland. We joined the Aborigines Protection Society, and we were keen on the protection of animals, children, foreigners, heretics, unpopular minorities and the like. If a boy was unhappy or unpopular at school we assumed that it was the fault of the school and the other boys. We were all greatly interested in religion and all sceptical, though Hubert in middle life became a rather devoted Catholic. Only gradually as we reached positions of responsibility did we get to see that there was something to be said for the authorities, and that mostly they were doing their best.

2. Hubert's Personality

Gilbert, four years younger than Hubert, followed his older brother to Oxford.

From: Gilbert Murray, *An Unfinished Autobiography*, London, 1960, pp. 75-7.

He [Hubert] worked hard and obtained First Class honours in both Mods and Greats, but seemed to put almost as much interest into his athletics. He rowed in the College eight and performed some of the half-blue contests for Oxford against Cambridge Though markedly successful I should not say that he was particularly happy by temperament. One would often find in his rooms a little knot of big athletic men, not at all his intellectual equals, among whom he would sit rather silent and perhaps bored, occasionally intervening in the conversation with some crushing or conclusive phrase. I remember an awful day when, in the course of conversation, it became obvious that I did not know one of those present. 'Don't you know Mr X?' said Hubert. 'No,' said I leaning forward to be introduced. 'Lucky dog,' said Hubert, and there left it. He was a sensitive, shy man, and other people, especially people in any sort of authority, had to go at least half way and perhaps three-quarters of the way to meet him before he would feel at his ease. . . . But I had an immense admiration for Hubert, as indeed most of his friends had. I used to go religiously to see him box, and I remember acutely the incredulous disappointment I felt when, at his first attempt at the All England Amateur Championship, the judges after some

hesitation awarded the medal not to Hubert but to West. The next year, however, no one stood against him. He sometimes gave me lessons and made me a much less incompetent boxer than I should otherwise have been.

He stayed in England three years after taking his degree, reading for the Bar and 'eating his dinners'. He took his examinations lightly and never seemed much interested in the intricacies of the law, while certainly he was impatient of its unrealities. I have heard that at the Bar in Sydney his advocacy was somewhat damaged by his impatience with human stupidity. He was always impatient of criticism and restraint. He was, for all this brilliance and learning, only a moderate success at the Bar. It was not until he had, as Governor of Papua, a position of clear and unquestioned authority that his full powers of characters and intellect came out unhindered: his courage, his sympathy, his imaginative understanding, his great conscientiousness, and notably a gentle patience and courtesy which had grown slowly with the years.

3. Safety in Papua

Hubert Murray arrived in Papua towards the end of 1904. Port Moresby at the time had a European population of less than fifty; Hubert's wife, Sybil, returned to Sydney after one week. On 20 January 1905 Murray wrote to his half-sister Evelyn. His position in New South Wales, he wrote, had given him no security.

From: Murray Family Papers, National Library of Australia.

In New Guinea I think I am safe; they must have a judge and the salary will be fixed by Act of Parliament. And after all there are worse places than New Guinea. The only real objection to it is the malarial fever, which is said to affect the heart—always my weak spot so far as I had one. However if I can hang on for 10 years I ought to have made enough to educate the children which is all I care about

It is the most unprogressive place you can possibly imagine. It is a singularly rich and beautiful country, yet there is hardly any white settlement; it appears to me that the New Guinea administration have consistently done all they could in a covert way, to discourage immigration, and have done their best to keep the island as a field for exploration and ethnological study. It is of course treason to write like this, and it is possible that now we are under the control of the Commonwealth things may be different—but I doubt it.

However there is one thing of which the New Guinea administration can not be proud enough, and that is their treatment of the natives; it is a great contrast to the way we dealt with them in Australia. There have been no 'dispersals' as in Queensland, and no 'indenture system' as in West Australia. In fact they are treated with almost too great consideration: for instance they are allowed to walk about Port Moresby with nothing on but a piece of string or tape because it would be contrary to their custom to make them wear a loin cloth. There is a Papua Bill before the Commonwealth Parliament which will forbid the Government to sell land (though they may lease it), and which also proposes total prohibition of intoxicating liquor. The latter seems to me more absurd than the former; it will not trouble me as I have not had a drink for nearly 3 years (and, I may add, do not feel any better than I did before), but the result of course would be that there would be smuggling all along the coast, and it would be impossible to control the supply to natives*

As to the land $\frac{3}{4}$ of it belongs to the natives, and they can not, and never could, sell to any one but the Government, and the Government do not buy and never have bought any land which could possibly be of any use to the natives, nor any land which the natives were not desirous of selling; and why this land, which does not belong to the natives and which the natives do not want, should not be sold to white men passes my comprehension.

However I have bored you enough about New Guinea—my excuse must be that one has to be very careful how one talks in this small community and I gladly embrace an opportunity of letting off steam.

4. Murray Criticises His Colleagues

The Royal Commission of 1906 had made recommendations about Australian policy in Papua; and it had also made a thorough examination of the public service. There had been complaints about the administration of Captain F. R. Barton. It was said that he was hostile to white settlement, the Administration was slow to deal with requests made by settlers, and the members of the public service were engaged in bitter quarrels. Barton wrote to the Australian Prime Minister requesting that an inquiry be held to clear his name.

*Before the Papua Bill was finally passed the total prohibition clause was modified. Europeans only were permitted to purchase alcohol; but the number of licences to sell liquor in the Territory was not to be increased.

Hubert Murray gave evidence for long periods on the 8 and 9 November. His evidence was strongly critical of the policies and personalities of some of the senior government officials. Murray's testimony before the Royal Commission immediately raised a number of questions: Was his evidence accurate? Should he have been so critical of his colleagues? Was he influenced by the fact that the Commissioners were likely to be sympathetic to much of his evidence? Was he conscious that he might be appointed to replace Barton?

From: "Report of the Royal Commission, 1906", pp. 84-6, 88.

2037. *The Chairman*.—What is your name?—*A.* John Hubert Plunkett Murray. I am the Chief Judicial Officer of the Territory, and I have held that office for two years and two months.

2038. *Q.* I understand that the first matter you wish to give evidence on is the lack of encouragement to white settlers?—*A.* Yes. It struck me a short time after I arrived that the Administration was inclined to pursue a policy rather opposed to white settlement. The Government had an idea, so far as I could see, that the future of the country was that it should be a home for natives; that the whole of the administration was to be for their sake; and a policy of passive resistance was to be offered to the white settler; and this, I assume to be contrary to the policy which would be approved by the Commonwealth, inasmuch as the Commonwealth grants a subsidy of £20,000 a year, and over £300,000 of Australian money has been spent on the place. The policy the Government pursues is defended sometimes on the ground that the country is not fit for settlement, and that the natives are not yet in a fit position to be brought into contact with white men The natives have been treated extremely well; perhaps too well. I think they have been placed on a pedestal for too long, with absolutely no result. If the country is not fit for settlement, we should not have any land or labour ordinances. You have seen the country yourselves, and will be able to judge. In regard to the natives, after twenty or twenty-five years of settlement, a harmless old market gardener, Weaver, is killed within 10 miles of Port Moresby, and the object of the murderers who killed him, and who had lived, some of them, within rifle shot of Government House, was partly to have the right to paint the posts of their houses red, and to wear feathers in their heads. If that is the result of twenty years of the present policy, I think another policy should be adopted. (2039.) To illustrate what I mean by the lack of encouragement to white settlement, I take the land. The

scantiness of white settlement in New Guinea is obvious to any one. There is really none except by the missionaries, and my contention is that it is due, not so much to the survey fees being high, or the rent being high, or even to the chance of the natives not being willing to sell, but to the interminable delay

2045. *Q.* What makes you think that Captain Barton is absolutely wedded to the old reactionary policy?—*A.* I do not consider that he is actuated by unworthy motives, but I think he is afraid of the natives being ill-treated for one thing, and I think he has a nervous dread of Australia and Australian ideas, and he thinks that if there is any great influx of white settlement, the natives will suffer. I think those are the motives which actuate him; also he is a man who constitutionally hates responsibility

2055. *The Witness.*—With regard to labour, I do not think, so far as I can see, that any encouragement is given by the Government in regard to the supply of native labour. There is always a scarcity of native labour. There is never a sufficient supply, and the Government, even if they did not take over the recruiting themselves, could, I think, give considerable assistance if they encouraged the natives to go to work, and directed the Village Constables also to encourage them. Instead of that they seem to take quite the opposite view. The Government's ideal is the same as the ideal of the missionaries, though arrived at by a different process of reasoning, that is, that the natives should keep to their own villages

2060 In regard to mining, what struck me is the absolute absence of encouragement in regard to that industry. That I have dealt with in connexion with the labour, and the conversations I have had with the Administrator. While we were away, I think last year, about the middle of the year, some news reached us of a sudden development in Woodlark mining. I remember it having a most depressing effect on the Administrator, which lasted until we heard that this development either was not true, or, at any rate, was greatly exaggerated; and it was on that occasion that I had one of the conversations which I have referred to in which he said he wished there had never been any gold found or any miners, and I said, among other things—"Have you any objection to planters also?" He said—"I would not mind them so much. There would be fewer of them, anyhow."

2065. . . . My point, broadly, is this: that there are in the service a certain number of people who can get anything they ask for, and do anything they like, while there are others who are being continually snubbed and sat upon; that matters are decided upon purely personal grounds, and that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that

the mainsprings of administrative action are personal spite and favoritism, the result being that it is extremely difficult for any one with self-respect to remain in the service. I consider that Captain Barton is naturally a weak man, and that he has no very strong idea of fair play.

5. Shooting of Papuans

Murray defended the miners against charges that they had shot large numbers of Papuans; he thought more were being shot by government officials.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission, 1906", p. 88.

2062 I think, if you will read the reports, you will see that, although the numbers given in the reports are probably very much under the actual numbers of those who have been shot; and a thing that struck me as curious, but which may be capable of explanation, I have seldom heard anything about the wounded. I do not say for a moment that the shooting of these natives was not justified, as I do not know the facts. I am only pointing out that a great number are shot, and the two men who shoot nearly all of them are the two particular friends of His Excellency—Mr. Monckton and Mr. Bruce. In the Gulf and Western Divisions you never hear of this sort of thing.

6. Murray Deals With Ballantine

Murray was particularly scathing in his criticism of David Ballantine, the treasurer.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission, 1906", pp. 90, 92.

2071. I will deal now with Mr. Ballantine. I admit that he is a man I never liked. I will try and not do him an injustice in any way. To put the matter briefly, he is really the Governor. That must be admitted by everybody in the Territory. All sorts of theories have been advanced to account for the influence he wields, but I do not believe in any of them, so I need not mention them, but the result is that he indulges in what Mr. Musgrave, in a minute describes as an "insane assumption of authority", and attempts to rule all the Departments. He has endeavoured to run the Lands Department, and with regard to the Government Secretary's Department, I may

state that the state of affairs between that Department and the Treasury is not one of friction but almost of open warfare

These matters [Ballantine's drunkenness] were of public notoriety. People will even tell you the visions he saw when he was raving. There are any amount of people who have seen him in this state—Mr. Russell, and Mr. Garrioch, Mr. Wood, the Government Printer. I believe Wood nursed him through one attack, and Mr. Bruce through another. I have not the slightest idea whether he drinks now. He may have given it up while he was away,

7. Royal Commission's Findings

The Commissioners accepted the evidence of Murray, and others, against Barton. They recommended that Barton not be appointed to the permanent position of Administrator. A number of other senior officials, including the Treasurer and the Government Secretary, were retired. Murray was Acting Administrator from 1907 until his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor in 1908.

From: "Report of the Royal Commission, 1906", pp. XCVII, XCVIII.

It appears to Your Commissioners that, while Captain Barton cannot be charged with by direct action discouraging agricultural or mining development, he has yet failed to do all a sympathetic Administrator—untrammelled by personal prejudice for and against certain members of the Public Service—might have accomplished. In their opinion, the division of his staff into two classes, one, from his point of view, for, the other always against, his policy has been the key-note of his comparative failure as an Administrator.

Personal prejudice towards those he counted as friends or enemies, in the main unwarranted by the action of either, has so clouded the broader question of outside interests, that Your Commissioners rather wonder he has accomplished what he has in the direction of general development

In the opinion of Your Commissioners, any man to successfully administer Papua in the future must put behind him most of the late Crown Colony traditions, and fully realize that changed conditions have to be faced, involving not only the presence of a large number of white settlers of every class, but also their active encouragement and speedy and satisfactory bestowment.

To bring about this state of industrial progression, he must not only be personally sympathetic, but also possessed of sufficient administrative ability and impersonal fairness to command not only the individual respect, but also the hearty co-operation of his service,

not only with each other, but also as a whole with himself.

While admitting that the qualifications so demanded are not readily found combined in any one man, Your Commissioners, deeming them to be absolutely necessary, and unfortunately in essential respects lacking in the present Administrator, cannot in justice, either to the Commonwealth or to Papua, recommend his permanent retention in his present office.

II. MURRAY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The legislative basis of economic development, the Land Ordinance of 1906 and the Labour Ordinance of 1907, were passed before Murray was appointed Lieutenant-Governor. Before 1906 the Administration had been criticised for not making land readily available to intending settlers.

1. Land Law

The new Ordinance, as described by Staniforth Smith, the newly appointed Director of Mines, Agriculture and Works, would eliminate all delays.

From: Staniforth Smith, *Handbook of the Territory of Papua*, Melbourne, 1907, pp. 14-15.

The land laws of the Territory of Papua . . . are probably the most liberal in the tropics. They are based on the broad principles that (a) No land can be alienated in fee-simple, and (b) the rental of the land leased is assessed on the unimproved value of the land and is subject to re-assessment at fixed periods.

AGRICULTURAL LANDS

The terms upon which the land may be leased are exceedingly easy to the settler. He can obtain a leasehold of the best class of agricultural land for any period up to 99 years, on the following conditions:

- (1) Upon making application a small deposit fee, ranging from £1 to £10 according to the area, is payable. This is returned to the applicant if he accepts the lease he has applied for.
- (2) No survey fees are charged to the lessee, and no fee is charged for the preparation or registration of the lease.
- (3) If the lease is for more than thirty years, the rent payable is determined at 5 per cent per annum of the unimproved value of the land, *but no rent is payable for the first period of ten years, and no more than sixpence per annum an acre during the second period of ten years.*

- (4) The unimproved value of the land is to be appraised every twenty years, during the currency of the lease, and the land determined accordingly, *but if on any appraisal the rent is raised by more than one-third, the lessee may disclaim the lease, and is thereupon entitled to receive compensation for his improvements.*

The compulsory improvement conditions attached to agricultural leases are—

- (a) One-fifth shall be properly planted with some approved plants within five years.
 (b) Two-fifths in ten years.
 (c) Three-fourths within twenty years.
 (d) That for the remainder of the term, three-fourths of the suitable land shall be kept properly planted. Provided always that, if at any time during the first five years of a lease, it appears to the Land Board that reasonable efforts are not being made to fulfil the improvement conditions, they may recommend the Lieutenant-Governor to cancel the lease, and thereupon it shall be lawful for the Lieutenant-Governor, by notice in the *Gazette*, to cancel the lease accordingly.

All agricultural lands that have not been alienated by the Crown have been assessed under Section 13 of the Land Act, at an unimproved value of 5s. per acre.

All pastoral lands have been assessed at 1s. per acre unimproved value.

This appraisal definitely fixes all lands rentals for 20 years as follows:—

- Agricultural land (Class A)—First ten years free.
 Second ten years, 3d. per acre per annum.
 Pastoral leases (Class B)—First ten years, free.
 Second ten years 25s. per 1,000 acres.

If during the second twenty-year period of the lease the appraisal is increased by more than one-third of the existing rental, the lessee may disclaim the lease, and is entitled to receive compensation for his improvements.

2. Labour Law

The Native Labour Ordinance of 1907 established closer controls over the recruiting and employment of villagers, although a good deal depended upon the magistrates responsible for supervising the labour scheme.

From: *Native Labour Ordinance 1907.*

14. No person shall recruit natives without a Recruiters' License, and, if he uses a ship, the ship must be licensed; but an employer may personally recruit natives to work for himself without a Recruiting License, either for himself or his ship.

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17. (1) A native who has been recruited as a labourer shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the Magistrate, Inspector, or Qualified Officer of the Division in which he usually resides, but a Magistrate of a Division may nevertheless issue a permit to any person granting him authority, for a period not exceeding twelve months, to take natives recruited by him in a specified district before some other Magistrate, Inspector, or Qualified Officer named in such permit

(2) The Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time by Proclamation declare any portion of the Territory to be a Settled Labour District, and a native whose home is in a Settled Labour District need not be taken to the Magistrate of the Division in which he usually resides, or to the nearest Inspector or Qualified Officer, provided that he is taken to a Magistrate, Inspector, or Qualified Officer stationed in the Settled Labour District, and provided that the contract of service is entered into within that district.

18. The recruiter or employer who removes a native shall personally take charge of and be responsible for the native until—

- (1) The native is duly engaged under the Ordinance; or
- (2) The native has been returned home; or
- (3) A Magistrate, Inspector or Qualified Officer has, by writing under his hand, absolved the recruiter or employer who took away the native from all further responsibility.

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20. No native shall be employed by any person for a longer period than three months, except under written contract of service under this Ordinance.

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24. The term of service of a native shall not exceed three years, except in the case of miners and carriers. In the case of miners and carriers it shall not exceed eighteen months.

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27. A Magistrate, or an Inspector, or a Qualified Officer shall not sanction the engagement of a native until he has satisfied himself—

- (1) That fair remuneration is offered and will be duly paid;

- (2) That the native is willing to enter into the contract of service;
- (3) That there is no reason to suspect that the native will be unfairly treated;
- (4) That there is no reason to suspect that the native will not, on the expiration of the contract of service, be returned to his home by the employer.

. . . .

28. If a native after serving the term of his contract wishes to re-engage he may enter into a fresh contract of service before a Magistrate or an Inspector, or a Qualified Officer with the same or another employer; but the Lieutenant-Governor may by proclamation declare that natives recruited in a specified district are not to re-engage, and thereupon no officer shall sanction the re-engagement of any native recruited in that district.

32. A Magistrate may at any time, on the complaint of any of the parties concerned, cancel the contract or vary its terms in so far as any party is concerned. If a contract is cancelled in so far as any particular native is concerned, that native shall be deemed duly discharged but the cancellation shall not release the employer from the obligation of returning the native to his home

33. If a native has entered into a contract of service his employer shall not be entitled to discharge him against his will before the expiration of the term of service.

The death of a sole employer shall put an end to a contract of service, but, when there is more than one employer, only the death of all of them shall have that effect.

60. A male native who has entered into a contract of service under this Ordinance or "*The Native Labour Ordinance of 1900*", and who neglects, without reasonable cause, to perform any work which under the contract it is his duty to perform, is liable to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding fourteen days, or in the alternative to a fine not exceeding his pay for fourteen days.

61. A male native who has entered into a contract of service under this Ordinance or "*The Native Labour Ordinance of 1900*", and who, without reasonable cause—

- (1) Neglects to enter the service of the person whom he has agreed to serve; or
- (2) Deserts from his service;

is liable to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months.

3. Murray in Praise of Papua

Murray wrote of the riches Papua offered the white settler. His praise was less extravagant than that of Staniforth Smith and the English novelist and travel writer Beatrice Grimshaw, who had recently taken up residence in Papua.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, pp. 316-7.

Papua has been singularly favoured, not only in the fertility of its soil, for there are many fertile lands in the tropics, though probably none more fertile than the richest parts of Papua, but more particularly in the variety of its resources. To begin with, in Papua you can get pretty well any climate you wish, for you can have it as cold as you like if you care to go into the mountains, and very much hotter than you like if you remain on the coast, you can also get any rainfall you like from under 50 inches to over 200, and every variety of soil. Agricultural possibilities under these conditions are boundless, and, in addition, there is the mineral wealth of the territory which has as yet hardly been touched, and the timber, of which the exportation has only just begun, but which last year (1910-11) amounted to 400,000 superficial feet, nearly seven times as much as the year before. Copper, we know, extends over a huge area of country at the back of Port Moresby, but it can hardly be said that we know any more about it than that, and coal and petroleum (both Government monopolies by the way) are also believed to exist. What Papua contains besides all this is a mere matter of conjecture, but even if it contains nothing more, enough has already been found to show that the territory is a possession of very considerable value. It seems strange that such a treasure should have remained hidden for so long, but I suppose that at first the remoteness of its position, and later on the alarming tales that were circulated about its climate (really in most places a very good one as tropical climates go), were the reasons why such a length of time elapsed before any one thought of attempting to exploit its resources.

4. Plantation Development

During the early years of Murray's administration there was considerable development of plantations. The area of land held under lease increased rapidly and so did the number of Papuans employed as labourers.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, pp. 340-1.

The Land Ordinance of 1906 passed through the local legislature in September, 1906, and 7,000 acres were applied for in the last three months of the year; the total area held under lease up to June 1, 1906, was only 2,089 acres. Then in the month of January, 1907, 14,000 acres were applied for, and then came a lull, and in February there were no applications except for some town allotments. But in February the report of the Papua Royal Commission appeared, and the "boom" began in earnest. In March over 15,000 acres were applied for, and in April over 20,000.

The official returns show the area under lease as follows:—

				Acres.	
Area under lease on June 30,	1906	2,089	
"	"	"	1907	48,002
"	"	"	1908	242,395
"	"	"	1909	336,803
"	"	"	1910	363,425
"	"	"	1911	364,088

The diminished increase in the years 1909-10 and 1910-11 is due to modifications which were introduced into the extremely liberal system of the old Land Ordinance of 1906. That Ordinance, it has been seen, provided for free survey, and in 1909 survey fees were imposed, with the result of an immediate drop in the number of applications; the Ordinance also provided that the first ten years should be rent free, but in the year 1910 rents were imposed with a result of a still further decrease.

This reduction had been foreseen. The promises of free survey and no rent had done their work, and although of course existing promises would be kept there was no reason for undertaking free surveys in the future or giving land rent free indefinitely; attention had been called to the resources of the country, and the work of settlement had fairly begun. In fact, there was a danger of the speculative boom in land being somewhat exaggerated, and in the year 1909-10 the forfeitures for non-fulfilment of conditions amounted to nearly 58,000 acres.

5. Labour Shortage

To Murray in 1912 it appeared that the factor most likely to limit further plantation development was a lack of labourers.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, pp. 344-5.

Papua is sparsely populated, and there is far more land than is ever likely to be wanted either for natives or for Europeans, so that the land problems which have caused so much trouble elsewhere are not likely to arise. In fact, what will limit development in Papua is not want of land, but want of labour. There is almost an unlimited supply of the former, but there is by no means an almost unlimited supply of the latter, and the labour question is the one serious danger in the path of Papuan development. For this reason it was well that the land boom ended when it did; had it continued there would certainly not have been sufficient labour to go round. As it is, there has hitherto been enough, though barely enough. That is to say, all, or practically all, have sufficient labour to go on with, with the exception of those who hold land in localities where the mortality from dysentery (the great curse of Papua at the present day) has been exceptionally great; but all, or practically all, express great doubt whether they will have enough for the future development of their estates. The increase in the number of labourers has so far been satisfactory; in the year 1910-11 the number of boys who signed on was 7,806; in 1909-10 it was 5,202, and the amount of wages paid in the former year was over £30,000.

Writing in November, 1907, I estimated the number of natives at work at 2,000, about a quarter of the number that are at work to-day; but, while the number of labourers is increasing, the number of plantations and the area under cultivation, and the consequent demand for labour, is also increasing, and increasing rapidly, as will be seen from the following figures:—

On March 31, 1907,	there were	1,467	acres	planted.		
„	1908,	„	4,955	„	planted	and 76 plantations.
„	1909,	„	7,740	„	„	130 „
„	1910,	„	10,053	„	„	151 „
„	1911,	„	15,881	„	„	167 „

Labour imported from outside the island of New Guinea, forced labour, and probably native taxation, are out of the question, so the labour supply must consist entirely of natives of New Guinea, who volunteer their services for periods varying up to three years, which is the maximum allowed by the Native Labour Ordinance.

6. Benefits for the People

Murray could claim that the Australian administration had 'so far, been successful as regards the development of the territory'. And he

went on to consider whether the coming of the Europeans had benefited the people of Papua. Murray thought that the imposition of law and order had brought a better life.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua or British New Guinea*, London, 1912, pp. 361-3.

We have, so far as our influence extends, put a stop to raids, to head-hunting, to cannibalism, and to village warfare in general, so that while undoubtedly spoiling sport we have vastly increased the feeling of individual security, and, so far as it is possible to conjecture, we have, even after making allowance for the epidemics which we have introduced, also increased the general happiness.

We may therefore, I think, flatter ourselves that so far the presence of the European has benefited the native; can we venture to hope that it will also benefit him in the future? Papua must be developed; can it be developed without evil results to the Papuan? Personally I think that it can, not only without evil results, but with the best results possible; in fact, that it is only in connection with the development of Papua that the future of the Papuan can be assured.

An official who expresses these opinions, who thinks that (altogether apart from the interests of the settlers) it is to the advantage of the Papuan to learn to work, and that the best available schools are the plantation and the mining field, runs the risk of being looked upon as a hypocrite who seeks to curry favour with the employer while posing as a friend of the native, for there is somewhere at the back of the mind of many of our critics a sort of unspoken conviction that, while it is inadvisable and even wicked for a white man to be idle (for is not sloth one of the seven deadly sins?), it is equally inadvisable and wicked for a black or a brown man to work. He is more picturesque (perhaps) chewing betel-nut in his village than working in a plantation or carrying a pack upon the road; therefore, I suppose, it is argued he should be left to chew betel-nut and not encouraged to sign on as a labourer. Fortunately the native who remains in his village does more than most casual observers would give him credit for, but it is none the less true that if we wish the Papuans to survive we must encourage them to work and endeavour to change them from a non-industrial to an industrial people.

When a man has to hold himself in readiness to fight for his life at a moment's notice, and when in addition he has to get a living out of the earth with the aid of tools made of sticks and stones and shells, supplemented by any fish or game that he can procure by weapons made of the same material, and when his chief amusement consists of

head-hunting and raids on other villages, he is likely to grow into a rather strenuous person of active habits; and then, if he is suddenly told that he need never fight again, and that his life is perfectly safe, and is presented with implements which will enable him to do as much in a day as he could do before in a week, but is told that he must never go on any more raids and never collect any more heads, he is likely to feel a void in his existence, for his chief occupations will be gone, and unless something is given to him which will fill the void he and his descendants will suffer. This is the case of the Papuans; we have taken away his old ideals of war and bloodshed, and it is our duty to put a new ideal in their place—to substitute the activity of labour for that of fighting, and to transform the tribe of disappointed warriors into a race of more or less industrious workmen.

7. Stagnation

The boom period of Papuan plantation development was brief. In 1922 Murray reviewed the history of commercial agriculture.

From: *Papua Annual Report For 1921/22*, p. 6.

A retrospect of Papuan agriculture shows that it can be divided into four phases:—

- (i) An initial stage of experimental and tentative effort which lasted about three years—1907-1910.
- (ii) A period of rapid development during which freights were comparatively low and communication unhampered. This phase began in 1910 and lasted till the outbreak of war in 1914. Over 30,000 acres were planted during this period. There was little export of copra.
- (iii) A period of comparative stagnation during the war—less than 16,000 acres planted in 5 years. During these years capital and enterprise were diverted elsewhere and development was at a stand-still, not only in Papua, but in most of the Crown colonies. The export of copra was still negligible as the plantations had not yet come into bearing.
- (iv) The present post-war period, which I think will be a period of almost complete stagnation. The stagnation is due, partly, to the low price of copra and rubber, but these causes are perhaps only temporary; at the root of the whole matter are the difficulties of shipping, and, as these difficulties are likely to be made permanent by the application of the Navigation

Act to the Territory, I do not think that we should be justified in relying upon any further investment of capital. During this period the export of copra should increase from year to year as the plantations come into bearing. The export of native copra should also increase for the same reason; but the supply of native copra varies very much with the price offered, and is affected also by other causes which are imperfectly understood.

Comparisons are proverbially odious and often misleading, but a reference to the progress of the then German New Guinea during phase (ii)—from 1910 to the war—may be of interest. German statistics for the few years before the war are available; they show the increase of the planted area each year in the German territory as about equal to the increase in the same year in Papua—one set of figures makes it rather more, another set of figures makes it rather less. But during phase (iii)—the war period—while there was little or nothing going on in Papua, development in the German territory was rapid, for there was no other outlet for the money realized by the sale of copra and it had to be spent in the Territory; of course, their plantations were older than ours and were already in full bearing.

It should be remembered also that agriculture is not the sole source of production in Papua. Papua was a mining country before it became agricultural, and it may become a mining country again; and while a coconut plantation cannot carry much of a handicap, a mine, if it is rich enough, may.

8. The Navigation Act and Catastrophe

Murray called the Navigation Act the 'final catastrophe'. The planters and the commercial community who suffered directly from the Act were, for once, united with Murray in opposition to the Commonwealth Government.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, pp. 142-3.

This is an Act which was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament for the protection and encouragement of Australian shipping the effect is that no ship can carry passengers or cargo between an Australian and a Papuan port, unless she complies with all the Australian shipping conditions. No ships do comply with these conditions, except Australian ships manned with European or (generally) Australian seamen, and consequently only those ships can carry passengers or cargo between Papua and Australia. Papuan exports

and imports are not large enough to maintain a regular trade with England or America, so that the net result of the extension of the Act to Papua is that Papuan trade is confined to Australian ports, and, in practice, to one Australian port, and even to one Australian firm. Before the war Dutch and German steamers called at Port Moresby and Samarai, in addition to the regular mail service to Australia, freights were low, plantations were rapidly extending, and all looked well; but under present conditions our sole communication with the outside world is by the monthly steamer to Sydney.

9. Depression

The Commonwealth Government agreed in 1925 that the Navigation Act should not apply to Papua and the Mandated Territory. The lifting of the Navigation Act and a rise in prices resulted in a sudden increase in the value of Papua's exports; but even before the effects of the depression were felt in Papua it was clear that Papuan agriculture had not found long-term prosperity. By the end of the 1930s the total value of exports had not reached the level attained in 1925-26. Murray wrote of 'unrelieved misfortune' in the Annual Report for 1928-29. The prices for both rubber and copra were to be even less the following year.

From: *Papua Annual Report for 1928/29*, p. 3.

LOW PRICE OF TROPICAL PRODUCE

2. It seems indeed to have been a period of almost unrelieved misfortune, and of misfortune which was not due to any action or negligence of our own, but was the result of causes entirely beyond our control. Copra and rubber are practically the only commodities that we produce, and, when the price of these is low, depression is inevitable throughout the Territory. Unfortunately the price of both was very low in the year 1928-1929 and we suffered accordingly, and, as depression inevitably begets depression, our losses cannot be accurately measured by the mere difference in price.

COPRA AND RUBBER

3. Copra, fortunately, never fell so low that its production ceased to be profitable, and, as the season happened to be a good one, the quantity exported was the greatest on record—12,480 tons as compared with 9,825 in the year before—but rubber fell so low that the trees were hardly worth tapping, and production dropped from 811

tons to 470. However, experts foretell, I am told, a rise in the price of both commodities, and in that case the production of both, certainly of rubber, will increase accordingly. Quite an appreciable part of the copra exported now is native copra, the produce of the native plantations which have been started in the last ten years or so; this copra is not of such good quality as plantation copra, but it is improving. The quantity produced varies considerably with the price which is offered, for many natives, ignorant of markets and their movements, still regard the offer of a low price as an attempt to defraud.

GENERAL DEPRESSION

5. Of course it was not only the producers themselves who suffered by the fall in prices; the whole Territory suffered with them. Employment was more difficult to find—for less labour was wanted, both European and native—and the salaries of white men were reduced; and the Government suffered also, for, in the general financial straitness, imports fell by almost £100,000—from £455,000 to £361,000—and customs revenue fell accordingly. Even the revenue from the export duty on copra was less than last year, in spite of the increased yield, for our duty is on a sliding scale, varying with the price in London, and prices during this year were so low as to more than counterbalance the great increase in production.

EFFECT UPON INVESTORS

6. So the whole community is affected by a fall in copra and rubber; necessary public works must be postponed, or carried out in a cheap and unsatisfactory manner, and the general air of shabbiness, in private and public buildings alike, must make the worst impression on any passing visitor, and confirm him in a determination to have nothing to do with any Papuan investment.

III. THE DUAL POLICY

In 1912 Murray had written that, in addition to promoting economic development by white settlers, 'we must also succeed in our solution of the native problem, by preserving the Papuan and raising him eventually to the highest civilisation of which he is capable'. At the time the administration had passed legislation to protect the Papuan, but had done little to 'raise' him. The best schools Murray offered in 1912 were the 'plantation and the mining field'.

1. Native Plantations

By 1920 Murray had modified his opinion of the value of working as a labourer for the European, and the Native Plantations Ordinance and the Native Taxation Ordinance had been passed to provide a basis for the new policy.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Review of the Australian Administration in Papua from 1907 to 1920*, Port Moresby, 1920, pp. 32-6, 39, 40.

Labour in the service of a white man on a plantation at what, I suppose, must be considered a reasonable wage for a native, however absurd it may seem to an European, probably offers as good an industrial training as a native could have, by way of a beginning—but only by way of a beginning; for chopping wood and scrub and picking weeds, at ten shillings a month, cannot seem very exhilarating to the more ambitious among natives, when regarded as an end. A young native, who has no particular trade, probably could not do better than go and work for a term on a mine or a plantation, but I think that he should be able to look forward to the time when he will be able to make use, for his own advantage, of what the plantation or mine has taught him. If the whole race can hope for nothing better than to be, till the end of time, hewers of wood and drawers of water for European settlers, I do not think they will have much cause to be grateful to the democracy of Australia. It is probably that modern industrialism will offer but little attraction to the Papuan, and we

should therefore try to discover a form of civilization which may appeal to him more readily; and this, I think, we shall find in a life based upon the cultivation of the soil for the benefit of himself and others.

This is a matter to which I invited attention in 1907, but which for various reasons it has been impossible to deal with until quite recently, in connexion with native taxation. (*See Native Plantations Ordinance, 1918.*)

In a concrete form the system will work out very much as follows—the Government will resume an area of land near a village and declare it a native plantation; the villagers, or a certain number of them, will work out their tax by clearing, planting, etc., while the Government superintends, and perhaps supplies seed and tools. The crop is to be divided between the Government and the villagers, and the proceeds of the Government's share are to be paid into a fund, and to be expended for the benefit of the natives generally, and for no other purpose

Of late more care has been taken to see that the natives plant the nuts at proper intervals, and keep their plantations reasonably clean, but even now the best of them are probably inferior to the most carelessly-kept European plantation. Still, they are in advance of the ordinary native grove, and it is hardly possible that an increase in the number of coconuts should not eventually bring about an increase in the export of copra; though it must be remembered that, when coconuts are plentiful, an enormous number are used for food.

The system of "native plantations" will, it is hoped, be an improvement upon the rather sporadic efforts at planting under the Native Regulation, and it will be more directly under European supervision and control. It must be introduced slowly and with great care, but if prudently managed it will, in time, solve many problems of Papuan administration. The advantage that the natives may derive from these plantations is obvious, but the system is also of importance from the point of view of development. It is clear that the limitation of the labour supply will prevent the full development of the Territory by what (without using the word in any invidious sense) I may call the "capitalistic" system, that is, the present system of indentured labour under European control. For getting the greatest return from the land actually occupied the capitalistic system is probably better than any other, but it ceases to be effective when there is a scarcity of labour. Consequently, as it is likely that there will be a scarcity of labour in Papua, it follows that this system should be supplemented by some other, unless the Territory is to be left undeveloped. And that other system should, in my opinion, be

based upon the native plantations which I have suggested, or upon something of the same nature

The only objection, so far as I know, to the "native plantation" scheme is that it may result in the withdrawal of labour from plantations worked under what I have called the capitalistic system. This objection would be of very great weight as regards that part of my argument which deals with the development of the Territory, however little it may affect the part which deals with the welfare of the natives; and, if I thought the objection a valid one, I could not argue that native plantations would do much to assist development, for, while we should gain in one way by the establishment of such plantations, we should lose in another, if we thereby made it impossible for capitalistic enterprise to take up further areas, and perhaps even to extend plantations already in existence. However, I do not think the objection a valid one; I do not think that the supply of labour will be affected (especially if the system is introduced gradually, as I have suggested) any more than I think that the supply of labour has been affected in the past by the enforcement of the Regulation under which natives are compelled to plant coconuts. Many hundreds of thousands of coconuts have been planted under that Regulation, but the number of "signed-on" boys in 1918-19 was greater than ever before.

NATIVE TAXATION

I have perhaps anticipated matters in dealing with the village plantations before native taxation. The Papuan system of native taxation differs in principle from that in force in other countries. Elsewhere, I believe, the tax is imposed, partly at any rate, for the admitted purpose of inducing natives to work. In Papua it is imposed solely for the purpose of raising money. Thus in Papua an indentured labourer has to pay the tax, whereas in most other countries he is exempt.

In Papua it was thought that, if you impose a tax in order to induce natives to work, you are practically admitting the principle of forced labour. There is something to be said in favour of forced labour, though the precautions against abuse must be so strict that it is probably better left alone; but at any rate, if there is to be forced labour, it was thought that it should be introduced openly, and with those precautions, and not secretly, disguised as something else. So that the native tax in Papua is a tax, and a tax only

If the Papuan is (as he has been) confirmed in his title to his land; if he is shown how to make reasonable use of it; if he is taught to read and write; and if, in addition, he has the opportunity of learning a

trade, and is shown how to keep his village clean and free from infection—if all this is done for him he will have as good a chance as any native ever had, and Australia will have shown that it is possible to introduce civilization among these primitive peoples in such a way that it may endure to their lasting advantage.

2. Change of Emphasis—League of Nations

The emphasis in Murray's policy had changed for several reasons. The aim to develop Papua with European capital and Papuan labour had been less successful than had been hoped. Murray accepted theories, current at the end of the First World War, expressing the responsibility of colonial powers for advancing the people they governed.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, pp. 210-1.

“To those colonies and territories which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.”

These are the words of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In terms they apply only to enemy possessions, but the principles which the Covenant embodies must be taken to extend also to colonies and territories which are in the possession of the allies.

Article 22 in fact means the final repudiation of one system of colonial government, and the definite acceptance of another. It marks the abandonment of the theory that a colony is to be regarded merely as a business proposition, and the native inhabitants merely as “assets” to be utilized for the purpose of the business; and it marks the definite approval of the opposite theory, that the colonizing power has a special duty towards the colony and its inhabitants, quite apart from any questions of business and development.

3. Influence of Anthropologists

In addition Murray was influenced by the teachings of the anthropologists and maintained a close interest in the findings of the new science of anthropology.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Native Administration in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1929, pp. 9-10.

Some knowledge of anthropology, however slight, is of great value, for obviously if you have to govern natives it is desirable that you should know something about them, and the more you know about them the more efficient your administration is likely to be. We may claim to have realised the value of anthropology very early in our administrative experience, and Papua was one of the first British dependencies, if not actually the first, to appoint a Government Anthropologist. Since then largely through the persistent efforts of the Papuan Government, a Chair of Anthropology has been established at Sydney University, and officers of the Papuan Service have the opportunity of going through a course of instruction under the able and suggestive guidance of Professor Radcliffe-Brown. And I am glad to say that they avail themselves of this opportunity.

4. A Different View of Papuans

Murray took two particular beliefs of the anthropologists to support his administration, the unity of mankind, and the effects of European settlement on Melanesian cultures.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, pp. 227, 229-31.

The unity of mankind is, I suppose, the essential idea lying at the base both of anthropology and of the approved theory of native administration. Otherwise not only the science itself, but the very name of the science must go; and, as regards administration, if the black man is indeed entirely different from the white, there seems to be no reason why he should not be used in an entirely different manner, and treated as one of the lower animals

Now, if we have a real, practical belief in this unity, we shall look on native races in an entirely different way; we shall no longer see in them a bundle of inexplicable eccentricities and contradictions, and we shall no longer be prepared to dismiss them off-hand as "half devil and half child." We shall look upon them as men like ourselves, with similar passions, and probably with less self-restraint, with the same feelings of love and hate, and often the same respect for justice and contempt for injustice

The idea that a black or brown man is not really a man like ourselves is probably responsible for many of the worst outrages which have been committed, not only by white men upon black, but also by black upon white—and especially upon white women. In its most harmless form it is found disguised, in the shape of a theory that the

native is a child and must be treated as a child. Of course, there is an analogy between a native and a child, but there are many false analogies, and, though this particular analogy does not lead to any very dreadful conclusions (since one does not, for instance, starve or torture a child), still it appears to me to be, logically, as false as any of them. When I have come across this analogy it has generally been used as a justification for corporal punishment; the native is a child, it is argued, and when he offends he should be punished as a child—which, in effect, means that the native should be punished by a flogging administered without trial and at the caprice of the man against whom the offence, real or imaginary, was committed. On the other hand, if the native does something wrong, and asks to be forgiven as a child is forgiven, the analogy would probably be forgotten; many sententious platitudes would be uttered about the necessity of setting an example and keeping the native in his place, but it is likely that the pardon would be withheld.

The truth, of course, is that the native is a man, and not a child; he has a man's passions and a man's power to hate and love, but he is a very ignorant man, and he is a man whose customs and ways of thought are strange to us, even in the rare instances in which we try to understand them. And if we must use the method of analogy we should argue, not from the child, but from the peasant . . .

5. Views of "Savage" Culture

The anthropologists, A. C. Haddon, W. H. R. Rivers and B. Malinowski, taught that the cultures the Europeans confronted in Melanesia were complex and their different elements were interconnected; interference with one element could lead to the disintegration of the entire culture. Murray (and some anthropologists) assumed that this was a marked characteristic of 'savage races' only.

From: Papua Annual Report for 1919/20, p. 106.

In dealing with native customs it must be remembered that, among savage races, the different departments of thought and action are not clearly distinguished as with us; even among ourselves the interdependence of ideas is greater than appears on the surface, but we do keep our ideas and our customs in more or less watertight compartments, and we can change one set of opinions without altering others—for instance, we can change our politics without changing our religion, while a savage cannot do anything of the kind. His ideas are, as is to be expected, less highly specialized—they are all interwoven

and jumbled up together—so that, in suppressing a practice which seems to you simply silly and useless, you are at the same time perhaps affecting a dozen other practices which may be in many ways desirable.

6. Distintegration and Depopulation

The disintegration of traditional cultures was thought to be the main cause of depopulation.

From: *Papua Annual Report for 1922/23*, p. 15.

The great danger, to put it briefly, is that the suppression or modification of native habits and institutions, consequent upon contact with Europeans, is likely to destroy “the complex web of custom and institution” which constitutes native society, to cause the native to lose interest in life, and so to bring about the gradual extinction of the native himself, for if he has nothing to live for he will die. . . .

The two outstanding facts about European settlement in a country like Papua are the introduction of metals and the establishment of tribal peace. The immediate effects of these are that existence is thereby made much easier for the native, and that the chief activities of his life—the delight, for instance, of head-hunting and the joys of the raid—are lost to him for ever. At the same time, contact with the white man inevitably undermines his confidence in his ancestral religion and the magic of his tribe, and makes his traditional institutions appear rather absurd to the younger men.

Hence the loss of interest in life to which Dr. Rivers, arguing from the “enormous influence of the mind upon the body among lowly peoples,” attributes the apparent extinction of the natives of Melanesia. As I have already said, it is useless, in most cases, for the Government to fight against these facts; the true policy is to substitute some other interest in life for those which are going rapidly and, perhaps, are already gone.

7. Missions and Village Life

To replace the lost interest in life Murray had said in his Review of the Australian Administration that the Papuan could work; not for the European, but for himself. In addition, the missions could teach new beliefs, and the Government could attempt to put some joy into life.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Native Administration in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1929, pp. 21-3.

The Missions help us in matters of religion, and this is one of the greatest services they render to the Administration. Of course religious teaching is no part of our business, and if it were not for the Missions we should simply have to watch the old time paganism . . . fade away without being able to put anything in its place; but the Missions can and do put something in its place, something which may enable the Papuan to cross in safety the gulf which separates the old world, which he knew, from the strange new world into which he is being hurried.

Dances and feasts will, I suppose, die out like other ceremonies, and it is hard to see how we can prevent this. We encourage native gardens and plantations by awarding prizes for the best in each district, just as we encourage the birth-rate by the bonus; the distribution of both the bonus and the prizes is accompanied with such feasting and ceremonial as we can arrange, and it is possible that this may have an indirect effect in preserving the festive spirit. But direct action is impossible; no Government can compel a man to dance and make merry against his will.

The wisdom of ages has warned us against the bad effects of too much work, so we have attempted to modify the work with play, this time, I am glad to say, with the most enthusiastic assistance from the Missions, by encouraging the more warlike tribes to play football, and others to play cricket. Football, though in my poor judgment the only game worth playing, must at the best seem but a milk and water substitute for a head-hunting raid, and could not go far to satisfy the Papuan's craving for bloodshed. Still it is the best that we can do, and, when the old traditions of blazing villages and bleeding heads have at last died out, it is quite likely that the young men will lose the lust for murder which is so curious a feature to-day in the character of both young and old, and will find an outlet for their youthful energy in the more peaceful pursuits of work or play; and we can do much to help them in this direction by care for their physical health, and by an efficient system of education.

8. "Indirect Rule" in Papua

During the 1920s Indirect Rule came to be accepted widely as an aim by the British colonial administrators. Indirect Rule was described fully by F. D. Lugard in The Dual Mandate in Tropical

Africa in 1922, although Murray, who read widely on colonial administration, was already familiar with the term. In Uganda and Northern Nigeria Lugard had ruled 'indirectly' through existing chiefs and courts. There were a number of problems to be faced by any administrator considering applying Indirect Rule in Papua.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *The Machinery of Indirect Rule in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1935, pp. 1, 2.

In Nigeria there were Chiefs and Courts and a native administration already in existence, and all that was necessary was to stiffen the administration, to strengthen the Courts, and to rule through the Chiefs; but what is to be done in a territory like Papua, where there are practically no Chiefs worth talking about, no existing administration, and no Courts; where there is in fact no one to rule through and nothing to serve as a foundation?

EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF PAPUA

For, though village life in Papua was, in fact, ordered in a reasonably efficient manner, still there was nothing, apart from a few exceptional cases, which corresponds with our idea of Government or executive control. It is true that you read about Chiefs in any account of Papua that you care to take up, and it is only natural that in any body of men there should be some of stronger personality than the rest, and such men will take the lead as occasion arises. We may call these men "Chiefs" if we like, but the name is apt to be misleading; for in Papua the power of such men is likely to be personal to themselves, and to have no connection with any recognized position in the community. They are probably merely the strong men of the moment, and when the moment is past they may easily relapse into insignificance. And in most cases their influence is too transient and fleeting to support even the most modest system of Indirect Rule.

9. Village Councils

Murray consulted the writings of the anthropologists, but felt he still had only a vague idea of the 'secret of this very efficient lack of organization' in the villages.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *The Machinery of Indirect Rule in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1935, pp. 3-5, 7.

Well, if we have no Chiefs, no Councils, no Courts, no administrative machinery of any kind, nothing but a very problematical

“collective unconscious” and a few stray sorcerers, it may be argued that anything in the nature of Indirect Rule is impossible, and that we are driven to Direct Rule, even against our will

To supply the place of the non-existent Chiefs, Sir William MacGregor appointed native officials whom he called Village Constables. He was very proud of his Village Constables, and he had every reason to be, for they have done good work; but their appointment had no relation to any principle of Indirect Rule, which, indeed had hardly been heard of at that time. It was really an act of the most obvious Direct Rule, for these men are servants of the Government. They are selected and paid by the Government, and they hold office during the pleasure of the Government; and their duties are to act as the mouthpiece of the Government, and to carry out police duties generally. The weakness of their position is that they are not in any sense representatives of the village people; and to remedy this defect we have, in recent years, established Village Councils, in order to give the villagers an opportunity of taking part in the management of their own affairs.

The villagers select the Council by whatever method seems best to them, sometimes by popular vote, sometimes by a show of hands, sometimes as the result of a discussion among themselves; and the term of office is generally three years, though it may be as long as the villagers please. The duty of the Councils is to make suggestions for the improvement of village life, or of native life generally, either direct to the Magistrate or through the Village Constable. The Councillors are not paid.

The two initial difficulties in native administration are (i) that the white man really knows very little about the native, and (ii) that the native knows even less about the white man; and it was thought that the Councillors, if judiciously handled, could help to remove the second of these difficulties. Thus they can, and in fact do, render good service in explaining to the rest of the village the general objects of the administration. The Magistrate explains to the Councillors, and the Councillors to the rest of the village, that the native tax, for instance, does not go into the pockets of the tax-collectors but really comes back to the villages in the shape of schools, medical treatment and so forth; that we really are anxious that the people should live together in peace and prosperity, and that we do not make men carry heavy burdens along steep and slippery paths for our own amusement, but that we always have some definite object in view, and that nine times out of ten what we are doing is for their benefit.

These, the Village Constabulary and the Councils, are the slender machinery which we have provided to assist us in our attempt at

Indirect Rule. Fanatics of that form of Government would disapprove of both, for both Constables and Councils are creations of the Government and are quite foreign to Papuan ideas. The Papuans themselves are, as a rule, strong supporters of Direct Rule. There was, at first, no wish for the appointment of Councillors. "Why should we have Councillors?" they would ask. "It is the white man's business to carry on the Government; we do not know anything about it, and do not want to. We are quite satisfied with things as they are."

VILLAGE COUNCILS IN ACTION

And indeed at first the Councils were of little use, and it looked at one time as though they were going to be a failure. The Councillors were timid, and reluctant to volunteer an opinion on any subject; but, by degrees, as they saw that their suggestions were taken seriously, they gained courage, and they are beginning now to offer interesting and useful proposals.

It may be desirable to extend the system in the future, and to arrange for the amalgamation of different Councils into one large Conference on matter of common importance; but here I see a danger. Perhaps I am too timid, but, while I do not think that there is any risk of undue interference by the Government with the social side of Papuan life, I fear that, politically, we may, if we are not careful, be led too far and too fast by an excess of devotion to our own particular fetish, which, in the case of Australians, takes the shape of an advanced democracy.

10. Justice and Traditional Custom

Murray had found no political leaders he could use as the basis for Indirect Rule in Papua; nor could he find any suitable legal institutions.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Indirect Rule in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1929, pp. 10-11.

So, as the Papuan has no Courts of Justice of his own, we must establish Courts for him. This is direct rule of the most bare faced kind, but the Court is after all only the machinery, and in the actual administration of justice we come back to our principle of indirect government. For here we give due weight to native custom, especially in the sentences that we pass, and there are even two cases—sorcery and adultery—in which native custom has compelled recognition by the criminal law. But the main thing to remember—and one which

ardent advocates of indirect rule are apt to forget—is that it is our criminal code and not that of the Papuans that is going to survive; so we punish murder and we punish cannibalism, though both may be committed in strict conformity with native custom, but we show our appreciation of the custom by passing a sentence which, in the case of natives who are not fully under control, may be so light as to be little more than nominal.

Perhaps the matter in which we deviate most widely from Papuan ideals is our substitution of individual for collective responsibility. Collective responsibility is well enough outside a Court of Justice, for doubtless if the father is killed it is no little satisfaction to the son to “deal it out” to a fellow tribesman of the man who killed him, but such a thing is inadmissible in a Court constituted according to our ideas. We realise that an accused person cannot be convicted and hanged for murder upon evidence which establishes the guilt of one of his cousins, and, no doubt, if the Papuan had ever advanced so far as to establish a Court, he would have realized it as well as we. He never did advance so far, and he has always recognized the whole village or tribe as legitimate objects of his vendetta, but he adapts himself readily to our ideas of personal responsibility in matters coming before our Courts. . . .

All these principles of administration, whether you call them Indirect Rule or anything else, are useful only as beacons to guide the Administrator on his main course; they are not to hamper him in the details of his government. So in Papua we have found it necessary to follow the method of Direct Rule in building up a form of administration of our own, both executive and judicial; but in the substance of our administration we adhere as closely as we can to native custom and native tradition generally. We cannot fulfil the letter of Indirect Rule; but we are true to its spirit.

11. Education Through Missions

In his Review of the Australian Administration of 1920 Murray admitted that the government had done very little for the education of the people of Papua, but he was able to announce that a new scheme was being introduced: the missions were to be subsidised from the Native Taxation Fund. In 1929 the Government Secretary, H. W. Champion, described the progress made in education by the government and the missions.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Native Administration in Papua*, Port Moresby, 1929, Appendix B, pp. 46-50.

The first school in Papua for natives was that opened in Port Moresby apparently in 1874, by the late Dr. W. G. Lawes of the London Missionary Society. Other Missionary bodies soon established themselves in the Territory, and by 1918, when the "Native Taxes Ordinance" came into force, there were few, if any, important centres of native population where some sort of education was not available to natives. Except for a regulation making attendance compulsory for children living within one mile of a school, no assistance, monetary or otherwise, had ever been given to the Missions by the Government.

The "Native Taxes Ordinance" provides that the taxes firstly, "shall be applied for the purposes of the general and technical education of the natives of Papua in such manner as may be prescribed." It was natural, and indeed, inevitable, that the Government should invite the various Mission organizations, in return for financial assistance, to extend and improve the educational facilities already existing for the natives

Papua is a country of many tribes speaking many different languages and dialects, and, it being highly desirable that there should be a common language, the Government chose English as being the most suitable, and, as far back as 1907, directed its officers to use English in speaking to natives. In the same year the native regulation which makes school attendance compulsory was amended, so that punishment can now be inflicted only upon those children who fail to attend a school where English is taught. It followed, therefore, that the payment of subsidies should be limited to the schools teaching English. The Missions do not agree with this policy, but, without it, English would probably make little progress. On most of the Mission stations the custom is to use the vernacular, and to such lengths has this policy been sometimes carried, that even the children of European Missionaries have been denied a knowledge of their mother tongue. . . .

The first inspection under the new conditions was made in 1927. The total number of pupils in the schools inspected was about 2,000. The accommodation was found suitable and adequate, and the equipment satisfactory, but the want of an English reading book in keeping with Papuan conditions was commented on. The European teaching staffs were very favourably spoken of, but it was pointed out that the best results were obtained only where the teachers' work was wholly or mainly scholastic. Native assistants, zealous and industrious, were found in most of the schools doing valuable work, but often their ability to cope with English was extremely limited. . . .

The schools were again examined a year later by the same Inspec-

tor. In the meantime, a school reader suitable for Papuan conditions had been written by the Rev. W. J. Saville of the London Missionary Society, published by the Government, and its use made compulsory in all the subsidized schools. The Inspector found a decided advance upon the year before. English in particular had made substantial strides, and, in the lower classes, lessons having a certain amount of local colouring had been taken to "with a degree of avidity never before exhibited." Arithmetic, however, was still weak. Not much progress had been made in general knowledge, but the Inspector looks to the new reader, which he says "is destined to become a valuable factor in the education of natives," to supply this deficiency. At this examination 1,366 pupils were examined, and 1,147 passed.

The villages on the shores of Port Moresby of the Motu tribe have a population of about 2,000 with a large number of vigorous, intelligent children. Here the London Missionary Society established itself in 1874. In 1918, the 430 children attending school were being given such education as the Resident Missionary and his wife, both untrained teachers, could, with their multifarious missionary duties, manage to give them. Nevertheless, good progress was made. In return for an annual subsidy of £1,000, besides the *per capita* grant, the Society appointed a fully qualified teacher and an expert kindergarten mistress, who is assisted by the teacher's wife. Two large schoolrooms, a workshop and a teachers' residence were erected. The number of children attending the school is now about 550. A Papuan of considerable ability has been given special training at this school, in order to act as assistant master in it, and will shortly take up duty. The Society has, elsewhere, a college in which native pastors are trained and educated. After five years' tuition at the college, they come to Port Moresby and put in a year at the school here, where they are initiated into the latest teaching methods, so that, when they go out to distant villages as Missionaries, they will also be equipped for the school work which they are expected to undertake. Children taught by these men have been successful at the examinations conducted by the Government Inspector. . . .

The Roman Catholic Mission, whose head-quarters are at Yule Island, are also paid a subsidy of £1,000 per annum, in addition to the *per capita* grant. It is, however, a condition of the payment that the Mission shall give special attention to industrial training. Schools for primary education, which are all conducted by European Sisters, exist in the Mekeo District, and one at Port Moresby and one at Yule Island. At the two latter a large number of other than pure-blooded Papuans attend, and though they sit for examination, the Mission is not entitled to the *per capita* grant for them, as the operation of the

“Native Taxes Ordinance” does not extend to Papuans of mixed blood. . . .

One of the practical benefits of the education of the native is seen in the number of natives employed by Europeans at clerical and other duties, a result not believed possible a few years ago. In the Government Service many native clerks are employed; their work is highly satisfactory, and as they gain experience it is found possible to increase their responsibilities. The Medical Department has a number of native medical assistants who, without European assistance, travel from village to village giving yaw injections and dispensing simple remedies, and who are able to make a map of the route travelled and keep an intelligent account in English of the work performed. . . .

Progress in English must necessarily be slow since the opportunity of using it outside the school is not available to many natives. The Government Anthropologist, Mr. F. E. Williams, M.A., has recently started the publication of a newspaper for natives written wholly in English. This newspaper, called *The Papuan Villager*, had an immediate success, but, as Europeans are considerably attracted by it, it is difficult to say, as yet, what circulation it has among the natives. However, the growing number of contributions to its pages by natives—more indeed than the Editor can cope with—is an indication of the spread of English. We are apt to smile at the mistakes of the native writers, but we should be surprised, not at the number of mistakes made, but that they should be so few. Except the Missionaries, there are very few Europeans who have attained a knowledge of any native language approaching the knowledge that very many natives have acquired of ours. . . .

12. Medical Training for Papuans

During most of Murray's administration health services were under the direction of Dr. Walter M. Strong, who served as a Resident Magistrate and Government Anthropologist as well as a Medical Officer.

In 1933, 1934 and 1935 groups of Papuans attended courses at the School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine at Sydney University. In all, 38 students were trained in Sydney. On their return to Papua the students joined others who had been trained as Native Medical Assistants in Papua. The criticism referred to in the final paragraph of this report was one factor influencing the decision to send only three groups of students to Sydney.

From: "Training Papuan Medical Assistants", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, October 1935, p. 9.

At first little medical work was done among the natives—doctors being established at Port Moresby and Samarai mainly for attendance upon Europeans. Gradually, as the native population became more settled and in closer contact with white people, native hospitals were erected at the main centres. There natives were trained as wardsmen and assistants to look after native patients, and so was laid the foundation of the present training system.

A severe outbreak of dysentery occurred in Papua in 1912, and Dr. Strong, who had been a Resident Magistrate, was appointed travelling medical officer. By this time he was proficient with Motuan, the most widely understood of the many Papuan dialects, and he conceived the idea of teaching several natives to help him in combatting the dysentery outbreak. Under his tuition they slowly acquired a smattering of elementary medical knowledge and rendered useful service during the epidemic. Dr. Strong was appointed Chief Medical Officer during the war period, and, with a depleted staff, relied largely upon native assistants to do most of the work in villages.

After the war the tropical disease of yaws became general in Papuan coastal districts, and native assistants were shown how to give arsenicals by intravenous injections. The first Papuan to make injections could neither read nor write, but merely recorded each incision made by a stroke on paper. When, in 1923, a new material (*Bismuth Salicylate*) was found to be efficacious by intramuscular injection, and was also of negligible cost, a definite policy was instituted by the Papuan Government to train natives for independent work in villages.

Thousands of injections were given per annum with a noticeable decrease in the incidence of ulcers and other conditions dependent on yaws. Incidentally, side by side with the training in medicine, went education in English, in which the natives made their reports. Senior assistants regularly sent reports to Port Moresby showing the more serious cases treated by name, district, village, age, sex, etc. and with a brief statement of diagnosis and treatment. This system was carried on successfully until 1932, when a more ambitious attempt was made to give the assistants a better medical education. . . .

On leave in Sydney, Dr. Strong discussed the matter with Sir Charles Marr (the then Minister for Health and Territories), Dr. J. H. L. Cumpston (Commonwealth Director-General of Health),

and Professor Harvey Sutton (Director of the School of Tropical Health and Medicine). It was finally decided that a number of Papuans should be sent to Sydney University for a period of six months' training. The Papuan Government readily agreed to the plan. Twelve natives were selected, some of whom were already assistants in the medical department with a practical knowledge of dealing with native patients. Others were new recruits from mission stations. All could read and write Motuan, and had a knowledge of simple arithmetic and English.

A preliminary course of six months was undertaken at Port Moresby. Their instructions included: positions of bones and body organs; anatomical terms; physiology of blood; lung actions; nervous and digestive systems; etc. They were taught weights and measures, and how to use the balance and microscope. In September, 1933, the party was taken to Sydney by Dr. Strong and placed under the care of Dr. Clements, at the School of Tropical Health and Medicine. He revised and extended the work done in Papua and, with the wide resources of the school, was able to enlarge the young natives' studies, illustrating by practical demonstration and the use of models. They were taught the treatment of surgical injuries, fractures, dislocation of bones, haemorrhage, and head injuries. . . .

The cost of maintaining a party in Sydney is about £300, which is appropriated out of the Native Taxation Funds—a special fund held in trust for the benefit of Papuans by the Government. The ages of the native medical assistants range from 17 to 25; but experience has suggested that students over 20 have lost their elasticity of mind, and find more difficulty in grasping new ideas than the younger trainees.

The main fear of critics of Dr. Strong's scheme is that the Papuan lads, while in Sydney, may be brought into contact with undesirable elements, and especially with low-class white women; and that this may affect the good relationship between the races, which is so jealously guarded in Papua. So far, however, the residence of the Papuan youths in Sydney has been carefully supervised, and no harm appears to have been done.

13. The Papuan Capacity

In 1937 Father Louis Vangeke, a Papuan, returned to Port Moresby from Madagascar where he had trained for the priesthood. His return prompted Murray to speculate on 'how far the Papuan can make use of any high educational facilities that may be offered to him.' The document shows Murray's wide reading in

anthropology and colonial administration; the opposition he faced from some of the European community; his inevitable acceptance of some of the assumptions of his time; and his belief that questions of higher education could be postponed until the distant future.

From: *Papua Annual Report for 1937/38*, pp. 20-1.

INNATE CAPACITY OF DIFFERENT RACES.

Scientifically speaking it is probably quite impossible to compare the innate mental capacities of different races. Measurement of skulls is apparently quite futile, for Dr. Malinowski tells us "we know nothing, and probably never shall know anything, about the relation between the structure of the brain and mental processes, still less about the size of the brain in relation to intellectual capacity". A comparison of the cultural achievements of different races leads he says, to "a variety of errors" and "intelligence tests" have been admittedly quite unsatisfactory. (See *International Review of Missions* of October, 1936 at page 486 and following.)

HIGHER EDUCATION OF PAPUANS.

So we are left pretty well where we started, with no criterion of value to help us. My own opinion, which in itself is not of any importance, but which probably coincides with that of most of the European residents of Papua, is that Papuan and European overlap; that is I think that the best Papuans are superior to the worst Europeans, but that Europeans as a whole have an innate superiority over Papuans. As for the possibility of higher education among Papuans one must admit that, if a Papuan can qualify for the priesthood, there is no reason to suppose that another Papuan could not qualify for medicine or law. Personally, I have no doubt that Papuans could be found who could be educated to the standard of an ordinary professional career; but, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, I may say at once that I am quite opposed to the creation of a Papuan intelligentsia, and would rather aim at the diffusion of an elementary education, with a knowledge of English, over as wide an area as possible. The danger of an "intellectual proletariat" is explained by Dr. Thurnwald at page 258 of *Black and White in East Africa*.

A PAPUAN ELITE UNDESIRABLE.

The French, I have read, deliberately create a native élite in some of their colonies, but then the French do not draw the colour line

as we do. They are even inclined to criticize our policy of Indirect Rule as a disguised colour bar, and with them a black man can rise to any position that he is capable of filling. There has even been a black Colonial Minister at Paris, and those who have read *Africans learn to be French*, by Dr. Mumford and Major Orde Brown, will remember the case of M. Eboué, an African who is chief Secretary to the French Soudan, and who from time to time acts as Governor. There is a similar British case in Burma, but with us in Papua anything of the kind would be impossible.

And it would be unwise to give the Papuan a first class education unless the way to advancement is to be fully opened to him. As Dr. Pfahl puts it, we have to create a symbiosis with the native, and we can not do this if we create an educated class of Papuans, and then do not allow them to make use of the education which we have given them. And to give them the same opportunities as we give to Europeans would, under present conditions, be out of the question.

"There is no colour bar in the British and French West Indies". I am quoting from page 118 of a report by the Study Group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, entitled *The Colonial Problem*; and it may be that in time the bar may disappear from Papua also, as, apparently, it has from New Zealand, where, I believe, a Maori has been Acting Prime Minister. In that event the higher education of the Papuan will become practical, and perhaps even a burning question; but I do not consider that it is so at present.

PAPUANS AS MAGISTRATES IN NATIVE CASES

Still, as I said in the Annual Report for 1932-33, I hope that some day we may be able to hand over petty acts of administration and trivial native cases to Papuans themselves to deal with, and so save the time of highly-skilled Europeans; but when that day will come is hard to tell. We have already two or three natives who collect taxes and distribute the bonus, and who send in quite good reports, of course in English, and I do not think that there would be any difficulty in finding natives of sufficient intelligence to try a case; but there is a difficulty in finding men who possess strength of character, and who will not be swayed by family or village considerations, and a still greater difficulty, especially in some districts, in finding men who are not influenced by the fear of sorcery.

14. Peaceful Penetration

Education and health services could not be extended until the

villages had been brought under control. Murray's general policy of extending law and order in Papua came to be called 'peaceful penetration'.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *The Scientific Aspect of the Pacification of Papua*, Port Moresby, 1932, pp. 4, 6.

A scientific method of pacification postulates firstly some knowledge of the people whom you propose to pacify, and secondly some idea of what you are going to do with them when they are pacified. Native races are no longer deliberately exterminated, and the possible methods of dealing with them have been classified as subjugation, assimilation, and association. Subjugation may be said to be a thing of the past, and assimilation is perhaps the method of the future. Assimilation, in so far as it neglects the obvious facts of race, can perhaps never be realized, but, in so far as it insists upon the common humanity of both black and white, and the comparative unimportance of the points of divergence, it may contain the secret of the ultimate adjustment of racial differences. . . .

ESTABLISHMENT OF ORDER.

But, whatever method you are going to adopt whether it be assimilation or association or anything else, your first duty is the establishment of order; for this is the foundation upon which all administration must rest. And here, perhaps more than anywhere else, the importance of the scientific method appears. What I have elsewhere called the "swift injustice" of the punitive expedition may conceivably, under some circumstances, be capable of excuse, but it has always seemed to me to be the last word in unscientific bungling. The punitive expedition ignores the individual and makes war upon the tribe, some member of which is suspected of having committed an offence, and returns, perhaps, flushed with victory, "after killing the offender's uncle, ravishing his second cousin, and stealing his grandmother's pig." We consider this method unscientific for two reasons. The first reason is that it is an abandonment of our principle of individual responsibility, and an adoption of the savage's crude idea of tribal vengeance, which we consider to be a lapse into barbarism and a sin against civilization. And the second reason is that the punitive expedition is inconsistent with the peaceful association which is the end that we have in view.

15. Patrolling

The idea of gradually extending government influence out from a

fixed post was illustrated by a French administrator who compared it with the way an oil spot spreads over the surface of water. Murray used the 'policy of the oil stain' in Papua.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *The Scientific Aspect of the Pacification of Papua*, Port Moresby, 1932, p. 11.

Isolated posts have been established throughout the Territory, and from these posts patrols have been made into the neighbouring districts. Each post has become a centre of ever widening influence, and it has been our practice to link them up by a series of patrols, each patrol following a different route so as to cover as much of the Territory as possible. The patrol has generally been a small one, consisting of from six to ten police and one white officer. There is a risk in sending a single officer, and, if the numbers of our Service had permitted, we should always have sent two; but, as a matter of deliberate policy, I think that a small patrol is preferable to a large one. A large patrol has the advantage that it overawes the opposition, and is less likely to invite attack; but it has the disadvantage that it requires a big transport, which is always a difficulty in Papua, and that the carriers are likely to get out-of-hand and cause trouble with the local natives. Unfortunately we must rely upon human transport, for animal transport is out of the question in the mountains of Papua.

An essential part of Murray's policy was that violence was to be avoided if it was possible to do so without taking absurd risks. Murray thought that the most dangerous time for his 'outside men' was when they made an arrest in a newly contacted area and the arrest was interpreted as an attack by the villagers.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *The Scientific Aspect of the Pacification of Papua*, Port Moresby, 1932, pp. 26-7.

The attack must be repelled, and so all spring to arms, and grasp spear and club, and begin the hopeless fight of the Stone Age against the Twentieth Century.

And then there are two courses open to the police. They can either blow their opponents to pieces with rifle fire, burn their village, lay waste their country, and cow the survivors into subjection; or, in the alternative, they can concentrate their efforts upon the arrest of the individuals who are believed to be guilty, and seek to bring them to trial with as little disturbance as possible.

The former, that is the violent method, is certainly the easier and the less dangerous, and it brings kudos to the Officer concerned, who

will be praised as a "stout fellow," and held up to admiration as one who "will stand no nonsense"; but we have regarded it as unscientific, inasmuch as experience shows that it retards the policy of association which we have in view. So we have preferred the slower, less showy, much more dangerous, but more scientific alternative.

In practice the natives always have the first shot, for a Government party does not open fire until it is attacked, and not always even then. It is difficult to stop a fight when it has once begun, although, until then, even if spears are poised and bows are bent, there is still a chance of preserving the peace and of making friends. But it is a chance that a timid man would not care to take. Mr. Karius took such a chance in his celebrated expedition across New Guinea; and took it successfully. But Mr. Karius is not a timid man.

16. Race and Respect

Although Murray shared many of the beliefs of his time on race, he could still write with common sense on the question of relationships between Papuans and Europeans. His writings were not approved by some Europeans in Papua who demanded more sternness from the Europeans and more respect from the Papuan.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, pp. 51-3.

Letters sometimes appear in the Australian Press complaining of the lack of respect shown by natives to the writers, and the blame is invariably cast upon the Government. I have never been able to understand what the Government has got to do with such a matter—it seems to me emphatically a question of private relation between individuals with which the Government can have no concern—but I have often wondered whether the natives really have any particular disrespect for the authors of these letters. Is it not again a question of expecting a great deal too much from the native? I remember a very valued old friend of mine with whom I was travelling far inland in the Papuan bush, who one night came into my tent and wept bitter tears, because, as he said, "the police did not love him." Neither by appearance nor by character nor by reputation was he a man who would be easily moved, so I felt rather concerned and did my best to assuage his grief, pointing out that the police probably did not feel any extravagant affection for any of us, and that, as regards himself, so long as he invariably addressed them as "black bastards," he could hardly hope to win their love. But he refused to be comforted.

Now my old friend certainly gave too little and asked too much,

and I have sometimes thought that the writers who complain that they are not respected may perhaps be making the same mistake. A white man suddenly appears in a native village and asks for a number of men, who are to lay aside all their own business in order to carry heavy ill-fitting burdens up mountain tracks under a blazing sun, to a destination to which they do not want to go, on an errand in which they have no interest. All for a wage of perhaps 6*d.* a day. Now the village people have by law a perfect right to carry or to refuse to carry as they please; and it may readily be understood that they not infrequently refuse. Thus a refusal is merely the exercise of a legal right; but it is frequently regarded as evidence of a want of respect, and has been made the foundation of bitter complaints.

I think that it is a matter of great importance that the natives should feel a respect for the white man, but I think that this feeling cannot be forced upon them, and that any attempt to do so by punishment or harsh treatment for offences that are probably quite imaginary would have an effect exactly opposite to that which we intend. Nor do I think that an attitude of studied discourtesy or an affected rigidity of manner can help matters at all. Those stern disciplinarians who refuse to say "Thank you" or "Good morning" to one of an inferior race, or indeed to speak at all except to give an order, have always been rare in Papua, and I am very glad that they are rare; the only effect such antics can have is to spread the very false idea that the white man in the tropics is necessarily a prig.

But not only should the native respect the European, but the European should realise in his turn that he has a duty, both towards the native and towards his fellow-Europeans, never to act in such a way as to diminish that respect. So far as I am aware, the majority of white men in Papua act up to this standard and have in fact won the respect of the natives generally; and I think that they will retain this respect as long as they realize that the native has rights as well as the white man, and that superiority of race carries with it duties in proportion to its privileges.

17. Independence or Links with Australia?

The question of whether Papua and New Guinea should eventually become independent was not of course an issue in Murray's time. But in 1939 when he wrote a pamphlet opposing the amalgamation of the two territories, he based one of his arguments on the supposed different aims of the administration of Papua and New Guinea.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Notes on the Suggested Combination of the Administrations of Papua and New Guinea*, Port Moresby, 1939, pp. 16-17.

COMPLICATION INTRODUCED BY THE MANDATE

And here again a very important question arises which I should perhaps have mentioned earlier, and that is the wide difference which exists, in native administration, between a territory under Mandate and one which is not under Mandate. In the Mandated Territory the objective of the Government is that the natives shall eventually stand by themselves—that is shall become independent. (*See per Sir Donald Cameron in "Papers relating to the question of the closer union of Kenya, Uganda and the Tanganyika Territory."*) But this is rarely, if ever, the objective in a Territory or Colony which is not under Mandate.

INDEPENDENCE THE AIM OF NEW GUINEA; ASSOCIATION WITH AUSTRALIA THAT OF PAPUA

So independence is to be the ultimate condition of the natives of New Guinea if the Mandate is adhered to; but no such argument can apply to Papua. The ultimate condition of the natives of Papua (failing conquest by some foreign power) will certainly be, not independence, but closer connection with Australia, and ultimate absorption in the Australian Commonwealth. So the path of the Papuan is in just the opposite direction from that of the native of New Guinea. And this alone makes the amalgamation of native policies impossible.

To take the instance of New Guinea and Papua. The objective of the New Guinea Government should be, under the Mandate, and doubtless is, the ultimate independence of the natives of that territory. This point is very well dealt with by Sir Donald Cameron at page 112 of the pamphlet mentioned. In reply to the inevitable objection that it is fantastic to suppose that the natives of such territories could ever be independent, he makes the unanswerable reply that, if this is the opinion of the mandatory power, that power should either abandon the mandate or have it altered. And indeed the example of the Philippine Islands shows that the independence of such peoples may be more than a dream.

IV. SIR HUBERT AND HIS CRITICS

Murray was never without numerous critics. It was a characteristic of many European settlers and visitors in Papua that they could readily prescribe what was best for Papua and the Papuans. Frequently strident critics denounced Murray's policies; but by the time he died there was another group almost equally passionate in his defence. Murray's testimony before the Royal Commission of 1906 alienated a number of public servants and after his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor some of them, who had resigned from the government service, formed a centre of opposition to Murray. They were joined by some planters and traders who believed that Murray's policies unfairly restricted their activities. The Papuan Times and Tropical Advertiser, Papua's first independent newspaper founded in 1911, published their condemnation of Murray's administration.

1. Settler Opinion

In an editorial on 8 March 1911 the Papuan Times and Tropical Advertiser stated that there should be an increase in the number of non-official members of the Legislative Council and that these members should be elected. The Times also believed that Papua should have a representative in the Commonwealth Parliament. The editorial then went on to consider the basic aims of government in Papua.

From: *Papuan Times*, 8 March 1911.

A head tax of say 10s. per head per annum on the natives would bring in a large amount of money, which could be used for public purposes, besides being a big factor in the way of compelling the able-bodied natives to work on the plantations and mining fields. Here we have a country with a large aboriginal population, and even at the present initial stage difficulty is experienced in procuring labour for field work. The soft-hearted politicians in Australia who do not understand black races say that the Government of Papua is primarily in the interests of the natives, and we have no doubt that

they wish it to continue so, but our contention is that the Government of Papua should be primarily in the interests of the white pioneers of this new country, which after all is only an outpost at the door of Australia. Will it benefit the Commonwealth if Papua is allowed to elapse into its old savage state, a prize for any hostile alien nation which decides to come forth for room for its crowded out hordes? We rather think it will benefit the Commonwealth to assist the settlement of a big white population in Papua, even though it should cost five times £29,000 per annum for subsidy. . . .

The creation of an elective Parliament in New Guinea, and the representation in the Commonwealth Chamber, will establish some democratic rule for the Government of the Territory and for its future development. If the people who know Papua can be allowed a voice in the management of their own affairs, it will mean that the country will go ahead wonderfully and that a large and prosperous community will soon occupy the present vacant spaces.

2. Settlers and Murray

The opposition to Murray reached its height in 1920 when a public meeting called by the Citizens Association of Port Moresby passed a motion calling for the replacement of Murray. The meeting's decision was sent to the Prime Minister.

From: *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XCI, 24 March 1920, p. 640.

Mass meeting of citizens last night Port Moresby following resolution was carried by large majority:— 'That in the opinion of this meeting a message be forwarded to the Prime Minister requesting the removal of the Lieutenant-Governor, as his administration has lost the confidence of the white residents through its hostility to progress, its contempt of the white race, and its retarding the proper development of the Territory. That the Honorable Staniforth Smith be invited to fill the position, his policy, in addition to safeguarding the native race, being progressive and sympathetic to whites, whose interests would be safe in his hands.' Minority vote consisted of civil servants only. BRUCE, Chairman.

One member of the Citizens Association attempted to send a telegram to the King.

From: *Papuan Courier*, 8 October 1920.

Persistent despotic and persecuting actions by Governor Murray leading to serious and dangerous uprising of white people in Papua. Repeated demand for enquiry and redress by Commonwealth both ignored. Respectfully request His Majesty take immediate action which honour and integrity Empire demands.

Supporters of Murray claimed that the motion passed was not representative of the feelings of most citizens, and that the telegram was ludicrous. A further public meeting in Port Moresby repudiated the telegram.

From: Government Archives, Port Moresby, Murray to Minister, 26 October 1920.

Meeting Port Moresby citizens emphatically repudiate cablegram sent by unauthorised persons to H.M. the King. Cablegram in question does not reflect matured opinion of white Australians in Papua and was despatched without their knowledge and approval. Citizens unanimously express their loyalty and attachment to constituted authority of the Commonwealth and look confidently to Australia for speedy removal of any disabilities under which they labour.

3. Deputation to the Minister

In 1921 the Minister for Home and Territories, A. Poynton, visited Papua and received a deputation claiming to represent the planters and miners.

From: *Second Annual Report of the Planters' Association of Papua*, Sydney, 1921, pp. 23-41.

The native, as we all know and admit, is the finest asset that Papua possesses, both from an Official and Industrial side, but it is only with his willing co-operation that his value, as an asset, can be proved.

For many years the Papuan Native has enjoyed the peace and protection of British Administration, which has rendered his life and property more secure from hostile tribes. It has relieved him of the necessity of self-preservation, and incidentally it has deprived him of his principal occupation, and left him free for other and more useful pursuits. Under these improved conditions it is easy to understand how he may lapse into a life of idleness and indolence, or, at the most, the gratification of his own personal desires.

We do not think we are contravening any accepted principle of the British Colonial Policy, or humanity, in suggesting that the Native should contribute, in some way or other, towards the cost of the administration, which has provided him with such improved conditions of life.

With very few exceptions, the only way in which the native can contribute is by the exercise of his physical energy, and in our opinion this can be directed with the greatest advantage towards the development of the Territory.

We emphatically state that we are not suggesting any form of compulsion, for that is just as repugnant to ourselves as it is to the world at large.

We do, however, suggest that the attitude of the Government towards the Native should be to encourage him in habits of industry, and we are convinced that the Native is readily influenced by the Government's attitude.

We make this suggestion just as much in the interest of the Native, and the welfare of the Territory, as in our own, for we know, from practical experience, how the physical, mental and moral, condition of the Native is improved by a period of employment, usefulness, and discipline, under suitable feeding and housing regulations. The Armed Native Constabulary provide a striking example of this.

A vast amount of capital . . . has been expended on the agricultural and mining development of this country, for which no return, with perhaps one or two exceptions, has ever been received. . . .

All such ideas as 'exploiting the native for the payment of dividends' must therefore be immediately dismissed.

Financial Policy

. . . We favour a loan by the Commonwealth to the Territory of £500,000 at a low rate of interest, only to be expended on public works and the promotion and fostering of industries within the Territory. . . .

Lands

In the opinion of this deputation there is not enough assistance or inducement held out to intending settlers. The present system is cumbersome and involves too much delay.

. . . We know of cases where intending settlers, in view of the difficulties of obtaining land, have turned away. . . .

Native Labour and Taxation

In the opinion of this deputation the Native Labour Ordinance as it stands is fair and just to white and black, and we have no complaint whatsoever. Our only objection is the administering of the Ordinance

by young and inexperienced officers who are inclined to follow the letter rather than the spirit of the Ordinance, and through their ignorance or zeal often involve both the Government and the Planter in unnecessary friction and expense. . . .

Native Taxation

We are entirely in agreement with the taxation of natives as a general principle. . . .

We are, however, of the opinion that the present system of taxation in Papua is fundamentally unsound, as it falls most heavily on one particular class of native, inasmuch as it practically penalises the indentured labourer, while many of the free natives living in districts from which labour is recruited entirely escape. . . .

The imposition of this tax has certainly not had the effect of inducing natives to go to work, but has considerably added to the difficulty of recruiting, as the natives now realise the disadvantages of going to work. . . .

Asiatic Labour

Our chief difficulty in development and production is the want of good boss boys or intermediaries between the white and the raw black, and in our opinion the training of the native would be more rapid and effectual if we were allowed to indenture a proportion of skilled Indian or Chinese labour. . . .

Preferential Tariff

In our opinion the most effective assistance that could be given [the planting industry] would be a tariff providing for absolute preference for Papuan products imported into Australia. . . .

Navigation Act

We understand this matter is now under consideration. We believe this Act was framed for the purpose of protecting Australian Labour interests. Its application to Papua is therefore, in our opinion, entirely unnecessary, as we are in no way in competition with Australia.

4. Horrified Settlers

In his defence Murray said that in places similar to Papua it was normal for the government to be bitterly opposed by some groups; in fact, he thought it could be assumed that such opposition was a sign of good government. He also claimed that while most settlers were prepared to express their approval for policies designed to protect the welfare of the Papuan, they were completely unprepared to see them put into effect.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Papua of To-day*, London, 1925, p. 214.

No secret had been made by the Commonwealth of the policy that would be followed, but intending settlers were inclined to ridicule anything of the kind as humanitarian rubbish. For the general belief was that the Papuan Government would be careful not to run counter to public opinion or to seek any quarrels with investors; and would in effect pay the more powerful companies the compliment of allowing them to "run" the administration to suit themselves. This was the case, it was said, under other Governments, and the precedent would be followed in Papua.

But to the utter amazement of every one concerned, the precedent (if indeed there was one) was not followed in Papua. I think that it was with genuine horror that the first investors realized that the native interests would actually be considered, that the provisions of the various ordinances and regulations were really going to be carried out, that native evidence might be believed in Court, that a native might get a verdict against his employer, and that a white man might even be sent to jail on native evidence. I say that it was genuine horror, because I am sure that the majority really did think that all these things were most iniquitous. They honestly thought that ordinances and regulations should be kept for show, or at any rate should hardly be used against a company that had spent money in the country and was prepared to spend more, and that native evidence should never be received against a European. They were also deeply imbued with the idea that the native was an "asset," but seemed to have little suspicion that he was anything more.

5. Expressions of "loyal regard"

By the 1930s criticism of Murray was muted, and he was praised on public occasions as a great Australian. When the Governor-General of Australia, Lord Gowrie, visited Port Moresby in July 1937 Arthur Jewell, a member of the deputation to Poynton in 1921, said of Murray:

From: *Papuan Courier*, 30 July 1937.

The country . . . had one great achievement and a prominent one, its native administration, one that was emulated by other administrations and one which, through its safeguarding of the natives, had prepared the way for industrial and commercial development by which it was now hoped to achieve greater prominence in the eyes of the world.

Lord Gowrie presented an address to Murray signed by nearly all the European residents of Papua 'to signalise the completion of 30 years administration of the territory'.

From: *Papuan Courier*, 6 August 1937.

Your Excellency,

We, residents in Papua, beg to express to you our pleasure and satisfaction that the completion of your thirtieth year of administration should be marked by a visit from Australia's Governor-General.

We venture to make this an occasion for congratulating Your Excellency not only on the duration of your long term of Office, but also on the happy results accruing from it.

Your Excellency's reputation is world-wide and firmly established. What is not so well known outside Papua is the patient, wise, and sympathetic manner in which you have worked always for the protection and support of European industries, for the advancement of Papua as a colony, and for the welfare of every member of the community.

In offering Your Excellency our heartfelt congratulations, we wish to tender an expression of our affectionate and loyal regard as much for your person as for the high Office which we pray that you may long continue to hold.

Later, when the Governor-General visited Hanuabada, Rakatani Leke presented a letter of appreciation to Murray signed by 2,000 Papuans.

From: *Papuan Courier*, 6 August 1937.

Our Governor,

We people of Papua all know that in July, 1937, you complete thirty years as Governor of Papua. During all those years we have seen your good works, and all the helpful things you have done. When we have come to speak to you, you have not closed your ears, nor have you frowned on us, but have received us, and listened to us, and taken action for us. We have seen all the good things you have done, and our happiness is great because of you.

Therefore we all beg of you not to leave us, but stay here as our Governor for years to come. For we know you and how you have led us into the ways of your laws, treating white people and ourselves just the same. We know that you love us well, and we are full of love for you, our Governor.

It needs to be added that in the same issue of the Papuan Courier the editorial claimed to be 'speechless' at the 'disregard of all the ethics of government' shown by the administration in the presentation of the Supplementary Estimates.

6. Discriminatory Laws

Recent critics of Murray have pointed to some of the legislation which Murray introduced and administered. Some of it is, they claim illiberal and discriminatory. The Native Regulations have been cited as evidence.

They concerned marriage and divorce, disposal of the dead, courts for native matters, cultivation of the soil, and other customary matters, and all 'matters . . . bearing upon or affecting the good government and well being of the natives'. The Regulations provided for penalties up to £25 fines or six months' imprisonment.

From: T. P. Fry, ed., *The Laws of the Territory of Papua 1888-1945* (Annotated), Sydney, 1949, pp. 3305, 3306, 3315, 3316.

Being absent from quarters, making a noise, etc., after 9 o'clock p.m. 73.—(1) Any native engaged under the Ordinances for the time being relating to native labour who is away from the quarters assigned to him at any time after 9 p.m. and before daylight of the following morning without the written consent of his employer or other sufficient excuse shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding Ten shillings, or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding One month, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding One month.

A written consent of an employer shall not be valid as an excuse under this sub-regulation for a native to be away from his quarters after the hour of 11 p.m.

(2) All noise, shouting, beating of drums and dancing shall cease in the towns and villages at 9 o'clock each night unless the Magistrate grants permission to the people to dance after that hour. Any native disobeying this regulation shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Ten shillings or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding One month, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding One month . . .

Conduct of natives.

93.—(1) If any native in any street or public place—

- (a) uses any threatening, abusive, insulting, jeering or disrespectful language to any European; or
- (b) behaves in a threatening, abusive, insulting or disrespectful manner towards any European; or
- (c) begs for money, tobacco or other property from any European; or
- (d) wilfully or wantonly throws or discharges any stones or other missile to the damage or danger of any person; or
- (e) wilfully obstructs the passage of any vehicle, or without the permission of the driver thereof gets upon or holds on to any vehicle whether in motion or not,

he shall be guilty of an offence against this regulation

Loitering, etc., in towns.

95. No native shall in the Town of Port Moresby—or in any other Town to which the Lieutenant-Governor shall extend the provisions of this regulation by Order in Council published in the *Gazette*—

(a) loiter upon any footway to the inconvenience of passers by;
or

(b) wilfully obstruct or impede the passing of persons along any carriageway or footway.

A breach of this regulation shall render the offender liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding Ten shillings or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding One month or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding One month.

7. A Papuan Tribute

Hubert Murray died at Samaria on the 27th February 1940 while he was visiting eastern Papua on the Laurabada. The next day an R.A.A.F. flying boat brought Murray's body to Port Moresby. Members of the Royal Papuan Constabulary led the funeral from the wharf to the cemetery. A requiem mass was celebrated at the Roman Catholic church, Port Moresby on the 29 February, and a Masi-Ariana was conducted by the Motu people at which Ahuia Ova spoke.

From: Lewis Lett, *Sir Hubert Murray of Papua*, London, 1949, p. 305.

Governor Murray is dead. He worked until he died. He was our Governor for more than thirty years.

During all that time we saw his work and his laws. And we have seen his good deeds also.

When our people were in trouble they went to him, and he did not turn them away. In our trouble he gave us help and made us happy again. There was no man like him in this way.

Wherever he went in Papua he spoke friendly words. He was never harsh towards men, or women, or children.

He brought great happiness into our lives. Therefore we say that he was good.

But in February this year he died. We, his people, remember him and weep.

He treated us always as friends. His way towards us was the way of a friend.

We think of him still, and we shall think of him always, for he guided us well. Now we make for him this feast according to the custom of our people.

The ways of his people were not our ways. But he understood us and made our lives happy.

We, too, understood him, and we loved him. Therefore we now make his *Masi-Ariana*.

But who is like him in Papua? There is none. There will never be one like him.

He came among us and saw our lives. Sometimes when he was younger, he hunted and fished with us. He knew us in all our ways.

Sometimes when his work was done, he met us on the roads. As we came home from our gardens he greeted us.

Now we have lost him, for he is dead. We shall not know his friendly ways again.

There were Governors here before him, but we know nothing of them. Our fathers have not told us of them.

There has been only one Governor in our time. He was the best of men; our children and their children will talk of him.

But he is gone, and we have lost him. Our hearts are heavy because of his going.

He promised us all 'I will not leave you. I will die in Papua'. His words were the words of a true man, for his body now lies in our ground.

8. Murray's Achievements

Many tributes were paid to Murray on his death. Judge Nicholas wrote of his reputation and his personality.

From: H. G. Nicholas, "Sir Hubert Murray, K.C.M.G.", *The Australian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 2, pp. 5-6.

Whoever writes the official biography of Sir Hubert Murray will have a task in some respects simple, in others of baffling difficulty.

It will be an easy matter to enumerate his achievements. His administration of Papua, in spite of many obstacles and years of criticism, was acknowledged to have been an outstanding success. He explored, developed and pacified the Territory, maintained the supply of labour, protected the native inhabitants and adapted them to the needs of civilization.

Australia had made for itself a bad reputation by its treatment of its aborigines. Murray made Papua a shining illustration of the British doctrine of trusteeship and set a standard in the treatment of native races which has been acknowledged to be of the highest throughout the British Colonial Service and by the Commissions of the League of Nations. He rejected many suggestions that imported labour should be called in for the plantations. He established the "Murray doctrine" for his own and every other civilized country. With no training school to draw upon and without adequate pay to offer them, he attracted to himself courageous and capable lieutenants, well fitted to carry out his policy in the spirit in which he had planned it. He did this in spite of some years of opposition from the commercial interests in Papua until in the later years of his administration merchants and planters were united with missionaries and civil servants in acceptance of his creed. For over thirty years he sent annual reports to the Commonwealth Government which besides supplying all necessary information to his Department are full of amusement and enlightenment to the judicious reader.

What the man did in over thirty years of administration may be summarized without much difficulty. It is far more puzzling to describe what manner of man it was who did so much. Murray had many friends but none of them was in touch with every side of his character. He was a scholar and humanist who was never at his best except in action. He was one of the greatest of administrators and probably never thought of service in the tropics until he was over forty. He was a champion boxer, he performed prodigious feats of strength, he used to keep himself fit by rowing home to Hunter's Hill and he cared little or nothing for organized sport. He was a Catholic, he called himself a Papist, and for over thirty years he was a strict teetotaller. "Did you have a good time in England?" one of his friends asked him after his return trip. "Can a teetotaller ever be said to have had a good time?" was Murray's answer.

Before he went to Papua, Murray's happiest time was in the South African War with the Irish Rifles. He served with distinction and made friends of all types. At the Bar he was a Crown Prosecutor and acted as a District Court Judge. He was not happy nor really successful but his pre-eminent ability was not hidden from his contemporaries. "We have all much the same kind of brain," said one of them to the lunchers at the Oxford Hotel, "except of course Hubert Murray and Frank Leverrier" and that was a time when there were some brilliant men about. It was an inspiration that sent him to Papua just when there had been a relapse from the high level of Sir William Macgregor. It was a stroke of luck that in the first years of his reign no one wanted to displace him and in the later years he was acknowledged to be irreplaceable. It may also have been a stroke of luck that it fell to his lot to persuade the Commonwealth Government not to apply the Navigation Act to Papua or New Guinea.

Murray had the foresight and the idealism to plan for many years ahead, the patience, the obstinacy, the self-control and the power of inspiring others necessary to outlast his opponents. It was his good fortune as well as that of the Territory that he held office continuously for over thirty years until he died in harness.

CHAPTER FOUR

GERMAN NEW GUINEA

I. NEW GUINEA COMPANY

The "German period" in New Guinea history lasted thirty years. During the first fifteen years, from 1884 to 1899, the colony was administered by the New Guinea Company, which failed to make profits and was taken over by the Imperial Government in 1899 to stave off imminent bankruptcy. During the Imperial period (1899-1914) the colony was administered by a Governor; after 1904 he was assisted by a nominated Government Council, an advisory body representing all shades of European opinions and interests. The colony had two main administrative divisions the "old protectorate" (today's New Guinea) and the "island sphere". The latter consisted of the Carolines and the Marianas and Nauru and the Marshall Islands. Until 1909 the island sphere enjoyed considerable autonomy. In 1910 the capital of German New Guinea was transferred from Herbertshoehe to Rabaul, and the island sphere was brought into close administrative union with the rest of the colony.

1. Imperial Letter of Protection

German interests in New Guinea before the annexation took two forms: a trading interest in the Bismarck Archipelago and a financial interest, emanating from Berlin, which was concerned with investment in plantations on the New Guinea mainland. The New Guinea Company was formed in May 1884 and received its charter a year later.

From: P. W. van der Veur, comp., *Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea Boundaries*, Canberra, 1966, pp. 14, 16.

WE, William, by the Grace of God, German Emperor, King of Prussia, &c.

Declare and ordain by these presents:

Whereas, in August 1884, we promised our protection to an Association of German subjects, which has in the meantime adopted the name of the New Guinea Company, for a Colonial enterprize undertaken by them in islands of the Western Pacific, which are not under the sovereignty of any other Power;

Whereas this Company has, through an expedition fitted out by itself, acquired and taken into occupation, under control of our Commissioner on the spot, harbours and portion of the coast, with a view to cultivation and to the establishment of commercial stations, and that these districts were thereupon placed under our protection by our ships of war;

Whereas the two German firms which had previously erected factories and acquired territorial rights of those districts have joined the Company, and whereas the Company, legally represented by our "Geheimen Commerzienrath" Adolph v. Hanseemann, has now shown that it undertakes to create and maintain such political institutions as will promote commerce and make the land and soil available for cultivation, as well as bring about and preserve peaceful relations with the natives, and all that may conduce to their civilization, and has, in making this declaration, proposed that, to assist in carrying out these objects, an Imperial Letter of Protection should delegate to it the right to exercise territorial sovereignty under our sovereignty, with the exclusive right, under the supervision of our Government, of taking unclaimed land into occupation, and disposing of it, and concluding contracts with the natives respecting title to landed property.

We grant to the New Guinea Company this our Letter of Protection, and confirm hereby our assumption of the sovereignty over the districts in question.

These districts are—

1. That part of the mainland of New Guinea which is not under British or Dutch sovereignty. This district which, at the proposal of the Company, we have permitted to be called "Kaiser Wilhelm's Land," stretches on the north coast of the island from the 141 degree of longitude (east of Greenwich) to the point in the vicinity of Mitre Rock, where the 8th degree of south latitude cuts the coast, and is bounded to the south and west by a line which follows closely

the 8th degree of latitude up to the point where the latter is intersected by the 147th degree of east longitude, and then runs in a straight line in a north-westerly direction to the intersection point of the 6th degree of south latitude and the 144th east longitude, and again in a north-westerly direction to the intersection of the 5th degree of south latitude and the 141st degree east longitude, and hence follows this line of longitude to the sea.

2. The islands lying off this portion of the coast of New Guinea, as well as the islands of the archipelago, which has up till now been known as the New Britain Archipelago, and is now, at the proposal of the Company, and with our authorization, to bear the name of Bismarck Archipelago, and all other islands north-east of New Guinea, situate[d] between the Equator and the 8th degree of south latitude, and the 141st and 154th degrees of east longitude.

Moreover, we grant to the said Company, in return for their engagement to create and maintain the political organization undertaken by them, and to defray the costs of an adequate administration of justice, herewith the rights implied in territorial sovereignty, as well as the exclusive right to take into occupation unoccupied land in the protected territory, and to dispose of it, and to conclude contracts with the natives as to territorial titles, all this being under the supervision of our Government, which will take the necessary steps to guarantee such rights of possession to which a former lawful title can be shown, and to protect the natives.

The regulation of the administration of justice, as well as the direction and conduct of relations between the protected districts and the foreign Governments, remain in the disposition of our Government.

We promise and order hereby that our officials and officers shall carry out this our Letter of Protection by protecting and supporting the Company and its officers in all lawful ways.

This our Imperial Letter of Protection we grant to the New Guinea Company on condition that it completes its legal organization according to the prescriptions of German law within a year from this date at latest, that the members of its Board of Directors, or persons otherwise intrusted with the conduct of affairs, are members of the German Empire, making due reservation respecting future amplifications of this our Letter of Protection, and such directions as may issue from our Government with a view to giving effect to it, as well as such further dispositions as may be found advisable in the exercise of our sovereignty over the protected territory, to observe which the Company is [obliged to be] engaged, under pain of losing their claim to our protection.

In witness whereof we have executed this Letter of Protection with our own hand, and sealed it with our Imperial seal.

Given at Berlin, the 17th May, 1885.

(Signed) WILHELM.

(Countersigned) v. Bismarck.

2. Company in Difficulties

The New Guinea Company was plagued with problems right from the start. There was too much control from Berlin, too many rules and regulations, not enough staff, and little expert knowledge of tropical agriculture. Even the choice of the site for the first "capital", Finschhafen, turned out to be a mistake. In 1891 most of the Europeans died during a malaria "epidemic", and the capital was transferred to Stephansort on the Astrolabe Bay.

From: G. Souter, *New Guinea: The Last Unknown*, Sydney, 1963, pp. 72-5.

Finschhafen, the first capital from which the *Kompagnie* administered Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the islands of Neu Pommern (New Britain), Neu Mecklenburg (New Ireland), and Neu Lauenburg (Duke of York Islands), was a dreary little settlement spurred to unwilling action by voluminous correspondence from Berlin, stifled by a murderous climate, fevered by a particularly virulent strain of malaria, shaken from time to time by earth tremors, and consoled only by alcohol. Madang Island was soon connected by a stone causeway to the harbour shore, where there was barely enough flat ground for a town cemetery. Stefan von Kotze, a nephew of Bismarck who worked for some years in the colony as a surveyor, said that the two most frequented spots in Finschhafen were the cemetery, which had no headstones but many anonymous mounds, and the "hotel", which possessed an attraction that few officials could resist.

The style of life in Finschhafen was described by one resident as *junggesellenwirtschaft*—bachelor housekeeping. There were only four married men in the settlement during its first three years, and only three unmarried European women. Diet consisted mainly of sweet potatoes and a brand of tinned meat that tasted like "pieces of ship's rope boiled in candle grease", and to make matters worse the normal processes of digestion were frequently upset by diarrhoea and quinine. Most Europeans suffered attacks of malaria once a month. The mosquito's role in malaria was not yet understood, and although the fever was treated with quinine it was customary to

take much larger doses than were necessary or, indeed, advisable. The side effects were most unpleasant. "I am one of the few to get out of that malaria-hole Finschhafen with a whole skin," wrote Kotze, "because I treated the fever with alcohol instead of quinine, and the orders of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie similarly—with alcohol instead of respect."

Berlin was the heaviest burden of all. A *Landeshauptmann*, or Administrator, was stationed at Finschhafen, but the "green table" at which policy decisions were made was on the other side of the world. The Board, elected by shareholders and presided over for twelve years by the Kompagnie's managing director, Adolph von Hanseemann, seemed to regard New Guinea as a sort of Cathay merely waiting to be exploited; it took a long time to realize that the colony had few natural resources, and that those it did possess could be exploited only by hard work. "Berlin wanted to play the ruler, not the settler," wrote Kotze. "But New Guinea was not suitable for ruling."

The Neu Guinea Kompagnie was making a poor job of colonization. It ruled clumsily, and with far too much red tape. So endless was the flow of its ordinances and regulations, indeed, that the *Landesbureau* from which they emanated became known as the "paper house". "Even the black boy who provides kitchen food, birds, boars etc.," wrote one colonist, "is required at all times to carry on him the permit to shoot which is issued for a year, apparently in order that he can show it at any time to the policeman he may meet in the forest. Picture to yourself what a piece of paper looks like after a naked black has carried it on him for only 24 hours in wind and weather!" There was an ordinance setting out the correct method of erecting flagpoles, an ordinance dealing with the use of artificial manure, and an ordinance instructing all Kompagnie employees for some obscure reason to surrender their collections of beetles, shells, fish, or butterflies.

The Kompagnie was unpopular with its staff, and, worse still, its operations were unprofitable. Its ships were wrecked in uncharted waters, its officers died of malaria and smallpox, and the local natives could not be persuaded to work. Nor did the Chinese coolies who were brought to the colony show much enthusiasm for manual labour; they deserted, and when recaptured and flogged they were inclined to commit suicide. One night six recaptured coolies who were confined on board a hulk in the harbour hanged themselves *en masse* from the taffrail.

A sawmill was built to produce timber which could have been imported more cheaply from Australia, a cotton plantation was

established in a district with unsuitable soil and rainfall, and somehow immigrants never seemed to arrive in any number from Germany. While the white-suited officials at Finschhafen reacted to these disappointments by merely raising their daily intake of Bloody Bones, the Berlin directors took more decisive action in 1889 by asking the Imperial Government to relieve the *Kompagnie* of all its administrative powers and responsibilities. The Government did this, but restored the *Kompagnie* to roughly its original status four years later.

In 1892 the *Kompagnie* moved its headquarters up the coast to Stephansort (Bogadjim), hoping that the new site would be healthier than Finschhafen, where death had become far too familiar. "For goodness sake," the manager of the *Landesbureau* said to Kotze at Finschhafen one morning, "where is the clerk Müller? At the hotel I suppose!"

"Herr Müller died this morning," someone replied.

"So, so, so! Then it is not as bad as I thought!" The manager retired to his own room, then emerged once more. "Today is mail day," he snapped. "There will be no funeral beer today!"

"And so," commented Kotze, "the kanakas carried poor Müller to the cemetery without escort."

Stephansort made "a rather friendly and pleasing impression" upon one visitor in 1895. It had a hospital, a Chinese store, the *Rheinische Mission Society* headquarters, the *Landeshauptmann's* residence with offices on the ground floor, a clubhouse with billiard room, a park with a shooting-stand, a number of private houses built on six-foot-high poles, and twenty labour houses each accommodating about fifty Chinese, Javanese, or Melanesians. Despite its appearance, however, Stephansort was even less healthy than Finschhafen had been, and the capital was transferred twenty miles farther up the coast to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen (Madang). Twenty-five Europeans were left behind in Stephansort cemetery.

3. The 1893 Tolai Uprising

In New Britain the New Guinea Company set up its first headquarters at Kerawia, on the Duke of York Island, whence it was moved to Herbertshoehe (Kokopo) on the Gazelle Peninsula. This part of New Britain was settled before German annexation, and witnessed much alienation of village land during the 1880s. In 1893 the Tolais of the Kokopo area attacked the township and tried to kill all Europeans. This extract is based on information supplied to

Margaret Mead by Phoebe Parkinson, wife of one of the earliest settlers on the Gazelle Peninsula, Richard Parkinson.

From: J. B. Casagrande, ed., *In the Company of Man*, New York, 1964, pp. 195-6.

The first German government station was in the Duke of York Islands, at Kewura [i.e. Kerawia]. The German flag was hoisted but there was no government for a long time. Richard Parkinson was the station master. Later the "government" moved to New Britain and started a station at Kokopo. The Parkinsons warned them to be careful not to let any of the "station boys" interfere with the *maries* (native women) when they came down to the beach to market. Before in earlier days the Parkinsons had had trouble with their laborers flirting or "pulling" the bush *maries*; the laborers would be killed by the bush natives and a retaliatory expedition would be necessary. But the government was not careful and very soon the trouble began again. The natives came to Mrs. Parkinson and she told them to go to the government, but the government would not listen. The local natives got more and more dissatisfied and stirred up feelings "against all the white men in the country."

Then there was a native named Talavai, who belonged to Pararatawa, who invented a bullet proof paint. You had to come into his enclosure and bring with you a white fowl without any dark or colored feathers on it. Then this fowl was cooked and eaten with Talavai, and you paid so much *tambu*. Only a fathom if you were poor, and then it went up. Then Talavai had a test of the paint. After he has said some words over the paint and talked to the spirits and painted the man—just ordinary red paint, volcanic clay from Matupe such as the natives used to sell in their markets—he would take a gun—in those days the natives had only brass guns and Enfields that had to be rammed with a ramrod—the natives used to make bullets out of bits of lead. I used to make bullets too out of all kinds of lead. You just melt the lead, pour it in a mold, stick it in water and there it is. So Talavai would stand up at one end of the enclosure and have the native stand up at the other. He would hold up his hand and say, "Here is the bullet" and the native couldn't see. Then he would put it in and the powder and the paper and the cap and shoot it off, and the native would find just a little blood-red spot on his chest. But he had not put a bullet in his gun, he had put in a little blood-red fruit like a cherry—we planted some at Kuradui and I used to make a kind of blanc mange of it, lovely and red—into the gun instead, and this would be the red spot. And natives far and near came to be painted and in some faraway districts men who dealt in

these things—I call them priests—came and bought the secret for a hundred fathoms of *tambu* and then they painted more people. So it—the *mailan* they called it—spread and spread and the natives attacked Kokopo.

The white men had to watch all the time with arms and they couldn't work their plantations and at night the natives would come down and shoot into the houses. The natives sent word to us that if we stayed at home they wouldn't bother us as we had always been good to them, but that they were going to get those bad white men at Kokopo.

The Germans made one or two expeditions into the bush but they didn't know where to find them, the natives would all hide and they only succeeded in wounding a few. Then the natives would show the wounds to Talavai and he would say, "Ah, yes, you must have broken one of the taboos. You must have slept with a woman or eaten a fowl which was not pure white," and the natives were quite satisfied. Finally the people at Kokopo got tired and they sent for a war vessel. Then the Judge said to Richard, "Now you must come in with us. We are only a handful of white people here in the country and you know well enough that if the natives succeed in killing us and capturing all our ammunition they will come and kill you afterwards." And that was true, they would have done that to rid the country of white people altogether. So Richard said, "Yes, I will help you now and we'll end this."

4. The Killing of a European Trader

In the Solomons the control of the New Guinea Company was purely nominal, and all Europeans who ventured into the area did so at their own risk. In 1885 the Sohano villagers destroyed a trading station established by Hershheim and Co. and ate the trader. The author of this extract, a Miss A. G. Evans, lived on her father's plantation near Buka Passage and spoke the local language fluently.

From: "Old-Time Cannibal Tells His Story", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 24 October 1933, pp. 23-4.

Mugarra is the last of his tribe. He is one of the only remaining hereditary chiefs on the Island of Buka, in the Northern Solomons (part of Mandated Territory of New Guinea).

Although perhaps only 60 to 65 years of age, Mugarra is very feeble and cannot walk around. He has not a tooth left in his head.

Mugarra lives apart from the villages, with his old wife, his

daughter, and his son-in-law, on the banks of Buka Passage. He has a platform made specially to sit on, and there, at any hour of the day, you will find him, looking out on to the Passage. He just sits and looks.

Old Mugarra cannot speak a word of Pidgin. But one who understands his language can spend many hours listening to his tales of olden times.

One day I was talking to him and I asked him what he thought of civilisation.

He answered—just what I expected, all in his own lingo and in his own way—that “as far as he was concerned it was no good; but for the younger generation—his son, for instance—it was quite good.

“The present generation have never kai-kaied man,” said Mugarra, “but I have; and if there was no Government to stop us, we would fight and kill again.”

“But that is not right,” I ventured.

“No—you white people do not think so!”

“Well, now tell me,” I asked, “did you ever kill a white man?”

“Yes, I helped kill one. I will tell you about it,” he replied.

“Long time ago, when we were all bush-Kanakas—no Government was here, no missions, just ourselves—it was long before you people had that big fight with the Germans—I was only a small piccaninny about so high. (By his demonstration, I judged him to have been seven or eight). We heard that a white man had come on to our Island—Sohana—where we had our taro gardens.

“So my father said we would go along. See who it was, and what he wanted. We went—my father (then the big chief), another man and I. At the time I had an Upi hat on, and they were very sacred to us in those days, not like now. I had just had mine put on a few months, when we had held a very big ceremony.

“We went along to Sohana and my father and I went up to where this white man had made a house out of canvas. When we came close, he looked and saw and came over to us. When he got near we saw him laughing and pointing at my Upi.

“This annoyed my father and he made signs for me to go back with him. So we turned round and went back in great haste, got into our mona and returned home. I could see my father was cross too much, so I did not talk.

(The Upi is made of light plaited cane, and is of the shape and size of an old-fashioned bedroom water-jug. It is fitted tightly on the boy's head, over his thick hair, and it remains there continuously for a long period. It is connected with initiation ceremonies.—Ed. P.I.M.)

"When we got back to the village I heard the garamuhs calling the men for a talk-talk. They all came to my father and he then told them what had happened when we went to Sohana.

" 'Yes,' my father said, 'the white man laughed at Mugarra's Upi.'

"On hearing that, they all jumped up. My father went into our house and came out with spears and an old stone axe, the other natives all doing the same. The chief then beckoned me along with him and off we went up to 'Sohana' again, where the white man was.

"My father went up to him and chopped him with his axe and I threw a spear at him, just like my father had shown me to do. While my father was cutting the white man with the axe, he said, 'No more will you laugh at Mugarra's Upi!'

"Later, we kai-kaied him, and that was when I tasted white man for the first and last time.

"This master we killed was a German and he came out here and was going to try and sell axes and knives and other things to us. But he laughed at my Upi hat, so we killed and kai-kaied him.

"No more white masters came for a long time after, and we used to fight with all the Kanakas from Seleo (Bougainville) and we always kai-kaied them. Then the Kiaps (District Officers) came and the missions, so we could not kill any more. You came a long time after. We were no more bush-Kanakas," he added.

Mugarra at one time owned most of the land around Buka Passage. It all belonged in the first place to his father.

"Now, when I die, if my son becomes the chief, he will not be like me," said Mugarra; "he is civilised. But I think old times were the best, when we could do as we liked and kill as we liked."

It is interesting to note that Sohana, where this massacre took place, is now the seat of the Government in Buka Passage.

5. Ehlers' Attempt to Cross New Guinea

Otto von Ehlers was a professional traveller, with several books about Africa, Asia and Oceania to his credit, who in 1895 tried to cross New Guinea from the mouth of the Francisco River to the Gulf of Papua. Although he came to New Guinea with the approval of the board of directors of the company, the local officials tried to persuade him not to attempt the crossing. He died somewhere in Papua.

From: M. Lett, "Across Primitive New Guinea in 1895", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 25 June 1935, p. 46.

One of the earliest expeditions to cross the south-eastern portion

of the island of New Guinea was that led by the once well-known traveller Herr Otto Ehlers, and Herr Piering, which left Freidrich Wilhelmshafen (Madang) in 1895.

The expedition was not a success, but in spite of its failure it was a noteworthy achievement. According to the account of the survivors, Herrs Ehlers and Piering perished from exhaustion and starvation, but from evidence gathered later it was found that both men had been murdered by their carriers and, perhaps eaten.

Herr Ehlers, accompanied by Herr Piering (an officer of police), set out from Freidrich Wilhelmshafen in August with 43 carriers and one coloured servant, a Creole. The equipment and stores consisted of eight rifles, two shotguns, tents and trade goods, but no instruments whatever for surveying the country.

On August 14 the party started inland from the Francisco River, near Salamaua, and on the 23rd reached an inland village where they remained for three days. After leaving the village it does not appear that they saw any signs of native life until they reached the gardens of the Moviavi people, on the Lakekamu River, near the coastline of Papua. There they arrived on October 21, 67 days after the party had begun their overland journey.

Their difficulties can well be imagined. Rainy weather set in from the beginning of the journey and one of the carriers died at the inland village. With no native pads to follow, the unfortunate men hacked their way through thick jungle, climbed up and down steep mountain sides, and crossed precipitous ravines and swollen rivers. They suffered the torments of leech bites, cold, and fatigue.

Later, to all their discomforts, was added a more grievous enemy, hunger. They were reduced to eating grass and the leaves of trees, and it does not appear from the report that the leaders had any better fare than the carriers. As a result, dysentery broke out amongst them and 10 men died.

About the end of September they struck a large tributary of the Lakekamu River (in Papua) and an effort was made to descend it on rafts, which soon capsized. It was then, according to the reports of the carriers, that the already disabled Europeans were drowned.

The above statement is very likely incorrect. Ehlers and Piering were almost certainly shot by two carriers, Ranga and Opia, and thrown into the river. Later Ranga and Opia shot three of their most outspoken critics among the carriers.

The 22 survivors travelled down the left bank of the river for nine days. Then on newly built rafts they drifted down stream for six days until they reached the first coconut trees of the Moviavi people.

The Moviavi natives befriended them and conveyed them to the coast. There they were looked after by a native teacher of the London Missionary Society and the chief of the Toaripi until Mr. Kowaleh, Government Agent for the Mekea [i.e. Mekeo] district, brought them to Port Moresby. At Port Moresby they received attention and were returned to Freidrich Wilhelmshafen by the S.S. Merrie England on March 29, 1896.

According to the early reports of the carriers, Herr Ehlers seems to have given much thought to the rescue of his followers and it was mainly owing to his last dying instructions that they reached the coast and escaped with their lives. But in view of the evidence gathered later on, of the murder of Herrs Ehlers and Piering by their carriers, it seems that these men were fully capable of fending for themselves.

A report of the ill-fated expedition was published about 1896 in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt by Landeshauptmann Rudiger. *The Ehlers expedition was indirectly responsible for the death of the Landeshauptmann Kurt von Hagen. After their repatriation to Stephensort, the two men suspected of having murdered Ehlers escaped from goal where they were held for trial. Von Hagen led the patrol sent out to recapture them and was shot by one of the escapees near Gorib village.*

6. Transfer of Sovereignty

The difficulties of the New Guinea Company eventually led to the transfer of sovereignty from the company to the Imperial government. It was not the first time that the company had appealed for help; the fact that it took three years to complete arrangements indicates that Germany was not eager to assume control.

From: *Sammlung von geltenden Gesetzen und Verordnungen in Deutsch Neuguinea und dem Inselgebiet*, Rabaul, 1912, pp. 8-10.

Article 1

The German government agrees to take over from the New Guinea Company sovereignty over the protectorate, granted to the company by the Imperial Letter of Protection dated 17 May 1885 and 13 December 1886, and by subsequent Imperial ordinances.

Article 2

The company renounces in favour of the German government all rights granted to it in article one of the Letters of Protection, namely:

- (a) the sole right to take into possession ownerless land, and the sole right to buy land from the natives;
- (b) the right to engage in the following industries: pearl-shell and trepang fisheries, extraction of guano and other similar deposits, exploitation of the ground as regards minerals, precious stones and oil, exploitation of coconut stands not belonging to natives or not in private lands, and exploitation of timber stands not in private possession.

Article 3

The company cedes to the German government all buildings, harbour installations, ships, and goods and chattels used for administrative purposes (these are listed in a separate inventory). With the buildings it cedes the land on which they stand and the land used for making gardens. In addition, all land used by the company for public purposes is transferred to the government.

Article 6

The German government shall pay the New Guinea Company the sum of 4 million marks, in ten yearly installments due on 1st April of every year and starting on 1 April 1899. The Company is under an obligation to spend each installment, within four years of the date of receipt, on economic projects which will benefit the protectorate either directly or indirectly, and shall account for the moneys so received in its annual reports.

During this period the government will take all necessary steps to enable the company to recruit labour in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, under government supervision.

Article 7

The company is authorised, for a period of three years starting on 1 April 1899, to select, without payment to the government, 50,000 hectares of land in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and nearby islands, without prejudice to existing rights, and with the qualification that in the case of coastal land and land adjacent to riverbanks the maximum length of any block shall be 5 km; the minimum width of any river block shall be normally 1 km. The government reserves for itself the right to acquire any land so selected for public purposes, under normal conditions pertaining to expropriation. The company shall notify the government, within one year of completion of each transaction, whether the land in question had been acquired from the natives or occupied as ownerless.

Some time ago the company had sent out, at its own expense, an expedition to explore the Ramu River and to open up the Bismarck Range, and established stations for that purpose. For this reason the

company shall be allowed to retain the sole right to mine precious metals and to prospect for oil in the Ramu River area as far south as the 5th parallel. The government will be entitled to 10% of all profits, and reserves for itself the right to participate with the company in any mining operations, the cost of such enterprise to be shared equally by both partners.

II. MISSIONS IN GERMAN NEW GUINEA

The first permanent mission in north-eastern New Guinea was established by the Methodist Dr. George Brown on the Duke of York Islands in 1875. Next came the Roman Catholic Sacred Heart Mission in 1882. The Neuendettelsau Lutheran Mission started work around Finschhafen in 1886, and the Rhenish Missionary Society, also a Lutheran Mission, at Bogadjim in 1887.

1. The Neuendettelsau "Group Approach"

The Finschhafen Lutherans were initially successful, partly because there had been little land alienation in their area of operation, and partly because of their methods.

From: C. Keysser, "Mission Work Among Primitive Peoples in New Guinea", *International Review of Missions*, 1924, pp. 427-30.

After I had made all kinds of experiments in the proclamation of the gospel message in New Guinea, and had observed that the Papuans always sheltered themselves behind consideration for the tribe, or fear of their neighbours, in their rejection of the good tidings, it seemed to me expedient not only to try to influence isolated individuals but to attempt to arrest the attention of the whole tribe. I succeeded in getting an influential chief to attend a big general meeting at which the important question of death magic was to be dealt with, and all the witch doctors of the neighbourhood were to be mentioned by name that they might be put to shame. This was an unheard-of proceeding, and one which aroused the gravest misgiving in the mind of my brown friend. But at last the feast was held. The chief arranged a great dance, as was the custom, and the missionary earned the right to be regarded as part originator of the proceedings by providing a large quantity of rice for the festal meal, which gave him the right to speak weighty words on the important occasion. After the dance the deep tones of the conch shell called all those present together. The missionary stood with a long paper in his hand; all eyes were fixed expectantly on him. He began: 'My friends, you are like a

sick man, on whose body there is a dangerous abscess. He is restless and in much pain. In such a case you open the abscess, even though the sick man remonstrates, because you are convinced that in this way alone can the trouble be cured. I want to show you now a similar case; belief in witchcraft and the fear of it are a poisonous, festering sore in the body of your people, which must be cut away if healing is to follow.' Then I read aloud a list of the names of those who were known to practise death magic. The Papuans were so taken aback at first that they did not know how to behave. Soon a violent war of words broke loose and it became impossible to distinguish between truth and falsehood. But Christianity had for the first time made itself felt as a real power for truth. The unknown, unseen God of the missionary all at once proved to be a powerful reality who had to be reckoned with.

It may at times be right to baptize men without any consideration of family or tribal customs, and thus to separate them from their natural and traditional surroundings. But is this always rightly applied? And is there not sometimes another way? In New Guinea I once had a number of inquirers from a heathen district in the neighbourhood. If I admitted them to baptism, the whole tribe would be embittered, and even if it did not lead to bloodshed the converts would be cast out of the community and the rest of the tribe would set itself to oppose Christianity. On the advice of reliable native Christians, the inquirers were refused baptism in spite of tearful pleading on their part, and were sent home with the advice that they should set to work to influence the other members of the tribe. Two years later the whole tribe took a solemn oath to refrain from all opposition to Christianity and to welcome it to their country. This promise—like all other tribal agreements—was faithfully kept.

2. Problem of Communication

All missionaries faced language problems. The New Britain Methodists solved it by choosing the "Duke of York language" and later the "New Britain language"—both dialects of the Tolai language. Mission literature was initially printed in Australia but after 1886 most of it was produced in New Guinea itself.

From: J. Collwell, ed., *A Century in the Pacific*, Sydney, 1914, pp. 522-3.

The creation of a literature is no light task. When created, there still remains the equally difficult task of inducing the people to avail

themselves of it. The work done must be considered in relation to the time occupied, and to the number and circumstances of the agents employed. Measured thus, the translation and other literary work in New Britain is far from insignificant. The first book by Mr. Brown, in the Duke of York dialect, did not reach the mission till the end of 1879. It contained ten reading lessons, the First Catechism, including the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and fourteen hymns. In 1882 the Gospel according to Mark was translated by Mr. Brown. In 1883 a dictionary was published by Mr. Brown and myself, containing 5,000 words. It remains to this day the only dictionary in the Duke of York dialect. A book of Scripture lessons, a revision of the Catechism, a kind of *Peep-o'-Day* book translated from the Fijian, and containing 100 lessons, the Gospel according to Matthew, and the Book of Jonah, together with a goodly number of hymns, I also prepared.

The Rev. I. Rooney was an indefatigable student of the Duke of York dialect. He translated the Old Testament, with a few omissions, from the account of the Creation to the death of Moses, many of the Psalms, parts of Isaiah, revised Matthew and Mark, and translated large portions of Luke and John. Mrs. Rooney and her husband also added many useful hymns. This practically closes translation work for the Duke of York Islands, the New Britain language being adopted as the literary language of the group. In 1883 we went with the Rev. R. H. Rickard to reside upon the main island of New Britain. Within four years the four gospels were translated in 118 lessons in the order of the Bible Society's Gospel Harmony, also the First Catechism, a Scripture lesson book containing 100 lessons, the Acts of the Apostles, the Book of Jonah, the story of Daniel and Esther, and some school books. Soon followed the four gospels in complete form, and a splendid dictionary by Mr. Rickard.

Succeeding missionaries divided the literary work, and the New Testament was completed in the New Britain dialect. In 1900 the Rev. J. Crump brought the manuscript to Sydney, and saw it through the press. One specially bound copy and one copy bound as for the natives were enclosed in a handsome casket, and sent by the Board of Missions through the Governor of New Britain, for presentation to his Majesty the German Emperor. This reply was received by the chairman of the district: 'His Majesty, the Emperor and King, has graciously accepted from the chairman of the Methodist Missionary Society in Raluana the two copies of the New Testament translated into the native language of the Gazelle Peninsula, and sends his thanks for this gift. With the greatest pleasure I also have to communicate that his Majesty has graciously commanded us to hand

over to the chairman, the Rev. H. Fellmann, the Order of the Crown of the IV Class, which decoration will be given to the gentleman when he returns from Germany.'

3. Portrait of a Roman Catholic Missionary

Monsignor Coupé, the first Bishop of New Britain, arrived in German New Guinea with the ill-fated Marquis de Rays' expedition in 1888, having previously spent a year as parish priest in Sydney, and two years on Thursday Island and in British New Guinea. He became Bishop in 1890 and was the head of the New Guinea Branch of the Sacred Heart Mission until 1923. He died in Sydney in 1926. The author of this extract travelled with the Bishop from Sydney to Herbertshoehe in 1900 on board the steamer Stettin.

From: C. D. McKellar, *Scented Isles and Coral Gardens*, London, 1912, pp. 77-9.

Monsignor Coupé, the Bishop—appointed "Vicariat Apostolique" of the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Admiralty Isles and New Guinea, and head of the Sacred Heart Mission—is a very tall, strong, portly, energetic man with a long black beard, and, though French, has little of that nationality about him. The Mission was re-established in New Britain in 1889, but for over a year the New Guinea Co. would not allow them to do anything or interfere with the natives. At last permission came from Berlin, and different spheres were allotted to the Catholic and Protestant Missions. Bishop Coupé was long in British New Guinea, but, as he laughingly said to me, the Protestant missionaries there were too much for him. He has now been seven years in the German sphere, and has just returned from a visit to Europe. The Governor of German New Guinea did not see his way to letting him have what land he desired for his Mission Stations, so in Berlin he, map in hand, interviewed the Foreign Office, talked them over, and got them to concede his wishes, they naturally knowing nothing about it.

In 1891 an edict of the Imperial Chancellor divided the Gazelle Peninsula into two spheres of influence: the Methodists were assigned the western half, and the Mission of the Sacred Heart the eastern half, although it was allowed to keep its enclaves at Vlavolo, Malaguna and Nodup. Unlike a similar arrangement in Papua, this was no gentlemen's agreement, and the edict was a dead letter almost from the start.

You see, in Berlin, when they got this new possession, they took the map, altered all the names, ignoring what was due to the discoverers and charters of these lands and seas, and then put dots along the coast-line wherever it looked pretty, and affixed a name to each dot. These now are "ports," and the N.D.L. boat has to call and remain a certain time at each, regardless of any lack of passengers or "trade" being embarked or disembarked. Any one can civilise and colonise a country like that; it is quite easy; merely get a blank map, write down a few names—Frederick Williams, or Johann Charles, or the like—and there you are! New Britain is now Neu Pommern; New Ireland is Neu Mecklenburg; the mainland colony is Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, and *so weiter*. Nevertheless, on this boat we call them by their English or original names, for, much to the annoyance of Germans, every one speaks English—it and "pidgin-English" are universal amidst all natives throughout the East. The Malays, Cingalese, and Chinese understand and speak nothing but pidgin-English, so that all orders on the ship and elsewhere have to be given in that dialect.

The Bishop told me he had expended in Berlin 40,000 marks in the purchase of a dynamo and plant for felling, sawing, and moving timber, and he is about to start a brewery, which has created wondering admiration amongst the Germans. He introduced forty head of cattle into New Britain, but the tick killed off most of them. A bull and cow, landed on the same day, caught this disease and died in two weeks on the same day and at the same hour! Most touching and romantic, was it not? First romantic cow I ever heard of. Perhaps some one will write an idyllic poem on the subject one day. I trust the Bishop was not engaged in the undignified amusement of "pulling my leg."

I ask most irritating questions at times, ones that require a definite answer. This is not nice of me, I know; but then, you see, I want to know. How do they convert natives—that is the object of the Mission, I suppose? They "adopt" as many small children as possible, educate them, and teach them agriculture and what they can, and when of age marry them, help to start them in villages with cocoanut trees, a house, cattle, etc. They are obliged to teach these children to read and write German.

III. LAND AND LABOUR

1. Influence of Large Commercial Interests

After it had relinquished sovereignty over the protectorate to the Imperial government, the New Guinea Company became a purely business concern. Together with Hertsheim and Co., the Mioko branch of the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagenesellschaft and Queen Emma's E. E. Forsayth and Co. it dominated the economic life of German New Guinea.

From: S. S. Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul*, Sydney, 1934, pp. 112-3.

Round these large companies the commercial life of the Protectorate ebbed and flowed. In their extensive coconut plantations they had abundant assets, which steadily increased in value each year as the palms grew to maturity and became more prolific; through the medium of their head offices in Hamburg or Berlin they had facilities for obtaining financial accommodation on the most favourable terms; copra was in demand and readily saleable in Europe, and advances against shipments could easily be negotiated; the steamers of the Norddeutsche-Lloyd, linking up Rabaul with the China and Eastern trade, carried the produce of the Protectorate from Rabaul to Hamburg at a freight of about two pounds fifteen shillings a ton; working expenses were low, and native labour was cheap and plentiful. In consequence of these favourable conditions the German companies, during the decade preceding the outbreak of war, had become established upon a very solid commercial basis, and were beginning to make large profits. The success of the companies had encouraged individuals to become planters. Many employees of the companies, having gained experience as managers or overseers on plantations took up land for themselves. For the most part they had only a small amount of capital, representing the savings from their salaries. In these circumstances it was natural that they should apply to their former employers for financial assistance to carry them on until such

time as they could obtain a return from their new plantations; it was equally natural that the managers of the companies, knowing these men to have experience in planting and in controlling native labourers, should be willing to enter into business relations with them. Thus it came about that under the wing of the large companies there grew up many smaller firms, and planters took up land and cultivated it with the aid of borrowed capital. This arrangement was an advantageous one for the big companies. The general custom was that the borrower bound himself to obtain from the financing company all stores and supplies and to sell through the company any produce grown by him or coming into his hands. In addition, if he had a registered title to his land, he gave a mortgage over it to the company to secure the repayment of the money; if he had not completed the purchase of his land, and thus lacked a clear title, he nevertheless gave the company a written promise that he would execute a mortgage in its favour as soon as he had obtained such a title. Under German law this promise of a mortgage constitutes an effective form of security. In accordance with commercial usage in the Protectorate, the yearly rate of interest was eight per cent.

In these circumstances it followed that the large companies dominated the commercial activities of the Protectorate. Apart from their intrinsic authority and influence, they controlled the smaller firms and individual planters through the factor of finance; the debtor could not afford to oppose his creditor in matters in which the latter had pursued or indicated a definite policy. Thus the small planter, who otherwise would have had little voice in the control of public affairs, had his views on questions affecting his business forcefully advocated by the large companies, whose interests in all essential subjects such as shipping freights, and the regulation of native labour coincided with his. On the other hand, the large companies, fortified by the fact that they had the whole body of settlers behind them, were able to exert potent, if indirect, influence on the trend of administration in the Territory. Not infrequently, also, it fell out that what could not be achieved in Rabaul could be accomplished through the political "pull" of the head office in Hamburg or Berlin. The principal administrative problems of the Territory therefore had for their centre the interests of the large trading companies, with an outer circle representing the subsidiary interests of the small firms and the planters: beyond that again lay the innumerable questions connected with the regulation and control of native affairs.

The question whether the big firms exercised a "potent, if indirect" influence on the administration of the territory is taken up in a number of extracts which follow.

2. German Land Law

During the company period, when development of European-type of production was the sole policy objective, the land and the people who inhabited it were regarded primarily as resources. The Imperial period, especially after 1902, saw increasing emphasis on the protection of village lands, and by 1914 there was, in practice, little difference between Murray's land policy in Papua and the German land policy across the border.

From: S. S. Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul*, Sydney, 1934, pp. 273-4.

At the time when its authority was suspended by the military occupation, in September, 1914, the Government of German New Guinea was pursuing an active policy of land-alienation, and giving practical encouragement to the development of tropical agriculture. The lands acquired by the New Guinea Company during the years of its plenary powers as a chartered company were held by it under a freehold tenure. Before the declaration of a protectorate over north-eastern New Guinea and the New Britain Archipelago (Bismarck Archipelago), land at Molot and Mioko in the Duke of York Islands, and in New Britain at Matupi, on the shores of Blanche Bay and at Kokopo (Herbertshöhe) on St. George's Channel, had been purchased from the natives by pioneer settlers. Their purchases were subsequently confirmed as freeholds by the German Government. These facts shaped and determined the land policy of the Protectorate, and, up to the beginning of the year 1914, most land alienated by the Government had been granted in freehold. The procedure followed in acquiring land was this. The intending purchaser selected the area he desired, and obtained the preliminary consent of the native owners to sell it to him; thereupon he requested the Government to purchase the land on his behalf. If the Government approved, it satisfied itself that the natives were not acting under coercion and would still retain sufficient land for their own needs. The Government then bought the land from the native owners and transferred it to the applicant upon his compliance with prescribed conditions. He had to pay (*a*) the price agreed upon with the natives, (*b*) a sum (fixed by law) for each hectare of land alienated by the Crown. He had also to bear the cost of survey and the fee for registering the purchase of the land.

Prior to 1902 the interests of native landowners had not been closely guarded, and too often they had unwittingly parted irrevocably with their entire inheritance. Whole islands, for instance, had

become the absolute property of commercial companies and planters, though the former native owners had intended to sell only the right to clear and cultivate land, without encroachment upon the full enjoyment of tribal life with its social and agricultural customs and its traditional places for fishing and barter. Legislation brought into force in 1902 introduced the principle that purchases of land from the natives should thenceforth be conditional on, and accompanied by, reservations and covenants designed to safeguard the agricultural, hunting, fishing, and other occupational or customary needs of natives who had exercised any rights of possession or ownership over the particular area intended to be sold, and that such purchases must be subject to the approval of, and be made through, the Government.

3. Land For Intending Settlers

Although all early land grants were in freehold, leasing of land became increasingly common towards the close of the Imperial period. The following statement concerns the inducements offered to the small settler with little working capital.

From: Official translation in Australian War Memorial Archives.

There are large tracts of uncultivated land available in almost all parts of the colony.

When the land is in possession of natives or is unclaimed, the Government purchases it in the first instance and then sells it or leases it to applicants.

Certain lands (for instance lands reserved for public purposes or reserved for the natives) are not sold or leased. Other lands, for instance those near settlements, and also lands which, without having to be cleared or cultivated, give natural products, and whole islands and groups of islands, are only leased and not sold.

Companies and members of the legal profession can only get land if their businesses are established according to German law and if their head office is either in Germany or in a German colony.

The purchaser must prove that he has 20,000 marks available as working capital for every 100 hektars of land purchased.

The purchase price, paid by the Government to the natives, is charged to the purchaser or lessee. The same applies with regard to the costs of taking possession of owner-less land.

If the land is sold, the purchaser pays the cost of surveying and entering into the land register. If it is taken on lease, the Government pays the costs.

It is compulsory for the purchaser or lessee to commence cultivating the land within one year of taking possession; within five years at least one fifth, and within fifteen years, at least three quarters of the land must be worked continually.

The purchasing price at present is five marks per hektar, one fifth of which is to be paid as soon as the applicant has permission to work the land. The balance is to be paid regularly until the date of transfer, which takes place after surveying.

Applicants who have resided in New Guinea for one year or have resided for two years in another tropical country, who are desirous of settling down in New Guinea and have not yet purchased land there, who are at least 21 years of age and are physically capable of doing the practical work of a planter in the Colony, can get land (up to 150 hektars) at a price of one mark per hektar, without having to pay the costs of the transaction, survey and transfer. With regard to the management of the land, an agreement is entered into and further conditions imposed.

With regard to the leasing of land for plantation purposes (not less than 50 hektars) an agreement is made for 30 years. The yearly rent as a rule is 20 pfennigs per hektar. The lessee, if he punctually fulfils the terms of his agreement, has the prospect of a further 30 years lease at a rental not exceeding 40 pfennigs per hektar.

4. German Labour Law

Under the New Guinea Company, labour policy was moulded to meet the Company's needs as a commercial enterprise. Some safeguards were included in labour legislation to protect the recruit, but labour conditions in practice left much to be desired. After 1899 these safeguards were applied with increasing vigour, partly for humanitarian reasons, and partly because of fears of depopulation.

From: C. D. Rowley, *The Australians in German New Guinea 1914-1921*, Melbourne, 1958, pp. 106-8.

It was a common German assumption that the welfare of the native could best be promoted by employing him in European-managed enterprise. This claim was put forward as a partial justification of the crude conditions of recruitment and employment which had originated when New Guinea was under the control of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie. Emphasis on labour as the means of salvation expressed also the determined paternalism of Europeans revolted by the barbarism of the native cultures. Work, it was argued, must take

the place of warfare: the native fully employed as a labourer could not kill or maim as a warrior. Another common argument had its origin in popular pseudo-Darwinism. Only the fittest survived; the native had been deprived of the warfare which had kept him fit, therefore the European must provide opportunities for maintaining fitness in hard physical work.

Parkinson, the planter who knew natives in the Gazelle Peninsula well, wrote:

War has a stimulating effect on the native: it sharpens his mental powers and develops him physically. . . . If therefore, we forbid the natives to fight, we must give them some means of stimulus in exchange, that is to say, work. If all the population of the [Bismarck] Archipelago were to be set to regular daily work, the large uncultivated areas, which exist everywhere, would soon disappear, and a strong healthy people would grow up. But the native will never work of his own accord, and it is the duty of the Government, of the missions, and of the settlers, to set the natives to work, and by gentle persuasion to make them useful members of society.

If such a careful observer regarded the native as 'idle' without warfare, it was to be expected that others less well informed would also judge his activities in his own environment by European standards and values. Impatience at the 'idleness' of natives has usually marked those who want to employ them. A further justification for stern paternal action was a vague belief that 'survival' in the modern world depends on a comparatively high level of economic production. Also, it was easy to assume that European employment was educative in its supposed effect of equipping the labourers for the modern world.

Where the planter had established himself either on a small island away from other Europeans, or on an isolated coast, he could make his own arrangements with local natives. In fact, their availability to work was the main reason for his enterprise, as he avoided the extra costs of overseas labour. He would try where he could to establish legal title to the services of 'boys' by using contracts; but he might also depend largely on 'free' labour with verbal agreements only, often of a loose character and for short periods.

Overseas labour was obtained under conditions which elsewhere had made the contract of service essential in the interests of both employer and labourer. The lengthy absence from home of the labourer, his complete dependence on the employer to get home again, his separation from his family, and in particular from his womenfolk, had established his claim for protection on both economic and humanitarian grounds. The employer had the expense of

recruiting, of transport, and of preliminary training, and needed some continuity of service from the labourer in return. These needs in migrant labour situations had long been recognized in colonial legal systems by the use of the contract of service. In German New Guinea the contract had been obligatory in cases of 'overseas' labour, and the recognized term of service was three years.

An ordinance of the Governor, dated 4 March 1909, and operating since 1 January 1910, had defined the labour code as it stood at the time of the Australian conquest. All the protective provisions of this code were applied in cases of natives recruited for removal overseas, and the instrument of application was the contract. In the main this ordinance repeated earlier legislation. Special provisions had, for instance, covered overseas service of natives since the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's Labour Recruiting Ordinance of August 1888. The 1909 ordinance had, however, introduced some new requirements—including an increase of minimum rations. There was a further ordinance in the course of preparation when the Australians captured Rabaul, and reference was made to this draft in preparing the first labour regulations of the military administration. It appears to have been more restrictive on the employer than the 1909 ordinance. The A.N.M.E.F., however, was more considerate of German employers than the German administration would have been had it remained and had its way, for the German draft indicated an intention to reduce the contract period to two years, which the Australians ignored.

5. An Australian Looks at German Labour Laws

After the First World War a myth grew up that the Germans were exceedingly cruel in their treatment of native labour in their African and Pacific colonies; it was used, in part, to "justify" the transfer of former German possessions to the victorious Allies. In this extract the then editor of the Rabaul Times expresses a contrary opinion.

From: G. Thomas, "Was There Cruelty in German Colonies?", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 15 February 1939, p. 34.

So-called patriotic fervour is inclined to make the world cock-eyed; and your "valued correspondent", in the October "P.I.M.", who quotes from the Foreign Office hand-book, compiled at that particular time when the boot was being put in on Germany—with what was thought at the time every justification—lays himself open to criticism on the point of cruelty by the Germans in their pre-War colonies.

Personally, I have never perused the hand-book in question. Post-war propaganda left me cold. I had served with the A.I.F. in France and had some idea of what war meant in the front line and it was my experience that those people who banged the propaganda drum the loudest were furthest from the scene of action, and felt that they were "doing their bit" by launching a campaign of hate.

Of the pre-War situation in Africa I know nothing from personal experience; but I do claim to speak with some authority on conditions prevailing in New Guinea from the time of my arrival there in 1911 and onwards, and I can honestly say that the treatment meted out by the Germans in charge of native labour on a plantation was neither more brutal nor harsh than that shown by the Britishers either in New Guinea or the British Solomon Islands.

The German draws a very definite colour line in regard to native labourers; he laid down and insisted upon the observance of strict discipline. He was not over-awed by a Government guided by a policy of "We are the saviours of the black races whom we have liberated from the heel of the oppressor", which was the idea disseminated by many of the post-War British drum-banging propagandists.

There is a vast difference between discipline and brutality. The German demanded the former, and any breach of it made the offender liable to punishment. The usual punishment in those days was a caning, half a dozen, a dozen or twenty-five strokes with a cane across the buttocks according to the seriousness of the offence. It was over in a few minutes, the native went back to his work and the matter ended. On isolated plantations where the visits of Government officials were few and far between the plantation manager was granted a permit to administer canings from ten to fifteen strokes. These permits were termed *Diziplinar Erlubnis* [i.e. *Disziplinar Erlaubniss*] and a register was kept of every punishment inflicted. When the visiting official came to a plantation the labourers were "lined" and one of the routine questions addressed to the labourers was in respect to the use of the cane and "Has any 'boy' been caned?" was the question. On a labourer stepping forward, the register was consulted and if no record had been made and the "boys" assertion proved correct then the plantation manager was "for it". His permit would probably be cancelled as well as a fine being inflicted. Investigations were also made by the visiting official of cases recorded. Did the "boy" deny the justice of the punishment? How many strokes had he received, and for what offence?

At one period, I was possessed of such a permit and during the course of two years had only two occasions on which it was necessary

to use it whilst running a "line" of 300 labourers. The great benefit of the disciplinary permit was the fact that the "master" had this permission from the Government and was entitled to use it in cases of insubordination, petty crimes and other offences against "good order and plantation discipline". No reasonably-minded man was going to abuse such a privileged safeguard of his discipline, knowing full well that unjust use meant the cancellation of the permit.

Compare the situation on a plantation to what occurred later when caning permits were abolished when the change of Administration came in. Corporal punishment of any kind inflicted by an overseer or manager was a crime. "Masters" who had justly meted out punishment on an isolated estate were brought before the district official and fined. This new "fashion" soon became known by the labourers who realised they were immune from corporal punishment at the hands of their "master", who in turn was not prepared to make a Court case out of small breaches of discipline which would necessitate travelling perhaps many miles, or else waiting the arrival of an official two or three months after the offence had been committed.

There was, naturally, instances when the caning permission was abused. In those days—as there are nowadays—there were men temperamentally unsuited to be in charge of labourers on isolated plantations; nervy, ill-healthied individuals who thought the only way in which to obtain work from the "line" was by brute force and fear, but I doubt very much if this type was more prevalent in the German time than it is now. At any rate it was seldom that one saw a white man strike a native with his closed fist and that has been no uncommon incident since 1921. Of one thing it is certain: the present plantation man, or man in charge of native labour, is held in far less respect by the native than his German predecessor.

It was admittedly the policy of the German Government to give as little publicity as possible to the misdemeanours of white men in a black country. Usually the offender was given an opportunity of clearing out of the country before legal action was taken; if this was ignored and the Court passed sentence of imprisonment, then the term was usually served by the convicted man on an outstation—as Government plantation-overseer or assistant roadmaster. This policy was for the purpose of maintaining prestige and preventing natives from witnessing the degradation of the "superior race".

The following extract, taken from "In Wild New Britain", compiled from the diary of Rev. Benjamin Danks, a well-known pioneer Methodist missionary, is of interest. Writing of the period June, 1886, he says:

"To them (the natives) everything but the commissariat sank into

insignificance. Truly, they were big children. The accoutrements and the organisation counted for little; and the fact that only houses were burnt, and some plantations destroyed, by the expedition, seemed to them a small result for such a large effort.

“Just about this time we read so much in the public press about the Germans being hard and pitiless in their military affairs—‘men of blood and iron’—that we feared much for the people. I did not find them so. On the contrary they were anxious to avoid bloodshed as far as possible, and took every precaution to save the people from the consequences of their own savage folly. In this we, as interpreters, seconded their efforts to the utmost of our ability, and our efforts were very warmly appreciated”.

My expressions of opinion refer solely to the actions of the German official and settlers with whom I came in contact during 1911 and onwards. It would be contrary to my sense of justice—whomsoever may be accused—to allow the impression to be circulated that the treatment of the natives by the Germans was as brutal and ferocious as some people would have us believe, or that their system of native control—under the conditions existing then—should have been different.

6. Extracts From a Labour Contract

Shortage of indigenous labour had forced the New Guinea company to import indentured “Malay” and Chinese labour. The Imperial Government did not favour the immigration of indentured labour but made an exception in 1907 when it allowed the Pacific Phosphate Company to recruit indentured labour in South China for work in Nauru.

From: Commonwealth Archives Office, CRS G2.

AN AGREEMENT made this _____ day of

One thousand nine hundred and

BETWEEN _____ (hereinafter called ‘the Employee’) and THE PACIFIC PHOSPHATE COMPANY LIMITED of No 27 Leadenhall Street, London, England (hereinafter called ‘the Company’) whose agent at Rabaul is _____ whereby it is agreed as follows:—

1. THE Employee agrees to proceed to Nauru (otherwise called ‘Pleasant Island’) and there work for the Company in the

capacity of laborer in connection with the quarrying and shipping of Phosphate.

2. THE Employee shall receive wages at the rate of eight (8) Mexican Dollars (or sixteen (16) Marks) per calendar month payable on the last day of each month.

3. THE Employee's wages shall commence from the date of his leaving Hongkong and cease on the date of his leaving Nauru.

4. THE Company will provide the Employee with free passage to Nauru and also, if he completes this agreement satisfactorily, provide him with a free return passage to Hongkong.

5. THIS agreement shall be in force for three years from the date of commencement of work at Nauru by the Employee and if after completion this agreement is mutually renewed the Employee shall receive an increase in wages of five (5) Mexican Dollars (or ten (10) Marks).

6. IF the Employee neglects to work or is insubordinate or is guilty of gross misconduct he shall be liable to instant dismissal.

7. THE Employee hereby acknowledges the receipt of one month's wages in advance which shall be deducted from his wages by the Company in monthly amounts of two (2) Mexican Dollars (or four [4] Marks).

8. THE hours of work shall be 9 (nine) hours per diem the hours as at present arranged are 7 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. 1 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. but these are subject to change at the discretion of the Company's Representative.

9. THE Employee shall not be compelled to work overtime, or on Sundays or on the Chinese holidays, the Chinese holidays being:

New Year's Day

Ching Ning	(as per current calendar)
Tin How	(23rd day of the 3rd Moon)
Twang Yang	(5th do 5th „)
Ching Tsen	(15th do 8th „)
Tung Tschit	(23rd day of December)

11. THE Company shall provide free quarters including a bed and the ordinary coolie feeding kit.

12. THE Company shall provide free food namely three ample meals daily consisting of rice and/or fresh or salt fish and/or pork

and/or vegetables and also tea salt and good water unless the Medical Officer shall in the interests of the health of the Employee prescribe other rations.

13. THE Company shall provide free medical attendance provided the Employee is not ill owing to his own fault.

15. SHOULD the Employee be ill and it be deemed advisable in the opinion of the Medical Officer that he return to China the Company shall furnish him with a free passage to Hongkong and this agreement shall be deemed cancelled.

19. IN contract renewals, mentioned in Par. 5 the Company undertakes to pay the Chinese besides the monthly increase of five (5) dollars a yearly bonus of twenty (20) dollars.

7. Labourers' Petition

The recruiting of Chinese coolies in Hongkong, although supervised by the British authorities, was open to certain abuses. In this extract a group of Chinese complain that they had been "kidnapped", taken to Rabaul and there forced to sign a contract for work "in an isolated island" (Nauru) for three years.

From: Commonwealth Archives Office, CRS G2.

Petition by Lo Luk, Tong Liu and others (whose names are all mentioned in the following list) complaining that they have been kidnapped and forced to work.

Petitioners would state that they came to Hongkong in May this year in order to find some employment. It then happened that one Cheung Kiu Lam, a native of Lun Mi Village in the Pun Yu District recruited Petitioners in Yaumati under the pretext of taking them to Rabaul, a German Colony in the neighbourhood of Sydney, Australia. The monthly wages promised for each man was \$16 in "Kam Shan" currency, which was equal to \$32 in Hongkong money. We went on board the S. S. "Sigismund" of the Melchers & Co. some time in May. On the day of embarkation we were each given \$8 for our petty expenses, and before our embarkation we had made sure from the supplementary sheets of the various papers that the S. S. "Sigimund" was going to Rabaul in the neighbourhood of Sydney. However, on our arrival in Rabaul we found that we were not required to work in Rabaul but to enter into a contract to work in an isolated island for three years. The island is an uncultivated

region and even the aborigines in the various neighbouring ports could not adapt themselves to the climate of the island, nearly 8 or 9 out of every 10 of these aborigines having died in the country. On this score none of them are willing to be labourers in the island. Now since the climate there does not agree even with these aborigines who are born but in the neighbouring ports and has proved fatal to numbers of them, certainly petitioners will all meet with their fate without exception when they reach there. In the vicinity is a port called Ah Sik(?) of New Guinea, for which port some time ago several thousands of labourers were recruited from Singapore; but since none of them survived to return to Singapore, therefore recruiting of labourers for the port is no longer allowed by the Secretary of Chinese Affairs in Singapore. Now petitioners have been deceived by Cheung Kiu Lam, taken to Rabaul and compelled to enter into a contract to proceed to the isolated island to work for three years. In case petitioners—45 in all—refuse to proceed thither, some aborigines will be sent to force them to go with a pistol, and if petitioners still disobey, they will put several of them to death, that so petitioners may all be reduced to submission. However, petitioners would rather allow ourselves to be killed with a pistol than proceed to the isolated island and perish on account of the injurious climate. We have learned that Hongkong is under the jurisdiction of the great civilised British Empire, and that any emigrant desiring to enter into any labour contract must first undergo a careful examination held by the Honourable Registrar General, otherwise no contract is allowed to be made. Now Cheung Kiu Lam, setting the British Government at defiance and treating the British laws as nothing more than a form, unlawfully recruited in Hongkong for a German merchant labourers to proceed to the German colonies. This practice indeed causes much injury to the Chinese and puts many obstacles in the way of your affording the Chinese proper protection instead of merely enjoying your title of Protector of Chinese. Now petitioners long very much that your Honour will relieve them of their distress and pray that you will visit Cheung Kiu Lam with proper punishment in accordance with the law and approach the German Consul with a view to sending a despatch to Rabaul to get petitioners repatriated to Hongkong. Then petitioners will be deeply grateful.

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND WELFARE

It was said in later years that the German administration cared little for the villagers of New Guinea, although this was often used as a justification for Australian shortcomings between the wars. The German record was as uneven as Australia's but some administrators showed imagination in dealing with problems, and government and welfare policies compared well with those in Papua.

1. German Administration at Village Level

One of the most important contributions of the Germans in the field of native administration was the introduction of luluais. Unlike the village constables in Papua, the luluais had certain well-defined judicial powers. After the introduction of the head-tax in 1907, they were also "responsible" for the collection of the tax in their areas and kept 10 per cent of the proceeds for this service.

From: P. Biskup, "Dr. Albert Hahl—Sketch of a German Colonial Official", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, December 1968, pp. 349-50.

The appointment of "village chiefs" around Blanche Bay is the best known of Hahl's early experiments. Although they have become generally known as *luluais* or *kukurais*, the Germans among themselves referred to them as chiefs, local chiefs, native or village magistrates, *a tena varkurai*, or *constabler*. The first three chiefs were appointed in August 1896 near Ralum, and others soon after in the Duke of York Islands and later in most of the Gazelle Peninsula; significantly, Hahl's action was immediately criticized by the entire European community who, as Hahl put it, simply did not "believe in the possibility of establishing an orderly administration among the natives". Hahl says little about the circumstances which led to his early experiments in local government. "It was not difficult to persuade the inhabitants of the nearby villages to elect one of their clan leaders as their *luluai*, as their acknowledged head who would be responsible to me. He would come to me with their disputes,

immediately if they were of a serious nature, otherwise he would settle them himself and report to me on the great court days held from time to time". The emphasis was clearly on the chief's magisterial functions (road-building and other administrative powers were apparently an afterthought), and effective supervision was to be an essential part of the system. Land disputes and matrimonial cases were excluded from the chief's jurisdiction, being reserved for the "court days" held by Hahl himself.

In his early experiments in local government, Hahl may have drawn on German experience in East Africa where the Germans found, and later extended, the Arab system of ruling the coastal people through the *akidas* (heads of a single village) or the *jumbes* (heads of several villages). Like the chiefs in German New Guinea, the *akidas* were given certain administrative and judicial powers, although the latter were never clearly defined. It was a system of direct rule, not to be confused with the rule through native chiefs practised by the Germans in Ruanda-Urundi. In any case, Hahl knew he was not instituting a system of indirect rule. In his 1897 study of the power system within the Tolai kinship group, he made it clear that the traditional *luluai* was not the ultimate repository of power. He distinguished between the hereditary position of a *gala na tutana*, the head of the extended family (*Sippe*) whom all members of the family must obey, that of *luluai*, the leader in war, and that of *uviana*, the rich man. "The position of the head of the family always carries with it the dignity of *uviana*". The *luluai* "gives orders in the field and the men who attach themselves to him must obey him. No right of succession exists. The rule is that the head of the family is also the first *luluai*. Anyone, however, who has rendered special services on the field has a right to the title, even an alien who has been admitted to the district, and he does not lose the title even if he has run away from the field of battle. If he enjoys special respect he is called upon to give decisions between parties in civil battles. The force of his personality ensures the carrying out of his verdict. . .". Professor Salisbury has recently added a fourth position, that of a *lualua*, who managed estates with parcels of land in several villages, and has also made a further distinction between the *luluai na winarubu* (fighting chief) and the *luluai*, reserving the latter title for anyone engaged in recruiting a following. According to his Tolai informants, some pre-contact *luluais* were "bad" men using sorcery, poison, theft or any other means to gain or to increase their power; they were feared and admired at the same time. "In modern terms a *luluai* was a 'ward boss'. It could be argued that he possessed power but not authority". What Hahl tried to do was to give the *luluais* the

authority they lacked. Later, under imperial rule, they were also given certain privileges, such as the right to retain 10 per cent of the head tax collected in their districts, but it was the "signs of the government" (*vakilag na matanitu*) which they coveted most. "When I come to (Manus) again", wrote Boluminski to the leaders of the Papitalai, "and hear your words of peace, I shall give you a hat and support also . . . as I had given to the two leaders from Paak who received hats and also support to be recognized as government". Hahl sought to use the *luluais* to displace the increasingly powerful *agalas* and to promote political and economic development, by creating larger groupings (after 1899 they were called *Kreise*) and by drawing the natives more closely into the growing commercial economy, on European rather than native terms.

2. Advice for Village Magistrates

The system of luluais pioneered by Hahl around Blanche Bay was generally extended after 1899. It was applied around Kavieng in 1901, at Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in 1904, around Namanatai in 1905, in Bougainville in 1906, at Aitape in 1907, Manus in 1911, Morobe in 1912 and Manam Island in 1913. Its success, particularly in the judicial field, depended on several factors: the "election" of the luluais by the people themselves rather than their imposition from above; regular "circuits" by the kiap in addition to the court days held at district headquarters; and the use of the vernacular rather than pidgin in court proceedings. Even on the Gazelle Peninsula where the luluais grew out of the power system of the Tolai society, Hahl's early hopes were not realized.

From: *Proclamation to Native Magistrates*, Australian War Memorial Archives.

It has been continually reported to me that the Native Magistrates do not know what all they are to "kure" about; it has been stated also that their "varkurai" is not satisfactory and that they accept good pay for their "varkurais" in money or in tabu; it has been stated also that they retain the money and the tabu which the people paid at the "varkurais" (the fines).

Therefore I send this PROCLAMATION to you all, the Native Magistrates that you do your work according to my directions. My proclamation contains two parts:

Firstly, that the Native Magistrates are to help to administer the laws of the Government

Secondly, that the Native Magistrates are to help the Government to keep good order in all the villages.

I

That the Native Magistrates are to help in the various "varkurais". A Native Magistrate is to observe the following: Each Native Magistrate is to "kure" in the village for which he is appointed, if his people quarrel about money or tabu, about pigs or produce or their other goods.

A Native Magistrate has to judge the people also for their various offences.

He shall *not* pronounce a divorce. He shall *not* judge quarrels about land, about villages, about boundaries! The Native Magistrate is to bring all such matters before the Kiap at Kokopo or to his representative.

The Native Magistrate shall *not* judge (tribal) war matters! He must *not* hold court if somebody has been murdered, if a house has been broken into for robbery, if somebody's hut has been burnt, if somebody's garden has been damaged, if boundary stones have been shifted, if incest, rape or adultery has been committed. If somebody has erred in any of these matters, the Native Magistrate is to bring him to Kokopo to the Kiap or his representative.

The Native Magistrate shall *not* judge a man from another village. In case a quarrel arises with a man from another place, his own Native Magistrate is to be informed. If he does not 'kure' properly, the matter is to go before the Kiap at Kokopo or his representative.

The Native Magistrate shall *not* fine the people for tabu or for 'karabus', he shall fine them for money only. All this money he is to bring to Kokopo to the Kiap or his representative.

The Native Magistrate is not to receive any payment for his 'varkurai' from the people.

If anybody thinks that the verdict of a Native Magistrate is unjust, he is to inform the Kiap at Kokopo or his representative about it.

II

The Native Magistrates are to help the Government. All of you are to know that the Government aims at your well being in your villages. I, the Governor, have ordered the Native Magistrates to keep the roads in good order and to watch the boundaries(or Districts). The Native Magistrates are to see to it that their people make gardens to avoid famines. They are to watch over their villages lest (foolish) fear may prevail. They are to make an end to all quarrelling. If sickness prevails in a village, they are to report to the Doctor at Kokopo about it. They are to support those who are hungry. They

must quickly report to me anything that may trouble their villages. I wish also that the Native Magistrates at once fulfil my orders. That is all.

I direct that the Native Magistrates and all the people do their best to carry out all the items of this proclamation hereby issued in order that all proceedings may be correct and all the villages enjoy peace.

KOKOPO, July 18th, 1903. I, the Governor (Hahl)

3. Road-building

One of the more permanent assets left behind by the Germans were their roads, built and maintained by forced labour normally arranged by the luluais. Most roads had little economic justification when they were built—the Germans saw them as an important “civilizing agency”.

From: C. D. Rowley, “The Area Taken Over from Germans and Controlled by the A.N.M.E.F.”, *South Pacific*, April 1954, pp. 827-9.

The Germans had thus developed widely dispersed administrative headquarters; Rabaul, the centre not only for the Old Protectorate, but also the Island Territory, directly controlled the older station at Herbertshohe. Outside New Britain, were Kaewiang and Namatanai in New Ireland; Kieta, in Bougainville; Friederich Wilhelmshafen (Madang) and the more recently established stations at Eitape and Morobe on the mainland; and the new one on Manus Island. There were also the special spheres of influence of the missions, of which the most notable administratively was that of the Neuendetelsau Lutherans, based on the old centre at Finschhafen—an area which was to present some special problems to the A.N.M.E.F. The actual areas “controlled” from even the older stations had varied from one year to another, according to the ships, police, and administrative officers available, and to the extent of the road system. It is probable that in the first years of the Military Administration the area of influence was somewhat less than it had been in the later German period, partly because of the shortage of coastal shipping, which seems to have presented a desperate problem during the war.

The German stations were well built—so well built that most of them remained in use till their destruction in the second world war.

But more important was the road system inherited from German administrative effort. The German use of native manpower on the roads may be condemned on humanitarian and even economic

grounds, but once the roads were there they were a real administrative asset, so long as adequate maintenance was provided. It is doubtful whether at any time, until the armed forces built roads for different purposes in 1942-45, there were road facilities comparable with those of the Germans, though admittedly they had only made a beginning. Probably the best known of these roads is that down the east coast from Kaewieng through Namatanai, on which the District Officer of Kaewieng tamed New Ireland villagers. By 1911, 180 kilometres of it were being surfaced for motor traffic—mainly no doubt for administrative convenience. In the previous year the wooden bridges were being replaced by stone structures. In the same district a road right round New Hanover was expected to be completed in 1912.

Very great labours had gone into road building at Blanche Bay for very much more definite economic ends. The Herbertshohe-Rabaul cuttings were finally completed in 1910, and there was a continuous line of road (needing constant repair) for 200 kilometres from the mouth of the Warangoi River to the Baining country. In the following year the roads round Rabaul were being surfaced for vehicles with pumice ash and loam.

Among the most remarkable feats of road making were those in the Kieta district. By 1912, although the station had been opened up only in 1906, there was a total of 200 kilometres of made road—73 kilometres round the coasts of Buka, and the rest of it extending, with one break, down the east coast from the north-east section of Bougainville through Tiop, Numa Numa, Roruen, Kieta and Toiemanapu. The section to Toiemanapu had even an iron bridge. "As soon as the unmade section to the South of Numa Numa is completed, overland traffic can be carried on from the north part of Buka, and after bridging the straits from the north part of Bougainville via Kieta to Toiemanapu". There was an imperial disregard of economies that did not characterise the Australians at any time. Most of this road has long been lost, but there is local tradition of the German administrator who went by car from Kieta to the straits opposite Buka by car—even though it meant natives hauling the car over cliffs in large vine nets at one place on the road.

In the Friederich Wilhelmshafen district, where labour was in demand for long periods for filling in the swamps, roads were being extended by 1914 to the north and north-west past Alexishafen inland, and along the coast to the south. By 1912 there were even forty metres of road on the Rai coast. The mainland roads along the coast were (as they still are where they exist) especially liable to disruption at the numerous bridges, for a bridge may not only be

washed out, but may be left forlorn when the river changes course. Even Eitape had 70 miles of coastal road by 1911, though the bridges were continually having to be replaced; nevertheless extensions continued as well as repairs, until it was stated at the beginning of 1913 that further building had been temporarily abandoned because of local "unrest"

One has the feeling, when weighing all this work against the likely possibilities of economic return, that the Germans were doing the "colonial" thing as befitted an imperial power. It is extremely doubtful whether the labour resources would ever have been adequate both to maintain a road system developed on this scale, and to supply the needs of comparable European industries. But the Germans hoped for large populations. Only high costs kept them (for the time being) from using more Asian labour. Not only was there this possibility, but that of large populations to be discovered in the interior. They were, at least, really there to stay.

4. Opposition to Luluai System

Village elders saw little virtue in government officials, or "chiefs", whom they considered a threat to traditional influence by the elders.

From: German New Guinea, *Annual Report*, 1907-08 (translated by H. A. Thomson).

In Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, eleven new chiefs were appointed in addition to the eleven existing ones. Most of them had two policemen detailed as assistants (tultuls-messengers) to strengthen their influence in the village. Systematic progress was made in attracting natives for road making. During the report year natives from the Yomba plains as far as Gogol, residents from all the islands in the vicinity of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, and natives from the environs of Alexishafen as far as the districts of Madugas, Rempi, and Bamu, places up to about twenty sea miles from Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, worked on the roads. One can hardly say that the natives willingly carried out that work. During the report year it happened repeatedly that they left their work in large groups and fled to the bush. Repeated wearisome expeditions had to be undertaken to capture the fugitives. Great patience is required in dealing with the natives by reason of their great shyness of Europeans. Strengthening the chiefs' powers in the future can only be cautiously effected and advanced. In the environs of Potsdamhafen (Monumbo) they make their own chief's positions. The community of the oldest men as

district heads exercises a decisive influence in the village. They also decide on marriages, questions of ownership, on the ceremonies for obsequies and control the relationship of children to the village. Their influence was affected by the appointment of a chief and by the Government's measures. They are no longer the great sorcerers which they formerly were. Naturally they are the greatest enemies of the chiefs and of the Europeans. Their influence will work in secret for a long time yet. The Gogol-Nuru plains are not yet incorporated in the organization.

5. German Administration in Outlying Districts

The area under effective German control in 1914 consisted of the Gazelle Peninsula, Manus, most of New Ireland, the coastal regions of Bougainville and, in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, of small pockets around Morobe, Burgberg (today's Lae), Finschhafen, Friedrich Wilhelmshafen and Aitape. Other areas which the Germans claimed were under control were in fact under nominal control only—for instance, Manam Island near Potsdamshafen.

From: K. Burrige, *Mambu*, London, 1960, pp. 124-6.

At about the same time as Tangu were suffering from the first effects of the 'great sickness' the German administration was beginning to make itself felt on Manam Island and on the coasts of the mainland opposite. The S.V.D. mission was establishing a station near the village of Baliau on Manam island, and another was in the process of building on the northern curve of Bogia Bay. If the bulk of Tangu had not seen a white man they were probably beginning to hear about their existence and the kinds of opportunities they were offering. It is probable, too, that some few Tangu had seen a white man whilst on a journey to the coast for salt. And it is from this moment when, with troubles at home, Tangu first saw white men and their goods that we must record the birth of the Cargo myth-dream. White men and their goods had to be explained and accounted for.

About 1910 sufficient knowledge about white men and their doings had been gained to persuade a few Tangu to leave the strife of their homeland to seek their fortunes in distant plantations. Some years later the first missionaries and recruiters came up to Tangu. The missionaries came to explore, to see what was there, not to convert. The recruiters came to get men. Both brought with them objects, ideas, and ways of behaving that were, for Tangu, literally

from another world. Tangu admit today that they were greedy for the trade goods the recruiters had. And they were impressed with the apparel and equipment of the missionaries. Tangu parents sold their young sons to the recruiters for a steel bush-knife and a few beads. And on several counts the bargain was satisfactory to both sides. As far as the parents were concerned they obtained possession of valuable tools which saved them the labour of chipping spear, adze, and knife blades from stone, and in the chronic situation of wife stealing coloured beads in the hand were worth several arms with a spear. Tangu admit, too, that they had few scruples regarding the honesty of the bargain. If the recruiter got his labour cheaply, it was thought that the children who were sold could be relied on to escape from the recruiter if they wanted to, and, if they wished to go with him, it was better that they should do so rather than remain in Tangu in peril.

The men who were once these youths sold to recruiters do not express themselves as having been dissatisfied at the time. They were eager for adventure, to see new things. But when, eventually, they returned to Tangu not a few of them found that their fathers had been killed and that their mothers were the wives of other men. They had left Tangu at an age when they were just beginning to understand what life was about: they came back having learned of new ways and not well versed in the lore of their own kind. As well as they could they settled to the task of relearning their lives. They told stories of their adventures, firing others to follow their example. Meanwhile, clubhouse life, feuding, feasting, exchanging, trading, and disputing continued to flourish; and underlying all was the necessity for making new gardens each year, for hunting, for gathering, for wresting a living from the land.

German administration in Tangu was nominal merely. Tangu came across German administrative officers in the coastal areas, and there is a vague story of an administrative patrol which came to, but did not enter Tangu territory. Tangu are more certain, however, when, with a laugh, they tell the story of a police boy who, shaking with fright, came to Tangu one day and told them that henceforth they were to be subject to a 'Kukurai' living near the coast.

Nobody took any notice.

6. Education

The German government entered the field of education in 1907 by opening a school at Namanula. The language of instruction

during the first two years was Kuanua, thereafter German. The government also subsidised missions for the teaching of the German language.

From: C. Ralph, "Some Notes on Education in German New Guinea, 1884-1914", *Papua and New Guinea Journal of Education*, July 1965, p. 77.

For the first 23 years of the Protectorate all educational activity was in the hands of the Christian Missions, Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Wesleyan. Even when the Government did enter the educational field, its activities, though influential, were restricted.

For the most part the medium of instruction was the vernacular, the learning and writing of which entailed tremendous labour and resource. There was no lingua franca, no literature, not even an alphabet. In this they had to start with a blank sheet. There were hundreds of languages and obviously it was impossible to learn them all or commit them all to writing. Hence developed the practice of selecting a local language, committing it to paper, and then teaching it to people of other linguistic groups, superimposing one vernacular to make it the lingua franca for a whole area. And as their influence spread to other areas, they took that vernacular with them, with its alphabet and its books. A start was made to introduce German, but this did not make much headway, thanks, said one Mission, to the pernicious influence of this "miserable pidgin English."

A school system developed, if system so haphazard a growth could be called. To capture the adults, it was necessary to enlist the aid of the children, and so elementary schools started. To cater for those who had gone to the limit of these village schools, boarding or district or "secondary" schools were added, with increased curriculum and hours of instruction. The culmination of the system was the teacher training school and the seminary for training teachers of religion. No fees were charged, but pupils at boarding institutions were required to work in the gardens to supply the means of their own sustenance. The practice was begun of requiring pupils to buy school materials either with payments of produce or of personal labour. At least one Mission found it necessary in the early stages to hire pupils to come to school. All this was done with a minimum of resources from overseas, and local resources had to be developed, such as beginning plantations.

When the Government did interest itself in education, it did so in a limited field only with one European and one Native School, both in Rabaul. Even then in the latter subsistence gardening was neces-

sary to cut down expenses, and the Native School was also the Government Printery, which helped cut down the costs of administration. Towards the end of the era, it seemed that the Government was planning to co-ordinate the work of the different Missions and so to develop some sort of unified system of education. However, when the 1914-1918 War came, each Mission was still running its own schools in its own way. Their common purpose was to use the schools as a means to the end of bringing the Gospel to the people.

7. Plans for Developing Schools

In 1914 the Germans prepared a three year "developmental plan" involving the opening up of new areas in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, an expansion of medical and agricultural extension services, and the establishment of a government school system. The latter was prompted by increased demand for educated workers rather than by welfare or humanitarian considerations.

From: Official translation in Australian War Memorial Archives.

As regards old schools in the Protectorate, there is only the Government school at Rabaul, and at Saipan, and as regards new schools the Government school at Truk, this latter established since 1914. The attendance at the Government school at Saipan, which numbers at present 400 pupils, is so great that private premises have to be rented for instructional purposes. Conditions at Namanula are much the same, therefore it is proposed at the end of 1915 to transfer the site to Rabaul and enlarge the school premises. The success of the two Government schools may be described as good. In the Marianas and Carolines, Spanish or Pidgin English is no longer spoken by the native youth, but German. In 1913 for the first time pupils who were due for discharge from the Government school at Namanula have been accepted by the Offices and works of the Government. From Saipan German speaking natives are working under Government as clerks and craftsmen. Some former pupils from Saipan and Ponape have been sent for further training to the ship building yards at Tsingtau. This however does not suffice for the needs of the Protectorate as regards coloured personnel capable of reading and writing. Government as well as the public are, on the contrary, dependent on Chinese, Malay and Japanese assistance, although the local natives are equally suitable as are the others, for clerks, salesmen, craftsmen, etc. Their ethnological carvings proclaim that they are skilled wood workers. Bearing this in mind, industrial instructional workshops

have been attached since 1914 to the Government schools in Saipan and Truk; and of these industrial workshops that in Truk is also designed for agricultural purposes. A second agricultural school might be combined later with one of the Agricultural Stations. In 1915 an Industrial Instructional workshop will be provided in Rabaul as well. It will be possible to produce the main essentials for house building, which to-day by reason of the great distance from whence they are brought are very expensive, and it is to be hoped that by these arrangements equally favourable results may be experienced as in other Protectorates. Timber material will be provided for the greater part by the Protectorate itself, for the local school has as its aim teaching practical craftsmanship, moreover the native population in other portions of the Protectorate are asking for useful tuition, which will as a latter result influence beneficially local political conditions. A Government school for 40 respectively 30 scholars will be erected in Fredrich Wilhelmshafen for Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and in Jaluit for the Marshall Islands in 1915. Every year the greater majority of intending scholars from Kaiser Wilhelmsland who report at the Government school at Namanula have to be refused on account of overcrowding. It is intended that when the School at Kaiser Wilhelmsland is opened the native population shall have the chance of going through the curriculum of a Government school. The missions in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, as in the whole Protectorate, apply the elementary school course, as well as industrial instruction, but generally they keep those trained to a calling for their own ever growing concerns; hence, pupils who are to occupy a higher position in industrial life must be further advanced, and the Government schools are intended to serve this aim. The erection of a Government school at Jaluit, which was mooted even in 1907 for the first time by the German Colonial Society, was due to the same reasons. In later years Government schools must be erected at Kieta, which is situated where the English language commences to be spoken, and also at Kawieng for the New Mecklenburg people. The erection of a second school in Kaiser Wilhelmsland probably at Eitape may be reserved for future years, in order to disseminate the German language among the natives on and near the Dutch frontier. The first results of these arrangements will only become noticeable in six years time, when the non-local coloured employees of the Government and public may be gradually replaced by correspondingly advanced local coloured employees. Although by this arrangement success may only be in sight after a lengthy period, yet this work of the present time for the sake of the future is a demand of Colonial Political culture. The common aim of instruction in the Government

schools will be indicated by the model school at Rabaul, managed by a headmaster. This distribution of Government schools throughout the Protectorate will also have the greatest influence on the dissemination of the German language by the Mission schools, and in order that work to this end may be persevered with, the fund for dissemination of the German language has been increased by a third of its original establishment.

8. Health Services

During the last few years of their rule, the Germans spent about one-quarter of the colonial budget on health services. Although the number of qualified medical officers was small, the Germans made considerable use of European medical assistants, and after 1908 also trained local people as dokta bois (heil tultuls) for work on village level.

From: C. D. Rowley, "The Promotion of Native Health in German New Guinea", *South Pacific*, March-April 1957, p. 392.

In fact, however, the Germans had shown a consistent interest in the problems of native health. Their chief efforts in the field were directed against malaria and dysentery: and there was research into problems of malaria from early in the century. Inevitably, preventive or suppressive treatment was available first to those near government or mission stations. In at least some areas quinine was in use for natives (most of them, probably, labourers) as early as 1906, "being more and more adopted by the natives as a cure for fever, so that requests are frequently made for quinine . . ." In the Gazelle Peninsula and other areas where a high proportion of labour came from villages nearby, it was neither practicable, nor humane to limit medical treatment to labourers only; so that the health problems of the "free" or "day" labourers were regarded as those of the villages.

Dysentery in German times seems to have been a major destroyer of life. There were campaigns for preventive public health measures in the villages through the *heil tul-tul* system, by assistance to missions, and by civil engineering to improve water supplies. In 1909 it was reported in the Gazelle Peninsula to be "everywhere endemic and during the rainy season becomes epidemic. Sleeping on cold and often wet ground, frequently with an entire absence of bodily cleanliness, lack of intelligence, and superstition are responsible. To combat this illness, medicines and bandages were supplied free to Rabaul missionaries by the administration, as far as the supplies permitted.

Furthermore, some natives were given the necessary instructions and medicines and were sent to their homes in order to aid their ailing countrymen." Labourers returning to Lihir in 1910 were stated to have taken dysentery with them. The establishment of the station at Lorengau in 1911 was followed by an epidemic of the disease which wiped out an estimated 14% of the population of neighbouring coastal villages, and continued to cause death until the end of the wet season. There was another epidemic on Manus in 1912. The Germans put down seven 'pump wells' in villages, and established ten '*heil tul-tuls*' trained in Rabaul. They tried to induce villagers to alter their customary disposal of the dead: "the people are being taught as far as it is possible to approach and influence them at the present time". In that year dysentery was reported as prevalent also in mainland New Guinea and in Bougainville. Attempts to provide better drinking water were being continued. Wells were sunk at four villages near Rabaul in 1911.

The number of qualified medical officers was very limited, as in Papua. The Germans made use of European medical assistants, who were occasionally stationed at outposts among the villages to report epidemics and to give treatment, as in the area south of Kaewieng station in 1911. By 1914 at least one appears to have been posted to each Government station.

The basic problem, then as now, was an educational one. In the attempts to provide curative treatment, and in the more effective preventive measures for the public health, fears must be dealt with and cultural resistances overcome. "A white doctor" stated the Report for 1911-12 "is a personality who does not awaken confidence, but fear, at whose approach every sick person flees to the bush. Only in the vicinity of the white settlements . . . another view has slowly gained ground." The first experiments with the *heil tul-tuls* marked an endeavour to meet this situation. The system was reported in 1911 as having been "long in force" in the Kaewieng area where at that time there were "about twenty . . . spread over the whole District. There also, . . . with the assistance of the authorities, a small house has been built in each village, where the bandages and medicines are kept, in which, when necessity arises, several patients can be accommodated." Four were then training at the native hospital, Rabaul, where they served at least part of the time as hospital attendants. "A training period lasts on an average three months. They are then placed in their villages as *heil tul-tuls*. The activities of such *heil tul-tuls* consist of treating wounds and slight illnesses. More serious illnesses must be reported to the authorities. (The *tul-tul*) receives a box with a key, containing bandages, cotton

wool, disinfectant, soap and some simple medicines, such as castor oil. Later on hospitals of bush material are to be erected in the larger villages." Training at the Namatanai native hospital was reported as early as 1909. The programme at Rabaul was apparently increased considerably in 1912 as ten were supplied for Manus alone.

The medical *tul-tuls* were paid annual salaries of twenty marks, in itself an indication of the anxiety of the Government that the system should work effectively.

In 1913 an experiment with female 'health assistants' was commenced. The women concerned were to promote the health of nursing mothers and babies.

It had been German policy to encourage "free" natives to resort to the native hospitals at the stations. It was reported that at Namatanai in 1909 so many sick villagers were asking for treatment, chiefly of wounds and yaws, with increasing requests from villages further out, that extensions to accommodation were necessary. Treatment of deep-seated disease was handicapped there by "superstition, homesickness, and aversion to treatment for internal complaints." It was claimed that as many as fifty outpatients might be treated in one day at Namatanai in 1910. At the new station of Kieta numbers were from six to ten daily. The outpatient work was described as an extension of the work of caring for labourers, who had the first claim. It was reported that in 1910 "a start has also been made in Kaiser Wilhelmsland with the medical treatment of natives other than labourers:" and that this included the vaccination of a thousand "free" natives.

9. The German Expatriate Community

The following comments were made by an Australian visitor shortly after the war but they apply equally to the pre-1914 days.

From: L. Overell, *A Women's Impressions of German New Guinea*, London, 1923, pp. 27-9.

At Kokopo were the barracks, native hospital, private bungalows, and a store, but the chief feature was the big hotel built by the New Guinea Company. It stood on top of the cliff and faced the Pacific. Its verandas were ornamented with quaint green carvings that reminded the planters of many a familiar *Gasthaus* in the far-away Fatherland.

The manager's wife took me upstairs to my room, explaining carefully that only her family lived below and that I should have all the

upper floor—three rooms and big balconies to myself! I could not quite understand her solicitude, but I was sorry to see that access could only be gained by an outside flight of steps. Later on, I discovered that hotel proprietors find single women rather a responsibility. Married couples and men were accommodated in guest-houses near, for the hotel buildings covered a large area of land. The spacious dining-room, with the bar at one end, opened into a huge *Trinkhalle*, where there were very merry gatherings in the old German days.

I had recently been staying at a Sydney boarding-house, where the men were served before the women, so it was rather a contrast when the Germans at the dinner-table turned fiercely to the native waiters who were handing dishes to them and said sternly, "Serve Missus first, always first."

Occasionally a planter would bring his wife, but usually there were only men.

I tried giving my orders to the boys; in vain—for they paid no attention. The Germans would repeat them in loud tones with excellent results.

I overheard one say, "Sie ist doch viel zu höflich und bescheiden,"* but it was not until I heard the German women speak to the natives that I realized my error. They did not *speak*, they yelled, they shouted, they roared, and the shuddering blacks flew to obey.

There was frequently an air of gloom about the settlers, who were waiting anxiously for the Mandate to come through. They hoped England, not Australia, would have it. They said England would be just—but Australia! They shook their heads sadly. Few of these wanted to go back to the Fatherland. They loved their flourishing plantations and hated to think of giving them up.

Life in the Bismarck Archipelago under the German régime was a delightful thing. The planters had beautiful homes, cheap black labour, every encouragement from the Government, good roads, telephones, a sanatorium in the hills, frequent German war-boats, a regular shipping service, ice, fresh milk and meat, amusements and all kinds of social festivities. There probably never was a gayer little colony than that of the Südsee!

*She is too polite and modest.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY RULE IN NEW GUINEA

I. AUSTRALIANS TAKE CONTROL

The Australian occupation of German New Guinea in September 1914 was a minor episode in the history of the 1914-1918 war. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force landed unopposed in New Britain on 11 September; six days later the German forces surrendered and an armistice was signed between Colonel Holmes and Haber, the Acting Governor, allowing German militiamen to return to their homes. During the period of military occupation German laws were retained, as were some German officials who took the oath of neutrality. In 1919, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, German colonies were transferred to the League of Nations which entrusted their administration to allied powers, as mandates. Australia was assigned New Guinea as a "C" Mandate and could thus administer the territory as an integral part of Australia.

1. Military Rule Proclaimed

On 12 September 1914 Colonel Holmes, commander of the Expeditionary Force, issued a proclamation setting out the conditions of the military occupation.

From: F. Burnell, *Australia Versus Germany*, London, 1915, pp. 133-5.

WHEREAS the forces under my command have occupied the Island of New Britain; and whereas upon such occupation the authority of the German Government has ceased to exist therein; and whereas it has become essential to provide for proper government of the said colony, and for the protection of the lives and property of the peaceful inhabitants thereof,

Now I, William Holmes, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Colonel in his Majesty's Forces, Brigadier Commanding the aforesaid Expeditionary Force, do hereby declare and proclaim as follows:—

1. From and after the date of these presents the Island of New Britain and its dependencies are held by me in military occupation in the name of his Majesty the King.

2. War will be waged only against the armed forces of the German Empire and its allies in the present war.

The lives and private property of peaceful inhabitants will be protected, and the laws and customs of the colony will remain in force so far as is consistent with the military situation.

4. If the needs of the troops demand it, private property may be requisitioned. Such property will be paid for at its fair value.

5. Certain officials of the late Government may be retained, if they so desire, at their usual salaries.

6. In return for such protection it is the duty of all inhabitants to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner, to carry on their ordinary pursuits so far as is possible, to take no part directly or indirectly in any hostilities, to abstain from communication with his Majesty's enemies, and to render obedience to such orders as may be promulgated.

7. All male inhabitants of European origin are required to take the oath of neutrality prescribed, at the garrison headquarters, and all firearms, ammunition, and war material in the possession or control of inhabitants are to be surrendered forthwith, as is also all public property of the late Government.

8. Non-compliance with the terms of this Proclamation, and disobedience of such orders as from time to time may be promulgated, will be dealt with according to military law.

9. It is hereby notified that this Proclamation takes effect in the whole Island of New Britain and its dependencies from this date.

Given at Government House, Rabaul, this twelfth day of September, 1914.

(Sgd.) WILLIAM HOLMES
Bridagier Commanding.

Witness (Sgd.) FRANCIS HERITAGE, MAJOR,
Brigade Major.

GOD SAVE THE KING!

2. Terms of Capitulation

According to international law, a military occupant is not the sovereign of a territory, and thus lacks the power to alter its legal and administrative system, except to maintain and safeguard his army. This explains the retention of "local laws and customs" during the occupation. The retention of some German officials and the decision to allow all planters to stay arose from practical considerations: without them the administration and the economy of the colony would have collapsed.

From: Australian War Memorial Archives.

WHEREAS the principal centres of Deutsch Neu Guinea have been occupied by an overwhelming force under the command of the said Colonel Holmes;

AND WHEREAS the said Acting-Governor has no authority to surrender any portion of the German Possessions under his Administration, but in view of the said occupation by the said overwhelming force, the said Acting-Governor is prepared to give an assurance that all military resistance to such occupation in Deutsch Neu Guinea shall cease forthwith.

NOW, the following terms and conditions are solemnly agreed upon between the said contracting parties:—

- (1) The name Deutsch Neu Guinea (German New Guinea) includes the whole of the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean lately administered from Rabaul by the said Acting Governor on behalf of the Imperial German Government, and the said possessions are hereafter referred to as "The Colony."
- (2) All military resistance to the said Military Occupation of the Colony shall cease forthwith.
- (3) The armed German and Native Forces now in the field are to be surrendered at Herbertshöhe on the 21st day of September, at 10 o'clock in the morning. Military honors will be granted.
- (4) Upon the said Acting Governor giving his parole to take no further part directly or indirectly in the present war, no obstacle will be placed in the way of his returning to Germany. Such parole shall not prevent the said Acting Governor from

- tendering to the Imperial Government at Berlin such advice as he may deem proper with regard to terms of peace.
- (5) Such of the officers of the said forces in the field as are officers of the German Regular Forces will be treated as prisoners of war in the usual manner. Such of the officers of the said forces as are not officers of the German Regular Forces, but whose usual occupation is civil, on taking an oath of neutrality for the duration of the present war, will be released and permitted to return to their homes and ordinary vocations, except where such vocations are official, in which case the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof will apply.
 - (6) As the said Acting Governor gives his assurance that none of the white non-commissioned officers and men now in the field belong to the Regular Forces of the German Empire, such white non-commissioned officers and men, upon taking the said oath of neutrality, will be released and permitted to resume their ordinary avocations, except where such avocations are official, in which case the terms of paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof will apply.
 - (7) As it is understood that the safety of the white population depends to an extent on the existence of a Native Constabulary, that portion of the armed Native Constabulary which now forms part of the German Forces in the field, if found satisfactory, will be transferred to the Military Administration.
 - (8) As the administration of the Colony during the military occupation will be conducted by the British Military Commander, all monies and properties of the late administration are to be handed over to the said Colonel Holmes, Brigadier Commanding.
 - (9) During the said military occupation the local laws and customs will remain in force so far as is consistent with the military situation.
 - (10) As it is intended that administration shall be carried on under the control of British Officers, subject to the succeeding paragraph, such only of the Civil Officials of the late German Administration as it may be considered necessary to retain in an advisory capacity, will be continued in their offices. Officials so retained will be required to take the oath of neutrality, and their former salaries will be continued. Officials not so retained, and those who refuse to take the said oath, will be deported to Australia, but will have no obstacle placed in the way of their returning thence to Germany as soon as is possible.
 - (11) For the protection of the white population against the Natives,

the German Officials now in charge of outlying portions of the Colony, will continue in their official capacities until relieved by the Military Administration.

- (12) Any British subjects at present imprisoned or held in duress in the said Colony are to be released and returned to their homes and former positions forthwith. This does not apply to such persons (if any) who may be serving a sentence imposed by a Criminal Court of Competent Jurisdiction.

In witness whereof the said contracting parties of this first and second parts have hereunto set their hands this 17th day of September, 1914, at Herbertshöhe, New Britain.

E. HABER,
WILLIAM HOLMES.

3. Stories of the Occupation

Lillian Overell recorded some of the stories about the "September days" of 1914.

From: L. Overell, *A Woman's Impressions of German New Guinea*, London, 1923, pp. 53-4.

When the Great War began, the Germans in Rabaul promptly interned the few British there, but when the Australian force arrived the tables were turned. Why the Germans secured such excellent terms for themselves is somewhat of a mystery. A well-known writer who had recently visited the Gazelle Peninsula told the authorities that Rabaul was fortified, but not Kokopo. But the reverse was the case, and when the Australians landed at Kabakaul, near Kokopo, having for their objective the wireless station at Bita Paka, they found trenches dug on the road leading there and armed police boys hiding in the tops of the coco-nut palms, and a few young lives were lost.

All the German gold was hidden somewhere near Toma, but no one seems to know if it has been discovered or not. It would be interesting to find out the truth.

The commanding naval officer declared that he had been handed a written unconditional surrender, but this seems to have been ignored, and the military officer in command, bluffed by the ludicrous idea that there was a large native force in reserve somewhere, agreed to the terms that the Germans themselves drew up! There were many of the elements of comic opera in the taking of Rabaul, and most who took part in it enjoyed it tremendously.

I could not but remember what my gardener, an ex-B.R.N. seaman, told me of the event when I asked his experiences.

"Oh ma'am," he said, looking very puzzled, "they all looted."

I didn't know before that officers looted!

I asked my friend, the Commander.

"Oh, no," he said, "the officers didn't loot. There was a report to that effect and one man was tried for it. We knew he could prove his innocence, so it was just as well for the case to go through. It was Captain X., a very decent fellow."

I thought it would be interesting to hear the military version, so I inquired of the Colonel's wife.

"Did Captain X. loot?" she repeated. "Anyhow he shared the loot. His wife lived next to us and, when we all went in to afternoon tea, she showed us the loveliest things he had brought from Rabaul—linen pillow-cases, and tray-cloths with beautiful lace-work, and all sorts of treasures."

"But he was acquitted?" I argued.

"Yes," she replied, "because he was warned beforehand that the house would be searched, and large boxes of loot were sent to his mother-in-law's the day before. I saw them go."

4. The "Cox Incident"

On 26 October 1914, shortly before the A.N.M.E.F. occupied Namatanai, a group of German nationals assaulted the Reverend William Henry Cox, because they suspected him of being a British "spy". The legality of their subsequent public flogging was later raised in the Commonwealth Parliament and the Minister for Defence, Senator Pearce, promised that this form of punishment would not be used again, since it was not the result of a court judgment.

From: S. S. Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul*, Sydney, 1934, pp. 120-6.

It was during the time when the outlying islands were being occupied, after Heritage's landing at Käwieng on October 17th and before the occupation of the Western and Admiralty Islands in November, that an incident occurred which, on account of its local and international consequences, as well as of its bearing upon a narrative concerning the administration and character of Colonel Holmes calls for somewhat detailed statement. This was the assault, by certain Germans and a Belgian at Namatanai on October 26th,

upon the Reverend William Henry Cox, a British national, who at the time was Chairman of the Methodist Mission in the Bismarck Archipelago. That outpost had not, at the date been occupied by a detachment of the expeditionary force, but the German residents there, with the knowledge that Kāwieng had recently been occupied and garrisoned, were daily expecting the arrival of Australian troops. Excitement was therefore running high. In the midst of this tension, with racial feeling very acute, German officials at Namatanai intercepted a letter from a British subject in the German schooner *Samoa* (then hidden in Kalili Harbour on the west coast of New Ireland) addressed to Cox and requesting him to let the British warships know where the *Samoa* was concealed. This led the Germans in the district to believe that Cox was a spy, and that he had been giving information about the Germans to the British naval and military forces . . .

On the very day on which the affair took place, the German district officer at Namatanai had made up his mind to retire into the interior, so that he would not have to surrender the station to the Australians. He was accordingly making preparations for his departure. He and the resident government medical officer had not been on good terms. A number of Germans, including the medical officer — and with them a Belgian planter, who had come to Namatanai from his plantation to seek some protection for himself and his property in view of the threatening attitude of the natives in his locality—had gathered during the day at the district officer's house, and had there been drinking freely and discussing the matter of the intercepted letter . . .

Meanwhile those who had made up their mind to thrash Cox set out from the *Bezirksamt's* house to carry out their purpose: all were more or less drunk; indeed, one of them was left behind incapable. On the way they met the doctor's assistant, who had taken no part in the discussion, but who was ordered by his senior to accompany him. This assistant, a mere boy, apparently without comprehending what purpose was afoot, joined in the party. They ran towards a spot close to the mission station, sat down to recover their breath, then hurried across the mission land, and three of them rushed up the hill and into the house, where Cox was sitting talking to the wife of the missionary. The medical officer pointed a pistol at Cox, and exclaimed—"You are a prisoner." Cox was then seized by the neck, pushed or dragged out of the room on to the verandah and down the steps, held down over a wash-tub, and given thirty or forty strokes with a cane. The affair occupied only a few minutes, Cox's assailants then releasing him and running down the hill towards Namatanai. The other missionary, returning from his interview with the district officer, thus saw the assailants hurrying away . . .

To Holmes this action against a prominent British subject—and a missionary—by Germans living under the authority and protection of a British government in newly-conquered territory naturally appeared to be of outrageous insolence and defiance. It was, indeed, precisely characteristic of those qualities by which a certain type of German blackened his country's name from the outbreak of war in Belgium. In the highly-charged state of a war atmosphere the assault seemed, when first reported, to have been purposely committed in order to insult the British character and cause. The indignation aroused was intense and the crime called for prompt punishment and suppression. Especially did Holmes conceive that the dignity and authority of the military administration had been intentionally flouted. To persons separated from these events by a wide distance of time or space, it is perhaps easy to judge that he wrongly assigned to the occurrence a political colour which clouded his usually clear vision; yet that judgement must be passed. Here is no question as to whether he was morally justified in retaliating for a brutal act by inflicting similar punishment on the offender; the issue is legal and political—not moral. In the face of a delicate international situation, with the tide of racial feeling running full, he decided to treat Manning's report as a conclusive judicial finding, and to dispense with a trial. In this he acted against both the advice orally tendered by Manning, and a warning from the former German judge, Weber. Though the inquiry had been careful and impartial, and the facts adduced had been clear and accurate, the proceeding had been in no sense a judicial trial. The report was handed to the Administrator on the 28th of November, 1914, and on the same day Holmes issued an order in the following terms:—

“This report fully bears out the complaint made to me by the Reverend Mr. Cox, that a gross and unprovoked assault had been perpetrated upon him. . . .

“In view of the indignity and humiliation inflicted upon the Reverend Mr. Cox, a British subject, whose calling as a minister of religion alone should have protected him from such an attack, I consider it necessary that a short, sharp, and exemplary punishment should be meted out to those concerned. The case is a unique one, and must, therefore, be dealt with in a special manner, and I can see no better means of doing this than by awarding the guilty persons a taste of the same medicine they administered to the Reverend Mr. Cox.

“I therefore direct that a parade of all available troops of the Rabaul and Herbertshöhe garrison be held on Monday next, 30th November, in Proclamation square, at 10 a.m., and that

the following punishments be publicly inflicted upon the prisoners. . . .”

The order then prescribed that the ringleader should receive thirty strokes with the cane, and the others twenty-five strokes each, with the exception of the German doctor's young assistant, who was to receive ten.

This punishment was duly carried out in Proclamation square, Rabaul. Natives were forbidden to be in the vicinity of the ground, and guards were posted to prevent them from approaching. Photographing was prohibited. The troops were formed around the place. All the male German residents of Rabaul had been ordered to attend, but were informed that they would not be compelled to witness the actual punishment. Before its infliction, the Administrator made a speech, pointing out the reasons for it, and warning the German residents that assaults on British subjects would not be tolerated. The German residents then left, except Weber and another, who remained at their own request to watch the proceedings. The arrested men were then given the allotted number of strokes with a cane about as thick as a man's thumb. In protest against the proceeding all the German officials resigned their posts as advisers to the administration, and there the affair, for the time being, ended; but its more distant results, which will be narrated in a later chapter, provide a warning against hasty action in such circumstances; however complete may appear at the time to be its moral justification.

5. Occupation of Mainland New Guinea

Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, the headquarters of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, was occupied by the Australian Expeditionary Force on 24 September 1914. Morobe remained in German hands until 8 January 1915, and Finschhafen was not garrisoned at all. In this extract the Superintendent of the Neuendettelsau Mission expresses some of the fears and hopes of the German missionaries during the opening stages of the conflict.

From: J. Flierl, *Forty-Five Years in New Guinea*, Columbus, Ohio, 1931, pp. 102-6.

It was on the eighth of August, 1914. My older son and I were making a call at Wareo, when we very unexpectedly received another delivery of mail and with it the startling news of the beginning of the terrible war in Europe. During the night a government steamer on a special trip had passed Finschhafen to bring also to our Mission the

evil tidings that our dear fatherland was in a state of war with Russia, France and England. . . .

I immediately summoned the brethren to a special conference at Heldsbach to consider the best and most economical distribution of the provisions on hand. There was no doubt that for an indeterminate time we would be cut off from all communication with the fatherland and the mission society at home. Our own future and that of our Mission was shrouded in complete darkness and uncertainty, and, although we still hoped for the best, we realized that we would also have to prepare for the worst. We wished with the help of God to do all in our power to carry on our mission work as well as possible through the evil times. We also considered whether or not to inform our natives concerning the war, and we agreed that the best course would be to tell them about it, since we could not hope that the war would be restricted to Europe. We justly feared that English or French dominions would soon carry the war also into our colony. We wanted our natives to understand our necessary measures of economy, and we didn't want them to get the worst news from others first. . . .

One day in September we sighted from Heldsbach four warships coming from the east and apparently heading towards Finschhafen. Before they came very near, however, they suddenly turned towards the northwest. The month following I happened to be up at Sialum for several weeks with my son. There we saw many fugitives from the neighborhood of Madang, who told us of the occupation of the government station at the place by the warships that we had seen. More detailed information concerning the fate of Madang and the capture of Rabaul, but also of great victories of our fatherland in Europe we got from a long letter which the Rhenish missionary of the Astrolabe Bay had sent to us with fugitives. Thus the early days of the war were for us days of hope and fear, days of watching and waiting. . . .

In January, 1915, we held our general annual conference at Heldsbach. The Superintendent of Missions, Pastor Steck, who represented the Home Church, and who had been in the field since the beginning of 1914 and had visited all the stations, was with us at Heldsbach. Just before the beginning of the ten days' conference, we saw two destroyers traveling south along the coast; their object was the occupation of Morobe, the last of the German government stations. Shortly before one of these destroyers had stopped for a few hours at Finschhafen. When the ship was first sighted to the north and our black boys loudly proclaimed the news with "Sailo! sailo!", one of our men, according to our custom, raised the German flag

before the station building. It was the last time that this was done.—The brother who raised the flag, thinking of the German victories that had been reported, reasoned that it might possibly be a German ship that was coming. When the English battleship cast anchor, no one in the general confusion that followed seemed to remember the flag. The British commanding officer did not seem to mind the flag in the least and only remarked dryly: "Well, if it doesn't look like a challenge!" At the station he got out a paper that Brother Ruppert had to sign. It was a short statement to the effect that the mission schooner *Bavaria* would not be permitted to transport anything but members of the mission force and mission goods. The *Bavaria* was not even in port at that time. There were no further questions concerning the ship, and the missionaries at Finschhafen received neither an oral nor a written proclamation concerning the occupation of the colony. Nor was an oath of neutrality demanded on that day. A formal proclamation of occupation I did not receive until months later when all the mischief had been done.

All missionaries were asked to sign an oath of neutrality on 28 February 1915, during an official visit by S. A. Pethebridge, who had replaced Holmes as Administrator in January 1915. Two—Pastor Steck and missionary Laur—refused, were detained and eventually interned in Australia.

II. THE ARMY SETTLES IN

1. "Ye Shall Occupy the Land"

Between March 1916 and July 1918 the Rabaul garrison produced a monthly newspaper entitled the Rabaul Record. It contained official announcements, news, articles by officers and the men and, occasionally, attempts at poetry.

From: *Rabaul Record*, 1 August 1916, p. 9.

I wish to speak to-night, kind friends, on this world and the next,
And as it's going to be a sermon, I must first announce my text.
You will find it in the Bible, in those noble words and grand,
"And the Lord said unto Moses ye shall occupy the land".

Now the man who just supposes that these words were meant for
Moses,
His great ignorance discloses, as I think you'll all agree.
For it means, although unwritten, that our foemen must be smitten,
We must occupy New Britain from the mountains to the sea.

Did we buy the place and book it? Did the Germans meekly hook it?
No, we bravely came and took it in obedience to command;
And now we're just complying with our text, at least we're trying,
We're engaged in occupying. "Ye shall occupy the land."

Now, who has not heard the story, how we cut our path to glory,
Over pastures green and gory, over sea and over land?
Was there ever sight more thrilling, were there ever men more
willing?

So you see we're just fulfilling the old Biblical command.

From the time we first did spot it, till we ultimately got it
You could make an I and dot it, and we took it on our ace.
If we love, or if we hate it, now we're here, don't underrate it,
Soon we'll have to populate it if we want to hold the place.

My old head this puts some care on (How I wish 'twould put some
hair on)

But as Moses said to Aaron, "Let each soldier play his part,"
 Is there here one doubting Thomas? Friends, just listen to the
 promise,
 It will ne'er be taken from us if we only make a start.

Our O.C. has bravely led us, and our country's clothed and fed us,
 Will our chaplain now please wed us, and we'll each select a wife.
 Ev'n as Eve once lived with Adam in the days when fig leaves clad
 'em
 As his most devoted madam. Let us live the simple life.

For the sands of time are sinking, and it's time we started thinking.
 Black and white will soon be linking. Oh! what will the harvest be?
 Let our love begin to kindle, for our numbers must not dwindle,
 Be the product brown or brindle, there must be posterity.

Now this pressing question clamo'rous opens up a subject
 glamo'rous,
 What did Cain when he felt amorous, after taking Abel's life?
 We don't read he into quod went, but unshorn, likewise unshod went,
 Out into the land of Nod went, where he found a colored wife.

Thus the tribes of Ham and Shem too, had their origin in them, too,
 Can't we do the same, ahem, too? shall we merely occupy?
 Waste no time in vain palavers, plant your coco-nuts and guavas,
 Up, and don your lavalavas, marry quick and multiply.

Do not think this scheme foolhardy, we Australians are too tardy,
 Let us all at least crack hardy, and some settlement devise;
 Some are butchers, some are bakers, O.C. stiffs, and undertakers,
 And for me, give me ten acres, and we'll all be Lu-luis.

Then these isles of the equator, blest by an all wise creator.
 Will in future become greater than the wisest can foresee,
 In a century all traces will be gone, of flat nosed faces,
 And a race of real hard cases will decide their destiny.

J. ANDREWS.

[The above was delivered as a recitation by the author at one of the regular entertainments improvised by the members of the Rabaul Garrison. Needless to say the Editor entirely disclaims any adherence to some of the sentiments expressed, but even in Rabaul some consideration must be accorded to a "Poet's licence." If that is not a sufficient excuse for the publication, then we must fall back on what everyone in these parts suffer from to a larger or smaller extent, viz.,

“Tropicholia,” a disease due to environment, climate and last but not least, quinine.—Ed. R.R.]

2. Rabaul in 1915

A few months after the occupation the Army officials provided a description of their pleasant surroundings in Rabaul.

From: *Government Gazette British Administration—German New Guinea*, 15 February 1915, pp. 1-2.

Rabaul is situated on Blanche Bay, surrounded on three sides by green-clad slopes and mountains. The township came into prominence when, in 1910, the then German Governor, Dr. Hahl, transferred the seat of government from Herbertshohe to Rabaul, at that time not very much more than a native village. To-day the population numbers approximately 1,500 all told, and consists of Europeans, Chinese, Japanese, Malays, and the Natives.

RABAUL PROPER

Rabaul proper is the European quarter. It is well laid out with wide avenues, and squares, and possesses two jetties. In Rabaul nearly all the officials and traders live in well equipped houses. The business hours are from 8 till 11 a.m. and from 2 to 4 p.m., five hours constituting a tropical working day for Europeans. The houses are all built on concrete blocks and piles, partly to procure draught, and partly to protect them against white ants and dampness during the wet season. They are light and airy, yet strongly constructed so as to withstand the frequent and often severe earth tremors. On the outskirts of the city an enterprising New Zealander has erected a Kinetograph Theatre.

CHINATOWN

Five minutes walk from Rabaul proper is Chinatown: probably the busiest, and, in some respects, an interesting place.

THE NATIVE COMPOUND

The Kanakas number approximately 190 police boys and 300 contract laborers, including 30 Marys. They live in big barracks, only the “boss boys” and their Marys having small wooden huts, one room being allotted to each couple. In the native compound is also situated the police-masters’ residence, the jails, magazine and the Government stables. There are three jails—one for the Europeans, one for the Japanese, Chinese and Malays, and one for the Natives. The

crimes committed are, in the case of the natives, of no great variety, gentlemen criminals of the higher order being unknown. They are incarcerated either for theft, assault, unnatural offences, or desertion from their masters. Two are awaiting their trial for cannibalism. In the day time life is at an ebb in the native compound, the place being given over to the womenfolk and their youthful offspring. The Malays are away at the offices and stores, the Government laborers are at the wharf loading or unloading vessels, or they are engaged in transport work, road-making, or any other occupation, where muscles and sinews are in demand, and which is considered below the dignity of the white, or to some extent even the yellow man, to touch. The dark prisoners are doing sanitary work, and the native police are drilling on the parade ground or on duty. Towards noon, and again towards evening, they all go back to the compound for "kai-kai" in the main consisting of rice. There are no shops in the native compound, and very little money—nothing to buy and nothing to buy it for, nothing to draw either the white man nor anybody else. Divorce cases of a primitive kind are not uncommon.

NAMANULA

In the mountains, a mile-and-a-half by road from Rabaul, Namanula is situated. It is healthier and slightly cooler than below, but the mosquitoes are none the less vicious. The country is wild and wooded, the gorges are deep and the level places few. When subterranean volcanic forces, in the unknown past, lifted New Britain up out of the sea it handled this place particularly roughly. Still, nature has created a delightful spot around Namanula, and probably for this reason it has become the fashionable suburb. It is here that the Government House is situated on the summit of a hill, surrounded by the most luxuriant tropical vegetation, and presenting excellent views. On the one side New Ireland and the Duke of York Group of Islands, are to be seen in the distance whilst on the other side the scene takes in Rabaul, Chinatown, and Simpsonhafen with its encircling slopes. Every steamer, motor-launch or cutter entering or leaving port can be observed. In Namanula there are a number of picturesque villas where the higher German officials used to live. The European hospital, the Government Printing Office and the now deserted school are also situated here. The teachers from the school have been deported, the white children have been taken away by their parents, and the Kanaka boys who had been brought here from every corner of the Bismarck Archipelago to learn German, handicraft, and agriculture, took advantage of our arrival to disappear, mostly to Rabaul, where they have been employed, and they seem to be exceedingly happy. Boys are always the same, whether white or

black. The printing staff, numbering about a dozen, and who were being instructed by a German, also took leave and have not put in an appearance since. In fact, Namanula is in no respect what it was a few months back.

3. Patrol Along the Rai Coast

In comparison with Germans, the Australian military administration did little patrolling work away from the vicinity of the district offices. The Australians also closed several German patrol posts, for instance Burgberg (Lae) and Angoram. The result was that in some areas formerly under German "control", Australian administration was virtually unknown.

From: *Rabaul Record*, 1 December 1916, pp. 11-12.

I have often listened to what I thought highly coloured stories of patrols and expeditions among the natives of New Guinea, and of such feats as walking over mountains and swimming crocodile infested rivers and diving under logs.

But reader the stories I heard about New Guinea are true, and I can vouch for some of them from my own personal experiences.

My job was to proceed to Sialum on a schooner and patrol from there to Madang, taking the census and tax collecting, etc., in September. I had twelve native police and a private to assist with the transport and cooking. The country between Madang and Sialum embraces the Rye coast, along which many natives of proven bad character are located, having been deported from Madang, Siar, and adjacent islands by the late German Government for a threatened conspiracy to wipe out all the white men in Madang. The plot was discovered in time by a native police boy and nearly all the native inhabitants of Madang and Siar were immediately deported to the Rye coast. Threats were hurled at the Government that if ever a Kiap came to visit them they would cut off his head from the eyes upwards. This story is testified by residents of Madang and along the coast. The result of their long absence from civilisation now is that they are wild and half afraid, like animals. . . .

I have slept in native huts crawling with vermin. At a village named Sincorn I "slept" with native filth all around me, my body crawling with vermin, and there was that smell of dirty humanity and pigs. The natives are merely human pigs as they live at present. The women clothed in the ordinary grass "pull pull" squat on the ground, covered in dirt from head to foot, chewing betel nut, and allow the

pigs to rub themselves against their naked bodies and grunt for food.

In some chief's huts there are generally a number of skulls. Are they victims? At all events they are regarded as sacred—or the devil—or some weird idea of tabaran.

Not all the villages are the same, some are cleaner, but the cleanest are filthy. Venereal disease and elephantiasis are rampant. Otherwise healthy looking natives have limbs twice and three times their normal size. The natives along the Rye coast are as cunning as the proverbial fox. I never saw many. They had all cleared into the mountains. I discovered that they were signalling from one village to another with smoke by day and fires by night. If I left a seemingly deserted village I would look around when about a mile away and see the inevitable smoke, thick and black, curling upwards, which is, I discovered, a signal to the next village that the "Keap has been and gone, so go for your life." They usually went.

Some villages showed evidences of having been occupied only a few minutes previous to my arrival. Fires burning, dogs and pigs about, and coconut trees literally bristling with arrows, as if the Kanakas had been practising for me and were disturbed suddenly. I collected a few arrows that were meant for me, but no tabarans or skulls, etc., would I allow to be touched. I think it would go hard with the next white man visitor had I disturbed them.

4. Life With a German Planter

J. Lyng, "Captain Jones" of the following extract, published two books about his years in New Guinea. Here he records a conversation with a German settler on Dampier Island where he went (as District Officer, Madang) to settle a land dispute between two German plantation owners.

From: J. Lyng, *Island Films*, Sydney, 1925, pp. 180-1.

Captain Jones caught sight of a young native woman squatting on the floor at one end of the verandah; alongside her was a child of light brown hue, while a baby, only a few months old cuddled into her breast. Pointing towards the woman Jones asked "Has that something to do with the lure of the Pacific?"

"Some white men have a peculiar weakness for black women, but to most of us they are merely a necessary evil. These are my children," the planter continued, while coaxing the child, a girl about two years old, to go to him. The child staggered along the floor to the planter, and clasped one of his legs with her tiny arms.

"There *can* be affection between a white father and his half-caste children," Captain Jones remarked tentatively.

"I believe that more often than not there is no affection," the planter replied. "Personally, I am very fond of my children and am going to see to it that they get a chance in life. It will all be arranged before I go to Germany and marry a woman of my own kind."

"You don't think a white woman will object to marrying you, after you have given the affection of your youth to a black woman and made her mother of your children?" Jones asked.

"I guess some women would object, but to others my experience in youth would render me all the more fascinating,—women are funny beings, and I never met anybody who thoroughly understood them." He paused, but added after a while with a touch of sadness—"There will be many a widow in Germany today who is in need of a friend. By the time war is over very little but human kindness and the means to exercise it, will be considered of any real value."

5. Comparing Papua and New Guinea

During and after the war, a number of explanations had been advanced to account for the different stages of development of Papua and New Guinea. In this extract, J. Lyng expounds his explanation. Note that most of the German Imperial subsidy of £85,000 was spent on the "old protectorate"—the "island sphere" had been virtually self-supporting since about 1909.

From: J. Lyng, *Our New Possession*, Melbourne, 1919, pp. 233-5.

Travellers coming to Rabaul via Papua find much to admire in what German enterprise has achieved. Their eyes are caught by the spacious government buildings, the picturesque and practical bungalows, the shady avenues, the luxuriant Botanical Gardens, the excellent roads leading along portion of the seaboard, to say nothing about the extensive plantations studding the coast. It is only through comparison that our success, or lack of success, can be measured, and in comparing Papua with German New Guinea we must admit that in some respects the latter is ahead. The experience gained in Africa shows that Germany's iron rule and intense organisation—so unsuited to the temperament of primitive races—were well on their way to exterminate the native population, thereby doing themselves out of cheap labour. When therefore, this colony has shown a sustained progress, much of the credit is due to the late German governor, Dr. Hahl, who—unlike the military moulded governors in

Africa—combined an earnest desire for developing the Possession with a strong sense of justice towards the native population. At the same time, it must be remembered that Germany spent money more lavishly in German New Guinea than was spent in Papua, and, therefore according to the law of proportion, would attain greater results. Thus, for instance, in the last year before the war, the German Imperial Government subsidised her Possession to the extent of £85,000, as against £30,000 granted Papua by the Commonwealth. Another advantage not easily overestimated was the greater freedom of action possessed by the German governor.

The exports from the part of German New Guinea occupied by the Australians, in 1913 amounted to £402,013, against £123,140 for Papua, while the export of copra from the two possessions compared as fifteen to one.

To account for this difference we must, of course, look further afield than to subsidies—we must seek the explanation in a difference of policy. The causes for German New Guinea leaving Papua behind are several—Germany encouraged tropical agriculture, Australia encouraged mining, Germany opened the door for Asiatics, thereby securing cheap skilled labour, plantation overseers, and small traders. And most important of all, Germany fixed native labourers' salary at five shillings a month, while in Papua it was ten—in German New Guinea the term of service was three years, in Papua generally one—and in German New Guinea the planters, by paying a small annual fee to the government were allowed to administer corporal punishment to their labourers. It is questionable if, in the end, it was a wise policy to let the Chinese in; still, the immediate gain is obvious; and as for working the natives to the utmost, it naturally further facilitated economical progress.

In order to induce the natives to recruit, more than for revenue raising purposes, an annual head tax of from five to ten marks—the latter being the usual rule—was, as far as the government arm reached, imposed on each adult not in the employ of a European or of a person with the standing of a European. Where the tax was not forthcoming the natives had to put in two months at roadmaking.

It would appear that the German policy towards the natives could be expressed in the three sentences: Pay them badly; tax them heavily; treat them severely, and that it was one of utter selfishness. We are, however, told that such was not the case, that the government had the welfare of the natives at heart, that the late German governor was more loved by the natives than by the planters and traders, and that they actually got him removed shortly before the war.

Dr. Hahl's ideas were that as this primitive race—much against their own wish and will—had been dragged into the maelstrom of the world's economical life, it must either progress or perish. To a German the first steps towards progress are to work and to obey.

III. STEPS TOWARDS THE MANDATE

1. Royal Commission of 1920

In 1919 the Australian government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the desirability of amalgamating Papua and New Guinea; it reported in 1920. The Chairman, J. H. P. Murray, recommended amalgamation, but the other two members of the Commission, Atlee Hunt and Walter Lucas, disagreed. Hunt and Lucas also made certain suggestions regarding the future relations between the British Solomon Islands and the two Territories.

From: *Interim and Final Reports of Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 29, 1920, pp. 48-50, 73.

Synopsis of Chairman's Report.

1. *Organization of Government.*—Three possible policies: (i) amalgamation; (ii) separate administrations; (iii) intermediate policy of separate Executive and Legislative Councils with one officer to administer the Government.

A.—Policy of amalgamation likely to be the most successful. Advantages of this policy over that of separate administrations:—

- (i) Greater economy of administration than if Territories are kept separate;
- (ii) greater efficiency as the result of a large and well paid service;
- (iii) more certain compliance with the native policy approved by the Treaty of Peace.

Policy of amalgamation facilitated by:—

- (i) the relative geographical position of the Territories;
- (ii) the racial characteristics of the native populations, and the stage of civilization reached by them;
- (iii) similarity of natural products;
- (iv) parity of economic development.

Objections more apparent than real:—

- (a) the size of the amalgamated territory is less than that of many Crown Colonies.
- (b) Effects of previous German occupation create the same difficulties more easily dealt with under amalgamation than by separate administrations; others are difficulties which must be settled by the Commonwealth and not by the local Government.
- (c) A temporary check to development is possible under any policy from the probable increase of wages and change in system of recruiting, but not more probable under policy of amalgamation than under any other. Inclusion of British Solomons creates no difficulty.

Synopsis of Majority Report

A separate Government for the Mandated Territory is recommended because—

Although the Territories of Papua and late German New Guinea have much in common, there are wide divergencies.

The systems of law are different.

If German residents remain there will be constant hostility, and they will require special supervision.

If German residents are repatriated the task of replacing them is one of special difficulty.

There may be difficulties in regard to the Chinese and Japanese now there.

Unusual care is needed regarding German missionaries, who number over 200 and have much influence over natives.

If they remain they may form a centre of German influence, and may create unpleasantness in our relations to the League of Nations.

German traders and planters are also a possible source of danger.

The Papuan Government have sufficient occupation in their present Territory.

The Papuan Legislative Council could not legislate effectively for the new Territory.

Port Moresby is not suitable as a capital, while Rabaul is.

The Mandated Territory is further advanced in development than Papua.

If the Territories are combined it would not be practicable to present an adequate report concerning the Mandated Territory to the League of Nations as required by the Peace Treaty.

The Chairman's fears that transfer of the Mandated Territory will be followed by a decline of prosperity demand the closest supervision to prevent such decline.

The British Solomons can be best dealt with if their transfer to the Commonwealth takes place, by a system of separate Governments.

THE RELATIONS OF THE MANDATED TERRITORY WITH PAPUA AND THE BRITISH SOLOMONS.

Should it be decided to transfer the control of the British Solomon Islands to the Commonwealth, your Commissioners recommend that a separate Government be retained for that group also. In their opinion the concentration of energies made possible by having Governments with only a moderate area to rule over will lead to much greater efficiency, especially in regard to the supervision of native interests, than combining all areas under one central Government, which could only tend to hamper that direct supervision by the Commonwealth over local administrations which your Commissioners regard as so desirable.

Your Commissioners express no opinion as to the desirableness of effecting such transfer. They are aware that some time ago a number of white planters in the British Solomons forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a petition against the annexation of the group to Australia, and requesting that no change in their status should be effected without their consent. Your Commissioners believe that the petition was based on a misapprehension of facts and conditions, and suggest that, if the transfer is considered, steps be taken to acquaint the residents of the group with the precise situation in which they would be placed as regards the Commonwealth and the other Territories of the Commonwealth.

If the transfer is effected the British Solomons would easily and naturally find their place in the relations between the Commonwealth and the Territories of Papua and the Mandated Territory, a brief outline of which is now submitted.

It has been admitted by your Commissioners that Papua and the Mandated Territory have so much in common that it is desirable that the laws and regulations of Government should be brought into conformity as far as possible. In order that this should be effected they suggest that a system of annual conferences between representatives of both Territories and the Commonwealth Government should be established. It is at present the practice for the Lieutenant-Governor of Papua to visit Australia each year to confer with the Minister. He brings with him his Official Secretary, and sometimes

also one of his principal heads of Departments. If the visits of the Administrators of both Territories were to be made at the same time, and the Territory delegation were enlarged, to comprise one or more official and one or more unofficial members of the respective Legislative Councils, a full conference could be held, under the Secretary of the Minister, at which the legislative programme for each Territory for the coming years could be exhaustively considered, and arrangements made to obviate the divergencies possible under independent action. It would be much easier to prevent such divergencies, as could be done under the scheme proposed, than to correct them after they had found positive expression, in the form of ordinances.

There is another matter in connexion with which the closest co-operation between the two, or, if the British Solomons come in, the three Territories is desirable. Your Commissioners recognise the advantages offered by a large Public Service over two or three smaller ones, especially in the way of the inducements offered to young men to take up the tropical Public Service as a life career. They recommend, therefore, that the salaries of the officials in the various Territories should be made similar for similar work, and that the services be treated as a whole, not so far as immediate control is concerned, but so that members of each shall be eligible for transfer or promotion to higher posts in the other. In their opinion a scheme on these lines could be worked out which would give the inducement of a wider field for promotion, and, by the frequent interchange of officers, would tend to promote uniformity in the spirit and methods of administration.

(sgd.) ATLEE HUNT.

(sgd.) WALTER H. LUCAS.

2. League of Nations Covenant

The League of Nations was part and parcel of the 1919 peace settlement. The Covenant of the League proclaimed that the government of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves was the "sacred trust" of civilised nations. The doctrine, however, was not applied to the colonies of the former allies but only to the territories of the former Central Powers. Three kinds of mandates were established. Former Turkish possessions became "A" Mandates and were to be prepared for independence in the near future. "B" Mandates (German African colonies except South-West Africa) were to be treated as normal colonies, subject to certain moral, economic and political

obligations on the part of the mandatory powers; "C" Mandates (Pacific Islands and South-West Africa) differed in that no political or economic restrictions were attached to them.

From: *Interim and Final Reports of Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 29, 1920, p. 77.

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effects to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the Stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.
6. There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of

the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

3. The Mandate

The mandate to administer New Guinea was conferred on Australia on 17 December 1920.

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, from September 1914 to 30th June 1921*, p. 65.

Whereas, by Article 119 of the treaty of peace with Germany signed at Versailles on 28th June, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German New Guinea and the group of islands in the Pacific Ocean lying south of the Equator other than German Samoa and Nauru; and

Whereas, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that, in accordance with Article 22, Part I. (Covenant of the League of Nations), of the said treaty, a mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to administer New Guinea and the said islands, and have proposed that the mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and

Whereas, His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has agreed to accept a mandate in respect of the said territory and has undertaken to

exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and

Whereas, by the aforementioned Article 22, paragraph S, it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

Article 1.—The territory over which a mandate is conferred upon His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprises the former Germany colony of New Guinea and the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying south of the equator other than the islands of the Samoan group and the island of Nauru.

Article 2.—The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present mandate as an integral portion of the Commonwealth of Australia and may apply the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.

The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present mandate.

Article 3.—The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labour is permitted except for essential public works and services and then only for adequate remuneration.

The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on 10th September, 1919, or in any convention amending the same.

The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

Article 4.—The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortification erected in the territory.

Article 5.—Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

Article 6.—The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Article 7.—The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers signatories of the treaty of peace with Germany.

Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920.

CHAPTER SIX

THE MANDATED TERRITORY

I. PLANTATIONS AND GOLD

Civilian rule was restored in May 1921 when the New Guinea Act, passed in the previous year, came into force. The system of government conferred upon the Territory by this legislation differed from that of Papua in several ways. The chief executive of the territory was called the Administrator, and there were no Legislative or Executive Councils until 1933 (an Advisory Council resembling the old German Government Council was established in 1926). Although New Guinea was a Mandated Territory, Australia had virtually a free hand: its only obligation was to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory".

1. Outstation Life

Marnie Bassett, néé Masson, arrived in the Mandated Territory a week or so after the ending of the military administration, in May 1921, and stayed for three months. She wrote a number of letters to her parents, Professor and Mrs. Orme Masson.

From: M. Bassett, *Letters from New Guinea 1921*, Melbourne, 1969, pp. 76-9.

We got to Namatanai about 24 hours after leaving Kavieng, and the first part of this letter was written as we were on our way there,

through the ridiculously calm seas we have so far always had. Namatanai isn't a town or even a village, remember, it is just an administrative station. It lies inside the reef, at the base of a shallow curve, and consists of the D.O.'s house and one or two others lying on the hill above. We anchored outside the reef, and the police boat came out with Captain Smith. It is somehow quite thrilling when you come to one of these out-stations from the sea, apparently just a landing place and a clearing and a Union Jack and little more, and you watch a white-clad figure appear from somewhere near the flag and realise that he is the controlling power in that region; that the other white men and the hundreds of natives and the Chinese, all of them hidden away among the hills, look to him for help and advice and protection, punishment and reward. What a grand life it is for a man to lead. Well, Captain Smith came aboard and we went back with him in the police boat. He said he had 'a perfectly good bungalow' which he had had scrubbed out for us, and we accepted his invitation to stay with joy. He asked Mrs. Schultz too, but she wouldn't come, he wasn't sure why. I think it was simply that being stout she was afraid of the steep climb.

From the grass-covered landing stage you pass straight into a green tunnel of mango-trees leading away from the beach, and at its end you climb up through red and yellow croton bushes to the House Kiap. Captain Smith has relieved Captain Townsend, who was to come on with us in the *Madang*, and who has been two years there. . . He is a shy man, and looks at the ceiling or shuts his eyes when he does say anything; but he is interesting and I believe a very good man. Namatanai has had a series of good D.O.'s and is in good running order; Kavieng has suffered through weak administration, and everyone is very unhappy and unsettled in consequence. Captain Smith is rejoicing at his luck in taking over Namatanai, and he seems the kind that will carry on along good firm lines. We sat and chatted on the verandah till nearly dark, looking out across the bay to the peaked outline of the island of Lihir in the distance; and then Captain Smith took us along hibiscus bordered paths to our own 'perfectly good bungalow'. Perfectly lovely would have been a better description; for the view was a feast, especially when the stars and the moon were shining behind the leaning cocoanuts grouped between us and the sea. These bungalows have just the necessary furniture and no more, and the breeze blows through from side to side. The verandah and the shower bath are really the most important parts of any tropical home. We dined on the D.O.'s verandah, Mr. Gray making a fifth. There was a glass jar of hibiscus and other lovely flowers on the table, and all round it a tracery of a fern-like croton with the heads of

orange cosmos in amongst it. A paw-paw tree growing against the verandah was lit by our lamps to a pale clear-cut green against the deep night-sky, and from below there drifted up the scent of frangipani. After dinner the inevitable gramophone was set going with some excruciating records, but soon the repertory was finished and we just talked. It was hard, when we went to bed, to tear ourselves away from our own verandah and the moon. We slept like tops, and got into riding kit for breakfast at eight. Before setting off, however, we went round the station with Captain Smith. First, we looked at 'Calaboose', a log stockade about twelve feet high, with a sleeping-hut and a cooking shelter and a special 'refractory ward'. Namatanai calaboose is not the genial holiday place that many other calaboooses seem to be, nor as pleasant a spot as Fanny Bay prison in Darwin, for the prisoners have really to work. There is a saw mill nearby in charge of a Chinese carpenter, and all the timber used on the station is prepared by the calaboose boys. Then we looked in at the Police hut—a clean-swept simple arrangement of roof, walls, and plank sleeping platforms; and passed the sak-sak married quarters to look at a big field of sweet potatoes. The station grows all its own native food. The native hospital is some distance off, in charge of a lik lik doctor, and we didn't see it. Then we started off for a ride. Captain Smith couldn't come as he had work to do, but he sent a boy with us to put us on the road. We are very well looked after everywhere we go, and Captain Smith was extra-ordinarily kind and careful. The last thing I saw the night before, as I looked from a window in our bungalow, was the white cap of a police boy on guard outside with his rifle, head bent. I felt as if I were dead and in Westminster Abbey.

2. Expropriation of German Property

According to article 120 of the Treaty of Versailles, all movable and immovable property belonging to the German Empire was transferred to the Australian Government. Article 297 of the treaty granted Australia the power to "retain and liquidate the property rights and interests" of German nationals and companies. German plantation owners were deported to their homeland and compensated by the German Government in German currency.

From: G. W. L. Townsend, *District Officer*, Sydney, 1968, pp. 27-8.

Early in my time there I got to know a young couple from Kavieng. Their story was typical. Some years before the outbreak of war in 1914 he had been a tutor on a large cattle-station in Queensland

while she was governess on an adjoining property. They decided to marry and to take advantage of the offer made at the time by the German Government in New Guinea to provide land for new settlers. They planted up a coconut estate on New Ireland and, in the course of time, two children were born to them.

When war broke out and Australian troops occupied New Guinea, they were allowed to remain on their plantation but they sent their two girls to school in Australia. When I got to know them they and the small girls were living in a shed behind a Chinese store, a shed formerly occupied by the storekeeper's two native servants. They, and the Chinese family and the natives, washed under a tank tap in the yard and used a common latrine.

The "Board" referred to below is the Expropriation Board, set up in 1920, whose duty it was to manage the ex-German plantation interests and eventually to dispose of them by tender.

One day I saw them at one of the auction sales which the Board regularly held to dispose of the private effects of those German nationals who had been expropriated. Some of their household things were being sold and while she sat on a box by the wall, he stood in front of the auctioneer holding three one-pound notes in one hand, nervously wiping the sweat from his face with the other. I asked her what they wanted to buy, not knowing that their own possessions were being sold but aware that they saved what few shillings they could from their daily allowance for extras for the children.

Her face contorted with emotion but she kept the tears back. "Just a silver brush and comb", she told me, "I can do without them, I suppose, but they are what my husband bought me for a wedding present, and I have nothing else he has given me, except my wedding ring."

This, I thought to myself, is not expropriation, this is looting. I quickly passed the word around and, when the husband made his initial bid of five shillings for brush, comb and mirror, there was no advance from anybody. I made an appearance at only one more sale, but the faces of the German men and women there, sad and desperate, drove me away.

Their property had been valued in marks by the Australian authorities, but by the time Germany paid them, the mark was worthless. The husband and wife I mention here finally received the equivalent of £21 Australian for their nine years work in bringing a plantation into bearing—a plantation we valued at the time, in Australian money, at £17,000.

The failure of the mark was a German affair, but the method of expropriation in New Guinea was ours, unjust and hate-breeding.

3. Criticism of the Expropriation Board

In 1924 Colonel Ainsworth, a former Chief Native Commissioner in Kenya, was asked to report on the administration of the Mandated Territory. He recommended, inter alia, a quick disposal of the expropriated properties. Most of them were offered for sale between 1925 and 1927.

From: *Report by Colonel John Ainsworth, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 109, 1924, p. 42.*

Notwithstanding the very excellent management of the expropriated properties, and the fact that very considerable difficulties have been surmounted in order to arrive at the present position, it is my definite opinion that the continued existence of the Expropriation Board in its present capacity is undoubtedly acting as a severe handicap to commercial prosperity in the Territory, in that no new private enterprise of any importance can be expected to establish itself while the present conditions continue. It is practically a Government concern, which, however, appears to have an existence apart from the Central Administration of the Territory. The result is a sort of *imperium in imperio*. Apart from this, however, the existence of the board as a widely spread Government trading organization, with a very large demand for native labour, tends undoubtedly to curtail to a large extent any healthy form of commercial enterprise, and, as the policy is to maintain, and not extend plantations, the result is that the existing and potential agricultural wealth of the Territory is not being beneficially exploited. Look at it from any possible point of view, business arrangements of this kind are best run by private persons. The business of the Government is to govern, and not run plantations.

With the plantations in the hands of private owners, the material wealth of the Territory will increase in a wonderful manner, and so result in renewed and increased prosperity. The sooner, therefore, the change comes about the better.

The sale of the expropriated properties to private owners did not increase the wealth of the territory in the "wonderful manner" Colonel Ainsworth had hoped for. Most of the new owners were returned soldiers whose only experience of planting was gained as

Expropriation Board overseers of the old German estates. Following a drop in copra prices after 1926 most of the properties ended up in the hands of the large companies who helped to finance their purchase.

4. Discovery of Gold

The economy of the Mandated Territory was largely based on gold. The Germans had done some prospecting but were unsuccessful: the logical place to look for gold was on the upper Waria, next to the Yodda Goldfield in Papua, but the rich deposits were in fact on the other side of the watershed, in the valleys of the rivers which flow into the Markham. The discovery ended the Territory's dependence on copra as its sole export earner.

From: O. Ruhen, *Mountains in the Clouds*, Adelaide, 1963, pp. 137-9.

But it is probable that the more ambitious of them prospected German territory in defiance of regulations; and that the big strikes of later years were made in the light of prospecting knowledge illegally gained during this waiting period. In 1922, Shark-Eye Park and a mate named Nettleton uncovered the gold in the Bulolo Valley, and a new era in New Guinea development began. Park, a lone wanderer, had made his strike in a huge valley which was called by natives Pealolo. He was out of funds, and took Jack Nettleton as partner in order to finance an expedition. They went back and, outside the protection of mining laws, began to accumulate quantities of gold.

At this time, Cecil James Levien was District Officer for Morobe; in view of subsequent events it seems more than likely that he had gone to some trouble to secure the post. He knew that Park was interested in the district; he knew of a pre-war association between Park and a man named Darling who had found a great deal of gold somewhere near the headwaters of the Watut; and he made it his business to locate the area in which Park was working. He had ample opportunity to do so while carrying out regular and exploratory patrols, and he eventually came across Park and Nettleton in camp.

Mining regulations had not then been issued, and it was Levien's duty to confiscate the gold which Park and Nettleton had won; but from his actions it seems he was in possession of the information that regulations had been gazetted permitting the working of claims after April 1923, a date four months ahead. Levien did nothing. He also

left two other miners, Dover and Mason, on the field. A mining warden arrived at Morobe, and on the first day he issued five licences—the first to C. J. Levien, the remaining four to Park, Nettleton, Dover, and Mason. Levien, however, as a magistrate, could not exercise his miner's right to establish a working claim.

Mining became legally permissible after April, but by that time the original miners, possibly excepting Levien, had stored quantities of gold. Levien then applied for dredging and sluicing leases which, being larger than the forty feet by forty feet permitted in an alluvial claim, are usually allotted only on low-grade ground. The leases were issued, in the names of Nettleton and Park, and one was later transferred to Levien's name. But before that, towards the end of the year, he had resigned from his official positions.

His machinations had the effect of putting the rich gold into a few hands, and of preventing the fields from being packed with small men with small stakes. Thus he laid the foundation of large-company investment in gold in the area.

The rush to Bulolo did not begin until two years later, in 1926, by which time there were twelve to twenty men well established. Levien formed the Guinea Gold company, with holdings which practically controlled the Bulolo area. However, in the meantime an even richer strike had been made at Edie Creek, higher up the river. Administrator E. A. Wisdom, conceiving his first duty to be to the natives, had declared the area uncontrolled, which had the effect of enabling him to keep "undesirable" persons out; and he included in this category men who were without money or who were poorly equipped.

Long before the rush started, Levien and his company had gained control of more than four thousand acres of proved gold-bearing ground from which newcomers were excluded, an area many thousands of times that to which shareholders would ordinarily have been entitled.

5. Early Days on the Bulolo Goldfield

Mrs. Doris Booth arrived at the Bulolo goldfield with her husband in 1924. A trained nurse, she converted a boihaus into a native hospital and nursed sick miners in her own home. The drugs and dressings were supplied by the administration.

From: D. R. Booth, *Mountains, Gold and Cannibals*, London, 1929, pp. 144-6.

On several occasions I heard that there were boys ill on the road, and I sent my boys out with stretchers to pick up the sufferers. These were all cases of dysentery. The stretchers were made of copra sacks, placed on saplings, and they served as well as any issued to the A.M.C.

On numerous occasions my stretcher-bearers would bring in boys whom they found on the road—boys belonging to the various masters; also “free” Kanakas. All these would be admitted to hospital. On making my entries for these boys, I was struck by the fact that I was obliged to enter the name of the master to whom the boy belonged, rather than the name of the boy himself. That was the easiest way to identify a boy—ask him the name of his master. Quite a lot of “free” Kanakas found their way into my Bulolo Hospital.

I would enter particulars concerning the boys, and at the first opportunity send a note to their masters. There were carriers going to and from the field all the time now. In some cases the boys did not know their masters’ names, and in these cases where I did not know to whom the boys belonged, I would notify the Government official on the field with as many particulars of the boys as could be gathered from them. As soon as the boys were well enough to travel, I would pack them off to their masters, saying they had been in hospital for a period. In that way their masters would know that they had been ill, and not loitering on the road in to them.

As each boy was admitted, I would take all his “particulars,” and enter his condition, treatment, diet, etc., opposite his “name.” Frequently I would make these little notes in shorthand—if only to keep up my practice, as I had taken a business course in a commercial college before starting nursing. . . .

Reliable orderlies were hard to find for the Bulolo Hospital.

One day I was busy preparing a brandy-and-egg flip for a boy who was very ill with pneumonia and dysentery, and I told my assistant to give it to the patient, and to hold him up while he took it, for the boy was very weak.

I went on mixing medicines for the rest of the boys, and I happened to look up, to see my fickle assistant drinking the brandy-and-egg flip himself! Of course I demanded an explanation, and it was forthcoming immediately, and with no sense of delinquency on the part of the offender. His simple excuse was that it was no good wasting good “kai kai” on a boy who was going to die! Pity was unknown amongst these savages, and I found it very very hard to get them to help one another. A quiet study of the natives often helped to pass a weary day. Never did they fail to produce some new trait to puzzle or entertain a lonely white woman.

6. Dredges by Air Freight

By about 1930 most of the alluvial miners had been bought out by large dredging companies, of which the most important were Bulolo Gold Dredging and New Guinea Goldfields. The machinery required for large scale operations was flown in by specially designed planes, and air transport eventually became the sole source of supply for the goldfields population of some 700 Europeans and about 6,000 labourers.

From: A. M. Healy, *Bulolo*, New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 15, 1967, pp. 44-5.

Bringing Bulolo to production was a complex operation, for equipment had to be ordered from Australia, Europe, and the United States; simultaneously, a power supply had to be arranged, transport coordinated, further leases secured, and more prospecting and testing carried out.

The first two dredges designed for Bulolo were tailored to the conditions as they were then known: that is, a digging depth of twenty-eight feet and a length of life as given in the prospectus, though they were eventually to operate long beyond this. Each weighed well over 1,000 tons.

Sectionalising of the parts was an extension of normal practice, for dredges were usually located in difficult terrain with inadequate communications. But at Bulolo the dredges had to be sectionalised to such an extent that key parts were affected. The upper tumbler shaft, which provided the main drive for the bucket line and the means of tipping the full buckets, was normally cast in one piece weighing seven to nine tons. For Bulolo, shaft sections, the hexagonal centre piece, and side plates were made separately, and fitted together on the field. The ten-foot final drive, too, was cut into two pieces and welded together after transportation. As the power was applied through a belt system from a single motor, the whole of the strain was taken by this drive unit; it was therefore most important that field assembly be performed with meticulous care. A fully equipped workshop, the best in New Guinea during the 1930s, was made ready at Bulolo, with depots at the assembly sites.

Before the parts were shipped, BGD had ordered the Junkers G-31 aircraft to be tested in Germany. Their performance exceeded all expectations. With a full load, equivalent to an all-up weight of 19,000 pounds, the machine could climb at the rate of 200 feet per minute, at an altitude of 3,000 feet and on only two engines.

Reserves of power and range were carefully examined, for the

success of the Bulolo venture depended on them. They represented insurance against loss of life, time, and key pieces of machinery; and the margins insisted on were so great that no undue risk was involved.

The first G-31 went into service in April 1931, and the second in May. During May, 150 short tons of freight were carried without incident. This fell short of the 200 tons estimated as necessary to keep up with the construction program, but the radio-telephone link between Lae and Bulolo giving advance weather information was not in operation until June. By November the two G-31s were lifting over 300 short tons a month, and had already carried an upper tumbler shaft.

Rail cranes loaded and unloaded the aircraft at Lae and Bulolo. At Bulolo, unloading generally took little more than ten or fifteen minutes. In mid-1931 a record six round trips in a day were completed by Grabowsky, but four trips a day were common.

Although the transport of materials did not reach its peak until November 1931, the pace of dredge and power house construction was maintained. Plans drawn up in mid-1930 provided for the delivery at Bulolo of 2,400 tons of machinery, field fabrication, and the beginning of operations within fifteen months. This schedule was completed on time, nothing was lost in transit, and on the one occasion of engine failure the aircraft completed the flight on its remaining two engines.

II. LABOUR AND THE RABAUL STRIKE

1. Labour Conditions During the 1920s

Labour policy was laid down by the 1922 Native Labour Ordinance which tried to eliminate the evils normally associated with wage labour in a tropical colony. This extract examines the working of these regulations in practice.

From: F. W. Eggleston, ed., *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea*, Melbourne, 1928, pp. 77-9.

The Germans had left a draft-regulation, which the Australians embodied in their text of July, 1915, the main difference being that flogging was gradually checked, until it was totally abolished in May, 1919 (though missionary bodies have since urged its re-introduction!). The new code prevented assaults on labourers, left the employer the right to imprison or fine recalcitrant "boys," and provided for a working week of sixty hours. Just before the establishment of civil government in May, 1921, came a new and very elaborate "Native Labour Consolidation Ordinance," but its very elaborateness showed the impossibility of checking the human factors which led to abuse, especially when many of the recruiters were unscrupulous Chinese and the labourers uncivilised bush natives, who perhaps had never seen a European. Despite this difficulty, the new civil government abolished all forced labour and tried to prevent the perennial abuses of recruiting; but it was uphill work.

The evils remained obvious to him who would read, especially if he were sufficiently an anthropologist to analyse the effects on native culture. The number of indentured labourers rose from 17,500 in 1914 to 31,000 in 1921 and 23,569 in 1926. These men are indentured for a period of years, mostly from Aitape, Madang and Kieta, but most work in divisions other than those from which they are recruited, most being concentrated in Rabaul and Kawieng. They receive as little as 5/- a month, though, over the ranges in Papua, 10/- is paid, and even more in the Solomons! Though officials are sent round periodically, it is impossible to prevent abuse, either in recruiting, employment or in terminating contracts. Nor is the system

any more desirable from an economic standpoint. Most natives will not engage for more than twelve months, they take two months to break in for plantation work, and then frequently desert. A few figures tell the whole story. In one year 22 Europeans and 91 Asiatics were tried for breaches of the Native Labour Ordinance; 525 natives out of 23,569 died in one year, though they were naturally the pick of the villages and young men in their prime; the death rate in previous years (1921-6) had been respectively 2.9, 2.097, 1.8, 3.1 and 2.2 per cent; there were 1007 deserters in a single year, of whom 545 got away clear; 331 native women were employed on plantation work (as apart from domestic duties); and, as for the social aspects, the less said the better. The fact that labourers must go to other divisions tells the whole story of social disruption in itself; it has been clearly proved that indenture breaks up native life and causes the spread of loathsome diseases into districts untouched by Europeans, and more than a third of the criminal cases in the Territory are by "boys" for sexual offences, even to interfering with dead female bodies. Indenture—what Murray called a necessary evil that one doesn't like to speak about—is thus a social menace and not even a cheap means of production from a strictly utilitarian point of view. It serves the best ends of neither the natives nor the planters, but it must linger on, so long as the Administration thinks in the "plantation-fodder" stage. Despite the uncertainty of supply and the defects of quality, it is the only alternative to stagnation—unless Asiatic labour is imported, and this is a course of action that will not be dispassionately considered. So that the situation continues, with its inherent evils, and the Government looks only to the practically virgin recruiting fields of the Upper Sepik and the Markham.

2. The Canning Inquiry

In 1923 a number of articles appeared in the Australian press accusing the government of using forced labour, either without pay or at rates less than those prescribed in the Native Labour Ordinance. This extract is from the report by A. S. Canning, who was appointed by the Commonwealth government to investigate the accusations.

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Annual Report*, 1922-23, pp. 117-9.

At Alexishafen, New Guinea, I interviewed Father Andros Puff (German), Administrator of Prefecture, Roman Catholic Mission of New Guinea, which embraces the Eastern New Guinea Mission and

the Central New Guinea Mission.

The mission has about 1,700 acres of plantations, employing 5,600 natives—all indentured—and conducts schools, churches etc., with 7,000 adherents, and a further 1,000 in Central New Guinea.

He expressed the opinion that the natives are very intelligent, and know too much of the protection afforded them by the British Administration. This witness says, he has never heard of a case of forced labour, and, while applauding the District Officers for the way they carry out their duties, he deprecated the frequent changing of District Officers, Police Masters, and Patrol Officers, the varying instructions or orders having a tendency to confuse the natives.

Father Charles Borchard (German) stated he had been ten years in the Territory, and three years in charge of the Catholic Mission at Manus, in the Admiralty Group.

Q. You know something about the native character. What sort of intelligence has the Manus native?

A. He is very intelligent, and most of them talk well.

Q. Do they understand what they are doing when making a contract?

A. Yes. They know how to enter into a contract just as they did in the German time; they are practically under the same conditions in that respect.

Q. Have you heard of any instances where natives have been compelled to work against their will for the Government?

A. No.

Q. How are the natives for truthfulness?

A. You can't put too much reliance on what they tell you; they are not trustworthy.

Q. Are they capable of framing a charge against a white man?

A. The natives here are very intelligent and up to all the tricks.

Q. You have heard of no complaints re their being forced to work for the Government?

A. No: never. All the Government Officials pay periodical visits to the natives and ask for complaints. I have heard of none. The boys all know they can go to the kiap with their complaints.

Father August Becker (German) stated he was Dean of the Roman Catholic Mission at Eitape, New Guinea, with ten or twelve Mission Stations to look after, and five other Fathers assisting.

He stated he knew of no forced labour except with regard to carriers carrying baggage from village to village. He said they carried the baggage for nearly every one. They are accustomed to do it, but not voluntarily.

Q. Do the natives get paid for their labour?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they quite willing to work for pay?

A. Yes.

Q. They are not compelled to work?

A. No; they are willing to do the work so long as they are paid.

The Father said he did not know of a case, and he would have done so if the natives had been compelled to work without pay. The baggage was usually carried for the Police Master when on patrol, and the pay therefore was 6d. a day and food. The native said he carried the baggage too often and did not like it. He also stated it was the custom when a master comes to a place that his baggage must be carried to the next village. Planters and recruiters do the same when they come along. They place their luggage in the village and the natives carry it to the next village when required. They do this to get rid of them as quickly as possible, and they only growl. They want to get rid of the people, and do it to save trouble.

Father Henry Meyer (German) is Missionary Father at the Ulong Mission Station in the Eitape District. This church has many adherents.

The only complaints he has heard of arise from carrying the patrol boxes from one village to another, for which they are paid, and which they had to do in the German time.

Mr. Cardew, the Commissioner of Native Affairs, informed me whilst this witness was making his statement that under the new Regulations the natives have to carry patrol boxes and other luggage for officers of the Government who are on patrol in the bush.

Although I have not verified this statement, it seems very reasonable that it should be so. Moreover, the evidence of all the witnesses on this point does not disclose a case where a native has refused and been compelled to do this work. Apparently he does not care for doing it, but is satisfied to carry out the work for the remuneration and indulges in a grumble.

Father William Ricken (German) stated he was Missionary in charge of the Roman Catholic Mission at Monumbo, Potsdamhafen for twelve years. He said he knew the natives well, and had to use four different languages. In his opinion, the natives are fully aware of the protection afforded them by the law and their immunity from assault and the remedy at hand. The witness says—"Some boys are very good and some boys are rather bad. In my opinion, we should make the Government a little stronger; at present it is a little weak. We must expect a rebellion if they keep going on this way. The

Government is too mild. Germans made big trouble in the villages supposing boys did not work. If the natives gave trouble in the German time the Germans used a stick. I have often heard from the boys they have no respect for the kiap or the Government!

"The Germans were stronger with the natives.

"The natives are children . . ."

"No one can be forced to work. For instance, when a native says 'me no like,' he cannot be made to work. He is a free kanaka.' The native chiefs can say to the boys—'You are free kanakas,' and there is no law which allows them to be 'pulled' and made to work against their will. They are recruiting plenty of boys for plantations. Not necessary nowadays to recruit boys in this district, as they come to you to be signed on, conditions being very good. It may be the boy's people force him to work, but the 'kiap' will not allow any forced labour. It does not matter whether the luluai or tul tul asks him to go to work, he can exercise his own will. The natives thoroughly understand this. The usual procedure in recruiting is for the luluai, tul tuls, and natives to have a 'talk-talk' (conversation), and the luluai says: 'Master he got plantation, he like some boy go work along him.' He says to the boy: 'You think you can go?' Suppose boy like he goes. Suppose he does not like he does not go." Under this Administration forced labour is forbidden. Villages are visited periodically by the 'kiap'. . . .

My conclusion, therefore, is, in regard to this portion of the Mandated Territory, with the exception of the Baining and Solomon Island districts that the evidence, both weight and quality, is overwhelming that forced labour, Government or otherwise, is not practised or tolerated. With the rigid regulations and strict supervision of the officers, who, on the whole, I am satisfied carry out their multifarious duties with fidelity, it is practically impossible for such a condition to exist.

3. The Rabaul Strike: A European View

The first "strike" in the history of Papua and New Guinea occurred at Rabaul, where the largest concentration of native labour outside the goldfields could be found. During the night of 2 January 1929 practically all of the 3,000 labourers in and around Rabaul, including 200 of the 217 police stationed there, assembled at the Roman Catholic and Methodist missions outside Rabaul, and refused to go to work next day. The European reaction clearly illustrated tensions within the community and attitudes towards the labourers.

From: *Rabaul Times*, 4 January 1929.

Mutiny
Rabaul Native Laborers on Strike
Position very Grave
Citizens Demand Suspension of Officials.

A thing which has been half-expected by older residents took place on Wednesday night, when the whole of the native laborers, contract and otherwise, in Rabaul, mutinied and ran away to the Methodist and Roman Catholic Missions at Malaguna. They were joined by most of the Native Police, and at present the situation is a very grave one.

Who is responsible for this mutiny has not yet been definitely ascertained, although rumor is busy. One thing is evident, and that is that the mutiny has been carefully planned for some time. On Tuesday last certain boys came to this office with a story to the effect that all the boys belonging to the Melanesian Co. were going to refuse duty on Thursday, until the company promised to pay them a minimum wage of £1 per month. The whole story seemed so improbable that no notice was taken of it. However, on Wednesday evening the police boys visited every house and ordered all the kanakas, irrespective of "talk", to hold themselves in readiness to run away to the Malaguna Missions at number two bell (9 p.m.). Boys who raised any objection were threatened with violence. Consequently, before midnight, a number of kanakas, estimated at from 3000 to 4000, marched boldly along the deserted streets, and with them went almost every police boy in Rabaul, these gentry first removing their uniform lap-laps and accoutrements. Our highly efficient white police did not see the exodus, and, it is said, knew nothing of it until daylight on Thursday morning. The throat of every white resident could have been cut by that time had the boys intended violence. A remarkable and significant feature of the march was that boys from every district were mingled, forgetting their racial hatreds in their antagonism towards the Europeans.

At Malaguna the Methodist boys invaded the Methodist Mission Station, while the Catholics went further down the road to the Catholic Mission. Discussing the thing next morning, one of the Catholic fathers said:—

"It was an amazing sight. When I was aroused, I saw about 2500 boys walking across the grounds towards the school-house. They were all in a state of great excitement, but seemed to be well controlled by their leaders. I called to one boy, and asked him what had

happened. He told me that all the Rabaul laborers had deserted, and were coming down to the Missions. I then spoke to the leader, and warned him that the boys would be punished by their masters. He replied insolently that, in that case, the boys would resist, and 'the blood of the white men and the kanakas would flow together'. We then learned that a number of deserting police boys were present, which meant that Rabaul must be undefended, so as the natives seemed ripe for any mischief we refrained from sending them back, and allowed them to remain about the Mission Station for the remainder of the night. In my many years' experience of the natives I had seen nothing like this gathering."

Early next morning word was sent to Rabaul, which had already become alarmed. Col. Walstab, the A/Government Secretary, with Inspector Ball, of the Town Police, and Mr. McDonald, the A/District Officer, as well as a few remaining police boys, proceeded to the Mission, and in a very pacific manner asked the natives to come home again. One story going round the town which we have been unable to verify, is that even the mutinous police-boys were asked to resume duty, in which case all would be forgiven and forgotten. We can hardly credit this story, which is probably rumor. The boys finally did decide to return, and swaggered off up the road in an extremely arrogant manner. Mr. Inspector Ball then visited the various employers of labor, and warned them that they must in no way punish their kanakas for running away. . . .

Nearly every boy in Rabaul went out either of his own free will or under compulsion by the police mutineers. A remarkable fact is that no one seems to know who organised the business. Who ever did the organising did it exceptionally well. The Missions, particularly the Methodist Mission, are among the suspects, and strong language regarding this was used at the emergency meeting of citizens called at the Picture Hall, at 10.30 yesterday morning. There were upwards of 100 people present, Mr. H. B. Perriman taking the chair.

We regret that the report of this meeting, and one held later in the afternoon, has had to be greatly condensed. In common with most of Rabaul employers, our printer boys are still absent, despite the fact that they are the highest paid native labor in the Territory. However, we shall endeavor to give the salient points of the two meetings.

Mr. Perriman said that although a great deal of feeling had been aroused against the head of the Methodist Mission, it would be unwise to take any hasty steps until definite proof had been obtained.

Mr. C. I. H. Campbell, who acted as Secretary, agreed that while some speedy and definite action must be taken by the white population, they must first be sure that what they were doing was right, and

avoid being too hasty. He urged that a committee be appointed to confer with the authorities.

Mr. C. H. Hughes pointed out that police were amongst the leaders in the mutiny. He urged that they should not again be allowed to handle firearms.

Mr. Luxmoore said that the boys at the Rabaul Hotel had, in many cases, been forced by police boys to accompany the others. He also stressed the need for immediate action, and asked, "Have we confidence in our Administration?" to which the meeting shouted "NO!" in chorus.

The Chairman then moved that a committee be appointed to wait on the Acting Administrator, and to put before him resolutions passed by the meeting. . .

The following gentlemen were nominated:—Messrs. Palmer, Smith, Ding, Greenwood, Perriman, Forsyth, Harrison, and the Secretary. Nominations were then closed. . .

The Committee then waited upon the Acting Administrator, accompanied by Mr. Margetts, who had been intercepted as he was leaving Headquarters.

The Acting Administrator (Mr. Justice Phillips) stated that the Administration officials were doing everything in their power to get to the bottom of the matter, and find out the cause of the trouble, and who were the instigators. He stated that as soon as the trouble was discovered the police were on the job, and saw that all arms and ammunition were safely locked up under white guard. It was not a fact that the native prisoners had escaped or been liberated by the Native Police. All were on parade in the morning. He regretted, however, that all the Native Police appeared to be actually concerned in the trouble, except the reserve squad.

A Voice: "He's the one with the pink ears!" (Laughter.) . . .

The Acting Administrator said he thought it advisable to avoid allowing the natives to think we were too much disturbed, and that the officials were carrying on, and dealing with the matter, and endeavoring to find the culprits, and that he hoped the people would stand behind the Administration, and not take any hasty action.

Mr. Forsyth asked why natives should go to Mr. Margetts in a matter of this sort, instead of to the Commissioner of Native Affairs.

Mr. Hausen also spoke on this matter, and Mr. Pratt asked if it were true that the Mission held courts and inflicted punishments and fines.

Mr. Margetts denied that he held any court, but that he frequently intervened in native disputes, and endeavored to bring about peaceful settlement.

Mr. Perriman informed the Acting Administrator that his boss boy stated that he was approached by a Melanesian Co. boy, Sumsuma, who told him to come to a meeting at the Methodist Mission to discuss the question of wages with the Missionary. He told him that several boys had already been to see the Missionary, who told them to bring to him those who were dissatisfied.

Mr. Margetts said he knew nothing about that.

His Honor the Acting Administrator said he was arranging to question Mr. ————— and other missionaries on this matter, and that he was also endeavoring to get in touch with Father Madigan and the R.C. missionary at Malaguna.

Mr. Perriman advised the Acting Administrator that he had several boys who would swear that they were pulled out of their beds in the night by the police boys, who told them to go to the Methodist Mission at Malaguna. . .

Mr. Forsyth also spoke very strongly on the conduct of affairs between whites and natives by the Police Department, and that in his opinion, Col. Walstab and Mr. Ball were unfit to continue in their positions.

Mr. Palmer also spoke strongly on this subject, and said that Mr. Forsyth's remarks were the unanimous opinion of the public meeting, and that the Committee had been instructed to put them before His Honor the Acting Administrator.

Mr. Perriman said that it was strongly urged that Sikh or other such natives should be brought in to take the place of the local Native Police, and that action should at once be taken in this direction. The danger at out-stations and outlying plantations, where the natives would probably receive news of this trouble before the owners or overseers was also pointed out, and the Administration was asked to take steps to see that planters and others were warned.

Mr. Palmer pointed out how strongly the public meeting had felt that any missionary should receive and discuss such a matter with indentured boys who had deserted from their masters, and that the meeting had resolved that if Mr. Margetts or any other missionary had been in any way responsible they should be deported.

Mr. Hanson said one boy had said that last night's occurrence was nothing to what could be done with the aid of the Missions.

Mr. Margetts then made a long speech (the notes of which are available), elaborating the Acting Administrator's report of his statement to him. He expressed amazement and regret that the gentlemen present should have believed the statements made against him or been gulled by what the natives had said. He had heard the complaint of the boys, and talked with them, and so dealt with the

matter as he thought for the best. He wished to deny the suggestion that he had held courts, and dealt with matters outside his province . . .

Mr. Geo. Palmer said that he was disgusted with the result of the interview with the Acting Administrator. When 2000 kanakas could congregate without the knowledge of the Government, then that Government was not fit to govern. The committee had gone to the Administrator to lodge complaints, and had instead been forced to listen to a sermon from a Methodist minister on how to treat their black brothers.

A Voice: Did you say Amen. (Laughter.) . . .

Mr. Mulally suggested that every person present should pledge him or herself to deal summarily with the deserters when they were returned.

Mr. Forsyth moved: That this meeting requests the Administration to ascertain from the responsible officials why native troubles have been allowed to be brought to a head in this way. He pointed out that white employers had lately been submitted to petty persecution in regard to their native labor. The motion was seconded and carried.

Mr. Laws said that there could not be the slightest doubt that the Missions had helped the natives in this instance. He moved that the Mission be asked to refrain from interfering in political and domestic matters, and to confine themselves to their religious teachings.

The motion was seconded and carried.

Mr. C. H. Hughes asked who would have control of the special police now being formed.

A Chorus: Ball and Walstab.

Mr. Hughes said that he did not believe in the safety of the town being left in the hands of "those two idiots." (Loud laughter and applause.) He moved: That this meeting records its utter lack of confidence in the present police. The motion was seconded.

Mr. Gilmour moved as an amendment that both Messrs. Walstab and Ball be suspended from duty pending an investigation. (Applause.)

Mr. Hughes then withdrew his motion, and Mr. Gilmour's amendment was put as the motion, and carried unanimously.

Mr. Geogheghan moved that employers be empowered to inflict corporal punishment on their boys. This was seconded and carried.

A short but hectic fight having occurred between a resident and a supporter of the Rev. Margetts, the meeting then adjourned until 1 p.m. today. In the interim the members of the committee will again see the Acting Administrator, and will report to the general meeting.

4. Inquiry into the Strike

A commissioner was appointed to inquire into the origins and causes of the Rabaul strike. The conciliatory tone of his report contrasts sharply with the strict punishment meted out to the strikers. All the police who participated were sentenced summarily to six months' imprisonment and dismissed from the force. Sumsuma and Rami were sentenced to three years. In a report to the League of Nations, the Australian Government said: "The strikers in the case in point had no reason at all for striking . . . A severe sentence therefore upon the agitators would probably prevent future riots."

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Annual Report, 1928-29*, pp. 107-9.

It is clear from the evidence that practically the whole of the natives and native police employed in the Rabaul District attended the meetings at the Mission Stations—there were a few exceptions, but, so far as could be ascertained, very few indeed; included in the exceptions were some nineteen police boys, but these, or at any rate the majority of them, did not remain on duty from any sense of loyalty, but really because they were posted and instructed to remain at their posts by the leaders of the "trouble".

The bedrock of the "trouble" was stated to be "talks" between visiting sailors (said to be American negroes and Samoans). Boys from Samarai (Papua) were also mentioned, but in all probability Samoans were intended. At these talks the visiting sailors were said to have jeered at the New Guinea natives for working for so small a remuneration, and to have suggested to them the advisability of ceasing work until higher rates were paid.

Sumsuma, the native master of a local schooner owned by the Melanesia Company, who seems to be a native of extraordinary intelligence and ability at his job and who is in receipt of pay at the rate of £5 per month together with food, clothing, lodgings and medical attendance, and who had also been granted bonuses for his services to his employees, seems to have brooded over this (it must be remembered that nothing hurts a native more than a jeer or laugh at him—to use his own expression, he feels "greatly shamed") and to have resolved to adopt the advice of the foreigners and organize what may be termed a strike.

As it was not practicable for him to do this unaided, no doubt he talked it over with other "Head" or "boss" boys, and decided to enlist the aid of the police boys, without whom, of course, it would have been quite impossible to do anything. With this in view he

approached the No. 1 Police Boy—Sergeant-Major Rami. Rami thought the idea a good one, and called a meeting of the police boss boys (N.C.O.'s) who similarly agreed. Rami then seems to have taken over the organization of the "strike"; his police training and the assistance of his N.C.O.'s enabled him to do this efficiently.

A meeting of all the "boss" or "head" boys of the District was held, time for ceasing work was arranged, and, although it does not appear in the evidence, no doubt definite and drastic instructions were given that no hint or suggestion of the "strike" was to be given to the white masters.

After ceasing work, and, presumably, having had their evening meal, the labour "boss" boys led their respective gangs to the Mission Stations—the rough rule having been that Protestants went to the Methodist Mission and Catholics to the Catholic Mission, but many of the boys are pagans and it may be assumed that each boy followed his leader, either to the Methodist or Catholic Mission. In the case of the police, as they came off duty they took off their police clothing, carefully put their arms, equipment and kit away, donned their private clothing, and then left for the meeting. Constables first, then the junior N.C.O.'s, and, last of all, the Sergeants-Major; those police boys who were on guard duty remained on duty; and although only a few specific cases were mentioned in evidence, I think it may be assumed that the police boys, when on their way to the Mission Stations, "rounded up" any labour boys who had remained at their jobs.

At the Methodist Mission the boys seem to have been well under control, as all, or nearly all, the police N.C.O.'s attended there, and there seems to have been a higher percentage of labour "boss" boys.

The meetings were peaceable throughout. There was no misconduct or rowdiness of any kind—the men merely squatted or waited about in the roads or in the Mission compounds, and apparently were expecting their white masters to come to them, talk the matter over quietly with them, and that the white masters would then give them more wages, and everyone would be happy.

The Methodist Missionary, the Rev. J. H. Margetts, whose house, as before stated, is at some distance from the road, was not aware that anything unusual had occurred. One of his native assistants came to him about 9 p.m. and said that "not less than ten and not more than twenty" natives were in the compound, and that they were after more wages.

Mr. Margetts passed the information by telephone to the Acting Town Inspector, Mr. Ball, later on receiving instructions that the natives in question should either remain where they were or return

to their quarters—as they desired.

The night was very dark and wet, and neither Mr. Margetts nor Mr. Ball had any idea that any greater number than between ten and twenty were involved.

Before issuing these instructions to Margetts, Mr. Ball consulted his superior officer, Lieut.-Colonel Walstab.

With regard to the natives assembled at the Catholic Mission—this Mission is not on the telephone, and is situated some 3 miles from Rabaul (a mile further on from the Methodist Mission)—no word of the assembly there reached the Administration until the following morning.

It was not until the following morning that it was discovered that all the labourers and servants had left Rabaul.

Telephone communication with Mr. Margetts established the fact that there were about 1,000 natives in the vicinity of his Station, and that he gathered a large number (afterwards stated to be about 2,000) were at the Catholic Mission.

Mr. Margetts acted with great promptitude. He explained to the meeting (as he had done to the representatives of the ten to twenty boys the night before) that having freely entered into a contract to work for a certain amount for a certain time, they were bound to abide by it, and that if they were dissatisfied they should ask for more money before again renewing their contracts—and ordered them to return to their work. They immediately did so, Mr. Margetts accompanying them to ensure that they returned.

On the way, and close to the Mission Station, Mr. Ball met the party, “fell in” the police boys who were with the party, and had them marched in military formation back to their parade ground in Rabaul. Mr. Ball, accompanied by the police ringleader (although not then known to be such)—Sergeant-Major Rami—proceeded to the Catholic Mission. Here he found the matter somewhat different—the men were said to be more or less in an excited state—and to help to calm them the priest in charge had two masses celebrated.

Mr. Ball ordered the boys to return to their work, but possibly owing to the scarcity of “boss” boys amongst those assembled there—but more probably, as stated by the Reverend Father in his evidence, owing to the fact that Mr. Ball made use of Sergeant-Major Rami to convey his instructions and that he (Rami) made signs to the boys not to obey, such signs having been unobserved by Mr. Ball—no notice whatever was taken of the order.

Mr. Ball returned to Rabaul, reported to his superior, Lieut.-Colonel Walstab, who had already sent Mr. Donald, the Assistant District Officer in charge of the Rabaul Sub-District, to assist in

getting the labourers back. Lieut.-Colonel Walstab thereupon collected the few so-called "loyal" police remaining, and after having informed the Acting Administrator of the situation, went out to the Catholic Mission and took control.

Seeing a police boy in the crowd he called him out and ordered him to "fall in". He did so, and after two or three other police boys had been singled out and ordered to "fall in" the trouble was over. A representative of one of the Rabaul Companies employing labour now appeared on the scene. He was easily able to collect his labour, and after the police and his labour moved off nearly the whole of the men remaining also returned to their employers—the balance (or nearly so) drifting back during the afternoon and evening. As the Reverent Father put it—"Hunger was beginning to bite them".

Briefly put, the origin and cause of the meetings were—

- (1) The talk of the foreign colored sailors;
- (2) Sumsuma;
- (3) Sergeant-Major Rami,

without either one of these the meetings would not have occurred.

It was stated that the origin and cause of the meetings were much deeper seated and more involved than this, but there is not one tittle of evidence to support such a statement.

It is only right to add that, so far as the evidence showed, the missionaries concerned, the Reverend J. H. Margetts (Methodist) and the Reverend Father Boegershausen (Catholic), were not in any way concerned in the origin and cause of the meetings, and when the meeting occurred they did all that could reasonably be expected to get the natives back to work. I cannot see that they could have done more than they did.

With regard to Lieut.-Colonel Walstab and Mr. Ball—the evidence shows that these officers carried out their duties in an excellent, indeed in an exemplary manner: that the natives were got back to work so soon and without any trouble having occurred is sufficient proof of this.

It has been said that those responsible for the police should have been aware of what was contemplated, and, indeed, it seems hard to understand how it could have occurred without it coming beforehand to the knowledge of officials; but careful inquiry failed to discover any leakage of the plans anywhere, except in one instance where a letter telling him what was being done was sent to Captain Jolley of the Melanesia Company, but unfortunately it did not get into his hands until days after.

The missionaries, who are in closer touch with the natives than even the Government Officials, were unaware of what was proposed.

The house mistresses and masters, who see their house servants nearly all day long, did not know.

The police drill instructor—who struck me as being a very live and zealous official, and who is in touch with the police—was unaware.

So, under the circumstances, I consider that both Lieut-Colonel Walstab and Mr. Ball are exonerated in this respect.

Although not coming within the “terms of reference” of the Commission, it may be considered to be not out of place to offer a few remarks on some of the matters referred to at the Inquiry.

(1) RATES OF PAY.

The Native Labour Ordinance prescribes a minimum rate of pay of 5s. per month for each adult male labourer, not more than one-third of which may be paid to the labourer at the end of the month (this is termed “in the hand”), the balance being paid to him at the end of his contract (this is termed “on the paper”).

Many labourers are, of course, paid a much higher rate; take, for example, the case of Sumsuma, but an average of 6s per month may be accepted generally as the normal rate of payment to a native labourer.

In addition to pay, the labourers are provided with food, lodging, clothing and medical attendance, and the employer is also required to pay to the Administration a Native Education Tax at the rate of 1s. per month for each native employed.

The Regulations do not prescribe a maximum rate of pay, nor does it seem practicable to do so.

With the development of the goldfields the demand for labour will increase, and with the increased competition it may be assumed that wages will materially increase.

Strange to say, the evidence at the Inquiry tended to show that at the present time there is no general demand for higher wages—the labourers and police seem satisfied, not withstanding the fact that they joined in the meetings, attendance at which, after all, was more or less a “follow the leader” movement consequent on the pressure of Sumsuma and the police Sergeant-Major Rami.

(2) NATIVE LABOURERS IN RABAUL.

For some years now the Administration has been endeavouring to establish Native Labour Hospitals and Barracks for Rabaul at Rapindik—a place on the Bay, well situated for the purpose, about two miles from Rabaul township—but with the exception of the Hospital Buildings (which are complete and up-to-date) want of funds has stood in the way of its being put in hand.

It is strongly urged that the removal of the labour lines from Rabaul township to Rapindik be undertaken as a pressing measure, and that the Native Labour Regulations be amended to provide no native labourer be permitted to be abroad in Rabaul township after, say, nine or ten at night, unless he is in possession of a pass issued by the police officer.

(3) POLICE.

When I was at Nauru, a system of tell-tale or watchman clocks for the police was instituted—it was very unpopular at first with the police, and all kinds of tricks, &c., were played with the clocks, but after a little while they were accepted as part of the system, and I am safe in saying that they were responsible for a surprisingly increased efficiency in the police force there. I would suggest a trial here.

CONCLUSION.

I have already expressed my thanks to Messrs. Grose and Welshman for the assistance they gave me in presenting their respective sides of the case. I now desire to record my thanks for the excellent services rendered by the Secretary, Mr. R. R. Bieske, and the stenographer, Miss Hutchinson.

Rabaul, 14th March, 1929

(Sgd.) T. GRIFFITHS.

III. DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

1. Changes for the Luluais

Australian administration retained some of the features of the German system; the administrative units continued to be called districts (rather than divisions, as in Papua) and the officials who administered them retained the title of district officers. The Australians also retained the system of luluais but stripped them of their judicial functions. In 1924 Colonel Ainsworth, a former Chief Native Commissioner of Kenya, suggested that the luluai courts (held "illegally") should be once more legalised. His recommendation was not put into effect.

From: *Report by Colonel John Ainsworth*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 109, 1924, pp. 17-18.

A luluai or kukurai is the political head of the particular section of which he is either the hereditary or appointed headman. According to native custom, a luluai is the administrator of native law amongst the people over whom he has jurisdiction; but it would appear that, according to the Native Administration Regulations 1924 (published under the *Native Administration Ordinance* 1921-22), the duties of luluais and kukurais are confined to that of arresting offending natives belonging to their tribes or villages, &c., and bringing them before the nearest court in the district, &c. . . . Whether it was the intention, when framing the Regulations, to restrict the powers of the luluais or whether the question was not considered, I do not know. I was, however, led to understand that these headmen were not, and could not be, entrusted with magisterial authority over their people. On interviewing numerous luluais I found that, not only have they always possessed the right to hear and adjudicate upon the troubles of their people, but they continue to exercise such functions. They recognize, however, that serious offences must now be brought before the district officer (kiap). This is as it should be, but why the Regulations have not regularized the position is not clear. As the matter stands at present, it would appear that the headmen in hearing cases and exacting fines, as they apparently do, are acting *ultra vires*. On

subsequent discussion of this question with the Administration, I am informed that it was known that the luluais did exercise the functions described and that, while the Government does not recognize the position under any enactment, it acquiesced in the procedure. I have suggested that the position of these headmen should be officially recognized by ordinance, and I attach hereto copy of a memorandum I have addressed to the Crown Law Officer on the subject.

Rabaul, Wednesday, 14th May, 1924.

Memorandum for

The Crown Law Officer,
Central Administration, Rabaul.

Reference your Memos. *re* Powers of Luluais

(iii) *Jurisdiction* (over their own people only while residing in villages located within the area of their jurisdiction).—(a) In all civil matters, including marriage questions, divorce, and adultery, where the latter is treated as a civil case; the disposal of property of deceased subjects where succession is in dispute or where for any other reason difficulties arise between successors; (b) criminal matters to include theft, assault, sexual offences, disobedience of lawful orders—the orders a luluai is authorised to issue to his people should be defined; I suggest the following as examples of orders that could be issued:—

- (1) To construct and maintain tracks in native areas;
- (2) to assemble for census taking and tax collections;
- (3) to plant food and economic products for their own use and to maintain such gardens, &c.;
- (4) to mark out individual, clan, or tribal boundaries;
- (5) to report disease amongst humans, plants, and animals, and to take such preventive or curative measures as may be ordered or deemed necessary by the departments responsible for dealing with such diseases, &c.;
- (6) the keeping of villages clean, exclusion of pigs from villages, non-contamination of drinking water, burial of the dead;
- (7) any other orders which it may be necessary to issue in connexion with the welfare of the native people— . . .

(c) the luluais themselves would apparently prefer that each court should consist of not less than three luluais. Personally, I think it would be better to arrange for the ordinance to provide for a court to consist of all the luluais of the particular division, but that such court would be legally constituted when not less than three members sit.

(iv) *Powers of Punishment*—

(a) Fine up to ?

(The luluais in the Rabaul district do fine their subjects at present. It is said that 50 per cent. of the fine goes to the aggrieved party and that the remaining 50 per cent. is retained by the luluai or luluais concerned. Of course, this position seems undesirable from the point of view of the practice in civilized courts, and in the African Crown Colonies it is not now permitted; but in the African Colonies the headmen appointed are given a regular salary.

(b) Should the fine not be paid, or in cases where a fine has not proved a deterrent, imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, but such sentence to receive confirmation by the district officer, who, if he confirmed, would make out a warrant committing the accused to a Government prison.

(c) *Records to be Kept.*—Wherever possible, the senior luluai to be authorised to employ a native who can read and write; the native to record the names of the persons concerned in a case, date, luluais present, the charge or ground of action, decision, amount of fine, &c.; the clerk to be paid from public funds.(d) *Supervision.*—All courts under the Native Authority Ordinance to be subject to the supervision of the district officer, the deputy district officer of the district, the Commissioner for Native Affairs, or such other officers as the Administrator may appoint for the purpose. District officers and deputy district officers to be authorized to attend such courts and sit therein, but to take no active part in the proceedings.(e) *Appeal.*—Any native to have the right to appeal from a native court to a district court, but in any such appeal he is to deposit the sum of 10s., which sum, if the appeal is found to be justified, shall be refunded; but should the appeal be found to be actuated by a wish to defy the native court, then the sum to be forfeited. On the other hand, should the native court be found to have intentionally made an attempt to injure the appellant, then the luluais concerned to refund the amount of the deposit money, apart altogether from any disciplinary action the Government may institute.**2. Murray's Comment on Ainsworth's Report**

Sir Hubert Murray, too, was sceptical of Ainsworth's comments, about which he wrote in typically caustic fashion.

From: J. H. P. Murray, *Notes on Colonel Ainsworth's Report on the Mandated Territory of New Guinea*, Port Moresby, 1924, pp. 2-3.

But in reading Colonel Ainsworth's report I seem to be meeting natives of quite a different type. Some indeed appear to be below anything that we have in Papua, for they are described as "food collectors," and I do not know of any such in this Territory, but most of them are apparently far ahead of our natives in intelligence and social culture if Colonel Ainsworth's estimate of them is correct—and it is impossible to suppose that he is mistaken, for he speaks of what he has actually seen. These natives are, it is true, described as being "as a whole extremely backward" (par. 69), but they seem to have practised slavery (par. 78)—which is a stage that none of our natives in Papua have ever reached—and one finds throughout the report references to native laws and to recognized native authorities in the villages, and to their "old time institutions" for dealing with offences. (See pars. 80, 81, 83, 143.) In fact Colonel Ainsworth himself finds the *Luluai* (whom he describes in par. 94 as being "according to native custom the administrator of native law amongst the people over whom he has jurisdiction") actually trying cases and imposing fines; in fact the *Luluai*, as he puts it, "do function in a judicial capacity and have all along so functioned," and he recommends that *Luluai* be empowered to try cases both civil and criminal—in fact to continue to do under Statutory sanction, what they have all along been doing without that sanction.

Now I do not know and I have never heard or read of any tribe in Papua by whom anything even remotely resembling an administration of justice has ever been attempted, nor do I know of any part of Papua where native administration of justice could be introduced with any prospect but the certainty of absolute failure; and, if a regular system, however primitive, of trial according to native law actually exists in the Mandated Territory, I can only draw the conclusion that the natives of that territory must be many centuries in advance of the natives of Papua. And any comparison that I may make between the native populations of the two territories, and any inference which I may draw from the one to the other, must be taken as qualified by this very material difference of culture.

3. Native Regulations

The 1921 Native Administration Ordinance set up Courts for Native Affairs, held by the district officer, the assistant district officer or the patrol officer either in villages or at government stations. It

also gave the government the power to make regulations on marriage, divorce, adultery, inheritance, disposal of the dead, real and personal property, cultivation, and so on. The first Native Regulations under the Ordinance were promulgated in 1924; one version was in pidgin, but with English spelling.

From: *Report by Colonel John Ainsworth, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 109, 1924, pp. 30-1.*

85. Spose Kiap send im talk long boy, he must come long Court, now boy he no savvy hear im talk Kiap he can calaboose im this fella boy.

Spose boy he come long Court he must hear im talk long Kiap, he no can make im plenty trouble long Court. Spose Kiap he ask im something long boy, boy he must talk im out good, he no can gammon long Court. Spose boy he lie long Court, Kiap he can calaboose im.

Spose Policeboy catch im some fella boy now behind this fella boy run away long Policeboy, Kiap he can calaboose im. Spose one fella boy alieve im nother fella boy long run away, im too Kiap he can calaboose.

Spose boy he stop finish long calaboose, now behind he run away, Kiap he can calaboose im three fella moon more.

Spose one fella boy alieve im nother fella boy long run away long calaboose, im too must go along calaboose.

86. Spose boy he no ask im long Kiap first time he no can give him something long boy belong calaboose.

87. Boy he no can fight im nother fella boy.

He no can make im talk gammon long place belong him.

He no can make im bad fella talk.

88. Boy he no can steal im mary belong nother fella boy.

Suppose one fella boy he married finish he no can go long nother fella mary.

All same, spose one fella mary he married finish he no can go long nother fella man.

Spose man now mary he make im all same, Kiap he can calaboose im two fella one time.

89. Spose one fella boy he pull im mary now he speak this fella mary must sleep long nother fella man, Kiap he can calaboose im.

89. Spose one fella mary he catch im money long sleep long boy, Kiap he can put im long calaboose.

92. Spose Kiap he speak one fella boy, all same mary, must go long house sick, he must go, spose he no go, he calaboose.

93. Spouse Kiap he talk long Luluai now Tul Tul he must send im long house sick, he must send him quick too much. Spouse he no send im Kiap he can calaboose im.

94. Spouse big fella sick come up long place Luluai must send im talk long Kiap quick too much.

95. Spouse big fella sick come up long place Kiap now Luluai can send im all boy he sick long nother fella place all he mark im. Luluai must look out good long all boy he sick. He must make im house, he must give im kai kai, he must send im boy long look out long all boy he sick.

All boy he stop long place belong sick, no can lim limbur long nother fella place. He must stop good.

96. Spouse boy now mary he die long place, Luluai must send im talk long Kiap.

Spouse one fella mary got im picanniny long place, Luluai must send im talk long Kiap.

97. Spouse boy now mary got one bad fella sick he come up long something belong im, he must talk im out long Luluai, Luluai must send im long house sick belong Guvment. Spouse house sick he long way too much, Luluai must send im boy he sick long Missionary or nother fella place belong white man. Luluai must send im talk long Kiap.

98. Spouse Kiap send im talk long Luluai long line im all boy all same mary long catch im medicine long doctor, altogether he must line. Spouse some fella he no line, Kiap can calaboose im.

99. Boy no can steal im something long nother fella boy.

100. Spouse he find im something belong nother fella boy he must bring im this fella something long Luluai. Luluai must send im talk long Kiap.

101. Spouse boy he make him poison long nother fella boy Kiap he can calaboose im. Boy he no can talk long nother fella boy long poison. Boy he no can talk long nother fella boy long make im poison long make im die nother fella boy. Boy he no can give im medicine long mary long rouse im picaninny he stop long bel belong mary.

102. Spouse boy he give im money all same nother fella something long Luluai all same Policeboy long make im straight some fella wrong, Kiap he can calaboose im.

103. Spouse one fella pig all same one fella dog he got sick, Kiap he can talk im boy he must make im die this fella pig now dog. Spouse boy he no hear im talk belong Kiap, Kiap he can send im long calaboose.

104. Spouse one fella boy like bring im pig all same fowl long nother fella place he must put him long basket first time, he no can

fas'im leg belong pig all same fowl long one fella dee why all same fashion belong before.

105. Spose pig belong one fella boy go long work belong nother fella boy, this fella boy must talk long boy belong pig first time, spose pig he come long work again he can make im die, das all he must talk long boy belong pig, all same Luluai. Spose boy belong pig he no take im away, boy belong garden he must plant im, he no can kai kai this fella pig.

106. Spose boy, all same mary, he die, you fella no can plant im underneath long house. You no can plant im close to long place. Bime-by Kiap he mark im one fella place belong mat mat belong you fella. You fella must clean im this fella place, take away all pippea all same kunai.

107. Boy he no can play long paper long catch im money.

108. Boy he no can drink long beer all same whisky, spose Kiap he find im he can put im boy long calaboose.

110. Spose boy he make im fire long kunai long place belong im he must look out good this fella fire no can go long ground belong some nother fella boy.

111. Spose boy make im fire now this fella fire he go long plantation he cook im some fella coconut all same some nother fella something, Kiap he can talk im boy he must pay long this fella something fire he cook im.

112. Spose some fella boy like make im fire long kunai long run im pig he must talk first time long all boy he got place close to.

114. Boy no can put im singlets all same shirt more long skin belong im, das all spose boy he like put im shirt long go long Lotu he must catch im paper long Kiap first time.

115. Altogether kanaka spose im come up long place belong white man all same Rabaul, Kavieng, Madang, Kieta, must put him lap lap. Lik Lik picaninny das all can walk about nothing.

116. Kanaka no can put im something long river long fas'im water. Spose Kiap he talk im he must take away this fella something him he put im.

117. Long time belong count im all kanaka spose one fella boy all same mary carafy long bush, Kiap he can calaboose him.

118. Spose one fella boy alieve im nother fella boy long carafy im him too can go long calaboose.

119. Altogether picaninny he no got paper no got mama must line long line long all boy.

121. Spose Kiap sing out long some fella boy long alieve im long catch im one fella boy he make im some fella wrong, altogether boy must alieve him long Kiap.

122. Spose some fella boy no savvy hear him talk he stop long this fella paper Kiap he can calaboose im.

123. Spose some fella kanaka no savvy hear im talk long Luluai all same Tul Tul all same doctor Tul Tul, spose this fella talk he straight Kiap can put im this fella kanaka long calaboose.

124. Kiap can make im Luluai all same Tul Tul long altogether place belong kanaka. Spose boy he make im something wrong Luluai must bring im long Kiap.

126. Luluai all same Tul Tul all same doctor Tul Tul no can throw away money long takis.

128. Kiap can take away hat belong Luluai all same Tul Tul all same doctor Tul Tul spose im make im something no good spose im no savvy hear im talk belong Kiap.

129. Spose Luluai all same Tul Tul make im something no good long Varakurai spose he make him Varakurai gammon, Kiap can calaboose im long this fella something.

130. Spose some fella boy he gammon he Policeboy all same Luluai all same Tul Tul, Kiap he can calaboose im.

4. Uncontrolled Areas

Another Australian innovation was the policy of peaceful penetration, in contrast with the German policy of allowing private individuals to go wherever they wished, at their own risk. The Territory was officially divided into areas under "control", "influence" and "partial control". In 1925 the Uncontrolled Areas Ordinance was passed empowering the government to proclaim uncontrolled areas which private persons might not enter without a permit. Papua passed similar legislation in 1926.

From: *The Laws of the Territory of New Guinea 1921-1945 (Annotated)*, Vol. 4, pp. 4,560-1.

4. The Administrator may, by Proclamation in the *New Guinea Gazette*, declare any area which is not fully, or has not yet come, under the control of the Administration, to be, for the purposes of this Ordinance, an uncontrolled area.

5. No person except—

(a) natives;

(b) officers of the Administration; or

(c) persons holding a permit,

shall enter an uncontrolled area.

6. (1) The Administrator may grant to any person, upon such conditions as he thinks fit to impose, a permit to enter an uncontrolled area.

(2) The conditions shall be indorsed upon the permit.

(3) The Administrator may, as a condition precedent to the grant of a permit, require the applicant to furnish security either in cash or by bond, in such sum as the Administrator deems fit, that the applicant will observe the conditions to be indorsed upon the permit and the provisions of this Ordinance.

(4) An application for a permit shall be made in writing in accordance with Form A in the Schedule to this Ordinance.

(5) A permit may be in accordance with Form B in the Schedule to this Ordinance and shall remain in force for such time as is specified therein.

6A. Notwithstanding the provisions of section six of this Ordinance, a permit to enter an uncontrolled area shall not be granted unless the applicant for a permit gives, to the satisfaction of the Administrator or a person to whom the Administrator has, under section three A of this Ordinance, delegated his power to grant a permit to enter an uncontrolled area, security in the sum of Two hundred pounds for the payment of any compensation which may become payable by the applicant under section nine A of this Ordinance:

Provided that the Administrator may exempt any applicant for a permit from the provisions of this section.

7. The Administrator may at any time by notice in writing cancel a permit.

8. Any person, other than a native or an officer of the Administration, who—

(a) enters any uncontrolled area without a permit; or

(b) without reasonable excuse, proof whereof shall lie upon him, remains in any uncontrolled area after cancellation of his permit; or

(c) without reasonable excuse, proof whereof shall lie upon him, remains in any uncontrolled area after the expiration of the term specified in his permit,

shall be guilty of an indictable offence.

Penalty: Imprisonment for twelve months.

5. Conditions of Service

Most of the benefits available to members of the Papua and New Guinea public service today were absent in the Mandated Territory.

Housing was not subsidised and passages were not granted to officials going to Australia on leave. The maximum salary for a district officer was £756 per annum.

From: G. W. L. Townsend, *District Officer*, Sydney, 1968, pp. 118-19.

The other matter of note was that I received my first promotion in the Service.

My substantive grade had been that of Patrol Officer and the salary rate £300 a year. When detailed for duty with the expedition led by Walstab, I had been appointed Acting Deputy District Officer and my salary was lifted to £400—after a “trial period” of six weeks. I had been further appointed Acting District Officer whilst in charge of the District, an appointment which lifted my salary to £600, though not until after a further “trial period” of six weeks. This may sound complicated but in fact had been cleverly thought out by Treasury, I imagine; or perhaps even in Australia.

I quote one example of how this money-saving system worked: When I handed over Ambunti to Woodward and transferred to Wewak, I had naturally lost my appointment as Acting District Officer. This meant that I reverted to Patrol Officer and only then was I re-appointed as Acting Deputy District Officer, being required to serve a further trial period without pay increase for six weeks. All this was no doubt very desirable from the Treasury point of view but it was on leave periods that Treasury saved real money.

An officer might—and several of us did—“act” as District Officer for up to six years; but when, after two to three years’ service, leave to Australia was granted, the officer’s appointment was cancelled as from the time of his leaving his District, though his leave did not commence until he left Rabaul. Then his leave pay was calculated at his lowest substantive ranking, sometimes two grades below the one which he had been performing for two years or more. Naturally, any future “acting” promotion on his return from leave was subject to six weeks’ trial without any higher-duty pay. In those days there was no superannuation scheme of any kind for New Guinea, although public servants both in the Commonwealth and in Papua were covered. This did not come into being until 1929 when I was required to contribute retrospectively to the date of my joining the service in 1921.

Neither at this time, nor for some years afterwards, did the Administration accept any responsibility for the death or injury of an officer while on duty. But when, as sometimes happened, an officer was wounded while on patrol, he could feel reasonably certain that if he paid his hospital bill without any fuss and there were no debatable

extras, the Administrator would grant, upon request, a sum of money as an Act of Grace exactly equal to the amount of his hospital bill.

I was now promoted to be Deputy District Officer, appointed to "act" as District Officer in the Sepik District. Private advice from friends in Rabaul was to the effect that there had been no competition for the job to which I was to go although an appointment had been made prior to my "acting" one. But the officer selected, a member of the Lands and Mines Department, whose days of field work were long over, had died the day his schooner entered the mouth of the Sepik River and, such was the reputation of the place at that time, no one was at all surprised.

Presumably as a result of recommendations made by the redoubtable Colonel Ainsworth, all field staff were now instructed to gather and record all possible information concerning systems of native land tenure, to list tribal and linguistic boundaries and to learn as much as possible of the native people and their way of life. Additionally, to learn a native language would, we were told, "be a good thing".

All very sound, of course, especially to anyone of the Ainsworth breed who was descended from a long line of British Colonial administrators. Unfortunately, in our infant administration in New Guinea, postings were left to the Staff Clerk in Rabaul, who had field staff playing musical chairs all over the Territory. It was impossible in the short period any officer remained at any one Station to do very much more than perform the routine tasks necessary to keep a Station functioning. There was little time, even for the most enthusiastic and interested officer, to learn more about native customary life than what was immediately apparent in his District.

6. The Bena Bena—Mount Hagen Patrol

The opening of the highlands was probably the most important single achievement of the administration of the Mandated Territory. Parts of the eastern highlands were explored by Lutheran missionaries between 1926 and 1929. In 1930 Michael Leahy's and Dwyer's exploration of the upper Purari led to the construction of an airstrip at Bena Bena. It was from there that the historic Bena Bena—Mount Hagen patrol, led by J. L. Taylor, left in March 1933.

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Annual Report*, 1933-34, pp. 115-17.

In March, 1933, it was decided by the New Guinea Administration that a patrol should be made into the interior of New Guinea to an

unexplored area between the Bismarck Range and the Papuan boundary which had been recently brought within the administrative district of Morobe, of which Salamaua is the principal port. I was instructed to undertake the task. At this time also Mr. M. J. Leahy, the well-known explorer and prospector, proposed taking a party through the same area in search of gold. He was acting on behalf of the New Guinea Gold-fields Company. To simplify matters and avoid duplication, I invited Mr. Leahy to join me, and we decided after some discussion to combine forces and explore the area together. (Mr. Leahy had recently made a rapid journey as far west as Mount Erigivanna, and his assistance was invaluable.) This we did, and the arrangement worked smoothly and to the advantage of both parties. . . .

The part played by aircraft in the Morobe District is now well-known, it being used there perhaps more extensively in the everyday life of the community than in any country in the world. We decided to make as much practicable use of aircraft as the circumstances warranted. Consequently, on the 27th March, 1933, an aerial reconnaissance was carried out from the Bena Bena landing ground, Purari head-quarters, our jumping off point for the patrol. The pilot was Mr. O'Dea of Salamaua, and the machine De Haviland 50. The party consisted of Messrs. M. J. and D. Leahy, K. Spinks, surveyor, and myself. We took off on a beautiful morning and flew a course of 300 degrees, approximately north of north-west. The flight was delightful and we obtained a good view of the country passed over, which enabled us to form an opinion of the population to be met with, and the food resources of the country, an all-important factor. Bearings were taken at certain times during the flight, and a sketch map prepared. We were now in the unique position of having seen from the air the country we were to examine on foot. . . .

The people of the area from Bena Bena to Mount Hagen appear to be of two, or perhaps three, great tribes. The differences between those of Bena Bena and Mount Hagen are plain and definite, though midway between those places there is a third tribe, which may be distinct, or may be due merely to the fusion of the other two peoples. The first may be called the Bena Bena people, their correct title being as yet unknown. They extend from the Kratke Mountains, 40 miles south-east of Bena Bena to the Garfuku Valley, and are a very numerous people, who live in villages of from 20 to 100 small circular houses. They are a handsome race, clean-shaven generally, well-built and of medium height, with a highly developed sense of decoration, and they delight in ornamenting themselves with leaves and flowers. Their excellent sweet potato gardens of the patchwork

quilt variety, exact in design, cleanly furrowed and perfectly tilled; their cultivation of corn, sugar and cucumbers; their eagerness to get seeds of any kind connotes them to be agriculturalists of a high order for New Guinea. The bow and arrow is the principal weapon and war would appear to be more or less continuous, though more general in the dry than the wet season.

The second, who may be called the Wahgi people, are also very numerous, but live in small farm houses, oblong in shape, and quite separate from one another. There are no villages. They are not as good agriculturalists as the Bena people, but make extremely well-designed "Chessboard" gardens, which are laid out in squares with mathematical precision; hence the name. One sees them in all stages of growth, from the reddish-brown of the newly tilled earth, to the bright green of the sweet potato plant at maturity, whilst the country for miles bears the imprint of ancient gardens showing how intensively the native race has cultivated the area throughout successive generations. The people are well-built, good-looking, some reach 5ft. 8in., and are nearly all bearded. Their principal weapon is the spear, and it would appear that though war plays a prominent part in their life, it is not so general as with the Bena Bena people. This, of course, is open to correction.

Generally we were received well and without hostility. Weapons were seldom seen, and we were regarded in a way as something ghostly or super-natural. In some parts we were regarded as people returned from the dead; some of the party were actually recognized as ones who had died in recent years. Scenes of great emotion and enthusiasm were witnessed as we passed through villages, laughing or crying people rushing to caress or kiss, or even touch the members of our party. The recognized ones were asked to stay and take their old place in the community. There was also much running up and down the line of carriers—some anxious to help and carry and assist our boys, others calling out to their relatives to come and see us, and put down their arms, the women and children standing by in groups observing everything in amazement. When I removed my hat they would gasp "Oh!" and talk excitedly, and hold their children up to get a look at us. In other places they appeared awe-stricken and dazed.

Near the Wahgi landing ground we were received with open hostility. Here the people, probably one of the finest types in New Guinea, and who display a remarkable uniformity of stature and physique, met us with spears raised in an attempt to prevent us entering their country. After some parleying, the spears were put down, and friendly relations established.

For New Guinea the density of the population in the area between

Bena Bena and Mount Hagen is remarkable. It is impossible to give a reliable estimate at this juncture, but it was noticed that wherever the patrol had occasion to halt along the track as long as 30 minutes, not less than 1,000 natives gathered around us. Probably there are 150,000 people there. Both tribes are probably of non-melanesian origin, but anthropological investigation must be carried out before that can be stated definitely. A noticeable feature in the Mount Hagen area is the beautiful park-like enclosures, planted with ornamental trees and shrubs, which surround a well-kept lawn of fine grass. These enclosures are used in connexion with the ceremonial life of the people. Another is the high degree of art and skill with which their axes are made. The battle-axes are particularly fine, being made of grey or blue stone of fine texture and highly polished. Where these axes exist steel has never penetrated, it not being required, and I had the greatest difficulty to induce natives to accept steel tomahawks and steel knives in payment for food. . . .

In August it became necessary for me to return my native carriers from the Upper Markham to their homes, their terms of service having expired. They had worked well, and it was due to their strength and endurance that our expeditions had been possible. When the history of New Guinea is written it is to be hoped that there will be a special page for the native carrier, who has made the country's development possible. Mr. Spinks, surveyor, and I left Mount Hagen on the 14th August, and arrived at Bena Bena on the 26th August. It was an arduous trip, but apart from two sick, whom we carried on the last day, all arrived well. The attitude of the natives through whose territory we passed, was with certain exceptions, entirely different from that on our first trip; they then had imagined us as gods or spirits, but on reflection they must have realized their mistake, and so a revulsion of feeling had taken place throughout the people, from about 20 miles south-east of Mount Hagen landing ground to within about the same distance of Bena Bena. Our peaceful behaviour they regarded as being merely due to us not being warriors, and to an absence of weapons. Rifles they appeared to imagine were sticks, and though they saw them shoot through trees and shoot pigs, they still could not connect them with their conception of war. Day after day we encountered large numbers of hostile or contemptuous people, who shouted insults at us, and howled with derisive laughter when told to desist. They appeared to think that they had us in their power, and with their natural avariciousness aroused, here was the chance to raid the line and plunder our cargo. At one village, Kunimbi, one fellow actually brought along a rope to tie up his share of the loot, or it appeared so from his actions, and at

many places people came forward armed with sticks, with which to destroy us. Prancing women danced around the line, and others ran up and down attempting to steal. We were counted very poor warriors indeed. Twice, the hostility assumed such serious proportions—bows were drawn and spears raised—that it became necessary to use firearms to protect the party. On both these occasions I fired and a native was killed. The others then withdrew. Upon reaching the area about 20 miles west of the Bena Bena landing ground the atmosphere changed, and the patrol proceeded peacefully on its way.

7. Who Discovered the Highlands?

In 1920 a German surveyor, Hermann Detzner, published a book in which he claimed to have traversed parts of the highlands during the war. When the war broke out Detzner was on a trip of exploration somewhere in the Kukukuku country. He refused to surrender and remained in hiding until the armistice. Detzner's claim has since been dismissed as a complete fabrication, but in 1933 he was still a serious contender for the title of the discoverer of the central highlands.

From: S. Lane, "Leahys or Detzner?", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 19 June 1934, p. 41.

Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land.

Doubtless Papua is only Mollie Lett's land of adoption, but, nevertheless, the article written by her claiming Captain Detzner as being the first explorer of the Purari—Mt. Hagen district (Central New Guinea) in preference to the expedition of Messrs. Leahy Brothers and J. L. Taylor, last year, is partially, if not wholly excused because of the above quotation.

To New Guinea residents—and indeed to many tourists—the jealousy that exists between the Mandated Territory and Papua, especially between the Administrations, is very similar to the friendly rivalry existing between Sydney and Melbourne, and I take it that it was this spirit that prompted Mrs. Lett to pen her article, which appeared in this valuable islands magazine of April issue.

There is a Lutheran Mission now exploring the possibilities of the Mogai Valley (in fact, the religious "rush" there exceeds the gold "rush"), and this Mission, according to Captain Detzner, hid and fed

him during the War years. Mr. Bergmann of this Mission, frankly admits that Detzner himself has since repudiated his book on New Guinea travels and has relegated it solely to the fiction class. No longer can it be accepted as authentic history.

This action was taken following on a protest to the German Geographical Society by the Lutheran Mission, who accused Detzner of using information from the Mission to write his book. The contents of his book were entirely due to his powers of listening while he was temporarily domiciled at the Mission. He himself never saw the things he wrote about.

These Missionaries will tell Mrs. Lett and other staunch Papuans that Captain Detzner most certainly never ever saw any valley on the Purari headwaters. His travels extended over the Watut country only.

Captain Detzner describes the men of the Purari headwaters as natives with shaved heads, with a patch on top whereon to hang their beads. The native peoples of the Purari headwaters actually build up and strengthen their growth of hair, by packing hair and bark on top, and covering the lot with a bark cloth all the better to withstand a thump on the cranium from a pineapple club, or more correctly one of those evil-looking battle axes that are used in that part of New Guinea between the Purari and Mt. Hagen. . . .

No ill-feeling is conveyed herein: it is merely a matter of giving honor where honor is due.

Papua is proud of Jack Hides, just as the Mandated Territory is proud of Mick Leahy. They are both New Guinea Wizards of the Interior, who have done marvellous work, so why not give credit where credit is due, regardless of Territory.

All Australians should be satisfied and proud that these courageous men are such worthy sons of Australia.

Shortly before the publication of this article, Detzner himself had publicly announced in a German journal that his book "is a scientific report in part only: it is primarily a fictional account of my experiences in New Guinea . . . Some of the journeys I had actually undertaken are not described at all; on the other hand, it contains passages which do not correspond with facts".

8. Missionaries in the Highlands

The discovery of the central and western highlands was followed by a "mission rush" during which the Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Seventh Day Adventists competed with each other to stake out

their spiritual claims. In 1934 two Roman Catholic missionaries were killed during a dispute with the villagers, and the administration closed the highlands to all further European penetration. The missions already established there were permitted to continue their work but were not allowed to expand their activities or to acquire land.

From: W. A. Ross, "The Growth of Catholicism in the Western Highlands", *Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society*, 1969, No. 2, p. 61.

The official approval for the first foundation of the Catholic Mission in the Western Highlands was embodied in a letter from Bishop Wolf, dated June 15, 1934, authorizing Brother Eugene and Father Ross to reside at Mount Hagen, and be responsible for the establishment and development of the Catholic Mission in the Mount Hagen area.

Brother Eugene with 15 coastal boys, and hundreds of local volunteers, quickly built the main station at Wilya, where Mick and Dan Leahy had built their Mogeï airstrip. House, church, kitchen, workers' quarters, fowl house, piggery, were completed, built of native materials, bamboo walls and kunai grass roofs. Brother Eugene was a tireless worker. From June till September, 1934, besides the main station, nine out-stations were built. To the west, 12 miles; south 15 miles; east 24 miles; and north 20 miles. It would seem almost unbelievable, but one out-station at Anggil in the Ulga valley was completed in one day of 13 working hours; some 2,000 natives, men and women and children, like an ant-colony, kept busy bringing in kunai-grass, ropes from the bark of trees, wild sugar-cane for walls, saplings. For each bundle brought in, a few small cowrie shells was considered adequate payment by the Ulga natives. From 6am till 7pm, residence and kitchen, house for workers, and workers' kitchen and a number of latrines; in this one day eleven houses were completed and ready for use.

In December, 1934, the local paramount chief of the Mogeï-Nampoga clan, came to me and asked what might seem a very blunt question, but a question for which I had been waiting patiently all these months. Six months had passed since we took up residence at Wilya. Nindi, the Chief, asked me: "What do you want from us; when is the pay-off? You have been here six months now, buying our food and pigs, paying us well; you have looked after our sick, attended to our sores, wounds and bruises, now we want to know when you are going to give us the bill, for in our way of life, nothing is given for nothing, and we presume you are the same".

I replied to Nindi. "That is the question I have been waiting for and here is my answer. We do not want your land, your women or your pigs. We wish to open a boarding school where your boys from the ages of 10 to 16 will be taught to read and write. You have seen us looking at books, writing on paper. This art we shall teach your boys; they will live at our mission station and go to school each day." Nindi then asked, "Will we have to find food for the boys?" I told him we would take care of the food. "We can take care of 50 boys". Nindi said, "I can send you 100 boys if you want them". "No", I said, "for the beginning 50 is the limit. We shall open the school right after the New Year".

9. The Hagen—Sepik Patrol, 1938-39

The Hagen—Sepik patrol, led by J. L. Taylor, was one of the largest and longest ever undertaken. It lasted from March 1938 to April 1939 and was assisted by 20 police and 230 carriers.

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Annual Report*, 1938-39, p. 149.

The practical results obtained are as follows:—

- (1) Examination has been made of the area between Mount Hagen and the Dutch border from the Papuan boundary to the Sepik River, and the country carefully mapped. Needless to say there is more to be done. We should have liked to have done more ourselves, but in the time available that was not possible.
- (2) Many thousands of new natives were met and the advent of the new era, that is, the era of European influence, explained to them wherever interpreters were available and that covered a large area before the patrol concluded.
- (3) The native people have learnt, that the European is a friend and that to trade with him is to their advantage.
- (4) That the future of most of this country lies in agriculture and pig raising, not in minerals—much of it being of limestone formation and gold free, that is again excluding the lowlands.
- (5) That the natural ingress of this interior is from Lae via Mount Hagen, and it is from this direction that progress and development should come.
- (6) That if a road from Lae is not constructed this area may be opened up from the Sepik River by establishing police posts (a) at Maramuni (upper Yuat) with a landing stage for pinnaces or small craft on the Arafundi (Karawari), (b) in the vicinity of Wabag or Ailemande on the Yuat headwaters, (c)

on the lower May river, (d) at Kelafomin on the Sepik headwaters.

- (7) That the upland people are unfit for employment on the lower levels unless given quinine continually and in extremely large doses.

Further examination is required of the forested lowlands between the Karawari and the May Rivers on the northern slopes of the central range. This can be better done with the aid of river craft operating from the Sepik.

White Settlement.

As to the possibilities of white settlement, much of the area in question is extremely mountainous and too rough for this purpose.

There are areas available, however, which may be suitable for the growing of tea and pyrethrum and other products and there is a tremendous reserve of water power which in the future will enable great industrial development.

The interior should, however, be considered as a whole. That is, the plateau country from the Markham River, to Mount Hagen and the Dutch Border. The eastern half is the more suitable for European settlement at least in the first instance, and what will most likely happen is that when we establish industries in the eastern area, people will come from all over the western side to work there and to gain experience. On this recent journey when travelling between Mount Hagen and Bena Bena, I met bands of young men walking 60 miles to Mount Hagen seeking work. As we bring the western half under-control the movement will be in the other direction, easterly.

The future of the interior as I see it, is that there will take place firstly, native development, secondly European development. The native will grow, in addition to his ordinary foods, quinine, coffee, soya beans and European vegetables. He will also raise pigs—he is incidentally a specialist at this art—which will be cured at a Government or co-operative bacon factory. The native will also work on European plantations in the highlands and some may work the numerous poor gold-bearing streams for their own benefit.

Europeans will grow quinine, coffee, tea, pyrethrum and European vegetables for supply to people living on the coast and lowlands where these vegetables will not grow. They will raise cattle, not on huge ranches after the American or Australian patterns, but in a smaller way as in the more closely settled European countries. There will also be some dairying, if only as a concomitant of agricultural pursuits.

The country will lose some of its charm by this development, but that has been the history of colonization, I suppose, since Roman

legions invested Britain, and European governments began the emancipation and westernization of the African.

The savage charm and fascination of pristine New Guinea is not for later generations. This is something to be sorry for, but I believe the advantages to be gained by extending the Pax Britannica to these regions will more than make up for that regrettable and irreparable loss.

The almost uninhabited lowlands may be settled by natives from over-crowded areas of the very distant future or perhaps native-born Chinese, whom, it is said, are increasing at a prodigious rate and who will in future demand agricultural areas upon which to settle. The land awaits them and though it needs much closer examination than I could give it, it appears to be fair quality land which the European does not require or desire because of its remoteness and its hot climate.

I think that we should adopt the policy of the Government of Kenya and reserve the highlands of New Guinea for Europeans, where climate conditions are temperate and suitable for the European manner of living. Asiatics flourish exceedingly in the warm climate of the lowlands and the coast.

The existence of these highland areas makes New Guinea, normally a land of moist tropical conditions, something between a second Java and a second New Zealand. That is the opinion of John Black, my colleague and companion, who has had some experience in agricultural matters.

In order that the interests of the native people of the area should be conserved, I should like to see those officers administering the area, men with a bias towards anthropology. So many people regard anthropology as an academic study and perhaps do not realize how applicable it is to the host of problems which beset administrators in native matters, and I might add European matters in and out of Europe. Unfortunately I am not an anthropologist.

It will be seen from this that New Guinea is a much greater country than most of us have believed hitherto. That it has a golden future I have no doubt, and I trust that we may see it in our time—upon our energy and initiative this depends.

IV. WELFARE AND RACE RELATIONS

In the field of native welfare, Australian achievements during the mandate were somewhat uneven. Comparatively little was spent on health and agriculture and next to nothing on education, which remained the province of the missions. However, in each of these fields there was at least the beginning of a policy.

1. Health Services

Of all the welfare problems facing the administration, that of health was the most clearcut; but success depended upon the amount of finance available.

From: L. P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea*, London, 1948, pp. 179-81.

In the mandated territory the total expenditure on public health was far higher than in Papua; it rose from £47,000 in 1925-26, when figures were first published, to nearly £90,000 in 1938-39. In each annual report to the Mandates Commission since 1926-27 an estimate has been made of the territory's total expenditure for native welfare. According to this the cost of maintaining medical services for Europeans was only £3,000 in 1923-24, and had only risen to £4,000 in 1938-39. The basis of this calculation is not explained; the cost of upkeep of hospitals for Europeans, a part of which, of course, is covered by fees, is not shown separately. £4,000 would pay half the salaries of the 10 qualified medical officers employed by the department in 1942, on the assumption that each one was receiving the minimum salary for his post. Perhaps, then, it is calculated that each of these gives half of his time to the service of Europeans and half to that of natives. Native hospitals were opened in 1922 at each of the government stations and sub-stations then established—Aitape, Madang and Morobe on the mainland; Rabaul, Talasea and Gasmata in New Britain; Kavieng and Namatanai in New Ireland; Kieta and Manus. At Rabaul, Kavieng, Madang and Manus there were also hospitals for Europeans. Another native hospital was

opened at Kokopo, 20 miles from Rabaul, in 1926, and a sub-station of Kieta on Buka Passage. This was the year of the gold rush to Bulolo and Edie Creek, and the first of a series of years in each of which there was an epidemic of dysentery, and sometimes also one of pneumonia, on the goldfields. The first outbreak occurred before any hospital provision had been made by the Government at all, and was dealt with by the only white woman on the goldfield, the wife of one of the first miners to arrive in the territory, who was a trained nurse, and housed her native patients in an empty building on her husband's claim. The Government, in reporting on the question to the League of Nations, took credit for a lower death-rate than that in the dysentery epidemic of 1909-10 in the Lakekamu goldfield in Papua; but the Commonwealth had the grace to express especial thanks to Mrs. Booth. Steps were then taken to build a native hospital at Wau, while at Edie Creek, six hours' walk further on, an advanced post was opened under a medical assistant: this did little more than give preliminary treatment to cases sent on to Wau. A European hospital also was built at Wau in 1929. After New Guinea Goldfields had engaged a medical man and opened their own hospital at Edie Creek, the Government's contribution to native health in that locality was confined to inspection until 1932, when dysentery was more serious than usual, and the death-rate among labourers for the whole Morobe District rose to 3 per cent. It was then decided to open a Government native hospital there. This was closed in 1936 when a motor road had been built from Edie Creek to Wau, and the medical assistant in charge transferred to the Watut, where the opening up of a new goldfield had brought the inevitable outbreak of dysentery. A European hospital also had been built at Wau in 1929.

A native hospital was opened at the government post at Ambunti, on the Sepik, in 1929, and another, along with a hospital for Europeans, at Wewak in 1936, when this became the headquarters station for the Sepik District. By 1938 there were four native hospitals in this district, at Wewak and the three sub-stations. It remains true, however, that until a few years before the Japanese occupation, hospitals for natives were concentrated in areas of European activity rather than those of dense native population. While the medical treatment of native labourers is obviously to their advantage as well as to that of their employers, this does suggest a certain disproportion in a territory purporting to be administered on the principle of trusteeship. The total number of natives treated at hospitals in 1938-39 was 30,000, or one twenty-first of the enumerated native population. The total number of Europeans treated in

Government hospitals was 1,933, or nearly one-third of the white population.

2. Agriculture Policies

Encouragement of cash cropping began in earnest in 1924 with the appointment of a Director of Agriculture, whose main task was to develop village agriculture and to diversify crops. This extract evaluates the work done up to 1938.

From: M. G. Jacobs, "The Australian Native Dependencies in the Pacific", *Australian Supplementary Papers*, Series E. No. 3, 1938, pp. 15-16.

Side by side with the development of native political institutions the Australian Administration has sought to develop native agriculture, which is still most rudimentary. As in Papua, every care is taken to see that the natives are not deprived of land which is essential for their welfare. Land can be purchased from the natives by the Administration only after the District Officer has certified that it is not required by them and after every application for transfer has been publicly considered by the Land Board. With their lands thus assured to them, the natives have shown little interest in cultivation, which in 1924 was confined to the growing of a few native food crops and coconuts planted under instruction from the administration. The Native Administration Regulations authorise the Administrator to issue regulations concerning native cultivation, but there is in the territory no comprehensive measure such as that of Papua to compel the natives to plant certain crops each year. The Administration has sought to influence the natives rather through pressure exerted by the District Officers and by regular inspections carried out by the inspectors and instructors of the Department of Agriculture. An elaborate scheme worked out in 1924 provided for the cultivation of annual crops such as cotton, maize and ground nuts in regular rotation. The object of the scheme was to instil in the native habits of sustained industry, for in the old way the natives were prone to spend months in idleness after their yams and taro had been planted. Special seed was purchased by the Department of Agriculture and distributed to the natives. However, native conservatism again proved the stumbling-block and the results have belied the expectations of earlier years. Despite the vigorous efforts of the inspectors, who visit the villages, distribute seeds and demonstrate methods of cultivation, imported crops have on the whole been

a failure. Unless educated in agriculture, the native must be constantly supervised, and this demands a far larger staff than can at present be provided. On the other hand, coconuts are now planted more extensively than before and in every district the latest reports show that the natives are taking a greater interest in the cultivation of food crops, which now assure them a plentiful supply of food. In some cases the villages have produced a surplus which has found a ready market in the European settlements.

3. Education: The McKenna Report

In the early days of Australian administration the aim of government schools appears to have been to provide a more advanced education than the missions. The first elementary school was opened in Kokopo in 1922, and another at Kavieng soon after. In 1927 it was announced that similar schools would be opened in each of the nine districts, but nothing was done. In 1929 B. J. McKenna, Director of Education in Queensland, was asked to report on native education in the territory. He recommended that village schools should continue to be managed by missions, and that the government should assume responsibility for schools in towns and for all technical education. The report was not implemented.

From: Territory of New Guinea, *Annual Report*, 1929-30, pp. 127-9.

It is not in accord with the spirit of British Government or colonization or of British traditions to allow a subject native race to remain in subjection without taking reasonable measures to ameliorate their condition. It is the function of the strong to help the weak. Further, the experience of the world shows that a subject race can more efficiently minister to the needs of industry if it is trained on the right lines, and that, instead of being a menace, as some assume, education can become the hand-maid to progress and development.

The natives are a very primitive race. Their tribal organizations and their home industries (such as the making of baskets, nets, ropes, fishing tackle) have to a definite extent been undermined where they have experienced the impact of civilization. The obligation, therefore, is upon civilization to make good the loss caused in village social order by this thrust of trading and commercial interests. The inculcation of the habit and practice of work is fundamental. Work should have some definite objective—the motive should always be in evidence. Industrial training should have a definite

relationship to local conditions. It must take cognizance of and utilize any local organization that makes for orderly arrangement, improving what is good and rejecting what is bad. The vocational training should include measures to restore home industries where they have been lost, and to improve those which have survived. A native of the Territory looks to the soil for his main food supply—the coco-nut, the taro, the banana, the yam. Associated with these are his fowls and his pigs. His training should aim at improving native cultivation, at encouraging the use and growth of new crops—such as rice and beans—and the cultivation of others, such as cocoa and coffee, which have a definite commercial value. Care should be taken that the making of fishing tackle, the weaving of mats, the making of baskets, the construction of native huts in the native style, do not become lost arts. Such things should all find a place in vocational training. His religious and moral teaching should aim at inculcating habits of discipline, of truthfulness, of cleanliness, and of respect for each other's property. Concurrently with this vocational and moral instruction, there should be imparted an elementary knowledge of the fundamental technical instruments of instruction—speaking, reading, spelling, writing, composing and calculating. The standard of proficiency in these arts should approximate that reached by a ten-year-old pupil in an Australian school, and should enable the native to conduct in an intelligent manner ordinary business transactions.

In devising a system of native education, one is immediately confronted with the language difficulty. Is it desirable to use the prevailing vernacular, or to discard it in favour of a foreign tongue—English, in the case under consideration? The suggested use of a native language in the Mandated Territory is straight away discounted by the fact that there is no universal tongue. The inhabitants of one village fail to understand the language of villagers in adjoining localities; and, while there may be certain fundamentals having some relative significance, the use of any dialect as a medium of instruction or of communication means the general imposition of a foreign language on all classes of the community. Not only do the different dialects make so many separate divisions, but divisions are made by virtue of the disparity in the ages of those whom it is desirable to reach, and by the conditions engendered through the contact of natives with trading centres and with Mission Stations.

SUGGESTIONS.

It might be laid down as a general principle that it is the function of the Government to control education. In a well organized social system, the ruling authority should either have direct control of

schools, or it should be able to satisfy itself that schools not under its direct control are being efficiently conducted.

The following general principles govern the means by which primitive races may be trained to become useful members of society:—

- (1) Primary school courses adapted to local conditions. Religious and moral training, with industrial training, should be the basis of the teaching. Each school should have its garden plot, where practical agriculture can be taught. The habit and practice of work should be inculcated at all times, as one of the main difficulties lies in overcoming the inborn indolence of the native.
- (2) Super-primary course for selected students destined to become tradesmen, teachers, or to engage in other work requiring a more than average degree of skill. The masses of native people cannot be lifted from their uncivilized condition without the help of native teachers, and without utilizing the tribal or other social organization of its leaders. The training of native teachers is, therefore, important, and their course of instruction should have definite relation to the syllabus of work for primary schools.
- (3) Religious and moral training to be given with the assistance of missionary organizations. This postulates the formation of an advisory Board on which the Native Administration, the Missions and the lay teachers should have representation.

A comprehensive scheme giving effect to (1), (2), and (3) would, in reference to conditions in the Mandated Territory, make provision for:—

- (a) The establishment of elementary schools for natives in populous centres;
- (b) The establishment of boarding schools at selected centres for the training of native teachers, the trainees to be selected by the teachers of the elementary schools;
- (c) The drafting to Rabaul of pupils selected for training as teachers, tradesmen, agriculturists, &c,;
- (d) The creation of a staff of white teachers who will be officers of the Territory, and who will have the charge of the bigger schools, and the supervision of such adjacent village schools as can be efficiently supervised;
- (e) The holding of refresher courses for white teachers at the Keravat Agricultural College;
- (f) The granting of subsidies to Mission schools on condition that they teach English and throw their schools open to Govern-

ment inspection—the granting of such subsidy to be subject to a satisfactory report by an Inspector.

4. Education: The Griffiths Proposals

In 1933 the Acting Administrator, Brigadier-General T. Griffiths, proposed that all education should be entrusted to missions and subsidised by the government. Under Sir Walter McNicoll, who replaced Griffiths in 1934, relations between the administration and the missions were strained, and the proposal was not implemented.

From: R. R. McNicoll, "Sir Walter McNicoll as Administrator of the Mandated Territory", *Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society*, 1969 vol. 2, pp. 8-10.

In 1933 Griffiths had put to the Commonwealth Government a plan for New Guinea based on the system in Papua: 'The Missions to take in hand the whole education of natives of the Territory and provide the necessary teachers for the schools, the Administration on its part to issue the necessary regulations and render monetary assistance by way of subsidy'. Education would be compulsory. There would be village schools, primary or middle schools and high schools. Griffiths had reported that the missions had agreed to the proposals in principle. But Cabinet had withheld approval until it could consider details and estimates of cost. The proposals, set out in the annual report for 1932-33, had been received coolly at Geneva.

There were several objections to the Griffiths plan. The administration's own schools, few as they were, would have been abandoned. He had envisaged no central organisation for producing trained teachers. And the use of English for instruction above primary level, which he had rightly insisted upon, and which was feasible in Papua (or would have been feasible, if Murray had not limited native education to the primary level) was out of the question when English was a foreign language to the great majority of missionaries.

A change of policy

Within a few months of his assumption of office McNicoll formed the opinion that the mission schools could not be used as the basis for a universal education system. In May 1935 he reported adversely on their standards and pointed out that the German missionaries, who predominated, would not be able to use English. He gave his view that the existing policy of development of administration

schools should continue. He recognised that progress must be slow because it would be determined by the output of native assistance from Malaguna. 'The Mission schools will continue', he wrote, 'and be a very useful subsidiary organisation which might after a considerable number of years be brought into closer collaboration with the Administration's general scheme'.

Elsewhere in the article the author lists other "policy differences" between McNicoll and the missions: the Administrator saw some missionaries as a potential threat to security (because of their German nationality), was troubled by the "competition for souls" between the denominations, and thought that the missionaries' attitude to the native population was "ambivalent".

A few months later he reported his view that the figures given by the missions and quoted in the annual report for 1933-34—that 57,000 natives were receiving education—were misleading. 'I could quote many instances', he wrote, 'where, from personal observation, no secular education of any value whatever is being given'.

Early in 1936, in conformity with his policy of bringing the Legislative Council into the formative stages of policy making, he secured the appointment of a committee of the Council to investigate and report on the education problem. The committee presented a brief report in August of that year: having had discussions with the missions, its members found themselves 'in agreement that any future policy should be on the basis of co-operation between the several missionary bodies and the Administration under the general direction and supervision of the Administration'. This must have made it clear to McNicoll that his hope of a scheme of purely government schools was simply not feasible, given the accepted policy that the Mandated Territory must be financially self-supporting. The committee's final report was delayed for various reasons, until at length the Legislative Council's term expired and the committee ceased to exist. The aftermath of the eruption of 1937 took so much of the time and effort of the administration that little thought could be given to the subject for about a year. . . .

In retrospect one cannot condone the loss of the years 1935 to 1939 during which the Mandated Territory was groping for an education policy—just as it had groped, to no greater effect, ever since 1922. But it must be remembered that in those days the matter was generally regarded as neither vital nor urgent. As Sir Frederick Eggleston pointed out, the expenditure on native education in the Mandated Territory was on a par with a good many other administrations. 'The fact is', he said, 'that the problem of native education

is unsolved. The best educational authorities cannot give a confident pronouncement on the subject'.

5. Education Policy Criticised

The question of education was only one part of the problem of finding a policy for New Guineans as a people. Their education had to be of use to them, and this meant that they had to be given their proper place in the community.

From: S. W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea*, Philadelphia, 1943, pp. 187-90.

Native education has proved to be probably the most sterile of all the Australian Government's undertakings. An impressive start was made in 1922 when central institutions were established at Rabaul for technical and intellectual training of outstanding natives. But the results were far from impressive at the time, and fifteen years have seen no changes which would justify expansion along the present line. Academic instruction answers no need in the lives of the natives and skill in carpentry or iron-working has found as yet no place in village life.

Today there are approximately 300 natives enrolled in elementary, and seventy-five in technical, schools conducted by the Government, an infinitely small number considering only those natives whom we might regard as being of school age. At the same time, the total amount spent by the Government on native education has shrunk by more than two-thirds: £18,000 in 1923 to £5,000 in 1937. To what may we attribute the Government's failure to utilize education as a means for "improving the material and moral welfare" of the natives?

There is, of course, the fact that the missions have looked on education as one of their own particular tasks. They had functioning institutions before the Civil Administration was established; and it was hoped that the two agencies could cooperate. Another important factor is the present Administration's lack of sufficient funds to institute the type of educational system that New Guinea would require. The problem of health, moreover, is considered (not without reason) to be of greater urgency at the present than education; and the Department of Public Health considers its share of the budget far too small.

More important than the lack of funds, however, is the fact that an education along European lines is virtually useless to the New

Guinea native. There is, in short, no place for an educated native in modern New Guinea. A few may become teachers, and each year a dozen or so from the technical school get positions demanding some slight skill. But there are no clerical positions, and only a few of the most menial government jobs are open to natives—educated or not. Many positions which might well be filled by natives who have received a rudimentary education are reserved for men from the ranks of Australia's unemployed. . . .

There is one more factor in the situation which must be noted, *i.e.*, the definite hostility of Europeans toward the native being given any education at all. One inevitably receives the impression that the Government's policy, notwithstanding its limited budget, is shaped on the do-nothing model in response to the attitude of the non-official population. The exploiting class has a very real fear that intellectual training will make the native less amenable to labor. As Pitt-Rivers says, "The process of native education on European lines serves to stimulate the antagonism of the white man, for it means that the coloured man, as he becomes divorced from his native life and occupations and is equipped for trade and skilled handicraft, becomes a competitor instead of being merely a hewer of wood and a drawer of water." The whole problem of native education—if a pun be permitted—is fraught with caste-irony; and, as the caste system congeals, there is less and less likelihood that the native will ever be able to acquire equal opportunities in education. An important precedent was established in 1929, when the Government made plans to send a small group of its more successful students to Australia for higher education. European residents of New Guinea raised strong objections which led to the abandonment of the whole scheme. The Rabaul *Times* exulted editorially: "We learn with pleasure that the seven natives who were to be sent to Australia did not go owing to representations made by the Citizen's Association. This should go a long way towards satisfying those who expressed their indignation, and their number is legion."

6. The Code of White Supremacy

Race relations in the Mandated Territory were more strained than in Papua. There were several reasons for this: the Territory had more western-type economic development and a larger European population than Papua. The presence of the Chinese community created additional problems.

From: R. A. Fink and I. Grosart, *Race Relations in Papua and New Guinea*, Australian School of Pacific Administration Staff Seminar No. 3, 1963, pp. 3-4.

White supremacy was accepted as the fundamental basis of the emerging society, and it was supported by a variety of arguments some of them genuine and some rather thinly disguised rationalizations. The cultural gap between the European settlers and the majority of New Guinea people was undeniably true. The majority of New Guineans were illiterate, unfamiliar with Western society and living a simple village life that entailed a rather limited variety of material wants beyond mere subsistence. However, the arguments for European dominance were more often based upon ideas of the innate superiority of all the white races over all coloured races. It was upon this theme of white superiority and therefore "white prestige" or the "dignity of the white race" that the most powerful sanctions could be enforced not merely against natives, but also against any European who deviated from the accepted standards of caste behaviour.

An explicit code of conduct for both "black" and "white" races gradually developed, though it varied in intensity and extent of observance throughout New Guinea. The larger town centres such as Rabaul, Wau, Kavieng and Madang were the most "race conscious" and most strict in enforcing total social segregation between Europeans and natives. In these centres when people spoke of "the native problem" they meant the problem of ensuring that natives remained subservient and did not overstep the "caste-lines". The sort of behaviour that was expected of natives included:

1. Addressing all Europeans respectfully ("Masta", "Misis", "Kiap") and observing a whole etiquette of caste behaviour (standing up when spoken to etc).
2. Avoiding all social intimacy with Europeans, and being in European areas only when carrying out orders or engaged in tasks that required their presence. Using separate facilities at all times, including separate entrances to stores.

European newcomers also had to observe a code of behaviour toward natives and were not free to treat them exactly as they wished. The native employment ordinances were extraordinarily detailed with a formidable body of regulations specifying even the hours during which native house servants were permitted to beat drums. The newcomer was quickly indoctrinated to his new role of "White Masta" and Reed notes that inexperienced residents seemed to take "white prestige" much more seriously than the older resi-

dents. In a sense the "white code" complemented the "black code".

Yet the growing number of minor regulations that were added to the Native Affairs Regulations over the years indicates that there was a fair amount of deviation from the expected and natives were not as amenable or submissive as they should have been. Town residents especially, were plagued by the misdemeanours of their "house-bois" and expressed their views in the correspondence columns of the Rabaul *Times*, urging that sterner enforcement of the law was needed or the natives would become completely spoilt and intractable. Blame for this was generally directed at the thoughtless Europeans who came on steamers and fraternised with the natives and let down the prestige of their race. Dr. I. Hogbin was very sceptical of these assertions. He also noted the steady deterioration of manners and the ungracious behaviour of some of the native peoples living in New Guinea towns in the late 1930's. But he believes the more likely explanation lay in the greater independence of some town natives who could earn money without entering regular European employment and therefore had no need to hide their feelings of resentment. That such feelings existed and that many natives were secretly quite as unflattering to Europeans as white men were to them is shown in their use of derogatory terms for Europeans, such as "bum-bum" which the villagers of Basuma told Hogbin meant literally "stinking wild man".

7. Chinese Grievances

The Chinese community found, as in so many parts of the world, that its members were denied full acceptance by both Europeans and New Guineans, all of whom resented Chinese thrift and success.

From: *Report by Colonel John Ainsworth*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 109, 1924, pp. 42-3.

Sir,

I have the honour, on behalf of the Chinese residents of the Territory of New Guinea, to bring under notice some of the disabilities and grievances under which we residents are at present labouring.

In doing this, I wish to assure you, sir, that it is not our intention to in any way embarrass the Administration, our aim being to assist in every way possible the Government, recognizing, as we do, that in a country such as this it is to everybody's advantage to work together harmoniously. All we wish to do is to place certain facts before you, in the hope of obtaining recognition of what is con-

sidered the just rights of the Chinese.

1. The Land Question.—This question is most vital to the Chinese. Very many applications for land are now lodged in the Lands Office in accordance with the provisions of the Land Ordinance. With each application the sum of Ten shillings has to be lodged, and, in addition, an amount equivalent to one-quarter of the survey fee, the amount of which is arrived at by reference to sliding scale. The majority of these applications have now been lodged for twelve months or more, the fees amounting to well over One thousand pounds have been paid in, yet at the time of writing not one single application has been dealt with, and, on inquiry, we are informed that no promise of satisfaction can be given pending a declaration of the land policy. Surely, sir, we are not asking too much when we request that we be informed what is to be the policy of the Government regarding the Chinese land question, and whether or not we are to be allowed to hold land, and if so, under what conditions. As I have stated, the question is indeed a vital one. For months we have waited, and still the end seems to be no nearer, our business enterprises are being held up, and the prosperity of the Territory is being sadly affected.

2. Many Chinese residents of this Territory are married men, with wife and families in China. Permission is refused to these people to bring their families into the Territory. We would suggest that this treatment is unnecessarily harsh. Men who have built up business and plantations are faced with the problem either of giving up their families or of surrendering their interests in the Territory and returning to China.

Again, should a Chinese woman die leaving young children, as has happened often here, it is impossible for the father to provide a female guardian for them. He is unable to devote the care and attention on them that they should have, and consequently the children themselves are the sufferers.

While on this question, it is pointed out that should wives and families be allowed to come here, the money which now leaves the Territory for their support elsewhere would remain here, thus, from the commercial aspect alone, showing the advantage of withdrawing the embargo. Inquiries at the Commonwealth Bank would convince you that no small sum of money is lost to the Territory monthly on this account.

3. Permission has been sought to bring to the Territory a qualified male teacher for the instruction of the Chinese children. In response to this request, a reply dated the 22nd August, 1921, was received from the then Government Secretary, intimating that “a

scheme of education is now under consideration, and under the circumstances approval cannot be given for the importation of another teacher."

Although many months have elapsed since the writing of that letter, no scheme of the kind indicated has yet been inaugurated, and at present it does not seem that any steps are being taken in the matter.

In the meantime, the Chinese children are suffering, and their chances of being useful citizens in the future are being greatly impaired through lack of educational facilities.

We ask that this deficiency of teachers be rectified, and seek permission for three or four qualified Chinese teachers to enter this Territory for educational purposes.

Again, sir, we are sure you will agree that our claims are not unreasonable. We regard our children's welfare just as much as Europeans, and it rends our hearts to think that their future is jeopardized on account of the restrictions imposed upon our race.

4. Permits.—Permits are issued to Chinese who wish to visit their homeland. The time allowed under these permits is twelve months from the time of embarkation in Rabaul to the time of disembarkation in Rabaul on their return. The voyage to China (including time of waiting transport from Australia) occupies approximately two months, and the return voyage, of course, would occupy a like time. This leaves only eight months to be spent in China.

In Australia the total period allowed between departure and return is 36 months, which I submit is not an unreasonable time for such a journey, when one considers the expense attached, and the long periods which must elapse before a man is able, for pecuniary reasons, to undertake such a journey.

We request that the Territory be brought into line with the Commonwealth by extending the period of the permit to 36 months.

5. Chinese residents, before entering the Territory, are required to impress upon their exemption certificates the imprint of the full hand, whereas in other cases the imprint of the thumbs only is asked for. For the purpose of identification, even in legal circles, the imprint of the thumb is regarded as infallible. We ask that the treatment according to Chinese be brought into conformity with that accorded to other Europeans and Asiatics, and that the imprint of the thumb be treated as sufficient for identification purposes. Trivial as this complaint may seem to you, sir, we would point out that to the Chinese it is an important matter. In China the imprint of the full hand is only required from convicted criminals, and the Chinese feel that they are being disgraced by being forced to submit to regula-

tions only applied to criminals in their own country.

In Australia the imprint of the thumb is only required.

6. Many Chinese residents in this Territory are the owners of plantations. In the event of their wishing to visit their homeland, they find it most difficult to do so, because they are unable to find any one who can attend to their interests in the Territory during their absence. White overseers it is impossible to obtain. We would like, therefore, to be assured that, on such an event happening, no objection would be placed in the way of securing the services of a fellow countryman from their homeland, to act in their stead during their absence. We do not ask for unlimited permission to import assistance from China. We would suggest that any Chinese wishing to visit his home be empowered to engage the services of a countryman to act for him, and the person so appointed be allowed to enter the Territory for a limited time, say three years, under such bond as may be considered necessary under the circumstances.

The foregoing are some of the most important matters I, representing the Chinese public, wish to place before you, sir. We feel that you will be able to assist us in your position, and with your long and valuable experience of tropical matters, and your extensive knowledge of Chinese in other parts of the world. The Chinese are, and always have been, amongst the most loyal supporters of the Administration, and we feel sure that our grievances have only to be mentioned, and that they will receive consideration. It is in the hope, sir, that you will recognize the justice of our complaints, and that any recommendations that you may make will be along the lines suggested herein.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Alois Akun.

8. The Expatriate Community

Mrs. Judy Tudor spent several years in New Guinea with her husband, mostly on a gold-mining lease in the Sepik District. Later she worked in Rabaul, and for many years she has been a prominent writer for the Pacific Islands Monthly. She observed the New Guinea Europeans under some of the harshest conditions they experienced.

From: J. Tudor, *Many a Green Isle*, Sydney, 1966, pp. 66-7.

Life in the pre-war Territory was both simpler and more difficult

than it is today. Simpler, because you had no doubts about the rightness of what you were doing; more difficult, because of the physical obstacles in the country itself.

In the world outside few people then had ever heard of New Guinea; even fewer cared that it existed. Consequently, only a minority of advanced cranks had ideas about the wickedness of our brand of colonialism or what since has been called the exploitation of the natives.

We laughed about being Empire Builders but, secretly, felt that we should be congratulated on being just that. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Africa had been colonised, and it had been found good. Ergo, it was equally good that we should assume the white man's burden in darkest New Guinea.

We expected to be respected, have privileges, feel superior. In return, we were the Rock on which such frail structures as honesty, fair-play, protectiveness, obligation were to be erected. Generally, we lived a life of natural *apartheid*, in which the native inhabitants went their way and we ours, meeting at such points as were mutually advantageous—but where we called the tune. This, anyway, was the theory.

According to today's book, we were long in sin. According to ours, long in virtue. The extraordinary thing is that less than a generation separates the two attitudes.

Away from the townships there was great isolation. The bush was a place where you were suddenly, sometimes quite awfully, thrown on your own devices in a way you would not know in a lifetime in Australian suburbia. Nor was the Government there to throw a protecting cloak over you or to give advice; but simply—or so it seemed to us—to crack down on you if you made any errors in judgment.

Above all else, the bush society was an exclusive society; one in which those who were in it, whether in government or not, were aloof from the newcomer, who could not enter the sacred circle until, by deed or the effluxion of time, he had proved his mettle.

Much has been written about Australian male mateship, but little of this mateship, as far as I could see, extended to the mining areas of New Guinea. Here men were lone wolves, with their own individual formulae for almost every aspect of living with the country and extracting from it the things for which they had come.

Conviviality was restricted to visits to the coastal centres, the places where men disembarked from or embarked on ships, went to collect their stores and their mail, to gather to drink at the pub, if there were one; or to carouse in some native-built rest-house.

The highest accolade in this society was to be dubbed “experienced”; the most damning—and all newcomers went through it—was to be classed as inexperienced. It was like being a new boy at school over again. No one helped you do what was considered right; but all felt obliged to tell you that what you did was wrong.

9. Errol Flynn’s New Guinea days

Not all Europeans went to New Guinea to carry the “white man’s burden”. Some, like the future film star Errol Flynn, came to look for adventure and to escape the conventions and restrictions of their own society.

From: J. K. McCarthy, *Patrol into Yesterday*, Melbourne, 1963, pp. 114-15.

There had been a tall fellow of my own age at Kokopo when I arrived there in 1927, and he now appeared in Salamaua. His name was Errol Flynn. The debonair Flynn had been appointed a Cadet Patrol Officer at Kokopo, and he told me then that he had arrived in New Guinea in a friend’s yacht. He was a handsome youth, who appeared to have a wise head on his wide shoulders. We forgave him the white jodhpurs that he affected when we found he played a good game of tennis.

Flynn at Kokopo was apt to play the pansy when drunks were boasting of their fighting ability. A drunk would pick on Flynn and then the fun would begin—for Errol Flynn really could box. After the first two or three of these displays I rather disliked the others, but there was one occasion when I did admire him for stepping in to protect a small man against a bully. It was done in the most dramatic style, and all of us should have foreseen that he had a movie career ahead of him. There was the noisy bar, the crowd of onlookers, the challenge—and the hero knocking the loud-mouthed one cold, right on cue.

Here at Salamaua in 1933 Errol Flynn was as debonair as ever, but broke. He was not now with the Administration—he had resigned while he was still at Kokopo. He had been recruiting native labour and he had tried his hand at goldmining, but he was successful at neither. To keep going he had borrowed from many of the generous miners, and owed money everywhere. Quite a few pounds were owed to the local dentist, Eric Ween. These matters were no concern of mine, of course, but when half-a-dozen natives who had worked for Flynn at Wau complained to the District Office that their wages

were still owing, I was asked to go along and see what could be done.

Flynn was magnificently optimistic.

'You don't have to worry about a thing,' he said. 'I am just waiting on some money that's owed to me in Australia. And there are a few cheques due locally in a day or two. By the way, I suppose you've heard of Elstree Studios in England? I've been offered a contract—cash in advance—and I'm thinking of accepting.'

I kept after Errol for several days. He was charming, and his optimism was unbounded. Finally he paid up—to my surprise, although he didn't owe the natives much. He owed Ween and the others much more, with the result that when, shortly after this incident, Errol Flynn suddenly left New Guinea, the things that were being said about him in Salamaua were far from complimentary.

'A man should have filled his blasted teeth with temporary stoppings!' roared Ween, who was also a miner and a man who loved a scrap.

Ween never forgot that particular debt. Years later, when Errol Flynn was famous, Eric Ween sent him a bill for his fillings. Flynn replied—with a large, glossy autographed picture of himself. Ween hung it in his lavatory—an outside pan affair—and I think the cockroaches eventually chewed it up.

Flynn left New Guinea on a steamer for Hong Kong. We heard that he arrived in the East all right, through a message from the Hong Kong police asking us about several thousand pounds worth of 'uncut diamonds' that Flynn had had with him on the ship and which he had told the police he had found in New Guinea. But the only diamonds to be found in New Guinea adorned the handsome persons of several ladies there—and certainly none ever came out of the ground. What the result of that episode was we never heard, although some people would like to have known—among them, no doubt, the proprietor of the Salamaua pub who, much later, opened a trunk that Flynn had left behind and found it crammed with the hotel's sheets and towels.

V. ASSESSMENTS

There have been many criticisms of Australian colonial policy, and as many defences. Whatever their attitude, the people who went to New Guinea were fascinated by the country and its problems.

1. Australia and the League of Nations

Australia's performance as a mandatory power had been criticised in its time by the League of Nations, and since then by a good many independent observers. Any criticism of the mandate, however, should take note of the fact that between the wars positive doctrines of economic and social development were not generally accepted throughout the colonial world, and that Australia was, in a sense, itself an "under-developed" country. This extract provides one explanation for Australia's lack of interest in New Guinea before 1941.

From: W. J. Hudson, "Australia's Experience as a Mandatory Power", *Australian Outlook*, April 1965, pp. 35-7, 43-6.

The way in which Australia became a mandatory power needs little description. At the request of the British Government and on the clear understanding that Australia was to act merely as an agent, the Australian Government in 1914 secured by force the German colonies to the north of Australia and south of the equator, the major territory being that of German New Guinea adjacent to the Australian possession of Papua. During succeeding war years, a conflict situation developed: within Australia, there developed an assumption of Australian post-war control of the formerly German colonies; overseas, there developed a strong sentiment against territorial aggrandisement and there emerged the notion of international mandates. The resolution of this conflict at the Paris Peace Conference is well known: W. M. Hughes fought for annexation but was at last induced to accept an arrangement whereby Australia would administer New Guinea under the very light trammel of a 'C' class League mandate and would share with Britain and New Zealand the administration of the prize of Nauru.

Considering what Hughes can be assumed to have known about German hostility towards Australia in the Pacific, considering deeply ingrained Australian suspicion of Japan, and considering acute Australian sensitivity on immigration policy, it is fairly clear that Australia's primary motive in seeking control of the island territories to the north was based on security postulates. It is also fairly clear that, having achieved sufficient control over them to neutralise any threat to immigration policy and having achieved, apparently, deliverance from the possibility of nearby fortification by a potentially unfriendly power, Australian governments over the next two decades were inclined to pay a minimum of further attention to them. Financial policy was the then orthodox one of colonial self-sufficiency. As Cook said of New Guinea in his 1921 budget speech:

After considerable pruning, the expenditure estimates have been reduced to a sum not exceeding estimated revenue. In accepting the mandate, Australia has entered upon additional responsibility, but no stone will be left unturned to prevent further financial burdens being entailed thereby.

An official report in 1924 noted 'an absence of any constructive policy' in New Guinea and concluded that the territory's administration had so far cost Australia virtually nothing. As McAuley has said of the whole inter-war period, 'there was no thought of promoting development by the deliberate intervention of Commonwealth finance'...

Official reaction to criticism by the League of Nations took two major forms; fear of losing the mandate and concern for the preservation of domestic jurisdiction. The former led to pressure being brought to bear to minimise even domestic criticism of the Government's handling of the mandate. In 1923, Bruce, for example, appealed to members to say nothing which could be used overseas to reflect on the New Guinea administration. Pearce, in 1926, warned senators that 'everything said in connection with the Mandated Territory is closely scrutinised, including debates in Parliament, and any statements made without backing are used against us at the League of Nations'. Even Beasley was fearful of rumours and misleading information coming from New Guinea to Australia and then being cabled abroad where 'there are those . . . who . . . are eager to place before the League of Nations reports which rebound to the discredit of Australia's administration'.

Two examples of the latter related to petitions and immigration policy. Australia was less than happy with the League Council's decision in 1923 to allow the commission to receive petitions from mandated territories, despite the provision that such petitions might

not be considered until the respective mandatory powers had seen them and supplied their comments. Cook felt that 'proper precautions must be taken to prevent such rights of petition being made an instrument in the hands of agitators for the annoyance of the mandatory authorities'. Commission publicity was quite sufficient as a safeguard against abuse of the mandates. When the question of oral petitions was raised (and disallowed by the Council), Australia was utterly hostile. The mandatory power, argued Latham, would have to appear and answer oral petitions and would thus be 'put on trial' on charges which might, after expensive delays, turn out to be frivolous or vexatious. . . .

Australia, then, received a fair measure of criticism but accepted it without much apparent distress. The structure of the League's accountability system, of course, was such that this criticism came mainly from within the white man's club. A disinclination to accept criticism from lesser breeds like Abyssinians foreshadowed post-1945 developments. Fortunately for Australia, her territories' internal affairs caused her little embarrassment; as one writer put it in 1928, 'the maxim "happy is the nation which has no history" held good for the mandated territories par excellence'. It is clear that Australia was constantly alive to the domestic jurisdiction barrier beyond which she would not tolerate League encroachments. It is equally clear that Australia did not merely accept criticism: she showed some aplomb in ignoring it and going her own way.

2. A D.O.'s Defence

In later years Eric Feldt, a former District Officer, goldfields Warden and wartime head of the Coastwatchers, pointed out some facts and attitudes.

From: E. Feldt, "New Guinea's Between-Wars Administration Is Too Frequently Misunderstood", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, May 1967, pp. 58-9.

We had no financial assistance from the Commonwealth in those early days but lived on our own revenue. Our first duty was to bring the country under control and so establish a peaceful order. This with the supervision of native labour and the supply of medical services (which themselves cost more than the head-tax collected), left no money for anything else.

We could have done more in education, but not much more in view of the cultural indigestion of the natives.

Opportunities were there for the native to make money if he would. He had his own land, he knew how to grow coconuts and make copra, as he had worked at it on plantations, and there was a ready market. But only rarely would he do it.

In the early twenties, I remember that Goi, of Namatanai, was one man who did so, and he had a European-style cottage. His wife would not live in it, and occupied a native material hut alongside.

Some officers, at the risk of being accused of having used forced labour, ordered natives to plant coconuts on the excuse that they were food crops, but really with the object of increasing their money income. But the natives were lethargic.

It has been pleaded that the natives had no money, but it was later estimated that 10 million shillings were hoarded in villages by the time World War II broke out. Another excuse is that they did not know enough about money, but anyone who tried to take it off them found, finally, that they knew *something*.

When the depression came, many of us believed that the native producer, having no overhead, would weather it better than the planter. But it did not work out that way. Native-produced copra was of such poor quality that it could not be sold, and copra inspection had to be introduced to protect the market. There was no sinister plot to prevent the native making copra.

Incidentally, native wages were not reduced during the big economic depression—a rare distinction. Overall, the wages of the unskilled worker compared well with those in such countries as the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya and Java. And there were so few skilled native workers in New Guinea that no comparison can be made at this level.

But copra production was for the coastal natives. For the inlanders there was no economic solution apart from going off to work, unless the country round was auriferous. Though hundreds of them had worked alluvial gold, they would not work their own areas. Both as DO and as Warden, I tried to induce them to do so without success. The Waria Valley was perfect for it.

Today natives are working gold but there is no reason why they should not have done so 30 years ago—nothing except conservatism and laziness.

Our Administration was admittedly paternal. But I still believe it was the most humane way of governing the country at the time. If we had forced the native into a civilised commercial way of life then, he would have died off in thousands. The other alternative was to have imported Eastern coolie labour, in which case the result would have been worse still.

3. A Frenchman Looks into the Future

A point to be taken into account when assessing Australia's record in the Mandated Territory is the speed of development in the colonial world since the beginning of the Second World War. In 1939 the colonial empires were at their height: thirty years later they had all but disappeared. This is something which even the most ardent friend of the colonial peoples could not have foreseen in the 1930s, and Demaitre was no exception.

From: E. Demaitre, *New Guinea Gold*, London, 1936, pp. 251-5.

A philosopher, not unknown to fame, claimed that man living in a state of nature had more human kindness and deeper feelings than man 'corrupted' by the institutions of civilised society.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not, it is true, ever visit New Guinea.

If he had, he would certainly not have upheld with such conviction his well-known thesis. He would no doubt have discovered that contact with men 'living in a state of nature' produces feelings of horror and disgust, rather than pure intellectual or moral pleasure.

This does not mean that civilised man has no serious defects. Progress in fact robs us of certain qualities, which on the other hand are highly developed in savages, but, all the same, it is rare for us to sink to the degree of moral and physical degradation which prevails among men not 'tainted' by civilisation. I admit that, in war and in the revolutions which follow it, men claiming to be civilised have committed acts of barbarism worthy of the Ku-Ku-Ku-Kus and other head-hunters. But such acts, which are very rare with us, are the general rule among cannibals. . . .

Still, in what concerns vital problems, impulses, desires, passions, will, and ambition, the cannibal is not perhaps so far removed as one might expect from the man who, for example, in Paris revels in the poems of Verlaine, who at Toledo admires the pictures of El Greco, who in Arizona builds huge bridges, or who makes a ritual of afternoon tea in a fashionable club in Pall Mall.

I do not lay any claim to originality in affirming this, but it may be that I am the first, so to speak, who has 'photographed' it.

The camera which I took with me to New Guinea had no philosophical, social, or political convictions. It gathered truth, and reproduced it, without attenuating or exaggerating either facts or scenes, and without adding to the picture either comments or arguments. It portrays men as they are, *sub specie aeternitatis*, as they used to say in the eighteenth century.

Certainly there is a difference in degree. But no matter. Our

instincts and reflexes are, if not identical with, at least analogous to those of a cannibal, who, after all, is still *homo sapiens*, though six degrees south of the equator.

The great-grandchildren of those I met in the bush will wear white duck trousers, will read the works of Karl Marx, and at their Grand Palavers, which will then be called 'meetings', will clamour for Dominion Status for New Guinea. A few hours after the new government has submitted its programme to the Parliament sitting at Rabaul the British Resident General will be on the links, playing a round of golf with the *luluai* of Morobe or Sepik. Next day the new Academy of Arts and Letters will be inaugurated, and in the course of the proceedings a Professor of Salamaua University will make a speech to prove that travellers who a hundred years ago drew such a gloomy picture of the ancestors of their noble race were without the slightest doubt either liars or fools.

4. New Guinea and Papua

Twenty years after the first inquiry into the amalgamation of Papua and New Guinea, a second committee decided that the two Territories had since gone their separate ways.

From: *Report of Committee Appointed to Survey the Possibility of Establishing a Combined Administration of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 230, 1939, pp. 5-6.

8. The Committee has arrived at unanimous conclusions as to the questions which it was asked to investigate. It is desirable, therefore, to commence the Report with a very short summary of the conclusions and the main reasons therefore, and then to elaborate in detail the meaning of these conclusions and the reasons which have influenced the members of the Committee. Though unanimous in their answers to the questions put in the terms of reference, the members of the Committee are not always in agreement as to the reasons for a conclusion or as to the weight to be given to certain factors.

9. In the first two of the terms of reference we are asked to consider

- (1) Whether any form of combined administration for the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea is necessary or desirable for the progress and

prosperity of those territories and in the interests of their people.

- (2) If so, what form of combined administration would be most suitable. . . .

11. We have arrived at the conclusion that at the present time, a fully combined administration for the two territories is not desirable in the interests of the territories or their people and even if it were desirable there are financial and legal reasons which make it impracticable at present. The following is a summary of the course of reasoning which has led us to this conclusion.

12. The two territories of Papua and New Guinea are so similar in natural resources, population and physical characteristics, geographical conditions and native races, that if they had been acquired at the same time and under similar titles it is highly improbable that they would have been divided into separate political units. The size of the combined area would have made a certain amount of decentralization desirable but it is not large as compared with other Colonial territories. Generally speaking, it seems desirable that contiguous territories in the same geographical area and with the same problems should be governed as one political unit.

13. The two territories, however, were acquired at different times and under different titles and their history as separate units makes a combined administration difficult for a variety of reasons. These factors may be classified as under:—

- A. Differences of laws, administrative methods and conditions.
- B. Difficulties arising from different financial position.
- C. Considerations arising under the Mandate.

14. The main differences in law and administrative methods are as follows (the list is not exhaustive):—

(1) *Difference of Native Policy*.—There is a higher minimum wage and a shorter period of indenture in Papua than in the Mandated Territory. Values have been fixed around these factors and the application to the combined area of the present laws of either territory or any compromise would almost certainly be opposed.

(2) *Supply of Native Labour*.—New Guinea has drawn on the native population to a greater extent than Papua and there is a demand for further supplies in that territory. The Papuan employers want to conserve their supply and would oppose a combined administration if it would mean access by New Guinea employers to Papua's labour supply.

- (3) *Asiatic Population.*—There is a population of Asiatics in New Guinea; mainly the descendants of the Chinese workers brought in by the Germans. The number is about 1,800. The European community in Papua is afraid that the Asiatic population in New Guinea would be permitted to enter their territory and they would oppose a combined administration on this ground.
- (4) *Native Education.*—Papua has adopted a policy of native education through the missions and gives a *per capita* subsidy subject to inspection and examination. This policy has not been adopted in New Guinea.
- (5) *Mission Policy.*—Since the time of Sir William MacGregor, there has been an informal agreement between the missions for separate spheres of influence. No such arrangement exists in New Guinea and it would probably conflict with the Mandate.
- (6) *The Revenue Policy* of the territories differs considerably. Tariffs and taxes are different. New Guinea imposes a 5 per cent. gold royalty. Papua has no gold tax and exempts machinery from import duty. The copra export duties are also different. Owing to the different circumstances of the two territories it would be difficult to get a compromise on these points accepted.
- (7) There are differences in the political constitution of the two territories as set out in the New Guinea Act and the Papua Act. These appear to be small but are regarded as important. The Papua Act gives more power, in certain respects, to the Lieutenant-Governor.
- (8) The people of Papua would prefer to be an Australian territory than to be held under a mandate. The reasons for this will be dealt with later.

15. The above are samples of the differences which exist and perhaps they could be adjusted without vital sacrifice on either side if the union were definitely desirable on other grounds. Indeed, no political union would ever be consummated unless obstacles of greater difficulty were overcome. On the other hand, they are obstacles which appear important to the inhabitants of small communities, especially those which are struggling with pioneering problems. A government introducing a measure for closer union would probably have to face opposition from both territories. As a fact, political unions are rare unless some overwhelming, urgent need exists, or a substantial body of public opinion demands it. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire whether—

- (a) there is any popular demand for combined administration;
 - (b) there is any urgent need for it;
 - (c) any striking improvement in administration or reduction of expense would result from it.
16. In answer to the above questions, the following is submitted:—
- (a) There is no popular demand for a combined administration. The weight of evidence which we received in both territories was definitely against a combined administration, though some people expressed themselves as unable to give an opinion in the absence of any concrete proposal.
 - (b) There is no urgent need for closer union; the chief support for closer union comes from those who stress the problems of defence and think that the Mandate impedes the defence of New Guinea. Amalgamation, in the view of these people, involves a repudiation of the Mandate and practical annexation of the territory.
 - (c) The improvement in administration and reduction in expense likely from combined administration are at least problematical; in fact the chief advantage would be to solve certain problems on common lines and to prevent the development of further differences. No great economy is likely from combined administration.

CHAPTER SEVEN

WAR AND ITS EFFECTS

I. THE FIGHTING IN NEW GUINEA

Whatever the merits of European control in Papua and New Guinea, Australian policy collapsed abruptly with the Japanese attacks that accompanied the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941. Before long, enemy troops overran many parts of the Mandated Territory and air attacks on Port Moresby began. Such events were beyond the control of government officials; those in New Guinea were captured or retreated, while the Papuan service was forced to hand over to the Army. The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (Angau) governed the country until the bitter campaigns against the Japanese ended in 1945.

1. Chaos in Port Moresby

It was alleged that the attacks on Port Moresby created panic. A war correspondent, George Johnston, presented a most unflattering picture of the general reaction to the crisis.

From: G. H. Johnston, *New Guinea Diary*, Sydney, 1943, pp. 18-19.

Strewn all over the main street are pieces of twisted corrugated iron, splintered plaster and smashed timber—souvenirs of the two night raids. A few houses and shops have been blown to pieces and scores of others damaged by blast. Practically none of the lathe and plaster buildings in Port Moresby would be able to stand up to the blast of a fair-sized bomb and it is evidence of the inaccuracy of the Japanese bomb-aimers that half the town isn't in ruins. Actually the

damage is quite slight. Casualties have been one man killed and a couple slightly injured.

The consensus of opinion is, of course, that the town will be wiped out when the Japs really get started. For that reason it has been completely abandoned. To-day there isn't a soul living in the town area proper, which is generally referred to as "Bomb Decoy No. 1". There is plenty of activity by day, but at night Papua's capital is now abandoned and in the hotels and houses, where there were the sounds of tinkling ice and swing music and laughter only a few weeks ago, there is no sound but the buzzing of the insects and the kek-kek-kek-kek of little gecko lizards.

The troops are not waiting for the town to be wiped out. Looting has been going on for days, in some cases on a grand scale. I agree with what might be termed "organized impressment" under these conditions, but this has been carried into the realms of sheer vandalism.

I went into some of the stores to-day and the picture was staggering. Shelves had been torn down from walls and their contents were thigh deep on the floor. I had to wade through one sea of ripped women's frocks, over which had been spilt bags of flour and scores of tins of paint. On top of this chaotic mess were dozens of shattered hurricane lanterns. I don't think the troops will need women's frocks, nor will they find much use for bright red and yellow enamel. But I'll swear there'll be a lot of people wanting hurricane lanterns before long.

Number one priority for the looter was, naturally, liquor. And war came to Port Moresby at a time when there were big stocks in the town, in the bond shed on the wharf, and in most of the homes. By a process of transportation that would have been admirable in any army, this considerable stock of spirits and ales was transferred to army camps and establishments for miles around within a few hours.

2. Suspension of Civil Administration

The Papuan administration was obviously unable to cope with the situation, but then it had never been intended to do so. Much of the criticism which was subsequently levelled at the service and the Administrator (Mr. Leonard Murray, Sir Hubert's nephew) was unduly severe. A Commission of inquiry under Mr. J. V. Barry, K.C., was asked to report on the events of early 1942; while finding the administration blameless, he damned it with the faintest of praise.

From: *Report of a Commission of Inquiry into . . . the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February 1942*, Melbourne, 1945, pp. 25-6, 51, 56.

I am satisfied that the looting did not assume large proportions until after the second bombing raid but thereafter it is undoubted that the theft and destruction of civilian property was general and extensive . . . It must be borne in mind that there was a general belief in Port Moresby, which all the knowledge then available suggested to be well-founded, that the enemy would attack and invade Port Moresby. If such an attack and invasion had been undertaken by the enemy at that stage it could have had only one outcome. The resources at the disposal of the Commandant were quite inadequate to enable any attack in strength to be repelled, and the general feeling was, therefore, that civilian property would either be destroyed by air attack or bombardment or fall into the hands of the enemy. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that respect for private property, particularly where there was any appearance of abandonment, diminished to such an extent as no longer to act as a restraining influence. The civil administration was powerless to prevent the looting, and even if it had been functioning in full vigor, it could not have done so. Because of the lack of discipline of the troops under his command and the worthlessness of his insufficient Provost personnel, it was impossible for the Commandant, confronted as he was with an extraordinarily difficult and complicated situation, to take any effective steps to prevent the looting . . .

Reading the communications that passed between the Administrator and the authorities in Canberra it is impossible to escape a feeling that an Administrator who felt it necessary to refer as constantly for instructions could never cope with the unprecedented situation which developed with bewildering rapidity in January and February, 1942 . . . I think it is too harsh a criticism of the Administrator to say, as did the Chief of the General Staff in a minute which was incorporated in War Cabinet Agendum No. 82/1942 of 5th February, 1942, that he was "apparently . . . unwilling to assume the responsibilities which devolved upon him", but there is substance in the view that his training and experience made him unsuited for the arduous role thrust upon him. Such a situation had never been foreseen and no plans existed to which he could conform. . . .

To state the matter compendiously, I consider the Administrator was, if I may use the phrase, the prisoner of circumstances, and those circumstances were of a kind so overwhelming and so foreign to anything with which his experience and training had made him familiar

and the powers that he had been accustomed to exercise enabled him to deal that it would be exacting an unreasonably high standard to ascribe the necessity to make the military authority supreme to any censurable failure on his part. It was the impact of events upon an administrative machine incapable of withstanding their force that brought about that result.

3. Confusion in the Villages

The events of the war were even more confusing to most villagers than their first contacts with Europeans had been. The Mandated Territory had already seen several masters, and so another caused little surprise. But the Japanese and the allies both wished to win the loyalty of the people, who could be punished for disobeying either group. The treatment of the villagers angered several later observers, among them Dr. Ian Hogbin, who gave his own version of events in Busama, a village near Lae.

From: H. I. Hogbin, *Transformation Scene*, London, 1951, pp. 7-12.

A few days after the landing a small detachment of Japanese military police, including an interpreter who spoke pidgin English, went around the countryside with orders that the village officials should attend at the headquarters to receive instructions. Each settlement had two such leaders recognised by the Australian Administration, a senior called the luluai and an assistant referred to as the tultul. The Busama luluai, a man named Bumbu . . . had gone into hiding, but the tultul, Isom, thought it advisable to recognise the *de facto* authority and make the journey. In the absence of his superior, who was later imprisoned for disobedience, he was created headman and invested with appropriate insignia. The chief of the military police stated that all orders would be issued through Isom and that he was to inform the villagers of the probability of future requests for food and casual labourers. Everything would be paid for in invasion currency, which could be spent in shops to be set up when the war was over.

Village affairs went along smoothly for two or three months. The Japanese bought pigs and fruit and occasionally sought the services of a group of men for a few days to unload a submarine or assist in dragging guns and other gear into position, but they never interfered in purely domestic matters. . . .

The luluai Bumbu was now released from his imprisonment. Burning with resentment at his dismissal, he sent word through his

daughter to ANGAU officers inland at Wau that the villagers, led by Isom, were giving the enemy willing assistance. A raid by native police under the command of two white men was accordingly arranged to bring the new headman to trial. The plan was for a night surprise, but in the darkness friend and foe were indistinguishable. An old woman and a youth were shot dead by the police and another youth bayoneted, but Isom made his escape.

A couple of months afterwards, in September, a party of three native policemen who were scouting for the Allied Forces walked into one of the refugee camps. The labourers promptly seized them, bound their wrists, and marched them to Busama, where the leader told the people to hand them over to the Japanese. If this was not done, he said, he would lay information at Salamaua, and doubtless everyone would be punished. . . . The villagers felt bound to obey, and the captives were soon incarcerated.

An order immediately went out for the Busama elders to appear before the Japanese commander. He addressed them through an interpreter and asked those related to the persons killed in the earlier raid to stand. The deaths of the police, it was suggested, might be a fitting return for the murders: did everyone agree? Again I cannot tell what the real feelings of those present were, but they clearly had no alternative but to say 'yes', and next day the three men were shot. . . .

Salamaua was eventually recaptured on September 14, 1943, eighteen months after its occupation. Large Forces were soon concentrated nearby, and the Busama village site served as a convalescent camp. . . .

One of the District Officer's first moves was to despatch a posse of police to arrest Isom and the men who had captured the three scouts. Forewarned, Isom took to the hills. . . .

Bumbu lost no time in paying his respects to ANGAU. The Administration had for years reposed trust in him, and his claim that he had been imprisoned and tortured for refusing to co-operate with the Japanese was given full credence. The District Officer recommended a decoration, and a Loyal Service Medal was eventually awarded. To heighten the effect and pay back a few old scores Bumbu also circulated the untruth that the rest of the Busama had openly courted the enemy and done all in their power to bring about a Japanese victory. The story was repeated so often, with more and more circumstantial details as time went on, that some officials came to refer to the village as 'disloyal'. . . . If words are to retain their ordinary implications, however, it is surely impossible for anyone to be 'disloyal' to an alien Government which is none of his choosing, or 'disloyal' to a cause

which he has no power to accept or reject—a cause, moreover, which he does not have the necessary background to comprehend. In New Guinea, too, the German Administration had been overthrown in 1914, and the people were not to know that our departure twenty-eight years later would be less permanent.

The reply which a Busama native gave to this former employer when asked in my presence why he had not joined up at once with the Allies has much point. 'The negroes stuck to the Americans,' said the employer. 'Why didn't you do the same?' 'The American Government taught the negroes to read and write and so made it possible for them to understand all about the war,' was the reply. 'Our Government gave us nothing. The little learning that we had came from the Missions. The Americans also furnished the negroes with weapons, but what guns did we receive?'

The usual Busama attitude, at least in the beginning, was one of neutrality: the people were neither pro-Japanese nor anti-Japanese. But so long as the enemy had the power of punishment it was obviously inexpedient to neglect his orders. Increasing familiarity, however, aroused contempt. The natives were disgusted by the filth of the Japanese Army, by its neglect of the wounded, and by its indifference to hygiene. The ordinary soldiers are said to have defecated outside their quarters in preference to using latrines.

Many, perhaps the majority, were neutral also to the Allies and gave them assistance no less but no more willingly. A certain number had in the preceding years developed close ties with particular white men and on this account were prepared to stand beside them in hardship and danger; but such conduct was a matter of personal trust and had nothing to do with political conviction.

The aid which was given to the Japanese voluntarily by individual natives in other parts of New Guinea may possibly be attributable in some instances to similar friendships, but real or fancied grievances against Europeans are the more common explanation.

Later, in March 1944, the New Guinea native infantry battalion was formed. Volunteers were found without difficulty, and the detachment earned a fine name for itself, winning several decorations. It would be rash to assume from this, nevertheless, that there was any belief in the Allies having a monopoly of right and justice. Some men joined to carry on the warrior traditions of their fathers, some for adventure, some for the high pay, some for the glamour of a uniform, some to see the world, some because their friends had already done so, some as an escape from unhappy domesticity.

4. The Peoples' Contribution

Despite some doubts about the villagers' "loyalty", Australians generally formed the opinion that the people of New Guinea were in full support of the war effort, because of the patience and courage displayed by many in helping allied servicemen. Some colourful descriptions were provided, partly as a form of propaganda and partly from genuine conviction; all were important in influencing post-war Australian attitudes to the Territory and its people.

From: G. H. Johnston, *New Guinea Diary*, Sydney, 1943, pp. 156, 165-7.

I was glad to hear General Blamey pay tribute to the work of the Papuan native carriers. Our good treatment of the natives in the past has earned us rich rewards. "These natives can't be given too much praise," he said. "They've carried stretchers through feet-deep mud with the Australian wounded, down slimy defiles, through terrible jungles. They were almost at the point of exhaustion, but they always kept two men awake at night to take care of the patients, to wash their muddy limbs, to attend to their bandages and to give them their meals. The work of these natives has been astounding. We owe them a lasting debt." . . .

Thursday, 1 October

Today, squat, broad-shouldered, well-muscled, fierce-eyed Sergeant Katue, coal-black warrior of the all-native Papuan Infantry Battalion—a force which has done magnificent work on jungle patrols since the Japanese landing 10 weeks ago—walked into an Australian post with a scared-looking Japanese prisoner. Katue created a profound impression. Apparently he intended to, because stitched to his standard Khaki tunic was a mass of stripes, badges and regimental insignia which Katue had taken from 26 Japanese soldiers and marines, all of whom he had killed during a spectacular two months' patrol inside the Japanese-occupied areas north of the range.

Gunmen of the Wild West cut a notch in their revolver butts to signify each victim. Katue merely cut off the sergeant's or corporal's stripes, or marine's insignia, or lieutenant's badges, and stitched them on around his own three red sergeant's stripes until his jacket outshone the uniform of a Patagonian grand admiral.

When I spoke to him to-day he grinned widely, showing an expanse of broken teeth, blackened by betel nut, and in pidgin English carefully explained the rank and fate of each former owner

of each piece of enemy insignia. Several of his victims were privates, with no badges to take, although Katue made it clear that he had tried to concentrate on the top men, and he shrugged his shoulders lugubriously as he explained why he didn't have more stripes on his already resplendent uniform.

"Some Japanese, he no good. He wear nothing worth taking." So just to keep the record straight Katue brought back a cloth cap, bearing the anchor insignia of the Japanese marines, which one of his victims had been wearing. . . .

The fighting sergeant moved like a black phantom through the dripping jungles, recruiting men as he went, until eventually his little private army numbered 14. Next day they saw a Japanese soldier climbing an orange-tree. Katue picked him off from long range with a bullet through the brain. The noise of the shot brought 16 Japanese running from a hut near by. Katue's men met them with a withering fire, and four Japanese fell dead and the rest fled.

Some time later they came to a storehouse filled with food, and to prevent its falling into Japanese hands Katue burnt it to the ground. A party of six Japanese soldiers with two native guides came trotting along to investigate the fire. Katue shot and killed the eight of them. By this time the little native force was out of ammunition, and they trekked for days through terrible country to an Australian base, where they obtained additional weapons and ammunition, and set out on their self-imposed job again. . . .

In one village the headman came out wearing long pants, a frock coat, a Japanese helmet, six stripes and a huge tin medal—all gifts from the Japanese—and refused to co-operate with Katue. A few minutes later, after Katue had very effectively demonstrated his intention, the quaking headman was completely pro-Allies. He scaled a coco-nut palm and pointed out to Katue three Japanese soldiers walking along the track toward the village. Katue strolled out to meet them, killed two and captured the third. That was the captive he brought in to-day, together with a great bundle of captured Japanese equipment, including a couple of tommy-guns. In his 73-day jungle war in miniature Katue never had one man wounded or even sick. They lived entirely on indigenous fruits and what native food they could get from villages, and they travelled hundreds of miles.

5. Helping the Coastwatchers

A few Australians were landed behind enemy lines to observe

Japanese activities. In most cases they received invaluable assistance from village headmen and officials.

From: Eric Feldt, *The Coastwatchers*, Melbourne, 1946, pp. 320-1.

Figgis also remembered that to the southwest lived a *Luluai*, or chief, named Golpak, who had been of considerable help to the retreating soldiers on New Britain in the early days of the war. A meeting with him was arranged in a jungle hamlet near the coastwatchers' camp, and immediately he arrived the watchers knew that in this dignified old man they had a staunch friend. On their part, they could only assure him that the Japanese would one day be driven from the island. But Golpak needed no elaborate assurances, no persuasion. His faith was as strong as theirs and he unreservedly promised his help and support.

Piranis, the principal chief to the north, sent word on his own initiative that he, too, would support the coastwatchers. He was a comparatively young man of strong character, and he had considerable authority in his area, although neither he nor Golpak could impart their resolution to the timid coastal natives. Piranis and Golpak would be forced to obey the Japanese orders but, they made it plain, they would give underground assistance. Dissimulation is second nature to the native, as it is to most subject peoples, and Wright knew that no coaching of the two chiefs was necessary.

The terror of the neighbourhood during this period was a Manus native, Eiwei, who was serving the Japanese as a policeboy. He had given the watchers no trouble, which puzzled everyone because it seemed incredible that he had not heard of their presence. One day he drew aside a native who was friendly to the coastwatchers and mentioned that he knew of the party and wanted to assist it. The word was passed on to Wright who sent Eiwei an invitation to visit the post.

Courageously, Eiwei walked into camp, alone, undefended, knowing that if his sentiments were doubted he would be shot. Tears came to his eyes when he saw Europeans again and met his old friend, Sergeant Simogun. With dignity he told his simple story. He had been left in Rabaul when it fell and had had to serve the Japanese or starve. Many other ex-police, he said, were in a like position and would come over to our side at the first opportunity. Wright's presence was already common knowledge in their ranks and to their minds disproved Japanese propaganda that Australia was conquered and the war over. His position made clear, Eiwei returned to the Japanese, outwardly to serve them.

6. Angau Labour Policy

The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit controlled those areas not under Japanese occupation. A great many people were brought in to work for the allied armies. Angau had the difficult task of balancing village welfare against the needs of the war effort and its work was the subject of some strong criticism.

From: W. E. H. Stanner, *The South Seas in Transition*, Sydney, 1953, pp. 80-1.

An investigation carried out . . . in 1944 claimed, with evident truth, many damaging results of such large-scale compulsory employment. In February 1944 the European strength of ANGAU was 1,349, of whom 723 were members of the Native Labour Service. The report stated that some of these troops were unfit to be in charge of natives. Others were said to be making strenuous efforts to maintain good conditions; some were inexperienced; and "to judge from their conversation some of the old hands regard brutality as part of the regular routine". Conditions in some compounds and sleeping quarters left "much to be desired". There were no food shortages, though these had been "not uncommon in the past". The distribution of clothes was faulty, "everyone was in rags at Finschhafen" and labourers at Arawe were "wearing bark cloth". Many labourers were "bitter" and "hostile" over their forced labour and "breach of promises" to send them home, or because of general debility, fatigue and homesickness. The report referred to the compulsory employment of 5,000 labourers on Papuan plantations by the Production Control Board, where "although conscripted they are working for the profit of private employers", a twisted observation which makes the objectivity of the report doubtful.

The report quoted "without comment" an order issued from ANGAU on 3 November 1943:

"If a member of the field staff (of ANGAU) conducting an inspection (of a plantation of the Production Control Board) possesses the necessary authority, he should deal immediately with the charges laid against the labourers by the employer. No proceedings will be taken, however, against an employer until a full report has been submitted to this H.Q. and an instruction received that proceedings are to be instituted".

The probability is that the order was issued in this form because of the Cabinet's instruction for the "absolute maximum" production of rubber.

The incidence of compulsory recruitment was certainly very high, as Tables 11 and 12, extracted from the above report, show:

PERCENTAGE OF INDENTURED LABOUR TO TOTAL MALE
POPULATION IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS OF MANDATED
TERRITORY, 1944

Date	Region	Lowest Percent- age	Highest Percent- age	Average Percent- age	Number of Villages	Number of Villages with over 33% of Males Indentured
1944	Cape					
April	Gloucester	5	66	29.7	30	13
March	Yabim	29	47	36.3	14	12
March	Kalasa	11	45	26.6	35	11
Not stated	Lower-Watut	20	51	32.5	9	3
Not stated	Mid-Watut	7	41	20.6	26	3

NUMBER OF MALES RECRUITED FROM ELEVEN VILLAGES IN
MANDATED TERRITORY, MAY 1944.

Village	Total Population	Total Adult Males	Males Inden- tured	Number of Ablebodied Males left in Village
Ragitsaria	219	93	45	3
Marawasa	319	80	46	0
Marasasa	124	35	17	4
Raginan	413	123	74	7
Ragitsumanj	228	73	49	0
Wankan	260	76	47	4
Ragiampun	242	95	52	8
Antiguran	148	52	34	0
Atsunas	232	72	41	1
Atgaratamia	306	161	57	5
Aritsian	278	92	56	6

7. Angau Services

Angau possessed a major advantage over the pre-war administrations in that it had much greater resources available to it. As a consequence, it was able to expand several activities and undertake projects which had only been dreamed of in earlier years.

From: L. P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea*, London, 1948, pp. 195-7.

The normal provision for native education lapsed almost completely during the war. The missionaries from the New Guinea mainland were evacuated, those on the islands were taken prisoner. On the Papuan side most of the men stayed at their posts, but the women, who were responsible for a large part of the teaching, had to leave. Towards the end of 1943, permission was given for the return of women missionaries to Papua. Angau also undertook to provide free supplies of essential school materials, but in spite of this assistance the general level of equipment remained pitifully inadequate. In October, 1945, gifts from the crews of R.A.N. boats putting in at mission stations of such common objects as pencils and paper were being eagerly welcomed. By this date—the time of the resumption of civil government—teaching staffs were still below pre-war strength. In addition there was difficulty in obtaining supplies of food for large numbers of children at the mission head-quarter schools. Numbers were limited by restarting only the lower classes.

Angau had had perforce to organize certain types of technical training—notably of drivers and wireless operators—to meet its own needs. During 1944 the decision was taken to enter the field of general education, and the central teacher training school, which had been beyond Papua's resources when it was recommended years before, was opened at Sogeri, near Port Moresby. The principal was a former organizer of missionary education, and some of the staff had had experience in government schools in New Guinea. The response of the missions to this new venture was not very cordial. Some felt that its creation implied a reflection on their own methods, and some hesitated to send their bright boys to an undenominational school. Nevertheless, the school had 97 pupils by October, 1944. Standard V was asked for, but it was found that many of the boys coming with Standard V certificates had not really attained the level which these should have indicated, and the course had to consist largely in supplementing the pupils' general education.

Another innovation introduced by Angau was broadcasting to natives. A short programme in Motu was broadcast from Port Moresby twice a week. It included news items, talks, sometimes given by natives, singing by school choirs, etc. Far Eastern Liaison Office, a propaganda organization, arranged broadcasts in pidgin for the benefit of natives in forward areas, and provided receiving-sets in labour camps.

Angau kept in being the agricultural station at Aiyura, and planted cinchona on an extensive scale there and in the highlands on the Papuan side, where Catholic missionaries had already introduced

it at Ononge on Mount Yule. They restored the Sangara coffee plantation and machinery which had been damaged by the Japanese, and greatly extended the rice-growing area in the Mekeo by the introduction of tractors. Production here, in 1944, was four times as much as ever before.

In the sphere of health, a period during which the cost of the war to the people of New Guinea was high was later partially offset by the expenditure of money on a scale which only the resources of the army could have made possible. Those members of the small pre-war medical departments who were of military age were assigned to purely military duties, particularly Intelligence. Angau included some medical personnel in its Field Service, and when in October, 1942, a separate Medical Service was created, its staff consisted of two medical officers and 12 medical assistants. Attempts to secure the return of pre-war medical assistants were unsuccessful. Eventually, in June, 1943, training courses for European and native medical personnel were organized, and by September, 1944, the numbers had been expanded to a total of 10 medical officers, 113 European medical assistants, and 453 native medical orderlies. A native base hospital with full army equipment had been set up at Port Moresby, another was later added at Lae, and there were 53 other hospitals. Most of these were rather rough buildings, some providing little more than shelter, though some were of better quality. The number of cases treated represented an enormous increase over the last figures published by the civil administration—85,000 between February, 1942, and September, 1944, compared with 23,000 in 1939. The expenditure in the same period was nearly £250,000.

8. The Angau Contribution

Writing more than twenty years after the war's end, one of the men who served with Angau summed up the Unit's problems and its place in New Guinea affairs.

From: Peter Ryan, *The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1968, pp. 2, 18-19.

Its officers were largely pre-war government men such as resident magistrates, district officers, patrol officers and other officials. They were supplemented first by pre-war non-official residents, and finally by newcomers without peacetime experience. Among Angau's staff in the field, there was at all times and in all places a clear preponderance of pre-war officials. There were delicate problems of seniority

and of difference of philosophy between former Papuan and former Mandated Territory officials. The pre-war European community had been a tiny one, where individuality was cultivated, sometimes even beyond the point of eccentricity, and where everyone knew everybody else's business. The petty animosities of small closed communities survived and smouldered in war as in peace. To them were added the frictions, seemingly inevitable, between headquarters staff and men in the field—abrasive factors alluded to more than once in official documents. Short of shipping and virtually without aircraft, Angau had fantastic problems of communication and supply; late in August 1942, for example, it was noted that Ramu and Sepik Districts had received no stores whatever since December 1941. Cargo cult was widespread. For long, there were nagging doubts about the whole legal basis of Angau's existence. In Australia, in almost total ignorance of conditions then prevailing in New Guinea, missionaries, commercial people, frustrated ex-officials and just plain busybodies pestered the government and badgered the overworked Lieutenant-General in charge of Administration at Land Headquarters. . .

Lt.-Col. (Professor) T. P. Fry has pointed out that Angau did not operate at a high policy level. Weighty matters of Territory post war development were not entrusted to it, nor was it equipped to handle them. The expertise of its staff was not impressive in specialized fields such as agriculture and education. After the death on service of F. E. Williams it had no anthropologist. Much of the highly expert advice it needed came from the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs at L.H.Q. It was this body which dealt with high policy at Commander-in-Chief and Cabinet level. Up to the end of 1944 Angau had spent less than 1000 pounds on native education. For the training of its own patrol officers Angau relied on the School of Civil Affairs, started and maintained by the Directorate of Research. Even today, after nearly quarter of a century, the Prefaces to the Laws of Papua and the Laws of New Guinea acknowledge the Directorate's part in those publications.

A measure of the talent available to Angau is found in the proceedings of the Conference of District Officers held in Moresby in February 1944. They were all men whose character and tenacity had enabled them to survive the stern tests imposed on pre-war field staff, and their sincerity and honour are not in question. But with certain exceptions (the names of Capt. W. R. Humphries and Major J. L. Taylor come to mind, and there were others) the level of thinking and the knowledge of the outside world displayed by the speakers was pedestrian and provincial.

At that Conference, General Morris said: ' . . . native administration . . . as we want it to be must take a back seat because of operational necessities'.

An observer from outside, J. V. Barry, K.C., reached a similar conclusion. 'Angau . . . was an essential and valuable body to meet the urgencies [of the time] and it has, from the military viewpoint, been successful in its handling of native affairs, but the fact that it was a military unit has meant that when the supposed needs of the Army have conflicted with the welfare of the natives, Army requirements have triumphed . . .'

Nor is that all. Another detached student, Gavin Long, believed we drove the New Guinea people harder than we drove ourselves. Speaking of 1944-45, when conditions of service for labourers had been much improved, Long wrote: ' . . . the burden of war was weighing heavily on the New Guinea native—more heavily, man for man, than on the general run of Australian citizens'.

II. PLANNING FOR POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT

The Japanese threat made all Australians aware of their proximity to Asia and of possible future threats. It was essential that New Guinea, Australia's nearest neighbour, remain friendly, and so realistic plans had to be made for positive development in the islands. The Labor government which came to power in 1941 intended to transform the pattern of life in New Guinea, mainly by emphasising the welfare of villagers and by exercising much stricter controls over European enterprises. Much of the planning was carried out in an unusual Army unit, the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs, under Colonel A. A. Conlon, whose strong personality inspired a number of people and antagonised others. His contribution to post-war New Guinea is still not clear, but those associated with him certainly believed that a new era was about to begin.

1. Parties to the Plan

The planning situation was summed up by Colonel J. K. Murray, the post-war Administrator of the Territory, in an address delivered more than twenty years after his first contact with New Guinea affairs.

From: J. K. Murray, "In Retrospect 1945-52", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 320.

The cabinet committee appointed in relation to New Guinea affairs played the plenary role.

Among the bodies decisively influencing opinion and people affecting the policy to be determined upon for the post-war administration of 'New Guinea' was the allied landforces directorate of research, later renamed the allied landforces directorate of research and civil affairs. Its director, Colonel A. A. Conlon had what may be realistically termed a unique staff, full-time and part-time, including professional people drawn from many fields, the universities in particular being called upon.

That Colonel Conlon influenced directly (and indirectly by bringing knowledgeable people into contact with the minister for external territories) the formulation of a Rooseveltian new deal for Papua and New Guinea is undoubted. He put forward major principles which needed to be given effect to in order to apply the 1945 programme in native administration as a common policy in a joint administration of the possession of Papua and the territory of New Guinea. Through General Blamey, to whom his directorate was directly responsible, he modified the thinking and procedures of the army in relation to the use and treatment of native personnel in the army and its auxiliaries.

He and his directorate decisively countered a naive tendency to depend on precedents for action, in a revolutionary new system, on what had happened in the between-wars period in the two territories.

His estimate as to what it would cost to put the new deal and arrangements into operation, three million pounds was a figure I believe he used, was regarded as astronomical. Actually it was close to the mark; in the three commencing years from October 1945 to June 1948 the grants-in-aid amounted to four million pounds.

The holding of the portfolio of external territories by Mr. E. J. Ward (he was also minister for transport) was timely in relation to the creation and control of a policy for New Guinea. He was approachable, a good listener, humanitarian in outlook and was responsible for the basic policy that was to last from 1945 to the present day which was, and is, that the interests of the native people are paramount and that priority be given to their educational, social, economic and political development. Ward was fortunate, in relation to Papua and New Guinea, in having as prime minister first Mr. Curtin and subsequently Mr. Chifley (who was treasurer in both governments) and Dr. Evatt as minister for external affairs. Evatt and his department could be depended upon to support and defend the policy which Ward defined in his second reading speech on the bill for an act for a provisional administration for the territory of Papua-New Guinea. Chifley supported increased expenditure in Papua and New Guinea when the allocation had reached a figure causing the following estimates to face serious curtailment.

The Curtin and Chifley governments in 1945 were as relevant to the future of Papua and New Guinea—in a more restricted range—as was the Attlee government in relation to India and Ceylon. These governments enacted and administered policies in keeping with principles enunciated at San Francisco where Dr. Evatt and his staff contributed to the evolution and achievements of the UNO charter.

2. Colonel Conlon

It may be that Colonel Conlon and his Directorate did little more than create an atmosphere in which changes were bound to occur; few concrete proposals can be traced back to the Directorate as an organisation. Yet Conlon was obviously a man who could seize his opportunity in a highly unusual situation, when he had access to the most powerful men in the land.

From: P. Coleman, "Alf Conlon: The man and the legend", *The Bulletin*, 28th September 1963, p. 24.

He obviously had a vast, almost hypnotic capacity to inspire people to acts in a variety of fields which they did not think they were capable of. Professor Stone refers to "some power that Alf had, but it wasn't a sinister power". Dr. Christian McCaffrey, superintendent of Newcastle Hospital, refers to his ability to "infiltrate your personality". Miss Ida Leeson, former Mitchell Librarian, says: "Oh, what a life-changer he was". John Kerr says: "One could positively feel that Alf was entering one's mind and occupying it and taking it over. One came to be dependent upon him and to need, before one acted in any field at all, to talk it over with him".

Then there were his philosophical theories about power. Lord Lindsay of Birker, for example, refers to one of his "great themes"—that we were living in a period when traditional power had become decadent and the new power elite had not yet established itself. During the war one of his jobs was to try to solve the problem how to control Australians if they were cut off from the people who usually give them orders, as happened in a minor way for a time in Darwin and might have happened more generally if the Japanese occupied and isolated parts of the country. Always concerned with New Men he saw himself as the man to step into such crisis situations, and he also channelled other intellectuals, often the brainy, ambitious, confident, contemptuous State School elite of his own type, into positions of authority which the "old guard" could not cope with. One got from Conlon, says James McAuley, a sense that great enterprises were still possible.

But the great basis of the Conlon legend is in his public career. Himself of working-class origin, he grew up in Newtown, Sydney, a long way from the centres of power, and went to Fort St. High School under A. J. Kilgour (school motto: *Faber est suae quisque fortunae*: man is the maker of his own fortune). Although details are missing in this book, others have referred to his power complex in school days as well as to his Leonardo complex—his drive to master the whole range of knowledge.

But it was at the University that the real Conlon began to emerge. He spent most of the 1930s there in Arts, Law and Medicine—and he became a prominent student politician, a Union director, a Student Senator and so on. At the age of 33, when his earlier colleagues were out in the world, Conlon was still strolling in the corridors of student power, looking for opportunities—for some people, at least, a rather pathetic spectacle, a perennial student politician.

Then, dramatically, he was catapulted from this obscure arena into the national field at the highest level. For him, as for so many others, the war, the period of crisis, was his great opportunity. First as University Manpower Officer, then chairman of the Prime Minister's Committee on National Morale, then as the Army's Director of Research and Civil Affairs—the absurd names seem typical—he became almost overnight a confidant of Blamey, Ward and Curtin.

Strategically placed, he used his influence to lay the basis of post-war policy in New Guinea, to establish what became the School of Pacific Administration, to gain effective control of the policy side of military government of British Borneo, to help launch the ANU. In the process he collected, in or on the fringe of one unit or another, his famous group of Conlonites—often converting them overnight from privates to lieutenants or majors—Professors Julius Stone, R. M. Crawford, "Panzee" Wright, A. K. Stout, K. Isles, John Passmore, James McAuley, Judges Gamble and Perrignon, Drs. I. Hogbin, W. E. Stanner, Sir James Plimsoll, Sir Ian Clunies-Ross, and the poet Harold Stewart—one of the strangest collection of brains-trusters ever assembled in Australia. (It is hard to know what some of them actually did: James McAuley says he was the court poet.) According to Sir James Plimsoll, now Ambassador in New Delhi, it was like what the New Deal must have been like in the US.

Looking back through the mists of the legend it is sometimes difficult to assess these achievements accurately. The National Morale Committee was established to help counter the Japanese threat, but almost immediately it became obsolete and achieved nothing. The School of Pacific Administration was established, but what was intended to be a great centre of New Guinea studies became a mundane, if useful, training school. The ANU was established, but Conlon was not appointed to its Council (was, one wonders, someone using Conlon rather than the other way around?). There is no doubt he did launch many bold, imaginative ideas, some of them successfully, but they did not always work out as he wanted.

But in any case he was certainly in the centre of things, a go-between for intellectuals, generals, politicians, one pivot of a crisis government and a reform movement.

3. Mr. Ward's Policy

Whatever the influences on the Labor government's policy, Mr. E. J. Ward, the Minister for External Territories, in July 1945 made a broad statement of the aims for New Guinea in a speech which has been often quoted as the Australian charter for post-war New Guinea.

From: *Second Reading Speech of the Hon. E. J. Ward, Minister for External Territories, on the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945*, typescript, Canberra, 1945, pp. 2, 5-6.

The occupation by the enemy of most of the Territory of New Guinea and a large portion of the Territory of Papua caused disruption to the native inhabitants and destruction of property that will require considerable sums of money to repair. Some of this money will be forthcoming from the Commonwealth War Damage scheme which applies to the Territories but appropriations will also be necessary from the revenue of the Commonwealth to assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Territories. This Government is not satisfied that sufficient interest had been taken in the Territories prior to the Japanese invasion or that adequate funds had been provided for their development and the advancement of the native inhabitants. Apart from the debt of gratitude that the people of Australia owe to the natives of the Territory, the Government regards it as its bounden duty to further to the utmost the advancement of the natives and considers that can be achieved only by providing facilities for better health, better education and for a greater participation by the natives in the wealth of their country and eventually in its government. . . .

A comprehensive programme is to be followed for the rehabilitation and development of the Territories having regard to the moral and material welfare of the native inhabitants and the strategic importance of the area to Australia. The Government has already taken decisions on a number of matters, the most important of which is that relating to native labour. In the past, native labour has been employed under the indenture system. It has already been announced that it is the intention of the Government to abolish this system as soon as . . . practicable. . . .

For the general benefit of the natives much more must be done to improve conditions of living in the villages and plans for that purpose are being formulated.

The immediate need is to repair the damage caused by war, both to native life and property. Some time ago a Committee was set up to

investigate and recommend a just and practicable plan for compensating natives in Papua and New Guinea for loss of or damage to land and property and death or injury arising from military operations or arising out of causes attributable to the existence of a state of war in the Territories. This Committee has completed its investigations and it is expected that its report will be available at an early date. Thereafter, it will be the aim to improve the health of the natives generally and by education to improve their conditions and the standard of living. In the past much of the education of the natives has been in the hands of the missionaries. Our plans provide for a vigorous programme of education in its broadest sense controlled and directed by the Administration. This does not mean that the missions will be excluded from that field. They have performed very valuable services in the past and can continue to do so within the framework of the educational programme that is being developed.

Formerly, the economic development of the Territory and the extent to which industry might be expanded were limited only by the markets available and the supply of native labour that could be obtained. There had been some development by natives on their own account. In future, the basis for the economy of the Territory will be native and European industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally.

Trading activities particularly so far as they affect the natives will be under much closer scrutiny and control than in the past but the policy of the Government in this regard has not yet been determined.

It is the aim of the Government as the proposer at the San Francisco Conference of the establishment of the principle of trusteeships respecting dependent peoples to set an example by the way in which Australia carries out its responsibilities in the Territories under its control. Naturally, many of the plans of the Government affecting native education, health, etc. are in the formative stage, and from time to time statements will be made to the Parliament of decisions taken in various subjects.

4. The Trusteeship Agreement

In addition to its extremely broad statement of policy, the government, with the advice of the External Affairs Minister, Dr. H. V. Evatt, also agreed with, and subsequently ratified, the principles outlined in the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea. Equally significant was the government's decision that the spirit of the agreement would apply to the Territory of Papua.

From: *Trusteeship Agreement for the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, as approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.*

The territory of New Guinea has been administered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in pursuance of a mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty and exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on 26th June, 1945, provides by Article 75 for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements.

The Government of Australia now undertakes to place the Territory of New Guinea under the trusteeship system, on the terms set forth in the present Trusteeship Agreement.

Therefore the General Assembly of the United Nations, acting in pursuance of Article 85 of the Charter, approves the following terms of trusteeship for the Territory of New Guinea, in substitution for the terms of the Mandate under which the Territory has been administered.

Article 1.

The Territory to which this Trusteeship Agreement applies (hereinafter called the Territory) consists of that portion of the island of New Guinea and the groups of islands administered therewith under the Mandate dated 17th December, 1920, conferred upon His Britannic Majesty and exercised by the Government of Australia.

Article 2.

The Government of Australia (hereinafter called the Administering Authority) is hereby designed as the sole authority which will exercise the administration of the Territory.

Article 3.

The Administering Authority undertakes to administer the Territory in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and in such a manner as to achieve in the Territory basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, which are set forth in Article 76 of the Charter.

Article 4.

The Administering Authority will be responsible for the peace, order, good government and defence of the Territory and for this purpose will have the same powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in and over the Territory as if it were an integral part of

Australia, and will be entitled to apply to the Territory, subject to such modifications as it deems desirable, such laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it deems appropriate to the needs and conditions of the Territory.

Article 5.

It is agreed that the Administering Authority, in the exercise of its powers under Article 4, will be at liberty to bring the Territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with other dependent territories under its jurisdiction or control, and to establish common services between the Territory and any or all of these territories, if in its opinion it would be in the interests of the Territory and not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the trusteeship system to do so.

Article 6.

The Administering Authority further undertakes to apply in the Territory the provisions of such international agreements and such recommendations of the specialised agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter as are, in the opinion of the Administering Authority, suited to the needs and conditions of the Territory and conducive to the achievement of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system.

Article 7.

The Administering Authority may take all measures in the Territory which it considers desirable to provide for the defence of the Territory and for maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8.

The Administering Authority undertakes that in the discharge of its obligations under Article 3 of this agreement—

1. It will co-operate with the Trusteeship Council in the discharge of all the Council's functions under Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter.

2. It will, in accordance with its established policy—

(a) take into consideration the customs and usages of the inhabitants of New Guinea and respect the rights and safeguard the interests both present and future of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory; and in particular ensure that no rights over native land in favour of any person not an indigenous inhabitant of New Guinea may be created or transferred except with the consent of the competent public authority;

(b) promote, as may be appropriate to the circumstances of the Territory, the educational and cultural advancement of the inhabitants;

- (c) assure to the inhabitants of the Territory, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Territory and its peoples a progressively increasing share in the administrative and other services of the Territory;
- (d) guarantee to the inhabitants of the Territory subject only to the requirements of public order, freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of petition, freedom of conscience and worship and freedom of religious teaching.

5. War Damage Compensation

One of the first demonstrations of the more generous approach to New Guinea was the approval of the War Damage Compensation Scheme for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of those areas affected, directly or indirectly, by the war.

From: H. I. Hogbin, *Transformation Scene*, London, 1951, pp. 19-22.

. . . the Minister for External Territories invited J. V. Barry, Esq., K.C. (now Mr. Justice Barry of the Supreme Court of Victoria), Major J. L. Taylor, a senior District Officer of the New Guinea Administration, and myself to advise him on 'a just and practicable plan for compensating the natives of Papua and New Guinea for loss or damage to land and property and death or injury arising from military operations or arising out of causes attributable to the existence of a state of war in the Territories.' Our Report was adopted shortly after the cessation of hostilities. . . .

'(I) All natives except those who have voluntarily assisted the enemy with a knowledge that it was wrong to do so should be eligible to receive compensation.

'(II) Compensation should be paid for deaths, injury and incapacity arising from causes directly or indirectly connected with the war.

'(III) Compensation should be paid for all damage or loss arising from causes directly or indirectly connected with the war.

'(IV) Simple machinery to enable compensation to be assessed promptly should be adopted.

'(V) Compensation should be paid in cash.

'(VI) Provision should be made for the immediate deposit of all sums in Savings Bank accounts.

'(VII) Adequate provision should be taken to protect natives from reckless expenditure and exploitation.

‘(VIII) Stores for natives should be established by the Administration throughout the Territories as soon as possible.

‘(IX) Stores should be stocked with approved goods of standard quality.

‘(X) Store prices should be controlled.

‘(XI) Government piggeries should be established to enable the natives to replace pigs which have been destroyed.

‘(XII) Government nurseries should be established to permit the natives to acquire seeds and plants to improve their food supply.

‘(XIII) Pools of building material should be established in areas where local materials are now unobtainable. . . .

I had already investigated the value of the losses of the Busama, and, as an example of the sort of payments which would have to be made, we included these. The total sum involved was £3,398 10s., made up of claims for £420 in respect of seven natives killed (£60 each), for £319 2s. in respect of village, property, for £300 in respect of property belonging to small groups, and for £2,259 8s. in respect of goods owned by individuals. The village property included the church (£99 12s.), the school (£34), the rest house (£16 10s.), a seine (£89), and a whale boat (£80); the property owned by groups of various club houses worth from £10 to £40 each. Individuals wanted money for houses, coconut palms, hunting dogs, livestock, bicycles, sewing-machines, trade boxes, spectacles, furniture, irons, lamps, gramophones, axes, knives, gardening tools, carpenter's tools, clothing, beds and bedding, books, cooking utensils, household crockery and cutlery, canoes, mats, woven bags, clay pots, and wooden bowls. One hundred and twenty-five separate claims were put forward for amounts averaging £18 (the biggest, £68 19s., was from a fully trained carpenter whose kit of tools had been destroyed).

The scheme was criticised by some on the grounds that honesty is not a conspicuous native virtue and that the claims would be too high. The District Officer of Morobe determined to make Busama a test case, and instead of paying out on my figures he waited for two years and sent one of his staff to collect new ones. Then, pretending that these had been lost, he had a third set compiled a year later again. He informs me that when the three were compared only one man's claim showed any considerable variation . . . only a proportion of the money handed to individuals was invested so wisely. An analysis of the expenditure of twenty-five persons disclosed that although sixty per cent. of the total sum was spent on tools, lamps, pigs, and clothing, and five per cent. went into banking accounts, no

less than thirty-five per cent. was squandered on foodstuffs, tobacco, and rubbishy cosmetics.

Several of the recommendations of the Compensation Committee proved to be unacceptable, and it is this fact no doubt which largely explains the waste. The setting up of Government stores was declared to be contrary to policy, the regulations controlling prices could not be enforced, and no Government piggeries were established (a number of European business men set up piggeries on a small scale and sold piglets at £7 and £8 each). Further, the Committee's suggestion of a means for preventing reckless spending and exploitation was rejected as impractical. We had thought that all money should be paid into banking accounts and that the District Officer's permission might be required for withdrawals in excess of £5 in any six months' period.

6. Angau Conference

In addition to the planning in Australia, a conference of Angau staff in 1944 suggested some schemes for post-war development. However, no detailed programme was available to provide specific directions for officers at all levels of the New Guinea Administration. This was to prove a growing embarrassment, as many officers tended to interpret post-war policy in the light of their own prejudices. Nevertheless, a number of the suggestions at the conference had merit, even if some were too optimistic and others neglected the realities of political influence in the Territory. Major Taylor suggested several targets.

From: J. L. Taylor, "Native Welfare", *Angau Conference*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1944, pp.

Immediate

(1) The return home now of all married indentured labourers who desire to do so.

(2) Anthropological research and demographic investigation into the present condition of the native population.

(3) Economic survey of the coastal and sub-coastal areas with a view to the resumption of such plantations as may be necessary for the establishment of a native agricultural industry.

(4) The recognition of the function of ANGAU as a specialist Unit advising the Command as to the correct attitude to the native people.

(5) The injustice of charging New Guinea natives with treason.

(6) This is additional. That the financial side of the problems involved receive immediate consideration and that the Common-

wealth Government be requested, through the correct channels, of course, to set aside the necessary funds.

Future

(1) That the aim of Australian rule in these parts is to build up a vigorous native population of ten million with an Australian outlook and culture, and that in consequence of this, native industry and agriculture will be encouraged and that no alienation of land will be permitted, which is dependent on large numbers of native employees, until it is proved that the employment of such numbers will not be injurious to the native people.

(2) That a policy of compulsory free secular education be established as soon as the enemy is expelled from the country.

(3) That the Commonwealth Government be advised that returned soldiers be trained as teachers, medical assistants, agricultural and veterinary advisers, native administrators, etc, and that any system of soldier settlement be along the lines suggested—that is, as public servants, not as agricultural settlers.

(4) That the indenture system be revised as soon as practicable and that on the resumption of Civil Government, Native Labour Bureaux be established to facilitate the employment of labour, employment to be on the basis of one month's notice either way.

(5) That special provision be made for the employment of nursing sisters, adequately paid, in the Health Department of the country for work amongst the native people in an endeavour to increase the survival rate of women and girls.

(6) That all missionaries be permitted to operate within the Territories—as before the war, but that the Commonwealth Government express the desire that they receive adequate training in Anthropology and the English language before entering New Guinea.

(7) That arrangements be made through the British Colonial Office for one or two officers interested in native arts and crafts and showing themselves possessed of some talent and artistic taste to visit the School for Native Arts and Crafts in Nigeria.

In concluding this paper, I am aware that all my recommendations may not be acceptable at the present time . . . but I do hope that those that are will be implemented by the Command with a vigour that past Civil Governments have not been capable of: and that there will be close liaison between the Army and the Department of External Territories of the Commonwealth Government, in order that what we achieve now will dovetail into the structure that is to be set up by the future Civil Government. How shocking it will be if we build up a fine and elaborate organization only to find that it is of no value when peace comes and that it does not fit into the organization of the future.

III. PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea took control of the area south of the Markham River on 30 October 1945 and was superseded by the Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea on 1 July 1949. In the interim, the Provisional Administration re-established a degree of order in the Territory, began rehabilitation programmes and still managed to prepare for such innovations as co-operatives and local government councils. Its work was carried out under constant attacks from interests within the Territory and from the press in Australia, for whom External Territories Minister Ward was a ready target. Moreover, a lack of direction from Canberra placed added responsibilities upon the Administrator, Colonel J. K. Murray, without providing him with the authority to carry them out.

1. War's Effects—Visible and "Invisible"

Partly owing to the pressure on the Provisional Administration and partly because of the relative ease with which order was restored in New Guinea, there was little investigation of the war's effects on the people. As Professor W. E. H. Stanner pointed out, it was difficult to calculate the more obvious damage and impossible to define the hidden costs of the conflict.

From: W. E. H. Stanner, *The South Seas in Transition*, Sydney, 1953, pp. 87-8.

Visible upset and dislocation of the native communities were most serious. Except by giving a series of local catalogues, an adequate summary is scarcely possible. There were widespread but unknown loss of life; much destruction of gardens, villages, livestock, crops, trees, canoes and various resources; and much deep-seated social dislodgment, especially in New Britain, New Ireland and the centres of intensive fighting or base installations. It was estimated in July 1946 that 27.5 per cent of the population of the Kokopo area of Rabaul had been killed or died of sickness in the war years. The

mortality was probably higher in this area (a main Japanese concentration zone) than elsewhere, except in odd localities. The dislocation of the population by the labour-recruiting was referred to earlier. This must have meant much loss of real property. In the worst areas of New Britain native claims for compensation, though possibly over-valued, appeared in 1946 to average between £40 and £50 each, equal to the gross earnings of an indentured labourer at pre-war rates for eight or ten years.

A rough indication of the possible extent of native damage is shown by the fact that the Barry Committee in 1944 estimated probable compensation costs on the basis of the loss of 15,000 lives, 20,000 buildings and 100,000 pigs. An analysis of affected villages showed that although the native economy was largely non-monetary, the assessed capital value of their possessions was surprisingly high. Total village claims for compensation of between £3,000 and £5,000 were not uncommon. In 1947 claims were still being investigated. The pressure of administrative problems prevented inquiries which might have revealed the full effect of the war on native life. Much will never be known. There is no doubt that suffering and loss were substantial.

The "invisible" effects are the realm of surmise. Psychological trauma and all the personal and family disturbances of people made homeless and at first freed from authority only to be clamped down by other authorities, pressed into work or elbowed out of the way by soldiery at their business, must have been severe. All early reports from field-officers agreed on certain things. The natives' "realized" experience had grown; there seemed to have been significant changes of outlook and behaviour in many areas; where the fighting had been heaviest and native losses greatest the simple acceptance of European authority and prestige seemed to be no longer assured; here and there hostility towards Europeans was marked; racial awareness and a sense of cultural inferiority seemed sharper; more natives were capable of verbalizing their hopes and dissatisfactions than before.

2. Re-establishing Administration

When Colonel Murray arrived to take up his position as Administrator he faced a dismaying prospect, one which he described in his first major report.

From: *Papua Annual Report 1946*, pp. 5, 7-9.

Where to start was indeed a problem. The Army had everything, the civil authority nothing. It was decided therefore to deal with essentials according to priority. It was apparent from the beginning that civil officials in sufficient numbers would not be available to relieve the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit personnel by 30th October, 1945, the date of take over. Arrangements were therefore made for the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit personnel to remain at their posts for a reasonable time or until replacement by civil officials was possible; also that the Provisional Administration would acquire all the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit establishments and installations at outstations, except Native Labour Camps which would not be required for civil use. Hospitals would be taken over and maintained similarly. As staff became available it would be posted to outstations to take over; where it was not available the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit officer would take over on the due date on behalf of the Provisional Administration and later hand over to a civil officer. . . .

The provision of staff and its accommodation in Port Moresby were major problems to be solved. There were in Australia and in the Defence Forces a number of officers of the Public Services of Papua and New Guinea, but their numbers had been decreased through death, retirement and war losses. Moreover, a number were serving in the Forces; many held important appointments; their services were not immediately available, while those in civilian occupation were widely dispersed in Australia and time was needed to permit them to relinquish their appointments and take up duty in the Territory. Included in the Forces were Senior Officers serving with the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit; and since the plan was to introduce Civil Administration progressively to areas as Army moved out these officers could not be released for civil employment until the areas in which they were posted came under civil control. While this deprived the civil authority of their services in the early stages there was the compensation of avoidance of disruption to the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit administration and this permitted a gradual re-orientation of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit policies towards the civil pattern, which was of considerable advantage in the long run. Should all officers have been available immediately the number was insufficient for the task ahead and this necessitated the engagement both in Australia and the Territory of new staff. . . .

A survey of the town was not encouraging. Buildings belonging to the Papuan Administration bore the traces of occupation by troops and of war; some had been damaged by bombs, others had fallen into

disrepair and most of them needed a good deal of renovation and repair to fit them for civil use. There were not sufficient to accommodate all Departments and their staffs. It was possible, however, to obtain sufficient for the Supreme Court, Crown Law Office, Registrar-General's Office, Post Office, Customs Department, Public Works Department (Office), District Office and Police Station and European and Native Hospitals, and a few residences, including quarters for female officers. It was necessary, therefore, to seek elsewhere for office and residential accommodation for the staffs of the Departments of the Government Secretary, Education, Public Health, Native Labour, Treasury, District Services and Native Affairs, Lands, Mines and Surveys, Forests, Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, Audit and Police Headquarters and Government Stores. The area and buildings, which comprised the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit headquarters at Konedobu about two miles from Port Moresby were accordingly taken over and as staff became available Departments moved in. . . .

In the preliminary stages of organizing the Administration the decision was taken to build small temporary cottages to a design permitting the use by a married couple or two single persons and to convert the Royal Papuan Constabulary Barracks into a Transit Camp for officers posted to outstations. Owing however to the difficulties in obtaining artisans in sufficient numbers, building materials and essential items such as stores and household refrigerators from Australia, this plan could not be immediately carried out, but had to proceed slowly as the obstacles were overcome. To meet current needs, use was made of a number of Army huts in the Konedobu area which were adapted as single quarters for men. As most officers were transported to the Territory by air, beds and bedding, mosquito nets and indispensable items of household equipment were provided by the Administration. Messes were instituted—one at Konedobu for males and another in Port Moresby for female officers—and managed on behalf of the Administration by a Board of Management consisting of Officers. Supplies were obtained from the Government Stores Branch which had as previously stated taken over supplies of rations from Army.

As there were no shops, other than a store conducted by the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board for plantation supply, it became necessary for the Government Stores to sell to officials and others such items in stock as could not be obtained elsewhere. It was a case of the Administration helping those in the Territory to help themselves, so that rehabilitation would proceed as quickly as possible. So that officers could obtain some of the many things re-

quired in addition to food a canteen was started as soon as the number in Port Moresby justified it. This service was extended to Districts. Stock was obtained from the Australian Army Canteen Services through the agency of the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board, which had been handling similar supplies on behalf of civilians on plantations. This service ceased as soon as the first store opened in Port Moresby not long after Civil Administration had commenced.

3. Memorandum on Policy

In 1947 the Administrator issued a cautiously-worded statement of general policy aims which nevertheless made clear the Provisional Administration's emphasis on village welfare. Yet a detailed programme had still not emerged from the government and the New Guinea Administration lacked the authority to apply its own.

From: *Memorandum on the policy of the Administration*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1947, pp. 1-2.

We cannot be too grateful that the wisdom of former Administrations has preserved Papua-New Guinea from some of the complicating evils that are present elsewhere. There is needed competent and informed administrative activity commensurate with the uniquely favorable opportunities thus presented of building from the base up, with the advantages of access to modern knowledge and resources, and in the light of the experience of the past in Colonial Administration.

In the determining and the carrying out of its policy, the Administration has been primarily guided by the letter and the spirit of the obligations which Australia has accepted in accordance with the United Nations Charter; the Trusteeship Agreement text in respect of the Territory of New Guinea; the second reading speech of the Honourable the Minister for External Territories in connection with the Papua-New Guinea Bill relating to the above considerations; the standards of social policy embodied in the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization; by the tendencies and aspirations of Australian democracy; and by the Administration's interpretation of the broad implications of strategy and defence in assuring the survival of democracy in the Australian area. The Administration has been aware, too, of the significant developments that are taking place in the government of other backward and dependent territories.

It will, then, be clear that the Administration's present aims are a quickened and ample development of policies associated with the names of Sir William MacGregor, Sir Hubert Murray and others.

One way in which previous policy is being extended is in the greater responsibility and initiative which the Administration is taking in various fields of social and economic life. This does not imply any restriction or discouragement of the vital contribution which unofficial organizations will continue to make in those fields. Increased governmental activity will, on the contrary, create conditions favorable to an increase in the opportunities for private effort in both the social and the economic field. The Administration, under the Australian Government, undertakes responsibility for the fostering of all phases of social, economic and political progress in the Territory.

The challenge and problem facing the Administration is, in its essence, the widening and advancing of the economic productivity of the country as a whole, but with activities qualified and circumscribed in strict accordance with the other territorial obligations of the Commonwealth in respect of native welfare, the social and political development of the native peoples, and conditioned by a policy of conservation of the natural resources of the Territory. Continued progress will, in the last analysis, be dependent on a simultaneous development and conservation of economic resources.

4. Colonel Murray's Sentiments

The Administrator was more direct in his Macrossan lecture at his old university in Brisbane. His attitude towards race relations was considerably in advance of the great majority of people in New Guinea.

From: *The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea*, Brisbane, 1949, pp. 38-9.

New Guinea is a plural society. The Europeans are a small dominant minority with a monopoly of political and economic power and social prestige, which they are somewhat reluctant to share with those below. The great mass of the native community scattered over the islands live their own cultural and economic life remote from the Europeans, though they are becoming increasingly desirous of achieving a more European mode of existence. In the Territory of New Guinea there exists a third group of over two thousand Chinese who live as traders and artisans for the most part and have a social

and economic status intermediate between the whites and the natives.

Where the European group interacts with the native group, institutions of culture contact arise, e.g. the native labour system or the forms of native Christianity, and the Europeans tend to insist that their notions and needs shall be the paramount factor in the shaping of these institutions. The native community is not able to exert an equal pressure for the protection of its desires and interests; hence the duty thrust upon the Administration to disentangle itself from its European associations and prejudices and hold the balance as fairly as it can between the groups—the essential, basic role, but one which is likely to earn it the suspicion of all and the gratitude of none.

Cultural differences and differences in economic pattern tend to close off the members of one group from easy access to other groups. On the European side, this sense of difference becomes frozen into the ugly and irrational prejudices of racialism. The attempt is made to assert that cultural differences are not historical and conditional, but genetical and absolute. Skin-colour is taken as an infallible guide to human status, rights and potentialities. Complete subordination in all phases of life is demanded from all who are not members of the privileged caste. Unhealthy attitudes to sexual relations work like poison in the background. Miscegenation between the groups is publicly frowned upon, with the result that half-castes become an unwanted and maladjusted fourth group without a secure position in society.

Although the Europeans as a whole act as an exclusive caste, there is not complete solidarity of prejudice. Many individuals, whether officials, unofficials or missionaries do not take the racial taboos seriously and recognise that the much desired "white prestige" must be a function of knowledge, leadership and justice, not of empty pretensions based upon unsound biological fancies. It is above all the duty of administrative officers to combat by their example the perpetuation of these damaging illusions, and develop a spirit of fellowship without which Australia's future in New Guinea will be insecure and unfruitful.

The growth of sound race-relations must be based upon common interests, both economic and social. New Guinea will progress as it should only when all parties understand that race-prejudice constitutes an irrational barrier to the full development of the country's resources, and is in the long run an enemy of the economic interests of all.

5. An Opposing View

Throughout the period of the Labor government's control of New

Guinea there was a steady stream of criticism against the new policies, real and fancied. Some of the more outspoken comments came from the Pacific Islands Monthly.

From: "End of Queer Wardist Regime in Papua-New Guinea", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, May 1952, pp. 21, 25.

As a man, a responsible citizen and a scholar, Colonel Murray won for himself a high place in the regard of Territorians: within those limits, no Administrator there has been held in greater esteem. But as an Administrator, trying to reconcile his humanitarian ideas and his stubborn political principles, with the raw facts of Papua-New Guinea conditions, he was not happy, either in his own mind or in the sight of spectators.

One of the most freakish things in the history of Australian Government was the appointment of Mr. E. J. Ward—that ornament of the extreme Left—as Minister for Territories. Ward probably had never even seen a coconut tree or a Melanesian; but (after the manner of all Socialist planners) he immediately and confidently set about the creation of a new heaven on earth for Brown Brother, and the extermination of the vicious profiteers who had "enslaved" him. . . .

Ward, in his unfamiliar Territories job, rightly decided that he should be assisted by a council of research and planning; but, in the manner typical of this queer politician, his set-up consisted entirely of academicians of known Socialistic inclinations—anthropologists, students, legal luminaries, and what not. During the war period, with commissions ranging from colonel downwards, complete with priorities and emoluments, these people ranged all over Eastern Australia and the Southwest Pacific, planning the new Melanesian Empire in Papua-New Guinea for the liberation of Fuzzy-Wuzzy and the glory of Ward. There was not one proved businessman or one experienced Territorian among all the planners.

Most definitely, the original plan with which Ward proceeded to take over Papua-New Guinea from the Army had no provision in it for the encouragement of private enterprise. One Government set-up was to compulsorily acquire all the produce of the country, and be responsible for the distribution of all goods; another was to own and operate all shipping; the employment of natives was to be most rigidly controlled. Planters and miners were to be allowed to return to their properties, but under conditions which would curb severely their nasty habit of making profits.

Normally, the whole plan was based on the welfare of Papua-New Guinea natives. Actually, it simply was an example of how an

impractical Red politician, given unlimited power, would set up the complete Socialist State.

But the whole outlook has changed since 1945. The rise of the Communist power, the rapid spread of the Red doctrines across Asia, have created for Australia a situation in which New Guinea must be regarded as the South Pacific's principal barrier against aggression—and all considerations must be subordinated to that.

Natives must be trained and new industries must be established for the encouragement of European settlement, so that we may have, in New Guinea, an economy calculated to support a strong defensive organisation. That envisages governmental policies and an administrative set-up different to those which Colonel Murray took to P-NG in 1945. . . .

6. Balance of Forces

A much more sympathetic summing-up of the Provisional Administration was provided by the English academic Dr. (later Professor) Lucy Mair, who had worked in the School of Civil Affairs and was obviously in favour of the post-war schemes. She hinted broadly that there had been deliberate obstruction of the new policy, perhaps overlooking the difficulties which the Australian public service, too, had encountered after the war.

From: L. P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea*, London, 1948, pp. 231-2.

In October, 1945, Australian New Guinea entered on a great experiment. This was not, as most of its critics assume, a leap in the dark. It was an attempt to make up in a short space of time the considerable leeway between Australian practice and what has been found possible in some other colonial territories and is now demanded by world public opinion. The Ward policy was not devised and is not supported by unpractical visionaries; it has not the dubious advantage of popularity as a good cause. The small body of men who are loyally working for a development of New Guinea that will offer wider opportunities to its native inhabitants have reached their conviction as a result of first-hand study of the facts in all cases, and of experience in the administrative service in many. At their head, in the present Administrator of Papua-New Guinea, is a man wholly devoted to the new ideals. The forces opposed to them are the same forces which in every colony have opposed the same type of advance; vested interests too short-sighted to look beyond the advantages of a

cheap and docile labour supply, the scepticism of the "old hand" towards new ideas, the resentment of senior members of a service at an influx of juniors with a different type of apprenticeship from theirs.

There are also special difficulties inherent in the situation of New Guinea. The natural obstacles to movement have retarded both the extension of political control and economic development. The native population with its innumerable divisions presents problems of unusual complexity for any policy of development of native local government. Papua never succeeded in emerging from that stage of dependence on eternal subsidies which was looked upon with more disfavour before 1940 than it is to-day. The apathy towards colonial questions for which the British public has often been criticized is inevitably greater in a nation whose colonial subjects number hardly more than a million. In Britain those who are interested in these problems regret the fact that the Colonial Secretaryship is not regarded as a political plum; in Australia the corresponding position is a half-time post, and its present very able holder received it only through the accident that he fell foul of his leader and was moved from an office held in higher estimation. The Minister for External Territories is at present also Minister for Transport, and his duties in the latter capacity are much more important from the point of view of Australian politics. Almost any other possible combination of portfolios would produce the same result. Finally, one is forced to the conclusion that the tradition of a Civil Service loyally carrying out the policy of whatever party is in power is not strong enough in Australia, for the alternative supposition, that sheer inefficiency is responsible for the delays at Canberra in action on urgent requests from Port Moresby, would be too uncomplimentary to the officials concerned.

For all these reasons, and also because it will be a long time before the peoples of New Guinea can voice their own demands as those of many other colonial territories do, the need for an informed and vigilant public opinion in Australia is particularly great. It is with the aim of making the facts available to this potential public that I have written this book.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT

I. POLICY MAINTAINED

The Labor government was defeated at an election late in 1949. In the New Liberal-Country Party government the Minister for External Territories was Mr. P. C. (later Sir Percy) Spender, who also held the more important portfolio of External Affairs. Supporters of the new government assumed that the post-war policy would be changed substantially in favour of European traders and settlers, but this was not the case. Mr. Spender gave such attention as he could spare to New Guinea, but it was with the appointment of Mr. P. M. C. (later Sir Paul) Hasluck as Minister for Territories in 1951 that the Territory was brought under firm Ministerial control.

1. The Spender Pronouncement

Mr. Spender's first major statement on New Guinea affairs was made in the House of Representatives on 1 June 1950. He suggested that a more sympathetic attitude would be shown to European settlement, but the main areas of policy remained unchanged.

From: *Australia's Policy in Relation to External Territories*, typescript, Canberra, 1950, pp. 12-15, 20-21.

The natives—our first and foremost duty is the advancement of the native peoples of the Territories and their development to the stage that they will be able to take their share in the Administration of their country. This will take a very long time but the natives have

shown that with the proper guidance and given the opportunity they have the capacity to carry out both manual and mental tasks in accordance with our concepts.

Immediately following the re-establishment of Civil Administration after the war a major task was rehabilitation of the native inhabitants and the reconstruction of their villages.

This phase has been completed and the native life of the Territory has in a large measure been restored to the pre-war standard. This, however, is not enough and it is the aim of this Government to improve those standards as rapidly and as far as our resources will permit. Such improvement will be effected through health, education and agricultural services. In all those services the first requirement is the provision of staff which must be carefully selected and trained for the specialised task they are required to perform. The heavy loss of experienced personnel of the former Administration of Papua and New Guinea has been a severe handicap and it is not possible for that loss to be repaired in a short time. The special arrangements that were made for the training of staff at the Australian School of Pacific Administration will be continued and action is now being taken to appoint a Principal and other academic staff to the School. Applications for these positions were advertised some time ago and the Council of the School is now examining those applications and it is expected that the appointments will be announced at an early date.

There are areas of the Territory that have not yet been brought under the control of the Administration and in which the native inhabitants have not been in touch with the white man. Many of these areas are in the centre of the mainland of New Guinea and comprise most rugged country. The task of bringing the natives of those areas under the control of the Administration is difficult and slow.

However, we cannot allow any part of the Territory we administer to remain a closed book to us any longer than can be avoided and it is the aim of the Government that every part of the Territory should be fully controlled and administered within the next five years . . .

The co-operative movement has been introduced into the Territory and the Administration is guiding and sponsoring natives in the formation of societies under this movement. The natives have displayed a keenness to participate in the movement which is being encouraged by the Administration as it affords a splendid opportunity to the native for self help and as a practical means of education in the ways of modern society.

The Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme was estab-

lished in the Territory for the benefit of natives who served with the Forces during the war. This produced very creditable results and a scheme of like nature has been continued by the Administration and is open to all natives of the Territory who wish to receive and are adaptable for training as artisans and technicians such as carpenters, electricians, engineers, etc.

In all these activities in relation to the native peoples care is taken to preserve the structure of native tribal life and native customs that are not harmful or repugnant to humanity.

The native village of Hanuabada close to Port Moresby is now being rebuilt by the natives themselves under the guidance of an Administration officer. The question of the rebuilding of this village has been the source of concern to the Administration for some years and the matter is now being solved largely by the initiative and enterprise of the native people themselves . . .

In the promotion of the welfare and advancement of the native people and in the steps to be taken to ensure their participation in the fruits of the development of the resources of the Territory one of the principal factors is education.

The broad objectives of the educational programme of the Territory are universal literacy and the development of the Native people as a community within their own environment, including all aspects of native culture. To this must be added such instruction as will assist the Native to adjust his mode of life to the changed conditions resulting from contact with civilisation and culture and such technical training as will assist him to become more self sufficient whilst taking an active part in the general development of the Territory. . .

It is frequently stated that in the Administration of the Territories there is too much control from Canberra and not enough responsibility granted to the man on the spot.

I have found that the Department of External Territories in Canberra and the Administration in the Territory have been doing excellent jobs in most difficult circumstances. The Department in Canberra which has never been given the recognition that its importance demands was created as a separate Department with a separate Ministerial portfolio only in 1941 by the former Menzies Government. Even then it was not until 1944 that a separate Secretary was provided for the Department. In fact, it has been the Cinderella of Commonwealth Departments, and it has only been by the energy and enthusiasm of a small number of officers that the Department has been able to cope with the many and varied problems that are inherent in the Administration of the External Territories.

Steps that are in train to strengthen the staff of the Department

will be continued so that it will be equipped to carry out its functions.

At the same time it is clearly necessary that responsibility for detailed Administration should rest with the staff in the Territory and that there should not be undue reference to Canberra in matters that can and should be settled on the spot.

It will, therefore, be the policy of this Government to place administrative responsibility as close as possible to the people who are affected by such administrative actions.

As between Canberra and Port Moresby delegated authority will be reposed in the Administrator whenever practicable and likewise in the Territory itself there will be a policy of decentralisation and the spreading of authority. In the pre-war Laws of the Territory, which are still in force, the Administrator was required to submit to the Minister for approval any item of proposed expenditure that exceeded £5,000. Steps are being taken to amend the relevant Ordinance so that the Administrator will be able to incur expenditure upon any one item not exceeding £15,000. This is the first step towards delegating increased authority to the Administrator as I am satisfied that only by so doing can the best efficiency be developed.

2. Local Government

Among the policies which were introduced during the period of Provisional Administration and which continued under the new government were those relating to local government councils and co-operative societies. In one of the few published reports on the early stages of these institutions, Professor J. D. Legge pointed out that they were a significant departure from earlier policy and from traditional organisations.

From: J. D. Legge, *Australian Colonial Policy*, Sydney, 1956, pp. 219-222.

The Councils were intended to meet the problem posed by the absence of suitable indigenous authorities in the Territory and to serve as institutions suited to the needs of Papuan society in a period of change. Tradition was thus less important than was the case in the early development of native authority systems in African colonies; and indeed the term "native authority system" which has been applied to the Council system in Papua and New Guinea is misleading. At the same time, tradition was not to be ignored unnecessarily. The Ordinance provided that in determining the constitution and membership of a Council the Administrator "shall

have regard to relevant native custom in the area within which the Council has, or is to have, authority". Further, the Councils, in addition to the powers specifically conferred on them by the Ordinance, were also to have such powers as native customs might confer upon them except insofar as custom might conflict with the laws of the Territory or be repugnant to the principles of humanity. In particular they were empowered to enforce customary obligations and requirements. Beyond this field a wide range of tasks was placed within the area of Council responsibility. They could make rules in general with regard to "peace, order and welfare" and in particular with regard to an extensive list of subjects such as pest control, prevention of water pollution, registration of births and deaths, compulsory cultivation and a number of others. Village constables in Council areas were to become Council constables. Councils could also engage in business enterprise, carry out public works or provide social services. Financial responsibility was conferred on them and they were empowered to levy rates and taxes or to charge for services rendered. Village Treasuries were to be established and rates, taxes or fees were to be paid into a Council Treasury account vested in the Council. Offences against the rules and authority of Councils were to be tried in Courts for Native Matters. . .

Local government under the Council system was seen as forming an integral part of community development on a broad front. In the provision of services, Councils could rely on the help of the Administration to give technical as well as general guidance. In addition to the ordinary assistance to be expected from the field staff, a Native Authorities section was established within the Department of District Services and Native Affairs to supervise Council activities, and expert advice was also provided from the other Departments of the Administration: Health, Education, Forests, Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries. The division of responsibility implied in this arrangement may not have been altogether desirable but experience of the working of a Council system was required before ideal administrative machinery could be evolved to assist its development. In the meantime the Councils were not regarded as concerned purely with local government in a narrow sense but as the focal point of a number of complementary activities covering economic advance and social development, as well as the performance of the more strictly municipal tasks. It is significant, as a measure of the native response to the scheme, that natives have been prepared to accept a higher rate of tax when imposed by their own authorities, than was acceptable before when imposed from above by the Government.

Perhaps the most important feature of the scheme is the fact that,

as has been noted already, the emphasis is upon development, rather than tradition—upon the evolution of a new machinery for local government rather than upon the adaptation of existing institutions. In this respect the approach now being adopted in Papua and New Guinea corresponds more closely with recent practice in British African colonies rather than with the earlier conceptions of “Indirect Rule” as developed in Africa. A recent observer has distinguished three stages in the development of indirect rule theory in Africa, the first two being identified with Lugard and Cameron respectively. “During the first, the emphasis was to preserve traditional institutions intact in their indigenous form: in the second, stress was laid not only on preserving traditional forms but especially the democratic element within those forms, with a view to making native authorities more representative of all sections of the local communities. In the third stage . . . there has been a definition and authoritative confirmation of the idea that the evolution of traditional institutions must be directed more decisively and rapidly towards democratic local self governing bodies of the English type.” The Council scheme in Papua and New Guinea has passed over the first two of these stages and aims at the formation of democratic local governing bodies possessed of legal and executive functions.

3. Co-operative Societies

The co-operative movement has not experienced as much success as has local government, but its beginnings seemed most promising.

From: J. D. Legge, *Australian Colonial Policy*, Sydney, 1956, pp. 217-8.

By 1949 co-operative enterprise was well under way, particularly in the Gulf and Central Districts. The Annual Report for that year refers to the formation of societies in the Gulf District for the marketing of copra and for the building up of capital to establish retail stores and to purchase a vessel to transport produce to Port Moresby. And in the Central District co-operative retail stores were functioning independently of any marketing activity and had turnovers in one case (the Poreporena and Hohodae Society) of £1000 per month. From these beginnings development was rapid. In the Gulf District, fifty-three societies were operating by 1951 with a capital of £13,505. Seven of them formed an association, the Toaripi Co-operative Association, for the purchase of a vessel to take produce to Port Moresby and return with goods for the Association's trade

store. In the Central District there were forty-three societies with a capital of £7998 and a store turnover of £49,570 and in the Northern District four societies with a capital of £1887; and a beginning was made in other Districts. The Administration assisted the growth by establishing schools to train representatives of societies in co-operative procedure and elementary book-keeping. By 1950 eight natives were being trained as inspectors. In addition co-operative officers were sent to assist the formation of new societies.

In 1950 a Co-operative Societies Ordinance was passed with the intention of providing a legal framework for the establishment and development of native societies. Unfortunately the Ordinance was modelled on Australian legislation and the complexity of its provisions, which covered such matters as the extent of reserve funds, the payment of dividends, the cancellation or reissue of shares, the power to borrow, and the most complicated requirements for the keeping of accounts and for the form of rules of co-operative societies, made it a completely unsatisfactory instrument for regularizing the activities of native societies. Indeed, it was the unsuitability of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance which led the Department of Agriculture to found its Rural Progress Societies as a more informal means of promoting group activity. This Ordinance has remained a dead letter and a further measure, the Native Economic Development Ordinance, 1951, was passed laying down a much simpler and more flexible procedure which was more in keeping with native needs. The new measure provided for the registration of any body of seven or more natives engaged in the buying or selling of goods, in carrying or in production of goods or the provision of services for its members. Any three or more societies could further register as an Association of Societies. Flexibility was secured by the absence of any detailed rules governing the method of accounting. The Registrar of Societies was merely empowered to require societies "to keep such financial records and submit to him such returns as he may specify in writing". The Registrar had a similar discretion in deciding what rules were necessary in individual cases for efficient operation of societies.

With the passage of this Ordinance the movement was placed on a regular footing and in 1953 there were 103 societies in Papua as a whole, with a membership of 17,172, a capital of £70,414, a store turnover of £181,060 and proceeds from copra of £85,841. (An indication of the rate of progress may be gained by comparing these figures with those of the previous years when eighty societies with 10,541 members and a capital of £34,200 had a store turnover of £95,800 and earned £50,500 from copra sales.) The movement has

expanded, of course, on the crest of the copra boom.

The significance of the co-operative movement lies in its spontaneity. The Administration's task was to encourage and direct its development in response to aspirations which were making themselves felt independently of official efforts. This, in itself, marks the movement off from the pre-war experiments in community development which depended on compulsion. The war's disruptive impact and its demonstration of European technical achievement on a colossal scale had evoked a new ferment amongst Papuan peoples which could be dangerous or beneficial, according to the channels into which it was directed. Tactically the Administration's assistance was designed to guide potential forces of resistance into proper channels.

4. Beginning of the Hasluck Era

In May 1951 the gifted, hard-working Mr. P. M. C. (later Sir Paul) Hasluck was appointed Minister for Territories. Unlike his predecessors, he had only one Department under his control and was able to devote considerable attention to New Guinea. Not long after this appointment, he addressed the Sir William MacGregor Club at the Australian School of Pacific Administration on the future of the Territory. At that time Mr. Hasluck apparently saw New Guinea as a multi-racial community whose development would occupy "generations". He also rejected existing notions of colonialism.

From: "A Policy for New Guinea", *South Pacific*, January-February, 1952, pp. 226-7.

The question we, therefore, ask ourselves is, "What will happen if we succeed in what we are trying to do?" If we succeed, we will see, on the one hand, an increasing native population. Health measures will reduce infantile mortality and the toll of disease, and better nutrition will give a healthier population. We will see a better educated native people, a more politically conscious and politically active native population who, very gradually, over a number of generations, will take an increasing interest both in running their own enterprises and in taking a share in their own government. If we succeed in what we are trying to do, we may have in New Guinea as many as 10,000,000 active, healthy, enterprising people with ideas of their own about the world. We will also see a transformation of Territory production and the economic life of the country—simple

subsistence varied by exports; new products, new methods, new industries. There are risks in such changes but, on the whole, there will be material benefit.

On the other hand, we will realise that this process which I have optimistically sketched cannot take place without the help of white men and women. The material advancement of the country, the introduction of machines and new techniques, as well as new materials and new crops, the planning and development, the health measures, the education, the law and order, and the political ideas are being and will be brought to the native people by the white men. The material wealth gained from the use of the country's great resources and the opening of the riches of New Guinea to the world will be as the result largely of white direction and endeavour. In the process, the white immigrants will, themselves, gain a stake in the country; they will, themselves, have an interest in their own self-government, and a wish to share in the life of the country and the shaping of its future. They, too, will grow in numbers and develop a stronger interest in the country. They will become a second and equally self-conscious element in the situation. They will be necessary to the country and the country will be necessary to them.

Therefore, I suggest to you that the basic problem of all our work in New Guinea from this time onwards is the problem of race relations. It is a problem of finding a way in which two peoples at different but slowly converging standards of living and cultural habit can live in harmony with each other and with respect for each other's rights and each other's dignity and self-respect. A realisation of that factor is basic to wise administration in New Guinea. . .

Our task is to apply our minds to discover those principles of conduct in New Guinea, and of relations between the two races who are destined to work together there, which will be just as relevant in three or four generations as they are to-day. If we base our conduct on such principles, we are more likely to build soundly for the future.

Because the white settlers have the greater power to-day, they carry a greater obligation of service; because they have wider knowledge, they can be expected to have wider understanding. For a commencement, most of the tolerance, the vision, and the kindness will have to be on the white side. For a commencement, we may not always receive the same coin in return, but our reward will come and our nation will be served when, in the course of the years, we see those qualities being reflected from the minds of those whom we have helped.

In conclusion, I should like to mention briefly a different aspect of the subject. If what I have said is true, we have to adjust some of the

notions current to-day about the nature of the government of Papua and New Guinea. I mean that New Guinea should not be regarded as a colony, nor is it, strictly speaking, to be regarded forever as a territory in the same way as the Northern Territory is so regarded. Having regard to the future, and giving for the moment no value to the present constitutional arrangements, New Guinea is neither a colony nor a territory; it is in the experimental stage of something which the world has not yet seen and which it may not be possible to create anywhere else in the world—an attempt at co-operation and mutual service between two peoples, a guardianship in which both the guardian and the guarded are to survive. For some years to come, it is inevitable that Papua and New Guinea will be administered as a territory and that the administration will become increasingly centralised in Australia.

5. Australian Control

There was tension between the Liberal-Country Party Ministers and Colonel Murray, the Labor government's appointee as Administrator. Colonel Murray was offered other positions, which he declined, and it was eventually decided that there should be another Administrator, one more obviously committed to the new government's policies. On leaving the Territory, Colonel Murray said that there was excessive control of New Guinea affairs from Canberra; this was to be a recurring theme for many years. In reply, Mr. Hasluck made his position quite clear.

From: "Policy in Papua and New Guinea", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 August 1952.

In a community, largely composed of primitive people, Government and governmental authority have to be personified in one man, who is visible to the people, and there is also a certain need for impressive ceremonial. The Europeans, too, look for someone to be their chief citizen or the focus of social life.

Governments encourage Administrators to "do the honours" properly, but sometimes this leads to unexpected consequences. It needs a very level head and practical outlook to avoid confusion in the duties of the post. The greater part of the allegations of "remote control" from Canberra do not concern any interference with the exercise of powers delegated to an Administrator but a confused view as to what the office of Administrator really is. For example, some critics complained of the dis-allowances of Ordinances by

“Canberra”, as though the Administrator ought to have the final word. Yet as an official he can have no claim to such a power, and constitutionally, the responsibility rests squarely on the Governor-General (which means in practice the Federal Executive Council acting on a recommendation from the Minister for Territories).

Confusion might be dispersed if someone were appointed to hold office above the Administrator and act as a kind of deputy for the Governor-General in carrying out ceremonial duties, leaving the Administrator free to concentrate on his real functions. Such a titleholder would, however, have little to do but hold the title, occupy Government House, and take salutes, until there had in fact been further constitutional growth in the Territory.

One fundamental lesson to be learnt is that local political institutions will first have to be developed before the ambitions for a higher measure of local autonomy can be realised. No one can sit at the apex of government until the pyramid has been built. Furthermore the capability of the Territorial Administration will have to be improved before heavier administrative duties are placed on it. . . .

During the period of building up the service, care should be taken not to confuse the means we are using for the end which we are seeking. During the past year there has been a greatly increased number of visits to the Territory, not only by myself as Minister, but by senior officers of various Commonwealth Departments. We have also arranged more visits by senior Territorial officers to Canberra. In some sensitive quarters in the Territory this action has been regarded as “interference” with local administration. The true purpose has been threefold. Firstly, Port Moresby being only 12 hours distance from Canberra, the easiest and cheapest way of completing action is often for the Departmental and Territorial officers engaged in a common task to work on it together for a few days rather than spend months in exchanging letters.

Secondly, our purpose has been to make available to the Territory the resources and experience of the Commonwealth.

Thirdly, we want the Territorial Public Service and the Territorial community to feel that behind them is the whole strength of Australia. They are an independent service but they need not be an isolated one . . .

In fact, of course, everything that the Administration does in Papua and New Guinea is done on behalf of the Australian Government in pursuance of a policy laid down by the Government, by officers appointed by the Government, and with funds provided in a large part by the Australian taxpayer. The confidence of the native people has to be a confidence in Australia as such, attained

through their confidence in the Australians who work among them.

The policy of the Government is to encourage the Territorial Administration to do more and more on the spot but for the time being the delegations are necessarily limited to administrative action. The immediate need is for administrative efficiency rather than constitutional dream castles.

6. The Task

The appointment of Mr. Hasluck as Minister for Territories marked the beginning of an era, but even at that time there were a few observers willing to point to the problems that lay ahead rather than to accept the promises that had been made; among them was Professor Stanner.

From: W. E. H. Stanner, *The South Seas in Transition*, Sydney, 1953, pp. 164-5.

In 1951, with a new Minister having External Territories for the first time as a single portfolio, New Guinea was set reasonably fair to prove what could be proved by the social experiment launched in 1945. The general conditions were just about as favourable as goodwill, good law, enthusiasm and material help could devise in this kind of world.

The new Legislative Council assumed office in November 1951 with three native members. Several village councils on which high hopes were built were about to be gazetted. The indignity of indentures was a thing of the past. Native self-help schemes, from co-operatives to community projects and welfare clubs, were surprisingly active. An extraordinary—for New Guinea—volume of native savings was accumulating in the bank and large sums were being subscribed to spend on useful equipment. Native production of copra, rice, coffee and cacao was increasing promisingly.

With buoyant world demand and an easing of material supplies, the copra plantations were at last able to tackle in earnest the problems of rebuilding and replanting, especially in Madang and Bougainville. The build-up of new private capital continued alongside the liberal spending of Australian savings by the Administration at rates no one would have thought possible in the 1930's. The rumours of a £200 million development scheme and 50,000 European settlers promised the materialization of an old dream that the "real" New Guinea would be "discovered". A company was formed with £100,000 capital to find and develop hydro-electric sources to

work bauxite for aluminium. The search for oil continued. Gold production increased. The development of a fibre industry processing jute, abaca and hibiscus was under study. There was a Government of solicitude and energy. And no one paid direct tax.

To suggest in such a foreground that New Guinea was really a very poor country with a contorted social structure and the scene of a *mêlée* of wholly uncertain outcome between a dilapidating native culture and a strained Europeanism, was to seem to question the value of vitality, enthusiasm and high expectations.

Yet New Guinea is a poor country. Its "vast untapped potentialities" have never been carefully studied but are an article of Australian faith. What resources are known are very hard to get at and to work. It has no *proven* coal, oil or power sources. The "external" economy is rudimentary, especially its transport. There are, for example, only 1,700 miles of vehicular roads—three times the mileage of Fiji (which is one-tenth its size and has, maybe, one-eighth its population), or about one-tenth the road and rail mileage of Kenya (which is larger by one-third and has, maybe, four times the population). All three colonies are approximately the same "age" in terms of settlement and investment. A mile of surfaced road may cost from £4,000 to £6,000 in many parts of these islands. Annual maintenance may be on a scale equivalent to rebuilding the road every eight to ten years. No road programme had emerged by 1951 and, when one does, it must force a re-casting of the entire social service and development design built up from 1945. New Guinea could cripple itself building and maintaining the roads without which real development cannot come. The logistics and economics of air transport are highly unfavourable to a remote area so dependent on bulky commodities.

In 1950 the Territory had to spend about 70 per cent of the value of all exports of local origin to keep a fraction of its total population in imported food, alcohol and tobacco in order to do the same, perhaps on slightly better terms, the next year. A high development rate will redistribute population indiscriminately over an area where the basic food problems are not yet solved.

The Territory has insufficient labour to do everything it is committed by aggregate plans to do. The intended scale and rate suggest that capital and labour are regarded as disconnected resources to be used with right and left hand acting autonomously. This is a prospectus of capital wastage and costly social tangles.

The breakdown of all shape and line in the traditional native social structures and the dissolution of traditional cultures into unrelated fragments continue in a context in which, it can safely

be said, the number of new coherences appearing is unequal to the number disappearing, though some fascinating native experiments in mixing new and ancient ways are occurring very widely. The upshot is completely unpredictable.

The United Nations Mission, contemplating this scene, recommended, in substance, that everyone and everything should be encouraged to go faster, and the Commonwealth seemed to value the advice. In such circumstances the future of New Guinea will be one of the most interesting essays in modern colonialism.

II. PROGRESS CONTINUES

Throughout most of Mr. Hasluck's term as Minister for Territories, optimism about New Guinea's future ran high and it was usually supposed that Australia had many years in which to develop the country; there were even suggestions that the Territory would eventually become a State of the Commonwealth. Mr. Hasluck set out a certain philosophy of development, in which he suggested that Australia's approach was different from that of the old colonial powers, so that the final results would be superior. Certainly, he was able to list impressive achievements for the 1950s, but there were even then suggestions that New Guinea would eventually find its own way.

1. Political Assimilation

Writing in 1953, Mr. (later Professor) J. P. McAuley suggested that a suitable policy would allow New Guinea to be integrated with Australia.

From: J. P. McAuley, "Australia's Future in New Guinea", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1953, pp. 67-9.

The successful political assimilation of New Guinea to Australia would require an accompanying assimilation in the social, economic and cultural spheres. It is here that the most serious difficulties arise, but before considering them there is this to be said in general: that, setting aside the possibility of the replacement of Australian control by that of some non-Western power, the direction of culture change in New Guinea must be a one-way assimilation of native life to Western culture as represented by Australia. There is not in New Guinea that hard resistant core of an alien religious-social order which sets limits to acculturation among Islamic peoples, for instance. The indigenous traditional cultures are parochial, variegated, extremely primitive and very fragile. On the one hand they lack the durability which codification and organization give to civilized traditions; and, on the other hand, none of their distinctive

peculiarities seems able to survive under close contact with modern civilization: not only material equipment and techniques, traditional arts and crafts and pursuits, but also the fundamental world view, the ceremonial life, the body of customary law relating to basic personal and property relations, the characteristic forms of social organization, the local languages, seem bound to be more or less completely effaced as time goes on—allowance being made only for the uncertainty how their style of tropical agriculture will develop, since Australian techniques are only partly applicable to New Guinea conditions. Where old things give way to new, the new things adopted will be Western, even though the rate of acculturation may be slow among the more remote groups and though the course of events may include eddies and cross-currents, such as nativistic movements. This is so even in the absence of any deliberate policy of acculturation, but Australianization could become a part of conscious policy, influencing not only the manner and matter of native education but also the administration of native affairs generally, especially in regard to changes in native customary law. At present the Administration expresses no positive view about the desirable direction of social change as registered in the native law of land use, marriage, inheritance, property and commerce. But it can hardly stand aloof from these things on the assumption that the unguided modifications introduced into local customary law by a mass of native institutions under the pressure of bewildering culture contact will result in a satisfactory legal code.

A general tendency of cultural assimilation is one thing; complete equalization is another. The successful incorporation of New Guinea seems to involve as a desideratum, if not a necessity, that the citizens of the new State can aspire to standards of living and welfare services on a scale more or less similar to that of the other States. Yet here the difficulty arises that the natural resources of New Guinea are not a very promising economic base for maintaining one and a half million (or perhaps many more) people at Australian standards. It is true that in the Commonwealth the standards of people in the less productive areas are to some extent supported by the more favoured areas, and the principle is already well established that the Territory is entitled to subventions from the Commonwealth; but can it be expected that the Commonwealth will make the sacrifices required to bring such a mass of people to equality of economic status with the mainland? And even if the task were undertaken, would it be really practicable?

The real answer to this problem of equalizing economic standards lies in a change of population distribution. Australia needs people: if

New Guinea cannot support its population at Australian standards and if Australia offers economic opportunities, then the surplus New Guinea population may best be absorbed into Australia. And this is what would in fact happen if the natives acquired full rights in the Commonwealth, including the right to move about freely. They would undoubtedly move in considerable numbers into Queensland, seeking the opportunities offered by development there. The question is, however, whether the Australian people are prepared to accept this necessary consequence of an incorporation policy which leads to complete enfranchisement, or whether the same powerful interests and prejudices that underlie the White Australia policy would not resist, even at the cost of damaging the fabric of constitutional relations.

Behind the question of economic equality lies the problem of race relations. What is valid in liberal nationalism is its understanding of the truth that people do need a sense of belonging to the political community in which they live. The "tone" of social affairs, the degree of spontaneity and social cooperation and discipline, is affected by the existence of an inclusive national sentiment. Incorporation will work well only if the New Guinea people can feel that they belong. Social discrimination on grounds of race, such as has been the prevailing pattern of brown-white relations in the Territory, can destroy that sense of belonging. At present there is no developed national sentiment in the Territory because of the parochialism of the native population. It is perhaps not too late to ensure that that sentiment, when it comes, shall be focussed on membership of the Australian Commonwealth; but it must be admitted that the sentiments that are developing as forerunners of national consciousness show signs of bitterness. It is foolish to imagine that a small group of resident whites can sedulously over two or three generations insult the sense of personal being and self-respect of a people without producing in them a feeling of alienation and distrust. It remains to be seen whether Australians, understanding the consequences of whatever constitutional policy they choose to pursue and the vital importance to Australia of the outcome, can rise to the height of their opportunities and difficulties. If, as has been argued here, incorporation on a basis of equality is the only policy consonant with Australia's vital interests, it is not too early for Australia to review her whole activity in the islands with this as a criterion.

2. Pragmatic Approach

Mr. Hasluck came to be so closely associated with all aspects of policy-making for New Guinea that it is best to consider his major

statements in some detail. In the course of "twin" lectures in September and October 1956 he set out his ideas of a realistic approach to Territory development, levelling some criticism at the Labor government's Papua and New Guinea Act and relying on a pragmatic attitude to the slowly evolving problems of the country.

From: P. M. C. Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea", *George Judah Cohen Memorial Lecture*, typescript, Canberra, 1956, pp. 27-9.

After the war, there was a good deal of confused thinking when the time came to re-establish civil government. I shall say nothing at this stage regarding the Australian thinking about the international trusteeship system, which was created by the United Nations Charter, but, if we take the acceptance of the Charter by the Commonwealth Government as a starting point, I would suggest that the clearest and most practical thinking was that which, under the direction of Dr. Evatt, was expressed eventually in the hard-fought agreement achieved between Australia and the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. The notable points of that agreement were the recognition of the Government of Australia as the sole authority to exercise the administration of the Territory and the recognition of the right of the administering authority first of all to have the same powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in and over the Territory as if it were an integral part of Australia and to apply to the Territory, subject to such modifications as it deems desirable, such laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it deems appropriate to the needs and conditions of the Territory. (Article IV). It was also agreed that the administering authority could bring the Territory into an administrative union or federation with other dependent territories under its jurisdiction or control, and establish common services between the Territory and any or all of these other territories. (Article V). The administering authority also obtained the right to take all measures in the Territory which it considered desirable to provide for the defence of the Territory and for the maintenance of international peace and security. These clear rights, which are, of course, accompanied by obligations on Australia to observe the provisions of the Charter, laid down a firm and practical foundation for post-war administration. In accordance with them, the Commonwealth Parliament made a decision in the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949 that the Territory of Papua (which is a possession of the Crown) and the Territory of New Guinea (which is a Trust Territory) should be

governed in an administrative union to be called the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

The clarity of thinking which is apparent up to this point, however, becomes rather cloudy when we pass to the terms of the Papua and New Guinea Act, many details of which reveal some sort of carry-over from pre-war years and also some confusion probably derived from pre-war notions of colonial rule. It is not so much that the various sections of the Act are open to grave objection or that any of them is unworkable, but rather that, in total, they add up to a rather confused conception of the system of government. I have never had the opportunity nor the leisure to enquire into the history of the drafting of this piece of legislation, and I may be wrong in my judgment, but on the surface it gives the appearance here and there of clauses being sneaked in without full consideration, and some of its divisions (notably that dealing with the Executive Council) are clearly a carry-over from pre-war practice and the British colonial system with a rather muddled attempt to fit them into the realities of the Australian constitutional situation.

As I have indicated, however, the Act is by no means unworkable and, although as a theorist I might like to re-write it, as a person engaged in government I would not regard its amendment as being in any way an urgent undertaking.

I would suggest, however, as in the case of all political institutions, that the letter of the law is a lesser formative influence than the daily practice of government. Year by year, the shape of this institution will be worked out as the result of what we do. I think the guiding principle is to be found in the recognition that some day, though it may be in the distant future, the people both of the Australian possession and the Trust Territory have to live and work together as one people; that they have to develop their own common culture; that they have to take part in creating the institutions of government in which they themselves can best participate, and that as a result of these developments they themselves have to find the way in which they can live in relationship with the people of Australia and with the modern world. We need to keep in mind that some of the old colonial forms of government were worked out to fit in with a picture of the world rather different from that which we have today.

Having regard to the present state and condition of the people of the two Territories and the nature of the responsibility and the task which we have to undertake in the present generation, I would suggest, too, that we need to seek a directness and a practical efficiency in what we do in the Territory rather than spend too much time on making the constitutional blueprints. Simplicity and direct-

ness and effectiveness are virtues in the administration of the sort of problems with which we are dealing.

3. Confident Appraisal

The Minister's confidence was illustrated in his Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, which seemed to be expressing certainties just as some others were beginning to doubt them.

From: P. M. C. Hasluck, "Australia's Task in Papua and New Guinea", *Roy Milne Memorial Lecture*, typescript, Canberra, 1956, pp. 8, 15-16.

The representative principle essentially is linked with the conception of a civilised society. It is linked, too, with a conception that a man or woman has a value as an individual and that each individual has both the right and the capacity to take part in the shaping of his own life and the life of the community to which he belongs.

The full expression of this principle is undoubtedly far in advance of either the ideas or the capacities of the primitive villager. It is true that the villagers were accustomed to discuss their affairs among themselves or to have them discussed by a group of elders whose power of decision was recognised. They were also accustomed to recognise the leadership of those distinguished among them either for wealth or physical prowess. There is something in those practices on which we can build quite readily and, throughout the history of Australian rule, our administration has built on them. In the selection and appointment of head men (or luluais) and in the selection and appointment of village councils in the old style, the district officers used their intelligence and knowledge in order to select those who would be acceptable as leaders to the village, and who had the qualities which both village and Administration would require in a councillor. From the start acceptability to the village appears to have been considered important. Today, on these foundations of local authority, we have since commenced to build local government councils in villages or groups of villages. These councils are fully elected by those who pay local taxes to their villages.

A gradual transition had to be made from the stage at which the head man or council were selected and appointed by a district officer to the stage at which a truly elective council came into being. This was necessary because of the primitive nature of the social organisation on which we had to build. In time there will be transition to larger representative bodies, perhaps to federations of local govern-

ment councils; or to regional councils and then to federations of regional councils.

Starting at the other end of the scale, on the creation of a Legislative Council for the Territory the Government selected three of the indigenous people from different parts of the Territory to become members of that council. There is not, at present, and cannot be for many years to come, any possibility of a Territory-wide franchise for the native people. They are separated into so many different language groups; they are at so many different stages of progress towards civilisation; and there are so many of them still unaware or only partly aware of what a legislative council is that any attempt to form an electoral roll would be a travesty of any democratic principle and would only have the effect of allowing a very small minority of the people in a few regions to assume the representation of the interests of tens of thousands of people about whom they know less than do the officers of the Administration. In time, the numbers of native members appointed to such bodies will be steadily increased and, with the increase, greater efforts will be made consciously to give the selection a more widely representative character. Perhaps the first advance might be, after the development of more of the local government councils, to give those councils an opportunity for the nomination of some of those to be considered for selection to the Legislative Council, but even then the representative principle will only be served if the Administration itself were to select other members who might be considered as representative of those people still at an earlier stage of progress towards civilisation. . . .

We have to care very deeply about what we do for it is going to have a strong influence on what these people are in the generations to come. It is also, in a narrower field, a matter of importance to us as a nation for it will decide the nature of the future partnership between them and us. We Australians look forward to a partnership that will be free, close and permanent. That will not be determined by what is to be done at some future date but by what we do this year and in every year of our association with them.

The Qualities We Need for the Task

I have tried to indicate in a comprehensive way the sort of task on which we Australians are engaged in Papua and New Guinea. What qualities and resources do we have to bring to this task?

There is probably no human undertaking more complex, more difficult and more thankless than the government and tutelage of a primitive and dependent people.

Many tasks of government have a clear beginning and a clear

ending. For example, it is comparatively simple to bridge a river. The difficulties that have to be overcome can mostly be measured; the materials to be used can be chosen, weighed and counted; the experience gained elsewhere can be applied with some certainty that the result yielded by one action in one place will have a comparable result by the same action in another place; the opening of the bridge to traffic means that the task has been accomplished and that if it has been well done the accomplishment will stand.

Any of the tasks of government which concern human beings are more difficult. Yet, the tasks of government which apply to human beings in a comparatively stable society with an integrated culture and with some common standards of likes and dislikes, are far less complex than when your actions concern not one society but several societies which, during the course of your work, will intermingle one with the other to varying degrees. They become more complex when one of those societies is not stable but is changing rapidly. We are not engaged in an ordinary task of government but are trying to control and direct a cultural revolution. Once the revolution starts, through a variety of causes, and once the streams of change that originated in numerous widely separated springs have merged into one great advancing torrent, it is beyond the power of the most devout well-wisher to say that the flood must go here or must go there. The wisdom of government is to anticipate and avoid the building up of a destructive flood, and ensure that the energy of people flows along quieter and happier channels.

The doleful lesson of history is that colonial government has sometimes been attended by failure. Failure may be perhaps too harsh a term. In any case, it is usually a comparative term meaning little more than that the administering power has not been able to achieve all it hoped to achieve in the way of good for the dependent people, and has not been able to retain what it hoped to retain in its own interest, while the dependent people have reached for the prize of independence only to find that it crumbles and spoils in their hands because resentment about the past is a far more dominant element in their life than faith for the future, while their capacity to handle their own affairs is unequal to their ambition. In general, I think that a study of most of these so-called colonial failures—if the study is made without the conventional attempt to find a criminal—will reveal that failure did not come about through anyone intending to do wrong, but only because people were not positive and active enough about doing the right. The challenge to us as Australians is that we should find out what is right, determine to do it and then make the required effort.

4. Notable Achievements

Whatever the prospects for New Guinea, there was no denying that some impressive tasks had been accomplished since the Pacific war.

From: P. M. C. Hasluck, "*Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea*", Canberra, 1960, pp. 4-6.

Since the war we have established law and order over more than 50,000 square miles of country which was previously in a state of savagery and belligerence. We have built up an Administration service from nothing to a total of 3,623 Australian public servants, 334 native members of the public service and 7,500 Administration native employees. We have provided facilities with which to enable this public service to do its work. We have equipped each of the five main ports with modern wharves, built over 5,000 miles of road, constructed over 100 air fields and many alighting areas, provided housing, sanitation, water supply and electricity services. We have re-established and greatly improved the postal and telecommunications services inside the country. In short we have put the whole country into working order with many more modern facilities and amenities than people who have not visited the Territory can appreciate. We have built four large and modern base hospitals, 101 subsidiary hospitals and 1,200 aid posts and medical centres (at the same time assisting the Missions to build an additional 92 hospitals and 420 aid posts). To-day we (and the Missions whom we assist) have in operation 578 infant and maternal welfare clinics in various parts of the Territory. We have built from nothing medical services which, counting both officials and missionaries, now have 119 doctors, 16 dentists, 17 pharmacists, 347 trained nurses, 236 medical assistants, 307 other European medical workers and, as a result of training inaugurated since the war, 1,447 native medical assistants, 1,620 native medical orderlies, 390 native nurses and 1,158 other native medical workers. In close association with the missions we have established an education system so that to-day there are over 400 European teachers and some 5,400 native teachers at work in 4,100 schools attended by 196,000 pupils. In agriculture we have built up an Agricultural Department staffed by close on 300 officers, with a high proportion of persons with technical and professional qualifications. Notable among these is the Agricultural Extension Branch with about 75 trained European extension officers, 250 trained native extension officers and 420 native agricultural trainees, who are engaged in work directly related to the improvement of village

agriculture and the encouragement and guidance of the native people in the growing of crops for market. We have established 41 agricultural and livestock stations and extension centres and in the course of a normal year we are now capable of conducting 200 agricultural patrols by European officers throughout the Territory to bring agricultural services within reach of the people. In forestry we have established a major industry which has an export value approaching £1,500,000 a year and is backed by a Department of Forests with a staff of over 100 officers. We have built up a Lands Department which, although greatly hampered by a shortage of surveyors, has done notable work and is now preparing to undertake the major measures of land reform which I announced to the House in a statement last April. We have encouraged, guided and instructed the native people in agriculture, with the aid of many private settlers who have taken more than a neighbourly interest in the native people. To-day we have native farmers growing copra, coffee, cocoa and food crops for market of a value which, it is conservatively estimated, must be returning to them an income of £3,000,000 a year which will increase steeply as the potential now developing is realized. Under our guidance, although mining has declined as an industry, the native people are themselves mining gold and enjoy the direct income which it provides. We have re-established trade and, compared with a pre-war annual value of trade of £5,000,000, approximately half of which was accounted for by the production and export of gold, we now have a total Territory trade of £40,000,000 a year, including over £18,000,000 export trade. The Territory now has a banking system. Savings bank deposits by natives have risen from a negligible amount to a current total of credit balances of £1,190,000. The monthly average of deposits in the cheque-paying banks has risen in comparatively few years from nothing to close on £8,000,000. Individual native people are sharing in this prosperity and furthermore the co-operative societies, formed and guided by the Administration, have to-day an annual turnover of close on £1,000,000. In the field of political advancement we have moved in less than ten years from nothing to a position where a population of 250,000 people living in more than 1,000 villages is now being served by 36 Local Government Councils, democratically elected on an adult franchise and handling their own budgets for the management of local affairs. We have established Town and District Advisory Councils on which natives are represented; we have set up a Legislative Council on which there are native members and have completed plans for the reform of this Council and an increase in its native membership.

During this post-war period public expenditure of all kinds has totalled not less than £179,000,000, of which £157,000,000 appeared on the budgets of the Territory Administration.

5. Melanesian Federation

By the late 1950s there was some questioning of the assumptions underlying the notion of a "free, close and permanent" association between New Guinea and Australia. Mr. Justice J. R. Kerr, who had been a member of the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs and the post-war Principal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, recommended an independent Melanesian Federation incorporating West New Guinea (then under Dutch control), Papua and New Guinea, and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. The proposal was aimed partly at countering Indonesian claims to West New Guinea (West Irian).

From: J. R. Kerr, "The Political Future" in Australian Institute of Political Science, *New Guinea and Australia*, Sydney, 1958, pp. 158-60, 163.

The policy of full incorporation of New Guinea as a seventh State, therefore, would certainly involve a serious tightening of our belts economically and the willing acceptance of racial problems which we would have to solve on the basis of equality and genuine acceptance of the New Guinea people in Australia. In return we would get extra manpower for our own development and for defence.

The establishment of New Guinea as a seventh Australian State would clearly indicate to the world that an attack on New Guinea was an attack on Australia. It would be one way of adopting a kind of Monroe Doctrine, otherwise difficult in the modern world.

Full incorporation as a seventh State would also make it easier for the Australian Government to maintain control, at the centre, of foreign policy, defence policy and economic policy because the Commonwealth has wide powers in these fields. But it would have to be remembered that we would have New Guinea Senators and New Guinea Member in the House of Representatives who would have a voice in general Australian affairs. In some political eventualities they could easily have the balance of power.

All in all it does not seem to be a practicable long-term policy and if it is not we should say so now. It is most undesirable for us to pretend to ourselves or to others that this is a possible outcome if it is not really open to us. . . .

Political independence is to be the goal but there must be a close and permanent economic and cultural partnership between Australia and the new independent country. The political independence should be within the British Commonwealth similar to those new states emerging in Africa today.

Such a goal will make it much easier to bring West New Guinea into a unified administration than would a policy of incorporation of New Guinea territories into a seventh Australian State or any other form of *political* partnership with Australia. The Dutch would be more likely to co-operate fully. The United Kingdom would give her support. More importantly, the United States would be much more ready to support independence of a unified New Guinea within the British Commonwealth than any other solution likely to be proposed by us.

What is really involved in this proposal is the ultimate establishment of a new Dominion within the British Commonwealth—a Federation of Melanesia—in which Papua, the Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea would be constituent States. If such a policy were adopted the British Solomons should also be included. They round out the area, which already includes the Australian part of the Solomon Islands, and existing air and sea services could easily be developed to serve the whole area. British participation with us in the formation of a new Melanesian Federation would greatly assist in obtaining Dutch participation, United States approval and a reasonable reception of the idea in the United Nations. Such a policy, based on a nationalist approach to the New Guinea area leading to the establishment of a new Melanesian Federation, would make Indonesian claims difficult to sustain. Both present Indonesian policy and an Australian policy of incorporation as a seventh State would involve splitting up the Melanesian people into different nations with fundamentally different policies. . .

At an earlier point it was said that the Australian Government cannot be forced at this stage to announce publicly its choice among the constitutional possibilities. It is true, also, that many will point out how truly primitive are the peoples and institutions of New Guinea. They will rely on the absence of any educated local leadership and they will say that no present announcement of ultimate aims is possible. Perhaps, too, we may have to reassess from time to time how important New Guinea is to us from the defence point of view.

However this may be, there is really only one ultimate policy open to us: the Government should grasp the nettle firmly now and elect for a Federation of Melanesia as a long-term aim. We should persuade the British and Dutch, bring them together to work out the

policy, announce it to the world and set out from now on to help the peoples of New Guinea to bring about the birth of a Melanesian nation and state.

III. PROBLEMS APPEAR

The years from 1959 to 1963 saw a flurry of activity in Papua and New Guinea. Several problems had to be resolved: the future of European representation in the legislature, overt racial discrimination, the role of the education system and the need for overall development planning. At the same time, the government wished to maintain a process of orderly change, to ensure that investment and confidence in the Territory should continue.

1. Tax Dispute

In 1959, graduated income taxation was introduced to New Guinea for the first time. It precipitated a minor crisis in the Legislative Council, from which the elected (European) members resigned, challenging the government's actions in the High Court of Australia. This episode helped to convince the government that the number of Papuan and New Guinean representatives in the Council should be increased in order to stave off a European challenge to official authority.

From: Brian Jinks, "The New Guinea Tax Issue", *Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society*, No. 2, 1967.

The dispute centred on the Legislative Council, which at that time comprised an official majority of 16, plus the Administrator as President, and 12 non-official members. Of the latter, three were elected Europeans and three were appointed indigenes, with the remainder being nominated to represent commercial, plantation and mission interests. From the first meeting of this Council, the non-official members had attacked the government as being wasteful, inefficient and arrogant, but because of the structure of the Council they had had little influence on government policy. Frustration at this situation had grown as customs and excise duties were increased, controversial labour legislation was introduced and a head tax was imposed in many parts of the Territory. As rumours of impending income tax legislation began to circulate, the Legislative Council was

being called a "farce" and debate there a "waste of time". . . .

Opposition groups were soon organized. On 20 December 1958, the Port Moresby Town Advisory Council passed a resolution calling for the formation of a joint committee "of business people and other organizations to study and report on the recent review of Territory finances." At the same time it was announced that the Public Service Association had also formed a committee to study the financial review, and the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce then stated that it would co-operate with the other bodies. A public meeting was called on 21 January 1959; it was reported that "about 60" people had attended, out of a total European population in Port Moresby of about 4,000.

Opposition by official members of the Legislative Council came to a head with the introduction of the *Income Tax Bill* . . . On most other occasions, official members had met prior to the sitting of the Council to hear explanations of proposed legislation from the Administration's leaders and to ask questions, but on this day no such meeting was held and many of the official members were unaware that the tax Bill was to be introduced until the Council proceedings actually began. Following this sitting the Director of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs proposed that the official members should petition the Governor-General to be allowed to vote according to conscience on the *Income Tax Bill*. Of the other fifteen official members only four . . . were willing to sign such a petition. During the following fortnight this group held a number of informal meetings at which the petition was drafted; it was then handed to the Administrator and eventually sent on to Canberra. . . . However, before the Council met again on 22nd June, the petition was rejected, and the official members decided to let the matter rest.

The *Income Tax Bill 1959* was finally introduced in the Legislative Council on 20th April. The Council divided on the Treasurer's motion to introduce the Bill and following the government's achieving a majority, the three elected members left the building amid "loud and prolonged" applause from the gallery. They then stated that they would remain in the Council in an effort to amend some sections of the Tax Bill, but intended to resign after this.

The ultimate effectiveness of dominantly European representation in the Territory legislature was decided in the period between the April and June meetings of the Legislative Council. In April the elected members made it clear that they intended to continue their opposition by political means. . . . In the following weeks, however, the anti-tax groups, including the elected members of the Council, came to abandon their political methods in favour of a legal cam-

paign aimed at challenging the tax legislation *after* it had been passed. At a public meeting called by the Papuan Taxpayers' Association on 6th May it was decided that the *Income Tax Bill* should be challenged in the Courts. Mr. C. P. W. Kirke, a solicitor and a vice-president of the Association, announced that, acting on the Association's behalf, he had briefed Mr. B. McFarlan, Q.C., of Brisbane "to examine the legality of the proposed Territory tax law." Such a challenge could involve, on the one hand, maintaining that the *Papua and New Guinea Act 1949* had exceeded the terms of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement in combining the formerly separate Territories of Papua and New Guinea, under which circumstances the combined Legislative Council had, since 1951, been exceeding its legislative power. On the other hand, if the three elected members were to resign it could be contended that the composition of the Council, at the time of its passing of the *Income Tax Bill 1959*, was not within the requirements of Section 36 of the *Papua and New Guinea Act*. The former course threatened to have most serious repercussions, if successful, so that the latter step was taken initially.

The resignations had other effects upon both the anti-tax campaign and the political processes of the Territory. When the Council next met on 22nd June the main opposition to the Bill, particularly during the committee stages, was left almost entirely in the hands of Mr. Fairfax-Ross, whose position was a difficult one; although he considered that the Bill should have been a simpler one, he also realized that the measure which was introduced was of some benefit to the copra and rubber industries which he primarily represented. Notwithstanding his equivocal position, Mr. Fairfax-Ross, with support from Mr. R. Bunting, contested the Bill for almost five days. During this time 333 amendments were moved, 149 of them by the Treasurer, 108 by Mr. Fairfax-Ross and 45 by Mr. Bunting. On this occasion some of the non-official amendments involved re-phrasing up to 800 words for a single Schedule, while at least 43 of the official proposals seemed to be direct responses to appointed members' amendments moved on the floor of the Council. No contest of this magnitude had previously occurred in the Legislative Council—indeed, nothing approaching it has since taken place in either the reformed Legislative Council or the House of Assembly—and in conducting it, Mr. Fairfax-Ross and Mr. Bunting achieved stature as truly effective representatives.

Before this debate had even begun, however, there was clearly no hope of postponing income tax, far less of averting it; the government had made its decision, and when it came to the issue, its political power was overwhelming. . . .

The legal campaign was no more successful. The full Bench of the Territory Supreme Court held that the resignations of the elected members did not affect the Legislative Council's power to debate and pass any Bill, and it also ruled against the further contention that a Council for the combined Territory was invalid because of the limitations imposed by the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations. An appeal to the High Court of Australia was dismissed early in 1960. The outcome of these legal manoeuvres is less important, for the purpose of this discussion, than the fact that they were undertaken in the first place. Had the first challenge on the grounds of insufficient membership been successful, the Third Legislative Council would have been destroyed, although a similar body could have been established immediately an amendment was made to the *Papua and New Guinea Act*. A successful challenge to the Act itself would have invalidated all the laws passed for the Territory of New Guinea since 1951, besides having other serious repercussions. Both of these manoeuvres, and particularly the second, thus appear to have been against all the interests of the Territory and its people. In September, 1959, three new members were elected to the Legislative Council and resigned after admitting that they were acting on the orders of the Territory's Taxpayers' Associations. Elected representation had not only come under the complete control of a small group of men, but had been reduced to farcical proportions. The original elected members of the Third Legislative Council had long claimed that the government was intent on making a mockery of European representation in Papua and New Guinea. Many of the government's acts had this effect, if not this intention, but the final and most decisive blow was delivered by the elected European members themselves.

2. Liquor Commission

During this period additional pressure was building up in support of the rights of Papuans and New Guineans. One of these movements culminated, in 1962, in the appointment of a Commission to investigate the question of allowing the people to drink intoxicating liquor, something which had been forbidden them since the first days of government control.

From: *Report of the Liquor Commission*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1962, pp. 5, 8-9.

It was apparent that the present Ordinance either could not be or was not effectively enforced and a great deal of criticism both of the

Administration and of the police was voiced in certain areas. In spite of this evidence of wide spread breach of the law there was very little evidence of any adverse social effects which had resulted from the consumption of liquor, either in the way of breaches of public order or of economic distress or of deterioration in health. Many witnesses however urged that the ineffective control under the present law had created a position in which the law against drinking was largely regarded with contempt and they expressed their fears that this attitude, which was so far reserved for the liquor law, may tend to expand to affect the enforcement of the law generally.

It was also clear that the racial discrimination involved in the present prohibition of native drinking had resulted in a growing resentment against this law. Some of the Commissioners were not satisfied that this resentment was of spontaneous origin among the natives but all are agreed that whatever its origin and to whatever extent it has been fostered and developed by influences other than indigenous reaction it is now a real factor in the thinking of a sizeable proportion of the indigenous people. Particularly among indigenes holding skilled and semi-skilled positions, the feeling was apparent that the Administration was withholding from them a privilege to which they were entitled and that no matter how justified restrictions had been and might still be with respect to many of their compatriots, there was no valid reason why they themselves should not now be permitted to make their own decisions, as individuals, as to whether they should drink or not.

On the general question of maintenance of order the Commissioners heard much evidence. Fears were expressed both by expatriates and indigenes, particularly indigenous women, that troubles would result. The Commission regards it as beyond doubt that excessive consumption of alcohol in any community leads to increase in crime because the effect of alcohol is to loosen those controls which a man normally exerts upon himself and to make him less apprehensive of the consequences of his actions. There was however no evidence before the Commission that the emotional reaction of the indigene to the stimulus of alcohol is any different in nature or degree from that of the European and there was no evidence which satisfied the Commissioners that the dangers to public order resulting from the availability of alcohol were any different in degree from those which occur in any European community, except to the extent that the forces maintaining law and order were less effective.

In urban areas the police force should be able to maintain substantially the same degree of order that exists in a western community. Indeed the Commissioners consider, on the evidence before

them, that the main danger in public drinking places is likely to arise from the occasional provocative expatriate. On plantations and in villages remote from police control the problem may present more difficulty but that depends partly upon the extent to which liquor is available in those areas and partly upon traditional sanctions which village life enforces on those who are part of its community. So far as sources of supply in such situations are concerned, a Licensing Authority should of course consider any dangers to law and order which may result from the grant of an application for a license and the means of control available in the area to meet such dangers.

It is possible that immediately following the lifting of an unpopular law there may be some disturbances but on the other hand the fear of prejudicing a privilege gained will tend to subdue them. In any event the weight of evidence, both expatriate and indigenous, favoured the view that any disturbances would subside in a comparatively short time. The Commission had material before it in regard to the introduction of drinking to other native communities in various parts of the world and in no instance was there any evidence of widespread or serious disturbances following its introduction. The Commission has no reason to believe that experience in the Territory following the relaxation of the law prohibiting the indigenous people from drinking would be any worse than that which had been encountered elsewhere.

3. The Menzies Statement

The issue of Australian control of New Guinea was complicated further by a statement of the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, on his return from the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. It required considerable effort on the part of the government to show that the Prime Minister had not in fact said what he had been reported as saying.

From: *Papua and New Guinea: Some recent statements of Australian policy on political advancement*, Canberra, 1960, pp. 13-14.

THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY

What The Prime Minister Has Said

On his return from abroad on 20th June, 1960, the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) gave a Press Conference at Kingsford-Smith Airport, Sydney. What he said about New Guinea should be read in context.

Mr. Menzies, after commenting on the Prime Ministers' Conference in London, passed on to a discussion of the future of the

Commonwealth and then to a review of developments in Africa. Still dealing with African events, the transcript of the tape-recording of the Press Conference continues—

Prime Minister: Whereas at one time many of us might have thought that it was better to go slowly in granting independence so that all the conditions existed for a wise exercise of self-government, I think the prevailing school of thought to-day is that if in doubt you should go sooner, not later. I belong to that school of thought myself now, though I didn't once. But I have seen enough in recent years to satisfy me that even though some independences may have been premature, where they have been a little premature, they have at least been achieved with good will. And when people have to wait too long for independence, then they achieve it with ill will, and that perhaps is the difference between the British colonial policy of this century and that of some other countries.

Question: Would you apply that view to New Guinea, sir?

Prime Minister: I would apply that to any country.

Question: Continuing with New Guinea, sir, did you discuss anything about the New Guinea area with the Dutch?

Prime Minister: No, no I didn't go there. Mr. Hasluck went to The Hague. When you say "apply that to New Guinea", yes, but that doesn't mean I belong to this fancy school of thought that you write a time-table out and say, "In ten years' time so and so, and in a twenty years' time so and so". That's just silly. But we are doing a wonderful job of work in New Guinea and Papua. We will go on doing it. We will get to the point where the standard of living of the indigenous inhabitants has risen, as we think, pretty well. We may get to a point or my successors may get to a point, where they say, "Well, maybe if we allow them to determine their future now, it is a little premature". I would sooner take that risk at that time than leave it too long so that the demand for self-determination became explosive and produced hostility.

The Prime Minister referred to these comments in the course of a speech in the Brighton Town Hall on July 13.

"It is good common sense", Mr. Menzies said. "But there is now being built around this some sort of idea that we ought to be out of New Guinea and Papua in a few years. And the result is, if that view obtains currency, that the development of New Guinea for self-government will be greatly postponed. Because what New Guinea and Papua need for their economic development for the development of their population, is a steady inflow of investment in those lands so that their rural industries may be developed, their cattle industry developed: all these various things which mean a

rising standard of living for the New Guinea people and for the Papuan people.

"All these things require confidence and investment and I do wish I could persuade people who are talking about 'out in five years' to understand that if they are believed they will make it impossible to be out in many many more years than that. We want to see a steady development as fast as possible, according to our resources. And after all, we are spending a great deal of money in New Guinea, or you are, through us. We want to see all these things go on. But above all things it would be idle to talk about giving self-government to the native inhabitants of New Guinea and Papua unless you had developed their economy in their country so that they had industries, so that they had employment, so that they had a standard of living of a kind that we would recognize based upon their own efforts in their own country. . . .

"A friendly New Guinea is essential to Australia. And the right way to get it is to pursue in a perfectly normal, sensible fashion, the development of this country and the development of its people. Not being turned aside by cheer-chasers or by violent advocates on one side or the other, but going straight along the track and saying: 'Our ultimate objective, as Australians, is that we shall bring these people to a point when they are fit to rule themselves and to determine their own future'. When we have done that we will have discharged a great trust for humanity and we will have brought great credit and, as I think, great security in the true sense, upon ourselves."

4. Partnership and Paternalism

Shortly after the Prime Minister's statement, Mr. Hasluck, during a visit to New Guinea, made a reassuring statement about Australia's presence in the Territory. He referred to the paternalistic relationship between the two countries in terms which differed little from those of Sir Hubert Murray.

From: *Papua and New Guinea etc.*, p. 12.

OPINION IN THE TERRITORY "PARTNERSHIP"

Before leaving the Territory on 15th July, 1960, the Minister for Territories said that he had talked with hundreds of representative people in Port Moresby, Lae, and Rabaul, both native and non-native, on contemplated reforms of the Legislative Council.

After reviewing the opinions expressed to him, he said—

“I have been much impressed by the very warm desire in all quarters to see a close and intimate partnership between the non-native and native people in the development and democratic evolution of the country.

“The hundreds of native spokesmen I talked with are keenly aware of the problems involved and are unanimous in their opinion that the political education of the more backward people will inevitably be a slow process. They see their development in terms of long-range education. The educated native people have given much thought to this question and believe that the close partnership between Australia and their own country should be maintained. In their imagery they see the relationship as one between father and son and look to Australia for a father’s guidance, counsel and help. This attitude of mind and the friendly co-operation of the non-native leaders of thought in the country will be of great value in the transitional period ahead.

“The advancement of the welfare of this country and its people needs the help of the private citizen no less than of the government. That help is wanted in all fields—social, economic and political—and is already being given and appreciated. In spite of misunderstanding and even misrepresentation elsewhere, the people of the Territory should have faith in what they are doing. If you know you are trusted by those alongside you and if you believe you are helping them, you are standing on firm ground; and in carrying out your part in a great national task, you have the full backing of the Australian Government.

“Australia has a responsibility of its own to make decisions and we will carry out that responsibility. Expressions of opinion, particularly by the native people, have shown that there is appreciation in the Territory of what has been done and confidence in the Government’s judgment on the Territory’s future.”

5. New Legislative Council

By 1961, however, the balance seemed weighted against European influence, with the appearance of an increased number of Papuans and New Guineans in the reformed Legislative Council, and with Sir Dallas Brooks’ statement on the “Principle of Self-determination”.

From: *Speech by the Administrator of the Commonwealth on the Opening of the Legislative Council, 1961, Port Moresby, 1961.*

The Legislative Council was inaugurated in November, 1951, and during nearly ten years of service to the Territory has helped to shape the progress of this country and its people. Following constitutional reforms enacted by the Australian Parliament, and as the result of recent elections, the Council assembles to-day with a larger membership and a more strongly representative character than it previously had. Twelve of its members are now elected and half of its membership is drawn from the indigenous people, whereas formerly only three were elected and there were only three native members. . . .

At this meeting of the Council the people of the Territory cross the threshold of a new political life. The Australian Parliament, in enacting the constitutional reform which led to the changes in this Council, had it clearly in mind that there should be continuous political growth and progressive constitutional change. It is their belief that political growth and constitutional change should go hand in hand so that the political advancement of the people is never hampered by having to work through institutions which have become out-of-date and unsuitable; and so that the institutions themselves will never fail to serve their purpose through any lack of political capacity among those who use them.

The Government and the Territorial Administration will continue to promote, to encourage and to assist in all possible ways political advancement in the Territory. Their efforts will be exerted in many spheres—in local government, in public administration, in the functioning of various agencies of government, and in general education—and will find their apex in the membership of this Council. We trust that in this Council the leaders of the people will never fail to find their opportunity and that, as the political aspirations of the people expand, this Council will give them the means of shaping their own future until eventually they reach the goal of self-government.

My advisers have expressed readiness to set target dates for the performance of the various practical tasks they have undertaken in social, economic and educational advancement. The stages in the progress of political advancement will be set by the response of the people themselves. Nevertheless my advisers have it in their own minds that, after experience of one full term of the newly-constituted Council and after a second general election—that is to say in perhaps five years from now—this Council and the Australian Parliament might be asked to consider what the next step forward should be. My advisers also have it in mind that, as soon as the people of the Territory themselves feel ready for the change, they should move to a system of elections on a common roll. On all these questions my advisers look to the participation of all the people of the Territory,

through this Council, in shaping the course of change and progress. . .

It has been the sad history of many people in all parts of the world at various times in history up to the present day to have had their fate decided as a result of decisions in which they themselves have had no part. We believe that the fate of peoples should not be so decided but that the principle of self-determination should be applied in such a way that the peoples themselves can make an effective choice for their own future. In our understanding of the term, an effective choice means that they have an opportunity to express their views; that their views can be formed and expressed without coercion on them; and that, having expressed their choice, they will in fact be able—if necessary with the help of friendly neighbours—to live the life that they have chosen. We believe that the trust and respect between the people of this Territory and the people of Australia is such that when the time comes to choose they will wish to preserve, as we ourselves wish to preserve, a close and friendly association with Australia.

6. West Irian

During this period the problem of the Dutch presence in West New Guinea, and its dispute with Indonesia over that part of the island, grew more urgent. At one time it appeared that an armed conflict would result and there was disquiet in Australia when West Irian became part of Indonesia.

From: "West Irian—A Problem Settled, or Postponed?", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 20 October 1969, pp. 164-5, 175-6.

To appreciate the continuing volatility of the Irian question it is necessary to go back briefly to post-World War II developments in the area. West Irian was the one portion of their East Indian empire which the Dutch retained when they turned sovereignty over to the Indonesian Republic. This was in December, 1949, after four years of confronting revolutionary Indonesian nationalism. West Irian was the most backward and internally isolated region of the East Indian possessions, but the Dutch Government at the time insisted on retaining control of it in order to placate conservatives at home. This element had threatened to prevent passage in the Dutch parliament of the constitutional changes formally giving the rest of Indonesia its freedom. . . .

With Australian assistance, the Dutch . . . succeeded on three occasions (1954, 1956, and 1957) in preventing Indonesia from

obtaining the necessary support in the United Nations' General Assembly on behalf of its claim to West Irian. Earlier Dutch pronouncements of determined resistance to Indonesia's "confrontation" campaign to win the territory by means of guerrilla infiltration were supported by a campaign to win international support for its retention of West Irian. As a consequence The Hague's abrupt turn-about in the early weeks of 1962 and surrender to pressure from the Kennedy administration in Washington to give in to the Indonesian demand predictably led to bitter Papuan protests and disappointment.

Dutch and Indonesian representatives in New York reached agreement on August 15, 1962, to transfer West Irian to Indonesian control after a brief United Nations temporary administration. And this news sparked Papuan mass demonstrations in several towns, with placards reading "*How many dollars for a Papua, Yankees?*" and "*Papua Barat wants Freedom not Sukarno*". . . .

All during the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian Australia had backed the Dutch, and Canberra's policy statements tended to stress the necessity of a peaceful solution to the question as well as the right to self-determination of the Papuan population. The relatively abrupt Dutch surrender to Indonesia's demands in the first half of 1962 meant something of a defeat for Australian policy as well.

Sir Garfield Barwick, then Minister for External Affairs, on August 21, 1962, made a statement to the House of Representatives explaining the recently concluded Dutch-Indonesian Agreement on West Irian. He was at pains to note that none of the Western countries, "*particularly those with whom Australia has the closest association*" had been willing to maintain a Dutch administration in West Irian by military means, if necessary. Hence, Australia had had no other choice than to accept the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. Sir Garfield noted, however, that the plebiscitary provision of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement accorded also with Australia's desire that "*the indigenous people should have their choice of their future*".

Very shortly Australian-Indonesian relations worsened because of Djakarta's new "confrontation" policy against Malaysia where Australian forces were based as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve forces. Open conflict was avoided (Australian forces were largely stationed in those areas in Malaya where they would not be likely to engage infiltrating Indonesian guerrillas), as both parties meanwhile quietly worked to clarify the West Irian-T.P.N.G. boundary. . . .

In the meantime, there was the mounting refugee problem. Be-

tween 1963, the year of the formal Indonesian take-over of West Irian, and the end of 1966, when anti-Indonesian Papuan resistance began to take significant form, 573 West Irianese crossed into T.P.N.G. In 1967 there were 866; in 1968, 801, and by May, 1969, already at least 350, an indeterminate number of whom were reportedly seeking "permissive residence" in T.P.N.G. for political and humanitarian reasons.

In April and May, 1969, Indonesian patrols which were pursuing West Irianese crossed the T.P.N.G. border and fired shots well inside it. But even then Canberra made no official public protest, though discussions were subsequently held in Djayapura to prevent a repetition of such incidents.

In T.P.N.G., however, clergy, students, Papuan political leaders and the House of Assembly, all criticised Indonesian policies and Australia's apparent acquiescence in them, but to no apparent avail. Clearly the Australian Government was and is determined not to let the West Irian problem interfere with the new Indonesian rapprochement. There is little doubt that U.S. policy makers, equally desirous not to upset the present Indonesian domestic power structure, strongly concur in Canberra's position. Whether this policy will have been wise, in the light of the ongoing West Irianese resistance and its effects on T.P.N.G. opinion, remains to be seen.

CHAPTER NINE

SELF DETERMINATION

I. THE FOOT REPORT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission to New Guinea, under the leadership of Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon), drew up a report which was frequently critical of Australian policy in the Territory. In general, it stated that progress would have to be much faster if Australia were to keep pace with world trends. It particularly recommended that a long-range plan be drawn up for the economic development of Papua and New Guinea, that an immediate start be made on tertiary education and that an enlarged, more representative legislature be set up. There was a belief at the time that these moves would begin a new and radically different train of events in New Guinea.

1. Sense of Urgency

In addition to recommending that the World Bank be asked to investigate New Guinea's potential, the U.N. Mission sought to create an impression of urgency with the other two of its major recommendations.

From: Report of the 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea, New York, 1962, pp. 24-6.

The main reason why the present educational programme is inadequate is that it pays little or no attention to the need for higher education. The Administration is specific in stating that post-primary, secondary and higher education will be made available to

all students who qualify by satisfactorily completing their primary education and who possess a good knowledge of the English language. Facilities in both the Territory and Australia will be used for secondary education. And in his statement of 26 October 1961, the Minister for Territories specified that in the next five years secondary schools, technical schools and professional training would be developed in keeping with the demand for them by children who had completed their primary education. He also noted that in five years it is estimated that the enrolment in post-primary and secondary schools will rise to 10,000. But there is no indication at all of how many students will be completing their secondary education, let alone how many will be taking and completing university courses. Nor is there any evidence that the Administration intends to encourage these students to remain in schools and universities in the face of the strong demands that will continue to be made for their services by the Administration itself and by business enterprise before they complete their education.

The Territory needs more than the promise that such education will be made available to those who can qualify and who demand it. What is required is a positive programme to ensure that hundreds of students do qualify and do demand it. The trouble has been that the incentive and the inducements to go higher have not been impressed upon them. They have not been encouraged, assisted and persuaded to carry their education through to the end. They have in fact had little or no example of higher education before them, for the simple reason that there has been practically none.

In the Mission's view the kind of programme for secondary and higher education needed in New Guinea must be approached with greater imagination and boldness. The need for qualified personnel in all fields is so great and so urgent that a new approach is essential. The Mission believes that the Administration should be planning now to provide an annual turn-out of university graduates of the order of at least a hundred. Such planning should include the provision of special courses for selected students at both the secondary and tertiary levels and the provision of inducements through scholarships or the payment of living allowances, in order to make it possible for them to complete such courses. Educators in the Territory assured the Mission that they knew which students were outstanding. Therefore, it should not be difficult to select a hundred or so of the most promising students in the Territory each year and prepare them for matriculation in Australia. Inevitably, until a university is functioning within the Territory, the co-operation of Australian or even other overseas universities will have to be sought,

but the Mission feels confident that this assistance will be readily granted. Finally, the Mission wishes to stress that a programme such as this should not only be planned now, but should be put into operation immediately.

The Mission knows this is not a conventional academic programme, but neither is the situation or the times. Australia has shown imagination and daring before this in tackling and overcoming difficulties in New Guinea. In fact, it has been forced to, whenever urgency was a factor in administration, communications, the extension of control, and public health. The Mission is confident that it will not fail to meet this challenge in the spirit in which it has met others in the past. Since the end of the Second World War education policy in the Territory has been in what might be termed the "preparatory stage". It is now high time to move confidently into the development stage. The base of the educational pyramid has been well laid. The Mission feels that the time has come to complete the structure of earlier effort, and to provide the apex of the pyramid by a new policy of selection for and encouragement of higher and university education. . .

We believe that the time has come for an imaginative advance which would create a truly representative parliament. We think that the target should be set of creating such a parliament without delay, all preparations being put in hand at once and completed next year so that the first general election on the new basis can take place no later than April 1964 when the term of office of the present Legislative Council expires. We are of the opinion that all the necessary preparations for the voters' common roll, single-member constituencies and ballot box elections can be completed within this timetable.

Before going on to consider in more detail the problems of constituencies, methods of election and composition of the new House of Representatives (we suggest that this title is preferable for many reasons, principally because it gives a more accurate picture of the composition and function of the parliament proposed) we should state the main arguments which have weighed with us in making this principal recommendation.

Firstly, we consider that, as General Sir Dallas Brooks said in the speech already quoted, "it is essential to look to the participation of all the people of the Territory, through this Council, in shaping the course of change and progress". In facing the urgent, anxious and awkward problems of the future the people of the Territory must play their full part. Their interests must come first; their ideas and their opinions should be heard and respected. That is the principle

and purpose which have predominated in the preparatory steps already taken by the Administering Authority.

Secondly, we are convinced from our public discussions in every district in the Territory that the people have leaders well competent to speak for them and to represent them in a thoroughly responsible way in a central parliament. Indeed, wherever we have been in the Territory—in patrol posts and country centres as well as in district and sub-district headquarters—the leaders of the people (often presidents or members of the local councils) have spoken out for those they represent, often with vigour and eloquence and nearly always with an impressive steadiness of judgement and a sense of constructive responsibility. Some of the most backward areas might find it difficult at first to find local representatives capable of taking a full part from the start in a legislative body. The electors of such communities may consequently decide to elect representatives whom they trust from outside their own members. In any event no harm will be done if in a parliament of a hundred members there are a few who do not at first play a prominent role.

Thirdly, we believe that the establishment of a central representative parliament will, more than anything else, give to the Territory that national sentiment and that sense of political unity which has so far been so noticeably lacking. The constituencies for which the present six New Guinea members are elected are far too big to give the people a sense of direct representation through their own elected leaders. For instance, the people of Manus and New Ireland and Bougainville can hardly be expected enthusiastically to agree on one New Guinean representative for all three islands, nor is it reasonable to expect the more than 600,000 inhabitants of the Eastern and Western Highlands to be satisfied with one New Guinean representative. The attitude will be considerably different when each sub-district elects its own parliamentary representative (with the larger sub-districts being divided into two or more constituencies). Then the House of Representatives will at once become a political reality in the minds of the people and a true centre of political opinion and political activity. It will come alive, and help to provide that living unity which has so far failed to emerge.

The Mission believes that the proposal for a House of Representatives of about one hundred members elected from single-member constituencies on a ballot-box system of full adult suffrage is practicable. The Mission also believes that all the preparations can be completed in the time proposed. Experience elsewhere amongst people no more advanced than those in New Guinea indicates that there need be no insuperable difficulties in these practical tasks. The

New Guinea census figures, efficiently kept up to date as they are, provide the material for the preparation of the common electoral roll. The census figures would also make it possible quickly to work out constituency boundaries (it is suggested that the constituencies should be established roughly on the basis of 20,000 inhabitants in each constituency), this task perhaps being carried out by a boundary commission, which, with the material and information already available, could be expected to complete its task in a month or two. It would also take time to appoint and train the necessary electoral staff—most of this work would no doubt be done by existing staff under the direction of the district commissioners—and then several months would have to be devoted to explaining to the people the system of ballot-box voting by symbols. It is a system which has worked without difficulty amongst people with a higher illiteracy rate than that in New Guinea. Some people imagine that the ballot box can be used only by highly educated persons, but in fact such a system of voting by symbols is one of the simplest of all procedures. Any one can understand it. And the essential democratic process of the elector deciding and indicating whom he wishes to represent him and to speak for him is a function which anyone, whether or not he or she has been educated, can well exercise.

2. Rights and Representation

Not long after the publication of the Foot Report, Mr. Hasluck addressed the Public Service Association Congress in Port Moresby, where he seemed almost belligerent in insisting on Australia's rights and in reiterating the principle of self determination.

From: P. M. C. Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea", Port Moresby, 1962, typescript, pp. 1-4.

It would appear, from what has been said to me, that changes and impending changes in West New Guinea have led to questioning about the future of the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Newspaper accounts of the report made by the United Nations Visiting Mission which toured the Territory last April have had an unsettling effect and brought even a sense of dismay among some of the native people.

At the outset I want to remind the people of Territory of two facts about the situation here.

The first concerns our right to be here. The Territory of Papua has been under British sovereignty since 1884, and sovereignty was

transferred to Australia in 1906. The Territory of New Guinea, the former German colony of New Guinea, was placed under the administration of Australia in 1920 by mandate of the League of Nations and in 1946, in substitution for this mandate, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated Australia "as the *sole authority* which will exercise the administration of the Territory."

There is thus no dispute, nor is there ground for dispute, on the Australian authority in these two Territories.

Do not let us or anyone else forget that we have our rights. We do not have to be either offensive or unfriendly when we insist on our own rights. We do not have to be apologetic. It is proper that we should declare our rights and maintain them. . .

The second fact concerns the defence of the Territory. Article 7 of the Trust Agreement says:

"The Administering Authority may take all measures in the Territory which it considers desirable *to provide for the defence of the Territory* and for maintenance of international peace and security."

Our right to administer and to defend the Trust Territory is no less strong in the Territory of Papua, which is an Australian possession.

None of these Australian rights, clearly confirmed by international treaties, such as the Charter of the United Nations, is at present in dispute. If, in breach or disregard of international agreement, these rights are challenged, Australia will maintain its rights

Because it is so often forgotten today, I want to stress that this freedom of choice is the keystone of the United Nations trusteeship system established by the Charter. Too often, today, other nations of the world are trying to insist that they have the right to select what it is that the dependent peoples should choose. But Article 76 of the Charter says exactly what the Australian Government says and means on this matter. That Article refers to the objective of promoting the advancement "of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and *the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned*"

. . . .

The Government is carefully examining all aspects of the proposal for a representative assembly. As is well known the Australian Government has previously committed itself to advancement towards self-government through a process of successive extensions of the representative character, powers and responsibility of the Legislative Council until the point is reached at which the Legislative

Council becomes fully representative and fully responsible. We believe that it is an essential part of a policy of respecting the choice of the inhabitants of the Territory that constitutional changes should not be imposed on the Territory as the result of decisions made outside the Territory, but should be made in consultation with the people of the Territory. We will have such consultation. The Australian Government will not hang back from political change, indeed, we will continue to do our utmost to promote it—but we have to respect the wishes of the people as well as the wishes of the United Nations. We want a political system that will work and that will be deeply rooted in the needs and the aspirations of the people. We look to their responses as well as at our own planning.

3. World Bank Report

Following one of the recommendations of the Foot Report, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) was commissioned to carry out a survey of New Guinea and to draw up a plan for the economic development of the country. The World Bank Report suggested that Australian finance and skilled manpower be increased further.

From: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea*, Baltimore, 1965, pp. 31-2.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

In its request to the Bank, the Commonwealth Government of Australia asked that the Mission make recommendations to assist it in planning a development program for the Territory of Papua and New Guinea designed to stimulate economic growth and raise the standard of living of the people. The Commonwealth Government stressed that its major aim is to help the inhabitants of the Territory to become self-governing as soon as possible and to ensure that when this aim is reached the Territory will, to the greatest extent feasible, be able to stand on its own feet economically. The task, therefore, is to marshal the human and material resources available to the Territory through a development program which will continue the process of development toward the economic objective of the Commonwealth Government. To this end, the Mission has prepared a program for economic development focused in particular on the next five years 1964/65–1968/69. In agriculture and livestock, the projections cover ten years since a number of the crops take years to mature.

If the Territory were left to its own means there would not be the technical skills, the management or the finance to develop the economy at any reasonable pace. Continued financial support from the Commonwealth Government will be necessary if economic progress is to be made. In fact, if progress toward the goal of economic viability is to be as rapid as possible, it will be necessary that financial support be increased over and above that now being made available by Australia. With increasing support in the amounts projected later in this chapter, the Mission is convinced that the natural resources of the Territory are such that substantial economic growth is possible in the next five to ten years. The Mission also believes that with education and training the indigene can be motivated and is capable of taking an expanding role in the economy and in government. But the molding of the indigene and the resources into a modern economy will not be an easy task. It will take great effort. It will be expensive. It will take time.

While substantial economic growth is possible over the next five to ten years, economic viability in any meaningful sense cannot be achieved within several decades. The physical and human resources have not been developed to the point where economic viability is yet in sight. The program projected for the next five years can only set the pattern that development should take.

The Mission has assumed that the Commonwealth Government will be prepared to increase its financial assistance to the Territory. The availability of finance has not, therefore, been regarded as the prime limitation on the scale of the program which the Mission has formulated. The prime limitation has been the availability of skilled manpower which will have to come mainly from Australia. Given this limitation, the program formulated by the Mission provides for development at as rapid a rate as is possible of achievement by an aggressive Administration following sound policies.

The Mission believes that major emphasis in the development program should be given to the stimulation of production and the advancement of the indigenous people. Only by these means can the real income of the native people be raised, the tax base broadened, the disproportionate gap between government expenditures and revenues raised in the Territory narrowed and the widening deficit in the balance of payments—now met by grants from the Government of Australia—reduced.

4. Criticism of World Bank Report

The World Bank Report was very well received, with only an

occasional critic such as Dr. Bernard Schaffer, raising objections to its approach. It is significant that a number of Schaffer's objections were implicitly taken into account in the 1970's.

From: B. B. Schaffer, "Thoughts at Goroka", *New Guinea*, June/July 1965, pp. 73, 76-7.

The three principles are firstly the idea of a concentration: "To obtain the maximum benefit from the development effort, expenditures and manpower should be concentrated in areas and on activities where the prospective return is highest". Secondly, one at any rate of the consequences of dependence on external government assistance as the major factor in development is to be eradicated as far as possible: "The standards of administration services and facilities should be related to Territory conditions." Thirdly there should be a fostering of responsibility. Here again we are to see an effort to eradicate the consequences of a reliance on external governmental assistance and the local administration.

The idea of concentration is applied particularly to agricultural development, especially in developing some areas rather than others; to health, especially in a cutback in hospital building and curative work; to general administration; and to education, especially in giving up the idea of universal primary education. The idea of using standards appropriate to the Territory is applied particularly to salaries, to public works and to design and materials.

Of course the principles can mean anything at all just stated in general terms. The point, the whole point, is what specific recommendations they lead to or, at any rate, introduce. Take the idea of fostering responsibility and reducing paternalism. Who could oppose it? Actually, the interpretation of this principle in the report is very questionable indeed. In the first place the report seems unclear about whether this is something it wants to see achieved, against all sorts of difficulties, or something which is bound to happen as development proceeds.

Secondly, the situation of the Territory with an external administration and a heavy dependence on subsidy, is inevitably paternalistic and so it will remain at least until independence. Other policies which will increase the financial assistance which the Territory gets will increase paternalism in a sense.

Furthermore, many of the specific recommendations of the report itself, quite apart from the problem of increasing assistance, are in fact highly paternalistic.

This applies especially to what is almost the chief feature of the

report: its over-emphasis on the European role in development and its neglect of the indigenous role, including those points of the indigenous role, like the co-operative movement, which do urgently need investigation and advice. . .

What certainly does seem to be clear is that the report completely understates the need for industrialisation and, very significantly, the potential role for public enterprise. Both these points, closely related, are again very striking in relation to the sort of political philosophy underlying the report and its insistent disregard of comparative existence.

If we follow the report what we will be creating is an economy based almost exclusively on European capital and management and, secondly, peasant production of tropical primary products. Nothing significant is said about industrialisation at all. Furthermore, considering the general situation in the Territory, the role of government administration and public expenditure both in the past and its enhanced role in the future, and some actual experiments in public or joint public-private enterprise and—once again—the whole range of comparative experience, it is striking to find such a restrictive attitude to public enterprise.

Public enterprise is to play no role, apparently, in meeting the problem of industrialisation—but, then, nothing is said about industrialisation of any real import. The role of government will be restricted to information and to politics which will help the private sector in taxation, tariffs, land and credit . . .

There are a whole series of problems of development administration, many of which will be enhanced by the report's recommendations and all of which are deeply and intimately involved in the possible success of its plans (or anyone else's) for economic growth; almost none is given serious attention.

We can take instance after instance: all of them present or about to emerge in the Territory, all obviously related to the substance of the report, all evidenced vividly in comparative experience, and none dealt with in the report: the control of public corporations, the relations between central departments and developing local authorities, the relations between public corporations and other *ad hoc* authorities (like an urban housing authority) and local government.

It is difficult to think of any competent and responsible document about development which would not give attention to these problems. It is, once again, very misleading of the report to imply that development can be discussed without discussing these problems and without looking at what is likely to happen here and has already happened elsewhere on each of these points.

In this respect the major weakness may be that the report has nothing at all to say about the need to develop a style of administration to handle the tasks of development in the Territory.

5. Higher Education

The Foot Report recommendation on tertiary education was investigated by a Commission under the chairmanship of the eminent Australian educationist Sir George Currie. The Commission's recommendations were clear and direct.

From: *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in Papua and New Guinea*, Canberra, 1964, pp. 59-61.

The first question to be tackled in any discussion of university education for Papuans and New Guineans is: should such education be given by means of scholarships to Australian universities, or at an institution actually in the Territory? For a variety of reasons, the Commission is very firmly in favour of the latter alternative. There are negative objections to training at the undergraduate level being given in an alien environment, and even as a matter of economics, the numbers to be catered for will in a few years be too great to be readily handled in Australian universities. This emerges from an examination of the likely availability of students, although once more this depends on expansion of the secondary school system, which expansion itself, however, will be at the least greatly facilitated by the presence of a university, if not indeed dependent on it. The numbers available in the first triennium (1965-67) will not be large, but this will be a positive advantage in the preliminary phases of planning and "running-in", while there are very cogent reasons for an early start. Altogether, as it seems to the Commission, the balance is decidedly in favour of the early establishment of a university institution in the Territory itself.

The next problem is whether such an institution should be fully autonomous, or should start life as a college of an existing university. The Commission has no hesitation in recommending that it should be a full and autonomous university from the very start. The strongest, if not indeed the only, argument in favour of the approach by way of a university college is that this would maintain reasonably high standards; the Commission fully shares the concern for standards, but feels that they can be maintained by other measures of association with the Australian academic community. The Australian experience suggests that the "guidance" given by a parent

university to a university college can be frustrating as well as helpful, and if this can be so for two institutions within a single Australian State, it seems bound to be so, to a much higher degree, as between two institutions separated by much greater distances and in totally dissimilar environments. We are convinced, also, that it would be much easier to attract really good staff to an independent university than to a subordinate college; the type of man needed is one who will wish to build up something of his own rather than one who will be content to accept remote control. The examples of "special relationship" do not seem very relevant. Finally, there is once again the paramount necessity of having an independent university if the education system as a whole is to be properly integrated and balanced. For all these reasons, the Commission is very firm that the Territory institution should be a full university. . .

Granted the desirability of a Territory university, the next question is what disciplines should be offered initially? The Commission recommends beginning with teaching Faculties of Education and Arts, followed as soon as possible by Science, and "planning Faculties" of Agriculture, Law, and Medicine. These recommendations are in accord with the indigenous "felt needs", which seem to the Commission to be very sensible and real needs. The first professorships recommended are: Education, English, Agriculture, Anthropology, Geography, History and Political Science, Economics, Mathematics, Biology, Chemistry and/or Physics, Law, and Medicine. . .

It is obvious that the problem of staffing will be a crucial one, and the Commission gave much consideration to this. It seems clear that the basic source of staff will be the Australian universities, though recruiting should not be confined to Australia. While secondment may be very useful as an ancillary, it is clear to the Commission that the staff cadres must be mainly either permanent or on reasonably long (four or preferably six year) contracts. Interest and ability in *teaching* must be stressed in staff recruitment, although the research potentiality of the Territory for the field and social sciences are considerable and will be a main attraction; this is not so much the case in the purer arts and sciences, though even here there may be unsuspected possibilities. But liveliness of mind, interest in teaching, and some pioneering spirit will be main desiderata in staff selection. Material conditions—pay, housing, leave, superannuation—must be made attractive. On the important question of whether initial appointments to specialised departments should be at "in-charge" levels or at the top—i.e. of professors—the Commission is strongly of the opinion that to get the best men the full status of a

Chair must be offered; and in this it is backed by an overwhelming majority, almost but not quite an unanimity, of Australian academic opinion.

6. House of Assembly

The third major recommendation of the Foot Report, dealing with the development of the legislature, was investigated by a Select Committee of the recently reformed Legislative Council. The Committee was not in full agreement with all the points in the Foot recommendation.

From: *Interim Report of the Select Committee on Political Development*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1962, pp. 4-6.

With one exception all of the people interviewed wished to see an increase in the number of Members on the Council, on the ground that the present electorates were too large to allow the necessary contact between Members and their electors. Non-indigenes also favoured greater representation of indigenes because of their population majority. On the other hand there was a definite feeling against too large a membership and only four favoured a Council of 100 representatives, the main reasons given being that such a Council would be irresponsible, too unwieldy to be of any great educative value and full of talk instead of work, that at the moment there were probably not 100 indigenes capable of successfully carrying out duties as Legislative Councillors and that a Council with so many Members would be unnecessarily costly. Attempts by your Committee to modify this attitude were of no avail. The indigenous Members of your Committee are of the opinion that a Council of 100 is associated in the people's minds with self government which the people appear to fear and say they do not want at this stage.

The great majority of the witnesses desired representation on a Subdistrict basis, with some allowance for population and geography. For instance most agreed that although Manus had a population of only 18,043, it should have a Member because of its geographical isolation. Similarly many of those interviewed said that the heavily populated Subdistricts such as Chimbu might need special consideration, but not on a purely proportional population basis.

There are 54 Subdistricts in the Territory ranging in population from the 5,022 of Kokoda to the 164,598 of Chimbu. Upon examination it appears to your Committee that by joining very small adjacent Subdistricts into one electorate and dividing the largest

into two or more electorates, the present requirements of geography, population and Subdistrict representation could be met with a Council of about 44 Members.

The actual boundaries of the 44 electorates will be worked out later by your Committee.

The people of this Territory have now had some experience of two types of election; the electoral college system as used in the election of indigenous Members in the last Legislative Council elections and the individual voting system now familiar through the Local Government Council system.

Many of the leaders were in favour of the electoral college system on the ground that the ordinary villager might be too easily swayed by clan or local ties, that in any case the village headman would make the best choice and that it would be too difficult to arrange for every individual to vote at a convenient place.

However, an almost 3:1 majority of those interviewed were in favour of individual voting. It was claimed that it had a twofold effect; not only did it give the ordinary man and woman a personal interest in the Council, but it also placed on them a certain responsibility to obey the laws passed in such a Council.

Your Committee realises that individual voting will entail much more work and expense than the electoral college method and will mean that elections may have to be held over a period of perhaps two weeks. Nevertheless, it is in favour of individual voting and wishes further to point out that this is not only more democratic and less liable to corruption or manipulation than the electoral college method, but it is also more likely to develop political awareness at the village level.

II. DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM ?

The main recommendations of the Foot Report were put into effect, but there was some doubt whether the changes were in the direction originally intended. The problem of setting different salary scales for local and overseas officers of the public service heralded a series of debates about the Territory's European community: were they gaining too many of the benefits of rapid development? Yet so long as the Australian authorities remained opposed to government-financed industrial growth, the New Guinea economy had to depend on development by European initiative and example, just as it had under MacGregor, Murray and the Mandate. As a consequence, change in New Guinea had to be modified to maintain a secure environment for overseas investment.

1. Salary Scales

The Territory's public service was restructured in 1964 in an attempt to provide salaries which could eventually be afforded by an independent New Guinea. Under the scheme as it was first introduced, Papuan and New Guinean officers received less than half of the salary paid to a European holding a similar position. Comments in such journals as the Pacific Islands Monthly presented the change as a matter of common sense, while noting that the separation of European and New Guinean interests had already begun.

From: "Upsets Follow P-NG Public Service Reorganization", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, October 1964, p. 20.

Under the reorganisation, which was approved by the Legislative Council at its final meeting last November, the auxiliary division, which has been used in the training of New Guinean public servants, has been abolished and there is now only one single line of positions open to both local and expatriate officers.

But there are different rates of pay—higher for the expatriate—and this has caused trouble. Local officers will continue on their present salaries, but new local recruits holding the same positions

will have to accept lower salaries.

The Public Service Commissioner, Mr. G. D. Somers, pointed out that salaries for local officers had to be related to the future economy of the Territory. This applied in every independent country.

But this self-evident fact, understood throughout South Pacific territories, was not understood by many in P-NG and there were protests in some parts of the Territory. More than 200 angry New Guinean students from the Port Moresby Teachers' Training College marched on the Administration to protest. One leading public servant, Oala Oala Rarua, told a TV interviewer in Sydney that the scheme was wrong and should have been debated by the new House of Assembly. He said stronger unions were required.

Others complained not so much at the principle of the cuts but at the amount of the cuts for local officers. They said the new scales were too low.

The Rev. Percy Chatterton, MHA, said the new rates would drive a wedge of ill-feeling between those New Guineans who joined the Public Service before September 10 and thus were entitled to the higher rate and those who joined it after that date.

Administrator Sir Donald Cleland went on record to deny what he said some New Guineans believed—that the new pay rates meant Australia intended to withdraw its support from the Territory prematurely.

He said the change would assist independence and relieve the future government of a difficult adjustment they would otherwise have to make themselves.

Meanwhile Oala Oala Rarua was appointed chairman of a committee to set up the Federation of Trade Unions, which will handle claims from Territory workers for better pay and conditions. It hopes to cover 10,000 New Guineans.

Representatives of eight Workers' Associations, as trade unions are called in the Territory, met to form the committee. Delegates agreed that a federation would give the associations greater bargaining strength.

In Port Moresby in late September, acting president of the P-NG Public Service Association, Mr. W. C. O'Brien, said there was growing unrest among European members of the Public Service "who are becoming anxious to know what the future holds for them".

Mr. O'Brien was commenting on talks held between the association and the Minister for Territories, Mr. C. E. Barnes, in Canberra on the question of compensation for expatriates for loss of jobs when they were replaced by New Guineans.

The association's proposals for compensation, which are based on

Northern Rhodesia's compensation scheme, will be submitted to Federal Cabinet.

Mr. O'Brien said, "One thing emerged from the discussions: the Department of Territories is anxious to have a compensation scheme in existence by the end of the year".

He added 358 people had resigned from the service in 1963-1964 and 90 people had already resigned since the start of this financial year.

2. The University and European Status

Racial feeling among Europeans was heightened as, for the first time, they saw their status being challenged by Papuans and New Guineans. One response was to denigrate new developments and for several years a magazine with the title Black and White enjoyed a circulation of some thousands by following this policy. The newly-established University of Papua and New Guinea was one of its obvious targets.

From: "Casy (sic) at the University", *Black and White*, August, 1967, pp. 6-7.

The visit of the Governor General of Australia, Lord Casey, coincided remarkably well with the official opening of the University of Papua and New Guinea.

It coincided so well, in fact, that the Lord got around to performing the ceremony!

And for his trouble he was awarded an honorary degree—a Doctorate of Law of this spanking new uni.

It's a pity they didn't give him an honorary doctorate of medicine . . . but even THEY couldn't be so idiotic!

As it is, this honorary doctorate of law will carry a lot of weight throughout the world, like in places such as Al Capp's Lower Slobovia.

But it certainly will add prestige for the University. It has to. The SOUTH PACIFIC POST said so in one of its usually brilliant editorials!

Let's look at a direct quote from the Post's editorial:

"Often an important influence on the reputation of a university can be the quality and character of the people invited to, and who are willing to accept, honorary degrees from it," the editorial said.

From this we can draw a couple of conclusions; either the Melbourne Herald newspaper (which controls the Post these days) has

also a controlling share in the new university . . . or it has a controlling share in Lord Casey!

Leaving the stupidity of the Post out of it, this "honorary degree" for our esteemed Lord is an insult. Not an insult to him, so much, but it's an insult to the people he represents.

DEGREES GAINED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA WILL BE RECOGNISED IN ONE PLACE ONLY . . . papua and new guinea.

Meanwhile, fewer than 60 percent of children of school going age here are attending school.

Primary education in this country, we read, is at a critical stage. New taxation and contribution schemes will have to be implemented to meet the need of finance to teach these youngsters.

Much money will have to be spent to even get them to the precincts of a school.

Meanwhile, there will evolve in the Territory a clique of half-baked idiots who, by virtue of their attendance of a university whose degrees mean nothing, will set themselves up as intellectual and social leaders of their own people.

Criticism of the way expatriates treat the lower indigene is heavy.

But the pseudo-intellectual native's treatment of his less "educated" compatriot will put anyone to shame . . . even the Dutch or Germans.

So money will go on being spent on this university . . . an institution which can well be compared to a badly managed chook farm. By the time any eggs are gathered, they'll all be rotten.

The blame for what is going to become in the future an absolute social mess rests with none but the Australian Government, which has not had the guts to throw off the yoke of international pressure and run the country the way it should be run.

And the way it should be run is the way any good nursery should be run . . . because the Australian Government's charges are nothing more than babies.

Babies should learn to crawl, then walk, and later . . . maybe . . . run.

With any luck, trying to run before crawling is going to break the right sort of necks!

3. Five-year Plan

A further step in New Guinea's economic development occurred in 1968, with the publication of a programme which came to be

known as the "five-year plan". It extended the recommendations of the World Bank Report, anticipating a growth in the European role in the Territory until 1973.

From: T. P. & N. G., *Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea*, Port Moresby, 1968, p. 119.

11.56 Papuans and New Guineans will be assisted by the Department of Trade and Industry, the Development Bank and other agencies to start their own businesses. This will apply especially to the establishment of cottage industries, stores, engineering and transport businesses, and to service industries such as plumbing and contracting. Action will also be taken to strengthen the co-operative movement. It is expected that there will be a substantial increase in the number and membership of co-operative societies and a Co-operative College will be established.

11.57 While this programme has concentrated on the five year period from 1968-69 to 1972-73, it is nevertheless important to give some consideration to the likely pattern of development of the economy in later years.

11.58 By 1972-73, approximately 28 per cent of the indigenous population should be wholly or mainly in the monetary sector, compared with an estimated 20 per cent in June, 1966. If all those in the transitional sector are included, the completely non-subsistence element of the population could be 70 per cent or higher by 1972-73, compared with about 56 per cent in 1966. The rate of growth of the indigenous cash economy will necessarily decline because of the expanding base and the continued existence of populated areas that will remain largely underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the non-subsistence population should rise to 80 per cent of the total population later in the 1970's.

11.59 Towards the end of the programme period, the growth in public expenditure and overseas recruitment should begin to level off. With the expansion of the productive base and the increasing indigenisation of the public sector the Territory should be able to finance the greater part of its current public expenditure by the mid 1970's. At that stage, the economy should have sufficient productive capacity and an adequate infrastructure, particularly in transport and telecommunications, to generate substantially increased private investment and to attract funds from overseas.

11.60 It is not possible to predict when the Territory will reach a stage of self-sustaining economic growth, with the ability to finance

the greater part of its total budgetary needs from domestic savings, while at the same time supporting an acceptable rate of growth of living standards. The economy will not have acquired viability in either the balance-of-payments or the budgetary sense by the mid 1970's. Indeed this follows from the assumption of large and continuing aid programmes. It should, however, have reached the stage that some tapering off in aid is either in operation or prospect. Nevertheless, the need for substantial aid will remain and must be expected to continue well beyond the time horizons envisaged in this paper.

4. The Crocombe Viewpoint

As with the World Bank Report, the five-year plan drew a number of criticisms, the most detailed being those of Dr. (later Professor) R. G. Crocombe, who maintained that economic development in New Guinea was favouring European interests.

From: R. G. Crocombe, "That Five-Year Plan", *New Guinea*, December 1968-January 1969, pp. 57-8.

At the end of the five-year plan, 52 per cent. of all commercial agriculture will be in expatriate hands and even in the 1980's nearly half the value of rural production, and hence of rural income, will still be controlled by foreigners (page 105). No proportionate details are given for commerce and industry, yet it seems that by the 1980's, if the plan is followed, at least 90 per cent. of all business and industry, and probably over 95 per cent. of all business profits, will be in the hands of foreigners. If this is so, the verbal reiteration of the paramountcy of indigenous interests acts, perhaps unconsciously, as a smoke-screen for the real consequences of the plan.

There is an implicit tendency to regard New Guineans and Australians as in some way equal in relation to New Guinea. The implication is that it is in some way equitable for the 98½ per cent. of the population which is New Guinean to get an eventual 50 per cent. of gross rural income, while the other 50 per cent. goes to the 1½ per cent. of foreigners. The inequity is even greater in relation to industry and commerce.

The plan claims that local people will slowly catch up with foreigners in entrepreneurial activity, but by the time they are in a position to, most of the highly profitable enterprises will be held by foreign interest. It is difficult to see the processes by which the indigenous people will catch up, for the plan makes no adequate provision to enable them to do so.

Although it suggests that the maximum indigenous participation is being provided for, I am convinced that this is not so. Perhaps it is partly because those who drafted the details of the plan are not aware of alternative ways to increase the proportionate participation of New Guinean people, but partly it is a question of inevitably divided loyalties when the interests of Australia and the interests of New Guinea are neither complementary nor parallel. In many ways the interests of Australian capital and New Guinean people are at one, but in many ways they are not. In the latter situations, it appears to me, the planners have come down clearly on the side of foreign capital. The assumption throughout that the interests of expatriate and indigenous people are common is simply not true. The specific ways in which they are contradictory or mutually advantageous need to be squarely faced.

Great emphasis is given to the part to be played by the "private sector" which will in practice be largely a foreign, and predominantly an Australian, sector. The plan seems to imply that there should be equal opportunity for all participants in private business in New Guinea. Given the very unequal backgrounds, this would be most unfair. . . .

The plan clearly accepts, in its budgeting, that there will be two categories of income and privilege and that these will be based on race, i.e. that expatriates will be paid very much higher rates of pay and be given very much more favourable conditions of employment than indigenous people. Whether indigenous people will tolerate such a state of affairs is yet to be seen.

5. Speed of Development

In reply to Crocombe's criticisms, Mr. E. K. Fisk of the Australian National University suggested that New Guinea could be developed rapidly only by means of imported resources.

From: E. K. Fisk, "How Fast Do You Go?", *New Guinea*, June-July 1969, p. 69.

The real question is, how fast the productivity of the economy is to be raised, and at what cost. The present planning is for an extremely fast rate of development, much faster than has been possible for the majority of other underdeveloped countries, in such an early stage of the development path. For this fast rate of development it is necessary to supplement the resources of the Territory itself, not only in skills and equipment, but in capital and entrepreneurship as well.

This can be done basically in two ways, through socialist type state enterprise, or through capitalist type private enterprise, or, of course, by a combination of the two. In either case it is a matter of bringing into Papua and New Guinea resources not yet available locally in order that certain goods or services may be produced there before they could otherwise. The choice in either case is simply how fast it is desired to go: that is, whether it is better to import the needed resources now, or whether to wait until they are available in sufficient quantity and quality locally. In this choice, in the New Guinea situation, the waiting period at stake may in many cases not be months or years, but decades. Let me illustrate.

To take effective part in the exchange economy, the indigenous people need to be presented both with the *means* and with the *incentive* for doing so. The *means* include the skills, the tools, and the other inputs over and above what they already have (such as land); the *means* also include roads and transport services, processing plant and services where necessary, facilities for storage, and marketing services extending to wherever the consumer for the goods or services produced may be. The *incentive* includes the provision of retail and distributing services, transport, entertainment, and all the goods and services which give money its usefulness to the person who earns it. The speed with which the indigenous people can enter the exchange economy depends on the speed and efficiency with which these components (and others) of the means and incentive can be provided to them wherever they are. If more rural extension workers are needed, they must be trained. If there are insufficient teachers to train them, a choice has to be made, either to wait until local schools and training colleges produce them, or to import some from overseas.

6. Bougainville Copper

All other development projects were dwarfed by the mining operation of Conzinc Riotinto at Panguna, Bougainville, where economic progress brought with it social and political problems.

From: P. Robinson, "Birth of a Mining Giant", *Australian Financial Review*, 15, 16 July 1969.

The site of what will almost certainly be one of the world's largest open-pit mines lies in the remote Panguna Valley, 2,000 ft. up in the mountains of the most remote island of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

The Valley, which is like a slightly elongated square in shape, is

surrounded by mountains extending up to 4,000 ft. in height. It is about 1.5 miles long by two miles wide: the planned dimensions of the open cut are 1.25 miles by 1.5 miles.

To mount a massive and immensely complex mining operation in confined dimensions of this nature is tantamount to expecting a man six feet tall to perform a skilful juggling act in a room six feet high by six feet square.

The area is covered with spectacularly lush tropical rain forest and dense underbrush. Underneath the brilliantly green growth, the giant leaves, the tall, slender trees and the iridescent tropical flowers lies the "tuff"—a bonded, sticky, unstable layer of volcanic ash which runs to a depth of 50 feet or so above the more conventional overburden of earth and weathered rock which covers the ore body.

When cleared of its coating of greenery, the tuff is so soft that it cannot support wheeled vehicles; only bulldozers and tracked vehicles with extra-large treads can negotiate the surface.

Every square foot will have to be cleared completely of growing things and then hydraulicked into the river system with high-pressure jets pouring out 2,000 gallons of water per minute in a concentrated stream.

It is estimated that some 400-million tons of overburden and waste rock will have to be removed during the lifetime of the mine. . .

But these formidable technical problems pale into relative insignificance when placed besides the social, political and cultural problems associated with the project and the solutions to them which the company is committed to putting into effect. . . .

The hostile reaction of many Bougainvilleans to the mining company's need for land has already made headlines in Australia. Yet underlying the natural reluctance of people whose only possession is land to part with it is a simmering concatenation of fear, suspicion, ignorance, resentment, superstition, fantasy and self-interest impossible to disentangle into any rational pattern.

Those who cannot even visualise the project sometimes see it as a plot to turn all of Bougainville into one gigantic hole; others see it as a tortuous trick being played by white people on natives for their own deeply laid and imperceivable purposes.

Those who have an idea of what a mine is and what it produces may feel that all profits should be paid as royalties, or that the whole project should be postponed until after independence. . . .

Many of the criticisms directed against the Administration over the way it has handled the land resumption question concentrate on this question of communication: it is suggested that much of the trouble could have been avoided if a bigger effort had been made to

inform the local people about what was involved in the project.

Mr. F. R. McKillop, the owner of Arawa Plantation which is being bought as the main town site on Bougainville, said forcefully that "the last people to be consulted are the landowners. It wouldn't have been difficult if they had only consulted the people."

Similarly, the elected member for Bougainville South, Mr. Paul Lapun, says that the people are angry at the tactics employed by the Government. If they had been told the truth from the start they would not be annoyed now, but they were under the impression that the Government was stealing their land.

The Government was "now in so much of a hurry that it does not want to sit down and talk about it. They just want to start."

It is indisputably true that much trouble could have been avoided if a long and sustained program of informing the local people about what the project meant and what was required had been carried out.

But it is probably wrong to make the Administration shoulder most of the blame for any failure to do this.

The failure to communicate, indeed, is just the first great problem to arise from the essential dichotomy between modern industrial organisation and primitive village subsistence life—and it will certainly not be the last.

III. POLITICAL CHANGE

Parallel to the policy of economic development, the Australian government sought to transfer increasing responsibility to the people of Papua and New Guinea. As in the field of economic development, however, opinion was divided on the direction and pace of change. While the United Nations Organization continued to press for rapid progress, the younger generation of educated Papuans and New Guineans antagonised their elders and most of the European population by demanding more power. The Australian response was to grant greater control over the execution of policy, while a Select Committee of the House of Assembly recommended internal self-government within a few years. Yet by many measures, New Guinea was ill-prepared for responsible government, a fact which conservatives in the Territory never tired of stating.

1. United Nations Resolutions

In 1960 the United Nations General Assembly passed its landmark resolution on colonialism, to which it repeatedly referred in its subsequent resolutions on the Territory of New Guinea. The Australian government refused to set target dates for independence, as requested by the U.N., until they were finally omitted from the resolution of December 1969. However, this was partly because Australian policy on New Guinea had changed in response to both external and internal pressures.

From: U.N. Information Service, *A Sacred Trust*, Port Moresby, 1970.

DECLARATION OF THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES Resolution 1514 (XV)

Adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1960, at its fifteenth session, without a dissenting vote.

The General Assembly,

...

Declares that:

1. The subjection of peoples of alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

RESOLUTION 2427 (XXIII)

Adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on 18 December 1968 by a vote of 72 in favour to 19 against, with 24 abstentions.

The General Assembly,

...

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. *Regrets* the fact that the administering Power has not yet fully

implemented the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions relating to Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea;

3. *Calls upon* the administering Power to implement fully resolution 1514 (XV) and to this end to take the following measures in particular:

- (a) Fix an early date for self-determination and independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people of the Territories;
- (b) Hold free elections under United Nations supervision on the basis of universal adult suffrage in order to transfer effective power to the representatives of the people of the Territories;

RESOLUTION 2590 (XXIV)

Adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on 16 December 1969 by a vote of 112 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions.

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Recalling further its resolutions 2227 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, 2348 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2427 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968,

Having considered the report of the Trusteeship Council covering the period from 20 June 1968 to 19 June 1969 and the relevant charter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

...

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946;

2. *Reaffirms further* its previous resolutions regarding Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea;

3. *Calls upon* the administering Power to take all necessary steps to transfer full powers in the executive and legislative branches of government to elected representatives of the people, in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples;

4. *Requests the* administering Power to intensify and accelerate the education and technical and administrative training of the indigenous peoples of the Territories;

2. Political and Racial Tensions

The U.N. Visiting Missions to New Guinea held numerous meetings with the people during their tours of the Territory. At such times the invitation to speak out produced bitter and emotional reactions from the audience.

From: Department of External Territories, *New Guinea: The People Speaking*, Canberra, 1968, pp. 8-9, 21-22.

A spokesman for 140,000 Wabag people told the Visiting U.N. Mission yesterday (29th) that they did not want independence now. They would ask when ready for it.

Spokesman Tei Abel, the M.H.A. for the Wabag open electorate returned unopposed at this election said 'independence is something for all people to decide, not a few educated ones. This is not the time. We know the U.N. is pushing Australia to give independence soon. This talk about hurry up we don't want until we are ready. We want to go slowly until we say ready'. . . .

Tei Abel asked was the decision to appoint Ministers in the new House of Assembly an Australian or a U.N. decision. The Chairman replied 'It was felt a start must be made sometime to educate people to learn how to govern. Better now than later'.

At Wapenamanda one European Councillor sat with others, some in traditional headdress, armbands, etc. Speakers asked for roads, schools, etc., but one, Inu Rei, speaking of independence said, 'Australia is our father and we will follow what he says'.

A European Councillor, Roland Freund, who is a candidate for the Wapenamanda open electorate at the current election spoke in the Wabag language. He said Wabags realised they were not ready for independence and were content to wait until they were ready before asking for it.

Another candidate, Phillip Matuakan, for the Western Highlands District regional electorate added 'My son will think about independence but I will not, not me'. . . .

A stormy meeting at Kavieng this afternoon (13th) was marked by a passionate plea to educate Papuans and New Guineans to the responsibilities of self-government, and a clash between a House of Assembly candidate and a planter. The meeting with the Kavieng

Workers' Association began quietly with few people, but a crowd gathered outside the hall later.

House of Assembly candidate Epel Tito said self-government was just around the corner; 'It is an inevitability'. By self-government he said he meant leaving foreign affairs, defence and finance, to the Australian Government. If people were not trained for self-government this could lead to a breakdown of democracy, chaos, suffering, and an eventual dictatorship. He asked for the House of Assembly to have full powers over internal matters and for localisation of the Public Service. Present localisation reached seventy-five per cent but he questioned how many indigenes held positions of real policy making responsibility.

Epel said there was a need for sound and continuing association with Australia. Papuans and New Guineans should hold on to advisers until they could do the job themselves. Their need was for a long period, as long as possible, to become adjusted to new responsibility and to learn the knowhow of government and how to use power wisely and well. During his speech a Mission Member twice asked Mr. Tito's reasoning that economic viability was not a necessary prerequisite to self-government.

Luke Robin said economic stability was not a necessary prerequisite for training for self-government. The people were intelligent and if given training were equal to other nationalities. He drew a parallel with a sick man where it was asked if the patient's economic status should be considered before giving treatment.

Planter Jim White said he was scared of people like Epel and asked the Chairman, 'Do you think he is good enough to take over as boss cocky.' Epel interjected vigorously and the Chairman told Mr. White to stop being personal. The Chairman said if Mr. White continued in this manner the Mission would leave the room. Mr. White apologised.

3. Gazelle Peninsula Problems

The first example of modern, large-scale opposition to Australian policy was the Mataungan Association in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, organised in response to the Administration's attempts at introducing multi-racial local government in the area. One of the spokesmen for the Association, Mr. John Kaputin, stated priorities different from those which had for so long been accepted as self-evident by the vast majority of Europeans and Papuans and New Guineans.

From: J. Kaputin, "Rabaul", *New Guinea*, September-October 1969, pp. 8-9.

Evidently, to judge by the relentless determination of the Administration to enforce the establishment of multi-racial councils in the Territory, racial integration in political institutions at all levels is the policy of the Australian Administration in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Whether this policy is acceptable to the native inhabitants of this country is highly dubious, witness current opposition to the establishment of the multi-racial council in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. Insofar as their motives can be understood, the Administration has instituted multi-racial councils because it regards such joint political ventures as one desirable means of bringing the country to the stage of self determination. However I will argue in this paper that this policy is misguided and will result in continuing limited participation by the people in the social, political, and economic affairs of this country. I consider that the most unfortunate outcome of Australia's actions or inactions in Papua and New Guinea has been that the Australians in this country have undermined the confidence of many Papuans and New Guineans in their ability. It will take a lot of dollars and thoughtful administration to restore the damage that insensitive, ill-formed and rough and ready colonialism has done.

It remains for my people to make any political compromises—and all of them. It would be unwise for the Administration in any way whatsoever to continue to rely for support for its mistaken policies on those in the old institution; that is, those who are subservient to kiap doctrine, for enforcing its policies. Canberra must remain faithful to the ideals of its educational programme in the Territory and when independent thought results, it must not be suppressed by riot squads and what you have. It must not take advantage of our majority who suffer from a serious educational circumscription. We cannot be expected to remain within the fence of racial integration whose fencing materials—the persuasiveness of the Kiap, the teaching of the church, and the legislations of a colonial administration—shows distinct signs of weathering. . . .

If today's development is dominated by a small nucleus of foreigners, both privately and publicly, I see no reason why that small segment of foreigners should not be replaced by Papuans and New Guineans.

4. Increased responsibility

The Australian Labor Party seemed more responsive to the new

pressures from within New Guinea than did the government. During visits to the Territory the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gough Whitlam, startled many people with apparently radical statements on the future of the country. In mid-1970 the Prime Minister, Mr. Gorton, visited New Guinea on a tour that was frequently interpreted as a counter to Mr. Whitlam's influence. On 6 July 1970 the Prime Minister announced several changes in the powers of Ministerial Members of the House of Assembly and of the Administrator's Executive Council.

From: J. Gorton, *Steps Towards Self-Government in Papua and New Guinea*, Canberra, 1970, pp. 4, 6-7.

We believe that the time has come when less should be referred to Canberra for decision and more should be retained for decision by the Administrator's Executive Council and by the Ministerial Members who for the most part make up that Council. What we suggest is this—that there should be negotiated between the Australian Government and the Government here, a sum of money for recurrent expenses and for minor works inside the Territory. And, speaking for the Australian Government, we would expect that there would be more effort on the part of the local peoples to raise revenues inside this Territory, as years go by for the purpose of this recurrent expenditure and these minor works. But once this sum of money had been negotiated, made up partly by local revenue, partly by what we will call a grant-in-aid for these purposes from the Commonwealth, then that sum of money, we believe, should be divided by the Administrator's Executive Council among the various Ministries up here which will put in claims in the way Ministers put in claims to the Cabinet in Canberra.

So there will be a claim from the Minister of Education, there will be a claim from the Minister of Health, there will be a claim from the Minister of Public Works, and the Administrator's Executive Council—within the sum of money available to it—will apportion to these various Ministers the sums that they can spend. When that has been done, when a Minister, let us say, of Education, has received a sum within the total limits then we believe that he should have authority as to how that money should be spent in the Territory, should be able to make decisions here which now require reference to Canberra before they can be made.

If he has a new programme, he will need to get the agreement of the Administrator's Executive Council. If, as is not unknown in political circles in Canberra, he wishes to get more money in the

course of the year for his own portfolio at the expense of somebody else's portfolio—and that is the only way he will get it, he won't get it by additional grant from Australia—then the Administrator's Executive Council can listen to the pleas of the two Ministers concerned and, as a council, can decide what should be done . . . the subjects on which we think that authority to take decisions should reside in the Ministerial Members or the Administrator's Executive Council are educational—primary, secondary, technical, but not tertiary—public health, tourism, co-operatives, business advisory services, workers' compensation, industrial training, posts and telegraphs, Territory revenue including taxation, (for inherent in what I have said is the need for the House of Assembly to take greater responsibility in the levying of revenue in this Territory), price control, coastal shipping, civil defence, corrective institutions (that's prisons in case anybody's wondering), registration of customary land, land use, leasing of land and town planning and urban development.

The areas in which we wish and must at this stage retain final authority are the judiciary, the enforcement of law and order, internal security, external affairs, external trade and large scale development projects in agriculture, in transport, forestry. . . . in those things in the five-year development plan which we are now some half-way through and which will for the most part be financed by the Australian taxpayer and therefore overseen by the representatives of the Australian taxpayer rather than the representatives of the Territory.

I may say that other matters such as civil aviation and defence will, as they are at present, be paid for and controlled directly by the Commonwealth Departments concerned.

In the Administrator's Executive Council, when decisions are being arrived at as to proposals put forward by Ministerial Members for authority to spend on this or that, the official Members will sit in the Administrator's Council, as they sit at present, and they will offer advice to that Council and they will offer their experience to that Council. They will not take part in any vote that Council may have as to what it finally does. I suggest that these are very significant steps forward along the road to transferring power to the representative Members of the Territory and to transferring responsibility to the representative Members of the Territory.

5. Dates for self-government

While the Australian leaders manoeuvred for political advantage,

another Select Committee of the House of Assembly was seeking public views on future developments towards responsible government. The majority of people were opposed to early self-government, but in view of several pressures discerned by the Select Committee, a recommendation was made that internal responsibility should be handed over by Australia during the period 1972-76.

From: *Final Report from the Select Committee on Constitutional Development*, typescript, Port Moresby, 1971, pp. 3-5.

At the moment the majority of the people of Papua and New Guinea feel that internal self government should come about *no sooner* than during the life of the 1976-1980 House of Assembly. Many people, particularly those of the Western and Southern Highlands oppose early internal self government. Those who oppose early internal self government feel that there is a need for much economic, social and educational development and that there is a need for skilled local manpower in all aspects and areas of government before internal self government can become a reality for the Territory. On the other hand there are a number of people who feel that the time is now ready for internal self government to come about in Papua and New Guinea.

Your Committee believes that the rate of political development and awareness in Papua and New Guinea is accelerating. Your Committee is aware that the policy of the Australian government is for the steady advancement of Papua and New Guinea along the road to self government under the terms of the Papua and New Guinea Act. The changes announced by the Right Honourable the Prime Minister in July 1970 have resulted in an acceleration in the advancement of this country towards internal self government. Because of this rate of advance the possibility may exist that the majority of the people of the Territory may request that the country move to internal self government before the end of the life of the next House of Assembly. Also your Committee is aware that there could be a change of government in Australia which could result in internal self government becoming a reality before the majority of the people are prepared to accept it.

Your Committee therefore recommends that the development of the Territory be geared to preparing the country for internal self government during the life of the next House of Assembly so that should it become a reality earlier than expected or if it is in fact requested by the people then, then the move to internal self government can be made at that time with the least possible amount of

administrative disruption.

Your Committee is concerned that attention be given to the sort of economic and political arrangements and relationships which might be developed between Papua and New Guinea and Australia at internal self government and recommends that these be considered as part of the programme of development towards internal self government.

Your Committee feels that target dates for internal self government and independence should not be arbitrarily set. Your Committee nevertheless believes that an approximate timetable, such as it now recommends will provide a sense of direction to the development of Papua and New Guinea for internal self government.

If programmes are developed now with the view that the Territory may become internally self governing during the life of the 1972-1976 House, your Committee feels this should ensure a smooth transition to internal self government when the people are ready for it.

6. Australia Accepts a Time-Table

The Australian government was prepared to accept the time-table suggested by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. The bickering and uncertainty about policy seemed at an end. On the other hand, the Australian authorities continued to emphasise problems rather than possibilities and remained committed to the view that economic development was an essential foundation for political progress. There was still no sense of urgency in an address delivered by the Minister for External Territories, Mr. Barnes, in July 1971.

From: *Selected Policy statements on Papua New Guinea 1970-71*, Canberra, 1971, pp. 41-8.

The Papua New Guinea House of Assembly has recently agreed to a number of recommendations by its most recent Select Committee on Constitutional Development. The Australian Government has accepted these recommendations. In effect these recommendations set, for the first time an approximate timetable for constitutional developments. This will require Australia and the Administration to prepare a programme for full internal self-government in the period 1972-76, which is the lifetime of the next House of Assembly.

However, the execution of that programme will have regard to the state of opinion as it develops after the 1972 House of Assembly elections and to the policies of the political leaders who then emerge. At present majority opinion in Papua New Guinea favours internal self-government during a later period—1976-80—but opinion has been changing and the Select Committee concluded that the people may request internal self-government within the next five years.

How long an interval there will be between that stage and independence will depend on the wishes of the elected leaders of the time. The Commonwealth has declared that it looks to the elected members of the House of Assembly to represent the wishes of the majority of the people and to take the initiative in such matters as the pace and nature of constitutional development

The Commonwealth Government has thus had a consistent and I believe enlightened approach to constitutional development in Papua New Guinea. There have been, and still are, some who wish to impose their own views as to the timing of internal self-government and independence on the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly. Up until recently they have in the main come from the United Nations. Happily this is no longer the case. The last Visiting Mission, and more recently, a senior representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have commented favourably on Australia's adherence to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Only last month Mr. I. D. Djermakoye, Under Secretary-General of the Trusteeship Council, referred to 'the deeper understanding between Australia, as the Administering Power, and the United Nations'.

In accepting the Select Committee's recommendation that a programme of movement towards self-government be prepared for the period 1972-76 in case the political leaders who emerge in 1972 wish this to happen, the Commonwealth has taken on a formidable task.

There are still major obstacles to national unity; there is a serious shortage of skilled manpower; the capacity of Papua New Guinea to raise revenue internally is limited: there is a need to retain the services of Australian and other expatriates. Let there be no doubts that the final steps towards self-government and independence of a country of over two million people, are not easy

The public service currently numbers more than 16,000 indigenes and 7,000 expatriates. Building and maintaining this service has been a major task of the Australian Government in the post-war years. It has not been easy. It is only in the last half-dozen years that substantial numbers of Papuans and New Guineans have been flow-

ing from the secondary schools. They are only now coming forward from the tertiary institutions in Papua New Guinea. We have had to rely on Australians and other expatriates for much of the skilled manpower. It is not easy to attract and hold them.

The objective now is to develop a public service which will more and more become a service of Papuans and New Guineans serving their own country. With the quickening pace of movement towards self-government and independence it has been necessary to take stock and gear up to meet these new circumstances. A new look has been taken at bringing local people into areas of administrative and executive responsibility. A very substantial training effort is required. Our plans will not overlook the rights of the serving overseas officers whose knowledge and skills will be required for many years as the country's economy develops and expands

I have spoken of the organs being created for self-government. These could be endangered if the divergent interests in Papua New Guinea fail to achieve unity. I have already mentioned the divisions due to geography, language and outlook. Separatist movements exist in the Islands.

Some Papuan leaders claim they do not wish to live side by side with New Guineans. Happily there are also powerful influences working for unity. In the public service, in the university, in the police and the Army, young men and women from all over Papua New Guinea are working together, learning about each other and acquiring a wider national vision. This same national outlook is being fostered by the wise and responsible political leaders who now hold ministerial offices.

In its administration of the two Territories, as one unit, Australia for its part, has made no distinction in the basis for their legally different status.

In May this year the Administrator emphasised this government policy. He said: 'The Government sees no other long term course for Papua and for New Guinea than one directed towards internal self-government and independence for the country as a whole'.

The people of Papua New Guinea have made it clear that they look for rising standards of living, better food and housing, better education for their children, health services and security. These depend on economic advancement. The Australian Government has strongly supported the economic development of the country as the essential basis for increasing social welfare and meaningful self-government.

In saying this I do not wish to imply that in taking up its task in the post-war years Australia postponed attention to social develop-

ment. On the contrary, Papua New Guinea's health services equal those of most developing countries and are better than many. Australia has established a national education system running from primary levels through secondary and technical to a wide range of tertiary institutions including a University, an Institute of Technology, agricultural and forestry colleges, business and administrative training institutions

But in the long run the holding and extending of these social gains rests upon economic advancement. So it is that the Government has paid increasing attention to the economic base. There has been considerable expenditure to create the infrastructure of a modern economy—the roads, the ports, the airfields, the towns, the sources of power, the communications, and the availability of credit through a Government Development Bank. The Government has provided the extensive services required by primary industry—in research, in farmer extension, in improved planting material, in the introduction of new crops and in marketing

The need to give impetus to the native economic sector is also of importance. The Government has recognised this and in the current five-year development programme has adopted as one of its major aims to assist Papuans and New Guineans to develop and manage their own enterprises. We are now in the process of revising the development programme.

Action has recently been approved to reserve selected commercial sites for local businessmen, and to authorise councils to give native entrepreneurs within their areas preferential rights to conduct such enterprises as trade stores. The co-operative movement has, for years, been supported by Government and has a membership of some 130,000.

Legislation was recently introduced into the House of Assembly which, if passed, would restrict the numbers of expatriates who could come to Papua New Guinea for employment in work categories the local people could fill. The legislation provides for training of local people to replace immigrants who arrive after the scheme commences. At the same time the legislation will not impede in any way the entry of people with skills of value to Papua New Guinea or tourists

I conclude with some thoughts about the future. At independence, Australia's legal obligations towards Papua New Guinea deriving from the United Nations charter will expire. Papua New Guinea will take its place as a member of the international community. Any special relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea will be the subject of negotiations between the governments of the day.

Australia will, of course, want to maintain close and friendly relations with an independent Papua New Guinea. We would want to preserve the bonds which have already been established over the years, deriving from war-time associations and personal contacts, from interest in the work of the Christian missions and from a certain pride in doing a job which needs to be done.

A constant feature in future relationships between the two countries will be economic aid. As the then Prime Minister said last July 'even when, in the future, self-government comes or independence comes there will be continuing assistance' for Papua New Guinea. We have an obligation and responsibility to help the development of this country to a stage where it can not only govern itself politically but support itself economically. We accept that responsibility—and this may go on for years. As the then Prime Minister also said: '... for the present and in the foreseeable future we intend to provide that assistance at least which we provide now.'

The report of the 1971 United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea has been most favourable and it is encouraging to see that Australia's efforts in the discharge of her responsibilities have been recognised and appreciated. The report said in part 'The Visiting Mission found a Territory which, while undeniably still poor, was beginning to develop rapidly and to benefit from the considerable efforts made by the Administering Authority during the last ten years.'

7. Party Contest for Power

A political party system emerged by the time of the elections for the third House of Assembly in March 1972. The United Party, a conservative group including a number of European and Highlands members, appeared the largest and the most likely to gain a majority. Its major and most radical opponent was the Pangu Pati, which drew its main support from a limited number of urban and coastal areas. The election platforms of the two main parties were similar in several respects, but Pangu took a firmer line on the question of self-government. The United Party's attitude to self-government seemed identical with that of the Australian government, but the Australian authorities were already adjusting their position on this question.

From: *What do Political Parties Want for Papua New Guinea?*, Port Moresby, 1972, pp. 24-31, 48-54.

UNITED PARTY POLICY STATEMENT BY
TEI ABAL, MHA, PARLIAMENTARY LEADER

1. SLOGAN

“A united country of Papua New Guinea under a Government chosen by the people.”

2. THE PARTY

The United Party was developed during the term of the recent House of Assembly, with 47 members who had control of that House, and through its Ministers, control of the Administrator's Executive Council.

3. THE GOALS

- (a) To develop a strong system of Government at local, area, regional and central levels with laws that express the true wishes of the people of Papua New Guinea.
- (b) To develop a strong economic system by which an independent Papua New Guinea could support such a Government.
- (c) To raise the living standard of all people directly by such economic development, and with wiser spending of Government monies, to give benefit to all regions.
- (d) To strengthen law and order, and promote respect for the Government, so that all people would be safe from harm and would receive fair and equal treatment under the laws of the country regardless of their race, colour, or religious or personal beliefs.
- (e) To develop an education system that would enable the people of Papua New Guinea to participate fully in all affairs of the country.

4. THE POLICY

(a) *Political Development*

- (i) The United Party, through experience gained during the last House of Assembly, regards the development of a strong political party system as essential.
- (ii) The United Party considers that political development, from village level through to national level, must be pursued strongly.
- (iii) The United Party stands for village participation in local government councils; area authorities; regional participation in a form of regional control; and one

central government elected by the people of Papua New Guinea.

- (iv) The United Party believes that self-government should be given to Papua New Guinea immediately after the people decide they want it.
- (v) The United Party believes that the final decision for independence and the date for independence should be decided by the House of Assembly, after it has ascertained the desires of the people of the country.
- (vi) The United Party believes that more attention must be given to the village people of Papua New Guinea in the form of political education, so that all people will be aware of the significance of each step taken in political advancement.
- (vii) The United Party believes that a prerequisite for independence is the development of experienced political leaders at council level, area level, regional level and national level, and more responsibility to each institution responsible for control at these levels.

(b) *Economic Development*

- (i) The United Party believes that economic development of Papua New Guinea must proceed at a vastly accelerated rate.
- (ii) The United Party believes that the government must take steps to ensure that all areas and regions participate in economic development.
- (iii) The United Party believes that, where necessary, overseas consultants should be employed to ensure that economic development is more widely spread and that all areas of Papua New Guinea participate.
- (iv) The United Party believes that the vast underdeveloped areas of Papua must be investigated, and resources found and developed to give economic growth wherever possible in Papua.
- (v) The United Party believes that areas of New Guinea undeveloped to date, must be similarly treated.
- (vi) The United Party believes that the Government should seek assistance from international agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to ensure that economic development is extended to areas in Papua and areas in New Guinea.

- (vii) The United Party supports the development of roads throughout the country to aid in both social and economic exchange.

Examples: Highway to Highlands from Madang. Extension of the New Ireland road, to link all points on the west coast and the southern extremities throughout the island.

A main highway through New Britain; extension of existing roads in Bougainville; the development of the Sepik Highway linking Wewak to Lumi.

The construction of a road from Port Moresby, through the Mekeo to Bulldog and on to Wau—the great link between Papua and New Guinea.

The construction of roads in Papua through to the underdeveloped districts of western Papua to Mendi.

The construction of a road from Port Moresby through to Marshall Lagoon, and on to Abau.

- (viii) The United Party fully encourages the financing of Papua New Guineans through shareholding in companies and businesses in the country.
- (ix) The United Party regards as an urgent priority, the appointment of more experienced advisors to assist the people in the development of privately owned businesses in the country.
- (x) The United Party believes that the investment of overseas capital should be encouraged and assistance be given to investors to ensure the development of our resources.
- (xi) It strongly supports the theory that, whenever possible, participation be made available on behalf of, or directly for, the people of Papua New Guinea.
- (xii) The United Party believes that while revenue from taxation is necessary to support a government, revenue should be raised through borrowed finance, as an inducement to development, rather than substantially raising existing taxation levels.

(c) *Law and Order*

- (i) The United Party, while gravely concerned with the level of lawlessness in some part of the country, considers that through expansion and further training, the

Police Constabulary could cope with the overall situation.

- (ii) The United Party believes that the requirements of the Police Constabulary, with regard to men and equipment, must at all times be met by the Government as it is essential that law and order be maintained.
- (iii) The United Party believes that laws of the country should meet the needs of the people, and be presented and executed within the contexts of the indigenous society.

(d) *Health and Social Development*

- (i) The United Party recognises the tremendous efforts made to supply health services to the people of Papua New Guinea, and support fully the maintenance and expansion of these services.
- (ii) The United Party pays tribute to the health services provided by Christian missions in the country, and considers that the Government must give recognition of these services in the fullest sense.
- (iii) The United Party considers that health services should be paid for, but not until such time as economic development proceeds further, and that payment by people with limited means be at a reduced rate.
- (iv) The United Party believes that overseas specialists in health should be engaged to provide services to the people in the forms of actual practice and training.

(e) *Land*

- (i) The United Party, aware of the land problems in Papua New Guinea, strongly supports the view that this major problem be given priority by government.
- (ii) The United Party considers that major land problems involving ownership must be resolved in order that economic development be allowed to proceed.
- (iii) The United Party believes that the allocation of land in town areas must be simplified in order that the squatter problem can be handled. The Party is concerned with the squatter problem and believes that until such time as a Papuan or New Guinean can easily obtain land in a town, then the squatter problem will continue.
- (iv) The United Party believes that the opinion of the people

of Papua New Guinea should be canvassed to ascertain whether it is necessary to maintain such a high standard of building in the towns.

- (v) The United Party feels that the maintenance of the existing high standards of housing prevents many local officers and village people from erecting homes in the towns.
 - (vi) The United Party recognises that squatter settlements present problems whereby many children within the settlements do not obtain adequate schooling, law and order tends to break down and, through poor hygiene, sickness increases.
 - (vii) The United Party considers that health education services, including the establishment of pre-schools, should be more widely distributed.
- (f) *Army*
- (i) The United Party believes that the establishment of defence services is in the best interests of the country and likewise recognises the valuable contribution the Army has made in times of medical crises, and through assistance in development projects.
 - (ii) The United Party believes that the defence services should participate in developmental projects and actively participate in the development of the country.
- (g) *Education*
- (i) The United Party, aware of the need to support its policy of economic development, considers that the education system must be maintained and broadened where necessary.
 - (ii) The United Party considers that a wide educational programme is necessary to provide the technicians and tradesmen needed to support the professional people who will graduate from the University and Institute of Technology.
 - (iii) The United Party considers that while the principle of payment for schooling is sound, and necessary to maintain facilities, children should not be deprived of the opportunity to attend schools because their parents were unwilling or unable to meet school fees.
 - (iv) The United Party believes that the educational pro-

gramme must be expanded, particularly in the field of technical education.

- (v) And that finance be borrowed if necessary to support this programme.

(h) *Transport*

- (i) The United Party believes that the development of road systems is vital to ensure accelerated economic development, and likewise allow people of Papua New Guinea to travel freely to other parts of the country for economic and social exchange.
- (ii) The United Party is reviewing its policy on airline operations at all levels as the Party is aware that, at present, only a small number of the people of the country have sufficient money to pay for air tickets.
- (iii) The United Party would like to develop shipping services to ensure that all people in outlying villages and islands will be able to develop and prosper through the marketing of their produce.
- (iv) The United Party believes that overseas freight rates should at all times be carefully observed to ensure that our country is being provided with the best service available and thus ensure that our imported goods are being sold as cheaply as possible.

(i) *Industry*

- (i) The United Party regards as urgent the development of secondary industries in our country. It is essential that we produce more goods in this country to give more employment to more people, and increase the level of production in the country and hence keep money in the country for further development.
- (ii) The United Party believes the Government should provide more incentives to people desirous of starting secondary industries in this country and encourage participation by local people.

(j) *Missions*

- (i) The United Party recognises the tremendous effort made by Christian missions in the development of Papua New Guinea.
- (ii) The United Party would like even closer co-operation between government and missions to ensure that services

do not overlap, and assistance given when government services are not provided.

(k) *Public Service*

- (i) The United Party believes that for the government of this country to be able to exist and for people to live in harmony with each other, then Papua New Guinea should have a stable, efficient, and loyal public service.
- (ii) The United Party believes that localisation of the public service must proceed at a rapid rate to achieve the stability and loyalty goals.
- (iii) The United Party believes that with localisation there must be an increased level of training within the public service to provide the level of efficiency required.
- (iv) The United Party believes that conditions of employment must be attractive enough for the overseas public servants, experienced in the affairs of Papua New Guinea, to remain and work, and train local officers in the service.

**PANGU PATI POLICY STATEMENT BY
MICHAEL SOMARE, MHA, PARLIAMENTARY LEADER**

PART 1

WHAT PANGU BELIEVES

This is what Pangu believes and will try to do if enough of its members are elected to the House of Assembly.

1. PANGU WANTS SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW

Pangu has always wanted self-government because this is how Papua Niuginians can learn to run their own country. Our own leaders will put our own people's interests first. Our leaders can only learn to govern if they have real power now.

Some people are still afraid of self-government. But Australia is going to give us self-government very soon whether we want it or not. So we must be ready!

HOW CAN WE BE READY?

(a) *Better Political Education*

We must teach our people about politics and government so they will not be afraid of self-government any more. If we all

understand about government we can take part in it and make our voices heard.

(b) *More Important Jobs for Papua Niuginians*

Pangu wants Papua Niuginians to be given many more important jobs in the public service and in business as quickly as possible. Our people must be given the power to go ahead and do their jobs when they are promoted. To be ready for this, Pangu wants our people to have plenty of training, both in colleges and while they are working.

(c) *Political Parties Must Be Strong*

The government must help political parties to be strong. Our way of government will not work if we do not have strong political parties.

These are the ways our people can be ready for self-government.

2. **SAVE OUR LAND!**

Pangu believes that the land belongs to the people of Papua Niugini. If the arguments over land are not straightened out, there will be trouble when we are governing ourselves. Pangu wants an expert committee to look at all problems of land. This committee must find a way to give proper pay for land that has already been taken away and to make better laws and courts for land.

3. **ALL CHILDREN MUST BE EDUCATED**

Pangu wants all children to go to school up to Form 2 or higher. Pangu wants more high schools, now there are not enough and many children cannot go ahead with their education. Many children leave school when they are too young to work. To help them, Pangu wants more vocational schools or technical schools to teach them how they can help their villages.

4. **PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURE**

Pangu wants farmers to get better pay for their crops, by finding better ways to sell the things they grow and by planting better crops. We want Papua Niugini to grow its own food instead of buying it from other countries. Meat, fish, rice, sugar and tea are only some of the things we can produce ourselves. It must be made easier for Papua Niuginian farmers to borrow loan money for agricultural development.

5. PROGRESS IN BUSINESS

Pangu wants more Papua Niuginians to own their own businesses. From now on, licences for businesses such as trade stores, taxis and trucks should only go to Papua Niuginians or to companies which they have a big share in. More help should be given to Papua Niuginians to get loan money and training to start their own businesses.

6. MORE PAY FOR WORKERS

Pangu will help workers' unions to get better pay and conditions for all kinds of workers in business and in the public service. Pangu believes that a well-paid worker is a good worker and will do his job better. Pangu also wants to find ways for workers and employers to get along well together.

7. PAPUA NIUGINI MUST RUN ITS OWN SHIPS

Most of the goods that come into our country and the products that are taken out are carried in ships that belong to other countries. They can fix high prices to carry these things that we cannot control. If our country has its own ships then the prices of carrying goods could be lower. Pangu wants a national shipping line.

8. BETTER HOUSING

Pangu wants all workers to have houses if they are away from their villages, so that they can have their families with them. The houses for most public servants are poor. Pangu will give them better housing.

Pangu wants Papua Niugini workers to own their own houses and will help them to get land and loan money.

9. MAKE VILLAGES BETTER PLACES TO WORK IN

Pangu wants the villages to be better places to live so people will not want to go away from them. One way we can do this is to have more training for business and farming in the village. Another way is to bring roads and electricity to the village.

10. ONE NAME, ONE COUNTRY, ONE PEOPLE!

Pangu wants national unity. We will help *all* the people of *all* the districts of our country. We must learn new ways for our people to go ahead but we must not throw away the best of our old ways. All people who believe that Papua Niugini is their country will have the same rights, whatever their language, their skin or their church.

PART 2

WHY PANGU WANTS SELF-GOVERNMENT

WHAT DOES SELF-GOVERNMENT MEAN?

When the Pangu Pati talks about self-government, it means the right to run our own country, except for things like the army and talks with other countries—these would still be controlled by Australia. In self-government, Australia will still give us help, such as trained men who can do work that Papua Niuginians cannot do yet. We do not want independence, which means running our country without the help of Australia, until we are really ready for it.

It is quite natural for Papua Niuginians to want to run their own affairs, instead of being told what to do by others. We all know that the big churches, such as the Catholic church, the United church, the Anglican church and the Lutheran church all want to put Papua Niuginians in the top jobs in the churches as soon as possible.

Like the churches, Pangu too wants Papua Niuginians to have the top jobs in the government. However, we must learn to govern while Australia is still helping us.

Pangu says that learning to run our country is like learning to drive a car. We can never learn to drive a car if we are only passengers in the car. We can watch the driver, but we will not really learn very much. If we are passengers all the time and one day the driver gets out and tells us to drive the car, we would not be able to drive it. To learn to drive the car, we must sit behind the steering wheel, with a person who knows how to drive sitting beside us to help us. We may make some mistakes when we are behind the wheel, but our teacher will be able to straighten them out, and so we will learn to drive.

In the same way, we must learn to govern ourselves while Australia is here to teach us. We will make some mistakes while we are learning, but Australia will still be helping us. That is one reason why we want self-government now.

IT IS BETTER FOR PAPUA NIUGINIANS TO RUN OUR COUNTRY

When Papua Niuginians are running the country, they will want to help their own people. Suppose there is a woman who has her own child and is also looking after a child belonging to someone else. If there is only enough food for one child, the mother will give it to her own child—that is natural.

While the Australian government is running our country it

will look after its own children—the people of Australia, first. But if Papua Niuginians are in charge, they will look after their own children—the people of Papua Niugini, first.

When Papua Niuginians are running the government, they will understand our problems. While Australia is running our government, it is trying to solve our problems in an Australian fashion. This is not always good for our people. But when Papua Niuginians are our leaders, they will develop our country in a Papua Niuginian fashion.

SELF-GOVERNMENT CAN HELP OUR LAND PROBLEMS

One of the problems our leaders must solve in a Papua Niuginian fashion is the question of land.

All our laws and courts about land are not straightening our land problems. But when we have self-government we can ask the Papua Niuginian leaders to make land laws which the people will understand and will accept because they follow the Papua Niuginian fashion.

For example, Pangu wants to change the law so that clans or villages would be able to get loans for economic development. Now the law says that the groups cannot be given loans.

SELF-GOVERNMENT MUST COME BEFORE WE CAN HAVE TRUE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Self-government will also help our economic development to go ahead. Some people say that economic development must be finished first before we can have self-government. This is not right.

If we want to choose the kind of economic development we want, we must have self-government first. Australia would not want us to grow things that Australia grows and sells, because then the Australian farmers could not sell all their crops. So sometimes the Australian farmers stop us from growing some crops.

Now Australian businessmen do not know if we can run our country well. Because of this, many of them are taking high profits from their businesses. They think that they must get all their money back quickly before self-government because they do not trust us. This means high prices and at the same time low pay for our people. But if we can get self-government and run our country well, the businessmen will be happy to get lower profits as they know they can trust us.

When we have self-government we can ask many other countries to help us to develop our country. In this way we can choose which countries can help us to develop best.

PART 3

WHY VOTE FOR PANGU?

A PARTY IS MANY PEOPLE WITH ONE VOICE

Everyone must understand why it is best to vote for a political party. A member of the House of Assembly who does not belong to a political party is only one voice among one hundred voices. The Government will not listen to one man.

Being a member of a party is like being a member of a big family. When a party member in the House of Assembly asks the Government to help his people, all the other members of the family—that is, all the other members of the same party—will speak strongly with the same voice.

PANGU FIGHTS FOR YOU

Pangu is a party formed by Papua Niuginians which has always worked for the good of the people of this country.

What we have done in the past four years in the House clearly shows that this is true.

Some of the things we have fought for, we have won. One of these was the payment of part of the profit from copper mining to owners of the land. Another was payment to luluais and tultuls for their work. We also made a new law to stop evil sorcery.

But there are other things which we have fought for, but have lost because the government and other parties have stopped us. We wanted a new Department for Local Government. We wanted to change the high school fees so that a man with many children or with not enough money would pay only a small fee. We tried to raise the price of smoked copra.

If you vote for Pangu, we will have many members in the House of Assembly. We will then be able to win these and other things for the people.

PANGU MEN ARE NOT YES-MEN

Pangu is not a party which says yes to everything that the Administration and other people put up. If we think the Administration is doing something for the good of the people, we help them. But if we think the Administration is doing something against the people, we have tried to stop it.

Remember, a vote for Pangu is a vote for Papua Niugini.

8. The National Coalition and Self-Government

The United Party failed to gain a majority of seats in the 1972 House of Assembly, while the Pangu Pati polled much better than had been generally expected. Pangu was able to form a National Coalition government with the support of smaller parties and some independents. The Pangu Pati leader, Mr. Michael Somare, became Chief Minister, but he had to proceed carefully in order to retain the support of his coalition partners. Thus the Constitutional Planning Committee set up in mid-1972 contained a small minority of Pangu members. Nevertheless, the opposition United Party continued to resist the movement towards self-government, as if events had passed it by.

From: Papua New Guinea, House of Assembly, *Proceedings*, Vol. III No. 3, pp. 279-81 and Vol. III No. 4, pp. 362-4, 368-70.

Mr. SOMARE—My Government proposes to establish a Constitutional Planning Committee made up of members of the House of Assembly. The Committee will be representative of the various regions of the country and of political parties and groups in the House.

The basic reason for this committee's being established by the Government, instead of being a Select Committee of the House, is to allow the committee maximum flexibility. The committee will be able to consult progressively with the Commonwealth Government and with the Administrator's Executive Council which will not have a regular representative on the committee. Under this arrangement, the committee may submit draft sections of its reports to the Administrator's Executive Council and to the Commonwealth for comment. Upon receipt of any comment, the committee may or may not wish to reconsider some of its proposals before making its final report. In addition, the committee will in no way be restricted in seeking public reaction to sections of its draft proposals before completion of its final report.

Sir, my Government will table the committee's final report in the House of Assembly for its consideration. My Government also undertakes to accept whatever decisions are reached by this House on the final report.

Although ministers will be keenly interested in the work of this committee, they will not have sufficient time to attend committee meetings regularly. With the exceptions referred to in the next para-

graph it is therefore intended that ministers do not become members of the committee.

It is proposed that I, as Chief Minister, be Chairman of the committee ex officio, and that the Chairmen of the two previous Select Committees on Constitutional Development be included as members in recognition of the value of their experience. However, our ministerial duties will mean that we can only attend from time to time.

The position of Deputy Chairman of the committee will be virtually a full-time job between meetings of the House. The Government intends to nominate the Chairman of Committees of this House, Mr. John Momis, for this position.

All appointments to the committee will be made by His Honour the Administrator, on my recommendation as Chief Minister, after full consultations with the leaders of the parties and groups represented in this House.

The following composition is proposed:

Chairman ex officio—Mr. Michael Somare.

Previous Chairmen of Select Committees—Mr. John Guise and Mr. Paulus Arek.

Pangu Pati—Three members including Mr John Momis (Deputy Chairman).

People's Progress Party—One member.

National Party—One member.

Mataungan Association—One member.

United Party—Five members.

Independents—One member.

The terms of reference of the committee will be—

'To make recommendations for a constitution for full internal self-government in a united Papua New Guinea with a view to eventual independence. Without limiting the power of the committee to make any investigation or recommendation which it deems relevant to this objective, matters to be considered by the committee for possible incorporation into the constitution or related documents should include the following:

- (a) the system of government; executive, legislature and judiciary;
- (b) central-regional-local government relations and district administration;
- (c) relations with Australia;
- (d) defence and external affairs—transitional provisions;

- (e) the machinery of government—control, organisation and structure of the Public Service;
- (f) a Director of Public Prosecutions and the Public Solicitor;
- (g) an ombudsman and tribunals of administrative review;
- (h) protection of minority rights;
- (i) a Bill of Rights;
- (j) emergency powers;
- (k) citizenship;
- (l) procedure for amendment of the constitution; and
- (m) judicial review—the power of a court to decide whether or not any action by the Government or law passed by Parliament is in accordance with the constitution’.

In addition the committee should be asked to consider the mechanism for implementing the constitution, including the possibility of holding a constitutional convention, and to make recommendations.

Mr. NEVILLE—Once again Mr. Speaker, we see a statement by the Honourable Chief Minister which continues his coalition’s mad bulldozing tactics designed and planned to tear Papua New Guinea away from a sympathetic but so-called ‘colonial power’ and lead it at a bullet’s pace on already preconceived lines irrespective of the wishes of the majority of the people of Papua New Guinea.

Sir, in the 21-point statement to this House, late—late—in its present meeting, Mr. Somare has attempted to implement a massive plan for the entire future of our emerging country with a few hours’ notice only to this House. Mr. Speaker, I would have sincerely hoped that the responsible members on both sides of this House would not have permitted this statement to be ratified at this meeting of this House and would have agreed to its being postponed until the next meeting. I would have hoped that this would have given us time to consult other much interested people in our electorates.

Sir, as the history of political development of Papua New Guinea is written, this present meeting of this House will undoubtedly be written down as the era of the great sell-out of our people.

Sir, by his attempt to slam such a tremendously important document through this House with so little time for debate, the Honourable Chief Minister is selling out the voters who gave their mandate to the People’s Progress Party, the National Party as well as the United Party and those of this House who have remained independent. By careful wording in this statement, Mr. Somare has established himself and the AEC as the determining persons who will

adopt and initiate action on the findings of this unrepresentative committee. The first point which springs instantly to mind is that the advisers to the coalition have sought to calm the fears of the majority of our people by hiding the true facts surrounding this committee from them. To those of us who can read between the lines it is more than obvious, as night follows day, that the minute the findings of this committee are accepted by an unrepresentative AEC, then Papua New Guinea will be blasted into probably blind and premature independence.

The bulldozing tactics of the coalition do not allow any time at present for responsible discussion of this document which under no circumstances can truly be classed as the wishes of the people of Papua New Guinea.

Sir, the United Party, as the largest single party in this House, demands that this most important step towards self-government should be given far more time for airing in this House before any final decision is made and the work of the committee commences. Sir, we would demand that every member of this House has access to all the true facts behind this proposed semi-secret document before any final vote is taken on its implementation, and that no action be taken until all parliamentarians have had the opportunity to speak on the implications. Unless full and clear control of the workings of this committee, which is presently not even proposed as a Committee of this House, is exercised by the members of this House, then the United Party, as stated by our leader, can have nothing to do with such an irresponsible concept. The United Party cannot condone any committee which is not responsible directly to its members and furthermore cannot allow such a committee to be brought into existence without full and free discussion of the real results of such a committee, which we believe will result in premature and ill-conceived self-government and subsequent hazardous independence.

We are worried about the way this statement was presented. Firstly, many honourable members had no time to look carefully into the statement which was presented last Friday and we would like debate on it to be adjourned until the next meeting of the House. However the government side would like to proceed with it at this sitting. Sir, this is a very important matter and it will affect your electorates as well as ours. During the elections about 500,000 people voted for candidates with conservative platforms. It is true that some of them have now joined the Coalition Government and it is up to them. However only about 140,000 people voted for the Pangu Pati.

Mr. PITA LUS—Shut your mouth and go and calculate your figures properly.

Mr. NEVILLE (continuing)—We did calculate them properly and we do not think that the coalition has a mandate from the people to create such a committee. The basic belief of the United Party is a very good one for it gives us more time to look into problems and to seek our own way to self-government and independence. It is not good for us just to sit back and do nothing and to close our eyes to problems and people as we approach these two goals. It is fine to set up a committee to look into these things and to get the ideas of the people but, as you have heard from one of our members who was included in the Constitutional Development Committee, we have no expert politicians to draw up our constitution. We have some educated people available and some with no education whatsoever, but none has any knowledge of law.

It is true that there are lawyers in the Government as well as in private enterprise but they are not the sort of lawyers I am talking about. These lawyers have had no training in constitutional law which is a particular science and a very difficult section of the law. Our belief is that we must get experts who have already drawn up constitutions for countries like Western Samoa and some of the former African colonies and keep them here for one or two years so that they can help formulate our constitution as well as advise us on what type of government we are to have. These lawyers must be able to call in politicians, local people with good ideas and village leaders, as well as the ordinary people, so that they can get these people's ideas as to what sort of government they may know and like and would like to follow. Only after obtaining all this information will these special experts draw up a constitution for this country.

Mr. SOMARE—I know that the United Party opposes the appointment and the composition of this committee for three reasons. The first reason is that this committee is weighted in favour of the Coalition Government. The Government is prepared to ensure that the composition of the committee is truly representative. This means that one United Party member will now be included in the Constitutional Planning Committee in place of an independent member. The composition of the committee will be six members from the United Party and nine members from the Coalition Government. Three of the government members are ministers and most of their time will be spent on their ministerial responsibilities. They will have little time available to spend on the Committee's duties and will be

absent from time to time. Sir, I am speaking from practical experience which I gained when I was a member of the last House's Select Committee on Constitutional Development. Many of the honourable ministers on the previous Committee did not sit on the Administrator's Executive Council on many occasions because of their attendance at the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. From this we know that the ministers will have a lot of work to do. I, too, will have a lot of things to do and therefore I will not be at the committee's meetings most of the time. This committee will submit its report to me, to the Australian Government and to the Leader of the Opposition. The Leader of the Opposition will afterwards inform his party.

Sir, the United Party's second point is that it wants experts on constitutional matters to be members of the proposed committee and that these experts be appointed from outside this House. The coalition does not agree with this move because the members of the House were elected by the people to speak on their behalf in this House. Members of the United Party seem to think that members of this House are not capable of carrying out these tasks. They have no confidence and pride in their own men. We have capable people such as the Leader of the Opposition, the Member for West Sepik, the Member for Northern District and the Member for Sumkar Open. Therefore, their argument is baseless. There are experts in this House of Assembly.

Mr. Speaker, if we are unable to select the 15 men for this committee from this House we might as well resign because we would not be showing qualities of leadership. Some members are not ministers nor are they on any of the Committees of the House, but the fact remains that they have to make decisions. People have confidence in them; that is why the people elected them to come to this House to make decisions. They must show their leadership qualities. Why should we keep on saying: 'Oh, I cannot do this at this stage'? Why can we not show people that we are leaders? If we have no confidence in ourselves, then we may as well return to our village. The Honourable Members from the Southern Highlands and Wabag have told us that we have no constitutional lawyers on this committee, to draft a constitution suitable for the good government of the country. It is true that we do not have this type of lawyer here but we believe that there are men in this House who are capable of making decisions to guide this country. We believe that experts such as constitutional lawyers will be employed as consultants and advisers so that we can draft a constitution suited to this country. We must also bear in mind that we do not have to accept everything

that these experts say. We will obtain their advice and from this advice we will make decisions for the ministry of this country. We think that members of this House must be on the committee and it is for us to make the decisions and not the experts.

I said that this constitution is going to be a home grown one. We members are the ones who will decide on our constitution. We will certainly seek legal assistance and advice from experts but the decisions as to what type of constitution will best suit this country will be made by us members of this House

Thirdly the United Party said that the Pangu Pati is handling things in such a way that all its ideas will be accepted. Mr. Speaker, only three members of my party will be on the committee. Does the Opposition think that this is fair considering the fact that there are 34 members in the Pangu Pati? I think this sort of attitude is utter nonsense. The people will be notified about the work of the committee. Prior to the committee's tour around the whole country to obtain the views of the people on the type of government that we might have, a political education programme will explain the whole issue first to the people. The committee will be talking to the people of subdistricts and at patrol posts. Then the views of the people will be channelled to district headquarters. The committee will not ignore the views of the people. I heard the Member for Southern Highlands and the Honourable Member for Wabag saying that the committee will only submit its report to the Administrator's Executive Council. This is not so. The committee will, in the first place, report to me, then to the Honourable Leader of the Opposition and, finally, to the Australian Government. These three authorities will know what the committee has formulated. We believe that the United Party members should consider this plan carefully and support it. We will all have to meet together and discuss all the submissions made to the committee. Perhaps the Honourable Member interjecting over there was not present when I was making my speech.

When it is brought before the House, this report will not be acceptable for drafting the constitution unless 75 per cent of the members support it. Fifty to sixty members of this House supporting it would not guarantee the acceptance of that report as in any country 75 per cent of the Parliament must vote for a constitution.

9. Australian Endorsement at Last

Following the emergence of the National Coalition, and after decades of vacillation, the Australian government gave unequivocal support to rapid progress towards self-government in Papua New

Guinea. The change in Australian attitudes was epitomised by the new Minister for External Territories, Mr. Andrew Peacock, a much younger man than his predecessors had been. Mr. Peacock appeared determined to seize every opportunity in supporting the policies of the National Coalition; in this, he enjoyed relative freedom, since the coming election in Australia turned the attention of its leaders more towards their own future than that of Papua New Guinea.

From: A. S. Peacock, *Speech to the Victorian Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 21 August 1972, Canberra, 1972, pp. 2-5.*

The Papua New Guinea elections in February and March of this year produced a cohesive leadership group in the form of the National Coalition. The main partner in this Coalition in the Pangu Pati, whose policy platform for the elections was the early assumption of greater control by Papua New Guinea of its own internal affairs. The National Coalition has as its head a man who has emerged as a leader of the Papua New Guinea Government. I refer of course to Mr. Michael Somare the Chief Minister. The House of Assembly has resolved to set up a Constitutional Planning Committee, which will consider the most appropriate form of future government for Papua New Guinea in the period to independence and beyond. In addition, the Chief Minister has stated that he considers the date of formal internal self-government should not be before 1 December 1973, but that it should occur as soon as possible thereafter.

I met the Chief Minister and other Papua New Guinea leaders in Port Moresby on 27 and 28 July to discuss the possible transfer of further powers to the Papua New Guinea Government, the timing of such transfers, and the administrative and legislative steps which would be necessary for them to take place

Among the agreements reached, it was decided that certain items of responsibility could be transferred to Papua New Guinea control almost immediately. The machinery for these transfers would be that I, as Minister for External Territories, would make a fresh determination under the Papua New Guinea Act similar to the 1970 determination which I mentioned earlier, which would place extra matters under the control of Papua New Guinea Ministers. Wages and industrial relations policy, private sector training and localisation, migration policy, and land settlement and development policy are some of these matters. It was also agreed that, in some other

matters such as Area Authorities and the Tariff Advisory Committee, transfer could be made when amendments to Papua New Guinea legislation have been made. I should stress at this stage that agreement on items such as I have mentioned can only be provisional as references to the House of Assembly will be prerequisites to transfer. It was also understood that I would wish to place the results of the discussions before my ministerial colleagues. Subject to these provisos, it may be expected that, in the near future, a further series of powers will be given over to Papua New Guinea control. There was also agreement that continued close consultation between the Papua New Guinea and Australian Governments would be necessary on such matters as development planning and major development projects where there are constraints to these matters passing over to Papua New Guinea control in the immediate future. Such consultations would in no way preclude final responsibility being handed over as soon as suitable executive arrangements have been settled. Of course, there are matters in which the Commonwealth must retain control until closer to internal self-government, such as the Public Service and other areas such as defence and foreign affairs in which control will extend until independence. In many of these fields however the recent discussions have reached agreements which will pave the way for closer consultation between the two governments in future. The establishment of machinery for such consultations will satisfy a Papua New Guinea desire that their views should have an increasing influence on Australian decisions.

One fact which appears to have impressed all those who have taken part in, or observed the discussions, was the friendly manner in which they were conducted. None of us would pretend for one moment that there were no differences of opinion in some matters. Such a thing would be rare indeed in government discussions of such importance. What is significant is the way in which differences were resolved, and the willingness to make concessions which was displayed by both sides. Neither Australia nor Papua New Guinea has a wish to follow some of the more unfortunate precedents of colonial disengagement in which there has been bitterness and resentment. The importance of such wishes should not be underrated. We hope that our governments will be able to foster a smooth and amicable transfer of power until Australia's trusteeship is fully discharged

One result of the present developments is that the time will come when Australia will be dealing with Papua New Guinea as an independent nation. This can be a difficult adjustment for a former administering power to make. However in our case I am hopeful

that it will present no great problems. The political development of Papua New Guinea has been gradual enough for Australians to accustom their thinking to the emergence of their closest neighbour as a sovereign nation. As such Papua New Guinea will be making its own way in the world. We should not expect her to defer to Australia as she does this. We should not look to receive gratitude from Papua New Guinea for the part we have played in her development. During these recent discussions I have been made more aware than ever that Papua New Guinea leaders are not prepared to accept institutions and concepts from Australia or anywhere else without close scrutiny. It is only natural for national leaders to seek the best deal they can for their country. In seeking to satisfy the aspirations of its people Papua New Guinea may well invite other countries to help in her development. In doing so these countries will enter a sphere where Australia has been the main influence for many years. Consequently it is only to be expected that they may exert influence at Australia's expense

The question of Papua New Guinea's constitutional future is one where Papua New Guinea's leaders have indicated that they will choose carefully before deciding between one system or another. Australia has always maintained that it has allowed Papua New Guinea to keep its constitutional options open as much as possible, and the setting up of the Constitutional Planning Committee has as its objective the choosing of a system to best suit Papua New Guinea's needs.

It has been our policy that the choice of the system of government to be ultimately adopted in Papua New Guinea is one for the people of that country. There has never been an intention to bind Papua New Guinea to an Australian constitution or an Australian pattern of administration.

10. National Day—National Identity?

The rapidly changing status of Papua New Guinea was apparent in the National Day statement for 1972, issued not by the Australian Administrator but by the Chief Minister. Printed with the statement were the symbols of a nation—a national flag, a national coat of arms. However, the slogan for the national day was an exhortation—"bung wantaim"; "ahebou"—unite! The degree of unity among the people was obviously one of the major factors that would determine the future of Papua New Guinea. The fact that it had not yet been achieved was apparent from the need to print the Chief Minister's message in three languages.

From: *National Day Speech by the Chief Minister, Mr. Michael Somare*, Port Moresby, 1972, pp. 1-4.

Today is National Day. It is a day for us all in Papua New Guinea to be happy. It is a holiday but a different kind of holiday, one that is something special for Papua New Guinea.

Many people have been dancing, singing, listening to their leaders talk or watching or playing sport. Many people have just been in their homes.

Why do we have a National Day?

What does it all mean?

I would like you to think about this.

Each one of us is a member of a family and we all think of our family.

We think too of the clan to which we belong and of the District we come from.

We are proud of these things.

But this is not good enough today as our country moves towards self government.

Nowadays Papua New Guinean men and women go from their families, their clans and their districts to other place to work for the good of people who are not their 'wantoks.'

Just as children grow up and meet other people so do workers move to other places and work with men and women from other districts.

It is not so long ago that this was not possible.

Papua New Guinea is growing up.

It is becoming a nation.

But while families and clans may drift apart there is a bigger family growing up—the family of all the people in Papua New Guinea.

In many families there are little troubles and fights.

We have these too in Papua New Guinea.

Children when they grow up, learn not to fight, and the people of our country must learn this too.

Fights after football games, and in towns, and about land do not help anyone.

They are truly bad when people from one district fight with people from another area.

Today, on our own National Day, we must think about our country.

It is good to be a Kiwai or a Tolai or a Chimbu or a Manus BUT

we should be proud of what we are BECAUSE we are first Papua New Guineans. This is the important thing.

We do not have to stop being people from certain clans or from certain districts.

We should be proud of this but now, as we become a nation, we must think first of being Papua New Guineans.

We can say 'I am now proud of being a Madang BECAUSE it means I am a Papua New Guinean.'

I am from East Sepik. I am leader of the Saet Clan from the Murik Lakes. There is my home and there is my family. But I know that first I am a Papua New Guinean and I am very proud of this.

As your Chief Minister, I go to many places in our country and they are all like home to me. It is only when I leave Papua New Guinea that I go away from home.

We should think like this.

We should forget our fights and work together to make a country of which we can all be proud.

I believe we can do this.

National Day is, therefore, a day that reminds each one of us, that above everything else, we are one people—we are Papua New Guineans.

If you can hold your head and say with pride, 'I am, first, a Papua New Guinean,' then you have understood the meaning of National Day.



Tudei i National Dei.* Em i dei bilong yumi ologera bilong Papua Nu Gini ol i ken hamamas. Em i dei bilong limlimbur tasol i narakain dei limlimbur. Em i spesul dei bilong Papua Nu Gini.

Tudei i bin gat planti pipal i danis na singsing na harim toktok bilong ol pasman bilong ol na sampela tu i lukim ol man i pilai spot na sampela ol yet ol i pilai.

Planti pipal tu ol i bin stap nating long ples bilong ol.

Bilong wonem yumi gat dispela National Dei? Wonem menin bilong en?

Moa gut yumi tingting long dispela samting.

Olosem nambawan samting yumi ologera wanwan i memba bilong wanpela famili, na yumi ologera i save tingting tumas long

*Compare the Melanesian pidgin used here to the Europeanised version on pages 260-3.

famili. Nau tu yumi save ting ting long liklik lain bilong wanwan na long distrik bilong wanwan.

Yumi save hamamas long ol dispela samting.

Tasol nau kantri bilong yumi i bihainim rot long kamap long sel-gavman, nau kain tingting olosem i inap no nogat? Long wonem nau i taim planti man na meri i save lusim ples bilong en na liklik lain na famili bilong ol nau ol i go wok longwe. Na ol i save wok long halivim ol pipal i no wantok bilong ol.

Taim ol pikinini i save kamap bikpela ol i bungim sampela narapela manmeri. Olosem ol wokman i save go long ol narapela ples nau ol i wok wantaim ol man na meri bilong ol narapela distrik.

I no long taim tumas ol i no inap long mekim dispela kain. Olosem Papua Nu Gini i kamap bikpela nau, i no moa pikinini. I laik kamap nau olosem wanpela kantri—long tok Ingglis ol i save kolim 'Nation'.

Olosem ol famili na liklik lain ol i save drip nabaut tasol i gat narapela bikpela famili nau i kamap. Dispela narapela bikpela famili i gat ologera pipal bilong Papua Nu Gini i stap insaet long en.

Planti famili i gat liklik trobel na pait i stap insaet long ol. I gat kain olosem yu long bikpela famili bilong Papua Nu Gini.

Tasol taim ol pikinini i kamap bikpela ol i save lusim pasin bilong pait na i laik bilong mi bai ol pipal long bikpela famili bilong yumi ol tu i ken lusim dispela pasin bilong pait.

Ol pait i kamap bihain long futbol na insaet long ol taon na ol pait long giraun i no inap halivim wanpela man. Nogat!

Na i samting nogut tru sopus pait i kamap long tupela lain bilong tupela distrik.

Tudei long dispela spesul dei bilong yumi i moa gut yumi tingting long kantri bilong yumi.

I tru i gutpela samting long hamamas long ples. Olosem sopus man i Kiwai no Tolai no Chimbu no Manus em i ken hamamas long dispela samting long wonem em i PAPUA NUGINIAN. Em i bikpela samting.

I no olosem sopus man i Papua Nu Ginian i no moa bilong wonem liklik lain no distrik. Nogat! Yumi ken hamamas yet long dispela samting tasol taim nau kantri bilong yumi i kamap 'nation' orait yumi mas ting 'mi Papua Nu Ginian'.

Yumi ken tok 'Mi bilong Madang no we na mi hamamas long dispela long wonem i menin mi mi Papua Nu Ginian'.

Mi bilong East Sepik. Mi pasman bilong liklik lain bilong Murik Lake. Dispela i as ples bilong mi, famili bilong mi i stap long dispela ples. Tasol nau mi save mi Papua Nu Ginian pastaim na mi hamamas tumas long dispela.

Inap yupela ologera i ken stat tingting olosem?

Inap yupela i ken lusim tingting long pait?

Inap yupela ol i ken bung wantaim long hat wok long gerapim wanpela kantri bai yumi ken lukim na ologera hamamas long en?

Yes! Mi bilip tru yupela ologera i inap!

Ol narapela kantri bilong world em i was long yumi. Orait inap yumi ken soim ol yumi wusat na yumi inap wokim wonem gutpela pasin.

National Dei. Dei bilong yupela ologera, Dei

National Dei. Dei bilong yupela ologera, Dei bilong mi. Dei bilong Papua Nu Gini.



Hari dina be National Day. Inai be ita ibounai moale henia dinana Papua New Guinea lalonai. Inai be laga-ani o holiday abia to inai be holiday idauna abia Papua New Guinea lalonai.

Taunimanima momo be idia mavaru, ane abia, edia gunalaia taudia edia hereva hakala henidia eiava gadara idauidau karadia gaudia idia itadia. Taunimanima momo be hari idia noho edia ruma dekediai.

Dahaka totona National Day ita abia?

Ia ena anina be dahaka?

Namo inai dina abia dalana laloo karaia.

Ita ta ta be mai eda bese bona ita ibounai be iseda bese ita lalodia karaia.

Ita ese danu eda iduhu bona edene gabu amo ita mai gabudia ita lalodia karaia.

Ita be inai gaudia ita moalelaidia.

To inai gaudia hari inai neganai be idia namo momokani lasi hari self government ita tahua lao lalonai.

Hari inai negadiai Papua New Guinea tatau bona hahine be edia bese, edia iduhu bona edia gabu idia rakatanidia idia lao gabu haida dekediai idia gaukara gado tamona lasi taunimanima edia namo havaraia totona.

Hegeregere natuna maragidia idia bada bona taunimanima haida danu hedavari henidia inai bamona dala hegeregere gaukara taudia idia lao gabu haida dekediai tatau bona hahine gabu idauidau amo mai taudia danu idia gaukara hebou.

Nega daudau lasi hanaia lalonai inai bamona dala ia vara lasi.

Papua New Guinea be ia tubu deakau noho.

Ia tubu deakau tanobada ta dekenai lao totona.

To hari bese momo bona iduhu momo idia ura bamona be bese

badana ia tubu daekau—inai be bese ibounai taunimanima Papua New Guinea lalonai.

Bese momo lalodiai be kerere maragidia idia noho bona idia heatu karaia.

Inai bamona daladia danu idia noho Papua New Guinea lalonai.

Natuna maragidia idia bada neganai, aonega tahua heatu karaia lasi, bona iseda tanobada taunimanima inai bamona dalana diba danu be namo.

Football gadaradia lalodiai, towns lalodiai bona tano totodia heatu karaia be taunimanima ta durua henia lasi daladia.

Gabu ta amo mai taudia ese gabu ta taudia danu heatu karaia be dala dikana momokani.

Hari, iseda National Day korikori lalonai be namo iseda tanobada korikori laloa karaia.

Dala namona be Kiwai ta eiava Tolai ta Chimbu ta eiava Manus ta ia noho TO namo ita sibona dekenai moale karaia BADINA ita be Papua New Guinea taunimanima ginigunadia. Inai be gau badana momokani.

Iduhu idauidau eiava gabu idauidau amo mai taunimanima noho dalana ita hadokoa lasi.

Ita be namo inai gauna moalelaia to hari ita mai hegeregere tanobada tamona karaia, ita laloa karaia Papua New Guinea taunimanima ginigunadia.

Do ita hereva 'lau moale lau noho Madang tauna BADINA inai anina lau be Papua New Guinea tauna.'

Lau be East Sepik amo lau mai. Lau be Murik Lakes amo Saet Iduhuna gunalaia tauna. Lau egu hanua unai bona egu bese be unai. To lau diba lau be Papua New Guinea ginigunana ta bona inai gauna lau moalelaia.

Chief Minister dagi dogoatao lalonai iseda tanobada lalonai gabu momo dekediai vadivadi henidia idia ibounai be hegeregere egu hanua. Papua New Guinea rakatania sibona dekenai be hegeregere egu hanua lau rakatania.

Inai bamona dala dekenai laloa ita karaia be namo.

Ita heatu karaia daladia laloaboio ita gaukara hebou karaia amo tanobada hatamonaia bona ita ibounai eda tanobada moalelaia. Lau diba inai bamona do ita karaia diba.

Unai totona National Day abiahidi inai dina lalonai ita ta ta laloa karaia ita be taunimanima tamona—it'a be Papua New Guinea taunimanima.

Bema emu kwarana abia-isi bona mai emu laloa ibounai hereva, 'Lau be Papua New Guinea ginigunana,' unai murinai do oi diba National Day anina.

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