General Katsura Tarō and the Japanese Empire in East Asia, 1874-1913

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated
this thesis is my own work

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Abstract

General Katsura Tarō was a key figure in the development of Japan's first national army, acted as colonial governor-general in Taiwan, developed what is now Takushoku University as a school for Japanese overseas administrators and businessmen, and, as prime minister for most of the period 1901-1913, took his country to alliance with Britain, war with Russia, and finally annexation of Korea. He was a political general who made the transition to full statesman. Ironically, however, on the point of introducing his own political party, he was crippled by the public's intolerance of continuing military intrusion in Japanese politics.

This thesis borrows Katsura's life in order to investigate the relationship between Japan's army, society, and empire in a period of extremely rapid change. The focus is on Japan's overseas expansion, viewed a a kind of "social imperialism"; that is, that the creation of a conscript army was intended to regiment the people and prevent disorder, and that the employment of this army in overseas expansion was further designed to maintain domestic economic progress and divert outwards potentially disruptive social tensions.

It is argued, however, that the inherent weaknesses of imperialism, involving expanded military force to defend overseas interests, heated competition between the army and navy for limited budgetary resources, and rising international discord, ultimately exacerbated the domestic pressures such expansion was intended to assuage, and that Katsura was unusual among army leaders in sufficiently perceiving this concertina relationship to adopt a revised approach to foreign policy. He came to emphasise economic development of overseas possessions over and above the military factor, and adopted a British-style business attitude towards imperialism. This is evident in his establishment of the Oriental Development Company in Korea, his willingness to consider joint American-Japanese development in Manchuria, his frequent rejection of inflationary army expansion after 1905, and his assumption of the office of finance minister in his own second cabinet (1908-1911).

This study examines Japan's military and foreign policies in the Meiji period, giving particular attention to China, Korea and Taiwan. It investigates the position of the army within Meiji society, and the changing relationship between the army and nascent political parties after the introduction of constitutional government in 1890. It also charts the rivalry between the Japanese army and navy, and within the army itself. It suggests, in conclusion, that Katsura Tarō was something of the "adaptable

general" posited, but not realised, by Clausewitz, a general capable of balancing military and political requirements. However, this balance was ultimately impossible given the extraordinary stresses, nationally and internationally, of the late imperial age, and a viable policy of "economics first" had to wait on Japan's utter military defeat in 1945.

Only in war will a nation truly become a nation.

Heinrich von Treitschke.

Even the most sublime creations
of society carry within themselves the
element of their own destruction.

Carl von Clausewitz.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: IMPERIALISM AND JAPAN

General Katsura Tarō (1848-1913) was a central figure in the development of Japan's first national army, fought as divisional commander in the war with China (1894-95), served, albeit briefly, as governor-general of Japan's first colony, Taiwan, founded what is now Takushoku University to develop Japan's overseas commerce and administration, and, as prime minister for much of the period 1901-1913, was responsible both for taking the country to victory in the Russo-Japanese war and for the annexation of Korea. His life is, therefore, an exceptional mirror of the relationship between Japan's army, society, and empire, in the Meiji era, and his personal successes and failures reflect the movements in Japanese society at this time. Before embarking on the study of Katsura himself, however, it is necessary first to place him and his world in context.

The nineteenth century was predominantly European. It began in chaos and passed in the search for stability. The French revolution threatened Europe's established order, while the Napoleonic wars led to a restructuring of the European map, forced the combatants to compete for global economic resources in order to pay for these and future wars, and, in the vast numbers of men and distances involved, completely revised prevailing attitudes towards warfare and international relations. Here for the first time armies clashed on a national basis. For states to field, and employ successfully, a national army, it was essential that the troops be united by a deeper sense of nation and patriotism than had ever existed before. Lacking this, the result could be, as Friedrich Engels anticipated, merely to arm the masses and, indeed, Clausewitz's suggestion for a Prussian popular militia to combat the French was dismissed as a recipe for revolution.[1] Thus, nationalism, as employed by the state, was not a natural outgrowth of cultural development, as insisted by German historians of the time, but a manufactured response to a period of intense social change, and a lubricating force for the development of mass

[1]W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, Cambridge 1978, p. 39.

armies, which were themselves part of the regimenting process.[2] It was a device of the ruling elite who attempted to control social and economic change in the interests of national power and retention of the existing political structure in so far as that was possible given the extent of such change. Its target was the popular mass whose loyalty to the, still poorly understood, nation remained in question. This social nationalism is, therefore, with its antithesis, the anti-capitalist, supra-national socialism, the overwhelming phenomenon of the nineteenth century.

Nationalism is the individual's sense of attachment to the larger group, whether bonded by linguistic, historical, racial, or simply geographical ties. This sense of the larger group is produced by expanded communications and commercial or social intercourse, all requiring dramatic and necessarily disturbing changes to the current social order. Above all, however, nationalism is created by education. While an emotional and reactive nationalism may be ignited by fear of attack from "outside", only education can ensure that nationalism is maintained over time and men respond when called upon to serve national policy.[3] However, an educated population is more likely to question a primitive nationalism based on presumed external threats, and to agitate for democracy. That, in the wake of the French revolution, seemed itself an invitation to anarchy.

One form of education was conscription. As well as providing the armed force sufficient to deter enemies, it also socialised the people in the habits of order and discipline. This had economic benefits in that a regimented workforce was better suited to urban living and industrial modes of production. It was also expected to reduce democratic tendencies, and a German army circular in 1909 pronounced that "service with the colours must work like a healing spring, and wash the sickness (of social democracy) out of their system."[4] At the same time, however, a formal system of schooling, based on "national" history and language, was needed to build a people with the abilities to adapt to state requirements. To counter the possible adverse effects of this education, there had to be some promise of future participation in government, and this promise could not remain forever unfulfilled. In the interim, governments sought other

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[2]See the discussion in Robert M. Berdahl, "New Thoughts on German Nationalism", *The American Historical Review*, 77-1, February 1972. As argued below, imperialism was an outgrowth of nationalism and designed for similar ends of social unification. This is a view suggested in Woodruff D. Smith, *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism*, N.Y. 1986, p. 6, when he describes Wilhelmian imperialism as, "far from being the product of an elite concensus, was rather the result of attempts to create concensus."

[3]As Napoleon noted, "There will never be a fixed political state of things until we have a body of teachers instructed on established principles. So long as the people are not taught from their earliest years whether they ought to be republicans or royalists, Christians or infidels, the state cannot properly be called a nation," quoted Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London 1960, p. 82.

[4]V.G. Kiernan, "Conscription and Society in Europe Before the War of 1914-1918", M.R.D. Foot, ed., *War and Society*, London 1973, p. 148.

means to dampen unrest promoted by the very industrialisation, urbanisation, and education which were intended to produce national strength and unity. The psychologist Bruno Bettelheim, in a study of fear based on his experience as an inmate in Dachau and Buchenwald, has described the individual in the mass state[5];

> Feeling his inner weakness, he yearns for something strong and powerful to support him. So to be attractive a mass must be powerful, or at least make a show of power. A powerless mass is not only unattractive, it creates anxiety and depression. That is why a mass society must always claim and often demonstrate that it is powerful, that its strength provides security; otherwise it would lose its hold over its subjects.

One palliative for insecurity was overseas expansion. By displaying global influence and dominion over foreign races, European, and later American and Japanese, governments tried to exploit the psychological value of imperialism and enhance national pride. Initially, Britain felt sufficiently confident of her industrial lead to eschew formal control of colonies and Prime Minister Palmerston declared, "All we want is trade, and land is not necessary for trade."[6] Simple trade in Africa or Asia limited the possibility of an anti-Western reaction based on primitive nationalist fears, but, as economic competition increased from France, Germany and Russia, this cheap, informal imperialism grew less tenable, and Britons such as Benjamin Disraeli and Cecil Rhodes advocated formal colonisation as a means of preclusive imperialism following the concession of the franchise in 1867. Other European, American, and Japanese policymakers followed the same course. They believed that, as well as denying benefit to foreign rivals, access to overseas raw materials and markets would feed domestic industrial growth and help maintain prosperity, whilst also providing an outlet for the supposedly excess population. This is the "social imperialism" as defined by German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler; "the diversion outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political *status quo*."[7] This definition, however, has been attacked as too narrow, and it fails to take account of the very influence exerted on domestic society by imperialist expansion.[8] Domestic economy and society were caught in a concertina relationship with imperialism. Successful development overseas, whether of commerce or migration, depended on a state's ability to guarantee armed protection and this, in turn, required mounting defence expenditure. The imperial nations justified their expansion in

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[5]*The Informed Heart*, Glencoe 1960, rep. 1986, p. 98-99.

[6]Quoted Mark Girouard, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman*, New Haven 1981, p. 220.

[7]Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperiliasmus*, Cologne 1969, p. 115, quoted in Geoff Eley, "Defining Social Imperialism: Use and Abuse of an Idea", *Social History*, 3, 1976, p. 265. See also Wehler's, *The German Empire, 1871-1918*, Dover 1985, p. 171-76, and his, "Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism", in Roger Owen/Bob Sutcliffe, ed., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972, p. 76, "Since the preservation of the traditional social and political hierarchy was often the motive behind expansion, one may also define this expansion as a social imperialism."

[8]Wehler's theory is critically examined by Eley and by Winfried Baumgart, *Imperialism*, Oxford 1980, p. 140-55.

the same terms of order and stability as used at home, and British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury suggested in 1898;[9]

> The weak states are becoming weaker, and the strong states are becoming stronger.... The living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the seeds and causes of conflict amongst civilised nations will speedily disappear.

However, even with technological superiority, to impose order overseas required strategically placed naval bases or army garrisons. When tested, as the British were in India in 1857 and again in the Sudan during the 1880s, the cost of restoring order could be immense. Moreover, growing competition among the Western powers for overseas assets, either as access to markets or as formal imperial possession, endangered their individual domestic economies, threatened industrial stagnation, and necessitated ever stronger doses of military funding for defence of national interests. This competition would be especially intense where imperialism took the form of army-led continental expansion, involving greater numbers of men, longer lines of supply, and diminished central government control of events. Spiralling military costs would, in turn, retard domestic improvements and test the popularity of militant nationalism. However, in the age of the nation in arms, there could be no such thing, short of genocide, as a conclusive victor in this international trial of strength. The result would be either for imperial rivalries to produce a catastrophic (and, to some, purgative) war, or for domestic discontent to halt further military expenditure. Thus, imperialism, as with capitalism in the Marxist definition, contained the seeds of its own destruction and, as with the actual course of capitalism, could only be saved by the appearance of business-minded imperialists, able to see the dangers and reconcile strategic and domestic needs. As much as any Japanese of his time, this was the case with Katsura Tarō.

In 1868, Japan's new Meiji government could not foresee all the problems inherent in industrialisation at home and development overseas. For Japan, the dilemma, as with other Asian and African peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was how to respond to the Western juggernaut. The West was undeniably superior in industry and technology, making resistance costly and emulation attractive. The choice was to endure colonial subjugation, or voluntarily subordinate one's own culture with a view to ultimate parity.[10] Emulation raised the obvious question of how to assimilate foreign ways and

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[9]Baumgart, p. 72. The young Cecil Rhodes anticipated Salisbury, writing in 1877, "The absorption of the world under our rule simply means the end of all wars," quoted Girouard, p. 223. The same view was taken by President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress in 1902, "Wars with uncivilised powers are largely mere matters of international police duty, essential to the welfare of the world", John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest*, Camb. Mass. 1983, p. 71.

[10]The comment of Abba Eban, formerly Israeli foreign minister, is interesting in this context; "From the end of the nineteenth century, Arabic thought and literature are dominated, to the point of obsession, by the tension between the need to reject the West - out of fear of its domination - and the need to emulate the West in order to gather strength for the rejection," *The New Diplomacy*, London 1983, p. 194.

still retain the original culture, or, in the words of Katsura Tarō, graft new branches on to the old tree and leave the old tree standing. A compromise ideology was socialism, both modern and inherently anti-Western/capitalism, and this was favoured by many Asian and African states in the twentieth century.[11] However, the Meiji leaders were conservative by education and revolutionaries only by default. Their solution, later adopted by Chinese reformer and official Chang Chih-tung, was to employ Western technology, backed with Asian morality, with the aim of producing *fukoku kyōhei* - a rich nation and strong army. First, however, they would have to build the nation in the popular consciousness, and, to do so, they would use education and military service. This would take time, but they believed that a partial concession to the Western order would be acceptable to the leading imperialist, the business-minded British. As Sakuma Shōzan had written in 1840;[12]

> Once they have finished off the business in China, they will send warships to Nagasaki, Satsuma, and Edo. They are a people who are swayed only by a desire for profit and they are not likely to go to the expense of sending a large expedition against us all the way from England.

Consequently, if Japan were to meet Britain and the other powers half-way, she might retain her political and cultural autonomy.

However, Napoleon's 1799 expedition to Egypt not only established a French political presence in the Middle East, but, perhaps more importantly, emboldened European scholars to seek to define "the Orient," and dictate, often in the face of fact, just what "the Orient" should be.[13] This produced the conviction of Western imperialists that "Orientals" were work-shy, childish, and essentially untrustworthy, and the credo of imperialism became the West's right to rule, buttressed by the fiction of a chivalric "tutoring" of ignorant peoples.[14] Only iconoclasts like Wilfred Scawen Blunt thought colonial peoples could improve rapidly and Lord Cromer, long time *de facto* ruler of Egypt, habitually predicted a hundred years before the Egyptians would be ready for self-rule. However, as with imperialism, colonialism was fatally flawed. It was far easier for the colonised to assimilate existing knowledge than for the colonisers to maintain their own pace of technological inventiveness *ad infinitum*, and there were soon Indians,

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[11] A point argued by S.N. Eisenstadt, "European Expansion and the Civilisation of Modernity", in H.L. Wesseling, *Expansion and Reaction*, Leiden 1978, p. 180.

[12] Quoted Delmer Brown, *Nationalism in Japan*, Berkeley 1955, p. 70.

[13] The exhaustive and exhausting treatment of this subject is Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London 1978. A more concise and convincing study is Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient*, London 1985.

[14] The nineteenth century's massive revival of interest in medieval chivalry, and the effect of chivalric images on British and American imperialism is considered by Girouard, p. 224-25; also Jeffrey Richards, "Boy's Own Empire: Feature Films and Imperialism in the 1930s", John MacKenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, Manchester 1986, p. 73-93, plus particularly p. 159. which cites John Fraser, *America and the Patterns of Chivalry*, Camb. Mass. 1982.

Vietnamese and others producing cogent arguments for the restoration of self-government.

Along with all the other pitfalls of imperialism, Japan was peculiarly burdened with the fear that her success in first industrialising, and then resorting to the same social imperialism as Western powers, would explode the myth of the "Oriental". This might cause an antagonistic Western union and she felt compelled, at least in the Meiji era, to protect her nascent economic development by tailoring overseas expansion to Western prejudices. This careful control of development necessitated real unity of Japanese military, diplomatic, and economic policy, a unity attainable only under the ideal business-minded strategist envisaged by Clausewitz.

Katsura Tarō is routinely dismissed as a colourless minion of General Yamagata Aritomo, and his rise to prominence excused on the grounds of Yamagata's protection.[15] In a poll of Japanese and Western historians conducted in the late 1960s, Katsura was excluded (while Ōkuma Shigenobu, Matsukata Masayoshi, and even Saigō Takamori were all included) from the ten most important Meiji statesmen on the question of "influence in shaping the course of modern Japan in general and polices of the Meiji government in particular, plus the degree of power exercised in carrying out those policies."[16] As this study hopes to show, such a dismissal is entirely unfounded.

Hitherto, Western research has followed Japanese lines, and even studies which include Katsura in their focus, such as Najita Tetsuo, *Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905-1915* (Cambridge Mass. 1967), present him as a kind of dull policeman, a simple militarist, who, while exhibiting political acuity, was nonetheless bitterly antagonistic to the development of political parties and concerned above all else to ensure the primacy of the military.[17] Najita's work shows no real understanding of, or interest in, Katsura or his career. This dismissiveness may be understandable in so far as Japanese historiography has been hamstrung by the dominance of broad classifications such as "militarist bureaucrat" and "metropolitan bourgeoisie", and there is no critical biography of Katsura in Japanese. The 1917 work by Tokutomi Sohō, Katsura's political

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[15]Even Matsushita Yoshio, *Nihon no Gumbatsu Zō*, Tokyo 1969, p. 117, while commending Katsura for his political and administrative brilliance, attributes his rise to being "the Chōshū military clique's favourite son."

[16]Richard T. Chang, *Historians and Meiji Statesmen*, Gainsville 1970. p. 42, 55.

[17]See Najita, p.27, 71-79, 122-23. Najita's attitude towards Katsura is exemplified in his passage on the Katsura-Hara relationship after the Taishō incident of 1913, p. 187, "Realizing that Hara alone understood him and could restore his discredited image, Katsura anxiously sought a meeting with Hara for one final exchange of words; but up until the very end Hara was without pity, sending his good wishes to Katsura through his seconds."

ally, is, in the tradition of the time, designed to eulogise the man rather than expose his weaknesses.[18] Yet, even a cursory inspection of the materials reveals the importance and individuality of Katsura's influence over Meiji domestic and foreign policy. It shows a pragmatist and a businessman, constantly ready to make concessions in the interest of achieving higher goals, and, in his later years, a frequent opponent of military expansion without accompanying economic development. In fact, he worked more smoothly with party politicians and businessmen than soldiers, and his political abilities were more frequently noted than his martial skills. Consequently, to interpret issues in Meiji history such as the question of Korean policy 1905-1910 as a simple polarisation of the so-called Yamagata-Katsura militarists and Itō civilian bureaucrats is quite untenable.[19] As prime minister in the 1900s, and simultaneously finance minister from 1908-1911, Katsura took a business approach to Japan's empire, both at home and as this expanded overseas. He came to downplay the importance of the armed forces in imperialism, and thereby revealed the progress in his thinking from the earlier years of advocating military expansion alone. It is this picture, of a man who begins life in army administration, and who moves on to reordering Japan's empire along business lines, which runs through the following pages. This will be particularly evident in chapters four and ten which emphasise Katsura's support for Japanese overseas commerce and administration as president of the Taiwan, later Oriental, Society, and his establishment of the school for colonial administrators and commercial agents which remains today as the Takushoku University.

By failing to recognise the individuality of Japanese policymakers, Western commentators perpetuate their own "Oriental" myth of Japan as an impenetrably group-oriented society, in perpetual opposition to the individualistic West. Even when Katsura, as with Takeshita Noboru in recent years, assumes the premiership, he remains bound by definition not only as a Yamagata man (or in Takeshita's case, a Tanaka Kakuei man), but also as the leader of his own clique, and so his is a group rather than an individual identity. This impersonality obviously restricts Western students from empathising with

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[18]Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1965. In fact, this is not quite the fawning tribute suggested by Marius Jansen in *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, Cambridge Mass. 1954, p. 229. It does omit whole incidents, such as the Amoy affair during the Boxer war of 1900, which do not allow a positive explanation, but Tokutomi also reveals Katsura's personal weaknesses, such as his poor writing ability and monotonous speech-making, and even pulls Katsura up for dissembling in his autobiography concerning the Itō Hirobumi incident of mid-1903, see chapter seven herein.

[19]This simplification regarding Korean policy is frequently evident, for example, C.I. Eugene Kim/Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910*, Berkeley 1968, p. 136; Karl Moskowitz, "The Creation of the Oriental Development Company: Japanese Illusions Meet Korean Reality", *Occasional Papers on Korea* (University of Washington), 2, March 1974; and even Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910*, Philadelphia 1960, p. 353-54, while criticising the degree to which other scholars have emphasised the division, nonetheless accepts its existence.

Japanese history and politics, and any attempt to add character is of unquestioned value in making both those subjects more readily approachable. However, this study is not intended as a comprehensive biography of Katsura Tarō. Domestic affairs are only included where relevant to the relationship of Japan's army, society, and empire, and a domestic profile will have to wait for Professor Uno Shunichi's biography in the Yoshikawa Jimbutsu Sōsho series. Indeed, Katsura is himself used here as no more than a device for rendering order out of the chaos of Meiji history.

Chapter 2

THE ARMY 1848-1891

Katsura Tarō was born on the twenty-eighth day of the eleventh month of Kōka 4 (equivalent to 4 January 1848) at Hagi, the capital of Chōshū domain in western Japan. His ancestors were related to the ruling Mōri family and, his father, Yōemon, described as a wise and gentle man, belonged to the high-ranking *ōgumi* class of samurai with a stipend of 125 *koku* of rice.[1]

As long as the existing social system remained, this family status presaged a secure future for the young Katsura, particularly after the early death of an elder brother left him heir to the family name. However, in the wake of the great uprising by Chōshū peasants in 1831, the domain government attempted far-reaching economic reforms, causing a decline in the real value of samurai incomes.[2]

A further catalyst for change was rising contact with the West following the arrival of a U.S. diplomatic mission in 1853. In Chōshū, this ignited study of Western medicine. However, in a society governed by warriors, attention naturally turned to martial techniques, and, in 1857, a Chōshū samurai returned from Nagasaki with the latest military knowledge, was appointed head of Western studies in the domain school, the Meirinkan.[3] Thus, as Katsura began his childhood education, the future grew increasingly uncertain.

For six years Katsura studied Chinese characters at a private school in Hagi. Taking his father's advice, he adopted a careful, painstaking approach which he expressed as a personal maxim; "A walk of ten miles is pleasanter over ten days rather than one." This remained his attitude throughout life, explaining at the height of his fame that cautious

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[1]In the mid-sixteenth century, Katsura's ancestors had been lords of the town of Sakurao, present-day Hatsukaichichō, Hiroshima prefecture. Tanaka Akira, *Bakumatsu no Chōshū*, Tokyo 1965, p. 15, lists Chōshū stipends in 1852. Of 2,599 retainers, 925 received less than 39 *koku* while only 661 received more than 100 *koku*. This clearly contradicts Takane Masaaki's statement that Katsura originated from a low samurai family, *The Political Elite of Japan*, Berkeley 1981, p. 96. In Satsuma, by contrast, the father of Katsura's contemporary, Kawakami Sōroku, received just 50 *koku*.

[2]Tanaka, p. 26-31; Albert Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, Camb. Mass. 1961, p. 58-80.

[3]Craig, p. 132-37.

preparation was the key to ultimate success, whereas haste merely invited failure.[4] It may be that this tortoise-like philosophy cloaked Katsura's weakness at school. His writings, which are few, are awkward in expression, and his biographer, Tokutomi Iichirō (Sohō), has testified to his preference for horse-riding and song over reading.[5]

In 1859 Chōshū introduced a Western-style rifle unit and, despite a critical backlash threatening its existence, Yōemon urged his son to practice Western drill. Too small to bear a gun, the twelve-year old Katsura was given a drum in order to march along with the rest.[6] As was expected, he also learned traditional arms, the lance, sword and bow, and entered the Meirinkan for advanced military studies.[7]

At this point, relations between Chōshū and the ruling Tokugawa house were building to a crisis. Chōshū was one of the largest domains with strong historical ties to the imperial court, and, following the assassination of Tokugawa strong-man Ii Naosuke in 1860, the provincial lords became increasingly assertive. Chōshū persuaded the court to issue a demand for the expulsion of all foreigners and, in May 1863, challenged the Tokugawa's position as defenders of Japan by unilaterally attacking Western ships. The results were chastening as successive bands of American and French troops razed Chōshū forts and left some 7,000 dead.[8] Chōshū samurai Takasugi Shinsaku, after visiting Shanghai in May 1862 and witnessing the Western powers hovering over the Chinese civil war, had already proposed army reform in Japan. Now he was given his chance. Borrowing from the people's armies of the early French republic, he recruited men irrespective of status, even arming farmers and ordinary people for his new *kiheitai* squads.[9]

For the teenage Katsura, therefore, the established social system was in question and the future would require adaptability. To Japan's youth, this may have seemed an exhilirating mixture of fear and anticipation; fear at the impending collapse of order, anticipation at the opportunities that might follow.

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[4]Katsura Tarō, *Shosekun*, Tokyo 1912, p. 2

[5]As military attache in Berlin during the 1870s, this literary awkwardness led Katsura to rely on a colleague for drafting reports to Tokyo, Tokutomi Iichirō, *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 1, p. 356.

[6]The frontispiece to Sugiyama Shigemaru's biography of Katsura, *Katsura Taishō-den*, Tokyo 1919, is a drawing of this scene. The idea of a little drummer boy marching to another's tune finely captures the lingering image of Katsura.

[7]For Katsura's childhood, see Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 37-69; Katsura, p. 5-10; Asahina Chisen, ed., *Meiji Kōshin-roku*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1915, v. 2, p. 1030-31.

[8]Craig, p. 199-201

[9]Tanaka, p. 93-6.

In 1864 Katsura became one of the first samurai of his century to experience war. An allied Western fleet arrived at Shimonoseki to punish further Chōshū bombardment of passing vessels. The action was again brief, and, for the Chōshū forces, bitter. Nonetheless, at just sixteen, Unit Commander Katsura had tasted his first experience of leading men in battle.

The Tokugawa responded to this Chōshū gauntlet with a punitive mission, supported by the great southern house of Satsuma. The success of this mission encouraged Tokugawa leaders to confirm their authority with a repeat assault, but Satsuma grew disenchanted and negotiations with Chōshū's Kido Takayoshi led to a secret alliance in early 1866. Unaware, Tokugawa forces marched back into Chōshū in mid-1866, and this time Katsura led a battalion (*daitai*) in the north-eastern Sekishū region (modern Shimane prefecture). The Tokugawa were routed and the perhaps timely death of the Tokugawa *shōgun* opened the way to a negotiated settlement. However, Satsuma and Chōshū aimed at destruction of the *status quo* and when the new *shōgun*, Yoshinobu, appeared to be successfully reforming his administration, they armed for a confrontation. In late 1867, a compromise was proposed whereby the *shōgun* could voluntarily return authority from the Tokugawa to the emperor. As Yoshinobu considered his answer, Satsuma's Saigō Takamori waited nearby in a northern Kyoto temple ready to fight if necessary. Katsura was sent to report and stayed with Saigō to hear the decision. Yoshinobu acceded to the proposal and Katsura raced back to Chōshū with the news. Then, on 28 December 1867, he accompanied a group of anti-Tokugawa leaders, including Sanjō Sanetomi, Ōyama Iwao, Saigō Jūdō, and Inoue Kaoru, to Kyoto for an audience with the emperor.[10] He had just turned twenty and already found himself standing beside Japan's new leaders.

Into Meiji

The compromise did not last and fighting erupted at the start of 1868. In the civil war, Katsura continued to serve as a messenger, observing the major battle at Toba-Fushimi in February 1868, and carrying the news of Tokugawa defeat back to Chōshū. He was then assigned command of a disaffected infantry company (*chūtai*) in the Kansai region and here demonstrated those persuasive gifts he would utilise so ably in later life, managing to restore order among the men. Katsura and his troops then joined the fighting as it moved north to the Sendai area where there was a good deal of moving back and

[10]Katsura, p. 15-18.

forth as alliances were arranged, tested and renegotiated according to circumstances. Looking back from forty years, Katsura cast himself in the role of adventuring scout and perceptive strategist.[11] Nonetheless, in mid-1868, as the war began to wind down and Katsura returned to Chōshū, his service had clearly been neither negligible nor unnoticed, and he was granted an annual 250 *koku* as reward.[12]

The post-war period was, wrote Katsura, a time of extraordinary opportunity and he recalled a popular song of the time warning, "don't despise the lodger; tomorrow he may be the minister's secretary". Indeed, it seemed that any ambitious young man might rise to eminence. Ultimately, this is just what Katsura did. Of course, it helped to originate from Satsuma or Chōshū when men from those areas dominated high office. However, as time progressed, this domination would cause increasing resentment. When it exploded in 1913, Katsura would be its greatest victim.

In mid-1869, Katsura was confronted with a choice between new responsibilities and new opportunity. He became head of the family after his father's death in March, but the Chōshū authorities instructed him to learn French in Tokyo preparatory to study of the French military system, as adopted by the Tokugawa and retained by the Meiji government. This could have led to advancement in the new administration and, although the order was quickly replaced by a field appointment, Katsura recognised the value of overseas experience. He pressed for admission to the Language School at Yokohama and, after waiting for a place to fall vacant, was finally admitted in September 1869.[13]

The post-revolutionary freedom of 1868 was accompanied by widespread confusion. In April 1870, the Language School was uprooted to Osaka and renamed the School of Military Studies (*Heigaku-ryō*), but Katsura was impatient with the change and, within one week of transfer, decided to visit France at his own expense. Feigning sickness, he tried to persuade a doctor to release him from the school. When news reached his senior commanders, Katsura was cautioned that departure now might prejudice his chances in the nascent army, but, undeterred, he obtained his release in mid-1870.[14] He returned to Hagi to arrange encashment of his 250 *koku* award, which, he hoped, would pay for several years overseas. A rare government passport was arranged

[11]Katsura, p. 30-33.

[12]Yamagata Aritomo, a staff officer at the assault on Aizu, and a leading figure in the war, received 600 *koku*. Maejima Shōzō considers the level of Katsura's award was influenced by his relatively high status within Chōshū. *Meiji no Genkun-tachi*, Tokyo 1967, p. 41.

[13]A fellow student was Sone Arasuke, later finance minister in the first Katsura cabinet.

[14]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 308.

with, no doubt, the Katsura family status smoothing the way. Then, taking leave of senior Chōshū statesman Kido Takayoshi, Katsura departed from Yokohama on 26 August 1870. His travel companions included Ōyama Iwao and Shinagawa Yajirō, both off to observe the war then taking place between Prussia and France.

When their ship reached London, Paris was under siege and Katsura, with artless pragmatism, opted instead for Berlin. Given that his introductions were for Paris, this was a bold decision, but he arrived to find other Japanese students already in the Prussian capital, led by future foreign minister, Aoki Shūzō, already an old hand having spent one year in the city.[15] After victories over Austria and now France, the Prussian General Staff attracted military students from a host of countries so Katsura was far from out of place and soon found lodging with a Prussian officer of the 1866 campaign.[16] During his three years in Germany, he concentrated on studying the language and using this to learn about military administration.[17]

Although Kaiser Wilhelm the Second would later take a leading role in fostering anti-Asian prejudice, while Katsura was in Germany, he apparently received nothing but kindness, and the same is true of Kawakami Sōroku who spent a year in Berlin in 1887-8.[18] Nor did others who studied in Germany at this time, including Aoki and Heidelberg Ph. D. Hirata Tōsuke, mention prejudicial treatment.[19]

Post-war German society endured turmoil following its military successes. In 1870, Bismarck launched the *kulturkampf* against the power of the Catholic church and in May 1873 secularised many aspects of German life, including marriage. That same month, the Vienna stock market collapsed, German industry reeled, and Chief of Staff Moltke feared that France might use the disruption to attempt a war of revenge.[20] Katsura's income was also hit by a fall in the price of rice in Japan and he was forced to curtail his studies.[21] He docked at Yokohama in October 1873.

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[15]For the situation of Japanese students in Berlin see Sakane Yoshihisa, ed., *Aoki Shūzō Jiden*, Tokyo 1970, p. 29-32.

[16]On the reputation of the Prussian general staff at this time, Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff*, N.Y. 1957, p. 97.

[17]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 317-26. It would seem Katsura learned his lessons well. Fully thirty years after leaving Germany he was still able to converse easily in the language, British Foreign Office records, F.O. 410-62, Anthony Rumbold (Tokyo), to Foreign Secretary Grey, 23 Dec. 1912.

[18]Tokutomi Iichirō, *Rikugun Taishō Kawakami Sōroku*, Tokyo 1942, p. 67-83 gives Kawakami's diary of his stay.

[19]Shinagawa, Hirata and others organised a society for returned German students in 1876. Katsura became a member in 1881 and in 1887 succeeded Nishi Amane as principal of the society's school for German studies. Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 901-2.

[20]Edward Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, N.Y. 1981, p. 306-24.

[21]It is unlikely that the dispute in Tokyo over Korean policy had much to do with his decision to return. He left Germany too early to be aware of the seriousness of the fissure in government.

In retrospect, Katsura's time in Germany was doubly advantageous. He acquired specialist knowledge of a type rare in Japan, and was also safe from the political convulsions at home. The anti-Tokugawa alliance of four domains, having achieved its basic goal, inevitably fractured over policy direction and in vying for position. When Katsura returned, the situation had already been clarified by the veto on an aggressive policy towards Korea, the subsequent exit from government of major Satsuma, Tosa and Hizen figures, and the successful campaign by Chōshū's Yamagata Aritomo for a conscript army. Moreover, Katsura could see that the influence of Kido Takayoshi, previously generous in support, was beginning to wane along with his health, and that Yamagata was rising as head of the army.

Initially, Katsura stayed at Kido's home, waiting to see whether the army would accept him back. Kido was well-inclined towards the young man, supported him for an appointment, and also directed the Hagi authorities to ease his financial difficulties.[22] After a brief visit home, Katsura returned to Tokyo in the New Year of 1874 to be appointed captain in the imperial Japanese army. This was his first meeting with Executive Military Commander (*rikugun-kyō*) Yamagata Aritomo. Based on existing precedents, Katsura might have expected a higher rank for his German experience.[23] However, he accepted Yamagata's explanation that the army was becoming increasingly regulated and a man had to proceed through the ranks. Katsura, always a proponent of careful preparation, replied;[24]

> What you have said accords with my greatest wish. To help bring order to our army was the main purpose of my own studies of military systems.

This emphasis on order was to be a keynote of both their lives, and is not exceptional in men who have endured or even instigated revolutionary upheaval. One might recall the comment of Mikhail Bukharin; "History is full of examples of the transformation of parties of revolution into parties of order. Sometimes the only mementos of a revolutionary party are the watchwords it has inscribed on public buildings."[25]. However, Yamagata's brightest aides rarely lingered in the lower ranks. Katsura, like Kawakami Sōroku and Kodama Gentarō later, rose swiftly, and became a major-general at the age of just thirty-seven.

The Army System

[22]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 326-7. All future references to works by Tokutomi other than his biography of Katsura will be followed by an abbreviated title.

[23]Matsushita Yoshio, *Nihon no Gumbatsu-Zō*, Tokyo 1969, p. 120, suggests lieutenant-colonel.

[24]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 330.

[25]David Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams*, N.Y. 1976, p. 265

The national army which Katsura entered was quite different from that established in February 1871. Then the force of 10,000 men had been drawn entirely from Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, and was based in four camps strategically placed to meet any domestic challenge to the still unproven government. Yamagata became executive commander following the assassination of his predecessor, Ōmura Masujirō, and, following the lead of Takasugi Shinsaku, pushed through the introduction of conscription, thus breaking the traditional samurai monopoly on bearing arms. The first conscripts entered Tokyo camp in April 1873, and two further camps, in Nagoya and Hiroshima, were constructed. Yamagata aimed at 35,000 men per camp, but financial instability and the newness, and consequent ineffectiveness, of the system kept the total force to just 70,000.[26]

As noted in the introduction, the success of conscription depended on the individual's commitment to nation over region. Such commitment also served to undermine local discontent towards the central authorities, and the Meiji government moved to blur regional division in August 1871 by replacing the domains with a prefectural system, and instituting a national system of education the following year. However, the Meiji leaders were under constant pressure from democratic movements, headed by men with a definite regional profile, to establish a constitutional assembly. While they accepted this as an eventual necessity to retain the people's sense of nation, they wanted evidence that the people understood their own national responsibilities. These included military service and an awareness of Japan's international position. The Meiji oligarchs considered themselves solely responsible for establishing Japan's new national order, and feared any challenge would result in division and weakness. This was particularly true of General Yamagata. However, a closed elite is an obvious target of discontent for those excluded from office, and must release some authority in order to stay in power.[27] The only question was how much and when.

Katsura was openly confident in his specialist knowledge and within weeks of appointment was already offering major suggestions. The principal difference between the French and German military systems was that, in France, administration and operational command were unified in the army ministry, whereas, in Germany, command

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[26]Ōyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 228-40. Fujiwara Akira, *Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1961, p. 47-8, considers the 1873 conscription order virtually worthless; so broad was the range of exemptions, including householders, adopted sons, only sons and grandsons, etc., that from those of conscription age in any one year only about 3% were taken into the military.

[27]An interesting discussion of the elite and oligarchic theories of Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Roberto Michels, all opponents of the Marxist view of politcs, is given in T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, London 1964.

resided separately in the general staff.[28] Although Japan had decided in October 1870 to maintain the French sytem, Katsura decided it was time to change and Yamagata was receptive. In February 1874, command of troops sent to quell reactionary samurai in the Saga region had been delegated to Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi. Yamagata resigned in protest at what he saw as this civilian intrusion and transferred himself to command the imperial guards, also taking over at the army command's powerful 6th Bureau.[29] On 19 February, using Katsura's draft, he asked cabinet to approve replacement of the Army Command 6th Bureau by a general staff office (*sambōkyoku*) and the nervous government offerd no opposition. The plan was implemented three days later with Yamagata himself taking over the new office. Once regulations had been drafted giving full operational command to the head of this body, Yamagata resumed his duties as executive army commander on 30 June.[30] The acceptance of his plan was Katsura's first success. It was also a demonstration of the lengths to which Yamagata would go to protect the army from civilians, and set a dangerous precedent for the future.

The Saga rising was quickly suppressed but an attempt to divert further samurai opposition to reform nearly caused an international conflict. The murder of Ryūkyūan fishermen by Taiwanese in 1871 was resurrected by the Meiji government as a pretext for a large-scale punitive assault. However, China claimed suzerainty over Taiwan and there was no telling how far she would defend this right while encircled by avaricious Western powers. On 2 July 1874, Katsura moved to the intelligence bureau of the general staff and began collating information on China for use in the event of war. Yamagata originally opposed the Taiwanese expedition as premature, and though he doubted China would fight over Taiwan, he did admit that matters had gone further than expected.[31] Japan was certainly ill-prepared for war. China's value at this point was as a latent threat to mobilise the Japanese people behind the policy of "rich nation, strong army," and a conflict in 1874 would have severely tested her resources. Fortunately, with some diplomatic help from Britain, the matter was resolved peaceably, although the expedition

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[28]The chief of the German general staff did not yet have direct access to the monarch. Nor was there an independent navy general staff until 1889 under the patronage of Kaiser Wilhelm the Second.

[29]The 6th Bureau's powers were vaguely defined but included authority over staff officers, promotions, military regulations, and map-making. See Matsushita Yoshio/Izu Kimio, *Nihon Gunji Hattatsushi*, Tokyo 1937, p. 172-73.

[30]Matsushita Yoshio, *Kindai Nihon Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1941, p. 93; Ōe Shinobu, *Nihon no Sambō Hombu*, Tokyo 1985, p. 23-4; Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 334. Roger Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922*, Camb. Mass. 1971, p. 72, makes no mention of this incident, describing instead Yamagata's rapid change of offices as designed to restore order following Saigō Takamori's resignation and subsequent Satsuma disaffection.

[31]Ōyama, ed., *Yamagata Ikensho*, p. 57-9.

involved a considerable financial loss for Japan.[32]

During the Sino-Japanese negotiations, Katsura's mother died in Hagi and he was sent back to what was now Yamaguchi prefecture to arrange household affairs. At the same time, he undertook to meet another disenchanted ex-member of the government said to be plotting samurai rebellion, Maebara Issei. Katsura was ordered to see if the rumours were true, and, in conversation with Maebara, advised him to trust in the government and accept the need for change. However, on this occasion, Katsura was not lastingly successful and the Hagi rebellion erupted two years later.[33]

Although Japan's internal and external position remained uncertain, Katsura wished to complete the studies begun in 1870. In late 1874, following the settlement with China, he suggested that Japan establish a system of military attachés overseas, and, with considerable self-assurance, proposed himself for Germany. This was logical given his earlier experience and, with the concurrence of superiors Yamagata and Ōyama Iwao, he was appointed military attaché to Berlin on 30 March 1875. He realised that Japan's future might be troubled but expressly asked Yamagata not to recall him should a crisis arise during his researches.[34] Yamagata agreed, and then, accompanied by younger brother Jirō, Katsura left Japan in May 1875.

In Germany, Katsura was attached to the command of the 3rd army corps and observed military administration at both central and provincial levels. In addition, he attended various lectures at the University of Berlin, taking particular interest in economics and law. In time, he moved from lodging with old army acquaintances to a house behind Unter den Linden, close to the general staff headquarters, and spent his evenings with Aoki Shūzō, employing Aoki's help with difficult texts.[35]

While Katsura was abroad, Japan confronted some of her problems. A settlement with Russia in 1875 reduced tension over the disputed islands north of Hokkaidō, and an internationally recognised treaty was enforced on the reluctant Korean government. In 1876-77, there were a succession of internal uprisings in Japan, the most dangerous being led by Saigō Takamori of Satsuma in 1877. Despite his earlier request, Katsura now

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[32]Sidney Brown/Akiko Hirota, eds., *The Diary of Kido Takayoshi*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1986, vol. 3, p. 99-101, entries 18, 23 November 1874. Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, N.Y. 1955, p. 97, considers the expedition "eminently successful". Neither Kido nor Yamagata would have been so sure.

[33]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 337-40.

[34]Katsura, p. 72.

[35]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 354-57.

wrote to Yamagata;[36]

> The fighting in the south-west of Japan is far more serious than the incidents in Yamaguchi, Kumamoto or Korea. Even the siege of Kumamoto castle is yet to be broken. Should I return or continue my studies? Please advise.

Yamagata, commanding government forces against Satsuma, kept to his original agreement. Katsura remained in Berlin and, though he realised his absence during the conflict would disadvantage him in the eyes of the battle-worn, as he later wrote;[37]

> It would have been very difficult to return and put into practice my years of study at a time when those involved in the actual fighting were still in hot temper.

However, following the assassination of Ōkubo Toshimichi by Satsuma men in early 1878, Katsura accepted the urging of his close friend, Inoue Kaoru, then visiting Berlin, and they arrived together at Yokohama on 14 July 1878.

Katsura and Army Reform

It was from this point that Katsura's position within the army, and the army's position within Japanese politics, began to rise sharply. At first, he was treated disdainfully as "a sword-bearing bureaucrat."[38] Moreover, the army had been established on French lines, employed French instructors, and senior officials such as Ōyama Iwao had studied in France, so there was residual opposition to his German methods. Fortunately for Katsura, army administration and command had not functioned smoothly during the Satsuma war and, soon after return, he received Yamagata's approval for an office to consider all aspects of military reform. Consequently, on 12 September 1878, Katsura, then chief of the general staff intelligence bureau, was concurrently appointed head of the new army ministry regulations office (*dai ichi-kyoku hōsoku kakari*). Promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel followed in November.

Conscription was increasing the number of men in uniform and, with internal uprisings defeated, the army saw its greatest threat lying overseas. An expeditionary force required careful planning and army duties were growing beyond the capacity of the existing bodies. Katsura's first proposal was to up-grade the present general staff office to a fully independent general staff (*sambō hombu*) capable of researching foreign military capabilities, planning an effective Japanese strategy, and seeing this implemented. The first instance of anti-government violence within the army, the

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[36]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 372.

[37]Katsura, p. 73.

[38]Ōkubo Toshiaki, "Katsura Tarō to Nihon Rikugun no Tanjō", *Chūō Kōron*, vol. 80-8, Aug. 1965, p. 337.

Takehashi riot of August 1878, had deeply unsettled Yamagata and he responded by preparing an injunction to all military personnel, published on 12 October, emphasising loyalty to the throne, bravery, and non-involvement in politics. As Katsura's idea was to promote a more orderly army structure, Yamagata was supportive and, on 5 December 1878, the general staff was established with full operational power over all camps and imperial guards, and under the direct command of the emperor.[39]

Shortly after, on 14 December 1878, Katsura was transferred to head the new general staff's western department (*kansai kyoku*), with responsibility for the camps from Nagoya to Kumamoto, plus affairs in both Korea and on the Chinese sea-board. His counterpart in the eastern department (*kantō kyoku*), responsible for Tokyo, northern Japan, Sakhalin, Manchuria and Siberia, was Horie Yoshisuke. Saigō Jūdō became chief of staff and Ōyama his deputy.[40] Katsura was delighted by the progress in army reform and wrote in his autobiography, "military affairs were shared with the army ministry; military command going under direct imperial control, and military administration going to the government. An air of naturalness flowed."[41] Effectively, this meant the cabinet lost control over army command. Some have concluded that the creation of an independent general staff was, in part, a device to forestall the democratic movement from making inroads into government and interfering with the army's ability to defend the homeland.[42] The Japanese army was suspicious of the trend towards constitutional democracy, a view which earlier in Prussia had threatened mass bloodshed but for the advent of Bismarck.[43] In Japan, public criticism of the government was fierce in the summer of 1881, and the oligarchs accepted the need to loosen their hold on power. It was announced that a constitutional assembly would be convened nine years hence, and army administrators, led by Katsura, determined to press through as many changes as possible before coming under Diet scrutiny.

The army was still unshaped. Avoidance of conscription remained high while

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[39]In the late 1890s, the army general staff was composed of five offices: no. 1 - strategy, location of forts, placement of troops; no. 2 - mobilisation, formulation of units in war and peace; no. 3 - overseas military intelligence, geography, statistics; no. 4 - transport, military communications; no. 5 - military history, journals, translation. The heads of the various offices in 1900 were: 1 - Tamura Iyozo; 2 - Fukushima Yasumasa; 3 - Uehara Yūsaku; 4 - Tōjō Hidenori; 5 - Ochiai Toyosaburō.

[40]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 376-82.

[41]Quoted in Ōe, p. 31.

[42]Ōe, p. 32-4. Ōe does conclude, however, that Katsura intended the general staff as part of a larger reform of the army machine rather than an end in itself.

[43]The Prussian army had been prevented by the kaiser from suppressing the popular rising of 1848. When the Diet attacked Moltke's army reform budgets of 1858-61, commanders took this as a *casus belli* against the parties. Army Minister von Roon planned to attack Berlin if the politicians appealed to the people against the army but Bismarck, arguably disappointing some generals, managed to force through the military budget, Goerlitz, p. 77-81.

morale was low.[44] Miura Gorō, commander of the Tokyo region, recalled inspecting one regiment to find the troops resplendent in parade uniform and bootless feet, with their royal commander nowhere in sight.[45] Yamagata replied to the constitutional announcement by arranging an imperial edict to all military personnel, restating the soldierly virtues as outlined in his injunction of 1878, and emphasising the army's intimate relationship with the emperor rather than the government. Clearly, however, with a constitutional system looming, the general public had also to be made aware of Japan's, and the Japanese army's, position in the world.

Katsura, as chief of the western bureau, attempted to raise public consciousness of the possible threat from China or Russia. At the close of 1879, he travelled incognito through north China, and supported officer training in the Chinese language and conditions. The information thus gained went to improving the quality and impact of general staff intelligence publications, and initial research on Chinese capabilities (*Rimpō Heibi Ryaku*) was bound in six volumes for presentation to the emperor in November 1880. Yamagata's comment was that "The military strength of our neighbour is both to be welcomed and feared," and this ambivalence towards China remained throughout the Meiji period. In consequence, Japan's policy vacillated between Sino-Japanese friendship and a willingness to exploit Chinese weakness as a means to retain the upper hand in East Asia.

Yamagata also prepared a memorandum based on the general staff material. In this, he argued that a global wave was moving on the East and had recently struck both China and Japan. By reforming her army along Western lines, Japan may have staved off its full destructive force, but remained in danger. The Japanese people, however, ignored current events and appeared complacent. He warned of persistent regional instability and attacked Japanese derision of China, admitting that Chinese weapons were archaic and their command structure poor, but warning of the more than one million Chinese in uniform, modern arsenals at Kiangnan (Shanghai) and Tianjin, the Foochow dockyard, and Chinese students overseas imbibing Western techniques. To shock the public out of its complacency, these general staff reports were given to leading journalist Fukuzawa Yukichi, and he produced cautionary articles in November 1882 supporting Yamagata's

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[44]Low morale particularly worried Yamagata and, in 1880, he ordered Kawakami Sōroku from Kumamoto to restore discipline in the troubled Osaka camp, Tokutomi, *Kawakami Sōroku*,p. 51-3.

[45]Miura Gorō, *Meiji Hankotsu Chūjo Ichidai ki*, Tokyo 1981, p. 136-37. This is a reprint of the two volumes of Miura's memoirs.

contention.[46]

Despite Katsura's efforts, the officers who became China experts have been described as estranged from the army elite.[47] Preference remained then, and later, for study in European languages and, in 1885, of forty students at the Army College (*Rikugun Daigakkō*), opened with backing from Katsura in 1883, twenty-five studied French, fifteen German, and none Chinese.[48] Indeed, of the 792 graduates to 1914, 81 were sent to study in Germany, 33 to France, 29 to Russia, 24 to Britain, and only 13 to China.[49] Nor were those who turned to Asia always well used. Aoki Norizumi, later military adviser to Yuan Shih-k'ai in Tianjin, was sent by the army general staff to Kwangtung province in 1884, only to find himself the sole Japanese in the area and his mandarin Chinese quite unusable. This army bias towards things Western was in part balanced by Japanese activist societies such as the Genyōsha (est. 1881), Kokuryūkai (1901), and Tō-A Dōbunkai (1898), which stressed Japan's Asian heritage and maintained links with a variety of Chinese political opinion. However, for the army to accept an imbias in its own education and leave Asian expertise to such groups was to invite weaknesses in its own policy as Japan became a continental power.

It is frequently argued that Japan's military policy changed direction after China's 1882 intervention in the Korean Imo incident; hitherto, the army concentrated on domestic order, henceforth, it prepared for action overseas.[50] This is partly true. However, Meiji Japan had from the first tested the weaker outlying members of the Chinese World Order, and, in effect, tested China herself. The demand in 1871 for a Sino-Japanese treaty based in international law was early evidence that Japan was, in Fukuzawa Yūkichi's later phrase, departing Asia for the West.[51] Her forceful actions in Taiwan, Korea and in taking over the Ryūkyū islands, merely emphasised this opposition

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[46]Yamagata's memorandum is given in Ōyama, p. 91-99; also discussed in Fujiwara, p. 43-49, and Banno Junji, *Meiji - Shisō no Jitsuzō*, Tokyo 1977, p. 39-40. While Chinese leaders were concerned about defence after the Taiwan incident of 1874, emphasis remained on land forces, and the Foochow shipyard was forced into construction of merchant vessels in order to remain afloat. Equally, Chinese purchase of foreign ships was uncoordinated, and initially concentrated on gunships suitable only for coastal defence. See John Rawlinson, *China's Struggle For Naval Development 1839-1895*, Camb. Mass. 1967, p. 40-54, 63-74.

[47]Fujiwara Akira, in Hashikawa Bunzō/Takeuchi Yoshimi, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku*, vol. 1, Tokyo 1974, p. 111-114.

[48]Hayashi Saburō, *Sambō Kyōiku*, Tokyo 1984, p. 48. The preference for Western over Asian postings still existed in the 1920s according to Mark Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*, Princeton 1975, p. 22.

[49]Nihon Kindai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed., *Nihon Riku-Kaigun Seido Soshiki Jinji*, Tokyo 1971, p. 271-302. The first student despatched to China was Banzai Rihachirō, graduated 1900, and patron of later China-hands Aoki Norizumi and Doihara Kanji.

[50]In August 1882, China sent 2,000 troops to quell disorder and forcibly removed the king's father, the Taewŏn'gun, who hoped to return to power.

[51]Yamagata was also concerned to gauge Japan's response to China over the Imo incident in terms of international law, Oyama, p. 116-18, memo. of 7 August 1882.

to the Chinese system of relations. However, while China's despatch of troops to her tributary, Korea, was comprehensible in terms of the Chinese World Order, it was a departure from recent Chinese policy, and Japanese strategists chose to view it as, for example, Germany viewed Russian movements on her periphery; that is, Japanese military thinking approached China's actions in Western strategic terms as a potential threat to herself rather than a Chinese policing action.

Having been humiliated at European hands in 1840 and 1860, subsequently ravaged by civil war, and with so many wolves still at her door, it was unlikely that China would seek war with Japan. However, the possibility remained. As Yamagata wrote in June 1883, Japan considered her actions in Taiwan and the Ryūkyūs defensive and unavoidable, but China might demur and use her growing military strength to exact revenge.[52] Just as Japan employed the weaker Koreans for diplomatic victories, so China might seek a morale-boosting conquest of little Japan. To forestall this, Japan needed her own military and territorial expansion. Thus, while Chinese troops in Korea neither threatened nor were meant to threaten Japan, they did seal the fears of Japanese military planners who responded in 1882 with plans for major troop increases.[53]

In 1884, with the outbreak of Sino-French hostilities over French encroachment on north Vietnam, Japanese army intelligence officers began appearing on the continent. The misuse of Aoki Norizumi has already been noted but Japan's ill-preparedness almost led to serious troubles in Fukien. There, a Captain Ozawa developed his own idea to use the war to promote revolution against the Ch'ing. When the general staff found out, some argued for disciplinary action but an unfortunate indulgence, so harmful in the early Shōwa period, was already apparent. Kawakami Sōroku, commander of the imperial guards, defended Ozawa as acting in Japan's interest and pleaded that nothing had actually happened. Ozawa's only punishment was transfer to Hong Kong, and it seemed that Japan valued spirit over order.[54]

The Katsura-Kawakami Reforms 1884-89

Katsura recognised the army's unpreparedness for overseas service but, with the Diet approaching and a battle likely over military expenses, his first concern was to reduce administrative waste. To smoothe replacement of French methods by the more

[52]Ōyama, p. 137-38.
[53]Fujiwara, p. 43.
[54]Tokutomi, *Kawakami*, p. 104-05.

efficient German system, he suggested a military tour, along the lines of the 1871 Iwakura mission, to inspect Western armed forces. This was approved and, on 16 January 1884, Army Minister Ōyama left Yokohama with fourteen of his most promising officers, including Katsura, Kawakami, and Lieutenant-General Miura Gorō.

Ōyama worried particularly about the relationship between Katsura and Kawakami, the brightest of his juniors. "The future of the army", he wrote, "rests on the shoulders of these two. If they are left as they are, a confrontation will be unavoidable, hurting them and the army. We must help them become friends and work together, and so have them serve the army well."[55] However, Katsura, willing as ever to work with rather than against men of ability, approached Kawakami soon after departure and suggested a natural division of labour; Kawakami to handle army strategy, himself to handle administration, and this was agreed.

The trip lasted exactly one year, with most time in Germany, attending army trials in September 1884, witnessing arms production at a Krupps factory, and visiting army schools.[56] The Japanese were impressed, and the government decided in March 1884 to employ one German instructor at the new Army College to balance the French instructor at the Officer's School (*Rikugun Shikan Gakkō*). Minister Aoki and Katsura handled negotiations in Berlin and the German army minister recommended Major Clemens Meckel.[57] Meckel arrived in Japan in March 1885, whereupon he and his French counterpart promptly exacerbated the division between Franco-German methods within the Japanese army.[58]

While in Paris, the French army minister invited Japanese participation in her war against China. This was supported by Itō Hirobumi, then researching European constitutional systems, and by prominent Japanese liberals such as Ozaki Yukio who, reporting the war from Shanghai, was aghast at China's weakness and, abandoning all hope of a Sino-Japanese alliance against Russian penetration of East Asia, declared China and Korea "nations outside of international law."[59] Japan, he argued, should exploit China's frailty to strengthen herself for competition with the West. Yet, whatever her

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[55]Quoted Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 398.

[56]Tokutomi, *Kawakami*, p. 59-64.

[57]Matsushita Yoshio, *Meiji Gunsei Shiron*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1956, vol. 2, p. 58-59; Ōe, p. 10-15; Hayashi, p. 41-45. The German choice was initially Major von Goltz, one of the leading military theoreticians of the day, but Meckel was deemed more practical and therefore better suited to Japan.

[58]Jōhō Yoshio, *Rikugun Daigakkō*, Tokyo 1973, p. 99-100.

[59]Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō-shi*, vol. 1, p. 128; Nakahara Nobuo, "Ozaki Yukio ni okeru Tai-Gai Kyōkō-ron no Ronri", *Nihon Rekishi*, no. 150, Dec. 1960, p. 74.

aspirations, Japan remained tied to Asia by geography. Miura Gorō explained Japan's refusal to the French;[60]

> China is hard pressed by France alone and were Japan to join in, she would surely yield. However, in the next fifty or sixty years she cannot ford the Mediterranean and take revenge on you. Instead, all her hatred will be concentrated on Japan.

Yamagata already feared China would awake and lead an anti-imperialist Asian resurgence with Japan as its first victim. A Sino-French peace, he argued, would permit Chinese forces to head east to Japan, and he called for rapid preparation, including strengthened coastal defences, but also a resolutely peaceful diplomatic profile.[61]

With the Ōyama tour still in Europe, a second Korean incident in December 1884 led China to increase her troops in Seoul and take greater control of Korean affairs.[62] There were Japanese soldiers and civilians demanding war to oust China from the peninsula but, just as Ōyama returned, Itō Hirobumi negotiated an agreement with China's Li Hung-chang in Tianjin, showing once again that Japan's national strength remained suspect.[63] The continuing Chinese threat, however, could be used to justify further military expansion. In March 1885, a National Defence Council (*Kokubō Kaigi*) was set up to co-ordinate army and navy development plans. Naval facilities on the west coast were approved to supplement the existing eastern Yokosuka yard (opened 1884), and, in May 1886, bases at Kure and Sasebo were opened. Shortly after, in August 1886, a street fight between Chinese sailors of the Beiyang fleet and Nagasaki police resulted in fatalities on both sides, but, heeding Yamagata's earlier caution, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru negotiated a peaceful settlement. However, the repeated war scares arguably maintained public support for military appropriations.[64]

The unanswered question for Meiji Japan was what to do with her forces. With limited finances, it was inevitable that the army and navy should compete for a share of the budget. The army would naturally look to the continent for reasons to support its expansion, while the navy would downplay continental interests and later showed itself reluctant for Japanese expansion into Korea.[65] To press their case, naval commanders had requested their own general staff in 1880 and, as the navy budget fell further behind

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[60]Miura, p. 95.

[61]Ōyama, p. 137-38, memo. 5 June 1883.

[62]For details of the Kapsin coup and the aims of the would-be Korean reformers, Harold Cook, *Korea's 1884 Incident*, Seoul 1972.

[63]Aoki Shūzō in Berlin heard the cabinet's decision to avoid war with incredulity, writing (in English), "I scarcely believe it!" Quoted Banno, p. 61.

[64]Shinobu, vol. 1, p. 135.

[65]The British admiralty held similar views after the 1904 Anglo-French *entente cordiale* led to increased British activity within Europe. See Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation 1914-1922*, Chicago 1976, p. 7.

that of the army, they repeated the demand in 1886. Katsura and Yamagata retorted with the orthodox soldier's view of "army leads, navy follows" (*riku shu kai jū*), arguing that the army constituted the first line of national defence, and that the differing modes of combat, the army fighting en masse over vast areas, the navy employing a few vessels for ferry and coastal duties or in minor engagements, not only rendered a naval general staff unnecessary, it increased the possibility of a discordant strategy. Appointed vice army minister to General Ōyama in March 1886, Katsura declared;[66]

> The army and navy are the basis of the state and particularly nations like Japan must fully prepare both services in order to control her own destiny. But, it is the army which goes to clear out the enemy's den and ensure he cannot rise from defeat. The navy enables the army to brave the dangers of land and sea and invade our enemies. It is the navy's duty to repel enemy ships and defend our coasts, but the defender of the homeland and the last line of defence is the army.

That same month, a compromise was reached whereby naval command was divorced from the navy ministry to the army general staff, with an imperial prince as chief of staff to ensure harmony, and and a vice chief of staff from both services under him.[67] However, the position of chief of staff remained exclusive to army generals or lieutenant-generals and the navy continued to fights its secondary position.[68] In March 1889, naval command was returned to ministerial control and finally in May 1893 a wholly independent naval general staff (*kaigun gunreibu*) was established. This was not a complete resolution, however, as the navy chief of staff remained subordinate to his army counterpart in wartime, and the cause would later be shouldered by a man fast rising in naval circles: Yamamoto Gombei.

Within the army itself, there were polarised views on future policy, and taking issue with the beliefs of Katsura and Yamagata were the Getsuyōkai.[69]

The Getsuyōkai was a military study group formed by graduates of the Army Officers School in March 1881. Its membership attracted virtually all the ablest young officers in Japan, including Katsura himself, and president from 1884 was Katsura's former colleague, Major-General Horie Yoshisuke. From 1885, as Katsura and

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[66]Quoted Umetani Noboru, "Kaigun Sambōhombu no Setchi-ron no Hasshō to sono Rekishi-teki Seikaku", *Nihon Rekishi*, no. 252, May 1969, p. 72; Tokutomi, vol. 1, p 442.

[67]The general staff regulations were revised and control of all army and navy planning, all military inspectorates, all army and naval bases, plus the staff headquarters of naval squadrons, was given to the army general staff, Matsushita/Izu, p. 182.

[68]This inter-service rivalry never died. During the Pacific war, Navy Minister Shimada Shigetarō was derided by juniors as the "tea servant of Tōjō" and a routine photo of Shimada standing behind Tōjō angered naval officers as indicating subservience, Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, Oxford 1981, p. 46.

[69]See the author's, "Factional Discord in the Meiji Army: Katsura Tarō and the Getsuyōkai, 1881-89", *Papers on Far Eastern History*, no. 37, March 1988.

Kawakami seemingly reformed the army for activity overseas, Getsuyōkai leaders and senior army sympathisers were increasingly vocal in their criticism. Vice Chief of Staff Major-General Soga Sukenori led the charge in Tokutomi Sohō's widely influential *Kokumin no Tomo*:[70]

> Arms must primarily be for defence, for the protection of the homeland. That we be not invaded nor subjugated by any other nation, that, no matter how powerful an enemy might attack, we can repel them and frustrate their designs - this must be the central meaning of an army.

Soga and the Getsuyōkai were supported by a group of senior officers popularly identified with opposition to the Satsuma-Chōshū domination of politics. This included Tani Kanjō, hero of the 1877 siege of Kumamoto, and Miura Gorō, commander of the prestigious Tokyo garrison. Miura was extremely outspoken at what he derisively termed Yamagata's "poor nation, strong army" policy, and campaigned hard for economic development to receive priority as a prerequisite to military strengthening.[71]

For Yamagata, Katsura and Kawakami, however, the external threat was real and only a strong army could protect secure economic development. In a joint letter to Army Minister Ōyama in 1886, Katsura and Kawakami explained;[72]

> The nations of the world, whether great or small, have two choices in establishing an army. They can simply defend themselves against enemy invasion or preserve neutrality. This is the goal of second-rate nations in the West. Alternatively, they can display military power and, in times of crisis, field a nation in arms, thus taking insult from no-one. To do this, a force capable of acting overseas is necessary. This is the aim of all the Western powers.
>
> Although it is just a short time since we built our military system and reforms remain to be carried out, we are not looking to stand with the second-rate Western nations, but to rank with the leading powers. From conscription on, everything we do is based on this premise.

The positions of the Getsuyōkai and Yamagata group were irrevocably opposed and the dispute festered from 1885-89. However, casualties were all with the Getsuyōkai. Miura, Soga, and Horie were all demoted and eventually relieved of office in 1886. The Getsuyōkai remained openly critical, but that same year, the pace of reform accelerated under the Kodama committee, dominated by Katsura and Kawakami, and with Major Meckel as adviser. Already, in May 1885, army camps had been enlarged into brigades (consisting of two infantry regiments), and in May 1888 these were further expanded into seven integrated divisions under the close supervision of the central army authorities.[73]

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[70]Fujiwara, p. 68.

[71]Matsukata Masayoshi, the financial expert among the oligarchs, commented scornfully, "This is the first time I've heard a soldier argue economics," Miura, p. 155-56.

[72]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 413.

[73]Matsushita/Izu, p. 194-98. Matsushita in another work, *Nihon no Gumbatsu-zō*, p. 124 describes the establishment of the divisional system as Katsura's greatest achievement while vice army minister.

Avoidance of conscription remained high with the figures for absentees rising from approximately 3.5% (9,798) in 1880 to nearly 10% (35,940) in 1889.[74] Consequently, the law was tightened and the range of exemptions narrowed in January 1889, making all males between the ages of seventeen and forty liable for military service. The Kodama committee was ably supported by Ōyama who gave free rein to Katsura and Kawakami's abilities, and, on one occasion, even stood up to the emperor in a dispute with Soga and his chief, Prince Arisugawa no Miya Taruhito, over power-sharing between the army ministry and army general staff.[75] As the 1890 opening of the Diet drew closer, Katsura continued to push through administrative reforms. When Ōyama cautioned against moving too fast, Katsura replied;[76]

> If we can't carry through these reforms now, we won't be able to unite and renovate the army, and so will be incapable of responding to preparations for constitutional government in 1890.

The army was an obvious target for popular criticism until war was actually at the farmer's doorstep and Katsura believed the best means of self-defence was voluntary reform. However, there was no doubt that the popular political parties would attack the defense budget once the Diet opened, and Katsura took action against army disunity. In February 1889, six of the seven divisional commanders addressed a letter to Army Minister Ōyama demanding the Getsuyōkai be merged with the Kaikōsha, then under the presidency of Katsura Tarō.[77] Under this pressure, the Getsuyōkai immediately collapsed. Its views, however, would continue to be heard after 1890 as Tani, Miura and other supporters, entered the House of Peers, and, while Yamagata remained constant in his thinking, Katsura himself would finally incline towards the Getsuyōkai position.[78]

By the time the first Diet convened in November 1890, Katsura (a lieutenant-general since June) and his colleagues had achieved their immediate aims. Katsura acted as a spokesman for the Yamagata cabinet in defence of the military budget, and, despite Yamagata's encouragement to give brief and indefinite answers, used his considerable

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[74]Koyama Hirotake/Asada Mitsuteru, *Nihon Teikokushugi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1958, rep. 1985, vol. 1, p. 35.

[75]Chief of Staff Prince Arisugawa and Soga contested a proposal to alter regulations for the army inspectorate and promotion. This would, it seemed, plant too much power in the army ministry. The cabinet was incapable of mediation and Oyama and Arisugawa were called before the emperor. Oyama defended his position and refused all compromise. This shocked observers but the regulations were revised as originally proposed in July 1886. Watanabe Ikujirō, *Jimbutsu Kindai Nihon Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1937, p. 221-23. On Katsura's amicable relationship with Oyama, see his recollection in Nishimura Fuminori, *Oyama Gensui*, Tokyo 1917, p. 225.

[76]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 418.

[77]The letter is in Tokutomi, vol.1, p. 462. Strictly speaking, there were only six divisions at this time. The imperial guards did not receive divisional status until 1891.

[78]Getsuyōkai influence in the Peers was evident in, for example, the incident of December 1891 when the debate on a defensive as opposed to offensive force was resurrected by Lieutenant-General Ozawa Takeo and received the support of fellow members of the Konwakai faction in the House of Peers, Tani, Soga, and Torio Koyata, Ōe Shinobu, "Shokuminchi Ryōyū to Gumbu", *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 460, September 1978, p. 11.

personal charm in meetings with politicians of all parties to explain the rationale for these expenses.[79] However, the Lower House voted overwhelmingly for budget cuts and were unswayed by the argument that military strength alone ensured international respect and secure national development.[80] However, the constitution drafted by Itō Hirobumi gave the Diet no absolute right to impose budget changes and both the parties and government wished to avoid this first Diet ending in failure. A compromise reduction in the budget was agreed, but to ensure future Diet support, the army would either have to legitimise its expansion in war, or, failing this, accept some form of accommodation with the parties. As for Katsura, however, he was satisfied with his work thus far;[81]

> The army system is in order and the budget has passed the Diet so I have achieved something of my original aim. It may be necessary for the future to resign with Army Minister Ōyama and engage directly in the proper duties of an officer.

In June 1891, Ōyama resigned along with the Yamagata cabinet and Katsura followed suit. For the first time in over twenty years, he resumed a command position as head of the 3rd division in Nagoya. The new army would soon be tested.

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[79] Yamagata's attitude to the Diet is described by Hackett, p. 140.

[80] Ōyama, p. 204-07, Yamagata speech of 16 February 1891.

[81] Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 474.

Chapter 3

THE WAR 1894-95

In March 1890, Prime-Minister Yamagata clarified the army's concept of national development.[1] Echoing Katsura and Kawakami's letter of 1886, he explained the imperative for;

> moving forward to defend our line of profit and place ourselves in an advantageous position.... A nation unable to defend this line may retreat to its sovereign perimeter and, with foreign aid, just avoid being invaded, but it can never hope for complete independence.

He defined Korea as Japan's immediate line of profit and warned that Russia's Trans-Siberian railway, when completed, would threaten Korean autonomy, while, simultaneously, Canadian trans-continental railways brought the West ever closer to Japan's east coast, and it seemed that "the remaining assets and resources of the East are like meat before a pack of tigers." China and Japan lay in the middle of this convergence and were consequently the most endangered. Yamagata felt that China had reached a similar conclusion and was intent on self-strengthening. He believed it possible now to arrange a Sino-Japanese alliance, legally (*kōhō-jō*) affirming Korean independence, and serving to interdict Russian ambitions. Thus, the Trans-Siberian line forced Japanese strategists to consider the ideas of Sino-Japanese unity previously restricted to "radicals" like Tarui Tōkichi, imprisoned author of *Dai Tō Gappō-ron* (The Great Eastern Union, 1885, pub. 1893).[2]

For Yamagata, however, Japan's first priority was her own self-strengthening based on arms and education; arms to ensure territorial safety, and education, emphasising language and history, to foster national support for real military strength. This was the basis of the imperial rescript on education, promulgated in June 1890, and the draft of

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[1]Ōyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 196-201.

[2]On Tarui, see the introduction to Takeuchi Yoshimi, ed., *Gendai Nihon Shisōshi Taikei 9: Ajia Shugi*, Tokyo 1963, and the excerpt from *Dai Tō Gappō-ron* therein. Tarui was jailed in 1885 following the Osaka incident when Japanese activists led by Ōi Kentarō planned to enter Seoul and work to eject the Chinese.

Yamagata's accompanying speech to the Diet asserted;[3]

> There are two indispensable elements in the field of foreign policy: the armed forces first and education second. If the Japanese people are not imbued with patriotic spirit, the nation cannot be strong. Patriotism can be instilled only through education.

Yamagata remained fearful that Japan's geographical isolation led to popular complacency, and the parties' opposition to defence budgets seemed indicative of a dangerous lack of patriotism. If the Diet could be used as a central valve to contain public discontent, Japan might now use some form of overseas expansion to bring the people closer together and illustrate the need for international thinking and responsibility at home. This would employ war as a progressive force, just as many Europeans in 1914 anticipated its regenerative powers.[4] In the spring of 1894, as Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu later wrote;[5]

> In the absence of any pressing reason to fight or even a plausible pretext for hostilities, no *casus belli* existed. For us to deal satisfactorily with the situation at home and in Korea, it now became essential to devise some sort of diplomatic strategy paving the way for a transformation in this state of affairs.

As the internal and external pressures for war increased, the army had to accept that Japan's navy was too weak even for effective defence of major home ports.[6] At the close of 1892, the parties had concentrated on reducing naval expenses from the popular burden and there was also mounting criticism of Yamamoto Gombei who proposed major renovations within the navy. Like Katsura, Yamamoto had fought in the civil war of 1868 and later spent time as a student on German vessels. Using his experience as a gunner, he rose through the ranks and, in June 1891, was appointed head of affairs in the naval ministry (*kaigunshō shuji*). There he worked behind his superiors as skilfully as Katsura had worked behind Ōyama. Central to Yamamoto's reforms was an independent naval

[3]Joseph Pittau, "Inoue Kowashi 1843-1895 and the Formation of Modern Japan", *Monumenta Nipponica*, no. 20, 1965, p. 273. Inoue participated in the rescript's composition and drafted Yamagata's speech. This link between education and a strong defence force had been emphasised by the German philosopher, Johann Fichte (1762-1814), in his *Patriotism and its Opposite*. He advocated education as an instrument of state policy, working to destroy individualism and create a national will. If successful, standing armies would become superfluous as the people would respond to any threat as a nation-in-arms, Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London 1960, p. 84. It was this very destruction of individualism in the name of nationalism which prompted Tokutomi Sohō, editor of the *Kokumin Shimbun*, to deplore the imperial rescript, John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan*, Princeton 1980, p. 210-12.

[4]Roland Stromberg, *Redemption By War: The Intellectuals and 1914*, Lawrence 1982, p. 2, lists numerous artists and intellectuals, including Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Andre Gide, Thomas Hardy, and even Georgy Plekhanov, who supported war as "the moral regeneration of Europe."See also John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest*, Camb. Mass. 1983, p. 36, on Theodore Roosevelt's belief that "belligerent nationalism offered a cure for what he saw as the degenerative materialism of advanced industrial nations".

[5]Gordon Berger, trans., *Kenkenroku*, Princeton 1982, p. 20. See also Mutsu's letter to Aoki Shūzō in London, 27 March 1894, "If there is nothing to jolt the people, we will be unable to quieten this clamor... We cannot begin a war without cause ... The only thing at hand is treaty revision." Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 166. Affairs in Korea quickly provided an alternative.

[6]Ōyama, p. 219, Yamagata memo. October 1893. Koyama Hirotake/Asada Mitsuteru, *Nihon Teikokushugi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1955, rep. 1985, p. 82-3, show Japan's navy in 1893 as thirty-one battleships and twenty-four torpedo boats. At a total of just sixty-one thousand tonnes, this was far below the basic plan of one hundred and twenty thousand tonnes.

staff and large-scale reductions in personnel. His proposals, however, were attacked by the press as no more than a screen for personal ambition and the army rejected any enhancement of the navy's status.[7] Nonetheless, after the opening of a Russian naval base at Vladivostok in August 1892, the emperor personally intervened against Diet calls for a reduced navy budget, donating an annual 300,000 yen for six years towards ship construction, and ordering civilian and military officials to follow suit by contributing 10% of their salaries for the same period. The government also established a committee on naval reform under Yamagata at the end of March 1893. Yamagata wanted to inspect Yamamoto himself and, in their first private conversation at Yamagata's Mejiro residence, tried to evaluate the adverse rumours circulating about the new navy strongman. Yamamoto was a commanding personality within his own province, if less skilled as a future prime-minister, and managed to win over the older man.[8] With Yamagata's support, and the general sense within the army that Diet control of military expenses needed curtailing, a fully independent navy general staff (*kaigun gunreibu*) was introduced in May 1893, yet, as noted earlier, responsibility for overall military planning in wartime remained exclusively with the army chief of staff. Yamamoto's campaign, however, had just begun and, over the following twenty years, as Katsura advanced in politics, so the figure of Yamamoto would remain always in sight.

The idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance against Russia was killed by two army intelligence reports in mid-1893. From April, Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami Sōroku spent two months inspecting Korea and eastern China. In Tianjin, he was received with extreme courtesy by Northern Commissioner Li Hung-chang, freely toured the armaments factory and regional forts, and viewed a troop display. In Shanghai, he examined the Kiangnan arsenal and, in Hankow, the Hanyang ironworks. In all his dealings with Chinese officers, he was treated with great respect and openness.[9] At the same time, intelligence officer Fukushima Yasumasa journeyed on horseback from Berlin through Russia and Manchuria to Japan. In October 1893, Yamagata used the

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[7]Ko Yamamoto Kaigun Taishō Denki Hensankai, ed., *Hakushaku Yamamoto Gombei-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1938, vol. 1, p. 325-39.

[8]Matsushita Yoshio, *Nihon Gumbatsu no Kōbō*, Tokyo 1975, p. 133, considers Yamamoto Meiji Japan's pre-eminent naval commander "in the heroic mould" and refers to his "lion-like authority." His good relations with Yamagata did not last. He was known to greet Yamagata in rather brusque terms as "Oi, Yamagata-kun", and forfeited much goodwill.

[9]Tokutomi Sohō, *Rikugun Taishō Kawakami Sōroku*, Tokyo 1942, p. 112-123. In Shanghai, Kawakami also visited Arao Kiyoshi's Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo which was supplying information on conditions in China.

information from Kawakami and Fukushima to revise his appreciation of China.[10] The Trans-Siberian line was already one-third complete, having reached Novosibirsk, work was continuing on the central section from Tomsk to Irkutsk, and Fukushima predicted Vladivostok would be reached within ten years.[11] Yamagata considered Mongolia could easily fall to Russia, the only obstacle hitherto being lack of communications. Should this happen, Beijing would be endangered and Russia free to dominate northern China and Manchuria, while Britain and France would seize areas strategic to their interests as compensation. Up to 1885-86, Yamagata wrote, the Chinese army had shown real progress, but Fukushima now quoted one doctor's verdict that opium abuse had recently doubled to nearly seventy per-cent of all troops. Chinese armaments remained backward and she would be hard-pressed to defend herself once the Trans-Siberian line was complete. Survival, Yamagata argued, depended on Japan acting before matters deteriorated irretrievably. This meant replacing China in Korea before Vladivostok was reached. Thus, the external motivation for war was not enmity towards China, nor to protect Korean independence, though that was the banner under which Japan fought. Even in February 1894, as the Tonghak peasant rising in Korea's southern Chŏlla province gave Japan her excuse, and Sino-Japanese tension mounted, ambivalence remained. Army Minister Ōyama, speaking to two young officers leaving for the legation in Seoul, warned;[12]

> This despatch of troops to Korea is solely to protect our legation, consulates, and citizens. It is not intended to cause trouble with China. In the world today, only China and Japan can maintain the situation in Asia and raise it to the level of the West. Over the past twenty years, we have endured great troubles and finally achieved our present culture. Sino-Japanese goodwill deepens every year and we have high hopes for the future. At such a point, if this affair leads to conflict, it would be like two beasts fighting while the hunter watches. Indeed, a crowd of hunters is waiting. A sudden clash would hurt us both, and Asia would never be revived.

Immediately afterwards, however, Kawakami told them, "official instructions are official instructions, but don't be tied down by them. Deal with situations as they arise." He reportedly also invited the Genyōsha activists to "light the fuse" for Japanese military action, and Genyōsha members joined the Tonghak in arms against the Korean government.[13]

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[10]Ōyama, p. 215-222, memorandum October 1893. It would appear that Japanese army intelligence in Manchuria was virtually non-existent at this time. Even in 1897, when Fukushima paid a return visit to the area, the Japanese consul at Yingk'ou, Honda Kumatarō, reported that there was no fixed intelligence apparatus, Honda, *Tamashii no Gaikō*, Tokyo 1941, p. 61.

[11]Harmon Tupper, *To the Great Ocean*, London 1965, recounts the construction and history of the Trans-Siberian line in splendidly evocative detail.

[12]Tokutomi, *Kawakami*, p. 128. The two officers were Lieutenant Fukushima and Major Uehara Yūsaku.

[13]Kokuryūkai, *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden*, 3 vols., rep. Tokyo 1966, vol. 1, p. 144.

To War

Japan's first modern war officially commenced on 1 August 1894. The internal and international standing of her armed forces remained low, with both numbers and military spending far down in the world league table. Foreign commentators assumed, as they had in the 1874 Taiwan incident, that China would prevail and punish Japanese intemperance. At home, Katsura's 1889 revision of the conscription law indicated that troops remained poorly motivated, and the Toyohashi riot in February 1889, while obviously an isolated incident, also revealed tensions between the army and public.[14] The armed forces themselves were divided between a Chōshū-dominated army and a Satsuma-led navy, and while overall wartime planning might be the prerogative of the army chief of staff, there was no guarantee that the navy would co-operate in full.

Most serious of all, however, was the dilemma which confounded Clausewitz: how to reconcile the demands of absolute war with real war, that is, to destroy the enemy without strategy becoming divorced from political expediency.[15] In the age of national armies, the total extermination of an opponent was, as Japanese strategists realised, financially and physically impossible. Political leaders had to take responsibility for drawing the line, and ensure this was accepted by the armed forces. If the executive failed to enforce its constitutional authority over the military, then havoc would ensue. When the services competed for victories to support their popular and budgetary appeal, it would need a strong hand to keep them in check. However, military glory, as Katsura and Kawakami implied in 1886, deterred potential enemies. Consequently, a major victory in one war might reduce the likelihood of future conflicts. Yet, to humiliate the defeated would obstruct a post-war rapprochement, an essential addendum where greater enemies, such as Russia, remained nearby. Where the military already held considerable authority within the executive, as in Japan, the danger of a civil-military split was considerable.

Japan's first problem was the question of front-line leadership. The Japanese

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[14]Matsushita Yoshio, *Riku-Kaigun Sōdōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 162-165. Soldiers from the 3rd infantry division wandered into the baggage room of Tokyo's Toyohashi railway station. They were told to leave but refused and a scuffle broke out. They were taken before the station master and again treated roughly. The following week, they and a group of comrades stormed the station offices, destroyed everything possible, then broke into the assistant master's residence and physically assaulted him. Matsushita describes the incident as typifying army arrogance towards the civilian population. This arrogance increased following the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and was maintained by emphasis on the army and navy as an imperial force. That is, the armed forces derived status from their proximity to the emperor as supreme commander. See Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, London 1963, p. 12.

[15]A lucid discussion of Clausewitz and his theories is provided in W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, Cambridge 1978, particularly p. 49-50. The major study, however, is Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, N.Y. 1976.

army's last major action had been the Satsuma rebellion nearly twenty years earlier, and for soldiers like Yamagata (56) and Katsura (48), the chance to prove themselves on the battlefield might not recur. Katsura burned to shed his image as a "sword-bearing bureaucrat", and repeatedly asked Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami to hasten despatch of his 3rd division.[16] Similarly, Chief Privy Councillor Yamagata insisted on being appointed to command the 1st Army, largely drawn from Katsura's 3rd and Nozu's 5th divisions, and later described his departure for the battlefront as the happiest day of his life.[17] He and Katsura arrived at Inch'ŏn on 12 September and entered Seoul the following day.

With both Yamagata and Ōyama Iwao in the field, the imperial headquarters in Japan, intended as the senior authority in war policy, was headed by Army Chief of Staff Prince Arisugawa no Miya Taruhito. However, the prince was terminally ill and real authority was exercised by Kawakami who had already been humbled in argument with Yamagata at the war's outset.[18] Thus, from the first, Japan's chain of command was seriously weakened.[19] Prime-Minister Itō Hirobumi feared the consequences and, on the very day of Yamagata's appointment, 30 August 1894, had the emperor announce a five-point command to himself, Yamagata, the two service ministers, and both chiefs of staff. This read:[20]

1. Overall national planning requires close civil-military consultation.
2. In particular regard of military affairs, the respective powers of the imperial headquarters and field commanders should be explicit, and planning conducted with mutual understanding and without miscalculation.
3. The battle being overseas, the army and navy must obviously plan together. Apart from obeying the orders of the imperial headquarters, the two forces must co-operate to avoid friction or error.
4. On the Korean battlefield, military commanders and resident diplomats must be scrupulous not to exceed their respective offices and must strive for co-operation.
5. The fortunes of the nation do not rest solely on the battlefield. On occasion, foreign interference will be unavoidable. Thus, it is absolutely essential that diplomacy and military strategy be united to bring the overall plan to conclusion without friction.

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[16]For example, Tokutomi, *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 1, p. 503, Katsura letter to Kawakami, 16 August 1894.

[17]Despite noting this statement, Roger Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922*, Camb. Mass. 1971, p. 162, dismisses Yamagata's activities on the battlefield in a few lines, and ignores his disagreements with the imperial headquarters noted below.

[18]Matsushita Yoshio, *Nihon no Gumbatsu Zō*, Tokyo 1969, p. 241-42. Prince Arisugawa died early in 1895.

[19]In 1943, the United States Chief of Staff, George Marshall, avoided similar disorder in command by abandoning his own wish to lead the allied assault in Europe, and leaving this to a trusted junior, Dwight Eisenhower.

[20]Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji Tennō Ki*, 12 vols., Tokyo 1968-75, vol. 8, p. 495.

At lunch, Itō reiterated the threat of foreign, particularly British or Russian, intervention against Japan, and argued;[21]

> The most important task now is to gain a mighty victory over China before such outside interference can occur, so that we are in a position to present our demands to the enemy at any time.

Thus, Itō had arrived at the Clausewitzian dilemma and with General Yamagata departing for the front no-one remained to help him find a solution.

Japanese forces in the war stood at 240,616 men. By Western standards, armaments were mediocre and the inaccurate 1885 Murata single-action rifle remained standard issue.[22] Neither troops nor commanders possessed recent battle experience and supply lines were highly suspect. Moreover, the army had ignored Korean language skills and this could create difficulties in the event of a protracted occupation of the peninsula. Kawakami, however, was sanguine. He predicted the Chinese would scurry to the negotiating table after being driven out of Seoul, or, at worst, after defeat further north at P'yŏngyang.[23] This confidence was misplaced. The Chinese army held back from Seoul and, though defeated at P'yŏngyang on 15 September 1894, the war continued.

Itō was preoccupied with Western attitudes, and believed the powers might even intervene militarily if their interests were sufficiently endangered.[24] Britain had the largest interests in China and attempted to mediate a peaceful solution in July. However, the Japanese had convinced themselves that war was essential and replied evasively. Angered by this, Britain then demanded a promise that no fighting take place around Shanghai and Japan had been forced to agree.[25] The Kowshing incident on 25 July, six days before the declaration of war, wherein the Japanese navy sank a British vessel carrying Chinese troops, threatened a backlash of British opinion. While Japan's modernisation had been greeted in the West, there remained doubts as to the extent of her "civilisation". After the Japanese victory at P'yŏngyang, European residents in Beijing prepared for the worst. As Inspector of Chinese Maritime Customs Sir Robert Hart wrote confidentially on 26 September;[26]

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[21]Kunaichō, vol. 8, p. 497. The concern that British interests were too closely identified with China was shared by Japanese Minister to Beijing, Komura Jūtarō, see Gaimushō, ed., *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966 edition, p. 51.

[22]Iguchi Kazuki, "Nis-Shin Nichi-Ro Sensō-ron", Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai et al, ed., *Kōza Nihon Rekishi 8 - Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1985, p. 85-120, gives a quantitative and qualitative comparison of the wars of 1894-95 and 1904-05.

[23]Shinobu, vol. 1, p. 169.

[24]Kaneko Kentarō, ed., *Itō Hirobumi-den*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1940, vol. 3, p. 83; Fujimura Michio, *Nis-Shin Sensō*, Tokyo 1974, p. 104.

[25]Kunaichō, vol. 8, p. 463-65.

[26]Letter to Mrs. J.O.P. Bland, Bland Papers, unpub. autobiography, ch. 8, p. 5, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto.

> Things being as they are, the best way of passing the day would be to think out the fastest and most convenient way of packing up.

The following day, with news of Japanese troops entering north China, Hart decided to evacuate the inspectorate of its women and children, and, early in October, the British government attempted further mediation.[27]

In the event, Yamagata's 1st Army was delayed by poor supply lines and did not reach Ŭiju on Korea's northern border until 23 October, fully three weeks after leaving P'yŏngyang. Two days later, Katsura led his men into their first battle, writing in the heroic mould the night before;[28]

> Strong the enemy's fort may be,
> Yet 'twill be joy to breach,
> For the valorous Japanese.

The fighting lasted just one hour and Japan's march continued.

Military-Diplomatic Disunity

Whether the fear in China was of Japan or of Chinese lawlessness is questionable.[29] Japan, however, could ill afford international complications, and on 3 November 1894 established a civilian office in the occupied Andong region of southern Manchuria. Appointed as head was Komura Jutarō (1855-1911), recently Japanese minister to Beijing, and a man with three years' experience at Harvard University and two in an American law firm. Yet, as Foreign Minister Mutsu noted, the situation in Manchuria required someone able to mediate not just with local Chinese and resident foreigners, but also between Japanese army and diplomatic personnel.[30] Komura was considered intelligent and frank, and, conversing with Yamagata and Katsura at the battlefront, impressed them with the breadth of his knowledge. Katsura remembered this meeting and it would have far-reaching consequences for Japanese diplomacy in the 1900s. However, Komura impressed other officers in a different fashion. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the Andong office, he cautioned the army against offensive behaviour towards civilian Chinese and some of Katsura's juniors found the remarks offensive. One in particular, Satō Sei, nicknamed "The Devil Colonel", attempted to thrash the upstart

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[27]Britain proposed an international guarantee of Korean independence to bring the war to an end, Shinobu, vol. 1, p. 176-77. The responses of the United States, Germany, France and Russia, were all effectively negative.

[28]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 528.

[29]In Liaoyang in August 1894, Manchu troops had terrorised the city, destroyed the Christian chapel, and murdered the Reverend James Wylie. Western residents in Mukden confined themselves strictly to neighbourhoods where they were known by sight. Dugald Christie, *Thirty Years in Moukden, 1883-1913*, London 1914, p. 86-96.

[30]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 54, Mutsu to Ōtori, 3 September 1894.

civilian the same evening.[31] Yamagata allayed the friction by having Komura's status elevated beyond the equivalent of colonel, but Komura was recalled at the end of November and succeeded not by a diplomat but by Lieutenant Fukushima. Clearly, the army was uncomfortable with civilian intrusion. The result was that Japanese diplomats were forced into the role, increasingly familiar in later years, of trying to explain away army depradations. This was the case with the massacre at Port Arthur in November 1894.

Ōyama's 2nd Army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th divisions, were assigned to the Liaotung peninsula in southern Manchuria, and, on 21 November 1894, troops of Lieutenant-General Yamaji Motoharu's 1st division occupied Port Arthur. Japanese troops captured just days before had been butchered and now a bloody revenge was taken.[32] Over four days the troops slaughtered everyone in sight, sparing only thirty-six civilians, marked by notices - "Do not kill this one" - whom they employed for burial duty. The New York *World* of 28 November estimated 60,000 civilian deaths and described the scene in terms of Dante's *Inferno*. Eyewitness corroboration was provided to Mutsu by *The Times* correspondent.[33] This was hardly the expected military-diplomatic unity, but the foreign ministry was caught between the scylla and charybdis. Vice Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, writing to Japan's new representative in Washington D.C., Kurino Shinichirō, expressed his frustration. While admitting the barbarity of Japanese troops in the incident, he also attacked foreign bias;[34]

> The explanations of foreigners attached to our army are ill-informed and frequently way off course. Most of the inhabitants of Port Arthur had already fled before the war, and only a few remained on the day. Defeated Chinese troops had taken refuge in civilian houses and adopted everyday dress, and many of those taken by the foreigners for townsmen were in fact soldiers. The Chinese did not help defeated troops and though they hid as best they could, they were convinced that if caught they would be killed and so were ready to fight to the death. After just five days of war there had been numerous instances of slaughter. When our troops saw their comrades had been murdered by the Chinese, they were outraged. But the foreigners completely ignore this. All they do is blame us for misconduct, and first among them is the New York *World* correspondent, Coleman.... It is worrying that such reports in the U.S. may momentarily turn the public against Japan.

American opinion was particularly important as the United States senate was then reviewing the new treaty with Japan, signed on 22 November 1894. The news from Port Arthur prompted a declaration that Japan was not ready to regain judicial authority, and

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[31]Shinobu Jumpei, *Komura Jūtarō*, Tokyo 1941, p. 61; Komatsu Midori, *Meiji Gaikō Hiwa*, Tokyo rep. 1976, p. 103.

[32]For an eyewitness account, see James Allan, *Under the Dragon Flag*, London 1898, p. 76-96; further details are in Komatsu, p. 93.

[33]Fujimura, p. 132.

[34]Hiratsuka Atsushi, *Shishaku Kurino Shinichirō-den*, Tokyo 1942, p. 189-91.

U.S. Minister Dun in Tokyo advised the Japanese government to punish those responsible for the massacre without delay. However, Itō could not predict where the chain of military responsibility would end, and decided his only option was containment.[35] Mutsu himself wrote directly to the *World*, claiming that the incident would be properly dealt with following a full investigation, and asking that international opinion avoid condemning Japan prematurely. The senate foreign relations committee was persuaded and unanimously approved the new treaty, but the senate itself procrastinated and Kurino was forced to labour hard for final approval. This was ultimately forthcoming on 5 February 1895.

Within days of Port Arthur, however, a new division emerged in Japanese policy. Army officers had already demonstrated a tendency towards independent action. In the attack on P'yŏngyang, Nozu had engaged the enemy without waiting for support, and, in late October, Katsura had chased after retreating Chinese, causing confusion among the Japanese forces. On 10 November, the imperial headquarters ordered the army to camp through the winter as per agreed strategy, but Yamagata disagreed and chose to act on reports of enemy troops massing at Suiyen, west of Tadong. The town fell to Japan on 18 November. While license to alter strategy according to circumstances was a necessary right of a field commander, it inevitably caused disquiet back in Japan.

Yamagata had already outlined his view of Japan's strategic alternatives on 3 November. These were:[36]

1. Re-embark troops of the 2nd Army and land at Shanhaikwan to occupy a base for the main attack (i.e. on Beijing).
2. Have the 1st Army strike into the Port Arthur peninsula and join up with the 2nd Army. Then move supply bases to the ice-free coast.
3. Move immediately to attack Mukden.

The imperial headquarters' reply of 10 November dissatisfied Yamagata who was determined to keep his troops active. With the sudden fall of Port Arthur on 21 November, he concluded;[37]

> Our strategic goal is to advance into Chihli, take Beijing and by grasping control of the enemy's fate, gain final victory. To do this, we have to link the 1st and 2nd armies. If we do not, even with the fall of Port Arthur, the gate to the Pohai bay, we will be unable to advance into Chihli without worrying about the enemy behind us making a stubborn defence of Haich'eng.

Yamagata also proposed bringing the imperial headquarters onto the mainland in

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[35]Fujimura, p. 132-3; Komatsu, p. 94.
[36]Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo-den*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1933, rep. 1969, vol. 3, p. 176.
[37]Tokutomi, *Yamagata*, vol. 3, p. 177.

accordance with a suggestion he had made in June. On 25 November, he ordered Katsura's 3rd Division to march on Haich'eng, lying directly between Yingk'ou and Mukden, and alerted the imperial headquarters to the impending attack one week later.

Thus, Yamagata attempted to fulfil one of Itō's demands while simultaneously contravening the other. Any assault on Beijing would guarantee foreign intervention, most likely from Britain which, since 1867, had adhered to its policy of preserving the ruling dynasty. Moreover, both Itō and Yamamoto Gombei opposed shifting the imperial headquarters. Even before Katsura's troops began their march, Yamagata's recall on health grounds was being drafted.[38] As Katsura proceeded to Haich'eng and unexpected trouble, Itō persuaded imperial headquarters to accept a compromise plan which neither left troops at a standstill nor risked foreign opprobrium. He suggested a joint army-navy strike on Weihaiwei to neutralise once and for all China's Beiyang fleet, timorously holding to port since its defeat two months earlier. This would avoid the inherent danger of a Chinese government collapse following an assault on Shanhaikwan, an event guaranteed to bring about foreign intervention. In addition, Itō proposed an extra assault on Taiwan to placate naval fears that France or Germany might seize the island. Itō believed the powers had no real interest in Taiwan and would be satisfied with a guarantee of commercial equality. Thus, Japan could maximise her gains from the war, be well placed for peace negotiations, and also avoid the perils of an approach on Beijing.[39] Imperial headquarters approved Itō's plan on 4 December 1894 and thereby rendered Yamagata's strategy, and Katsura's attack on Haich'eng, obsolete. Katsura, however, was already on his way.

Katsura at Haich'eng

Katsura began with regard to politics. Informed that a French church lay ahead, he sent a message reassuring the missionaries of Japanese intentions, and guaranteeing the safety of Christians and civilian Chinese. This produced a grateful reply and he repeated his message to Yingk'ou, an area of numerous foreign residents.[40] He also warned his

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[38]Fujimura, p. 129, accepts on the flimsiest of evidence the idea that Katsura and Kawakami were responsible for Yamagata's recall. At the height of the Taishō incident in 1913, a Dr. Egi told an acquaintance that Yamagata would not help Katsura in his difficulties due to residual hatred from Katsura's involvement in his humiliation of 1894. This anecdote appears in Hiratsuka Atsushi, ed., *Zoku Itō Hirobumi Hiroku*, Tokyo 1930, p. 118. Tokutomi, *Yamagata*, vol. 3, p. 185, admits that Katsura and Nozu had written on Yamagata's health, and these reports along with those of Torio Koyata, inspecting the front late in 1894, may have supplied the material for Yamagata's recall. However, had Katsura been scheming to remove Yamagata, he would hardly have carried out the order to attack Haich'eng. Nor is it likely that Yamagata, who appointed Katsura his army minister in 1898 and proposed to nominate him for the premiership in 1900, would have been so petty-minded as to resurrect a grudge after nearly twenty years.

[39]Kaneko, vol. 3, p. 134-38.

[40]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 672-79.

men against mistreating civilians and threatened severe punishment for any transgressors. He was particularly sensitive about Japan's international image;[41]

> Ahead of us there are foreigners, and particularly missionaries, scattered around. There is a cross on their dwellings. If they are not fully protected, it will cause diplomatic trouble and dishonour the Japanese army before the world. You must adequately protect foreigners and their residences, and show the vast difference between civilised troops and the enemy.

After a skirmish on 12 December, the 3rd division occupied Haich'eng the following day. With the help of his able subordinate, Kigoshi Yasutsuna, Katsura immediately set to preparing defences and posted outriders to give advance warning of Chinese troop movements. Men were also sent out to cut the telegraph lines between Niuch'ang and Liaoyang, and between Niuch'ang and Yingk'ou.[42] On 15 December, he opened an office to co-ordinate the occupation with civil life, providing relief for the poor, old and infirm, and giving work to those who needed it. He also issued stern regulations, warning that spies, saboteurs, or anyone seriously impeding military administration would be shot, while anyone caught entering another's house without reason would be treated as a looter.[43] These measures appear to have been successful and relations between the townspeople and soldiers proceeded amicably. Their relationship, however, was to last far longer than anticipated.

Thus far, Katsura's diplomatic talents had proved more than adequate. Now he was to be tested militarily. Chinese commander Sung Ch'ing had more than 20,000 men at his disposal and was determined to restore China's honour. Katsura decided to avoid being surrounded and take the initiative by striking at Chinese forces a few miles to his north. On 19 December, he led his forces out, denuding Haich'eng of troops. The Chinese were finally sighted in the afternoon and after several hours fierce combat, Katsura ordered the return to Haich'eng. His exhausted men were forced to struggle back through the bitter cold and snow of a Manchurian winter, many losing their way in the dark, or taking refuge in villages for the night. They had taken perhaps the heaviest casualties of the war: nearly one quarter of the force at Haich'eng with 69 dead, 339 wounded, and over 400 serious cases of frostbite, and Katsura's abilities were reckoned by some as worthless.[44] Sung, however, immediately prepared a major assault and Katsura begged

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[41]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 662-65.

[42]Kyū Sambō Hombu, ed., *Nis-Shin Sensō*, Tokyo 1966, p. 265.

[43]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 668.

[44]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 557-574 for details of the encounter. Kigoshi's memory of the battle appears on p. 572-73; Uzaki Kumakichi, *Satsu no Kaigun Chō no Rikugun*, Tokyo 1911, p. 155, records the comment of some Japanese officers that "as a soldier Katsura isn't worth three *mon*." Kyū Sambō Hombu, p. 321, gives Japan's total battle dead on the continent at 1,415, with 11,894 dying from illness.

for support from the 1st and 2nd armies. No troops were available at that time and he was given leave to withdraw ten or so miles to Hsimuch'eng. He decided to hold on but continued appealing for aid. Haich'eng was assailed by upwards of 20,000 Chinese on the morning of 17 January 1895, again on 22 January, and three more times in February. In total, Katsura was besieged for sixty-eight days.[45] The change in Japanese strategy meant that Ōyama's 2nd army was pre-occupied with the landing in Shandong, ultimately taking Weihaiwei on 2 February. This left Katsura isolated until 24 February 1895, when Nogi Maresuke's mixed brigade finally broke the Chinese ring.

The disruption in army strategy during December had made the attack on Haich'eng unpopular, and Katsura's losses and frequent pleas for help did nothing for his military reputation. Yet, the Chinese determination had been unprecedented and he believed his honour as a soldier had been vindicated. At the war's end, he wrote of his satisfaction at the emperor's praise, convinced this would quieten those who mocked him, and in later years took "Haich'eng" as his pen-name.[46]

In March 1895, the Japanese army was well established for a march on the Chinese capital and, on 16 March, Prince Komatsu no Miya Akihito, the new army chief of staff, was appointed in the emperor's stead as supreme military commander. He and the necessary branches of the imperial headquarters sailed for Manchuria to direct the assault. However, Itō Hirobumi was already working for a political settlement and Komatsu no Miya arrived at Port Arthur on 18 April, one day after the Sino-Japanese peace treaty was concluded.[47]

Korea

Japan had ostensibly fought on behalf of Korean independence, or, more accurately, independence from China. This was formally proclaimed in the Korea-Japan agreement of 20 August 1894. However, both Mutsu and Yamagata saw the Koreans as indolent, their government corrupt, and doubted the country's ability to survive alone. Yamagata considered the Japanese example as one means to regenerate the people, and urged official promotion of Japanese agricultural and commercial migrants, particularly to the strategically sensitive northern border regions where, he believed, Chinese influence had

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[45]For details of the siege, Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 550-627; Kyū Sambō Hombu, p. 264-71; Fujimura, 145-46; Matsushita, 128-30.

[46]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 696-97, Katsura letter to Colonel Manabe Bin, 24 August 1895. Alone of all the divisional commanders, Katsura was awarded a viscountcy. The other commanders were made barons.

[47]Tokutomi, *Kawakami*, p. 149-57.

been greatest. This idea would resurface in later years, but would not be carried out until championed by Katsura in 1908. Nonetheless, in 1894, Yamagata's concern was greatest for rapid central reform of the Korean administration, writing, "The duty we must accept before the powers is to make Korea fully independent and to avoid loss of trust we can on no account neglect this."[48] Mutsu agreed, and worried that if tangible improvement were forthcoming within one year, the likelihood of foreign intervention in Korea would greatly increase.[49] However, overt Japanese interference in Korean affairs would inevitably stiffen Korean opposition, and this, in turn, could provoke foreign intervention. On 23 August 1894, Mutsu ordered Minister Ōtori Keisuke in Seoul;[50]

> Anything which infringes on the independent rights of Korea, even where the result is military inconvenience or increased expense, is to be avoided wherever possible.
>
> Secondly, on occasion, requests will have to be made of the Korean government, but care should be taken to keep these within limits acceptable by that government without loss of dignity, and keeping in view the economic relations of the new administration. We must avoid making them feel that our requests are unbearable.
>
> Thirdly, Korea is our ally and not our enemy. Goods needed for military or other purposes should be satisfactorily recompensed and all trace of aggression avoided.

Given that Japanese troops had surrounded the palace in Seoul on 23 July and re-installed the conservative Taewŏn'gun as premier, the facade of benevolent non-involvement would be hard to maintain. Moreover, the Taewŏn'gun himself was quick to turn against Japan, secretly offering to join forces with the Chinese commander in late August, and supporting peasant guerrilla attacks on Japanese lines in the south.[51]

Inoue Kaoru, a member of the Meiji oligarchs and formerly minister for foreign affairs, was appointed Japan's representative in Seoul on 15 October 1894. His policy, as described to Prime-Minister Itō in December, was to employ the British model of shadow government in Egypt.[52] What this meant in practice, was to force loans on Korea for reform and take major rights as security, and also have Japanese advisers placed in the court and government to assume *de facto* authority.[53] With these in place, Inoue attempted to hurry through a vast program of change known as the Kabo reforms.

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[48]Ōyama, p. 223-26, memo. of 7 November 1894.

[49]Moriyama Shigenori, *Kindai Nik-Kan Kankeishi Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1987, p. 32-4.

[50]Ichikawa Masa'aki, ed., *Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō*, vol. 4, Tokyo 1979, p. 125-27.

[51]Lew Young Ick, "Minister Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts in Korea During the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895", *Asea Yŏn'gu*, 27-2, July 1984, p. 153.

[52]W.G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, Oxford 1987, p. 51, Inoue letter 25 December 1894. There is a suggestion that Inoue's appointment was in part to restore his prestige following allegations of corruption, Moriyama, p. 30.

[53]By April 1895, forty-two Japanese were employed by the Korean cabinet and imperial household, including Hoshi Tōru, adviser to the law ministry (15 April 1895 - 14 October 1895), and Ishizuka Eizō, cabinet adviser (26 December 1894 - 24 October 1895), Lew, p. 158-59. In nominating these, Inoue had been careful to avoid infringing on existing foreign advisory posts such as that of American Clarence Greathouse, attached to the Korean foreign ministry. Fujimura, p. 135, details Inoue's loan plan. This involved a 300,000 yen loan on the security of Korean customs revenue, and a 5,000,000 yen loan on the security of taxes from Ch'ungch'ong and Kyŏngsang provinces.

To support the fiction that these Kabo reforms were Korean rather than Japanese-inspired, liberal refugees of the 1884 coup, Pak Yŏng-hyo and Sŏ Kwan-bŏm, were repatriated at Inoue's insistence and appointed home and law ministers respectively. However, the blizzard of reforms was ultimately too provocative in a state which had long prided itself on neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The Korean cabinet split into conservatives and progressives, and Inoue confessed that to purge the former would only strengthen the forces of opposition, while highlighting Japan's interference in state affairs.[54] This was already attracting foreign criticism. Japanese military strategy depended on control of communications within Korea, specifically the arterial Pusan-Seoul-Ŭiju railway to the northern border. Western suspicions were roused in January 1895 as Japan moved to take over Korean representation in the United States. When she attempted to monopolise Korean rail concessions in May, the U.S., Britain, France and Russia, all issued stern diplomatic protests. Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov followed this on 15 May by urging Japan to moderate her control of Korean commerce and administration. Ten days later, the Japanese cabinet met and decided;[55]

> The continuation of Korean independence is a matter involving all those states with general interests in the country. Japan sees no need to be the sole bearer of responsibility for maintaining this independence. Therefore, she announces that there is no impediment to co-operation with all interested states in the goal of improving Korean conditions.

As Mutsu explained in a letter the same day, this decision was grounded in the fear that Russia might intervene at any time.[56] Thus, Korean reform was subordinated to Western opinion, even though the result might be further conflagration in the peninsula. Incapable of quietly muzzling Korean opposition, and unwilling to forego Western goodwill, Japan managed to achieve none of her objectives. The contradictory and self-defeating nature of her policy was fully exposed in late 1895 when the newly-appointed minister to Seoul, Miura Gorō, was heavily implicated in the murder of Korea's Queen Min but the Japanese court, despite foreign condemnation, found itself unable to pronounce him guilty.

Victorious Japan

Japan's rapid and spectacular victories, not only on land, but also against China's feared Beiyang fleet, did succeed in promoting a sense of national pride. Fiction, songs, theatre, prints, children's toys, "Great Victory" canned goods, all testified to the public's

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[54]Ichikawa, vol. 4, p. 384, Inoue to Mutsu, 23 May 1895.
[55]Ichikawa, vol. 4, p. 386.
[56]Ichikawa, vol. 4, p. 386, Mutsu to Nabeshima (Kyoto), 25 May 1895.

support for the war, and the "willow world", ever quick to spot new fashions, took to using "General Yamagata" and "General Ōyama" as sobriquets for favoured clients, and "Li Hung-chang" for the disfavoured.[57] The Diet, in the interest of "national unity" (*kyokoku itchi*), approved military expenses without demur, and voted an expression of popular gratitude to the armed forces.[58] There was a danger that arrogance might hinder the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations, but patriotism, it seemed, had provided the national unifying bond so desired by the Meiji leaders. As Tokutomi Sohō wrote in his *Kokumin Shimbun* on 5 December 1894:[59]

> Before we did not know ourselves, and the world did not yet know us. But now that we have tested our strength, we know ourselves and we are known by the world. Moreover, we know that we are known by the world.

During the war, the armed forces recognised the need to protect Japan's international reputation, and remained sensitive on this point. Prior to the attack on Weihaiwei, a region with many foreigners, Vice Chiefs of Staff Kawakami and Kabayama requested Itō to place an experienced legal and diplomatic adviser with the Japanese forces to prevent further complications.[60] However, in practice, relations between civilian and military personnel had been strained, and the emperor's order on inter-service co-operation had not been fully heeded. The evidence of the Sino-Japanese war was that Japan remained too weak to defy Western opinion, even where this hampered her own development. In demanding cession of both the Liaotung peninsula and Taiwan at the peace conference, and thereby equally satisfy army and navy demands, Itō ensured the feared intervention. Russia, Germany and France combined to force her to relinquish all claims on Manchuria, and she was unwilling to call their bluff. However, realistically, Japan did not then have the resources to develop two imperial acquisitions simultaneously. As Katsura later wrote, "It was impossible given our national strength to place suitable facilities in both the north and south, and the attempt would have caused great difficulties for our future."[61] Had she garrisoned troops in Manchuria at this time, it is possible that a clash with Russia would have erupted before she was ready. Instead, she was given time to nurture her strength and develop colonial skills in the relative isolation of Taiwan. Moreover, the intervention also outraged the Japanese people who responded by supporting an unprecedented military build-up. As the *Hōchi Shimbun*,

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[57]Suzuki Tsutomu, ed., *Bakumatsu Meiji no Gunzō 6: Teikoku Rikugun no Tanjō*, Tokyo 1977, p. 104-09; also Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Japanese Culture", in *Landscapes and Portraits*, Tokyo 1971.

[58]Quoted in Tanaka Sōgorō, *Nihon Guntaishi*, Tokyo 1954, p. 203.

[59]Pierson, p. 236.

[60]Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, Tokyo 1974, vol. 5, p. 84, letter of 21 December 1894.

[61]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 687-89.

mouthpiece of the liberal Kaishintō, exhorted, "Even if we must cut three meals a day to two, the navy must be expanded."[62]

The question now was how far she could expand her empire without further conflict. This would depend to a considerable extent on the attitude of the fastest-growing power, the United States. The outlook was bleak. The American minister in Seoul, John Sill, had been highly critical of Japanese policy in Korea, and on hearing Japan's demand for cession of the Liaotung peninsula and Taiwan at the peace negotiations, U.S. minister to Beijing, Charles Denby, responded;[63]

> Japan has been posing as the knight errant of civilization. She had intimated to the European powers that she intended to do many things for foreign commerce, and under cover of these intimations she has securely pursued her own aggrandizement and the Western powers gain practically nothing.

Only by renouncing imperialism could Japan undermine this view, but to do so would be to cast herself back into "the Orient" and abandon the race for survival.

[62]Quoted Fujimura, p. 209.

[63]Quoted in Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defence and the Open Door*, New Haven 1973, p. 24. Also Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, N.Y. 1967, p. 63. For Sill, see Jeffrey M. Dorwart, "The Independent Minister: John M.B. Sill and the Struggle Against Japanese Expansion in Korea, 1894-1897", *Pacific Historical Review* vol. 44, 1975.

Chapter 4

TAIWAN AND THE TAIWAN SOCIETY 1896-1898

Taiwan

The economic prosperity of Taiwan, like that of Hong Kong in modern times, was fuelled by refugees from the Chinese mainland. Predominantly from south Fukien and east Kwangtung provinces, they fled in the seventeenth century from unemployment and later unrest following the collapse of the Ming. The immigrants settled on Taiwan's west coast and preserved strong commercial links with the mainland. Proximity to the Fukienese port of Amoy made Taiwan a gate through which goods could pass to and from all regions of south-east Asia and the South Seas.[1]

British trader William Jardine thought of seizing Taiwan before his attention turned to Hong Kong, and France considered occupation after using the island to blockade southern China during the war of 1884-5. However, Japanese concern with Taiwan was minimal prior to 1894. Yano Tōru writes that the so-called "southern advance" was the theory of romantics and political outsiders.[2] Those in the central government were fully occupied by developments in Korea and northern China, and only employed Taiwan in 1874 as a means to gain prestige and ease internal discontent. Even then matters had threatened to get out of hand, and Japanese troops had been devastated by disease.[3]

In 1895, faced with the creeping talon of the Trans-Siberian rail, it seemed foolhardy for Japan to despatch troops and material so far from the prospective northeastern theatre of war. The Itō cabinet, however, had accepted a strike on Taiwan for essentially negative reasons; to pre-empt any other power and satisfy the navy, and as

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[1]Ng Chin-keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the South China Coast, 1637-1783*, Singapore 1983.

[2]Yano Tōru, *Nihon no Nanyō Shikan*, Tokyo 1974. p. 58-9. Yano distinguishes two strains of *nanshin-ron*; one leading through Okinawa, Taiwan, Fukien and into the South Pacific; the other through the Ogasawara and Pacific Islands onto New Guinea. The latter involved less diplomatic risk, was more open to emigration and trade, and so received greater attention from proponents of the "southern advance" such as Shiga Shigetaka, Taguchi Ukichi, and Inagaki Manjirō. Yano, p. 12, 24-49.

[3]Edward House, *The Japanese Expedition to Formosa*, Tokyo 1875, rep. Taipei 1984, p. 215, "Some hundreds of the troops died - so many that it was necessary to fill the vacancies by successive reinforcements from Japan".

a relatively trouble-free distraction from the army's impolitic plans for attacking Beijing. However, it did ease international concern, and Russian diplomats, clearly worried about the direction of Japanese expansion, had indicated they would welcome Japan's takeover of Taiwan.[4] The imperial guards, led by newly-promoted Admiral Kabayama Sukenori, seized Taiwan's outlying Pescadores Islands in March 1895, and entered Taipei the following June.

Taiwan made Japan a nominal imperial power and its prestige value was considerable. Looking back from 1898, Katsura noted that Japan's geography had previously gained her a name as the Britain of the Far East, but the reality had been that she was more like Scandinavia lying adrift from Europe. Now, with her victory over China and acquisition of Taiwan, the comparison rang true and her relationship with the Asian continent was completely changed.[5]

> With this, for the first time, we face onto the belly of the Asian mainland and, the seas from north Sakhalin to the southern Pescadores being in our grasp, we have succeeded in extending the Japan Sea one thousand *li* to the south. Now we are truly the Britain of the East.

However, Japan was not rich enough to live on prestige alone. The economic value of Taiwan depended on strong ties with the Chinese mainland and the expansion of commercial shipping. The triple intervention obstructed this expansion only in so far as defence claimed first priority on funds, and, of the 3.6 billion yen indemnity obtained from China, fully 1.9 billion was given over to military expansion. In contrast, the share for Taiwan was nugatory.[6] What was potentially more serious, however, was the triple intervention's sequel. Germany was discontented by China's failure to reward her with port facilities, and, in late 1897, she unilaterally seized Kwaichow on the Shandong peninsula. The remaining powers followed with their own territorial demands, and Russia obtained the lease of the Liaotung peninsula. Viewing the position of Taiwan, Kuga Katsunan, journalist for the *Nihon*, wrote despondently in April 1898;[7]

> Hainan island, Hong Kong, Samsah Bay, Chusan island, and their coastlines, have all been occupied by others. Even though Taiwan and the Pescadores look on to southern China, they are set to become practically no more than isolated South Sea islands, worthless for our China policy. Do not British or German ships already sit in Samsah Bay, in Taiwan's most immediate neighbour, Fukien? Japan is increasingly being ejected from Far Eastern affairs. Today the occupation of Taiwan is coming to seem more of a burden.

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[4]Edward I-Te Chen, "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-95", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 37-1, Nov. 1977, p. 69-70.

[5]Katsura Tarō, "Taiwan Shokan", *Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, 1, October 1898.

[6]Koyama Hirotake/Asada Mitsuteru, *Nihon Teikokushugi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1955, rep. 1985, vol. 1, p. 99. A total 36,050,000 yen was divided among Taiwan, education, and disaster relief.

[7]Banno Junji, *Meiji: Shisō no Jitsuzō*, Tokyo 1977, p. 99, issue of 6 April 1898.

Yet, as Japan's minister to Beijing, Yano Fumio, explained, this scramble for concessions actually aided the reconstruction of Sino-Japanese relations, with the fear of Western rapacity already driving China back towards Japan. Consequently, Japan could seek rights in Fukien equivalent to those demanded elsewhere by the powers, and still convince China that her actions were motivated by self-defence and a concern to prevent further loss of Chinese territory to the West.[8] Indisputably, however, Russia's acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula increased the need for Japanese military preparedness in the north and so threatened her ability to finance Taiwanese development.

The subjugation of Taiwan in 1895 had proven more difficult than expected. Local resistance may have been blunted by the racial and regional divisions in the island, and, indeed, some of the bloodiest fighting took place between islanders hailing from Fukien and marauding Kwangtung troops originally sent for their defence.[9] Nonetheless, Kabayama's troops met spirited opposition as they drove southward from Taipei, through Taichung, and down to Tainan. In addition, disease took a heavy toll. By 18 November 1895, when Kabayama finally declared Taiwan pacified, he had lost 453 men in battle and 10,236 to disease.[10]

Soon after, in March 1896, an imperial edict announced the regulations for the government-general of Taiwan and martial law was ended. In the course of establishing Japanese authority, approximately 17,000 islanders had died.[11] Guerrilla attacks, however, continued unabated. On New Years Day 1896, a large rebel force attacked Taipei and, after being repulsed by Japanese troops, took a bloody revenge on Japanese civilians in the outskirts. Many of the bodies were found to have been tortured and mutilated.[12] Then, in June 1896, a massive disturbance rocked the central Tau-lok district: rebels, convinced that the West would soon force Japan to abandon Taiwan, took control of several important villages. Japanese forces recovered the territory with cold aggression, razing thirty villages said to have harboured rebels, and murdering many innocents in the process.[13] The affair was witnessed by foreign observers, and the

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[8]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, vol. 31-1, p. 486-8, Yano (Beijing) to Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujirō, 26 March 1898.

[9]Harry J. Lamley, "A Short-Lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan's Resistance against Japan", Paul Sih, ed., *Taiwan in Modern Times*, N.Y. 1973, p. 245-55.

[10]Fujimura, p. 183.

[11]Ōe Shinobu, "Shokuminchi Ryōyū to Gumbu", *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 460, Sep. 1978, p. 14.

[12]James Davidson, *The Island of Formosa*, Yokohama 1903, rep. Taipei 1963, p. 367. Davidson accompanied Kabayama's troops during the 1895 campaign.

[13]Davidson, p. 367; George Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945*, Honolulu 1974, p. 29-30.

condemnation of Japanese brutality gravely embarrassed the Japanese government. Foreign residents at Anping, the port closest to Tainan, expressed their feelings by establishing a relief fund for the natives.[14]

The continuing violence obviously influenced Japanese policy. A Taiwan affairs bureau had been established in June 1895 under Prime-Minister Itō and Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami Sōroku. Other members included Vice Navy Minister Yamamoto Gombei, Vice Army Minister Kodama Gentarō, Vice Home Minister Suematsu Kenchō, and Foreign Ministry Commercial Chief Hara Kei. With the changeover to civilian rule imminent, they assembled at the prime-minister's residence on 2 February 1896 to decide, among other things, the qualifications for the post of governor-general. Kawakami alone insisted on restricting the office to army generals, lieutenant-generals, or naval officers of equivalent rank.[15] Hara was the staunchest campaigner for a civilian governor-general, both here and later as editor of the *Ōsaka Mainichi*. His idea was to integrate Taiwan with Japan by extending the authority of home ministries to the island.[16] He considered Taiwan and Japan as close together, and soon to be brought closer by the laying of ocean cables and the expansion of commercial shipping. He cited parallels in French Algeria, and further argued that to treat Taiwan as a distinct colony on the British mould would contradict Japan's promise to extend her existing treaties to the island.[17] However, with Taiwan still unsettled, and the army necessary for public order, Itō acceded to Kawakami. In 1906, in different circumstances, he would battle for civilian control of Japanese forces in Korea, but not in Taiwan. In September 1897, the emperor himself would support a move to allow civilian governors-general, but Kawakami remained firm and the regulation continued until finally changed in 1921 by Prime Minister Hara Kei.[18]

In view of the sensitive nature of this, Japan's first experience of colonisation outside of Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyūs, it was advisable to have an officer with political acumen as governor-general. Katsura's persuasive abilities were well known and his

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[14]Kerr, p. 29-30; Davidson, p. 367.

[15]Kawakami asked Yamamoto how he as an officer could accept a civilian governor-general. Yamamoto tersely replied that being an officer was not in itself sufficient reason for supporting a military governor-general, Tokutomi Sohō, *Rikugun Taishō Kawakami Sōroku*, Tokyo 1942, p. 161.

[16]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 1, p. 230. Hara wrote, "I argued that the navy and army ministries should control directly relevant affairs and not delegate authority to the governor-general, and also that customs, postal and communication matters be handled directly by the appropriate ministries. However, many disagreed with me."

[17]Itō Hirobumi, ed., *Hisho Ruisan Taiwan Shiryō*, Tokyo 1936, p. 32-34.

[18]Tokudaiji Sanenori diary, quoted in Yui Masaomi, "Nihon Teikokushugi Ki no Gumbu", Nakamura Masanori et al, ed., *Taikei Nihon Kokkashi 5: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1976, p. 110-11.

sensitivity to foreign opinion had been amply demonstrated during the Sino-Japanese war. It was to him that Itō now turned.

The question was, would Katsura be physically able to accept? In 1895, shortly after returning from the battlefront, he had taken a glass of iced water during the oppressive heat of mid-August and had succumbed to acute stomach pains. Though apparently recovered after two weeks' rest, his health collapsed in September. Dr. Baelz, the German specialist, was called in and diagnosed an uncertain liver complaint, but Katsura, his body drained of fluid and his pulse remote, lay in a suspended condition for several days. Throughout this time, his close friend Kodama Gentarō kept a nightly vigil in an adjoining room, leaving only during office hours to work at the army ministry.[19] Katsura finally pulled through and returned to his command at Nagoya in mid-October. However, his health remained uncertain.

It was in May 1896 that he was called to Tokyo. Upon arrival at Shimbashi station, a government carriage took him directly to the prime-minister's residence where Itō and Colonial Minister Takashima Tomonosuke were waiting. Itō, habitual glass of brandy in hand, explained the predicament in Taiwan and explained their confidence in him as the new governor-general. Katsura pleaded that a lifetime in the army and inexperience of colonial administration hardly fitted him for the office. Takashima retorted that no-one yet had experience of governing Taiwan under civilian rule, and both the cabinet and government leaders, led by Yamagata, would be relieved if he would only agree. In view of Katsura's health, Takashima suggested that he return to Japan for the half year when Taiwan's climate became too oppressive.[20] After taking medical advice, Katsura finally agreed and was appointed the second governor-general of Taiwan on 2 June 1896. Initial demurs notwithstanding, he now entered upon his task with gusto.

Katsura's Plan for Taiwan

One of his first actions was to defuse foreign criticism. Using the method employed by Foreign Minister Mutsu in 1894, Katsura wrote directly to Western newspapers, notably *The Times* of London. He assured his readers that the new governor-general was a man familiar with the West and had demonstrated his respect both for Christians and ordinary civilians during the war with China. These same values, he promised, would be

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[19]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 695-9.

[20]Sugiyama Shigemaru, *Katsura Taishō-den*, Tokyo 1919, p. 397-400; Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 702.

upheld in Taiwan.[21]

On 9 June, Katsura, Itō, and Navy Minister Saigō, embarked on an inspection trip of Taiwan and the surrounding region. They arrived in Taipei on 13 June, toured the Hsinchu area south-west of the capital on 16 June, and departed four days later for the Pescadores and Amoy. Completing the tour on 24 June, they returned to Shimonoseki on 2 July. Katsura went on to Nagoya to collect his family and then headed to Tokyo for further discussions.[22]

Despite the brevity of the visit, and the restrictions caused by the ongoing violence, Katsura produced a long and wide-ranging memorandum on Taiwan policy which he now presented to Itō. This would imply that the question of Taiwan had already occupied his thoughts. The memorandum began with a preamble on geopolitics.[23]

> Taiwan looks over the Pescadores to the China coast and is linked, through Amoy, to the whole of southern China. It also leads onto the South Sea islands and there is potential for controlling the distant South Seas in the same way that Tsushima joins Kyūshū to Pusan and helps our control of Korea.... In China, the moment a pretext arises, the powers compete for individual spheres of influence. If we stand idly by, we shall not survive. We must prepare if we are to use these troubled times to build our national strength. We must make the south China-Fukien zone ours. To do this, we must open close contacts with Amoy and guard our possibilities in Fukien...... When considering national strength, we should take account of the real world and differences in real power. Even if our borders come into contact with strong nations, they go no further than expanding their domains and establishing colonies. They keep their main force in the distant West. The powers watch each other with such hatred, looking for ways to stab each other in the back, that they cannot relax for a moment.[24] Obviously they cannot send their main force to far-off regions.

As to the value of Taiwan, Katsura explained;

> All the ports of south China, particularly Amoy, face Taiwan. Taiwanese goods are collected in Amoy and then exported in all directions.... In political and trade terms Amoy will be our most important point, serving as a new channel for our ways and goods. With this, we can nurse our possibilities in the Fukien region and, when the opportunity arises, we will be ready.... Taiwan has for several centuries engaged in trade and diplomacy and the common people are serious businessmen and traders. Moreover, the successful companies are well aware of the nature of Western civilisation and are sympathetic to our people. In future, it will become clear to them what a disadvantage it is not to work in close communion with us.

After dismissing any real threat to Japan's position within Korea, Katsura re-emphasised the economic potential of Taiwan as an entrepot for south-east Asia;

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[21]Sugiyama Seiken, *Taiwan Rekidai Sōtoku no Chiseki*, Tokyo 1922, p. 70-73. On the massacre of Taiwanese civilians, Katsura echoed the claim of Hayashi Tadasu relating to Port Arthur, that apparent citizens were in fact rebels in civilian dress.

[22]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 705.

[23]The memorandum is reproduced in full in Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 705-33. This preamble is convincing evidence of Katsura's literary weakness. Fortunately, his style improves markedly once he enters into the concrete problems and possibilities of Taiwan policy.

[24]Or, as Chancellor Bismarck noted in 1879, "The great powers of our time are like travellers, unknown to one another, whom chance has brought together in a carriage. They watch each other, and when one of them puts his hand into his pocket, his neighbour gets ready his own revolver in order to be able to fire the first shot", quoted in Brian Bond, *War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970*, London 1984, p. 27.

> Presently as many as ten thousand men from Amoy have turned to the South Seas for work. The trade there in rice and assorted goods is flourishing. In the future it will not be difficult for us to extend our political and commercial strength from Taiwan. To accomplish this will depend mainly on our fleet.... I propose we expand our shipping to Taiwan, southern China, and the South Seas. Up to now, we have maintained security in the Japan Sea, checked developments in Korea, and maintained a stranglehold over Vladivostok, but, since the war with China, things have changed. I want us to plan on holding matters in the north and pushing southwards, reaching out from the Japan Sea to the China Sea and all parts of its coast.

Having sketched the geopolitical background, Katsura then offered detailed proposals for the practical economic development of Taiwan and its region. Clearly here was an administrator, not a militarist.

The fundamental problem was that development of the Taiwanese economy, thus reducing the burden on central government subsidies, would itself require heavy expenditures. Moreover, to ensure that development reached the stage where the islanders could see tangible benefits of Japanese overlordship, the problems of insurgency or other political opposition, would have to be dealt with severely. This, of course, risked an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment. The infrastructure of Taiwan: the roads, rail, port facilities, and sanitation, would require Japanese capital and technological investment, but, as long as the island remained unstable and insanitary, it failed to attract Japanese capitalists or migrants. Clearly these problems were all related and admitted of no easy or immediate solution.

Katsura attacked the problem logically. Firstly, the government-general itself must work effectively and internal division between civil and military officers ended. This was an area where Katsura's diplomatic skills could be utilised. Secondly, the administration should be expanded to bring the island under closer control. To do this, the existing three prefectures (plus island unit of the Pescadores) should be divided into seven, and at least twenty more local government offices established. Thus, Japanese directives would penetrate deeper and officials gain a better understanding of local conditions. However, while Japanese law should ultimately be extended to Taiwan, in the interim, "the differences in manner, customs and language of the various regions should be investigated, and where legal regulations prove unsuitable, imperial edicts or executive decrees should establish exceptions, thus, in unison, we shall achieve the <u>intention</u> of the legal regulations." This respect for native custom would be continued by succeeding governors-general.[25]

However, to ensure that Japanese directives would be obeyed, it was necessary also to be firm, "on the one hand guiding the people towards becoming good imperial subjects, on the other, showing our authority with stern punishments."[26] Katsura proposed a further 1,500 *gendarmerie* and 2,300 police, and urged these to go beyond the cities and points of expected trouble, out into the countryside, and so display Japanese authority throughout the island.

Along with law and order, the urgent task was sanitation. The figures of plague death for such a small population were alarming. In 1896, there were 258 recorded cases of plague infection from which 157 died, but, as records improved, the annual death rate averaged closer to 1,800.[27] As Katsura later noted, "sanitary improvement of the island was a preliminary and necessary step" to Japanese migration.[28] It was also, he suggested to Itō, the best means to win native acceptance of Japanese rule. "The way to care for the natives is to show them kindness and the most easily perceived kindness is better safety and health."[29] However, on the thorny question of opium addiction which gave the island such an unhealthy reputation, Katsura advised caution. Misplaced extremism would only complicate matters and "if a stop were put to this sole enjoyment of theirs, a reaction of a grave nature was inevitable."[30] Consequently, while the expanded police force should guard the western coast against opium smugglers, a separate office should be established within the government-general, register the names of addicts, educate the people against opium, and control the trade under government monopoly. In addition, a health clinic should be set up to fight the problem and Katsura was already thinking of Dr. Gotō Shimpei for the post.[31] However, he warned, "we cannot simply dictate health measures. There are many areas where we must act with an understanding of local ways. Randomly

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[25]Sugiyama, *Taiwan Sōtoku*, p. 76, reproduces Governor-General Nogi Maresuke's policy declaration; "The old customs and practices of the island's inhabitants, preserved over the generations, have penetrated deep into their hearts and become virtually an unwritten code. Those differing greatly with our regulations will of course be abolished as impediments to our rule, but the question of whether to alter hair-styles, foot-binding, costume, will be left to the individual's discretion.... Other, more admirable customs, will be preserved and used to facilitate our administration". For the attitude of Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and his civilian chief Gotō Shimpei, see Kobayashi Michihiko, "Gotō Shimpei to Shokuminchi Kei'ei", *Shirin*, 68-5, Sep. 1985, p. 11-12.

[26]Quoted, Sugiyama, *Taiwan Sōtoku*, p. 66.

[27]Tōgō Minoru/Satō Shirō, ed., *Taiwan Shokumin Hattatsu-shi*, Taipei 1916, p. 469, cites figures for the period.

[28]Katsura Tarō, "Formosa: Early Administration", in Alfred Stead, ed., *Japan By the Japanese*, London 1904, p. 581-85.

[29]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 721.

[30]Katsura (Stead), p. 581-85.

[31]Ng Yuzin Chiautong, *Taiwan Sōtokufu*, Tokyo 1981, p. 73, notes that the appointment was not carried out at this time due to bureaucratic rivalries.

transposing civilised legal rules to a primitive land will not only be ineffective, it is potentially dangerous."[32] Instead, Katsura looked to the gradual diffusion of basic, as opposed to high level, education as one way to bring about native understanding of Japan's health aims.

Finally, although administrative reform and sanitary improvement might tempt more Japanese migrants, without the ships to carry them back and forth, and the roads and railways to ease their internal passage, they would still give preference to Hawaii and elsewhere. In mid-1896, as Katsura wrote, there were only three ships per month plying the route between Kobe in Japan and Keelung in Taiwan. These were all small craft of the Osaka Commercial Shipping Company, receiving just 60,000 yen per annum in subsidies from the government-general. As Itō himself realised, Japan would have to work to contest the south China monopoly of the British-owned Douglas Steamship Company and its eight local vessels.[33] The prospects were good; in 1895 alone some 80,000 Chinese had travelled between Amoy and Manila. Katsura wanted more subsidies for new sea routes and increased traffic, and suggested five new routes to commence in 1897; three from Kobe to Keelung, one around Taiwan and adjacent islands, and one from Tamsui in northern Taiwan to Hong Kong, Amoy and Fuchou, the major markets for Taiwanese tea. His main emphasis was clearly on getting Japanese to and from Taiwan. The cost would be high, and Katsura estimated 820,555 yen, but;[34]

> If it is not possible to open these shipping routes, the development of Taiwan is at an end.... with such poor communications, who would risk the heat and plague to go there? If we are to have no migrants to Taiwan, then how can we build commerce and open up the land?

Government subsidies would also be essential in rail construction as uncertain conditions continued to deter investors. Once again, however, Katsura warned against hesitation as "railways become the mainspring of industrial advancement, an efficient military, and a good administration."[35]

In the continuing debate as to whether Taiwan was a British-style colony, or an integral part of Japan, along French lines, Katsura declared his position as prime minister in 1905. Ōishi Masami of the House of Representatives had asked;[36]

> Is Taiwan part of Japanese territory, to be reformed and advanced, that is to be Japanised (*Nihon-ka*), or a colony where the natives are merely to be satisfied and rebels suppressed?

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[32]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 721.

[33]Itō, ed., *Taiwan Shiryō*, p. 313-15.

[34]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 725-29. The quotation is on p. 729, details of the routes from p. 725 on.

[35]Katsura (Stead), p. 581-85.

[36]Quoted Haruyama Akiyoshi/Wakabayashi Masatake, *Nihon Shokuminchi-shugi no Seijiteki Tenkai 1895-1934*, Tokyo 1980, p. 34.

To which Katsura replied;

> Of course it is a colony. I do not believe it can be treated the same as the Japanese islands.

Taiwanese development was intended to serve Japan and Japanese migrants, but Katsura realised that the Taiwanese must also benefit if it were to succeed. He held no ideological belief about Japan's "civilising mission", assuming instead that commercial intercourse, time and self-interest, would eventually bring the two peoples into closer and deeper relations.

The Army Minister Affair

Katsura stayed in Tokyo, visiting influential statesmen and selling his plan in order to ensure the necessary funding and government support. Time was needed to bring about a consensus and he remained in Japan until at least 4 August 1896.[37] The problem of distance meant that any unresolved difficulties would be hard to resolve, and Katsura, ever cautious, was determined to avoid later disputes. Finally, with policy agreed, he made his belated way to Taiwan.

Katsura's actual period of residence in Taiwan has been estimated at just ten days.[38] Historians have criticised him for abandoning his post and seeking personal advancement in Tokyo.[39] However, in view of the seriousness with which he formulated the above proposals, and recalling his natural caution, such criticism must be examined.

The Itō cabinet survived the post-war years by reaching an accommodation with Itagaki's Jiyūtō in the Lower House. This accommodation collapsed when Itō replaced Foreign Minister Mutsu, the victim of cancer, with Ōkuma Shigenobu of the rival Shimpotō. By early September 1896, Itō had given way and Matsukata Masayoshi of Satsuma became prime minister. Takashima Tomonosuke, also of Satsuma, temporarily doubled as head of the army and colonial ministries, while Ōkuma remained as foreign minister.

Matsukata was known as a weak man.[40] Yamagata, incessantly nervous at signs of party incursion into government, feared Ōkuma would dominate the cabinet and impair

[37] A letter from Katsura to Itō dated 3 August makes it clear he is still in the capital, Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 3, p.354.

[38] Ng, p. 64.

[39] For example Matsushita Yoshio, *Nogi Maresuke*, Tokyo 1960, p. 105.

[40] A popular joke among the diplomatic community had the emperor commenting on Matsukata's extreme prolificacy, "Tell me, Matsukata, just how many children do you have these days?". The financial authority looked pensive for a moment, then replied, "I shall enquire and report back, Your Majesty."

the armed forces. To prevent this, he sponsored the idea that Takashima relinquish his army minister's portfolio to Katsura. Matsukata was agreeable and the *genrō* largely approved. Yamagata then recalled Katsura to Japan. Katsura, not unnaturally, was loathe to abandon his new and challenging post after just three months, but Yamagata insisted the nation needed his presence in the cabinet and Katsura acquiesced.[41]

On 10 October 1896, Katsura asked for a talk with Matsukata and was told to call the following morning. As he prepared to leave home the next day, a messenger called to postpone the meeting. In confusion, Katsura hurried to his old friend Inoue Kaoru, and there heard that Takashima refused to give up either of his posts, and that Matsukata was floundering in search of a compromise. Katsura felt he had been placed in an impossible position and left, bitterly refusing to join the cabinet under any circumstances. The *genrō* met that day and decided to ask Katsura to resume his duties in Taiwan. Inoue was chosen as emissary. However, after spending all night, arguing national needs and citing his own past humiliations, Inoue was forced to give up. Katsura's unchanging reply was that, "I refused the recommendation as army minister time and again because I expected it would lead to trouble. But my decision was overruled. I agreed because the requests were so sincere and now they expect me to go back to being governor-general of Taiwan. Can a man's honour really suffer this?" As dawn broke on 12 October, Katsura visited Itō and Mutsu to explain his predicament and then delivered his resignation as governor-general to Matsukata.[42]

Katsura remained bitter towards Yamagata. In his autobiography, written over a decade later, he scorned Yamagata for "lacking the face" to call in person and sending Inoue in his stead. Following the trials at Haich'eng, Katsura was slowly becoming familiar with the dangers of Yamagata's patronage. This would not be his final lesson. He remained, however, as suspicious of the parties as Yamagata, and believed an equal share of blame for the incident should go to Ōkuma who had, "with sweet words and braggadacio won over Matsukata and managed to dissipate some of the goodwill earlier felt by the cabinet towards the *genrō*".[43]

It took the government some days to accept Katsura's resignation. Finally, however, he got his wish. Takashima consulted him on a replacement and Katsura

[41]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 739-41.
[42]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 738-747.
[43]Katsura autobiography quoted in Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 749.

recommended his good friend Kodama Gentarō, also of Chōshū.[44] This was rejected by the Satsuma minister and a compromise was reached on the less political Chōshū general, Nogi Maresuke. Thereafter, Katsura spent the whole of 1897 virtually unnoticed as commander of Tokyo bay defences.[45]

The Taiwan Society

This was not the end of Katsura's interest in Taiwan. Neither the government nor army leaders desired war with Russia, and consequently official policy remained committed to southern expansion. Indeed, the concept of expanding to the north in defiance of Russia would be most heavily advocated by those who believed in Japan's "mission" to revive Asia. Only after Russia's occupation of Manchuria in 1900 would this view gain broader support.

In January 1898, Katsura returned as army minister in the third Itō cabinet. In February, Major-General Kodama Gentarō was finally appointed governor-general of Taiwan and a month later Gotō Shimpei, with Katsura's support, joined him as head of civil affairs.[46] While they applied his general policies for Taiwan, Katsura invested his own energies in building domestic support for economic development.

There was a handful of Japanese societies concerned with Taiwan. One of these, the Taiwan Group (*Taiwankai*), had been established in April 1897 as a convivial annual gathering of soldiers, politicians, scholars, journalists and entrepreneurs, all of whom had bothered to visit Taiwan since its transfer to Japanese sovereignty. Founding members included Mizuno Jun, civilian head under governors-general Kabayama, Katsura, and Nogi; Fukushima Yasumasa of the army general staff; and industrialist Ōkura Kihachirō. However, with the continuing disarray in colonial policy, the Taiwankai decided at its second meeting in March 1898 to become more politically active.

Two other bodies, both named Taiwan Society (*Taiwan Kyōkai*), had appeared about the same time but neither demonstrated political force. One was the vehicle of Japanese residents and officials in Taiwan who complained that, "the great gulf between Japan and Taiwan makes those who move there seem like exiled convicts, and without a group to make known the true situation in the island, they can get no sympathy or

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[44]Ng, p. 64.

[45]While the existing Katsura papers in the National Diet Library, Tokyo, are probably no more than a fraction of the whole, they include not a single letter from anyone for the year 1897.

[46]Kitaoka Shinichi, *Gotō Shimpei*, Tokyo 1988, p. 36, notes Katsura's support for Gotō.

understanding from the homeland."[47]

In April 1898, these three groups amalgamated under the name Taiwan Society. A thirty-nine man council sat to elect a president with political weight for their new role as lobbyists. Apart from Mizuno and Ōkura, the council included many prominent names; Diet members Inoue Kakugorō and Kaneko Kentarō, journalist Taguchi Ukichi, Kondō Rempei of the Mitsubishi-owned Japan Steamship Company (*Nippon Yūsen Kaisha*), Tokyo University professor Terao Tōru, and Sakatani Yoshirō of the finance ministry. On 19 July 1898, they nominated Army Minister Katsura. However, to their disappointment, Katsura made his his acceptance conditional on the Taiwan Society renouncing politics and devoting all its energies to economic development. This, he believed, was the way to improve the situation. Moreover, with Kodama and Gotō now in Taiwan, he refused to sanction a pressure group. The society was compelled to accept Katsura's terms and the new manifesto was silent on political aims. Instead, it declared the Taiwan Society would;[48]

- Study all matters relating to Taiwan and assist in the administration of the territory.
- Reveal the true situation in Taiwan and send observers to the island.
- Assist both Japanese migration and Taiwanese visits to Japan.
- Carry out development surveys and provide business introductions.
- Provide facilities for study of the Taiwanese and Japanese languages.
- Establish a Taiwan Meeting Hall.
- Publish a monthly bulletin.
- Arrange lectures.
- Aid and supervise Taiwanese exchange students to Japan.
- Collect all manner of printed works on Taiwan.

His wishes having been met, Katsura now worked to drum up support from Japanese financiers. On 16 September 1898, he invited to his official residence the most prominent businessmen of Tokyo and Yokohama. Present were names like Iwasaki, Yasuda, and Masuda, plus new Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and Home Minister Itagaki Taisuke. Katsura introduced the Taiwan Society and spoke on the colony's importance to the new Japan, while Ōkuma suggested that public awareness and concern made British colonialism successful, in contrast to Spanish or French, and this was the role he

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[47]Mizuno Jun, *Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 1, p. 12; also quoted in Yamane Yukio, "Taiwan Kyōkai no Seiritsu to Sono Hatten", *Ronshū Kindai Chūgoku to Nihon*, Tokyo 1976, p. 176.

[48]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 1, 20 October 1898.

envisaged for the Taiwan Society.[49] Perfectly dovetailing with Katsura, Ōkuma explained his belief in commerce as a progressive force;[50]

> Commerce can bring our peoples together. It has the power to "Japanise" the people of Taiwan, and this will be of major benefit to our administration of the island.

A similar gathering was held two days later at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel, and Katsura's persuasiveness was reflected in the generous contributions. Among the leading donors were; Iwasaki Yanosuke, Iwasaki Hisaya, Mitsui Hachirōemon, Mitsui Gennosuke, 2,500 yen each; Shibusawa Eiichi, Yasuda Zenjirō, Ōkura Kihachirō, Hiranuma Senzō 1,000 yen each; Masuda Takashi and Katsura Tarō, both 500 yen.[51]

The first Taiwan Society bulletin (*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*) appeared in October 1898. After introductory pieces by Katsura, Ōkuma and Ōkura, plus an account of the society's founding, there followed articles on Taiwanese forestry, industry, labour problems in the island, the implantation of tropical plants, and a discussion of Hong Kong. Succeeding issues retained this pattern.

A branch was quickly established in Taipei with Gotō Shimpei as president. At its inaugural meeting, held in the Tamsui-kan on 29 February 1899, Governor-General Kodama expressed his thanks for the society's assistance in correcting the misinformation spread by newspapers in Singapore and on the China coast.[52] Membership of the Taiwan branch was given as 614, including a small number of local Chinese.

Katsura concentrated on expanding the society within Japan. In April 1899, he combined an official inspection of newly established army divisions with a series of speeches in the Kansai region. Branches soon followed in Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto and Nagoya.[53] At the first annual general meeting, held at the new Taiwan Society Hall on 28 May 1899, membership totalled 1,410, half of these in Taiwan. There were also eleven honorary members, nominated by Katsura; Yamagata, Itō, Saigō, Matsukata, Ōkuma, Itagaki, Takashima, and governors-general past and present, Kabayama, Nogi and Kodama.

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[49]For the difficulties of early French colonial propagandists, see Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*, N.Y. 1961.

[50]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 1.

[51]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 1.

[52]Kusano Fumio, ed., *Takushoku Daigaku Hachijūnenshi*, Tokyo 1980, p. 57-9. Also present that evening was Katsura's right-hand man in Nagoya and Manchuria, Major-General Kigoshi Yasutsuna, now chief of staff to the army in Taiwan.

[53]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 910. In Kyoto, Katsura received assistance from prefectural governor Utsumi Tadakatsu, and Kyoto mayor Uchiki Kanzaburō became local branch secretary. In Osaka, Sumitomo Kichisaemon took the post of branch president, and in Nagoya, Prince Tokugawa Yoshinori. However, membership in the Kobe and Nagoya branches never passed 100 and they closed within a short time, Yamane, p. 188, 215.

Yet, meetings and speeches were not enough. Results in Taiwan would only come with greater investment and improvement in the standard of Japanese administrators. The first of these problems depended on the financiers themselves.

Masuda Takashi of Mitsui Industries was persuaded to visit Taiwan and southern China in October 1898. His interests were in camphor and coal deposits in Taiwan and the establishment of local Mitsui branches. The trip did not begin well. Guerrilla activities forced him to spend the entire time shut up in Taipei, steaming in the oppressive heat and unable even to visit a nearby hot-spring. Rough seas delayed his passage to Amoy and the original two-day visit stretched to an interminable two weeks.[54]

Despite these discomforts, Masuda's report to the Taiwan Society was full of colonial pride, comparing the Taiwanese to the Chinese of British Hong Kong and Singapore. Echoing Katsura, Masuda proposed a non-ideological approach, "soothing the Taiwanese by respecting their traditions and allowing them autonomy wherever possible. As long as they do not disturb others, they should not be disturbed."[55]

Whether Masuda's support would improve the uncertain future of Taiwan's economy remained in doubt. Not until 1900 did Inoue Kaoru manage to raise the question of Mitsui financing sugar production in Taiwan. Mitsui investigators were sent to the island but firmly opposed any investment where constant armed police protection was essential. Governor-General Kodama promised to solve the rebel problem within two to three years but only when he offered to guarantee company profits did Mitsui go ahead.[56] Within a few years, Taiwan was turned into a major exporter of sugar and its economy secured. That is, so long as native Japanese sugar growers remained quiet.

The second problem, improving administrative standards, was something for the Taiwan Society itself. Education was the keynote and at the first general meeting Mizuno Jun proposed the establishment of Japan's first school for languages and the training of colonial officials. A draft plan was presented to Katsura in February 1900. The curriculum was to include Chinese (including Taiwanese dialects), English, Russian, Korean, international and constitutional law, administration, economics, diplomatic and colonial history. Treasury subsidies would be needed to make good the projected deficits of 10,000 yen per annum for the first ten years.[57] The plan was unanimously approved at

[54]Nagai Minoru, ed., *Jijo Masuda Takashi Ō-den*, Tokyo 1939, p. 326-28.
[55]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 5, 25 Feb. 1899.
[56]Nagai, p. 336-42.
[57]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 17, February 1900; Yamane, p. 192-93.

the society's second general meeting in May 1900, and Katsura selected a thirty-one man committee to bring the school into existence. He wanted the broadest possible support and his selections included Izawa Shūji, formerly head of education in Taiwan, Masuda Takashi, Inoue Kakugorō, journalist Asahina Chisen, and liberal politicians Kataoka Kenkichi and Ozaki Yukio.[58]

In July 1900 Katsura was elected first principal of the Taiwan Society School, forbear of the present Takushoku University. The school opened its doors at a temporary site in Koji-machi on 17 September.[59] The founding principle was simply; "To study all things necessary for public and private business in Taiwan and southern China", and the one hundred students who commenced in 1900 were required to observe the school pledge; "While at school, we will firmly uphold its regulations, and, upon graduation, will serve for an extended period in Taiwan or the southern China region." The first-year curriculum concentrated on languages, and of twenty-eight hours of lessons per week, seven were in the Taiwanese languages, five in mandarin Chinese, and six in English. The second and third year courses were similar, with a slight reduction to twenty-four hours per week in the third year when students would be separated into administration and enterprise (*jitsugyō*) classes.

Katsura's first address, repeated in content over the years, exhorted the pupils to carry out dutifully the aims of the school, without seeking personal glory or greatness. To the class of 1902, he explained;[60]

> All the students here resolve at the beginning of their studies that when they graduate they will not take work in the homeland but seek employment in Taiwan. The curriculum gives them what they need for this, and they study with this resolution in mind. They pay attention to health so as to be able to bear the conditions of work in Taiwan. The aim of education at this school is not to create outstanding men, but men who can function as the hands and feet of others. I hope you will understand this and do your best.

The school received annual subsidies of 10,000 yen from the Taiwan government-general, and both Gotō and Kodama were honoured visitors. Kodama addressed the students on 3 May 1902, and that same day Katsura, now prime minister, invited Home Minister Utsumi Tadakatsu and Japanese prefectural governors to attend. After viewing the buildings and observing lessons, Katsura explained the the widespread instability of East Asia and pointed to the school's incalculable value in teaching foreign languages

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[58]The full committee list is reproduced in Yamane p. 194.

[59]The history of the school is recounted by Kusano. The permanent site would be in northern Tokyo, at Koishikawa-Myōgadani, with a second campus opening in the Kantō plain at Hachiōji in the 1970s. Future principals of the school included Komatsubara Eitarō, Gotō Shimpei, Ugaki Kazushige, Yabe Teiji, and Nakasone Yasuhiro.

[60]Kusano, p. 97.

and administration. For the nation's sake, he argued, the governors should send their best pupils here.[61]

The results of the first graduation ceremony in July 1903 were mixed. Of the original one hundred students, only forty-five took degrees, most of these going on to the Taiwan government-general. Of the total two hundred and twenty graduates to February 1907, forty worked in Taiwan, sixty-three in China, twenty-three in Korea, and thirty-six in such Japanese companies as the Ōkura concern or Osaka Commercial Shipping Company. Graduates and students were also employed as translators by the armed forces during the war with Russia, and some operated individually as spies and saboteurs in Manchuria and Mongolia.[62]

Japan was relatively early in seeing the need for colonial studies and training. France and Britain, perhaps more confident in their capacity to rule, took longer. Only after a decade in Indochina was the Ecole Francais d'Extreme Orient established at Hanoi in 1898, and Britain's School of Oriental and African Studies, while proposed in 1907, was not actually opened until 1917. Moreover, the Taiwan Society School emphasised the need for working with, and gaining understanding of, the native peoples, and in this it inclined more to the "united Asia" theories of Tarui Tōkichi and Katsu Kaishū than to the "departing Asia" idea of Fukuzawa Yukichi.[63]

Results

Writing for an English-language audience in 1904, Katsura boldly declared, "In Formosa, the imperial government has carried out the general line of policy laid down in 1896, and most of the projects then advanced are now accomplished facts."[64] Essentially this was true, but the results had fallen considerably short of expectation.

General Nogi's brief tenure as governor-general had been marred by accusations of administrative malpractice and the controversial removal from his investigations of Taiwan Supreme Court Judge Takano Mōku.[65] Nogi had been succeeded by Kodama Gentarō, both a good friend and, in many ways, a younger version of Katsura, having

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[61] Yamane, p. 198.

[62] Kusano, p. 99-104.

[63] This is a point stressed in the Takushoku University prospectus for 1987.

[64] Katsura (Stead), p. 581.

[65] Ng, p. 69-71, details the Takano incident. Takano seemed likely to implicate Mizuno Jun in these accusations but was physically ousted from office before completing his case. Appeals for support to Foreign Minister Okuma and Governor-General Nogi were ignored and several members of the Tokyo government resigned in disgust at the evident abuse of law. The Matsukata cabinet fell soon after.

followed the same route of vice army minister, commander of the 3rd Division, and now governor-general. Kodama's Taiwan policy, drafted by Gotō in January 1898, and distributed to Itō, Inoue, Kodama, and Katsura, stressed two basic points: firstly, following Katsura's lead, to respect native customs and autonomy where possible, for example in local defence and tax collection, thus easing fears of Japanese domination and cutting administrative costs; secondly, insufficient funds having been provided from Japan, to employ foreign loans for colonial development and so deflect attacks by the Diet on central government subsidies.[66]

Consequently, in August 1898, Gotō resurrected the old *pao-chia* system of collective group responsibility, forcing the onus to maintain social order on to the Taiwanese themselves. Meanwhile, he concentrated on improving health and educational facilities. Between 1899 and 1907, the number of schools rose from 74 with 7,318 students aged eight to fourteen, to 252 with 32,281 students.[67] The opium law, introduced in January 1897, made the product a government monopoly as suggested by Katsura. Addicts had to be registered with the government-general in order to obtain short-term supplies (later just one day's supply) from official outlets. The elimination of opium addiction, however, proved very gradual. In 1900, out of a population of 2,707,322, there were 151,950 registered male and 12,802 registered female addicts, up from a total of 131,000 the year before. While the figure for men declined to 107,199 in 1906, the records showed an increase in female addicts to 14,131.[68] The monopoly of opium was lucrative, producing between 15-30% of annual revenue, and it was not until June 1945 that government sales were discontinued.[69] Gotō was more successful in eradicating virulent diseases, though the incidence of plague deaths remained high.

Kodama and Gotō also moved against the scourge of official corruption and incompetence. Regulations introduced in October 1897 had clarified the division of powers between army and civilian offices in Taiwan, and in the summer of 1898, Gotō planned a drastic reduction in official posts.[70] In the fall of that year, 1,080 men were removed in a massive simplification of the administration. This included a reversal of

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[66]The plan is discussed by Kobayashi, p. 11-12, and Tai Kuo-fei, "Izawa Shūji to Gotō Shimpei", in Hashikawa Bunzō/Takeuchi Yoshimi, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 2, p. 159-61.

[67]Chang Han-yu/Ramon Myers, "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan 1895-1906", *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 22-4, Aug. 1963.

[68]Tōgō/Satō, p. 392-93.

[69]Ng, p. 75-6.

[70]Letter to Tokutomi Sohō, 8 June 1898, Sakeda Masatoshi et al, ed., *Tokutomi Sohō Kankei Monjo*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1982-87, vol. 2, p. 160.

Katsura's idea, restructuring the six prefectures and three smaller units (*chō*) into three prefectures and four units.

Gotō also responded to Diet criticism of central subsidies with the regulation that each prefecture should be responsible for its own expenses. France had resolved a similar problem by a law in 1900 forbidding colonial financial demands on the homeland. Gotō hoped to use tighter land tax surveys and the government monopolies to make Taiwan financially independent. In this he was successful, ending the need for treasury subsidies in 1904, four years earlier than anticipated.[71] In working to make Taiwan financially viable, however, Kodama and Gotō appear to have forfeited much local sympathy. It was all very well allowing people to dress as they wished and live in relative good health, but if the land tax and prices were high, there would be little thanks. A popular rhyme told how "Kodama is governor-general, the farmers meet hardship and pain, the injured have no rice to boil, father and child are scattered east and west."[72]

Gotō had been warned that Japan's tax exactions were creating rebels out of formerly good men, but financial demands had to take precedence. A procedure for surrender and pardon had been instituted by Katsura in September 1896, despite the legal protest of Judge Takano, and, although Nogi had abolished the process, it was successfully revived by Kodama in June 1898. Leading guerrillas abandoned their arms and Gotō personally attended surrender ceremonies in northern Taiwan.[73] However, collection of provincial taxes from October 1898 was met by fierce resistance. The government-general reacted with force and, once opposition had been broken, renewed its offer of pardons. However, it became clear in 1900-1901 that many who surrendered were later returning to guerrilla activities. With companies such as Mitsui unwilling to invest in a war zone, Kodama decided on drastic measures. On 25 May 1902, two hundred and eighty rebels surrendered at official ceremonies. Government forces ensured that not a single one survived the day.[74]

Despite all the improvements, Japanese private capital and migrants remained in short supply. Sugar profits were guaranteed by the government-general, and rail and shipping expansion was also left to official sources. A Taiwan Rail Company had been

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[71]Ng, p. 82-3 gives a breakdown of Taiwan income and central subsidies. In 1906, the total ordinary income was 25,656,672 yen. Of this, the land tax constituted 11.6%, opium 17.3%, taxes on sugar 9.4%, and monopolies on tobacco, salt and camphor 33.6%.

[72]Quoted Tai, p. 164.

[73]Hsu Shih-k'ai, "Taiwan Hōki Jiken," in Wagatsuma Sakae, ed., *Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku - Meiji Kō*, Tokyo 1969, p. 271-283.

[74]Hsu, p. 273-74.

established in the fall of 1896, with the participation of Ōkura Kihachirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, Hotta Masayoshi and others, but simply failed to produce sufficient funds. In 1898, Gotō persuaded the Jiyūtō to support Diet approval for 28,800 yen worth of bonds for the essential north-south railway, but this was only completed in 1908, and then with emergency military funds from the war of 1904-05.[75] As for shipping, the governor-general was still hoping as of 1916 to boost southern routes and finally establish the importance of Keelung as a port.[76]

The real test of Katsura's hopes lay in the number of Japanese willing to invest their lives in Taiwan. Only thus could mutual understanding be achieved, domestic support for Japan's empire maintained, and private Japanese investment accelerated. However, the results were meagre and officials formed the bulk of the Japanese population. The figures to 1914 are;[77]

	Taiwanese	Japanese	Aborigines	Foreigners
1899	2,625,709	33,120	99,332	1,292
1904	2,915,984	53,365	104,334	6,009
1909	3,064,917	89,696	121,981	13,591
1914	3,307,302	141,835	129,715	19,582

Japanese as a percentage of the total population were; 1899 - 1.2%; 1904 - 1.7%; 1909 - 2.7%; 1914 - 3.9%.

In 1897, the government had planned to transplant five hundred households to Taiwan but nothing came of it. Thereafter, perhaps in view of the continuing unsettled situation, the government adopted a *laissez-faire* attitude. Across the sea, there were Japanese willing to set up in Amoy and, as one enthusiastic Taiwan Society member wrote in May 1899, "Japanese young and old, male and female, number a hundred and have opened three general stores, a chemist's shop, one trading store (Mitsui), and one lodging house, plus there are two Honganji missions here...."[78] In Amoy, however, there was a commercial incentive but Taiwan needed agricultural settlers. By 1909, there had been only seven hundred and ninety small farmers immigrating through private companies. In that year, the government-general finally took a hand and began

[75]Ng, p. 78.

[76]Tōgō/Satō, p. 277-78.

[77]Tōgō/Satō, p. 169.

[78]*Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō*, no. 8, May 1899. One of these Honganji missions was presumably that burned down in suspicious circumstances during the Boxer war.

sponsoring permanent agricultural immigrants. By March 1915, 2,824 people, or 554 families, had been brought from Japan.[79]

As for the Taiwan Society's hope to bridge misunderstanding and ignorance, the results were similarly equivocal. A major effort was made at the Osaka Exhibition in April 1903. The Taiwan Society and government-general co-operated to establish a Taiwanese display and visitors from the island were lodged in a specially constructed hall.[80] However, Taiwanese aborigines were part of the living anthropological exhibit, which included Ainu and Okinawans, and would have included Chinese and Koreans but for diplomatic protests.[81] This obviously reinforced the image of Taiwan as primitive, and the ambivalent attitude of Japanese was reflected in the small numbers of Taiwanese studying in Japan. In February 1909, these totalled just 43, with two at Chūō University, six at Meiji Gakuin, three at Keiō Gijuku, and two at Tokyo Upper Level Industrial School. The rest were virtually all at middle or primary schools.[82]

In 1906, Kodama died, Gotō left to head the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Taiwan Society was restructured towards northeast Asia, and aging war-horse Sakuma Samata was appointed governor-general. The Japanese people had shown little concern for Taiwan hitherto. Now the authorities were also looking elsewhere.

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[79] Tōgō/Satō, p. 174-82; *Tōyō Jihō*, no. 148, January 1911.

[80] Kusano, p. 123.

[81] Inoue Kiyoshi, *Nihon Teikokushugi no Keisei*, Tokyo 1968, p. 296.

[82] *Tōyō Jihō*, no. 125, February 1909. Of the rest, three students attended the Iwakura Railway School, one Tokyo Music School, two Seisoku English Language School, one Shibanaka School, and one Tokyo Prefectural School no. 4.

Chapter 5

ARMY MINISTER 1898-1900.

Japan's victory over China had solved none of her strategic or economic worries. In April 1895, even as the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations were in progress, Yamagata had written on the need to defend whatever territorial acquisitions were made, prepare for the inevitable Chinese war of revenge, and, greatest of all, ready for completion of the Trans-Siberian railway.[1] In his view, Japan had to strengthen infantry divisions from their present wartime level of 9,600 to 18,000 men, and expand artillery personnel, the cavalry, and training of junior officers. The cost, he estimated, would be more than 7.5 million yen. In September 1895, the army general staff followed by proposing that Japan move to "an aggressive defence", a peacetime force of 164,500 men, and a two-fold increase in wartime numbers to 545,000 men.[2] By the end of 1898, six new divisions were in place, and six officer cadet schools, with three hundred students apiece, had been introduced to the provinces.

The navy responded with its own plans. In July 1895, Navy Minister Saigō Jūdō asked the cabinet for 213,100,964 yen between 1896-1905 to build a force capable of meeting any potential enemy or coalition of enemies. These were seen as Britain or Russia, with either allied to France. The core of Japan's expansion would be four new armoured battleships and four first-class cruisers (approximately 5,000 tons), with large numbers of destroyers and torpedo boats.[3]

The question for the Japanese taxpayer was how to defray these costs. Financiers continued to defend the slogan of "a rich nation, strong army", and Tsuruhara Sadakichi

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[1]Ōyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 228-40, memorandum of 15 April 1895.

[2]Yui Masaomi, "Nihon Teikokushugi Seiritsu Ki no Gumbu", in Nakamura Masanori et al, ed., *Taikei Nihon Kokka-shi 5 - Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1976, p. 103.

[3]Kaigunshō, *Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun*, Tokyo 1966, p. 346-64; Yui, p. 104. Saigō estimated that Britain or Russia in alliance with one other power could despatch five or six new-style iron-plated warships to the Far East. Consequently, Japan would be safe with four new warships in addition to the two already under construction. Iguchi Kazuki, "Nis-Shin Nichi-Ro Sensō-ron", *Kōza Nihon Rekishi 8 - Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1985, p. 105-07, notes that by 1904, 44 ships had been built, but of these only 11 of the smaller vessels such as third-class cruisers (c. 3,000 tons) and gunboats were constructed at Yokosuka and Kure. 27 vessels, including 6 battleships, were British-made, 2 each came from the U.S. and Italy, plus one each from Germany and France.

of the Bank of Japan, later deputy resident-general of Korea (1906-07), wrote in the *Tokyo Keizai Shimpō*, "Arms are essential for the development of enterprise.... If we entrepreneurs hope to reap from our victory in war, peace must be guaranteed, and the guarantor of peace is the armed forces."[4] Yet, the experience of 1894-95 showed that military expansion did not necessarily produce economic benefits, and this new expansion, in taking over forty per-cent of the 1896 budget, would further retard domestic improvements.[5] In the 1880s, the Getsuyōkai banner had been a rich nation first, then a strong army, and Tani Kanjō and Soga Sukenori of the House of Peers remained committed in 1895 to opposing further military expansion. Yamagata and Katsura, however, had argued for comprehensive security as a prerequisite for economic advance, and Yamagata would remain equally committed to this view.[6] Yet, in 1895, more than half of government revenue derived from the land tax. Japan was not a rich nation and landowners were not the beneficiaries of industrial growth. The tone of Katsura's program for Taiwan suggests that he was increasingly sensitive to the economics of imperialism and was shifting from his earlier position. However, the Russian threat could not be ignored and to ensure popular approval for a strong army would require skilful handling of the popular parties and constant emphasis on the dangers lurking at home and overseas.

This was not difficult given Japan's situation in East Asia. Relations with both China and the U.S. underwent changes which limited Japan's avenues for expansion and Katsura would have to deal with these changes in later years.

Post-War Japan: Relations with China and the U.S.

The Japanese government never doubted the necessity of restoring relations with China if Japan were to affirm her position in East Asia.[7] However, those Chinese viceroys emerging as rivals to Li Hung-chang in the immediate post-war period, Liu K'un-i in Nanjing and Chang Chih-tung in Wuchang, both supported an anti-Japanese alliance with Russia and, in May 1896, a secret Sino-Russian treaty was negotiated in St.

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[4]Quoted in Maebara Shōzō, *Meiji no Genkun-tachi*, Tokyo 1967, p. 72.

[5]The budget for 1896 was approximately double that of 1893 at 169 million yen, and military expenses rose from 27.6% to 43.5% of the total, Iguchi, p. 105; Fujimura Michio, *Nis-Shin Sensō*, Tokyo 1974, p. 209; Fujiwara Akira, *Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1961, p. 91-93.

[6]Ōyama, p. 221-22, memo. of October 1893.

[7]See the memorandum in Itō Hirobumi, ed., *Hisho Ruisan Taiwan Shiryō*, Tokyo 1936, p. 55-60.

Petersburg.[8] In return for military support against Japan, Russia was allowed to build the Trans-Siberian railway across Manchuria, saving over three hundred miles in construction. China also offered Russia wartime access to her ports and supplies. At the same time, China concentrated on her own defences and a new army was fashioned under Yuan Shih-k'ai's direction, using Western methods and with predominantly German instructors.[9]

Japan had nothing with which to counter this Sino-Russian rapprochement. Until circumstances changed, the government attempted to restore the balance of military and economic expansion by promoting industrial and commercial growth. Using the indemnity from China, it introduced two laws in March 1896 providing official subsidies over fifteen years for ship construction and for the opening of new shipping routes. These allowed the Mitsubishi shipyard at Nagasaki to become virtually independent of foreign design and construction advice by 1907, and its sister Japan Steamship Company (*Nippon Yūsen Kaisha*) to begin new routes to Europe, the United States, and Australia.[10] At the same time, an official program was led by Shinagawa Yajirō and Hirata Tōsuke to increase agricultural co-operatives and so avoid social disruption in the land-based community. This was in part a response to the apparent moral decline in urban areas where such "yellow papers" as Kuroiwa Shūroku's *Yorozu Chōhō*, with its emphasis on scandal and gossip, enjoyed a post-war boom among the increasingly literate townsmen.[11] This "decadence" held no obvious dangers as long as industrial growth were maintained, and Abe Isō, one of the earliest socialist campaigners, wrote in July 1896, "Pauperism is scarcely known, because the rapid growth of industry gives a chance for everyone to earn a living; and none think of socialism except as a question of the distant future."[12] Nonetheless, men like Katsura, Shinagawa and Hirata, all educated in Germany during the 1870s, were keenly aware of the example of Germany's recurrent

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[8]The memorials of Liu and Chang are translated in Ssu Teng-yu/John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1925*, Camb. Mass. 1979, p. 127-30. J.V.A. MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, Washington D.C. 1921, p. 81, translates the alliance. Article 1 reads, "Every aggression directed by Japan, whether against Russian territory in East Asia, or against the territory of China or that of Korea, shall be regarded as necessarily bringing about the immediate application of the present treaty."

[9]Naitō Juntarō, *Seiden Yuan Shih-k'ai*, Tokyo 1913, p. 82-84; Jerome Ch'en, *Yuan Shih-k'ai*, 2nd. ed., Stanford 1972, p. 33. One of China's first army advisers was General von Falkenhayn, German army minister in 1914.

[10]Mishima Yasuo, *Mitsubishi Zaibatsu-shi: Meiji-hen*, Tokyo 1979, p. 185-89. The subsidies were available until 1911 by which point Mitsubishi Shipbuilders had received 4,892,826 yen and the N.Y.K. 65,800,000 yen.

[11]On post-war newspaper trends, see Itō Masanori, *Shimbun Gojūnen-shi*, Tokyo 1943, p. 167-68; on a similar "decline" in literary content, Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals: Writers and the Meiji State*, Seattle 1984.

[12]Quoted Hyman Kublin, "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War", *Journal of Modern History*, 22-4, December 1950, p. 324.

depressions following the Franco-Prussian war and the dangers of an overheated economy.[13] Migration was one way to reduce domestic tensions, but emigrants of the new Japan were to find themselves increasingly unwelcome in the younger lands of the West.

Katsura had written in 1896 of the potential for commercial expansion through the southern Pacific. There was a small movement of Japanese traders and plantation workers to the South Seas and larger numbers, nearly 2,000 by 1897, were welcomed as cultivators of land in Australia.[14] However, German influence in the South Sea islands restricted Japanese commerce, and anti-Chinese prejudice, evident in Australia since the 1850's, was transferred to Japanese following the victory of 1895. Bills to restrict all Asian immigrants were debated by Australian states in 1896, and upon federation in 1901 a carefully contrived method of language testing effectively closed the country to Asian workers.

A similar situation existed in the U.S. and Hawaii. Chinese had been excluded from the U.S. by law in 1882, and American employers turned to Japanese as an alternative source of cheap, obedient labour. American sugar planters in Hawaii also favoured Japanese labourers and, by September 1896, Japanese had supplanted Chinese as the second largest group on the islands.[15] However, the announcement by the American Census Bureau in 1890 that the frontier was closed, aroused fears of reduced living space and bitter competition for jobs.[16] The Japanese took the place of Chinese as the most distinctive non-American group and anti-Japanese feeling grew on the west coast of the U.S. In Hawaii also, the greater education and organisation of Japanese workers threatened the profits of sugar planters who looked in turn to Koreans as an alternative source of coolie labour.[17] American interests had been pressing for the annexation of Hawaii since the early 1890s and they portrayed the newly powerful Japanese as potential fifth-columnists. When Japanese migrants were refused permission to land in April

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[13]Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism", Roger Owen/Bob Sutcliffe, ed., *Studies In the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972, p. 75, identifies 1873-79, 1882-86, and 1890-95 as years of depression in Germany.

[14]David C. Purcell Jr., *Japanese Expansion in the South Pacific, 1890-1935*, unpub. Ph. D., University of Pennsylvania 1967, treats the early Japanese settlers in the region. Narita Katsushirō, *Nichi-Gō Tsūshō Gaikō-shi*, Tokyo 1971, takes up the story in Australia. Figures for Japanese in Australia are given in Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, (hereafter NGB), vol. 30, p. 597-99, Katō Takaaki (London) to Okuma Shigenobu, 6 May 1897.

[15]NGB, vol. 30, p. 959, Shimamura (Honolulu) to Ōkuma, 17 April 1897, cites a population survey from September 1896 which describes the islands as: native and half-breed Hawaiians, 39,504, Japanese 24,407, Chinese 21,616, Americans 3,086, English 2,259, Germans 1,432.

[16]See John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*, New Brunswick, 1955, 2nd. ed. 1988.

[17]A process described in Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910*, Honolulu 1988.

1897, it seemed that Japan might have the temerity to confront the U.S., as both despatched battleships to the islands.[18] Japan considered Hawaii her eastern outlet, an outlet increasingly valuable as Russia approached from the west, and Foreign Minister Ōkuma attempted to build an international coalition against U.S. annexation. However, neither Britain, after its own war scare with the U.S. over Venezuela in 1895, nor Germany were inclined to render support.[19] Hoshi Tōru, Japanese minister to Washington D.C, suggested a radical alternative. In a manner evocative of Japanese thinking in 1941, he proposed a sudden Japanese occupation of Hawaii which, even if unsuccessful, would impress Americans with Japan's depth of resolve.[20] This would only have confirmed the idea of Japan as a duplicitious "Oriental", as suggested by Charles Denby in 1895, and Ōkuma confined himself to verbal protest. However, Japan's image was already fixed. Senator John Morgan of Alabama, ordered to investigate Hawaiian conditions in October 1897, overrode native objections to annexation with a dire warning;[21]

> When the alternative is presented as it is, whether I would prefer annexation to the United States rather than have Hawaii sink into a petty monarchy, to be ruled by some foreign country, I would prefer to save the liberties of the people, through annexation, to a tawdry show of royalty by a few persons set in authority over them, who would be compelled to do the bidding of some supreme monarch.... When Japan wished to annex Formosa to her empire, she did not consult the Chinese there, to ascertain their wishes. When by a process of emigration Japan has filled these islands with her people, who still owe allegiance to the Emperor, she will ask no questions of the Hawaiians whether they wish to become Japanese subjects; nor will your people be able to resist this quiet process of absorption, you will sink, as the rains sink into the thirsty soil.

Ōkuma attempted to compensate by openly supporting America's acquisition of the Philippines, but the damage to U.S.-Japanese relations had been done.[22]

Japanese fortunes in China took a mixed turn in November 1897 with Germany's sudden occupation of the Shandong peninsula. The Western powers exacted compensation from China in their "spheres of interest", and Japan was able to improve her position in Fukien. Also, Russia's lease of the Liaodong peninsula placed her in a commanding position over Beijing and Chinese, including Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-

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[18]For President McKinley's view of Japan and Hawaii, see Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, Boston 1922, p. 612. Okuma's action did not surprise his deputy Komura Jutarō who described him as "fond of despatching warships", Gaimushō, ed., *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 130-31.

[19]NGB, vol. 30, p. 950-57, Aoki (Berlin) to Ōkuma, 6 April 1897, Katō (London) to Ōkuma, 15 April 1897.

[20]Hoshi's suggestion is in NGB, vol. 30, p. 978-981, Hoshi to Ōkuma, 17 and 19 June 1897.

[21]NGB, vol. 30, p. 1050-52, open letter from Morgan to *The Independent*, 16 October 1897, included in Shimamura to Okuma, 20 October 1897.

[22]NGB, vol. 31, part 2, p. 344-46, Ōkuma to Nakagawa (Washington D.C.), 1 September 1898, "The extension of the sovereignty of the United States over those possessions would furnish a complete solution of the question which would be entirely acceptable to Japan". Japan's response to the situation in the Phillipines is examined in Grant Goodman, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution: Image and Legend", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 1970.

tung, looked back to Japan as a potential ally. Prince Konoe Atsumaro, president of the House of Peers, was just one of those who worked to enhance this Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In 1898, he established the Tō-A Dōbunkai, emphasising Japan's cultural and racial responsibility to help China rebuild, and worked to improve ties with Chang and Liu.[23] The Japanese army was already pursuing these links and despatched a mission to Chang in December 1897.[24] On Kawakami's orders, the mission warned Chang against Chinese isolation, and stressed the need to unite with both Japan and Britain. As a first step, Japan offered to train Chinese military students. Chang hesitated to antagonise Russia, but, in a phrase evoking earlier Japanese thought, advocated "Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for practical use", and realised that Japan's cultural and geographical proximity made her the best guide to modernisation.[25] In mid-1898, he sent the first pupils to Japan, and Liu K'un-i, and later Yuan Shih-k'ai, followed suit, with the Japanese army providing a special section at the Seijō School in Tokyo for the students' benefit.[26] The seizure of Shandong may also have undermined the position of German military advisers in China, and Yuan Shih-k'ai for one never forgave the insult.[27] China responded by hiring Japanese military instructors to supplement and later rival the Germans, and Yuan himself requested the Japanese military attaché at Beijing, Colonel Aoki Norizumi, for his personal military adviser.[28] The Japanese army responded gladly and the appointment was carried out in March 1900.

The reconstruction of Sino-Japanese relations brought rewards; Japan's special rights in Fukien improved the prospects for Taiwanese development, Chinese officials helped supress Taiwanese rebels operating out of Fukien, even allowing a Japanese police force in Fukien to capture one rebel leader in March 1900, and Japan was assured a steady supply of raw material from China's Tayeh ironfields to feed her Yawata

[23]Sakeda Masatoshi, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru Tai-Gai Kō Undō no Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1978, p. 109-31, traces the founding of the Tō-A Dōbunkai. This was an amalgam of two groups: Konoe's Dōbunkai, and the Tō-A Kai set up by Inukai Ki and Oishi Masami.

[24]The mission was led by Colonel Kamio Mitsuomi, commander of the allied attack on German possessions in the Shandong peninsula at the outbreak of world war one.

[25]Daniel Bays, *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age*, Ann Arbor 1978, p. 45.

[26]Sanetō Keishū, *Chūgokujin Nihon Ryūgakushi*, 2nd. ed., Tokyo 1970, p. 65-68.

[27]As foreign minister in 1907, Yuan's first meeting with the German representative, Count Rex, was marred by a stormy mutual recrimination for the events of 1897, British Foreign Office Records, F.O. 350/4, John Jordan Papers, Jordan to Francis Campbell, 19 September 1907.

[28]Ralph Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*, Princeton 1955, p. 161, 236, suggests that between 1901-03 the Japanese army influence extended nationwide; Satō Kōseki, *Bōryaku Shōgun Aoki Norizumi*, Tokyo 1943, p. 18-21.

ironworks.[29] However, as China rebuilt, Yamagata began to worry. For him, the presence of two strong Asian states increased the danger of world polarisation, while a weak China necessarily undercut fears of an anti-Western "yellow peril".[30] As he explained in 1899;[31]

> If relations with China become extremely close, the Western powers will suspect we are forming a Sino-Japanese alliance against them and we will end up in a racial conflict.... Even if our financial, political and military power allowed it, it would still be the most foolish policy to work with China for the independence of East Asia. As anyone of intelligence knows, the Chinese are like the Jews; even though they exist, they cannot maintain their nation for long. Even were this possible, they could not preserve their existing domain and will retain only a part, the rest being swallowed by the powers. In the Far East, our country alone can preserve its independence and our diplomacy towards China and the West must be extremely cautious.

If China's weakness was as Yamagata imagined, Japan would have to confront Russia alone. Alternatively, a strong China might embroil Japan in a global East-West conflict. Either way, he believed, Japan would need strong armed forces.

"Strong Army"

Although the Meiji oligarchs remained in control following the establishment of constitutional government, post-war cabinets realised the need to work with the parties if Japan's constitutional process were to function and social unrest contained. Japan had gained partial treaty revision with the abolition of extraterritoriality from 1899. The question of tariff autonomy, however, remained to be decided. The parties themselves were less populist than in earlier years and the Jiyūtō in particular supported post-war military expansion. Yet, higher land taxes were unpopular and Prime-Minister Matsukata failed to achieve a land tax rise in 1897 despite his accommodation with Ōkuma's Shimpotō. The same problem confronted the third Itō cabinet as it took office in January 1898. Katsura was appointed army minister and it was his responsibility to ensure adequate funds for the armed forces. However, Itō failed to enlist support from either of the two main parties and, as the Diet convened in mid-June 1898, the land tax issue finally motivated the Jiyūtō and Shimpotō to amalgamate. The new Kenseitō was announced on 22 June.

It was testament to the parties' increased strength that Itō immediately chose to

[29]On Taiwanese rebels, Hsu Shih-k'ai, "Taiwan Hōki Jiken", Wagatsuma Sakae, ed., *Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku: Meiji Go*, Tokyo 1969, p. 272-73. The Yawata ironworks in Kyūshū actually began production in February 1901. In the 1980s, with the vicissitudes in the Japanese steel industry, it was being considered for redevelopment as an amusement park.

[30]He was quoted in the *Kokumin Shimbun* of 8 March 1898, "The Japanese people may be from the same race as the Chinese, but this does not mean we should form an anti-Western alliance", Liao Lung-kan, "Wu-hsu Hempō Ki ni Okeru Nihon no Tai-Shin Gaikō", *Nihon Rekishi*, 471, August 1987, p. 50.

[31]Ōyama, p. 252-53, memo. of 27 May 1899.

resign rather than face a protracted Diet struggle. Katsura, however, was desperate to end the indecision regarding post-war expansion and resolved to fight back. On 23 June, visited at his official residence by Yamagata and Inoue, Katsura argued;[32]

> Marquis Itō cannot resign. Post-war policy is at mid-point and has to be brought to a conclusion. We should overturn the progressives and set up a united *genrō* cabinet. Then we can get Itō to carry out his original aim. If he can't stay as premier, then another *genrō* should take his place. Whatever happens, our post-war plans must be carried through.

Katsura offered to resign in favour of *genrō* Ōyama and, with such an imposing cabinet, he expected to prevail, but;

> Even if we are repeatedly opposed, repeatedly have to disband the Diet, and ultimately forced to suspend the constitution, we cannot neglect post-war planning.

This was unprecedented from Katsura, and implies that he viewed Japan's social, political, and international situation with extreme gravity. However, having invested so much prestige in constitutional government, the oligarchs could not sweep it away and emerged unscathed. On 27 June 1898, Ōkuma and Itagaki were called to the palace at Itō's recommendation and ordered to form a joint cabinet. They were instructed, however, to except the army and navy ministers from their nominations.[33] Katsura had already presented his resignation to the throne but Yamagata ensured this was rejected. Ōkuma became prime-minister, Itagaki home minister, and the remaining portfolios were distributed among members of the coalition. Katsura and Saigō Jūdō remained as army and navy minister respectively. Immediately prior to the investiture ceremony, however, Katsura and Saigō informed Ōkuma they would only stay if he guaranteed no retrenchment in military spending. Ōkuma was unprepared to confront the armed forces at the point of finally achieving power and accepted. With this, the cabinet was inaugurated on 30 June 1898.[34]

Katsura was the first army minister in a party cabinet and the experience was not comfortable. Yet, when pressed by Kawakami to resign, he countered that the army might refuse a replacement and embroil the service in political squabbles.[35] This was a signal point in Japanese constitutional history and, given the previous relationship between the army and parties, a clash was to be expected. However, the army could lose

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[32]Katsura Jiden, in Imai Shōji, ed., *Gendai Nihon Kiroku Zenshū 7: Seiji to Gaikō*, Tokyo 1971, p. 67-68. Itō's appointment of Itagaki Taisuke as home minister in mid-1896 had first indicated the growth in party influence. Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1958, p. 65, shows the anger of Yamagata-group officials at the appointment. It should be noted, however, that criticism of party venality was neither new nor local to Japan. Yamagata would have approved George Washington's farewell address in 1796, wherein he described parties as, "potent engines by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the Power of the People, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government", quoted Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New Haven 1987, p. 26.

[33]Grand Chamberlain Tokudaiji Sanenori diary, quoted in Yui, p. 115.

[34]Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 69-71.

[35]Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 1, p. 789.

popular respect if it adopted a confrontational approach, and it was better that the coalition broke naturally. Katsura believed the Kenseitō was an uneasy alliance, based solely on the need to defeat Itō's land tax bill, and expected an early collapse. Nonetheless, when the cabinet did break, he was assumed to be the culprit, and this may help explain Education Minister Ozaki Yukio's enduring hatred.[36] The image of an arrogant militarist and enemy of the constitutional process would redound against Katsura in 1912-13, but, as will be seen, it was Ozaki himself who provided the first nail in the party cabinet's coffin.

After drafting post-war plans with Kawakami and, presenting these to Ōkuma, Katsura fled the heat of Tokyo for the coast in early August. Saigō also took leave and it seemed both men were quietly distancing themselves from the cabinet. The expected collapse of unity was immediate. In addition to Ōkuma doubling as foreign minister, the Shimpotō had four cabinet seats while Itagaki's Jiyūtō held only three.[37] On 19 August, Jiyūtō strongman Hoshi Tōru returned from duty as ambassador to Washington D.C. and Itagaki proposed him to relieve Ōkuma as foreign minister. Katsura returned from vacation in late August and was instantly deluged by appeals for support, first from Ōkuma who, perhaps recalling Hoshi's dangerous advice over the annexation of Hawaii, considered him unsuitable as foreign minister, and then from Itagaki who believed that the international situation demanded a full-time incumbent.[38] Hoshi was a strong party boss rather than a diplomat and Katsura initially sided with Ōkuma. However, before a truce could be arranged, a speech by Education Minister Ozaki on 22 August revived the in-fighting. In his speech, Ozaki, until his death in 1954 the hero of Japanese liberalism, appeared to accept the concept of a Japanese republic, and the public, the House of Peers, and Jiyūtō, demanded his removal on the grounds of *lese majeste*. Katsura advised Ozaki to apologise to the emperor, but Ozaki stopped short of this. The dispute bubbled on until the palace became entangled and Ozaki was eventually ousted. This created new problems. Throughout October 1898, the Jiyūtō and Shimpotō appalled conservative opinion by wrestling each other for a sympathetic replacement. As Katsura wrote on 23 October;[39]

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[36]Witness Ozaki's malicious little verse against what he considered the two pre-eminent parvenus of his time, Katsura and Yuan Shih-k'ai; "Katsura and Yuan/ Both in hell/ Slapping the backs of devils", Ozaki, *Kindai Yūketsu-roku*, Tokyo 1936, p. 183-85. Ozaki also flattered himself that he was partly responsible for the demise of both these men.

[37]Shimpotō members; Ōkuma (premier and foreign minister), Ōhigashi (law), Ozaki (education), Ōishi (agriculture, commerce and industry); Jiyūtō members; Itagaki (home), Matsuda (finance), Hayashi (communications).

[38]Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 71.

[39]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 817-19, Katsura to Yamagata.

> Now when there is so much to attend to at home and abroad, the government wastes its days on balancing power or office-seeking and has no thought of offering suitable plans to deal with matters. The sooner the situation is brought to a conclusion, the better it will be for the nation.

When Ōkuma broke the deadlock and unilaterally appointed Inukai Ki, the Jiyūtō ministers decided to resign *en masse*, simultaneously declaring the coalition at an end.

The Ōkuma cabinet was in no state to meet the Diet in November and Katsura warned that the Peers would be out for blood over the Ozaki incident. He advised Ōkuma to offer the cabinet's resignation as a way to calm tempers, safe in the knowledge that the emperor would never accept at this time. He also tried to stop Itagaki's departure from office and so prevent the cabinet from tilting entirely to the Shimpotō.[40] Katsura may appear as a ringmaster attempting to hold up two boxers so that they may batter each other to a finish, yet it was not at his invitation that the two had entered the ring, nor did he need a pretext to keep them fighting. This he could safely leave to the intemperate Ozaki *et al.* Indicative of the cabinet's internal weakness, Katsura and Saigō did not even make a lengthy issue of retrenchment demands proposed by Finance Minister Matsuda which would ban all new projects in the 1899 budget.[41] Saigō finally induced Ōkuma to offer the cabinet's resignation, and as surety, promised to follow suit. However, once Ōkuma acted, Katsura reproved Saigō for ignoring the emperor's earlier command and Saigō duly reneged on his promise. This was a carefully planned charade, but the cabinet was already terminally ill. The emperor accepted its resignation but ordered Katsura and Saigō to remain at their posts. The Kenseitō cabinet had lasted four months.

Years later, Ōkuma wrote that it was natural for the Sat-Chō cliques to try and destroy the constitutional Kenseitō cabinet which threatened its monopoly of power. However, detsruction was only possible with "the betrayal of our allies", the Jiyūtō, and, thereafter, he identified Hosho Tōru as the single greatest culprit for retarding constitutional progress.[42] The betrayal in Ōkuma's mind was the partnership now evolving between Hoshi and Katsura.

Once the Kenseitō cabinet collapsed, Katsura took control of the situation. He herded *genrō* opinion behind Yamagata as the succeeding premier and conveyed their recommendation to the palace. Some worried that Itō, then travelling in China, should be

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[40]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 825-28.

[41]If Matsuda's demands were accepted, only construction of the Tsushima fort would escape paring down in the army's plans, Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 806, Katsura letter, undated to unidentified *genrō*.

[42]Kimura Ki, ed., *Ōkuma Shigenobu Sōsho 1: Ōkuma Shigenobu wa Kataru*, Tokyo 1969, p. 119-20, Ōkuma article in *Taiyō*, 1 October 1911.

consulted as was customary. Katsura quashed this by warning of Itō's probable embarrassment at the failure of his nominated cabinet, and the potential trouble from Ōkuma's continuing desire to return to the premiership.[43] On 29 October 1898, Yamagata was recalled from his Kyoto residence and the "aged general of a beaten force" was restored to the ascendant. Arriving at Shimbashi station late in the evening of 1 November, he drove straight to Katsura's residence for a full briefing. Katsura repeated his earlier argument;[44]

> The next cabinet must first of all take a hard line towards the parties. If they fight, the Diet should be dissolved time after time, even if the constitution has to be suspended. If they are allowed to continue running riot, the nation will be seriously harmed.

However, Katsura was well-known as a *happō bijin*, a man accommodating to all. Having rattled the sabre to please Yamagata, he then explained that such drastic action would not be necessary. Party rivalries could be used to split the Diet, and Katsura was confident that his friendship with Kenseitō (i.e. Jiyūtō) leaders, Itagaki and Hayashi, would smoothe the way to a cabinet-party alliance. With this, Diet opposition could be surmounted and the question of the higher land tax temporarily put to rest.[45]

The second Yamagata cabinet was inaugurated on 8 November 1898. Aoki Shūzō took over foreign affairs, Matsukata Masayoshi finance, and Katsura remained as army minister. Saigō moved to home affairs and, in his stead, rising dramatically since 1891, Yamamoto Gombei arrived as navy minister. He and Katsura would spend the lifetime of the Yamagata cabinet fighting over army-navy jurisdiction.[46] At first, however, Katsura was preoccupied with the Kenseitō.

Katsura rated Hoshi Tōru highly: "He is a positive man and the one best able to bring the Kenseitō behind the cabinet.... He is a man who once he makes an agreement, carries it through."[47] Before the Yamagata cabinet was assembled, Katsura approached Hoshi and negotiated over cabinet seats for the Kenseitō.[48] Simultaneously, Katsura

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[43]Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 77.

[44]Tokutomi, *Katsura-den*, vol. 1, p. 838-42.

[45]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 841; Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 77.

[46]Morimatsu Toshio, *Dai Honei*, Tokyo 1980, p. 97-107.

[47]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 868. Wakatsuki Reijirō, *Kofūan Kaikoroku*, Tokyo 1975, p. 64, describes Hoshi in action. In 1901, Hoshi headed a Diet committee on the Katsura cabinet's plan to raise consumption taxes. Wakatsuki appeared to explain the government's position but was assailed with aggressive questions. Hoshi sat quietly, occasionally moderating the proceedings. In due course, he called, "Well, it's probably time. I assume everyone agrees with the government's proposal." In fact, no-one agreed and heated debate resumed. Hoshi sat impassively, allowing the members to have their say, and, after some time, repeated his statement. The debate resumed. After this process had been repeated several times, the committee members finally realised that Hoshi's decision had been made in advance and there would be no shifting him. As they all signalled their exhaustion, Hoshi pronounced, "The committee has finished its work."

[48]Katsura offered the post of law minister, Hoshi in turn demanded three cabinet seats, Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 81; Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 1, p. 284, entry for 27 November 1898.

worked to improve party goodwill by having a Kenseitō member elected speaker of the Lower House. On 8 November, with support from the Kokumin Kyōkai, a bureaucratic party established by Saigō and Shinagawa Yajirō, this was achieved with the election of Kataoka Kenkichi. Although the question of cabinet seats proved intractable, Katsura believed his attempt to compromise was not wasted and he persisted in seeking an arrangement. As army minister, he arranged a special invitation for Itagaki and Kenseitō leaders to attend the mid-November imperial army manoeuvres in Osaka. There, they were treated with elaborate courtesy and Itagaki was given the place of honour at dinners with the emperor.[49] In substantive negotiations between the two sides, the Kenseitō was persuaded of the need to raise land taxes, but the sticking point remained the degree of government concessions. Finally, Yamagata made a public announcement of his reliance on the Kenseitō and his intention to implement its policies. With this, and quiet assistance from Itō Hirobumi, a compromise was reached. On 29 November 1898, the Kenseitō overturned its earlier combative resolution and declared its support for the Yamagata administration.[50]

In December, cabinet critics, including Ōkuma and Katsura's old opponents, Tani Kanjō and Miura Gorō, organised themselves into the League Against the Land Tax Rise (*Chiso Zōchō Hantai Dōmeikai*). However, Hoshi's support was decisive. On 20 December 1898, the Lower House approved an increase in the land tax from 2.5% to 3.3% by 166-129 votes. Katsura and Yamagata now reciprocated. One concession to the Kenseitō had been a promise to raise Lower House salaries from 800 to 2,000 yen *per annum*. The House of Peers adamantly rejected the bill, and the government responded with every available means, even recalling peers away from Tokyo and detaining one opponent in the prime minister's waiting room until voting on the bill had ended. On 8 March 1899, the House of Peers reversed its earlier decision and approved the pay rise by 96-90 votes.[51]

The land tax had brought Katsura into the first of his party alliances. It was not his last. Hoshi would be the unmourned victim of assassination in 1901 and Hara Kei would take over his political role. Katsura had demonstrated his willingness to compromise with political opponents, and even manipulate the conservative House of Peers when

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[49]Masumi Junnosuke, *Nihon Seitō Shiron*, 7 vols., Tokyo 1966, vol. 2, p. 304.

[50]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 851-55; Kurihara Kōta, *Hakushaku Itō Miyoji-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1938, vol. 1, p. 306-10; *Hara Nikki*, as above. Hara's comment was, "Itō (Hirobumi) saw Hoshi in Kobe and urged him to help the government and win the support of the people. Hoshi then privately decided on unconditional co-operation. The Jiyūtō seems to be looking to Itō for its leader."

[51]Katō Fusakura, ed., *Hakushaku Hirata Tōsuke-den*, Tokyo 1927, p. 82-84. Hirata was one of the leaders of Yamagata's faction in the House of Peers.

necessary. However, he realised that in any cabinet-party alliance, the government retained the upper hand. The Kenseitō wanted cabinet support and its men appointed to power, but a reversion to outright opposition merely opened the way for the Shimpotō to move in and replace them. Katsura was able to utilise this weakness and, when a test of wills arose over the budget for 1900, he visited Kenseitō headquarters to warn;[52]

> If you are going to reduce the army budget I have proposed, go ahead. If you remove a paltry 300,000 yen from a budget of 37,000,000, despite my repeated explanations of why this money is necessary, it is tantamount to a declaration of no confidence in me. If so, I shall have no choice but to announce the end of my relations with the Kenseitō.

The Diet committee approved the original sum, and, as long as the two major parties remained roughly equal in popular support but split in policy, this situation would continue.

An incisive portrait of Katsura at this time has been left by Miyake Setsurei, editor of *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin*;[53]

> On the outside, Yamagata is a politician who acts like a soldier and Katsura is a soldier who acts like a politician. Neither is purely a soldier.... They do not have the mentality of soldiers (*gunshin*) and can talk to, and manipulate, party men. On this point, Katsura is the more skilled of the two. Yamagata is not without skill at winning people over, but he prefers to stay in the back room and pick men in advance. He does not like to go out into the lobby and chat with just anyone. With Katsura, neither the place nor the person is important. He will discuss matters with anyone and sees no trouble in persuading men. Something of this aspect of Katsura's nature was known hitherto, but, as army minister in the Itō and Ōkuma cabinets, he came into contact with the party men, learned their tempo, and became indispensable in negotiations with the parties.... The present Yamagata cabinet is in reality the Katsura cabinet.

Having achieved this central role in domestic politics, Katsura was now to be tested in the international arena. The first problem was Russia.

Russia in Korea

In retrospect, there is a sense of *la machine infernale* in the way that construction of the Trans-Siberian railway extends to the battlefield of 1904. Yamagata's memoranda of the 1890s indicate that a Russo-Japanese conflict was unavoidable. Yet, Russian policy towards Korea prior to the Sino-Japanese war had been very cautious. In 1885, the Korean monarch's request for Russian protection led the British to occupy Kŏmundo island (Port Hamilton), and, thereafter, Russia studiously avoided any provocation of the powers. Indeed, her policy was predicated on the belief that, "Acquisition of Korea would not only not give us any advantage, but would not fail to entail very unfavourable

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[52]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 879-81.

[53]Miyake Setsurei, *Dōjidaishi*, vol. 3, Tokyo 1950, p. 180.

consequences."[54] Paramount among these would be to alienate Japan. As Foreign Minister Lobanoff noted early in 1895, "Incontestably our principal and most dangerous adversary in Asia is England" and "without Japanese harbours fighting against England is hardly thinkable."[55] The problem for Russia was to keep Japan out of Manchuria, dissuade her from foreclosing on Korean independence, and all this without pushing her into the arms of the British. In the same memorandum, Lobanoff concluded that Japan's growing naval strength would lead to friction with Britain in East Asian waters. Consequently, he was optimistic of Russo-Japanese amity, perhaps even alliance.

However, Russia again found herself the object of Korean supplication after the triple intervention and Japanese involvement in the assassination of Queen Min. In February 1896, King Kojong managed to elude his unwelcome Japanese guard and requested asylum in the Russian legation. After considering the potential damage to Russo-Japanese relations, and heeding the king's fear that Japan intended to force his abdication, Russia acquiesced.[56] Later that year, at precisely the same time as Li Hung-chang negotiated the anti-Japanese alliance in St. Petersburg, and General Yamagata a Russo-Japanese accord over Korea, Korea's representative to the Tzar's coronation, Prince Min Yŏng-whan, appealed for Russian financial and military aid. Once again, Russia measured her response against Japanese concerns. Lobanoff refused Min's request for Russian troops to guard the Korean palace, but agreed to send a financial adviser to Seoul and consider a loan of three million yen to the Korean government.[57] In due course, D.D. Pokotilov of the Russo-Chinese Bank arrived in Seoul, followed in October by military adviser Colonel Potiata. In return, Russia received mining and timber rights in north Korea, and authority to station warships on Ch'ŏllyŏng-do (Deer Island) near Pusan. However, Russia's primary interests were in Manchuria, and that she considered Korea of secondary importance was clear both in Seoul and Tokyo.[58]

Surrounded by overwhelming neighbours, Korea had little chance to assert her own independence. However, in mid-1896, there appeared the Independence Club, a society of progressive officials and intellectuals, seeking moderate liberal reform at home, and

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[54]Krasny Archive, vol. 52, memorandum of Governor-General of Amur, Baron Korf, and Privy Councillor Zinovieff (Head of Asiatic dept., ministry of foreign affairs), May 1888, in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 18, 1934-35, p. 236.

[55]Krasny Archive, above, Lobanoff memorandum, 25 March 1895, p. 261-63.

[56]Seung Kwon Synn (sic), *The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, 1876-1904*, Seoul 1981, p. 206-08.

[57]Synn, p. 224-28; Andrew Nahm, "Korea and Tsarist Russia: Russian Interests, Policy, and Involvement in Korea, 1884-1904", *Korea Journal*, 22-6, June 1982, p. 10.

[58]By late 1896, Japanese observers were hopeful that the Korean government might turn back to Japan, Oka Yoshitake, ed., *Konoe Atsumaro Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1968, vol. 1, p. 115, entry for 1 December 1896; Synn, p. 237-38.

freedom from all external complication. Throughout 1897, it agitated for the 1896 Russo-Korean agreement to be absolved. Leading the campaign in cabinet was Independence Club vice-president and foreign minister, Yi Wan-yong, who, because of his involvement in Kojong's escape from Japan's clutches into the Russian legation, has been frequently accused of Russophilia.[59] Yet, in April 1897, as negotiations began in Seoul for on the employment of further Russian military instructors, Yi refused to sanction any contract.[60] Instead, he pressed for an "open door" policy with the result that an imperial decree of July 1897 commanded the opening of ports Mokp'o, and Chinnamp'o. An announcement on three further ports, including Masamp'o, west of Pusan, followed in May 1898.[61]

The Chinese precedent suggested that an "open door" could escalate foreign competition and forfeit native authority. The opening of Korean ports facilitated Japan's attempts to improve her position in the peninsula, and simultaneously raised the fear that Russia would get in first. In August 1897, this fear was heightened by the removal of Yi Wan-yong under Russian pressure, and the installation in cabinet of pro-Russian ministers, including Russia's leading ally, Cho Pyŏng-sik, in October.

Just as the pendulum swung back to Russia, Germany's occupation of Shandong altered the situation. The Russian navy was ambitious for territory near Pusan, directly across the sea from Japan. Foreign Minister Muraviev, however, recognised that "any future attempt of ours at firmer consolidation in Pusan would not only meet with a hostile reception from Japan but might easily lead to a serious clash with her."[62] Shaken by the German action, China allowed Russia the leasehold of the Liaodong peninsula, and, while this devalued Korea's importance to Russia, it also inflamed Japanese opinion. Muraviev wanted to ease the situation and, in mid-January 1898, approaches were made both in St. Petersburg and Tokyo for a compromise over Korea. In March, the Russo-Korean Bank, established to fund the promised loans to Seoul, was closed virtually before opening its doors. The following month, Russian financial and military advisers were withdrawn, and the bellicose minister, Alexis de Speyer, transferred to Brazil. Finally, on 25 April 1898, the Nishi-Rosen agreement was signed whereby Russia

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[59]For example, Ch'a Mun-sŏp, "Yi Wan-yong: Maeguk, Minjok ŭi P'asan", Yi Hŭi-sung, ed., *Han'guk ŭi In'gansang*, Seoul 1966, vol. 6, p. 482. Synn, p. 249, reveals just how pro-Russian de Speyer regarded Yi Wan-yong. In conversation with Yi's foremost ally, Horace Allen, de Speyer warned, "That man is the worst I have known. I have put a cross on his name and he shall not hold any office in Korea while I am here. He is the head of the pro-American party.... You shall see I will put that party out of Korea".

[60]This was despite being urged to sign by the U.S. Minister John Sill, who erroneously believed Russian military advisers to be part of the Russo-Japanese accord, George Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899*, 2 vols., Tallahassie 1985, vol. 2, p. 661-65.

[61]Moriyama Shigenori, *Kindai Nikkan Kankeishi Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1987, p. 62-63.

[62]Quoted in B.A. Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906*, N.Y. 1952, p. 136.

acknowledged Japan's special interest in Korea.[63]

Katsura greeted the Russian pull-back with coolness. Writing to Yamagata on 25 March 1898, he wondered;[64]

> Either they find it difficult to expand in Manchuria with both hands full, or they have no genuine interest in Korea while making their stronghold at Dalny and Port Arthur.

Still there remained the Trans-Siberian line. With its new extension through the Liaodong peninsula, the railway looked like a crossbow drawn on Beijing and Seoul. The British Foreign Office shared Japan's concern and quietly suggested the Chinese move their capital south, perhaps to Nanjing, but certainly away from Russia's grasp.[65]

Despite Russia's apparent conciliation in Korea and her protestations of good intent in Manchuria, imperialism had its own dynamics. The problem had been described by a Russian Asian specialist in the 1860s;[66]

> Various points in Central Asia have continually been indicated to us as necessary acquisitions to strengthen our position and serve as a base and a bulwark for our possessions.... It has constantly been said that for the glory of Russia, for the raising of her prestige, it is necessary to take some stronghold or other to smash the Asiatic hordes in the field: strongholds have been taken one after another, the hordes have been utterly defeated, good borders have been attained, and then it has invariably turned out that one more stronghold is lacking, that one more final victory is necessary, that the really perfect frontier lies somewhat further off, that our prestige is still insufficiently raised by our former successes.

As Tsuruhara Sadakichi noted after the war with China, Japan's real victory demanded peace and the expansion of her commerce. In his role of army minister, Katsura stood in the forefront of guaranteeing this peace. His memorandum of 1896 proposed maintaining the balance of power in Korea while expanding through south China. In April 1898, with China's promise of non-alienation of Fukien province, and the Nishi-Rosen accord stabilising Russo-Japanese rivalries in Korea, this policy appeared to be succeeding. However, even as Nishi and Rosen concluded their negotiations, Minister de Speyer had demanded territorial concessions in Seoul. These included a coaling station on Ch'ŏllyŏng-do, leases at Mokp'o on the northwest coast and Inch'ŏn near Seoul, as well as coastal whaling bases. Katsura immediately readied funds for Japan to

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[63]Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō-shi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 195-97; Ian Nish, *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*, London 1985, p. 44-48.

[64]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 870-71.

[65]F.O. 800/163, Francis Bertie Papers, Bertie memo. 19 May 1899, "The only thing to pray for is that by the time or rather before the railway connection is completed the Empress Dowager will have been removed to other spheres and that those Chinamen who then direct the Chinese government will sufficiently appreciate the danger to their country of the immediate proximity of the Russian power to remove the capital southwest." Bertie made this suggestion to Chinese minister Loh Feng-luh on 21 May 1899.

[66]Quoted in Winfried Baumgart, *Imperialism*, Oxford 1982, p. 43.

make a counter purchase of land on Chŏllyŏng-do, but, the Independence Club, with Yi Wan-yong as Kojong's chief secretary, provided timely intervention to obstruct the Russian demands.[67]

The Russian navy was still fishing for opportunities. They convinced themselves that the occupation of Koje-do, an island southwest of Pusan, would entail "no dispute on the part of Japan while an occupation of such a point of Korean territory as Port Lazareff (Yŏnghŭnghang, near Wŏnsan on the east coast) would certainly result in protests of Japan."[68] Even with the new base at Port Arthur, the 1,100 miles to Vladivostok was beyond the capacity of her smaller vessels, and Russia continued to press for a coaling station off the southern Korean coast. She would soon discover how badly she had misjudged Japan's reaction.

Japan's strategic priority in Korea was to control internal communications. The right to build railways from Pusan to Seoul and Seoul to Inch'ŏn had been granted at the outset of the Sino-Japanese war, but, in the post-war vicissitudes, the latter concession was lost to an American entrepreneur. In 1898, Prime Minister Itō hesitated over the funds for repurchase when the American failed to develop the line, and it needed Vice Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, citing the example of Disraeli and Suez, and protestations from Katsura to force movement.[69] However, it was not until the establishment of the Yamagata cabinet at the year's end, and with Katsura employing his Kenseitō contacts, that the Diet approved the 1.8 million yen to buy back the concession and further funds were made available for construction of the long-delayed Seoul-Pusan track.[70] Internal communications, however, were useless if Russia could prevent Japan from landing troops. After the earlier scare over Ch'ŏllyŏng-do, Katsura suggested to Prime Minister Ōkuma in August 1898 that Japan purchase 50,000 *tsubo* (one *tsubo* being about thirty-six square feet) of land in the prime anchorage of Masanp'o, the southern port just then being opened. Using a device which he often employed in later years, Katsura proposed that this purchase be made by a Japanese individual or company as a front to avoid

[67]Moriyama, p. 68; Synn, p. 258-60; C.I. Eugene Kim/Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910*, Berkeley 1967, p. 94-105.

[68]Krasny Archive, vol. 52, above p. 254, minutes of meeting, 1 February 1895.

[69]Honda Kumatarō, *Tamashii no Gaikō*, Tokyo 1941, p. 11-13.

[70]Oka, *Yamagata*, p. 79; Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Matsukata Masayoshi-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1935, rep. 1976, vol. 2, p. 760-63. As prime minister in 1897, Matsukata had agreed on one million yen for a Japanese syndicate to repurchase the Seoul-Inch'ŏn line, but delays and troubles both with Morse, the American owner, and within the syndicate, had led to a demand for a further 800,000 yen in April 1898. This demand was renewed on 31 October 1898 when Yamagata and Katsura moved into action. The railway concession returned to Japan on 31 January 1899.

diplomatic repercussions.[71] Ōkuma approved and, on 1 October 1898, ordered the Japanese minister to Seoul to prepare for such a purchase. The following week, Navy Minister Saigō asked Katsura to support a purchase of land on Koha island, off Mokp'o on Korea's south-western tip, and again the cabinet accepted that Japan's security was endangered. Secret army funds of 90,000 yen were diverted in readiness.[72] However, the collapse of the Kenseitō cabinet, and the disruptions in Korean diplomacy, with eleven changes of foreign minister in 1898 alone, prevented any further move at this point.

Russian dignity could not accept a complete renunciation of interest in Korea, and she felt entitled to pursue legitimate rights. The new Russian minister to Seoul, Aleksandr Pavlov, considered these included the lease of whaling stations, and it was believed that he sought to ensure satisfaction by supporting large-scale arrest of Independence Club members at the end of 1898. The following spring, he worked for the complete destruction of the Independence Club, and, having engineered a new administration under Cho Pyŏng-sik, received the desired leases on 29 March 1899.[73]

Earlier the same month, Tokyo was shaken by a report that Russian naval opinion was uniting behind the lease of Koje-do, another island on Korea's southern coast. Although the rumour proved baseless, Japan's army and naval general staffs needed no further provocation. On 28 March, Katsura and Yamamoto presented a joint army-navy plan to cabinet for 500,000 yen of secret military funds towards a pre-emptive purchase. The cabinet gave immediate approval.[74]

The newly-opened port of Masanp'o now became the focus of Russo-Japanese competition. On 5 May 1899, en route for home leave, Minister Pavlov entered the harbour and, after marking out a site for the new Russian consulate, erected posts around 10,000 *tsubo* of land outside the foreign settlement. Observers inferred that this would serve as a coaling station and dock, and perhaps as a replacement site for the existing Russian naval hospital at Nagasaki.[75] Irrespective of its purpose, and contrary to earlier Russian opinion, Japanese security precluded Russian domination of such a sensitive area. Foreign Minister Aoki ordered his representative at Pusan to take swift measures;

[71]Moriyama, p. 68.

[72]Moriyama, p. 68.

[73]NGB, vol. 31 part 2, p. 400, Hioki (Seoul) to Ōkuma, 5 and 6 November 1898; vol. 32, p. 224-27, Katō Masuo (Seoul) to Aoki, 26 March, 18 April 1899.

[74]Moriyama, p. 69; NGB, vol. 32, p. 231, Aoki to Katō, 7 March 1899.

[75]NGB, vol. 32, p. 246-47, Nakamura (Pusan) to Aoki, 10 May 1899. A brief summary of the incident and the value of Masanp'o as a harbour is given by Horace Allen, report to Secretary of State John Hay, 19 March 1900, in Scott S. Burnett, ed., *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, Honolulu 1989, p. 86.

the army general staff sent an officer to the spot; and Katsura arranged to make necessary funds available to a Japanese merchant in Pusan, Sakoma Fusatarō.[76]

The supplementary effect of Russian expansion was to promote Japan's own interests as first China, and now Korea, turned to her as a counterbalancing force. Agriculture-Commerce Minister Min Yŏng-gi and Foreign Minister Pak Che-jun were no longer certain of Russia's good intentions and were persuaded into co-operating with Japan. Min had a subordinate purchase the land desired by Russia and, late in June, this was sold to Sakoma using Japanese army funds.[77] The acting Russian minister was furious, protesting first at the Korean foreign ministry, and then to Japan's new representative, Hayashi Gonsuke. However, both Pak and Hayashi denied that their governments could intrude on private commerce and the dispute was concentrated in Masanp'o.[78] There, Russian officials remained on hand throughout the year as Russian and Japanese proxies vied to buy up available land. In September, Seoul was warned that Pavlov's return was imminent and either the Japanese landowner must be forced to give up his rights or Russia would reserve to herself freedom of action. Russian vessels frequently entered Masanp'o to reinforce the point and, momentarily, a Russo-Japanese war seemed in the offing. Japan's naval attache at Pusan asked the cabinet to balance regional forces, but Yamagata refused a trial of strength.[79] As he wrote in October 1899;[80]

> Our present situation is that military expansion remains incomplete and financial reform is only just beginning. We must strive to avoid a clash with Russia.

If compromise or the existing Russo-Japanese agreements failed, then;

> We will have to decide whether or not to abandon our long-standing historical and geographical relationship with Korea, and with it our line of advantage.

This would have meant a complete revision of Japanese strategic policy and the adoption of that defensive posture advocated by the Getsuyōkai in the 1880s. However, Yamagata had earlier concluded that such a passive approach would only result in ultimate collapse. Consequently, the cabinet attempted to ease tensions, and Navy Minister Yamamoto ordered his ships to avoid Masanp'o and Koje-do for the present, and report on Russian

[76]NGB, vol. 32, p. 248, Aoki to Nakamura, 13 May 1899; Yamabe Kentarō, *Nikkan Gappō Shōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 141.

[77]NGB, vol. 32, p. 248-52, Hioki to Aoki, 20 May 1899; Hayashi Gonsuke (Seoul) to Aoki, 12 July 1899; Moriyama, p. 72-73, notes that the army sent 50,000 yen on 17 June and 95,000 on 14 July for these land purchases.

[78]NGB, vol. 32, p. 252-56, Hayashi to Aoki, 18 and 27 July 1899.

[79]NGB, vol. 32, p. 266 Hayashi to Aoki, 16 and 26 September 1899.

[80]Ōyama, p. 254-55, memo. of 11 October 1899.

activities indirectly.[81] On the ground, Sakoma appeared to be winning the race to buy up Masanp'o and, despite Russia's free use of money and warships as enticement and intimidation, had acquired the most advantageous locations.[82] Finally, in the spring of 1900, both sides recognised the futility of competition. Russia accepted land at Masanp'o within the foreign settlement, the Japanese government took over the land purchased privately within the same area for a Japanese settlement, and both renounced claims on Koje-do.[83]

Whatever satisfaction Russia had given to Seoul and Tokyo with her apparent withdrawal in the spring of 1898 was undone by the pursuit of naval facilities adjacent to Japan. Objectively viewed, Russian demands were comprehensible given the distance between her two Far Eastern ports. However, the Japanese army and navy could not allow such objectivity. There were those who believed a conflict could still be averted and some arrangement come to over Manchuria and Korea. In St. Petersburg, Baron Hayashi Tadasu privately informed the British ambassador that Japan had little or no commercial interest in Manchuria, which, given China's weakness, was "destined eventually, whether Russia wished it or not, to become practically a Russian province."[84] Hayashi Gonsuke in Seoul believed the troubles of 1899 had been essentially minor and could be overcome with mutual willingness. He ordered the Japanese press in Korea to restrict criticism of Russia and asked Foreign Minister Aoki for a real effort to restore good relations.[85] However, the majority view, echoed by *The Times* in London, was that the dogs of war were on the loose. As Katsura later recalled;[86]

> Russia sought to use the triple intervention to monopolise the Japan Straits and link Vladivostok, Masanp'o and Port Arthur. To cement this connection, they planned initially to dominate Korea, seize our island of Tsushima, and then threaten us with war. This was evident from the land purchase at Masanp'o.

The validity of this view, and the limits of Russo-Japanese understanding, were now to be tested by events in China.

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[81]NGB, vol. 32, p. 238, Vice Navy Minister Saitō to Vice Foreign Minister Takahira, 11 October 1899. Hayashi Gonsuke criticised this order as overly timid and was himself censured by Aoki for speaking out of place, p. 241, Hayashi to Aoki, 16 October 1899.

[82]NGB, vol. 32, p. 266-68, Kawakami (Masanp'o) to Aoki, 29 September, 10 October 1899. In March 1900, three of Russia's largest warships arrived at Inch'ŏn to intimidate the Korean government, Horace Allen to Secretary Hay, 19 March 1900, Burnett, p. 86.

[83]Moriyama, p. 77-78; Andrew Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904*, Berkeley 1958, p. 120-23; Horace Allen to Secretary Hay, 21 April 1900, and 28 May 1901 (1900?), Burnett, p. 87-88. Allen reported that Pavlov had gone to Japan to be treated for the bite of a rabid dog. There is no record that the dog was in Japanese pay.

[84]F.O. 46, Charles Scott to Foreign Secretary Salisbury, 9 August 1899.

[85]NGB, vol. 32, p. 273-74, Hayashi to Aoki, 6 December 1899.

[86]Katsura Jiden, quoted in Yamabe Kentarō, *Nikkan Heigō Shōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 148-49.

Chapter 6

THE BOXER WAR 1900

The end of each century or extended reign period leaves a sense of dislocation.[1] The end of the Western nineteenth century caused widespread fears of cultural decay and population pressure, engendering proto-fascist movements with their promise to restore order. This Western crisis of confidence accelerated the pace at which foreign territories and materials were appropriated, and legitimised this self-aggrandisement in the name of progress. Following the 1898 "scramble for concessions" in China, Western commentators, such as Lord Beresford in his *The Break-Up of China* (London 1899), imposed their outlook on a land which enjoyed a separate calendar, and acted so as to ensure the accuracy of their predictions. Despite a momentary uncertainty over K'ang Yu-wei's 1898 reform movement, the Ch'ing dynasty remained in control of China, and the army under Yuan Shih-k'ai served the dynasty. Subsequently, Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi placated reformists by implementing changes earlier proposed by Kang Yu-wei, and when the popular Boxer movement rose in 1899, its grievances were based on natural calamity and their anger directed less at the Ch'ing than at Western intrusion. However, the violence of the Boxers, and the equivocal response of the Ch'ing, only confirmed Western preconceptions, preconceptions also adopted by Japanese leaders.

China's northeastern provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Shandong, had been hit by crop failure and drought through 1898-99, and popular unrest was harnessed by the Boxer bands who argued, "If only we sweep away the Westerners (*yang-jen*), the rains will fall and disasters disappear."[2] The Boxers vented their fury on the symbols of Westernisation; railways and telegraph lines, and increasingly on the Westerners and their Christian converts. The Chinese government tried to placate foreign protests, and the ineffectual governor of the most troubled province, Shandong, was replaced by Yuan Shih-k'ai in December 1899. Yuan used a policy of persuasion backed by his 7,000 well-

[1]For Japanese reactions to the end of the Meiji era, see Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton 1985, p. 220-21.

[2]Horikawa Tetsuo, *Chūgoku Kindai no Seiji to Shakai*, Tokyo 1981, p. 140.

trained troops to restore order, but at the cost of driving the Boxers north into Chihli.[3] Yet the unrest continued and 1899 closed with the murder of a British missionary in Shandong. The new century began with further Western protest, and though the Chinese promised results, they stopped short of violent repression. This may have contributed to foreign beliefs in the Ch'ing's declining authority. In May 1900, a group of Chinese Christians was slaughtered in Chihli, and local officials were unwilling to discuss retribution or reparations for the bereaved. French Minister Stephen Pichon called for a united Western response and, at a meeting on 20 May of all the major foreign representatives, including Russia and Japan, a joint note was agreed demanding suppression of the Boxers and punishment for those officials either supporting or silently observing the rebels. To press their point, the powers decided on a naval demonstration if they received no satisfactory response within five days.[4] On 24 May, Beijing heard that Chinese troops sent to punish the rebels had themselves been destroyed. The Chinese offered further reassurance but Pichon was sceptical and, in conference with the other powers on 26 May, advocated a despatch of foreign marines to Beijing. Both Russia and Germany were opposed to such provocative action, but two days later, as the powers again met to discuss the situation, news arrived that the Boxers had destroyed the railway station closest to Beijing.[5]

The Japanese Response

In Japan, a time of political stability had followed the arrangement between Katsura and the Kenseitō, and the passage of the contentious higher land tax. Kenseitō support, however, was predicated on eventual reward and, in May 1900, they finally realised that Yamagata rejected any further increase in party influence. The arrangement was terminated at the end of the month. Irrespective of events in China, and putting aside his sense that domestic improvements were only just beginning, Yamagata immediately prepared to resign. This was a surprising retreat. Perhaps the elder statesmen were losing their will to fight the parties directly, and, indeed, first Saigō, then Matsukata, and finally Itō, all refused Yamagata's request to take over.[6] Then, at Matsukata's suggestion, Yamagata quietly sounded out Katsura who, although professing surprise, had long

[3]Horikawa, p. 139-41; Somura Yasunobu, "Giwadan Jiken to Shinchō Seifu", *Kokusai Hō Gaikō Zasshi*, 51-2, June 1952, p. 21-22; Jerome Ch'en, *Yuan Shih-k'ai*, 2nd. ed., Stanford 1972. A recent study of the background is Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*, Berkeley 1987.

[4]Muramatsu Yūji, *Giwadan no Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1976, p. 166-67.

[5]Muramatsu, p. 168.

[6]It is worth noting that Yamagata still considered Itō an acceptable candidate after his 1898 "betrayal" in nominating the Kenseitō cabinet.

argued the need to train successors in the interest of stability, and was prepared to accept.[7] However, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gombei discovered the talks and, whether from personal animosity, the desire to stop another Chōshū premier, or simply national considerations, campaigned against Katsura's appointment, arguing that no *genrō* should resign at such a critical juncture.[8] Although Yamagata requested imperial permission to resign on 8 June, the situation in Beijing collapsed shortly thereafter and all cabinet changes were deferred.

The Boxers' hatred was of *yang-jen* and Japan, initially taking this to mean Christians or Westerners, assumed her interests were safe.[9] Although Japan's modernisation might be equated with Westernisation, a view dismissed by Katsura in later years, recent Sino-Japanese goodwill might be expected to offer some protection. Diplomatically, however, Japan could not afford to be isolated, and when the powers demanded that Beijing restore order early in April, Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō repeatedly directed Minister to Beijing Nishi Tokujirō to join in any future action;[10]

> Even though we do not share the Western religion, when the Boxers and other rebels disturb social order and threaten foreign residents, you should act in the same manner as the Western representatives.

Nishi was unconvinced and replied on 28 April;[11]

> This problem is in no way related to our interests and to become involved would only end by damaging Chinese feelings.

The question for Japan was how far she could avoid harm to her increasingly favourable position with the Ch'ing regime without setting herself apart from the West. Aoki clearly gave precedence to Western relations, a view already advocated by Yamagata in 1899. However, China had survived successive defeats and civil war, and it could be a dangerous move to alienate her entirely.

In May 1900, Aoki received warning from an American missionary that the Shandong Boxers were preparing for war. On 21 May, he requested Nishi's opinion and

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[7]Tokutomi Sohō, *Kōshaku Matsukata Masayoshi-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1935, rep. 1976, vol. 2, p. 796, Hirata Tōsuke letter to Yamagata, 3 June 1900; "Katsura Jiden", Imai Shōji, ed., *Gendai Nihon Kiroku Zenshū: Seiji to Gaikō*, Tokyo 1971, p. 86.

[8]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 2, p. 146, entry for 16 August 1905, Katsura conversation with Hara; Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 1, p. 889. Tokutomi identifies Katsura's opponent only as "one of his colleagues."

[9]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (hereafter NGB), vol. 33-1, p. 2-3, Nishi (Beijing) to Aoki, 6 March, 26 April 1900, stresses the anti-Christian nature of the Boxers.

[10]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 320-24, Aoki to Nishi, 27 April, 3 May, 25 May 1900.

[11]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 322. Russia also continued to believe herself excluded from Boxer anger. George Lensen, *The Russo-Chinese War*, Tokyo 1967, p. 3, writes, "Russia felt that the Boxer movement had not been directed against her. Officially she regarded it as an internal uprising against the throne, and intervened to save the Manchu dynasty from revolution. Privately she believed that the conflict had been the result of Western economic and missionary penetration of China, something in which few of her subjects were involved."

was assured the following day;[12]

> Missionary reports say the rebels are violent and there is anxiety that the foreigners in Beijing will be in danger. Other reports suggest these fears are exaggerated. It is very difficult at present to be sure of the truth, but I am inclined to believe the latter, and, anyway, the Chinese government will ensure that the rebels do not reach Beijing.

Matters also came slowly to the army's attention. Vice Chief of Staff Terauchi Masatake's first diary note is on 30 May 1900;[13]

> For the past couple of days the *I-ho tuan* (Boxers) have been on the rampage, destroying railway and telegraph lines. All the nations have called in troops.

Among these was Japan. On 28 May, all the foreign representatives had taken the lead of Pichon and British Minister Claude MacDonald and decided to call up marines, overriding the vehement protest of the Chinese foreign ministry. Nishi, however, did not expect the situation to worsen, and long-time Western residents of China agreed that the arrival on 31 May of marines to guard the foreign legations would end all troubles.[14] Compared to the British, French, and Russian forces of seventy-five men each, and the American squad of fifty-two, the Japanese contingent, at just twenty-four, was small. Yet Nishi was complacent, observing sanguinely, "it is sufficient and, moreover, in view of the prevailing hot weather, there is room for no more." However, Aoki was more sensitive to Japanese prestige and ordered additional men to maintain the parity of forces.[15]

On 3 June, another British missionary was killed between Beijing and Tianjin, and railway transport between the two cities was interrupted. The next day, the Japanese army general staff met to discuss the situation, and, on 5 June, a conference of the foreign naval commanders at Taku, on the river mouth to Tianjin, was hosted by British Admiral Edward Seymour.[16] The Boxers had been unmoved by the arrival of foreign marines and were, in fact, growing more violent. On 8 June, all roads between Beijing and Tianjin were cut, and Nishi sent word that a force of up to five hundred marines was needed to protect Tianjin.[17]

The fear of native uprising was the colonialists' nightmare. On a small scale, it

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[12]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 4, Nishi to Aoki, 22 May 1900; Sakane Yoshihisa, ed., *Aoki Shūzō Jiden*, Tokyo 1970, p. 325. Aoki noted critically that Nishi had been in the West too long to understand China.

[13]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 67.

[14]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 326, Nishi to Aoki, 28 May 1900; Claude MacDonald, "The Japanese Detachment During the Defence of the Peking Legations, 1900", *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society*, vol. 12, 1914, p. 4. MacDonald ascribed this optimistic view to Sir Robert Hart, inspector-general of Chinese maritime customs, and university president Dr. W.A.P. Martin.

[15]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 334, Nishi to Aoki, 1 June 1900; Aoki to Nishi, 2 June 1900.

[16]Kawano Teruaki, "Hokushin Jihen ni okeru Rengō Sakusen to Nihon no Taiō", *Gunji Shigaku*, 22-4, March 1987, p. 4.

[17]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 19, Tei (Tianjin) to Aoki, 8 June 1900; p. 339, Nishi to Aoki, 8 June 1900.

could produce benefits, allowing the colonisers to demonstrate their armaments and take greater concessions or reinforce their authority. A mass rising, however, threatened to reveal the paucity of occupation forces, and while romantic legends might arise from the fall of Khartoum, the fact is that such humiliations were costly, and required even greater efforts along the lines of Kitchener's 1898 campaign to reassert colonial domination. With memories of the concurrent Arrow war in China and "mutiny" in India, it is unsurprising that in 1900 Britain should lead the search for a solution. MacDonald, a former army officer, increasingly dominated the allied response in Beijing and proposed an audience with China's emperor and empress dowager, there to warn them that if they could not maintain order, the powers would take this responsibility upon themselves. The other foreign representatives cabled home for instructions and Aoki replied on 9 June confirming Japanese support for Britain.[18] However, the Chinese court was now seen as powerless and MacDonald abandoned his proposal. The West looked instead to the allied marines then marching on the Taku forts.

On 11 June 1900, Japan was dragged deeper into the crisis when a secretary at her Beijing legation, Sugiyama Akira, was murdered by Chinese troops while going to meet a detachment of fifty Japanese marines expected from Tianjin.[19] Two days later, the old Japanese legation in Beijing was razed to the ground as Boxers invaded the Forbidden City, burning churches and foreign houses, and enjoying a general massacre of Chinese Christians.[20] On the same day, Boxers entered Tianjin in force and the Chinese authorities stood aside.

The Boxer incident was developing into a Boxer war, and Japan could not predict the gains and losses of a general Chinese collapse. In 1898, Yamagata had acceded to Ch'ing requests for the expulsion of political refugee K'ang Yu-wei, and thereby signalled Japan's unwillingness to support anti-Ch'ing forces. However, if the Ch'ing were losing control, it might be better to install a new government under the reformist viceroys, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, who were guaranteeing foreign safety in the Yangtze region.[21] Prince Konoe's Tō-A Dōbun-kai already envisaged a new

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[18]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 340-41, Nishi to Aoki, 8 June, Aoki reply, 9 June 1900.

[19]Sugiyama died more times than Mark Twain. Sakane, p. 325, and Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabi Shuyō Bunsho*, Tokyo 1965, p. 138, date his murder as 11 June, while Gaimushō, ed., *Komura Gaikō-shi*, 1966 ed., p. 156, gives 13 June. NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 32-35, Nishi to Aoki, 17 June 1900, includes a report on the incident. The detachment was turned back before Beijing after suffering heavy losses.

[20]MacDonald, p. 6-7.

[21]Daniel Bays, *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age*, Ann Arbor 1978, p. 72-73; NGB, vol. 33-1, Aoki to Komura, 18 July 1900, shows that Liu, Chang, and Li Hung-chang continued their protection of foreigners.

administration in southern China under Li Hung-chang, Chang and Liu, in association with Chinese popular leaders, and under the guidance of Japan, Britain and the United States.[22] However, as the violence increased, Japan's responsibilities as the only Asian power were to force her into the spotlight and prevent any radical initiative. None of the powers could afford to be ejected from China, yet, equally, none could respond immediately to the crisis; none except Japan. She would have to shoulder the major burden in restoring order, or face Western ire. In a choice between China and the West, her national interests were obviously best served by siding with a strong potential enemy than a seemingly hopeless friend.

Yet, the West's obvious weakness in China might allow Japan to assert her claim as the policeman of the Far East and so guarantee regional peace. To this end, urged the *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun* on 8 June, and socialist writer Kōtoku Shūsui in the *Yorozu Chōhō* in mid-June, Japan "cannot be allowed to lag one step behind the powers."[23] Implicit in this approach was the belief in Japan's right to assume direction of the Far East for the greater Asian security. Hence, the seeds of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are already apparent. Japan could not confidently allow China the strength to defend herself, and so would have to exploit Chinese weakness in order to increase her own strength for the general defence of Asia. Obviously, however, this would animate a Chinese nationalist reaction and Japan would never find a workable solution to this dilemma.

While the Japanese press attacked the government for its caution over sending troops, the public appears to have been patient.[24] This allowed Katsura to act as he preferred. On 12 June, further Japanese forces were readied for despatch, but Katsura was a businessman at heart and calculated on a gradual development of Japan's stock in East Asia. Few believed in China's long-term survival and so there would be other opportunities to improve Japan's position. Better then to move carefully at this point, for, as Katsura explained;[25]

> The Western powers and ourselves are racially different and when we have, at length, achieved the abolition of extraterritoriality, we need resolve and care about joining them in alliance. There are those who scribble or mouth about Japan taking a hold on the Far East, but, in truth, this is our <u>first</u> step towards future control of the region. If we

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[22]Oka Yoshitake, et al, ed., *Konoe Atsumaro Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1968, vol. 3, p. 202-08, entries for 30 June and 4 July 1900.

[23]The same phrase was used by both sources. *Ōsaka Asahi* quoted in Kayano Sei, "Giwadan Jihen to Nihon no Yoron", *Hisutoria*, 44-45, June 1966, p. 29; Kōtoku quoted in Shimomura Fujio, "Seron no Atsuryoku to Shihon no Atsuryoku", *Rekishi Kyōiku*, 10-2, February 1962, p. 47. Kōtoku's opinions on the Boxer war are considered in more detail by Kobayashi Kazumi, *Giwadan Sensō to Meiji Kokka*, Tokyo 1986, p. 463-484.

[24]Kayano, p. 30.

[25]Katsura Jiden (Imai), p. 88; Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 894.

> stumble at the outset, we will undo the work of these many years, so we must take the greatest care. We should use the navy wherever possible and hold back from sending troops.... Once the army is unleashed, it is hard to withdraw.

Navy Minister Yamamoto generally agreed and, while criticising the powers for their earlier inflammatory response to the Boxers, nonetheless recognised the necessity for united action henceforth.[26] He noted one major problem, however. Rewards at the end of the day should correlate to the forces employed, and Japan had to ensure adequate benefits in the post-war settlement. This could not be done by fielding marines alone. Yamamoto also feared division among the powers, each seeking profit individually or in small groups, perhaps leading to a global conflict. In this event, a prominent Japanese force could have major repercussions. Consequently, Japanese interests demanded a limited action in north China, and any Japanese initiative to take place in southern China.

Even as Admiral Seymour's small force prepared to assault Taku, Katsura could no longer rely on marines alone. On 14 June, he assembled general staff officers and, the following day, cabinet approved the despatch of two infantry battalions, approximately 3,000 men, to assist in the coming allied march on Tianjin. Major-General Fukushima Yasumasa was appointed commander on 16 June, and before departure, Katsura explained;[27]

> Your going is by way of an insurance downpayment to the powers, so give all you have (*senshi subeshi* lit. "die in action!"). Even if your squad is completely destroyed, our nation will be entitled to great rewards in the future.

Fukushima may well have hoped the premium could be collected without the annihilation of his men. However, Katsura's real fear was a repeat of 1895;[28]

> Then we gained total military victory but were forced to return the Liaodong territory because of the triple intervention. We have to guard against this happening again and only help the powers after they are in dire straits.

Consequently, Japan should avoid taking the diplomatic lead and ensure Western backing for each new move. Thus, on 16 June, Foreign Minister Aoki cabled London;[29]

> If the British government agrees, the Japanese government can immediately despatch a sizable rescue force. Should the British government not approve, Japan will hold back.

Britain, however, chose to wait and see what happened at the Taku forts. These were bombarded on the evening of 17 June and quickly occupied. On 18 June, the Japanese government ordered Fukushima's small force to sail. The next day, the Chinese government, infuriated by the capture of Taku, gave the foreign representatives twenty-

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[26]Yamamoto memorandum, 24 June 1900, NGB, vol. 33-3, p. 940-45.

[27]Katsura (Imai), p. 89.

[28]Katsura (Imai), p. 91.

[29]Quoted in *Komura Gaikō-shi*, p. 157.

four hours to leave Beijing for Tianjin and the German minister, von Ketteler, was subsequently murdered en route to the Chinese foreign office.[30] On 21 June 1900, China declared war on the powers.

Admiral Seymour, having moved too fast, now found himself outnumbered by Chinese troops. British reserves were still en route from India and London decided it was time to seek Japan's help. After preliminary enquiries by the acting British minister in Tokyo, Aoki assembled the foreign representatives on 23 June and asked for their official views on an increase of Japanese forces.[31] The following day, Katsura decided to have the 5th division in Hiroshima mobilised in readiness. This received cabinet approval on the afternoon of 25 June and Katsura himself took the order to Chief of Staff Ōyama Iwao.

As Terauchi noted, "Truth and lies accompany each other", and no-one even knew whether the diplomats remained in Beijing or were on their way to Tianjin.[32] If they had been massacred, the potential inter-allied disputes might embroil Japan in serious trouble. Her ministers in Europe were carefully monitoring attitudes towards Japan, and these were mixed. French newspapers were ambivalent about Japanese intentions in mid-June, and grew more critical in July.[33] Russian commanders, however, both in St. Petersburg and on the spot in Manchuria had made it clear they felt "henceforth there is no other way but to rely on increased Japanese forces."[34] In Britain, the greatest potential loser in China, there were cautionary voices. Algernon Mitford (Lord Redesdale), one of the earliest British diplomats in Japan, and widely regarded as an expert on the country, wrote to *The Times* on 12 July that Japan's "civilisation" was no more than a veneer and at heart her brutishness no different to that of the Chinese, a view which *The Times* appeared to accept.[35]

This mistrust obviously made Japan hesitant. However, on 5 July, Major-General

[30]With communications from Beijing interrupted, Foreign Minister Aoki was dependent on Yuan Shih-k'ai for confirmation of events, Sakane, p. 326; see, for example, NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 38, and 66, Odagiri (Shanghai) to Aoki, 26 June, 26 July 1900. The U.S. legation in Tokyo was similarly reliant on Yuan for communication with Beijing, F. Huntington Wilson, *Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat*, Boston 1945, p. 103.

[31]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 158.

[32]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 70, entry for 29 June 1900.

[33]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 354, Kurino Shinichirō (Paris) to Aoki, 13 June, p. 416, 20 July 1900.

[34]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 396, Katō (Taku) to Aoki, 3 July 1900, relaying the statement by Admiral Alexieff on 30 June. See also p. 399, Japanese military attache at St. Petersburg to Army Chief of Staff, 6 July 1900, for statements on Russo-Japanese co-operation by War Minister Kuropatkin. For a report of Russian disquiet concerning Japanese intentions in Korea and China, see p. 411-12, Baron Siebold to Aoki, 13 July 1900.

[35]NGB, vol. 33-1, p. 416, Kurino (Paris) to Aoki, 20 July 1900. Kurino returned to the problem of Mitford's letter and its effect in France on 28 July 1900, p. 428-31, and also enclosed a Japanese translation.

Fukushima reported the situation at Tianjin as highly dangerous.[36] The allies were now in the state of desperation anticipated by Katsura and, on 6 July, five days before the arrival of an appeal from the Chinese emperor for Sino-Japanese unity against the West, the Yamagata cabinet decided to join fully with the West and despatch the 5th division, bringing Japanese total ground forces in China to 22,000 men.[37] This gave Japan the largest contingent among the allied force of about 46,000 and made her, in Katsura's phrase, "a major shareholder" in the "pacification enterprise."[38] As before, he gave personal instructions to the 5th division's commander, Lieutenant-General Yamaguchi Motoomi;[39]

> It is essential that we work in unison with the powers and rash independent action will not be allowed. Take great care over this, and maintain a cautious attitude towards all matters concerning the troops, particularly so in regard to the Russian force.

Katsura also ordered Yamaguchi, the most senior of the allied officers, to delegate negotiations with his Western colleagues to the more diplomatically-experienced Fukushima, and thus act only with common approval. In this way, despite being the leading shareholder, Japan could limit her individual responsibility and the attendant diplomatic risks. The government, however, remained nervous and immediately despatched Vice Chief of Staff Terauchi to Tianjin with the express purpose of emphasising Japan's desire for allied co-operation, and to ensure Russo-Japanese understanding on the ground.[40] Thereafter, Japanese troops concentrated on the fighting, but Terauchi reported an overall allied commander was essential to prevent internal conflicts.[41] The cabinet had already refused that position to Yamaguchi, and, on 8 August, when the kaiser requested supreme command of the assault on Beijing for his aging General Waldersee, Yamagata and Katsura agreed unconditionally. Even Itō Hirobumi was appalled at this renunciation of advantage, yet it was consistent with the army's low-key policy and the decision remained.[42] Seven days later, as the Ch'ing court took flight, the allies entered Beijing.

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[36]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 71, entry for 5 July 1900.

[37]The Chinese appeal warned that Japan's future independence was also at stake if China collapsed. It is quoted in Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 205. Li Hung-chang also appealed through the Tō-A Dōbunkai in late July for Japan's help in preventing allied demands for an indemnity at the war's end, Kawamura Kazuo, "Giwadan Jihen no Sai no Konoe Atsumaro Kōra no Tai-Shin Seiryaku", *Chōsen Gakuhō*, 57, October 1970, p. 41; Oka, vol. 3, p. 265-66, entry for 8 August 1900.

[38]Katsura (Imai), p. 91. Terauchi's report on allied contingents in August is reproduced in Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Kankei Monjo: Shushō Izen*, Kyoto 1984, p. 39-40. This shows Britain with about 10,000 men, Russia 6,000, the United States 5,000, France 3,000, and Germany 250 marines. Terauchi warned that these figures were probably inaccurate.

[39]Quoted Kuroda Kōshirō, *Gensui Terauchi Hakushaku-den*, Tokyo 1920, p. 215-16.

[40]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 71-74, entries for 9-22 July 1900; Kuroda, p. 217. Yamagata's instruction to affirm a united military strategy and await further orders concerning any diplomatic matter is given in Yamamoto, *Terauchi Monjo*, p. 37-38.

[41]Kuroda, p. 227, Terauchi report 4 August 1900.

[42]Hattori Shisō, *Meiji no Seijika-tachi*,2 vols., Tokyo 1954, vol. 2, p. 115.

Japan had managed to help rescue the foreign representatives without incurring Western censure. However, it is the abortive Japanese landing at Amoy in September 1900 which is most frequently noted by scholars. By emphasising this in isolation, Japanese policy is made to appear duplicitious, and it is essential to place the landing within Japan's overall policy of *hokushu nanshin* - holding in the north, advancing to the south.

"Hokushu" - Korea

In Katsura's 1896 memorandum, he clearly advocated the policy of *hokushu nanshin*; maintaining a presence in Korea but working to expand Japanese interests through Taiwan to southern China and the South Seas. Russia and Japan had come to terms over Korea with the series of agreements culminating in the Nishi-Rosen protocol, but the Trans-Siberian railway, identified by Yamagata as the signal threat to Japan's existence, remained, and was expected to be complete in 1903. If the Russian threat remained paramount, as proponents of *gashin shōtan* - revenge for the 1895 intervention - declared, then Japan could use the confusion in China, and the internecine Western rivalries described by Katsura, to enhance her position in Korea in readiness. However, as will be seen, the Yamagata cabinet rejected all initiatives in Korea and concentrated on south China. Proponents of a strike into Korea were consequently left to seek popular support, and even this was transitory until Russia's ambitions became clearer in 1903.[43]

In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war, Korea had been relieved of Chinese protection and sought to play off the contending forces of Russia and Japan. However, she had experienced her own troubles with the Tonghak agrarian rising and moderate political reform movement led by the Independence Club (1896-99). Discontent remained with members of both groups hiding either in Korea or as refugees in Japan. Consequently, the Boxer troubles might endanger the Korean monarchy and Emperor Kojong was particularly anxious that Japan would use the Korean refugees against him. In the summer of 1900, he considered ways to limit the threat.

In June, Aoki cabled Minister in Seoul Hayashi Gonsuke to avoid any conflict either within or concerning Korea.[44] Consequently, when Kojong intimated a desire to join with Japan and the allies on 20 and 25 June, Hayashi merely advised caution and ensured

[43]The author has treated these questions in more detail in "Holding in the North: Japanese Policy in Korea During the Boxer War, 1900", *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 40, September 1989.

[44]NGB, vol. 33-2, Aoki to Hayashi, 19 June 1900.

that nothing concrete was decided.[45] Seoul itself remained deathly quiet, but Korean forces at P'yŏngyang were doubled and more troops recruited for the northern border to prevent Chinese infiltration.[46] Sporadic rumours warned of Chinese crossing the border but later reports by Japanese consular police showed these to be groundless.[47] Nonetheless, American Minister Horace Allen was disturbed by Korea's weak defences and, in mid-July, suggested to Hayashi that they undertake plans to protect foreigners, mainly Japanese and Americans, resident north of P'yŏngyang. Hayashi abided by his official instructions and replied that, while the situation needed watching, any action must be taken in consultation with Russia.[48]

Korean apprehension was exacerbated early in July by the arrival of Russian troops in Manchuria, and the terror instilled in Chinese by the Russian massacre at Blagoveshchensk on the 17th.[49] Hayashi now began to question official policy. He warned that Russia would occupy Manchuria, and China would be dismembered, and asked Tokyo for protection of Japanese interests in Korea. While acknowledging Japan's primary concern as south China, he argued that she could quietly take over Inch'ŏn as a military base, thus establishing *de facto* control of Korea south of Seoul, and, reviving an idea proposed by Yamagata in 1894, Russo-Japanese tensions could be eased by a demarcation line from P'yŏngyang to Wŏnsan between the thirty-eighth and fortieth parallels. Japanese warships were shuttling between Inch'ŏn and Chefoo, and a Japanese survey vessel lay off Korea's western coast. Their activities, Hayashi argued, would divert the powers' suspicions until Japanese forces were in place, by which time attention would probably have turned elsewhere.[50] The Yamagata cabinet, however, was unresponsive.

A second invitation for Japan to install troops in Korea came from a surprising source; Emperor Kojong himself. Kojong was dissatisfied at being left to wait on events and in mid-July despatched his chamberlain, Hyŏn Yŏng-un, with a private appeal to Itō Hirobumi, reaffirming Korean-Japanese goodwill, and asking for help in solving the present troubles.[51] Hyŏn arrived in Tokyo on 19 July and presented his argument to the

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[45]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 375, Hayashi to Aoki, 21 June 1900; Ichikawa Masaki, ed., *Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō 8: Hogo oyobi Heigō*, Tokyo 1964, p. 422.

[46]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 375, Hayashi to Aoki, 18 June 1900, p. 389, Shinshō (P'yŏngyang) to Aoki, 20 July 1900.

[47]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 386-89, Shinshō (P'yŏngyang) to Aoki, 20 July 1900.

[48]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 384, Hayashi to Aoki, 16 July 1900.

[49]The bloody details are in Lensen, p. 80-104.

[50]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 379-80, 389-91, Hayashi to Aoki, 5 and 23 July 1900.

[51]Ichikawa, p. 423.

foreign ministry. He also contacted Prince Konoe Atsumaro and the Tō-A Dōbunkai. It seemed that a deal might be arranged whereby Japan expelled the Korean refugees to the United States, and Kojong would consider Japanese troops in Korea to maintain order.[52] Konoe realised that Kojong was acting out of fear and would probably seek Russian help as well, yet the lure of taking effective control over south Korea was strong. The foreign ministry was less convinced, and believed the proposal no more than a cover to remove a refugee Korean prince, Ŭi Hwa, from Japan and so clear the way for the son of Lady Ŏm, Kojong's favourite, to become crown prince. Hyŏn was advised to return to Seoul and commence negotiations through the proper channels.[53]

On the same day as Hyŏn arrived in Tokyo, there had been a further invitation for Japan to intervene in Korea, this time from Russia. Minister Izvolsky approached Itō, regarded as sympathetic to St. Petersburg, with the suggestion that Russia and Japan divide the Korean peninsula and maintain order in their respective spheres.[54] As Foreign Minister Lamsdorf later explained to Izvolsky;[55]

> You were instructed to enter into negotiations with the Tokyo cabinet on this matter merely because Japan had repeatedly expressed views implying that the protocol of 1898 did not sufficiently clearly define the mutual relations of the two powers in regard to Korea.

One can only speculate on the source of Russia's belief. Aoki was known for his Russophobia; Komura Jutarō in St. Petersburg supported an accommodation on Manchuria and Korea, but not on Korea alone; Kurino Shinichirō in Paris was close to Itō in his views, but it may be that Hayashi Gonsuke himself, never loath to speak his mind, had tried to use the Russians to impress action on Tokyo. At first, this seemed to be working, with Yamagata and Itō favourably inclined to the Russian proposal and, in cabinet, only Aoki adamantly opposed.[56] This implies that Katsura was also willing to consider the plan, which would, after all, maintain the balance of power in Korea. That anyone should consider abandoning half of Korea, however, shocked the Tō-A Dōbunkai and from being a cultural society, it now began an outright campaign of political activism. It lobbied ministers and elder statesmen to win support for Aoki; Torio Koyata, an old opponent from the Getsuyōkai days, was sent to Katsura and Itō; and Konoe called on the army general staff.[57] The army under Katsura and Chief of Staff Ōyama remained

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[52]Oka, vol. 3, p. 243, entry for 19 July 1900; Ichikawa, p. 424.

[53]Ichikawa, p. 425.

[54]Oka, vol. 3, p. 247, entry for 21 July 1900; NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 386, Hayashi to Aoki, 19 July 1900, shows Pavlov in Seoul made the same proposal to Hayashi.

[55]Krasny Archive, vol. 2, Lamsdorf to Izvolsky, 17 January 1901, *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 18, (1934-35), p. 578.

[56]Oka, vol. 3, p. 247, entry for 21 July 1900.

[57]Oka, vol. 6, p. 64, entry for 22 July 1900.

committed to official policy, but a staff captain privately placed Konoe in touch with Gotō Shimpei, head of civil affairs in Taiwan. Gotō perceived Japan, Korea, and Fukien, as a single unit, and felt security in Korea essential to protect Japan's southern development. In conversation with Konoe on 23 July, Gotō also revealed another reason for courting war with Russia; the stultifying effect of Japan's passive diplomacy on the public.[58] Entertaining ideas of social imperialism, they agreed that a display of assertiveness would, increase national confidence and cauterise internal divisions. This echoed Yamagata's comment that Japan's island isolation gave her a false sense of security and weakened the spirit of patriotism. It also accorded with the view of Katsura and Kawakami in 1886 on Japan's need for a great power army. The only difference was that the latter argument centred on shaping external attitudes to Japan. Gotō and Konoe, however, were considering Japanese attitudes to the outside and believed that fear would strengthen domestic order. They also seemed confident that a confrontational approach, demanding ever greater defense expenditures of the people, would not widen the very divisions they sought to heal. Consequently, although the cabinet ultimately dismissed Russia's proposal on Korea, the Konoe group decided that Japan must push forward regardless, bring about Kojong's suggested alliance, and even provoke war with Russia.[59]

In Korea, the northern provinces remained alive with rumours, and Chinese ships were reported on the Yalu river. On 23 July, with her invasion of Manchuria progressing, Russia tried to settle affairs. Minister Pavlov in Seoul informed Kojong that 500,000 Russian troops were ready to crush the Boxers in the north, raising the possibility of Chinese refugees entering Korea. Pavlov was sceptical of the Korean army's utility, remarking pointedly, "I hear your troops usually loot and maltreat the people when they enter the provinces. Should they do so when defending the north, you will have your own uprising brewing even before there are rebels on your borders." For security, he urged Korea to accept Russian troops in the north and, at the same time, openly request a Japanese peacekeeping force for the south.[60]

Seoul newspapers speculated that a Russo-Japanese agreement over Korea was imminent, and Kojong feared Japanese troops would land at Inch'ŏn, bringing with them the hated refugees.[61] While Minister Hayashi offered disclaimers, Konoe and Gotō

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[58]Oka, vol. 6, p. 65, entry for 23 July 1900.

[59]Oka, vol. 3, p. 251-53, entries for 25-27 July 1900, vol. 6, p. 66, entries for 26-27 July 1900.

[60]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 401-08, Hayashi to Aoki, 2 and 6 August 1900.

[61]NGB, vol. 33-2, p. 391-408, Hayashi to Aoki, 24 and 25 July 1900, 6 August 1900.

Shimpei continued to demand military action from Tokyo, heedless of the fact that this would give Russia the excuse to act as she wished in the north. Gotō was received coolly by Navy Minister Yamamoto at the end of July, and his old friend Katsura offered only vague assurances.[62] Nonetheless, Gotō chose to interpret Katsura as a supporter of positive action and returned to Taiwan on 30 July to begin planning the *nanshin* - advance on Amoy.

On 4 August 1900, Russian gunships bombarded the Manchurian port of Yingk'ou, causing Boxers and Chinese troops to flee, and giving Russia temporary administration of the city. Even some Konoe supporters now joined Ozaki Yukio and others in calling for a deal over Manchuria for Korea.[63] Yet, despite warnings of financial overextension, Konoe and his group were desperate for Japanese troops in Korea, and their wilder schemes included supplying passage to Manchuria for a Boxer leader, said to be hiding in Tokyo. This, they hoped, would lift Boxer morale, exacerbate the conflict, and create a pretext for Japanese intervention in Korea.[64] They ignored the Yamagata cabinet's apparently supine response over the Waldersee appointment, and continued to believe Itō Hirobumi was the primary obstacle to their goals. With Itō negotiating to head a reformed Jiyūtō, Konoe feared a new and unsympathetic administration would soon be in power. A team of Sassa Tomofusa, Haseba Sumitaka, Tōyama Mitsuru and Inukai Ki, was sent to Itō's house on 17 August to bully him into a firm stance against Russia. It failed miserably.[65] Finally, on 24 September 1900, only days after the formation of Itō's Seiyūkai, Konoe and his comrades turned to the public for support. On that day, they announced the establishment of the Kokumin Dōmeikai, with two support groups of journalists and youths to broadcast the message of "Preserve China, Help Korea." At a general meeting in Tokyo on 21 October, they tempted 1,500 people to brave the heavy wind and rain, and, thereafter, sent speakers around the provinces. However, they received little support from the Itō cabinet, inaugurated on 19 October, and incoming Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki assured Konoe that the Korean situation lacked urgency.[66] In late August 1900, at the urging of Konoe followers in Seoul, Emperor Kojong had despatched Cho Pyŏng-sik to solve the question of Korean refugees, using

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[62]While admitting that Russian troops in Manchuria was disturbing, Katsura implied that this was not sufficiently worrisome to need immediate action, Oka, vol. 6, p. 66-67, entry for 30 July 1900.

[63]Oka Yoshitake, ed., *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Monjo*, (hereafter *Ogawa Monjo*), 2 vols., Tokyo 1973, vol. 1, p. 151, entry for 9 August 1900, shows Torio Koyata inclined to abandon Manchuria to the Russians.

[64]Oka, vol. 3, p. 265, entry for 6 August 1900.

[65]Oka, vol. 3, p. 274-80, entries for 17-18 August 1900.

[66]Oka, vol. 3, p. 365, entry for 6 November 1900.

the defensive alliance as bait. However, Cho saw no point in pursuing matters with Itō in power and decided to return home.[67] Kokumin Dōmeikai agitation continued throughout the new year, causing Russia concern at the volatility of Japanese popular opinion, but by June 1901, the group had lost steam and was considering disbandment.[68]

Kojong continued to trust in Kokumin Dōmeikai promises and, to their delight, sent Foreign Minister Pak Che-jun to Japan in November 1901. However, as before, Korea's primary concern was the refugees, and her unwillingness to ally with Japan alone was obvious.[69] The Itō cabinet declined a further approach from Russia on the neutralisation of Korea in January 1901, arguing repeatedly that the Nishi-Rosen protocol remained satisfactory, and the succeeding Katsura cabinet preferred to let the Pak negotiations lapse upon Russian protest.[70] Thus, Japan adhered to the policy of *hokushu*.

Nanshin - South China

The Japanese government, and Katsura in particular, feared a repeat of the triple intervention if their territorial demands were left to the negotiating table. This fear is essential in understanding the apparent departure from Japan's policy of caution up to late August. Having made no attempt on Korea, and continuing to work in harness with the powers in northern China, Japan felt entitled to advance her interests in southern China. The entire rationale for Japanese policy was detailed in a Yamagata memorandum on 20 August 1900.[71] Repeating Katsura's argument of 1896, Yamagata noted the bitter Western rivalries and how these prevented any individual power from starting a general devouring of Chinese territory. However, it was equally clear in Tokyo that behind the Western protestations of support for China's territorial integrity, each was already hastening to affirm its interests in the manner of Russia in Manchuria and Britain in the Yangtze region. Moreover, while China might survive temporarily, Yamagata believed the Chinese spirit was dying and each power must prepare for the eventual collapse.

> At that time, what should be our plan? Our relationship with China is one of trade, not invasion, protection, not dismemberment. Earlier, we asked for the non-alienation of

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[67]Oka, vol. 3, p. 348-52, entries for 9-11 October 1900.

[68]Krasny Archive, vol. 2, Izvolski to Lamsdorf, 14 January and 9 February 1901, *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 18 (1934-35), p. 575-77, 581-85. The history of the Kokumin Dōmeikai is covered in Sakai Yūkichi, "Konoe Atsumaro to Meiji Sanjūnendai no Tai-Gai Kōha", *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi*, 83-3, August 1970, and Sakeda Masatoshi, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru Tai-Gai Kyōkō Undō no Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1978, ch. 3. Internal discussion of the group's disbandment appears in Oka, vol. 4, p. 218-19, entry for 29 June 1901. The group did disband in April 1902, only to reappear in 1903 following Russia's failure to evacuate Manchuria.

[69]Oka, vol. 4, p. 305-10, entries for 28 October and 3 November 1901; Ichikawa, p. 439-43, for the talks between Pak and Yamaza Enjirō of the foreign office.

[70]F.O. 46/538, Hayashi Tadasu (London) to Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, 29 January 1901; Krasny Archive, Japanese government to Lamsdorf, 9 January 1901; Ichikawa, p. 443.

[71]Ōyama Azusa, *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 255-64.

> Fukien but this was merely to preserve the balance of power and maintain peace. Our plan henceforth should devolve from the same spirit. We should have Fukien, and Chekiang as well, added to our sphere of influence.

Unlike Russia, however, Japan had no obvious pretext for intervention in Fukien. Throughout June, Japanese consular and naval representatives reported the area as calm and orderly, with the Chinese authorities taking pains over the safety of foreigners.[72] There were rumours late in June of possible Chinese troop movements, but the governor-general at Fuzhou remained attentive to foreign anxieties and asked in return that the foreign consuls avoid disturbing his people by keeping their warships out of local harbours.[73] Japanese Consul Toyoshima interpreted this request as arising out of Chinese fears of the powers' intentions, a fear particularly strong in respect of Japan. The foreign consuls refused to forego this privilege, but did agree to an accord on mutual restraint similar to one concluded at Shanghai. Foreign Minister Aoki approved and cabled advance permission for Japanese participation in any action supported by a majority of consuls.[74] Despite some anti-foreign proclamations at the end of the month, the situation remained stable throughout July.

However, as the allies marched on Beijing, Chinese officials ordered preparations against invasion on the central or south-east coast. The Japanese cabinet met on 10 August and agreed that troops should be sent to the Fukienese port of Amoy if necessary. The navy ministry despatched a second vessel in readiness, and Katsura ordered Taiwan Governor-General Kodama to have an expeditionary force standing by. That same day, Aoki asked Kodama by telegram, "Is there any means to bring about a favourable anti-foreign disturbance in Amoy or Fuzhou?"[75] Shortly after, a British vessel arrived at Fuzhou, ostensibly to protect the local ocean cable, and regional tension increased.

With warships in place, it was the Japanese naval command which held the lead in policy decisions over Amoy-Fuzhou. The navy had originally advocated the occupation of Taiwan in 1894, and never supported expansion into Korea or north China. Consequently, they had a vested interest in keeping Japanese attention fixed on the south and, on 13 August 1900, Chief of Naval Affairs Saitō Minoru considered the problem for Yamamoto. Recognising that peace negotiations would be convened soon after the fall of Beijing, and that Japan should occupy Amoy to affirm her sphere of influence, Saitō

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[72]Ōyama Azusa, *Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1980, p. 197.
[73]Ōyama, *Nihon Gaikōshi*, p. 198.
[74]Ōyama, *Nihon Gaikōshi*, p. 198-200.
[75]Quoted Saitō Seiji, "Amoy Jiken Saikō", *Nihonshi Kenkyū*, 305, January 1988, p. 32-33.

suggested;[76]

> We should place two or three warships in Amoy, the location most closely related to our region of non-alienation, and, responding to the situation, have them patrol the ports of Fukien and elsewhere (to observe the popular mood, though without raising local fears), and, when the time arrives, have them occupy the vital point of Amoy and environs.

Saitō admitted that firmness at the peace negotiations might gain Japan her ends in Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, but the memory of 1895 could not be expunged. The following day, Yamamoto ordered the commander of the Izumi, anchored at Amoy, to plan for assaulting the forts in case of emergency. Yamamoto also warned;[77]

> When the time comes for joint action with the foreign nations, ensure that you do not lag behind.... Also, should disquiet appear in the Amoy region, or some other opportunity arise, work with our consul and, on the pretext of defending local Japanese residents, land a number of marines.

Saitō wrote directly to Yamagata and Katsura with details of this order and asked that the main points be conveyed to Kodama in Taipei.[78]

Kodama was impatient and, following his earlier correspondence with Aoki, complained to Vice Chief of Staff Terauchi on 17 August;[79]

> We should occupy Amoy at least and without delay. Since we need a pretext it is no good to leave things to our consul. I have spoken on this to Aoki and believe we can find a way.

Now, with the British vessel at Fuzhou and Consul Ueno at Amoy hesistating, Kodama feared the opportunity would be lost and, enclosing details of his available forces, pressed the government to act.[80]

Saitō's memorandum envisaged about three hundred marines to deal with Amoy and a number of Taiwanese guards to help with the aftermath. He clearly did not intend Japan to oust the Chinese authorities, but merely rattle the sabre and pressure them into diplomatic concessions. An overly strong show of force might only result in a conflagration, effectively destroying Japanese commercial prospects in the region. Earlier scholars depict the army as leading the assault on Amoy over naval protest.[81] However, Katsura could not be blind to the dangers of an expanded conflict in the south

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[76]Saitō Minoru diary, 13 August 1900, quoted Saitō, p. 33-34.

[77]Quoted Ōyama, *Nihon Gaikōshi*, p. 204.

[78]Saitō, p. 32.

[79]Terauchi Papers, 121-17, Kodama letter 17 August 1900; also quoted Yui Masaomi, "Nihon Teikokushugi Seiritsu Ki no Gumbu", Nakamura Masanori et al, ed., *Taikei Nihon Kokkashi: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1976, p. 126. Kodama's earlier suggestion to Aoki was to pull Japanese warships back from Amoy and perhaps convince any militant Chinese the impression of a Japanese retreat, thus enticing them into violence, Saitō, p. 36.

[80]Saitō, p. 36; Yui, p. 126.

[81]For example, Nakayama Jiichi, in Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 208.

and, after consulting Terauchi on 21 August, sent explicit instructions to Kodama on 23 August;[82]

> In view of the need to occupy Amoy at an appropriate moment, the navy minister ordered the commander of the Izumi on 14 August to plan for the seizure of Amoy forts, to land marines swiftly once the opportunity arises, and then occupy the port. When you receive the request from the Izumi's commander, quickly despatch from your forces up to one infantry battalion, two artillery batteries, and two engineering batteries. Then, in co-operation with the navy, you should complete the objective. Make advance preparations to this end.

While allowing Kodama to despatch something over 1,000 troops, Katsura's order clearly limited the size of Taiwanese forces, and also assigned full responsibility to the navy as to whether and when these troops would be needed.

Kodama, however, was already working on a forward policy. On 18 August, a payment of 600 yen was made from the Taiwan government-general to the Japanese Higashi Honganji temple in Amoy.[83] Six days later, the temple was razed in suspicious circumstances, giving Japan her pretext. Marines were immediately landed to protect Japan's consulate, and a further squad followed on 25 August to defend Japanese residents and property.

That same day, Kodama wrote back to Terauchi, criticising the timidity of Japan's consular and naval authorities in Amoy, and repeating the fear that Japan might yet lose her opportunity. He attacked Katsura's restriction of his troops as unsafe, and suggested an increase of two companies of infantry plus one of artillery. However, even this force, he argued, would be incapable of mobile action in the event of matters spreading to Fuzhou, and so he asked Terauchi to prepare troops from within Japan. In closing, he gave assurances that his men were ready and merely waiting for news from Amoy.[84]

This was slow in coming. The navy general staff wanted to retain control over policy and despatched Lieutenant Hirose Katsuhiko to Amoy via Taiwan. In Taipei, Hirose talked with Kodama and Gotō Shimpei, and, after cabling the naval commander at Amoy to land further marines on 24 August, attempted to sail with Gotō to direct matters on the spot. Delayed by bad weather, Hirose and Gotō jointly wired Amoy on 27 August, urging Japan's consul and naval commander to request Taiwanese support without delay. That same day, the desired call arrived;[85]

> Although there is slight evidence that the forts are being strengthened, two Chinese

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[82]Quoted in full in Saitō, p. 37; Ōyama, *Nihon Gaikōshi*, p. 205; Yui, p. 126. See also Ian Nish, "Japan's Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 20-4, August 1961, p. 451-53.

[83]Saitō, p. 37, notes the payment.

[84]Terauchi Papers, 121-18, Kodama letter 25 August 1900.

[85]Quoted Saitō, p. 43; Ōyama, p. 206.

> ships have entered the harbour, there seems to be a general increase in troop numbers, and Chinese officers have requested withdrawal of part of our force protecting our residents. We believe this clearly reveals their aggressive intentions.

The Chinese authorities were given an ultimatum; relinquish the forts or face attack. Yamamoto sent further vessels to Amoy and Kodama despatched the first of his troops. On 28 August, Hirose and Gotō finally arrived at Amoy and conferred on the coming assault. Simultaneously, Aoki had Minister Hayashi Tadasu advise the British government that Amoy had "frequently been the basis of secret and dangerous attempts against the security of the Formosan Islands" and this latest outrage necessitated the landing of "a small force" to protect the Japanese consulate and foreign population.[86]

The problem was that Japan's "small force" threatened to expand rapidly, rendering the situation uncontrollable. Kodama appeared undisturbed by the prospect of war in the south, but a successful full-scale military action would require close army-navy co-operation. Given the history of the two forces, this could not be guaranteed, and the navy clearly resented Kodama's assertiveness. Also, this kind of violent adventurism would undo all Japan's effort in the north. A limited threat bringing diplomatic concessions was the aim of Yamagata, Katsura, and Yamamoto, not a second front to a dying war.

Early in the morning of 28 August 1900, Saitō Minoru ordered naval forces at Amoy to halt all action until the situation was grave enough to warrant it. Immediately thereafter, Yamagata, Katsura, Yamamoto, Aoki, Terauchi, and Saitō, went into conference at the foreign ministry. The British, American, and German consuls at Amoy had protested Japan's landing and now the cabinet had to decide its response. In fact, discussion quickly degenerated into an argument between Katsura and Yamamoto. Katsura defended the army's wish to join in any action at Amoy, while Yamamoto lashed both the endangering of international trust and what he saw as army intrusiveness.[87] However, the meeting agreed on the weakness of Japan's position in Amoy and resulted in a joint telegram by Yamamoto and Katsura aborting the attack for insufficient evidence of a threat to Japanese interests.[88] The cabinet resumed debate on 29 August but, despite appeals for positive action from Gotō and Hirose, the mission was at an end. That day, Aoki informed the British government that Japanese marines had pulled back following Chinese assurances regarding all foreign citizens.[89]

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[86]F.O. 46/535, Aoki to Hayashi Tadasu, 28 August 1900. Japanese Consul Odagiri at Shanghai was also ordered to explain the landing to his foreign colleagues.

[87]NGB, vol. 33-3, p. 945-46, appendix to Yamamoto memorandum, 24 June 1900; Takagi Sōkichi, "Yamamoto Gombei to Teikoku Kaigun no Kakuritsu", *Chūō Kōron*, 80-8, August 1965, p. 343-44.

[88]Telegram quoted Saitō, p. 46; Ōyama, *Nihon Gaikōshi*, p. 207-08; Yui, p. 127.

[89]F.O. 46/535, Aoki to Hayashi, 29 August 1900; also, Saitō, p. 47.

Complex reasons are unnecessary for Japan's backdown in Amoy. It had been clear from mid-August that an occupation should proceed if the pretext arose. Kodama had attempted to force such a pretext, but even in the aftermath of the Higashi Honganji's burning, the only evidence of Chinese aggression was slight and circumstantial. The Yamagata cabinet realised that foreign protests could not be assuaged on such slender grounds and chose to cut its losses. Moreover, there was an impending loss of central military control. The end result would have been to forfeit both hard-won foreign trust and Chinese goodwill.

Aftermath

Following the Amoy decision, there was no further deviation from the cabinet's low-key policy. Katsura feared that Japan might stumble into difficulties at the negotiating table, and was anxious to maintain her tenuous acceptance among the "civilised nations" (*bunmei kokka*) by adopting a reduced diplomatic profile. As he explained in his memoirs;[90]

> To this end, it was essential that we withdrew the greater part of our forces as soon as possible, go no further than making the downpayment mentioned earlier, look to retain our inclusion among the powers, and, in the future, move forward step by step in the Far Eastern problem. In order not to lose the position already gained, we had to move forward in fits and starts.

Cabinet debated the question on 5 and 6 September and, although Katsura initially proposed a seventy-five percent withdrawal, it was agreed that half the troops be repatriated.[91]

There was good reason for Katsura's anxiety. Beijing was described as like "a huge city of the dead where the tombs had been thrown down and enveloped in dust."[92] There was widespread violence and looting, some involving Western diplomats and journalists, and victims included T'ang Shao-yi, soon to be a major figure in Chinese diplomacy and right-hand to Yuan Shih-k'ai, who later recounted that he lost everything, including his wife and daughter, and was himself saved from hanging only by the intervention of Japanese troops.[93] Japanese troops, however, were careful to avoid censure by either

[90]Katsura Jiden, (Imai), p. 92-93; a slightly different version is given in Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 901-02.

[91]Yamamoto, *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 80, entries for 4-6 September 1900; Terauchi Papers, 104-2, Katsura Tarō letter, 7 September 1900.

[92]G.A. Lensen, ed., *Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan 1895-1904: the Observations of Sir Ernest Satow*, Tokyo 1968, p. 12.

[93]The "tomb-robbers" included British Minister Claude MacDonald, correspondents Putnam Weale, Henry Savage-Landor, and George Morrison of *The Times*, J.O.P. Bland Papers, draft memoirs, ch. 10, p. 6. Morrison was heard to say after looting a Manchu prince's house - "I have left him the glass in the windows, but nothing else", quoted Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Hermit of Peking*, London 1976, p. 53-54. On T'ang Shao-yi, Bland Papers, diary, 25 May 1906.

Westerners or Chinese.[94] At the subsequent peace conference, Japan attempted to bridge East and West and moderate Western retaliation against China, but stopped short of isolating herself from the other powers.[95]

As for Katsura, he returned to Hayama on 15 September, just as Itō Hirobumi announced the formation of the Seiyūkai.[96] To unsettle this new party, Yamagata immediately nominated Itō as prime minister, just as Itō had proposed the Kenseitō only days after its formation in 1898. Katsura professed himself exhausted and ill after three years as army minister, and was bitter that Yamagata had passed him over for the premiership. He repeatedly asked to resign but Itō, perhaps realising the difficulty in finding another army minister for a party-based cabinet, begged him to stay on, a plea reinforced by the emperor's own entreaties.[97] For nearly three months, Katsura continued to plead ill health and finally, on 23 December, gained his wish. As his replacement, he suggested Kodama Gentarō, still no doubt aggrieved by the Amoy affair, and returned to Hayama, planning both to revisit Europe, and with a promise from Chief of Staff Ōyama to assume that post when Ōyama resigned.[98] However, the brief existence of the Itō cabinet would ensure that neither plan came to fruition.

[94]Nonetheless, there were isolated cases of Japanese officers confiscating silver bullion and religious artefacts. Details in Matsushita Yoshio, *Riku-Kaigun Sōdōshi*, Tokyo 1965, p. 171-79.

[95]For example, Japan argued against the death penalty for senior members of the Chinese court on the grounds that such severity would only cause further troubles, F.O. 46/535, Japanese Govt. to Lansdowne, 19 November 1900. The position of Japan on the various issues debated at Beijing, including the destruction of Taku forts, prohibition of arms imports to China, and foreign administration of Tianjin, is taken up by Kayano Sei, "Giwadan Jihen Go no Tai-Chūgoku Seisaku", *Hisutoria*, 55, April 1969.

[96]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 82, entry for 15 September 1900.

[97]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 940-41; Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 3, p. 356, Katsura letters to Itō, 14 and 19 November 1900; *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 89-91, entries for 15-30 November 1900.

[98]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 949-51.

Chapter 7

PRIME-MINISTER 1901-04

In 1901, Katsura Tarō was fifty-four years old, the father of four boys and five girls, and a senior figure in Japanese military politics. Yet his future remained unclear. After the early decades of study overseas, rapid promotion, and sculpting a modern army, he had endured embarrassment in the war with China, humiliation at Yamagata's hands in 1896, and a year in the political wilderness during 1897. In 1901, he would reach the premiership, but only due to the convergence of two related phenomena: the declining will of the Meiji oligarchs to defend their authority in person, and the maturing of the political parties within the constitutional framework. To maintain these two opposing forces in a workable relationship, a compromise figure was essential, and equally essential was that such a figure be adept at compromising. Katsura's extraordinary talent for dealing with party men had been observed by Miyake Setsurei. To Katsura, the oligarchs now reluctantly turned. However, he was keenly aware of his position, and of the failing energies of the oligarchs. Henceforth, he would gradually build his own network of contacts, particularly to that rising force of Japanese politics, the popular parties.

After the Boxer war, Russia appeared dangerously entrenched in Manchuria, while Japan's defense preparations for the coming Trans-Siberian rail confronted her with a financial crisis. The Itō cabinet had no solution for either problem. The government's attempt to introduce a consumption tax was furiously opposed by the House of Peers, led by Prince Konoe, while Konoe's Kokumin Dōmeikai was already plotting to undermine both the cabinet and Seiyūkai.[1] Russian minister Izvolski reported gloomily;[2]

> It is impossible not to see the extraordinary similarity between the present condition of Japanese home affairs and that which immediately preceded the Sino-Japanese war.

However, the emperor was used to muzzle Konoe in March 1901, and Itō sought

[1]Oka Yoshitake et al, ed., *Konoe Atsumaro Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1968, vol. 4, p. 26, 45, entries for 22 January, 9 February 1901.

[2]Krasny Archiv, Izvolski to Foreign Minister Lamsdorf, 1 March 1901, *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 18, 1934-35, p. 585-88.

alternative funds in America using unofficial envoy, Sugiyama Shigemaru.[3] Sugiyama left in May 1901, but the cabinet had already split over Finance Minister Watanabe's drastic retrenchment plan and the Seiyūkai ministers walked out *en masse* on 30 April.[4] Despite pressure from the *genrō* to reconsider, Itō followed by resigning on 10 May.

Itō chose Inoue Kaoru as his successor. Both Yamagata and Matsukata approved and Inoue received the imperial command on 16 May. That same day, he asked for a meeting with Katsura who had kept himself in self-imposed isolation at Hayama since the previous December, visiting Tokyo only in April 1901 for discussions with Itō on his prospective European trip. Perceiving the cabinet's troubles, however, Katsura had remained nearby, waiting to see what developed. Inoue had long been a close friend, and, in 1898, had by adoption given the prestige of his name to Katsura's wife, Kanako. Now Inoue hesitated about the premiership and asked Katsura to replace him. Katsura, equally aware of the nation's problems, and recalling his past experiences in 1896 and 1900, declined, and tried to dissuade Inoue himself from taking up the post. Inoue, however, felt responsible to the emperor and asked Katsura to serve as army minister. Whether from honour or guile, Katsura refused on the grounds that, having proposed Kodama as Itō's army minister, he would not now oust him. As slight consolation, Katsura promised to defer his European trip and support Inoue unofficially.[5]

Inoue was similarly rebuffed by financier Shibusawa Eiichi, Yamamoto Gombei, and diplomat Katō Takaaki, and finally conceded defeat. On 22 May 1901, Yamagata concluded that the only remaining candidate was Katsura. The next day, he sent Kodama to explore Katsura's views. Matsukata also visited Katsura that evening and for the following two days he and Inoue co-ordinated a series of calls and letters all designed to win his acceptance.[6]

Katsura's natural caution has been noted and he refused to act until he had full *genrō* support. It was rumoured that Itō wanted to be reappointed after the failure of all alternatives, the Seiyūkai were certain opponents of a Katsura cabinet, and Japanese finances could not be settled without compromise in the Diet. The *genrō* had come to Katsura as a last resort and he vented his frustration to Inoue;[7]

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[3]Oka, vol. 4, p. 85-93, entries for 8, 12 March 1901; Uno Shunichi, "Dai-Ichi-ji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols., Tokyo 1981, vol. 1, p. 374.

[4]Nakagawa Kojūrō, *Kindai Nihon no Seikyoku to Saionji Kimmochi*, Tokyo 1987, p. 1-2.

[5]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 966-69.

[6]Tokutomi, vol. 1, 971-72; Tokutomi Iichirō, ed., *Kōshaku Matsukata Masayoshi-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1935, rep. 1976, vol. 2, p. 808-09; Uno, p. 367-71.

[7]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 972.

> In or out of office, the genrō have the imperial trust, and the responsibility to help the nation out of trouble. So, there can be no obstacle when they keep the premiership among themselves as they have done up to now. But I just don't understand when they appoint someone else. If that person trusts them, takes up the post, and doesn't keep their confidence, what then?

The solution, as Katsura increasingly realised, was to extend one's own contacts throughout the organs of constitutional government. However, for the moment, the *genrō* retained control of prime ministerial appointments and they finally agreed on Katsura. He was called to the palace to receive the appointment on 26 May but spent the following three days trying to coerce Itō back into the job. This pressure forced Itō into a declaration before the emperor that he had no intention of returning to the post and, on the morning of 30 May, Katsura finally accepted the premiership of Japan.[8]

The Premiership

Katsura's military career revealed his genius in administration and human relations. Now, while remaining on active service by special imperial command, he effectively left the army for the political arena. His son-in-law, Nagashima Ryūji, once said that Katsura had a greater appetite for politics than even food.[9] Indeed, he shared Lyndon Johnson's love of politics as a human art, and his famous *nikopon-shugi*, a physical jocularity, resembles Johnson's intimate style. Speaking before the Diet, he was uninspiring and monotonous, but in small groups he shone. Ozaki Yukio loathed his "vulgarity" but politics is by definition a matter of the *vulgus* - the common people. Even Katsura's opponents admitted his charm, one critic writing incredulously of his ability to balance amicably a wilful mistress, O-Koi, with a highly-strung wife, and, in a similar fashion, retain the favour of both Yamagata and Itō.[10]

Popular opinion, however, gave Katsura less than three days in office. The first hurdle was to convince able men to serve under him. Yamamoto Gombei, having obstructed Katsura's nomination in the spring of 1900, was a problem, but, with pressure from naval elder statesman Saigō Jūdō, and Katsura's promise to support naval expansion, Yamamoto agreed to stay as minister.[11] Their association remained difficult, and, though Katsura denied any conflict in his memoirs, Yamamoto was said to be

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[8]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 970-81; Uno, p. 370-72; Nakagawa, p. 4-6.

[9]Nagashima Ryūji, *Seikai Hiwa*, Tokyo 1928, p. 90. Nagashima married Katsura's third daughter, Kiyoko, in December 1906.

[10]Takahashi Tetsutarō, *Katsura Kō Kōzai Shiron*, Tokyo 1914, p. 9-11.

[11]Kaigun Daijin Kambō, ed., *Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun*, Tokyo 1966, p. 123-26. Katsura thanked Yamamoto by promising to serve under him should he ever become prime minister. Yamamoto dismissed the remark curtly. See also Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 972, Inoue letter to Katsura, 25 May 1901.

openly insulting the prime-minister in cabinet.[12]

Katsura naturally retained Kodama as army minister, and brought in Sone Arasuke, a competent bureaucrat and follower of Yamagata, as minister of finance. As foreign minister, however, he even considered Itō Miyoji, whose strong party connections but lack of diplomatic experience suggests that Katsura's first concern was to obtain Diet approval of financial reforms and military funding. The offer came to nothing, and Katsura then turned to Katō Takaaki, formerly minister to London, and another with links to party heads. Finally, in a letter of 11 June 1901, he returned to his acquaintance of the Sino-Japanese war, choosing a man barely known to the public, but with service as minister to Beijing, Seoul, Washington D.C., and St. Petersburg, and then acting as Japanese plenipotentiary to the Boxer conference: Komura Jutarō.[13]

While Komura may not have been Katsura's first choice, their cabinet partnership was marked by extreme harmony. The only major disagreements came over the 1905 Portsmouth treaty and subsequent Harriman railway plan. At the outset, Komura requested full diplomatic authority and, while Katsura often intruded on financial policy under Sone, he placed fundamental trust in Komura.[14] They also complemented each other in domestic circles. Komura had no taste for parties or clan factions, whereas Katsura moved easily among men like Hoshi Tōru and, after Hoshi's assassination, Hara Kei.[15] Komura was popular with diplomatic activists such as the Genyōsha and Kokumin Dōmeikai, and appointed as his chief of political affairs, Yamaza Enjirō, son-in-law of Konoe's associate, Kōmuchi Tomotsune.[16]

Komura's vision also complemented Katsura's practical style. Directly after arriving from Beijing, he presented Katsura, then recuperating from a cold at Hayama, with a ten-year projection on domestic and foreign policy.[17] While espousing cost-saving administrative and army reforms, Komura advocated expansion of armaments,

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[12]Itō Miyoji Diary, Kenseishiryōshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo, entry for 9 October 1901. This reference courtesy of Dr. Andrew Fraser.

[13]Katsura's letter to Komura is in Shinobu Jumpei, *Komura Jutarō*, Tokyo 1942, p. 104.

[14]Sone's abilities were to come under severe criticism from Itō on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war and he was nearly forced to resign, Tokutomi, *Matukata Masayoshi-den*, vol. 2, p. 883-84.

[15]A revealing story is told of Komura and party politicians. At school in the 1870's, he purchased a photograph of Okuma Shigenobu and inscribed on the back, "To Mr. Komura from his friend Okuma", which he then pretended was genuine to his classmates, Shinobu, p. 30. It should be noted, of course, that this was before Okuma became a party leader.

[16]To ensure conservative support, Katsura agreed to meet Konoe as representative of the Kokumin Dōmeikai on 7 June, and also invited representatives from all factions in the House of Peers to his residence on 17 June, Oka, *Konoe Nikki*, vol. 4, p. 206, 211, entries for 7, 17 June 1900.

[17]Details in Gaimushō, *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 206-15; summary in Honda Kumatarō, *Tamashii no Gaikō*, Tokyo 1941, p. 6-8.

communications, shipping and overseas trade, all vital to strengthen Japan's financial base. He assigned particular importance to railway nationalisation and expansion, completion of strategic and commercial lines in south China and Korea, and naval expansion to defend Japan's international interests. Sino-Japanese relations, he argued, should be developed through joint economic projects. Komura acknowledged that China was suspicious regarding Japanese enterprises, but suggested that a government-sponsored bank, with protected investments and utilisation of Japanese financial syndicates, would guarantee economic success, thus employing mutual commercial prosperity gradually to dispel this mistrust. Official support was already extended to Japanese enterprise in Taiwan, and the government's profile would be even stronger in the, ostensibly Sino-Japanese, South Manchurian Railway Company (1906) and Katsura's own project, the nominally Japanese-Korean Oriental Development Company (1908).

However, Sino-Japanese commerce could not develop with Russia hovering in Manchuria. To deal with the problem, Japan needed first money for the military, and an ally to counter a possible Franco-Russian coalition. Tentative discussions were held commenced with French and German financiers, but Katsura remained confident in the continuing Sugiyama mission to America.[18] By September, however, the Americans were questioning why Japan did not simply increase taxes and, on 24 October 1901, the Tokyo press reported the collapse of negotiations.[19]

Limited funds could be raised by selling bonds on Japan's share of the Boxer indemnity, and this would avoid increasing the tax burden on Japanese landowners or consumers. However, individual shares were still undecided and would not be paid for several years, if at all given China's political instability. Consequently, when the Diet received the proposal in December 1901, it was widely criticised, with Ozaki Yukio of the Seiyūkai leading the attack. Katsura immediately suggested talks and, on 18 December, offered Yamamoto and Sone as government negotiatiors.[20] The Seiyūkai chose Katsura over Sone, and the two sides met at the Imperial Hotel the following day. The talks were inconclusive and remained so despite the intervention of Inoue Kaoru.

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[18]On 21 August 1901, Katsura wrote that American financiers seemed likely to approve a loan of up to fifty-eight million yen, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 3-5, letter to Yamagata. Discussions between Aoki and German financiers and Sone and the French were reported by the acting British minister to Tokyo, British Foreign Office Records, FO 46/540, J.B. Whitehead to Lansdowne, 22 July 1901. Inoue also helped by entering highly secret discussions with an American financier in Tokyo, all the while keeping Katsura informed, Katsura papers, 16-6, 16-8, 16-16, Inoue letters, 22 June, 29 July, 12 September 1901.

[19]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 1005-07; Uno, p. 375.

[20]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 1, p. 374, entry for 18 December 1901; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 12-14.

Katsura was now helped by the appearance of discord between *genrō* Itō Hirobumi and his Seiyūkai colleagues. The Katsura cabinet had been weakened by the failure of the American loan, and the worsening international situation mitigated against Japanese political unrest at this time. With this in mind, Itō, then in St. Petersburg, had cabled the Seiyūkai against a violent attack on the government.[21] He also argued that France and Germany had utilised their prospective shares of the indemnity in the manner proposed by Katsura, and some in the Seiyūkai suspected that Katsura had secured Itō's approval before departure.[22] The party was left without its president's support, and was further undermined by a faction within the Seiyūkai, the Hamanoya-gumi, led by Den Kenjirō and Inoue Kakugorō, which shared Itō's concerns. Consequently, in talks at the prime-minister's residence on 25 December, Matsuda Masahisa and Ozaki Yukio for the Seiyūkai were forced to compromise, accepting only a slight reduction in the government estimate of the indemnity's value, and an official promise on financial and bureaucratic retrenchment.[23] Thus, Katsura had succeeded in the first step towards ameliorating Japanese finances.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Itō's presence in St. Petersburg, nominally part of a private trip, was in fact with the hope of discussing a Russo-Japanese settlement over Korea and Manchuria. At the same time, the balance of Japanese opinion was towards alliance with Britain, then feeling herself a "weary Titan" as the war in south Africa dragged on, and negotiations towards this end were already in progress.[24] The view of Yamagata and the army was that China would eventually collapse, but a sudden, explosive convulsion might be avoided by a concert of Japan, Britain and Germany, restraining the Russian threat to Beijing.[25] Such an alliance, they believed, would support Japanese commercial and industrial development, and also prevent war.

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[21]Itō's telegram appears in Hara, vol. 1, p. 369, entry for 4 December 1901.

[22]Itō telegram in Hara, vol. 1, p. 373, entry for 18 December 1901.

[23]The Seiyūkai reponded to this relative defeat by expelling the Hamanoya-gumi. The negotiations are detailed in Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 19-22; Uno, p. 388-89; Hara, vol. 1, p. 381-82, entry for 25 December 1901; W.W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era, 1867-1912*, London 1916, rep. 1965, p. 278.

[24]A letter from Valentine Chirol, then foreign editor of *The Times*, is worth quoting. "Lo Feng-loh (Chinese minister to London) was not far wrong when he said to Lord Salisbury who was putting him off with his favourite "Weary Titan" sort of argument, "Ah, what a pity it is, my Lord, that the two greatest empires of the world should be in a state of decadence at the same time!" Lord Salisbury used to tell the story against himself with great zest because there's so much truth in it", J.O.P. Bland draft memoirs, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, ch. 12, p. 5.

[25]Ōyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 264-66, memo. of 24 April 1901, "Our relations with Russia have not yet collapsed, but sooner or later there will be a great collision.... the only way to avoid this and prevent war is by girding ourselves with outside strength to limit her southern advance."

Katsura had explained his own position following discussion of a British alliance with Itō on 4 August 1901;[26]

> Since the Sino-Japanese war, there have been arguments both for siding with Russia and with Britain. The matter is still undecided. The pro-Russian party says that she is determined to carry out her wishes and to oppose her would not only cause grave problems, it is simply beyond our power to do so. Their argument is based on a temporary peace.... However, as I see it, Russian policy will not stop with occupying Manchuria. Having taken Manchuria, she will inevitably reach for Korea and she will not stop until she leaves us without room to breathe. If so, then to side with Russia now would only buy a moment's respite, and, in the end, we would be forced to submit.... I do not agree with the pro-Russian view, but, if Russia is truly friendly towards us, then, even if it is only temporary, there is no need for us to destroy that goodwill. Simply, we should realise it is only temporary and resolve to fight in the end.
>
> On the other side, Britain's goodwill towards us is based on calculation of her own self-interest. It is clear she has no territorial desire. Her influence extends virtually throughout the globe and she has no intention of fighting us to get land. Her plan is just to use us to oppose Russia's Far Eastern advance. This is particularly true now when she has no spare force due to the south African affair. For these reasons, I support responding to Britain's request.

Katsura acknowledged Itō's fear that Britain was motivated by selfishness, and any union with her might prove unsatisfactory, yet his first concern, as he wrote to Itō on 28 August, was "to construct an effective way to clear up the Korean problem, and, to do this, one way or another we must open talks with Russia."[27] Consequently, as long as the possibility existed that Itō might persuade the Russians to compromise, Katsura remained open-minded, and the appointment as minister to St. Petersburg of Kurino Shinichirō, a man demonstrably sympathetic to Itō's view was designed to balance the negotiations then taking place in London.[28]

Itō's trip, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have been studied in detail by Ian Nish.[29] All that needs to be said here is that Katsura agreed to Itō discussing matters in St. Petersburg on a private basis, and provided government assistance with travel arrangements and expenses.[30] In return, he asked only to be kept informed. He was also aware, following Minister Hayashi Tadasu's report from London on 15 July 1901, that

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[26]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 1055-57.

[27]Katsura letter to Itō, 28 August 1901, Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 3, p. 359-60.

[28]Hiratsuka Atsushi, *Shishaku Kurino Shinichirō-den*, Tokyo 1942, p. 268-69. Kurino's appointment was made on 20 September 1901. Kurino expressed his view on exchanging Manchuria for Korea in a lengthy memorandum to Katsura and Komura and received what he took to be firm encouragement from them at a prime-ministerial dinner on 16 October, Hiratsuka, p. 255-59; Imai Shōji, "Nichi-Ei Dōmei to Kurino Shinichirō", *Rekishi Kyōiku*, 10-2, Feb. 1962, p. 41.

[29]*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, London 1966, 2nd ed. 1985; "British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1892-1905", B.J. McKercher/D.J. Moss, ed., *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy*, Edmonton 1984; "Itō Hirobumi in St. Petersburg, 1901", G. Daniels, ed., *Europe Interprets Japan*, Tenterden 1984.

[30]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 1064; Masumi Junnosuke, *Nihon Seitōshi-ron*, 7 vols., Tokyo 1966, vol. 2, p. 401. Katsura asked the palace for 30,000 yen for Itō's trip but Imperial Household Minister Tanaka Mitsuaki, one of the victims of the earlier Getsuyōkai affair, refused and offered only a gold watch and table-cloth as parting gifts. Katsura was forced to beg a loan of 20,000 yen from Mitsui.

Britain feared a Russo-Japanese alliance, and that this fear could be used as a negotiating lever.[31] At the very least, as Katsura realised, Itō's appearance in St. Petersburg enhanced this advantage.

However, Katsura's real expectation was that Russia would be conciliatory only after an alliance with Britain had been concluded. Negotiations in London moved unexpectedly fast. Once Britain's seriousness was clear, Itō's presence in St. Petersburg became potentially embarrassing, and Katsura grew impatient for him to complete his journey.[32] Confusion ensued between the two men, and although Katsura tried to blame this on Itō in his memoirs, even the loyal Tokutomi Sohō later declared this unjust.[33] However, the rift was not so great. As noted above, Itō advised the Seiyūkai against attacking the government, and Katsura wrote comfortingly on 29 December that, "concerning possible concessions to Russia in Manchuria, I am in complete agreement with you."[34] As he hoped, once the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in January 1902, Itō fell in line and publicly expressed his approval.[35]

With the exception of partial treaty revision in 1894, the alliance was Japan's greatest diplomatic success to date, and gave her enormous prestige. However, the British remained cautious about possible Japanese demands either for naval support or concerning freedom of action in Korea.[36] The alliance also forced Japan to carry out a major expansion of her navy and this would bring Katsura and the parties into an ever deeper relationship. Nonetheless, the cabinet gained a breathing space with the public and on 27 February 1902 Katsura was rewarded with the rank of count and Komura that of baron.

The response of China's leaders to the alliance was generally favourable. Prince Ch'ing, increasingly in command of Chinese diplomacy following the death of Li Hung-chang, stated that it would certainly speed Russia's evacuation of Manchuria.[37] Whether

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[31]Imai, p. 40.

[32]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 1075, 1080, Katsura telegrams to Itō, 17, 20, 27 November 1901. Hara Kei later remarked on the surprising speed of Britain's response, Hara, vol. 2, p. 3, entry for 12 February 1902.

[33]Tokutomi points out Katsura's misinformation in vol. 1, p. 1060.

[34]Tokutomi, vol. 1, p. 1121-22.

[35]Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, p. 225.

[36]For British worries, Nish, p. 214-15; Hara, vol. 2, p. 37, entry for 30 November 1902. British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne believed Japan was sincere in wishing to avoid a fight with Russia and the visit of Itō only served to confirm his view, FO. 800/134, Lansdowne Papers, Lansdowne to MacDonald (Tokyo), 31 March 1902.

[37]George Lensen, ed., *Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow*, Tokyo 1968, p. 173,179. Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, seemed to care only about the return of Tianjin from allied control, and considered this would be delayed as a result of the alliance.

this meant that China would side more closely with Japan in the future, or merely discard her after Russia had been ejected from Manchuria, could only be gleaned in time. For the present, her leading contacts, Chang Chih-tung, Liu K'un-i, and Yuan Shih-k'ai, had all emerged well from the Boxer trouble and their reform movement enjoyed imperial support.[38] In 1901, Japan sought to improve these ties by vigorously supporting China against Russia's demands in Manchuria, and worked with Britain to fulfil Yuan Shih-kai's request for the return of Tianjin to Chinese authority.[39] Her rewards, however, were slight. The Chinese government offered thanks and sent further students to Japan, but Russia returned to influence in Beijing, based, it was said, on bribes to Chinese courtiers and Manchu clansmen, after the first Russian troop withdrawals from Manchuria in October 1902.[40] Another rival, Germany, overtook Japan in the race for commissions on railways and arms supplies in Yuan's own region, and fought Japan for concessions with the Hanyehping ironfields.[41]

Funding an Imperial Navy

The Japanese army had long cherished the idea of "army leads, navy follows," but, in the 1890s, had come to accept that an island state like Japan could not rely on the military alone. Now, however, in order to meet the continental threat of Russia, Japan had allied herself to the leading naval power, and the army would find itself compelled to support a vast expansion of the Japanese fleet, which, would also enhance the navy's political authority. The final irony was that, were Japan to contain the Russian threat, this would allow her to expand in Korea and consequently restore authority to the army. By 1902, however, the Diet was the key to naval expansion, and General Katsura would have to fight a long campaign under the navy's banner.

The third-stage of Japan's on-going naval expansion consisted of twelve battleships, twelve first-class cruisers, and ten second-class cruisers, with new docks at Maizuru, Kure, and Sasebo.[42] The expenses involved were immense: nearly one hundred million

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[38]Ichiko Chūzō, "Political and Institutional Reform 1901-1911", Denis Twitchett/J.K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11-2, Cambridge 1980, p. 375, quotes the imperial edict of 29 January 1901, "What misleads the country can be expressed in one word, selfishness and what suffocates all under heaven is precedent."

[39]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 203-04; Lensen, p. 156, diary for 7 September 1901; Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shih-k'ai in Beijing and Tianjin 1901-1908*, Berkeley 1980, p. 40-45. The allied administration of Tianjin was finally ended on 15 August 1902.

[40]Bland Papers, letter to Valentine Chirol, 9 February 1903.

[41]Bland above, suggests that this German success was also based on bribes. On the Hanyehping loan, Marius Jansen, "Yawata, Hanyehping, and the Twenty-One Demands", *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 23, 1954, p. 35; Nagura Bunji, "Kindai Kōgyō Gijutsu to Genryō Shigen Mondai", Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai et al, ed., *Kōza Nihon Rekishi 8: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1985, p. 255. A loan of 30 million yen from the Nihon Kōgyō Ginkō was signed on 15 November 1903, and the first installment paid in January 1904.

[42]F.O. 46/555, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 30 October 1902. The battleships were to be built in Britain.

yen over eleven years, and almost 2.7 million yen in 1903 alone. The British government worried about Japan's ability to meet these costs and though Komura offered bland reassurance, it was Katsura, not he, who would have to negotiate with the Diet.[43] As before, Katsura began by seeking Itō's approval. He explained that a foreign loan was impractical, and the only alternative was to continue the 3.3% land tax, introduced in 1898 with the promise of reduction to the original rate of 2.5% at the end of 1903. Itō appeared sympathetic and Katsura left with the impression that matters were in hand.[44] Early in August, he returned to the coolness of Hayama, and wrote that he was "tied up with a crowd of children and feeling instantly restored."[45] In the general election of 10 August, the Seiyūkai took 190 seats, a result which Katsura greeted as ensuring the implementation of his accord with Itō in the coming Diet.[46]

However, no-one was ever sure of Itō and problems resurfaced in September. First, Okuda Yoshito, head of the committee investigating administrative retrenchment, resigned when the cabinet rejected his proposals.[47] Meanwhile, Seiyūkai leaders, Hara Kei and Matsuda Masahisa, were lobbying for rejection of the continued higher land tax on the grounds that the Anglo-Japanese alliance allowed military expansion to be postponed in favour of domestic financial reform. Although Hara himself remained uncertain of Itō, the Seiyūkai decided on 7 November to oppose continuation of the higher land tax, but accept naval expansion by other means than tax increases.[48]

As this decision was taken, Katsura had accompanied the emperor to the Kumamoto army trials, subsequently collapsing with severe stomach pains. From his sick-bed, he began to receive disquieting reports about Itō.[49] Before departure, Katsura had laboured to keep Itō informed with personal visits and briefing from secretaries and ministers. Throughout, Itō expressed no opinion and only in mid-November revealed to Yamagata

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[43]F.O. 46/552, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 2 July 1902.

[44]Katsura Papers, 70-38, Yamagata letter 29 April 1902, "I read your report that you received a favourable result from your discussions with Itō on Diet policy and would achieve a compromise. This is a source of great rejoicing for the nation and the government"; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 31.

[45]Sakeda Masatoshi et al, ed., *Tokutomi Sohō Kankei Monjo*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1985, vol. 2, p. 67, Katsura letter, 9 August 1902.

[46]Itō Miyoji diary, quoted Yui Masaomi, "Katsura Tarō", Ōkubo Toshiaki, ed., *Meiji Seifu*, Tokyo 1966, p. 257.

[47]Matsushita Yoshio, *Meiji Gunsei Shiron*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1956, vol. 2, p. 528-29, Okuda also proposed the abolition of the military's direct access to the emperor (*iaku jōsō*) on the grounds that the army minister and chief of staff might present overlapping demands and so produce unnecessary expenditure. Katsura had the proposal erased.

[48]Hara, vol. 2, p. 28-33, entries for 15 September, 29 October, 6 and 7 November 1902. Hara was informed by Katō Takaaki of the Katsura-Itō conversation, but assumed that Itō had simply listened without comment.

[49]Katsura Papers, 66-2, Utsumi Tadakatsu letter, 10 November 1902; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 35-37; *Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 362, Katsura letter, 30 November 1902.

his absolute opposition to military expansion based on the land tax, and his disagreement with the government's entire financial policy.[50]

Flanked by Sone and Yamamoto, Katsura met Itō on 1 December, and responded to his criticism with the simple reply that cabinet policy had received imperial approval and could not be altered at the behest of a single *genrō*.[51] This was an attempt to affirm the constitutional relationship of the emperor and cabinet over that more amorphous link between *genrō* and emperor. However, Itō was not merely a single *genrō*, but both a member of the elite and representative of the major popular party. Yet, as events were to show, this dual position could not be maintained.

It seemed that Japan's quest for overseas expansion might founder on financial instability. On 3 December, Katsura visited Itō and tried to minimise the dispute by regretting their disagreement and hoping it would not affect their personal friendship. That same day, however, with Katō Takaaki as intermediary, Itō joined Ōkuma Shigenobu in temporary alliance against the government.[52] Katsura's initial response was to regard the union as a compliment. With memories of the siege of Haich'eng, he wrote to Yamagata on 6 December;[53]

> There is really no finer honour than to be opposed by the nation's great retainer, and party leader Count Ōkuma. As a soldier, I was often ready to die in battle but I never thought to have the pleasure of being confronted in politics by such formidable opposition.

If Nagashima Ryūji's comment on his father-in-law is accurate, then perhaps this was not simply bravado. The government retaliated by a campaign among the Peers condemning Itō's former policies and present position, and employed spies to keep track of the coalition's strategy.[54] Katsura went before the Diet on 13 December, explaining the diplomatic situation, the difficulty of a foreign loan, and the urgent need for naval expansion. He spoke again the following day, repeating an argument he had used while reforming the army in the 1880s; retrenchment was not the only way to reduce costs, and improvement now would bring future savings. In private, he assured Yamagata the government was firm and predicted the coalition would split in an election.[55]

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[50]Hara, vol. 2, p. 34-35, entries for 14 and 25 November 1902.

[51]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 37-38; Hara, vol. 2, p. 35-38, entries for 25 November, 2 December 1902.

[52]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 39-41, 56; Hara, vol. 2, p. 36-39, entries for 29 November, 4 and 5 December 1902; Nakagawa, p. 10, gives Katsura bumping into Saionji in the palace on 6 December and asking tearfully, "What on earth do you intend to do with me?" To which Saionji cheerfully replied, "Well, it can't be helped, can it." The story no doubt amused Katsura's enemies.

[53]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 43-47.

[54]*Itō Kankei Monjo*, vol. 4, Kaneko Kentarō letters, 13 and 16 December 1902; Hara, vol. 2, p. 40-42, entries for 12 and 23 December 1902.

[55]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 49-57, details Katsura's speeches; p. 59-61, Katsura letter to Yamagata, 14 December 1902.

Yamamoto followed by explaining the naval situation to the Lower House on 16 December. However, the representatives were unmoved. As one later argued, "If Russo-Japanese diplomacy continues on the present course, to maintain parity we will certainly have to carry out a fourth expansion while in the midst of the third."[56] The government's budget was rejected and Katsura had the Diet suspended. He continued to seek a compromise, however, sending Konoe Atsumaro to visit the budget committee, and Kodama to call on Itō.[57] Katsura himself met party leaders Inukai Ki, Ōishi Masami, Hara and Matsuda, on 25 December. He pleaded that the government was already carrying out retrenchment, but reiterated that naval expansion, vital to the development of Japanese interests in East Asia, could not be paid for at the expense of other essential projects such as railways, telephones, and commercial shipping. Here Katsura was attempting to combine the polarised views of himself and the Getsuyōkai from the 1880s. This was not within Japan's economic capacity and, for once, he failed to convince his listeners.[58] The matter was referred to the people with a general election scheduled for 1 March 1903. Mindful of government corruption in earlier elections, Katsura ordered no government interference in the result, and this was generally respected.[59] The Seiyūkai took 175 seats, Ōkuma's Kensei Hontō 85, and the rest shared 91. The 18th Diet convened on 12 May 1903.

Immediately after the December dissolution, Katsura had returned to Hayama, where Itō called to discuss a resolution. Katsura realised the Seiyūkai would hold its majority and accepted that it was the government which would have to be flexible. With Finance Minister Sone, he drafted a compromise in which railway funds would replace the land-tax as a source for naval expansion, and these railway expenses would be recovered through government bonds.[60] On 28 January 1903, Katsura met Yamagata in great secrecy at Hirata Tōsuke's neighbouring villa, and Yamagata then took the new proposal to Itō.[61] This closeted style disturbed both cabinet members and younger leaders of the Seiyūkai, and there was growing irritation on both sides at Itō's position.[62] The coming Diet would force him back into the ranks of the *genrō*, and allow Katsura to start

[56]Mochizuki Kotarō, quoted Matsushita, p. 522-23.

[57]Hara, vol. 2, p. 41, entries for 19-20 December 1902.

[58]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 71-77.

[59]Hara, vol. 2, p. 53, entry for 5 March 1903.

[60]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 82-83.

[61]Katsura Papers, 70-47, Yamagata Aritomo letter, 26 January 1903; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 84-89; Katō Fusakura, ed., *Hakushaku Hirata Tōsuke-den*, Tokyo 1927, p. 105-06. The secrecy was to avoid both the notice of the public and Itō. Hara, vol. 2, p. 51, entry for 9 February 1903, shows Itō and Yamagata meeting on a near daily basis.

[62]Katsura Papers, 66-3, Utsumi Tadakatsu letter to Sone, 29 January 1903; Hara, vol. 2, p. 55-58, entries for 12 March, 25 April 1903. Utsumi was concerned about the "*genrō* cabinet above the cabinet."

negotiating directly with the parties. Hence the period known as the Keion (Katsura-Saionji) era actually begins in 1903.

The strains within the Seiyūkai proved illimitable and, in April, some members were expelled on suspicion of taking government bribes, while others, including Watanabe Kunitake and Kataoka Kenkichi, agitated against Itō and for open presidential elections.[63] The Lower House budget committee ignored Itō's urging and rejected the government's revised land tax bill on 19 May, thus forcing Katsura to accept that Itō could not be relied upon in future dealings with the Seiyūkai.[64] Katsura asked Yamagata to talk with Itō, but was left to his own devices when Yamagata temporised.[65] On 20 May, Katsura went into direct negotiations with the Seiyūkai's Hara, Matsuda and Ozaki, and the latter were conciliatory, but Hara warned that it would require some effort to unite all the Seiyūkai factions behind a single position.[66] Katsura agreed to provide some time and had the Diet suspended from 21-24 May. On that day, the government withdrew its land tax bill, but the Seiyūkai remained in disarray. The Tosa faction led by Kataoka was determined to protect railway interests for its region and quit the party in protest.[67] Itō's despotism and government links were blamed for the discord, and Ozaki Yukio gave this same reason when he also resigned the party on 21 May.[68] To Hara's dismay, Itō reacted by pressuring the Seiyūkai against further demands of the cabinet, and bitterly criticised his subordinates when they failed to support Katsura against a Kensei Hontō motion of censure over the government's educational and commercial activities.[69] Itō demanded the resignation of the Seiyūkai standing committee and personally visited Katsura with a plea to remain in office.[70] However, with Itō's help and Hara as whip, Katsura finally managed to get his budget approved, but it had been an exhausting struggle.[71]

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[63]Hara, vol. 2, p. 57-58, entries for 14-18 April 1903.

[64]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 114, Katsura letter to Yamagata, 19 May 1903.

[65]Yamagata promised to return to Tokyo within a few days, and, in the meantime, advised Katsura to maintain his bargain with Itō, and meet Diet opposition by a temporary suspension, followed by further negotiations along the agreed line, Katsura Papers, 70-51, Yamagata letter 19 May 1903. A further letter, on 2 June 1903, shows that Yamagata only reappeared in Tokyo on 1 June.

[66]Details in Hara, vol. 2, p. 60, entry for 20 May 1903.

[67]Hara, vol. 2, p. 65-66, entry for 6 June 1903.

[68]Hara, vol. 2, p. 61, entry for 21 May 1903. Ozaki felt Itō had deceived the party over the extent of his dealings with the government. Over seven hundred members left the Seiyūkai in May and June June 1903, with over six hundred more in the following five months, Yamamoto Shirō/Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Zoku Hara Kei o Meguru Hitobito*, Tokyo 1982, p. 129.

[69]Hara, vol. 2, p. 61-64, entries for 23-31 May 1903. The motion of censure was defeated in the Lower House on 27 May, but was revised to target just Education Minister Kikuchi and Agriculture-Commerce Minister Hirata and was approved on 29 May. The two men resigned from the cabinet in mid-July.

[70]Hara, vol. 2, p. 64, entry for 31 May 1903.

[71]Writing to Yamagata on 2 June, Katsura likened it to fighting in the Sino-Japanese war, Tokutomi, vol. 2, 114-16.

Preparing for Russia

The budget negotiations were conducted in the shadow of a new international crisis. In April 1903, while accompanying the emperor to the Osaka Exhibition, Katsura and Komura were informed of Russia's failure to complete the promised second-stage withdrawal from Manchuria. On 21 April, they met with Itō and Yamagata at Murin'an, Yamagata's villa by the eastern Kyoto hills, and agreed to seek a peaceful settlement but resort to force only when all else failed.[72] This was consistent with the stated views of all present, although differences remained in the individual expectations of diplomacy. The cabinet met before the emperor on 23 June to confirm Japan's position, and, on 3 July, sought British approval for negotiations with Russia. Despite the anti-Russian writings of George Morrison, Beijing correspondent for *The Times*, the British government was pleased at Japan's decision and hoped throughout 1903 that deteriorating Anglo-German relations could be offset by her own *rapprochement* with France and better dealings with Russia.[73]

The day after the imperial conference, Katsura presented his resignation. In the presence of Yamamoto, he then asked either Itō or Yamagata to take over and lead the country through the coming difficulties. In his memoirs, Katsura made it clear that he anticipated war and felt that Itō's dual position as *genrō* and party head would encumber whoever was premier.[74] Itō interpreted this as a plot to divorce him from the Seiyūkai, and this view has largely been accepted by later writers.[75] As in previous difficulties, Katsura removed himself to Hayama when the emperor rejected his resignation, and waited for events to unfold. By 10 July, the *genrō* had persuaded Itō to leave the Seiyūkai and head the privy council. As a face-saving measure, Yamagata and Matsukata agreed also to join the privy council as Itō's subordinates. The emperor ordered Katsura back to duty and he complied.[76] The Seiyūkai voted on 11 July to retain Itō as president, but the move was more a protest against Yamagata than support for Itō, and Saionji

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[72]Okamoto Shumpei, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, N.Y. 1970, p. 69-71, details the conference.

[73]Lord Lansdowne cabinet memorandum, 10 September 1903, quoted Briton Cooper Busch, *Hardinge of Penshurst*, Connecticut 1980, p. 66. Morrison bellicosity is apparent in his letters to Shanghai colleague J.O.P. Bland, claiming "If there is no war, I will hardly know how to pass the winter" and he would consider his whole work in the Far East a failure. He was indignant at Britain's supposed restraining of Japan, and expressed his hopes in "the immensely improved position we will have when our ally Japan has broken the force of Russia in the Far East", Bland Papers, draft memoir, ch. 11, p. 16-20.

[74]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 132.

[75]When Yamamoto asked Itō to meet Katsura, Itō angrily declared he would not be forced apart from the Seiyūkai, Inoue Kaoru Papers, vol. 28, p. 364, Tsudzuki Keiroku letter, undated.

[76]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 136-37.

Kimmochi became the new party president on 14 July.[77]

Japan's military leaders had no illusion about Russia and, on the eve of war, Vice Chief of Staff Kodama predicted the chance of victory as no more than even.[78] While Katsura's resignation was directed at Itō, it is unsurprising, given his belief that war was inevitable, that Katsura should attempt to return responsibility to the experienced *genrō* rather than sail the ship of state himself. Moreover, in the event of war, it was imperative to retain Western sympathy by making Russia seem the belligerent and Itō as premier would undoubtedly have enhanced Japan's image as a force for peace. However, with equal certainty it would have enraged the vocal pro-war minority at home.[79]

Katsura had expressed his impatience of political lobbyists when appointed Taiwan Society president. In 1903, however, the heightened perception of a Russian threat gave rise to several activist groups. Just as Katsura and Komura were accused of impatience relative to the *genrō*, so their own juniors were pushing them. In May 1903, a cross-section of military and diplomatic personnel formed the pro-war Kogetsukai. They were led by Major-General Iguchi Shōgo, head of general affairs on the army general staff, and included Colonel Matsukawa Toshitane, Major Tanaka Giichi, future Vice Navy Minister Takarabe Takeshi, and Komura aides, Yamaza Enjirō and Honda Kumatarō.[80] Yamagata's admonition to soldiers and sailors (1878) and the subsequent 1882 imperial rescript had aimed at an apolitical defence force. However, an inherent weakness of army education was its exaltation of the link between army and emperor, and denigration of politics.[81] This made action in defiance of politics seem expressive of loyalty to the throne, an attitude clearly prevalent in the 1930s. In 1903, the Kogetsukai limited itself to impassioned appeals for an early war to interrupt Russia's war preparations, and Chief of Staff Ōyama Iwao agreed to memorialise the throne on Russian bellicosity and urge

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[77]Hara, vol. 2, p. 69-72, entries for 7-19 July 1903. Hara, Saionji, and Katō Takaaki had all urged Itō to fight what they saw as a plot by Yamagata to destroy the Seiyūkai. After Itō's decision to resign, but before the appointment of Saionji, Ōishi Masami of the Kensei Hontō suggested pensioning off Ōkuma and amalgamating the two parties.

[78]Kodama to Kaneko Kentarō, quoted Watanabe Ryūsaku, *Kindai Nit-Chū Seiji Kōshōshi*, Tokyo 1977, p. 95. See also Terauchi Masatake's letter to Yamagata, 29 April 1903, quoted in Tsunoda, p. 162. After deciding to break off negotiations with Russia on 4 February 1904, Yamagata made a dramatic appeal to Itō to look after the nation if Russia triumphed as soldiers like himself would surely be dead, Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1958, p. 94.

[79]Even in February 1904, Hara Kei believed no-one really favoured war but indecisiveness was leading Japan into the maelstrom, Hara, vol. 2, p. 90, entry for 5 February 1904.

[80]A list of Kogetsukai members is given in Tsunoda, p. 159, and Okamoto, p. 73.

[81]On army education see Fukuchi Shigetaka, *Gunkoku Nihon no Keisei*, Tokyo 1956; Theodore Cook, *The Japanese Army Officer Corps: The Making of a Military Elite, 1872-1945*, unpub. Ph. D., Princeton University 1987.

immediate action to save Korea.[82] Minister Yamamoto, however, had no interest in Japan expanding on the continent and refused to allow the navy chief of staff to countersign the memorial. In October 1902, the navy, seeking to reverse the "army leads, navy follows" concept, had drafted a plan for national defence which, repeating Getsuyōkai arguments, had ignored Korea and supported a local defence of the Japanese islands.[83] Yamamoto had also hindered government support for the Seoul-Pusan railway, essential for army strategy, and navy opposition to expansion in Korea would resurface during the war.[84]

Civilian discontent was represented by Konoe Atsumaro's followers, liberally staffed with Diet members and intellectuals, and Uchida Ryōhei's Kokuryūkai, a group of mainly young men romanticising themselves as adventurers in the tradition of the Chinese classics.[85] From 1901-03, the activists' anger was directed at Itō and, in the summer of 1903, there was talk of assassination.[86] Katsura's concern was to maintain internal stability and, on 1 June 1903, he met a group of Tokyo University professors associated with Konoe; the so-called pro-war seven doctors, led by legal experts Tomizu Kondo and Terao Tōru. Katsura accepted their memorandum requesting positive action against Russia, reassured them no exchange of Manchuria for Korea would take place, and explained Japan's delay as necessary only to confirm Western, primarily British, attitudes. However, Katsura also reminded them that he, as a soldier, was better able to judge military strategy and cautioned against disruptive agitation.[87] Katsura did at least meet the academics, but Komura refused an interview then and later, and both Yamagata and Kodama proved repeatedly absent when visited.[88]

At the end of July, the Kokumin Dōmeikai was resurrected as an anti-Russian

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[82]Ōyama's memorial is in Rikugunshō, ed., *Meiji Gunjishi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1966, vol. 2, p. 1243-44, 1256.

[83]Kaigun Daijin Kambō, p. 132-33; Matsushita, vol. 2, p. 524-25; Morimatsu Toshio, *Dai Honei*, Tokyo 1980, p. 112. The author was Satō Tetsutarō.

[84]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 163, entry for 19 August 1902.

[85]This romantic notion of a new "Water Margin" is emphasised by Hiraoka Masaaki, "Sugiyama Shigemaru to Uchida Ryōhei", in Takeuchi Yoshimi/Hashikawa Bunzō, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 223-245.

[86]Ichimata Masao, *Yamaza Enjirō*, Tokyo 1974, p. 33-34. F.O. 46/567, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 22 November 1903, reports Itō and Ōkuma were receiving police protection.

[87]Details from Tomizu Kondo, "Kaikoroku", in Imai Shōji, ed., *Gendai Nihon Kiroku Zenshū 7: Seiji to Gaikō*, Tokyo 1971, p. 111-116. The doctors were by no means all pro-war. Some pressed for war only as a last resort, while Tomizu advocated pre-emptive war to win "living space" in Asia following immigration barriers against Japanese in America and Australia. See Tomizu (Imai), p. 123, and the discussion in Somura Yasunobu, *Kindaishi Kenkyū Nihon to Chūgoku*, Tokyo 1977, p. 80-83.

[88]Despite an agreement between Katsura and the doctors to keep the meeting private, the affair exploded in the newspapers two weeks later when inaccurate excerpts from the doctors' memorandum appeared in the anti-government *Ni Roku Shimpō* of 16 June, and the doctors responded by making public the original, Tomizu (Imai), p. 113-18; Itō Masanori, *Shimbun Gojūnenshi*, Tokyo 1943, p. 173.

alliance, the Tai-Ro Dōshikai, and there were rumours of secret official aid.[89] Komura, as noted earlier, employed Kogetsukai members Yamaza and Honda, and Yamaza was related by marriage to Kōmuchi Tomotsune of the Tai-Ro Dōshikai. Komura also apparently supported the Kokumin Dōmeikai when first appointed foreign minister.[90] However, the suggestion of Katsura links with the activists is more difficult to substantiate. He was threatened by the Tai-Ro Dōshikai in November with ultimate responsibility for Japan's actions, and warned not to allow Itō to influence his actions. Again, he chose to meet with representatives, Sassa Tomofusa, Tōyama Mitsuru, and Kōmuchi, and, on 10 November, convinced them both to leave matters in his hands and refrain from violence.[91] Moreover, while he worked with Sassa over Diet policy, Sassa's faction within the Tai-Ro Dōshikai has been described as the "softest faction" (*sai-nan-ha*) by later scholarship.[92]

Chinese Neutrality

A major factor in Japan's China policy was her wish to avoid Western suspicions of a "yellow peril". In the event of war, Britain would probably remain neutral, and America had never considered active involvement, leaving Japan and possibly China to fight alone.[93] As early as March 1903, Komura had rejected Chinese hints of some kind of alliance so as to avoid the impression of a racial bloc, and this was firmly supported by Katsura.[94] As war approached, however, Japan's military weakness had to be faced and Itō favoured bringing in China as a combatant.[95] On 30 December 1903, the cabinet debated two options; to unite with China against Russia, or maintain Chinese neutrality.[96] Their decision was that active Chinese involvement against Russia would probably end in indiscriminate slaughter of Westerners and increased violence from anti-Ch'ing groups, leading to Western intervention in central China while Japan remained

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[89]Hara, vol. 2, p. 76, entry for 17 October 1903, "The government seems to be giving some help and incitement to the Tai-Ro Dōshikai but public opinion is scornful so they have recently tried to increase intellectual debate for a stand against Russia." See also, Seung Kwon Synn, *The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, 1876-1904*, Seoul 1981, p. 340-43.

[90]Oka, *Konoe Nikki*, vol. 5, p. 173, entry for 10 September 1902, Kuga Katsunan letter to Konoe, "I have promised that Komura's repeated kindness (*kōi*) will be kept absolutely secret, so I ask you not to let it slip to Iyogi, Kamiya and the others. If by chance they should find out, Komura would be greatly embarrassed."

[91]*Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 367, Katsura letter, 10 November 1903; *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 343; Okamoto, p. 84.

[92]Miyaji Masato, "Kokuminshugi-teki Tai-Gai Kōha-ron", *Shigaku Zasshi*, vol. 80, nos. 11-12, Nov-Dec 1971, p. 4.

[93]Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defence and the Open Door*, New Haven 1970, p. 80-81; Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, Seattle 1966, p. 9.

[94]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 304; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 214.

[95]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 190, entry for 9 December 1903.

[96]The relevant document is in Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Monjo narabi Shuyō Bunsho*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1965, vol. 1, p. 217-19. The cabinet decision reflected Komura's as detailed to Claude MacDonald on 25 December, F.O. 46/567, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 26 December 1903.

mired in the north. This would mean the loss of vital Japanese interests in Fukien and southern China. Moreover, the presence of China would impede Japanese manoueverability, both in the war and subsequent peace negotiations. Finally, there was the ever-present fear of a resurgent "yellow peril" scare. For all these reasons, the cabinet opted for official Chinese neutrality. By then, however, discussions had already begun on a covert alliance.

By late 1903, Chinese diplomacy was in the hands of Prince Ch'ing and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Yuan suspected that if Japan were successful in war, China might find herself merely exchanging one unwelcome guest for another.[97] Although some in the Chinese press supported alliance with Japan, China might face penalties from a victorious Russia. Instead, Yuan agreed with the Japanese army on an informal relationship, with discussions from mid-1903 towards Chinese intelligence assistance in the event of war. In November 1903, newly appointed Vice Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarō visited Yuan's former military adviser, Colonel Aoki Norizumi, and asked him to arrange an intelligence and guerrilla network in Manchuria and Mongolia with Yuan's co-operation. The aim was to spy on the Russians' activities, damage rear-line communications, and establish bandit groups to harass their rear and flanks.[98] Yuan agreed to commit himself thus far, and supplied about sixteen Chinese officers, all of whom were publicly stated to have deserted. Tang Shao-yi and Tuan Chi-jui were delegated to arrange the details and matter of supplies to Japanese forces.[99] In February 1904, Japan placed Major Banzai Rihachirō in Tianjin as military adviser to Yuan. During the war, he would translate incoming intelligence reports and transfer these to the Japanese imperial headquarters.[100] To reassure Yuan and other Chinese, Komura gave a solemn assurance at the outbreak of war that Japan had no designs on Chinese territory and renewed this message in May 1904.[101] However, Yuan remained cautious and hurried through reforms in his own forces, aided by the group of Japanese military advisers and instructors attached to the

[97]Lensen, p. 35, 237. Yuan sent Tang Shao-yi to visit Satow on 29 October 1903 to discuss China's response to the expected war.

[98]Satō Kōseki, *Bōryaku Shōgun Aoki Norizumi*, Tokyo 1943, p. 9-10, 63-67, 397-401; Doihara Kanji Kankōkai, ed., *Hiroku Doihara Kanji*, Tokyo 1972, p. 35-37.

[99]Lensen, p. 237; Louis T. Sigel, *Tang Shao-yi (1860-1938): The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism*, unpub. Ph. D., Harvard University 1972, p. 134. As early as July 1902, during discussions in London pursuant to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Major-General Fukushima had already stated that the Chinese in Manchuria would be sympathetic to Japan and Britain in the event of war, and would "actively help the troops in the matter of transport and supplies", F.O. 46/560, British war office, letter to foreign office, 24 July 1902.

[100]*Doihara*, p. 37.

[101]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 392.

Beiyang army.[102]

To War

The imperial conference of 23 June 1903 had established Japan's minimum requirements in negotiations with Russia. However, as Katsura explained in his memoirs;[103]

> To solve the problem, we had to resolve not to withdraw one inch from Korea no matter what happened. If we persisted in our demands, war was inevitable. If we asked for control of Korea all the way to the Yalu, then we would threaten Russian authority over Manchuria, and this she could not easily allow. The Russians could not rely on a single railway to carry through their administration of Port Arthur and Dalny safely. In military terms, we would occupy a position on their flank.... Having extended the Chinese Eastern railway through south Manchuria to Port Arthur, they had to take Korea for self-defence.... Were Korea to be lost, they could not protect the link between Harbin and Port Arthur.

Immediately prior to negotiations, Katsura pared his cabinet, assigning multiple portfolios to a small number of ministers, both to tighten his control and force through cost-cutting measures in time for the coming Diet.[104]

Japan's first proposal was handed to Russia on 12 August 1903, but St. Petersburg already understood Japan's position from the private discussions held during Army Minister Kuropatkin's visit in June 1903.[105] Kuropatkin was impressed by Japan's fears at the perceived Russian threat to Korea and argued in St. Petersburg for conciliation; Russia to consolidate her position in north Manchuria, but to return south Manchuria to Chinese control and enter solely into commercial activities in Korea.[106] However, on the day that Japan's official proposal was received, Russia established a viceroy of the Far East with influence extending to Korea. This development alarmed Japan and Yamagata wrote despondently, "it seems our aim of maintaining peace in the Far East is virtually

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[102]*Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū Ihō*, Tokyo 1981, p. 1-5, Major-General Semba Tarō, commander Japanese forces Tianjin, letter to Major-General Fukushima Yasumasa, 11 December 1903; Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shih-k'ai in Tianjin and Beijing, 1901-08*, Berkeley 1980, p. 73; Watanabe, p. 100-01; *Doihara*, p. 47. The Chinese military reorganisation bureau was established in December 1903. Banzai, recalling this time thirty years later, described how the nineteen or so Japanese army instructors in Tianjin avoided contravening the nominally secret Sino-Russian treaty by growing long hair and sporting Chinese dress. The numbers of Japanese officers with Yuan's army was confirmed by Terauchi at no more than twenty, with less than thirty officers in total employed by the various Chinese viceroys, F.O. 46/565, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 19 January 1903.

[103]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 121-22, 160.

[104]For example, Army Minister Kodama took over the ministries of education and home affairs.

[105]For Kuropatkin's visit see Kuroda Kōshirō, ed., *Gensui Terauchi Hakushaku-den*, Tokyo 1920, p. 246. Terauchi and Kuropatkin had been acquainted when Terauchi was a student in Paris. Also, Shinobu Jumpei, *Komura Jutarō*, p. 125; Ian Nish, "General Kuropatkin's Visit to Japan, 1903", *Proceedings of the British Association of Japanese Studies*, vol. 9, 1984, p. 87-95. Katsura had tried to enlist Itō's help in discussions with Kuropatkin to improve their chance of success. Itō's advisers had warned him that any achievement would only be stolen by the government which was "trying various tricks to cover its disappointment at the near ineffectiveness of the Anglo-Japanese alliance", Hara, vol. 2, p. 67, entry for 12 June 1903.

[106]Nish, "General Kuropatkin's Visit", p. 93.

hopeless."[107] With Russia delaying over the site for negotiations, and omitting all mention of Manchuria in her counter-proposals, even Itō seemed resigned to war.[108]

December 1903 brought further reports of Russian build-up at Port Arthur and on the Korean border. Russian officers were believed to being engaged as palace guards in Seoul, and a Russian ship appeared at Inch'ŏn, causing Yamagata to worry that annexation was in the offing.[109] As the year closed, Katsura was temporarily freed from Diet troubles. Kōno Hironaka, the new speaker of the Lower House was a militant on diplomacy and, in collusion with Ozaki Yukio and *Ni Roku Shimpō* editor Akiyama Teisuke, departed from tradition by openly assailing the government in his opening Diet address to the throne. The resulting storm of opinion led to the Diet being dissolved on 11 December, and an election called for March 1904.[110] By then, of course, the nation would be fighting for its life.

Despite everything, Itō and Yamagata remained hesitant. On 21 December 1903, Katsura explained the cabinet's intention to Yamagata;[111]

> Firstly, on Manchuria we will take negotiations to their limit, but not go to the final resort.
>
> Secondly, on Korea, we will fully state our wish for Russia to reconsider and if she refuses we will go to the final resort - war.

From Ōiso, Yamagata replied immediately;[112]

> As you know, I believe it advisable today to discuss an exchange of Manchuria for Korea, but the foreign minister and others are determined to have a try at getting Russia to reconsider. Of course, the negotiation of policy must be conducted by the responsible authorities, and I have told Komura I will not press my case further, but I do not agree with your second plan, the final resort to war.

That day, Vice Chief of Staff Kodama requested authority to begin military preparations, but Katsura and Terauchi had first to visit Yamagata. Not until 29 December was the army command allowed to prepare troop despatches.[113] Emergency funds were alloted for completion of the Seoul-Pusan railway and, after years of haggling, Yamamoto

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[107]Katsura Papers, 70-54, Yamagata letter, 19 August 1903; also quoted Tsunoda, p. 220.

[108]Katsura Papers, 70-62, Yamagata letter, 25 November 1903, "Marquis Itō's resolution is a source of great celebration for our nation's future"; Takekoshi Yosaburō, *Prince Saionji*, Kyoto 1933, p. 211. In true Itō style, this resolution was not absolutely clear, nor apparent to all his visitors. When Hara Kei called on 5 January 1904, Itō was still unwilling to declare himself for peace or war, claiming rather that the decision lay with Russia, Hara, vol. 2, p. 87-88, entry for 5 January 1904.

[109]Katsura Papers, 70-64, Yamagata letter, 5 December 1903; F.O. 46/567, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 25 December 1903.

[110]For the various interpretations of Kōno's action and the intentions of his supporters, see Hara, vol. 2, p. 83-85, entries for 2-11 December 1903.

[111]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 185-87.

[112]Katsura Papers, 70-65, Yamagata letter, 21 December 1903; Tsunoda, p. 224. Yamagata sent similar messages to Terauchi and Kodama.

[113]Tsunoda, p. 225; Morimatsu, p. 114. Katsura and Terauchi visited Yamagata on 24 December.

Gombei finally achieved his goal as the wartime imperial headquarters was revised to give the navy equal status with the army.[114]

On 6 January 1904, Katsura, confined by influenza to his Mita home, received another unsatisfactory Russian reply. Japanese naval preparations were due to be completed by 20 January, and he decided to wait until then to abandon negotiations. Towards the end of January, however, with Katsura just emerging from his sick-bed, Itō attempted a last-minute appeal, claiming to have the support of Yamamoto, Komura and Yamagata, for a peaceful Russo-Japanese demarcation along Korea's 39th parallel. Yamagata was informed and reproved Itō for sowing the seeds of confusion. A spate of meetings followed to restore Japanese unity of opinion, and it was only on 3 February, with reports arriving that the Russian fleet had left Port Arthur, that the *genrō* ultimately agreed to break off negotiations.[115] Katsura now repeated his call of mid-1903 for Itō or Yamagata to take over as leader of the nation, but neither accepted.[116] On 9 February, he agreed to remain as prime minister and, the following day, war officially commenced.

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[114]Morimatsu, p. 114.

[115]Hirata Tōsuke diary, in Katō, *Hirata*, p. 314-17. These fragments of Hirata's diary are all that remain following the destruction of the 1923 earthquake. See also Katsura Papers, 71-4, Yamamoto Gombei letter, 29 January 1904, on Itō's argument for a respite (*shōkō-ron*).

[116]Hirata diary, p. 314-17.

Chapter 8

THE WAR 1904-05

Japan's victory in the war of 1894-95 had brought mixed rewards: the expansion of empire and brief patriotic support for greater armed forces; but also a long-term need for the oligarchs and military to compromise with the popular parties in order to fund these increased responsibilities. This obviously influenced the balance of existing political forces. If war, as Clausewitz suggested, was an extension of policy, then the imperative for the Meiji leadership 1904 was a short war, limiting expenses to the minimum, but enjoying sufficient victories to shock Russia away from Korea and maintain public satisfaction with the political *status quo*. "Absolute war", in the sense of destroying Russian defences and taking her capital, was out of the question, and although Komura glibly informed the British minister that war would be disastrous for Russia in view of her internal situation, Japan's leaders realised from the start they could never extract an indemnity even if triumphant.[1] Katsura had earlier concluded that Western rivalries made the powers incapable of releasing their main strength from Europe. Consequently, success against Russia depended on fighting a war of advantage, using quick, effective strikes against local forces, and moving towards peace before the superior troops from European Russia could be employed. Once hostilities commenced, it was Katsura's responsibility to ensure the armed forces respected political expediency, also to keep Western sympathy, maintain domestic support for the war effort through all its vicissitudes, and secure Japan's domination of Korea. That he was not confident of achieving this is evident from his wish to resign at the war's outset.

Military Command

On 8 February 1904, without declaring war, Japan attacked Russian vessels at Port

[1]Komura's statement, F.O. 46/566, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 13 August 1903. On a Russian indemnity, for example, Inoue Kaoru speaking to the nation's bankers at Katsura's official residence on 28 January 1904, "We have come to the point where we must gamble the fate of the nation, and the government and you who are involved in finance, plus the men of commerce and industry, must all work as one.... Even if we are victorious, there will be no indemnity," quoted from Sakatani Yoshirō papers, Uno Shunichi, "Dai Ichiji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols, Tokyo 1981, vol. 1, p. 404.

Arthur. This was not entirely cricket but was certainly applauded as practical.[2] The next day, two battalions under Katsura's former subordinate, Major-General Kigoshi Yasutsuna, entered Seoul and took command of the city. The Korean government immediately waxed co-operative and an agreement, pending for several months, was hurried through allowing Japanese forces virtual free rein in Korea.[3] On 1 May 1904, Japanese troops crossed the Yalu river and the basic objective, control of Korea, was achieved.

Katsura was determined to retain command authority and avoid any repetition of incidents such as that at Port Arthur in 1894. Initially, the apolitical Ōyama served as army chief of staff and, with advances in communications, imperial headquarters remained central in Tokyo rather than moving to Hiroshima.[4] This enabled Katsura to co-ordinate military and political affairs.

There were early signs of army assertiveness. While Katsura and Terauchi insisted that establishment of the imperial headquarters wait on a declaration of war, the general staff demanded it be convened upon cessation of diplomatic relations. The formation of Kigoshi's force had also provoked argument. Then, in March 1904, Vice Chief of Staff Kodama, with subordinates Iguchi Shōgo and Matsukawa Toshitane, proposed a new supreme command (*daisōtokufu*) in Manchuria, with the crown prince serving in the emperor's stead. This had been allowed towards the end of the Sino-Japanese war, but when peace negotiations were already imminent. Against Russia, however, Katsura was unwilling to see the imperial headquarters divided and he was supported by Terauchi, Yamagata, and Yamamoto, who all opposed the Kodama plan. The dispute dragged on, with Katsura using his status as an active service general in discussions, and a resolution was only achieved on 25 May when, at Yamagata's suggestion, the emperor commanded Terauchi and Ōyama to establish a senior command (*kōtō shireibu*) for the Manchurian armies. A staff of approximately twenty-five officers arrived in Manchuria on 31 July

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[2]For example, Denis and Peggy Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*, London 1975, p. 204, quotes *The Times*, "Our ally put her navy in motion with a promptness and courage that exorted the admiration of the world and her action in doing so before war had been formally declared, so far from being an international solecism, is in accordance with the prevailing practice of most wars in modern times."

[3]Ichikawa Masaaki, ed., *Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō 8: Hogo Oyobi Heigō*, Tokyo 1964, rep. 1980, p. 14-15, details the negotiations and terms of the agreement of 23 February 1904. Yi Yong-ik, the most pro-Russian of the Korean ministers was invited to Japan prior to the conclusion of the agreement and given little opportunity to refuse.

[4]The imperial headquarters met two or three times per week and, on average, once or twice a month before the emperor until October 1904. Meetings were less frequent thereafter. Members of both general staffs, *genrō* and cabinet attended. See Morimatsu Toshio, *Dai Honei*, Tokyo 1981, p. 116-17.

1904.[5] Ōyama took the new command, Kodama, promoted to general, remained his deputy, and Yamagata stepped in as chief of staff. Friction remained, however, over personnel matters, and the additional level of command did not improve army efficiency.[6] Manchurian command played favourites with intelligence reports, giving greatest credence to those from Fukushima men, and discounting those from such as Utsunomiya Tarō in London.[7] The result was unnecessary Japanese casualties and though she repeatedly claimed victory, the cost was unprecedentedly high. On 5 May alone, Japan took 4,300 dead and wounded, equivalent to all her losses in mainland fighting during the Sino-Japanese war.[8]

"White Japan"

With Japan's military reserves limited, it was essential to monopolise Western sympathy. On 9 February 1904, Yamagata advised Katsura to "rouse the spirit of national unity and hatred for the enemy."[9] However, showing an independent mind, Katsura spoke to prefectural governors the following day, and on 19 February to the heads of all religious denominations, calling for public thrift, industry, and support for the Japanese armed forces, but also making it clear that this was a war between states, not peoples, and that there should be no hatred of the ordinary Russian man.[10]

Also in February, Japan despatched unofficial envoys Kaneko Kentarō and Suematsu Kenchō on propaganda missions to the United States and Britain respectively. Both were familiar with the West and carried the prestige of close association with Itō Hirobumi.[11] On 3 April 1904, Kaneko wrote confidentially to Katsura describing

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[5]The affair is considered in Morimatsu, p. 121-23; Ōe Shinobu, *Nihon no Sambō Hombu*, Tokyo 1985, p. 90-93; Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 225-26, 239, entries for 7-10 and 24-25 April 1904. Members of the staff included Major-Generals Fukushima Yasumasa and Iguchi Shōgo, Colonel Matsukawa Toshitane, and Major Tanaka Giichi.

[6]F.O. 46/593, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 2 August 1905, Terauchi was concerned at friction within the army and the independence of the general staff. MacDonald reported that Terauchi described the staff as "a law unto themselves; this, he said, was all wrong, and would have to be altered. The difficulties were not so pronounced with a man like Marquis Yamagata at the head.... but if another held the post matters might and undoubtedly would be difficult, and serious friction ensue. I (MacDonald) could see that friction had ensued, and that it would have been much worse had not a man of Marquis Yamagata's unique position held the post of Chief of Staff."

[7]Ōe, p. 110-112.

[8]Fujiwara Akira, *Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1961, p. 98, 106.

[9]Yamagata letter, 9 February 1904, quoted Uno, p. 409.

[10]The speeches are reproduced in Tokutomi Iichirō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 2, p. 202-06. See also his speech as home minister, 12 February 1904, in Taikakai, ed., *Naimushōshi*, 4 vols., Tokyo 1982, vol. 4, p. 342.

[11]For Komura's instructions to the two envoys, see Gaimushō, ed., *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 379-80. Suematsu departed 10 February and Kaneko followed fourteen days later. Hara Kei noted that Yamagata proposed Suematsu for London and later received Itō's approval, Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 2, p. 92, entry for 26 February 1904. On the general topic of Japanese propaganda at this time, see Robert Valliant, "The Selling of Japan", *Monumenta Nipponica*, 29-4, 1974.

American sympathies as mixed. Russian Minister Cassini was employing the newspapers to stress Russo-American racial and religious ties, while powerful socialites and businessmen with Russian connections worked against Japan. However, the major cities were inclined to Japan and even San Francisco, hitherto violently anti-Japanese, had apparently reversed its stance. Yet, Kaneko warned that American opinion was volatile and uncertain.[12] To support her actions, Japan published the diplomatic correspondence preceding the war, a learned scholar, Asakawa Kanichi, produced an authoritative work on the same events (still in print eighty years later), and in 1905 Suematsu published *The Risen Sun*, arguing;[13]

> There are some who accuse Japan as the probable organiser of the Pan-Asiatic peril. Peace-loving as the Japanese also are, the characteristics, notions, and feelings of the Japanese and Chinese are so different that there is no possibility of their complete amalgamation in one common cause; and what is true with regard to the Chinese holds even more true with regard to other Asiatic peoples.
>
> Japan aspires, moreover, to elevate herself to the same plane and to press onward in the same path of civilisation as the countries of the West.... Japan has already cast in her lot with the Occident, and in the eyes of many Asiatics it is to be remembered the Japanese are no less "Yang-Kwai" (foreign devils) than the Occidentals.

Katsura repeated this position during an interview with Dr. William Imbrie, secretary of the Association of Presbyterian Missionaries in Japan, and a member of the pan-religious association (*Dai Nihon Shūkyō Taikai*), formed in response to Katsura's request for united religious support. Katsura dismissed the fear that "perhaps after all Japan is not quite what she is said to be", and warned of Russian attempts to foster prejudice in the U.S. He firmly denied any racial or religious conflict and explained that this war was "carried on the interests of justice, humanity, and the commerce and civilisation of the world." He reminded Imbrie of his order that racial antagonism in teaching be suppressed, and emphasised that Japan was limiting the area of conflict to avoid "fanning into a flame the anti-foreign spirit in China." Having contrasted enlightened Japan with reactionary Asia, Katsura concluded;[14]

> Whether or not it is the destiny of Japan to be the leader of of the East remains to be unfolded. But if ever that responsibility shall be hers, of one thing the world may be

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[12]Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., 1974-81, vol. 4, p. 93, Kaneko letter, 3 April 1904.

[13]Baron Suyematsu, *The Risen Sun*, London 1905, p. 294-95. See also, Suyematsu, "The Problem of the Far East", Alfred Stead, ed., *Japan By the Japanese*, London 1904.

[14]The interview was reported at length by British Minister Claude MacDonald, F.O. 46/578, MacDonald to Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, 29 May 1904. Katsura also attacked the idea that Japan's modernisation was a superficial copy of the West, "Japan is an old country with a history which it will always read with a proper pride, for the civilisation of what we now call Old Japan was one of a high order, and comprised elements which New Japan has no desire to change. For reasons which, however, I need not now give, during a long course of years Japan thought it wise to live an isolated life. Then came a period in her history, little understood by most foreigners, when great internal forces were actively at work bearing Japan on to a new era. It was during that period that Commodore Perry came to Japan; and no doubt his coming, and the manner of it, did much to give the movement of which I am speaking direction; but it was not his coming that caused the movement.... The old tree still stands but the new branches have been grafted into the tree."

> sure. She will not willingly retrace her own steps; and she will at least endeavour to persuade the East to do what she has done herself, and what she is trying to do more perfectly.

This might be interpreted as a plea to the West to leave the education of Asia to Japan. However, the thrust of Katsura's discourse was that Japan would not lead the East against the West, and that Japanese development on the Asian continent did not pose an immediate threat to the Western order.

Katsura also appointed Tokutomi Sohō, editor of the *Kokumin Shimbun*, to co-ordinate domestic opinion and see to the comfort of Western correspondents.[15] These propaganda efforts were fatally undermined, however, by the actions of the Japanese army. During the opening months of the war, about forty military observers and more than eighty foreign journalists were penned in Tokyo.[16] These restrictions produced adverse comment and even G. E. Morrison of *The Times*, having clamoured for the war, found himself repeatedly unable in the summer of 1904 to find "a weak spot in the Japanese armour of silence." In frustration, he began sending telegrams to London criticizing Japan, and privately questioning whether *The Times* was not "unwise in displaying such fulsome particularity for the Japanese."[17] Both Tokutomi and Yamagata were particularly concerned about the choleric Captain James, also of *The Times*, but Kodama refused to subordinate military priorities to public relations at this stage. James finally returned home in protest, while British military attachés pointedly boycotted Ōyama's send-off for the front on 6 July 1904.[18]

Once the foreign observers were allowed to sail, they remained set apart from the action and their bitterness increased. J.O.P. Bland, *The Times* correspondent in Shanghai wrote privately;[19]

> I saw Harding Davis and Fox on their way through; they could say nothing bad enough about the Japanese methods, and the effect of their criticism on Japanese morality in this matter is bound to have considerable weight. The attaches are still penned up like sheep, and behaving as such.

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[15] John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō: A Journalist for Modern Japan*, Princeton 1980, p. 278-79.

[16] W.W. Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, E.V. Morgan (Yokohama) letter, 26 April 1904. In April 1904, only about fifteen correspondents and a British naval attache were permitted to join the forces. Morgan described the entertainments provided for the other foreign officers as a "diet of sugar candy to wean them from the fire and brimstone for which they crave." Japanese correspondents, however, faced equal restrictions, Itō Masanori, *Shimbun Gojūnenshi*, Tokyo 1943, p. 183-85.

[17] J.O.P. Bland Papers, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, draft memoir, ch. 2, p. 10.

[18] On Tokutomi and Yamagata, Sakeda Masatoshi et al, ed., *Tokutomi Sohō Kankei Monjo*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1982-85, vol. 2, p. 382, Yamagata letters, 15 and 22 June 1904; On Oyama, Bland Papers, Bland to Morrison, 15 July 1904, and on Lionel James' departure, Bland to Valentine Chirol (foreign editor, *The Times*), 19 September 1904. Bland wrote, "The Japanese are evidently anxious to have his homegoing (in wrath) stopped and Odagiri has taken much trouble, telegraphing much to Tokio, on the subject. James is a good man, but I fear that if he talked to the Japanese military men as he talks to Odagiri here, their desire to put him under arrest is not entirely surprising!"

[19] Bland Papers, letter to G.E. Morrison, 10 September 1904.

Katsura recognised the dangers. Japan was desperate for money and had pleaded unsuccessfully for British financial help prior to the opening of hostilities.[20] On 15 September 1904, Terauchi confided to his diary;[21]

> The 2nd army's cold treatment of the journalists has greatly affected British opinion and devalued our loan. The government is terribly distressed.

In this case, the Japanese army had rejected a political advantage for the sake of military ends. However, while unfriendly reportage clearly disturbed the Japanese, it is questionable whether the war correspondents had the influence to overturn deep-rooted Western sympathy. Rather, the rapidity with which feelings turned away from Japan, in the United States and even in Britain, suggests that pro-Japanese feelings were a fad of the moment. Despite Suematsu's contention that Japan had sided wholly with the West, or Katsura's that she was a unique combination of old and new cultures, geography, physiognomy, and Western scholastic tradition placed her indivisibly with Asia.

National Unity

On the eve of the 20th Diet in March 1904, both Katsura and the main parties expressed a willingness for co-operation. As Katsura wrote to Yamagata;[22]

> On the question of national unity, we would lose face and authority overseas, particularly towards our enemy, if all kinds of debate were to boil over the Diet floor.

In mid-March, he invited in representatives of all factions from both Houses for discussion. Police reports had shown the Seiyūkai and Kensei Hontō opposed to major parts of the government's tax plan, but an all-night conference with Katsura, Sone and Yamamoto, on 20 March produced general agreement. After some internal party wrangling, a valuable tobacco monopoly received Diet approval and was announced on 1 April.[23]

In the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had avoided the need for foreign loans. This was impossible against Russia. However, when she floated a 10 million pound loan in London and New York in May 1904, the terms were harsh; Japan received 93% of the

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[20] F.O. 46/576, Lansdowne to MacDonald, 1, 5, 6, January 1904; F.O. 46/577, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 14 January 1904. On 5 January 1904, Hayashi Tadasu in London warned Foreign Secretary Lansdowne that Japan had reserves for one year, could extend the war for six months by increased taxes and paper issue, but thereafter would be exhausted. Komura on 3 January stressed to MacDonald that Japan was fighting on behalf of commercial freedom and Britain especially would be harmed by a Russian victory. Lansdowne maintained his position that financial support to Japan would be considered an unfriendly act by Russia.

[21] Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 269, entry for 15 September 1904.

[22] Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 220-21, letter of 21 March 1904.

[23] *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 218-19, entries for 15-19 March 1904, includes the police report; Hara, vol. 2, p. 92-96, entries for 5-26 March 1904, for the government-party negotiations. Hara and Matsuda Masahisa represented the Seiyūkai, Oishi Masami, and Minoura Katsundo the Kensei Hontō. After the Diet closed on 30 March, Katsura met Hara and Matsuda to discuss matters that had arisen then and in the future, Hara, vol. 2, p. 98, entry for 9 April 1904.

face value, less the banks' commission of 3%, producing a net figure of only 9 million pounds. In addition, the 6% interest contrasted unfavourably with an earlier London loan, and, most disturbingly, security was provided by customs revenue, conjuring up parallels with China's financial weakness. Katsura exhorted Japanese bankers to accept the hard reality of the national situation and the *Kobe Chronicle* explained bluntly "that to whatever extent Japan's successes were carried, she has no hope of obtaining an indemnity from Russia.... for Japan cannot strike at Russia's vulnerable points and hold that empire to ransom."[24] This remained true, and a second foreign loan for 12 million pounds in November 1904 suffered the same conditions, with a second call on customs revenue as security.[25]

Writing in the journal *Sekai* in October 1904, former Agriculture-Commerce Minister Hirata Tōsuke tried to force a similar awakening on the Japanese public;[26]

> Though everyone must work to relieve the troops and help bereaved families, the general public must work most of all to provide military capital over the long term and prevent fear of shortages, reduce the area and magnitude of economic and social influences of the war, and establish ways to protect against the decline of national might. Thus, should the war continue for two or three more years, we will, solely with ultimate victory in view, give way neither to pessimism nor optimism.

The disruption of internal commerce had grave possibilities;

> Markets are lost, projects halted, workers unemployed, and many are hard pressed to find food or clothing. If this situation persists, we may end with throngs of destitute people everywhere.

Industrial co-operatives increased - 1,120 by June 1904 - and the public responded patriotically to government bond issues.[27] Bank support was co-ordinated by Matsuo Shinzen, president of the Bank of Japan, with increasing help from the Mitsubishi Bank under Toyogawa Ryōhei, later a close ally of Katsura.[28] Despite the bloody five-month siege of Port Arthur and costly victories at Liaoyang and Sha-ho, only the socialist *Heimin Shimbun* protested. Its circulation, however, was only 4,500 when it began

[24]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 222, Katsura letter to Yamagata, 18 May 1904, "I want the difficulties of the situation to waken them from their complacent dreams." Paraphase of the *Kobe Chronicle*, F.O. 46/578, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 18 May 1904. MacDonald's own comment was that some unknown circumstance must have forced Japan to accept these terms.

[25]F.O. 46/579, MacDonald to Lansdowne, it "provoked a good deal of criticism from the Japanese press" and a general discontent with the government. Japan did fare slightly better, receiving 90.5% of the face value.

[26]Hirata Tōsuke, "Senji ni okeru Kokumin no Kakugo", quoted Katō Fusakura, ed., *Hakushaku Hirata Tōsuke-den*, Tokyo 1927, p. 111-117.

[27]These bonds were issued on five occasions during the war; 13 February, 23 May, 12 October 1904, 27 February and 20 April 1905. Issues were all for 100 million yen, with the exception of 80 million yen in October 1904.

[28]Uzaki Kumakichi, *Toyogawa Ryōhei*, Tokyo 1922, p. 197-200.

publishing in November 1903, and declined under police harassment and suspension.[29] Matters were helped by an excellent harvest, and in October 1904 Japanese financial experts predicted the war could continue "fairly comfortably" for another year to eighteen months.[30]

However, Katsura was again forced to increase the tax burden at the end of 1904, proposing a salt monopoly and transit duties. He had maintained consultation with party leaders since the 20th Diet and, on 16 November, invited them for discussion at Inoue Kaoru's residence. Katsura explained the financial and military situation, and warned of Russia's plan for a major offensive on land and sea. On 19 November, Seiyūkai leaders approved the government's financial package and acknowledged the inevitability of tax rises. Saionji, speaking to his members on 26 November, asked for swift Diet approval of military expenses, but also warned the government against wasteful effort such as the aborted Nagamori scheme for land development in Korea.[31] Katsura responded by offering the Seiyūkai preferential treatment;[32]

> The government will base its actions on the Seiyūkai and when the resolutions of the Seiyūkai and Kensei Hontō are at odds, the government will follow that of the Seiyūkai.

Saionji and Hara were unsure whether this was merely a device to separate the two parties, but they could not reject a special relationship with the prime minister. This co-operation enabled Katsura's budget to pass the Lower House on 16 December 1904, but the House of Peers, perhaps stirred by textile manufacturers, fought the proposed textile and inheritance taxes. At Katsura's prompting, the Seiyūkai and Kensei Hontō publicly reaffirmed their support and the Peers acquiesced, approving both measures on 28 December.[33] To smoothe feelings, Katsura then arranged a dinner for senior members of both Houses on 1 February 1905, and Saionji returned the compliment with a banquet for the cabinet, *genrō*, and Kensei Hontō leaders on 18 February 1905. This was an unprecedented scene of government and party men dining amicably during a Diet session, and Saionji declared it a new era in Japanese politics.[34] Hara privately agreed, if

[29]Hyman Kublin, "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War", *Journal of Modern History*, 22-4, December 1950, p. 330-33. The anniversary edition of 13 November 1904 contained a translation of "The Communist Manifesto". This caused lead writers, including Kōtoku Shūsui, to be fined and then imprisoned from March 1905.

[30]Charles Hardinge papers, Cambridge University Library, Claude MacDonald letter to Hardinge (St. Petersburg), 22 October 1904.

[31]Saionji's speech is in Nakagawa Kojūrō, *Kindai Nihon no Seikyoku to Saionji Kimmochi*, Tokyo 1987, p. 45-47; Hara, vol. 2, p. 116, entries for 19, 26 November 1904.

[32]Hara, vol. 2, p. 117, entry for 6 December 1904. It is worth noting that Katsura and Hara habitually referred to the Kensei Hontō by its former name, Shimpotō.

[33]Hara, vol. 2, p. 121, entries for 27-28 December 1904.

[34]Saionji's speech is in Nakagawa, p. 50-51. Katsura replied, followed by Ōishi Masami and Yamagata. Itō and Inoue were absent due to illness.

from a different perspective;[35]

> With this, the government can pretend to the world that the country is united but for us it shows the people that the Seiyūkai have now become the leaders and brought the nation together. There has never been a meeting like this.

Indeed, by supporting the war effort, the Seiyūkai in particular had improved its relationship with the Meiji leadership. This would ease the appearance in 1906 of the Saionji cabinet. However, in order to improve its political influence, the Seiyūkai had turned a blind eye to the sacrifices being made by the people. This was a dangerous ploy. If the Seiyūkai would not represent their grievances, the people might turn to the other parties, or even to more radical movements. Consequently, the Seiyūkai would be left with two choices; either to depend on Katsura to contain army disapproval and pave the way to office, or turn back to popular support. Should it turn to the people, this would only aggravate army suspicions. In the event, both the Seiyūkai and Katsura were forced into a balancing act to maintain their working alliance. Katsura would have to deal with army discontent at changes in power, and the Seiyūkai with popular frustration at the apparent lack of change in oligarchic control. As the stresses at home and overseas increased, so they would both look for a third force. The Seiyūkai would turn to the navy, succeeding only in alienating Katsura as well as the army, while Katsura would attempt to form his own party, and so lose military support.

The war, however, continued insatiable and even as the 1905 budget was cleared away, Chief of Staff Yamagata pressed for a third foreign loan.[36] In March 1905, shortly after another colossal engagement, this time at Mukden, Katsura had financial representative Takahashi Korekiyo arrange a loan of 300 million pounds at 4.5% interest in Europe.[37]

Korea

Korea at the turn of the nineteenth century endured the same Western contempt as China. In 1902, British Minister to Seoul John Jordan wrote poignantly;[38]

> One is always inclined to wonder how long the present state of things can continue, but decaying countries die a very lingering death.

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[35]Hara, vol. 2, p. 125, entry for 18 February 1905. Army Minister Terauchi also noted, with some apprehension, the new position of the Seiyūkai, *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 305, entry for 18 February 1905.

[36]Katsura papers, 70- 80, Yamagata letter, 13 February 1905, "Let us not argue whether this foreign loan will succeed or fail for if we miss this present chance to exert all effort and reach our goal, then I believe we will end with no hope of carrying it out. We should not worry about the various turns in our national situation and consequent rise in interest rates, but go ahead now and with resolve. The finance ministry and economists will argue a good deal but I hope you will not hesitate."

[37]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 233-34, Katsura letter to Yamagata, 23 March 1905; Yamagata's congratulatory note, also of 23 March, is in Katsura Papers, 70-82.

[38]John Jordan Papers, F.O. 350/3, letter to Sir Cyprian Bridge (Weihaiwei), 20 June 1902.

There had been two internal movements to modify the political situation; the agricultural-based Tonghak, seeking reform of land and local administration abuses, and the elite-centred Independence Club (1896-99), calling for a non-aligned Korea, with greater political participation at home to follow. Both were crushed by Emperor Kojong, but remnants continued both within Korea and as refugees in Japan.[39] Nonetheless, there was no international confidence in a native Korean regeneration and the emperor was regarded as frivolous and corrupt.[40] This eased Japan's intended domination. However, to avoid a bruising wartime struggle with the Koreans and consequent loss of face, it was, as Katsura and Terauchi realised, "absolutely essential to get an arm around the monarch" and prevent him fleeing again to a foreign legation.[41] Japan's reputation in Korea still suffered from the excesses of the past, and indirect control through the emperor, intimidated by the threat from his domestic opponents, held obvious advantages. Moreover, the Meiji leaders, while themselves products of revolution, feared radicalism and supported traditional authority. Following the February 1904 agreement with Korea, Itō Hirobumi was sent to console Kojong. The emperor, Korean cabinet and traditional Confucianists, revealed themselves open to bribery, and Japan assumed she could buy her goals.[42] Kojong continued to trust in eventual Russian victory and provided individual assistance: as Vice Foreign Minister Yun Ch'i-ho gloomily noted, "I am credibly informed that his majesty is engaged in boiling Japanese maps in a cauldron - a singular means of cursing Japan and her cause."[43] However, open opposition to Japan was muted.

Official policy towards Korea was decided by a meeting of cabinet and *genrō* on 30 May 1904. The essential points were; Japan to assume control of Korean defence, diplomacy, finance and communications, and to plan for the development of Korean agriculture by Japanese settlers. The meeting stressed the need for a foreign (Western) adviser to the Korean foreign ministry and there had been talk as early as March 1904 of

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[39]Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Kojong Sidaesa*, 6 vols., Seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 21-22, details the activities of the Tonghak in the northern provinces of Hwanghae and P'yŏngan in February 1904. A list of Korean refugees in Japan in 1903 is given in Ichikawa, p. 443-45.

[40]Jordan Papers, F.O. 350/3, letter to Francis Campbell, 19 December 1903, "The emperor is truly hopeless. Nero's fiddling while Rome was in a blaze was a dignified performance with what goes on lately."

[41]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 190, entry for 9 December 1903. The word used by Terauchi was *yō suru*, implying to embrace or lead someone. As war approached, there were rumours that Kojong was seeking asylum in the French legation, Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Monjo*, (hereafter NGB), vol. 37-1, p. 319, Hayashi Gonsuke (Seoul) to Komura, 8 February 1904.

[42]The details of bribes to Foreign Minister Yi Chi-yong and Confucian scholars are in *Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 13; also NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 464, Hayashi Gonsuke (Seoul) to Komura, 11 January 1904. Itō's donations to the emperor are in *Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 38-39. On 21 March 1904, Itō offered the Korean imperial household minister 300,000 yen, and on 23 March gave a further 20,000 yen for the emperor's favourite, Lady Om.

[43]Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Yun Ch'i-ho Ilgi*, 6 vols., Seoul 1973, vol. 6, p. 22-23, entry for 26 April 1904.

bringing Durham White Stevens from Japan's Washington legation for the post.[44] Japan had wartime authority over Korea's external and internal defence, and already owned the railways. She began, therefore, by trying to regenerate the Korean economy through agriculture. As the cabinet decision noted, this would also alleviate Japan's internal pressures;[45]

> Korea has a small population relative to its land and could easily accommodate large numbers of our farmers. If this were done, we could simultaneously find an outlet for our excess population and increase our supply of scarce foods. This would be to kill two birds with one stone.

In accordance with the earlier views of Katsura and Komura, the meeting decided to use a Japanese individual to seek rights for extensive Korean wastelands. In Seoul in March 1904, Nagamori Tōkichirō, previously head of the finance ministry secretariat, had applied for just these rights in concert with Minister Hayashi.[46] On 6 June 1904, Hayashi presented a draft agreement on Nagamori's behalf to Korean Foreign Minister Yi Ha-yong. Yet, however undeveloped Korea's sense of national identity might be, whatever existed was tied firmly to the land. Even before the war, Seoul's *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* had warned that military coolies arriving in Korea were intended to colonise the land after hostilities and, in June, the Nagamori scheme produced a dramatic increase of Confucian anti-Japanese pamphlets and memorials.[47] While Hayashi asked the Korean law minister and police for action, and some arrests were made, the disturbance allowed the Korean government to shelve discussions from 27 June until calm returned, and Hayashi saw the sense in proceeding gradually.[48] In mid-July there were reported firings on Japanese troops, and on 13 July a new society, the Poanhoe (Peace Preservation Society), was established in Seoul with court assistance. Emulating the Independence Club, the Poanhoe held mass meetings to rouse popular opposition to the Japanese demand, published petitions in the Seoul newspapers, and appealed to all the foreign legations.[49] The Korean government attempted to transfer the wasteland rights to a brand new Korean

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[44]W.W. Rockhill Papers, letter from Horace Allen (Seoul), 19 April 1904.

[45]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabi Shuyō Bunsho*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1965, vol. 1, p. 224-28.

[46]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 569-78, Wakamatsu (Mokp'o) to Hayashi, 2 April, Hayashi to Komura, 8 April, Komura to Hayashi, 6 May 1904. These telegrams show that the Japanese authorities in Korea were considering wasteland development before the arrival of Nagamori. Hayashi had expounded a similar plan to Itō on his visit to Seoul in March. Details in the author's "Of "Collaborators" and Kings: Japanese Political-Agricultural Demands in Korea During the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05", *Papers on Far eastern History*, 38, September 1988.

[47]*Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 5, *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* of 12 January 1904, also p. 82. Vice Foreign Minister Yun Ch'i-ho expressed his anger on 8 June 1904, "It is annexation minus the name.... It is morally wrong. No shame for a weak nation to be swallowed up by a stronger one. But to hand over the whole country with eyes open, for dirty bribes, to Japan, is too much even in this corrupt land", *Yun Ilgi*, vol. 6, p. 40.

[48]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 586, Hayashi to Komura, 29 June 1904.

[49]Yun Pyŏng-sang, "Ilbonin ŭi Hwangmuchi Kaech'okkwŏn Yogu e tae hayo", Yŏksa Hakhoe, ed., *Han'guksa Nongmun Sŏngnip*, Seoul 1976, vol. 6, p. 228-30; *Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 93-98; Lee Ki-baik, *A New History of Korea*, Seoul 1984, p. 327. Attendance at the Poanhoe's meeting of 21 July 1904 was estimated at 3-4,000 people, watched over by approximately 100 armed Japanese troops.

Agriculture and Mining Company, but this was annulled under Japanese pressure on 16 July.[50] The Koreans feared a military response from Japan, and on 21 July the commander of Japanese forces in Korea, Haraguchi Kenzai, declared that Japanese gendarmes would be stationed in Seoul to preserve order.[51] In Tokyo, Komura warned the Korean representative that Japanese patience was wearing thin, and expressed his belief that the Nagamori scheme was essential for Korea's financial regeneration.[52] On 22 July, Japanese gendarmes moved into a Poanhoe meeting, arrested members, and confiscated documents. This only provoked further violence. Japanese troops were again attacked and by 2 August Hayashi had to admit that the moderate cabinet of Sim Sang-hun would fall if further pressed.[53] This was a feeling shared in Japan. Hara Kei complained to Navy Minister Yamamoto that the Nagamori plan was merely getting in the way of Japan's larger plans for Korea and Yamamoto seemed to agree. There was already discussion of sending Itō or Ōkuma on a semi-permanent basis to oversee Korean affairs but the situation would first need greater stability.[54]

Japan withdrew the Nagamori plan and concentrated on installing advisers in Korean ministries. On 21 August, Katsura and Terauchi decided to increase troops in Korea to two divisions, and, on 23 August, forced the Korean government to accept Megata Tanetarō and Durham Stevens as financial and diplomatic advisers. To reduce friction among Japan's existing diplomatic and military representatives in Korea, General Hasegawa Yoshimichi was appointed overall commander of local forces and entered Seoul on 13 October.[55] However, Japanese advice could be, and was, ignored. In the meantime, Emperor Kojong waited for the Tzar himself to lead a million men and crush Japan.[56]

Japan had learned to step carefully. Yet, the Nagamori scheme also produced a counter-response from ex-members of the Independence Club who realised that Korea's

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[50]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 592, Acting Minister Hagiwara to Komura, 14 July 1904.

[51]*Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 98.

[52]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 598, Komura to Hayashi, 20 July 1904.

[53]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 602, Hayashi to Komura, 2 August 1904.

[54]Hara, vol. 2, p. 106, entry for 28 July 1904, "According to Yamamoto and Saionji, it is true that Itō will go back to Korea, but in Yamamoto's version, it seems he is to stay in Korea and occasionally return to Japan. If he has the great resolve to direct Korea's fate, very well. If not, it will end in failure like Count Inoue in the past." On 14 November 1904, Katsura told a colleague that he was thinking of despatching Okuma to Korea, Hara, vol. 2, p. 115, entry for 16 November 1904. The option of sending Itō or Ōkuma as ambassador to Korea and strengthening Japanese-Korea ties to the point of a "father-mother" relationship was stressed by Shiba Shirō, an associate of Konoe Atsumaro, in *Taiyō* on 1 September 1904. Shiba, however, rejected advisory government as unlikely to prove effective, Imamura Yoshio, "Nik-Kan Heigō to Chūgoku no Nihon-kan", *Shisō*, 537, March 1969, p. 382.

[55]Tani Hisao, *Kimitsu Nichi-Ro Senshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 558-59.

[56]*Yun Ilgi*, vol. 6, p. 42, entry for 17 June 1904.

fate was no longer distinguishable from that of Japan, and sought to make the best arrangement for Korea. On 18 August 1904, they formed the Ilsinhoe.[57] For political leader, they chose a man who had spent ten years in Japan as a refugee, and was now working as an interpreter with the Japanese forces, Song Pyŏng-jun. The Ilsinhoe manifesto attacked the Korean government for corruption and oppression, and assailed its inability to respond to Korea's imminent destruction with anything but further repression.[58]

There was a similar group in the provinces, the Chinbohoe. This was an organisation run by Tonghak refugees in Tokyo and controlled locally by Yi Yong-gu. The Chinbohoe also accepted the need to utilise Japanese strength to improve a corrupt and repressive society and despite Japanese army attacks in March 1904, provided voluntary labour for Japanese military railway construction in the summer of 1904.[59] The two groups began negotiations on amalgamation and merged on 25 December 1904 as the Ilchinhoe.

Ilsinhoe relations with Japanese authorities had been aided by Kōmuchi Tomotsune, an intimate of Prince Konoe Atsumaro, and, from October 1904, two other Japanese advisers. The Ilsinhoe addressed a letter to General Hasegawa on 22 October noting the close historical and cultural ties of the two nations, acknowledging Japan's major role in establishing Korean independence, and thanking Japan for her declarations of support for Korean reform.[60] This was followed on 2 December 1904 by a long letter from Song to Colonel Matsuishi Yasuharu, vice chief of staff to Ōyama, in which he emphasised the reformist tendencies of the common people as opposed to the corruption and despotism of the government, and pleaded with Japan to respond to popular wishes rather than support the tyrants. Song attacked Japan's diplomats as mean and corrupt, but promised unequivocal support if his request were granted. However, he warned that a refusal would lead to the Korean people seeking alternative allies in the West while resisting the same

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[57]The original name was Yusinhoe under president Yun Si-pyŏng, but this was changed on 21 August when the Korean court declared Yusin (restoration, i.e. the same as Meiji restoration) unacceptable, Keijō Kempei Buntai, ed., *Ilchinhoe Ryakushi*, (hereafter Ryakushi), unpub. Seoul 1910, Gakushūin University, Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Library, p. 1-5. See also, Benjamin Weems, *Reform, Rebellion, and the Heavenly Way*, Tucson 1964, p. 56.

[58]The manifesto is discussed in Han Sang-il, *Nik-Kan Kindaishi no Kūkan*, Tokyo 1984, p. 154-55.

[59]*Kojong Sidaesa*, vol. 6, p. 35, Japanese troops attacked a Tonghak meeting place on 20 March 1904 causing death and injury. The reason for the attack was fear that the group would rise to threaten the Japanese army and foreign missionaries. The Chinbohoe's offer of labour came at a time when Koreans violently refused the high wages offered by the Japanese army out of fear of being pressed onto the battlefield, Lone, p. 117.

[60]The letter is quoted in Han, p. 155-56.

fate as the Taiwanese.[61] The very success of the populist Ilchinhoe unnerved the Japanese government. Both Hayashi and local Japanese military observers acknowledged the Ilchinhoe's sincerity and its effectiveness in checking official corruption.[62] However, Komura believed any popular group threatened Japan's contention that she alone could reform Korean affairs and, 30 December 1904, warned Hayashi to restrict Ilchinhoe activities.[63] The Ilchinhoe was criticised for using apparent Japanese support to boost membership with promises of position in a future government, and, in late 1905, tried to push through an agricultural company to develop Korean waste lands in the north without regard to existing ownership.[64] By then, Japan had clearly cast her lot with existing authority and the Ilchinhoe was isolated. It would return to influence, however, upon the failure of Japan's advisory government in Korea.

Preparing for Peace

By January 1905, Japan had won every military engagement in the war, but Katsura expected 600,000 Russian troops to be thrown against a Japan already scraping for reserves, and knew that peace negotiations would be difficult.[65] However, the war had been fought to secure Korea and Katsura was determined to get British and American approval for Japan's new position. The battle of Mukden from 1-10 March 1905 marked the limit of Japan's resources and, although Katsura boldly declared to Japanese bankers on 18 March that the war would continue until Japan emerged victorious, the realisation was already general that she had nothing more to gain.[66] Even as the armies fought at Mukden, civilian politicians such as Hara and Itō, and soldiers including Terauchi and Ōyama were talking of peace.[67] In a long letter to Katsura in April, Chief of Staff Yamagata outlined the alternatives: Japan could sit and wait for fresh Russian troops to gather at Harbin and then come south, or she could carry the fight to the Russians, drive them out of Manchuria and take Vladivostok. Neither was practical given Japan's level of exhaustion, her already overstretched supply lines, and the extraordinary financial and

[61]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 936-41, reproduces the letter in full. See also Nishio Yōtarō, *Yi Yong-gu Shōden*, Fukuoka 1978, p. 51-56, with a lengthy commentary on p. 56-64.

[62]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 477-87, Hayashi to Komura, 5 and 26 November, 31 December 1904, report of chief of staff to army in Korea to Vice Chief of Staff Nagaoka, 9 November 1904.

[63]NGB, vol. 37-1, p. 485, Komura to Hayashi, 30 December 1904.

[64]Ryakushi, p. 11-12.

[65]Katsura's prediction was noted by Hara, vol. 2, p. 115, entry for 16 November 1904. On peace negotiations, Itō bluntly stated that even Bismarck would have been hard pressed in Japan's position, Oka Yoshitake et al, ed., *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Monjo*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1973, vol. 1, p. 185, Itō speech of 6 January 1905.

[66]Katsura's speech was noted in F.O. 46/591, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 24 March 1905.

[67]Hara, vol. 2, p. 129, entry for 9 March 1905; *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 487, for Ōyama's memo. of 13 March 1905; Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, Seattle 1966, p. 64, notes that Terauchi privately informed U.S. Minister Griscom on 8 March that fighting should end here.

manpower burden moving north would place on the people. Nor could she hope to rely on Russia's own internal disorder to save the day.[68] Vice Chief of Staff Nagaoka Gaishi had devised a combined army-navy attack on Vladivostok in March, but open concern from Katsura, and refusal to participate from the navy, then contemplating the approaching Baltic fleet, led to its rejection on 11 April.[69] Katsura and Terauchi were also reluctant to approve Nagaoka's plan, supported by Komura, for an invasion of Sakhalin.[70] The third foreign loan on 26 March was intended to demonstrate Japanese strength but reports from Kodama, just returned from Manchuria, revealed her true exhaustion. On 7 April 1905, Katsura, Komura, the service ministers and *genrō*, approved Itō's contention that Japan had achieved her defensive needs and there would be no shame before the powers in now calling for peace.[71]

Katsura met Hara Kei on 16 April. Both agreed on the certain popular dissatisfaction with the coming peace terms and Katsura acknowledged that here the Seiyūkai would have to side with the people. He stated that he would resign and transfer power to Saionji, but wanted to fabricate some dispute over post-war policy so that he could climb down without giving the impression that the war had been in any way a failure. He had already considered the profile of the successor cabinet and confirmed that Yamamoto would not remain in office. However, he suggested either Terauchi or Kodama would be suitable as Saionji's army minister. Revealing just how far he had drifted from the army, Katsura explained that he had discussed matters with Itō and Inoue, but not with Yamagata. Nonetheless, he assured Hara that Yamagata, who was himself talking of withdrawing from politics, would be no trouble.[72] Before this, however, Katsura had to affirm Japan's position in Korea and bring the war to an end. Japan had already made her basic peace terms known to Britain in January 1905. While dismissing an indemnity and the disposal of Russian vessels as minor points and open to discussion, her essential requirements were: that Korea be recognised as exclusively within Japan's sphere of influence; that the lease of the Liaodong peninsula with associated rail rights be transferred to Japan without alteration; that Manchuria outside of

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[68]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 243-48, Yamagata memorandum.

[69]Tani, p. 564-66. It was at Nagaoka's house that the Getsuyōkai had been established in 1881. Nagaoka's later position shows that a difference of opinion did not necessarily prejudice an officer's career for life.

[70]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 493-95; Shinobu, p. 164-65. Kodama's influence was decisive and the attack actually took place in July.

[71]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 317, entry for 7 April 1905; *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 487, for Itō's memo. of 29 March 1905.

[72]Hara, vol. 2, p. 131-32, entry for 16 April 1905. Yamagata's talk of resignation was noted by Hara, vol. 2, p. 154, entry for 30 October 1905. Katsura also assured Hara that the House of Peers, while probably opposing the transfer to Saionji, would not be able to impeded it.

the Liaodong peninsula be restored to China.[73] Itō had privately suggested to Britain that Manchuria beyond the Liaodong area be placed under international control, but both Komura in Tokyo and Hayashi Tadasu in London quickly scotched that idea, stating that the Japanese government would "view such a settlement with extreme disfavour". Moreover, Hayashi added the caveat that Manchuria would be returned to China "as soon as circumstances permit.... subject to such guarantees of reform and improved government as will insure peace and good order."[74] This was the position as taken by Russia in 1901 and would cause the Japanese equal trouble.

On 31 May 1905, following the stunning victory of the Japanese fleet in the Tsushima Straits, Komura requested President Roosevelt's mediation in ending hostilities.[75] Russia had just decided to continue the war but was persuaded to consider negotiations. Katsura proposed Marquis Itō, assisted by Komura, as Japan's plenipotentiary to the peace talks at Portsmouth, but Itō had no intention of taking the blame for a failed peace. Komura was then chosen over doubts from other *genrō*.[76] A fourth foreign loan of 30 million pounds was announced on 8 July and on that same day Komura sailed for the U.S.A.[77] Katsura took over as acting foreign minister.

Katsura's first task was to deal with William Howard Taft, lately governor-general of the Phillipines and now secretary for war. Taft arrived in Japan on the morning of 25 July.[78] Now, accompanied by the president's daughter, Alice Roosevelt, and a party of some fifty people, he was greeted by a tremendous demonstration of courtesy and popular goodwill towards the U.S., orchestrated, the British minister surmised, by the government.[79] Katsura had been informed of Roosevelt's disturbing attitude towards a powerful Japan: the Pacific, Roosevelt had declared, should become an American lake, with America dominating Far Eastern trade, and Japan's pretensions to power crushed

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[73]F.O. 46/591, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 26 January 1905.

[74]F.O. 46/590, Lansdowne to MacDonald, 30 January 1905. Komura's statement on "extreme disfavour" was recorded in F.O. 46/591, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 26 January 1905.

[75]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 451, reproduces Komura's telegram.

[76]F.O. 46/592, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 23 June 1905; *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 474-75; *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 334, entries for 19-21 June 1905. Komura was warned by Yamamoto to seek cabinet approval for anything beyond his instructions, Shinobu Jumpei, *Komura Jutarō*, Tokyo 1942, p. 159. Shinobu also notes, p. 169, that when Komura departed Shimbashi station on 8 July, the crowds cheered *Banzai*. Komura's assistant, Yamaza Enjirō wryly suggested, "When we return, we'll be lucky to get away with *bakayarō*", which amused them both.

[77]The terms of the loan were as in March, 4.5% interest with the net profit of the tobacco monopoly as security, F.O. 46/592, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 10 July 1905. Hara's comment was, "It appears he has been forced to raise a loan from Inoue's continuing concern that peace negotiations will be hard and, to some extent, to show strength to Russia", Hara, vol. 2, p. 141, entry for 13 July 1905.

[78]Taft had visited Japan on his way back from the Philippines in January 1904 and had apparently mixed well with the Japanese authorities, *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 192-93, entries for 4-7 January 1904.

[79]F.O. 46/593, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 29 July 1905.

through exhaustion against Russia.[80] While Katsura and Komura dismissed the report as unreliable and unrepresentative of the president's true feelings, they could not be sure. At Katsura's request, he and Taft met privately on 27 July. Katsura's intention was two-fold; to give advance warning of Japanese intent to make a protectorate of Korea, and repeat the pledge of Japanese non-interference in the Philippines given by Prime-Minister Ōkuma in 1898. Taft accepted both points.[81] Katsura also denied in emphatic terms any basis for "yellow peril" fears and emphasised the unity of Anglo-Japanese-American interests. While discounting the possibility of formal alliance with the United States, he expressed the hope that they would have "an alliance in practice, if not in name."[82] When informed, Roosevelt affirmed Taft's position in the informal talks and the American party departed with repeated fanfare and popular acclamation.[83]

Negotiations with Britain were more predictable. Both sides had already made clear their inclination towards renewing and expanding the alliance.[84] The Balfour government was under attack and before losing office wished to convert to an offensive rather than defensive alliance, and expand its scope to include India. In return, it was willing to consider greater recognition of Japan's position in Korea. As British minister MacDonald put it;[85]

> If we acquiesced in a Japanese protectorate over Korea after the war, they would see to it that we had no anxiety as regards India. I pointed out [to Lansdowne] that whether we acquiesced or not the Japanese would <u>most certainly</u> establish a protectorate.

This did not imply *carte blanche* for Japan in Korea and in June MacDonald gave a stern warning that Britain would expect such a protectorate to "be for the real benefit of Korea

[80]F.O. 46/579, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 30 December 1904, report of Shanghai barrister, Venn Drummond, from conversations with Roosevelt. See also, Esthus, p. 38-41, for earlier Roosevelt comments along these lines.

[81]Ralph Eldin Minger, "Tafts' Mission to Japan: A Study in Personal Diplomacy", *Pacific Historical Review*, 30-3, August 1961, p. 280. Taft wrote privately that he thought Japan's continental responsibilities would keep her hands full and well away from the Philippines.

[82]Minger, p. 280-82. A report to the British foreign office in August suggested that Komura had at one point suggested to Taft that the U.S. formally join the Anglo-Japanese alliance, F.O. 800/134, Lord Lansdowne Papers, Sir Mortimer Durand (N.Y.) letter, 4 August 1905, detailing Theodore Roosevelt conversation 3 August 1905.

[83]The English text of the Katsura-Taft memorandum is in *Gaikō Nempyō*, vol. 1, p. 240, also Andrew C. Nahm, "The Impact of the Katsura-Taft Memorandum on Korea - A Reassesment", *Korea Journal*, 25-10, October 1985, p. 14-15.

[84]Charles Hardinge Papers, vol. 7, Claude MacDonald letter, 23 December 1904, Katsura and Komura dismissed Russian press suggestions of a Russo-Japanese alliance after Japan had been defeated, "They both laughed and said their opinion was quite different.... and that was that if Japan was successful in the war, she would seek a closer alliance with England"; also, Lansdowne discussions with Hayashi (London), February 1905, see Kurobane Shigeru, "Nichi-Ei Dōmei no Kōshin to Kokka Zaisei Mondai", *Rekishi Kyōiku*, 10-2, February 1962, p. 52.

[85]Hardinge Papers, vol. 7, MacDonald letter, 19 July 1905. F.O. 800/134, Lansdowne Papers, Lansdowne to MacDonald, 27 August 1905, the foreign secretary considered a protectorate of Korea "indispensable from the Japanese point of view" and wrote that Britain would "not object even if the protectorate were to lead to annexation, and I have, in my conversations with Hayashi, taken this line." The incoming Liberal government would not be quite so supportive.

and the Koreans." To this, Komura replied that Japan would avoid her past mistakes.[86] Katsura was initially unwilling for Japan to become embroiled in Indian affairs but, as Komura had stated on 24 May 1905;[87]

> With this war, the powers have recognised our true value. Yet, behind their praise there lie feelings of fear and suspicion. These will increase after the war as our national strength develops and we cannot avoid the fear of being isolated. We will save ourselves this worry by concluding an offensive alliance with Britain and avoid being forced out by others.

As acting foreign minister, Katsura dealt with the final negotiations, ensuring that Japan's new rights in Korea were affirmed, and conceding India's inclusion in the alliance as a conciliatory gesture to Britain.[88] Publication of the revised alliance was delayed until after the peace terms were published, but by then few cared to notice.[89]

Portsmouth to Beijing

Japan's fear at Portsmouth was that some other power, particularly the Germans, might intervene as in 1895.[90] Added to the mounting distress at home, this made Katsura eager to conclude peace. The Russians, however, remained militarily strong and had entered negotiations as a result of internal instability following the massacre of civilian protesters in January 1905.[91] They could afford to hold out whereas Japan could not. At Portsmouth, there was general agreement over Japan's main demands, but the sticking points were the disposition of Sakhalin and the question of an indemnity. Russian plenipotentiary Sergei Witte had been willing to accept a disguised indemnity but only Komura on the Japanese side was willing to push him that far.[92] On 26 August, Witte explained that Russia would pay nothing, and Komura prepared to go home.[93] Two days later, the Japanese cabinet and *genrō* met at Katsura's official residence, and then before the emperor. Yamagata argued that Japan would need ten new divisions to continue the

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[86]F.O. 46/592, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 29 June 1905. See also Hardinge papers, MacDonald letter, 10 August 1905, "We shall have to keep an eye on them in Korea, they have been too much in the habit of kicking and cuffing the Koreans at sight."

[87]*Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 625-27.

[88]Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, London 1966, p. 326-30; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 261-62.

[89]Hardinge Papers, vol. 7, MacDonald letter, 28 September 1905, notes that only Ōkuma Shigenobu had called with congratulations. "When the first alliance was made public I had as many as fifty callers before the day was over, and at night a torchlight procession."

[90]See Katsura to Hayashi (London) on 18 August 1905, as reported in F.O. 800/134, Lansdowne Papers, Hayashi Tadasu letter, 18 August 1905. Japan's nervousness over Germany was explicit over Edward the Seventh's visit to Kiel in mid-1904, F.O. 46/578, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 25 June 1904; see also Esthus, p. 45.

[91]This is the view of Dominic Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, London 1983, p. 19.

[92]F.O. 800/163, Lansdowne papers, Sir Francis Bertie (Paris) letter, 28 July 1905. Witte had tols Bertie that Russia might pay Japan for the maintenance of large numbers of Russian prisoners, and "in that matter we can be very liberal". Alternatively, Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity, or China's repayments from the 1895 Sino-Japanese war indemnity loan might be re-routed to Japan.

[93]Shinobu, p. 189.

war, and the payment of an indemnity could bring ruin on the Romanov dynasty.[94] It was decided to achieve peace at any cost and Komura was directed accordingly.[95] Subject to Chinese approval, Japan received the rail and mining rights held by Russia in southern Manchuria, but no indemnity. However, as Nagasaki Governor Arakawa Gitarō wrote to Katsura on 4 September, "Whatever the terms, we ask for the restoration of peace at the earliest possible date."[96] With Roosevelt's aid, a peace agreement was achieved on 29 August 1905 and the terms published on September 5.

The Japanese public's response was mixed. Some, such as Katsura's old adversary, Tani Kanjō, acknowledged Japan's weakness and approved the settlement.[97] The most spectacular response, of course, was the demonstrations at Hibiya park led by those such as Tomizu Kondo and Uchida Ryōhei, who had clamoured for war in 1903.[98] Katsura expected trouble but hoped to keep it a political rather than a social problem.[99] By this, he may have meant that any criticism should be restricted to the Diet floor, and that agitation outside the constitutional machinery posed a threat to social and political stability.

Despite the riots and the subsequent declaration of martial law, the effect of the Hibiya incident was transitory. Satirists enjoyed the image of Katsura's mistress nervously guarded by a crowd of police but once the anger had spent itself, business returned as usual and there was no major change in the power balance.[100] Katsura had long since agreed to hand over to Saionji and the only effect of the riots was to prevent him from arranging a pretext for resignation. Indeed, one of the ironies of the Hibiya incident is that while the authorities feared socialism, the only violence came from the

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[94]Hara, vol. 2, p. 147, entry for 31 August 1905. Katsura had already ruled out six new divisions as financially impossible on 28 June 1905, Hara, p. 140.

[95]Hara, vol. 2, p. 147, entry for 28 August 1905, Yamagata was "all for big concessions and wishes to restore peace no matter what the conditions." Yamagata subsequently asked Katsura to efface the military reasons for Japan's backdown and give only financial reasons. This would reflect on Yamagata's honour as chief of staff. Katsura replied that the cabinet had made its decision and could not now revise it, Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1958, p. 97.

[96]Quoted Kimbara Samon, "Ie to Mura to Kokka no Ideorogii", Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai et al, ed., *Kōza Nihon Rekishi 8: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1985, p. 280. MacDonald's comment on the peace terms was, "The way they have backed down over Sakhalin and the indemnity passes understanding", Hardinge Papers, letter to Hardinge, 31 August 1905.

[97]Tani letter, 13 September 1905, quoted *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 606-07.

[98]Konoe had died and Sassa Tomofusa's group did not involve itself, Miyaji Masato, "Kokuminshugi-teki Tai-Gai Kōha-ron", *Shigaku Zasshi*, 80-11/12, November-December 1971, p. 8-9. The Hibiya riots are examined in Shumpei Okamoto, "The Emperor and the Crowd: The Historical Significance of the Hibiya Riot", Tetsuo Najita/J. Victor Koschmann, ed., *Conflict in Modern Japanese History*, Princeton 1982.

[99]Katsura letters to Yamagata, 2 and 18 September 1905, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 296-97.

[100]About thirty police were sent to O-Koi's house in Akasaka to protect her from the mob, Haga Tōru/Shimizu Isao, ed., *Nichi-Ro Sensō Ki no Manga*, Tokyo 1985, p. 33. Komura's comment on hearing of the riots was to applaud the "righteous indignation, pluck, and brightness of the people's spirit", quoted Shinobu, p. 21.

nationalists. Kōtoku Shūsui, just released from prison, might laud the "sea of fire and blood" as a triumph of popular will, but the seas quickly abated.[101]

At the war's end, there arose the only example of serious discord between Katsura and Komura in their long relationship. This was the Harriman affair. Katsura remained acting foreign minister, pending Komura's return from Portsmouth, and wanted both to build on his earlier talks with Taft to reinforce Japanese-U.S. relations, and provide support for Japan's tattered finances. The American railroad magnate E.H. Harriman was interested in buying into Japan's new-found Manchurian railways and visited Tokyo in October 1905. Japan needed capital to repair and develop the battle-torn railways and Harriman's offer held obvious benefits. American involvement in Manchuria would also deter Russia from any war of revenge. American Minister in Tokyo, Lloyd Griscom, appeared to back Harriman, and Katsura, Itō, and Inoue, all received the idea of joint development with enthusiasm. Here Katsura was clearly giving precedence to business needs, and approving a sound commercial arrangement over defence requirements. He was also siding with Itō and Inoue against the army which, in 1906, would cause Japan serious difficulties by its impolitic attitude towards international commerce. A preliminary agreement was drawn up at a luncheon given by Katsura in Harriman's honour on 12 October. However, when Komura returned to Japan on 16 October, he immediately sought to annul the agreement on the grounds that it would mean abandoning Japan's foothold in Manchuria and cause a second wave of popular anger. Katsura failed to stand up to his foreign minister and the Harriman plan was indefinitely postponed.[102] With this, Japan retreated into exclusionism, and while Komura may have better understood the growing antagonism towards Japan in the U.S., Katsura's attempt to form some kind of working arrangement was a surer way to defuse this tension. His weakness in defending the Harriman plan was to have unfortunate consequences in later decades.

Finally, to negotiate Japan's new position, Komura and Itō were despatched to Beijing and Seoul respectively. A demonstration of Japanese strength in Seoul produced a protectorate treaty in November 1905, and Itō himself was later appointed resident-general to supervise Korea's local diplomacy. In Beijing, hard negotiations produced an agreement in principle on Manchuria, but the two sides were fundamentally at odds, and implementation of the agreement would take several years. However, once the treaty with Beijing had been signed, Katsura announced his resignation on 22 December 1905.

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[101] Kōtoku letter, 8 September 1905, quoted, Kublin, p. 337.

[102] For general details of the Harriman affair, see Shinobu, p. 217-23; Richard T. Chang, "The Failure of the Katsura-Harriman Agreement", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 21-1, November 1961.

Chapter 9

JAPAN AND CONTINENTAL EXPANSION 1906-07

In 1906, Katsura hoped to rest after an unprecedented four and a half years as premier, and revive his plans to visit Europe.[1] However, having taken personal responsibility for Saionji's appointment, and participated in selecting the new cabinet, Katsura assumed the position of a junior *genrō*. With Itō in Seoul and Yamagata usually at his Kyoto villa, the chance existed to consolidate this new status.[2] His relationship with incoming Home Minister Hara Kei, Saionji's promise to continue his diplomatic policies, allies in both Houses of the Diet, and appointment, along with Yamamoto Gombei, as imperial military councillor in January 1906, all portended a bright future.[3]

There were, however, grave new problems. Japan was now a continental power, irrespective of her financial weakness, and the policy of expanding southwards, advocated by Katsura in 1896, was effectively abandoned. This meant that the navy was largely excluded from decision-making, but the consequent army domination of Manchurian affairs wrought its own difficulties as political needs were subordinated to strategy. In Korea, the appointment of Itō as resident-general was a heavy investment of Japanese prestige, and a declaration of moderate intent. As such, it was welcomed by even her severest critics.[4] However, Japan now had two further regions to develop, and failure to do so would cause her international embarrassment, while this same development increased both Western and Eastern suspicions.

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[1]Katsura described his future plans in Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 2, p. 143, 14 August 1905.

[2]Katsura apparently kept Yamagata lieutenants, Ōura Kanetake and Kiyoura Keigo, completely in the dark about his resignation, Hara, vol. 2, p. 184, entry for 29 June 1906. For Katsura's control of the transfer and participation in the choice of Agriculture-Industry Minister Matsuoka Kōki and Yamagata's son, Isaburō, as communications minister, see Hara, vol. 2, p. 143, 14 August 1905, p. 159-60, 17-21 December 1905, p. 164, 7 January 1906; Katsura Papers, 47-2, letter from Saionji Kimmochi, 1 January 1906.

[3]Saionji also emulated Katsura's approach by calling in members of both Houses to give advance explanation of his policies, causing Hara to note, "Katsura frequently did this kind of thing", Hara, vol. 2, p. 165, entry for 17 January 1906.

[4]British journalist Frederick McKenzie, who vigorously defended Korea in *The Tragedy of Korea* (1908) and *Korea's Fight for Freedom* (1920), wrote, "There could have been no better choice, and no choice more pleasing to the Korean people", *Tragedy*, p. 142.

Itō and the Army in Korea

Even before Katsura left office, the question of authority over Japanese forces in Korea raised problems. As prime minister in 1896, Itō had accepted a military governor-general in Taiwan, but Korea was not Japanese territory and Japan, as indicated by the imperial New Year's ceremonies of 1906, preferred to think of herself as following Britain in Egypt, with Itō as the new Lord Cromer, the most successful contemporary example of indirect civilian control.[5] Itō agreed to serve as resident-general in Seoul on condition that he take control of Japanese troops in Korea. This would ensure a unified civil-military policy. Katsura and Army Minister Terauchi accepted this and article four of the residency-general regulations stipulated: to maintain peace and order in Korea, the resident-general may, when necessary, order the commander of the Korean garrison to employ military force.[6] However, as soon as the regulations were announced by imperial edict, officers of the general staff, notably former Kogetsukai members Iguchi Shōgo and Tanaka Giichi, struggled to overturn the decision.[7] Tanaka, who was to draft national defence policy later in the year, saw Korea's value in purely military terms, as a railway conduit to the prospective battlefield of Manchuria, and opposed any civilian intrusion on military command.[8] Terauchi, while acknowledging Itō's argument that Korea remained formally independent, consulted Katsura about this army unrest. Katsura, however, refused to become directly involved, thus withdrawing his support from the army and indirectly aiding Itō.[9] Terauchi and Chief of Staff Ōyama were forced to seek a compromise, but this was not achieved until 14 January 1906 when an imperial edict authorised regulation four on a temporary basis, implying that the right would belong to Itō alone and not to any future resident-general of Korea.[10] For Katsura, one potentially dangerous result of the incident was that officers like Tanaka, later to play a major role in

[5]At the imperial New Year ceremonies of 1906, the *go-kōsho hajime*, in which three scholars were invited to lecture the emperor on a subject from Japan, China, and the West, the Western topic was the relationship between Britain and Egypt, Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji Tennō Ki*, 13 vols., Tokyo 1975, vol. 11, p. 461, entry for 15 January 1906. Minister to Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke, had also requested writings on Cromer's administration from his British colleague in 1905. For a comparison which flatters Itō over Cromer, see Toyabe Shuntei in *Meiji Jimbutsu Ronshū* (*Meiji Bungaku Zenshū* vol. 92), Tokyo 1969, p. 22.

[6]The full regulations are given in Kim Chung-myŏng, ed., *Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō Shūsei*, Tokyo 1964, vol. 6-1, p. 104-09.

[7]FO. 371/179, MacDonald to Grey, 30 December 1905, report of Itō conversation. Yui Masaomi, "Nihon Teikokushugi Seiritsu Ki no Gumbu", Nakamura Masanori et al, ed., *Taikei Nihon Kokkashi 5: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1976, p. 139, quotes Terauchi to Yamagata, 27 December 1905, on Iguchi's opposition to the regulation.

[8]Tanaka's views on strategy are presented in Kitaoka Shinichi, *Nihon Rikugun to Tairiku Seisaku, 1906-1918*, Tokyo 1978, p. 34-36.

[9]Katsura merely advised Terauchi to deal with the palace in person, Terauchi Papers, 104-10, Katsura letter 11 January 1906.

[10]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 360-61, entries for 4, 9 January 1906, show Terauchi's concerns; the imperial edict is quoted in *Meiji Tennō Ki*, vol. 11, p. 460.

the Taishō incident of 1912, lost confidence in him and drew closer to Yamagata.[11]

With the problem settled, Itō prepared for Seoul. However, another dispute between civilian and military authorities intruded, as it would repeatedly in 1906; the question of Manchuria. From Seoul, Deputy Resident-General Tsuruhara Sadakichi cabled anxiously about the delay but Itō decided to remain in Tokyo and leave Korea pending.[12]

Manchuria

The Japanese government could not handle the consequences of victory over Russia. Japanese prestige soared throughout Asia and the Middle East, and students from China, along with Koreans and Vietnamese, poured into her schools.[13] Yet, the arrogance of Japanese civilians in Korea and of her military administrators in southern Manchuria dispelled whatever respect might have been earned.[14] The Kwangtung government-general had been established by Japan on 26 September 1905, and Governor-General Ōshima Yoshimasa, based at Liaoyang, commanded two army divisions and military administrative offices throughout the area.[15] The Japanese army seemed to share Komura's view, frankly expressed to Yuan in Beijing, that Japan's sacrifices against Russia entitled her to some reward.[16] They seemed ready to take this at will and there were successive reports of Chinese being mistreated: Japanese troops had restrained a Chinese village head while chopping wood for barracks and forced him to accept a nominal payment; the Japanese office at Ch'angtu was said to be exacting all kinds of taxes from the local Chinese; while Japanese military police were arresting Chinese citizens and threatening officials.[17] The Chinese government formally protested on 18 January 1906, and newly appointed Governor-General of Manchuria Chao Erh-sun, an

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[11]Ōe Shinobu, *Nihon no Sambō Hombu*, Tokyo 1985, p. 122. See also Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*, Philadelphia 1960, p. 337-38.

[12]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 115, for Tsuruhara's telegram of 1 February 1906.

[13]Vietnamese nationalist leader Phan Boi Chau brought over the first four Vietnamese students in 1906. Three of these entered the Shimbu School under Fukushima Yasumasa, and one the Tokyo Dōbun Shoin, Kamigaito Kanichi, *Nihon Ryūgaku to Kakumei Undō*, Tokyo 1982, p. 70.

[14]Putnam Weale criticised Japanese actions in Korea in the *North China Herald* of 15 December 1905, and again on 5 January 1906, pointing to such irritations as the Seoul-Pusan train being called not "down train" but "up train" as it headed towards Tokyo. Korean official Yun Ch'i-ho also noted Japanese depradations when visiting the ancient capital of Song-do in March 1906 and finding that all the graves of the kings of the Song-do dynasty had been dynamited, apparently by Japanese troops, Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Yun Ch'i-ho Ilgi*, 6 vols., Seoul 1976, vol. 6, p. 222, entry for 30 March 1906.

[15]Military administrative offices existed at T'iehling, Mukden, Ch'angtu, Hsinminhui, and, from February 1906, Wafangdien, Yingk'ou, Liaoyang, and Andong, Shimada Toshihiko, *Kantōgun*, Tokyo 1965, p. 6; Yui, p. 136.

[16]Iriye Akira, *Nihon no Gaikō* Tokyo 1966, p. 52, notes that some officers were already talking of assuming Manchurian defence or establishing a "new Japan" in the region.

[17]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, (hereafter NGB), vol. 39-1, p. 836-37, Uchida Yasuya (Beijing) to Foreign Minister Katō, 20 January, 1 March 1906.

intimate of Yuan Shih-k'ai, followed with his own list of Japanese army abuses.[18] Chinese friendly to Japan appealed to Minister Uchida Yasuya in Beijing for improvement, but this could only come from the army itself.[19]

For Itō and Yamagata, a Russian war of revenge was certain, and, no less than after the Sino-Japanese war, Japan could not forfeit Chinese goodwill in the anticipated conflict.[20] On 16 February 1906, Itō called a meeting of Yamagata, Ōyama, Inoue, Saionji, Vice Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarō, and Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki. The intention was to revise Manchurian policy but Kodama, supported by Yamagata, adamantly refused to "re-open the door" in Manchuria before military preparations were complete in the spring of 1907. Katō conceded defeat by resigning the next day, and Itō belatedly arrived in Seoul on 2 March.[21]

The basic problem was that noted sardonically by a Russian official in the 1860s, and familiar to British administrators dealing with India's north-west frontier; extending one's borders not only failed to solve the question of security, it extended supply lines and exacerbated existing international tensions. Japan had begun the war to keep Korea out of foreign hands. Now, Korea's primary strategic value was as a railway passage to south Manchuria. Katsura and Kawakami had argued in 1886 that a nation's strength was reflected in the actions of its military forces overseas, so that any refusal to exploit new territory might be regarded as weakness.[22] Katsura's discussions with Harriman on Manchuria showed that he had moved beyond this early logic, but others continued to estimate national strength solely in military terms. However, with increasing financial and social strains on the new Japan, there would have to be a point at which economic development took precedence.

The situation in Manchuria continued to deteriorate. In early March 1906, a Japanese soldier in Hsinminhui was reported to have outraged the local people by striking

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[18]NGB, vol. 39-1, p. 836, Uchida to Katō, 20 January 1906.

[19]On 22 February 1906, Mukden Rail Inspector T'ao Ta-chun, a long-standing ally of Japan and one who provided valuable assistance during the war, warned Uchida, "the Japanese military despise our officials and maltreat our traders.... hatred of Japan grows deeper with every day", NGB, vol. 39-1, p. 841-42, T'ao letter enclosed in Uchida to Acting Foreign Minister Saionji, 12 March 1906.

[20]Itō expressed his fears of Russia to the British ambassador in Tokyo, FO 371/179, MacDonald to Grey, 6 May 1906.

[21]Itō Masanori, *Katō Takaaki*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1929, vol. 1, p. 583-85; Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 229; Kitaoka, p. 13. It is unclear why Katsura did not attend this meeting. It may be that he was occupied with the Japanese crown prince who was then staying at Hayama.

[22]A similar concept was evident in U.S. strategic thinking when the containment doctrine of George Kennan was abandoned in 1950 and a militant posture, ostensibly more in keeping with American wealth, was adopted under Paul Nitze. The result was intervention in the Korean war. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, N.Y. 1982.

a Chinese official.[23] There was criticism of large-scale Japanese land purchase in the Yingk'ou-Tadong region, and China repeatedly pressed Japan to fulfil her agreement at Beijing to sell back the light railway from Hsinminhui to Mukden, built by the Japanese army during the war, and then being employed to transport military supplies.[24] As Minister Uchida explained;[25]

> There have recently been numbers of Chinese coming to Beijing to express their discontent at our military administration in Manchuria. The government here is extremely angry at our actions and already let slip that, while they consider our troops very good, our military administrators are even worse than the Russians.

What was even more alarming was the growing frostiness of Britain and America over Japanese trade policy in Manchuria. U.S. chargé in Tokyo, Huntington Wilson, made an initial protest to Saionji on 8 March, and complaints of Japanese obstruction from British residents at Niuch'ang and businessmen in Manchuria were taken up in London.[26] Although U.S. minister in Beijing, W.W. Rockhill, rejected the criticisms of American businessmen, formal complaints of Japanese trade obstruction were made by the British and American representatives to Tokyo on 19 and 26 March respectively.[27]

While American opinion had cooled toward Japan in 1905, and had, in any case, been ambivalent since the annexation of Hawaii, the loss of sympathy from Japan's single ally, Britain, was a serious development. In March 1905, when the British half of Japan's loan of 30 million pounds was issued in London, the popular response had been so great that policemen at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank door had been carried away by the crowds and the "football team of the Bank rushed in to the rescue."[28] Now, Japan's apparent duplicity in Manchuria disturbed the British authorities and, in his protest to Saionji, Ambassador Claude MacDonald noted tartly that reports of Japan's projected exposition of her products in Mukden seemed to show, "that the tradal restrictions imposed by military necessities are not such as to prevent the encouragement

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[23]NGB, vol. 39-1, p. 843, Uchida to Acting Foreign Minister Saionji, 16 March 1906. The situation quieted after the local Japanese commander apologised publicly and promised suitable punishment, p. 845-46, Uchida to Saionji, 19 March 1906.

[24]Baba Akira, "Nichi-Ro Sensōgo no Tairiku Seisaku", Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū - Nis-Shin Nichi-Ro Sensō*, Tokyo 1962, p. 136, details the Japanese position on the line.

[25]NGB, vol. 39-1, p. 837, Uchida to Katō, 2 March 1906.

[26]Japan's refusal of permits for British vessels at Tadong was seen as a serious impediment to the British sugar trade and the Chefoo silk industry, and the British-American Tobacco Company, finding itself prevented from travel to Mukden or anywhere north of Yingk'ou, also demanded action of Foreign Secretary Grey, FO 410/47, MacDonald to Saionji, 19 March 1906.

[27]W.W. Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, letter to Arthur Hippisley, 29 March 1906, Rockhill wrote, "Last year's trade returns are excellent for the U.S. except kerosene. I fancy all the kicking of American exporters to China was because they overstocked in anticipation of the war continuing. We'll soon know the facts. Rodgers tells me he is preparing a report on it which will nail the lies on a certain number of persons in Shanghai and elsewhere." In a further letter to Hippisley on 21 April 1906, Rockhill explicitly named J.O.P. Bland, *Times* correspondent in Shanghai, as one of the malefactors.

[28]Sir Charles Addis diary, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, entry for 29 March 1905.

of Japanese commerce."[29] Katsura's efforts throughout the war had been to avoid Japanese isolation and Saionji followed suit by giving MacDonald emphatic assurances over Manchuria and Korea. However, MacDonald doubted whether Saionji had Katsura's influence and, on 31 March, wrote so dramatic a warning to Itō, that the latter scurried back to Tokyo. While Itō realised the disruption his leaving would cause in Seoul, he departed for Tokyo on 21 April.[30]

The confusion in Japanese policy emanated from her continuing uncertainty over whether to "leave" Asia and exploit Chinese weakness to the full, or retain Chinese goodwill in the event of a Western anti-Japanese backlash. The writings of Yamagata and Katsura indicated that China would not survive in her present form and that Japan should improve her position so as not to be disadvantaged once the convulsion came. What Japanese policymakers failed to see, however, was that each accretion to their own authority at China's expense only served to hasten the decline of Ch'ing authority and increase the anti-Japanese tenor of Chinese nationalism. This contradiction was evident when the Japanese Kwangtung government-general put its view into writing in April 1906;[31]

> Although military administrative policy should be positive, we should, as far as circumstances allow, take a regional stance (*chihō shugi*) and work for good relations with Chinese officials and citizens. However, we should not miss any favourable opportunity to get hold of rights, and advantage for achieving our military goals should be pursued with resolve.... There is a tendency in this new territory to ignore the locals and seize all rights and interests. This is inappropriate. Although Manchuria cannot be called a Japanese domain, we should administer it as if it were, and, as far as possible, base our stance on the local people. Thus, without being observed, we should be able to gain control of considerable authority and improve our position in the next war. Should we alienate the local people, our friends of today will be enemies tomorrow, and, in the next war, may well become Russian spies.

Faced with rejection by the West and China, the army was forced to reconsider. Following a secret month-long tour of Manchuria by Prime Minister Saionji from mid-

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[29]FO 410/47, MacDonald to Grey, 23 March 1906.

[30]Itō declared he would return within one month, Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 185-86, 190. In fact, he would be away until late June.

[31]The full text is given in Tsunoda Jun, *Manshū Mondai to Kokubō Hōshin*, Tokyo 1967, p. 301-05. On the question of trade discrimination, the document explained;

> We presently allow Japanese residents to engage in activities outside of the Kwangtung leased territory because they provide services to our army. This does not mean that the area has been thrown open. Businessmen serving the authorities act as a kind of p.x. This is why we allow our citizens' activities and forbid those of others.

Masaru Ikei, "Ugaki Kazushige's View of China and His China Policy, 1915-1930", in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese*, Princeton 1980, p. 201, shows that Ugaki, army minister in the 1920's, maintained the same view, writing in 1915, "A state which fails to take advantage of a good opportunity with all the power it can muster commits a crime against itself."

April, a meeting was convened at Itō's request in Tokyo on 22 May.[32] In addition to those present at the February meeting were senior cabinet members, Matsukata Masayoshi, Katsura and Yamamoto Gombei.[33] Itō opened the debate by remarking on the extent of foreign criticism of Japan's Manchurian policy, how this had become a parliamentary question in Britain, and how such attacks might spur the Koreans, far from acquiescent to Japanese tutelage, to seek aid from Russia. He then summarised Ambassador MacDonald's letter to the effect that;

> The Japanese government's present policy excludes those nations which rendered sympathy and military expenses to her in the conflict with Russia. This can only be called a suicidal policy. These nations rendered sympathy and aid to Japan because she fought on behalf of the open door. Japanese military circles argue that Russia will sooner or later plan a war of revenge, and that Japan needs to make preparations in Manchuria. This may be so, but if Japan continues along the lines of today, she will forfeit the sympathy of her allies, and suffer great loss at the outset of a future war.

Turning to the growing movement in China for rights recovery, and the attitude of Chinese officials, Itō warned;

> It is best for Japan if no commotion arises in China and our wisest policy is to work as hard as possible to avoid incurring Chinese displeasure. When even Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese statesman most sympathetic towards Japan, makes such statements (of protest), then Japan must hold back.

Itō attacked the presumption of army officers and merchants who talked of "the running of Manchuria" (*Manshū keiei*) as if Japan owned the region, and proposed that authority be returned to China as soon as possible. To this end, he presented a detailed plan drafted by the foreign ministry. This included the gradual abolition of military administrative offices in advance of full troop withdrawal; Chinese forces to be allowed back into south Manchuria to maintain order; discontinuation of provocative taxes exacted on Chinese citizens by the Japanese army; foreign residence and enterprise to be permitted in the areas of south Manchurian railway stations, with this extended to Russian citizens on a reciprocal basis; Russians also to be allowed back in Port Arthur if similar privileges were granted to Japanese in Harbin; Dalien to be opened as a free port as soon as possible. Although Yamamoto asked Saionji for the government's attitude, it was Katsura who replied;

> I believe we can say that Japanese policy towards Manchuria was decided with the Beijing treaty of 1905. The present cabinet was tied up directly after formation with the

[32]Saionji was determined to fulfil his promise to MacDonald. On 24 March, he cabled Terauchi on the need to open Manchurian ports in accordance with British and American demands, and later declared publicly that Andong and Tadong would be open from May, followed by Mukden on 1 June. Then, with Yamagata's backing, he set off for Dalien, under the guise of Vice Finance Minister Wakatsuki's party, on 15 April. They travelled through the area, visiting Japanese military administrative posts and questioning officers, gave a banquet for Governor-General Chao Erh-sun in Mukden, and returned through Korea to Japan on 15 May, Wakatsuki Reijirō, *Kofūan Kaikoroku*, 2nd. ed., Tokyo 1975, p. 68-73.

[33]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabi Shuyō Bunsho*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1965, vol. 1, p. 260-63. A fuller record of the debate is given in Tsunoda, p. 319-31; also, Kurihara Ken, "Nichi-Ro Sengo ni okeru Manshū Zengo Sochi Mondai to Akibara Shodai Mukden Sōryōji", Kurihara, ed., *Tai-Man-Mō Seisakushi no Ichimen*, Tokyo 1966, p. 16-25.

> post-war Diet and and has not yet fixed national policy. Because of this, the feelings of other states have suffered. I ask for national policy to be settled at this meeting. It seems our military authorities have not decided on an overall plan and are having their own troubles as a result. If they have a fixed outline policy, then it goes without saying that they cannot overstep their guidelines. In my view, the Japanese government acted with a consistent policy towards Manchuria before and during the war. That policy is well represented in the (Itō) plan before us. Anyone disagreeing with this plan is contradicting his own actions (in support of government policy) before and during the war. I ask you to agree on an overall policy without distinction between military and diplomatic affairs.

Katsura was in a difficult position. As a soldier, still on active service, and a close friend of Kodama, he could be expected to support the army position. However, even more than Yamagata, he had made the transition from soldier to statesman, and increasingly came to see himself as Itō's successor. Katsura recognised that a strong military position did not depend solely on how well entrenched Japan could make herself in Manchuria. Although the army in Manchuria had alluded to the same realisation in its April memorandum, as Army Minister Terauchi noted, "Here all debate is conducted in the spirit of peace; in Manchuria, action is taken in the spirit of war." Now, although Kodama agreed to alter Japan's military profile in the region, disagreement remained over the division of power between Japanese authorities. As with Katsura, Itō wanted military and diplomacy affairs co-ordinated. Terauchi preferred to see consular and military powers clearly separate, while Kodama, expecting the worst, demanded one controlling authority able to respond quickly to future disturbances. The best compromise those present could reach was to revise the Kwangtung government-general along peacetime lines, and work to reduce military administrative offices according to circumstances.[34] There was no detailed discussion of Itō's plan. Instead, Terauchi confidently predicted that Kodama's committee would resolve all problems.

Policy Revised - The South Manchurian Railway Company

The Kodama committee, established in mid-January 1906, included representatives from the foreign, finance, and communications ministries.[35] During the war with Russia, Kodama and his deputy in Taiwan, Gotō Shimpei, had concluded that railways provided the backbone for Manchurian development, and when Gotō visited Kodama at Katsura's request in September 1905, they agreed that initially a single body, along the lines of Britain's East India Company, was needed to oversee Japanese economic activities in the

[34]Kodama explained this to mean that the army administrative offices would be abolished gradually, and removed as soon as possible where Japanese consulates existed.

[35]These included Chinda Sutemi and Yamaza Enjirō from the foreign ministry, Wakatsuki Reijirō and Arai Kentarō from the finance ministry, and Nakashōji Ren, vice minister of communications. The committee is listed in Shukuri Shigeichi, *Kodama Gentarō*, Tokyo 1942, p. 747.

region and prevent confusion or harmful competition.[36] In committee, Kodama proposed this be a purely official concern. This would have contravened Japan's agreement with China, but, as committee member Wakatsuki Reijirō explained;[37]

> There were various things the Japanese government could not do in Manchuria, and these included leaving things to civilian entrepreneurial competition. They had to have matters carried out by a single company, organised on semi-official lines, and so have government orders fully implemented.

On 7 June 1906, an imperial edict established the South Manchurian Railway Company to spearhead peaceful economic development in Manchuria.[38] The company would manage the various railways and mines taken over from Russia, and engage in supplementary business including railroad inns and restaurants, storage, water transportation, electrical enterprises, warehousing, and land and housing concerns in the railway territories.[39] By mid-June, Kodama had privately decided on Gotō as president of the new company, and it was clear that Katsura was working quietly in support.[40]

Gotō, however, recognised that economic reality had not been fully accepted by the army in Manchuria. Upon arrival from Taipei on 22 July, he refused Kodama's offer on the grounds that, without strict conditions, the variety of Japanese forces in Manchuria, military, diplomatic, and now commercial, would lead to administrative chaos.[41] Although Kodama died suddenly that night, Gotō was unemotional and suggested instead that he serve under Yamagata as company president.[42] The regulations for the revised Kwangtung government-general, issued on 1 August 1906, only supported Gotō's fears. The post of governor-general was limited to army generals or lieutenant-generals, who would "take charge of the protection and control of the railways in south Manchuria and supervise the business of the South Manchurian Railway Company." In these circumstances, Field Marshal Yamagata may have been more suitable than Gotō. However, Yamagata had retired from foreground politics, and Japan's intention was to reduce, not exacerbate, Western antipathy. Consequently, Dr. Gotō was the preferred

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[36]Shukuri, p. 749; Kitaoka Shinichi, *Gotō Shimpei*, Tokyo 1988, p. 83-84; Harada Katsumasa, *Mantetsu*, Tokyo 1981, p. 39-41.

[37]Wakatsuki, p. 86. Shukuri, p. 750-51, explains that Japan had promised to abide by the terms of the original Sino-Russian agreements which stated that the Chinese Eastern Railway Company would not be a government office.

[38]The edict is given in Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha, *Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha Sanjūnen Ryakushi*, (hereafter *Sanjūnen Ryakushi*), Dalien 1937, rep. Tokyo 1975, p. 2-5.

[39]The railways under company control were those from Dalien-Changchun; Nankwanling-Port Arthur; Tafangshin-Linshutun; Tashihchiao-Yingk'ou; the Yentai coalmine track; Sokiatun-Fushun; Mukden-Andong. Details of the company concerns are in *Ryakushi*, p. 6-7.

[40]Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shimpei*, 4 vols., Tokyo 1937, rep. 1965, vol. 2, p. 660-62, Sugiyama Shigemaru telegram to Gotō, 28 June 1906.

[41]Tsurumi, vol. 2, p. 662, 677; Kitaoka, *Gotō*, p. 85-86.

[42]For Gotō and Kodama, see Kurihara, p. 27; Harada, p. 49. Gotō's suggestion regarding Yamagata was recorded in Hara, vol. 2, p. 190, entry for 2 August 1906.

choice. Nonetheless, he managed to obtain Kwangtung Governor-General Ōshima's written promise not to interfere in railway administration, and also had himself appointed as adviser to the government-general.[43]

In accordance with both the Katsura cabinet policy on economic co-operation with China, and the original Sino-Russian agreement, the South Manchurian Railway Company would be a joint Sino-Japanese venture. Half the capital of 200 million yen would come from the Japanese government, consisting entirely of the rail, stock and buildings captured from Russia, plus mines at Fushun and Yentai, and half from private investors with a guarantee from the Japanese government of 6% interest for fifteen years. The Japanese government would also appoint the president and vice-president, and select four directors from among the shareholders. The head office would be in Tokyo, with a branch office in Dalien.[44]

The first issue of 99,000 shares was made on 10 September 1906, and, reflecting the post-war boom, was heavily over-subscribed, with one major capitalist, Ōkura Kihachirō, bidding for every single share.[45] Chinese investors, however, were deterred by Japan's attitude. Tokyo waited until two weeks before the share issue to notify Beijing or enquire about her intentions.[46] Chao Erh-sun and Yuan Shih-k'ai remained silent until the issue closed on 5 October, and only then protested Japan's domination of the new company.[47] This no doubt confirmed Japanese expectations, and they probably hoped that once business was off and running the protest would be forgotten. However, Japanese ambivalence toward China made real joint-ventures unlikely. The South Manchurian Railway Company employed a large number of Chinese in minor roles, and would continue to do so, but authority remained firmly with Japan.[48]

Despite Gotō's precautions, this authority continued to be undermined by internal

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[43]Hara, vol. 2, p. 190, entry for 2 August 1906. Gotō also had his deputy, Nakamura Zekō, double as head of civilian affairs in the Kwangtung government-general but the opposition of Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu and the time lost in commuting between Dalien and Port Arthur soon terminated this arrangement, Kitaoka, *Nihon Rikugun*, p. 55.

[44]The imperial ordinance on the establishment of the South Manchurian Railway Company was printed in the *Japan Times* on 8 June 1906, and reported to the British Foreign Office on 29 June 1906, MacDonald to Grey, FO 410/47. The company's main and branch offices were switched by imperial edict on 5 March 1907, Harada, p. 48.

[45]He was disappointed to get only 91 shares, Harada, p. 50.

[46]Miyazaka Hiroshi, ""Mantetsu" Sōritsu Zengo", Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū - Nit-Chū Kankei no Tenkai*, Tokyo 1961, p. 31.

[47]Miyazaka, p. 30.

[48]Harada, p. 78, produces a list of employees; in 1907, the total workforce was 13,217 with 4,129 Chinese; in 1912, 20,475 with 8,570 Chinese; 1922, 36,037 with 14,614 Chinese; and, in 1942, the total of 296,213 included 33,489 Chinese. Harada notes that Chinese day labourers were paid less than half their Japanese counterparts.

Japanese friction. Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu opposed Gotō's advisory position with the Kwangtung government-general, and pleaded illness to avoid signing the authorisation.[49] Governor-General Ōshima persistently tried to expand his control over Japanese diplomacy in the region, causing Hayashi to warn of damage to Japan's international reputation and recruit Itō's help against the army.[50] Gotō continued in 1907 to seek a merger of the offices of South Manchurian Railway Company president and Kwangtung governor-general, or to set up a development ministry (*takushokumushō*) to unify control of Taiwan, the Kwangtung leasehold, and Manchurian affairs, but nothing would come of it until Katsura returned to the premiership.[51]

Japan's partial revision of policy in Manchuria came too little and too late. The Chinese rights recovery movement grew, and senior figures in the Ch'ing government, such as Yuan's helpmate T'ang Shao-yi, appointed to control Chinese customs in May 1906, openly declared their distaste for Japan.[52] Yuan himself continued to employ numerous Japanese advisers, took Yoshino Sakuzō as tutor for his eldest son in 1906, and that same year established at least two schools concentrating on the Japanese language.[53] However, there was a radical change in his attitude to Japan, and he turned increasingly to Britain for diplomatic consultation.[54] This may have been a defensive act on his part. Officers returning from study in Japan were challenging Yuan's authority, and this spurred rivals in the Manchurian nobility to attack both Prince Ch'ing and himself.[55] From late 1906 to mid-1907, the internal battle for power continued and Chinese politics

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[49]Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols. Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 5, p. 73, Saionji Kimmochi letter, 31 August 1906; Kurihara, p. 254.

[50]*Itō Monjo*, vol. 6, p. 411-13, Hayashi Tadasu letters, October 1906, 10 October 1907; Kurihara, p. 42-43, Hayashi to Oshima, 1 September 1906, p. 44-46, 259-60.

[51]Tsurumi, vol. 2, p. 971-72, Gotō letter to Itō, 7 October 1907; *Itō Kankei Monjo*, vol. 6, p. 412-13, Hayashi Tadasu letter 10 October 1907. The best that could be done was an unsatisfactory compromise whereby from January 1908, Japanese consular staff doubled as officers of the Kwangtung governor-general, thus controlling police authority outside the railway areas as consuls, and within the railway areas as subordinates of the governor-general, Kitaoka, *Nihon Rikugun*, p. 56.

[52]For Tang, see J.O.P. Bland Papers, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, diary, 1 June and 7 May 1906. Tang "declared himself as loathing the Japanese and didn't care who knows it." Tang would be assassinated in September 1938 by Chinese nationalists who believed he was ready to collaborate with Japan rather than see Chinese communists prevail, John Hunter Boyle, "The Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration: The Background to the Defection of Wang Ching-wei", *Monumenta Nipponica*, 25, 1970, p. 273.

[53]Watanabe Ryūsaku, *Kindai Nit-Chū Kōshōshi*, Tokyo 1977, p. 102-08. The two schools were for teacher training and translation. These supplemented two schools set up by Yuan in 1903 for police training and industrial arts.

[54]Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shih-k'ai in Beijing and Tianjin 1901-1908*, Berkeley 1980, p. 70-71. For Yuan's relations with British minister to Beijing, John Jordan, see Chan Lau Kit-ching, *Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy 1906-1920*, Hong Kong 1978.

[55]Ichiko Chūzō, "Yuan Shih-k'ai", *Rekishi Kyōiku*, 2-1, 1954, p. 114-15; MacKinnon, p. 81-85. Prince Ch'ing fell ill during the fight, but as British minister John Jordan reported, "(he) has caused some disappointment by getting better." Jordan Papers, FO 350/4, letter to Francis Campbell, 7 March 1907.

seemed hopelessly adrift.[56]

Moreover, relations with Britain had been impaired. The Anglo-Japanese alliance had declined in popularity, and in 1908 the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank warned Ambassador Komura in London that Japanese credit was suffering over her restrictions in Manchuria.[57] These troubles would rebound on Japan when the expected convulsion finally came in 1911.

As for Katsura, shortly after the May 1906 conference on Manchuria, he succumbed again to stomach illness. Early in July, he took to his sick-bed attended by several doctors and Terauchi, visiting on 18 July, described the situation as "extremely grave".[58] Not until the end of the month did his condition improve, and even then a full recovery was uncertain. Finally, at the beginning of October, he began the climb back to full strength.[59] Before he could reconsider his plans for travel to Europe, however, new problems developed in Korea.

<u>Cromerism in Korea</u>

In 1906, Japan considered her nominal defence of Korean independence in two wars gave her the right to dictate Korea's future.[60] However, Japanese officials had little understanding of Korean society or conditions, and any attempt to annex Korea would have been reckless given Japan's financial and military exhaustion. Two Japanese infantry divisions were stationed in the peninsula, but these had been hastily assembled at the war's end, and included men whose terms of service had been extended, raising doubts about their discipline and effectiveness.[61] Moreover, with scepticism in the West about Japan's modern "civilisation", she had to avoid bloodshed in Korea, a continental

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[56]In 1906, Yuan's major enemy, T'ieh Liang, head of the new centralised army ministry, seized control over four of Yuan's six Beiyang camps. Later, in May 1907, Yuan was divested of his position as minister of railways and communications, and, in September of that year, was appointed foreign minister and grand councillor, thus losing his military and financial base.

[57]FO 800/68, Edward Grey Papers, MacDonald to Grey, 19 February 1908, following a question by John Morley, secretary of state for India, on the value of the alliance, MacDonald wrote, "I was very much struck last spring coming from Japan (where the alliance and we are immensely popular) by the unpopularity of the Japanese and to a certain extent of the alliance"; Sir Charles Addis diary, 27 February 1908, Addis met Komura and "pointed out the menace to Japanese credit if their action in Manchurian railway question should give rise to idea here that Chinese were being prevented from developing their own railways. He was very nice and so on, but was not disposed to consider any compromise."

[58]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 378, 18 July 1908.

[59]*Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 373, Katsura letter 9 October 1906; vol. 4, p. 105, Kaneko Kentarō letter, 29 July 1906; vol. 5, p. 73, Saionji Kimmochi letter, 31 August 1906.

[60]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 19-27, shows Itō Hirobumi had taken this attitude with Emperor Kojong on 15 November 1905.

[61]Ōe Shinobu, *Nichi-Ro Sensō to Nihon Guntai*, Tokyo 1987, p. 377-81. In February 1907, these problems were finally attended to, and the force in Korea was reduced to the 13th division alone with increased gendarmerie to fill the gaps.

state with a long and proud history from which Japan herself had once benefited. Indeed, all the indications are that until 1909, Resident-General Itō and the Japanese leadership regarded annexation as an extreme step to be held in reserve.[62] Japan's colonial experience thus far was limited to the island of Taiwan, and it was to be expected that she look for a precedent in dealing with the Koreans. At the time, there was no more successful example of apparently benevolent imperialism than Lord Cromer's almost *shōgunal* authority in Cairo. This was a cheap and civilised form of control, and the question of cost was much on Itō's mind as he commenced his new duties.[63] Cromerism was simply defined by Lord Salisbury as, "moral influence, which in practice is a combination of menace, objurgation, and worry."[64] The key was control of the native monarch and, as outgoing inspector of Korean customs, John McLeavy Brown, noted in October 1905, Japan cherished a curious reverence for Kojong and would not harm him unless absolutely necessary.[65] Itō repeatedly declared Japan's respect for the Korean imperial house, but control implied restraint, and, as Itō warned Kojong in March 1906, Japan could take any step for reform and none of the powers would interfere on his behalf.[66] Japan had a variety of menaces with which to worry Kojong. One was the recall of Prince Ŭi-hwa, in exile since being implicated in an 1898 regicide plot. The prince was housed in Seoul's Japan district, claiming to fear for his life in the palace, and Kojong understood that his throne might be under threat.[67] There was also the Ilchinhoe which, during the war, had shown itself capable of frightening the court. Finally, there were ex-members of the Independence Club such as Education Minister Yi Wan-yong who were critical of Kojong. Yi is villified by Korean historians as an arch traitor, but, to Itō in May 1907, he explained his acceptance of co-prosperity along lines echoed by Filipino President Jose Laurel in 1943;[68]

> We are all agreed on co-operation with Japan and cementing friendship between us. This is not just to pay lip service to your excellency, nor merely to submit to Japanese power. A nation, like a man, cannot stand without real strength. It is foolish for a state without strength to hope for independence. For Korea's sake, it would be most advantageous to co-operate with that country which is geographically closest and most

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[62]This is accepted by Moriyama Shigenori, *Kindai Nik-Kan Kankeishi Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1987, p. 201, when he states that Itō and other Japanese leaders viewed annexation as "an extreme goal" (*kyūkyoku no mokuhyō*). Itō's sensitivity to foreign opinion was obvious when speaking to his old party, the Seiyūkai, in February 1906, "If Japan loses the sympathy of the powers through the pride of victory, it will cause grave troubles in the future," Komatsu Midori, ed, *Itō Kō Zenshū*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1933, vol. 2, p. 444, speech of 5 February 1906. See also p. 437, speech in Seoul, 28 November 1905.

[63]Komatsu, vol. 2, p. 438, Itō memo. 30 January 1906. Expense remained to the fore in Itō's mind, for example, his speech to the Oriental Society (*Tōyō Kyōkai*), 2 February 1907, in *Itō Kō Zenshū*, vol. 2, p. 451.

[64]Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, London 1968, p. 4.

[65]Herbert Croly, *Willard Straight*, N.Y. 1924, p. 172, diary for 9 October 1905.

[66]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 123.

[67]For Prince Ŭi-hwa, see Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 186-88, 201.

[68]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 484.

> deeply shares our fate - Japan. That is one reason for working together. Another is that while a dependency of China, our nation received no benefit, nor did it do so while under the influence of others. Consequently, to work with Japan which holds to a consistent policy is to serve Korea faithfully. This is the second reason. In addition, if Japan wished to annex Korea, she has the power and the opportunity. As she has not done so, to co-operate with Japan is to avoid the fear of annexation and enable Korea to build her strength. From whatever aspect one looks at it, co-operation with Japan is the best way to protect Korea.

Unfortunately for Yi, this view was not widely shared. From early 1906, the southern provinces were shaken by guerrilla risings, led by provincial gentry, and the climate of violence led Itō to draft his will.[69] Japanese authority was also under fire from the "patriotic enlightenment movement" spearheaded by the Chajanghoe (Self-Strengthening Society). The Chajanghoe rejected violence, and took on a Japanese adviser, Ōgaki Takeo, to smoothe matters with the residency-general. Its intention was;

> By study and implementation of educational expansion and industrial development, to pave the way for national wealth and strength, and so establish a base for future independence.

This was essentially the same principle as Japan's *fukoku kyōhei*; that is, develop a sense of nation, and strengthen to resist. The catalyst for this nationalist awakening was, of course, the threat of long-term Japanese domination.[70] Chajanghoe membership was later estimated at about 30,000, making it Korea's second largest political society. Its intentions and activities suggest that, as Katsura remarked on the Ilchinhoe, Japan, or the danger from Japan, was indeed teaching the Koreans to become nationalists. However, modern research suggests that its support was urban and intellectual and that it made little or no impact on the provinces or traditional Confucianists.[71]

As for the Korean people, neither Itō nor Katsura placed much hope in their reforming zeal. However, Japan was proud of her modernising achievement and expected to be emulated by other Asian states. Itō considered the Korean people child-like and open to instruction, and, speaking to Britain's consul in Seoul, Henry Cockburn, he suggested;[72]

> Although they are unenlightened the Koreans are nevertheless human beings; if they are treated kindly and receive guidance and assistance, they will certainly look up to the moral influence of the Japanese and come involuntarily to rely on them.

This "kindness" began in the form of a ten million yen loan, arranged by Itō, and intended

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[69] Kaneko Kentarō, ed., *Itō Hirobumi-den*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1940, vol. 3, p. 717.

[70] The Chajanghoe was established in April 1906 by writers and educators such as Chang Chi-yŏn, formerly editor of the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, and, as president, Yun Ch'i-ho, educated in the United States and previously vice education minister to Yi wan-yong. For details, see Kang Chae-ŏn, *Chōsen Kindaishi Kenkyū*, 2nd ed., Tokyo 1982, p. 441-44; *Yun Ch'i-ho Ilgi*, vol. 6, p. 227-28, entry for 6 May 1906.

[71] Kang, p. 444.

[72] FO 371/179, Cockburn to Lansdowne, 10 December 1905.

for development of Korea's infrastructure.[73] As with Katsura in Taiwan, the belief was that greater administrative rectitude, and tangible economic, social, and educational benefits, would reconcile the Koreans to Japanese authority. Economic development necessarily began with agriculture and Japan's long-standing intention, restated by Itō in January 1906, was to transfer Japanese agricultural migrants, who, would relieve tension on Japan's own population, and act as models for their Korean counterparts.[74] Itō, Katsura, and Gotō Shimpei all expressed their belief in the progressive effect of economic improvement, and Gotō wrote in 1905 that troubles with the Korean emperor or government would disappear if economic development were forthcoming.[75] However, there had been considerable problems with Japanese carpetbaggers, and the residency-general produced regulations in May 1906 aimed directly at private Japanese fraud and intimidation in Korea.[76] This problem, however, would remain in Itō's mind when Katsura proposed large-scale Japanese migration to Korea in 1908.

There were also problems with Kojong. Throughout 1906, he made use of Itō's frequent returns to Japan to assert his independence, passing a letter to a British journalist to refute the protectorate treaty, and, in mid-June 1906, despatching a secret envoy to Vladivostok in search of Russian support.[77] Each indiscretion was discovered by the Japanese police and each time Japan placed further restrictions on Kojong's movements; in April 1906 a law was drafted to prevent Korean mining rights being sold to foreigners without Japanese approval, thus limiting the emperor's access to new funds, and, on 3 July, following the capture of Kojong's secret envoy, a mixed Korean-Japanese police guard was placed around the palace to screen all visitors.[78] Itō warned Kojong that he knew of the monarch's personal responsibility for anti-Japanese actions and the despatch of court funds to aid the guerrillas.[79] However, Japan had sided in 1905 with established authority and, although Itō would come to describe Kojong as Korea's greatest enemy, he

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[73]The loan was on guarantee of the Korean maritime customs, at 6.5% annual interest, with half being handed over immediately, and half to be on call. The money was directed towards road construction, such as across from Chinnamp'o through P'yŏngyang to Wŏnsan, and from the central city of Taegu through Kwangju in the south-west to Yanil bay; also, waterworks in Inch'ŏn and P'yŏngyang, schools and hospitals, and 800,000 yen in subsidies to agricultural and industrial banks. Details in Residency-General of Korea, *Administrative Reforms in Korea*, January 1907, enclosed in FO 371/383, Henry Cockburn (Seoul) to Grey, 4 June 1907.

[74]Itō's policy statement is in Komatsu, vol. 2, p. 438.

[75]Gotō's view is in Tsurumi, vol. 2, p. 624-25.

[76]The regulations are noted in F.O. 371/179, Cockburn to Grey, 15 May 1906.

[77]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 236-38, 375-76; *North China Herald*, 29 June 1906, reported the arrest of the envoy; for an early warning against the journalist, Douglas Story, see *Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 104, Kaneko Kentarō letter 23 March 1906.

[78]Taruzaki Kanichi/Togano Tadao, *Chōsen Saikinshi*, Tokyo 1912, p. 63.

[79]Kim, 6-1, p. 236-38; *Itō-den*, vol. 3, p. 718-22.

had already declared that his policy would "not be in any sense revolutionary."[80] Japan managed to exploit each of Kojong's "indiscretions" to improve her authority in Korea, but this attrition of the emperor's powers could only go on so long. Moreover, Japan still had no answer for Korean popular antipathy.

Uchida Ryōhei (1874-1937), founder of the Kokuryūkai, and an informal member of Itō's staff, believed that the Korean people were embittered largely by the failure of Japan's currency reform, causing major financial loss and the closure of numerous local markets.[81] The implication, therefore, was that steps to improve the situation and take real authority in Korea by ousting Kojong would not cause nationwide protest. In October 1906, Uchida began cultivating links with the Ilchinhoe to force matters to a head. However, Uchida had a fundamentally different conception of Japanese policy to that held by either Itō or Katsura. He shared Tanaka Giichi's view of Korea as strategically vital in the impending conflict with Russia, and believed;[82]

> Business, farming or industry will not increase our authority in Korea. First we must take hold of political power, and keep things in check. Then commerce will be helped and agriculture and industry increase.

Uchida intended to utilise the Ilchinhoe to force Kojong off his throne and prepare the way for annexation. The Ilchinhoe had already stated that voluntary unity with Japan was the only way to effect real political change in Korea. Indeed, their dissatisfaction lay in the refusal of Japan to settle matters by an early annexation. Only thus, they argued, could Koreans reconcile themselves to the nation's weakness and set about reconstruction. Consequently, as with the Chajanghoe, their avowal of active Korean-Japanese co-operation was intended to lead back to eventual Korean independence.[83] However, by October 1906, the Ilchinhoe had been weakened by official Japanese

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[80]Speech of 27 November 1905, quoted *Japan Daily Mail*, 30 November 1905. Itō's description of Kojong was made to Ambassador MacDonald in Tokyo, F.O. 371/179, MacDonald to Grey, 26 June 1906.

[81]Kokuryūkai, *Nik-Kan Gappō Hishi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1930, rep. 1966, vol. 1, p. 74-95, Uchida letter to Sugiyama Shigemaru, 14 January 1907. Uchida had been actively involved in Korean affairs since fighting alongside the Tonghak in the rising of 1894. In December 1905, at the request of fellow Fukuokans Kurino Shinichirō and Sugiyama Shigemaru, Itō agreed to take him as an informal member of the residency-general, to use his research skills, and, perhaps, even his advanced ability at martial arts for personal protection, a suggestion made by Kitazawa Makoto, *Hyōden Uchida Ryōhei*, Tokyo 1976, p. 207. Moreover, keeping Uchida close might restrict any unauthorised movement by the Kokuryūkai during Itō's term of office.

[82]Kokuryūkai, vol. 2, p. 10.

[83]The enduring image of the Ilchinhoe, as with Yi Wan-yong, is that of arch-traitors, but this was never accepted by Itō or Katsura. F.O. 410/52, Cockburn (Seoul) to Foreign Secretary Grey, 4 June 1908, records Itō's view that the Ilchinhoe had a rather primitive view of progress but were nonetheless genuinely liberal in outlook. Moreover, he was convinced of their patriotism and had warned Tokyo "that if any proposals were made for the annexation of Korea, the whole body of the Ilchinhoe would join their fellow countrymen in determined resistance" as they aspired to Korean development not loss of independence.

disregard and funds for its newspaper had dried up.[84] In August, Song Pyŏng-jun, the society's political leader, was arrested on suspicion of harbouring a court thief and the Ilchinhoe appeared about to collapse, perhaps fragmenting into militant groups.[85] On 22 September 1906, Uchida advised Itō to use the Ilchinhoe and balance the anti-Japanese groups, simultaneously reducing the influence of both.[86] Uchida then introduced himself to Ilchinhoe president Yi Yong-gu on 1 October and promised to obtain's Song's release in return for appointment as society counsellor. The implicit understanding was that they would work together to establish a Korean-Japanese union in which Korea would be a respected partner rather than the prize of the mighty.[87] Itō was persuaded to keep the Ilchinhoe alive and Song was released after two months imprisonment on 24 October 1906.[88]

Song was bolstered by this new support and explained that progress in Korea necessitated the emperor's removal. This accorded with the aim of Uchida and his followers, but not with that of Itō. On 18 November, Song asked Itō to stand aside while the Ilchinhoe forced Kojong to abdicate, thus absolving Japan from responsibility and avoiding international criticism. Itō attempted to deflate the idea without alienating the Ilchinhoe. With typical evasiveness, he advised Song to consult General Hasegawa, commander of Japanese forces in Korea, and then left for Japan. On appointment, Hasegawa had been warned by Yamagata against causing any disruption, and was loath to follow the example of General Miura in 1895. When visited by Song, Hasegawa angrily dismissed the planned *coup*, as Itō knew he would.[89] In January 1907, Uchida continued to plead the Ilchinhoe's near insolvency and warn it might dissolve into violent bands. Itō authorised a half-year subsidy of 2,000 yen per month but this was no more than a stop-gap measure, primarily intended to maintain the society's *Kukmin Sinmun* as a sympathetic conduit for publicising Japanese policies.[90] Song and Uchida soon realised the lukewarm nature of Itō's support and began to look for other allies. The sources they turned to were Yamagata, Terauchi, and Katsura.

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[84]Han'guk Sinmun Yŏn'gusŏ, ed., *Han'guk Sinmun Paengnyŏn*, Seoul 1975, p. 63. The paper had begun publication on 6 January 1906 supported by ex-governor Kim Se-ki, whose total assets were exhausted in the endeavour.

[85]Uchida, *Koseki Gojūnenpu*, Fukuoka 1978, p. 113.

[86]Uchida, p. 112.

[87]Nishio Yōtarō, *Yi Yong-gu Shōden*, Fukuoka 1978, p. 67-68; Uchida, p. 118.

[88]Baba Tsunego, *Kiuchi Jūshirō-den*, Tokyo 1937, p. 163-67; Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 44-45; Han Sang-il, *Nik-Kan Kindaishi no Kūkan*, Tokyo 1984, p. 159.

[89]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 52-55.

[90]*Itō Monjo*, vol. 6, p. 196, Tsuruhara Sadakichi letter, 12 January 1907; Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 55.

As noted in the introduction, Japanese policy in Korea between 1905-1910 has often been portrayed in terms of a split between the civilian Itō and Yamagata-Katsura militarists. Uchida Ryōhei's actions in 1907, deliberately waiting until Itō had returned to Korea before calling on Terauchi and Yamagata, would appear to support the contention. However, Katsura's position over the resident-general's military powers has alrady been discussed. Also, the Kokuryūkai history of the annexation states that Uchida and Song met with Yamagata, Terauchi, and Katsura, at this time, but, while recording at length the encounters with Yamagata and Terauchi, it provides no date and no details for Katsura.[91] This is striking as the Ilchinhoe's newspaper had been banned in February 1907 for reporting that Katsura would soon take over from Itō as resident-general.[92] If the Ilchinhoe gave any credence to this rumour, then Song would naturally try to see Katsura while in Japan. The silence in the Kokuryūkai account suggests that, if the meeting did take place, it was far from satisfactory. Katsura's distaste for political activists has been noted, and it has been suggested by scholar Hatsuse Ryūhei that Uchida found Katsura less than wholly sympathetic.[93] However, Uchida's future reports on Korean affairs would be directed to Katsura as well as Yamagata and Terauchi.

Having questioned the inclusion of Katsura in a "military annexationist" faction at this time, it is necessary also to examine the responses of Terauchi and Yamagata to Uchida and Song in March 1907. The meeting with Terauchi was on 19 March 1907, and that with Yamagata on 22 March. Two weeks earlier, Itō had again advised Song to defer his plans for deposing the emperor, and, at first, there appeared little better response from Terauchi who declared at the outset that he would listen without comment. However, Terauchi was impressed by what he heard, writing in his diary the following day, "Managed to get a very detailed picture of the state of Korean affairs."[94] Although Terauchi offered to give what help he could, Yamagata responsed three days later with the same mixture of apparent sympathy but implicit warning as Itō. After noting the difficulties of Japan's advisory apparatus in Korea, and suggesting that the Korean people would be satisfied by the land reforms then in process, Yamagata remarked;[95]

> I hear the emperor of Korea has a very sly nature and a soldier like myself would not last three days with him, but that is why Itō is in the post. Itō is Japan's foremost politician.... If you rely on him, matters will surely reach a favourable conclusion, so be patient.

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[91]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 153; Han, p. 160. Han does not mention the missing reference to a meeting with Katsura.

[92]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 140.

[93]Hatsuse Ryūhei, *Dentō-teki Uyoku Uchida Ryōhei no Kenkyū*, Fukuoka 1980, p. 122.

[94]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 396, entry for 20 March 1907.

[95]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 152.

Uchida and the Ilchinhoe made no secret of their plan to depose Kojong.[96] Yet, neither Itō nor Yamagata wanted to see the Ilchinhoe go underground, and neither did they wish to lose its support in case of changed circumstances. Itō himself realised that Korea might have to be annexed. Prior to negotiations for a Russo-Japanese commercial agreement in early 1907, it was suggested that Russia be asked to recognise in advance a Japanese annexation of Korea at some unspecified date. These were negotiations undertaken by the Saionji cabinet rather than the "militarists", and Itō's opinion, dated 13 April 1907, is worth examining;[97]

> I believe it best that the articles referring to Korea in the present agreement be fixed and announced, with, as Minister Motono suggests, an exchange of notes to make clear that the words "further development" go as far as to include annexation. If this is impossible and the relevant article has to be moved to a secret agreement, I believe we have to employ Motono's suggestion. If Korean conditions move along their present lines, annexation will become more difficult with each year. Consequently, we should make our thoughts clear and get advance Russian acceptance.

If Itō were openly supporting annexation of Korea, this would contradict the idea that he was fighting the "annexationist militarists". However, there is an alternative interpretation. Itō agonised about Korean pleas for Russian support against Japan. If Russia were to declare her sympathy with whatever action Japan thought necessary in the peninsula, this would undermine Korean resistance and considerably ease Japan's task. However, if Russia were to refuse a public announcement, and conditions in Korea continued to deteriorate as Itō feared, then it was merely a cautionary measure to sound out Russian views with regard to a potential annexation. In fact, although the final agreement, signed in St. Petersburg on 30 July 1907, contained the provision on "further development", the Russian government was far from pleased when Japan did annex Korea in 1910.[98]

Even as Itō outlined his views, affairs in Korea seemed to bear out Uchida's thesis that improvents could not be made without total Japanese control. The Pak Che-jun cabinet, which was itself in disarray following internal manouevering, was under fire from the public and Chajanghoe, and a group organised by *yangban* of southern Chŏlla was discovered planning to assassinate the ministers *en masse*.[99] Moreover, early in 1907, Japan's earlier loan finally produced a Korean national movement, co-ordinated by

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[96]See Uchida's February 1907 "Essentials of Future Policy", Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 113-31.

[97]NGB, vol. 40-1, p. 124, Itō to Hayashi, 13 April 1907. For a discussion, see Masato Matsui, "The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of Negotiations", *Modern Asian Studies*, 6-1, 1972, p. 43.

[98]The text of the 1907 agreement, including the secret clause on "further development" in Korea, is given in *Nihon Gaikō Nempyō*, vol. 1, p. 280-81.

[99]Ichikawa Masaaki, ed., *Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō*, Tokyo 1964, vol. 8, p. 39-40. The assassinations were meant to take place in March 1907.

the *Taehan Maeil Sinmun*, to repay every yen. Itō realised "a premature defence would only hasten an explosion," and could take no action against this peaceful, but implicitly anti-Japanese, campaign.[100] The cabinet attempted to placate Chajanghoe opposition with provincial appointments, while it seemed to Itō that the Ilchinhoe, still facing collapse despite the earlier subsidy, might restore its energies by joining the assault on the cabinet, and even unite with the Chajanghoe.[101] This was feasible given the underlying similarity of Chajanghoe and Ilchinhoe platforms, and just such a union would be discussed in late 1909. Itō responded to the worsening situation by trying to provide the government with popular Ilchinhoe support, and reduce that society's discontent, with the appointment to cabinet of an Ilchinhoe member. Terauchi was also persuaded of the danger of an Ilchinhoe split and, in April 1907, prepared a secret gift of 100,000 yen, ostensibly for services rendered during the Russo-Japanese war.[102] Prime Minister Pak, however, refused to work with the Ilchinhoe and, over Itō's entreaties, chose to resign in May. Itō then turned to Yi Wan-yong, according to one report, "the object of the emperor's special aversion," and a man whom Itō was sure would exclude Kojong from politics.[103] Shortly after, Song Pyŏng-jun was appointed minister for agriculture and commerce, but with an open warning on 30 May from Itō not to employ the Ilchinhoe against the cabinet.[104]

Speaking to the new administration in May 1907, Itō explained;[105]

> Gentlemen, spread out a map and the first thing you will note is the changes in the East. Until just thirty years ago Korea believed China to be a great power. Yet, however vast its land or numerous its people, China lacks the essentials for a great power and is now like a lump of meat surrounded by dogs.... It is natural that Japan should today be in control of Korean diplomacy. If this remained in Korean hands, then Korea would forever remain the battleground of the powers and this would greatly endanger Japan. Yet, the Koreans do not strive to restore their diplomatic authority, but constantly work to get some other nation's aid to dispossess Japan of this power. But there is no country willing to sacrifice its money and the lives of its people for another. Were there such a country, it would first consider its own benefit and secondly that of the other country. There is no nation which, lacking the fundamentals for independence, can stand by leaning on another. If matters continue as they are today, it will not be some other state which destroys Korea, but Korea itself.... Therefore, I say to you, the most urgent and appropriate policy for Korea today is to show sincere goodwill towards Japan and for you to cast your fate with ours.

Thus, Itō had the arrangement he desired: Kojong's influence was restricted, a

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[100]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 426, 5 April 1907.

[101]Itō to Hayashi and Saionji, 4 June 1907, Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 490-91.

[102]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 240.

[103]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 494, Itō to Hayashi and Saionji, 4 June 1907. Itō was correct as Kojong often refused to see the new prime minister, *North China Herald*, 14 June 1907.

[104]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 488.

[105]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 482-83.

Japanese-Korean guard screened his visitors, and the cabinet was composed of men aspiring to reform under Japanese guidance. Two weeks later, the independence of the cabinet from court was increased and the system revised along the lines of foreign states.[106] This appearance of successful Cromerism, however, was not to last.

Kojong's Abdication

At this point one must note the first interview between Katsura and Uchida Ryōhei detailed in the Kokuryūkai history. On 7 June 1907, Sugiyama Shigemaru informed Uchida of Katsura's anxiety concerning Korean affairs. When Uchida called three days later, Katsura explained;[107]

> The Korean nature is to forget things once they are satisfied. If the Ilchinhoe becomes prosperous, it will abandon its main project, and to have it carry this through the members must be kept in adversity.... Although the Ilchinhoe have patriotic feelings, they suppress them only because of Korea's terrible situation. Should the people become prosperous, then you will see how they devote themselves to protecting the nation.... Japan has taught them loyalty and patriotism.... but the day they complete their studies, that day they will stand alone. The present is not the time to plan for a thorough reform as we have not yet got real protectorate authority.

Katsura clearly opposed Song's appointment to cabinet and wished to keep the Ilchinhoe in reserve. Whether he wished to employ the Ilchinhoe to destroy Kojong at a later point, or simply retain the society's value as a device for intimidation against both the court and Korean cabinet is open to question. However, that he was not proposing annexation at this time is obvious from events of the following month.

The Second International Peace Conference was to open in The Hague in July, and, although Russia had previously issued an invitation to Korea, this had been withdrawn at Japan's request.[108] Nonetheless, Kojong believed that an appeal before the nations of the world would shake Japan's hold on his country and, late in April, organised a secret delegation with the aid of American missionary-educator, Homer Hulbert.[109] On 22 May 1907, when Kojong resisted Yi Wan-yong's appointment as prime minister, Itō revealed that he knew of Kojong's "entrusting the American Hulbert, with the task of working to restore Korea's power at the International Peace Conference" and warned that this would be an infringement of the 1905 treaty for which the emperor would be clearly

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[106]Ichikawa, p. 92-96; Kim Myŏng-su, ed., *Ichidō Kiji*, Seoul 1927, p. 54-55. The cabinet was upgraded from, in Japanese, *giseifu* to *naikaku*, and was empowered with greater control over official appointments and government decisions.

[107]Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 269-70.

[108]Itō conversation, reported F.O. 371/179, MacDonald to Grey, 26 June 1906.

[109]See the introduction by Clarence Weems Jr. to Homer Hulbert, *History of Korea*, 2 vols., London 1962, vol. 1, p. 52; Taruzaki/Togano, p. 94-95. For Kojong's written appeal to the Tzar, see Kim Myŏng-su, p. 61-62.

responsible.[110] This had the desired effect of cowing Kojong who meekly accepted Yi's appointment. However, if Itō had intended to unseat Kojong, this would have been the perfect opportunity. Yet, with this advance warning, Itō offered Kojong time to preserve the *status quo*. The offer was rejected and the supposedly secret delegation duly appeared in The Hague.

Nonetheless, the situation, as Itō realised, offered possibilities.[111] Kojong could be made to pay yet another, and considerably greater, forfeit, and this was the course chosen by Japan. At a meeting in Tokyo on 10 July of the cabinet with Yamagata, Matsukata, Inoue, Ōyama and Katsura, it was decided unanimously to reject annexation, but to demand a new agreement from the Korean government. This was to allow the resident-general powers as a regent (*kanpaku*), and replace the system of advisers in the Korean government by Japanese at ministerial or vice ministerial level. Army Minister Terauchi alone voted for Kojong to be removed in favour of the crown prince. However, it was agreed that, should Kojong reject the new agreement, then annexation would be carried out.[112] In Seoul, Itō stood back from events after making thinly veiled threats of war, but the crisis was exploited by Song Pyŏng-jun and Yi Wan-yong against Kojong. They charged him with endangering the state to preserve his own authority, and when Kojong's own advisers urged him to abdicate, Sunjong became the last ruler of the 500-year Yi dynasty.[113] Shortly thereafter, Yi signed the agreement demanded by Japan, extending the resident-general's authority to internal Korean matters, and appointing Japanese nationals to vice-ministerial positions throughout the Korean administration.[114] A further loan of nearly 20 million yen followed in March 1908. Thus, the pattern of Cromerism was retained with the new, and like Egypt's Khedive Tewfik, considerably

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[110]Kim, vol. 6-1, p. 475-79. An undated letter from April 1907 shows that Uchida Ryōhei also had some knowledge of the secret envoys, Kokuryūkai, vol. 1, p. 195.

[111]NGB, vol. 40-1, p. ....., Itō to Hayashi, 3 July 1907; Han, p. 163.

[112]Kim, vol. 6-2, p. 600-01, Hayashi to Itō, 12 July 1907. It should be noted that the record of this meeting identifies only the votes of Yamagata and Terauchi by name. However, Yamagata had written to Katsura on 10 July saying, "I believe the policy outline we agreed the other day should in no way be altered", and specifically asked for Terauchi to be present at a meeting on 12 July, thus suggesting that Katsura's opinion was the same as that of Yamagata rather than Terauchi. Katsura Papers, 70-98. This letter is dated 1908 in the guide to Katsura's papers but 1907 in the *Kyū Kizokuin Gojūnenshi* collection.

[113]Details of the incident and Itō's attitude in Komatsu Midori, *Meiji Gaikō no Hiwa*, Tokyo 1976, p. 247-50; Kaneko, vol. 3, p. 751-53; Taruzaki/Togano, p. 104-05; Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Kojong Sidae'sa*, 6 vols., Seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 672, notes the modernity of dress and hair-styles in Sunjong's enthronement ceremony. Emperor Kojong's action was described in typical terms by the *North China Herald* on 12 July 1907 as like "that of a naughty schoolboy."

[114]The full text of the agreement is in *Nihon Gaikō Nempyō*, vol. 1, p. 276-77. A contemporary report suggests that Prime Minister Yi was a stubborn negotiator and attempted to restrict Japanese demands just as he had in 1905, see *Japan Times*, 25 July 1907, enclosed in F.O. 371/383, MacDonald (Tokyo) to Grey, 7 August 1907. No such discord is evident in the biography of Yi by his secretary, Kim Myŏng-su, p. 99. A list of the Japanese appointed to the Korean government to January 1908 appears in Furuya Tetsuo, "Dai Ichi-ji Saionji Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols., Tokyo 1981, vol. 2, p. 35.

weaker monarch. However, Itō realised that Japan's political and financial responsibilities had been increased by the abdication, and that it signalled the failure of discreet control. As one member of the British foreign office noted upon reading the new Japanese-Korean agreement, "The change might perhaps be summed up thus: that Korea passes from the position of Egypt towards England to that of Tunis towards France."[115]

To the Western powers, Japan denied all involvement in Kojong's removal and, speaking to journalists immediately after the abdication, Itō stressed, "Japan sees no need for annexation. Annexation is very troublesome and Korea needs self-rule.... We will be satisfied to see our two flags flying side by side."[116] However, following street fighting in Seoul throughout late July, Japan ordered the Korean army, already trimmed to less than 8,000 men by Japanese economy measures, to disband. This only exacerbated the violence as troops took to the hills, and the only result was that the guerrillas who, after two years of resistance, "existed in name only", according to one study, now obtained their first professional commanders.[117] Where there had been fires of opposition, now there was a conflagration. Between August and December 1907, an estimated 44,000 guerrillas "contacted" Japanese forces, and Japanese civilians, police stations, and the Ilchinhoe were repeated targets for attack.[118] In September 1907, General Hasegawa, commander of the Japanese army in Korea, offered amnesty to all those who surrendered, and offered handsome reward for information or seizure of insurgents. However, he warned that individuals aiding or concealing insurgents would bring a heavy punishment on their communities.[119] Japanese troops and gendarmerie went about their task with scant regard for political necessity. One attempt at pacification was described by British correspondent F.A. McKenzie;[120]

> The Japanese soldiers were allowed great licence, wounded were bayonetted, women violated, women and children were shot in scores, and thousands of innocent countryfolk were driven to the mountains.

British opinion, sensitive to the attempt at Cromerism, was subdued. Commenting on McKenzie's report, British Consul in Seoul, Henry Cockburn, deemed it, "much over-

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[115]F.O. 371/383, MacDonald to Grey, 4 September 1907, for Itō's comment on Japan's increased burden and the regret that "This so-called Hague mission had.... upset everything"; Foreign office opinion, same series, notation on translation of Japanese-Korean agreement, received 26 July 1907.

[116]Denial to the powers, F.O. 371/383, Cockburn (Seoul) to Grey, 19 July 1907; quotation, Komatsu, vol. 2, p. 455-59, Itō speech of 29 July 1907.

[117]Kim/Kim, p. 201; *Kojong Sidae'sa* Seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 660, 665.

[118]F.O. 371/383, Cockburn to Grey, 26 September 1907, provides a detailed report of the various engagements and casualties for the period August to September 1907; also *North China Herald*, 4 October, 13 December, 20 December 1907; *Kojong Sidae'sa*, vol. 6, p. 664; Kim/Kim, p. 231.

[119]Hasegawa proclamation, *Seoul Press*, 10 September 1907, enclosed in F.O. 371/383, Cockburn to Grey, 26 September 1907.

[120]F.O. 371/383, undated, no. 34377, McKenzie telegram to the *Daily Mail*, 21 September 1907. The paper did not print the report out of consideration for the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

coloured.... The so-called "atrocities" committed by the Japanese are not much more than is generally to be expected from a victorious army stamping out rebellion in a conquered territory." With imperial insouciance, he then noted, "The Japanese take no prisoners, so far as I can learn, except temporarily for the purpose of obtaining from them information, after which they are shot."[121]

Official Japanese figures for the period July 1907 - October 1908 gave the number of Japanese soldiers and police killed or wounded at 452. The death toll of Korean insurgents stood at 14,354, and McKenzie's view that Japanese retaliation would only help guerrilla recruitment proved accurate.[122]

On 15 September 1907, a Korea-Japan Exhibition opened in Nihyŏn to celebrate the mutual harmony. That same day there were at least four major engagements between armed Koreans and Japanese troops.[123] Meanwhile, within both the Korean cabinet and Japanese residency-general there was renewed in-fighting. Uchida Ryōhei campaigned to remove Itō, and was supported by Kiuchi Jūshirō, vice minister for Korean finance, who provided materials to Japanese Diet members and newspapers for blistering attacks on Itō personally and the chaos of his administration.[124] Yi Wan-yong and Song Pyŏng-jun were completely at odds: Yi wanted to retain Korea's basic political framework as the engine for reform; Song, backed by Uchida, wanted to destroy a system of proven weakness. The result was that Itō had to labour just to prevent either from resigning.[125] In the middle of this confusion stood Katsura. He could choose between two options; continuation of discreet control and gradual change, or overt control with swift reform. In 1908, at least, he would try to improve matters without annexation.

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[121]F.O. 371/383 above.

[122]F.O. 410-53, MacDonald (Tokyo) to Grey, 6 December 1908; Ōe, p. 394-95, produces slightly different figures. There were some Korean prisoners, but the ratio was considerably imbalanced. For example, Ōe notes that in 1908, 11,562 Korean insurgents were killed, and only 1,417 captured.

[123]*Kojong Sidae'sa*, vol. 6, p. 681.

[124]*Itō Monjo*, vol. 6, p. 84, Vice Resident-General Sone Arasuke letter, 23 February 1909. Sone accused Kiuchi of providing the ammunition for Diet member Otake Kan'ichi, a proponent of annexation, to launch a two-hour assault on Itō, and the material for unfavourable articles in the *Hōchi Shimbun*.

[125]Katsura Papers, 18-38, Itō letter, 6 December 1908.

Chapter 10

THE ORIENTAL SOCIETY and ORIENTAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 1907-08

The Oriental Society

After 1905, far more than Taiwan, Korea and the Kwangtung leased territory offered opportunities for population redistribution and agricultural-industrial development in what some were calling the "age of disillusion."[1] The Japanese army had also entrenched itself in Manchuria, ensuring that government attention remained fixed on the north. However, military garrisons were expensive, unproductive, and an irritant to the local people. To maintain a strong position in northeast Asia, it was essential to improve Japanese administration and investment.

The redirection of Japanese interests following the war with Russia was obvious at the Taiwan Society's general meeting in February 1907. There, before an audience that included Korean Resident-General Itō Hirobumi, Army Minister Terauchi Masatake, Home Minister Hara Kei, and president of the South Manchurian Railway Company Gotō Shimpei, Katsura reviewed Taiwan Society activities over the past decade and announced that, in response to the changing times, the group would henceforth be known as the Oriental Society (Tōyō Kyōkai).[2] Its journal was renamed *Tōyō Jihō* and the institution in north Tokyo became the Oriental Society School.

The aims of the Taiwan Society had been to promote mutual understanding between Japan and Taiwan, and to assist colonial government and economic development. It had gathered information on Taiwan's agricultural and industrial potential, served as host to Japanese businessmen interested in the region, and established a specialist school to feed Japan's administrative and commercial machinery in Taiwan. However, the society had no discernible impact in raising Japanese popular consciousness of Taiwanese affairs.

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[1]The term was *genmetsu no jidai*, Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals: Writers and the Meiji State*, Seattle 1984, p. 60, quoting Hasegawa Tenkei, chief literary critic of *Taiyō*.

[2]Katsura speech, 3 February 1907, quoted Yamane Yukio, "Taiwan Kyōkai to Sono Hatten", *Ronshū Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku*, Tokyo 1976, p. 201-02.

Membership had fallen after the first years and in 1906 stood at 885 supporting members (those having made a contribution of fifty yen) and 461 ordinary members (paying fifty *sen* per month).[3] The change in direction to northeast Asia gave it renewed impetus. The basic shape remained as before. It eschewed political involvement, concentrated on the education of overseas administrators and commercial agents, and acted as a support for economic development. The greater potential in the north, however, demanded expansion of the society's resources. Its council was nearly quadrupled to one hundred and fifty seven members, and a purely academic branch, the Asia Studies Society (Ajia Gakkai), received large subsidies under Katsura's former Agricultural-Commerce Minister Hirata Tōsuke for independent research.[4] Later, in November 1908, when the South Manchurian Railway Company opened an East Asian Economic Research Bureau (Tō-A Keizai Chōsa-kyoku) in Tokyo, the Oriental Society would ensure collaboration on research projects.

The Oriental Society moved quickly into its new arena. In June 1907, Komatsubara Eitarō, former editor of the *Ōsaka Mainichi*, spent a month travelling around Korea and Manchuria as society representative. In Seoul, after conferring with Resident-General Itō, he set up a branch office. Deputy Resident-General Tsuruhara Sadakichi acted as branch president and another member of the residency-general, Kodama Hideo, eldest son of the late Kodama Gentarō, served as one of the branch advisers.[5] Komatsubara also established support committees in the major Korean cities; Pusan, Inch'ŏn, Wŏnsan, and P'yŏngyang. Travelling on to Manchuria, he received full backing from Kwangtung Governor-General Ōshima Yoshimasa for a society branch in Port Arthur. Here Nakamura Zekō, vice-president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, was appointed branch head and Matsuoka Yōsuke, chief of the government-general's external affairs office, was among the advisers. While in Korea and Manchuria, Komatsubara hosted dinners for influential citizens and paid them visits to explain the Oriental Society's intentions. In Manchuria particularly, he requested Japanese consuls to suggest important Chinese visit Japan, and even consider joining the Oriental Society.[6]

Yet, as Katsura later declared, "the society's greatest enterprise is its affiliated

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[3]Figures, Kimijima Kazuhiko, "Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha no Setsuritsu Katei", part 1, *Rekishi Hyōron*, 282, November 1973, p. 36.

[4]Yamane, p. 204-205.

[5]Komatsubara report to the Oriental Society, 1 July 1907, *Tōyō Kyōkai Enkaku*, 2 vols., unpublished, Takushoku University Library (Hachiōji), vol. 2, p. 179-88. Kodama Hideo would become Kwangtung governor-general in 1923, and held several cabinet posts during the 1930s, including that of home minister in the Yonai cabinet of 1940.

[6]Komatsubara report above.

school."[7] It was, he exclaimed with pride to provincial Japanese authorities, virtually the only full colonial development school in the country, and its role was simple; "solely to cultivate human material to assist in the administration of our new territories and development enterprises."[8] The residency-general in Korea had suffered from the poor quality and ignorance of its administrators, revealing how ill-prepared Japan had been in 1905 to assume control. In 1907, following the abdication of Emperor Kojong and Japan's increased responsibilities, the need for trained administrators and development specialists was acute. It was here that the Oriental Society invested its major effort. On 1 October 1907, an Oriental Society School was opened in Seoul and Katsura, arriving shortly after with Japan's crown prince, asked Tsuruhara to care for graduates despatched from the Tokyo school, and provide help to future graduates.[9]

The course of study in Tokyo lasted three years. Korean was added from 1907, and it was intended that, upon completing their initial three years, graduates would be sent to Seoul for a further year. However, the urgency of the situation was such that some thirty-eight third-year students sent from Tokyo were graduated from the Seoul school in March 1908. Thereafter, all were employed in Korea, either in the residency-general, the government or local banks.[10] The school in Tokyo responded to the continuing demand by separating the Korean language course from Taiwanese and Chinese in 1909, and making each of these languages compulsory from the first year of study.

In the 1908 academic year, the Oriental Society School in Tokyo had 308 students: 130 in the first year, 80 in the second, and 98 in the third. In 1909, the total dropped to 269: 95 first year students, 102 in the second year, and 73 in the third. In 1910, the newly established government-general of Korea took students at such a rate that numbers at Tokyo fell to 193: 82 in the first year, 70 in the second, and 41 in the third. Equally, of course, figures at the Oriental Society School in Seoul rose, from 30 third-year pupils and 13 research students in 1909, to 43 third-years and 3 researchers in 1910. Taiwanese students, however, continued to receive assistance for study in Tokyo and, from forty-three in the 1908 academic year, numbers increased to fifty-four in 1909 and over seventy in 1910.[11]

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[7]Katsura speech, 17 April 1908, *Tōyō Jihō*, 116, May 1908, p. 83-86; also, Kusano Fumio, *Takushoku Daigaku Hachijūnen-shi*, Tokyo 1980, p. 123.

[8]Kusano, p. 142, Katsura speech at the Oriental Society School, 27 April 1912.

[9]Katsura made a similar request of Kwangtung Governor-General Ōshima at an Oriental Society dinner in May 1908, Katsura speech, 27 May 1908, *Tōyō Jihō*, 117, June 1908.

[10]Katsura speech, 27 May 1908, above.

[11]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 409-23, 532-39, 633-43, annual reports for 1908-1910.

By March 1910, there had been 538 graduates of the Oriental Society Schools. Korea was unquestionably the leading avenue for placement, with 55 having found work in Taiwan, 71 in China, 81 in Japan, and 197 in Korea.[12] The figures for leading employers of graduates in 1908, 1909, and 1910 are as follows;[13]

- Government-General of Taiwan: 12 - 12 - 15.
- Bank of Taiwan: 1 - 2 - 2.
- Bank of Korea (Dai-Ichi Bank): 2 - 1 - 2.
- South Manchurian Railway Co.: 4 - 4 - 5.
- Korean Govt. or Financial Assocs.: 42 - 30 - 29.
- Korean Customs: 0 - 0 - 1.
- Korean Agricultural and Industrial Bank: 0 - 0 - 1.
- Research Faculty Oriental Society School (Seoul): 0 - 0 - 3.
- Oriental Society: 0 - 0 - 1.
- Army Volunteer: 3 - 12 - 1.
- Yokohama Specie Bank: 2 - 0 - 0.
- Yokohama Customs: 3 - 0 - 0.
- Mitsubishi Ltd.: 0 - 0 - 2.
- Mitsui Industries: 0 - 0 - 1.
- Ōkura Group: 0 - 0 - 1.
- Self-employed: 0 - 0 - 3.

The situation in Manchuria, however, was less pleasing to Katsura who remarked in 1910 that "the establishment of the society's influence, relative to Korea, has been very unsatisfactory." Only through concerted effort had membership there had gradually risen.[14] Education was again the means adopted to rectify matters. By mid-1910, there were completed plans for an Oriental Society Language School at Port Arthur, and an Oriental Society Commercial School at Dalny (Dalien). The institution at Port Arthur was simply designed to bring Japanese and Chinese children together and have them exchange languages. It began with 255 students in September 1910, and was hoping to add English and Russian at a later stage. Numbers, however, were unstable, and only

[12]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 526-31, Katsura speech to 12th General Meeting of the Oriental Society. It should be added that as Katsura spoke, 27 more graduates were on recommendation to the Taiwan government-general. The remaining graduates were as follows: 17 entered one year's voluntary service in the army; 11 were conducting research in the society's schools; 9 were studying in the U.S. and one in Britain; 19 had died (this presumably includes those who died while serving as interpreters or in intelligence roles during the war with Russia), and 50 were unaccounted for.

[13]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 409-23, 532-39, 633-43, annual reports for 1908-1910. The annual figure for graduates in these years is 1908 - 76, 1909 - 82, 1910 - 90. This last figure includes graduates from the school at Seoul.

[14]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 526-31, Katsura speech to 12th general meeting, 8 May 1910.

sixty-nine pupils completed the first year.[15] The school at Dalny was a more ambitious venture and support was solicited from all major bodies in the city. The South Manchurian Railway Company donated 30,000 yen, the Specie Bank 10,000, and 5,000 was received from the Mitsui Company.[16] Land for the school was granted by a Chinese benefactor, and any shortfall in capital was to be covered by the Kwangtung government-general. Five hundred applications were received for the opening year in September 1910, and of the 379 accepted, the first 118 graduated in March 1911.[17]

In succeeding decades, the Oriental Society continued to expand its educational network. In 1920, it opened a Commerce and Industry School in Taipei, a Ladies Commercial School in Dalny in 1923, and a further Commercial School at Mukden in 1933.[18] The Oriental Society School in Seoul was transferred to Korean government-general control in 1921, while the original Tokyo school lost Katsura as principal upon his becoming grand chamberlain and privy seal in 1912. However, in that same year, it was honoured by an imperial donation of 10,000 yen for its service in producing valuable graduates. Later, the school was awarded university status and, in 1926, adopted the name it retains today, Takushoku Daigaku - Development University.

Thus, at the end of 1910, the Oriental Society had its share of successes and failures. Matters in Korea seemed to be improving solidly, if less certainly in Manchuria, while, at home, Katsura complained of the "extreme paucity of regular members" and the need for greater recruitment.[19] Visitors from East Asia were steady in number, and there was an increase in Taiwanese membership, but the disorderly situation in northeast Asia and the continuing problems in Japanese finance called for real economic advances. It was to this end that, in 1907-08, Katsura and the Oriental Society made their greatest effort in Korea: the Oriental Development Company (*Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha*).

<u>The Oriental Development Company</u>

The first point to make about the Oriental Development Company is that it was conceived by the Oriental Society and championed, in the face of considerable

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[15]Kusano, p. 130. The Japanese children were presumably the offspring of Japanese businessmen and administrators in the region, not all of whom would be permanent residents.

[16]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 633-43, annual report for 1910. Principal in Dalny was Matsumoto Kiichi, former head of a commercial school in Kobe.

[17]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 633-43, annual report for 1910; Kusano, p. 130.

[18]A summary of the China-related societies and their activities is given in Tō-A Dōbunkai, ed., *Tai-Shi Kaikoroku*, 2 vols., 1936, rep. 1968, vol. 1. For the Oriental Society, see p. 686.

[19]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 526-31, Katsura speech, 8 May 1910.

opposition, by Katsura Tarō. Beyond echoing a suggestion made during the Sino-Japanese war, it had no obvious connection with Yamagata Aritomo, and cannot be dismissed as a mere instrument in some presumed power struggle between the civilian Itō and Yamagata militarists over control of Korean policy.[20]

Policy-makers in Tokyo had often suggested that the immigration of Japanese farmers to Korea would profit both peoples, and increase Korea's agricultural productivity by the demonstration of advanced farming techniques. Such co-prosperity, it was argued, would reduce existing hatreds, undermine guerrilla opposition, and improve the acceptability of Japanese policies. This was the view of a report on the Oriental Development Company, authored by a committee under Viscount Okabe Nagamoto and addressed to Katsura in December 1907, which stated;[21]

> By leading Korea to enlightenment, we will not only make her rich and strong, and bring about progress in her culture, we will also deepen Japanese-Korean amity, further the economic relationship of the Japanese and Korean peoples, and increase their mutual prosperity.

One may dismiss this solely as a facade - *tatemae* - and argue that Japan's real intention was merely to exploit the weaker Koreans, using the Oriental Development Company as an imperialist Trojan horse to seize Korean lands preparatory to annexation.[22] However, if the Oriental Development Company was a device for land seizure, why bother if annexation were imminent? It would be cheaper and easier to take control of Korean lands once the native government had been removed and all hope of external intervention crushed. Indeed, one should see the company as Katsura viewed it, and as at least one foreign source realised; a Japanese equivalent of the British East India Company.[23] In that sense, it was indeed an imperialistic device. However, one must also understand the credo of the time; that business and imperialism were forces for global development, and that failure to open economic resources was a deliberate retardation of progress. This is the stance of the quotation above, and of the residency-general report for 1908-09 which

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[20]Karl Moskowitz, "The Creation of the Oriental Development Company: Japanese Illusions Meet Korean Reality", *Occasional Papers on Korea* (University of Washington), 2, March 1974, p. 99, writes, "A major reason Katsura and some, if not all, of his Tōyō Kyōkai members might well have had for creating the ODC was to by-pass Resident General Itō and his controls over the military and police in Korea. If so, then it follows that when the Yamagata-Katsura group actually did take over the Residency General, the ODC would no longer be critically important to them." As has already been seen, Katsura made no move to limit Itō's authority over Japanese troops in Korea when this was an issue in early 1906.

[21]Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* (hereafter NGB), vol. 40-2, p. 672-4, Okabe Nagamoto committee to Oriental Society President Katsura Tarō, 21 December 1907. The committee included among others Shibusawa Eiichi, Yasuda Zenjirō, Toyogawa Ryōhei, Matsuo Shinzen, Nitobe Inazō, and Hirata Tōsuke.

[22]A summary of Japanese historical opinion, largely critical, on the Oriental Development Company is given in Kimijima, part 1, p. 28-32. See also Uno Shunichi, "Dai Ni-ji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols., Tokyo 1981, p. 78, and Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Kojong Sidaesa*, 6 vols., Seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 722.

[23]Katsura is quoted in Kimijima, part 1, p. 41; NGB, vol. 41-2, p. 294, Nomura Motonobu (Vladivostok) to Hayashi Tadasu, 22 June 1908, reports Russian press comment on the similarity.

noted that a company promoting agriculture and industry "has often proved the pioneer of material civilisation in underdeveloped countries."[24] Without industrial development, the Okabe committee argued, "a people's strength wanes and national force stagnates."[25] This threat was as true of Japan as of Korea. It has already been suggested that Japan wished to be seen as emulating Britain in her Korean policy, so it is unsurprising that Katsura should promote comparisons with the East India Company. However, the basic difference was that Britain, whether in India or Egypt, concentrated on business and kept the number of her citizens relatively low. In Korea, Japan was hoping to transplant her people *en masse*, and on a full-time basis. This would cause serious problems. Nonetheless, while scrutinising the Oriental Development Company's actual operations, the statements of the company's founders should not be dismissed out of hand.

Katsura was well aware from the abortive Nagamori plan of 1904 that land was a contentious issue in Korea. Yet, Japan had to reap some profit from her overseas commitments in order to offset the costs incurred in their acquisition. Moreover, there was a growing fear that Japan was becoming over-crowded, and that this could worsen social and industrial tensions in the manner observed in the industrialised West. Thus far, there were few Japanese choosing to settle in Korea. Earlier arrivals had been hindered by the lack of banks and financial institutions capable of providing long-term capital support. Instead, they concentrated on simple commerce, while the numerous Japanese carpetbaggers caused frequent embarrassment to Resident-General Itō in his first years.[26]

One deterrent for Japanese farmers was the unpleasant reception they expected in Korea. Historical animosities ran deep, mutual language skills appeared in short supply, and Korea's image was truly "Oriental" in its corruption and degeneracy. Japan could take absolute control, annex Korea and bring over migrants whether the Koreans welcomed them or not. Uchida Ryōhei had argued, with some reason, that no economic progress could be achieved under the existing Cromerist system, and that Korean hatred of Japan would never be overcome with half measures. Japan's changing position in the world following the Russo-Japanese war made her uncomfortable with irresolution. Katsura's observation of Taiwan showed that Japanese business was timid in the face of

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[24]Quoted Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910*, Philadelphia 1960, paper ed. 1974, p. 480.

[25]NGB, 40-2, Okabe report above.

[26]The plea for capital support was made by the Union of Japanese Traders in Korea (*Zai-Kan Nihonjin Shōgyō Kaigi-jo Rengōkai*) to Resident-General Itō and the Japanese finance and foreign ministers in 1907. See Kurose Yūji, "Nichi-Ro Sengo no "Chōsen Keiei" to Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha", Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai, ed., *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Rombunshū 12: Kindai Chōsen to Nihon Teikokushugi*, Tokyo 1975, p. 100-01. Itō's problems with the "arrogant, low-class Japanese" in Korea and the harm they caused to Korean-Japanese relations are noted in an interview he gave to the *North China Herald*, 10 August 1906.

instability and, with constant Korean guerrilla activity in 1907-08, he knew that the government or a semi-government organisation would have to lead the way. The South Manchurian Railway Company had already been established to the north of Korea, and now Katsura turned to the peninsula itself.

After returning from the continent in mid-1907, Komatsubara Eitarō wrote of his impressions;[27]

> There is nothing more urgent in the development of Korea than agricultural improvement.... but it is vital that Japanese own Korean lands.... and ownership alone is not enough. Land rights have been obtained but most people appear satisfied to let the land to Koreans and take rice for rent. In this situation, improved agriculture is impossible.... Japanese farmers must be settled overseas and put their own hands to the plough.

Komatsubara urged the government to intervene and defray migrant travel expenses, provide assistance with the purchase of tools and foodstuffs, and help arrange loans for working capital. The government had made no such move in Taiwan, and had abandoned its control of migration to Hawaii in the 1890s. However, with Japanese migrants to the United States causing severe problems, and even talk of war in 1907, it was essential to redirect ambitious Japanese farmers towards the Asian mainland. The Oriental Society moved fast and had a choice of working plans on Katsura's desk by June 1907. These ideas were then developed in consultation with Komatsubara and Hirata Tōsuke, the latter long interested in agricultural problems. In September, Katsura called a meeting of Komatsubara, Hirata, and others, including Nitobe Inazō, and a unified plan was approved late in the month.[28] It was clear from the beginning, however, that major government subsidies would be needed to guarantee the company's initial years and Katsura himself began negotiations to this end.

The term "ne-mawashi", implying careful preparation of the ground before planting, is applicable to Katsura. To ensure support for the Oriental Development Company, he first approached Inoue Kaoru, who was intimately linked to the Mitsui Company and Dai-Ichi Bank, then acting as *de facto* Bank of Korea. Inoue, while generally supportive of the new venture, doubted that sufficient profit could be made on agricultural enterprises alone and suggested the company's scope be expanded to include mining at least.[29] The plan remained, however, centred on agricultural emigration. Then, on 25 September 1907, following a palace ceremony to reward the Meiji leaders for their

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[27]Komatsubara articles in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and *Bōeki*, July 1907, quoted Kimijima, part 1, p. 40.

[28]Kimijima, p. 41.

[29]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 2, p. 261, 263, entries for 29 September, 8 October 1907.

successful statesmanship, Marquis Katsura, as he now became, proceeded to broach the matter with newly-appointed Prince Itō.[30]

Having thus secured his base, Katsura departed for Korea with the crown prince, Higashi-no-Miya, arriving in Seoul in mid-October. This was the first imperial visit to Korea and was meant to reaffirm Japanese-Korean goodwill following the disruption of Kojong's abdication. However, it also allowed Katsura the opportunity to check the local situation and observe the progress of Komatsubara's earlier arrangements. He inspected the new Oriental Society School, which the crown prince had graced with a gift of one hundred yen, and a few days later retrod the battlefields of thirteen years before on a visit to the River Yalu. The trip also allowed him to conduct unobtrusive discussions on the Oriental Development Company with Itō, Korean Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong, and Agriculture-Commerce Minister Song Pyŏng-jun. Itō, in Katsura's words, "showed full agreement" (*jūbun ni sansei no i o arawaseri*), and at a banquet to celebrate the resident-general's sixty-seventh birthday, the two joked of their long friendship and expressed joint hopes for enduring Japanese-Korean amity.[31]

Despite the pronouncements of goodwill, Japan's political allies in Korea were isolated between the "patriotic enlightenment" groups and the guerrillas. There was a belief, however, that Korean businessmen, particularly in the northern provinces, were pragmatists and if agricultural-commercial benefits could be extended through Japanese activities, this anti-Japanese emotion might be contained. However, this could not be achieved by government *diktat*. As Katsura told supporters of the Oriental Society beside the River Yalu;

> In our territories (*ryōdo*), it is very difficult to get administrative results with the government running enterprises alone and officials giving direct orders and proclaiming laws and regulations. Yet, if a society like ours acts behind the scenes, works for mutual understanding, and tries to bring about that vital harmony of feeling.... then the benefits will be great.... Our group does not intrude in politics. It is completely outside of politics and stands on the practical ground of business.[32]

While still in Seoul on 30 October, Katsura hosted a banquet in the Oriental Society's name. The principal guests were the Korean cabinet, Itō, and new Deputy Resident-General Sone Arasuke. There, he reiterated his hope that the bitterness of the past twenty years would continue to fade. That night, however, returning to his lodging, he collapsed

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[30]On the same day, among others, Yamagata and Ōyama became princes, Matsukata and General Nozu Michitsura became marquises, and Yamamoto Gombei and Komura counts.

[31]Hara, vol. 2, p. 277, entry for 16 December 1907; Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 2, p. 327-28.

[32]Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 298-308, Katsura speech of 7 November 1907. The dating of this speech is obviously suspect given Katsura's alleged illness and return to Japan at the end of October below.

with a recurrence of stomach pains and had to return ahead of schedule to Japan. He remained convalescent until late November, by which time the Oriental Development Company plan was in need of his attention.[33]

The Oriental Development Co. Plan in Committee

The Oriental Society draft did not receive an easy reception at the Japanese finance ministry. Minister Sakatani Yoshirō had his own idea for a development bureau (*takushoku-kyoku*) within the residency-general, capable of handling up to 50,000 migrants per year.[34] This was in direct contradiction of Katsura's statements on the need for government to reduce its prominence in business. In addition, Sakatani was then in conflict over financial policy with Communications Minister Yamagata Isaburō, son of Yamagata Aritomo and, in part, appointed to the cabinet through Katsura's efforts. The effect of the 1907 U.S. depression hit Japan about October 1907, causing the price of raw silk to crash, and over fifty banks to suspend payments between November 1907 and June 1908.[35] Sakatani demanded strict retrenchment to fill the expected one hundred million yen deficit in the 1908 budget, but Yamagata was pushing for extensive railway development costing 134 million yen over twelve years.[36] The dispute and Saionji's apparent passivity caused particular concern to Katsura, Matsukata and Inoue, who would later step in to force a resolution.[37]

In this atmosphere of economic gloom, a new company working in a troubled field, and employing government funds to do so, would obviously have to fight to prove its case. However, criticism of the Oriental Development Company plan now appeared from an unexpected source: Itō Hirobumi. He worried that Korean sensitivities were ignored by the proposal, which gave all senior appointments to Japanese and which made the enterprise solely responsible to Japanese law. His suggestion was to empower the Korean government, backed by the residency-general, to oversee the company's activities within the peninsula; have influential Koreans appointed to major positions; and for the

[33]Details of the speech are from Enkaku, vol. 2, p. 269-72 and Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 329; Hara, vol. 2, p. 271, entry for 25 November 1907.

[34]Kimijima, part 2, *Rekishi Hyōron*, 285, January 1974, p. 47.

[35]Details of this and the Sakatani-Yamagata dispute are in Yamamoto Shirō, "1908 Nendo Yosan Hensei Keii", *Hisutoria*, 84, September 1979.

[36]Banno Junji, *Taishō Seihen*, Kyoto 1982, p. 34, shows Sakatani and Yamagata already arguing over the level of funding for rail nationalisation in mid-1906. Also in 1906, Sakatani had argued heatedly with Army Minister Terauchi over military expenses and Katsura had been forced to mediate, Hirata Tōsuke diary, entries for 27 November-3 December 1906, Katō Fusakura, ed., *Hakushaku Hirata Tōsuke-den*, Tokyo 1927, p. 456-57.

[37]Nakagawa Kojūrō, *Kindai Nihon no Seikyoku to Saionji Kimmochi*, Tokyo 1987, p. 87-88. Katsura ensured army co-operation for the resultant mix of retrenchment and tax rises, Furuya Tetsuo, "Dai Ichi-ji Saionji Naikaku", Hayashi/Tsuji, vol. 2, p. 40-41.

capital to be jointly Japanese-Korean.[38] To increase support, the Oriental Society played host in late December 1907 to a delegation led by the Korean imperial household minister and Agriculture-Commerce Minister Song. At a banquet in their honour on 23 December, Itō publicly defended the prospective company and joined Katsura in repeating their hopes for future Japanese-Korean co-operation.[39]

At the end of December 1907, the Oriental Development Company plan went to cabinet and Katsura continued negotiations both with the government and Itō over points of doubt. However, the dispute between Sakatani and Yamagata Isaburō was now so intense as to threaten the cabinet's future. On 14 January 1908, both ministers resigned, and, to the shock of Katsura and the anger of Yamagata Aritomo, Saionji followed suit.[40] Although Saionji's resignation was rejected by the emperor, some in the Seiyūkai believed Katsura was impatient to take over the premiership.[41] Indeed, Katsura was increasingly critical of Saionji's leadership, writing of the cabinet dispute on 15 January 1908;[42]

> Not once, not twice, errors have arisen, bringing about unprecedented confusion, and it is hard to say where the cabinet is going. However, a complete resignation at this point would only increase confusion and an imperial edict has ordered the cabinet as a whole to remain in office.... Yet, whether on finance, diplomacy, or internal affairs, the cabinet is never completely united. If it continues like this, at what harbour will the ship of state arrive?

Katsura, however, realised that the Seiyūkai dominated the Lower House and he would need their co-operation if he returned to power. He let it be known that he felt excluded by the government and was not inclined to advise Saionji in the future.[43] However, he made it equally clear that he was in no sense breaking completely with the present cabinet. Yet, while Yamagata worried about Saionji's leniency towards socialism, Katsura's main concern was financial policy and his call for a change in direction was echoed by prominent financiers, led by Toyogawa Ryōhei of Mitsubishi.[44] They would welcome Katsura's reappearance at Nagata-chō later in the year.

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[38]Katsura Papers, 52-10, Sone Arasuke letter, 19 January 1908; Kimijima, part 2, p. 48-49.

[39]Kusano, p. 122. The naming of the company as Oriental rather than Korean Development was later explained by its Korean director as designed specifically to avoid rousing public fears in the peninsula, Yamabe Kentarō, *Nihon Tōchi-ka no Chōsen*, Tokyo 1971, p. 25.

[40]Katsura's shock is described by Yamamoto Shirō, p. 55; Yamagata's fury is apparent in Katsura Papers, 70-95, Yamagata letter, 16 January 1908. Yamagata accepted the need for his son, and Sakatani if necessary, to resign, but considered affairs of state demanded the retention of the prime minister.

[41]Hara, vol. 2, p. 284-87, entries for 22-28 January 1908. This belief was strengthened by attacks on the cabinet from the Daidō Club, a group thought to be responsive to Katsura's direction. In fact, the government was attacked by several groups in in January-February 1908, and some later explained their action as a criticism of cabinet weakness in the face of pressure from the oligarchs, Nakagawa, p. 91-94.

[42]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 333-36, Katsura letter to Yamagata Aritomo, 15 January 1908.

[43]Hara, vol. 2, p. 287, entry for 28 January 1908.

[44]Nagashima Ryūji, *Seikai Hiwa*, Tokyo 1928, p. 117. Nagashima described Toyogawa; "He completely disregarded etiquette or formality and he spoke so poorly that no-one ever knew what he meant. There was no-one alive who ever caught more than one-third of what he said."

Despite its internal problems, the Saionji cabinet appointed a committee on the Oriental Development Company bill on 27 January 1908. Katsura envisaged no major obstacle and had already chosen as company president Usagawa Kazumasa, a fellow Chōshū man, head of military affairs in the army ministry since 1902, and formerly military attaché in Seoul.[45] The implications of an overseas development company meant that the committee had a variety of representatives, including Shōda Kazue of the finance ministry, Yamaza Enjirō from foreign affairs, Tsuruhara Sadakichi from the residency-general, and Katsura's own son-in-law, Nagashima Ryūji, as committee secretary.[46] The committee's report was submittee in February 1908 and, while attempting to weave together the various opinions, showed itself sympathetic to Itō.[47] It proposed that one-third of senior company posts be filled by Koreans; influential Koreans from each province be invited as committee members; and the capital be jointly Japanese-Korean. The Korean government was to provide assistance with land purchases and protection for the company's activities. In addition, as agreed in December 1907, both the Japanese and Korean imperial houses were to be shareholders, with the latter exchanging imperial lands for shares. The sticking point remained the company's legal status: Itō had demanded that the Oriental Development Company take account of Korean law and this was supported by the committee's recommendations.

The Oriental Society was aware of fears that the company would swamp Korea with Japanese migrants, and responded by emphasising a gradual approach fully in keeping with Katsura's personal dictum on measured progress;[48]

> The procedure for getting started is as follows. First, give exhaustive consideration to the choice and assessment of land. Make gradual purchases, then further preparations, and decide suitable plans slowly once these preparations are complete. Watch the Korean situation closely and first try agricultural migration on an experimental basis. Move forward slowly and then great results can be expected.

Itō, however, remained unhappy, and much to the surprise of Katsura and Terauchi, continued to oppose the Oriental Development Company proceeding.[49] On 8 March, Katsura returned to Itō for further talks, and followed up by calling on Inoue and

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[45]Katsura Papers, 52-12, Sone Arasuke letter, 14 January 1908, already urges Yoshihara Saburō as a suitable vice-president to Usagawa. This letter is dated 14 October 1908 in the Kenseishiryōshitsu guide to the Katsura papers. However, the *Asahi Shimbun* of 30 March 1908 also reported Usagawa's nomination, Moskowitz, p. 92.

[46]The committee is listed in NGB, vol. 41-2, p. 294; also Kurose, p. 102-05.

[47]Kurose, p. 103, citing Nagashima letter to Shōda, 29 January 1908.

[48]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 930.

[49]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 430, entry for 6 March 1908, describes Itō's attitude as "extremely strange."

Saionji.[50] Itō put his objections in writing on 10 March;[51]

> As long as existing treaties remain unaltered, foreigners cannot openly possess real estate in Korea.... Since the intended company is not recognised as a corporation under Korean law, it cannot openly receive real estate rights in Korea.

This was something which could be attended to before the company was established. However, despite reassurance from the Oriental Society, Itō remained worried that large numbers of Japanese arriving in Korea would spark racial hatreds. Consequently, he urged that;

> The aim of the company should be revised completely. It should move away from the emigration of farmers, and concentrate on the provision of funds for agricultural and land development. Migrant numbers should be limited to those needed for opening up new land and cultivating those lands under the company's charge.

Momentarily, it appeared that the company bill would be delayed beyond the Diet session of March 1908. This would be a serious drawback and Katsura was determined to see matters through. He agreed to revisions, allowing the recruitment of Koreans as settlers and the extension of company loans and supplies to Korean farmers.[52] With this, the bill was presented to the Lower House on 18 March. However, the general attitude was probably summed up by Home Minister Hara Kei when he noted, "it is for the non-political emigration of people to Korea, and, while Katsura and the rest may have other designs, there is no great reason to oppose its general purpose. Also, since the bill has complied with Itō's wishes, there is nothing to do but prepare for its passage through the Diet."[53] This was not quite the "general enthusiasm" for the Oriental Development Company suggested by one writer.[54] Nor was the Japanese press openly supportive, condemning the company as exploitative of Korea, and bitterly criticising the manner in which the government rushed the bill through the Diet on its final day.[55] However, both Houses approved with large majorities, and Itō's comments were reported by British Ambassador MacDonald;[56]

> The bill as passed had very few objectionable features. When first introduced it had many, but he had been instrumental in getting rid of the worst of them. He thought the promoters of the measure meant well, and the objects of the bill were sound, but that much would depend on the manner in which its provisions were put into force. Personally he did not think the measure would result in anything.

Indeed, Katō Takaaki, former minister to London and relative of the Mitsubishi family,

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[50]Katsura Papers, Inoue Kaoru letter, 8 March 1908; *Terauchi*, p. 431, entry for 11 March 1908. Inoue's letter is not listed in the guide to Katsura's papers, but does appear in the Kyū Kizokuin Gojūnenshi.

[51]Katsura Papers, 18-31, Itō Hirobumi letter, 10 March 1908. A summary of the letter is given in Conroy, p. 483-84.

[52]Moskowitz, p. 92.

[53]Hara, vol. 2, p. 298, entry for 21 March 1908.

[54]Moskowitz, p. 89.

[55]F.O. 410/51, Claude MacDonald (Tokyo) to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, 11 April 1908.

[56]F.O. 410/51, MacDonald above.

was even more scathing, telling MacDonald that he;[57]

> Condemned the measure, but added that I need have no fear as to the ill results it would cause in Korea, for it would never get that far. He cynically remarked: Why should it? The government guarantee good interest on the capital; the Directors will be satisfied to draw their dividends and do nothing.

As finally passed, the Oriental Development Company bill provided for Japanese government subsidies of 300,000 yen per annum over eight years. This would be reduced if the company's dividends surpassed eight per-cent of paid-up capital. Any dividend over ten per-cent would be repaid to the government. The aims of the company remained as originally proposed: agricultural emigration, with approximately two hectares of paddy field, one hectare of dry field, and a dwelling, to be supplied to an an estimated three-person family unit; direct land enterprise, including wasteland development, construction of dikes, drains, forestation and pasturage; and supply of soft loans for Japanese and Korean farmers. The company intended to work particularly hard to promote group, rather than individual, migration, and this was a point reinforced by Katsura.

Commenting on the successful passage of the bill in the *Tōyō Jihō*, Komatsubara Eitarō repeated the need for caution;[58]

> If you go too fast, you naturally invite failure. We must proceed slowly and purchase land with the accord of the Korean people. There will be no case whatsoever of a Korean farmer being driven from his land. The company's intention is to create a hamlet of Japanese-Korean co-operation and improve our mutual happiness.

As a deterrent to those with expectations of a quick profit at Korea's expense, Komatsubara stated that losses could be expected in the first years. Katsura also warned against optimism by noting;[59]

> There are not a few among the deeply suspicious Koreans who jump to the wrong conclusion and believe Japanese are coming to steal their land. If such misunderstanding gets in the way of development, it will cause grave difficulties.

Anticipation of these difficulties implies that the men actually involved in planning the Oriental Development Company were far from naive as Karl Moskowitz suggests. Nor were they seeking a pretext to increase Japanese troops numbers, and consequently their own influence, in Korea.[60] Initial Korean opposition was unavoidable given the furore

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[57]F.O. 410/51, MacDonald above.

[58]*Tōyō Jihō*, 115, April 1908.

[59]*Tōyō Jihō*, 116, May 1908.

[60]c.f. the extraordinary statement by Moskowitz, p. 89, that the Yamagata-Katsura group wished to create further disturbances in Korea to undermine Itō's civilian rule, but were being thwarted as, "The forces under Itō's command were successfully quelling the uprisings, but growing resentment against Japanese actions, including the wholesale abuse of the populace in putting down disturbances, was adding to the number of insurgents and increasing the frequency of incidents. The only areas that were completely safe for Japanese civilians were in centers where there were permanent garrisons." Clearly the success of Itō's forces was not absolute.

over the 1904 Nagamori scheme, and, by the spring of 1908, similar fears had already provoked Korean opposition to the Oriental Development Company plan. In May, Deputy Resident-General Sone returned specifically to impress this point on Katsura.[61] Certainly the so-called Japanese militarists had no need of pretexts to increase forces in the peninsula. Itō himself had returned to Japan early in April 1908 with a request for more troops to combat the rising guerrilla violence. Katsura had written in support. At the same time, he reassured Itō that the Oriental Development Company would co-operate fully with the residency-general, and ordered president-to-be Usagawa to consult Itō on all matters during his inspection of Korean conditions in May.[62] By the end of May, the residency-general, Japanese government, and Oriental Society, had reached general agreement on the company and the committee to bring it into being was in the process of assembly.[63] Meanwhile, Katsura sought to reaffirm Korean government support by inviting, through Itō, all members of the Yi cabinet to join the Oriental Society. The offer was accepted in full on 16 June.[64]

Although the company was moving towards realisation, dissatisfaction with the Saionji administration was building to a climax. Yamagata was appalled by unrestricted socialist display in the capital and personally complained to the emperor.[65] Katsura, Inoue, and Matsukata, however, were critical of the government's financial strategy. In May 1908, Katsura railed at the cabinet's weakness and passivity;[66]

> In my view, present financial policy will cause far more difficulties than all the diplomatic unpreparedness. On top of this, those in charge of financial policy continue to err in their actions, and that no-one has the strength to unify them will add to the problems.

The Seiyūkai won a resounding victory in the general election of May 1908, but Itō, Inoue, and Katsura had already concluded in the preceeding spring that Katsura should

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[61]F.O. 410/51, MacDonald to Grey, 11 May 1908. Sone also confided to MacDonald that much of the wasteland intended to be reclaimed by the ODC was already serving a useful purpose as grazing land for oxen and timber for fuel. He intended to warn Katsura that replacement planting of edible grasses for fuel and fodder should be undertaken before the company began operating.

[62]Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 3, p. 374-75, Katsura letters to Itō, 12 May 1908, 26 May 1908.

[63]*Tōyō Jihō*, 117, June 1908; *Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 375, Katsura letter to Itō, 20 June 1908. In return for accepting Korean law, the Oriental Society attempted to win some concessions for the company, including exemption from certain Korean taxes and charges, Kimijima, part 2, p. 49. However, as Hara Kei told the Society on 17 April 1908, "The implementation of the company is now out of Oriental Society hands and is the responsibility of the government," Hara, vol. 2, p. 303, entry for 17 April 1908.

[64]Katsura Papers, 18-33, Itō letter, 17 June 1908; *Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 375, Katsura letter of thanks, 20 June 1908.

[65]Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1958, p. 105.

[66]*Ito Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 374, Katsura letter, 12 May 1908. See also p. 375, Katsura letter, 20 June 1908, and Hara, vol. 2, p. 306-07, entry for 29 May 1908.

succeed to the premiership.[67] Accordingly, in June, Katsura retreated to his villa at Hayama and waited on events, certain that the wait would be brief.

On 4 July, Saionji resigned. Four days later Itō cabled from Seoul his approval of Katsura as the new prime minister, and the second Katsura cabinet was inaugurated on 14 July 1908.

Katsura and the Restoration of Stability: The Second Premiership

Surprising the public, which had only the one example of Matsukata in 1892, Katsura took on the dual role of premier and finance minister.[68] However, this was not unusual given Katsura's increasingly obvious conviction that economics lay at the root of all major problems. The service ministers were Terauchi and Saitō Minoru (victim of the 1936 Ni Ni Roku incident), remaining for the army and navy respectively. Katsura brought in Hirata Tōsuke as home minister, Komatsubara Eitarō for education, and introduced Gotō Shimpei to cabinet position as minister for communications. Former Oriental Development Company committee head, Okabe Nagamoto, was appointed law minister, while Komura Jutarō returned from London to resume foreign affairs.

In his early years, Katsura had emphasised military expansion overseas as the way to guarantee international respect and strengthen the base for national prosperity. However, the experience of Taiwan showed that military considerations could not be separated from economic reality. Yet, as Taiwan again showed, investors needed to be cajoled by such as the Taiwan Society, and then cossetted by strong government support, to make a colony pay. In 1908, Katsura made it very clear that he intended to restore Japan's financial stability, even in the face of military demands or Diet opposition. He outlined his policy based on retrenchment, with some government concerns such, as foundries and printeries, being shifted to private hands, increased repayment of outstanding loans, and no raised taxes.[69] This policy was far from unwelcome in the Lower House and was essentially the same as that later proposed by Ōishi Masami's group in the Kenseihontō. It did, however, meet with Seiyūkai criticism and Katsura had

[67]Hara, vol. 2, p. 309, entry for 29 June 1908. The initial scene for the talks was a reception to mark the opening of Itō's villa at Omori, a gift from the emperor, and then while the three accompanied the crown prince on a visit to Yamaguchi province.

[68]Hara, vol. 2, p. 311, entry for 14 July 1908, shows Hara wondering whether Katsura is not just filling in until Sone can be appointed.

[69]Wakatsuki Reijirō, *Kofūan Kaikoroku*, 2nd. ed., Tokyo 1975, p. 135.

to spend time in negotiation before the Diet approved the 1909 budget.[70]

Katsura also worked to assure business support for his administration by cultivating a particularly close relationship with Mitsubishi's Toyogawa Ryōhei, and had already in March 1908 restored the Unagi Society (lit. Eel Society) as a relaxed forum for business-government discussion.[71] Katsura treated the businessmen as confidants, even speaking candidly on secret matters such as treaty reform, and thereby gained their trust.[72] He took pains to ensure they understood his financial policy, drawn up in the spring of 1908, discussed with Toyogawa in advance, and shown to prospective cabinet ministers whose agreement was a condition for appointment, thus guaranteeing cabinet support for its implementation.[73] Katsura made a similar effort to improve relations with the public, a not unnatural step following the Hibiya incident. In this he was partnered by *Kokumin Shimbun* editor Tokutomi Sohō, working from a specially-created office, the Benkyōkan, which distributed press releases on government policy, and collated public and press attitudes towards the administration.[74] However, the liberal newspapers pointed to the retention of the so-called "three evil taxes", on salt, textiles, and freight, as evidence of Katsura's bourgeois orientation and remained critical opponents.[75] Undoubtedly Katsura was inclined towards business interests, but it as well to repeat the idea of the time, an idea with renewed strength late in the twentieth century, that business was for the general good. Katsura was willing to spend where he believed it would reap a profit, and offered further subsidies to shipping companies for new routes. He he also took unpopular decisions, including the five-year postponement of the Tokyo Exposition for 1912, a

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[70]In January 1909, Saionji urged a fair and restrained response from the party to the government's budget, but the Seiyūkai, in Katsura's words, "attacked everything down to minute matters and I often feel that all major problems are rooted in the parties with the state as secondary." Katsura letter to Inoue Kaoru, 8 February 1909, quoted, Uno, p. 64. See also Katsura's letter to Yamagata Aritomo, 6 February 1909, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 382-84. A picture of Katsura's negotiations with the Seiyūkai at a later point in this cabinet is given by Wakatsuki, p. 136-37. Wakatsuki would go to Hara and Matsuda Masahisa to explain that the prime minister wished to see them. Hara would ponder awhile, and then ask Matsuda, "Well, shall we go and see?" During the talks, Hara would counter everything Katsura said by asserting the opposite. Matsuda would remain silent. Katsura would repeat the government's position time and again, until, eventually, Hara would say, "Well then, maybe we'll just go back and consult everyone", to which Matsuda would reply, "Hmm, this is a difficult question." They would then leave, with all present recognising that matters had essentially been decided. Wakatsuki describes this as "an interesting spectacle."

[71]Uzaki Kumakichi. *Toyogawa Ryōhei*, Tokyo 1922, p. 194, gives the original Unagi Society as 1889. A list of frequent participants is given by Maejima Shōzō, *Meiji no Genkun-tachi*, Tokyo 1967, p. 175-76. It includes Asabuki Eiji of Mitsui, Shōda Heigorō of Mitsubishi, Kondō Rempei of the Japan Steamship Company (N.Y.K.), Masuda Takashi of Mitsui, Matsuo Shinzen of the Bank of Japan, and Takahashi Korekiyo of the Specie Bank.

[72]Wakatsuki p. 158-60. Wakatsuki attended the meetings as Katsura's vice finance minister. See also Yamamoto Hirofumi et al, ed., *Kindai Nihon Keizaishi*, Tokyo 1980, p. 88.

[73]Nagashima Ryūji, *Seikai Hiwa*, Tokyo 1928, p. 120.

[74]John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō: A Journalist for Modern Japan, 1857-1953*, Princeton 1980, p. 297.

[75]Maejima, p. 180-81.

project of considerable Japanese prestige.[76]

The Meiji leadership saw Japan's apparent economic decline during the post-war years as exacerbating socialism and "decadence". The Katsura cabinet attacked the problem with what might be called a policy of "rich nation, strong minds." Katsura worked on Japan's financial instability, while Education Minister Komatsubara asked writers to produce "edifying" literature, and Home Minister Hirata led a campaign for moral re-armament following the Boshin edict of October 1908.[77] Hirata also continued his earlier work in promoting agricultural co-operatives and local reform. Katsura backed these moves, and, at graduation ceremonies for the Oriental Society School, repeatedly told the students that graduation did not suddenly exempt them from rules; rather, they were to abide by society's code, and "the meaning of the imperial edict on education should never leave your minds even though you part from study."[78]

One means to alleviate population pressure and aid Japan's economy was to enhance Korea's profitability. This made the Oriental Development Company even more urgent. Soon after taking office, Katsura had the law on the Oriental Development Company promulgated. He also set up an establishment committee of eighty-three Japanese and thirty-three Koreans under the chairmanship of Shibusawa Eiichi.[79]

Although matters could be expected to move swiftly under a Katsura administration, with 13,000 more Japanese military police *en route* to deal with the Korean guerrillas, some feared that this was not the time for large-scale emigration.[80] However, the Oriental Society had already made it clear they intended the company to proceed gradually. Indeed, it was hoped the activities of the Oriental Development Company would serve to improve relations between the Japanese and Korean peoples, so there was no suggestion of holding it in abeyance until the situation quieted.

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[76]Nakagawa, p. 115, notes press criticism of Katsura for avoiding consultation over this decision. Nonetheless, Yamamoto et al, p. 89, suggests that Katsura's retrenchment policies did serve to ease the general depression.

[77]In essence, the edict called for industrious, loyal citizens of good morality.

[78]Katsura speech, 13 April 1911, *Tōyō Jihō*, 151, April 1911. On the contemporary social problems and attempted government remedies, see Kenneth Pyle, "The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900-1918", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 33-1, November 1973; Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton 1985; Oka Yoshitake, "Generational Conflict After the Russo-Japanese War", Tetsuo Najita/J. Victor Koschmann, ed., *Conflict in Modern Japanese History*, N.J. 1982; Uno Shunichi, "Dai Ni-ji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi/Tsuji, vol. 2; Katō, *Hirata-den*, p. 126-28; Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals: Writers and the Meiji State*, Seattle 1984.

[79]From these a standing committee was appointed of nine Japanese and three Koreans, including Vice Finance Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō, O.D.C. President-elect Usagawa Kazumasa, Professor Matsuzaki Kuranosuke of the Imperial University and Oriental Society, Kiuchi Jūshirō of the residency-general, and Han Sang-ryong, director-general of the Hanyang Bank in Korea. Katsura's son-in-law Nagashima Ryūji and Kodama Hideo served as committee secretaries. The committee is listed in full in Kurose, p. 110.

[80]See the article "Colonization in Korea", in *North China Herald*, 19 September 1908; and *Taehan Hyŏphoe*, September 1908, cited in Kimijima, part 2, p. 52.

On 12 September 1908, the Korean committee men arrived at Shimbashi station to be met by a large delegation of Oriental Society members. They were given a tour of Japanese concerns, including the Agricultural College at Komaba, the Japanese Beer Company, Bank of Japan, and, perhaps as a reminder, Japan's military arsenal and Yokosuka shipyard.[81] At a full committee meeting in the prime ministerial residence on 24 September, Itō Hirobumi spoke on the need for co-prosperity, and, while admitting his earlier opposition to the company, now professed himself satisfied, and hoped that large numbers of Japanese arriving in Korea would invigorate the economy, benefit the Korean government through payment of their taxes, and, perhaps most tellingly, relieve the financial burden on Japan. Itō noted the suspicion of many Koreans regarding the company, and warned that a single error could have untold consequences between the two states, but, in an effort to reassure his listeners, he affirmed that "the spirit of Japan's protectorate of Korea is fixed and will be unchanged regardless of who is resident-general."[82]

The Oriental Development Company was finally established in December 1908 with its head office in Tokyo and a branch office in Seoul. Company president, as decided long before, was Lieutenant-General Usagawa Kazumasa. Deputy presidents were Yoshihara Saburō, vice home minister in the first Katsura cabinet, and Min Yŏng-gi, an intimate of Korean prime minister Yi Wan-yong, and himself formerly holder of the posts of finance, agriculture-industry, and army minister.[83] Following a garden party at the Kyŏngbok palace the following April, Usagawa prepared a statement on the company's aims for general distribution, emphasising its intent to work within Japanese and Korean law and under the supervision of both governments, to establish model farms, irrigation works, seedling nurseries, import Japanese farmers to show the Koreans new methods, and take categorically "no steps resembling coercion" over land rights.[84]

However, there remained strong doubts as to the company's viability. Prior to its

[81] *Tōyō Jihō*, 120, September 1908.

[82] Komatsu Midori, ed., *Itō Kō Zenshū*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1922, vol. 2, p. 467-72, speech of 24 September 1908. Karl Moskowitz chooses to interpret this final statement as an admonition to Katsura against altering Itō's policies. This interpretation is based on the alleged rivalry between Itō and the "Yamagata-Katsura" group for control of Korean policy. It will already be clear that the present author does not share this view.

[83] The directors of the company were Iwasa Teizō of the Bank of Japan, Han Sang-ryong of the Hanyang Bank, Inoue Kōsai, governor of Saga prefecture, and Hayashi Ichizō, governor of Mie prefecture. Company inspectors were Viscount Matsudaira Naohira from the House of Peers, Noda Utarō, one of Katsura's major contacts with the Seiyūkai and a later vice-president of the ODC, from the Representatives, and Cho Jin-t'ae head of the Seoul Chamber of Commerce. The various appointments are listed in *Itō Monjo*, vol. 3, p. 377, Katsura Tarō letter, 20 December 1908; *Tōyō Jihō*, December 1908; Kimijima, part 2, p. 55.

[84] F.O. 410/53, Arthur Hyde Lay (Seoul) to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, 14 May 1909, quotes from the Usagawa statement.

establishment, the British ambassador had heard from businessmen on the organising committee;[85]

> It is a most unbusiness-like undertaking. They say it was only owing to the personal request made by Marquis Katsura that they consented to serve on the organising committee and put up the capital. As soon as the shares are placed on the market and the public take them up, which, as the government practically guarantee 6%, they will certainly do, the bankers and the businessmen will take their money out.... I think he (Katsura) honestly believes in the ultimate success of the scheme, but, so far, I have not met anybody else who does.

The loan flotation in Japan was a tremendous success, but, as with the earlier South Manchurian Railway Company, the response in the country of operation was slight. In Korea, there were only 88,545 shares purchased, 58,509 of these in Seoul alone.[86] In a speech to Korean visitors of the Oriental Society in April 1909, Itō claimed that the Japanese-Korean relationship differed from the usual "open door" of equal opportunity for all comers; "between us there is no door.... we are one family."[87] However, few Koreans shared this sentiment and would gladly have closed all doors on the the Oriental Development Company.[88] Moreover, as Sone Arasuke and later Usagawa himself admitted, the Koreans were formidable farmers of dry land on which the Japanese could offer no competition.[89] The hesitant beginning led to Diet criticism in Tokyo as well. In March 1910, Kurahara Korehiro attacked the Oriental Development Company in the Lower House for ninety minutes, complaining that no other enterprise in the world, with the exception of the South Manchurian Railway Company and old East India Company, was engaged in such diverse undertakings, and yet had such indecision regarding its business policy.[90]

The company received applications to emigrate from 1,235 Japanese families in 1910. Of these, however, and in line with the company's gradualist policy, only 160 were accepted.[91] Thereafter, applications increased to a peak of 3,472 in 1914, before falling to an average of around 1,400 per year up to 1922, and dropping to just a few hundred for

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[85]F.O. 410/52, MacDonald to Grey, 4 October 1908.

[86]Kimijima, part 2, p. 54. He suggests this poor response may have been due to Korean antipathy and a lack of understanding about shares as such.

[87]Komatsu, vol. 2, p. 494-95, speech of 23 April 1909.

[88]Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Kojong Sidaesa*, 6 vols., Seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 838, Yi Yong-sik, a self-appointed spokesman for Korean conservatives and education minister from October 1909, specifically demanded the abolition of the company in a list of grievances to the Japanese government in April 1909.

[89]F.O. 410/53 Lay to Grey, 8 April 1909; F.O. 410/55, MacDonald to Grey, 1 April 1910.

[90]Kurahara also noted the hopelessness of migration given the frugality and skill of Korean farmers, and derided Lieutenant-General Usagawa as unsuitable for a company president. Repeating a popular view, he suggested that Katsura had planned the company merely to undercut Itō's influence in Korea. F.O. 410/55, MacDonald to Grey, 1 April 1910, reports at length on the Kurahara speech. Despite the above attack, he would later join Katsura's Dōshikai.

[91]Figures taken from Yūhō Kyōkai, ed., *Shiryō Senshū Tōyō Takushoku Kaisha*, Tokyo 1976, p. 179-80, 191-92. A partial list of family applicants and those accepted is given by Conroy, p. 483. Conroy also notes that forty-five of the accepted families chose not to stay in Korea.

the years 1923-26. In 1928, the Oriental Development Company abandoned recruitment of emigrants and in later years depended increasingly on land purchase, becoming Korea's biggest landlord. From 1917, under the Terauchi cabinet, it was legally allowed to enter into Manchuria and opened branches in Mukden and Dalien. Thenceforth, it expanded its enterprises across a vast scale, including mining, fishing, oil prospecting, electricity production, transport, storage, textiles, salt manufacture, South Seas migration, and even the despatch of migrants to the Amazon basin.[92] The company was finally dissolved by the allied occupation authorities in 1945.

The problem with emigration to Korea was perhaps, as one scholar suggests, that the Japanese and Koreans farmers simply did not like each other.[93] However, the intention of the company's progenitors was to experiment. The Oriental Development Company was designed to ease social discontent at home, redirect Japanese migrants away from north America, and stimulate the Korean economy. However, by the time it began operation, Japanese policy had already turned towards annexation of Korea.

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[92]A list of the company's involvements and investments is given in Yūhō Kyōkai, p. 160-65.

[93]Kim Hyun-kil, *Land Use Policy in Korea: With Special Reference to the Oriental Development Company*, unpub. Ph. D., University of Washington 1971, p. 71.

Chapter 11

RESTORING ORDER OVERSEAS 1908-1910

In so far as Japanese overseas expansion was a form of social imperialism, aimed at relieving the social and economic burdens of industrialisation, it was imperative for Katsura to resolve international conflicts incurred by that expansion if he were to solve the nation's financial and spiritual troubles. That he was aware of this is shown by the lengthy memorandum, explicitly linking domestic and diplomatic issues, which he brought with him upon resumption of the premiership.[1] The problems were considerable. At the time of his resignation in 1906, Japan had an amicable arrangement with President Roosevelt over Pacific affairs, an agreement with Beijing over Manchurian rights, new protectorate authority over Korea, and a renewed alliance with Britain. By July 1908, there was loose talk on both sides of the Pacific regarding a Japanese-U.S. war, Japan was the focus of militant Chinese nationalism, and Korea was a battlefield as Japanese troops fought Korean guerrillas.[2] The decline in Japan's international reputation was obvious, and for the ageing leaders of the Meiji state, having grown up in uncertainty and hope, now there was only uncertainty. As the quote from Bruno Bettelheim in the introduction indicates, such uncertainty renders a state inherently unstable. However, if the intended cure of industrial growth and overseas expansion only created its own troubles, and Japan lacked the strength to take ever greater stretches of foreign territory, then compromises would have to be made, and it would be Katsura who would have to make them.

The two most enduring problems of Meiji diplomacy were treaty revision and the status of Korea. No final decision on Korea would be taken until 1909, and the question of treaty revision, now reduced to tariff autonomy, was not due for discussion until 1911. In 1908, Katsura's memorandum on foreign policy took as its departure point a

[1]Katsura's policy paper, circa July 1908, is in Tokutomi Sohō, ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 2, p. 341-58.

[2]For Japanese-American talk of war, see Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, Seattle 1966, p. 188, and Eleanor Tupper/George McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion*, N.Y. 1937, p. 42-43. Charles Denby, whose remarks on Japan at the end of the Sino-Japanese war have been quoted earlier, was one of those working to fuel rumours of war with Japan.

reaffirmation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.[3] Despite the British public's growing antipathy toward Japan, he personally reassured the British ambassador that, "as long as he was in power, indeed, so long as he lived - for when he was not in the government, he was behind it - his guiding policy would be a close alliance and friendship on every point and at every turn with Great Britain."[4] This made sense in so far as both Katsura and the British took a non-ideological business view of diplomacy. Japan and Britain had originally become allies in response to Russia's ambitions, but had simultaneously come to a *rapprochement* with Russia in 1907. With the European situation unstable, and the Ch'ing regime threatened by revolutionary forces, it was in their mutual interest to relax tensions further. Katsura was determined to build on this *rapprochement*, and told Ambassador MacDonald that he was "very keen to establish friendly relations with Russia and evidently is most anxious that we should do the same, Germany he thoroughly distrusts."[5] This attitude should be remembered concerning Katsura's own European tour in 1912. In late 1908, however, the two most urgent questions were relations with the United States and China.

Walking Softly: Japan and the U.S.

Theodore Roosevelt used to define his diplomacy as walking softly, but carrying a big stick. His drive to make America strong at home and overseas alarmed the Japanese who feared they might become the bogy of American expansion. As Katsura wrote;[6]

> Despite friendly relations since Perry, does America not warn us every day about arms, industry and commerce. If we do not take real precautions.... who can say that treaties and agreements will not turn into so much waste paper?

Indeed, the immigration issue had produced a situation by 1907 where U.S. representatives were quietly asking whether Britain would side with Japan in a war with

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[3]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 346.

[4]F.O. 410/53, MacDonald (Tokyo) to Grey, 14 May 1909. In 1908, Katsura was described as "very pro-English and a staunch supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of which he declares himself to be the agitator," F.O. 371/471, MacDonald to Grey, 14 July 1908. MacDonald, like Katsura a former soldier and colonial administrator, also claimed, "There are few Japanese for whom I have so great a personal regard." F.O. 371/471, MacDonald to Grey, 20 July 1908.

[5]F.O. 800/68, Edward Grey Papers, MacDonald to Grey, 17 May 1909. F.O. 410/53, MacDonald to Grey, 14 May 1909, also describes Katsura as "straining every nerve to get on the friendliest terms with Russia". When the Russo-Japanese agreement came in mid-1910, Foreign Secretary Grey did greet it as it "confirmed good relations between Russia and Japan, and thereby afforded the greatest possible security for the maintenance of peace in the Far East," F.O. 410/56, Grey to Arthur Nicolson (St. Petersburg), 6 July 1910.

[6]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 341.

America.[7] Roosevelt's pledge not to stand for re-election in 1908 meant that a new president was guaranteed in the early months of the Katsura administration. Then as now, this was a disquieting time for Japanese policymakers, and Katsura moved quickly to solve at least the question of Japanese migrants while Roosevelt remained in office. He recognised the need to dispel American suspicions of Japan regarding the Philippines, and to redirect Japanese migrants to Asia and South America. The Oriental Development Company was already in the final stages of establishment, and, in 1913, Katsura would help found an emigration company for Brazil. Immediately after reappointment as premier, Katsura cabled Roosevelt that he would restrict the flow of migrants to north America and work for better relations.[8] He also ensured a brilliant welcome for the U.S. Great White Fleet, arriving at Yokohama on 18 October 1908. American press opinion was acutely sensitive to the fleet's reception, but, with direction from Tokyo, this was so ebulliently friendly that newspapers around America expressed renewed favour towards Japan.[9]

Immediately after the U.S. fleet visit, Katsura reactivated a proposal made by Aoki Shūzō during his period as minister in Washington D.C. for a joint Japanese-American communique, unspecific in content, but resonant with goodwill.[10] Roosevelt was agreeable and, despite the arrival of Chinese emissary T'ang Shao-yi with hopes of

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[7]F.O. 410/50, Sir Arthur Nicholson (St. Petersburg) to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, 19 January 1907, quotes the U.S. ambassador's enquiry as to whether, "in the event of hostilities eventually breaking out between the United States and Japan over the difficulties in California, Great Britain would be bound by her treaty to actively side with Japan." Roosevelt's attitude towards Japan oscillated between friendship and anger. In 1908 he was heard to say;

> There might be war within a very short time.... The Japanese must learn that they will have to keep their people in their own country.... We have allowed these people to go too far through being too polite to them, and I made up my mind some time ago that they were simply taking advantage of our politeness.

F.O. 371/471, undated, circa February 1908, memo. of MacKenzie King report. On the Japanese immigrant question, Esthus, p. 128-49; Charles Neu, *An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-09*, Camb. Mass. 1967.

[8]Gaimushō, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (hereafter NGB), vol. 41-2, p. 662, Acting Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake to Minister Takahira (Washington D.C.), 17 July 1908; Esthus, p. 166. Katsura also personally briefed Nitobe Inazō, visiting the U.S. about this time as an exchange professor, on Japan's policy in Manchuria to ensure American understanding, Nitobe, *Ijin Gunzō*, Tokyo 1931, p. 318.

[9]Robert Hart, *The Great White Fleet*, Boston 1965, p. 228-29, "The (Japanese) people, as well as the government, had put themselves out to such an extent that flabbergasted the Americans and left them in awe of their own popularity." Tupper/McReynolds, p. 44, quotes the *New York Post* report, "Towards the close of the reception.... The Japanese admirals and captains raised Ambassador O'Brien on their shoulders and marched around the deck with him, everybody on board cheering wildly. The same performance was repeated with Rear-Admiral Sperry, and each of the other American Admirals present." One wonders how the Americans would have reacted had the Rear-Admiral been accidentally dropped overboard.

[10]In October 1907, Aoki proposed the two nations declare their mutual friendship and accord over matters in the Pacific and China. Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu was infuriated that Aoki had not consulted him before suggesting the idea, and also criticised the plan on the grounds that a declaration which ignored immigration would solve nothing and merely emphasise the strain in relations. At that time, Hayashi had consulted Itō and Katsura, both then in Seoul, and received their support for his stance, Hayashi Tadasu, *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*, London 1915, p. 241-42; Itō memorandum, 6 November 1907, quoted Nakayama Jiichi, "Tai-Man Seisaku ni okeru Saionji-Hayashi Rosen kara Katsura-Komura Rosen e no Tenkai", *Shirin*, 45-6, November 1962, p. 35-38; Esthus, p. 206-11. Part of Itō's opposition to Aoki concerned the German kaiser's attempt to rouse the Chinese and American peoples against Japan. He believed that Aoki, known as a Germanophile, was not the best man to have in Washington D.C.

raising U.S. interest in Manchuria to counter Japan, the Root-Takahira agreement was signed on 30 November 1908. This guaranteed mutual respect for each other's possessions, free and peaceful development in the Pacific, Chinese territorial safety and independence, and the maintenance of the "open door" therein. It was followed in February 1909 by a further sign of goodwill to the incoming administration of William Howard Taft. Just one month before Taft's inauguration, Foreign Minister Komura told Japan's House of Representatives;[11]

> As a result of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's position is completely changed and the area under our control expanded. It has become necessary that our people, instead of scattering themselves at random in distant foreign lands, should be concentrated in the region of the Far East so as to secure their united and concordant efforts for carrying on those legitimate activities.

Soon after, the Japanese government also began discussion of a press office in San Francisco, under the discreet control of the minister to Washington D.C.. This was to employ official materials to rebut false reports, make Japan's true intentions known to American politicians, businessmen, and the public, and also survey U.S. opinion on Japan.[12]

All this activity, however, had only limited effect. The State of California remained unwelcoming to Japanese migrants, while writers such as Thomas Millard, author of *America and the Far Eastern Question*, continued to sound warnings against Japanese ambition. In addition, the Taft administration would take a strong and, to Japan, disturbing policy in Manchuria under the new Secretary of State, Philander Knox.[13]

Philander Knox is known as the exponent of "dollar diplomacy". The ideological basis of this policy was, he wrote, that, "True stability is best established not by military, but by economic and social forces.... The problem of good government is inextricably interwoven with that of economic prosperity and sound finance; financial stability contributes perhaps more than any one factor to political stability."[14] In 1908, Katsura would have agreed entirely with this sentiment. However, the Japanese leadership had

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[11]F.O. 410/53, MacDonald to Grey, 5 April 1909, quotes from Komura's speech; also Shinobu Jumpei, *Komura Jutarō*, Tokyo 1942, p. 260.

[12]Katsura Papers, 70-156, Yamagata Aritomo letter, 12 May 1909.

[13]Knox was described by one observer as, "short, fat and benevolent, and his nephews and nieces call him Uncle Cupid. But he is peppery," F.O. 800/248, Sir Beilby Alston Papers, Mitchell Innes (Washington D.C.) to Francis Campbell, 2 November 1910. In Asian matters, Knox was influenced by the new Undersecretary of State, F. Huntington Wilson, who, as charge d'affaires in Tokyo during 1906, had written constantly of Japanese impediments to American economic interests in Manchuria. Wilson's autobiography from 1945 is severe on the Japanese as might be expected. By his own admission, however, these views were already in place when he arrived as Tokyo legation secretary in 1897. Seeing Foreign Minister Okuma's verbal protest against America's threat to annex Hawaii, Wilson recalled, "This struck me at the time as being so impudent it was almost funny." Wilson, *Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat*, Boston 1945, p. 52.

[14]Quoted Joseph Fry, "In Search of an Orderly World: U.S. Imperialism, 1898-1912", John Carroll/George Herring, ed., *Modern American Diplomacy*, Wilmington 1986, p. 15.

convinced itself that access to Manchuria was essential for Japan's own financial, and consequently social, stability. This clashed with American visions of a new economic El Dorado in Manchuria and a Chinese market four hundred million strong.[15] As Willard Straight, former American Consul at Mukden, and helpmate of T'ang Shao-yi, explained;[16]

> With us the White Man's Burden is to save China from herself as much as from the predatory peoples from the East and North. Save her, that we altruists may reap the profit of her development ourselves, for in the last analysis that (is is not?) is what our philanthropy means.

The Taft administration had already forced its way into a European consortium for the Hankow-Szechuan railway, thus preventing the Europeans from confronting China with a united front. In late 1909, a similar move was made in Manchuria.[17] In September of that year, Japan and China had finally resolved outstanding problems in Manchuria. This affirmed Japan's position in the region and the U.S. State Department concluded that the "open door" principle was under threat.[18] Straight was working with allies of Yuan Shih-k'ai to build a line in Manchuria from Chinchow to Aigun and so rival Japan's South Manchurian Railway.[19] In November 1909, however, Secretary Knox proposed something more radical: that Russia and Japan be invited to sell their respective Manchurian railways back to China, and that an international syndicate, having provided Beijing with the funds for this purchase, would then manage the lines until the loan was repaid. There would be, wrote Knox, an "economic, scientific and impartial administration" of Manchuria's railways and, in his eyes;[20]

> The advantages of such a plan to Japan and to Russia are obvious. Both those Powers desiring in good faith to protect the policy of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria and wishing to assure to China unimpaired sovereignty might well be

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[15]Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door*, New Haven 1973, p. 187, quotes Knox writing on 15 September 1909, "There is no doubt that the construction of (Manchurian) railways to any considerable extent will be attended by enormous internal development, and that the further introduction into the Far East of the methods and improvements of Western civilisation will present countless commercial opportunities to American manufacturers and capitalists." The lure of the potential Chinese market never died, as is shown Carl Crow's 1937 publication *450 Million Customers*, and the American soft drinks executive in the 1980s who gushed over the potential profit if every Chinese bought just one bottle of his product per year.

[16]Bland Papers, draft memoir, ch. 1, p. 8, Straight letter, February 1908.

[17]For European and U.S. policy on Chinese railways see the chapter by E.W. Edwards, in F.H. Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*, Cambridge 1977, and his *British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895-1914*, Oxford 1987.

[18]Hunt, p. 205, quotes E.C. Baker's memorandum, dated 7 October 1909, "A protest on the part of the United States at this time would doubtless check Japan in her present policy of penetration and absorption of Manchuria."

[19]The allies of Yuan were Viceroy of Manchuria Hsi-liang and former Viceroy Hsu Shih-ch'ang. Bland Papers, letter from Lord ffrench (Pauling and Company), 6 October 1909, shows the contract being opposed by Na-t'ung, then thought to be the principal ally of Japan in Beijing.

[20]Knox telegram to London, 6 November 1909, included in W.W. Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. A note from 13 December 1909 in the Rockhill papers cites an interview between an Associated Press correspondent and Russian Finance Minister Kokotsov to the effect that Russia would consider sale of her Manchurian railways. However, with respect to Japan, Sir Edward Grey thought the idea ill-timed and inconsiderate of legitimate interests deriving from the treaty of Portsmouth, see Ian Nish, "Great Britain, Japan and North-East Asia, 1905-1911", in Hinsley, p. 354.

expected to welcome an opportunity to shift the separate duties, responsibilities and expenses they have undertaken in the protection of their respective commercial and other interests.

During the Russo-Japanese war, Itō Hirobumi had suggested that lasting peace could only be had by Japan returning Manchuria to China and the railways there being placed under international control.[21] In Itō's opinion, Japan neither wanted Manchuria nor could she afford to garrison troops there on an indefinite basis. Consequently, he had welcomed the Harriman plan of 1905. That Katsura shared some of Itō's concern was evident from his own response to Harriman. However, since then, Japan had ploughed a heavy furrow in Manchuria. Katsura believed that Japanese businessman in the area depended on the South Manchurian Railway for protection, and this could not be guaranteed if Japan lost overall control. To sell out to a consortium might only produce greater friction in northeast China, and, given Japan's conviction that China was headed for chaos, the fewer powers involved in Manchurian affairs, the easier it would be to control matters at that time.[22]

The Knox proposal was received in Japan on 6 January 1910 and her reply showed just how great was the mutual suspicion. The Japanese minister in Beijing reported it to be of Chinese origin, a view no doubt based on the connection between Willard Straight and T'ang Shao-yi.[23] Komura, however, explained a deeper conspiracy to the Emperor Meiji;[24]

American ambition in Manchuria was defeated (in the Harriman scheme of 1905), but they did not give up easily. They established a Manchurian Bank and tried to bring our capital to heel by using this bank for a line parallel to the South Manchurian railway. Then, in October 1909, they obtained rail rights for a line between Chinchow and Aigun, and looked for British approval to threaten our Manchurian line.

Thus, the Knox plan was seen as one more step in America's anti-Japanese campaign in Manchuria. Both Russia and Japan rejected internationalisation of the railways and would soon join in precisely that arrangement regarding Manchuria which Knox had attempted to forestall.

Relations between Japan and the U.S. never recovered after this point. Japanese migrants to the U.S. were placed under increasing restriction and the American armed

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[21]F.O. 46/579, MacDonald to Lansdowne, 22 November 1904, record of conversation between Itō and legation secretary Thomas Hohler, 12 November 1904. Itō also suggested that Manchuria might be managed such an international committee and policed by Chinese, perhaps officered by Japanese. To limit the effect of Itō's statements, Henry Denison of the Japanese foreign ministry informed Hohler that Japan did not consider the Liaotung leased territory as part of Manchuria as this belonged to Russia under the terms of the lease.

[22]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 435-37.

[23]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki*, Kyoto 1980, p. 477, entry for 12 January 1910.

[24]Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji Tennō Ki*, 12 vols., Tokyo 1975, vol. 12, p. 341, entry for 13 January 1910.

forces found Japan a useful bugbear in their requests for expanded appropriations.[25] The situation by 1914 is vividly illustrated by a collection of articles from prominent Japanese, published in English by the Japan Society of America, and which might apply equally to the techno-nationalist 1980s. They included Kondō Rempei,"Japan Harbours No Ill Feeling toward America", Fukui Kikusaburō, "Japan and America (Co-operation versus Competition)", Otani Kahei, "America and Japan always Friends", Terashima Seiichirō, "Exclusionists not True to the Principles of America's Founders", and Ozaki Yukio, "To the Peace-Loving Americans."[26]

Katsura had tried to defuse tensions over Japanese migration, but the Knox plan showed that Manchuria remained a source of friction with America. He would seek a resolution here also, and would do so in conjunction with a new partner and old ally, Gotō Shimpei.

China and Manchuria 1908-10

Japan's revolutionaries of the 1860s aspired to stability in the 1900s. At the request of the Ch'ing government, they persuaded Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen to leave Japan in 1907, just as they had K'ang Yu-wei a decade before.[27] As Itō Hirobumi explained to the British ambassador, "at all hazards this dynasty should be upheld for the reason that there was no other so far as he could see to replace it."[28] A convulsion was still expected in China and the rapid pace of Chinese reforms, albeit directly inspired by the Japanese precedent, alarmed the Meiji oligarchs.[29] Consequently, Japanese policy was to try and slow this pace, reach an accommodation to lessen anti-Japanese feeling in Manchuria, and to co-ordinate her actions with those of the Western powers. This was the basis of two conversations Itō had in late 1907 with Katsura and Gotō Shimpei. In Itō's version, it was Katsura who, while visiting Seoul with the crown prince, had first asked

[25]Tupper/McReynolds, p. 89-90. In the spring of 1909, Japanese fishing vessels were prohibited in Hawaiian waters, and even the high number of Japanese chauffeurs in Seattle provoked a city ban on foreigners driving automobiles, *North China Herald*, 27 March and 1 May 1909. In 1911, the U.S. Bureau of Naturalisation ruled that Japanese, along with all other "Orientals", were ineligible for American citizenship, and the 1924 immigration act effectively prohibited all further Japanese immigration, Hugh Tinker, *Race Conflict and the International Order*, London 1977, p. 20-21, 30-31.

[26]Naoichi Masaoka, ed., *Japan To America*, N.Y. 1914.

[27]When Sun's Japanese allies sought aid from the army general staff in mid-1908, they were also rebuffed, Kojima Kazuo, *Ichi Rō Seijika no Kaisō*, Tokyo 1951, p. 120-21.

[28]F.O. 410/51, MacDonald to Grey, 19 February 1908.

[29]F.O. 410/51, MacDonald to Grey, 22 December 1907; F.O. 410/53, MacDonald to Grey, 14 May 1909, reports Katsura's statement that China was "going a great deal too fast, and trouble would ensue."

him to visit China and arrange a general understanding with the Ch'ing.[30] Both agreed it essential to pursue this in alliance with Britain.

Itō had also met Gotō in September of that year, and spent a few days on Itsukushima island discussing Japan's position in the world. Gotō had taken the same approach as Katsura, urging Itō to awaken China's empress dowager to the futility of Sino-American co-operation so long as legal and racial discrimination remained in the U.S.. Itō worried that this might be seen as evidence of the "yellow peril", but Gotō was sanguine;[31]

> Pan-Asianism is, just like the American Monroe doctrine, aimed at self-defence. If it is the source of "yellow peril" fears, then the Monroe doctrine should lead to anti-Americanism. It is diplomatic incompetence which causes foreign misunderstanding, not that the doctrine itself is bad.

They realised, however, that Chinese politics were confused at that point, and it would be difficult for any Ch'ing statesman to effect a reconciliation with Japan. In this event, Gotō suggested that Itō travel on to Europe and work for a better understanding with the European powers.

The rationale for Gotō's argument was influenced by German writings on geopolitics. While in Taiwan, he had come to perceive the world as three blocks; the old and declining West (Europe), the new and rising West (U.S.), and the East. The new West, he believed, would inevitably look to expand in the East, and the only way to prevent this was for Japan and China to come to terms, and work in unison with Europe. This view would be taken further by Major-General Ishiwara Kanji, ideological force behind the creation of Manchukuo, and proponent of Sino-Japanese unity in the mid-1930s.[32] In the event, Itō's proposed trip for the spring of 1908 was deferred as a result of the Tatsu Maru incident, and by the time the plan was resurrected in 1909, the situation in China had completely changed.[33]

Despite this setback, Katsura's memorandum of mid-1908 advocated the same

[30]F.O. 410/51, Cockburn (Seoul) to MacDonald, 12 November 1907, reporting conversation of the day before, and MacDonald to Grey, 22 December 1907, report of conversation with Itō, 20 December. As noted below, Gotō Shimpei had already discussed something similar with Itō, and, before Katsura's departure for Korea, met the latter for discussions on Japan's China policy, Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shimpei*, 4 vols., rep. Tokyo 1965, vol. 2, p. 971-72, Gotō letter to Itō, 7 October 1907.

[31]Komatsu Midori, *Meiji Gaikō Hiwa*, rep. Tokyo 1976, p. 257-59; Tsurumi, vol. 2, p. 955-70. Komatsu took his account directly from later conversations with Gotō. His recollection, however, does differ on some points from that given by Tsurumi working with Gotō's papers. For example, Komatsu dates the Itsukushima meeting as May 1907, but Tsurumi corrects this to September, vol. 2, p. 957.

[32]Ishiwara envisaged a final war between Japan as centre of all Eastern civilisation and the U.S. as centre of all Western civilisation, see Seki Hiroharu in *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi*, vol. 1, p. 366-67, also John Hunter Boyle, "The Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration: The Background to the Defection of Wang Ching-wei", *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 25, 1970, p. 279,

[33]In the Tatsu Maru incident, a Japanese vessel was arrested by Chinese authorities and the Saionji government, demanding a Chinese apology, aroused further Sino-Japanese discord.

approach; keep China intact, but not too strong, and deal with her in collaboration with Britain. As he wrote;[34]

> China is the source of troubles in the East, and our future safety depends on her state of order. Sooner or later, chaos is likely to break out. We can only watch the way things are moving, and decide our position by responding to changes as the opportunity arises. Although the Russo-Japanese war forced us to turn our advance from the south to the north, our geography and the balance of trade impels us to build our strength in the south. The longer it takes for chaos to erupt in China, the better it is for us, and where we differ with the powers is in hoping this chaos does not spread throughout China or last over a long period. While preparing for an emergency, we should also try to deal with the present using enlightened guidance, avoid carelessly harming Chinese feelings over small incidents, plan for mutual understanding based on stable agreements, and, in close collaboration with Britain, work to build our real trading power in so far as this does not harm the interests of both nations.

In effect, this restated Prime Minister Yamagata's memorandum of 20 August 1900. Additionally, however, Katsura wanted better Anglo-Japanese relations with Russia in order to stabilise the situation in Manchuria. Talks to this end were envisaged by Katsura and Gotō as part of Itō's trip to Europe. When these were aborted by Itō's assassination in 1909, Katsura himself would undertake the task.[35]

The internal struggle for power between Yuan Shih-k'ai and his enemies meant that any agreement reached with one faction might collapse in the event of a rival faction winning out. Moreover, in late November 1907, the empress dowager was said to be partially paralysed, rendering the political situation even more uncertain. Katsura decided that the outstanding rail and mining problems in Manchuria only aggravated Sino-Japanese friction and, at the risk of further alienating Chinese popular opinion, the cabinet elected in September 1908 to press for a settlement, also agreeing that if Beijing proved unresponsive, then Japan would take unilateral action to force a solution.[36] Negotiations then began with Yuan Shih-k'ai. However, the deaths of the Chinese emperor and empress dowager in November 1908, followed swiftly by Yuan's expulsion from power, caused Japan to fear that the Chinese central government and provinces might not hold together much longer.[37] Japan had indicated a willingness to stay with Yuan in early 1907, and his removal seemed, in Katsura's view, to leave "nobody of sufficient influence and authority now in Beijing with whom the Japanese government

[34]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 347.

[35]Yamagata's own optimism about Russo-Japanese co-operation in Manchuria is explained in his memorandum to the Saionji cabinet, 25 January 1907, Oyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 301-07.

[36]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 395, and Shinobu, p. 276, lists the six remaining problems; these were the Fakumen railway, Tashihch'iao branch line, extension of the Beijing-Mukden line, Fushun and Yentai coalmines, mines along the Andong-Mukden and South Manchurian railways, and the status of Chientao.

[37]This was the view expressed by Itō to Katsura on 6 December 1908, Katsura Papers, 18-38.

could negotiate."[38] Indeed, the loss of Yuan led Itō to predict revolution in China within three years, and Japan responded, as Ambassador MacDonald reported, by reaffirming her intent to "go hand in hand with us in everything but especially in things Chinese."[39]

With Yuan gone and the likelihood of a stable agreement receeding, Japan pressed on with a solution to Manchurian disputes. On the strategically important, but commercially negligible, Andong-Mukden line, the cabinet decided in August 1909 to change to the broad gauge regardless of Chinese dissatisfaction, thus prompting Chinese acquiescence within ten days of the decision.[40] This broke the logjam and an agreement on all outstanding problems was signed with Na-t'ung on 4 September 1909. Yamagata seemed more confident that a more stable and enduring policy towards China could now be achieved, and private reports to Katsura in December 1909 suggested that Japan might hold the balance in the Beijing in-fighting. Both the Chinese regent and his opponents, led by War Minister T'ieh-liang, seemed inclined to look to Japan for support, and Katsura's informant wrote, "Of late the regent's group is inclined to rely heavily on us. Particularly the likes of Prince Su has said that if China meets catastrophe in the future, there is only Japan from whom she can seek aid."[41] It was suggested to Katsura that Japan support the regent, then apparently making great advances in restoring central authority, and avoid Yuan Shih-k'ai who, while manoeuvering for a return to power, remained essentially untrustworthy. Japan was also believed to have found a purchasable ally in Na-t'ung, and to have used T'ieh-liang against the regent when the latter did seem about to recall Yuan in mid-1910.[42]

With the agreement on Manchuria, and new contacts in Beijing, one aspect of Sino-Japanese discord appeared to be solved. There remained, however, the equally worrisome division within Japan's Manchurian policy itself. Continuing friction between Japan's Kwangtung governor-general and foreign ministry was bad for business. Gotō had earlier argued for a single concern, along the lines of Britain's East India Company, to control

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[38]F.O. 410/53, MacDonald to Grey, 14 May 1909, report of Katsura conversation that day; also Katsura's letter to Itō, 12 January 1909, Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo*, 9 vols., Tokyo 1974-81, vol. 3, p. 378. J.O.P. Bland Papers, diary, 23 February 1907, reports a statement by Japanese consul at Shanghai, Odagiri Masanosuke, of Japan's close relationship with Yuan and Japan's willingness to aid him financially in his fight against rival, T'ieh-liang.

[39]F.O. 410/53, MacDonald to Grey, 13 may 1909, report of conversation with Itō that day; F.O. 800/68, Grey Papers, MacDonald to Grey, 5 January 1909.

[40]The value of the Andong-Mukden line is discussed in Kitaoka Shinichi, *Nihon Rikugun to Tairiku Seisaku, 1906-1918*, Tokyo 1978, p. 39-40. Kitaoka identifies Yamagata and Terauchi as the main forces behind reconstruction of the railway for military purposes, thus completing the strategic railroad from Pusan to Mukden. On Japanese negotiations over the line, see Tokutomi, vol. 2, particularly p. 405-414.

[41]Katsura Papers, 45-27, Munakata Kotarō report, 11 December 1909. This is also printed in Kamiya Masao, ed., *Munakata Kotarō Monjo*, Tokyo 1975, p. 233-35.

[42]J.O.P. Bland papers, letters from Lord ffrench, 11-12 September 1910; *North China Herald*, 9 September 1910.

all economic activity in the region, and repeated this arguments to Katsura in mid-1909.[43] In his 1908 memorandum, Katsura had already considered re-establishing a development ministry (*takushokumushō*) to unify Japanese administration in Taiwan, Sakhalin, Korea, and Manchuria, and to co-ordinate emigration to these regions.[44] In July 1908, in line with this re-ordering of policy, and following Gotō's advice, he transferred all but diplomatic authority over the South Manchurian Railway from the foreign ministry to the communications ministry, and in December 1908, set up a railway bureau (*tetsudō-in*) with Gotō doubling as bureau chief.[45] This was a partial amendment but establishment of the development ministry was opposed by Resident-General Itō, and the idea was held in abeyance.[46] However, in June 1910, following Itō's murder in Harbin, and with feuding between Kwangtung Governor-General Ōshima Yoshimasa and his chief of civilian affairs, Katsura created the Development Bureau (*takushoku-kyoku*), with himself as bureau chief and Gotō as deputy-chief.[47] This finally gave him a unified policy in Taiwan, Sakhalin, Korea, and the Kwangtung leased territory (with the exception of diplomatic matters).[48] By that point, Japan's colonial responsibilities were about to expand enormously with developments in Korea.

The Annexation of Korea

In mid-1908, the *North China Herald* described the situation in Korea; "All trade is in complete abeyance except in the immediate neighbourhood of the railway."[49] The Korean cabinet was politically isolated; the Ilchinhoe was torn between support for Minister Song and its revolutionary ambition; and, at year's end, Itō could see no immediate end to the guerrilla violence.[50] As Katsura resumed the premiership, doubts over Japan's relations with China and the U.S. mitigated against a prolongation of instability, and his own health, following a relapse of stomach illness late in 1908, may

43Katsura Papers, 6-8, Gotō memorandum, July 1909.

44Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 345-46. Thus far, the governor-general of Taiwan and the governor of Sakhalin had been responsible to the home minister, and the Kwangtung governor-general subject to the foreign minister.

45Tsurumi, vol. 3, p. 291.

46Itō apparently did not wish to be subordinated to any new superior. This was the explanation given by Komura to the British ambassador in June 1910, F.O. 410/56, MacDonald to Grey, 24 June 1910.

47On the dissatisfaction within the Kwangtung government-general, see *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 477, 483-95, entries for 14 January 1910, 7 February-25 March 1910.

48In August 1911, just as Katsura resigned, the South Manchurian Railway Company was also transferred to the Development Bureau, but foreign ministry concern at losing authority in Manchuria led to the bureau itself being abolished by the Yamamoto cabinet in June 1913. Authority for the Company was returned to the railway bureau and the Kwangtung government-general fell once more under the foreign ministry, Kitaoka, p. 56, 117. Katsura's plan was revived in 1929 when a separate development ministry was created with authority over the Korean and Taiwanese governments-general, Kwangtung, Sakhalin and South Seas offices, plus Oriental Development and South Manchurian Railway Companies.

49*North China Herald*, 6 June 1908.

50Katsura Papers, 18-38, Itō letter, 6 December 1908.

have persuaded him to resolve the Korean dilemma while physically able.[51] There was, however, to be one last attempt to win over Korean opinion.

In November 1908, Itō proposed a major propaganda offensive in Korea. In the early days of the Meiji restoration, a series of imperial tours had served to build a sense of Japanese nationhood and ease the introduction of otherwise unsettling reforms. Itō now suggested a tour by the young Emperor Sunjong might convince some Koreans to accept that reliance on Japan was the only way towards prosperity.[52] The imperial party left Seoul on the morning of 7 January 1909, toured the southern cities of Taegu, Pusan, Chinnamp'o, and Masanp'o, then returned through Taegu to Seoul on the afternoon of 13 January.

In its way, it was like a presidential campaign trail. Itō repeatedly addressed groups of Korean notables on the need to forget past grievances and work together, and, on 12 January, warned an audience of four hundred in the midland city of Taegu;[53]

> A people which daydreams of the past, has no sense of raising itself anew, and voluntarily falls into weakness, deserves to be reprimanded.... What Japan wants from Korea today is for her leaders to alter completely the existing situation, guide the people to knowledge, to industry, bathe in the same pool of civilisation as us, and for her to join her strength with ours. If Japan and Korea are together, then the force for defending the Far East will be even greater, and this is what Japan truly wishes from Korea.... If there are those among you who want to fight Japan alone, go ahead and try.

Anyone considering such a course would only have to look to Pusan where a 10-vessel Japanese fleet lay in wait for the emperor. Writing from Masanp'o on 11 January, Itō noted happily, "the despatch of the fleet has been the most profitable event of the tour and the emperor is greatly impressed." Katsura replied encouragingly the following day that he was sure the tour would prove beneficial, and agreed, "His Majesty's inspection of our navy will surely have a great bearing on our future policy towards Korea."[54]

Itō was emboldened to try a repeat performance in the northern provinces. However, north Korea was considerably colder, both in terms of climate and receptivity to Japanese propaganda. Whereas Pusan and Masamp'o were largely Japanese cities, there were few Japanese residents north of Seoul. Nonetheless, the imperial party set off

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[51]Katsura Papers, 10-3 and 63-9, letters from Hirata Tōsuke/Ōura Kanetake, 31 October 1908, and Tokudaiji Sanenori, 17 November 1908, show Katsura troubled by recurrent stomach illness.

[52]Katsura Papers, 18-39, Itō letter, 5 January 1909. This is dated 25 January in the guide to Katsura's papers. Sunjong was perhaps not well placed to convince anyone. It was said of him that he was not really of slow intellect, merely that he was in need of exercise having not taken a step for the past fifteen years. Report from Henry Bonar (Seoul) to Grey, 13 February 1910, Grey Papers, F.O. 800/68.

[53]Komatsu Midori, ed., *Itō Kō Zenshū*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1933, vol. 2, p. 485-90. For details of the tour, see also, Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Kojong Sidae'sa*, 6 vols., seoul 1972, vol. 6, p. 809-11; Arthur Hyde Lay (Seoul) to Grey, 15 January 1910, F.O. 371/645.

[54]Both letters are in Kaneko Kentarō, *Itō Hirobumi-den*, 3 vols. Tokyo 1940, vol. 3, p. 811-14, 821.

on 27 January, visited P'yŏngyang, Shin-Ŭiju, Kaesŏng, Chŏngju, and retraced its steps to Seoul on 3 February.[55] As the *Keijō Shimpō*, a critic of Itō, noted complacently on 5 February, "The Resident-General received in North Korea a very chilling reception from the Koreans."[56] Home Minister Song Pyŏng-jun's discontent with the general irresolution was palpable and he became involved in a near brawl with a chamberlain on the imperial train. On 27 February 1909, he was officially replaced by former premier Pak Che-jun.[57]

Itō returned to Tokyo on 10 February, accompanied by the unhappy Song, and continued to promote the image of Korea and Japan as members of one family - "Korea must unite with Japan. Union is strength, separation weakness."[58] However, he now realised that Japan and Korea were irreconcilable in the short term, while the continuing unrest only retarded economic development, and cost heavily in terms of Japanese resources, prestige, and Korean lives. On 10 April 1909, Itō received Prime-Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura at his home in Ōiso. The previous month, Komura had drafted a memorandum on annexation for which he received Katsura's approval.[59] Although they arrived at Ōiso expecting Itō to struggle over a general commitment to annexation, to their surprise, and, no doubt, relief, he immediately agreed and only echoed their own worries as to the timing.[60] This had to be gauged to limit Western criticism and Japan would seek advance approval fom both Russia and Britain. On 7 July 1909, a cabinet decision turned annexation into official government policy for the first time. Thus ended Japan's attempt at Cromerism.

Itō preferred to be dissociated from failure, and the annexation of Korea was a clear failure of Japan's ability to reform Korea by the policy of "menace, objurgation, and worry." Katsura began immediate discussions on a replacement in Seoul and suggested

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[55]*Kojong Sidae'sa*, vol. 6, p. 813-17.

[56]Quoted in F.O. 371/645, Lay (Seoul) to Grey, 11 February 1909.

[57]The *Asahi Shimbun* of 16 February 1909 reported Song's comment that U.S. missionaries were provoking unrest in Korea through their converts. The U.S. Minister in Tokyo protested, causing Itō considerable embarrassment, and ensuring acceptance of Song's resignation. See the report by Lay to Grey, 1 March 1909, F.O. 410-53.

[58]The *Keijō Shimpō*, with its usual respect for age and wisdom, commented in its edition of 9 April 1909, "We.... regard the utterances of the old man as the usual empty and high-flown talk of an alcoholic mood and cannot believe them to proceed from his heart," quoted in Lay to Grey, 1 May 1909, F.O. 371/646. The same report quotes Itō's speech on unity from the *Seoul Press* of 29 April 1909.

[59]Gaimushō, *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966 edition, p. 835.

[60]Shinobu, p. 300.

to General Yamagata on 17 April 1909;[61]

> A strong man isn't needed to hasten matters. It would be best for our policy hereafter to have the Korean emperor or government commit some indiscretion, and, having got that point over to him, I think it appropriate to recommend Sone whom we will be able to direct on any matter.

Itō returned briefly to Seoul in July, during which time he cleared up outstanding matters, persuaded Prime-Minister Yi to entrust Korean judicial authority to Japan, and made farewell speeches on the theme of Korea and Japan as one family. From late June, however, Sone Arasuke became Japan's second resident-general of Korea.

Katsura had given Sone his major cabinet experience with the appointment of finance minister in 1901, and retained him despite heated criticism of his abilities at the outset of the Russo-Japanese war. Sone was a solid bureaucrat, keenly respectful of orders, yet already in poor health, and within two months of appointment his wife was called as nurse to Seoul. Rumours immediately spread that he would be replaced, and the Seoul papers expected Katsura to be the replacement.[62] Perhaps this was a reflection of Katsura's own increasing identification with Itō. However, like Itō, who spent as much time in Tokyo as Seoul, Katsura's interests were in the centre of politics, and Korea was only as part of his overall policy in 1909.

Towards the end of 1909, Japan attempted to force Korean acquiescence by destroying the guerrillas. General Hasegawa had been replaced (but would return as governor-general in 1916) and the new commander, General Ōkubo Haruno, planned a grand search-and-destroy mission. Commencing from 1 September 1909, it continued over six weeks in the most troubled spots, the provinces of North and South Chŏlla. Japanese troops were strung out across the area and naval vessels guarded the coast, but they were no more successful than the Americans in Vietnam, and, as in that conflict, the guerrillas merely dropped their arms and melted into the population. One of the few groups neutralised by the army proved on closer examination to consist of Ilchinhoe members. Money was paid to the bereaved and the affair hushed up.[63]

Late in 1909, Katsura and Gotō returned to the idea of an Itō trip, this time with the specific aim of sounding out Russia on a Japanese annexation of Korea. Gotō arranged

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[61]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 454. For reasons of his own, Tokutomi censored the phrase "To have the Korean emperor and government commit an indiscretion." Yamabe Kentarō, *Nik-Kan Gappō Shōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 219, restores the omission. Yamagata replied the following day that he agreed Deputy Resident-General Sone should be appointed to replace Itō, both as a matter of course and because there was no other suitable appointee at that time, Katsura Papers, 70-110, Yamagata letter, 18 April 1909.

[62]F.O. 410/54, Lay to Grey, 25 September 1909.

[63]F.O. 371/645, Lay to Grey, 30 April, 7 September, 18 October 1909, 25 January 1910.

for Itō to meet Russian Finance Minister Kokovtsov at Harbin in October. Following the line agreed by Katsura and Itō, Komura was asked to inform Britain of the impending talks.[64]

By turning to the European powers over Korea, Japan's leaders, Katsura, Gotō, and Itō, clearly expressed their wish to be a part of the West. Equally, the destruction of Korean independence, for whatever reason, signalled their lack of confidence in East Asian co-prosperity. Hereafter, there would be few in Asia willing to trust a Japanese guarantee. They had hoped to come to terms with China, and so straddle both worlds, since at least 1897.[65] However, then as later, the convulsions of China's modernisation process made it difficult to find anyone with whom to make a stable agreement. The consequence was Japanese isolation in Asia.

Katsura realised that a voluntary Korean request for amalgamation would be valuable in limiting foreign criticism of Japan. The Ilchinhoe had long called for such a move and when Uchida Ryōhei resigned as Ilchinhoe adviser in order to work in Tokyo for annexation, Katsura, wishing to maintain contact, approved his replacement by Sugiyama Shigemaru.[66] As Itō's Manchurian trip was in preparation, Ilchinhoe president Yi Yong-gu and Sugiyama attempted to unify Korean progressive opinion by merging the Ilchinhoe with the two other major political groups, the Taehan Hyŏphoe (a reformed Chajanghoe) and Sŏbuk Hyŏphoe. Official restrictions had weakened the Taehan Hyŏphoe and there had been damaging internal divisions.[67] However, its views were not so distant from those of the Ilchinhoe and it was receptive to Yi Yong-gu's initial proposal on uniting to oust the Yi Wan-yong cabinet.[68] Sugiyama confidently assured Katsura that a joint appeal for a Japan-Korea union would soon be achieved, but Katsura was less certain and on 11 September asked for Sone's opinion. Sone confirmed Katsura's belief that the Taehan Hyŏphoe and Sŏbuk Hyŏphoe were only concerned with destroying the relatively long-standing Yi cabinet, which monopolised official posts, and doubted the accord would last. In the meantime, he urged a policy of distance and

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[64]Itō letter to Katsura, 1 October 1909, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 466.

[65]As previously noted, Kawakami Sōroku sent an army mission to Viceroy Chang Chih-tung in Wuchang in 1897, urging China to unite with Japan and Britain against the threat from Russia.

[66]Nishio Yōtarō, *Yi Yong-gu Shōden*, Fukuoka 1978, p. 112, quotes Sugiyama's memoir to the effect that he was initially unwilling to accept Yi's invitation, but Katsura and Komura had persuaded him saying, "You are right to refuse but, depending on the conditions, it may prove very useful." Sugiyama was appointed Ilchinhoe adviser on 17 August 1909.

[67]Kang Chae-ŏn, *Chōsen Kindaishi Kenkyū*, 2nd. ed., Tokyo 1982, p. 445.

[68]Keijō Kempei Buntai, ed., *Isshinkai Ryakushi*, unpub. Seoul June 1910, Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo, Gakushūin University, p. 22-30, charts the negotiations.

non-intervention.[69] Consequently, when asked by Sugiyama how he would respond to an appeal for Japanese-Korean union, Katsura replied; "I would not hinder it, and if it came I would allow it," but, he added, "there is a time for such matters," and the time should not be rushed.[70] In his mind, no doubt, were the impending discussions with Russia. Undeterred, Sugiyama, Uchida, and Song Pyŏng-jun began to draft the appeal.

On 26 October 1909, the news arrived from Manchuria that Itō, having survived all the vicissitudes of the Meiji era, had been assassinated by a Korean "independence activist" at Harbin. He was sixty-nine. This raised some problems. International sympathy was to Japan, but negotiations with Russia had been aborted. Katsura was with British Ambassador Claude MacDonald when the initial report reached Tokyo, and immediately declared;[71]

> You may assure your Government that, whatever happens, the policy of Japan towards Korea will remain unchanged. If the Prince should die the Koreans will have killed their best friend; but his policy will continue. Above all, there will be no vindictive feeling or action on the part of the Japanese Government for the act of one madman.

This did not entirely prejudice Japan's response to a Korean appeal for union. However, Itō's policy was widely understood to be one of gradualism, and Japan's British allies assumed that the *status quo* would be maintained.

Although the Ilchinhoe remain castigated as traitors, that they and their new allies were not surrendering Korea to Japanese mercies was clear from a joint declaration in October 1909. Using language familiar from Meiji Japan, this attacked the Yi cabinet for failing to understand the politics of renovation (*ilshin*, in Japanese, *ishin*), stressed the need for national unity (*kŏguk ilch'i*, Japanese *kyokoku itchi*) at this time of danger, and urged acceptance and retention of the existing agreement with Japan in order to advance Korean civilisation. Repeating Song Pyŏng-jun's letter of 1904, the declaration argued that Japanese popular opinion could influence government actions, and that sympathy for Korea could be won by an effort towards self-strengthening.[72] Nonetheless, following Itō's assassination, an appeal for amalgamation, drafted in Tokyo by Uchida Ryōhei and his Japanese colleagues, and shown beforehand to Katsura, Yamagata and Terauchi, was presented on 4 December 1909 under the signature of Yi Yong-gu. Resident-General Sone rejected it out of hand, and all Ilchinhoe meetings were banned to prevent further disturbance. Sone remained even-handed, however, making it known that he would

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[69]Katsura Papers, 52-17, Sone letter, 14 September 1909.
[70]Baba Tsunego, *Kiuchi Jūshirō-den*, Tokyo 1937, p. 220.
[71]F.O. 410/54, MacDonald to Grey, 28 October 1909.
[72]The declaration is quoted in Keijō Kempei Buntai, p. 24.

permit freedom of speech, and only act where order was threatened. Similarly, he rejected calls from Korean cabinet ministers for the Ilchinhoe to be disbanded in the wake of an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Yi later in the month.[73] Thus, Sone's response to the Ilchinhoe was not, as alleged by the Kokuryūkai history, overtly aggressive. Rather, he took what might be termed a strictly correct attitude. This did trouble Army Minister Terauchi, to whom most of Sugiyama's complaints against Sone were directed. Nonetheless, General Ōkubo soon reported that he had persuaded Sone of the need to be lenient with the Ilchinhoe and balance the anti-Japanese movement.[74]

The Taehan Hyŏphoe, apparently bribed by Yi Wan-yong, refused to support the Ilchinhoe proposal.[75] However, it explained this decision without excoriating the Ilchinhoe;[76]

> At present, it is not impossible to run Korea without recourse to amalgamation. Should things worsen and military rule or amalgamation be put into practice, this must be left to natural conditions. Calling for amalgamation now only unsettles the people, and this is not the right time.
>
> In the Japan-Korea treaty, Japanese protection is given in the expectation of Korea achieving true strength and prosperity. However, after Korea becomes enlightened and strong, will she be able to ask for the removal of Japanese protection immediately? With military expansion, loan repayments, and so many burdens, this will probably be impossible. It is clear, therefore, that at that time all the Korean people will naturally argue in support of union, and a union at that time will not be too late.

One may of course dismiss this as a carefully worded response to a crisis. However, if the Taehan Hyŏphoe really considered the Ilchinhoe action as premature, a radical move in defiance of the natural progression towards a union of Japan and Korea, then one must conclude that Korean responses to Japan in the period 1905-10 were far more complex than is generally supposed.

As for Katsura, he is considered to have supported the Ilchinhoe proposal and backed away only when popular Korean opposition proved too great.[77] Hilary Conroy quotes the Kokuryūkai history to the effect that Sone rejected the Ilchinhoe appeal on 7th, 9th, and 16th December, and that on the fourth time Katsura vainly ordered him to

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[73] *Komura Gaikōshi*, p. 844; Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 267.

[74] Katsura Papers, Terauchi to Katsura, 16 December 1909, includes a telegram from Ōkubo to Terauchi dated 15 December. These letters are translated in Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910*, Philadelphia 1960, p. 432-33. However, where Professor Conroy translates, "Ishizuka (Eizō) feels it will cost too much money to reverse opinions in Seoul with regard to annexation or to weaken the anti-Ilchinhoe arguments", it appears rather to be "taikin o yō sezaru" - "It will not require a lot of money...."

[75] Yi Wan-yong's moves to divorce the Taehan Hyŏphoe from the Ilchinhoe, and also bribe senior Ilchinhoe members, are noted in Keijō Kempei Buntai, p. 48-51.

[76] Quoted in Ichikawa Masa'aki, ed., *Nikkan Gaikō Shiryō 8: Hogo oyobi Heigō*, Tokyo 1964, rep. 1980, p. 318.

[77] See for example, C.I. Eugene Kim/Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910*, Berkeley 1967, p. 213.

accept.[78] Professor Conroy does right to view this suggestion with some suspicion. On 17 December, immediately after the purported third refusal, Foreign Minister Komura assured Ambassador MacDonald that there would be no change in Japan's policy towards Korea, "at any rate for some time to come", and that the pro-annexation views of ex-Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu neither represented nor carried any weight with the Katsura administration. This was confirmed by Sone to the British consul in Seoul two weeks later when he stated, "annexation or amalgamation were not at the moment thought of", and that the financial costs of such a move could well prove beyond Japanese capabilities.[79]

Henry Kissinger once noted, without irony, that there is no long-term value in duplicitious diplomacy. Such methods lead only to international isolation, and this was the constant fear of Japan's leaders in the Meiji period. Gotō's strategy was to join with China and Europe against the expanding new West. For Japan to have deliberately misled her sole treaty ally over the annexation of Korea would have been dangerous indeed. Katsura wanted better relations with Britain and Russia, not to deepen international mistrust. He had already warned Sugiyama Shigemaru about careful timing, and his own view was that annexation should be carried out unobtrusively, "at the moment when we do not arouse general suspicion, particularly among the Koreans."[80] Moreover, by December 1909, the cabinet had not considered who should be governor-general of Korea, or the details of how annexation should be effected. This lack of preparation, quite out of keeping with Katsura's character, suggests that any support for the Ilchinhoe may have been, as in early 1907, intended to ensure that the society neither collapsed nor broke completely from Japanese direction.[81] Alternatively, he may have been trying to steal the thunder of a future annexation; hoping that passions spent in 1909 would not later resurface. However, in that same December 1909, the Knox proposal brought a Russo-Japanese accord nearer than either Katsura or Komura had anticipated, and this provided the starting flag for annexation.

In March 1910, the Katsura cabinet opened discussions in St. Petersburg. The focus

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[78]Conroy, p. 431.

[79]F.O. 410/55, MacDonald to Grey, 17 December 1909; Henry Bonar (Seoul) to Grey, 31 December 1909. Further confirmation came from Japan's vice minister of the Korean Imperial Household, Komiya, in conversation with Bonar in February 1910, F.O. 800/68, Grey Papers, Bonar to Grey, 13 February 1910.

[80]Katsura memorandum, undated, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 464-65. Internal evidence suggests this was written about April 1910.

[81]Once the proposal had been made, Katsura informed the Ilchinhoe that its work was done, and matters could now be left with him, Kokuryūkai, *Nik-Kan Gappō Hishi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1930, rep. 1966, vol. 2, p. 572-73; Hatsuse Ryūhei, *Dentō-teki Uyoku Uchida Ryōhei no Kenkyū*, Fukuoka 1980, p. 108, Katsura memo., 2 February 1910.

was on Manchuria, but Russian Foreign Minister Izvolski argued for retention of the *status quo* in Korea, fearing a Russian popular backlash as had occurred over Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Japanese Minister Motono Iichirō complained that Russia had tacitly accepted annexation of Korea in their agreement of 1907 and, although the Russians were clearly displeased, Izvolski finally admitted that such action would not be an insuperable obstacle to a further Russo-Japanese agreement.[82] After a brief delay, matters proceeded smoothly enough to an agreement on mutual spheres in Manchuria signed on 4 July 1910.

Izvolski, however, continued to worry about Russian opinion regarding Korea and its effect on his position.[83] Moreover, the British were upset by news of Japanese intentions and, in May 1910, Ambassador MacDonald repeatedly warned Komura that annexation was inadvisable at this time, serving only to embarrass Britain and confirm American suspicions.[84] However, neither advanced beyond disgruntled protests. MacDonald reprimanded Komura for his apparently misleading statements of 1909, and expressed the British Board of Trade's fear that Korean tariffs would be revised unfavourably. As a sop to British opinion, Japan quickly replied that these would be maintained at existing levels for ten years, as in the case of America's takeover of the Philippines, but the mutual irritation was evident.[85] In 1911, this would undermine Katsura's hope for Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Chinese revolution.

While negotiations with Russia were in progress, Sone became a problem. The Kokuryūkai view has been generally accepted that Sone was forced to resign under pressure from Sugiyama, Uchida and Song Pyŏng-jun, who were all actively campaigning for his replacement.[86] However, Sone's illness was very real and he would be dead within a few months. Moreover, he was not opposed to annexation. After lengthy discussions in Tokyo, he wrote to Katsura on 17 January;[87]

> On the matter we discussed, implementation will, of course, have to begin with care for the timing, and we will have to use every means to create the right time. As you said, and as I noted yesterday, the best way would be for an appeal to come from above (i.e. from the Korean emperor). On this aspect, I will take your direction so please rest your mind.

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[82]Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 440-42.

[83]F.O. 410/55, Nicolson to Grey, 12 May 1910. Izvolski told Nicolson that whenever he warned Motono against annexation, the Japanese minister took on "a bulldog expression" and changed his tone completely.

[84]F.O. 410/55, MacDonald to Grey, 19 and 22 May 1910.

[85]F.O. 371/878, MacDonald to Grey, 22 July and 15 August 1910.

[86]Kokuryūkai, vol. 2, p. 616-17; Baba, p. 229-30; Conroy, p. 434. For evidence of their campaign, see *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 475-86, entries for 6, 10, 22 January 1910.

[87]Katsura Papers, 52-19, Sone letter 17 January 1910. Item 52-20, Sone to Katsura, 1 March 1910, reveals Sone's continuing concern over the preparations for annexation.

However, when Terauchi visited Sone at his sick-bed on 10 April, there was already little chance of recovery.[88] Katsura himself was then under fire from various quarters. Discontent at the Seiyūkai's parliamentary domination had led to a political regrouping in January 1910. One product of this was the Kokumintō, largely a derivative of the Kensei Hontō. In this reformation, however, Katsura suspected both the new party and the Seiyūkai were looking for an ally in his political nemesis, Yamamoto Gombei, who was then demanding extra naval funds to build Dreadnought-class warships. Faced with this challenge to his authority, Katsura momentarily considered going to Seoul himself, but Terauchi refused to step in as prime-minister and they agreed instead that Terauchi be the new resident-general.[89] The appointment was made on 13 May.

A few days earlier, Katsura had revealed to Hara Kei that Korea would be annexed that autumn.[90] Katsura ordered Terauchi to carry out annexation at "an appropriate time," but, no doubt aware of the British ambassador's disquiet, Terauchi sought advice on what constituted the best moment. There were divided views; the army ministry's legal adviser, Akiyama Masanosuke, supported the gradual approach to soothe both Korean and Western feelings. On the other hand, Komatsu Midori, foreign affairs chief of the residency-general, argued that four years of gradualism had not eased Korean hostility and delay would only prolong the uncertainty. Immediate action, he suggested, would resolve matters and hasten a reconciliation in Korea, while it was unlikely that Britain or America would seriously object.[91] Terauchi moved ahead and appointed a committee to prepare for annexation. This met at the prime-ministerial residence under the chairmanship by Shibata Kamon, Katsura's chief cabinet secretary and Terauchi's brother-in-law. Gotō Shimpei was also present on occasion. One of the committee's recommendations was to alter the name of Korea (*Han'guk*), and Nankaidō was suggested to complement Hokkaidō. This was rejected, but it was agreed that the Korean emperor become part of the Japanese imperial family with the title of *taikō* (grand duke).[92]

Terauchi entered the Korean capital on 24 July. Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong was still recuperating from a near fatal assassination attempt in the previous December and

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[88]*Terauchi Nikki*, p. 499.

[89]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki* 6 vols., Tokyo 1965-67, vol. 3, p. 23-26, entry for 12 May 1910; *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 505, entry for 4 May 1910; Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 268.

[90]Hara, vol. 3, p. 22, entry for 3 May 1910. Hara thought a gradual policy of assimilation far safer, and believed, "Katsura's haste stems entirely from his wish for glory for himself."

[91]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 271.

[92]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 269-70.

returned to Seoul only on 29 July. Yi could have pleaded ill health for abandoning the premiership, and did consider fleeing. However, rumour had it that Terauchi might accept a cabinet under Song Pyŏng-jun, then waiting in anticipation across the sea at Shimonoseki, and Yi feared the concessions Song might make.[93] In any case, Yi believed, no new cabinet could improve Korea's position and he resolved to wait and see what Terauchi intended.[94]

In Japan, Katsura had taken to his new villa in the mountains of Karuizawa. Writing to Tokutomi Sohō, editor of the influential *Kokumin Shimbun* on 5 August, he asked for restraint in reports on Korean affairs, fearing the situation might explode at any moment.[95]

In mid-August, Komatsu Midori reassured a private messenger from Yi that Japan's aim was to unite the two nations as one house, with Korea entering the Japanese domain, and the Korean people elevated to the same level as the Japanese. Yi's greatest fear was that the Korean imperial family might be exiled, as he understood France had exiled the monarch of Madagascar, or demoted to the status of ordinary citizens as with the Hawaiian queen. Komatsu promised generous treatment - the emperor and his family joining the Japanese imperial family, and the present income of the imperial household to be maintained - and Yi decided to negotiate.[96]

Yi had long accepted that Korea lacked the strength to resist Japanese demands, and that all remained was to make the best of the situation. On 16 August, he visited Terauchi to begin the annexation process before further trouble could arise. However, two sticking points remained: the post-annexation titles of emperor and nation. Yi was adamant that any change beyond reversion to the pre-1897 title of king (*wang*), or the loss of *Han'guk* for the nation, would anger the common people. In this, he was attempting to hold on to the two most visible psychological supports of nationhood. Terauchi, however, argued that no nation, having lost its sovereignty, had retained a sovereign, and to establish a precedent now would only prolong the confusion of responsibilities. Yi considered grand duke an unfamiliar title in the East, and liable, therefore, to cause its own confusion. Negotiations continued at night and Terauchi, believing a treaty imminent, finally

[93]Before Terauchi's departure, Song had repeatedly contacted him, offering to establish a cabinet if Yi Wan-yong proved troublesome. See, *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 500-02, 11, 14, 21 April 1910; Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa* p. 269.

[94]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 274-75.

[95]Sakeda Masatoshi et al, ed., *Tokutomi Sohō Kankei Monjo*, 3 vols., Tokyo 82-87, vol. 2, p. 71.

[96]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 280.

accepted a modified form of king, and to replace "Han'guk" with the older state name of "Chŏsun".[97] By 18 August, Yi had brought his cabinet to accept the Japanese draft. Katsura, earlier blocked by the floods sweeping Japan, finally managed to get through to Tokyo and cabled support for Terauchi's compromise. That day also, Song Pyŏng-jun reappeared in Seoul. All that was needed now was the approval of Emperor Sunjong.

On the afternoon of 22 August 1910, the Korean cabinet met before the emperor in the Ch'angdŏk palace. Yi Wan-yong had briefed former Emperor Kojong of events, and received his assurance of non-interference.[98] Consequently, the meeting was tranquil and Yi was simply directed to conclude the treaty with Japan. All had been readied at Terauchi's residence where Yi declined the need for written guarantees of the promises on imperial and national titles. If the guarantees were worthless, being on paper would not increase their value. Instead, he opted to trust Japan. The treaty was signed at 4 p.m. on 22 August 1910.

Japan - 1910

In 1905, Japan's position in East Asia had remained ambivalent. Historically, she had existed on the fringes of the Chinese world order, something of a renegade, sometimes trading and borrowing Chinese culture, sometimes the source of violence. She was regarded, in the words of K'ang Yu-wei, as "a little barbarian island".[99] After her stunning victory over China in 1895, there was greater Asian respect for her modernising success, but trust was a different matter. Chinese and Korean leaders realised that any future Japanese development could only be at their own expense, and even Asian revolutionaries who found refuge in Japan, including Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Vietnam's Phan Boi-chau, and Song Pyŏng-jun, remained wary.

This ambivalence presented Japan with a difficult choice. The world appeared to have split into two camps; the decayed Orient and the presently decaying Occident. She found herself lodged in the middle. The United States was the new and unknown force, but relations in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese were troubled. For Japan to side on a basis of equality with the perenially disturbed China and Korea might be to close off needed financial and diplomatic support from the West. To side with the West in the exploitation of Asia might be equally dangerous. Who could say that China, so

[97]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, p. 280-84; Kunaichō, *Meiji Tennō-ki*, vol. 12, p. 453-56, Terauchi report; *Terauchi Nikki*, p. 518, entry for 16 August 1910.

[98]Komatsu, *Meiji Hiwa*, 289-91.

[99]Quoted in Horikawa Tetsuo, *Chūgoku Kindai no Seiji to Shakai*, Tokyo 1981, p. 90.

vast and unconquerable, would not re-emerge as a major force, and then choose Japan as her first target for revenge?

Korea was Japan's continental foothold, her guarantee of potential future expansion. A small country with no armed force worth the name, and with no international support, her obvious course seemed to be to accept Japanese control. If Japan, after repeatedly declaring her respect for Korean independence, had destroyed this in 1905, the possibility of a more stable union of interests would have been lost, Japan's base would have been weakened by Korean antipathy, and the trust of both China and the West would have been forfeit. Itō had tried to persuade Korean leaders of the benefits of working with Japan. However, Japan had as little chance of Koreans approving her domination as England would from the Irish, or Russia the Poles. Katsura himself had tried to develop commerce with the Oriental Development Company, but, by the end of 1908, it was clear that progress had been negligible and, shortly after annexation, Katsura informed MacDonald that;[100]

> He, personally, from the very first, was of the opinion that the Koreans were absolutely unfitted to govern themselves, and that therefore they must be governed by some other power....(but) Prince Itō was of opinion that a serious attempt should be made to educate the Koreans to govern themselves, and thus maintain their independence.

However, Katsura apologised to Britain that the rapid march of events had forced Japan to move more quickly than anticipated, and explained;[101]

> (He) was of the opinion that the annexation had taken place too soon; it was his intention to wait until treaty revision was out of the way, and then to declare Korea annexed, but events had forced his hand.

In this Katsura may have been referring to his own declining position at home, the fatal illness of Sone, or the growth of American antipathy. The annexation, however, revealed Japan's inability to convince Koreans of her fitness to govern them and was a failure of policy. The English-language papers in Shanghai and Beijing attacked "the complete Machiavel" and warned that expansionism would be the ruin of Japan.[102] The Chinese press in Manchuria was particularly alarmed and called on China to awake to the fact that Japan was just another France in Indochina.[103] Russia and Britain were irritated by the affair and MacDonald made an ostentatious inspection of Korea soon after annexation. It also confirmed American doubts about Japan and Minister O'Brien in Tokyo was ordered

[100]F.O. 410/56, MacDonald to Grey, 10 October 1910.

[101]MacDonald above.

[102]F.O. 371/878, Muller (Beijing) to Grey, 20 September 1910, quoting *The National Review* (Shanghai), 3 September, *The Shanghai Mercury*, 30 August, and *Peking Daily News*, 30 August.

[103]Imamura Yoshio, "Nik-Kan Heigō to Chūgoku no Nihon-kan", *Shisō*, no. 537, March 1969, p. 388-89, quoting *Kirin Jihpao*, 27 August, *Liaodong-pao*, 27 August, *Shanghai Jihpao*, 29 August 1910.

to ask some searching questions on her future intentions.[104] Thus, neither East Asian nor Western co-prosperity was advanced by Japan's annexation of Korea. However, Katsura was then pre-occupied with further troubles at home.

[104]F.O.371/878, MacDonald to Grey, 4 October 1910. O'Brien was pessimistic of Japanese law and justice in the new territory, remarking acidly, "There's precious little of that in Japan and therefore we cannot expect much in Korea."

Chapter 12

THE END OF MEIJI 1911-13

At the end of 1910, Hara Kei informed his diary;[1]

> Noda [Utarō] surmises Katsura has no intention of giving up the cabinet. Katsura talks of many things which he has to clear away, but he is a short-sighted man. If he had quit in May or June, he would really have been called Katsura the Great.... Now the cabinet is on the down-slope and the longer it remains, the more it will make a mess of things.

The decline, however, was general and the constellation earlier constructed around the youthful Emperor Meiji appeared to be waning along with the ageing emperor and his lifetime advisers. The 1908 Boshin and provincial renovation movements indicated that the overriding goal of the Meiji period - *kyokoku itchi* - to unite the people, and produce a work-efficient state (*shokunō kokka*), bonded by love of village and love of nation, had still to be achieved.[2] Rural households continued to provide the reserve for Japan's military forces, and these had fought well in two wars. However, the army was now facing the blunting effect of increased education and democratic ideologies, and the stultification of Chōshū cliques which advanced each other's interests while retarding promotion for non-Chōshū officers.[3] Like other rapidly industrialising societies, Japan reverted to the countryside for its moral standards in what was effectively a return to the original slogan of "Western science, Eastern ethics." On 3 November 1910, the Emperor Meiji's fifty-eighth birthday, the Army Reservists Association (*Zaigō Gunjinkai*) was established with the aim of producing "national villagers", imbued with the simple soldierly ideals of the 1882 imperial rescript to defence personnel.[4] Here was another link in the chain of national unification.

However, two wars in ten years, and continued defence preparation for predicted future wars, had increased the pace of Japan's urban industrialisation. In the shifting

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[1]Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Kei Nikki*, 6 vols., 1965-67, vol. 3, p. 56, entry for 27 November 1910.

[2]See Kimbara Samon, "Ie to Mura to Kokka no Ideorogii", Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai et al, ed., *Kōza Nihon Rekishi 8: Kindai 2*, Tokyo 1985, p. 287-88.

[3]Uzaki Kumakichi, *Satsu no Kaigun Chō no Rikugun*, Tokyo 1911, p. 133-37; Fujiwara Akira, *Gunjishi*, Tokyo 1961, p. 115-20.

[4]The Army Reservists Association is studied in detail by Richard Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*, Berkeley 1974, see particularly the introduction, p. xiv-xix.

cities, the looser social ties and apparent malaise seemed to threaten Japan's future development, and Katsura, in his autobiographical *Shosekun* (How to Deal with the World) in 1912, criticised the "egotism" of youth and their lack of a concept of nation (*kokka no kannen*). His advice was;"[5]

> If you want to be obeyed, you must first obey - that is the most important rule for getting on in the world.... Obedience is thought to be limited to the army and navy, but this is completely in error. Anyone who wishes to get on in the world and do something for his family and his nation must, at any time and in any situation, preserve obedience.

Now, he argued, with Japan's expanding empire, and increasingly close relations with foreign states, it was essential to have strong, sound, responsible men.[6] In other words, the responsibilities of empire should force the people to act responsibly at home.

However, the Meiji construct of the emperor-centred national family had just been threatened with anarchy. Socialist leader, Kōtoku Shūsui, who opposed jingoistic and expansionist nationalism, and hoped to revive what he saw as the original domestic revolutionary spirit of the Meiji restoration, was charged with plotting to assassinate the emperor and was executed, along with his comrades, in January 1911.[7] That same month, a furore over historical interpretation of the imperial family in a primary school text-book also cast doubt on the sanctity of the emperor.[8] Although Katsura offered to resign in expiation of the Kōtoku incident, he had already confided to Hara Kei his wish to complete the final leg of treaty revision, and cannot have been too disappointed when the emperor rejected his offer.[9] Katsura also confided that he would not undertake a further cabinet and, momentarily, seemed ready to step out of central politics and into the ranks of the *genrō*.[10] In the meantime, he gave increased attention to social policy, using imperial and private contributions for the relief of the sick and elderly with the establishment of the Zaiseikai, and, in March 1911, introducing Japan's first work law to

[5]Katsura Tarō, *Shosekun*, Tokyo 1912, p. 93. See p. 146 for Katsura's criticism of Japanese youth.

[6]Katsura, p. 154-55.

[7]See F. G. Notehelfer, "Kōtoku Shūsui and Nationalism", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 31-1, November 1971.

[8]The text-book affair is examined in Shuzo Uyenaka, "The Text-book Controversy of 1911: National Needs and Historical Truth", John S. Brownlee, ed., *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation*, Toronto 1983. The principal offending statement in the primary school text was identified by Education Minister Komatsubara Eitarō as "it is not easy to argue between the legitimacy of the two (northern and southern) dynasties" of the fourteenth century, Katsura Papers, 29-3, letter of 25 February 1911. Katsura attempted to dissuade the Diet from debating the text-book matter because this touched on the imperial house. He personally intervened with House of Representative member, Fujisawa Genzō, and persuaded him to drop his question in the House, Uenaka, p. 109. As a gesture of goodwill, Katsura shared his carriage with Fujisawa and this was criticised as further evidence of Katsura's lack of dignity, Uzaki, p. 156.

[9]Katsura to Hara, Hara, vol. 3, p. 71, entry for 14 December 1910.

[10]To Hara's frustration, Katsura, while declaring he would hand over to the Seiyūkai, did not mention Saionji by name, Hara, vol. 3, p. 71, entry for 14 December 1910.

regulate work hours for women and youths and prohibit the employment of children.[11]

By now, however, Japan was an extended empire, and the greatest threat to Katsura's program of financial and social restrengthening remained the defence budget. An army ministry paper in December 1910 warned that annexation of Korea and the simultaneous Russo-Japanese accord over Manchuria had accelerated the long-expected collapse of China, and that at this time the powers would intervene as in 1900. Presciently, the memorandum noted China's vastness, and the greater unity of the people as a result of xenophobic nationalism, with the result that;[12]

> Even if we were militarily successful at first and subjugated China's leaders, the war would be far from over and we would have to take on the entire population. Thus the war would spread all over and would be very difficult to suppress, taking a great deal of time and exhausting us.

In July 1911, Yamagata took an even bleaker view. Seeing only Chinese progress and ignoring her weaknesses, he asserted that China would seek recompense for the humiliation of 1894-95, and certainly demand the return of the Kwangtung lease on its expiry in 1922.[13] His response was to fight fire with fire and build six new army divisions in anticipation.[14]

In addition, the navy had found excuses to claim extra funds in the the appearance of the Dreadnought class warship, and fears of possible U.S. intervention in Manchuria following the bellicosity of recent years. Early in 1910, Katsura had anticipated no additional funding requirements for the army or navy, in the latter's case at least until 1912-13, by which time he anticipated Japan's debt position to have improved to the point where additional funds would be available.[15] In May 1910, however, with his retrenchment policies seen to be working, Navy Minister Saitō Minoru presented an eight-year expansion plan, centring on seven new battleships, three first-class cruisers, and four second-class cruisers, and costing, in addition to funds agreed in 1907, three hundred and sixty-seven million yen.[16] This sank Katsura's original financial plan, but he managed to arrange a compromise and deflect the navy's full demands by granting

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[11]On the Zaiseikai, Tokutomi Sohō, *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1917, rep. 1967, vol. 2, p. 511-14; Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton 1985, p. 91; on the work law, Yamamoto Hirofumi et al, *Kindai Nihon Keizaishi*, Tokyo 1980, p. 99-100.

[12]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Kankei Monjo: Shushō Izen*, Kyoto 1984, p. 598-603, army ministry policy towards China, December 1910.

[13]Ōyama Azusa, ed., *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho*, Tokyo 1966, p. 334-37, Yamagata memo. to Katsura cabinet, 31 July 1911.

[14]Kitaoka Shinichi, *Nihon Rikugun to Tairiku Seisaku, 1906-1918*, Tokyo 1978, p. 69-70; Katsura Papers, Yamagata letter, 2 August 1911.

[15]Hara, vol. 2, p. 395, entry for 4 January 1910.

[16]Kitaoka, p. 68-69; Banno Junji, *Taishō Seihen*, Kyoto 1982, p. 62-63; Matsushita Yoshio/Izu Kimio, *Nihon Gunji Hattatsushi*, Tokyo 1937, p. 253.

eighty-two million yen for enlarging ships already in planning since 1907. Nonetheless, he did not expect the navy to lie quiescent, and his earlier fear of a navy-Seiyūkai coalition was replaced by suspicions that Inukai Ki of the new Kokumintō was backing Yamamoto Gombei.[17]

With domestic and international pressures building in spite of Katsura's efforts, it was as Hara suggested; in holding on, he was increasingly open to the changing structure of Japanese politics and the growing popular distaste for oligarchic control. Prior to the twenty-seventh Diet at the end of 1910, Katsura began to shore up his alliance with the Seiyūkai which was itself under attack for its privileged position with the government. In December, having declared he would not again stand as premier, Katsura proposed a reception with the Seiyūkai leaders to affirm in public their mutual reliance.[18] Subsequently, at a party given by Katsura on 29 January 1911, he announced his policy of *jōi-tōgō* - a union of minds - and *kyōdō itchi* - co-operation and unity - to carry forward constitutional government in Japan. With this, Katsura may be regarded as admitting the frailty of his position, or simply following the precedent of Prime Minister Yamagata's own declaration of reliance on the Jiyūtō in 1898.[19]

This affirmation of the Katsura-Seiyūkai alliance caused disquiet in certain quarters. The conservative Chūō Club needed reassurance that it did not imply an expansion of Seiyūkai authority, while members of the armed forces, including head of military affairs in the army ministry, Tanaka Giichi and Vice Navy Minister Takarabe Takashi, feared rather that *jōi-tōgō* would expand Katsura's authority and decrease his backing for the armed forces.[20] At the same time, Takarabe hoped to use the resultant uncertainty in the army to push the question of naval expansion. When Navy Minister Saitō refused support, Takarabe began to work with Matsuda Masahisa of the Seiyūkai towards replacing Saitō with Yamamoto Gombei. This would also undercut the Katsura-Hara relationship, and Saionji, of whom Hara had become increasingly critical in recent years, appeared well disposed to the idea.[21]

In August 1911, Katsura decided he had achieved all he could. Treaty revision was

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[17]Katsura's suspicion of Inukai and Yamamoto was recorded by Hara, vol. 3, p. 25, entry for 12 May 1910.

[18]Hara, vol. 3, p. 66, entry for 11 December 1910.

[19]Najita Tetsuo, *Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905-1915*, Camb. Mass. 1967, p. 82-84, considers Katsura's announcement unprecedented and an embarrassing climbdown, clearly ignoring Katsura's own role in arranging the 1898 compromise with the Jiyūtō.

[20]Banno, p. 72-75.

[21]Banno, p. 75-77, quoting Takarabe diary, 27 July 1911.

complete, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, still central to Katsura's conception of Japan's world position, had been revised. There were rumours both in the press and palace of his future intentions, and on 25 August he ended the speculation by resigning.[22] The second Saionji cabinet duly took office. The changing alliances within Japanese politics, however, would soon have serious consequences as China finally erupted in revolution.

Revolution in China

Katsura's resignation just two months before the revolution in China shows how unexpected was the convulsion. Japan's reaction was tardy and confused, and, having anticipated just such an event for the past decade, she would end up profiting less from this affair than even the Boxer war.

Speaking to Hara Kei in May 1911, Katsura had predicted that trouble in China would arise because of financial policy. In the event of disorder, he believed Japan might have to occupy the Tayeh iron-fields and so establish a base for dealing with China in concert with the powers. This would also help in solving the problem of southern Manchuria.[23] As always, Katsura was looking particularly for co-operation with Britain, and would maintain this attitude throughout the early months of the revolution. Ominously, however, Japan's recent troubles with the United States had influenced opinion in London and, in negotiations for the third Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911, Japan had recognised that Britain would never support her in a conflict with America.[24]

When the Chinese revolution broke out in October 1911, Japan's official response was in line with Katsura's policy and the Meiji government's distaste for revolution. On 13 October, the Ch'ing government appealed to Japan for arms and the Saionji cabinet approved covert supplies worth 2.7 million yen through a combination of the Mitsui,

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[22]Katsura's approving comment on the Anglo-Japanese alliance is in his letter to Yamagata on 30 June 1911, Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 536. Katsura gave half-hearted support for a move to have Saionji retain Komura as foreign minister, Hara, vol. 3, p. 155, entry for 26 August 1911; Gaimushō, *Komura Gaikōshi*, Tokyo 1966, p. 936; Uno Shunichi, "Dai Niji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols., Tokyo 1981, vol. 2, p. 95. Komura was already ill and died that November. Okuma Shigenobu, writing in the *Taiyō* of 1 October 1911, considered the influence of Katsura considerable in the new Saionji cabinet, pointing to Noda Utarō and Ooka Ikuzō in particular as close to Katsura, Kimura Ki, ed., *Okuma Shigenobu Sōsho*, Tokyo 1969, vol. 1, p. 122.

[23]Hara, vol. 3, p. 120, entry for 1 May 1911; Yui Masaomi, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon no Taiō", *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 344, January 1969, p. 2. Hara was then due to visit China and Katsura asked him to report on the suitability of Japan's policy.

[24]Foreign Minister Komura had initiated early talks towards revision and renewal of the alliance following rumours that Britain would abandon it at its expiration in 1915. For the background to these negotiations, see Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, London 1972, p. 45-59.

Ōkura and Takada companies.[25] Japan also had gunships sent to the Yangtze ready to defend the Tayeh iron-fields, but Yuan Shih-k'ai, recalled to save the dynasty, occupied the Hankow-Hanyang region in late October and so prevented further disruption in the area.

Also on 13 October, however, the southern revolutionary forces of Sun Yat-sen, who was himself then in the United States, declared they would respect all existing treaties, loans, and concessions, and tried to use Uchida Ryōhei to win Japanese government approval. Uchida begged Masuda Takashi of Mitsui Industries to halt arms supplies to the Ch'ing, and for Japan to realise both the deep-rooted opposition in China to the Ch'ing and the long-term value of siding with Sun Yat-sen.[26]

The Japanese army was also divided in opinion. Recognising that Japan alone could force a restoration of order if the civil war continued, Tanaka Giichi's subordinate and head of military affairs (*gunjikachō*), Ugaki Kazushige, argued that Japan should affirm her right to defend Manchurian railways, and, in an allied despatch of troops, avoid the error of 1900 by sending advance naval vessels to China's central coast and so monopolise advantageous positions in the Po and Yangtse rivers regions.[27] Tanaka also took a forward view. He seemed to agree with Uchida Ryōhei that the Ch'ing were rotten beyond salvation, and there was talk of supplying arms to Sun Yat-sen, perhaps with the hope of splitting China in two and arranging a more favourable position for Japan in the north.[28]

Yamagata and Army Minister Ishimoto Shinroku, however, would have no truck with the Chinese revolutionaries and opposed arms supplies to the south. As Home Minister Hara noted after an inconclusive cabinet meeting;[29]

> Ishimoto refused to agree no matter what the general staff says and we ended without a decision. Given the situation today, it is impossible to predict what will happen with the rebels or government forces, so if our diplomacy is one-sided, we can't help losing out.

In the end, the government chose to wait and see. Early in November, the British minister to Beijing approached his Japanese counterpart on joint defence of the Beijing-Mukden

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[25]Hara, vol. 3, p. 177, entry for 20 October 1911; Ikei Masaru, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25-1, 1965-66, p. 214.

[26]Oka Yoshitake, ed., *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Monjo*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 2, p. 397-98, Sung Chiao-jen telegram to Uchida Ryōhei, 17 October 1911, Uchida letter to Masuda, 26 October 1911.

[27]Ugaki's memorandum of 14 October 1911 is quoted in Yamamoto Shirō, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon no Dōkō", *Shirin*, 49-1, January 1966, p. 33; see also the similar memo. dated 13 October 1911 in Kurihara Ken, *Tai-Man Mō Seisakushi no Ichimen*, Tokyo 1966, p. 289-90.

[28]The idea of splitting China is noted in Banno Junji, *Meiji - Shisō no Jitsuzō*, Tokyo 1977, p. 141.

[29]Hara, vol. 3, p. 177, entry for 20 October 1911.

railway, and 6,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria were readied for action.[30] Moves by Nakamura Zekō of the South Manchurian Railway Company to force a pretext for Japanese military action were quashed by the cabinet, but the question of whether Japan should exploit the chaos or wait remained unsettled.

However, the disruption in China reawakened discontents within Japan. Japanese press opinion was split between those arguing for non-intervention, Tokutomi Sohō's *Kokumin Shimbun* claiming that a republican China was intrinsically undesirable for imperial Japan (12 November 1911), and Nakano Seigō in the *Osaka Asahi* (18 November 1911) leading approbation for China's revolution and hoping its influence would sweep away the oligarchic domination and corrupt parties of Meiji Japan.[31] The enthusiasm of Japanese youth for this latter view was noticed by army officers.[32] The military had been critical of Saionji's leniency towards socialism in his first cabinet, and now, following the alleged anarchist plot of 1910, there appeared to be support for republicanism among young Japanese. The growth of party influence, it seemed, was accompanied by an increase in "dangerous thoughts", and army actions against the government late in 1912 were in part to defend the monarchy from the growth of democracy and possible future republicanism.

Visiting the dying Komura at Hayama in late November, Katsura argued to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya the necessity of Japan and Britain exchanging views on the revolution. He believed Uchida was convinced and this course was adopted by the cabinet on 28 November 1911.[33] Japan's official policy was thus to work with Britain behind Yuan Shih-k'ai and a constitutional monarchy. Unbeknown to Japan, however, Britain had already negotiated an armistice between the two combatants and the news arrived without warning in Japan on that same 28 November. Britain apparently supported Japan's wish for a constitutional monarchy in China, but refused to intervene. Katsura, however, stuck to his opinion on the value of Anglo-Japanese co-operation, and this was reaffirmed by a meeting of *genrō* at which he was present on 22 December. Yet,

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[30]Ikei, p. 217; Yui Masaomi, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon no Taiō", *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 344, January 1969, p. 4.

[31]Press opinion is considered in Nozawa Yutaka, "Shingai Kakumei to Taishō Seihen", Yui Masaomi, ed., *Ronshū Nihon Rekishi 12: Taishō Demokurashii*, Tokyo 1977, p. 54-55; see also Shinobu Seizaburō, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1974, vol. 1, p. 249. Tsuzuki Keiroku, a protege of Inoue Kaoru, echoed Tokutomi's view in December 1911 when talking to Kojima Kazuo, about to leave for Shanghai to visit Sun Yat-sen. Tsuzuki explained, "We already have the American republic on one side, and if we now get a Chinese republic, our imperial Japan will be in the middle and then what will our future be?" Kojima thought he detected Yamagata behind this statement, Kojima Kazuo, *Ichi Rōseijika no Kaisō*, Tokyo 1951, p. 122.

[32]Katsura Papers, 62-69, Terauchi Masatake letter, 7 January 1912.

[33]Katsura letter to Yamagata, 1 December 1911, quoted Yui, p. 4-5.

about this time, Foreign Minister Uchida informed Inukai Ki, then about to visit Sun Yat-sen in China, that Japan might use military force to ensure a constitutional monarchy.[34] Indeed, there were some in the army chafing at the lack of direction in Tokyo, and this irritation was soon to be increased.

Yuan Shih-k'ai, now the pre-eminent figure on the Ch'ing side, announced that China's future political system should be decided by the national assembly. However, Yuan's adviser was G.E. Morrison, long-time Beijing correspondent for *The Times*, and a man who a few years earlier had exclaimed his intention to smash Japan as he (overlooking Japan's part) had smashed Russia in 1904-05.[35] To the chagrin of officers in Japan, Morrison, and British Minister John Jordan, supported a Chinese republic. As Governor-General of Korea Terauchi Masatake complained to Katsura on 7 January 1912;[36]

> Our China policy has received a setback through Britain's climbdown (*koshi-ori*). This is truly regrettable. It seems the British government gave full credence to its minister in Beijing and Morrison.... I ask you to think about how our government should step hereafter.

The way envisaged by Terauchi and Yamagata was military action in Manchuria. Yamagata, worried that unrest would extend to Manchuria, or that the powers might send in troops, asked for two army divisions to be sent in the name of protecting Japanese lives and interests. He also expected further trouble between the two Chinese factions, and wanted Japan to be in a position to deal with matters as they deteriorated. The divisions, he argued, should be sent following consultation with Russia. As for Britain, he believed that she "has already approved this in general (on this see her enquiry on placing rail transport guards) and is unlikely to disagree."[37] At the very least, Yamagata was hoping to secure Japan's hold on the Kwangtung peninsula for the future. However, Saionji was unwilling to employ troops, and was supported by Yamamoto Gombei, who remained critical throughout of the army's position.[38] The cabinet agreed on 16 January to deal with Manchuria and Mongolia in co-operation with Russia, and a Russo-Japanese agreement followed eight days later, but it was Major-General Tanaka Giichi, acting on his own authority, who pushed the foreign ministry into warning Russia that Japan might

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[34]Kojima, p. 122.

[35]J.O.P. Bland Papers, diary, 26 January 1908, "A long letter from Chirol (foreign affairs editor for *The Times*) complaining sorrowfully of Morrison's "wild talk" - quotes his having said "he was going to smash Japan as he had smashed Russia"."

[36]Katsura Papers, 62-29, Terauchi letter, 7 January 1912.

[37]Katsura Papers, 70-139, Yamagata letter, 15 January 1912. A variant of this letter, giving one army division instead of two, appears in Oyama, p. 337-38.

[38]Banno, *Taisho*, p. 95.

send troops to pacify Manchuria.[39]

Saionji accepted an army ministry compromise whereby fresh troops already waiting in Japan to join the force in Manchuria would be sent, and those due to return remain in place. However, despite army pressure, he heeded declarations by Germany and the United States against any unilateral moves in China, and, with a general election approaching, refused to pay for an overseas expedition. That domestic considerations should be given such weight appalled Yamagata. On 9 February, he told Katsura;[40]

> The cabinet has already approved a despatch or increase of troops and we have an agreement with Russia. For the nation's sake, I cannot contain my indignation that we should be thinking about things around us - concern about the result of the general election is deplorable - and take this policy of standing by as a-once in a lifetime opportunity is lost.

There were covert moves, some with army support, to start an incident in Manchuria or Inner Mongolia, but these were halted by Saionji following British protest. Yamagata and Tanaka Giichi were furious at the cabinet's dangerous inactivity and the support given by the navy. As Tanaka wrote in February;[41]

> There are people who are not pleased at Japan's development on the continent, who think only of expanding their own pasture and think nothing of the nation's existence.... They have joined with the government and the centre of government has come to be in their hands.

It was these people - the popular parties and the navy - whom Tanaka and his colleagues would challenge in the Taishō incident.

In January 1912, Hara Kei, worried about the general criticism of Saionji's passivity, thought Japan should "move a little towards the revolutionary army and give some help. As Russia has already made a move under the pretext of aiding Outer Mongolia to self-rule, we should take appropriate measures in Manchuria."[42] The alternative to military intervention was a variant of "dollar diplomacy". The revolutionary government quietly offered Japan rewards in Manchuria in return for financial support and Mori Tsutomu (Kaku) of the Mitsui Company unilaterally arranged sizable loans for Sun Yat-sen to continue opposing Yuan. These were retroactively supported by Masuda Takashi after talks with Katsura, Inoue, and Saionji. Masuda failed to convince Yamagata of the soundness of this arrangement, but Katsura, in one account, was agreeable to making himself available to meet Sun and arrange further Japanese

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[39]Tanaka Giichi letter to Yamagata, 17 January 1912, quoted Yui, p. 7.

[40]Katsura Papers, 70-140, Yamagata letter, 9 February 1912.

[41]Letter to Terauchi Masatake, 21 February 1912, quoted Yui, p. 11; also Banno, *Taishō Seihen*, p. 96.

[42]Hara, vol. 3, p. 212, 12 January 1912.

support.[43] However, this fell through as Sun was then preoccupied with the revolution and was unable to visit Japan.

It may be appropriate here to consider a question from the following year. In February 1913, with Katsura once more premier, but surrounded by the fury of the Taishō incident, there was a visit from Sun Yat-sen. Sun had been placed in overall charge of Chinese railway development in the government of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and his nominal purpose was to inspect Japan's railroad system and offer thanks for her aid in the 1911 revolution. However, at that time, Katsura is reported to have told Sun that future Japanese policy would be to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, push Britain out of the Far East, and for China and Japan to liberate the peoples of South East Asia and India. This is the account given by Sun's interpreter, Tai Chi-t'ao, in his *Jih-pen-lun* (Shanghai 1928).[44] It is also suggested that journalist Akiyama Teisuke, who helped to arrange the meeting, was trying to persuade Katsura to desert Britain for an alliance with Germany, and this suggestion is accepted by Miyake Masaki in his 1977 article on Katsura.[45] However, one may first question a book in 1928 which supports Western suspicions of a Japanese conspiracy. One may also question this sudden reversal in Katsura's thinking from alliance with the West to Pan-Asianism. China had never been considered, and certainly did not seem in 1913, to be strong enough to hold herself together. This was not just the result of Western imperialism, but of fundamental weaknesses within China herself. Not least of these was the lack of national unity. Consequently, Katsura would hardly have preferred to join with China against the West. Moreover, to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance would have been a personal humiliation given his role in its foundation and repeated renewal. Japan and Britain had not worked well together in the 1911 revolution, but this was no reason to ally with Germany, which had intervened against Japan in 1895, and was headed by a monarch widely regarded as unstable. Katsura was a *happō bijin*, and his willingness to please may have led him into some rash statements for Sun's benefit. However, it is unlikely that he was serious.

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[43]Yamaura Kanichi, *Mori Tsutomu*, Tokyo 1940, p. 406-08; Yamamoto, p. 48-49; See also Katsura Papers, 70-139, letter to Katsura, 15 January 1913. The chronology in the Yamaura account is questionable. It gives Katsura offering to meet Sun during the second Chinese revolution which commenced in mid-July 1913. This is repeated by Marius Jansen, using the Yamamura work, in his *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, Camb. Mass. 1954, p. 166. However, at that point, Katsura was terminally ill and had been unable to attend the funeral of his son only three months earlier. Moreover, a letter to Masuda Takashi, given as 4 February 1913 but reasonably interpreted as 4 February 1912 by Yamamoto Shirō, speaks of Sun or one of his senior aides being ready to visit Japan and arrange a secret agreement.

[44]This account is accepted by Harold Schiffrin in his biography *Sun Yat-sen* (Boston 1980), p. 172, and unchallenged by Marius Jansen in his study, p. 159. For the Katsura-Sun talks, see also Ishikawa Jun, "Katsura Tarō to Son Bun", *Kaigai Jijō*, 7-1, January 1959; Kojima, p. 125.

[45]Kojima, p. 125; Miyake Masaki, "German Cultural and Political Influence on Japan, 1870-1914", in John Moses/Paul Kennedy, ed., *Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914*, St. Lucia 1977. Miyake's article is unusual in its factual inaccuracy and club-footed logic.

In the 1911 revolution, Japan had ultimately achieved less than in the Boxer war. She was confronted with a republic under Yuan Shih-k'ai and murmurs of republicanism at home. Naval opposition, foreign protest, and the expense involved had prevented any despatch of troops to Manchuria and Japan's position there was not significantly improved by the affair. Having predicted chaos for years, Japan found herself spectacularly unprepared to deal with the situation and never showed herself in control of events.

However deplorable it might be to Yamagata that Saionji tailored his foreign policy to the upcoming general election, the voting public seemed less concerned by policies overseas. In the general election of May 1912, the Seiyūkai increased its seats in the Lower House from 207 to 209, the liberal Kokumintō improved from 87 to 95, while the conservative Chūō Club declined from 50 to 30 seats.

The Taishō Incident: The First Stage

Those in the army who considered military policy paramount quickly decided that the Seiyūkai-navy alliance endangered both their position and with it the nation. In April 1912, Army Minister Ishimoto died suddenly and, in talks with Katsura, Saionji came up with three lieutenant-generals as possible replacements: Kigoshi Yasutsuna, who had long served as Katsura's chief of staff in Nagoya and during the Sino-Japanese war; Uehara Yūsaku, a Satsuma man educated in France; and Nagaoka Gaishi, one of the founders of the Getsuyōkai, and formerly vice chief of staff during the war with Russia.[46] One may assume that Kigoshi was included at Katsura's request and that Katsura would have preferred to see him appointed. However, Tanaka Giichi believed the Seiyūkai's administrative and financial reforms were targetted against army expansion and believed the cabinet had to be forced to back down.[47] Tanaka received Yamagata's support for Uehara, who, despite his antipathy to the Terauchi-Chōshū domination of the army ministry, was believed to favour a forward continental policy, and it was Uehara who received the appointment.[48] This was to have grave consequences within a few months.

In mid-1912, Katsura embarked on the long-contemplated trip to Europe. At the time of Itō's assassination, he had declared, "Prince Itō nominated me his successor in

[46]See Saionji's letter to Yamagata, April 1912, cited in Jōhō Yoshio, *Rikugunshō Gunmukyokuchō*, Tokyo 1979, p. 147.

[47]See Tanaka's letter to Terauchi Masatake, 30 March 1912, quoted Kōketsu Atsushi, Atsushi, "Tanaka Giichi Kenkyū Nōto", *Seiji Keizai Shigaku*, 205, August 1983, p. 22.

[48]On Uehara and his group, see Kitaoka, p. 74-76.

Japanese politics."[49] Now he intended to pursue two of Itō's aims. One was the aborted discussions with Russia from 1909.[50] The other was the creation of a personal party to ensure government policies in the Diet. Katsura had already considered such a move and, in 1908, had told Yamagata that if an independent pro-government party were necessary, he would lead it himself.[51] As he informed the emperor in 1912;[52]

> Till now the great statesmen of the restoration have been pre-eminent and supported your majesty, but they are weakening and all are growing old and cannot provide such support forever. From now on, all the people must aid your majesty and carry out politics. For that reason, I have been thinking for some time that we must have a political party. I will inspect foreign parties as reference, and that is why I have thought to travel overseas.

Katsura's party, including Gotō Shimpei, Wakatsuki, Major Hata Eitarō (elder brother of Hata Shunroku), and language assistants, departed Japan in July. It travelled by rail to Harbin, locked tight by Russian police and troops to prevent a recurrence of 1909, with suspect Koreans detained in jail, and Katsura meeting Russian officials inside his train carriage.[53] However, upon arrival in St. Petersburg, they were informed of the Meiji emperor's collapsing health. Reports of some improvement allowed Katsura to begin talks on Russo-Japanese co-operation in China, but the emperor's condition worsened rapidly. The party decided to hurry back, but the Meiji era ended with the emperor dying as Katsura crossed the Ural mountains.

Immediately upon returning to Japan, Katsura found himself appointed to the posts of grand chamberlain and lord privy seal to the new Taishō emperor. There are divergent views on whether this was a slap in the face from Yamagata, or a strategic move by Yamagata to retain palace support against the apparent Seiyūkai-navy coalition. For some like Wakatsuki, the appointment was a shock, virtually ending Katsura's political life, and he recalls Katsura himself greeting the news with despondency.[54] Katsura's party plan might have been seen by Yamagata as repeating Itō's betrayal of 1900, and, whereas Yamagata had then forced Itō to become prime minister in a hurry, he could not do likewise with Saionji already in the premiership, and may have acted to shut Katsura out

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[49]Reported in *Japan Chronicle*, 11 November 1909, quoted George Akita, "Itō, Yamagata, and Katsura: The Changing of the Guards", unpublished paper, p. 2.

[50]Tsurumi, vol. 2, p. 976.

[51]Kagawa Etsuji, *Ōura Kanetake-den*, Tokyo 1921, p. 162-63. Yamagata had suggested that Ōura form such a party.

[52]Wakatsuki Reijirō, *Kofūan Kaikoroku*, Tokyo 1975, p. 177. Terauchi was looking for diplomatic results from the Katsura trip, writing of his hope for "many rewards for us from his discussions with European politicians", Sakeda Masatoshi et al, ed., *Tokutomi Sohō Kankei Monjo*, 3 vols., Tokyo 1982-87, vol. 2, p. 268-69, Terauchi letter to Tokutomi, 12 June 1912.

[53]Honda Kumatarō, *Senjin o Kataru*, Tokyo 1939, p. 60-80. Honda was consul at Harbin at the time. Wakatsuki, p. 180-81, describes the trip.

[54]Wakatsuki, p. 184.

of politics.[55] Katsura reportedly said before his trip that, "If I don't put Yamagata into retirement upon my return, I'll get nowhere," a position substantiated by his statement to the emperor on the decline of the Meiji leaders.[56] Hara Kei's immediate reaction to the appointment, however, was that this gave the Yamagata group a powerful ally in the palace, and this is accepted by Banno Junji.[57] Yet, the history of Katsura's attitude to army expansion in previous years, and his advice to Saionji late in 1912, suggest that Hara was quite mistaken.

In November 1912, Katsura reached the age of sixty-five and, after attending the military review with the emperor earlier that month, withdrew to the second reserve. With this, his active connection with the army virtually ceased. Almost immediately, however, the two division problem intervened and Katsura found himself thrust back into politics and revived in the public eye as a member of the Chōshū military clique.

As early as September 1911, the British military attache in Tokyo had predicted that the Japanese army would press for two new infantry divisions, both to improve its position over the navy and to strengthen the garrison in Korea, and would use the reasoning that greater numbers going through the ranks would combat the increase of democratic and socialist views.[58] The genesis of the divisional expansion went back to the Russo-Japanese war. Severe troop shortages had led the army general staff and army ministry to plan four new divisions. The Katsura cabinet, including Army Minister Terauchi, had replied that financial conditions prevented more than two divisions at this time. In March 1905, however, following the massive battle of Mukden, Chief of Staff Yamagata requested six new divisions over and above those already in consideration. Once again, Katsura and Terauchi pleaded financial incapacity, but Yamagata argued that troop strength should take precedence over economic demands.[59] Katsura compromised by accepting the extra two divisions previously shaved from army requests in return for abandonment of this new plan. Yamagata and Kodama, however, persisted in demanding a major troop increase, and Yamagata repeated his belief that sacrifices at home were essential to ensure post-war military expansion and the nation's survival.[60] The rift

[55]Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1958, p. 122. Irie Kanichi, *Yamagata Kō no Omokage*, Tokyo 1922, p. 149, suggests Yamagata wanted Katsura as the one most informed on domestic and international matters to serve the new emperor.

[56]Kojima, p. 134.

[57]Hara, vol. 3, p. 245, entry for 13 August 1912; Banno, *Taishō*, p. 103.

[58]F.O. 410/59, Lieutenant-Colonel John Somerville report, enclosed in MacDonald to Grey, 19 September 1911.

[59]Ōe Shinobu, *Nihon no Sambō Hombu*, Tokyo 1985, p. 118.

[60]Ōyama, p. 287, Yamagata memorandum, August 1905.

between Yamagata-Kodama and Katsura-Terauchi continued until Kodama's death in mid-1906. However, the first half of the agreed four division expansion was implemented in September 1907, with the remaining two awaiting the necessary funds.[61]

Yamagata, however, was convinced that Russia would seek revenge for her earlier defeat, and that China would demand the return of the Kwangtung peninsula in 1922. On 31 July 1911, he asked the second Katsura cabinet to make adequate preparations and establish six new divisions before 1922. As before, Katsura and Terauchi were unresponsive, and Katsura sent Vice Finance Minister Wakatsuki to Yamagata with an explanation of Japan's economic position.[62] Yet, after the Chinese revolution, the army had domestic reasons to press for the remaining two divisions from 1905. As an army ministry memorandum from September 1912 explained;[63]

> The government hopes to fulfil its public promise with reforms, thus raising the Seiyūkai cabinet's reputation and strengthening the base of party government. To this end, it will make temporary use of the navy and apply extreme pressure to the army.... The present situation is not just about divisional increases. The government's real intention is to use this opportunity and establish a base for party cabinets. The divisional question is no more than a sacrifice against this. It is a momentous point for our nation. In short, will Japan be a democracy or a monarchy?

Thus, the debacle of the Chinese revolution and the navy's alliance with the Seiyūkai had produced a test of wills between the democratic party movement and the army as defender of the emperor and nation.

The memorandum outlined army strategy against the Saionji cabinet. In the event of opposition from the prime minister to the new divisions, Army Minister Uehara should reply that a decision on military affairs was the emperor's prerogative. General Yamagata should take the same line if called on by Saionji. As for Katsura, he should explain that his office precluded him from intervening on the cabinet's behalf. If Saionji requested an imperial decision, then Katsura should convey the emperor's wish for a united cabinet policy, impossible given Uehara's position. Consequently, the cabinet would have to resign, and Katsura should have the *genrō* informed by the palace General Terauchi would head the new cabinet.[64] In this way, the pattern established by Katsura of transferring power between the prime minister and senior party would be overcome, the emperor would be seen as supporting the army for the needs of the nation, and Terauchi's appointment would guarantee army predominance over the navy. What could not be

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[61]Ōe, p. 119; Kōketsu, p. 18-19; Kitaoka, p. 67-68.

[62]Kitaoka, p. 70-71.

[63]Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Kankei Monjo: Shushō Izen*, Kyoto 1984, p. 583-86. Yamamoto does not identify the author of this memorandum, but its content suggests either Tanaka Giichi or one of his subordinates.

[64]Yamamoto, above.

guaranteed, of course, was that the public would accept this *coup de theatre*, or, indeed, that Katsura would co-operate.

On 22 November 1912, Army Minister Uehara formally requested cabinet to approve two new army divisions for the defence of Korea.[65] Saionji was not surprised. Although Katsura had been concentrating on an appropriately practical education for the new emperor in the new century, Saionji had long since asked his views on the army's intentions.[66] In August 1912, Katsura had advised Saionji to follow his own precedent and argue the economic facts directly to Yamagata. Yamagata had seemed to be convinced before, and might be again. Katsura also suggested that a compromise should be found to save Uehara's face. His idea was an actual increase in Korean forces by converting the two temporary regiments already there to permanent status.[67] However, he made plain his intention not to become involved in politics again. Although Saionji took this advice and spoke directly to Yamagata on 30 August, he came away without substantial gain.[68]

The Taishō Incident: Army, Parties, People

On 23 November, the day after Uehara's request in cabinet, Noda Utarō of the Seiyūkai asked Katsura for mediation. Ignoring the role scripted for him by the army ministry, Katsura agreed that two new divisions were inappropriate at this time and urged Saionji to suggest a two-year deferral of the matter.[69] However, the army was adamant that expansion take place from 1913 and this was supported by Yamagata.

Senior officers from Satsuma tried to prevent a split between the army and cabinet but Uehara believed himself acting in the national interest.[70] At the last minute, having realised that his earlier proposal had failed, Katsura offered a further compromise whereby the divisional expansion might be set in motion in 1913, but with reduced funds,

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[65]Hara, vol. 3, p. 264, entry for 22 November 1912. Tanaka Giichi had explained to cabinet on 9 November the reasoning for this request.

[66]On the Taishō Emperor, Katsura told Nitobe Inazō, "He follows the excellence of the Meiji Emperor, and this is not an easy thing. Up to the Meiji Emperor's reign, the primitive idea of Japan's emperor as god was acceptable, but, henceforth, he must be taught that he is not a god but simply the highest of men," Nitobe, *Ijin Gunzō*, Tokyo 1931, p. 321.

[67]Hara, vol. 3, p. 246-50, entries for 17-18 and 30 August 1912. Kōketsu, p. 20, interprets the same passage on Katsura's compromise as an increase of two regiments and the revision of status of the temporary Korean forces.

[68]Hara, vol. 3, p. 250, entry for 30 August 1912. Yamagata supported the army expansion, as his memorandum of 1911 would indicate, and believed this might be funded out of economies already made by the army.

[69]Hara, vol. 3, p. 264, entry for 23 November 1912. As earlier noted, Katsura expected Japanese finances to improve by about 1914.

[70]For the attempts by Takashima Tomonosuke and others to dissuade Uehara, see Hara, vol. 3, p. 265, entry for 25 November 1912.

and completion be postponed until 1914 or 1915.[71] Katsura had apparently spoken to Uehara and got him to agree. However, Hara, speaking for the cabinet, deemed the new plan unlikely to succeed and, realising a clash inevitable, asked whether Kigoshi Yasutsuna, Katsura's own army disciple, would be willing to step in as army minister. Katsura, however, refrained from committing himself entirely against army opinion.[72]

On 1 December, Saionji refused Uehara's demand and the following day the army minister gave his resignation directly to the emperor. Saionji had been ready to resign as early as October and now made little attempt to resist, handing in his own resignation on 5 December.[73] Apparently, Yamagata was shocked that matters had gone so far and now feared popular attacks on the army.[74] This made a Terauchi cabinet untenable, even though Tanaka Giichi worked for the appointment as outlined in the army ministry's memorandum, and cabled Terauchi in Seoul that Katsura was supporting the candidacy.[75] Consequently, the Meiji oligarchs were back with a familiar problem; how to find an acceptable premier from a limited pool. They tried to convince Saionji to stay on, then turned to Matsukata, Hirata Tōsuke, and Yamamoto Gombei, none of whom, with the possible exception of Hirata, would have supported the divisional expansion.[76] It was Saionji who proposed Katsura return as prime minister, and, by 10 December, the *genrō*, finding themselves without alternatives, returned to Katsura despite his adamant refusal.[77] Katsura suggested at a *genrō* meeting on 9 December the resurrection of an idea first made in November by industrialist member of the Lower House, Nakano Buei, and members of the Kokumintō. This was for a National Defence Council, composed of representatives from the defence forces, parties, bureaucracy, and finance, to debate the divisional question and reach a solution integrated into the wider national policy. While in session, both army and navy increases would be deferred.[78] Although Yamagata was

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[71]Hara, vol. 3, p. 266, entry for 25 November 1912.

[72]Hara, above.

[73]Sakeda et al, vol. 2, p. 269, Suginaka Tanekichi letter to Tokutomi, 9 October 1912, shows Saionji determined to resign as of October and also give up the presidency of the Seiyūkai.

[74]Oka Yoshitake, *Yamagata Aritomo*, Tokyo 1957, p. 124; Irie Kanichi, *Yamagata Kō no Omokage*, Tokyo 1921, p. 155-56.

[75]"Prince Katsura's intention to recommend you is stronger than ever so if you are asked to return to the palace, do not delay," Yamamoto, *Terauchi Monjo*, p. 587-88, Tanaka telegrams, 5 December 1912. As noted earlier, Terauchi had supported Katsura whenever Yamagata asked for additional troops and this may have been in Katsura's mind if he did support Terauchi's appointment. Tanaka himself realised that the people in general went in fear of Terauchi, *Terauchi Monjo*, p. 589, Tanaka telegram to Terauchi, 9 December 1912.

[76]In October 1912, Matsukata and Inoue, with Ōyama Iwao accompanying, had barged into a cabinet meeting to urge the suspension of new projects and the return to Japanese financial stability, Sakeda et al, vol. 2, p. 270, Abe Tsurunosuke letter to Tokutomi, 15 October 1912; Banno, *Taishō*, p. 106-09. Consequently, it is hard to believe Matsukata would have considered allowing such funds to the army.

[77]Yamamoto, *Terauchi Monjo*, p. 588-89, Tanaka telegram, 7 Decemeber, 10-12 December 1912.

[78]For Nakano, see Kōketsu, p. 24; Katsura's suggestion, Kitaoka, p. 133.

inclined to agree, the general army and navy view was that the council should meet only to decide how to implement increases as quickly as possible. Thus, the idea was stillborn.

This attempt by Katsura to ease army expansion away from being solely an army decision, and so prevent the army from isolating itself in society, did not attack the immediate question of who would be prime minister. It was said that Katsura's assumption of the office was a disgrace in so far as he had just entered the palace service, but his very presence in *genrō* meetings was unusual for a grand chamberlain or privy seal. As in 1901, Katsura had become the last acceptable choice for the Meiji oligarchs and he was formally asked to establish a cabinet on 17 December. That same day, Tanaka Giichi wrote begging him to protect the army's name and refuse any postponement of the divisional expansion.[79] Then, with political groups having already declared war on the Chōshū army faction as the enemy of both the constitution and people, Katsura accepted his third appointment as premier.[80]

Katsura, temporarily doubling as foreign minister, was described by the British ambassador on 23 December as giving "the impression of a man who was unmistakably pleased to re-enter politics after the seclusion of the court."[81] Katsura's love of politics has already been described, but the problems confronting him at the end of 1912 were all domestic and there was no immediately obvious foreign threat which might be employed to quiet the mounting popular fury. The army could point to the menace of Russia, but, as the *Tokyo Keizai Shimpō* had warned on 30 November 1912, Japanese army expansion would only prompt further Russian expansion.[82] The navy wanted more ships against possible challenges from the United States, but that was far distant. The army's original explanation was that the divisions were needed for Korea. However, this placed in question the value of annexing Korea if this merely increased Japan's defence burdens. Katsura was left to deal with the army, navy, parties and people, and no-one was in any mood for compromise.

Navy Minister Saitō had agreed to stay in the second Saionji cabinet on condition that the government approve naval expansion. In December 1912, he rejected Katsura's

[79]Tanaka letter, 17 December 1912, quoted Kitaoka, p. 135.

[80]Uno Shunichi, "Dai Niji Katsura Naikaku", Hayashi Shigeru/Tsuji Kiyoaki, ed., *Nihon Naikaku Shiroku*, 5 vols., Tokyo 1981, vol. 2, p. 137, quotes a statement to all the Seiyūkai branches on 14 December; "The politicians of the Chōshū faction are the enemies of the constitution, the enemies of public opinion, and the enemies of the people. We declare to the world that we will wage war on this faction and defend constitutional government."

[81]F.O. 410/62, Rumbold (Tokyo) to Grey, 23 December 1912.

[82]Quoted Kōketsu, p. 24.

suggestion that this be referred along with the army question to a National Defence Council, and ultimately refused to serve in the new cabinet. Faced with spiralling problems, Katsura called a further *genrō* meeting and, on 21 December, had an imperial rescript command Saitō to stay in office. As compensation, however, Katsura agreed to fulfil Saionji's promise on naval expansion in 1913, thus undermining his own, now clearly hopeless, proposal for a general National Defence Council.[83] With this the third Katsura cabinet was established, and it was determinedly a Katsura cabinet, comprising Kigoshi Yasutsuna as army minister, Gotō Shimpei for communications, Wakatsuki Reijirō at finance, and long-time Katsura cabinet secretary Shibata Kamon as education minister. Yet, for the public, Katsura was still a Chōshū clique militarist, and he tried to win popular approval by unofficially announcing his policies in Tokutomi Sohō's *Kokumin Shimbun* on 19 December. In these, he promised to advance constitutional government, use administrative and financial reforms to save fifty million yen in the budget, continue repayments on the national debt, renovate Japan's lacklustre diplomacy, give consideration to tax revision, and ensure a healthy national defence plan.[84] There was something for everyone here, but clearly financial reform and repayment of the national debt would impede immediate satisfaction of army demands, although such retrenchment might, as Katsura had suggested to Hara in mid-1912, allow for expansion in two to three years. The policy was designed to bring people back to the negotiating table. However, the journalists and politicians such as Ozaki Yukio and Inukai Ki, long separated from power by the Katsura-Seiyūkai alliance, declared, "We reject compromise and will cut out clique rule to defend constitutional government."[85] Thus the battle lines of the Taishō political incident were already well drawn as Katsura began his third administration. The events of January and February 1913 have been carefully charted in works by Najita Tetsuo, Peter Duus, and articles on Yamagata and Saionji.[86] Katsura, however, the central figure of the affair, has been overlooked and so only his actions will be recounted here.

[83]Uno, p. 135; Kitaoka, p. 136.

[84]Uno, p. 143; Tokutomi, vol. 2, p. 625-26.

[85]Uno, p. 140, quoting declaration from the first general meeting to protect constitutional government, Kabuki-za (Tokyo), 19 December 1912. See also the editorial of the *Yorozu Chōh(o)*, 12 January 1913, which termed the second Katsura cabinet one of compromise, and the third, one of challenge, Uno, p. 136. Ozaki in particular made a point of attacking the army's domination of senior posts in the colonies and Manchuria even though much of these duties were those of ordinary civil administration, Haruyama Akiyoshi/Wakabayashi Masatake, *Nihon Shokuminchishugi no Seijiteki Tenkai, 1895-1934*, Tokyo 1980, p. 43-44, Ozaki speech, Meiji-za (Tokyo), 16 December 1912.

[86]Najita, *Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905-1915*, Camb. Mass. 1967; Duus, *Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan*, Camb. Mass. 1968, particularly p. 38-49; Roger Hackett, "Yamagata and the Taisho Crisis, 1912-1913", *Studies on Asia*, 1962; Jackson Bailey, "Prince Saionji and the Taisho Political Crisis, 1912-1913", *Studies on Asia*, 1962.

In mid-January 1913, with the "protect the constitution movement" in full voice, and ignoring Yamagata's suggestion to "charge them at the center", Katsura revealed to Yamagata and associates such as Den Kenjirō the plan for his own political party, soonto be christened the Dōshikai.[87] On 20 January, the day before the Diet was prorogued for fifteen days, Katsura called in metropolitan journalists and made the announcement public.

Shortly after, there were disturbing rumours, as Tanaka Giichi reported, that Katsura would either abolish the stipulation that defence ministers be on active service, or exceed even Saionji in his pressure for more army reform, thus undermining the army's claim to have done everything possible. With Kigoshi as minister, the army would have lost the ability to resist within the constitutional framework.[88] As Kitaoka Shinichi has stated, with his knowledge of military conditions, "if Katsura chose to pressure the interests of the forces, he would become a fearsome presence towards the army."[89] This made Katsura something of a hero to an old rival: Ōkuma Shigenobu. Writing in the magazines *Chikyū* and *Jitsugyō no Nihon*, both on 15 February 1913, Ōkuma argued that the Dōshikai should be welcomed if it led to progress in constitutional government and carried out advanced policies. He declared that he had urged former colleagues Ōishi Masami and Taketomi Tokitoshi, both now in the Kokumintō, to join Katsura's party as its platform of financial retrenchment and tax reform was the same as their own.[90] Moreover, Ōkuma attacked Saionji both for his lordly attitude to politics and his surrender to the army, and expressed confidence that Katsura, with his far greater political skill, would ensure that army demands were rebuffed and further financial reform effected;[91]

> Prince Katsura is a Chōshū leader and like an elder brother to Count Terauchi. He is not open to army pressure like Prince Saionji and if the army complains and refuses reform, then Prince Katsura must, in view of national policy, censure its arrogance. Consequently, the reform of army expenses which proved fatal to the Saionji cabinet will, we may be sure, make steady progress under the cabinet of Prince Katsura.

As for the "protect the constitution movement", Ōkuma had mixed reactions. He praised Inukai and the Kokumintō for having pressured Katsura into accepting advanced policies,

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[87]Yamagata quote from letter to Katsura, 14 January 1913, cited in Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton 1985, p. 227; Yamamoto Shirō, "Katsura no Shin Seitō Soshiki ni tsuite", *Nihon Rekishi*, 242, July 1968, p. 103, quoting Den diary, 17 January 1913; Uno, p. 148. It is arguable that the Dōshikai was so named to evoke parallels with Itō's Seiyūkai, and also avoid the associations of the term *tō* with the early anti-government parties.

[88]Tanaka letter, 2 February 1913, quoted Kitaoka, p. 136.

[89]Kitaoka, p. 137.

[90]Kimura, p. 127-32 and 136-37. The reform faction of the Kensei Hontō led by Ōishi had in 1908 supported Katsura's financial policies, and had as early as 1906 looked to Katsura as their new leader to replace Okuma and Inukai in the struggle against the Seiyūkai, Najita, p. 51-52; Banno, *Taishō*, p. 52-53.

[91]Kimura, p. 128

but warned;[92]

> Inukai's movement is destruction, not construction. Trees and houses have fallen, but there is no new house or garden to suit our taste. We must sleep in the fields and here build houses anew. After destruction, the poor do not become rich, nor the foolish wise. Just because of a change in our thinking, foreigners will not respond to our poor nation's bonds.... The healthy development of constitutional government requires an attempt to build anew after this destruction.... Prince Katsura has announced a new party as his creation. We cannot say whether this will develop healthily or not, but it comes at the right moment, following the great destruction and when the people are dissatisfied with the existing situation. We should accept it as a step forward.

Some were inclined to agree. On 31 January 1913, Ōishi Masami, Taketomi Tokitoshi, Kataoka Naoharu, Shimada Saburō, and Kōno Hironaka, all of the Kokumintō and all former opponents of Katsura, took Ōkuma's advice to join the Dōshikai.[93] On 7 February 1913, Katsura introduced the Dōshikai to the public. It garnered support from over ninety Diet members, more than had been anticipated, but still insufficient to challenge the Seiyūkai and control the present Diet session.[94] On 5 February, as the Diet had re-opened, popular feelings against the cabinet had been heightened by Ozaki Yukio's speech vilifying Katsura and his apparent exploitation of the throne. The Seiyūkai had no reason to support a man working to reduce their influence, and Saionji refused Katsura's request for intervention against the Diet's vote of no-confidence. On 9 February, the emperor ordered Saionji to restore calm in the Diet, but this only incensed the public further. On the morning of 10 February, just as Katsura was about to leave for the Diet, a visitor suddenly called at his Mita residence - Yamamoto Gombei. Yamamoto angrily told told Katsura to stop using the emperor for his own ends and to get out of office.[95] In 1907, Katsura had concluded that Yamamoto's disclaimers of any wish to be premier should not be taken seriously.[96] Now, Yamamoto believed his time had come and, working with the Seiyūkai, he waited for Katsura's decision. The following day, with the Diet building surrounded by an angry throng, ready for violence if the Diet were dissolved, and the speaker of the Lower House appealing to him to prevent the possible chaos (*nairan*), Katsura resigned.[97] A *genrō* meeting accepted Saionji's recommendation of Yamamoto and, despite outrage at this betrayal of the movement to

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[92]Kimura, p. 136-37.

[93]Uno, p. 146; Yamamoto, "Katsura no Shin Seitō", p. 110-12. Yamamoto suggests various reasons why these five should abandon the Kokumintō for the Dōshikai and credits none of them with integrity. Instead, he suggests personal advancement and financial benefit. This is a rather uncharitable attitude towards the likes of Shimada, who is generally accepted as a man of honour.

[94]Duus, p. 42-49, examines some of the members and their own reasons for joining.

[95]The meeting is described by Wakatsuki, p. 197, who arrived at Katsura's residence immediately after Yamamoto's departure; also Motoyama Katsuragawa, *Katsura Tarō to Hara Kei*, Tokyo 1935, p. 215; Uno, p. 153.

[96]Hara, vol. 2, p. 227, entry for 24 February 1907.

[97]Wakatsuki, p. 197-98, recounts Katsura's meeting with the speaker of the Lower House.

defend the constitution, the first Yamamoto cabinet was appointed on 12 February 1913.[98] Thus, the "protect the constitution" movement gained no immediate advance, and the first party cabinet would have to wait until after the rice riots of 1918. In the meantime, Taishō democracy remained stifled by oligarchic intrusion, military domination, and transcendental cabinets. In 1915, it was Ōkuma himself who, as premier, approved the army's two new divisions over Diet protest.

After Katsura's death, Yamagata and Hara Kei agreed that Katsura was mentally unstable during the Taishō incident. Later scholars such as Yamamoto Shirō have blandly accepted the claim.[99] However, Katsura's plans attacked both the authority of Yamagata as head of military politics and Hara as mediator in the Katsura-Saionji compromise, and their dissatisfaction should not be taken so literally. Katsura was acting in accordance with policies and actions exhibited throughout his political career and the results of the Dōshikai were far from meagre. It persisted under the leadership of Katō Takaaki, and became the largest party in the Diet in the general election of March 1915. The politics of the 1920s were to be dominated by its rivalry with the Seiyūkai, then, ironically, under the presidency of General Tanaka Giichi.

As for Katsura, although he might have survived as easily as he had following the Hibiya riots in 1905, he was prevented from trying. After attending a dinner given by entrepreneurs in March 1913, his health declined rapidly and he took to his bed from mid-April.[100] The following month, he heard that his eldest son, Yoichi, had died of illness, but was too ill himself to attend the funeral. He made a brief recovery in late August and was able to walk the corridors at home. However, when son-in-law Nagashima Ryūji visited in September, he moved only with the aid of attendants. As Nagashima recalled;[101]

> Autumn was drawing on and the leaves were beginning to change colour. Beneath them, the shadow of the old politician, carried round in his chair, was faint.

Katsura died on 10 October 1913.

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[98]Nozawa, p. 64, notes some of the public responses to the new cabinet.

[99]Yamamoto, "Katsura no Shin Seitō", p. 117, and again in "Taishō Seihen to Gumbu", *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, 334, March 1968, p. 62.

[100]Sakeda et al, p. 49, 72, Ōura Kanetake letter to Tokutomi, 21 April 1913, Katsura Tarō letter to Tokutomi, 10 May 1913. By May, Katsura was unable to read the book about himself written by Tokutomi and had to get a nurse to read aloud for him.

[101]Nagashima, *Seikai Hiwa*, Tokyo 1928, p. 129.

Chapter 13

CONCLUSION: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM and KATSURA TARŌ

Japanese imperialism is an emotive subject. Its enduring images are, for example, the rape of Nanjing, the psychological theft of "lost names" in Korea, the Bataan death march. Mention has been made of the 1894 massacre at Port Arthur, the execution of surrendered guerrillas in Taiwan in 1902, and the ruthless destruction in Korea from 1907. As the British consul noted, "The Japanese take no prisoners, so far as I can learn, except temporarily for the purpose of obtaining from them information, after which they are shot."

Yet, as General Terauchi remarked in 1906; "Here all debate is conducted in the spirit of peace; in Manchuria, action is taken in the spirit of war." In fact, the Meiji era began in the age of accelerated Western imperialism, and the army was dominated throughout by the sense of Japan as a garrison-state. Save for the Getsuyōkai, the military reversed the slogan *fukoku kyōhei* - rich nation, strong army - and defined a strong army as the prerequisite to national survival and later riches. The introduction of conscription from 1873 was designed to produce national unity and a national army. However, as argued by the joint Katsura-Kawakami letter of 1886, military strength had to be seen to be effective, and the means to this end was imperial expansion. Japan could employ her weaker neighbours, initially Korea and Taiwan, as a source of cheap and reassuring victories, but the achilles heel of imperialism was that no border was ever secure and spiralling defence costs only threatened what General Miura Gorō termed a "poor nation, strong army". Criticism of the defence budget, however, only served to heighten the army's siege mentality, ultimately producing the 1912 clash between the parties of democracy and the guardians of monarchism.

Imperialism may be understood in its strategic aspect; as a demonstration of national strength to deter potential rivals. However, this demonstration cannot be convincing while there remain internal divisions at home. The two greatest threats to Meiji unity were socialism and indifference. One solution was a social imperialism; not only to divert outwards domestic tensions, but also to enhance the people's sense of authority and impose on them a greater understanding of responsibility. This is where imperialism acts as a complement to nationalism. In Japan, conscription and nationalistic education had not produced a regimented people, responsive both to government directive and security needs. Instead, following the Russo-Japanese war, army leaders saw only popular complacency, irresponsibility, and egotism, and observed similar vices among the people's elected representatives. In the late imperialist era, there were two broad categories of state: the living and the dying, as Lord Salisbury called them, or those which expanded and those which suffered full or partial foreign control. For the latter, anti-colonialism was a sufficient base for nationalism. However, in the living, passivity in overseas expansion was believed to bring about industrial stagnation, the consequent growth of socialism, and the weakening of the national spirit. Consequently, to ensure national survival and domestic harmony, it was essential to expand the empire. This was the stance taken by Yamagata, Katsura and Kawakami, and also adopted by American expansionists in the late nineteenth century. Imperialism was expected to enhance strategic security, provide access to overseas raw materials or markets for domestic industrial growth, and open "living space" for what was interpreted as excess population. Equally, however, imperialism was intended to provide a comforting sense of power to the nation in embryo, and to force the people into maturity by an acceptance of wider responsibilities. As Katsura wrote at the end of his 1912 book, *Shosekun*;[1]

> Now our empire truly ranks among the great nations of the world. We have achieved our wishes of old. If you ask what attitude we should work with in the future, and what activities we should undertake, the answer is that we must act as the people of a great nation, and stand with the world powers in the competitive arena.

By expanding the empire, the Meiji leaders were looking to involve their people in the global community, alert them to the dangers on Japan's periphery, and force them into greater obedience at home: in Katsura's words, "if you want to be obeyed, you must first obey." In the end, however, Japan became internationally isolated, and her people were made compliant only by extending the army's garrison-state mentality and reverting to a primitive nationalism based on fear of the outside.

Japanese imperialism began with obvious disadvantages. She was relatively late in industrialising, and the pace of both her modernisation and imperial expansion was so rapid as to threaten extraordinary social dislocation. This, in turn, provided an even greater incentive for imperialism as a tool of social policy. However, Japan was weak financially; railways were seen as the instrument and motive force of imperialism, yet rail

[1]Katsura Tarō, *Shosekun*, Tokyo 1912, p. 157.

projects in Taiwan or Korea enjoyed only meagre support from private capitalists. This made formal imperialism - the acquisition of colonies - a dangerous financial gambit, demanding a firm government lead and an assurance of social order from Japanese colonial garrisons. This would suggest that the Marxist definition of imperialism as a product of domestic capital pressure is simply inappropriate to Japan. Moreover, Japan was ideologically impoverished; contemporary imperialism was a product of Western civilisation, and she could not utilise the concept of the "White man's burden". Alternatively, were she to attempt a Pan-Asian *mission civilisatrice*, this would only have exacerbated Western fears of a "yellow peril", thereby cutting off modern technology and continued financial support. The ambiguity in Japanese imperialism caused her to oscillate between a policy of amity and distance towards China. She attempted to provide an anchor by co-ordinating Sino-Japanese relations with those of a third power, generally Britain, but the ineffectiveness of this was revealed in the 1911 revolution.

Japan, unlike the Western nations, was trying to build an empire in her own back-yard.[2] She faced the same problems as Russia in Poland, or Britain in Ireland. There was no geographical or cultural distance between would-be ruler and ruled, and she was incapable of elucidating a separate and convincingly superior individuality which would sustain her domination. The Western imperialists employed Christianity and its promise of heavenly reward, but there was no Japanese missionary vanguard preparing the way for her influence. Japan had no claim to a monopoly on understanding of Buddhism or Confucianism, and Shintō was so parochial a belief that attempts within Japan itself to unify it on a national scale were ultimately futile. Despite claiming to be unique, Japan remained, both for East and West, a part of Asia. The poverty of Japanese imperialism is finely captured by Chinese author, Lin Yutang, writing in the second Sino-Japanese war;[3]

> Peiping is now a Japanese city. Then let them be conquerors and look their part. But they cannot. They cannot be dignified and self-assured. If they could look confident and at ease, you could say, that is all right, they have taken Peiping and they are going to keep it. There would be a sense of finality, of something settled. But they can't be confident and self-assured and courteous. They can't command your fear or win your good-will.... The British hold India down by their charm... the charm of appearing like natural masters. The charm of a snake, if you like. The charm of confidence and bearing and going about in their own costumes, and eating their own food and talking their own language and expecting everybody to talk theirs too.... The Japs have not got the English charm. They cannot be graceful, and that is why they will fail.... The Japanese are new at the game. In one or two hundred years, they may be able to rule a colony and learn to make themselves liked. Guns are not enough for imperialism, and that is all they have.

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[2]This point is emphasised by Mark Peattie in his introduction to Peattie/Myers, ed., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, Princeton 1984.

[3]Lin Yutang, *A Leaf in the Storm*, London 1943, p. 69-76.

Given these disadvantages, Japan would have to build an economically sound empire, and employ the military only under strict political control. She would have to make small, steady advances to limit Western and Asian antipathy, and, in the meantime, contain unrest at home. This would require not only full civil-military unity, but also co-operation between the services, and popular support for the political *status quo*. In view of her financial and ideological limitations, Japan could not aim at French-style assimilation. This would have been too provocative, both to the peoples she intended to assimilate, and to her international audience. The way to achieve a middle ground was to emulate the British example. This made sense in that Britain was regarded as the greatest of the imperialists, and her policies of commercial imperialism, with as little direct control as possible, addressed both of Japan's difficulties. Thus, Katsura declared in the Diet that Taiwan would be treated as a colony rather than as a kind of *Japan d'outre-mer*; the South Manchurian Railway Company and Oriental Development Company both took Britain's East India Company as their starting point; and Japanese policy in Korea from 1905-09 was explicitly based on Lord Cromer's administration of Egypt. However, the Japanese army, unnerved by its garrison-state mentality and the conflict between the services over whether Japan should be a continental or sea power, chose to ignore political wisdom in Manchuria. Thus began the long-term division of state and military policy which led to the Pacific war. Moreover, the weaknesses noted above compelled both civilian and military authorities in Korea to employ first violence, and then annexation, as a means to restore order in the peninsula. As the British foreign office observed, the abdication of the Emperor Kojong in 1907 marked the end of Japan's Cromerist policy in Korea. This failure of discreet control would undermine the later East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere; in its way a kind of Chinese World Order, with Japan guaranteeing regional security in return for respect and economic privileges, but, as with China and its invasions of Vietnam, failing once formal control was assumed. At the end of his career, Katsura was clearly seeking to build a rich nation rather than a strong army. However, only with the utter rout of the armed forces in 1945, and consequent liberation from the sense of being under siege, could Japan effect a viable policy of "economics first".

We began by denying that this was a biography of Katsura Tarō. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the man himself has not appeared merely a cipher. Instead of a dull policeman, Katsura's outstanding feature was his charm; the rough and ready charm of a Lyndon Johnson perhaps, and not effective with everyone. Ozaki Yukio and Yamamoto Gombei, remained impervious, and Ozaki would later write, "Katsura's was a thoroughly commonplace talent, with no hint of sophistication or classicism.... To say I hate bugs gives some indication of my feeling (towards him)."[4] Opponents in the Taishō incident would later ascribe Katsura's failings to his shallow taste and lack of reading.[5] Yet, he was a political soldier of brilliance. From his first visit to Europe in 1870, he showed himself to be adaptable and pragmatic. He progressed in life from a simple military concept of policy to a broader and more statesmanlike attitude. Moreover, as his comments to the Emperor Meiji in 1912 suggest, he recognised the decline of the oligarchic system and began preparing for a new era of wider participation in government. Despite occasional unbending pronouncements towards political parties, he would always look for a workable solution. He was reckoned not worth three *mon* on the battlefield, but as a soldier and politician, he was positioned to unite the interests of the military and state. In his last years, he attempted compromise - with the foreign powers, the armed services, and the political parties - to ensure primacy to domestic finances and limit the influence of the army. Given the trend of the times, late Meiji Japan needed a political general to mediate between the military and democratic parties.

Clausewitz wrote of war as a social act;[6]

> It is a conflict of great interests, which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any Art, to liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again may be looked upon as a kind of business competition on a grand scale.

Meiji Japan was involved in international and internal conflicts, and attempting to mediate a compromise was Katsura, the soldier, statesman, and business-minded imperialist.

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[4]Ozaki Yukio, *Kindai Yūketsu-roku*, Tokyo 1936, p. 183-85.

[5]Takahashi Tetsutarō, *Katsura Kō Kōzai Shiron*, Tokyo 1914, p. 215-16.

[6]Clausewitz, *On War*, quoted in W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, Cambridge 1978, p. 43.

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