NON-LABOR PARTIES, 1894-1912

The Development of Their Parliamentary and Electoral

Organization in New South Wales and Tasmania

by

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This thesis is all my own original work.

SUMMARY

Very little is known about the development of the
non-Labour parties in Australia. Furthermore, the emergence
of parties has seldom been the subject of theoretical
examination. In this thesis I suggest that the early stages
of development of any party can be studied by examining its
use of political resources, such as organization and ideology,
and its development of a collective identity.

Between 1894 and 1912 the non-Labor parties in New
South Wales and Tasmania gradually increased their activities
and became recognizable as distinct collective bodies. In
Parliament they devised methods of maintaining unity which
were informal but which were as effective as the procedures
of the Labor party. In the electorate the non-Labor parties
began to co-ordinate campaigns and to develop a coherent
policy and a well articulated organization. They deliberately
used procedures which turned existing political influences
to their own advantage. In both spheres of activity, the
non-Labor parties had to act within constraints created by
the existing political attitudes of the non-Labor members.
In both states the non-Labor parties developed along similar
lines because, despite the economic and geographical
differences, the political resources available to them were
generally the same.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Parliamentary

M.P.   Member of Parliament (used in general
                                                sense)

M.H.R.   Member of the House of Representatives,
                      Commonwealth Parliament.

M.L.A.   Member of the Legislative Assembly, New
                                    South Wales.

M.H.A.   Member of the House of Assembly, Tasmania.

NSWPD   New South Wales Parliamentary Debates.

Newspapers

S.M.H.   Sydney Morning Herald.

D.T.   Daily Telegraph (Sydney).

M.   The Mercury, Hobart.

Dates

10/3/03   Day, then month, then year. Therefore
             the tenth of March, 1903. Since all dates
             mentioned were between 1879 and 1915,the
             century has not been included.

Journals

A.J.P.H.   Australian Journal of Politics and History.

J.R.A.H.S.   Journal of the Royal Australian Historical
                                            Society.

T.H.R.A.   Tasmanian Historical Research Association
                                Papers and Proceedings.

Other

A.P.D.A.   Australian Protestant Defence Association.

M.L.   Mitchell Library.

Chapter 1

Political Theory and the Emergence of

Political Parties

Introduction

Although mass political parties in western democracies
have generally emerged within the last century, most of them
were in fact formed by 1920. After this date the parties and
party systems 'froze'.[1] Many party systems and in many cases
even the party organizations have not changed since then des-
pite advances in communications and technology, changes in
class structure and new political problems. Changes of align-
ment within the party structure may have occurred, the role
of ideology may have decreased and political methods may have
become more sophisticated, but basically, if changes of names
are allowed for, most of the parties of to-day are the same
parties which developed their original structure around the
turn of the century. The Australian parties are no exception;
the two main parties date back to the nineteenth century and
have had continuous parliamentary representation, while only
two other new parties, both narrowly-based, have been formed
since then. Yet we know little about the history of the inter-
nal procedures and organization of the parties and what we do
know is concerned mainly with the extra parliamentary organi-
zation and not with the behaviour and organization of the party
in parliament.[2]

Political scientists have studied the circumstances in
which parties developed rather than the actual process of de-
velopment. They have drawn conclusions about the effect of
political situations, legislative duties, electoral systems
and other factors on the shape of parties and they have ex-
plained their emergence as a response to these external var-
iables. Systems theorists at a more general level have de-
scribed parties as organizations which perform a variety of
functions for society as a whole. These functions include the

1. The idea of 'freezing of political systems' is introduced
       by S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Party Systems and Voter
       Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. New York, 1967
       p.50.

2. For a review of the literature on Australian parties, see
       below chapter 2.

aggregation, articulation and communication of social demands.
In almost every case the analysts assume that a party fulfils
roles to benefit some other group in society and examine a par-
ty in relation to the state, society or some other external
body.[1]

A few examples of the views of political scientists will
illustrate how the development of parties has been interpreted
purely in terms of response to outside pressures. La Palombara
and Weiner concluded that three types of theory have been deve-
loped to explain the emergence of political parties - institu-
tional theories, historical-situation theories and developmental
modernization theories.[2] McKenzie[3] and Duverger[4] both argued
that modern parties were a direct result of the extension of
the suffrage; Lipset and Rokkan devised a model to explain par-
ties and party systems in terms of political cleavages within
a state.[5] A few writers, notably McKenzie and Ostrogorski,[6]
considered the distribution of power within parties and inci-
dentally traced the growth of party organization, but the de-
velopment of party still remains largely unconsidered. We
know the effects of a party's interaction with society, but
not how a party developed its organization so that it could
have those effects.

Lipset and Rokkan were aware of this and pointed out that

'we know much less about the internal management and
organizational functioning of political parties than

1. See, for instance, G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.) The
   Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960, p.38-52.
   For a summary of the functions which a party is assumed
   to play in relation to other sections of society, see
   R.C. Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends
   and Ideas, New York, 1967, p. 14, 17.

2. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and
   Political Development, Princeton, 1966, p.7.

3. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties; The Distribution
   of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties. 2nd
   Ed. London, 1963. p.7.

4. M.Duverger, Political Parties, London 1965, p.XXIII.

5. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments,
   p.39-50

6. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political
   Parties, 2 vols., London, 1902.

            we do about their sociocultural base and their
            external history of participation in public de-
            cision-making'. 1

While this comment is probably generally applicable to parties

at all periods of time, it is particularly true of the period

in which parties emerged. A brief examination of some general

comparative theories of political parties is necessary to show

how little attention has been given to this phase of party de-

velopment and to the special theoretical questions which are

raised by the study of their early growth.

        Duverger, the most eminent of stasiologists,[2] argued that

in western democracies there were two types of party, the cadre

and the mass, and briefly sketched the early development of

both in a theoretical and abstract, rather than in a historical

sense. He claimed, for instance, that the cadre parties were

generally founded by parliamentary representatives who wanted

to secure their own re-election and formed electoral committees

for this purpose. These committees were gradually extended

to influence those electorates which had not yet been won by

members of the parliamentary group. At first the connections

between the electoral committees were indirect and existed

only because their representatives co-operated in parliament.

When these links between electoral committees became direct

and formal, and when they no longer relied on particular indi-

viduals, then a party could be said to have been born. Duver-

ger also suggested that cadre parties only widened their mem-

bership as a reaction to the formation of mass-based parties

and that therefore their development was caused by 'contagion

from the left'.[3] Duverger included no details about the early

development of parties but merely suggested the methods by

which parties were formed. His work was more concerned with

modern party systems. Lipset and Rokkan suggested, but did

not pursue, a strategy for understanding the early development

of parties. They claimed that information was needed about

the 'timing of the formation of local party organization' and

that this area of research would be the key to an analysis of

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1. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p.51.

2. He suggested the word 'stasiology' as an apt title for the
        science of political parties, Political Parties, p. 422.

3. Duverger, Political Parties, p. XXIV-XXX.

the growth of parties because local activists were the backbone of party organization and local representation would 'open up much more direct access to power resources than representation at the national level'.[1] Neumann admitted the growing complexity of parties and argued that some of them developed from parties of personages to parties of individual representation, but he was not concerned with how the parties were originally formed.[2] Epstein explained the growth of cohesion in the parliamentary parties and described the circumstances which caused parties to emerge, but he did not consider how their internal organization developed.[3] Engelmann and Schwartz admitted in their classificatory scheme that many of the main determinants of a party's structure depended on how it was originally formed and suggested that all parties of parliamentary origin have a wide base of support, a cadre organization, governmental experience and an orientation towards electoral success. They did not explain how a party with a parliamentary origin developed these characteristics.[4]

Generally there is no theoretical approach to guide analysis of the development of the internal structure of the early parties and this is an important gap in the theory of party. In other fields the importance of the theory of collective action and organization has been recognized, even if little or no agreement among the theories exists.[5] For political parties there are no explanations of the development of collective action, with the exception of general Marxist theories of class representation. Even these do not consider the comparative and analytic details which should be taken into account in any theory.

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1. Lipset and Rokkan. _Party Systems and Voter Alignments_, p.53.

2. S. Neumann, "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties' in H. Eckstein and D.E. Apter, (eds.), _Comparative Politics: A Reader_, New York, 1965, p.362.

3. L.D. Epstein, _Political Parties in Western Democracies_, London, 1967, p.19-45, 318-22.

4. F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz. _Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure_. Toronto, 1967, p.2-3

5. See, for instance, M. Weber, _The Theory of Social and Economic Organization_, London, 1947, for one view and M.Olson, Jnr.,_The Logic of Collective Action_, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, for an example of theoretical work on the same subject.

Why does this large lacuna in political theory and empir-
ical study exist? There are basically three reasons. In the
first place, modern political scientists are concerned with
parties in the modern community and their effects on present-
day politics. Comments on the original development of politi-
cal parties are usually introductory and are placed in the
general context of national development. The emerging parties
themselves have never been examined in a theoretical manner,
except in connection with the politics of underdeveloped coun-
tries. Secondly, most studies of early party organization
have been written by historians and dealt with single parties
or particular countries; these works were neither comparative
nor theoretical.[1] Thirdly, and perhaps most important, writers
have usually concentrated on the aims, official structures and
external relations of the party and have been less concerned
with their internal activities. They have studied the inter-
action between the party and society but not the actions or
the methods of the party itself. The necessity to concentrate
on the activities of a party, rather than on its aims, has been
suggested by J.A. Schlesinger. He assumed that politicians
were motivated by ambition for office and claimed that with this
assumption a political scientist could avoid asking why a poli-
tician wanted office and could concentrate on what he had to do
in order to gain it.[2] His emphasis is on the 'how' rather than
on the 'why' of politics. While his acceptance of ambition for
office as a sole motive is an over-simplification when applied
to parties rather than to individuals, the strategy of concen-
trating on activities rather than aims, on the internal beha-
viour rather than the external relations of a party is sound,
provided that the various aspects of a party's activities are
still considered in conjunction with one another.

Existing theories of political parties are inadequate to
provide a frame-work for this thesis for three reasons. In the

1. Such as E.J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the
     Tory Party, Oxford, 1963. J.A. Vincent, The Formation
     of the Liberal Party, 1857-1860, London, 1966.

2. J.A. Schlesinger, 'Political Careers and Party Leadership'
     in L.J. Edinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industria-
     lised Societies, New York, 1967, p. 266.

first place functionalist approaches draw attention away from
the internal affairs and activities of a party, concentrate on
its relations with external groups or structures and presume
that the party system is settled and that there is a well-
established system of relations between a party and the state
or social institutions. In the early stage of development
of parties, the relations between the party and society were
not settled and therefore a party should be examined first in
terms of its own affairs and not in terms of the functions it
performs in relation to other parts of the political system.
Secondly, it is not easy to examine a political party at an
early stage of development in terms of prescribed activities
because, when its organization was not formally settled and
was in a state of rapid change, assumptions which depend on
the formal, official or regular activities of a party are often
inappropriate or inaccurate. Thirdly, many modern theories of
parties which suggest methods of enquiry into their internal
procedures, such as that adopted by Eldersveld,[1] cannot be em-
ployed once party origins have slipped into history and are
beyond the reach of surveys, questionaires and other modern
methods of investigation. I propose instead to adopt a theo-
retical framework which avoids these shortcomings and which
is appropriate to historical investigation.

A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Emerging Parties

If a party of any kind, whether parliamentary of extra-
parliamentary, radical or conservative, cadre or mass, class
or interest based, is operating in a democratic framework and
aiming to win power through parliamentary and electoral insti-
tutions, it must attract, influence and, if possible, control
the votes of individuals. In parliament these votes are cast
by members, in the electorate by enfranchised citizens.

In a western democracy the processes of government and of
elections are carried out within a framework which is deter-
mined by law and precedents. In an election the method of vot-
ing, the date of the poll, the siting of polling booths and

1. S.J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural
Analysis, Chicago, 1964, is an example of a study of
the internal procedures of a party organization based
on survey data.

the franchise - indeed all the mechanics of the electoral process - are, at least theoretically, beyond the control of any organization which is competing in the election. The rules of procedure allow individual citizens to place themselves before the electors as candidates, to express their views and to await the final decision of the voters. In theory any electoral organization is unnecessary because the framework within which the election is held is predetermined by a disinterested body. In parliament the rules of procedures and of debate follow established precedents and any man who receives the support of a majority of M.P.s can form a ministry. In both the electorate and in parliament the political system could, and indeed at times did, operate without any other formal organization.

But in practice there are advantages for an individual member or political leader and for groups of members in being able to attract and control the votes of individuals. If a party wants to gain power and effect political decisions, it must be able to influence or control votes both in parliament and in the electorate. The lacuna in the theory of party already mentioned is the failure of any writer to produce a theory to explain how the internal activities or structure of a party of any type were designed to meet this need and how the shape of the party was moulded by its interaction with, rather than purely its response to, the environment. Some histories of early party development at least implicitly adopt theories which may be applicable to the case under study, but no theory has been produced which is sufficiently general to be used for a variety of parties of different types and in different contexts.

The relationship between a developing party and its environment must be seen to be dynamic and two-way. If a party is to succeed in influencing votes, it must react to the existing pressures and demands of the environment; in its attemps to manipulate, mould and use these pressures to its own advantage, a party is restricted by the limitations placed upon it by the institutions of the state. Within these constraints, a party must develop sources of power, political resources which are applicable to and effective in its environment. The study of the emergence of parties is then a study of the way

in which they develop or obtain these resources and discover their uses and limitations. It is the study of how an individual politician or a party as a unit attracts and controls votes and of how the use of political resources gradually changes over a period of time.

Most theories of party concentrate on one aspect of party development to the comparative exclusion of other factors. A class interpretation of party requires that a certain stage of economic development has been reached before parties can develop on the basis of horizontal social divisions. An 'interest group' interpretation, which sees a party fulfilling an aggregative or brokerage role, is primarily concerned with the relations of a party with external pressure groups and sees its internal organization as a reaction to these external pressures. These methods of typing or classifying parties all tend to focus attention on only one part of a party's activities, supposedly the essential part, to the comparative neglect of the remainder which are considered merely mechanical. A theoretical framework ought to analyse all parts of a party's behaviour in a balanced way. A consideration of parties in the light of their use of political resources should permit such an analysis.

The procedure of assessing the power or influence of political bodies by reference to their use of resources has been summarised by R.C. Fried. He defined a political resource as -

> A source of power [which] consists of any means of inducing compliance, support, neutrality or non-participation by other political actors. 1

Fried only considered modern political parties with this conceptual approach but his method, even if not his details, can be adapted to the examination of parties in their formative stage. In particular, the use of organization, office, ideology, manpower, finance, leadership, information and legitimacy as political resources are relevant to a study of developing parties. In this thesis, I will use 'ideology' in the loose sense of general political slogans such as

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1. R.C. Fried Comparative Political Institutions, New,York, 1966, p.2. The resources which Fried uses are information, expertise, social power, popularity, legitimacy, leadership skills, organization, violence, rules, economic power, manpower and office.

freetrade or social amelioration and not as a reference
to a coherent fundamental political creed.

A party can use any of these political resources as a
means of attracting and controlling support and of expanding
its influence, but no one resource is likely to be of such
importance in different institutions or environments that a
party can rely on it and ignore the others. To examine party
development purely in terms of, say, ideology would be both
inaccurate and a distortion. A consideration of a party's
use of several resources and of its changing methods can show
how it improved its effectiveness simultaneously in different
areas and learnt to manage the political environment to its
own advantage.

Of course, any party's use of resources is constrained
not only by the institutional limits of what the constitution
and law permits but also by the receptiveness of the environ-
ment. A political resource is useful as long as it is
effective. Furthermore, each resource which a party uses must
also impose restraints on its actions. If a party is to
remain consistent, other options are closed off. For example,
once an anti-socialist party has used anti-socialist ideology
to attract votes, it can not desert its anti-socialist stance,
advocate the nationalisation of industry and expect to keep
its votes. If a party gains support because its constitution
permits branch participation in the selection of candidates,
the party leaders cannot ignore locally selected candidates
without provoking internal conflict and losing those supporters.
In other words, resources are not only a means of gaining
influence; they also impose restraints on a party's actions.
A party must learn which resources gain the most effective
response from the environment and then accept the constraints
imposed by those resources in exchange for their advantages.
For instance, some parties wanted to attract the support of
M.P.s who did not accept the idea of rigid discipline. They
had to devise methods which could achieve the required
discipline without appearing to restrict the freedom of action
of those M.P.s. The shape and activities of a party were
therefore moulded by its use of resources.

One distinct sign of the development of a party is the
growth of a collective identity. A party gradually ceases to

be a collection of co-operating individuals and gains a corpor-
ate existence. In the early stages of party development it is
usually a mistake to say that a 'party' carried out some action
since the 'party' did not have any process of consultation with
which to discover its collective will. In these cases the word
'party' is often used as a short-hand term to denote the party
leaders, the party supporters or some other such group and there-
fore is in fact inaccurate, although stylistically useful.
Gradually a party develops a collective identity which replaces
the earlier alliance of individuals or groups and this iden-
tity gives reality to the metaphor because then a decision or
action can be said to be that of the party as a whole.

This collective identity and corporate existence grows
as a party's use of resources becomes more sophisticated and
co-ordinated. It can be best seen in the development of
party offices and rules. For instance, although in the early
stages the influence of a leader is due to his own abilities
and only partly to his party position, gradually the position
itself gains acceptance and recognition and gives additional
power to the leader in his capacity as a party official. The
introduction of rules to regulate pre-selection ballots simil-
arly indicates that a party now has a prescribed way of carry-
ing out its business and using political resources.

Two themes therefore underlie this theoretical approach
to emerging parties and must be considered simultaneously.
Firstly, a party used resources to advance and increase its
influence and this manipulation of the environment gradually
became more sophisticated. The use of resources and the
resulting constraints were largely responsible for the shape
and methods of the party. Secondly, a party developed a cor-
porate and collective identity. These themes facilitate a
comparative study of developing parties because they are con-
cerned with how the internal procedures and structure of a
party developed in relation to its environment as a whole and
not as a response to certain parts of it and because all par-
ties develop some internal procedures and methods to increase
their influence.

At this point a political party must be defined in order
to anticipate semantic quibbles about what a party might be and

therefore whether the organizations discussed later in the thesis are parties. For the purpose of this thesis, I have defined a political party as any group, however loosely organized, which seeks to elect representatives to parliament under a given label, with the purpose of obtaining political power.[1] By 'label', I mean any distinct name which does not merely signify allegiance to an individual; therefore the followers of a faction leader do not constitute a party. By 'controlling political power' I mean that a party under its own name seeks to influence ministerial decisions; I do not include the supporters of particular movements who belong to different parties and who unite only on that issue. I have deliberately avoided any reference to ideology or structure and have concentrated on what a party must do, that is, elect representatives under a given label and affect political decisions. I will therefore use the term 'party' to refer to both well-established organizations with a strong and elaborate formal structure and the fluid informal groups of men who gradually developed the institutional characteristics we now expect a party to have.

In this thesis, I will use the theoretical framework suggested in this chapter to explain the development of the non-Labor parties in Australia. As we shall see in the next chapter, very little is known about the emergence of these parties and an examination of them in the light of the theoretical framework can both test the value of the theory and add to our knowledge of Australian history.

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1. This definition is derived from Epstein, _Political Parties in Western Democracies_, p. 9 and S. Henig and J. Pinder, (eds.) _European Political Parties_, London, 1969, p.12.

Chapter 2

A Review of the Literature on the Emergence of the
Australian Non-Labor Parties

Introduction

Very little has been written on the development of
parties in Australia and most of what does exist is on the
Labor party.[1]   It is assumed that the non-Labor parties
were formed as a response to the competition of Labor and
that they were forced to adopt similar organizational methods.[2]
The political historians who have discussed the years between
1891, when the first Labor party appeared in parliament, and
1910, when Labor ministries were formed with supporting major-
ities in the Commonwealth and New South Wales parliaments,
have been concerned primarily with tracing the growth of that
party. Yet during these years not only did the non-Labor par-
ties maintain themselves in office but they also laid the
foundations of the type of organization which they now have.

Before 1910 the Labor party had only formed three short-
lived minority governments.[3]   In New South Wales it remained
the third and smallest party until 1904; in Queensland it
became the recognised opposition party in 1898, but in the
Commonwealth and Tasmania it did not gain this position until

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1.   The official spelling of the party was not generally
       adopted till after 1912. Nevertheless in this thesis
       I will use the modern spelling of the party name and
       will also spell the name of the opponents in a similar
       fashion, i.e. as non-Labor, not as non-Labour.

2.   For a discussion of the initiative-resistance theme, see
       H. Mayer, 'Some conceptions of the Australian Party
       System', in M. Beever and F.B. Smith (eds.) Historical
       Studies: Selected Articles, Melbourne, 1967, pp.217-40;
       D.W. Rawson, 'Another Look at "Initiative and Resistance"',
       Politics, Vol.3,No.1, May 1968, pp. 41-54; M. Goot,
       'Parties of Initiative and Resistance: A Reply', Politics,
       Vol.4, No. 1, May 1969, pp.84-99; H. Mayer and D.W. Rawson,
       'Initiative and Resistance', Politics, Vol.4, No. 2,
       Nov. 1969, pp.212-216.

3.   Queensland in 1899, the Commonwealth in 1904 and Tasmania
       in 1909. These ministries lasted respectively one week,
       four months and one week. These and the following out-
       line details were taken from C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham,
       A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Can-
       berra, 1968.

1909 or in Victoria until 1911. Twice the party entered coalition ministries with Liberal members and one of these resulted in a party split.[1] Its success as an office-seeking body was decidedly limited.

During this period the non-Labor parties provided stable government in parliament and won elections without adopting Labor's methods. In New South Wales there were only three ministries between 1894 and 1910;[2] in Queensland the 'Continuous' ministry lasted from 1891 to 1903 under six different leaders, with the exception of a one-week break in 1899; in Victoria the Reform ministry of 1903 lasted under various leaders until 1913. In elections the non-Labor parties regularly won sufficient seats to return a safe majority; their methods were based at first on personal contacts rather than on formal organization. The Labor party had to compete with established methods when it entered politics and the Labor and non-Labor parties gradually each developed different political techniques which suited their attitudes, ideologies and approaches to politics. Nevertheless, there is a scarcity of information about the development of the non-Labor parties which prevents a clear understanding of the politics of the period because we do not know how the government parties maintained their existence, on what assumptions their organization was based and whether they reacted to the methods of the Labor Party. To illustrate this lack of detailed knowledge of the non-Labor parties,[3] the existing literature must be examined to discover what little we do know about their development and methods.

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1. Queensland, 1903-7 and South Australia 1905-9. The Queensland party split.

2. I count the ministries headed by Lyne, See and Waddell or by Carruthers and Wade as single ministries because the changes were of personnel, not party. A similar approach is taken to the other states.

3. In this thesis, I am not including the Country Party in any discussion of non-Labor parties. The Country party had not been formed at the time when this analysis ends and its early years are, by comparison with the other non-Labor parties, well documented.

Five general areas of research have produced some evidence about the development of the non-Labor parties, but it must be emphasised that most of these writers regarded party organization as a topic which was incidental to their main subject or purposes. These areas are:

(1) Descriptions of the pre-party period which mention the early development of parties or describe events in which the first signs of party were appearing.[1]

(2) Histories of the Labor party in which comments on some aspects of the organization or methods of the non-Labor parties can be derived from descriptions of the Labor party, even though the non-Labor parties are never directly analysed.[2]

1. P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties; The First Thirty Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856-1889. Melbourne, 1966; J. Rydon and R.N. Spann, New South Wales Politics, 1901-10, Sydney studies in Politics 2, Melbourne 1962; B. Mansfield 'Party Organization in the New South Wales Elections of February 1889', J.R.A.H.S. Vol. 41, Part 2, 1955; B. Atkins, 'Antecedents of the N.S.W. Protection Party, 1881-1889; the Protection and Political Reform League', J.R.A.H.S. Vol. 44 Part 2, 1958; A.W. Martin, "Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South Wales;, Historical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 23, November 1954; A.W. Martin, 'Political Developments in New South Wales, 1894-6', M.A. Thesis, University of Sydney, 1953; S.M. Ingham, PoliticalParties in the Victorian Legislative Assembly, 1880-1900' in Historical Studies, Selected Articles; N.B. Nairn, The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes; New South Wales Politics, 1871-1891', J.R.A.H.S. Vol. 53 Part 1, 1967; J.A. Ryan 'Faction Politics: A Problem of Historical Interpretation', Australian Economic History Review, Vol.8 No. 1, 1968; P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, 'The Politics of New South Wales, 1856-1889: A Reply', Historical Studies, Vol.13, No.50, 1968; N.B. Nairn, 'The Politics of New South Wales; A Note on a Reply', Historical Studies, Vol. 13 No. 52, 1969; J. Kiernan, "Party and Politics in Victoria, 1901-1909', Historical Journal, University of New South Wales, No. 1, August 1968; B. Dickey (ed.), Politics in New South Wales, 1856-1900, Melbourne, 1969.

2. W.G. Spence, Australia's Awakening, Sydney 1909; G. Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales; A History from its Formation in 1891 to 1904, Sydney n.d.; R. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics; A Study of Eastern Australia, 1850-1910, Melbourne 1960; B. Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labor Party, Melbourne 1944; V. Childe, How Labor Governs, London 1923; D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, C.A. Hughes (eds.), Prelude to Power, The Rise of the Labor Party in Queensland, 1885-1915, Brisbane, 1970.

(3) Early histories and studies of Australia or works of comparative government which are general in out-look.[1]

(4) Monographs which mention the state of party organ-ization as a topic incidental to their main subject. This group includes biographies[2], political remini-scences[3] and the descriptions of the behaviour of interest or pressure groups.[4]

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1. A.Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, Toronto 1947; J. Bryce, Modern Democracies, London 1921; C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Se-lect Documents in Australian History, Vol.2, Sydney 1955; C.A. Bernays, Queensland Politics during Sixty Years, 1859-1919, Brisbane 1919; H.G. Turner, A History of the Colony of Victoria, 2 Vols., London 1904; W.K. Hancock, Australia, London 1945. G. Greenwood (ed.), Australia; A Social and Political History, Sydney 1955.

2. J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, 2 vols., Melbourne 1965, J. Reynolds, Edmund Barton, Sydney 1948; B. Mansfield, Aus-tralian Democrat: The Career of Edward O'Sullivan 1846-1910, Sydney 1965; J.A. Ryan 'B.R. Wise: An Oxford Liber-al in Free Trade Party', M.A. Thesis, University of Sydney 1966; F. Green (ed.), A Century of Responsible Government, Hobart 1957; L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography, Vol.1, That Fiery Particle, 1862-1914, Sydney 1964; H.V. Evatt, Australian Labor Leader: The Story of W.A. Holman and the Labor Movement, Sydney 1940; D.A. Denholm, 'Edward Nicolas Coventry Braddon, 1829-1904: His Contribution to Tasmanian Politics, 1879-1899', B.A. Hons. Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1963.

3. G.H. Reid, My Reminiscences, London 1917; E.H. Collis, Lost Years, Sydney 1948; A.B. Piddington, Worshipful Masters, Sydney 1929; B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian Com-monwealth, London 1913; W. Affleck, Reminiscences of Wil-liam Affleck, Sydney 1916; W.M. Hughes, Policies and Pot-entates, Sydney 1950. W.M. Hughes, Crusts and Crusades, Sydney 1947.

4. W.A. Bayley, History of the Farmers and Settlers' Associat-ion of New South Wales, Sydney 1957; U. Ellis, The Country Party, Sydney 1958; B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Aus-tralian Country Parties, Canberra 1966; J.D. Bollen, 'The Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party in New South Wales Politics 1901-1904'. Journal of Religious History, Vol.1, No.3, June 1961; J.D. Bollen, 'The Protestant Churches and the Social Reform Movement in New South Wales, 1890-1910' Ph.D., University of Sydney 1966; I. Campbell, 'Groups, Parties and Federation', in Groups in Theory and Practice, Sydney Studies in Politics I, Melbourne, 1962

(5)　Surveys of modern political scientists who briefly

discuss the origins of the non-Labor parties as an

introduction to their analysis of the modern party

or political system.[1]

A Review of the Literature

The first signs of party development occurred between
1887 and 1889 in New South Wales and have been documented by
several historians, though interpretations of these events
have varied considerably. Loveday and Martin have analysed
the electoral campaign in 1887 and concluded that in that
election there emerged

> the first full-scale 'party' organization in New
> South Wales; a structure based on a ~~formation~~ *federation*
> of local bodies, allowing for group and individual
> membership, and directed by a central executive com-
> prised of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
> elements. 2

They have also suggested that in 1889 the Freetrade party
effectively chose its leader, rather than being grouped a-
round a dominant personality. In his article on the elec-
tion of 1889, Mansfield has supported their view that party
methods, particularly pre-selection, were common and that
therefore the Labor party was not the sole source of all
innovations in electoral techniques. Both these studies
were concerned with the process by which parties began to
develop out of the faction system and with the first steps
in the replacement of personal influence by party control.
Neither of them has argued that parties had developed beyond
a very rudimentary stage. Martin has also studied the poli-
tical situation in the 1894-5 parliament in New South Wales
by examining the structure and sub-groups within the non-Labor
parties of those years. He did not attempt to discuss how

1.　L.F. Crisp, _Australian National Government_, 3rd ed. London
　　　1962; J.D.B. Miller, 'Party Discipline in Australia, I',
　　　Political Science (N.Z.) Vol. 5 No.1, March 1953; J.D.B.
　　　Miller and B. Jinks, _Australian Government and Politics_,
　　　4th Ed., London, 1971, J. Jupp, _Australian Party Politics_,
　　　2nd Ed., Melbourne 1968; L. Overacker, _The Australian
　　　Party System_, New Haven, 1952.

2.　Loveday and Martin, _Parliament, Faction and Parties_, p.136

the parties developed or to contrast them with earlier or
later models.

Nairn has disagreed with many of the conclusions of
Loveday, Martin and Mansfield about the early non-Labor
parties. He has compared the embryonic non-Labor parties
with the Labor party, using the stated aims, rather than
the actual behaviour, of the Labor party of 1891 as a meas-
uring stick against which the non-Labor parties were judged.[1]
He has also assumed that the structure and methods of the
Labor party provide _the_ definition of a political party and
the argument between him and those he criticised was incon-
clusive partly because the latter did not share his view of
what a party should be. Nairn was unrealistic in expecting
non-Labor politicians to develop, or even to want, an organ-
izational structure based on the precedents set by Labor,
since that example included several procedures that were
alien to their political habits. The view that M.P.s should
be delegates, rather than representatives, or that they
should be formally restricted in their freedom to vote, was
unacceptable to men whose careers often stretched back to
the period of faction politics. The organization which the
non-Labor parties were to develop had of necessity to differ
considerably from the Labor model which relied heavily for
precedents on its trade-union background. Loveday, Martin
and Nairn have agreed that new political methods were re-
quired because the faction system was unable to cope with
the growing number of electors and the diversifying economy,
but Nairn was wrong in claiming that, if new methods were
to be effective, they had to be those which the Labor party
adopted. The organizations involved in the elections of
1887 and 1889 foreshadowed the lines along which the non-
Labor parties did later develop.

What is most significant in these works for a study of
the emergence of parties is that the non-Labor parties had
already developed some party organization before the Labor
party created a new political style. It was these early
precedents that they developed in later years.

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1. Nairn, The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes, p.40-41.

Rydon and Spann have narrated the political events in
New South Wales between 1900 and 1910 without analysing in
detail their significance. Kiernan has discussed the problem
of whether parties existed in Victoria between 1900 and 1910.
However his criterion for a party - that it should have 'el-
ectoral organization such that a uniform policy is presented
throughout the whole state' - was so restrictive that his
conclusion that 'party was the exception, not the rule'[1] may
be more   the product of his theoretical assumptions than
of actual events. Besides, he did not attempt to examine
how any party actually acted.

It has often been suggested in descriptions of the Labor
party that the older parties lacked the attributes of the
Labor party and were largely irrelevant to the needs of the
time. Details of the non-Labor methods are implied in com-
ments on what was new about Labor organization. Spence,
for instance, has claimed that before Labor's appearance
elections were fought on the unimportant sectarian issue,
that Labor organization was the envy of the non-Labor par-
ties and that, while Labor had a specific programme of re-
form, all other politicians were power-seeking opportunists.[2]
He has implied that the early non-Labor parties were no more
than organized factions interested solely in office and not
in the amelioration of the lot of the average working man.
Gollan has written that

> by the mid-nineties in New South Wales and Queens-
> land, Labour parties had emerged with a degree of
> organizational unity that no other political parties
> had. This unity gave the party a tactical advantage which,
> particularly in New South Wales, gave it a strong
> influence on legislation. [3]

Here he has suggested that the other parties lacked the unity
or cohesion both in the legislature and in the electorate to
challenge the organization of Labor. He has admitted that

1.   Kiernan, Party and Politics in Victoria, p. 31.

2.   Spence, Australia's Awakening, pp. 143, 146, 147, 154,
        191, 202, 216.

3.   Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, pp. 175-6.

the non-Labor parties already had some organization before 1891 but has implied that they were relatively powerless, incoherent and ineffective compared with Labor. Fitzpatrick has interpreted the growth of the Labor party as a struggle for control over the means of production and has seen the non-Labor parties as representatives of the employer class, but he has not tried to discover what special characteristics a party of the employer class might have or how these characteristics might have developed.

The non-Labor parties have received attention from Labor historians generally only as far as their incapacity, irrelevance and lack of organization could be contrasted with the organizational innovations, efficiency and social importance of the Labor party. They have not been analysed as organizations in their own right.

Most early histories of Australia or surveys of its government have provided little information about the early development of non-Labor parties, although generally they have paid considerable attention to the Labor party. Bernays and Turner did not mention any non-Labor organization or consider their political methods. Bryce and Brady have accepted the initiative-resistance theme and have argued that non-Labor parties were developed as a response to Labor. Hancock has popularised the term 'party of resistance' and accepted the same thesis. One comment of Greenwood was typical of these attitudes to party development. He claimed

> Labor's rigid cohesion was both distasteful
> and alarming to the other parties which were
> weak in organization and tactically flexible.
> It also changed the whole character of poli-
> tical activity by forcing the other parties
> into imitation since the formidable nature of
> the Labor machine could only be combated by
> similar if not identical methods. 1

In this passage Greenwood has clearly accepted the hypothesis that non-Labor organization was formed as a direct reaction

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1. Greenwood, <u>Australian: A Social and Political History</u>, pp. 200-1.

to Labor's effective methods. In his select documents Clark
has also ignored the growing non-Labor parties of the 1890's
but included several excerpts on the Labor parties. Each of
these writers was concerned with a broad view of Australian
history and saw the Labor party as a significant part of that
history while non-Labor organization was considered compar-
atively irrelevant. Details of its early development was
therefore not included in their works.

Biographers of non-Labor politicians generally have not
examined in detail the relation of their subjects to the
party organization. Barton and Deakin would appear from
their biographies to have had little interest in the party
machinery, although this impression may have been produced
by the lack of interest of the writers in such topics.
O'Sullivan, on the other hand, had 'zest for party warfare',
in 1901 was the 'chief organizer of victory'[1] and in 1904
was chairman of the Ministerialist Election Committee. Yet,
despite his subject's involvement in party affairs, Mans-
field has not discussed the problem of how political methods
may have altered during his career, although he has men-
tioned briefly O'Sullivan's contradictory views on party
action.[2]

The autobiographies and reminiscences of this period
invariably have concentrated on personalities, political
crises and important events, rather than the details of
electoral manipulation and party discipline which were
persistent problems and would scarcely have seemed worthy
of discussion. We can learn almost nothing about party
methods from these works.

Studies of pressure and interest groups are probably the most
useful sources for learning about some aspects of party de-
velopment. The Country party historians have described in
detail the base from which that party was later to grow,
with particular emphasis on the early years of the Farmers
and Settlers' Association and on the duties and problems of
the country M.P. They have mentioned the existence of a

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1. Mansfield, _Australian Democrat_, pp. 122, 169
2. Mansfield, _Australian Democrat_, p.221-222

'Country Party' in parliament within a major party around the turn of the century in New South Wales but have not examined the political situation which permitted an 'interest' group to operate within another major party. While they illustrated the political methods of early country M.P.s, they did not analyse party organization.

Bollen has discussed the relation of the temperance groups to parties and included several instances in which these groups tried to infiltrate and use parties to secure their own objectives. He incidentally has thrown light on the party methods themselves, particularly as regards preselection in the election of 1904 in New South Wales. Campbell has put forward a developmental hypothesis with evidence drawn from all states in which he described the growth of party in terms of its changing relations with pressure groups. His argument in brief is that at first parties were totally dependent on pressure groups, that they gradually became independent as they matured and that finally they were in a position to dictate terms to their supporting groups. His evidence was taken primarily from the decade, 1900-1910, when he considered that the non-Labor parties were only beginning to gain their independence. Unfortunately his conclusions were based on such a wide variety of evidence drawn from different sources that he was never able to specify when any one party had reached any stage of his model of development and he did not test his hypothesis in relation to any particular party. Nevertheless his work did contain some useful information on party methods. One limitation of the work of both Bollen and Campbell for my present thesis is that, since their attention is focused on the activities of groups, they may have attributed to them an exaggerated influence on the affairs of the party. However they do provide the only detailed analysis which we have of early party behaviour.

Surveys of Australian government and of modern political parties have often described the early development of parties, but because this topic was merely introductory and incidental to the main themes, the work has usually been

based on secondary sources and has sometimes been inaccurate.[1]

Generally political scientists have accepted the initiative-resistance theme as an explanation of the early development of parties. Miller has written that in 1901

> Political parties were diffuse and kaleidoscopic,
> formed around prominent individuals rather than
> dominant ideas, with the exception of the Labor
> party. [2]

He has then attributed Labor solidarity to their trade union heritage rather than to any coherent body of ideas. Overacker's description of the pre-1910 non-Labor parties was limited to a brief survey of the political situation and she did not examine early party methods. However, she has claimed that the non-Labor parties were forced to copy the organizational methods of the Labor party.[3] Crisp has agreed that the non-Labor parties were forced to organize as a result of Labor's challenge but has seen the non-Labor parties as more than merely forces of resistance. To him the parties were the political instruments of the owners and controllers of productive and commercial capital. The non-Labor parties consequently had a distinct characteristic of their own and were as responsible as Labor for dividing politics on class lines.[4]

Jupp has given some credit to the non-Labor parties for early organization but has claimed that the local leagues lacked cohesion and therefore that Labor had a distinct advantage. He has admitted that machines had been developed by both parties before 1909 and argued that the main difference between the parties was that the non-Labor parties did

1. For instance, Jupp writes 'In Tasmania the already existing Tasmanian Progressive League, formed in 1904, was renamed the Tasmanian Liberal League in 1911.' (Australian Party Politics, p.124). His source is probably Campbell, Groups, Parties and Federation, p.95 footnote 87. Unfortunately his statement is totally wrong; the Progressive League was founded in 1907 and had nothing to do with the formation of the Liberal League, which was founded in 1909. Obviously these writers have to rely on secondary sources but this instance illustrates the paucity and inaccuracy of those sources.

2. Miller and Jinks, Australian Government and Politics, p.38-9.

3. Overacker, The Australian Party System, pp. 197-208, 313.

4. Crisp, Australian National Government, p.192, 201-2.

not consider their parliamentarians as delegates.[1] Behind
his comments was the implicit assumption that the non-Labor
parties would have benefited if they had used methods sim-
ilar to those of Labor. Like Nairn, Jupp has not shown that
such methods were incompatible with the views of non-Labor
voters and M.P.s and that they could not have been used.
The non-Labor organization had to be tailored to suit the
attitudes of its party members.

Quite apart from the general lack of research on the
early non-Labor parties, two important gaps in the present
literature clearly exist. First, there is no comprehensive
or comparative study of emerging parties. Most works are
either concerned with parties in only one state or primarily
concentrate on New South Wales and Victoria, the largest
and most influential states. Few of these are concerned
with Queensland, almost none with Tasmania. Yet if a work
purports to be a study of Australia, or even merely of
Eastern Australia, these states should be included in a
comprehensive coverage. Also there is not a comparative
study of the emergence of parties even between New South
Wales and Victoria, let alone the less important states.
This is the more surprising since the modern parties are
basically federations of state parties. It either seems
to be assumed, but not proved, that all parties of the
same type developed along similar lines or that each party
was sui generis. There is no attempt to make any compar-
ative study of their development.

Secondly, none of the literature explains how a party
emerged, on what assumptions it based its actions and why
it developed along particular lines. Writers have given
attention to clashes of personality, to the changes in leg-
islation on particular topics and to the rise and fall of
ministries, but not to the parties themselves or to their
organization. Research on this subject has to be histori-
cal in approach because of the available evidence but it
can still concentrate primarily on party organization and
behaviour and not make these topics incidental to its main
discussion.

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1. Jupp, _Australian Party Politics_, pp. 5, 119, 124-5.

Furthermore, no coherent theory has been formulated to explain the development of parties. Fitzpatrick and Gollan see the emergence of the Labor party in hazy Marxist terms as a manifestation of class consciousness and explain its internal methods by its dependence on a trade-union base and traditions. But these writers have not attempted a similar Marxist analysis on the non-Labor parties or included the bourgeoisie as a coherent class in their analysis of political events. A class interpretation of the development of parties can only be partly satisfactory if it is based on observation or research into only one section of society. Miller, Campbell and other writers interpret the development of parties in terms of the behaviour of supporting groups, yet they seldom try to discover how the groups may interact within the party framework. While they consistently consider the effect of groups, they do not analyse the internal processes of the party which allowed the group to have that effect; the internal procedures are assumed but are not studied.[1] These group theories of party development are at present only partly satisfactory because they do not explain how the group activity helped to shape the party and its activities.

Any theoretical explanation of party development should be applicable to all parties and to all parts of a party's activities, even if it is only used in a more limited way. At present there is no general explanation in the Australian literature which examines the activities of a party in all areas and which indicates how and why a party developed its structure and methods, what the stages of development may have been, what difference existed between parties and how it reacted with its environment.

The Subject of this Thesis

In this thesis I will attempt to fill at least some of these gaps in the Australian literature on political parties

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1. The exception to this generalisation is B.D. Graham who does examine how groups interacted within the Country party, see The Formation of the Australian Country Parties. The events he described occurred after the other parties were fully organized.

by examining and comparing the early development of the non-Labor parties in two states. The states, New South Wales and Tasmania, were respectively the largest and smallest in population in eastern Australia at the turn of the century and were a vast contrast to one another in size, geography and economic development. In the next two chapters some background information and a brief outline of party history for each of the states will be provided; thereafter the development of the non-Labor parties in the two states will be considered simultaneously. I must emphasise here that this thesis is <u>not</u> intended to be a history of the non-Labor parties in the two states; it is an analysis of the development of their structure and activities, using the theoretical framework which I outlined in the previous chapter. Obviously no thesis which is concerned with parties only in two states can provide a comprehensive theory to explain the development of non-Labor parties in all Australian states; in this respect, the thesis clearly has limitations. Nevertheless I hope to illustrate by a comparative study that a party can not be completely understood unless all parts of its activities, the circumstances of its development and its reaction to the environment are analysed.

In New South Wales the analysis will begin in 1894 and end in 1907. Evidence later in the thesis will show that the party organization of 1894 had changed little from that of 1889, described by Loveday, Martin, Mansfield and Nairn. In 1907 the model of future non-Labor organizations had been securely established. In Tasmania the parliament of 1894-1897 has been analysed in detail. This was not only done to provide a comparable date at which to start the study but also to provide some information about the pre-party period in Tasmania, because there is no study of faction politics for the state, comparable to that of Loveday and Martin for New South Wales. The analysis of this parliament will provide some detail about pre-party politics in Tasmania and will permit a comparison with politics at a time when parties were first emerging. Thereafter the major part of the study will be concentrated on the period between 1903 and 1912. By the latter date a modern non-Labor party was firmly established in Tasmania.

Chapter 3

New South Wales at the Turn of the Century

Introduction

During the decade 1894-1907 the foundations of modern
political parties were laid in New South Wales. In 1894
the two non-Labor parties were opposed on the fiscal issue -
that is, on the alternatives of free-trade and protective
tariff policies. The Labor party was then small, split and
comparatively ineffective. Thirteen years later in 1907
the non-Labor parties had combined into an alliance which
opposed the growing Labor party. In 1894 only a few ques-
tions were contested on party lines; by 1907 such divisions
were common. In 1894 party organization was unco-ordinated,
ineffective and discontinuous; some politicians were sus-
picious of the idea of party and only reluctantly, if at
all, accepted the restrictions which party membership placed
upon them. By 1907 party organization had continuity and
co-ordination, it comprehensively covered the whole state
and politicians, especially the ones most recently elected,
accepted the responsibilities of party membership in ex-
change for its by now demonstrable advantages. However the
improvement in organization and the change in attitudes to-
wards party did not follow any regular pattern of develop-
ment. The tariff issue became irrelevant after 1900 when
the success of the federal movement removed control of
customs from the hands of the state government. At first
no dominant political question replaced it as a cause of
division between the two major non-Labor parties. They
remained divided only by personality and tradition, not by
policy, while the Labor party continued its 'support in re-
turn for concessions' strategy. In 1902 the formation of
an anti-socialist party created a new political situation
and from that date the party system which exists today has
gradually developed.

Between 1894 and 1907 there were six elections - in
1894, 1895, 1898, 1901, 1904 and 1907. The first two of
these elections were contested on tariff policy; in 1898
the campaign was focused on the question of federation, with
particular emphasis on the comparative ability of Reid or

Barton to secure the best possible terms for New South Wales.
The election of 1901 was fought on matters of personality,
not policy, because both parties put forward similar prag-
matic programmes and were not divided by any ideological
differences. In 1904 and 1907 the elections were contested
by a 'socialist' Labor party and an anti-socialist Liberal
party.

The development of the non-Labor parties can most use-
fully be studied by examining in detail five of these elec-
tions and the behaviour of the parties in the parliaments
which follow the first four of them because from the analy-
ses the main trends of party activity can be discovered.
These detailed analyses will be made later in the thesis.
At this stage it is necessary to provide some background
information for the study of politics in New South Wales
by briefly describing the constitutional framework, the
society and the economy and then by recalling the political
methods of the pre-party factions and the first steps of the
transition to party politics. Finally, I will summarize the
main chronological events of party history in the period
under analysis.

The Constitution

The constitution of New South Wales, like those of all
Australian states[1], was based on the Westminster model and
many of its conventions and precedents were taken directly
from the British parliament. Its parliament had two chambers,
the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. Mem-
bers of the council were nominated by the government for
life and there was no legal restriction or limit on the size
of the council. It both could and did block 'progressive'
legislation passed in the assembly by Liberal parties or at
the instigation of the Labor party.[2] Since the council

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1. Before federation, New South Wales was officially a colony;
    after 1901 it became a state of Australia. I will use
    the word 'state' to apply to New South Wales and Tas-
    mania throughout the period for the sake of convenience.

2. For instance the Council rejected Reid's direct land and
    income taxes in 1895, See's Female Suffrage Bill in
    1900 and Carruthers' Government Savings Bank Bill in
    1904.

could not be dissolved, the only solution available to a
government which found it obstructive was to swamp it with
new nominees. This action, generally considered a last
resort, was taken twice by Reid in 1895 and 1898. As par-
ties developed, so appointments to the council became accep-
ted as party actions.[1]

With a few slight Imperial controls on its actions,[2]
the Legislative Assembly had full rights to initiate and
alter legislation. Tradition required that a government
had to maintain a majority in the assembly and that, if it
was defeated on a censure motion or a major issue, it should
resign. A premier could obtain a dissolution provided that
no other cabinet could be formed which could gain a majority
in the assembly. Elections had to be held every three years.
The number of M.L.A.s was limited by statute - to 125 after
1894[3] and to 90 after 1903[4]. The premier and the majority of
his colleagues generally had seats in the assembly, while
the vice-president of the executive council and occasionally
the attorney-general sat in the council. Ministerial res-
ponsibility and government by cabinet were accepted as the
rule.[3] The Governor was primarily a figurehead but he did
have some discretionary power and a right to advise and to
be consulted. Although he could act only after taking ad-
vice, he was not bound to accept that advice and could, for
instance, refuse to grant a dissolution or make appointments
to the council.[4] His power was therefore not entirely
nominal,[5] but the possible political significance of his
power has so far not been studied.

Electorally the period under discussion saw few major

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1. For a discussion of party action in the Council, see
    Appendix D.

2. For a discussion of the powers of dominions and states,
    see A.B. Keith, The Dominions as Sovereign States,
    London 1938.

3. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties,
    chapter 5.

4. In 1894 the Governor refused to nominate several pro-
    tectionists to the Council at Dibb's request and in
    1899 he refused to grant Reid a dissolution.

5. James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol.2, p.193. H.V. Evatt,
    The King and his Dominion Governors, London, 1936.

changes. By 1894, manhood suffrage existed in the state.[1]
With a few exceptions any man over the age of twenty-one
who had resided in the state for twelve months and in the
electorate for three months was eligible to vote. Those
denied the vote included the military, the police, felons,
habitual drunkards, rogues and wife-beaters. There was no *plural voting*
but absent ~~or plural voting~~ *voting was permitted.* In 1896 the period of residence
in the electorate was reduced to one month and the police
were enfranchised. In 1902 a bill introducing universal
suffrage was passed and women voted for the first time in
the election in 1904. In order to vote at the polls, an
elector had to produce his "elector's right", which was a
certificate of qualification. The loss of this right meant
that the elector could not cast his vote. *The elector's right was*
abolished in 1906

In 1893 an electoral act reduced the number of members
from 141 to 125, abolished all multi-member constituencies
and instructed the electoral commissioners to divide the
state into 125 single-member electorates. The number of
electors in any constituency was allowed to vary from the
mean by up to 600 and, in drawing up the boundaries, con-
sideration was to be given to community or diversity of
interest, to lines of communication, to existing boundaries
and geographic features. The act of 1893 further ordered
that all polls were to be held simultaneously throughout
the state, thus preventing the government from arranging
the contests in an order which was politically advantageous
to it. In 1904 the number of seats was further reduced to
90. Throughout the period, the 'first-past-the-post' system
of non-preferential voting was used. Registration and voting
were not compulsory.

The Society and the Economy

At the turn of the century New South Wales can be class-
ified into regions according to their main industries. The
mines at Broken Hill in the Far West produced silver, lead
and zinc; in the Lower Hunter the mines produced coal and

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1. The following two paragraphs are based on the summary of
    electoral acts in C. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook
    of Australian Government and Politics, pp. 423-5.

in the Central and Northern Tablelands mainly tin. The pastoral industry was particularly important in the Tablelands, the Riverina and the Far West, while the agricultural areas of the state were mainly situated on the Tablelands, the Riverina and coastal areas. Almost all dairy farming was in the coastal districts. The manufacturing industries were mostly in Sydney, although they were also found in the Lower Hunter and, to a lesser extent, in other districts[1].

The products of rural industry, and particularly wool, remained the main export of the state, despite the bank crash of 1893 from which pastoralists took a long time to recover[2] and the serious drought between 1900 and 1904. In 1894 the wool clip provided 56% of the value of all exports; in 1902, at the height of the drought, it still produced 41% while in 1907 it accounted for 47%. Minerals, particularly coal and silver, consistently produced between 12 and 15% of the state's export income.[3] The production of agricultural crops increased rapidly before 1900 but then was badly reduced by the drought. For instance, wheat production fell from over sixteen million bushels in 1900 to one and a half million bushels in 1902 and this poor harvest seriously damaged the fortunes of the small settler. Better years followed and in 1906, a year of a bumper harvest, the state produced over twenty-one million bushels of wheat.[4]

Trade and manufacturing industries both gradually increased during the period 1904 to 1907. The value of manufactured goods expanded from five and a half million pounds in 1894 to over nine million in 1907 while the state's exports increased in value from £15,904,901 in 1894 to £37,724,837 in 1907[5]. Sydney was the hub of the state's

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1. New South Wales Census of 1901, p.633-649.

2. T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia from the First Settlement in 1788 to the Establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901, 4 vols. London, 1918, p.2045.

3. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.911.

4. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.913.

5. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.911, 914.

trade and most exports passed through it.[1]

As industry and mining expanded, the number of miners increased from 30,000 to 40,000 between 1891 and 1901 and the industrial employees from 54,000 to 66,000.[2] To these numbers must be added the itinerant rural workers, such as shearers. At the same time greater numbers of these men became unionised, following the early movements among rural workers, and consequently added to the strength of the Labor party to which some unions were affiliated. As a result of this expansion of the working class, of the union struggles of the great strikes of the early 1890s and of the hardship caused by the drought, industrial unrest was always likely to erupt. The Labor party consistently demanded measures to reduce industrial distress and to provide long term improvements in the condition of workers.

The expansion of the economy increased the demands on governments. The state government was always considered responsible for developing services for rural areas and for building roads, railways and bridges. Local residents often considered these public works to be more important than broader issues and local members were regarded as agents to present local demands and to mediate between the residents of their electorates and government departments. Governments were indeed active in developmental schemes; for instance, the railways open to traffic increased from a mileage of 2501 in 1894 to 3543 in 1907 - a 40% expansion.[3] At the same time the ministry was expected to provide land for settlement and to assist the settler in times of hardship. In 1895 and 1901 bills were introduced to unlock some of the land which had fallen vacant when the pastoral leases expired and at various times bills were passed which gave aid to settlers or provided drought relief. The additional areas which came under cultivation during this period were very large; in 1894, 1,688,524 acres were under cultivation and by 1906 this figure had been increased by 109%.[4] In

1. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, p.2046.

2. New South Wales Census, 1901; p.633-649.

3. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.911.

4. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.912.

the same period the population had only increased by 27% - from 1,239,250 to 1,573,224 people.[1]

Throughout the period, the government also introduced legislation to alleviate the social distress of the working man or to improve the quality of the social conditions; these bills included old age pensions, arbitration, early closing and local option measures.

While the success of federation meant that the state government no longer had control over tariffs, external affairs, postal services and other matters on which uniformity between states was desirable, it still had control of the two major administrative areas, lands and public works, and could legislate on all social matters. Since it was only partly dependent on the commonwealth for finance, the powers of the state government had not yet markedly declined and, with the exception of the tariff, the problems which faced the government after 1901 were largely the same as those with which it had always been concerned.

The Period of Pre-party Politics[2]

In the first thirty years of responsible government in New South Wales, factions, not parties, controlled the parliament.[3] Groups of members formed around such leading politicians as Parkes, Martin, Robertson and Cowper[4] and provided the nuclei on which majorities were based. These fac-

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1. New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907, p.905.

2. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, is the main source on which this section is based.

3. Bailey claims that a faction has two basic characteristics - the lack of any common ideology and the allegiance of each follower to the leader who was responsible for recruiting them. (F. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, Oxford, 1969, p.52). The factions in New South Wales fulfil both these requirements.

4. In this thesis I will not include biographical notes on politicians. For New South Wales, this information can be found in The New South Wales Parliamentary Record or A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales 1856-1900: Biographical Notes, Canberra 1959. For Tasmania it can be found in Walch's Almanac or F. Green (ed.) A Century of Responsible Government.

tions could bring to government both stability and continuity.

Since a faction seldom had a clear majority on its own
in parliament, the faction ministries had to be formed either
by coalition between two factions or by the accretion of un-
attached groups or individuals. The ministry could sometimes
rely on the support of independents but there were seldom
enough of them to give it security. There was no formal
organization to maintain a majority,but the faction cores
gave regular support to their leaders. The cabinet itself
was well established and it was accepted that members had a
collective responsibility to the assembly, but many questions
were regarded as 'open' and ministers publicly differed on
these issues. Although a majority had to be maintained if a
ministry was to stay in office, not all business, nor even
all government measures, were regarded as vital to the inter-
ests of the ministry. Defeats of governments in divisions of
the assembly did not always result in their resignation, al-
though defeats in censure motions or vital pieces of legis-
lation did. The struggle for power was fought primarily on
personal grounds with the majority of politicians middle-
class in origin. For instance, in 1887 pastoralists (14.3%),
lawyers (15.7%), journalists (6.4%) and various types of mer-
chants (33.4%) dominated the assembly.[1]

In the electorate no formal party organization existed.
At times the faction leaders attempted to secure the election
of their supporters in various electorates but seldom in an
overt manner.[2] Intervention was carried out by the leader
as an individual. Elections were usually contested on osten-
sibly local grounds with the personality of the candidate
and his local connections being particularly important.
Moral and economic pressure groups attempted to influence
the elections on some occasions but neither created electoral
organizations with any breadth or continuity. Organization in
elections consisted almost entirely of personal committees but

1. A.W. Martin, The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales,
    1856-1900; A.J.P.H., Vol.2, No.1, November 1956, p.55.

2. A.W. Martin, Henry Parkes and Electoral Manipulation,
    1872-8, Historical Studies, No. 31, November 1958, A.W.
    Martin,Electoral Contests in Yass and Queanbeyan in
    the Seventies and Eighties, J.R.A.H.S., Vol.43, part 3,
    1957; P. Loveday and Martin. Parliament, Factions and
    Parties, chapter four.

these were seldom co-ordinated between electorates and rarely survived from one election to the next. Their resources were limited; the candidate, his friends and those who hoped to gain from his election supplied funds and aid. Furthermore, the extent of the organization varied according to the size of the electorate, the character and connections of the candidate and the number of electors. Personal contacts were more influential in country areas than in urban seats.

The Transition to Party Politics

The first signs of early party development can be found in the 1880s. Disputes over the tariff became increasingly important and provided an opportunity for the political divisions between factions to be formalised and transformed. In the elections of 1887 and 1889 two fiscal parties emerged to contest the campaign[1] and the state-wide alignments which had formed during the contests were carried into the following parliaments and increasingly dominated them. In 1891 thirty-six Labor members were elected for the first time and their official strategy of 'support in return for concessions' clearly assumed the existence in the assembly of two other competing parties.

In parliament, the concept of party affiliation was gradually emerging. The incident which caused the defeat of the Dibbs ministry in 1889 was a vote which

> in effect gave notice that principle, and not
> attachment to a leader, was the real cement
> of the freetrade party. [2]

The selection of Parkes as leader in 1889 and of Reid in 1891 showed that the party now had a part in choosing its own leader rather than merely supporting a dominant individual. Direct election of a faction leader would have been unthinkable before 1889. Furthermore the members of the assembly were now more prepared to commit themselves to

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1. Loveday and Martin, _Parliament, Factions and Parties_, chapter six; Mansfield, Party Organization in the New South Wales Election of February, 1889; Atkins, Antecedents of the N.S.W. Protection Party, 1881-1889; Nairn, The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes.

2. Loveday and Martin, _Parliament, Factions and Parties_, p.145.

a fiscal faith and consequently, even if only unsteadily, to
the parties which were emerging. The methods of parliament-
ary organization remained basically informal and without any
rules of behaviour.

In the elections of 1887 and 1889, even though few mem-
bers may have been returned wholly because of their fiscal
views, the important point was that parties had organized
state-wide campaigns on the fiscal issue. Central committees
in Sydney attempted to co-ordinate the campaign, provided
candidates if required and endorsed others wherever possible.
Local associations also endorsed or selected candidates.
Furthermore, the results were interpreted in party terms
and the election of 1889 was seen as a triumph for freetrade.
In other words organization, however embryonic and informal,
had begun to replace or transform personal contacts in elect-
oral politics.

By 1894 contemporaries recognised three major parties
in the assembly, the Freetrade party, the Protectionist party
and the Labor party. Even though the legitimacy of party
was sometimes challenged in 1894, its organization still
only 'embryonic' and its efficiency limited, party action
had begun to emerge. There was a direct link between the
original organizations of 1887 and the ad hoc bodies created
to contest the election in 1894. As we shall see, it was
these earlier non-Labor models which were used as precedents
by the later non-Labor parties and which became the founda-
tions on which the modern non-Labor parties were built.

A Description of Political Parties

In the remainder of the thesis, the development of the
parties will be analysed topically and not chronologically.
Therefore a narrative account of the progress and develop-
ment of the parties is required here to put various events
into perspective and to act as a source of reference for the
later discussions. The significance of events will not be
analysed here; that will occur later in the thesis. This
section will be subdivided as follows:

(1)   The Freetrade (later Liberal) party[1]

(2)   The Protectionist (later Progressive) party

(3)   The Labor party

(4)   Other Parliamentary Parties - the Independent Parties
                                  - the Country Parties

(5)   Other Extra-Parliamentary Parties
            - the Freetrade and Land Reform League
            - the National Association
            - the People's Reform League

The comments on the last three sections will be brief and intended only to put these parties or groups into context for future reference.

The Freetrade or Liberal Party

In 1891 Henry Parkes resigned the leadership of the Freetrade party after the defeat of his ministry. Much to his disgust, he was replaced as leader by George Reid in a controversial caucus meeting.[2] Between 1891 and 1894 Reid enhanced his reputation as an able leader while Parkes sulkily refused to co-operate and claimed that Reid was personally hostile to him.[3] In 1893 Pulsford drew up proposals for the creation of a network of local freetrade associations in every electorate but this movement failed to gain support and

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1.   The Freetrade party of New South Wales deliberately changed its name to Liberal in 1901. The personnel remained the same and therefor the one must be considered as a direct continuation of the other. Similarly the Protectionist party re-named itself Progressive.

2.   Contradictory accounts of this meeting appeared throughout the 1890s. McMillan claimed that Reid received fourteen votes while thirty other members abstained from voting (Sydney Morning Herald (hereafter S.M.H.) 3/8/94). Wise claimed that fourteen voted for Reid, eight against and eighteen abstained. He suggested that Parkes had been offered, but declined the leadership (B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, p.172-5). In 1898 Neild claimed that the meeting had deliberately 'shunted' Parkes out of the leadership and that, after Wise refused to stand, Reid had been elected by a large majority (Daily Telegraph, Sydney, (hereafter D.T.) 10/1/98). Exactly what happened at that meeting can never be known, but the doubt and internal party divisions left Reid's right to the leadership open to challenge before August 1894.

3.   Parkes to McMillan, published in S.M.H. 3/8/94.

only a few branches were formed.[1] By early 1894 the Protect-
ionist Dibbs ministry had become unpopular because of its
strong actions during the bank crash of 1893 and because of
its protective tariff policy. Support for freetrade was re-
gaining strength in the state but the freetrade movement it-
self was far from united. It contained three main strands of
thought; the conservatives who favoured a pure free trade
tariff but opposed direct taxation, the moderates who were
prepared to accept some customs duties as a source of revenue
and some direct taxation and the radicals who claimed that if
freetrade was introduced, direct taxation of land and income
must be imposed as an alternative source of revenue. This
group regarded direct taxation as an instrument of social
reform.[2] A large number of freetraders from all sections of
the party announced their intention to stand in the election
of 1894 and threatened to split the vote, which would probably
have caused a loss of seats. In an attempt to prevent this
happening the parliamentary freetrade party formed the Free-
trade Council which was designed to choose between competing
candidates who had already announced their intention to go
to the polls.[3] Local freetrade associations were formed to
support and occasionally select candidates but these branches
were neither founded nor co-ordinated by the central organ-
ization. The Freetrade Council succeeded in reducing the
number of candidates by arbitration in some electorates but
was unable to prevent the splitting of votes in others.
Furthermore freetraders did not all campaign with the same
policy. In his manifesto as party leader, Reid promised to
introduce freetrade, direct taxation, new land laws and local
government but also emphasised the importance of federation.[4]
At the same time Wise declared that the introduction of free-
trade and direct taxation was the most important issue[5] and
Parkes claimed that federation was far more urgent than the
fiscal question or any land legislation.[6] Despite these div-

1. S.M.H. 6/6/94.

2. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
      Wales, p. 319-321.

3. S.M.H. 10/5/94.

4. S.M.H. 2/7/94.

5. S.M.H. 14/6/94, 7/7/94.

6. S.M.H. 3/7/94.

isions within the party, the election was still a triumph for
it; it won fifty-eight seats in an assembly of one hundred
and twenty-five members. This figure included twelve unen-
dorsed freetraders[1], of whom eight immediately joined the
parliamentary party.[2]

In a bid for the party leadership Parkes tried to claim
all credit for the victory, even though he had avoided iden-
tifying himself with the other freetraders during the cam-
paign. When Dibbs resigned, the governor, regarding Reid as
the Leader of the Opposition, commissioned him, and not Parkes,
to form a ministry.[3] The former ministerial colleagues of
Parkes, particularly Carruthers, Brunker and Garrard, had
earlier played important parts in the deliberations of the
Freetrade Council and were now prepared to support Reid in
preference to Parkes.[4] Parkes reacted violently[5] to his re-
jection and soon rumours of an alliance between Parkes and
Dibbs were circulating.[6]

In office Reid had to act cautiously because of the
divisions within his own party and particularly because of
the pressure from the group of radical freetraders who had
been elected for the first time. In November 1894 he intro-
duced federal proposals at the same time as the basic intro-
ductory measures which were required before a land or income
tax could be levied. Despite his attempts to keep all parts
of his party satisfied, he soon came under attack from his
own side of the house. Parkes condemned him for a lack of
sincerity in his federal proposals[7] while Wise accused him of
reneging on his promise to introduce direct taxation[8]; but

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1. Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government
    and Politics, p.431-2. For details of election results
    see Appendix A.

2. S.M.H. 1/8/94.

3. S.M.H. 31/7/94.

4. See comments of Carruthers D.T. 14/7/94 and of McMillan,
    S.M.H. 1/8/94, 3/8/94.

5. e.g. S.M.H. 3/8/94

6. S.M.H. 2/8/94, D.T. 21/7/94.

7. S.M.H. 14/11/94.

8. S.M.H. 8/11/94.

the other advocates of direct taxation who had been elected
as adherents of the Freetrade and Land Reform League repud-
iated Wise and remained loyal to Reid.[1] Despite the defec-
tion of Wise and Parkes, the Freetrade party remained united
and easily defeated a censure motion moved by Dibbs in Feb-
ruary, 1895.

In May 1895, Reid introduced a budget which implemented
his electoral promises by reducing tariffs and introducing
direct land and income taxes.[2] He effectively answered the
criticism of those who doubted his sincerity and, more impor-
tant, consolidated his leadership of the party. In May Parkes
finally arranged an alliance with Dibbs, which had been under
negotiation for three months, and moved a no confidence motion
which claimed that federation should be considered before the
fiscal issue.[3] He was unable to split the Freetrade party as
decisively as he had hoped and only two followers from it
joined the opposition to vote with him on the motion which the
ministry easily defeated.[4] Most of Reid's important measures,
including a land bill, direct land and income tax bills and
a freetrade customs bill, passed the assembly, although a
local government bill was amended in committee and quietly
dropped. However the Legislative Council rejected his land
and income tax proposals and Reid, posing as a wronged demo-
crat, fought an election on the issue of reform of the coun-
cil.[5] His party gained a decisive victory, winning sixty-two
seats in the assembly.

Between 1895 and 1898 Reid's freetrade majority remained
secure and he introduced a series of bills which improved
social conditions. Then, in 1898, his party began to disinter-
grate on the question of federation. In March 1897 represen-

1. See O'Reilly, S.M.H. 12/11/94.

2. D.T., 10/5/95.

3. D.T., 16/5/95.

4. James Martin and J.C. Ellis, but several others were
      rumoured as possible defectors, see D.T., 13/5/95,
      15/5/95, 24/5/95.

5. D.T., 2/7/95

tatives of all states had met in a federal convention and, over the next twelve months, had drawn up a constitution. Opposition to the proposed constitution in New South Wales had become obvious in 1897 and the freetraders in particular were badly divided over the acceptability of it. The majority of the party opposed it because they considered the conditions of entry, particularly the financial provisions, to be disadvantageous to New South Wales. The radical members of the party, like the Labor party, also condemned the constitution because it permitted the states with small populations to dictate to the majority of the people in Australia. A minority in the party, particularly Carruthers, McMillan and Thomson, advocated acceptance of the bill. Reid's position was equivocal; when he opened the campaign for the referendum in which the electors voted on the bill, he claimed he would vote for it but advocated that it be rejected until better terms were obtained.[1] He also allowed J.H. Want to resign from the cabinet to lead the campaign against the bill and then re-appointed him after its defeat. Whether or not his actions helped advance the cause of federation may be debated, but he was certainly faced in New South Wales with a badly divided party. The majority of the electors of New South Wales voted in favour of the constitution, but, as their number did not reach the minimum of 80,000 votes which the referendum bill required, it was not accepted. The election was then fought on the federal issue and particularly on the question of whether Barton or Reid could be better trusted to safeguard the interests of New South Wales in negotiations with the other state premiers for a revised constitution.[2] Both leaders produced similar lists of amendments to the bill as election manifestoes although Reid also added a series of promises of domestic reforms.[3] With the exception of a few ardent federalists who continued to support Barton,[4] most of the freetraders uneasily united behind Reid

1. _D.T._, 29/3/98 (This was the famour Yes-No speech.)
2. An editorial in the _Daily Telegraph_ was even entitled 'Under which King?' _D.T._, 23/6/98
3. _D.T._, 5/7/98, 11/7/98.
4. P.H. Morton, D. Thomson and W.H.B. Piddington all stood as federal candidates supporting Barton.

and formed a Liberal and Federal party which organized the
elections by co-ordinating meetings and financing some cam-
paigns and, most important, by providing and selecting can-
didates. However the party organization was ineffective.
Reid's party suffered severe losses, including the defeat of
three ministers, and was only able to maintain a majority
with the assistance of the Labor party.

After the election Reid tried to maintain the unity of
his party by raising the fiscal issue wherever possible but
he was now distrusted by some of his supporters. Further-
more, the Labor party believed that he had exhausted his
democratic ideas and it was becoming impatient with him.[1]
The parliamentary session of 1898 was barren of any progress-
ive legislation. In his budget for 1898, Reid increased the
tariff on sugar in a move which gained him the temporary
support of the protectionist members who represented sugar-
growing electorates but alienated the more determined free-
traders in the party.[2] He finally split his party in 1899
when, in the second referendum campaign, he supported a re-
vised constitution which still included the Senate as a
states' house and other clauses which were considered un-
acceptable and undemocratic by radical members of his party.
When the bill was accepted by the referendum, this wing of
the party, led by Haynes and Cotton, determined to overthrow
Reid but stated that they were not prepared to support the
opposition unless the conservative Barton was replaced by
Lyne, who was regarded as more democratic.[3]

In August, 1899, Lyne became opposition leader and
moved a censure motion condeming Reid for making an advance
payment to a member of parliament, J. Neild, for a report on
pensions, despite a promise to the assembly that he would not
do so. The Labor party also deserted the government on this
issue and the ministry was defeated.[4] After a half-hearted
attempt to secure a dissolution, Reid resigned.[5]

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1. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p.156.

2. D.T., 13/11/98.

3. Haynes, New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, (hereafter
   NSWPD) Series 1, Vol.99, p.182-3.

4. For discussions of the fall of the Reid government, see
   Mansfield, Australian Democrat, p.144-147 and below p.53.

5. D.T., 11/9/99

While Lyne was premier from September 1899 to April 1901, the state freetrade party had little purpose or cohesion. The tariff was no longer a cause of division between the parties because of the success of the federal movement and because of Lyne's promise to sink the fiscal issue. Furthermore, the government legislation was mainly concerned with social measures such as old age pensions, arbitration and early closing which did not divide the assembly on party lines. Reid himself lost interest in state politics and not one censure motion was pushed to a division in eighteen months. Political interest was centred around the federal elections of March 1901 which were contested primarily on the fiscal issue. Several prominent freetraders, notably Reid, McMillan and Thomson, were elected to the federal parliament, leaving the state party leaderless. With the transfer of the control of customs to the Commonwealth, the Freetrade party also lost its raison d'etre. In 1901 and 1902 it was primarily engaged in a search for a new leader and a new cause.

In March 1901 Lyne resigned after his election to the federal parliament and his successor, John See, attempted to form a coalition ministry and approached four prominent freetraders. Two of them, Carruthers and Garland, favoured acceptance of the proposals but a hostile reaction from Reid, Ashton and the Sydney press persuaded the wavering Brunker to reject the offer and the negotiations speedily ended.[1] In April, Reid resigned the party leadership and entered federal politics. The most obvious person to succeed him, Carruthers, was rejected because of his failure to consult the party during his negotiations with See and an undistinguished but loyal party member, C.A. Lee, was chosen as leader.[2] The party then renamed itself the Liberal party because it claimed that, since the state government no longer controlled tariffs, all reference to the fiscal issue should be dropped from its name.[3]

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1. Reid to Carruthers, 10/4/01, Box 25, Carruthers Papers, ML.Mss.1638; Ashton to Carruthers, 6/4/01, Box 25, Carruthers Papers, ML.Mss.1638; D.T. 8/4/01, 9/4/01, 10/4/01. See also Mansfield, Australian Democrat, p.165-7.

2. D.T. 17/4/01; Lee had openly opposed the coalition, D.T. 10/4/01.

3. D.T. 1/5/01.

The organization of the Liberal party in the election of 1901 was ineffective. Lee's manifesto promised, among other things, to reduce the number of members and to introduce bills for arbitration, closer settlement, female suffrage, educational reform and superannuation for the police.[1] Almost all his proposals were similar to those of the premier and the government party. At the same time the Liberal party itself was divided and an open split occurred between Lee and Carruthers. The latter issued an 'Unauthorized Programme'[2] and, although it agreed in most respects with the policies of the two leaders, it did indicate the lack of unity within the Liberal party. The election was a disaster for the party which lost several seats by split votes. Also some of its successful 'endorsed' candidates were immediately found in the government's ranks.

For twelve months, the party disunity continued. Lee was an inept leader, made tactical mistakes[3] and was unable to co-operate with Carruthers.[4] Many Liberal members regarded themselves primarily as the New South Wales branch of the federal freetrade party which was led by Reid and were most active during the agitation against the federal tariff which was introduced in October 1901.[5] The state government introduced no measures which might have helped the opposition; their legislation concerned such domestic subjects as friendly associations, the female suffrage, railways and the re-settlement of the western lands, which were mostly non-controversial and unlikely to divide the house on party lines.

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1. _D.T._, 17/5/01.

2. _D.T._, 26/4/01.

3. His first censure motion condemned See for mistakes made by the Lyne government, even though some new members, whose allegiance was in doubt, had explicitly stated that they would not vote for such a retrospective motion. These men were the independents whose support a party leader needed to attract. _D.T._, 8/7/01, 25/7/01, 3/8/01.

4. In December 1901 Carruthers moved a motion attacking the government over their failure to select a site for the Federal capital. Lee reprimanded him for failing to notify his leader of his intentions and by way of protest voted with the government against the motion. _D.T._,19/12/01.

5. _D.T._, 28/10/01 to 7/11/01.

In 1902 Lee failed to capitalise on the widespread de-
mand for a reduction of the number of M.L.A.s and for a re-
duction of state expenditure which had inspired the formation
of the Taxpayers' Union and the People's Reform League. He
also failed to unite his party and finally, in September 1902,
resigned the leadership. A party caucus then selected Car-
ruthers as his successor.[1] Immediately Carruthers, who has
been described with some justification as 'the greatest lead-
er of the opposition that New South Wales has known',[2] began
to consolidate the parliamentary party and to organise his
supporters in the electorate. In parliament he exposed a
series of ministerial blunders which began with the Friedmann
affair[3] and within fifteen months the number of his support-
ers had increased to fifty as a result of defections from
the government and by-election victories of candidates en-
dorsed by the party. In the electorate, Carruthers founded
the Liberal and Reform Association, a body which it was in-
tended should have sound organization and a branch in every
electorate to secure the local selection of candidates. The
Liberal and Reform Association, which has been called the
'prototype of the non-Labor parties',[4] quickly developed a
widespread network of branches and a coherent party policy
which demanded a reduction of the numbers of members of par-
liament, retrenchment of the expenditure, a 'return to res-
ponsible government' and water conservation. By 1904 the
organization of the Liberal and Reform Association was well
advanced and the election campaign was fought on a state wide
basis. Carruthers' success as leader was partly due to his
ability to provide a cause around which his supporters could

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1. D.T., 18/9/02, 19/9/02.

2. Collis, Lost Years, p.34.

3. Friedmann was a defendant convicted by a jury of re-
    ceiving stolen goods. Wise, the Attorney-General, gave
    him a free pardon on the advice of the trial judge who
    believed him clearly innocent. Carruthers made poli-
    tical use of this pardon by claiming that the Govern-
    ment was overriding jury decisions. Ironically the
    Crown Prosecutor in the case, G.C. Wade, entered the
    Assembly in 1903 and became Attorney-General in Car-
    ruthers' Cabinet in 1904.

4. J.A. MacCallum, 'How Fares Parliamentary Government in
    the Federal System' in G. Sawer (ed.), Federalism in
    Australia, Melbourne, 1949, p.112.

rally; he adopted an anti-socialist stance and accused the
See government of being nothing more than a front for the
Labor party. Consequently, the anti-socialist cause allowed
the party to operate as a unit on almost any issue and pro-
vided a new ideology around which the party members could
unite. In the election of 1904, some pre-selection problems
did occur but the Liberal and Reform Association candidates
won forty-six seats in a house reduced to ninety members.

Carruthers considered a coalition with the defeated
ministerialists but, in the interests of party unity,[1] formed
a cabinet entirely from within his own party. For most of
the parliament, and particularly in 1904, he was attacked
periodically by members of his own party who argued that he
had not reduced government expenditure with sufficient speed.[2]
However, most of the legislation promised in the party plat-
form was passed and the major achievements of the government
included the introduction of local government and local op-
tion and a new crown lands bill. Its most notable defeat
occurred on its attempt to introduce a bill forming a gov-
ernment savings bank; some Liberals opposed the measure[3] on
the grounds that the bill was socialist in outlook while the
Legislative Council rejected it entirely. The government
also re-established the state's finances on a firm basis, al-
though this was partly a consequence of the bumper harvests
of 1905 and 1906. Its success, however, was overshadowed by
the startling revelations of the Royal Commission into the
Lands department which tarnished the reputation of Carruthers,
even though he was never directly implicated.[4]

In the electorate the Liberal and Reform Association con-
tinued to hold regular meetings and to contest by-elections.
It was the first non-Labor electoral organization to have the
continuity of existence to contest successive state elections,
although it played no part as an organization in the federal

1. Brunker to Carruthers, 13/8/04, Box 25 Carruthers Papers,
     ML.Mss.1638.

2. Fell, D.T. 13/10/04. Storey, D.T. 4/11/04. For later
     criticism, see Storey, D.T., 28/12/06, 12/2/07.

3. Nine Liberal M.L.A.s opposed the government on this bill.
     D.T., 4/11/04.

4. For the best description of these events, see C. Pearl,
     Wild Men of Sydney, 1958.

elections because it contained both freetraders and protectionists. At the time of its formation Carruthers had explicitly stated that it would not be a nursery for federal free-trade politicians.[1]

In 1907 the party was placed, in Carruthers' words, on a 'war footing'[2] and contested the election on its record for sound administration and the fulfilment of its electoral pledges of 1904. Its new promises included some specific public works and generally a reduction of the level of taxation. Carruthers also promised to assert strongly the rights of the state against the commonwealth government.[3] Although the Progressive party refused proposals for fusion, its leader, Waddell, still joined the Liberal cabinet. In the elections, the Liberal and Reform Association secured a safe majority. Carruthers was unable to reconstruct his cabinet after the retirement of three of his ministers and was suddenly (and conveniently) taken ill. He resigned and advised the governor to send for Wade, who quickly formed a ministry.[4] By 1907 the Liberal and Reform Association was securely founded and in 1909 it adopted a new constitution[5] which acted as the basis for the Liberal organization over the next decade until it was overtaken by an upheaval of federal origin and incorporated into the new Nationalist party.

The Protectionist or Progressive Party

In 1891 Dibbs formed a protectionist ministry and introduced a protective tariff. However the depression of 1893 created severe problems for the government and eroded its support until it was able to defeat a censure motion by only a single vote. Two of its most eminent ministers, Barton and O'Connor, also resigned over a breach of ethics. In 1894 the electoral organization of the party was poor. The central

1. D.T., 10/3/03.

2. D.T., 30/1/07.

3. D.T., 10/5/07.

4. Random Reflections and Reminiscences, p.61-62. Box 14, Carruthers Papers, ML.Mss.1638.

5. S.M.H., 2/4/09, 18/5/09.

body was formed by M.L.A.s[1] with a few non-parliamentarians
later co-opted into it, but its influence was small and its
bias towards sitting members in preference to other candidates
obvious. At the local level branches held several pre-selection
ballots but generally discipline among candidates was almost
non-existent. Dibbs appealed for support on the grounds of
his sound record of administration, promised to leave the
tariff which he considered sufficiently protective undisturbed
and to introduce local government and new land laws.[2] Like
the Freetrade party, the protectionists were divided into
sections. They included members of the 'Country Party' who
wanted land reform, - and particularly the redistribution of
land and the breaking up of large estates, - local govern-
ment, federation and water conservation, as well as large
landowners who opposed any direct taxation of land.[3] In the
election the party was badly defeated and failed to win a
single city or suburban seat; it consequently represented
country interests almost exclusively. Dibbs decided to meet
the assembly in the hope of gaining a majority with Labor
support and was widely criticised within his own party for
failing to resign.[4] When the governor refused to appoint
his list of nominees to the Council because of the minority
position of his party in the assembly, Dibbs finally resigned.[5]

In the parliament of 1894-1895, the protectionists con-
sistently attacked the direct taxation proposals of Reid,
and despite the presence in the party of some members who
favoured land taxation as a means of breaking up the large
estates, the party gained the reputation of being conserva-
tive.[6] In May 1895, Dibbs and Parkes finally forged an al-
liance to defeat Reid. Some members of the party, particul-
arly Lyne, opposed this move and feared that the party would
lose all credibility by entering an electoral campaign in
alliance with such a prominent freetrader.[7] Others refused

1. S.M.H., 9/6/94, 12/6/94, 16/6/94, 23/6/94.
2. S.M.H., 26/6/94.
3. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
        Wales, p.316-17.
4. S.M.H., 30/7/94.
5. S.M.H., 31/7/94.
6. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
        Wales, p.318.
7. D.T., 15/5/95

to sink the fiscal issue in favour of federation, as Parkes proposed.[1] Lyne's fears were justified by the results of the election of 1895 which saw a further reduction in the numbers of the protectionists. Several leading party members, including Dibbs, Kidd and Copeland, were defeated. When parliament met, a caucus meeting elected Lyne as leader in preference to Crick or See.[2]

In 1896 the parliamentary protectionist party formed the National Protection Union with Lyne as president and W.F. Schey as secretary.[3] In April 1897 this organization convened a conference which included branches throughout the state and which considered tactics for the election of 1898.[4] Towards the end of 1897 several pre-selection ballots and electorate conferences were held to choose candidates for the election. However the federal issue relegated protection to a subsidiary role and split the party. The majority suported the bill but Lyne opposed it. After the bill had been rejected in the referendum, the protectionists entered an uneasy alliance with Barton's Federal Association for the purpose of contesting the election. Barton advocated some alterations to the bill but Lyne remained very dubious about the value of federation. The parliamentary party insisted on its own independence and refused to accept any dictation from the 'irresponsible' Federal Association.[5] In some electorates protectionists objected to being asked to vote for free-traders who supported Barton while federalists disliked the endorsement of anti-federal protectionist M.L.A.s by the central executive of the Federal Association.[6] In spite of these

1. D.T., 6/7/95.
2. D.T., 14/8/95.
3. Constitution and Rules of the National Protection Union, Sydney, 1896. National Library. No. 331.880994/NAT.
4. D.T., 21/4/97 - 24/4/97.
5. D.T., 24/6/98, 25/6/98, 28/6/98, 29/6/98, 1/7/98, 7/7/98.
6. For instance, at Gundagai the Protectionists supported Barnes who opposed federation but who had been endorsed by the central Federal Association because he was a sitting M.L.A. The local Federal Association selected J.J. Miller, asserted their rights to select their own candidate and refused to support Barnes. Gundagai Times, 15/7/98.

tensions the alliance made large gains and the combined party was only in a minority of four.

In parliament the divisions between the federalist and protectionist wings of the party remained. Since Barton had failed to win a seat, Lyne was elected leader unopposed.[1] When Barton won a by-election, the party decided that he had a better chance of uniting the party and deposed Lyne in his favour.[2] Ten months later, the position was reversed. Barton had failed to defeat Reid while federation had been a-chieved with the success of the second referendum. Lyne was paradoxically a more acceptable leader to the arch-protectionists in the party, to the radical freetraders who had deserted Reid and to the Labor party. This strange situation illustrated the political confusion of the time. Some M.L.A.s believed that the tariff question was still important, despite the imminent transfer of customs affairs to the federal government; others claimed that social questions would be the most important matters with which a state government now had to deal. Lyne was re-appointed leader in August,[3] moved a successful censure motion over the payments to Neild and formed a government in September. His ministry included two freetraders, Wise and Fegan. His promise to sink the fiscal issue[4] - a necessary promise to gain the support of the radical freetraders - angered the extreme protectionists in the party[5] and they formed a 'Protectionist' party within the ranks of government supporters.[6] Most of the legislation of the Lyne government was social in outlook, including measures that dealt with pensions, early closing and arbitration. Wise was appointed to the Legislative Council in order to assist in passing the arbitration bill.

When Lyne won a seat in the federal parliament, his successor, John See, tried to form a coalition government, but, having failed, formed a cabinet entirely from his own party.

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1. D.T., 17/8/98.

2. D.T., 6/10/98.

3. D.T., 17/8/98.

4. D.T., 24/8/99.

5. Copeland, D.T., 24/8/99, Henry Clarke, D.T., 26/10/99.

6. D.T., 11/6/00, 14/6/00.

In May 1901 the party changed its name to the Progressive party[1] but its organization in the election of 1901 was nominal. See's election manifesto contained a series of pragmatic promises and was similar to that of Lee[2]; there was no real difference between the platforms of the two parties. With the support of the Labor Party and of most of the eighteen independents who had usually been government supporters previously, but who had preferred not to identify themselves with the party in the election, See was able to maintain a secure if declining majority throughout the parliament. Much of his legislation was non-controversial and social, although the drought caused economic difficulties for the government. Even though reduction of the number of members in the assembly had been the first plank of his electoral manifesto, opposition to this proposal from his own party and from the Labor party made See reluctant to act on it. Eventually public pressure forced the government to hold a referendum on the subject and a large majority of the electors voted for a house of ninety members.[3] By 1904 clever propoganda by Carruthers had presented the government as a front for the Labor party and made the election a choice between socialism and anti-socialism. In June 1904 See suddenly resigned on the grounds of ill-health.[4] When Waddell was asked to form a cabinet, Wise and Crick refused to serve under him on the grounds that they had superior claims to the premiership.[5] The Progressive party had no electoral organization, its central body consisted entirely of M.L.A.s[6] and it endorsed candidates in less than half the electorates - an implicit admission that the party relied considerably on Labor support. Waddell's electoral platform included closer settlement, local government, aid to settlers, water

1. D.T., 4/5/01.

2. D.T., 27/4/01.

3. Electors had a choice between 125, 100 or 90 M.L.A.s. Only one electorate did not have a majority for an assembly of ninety members.

4. D.T., 10/6/04.

5. D.T., 11/6/04. See also Wise to See, 10/6/04. Wise Papers, M.L. MSS 1327 and Wise to Waddell 14/6/04 Wise Papers, M.L. A2646.

6. D.T., 13/4/04.

conservation and prudent financial administration.[1] It was
the traditional catch-all programme with no dominant theme.
In the election itself Waddell concentrated almost entirely
on securing his own re-election and, despite requests,[2] gave
little assistance to other party candidates. In a disast-
rous defeat only sixteen progressives were returned. After
meeting parliament and obtaining supply, Waddell resigned.[3]

During the next year the party was singularly ineffec-
tive. With the Labor party now the official opposition,
Waddell was an indecisive leader and his party had no dis-
cipline and little sense of purpose.[4] O"Sullivan and W.W.
Young consistently supported the Labor party while others
regularly voted with the Carruthers government. In 1907 a
series of caucus meetings considered fusion with the Liber-
als but rejected the proposal in a ballot.[5] Waddell had
strongly favoured an anti-Labor fusion and immediately re-
signed to take office in the Liberal cabinet.[6] The party
decided to postpone the election of a leader until after
the 1907 election.[7] However in that election the party as
a distinct unit disappeared; several members joined the
Liberals while the remainder became independent.

The Labor Party

In 1890 the Sydney Trades and Labor Council decided to
contest the parliamentary elections and the need for polit-
ical action was emphasised the same year with the failure
of the maritime strike. In the election of 1891 thirty-six
Labor candidates were elected. In spite of the introduction
of a pledge to vote according to the decision of a majority

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1. D.T., 28/6/04.

2. E.J. Brady to Waddell 8/7/04, 20/7/04. NSW Ministerial
    Election Committee Papers, M.L. Uncat. 234.

3. D.T., 27/8/04.

4. Spence commented that 'the remnants of the Lyne-See party
    also sat with them (the Labor party) but were an un-
    reliable set of men when any fighting was to be done'.
    Australia's Awakening, p.158. The Progressive party
    behaviour fully justified this criticism.

5. D.T., 8/5/07.

6. D.T., 9/5/07.

7. D.T., 5/7/07.

in caucus, the first Labor party was badly divided, partic-
ularly on the fiscal issue. Several members, pledged to vote
for protection, were unwilling to support the Parkes govern-
ment and split from the party. Nevertheless Black enunciated
the official strategy of the party in his 'support in re-
turn for concessions' speech.[1] In 1893 the annual confer-
ence attempted to increase the effectiveness of the party
by introducing a pledge which demanded more rigid discipline,
but all except two of the sitting M.L.A.s refused to sign
it. In the election of 1894 two Labor groups went to the
polls - the Independent Laborites, who were almost all
sitting members, and the solidarity Labor party whose can-
didates had signed the new pledge. After the elections,
Cook, the leader of the Independent Laborites, was given
office in Reid's cabinet while most of the remaining inde-
pendent Labor members were absorbed into the non-Labor par-
ties. Three rejoined the solidarity party before the e-
lection of 1895.[2]

The solidarity Labor party, a more cohesive and solid
unit after 1894, elected McGowen leader and gave consistent
support to the Reid government from 1894 to 1899. Although
there was never any written agreement between the parties
about the legislative programme that Reid should introduce,[3]
at election time the parties avoided opposing each other's
sitting members. This pact was never formally signed, but
was clearly accepted by both parties and usually adhered
to.[4] In 1899 the Labor party became dissatisfied with Reid[5]
and voted against him on the Neild censure motion. The cre-
dit for persuading the party to oppose Reid has been variously

1. G. Black. The Labor Party in New South Wales: A His-
tory from its Formation in 1891. Sydney n.d. p.5- 12.

2. G. Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales, p.12-14.

3. McGowen NSWPD Series 1, Vol. 100, p.1195.

4. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes,
p.7b., M.L. A2668, also New South Wales Ministerial
Election Committee Minutes, 26/4/04, p.1 M.L. Uncat.
MSS234.

5. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p.156; Black, The Labor
Party in New South Wales, p.21.

attributed to Hughes,[1] Holman,[2] Griffith,[3] and Spence,[4] all
of whom were said to have approached Lyne and extracted pro-
mises from him. In the circumstances it seems likely that
Lyne, an experienced politician, contacted as many Labor
members as he could in order to strengthen his support within
the Labor caucus. In other words, all the versions of
approaches to Lyne by individual Labor members may be true,
with the result that Labor's support for the censure motion
was the cumulative effect of Lyne's personal efforts rather
than the responsibility of any one caucus member. Whatever
the true explanation, the result was that Lyne became Premier
in 1899 and for five years the Labor party gave him and
his successors consistent support.

The internal affairs of the party were seldom placid.
After the split in 1894, the party remained united until
1900. Then two Labor members who had supported federation
against the policy of the party left the party after pre-
selection disputes.[5] In 1902 another member deserted the
party over the Freidmann affair, resigned his seat and won
re-election as an independent.[6] In 1904 the parliamentary
party tried to decide which seats in the redistributed elec-
torate thesitting members would contest and consequently
partly ignored the Labor methods of pre-selection.[7]

In 1904 the party became the official opposition after
the decline of the Progressives and in 1907 it further in-

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1. L.F. Fitzhardinge, W.M. Hughes in New South Wales
      Politics, 1890-1900, J.R.A.H.S., Vol.37 part 3,
      1951. p.160-1.

2. H.V. Evatt, Australian Labor Leader, p.118-121

3. John Perry attributed the arrangement to Griffith, who
      had been the party secretary in 1899, NSWPD, Series
      2, Vol.26, p.100-1.

4. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p.156. Spence admits to
      being actually approached by Lyne with a written set
      of promises. In fact he voted in favour of retaining
      the alliance with Reid (D.T., 7/9/98). So in this
      case Lyne failed to make a convert.

5. R. Sleath and W.J. Ferguson. Ironically these two were
      the only Labor M.L.A.s who, as unionists, had been
      imprisoned for their parts in the strikes of the early
      1890s. Both won their seats in 1901 as independents.

6. S.J. Law, see Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales, p.23.

7. D.T., 23/3/04.

creased its strength. After the 1910 election, it secured a narrow majority for the first time and McGowen became the first Labor Premier.

Other Political Parties

In this section I shall only briefly describe those organizations which were primarily political in purpose. Interest or pressure groups which took political action will be considered later in the thesis.

Parliamentary Parties

Two 'Independent' Parties were formed, one in 1898, the second in 1901. The former was convened[1] by Edward Terry, a wealthy merchant who had won the seat of Ryde by treating all his electors to lavish picnics and who in Parliament tried to win office by giving frequent banquets which members of all parties attended.[2] Although some caucus meetings were held, Terry refused to call a meeting if he thought a problem might arise which would split the party.[3] Despite its nominal existence for two years, the politically naive Terry was the only person to take the Independent Party seriously.

In August 1901 R.A. Price called a caucus of independents with the intention of forming a party.[4] Although some meetings were held,[5] the party never acted in a united fashion and by the end of the session had disappeared.

In 1894 a Country Party had issued a manifesto for the election,[6] held a caucus meeting[7] and then became redundant after the 1895 Land Act.[8] In 1902 another Country Party was

1. D.T., 17/8/98. Seven M.L.A.s were present.
2. Collis, Lost Years, p.66-9.
3. NSWPD, series 1, vol.99, p.139.
4. D.T., 8/7/01.
5. D.T., 11/7/01, 22/7/01, 13/8/01.
6. S.M.H., 7/6/94.
7. S.M.H., 31/8/94, 5/9/94.
8. C.G. Kerr, Political Protest and General Development in Rural New South Wales; Ph.D. Univ. of N.S.W., 1969, p.338.

formed within the Progressive party in parliament with
all its members supporters of the See government and from
rural electorates.[1] After a series of meetings the party
accepted a constitution which included a pledge to vote as
the majority of caucus decided. At the annual conference
of the Farmers' and Settlers' Association, the party offered
to act in the assembly as the political wing of the organiz-
ation, but this proposal was rejected.[2] At first the party
concentrated on such rural matters as water conservation[3] but
in October it was forced to make a decision on its attitude
in the Freidmann censure motion. The party caucus decided,
reputedly by one vote, to support the government. Carroll
immediately resigned and voted with the opposition while
Rose voted as directed by the party and then resigned.[4] The
unity of the party was shattered and despite a continuous
existence over the next year its influence was small.

Extra-Parliamentary Parties

    The Freetrade and Land Reform League was founded in
April 1893 by non-parliamentarians but B.R. Wise soon be-
came its leader. The League demanded direct taxation of
income and land without exemptions. Its followers were
drawn from the more radical freetraders and included sev-
eral leading single-taxers.[5] The League created a strong
branch network and was reputedly the most efficient organ-
ization involved in the 1894 election.[6] Wise claimed for
it the majority of the credit for the freetrade success.[7]
In August 1894 Wise made an attempt to create a ginger group
within the parliamentary freetrade party[8] but a split within

1. D.T., 24/4/02. Convened by Rose. In September, Gormly
        was elected leader, Briner secretary and Carroll whip.
        D.T., 11/9/02.

2. Farmers' and Settlers' Association, Conference Reports,
        1900-1906, 1902 Report, p.69. Mitchell Library M.L.
        630.6/8.

3. D.T., 29/7/02.

4. D.T., 1/10/02, 3/10/02, 13/10/02.

5. e.g. Frank Cotton, Dr. Hollis, Lonsdale.

6. A.W. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in
        New South Wales, p.320.

7. D.T., 18/7/94.

8. New South Wales Legislative Council Petitions and Pro-
        ceedings, p.251. Mitchell Library, A.285.

this group occurred when the ambitions of Wise became too obvious.[1] When Wise attacked Reid in November 1894, he was unable to keep the allegiance of his previous supporters who were generally satisfied with Reid's performance and became assimilated into the Freetrade party. With the loss of Wise, the League ceased to be an important political force.

The National Association, a strongly conservative, anti-socialist body consisting of businessmen and leading pastor-alists, also contested the 1894 and 1895 elections. It ig-nored both the fiscal issue and the existing parties and advocated the election of 'good men'. Their nominees tended to be conservative. In spite of extravagant claims for its effectiveness by its secretary, William Epps, its influence was probably limited and it disbanded in 1898.[2]

The Federal Association was formed by Barton in 1898 to secure the acceptance of the Convention Bill at the first referendum. It included both freetraders and protectionists. A series of branches were formed in April, 1898, and the referendum campaign was centrally co-ordinated with the speakers provided throughout the state. When the bill was rejected, the Association co-operated with the Protectionist party in the 1898 elections. Despite some tensions the com-bined strength of both parties brought large gains. The Association supported Reid and Barton in their advocacy of the second convention bill in 1899 and then disbanded.[3]

In 1902 two organizations were formed to demand retrench-ment in the expenses of the state government and a reduction in the number of state M.L.A.s. The Taxpayers' Union included the same class of conservative businessmen who had been mem-bers of the National Association and its policy was similar to that of its predecessor.[4] The People's Reform League,

1. B.R. Wise to Varney Parkes, 31/8/94. Varney Parkes Papers. Mitchell Library, A.1052.

2. A.W. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South Wales, p.321. S.M.H., 15/2/94, 16/3/94, 28/3/94, 14/4/94, 2/6/94, 6/7/94, 7/7/94, 12/7/94; William Epps, 'I am not Ashamed; My Apologia'. Mitchell Library ML MSS 1831; John Baptist Papers, Mitchell Library,Uncat.162.

3. D.T., 26/3/98, 1/4/98, 2/4/98, 1/6/98, 8/6/98, 16/6/98.

4. D.T., 16/1/02, 25/1/02, 25/2/02, 3/4/02.

founded in Camden,[1] was an attempt to copy the successful Kyabram movement in Victoria. It soon formed a series of branches throughout the Sydney suburbs and in some country electorates.[2] The two organizations united in May 1903 under the name of the People's Reform League.[3] Although it was supposed to be a body designed for propoganda purposes only, the League immediately became involved in political campaigning and the selection of candidates and consequently clashed with the Liberal and Reform Association. Its president, John Stinson, was suspicious of the sincerity of politicians and his personal antipathy towards Carruthers prevented any union between the two bodies.[4] In 1904, however, a joint committee was created to avoid vote-splitting in the selection of candidates[5] and it worked fairly effectively. After 1904 the People's Reform League continued to act on a limited basis, attempting to keep the government on truly conservative lines and registering voters. It played only a minor role in the 1907 election and, fully satisfied with the performance of the Wade government, declared itself redundant in 1909.[6]

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1. D.T., 25/4/02

2. D.T., 7/5/02, 8/5/02, 14/5/02, 16/6/02, 17/6/02, 29/7/02, 26/8/02.

3. D.T., 17/4/03, 28/4/03, 2/5/03.

4. D.T., 9/4/03, 28/4/03, 1/6/03.

5. D.T., 23/4/04.

6. S.M.H., 6/3/09.

Chapter 4

Tasmania at the Turn of the Century

Introduction

The character of politics in Tasmania changed markedly
between 1894 and 1912. In 1894 the Assembly was divided
between two loose groups often called Liberal and Conserv-
ative, or, more commonly, Ministerialist and Opposition.
These groups were called 'parties' by contemporaries but
were in fact little more than combinations of individuals,
in which no one person was dominant or responsible for their
formation or cohesion. By 1912 two distinct and coherent
parties, the Liberal and Labor parties, existed. The par-
liament of 1894-6 was typical of most parliaments in Tas-
mania before 1903; there was no formal organization in
parliament or in the electorate. Parties emerged gradually
after 1903 but not according to any regular pattern of de-
velopment and by 1912 a well-organized non-Labor party had
been formed.

In the period seven elections were held - in 1893, 1897,
1900, 1903, 1906, 1909 and 1912. In the decade, 1893-1903,
I will study only one parliament (1894-6) and one election
(1893) in detail because the activity of groups in that
parliament was similar to that of the following two. This
analysis is necessary to provide a contrast between the
party and pre-party period in Tasmanian politics. After
1903 each election illustrates a gradual growth of party
method and this development will be discussed later in the
thesis. First a general background to Tasmanian politics,
similar to that already provided in the previous chapter for
New South Wales, must be given.

The Constitution

The Tasmanian parliament was divided into two houses,
the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly. The
council contained eighteen members who were elected for six-
year terms by voters defined by a restricted property fran-
chise. Three members retired each year. The council could
not be dissolved and was therefore able to thwart any min-
istry without fear of reprisals. In fact the usually old
and conservative members were also often returned unopposed.

Party labels were seldom adopted either in elections for the council or in its actual activities.[1]

In the House of Assembly the number of members varied according to the electoral provisions. There were thirty-six M.H.A.s in 1893, thirty-eight in 1898, thirty-five in 1903 and thirty after 1909. Ministries had to maintain a majority in the assembly and usually all but one minister had seats there. The chief secretary was usually the government representative in the council. Collective ministerial responsibility was accepted, although ministers who had been personally discredited sometimes resigned individually.[2] Open questions on which ministers publicly differed gradually declined in number. The Governor could act only on the receipt of advice but, as in New South Wales, he was not obliged to take that advice. Twice he refused to grant a dissolution[3] and on another occasion he declined to postpone the meeting of parliament to allow discontent in the premier's party to subside.[4]

In 1894 a limited franchise still existed in Tasmania.[5] Voting for the assembly was restricted to those who owned freehold property of a rateable value of £40 per annum or whose wages exceeded £60 per annum. Plural voting was permitted if property owners fulfilled the franchise requirements in more than one electorate.[6] In 1898 all property-

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1. For discussion of voting in the Council, see Appendix D.

2. Such as E.T. Miles in 1899 and A. Stewart in 1906.

3. 1904 and 1909. There was also a famous incident in 1914 when he attempted to coerce the Labor Premier into asking for a dissolution by making it a condition of being invited to form a Cabinet. After the ministry was formed, the Labor leader ignored this condition. H.V. Evatt. The King and his Dominion Governors, chapter 4.

4. The Governor's Confidential Despatches, 30/6/06. State Archives of Tasmania.

5. This paragraph is based on Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, p.587-9.

6. In 1897 590 electors had two votes, ninety-eight had three votes and one person even had seven votes. Journal and Papers of Parliament, 1897 Vol.36, Statistics of Tasmania p.93.

owners received the vote and the wage barrier was reduced
to £40 per annum. After federation, manhood suffrage was
introduced and all men who had had twelve months residence
in the island, except paupers, prisoners and lunatics, were
permitted to vote. Universal suffrage was introduced in
1902 and women voted for the first time in the elections of
1906. Voting and registration were voluntary. In 1896 a
candidate was permitted by law to incur electoral expenses
of £100 for the first five hundred voters and £5 for each
hundred thereafter, but in 1906, with the introduction of
the Hare-Clark system, £100 was made the legal maximum ex-
penditure for any candidate.

Both the number of electorates and the electoral
methods changed frequently during this period. In 1893
there were eight two-member and twenty single-member elect-
orates. In 1897 this was changed to twenty-seven single
member electorates with six members being elected for Ho-
bart and four for Launceston under the Hare-Clark system
of proportional representation. Two West Coast seats were
added in 1894 and 1898. In 1903 the state was re-divided
into thirty-five single-member constituencies. Finally in
1906 the state was sub-divided into five electorates which
were identical with the federal constituencies, each re-
turning six members under the Hare-Clark system.[1] In all
the elections, the polls of every electorate were held
simultaneously.

The Society and the Economy

Tasmania at the turn of the century can be subdivided
into five economic and geographic areas. The main fruit-

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1. The Hare-Clark system of proportional representation,
   as adopted in Tasmania, demanded that each voter
   express at least three preferences. When a candidate
   reached the required quota (one-sixth of all primary
   votes plus one), his surplus votes were then re-
   distributed according to a prescribed formula. If no
   candidates had a quota, then the candidate with the
   least votes was excluded and his votes were distri-
   buted. When only seven candidates remained, those
   with a quota and those remaining with the highest
   number of votes below the quota were declared elected.

growing districts which had expanded their production rapidly in the 1890s[1] were in the south around the Huon. In the mid-lands were the well-established pastoral properties which had been settled for sixty years. Although the hegemony of the Tasmanian gentry was now destroyed, the leading families, particularly the Camerons, the Pillingers, the Youls and the Archers, still had a large influence over the politics of the small country electorates.[2] In New South Wales the larger population and the rapidly expanding areas of settlement meant that this class as a group was never as influential. In the north-west the country was being opened up by the small farmers who had settled there in the second half of the century and who were still remote from major towns and poorly serviced by roads and railways.[3] On the west coast the expansion of the mines and of the secondary industries which were connected to them, such as smelting, attracted a flood of mainland immigrants and this part of the island was in many respects different from the rest of Tasmania.[4] Smaller mining areas could also be found in the north-east. Finally the two major cities, Hobart and Launceston, contained one quarter of the state's population;[5] by contrast 41% of the population of New South Wales lived in the county of Cumberland in 1901.[6]

In 1894 wool and fruit were the main rural exports of the state, each with a value of around £250,000 - the Tasmanian wool clip was only 3% of the value of that of New South Wales. By 1909 fruit, with exports valued at over £750,000, was almost twice as profitable as wool (only £400,000). Exports of minerals in 1894 were worth about £750,000, and in 1906 £2,000,000. Copper and tin were the most valuable of

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1. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, p.2177.

2. H. Reynolds, 'Men of Substance and Deservedly Good Repute', The Tasmanian Gentry, 1856-1875, A.J.P.H., Vol.15, No.3, December 1969, p.71-2.

3. See H.J.W. Stokes, North-West Tasmania, 1858-1910: The establishment of an agricultural community, Ph.D. A.N.U. 1969.

4. See G. Blainey, Peaks of Lyell, 3rd Ed. Melbourne 1967.

5. Census of Tasmania, 1901, p.276-9.

6. Census of New South Wales, 1901, p.633-49.

the minerals.[1] The total exports of the state increased
from a value of £1,489,041 in 1894 to £3,431,250 in 1909 -
an expansion of 120%. However, the total value of Tasmanian
exports was still only worth about 10% of that of New South
Wales. In rural areas, Tasmania saw few major changes; the
number of people involved in agriculture increased from six-
teen thousand in 1891 to twenty thousand in 1911 when the
acreage under cultivation was 34% of the same area in New
South Wales. The industrial employees only increased from
16,000 in 1894 to 17,000 in 1911. The increase in the num-
ber of miners was more rapid, particularly in the decade,
1891 to 1901, when their numbers increased from about four
thousand to over five and a half thousand. Between 1891
and 1911 the total population of the stae expanded from
146,667 to 191,211 - an increase of 30%. Tasmania's popula-
tion was only 12% that of New South Wales.[2]

Although some rural areas were unchanged, other parts
of the state were developing rapidly and demanding govern-
mental assistance in opening up the country with public works.
A promise of a road or a bridge meant more to a farmer in
the north-west than a grandiose political scheme in distant
Hobart. Furthermore, the rugged terrain made land communi-
cations difficult, with the result that sea transport through
Burnie, Strahan and Launceston was the most convenient method
of moving produce and so Hobart, unlike Sydney, did not dom-
inate the trade of its hinterland.

The greatest change to the Tasmanian way of life was
caused by the arrival of many mainland miners and industrial
workers who brought a new radicalism and a new industrial
awareness to the island. At first this industrial movement
was confined to the mining districts of the island, but it
gradually expanded its influence to the main towns.

The government was always faced with the problems of
providing public works for the developing countryside and,

1. *Journals and Papers of Parliament*, 1911, Vol.65, Statist-
   ical Survey of Tasmania, p.6-7.

2. *Census of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1911, p.1286,1291.
   Also the number of Tasmanian miners was 15% of those of
   New South Wales; its industrial employees were 8%, its
   agriculturalists 25%.

as industry grew, it had to develop policies and institutions
for regulating industrial life and conflicts and improving
the social conditions in which the workers lived. Federa-
tion made little difference to Tasmanian politics; the
fiscal issue had never been a decisive factor[1] in the affairs
of a state which relied heavily on Victoria as a market and
as a source of goods. The post-federation problems were con-
tinuations of earlier ones.

The Pre-Party Period

Two groups were predominant in Tasmanian politics be-
fore parties developed. They were not factions according
to the criterion set up by Bailey[2] or in the manner of the
early factions in New South Wales; the members of the group
never supported the leader as an individual but rather as
an equal who had been elected to lead the group in the as-
sembly.[3] They were simply loose combinations of minister-
ialists or oppositionists who were either in or out of
office and who owed each other little. In particular they
were all electorally independent of one another. They co-
operated as individuals for the purpose of gaining power,
without making specific commitments to one another.

In the 1870s power had alternated between two evenly
balanced 'parties'[4] and a political stalemate was only re-
solved in 1879 by the formation of a coalition government.[5]
Opposition to this government was recreated in parliament in
1882[6] and a 'two-party' situation which lasted until 1902
was formed. Caucuses of opposition members selected all
their leaders in that time and the leader of the opposition
was generally invited to form a government after the defeat
of opposing ministries. Apart from these main groups the

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1. Some historians have overemphasised its importance; see,
   for instance, C.I. Clark, The Parliament of Tasmania:
   An Historical Sketch, Hobart 1947, p.65-6.

2. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p.50.

3. For the difference between faction leaders and elected
   leaders in New South Wales, see Loveday and Martin,
   Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.54.

4. J.A. Nockels, Tasmanian Politics and Factions in the 1870s,
   B.A. (Hons) Thesis, University of Tasmania 1967.

5. Mercury, (hereafter M.) 29/10/79.

6. M., 5/10/82.

assembly always included several independents who could not
be relied upon to give regular support to a ministry. Some
M.H.A.s were ministerialists in the most literal sense in
that they gave support to all ministries in a desire to sec-
ure stability of administration.[1] The groups were neither
inflexible nor exclusive. Any M.H.A. could join either party
or transfer from one to the other without undue loss of pres-
tige. The groups were not divided by any vital distinction
of policy and their attitudes could change according to the
ideas of the leading members.

Ministries were generally formed from one group alone
although coalitions could occur. A ministry had to maintain
a majority in the assembly but its fate was at stake only on
direct censure motions. Defeat on other motions, including
some government measures, was not regarded as illustrating
a lack of confidence in the ministry. The small number of
members in the house increased the power of the individual
whose vote could be more influential than that of his contem-
porary in New South Wales. With a majority of one in a div-
ision being fairly common, each M.H.A. had to be considered
in political tactics and his requirements, which were
usually local, satisfied.

Before 1902 politics was generally the activity of a
limited social group. Established city or country families
were often well represented. Most M.H.A.s were of a middle
class background and had already proved themselves in other
walks of life. Few were young. As a result power was kept
in the hands of men who had an interest in conserving so-
ciety and in opposing radical change, although some M.H.A.s
from small farming districts and the occasional city member
had more advanced ideas.[2] However, the western mining dis-
tricts, populated largely by mainland immigrants, began in
the late 1890s to challenge the ordered calm of Tasmanian

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1. H.R. Dumaresq contested every election between 1891 and
   1903 as a ministerialist even though four different
   ministries were in office during that time. Hughes
   and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and
   Politics, p.592-7.

2. H. Reynolds, Regionalism in Nineteenth Century Tasmania,
   T.H.R.A. Vol.17 No.1, p.25.

society and from these areas came the impetus which was to change its earlier political methods.

With politics dominated by personalities, the lack of formal organization is not surprising. In parliament informal caucuses were held at irregular intervals by both groups to discuss tactics. Whips were occasionally appointed. In the electorate few attempts were made to organize the voters. The allegiance of the member in parliament was of little account in the electorate; what mattered there was his success in promoting local demands. The electorates were often small geographically and had only a small number of electors. The structure of society was stable and deferential and the landowner or sitting member could often secure election without a contest. In 1897, 37% of the seats were uncontested, in 1900 36%, in 1903 11% and in 1906 23%. In New South Wales uncontested seats never accounted for more than 10.4% of the seats (as in 1901) and usually for less than 4%.[1]

The Party in Parliament

Since party lines in Tasmania were indistinct, it is more profitable for the historical description to concentrate on examining party history in parliament and then in the electorate. Both surveys will cover the period 1893-1912 but will only briefly mention the years between 1897 and 1903.

After the elections of December 1893, the allegiance of many members, and particularly of those elected for the first time, was sufficiently unclear for both groups to claim victory.[2] Even though a split between the two leading ministers, Henry Dobson and John Henry, was widely recognized, the government stayed in office and was able to defeat two censure motions in March 1894. Braddon had begun to rally opposition members directly after the election[3] and in February he had been elected leader, replac-

1. Figures from Hughes and Graham. Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, p.431-439, 593-596.

2. For details of party numbers, see Appendix A.

3. Launceston Examiner, 23/12/93, 28/12/93.

ing Bird.[1] The opposition held a series of caucus meetings
at which tactics[2] were discussed and finally defeated the
government on its land tax bill and forced it to resign. A
party caucus then elected Braddon premier, although he only
won the ballot by one vote from A.I. Clark.[3] The caucus
also persuaded Fysh and Moore to join the ministry. The
new ministerialists had no common ideology but were gener-
ally considered to be more liberal and progressive than the
ministers they replaced.[4] In the new opposition Lewis was
elected leader as a compromise to prevent the party being
irrevocably split between Henry and Dobson.[5]

Braddon was an able and vigorous administrator whose
retrenchment of the civil service became a by-word for ruth-
lessness.[6] He was an expert lobbyist who was often respon-
sible for persuading members to vote on his side in divisions.
With the aid of able colleagues he had no problems in pass-
ing through the assembly his main government measures, but
he was unable to control the council which consistently
rejected a series of proposals which were designed to
equalize the burden of taxation in the state.[7] Braddon's
main measure was the introduction of a graduated land tax,
but other minor taxes were imposed at the same time as
drastic retrenchment took place. The main achievement of
the ministry was to allow the state to recover economically
from the bank crash of 1893.

After 1897 Braddon's political position deteriorated
because he lost all his original colleagues[8] who were replaced
by mediocrities. The greatest burden of administration fell

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1. M., 28/2/94.

2. M., 29/3/94.

3. M., 13/4/94.

4. Reynolds, Regionalism in Nineteenth Century Tasmania, p.21.

5. M., 18/5/94.

6. F.C. Green (ed.) A Century of Responsible Government, p.196.

7. For instance in 1894, the Council defeated the Income Tax
    Bill (M., 19/7/94), the Probate Duties Bill(M., 26/7/94),
    the Assessment Bill (M., 17/8/94), the Stamp Duties Bill
    (M., 23/8/94). In the next two years, his legislation
    produced similar reactions.

8. Clark resigned in October 1897 and became leader of the op-
    position, Fysh became Agent-General in December 1898 and
    Pillinger died in May 1899.

onto his aged and ailing shoulders[1] and for the first time
the ministry became completely dependent on one individual.
Then, in August 1899, one of the new ministers, Edward Miles,
was accused of corrupt practices and the ensuing scandal[2]
alienated sufficient supporters to destroy the Braddon gov-
ernment. Lewis then formed a government and maintained
power with ease until 1903 but by that time he had become
unpopular in the state, particularly because he introduced an
income tax. In the election of 1903 the government was op-
posed by the popular Reform League and all three ministers
were defeated. This election brought to parliament a large
if unwieldy and internally divided group of supporters of
the Reform League who were partly identified with the earl-
ier opposition. The first Labor party of three M.H.A.s, all
from the West Coast, was also elected.

After the election William Propsting formed a ministry
whose members were young and progressive. Their plans in-
cluded consideration of the abolition of the council which,
not surprisingly, rejected many of their radical proposals.[3]
In the assembly Propsting was supported by a large majority
which was, however, united originally only by its opposition
to the Lewis government. He lacked the ability to maintain
the coherence of this group, especially when few of his
measures became law. His aspirations were far-reaching but
his achievements were few. He tried to alter the electoral
system, to introduce proportional representation and to im-
pose property, land and income taxes. These measures were
aimed at the wealthier classes and were suspect to many of
his lukewarm supporters. Gradually his followers became
disillusioned with his promises and several joined the op-
position which was now led by Captain John Evans. Prop-
sting was never defeated in the assembly but resigned in
protest against the council's obstruction in July 1904,
clearly expecting that Evans would be unable to form a min-
istry and that he would be granted the dissolution which

1. Governor's Confidential Despatches, 20/10/98. State
   Archives of Tasmania.

2. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p.236-7.

3. Such as their Occupancy Tax (M., 12/5/04) their Early
   Closing Bill (M., 20/5/04), and their Constitution
   Bill, (M., 20/5/04).

he had requested but which the governor had refused. However, Evans, a competent if uninspiring leader, gained the support of several followers of Propsting who had been discouraged by the government's radical ideas and who saw more promise of stable government under Evans.[1] After Evans took office, his administration was sufficiently competent to maintain a safe majority. His ministry aimed to give sound administration, rather than to innovate. His measures were mainly concerned with uncontroversial topics. The influence of the opposition declined as its numbers fell and in December 1905 its leader, Propsting, won a seat in the council and resigned.

In the 1906 election Evans consolidated his position, although he was forced by the defeat of his attorney-general to reshuffle his cabinet. In his new ministry he included Propsting and D.C. Urquhart, both nominally oppositionists.[2] The Labor party doubled its numbers and included members who represented electorates other than those on the West Coast. The opposition was left with little alternative but to co-operate with Labor and immediately half its members, who anyway did not disagree with the Evans government on any matters of principle, deserted to the government ranks. The government was never in danger of defeat, its legislation caused few crises and its majority was so large that strict party discipline was unnecessary. Several important social measures were passed; closer settlement was expanded and free education and proportional representation were introduced. Evans had a capacity for letting anything controversial drift by; his time in office was remarkably quiet and generally prosperous for the state. The opposition remained badly divided and even with the aid of the Labor party could not seriously challenge the ministry. In 1908 both its leaders were given government appointments and left politics.[3]

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1.   M., 8/7/04, 9/7/04.

2.   Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, p.~~598.~~ 255-6.

3.   Nicholls became a Judge after Alfred Dobson, the Agent-General, refused the appointment. (M., 1/12/08). McCall became Agent-General after Dobson fell overboard from a channel steamer and was drowned. (M., 8/12/08).

In 1909 the party was badly defeated at the polls, with
only one member being returned.

In 1909 eighteen non-Labor and twelve Labor members
were returned. The non-Labor members met in a caucus to
to create a united party in June 1909. The leadership of
Evans in the election had been poor because he had concen-
trated entirely on his own electorate and his position as
leader was challenged. The caucus first agreed on a common
policy and then elected Lewis leader with a majority of
one vote over A.E. Solomon, a newly-elected member for Laun-
ceston. Evans came third.[1] The election of Lewis caused
considerable dissatisfaction in the party because he be-
longed to a conservative tradition and several members im-
mediately made it clear that if the government was too slow
to act, particularly in removing unpopular taxes, they
would withdraw their support. For four months the govern-
ment was inactive and in October 1909 Ewing led a revolt
against Lewis on the floor of the assembly, condemning him
for his failure to keep promises made at the fusion caucus.[2]
The ministry was defeated and a minority Labor government
formed. However, when Lewis refused to resign the party
leadership, the rebels were left with the choice of coming
to terms with him or of supporting a Labor government. They
quickly re-negotiated another fusion.[3] For the remainder
of the parliament Lewis's position was secure although he
faced opposition from within his own party in passing a
wages board bill and there were rumblings of discontent from
the backbenches about his conservatism. He introduced land
taxation, consolidated the management of the railways, fin-
ally settled longstanding disputes in the Education Depart-
ment and legislated in a small way to improve industrial
conditions.

In the election of 1912, the anti-socialist party was
reduced to fifteen members and, after providing the Speaker,
it relied for a majority on the one independent in the house.

1. M., 9/6/09, 10/6/09.

2. M., 15/10/09.

3. M., 21/10/09, 22/10/09.

Lewis's leadership in the election had been uninspiring and, when challenged in a caucus, he resigned his position and Solomon was elected to replace him.[1] However the independent, Norman Cameron, was politically ambitious and determined to act as king-maker. When the Liberals refused his demand that they make him premier, he gave them inconsistent support and then in December offered to vote with the Labor party in a censure motion.[2] The Speaker immediately threatened to resign so that he could vote with his party in the division,[3] but Earle withdrew his motion[4] when Cameron's terms for an alliance proved unacceptably high. Although still undefeated, Solomon refused to govern at the whim of an independent and called a snap election in which Cameron was defeated. With sixteen Liberals and fourteen Labor members returned, a clear two-party alignment was recreated.

The Non-Labor Parties in the Electorate

Like all elections before 1903, that of 1893 was contested in personal terms, with no broad issues or widespread organization. The leading politicians of each group issued manifestoes which promised to introduce graduated land taxation, to retrench government expenditure and to alter the law on land, mining and the wood industry. There was little difference between the two policies.[5] The leaders did not campaign on behalf of their supporters, each of whom was concerned only with his own electorate and presented his own particular policy. Organization consisted almost entirely of local committees which canvassed the electorate. One electoral body, the Liberal Progressive Association[6], had some success. It organized the electors in Launceston, chose a candidate in a pre-selection ballot, won one seat

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1. _M._, 6/6/12.

2. _M._, 14/12/12.

3. _M._, 17/12/12.

4. _M._, 18/12/12.

5. _Launceston Examiner_, 20/11/93, 4/12/93.

6. Seen as the predecessor of the Labor party by Spence, _Australia's Awakening_, p.237-8 and by M.D. McRae, _Some aspects of the origins of the Tasmanian Labor Party_, _T.H.R.A._ Vol.3, No.1., December 1953, p.24-5.

and almost defeated a minister in another.[1] However it made
no attempt to extend its organization outside Launceston and
disappeared in 1895.

After federation a widespread demand for the reduction
in the expenses of the state government caused the formation
of the Tasmanian Reform League, a body which followed the
example of the Kyabram movement in Victoria. The League
attacked the financial incapacity of the Lewis government,
produced a vague ten-point platform and formed a state
council which was sub-divided into northern and southern
committees. Several branches were founded; some of them
selected candidates but they seldom co-operated with one
another.[2] This unusual electoral activity stirred the gov-
ernment into action. One minister, Edward Mulcahy, toured
the state addressing meetings and defending his government's
record. This tour was the first appeal by a politician to
the island as a whole in a state election. Generally there
was little difference between the policies of Lewis, of
the opposition and of the Reform League. All of them prom-
ised to reduce the numbers of the assembly, to balance the
budget, to introduce local government and to submit all pub-
lic works proposals to a board of experts. The main emphasis
was on the need for sound financial administration.[3] In the
election twenty adherents of the Reform League won seats
and all three ministers were defeated. However the League
disappeared in late 1903 after it had failed to create any
permanent parliamentary or electoral organization.

The election of 1903 also saw the appearance of the
first Labor M.H.A.s and, three months later, the formation
of the Tasmanian Labor party.[4] As a reaction to what was
seen as a threat of socialism, Lewis founded the National
Association in April 1904. This association was formed to

1. _Launceston Examiner_, 31/10/93, 21/11/93, 25/11/93, 27/11/93,
    18/12/93.

2. _Launceston Examiner_, 5/2/03, _North-West Advocate_, 2/2/03.

3. _Launceston Examiner_, 30/1/03, 5/2/03, 6/3/03.

4. McRae, Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian
    Labor Party, p.24-5; _M._, 8/6/03.

oppose class and socialistic legislation - the two were always considered virtually synonymous - and 'to secure for our representatives in Parliament the exercise of their independent judgement, unhampered by any body of men'.[1] Designed according to its propaganda to represent the producing, manufacturing and trading interests of the state[2], it put forward the views of the conservative sections of the community who were worried by the dangers of socialism and it received donations from several Hobart businesses, including the Cascades Brewery.[3] It had no direct connection with the Evans cabinet although its candidates always supported his ministry. In 1906 Evans's election manifesto included a series of practical reforms such as aid to settlers, subsidies for road building, closer settlement and local government and generally promised to continue a policy of careful administration.[4] The National Association did not produce any specific platform and its endorsement was probably of little help to candidates, none of whom used the National Association label as though it was an electoral asset. Although it was reported that numerous branches had been formed, the members had no part to play in the affairs of the Association which were run by an oligarchic council. Its organization was ineffective. It stood for anti-socialism and did not put forward any constructive proposals, though had the Labor party been as socialistic as it pretended, it might have been forced to provide a more definite policy.

In 1907 a group, led by N.K. Ewing, tried to alter the image of the association by changing its name to the Progressive League,[5] by putting forward a series of planks which the League would support and by developing a new constitution which permitted branch participation in pre-selection.[6] A fulltime paid organizer went on tour and founded several

1. M., 19/4/04.

2. M., 2/2/05.

3. M., 19/12/05.

4. M., 26/2/05.

5. M., 14/1/07.

6. M., 7/5/07.

branches. However the introduction of ~~preferential~~ *proportional* voting
reduced the immediate necessity for party organization which
was to prevent seats being lost by split votes. The Pro-
gressive League still held pre-selection meetings but these
did no more than endorse candidates who had little in common
except their anti-socialism. The organization of the League
appeared to be based on a firm foundation of branches, but
in the election of 1909 it organized no meetings and produced
no comprehensive or generally accepted policy. Its name was
not used as an electoral asset by candidates. After the
election, it faded out of existence.

In 1909 the Farmers' and Stockowners' Association
examined the possibility of forming a new anti-socialist
party with strong roots in rural as well as urban areas.
It believed that earlier organizations had failed because
they were entirely centred on the cities.[1] On its initia-
tive, meetings in Hobart, Launceston and Longford[2] laid
the foundation of the Liberal League which was officially
organized in August when a constitution was adopted.[3] This
constitution introduced a state council, electorate commit-
tees and branches, with all members of the ruling body of
the League being elected from below. With the appointment
of three organizers[4] the League concentrated on creating
a firm branch network and by June 1910 over a hundred
branches had been formed.[5] In 1911 its first annual con-
ference included delegates from fifty-three branches.[6] The
League was not connected with the parliamentary Liberal
party by an official link although its first president was
the premier, Lewis. Several M.H.A.s held official party
positions and the conference in 1912 was addressed by the
new premier, Solomon. In the elections of 1912 and 1913
the League endorsed the sitting M.H.A.s without question,
although it denied that it desired to control the members in
any way. It was a distinct extra-parliamentary wing whose

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1. <u>M.</u>, 11/6/09
2. <u>M.</u>, 17/6/09.
3. <u>M.</u>, 5/8/09.
4. <u>M.</u>, 11/9/09.
5. <u>M.</u>, 29/6/10.
6. <u>M.</u>, 21/6/11.

main task was to support the parliamentary Liberal party electorally. Its policy was general and demanded progressive government, the maintenance of states' rights, the introduction of closer settlement and the defence of the Legislative Council.[1] As premier, Lewis produced in 1912 a manifesto which was similar in its general aims and suggested short-term objectives for a government. In 1912 its organization, based on an impressive network of branches, was permanent and efficient and by then it had reached a similar stage of organization as the Liberal and Reform Association five years earlier. In 1917 it also became absorbed into the Nationalist party.

The Labor Party

After the failure of various organizations in the 1890s,[2] three Labor M.H.A.s won West Coast seats in the 1903 election. Three months later a conference of branch and union delegates was held in Hobart and the Tasmanian Labor party was formed. One other M.H.A., J. Jensen of Georgetown, immediately joined the party. In 1906 the Labor party increased its numbers to seven, including one seat from each of Hobart and Launceston. Although numerically stronger than the official opposition, the Labor party still acted as the third party in the assembly.

In 1909 the Hare-Clark system gave Labor the opportunity of drawing support from areas in which a Labor candidate would have had no chance of success if single-member electorates had been maintained. The party increased its numbers to twelve in the election. In October 1909 the Earle government held office for one week and then in 1910 the Labor candidates won all the seats in the Federal Senate election. This success was repeated in 1912 when Labor increased its strength to fourteen and for a time the party considered an alliance with Cameron but then rejected his terms. By 1914 the party was strong enough to take office for an extended period with the assistance of an independent Liberal.

1. M., 26/3/12.

2. See McRae, Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian Labor party.

Comparison Between Tasmania and New South Wales

Comparison between the states can be drawn in five relevant respects: these are the geographical, the economic, the social, the numerical and the political. New South Wales was of course a far larger state, distances between towns were much greater and electorates covered wider areas. The demand for railways, roads and inland transport was inevitably much more urgent than it was in Tasmania where fewer new areas were being opened up for settlement during this period. Furthermore, because Tasmania was an island, it had more outlets for trade and exports and they were closer to the areas of production. Consequently the degree of centralisation in the two states differed. In New South Wales Sydney was the hub of the state's trade and railways radiated from the capital whose position of dominance was unchallenged by any country town. In Tasmania Hobart did not play the same central role; the northern and western regions of the island were centred on the ports of Launceston, Strahan and Burnie, did not depend on Hobart for trade and, because of its geographical isolation, often ignored it. Exports were sent direct to the mainland.

Secondly, the economies of the two states differed; New South Wales was, of course, a much richer state.[1] It depended on the wool clip for its exports and less on mineral production. Tasmania's main primary export was fruit and jam but the greatest wealth of the island came from its mines on the west coast. New South Wales was the more urbanised state with over 40% of its population living in the County of Cumberland while only 25% of the Tasmanian population lived in its two main towns. Yet despite the importance of the pastoralists for the economy of New South Wales, a comparison of the social situation in the two states

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1. In 1900/1 the gross public capital formation in New South Wales was £4,744,000; in Tasmania only £102,500 (or 2% of the New South Wales total). In 1906/7 the comparative figures were £3,285,000 for New South Wales and £219,000 for Tasmania. N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing, 1861-1938/9, Cambridge 1962, p.393,396.

illustrates that the landed gentry were more powerful in Tasmania. In New South Wales the power of the squattocracy had been weakened in the early years of self-government and, except in the Legislative Council, their influence was limited; in Tasmania the landed gentry still maintained considerable influence, particularly in the midlands. The growth of the industrial class in New South Wales and the spread of unionisation[1] meant that the Labor party had a firm base on which to build; in Tasmania unions were slow to develop in areas outside the west coast, they were often suspicious of intervention in politics and a Trades and Labor Council was not formed until 1909.[2] Pressure from the working class was less important in Tasmania than in New South Wales. In neither state did the middle classes have any formal organizational base on which to build or from which to challenge the power of the unions.

A fourth difference was political. In New South Wales the divisions between the major parties in the 1890s were over the tariff question which was responsible for drawing up the political battle lines; after this issue had become irrelevant, a socialist against anti-socialist division gradually emerged. In Tasmania there was no distinct policy difference between the parties before the anti-socialist credo gradually gained influence; the differences had previously been matters of personality.

The states differed considerably in population and this is reflected particularly in the number of electors in each electorate. In Table 1, the mean number of electors in each electorate has been calculated for each state and then the number in each Tasmanian electorate expressed as a percentage of those of New South Wales.

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1. I can not find any accurate or comparative figures for the number of employees unionised in either state in this period.

2. M.D. McRae, The Tasmanian Labor Party and Trade Unions, 1903-1923, T.H.R.A. Vol.5, No.1, October 1955, p.4-6.

Table 1

Mean Electors per Electorate in New South Wales

and Tasmania[1]

	No. of M.P.s		Mean Electors per Electorate		Tasmania as a % of N.S.W.
	N.S.W.	TAS.	N.S.W.	TAS.	
1893/4	125	36	2059	830[2]	40
1897/8	125	37	2416	819[2]	33
1900/1	125	38	2389	1026[2]	42
1903/4	90	35	7661[3]	1278	16
1906/7	90	35	8287	2543[3]	30
1909/10	90	30	9641	19157 (3192 per M.P.)	198 (33 per M.P.)
1912/13	90	30	11533	20703 (3450 per M.P.)	179 (29 per M.P.)

Within these figures there is a quite considerable range. For instance, in New South Wales in 1901 Willoughby had 4854 electors, while Wentworth only 1706: in 1907 Northumberland and Middle Harbour both had over 12000 voters on the roll while the Clyde and Darling had under 6000. In Tasmania there was a similarly wide variation; in 1900 Richmond and Glamorgan only had 360 enrolled electors while West Devon had 1877 and Zeehan 2957. In 1906 the largest electorate numerically was Central Hobart with 3290, the smallest Franklin with 2057 electors. In 1901 only the largest of Tasmanian electorates had as many voters as the smallest in New South Wales while in 1906 the largest Tasmanian constituency barely had half the least number of any New South Wales electorate.[4] In 1909 the introduction of the Hare-Clark system gave to each

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1. These figures have been calculated from figures in Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics p.428-440, p.592-600.

2. Since some electorates returned two or more members, calculations have been on a basis of a voter per M.P.

3. Women voted for the first time.

4. The New South Wales figures have been taken from notes made by Hughes and Graham for their book and now held in the Department of Political Science, R.S.S.S., A.N.U. The Tasmanian figures can be found in the Journals and Papers of Parliament, Statistics of Tasmania, 1901-1907.

of the five Tasmanian electorates approximately twice as
many electors as were contained in each single-member N.S.W.
constituency.

Some of the possible implications of these similarities
and differences can be mentioned. The importance of Sydney
as the hub of the state's trade created a country against
city rivalry which caused suspicion of the influence of
Sydney residents over the politics of the state. In Tasmania
there was rivalry between regions and particularly between
the north and south of the island. In both states one
result of this rivalry was a resistance in country areas
against city politicians and against any organizations
dominated by them. The middle classes had dominated the
politics of both states in the pre-party era without any
formal organizations; but they seldom had any extra-
parliamentary base on which to found their electoral and
parliamentary organizations. The Labor party, which developed
at a different period in the two states, always had trade
unions as a foundation for their movement. Obviously there
were differences in the size of population, in economic
development, in the influence of landowners and in the
electoral systems and these differences may have affected the
timing of party development; but nevertheless the structure
of the states was sufficiently similar for the middle classes
in both states to have access to similar resources with which
they could build their parties.

PART II   THE NON-LABOR PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT

Chapter 5

Some Non-Labor Attitudes to Party and Party Action

Introduction

Party organization is not essential for the functioning of parliament and the maintenance of a government and in the Australian states it did not develop until forty years after self-government. Governments could not, however, be maintained without some combination among members around which majorities could be built. In the early years the personal contacts of faction leaders were usually sufficient to maintain ministries; to-day ministries depend on party machinery for majorities and rely upon discipline, not personal contacts, in the house. The action is now collective rather than personal. The transitional stage of party development can be traced by examining the increasing influence of the party as a collective unit.

During the period of faction politics, most M.P.s spoke of themselves as independent and free to vote as they pleased, but many of them were not. Besides the firm followers of the faction leaders, many others were influenced, however weakly, by a faction leader. As party methods became more efficient, the independence of the M.P.s in parliament declined and their voting became more predictable on a widening range of ideological and pragmatic issues. The notion that a member should be independent was gradually displaced by the belief that he ought to be loyal to his party and to his leader and that the test of loyalty was to vote with his party. That is to say, the parties gradually gained control over basic resources, the votes of members, although their control was never entirely complete. The development of parties in parliament can be seen in their growing cohesion and discipline, in the appearance of a collective identity and in the declining independence of M.P.s.

Some Non-Labor Attitudes to the Role of Party

The emergence of the Labor party in New South Wales forced its opponents to re-state their views on what parties

should stand for and how they should operate. The Labor party was openly sectional in character and claimed a place in politics for itself as the representative of working class interests. It dogmatically regarded all other parties in similar sectional terms. Its organization, drawing heavily on trade union support, was relatively rigid and its tactics were believed to necessitate consistent solidarity. The Labor party's organization and tactics gave the non-Labor politicians an opportunity to explain what they took to be the role of party and to distinguish their own political methods from those of Labor and to its discredit. Even though their beliefs were often expressed implicitly in their condemnation of the Labor party and were perhaps little more than rhetoric, they were important not because they necessarily reflected party performance but because they created constraints within which the party had to develop its methods. For instance, the party could not openly adopt any disciplinary measures to secure solidarity in parliament if they encroached on the accepted independence of party members, even though this freedom may have been little more than theoretical.

In the first place, the non-Labor members accepted and believed that parties were composed of men who shared common principles and that they represented the people and not merely one class or section of society. Ashworth claimed that the role of party was

> to reconcile or average the real interests of
> all sections of the community, 1

and later he insisted

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1. T.R. Ashworth and H.P.C. Ashworth, <u>Proportional Repre-sentation applied to Party Government; a New Electoral System</u>, Melbourne 1900, p.12. T.R. Ashworth was President of the Freetrade and Liberal Association of Victoria. Though his views are not those of a politician from New South Wales or Tasmania, they do represent the most common beliefs of non-Labor politicians in those states and are quoted here as the most coherent available expression of those beliefs.

each representative must represent _all_ interests;
he must be elected on a definite policy as to
what is best for _all_ the people. If he is sent
in as the agent of one interest or one section
of the people, he ceases to be a representative
and becomes a delegate. 1

Parties were supposed to be based on principles, not
on interest, so that the good of the state, rather than the
advantage of individuals or a section of society, was always
the cause of party action. Burke's definition of party
was quoted to justify party activity.[2] On another occasion
Carruthers claimed

Party government is the best you can get; it is
government by principles which create parties.
Personal government is the worst a country can
have, it is full of corruption and intrigue. 3

Wise too argued that parties were bound together by
political principles, not by the influence of individuals,
and that party government was always for the good of the
whole state.[4] The non-Labor parties consistently claimed
to be non-sectional and to be based on common principles.

Non-Labor spokesmen regularly attacked the Labor
party because of its sectional base and insisted that
Labor M.P.s were delegates of the Labor movement which
laid 'immoral' restraints on the individual freedom of
M.P.s.[5] The prevention of free discussion and debate,
the coercion of members to vote against their conscience
on specific issues and the possibility that members might
be forced to act under instruction from an outside
'irresponsible' organization were all anathema to the early
non-Labor members. Even if the Parliamentary Labor party
seldom used its coercive powers or took directions from
the executive of the Labor Electoral League, the fact that
the constitution of the Labor party allowed such actions
was sufficient to horrify non-Labor members and to cause

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1. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation_, p.22, my italics.
   Also Storey, _NSWPD_ Series 2, Vol.10, p.253-255 and
   in Tasmania, _Solomon_, _M._, 26/6/12, for similar views.

2. e.g. Gilbert, _NSWPD_, Series 2, Vol.5, p.409.

3. _D.T._, 15/6/01. See also _NSWPD_ Series 2, Vol.2, p.125.

4. _NSWPD_ Series 1, Vol.93, pp.519-20.

5. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation_, pp.83-6, Solomon,
   _M._, 7/9/09.

them to contrast their freedom and independence with the
bondage of the Labor members. They claimed that they could
say what they pleased on any subject, that they were not
forced to vote against their conscience and that they
supported measures, not men.[1] In 1906, Colonel Ryrie, a
newly-elected Liberal member, boldly warned the government
during the address-in-reply debate that, if they did not
introduce progressive measures, he would cross the floor
and put them out of office.[2] McGowen, the Labor leader,
immediately retorted that such promises were often heard
but seldom believed and suggested that Ryrie had already
been 'roped in' by the Liberal party.[3] Indeed Ryrie's
comments were little more than the usual non-Labor claim
to independence which was a token gesture intended for
public consumption and only occasionally taken seriously,
when it was convenient.

Even the party leaders paid lip-service to the view
that party members had the freedom to vote as they liked.
Carruthers claimed

> that we do not ask for slavish support but adopt
> the true principles of party, viz. to respect
> the conscience of individual members, only asking
> for adherence to pledges on the great principles
> which constitute the bond of co-operation. 4

He argued that members should vote solidly with the party
on the basic issues, because belief in these matters was
the cause of their party membership, and that on other
matters the party made no demands. The idea that the
party should restrict the freedom of action of a member
was always denied. Members claimed that no pressure was
exerted on them before divisions and that they voted with
the party because its actions agreed with their principles.[5]
In Tasmania the Liberal League made the usual point that

1. W. Anderson, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.193; Jessep,
   NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.24, p.3187, Shipway, NSWPD,
   Series 1, Vol.73, p.1361.

2. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.22, p.28.

3. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.22, p.31-2.

4. D.T., 6/5/03.

5. Booth, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.141, Morton, NSWPD,
   Series 2, Vol.5, p.513-514.

the freedom of members to act independently was vital for
the success of parliamentary government and claimed that
membership of the League

> ...while implying a general agreement with its
> political principles does not take away any of
> the rights of speech and of action which should
> belong to all members of parliament. 1

At the same time non-Labor members insisted that they were
not the delegates of any organization and that each of
them was a general representative and was responsible only
to his electors.[2] The proposition that an M.P. should be
restricted in his actions by any formal organization which
came between him and his electors or that he should be
forced to accept party decisions was seen as an attempt

> to degrade the ... party to the level of the
> solidarity party. 3

The distinction between the formalised methods of the Labor
party and the informal procedures of the non-Labor parties
was considered very important even if there was really
little discernible difference between them.

   Much of this rhetoric was aimed at discrediting the
Labor party but it was still of some importance within
the non-Labor parties, even though the claims for freedom
of action by the non-Labor members may not have been
reflected in actual performance. Nevertheless attitudes
on the legitimate extent of party action are important
because of the effect they had on the shaping of parties.
While it is possible that these claims of indepndence
were useful to a member who was defending his defection
from a party on a specific issue and that they had no
other constructive effect, they did prevent the development
of party methods which formally restricted the member's
freedom of action or openly coerced him into voting with
the party. Widely-held views on the role of party were
therefore reflected in the formation of the organization,

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1. M., 3/7/11, see also M., 13/7/10, 14/2/12.

2. Levy, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.22, p.129, also Solomon,
     M., 7/9/09.

3. J. Ashton to P.H. Morton, 31/7/95, P.H. Morton Papers,
     Mitchell Library A3039. For similar views, see Rose,
     NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.213, Carruthers D.T.,14/10/02.

even if not in actual party performance. In parliament,
the need for co-operation was always accepted, but the
methods used to secure it had to remain within well-perceived
limits. Throughout the period, there was no change in the
views of the role of party in parliament, although there
was a considerable change in party performance.

The Roles of the Individual Member of Parliament

The M.P. was naturally far more than merely a party
member; he was also obliged to perform several other roles
which occasionally clashed with one another. Quite apart
from his vague claims of being a general representative
of all the people, each M.P. could also be the representative
of his local electorate, the spokesman of some sectional
interest or pressure group and a party member. Not all
members fulfilled each role or placed the same emphasis on
them. Nevertheless, the effect of these roles on party
allegiance and solidarity must be examined because they
presented problems for the party, which had to ensure that
it had some claim to a member's allegiance, and for the
member, who had to decide on priorities when roles conflicted.
This could happen when, for instance, a party measure had
an undesirable effect on a member's electorate.

In both states the M.P.'s role as representative of
his district was considered to be vital to the welfare of
the electorate. At a time when the central government was
responsible for the development of the state and for
building roads, bridges and railways, the M.P. was the main
channel through which local demands could be made and
replies from government departments relayed to the electors.[1]
With the lack of any effective local government in New South
Wales outside the municipalities before 1906, the M.L.A.
was the only person who could act at the central government
level for local interests. His work was electorally important[2]

1. This relationship between M.P. and constituency was
      made even closer in New South Wales in 1902 when
      the Minister of Works announced that all public works
      communications would be channeled through the local
      member whether he had originally presented them or
      not. D.T., 21/4/02.

2. See Chapter 10.

and filled much of his time. One member of the assembly
in New South Wales claimed he had to make two or three trips
each week to Sydney on constituency business, even when
the assembly was not sitting;[1] another claimed that he
spent most of his time in the Lands and Mines Department[2]
while a third said he received 1500 letters in his first
nine months as a member.[3] In Tasmania the smaller
electorates meant that the member had even closer connections
with his constituents and one member of the Lewis government
even resigned in 1909 to give himself greater freedom to
advocate the needs of his electorate.[4]

The demands of the electorates occasionally affected
the party allegiance and behaviour of some members,
particularly those who considered that the needs of their
electorate took precedence over broader party issues.
For instance, John Gillies, who represented Maitland
constituencies between 1891 and his death in 1911, frequently
changed parties with the intention of benefitting his
electorate. In 1891 he was elected as a freetrader but
gave support to the Dibbs government. When a bridge was
opened in his electorate, the Minister of Works stated it
had been obtained by the persistence of the local member.[5]
In 1894 Gillies campaigned as an independent freetrader
and then gave consistent support to the Reid government for
four years. He deserted Reid just before his defeat,
supported Lyne, See and Waddell and in 1904 campaigned as
a ministerialist. In 1907 he advocated fusion with the
Liberals and, when those proposals failed, followed Waddell
into the government ranks. His attitude to the relationship
between local problems and party allegiance is best
summarized by two comments he made in 1899. In general terms
he claimed

1. Gillies, _Maitland Mercury_, 20/6/01.

2. Richards, _D.T._, 22/5/01.

3. McIntyre, _D.T._, 20/4/02.

4. Hope resigned his position as Honorary Minister without
       portfolio, _M._, 27/10/09.

5. _S.M.H._, 23/5/94. For charges that he sold himself to
       Dibbs in exchange for local works, see _D.T._, 5/7/94.

> my ambition on entering Parliament was that
> ...I thoughtmy presence in the assembly would
> be conducive to the public good and particularly
> to the good of the people of West Maitland. 1

He also suggested that the surplus shown in Reid's
budgetary accounts was illusory because the Maitland
hospital had not received promised grants and then concluded

> that being so, I have no hesitation in saying
> that the policy of the government has not been
> in the best interest of the people. 2

By consistently equating Maitland's demands with the
national interest, Gillies was possibly unusual; but he
was by no means the only member whose party allegiance was
influenced by the requirements of his electorate. In
1905 R.H. Levien, a former protectionist, promised to give
the Liberal government consistent support, providing his
constituents were well-treated.[3] Dr. Andrew Ross, M.L.A.
for Molong, declared he was proud to be a 'roads and
bridges' member[4] and later deserted the See government
because his electorate had been neglected in the grants
for public works.[5] The fiscal issue had not prevented
Gillies from changing sides when he wished, but Ross and
Levien only deserted their party after the fiscal issue
was irrelevant and there was no major division of principle
between the two non-Labor parties. The influence of local
demands had varying effects on party allegiance and often,
of course, had none at all.

In Tasmania party allegiance could also be affected
by local demands particularly in the period before strong
parties were formed. The effect of local pressure on

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1. NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.100, p.1128.

2. NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.99, p.156.

3. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.362.

4. NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.93, p.224.

5. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, pp.439. Also in 1901 George
    Anderson, an endorsed Liberal, immediately supported
    See, presumably at least partly because of the
    advantages that this might bring to his electorate.

politicians' actions is best shown by the demands for a
West Coast railway in 1896 which divided the house on
north versus south, rather than on party lines. As a
direct railway link already existed between Zeehan and
Burnie, the northern members could see no justification
for an expensive and, to them, unnecessary line from
Hobart to Zeehan. Describing the scene, Henry Dumaresq
wrote

> The people down here [Hobart] have gone railway
> mad and now want a Railway to the West Coast
> which would never pay for the grease for the
> wheels. They now want to give a company 400
> square miles of mineral country as well as very
> valuable water rights which may be most
> valuable to the colony a few years hence.
> There is a great danger that many members may
> be induced to vote for granting these
> concessions just to please their constituents,
> especially the Hobart members. As the elections
> will soon be coming on, the Hobart members will
> vote for anything to please the Hobart populace
> who care very little for Tasmania in general
> but very much for Hobart in particular. However
> I hope the Country members will show their
> independence and common sense but unfortunately
> two of the four northern members live in Hobart
> and one of them owns a newspaper so that I am
> afraid he will vote for the Bill. 1

With small electorates the M.H.A.s had to remain in
close contact with their electorates and most, though not
all, voted on matters of roads and bridges according to
the local wishes. Even after 1909, when the Hare-Clark
system had drastically increased the size of the electorate,
regional demands within the electorates could on occasions
affect the votes of M.H.A.s.[2]

A second role which the M.P. sometimes played was

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1. Henry Dumaresq to Edward Dumaresq, 3/10/96. Dumaresq
   Papers, Mount Ireh, Longford.

2. In 1914 the Labor government was kept in office by a
   dissident Liberal who was dissatisfied with the
   Liberal government's failure to combat the potato
   blight which had devastated the farmers in the
   part of the electorate where he lived. M., 23/3/14.

that of spokesman in the house for pressure groups.[1]
Membership of external associations was accepted by
parliamentarians and certain members within the house were
often regarded as the leading spokesmen of sectional
interests in the community. Occasionally groups even
formed within a parliamentary party, such as the temperance
group which called a meeting in 1894 in an attempt to force
local option through the house.[2] In 1905 Carruthers called
Jessep the leader of the Temperance party in the assembly[3]
and thereby recognised the existence of a distinct group
within his party. Occasionally, as we shall see in chapter
seven, the connections of a member with an interest group
were of sufficient importance for him to threaten to oppose
the party on the specific issues which touched on the
interests of the group. At times therefore the party had to
compete with pressure groups in its attempts to control the
votes of members. Each of these roles of the M.P. could
clash with his duties as a party member. The development
of party can therefore be traced by considering how far M.P.s
regarded themselves primarily as party members rather than
local representatives or group spokesman.

The Difference Between Attitudes and Actions

There were two major constraints to the development of
the party machinery and its control over the votes of members.
Firstly, party members refused to accept formal or
organizational procedures which restricted their freedom of
action or speech because, as they said, they were responsible
only to the electorate whose interests they served, and not
to any party. Secondly, each member in both states had to
fulfil several roles which were always in addition to and
occasionally contradictory to their activities as a party
member.

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1. For a discussion of the sub-groupings within the party,
   see chapter 7 and for a discussion of party and group
   interaction, see chapter 11. Here I only intend to
   point out the possibly contradictory position of the
   M.P. in his differing roles as group spokesman and
   party member.

2. S.M.H., 27/8/94, 23/10/94.

3. D.T., 4/9/05

In fact neither kind of constraint was a serious barrier to party solidarity because of the difference between the public attitudes of members and their actions. To understand how a party developed, we must examine not what the M.P.s claimed was true of their behaviour but how they actually reacted to particular situations, how party machinery was developed within the constraints created by their public attitudes and different duties and how the party began to develop a collective identity.

In order to examine the development and change in party actions, I will concentrate on three areas. First I will calculate the solidarity of the parties in divisions throughout the period in both states to show which parties were solid, on what occasions and how this cohesion may have changed over time. This analysis will show how far the party control over the actual votes cast may have increased and will be based on both documentary evidence and evidence from an analysis of division lists. With the latter source it is possible to fill gaps where the documentary evidence, always thin, tells us nothing.

Secondly, I will examine the methods used to maintain party unity and examine the growth of the party as a collective entity and as it became clearly identified with ministries, political decision-making and strategy. Thirdly I will consider the internal structure of the parties by identifying, wherever possible, groups within the party and by examining the causes of intra-party dissent. In this section I will trace the gradual disappearance of intra-party groups as openly separate units and their incorporation in the umbrella-like identity of the party.

Two basic methods will be used for analysing divisions. In calculating the solidarity of parties, I will use the Rice Index of Cohesion (R.I.C.) and the Index of Party Likeness (I.P.L.).[1] Using the former method, the cohesion

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1. For a full description of the methods of voting analysis see Appendix C. The basic reference for these methods is L.F. Anderson et al. Legislative Roll Call Analysis, Evanston, Illinois, 1966. For use of the method, see P. Loveday, 'Support in Return for Concessions', Historical Studies, Vol.14, No.55, October 1970.

of a party is assessed so that, when it votes solidly, its
R.I.C. is 1.00 and, when it is evenly divided, its R.I.C.
is 0.0. The indices have been calculated for each
party in each division. An R.I.C. of 0.80, for instance,
indicates that nine-tenths of the party are voting together,
with one-tenth voting with the opposition. The I.P.L. is
a measure of the similarity in the voting of two parties
in a particular division. An I.P.L. of 1.00 usually indi-
cates that both parties were voting solidly and together
while an I.P.L. of 0.0 means the two were totally opposed.[1]
The means of both indices may also be calculated.

The internal structure of the party will be examined
by a cluster analysis[2] which compares the voting of each
member of the house with that of every other member. The
process shows which members of the party generally voted
together and which members were opposed to one another.
The purpose of this method of analysis is to discover if
any groups existed within the party.

It must be re-emphasised here that conclusions from
these analyses of divisions will be coupled with documentary
sources before any final comments are made. I do not
suggest that these analyses can replace primary evidence
as a means of interpretation, but rather that they provide
some data on political behaviour which cannot be obtained
from the rather scanty primary evidence and which can show
what a party actually did, rather than what it claimed it
was doing. An analysis of divisions can strip away some
of the rhetoric and self-deceiving myths with which the
non-Labor members often surrouneded themselves.

To employ these methods two basic difficulties must
first be examined before the analysis is begun. The first
is that of party identification. Before parties became

1. The formula for calculating I.P.L.s is such that when
    two parties are evenly divided, an I.P.L. of 1.00 is
    obtained. The R.I.C.s can be used to distinguish
    these cases from the occasions when both parties are
    solid.

2. See Appendix C; for use of this method, see also D.B.
    Truman, The Congressional Party; a Case Study, New
    York 1959, and P. Loveday, 'Grouping M.P.s', Politics,
    Vol.5, No.2, November 1970.

strictly defined, the allegiance of some members was often doubtful; they were elected as 'independent' freetraders, protectionists or Liberals and claimed that they were only partly aligned with the various parties. Since their party membership may be only nominal, the question arises whether they should be included in the calculations because, in order to estimate the R.I.C. of a party, we must know who belonged to that party. Since it is preferable for a comprehensive study of party development to include all possible M.P.s, I have decided to accept the figures of Hughes and Graham[1] and count all those classed as, say, freetrader or independent freetrader as members of the freetrade party and later in the process to exclude those who subsequently left the party. The distinction between freetraders and independent freetraders is not always satisfactory or clear[2] but to attempt to re-define elected members would be to replace one subjective judgement with another. The classifications of Hughes and Graham were therefore used for the analysis of all but one session in New South Wales. In 1903 a considerable re-shuffling of parties had occurred and the original alignments of 1901 were almost meaningless. I therefore re-defined the parties for calculations in that session by calling 'Liberal' any member who sought or considered Liberal and Reform Association endorsement in the election of 1904 and 'Ministerialist' anyone who contested that election under that title or was generally recognised as a supporter of the See government.[3] Calculations which appear for 1903 alone in the thesis are made with these new alignments. In Tasmania the fluidity of party membership created particular problems. The change of party by various members in the 1903-6 parliament was so regular that I have assessed

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1. Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics.

2. For instance, in 1894 the Freetrade Council deliberately made no selection in two suburban electorates because it considered them to be safe and was prepared to accept either of two freetrade candidates. Yet, by the criterion of Hughes and Graham, the refusal of the Freetrade Council to make an explicit endorsement meant that the successful freetraders in both seats were classed as 'independent' freetraders.

3. For new alignments, see Appendix A.

government strength by examining the support granted the administration on specific issues. After 1906 I have generally ignored the opposition which split badly directly after the election and based my calculations on the behaviour of the ministerial party as defined by Hughes and Graham. R.I.C.s for Tasmanian parties have been calculated only for the period after 1906.

The second problem is caused by the differing importance of divisions. At this distance in time it is impossible to rate divisions in terms of importance, although contemporaries clearly did not regard all divisions as equally significant.[1] Since a party's view of a division may not be related to its apparent importance[2] nor accepted by the other parties, we can not divide divisions into important and trivial or into party and non-party divisions by a retrospective consideration of their subject matter, although it would be reasonable to suggest that divisions on pieces of government legislation are likely to be more important than a series of gags moved on minor issues.[3] Any categorisation of divisions must to some extent be artificial but it is necessary if a censure motion is not to be given equal weight with comparatively unimportant measures.[4]

1. i.e. T.H. Griffith, Albury Banner, 21/6/01; O'Sullivan, Goulburn Evening Post, 20/1/98; Fleming NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.5, p.348.

2. P. Loveday, Support in Return for Concessions, p.399. The problem does not exist for consideration of the House of Commons because the government whips consistently acted as tellers whenever they required the party to vote for a measure. It is therefore possible to separate divisions into whip and non-whip categories, regardless of the actual reason for the divisions. See H. Berrington, 'Partisanship and Dissidence in the Nineteenth Century House of Commons', Parliamentary Affairs Vol.21, No.4, August 1968, p.342; also S.H. Beer, Modern British Politics, London 1965, pp.256-7, 261-3. In Australian parliaments, the whips seldom acted as tellers, so such distinctions cannot be made.

3. For instance, Levy was once gagged ten times in the house and twelve times in committee during the course of one evening. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.6, p.1274-1287.

4. G.N. Hawker, (The Parliament of New South Wales, 1856-1965, Sydney, 1971, p.67,) bases conclusions about ministries' control of the house on calculations which include all divisions. He assumes that, however important or trivial the subject matter, the ministry wanted to win every division. This would seem to me an unwarranted assumption if the views about parties in the 1890s are considered.

One method of meeting this difficulty is to consider all divisions but to separate them into categories. I have sorted them into six categories - divisions on censure motions, on government bills, on all other motions moved by ministers, and on motions moved respectively by opposition members, by Labor members and by government backbenchers. This sub-division separates two categories which would appear to be important for party control - censure motions and divisions on government bills - from those in which party control was probably not at stake. These will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. I do not suggest that party voting occurred only in these divisions but merely that party control of divisions was particularly likely in these cases and its increase or decline can be traced by an examination of them.

In the following chapter I will therefore consider the solidarity of parties and analyse the changing methods used to maintain or increase control of members. In chapter seven I will analyse the internal structure or parties and see whether the influence of interest groups declined as the party developed a more distinct collective identity.

Chapter 6

The Growth of Party Solidarity and Identity

Introduction

Party solidarity can be defined as a compound of cohesion and attendance. If a party did not vote solidly, it could not win divisions or, if it was in a minority, effectively challenge the actions or measures of the government. If party members did not attend divisions in the house, then the party could not successfully win divisions even though it was voting solidly. In modern parliamentary politics, parties have developed machinery and established precedents to ensure that their members maintain a high level of cohesion whatever the political situation and however large their majority may be. These methods only gradually emerged. In studying the early development of parties we must therefore ask whether the solidarity of parties changed and whether the methods used by the party became more accepted and formalised over a period of time.

The Solidarity of the Parties in the New South Wales Parliament

In both states I will concentrate on the two categories of divisions, censure motions and government bills, where party action can be expected. First I will report the solidarity of the parties in these divisions; then I will analyse the results and explain the situations which created them. When I have shown how the parties actually behaved, I will consider the methods used to maintain this behaviour.

First, then the censure motions. In Table I the mean R.I.C.s and mean absenteeism rates of the parties in New South Wales are reported.(See overleaf, page 95).

The divisions in the Freetrade party in 1894-5 were caused by the revolt of Parkes and his two personal friends and the defection of H.H. Brown, a convert to protection.[1] Over fifty freetraders remained loyal to the party and its R.I.C. was always over 0.80 and on two occasions 1.00. On the first three censure motions in 1898 John Gillies, a

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1. P.M. Weller, Disciplined Party Voting: A Labor Innovation? Labour History, No.21, November 1971, p.20.

TABLE I: Censure Motions in New South Wales:

Mean R.I.C. and Absentee Rates of Parties[1]

(Government Party underlined)

Parliament	No. of Divisions	Mean R.I.C.			Mean Absentee Rate		
		Fr.Trade	Prot.	Labor	Fr.Trade	Prot.	Labor
1894-5	5	.91	.88	1.00	.21	.35	.15
1898-9	7	.78	.84	1.00	.09	.11	.02
1901-2	3	.82	.94	1.00	.23	.13	.19
1903	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	.19	.18	.15
1904-7	6	1.00	.63	1.00	.08	.45	.09

Reidite who had declared his belief in protection,[2] deserted the party, but its R.I.C.s remained above 0.90. Then in 1899 the party was decisively divided over the issue of federation when the "party of revenge", led by Haynes and Fegan, condemned Reid for his support of an undemocratic constitution and voted against the government on four divisions in September 1899. The R.I.C. of the party fell to 0.54 and this split explains the low mean cohesion for the freetraders in 1898-9. In 1901 some endorsed Liberals, of whom the most notable was George Anderson,[3] immediately announced their intention of supporting See and voted with him on censure motions with a resulting R.I.C. for the party of 0.80. Under Carruthers the party cohesion increased and, despite some tensions, the party voted solidly behind the Liberal government after 1904; none of those who voted with the party in the first censure motion of 1901 subsequently deserted it.

Before 1904 the cohesion of the protectionists did not differ much from that of the freetraders. In the 1894-5 session the party voted solidly on the censure motions moved by the party leaders, but were divided in votes on two amendments to the censure motions which were moved by

1. There were no divisions on censure motions against the Lyne government.

2. Maitland Mercury, 15/7/98.

3. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.I, p.279-82.

backbenchers.[1] In other words, on the most essential
divisions they remained solid. On the first three censure
motions in 1898 the party voted together except for Meagher,
an independent protectionist who had proudly announced that
he did not owe allegiance to any party[2] and who supported
Reid because he believed him to be sincere in his attempts
to achieve federation. In November, 1898, Reid continued
his strategy of raising the fiscal issue at every opportunity
and attempted to split the opposition coalition of federalists
and protectionists[3] by promising to maintain a sugar duty in
his budget. This move forced the M.L.A.s from the sugar
growing electorates to choose between allegiance to their
party, whose leader had moved a censure motion condemning
the government's financial proposals, and their electorates,
who wanted a continuation of a sugar tariff for protective
reasons. Six protectionists supported the government and
the R.I.C. of the party fell to 0.65.[4] In 1899 some members
objected to Lyne's promise to drop the fiscal issue and
refused to oppose Reid in the censure on the Neild affair.[5]
In these divisions the R.I.C. of the party was 0.78. In
1901 the party was at first solid but gradually lost support,
particularly on the censure motion on the Friedmann affair.
After 1904 it disintegrated and on only one occasion out of
six was it solid in the parliament of 1904 to 1907.

On censure motions the Labor party remained solid
throughout while splits did occur in the non-Labor parties.
However these splits occurred almost entirely between 1898
and 1902 when the parties were in a state of re-definition
after the removal of the tariff issue to federal politics

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1. In March 1895 O'Sullivan tried to focus Dibbs's general
    censure motion on the unemployment problem; in May,
    Schey, unhappy about the alliance with the freetrader
    Parkes, tried to add a demand for a fiscal referendum
    to the Parkes censure motion. In the first division
    the protectionist R.I.C. was 0.56, in the second 0.84.

2. NSWPD, Series I, Vol.93, p.90.

3. B.R. Wise to Sir James Walter 10/1/99. Walter Papers,
    Mitchell Library, ML. MSS. 724.

4. Ewing, McFarlane, Pyers, Perry, Meagher, Stevenson.
    All were members of North Coast electorates where
    sugar was the main product.

5. Ewing, Copeland, T.H. Griffith. For details of the Neild
    and Friedmann affairs, see above chapter 3.

and when there was no major difference of policy between
the two non-Labor parties. Even then it is noticeable
that the cohesion of the parties seldom fell below an R.I.C.
of 0.80; that is to say, nine-tenths of the party were
still consistently voting together.

Generally censure motions have received most of the
attention of historians and political scientists discussing
party discipline. Important historical events, such as
the fall of Reid in 1899, are studied in detail while the
actions of members on the basic humdrum matters such as
government bills - business which in fact takes up most
of the time of the house - are largely ignored.[1] Yet a
government must not only administer; it must also legislate,
and to some extent try to transform a party's ideas and
electoral promises into law. In the long run its legislation
is far more important than the result of censure motions,
unless the latter happen to result in the resignation of
a ministry. Therefore the behaviour of members and the
steady conformity of party followers in divisions on
government legislation deserve greater attention than they
have so far received; it is here that the real test of
party control over members occurs. If a party intends to
pass its legislation, it must be able to maintain throughout
the session a level of cohesion sufficient to win the
necessary divisions. I do not suggest that all government
legislation is crucial or that defeat of the occasional bill
would mean that a ministry had to resign; but no ministry
could afford to lose so many divisions that its competence
and control of the house were called into question. Since
it is impossible to determine accurately at this distance
of time which bills were the most important, I have included
in the analysis all divisions on government bills.[2]

The mean R.I.C. of parties in the divisions on government
bills was calculated for each parliament with the results
shown in Table II.

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1. See Berrington, Partisanship and Dissidence, p.339.

2. I have included as divisions on government bills all
   those votes on motions to recommit or amend bills or
   to gag debates, besides the various readings of the
   bills.

TABLE II: Mean R.I.C. of parties in divisions on government
             bills arranged by parliament with the government
             party underlined.

Parliament	No. of Divisions	Freetrade	Protectionist	Labor
1894-5	28	.95	.74	.88
1898-9	16	.77	.58	.68
1899-1900	33	.42	.75	.71
1901-2	65	.60	.85	.69
1903	23	.78	.91	.86
1904-7	60	.91	.50	.76

In 1894-5 the R.I.C.s of the freetraders in divisions
on government bills ranged from 0.68 to 1.00 and in 1898-9
from 0.55 to 0.94. In the same periods the protectionists'
scores ranged from 0.0 to 1.00; that is, from being evenly
divided to being solid. Between 1899 and 1903 the range of
scores for both non-Labor parties ranged from near 0.0 to
1.00. In the parliament which opened in 1904, the Liberal
party supporting the Carruthers government had scores ranging
from 0.42 to 1.00 on government bills.

The government party was the party with the highest
mean R.I.C. in every parliament. Before 1904 the Labor
party, which until that date was always in the position
of giving support to the government, has the second highest
figure while the opposition was always the least cohesive
party. After 1904 the Progressive party did not hold the
balance of power and therefore, if the other parties voted
solidly, it was too small to be of any significant influence
on the results of divisions and, anyway, it was usually
badly divided.

In order to refine the figuresin Table II, we can also
consider the number of occasions on which a party voted
solidly or was divided on divisions on government bills.
To do this we must decide arbitrarily at what level a party
can be described as solid. Since, as was evident in the
previous chapter, the philosophy of the non-Labor parties
was inhospitable to demands for complete solidarity and
allowed members to vote against the party for personal or
local reasons, it would be false to demand total solidarity,

particularly as party identification is sometimes vague. Therefore I have decided to follow the example of Lowell and Berrington and to call a party 'solid' if nine-tenths of the party members present voted together;[1] that is to say, a solid party is one which has an R.I.C. of over .80. Following this criterion, the percentage of divisions in which a party voted solidly are reported in Table III.

TABLE III: Percentage of Divisions on Government Bills on which the Parties voted solidly - Government Party underlined.

Parliament	No. of Divisions	Divisions on Government Bills as % of all Divisions	Free-trade	Protect-ionist	Labor
1894-5	28	25	96	64	82
1898-9	16	20	50	25	44
1899-1900	33	35	12	45	36
1901-2	65	40	31	74	49
1903	23	29	74	87	74
1904-7	60	41	90	22	58

This table reinforces the conclusions drawn from Table II and suggests three things which sould be explained. In the first place, the government party was always solid more often than any other party. Secondly, the solidarity of all parties was clearly inter-dependent; whenever the opposition was badly divided and failed to vote solidly, the cohesion of both the government party and of Labor declined; when the opposition consistently voted solidly, the cohesion of the government party increased. The effect of inter-party competition on party development must therefore be examined. Thirdly, the cohesion of all parties drastically declined between 1898 and 1902 before it increased after 1903. This fluctuation can be partly explained by an examination of the type of bills on which divisions were fought to see what light this may throw on party development.

The greater consistency of the government party can

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1. A.L. Lowell, The Government of England, 2 vols. New York, 1921, Vol.2, p.75-6; Berrington, Partisanship and Dissidence, p.340.

be explained by the fact that a majority was needed to keep the ministry in office and that the government was inevitably implementing a programme for which it demanded support from its own members. The opposition, on the other hand, may not have been concerned as a party with some of the particular issues. Writing of the House of Commons in the nineteenth century, Berrington suggested this difference between the government and opposition parties:

> 'the obligation to initiate, and to lead, which rested on the government was not paralleled, to the same degree, by the duty of the official Opposition to criticize or to check. The government as the body responsible for day to day administration could not abdicate its duty to give a lead to the House on the issues which came before it. Often in declaring its position and putting on the whips the government was acting, not as the leadership of a party, but as the heads of executive departments. Party support was transformed into support for executive decisions often lying far outside the scope of normal party controversy, decisions which were tangential to the philosophies and interests of the two parties; to this extent, the government's backbench following was changed from a political party into an administrative party.'   1

Later he pointed out that the government inevitably had a line of action to enforce but that the opposition need not have taken a stand on particular measures unless it wanted to.

His comments could be applied to Tasmania and New South Wales at this time. The government usually tried to gain party support for its measures while the opposition was often prepared to allow its members a free vote and as a result was more often divided in all parliaments. Legislation was often non-controversial but still caused opposition from small groups within the house. Because the government's actions were 'constructive' and internal divisions might mean the loss of some piece of legislation, its party had to maintain a solid front in case the opposition challenged them. As a result the government party maintained

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1.   Berrington, Partisanship and Dissidence, p.367.

solidarity more consistently than its opponents.

The state of party competition also clearly affected the solidarity of the government party. As Lowell pointed out-

> 'no party can be maintained in fighting
> discipline unless it has another party
> to combat, strong enough to be a serious
> menace to its tenure of power.' 1

As a comparison of Tables III and IV shows, the cohesion of the government parties on divisions on government bills was highest at the time when party competition was most sharp.

TABLE IV: The State of Inter-party Competition : the number of divisions of all types in which the three parties either supported or opposed one another where 'opposed' means that the parties compared had an I.P.L. of less than .20 and 'support' means that they had an I.P.L. of more than .90 - in every case both parties being compared having an R.I.C. of over .80:

Parliament	Total No. of Divisions	Opposed			Support		
		F.T./ Labor	Labor/ Prot.	F.T./ Prot.	F.T./ Labor	Labor/ Prot.	F.T./ Prot.
1894-5	112	2	26	24	35	1	1
1898-9	80	-	6	3	21	4	3
1899-1900	93	1	-	-	2	1	4
1901-2	161	20	1	21	3	34	10
1903	78	40	-	40	1	48	2
1904-7	148	63	6	6	1	10	20

Party competition was high in 1894-5 when on twenty-four occasions the protectionists were opposed by two solid parties, in 1903 when the Liberals were opposed by the combined strength of the other two parties on thirty-six divisions and in 1904-7 when the Liberal government was fairly often opposed by the solid Labor party. Between 1898 and 1902, parties were opposed to one another less frequently.

Before 1904 the Labor party always supported the government more consistently than the opposition party opposed it. In

1. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol.2, p.83.

1898 it consistently voted with the Freetrade party, even
though the Protectionist party was not regularly challenging
the government. It was only in the 1899-1900 period when
Lyne was premier that the Labor party seldom voted solidly
with the government; during this period, the opposition and
the government never opposed each other. In other words,
it seems likely that the cohesion of all parties declined
as the extent of party competition fell. When the opposition
began to challenge the government again towards the end of
1902, the government and labor parties once again voted con-
sistently together, as the figures for 1903 illustrate. A
divided opposition released the government from the necessity
of maintaining control over its votes, although it usually
had the capacity to exert influence if threatened. The
differing extent of party competition is, then, part of an
explanation of party cohesion. How then can we explain
this change in the extent of party competition?

Party competition was highest when the non-Labor parties
were divided by distinct principles or interests or when a
single non-Labor party was opposing the Labor party and its
allies. When there was no recognized cleavage between the
parties, a lack of disciplined voting in both parties followed.
In 1894-5 most (19 out of 28) of the divisions on government
bills were concerned with the fiscal issue and its corollary,
the introduction of direct land and income taxes. The two
non-Labor parties had opposing views on these important
questions. The result was a high degree of party competition
in these divisions. On other legislation, such as local
government, the parties were given free votes. In 1898-9,
fourteen of the sixteen government bills on which divisions
were held concerned public works - matters which may have
been regionally important but on which the parties, and
particularly the opposition, did not vote solidly. Between
1899 and 1902 the situation changed; inter-party competition
and party cohesion fell dramatically because all the parties
had been divided over federation, because the transference
of the tariff to the federal parliament had removed the main
difference between the two non-Labor parties and because
neither non-Labor party had yet found a new role. The
legislation in these years was concerned with such matters

as the Sydney corporation, the harbour trust, old age
pensions, women's suffrage and the settlement of lands in
the western districts. These were not issues on which the
parties as units were divided; as the opposition seldom
voted solidly, the members of the government party, which
itself was not always united on these matters, were similarly
allowed to judge each piece of legislation on its merits.
The low cohesion and lack of competition can be explained
partly by the failure of either party to find a new role
and partly by the lack of unity within the opposition.
Noticeably, when Carruthers became leader of the opposition
and when its unity improved, the government's and the Labor
party's cohesion also dramatically increased.

Carruthers re-vitalised the opposition by leading an
anti-socialist crusade. In 1903 he warned that 'there
will be a trial of strength from start to finish'[1] and
attacked most of the government's legislation, not only
because of the possible inherent failings of the bills,
but also because the Progressive ministry was seen as a
front for the Labor party and consequently was made the
butt of the anti-socialist attacks. After 1904 the Liberal
government received solid support from its party on a wide
range of issues, from the introduction of local government,
local option and closer settlement, which had been part of
the party policy, to less obviously important issues such
as the sale of Centenary Park and the assessment of Sydney
harbour rates. The difference between this parliament and
earlier ones was that, while in 1894-5 the party had been
united on a specific issue - the tariff question - and
its ramifications, by 1904 the party followed a general
anti-socialist doctrine and the Liberal government was seen
as a bulwark against the introduction of socialism. Since
the Labor party, which was accepted by many Liberals as
the personification of socialism, attacked many of these
measures, the Liberal members usually supported them,
regardless of their apparent importance. On most occasions,
of course, they approved of the government measures, but
nevertheless the broad threat of socialism ensured that the

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1. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.60.

party now voted solidly on a greater range of issues. The new role for the party brought greater cohesion and more inter-party competition to the parliament.

Defeat in a division could also follow if absenteeism was too high or uncontrollable. A party therefore had to maintain an attendance rate at least high enough to win divisions and this requirement usually demanded at least as high an attendance rate as the other parties had. In Table I absentee rates in censure motions are reported. The mean absentee rates in divisions on government bills are set out in Table V.

TABLE V: Mean Absentee Rates of Parties in Divisions on Government Bills arranged by Parliaments. Government Party Underlined.

	No. of Divisions	Freetrade	Protectionist	Labor
1894-5	28	.40	.47	.34
1898-9	16	.42	.57	.37
1899-1900	33	.60	.55	.47
1901-2	65	.49	.46	.42
1903	23	.39	.34	.33
1904-7	60	.36	.56	.36

In the early parliaments the Labor party appears to have a lower absentee rate than the other parties - a point which Black claims as an illustration of the greater dedication of Labor members.[1] However the figures in this table are slightly deceptive because pairs were not reported in the official parliamentary papers and only occasionally in newspapers. From the few instances in which pairs are reported in the press, it is apparent that, although pairs were officially arranged by the parties,[2] the Labor party

1. Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales, p.10.

2. In 1898 Reid wrote to E.M. Clark requesting him not to consider pairing with the opposition since the latter were only granting pairs to suit their own convenience. Reid to Clark, 20/9/98. E.M. Clark Papers, Mitchell Library, Uncat. MSS. 298.

seldom provided them.[1] The absentee rates of those parties
which did provide pairs are therefore higher in Table V
than they would be if those who paired were considered to
have voted.

In the censure motions the attendance rates of all
parties were fairly high and the addition of pairs usually
accounts for all but two or three members. Because of the
wide attention which such motions received, we know that
parties always attempted to ensure the presence of almost
all members on these occasions. On government bills, the
difference between parties was not large, although the
opposition always had the lowest rate of attendance and
the government party usually maintained an attendance rate
sufficiently high to ensure the winning of divisions.
Absenteeism, like cohesion, was clearly partly dependent on
the behaviour of the opposition. If it was divided, the
government had no need to demand strict discipline from its
supporters.

Two facts of particular interest have been shown by
this examination of party solidarity. Firstly all parties
varied in solidarity, not just the non-Labor parties.
Whatever the other effects of the Labor party's new methods
of caucus and discipline, the party did not in fact secure
higher cohesion from its members than the non-Labor parties.

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1. The Daily Telegraph occasionally reported pairs and
     division lists. From this evidence I have compiled
     a table of pairs provided on some government bills
     and censure motions. Although the number of occasions
     is limited, the lack of Labor participation in the
     practice is obvious.

     Occasions on which pairs were provided: arranged by
          Parliaments.

Parliament	No. of Divisions	Freetrade	Protect.	Labor
1894-5	7	66	66	-
1898-9	5	21	27	5
1901-3	8	56	44	12
1904-7	8	30	24	18

Although the parties used substantially different methods,
the results were similar. There are, of course, some occasions
where the non-Labor party failed to maintain solidarity,
such as the Protectionist division over the financial censure
debate in November 1898 and the Neild censure of 1899, but
generally, on a wide range of issues, there is little
difference between the results of the analysis for the
various parties. Secondly, the parties began to vote
cohesively on a broader range of topics. Whereas at first
solidarity was primarily obtained in those divisions on
matters that were connected with the central principle
which had brought the parties together, later it occurred
on a much wider scope of subjects as the vaguer anti-socialist
raison d'etre of the party's existence was accepted. At the
same time the solidarity of all parties in the house depended
to some extent on the ability of the opposition to produce
a united party which could challenge the government. These
conclusions from an analysis of the actual behaviour of
parties demand a study of the methods which parties developed
to secure discipline when it was required on an increasingly
broad range of subjects.

Solidarity in the Tasmanian Parliament

The solidarity of parliamentary groupings is more
difficult to estimate in Tasmania because of the difficulty
of defining the groups and identifying their members in
the absence of recognized party affiliations and because of
the frequency with which members crossed the floor. Since
directly comparable figures are liable to be misleading in
the early parliaments if they are based on any assessment
of party alignment, I have calculated the degree of support
given to the administration as an indication of governmental
strength. Between April 1894 and 1909 only one ministry,
Braddon's in 1899, was defeated in a censure motion in the
House of Assembly. Generally the governments were able to
maintain safe majorities on censure motions - the opposition
never mustered more than ten votes between 1903-5 or more
than eleven between 1906-8 in a house of thirty-five members.
All censure motions after 1909, except those in September
and October of that year, were fought on direct party lines.

In divisions on government bills the administration
was occasionally defeated but usually managed to maintain
a safe majority as is indicated in Table VI.

TABLE VI: Divisions on Government bills, expressed as a
percentage of all divisions on government bills
during that session and arranged according to
the percentage of those present who voted for
the administration.

Parliament	No. of Divisions included	Over 80%	70-80%	60-70%	50-60%	Under 50%
1894-7	30	3	20	30	30	17
1903-4	19	5	11	21	47	16
1904-5	8	37	13	-	13	37
1906-8	27	7	14	33	29	14
Total in all Parliaments	84	8	15	26	32	19

In eighty-four divisions on government bills, the
ministry was defeated fifteen times and only one of these,
the defeat of Dobson's land tax in 1894, brought about the
resignation of a ministry. In 1903 two of Propsting's
radical measures failed to pass the house[1] but he gained a
majority on the remainder; the only important defeat of
the Evans government was on a worker's compensation bill.
Yet between 1906 and 1908 those categorized by Hughes and
Graham as ministerialists had an R.I.C. on divisions on
government bills of only 0.51 while the Labor party had
an R.I.C. of 0.93. The point was that the ministerial
party could remain divided on many issues because it gained
so much support both from independents and from those
nominally defined as oppositionists (whose R.I.C. in these
divisions was 0.33) that it was seldom in danger of defeat
from a six-man Labor party and those members of its own
party who did defect. The type of majority gained by the
government in Tasmania before 1909 was similar to that of
New South Wales between 1899 and 1901; as long as a
majority was obtained, it did not matter who voted for the
measures. Because the opposition was not a threat to the
stability or security of the government, strong discipline

1. An arbitration bill and an occupancy rates bill.

within the ministerial party was not required. After 1909, when the Labor party increased in size, the cohesion of the Liberals improved. In seventeen divisions on government bills, the Labor party was solid (i.e. an R.I.C. of over 0.80) on eleven and the Liberals on seven. The parties were directly opposed to one another on legislation regarding taxation, local government, railway management and public meetings; the Labor party was also solid on bills concerning the establishment of wages boards. In 1912 when the parties had almost equal numbers and the Liberals often had to rely on the casting vote of the Speaker,[1] Liberal cohesion increased dramatically and the party had an R.I.C. of 1.00 on twenty out of twenty-six divisions, with its R.I.C. falling below 0.80 only twice. The Labor party was solid on eighteen occasions, but its R.I.C. fell below 0.80 on all others.

Between 1906 and 1908 the mean absentee rate on government bills was identical for all parties (0.25) while between 1909 and 1911 the Liberal absentee rate (0.25), was higher than that of Labor (0.15). Nevertheless, with a substantial majority of five in a house of thirty members, this lower attendance did not often place the party in danger of defeat.

As in New South Wales, the government parties usually managed to enforce discipline from their supporters when it was important and necessary. In the early years, support could be gained from all sides of the house to ensure that government legislation was passed and strict discipline was not required. When the party came under a more consistent attack after 1909, cohesion improved. The methods of the party still were not those of Labor, but the effect was similar. Party discipline was now achieved at a higher level and on a broader range of topics than occurred earlier. Party methods must therefore be examined for both states because in both of them the behaviour of the developing parties followed similar lines.

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1. On eleven of the twenty-six divisions held during the parliament.

Methods of Maintaining Discipline in the non-Labor Parties

The non-Labor parties relied primarily on informal methods and personal contacts to maintain party discipline, rather than on the heavily regulated procedures of the Labor party. Since individual M.P.s claimed to be free agents who could not be coerced into voting along the party line, party machinery had to be developed which could control the member to some extent without undermining his apparent freedom or unduly restricting his activities as a local member. Patronage, one of the means of securing the loyalty of individuals during the faction period, was adapted to party needs. Party meetings were used to allow general participation in party affairs and to let the backbencher have a say in party strategy. From these methods of maintaining cohesion the parties developed a corporate identity which will be studied in some detail. So too will the role of the whip. The aim will be to see how these methods were developed and how effective they were in the situations where leaders felt that party discipline was necessary.

Party Meetings

Party meetings are the most obvious sign of a party identity, yet it is difficult to assess their importance because of a lack of evidence of what actually occurred in them. The non-Labor parties had no rules by which meetings were conducted or decisions reached, but the very existence of party meetings shows that co-operation occurred and that the party had some collective identity.

Precedents for party meetings existed in both states before the 1890s,[1] but meetings were never called at regular intervals nor as a matter of right. Invariably they were used as a means by which leaders could gain support or consent for their own actions. Gradually, as parties developed, so the meetings increased in frequency, discussed more general topics and had a greater effect on political decisions.

An accurate estimate of the frequency of party meetings is impossible because it is evident that the newspapers did

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1. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.155-162.

not report all of them[1] and because informal meetings could
be easily held in the party rooms. It is probable that
more meetings were held in both states than were actually
reported. Nevertheless several conclusions about the
growth of the party identity and the increasing control
over party members can be drawn by studying the frequency
of meetings and the reasons for which they were called.

TABLE VII: The number of non-Labor party meetings held by
government and opposition parties under each
ministry arranged by state.[2]

New South Wales

Ministry	Reid 1894-5	Reid 1898-9	Lyne-See 1899-1904	Carruthers 1904-7
Government	2	-	2	7
Opposition	8	15	15	9

Tasmania

Ministry	Braddon 1894-7	Propsting 1903-4	Evans 1904-9	Lewis-Solomon 1909-12
Government	1	2	2	25
Opposition	8	7	4	Not applicable

Before 1904 in New South Wales and 1909 in Tasmania,
government parties seldom held meetings of supporters. In
New South Wales Reid held one party meeting after he had
agreed to form a ministry but before he selected his
cabinet. At this meeting which was intended to consolidate
his support and reinforce his position as leader, he wel-
comed eight M.L.A.s who had been elected without the
endorsement of the Freetrade Council and apologised for the
mistake of the central branch[3] in failing to support them.
The point of the meeting was to identify his government,

1. For instance, in Tasmania only three of the eight op-
    position meetings between 1894 and 1897 and only eleven
    of the twenty-five government party meetings between 1909
    and 1912 are reported in the press. In both cases the
    source for the remainder was the Diaries of Sir Elliot
    Lewis, in the State Archives of Tasmania. These diaries
    are the only primary evidence in either state which
    contain evidence of this kind.
2. I have not included meetings held by minor non-Labor parties
    such as, for instance, the Independent Party of 1898 or
    of 1901 or the Country party of 1902. The latter actually
    held eleven known meetings in four months.
3. S.M.H., 1/8/94.

when it was formed, with the parliamentary freetrade party which had expressed its support for him and to show that it was a party, not a personal, administration. Reid's second party meeting discussed organizational proposals for the election of 1895 and not internal parliamentary affairs.[1] In November 1902 See called a meeting of his followers with the intention of explaining the government's plans to them and of reducing the tensions in the party which had been caused by the Friedmann affair. The fact that a premier actually met his supporters to discuss plans was thought to be unusual by the contemporary press.[2] In 1904 the Ministerialists held a meeting, which was poorly attended, to elect an executive committee to organize the election.[3]

In Tasmania also the government parties held few meetings before 1909. Braddon called one caucus in 1894 which elected the cabinet,[4] two of the positions, those of premier and minister of lands, being the subject of ballots. He held none after he had become premier. In 1903-4 Propsting twice called meetings to discuss with his followers his proposals to reform the income tax and the Legislative Council.[5] Under Evans, two meetings were held after the close of the sessions of 1905 and 1908 to discuss electoral plans, not parliamentary business.[6] In both states the only meetings which actually discussed specific parliamentary business were those convened by Propsting. These exceptions can be explained by the radical nature of his proposals and the suspicion with which he was regarded by some of his followers. The meetings were designed to calm these fears. See's mid-session meeting fulfilled a similar but more general purpose. Otherwise all meetings were designed to discuss election prospects or to consolidate the party publicly. On no occasion were the ministers given instructions or advice

1. D.T., 28/6/95.

2. D.T., 21/11/02.

3. D.T., 13/4/04.

4. M., 13/4/94.

5. M., 3/10/03, 25/5/04.

6. M., 3/2/06, 6/11/08.

on how they should act in parliament.

The meetings of the government party in 1895 and 1904 in New South Wales[1] and in 1905 and 1908 in Tasmania to discuss the forthcoming electoral campaigns were significant changes from faction politics because they illustrated that the party recognized that it had a collective interest in the elections, even if that interest originated in the ministry's desire to retain office. Furthermore the party now realised that electoral success, rather than parliamentary manœuvres, was becoming the decisive factor in the gaining and maintenance of ministerial portfolios and that its future depended on the continued existence of the present cabinet.

After 1904 in New South Wales and 1909 in Tasmania a definite change in practice occurred as premiers kept their parties better informed of their intentions and probably allowed discussion of their proposals. Carruthers held seven meetings during his premiership. Three were held before the beginning of a session; at the first of these, which took place after the party had won the election but before Waddell had resigned, Carruthers was re-elected leader and given a free hand to decide tactics and cabinet selection.[2] At the other two, he informed the party what legislative proposals he intended to introduce and took the opportunity to reduce any antagonisms within the party.[3] Two mid-sessional meetings were held at which Carruthers reported progress, explained what legislation was still to be introduced and requested continued attendance at divisions.[4] In the two final meetings, the party agreed to allow Carruthers to negotiate fusion with the Progressives[5] and discussed, but did not alter, the electoral platform on which Carruthers

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1. The Protectionists had also held a party meeting in 1894 when Dibbs was premier to discuss electoral organization for the campaign that year. S.M.H., 9/6/94, 12/6/94.

2. D.T., 13/8/04.

3. D.T., 10/6/05, 26/6/06. In 1906 the party was reputed to be unhappy about Carruthers' leadership but was charmed into enthusiastic support at the pre-sessional meeting.

4. D.T., 21/9/04, 28/9/05.

5. D.T., 3/4/07.

intended to fight the elections of 1907.[1] Carruthers met
his followers more often than any of his predecessors, kept
them informed of government proposals and probably encouraged
comment on party action. For the first time he gave the
backbencher a chance to criticise party actions in private
and perhaps to affect decisions. This change implied that
the administration was a party one and that the party as a
collective body should be able to comment on its behaviour.
The party meeting was the main means by which the collective
view of the party could be ascertained. By 1907, the party
meeting was so well accepted as an integral part of the
machinery that Wade's pre-sessional meeting with his party
was regarded as conforming to recognized practice.[2]

In Tasmania the frequency of government party meetings
increased rapidly after 1909.[3] Of the twenty-five meetings
two were held after the elections. In 1909 the anti-socialist
M.H.A.s decided to fuse to form a Liberal party and elected
Lewis leader.[4] After the election of 1912 the new parliamentary
party elected Solomon to replace Lewis.[5] Both discussed party
policy for the forthcoming session. At two other meetings
which were held before the sessions of 1910 and 1912 M.H.A.s
were informed of the government's legislative plans and
given the opportunity to discuss them.[6] In September and
October 1909, during the crisis which led to the formation
of a one-week Labor ministry, seven meetings were held to
discuss the government's financial proposals, ministerial
failures, and, after the split, the terms on which the party
was prepared to re-admit the rebels.[7] After the party was
re-united, meetings were held weekly for the remainder of
the session in an obvious attempt to maintain party unity.[8]

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 9/5/07.

2. <u>D.T.</u>, 9/10/07.

3. This increase may be partly a product of more complete
   information but is unlikely to be wholly so.

4. <u>M.</u>, 9/6/09.

5. <u>M.</u>, 5/6/12.

6. <u>M.</u>, 3/6/10, 25/6/12.

7. <u>M.</u>, 30/9/09, 14/10/09, 19/10/09, 20/10/09, 21/10/09.
   <u>Lewis Diaries</u>, 23/9/09, 24/9/09.

8. <u>Lewis Diaries</u>, 3/11/09, 10/11/09, 17/11/09, 24/11/09,
   17/12/09.

In the remaining two years of the parliament, meetings were held fairly regularly. In 1910 they were almost monthly.[1] In 1911 backbench criticism of the Wages Board Bill, which was led by Ewing, forced Lewis to call three meetings to discuss amendments to the bill in the party room;[2] a fourth meeting was held later in the session.[3] Finally, at a meeting in February 1912, the parliamentary party as an independent body discussed policy and organization for the forthcoming election campaign.[4]

In both states therefore the purpose of party meetings changed; at first they were a means by which a leader could consolidate support, but they developed into a channel by which the party as a body could discuss administration policy, criticise leaders privately and make strategic decisions. Although we can not know precisely what went on at these meetings, ministers certainly used them to keep followers informed and it is reasonable to suppose that followers made their opinions heard. The party in both states became more closely identified with the government and the government implicitly admitted that it was to some extent answerable to the party as a body. It could not be censured or coerced but it discovered that it needed the contact with its supporters which meetings provided. The administration had to keep the party informed if it expected consistent support. This is a strong indication of the growth of a collective identity of party and its connection with the administration in both states.

Opposition meetings were more common in both states because of the necessity to discuss tactics. In a government party many of the tactical decisions were made by cabinet; in opposition these decisions had to be made by party meetings because the party had no obligation to remain solid in order to keep a ministry in office, because the leaders had no patronage with which to maintain unity, and because

1. _Lewis Diaries_, 22/7/10, 5/8/10, 4/10/10, 9/11/10.
2. _Lewis Diaries_, 15/9/11, 21/9/11, 27/9/11.
3. _Lewis Diaries_, 15/12/11.
4. _Lewis Diaries_, 2/2/12, 3/2/12.

there was no clear leadership group, corresponding to the ministry, in an opposition party. A party meeting had to decide what action the party should take and to persuade members to vote for the resulting decision, although it had no effective sanctions to coerce members into voting with the party. Party meetings therefore were concerned with a wide range of topics. In New South Wales in 1894-5 the Protectionist party discussed the moving of a censure motion[1] and the wisdom of an alliance with Parkes.[2] In 1898-9 five of their meetings dealt with problems of leadership[3] while the remainder discussed federation[4], the budget[5] and the Neild censure motion.[6] It was said that informal party meetings were held daily, but how often they actually occurred is unknown.[7] By 1900 it was the accepted practice for opposition parties to hold meetings before each session to discuss business and tactics.[8] Between 1901 and 1904 the meetings of the Liberal opposition discussed similar topics; two meeting received the resignation of leaders[9] and another two elected new ones.[10] In April 1902 Lee met his party in the middle of the recess to discuss tactics[11] and Carruthers called three meetings to discuss specific proposals, including two censure motions.[12] The party also had two meetings at which electoral tactics were planned,[13] and these meetings were held independently of external organizations on both occasions. After 1904 the Progressives held several meetings to discuss improved unity

1. D.T., 27/2/95, 28/2/95.

2. D.T., 11/5/95, 15/5/95.

3. D.T., 17/8/98, 6/10/98, 11/4/99, 24/8/99, 21/9/99.

4. D.T., 26/8/98, 8/9/98.

5. D.T., 5/11/98, 11/11/98, 18/8/99.

6. D.T., 30/8/99, 6/9/99.

7. D.T., 13/8/98.

8. D.T., Protectionists, 28/5/97, 17/5/98, 19/7/99, Liberals, 11/6/00, 24/7/01, 29/5/02, 17/6/03, Progressives, 20/9/04, 6/6/05, 29/6/06.

9. D.T., 12/4/01 (Reid), 18/9/02 (Lee).

10. D.T., 17/4/01 (Lee), 19/9/02 (Carruthers).

11. D.T., 1/5/02.

12. D.T., 1/10/03 (The Friedmann censure motion), 16/7/02 (the Fitzroy Docks Censure Motion), 20/1/04 (the Referendum Bill).

13. D.T., 1/5/01, 30/1/04.

and fusion with the Liberals, but the former was never achieved and the latter proposal was defeated by seven votes to four in a caucus ballot.[1]

In Tasmania the opposition similarly had fairly regular meetings. Between 1894 and 1897 two meetings were concerned with the selection of Lewis as leader,[2] one with planning tactics for the session[3] and the remainder discussed specific proposals.[4] During the Propsting ministry the opposition held meetings to discuss leadership[5] and the advisability of moving censure motions.[6] The opposition to Evans discussed similar subjects at meetings between 1904 and 1909.[7]

In both states the opposition meetings regularly discussed tactics, leadership and, in pre-sessional meetings, the general political situation. They provided an occasion for members to identify with the party and a means by which members could participate in the making of decisions. The increasing frequency of party meetings and the broadening of the scope of discussion indicated the growth both of collective identity and of participation by all members in the party decisions.

It is one thing to discover that all members became concerned in producing a collective party decision, but we must also ask how binding these decisions were on either leaders or followers, remembering that both consistently declared that their votes were not affected by outside influences.

Meetings were never able to bind leaders to obey their

1. D.T., 3/10/05, 27/2/07, 10/4/07, 8/5/07.

2. M., 18/5/94, 23/5/94.

3. M., 28/6/95. The meeting lapsed for want of interest.

4. Lewis Diaries, 30/5/94 (Customs Proposals), 5/7/94, 13/7/94, 23/10/94 (Assessment Bill), 3/9/96 (Gaming Bill), 13/11/96 (Referendum Bill). The diary for 1895 is missing, so no meetings are recorded for that year.

5. M., 22/5/03, 19/8/03, 16/3/04.

6. M., 2/10/03, 7/10/03, 25/5/04, 26/5/04.

7. M., 14/7/03, 20/5/06 (Leadership), 9/3/07, 15/7/08 (Tactics).

decisions, but gradually the value of consultation with
the party became recognized. At a caucus in 1895 the
Protectionist party discussed moving a censure motion on
Reid but adjourned without reaching any decision.[1] Before
the meeting was reconvened the next evening, Dibbs had
moved the no-confidence motion, a step which was bitterly
resented by one party member who claimed that he should
have been consulted.[2] In 1902 Brunker, a leading Liberal,
claimed that he knew nothing of a censure motion on the
address-in-reply until Lee actually moved it and pointed
out that the party meeting the previous evening had been
indecisive.[3] In both cases the freedom of the leaders to
decide tactics without instructions from a party caucus was
illustrated. More often the party meeting gave the leader
a free hand to act as he thought best, particularly when
the leader dominated the party.[4] What is important is not
that, in the style of faction politics, the leader occasionally
acted without the specific authorisation of the party, but
that the party was so growing in influence as a collective
identity that even strong leaders saw considerable advantages
in gaining the support of their parties before acting so
that they could speak and act in the name of the party, even
in some cases after a full discussion of their proposals.

Labor members often claimed that their opponents' party
meetings were worthless and that the leader forced his will
on the party and allowed them no part in discussing policy
or tactics. Holman once claimed

> 'their [the Liberal] programme, if it exists,
> if it exists in anything except the inner
> consciousness of their leader, is still buried
> in the silent bosoms of the honourable member
> for St. George and whichever of his associates
> he takes into his confidence' 5

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1. D.T., 27/2/95, 28/2/95.

2. G. Miller, D.T., 1/3/95.

3. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.5, p.464.

4. D.T., 12/6/00 (Reid), 17/6/03, 13/8/04, 7/4/07 (Carruthers).
    Carruthers was given a free hand to frame an amendment to
    the address-in-reply, to form his cabinet and to negotiate
    a possible fusion with Waddell.

5. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.171.

He clearly suggested that the party was little more than the
personal following of the Liberal leader. The Liberal leaders
insisted that they were not answerable to the party caucus or
directed by it. In 1907 Carruthers put his possible electoral
programme to a caucus meeting before it was announced, but
hastened to point out that, while the caucus could vote on it,
it could not dictate to the government what programme it should
adopt.[1] On the other hand he did claim that the leaders
usually took a consensus of opinion from the party followers
and that only by these means were members committed to vote
on the right lines. He described the process by which a
censure motion was moved in the following terms:

> When a vote of censure is moved or is contemplated
> an informal meeting takes place and the leader of
> the party makes known his intentions to his suppor-
> ters who are left absolutely unfettered by any fears
> of expulsion or any charge of breaking pledges and
> who are simply expected to vote as their conscience
> and the public interest may dictate.
>
> As a rule no leader strains the support of his
> followers by moving votes of censure recklessly.
> It is to the credit of the unpledged parties in
> the past that they have almost invariably gauged
> the feeling of the party in such motions which
> are based chiefly upon violation of those
> principles which form the foundation of the unity
> of the party.   2

Decisions at meetings were seldom decided by vote[3] but by
general agreement,with leaders gauging the feeling of the
caucus. The party at no stage had any formal means of
coercing members to vote along party lines. When the Labor
party tried to portray the non-Labor party meetings as
being identical to their own caucuses, with the only exception
that the non-Labor meetings were not truly democratic,[4] the
Liberal M.P.s rejected this comparison and emphasised the

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1. D.T., 9/5/07.

2. D.T., 23/4/03.

3. Only two instances of an actual vote are recorded between
       1894 and 1907. In 1895 the Protectionists voted on the
       decision to ally with Parkes and three members, probably
       Lyne, Willis and Price, opposed the motion. D.T.,
       11/5/95. In 1907 the Progressives voted on the proposals
       of fusion with the Liberals. D.T., 8/5/07.

4. A.H. Griffith, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.236; McGowen,
       NSWPD, Series 1, Vol. 100, pp.1192-3.

lack of any means of coercion and the freedom of the members
to vote as they wanted, even after a party meeting.[1] Ashton
suggested that Liberal M.L.A.s were expected, but not forced,
to vote with the party only on matters concerning the party
platform.[2]

In fact the party leaders could and did exert moral
influence on members to vote with the party even if they
disagreed with some of the proposals. For instance, in 1895
the government whip was relying on several protectionist
members to help pass a controversial clause of the local
government bill and allowed several radical freetraders to
pair against the clause. At the last minute, the Protectionist
party held a party meeting and decided to make the division a
party vote. Those protectionists who had agreed to support
the clause now felt obliged to support the party.[3] In July
1899 Crick wanted to censure the government, but the majority
of his party preferred to await a more appropriate moment.
Crick announced publicly that, although he disagreed, he
would abide by the decision.[4] A decision of a meeting could
therefore persuade the dissident members to agree, if only
by moral pressure. If, of course, the split was too great,
as it was in Tasmania in 1909 when some members of the party
were totally dissatisfied with the leadership of Lewis, then
the meeting had no method of preventing division. Nevertheless,
generally meetings could be used to reduce internal differences
and did assist in producing fairly united parties.

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1. Rose, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.213; Carruthers D.T.,
   14/10/02. The Labor caucus in fact ran on similar lines
   of consensus rather than coercion. In 1907 Edden claimed
   that only seven caucus meetings had been held throughout
   the whole parliament. (NSWPD Series 2, Vol.26, p.138).
   Nevertheless the main difference was that, even if never
   used, the machinery of coercion existed in the Labor
   party if required.

2. D.T., 6/5/03.

3. D.T., 2/5/95. One member, when asked if his vote could
   still be relied on, replied, 'It will depend upon
   whether the matter is treated as a party question'.
   Some protectionists were disgusted by these opportunist
   tactics and abstained.

4. NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.99, p.114.

Attendance at party meetings symbolised identification with the party and implied subordination of personal to party interests. In 1894 eight unendorsed freetraders immediately joined the parliamentary party by attending its first caucus meeting.[1] In 1907 Varney Parkes and Colonel Macarthur-Onslow, who had both defeated endorsed Liberal and Reform candidates, were regarded as normal party members after their presence at the first caucus meeting.[2] In Tasmania Whitsitt, an M.H.A. for Darwin, had not attended the fusion meeting of 1909 and, when he joined the Ewing rebels in 1909, his desertion was partly excused because he had not been committed at the meeting at which promises of support were made.[3] In the early years, identification with the party and attendance at party meetings usually meant satisfaction with the party leadership because the party was seen primarily in terms of supporting a group of leaders. T.H. Griffith and Copeland openly left the Protectionist party in 1899 when they disapproved of Lyne's actions.[4] However, as the party developed its own identity which was independent of the leader, so a member could criticise the leadership but remain within the party. In 1907 Storey regularly criticized Carruthers, yet could consistently claim

> I attended the party meeting and I am a good
> party man and a splendid supporter of the
> Liberal government. 5

The party meetings were now the most obvious illustration of the existence of the party; loyalty to the party no longer needed to be synonymous with loyalty to the leader.

In two ways, therefore, an analysis of party meetings illustrated the development of party. First, the increasing regularity with which they were held, particularly by the government party, showed that non-Labor parties developed an independent and collective identity, quite apart from the existence of any leaders or individuals. Secondly, party meetings were used as an additional method of persuading

1. S.M.H., 1/8/94.

2. D.T., 9/10/07.

3. M., 14/10/09.

4. Griffith, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.100, pp.1247-8; Copeland D.T., 5/9/99.

5. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.26, p.235.

members to vote with the party by allowing backbenchers
greater participation in party or governmental decision-
making, particularly as the range of issues on which the
party acted broadened. The parties never introduced new
methods or sanctions for the leaders to use, but the meetings
increased in importance as the participation of the backbencher
became more common, and as precedents of collective party
action became accepted. By increasing the information available
to backbenchers and by drawing them into party affairs, the
party as a collective unit increased its control over their
votes.

Patronage

A second method by which a government party could maintain
support was by the use of patronage. I am only concerned
here with patronage as a means of maintaining intra-party
discipline and not with the general problem of political
patronage. Patronage was mainly of two types, the personal
and the electoral. The former was an offer which benefitted
the individual himself, the latter was a grant to his
electorate which in turn brought votes to the member. I
have already pointed out how concerned some members were to
forward the interests of their electorates and the willingness
of men like Gillies to support governments if their constituencies
were well looked after. Ministries were able to use promises
of local grants as a means of gaining or securing party
loyalty; in 1905 Carruthers was accused of openly courting
two doubtful supporters by promising to resume large estates
for closer settlement in their electorates.[1] At the same
time opposition members consistently complained that their
electorates were ignored in the allocation of public works
grants, just because they were not government supporters.[2]
Often patronage in both states would be exerted quietly behind
the scenes and, especially in the pre-party days in Tasmania,
a vote for the government on vital divisions could assist

1. McDonnel, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.185. The two M.L.A.s
      were John Perry of Liverpool Plains and R. Levien.
      Levien did agree to support the government after the
      premier's promise (S.M.H.,13/3/05). So did Perry
      (D.T., 14/3/05).

2. Affleck, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.10, p.98. Briner, NSWPD
      Series 2, Vol.22, p.359.

in the inclusion of a grant for a road or bridge in the
public works estimates.[1]

The personal patronage by which ministries could attract
the support or maintain the loyalty of individuals had less
to justify it but was still common. On occasions patronage
was even used to remove potential rivals; in New South Wales
Barton and Copeland, both potential rivals for the leadership,
were given overseas appointments by Lyne in 1900;[2] in Tasmania
the two leading members of the opposition were also removed
from politics by appointment to official positions in 1909.[3]
Loyalty was encouraged by the rewarding of defeated members or
of party workers; Schey[4] and Garrard[5] were both given official
positions after their defeat in elections. Nominations to
the Legislative Council were similarly used for party purposes;
in 1895 Reid appointed three of the major architects of the
Freetrade organization and one defeated member to the council;[6]
in 1899 his appointments included two defeated M.L.A.s and
four Labor nominees.[7] In 1901-2 over sixty men were recommended
to See either by themselves or by others as deserving appoint-
ment to the council. Half of these recommendations gave
record of service as party members or party workers as the
main reason for appointment. In one instance the secretary
of the Progressive Association asked See to appoint four
leading manufacturers to the council as a reward for their
contributions to party funds and on account of their willingness

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1. M., 11/5/91.

2. Reid, NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.103, p.59.

3. See Chapter 4, p.69.

4. Schey was the Secretary of the National Protection Union,
   defeated in 1898 and rewarded directly Lyne took office.
   See Reid NSWPD Series 1, Vol.103, p.59.

5. Garrard, a minister from 1894-8, was defeated and made
   President of the Sewerage Board. For equally political
   reasons he was later refused re-appointment by the See
   Government. D.T., 24/5/04.

6. Party workers were A. Kethel, E. Pulsford, F.J. Smith:
   the defeated candidate was R. Fowler.

7. Defeated M.L.A.s were G.H. Greene and A.J. Gould; Labor
   nominees J. Wilson, J. Estell, J. Buzacott and J. Hepher,
   D.T., 10/4/99.

to start a pro-government newspaper.[1] Though See in fact made no appointments at this time, there is no doubt that many people regarded a seat in the council as a possible reward for political services. Since membership of the council was unpaid, it was presumably sought for prestige and not for financial reasons. Even those who were not appointed for directly political reasons could usually be guaranteed to hold views and to vote generally in the interests of the party which nominated them.[2] Positions in the Legislative Assembly such as the chairmanship of committees or places on the public works committee were often considered party gifts,[3] even though recipients sometimes denied that they felt obliged to support the government at all.[4] In 1898 the Reid government nominated two protectionists who were unpopular with their party for selection to the public works committee, but these members were then replaced in a ballot of the house by others who had been more amenable to party discipline.[5]

On some occasions personal patronage or expectation of it was more blatant. Rose was rumoured to have deserted the See government because it had refused to give him an official appointment.[6] In 1898 Reid's advance payment to Neild to cover expenses incurred during the compiling of his report on old age pensions came at an opportune moment because his loyalty was in doubt. During a censure motion the party whip had tried to persuade Neild, then at a charity

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1. H. Sparks to See, 21/5/01. See Papers, Vol.26. Mitchell Library, A3675. In this volume there are over sixty letters received by See concerning appointments to the Council. They were all written between April 1901 and July 1902.

2. For a brief analysis of party voting in the Legislative Councils, see Appendix D.

3. D.T., 29/6/00.

4. Wood, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.21, p.4840.

5. D.T., 1/12/98. Ewing and McFarlane, who had just voted against their party on a censure motion, were replaced by Perry and Levien.

6. For his defence against these rumours, see Rose, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.215-6.

ball, to attend the division. The whip both phoned and
sent a cab, but Neild refused to leave his evening's
entertainment.[1] Such direct method of persuasion, even
if uncommon and falling short of bribery, were additional
means of maintaining solidarity.

There is too little information available to draw any
precise conclusions about the influence of patronage, but
it seems likely that patronage was a more useful method of
obtaining party cohesion when party alignments were in
doubt and therefore, as party identification developed,
patronage declined as a means of attracting support, although
it remained useful for cementing the loyalty of wavering
followers. When parties were clearly divided on matters
of principle or policy, patronage was seldom sufficient
to attract members from the other side of the house; when
party members were dissatisfied or only on the fringe of
the party, then the government could use patronage to keep
these supporters within the party. Consequently the
development of solid parties inevitably reduced the scope
of patronage.

The Whip and Party Discipline

As we have seen, the non-Labor parties had no formal
rules or sanctions with which discipline could be maintained.
Party meetings became an accepted means of placing pressure
on members and of maintaining unity but were never controlled
by any rules of procedure nor gave leaders the means to
enforce any decisions. The only recognition of the fact that
discipline was necessary can be seen in the appointment of
the party whip. In both states he was the only paid party
official[2] and, apart from the leader, the only public sign
that the party actually had a corporate existence.

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1. D.T., 17/9/98. Lord Beauchamp, then Governor, once wrote
    that he was disappointed in the general tenor of politics
    but that there was an absence of any bribery. 'Through
    and through politics appeared to me perfectly pure'.
    (Diary of Lord Beauchamp, Mitchell Library, A3295). At
    the time this was written Hassell was making a fortune
    out of his position as minister for lands.
2. In New South Wales, the whip received an annual salary of
    £900 made up of contributions from other minister's sal-
    aries (D.T., 1/9/04). In Tasmania, the government whip's
    salary was reputed to be 100 (Launceston Monitor, 18/6/09,
    25/6/09). How, or even whether, the opposition whip was
    paid is unknown.

The position of whip had existed in the early politics
of both states but not consistently so,[1] because leaders
were often responsible for collecting support themselves.
As the parties developed in the 1880s, so the role of the
whip became accepted as a part of politics. In this period
in New South Wales, the party whips were:

TABLE VIII: Party Whips in New South Wales Politics 1894-1907

Party	Date	Whip	Reason for resignation
Freetrade	1894-8	F. Farnell	Electoral defeat
Freetrade	1898-1901	J.S. Hawthorne	Elected to Public Works Committee
Liberal	1901-7+	J. Nobbs	
Protectionist	1894-8	J. Perry	Elected to Public Works Committee
Protectionist	1898-1900	J.G. Carroll	Dissatisfied with Government
Protectionist-Progressive	1900-4	W.F. Hurley	Appointed to Council
Progressive	1904-7	G. Briner (officially party secretary)	
Country Party	1902	J.G. Carroll	Disagreed with Caucus decision

The whip was always faced with a lack of real power.
His duty was to organize the party and anticipate awkward
situations. In the early years he often approached members
of opposition parties in order to construct majorities on
issues which did not directly concern the basic principles
of either party. In 1895 Farnell relied on protectionist
support to pass a clause in the local government bill[2] while
in 1898 Hawthorne was described as

> that bland and insinuating official who on many
> occasions had whisked men from this side of the
> house to the other. 3

Personal charm, diligence and persistance were the main
requirements of a whip who had no means of coercing members

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1. For instance, Thomas Garrett was whip to the Cowper-Robertson
    faction. Loveday and Martin, _Parliament, Factions and
    Parties_, p.115.

2. _D.T._, 2/5/95.

3. O'Sullivan, _NSWPD_ Series 1, Vol. 93, p.126.

to vote with his party.[1]

Within the party, the whip was responsible for anticipating possible revolts and securing votes on party lines. When P.H. Morton wanted to attack Reid over his customs proposals in 1895, Farnell warned Reid of the threat and Morton was persuaded to remain silent.[2] In 1904 Nobbs acted as the link between Carruthers and potential ministers during the cabinet-making period of 1904[3] and was supposed to keep his party informed of opposition plans.[4] As the rift between parties became broader after 1903, so the role of the whip became exclusively concerned with his own party. The whip was always the servant of his party and could act only under instructions; when Perry called a party meeting on his own initiative to discuss the federal issue in 1898, he was accused by one backbencher of exceeding his powers.[5]

The main task of the whip was to produce a solid vote for the party when it was required. As mentioned in the previous chapter, contemporaries recognised a difference between party votes and free votes but, unlike the House of Commons, there is no way of deciding which divisions were party votes and when the whip tried, but failed, to maintain party solidarity. When the local government bill in 1895 was defeated after a Protectionist caucus had decided to make it a party vote, Reid complained that this issue had

1. Farnell was said to be an efficient whip because he was energetic, persistent, diplomatic and aware of impending developments in the assembly (D.T., 4/4/95). Perry was seen as the only practicable opposition whip in 1895 because he was efficient and popular (D.T., 14/8/95).

2. Ashton to Morton, 10/7/95. P.H. Morton Papers, Mitchell Library, A3039.

3. D.T., 29/8/04, 30/8/04.

4. In 1905 Gardiner moved a second amendment to the Address-in-Reply and, when Carruthers showed surprise, Gardiner claimed he had shown the details of the motion to the Liberal whip and that therefore Carruthers ought to have been better informed. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.378. See also D.T., 30/6/97 for a whip's anticipation of an opposition censure motion.

5. Richmond River Times, 21/4/98.

always been regarded as a non-party matter,[1] that he had not insisted on a party vote and that the Protectionist demand for a party vote was unfair. Such clear indications of a party's view on legislation are unfortunately few. However we can examine some occasions on which the effect of party pressure can be seen.

After the defeat of a clause of the local government bill in 1895, O'Sullivan tried to take the business of the house out of the hands of the government, but those freetraders who had opposed the bill now quickly returned to vote with their party.[2] In 1905 Carruthers was prepared to accept the defeat of one clause of the shires bill in committee, but when he declared that a second clause was vital to the bill, his party immediately solidified behind him.[3] The implicit threat that, if defeated, the government would drop the bill or even resign was sufficient to make party members sink minor criticisms in order to ensure that the whole bill was passed. The fate of the ministry was often considered more important than a matter of minor principle.[4] In 1905 Fleming voted against the party candidate for the chairmanship of committee but declared

> but were it a question of the life of the government,
> I would sink all minor differences, as others would,
> and vote with them, because it appears to me they
> are a genuinely good government taken either individ-
> ually or collectively. 5

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1. D.T., 1/5/95. Reid was later criticised by J.C. Ellis for failing to make the issue a party matter. D.T., 23/5/95. P.H. Morton also claimed that local government should be made aparty question NSWPD, Series 1, Vol. 78, p.7276.

2. D.T., 27/4/95.

3. D.T., 27/9/05.

4. Molesworth (NSWPD Series 1, Vol.100, p.1264-5), declared that the payment to Neild, although wrong, was not of sufficient consequence to justify the defeat of the Reid ministry. In Tasmania, see Bradley on the re-appointment of the commander of land forces, Launceston Examiner, 11/7/95.

5. Fleming NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, pp.472.

Generally the non-Labor parties were able to maintain disciplined voting because they did not push their demands too far. Between 1904 and 1907, when their parliamentary discipline was at its tightest, several groups of members broke away from the party on specific issues, though the party was never in danger of defeat. In 1898 Reid had refused to insist on a party vote on an affair in which he had a personal interest, lest it appeared that the party was being used to further his own ends.[1] One M.L.A. claimed that a party supporter was never forced to vote against publicly expressed opinions, even though he admitted "the crack of the whip" might change private or unstated convictions.[2] A Labor member claimed that the Liberals in 1905 were 'as easily whipped as any party I have seen'[3] and their solidarity does suggest that they were at least as cohesive as any other party. However, this solidarity was obtained primarily because non-Labor parties allowed freedom to vote on non-essential divisions[4] and only brought pressure on members on vital occasions, even then not always successfully. Furthermore, of course, once the party had gained a collective identity there was no longer a need to persuade individual M.L.A.s to support the party leaders because they were generally committed to the ideas of the party which they would support on all major issues.

Within this framework of some freedom to vote, party leaders generally used personal persuasion to attract support. In 1901 William Archer, M.L.A. for Burwood, complained that before the election he was approached by two leading Liberals who tried to persuade him to join their party and promised that, if he did so, he would not be opposed by the Liberal party in the election. When he refused, an official Liberal candidate opposed him in the election. After he had won the seat as an independent, he was again contacted by the two Liberals who made another effort to gain his support.[5] Personal contacts, not formal rules, were responsible for

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1. NSWPD Series 1, Vol. 99, p.96.

2. Jessep, NSWPD Series 2, Vol. 24, p.3187.

3. Burgess, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.300.

4. See below, chapter seven.

5. NSWPD Series 2, Vol. 1, p.294-295. The Liberals were
    J. Garland and J.J. Cohen.

maintaining party unity. As a result of these personal
contacts, party discipline had a flexibility which could
be contrasted to the rigidity of Labor methods and which
allowed the non-Labor parties to exert some control over
their members without undermining their widely stated views
of independence.

In Tasmania the whips had existed in early years[1] but
were less well established than in New South Wales because
in a small house the leader himself could more easily maintain
contact with individual members. In 1896 Braddon turned a
motion condemning the re-appointment of the commander of the
Land forces into a vote of confidence so that some of his
supporters who disapproved of the appointment did not oppose
the government.[2] In 1894 Dobson, faced with the possibility
of the defeat of the land tax bill, attempted to negotiate
acceptable limits of taxation with two M.H.A.s who came
from the biggest landowning families in the state.[3] The
personal negotiations failed and the ministry fell. In
general party methods were similar to those of New South
Wales. Freedom to vote on specific issues with which
members disagreed, such as the wages board legislation,
was permitted partly because it might have been impossible
to enforce solidarity on such an issue but also so that
the allegiance of members was not weakened by a clash with
the party on a minor issue. The non-Labor discipline was
designed to maintain at least an illusion of independence,
so that it could in reality maintain solidarity when necessary.

Conclusions

Party discipline is clearly not simply a reflection of
party methods. The non-Labor parties and the Labor party
used different methods to maintain cohesion in divisions
and to secure acceptance of their legislative proposals, but
the results were not significantly different. On no occasion
did the governing non-Labor party have poorer discipline in
its voting on government legislation than the Labor party.

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1.   M., 13/5/91, Launceston Examiner, 23/11/95.

2.   M., 9/7/96.

3.   M., 10/5/94.

The Labor methods of pledge and caucus control were by no means the only way in which a party could maintain discipline in that period; the other parties did not need to follow the Labor example because they could usually gain similar results with different methods that were more compatible with their attitudes to politics. When divisions on particular issues did occur, their flexibility of approach often permitted the party to re-group without recriminations.

In both states this analysis of voting behaviour and of party methods indicated that the non-Labor parties increased their control over party voting. In the first place, the range of issues on which the party took a stand broadened considerably; in 1894 in New South Wales the parties maintained a high rate of cohesion on divisions relating to the fiscal issue but allowed freedom of action on other matters. By 1907 the vague and broad 'anti-socialist' ideology brought a wide selection of issues, some of which were primarily administrative, into the category of party issues. Since the choice was then between a Labor or a non-Labor government, the party usually saw a need for cohesion on these proposals and voted solidly. The lack of unity in New South Wales between 1898 and 1902 and in Tasmania before 1909 can be explained by the lack of any specific principle on which the party could be based apart from the demands of sound administration. Since the legislation in these periods was non-controversial, the parties did not demand solidarity; as the cleavages between parties increased, so did party competition and party voting. Party solidarity was generally achieved when required, not as a matter of course. Unnecessary pressure was seldom exerted on members. Yet by 1907 in New South Wales and 1912 in Tasmania the party control of votes was sufficiently complete to maintain consistently cohesive parties on a broad range of issues. Their methods of maintaining this discipline may not have changed, but their results on a broad range of issues certainly did.

Simultaneously with the development of party discipline, we have seen the development of a party identity. Even though party meetings were still unable to bind leaders or followers and still had no official existence or role, they were held

more regularly and could discuss the behaviour of the
administration which they supported. The collective opinion
of backbenchers was becoming more important to ministers.

Furthermore as the collective identity of the party and
its voting solidarity over a wide range of issues grew, so
the internal groups which had been obvious in the parliamentary
parties began to disappear and the individual M.P. became
more fully identified with the party.

Chapter 7

The Party's Relations with Groups and Members

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I showed that non-Labor M.P.s
consistently claimed that they were free to vote as they
pleased and that they had to fulfil several functions, some
of which occasionally made contradictory demands on them.
Party methods of discipline were therefore developed which
could be effective on an increasingly broad range of topics
without appearing to restrict or regiment M.P.s. Party
members were not expected to give support on every issue
and were permitted to oppose the party on some occasions,
but nevertheless the party acted more cohesively and
developed a sense of collective party identity as the
period progressed.

Since the party only gradually gained cohesion and
members did oppose the party on some issues, we must
attempt to discover on what occasions members or groups
opposed the party, what effect these actions might have
had on the party development and how the relationship
between the party, on the one hand, and the groups or
individuals, on the other, may have changed as the parties
developed a collective identity. There are basically two
questions demanding analysis - first, whether groups
existed within a party and what their relations with it
might have been and, secondly, how the relationship between
members and their party changed. In both cases the
existence of groups or of dissenting members must be
discovered through cluster analyses or documentary evidence
and their behaviour explained.

In this analysis I will first consider any groups
within the government parties in New South Wales, then
groups in opposition parties and finally groups in the
Tasmanian parliament. Then I will examine the relationship
between individual members and their party.

Groups in the Government Parties in New South Wales

In New South Wales three important groups were formed
within government parties in parliament while several other
members or groups of members in the assembly had close

links with external interest groups. The three groups
within the government parties were the Freetrade and Land
Reform League men of 1894, the Protectionist party of 1899-
1900 and the Country party of 1902; those which had links
with external organizations which I will consider were the
parliamentary representatives of the temperance, liquor
and Protestant groups.

In August 1894 five radical freetraders invited
freetrade backbenchers to attend a meeting which was intended
'to consider the best means of organizing the Democratic
forces of the country' and to produce a four plank platform.[1]
The meeting was attended by about thirty members,[2] but the
group immediately split when Varney Parkes accused Wise
of using it to forward his own ambitions.[3] In November,
Wise attacked Reid's failure to introduce direct taxation
at the first opportunity but was disowned by O'Reilly who
claimed that Wise had spoken without the authority of the
thirty M.L.A.s who were members of the League[4]. In
February 1895 a second caucus discussed a proposal to block
the land and income tax assessment bill until the levels of
exemptions from the taxation had been announced,[5] but no
action was taken. In spite of the fact that many of these
radicals doubted Reid's sincerity, they distrusted Wise's
ambition more.[6] After the budget of 1895 had introduced
the desired taxation measures, the majority became absorbed
into the freetrade party and ceased to maintain a separate
existence.

On one occasion the votes of some of the radical members
had helped to defeat a government measure. In April 1895

1. Petitions and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, M.L.
   A285, p.251. The convenors of the meeting were Wise,
   Ashton, Bavister, Millen and Varney Parkes.
2. Martin, Political Developments in New South Wales, p.88-89.
3. Wise to Varney Parkes, 31/8/94, Varney Parkes Papers,
   M.L. A1052.
4. S.M.H., 12/11/94.
5. S.M.H., 27/2/94.
6. Wise to Carruthers 31/7/95, Box 14a, Carruthers Papers
   ML MSS, 1638.

Reid introduced a clause in the local government bill
which effectively prevented the proposed municipalities
from raising revenue from an unimproved land tax. Several
freetrade M.L.A.s were annoyed by this clause and, since
the bill was not considered a party question, were allowed
to pair or vote against it.[1] When the protectionist leaders
insisted on a party vote, the opposition of these freetraders
was sufficient to defeat the clause. On other occasions
these members usually voted with the government.[2] The
cluster analysis indicated that some Freetrade and Land
Reform advocates had marginally higher scores with the
Labor party than with the remainder of their own party,[3] but
to describe them as a distinct group would be too extreme.
They should be seen as a ginger group within the party which
wanted to ensure the introduction of the land and income
taxes and the reduction of customs duties.

Two points of significance arise from the behaviour
of the members of this group. In the first place their
action in convening a meeting and discussing a separate
platform was not considered to be incompatible with their
membership of the parliamentary freetrade party, even
though the meeting was held after the party members had
committed themselves to support the Reid government and
after the caucus had identified the party with the ministry.
The policy which the cabinet pursued was seen largely as
government, rather than as party, policy because there
was no way in which the party could express its opinions
on government administration except in private conversations
or public statements.[4] This group did not see it as
inconsistent with supporting the ministry to formulate a

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1.   D.T., 12/4/95, 1/5/95. The dissident radicals were
        O'Reilly, Ashton, Millen, Wilks, Dick, Fegan, Moore,
        Affleck.

2.   On one other occasion four radicals, Ashton, Haynes,
        O'Reilly, Wilks, opposed a motion to receive the
        committee resolutions on the land and income tax
        assessment bill.

3.   Wilks, O'Reilly, Hawthorne, Moore, Ashton, Bavister, Fegan,
        Dick, Newman. These members generally have agreement
        scores with Labor of over 0.80 while many of their
        scores with their own party drop as low as 0.70.

4.   See Martin, Political Developments in New South Wales, p.90.

platform for whose implementation the group would press,
because this was the only way in which the strength of
backbench opinion could be illustrated. In spite of their
strong feelings on the subject of direct taxation, the
group as a group did not attempt to pressure the government.
Its meetings were a forum for radical discussion within the
party, rather than a means of determining an independent
parliamentary strategy. They did not threaten the government
with withdrawal of support. The group ties were not strong
enough to justify any concerted attempt to defeat the
government, particularly since there was no alternative
section of the house that would be more inclined to introduce
the desired legislation. The tendency for the ties to party
to be stronger than the connections with the group was true
of all groups throughout the period.

In 1900 a backbench group of the Protectionist party
became dissatisfied with the promise of Lyne to drop the
fiscal issue and formed a 'Protectionist' party within the
government party with the intention of persuading Lyne to
re-adopt protective tariffs. Despite meetings and continual
criticism of the Premier, this party did not attempt as a
group to force Lyne's hand. It remained an ineffective
forum for complaint.[1]

In 1902 a Country party was formed by members of the
Progressive party. It harmoniously discussed matters
concerning rural affairs,[2] but was divided on other political
matters and after the Friedmann affair it ceased to act as
a political unit. Its separate existence was formally
recognised - in November 1902 the party leader, James Gormly,
attended a meeting with other party leaders to discuss
methods of alleviating the rural hardship caused by drought[3]
- but its influence was small. The cluster analysis does
not indicate that they consistently voted together. The
formation of this group suggests that its members met to

1. D.T., 11/6/00, 14/6/00.

2. Such as water conservation (D.T., 31/7/02), the rabbit
    act and the stock and pastures act (D.T., 11/9/02).

3. D.T., 27/11/02.

discuss legislation and to formulate proposals which
they would like the cabinet to adopt, because there
was no other means for a group to push its political
demands. Despite their protestations of independence,
the Country party would clearly not have been prepared
to defeat the government since this would have replaced
the country-orientated Progressives with the city-dominated
Liberal party. It was not searching for direct power but
for a means of more effective representation of its
interests within the government party.

The most consistently vocal interest-group representatives
in this period were the temperance advocates who, after 1902,
co-operated closely with the supporters of the Australian
Protestant Defence Association (A.P.D.A.). This group was
different from those so far considered because it was
concerned primarily with one issue and attracted support
from all parties; nevertheless its activities after 1904
still illustrated the changing position of groups within
the government parties. Before 1901 the parliamentary
advocates of the temperance movement included members of
all three parties and attempted to introduce local option
as a private member's bill. In 1894 an official meeting
of the Local Option parliamentary committee was held and
a motion demanding the introduction of local option passed
through the house.[1] However no legislation eventuated
since, like all advocates of private bills, its supporters
were faced with the problems of a lack of time and a
difficulty in raising sufficient interest.[2] After 1901
interest in the introduction of temperance measures remained
alive in all parties,[3] but the New South Wales Alliance -

1. S.M.H., 27/8/94. The motion was passed by thirty votes
   to twenty-seven.

2. For instance, in 1898 Henry Copeland tried to introduce
   a Sunday Trading Bill and wrote to E.M. Clark, another
   U.L.V.A. supporter, asking him to be in attendance
   when the bill was discussed. Copeland to Clark 13/4/99.
   E.M. Clark Papers, M.L. Uncat. MSS. 298. The member
   introducing such bills was responsible for persuading
   members to attend and vote at all.

3. In 1903 a petition from a local option league was intro-
   duced by three Labor members (McGowen, J. Storey,
   A. Griffith), two Liberals (Carruthers, Morton) and
   three Progressive (Thomson, Hall, Archer). D.T., 25/9/03.

a body which had united several temperance organizations -
realised the value of working through a party. It encouraged
participation in Liberal and Reform Association affairs,
entered an unofficial alliance with that party and had a
local option plank added to the Liberal platform.[1] Several
of the new Liberal members elected in 1904 were strong
temperance advocates. In 1905 the Carruthers government
introduced and passed a bill which established the local
option principle.

Despite their vocal demonstrations, their widespread
electoral organizations and their theoretically large group
of parliamentary supporters, the temperance movement was
ineffective until it worked through a party and persuaded a
government to take up its cause. Before then an independent
parliamentary group had found it impossible to introduce
and pass any piece of legislation, let alone one as complex
and time-consuming as the liquor act of 1905 which introduced
local option. At times the group made menacing threats -
in 1905 Fegan claimed

> The temperance party in this country will not be
> satisfied with promises any longer. They will
> require measures, not promises.   2

But generally such statements carried little weight. The
pressure to ensure that the bill was passed - if indeed
such pressure was necessary after it had become part of
the Liberal platform - came from within the party and not
from any inter-party alliance. It was significant that
despite a large electoral membership the interest group
could only be successful when it decided to work through a
party. Furthermore, the radical freetraders and country
M.L.A.s had seen a necessity for forming a formal group in
order to influence the decisions of a government which
was based on their party, but, although rumours of a meeting
of temperance members existed,[3] they did not appear to adopt

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1. J.D. Bollen. The Temperance Movement and the Liberal
   Party in N.S.W. Politics, 1900-1904, p.170.

2. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.354.

3. D.T., 7/7/05. The meeting was convened by Jessep, who
   was called by Carruthers 'the leader of the temperance
   party'. D.T., 4/9/05.

similar tactics in 1905, even though the government introduced
a bill on local option which did not fulfill all their hopes.

There was considerable external pressure group activity,
but no group formed within the Liberal party. It seems
probable that, since the government programme was now more
directly identified with the whole party and backbenchers
now had greater opportunities to criticize or advise the
government at party meetings, such methods were no longer
necessary.

It is significant that these groups were all formed
within government parties and that no similar bodies appeared
in the opposition parties. In the opposition, pressure
could be applied on a government more openly on the floor
of the assembly. In some respects the meetings of these
groups fulfilled similar functions to opposition party meetings
in that they gave an opportunity for backbenchers to express
their dissatisfaction of the party leadership - an opportunity
which was otherwise lacking in government parties before
1904.

Occasionally individual M.L.A.s in the government party
were recognized as the spokesman of outside interests and
their position sometimes clashed with the views held by the
party. For instance, E.C.V. Broughton, a Liberal, claimed

> 'I am here to champion the cause of the liquor
> sellers.' 1

despite the local option clause in the party's platform.
He opposed the government legislation which introduced
local option and was reputed to have been given a free hand
on the issue by the party managers.[2] When a party member
strongly opposed the party on a particular issue, he was
probably not forced to vote with the party. His support on
most other issues was too important for the party to create
a clash on one piece of legislation. Actions of this type,
however, were exceptional after 1904. M.L.A.s sometimes
threatened to take a stand against the party but were often
not forced to make a decision. Robert Booth, an extreme
Protestant, claimed he did not regard the question of free

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1. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.20, p.2571.

2. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.26, p.138.

education as a party matter and that, if it were, he would not vote with his party.[1] Another protestant reputedly attacked the government for its failure to ensure fair treatment of Protestants in the public service but did not threaten to leave the party.[2] Group interests within the government party were seldom seen as important enough to destroy a piece of government legislation; when the attorney-general in 1905 added a clause to the local option bill, allowing publicans eight years grace if an electorate had voted for total abolition, the temperance members of the Liberal party voted for the clause, which they disliked, for fear of defeating the bill as a whole and thus possibly causing the resignation of the ministry. Party allegiance was nearly always stronger than group alignment, particularly when the collective party identification increased after 1904. There was only one occasion when a cluster analysis of a parliament in New South Wales showed the existence of a specific group within a government party. In 1898-1899 a group of freetraders opposed Reid because of his support of the federal constitution in the second referendum and determined to defeat him at the first opportunity. They voted against their party leader on several occasions and appear as a distinct group in the cluster analysis.[3] This group later founded the short-lived Democratic League of New South Wales.[4] In all other government parties there was no distinct group who opposed the ministry, although individuals members often did. This supports the view that, whereas the party allowed members to oppose the party on specific issues, its discipline was usually strong enough to prevent the consistent disloyalty of a coherent group.

Groups in Opposition Parties in New South Wales

As we have seen, opposition parties were usually less disciplined than government parties and their members had

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1. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.22, p.290-1.

2. R.J. Anderson, The Watchman, 22/5/05.

3. Haynes, Cotton, J.C.L. Fitzpatrick, Fegan and Nicolson can be identified as a distinct group.

4. D.T., 14/2/00.

a greater freedom to vote as they pleased on a wider range
of issues. Since they were not committed to support a
ministry, several groups within the opposition party can be
identified from the cluster analysis or from documentary
sources. However, in every case these internal divisions
disappeared when the party took office.

Regional groups can be identified within the opposition
protectionists in 1894-5 and in 1898-9. In those divisions
in 1894-5 when the party was most divided - that half of the
divisions which can be termed the 'low cohesion' set[1] -
four M.L.A.s from the Riverina consistently voted together
and in 1898 these members, with some other local members,
were considered to be part of a solid regional group.[2] In
1894 a further set of three members from the Southern
Tablelands also voted together.[3] In 1898-9 five M.L.A.s
from neighbouring northern electorates consistently voted
together in a low cohesion set of divisions with agreement
scores usually over .90[4] and three other northern members
had high scores with this group.[5] This set of divisions
included several votes on public works and on the timing of
parliamentary sittings - both matters of considerable
importance to country members who were faced with problems

1. To obtain a low cohesion set of divisions, all those
   divisions on which the party was not solid are ranked
   according to R.I.C. and then are subdivided into two
   groups at the median R.I.C. A cluster analysis of
   the high cohesion set can be used to discover when
   individuals or small groups do not vote with the main
   party; the low cohesion set usually indicates the
   distinct groups within the party when it was badly
   divided.

2. Those who appear as a group in the analysis are Hayes
   (M.L.A for the Murray), T. Fitzpatrick (Murrumbidgee),
   Chanter (Deniliquin) and Gormly (Wagga Wagga). In
   1898 Byrne (Hay), T. Griffith (Albury) and Abbott
   (Wentworth) were included by the press. D.T., 17/8/98.

3. O'Sullivan (Queanbeyan), Rose (Argyle), Chapman (Braidwood).

4. Cruickshank (Inverell), Wright (Glen Innes), Levien
   (Quirindi), W. Piddington (Uralla-Walcha),Sawers (Armidale).

5. Perry (Ballina), Pyers (the Richmond), McLaughlin (Raleigh).

of regular travel to their distant electorates. When Lyne formed a ministry in 1899, these regional voting groups within the protectionists disappeared because party discipline was now demanded on a wider range of issues.

Freetrade members generally represented city or suburban electorates and, with the exception of high agreement scores between the two Newcastle members, Dick and Gilbert, in 1901, no regional groupings can be identified. Regional groups were more obvious in the protectionist party when in opposition because its members generally represented rural seats and came from regions in which the electorates had a greater identity of interest with one another than could be found in city or suburban areas.

Occasionally the cluster analysis indicated the existence of factions within an opposition which can not be explained in regional terms. In 1894 an examination of the scores of individual protectionists with members of the other two parties suggested that three groups with different attitudes towards these parties existed within the protectionist party, even though the agreement scores within the party did not show that the men in these groups co-operated among themselves. The scores of members with other parties suggested that one section of the party was strongly opposed to the Labor party and less opposed to the freetraders;[1] a second group was equally opposed to both parties[2] while a third section was more strongly opposed to the freetraders than to the Labor party. The last group included the more radical members of the party.[3] Even though the members of each of these groups may not have co-operated among themselves, these results illustrated internal party divisions.

1. Dibbs, T. Fitzpatrick, Kelly, See, Morgan, McFarlane.

2. Perry, Kidd, Copeland, Rawlinson, Ewing.

3. Rose, Barnes, T. Jones, Carroll, O'Sullivan, Miller, Chanter, Pyers, Ross, Gormly, Crick, Wood, Stevenson, F. Clarke. O'Sullivan and Miller joined the Labor party in 1910 and 1901 respectively; Wood was elected in 1894 as an Independent Laborite; Gormly, Rose, Crick and Chanter were champions of the small settlers. See A.W. Martin: The Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South Wales, p.316-8.

Between 1899 and 1902 the Freetrade party was badly divided and distinct voting groups within the party can be identified. After Reid's resignation, some of his ex-ministerial colleagues were the only members to oppose Lyne's ministry with any consistency.[1] After 1901 the party was split, with one group regularly opposing the government, another supporting it on many occasions[2] and many of its members being between these two positions. Although there is no obvious connection between these members, the lack of any cause for the party to follow and the resulting freedom of voting can explain this fragmented opposition. When Carruthers became leader and opened his anti-socialist campaign, these groups within the party disappeared.

Generally, regional and voting groups can only be found in opposition parties where discipline was more relaxed than in government parties. Although groups within parties clearly continued to exist, they became absorbed into the party and presumably pressed for local concessions more often within the party rooms than on the floor of the house. This change was yet another sign of the increasing dominance of party in determining the behaviour of M.L.A.s.

Groups in the Tasmanian Parliament

The more relaxed discipline of Tasmanian politics before 1909 and the small size of the house reduced the necessity for any formal links among groups in either government or opposition parties, although some groups of this nature did exist.

In March 1894 a caucus of country members, convened by a government supporter, discussed the ministry's legislative proposals.[3] In 1903 a 'Country' party, whose members came from both sides of the house, discussed Propsting's occupier's tax and assessment bill.[4] In 1909

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1. Brunker, Cook, Hogue, Young.

2. Latimer, Millard, Brunker, Moxham, McKenzie often voted with the government; Gilbert, Dick, Levy, Lonsdale, J. Fitzpatrick, Fleming and Nobbs often opposed it. The party leader, Lee, belonged to neither group.

3. M., 30/3/94.

4. Daily Telegraph (Launceston) 2/10/03, 3/10/03.

Hope was called the "chairman of the Farmer's Party in the last parliament".[1] In none of these cases did the groups hold regular meetings or pursue any consistent programme. In a small house formal ties between members with similar interests was unnecessary.

Between 1904 and 1909 the government party included most of the members who supported the liquor interests while the opposition contained most of the temperance advocates. The premier, Evans, was an ex-president of the Southern Tasmanian Licensed Victuallers' Association[2] while the National Association which supported the ministry received donations from the Cascades brewery.[3] The leader of the opposition introduced a local option bill which was supported by the churches[4] but defeated by the government.[5] However after the fusion of 1909 the different opinions within the party on the temperance question were usually subordinated to the good of the party as a whole. The only division in 1912 when ten of the fourteen Liberals were not solid was on a temperance question, so the split within the party on this issue remained but did not hinder it from acting together on a broad range of other issues.

Less demanding party discipline in Tasmania also resulted in regular regional groupings before 1909. In the 1894-5 parliament, a group of members from Hobart and the surrounding electorates of Glenorchy and Kingborough[6] voted together fairly consistently and supported the government in vital divisions. A second group of country members can just be identified, even though some of its members were regarded as government supporters and others voted with the

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1. _North-West Advocate_, 28/4/09.

2. _Daily Telegraph_ (Launceston), 16/7/03.

3. _M._, 18/12/05, 19/12/05.

4. _M._, 13/8/06, 14/8/06.

5. _M._, 13/8/06, 25/8/06.

6. Crowther and Gill (both Kingborough), Hamilton (Glenorchy), Bradley, Crisp, Mulcahy and Hiddlestone (various Hobart electorates). The other two Hobart M.H.A.s were ministers.

opposition when the fate of the ministry was at stake.[1]
Furthermore, these two groups opposed each other on eight
divisions which divided the house on town versus country
lines.

Distinct regional groups also can be identified in
the parliaments between 1903 and 1909. Among the supporters
of the Propsting government was one group of northern
M.H.A.s[2] and another of Launceston members.[3] When Evans
took office, he was supported by a group of five country
members.[4] After the election of 1906 a further three
M.H.A.s joined this group.[5] At the same time two M.H.A.s
from electorates near Hobart consistently voted together.[6]

After 1909 the regional groupings disappeared because
party discipline became stricter. In the earlier years
members had often been able to vote in a division to suit
the interests of their electorate, regardless of their
party affiliation. Members from the same or adjoining
constituencies co-operated and voted together on matters
affecting their electorate, even though they may have been
members of different parties.[7] Strict party discipline
finally subordinated the interests of these groups to
those of the party as a collective unit. It is likely
that regional interests were now considered in party meetings
and did not cause members to vote against their party so
often.

Individual Members and Their Party

In a previous chapter I explained the views that members
had of their own independence and the restrictions which

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1. Dumaresq (Longford), Archer (Selby) were pro-Government.
   McKenzie (Wellington), von Stieglitz (Evandale) and
   Woollnough (Sorell) opposed it.

2. Allen (Westbury), Bennett (Cambria), Gibson (N. Esk),
   Murray (Latrobe), Youl (Longford).

3. Batchelor, Sadler, Storrer.

4. Allen, Murray, Hope (Kentish), C. Mackenzie (Wellington),
   Wood (Cumberland).

5. R. Mackenzie (N. Esk), Best (Deloraine), Bennett.

6. Rattle (Glenorchy), Brownell (Franklin).

7. C.B.M. Fenton, Launceston Examiner, 24/6/96.

these views placed on the development of the party. These
theoretical views did not change during this period, but
the actual attitude of members towards the parties did.

Members occasionally voted against specific issues when
they disagreed with party policy. In all parliaments, party
members sometimes coupled an announcement of their intention
to oppose the party on particular pieces of legislation to a
general statement of loyalty to the party. In 1895 P.H.
Morton opposed the introduction of a land tax and stated he
felt bound,

> notwithstanding that I belong to the party now in
> power, which I have supported right through, to
> point out where I think the Government are wrong.[1]

In 1905 S.J. Kearney opposed the North Coast railway bill
and stated,

> While I am a supporter of the Government, giving
> them support where I think they deserve it, I did
> not come into the House with a view to assisting
> them to pursue a spirited policy of public works.[2]

His defence of his defection - the right of all members to
select the issues which he would support his party without
necessarily becoming estranged from that party - was similar
to that of Morton. What did change, however, was the general
nature of issues on which this opposition took place. Morton
opposed the party on an issue which had been a central part
of Reid's electoral manifesto. He himself had opposed the
land tax in the campaign and, despite Reid's promises, was
not electorally bound to support it. After 1904 the members
were generally identified with the party programme and
expected to support the legislation which implemented it.

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1. NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.7276. See also explanation of
   defection from the Protectionist party on the Income
   Tax Bill: Willis, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.6998,
   Chapman, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.6996.

2. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.24, p.3091. See also Fleming's
   statement quoted in chapter 6, p.127 and Levy's
   statement on the District Courts Amendment Act which
   ran 'How can I conscientiously vote against the
   motion for the recommittal, however much I may desire
   to be loyal to my party and the Attorney General? I
   do not look at this Bill from a party standpoint'.
   NSWPD Series 2, Vol.19, pp.1617.

Often backbenchers defended their opposition to the party
on specific issues by pointing out that this legislation had
not been part of the policy which they, as party members, had
been pledged to support. Some of the Liberals who opposed
the government savings bank bill in 1904 were careful to
explain away their disloyalty in those terms.[1] The only party
member to defect on legislation concerning the party's
electoral programme was Broughton who opposed the liquor bill
- and the reasons for this vote have already been indicated.
Most of the Liberal defections were on minor issues which may
have been relevant to particular problems but were not a
central part of the government's legislation.

Often this backbench opposition was caused by the clash
of party policy and the demands of the M.P.'s electorate.
When the fate of the ministry was not in the balance, a
member often opposed his party because of the votes which
such an action might win him in his own electorate. In
1904 three Liberal M.L.A.s from coastal electorates opposed
a government bill which imposed charges on goods being
transhipped for export because of the detrimental effect of
such a charge on coastal trade.[2] Several M.L.A.s from the
North Coast opposed the building of a Maitland-Grafton
railway because they did not want to see all their trade
being sent to Sydney before export. They argued that a line
from the Tablelands to the Coast was a more urgent requirement.[3]
In 1906 pressure from several suburban M.L.A.s forced Car-
ruthers to drop the clause in his local government bill which
introduced a Greater Sydney municipality.[4]

1. D.T. 4/11/04. The bill was opposed by nine Liberals.

2. Wood, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.16, p.1315-1316; Coleman, NSWPD
      Series 2, Vol.16, p.1319. The third M.L.A. who opposed
      the bill was Morton.

3. F.J. Thomas, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.19, pp.2172-2174; Kearney,
      NSWPD Series 2, Vol.24, p.3091.

4. D.T., 10/10/06. For other examples: in 1894 Moore opposed
      a Land Bill because of its possible effects on small
      settlers in his electorate (NSWPD Series 1, Vol.76,
      p.4608). Millard opposed a Land Bill for similar reasons
      in 1905 (NSWPD Series 2, Vol.21, p.4721). In 1905, R.J.
      Anderson, M.L.A. for Balmain, supported a motion demanding
      the local tendering for a bar dredge on the grounds that
      the contract could create employment in his electorate
      (NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.1009).

Even before 1904 opposition to the party for local
reasons seldom forced a member to leave the party, although
this could occur. When Reid proposed to remove the protective
tariff on dairy produce, three South Coast M.L.A.s asked
him to review the decision. When he refused to change his mind
two accepted the decision,[1] but the third, always a doubtful
supporter of the freetrade party, decided that the decision
forced him to join the opposition.[2] In 1898, as we have seen,
Reid's attitude to the sugar tariff forced several protec-
tionists to vote with him and against their party on a
censure motion. Generally, however, local pressures were
only a secondary influence on members and after 1904 no
member deserted his party on a major issue for local reasons.

While M.P.s still voted against their party on less
important matters after 1904, their attitude towards the
party and the government shows a more significant change.
In the early years party loyalty was seen in terms of
support for a ministry. Later the support was directed
towards the collective identity of the party and the cabinet
was regarded as part of the party leadership and not as a
totally separate body. We have already seen how the
increasingly frequent party meetings allowed members to
criticise and participate in government actions; at the
same time the party itself became the object of backbench
loyalty.

In 1894 the majority of freetraders re-affirmed their
support for Reid before he formed a cabinet, but one
member, W.H. Wilks, claimed he would reserve his support
until Reid had announced his ministry's policy.[3] Three
months later a second party member threatened that, if the
ministry did not fulfil its promises within eleven months,
he would cross the floor of the house.[4] When the 'party

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1. Reid to Morton 30/5/95. Morton Papers M.L. A3039.

2. D.T., 11/5/95. Alexander Campbell deserted the paty,
      Morton and Millard remained loyal.

3. S.M.H., 1/8/94.

4. S.M.H., 21/11/94 (Affleck).

of revenge' condemned Reid in 1899, its members claimed
that it was Reid who had deserted his principles and that
they were the only true freetraders.[1] The fact that they
had revolted against Reid personally rather than against
the Freetrade party generally was emphasised in 1901 when
these members rejoined the party directly after Reid had
resigned the party leadership.[2] The basic justification
for these actions was set out by Haynes:

> It is the duty of a man, if he is animated by
> any principle at all, to recollect that when
> he follows another as a leader, he follows him
> only as the figurehead of a set of principles.
> The moment he plays false to those principles,
> there is nothing to do but to leave him. [3]

During the See administration some members who deserted
the government justified their actions by claiming that the
government had shifted its position and that they had been
forced to leave the party if they were to remain consistent.[4]
In these instances, the party had become almost synonymous
with the government; party membership entailed support of
a specific ministry. If a member was dissatisfied with
the government, he was forced to leave the party.

As the party developed a collective identity, so loyalty
was directed more to the party, less to the leader. After
1904 Fell and Storey, both occasional critics of the Liberal
government, were able to attack the party leaders without
leaving the party. Fell argued that he was a loyal party
member, but that it was the duty of a backbencher to keep his
party on the right path by persistent criticism whenever it
was justified.[5] Storey was more violent, particularly in
his denunciations of Carruthers whom he regarded as a
political opportunist and a poor leader.[6] Yet at the same

1. D.T., 10/4/99, 22/6/99, 30/8/99, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.98,
      pp.54-7 (Fegan), pp.65-8 (J. Fitzpatrick), pp.88-91
      (Cotton), pp.101-110 (Haynes).

2. D.T., 17/4/01.

3. NSWPD, Series 1, Vol.99, p.183.

4. D.T., 1/4/03 (George), 15/4/03 (Broughton), NSWPD Series
      2, Vol.5, p.258 (O'Connor).

5. D.T., 13/10/04, 10/2/06.

6. D.T., 8/3/06, 7/2/07.

time he claimed to be a good party member.[1] In 1906 some
Liberal M.L.A.s were supposed to be dissatisifed with the
ministry but reports pointedly denied that anyone was
thinking of leaving the party.[2] Since the party was now
the object of loyalty and not the cabinet, there was still
scope within the party for those who disagreed with
ministerial decisions or the efficiency of the current
leadership.

In Tasmania, this change of emphasis occurred more
rapidly. After the first fusion meeting of 1909, some
Liberal members at first stated that they were only prepared
to support the Lewis government if it fulfilled certain
conditions.[3] When the government failed to act as required,
these members brought down the ministry in October 1909.
After the re-fusion there were no further demands of this
nature. Party meetings increased dramatically in frequency
an'd backbenchers were able to identify more completely with
the party because they now had scope to criticise the
government; when legislation on the controversial wages
boards was introduced, Lewis called three party meetings to
discuss amendments.[4] The party was thus fully identified
with the administration; loyalty was now to the party,
rather than to the personalities included in the cabinet.

CONCLUSIONS

Three basic points of significance arise from this
analysis. Firstly, formally organized groups, which normally
existed only within the government parties, often represented
a section of that party which wanted to promote certain
demands or interests. Whether or not they claimed to be
independent of the party, they never voted, or tried to vote,
as a body against the party which they supported. They were
in fact a useful forum within the government party for a
discussion of the administration and for the development of
proposals on matters of particular interest to others. As
the party developed machinery which allowed backbenchers

1. D.T., 21/6/06.

2. D.T., 13/7/06.

3. M., 30/6/09 (Ewing) 2/7/09 (Evans, Best, Sadler) 7/7/09
    (Rattle).

4. Lewis Diaries, 15/9/11, 21/9/11, 27/9/11.

within its framework to comment on government affairs, so these groups disappeared and the members became fully identified with the party. By expanding its influence, the party increased its control over members; they were inextricably connected with the party's actions because they could participate, however nominally, in making decisions.

Of course, this collective identity reduced the flexibility of the non-Labor parties. In the early period distinct groups could be formed within the party. After the party had become recognised as a body working towards a specific goal, any group whose interests clashed with that of the party was forced to subordinate itself to the party's aims or become separate from it. Consequently, the Country party later had to form a separate group from the main non-Labor parties. At earlier periods when the party identity was less distinct, it had been able to operate as a group within a major party.

Secondly, the policy of the cabinet became more fully identified with the party that supported it. At the beginning of the period, the policy was very largely that of the cabinet; by the end of the period the increasing alignment of members with the party and with its platform ensured that the party as a collective body became responsible in part for the government's policy and certainly became more fully identified with it.

Third, the growth of a party identity permitted members who were dissatisfied with the leadership to remain within the party. Before 1904 the party was invariably considered almost synonymous with the leadership and the cabinet. A dissatisfied member had little option but to leave the party. After 1904 he was able to remain within the party because criticism was now permitted and the party, not the leaders, were the object of loyalty. The fragile inter-personal relationship which had tied a member to his leader and his party[1] were replaced by the more explicit bonds of a recognised group, the party.

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1. For a full discussion of the changing role of the leader, see below chapter 12.

In general during this period the groups within the
parties became less distinct as the party increased its
control on a broader range of issues and developed processes
by which members became more fully identified with their
party. While party membership had anyway usually been
the most important reason for their voting habits, by 1907
its greater influence, especially compared to local or
group demands, was now widely recognised. An M.P.'s
role was known to be that of a party member.

PART III: The non-Labor Parties in the Electorate

Chapter 8

Some Aims, Assumptions and Problems

of the non-Labor Parties in the Electorate

Introduction

In the thirty years between 1885 and 1915, electoral
politics were transformed in both states, chiefly because
parties, and not only the Labor party, destroyed the independence
of the candidate in this sphere of politics too. This change
took place gradually and had a number of different facets.
For instance, broad issues of state-wide relevance became
more important than parochial ones; parties developed an
image of themselves as a collective identity which they put
before all electors; they co-ordinated campaigns, propaganda
and finance; they devised new procedures for selecting party
candidates and it became generally recognized that elections
were contests between parties. The importance of local
connections for the election of members was steadily reduced.

Parties had to develop organizations which were
designed either to replace the political methods which had
been used successfully during the faction period or to
adapt these techniques to their own use. Since the Labor
party was based on a trade union movement which had played
almost no effective part in pre-party elections and which
gave it an organizational foundation on which to build, it
could develop political techniques which were different
from those of the faction period. The non-Labor parties had
no such choice; many of their members had been in parliament
during the faction period and were familiar with the earlier
methods of winning elections; in addition they had to build
on the local political connections which had been developed
during the period of faction politics because they had no
other social or organizational base, similar to that of
Labor, on which they could rely. They had to design their
organization and procedures in such a way that they could
adapt earlier political techniques to their own advantage.

In order to explain how the non-Labor parties shaped
their organization, I will first examine in this chapter

the assumptions on which the non-Labor parties were based, the aims of the parties and the problems which the expanding parties had to face, particularly those problems created by existing political traditions. In the next chapter, I will show how these parties expanded their activities by co-ordinating campaigns and finance, by formulating a party policy and generally by acting as a collective organization. In other words, I will illustrate how the parties developed the available political resources, such as ideology, finance and organization, to their own ends. In chapter ten, I will show how the non-Labor parties developed their methods as a response to the existing pressures of the political environment and with the intention of adapting existing political methods to their own advantage.

Some Basic Assumptions on the Role of Electoral Organizations

All members of non-Labor parties were agreed on two basic principles which underlaid all electoral organization. They believed that a party should represent all classes and that the electoral organization should have no control over parliamentary representatives. In both these areas they distinguished themselves from the Labor party because it openly claimed to represent the interests of the working classes and because the parliamentary Labor party was supposed to be the mouthpiece of its extra-parliamentary organization. While these assumptions may or may not have accurately defined the position of these parties, they are important because they imposed restraints on the type of electoral methods which the party could develop. The party could not adopt electoral techniques which were obviously contrary to them.

In 1903 a Liberal and Reform Association pamphlet specifically claimed that the organization was supported by, and legislated for, all classes and suggested that representation of any one class, whether conservative or radical, would be a violation of the basic principles of democracy.[1] Individual members also claimed that they represented all sections and classes in the community and denied that the Labor party was

1. Liberal and Reform Association Officers and Platform, Sydney 1903, M.L. 329, 21/L.

the true representative of the working classes.[1]

In Tasmania the National Association claimed that it represented all sections of society and that its main task was to elect candidates who would agree to

> act as an independent representative of the
> community as a whole, to support legislation
> on broad and truly liberal principles and
> oppose class domination.   2

The Tasmanian Liberal League also stated that it had been formed to forward the interests of all the community.[3] In neither state did a non-Labor party accept that it should act as the representative of a single class or that its policy was not designed to benefit the whole community.

Secondly, non-Labor members consistently argued that an electoral organization had no right to dictate to or attempt to control those representatives which it had helped to elect. The organizations themselves accepted this limitation on their powers without concern. The National Association clearly stated that its aim was

> to secure for our representatives in Parliament
> the exercise of their independent judgement
> unhampered by any body of men.   4

In 1909, Ewing tried to use the electoral organization as a power base in a bid for the premiership. He claimed that the Progressive League had endorsed the premier, Evans, on condition that he allowed the newly-elected anti-socialist members to elect their own leader. His story was corroborated by the secretary of the League but denied by Evans, by two other M.H.A.s present at the same meeting and by the chairman of the committee which endorsed the candidates.[5] The executive council of the league declared that no such agreement had taken place and stated

1. For instance, Carruthers, D.T. 24/6/04, 26/7/04, Law, D.T., 1/7/04; Storey, D.T., 8/1/04; MacMillan, D.T., 26/7/04; G. Anderson, D.T., 11/6/04.

2. M., 19/4/04, 12/12/06.

3. M., 21/7/09. For a development of this theme, see Ashworth and Ashworth, Proportional Representation, p.22, 83, 113-117, 134.

4. M., 19/4/04.

5. M., 1/3/09, 2/3/09, 3/3/09.

> That this Committee is of the opinion that the
> object of the Progressive League with regard to
> elections is to promote the return of candidates
> representing the moderate party and opposed to
> Labor socialistic views and must be confined to
> this.
>
> That it is beyond the province of the League to
> discuss, and the League does not discuss and
> does not attempt to discuss, how Ministries
> should be formed or generally to impose conditions
> on the conduct of approved candidates in the event
> of their being elected, with regard to matters of
> administration.   1

The Liberal League similarly stated that it had no right to
give instructions to members of parliament.[2]

In New South Wales, Carruthers insisted that the
electoral organization should not try to dictate to the
parliamentary party. He was prepared to report the progress
of his government's legislation to meetings of the council
of the Liberal and Reform Association,[3] which he convened
on his own initiative, but he denied that the council could
advise him on how to act, and

> in conclusion he asked the ladies and gentlemen
> present [at a Liberal and Reform Association
> Council meeting] not to continue the battle for
> reform so ardently as many appeared desirous of
> doing. _The Government was doing all the fighting
> now._ 4

The power to decide what actions should be taken lay
entirely in the hands of parliamentarians and not of the
electoral organization. On another occasion Carruthers
stated that he refused to listen

> to those who wished to tell Parliament how it
> should do its work and whose dictation the
> Government claims to have properly resisted.[5]

Even John Stinson, the president of the People's Reform League
and a man who was deeply suspicious of the sincerity and

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1. _M._, 4/3/09.

2. _M._, 2/2/12.

3. _D.T._, 22/12/04, 15/12/05.

4. _D.T._, 4/9/05, my italics.

5. _D.T._, 22/12/04.

integrity of politicians, agreed that, once elected, M.L.A.s were free to act as they wished in the assembly.[1] In both states the independence of elected members was a fundamental article of faith about party action.

The Aims of the non-Labor Parties

The basic aim of all non-Labor organizations was to win elections; all other functions were subsidiary. The party originally evolved primarily as an electoral machine because of the need to organize electoralcontests to prevent seats being lost by split votes. From this basic function sprang other duties which were usually designed to increase the efficiency of the party as an electoral machine and to provide the numbers necessary to form a government in the parliament. In New South Wales improved pre-selection techniques were necessitated by the electoral bill of 1893 which created single-member seats and ordered that all contests be held on the same day. Since the first-past-the-post system was used, a vote split between two candidates of the same party would allow a candidate from another party to be elected on a minority vote. Pre-selection and discipline among party candidates was the first requirement of electoral organization; other duties developed from this base.

The Freetrade Council was designed primarily to arbitrate between freetrade candidates who had already announced their intention to stand and consequently to prevent the loss of seats by split votes. It was concerned only with selecting winners and was not worried about what other views a candidate may have held, provided he was a freetrader. Reid stated that the Freetrade Council was only intended to arbitrate on those occasions when a candidate was not unanimously agreed upon locally and then claimed

> the most important and practical question
> arbitration can be invoked to determine is the
> name of the freetrade candidate who commands
> the greatest amount of confidence in the con-
> stituency. The only definition we would attach
> to the term 'freetrade' candidate is this - one
> who pledges himself to tariff reform and also
> to oppose the present and any future Protectionist
> government. [2]

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1. D.T., 10/8/03. See also Ashworth and Ashworth, Proportional Representation, p.7 for similar views.

2. S.M.H., 2/6/94.

The Freetrade Council did not design any formula by which arbitration was to be carried out beyond this general criterion of local strength; each case was considered on an _ad hoc_ basis. Furthermore, it did not extend its activities beyond the endorsement or selection of candidates. Party was regarded as an unfortunate necessity, a product of a need for some organization in order to secure electoral success.

In the following eight years, the non-Labor parties did not create any organization with much more comprehensive objectives, although particular bodies did sometimes fulfil additional functions. The Liberal and Federal party of 1898 produced candidates to stand for seats which may otherwise have been uncontested;[1] the National Protection Union had a detailed constitution which included the regular election of officials and a branch network.[2] However none of these organizations effectively contested more than one state election or had any continuity of existence. They were still primarily organizations formed for the purpose of winning particular elections. The general attitude to parties is exemplified by an unguarded remark of O'Sullivan who claimed after the 1901 election victory,

> We had better disband now, _we_ can always get a
> fresh set [of men] at another election.   3

He saw no necessity for organization except at election time, because activity during that period was sufficient for its purpose of electing party M.L.A.s.

The first organization in New South Wales which deliberately expanded its functions was the Liberal and Reform Association. Carruthers determined to alter the whole concept of party organization after his election as leader of the

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1.   _Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes_, 1898.
         M.L. A2668.

2.   _Constitution of the National Protection Union_. (National
         Library, N-331-880994).   In 1898, the heads of 100
         local firms had joined the Party and ninety-seven local
         branches had been formed.   See Schey, _D.T._, 23/3/98.
         After federation the National Protection Union became
         wholly absorbed in federal politics.

3.   Reported by O.C. Beale to A. Deakin, 15/2/09.   _Deakin
         Papers_, N.L. No.663.

opposition. He condemned the old methods of organization
by which an electoral body was formed in the two months
before an election and realised that a party should have
continuity of existence, a large participating membership
and careful articulation between all sections of the party.[1]
The purpose of the party was still to win elections, but
several subsidiary objectives were introduced to facilitate
that aim.

The Liberal and Reform Association intended to produce
a policy or platform on which all candidates could campaign,
to form a branch network with well-defined links between the
central body and the branches, to permit members to participate
in decisions and to allow the election of officials at all
levels of the party. The organization was to consist of
several constituent parts, all of which had distinct roles
to fulfil in electoral contests. Consequently the basic
functions of party grew more complex, even if the aim
remained the same.

In Tasmania the aims of all organizations were also
electoral success. The National Association's organization
was never well co-ordinated nor did it have any clear
conception of what it should do as a body to assist candidates
in elections. Its successor, the Progressive League, had
a more complex constitution, but its methods were never
well-defined or effective.[2] The Liberal League, however,
carefully allocated responsibility for local organization, and
ensured direct articulation and the participation of members
in decisions. Its subsidiary aim of producing a viable and
effective organization forced it to participate in a greater
range of political activities; therefore its organization
grew more complex.

In both states the main aim of the parties was to win
elections. To achieve it, they developed organizations which
responded to existing environmental pressures and used methods,

1. D.T., 14/10/02, 22/10/02, 25/11/02, 20/12/02 and
particularly 25/10/02.

2. P.M. Weller. The Organization of the Early non-Labor
parties in Tasmania, T.H.R.A., Vol.18, No.4, October
1971, p.140.

such as the local pre-selection of candidates, as a means of
adapting already existing vote-winning techniques to their
own advantage. At the same time, they expanded their activities
and developed a 'party' approach to some of the problems which
a political campaign created. These new functions were
originally carried out only because they helped the party
achieve electoral success. Before considering how their
actions matched up to their aims, it is necessary to examine
the problems which any developing party had to face and
which were caused by the traditional political methods which
had been utilized by faction politicians.

Some Problems facing a Developing Party

The techniques of faction politics could neither be
absorbed nor removed at one step. Many of them continued to
be useful in winning votes throughout the period. The most
obvious problem facing any party organization was the fact
that many candidates were elected by virtue of their local
connections within the constituency and consequently for
personal, rather than for party, reasons. A few examples
of the close ties of M.L.A.s with their constituencies in
New South Wales will illustrate this point.

In Maitland, John Gillies, an M.L.A. from 1891 to 1911,
was proprietor of the local newspaper, an alderman, secretary
and treasurer of the Volunteer Water Brigade and the Northern
Hunt Club and on the committee of the Maitland Hospital
Board and the Hunter River Agricultural Association.[1] He
also consistently attended local functions.[2] In Tenterfield
C.A. Lee - who in parliament was as strongly a party adherent
as Gillies was a locally oriented independent - was a local
storekeeper, an ex-mayor, president of the Hospital Board,
on the committee of the local agricultural association and
delegate of the Sunnyside branch of the Farmers and Settlers'
Association to that body's state conference.[3] Both these

1. A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative
   Assembly. p.85.

2. Maitland Mercury, 18/3/04.

3. A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative
   Assembly, p.126. Tenterfield Star, 2/7/98.

members were recognised as efficient 'roads and bridges'
members, but many others had similar records of local service
which gained them votes on a personal basis. These local
connections were strongest in country areas where a strong
sense of community may have existed, but they could also be
found in suburban seats. For instance, John Nobbs, the
Liberal whip after 1901, was called the 'Father of Granville',
had been responsible for naming the suburb in which he had
lived for thirty years, had founded the local Australian
Natives Association and was president of the local fruitgrowers'
association.[1]

Sitting members invariably had a record of service to
the locality as M.L.A.s which they could use as a reason for
securing re-election. Haynes[2] and Rose[3] both ran columns
in the local papers in which they reported their successes
in representing local interests; Barnes at Gundagai was said
to have had no ideas beyond those associated with his
electorate.[4] Even the Treasurer, John See, based an appeal
for re-election in 1894 on the amount of money he had
procured for the electorate during his term of office.[5]

Failure to act as a local agent, even in suburban seats,
could damage a member's electoral prospects. In 1898 a
meeting of Burwood electors claimed that they had been virtually
disenfranchised for four years because McMillan had shown no
interest in local affairs. They demanded that a man who put
the electorate first be chosen and in the election McMillan was
defeated by a local mediocrity.[6] In 1898 the Gundagai Times
demanded that a local man be elected because he alone would
know the needs of the constituency and complained

> we have been represented in the past by big-wigs
> in the city who thought their only requirement
> was the commission to vote on party issues. 7

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1. Martin and Wardle, Members of the Legislative Assembly, p.161.
2. Wellington Gazette, 24/2/98.
3. Goulburn Evening Post, 6/1/98.
4. D.T., 3/7/94.
5. D.T., 10/7/94.
6. D.T., 11/6/98.
7. Gundagai Times, 19/4/98. Bruce Smith and J.H. Want had
   both recently held the seat.

In Ballina John Perry, the party whip in parliament, was
attacked on three grounds - Tintenbar still had no post
office, the unexpended road vote earmarked for Ballina had
been spent in neighbouring Lismore and there was still a
swamp in the middle of Ballina. His performance as a leading
member of his party in parliament was not considered relevant.[1]

Not surprisingly, a large number of members had some
personal connection with the constituency which they represented.

TABLE I: Percentage of M.L.A.s in Country Seats with Known
           Local Connections. 2

	1894		1898		1904	
	No.	%Local	No.	%Local	No.	%Local
Freetrade/Liberal	26	81	21	75	21	71
Protectionist/ Progressive	42	64	51	62	14	100

Since the Freetrade Party was city-based, the high
percentage of local men among its country M.L.A.s probably
indicated that local support was a useful addition to any
party vote, although the percentage declined slightly
during the period as the party became better organized. In
the Protectionist party, these connections may have been
less important because their policy was one that was
directly attractive to country voters. However, in 1904,
when the party's organization was poor, it is noticeable
that all the successful Progressive candidates had some local
connections. In all parties a fairly large percentage of
members for country seats had local connections. On those
occasions when candidates did not have any local ties, they
often emphasised that, in spite of this disadvantage, they
would still take special care of the interests of the
community.[3]   The need for a candidate who had a record of

1.   Richmond River Times, 14/7/98. Not surprisingly, one
     disillusioned and sensibly anonymous M.L.A. exclaimed
     "Hang reform! Blow ideals! I am nothing but a dancer
     on a departmental doormat." (Albury Banner, 31/5/01).

2.   Based on Wardle and Martin, Members of the Legislative
     Assembly and the brief biographies of new members pro-
     duced by the Daily Telegraph after each election. Local
     connections include business ties and past or present
     residence.

3.   e.g. Goulburn Evening Post, 28/6/98.

local service also meant that the non-Labor M.L.A.s were older and more successful in the society in which they lived than Labor members who could rely instead on trade union support.[1]

The importance of local connections and service as an influence on voting was explained by an M.L.A. in 1901 who pointed out that the local member was the only agent for the electorate,

> hence the result, frequently noted with suprise by those uninstructed in the workings of the system, that in country politics neither distinction nor eloquence nor acknowledged ability has been able to contend successfully with an established reputation for attention to local wants. 2

At the same time, parties were faced by a problem of jealousy between towns and regions which did not make any widespread organization work easily. In 1901 the Ballina Beacon objected to a speech in the town by the premier in favour of the local member, who was one of his ministers, and claimed

> the time has not yet come when a Grafton man can come to Ballina without protest and put his finger in the local election pie. 3

In the electorate of Gundagai, the rivalry of the two main towns in the electorate was so strong that the residents of one were noticeably loath to vote for a representative of the other. As a result this inter-town rivalry was probably as important as any party alignment in deciding the result of the election.[4]

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1. In 1901 the average age of the Progressives was 51.5 years, of Liberals 47.4 and of Labor 40.6. See V.M. Jansen. Social Background of Members of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly. 1901-59. M.Ec.Univ. of Sydney, 1962. p.48.

2. D.T., 6/4/01.

3. Ballina Beacon, 25/6/01.

4. In 1898 the Gundagai resident, who was not an impressive candidate, gained 54% of the Gundagai vote and only 0.8% of the Cootamundra vote. (Gundagai Times, 2/8/98). In 1901 a different Gundagai resident received 67% of the Gundagai vote and 11% at Cootamundra (Gundagai Times. 5/7/01). In both elections the same two Cootamundra residents contested the poll and together received 33% and 32% of the Gundagai vote in the 1898 and 1901 elections respectively and 98% and 89% of the Cootamundra vote.

Often local jealousy was aimed at politicians from Sydney and any candidate imported by a party was regarded with suspicion. The local party members feared lest a Sydney clique might take

> every opportunity of jockeying local men out of
> the political hunt in order to send along the
> shoddy article from Sydney. 1

This distrust of Sydney-based politicians was widely expressed in all parts of the country.[2]

The party was entering a political arena where local services and connections were important in a successful election campaign. All the intricacies of electoral campaigning are best summarized in a lengthy quotation from a letter by a Progressive candidate for the Clyde in 1904. His opponent, Captain Millard, was a well-established local member who had held the seat since 1894.

> I would like you at once to make an effort to get
> the Tilba Tilba polling booth reinstated as it
> means a loss of nearly 70 votes to me if it is not.
> It is too evident that Tilba Tilba and Central Tilba
> fight each other - the relationship is like that
> of the Capulets and the Montagues in the play, and
> at Tilba Tilba a separate booth was held for many
> years. They blame Capt. Millard and his nominee
> Shepherd the returning officer for the Clyde and
> they unanimously avow that rather than go to
> Central Tilba to vote they will not vote at all.
> It all arises from Capt. M. [sic] refusing to nomin-
> ate a local popular storekeeper at Tilba Tilba named
> May for a J.P. while he got the storekeeper at
> Central Tilba made a J.P. The Tilba Tilba people
> waited on me to have it reinstated and guaranteed
> that everyone there would plump for me as a protest
> against Capt. M. and his nominees. This was one of
> his strongholds in the past; it takes in electors
> of Tilba Tilba, Digman's Creek and Mt. Dromedary,
> in all about 70 votes. It is a close go and I think
> I will beat him but it is necessary for me to get
> that block vote. Something must be done without
> delay. There were originally three booths, one at
> Mt. Dromedary, one at Tilba and one at Central Tilba
> and the original recommendation was to take Mt.
> Dromedary away. But when Millard saw the trouble
> that arose over the J.P. business and felt that
> they were all against him and knowing their strong
> antipathy for Central Tilba would prevent them from

1. _Quirindi Gazette_, 29/3/04.

2. _Richmond River Times_, 28/3/01, _Moruya Examiner_, 7/6/01,
   Goulburn Evening Post, 9/5/01.

going there to vote - in which he was right -
he, it is said, averted their influence against
them by getting the booth taken away. It must
be put back at any cost, as they have openly
declared if I can do that they will all go for
me. The Government can do it - they can even
control the conduct of the Returning Officer.
The feeling between them is that each place
is led by a man named Bates who are brothers in
a very large way but who are deadly opposed to
each other. The Bates of Central Tilba is
father-in-law of the deputy returning officer
for the Clyde and bosom friend of the Returning
Officer and Capt. Millard. 1

This extract shows the type of social connections and
local knowledge which a member could build up within an
electorate. A party had either to compete against these
connections or to develop an organization which could
turn them to its own advantage.

In Tasmania the small electorates and the absence of
any clear principle dividing the political groups ensured
that support from local connections was indispensable in
winning any election. It was a fairly common remark that
a strong candidate

was so thoroughly identified with the district
as to make his election ..... a foregone conclusion.[2]

M.H.A.s were regarded as local agents. The fact that
instruments of local government were weak, poorly financed
and dependent on the state government for what they did
get helped to produce a response which has been called a
"what's in it for us obsession".[3] Members were invariably
responsive to the needs of their electorate to the extent
that the Mercury suggested that in the Huon they did not
speak of 'one man, one vote', but of 'one man, one jetty'.[4]
Even the state treasurer told his electors to consider how
many roads and bridges he had got for the electorate.[5]

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1. J. Keenan to E. Brady 26/7/04. Ministerial Election
    Committee Papers, 1904. M.L. Uncat. 234.

2. Daily Telegraph, (Launceston), 19/12/93. Speaking of
    Frank Archer, a candidate for Selby.

3. H.J.W. Stokes. North-west Tasmania 1858-1910: p.217.

4. M., 15/8/92.

5. M., 16/3/03.

Local contacts were usually important. Many members were local landowners or had local business connections. Nearly all were well-established members of society. Often they had graduated to the assembly from minor public offices - many had experience as local mayors, aldermen and councillors or as district magistrates; sometimes they had both.

TABLE II: Percentage of non-Labor members in the Tasmanian House of Assembly with Official Positions in Local Government or with Experience as Magistrates. 1

	1895	1904	1910
Local Government	54	75	77
Magistrates	54	56	50
Total number of non-Labor M.H.A.s	37	32	18

In 1901 all four members for Launceston were simultaneously local aldermen. Clearly most members had a record of service to the community and probably had gained some votes for this reason. Furthermore, their earlier service acted as a sign that they were proven and respectable members of the community.

A further problem which faced parties in their early years of development was a distrust of the legitimacy of party action. Some candidates in 1894 denied that the party had any right to select candidates and that pre-selection was an usurpation of the rights of the electors.[2] In other electorates, committees put pressure on their candidates not to accept or submit to party nomination.[3] In 1901 one candidate described the Liberal party as

> a political Tammany ring, who were endeavouring to rob electors of their power and make mere voting machines out of them. 4

Even up until 1904 the claim that parties had no right to interfere with the elector's choice was still used, but more

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1. Based on details in Walch's Almanac, Hobart - an annual publication with details of all public positions held in Tasmania. As some members were both magistrates and local councillors, the figures are not additive.

2. G. Eager, D.T., 6/7/94, F. Cotton, S.M.H., 30/5/94.

3. J. Graham, S.M.H., 21/6/94, G. Anderson, S.M.H., 27/2/94, 12/5/94.

4. A. Allen, D.T., 14/6/01.

often as a justification by a candidate for his refusal to withdraw when unselected.[1] Therefore, in the early years of development, the parties had to prove their legitimacy so that electors and candidates would be prepared to accept party intervention and action.

In Tasmania, older members also regarded the emergence of electoral organizations with suspicion. In 1903, N.J. Brown wrote

> I have never consented, and never will consent, to be the delegate of any individuals or of any separate interests. Except as to questions upon which I may have arrived at a well-considered opinion, I give no pledge or promise. As to other matters that may claim attention, I can only say that I will act in accordance with my best judgement. 2

Henry Dumaresq, M.H.A. for Longford, refused to be 'interviewed' by the representatives of any League or organization.[3]

Furthermore the party also had to prove that it could be of assistance to candidates and could affect the result of elections - in 1894 Dowel O'Reilly showed considerable scepticism of the value of party organization when he said

> I must continue to respectfully doubt their [the Freetrade Council] ability to foist any repre- sentative on the electors of Parramatta against their united will. 4

Candidates often claimed to be independent[5] or stated that they stood only because of a local requisition[6] even after they had received party endorsement. Party effectiveness and party legitimacy had to be established by the non-Labor party before their methods could be fully accepted.

In order to explain how parties developed their methods, I will analyse their actions in two areas. First, I will

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1. J.S. Hawthorne, D.T., 2/5/04, F. Walsh, N.S.W. Election Handbills and Leaflets, M.L., Q329, 21/N.

2. Midland News, 28/2/03.

3. Caroline Dumaresq to Mary Dumaresq, 12/1/03. Dumaresq Papers, Mount Ireh, Longford.

4. S.M.H., 27/6/94.

5. McLean, S.M.H., 13/3/94.

6. Fowler, S.M.H., 14/6/94, Barton, S.M.H., 2/6/94.

examine how the non-Labor parties developed activities which
had not been attempted in earlier years such as campaign
co-ordination, policy and branch formation and the development
of centralised propaganda and finance. Then I will examine
how the parties moulded their organization to utilize those
factors which had been electorally important in the faction
period and which I have described here. In both chapters
I will show how the party developed a collective electoral
identity, how the acceptance of party methods increased and
how the organizations became more complex. In the final
chapter of this section I will consider the changing
relationship between the party and interest groups in the
community.

Chapter 9

The Growth of Party Control I :

The Expansion of Party Activities

Introduction:

In the faction period, politicians seldom co-ordinated their electoral campaigns, issued a common policy or announced their affiliation to any party. As the non-Labor parties developed, campaigns were gradually co-ordinated, policies more widely accepted and contests ceased to be between individuals and became struggles between well-defined groups. To trace this development, I will examine several aspects of party action which were new to politics in both states and which indicated the growth of a collective party identity.

The Development of Co-ordinated Campaigns

The willingness of party leaders to speak throughout the state on behalf of party candidates and in support of party policy was a clear indication that a non-Labor party was developing an identity. Candidates became more identified with the organization and in return expected assistance in the campaign. Therefore the ability of a party executive to co-ordinate its speakers, to identify and arouse supporters to work and vote for its candidates and to provide candidates where necessary was an indication that a party was developing and expanding its electoral techniques.

In 1894 leading politicians made no attempt to co-ordinate the campaign of their parties or to ensure that all parts of the state were provided with speakers to promote their cause. The Freetrade Council announced the places where Reid intended to speak and Reid, but not his leading lieutenants, made tours of rural districts. It is possible that the leading members of the freetrade party, most of whom were suburban M.L.A.s, did arrange their appearances in conjunction with the Freetrade Council, but no details are known. In 1898 the executive of the Liberal and Federal party co-ordinated the speaking appearances of its leading members. Reid toured several country areas before concentrating his campaign on Sydney and its suburbs. Leading party members spoke in marginal electorates, particularly

Ashburnham, in an attempt to swing seats to their party.
In Paddington, where the sitting member was ill and unable
to campaign, a series of meetings were organized for party
members to speak on his behalf. In Warringah, where the
executive only decided at the last minute to oppose the
Bartonite candidate, several speakers gave support to the
party candidate.[1] Party action was seen as an essential
part of the campaign, even though the party was only formed
three weeks before polling took place. In this respect the
campaign of 1898 was clearly different from that of 1894.

In 1904 the Liberal and Reform Association carefully
co-ordinated tours throughout the state. In the months
before the election a series of educative 'meet-the-electors'
meetings were held to lay the foundations of the campaign.[2]
As polling day approached, several leading members of the
party toured country areas and then addressed meetings mainly
in the city. Carruthers addressed twenty-six meetings in
the country and twenty-five in the Sydney area during the
months before the election. Other members also co-operated
with the executive of the party in this respect.[3] By
contrast the organization of the Progressive party was
reminiscent of earlier elections. Candidates throughout
the state pleaded for a supporting speech from a party
leader, but to no avail.[4] Waddell, at the best of times an
indecisive leader, was so concerned about losing his own
seat that he refused to leave his electorate to speak on
behalf of other party members.[5] Even when help from party
leaders was available, it served only to emphasise the
party's lack of cohesion; in Surry Hills, one member spoke

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1. For details of the 1898 election, see the <u>Minutes of the
   Liberal and Federal Party</u>, M.L. A2668.

2. For instance at Burwood, <u>D.T.</u>, 24/3/04, at North Sydney,
   <u>D.T.</u>, 25/3/04, at Woollahra, <u>D.T.</u>, 26/3/04.

3. Ashton toured the northern coastal districts, the South
   Coast, Monaro and the Far West, <u>D.T.</u>, 2/8/04.

4. i.e. McLaurin's request for support from O'Sullivan, n.d.,
   <u>Ministerial Election Committee Papers</u>, M.L. Uncat. 234.

5. E. Brady to Waddell, 8/7/04, Waddell to Brady 20/7/04.
   <u>Ministerial Election Committee Papers</u>, M.L. Uncat. 234.

in favour of the endorsed party candidate while O'Sullivan, the chairman of the election committee, supported an independent.[1] The Liberal and Reform Association was far more advanced in viewing the campaign on a state-wide basis than any of its non-Labor predecessors.

In Tasmania the development of co-ordinated campaigns similarly illustrated the growth of a party. In 1903 Mulcahy was the first minister who toured the island to defend the actions of his government. Previously most ministers had restricted their campaigns to either the northern or the southern part of the island. In 1909 Evans was criticized by the press and by his party for his failure to speak on behalf of other candidates;[2] with the election being fought for the first time under the Hare-Clark system, he had felt unsure about his own election and had concentrated his efforts in his own electorate. His critics assumed he had a responsibility wider than that of securing his own re-election, even though the lack of effective organization prevented any widespread co-ordination of meetings. In 1911 the Liberal League appointed a committee to run a campaign against the acceptance in a referendum of the proposals of the Federal Labor government for increased Commonwealth powers.[3] In the Wilmot electorate, L. Atkinson, M.H.R., and Walter Lee, M.H.A., divided the electorate between them in order to concentrate their efforts in the areas where they were known.[4] Parliamentarians and other party members also spoke at meetings throughout the state[5] and the final defeat of the proposals was attributed to good organization and co-ordination.[6] In the election of 1912, the role of the Liberal League as a co-ordinator of campaigns was less obvious because the Hare-Clark system encouraged competition for votes between the members of the same party as well as between parties. Each candidate ran

1. D.T., 11/7/04, 14/7/04.

2. M., 6/5/09.

3. M., 4/2/11.

4. M., 6/3/11.

5. M., 21/4/11.

6. M., 12/5/11.

a personal campaign within the party ranks. Nevertheless, the regular speeches of leading party men like Ewing outside his own electorate in favour of the Liberal party as a whole indicated that the Liberal League co-ordinated the campaigning of its members to some extent.

A second important function which most modern parties would fulfil is that of providing candidates for a constituency where none were readily available. No party has ever been committed to contest every seat, but the growing preparedness of the non-Labor parties to contest all seats which could conceivably be won and to provide candidates for this purpose was another indication of their growing identity.

The Freetrade Council only made a choice between candidates who had already announced their intention of going to the polls: it had no need to provide candidates in most seats. In 1898 Reid declared that his party would contest all seats which might possibly be won.[1] For this purpose the party executive maintained a short-list of candidates who were prepared to contest any seat. Several of these men did stand at the request of the party. Some constituencies were still unable to produce a freetrade candidate; the local freetraders at Cowra pleaded for a candidate with a big reputation because they believed that, with three protectionists standing, he might win on a split vote.[2] However, no candidate was produced. The provision of candidates by the central executive of a party had occurred in the late 1880s when the polling dates of electorates were spread over a period of weeks. Consequently candidates defeated in one electorate could contest another, allowing a leading party member more than one chance of election. In 1898 all the polls were held on the same day and a party had to organize its candidates with greater care. Therefore the practice of providing candidates illustrated a new attitude towards party action in that the leaders felt that all voters

1. D.T., 14/7/98.

2. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, ML.A2668. Griffin was asked to contest Tumut and later transferred to Eden-Bombala. Danahay contested Uralla Walcha and Rolin Warringah. Waine was persuaded to withdraw from Flinders and stand for Phillip. All these imported candidates lost.

should have the opportunity of voting for a member of their party wherever possible.

In 1904 the Liberal and Reform Association was able to move candidates from electorate to electorate because of its improved co-ordination. Thomas Rose originally intended to contest Queanbeyan, but before the pre-selection was held, he was invited by the Bathurst branch of the Liberal and Reform Association to contest their seat. Since Carruthers had visited Bathurst a few days before, this invitation may have originally emanated from the central executive of the party.[1] Later the Belubula branch invited Rose, who was known as a good country representative, to oppose the premier, Waddell, in its electorate. When Rose accepted the invitation to contest Belubula, the Bathurst branch invited Sir James Graham, a Vice-President of the Liberal and Reform Association and ex-Lord Mayor of Sydney, to contest the seat. On another occasion, James Fallick, a sitting member, was defeated in a suburban pre-selection ballot and was shifted to contest the Singleton seat. It was not new for candidates to change seats because they feared defeat, but it was an innovation for a party to juggle their candidates between seats in order to improve their chances. No earlier organization had the influence to attempt such moves.

Before 1909, no Tasmanian organization tried to provide candidates for any seat. After 1909, under the new electoral system, the provision of candidates was unnecessary because sufficient were always prepared to stand and the party's main task was to endorse them in the multi-member constituencies.

The Formation and Articulation of Branches

The formation and articulation of branches was not simply a matter of extending the influence of the party in the electorate but was also intended to co-ordinate the activity of candidates in the party's name and to secure control of their resources. As long as the branches were formed by candidates as the basis of their bid for electoral success and were not part of a wider party structure, the

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1. Goulburn Evening Post, 3/5/04.

party had no control over their activities or the types of campaign they ran. When the central executive of the party, and not the individual candidates, was primarily responsible for the formation of branches and the branches had a formal role in the structure of the party, then the party developed an integrated structure and a distinct identity which gave it some influence over local nominations and campaign proceedings. However the development of a branch structure meant that a party had to define its purpose and identify itself to voters in the polity. At the same time, the question of the power and influence of the branches and of whether they would be content only to assist in campaigns or whether they demanded a greater influence on party affairs was inevitably raised. The creation of branches created problems as well as advantages for a party.

In New South Wales no central executive attempted to form a branch network before 1904. Pulsford's proposal in 1893 to set up a freetrade branch in every electorate had not been successful. In January 1894 Reid visited the Botany electorate, advised the local freetraders to form a local Freetrade Association and promised to speak in favour of the candidate which the branch selected.[1] He did not make any effort himself to form the branch; that was to be left to the initiative of the local freetraders. They later formed a branch, but were not able to gain support from all freetraders in the constituency. A second branch was formed which supported a different candidate and split the vote. Often local branches were little more than the personal committee of candidates; this tendency remained the same in the elections of 1898 and 1901.

In 1902 Carruthers claimed that a branch system, founded at local level in the weeks before an election, was of limited advantage to a party. He realised that a systematic effort to form a co-ordinated branch network was required and that, if branches were to be formed in every electorate, much of the original impetus had to come from the central executive.[2]

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1. S.M.H., 21/2/94, 9/5/94.
2. D.T., 25/10/02.

The Liberal and Reform Association was concerned with the formation of branches from its inception. In March 1903 it announced a plan by which organizers were appointed with the responsibility for founding branches in groups of electorates and at the same time electors themselves were encouraged to form branches.[1] After the central association had been firmly established, M.L.A.s and a few extra-parliamentary supporters held a series of meetings throughout the state and formed local branches wherever possible. Carruthers himself concentrated on the suburban areas while his leading followers were responsible for action in country districts.[2] This systematic approach to the problem was continued until the election of 1904. Party organizers such as Leon Broinowski and A.G. Huie were particularly active in the early months of 1904 when they founded new branches and, if necessary, resuscitated old ones. In ~~August 1903, the party conference was attended by delegates of sixty branches of the Liberal and Reform Association, forty branches~~ of the Women's Liberal League and two Liberal Associations,[3]

[handwritten insertions:] May Carruthers claimed that the Liberal and Reform Association itself had 70 branches and in Augu[st] 31 that it had 100,[3] evidently referring not only to the 60 branches of the Association which sent delegates to the party conference of August, 1903 but also to the 40 branches which also sent delegates to it.

~~In May 1903 Carruthers claimed that the Liberal and Reform Association itself had seventy branches; by August that total had risen to one hundred.[4]~~

Not only were the branches of the Liberal and Reform Association often formed by representatives of the central body, they were also the first branches which had a definite role to play in the structure of the party. In 1897 the National Protection Union had formally permitted branches some representation on its central body, but, since all decisions were to be made by the executive, this representation did not mean that branches had any part in the making of major

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1. D.T., 10/3/03.

2. D.T., 7/5/03 - 22/5/03. It is difficult to establish precisely when a branch was formed because of the unreliability of the press. For instance, the Daily Telegraph once announced the formation of a branch at Ballina. However the local correspondent of the Telegraph, who also happened to be Perry's election committee secretary, denied that a branch had been formed and claimed that the Telegraph had decided to claim that a branch had been formed, regardless of the actual outcome of the party meeting. Richmond River Times, 30/5/04, 2/6/04.

3.⁴ D.T., 11/8/03.

4.³ S.M.H., 30/5/03, 11/8/03.

decisions.[1] Party conferences, to which branches might send delegates, were rare; a freetrade conference had been held in 1889 and a protectionist one was convened in 1897, but these were unusual events. By contrast, the branches of the Liberal and Reform Association had recognised roles as part of the whole organization.[2] Although conferences were not annual events before 1909, two were convened in August 1903 and April 1904 to which branches could send delegates. In the only extant copy of the Liberal and Reform Association constitution - that of 1909 - methods of appeal from the branches to the central executive and rules for the selection of the branch delegates to the central executive were formalised.[3] The branch was consequently a demonstrable part of the general party machine, rather than an isolated body whose influence was limited to its own constituency because it had no way of influencing other sections of the party. The participation of the central body in the formation of branches identified all sections of the party with its corporate existence. It did not matter that not all branches were founded by central representatives. By entering the general area of branch formation, the party accepted that the branches had a role in the party structure because, as we shall see in the next chapter, they could bring additional electoral support to the party.

In Tasmania all electoral organizations accepted the necessity to form branches but were slow in developing any intra-party articulation which gave to the branches any influence in the party. Both the National Association and the Progressive League appointed full-time organizers whose main responsibility was to form branches throughout the state.[4] For instance, W.E. Sadlier, the National Association organizer, visited the Huon, the North-East and the North-West,[5] but whether many of the branches he formed continued

1. Constitution of the National Protection Union, N.L., N331.880994/NAT.

2. For details of branch duties and powers, see chapter 10.

3. Constitution of the Liberal and Reform Association, M.L.329, 21/L.

4. M., 2/11/04, 4/7/08.

5. M., 15/2/04, 30/3/04.

to exist is doubtful, especially since they had little to do and no important role in the making of decisions, even that of pre-selection. The National Association was controlled by an oligarchic central executive which did not seek advice from the party members. The Progressive League accepted the principle that branches should be represented on the state council and created procedures by which this could be achieved.[1] However no part of this organization appears to have had any real effect on the elections.

The Liberal League appointed three organizers who energetically formed a number of branches.[2] The constitution ensured that the wishes of branch could be heard by the council of the league and all officials were elected from within the party framework. The state council was elected by members of the electorate committees, the latter by the branches. Direct channels of communication consequently existed from the branch to the council. Furthermore the establishment of annual conferences, the first of which was held in 1911,[3] illustrated to the public the new collective identity of the party as a whole and showed that the branches were now an integral part of the party.

The growth of a well-articulated party with an integrated structure ensured that for the first time the party maintained a continuity of existence. The early parties in New South Wales were often formed just before the election - in the case of the Liberal and Federal party a mere three weeks before the poll - and, despite some intentions to remain in existence as a social club,[4] they disappeared within three months. The National Protection Union was founded two years before the election of 1898, but after the success of federation it was no longer a force in state politics. Branches usually disbanded after an election, although there were a few exceptions.[5] The Liberal and Reform Association expected

1.   M., 7/5/07.

2.   M., 11/9/09.

3.   M., 21/6/11.

4.   Minutes of the Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee,
       ML.A2668, p.36, S.M.H., 20/7/94.

5.   The Liberal Association of Warringah held regular meetings
       after 1901. D.T., 2/5/02, 3/11/02, 13/6/03.

its branches to remain active and to hold regular meetings.
Some fell dormant after their formation but others were
consistently active, particularly Ashfield and Belmore
in 1906.[1] Branches now had broader objectives and, as an
integral part of the party which itself remained continuously
alive, had a consistent role to play.

In Tasmania the National Association and the Progressive
League maintained a regular existence at central level and a
few branches of both held meetings which were usually of a
social rather than a political nature. The women's branches
in particular held regular recitals or smoke concerts, but
did not appear to be particularly concerned with political
activity. Since the constitution of the Liberal League
demanded the election of delegates to the electorate council
and annual meetings, many of its branches held regular meetings
and were consistently active.

The Growth of a Party Policy

A common policy for all candidates of the same party
is an obvious characteristic of most modern parties.
Furthermore the policy in general terms is usually settled
before candidates seek endorsement. Before this, in faction
politics, each candidate issued his own manifesto which did
not commit any other candidate. Even the manifestoes of
faction leaders were regarded as little more than personal
statements of their intentions if they gained office.
Gradually most candidates accepted a general policy and
contested the election under its banner. Parties did not need
to have any explicit ideology, but they invariably produced
for electoral purposes a policy or platform which they
promised to implement if elected. I am not concerned here
with the content of the policy which any party advocated
nor directly with the extent to which such policies were
implemented. I am interested in the degree to which
candidates accepted a broad party policy, the timing of this
acceptance and the uses to which party leaders put their
electoral policy.

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 9/3/06, 20/3/06. For details of branch duties
     and powers, see chapter 10.

During the 1880s in New South Wales, faction leaders had begun to produce platforms of a more general nature, demanding particularly the implementation of a policy of freetrade or protection, but their policies were still constructed by them individually. In 1894 Reid's electoral manifesto was not developed with the aid of the Freetrade Council or any other group.[1] Most of his planks, particularly those advocating the introduction of direct land and income taxes, had been announced publicly a year before when Reid tried to reduce the effectiveness of the Freetrade and Land Reform League by adopting the major part of their platform.[2] Obviously the manifesto was more than a personal statement because it included the proposals which any freetrade government formed by Reid could be expected to implement; but it did not commit other candidates and they were not forced to follow it. Wise propounded the alternative policy of the Freetrade and Land Reform League but was still regarded as a party member.[3] Other endorsed candidates laid personal programmes before their electorates.[4] They did not feel obliged to follow Reid's proposals or even to discuss them. Reid himself accepted this independence and stated that

> in the freetrade party there is room for every
> honest difference of opinion consistent with
> the cardinal freetrade principle that the state
> has no right to impose taxation so as to take
> the money out of the pockets of one citizen to
> put it in the pockets of another.   5

Reid's speech, however, was not intended only as a means of attracting votes. It was also meant to attract support from candidates and to consolidate the party. His policy was deliberately vague so that different sections of the freetrade movement could interpret it as they wished and happily support him. In 1894 many candidates were prepared to stand as freetraders, but not all were prepared to identify themselves with the parliamentary freetrade

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1. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 2/7/95.

2. B.R. Wise, 'A Year's Stewardship', Sydney 1895, M.L.
   042/P77, p.2.

3. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 7/7/94.

4. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 13/3/94 (McLean) 5/6/94 (Hogue).

5. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 28/5/94.

party. If Reid's policy was suitably attractive to these candidates, they might be more inclined to support him in parliament if they were elected. This did occur when eight freetraders, who had been elected without the endorsement of the Freetrade Council, immediately joined the freetrade parliamentary party.[1] Reid deliberately refused to take a stand on the local option issue because he knew his party was divided on this matter and feared that anything he said might be interpreted as party policy and cause the loss of support.[2] His policy was intended to consolidate his own party and at the same time to attract the votes of electors.

In 1898 and 1901 the party leader remained responsible for constructing the platform. In 1898 Reid again used his electoral policy as a means of uniting his party, particularly as the divisions in the party which had been created by the federal issue were becoming dangerously large. At one point he considered contesting the election on the fiscal issue on the grounds that it would help to close the splits in the party unity, but he was then persuaded that federation was the only realistic issue.[3] He therefore produced a policy which could keep within his party not only those who were strongly opposed to federation but also those who favoured the constitution of 1898. His demands for amendments to the convention bill were aimed at uniting his own party. Since federation was inevitably the major issue of the election, many candidates identified with his policy primarily because it was directly acceptable to them. In 1901 some members issued personal manifestoes without waiting for the formal party statements of See and Lee. Carruthers ostentatiously issued an 'Unauthorised Programme' before Lee made his policy speech and claimed he would not sacrifice his principles if he disagreed with his leader.[4] The leader's policy was still considered to be an individual's statement of intent, even if he did represent the parliamentary party.

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1. S.M.H., 1/8/94.

2. D.T., 4/7/94.

3. A.B. Piddington, Worshipful Masters, p.62.

4. D.T., 26/4/01.

In 1904 this situation changed considerably. The Liberal election policy of that year was formulated eighteen months before polling day by the party and not by the leader. Candidates knew what platform they would be supporting before they sought party endorsement because the party had developed a collective identity which included an explicit basic policy. Even though the party in fact played little part in forming the policy, the policy was presented as if the party had played a large part and this was important because it identified the party as a whole with the platform. When Carruthers founded the Liberal and Reform Association in December 1902, he proposed a ten-point platform which he thought would be acceptable and then, in February, submitted this programme to a provisional committee for consideration.[1] The platform was intentionally general in outlook, demanding a return to responsible government, financial retrenchment, a reduction in the numbers of both houses of parliament and an elective Legislative Council. The committee accepted most of the platform, changed the plank demanding an elective council to a general one suggesting reform of the council and added a clause demanding a thorough reform of the liquor trade. A move to commit the party to supporting local option was rejected at the meeting[2] but the clause was added three months later.[3] The party programme was therefore primarily the invention of Carruthers but, after amendments, was accepted by the party.

The two party conferences, held in August 1903 and April 1904, were also intended to identify the branches of the association with the party policy and they spent a large proportion of their time discussing it. Carruthers claimed that party members should not only vote

> but they should take the opportunity [of the
> conference] of becoming associated with the
> Council of the Association and <u>assisting to</u>
> <u>frame the platform of the party</u>. 4

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 20/12/02, 10/2/03.

2. <u>D.T.</u>, 10/3/03.

3. <u>D.T.</u>, 27/5/03.

4. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 28/3/04. My italics

Although the party conferences do not appear to have altered
the wording of the platform, their discussion of it served
to identify them, and the candidates which they endorsed, with
the programme. Whereas earlier policy speeches had been
primarily the creation of the leader and were designed to
attract candidates and electors, the Liberal and Reform
Association platform was the product of a collective body
which committed candidates before they stood for endorsement.
Occasionally candidates were not required to support every
plank of the platform - in Ballina Temperley was endorsed
with a proviso tht he maintained a free hand on the matter
of local government[1]- but generally they were prepared to
seek party endorsement because they agreed with the already
announced party policy and were prepared to support it.

In Tasmania the development of a party policy followed
slightly different lines because the electoral organization
had a distinct and separate identity from the parliamentary
party, whereas in New South Wales the party leader was
always the parliamentary leader. Before 1909 the manifesto
of all party leaders was regarded as a personal statement
of intention. In 1903 the opposition M.H.A.s held a caucus
meeting to discuss policy but then did not all identify
themselves with the programme that their leader propounded.[2]
The National Association and the Progressive League had no
detailed electoral programmes. In the 1906 and 1909 elections
the premier, Evans, announced government policies which were
designed to attract support[3] but which were not intended to
commit other candidates, even though the parliamentary party
held meetings to discuss tactics before each of these
elections.

The Liberal League could not produce a detailed platform
like the Liberal and Reform Association in case such a
statement might appear to bind its parliamentary representatives
without their having been consulted. It did produce a
platform which provided a general framework within which the
parliamentary party could operate, without any M.H.A.s being
offended by its planks. The League's platform demanded

1. Richmond River Times, 7/7/94.

2. Launceston Examiner, 13/2/03.

3. M., 26/2/06, 19/2/09.

(1)   A policy of Progress

(2)   For the Federal Constitution, resists Unification
      and stands for State Home Rule.

(3)   Preferential voting for Federal elections.

(4)   To assist in the selection of suitable parliamentary
      candidates.

(5)   Settlement of Crown Lands; compulsory purchase of
      private lands for closer settlement.

(6)   To defend the Legislative Council against efforts
      at abolition.

(7)   Direct taxation to be left to states.

(8)   Wages Boards and good conditions for workers.[1]

The premier's manifesto was essentially a set of short-term
proposals which fitted this general approach to local politics.[2]
Again, candidates were not required to agree to all planks
of the party's general or specific proposals.[3]   The essential
difference between the election of 1912 and earlier ones was
that the general policy had been discussed at the conference
of 1911 and that all candidates knew what policy party
endorsement would commit them to follow.

Party participation in the formulation of electoral
policy not only showed that the party was developing a
collective identity so that the party as a unit advocated a
particular policy but also that candidates usually accepted
the party's policy before they received endorsement.
Consequently they lost much of their independence of cam-
paigning because they had to act within a prescribed
framework which the party created by its definition of its
vague ideological commitment. As policy formulation became
the prerogative of the party, so candidates became more
closely identified with and subservient to the party as a
whole.

The party could never force obedience to its policy as
a *sine qua non* of party membership, as the Labor party claimed
to do; it could only suggest that its policy be adopted.
However, as the policy of the party became more distinct and

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1.   *M*., 26/3/12.

2.   *M*., 15/2/12.

3.   See Lewis, *M*., 14/2/12.

as members who joined the party were prepared to accept it, the party ideology itself acted as a means of securing compliance, even if the party had no sanctions. The use of ideology was merely one of the ways in which a party exercised control over its members.

The Party Control of Propaganda and Finance

The extension of party control over finance and propaganda was a further indication of an emerging party identity. Election contests in the early period of Australian politics were often expensive[1] and the cost was generally borne by the candidate who had to pay for printing the pamphlets and circulars, for the rent of halls and for the more dubious practice of 'treating' voters on polling day. In a modern election the party usually bears a large share of the costs which a candidate incurs. In analysing the development of parties it is less important to know what the actual cost of an election was than to understand what part the party organization played in meeting that cost by subsidising candidates.

Most party organizations appointed literary and financial committees, but there is little evidence of their actual activities. The literary committees were responsible for the production and circulation of party pamphlets or supporting literature. Sometimes their literature was printed by sympathetic firms or organizations at no cost to the party. In 1898 the Daily Telegraph published a special election edition for King Division where the party leader, Reid, was standing and distributed 30,000 copies without charging the party. A further 100,000 special election copies were available if required. At the same time the Departments of Lands and Mines issued circulars which were used by the party as propaganda.[2] How far these moves were a result of direct party initiative is unknown.

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1. In 1856, it cost each candidate approximately £300 to £600 to win a seat in a four-member Sydney electorate. See P. Loveday, The Development of Parliamentary Government in New South Wales, Ph.D. Univ. of Sydney, 1962, p.91-2.

2. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, M.L. A2668, p.22, 24.

In 1904 the Liberal and Reform Association was better
organized; under the energetic chairmanship of Broinowski,
the literary committee circulated 500,000 copies of the
pamphlet 'Reform' and a series of other pieces of propaganda.[1]
The latter concentrated on three themes - the maladministration
of the See government, the influence of Labor's 'irresponsible'
caucus over the government and the credibility and constructive
proposals of the Liberal and Reform Association in general
and of Carruthers in particular.[2] Because of a lack of
evidence, any accurate conclusions about the increasing party
use of information and propaganda as a means of gaining votes
are impossible, but it does appear that the Liberal and
Reform Association was the first body to organize electoral
literature on a wide scale and on behalf of the party as a
whole, rather than in support of individual candidates.

The finance of parties is shrouded in secrecy and we
have little evidence of either the income or the expenditure
of the parties. For the early organizations, the sources
of finance were mostly ad hoc contributions given at election
time. For instance, in 1898 the Liberal and Federal party
appealed for contributions to place itself on a secure
financial basis and was immediately offered £10 by W.H.
Mahony, M.L.A. for Annandale. On another occasion, £10 was
received from the firm of Angus and Robertson.[3] In 1901
the Liberal party expected all prospective candidates to
make some contribution to party funds but did not insist on
it or specify the size of the contribution.[4] The National
Protection Union allowed firms to become members and was
presumably partly financed by them.[5] In Tasmania the
National Association accepted donations from several businesses
in Hobart including the Cascade brewery.[6] Before parties

1. D.T., 12/8/04.

2. Liberal and Reform Association Election Pamphlets,
   M.L. 329, 21/L.

3. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, p.22,
   27; on another occasion Want was asked to contact the
   Hon. E. Webb, M.L.C., to get some funds for the party,(p.29)

4. D.T., 16/5/01.

5. Constitution of the National Protection Union, N.L.
   N331.880994 - NAT; see also Sparks to See, 21/5/01. See
   Papers, Vol.26, M.L., A3674.

6. M., 18/12/05, 19/12/05.

were well-co-ordinated, it seems probable that they depended for income on contributions and gifts and had no regular source of money.

The Liberal and Reform Association was the first body to organize a regular source of finance, although it insisted that it depended entirely on personal subscriptions and contributions and not on donations from capitalists. In February, 1904, Carruthers claimed that the total income of the association was between £600 and £700.[1] Later, when the membership of the Association was larger, he claimed

> The Liberal Party will not jeopardize its integrity or independence by accepting one shilling from any union or association or any kind whatever, the party holding it to be wrong to accept any aid which afterwards might be looked upon as a price for its policy. The only financial assistance it gets is from its own members who number about 90,000 and whose subscriptions range from about 3d per quarter to one shilling per quarter and in a few cases run to £5 or £10. [2]

After the campaign he admitted that one outside organization, the People's Reform League, had given £20 assistance to one candidate and a few pounds to another, but denied that money had been accepted from any other non-party source.[3] In an attempt to ensure that a regular income from personal contributions was forthcoming, the Liberal and Reform Association formed a 'Central branch' which any man who contributed one guinea per annum to the association, or any woman who gave five shillings a year, was eligible to join. In February 1904 this body was reputed to have three hundred members[4] and in the next years new members were welcomed.[5] Only individuals were permitted to join this body which has been described as the first 'confidential group which collected and disbursed party funds'.[6] In fact

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1. D.T., 5/2/04.

2. S.M.H., 19/7/04, (also a similar comment D.T., 23/8/07). On these figures the income of the Association in 1904 would have been somewhere between £4,500 per annum and £18,000 per annum.

3. D.T., 9/8/04.

4. D.T., 5/2/04.

5. See Carruthers to Varney Parkes when the latter joined the central branch, 8/4/07. Varney Parkes Papers. M.L. A1052.

6. J.A. McCallum, How Fares Parliamentary Government, ~~p.114.~~ in Sawer (ed), Federalism in Australia, p.114.

this body appears to have been ineffective as a means of keeping the party well supplied with funds. In December 1906 the association was supposed to be almost bankrupt and only kept solvent by personal contributions from ministers, even though all its officials were unpaid.[1] In January 1907 the secretary of the Liberal and Reform Association complained that he had sent out 150 letters asking for financial help to contest the by-election at Blayney and that only five had replied. The donations he did receive covered only one-tenth of the costs.[2] Obviously the income of all parties was greater than that publicly acknowledged and some services were offered free. In 1898, for instance, a local wine and spirit merchant offered to pay all printing costs incurred by Reid in the campaign in his own electorate.[3] This type of gift probably played an important part in financing elections without being officially noticeable. Nevertheless the Liberal and Reform Association was the first organization to formalize a method by which it could, as a party, receive regular subscriptions and donations.

It is even less clear how parties spent their money and how far candidates were or expected to be financed. In 1898 the Liberal and Federal party executive asked the Sydney resident, C.J. Danahay, to contest Uralla-Walcha and agreed to pay £25 towards his expenses, but refused to aid an independent ministerialist candidate at Cowra.[4] In 1904 the Ministerialist party sent a city businessman, J.G. Macdonald, to contest the far northern seat of Gough. Macdonald received £25 from a local grazier and £10 from the central committee but still complained that he was short of money. Macdonald claimed that the editor of a local newspaper, the Inverell Times, had demanded a deposit of £25 to be spent on drinks as the price of any publicity

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1. D.T., 24/12/06.

2. D.T., 11/1/07.

3. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, M.L.A2668, p.18.

4. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, M.L.A2668, p.8, 18.

and that he had spent over £50 in one hotel. He pleaded
for the loan of money which he promised to repay at a
later date.[1] In a by-election in 1900 the ministry agreed
to pay the expenses of Daniel O'Connor in exchange for a
written promise of support. When O'Connor deserted the
party in 1902, Crick instigated legal proceedings to recover
the money on the grounds that O'Connor had broken his
contract. He won the case,[2] but only as an individual and
not in any capacity as a party official.

Often candidates expected to pay their own costs. In
1901 J.M. Conroy rejected an offer of financial assistance
in his campaign for the Warringah seat and pointed out that
he was well able to bear the costs himself.[3] In Moruya in
the same year, a wealthy Sydney publican reputedly spent
£700 on the election - a sum which he could well afford
but which his party certainly could not.[4] In 1907 Carruthers
claimed that most of the money received from ordinary
subscriptions had been spent in the cost of work which preceded
the selection of candidates.[5] He did not say how the
campaign itself was financed.

There is too little evidence available about the methods
of party finance to draw any substantial conclusions about
the extent to which the more developed parties tried to
meet the expenses of the campaign. Nevertheless the Liberal
and Reform Association did organize a formal system by which
finances were raised and in Tasmania the Liberal League laid
down in clauses 25-31 of its constituion[6] which part of the
party was responsible for and could use contributions to the

1. Macdonald to Brady, 26/6/04, 20/7/04, 26/7/04. Ministerial
    Election Committee Papers. M.L. Uncat. 234.

2. D.T., 30/6/03.

3. J.M. Conroy to S.C. Sadler, 4/6/01. Conroy Papers, Dixon
    Library ADD 900.

4. J. Keenan to Brady, 19/7/04. Ministerial Election Committee
    Papers. M.L. Uncat. 234. The candidate was J.J. Smith,
    later Lord Mayor of Sydney and founder of 'Smith's
    Weekly'.

5. D.T., 23/8/07.

6. M., 5/8/09.

party. It would be pointless to pretend that subscriptions
or personal contributions were the only source of income,
but there is evidence that it was recognized that the parties
needed some formal and regular means of raising money to meet
the growing costs of party administration and of campaigning.

The Growth of Candidates' Affiliation with Parties

In the previous chapter, I showed that many candidates
were suspicious of the party's intervention in the electoral
arena. One indication of the growing identity of a non-Labor
party was the degree to which a candidate was prepared to
connect himself openly with the party. This affiliation
with a party can be seen in four ways; first, the candidate
was prepared to put himself forward as a party man; secondly,
he accepted its policy; thirdly, he was seen by others as a
representative of a party and finally the party was
prepared to support him and to appeal for votes for him as
the party representative.

It is impossible to decide at this range of time how
far electors identified with the parties and how far their
votes were cast for personal, rather than party reasons.
Any comments on this subject must therefore be impressionistic.

Party action in elections and the idea that people
might cast votes for party reasons was clearly recognized
in New South Wales in 1894. For instance, the Sydney Morning
Herald claimed that Thomas Bavister's win in the Ashfield
electorate in 1894 showed the popularity of the freetrade
movement because, as a former bricklayer, he was not
popular with the propertied classes.[1] Also the paper assessed
the popularity of freetrade in the state by adding up all
the votes cast for freetrade candidates[2] and interpreted the
result of the election as a victory for the freetrade party.[3]
In 1904, it was claimed that the support for the premier,
Waddell, in his own electorate would be given to him personally
and not to his party.[4] In other words, the difference between

1. S.M.H., 18/7/94.

2. S.M.H., 19/7/94.

3. S.M.H., 23/7/94. Elections had also been interpreted in
   these terms in 1887 and 1889, see Loveday and Martin,
   Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.141-148.

4. D.T., 2/7/04.

votes cast for personal or for party reasons was recognized throughout the period. Gradually candidates in this period usually became more fully identified with the party, were recognized as party members and supported by the executive. The change in attitudes towards the party policy have already been discussed.

In 1894 some candidates who received endorsement from the central branch or from a local freetrade association were not prepared to commit themselves fully to the party. Endorsement by a party did not mean that a candidate felt committed to it - in 1894 the Freetrade Council officially supported Sir Henry Parkes, even though he was not prepared to identify himself with any party led by Reid. Of the endorsed candidates, some declared that they were independent and others that they were only standing in response to a local requisition.[1] In Newcastle J.C. Ellis was annoyed that the local freetrade association had arranged for Reid to address a meeting on his behalf, because he did not want to be publicly identified with Reid.[2] J.A. Hogue had openly sought the support of a party and had been selected by the Glebe Freetrade Association, yet he claimed

> He did not look to the fact [his party endorsement]
> for support. He would trust for votes on his own
> merit and the views which he would proceed to
> enumerate. [3]

Obviously he believed that to be standing purely as a party candidate might suggest a lack of independence and might cause the loss of some votes from electors who supported him personally, but did not support his party.

Yet some candidates did regard party endorsement as an asset. In Denison, Harris refused to start campaigning until he had been endorsed by the Freetrade Council;[4] another freetrader advertised himself as 'the freetrade candidate

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1. McLean, S.M.H., 13/3/94, Fowler, S.M.H., 14/6/94.

2. Ellis to Parkes, 11/7/94. Parkes Correspondence, M.L. A.883, p.1127-8.

3. S.M.H., 5/6/94.

4. S.M.H., 4/7/94.

(selected by the Freetrade Council)'.[1] These men thought
that party endorsement was useful presumably because they
believed that some votes were cast for party, rather than
for personal reasons.

The definite affiliation of candidates with the party
only occurred gradually. In 1898 endorsement was still
considered irrelevant to electoral success by some candidates
who were prepared to stand independently of their party.
One condition of the coalition in the election of 1898
between Barton's Federal Association and the parliamentary
Protectionist party was that two leading anti-federal
protectionists,Levien and McLaughlin, were to be refused
endorsement. Neither of them was worried by the prospects
of campaigning without party support and both won easily.[2]
However, a more common, but by no means general, attitude
was expressed by the Liberal candidate for Camperdown in
1901 who claimed that he would only stand if he received
the party nomination.[3] The electoral advantages of
identification with a party were becoming more widely
recognized.

The organization and pre-determined policy of the
Liberal and Reform Association meant that candidates who
sought party support usually had to identify themselves
with the party. Carruthers argued that every candidate
who won the party selection gained in electoral strength
because he believed that many votes were now cast for the
party as an organization and for party candidates as
representatives of that organization.[4] Furthermore, the
party in 1904 supported its candidates more wholeheartedly
than in previous years. In 1894 the Freetrade Council had
refused to choose between freetrade candidates in Botany
and St. Peters because it believed that both seats were
safe for the freetrade cause and that, provided a
freetrader who supported the parliamentary party was elected,

1. Shipway, S.M.H., 8/7/94.

2. D.T., 7/7/98.

3. D.T., 29/5/01.

4. D.T., 6/5/04.

it did not matter which of the two candidates was successful.[1]
In 1904, the party executive committed itself more completely.
For instance, in Leichhardt Carruthers supported Booth and
claimed that Hawthorne, a party colleague in the assembly for
ten years, must be defeated because he had refused to submit
to the party pre-selection.[2]   In Waverley the local federal
member claimed

> I do not come forward in the interests of Mr.
> Jessep, as Mr. Jessep, but as the Candidate
> on whom has devolved the responsibility of
> fighting, in Waverley, the battles of economy
> and good Government, 3

and he also argued that once the party had made a selection,
all party members should support the candidate. Support
was now being demanded for candidates as party members
rather than as individuals. In 1894 party leaders tentatively
claimed that all they were trying to do was to point out to
electors the freetrader most likely to win the seat and
to suggest that he should receive their vote.[4] In 1904
the Liberal and Reform Association was demanding a vote
for the party candidate and condemning all Liberals who
refused to submit to party pre-selection. Candidates were
widely identified with the party and could be recognized
as party candidates by voters.

In Tasmania the identification of members with parties
was uncommon before the formation of the Liberal League.
Some candidates in 1903 were prepared to accept endorsement
by the Reform League but still considered themselves
independents.[5] No candidate used his connection with the
Progressive League or the National Association as a means
of extra appeal in the elections of 1906 and 1909 and indeed
all that most of their party candidates had in common was

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1. S.M.H., 11/7/94, 12/7/94.

2. D.T., 29/7/04. This statement was made despite an earlier
      promise to support Hawthorne personally and despite
      Hawthorne's own active efforts on behalf of the
      Liberal and Reform Association. D.T., 16/4/04.

3. Letter signed by T.H. Kelly. J.M. Conroy Papers, Dixon
      Library, ADD 899.

4. See Carruthers, D.T., 14/7/94.

5. Boatwright, North-West Advocate, 17/3/03. Bennett,
      Launceston Examiner, 31/3/03.

their anti-socialistm. Some members remained suspicious of party ties; in 1911 Whitsitt claimed that the Liberal League was unreasonable in expecting a pledge of support from a candidate in a by-election when the government proposals for that session was still unannounced[1] and later he declared that he did not care whether he was endorsed by the Liberal League for the 1912 election.[2] Generally, however, candidates were eager to secure the endorsement of the Liberal League. One declared that he was standing only because he had 'the sanction of the Liberal League'[3] while the Speaker, Sir George Davies, a politician who had in 1903 opposed the idea of party, expressed his annoyance that he was left off the party's list of endorsed candidates.[4] Generally, most candidates in both states accepted the existence of parties, were prepared to stand as party candidates and to affiliate in the elections with these parties.

Conclusions

During this period the non-Labor parties increased their activities in several areas; candidates now became identified with the party and with its policy while the party itself developed a distinct identity so that it appeared to be a well-defined group. The alliance of individuals who had campaigned during the faction period had become a well-co-ordinated group who assisted one another and advocated similar policies. Each candidate could be seen as part of a larger body and usually added to his local appeal a statement of his party affiliation and his views on major issues. As the party became more widely influential, so its central control over resources such as ideology, manpower and finance increased and the individuality of candidates, who had previously stood purely on their own appeal, decreased.

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1. <u>M.</u>, 7/6/11.

2. <u>M.</u>, 10/1/12.

3. Cotton, <u>M.</u>, 10/2/12.

4. <u>M.</u>, 15/4/12.

Chapter 10

The Growth of Party Control II:

The Adapation of Existing Political Methods

Introduction

Any party which attempted to build its electoral power
and influence without using sanctions on candidates and
without the advantages of the supporting organizations
which the Labor party had, could not replace the techniques
of faction politics and impose different ones on the
electorate. Nor could it ignore them. Candidates using
the old electoral techniques had assets which a party
could use to its own advantage if it could find ways of
adapting and controlling them. The main problems with
which any party had to deal were local jealousies and
localism, but these electoral influences also gave them
opportunities for gaining votes. Many electors were
suspicious of any intervention in electoral politics by
anyone not resident in the area and most contests in the
faction period were won by candidates who ignored all but
local affairs. This can be described as localism, meaning
all those local influences significant in elections, such
as personal connections, local services in obtaining roads
and bridges, inter-town rivalry and social position, which
may affect the results of an election.[1] Any party had to
pay attention to these forces, particularly in regard to
candidate selection and the organization and power of its
branches.

The Selection of Candidates

As we have seen, pre-selection was the basic activity
of most early non-Labor parties. They had to ensure that
only one candidate from their party stood in each electorate
so that he had a good chance of success. The central
executives of the early non-Labor parties were primarily

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1. B.D. Graham has defined localism as "the rural interest
   in obtaining concessions for district needs through
   the local member of Parliament". (The Formation of
   the Australian Country Parties, p.51). I regard this
   as merely one part of the general network of local
   influence which I have here called localism.

concerned with producing winners; they realised that, with
the existing local traditions, a man known in the constituency
or chosen by electors would have greater hopes of victory than
any outsider. The Freetrade Council encouraged local selection
of candidates wherever possible and stated that it would only
intervene in the choice of candidates if the local freetraders
were unable to decide among themselves to support a single
man. When it did intervene, the Freetrade Council claimed
that it would base its choice purely on the grounds of
strength in the electorate.[1] Whenever the local freetraders
were active, the Council was prepared to accept their
proposals; it endorsed the selection of the Tamworth Free-
trade Association which was made months before the 1894
election[2] and at the last moment it changed its selection
for the seat of Uralla-Walcha at the request of the local
branch.[3] The Council claimed that it was not biased in
favour of sitting M.L.A.s - and one at least was not selected
because the other freetrader in the electorate was considered
stronger locally[4] - and that it had no intention of forcing
any candidate on an electorate without the consent of the
local freetraders. The Council emphasised the desirability
of local selection and the disadvantages of a central
organization making any unilateral choice.

In the following three elections, all the party
organizations followed the example of the Freetrade Council.
The branches of the National Protection Union organized
pre-selection ballots throughout the state[5] and in one seat,
Moruya, any elector could vote in the pre-selection whether
he was a member of the local Protectionist Association or
not.[6] The Liberal party in 1901 similarly stated it would

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1. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 2/6/94.

2. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 10/7/94.

3. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 13/7/94.

4. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 2/6/94. The unselected M.L.A. was Jeanneret who
    was contesting West Macquarie.

5. e.g., <u>D.T.</u>, 28/1/98 (Annandale), 8/7/98 (Narrabri),
    <u>Goulburn Evening Post</u>, 8/2/98, <u>Gundagai Times</u>, 15/2/98,
    <u>Maitland Mercury</u>, 8/3/98, <u>Western Post</u>, 10/2/98,
    <u>Tenterfield Star</u>, 8/3/98.

6. <u>Moruya Examiner</u>, 25/3/98, 1/4/98.

accept the nominations of any local branches[1] and even
endorsed candidates supported by branches of the federal
Freetrade and Liberal Association.[2] In fact in 1901
almost all sitting members received automatic endorsement
regardless of local wishes.

In practice the central bodies were forced to play a
larger part in the selection of candidates than they wished
because branches were seldom well organized and because
there were no rules for pre-selection contests so generally
accepted that the unsuccessful candidates were prepared to
bow to the party decision. Each case was treated separately
and often by different methods. In 1894 the local branch
occasionally held a ballot[3] or the candidates and their
representatives met to decide who had the best chance of
success and therefore who should withdraw.[4] More often
the branches merely acted as a forum in which a candidate
could state his views or show off the strength of his
support before the representative of the Freetrade Council
made a final selection.[5] In 1898, the Liberal and Federal
executive tried to persuade Levy to retire from Fitzroy;
when he refused they changed their approach by asking the
sitting member to step down to prevent a split vote.[6]
Provided the party won, it did not matter which candidate
represented it. One detailed account of a freetrade
pre-selection will illustrate the problems which a party
faced in the 1894 election and the obvious lack of an
acceptable selection method.

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1. D.T., 24/5/01.

2. D.T., 16/5/01 (Woronora); for Armidale, see G.S. Harman,
    Politics at the Electoral Level, M.A., Univ. of New
    England, 1964, p.305.

3. At Woronora, 340 votes were cast in a ballot contested by
    three candidates; S.M.H., 16/6/94.

4. i.e. West Macquarie, S.M.H., 7/7/94; Marrickville,
    S.M.H., 22/6/94; Balmain North, S.M.H., 29/6/94.

5. For instance, Carruthers made decisions, either by himself
    or as one of a board of three in the following seats;
    Darlington, Waterloo, Denison, Balmain North, Balmain
    South, Leichhardt, Botany, Paddington, S.M.H., 12/7/94.

6. Liberal and Federal Party Election Minutes, M.L. A2668,
    p.24.

In 1894 the sitting member for the Glebe, Bruce Smith, decided not to seek re-election and left vacant a safe freetrade seat. The local Freetrade Association decided that it was sufficiently representative of the freetraders in the electorate to select a candidate and called for nominations. Six were received, of whom two were local aldermen.[1] At the start of the meeting Alderman Cary claimed that, although in previous elections he had retired in favour of Smith, he was not prepared this time to stand down for anyone. Later in the meeting he angrily rejected a proposal that all candidates should sign a pledge to retire if unselected and withdrew from the ballot. Abrams and Cole also retired and then the nomination of Eager, who was not present and who later indicated his refusal to accept a party decision,[2] was withdrawn. In the ballot Hogue defeated Wilkinson by fifty votes to eleven[3] and later won the election by defeating Cary and Eager, who stood as independents, and three other candidates. The events of this meeting illustrate two points of particular significance; in the first place Cary's nomination remained before the meeting despite his declaration that he refused to retire, and secondly the proposal of the pledge, and therefore the discussion of the method of pre-selection, took place after nominations had been received. Obviously the local associations had no guidelines on which to run their meetings. Pre-selection meetings were each based on an 'ad hoc' process, designed to suit different situations, and the absence of rules added to the internal party disputes over the results.

The party leaders preferred candidates to be selected locally because they realised the value of local support and because they knew that the central executives were self-appointed, that they had not been elected as representatives

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1. The Aldermen were Cary and Abrams. The other candidates were F.B. Wilkinson, S. Cole, G. Eager and J.A. Hogue.

2. Eager to Parkes, 16/7/94. Parkes Correspondence, M.L., A882, p.422-3.

3. S.M.H., 22/5/94.

of the whole movement and that this fact was the cause
of some dissatisfaction in the electorate.   In 1894 Reid
admitted that the Council was a self-appointed body but
pointed out that, with no other organization and with
the failure of an attempt to form branches which could
make local selections, it was merely doing the best that
it could in the circumstances.[1]   Carruthers claimed

> The Freetrade Council have simply performed a
> very difficult and very painful task in selecting
> candidates to guide the freetrade electors.   Their
> aim in selecting has been to ascertain the candi-
> date who has the best chance of success as a
> freetrader.   They have named the candidate and
> asked the electors who support the freetrade
> policy to rally around at the poll.   The Freetrade
> Council is not infallible.   It may have made
> mistakes, but the only way that it is possible for
> a victory to be gained is for the electors to
> accept in good faith the inquiries made by the
> Freetrade Council and the result of these inquiries
> as evidenced by their selection.   2

In other words, the Freetrade Council only interfered
where local selection did not take place and then
considered local conditions as the basic criterion for
selection.

In 1903 the Liberal and Reform Association insisted
in its constitution on local selection of candidates
whenever possible because of the votes that such a choice
could bring to the party.   All selections were to be made
by local branches; if more than one branch existed in a
constituency, a combined council of branches was established
to select the candidate.   Occasionally these councils
co-operated with the representatives of other organizations
such as the Women's Liberal League or the People's Reform
League.   The rules for pre-selection were clearly
established;

> The branch shall not proceed to the recommendation
> of any candidate for Parliament until so requested
> by the president of the Central Association.   A
> meeting shall then be regularly convened by
> circular sent to every member.   The recommendation
> should be immediately forwarded to the President

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1.   S.M.H., 17/7/94.

2.   D.T., 14/7/94.

> of the Central Association, setting forth the
> name and address of the candidate and when
> more than one candidate is proposed at the
> meeting, the names and addresses and respective
> number of votes recorded for each. Every
> consideration will be given to such recommenda-
> tions but the final selection shall rest with
> the central executive. 1

The local branch had the power of selection, even though the central executive retained for itself the right of veto.

In fact, the branches were free to select whom they pleased and in some cases a very large number of members of the Liberal and Reform Association voted in these ballots. In Canterbury the members of four different branches cast 1389 votes;[2] in Botany, a sitting member was discarded by the votes of 1863 men and he accepted his defeat and contested a different electorate.[3] In Burwood, 2065 of the 2883 eligible branch members voted.[4] Even in the country seat of Orange 1897 members of the local Liberal and Reform Association branches cast their votes.[5] Not all ballots were so widely representative - in Balmain 138 people voted[6] and in Phillip only ninety-three[7] - but often the party candidate was selected by a large number of local residents who could then be expected to vote for him in the poll.

In the pre-selections, the initiative nearly always came from the local branches. We have already seen how two Liberal and Reform candidates, Rose and Graham, were both invited to contest Bathurst and that it is probable that this was arranged by the party leader.[8] It is notable that the actual invitation to Rose did not come from the central executive but from the branch. When the safe seat of Ashfield became vacant in 1905, two leading

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 6/3/07.

2. <u>D.T.</u>, 1/6/04.

3. <u>D.T.</u>, 23/5/04.

4. <u>D.T.</u>, 21/5/04.

5. <u>D.T.</u>, 2/7/04.

6. <u>D.T.</u>, 2/6/04.

7. <u>D.T.</u>, 24/5/04.

8. See above, p.172.

party members, Sir James Graham and John Garland, sought the party nomination but were easily defeated by a well-known local alderman who had been prominent in temperance and protectionist movements in the previous decade. The latter received 188 of the 372 primary votes in the ballot; Graham got fifteen, Garland only seven.[1] Indeed, in the pre-selection contests, candidates often appealed to the party stalwarts to vote for them for local reasons. In Botany, R.J. Anderson pointed to his record as an alderman and as an owner of a local tannery while his opponent claimed that he was a suitable party candidate because he had lived in the area for forty years.[2] Many others had records of service in municipal government or in local affairs.[3] Local appeal was therefore an important explanation of a candidate's party selection, quite apart from his later electoral success.

The central executive had the power to refuse to accept a local selection but was very loath to use that power. Carruthers said he would refuse to attempt to influence any ballot because such interference would undermine the very basis of the organization.[4] The organising secretary of the Liberal and Reform Association claimed that the central executive would never use its veto to overturn a local selection.[5] In 1904 the central executive endorsed all local selections, even when sitting members were defeated. In one case, Leichhardt, the candidate selected by the local Liberal and Reform Association branch was known to be a Protestant fanatic and the branch was reputed to have been packed by A.P.D.A. supporters, but the central executive still declared its support for the locally selected candidate. In 1904 the executive did demand that one ballot be recontested after an appeal by a defeated candidate. The Camperdown branch

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1. D.T., 8/5/05.

2. D.T., 21/4/04.

3. Henley at Burwood, Perkins at Cooma and Moxham at Parramatta all mentioned thier municipal service. Creswell at St. Leonards pointed to his long association with the local rowing club.

4. D.T., 8/1/04, see also 26/3/04.

5. D.T., 17/5/07.

was said to have been 'engineered as a committee for Clegg'
and membership cards had been handed out with instructions
to vote for him in the ballot.[1] Nevertheless, the grounds
for the decision for a new ballot were not that the branch
had been packed, but that an electoral re-distribution had
added new areas to the electorate and therefore some Liberal
and Reform Association members had been denied the chance to
vote.[2] The principle of local selection was upheld at the
same time as the appeal. The central executive was
primarily concerned with setting the timetable for nominations
and local selections[3] and for actually making selections
where no local branch existed[4] or where some branch wanted
the responsibility removed from its shoulders.[5]

In 1907 the central executive of the Liberal and Reform
Association was more inclined to support sitting members
because they had given three years consistent support to
the Liberal ministry, but nonetheless they still advocated
local selection and generally accepted it, particularly in
the safe seats of Goulburn, Newcastle and Sherbrooke which
had been held by ministers who were retiring from politics.
One minister not retiring had to face a pre-selection
ballot which he narrowly won by sixty-six votes to forty-six.[6]
On another occasion the central executive withdrew its
endorsement of S.J. Kearney as candidate for Armidale at
the request of the local association which wanted a ballot.[7]
The ballot was won by a former M.L.A., Lonsdale, who had
been defeated in a pre-selection at Newtown in the same
month. Kearney had refused to participate in the ballot
and retired from politics.[8] In Waverley, the executive
supported the sitting member despite local agitation and

1. D.T., 19/4/04.

2. D.T., 4/5/04.

3. D.T., 23/3/04, 26/3/04.

4. D.T., 5/10/03 (Glen Innes by-election) 23/6/04, (King).

5. D.T., 3/5/04. The Mudgee branch asked the executive to
      choose between John Haynes and Robert Jones, both ex-M.L.As.

6. D.T., 15/6/07.

7. D.T., 14/5/07, 22/5/07.

8. Harman, Politics at the Electoral Level, p.316-18. The pre-
      selection defeat of Creswell, M.L.A. for St. Leonards, was
      endorsed by the executive who supported the man who beat
      him.

claims that he had been selected without support within his electorate.

In Canterbury, however, the central executive refused to endorse Varney Parkes who had been selected by the local branch and continued to back the sitting member, T.F.H. Mackenzie. This case showed the importance of local selection of candidates. Parkes was a former representative of the district and was determined to regain his seat. To become acceptable to the party, he joined the central body of the Liberal and Reform Association;[1] to improve his support in the electorate, he joined the Orange Lodge.[2] His supporters canvassed the electorate and joined as many voters as possible to the local branch of the Liberal and Reform Association. With these increased numbers, he was decisively endorsed by the local branch as their candidate. His opponent declared that he had packed the branch with his supporters, and even with Labor voters, and refused to recognize the decision.[3] The central executive then declared that the branch had been formed unconstitutionally - despite the fact that it was formed in 1903 and had since then had the one president - and declared the selection of Parkes to be void.[4] Nevertheless, Parkes easily won the election. It was significant that, by declaring the branch unconstitutional, the central executive avoided over-ruling a local selection. As Parkes' success illustrated, the value of local selection was that it involved electors in the party process and laid a firm basis of votes on which a party could build and which it could use to assist in the actual electoral canvassing during campaigns. The increase in total party membership was probably partly due to the ability of members to participate in pre-selection ballots. In August 1903, Carruthers claimed there were 10,000 party members,[5] in May 1904 there were 25-30,000 while in August 1904 he claimed

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1. Carruthers to Varney Parkes, 8/4/07. Varney Parkes Papers, M.L. A1052.

2. D.T., 18/5/07-

3. D.T., 25/4/07, 7/5/07.

4. D.T., 24/4/07, 9/5/07, 29/5/07, 10/6/07, 16/7/07, for details of the dispute.

5. S.M.H., 11/8/03.

that the party now had between 75,000 to 100,000 financial
members.[1] Three years later, the party membership stood at
70,000.[2] The illusion of power and the opportunity to
participate which local selection offered, helped to boost
party numbers and therefore party funds and provided the
necessary labour force for electoral campaigning.

However, the local selection of candidates could
produce problems, particularly where some branches were
little more than personal committees of candidates.[3] In
elections before 1904, several branches were of this kind;
in Balmain South in 1901 two Liberal candidates were backed
by different branches, each of which claimed that the other
was bogus.[4] After 1904 the instances of branches being
packed were probably less common but packing could still not
be prevented. For instance, in the Canterbury electorate
in 1904, nominations for the party selections closed on
7 May, the enrolments of members who would be eligible to
vote in the ballot did not close until 23 May and the
ballot was held on 25 May. The names of candidates were
therefore known over two weeks before the enrolment of
members closed. Since most new members probably joined with
a view to voting in the pre-selection, it was not surprising
that branches were often said to have been packed. In the
Camperdown branch in 1904, Clegg had announced his
candidature early in the year; in January 1904 the branch
had 333 members; in the next two months a further 270
joined and by early May there were over 1000 members.[5] The
party leaders realised the problems which local selections
could cause but intentionally did nothing. Carruthers
declared realistically that there was nothing wrong in enrolling
friends in a branch and denied that a branch could be packed

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1. D.T., 9/8/04.

2. D.T., 23/8/07.

3. W.J. Ferguson, an ex-Labor member, claimed that this was
    also true of some Liberal and Reform Association branches,
    D.T., 7/4/04.

4. D.T., 26/5/01, 31/5/01, 19/6/01.

5. D.T., 19/4/04 - 20/5/04.

so that a weak candidate was chosen. He argued that, once
selected, every Liberal and Reform Association candidate
gained strength from the party.[1] The point was that, as
any financial member was eligible to vote in the pre-selection,
it was impossible to decide who were or were not true
Liberals and who were merely voting for friends. Besides,
to the Liberal and Reform Association it was more important
that a large number of electors should become identified
with the party because this provided a strong electoral base
on which to build a majority. Local selection was intended
to serve this purpose as much as to secure a man who could
gain votes with local ties.

Occasionally the party was prepared to play down the
'party' affiliation of members if a candidate had a strong
personal following in an electorate where party intervention
might actually hinder his election. In Tenterfield,
Maitland, the Clyde and Goulburn, all of which were held
by well-established members before 1904, branches of the
Liberal and Reform Association were seldom active because
these members did not require aid from the party. In
Goulburn party activity increased noticeably in 1907 when
Ashton retired and a new member had to be selected. In
1908 Archdale Parkhill summarised the party's position in
the northern districts as follows:

> ... it is easier to organize against Webster [the
> Federal Labor M.H.R.] than for state purposes.
> In the first place because Jones [State Labor
> M.L.A. for the Gwydir] somehow is personally
> popular and people are not anxious to shift him
> and in second place because Mr. Moore [Liberal
> M.L.A. for Bingara and Minister for Mines] wins
> his fight on personal grounds which it is best
> not to disturb just now. 2

Since the party was designed to produce electoral success,
there was no point in interfering in an electorate where a
member who was loyal in parliament could win on personal
grounds.

When a local candidate was not available, the Liberal

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1. D.T., 6/5/04. In 1915 Wade admitted that branch packing had
   taken place, Fighting Line 1914-15. Vol.2 No.6, pp.6 and
   Vol.2 No.13, p.11.

2. Parkhill to Carruthers, 29/6/08. Carruthers Papers, Box 1,
   M.L. MSS 1638.

and Reform Association suggested that local men were not really needed to represent the party. In Singleton Carruthers supported the Sydney resident, James Fallick, and claimed that it was irrelevant that the sitting member lived in the area whereas Fallick did not and said that a loyal party member, not a local agent, was required.[1] He was merely making the best of the situation; the results of the election illustrated the value of local ties. Three Liberal and Reform Association candidates who had state-wide reputations, but who were contesting seats with which they had no connection, were defeated by sitting members with local connections. One of the latter was the premier; the other two were men of little ability but with a reputation of looking after their own electorate.[2] Local influence was still an asset and the results justified the attempt of the Liberal and Reform Association to select candidates for local reasons who would then support them in parliament, thus coupling for party purposes the party and the local vote.

In one further aspect the Liberal and Reform Association pre-selection methods combined local and party appeal to its own advantage. Before 1902, the parties demanded that any candidate seeking endorsement take two steps; first he had to announce his intention to run and then he had to provide evidence of his local strength to win the party endorsement. To produce the latter, candidates usually circulated requisitions which were signed by electors and presented as an illustration of the breadth of their support. Some candidates became so convinced that they could win the seat regardless of party support that they refused to submit to party nomination;[3] in other cases, hardworking committees did not want their efforts negated by the retirement of their candidate at the demand of an external body. Then, if unselected, the candidate had to make the positive step of withdrawing his candidature. The National Protection Union introduced pre-selection ballots which occurred before

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1. D.T., 5/7/04.

2. Graham was defeated by W.W. Young at Bathurst; Garland by Levien at Tamworth and Rose by Waddell.

3. Anderson to Parkes, n.d., Parkes Correspondence. M.L. A871, pp.473-5.

candidates were announced, but not in any widespread or systematic basis.

Under the constitution of the Liberal and Reform Association, candidates usually stood for party pre-selection before they announced their intention to go to the polls. It was easier to withdraw if unselected because any campaigning had generally been carried out only within the party. Furthermore, the acceptance of party selection before publicly becoming a candidate fully identified the candidate with the party. Occasionally the party might be forced to accept in parliament a candidate who was not totally loyal but was too strong to defeat electorally,[1] but such instances were not common. Usually the pre-selection methods successfully combined local appeal and party loyalty and therefore increased the party's capacity to win elections.

In Tasmania the results of all elections before 1909 can be explained in local, rather than party, terms. Electoral organizations did not impose candidates on an electorate or dispute local selections. In 1903 the Burnie branch of the Reform League chose its own candidate but refused to recommend the same man to the Penguin branch, despite the fact that both branches were in the same electorate. Its spokesman insisted that every branch must decide for itself whom it would support.[2] The National Association endorsed candidates but did not consult any branch members before reaching their decision. In 1909 electoral committees of the Progressive League backed slates of candidates in each electorate, but many of those endorsed had nothing in common except their anti-socialism. One reason given for the introduction of the Hare-Clark system was that it would reduce the necessity for machine politics and allow each individual to be elected on his general merits.[3] The premier further claimed:

> At one time a candidate's popularity depended a good deal on the good he could do for the little part of the State he represented, but under the new system the election took a wider range. 4

1. David Fell of Lane Cove, D.T., 18/10/04.

2. North West Advocate, 12/2/03, 13/2/03, 22/2/03.

3. M., 26/9/06.

4. M., 16/4/09.

In spite of these claims, non-Labor candidates were still partly elected for local reasons. The main difference after 1909 was that the Liberal League adapted its methods to allow this localism to act to its advantage.

The Liberal League was not permitted by its constitution to show any preference among its selected candidates,[1] but by endorsing candidates from different parts of the electorate, the personality of individual candidates was used to attract votes locally. When electors had been educated to vote down the party list, those votes originally cast for local reasons remained with the party if preferences were allocated.[2] Consequently, the Liberal League used the local ties of candidates to attract votes and, because of the multiple endorsements that were required by the system, few of the tensions that existed between locality and party in New South Wales were apparent in Tasmania. Each area could have its representative as a Liberal candidate. The local press advised electors to put the local Liberal candidate first on their list so that each Liberal got a share of the primary votes.[3] One candidate could stand as a local and a party candidate without the roles being at all contradictory.[4] The Hare-Clark system allowed the party to use localism to its own advantage within the party framework. Local issues were still strong and many votes were probably cast for local reasons, but now candidates could not rely purely on their own reputation in the enlarged electorates and needed party organizations. The two forces were therefore combined to the ultimate benefit of the parliamentary party which received the support of members elected with party assistance.

A comparison between the two states shows how far the development of party machinery was a response to electoral need. In New South Wales a split vote could cause the loss of the seat, so strict organization was required; in Tasmania it was less likely to do so after 1909 and tensions

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1. _M._, 21/6/11.

2. See below, p.216

3. _Deloraine and Westbury Advertiser_, 27/4/12.

4. _North West Advocate_, 26/4/12.

in the organization scarcely existed. In New South Wales
the large size of the electorates reduced, but did not
vitiate, the value of local connections, so that the vote
for party became more important. In Tasmania the small
size of the electorates made local contact almost essential
before 1909; the party only gained influence over the
electoral process when the number of electors rapidly
increased.[1]

Powers and Independence of Branches

The central executives of parties had to ensure that
their activities did not arouse feelings of jealousy among
the local branches, who objected to restrictions on their
independence of action or felt that they had no influence
on party decisions. In the early organizations in New
South Wales the central executives had no direct connections
with the branches and clashes between branches and the
executive inevitably occurred; the Liberal and Reform
Association attempted to mould its organization so that the
executive did not appear to dictate to the branches and
left to them at least an illusion of independence. The
party's methods of attempting to prevent any local jealousy
arising can be studied by examining how the causes of this
rivalry were removed and how the branches were allocated
specific duties within the party framework.

In New South Wales all parties were originally based
in Sydney and their executives worked from there. The
early parties were also formed primarily by M.L.A.s because
they were the only organized group which represented the
party ideology and had the common interest of securing their
own re-election.[2] The executives were accused of being
biased towards sitting members, of being unrepresentative
and of attempting to direct local affairs in the interests of
a central clique.[3] The executives did tend to favour sitting

1. See Chapter 4, Table I.

2. The Freetrade Council was formed by M.L.A.s, S.M.H.,
   10/5/94, the Protectionist Committee also by the
   parliamentary party, S.M.H., 9/6/94. In 1898, the
   parliamentary party similarly was responsible for
   the formation of the Liberal and Federal executive,
   D.T., 25/6/98.

3. See the accusations of T.W. Taylor, S.M.H., 4/6/94.

members. In 1901 the Liberal party issued its first list
of endorsed candidates, which included thirty-two M.L.A.s,
a mere three weeks after the party was formed; the next day
it announced that it would endorse any local selections.[1]
This practice was understandable because a sitting member
had already proved his capacity to win and the party process
was concerned primarily with producing winners. However,
it is not true that the executive was so swamped by sitting
members that such decisions were inevitable or that it was
totally unrepresentative of party opinion. The Freetrade
Council included freetrade representatives from all parts
of the state.[2] The Liberal and Federal party had a general
committee to which were added throughout the campaign the
names of leading freetrade advocates throughout the state.
The executive of the Liberal and Federal party held fifteen
meetings and in all but one of these sessions the non-
parliamentarians were in a majority. In that other meeting
the number of M.L.A.s and non-parliamentarians was the same.
Although all the sitting members who were on the executive
represented suburban electorates, they could still not
spend too much time away from their electorates during a
campaign and consequently most of the decisions were taken
by non-parliamentarians.[3] Non-parliamentarians were
included on the party executive and particularly on the
general party committee, whose powers were purely nominal,
to illustrate to the state, and particularly to the
freetraders in country areas, that the party was not purely
run by sitting members for their own benefit and that it
was representative of all parts of the state, even though
not, for reasons of time and organization, elected.

The Liberal and Reform Association formed an elected
and representative council so that the organization appeared

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1. D.T., 25/5/01, 26/5/01.

2. S.M.H., 2/6/94. Representatives on the Freetrade Council
    came from Manning River, Newcastle, Cootamundra,
    Goulburn, Bourke, Bathurst, Albury, Woollongong and
    Armidale.

3. Minutes of the Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee,
    M.L. A2668. Only three of the nine M.L.A.s who were mem-
    bers of the Executive attended two-thirds or more of the
    meetings; nine out of ten non-parliamentarians were
    present on at least ten of the fifteen meetings.

to be dominated less by its parliamentary members. Its
first council consisted of twenty-four M.L.A.s and twenty-
four other members.[1] Two months later, twenty-four women
were also elected.[2] At the annual meeting each year, this
council had to be re-elected by members of the Association.
Even though competition for the positions appears to have
been slight, the fact that councillors could be elected
allowed the body to appear more representative of the
movement as a whole.

Criticisms were often voiced that local branches were
not consulted sufficiently,[3] but in general the central
executive did try to give the branches independence of
action for two good reasons. Firstly, because as we have
seen, local activity was advantageous to a party's election
prospects and secondly, quite simply because they had no
power to force branches to accept any decisions. In 1894
the Freetrade Council could only cajole members into
supporting their decisions and promise an unselected
candidate that he would have precedence in the next election.[4]
If the central executive and the branches disagreed, the
usual result was a vote split between the two freetrade
candidates. Since branches were sometimes little more than
candidate's committees, the conflict was reduced to a
personal level.

The formation of the Liberal and Reform Association
did not include any sanctions on local branches because
they could not have been enforced. Clashes between the
central executive and the branches could only be solved by
compromise, not by the use of specified rules. For instance,
in Macquarie in 1904, the Liberal and Reform Association
executive selected Phillips as a candidate because, at
the date specified in its published timetable for the

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 10/3/03.

2. <u>D.T.</u>, 2/5/03.

3. For instance, Alderman Richards of Bowral, on the choice
   of the Freetrade Council, <u>S.M.H.</u>, 14/7/94, and local
   criticism of the choice of <u>J.C.L.</u> Fitzpatrick in 1904,
   <u>D.T.</u>, 29/7/04.

4. See Reid to A. Ralston, published in <u>S.M.H.</u>, 11/7/94.

selection of candidates, no local branch existed which could make a selection. Within the next two months, branches were formed at Dubbo and Wellington and some local members wanted the selection re-opened. The local paper claimed that the executive had no right to make a selection without consulting local opinion and accused it of trying to foist a candidate on the country electorate. A second candidate was then proposed. For two months the two sections of the Liberal and Reform Association in the electorate argued over the selection and, although a last minute compromise led to the withdrawal of the second candidate, the seat was lost.[1] In Canterbury in 1907, no settlement was reached between the branch and the central executive and both candidates went to the polls. Precisely because the executive had no way of forcing its decisions on the branches, it usually took care to avoid such disputes by specifying what the responsibilities of the branches were and by allowing them freedom of action in these areas.

In 1894 the Botany Freetrade Association declared that its purpose was

> ... to secure the registration of voters and the return to Parliament of a liberal freetrader as the representative of the electorate of Botany.[2]

In the same election the Warringah freetrade branch claimed it had been formed to create some unity among the large number of freetrade candidates and to endorse one of them.[3]

In 1909 the constitution of the Liberal and Reform Association defined the nine duties of each branch as follows:

(a) To advocate the Constitution, Principles and Platforms of the Liberal and Reform Association.

(b) To select a candidate and work for his return to Parliament.

(c) To act in concert with the Council in furthering the objects of the Association.

(d) To generally supervise the organization of the party within the electorate.

(e) To enrol as many bona fide persons as possible as members of the local branch.

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1. *Wellington Gazette*, 25/4/04, 5/5/04, 9/5/04, 23/5/04, 29/7/04.

2. *S.M.H.*, 21/2/94.

3. *S.M.H.*, 19/6/94.

(f) To see that every person eligible as an elector is on the Electoral Roll.

(g) To assist the selected candidate on the day of election with the staff necessary to conserve his interest and to secure his election.

(h) To promote social intercourse between members and their political friends, by means of entertainment etc.

(i) To keep an Electoral Roll of the electorate, and to keep the same marked from time to time showing the known supporters of the Liberal party thereon. 1

The basic duties of the branches remained the same - candidate selection and voter registration.[2] What was new was that branch duties were now defined by the party constitution and not by the branch itself. The branch knew what it was supposed to do and what the powers of the central executive were; therefore disputes over what either group should do became less likely, even though sanctions were still absent.

In fact the functions of the branches were similar to those fulfilled by personal committees and sometimes the branches and committees were almost synonymous. In Goulburn the local branch of the Liberal and Reform Association met Ashton's personal committee and the combined group then selected him as the Liberal and Reform Association candidate.[3] In Ballina the local Liberal and Reform Association branch selected Temperley and then formally became his campaign committee.[4]

A further requirement of the branches of the early parties was to persuade electors that a candidate would be a respectable representative by showing the breadth of support

1. Liberal and Reform Association Constitution, p.11.

2. The Secretary of the National Protection Union claimed the registration of voters was the basis of all successful organizations. D.T., 21/4/97. The People's Reform League clearly agreed - see its pamphlet, The First Step (M.L. 324/P) which encouraged electors to enrol. Obviously when party managers enrolled branch members, they ensured that they were registered to vote.

3. Goulburn Evening Post, 28/4/04.

4. Richmond River Times, 7/7/04.

which he received from leading members of the community.
Widely-signed requisitions were the most obvious method
by which this impression could be achieved. In 1894 J.M.
Conroy's local secretary at Wyong tried to persuade him
to stand by pointing out that the most influential people
there supported him and therefore he would get the votes
there.[1]

On election day there is less direct evidence of
party activity although candidates and their committees
obviously did try to 'persuade' candidates to vote in their
favour. Since much of the election day activity was
probably illegal, it was seldom published. One illus-
tration of what was probably typical behaviour will be
sufficient. At Mudgee in 1898 the Protectionist candidate
and the secretary of the local Protectionist League
reputedly 'treated' electors   to drinks before they voted.
Another elector was promised by a pawnbroker, who was on
the Protectionist committee, that he could retrieve his
watch without cost if he voted as instructed; yet another
was promised the contract to paint the race-course grandstand
by the course trustees who also happened to be on the
committee of the Protectionist branch. The freetrade
candidate denied in his turn that he had promised to get
work for two labourers if they voted for him.[2] Since no
candidate endorsed by the Liberal and Reform Association
had his election disputed, it is impossible to say how
far party members participated in such activities, although
it seems probable they did.[3]

In Tasmania tensions between the branches and the
central executive seldom occurred. Before 1909, the branches
had no influence even over pre-selection and were primarily
designed to attract voters by social functions. After

1. Tonkin to Conroy, 20/2/94, J.M. Conroy Papers, Dixon
      Library, Add.899.

2. Details from Legislative Assembly of New South Wales:
      Votes and Proceedings 2nd Session, 1898, Vol.I,
      pp.421-487.

3. See Macdonald to Brady, 26/7/04, 29/7/04, Ministerial
      Election Committee Papers, M.L. Uncat.234, for
      details of some campaigning practices and 'treating'
      by F.J. Thomas, the Liberal and Reform candidate for
      Gough.

1909 the large electorates produced by the Hare-Clark system
meant that each branch had to participate in a general
campaign over an area considerably wider than its own sphere
of influence. The Liberal League did advise what the
activities and duties of its branches should be - particularly,
to register voters and purge the roll[1] - but no instances of
clashes occurred. The annual conferences after 1911, the
process of intra-party articulation and the lack of decisive
duties for any one branch removed the danger of local
branch jealousies and the need explicitly to give to the
branches any independence of action.

Central branches always realised the advantages of local
action, encouraged local activity and retained, by necessity,
a decentralised structure. They did not usually attempt to
impose their decisions on the branches. In the early parties
any interference by the Sydney-based executive could be
interpreted as an attempt to impose control over branches
which had no direct link with it. When the constituion of
the Liberal and Reform Association defined the duties of
the branch in relation to all party activities, criticism
of interference was reduced provided the central executive
did not usurp the duties of the branches. The formalisation
of rules was designed to leave the branches a considerable
amount of independence, so that the local freedom would not
be infringed while the advantages of local knowledge and
support would be utilised to the party's advantage. The
local loyalties which might have restricted the growth of
a state wide party were subtly brought within the party's
sphere of influence and turned to its advantage.

Towards a Party Vote

In this chapter I have shown that parties tried to use
the advantages of local influence to increase their own
power. As the period developed, it seems likely that local
connections themselves were often no longer sufficient to
win elections and that the party had greater control over
candidates and voting. The increasing predominance of
voting for party candidates can not be proved, but some
indicators suggest that party affiliation was growing in

1. M., 5/8/09.

importance to candidates.

In New South Wales, two main indicators can be used
- the percentage of seats in which the unendorsed candidates
who supported the Liberal and Freetrade doctrine opposed
endorsed candidates and the percentage of the vote which
the endorsed candidates received in these seats.

TABLE I: The Percentage of seats in which endorsed and
unendorsed freetrade or liberal candidates
opposed one another and the percentage of total
votes cast for both type of candidates obtained
by the endorsed candidate.

Election	% of seats in which endorsed and unendorsed candidates opposed each other	Vote for endorsed candidates as % of total Freetrade or Liberal vote. [1]
1894	44	63
1898	10	82
1901	17	60
1904	20	67
1907	10	57

It is noticeable that the number of occasions on which
endorsed candidates were opposed by unendorsed candidates
of the same persuasion declined, but the percentage of the
vote obtained by the party candidate in these particular
seats did not increase. During this period, the total
percentage of votes in all electorates obtained by endorsed
freetrade or liberal candidates increased from 28% in 1894,
to 33% in 1901 and to 45% in 1904 and 1907.

The figures in Table I suggest that parties increased
their control over candidates, but that voters still did
not vote for men purely because they were party candidates.
The number of occasions when endorsed freetraders or
liberals were opposed by other members of the party declined,
but those who were still prepared to run obviously had
personal electoral support.[2] The increasing influence of

1. In 1894, the endorsed freetraders in these seats received
32,019 of the 51,134 votes cast for all freetrade candi-
dates in these seats; in 1898 endorsed candidates got
10,159 out of 12,330 votes; in 1901, 14,838 out of 24,903,
in 1904, 32,648 out of 48,651 and in 1907, 25,107 out of
44,291.

2. The nine independent Liberals who opposed endorsed Liberals
in the 1907 election included five former members and two
who had regularly contested the electorate in earlier
years. In other words, all were already well-known.

the party had removed from contention those weaker candidates
who now had no hope of success without party endorsement and
who therefore accepted party decisions. Since fewer party
members now refused to accept party decisions, more people
voted for party candidates, although we can not know
whether their vote was cast for personal or for party
reasons. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the Liberal
party gradually expanded its influence equally in all regions
of the state.

TABLE II: The percentage of the total freetrade or liberal
seats won in a region expressed as a proportion
of the percentage of total seats in that region.[1]

Election	City-Suburban	Northern Districts	Central Districts	Southern Districts	Western Districts
1894	1.7[2]	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.3
1898	1.7	0.3	0.9	0.6	-
1901	1.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	-
1904	1.4	1.0	0.8	0.7	-
1907	1.0	1.4	1.0	0.9	-

In 1907 the percentage of Liberal seats in all regions
except the Western districts was in almost exact proportion
to the percentage of total seats in that region. Whereas
in 1894 the freetrade party depended on the suburbs for much
of its support and less on country areas, by 1907 it was
drawing support equally from all regions. While aggregate
data can be misleading, these figures suggest that party
organization was now effectively extended to all sections of
the state and that the party drew its strength from all
parts of it.

In Tasmania direct evidence from parliamentary commissions,
set up to investigate the working of the Hare-Clark system,
enable us to trace the development of disciplined party
voting in the elections of 1912 and 1913. In 1909 a committee

1. In the Northern, Central and Southern districts, I have
   included all seats in the coastal areas, on the
   tablelands or on the western slopes.

2. For instance, in 1894, 53% of all seats held by freetraders
   were in the city or suburbs, 32% of all seats were in
   the same area. The proportion of freetrade seats to
   total seats is therefore $\frac{53}{32}$ or 1.7.

reported that no group except the Labor party showed any sign of discipline.[1] In 1912, only 719 votes were lost to a party by short voting and only 829 by cross voting, even though over 70,000 votes were cast. The difference between the losses of the two parties are not significant.[2] In 1913 the number of electors who voted only for one party increased even more.

TABLE III: The percentage of electors who voted only for the candidates of one party and the percentage who voted for all the candidates of one party before casting a vote elsewhere - organized by party and electorate. 3

Electorate	Percentage of Electors who voted for candidates of only one party.		Percentage of Electors who voted for all the candidates of one party.	
	Labor	Liberal	Labor	Liberal
Bass	92	93	89	90
Darwin	90	90	79	79
Denison	91	91	76	74
Franklin	90	91	82	80
Wilmot	88	87	88	79
Total	90	91	82	80

There is no significant difference between the results of the two parties. The Tasmanian Liberal League had attempted to attract voters by endorsing candidates from different parts of large electorates. There is no way of discovering whether

1. Report of Committee on the General Election of 1909. Journals and Papers of Parliament, Tasmania, Vol.61, 1909, No.34, p.7.

2. Report on the General Election of 1912, Journals and Papers of Parliament, Tasmania, Vol.67, No.11, p.11-12, 1912. The Hare-Clark system demands that an elector votes for three candidates but does not oblige him to vote for more. A 'short' vote was cast when an elector does not place all candidates in order of preference so that, when preferences are allocated, his ballot paper was exhausted when, had he voted for more party men, the party would still have gained value from his vote. A cross vote occurs when an elector jumps from one party to another. In 1912 the Liberals lost 382 votes by short voting and 457 by cross voting; Labor losses were 337 and 372 respectively.

3. Report of Committee on General Election of 1913. Journal and Papers of Parliament, Vol. 69, No.11, pp.51-53, 1913.

electors originally cast their votes for party or local reasons but Table III does show that party voting was accepted, because only 10% of electors changed party after making their original choice.

In both cases, these indicators suggest that votes for a party increased. The party's ability to use other factors in the electorate to its own advantage was clearly an important asset in the development of this party vote.

Chapter 11

The non-Labor Parties and Pressure Groups

in the Electorate

Introduction

In the previous chapters we have seen how the parties developed an organizational structure in the electorates and how they came to terms with localism. In addition to that, some of the interests in the electorates were organized into pressure groups and these, like the parties themselves, were relatively new forms of political action and were still in the process of extending their influence. Some of these interests had attempted to obtain influence in elections or in parliament or on the administration by their own independently organized activity since the 1870s and 1880s.[1] The parties had no choice but to contend with them. Unlike the Labor party which relied heavily on the trade unions, none of the non-Labor parties were themselves based on a single or particular interest and each of them included representatives of diverse interests in the community.

Campbell has hypothesised that parties and pressure groups went through three stages of relationship in this period. In the first stage the party was structurally, financially and otherwise dependent on supporting groups; in the second the party played off one supporting group against another and in the third, the stage of comparative maturity, it became independent of the groups and forced them to rely on it. The formation of a branch structure was one indication of a party's growing independence. He claimed that the groups gave the party continuity of existence at local level and were effectively the rivals of the party machinery for the loyalty and support of members.[2] Campbell assumed that the party organization was determined to become self-reliant and that it was consequently constantly in conflict with other groups until they had been reduced to a

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1. See Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Party, ch.4, pp.100-105.
2. Campbell, Groups, Parties and Federation, pp.48-50

subordinate position and he suggested that the party unwillingly depended on group support because it had no other alternative. The hypothesis depends on the assumption that the parties did not want to depend on group support. I have shown in the previous chapters that the party organization was designed to use local influence to its own advantage and I would argue that parties were prepared to accept support from groups at the local level as an integral part of their electoral strategy and that they did not object to dependence on them in individual constituencies because of the mutual benefits which accrued to both. The relationship between groups and parties did not progress steadily from stage to stage as Campbell suggested, but instead it varied dramatically according to the aims, strategies and influence of the groups themselves.

Of course, a large number of what might be regarded as interest groups in the states did not independently participate in elections. Some of them, like the pastoralists, were already well-represented in the legislature. Others had long since obtained favourable legislation or had developed satisfactory relations with the administration. Some did not have the numbers or the popularity to influence electoral results. Of those that were formally organized, some still did not participate directly in politics; their welfare could usually be secured by personal contact with parliamentary leaders or representatives. The Chambers of Commerce and Manufactures in New South Wales, neither of them in themselves well-established bodies, pretended to be non-political, although gradually, as a Labor government became an increasingly likely possibility, both began to realise the value of formally entering politics.[1] The Employers' Federation, formed in 1902, was more definitely anti-socialist in outlook.[2] Some of the members of these organizations did actively participate in the affairs of the Peoples' Reform League, but the organizations themselves did not participate in electoral affairs.

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1. D.T., 19/9/05, 9/11/06 (Chamber of Manufactures), 27/7/04 (Chamber of Commerce).

2. D.T., 23/8/02, 28/9/04.

In Tasmania similar groups had such close ties with the electoral organizations that independent action was not necessary. One of the signatories of the circular which convened the foundation meeting of the National Association was chairman of the Chamber of Commerce[1] and many of its original council were Hobart businessmen.[2] When the Employers' Federation was formed in 1908,[3] its first secretary, G.F. Douglas, was also the paid organizer of the Progressive League.[4] The Tasmanian Liberal League was formed at meetings which were convened on the initiative of the Farmers and Stockowners' Association[5] and many of its leading members, and even some of the Liberal parliamentarians, were on the executive of the Employers' Federation or the Chamber of Commerce.[6] These organizations often claimed to be non-political,[7] because their direct personal links and often common membership with the non-Labor parties made it unnecessary for them to become openly involved in electoral contests. This absence of electoral activity did not mean that these interests were unimportant to the non-Labor parties, but only that they need not be considered in a discussion of the development of non-Labor electoral organization.

Before considering the activity of those groups which competed in the electoral arena, it is necessary to classify them. Several typologies of groups have been suggested, but few of those concerned with more developed polities are directly relevant to this study, even if they are generally

1. <u>M.</u>, 12/4/04, 19/4/04.

2. I.e., H. Jones, a jam manufacturer, C.E Webster, general merchant, W.H. Burgess, wine importer, W.M. Williams, draper, G.P. Fitzgerald, retailer and director of the Cascades Brewery, C.E. Davies, proprietor of <u>The Mercury</u>, <u>M.</u>, 23/4/04.

3. <u>M.</u>, 11/8/08.

4. <u>M.</u>, 4/7/08, 18/8/08.

5. <u>M.</u>, 11/6/09.

6. <u>M.</u>, 19/8/09, 28/8/11.

7. <u>M.</u>, 31/1/12.

valid.[1] I will therefore divide groups first into local and wide-based categories and then I will sub-divide the latter category into single-interest and multi-interest groups. By 'local' I mean those groups which participated in electoral activity only in one or two constituencies. Progress Associations or Fruitgrowers' Unions are typical local pressure groups; although in both cases, organization on a state-wide basis did develop,[2] the central executive never involved the branches in a co-ordinated electoral strategy. The local associations each participated individually in only one or two seats. A wide-based group was one which had a series of co-ordinated branches and which developed a general electoral strategy which was then put into effect by its branches. Those which were concerned with promoting a particular policy, such as the temperance movement, or which defended a specific interest, such as the Licensed Victuallers Association and the Protestant Defence Association, I have termed 'single interest'. A 'multi-interest' group was one which took a stand on a series of inter-related issues which in themselves could constitute an electoral platform. In New South Wales the main multi-interest, wide-based groups were the Freetrade and Land Reform League, the People's Reform League and the Farmers and Settlers' Association. The strategies of these groups and the parties' reactions to them differed considerably and are important in understanding the approach of the non-Labor parties to politics and in explaining how and why they developed along particular lines.

1. J. Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders, London, 1963, p.160, divides them into protective and promotional groups. A. Potter, Organized Groups in British National Politics, London, 1961, prefers to call them spokesman and promotional groups. In fact, such distinctions are often difficult to uphold in detailed studies, see P.B. Westerway, 'Pressure Groups', in Forces in Australian Politics, Sydney, 1963, pp.120-22, and T. Matthews, 'Pressure Groups in Australia' in H. Mayer (ed.) Australian Politics: A Second Reader, Melbourne, 1969, pp.236-8.

2. The Progress Association Union was formed in 1902. D.T., 3/4/02, the Fruitgrowers' Union of New South Wales in the same year, D.T., 21/4/02. Neither played any part in electoral politics.

The Non-Labor Parties and Local Groups

The local groups often may have affected the result in particular electorates but had no broader importance. For example, in the Ballina electorate, the Murwillumbah and Tintenbar Progress Associations and the Alstonville Agricultural society were all addressed by the sitting M.L.A., John Perry, during his election campaigns.[1] The Sugar Defence League, formed to protect and promote the interests of the industry, held meetings during the campaigns of 1898, 1901 and 1904 and in each case supported Temperley, a member of its committee, against Perry.[2] In the Wellington electorate in 1901, a Werris Creek Railway League, a Federal Capital for Canoblas Association and the Neurea and Baker's Swamp Progress Association held meetings which were addressed by candidates.[3] Candidates were sometimes connected with these groups and often would directly seek their support. As far as the central executive of the party was concerned, these local groups were part of the edifice of local support which candidates built for themselves and which the parties tried to attract by encouraging the local selection of candidates and the independence of branches. The party accepted that each candidate had to establish connections with these groups at local level and, as we have seen, included consideration of these groups in its strategy to attract local votes. It did not try to compete with these groups for membership; indeed in 1898 one paper claimed that a party was sensible not to start its electoral activities more than three weeks before an election.[4] The party accepted the existence of local groups in their strategy of choosing candidates with local appeal. The groups themselves had no effect on the style of development of the early non-Labor parties.

The Parties and the Wide-based Single-interest Groups

A wide range of single-interst groups participated in electoral activity in several seats, held meetings, endorsed

1. Richmond River Times, 10/3/98, 11/4/01, 30/5/04, 19/5/04.
2. Richmond River Times, 3/2/98, 10/3/98, 31/3/98, 28/3/01, 9/5/01, 23/4/01, North Coast Beacon, 16/3/04.
3. Wellington Gazette, 10/5/01, 20/5/01.
4. Goulburn Evening Post, 22/1/98.

candidates and questioned them on their views on a particular topic,[1] but only a few of these groups were either large enough to be effective or sufficiently well-established to plan any deliberate strategy in a wide range of seats. I will therefore concentrate attention on the activities of three important single-interest groups and on their effect on the development of parties.

The New South Wales Alliance was an organization which combined several individual temperance bodies such as the Local Option League, the Independent Order of Good Templars, the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Rechabites.[2] It was a peak organization, interested in co-ordinating the influence of subordinate organizations for political purposes. Most of its members were protestant and came from the respectable middle-class sections of society.[3] In the early years of party existence, the Local Option League had limited its activities to suburban constituencies and its lists of endorsed candidates did not include anyone from seats which were distant from Sydney. The election of 1895 was the first time that it endorsed candidates in country electorates. Although, as Bollen pointed out, 137,000 votes were cast in 1891 for candidates endorsed by temperance bodies,[4] it remains impossible to estimate how many of these were cast for temperance, rather than party, reasons. Most of the time the

1. Groups which were active in the 1894 election included the Single Tax League (S.M.H., 3/2/94, 2/3/94, 28/3/94), the Christian Elector's Association (S.M.H., 17/2/94, 3/5/94), the Landowner's Defence League, (S.M.H., 25/4/94, 26/4/94, 31/5/94), the Property Owner's Defence League (S.M.H., 28/6/94, 11/7/94, 12/7/94), the Municipal Association (S.M.H., 5/7/94), the Anti-Humbug League (S.M.H., 25/1/94, 2/2/94, 1/3/94), the City Railway Extension Association (S.M.H., 14/7/94), the Australian Federal League (S.M.H., 14/7/94), and the National Association (see above, chapter 3). In 1901 they included the Early Closing League (D.T., 2/6/01) the Municipal Association (D.T., 9/6/01), the Womanhood Suffrage League (D.T., 25/6/01) and the Restaurant Employees' Association (Rydon and Spann, New South Wales Politics, pp.13-14). None of these groups consistently tried to work through a party.

2. D.T., 19/3/03.

3. J.D. Bollen, The Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party in New South Wales, pp.163-5.

4. Bollen, The Protestant Churches and the Social Reform Movement in New South Wales, p.232.

temperance organizations promoted their cause through petitions, mass meetings and the representations of those members of parliament who espoused their cause. It is certain that a large number of branches of the various organizations were incorporated in the New South Wales Alliance, although precise estimates are impossible.

In the early years the strategy of the temperance groups was intended to influence politics at the parliamentary, rather than the electoral, level. Since the parties at this time were primarily electoral machines organized in the months before an election, they had no continuity of organization or predictable procedures. The leaders of the groups consequently concentrated on influencing candidates, rather than the party as a whole, in the hope that a large number of committed candidates would be returned to the assembly and would promote their cause. While the temperance leaders preferred to support a candidate who was also endorsed by a party, they were prepared to run a candidate purely on the temperance issue.[1] In 1894 the Local Option League endorsed seventy-seven candidates from all parties, although the majority were freetraders. In twenty-eight of the thirty-eight seats for which candidates were endorsed, more than one candidate was selected, with the result that a block vote of temperance supporters was not directed to any particular candidate. Endorsement was a sign that a candidate had respectable temperance views and that he had promised to support the cause in the assembly. It was intended to commit candidates as well as attract votes for them. In the elections the temperance movement did not directly co-operate with either of the political parties, although its leaders did ask the Protectionist and Freetrade parties to take the views of candidates on local option into consideration when deciding whom the party would endorse.[2] The Protectionist committee rejected the suggestion outright[3] while Reid refused to take a stand on the question because he knew that his party was divided on it and that any commitment by the leader might

1. S.M.H., 28/2/93 quoted in Bollen, The Protestant Churches and the Social Reform Movement, p. 235.

2. S.M.H., 29/6/94.

3. S.M.H., 3/7/94.

cause the party to lose votes.[1]

In the following elections, the temperance organizations followed the same strategy of endorsing candidates rather than trying to influence the executive of a party, although on at least one occasion a branch did work through a party. In 1901, a deputation of the Temperance, Moral and Social Association of Marrickville met the executive of the Liberal party and secured party nomination for their nominee.[2] Such actions were unusual.

After 1901, the leaders of the New South Wales Alliance decided to change their strategy and work in co-operation with a party. The growth of party in parliament had made their original tactic of electing committed M.L.A.s ineffective. Inter-party groups committed to causes had never been particularly effective in parliament, but the growing rigidity of party lines and the declining opportunities for legislation sponsored by private members made the introduction of a measure as complex as a local option bill almost impossible. Gradually political necessity brought this change in the attitude of temperance leaders.[3] Such a strategy was particularly appropriate in relation to the Liberal and Reform Association which had predictable pre-selection methods and a policy formulated by the party.

In March 1903, a clause was added to the original policy of the Liberal and Reform Association which demanded a thorough reform of the liquor trade.[4] Two months later this plank was altered to give full support to local option. In 1904 Carruthers addressed a local option meeting in his own electorate and identified himself with the movement.[5] After the electoral victory of 1904, a local option bill was introduced as part of the government's policy. The large number of temperance advocates in Liberal ranks had been responsible for the introduction of this particular objective into party policy.

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1. D.T., 3/7/94.

2. D.T., 27/5/01, 30/5/01.

3. Bollen. The Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party, p.169-71.

4. D.T., 3/5/03.

5. D.T., 22/6/04.

One reason for the close alliance between the temperance
movement and the Liberal and Reform Association was the
co-operation between the Progressive party, the Labor party
and the representatives of the liquor trade. The Licensed
Victuallers Association had occasionally tried to influence
the results of individual electorates for many years before
parties developed.[1] Its members were mostly publicans and
in 1907 it claimed that it would attempt to influence the
30,000 hotel employees throughout the state.[2] Its actions
were generally defensive as it tried to protect the interests
of the trade against the demands of the temperance movements.
It was closely identified with the Protectionist party, and
particularly with Dibbs, in the years before 1894.[3] Later
it developed strong connections with the Labor party and in
1902, J.J. Power, Labor M.L.A. for the Lang division of
Sydney, was its president.[4] Unlike the temperance associations,
its activities covered the whole state from 1894 onwards. The
temperance bodies became involved in country electorates
only after 1895.

Despite its unofficial connections with the Labor party
there was no direct co-operation because some Labor candidates,
particularly McGowen, Griffith, Catts and G.D. Clark, were
strong temperance supporters. In every election the Licensed
Victualler's Association acted independently; it appointed
parliamentary committees to run the campaign,[5] extracted
pledges of support for compensation from candidates and usually
published a list of M.L.A.s who were supposed to be committed
to the principle of compensation.[6] Occasionally it claimed
that candidates had been converted by its electoral campaigns.[7]

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1.   Loveday and Martin.   Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.103.

2.   D.T., 14/2/07.

3.   In 1894 Dibbs as Premier attended the annual picnic of the
        Association. S.M.H., 21/3/94.

4.   D.T., 11/4/02.

5.   S.M.H., 7/4/94, 21/7/94, 3/8/94. D.T., 12/7/94, 3/3/98,
        13/7/04.

6.   S.M.H., 21/7/94, D.T., 30/7/98, 20/9/07.

7.   Such as J. Perry and Ewing. S.M.H., 3/8/94.

In 1907, after the LIberal government had introduced a local option poll which was to be held simultaneously with the general election, the Association formed a Liquor Trades Defence Association and asked all publicans to contribute to a political fund.[1] After the election Carruthers claimed that the trade had spent thousands of pounds to ensure the defeat of several Liberals who were strong temperance supporters and the accusation was not denied.[2] The liquor trade had entered into an informal alliance with the Labor party, although it never tried to work through the party structure.

The Australian Protestant Defence Association (A.P.D.A.), on the other hand, and to some extent the temperance bodies were prepared to work through a party at local level to promote their cause. The A.P.D.A. was formed with the intention of returning protestants to parliament and defending the state against the Roman Catholic Church.[3] Its founder, Rev. Dill Macky, was the driving force behind the movement, which was financed by several anonymous Sydney businesses.[4] In August 1902 only sixteen branches had been formed,[5] but by the annual general meeting of 1903 there were 116 branches.[6] At first, the branches were confined to the suburbs of Sydney, but after October 1902, they were formed in numerous country towns such as Wellington, Kiama, Maitland, Tamworth and Wagga Wagga.[7] The numbers enrolled in the branches ranged from thirty to two hundred and thirty, with an average size of around seventy or eighty.[8] The A.P.D.A. regularly held mass meetings at which the evils of Romanism were unveiled and a sectarian appeal was made to the audience to defend their religion.[9]

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1. D.T., 8/2/06., 25/7/06.

2. D.T., 16/9/07, 17/9/07.

3. The Watchman, 1/2/02.

4. See S.D. Stevensen (nee Dill-Macky) Papers. M.L. MSS. 1385.

5. The Watchman, 2/8/02.

6. The Watchman, 8/8/03.

7. See The Watchman. 23/8/02-14/3/03 for Lists of branches.

8. A.B. Marshall, Some Aspects of the Australian Protestant Defence Association 1901-4. Government III thesis Univ. of Sydney, 1961, p.20.

9. The Watchman, 11/10/02, 18/10/02, 9/4/04, 11/7/07.

The Liberal party refused to become connected with the A.P.D.A. and Carruthers vehemently protested that the Liberal and Reform Association was not a protestant party.[1] Nevertheless, many Liberals as individuals were connected with the A.P.D.A. Robert Booth was a Liberal M.L.A., secretary of the local branch of the A.P.D.A, and Deputy Grand Master of the Loyal Orange Lodge.[2] Ten Liberal M.L.A.s attended the first annual general meeting of the Association,[3] while several members were present at protestant demonstrations.[4] Yet during the election campaign both the party and the interest group denied that they had any alliance.

During the election of 1904, the A.P.D.A. co-operated with the Loyal Orange Lodges and formed a Protestant Political Joint Committee which was responsible for selecting the candidates for whom supporters were supposed to vote. This committee produced a series of questions to be put to all candidates before they could receive endorsement.[5] At the same time the protestants, and possible to a lesser extent the temperance supporters, decided to ensure that candidates favourably inclined towards their cause were endorsed by themselves participating in the pre-selection ballots of the Liberal and Reform Association. For the first time the methods of a party were predictable enough to permit such a strategy. Occasionally their moves were successful. In Leichhardt the local branch of the Liberal and Reform Association was reputedly formed by A.P.D.A. members who had selected Robert Booth as the protestant candidate on the previous evening. A month later this branch selected Booth as the party candidate.[6] In Parramatta the Protestant Political Council insisted that it was eligible as an organization to participate in the pre-selection ballot of

1. S.M.H., 23/5/03.
2. The Watchman, 28/4/06, D.T., 14/2/06.
3. Jessep, Law, Fallick, Hurley, Davidson, Affleck, Coleman, Moxham, Mackenzie, Nobbs, The Watchman, 2/8/02.
4. D.T., 13/7/06, 13/11/06.
5. D.T., 31/7/03, 30/7/04.
6. D.T., 14/4/04, 14/5/04.

the Liberal and Reform Association.[1] It later withdrew
its request, decided that its members should act only as
individual members of the Liberal and Reform Association
and then endorsed the candidate selected by the latter body.[2]
In other seats, the A.P.D.A. delayed the selection of their
candidate until the Liberal and Reform Association had made
their choice.[3] Occasionally candidates who were endorsed
repudiated the support and denied that they had been approached
by the A.P.D.A, although in one of these cases there is no
doubt that the A.P.D.A. had in fact been active in the
electorate.[4] How widespread the influence of the A.P.D.A.
was remains unknown - in Leichhardt one correspondent
suggested that only 120 of the 627 branch members who
unanimously selected Booth were members of the A.P.D.A.[5] If
this is true, then their influence may have been exaggerated.
Nevertheless, the methods they employed were an indication
of the changing relationship between the party and the single-
interest groups.

The Liberal and Reform Association permitted any
financial member to participate in the selection of candidates
and, as we have seen, this procedure was intended to encourage
the support of groups in the local electorates. What those
local groups may have represented was not considered important,
and, by accepting the support of the protestant or temperance
groups, the party undoubtedly helped its own cause. The
groups, of course, had little alternative but to work through
the party. Although the A.P.D.A. claimed that it did not
support any party, it also pointed out that it would be

1. Bollen. The Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party, p.171.

2. D.T., 8/7/04.

3. For instance Botany, D.T., 4/6/04, Glebe, 10/6/04.

4. Endorsements were repudiated by W. Millard (Tilba Times,
    3/8/04) and by P.E. Stirton and F.J. Thomas (D.T., 3/8/04).
    Yet on one instance in Thomas's constituency of Gough,
    'The Church of England here was decorated with boughs
    tied with orange ribbons on the Sunday when I arrived
    [at Emmaville] and a meeting of the Loyal Orange Lodge
    was held in the church after the service when the parson
    took a strong line against the government'. Macdonald to
    Brady, 26/7/04, Ministerial Election Committee Papers.
    M.L. Uncat. 234.

5. D.T., 8/7/04.

'vainglorious' to run candidates purely as protestants and advised all electors to vote for the Liberal candidate.[1] The unofficial co-operation was mutually beneficial to both groups; the party gained additional parliamentary members while the group gained parliamentary representation.

The fundamental factor explaining this relationship was that, as the protestant and temperance leaders realised, a single-interest group may have had wide support throughout the state but did not have sufficient votes in a single electorate to win without party support. Campbell has suggested that a party may have been prepared to co-operate with a group only if it could provide considerable assistance in some area.[2] Nevertheless, the party was prepared to accept the influence of groups in its own activities in the electorate partly because it could not prevent such action without undermining a fundamental part of its party organization but also because the groups were only concerned with a single interest and consequently did not try to undermine the freedom of action of the party on a broader range of issues. The Liberal and Reform Association was prepared to accept a plank supporting local option and to allow temperance advocates considerable freedom in the pre-selection ballots, because any members elected under their influence would probably support the party loyally on the majority of issues which were not concerned with local option. Since these groups were not a threat to the general independence of the party and might bring considerable electoral support, the party accepted their participation in branch activities. It never regarded itself as a rival of these groups or competed with them for membership. Instead it followed its strategy of attracting local support wherever available through the predetermined procedures of its organization.

In Tasmania the small electorates which existed before 1909 made organized group activity as difficult for interest groups as it was for parties. A candidate relied primarily

1. The Watchman, 30/4/04. For a time the A.P.D.A. even supported a catholic who was a Liberal candidate. He was S.J. Kearney of Armidale. The Watchman,16/1/04, 2/4/04.
2. Campbell, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups in Australia, p.51.

on local support, which included some group support. The small size of society meant that many of the single-interest groups whose counterparts were active in New South Wales had no need to be involved in Tasmanian politics. For instance, the Licensed Victuallers had close connections with the government and the non-Labor electoral organization between 1903 and 1909. The premier, Evans, had been a former president of the Licensed Victuallers Association[1] and the chairman of the National Association, G.P. Fitzgerald, was a director of the Cascades Brewery. In 1906 the National Association was accused of being nothing more than a clique, dominated by the liquor trade.[2] The close connections between the trade and some M.H.A.s remained after 1909 [3] The temperance associations made some endorsements[4] but, because formal organization played only a small part in elections, seem to have done little more. Their endorsements, like those of the same groups in New South Wales, were designed to influence affairs inside the Assembly.

The introduction of the Hare-Clark system altered the relationship of groups and parties. The parties could endorse candidates who represented several sectional groups within a constituency while the groups could draw support from all sections of the enlarged electorates and had a chance of securing the election of a party candidate who was committed to support their particular cause. One commentator suggested that in Wilmot

> The Druids will help Mr. Curwen a little, the P.A.F.S., (sic) Curwen and Hayes; the Hibernian vote will go to Lyons, Mulcahy and Cameron, the sporting vote to Field, the temperance vote to Best, Hays and Lee but as only a limited number will vote any of these tickets, they are not going to have a very important bearing on the result. 5

1. Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 16/7/03. Its patron then was Senator Edward Mulcahy.

2. M., 18/12/05, 21/12/05, 5/2/06, 6/2/06, 6/3/06, 8/3/06, 9/3/06

3. Edward Mulcahy, M.H.A. after 1910, was a former president of the Association. M., 15/3/06, 1/6/06.

4. M., 5/2/06, 27/2/09.

5. Deloraine and Westbury Advertiser, 27/4/12.

Each of these candidates was able to attract some votes to
the party because of their group connections and, if the
voting was disciplined, the preferences would remain with
the party. The opportunity which the electoral system offered
for multiple endorsements allowed most single-interest groups
in Tasmania to graduate without tensions towards some
identification with one of the parties. After 1909 there is
no evidence of any group endorsing separate lists of
candidates.[1]

In Tasmania the sudden enlargement of the electorate and
the flexible party pre-selection process which this electoral
system created meant that parties were never dependent
directly on particular groups for support. The party was
able to use group support at the same time as forwarding its
own cause; the two were not contradictory.

The Parties and Wide-based Multi-interest Groups

The decisive factor in determining the nature of the
relationship between parties and single-interest groups
was the inability of these groups to win elections on their
own and the independence which the parties maintained
because the majority of issues were of no concern to these
groups. The multi-interest groups, on the other hand,
espoused a series of inter-related causes and were able to
attract votes from a wide range of electors. When these groups
decided to take direct electoral action, and particularly when
their platform was similar to that espoused by the parliamentary
parties, they threatened the independence and even the
existence of the parliamentary parties. As a result, parties
were forced to regard such organizations as rivals and they
had to absorb them as rapidly as possible. If a wide-based
group did not attempt to challenge the independence of the
party, then the two could generally co-operate. The Freetrade
and Reform League, the People's Reform League and the
Tasmanian Reform League belonged to the first type of multi-
interest group which challenged the power of the parliamentary

1. In the federal elections of 1910, the Loyal Orange Lodge
   did issue a list of selected candidates which differed
   in only one instance from the Liberal list. Mulcahy,
   a catholic, was omitted. M., 12/4/10.

party; the Farmers and Settlers' Association entered electoral politics without being identified with or challenging any party organization.

The Farmers and Settlers' Association was formed at Cootamundra in 1893 to protect the interests of the small farmers and to ensure that when the leases of the Central Division expired, sufficient land was made available for settlement. Originally the Association drew its strength from the Riverina, but gradually it expanded its branches throughout the state. In 1894 twenty-eight branches had been formed and by 1899 150 delegates attended the annual conference which was held in Sydney. The conferences discussed a wide range of rural affairs, such as conditional purchases, interest rates, closer settlement, rail freight charges, water conservation and compulsory arbitration.[1] The Association had originally been formed in the land crisis of 1893-4 but, after many of its demands had been incorporated in the Land Act introduced by Carruthers in 1895, it remained in existence as the permanent representative of the small settlers.

Obviously the Farmers and Settlers' Association was a political organization, but it carefully refused to become identified with any party. At its annual conference in 1902, a motion suggesting that the recently formed parliamentary Country Party should be asked to represent the Association caused a long debate which illustrated a considerable division of opinion on party strategy. Some M.L.A.s who were delegates and members of other parties opposed the motion which was defeated by forty-seven votes to thirty-four. The feeling of the majority was that, if the Association became identified with any parliamentary group, it would lose its independence and reduce its effectiveness.[2] In 1904 the Association decided that, while the individual branches had the right to support any candidate regardless of his party,

1. Bayley. A History of the Farmers and Settlers Association, p.44-52.

2. Farmers and Settlers' Association Conference Reports, 1902. M.L. 630.6/8. p.69-72. Among the M.L.A.s present were Lee and Fleming (Liberal) and Clara (Labor); T. Brown a federal member, was also prominent.

the organization as a whole would maintain its previous stance and refuse to become identified with either party. The motion was only accepted after a long debate. At the same time, the Association produced an electoral platform which it intended to advocate during the campaign of 1904.[1] In 1905 the resolution permitting selection of candidates by branches was changed so that branches were directly encouraged to choose candidates.[2] The endorsement of Fitzpatrick in the Cootamundra by-election of 1906 caused a severe split in the Association and the pro-Labor group led by Trefle and Brown, which had been influential, was now clearly in a minority.[3] Gradually, without officially altering its policy of independence as an organization, the Farmers and Settlers' Association moved towards supporting the Liberal party.[4]

The Farmers and Settlers' Association never directly clashed with a non-Labor party because it refused to take a stance which fully identified it with any party organization. Although its objectives were broad and concerned most areas of country life, its refusal to attempt to compete with the parties meant that no rivalry existed. Other organizations, however, did cause parliamentary parties to take more decisive action.

The Freetrade and Land Land Reform League was founded in April 1893 and B.R. Wise became its leading spokesman. According to its secretary, William Harding, it was formed to shake the freetrade movement out of its apathy and to force it to accept a policy of direct taxation.[5] It was a league formed primarily by electors and not manipulated by

1. Farmers and Settlers' Association Conference Reports, 1904, M.L. 630.6/8, p.27-29, 64. At least seventy-four branches were represented.

2. Farmers and Settlers' Association Conference Reports, 1905, M.L. 630.6/8, p.91.

3. Farmers and Settlers' Association Conference Reports, 1906, M.L. 630.6/8, p.20, 27-28.

4. For a full description of all the above, see B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, p.55-65.

5. S.M.H., 26/4/93 quoted in J.A. Ryan, "B.R. Wise, an Oxford Liberal in the Freetrade Party', p.315. Much of this section is based on chapter nine, p.315-45, of this thesis. See also Wise to Carruthers, 26/10/- (probably 1893), Carruthers Papers, Box 14a, M.L. MSS. 1638.

the parliamentary party.[1] Its supporters were representative
of all types of city interests, including lawyers, journalists,
manufacturers and businessmen. At first the League was based
primarily in Sydney, but its branches were soon formed in all
parts of the state[2] and in the election of 1894 it endorsed
candidates who accepted a land tax.

Reid, as leader of the opposition, clearly realised
the possible electoral strength of the new organization
because the parliamentary freetrade leaders formally met
the leaders of the League.[3] Reid then took the opportunity
of identifying himself with the new movement and accepted
the policy of direct land and income taxation.[4] As party
leader he committed any cabinet that might be led by himself
to this policy, but his followers as individuals were not
committed. Since the party was divided into conservative,
moderate and radical groups,[5] Reid had to pursue a policy
of conciliation if he was to continue leading a united party
and if the parliamentary party was not to be dominated by
this new movement. Reid's strategy was that, by adopting
the main parts of the policy of the Freetrade and Land Reform
League, he could reduce its independence and reclaim the
leadership of the freetrade movement for its parliamentary
representatives.

During the election of 1894 the Freetrade Council and
the Freetrade and Land Reform League co-operated successfully
despite an acrimonious exchange of letters between Harding
and Pulsford on the possible effects of the League's taxation
proposals and its electoral results.[6] After the election

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1. See W.H. Wilks, S.M.H., 31/8/93.

2. See details of branch activity in Northumberland. Conroy
   Papers Add.899. Dixson Library.

3. See Wilks, S.M.H., 31/8/93.

4. See B.R. Wise, A Year's Stewardship, Sydney, 1895, M.L.,
   042/P77 for details of events during this year.

5. A.W. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New
   South Wales, p.319-322.

6. S.M.H., 21/5/94, 1/8/94(Pulsford), 23/5/94, 26/5/94, 19/7/94
   (Harding). The Freetrade Council selected 101 candidates,
   the Freetrade and Land Reform League fifty-six. In only
   seven seats were different men endorsed.

M.L.A.s who had been prominent members of the League were quickly absorbed into the parliamentary party and, when Reid fulfilled his promises by introducing the direct land and income taxes, remained as a satisfied part of his following.[1]

The League appeared as a direct rival for political influence to the parliamentary party because it was campaigning on a broad range of issues which were sufficient to secure the election of a candidate and which were so similar to the position espoused by the parliamentary freetrade party that it threatened to steal some of its electoral support. The leader of the parliamentary party therefore adopted its·policy in order to re-assert his own position of authority and to prevent the formation of a parliamentary clique which might challenge him. He succeeded in absorbing the group elected primarily under the auspices of the League. Obviously the League was seen as a rival influence and caused a direct and rapid reaction; it achieved this effect only because its platform was sufficiently broad to make independent and successful electoral action a possible strategy for it.

In 1902 the People's Reform League was formed and in 1903 it absorbed the Taxpayer's Union. Its members were all non-parliamentarians and, if an official of the organization decided to stand for parliament, he had to resign his office. Before 1904, no M.L.A.s were therefore involved in its organization.[2] The People's Reform League was conservative in character, anti-socialist in doctrine and closely connected with the Employers' Federation and the Chambers of Manufactures and Commerce.[3] It was effectively, but not exclusively, representative of business interests. The League originally claimed to be an educative organization but immediately began to organize a series of branches, particularly in seats which

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1. Whiddon, Dick, V. Parkes, Storey, Ashton, Affleck, Wilks, Mahony and Millen, all elected in 1894, had been identified with or even members of the executive of the League.

2. D.T., 25/9/02, 9/4/03, 4/7/03.

3. Its motto was 'Security and Freedom are all that industry requires'. D.T., 4/4/04.

were held by opposition members.[1] Branches were also formed
in country areas.[2] It claimed to be a people's movement and
was determined that it would not be dominated by politicians;[3]
instead, its president, John Stinson, declared that its
intention was to control the parliamentary opposition.[4] Its
platform demanded the reduction of the number of members of
the assembly and retrenchment of the state expenditure.

Its platform, its electoral activity and Stinson's threat
meant that it was offering a direct challenge to Carruthers,
the leader of the opposition. In an attempt to regain the
leadership of the anti-government movement, he founded the
Liberal and Reform Association. In this organization he
ensured that the leadership remained in the hands of its
parliamentary representatives. He adopted a policy which
was almost identical to that of the People's Reform League
and with considerable energy he and his parliamentary
colleagues laid the foundations of a branch network which was
soon to be larger than that of his rivals.[5] Personal antipathy
between Stinson and Carruthers made close co-operation between
the two organizations difficult to achieve,[6] but finally an
appeal committee was formed in April 1904. This committee was
responsible for arbitrating in disputes between the organizations
and included two members of the parliamentary party, two
representatives from each of the Liberal and Reform Association
and the People's Reform League, one delegate from the Women's
Liberal League[7]

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1. D.T., 1/6/03.

2. D.T., 24/1/03, 9/2/03 for lists of places where country
   branches were formed. It appointed a country organizer who
   was responsible for forming branches. Albury Banner,
   6/5/04, 13/5/04.

3. D.T., 4/7/03.

4. D.T., 9/4/03.

5. The only actual number available for the membership of the
   People's Reform League are those of 1906. Then the League
   had 7244 members D.T., 19/4/06. An estimate of the Liberal
   and Reform Association numbers at this time would probably
   be 50,000.

6. D.T., 1/6/03, 2/6/03, 3/6/03, 10/8/03, 11/8/03.

7. The Women's Liberal League, which was dominated by its pres-
   ident, Mrs. Molyneaux Parkes, espoused similar causes to
   the other Liberal organizations and was particularly active
   in the election of 1904 when women voted for the first time.
   It insisted on maintaining its own independence from the
   other bodies.

and two leading citizens.[1] On some occasions members of
branches of both organizations in the same electorate voted
in the same pre-selection ballot.[2] Several members of the
People's Reform League, notably Thomas Henley and David Fell,
were elected and became members of the parliamentary Liberal
Party. The People's Reform League remained an independent
organization, acted as a critic of the government, particularly
when Carruthers introduced the government savings bank bill,[3]
and generally continued to represent business interests.

Basically Carruthers' strategy towards the People's
Reform League was the same as that of Reid in 1893 towards
the Freetrade and Land Reform League. Both were faced by a
multi-interest group which was trying to form an independent
branch organization and which did not want leadership from
the parliamentary party. In both instances, the leaders
reacted to this threat to their independence and electoral
support by adopting the main parts of the policy of the rival
organizations and gradually absorbing them into the
parliamentary party. The strategy towards these groups was
very different from that which was adopted to the single-interest
groups. The multi-interest organizations did have the electoral
support to win seats and therefore were a threat to the
parliamentary representatives; the single interest groups did
not have that support and could be used without threatening
the existence of the party.

In Tasmania only one similar organization emerged. In
1902 the Reform League was founded at Burnie. Like the People's
Reform League in New South Wales it had been formed in imitation
of the Kyabram League in Victoria and demanded a reduction of
the members of parliament and a retrenchment of government
expenditure.[4] In the north of the state it rapidly developed
and was the first political organization to form a widely-based
series of branches. It was particularly strong in Launceston,
but there was also a committee formed in the southern part of
the island.

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1. D.T., 23/4/04. The two 'citizens' were Want and McMillan.
2. For instance, Burwood, D.T., 21/5/04.
3. D.T., 18/10/04, 6/4/05.
4. M., 1/1/03.

The opposition, led by W.B. Propsting, quickly identified itself with the movement. Many sitting members accepted its platform and appropriated its popular support. As a result the leading members of the opposition were returned with its assistance.[1] The new members who had been endorsed by the League became their followers. Therefore as in New South Wales, the politicians quickly put themselves at the head of an organization which appeared to have such wide electoral support that it might threaten their seats or their independence.

The Dependence of Parties on Pressure Groups

The party's attitude to pressure groups did not depend on its stage of development as much as on the breadth of their support. The party accepted and expected the support of local groups for a candidate; it accepted that widely-based single-interest groups might dominate particular branches and have their nominee selected as party candidate. It did not accept the activities of multi-interest groups, particularly those who were opposed to M.P.s but espoused similar policies as the parliamentary parties. The differentiation between groups can be explained by the different effect which groups might have on the parliamentary behaviour of its members.

All members were expected to have local connections and to represent local interests; as we have seen, the party was usually prepared to allow its members freedom of voting on these matters. Furthermore, it accepted that some of its members had connections with external groups on a particular issue and might disagree with the party on it; this connection was permissable as long as the member remained loyal on most other matters. But the party could not accept in parliament a group which was united on a series of principles which were similar to its own and which might be expected to challenge its general position. These groups had to be absorbed into the parliamentary party if the latter was to retain its independence and unity.

The party depended on groups when it considered them useful; if the group was a threat to its independence, the party could and did react to reduce its effectiveness.

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1. <u>M.</u>, 2/4/03.

Dependence, particularly in the cases of individual branches, was a matter of convenience to the party and not purely of necessity.

PART IV: Leadership in the non-Labor Parties and Conclusions

Chapter 12

The Power and Position of the Leader

in the non-Labor Parties

Introduction

Bailey has argued that in a faction followers were recruited directly by the leader, that they had no common ideology and that they only supported the leader in exchange for particular returns.   In a party he claimed that leader and followers were united by common beliefs.   He called the former type of relationship 'transactional' and the latter 'moral'.[1]   Loveday and Martin have pointed out that in the faction system in New South Wales some members supported leaders because of common attitudes and this implied that the arrangement was not entirely transactional in Bailey's terms.[2]   Nevertheless, the faction was still kept together by the personal efforts of the leader.   He received support as an individual and his followers co-operated primarily because they were 'his' supporters.   It is implied in both texts that in a party the leader was supported in his capacity as party leader and he had obligations to his followers collectively, and not just individually.   In particular, he had to advocate the principles of the party and uphold its symbols.   The loyalty was directed to the man as holder of a party office rather than as an individual. When the leader left that office, the loyalty was transferred to his successor.   There was a distinction between the position and the incumbent which became increasingly clear between 1890 and 1910.

In the period of faction politics, leaders held the factions together by maintaining personal loyalty to themselves. They were never obliged to consult their followers; they were in a position of undisputed leadership, but they did not have total freedom of action.   They had to act within the limits which, although unstated, were understood, if they were to retain

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1.   Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p.39-52.
2.   Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.46-49.

support. The adherents of modern parties gave support to a
leader only as long as his actions were consistent with the
aims of the party or as long as they could not legitimately
remove him. Since support for a party was more formally
organized than it was for a faction and since the party developed
a collective identity, the leader was faced with more constraints
on his actions than his faction counterpart. Nevertheless,
he also gained strength from the collective power of the party
as a distinct entity.

The non-Labor parties were the direct descendents of
the factions and inherited many of their basic assumptions
about the personal power and independence of the leader. They
rejected any suggestion that the leader should be restricted
by explicit rules as the leader of the Labor party was.[1]
Gradually a series of informal precedents developed which
implicitly defined the power of the leader, even though no
rules were ever formulated. The growth of a party identity
meant that loyalty was granted to the leader in his capacity
as party leader rather than as an individual. As a result
the personal power of the leader became more limited, but his
potential influence as party leader was more secure, more
widespread and probably greater. This change in the relation-
ship between the leader and the party can be analysed by
examining the selection and dismissal of leaders and the
changing attitude of the party towards the selection of cabinet.

The Selection and Dismissal of Party Leaders

In a faction the leader held his position because of his
personal ability and because of the resources at his disposal
for securing support; in a party he was selected by his party
and was liable to dismissal. The growing acceptance of a

1. The leader of the Labor party was supposed to be no more
    than a 'primus inter pares'. He was responsible to caucus,
    bound by its decision and had to undergo re-election,
    which was usually a ritual, at the beginning of each
    parliament. As chairman, rather than leader, of the
    party, he had no more than an equal voice with other
    party members in making decisions on party strategy.
    His scope for action or initiative was carefully
    delineated by formal party rules, even though in
    practice Labor leaders usually had more freedom than
    the rules formally allowed.

party's right to select leaders was an important indication of the development of a collective party identity.

In 1894 Parkes lamented that leaders could now be chosen by the parliamentary party and claimed

> 'a man should become leader by commanding others' sympathy by superior acquirements.' 1

The belief that a man should become leader only because of his personal characteristics was already outdated. By then parliamentary parties were responsible for the selection of the leader unless he became party leader by virtue of becoming premier.[2] In 1907 in New South Wales some party members believed that even a premier should be selected by his party. By 1912 in Tasmania the right of a party to elect a leader, and even one who was certain to become premier, was well-established. In New South Wales four leaders, Lyne, Barton, Lee and Carruthers, were originally chosen as leaders of the opposition by their party. Three men, See, Waddell and Wade, became party leader when they accepted a commission to form a government. In Tasmania all leaders were chosen by their party and in 1894 and after 1909 this selection occurred <u>after</u> the party had defeated the government or won an election and was about to take office.

The non-Labor parties in New South Wales never actually elected leaders by any formal method, but the most acceptable candidate for the position usually emerged and possible opposition was discouraged by informal methods. In 1895 See and Crick were both possible contenders for the leadership but refused to oppose Lyne;[3] in 1901 Carruthers, already discredited by his negotiations with See for a fusion government, refused nomination[4] and in 1902 he was elected unopposed despite rumours

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1. <u>S.M.H.</u>, 27/11/94. Leaders in the pre-party period in New South Wales were only chosen by groups which were not factions, e.g., Loveday and Martin, <u>Parliament, Factions and Parties</u>, p.161, for example of Stuart in 1882.

2. Parkes himself had been the first leader whose selection was ratified by a party meeting, (Loveday and Martin. <u>Parliament, Factions and Parties</u>, p.146-7,) although this interpretation of events has been challenged by Nairn; The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes, p.24-25.

3. <u>D.T.</u>, 14/8/95.

4. <u>D.T.</u>, 17/4/01.

of several other possible candidates.[1] Other party members
probably gauged the feeling of the party before deciding
whether they would stand. The non-Labor parties never had
any formal rules governing the selection of leaders, but they
could and did discourage candidates from standing. As the
party developed a collective identity, its supposed views
obviously had to be considered. The process of choosing the
leader was still undemocratic and, in some respects, reminiscent
of faction politics; the leader effectively emerged and then
was endorsed by the members of the parliamentary party.
However, unlike the faction leaders, the party leaders were
not self-selected; the party clearly wielded a veto over the
choice of leaders, could prevent a man being chosen and had
to be prepared to support the man who finally emerged.
Consequently, although all leaders may have been formally
elected unopposed, they were always chosen with the tacit
approval of the party, which had often blocked or discouraged
other possible candidates.

Furthermore, the party also had the capacity to dismiss
a leader, even though it never directly used this power. In
1898 Lyne resigned the leadership of the opposition because
the rank and file members of the party made clear their
belief that Barton had a better chance of uniting the party.
In 1899 Barton resigned in his turn because of dissatisfaction
among his supporters.[2] In 1902 Lee lost the confidence of
his party because of his inability to provide energetic
leadership and, officially on the grounds of ill-health,
resigned his position.[3] In 1907 Carruthers was distrusted by
his party and, when faced with obstructive opposition to the
reshuffling of his cabinet, resigned.[4] In this instance,
party opposition even caused the downfall of a premier. The
party never formally moved a vote of no confidence in a
leader but, just as it could make clear to aspiring leaders
that they had no chance of winning the leadership, so party

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1. D.T., 18/9/02, 19/9/02.

2. D.T., 19/7/99, 17/8/99, 24/8/99.

3. D.T., 20/8/02, 17/9/02, 18/9/02.

4. D.T., 1/10/07. For his bitter comments on this incident, see
    Random Reflections and Reminiscences, p.62. Carruthers
    Papers, Box 14, M.L. MSS. 1638.

members could indicate to leaders their dissatisfaction with them and by informal methods force their resignation. The leader in opposition was elected and could effectively be dismissed by the parliamentary party.

Three party leaders gained their position because they became premiers and, before 1907, there was no criticism of this process. In 1904 Crick and Wise both criticised the choice of Waddell because they considered they had better claims to the premiership. They did not deny that the governor had the right to ask anyone to form a cabinet or that that nominee should become party leader. When Carruthers resigned in 1907, he advised the governor to send for Wade without consulting any of his colleagues.[1] When Wade faced his first party meeting after forming a cabinet, he was not required to undergo any formal process of endorsement, although Sir James Graham did complain that, as he had had no part in the selection of the new leader, his relationship with the party might be altered.[2] For the first time, the idea that a premier automatically became party leader was challenged. In New South Wales, a member who replaced a party colleague as premier was still not selected because he was a party leader, although, if a ministry was defeated, the leader of the opposition was automatically asked to form a cabinet.

In Tasmania parliamentary groups had elected leaders for a long time. In 1879 two leading ministers were discarded by their group during coalition proposals in preference for two other members of the party.[3] All leaders of the opposition after 1882 were selected by party meetings. In April 1894, after the defeat of the Dobson government, Braddon was invited to form a cabinet. He gave to his party a free choice of ministers and in a ballot he defeated Andrew Inglis Clark by one vote. A.T. Pillinger was selected as minister for

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1. Random Reflections and Reminiscences, pp.61-2. Carruthers Papers, Box 14. M.L. MSS.1638

2. D.T., 16/10/07.

3. M., 23/10/79, also J.A. Nockels, Tasmanian Politics and Factions in the 1870s, p.62.

Lands and Works in preference to C.B.M. Fenton and the party as a whole also asked Fysh and More to join the ministry.[1] In May 1894, Lewis was elected leader of the opposition as a compromise because the two leading party members were personally opposed to one another.[2]

In 1903 the remaining supporters of the Lewis government selected first Patterson and then Evans as party leader. On the second occasion they also elected by ballot three of their number to join Evans on the opposition front benches.[3] In July 1904 Evans became premier and most of those he selected as colleagues had originally been chosen by the party. Before 1909 parliamentary parties always elected the leaders of the opposition; after 1909 the Liberal parliamentary party deliberately selected a leader on the understanding that he would form a government.

After the election of 1909 Evans as premier called a caucus of anti-socialists. After insisting on a discussion of policy to ensure that the new party had some common principles on which to operate,he agreed to allow the new party to elect a leader by ballot. Lewis defeated Solomon by one vote.[4] Evans, who had come third in the ballot, then resigned and advised the governor to send for Lewis. In 1912 Lewis's leadership of the party came under severe criticism and consequently he resigned and did not contest the leadership. Solomon defeated Ewing and then, in his capacity as party leader, formed a government.[5] In other words, the party selected a leader who took office because he was party leader. He did not become party leader because he was premier, as occurred in New South Wales.

Although the process of party selection of leaders had developed further in Tasmania in 1912 than in New South Wales

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1. M., 13/4/94, also C.I. Clark, The Tasmanian Parliament: An Historical Sketch, pp.65-66. Encel claims that this ballot was only held to remove a deadlock between various sections of the party. (Cabinet Government in Australia, Melbourne 1962, p.122). I can find no evidence for this view and regard the incident, even if exceptional, as part of a Tasmanian tradition of party participation in leadership selection.

2. M., 25/5/94.
3. M., 16/3/04.
4. M., 9/6/09.
5. M., 5/6/12.

in 1907, in both states there was a distinct tendency for the
party to elect leaders and for leaders to hold office only
so long as they maintained the confidence of their party.
Whereas in 1894 Parkes could be considered as a possible
governmental leader despite the fact that he was not a party
leader, in later years only a man who was obviously the
selection of his party could form a cabinet. The man became
important in his capacity as a party official rather than as
an individual.

The Party and the Selection of Cabinet

Although the non-Labor parties had few elected officials
before 1912, the growing identity of the party can be also
distinguished in the changing role of the party in the
formation of cabinets.

No party member had a definite right to cabinet office.
In the non-Labor parties, cabinet members could be chosen as
the result of political deals, as a means of satisfying
different parts of the state or even of the party or for many
other non-party reasons. No non-Labor member argued that
the party, rather than the leader, had the right to select
the members of the cabinet. Yet gradually in this period
the party effectively developed a veto over cabinet selections,
even though they never had any constructive powers.

In 1894 Reid called a party meeting after he had been
requested to form a cabinet but before he made any appointments.
Parkes exclaimed in horror that

> it means the Governor's commission is to be dragged
> before some party and its verdict is to be taken as
> to how the commission is to be performed; in other
> words, the Government is to be constructed by caucus. [1]

Parkes misunderstood the situation, or at least pretended
to, in order to give himself a reason for attacking Reid. He
assumed that a party meeting would have some influence in the
selection of the cabinet and, in doing so, he failed to
distinguish between the different types of party meetings
which the Labor and non-Labor parties held. His reaction was
typical of a faction leader who refused to accept the idea that

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1. S.M.H., 31/7/94.

supporters should play any part in the selection of cabinet.[1] However, neither Reid himself nor his supporters intended the meeting to restrict the power of the leader. Reid used the meeting to consolidate his position as leader and to extract party approval for his acceptance of the commission. The party identified itself with the future cabinet without limiting Reid's choice.[2] Joseph Cook, ex-leader of the Labor party, was included in the cabinet, even though he had not been present at the party meeting.

In 1898 Lyne's cabinet included representatives of supporting groups; the Bartonites were represented by Wise and the 'party of revenge', which had been responsible for the defeat of Reid, by Fegan. In this instance the leader had to satisfy the various parts of the party to gain their support, but there was still no direct evidence of any group openly demanding representation in the cabinet.

In 1901 the opposition Liberal party objected to its leaders making any coalition proposals without the party as a whole being consulted and some of the leading members of the party accepted this limitation on their actions. In an attempt to form a ministry of 'All the Talents', See approached Carruthers, Garland, Brunker and Ashton. If his plans were to be successful, a majority of the old 'freetrade' party had to follow their leaders. Garland and Carruthers were interested in the proposals but, when Reid was consulted, he advised

> ....that whatever may be done should be with the
> approval of the party or at least the leading
> members thereof. 3

Ashton similarly believed that the party should be consulted.[4] When the plans collapsed, Carruthers was accused within the party of being personally ambitious and was passed over in the party's search for a new leader. Throughout the

1. For a similar reaction from Parkes at an earlier date, see Loveday and Martin. Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.62.

2. S.M.H., 1/8/94.

3. Reid to Carruthers, 10/4/01, Carruthers Papers, Box 25. M.L. MSS.1638.

4. Ashton to Carruthers, 6/4/01, Carruthers Papers, Box 25. M.L. MSS.1638.

negotiations the government party had remained silent. Its members did not openly challenge the right of the premier to select ministers, even from the opposition. The opposition party, on the other hand, considered that before its members took office, the party should at least be consulted.

By 1904 a strong feeling had developed that cabinet positions should go only to loyal party members. Carruthers was given a free hand by the party to form the cabinet but, as soon as rumours of a possible coalition with the Progressives circulated, he was informed by Brunker and others that such proposals were unpopular among his own backbenchers and that it was vital not to offend the backbench members of the party.[1] If coalition plans did exist, they came to nothing. Generally the members of the party considered that, as they had worked loyally for the party cause, they should receive the rewards of office.[2] In 1907 Waddell and Perry were only included in a Liberal and Reform cabinet after a party meeting had specifically supported the moves for fusion.

In Tasmania the parties developed a similar influence over the selection of cabinet ministers; that is, they could occasionally prevent choices by leaders without being able to direct them in any way. The actual selection of cabinet ministers in 1894 by the party was exceptional, although in 1904 Evans selected his cabinet primarily from those chosen by his party colleagues to sit on the opposition front benches. When in 1906 he included two opposition members in a reshuffled cabinet, he tried to postpone the meeting of parliament to allow any antagonisms created within the party by these actions to subside.[3] Even though he acted without the consent of his party, he still needed party endorsement. In 1912 the unpopularity of Lewis and Hean, which was illustrated by their rejection by the party meeting, ensured

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1. Brunker to Carruthers, 13/8/04, Carruthers Papers, Box 25, M.L. MSS.1638. Reid favoured a coalition but told Carruthers that 'the solidarity of your own victorious brigade is the first consideration'. Reid to Carruthers, 10/8/04, Carruthers Papers, Box 25, M.L. MSS.1638.

2. Storey, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.26, p.235.

3. Governor's Confidential Despatches, 30/6/06. State Archives of Tasmania.

that neither could retain office; no one considered accepting
the independent, Cameron, as a minister because he was not a
member of their party.

No non-Labor leader could be forced to accept anyone as
a ministerial colleague, but he might hesitate to make
appointments which would be unpopular to the party as a whole.
The fact that an open clash between a leader and the members
of his party never occurred was probably an indication of the
leader's awareness of the climate of opinion in the party
and not of the party's subservience to the leader. In both
states, ministers were gradually drawn primarily from the
party's own ranks. The party became the 'gatekeeper'[1] to
cabinet rank and the main channel of advancement for an
ambitious politician. The personal governments of the faction
period were replaced by cabinets that were fully identified
with and approved by the supporting party.

The development of a party structure and the delegation
of powers of the leader probably created a series of leadership
cadres at different levels of the party. In 1904 Carruthers
discussed his selection of cabinet with two leading members
of the party, although the final decision remained his alone.[2]
These two M.L.A.s obviously belonged to the core of the party
leadership. In the electoral organization, party officials,
and particularly those who had a long record of participation
in political affairs, almost certainly gained wide influence.
Some, like Archdale Parkhill, progressed upwards in the ranks
of party officials and appear to have made politics and
party organization their career.[3] Others even used their party
position to advance their own ambitions.[4] However, in both

1. See L.F. Seligman, 'Political Parties and the Recruitment of
   Political Leadership' in L.J. Edinger, Political Leadership
   in Industrialised Societies, p.299.

2. D.T., 29/8/04. Ashton and Moore were both consulted by
   Carruthers.

3. See details of the careers of Archdale Parkhill and F.G.
   Hanslow in I.R. Campbell, Politics, Parties and Pressure
   Groups, 1900-1905, M.A., University of Sydney 1962,
   pp.46-50.

4. Sir James Graham, Vice-President of the Liberal and Reform
   Association, regularly, and usually unsuccessfully, tried
   to get himself adopted as candidate for some Liberal
   constituencies.

states the organization of the Liberal parties was only two
or three years old at the time when the analysis of events
in this thesis ends. Therefore there is not sufficient
evidence to draw any substantial conclusions about the effects
of the delegation of powers on party organization and on
leadership trends. The problem, which is an important one,
must remain unexplored.

Two Illustrations of Political Leadership in New South Wales

As the party identity developed, the party leader in
New South Wales gained authority because of his party office
rather than his personality. The increasing influence of
the office can be seen in various ways. The position of
party leader became formally recognized in the party
constitution, even though its powers were usually not defined;
it also became accepted by the public which saw the leader
as a symbol of the movement that he represented and as the
formal source of party policy. Consequently, the position
of party leader increased in authority, regardless of the
personality of the incumbent.

However, it is still difficult to discuss the source of
authority of parliamentary leaders in Weberian terms.[1] He
clearly did not have authority of traditional or charismatic
kinds. He had no authority granted by the rules of the party
to his office, as the leader of the Labor party had. The
non-Labor leader depended on informal authority which was
not defined in any set of rules but which was granted to him
by precedents and because of his party position. It was a
quasi-legal 'informal' authority of a kind which Weber's
classification does not admit. The leader had no sanctions
with which to enforce his decisions, yet, as the influence of
the party grew, he could bring some pressure to bear on
members because of his party position. A leader in the
early period had to act personally; a leader at a later date
could be said more accurately to act in the name of the party.
An examination of two party leaders in New South Wales and of
another two in Tasmania will illustrate how his position
changed as the party identity developed.

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1. For the various types of authority on which a leader depends,
   see M. Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H.H. Gerth and
   C.W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London
   1947, p.78-79 .

Before Reid became Premier, his position as leader was under consistent challenge. His right to the position was never generally accepted, particularly as contradictory rumours of the manner of his original election were often current. Furthermore, in 1894 the party was also divided over policy; Parkes was antagonistic towards Reid and it was predictable that, if the election returned a majority of freetraders, Parkes would make a bid for the party leadership. Consequently Reid had to attract support of voters and candidates and at the same time keep the confidence of the leading party members and particularly of those who had formerly been ministerial colleagues of Parkes.[1] Since there was no party organization, Reid had to carry out these functions primarily by himself and he had to maintain a high level of personal loyalty within the freetrade ranks.

After the election and the formation of his cabinet, Reid's position was strengthened. He was not only the unchallenged leader of the party, but he also could use legislative and administrative powers to maintain his majority. His increase in authority was primarily a result of his ministerial office, not his party position. In 1895 he still continuously had to exert influence to maintain party solidarity. Despite the occasional assistance of party organization in the elections of 1895 and 1898, Reid as leader still had no real limitations on his freedom of action. If he dissatisfied any supporters, as he did in 1899 when the party of revenge rebelled, they had to leave the party because the leadership was the most obvious symbol of the party and the party had no independent collective existence. Reid's success was based mostly on his ability as an individual and partly on his position of premier.

When Carruthers formed the Liberal and Reform Association, he deliberately developed a party structure which permitted local participation, the formation of a distinct party policy and the organization of a widely based branch network. Consequently, as the party developed a distinct identity,

1. See Reid to McMillan 21/3/94, McMillan Papers, M.L. MSS 1885, and Reid to Carruthers 8/6/94. Carruthers Papers, Box 14a. M.L. MSS. 1638. In the latter letter, Reid promised to seek advice from Carruthers on many important occasions.

loyalty could be directed to the party rather than to the
leader as an individual. At the same time Carruthers made it
clear that, within the party, he might not have expected total
agreement with party policy but he did expect loyalty and
obedience. Soon after being elected party leader, he declared

> I will not, therefore, take the responsibility of
> leadership without its power and authority. I
> wish then all true friends of reform to understand
> that I am prepared to lead in no uncertain way
> upon this question and I ask all who are prepared
> to follow me to enrol under the standard of the
> Liberal and Reform party. If, however, they prefer
> to join any of the existing bodies that course is
> still open to them, but in doing so let it be
> understood that in electoral matters my hands must
> not be fettered by a splitting up of votes through
> the various organizations interfering to push
> forward their friends and so risk defeat thereby.
> Let all the associations do their work in propaganda
> for their own cause, but when the decks are cleared
> for action, let there be but one captain to the
> ship and let the crew work under that captain
> heartily and loyally and not take it each into his
> own head to work as he likes, when he likes and
> for whom he likes. 1

He showed little patience with any criticism of his leadership
and believed that he alone had the sole right to make decisions.
In 1906 he commented to the Liberal and Reform Association
Council that

> There was a time for people who differed with a
> leader's tactics to discuss them but that time
> was not the time of warfare - it was not now. 2

Reid would never have dared take such a dictatorial stance,
but Carruthers now had the advantage that the loyalty of
members was directed to the party. As party leader he could
be deposed if his actions did not suit his supporters, but
backbench or electoral dissatisfaction with the leader himself
did not necessarily lead to defection from the party.

Carruthers still had to ensure that he acted within the
limits which his position allowed and in 1905 he was strongly
advised by Wade not to reintroduce the government savings bank
bill for fear of causing a split within party ranks;[3] even

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1. <u>D.T.</u>, 22/10/02.

2. <u>D.T.</u>, 24/7/06.

3. Wade to Carruthers, 9/6/05. <u>Carruthers Papers</u>, Box 11. M.L.
   MSS.1638.

the increased authority of a party organization could not
persuade members to accept a measure to which they objected.
The leader's role of conciliation was one which he could
never afford to ignore, yet generally the increasing influence
of the party organization and its growing usefulness as a
means of securing re-election for members, coupled with the
fact that Carruthers as party leader in parliament was
ex-officio president of the Association, added party authority
to the leader's individual influence. At the same time, the
organization became responsible for campaign co-ordination and
maintaining local activity and removed from the leader many
of the earlier burdens of the faction leaders. In his capacity
as party leader, Carruthers gained authority from the
organization, provided he acted within the constraints created
by the organization and the platform. When Carruthers
resigned, one correspondent suggested that Wade might have
problems uniting the party because Carruthers had relied
primarily on personal appeal.[1] The ease with which Wade
formed a cabinet showed that the party position was clearly
more important than personal influence. His followers similarly
had less freedom of action if they accepted party membership.
By 1907 the leader was primarily effective because of his
position; personal characteristics might increase his efficiency,
but they could not in themselves be a source of authority to a
leader on a wide scale.

Two Illustrations of Political Leadership in Tasmania

The growth in the importance of party office and the
decline of the influence of the individual as a source of
leadership and authority were even more marked in Tasmania
than in New South Wales. This fact can be illustrated by
a comparison of the position of Braddon between 1894 and
1899 and of Lewis between 1909 and 1912. Braddon was elected
by the group of parliamentarians who had constituted the
opposition to the Dobson government, but the support given to
his ministry was not party support because there was no
consistently identifiable group. Before 1898 Braddon was
assisted by other able ministers, but after the resignation

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1.   D.T., 1/10/07.

of Fysh most of the government administration fell on his
ailing shoulders and the ministry became totally dependent
on him.[1] When his followers became disaffected, they
deserted to the opposition. Although originally based on
a parliamentary group, the ministry became centred on Braddon
and there were no restrictions on his actions. His continuance
in office depended on his personal influence and his
administrative efficiency. When these talents failed, he
lost support and office.

Lewis, on the other hand, was never a popular leader
after 1909 and held office only because he was party leader.
He was a conservative and regarded with suspicion by many
members of the party. In October 1909 he was forced to
resign for a short period and in 1912 he was unceremoniously
discarded by his party. Rumours of discontent within the
cabinet were persistent. Yet, in spite of these tensions
within the party, he retained the party leadership and
consequently office from 1909 till 1912. He did not have
the personality to dominate the party but received support
from many members only on account of his position. The
anti-socialist M.H.A.s were united in their desire to retain
office and to achieve this aim were prepared to remain solid
even behind an unsatisfactory leader. As the events of
October 1909 illustrated, to reject the leader would mean a
loss of power. The major difference between the leaders
was that, when Braddon lost the confidence of his followers,
he lost office; when Lewis did, he remained in power until
discarded by his supporters after the election of 1912,
because the welfare of the party was too important to be
jeopardised by destroying a poor leader. Only his position as
party leader allowed him to remain in office.

Conclusions

Whether the leader held power as an individual or as
the incumbent of party office, he always depended on consent
from his followers to maintain his position. When writing
of the Conservative party in Britain, McKenzie comments that

1. Governor's Confidential Despatches. 20/10/98. State
   Archives of Tasmania.

> Although there are few formal democratic checks
> on his authority, it is important to note that
> the Conservative Leader achieves office and retains
> power only with the consent of his followers;
> and there is ample precedent for the withdrawal
> of that consent. 1

In the non-Labor parties in Australia, the leader did not
have to consult his followers and he was never formally
answerable to them; yet if he failed to satisfy them, he
might be faced either by desertion or by dismissal. Since
leaders in both states were deposed by the actions of their
supporters, clearly the threat of withdrawal of consent
could restrict the actions of leaders.[2] The general absence
of clashes between leaders and followers was not due to the
inability of supporters to affect decisions, but to the
knowledge of leaders that, even if not formally required to
consult the party, it would be unwise to act without
informally sounding out the opinion of followers.

In both states the development of party politics had
two major effects on the power and position of the leader.
In the first place, the leader was faced with more constraints
on his actions by the growth of a party identity. While the
actions of the early party leaders were limited only by the
need to maintain the support of followers, the leader of the
later parties had to act within the limits prescribed by the
organization and the adopted platform. Secondly, loyalty
was directed to the leader as the incumbent of a party position
rather than to him as an individual. The authority of the
party, small though it may have been and almost totally lacking
in sanctions, was added to the personal influence of the leader.
His authority was never actually defined or regulated but
clearly existed. Therefore the development of the party
limited the freedom of   action of the leader by developing
constraints on his actions and at the same time increased
his authority because he demanded loyalty as the party leader
and not merely as an individual. The support became more
secure and predictable and therefore increased his political

1. R.T. McKenzie, _British Political Parties_, p.22. The italics
    are McKenzie's.

2. P.Y. Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis of Power in
    Political Parties', _Political Studies_, Vol.18, No.1,
    March 1970, p.11.

influence and power, despite having apparently the opposite effect.

Chapter 13

CONCLUSIONS

The main object of this thesis has been to describe
the early non-Labor parties in New South Wales and Tasmania
and to give an account of the development of their
organization and identity. Usually non-Labor parties have
been described in terms which have been drawn from studies
of the Labor party and they have been compared with the
Labor party. Their lack of formal rules, their inability to
force members to obey party decisions with official
sanctions, their frequent changes of name, their lack of
organizational continuity and their failure to pursue a
consistent policy or platform have been contrasted with the
formal structure, aims and continuity of the Labor party.
It is assumed that the Labor party had the characteristics
of a modern party and that, compared with it, the early
non-Labor parties could scarcely be regarded as parties
at all.

Yet the non-Labor parties were undoubtedly very different
from the personal factions which they replaced, even if they
were still unlike the Labor party. In New South Wales in
1910 the non-Labor parties often elected their leaders,
held regular party meetings, co-ordinated electoral
campaigns, became involved in the selection of candidates
and fulfilled several other roles which the factions had not
attempted to play. In Tasmania the non-Labor parties
gradually developed an electoral structure which had
continuity of existence and which covered all parts of the
state; they also endorsed candidates, accepted a uniform
policy, and co-ordinated the efforts of candidates during
campaigns. None of these aspects of party action had existed
in the state in earlier years. Obviously the non-Labor
parties were different from both the Labor party and the
factions. The problem is that much of the discussion of
early Australian parties has been conducted by contrasting
the Labor party to the factions. The lack of formal
organization of the non-Labor parties was emphasized and they
were considered to be merely re-constituted and enlarged

factions, without any important changes in their mode of action. Since in this discussion there was no room for a third alternative type of organization, the fundamental differences between the non-Labor parties and the factions have been largely ignored.

What I have tried to do is to suggest a different framework within which parties can be studied. My basic assumption is that the activities of a party should be analysed and not its formal organization, its rules, its policy or the social and political functions which it performs for society as a whole. These things obviously must be discussed, but only after parties have been analysed in terms which can be equally applicable to all parties, both Labor and non-Labor, and which facilitate comparisons between them without being biased towards either one.

I have attempted to do this by considering how groups of individuals developed the use of political resources which were useful in assisting them to win power. The resources which I discussed were things which all parties must use to some extent although, as we have seen, the Labor and non-Labor parties did not have an equal share of or equal access to each resource. I have assumed that these resources were needed to allow a party to carry out activities which led to the attainment of power which, in this context, meant ministerial office. For example, the non-Labor parties needed organization to co-ordinate their campaigns, ideology to develop a unifying and coherent policy and both manpower and organization to secure the successful selection of candidates by the members of local branches. In parliament they managed the votes of M.P.s, developed a party stance on political issues and a collective identity. Manpower, organization, ideology and leadership were all necessary in some part to fulfil these activities. Some of a party's activities were developed so that a party could gain resources that were required for later activities; for instance, candidates were endorsed by the non-Labor parties before an election so that, among other things, they would be more amenable to party discipline in parliament if they were elected.

I have described how the non-Labor parties actually acted and it is in this area that the Labor and non-Labor parties might profitably be compared, without prejudice, both in one state and in different states. The comparison here has been between the non-Labor parties in the two states which at this time were as different socially and economically as any two states in the federation; the aim has been to see whether the non-Labor parties were generally alike and to identify differences between them. Since the political systems and to some extent the social and economic conditions were similar, the non-Labor parties in both states had access to similar resources. Although there were some differences in the timing of party development and in the organizations of the non-Labor parties in the two states and although these differences were not unimportant, they can be easily explained by the levels of industrial development, the sizes of the population or the demands of the voting system. What is more important is that activities of the non-Labor parties and their use of resources were very similar in both states. By examining how parties of any type developed their activities by use of resources, it is possible to compare them and to understand their procedures in a way which would not be possible if the analysis concentrated on their formal structure or organization.

The process of development of a party was gradual and there is no point at which it can be said that a party suddenly emerged, even though the non-Labor parties developed along similar lines in both states. What we can say is that by 1912 non-Labor parties which twenty years before had been unknown in Tasmania and only in 'embryo' in New South Wales, were now securely in existence and in a position to control proceedings in parliament and to drive most non-party politicians from the political scene.

I will now draw the threads of the earlier discussion together and summarise the main aspects of the development of the non-Labor parties. In parliament most non-Labor members claimed to oppose any organization or procedures which could theoretically force them to vote against their

conscience or could impose formal restraints on their
actions. Despite these attitudes, the increasingly regular
party meetings identified the members with the party as a
collective body and the development of a general anti-
socialist ideology helped to unify the party on a broad
range of issues. The election of leaders by the party was
becoming a recognized procedure and the notion that
promotion to cabinet office came only to party members was
widely accepted. At the same time the existence of
distinct groups within the party became less common as
members identified themselves more fully with the party.
Loyalty was granted to the leader primarily in his capacity
as a party official, rather than as an individual. At no
stage did the non-Labor parties develop any formal proce-
dures by which the activities of their members were regulated
Instead a series of precedents and generally accepted
procedures acted as a basis for the development of a
collective identity. Despite the lack of formal methods
and of effective sanctions, the non-Labor parties in both
states were able to maintain a fairly high level of
cohesion by the end of the period and to win divisions when
challenged by the opposition. The methods of the non-
Labor parties and their approach to the use of resources
may have been different from those of the Labor party, but
throughout the period they maintained a similar level of
solidarity to that of the Labor party.

In the electorate the non-Labor parties at first had
no organizational base of their own on which to found their
activities. Furthermore, many of the parliamentary members
of the party had formerly been elected for local, rather
than party, reasons. In order to increase the party's
parliamentary strength, the leaders of the non-Labor parties
expanded their influence wherever possible by co-ordinating
campaigns, centralising the finance and propaganda of the
party and forming branches which became part of a co-
ordinated and articulated organization. Instead of trying
to replace the influences which had previously been
responsible for the election of members, they tried to adapt
them to their own advantage. Consequently, they encouraged

the local selection of candidates so that the appeal of
local men could be of benefit to the party, they permitted
the branches to have at least an illusion of influence and
independence so that the country areas did not appear to be
dominated by the central executives of the party and they
allowed other groups to act through them. As the non-Labor
parties expanded their activities, their legitimacy became
accepted, their electoral methods became more effective
and their collective identity became more distinct. Gradually
the parties developed a sophisticated and co-ordinated party
structure as a means of formalizing these complex electoral
relationships. However, this organization served to
reinforce methods which had already proved to be effective
and it did not replace any well-established procedures with
new and untried ones. The electoral methods of the non-
Labor parties were devised to produce winning candidates
because they were intended primarily to increase the
parliamentary strength of the party. Because they were
adopting existing political processes to new ends and made
no attempt to carry out large-scale reforms of political
methods, their development was a gradual process which
lacked drama and appeared unremarkable by comparison with
the rapid growth of the Labor party.

APPENDIX A

Party Strength after Elections

1.   New South Wales

Several different versions of the numerical strength
of parties after elections are available and it is impossible
to argue that one is right to the exclusion of all the
others.   Therefore I have tabled the results given in the
following sources:

Hughes and Graham	A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics;
The Legislative Council	Consolidated Index (L.C.C.I.) Vol.3, 1894-1913.
Evatt	Australian Labour Leader
Rydon and Spann	New South Wales Politics, 1901-1910

Election	Author	Total No.	Free-Trade Liberal	Inde-pendent Freetrade Liberal	Protect-ionist Progres-sive	Inde-pendent Prot.-Inde-pendent Prog.	Labor	Inde-pend. Labor	Inde-pen-dent
1894	Hughes & Graham	125	46	12	36	4	14	13	-
	L.C.C.I.		61	-	41	-	23	-	-
	Evatt		58	-	40	-	15	12	-
1895	Hughes & Graham	125	61	1	41	-	18	4	-
	L.C.C.I.		60	-	44	-	19	-	2
	Evatt		62	-	45	-	18	-	-
1898	Hughes & Graham	125	45	1	50	9	19	-	1
	L.C.C.I.		46	-	54	-	19	-	6
	Evatt		46	-	56	-	19	-	4
1901	Hughes & Graham	125	37	3	41	-	24	4	16
	L.C.C.I.		39	-	38	-	24	-	24
	Evatt		40	-	34	-	24	4	18[1]
	Rydon & Spann		40	-	38	-	24	5	18
1904	Hughes & Graham	90	45	1	16	-	25	-	3
	L.C.C.I.		46	-	16	-	25	-	3
	Rydon & Spann		46	-	15	-	25	-	4
1907	Hughes & Graham	90	45	8	-	-	32	-	4
	L.C.C.I.		48	5	-	-	32	-	5
	Evatt		43	-	8	-	32	-	7
	Rydon & Spann		49	-	5	-	32	-	4

[1] Evatt's total here is only 120.

2.   Realigned Parties in the Session of 1903.

        Calculations for the analysis of voting in 1903 were
based on the following re-aligned parties.

Liberal: Affleck, Ashton, Broughton, Brunker, Carroll,
        Carruthers, Clark E., Cohen, Coleman, Davidson,
        Dick, Fallick, Ferguson, Fitzpatrick J., Fleming,
        Garland, George, Gilbert, Hawthorne, Haynes, Hogue,
        Hurley J., Jessep, Latimer, Law, Levy, McCoy,
        McKenzie, Mahony, Millard, Moore, Morton, Moxham,
        Newman, Nobbs, Oakes, O'Conner, O'Conor, Phillips,
        Rose, Storey D., Wood, Winchcombe, Campbell
        (Archibald), Lee, Allen, Howarth, Kearney, Lonsdale,
        Stirton, Terry, Thomas, Wade, Whiddon. (54).

Progressive: Anderson, Barnes, Bennett, Briner, Campbell
        (Alexander), Chapman, Clarke H., Crick, Davis,
        Dight, Donaldson, Evans, Fegan, Fitzpatrick T.,
        Gillies, Gormly, Hall B., Hays, Hurley W., Kidd,
        Levien, McFarlane, McLaurin, Meagher, MacMahon,
        Nelson, O'Sullivan, Perry, Pyers, Quinn, Reymond,
        Richards, See, Smith J., Smith T., Thomson, Waddell,
        Willis, Wright, Young, (40).

Labor: Burgess, Cann, Charlton, Clara, Dacey, Daley, Edden,
        Estell, Griffith A., Hall D., Hollis, Holman, Jones,
        Kelly, McDonald, McDonell, McGowen, MacNeil, Miller,
        Nielsen, Power, Scobie, Storey J., Sullivan, Webster,
        Williams. (26).

Excluded - (either they were not in the house during the
session or because they consistently claimed to be independent
both in the session and in the election of 1904).
        Collins, Farnell, McCourt (the Speaker), McIntyre,
        Ross, Smith S., Archer, Byrne, Griffith T.,
        Nicolson, Norton, Price, Quirk, Sleath, Walsh. (15).

The total in all categories is 135 because this list includes
ten members who retired or died during the 1901-4 parliament,
and the members who replaced them.

3.   Tasmania

The results of elections in Tasmania were always open to interpretation before 1909; the figures produced by Hughes and Graham are therefore as accurate as any, even though still open to dispute. I have therefore made up this table mainly from their figures.

Election	Total	Ministeria-list Lewis, etc.	Opposition Braddon, etc.	Independent	Labor
1893	36	17	10	9	-
1897	37	12	20[1]	5	-
1900	38	18	9	11	-
1903	35	7	22	3	3
1906	35	16	8	3	8

		Liberal	Independent	Labor
1909	30	18[2]	-	12
1912	30	15[3]	1	14
1913	30	16	-	14

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1.   Including the Democratic League candidate.

2.   Including the Liberal Democrat.

3.   Excluding Cameron, who was never endorsed by the Liberal League and who has been incorrectly classified by Hughes and Graham.

APPENDIX B

Ministries in New South Wales and Tasmania[1]

1. New South Wales, 1894-1907

1. <u>Reid Ministry</u> (Free Trade)

3 August 1894 to 13 September 1899.

G.H. Reid	Prime Minister; Colonial Treasurer (until 3 July 1899); Attorney-General (5 April 1898 to 18 June 1898 and from 19 April 1899).
J.N. Brunker	Colonial Secretary.
G.B. Simpson, M.L.C.	Attorney-General (until 1 Dec. 1894).
S. Smith	Secretary for Mines and Agriculture (until 15 August 1898).
J.H. Carruthers	Secretary for Lands (until 3 July 1899); Colonial Treasurer (from 3 July 1899).
J.H. Young	Secretary for Public Works (until 3 July 1899); Secretary for Lands (from 3 July 1899).
A.J. Gould	Minister of Justice (until 15 August 1898).
J. Garrard	Minister of Public Instruction (until 15 August 1898); Minister for Labour and Industry (11 March 1895 to 15 August 1898).
J. Cook	Postmaster-General (until 27 August 1898); Secretary for Mines and Agriculture (from 27 August 1898).
W.H. Suttor, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (7 August 1894 to 15 March 1895).

J.H. Want, M.L.C.	Attorney-General (18 December 1894 to 4 April 1898 and 18 June 1898 to 18 April 1899).
A. Garran, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (19 March 1895 to 18 November 1898).
V. Parkes	Postmaster-General (from 27 August 1898).
J.A. Hogue	Minister of Public Instruction (from 27 August 1898); Minister for Labour and Industry (from 27 August 1898).

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1. From Hughes and Graham. <u>Handbook of Australian Govern-ment and Politics</u>, p.59-63, p.254-257.

C.A. Lee	Minister of Justice (27 August 1898 to 3 July 1899); Secretary for Public Works (from 3 July 1899).
J. Hughes, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (from 22 November 1898); Minister of Justice (from 3 July 1899).

2. Lyne Ministry (Protectionist)
14 September 1899 to 27 March 1901

W.J. Lyne	Prime Minister; Vice President of the Executive Council (until 15 September 1899); Colonial Treasurer (15 September 1899 to 20 March 1901).
J. See	Colonial Secretary.
B.R. Wise	Attorney-General
T.H. Hassall	Secretary for Lands (until 9 April 1901).
E.W. O'Sullivan	Secretary for Public Works.
W.H. Wood	Minister of Justice (until 9 April 1901).
J. Perry	Minister of Public Instruction, Minister for Labour and Industry.
W.P. Crick	Postmaster-General (until 28 February 1901); Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (from 1 March 1901).
J.L. Fegan	Secretary for Mines and Agriculture (until 8 April 1901).
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (15 September 1899 to 24 April 1900).

F.B. Suttor, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (from 12 June 1900).

3. See Ministry (Protectionist)
28 March 1901 to 14 June 1904

J. See	Premier, Colonial Secretary.
T. Waddell	Colonial Treasurer (from 10 April 1901).
B. Wise, M.L.C.	Attorney-General; Minister of Justice (from 25 July 1901).
W.P. Crick	Secretary for Lands (from 11 April 1901).
E.W. O'Sullivan	Secretary for Public Works.

J. Perry	Minister of Public Instruction, Minister for Labour and Industry.
R.G.D. Fitzgerald	Minister of Justice (11 April 1901 to 16 July 1901).
J. Kidd	Secretary for Mines and Agriculture (from 10 April 1901).
F.B. Suttor, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (to 23 May 1903).
J. Hayes	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (from 11 April 1901).
W. Bennett	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (from 16 April 1901).

J.L. Fegan	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (from 24 March 1903).
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council (from 6 June 1903).

4. Waddell Ministry (Protectionist)
15 June 1904 to 29 August 1904

T. Waddell	Premier, Colonial Treasurer, Minister of Justice.
E.W. O'Sullivan	Secretary for Lands.
W. Bennett	Secretary for Public Works.
J.L. Fegan	Minister of Public Instruction, Minister for Labour and Industry.
J. Perry	Colonial Secretary.
J.C. Gannon, M.L.C.	Attorney-General.
J. Kidd	Secretary for Mines and Agriculture.
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C.	Vice-President of the Executive Council.

5. Carruthers Ministry (Liberal-Reform)
30 August 1904 to 1 October 1907.

J.H. Carruthers	Premier, Colonial Treasurer.
J.A. Hogue	Colonial Secretary (until 13 May 1907); Minister of Public Instruction, Minister for Labour and Industry (from 14 May 1907).
C.G. Wade	Attorney-General, Minister of Justice.
S.W. Moore	Secretary for Mines and Agriculture.
J. Ashton	Secretary for Lands.

C.A. Lee	Secretary for Public Works.
B.B. O'Conor	Minister of Public Instruction, Minister for Labour and Industry (until 13 May 1907).
W.T. Dick	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio.
J. Hughes	Vice-President of the Executive Council.

J.N. Brunker, M.L.C.	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (from 12 June 1905).
T. Waddell	Colonial Secretary (from 14 May 1907).

6. Wade Ministry (Liberal-Reform)

2 October 1907 to 20 October 1910

C.G. Wade	Premier, Attorney General; Minister of Justice (until 20 December 1909).
W.H. Wood	Colonial Secretary; Minister for Labour and Industry (until 21 January 1908); Secretary for Mines (from 22 January 1908).
T.W. Waddell	Colonial Treasurer.
J. Perry	Secretary for Mines (until 21 January 1908); Minister of Agriculture (from 22 January 1908).
S.W. Moore	Secretary for Lands.
C.A. Lee	Secretary for Public Works.
J.A. Hogue	Minister of Public Instruction; Minister for Labour and Industry (from 22 January 1908).
J. Hughes	Vice-President of the Executive Council.
C.W. Oakes	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio.
J. Ashton, M.L.C.	Member of Executive Council without Portfolio (until 25 June 1909).

J. Garland, M.L.C.	Minister of Justice, Solicitor-General (from 21 December 1909).

2. Tasmania

    1. <u>Dobson Ministry</u> (Conservative)

H. Dobson	Premier.
A. Douglas, M.L.C.	Chief Secretary.
N.E. Lewis	Attorney-General.
W. Hartnell	Minister of Lands and Works.
J. Henry	Treasurer, Postmaster-General.
C.H. Grant, M.L.C.	Member of Executive Council without Office.

    2. <u>Braddon Ministry</u> (Liberal)
       14 April 1894 to 12 October 1899.

E.N.C. Braddon	Premier; Treasurer, Postmaster-General (from 1 January 1899).
W. Moore, M.L.C.	Chief Secretary.
Sir P.O. Fysh	Treasurer, Postmaster-General (until 30 December 1898).
A.I. Clark	Attorney-General (until 23 October 1897).
A.T. Pillinger	Minister of Lands and Works (until 6 May 1899).
T. Reibey	Member of Executive Council without office.

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D.C. Urquhart	Attorney-General (from 10 November 1897).
E.T. Miles	Minister of Lands and Works (10 May 1899 to 1 October 1899).

    3. <u>Lewis Ministry</u> (Conservative)
       12 October 1899 to 8 April 1903

N.E. Lewis	Premier, Attorney-General.
G.T. Collins, M.L.C.	Chief Secretary; Minister for Agriculture; Minister administering the Defence Act.
B.S. Bird	Treasurer; Minister administering the Education Act; Postmaster-General (until 1 March 1901).
E. Mulcahy	Minister for Lands and Works, Minister for Mines, Minister for Railways.
F.W. Piesse, M.L.C.	Member of Executive Council without Office (until May 1901).

4. <u>Propsting Ministry</u> (Liberal-Democrat)
   9 April 1903 to 11 July 1904

W.B. Propsting	Premier; Treasurer.
J. McCall	Chief Secretary; Minister for Agriculture.
H. Nicholls	Attorney-General; Minister administering the Education Act.
C. Lyne	Minister of Lands and Works; Minister for Mines; Minister for Railways.
A. Morrisby, M.L.C.	Member of Executive Council without Office.

5. <u>Evans Ministry</u> (Liberal)
   12 July 1904 to 19 June 1909

J.W. Evans	Premier; Minister of Education (until 1 May 1906); Treasurer (10 October 1905 to 1 May 1906); Chief Secretary (from 1 May 1906).
W. Moore, M.L.C.	Chief Secretary (until 1 May 1906); Member of Executive Council without Office (1 May 1906 to 26 June 1907).
G.C. Gilmore	Attorney-General (until 1 May 1906).
C.L. Stewart	Treasurer; Minister for Mines (until 9 October 1905).
A. Hean	Minister of Lands and Works, Minister for Agriculture; Minister for Railways; Minister for Mines (from 10 October 1905).

D.C. Urquhart	Treasurer (from 1 May 1906).
W.B. Propsting, M.L.C.	Attorney-General (from 1 May 1906); Minister for Education (from 9 July 1906).

6. <u>Lewis Ministry</u> (Liberal Fusion)
   19 June 1909 to 20 October 1909

Sir N.E. Lewis	Premier;Treasurer.
G.H. Butler, M.L.C.	Chief Secretary.
A.E. Solomon	Attorney-General; Minister for Education.
A. Hean	Minister of Lands and Works; Minister for Agriculture; Minister for Mines.

J. Hope   Member of Executive Council
                               without Office.

C. Russen, M.L.C.   Member of Executive Council
                               without Office.

     7. <u>Earle Ministry</u> (Labor)
       20 October 1909 to 27 October 1909

J. Earle   Premier; Attorney-General; Minister
                               for Education.

J.A. Jensen   Chief Secretary; Minister for
                               Railways.

J.E. Ogden   Treasurer.

J.J. Long   Minister of Lands and Works,
                               Minister for Mines; Minister for
                               Agriculture.

J.W. Cheek, M.L.C.   Member of Executive Council without
                               Office.

     8. <u>Lewis Ministry</u> (Liberal)
      27 October 1909 to 14 June 1912

Sir N.E. Lewis   Premier, Treasurer.

G.H. Butler,M.L.C.   Chief Secretary.

A.E. Solomon   Attorney-General, Minister for
                               Education; Minister for Mines.

A. Hean   Minister of Lands and Works, Minister
                               for Railways; Minister for
                               Agriculture.

C. Russen, M.L.C.   Member of Executive Council without
                               Office.

     9. <u>Solomon Ministry</u> (Liberal)
      14 June 1912 to 6 April 1914

A.E. Solomon   Premier; Attorney-General; Minister
                               for Education.

G.H. Butler, M.L.C.   Chief Secretary.

H.J.M. Payne   Treasurer; Minister for Agriculture;
                               Minister for Railways.

E. Mulcahy   Minister of Lands and Works, Minister
                               for Mines.

C. Russen, M.L.C.   Member of Executive Council without
                               Office.

APPENDIX C

Methods Used to Analyse Divisions

1. Rice Index of Cohesion

The Rice Index of Cohesion[1] for a party is calculated for each division by the formula $\left|\frac{Y - N}{Y + N}\right|$ where Y is the number of 'yes' votes cast by the party in each division and N is the number of 'no' votes. The index established varies for 0.0 to 1.00. If one member in a party of ten opposes the party, its R.I.C. is .80; if five out of ten oppose, then its R.I.C. is 0.0.

2. Index of Party Likeness

The formula for calculating the index of Party likeness[2] of two parties voting in the same division is

$$1 - \left|\frac{Ya}{Ya + Na} - \frac{Yb}{Yb + Nb}\right|$$

Where Ya = total 'yes' votes cast by party a

Yb = total 'yes' votes cast by party b

Na = total 'no' votes cast by party a

Nb = total 'no' votes cast by party b

If two parties are solid and opposed to one another, their I.P.L. is 0.0. If they are solid and voting together their I,P.L. is 1.00. If one or both is divided, the I.P.L. ranges from 0.0 to 1.00. If both parties are equally divided, say, 80-20, their I.P.L. is also 1.00, but these instances can be distinguished from those on which the parties are solid by inspection of their R.I.C.s.

3. Absenteeism Rates

The absentee rate for a party is calculated by the formula $1 - \frac{Y + N}{Y + N + Abs.}$ It is simply a direct percentage of the party which is not present and voting.

1. For further details see Anderson et. al. Legislative Roll-call Analysis, p.32-35.
2. See Anderson et. al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis, p.44-45.

4. Rice-Beyle Cluster Analysis[1]

A cluster-analysis is used to discover the existence of groups within a party or parliament. It considers how often each possible pair of members agreed in their votes in relation to the number of divisions in which each of the individuals of a pair both voted together, either agreeing or disagreeing. If two members agreed on five divisions but voted together in ten divisions, their agreement score would be 0.50. Blocks of members can be built up by placing together on a matrix the high agreement scores of inter-related pairs.

The divisions from which these calculations are made can also be divided into two sub-sets at the median R.I.C. The low subset then includes those divisions in which the party more or less evenly split and the 'high cohesion' subset includes those divisions in which a few individuals only voted against the majority of the party. An examination of these subsets by a cluster-analysis enables other groupings or instances of dissidence to be identified.

1. For further details see D.B. Truman, The Congressional Party, p.320-330; Anderson et. al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis, p.59-75; P. Loveday, Grouping M.P.s, p.183-188.

APPENDIX D

Voting in the Legislative Councils of New South Wales and Tasmania

1. The Legislative Council in New South Wales, 1900-1903

In New South Wales, the votes of members in divisions
of the council between 1900 and 1903 were analysed. During
this period the Lyne and See governments were in office and
only two men, B.R. Wise and R.G.D. Fitzgerald, were nominated
to the council. There were ninety-one divisions of the
council in these four years - forty eight in 1900, twenty-
four in 1901, nine in 1902 and ten in 1903. Of these,
eighty-one were analysed in a cluster analysis; the
remaining ten divisions were excluded either because the
Council almost voted unanimously or because more than 60%
of the members included in the analysis were absent. A very
high absentee rate made it necessary to exclude from the
calculations those members who voted in less than twenty-
five of the original ninety-one divisions. As a result,
twenty-seven men were excluded and forty-nine included in
the calculations.

The cluster analysis indicated the existence of two
distinct groups who were generally opposed to one another.
One group of twenty-one members consistently supported the
government's proposals. Nineteen of these men consistently
had agreement scores among themselves of over 0.90 while the
other two had scores with this group of over 0.70. The
government group included all the fourteen appointments of
Lyne in June 1900[1] and five men who had been appointed by
Reid.[2] At least three of the latter group were Labor men
and the Labor party supported the Lyne and See ministries in
the assembly. The final two members of the groups were the
two fringe members and both had been appointed by Dibbs
in 1892.[3]

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1. Black, Earp, Flowers, Hill, Langwell, Meagher, Meeks, Nash,
    Robson, Ross, Slattery, Stuart, Suttor, Wise.

2. Backhouse, Buzacott, Hepher, Holborow, Wilson.

3. Day, Hyam.

The opposition group of nineteen was less cohesive; sixteen of them had agreement scores among themselves of over 0.80 and the other three had scores of around 0.70 with this group. Of these nineteen members, thirteen had been appointed[1] in 1890 or earlier, two in 1892 by Dibbs[2] and the remaining four had been nominated by Reid.[3]

Several members belonged to neither group; three of these tended to favour the opposition group[4], one the government[5], and the remainder did not vote consistently with either side[6].

The two groups were then considered as units and their R.I.C.s and an index of party likeness were calculated. The two opposed each other, (i.e., they had an I.P.L. of under 0.20 and at the same time had R.I.C.s of over 0.80) on forty-four of the eighty-one divisions. Twenty of these divisions were concerned with railway development, twelve with the introduction of the female franchise and twelve with various industrial matters such as arbitration, early closing, shearers' accommodation and miners' wages. Furthermore, both groups showed a fairly high level of solidarity over all divisions, as is shown in Table I.

TABLE I : The Frequency with which the Government and Opposition Groups reached different levels of cohesion in all divisions, expressed as a percentage of all divisions.

R.I.C. =	1.00	0.80-0.99	0.60-0.79	Under 0.60	Total number of Divisions
Government	56	20	15	9	81
Opposition	53	11	20	16	81

In the light of these findings, how far can it be said that party voting existed in the council in the same way as

---

1. Campbell, Charles, Dangar, Kater, Kerr, Lee, McIntosh, McLaurin, Moses, Norton, Pilcher, Renwick, Watson.

2. Brown, T.H. Smith.

3. Hawker, Jones, F.J. Smith, Want.

4. Vickery, Cullen, Humphries.

5. Hughes.

6. Heydon, Kethel, Creed.

it did in the assembly? All Lyne's nominees supported the
measures of the government. So did those members who were
identified with the Labor party. Consequently, the
government party reflected party voting. However, the
opposition did not. The two members who were most closely
identified with the opposition Liberal party in the assembly
did not vote together. Hughes, a future member of
Carruthers's cabinet in 1904 was favourably inclined towards
the government group; Want was definitely opposed to it.

Instead of interpreting the voting patterns in the
council as a reflection of party alignments in the assembly,
it would appear more reasonable to see the opposition to
the government's proposal as a conservative reaction to
'progressive' measures. Most of the members of the
opposition group had been appointed before 1892 and before
parties were firmly established. Their views on legislation
concerning arbitration, early closing and the female
franchise were likely to be less 'advanced' than those of
members of the Labor party or of the radical fringes of
the other parties.

Obviously far more detailed research is required to
support such a hypothesis, but the voting analysis does
suggest that, while members appointed by the government
continued to support its measures, the opposition in the
council was not yet directly identifiable with the opposition
in the assembly. By 1904 appointment to the council might
be recognized as a party action, but the two-party alignment
of the assembly had not yet been transferred there, even
though other alignments obviously did exist.

2. The Legislative Council in Tasmania, 1903-1908

In Tasmania divisions in the Legislative Council were
analysed for the years 1903 to 1908. There were eighteen
members of the council and in these years five members
either retired, died or were defeated. In 1903-4, the
Propsting ministry was in office and finally resigned because
the council defeated most of its progressive legislation;
there were twenty-seven divisions in this period. Between

1904 and 1908, Evans was premier; during these years there
were fifty-seven divisions. The two sets of divisions were
analysed separately.

In 1903-4 the cluster analysis indicated the existence
of two distinct groups. Seven members opposed the
government's measures and had agreement scores among them-
selves of 0.80 or above[1]; three others were on the fringe
of this group[2]. The government was supported by three
members; two of these were elected in early 1904 and
consequently only voted in ten divisions in this set. In
these divisions they voted solidly with one another and with
the official government representative.[3] Four members
belonged to neither group[4]. Since the leading member of
the opposition group, C.E. Davies, was suggested as a
possible premier if Propsting was defeated, it is clear that
the members of the council led much of the opposition to
the radical ministers. In this respect, the alignments of
the assembly were reflected in the council although, of
course, no formal party ties existed in the state.

Between 1904 and 1908 the cluster analysis does not
indicate the existence of distinct groups. A few members
supported the ministry, but not with any great consistency[5].
Others fairly regularly opposed it and showed some signs of
cohesion among themselves, but were not nearly as solid as
they had been between 1903 and 1904[6]. Generally no definite
groups can be found during this period and, as in the
assembly, there were no distinct party alignment. Since the
members of the council were elected, rather than nominated,
their lack of any identification with the government was not
surprising.

---

1. C. Davies, Gibson, Butler, Gant, Murdoch, Page, Dean.

2. Collins, Dodery, Grubb.

3. McCracken, Russen, Morrisby (the government representative).

4. Scott, Nicholls, Crosby, Moore.

5. Propsting and Moore were ministers. Russen, McCracken,
   Morrisby often supported them.

6. Davies, Dean, Gant, Fisher, Murdoch.

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