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PREDICTING POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT TO OPINION-BASED GROUPS

Ana-Maria Bliuc

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The Australian National University

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DECLARATION

The research reported in this thesis is my own
and has not been submitted for a higher degree
to any other institution.

A. Bliuc

Ana-Maria Bliuc

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I dedicate this thesis in memory of my uncle, Iulian Gutu, my role model in life.

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SUMMARY

This thesis examines the main predictors of political involvement from a social identity perspective, thus the main questions addressed is when people decide to take collective action in relation to shared ideas. It is argued that group self-definition should predict intentions to undertake political behaviours. Surprisingly the existing literature does not unequivocally show that the strength of subjective group membership is a good predictor of group behaviour in general, or political behavioural intentions in particular. The thesis proposes four key solutions to this problem. The first is that the relationship will tend to be strong when groups are in conflict: intergroup conflict seems to help organize behaviour into oppositional forms. Secondly, the group membership will be a stronger predictor when the groups are normatively relevant to the predicted behaviour. As social identity theorists have long argued, group behaviour is only predicted by group membership when that behaviour is consistent with a relevant norm for the group. Thirdly, the relationship will tend to be strong when relevant groups are chosen, and the focus here is on opinion-based groups: groups defined on the basis of a shared opinion. Fourthly, the relationship will tend to be strong when the degree or strength of self-categorization is measured appropriately. Here the argument is that measures of certainty of self-definition as a group member capture these constructs best for opinion-based groups. To sum up, self-definition as an opinion-based group member should strongly predict political involvement in conditions of intergroup conflict and when the behaviours involved are highly consistent with the norms of the specific salient group membership.

In addition to the main prediction that group self-definition should increase political group behaviour it was also expected that, in line with self-categorization theory, measures which better captured salience of opinion-based group membership

should be stronger and more direct predictors of behavioural intentions than standard social identification measures. Consequently self-definition as an opinion-based group member was assessed using standard identification scales but also some new items which were aimed to capture salience of opinion-based group membership. In particular, it was argued that certainty of self-definition as a group member holding a certain opinion would be the best indicator of salience, but only especially so in opinion-based groups.

These ideas were explored in a series of six studies (two surveys and four experiments). The results of the first two experiments using minimal opinion-based groups show that intergroup conflict had some impact on the main variables involved, and suggested the direction for the next studies in which the link between opinion-based group self-definition and political behavioural intentions was directly investigated. Results from Studies 3, 4, and 5 strongly supported the hypothesis that the salience measure employed predicted political behavioural intentions over and above identification. However, Study 5 provided no evidence that conflict enhanced the expected relationship. Finally, the results of Study 6 suggest that the salience measure is highly sensitive to the normative context and is a good predictor of political behavioural intentions but only especially so for the highly normative and validated behaviours.

The conclusion reached is that certainty of self-definition as an opinion-based group member is an excellent predictor of normatively relevant political behavioural intentions. The success of this measure stems for the fact that it captures the self-categorization theory construct of salience more accurately than do standard measures of social identification and this is almost surely because these measures capture the (relatively) enduring aspects of salience that are associated with perceiver readiness.

In summary, self-definition as a group member is indeed a good predictor of validated normative political behavioural intentions in opinion-based groups, even where there is not explicit intergroup conflict.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND ITS PREDICTORS

Introduction

In Romania in the late 1980s there were two long-standing currents of opinion, one supporting the communist regime and the other opposing it. Members of the public varied in their commitment to these competing opinions, but there was very little action associated with the broad anti-regime opinion. Following the violent repression of an anti-government rally in December 1989, however, there was a sudden increase in the strength of the belief that the regime had to go, and a massive increase in the degree to which people came to define themselves as being part of an opposition movement. This led to spontaneous and widespread collective action, ending in the downfall of the Ceausescu regime. This example shows that people can share beliefs and views and even be strongly committed to their views but this is not sufficient for them to become involved in collective action in support of these views. What is then, the final factor that determined whether people defined themselves as participants in an opposition movement and consequently to take part in the actions designed to end the repressive Ceausescu regime? Possible answer to this question is that the violent conflict with the outgroup (i.e., the regime) was the main factor that strongly influenced people to take collective action even when their own lives were in danger. Another is that people come to understand that taking action was an appropriate and desirable response.

This example is illustrative for this thesis because the question I address here is *when do people decide to take politically relevant action in relation to shared ideas*. In answering this question I am primarily interested in refining and clarifying the social identity approach to collective action. In particular, I will be exploring the

subjective aspects of group membership, or self-definition as a group member. The more general term collective action is used here, in the sense of unified group action, aimed either to create social change or to preserve the status quo (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, and Zellerer (1987) made a distinction between *individual* and *collective* forms of action. This distinction is not made simply on the basis of whether one or more people is involved but rather a single group member engages in collective action anytime that a person is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the condition of the entire group.

Individual action, on the other hand, is behaviour that is directed at improving one's personal condition. Over and above these, a third important distinction is necessary. Martin (1986) made the distinction between action that either conforms to the norms of the existing social system, normative, or is outside the confines of the existing social rules and structure, non-normative. From these three distinctions, according to Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), five broad categories of behaviour arise:

- (a) behaviour which indicates apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position,
- (b) attempts at individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the system,
- (c) individual action outside the norms of the system,
- (d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed norms of the existing system, and
- (e) instigation of collective action outside the norms of the system.

The actions described by these five categories have very different implications at the level of broad society. For example, collective non-normative action directly threatens the existing social order, whereas acceptance and individual normative

actions serve to preserve the status quo (Wright et al., 1990). However, for this thesis only the two categories (i.e., normative and non-normative instigations of collective action) are of primary interest.

The Social Identity Approach to Collective Action

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) provides an answer to the question of when people decide to take collective action. Social identity theorists argue that people are more likely to act collectively when they are highly committed to their views; in other words collective behaviour is driven by *social identification*, so that, under certain conditions, people who are committed members of their groups (high identifiers) will be more likely to take action. Researchers such as Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1999) focused on investigating the consequences of group commitment for intergroup behaviour. In general terms, their argument is that “people for whom a particular group membership is important are more likely to behave in accordance with their group’s norms and values than people who are less involved with their group” (Doosje, et al., 1999, p. 84). They define *group commitment* or *ingroup identification* as the extent to which group members feel strong ties with their group, thus implying that people may differ in the extent to which a particular group membership is important to them. In brief, social identity theory argues that group identification, in interaction with a range of other factors, should be a good predictor of group behaviour (see Figure 1.1).




Figure 1.1. The general main predictor of group behaviour

Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) argues more specifically that *salience of group membership* (i.e., the extent to which a social categorization becomes psychologically significant for perceivers, Oakes, 1987) causes collective behaviour. Group behaviour (a more general term which includes collective behaviour) is produced only when that certain group membership is activated or salient. It is argued that “ (...) the awareness of common category membership is the necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to feel themselves to be *and act as*, a group” (Turner, 1982, emphasis added).

Thus, social category salience, which is defined as a ‘cognitive redefinition of the self’ from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category membership and associated stereotypes (Turner, 1984, p. 528) should be the main factor determining group behaviour. As shared social identity becomes salient depending on the context, individual self-perception becomes depersonalized (i.e., individuals tend to define and see themselves more as interchangeable representatives of some shared social category membership and not as unique and differing individuals, Turner, 1999).

Under self-categorization theory then, long-term identification is merely one determinant of salience (McGarty, 1999). Self-categorization theory explains

variation in salience as a function of the interaction between the relative accessibility of a particular self-category (later termed by Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1999, 'perceiver readiness'), the readiness of a perceiver to use a particular categorization, and the fit between category specifications and the stimulus reality (the match between category and the reality). Perceiver readiness reflects past experience, present expectations, and current motives, values, goals and needs of a person and it is also influenced by previous identification with that category. That is, one important factor affecting perceiver readiness is the extent of identification with the group and the degree to which this is central, valued and ego-involving (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Gurin & Markus, 1988; Turner, 1999, p.12). The self-categorization theory approach to the relationship between self-definition as group member and group behaviour/collective action is perhaps best clarified in the following quote from Turner (1999):

In sum, as an account of the psychological group, the theory's key ideas are that, first, the level and kind of identity used to represent self and others vary with one's motives, values and expectations, one's background knowledge and theories, and the social context within which comparison takes place; second, the salience of shared social identity leads to the depersonalization of self-perception: and, third, depersonalization produces group behaviour (i.e., collective action and processes regulated by a shared social categorical self). (p.12)

In brief, self-categorization theory argues that group behaviour is predicted by self-definition as a group member as can be seen in Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2. The relationship between collective self-definition constructs and group behaviour (the shaded constructs are those that relate directly to collective self-definition)

In this figure the shaded concepts are all to do with the subjective aspects of group membership. As can be seen, the theory encompasses multiple concepts that could be involved in predicting group behaviour. Not surprisingly then there are some theoretical and methodological complexities to resolve. The terminology *self-definition as a group member* theoretically includes several self-categorization theory constructs such as identification, salience, perceiver readiness, and so on, but when using this term I will usually be focusing on identification and salience.

Some Empirical Evidence for the Social Identity

Approach to Collective Action

Although there is a large body of research regarding the relationship between self-definition as a group member (roughly speaking, identification and salience) and group behaviours, the empirical evidence to date is not as strong as might be expected. Many studies have tested the relationship between social identification and relevant group behaviours such as displays of ingroup bias: the correlations found

have been relatively weak in some cases (e.g., Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, Maras, & Taylor, 1992; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999) and stronger in others.

A smaller number of studies have explored the link between identification and intention to take action. For example, de Weerd and Klandermans (1999) investigated the relationship between group identification among Dutch framers and preparedness to take action and found correlations of small size. Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000), have also shown relatively weak links between identification and intention to take action.

However, there are researchers who have investigated the link between identification and the intention to take collective action and who have found stronger relationships. One such example is research done by Kelly and Breinlinger (1996). In line with social identity theory, they argued that people who strongly identify with their group are more likely to take part in political activities. They investigated women's readiness to participate in various actions and their social beliefs in relation to actual collective behaviour. Reported participation (among other variables) was related to identification as an activist. Kelly and Breinlinger found that identification in this case was a better predictor of intentions to participate in action and also reported participation than other variables such as identification with the broader category (i.e., gender identity), relative deprivation, efficacy and collective orientation.

Work by Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger (1998) is also illustrative. In two studies these authors examined the determinants of collective behaviour suggested by social identity and self-categorization theories. Among other variables, they focused on willingness to participate in collective action based on the collective identification as *an activist*. They used identification with a

broader category and identification with an action group as predictors of willingness to participate in collective action. In the first study they found that identification with an action group was a better predictor for collective behavioural intention than identification with a broader category (these studies and others will be presented in more detail in Chapter 2).

One general conclusion that might be drawn from these studies is that there is considerable variation in the strength of the link between self-definition as a group member and participation in different forms of collective action. More specifically, there are situations where the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour holds and is quite strong and others where this is not the case.

Another striking point is that there is very little research on collective behaviour which has sought to operationalise the self-categorization theory constructs of perceiver readiness, salience and depersonalization. The focus has remained on social identification.

In order to answer the general question of what makes people more ready to get involved in collective action in some situations it is useful to start by addressing some more specific questions. For example, is there a particular type of group where members are more prone to action? Or are there some specific behaviours more likely to be adopted by committed group members than others? And if so, what makes them more distinctive and more likely to be followed than others? Finally, are there specific social contexts which make people more likely to take action? These questions suggest a more refined general question for the thesis of the following form: when is the relationship between self-definition as a group member and decisions to take collective behaviour particularly strong.

Overview of the Chapters to Come

First, relevant evidence in relation to the question of when is the relationship between self-definition as a group member and different types of collective behaviours particularly strong is reviewed in Chapter 2. To anticipate what this literature review suggests I will present the following summary:

1. Commitment to particular types of groups (e.g. artificial groups or broad social categories) is sporadically related to commitment to collective action (Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle & Brown, 1990).
2. There may be some contexts where the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is particularly strong, for example, in cases of relatively clear intergroup conflict, or when a particular social identity is threaten in some way.
3. Commitment to groups only seems to be a good predictor of commitment to collective action when the action is normative for the group (see McGarty, 2001; Turner, 1999).

In Chapter 3 I will detail the generally accepted point that conflict between groups produces changes in behaviours of group members, often leading to strong and occasionally extreme actions. In particular, self-categorization theory explains these changes by postulating that intergroup conflict leads to increased salience which is expressed in increased commitment to the group position and norms and this is also anticipated in social identity theory. The literature review will outline different theoretical approaches of intergroup conflict focusing primarily on Sherif's (1967) realistic conflict theory and social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979,

1986) and self-categorization theories' (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) accounts on intergroup conflict. I will then focus on reviewing some empirical evidence of the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship between self-definition as a group member and relevant group behaviour. The main hypotheses suggested by this review is that intergroup conflict should increase self-definition as a group member and the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be stronger under conditions of clear intergroup conflict. The first part of the hypothesis is tested in Chapter 7, and the second part in Chapter 9.

In Chapter 4 I will elaborate my thesis on the importance of group norms for the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour by reviewing several relevant theoretical approaches and some empirical evidence. For instance, there is the argument by Terry and Hogg (1996) that, when a particular group membership is salient, people are inclined to construct norms with respect to attitudes, feelings and behaviours. These norms can become prescriptive, so that: "Group membership causes people to think, feel, behave, and define themselves in terms of group norms rather than unique properties of the self" (Terry & Hogg, 1996, p.780). On the other hand, Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears (1999) argue that the extent to which people tend to act in terms of group norms may depend on: (a) the context, (b) the structural salience of group membership, and (c) the importance attached to a group membership. For example, people with low commitment will act less in accordance with group norms than people with high commitment and who attribute a great importance to the group membership.

In Chapter 4 I will deal with the idea that if high identifiers are more likely to follow group norms, then it can be argued that an important role in the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be played by

the degree of *normativeness of a specific behaviour*. Following from this point, it can be inferred that the relationship between self-categorization as a group member and group behaviour will hold more strongly when the relevant behaviours are highly normative. The same relationship will be weaker, or fail to hold for non-normative or counter-normative behaviours. This hypothesis will be elaborated and tested in Chapter 10.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I will take each of these points in turn and I will explore the possibility that a particular form of group is extremely useful for studying the relationship between self-definition as a group member and commitment to become involved in different forms of collective action. These are groups formed on the basis of a shared position of their members. Such groups, which I term *opinion-based groups*, include examples such as pro-animal right groups, anti-abortion versus free choice groups, pro or anti gay pride, anti-globalization, etc. These groups may be particularly likely to stimulate politically relevant action because unlike broad social categories and artificial groups, they may tend to have clear norms for behaviours associated with them. This is because they are often the vehicles that convert broad ideologies in collective action (for a related argument see Klandermans, 2000). In order to explore the relevance of such opinion-based groups for political action, I have used a variety of different types of opinion-based groups in the studies I conducted. The opinion-based groups used include minimal opinion-based groups (Study 1 and 2), strictly political opinion-based groups formed around the preference for one political party over another during election (Study 3 and 4), and broader political opinion-based groups formed around issues such as financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government to the descendents of slaves in the colonial period, and implementation of a new law proposal in Romania regarding same sex relations

(Study 5 and 6). Additionally, it is worth noting that the data collection for this thesis took place in a variety of cultural contexts: Romania, Australia and the Netherlands.

Conclusion

To sum up, in this chapter I have outlined the principal question of the thesis and some possible answers offered by the literature. To reiterate, this thesis focuses on finding the central conditions where self-definition as a group member predicts involvement in different forms of collective action (in particular, involvement in political actions). The main ideas that appear important are the ways in which self-definition as a group member is conceived and measured, the norms of the groups in relation to the collective actions envisaged, the conflictual (or non-conflictual) context of intergroup relations and the type of group considered. In Chapter 2 I will consider evidence of the relationship between collective self-definition and collective action in more detail.

CHAPTER 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE GROUP MEMBERSHIP
AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

The adaptive function of social identity ... is to produce group behaviour and attitudes... it is the cognitive mechanism which makes group behaviour possible. (Turner, 1984, p.527)

Introduction

The general question of this thesis is: when do people decide to take politically relevant action in relation to shared ideas? One first step in answering this question is to outline the theoretical framework of the relationship between subjective group membership and group behaviour (ranging from ingroup bias to collective action). The refined question which will be addressed in this chapter is *how and why the perception of oneself as a group member impacts upon group behaviour*. Consequently this chapter is concerned primarily with introducing some key concepts such as self-definition as a group member (as per the concepts of social identification and salience), and articulating what I mean by group behaviour. The second part of the chapter is focused on fleshing out the theoretical framework for the relationship between social identification, salience and group behaviour and on reviewing some empirical studies investigating this relationship.

Conceptualizing Social Identity: Identification and Salience
as Aspects of Subjective Group Membership

Tajfel and Turner (1979) define a group as a “collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). In this view, the use of social categorizations is not

only to systematize the social world but also to provide a system of orientation for self-reference. Consequently, the term *social identity* was introduced to refer to those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories or groups to which he or she perceives himself or herself as belonging together with the value and emotional significance attached to that category or group membership (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the basis of this original definition it can be assumed that there are three components of someone's social identity: a cognitive component (awareness of the membership in a particular group), an evaluative component (a positive or negative connotation attached to the group membership), and an emotional component (a sense of emotional involvement with the group). Likewise, self-categorization theorists see social identity more as self-definition in terms of particular social category memberships. Every group is associated with a social identity which defines a person's shared similarities with members of a particular social category or group in contrast with others (Turner, 1999).

The *intergroup nature* of the social identity concept is emphasised by self-categorization theory when Turner and colleagues define social categorization as "cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same (...) in contrasts to some other class of stimuli" (Turner et al., 1987, p.44) pointing out that measures of social identity need to consider "the specific nature of the group and its social history of relations with other groups" (Turner et al., p.98).

In support of this view, van Knippenberg and Ellemers (1993) say that theoretically at least social identity is "established thought comparisons with other relevant social categories" (p.87). Brewer's (1991, 1993) optimal distinctiveness theory also argues that social identity comprises a tension between inclusion and distinctiveness, with the latter being obtained through intergroup comparisons. Brewer

and Gardner (1996) emphasize the importance of the ingroup for self-definition as well as for social comparison with the relevant outgroup:

in-group membership plays different roles in the formation and maintenance of the self-concept at different levels. On the one hand, in-groups provide the frame of reference for self-evaluation at the individual level and for selection of significant others at the interpersonal level. Shared in-group membership is one important basis for determining relevant sources of social comparison (...). The other role that in-groups play in defining the individual's self-concept derives from comparisons between characteristics shared by in-group members in comparison to relevant out-groups. This is the essence of social identity. (p.85)

Researchers investigating the ethnic social identity also conceptualize identity in terms of ingroup/outgroup relations, stating that ethnic identity “is not an issue except in terms of a contrast group” (Phinney, 1990, p. 509). In line with various conceptualizations of social identity, ethnic identity was defined as “an enduring, fundamental aspect of the self that includes a sense of membership in an ethnic group and the attitudes and feelings associated with that membership (Bernal & Knight, 1993; Phinney, 1990).

Jackson and Smith (1999) also focus on the intergroup nature of social identity but add another three dimensions in an attempt to organize and integrate the conceptualisation of social identity. In their view the four dimensions considered to comprise the essence of social identity are:

1. perception of the intergroup context (the extent to which an outgroup is salient and perceived to have competitive rather than cooperative relations with the outgroup);
2. ingroup attraction (positive affect toward ingroup);
3. interdependency beliefs or common fate (the future wellbeing of the individual and the ingroup are bound together);
4. depersonalization (thinking of the self in terms of a group member rather than in terms of a unique individual).

Other researchers such as Cameron and Lalonde (2001) also point out the multidimensional nature of social identity. They support the original view of Tajfel that social identity or identification can be “appropriately regarded as a multidimensional construct that incorporates both cognitive and affective elements” and proposed a three-component identification scale. Based on Gurin and Townsend’s (1986) ideas, Cameron and Lalonde argue that the principal components of identification are: a) ingroup ties (i.e., perceived similarity and bond); b) cognitive centrality (i.e., the amount of time in everyday life spent thinking about belonging to a certain category); and c) ingroup affect (i.e., positive and negative feeling associated with group membership). In particular, these researchers explored gender identity in these multidimensional terms. In order to assess gender-derived social identification, they used an expanded set of items derived from the social identity literature (Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989) but also from research on social identity of women (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Gurin & Townsend, 1986), and from scales used to measure collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). They found evidence that gender-derived social identification can be meaningfully conceptualized along at least three dimensions which are *ingroup ties*, *cognitive*

centrality, and *ingroup affect*. Moreover, this tridimensional model of social identification was shown to be relevant for other group memberships including ethnic, national, and university-derived identification (Cameron, 2000; Cameron, Sato, Lalonde, & Lay, 1997).

Finally, based on the original definition of Tajfel (1978) that maintains that social identity is “(...) that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (p.63), Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999) also elaborated a three-dimensional model of social identity. More specifically, they distinguish between a cognitive awareness of one’s membership in a social group, that is self-categorization (cognitive component), a sense of emotional involvement with the group, that is commitment to the group (affective component) and finally a positive or negative value connotation attached to this group membership, that is group self-esteem (evaluative component) as different aspects of group members’ social identity (p.372). These authors argue that this distinction is important and it is necessary to be made as to the extent that people identify with a particular group they will also behave in terms of this group membership. Thus:

(...) *self-categorisation* (the cognitive component) as well as *affective commitment* to a specific group (the emotional component) can be distinguished from group self-esteem derived from the value connotation of that particular group membership (the evaluative component). More importantly, we want to argue that this distinction *should* be made, to be able to understand how they are affected differentially by specific characteristics of the group or the social

context. (...) Furthermore, we predict that these components are differentially related to displays of ingroup favouritism in evaluative responses or outcome allocations. (p. 373)

Although there is a range of interpretations of the components of the social identity construct there is little dispute that people can identify as group members. Most attention has been directed to social identification and salience.

Social identification was defined as the internalisation of individuals' group membership as an aspect of their self-concept, that is, individuals should be subjectively identified with the relevant ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, researchers such as Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears defined social identification as the extent to which group members feel strong ties with their group. In this sense it is roughly analogous to commitment to the group: "social identification can be defined as the extent to which individuals identify and commit themselves to a social category as a whole" (Spears et al., 1997a, p.541). Doosje and colleagues argue that people may differ in the extent to which a particular group membership is important to them, and they make the distinction between 'die hard' fans (high identifiers) and 'fair weather' fans (low identifiers) depending on the degree of identification with the group (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002).

Concluding these findings, social identification was defined by McGarty (1999a) as someone's feeling of belongingness in a certain social group, which is conceptually different from seeing oneself as being the same as some class of persons (i.e., social categorization) and feeling good about oneself as a group member (i.e., social self-esteem). Social categorization is the necessary precondition for both social identification and social self-esteem. That is, as McGarty (1999a, p.190) explains in a discussion of the Doosje et al.'s paper (1999), someone cannot feel that he or she

belongs to a group and is proud about this group membership without accepting membership in that group.

Saliency of social identity is a more dynamic concept than social identification and it refers to the extent to which a social categorization becomes psychologically significant for perceivers, switched on or activated. By a salient group membership, self-categorization theorists refer to “one which is functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behaviour, and/or the influence of another person’s identity as a group member on one’s impression of and hence behaviour towards that person” (Oakes, 1987, p.118).

Although there are clear theoretical differences between identification and salience the concepts are often confused. Perhaps the most concrete difference is that identification has a more long-term nature than does salience. That is, identification is a relatively stable variable whereas salience is more context-dependent. As McGarty (1999b) argued, the relationship between identification and salience is analogous to the relationship between climate and weather. In the same way that climate reflects relatively stable and repeatable characteristics of some geographic region and weather reflects what is happening at any instant, identification can be thought of as a long-term variable which should be strongly related to, but not identical to, salience.

Self-categorization theory argues that cognitive activity in the form of previous knowledge and perceived similarities and differences influences the use of certain categories instead of others. That is salience depends on the interaction between two other variables which are *fit* and *perceiver readiness*. Fit in turn has two components: comparative and normative fit.

Comparative fit was initially called 'structural fit' (Oakes, 1987) and it refers to the influence of perceived equivalence of stimuli on category use. More exactly, in

any situation involving a set of psychologically significant stimuli, any collection of stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity or a class to the degree that the differences between these stimuli are perceived to be less than the differences between that collection and other stimuli (McGarty, 1999a; Turner et al., 1987, p.47). In other words, intraclass differences must be less than interclass differences (the meta-contrast principle). Thus, when in a room where there are women and men, if the women tend to act in one way and the men tend to act in another way it would be easier to perceive two groups because the differences between women in the room are less than the differences between women and men. To take another example, when there is a debate, supporters of one position (e.g., a certain political party) tend to make arguments leading to one conclusion and supporters of the other position argue in a way that leads to the opposite conclusion. Then, because the average difference between groups is larger than the average difference within groups, this comparative fit enables us to detect these two different groups in this context.

The other component of fit, normative fit, can be understood as the constraints of prior knowledge on perceived similarities and differences between stimuli. It is based on the social meaning of behaviours and thus refers to the match between category and reality in terms of content and not just the comparative fit of the dimension (McGarty, 1999a; Oakes et al. 1994). For example, in a political debate, supporters of a left-wing party will tend to argue using ideas which are associated with a left-wing ideology and respectively supporters of a right-wing party tend to use right-wing arguments. If this were not the case (i.e., left-wing supporters using right-wing arguments and vice versa) the normative fit would be low.

Perceiver readiness, (initially called 'relative accessibility' by Turner et al., 1987) refers to the constraints of prior knowledge on category use (i.e., salience), that

is the way in which perception is influenced by the perceiver to reflect the his or her vantage point at a particular time (McGarty, 1999a). A major component of perceiver readiness is the “degree of internalization of or identification with an ingroup-outgroup membership, the centrality and evaluative importance of a group membership in self-definition” (Turner, 1987). Put simply, a certain category which is central to self-definition has probably been used in the past by the perceiver so this makes the category more likely to be a basis of identification in the future. For example, for a white supremacist supporter, for whom the category white plays a central role in self-definition, it is probable that he or she will define themselves in terms of this category more often in everyday life, than some other category (e.g. music lover), which is not so important to them. In these cases, strength of identification and the degree of internalization of a certain group membership determine the future readiness to perceive oneself in terms of that group membership.

In addition, salience of a specific group membership depends also on the immediate social context as a particular self-categorization can be meaningful in one context but not in others. For example, it is more likely that a male-female categorization would occur when in a room males and females discuss the issue of abortion or rape, than in a case where they discuss drug abuse (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Thus, if taken into account the importance in context in self-categorization, the model proposed by self-categorization theory is:




Figure 2.1. Determinants of salience and social identification (from McGarty, 1999a)

In this section I have defined social identity and examined the processes by which people define themselves in terms of a particular social identity. In the next section the behavioural implications of social identity are examined.

Definition and Types of Intergroup Behaviour:

from Ingroup Bias to Collective Action

Sherif provided a classic and very straightforward definition of intergroup behaviour which states that "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behaviour" (Sherif, 1966, p.12). Similarly, social identity theorists suggested that social behaviour refers to "all the behaviour of two or more individuals towards each other (...) determined by their membership of different social groups or categories (i.e., by group affiliations and loyalties to the exclusion of individual characteristics and interpersonal relationships)" (Turner, 1999, p.9).

In real social life the situation is thought to be more complicated than this. Tajfel (e.g., 1978) suggested that intergroup behaviour is a matter of degree. That is, a

piece of social behaviour can be more or less an instance of intergroup behaviour depending on its position on a dimension. This idea does not contradict Sherif's suggestion that intergroup behaviour occurs *whenever* individuals belonging to different groups interact but it does qualify it. Tajfel was the first to make the observation that social behaviour varied along a continuum from interpersonal to intergroup. At the interpersonal extreme there is any social encounter at the personal level, where the interaction is determined by the personal relationships between individuals and their individual characteristics, and not at all affected by various social groups or categories to which they might belong. At the other extreme, there are "interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) that are fully determined by their respective memberships in various social groups or categories, and not at all affected by the interindividual personal relationships between the people involved" (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p.8). In both cases, interpersonal and intergroup behaviour in pure forms are very rare in real life.

A wide diversity of phenomena are covered by the heading of intergroup behaviour, ranging from apparently isolated actions of individuals such as displays of ingroup bias as in the minimal group paradigm, through to organized and planned collective activities of groups or even nations (i.e., collective action).

Intergroup discrimination can appear as a result of mere categorization and this had been supported by a large amount of empirical work using the minimal group paradigm. Intergroup discrimination or ingroup bias is the tendency to favour the ingroup over the outgroup in evaluations and behaviours (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As Tajfel and Turner (1986) pointed out, ingroup bias is "the laboratory analogue to real-world ethnocentrism (...) and the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is

sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the ingroup” (p.13).

Collective action (see also Chapter 1) can be seen as a specific case of intergroup behaviour that is strategic in that it is intended to improve the circumstances of the ingroup (Wright, 1999). Definitions of collective action refer to it as "an action taken by a group member when she or he is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a), or as "a group of people acting in concert" (R.H. Turner, & Killian, 1972).

However, both intergroup discrimination and collective action are interpreted by social identity theorists as being based on the single process of *the need of group members for positive distinctiveness*. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that there is a shift along the interpersonal-intergroup continuum which is a function of an interaction between psychological and social factors. The motivation of individuals to achieve and maintain a positive social identity is the cause of people engaging in social comparisons with relevant outgroups. If social comparisons result in a negative social identity, according to social identity theory, there are a number of strategies people adopt: a) social mobility (e.g., changing the ingroup for a higher status group); b) social creativity (e.g., engaging in social comparisons on dimensions which are favourable to the ingroup); and c) social competition (e.g., direct attempts to elevate the status of the ingroup). Social identity theory's perspective on collective action is that collective action is mainly due to the existence of a *social change belief system* (i.e., a view that people cannot resolve their identity problems, or that they cannot achieve a positive distinctiveness, through individual action and mobility, but can only change their social situation by acting collectively in terms of their shared group

membership) and also to the impossibility or difficulty for social mobility due mainly to perceived impermeability of group boundaries. This is very well summarized by the following quote from Turner (1999):

In social identity theory, then (...) it was impermeable group boundaries and the social change belief-system that were seen as the key factors in shifting behaviour along the continuum towards the intergroup pole. They played a central role in determining collective reactions by group members to insecure status in the social system. (p. 10)

All the forms of intergroup behaviour including ingroup bias and collective action are closely related to the subjective group membership or the social identity of the perceiver. Consequently, the next step will be to focus on the theoretical framework explaining the influence of social identity variables on intergroup behaviour.

The Relationship between Group Self-definition and Intergroup Behaviour

There are mainly two views in the literature concerning the implications of social identity for group behaviour. One is represented in principal by Brown and colleagues (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle & Brown, 1990) and it argues for a direct causal link between identification and intergroup behaviours such as displays of ingroup bias. Their reading of social identity theory is that the theory predicts a positive correlation between identification and ingroup bias or differentiation. They base their argument on the social identity theory idea that positive social identity is mainly based on favourable intergroup comparisons, so it is assumed that there should be a positive correlation between

strength of group identification and the amount of positive intergroup differentiation or ingroup bias (Brown, 2000). However, Brown (2000) also reported that there was poor empirical support for this hypothesis (see p.17). Brown and colleagues maintain that support for this hypothesis should be stronger, but only under certain conditions. They proposed a taxonomy of groups including an individualism-collectivism dimension and a comparative ideology dimension (see Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, Maras, & Taylor, 1992) and hypothesized that the identity-differentiation link would be stronger when looking at collectively inclined individuals in situations where a comparative ideology (i.e. the outgroup ideology) is salient.

On the contrary, the other view represented by Turner and colleagues (e.g., Turner, 1999; see also McGarty 2001), maintains that social identity theory never implied such simple positive correlations between identification and intergroup behaviour, but there are three main classes of variables which influence intergroup differentiation or ingroup bias in real social life. These classes of variables are:

1. internalization of group membership as part of the self-concept (identification);
2. the existence of relevant evaluative and relational aspects for intergroup comparison;
3. the relevance of the outgroup for comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, see McGarty, 1999b).

Social identity theory emphasises the importance of subjective group membership for displays of group behaviour, including ingroup bias or differentiation, implying that the need to achieve positive distinctiveness would explain discrimination in minimal group paradigm situations where there are not other factors involved. However the situation can be quite different in real social life. Of course,

the need for positive distinctiveness is a universal variable and group identification is one factor predicting group behaviour but there are other factors such as comparative context and the relevance of the outgroup for comparisons which play an important role in the process.

Moreover, according to self-categorization theory, the predicted relationship is actually more complex. First, the base of intergroup behaviour is assumed to be the process of *depersonalization*. That is, when there is a depersonalization of the self or a “cognitive redefinition of the self from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category membership and associated stereotypes” (Turner, 1982, p. 528), individual behaviour changes into collective or group behaviour as people come to perceive and act in terms of a shared, collective conception of the self (Turner, 1999). The theory states that:

depersonalization of self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena (social-stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, co-operation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action, shared norms and social influences processes, etc.). (Turner et al., 1987, p.50)

Social identity salience is determined by the interaction between fit and perceiver readiness (as explained above), but one important factor affecting perceiver readiness is *the level of identification* with the group. That is, if someone strongly identifies with a certain social category then they will be more likely to use this category for self-definition in the future. In this way, long-term identification impacts upon group behaviour.

In turn, the salience of a social categorization leads in turn to depersonalized self-perception and this should impact upon group behaviour. Identification, through

its impact on perceiver readiness, is merely one determinant of salience which in turn leads to group action (McGarty, 1999a), perhaps especially in specific contexts such as those involving intergroup conflict (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). According to self-categorization theory, salience rather than identification should be a more direct predictor of group behaviour. Consequently, the actual relationship proposed by self-categorization theory is as seen in figure 1.1 (Chapter 1).

Building on these ideas, there are other theoretical developments of self-categorization theory which offer explanations of different forms of group behaviour. In the next section I will focus on two specific accounts of group behaviour which shed light on the group behaviour of interest in this thesis – politically relevant collective action.

Discussion of Two Group Behaviour Accounts Developed from Self-categorization Theory: Social Identity Model Of Crowd Behaviour and the Model of Politicized Collective Identity

Group behaviour and especially collective action can take the form of crowd behaviour which generally occurs when big social movements take place (as in the example about the downfall of Ceausescu regime in Romania detailed in Chapter 1). It is particularly useful then, to discuss the social identity analysis of crowd behaviour developed by Reicher and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996a,b; Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a,b). The social identity analysis of crowd behaviour is primarily based on two assumptions. The first one is that crowd members act in terms of a common social identity. Secondly, the content of crowd behaviour will be limited by the nature of the relevant social category (Reicher, 1987, 1984). Thus, the social identity model (SIM), developed initially by

Reicher to explain crowd behaviour started from the idea that individuals in crowds are not behaving as separate individuals but they behave in terms of contextually relevant shared social identities. Crowd members do not lose control over their behaviour, but they act in terms of the norms prescribed by the particular social identity made salient by the given intergroup context. This model was supported by research investigating behaviour of people involved in riots which reflected their shared definition of a certain collective identity.

This model was further developed in the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998). This model highlights the role of intergroup context making the point that collective identity must be understood as a dynamic two-ways process whereby the self is not just 'cognitive' but it is embedded in an outgoing set of dynamic social relations. That is, the nature of social relations between ingroup and outgroup should shape the normative dimensions of the social category which drives collective action. Following from this dynamic understanding of collective identity, the authors make the argument that salience should not be only understood as an outcome of the relationship between perceiver readiness and fit. Rather, salience should be seen as an outcome of the power relations in the intergroup context, as salience also represents the achievements of one group to define the context for the another (Drury & Reicher, 1998; Stott & Drury, 1999). This account is particularly informative here as it points out the important role played by the dynamics embedded in the intergroup context, in determining the relationship between group self-definition and collective behaviour. In the next section I will focus on research which explores this relationship.

The second account of particular relevance in the context of this thesis is the model of politicized collective identity (PCI) developed by Simon and Klandermans (2001). This model is especially informative for explaining massive collective movements involving large numbers of individuals who attempt to bring about social change. In other words, when a politicized social identity is salient, people are involved in a struggle for power on behalf of their group in a given societal context. It is considered that in the case of politicized social identity:

(...) group members should intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in such a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly. (...) it is politicized collective identity that turns the social group from “a group of itself” (...) into “a group of and for itself” (...) in the political arena. (p. 323)

The authors further argue that when a politicized collective identity is activated, people need to be aware of their shared group membership, their common enemy or opponent, and of the wider societal context that affects the struggle and is affected by it. There are three stages in which this process takes place. First, people become aware of their “shared grievances”, then an external enemy is blamed for them and claims for compensation from this enemy can arise, (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p.324). If the expected compensation is not received the struggle for power continues. Collective identity completely politicizes when the group involved in the struggle seeks to win the support of the third more powerful parties such as the national government. At the same time, when the group tries to involve authorities, the issue automatically becomes of public interest and,

this final step results in a transformation of the group's relationship to its social environment because involving a third party implies recognition of society or the larger community (e.g., the city, region, country, or European Union) as a more inclusive in-group membership. (p. 324)

In the authors' view, thus, there are three "critical ingredients" of politicized collective identity: awareness of shared grievances, adversarial attributions to blame opponents, and the involvement of the broader society. They also note that in reality, the three stages presented as well as the processes associated with each stage might overlap and interact but the model is still extremely valuable for a systematic understanding of the antecedents of politicized collective identity.

At a general level, politicized social identity has consequences for the way people perceive and act in the social world, that is, for processes including stereotyping prejudice, conformity, discrimination, etc. It is argued next that, because the politicizing steps discussed above often feed back positively on collective identity and strengthen it, the politicization of collective identity should intensify all these consequences.

In addition, it is proposed that there are more specific consequences of politicization of collective identity. In particular, the authors suggest two categories of consequences. The first category concerns the psychological functions of politicized collective identity such as "understanding and agency functions" (p.327). In other words, politicized collective identity, through furthering reasoning about the social world (e.g., through increasing the awareness of shared grievances), provides group members with a more meaningful perspective on the social context they live in. On

the other hand, the agency function refers to the active struggle of group members for social change or even for preserving a status quo.

The second category of consequences includes the behavioural consequences of the politicized social identity which are linked to the third parties which usually become involved in the struggle between the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, “(...) politicized collective identity should (...) motivate not only collective action that is aimed at opponents but also attempts to directly or indirectly enlist third parties as allies”. This makes politicized group members more likely to engage in “collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or take sides” (p. 328). This model is then particularly relevant to the behavioural consequences of the politicized collective identity as strategically aimed at involving third parties in the struggle between the ingroup and outgroup.

Review of Studies Investigating the Relationship

between Self-definition as a Group Member and Intergroup Behaviour

Although there is a large body of research concerning the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviours, the empirical evidence is not as strong as might be expected. Most interested was surrounding the phenomena of ingroup bias or favouritism and collective action. Considering the type of group behaviour investigated and identification with the group, research focused on this topic can be divided into three main categories (see Figure3):

1. Studies which have tested the relationship between social identification and relevant group behaviours such as displays of ingroup bias.

2. Studies which have tested the relationship between social identification and commitment to group-relevant behaviours, including collective action.

3. Studies which have tested the relationship between social identification as an activist and particular forms of commitment to collective behaviours.

Table 2.1. Examples of studies investigation the link between identification and collective behaviour.

Identification	Group behaviour		
		Ingroup bias	Commitment to action
	Identification with a group or category	e.g., Perreault & Bourhis, 1999;	e.g., de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000.
	Identification with an activist group		e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kammeier, and Spahlinger, 1998; Simon, Sturmer, & Steffens, 2000; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003

First, the focus will be on those studies which have tested the relationship between *social identification and ingroup bias*. This direction of research is based on Brown and colleagues' argument that, because positive social identity is mainly based on favourable intergroup comparisons, it could be assumed that there should be a positive correlation between strength of group identification and the amount of positive intergroup differentiation or ingroup bias (Brown, 2000). However, the correlations found are not uniformly positive and often tend to be weak and variable. For example, Mullen, Brown and Smith's (1992) meta-analytic integration of the results of 137 tests of the in-group bias hypothesis using the responses from 5,746 participants, showed that the effect of ingroup bias was highly significant but of moderate size. They concluded that ingroup bias was stronger when the ingroup was made salient.

In addition, Hinkle and Brown (1990), in a review investigating the relationship between identification and ingroup bias, across the 14 studies surveyed found that the overall correlation between identification and ingroup bias was close to 0 (.08). While the majority (64%) of associations were positive, the mean correlation was not very strong (.24).

To take one recent illustrative study based on the ingroup bias hypothesis, Perreault and Bourhis, (1999) tested the idea that stronger identification with the ingroup would be linked to stronger discriminatory behaviour in a minimal group paradigm setting. They also investigated the influence of other intrapersonal orientations such as ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure on discriminatory behaviour toward the outgroup. They tested if ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure were related to greater identification to the ingroup and ultimately to greater discriminatory behaviour. In a two-phase

study, the authors first asked participants ($N = 121$) to complete scales assessing their ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure. In the second phase, the same participants were involved in a minimal group paradigm study in which an us-them categorization was either assigned by the experimenter or chosen by the participant. Thus, the researchers manipulated the degree of ingroup identification by giving group members the opportunity to engage in discriminatory behaviour by either assigning respondents to their group (the usual minimal group paradigm procedure) or by allowing them to choose their group membership.

They expected that participants who chose their group membership would identify more strongly with the ingroup than those who were assigned to the group, and also that stronger identification with the ingroup would predict stronger discriminatory behaviour. They also aimed to test whether ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure measured in the first phase (before the actual minimal group paradigm study) were related to greater identification with the ingroup and hence to greater discriminatory behaviour. The study also tested whether a combination of situationally induced ingroup identification (assigned versus voluntary) would interact with the individual difference orientations (i.e., ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure) as joint predictors of degree of ingroup identification and discriminatory behaviour.

The results showed that individuals who chose their group membership indeed identified more strongly with the ingroup and engaged in more discriminatory behaviour than participants who were randomly assigned to their group. However, they found a relatively weak correlation of .20 between the degree of ingroup identification and discriminatory behaviour. They also found that ethnocentrism

predicted degree of identification with the ingroup, which in turn was positively although weakly related to discriminatory behaviour.

However, the weak correlations are not entirely surprising when considering arguments by Turner and colleagues' that a direct causal link between ingroup identification and ingroup bias was never advanced by social identity theory. Indeed, as already indicated in social identity theory, this relationship is qualified by a number of moderator variables. Similarly, according to self-categorization theory, it is also mediated by the theoretical distinct variable of salience.

The second class of studies which are relevant involved those studies which tested the relationship between *social identification and group behaviour including action or, more correctly, intention to take action*. Researchers such as de Weerd and Klandermans (1999) focused on the relationship between group identification among Dutch farmers and preparedness to take action, in particular, the decision to participate in a political protest. They assumed that higher levels of group identification would stimulate participation in the protest on behalf of the ingroup. They decomposed identification into an *affective component* (degree of attachment to the ingroup which was assessed by asking farmers whether they identified strongly with other farmers) and a *behavioural component* (i.e., voluntary choice of being a group member which was assessed by asking farmers about their participation in a farmers' organization). They hypothesized that factors such as perceived permeability of group boundaries and the stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations would modify the role of group identification. However, they found correlations of small size ($r = .20$) between identification and preparedness to participate in protest. Identification with farmers in the European Union did not have any impact on protest participation but identification with farmers at the national and regional level did

predict protest participation (even if the correlation was of small size). Perceived characteristics of the intergroup situation such as the permeability of group boundaries, and the stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations did not have any impact on group identification.

Work by Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000) showed similarly weak links between group membership and group behaviours. In a paper examining the effects of ingroup norms, salience of group membership and mode of behavioural decision-making on attitude-behaviour relation, they tested the hypothesis that attitudes would be more likely to predict behaviours when they were supported by congruent group norms. In this research they actually assessed the salience of group membership as strength of identification with the group membership and investigated its effect on behavioural choice (i.e., career choice in psychology). They found no significant effects involving identification on behavioural choice. However, they found that participants who identified strongly with the psychology student category were more likely than low identifiers to be willing to engage in activities related to finding out more about their preferred career choice.

Other researchers such as Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1998) have tested the link between identification and group behaviour, also showing that high identifiers display more group-oriented behaviour than low identifiers. They argue that the general pattern is that social identification or commitment will enhance conformity to group norms (e.g., Doosje et al., 1999; Ellemers et al., 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000), which results in group behaviour. Ellemers and colleagues (1998) measured levels of identification with their participants' major among psychology students, divided the group into low and high identifiers and then measured different types of group-oriented behaviours. They found that high identifiers displayed more group-

oriented behaviour than low identifiers. In this particular case, however, the behaviours observed were not collective action type behaviours but more general group behaviour (e.g., socialising with friends, Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999).

In an industrial relations context, Veenstra and Haslam (2000) investigated the impact of group identification and social context on willingness to participate in industrial protest. In a survey-based study they manipulated the social context by using three types of questionnaire corresponding to the three conditions they had: a) referring to the conflict between the union and the present government (conflict condition), b) referring to this conflict together with the government's threat to the union (conflict plus threat), and c) presenting no additional information (control condition). They anticipated that a person's willingness to participate in collective action would vary depending on the level of identification with the ingroup and they also expected that willingness to participate in collective action would vary as a function of identification in interaction with response context. They found that high identifiers with the trade union were more willing than low identifiers to participate in collective action when issues were defined in conflictual terms. The effect they found was highly significant but of relatively small size. Veenstra and Haslam's conclusion was that "collective action is not simply a product of identification, but is also shaped by the distinct meaning which such action assumes for high and low identifiers within a given context" (Veenstra & Haslam, 2000, p.153).

The third broad class of research involves studies which tested the relationship between *social identification as an activist and particular forms of collective behaviours*. An example is the paper by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), which built on Milbrath and Goel's (1977) idea that group identification can become a belief system leading to greater political activity. In line with social identity theory, they argued that

people who strongly identify with their groups are more likely to take part in political activities. They investigated women's readiness to participate in various actions related to feminist issues and their social beliefs in relation to actual collective behaviour (they asked the same women one year after the initial investigation, how much they participated in political action over the last 12 months). They measured both identification with women as a group and identification as feminists. They investigated different types of action ranging from individual acts of protest (e.g. signing a petition, contacting media, etc), and joining and participating in a women's group to collective protest (e.g., breaking the law by blocking the road with a street demonstration, taking part in a rally or demonstration, and attending demonstrations, protests or rallies about women's issues). They found that reported participation (among other variables) was related to identification as a gender equality activist. Moreover, identification in this case (i.e., as a gender equality activist) was a better predictor of intentions to participate in action ($\beta = .62$), and also reported participation ($\beta = .50$) than other variables such as gender identity (i.e. identification as woman), relative deprivation, efficacy and collective orientation.

Another paper of interest here is that by Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kammeier, and Spahlinger (1998). In two studies these authors examined the determinants of collective behaviour suggested by social identity and self-categorization theories. Amongst other variables (i.e., collective, social and reward motives), they focused on willingness to participate in collective action based on collective identification as an activist. The purpose of their research was to accentuate "that beyond the collective, social and reward motives usually considered in social movement research, collective identification is a unique predictor of group members' willingness to participate in collective action" (p.628).

Simon et al. measured two levels of identification which were identification with a broader category (identification with older people in a first study and with gay people in the second) and identification with an action group (respectively Gray Panthers, and the gay movement) as predictors of willingness to participate in collective action.

It was expected that identification with the social movement itself would be a better predictor than identification with the broader category. Their argument was that this must be the case because identification with the movement itself is more directly tied to an activist identity which typically was considered as having more specific implications for action. This is also consistent with Ajzen and Fishbein's (1977) principle of compatibility which states that attitudes predict behaviour to the extent that the predictor and the criterion are matched in terms of level of specificity or generality. Simon et al. anticipated that identification with the specific group should be a better predictor for a specific activist behaviour, or of the willingness to engage in such behaviour, than the identification with the broader category.

In the first study indeed they found that identification with an action group is a better predictor of collective behavioural intention ($r = .57$) than identification with a broader category ($r = .31$). In the second one the findings were consistent ($r = .40$), for identification with gay people, and for identification with the gay movement ($r = .64$).

Simon, Stürmer and Steffens (2000), also conducted a correlational study in order to investigate helping behaviour such as AIDS volunteering from a self-categorization theory perspective. They tested the hypothesis that people should be more likely to display more helping behaviour toward ingroup members when their collective identification is strong and less when their individual identification is

strong. More specifically, they assessed identification with homosexuals and heterosexuals and additionally, identification with a particular AIDS volunteer service organization. They expected that for homosexual participants collective identification would increase willingness to help ingroup members, while the individual identification would decrease it. For heterosexual participants, collective identification would decrease willingness to help outgroup members, while the individual identification would increase it. Finally, the authors also predicted that organizational identification (i.e., identification with the AIDS volunteer service organization) would predict volunteerism regardless of respondents' social category. They also assessed some other individual motivations that might account for AIDS volunteerism.

The authors found strong support for their hypotheses. As predicted, homosexual participants showed more willingness to volunteer when collective identification was high ($\beta = .41$) than when the individual identification was strong ($\beta = -.29$). Also in line with predictions, heterosexual participants were more willing to volunteer when they perceived themselves more in individual ($\beta = .24$) than in collective terms ($\beta = -.20$). Regardless of the sexual orientation, identification with the AIDS volunteer service organization predicted willingness to volunteer for both homosexuals ($\beta = .30$) and heterosexuals ($\beta = .31$). The total R^2 for homosexual participants was .25 and for heterosexuals .16. It is also worth noting that for the overall data, the strongest predictor for willingness to volunteer was identification with the AIDS volunteer service organization ($\beta = .23$).

More recently still, Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, and Jörger (2003) focused on the U.S. fat acceptance movement and examined two possible pathways to social movement participation. The first possible pathway examined involved the calculation

of the costs and benefits of participation. Based on Klandermans' (1984, 1997) review of the social movement literature, the authors distinguished three motives for involvement in such movements. These are collective, normative, and reward motives. The collective motives are conceptualized as the multiplicative function of subjective value of the social movement specific collective goals and the expectation that these goals will be reached. The normative motives are conceptualized as the multiplicative function of the subjective quality of the expected reactions of other people and the personal importance of their reactions. Finally, the reward motives are conceptualized as a multiplicative function of value and expectancy aspects (e.g., losing money or time or having good time with friends).

Of most interest here, however, is the second pathway for predicting social movement participation. Based on social identity theory ideas in relation to social movements participation (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), Stürmer et al. (2003) argue that:

(...) the willingness of members of a disadvantaged group to engage in collective action in behalf of their in-group increases with increasing collective identification. This should be the case particularly when group boundaries are impermeable and when status-based group relations are perceived to be unstable and illegitimate. (p.72)

More specifically, identification with a social movement organization should specifically increase willingness to participate, but the authors further argue that this relationship should be mediated by people's inner obligation to participate. In short, they expected, the three motives and collective identification processes (in particular identification with the social movement organization of fat acceptance) to both contribute independently to the prediction of willingness to participate in social

movement activities, and also the effect of identification on willingness to participate would be mediated by the inner obligation to participate.

Following multiple regression analysis with the three motives and identification included simultaneously in the model, it was found that, as predicted, collective, normative, reward motives and identification with the social movement organization made unique contributions to the prediction of willingness to participate in action. The total R^2 of the model was .32. In addition, the hypothesis that the relationship between identification with the social movement organization and willingness to participate should be mediated by an inner obligation to behave as a good group member, was confirmed.

It is difficult to draw a clear pattern from what is not an extensive number of studies. It seems however, that, those researchers who have specifically investigated the link between identification with an *action group* and collective action have found stronger relationships than those who have measured identification with a broad social category.

There are two principal reasons for this apparent lack of support for the relationship between collective self-definition and group behaviours. The first is theoretical: social identification should be an indirect predictor of group behaviour and therefore particularly strong links should not be expected. The second is both a methodological and theoretical point: in order for social identification to be connected to behaviour, the group in question must be relevant to that action.

As we have seen, the first point follows from self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A weak relationship between identification and behaviour is not surprising because social

categorization salience, and not identification, is hypothesised to be the proximal cause of group behaviour.

The second point about the relevance of groups to action can be illustrated by a comment by Klandermans (2000) who noted that, even where mass action is taken by members of ethnic groups, this action is actually taken by people who hold shared opinions and are committed to the action rather than everybody who shares the particular ethnic background. Thus the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s did not include all African Americans, but rather that subset of African Americans (and others) who were in favour of improving the status of this group. Clearly, the identification with certain groups is on occasions strongly connected with intended collective action. However, while these groups cannot always be equated with social categories, they can nevertheless be *about* social categories, and in particular about attempts to change relations between social categories.

To capture this idea I suggest that people who share opinions about different issues can be seen as forming *opinion-based groups*. The idea to focus on of opinion-based groups constitutes a key contribution of this thesis and it will be further developed in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to (a) offer definitions for the key concepts used such as social identity, social identification, social identity salience, intergroup behaviours; (b) outline an integrated theoretical explanation of the processes involved in predicting collective behaviours; and (c) provide a review of the most relevant research investigating this issue. There are two main views in the literature concerning the relationship between subjective group membership and group behaviour: one predicts positive simple correlation between identification and displays of group

behaviour such as ingroup bias based on Brown and colleagues' reading of social identity theory. The other one argues, based on Turner and colleagues reading of social identity theory, that there is not a simple link between these factors, and, on the contrary, this relationship is moderated by a number of variables and mediated by salience.

In any case, the empirical evidence of connections is not particularly strong. One solution I will propose in this thesis is that in order to reveal stronger links between the key variables (i.e., social identification, salience and group behaviour) it is necessary to research a particular type of group, *opinion-based groups* under conditions where there is intergroup conflict and high normativeness of behaviours. As previously mentioned in the introductory chapter, theory and past research suggest that the main factors which might enhance the relationship between social identification, salience and intergroup behaviours are:

1. Particular social contexts (e.g. cases of relatively clear intergroup conflict);
2. Normativeness of behaviours for groups (Turner, 1999; see McGarty, 2001);
3. Commitment to a particular type of groups (i.e. opinion-based groups).

Therefore, the next three chapters will review these theoretical points in order.

CHAPTER 3

INTERGROUP CONFLICT AS A CONTEXTUAL ENHANCER OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to point out the implications of intergroup conflict for the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. It is argued that intergroup conflict is a contextual variable which should lead group members to behave more in line with the norms of the group they identify with. Thus, intergroup conflict is an hypothesized enhancing factor of the relationship between identification/salience and group behaviour.

In this chapter I will start by presenting the classical account of intergroup conflict as envisaged by the realistic conflict theory. I will then present an alternative social identity theory account of intergroup conflict and Tajfel's distinction between different types of intergroup conflict which potentially have different underlying mechanisms and implications. The section after that will be concerned with outlining the antecedents of intergroup conflict as proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1979). More specifically, I will focus on socially shared systems of beliefs which should influence behaviour in relation to intergroup conflict and the distinction between social mobility versus social change belief systems. The main point is that people who share a social change belief system are more likely to see the situation in terms of social competition, and to act in those terms, compared to people who hold a social mobility belief system (and hence tend to act more in individual terms).

I will then move on to discuss the implications of intergroup conflict as anticipated by social identity and self-categorization theories. As already indicated,

the main idea here is that, under conditions of intergroup conflict, people tend to act more in terms of their group membership, that is the link between identification, salience and group behaviours should be stronger when intergroup conflict exists.

Finally, in the last section of the chapter I will review some studies which investigate the role of intergroup conflict, some dealing explicitly with intergroup conflict and its consequences, and some others conceptualizing the intergroup conflict as social identity threat.

Realistic Conflict theory: A Classic Treatment of Intergroup Conflict

One way to define social conflict as distinct from other forms of conflict is to consider it as conflict between large-scale socio-economic or socio-political groupings as distinct from conflicts inside an individual or between individuals (Tajfel, 1982). In that sense there is a distinction between social conflict and intergroup conflict which can also concern conflict between small groups.

One of the best-known approaches to intergroup conflict is Sherif's realistic conflict theory (RCT). Its central hypothesis is based on the simple idea that "real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict" (Campbell, 1965, p.286), and this hypothesis has received strong empirical support over the years (for a review see Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Realistic conflict theory argues that, when resources are scarce, opposed group interests promote competition which develops into overt social conflict. Intergroup conflict is most intense where the real conflict of interests is greatest and where the conflicting parties have the most to gain by victory (Levine & Campbell, 1972). When groups are independent and in competition, the interplay between the actions of each group results in positive outcomes for the ingroup and negative outcomes for the other group. Consequently, through attempting to achieve beneficial outcomes for

themselves, the actions of the members of each group are realistically perceived to be calculated to frustrate the goals of the other group.

However, Sherif noticed in his early experiments that there were displays of intergroup bias even before the introduction of functionally competitive relations between groups. Even before groups met face to face or engaged in competitive activities, intergroup tension and conflict were already present. It seemed that knowledge of the mere existence of the other group appeared to initiate ingroup bias (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). As Tajfel and Turner (1979) noted an institutionalized or explicit conflict of 'objective interests' between groups does not provide a fully adequate basis to account for many intergroup situations. For this reason, they introduced the distinction between subjective and objective conflict which is explored in the next section.

Another Type of Conflict: Distinguishing Subjective from Objective Conflict

The intergroup conflict in the Sherif's studies can be seen as having three main characteristics:

1. It was *institutionalized* (in the sense that it was officially organized by the summer camp authorities);
2. It was *explicit* (it dominated the life of the participants);
3. It was *objective* (in the sense that, under the terms of the competition, one of the groups had to be the winner and the other the loser).

However, there is empirical evidence that these three characteristics (institutionalization, explicitness, and objectivity) of an intergroup conflict are often found to be sufficient but not *necessary* conditions for intergroup behaviours. Thus, Tajfel made the distinction between objective or *realistic conflict* which would imply

a competition over resources in the sense used by Sherif and *subjective conflict* which does not necessary involve the existence of competition over resources. The minimal group paradigm experiments (Tajfel et al, 1971) are the clearest examples of the fact that discrimination can exist in conditions of minimal group affiliations, anonymity of group membership, absence of conflict of interests, and absence of a previous history of hostility between the groups. These experiments provide evidence for the existence of a subjective intergroup conflict which is the result of mere awareness of belongingness to a particular group. However, the subjective conflict can occur also in the case where there is a competition not over resources but a “social competition” in the sense used by Turner (1975) and discussed by Tajfel (1982):

There exists, however, another basis for competition, in which (...), the scarce resources have no value outside of the context of the competition itself. This is the case of groups competing to win a contest, to achieve higher rank, status, or prestige – the case of ‘social competition. (p. 12)

It is also true that objective conflicts are generally speaking, conflicts over power, such as wealth or territory and involve structures such as the economic, political and historical ones. It is useful to distinguish them from subjective conflicts which can be seen as usually being based on attempts to establish positive distinctiveness for the ingroup (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000). Although objective and subjective conflicts can be distinguished conceptually, they are often closely interrelated as in cases where subjective conflicts exist long after the initial objective conflict disappeared (such as cases of historical antipathies between people living in zones of previous ethnic frictions). There are also cases where the conflict for the “scarce resources” of status or prestige is “realistic” in the sense of Sherif, and it is

also institutionalized, that is for example, when it is explicitly defined as a contest or determined as such by the norms of the social situation (Tajfel, 1982). Having clarified what social identity theory means by subjective conflict, the next question of interest is when such a conflict is more likely to occur.

Antecedents of Intergroup Conflict: Social Mobility versus Social Change

Belief Systems and Their Implications for Intergroup Conflict

An important role in explaining intergroup conflict is played by socially shared system of beliefs. The social identity theorists introduced the idea that the social psychology of intergroup relations should take into account “social realities as well as their reflection in social behaviour through the mediation of a socially shared systems of beliefs” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 36).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) considered that there is another social and behavioural continuum which is associated with the interpersonal-intergroup continuum and its two extremes are “social mobility” and “social change”. These terms refer to the “individuals’ belief systems about the nature and the structure of the relations between social groups in their society” (p.34). The *social mobility belief system* is based on the assumption that the society has a flexible and permeable structure, so that if individuals are not satisfied with the conditions imposed by the groups they belong to, it is possible for them through different means (e.g., talent, hard work, good luck, etc.) to move individually to another group which provides a more satisfactory social identity.

At the other extreme, there is the *social change belief system*. This social change system of beliefs implies that “the nature and structure of the relations between social groups in society is perceived as characterized by marked stratification, making it impossible or very difficult for individuals, as individuals to

divest themselves of an unsatisfactory, unprivileged, or stigmatized group membership” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 35). This is the case in which individuals cannot achieve social mobility by themselves and in order to be satisfied by the social conditions they have to act rather as a group and try to achieve a change in society. As Tajfel noted, the impossibility of “getting out” based on individual effort alone determined different forms of intergroup behaviour. Thus, the main characteristic of social behaviour related to the social change belief system is that:

(...) in the relevant intergroup situations, individuals will not interact as individuals, on the basis of their individual characteristics or interpersonal relationships, but as members of their groups standing in certain defined relationships to members of other groups. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.35)

Tajfel and Turner (1979) also pointed out that there is a close relationship between explicit conflict of interests and the social change system of beliefs. One of the main features of this system of beliefs is that individuals perceive it to be very difficult or impossible to move individually from their own group or category to different ones, but this is exactly the situation where there is an *intense conflict of interests* which makes it very difficult for members to resolve their situation by moving to the opposite group. This is also the case when movement to the opposite group is perceived as betrayal and can be followed by powerful sanctions from the original group members:

The intensity of explicit intergroup conflict of interests is closely related in our cultures to the degree of opprobrium attached to the notion of ‘renegade’ or ‘traitor’. This is why the belief systems corresponding to the ‘social change’ extreme of our continuum are

associated with intense intergroup conflicts. These conflicts can be conceived, therefore, as creating a subclass or subcategory of the subjective intergroup dichotomization characteristic of that extreme of the belief continuum. They share the basic feature of the 'social change' system of beliefs, in the sense that the multigroup structure is perceived as characterized by the extreme difficulty of an individual's moving from one group to another. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.36)

Holding one or the other system of beliefs has other consequences for intergroup behaviour which have to do with the variability or uniformity of behaviours and attitudes in a group concerning the relevant outgroup. There are two main statements regarding intergroup behaviours that can be drawn from the previously discussed ideas about the belief systems:

1. the nearer are members of a group to the social change extreme of the belief-systems continuum and the intergroup extreme of the behavioural continuum, the more uniformity they will show in their behaviour toward members of the relevant outgroup;
2. the nearer are members of a group to the social change and intergroup extremes, the more they will tend to treat members of the outgroup as undifferentiated items in a unified social category, rather than in terms of individuals characteristics (e.g., group stereotypes in situation of high intergroup conflict).

The general implications of considering intergroup relations through the socially shared systems of beliefs are that, in cases where social stratification is based on an unequal distribution of scarce resources such as power, prestige and wealth between groups, the social situation can be characterized by ethnocentrism and

antagonism between the over- and underprivileged groups (Oberschall, 1973; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). More specifically, conflicts are more likely to arise and develop in situations where people share a social change belief system (i.e., people will tend to act collectively in order to achieve social change) compared to cases where people shared a social mobility belief system (i.e., people will tend to act individually in order to move to other more satisfactory social groups). Moreover, when the social context is characterized by impermeability and inflexible social stratification, intergroup tensions and overt conflicts are more likely to develop. However, the consequences of intergroup conflict in general are far more diverse than simple displays of ethnocentrism and these consequences will constitute the focus of the next section.

The Social Identity Perspective on the Link between Intergroup Conflict and Group Behaviour

Giving the implications of this topic, there is a considerable amount of research investigating the consequences of different types of intergroup conflict. Previous studies generally showed that intergroup conflict enhances intragroup morale, cohesiveness, and cooperation (Fiedler, 1967; Kalin & Marlowe, 1968; Vinacke, 1957). Moreover, real conflict of interests not only creates antagonistic intergroup relations but also heighten identification with, and positive attachment to, the ingroup (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p.8). However, identification with the ingroup received little attention from RCT theorists, being considered more an epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict.

Alternatively, Tajfel and associates introduced social identity theory in order not to replace RCT as a valid explanation of intergroup conflict, but to supplement the theory in some essential aspects, such as the role of identification with the ingroup.

Tajfe and Turner (1986) pointed out the important role played by identification in relation to intergroup conflict:

As treated by RCT, these identifications are associated with certain patterns of intergroup relations but the theory does not focus either upon the processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity nor upon the possibly autonomous effects upon the in-group and intergroup behaviour of these 'subjective' aspects of group membership. (p. 8)

In terms of implications of intergroup conflict for behaviours and from a social identity perspective, intergroup conflict should increase the salience of group memberships and thereby lead to attitudes and behaviours that are more in line with group norms and values. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue:

It could be assumed, in accordance with our common experience, that the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals who are members of the opposite groups will behave toward each other as a function of their respective group membership rather than in terms of their individual characteristics or interindividual relationships. (p.10)

In other words, during overt conflict, group membership becomes salient and thus the individuals tend to become depersonalized, so there is a shift from personal to social identity. As pointed out by Hewstone and Greenland (2000, p.138), the consequences of overt intergroup conflict are that "a concern with the in-group takes over from a concern with the self; ingroup favouritism replaces self-favouritism; the self is stereotyped as an ingroup member; and the ingroup is viewed as coherent and

homogenous” There is, of course, an explicit opposition in this quote between the idea of self and the ingroup that is not entailed in self-categorization theory.

Brewer (1997) also proposed three principles which are likely to operate in any situation in which a group membership becomes salient, so that they are applicable in the cases of intergroup conflict, too. These three principles are:

1. *The intergroup accentuation principle*, which refers to assimilation within category boundary and contrast between categories (members of the ingroup are seen as more similar to the self than members of the outgroup);
2. *The ingroup favouritism principle*, which refers to the selective generalization of positive affects such as trust liking, to ingroup members but not outgroup members;
3. *The social competition principle*, which refers to the fact that intergroup social comparison is typically perceived in terms of competition, rather than cooperation with the outgroup.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) made a further distinction concerning the behaviour toward the outgroup in situations of intergroup conflict. They suggest that such behaviour can be divided into *instrumental* and *noninstrumental* behaviours.

Instrumental behaviours refers to actions which aim to cause the ingroup to win the competition, while noninstrumental behaviour is gratuitous discrimination against the outgroup and does not have any meaning outside the context of intergroup relations.

One example of such noninstrumental behaviour is the attribution of negative stereotypes to the outgroup: a set of traits is attributed to all members of a group or category such that all individuals are assumed to be more similar to each other and different from members of other categories. Through this strategy, the outgroup is

seen as more predictable, discrimination becomes more justifiable, and the ingroup can better positively discriminate from the outgroup (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000).

Self-categorization theory argues that intergroup conflict increases salience and therefore relationships that are not present (or too weak) otherwise, might be detected in conditions of conflict. Intergroup conflict increases salience through comparative fit (i.e., ingroup members seem more similar compared to outgroup members, so the differences between ingroup and outgroup should be considerable enhanced) providing that this is consistent with the social meaning of category. As Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, and Doosje (2002, p.163) noted in relation to comparative fit:

(...) a New Yorker and a Californian are more likely to see themselves (and be seen) as Americans at the Olympic Games (an intergroup context) than at the Superbowl (an intragroup context).

Conflict, however, might also increase perceiver readiness by making the outgroup more accessible and relevant because of the threat it poses.

Beside the classical intergroup conflict studies of Sherif and colleagues, there is a considerable number of studies in the literature investigating the effects of intergroup conflict on different aspects of self-definition as a group member (e.g., identification, salience, self-stereotyping, etc.) and behaviours. It is not surprising that over the years, researchers have found intergroup conflict to be a topic of increasing interest. Thus, the following section will be concerned with reviewing some of the existing studies which I believe are most relevant for showing the effects of intergroup conflict on different aspects of self-definition as a group member and behaviours.

Review of Studies Investigating the Effects of Intergroup Conflict

The studies investigating intergroup conflict can be regarded as falling into three main categories:

1. Studies which explicitly deal with intergroup conflict and its consequences on group behaviour;
2. Studies which approach intergroup conflict in terms of threat to social identity;
3. Studies which approach intergroup conflict as a trigger for negative emotions;
4. Studies which approach intergroup conflict focusing on crowd disorder (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Different approaches and studies on intergroup conflict.

Approaches	Examples of studies	Background theories	General hypotheses
1. Classic treatment of intergroup conflict	Jackson (2002); Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, L.A., McNatt, & Renfro (2002);	Social identity theory, self-categorization theory, realistic conflict theory.	Conflict moderates the relationship between ingroup identification and group behaviour including displays of ingroup bias; perceived intergroup conflict predicts negative racial attitudes
2. Intergroup conflict as threat to social identity	Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers (1997), Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg (1993), Grant (1993); Branscombe & Wann (1994); Grant & Brown	Social identity theory, self-categorization theory, realistic conflict theory	Under identity threat the relationship between identification and group behaviour (e.g., ingroup bias, derogation, coping strategies, etc) is stronger.

	(1995); Dietz-Uhler and Murrell (1998); Crocker & Luhtanen (1990); Veenstra & Haslam (2000).		
3. Intergroup conflict as a trigger for negative emotions	Mackie & Smith (1998); Mackie, Devos, & Smith (2000); Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith (2002).	Intergroup emotion theory; Self-categorization theory;	Intergroup conflict and perception of ingroup power (relative to outgroup) trigger negative emotions (i.e., anger) and behaviours.
4. Intergroup conflict as in crowd disorders	Reicher (1996); Stott & Reicher (1998); Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury (2001).	Social identity theory, self-categorization theory, realistic conflict theory, crowd behaviour approaches	Collective behaviours are better explained in a dynamic, intergroup manner which consider the interplay between perceptions and self-categorization of both groups in conflict.

Despite the volume of research on intergroup conflict, few studies have explicitly tested the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship between identification/salience, and group behaviour. One example of a study dealing directly with intergroup conflict and its antecedents was conducted by Jackson (2002). He focused on identification and perceived intergroup conflict as predictors of different intergroup attitudes. Using self-selected ingroups and outgroups (i.e., participants had to think about various groups they belonged to and then write down one they especially valued; they also had to write down a relevant outgroup), he included a three-dimensional scale of identification in order to assess the impact of different

aspects of identification on attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup such as feelings, thoughts and behavioural tendencies toward the ingroup and outgroup.

The intergroup bias score was calculated by subtracting the average outgroup evaluation score from the average ingroup evaluation score. Furthermore, in that study, perceived intergroup conflict was assessed on a twenty-one-item scale (e.g., “When outgroup members obtain their goals, the ingroup is hindered”, “General relations between the ingroup and outgroup are cooperative”) in order to examine the impact of this important social context variable.

The hypotheses were formulated on the basis of both social identity theory and self-categorization theory. It was expected that perceived intergroup conflict should moderate the relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias. That is, the relationship between identification and ingroup bias should have been significantly stronger when perceived conflict was high. Moreover, perceived conflict was predicted to be related to expressions of ingroup bias because it should have stimulated negative views of the outgroup but have little impact on views of the ingroup.

In support of social identity ideas, the results of the study showed that the relationship between evaluative and cognitive dimensions of identification on group attitudes was significantly moderated by perceptions of conflict. Perceived conflict significantly interacted with the following dimensions of group identification: ingroup attraction, self-categorization, affective ties, and ingroup bias. Under low levels of perceived conflict, participants with high levels of ingroup attraction expressed greater ingroup bias than those with low levels of ingroup attraction. This pattern was further accentuated, however, when the perception of conflict was high, in that, self-categorization, and affective ties, were associated with more bias when conflict was

perceived as high. Thus, under conditions of high conflict, the link between self-definition as a group member and ingroup bias was stronger.

Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, and Renfro (2002) investigated the effects of perceptions of intergroup conflict along with other variables (i.e., negative contact, strength of ingroup identification, perceived status inequality, negative stereotyping) on negative racial attitudes for groups of Blacks and Whites. They had predicted that the relationship between perceived intergroup conflict (plus the other investigated variables) and negative racial attitudes should be mediated by various types of threat such as realistic (i.e., threats to the existence of the group) and symbolic threats (i.e., perceived group differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes) and intergroup anxiety (i.e., feeling of threat experienced by people during intergroup interactions because of concerns about negative outcomes for the self).

Perceived intergroup conflict was measured on a four-item scale consisting of items like: "Relations between Blacks and Whites have always been characterized by conflict" and "Although sometimes it is not visible, there is a racial battle going on in this country" (p.1246).

Negative racial attitudes were measured using a previously employed scale (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998) that was designed to reflect negative affect associated with outgroups. They measured twelve different evaluative and emotional reactions toward the outgroup including hostility, admiration, dislike, acceptance, superiority, affection, disdain, approval, hatred, sympathy, rejection, and warmth.

They found that for both groups (Black and Whites) the perceived intergroup conflict predicted negative racial attitudes, and this relationship was also mediated by

the different types of threat and intergroup anxiety investigated. Realistic threats, symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety all significantly predicted negative racial attitudes for both Blacks and Whites. Finally, perceived intergroup conflict predicted realistic threats, symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety for both Black and White groups.

Another way in which intergroup conflict may be evident is through manipulation of social identity threat because such threats can also be seen as a form of subjective conflict. These researchers including Ellemers, Spears, Doosje and Branscombe have focused not so much on the effects of intergroup conflict but on *social identity threat* on different outcomes such as identification, salience, self-stereotyping, and discrimination. Tajfel and Turner (1979; Tajfel, 1978) suggested three general ways in which people might react when their social identity is threatened: a) social mobility (the enhancement of social identity through moving to a group of higher status); b) social creativity (e.g., strategies such as comparing the ingroup with the outgroup on different dimensions); and, c) social competition (i.e., ingroup members can compete directly with the outgroup to attain positive distinctiveness).

However, research on social identity threat is mainly based on an interpretation of social identity theory that when group boundaries are not permeable the low status group should be more prone to discrimination, and also to other forms of collective behaviours, and this should be especially true when group social identity is threatened in some way by a higher status outgroup. Moreover, it is argued that one reason why identification with the group does not always predict ingroup bias, relates to the intergroup context, and that social identity threat is one factor that should make the identification-bias relationship stronger. Thus, these researchers are primarily

interested in outcomes such as increased identification, discrimination and group behaviour, when social identity is threatened and they are usually manipulating intergroup conflict through status and hierarchical relationships between groups.

A good example of such research is provided by the work of Ellemers, Wilke, and van Knippenberg (1993). In two experiments, Ellemers and colleagues tested the prediction that legitimacy of low status, permeability of group boundaries and stability of group status (identity threat) will impact upon ingroup identification, ingroup favouritism and individual and collective attempts to achieve social mobility. Their main hypotheses regarding the low status groups were that illegitimate treatment of a group as a whole, resulting in low group status, would determine stronger ingroup identification than legitimate assignment of low status. Secondly, they predicted that in the case when a group has an illegitimate low status position, group members will focus more on opportunities for collective status improvement (which depend on the stability or instability of group status) than in the case of legitimate group status. In other words, if we consider the condition of illegitimate low status and impermeability of group boundaries as the high threat condition, then, in this case, ingroup identification as well as collective attempts to change or improve the group status (i.e., group behaviour) should increase. In a first experiment they found that illegitimate assignment of low status to the participants increased in-group identification. In a second experiment they found that illegitimate allocation of individual participants to a low-status group decreased group identification. Finally, attempts to acquire higher status individually (individual mobility) or collectively (group mobility) were more strongly affected by prospects for status improvement than by the legitimacy manipulations.

Other studies, which also support the idea that threat to identity and identification may interact in order to produce group behaviour, have been conducted by Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997). In four studies, they investigated the effects of self-perceived or public-perceived threat to group status on self-stereotyping for people with high or low levels of ingroup identification. They manipulated social identity threat by manipulating status, so that the low status condition consisted of a combination of comparison groups (i.e., psychology students versus art students, and psychology students versus physics students) and dimensions (i.e., intelligence and creative). In the high status condition, the psychology ingroup compared favourably with either arts students with respect to their intelligence or with physics students with respect to creativity. Self-stereotyping, defined as the perception of the self as a prototypical group member (Turner, 1987), was operationalized in terms of general similarity of self to the group prototype. They predicted that high and low identifiers would respond differently to a threat to their group status, such that self-stereotyping would be reduced for low identifiers but enhanced for high identifiers.

They found that, in general, high identifiers perceived themselves as more prototypical for their group than low identifiers and there was a significant interaction between group status and identification. That is, this pattern was even stronger when the identity of the group was threatened. Under threat conditions, low identifiers tended to choose individualistic strategies of dissociating from their group, while high identifiers in the same situation tended to adopt group-level strategies and still see themselves as prototypical for their group.

Another study by Grant (1993) showed that identification moderated the effect of threat on ingroup bias in the context of gender relations (i.e., groups of men and women discussing issues related to gender). He found that positive intergroup

differentiation along gender-stereotypic dimensions was obtained when group identity was threatened, especially for people with high levels of identification.

In another study, Branscombe and Wann (1994) tested the effects of social identity threat using exposure to a video clip in which the ingroup representative either won or lost a world boxing title to a member of the outgroup. Although there was a strong correlation between ingroup identification and ingroup favouritism (more exactly outgroup derogation in this particular case) in both conditions (i.e., threat and non-threat), the correlation was even stronger under threat.

Grant and Brown (1995), besides threat to social identity, also tested the effects of collective relative deprivation conceptualized as the result of a social comparison implying that the person making the comparison was not receiving entitled valued resources, on behaviours such as intention to engage in collective protest actions and expressions of ethnocentrism. They investigated the realistic conflict theory prediction that perceived threat to valued resources is an important factor in ethnocentrism and also would be an incentive to collective action (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966). Perceived threat was conceptualized as the perception that an objective conflict of interest existed between ingroup and outgroup (i.e., they actually created a threat from the outgroup to the values and beliefs shared by the members of the ingroup). The authors also assessed behavioural intentions to engage in individual and collective protest action, ethnocentrism (i.e. in the form of dislike for the outgroup and ingroup-outgroup differentiation), and strength of group identification. The participants were divided into two groups which were seated in separate but adjoining rooms and they were informed that both groups would be working on the same task (to develop and tape record their position on a particular social issue).

They also based their argument on the social identity theory idea of the social-change belief system suggesting that when status is illegitimate and unstable, subordinate or lower status group members would strive collectively for changes in society which were beneficial for the ingroup through directly confronting the dominant outgroup. However, regardless of illegitimacy and instability of group status, direct threats to social identity may increase the likelihood of group members engaging in collective action to counter this threat.

Thus, the authors explored the impact of threat to social identity (in the form of an attack on central, shared ingroup attitudes, values, beliefs, norms, and group practice, by rejecting and derogating their nature and importance) on collective behaviours, particularly protest behaviours, as well as expressions of ethnocentrism along attitudinal and stereotype dimensions. They predicted that such threats to social identity, would generate negative reactions both by an increased likelihood to engage in collective protest and by a more intense expression of ethnocentrism toward the outgroup. Additionally, they predicted that the relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias should be stronger in the condition of high relative deprivation and threat.

However, Grant and Brown found that only collective relative deprivation had an impact on collective social protest, and that the threat to social identity manipulation did not influence the choice of the collective protest. Regarding ethnocentrism, manipulation of collective relative deprivation resulted in a strong ethnocentric reaction, while threat to social identity increased the likelihood of derogation of the outgroup. The threat to social identity manipulation had a main effect only on the ingroup differentiation measures, so that groups in the high threat conditions differentiated the outgroup from the ingroup more strongly than did groups

in the low threat conditions. Most importantly, however, in line with the predictions, they found that the correlations between identification and intergroup differentiation or ingroup bias were stronger in the deprived-high threat condition.

Dietz-Uhler and Murrell (1998) examined reactions and coping responses to threatened group identity in two studies. In a first study they expected that people who identified more strongly with a group would react more strongly and would be more likely to engage in coping responses when their positive identity was threatened than people not identifying with a group. In a second study they hypothesized that people who identified strongly with their group and who engaged in coping responses would feel better about themselves and their group.

Manipulation of threat consisted of participants (students at a U.S. university) reading a fictitious news statement indicating that the U.S. Board of Education recently completed a rating of textbooks used in all universities and colleges. The news statement asserted that the quality of books reflected the quality of education. In the low threat condition the respective university received a good score (90 out of 100 possible points) and in high threat condition a poor one (30 out of 100 possible points). Participants also completed different self-esteem, ingroup bias, and organizational commitment scales.

Although they found that identification with their university significantly predicted university commitment, academic self-esteem, and general self-esteem, there were no main effects of threat or interactions of social identity and threat. The results of the coping responses measures (i.e., degree of affirmation and amount of group-serving attribution) showed that people in the high threat condition made more positive affirmations than those in the low threat condition.

In the second study, the hypothesis tested was that when people who strongly identify with a group make group-serving attributions (i.e., internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure), they will have higher self-esteem than people who do not identify strongly with the group and who do not make group-serving attribution. For this study, the results showed a three-way interaction of social identity, threat, and type of attribution for self-esteem.

Overall, the results in both studies showed that people tend to act defensively when their group is threatened and there is a tendency for this reaction to be especially high among those who identify strongly with the ingroup. Moreover, the authors suggest that this defensive reaction seems to serve the purpose of restoring or at least protecting a person's self-esteem.

From a slightly different perspective, a piece of research by Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) dealt with the relationship between threat to social identity and ingroup enhancement/outgroup derogation. They made the distinction between personal self-esteem and collective self esteem and, based on research on personal self-esteem predicted that people with a high collective self-esteem should be more likely to react to social identity threat (e.g., threats to collective self-esteem) by derogating the outgroup and enhancing the ingroup.

Based on theories regarding the self-concept, they also argued that, when there is threat to their social identity, people maintain a positive social identity by identifying or creating favourable comparisons between the ingroup and outgroup. Consequently, individuals will discriminate against or derogate the members of the outgroup, in order to create and maintain the favourable comparisons between them and outgroup, which results in a positive social identity and high collective self esteem.

In a study using the minimal group paradigm, Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) manipulated threat by telling participants that they performed well or poorly in a task. Then, authors measured personal and collective self-esteem, and participants received information about the average performance of their group. As predicted, the results showed that participants high in collective self-esteem rated above-average and below-average scorers on the test in an ingroup-enhancing way, while those participants low in collective self-esteem did not. Their conclusion was that collective self-esteem is an individual variable that may moderate the attempt to maintain a positive social identity.

It is also worth mentioning that there is another series of papers focusing on the effects of interaction between threat to identity and identification not specifically on group behaviour but on other related effects and outcomes. For example, Turner, Hogg, Turner, and Smith (1984) investigated the effect of threat and identification on group cohesiveness, showing that “socio-emotional attraction to the group” or group cohesiveness increased after failure and defeat, especially under conditions of high initial commitment to the group, while Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) found that social identity threat and identification impacted upon group variability, that is under conditions of threat, high identifiers perceived less variability within both ingroup and outgroup than low identifiers.

An example of research that integrates classic treatment of intergroup conflict with approaches of intergroup conflict as threat to social identity is a study done by Veenstra and Haslam (2000) in which they manipulated both perceived intergroup conflict and threat to social identity in union context. More specifically, they explored the role of both intergroup context (i.e., intergroup conflict) and identification on willingness to participate in an industrial protest in a survey-type study employing

three conditions: a control condition (no reference was made to the broad context), a *conflict* condition (explicit reference was made to the conflict between the government and unions), and finally, a conflict and *threat* condition (reference was made to the threat that government reform posed to union members). The authors expected that willingness to participate in collective action would vary as a function of identification in interaction with the intergroup context (e.g., intergroup conflict, threat from outgroup). They argue that:

this is because the meaning of collective action conferred by different contexts – and the impact of context on the salience of a shared in-group categorization – should vary depending on the participant’s level of identification. (p.160)

In particular, they anticipated that reference to conflict alone should increase the salience of union membership for high identifiers and these tendencies should be further affected by references to the threat posed by the outgroup to union members (i.e., the government).

Veenstra and Haslam (2000) found that high union identifiers were generally more willing to participate in collective action than low identifiers. Regarding the intergroup context manipulation, all participants showed more willingness to participate in collective action in the conflict and threat condition than in the control condition. The results also revealed that high identifiers were more willing to participate in collective action in the conflict and conflict plus threat conditions than in the control condition. On the contrary, for low identifiers, the willingness to participate in collective action did not seem to be strongly affected by the intergroup context manipulation. The authors point out the importance of the intergroup context explaining that, collective action seems to be:

(...) not simply a product of identification, but it is also shaped by the distinct meaning which such action assumes for high and low identifiers within a given context. (p.153)

In conclusion, this research, generally suggests that intergroup conflict, in the form of threat to social identity indeed plays an important role in the processes relating to self-definition as a group member and different forms of group behaviour. Social identity threat is a context-determining variable and not taking it into consideration might be responsible for the inconsistent results concerning the link between identification and group behaviour.

Another slightly different approach on intergroup conflict comes from intergroup emotion theory (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 1998). This approach takes into account emotions as determinants of intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Following from self-categorization theory, it holds that when a social identity becomes salient people come to define themselves in terms of this group membership, and this specific group membership becomes part of the self, and acquires emotional significance. Thus, “(...) people do not only define themselves as group members; they also care about situations or events affecting the ingroup” (Devos et al., 2002, p.112). This approach is of relevance here to the extent to which the theory maintains that different forms of intergroup conflict and relations between groups trigger specific emotions and that “specific emotions also correspond to different patterns of behavioral responses” (Devos et al, 2002, p. 113). More specifically, as the intergroup emotion theorists noted:

There is no doubt that a wide range of specific emotions may arise in intergroup situations. For example, a threatening and powerful

outgroup is likely to be feared. Conflicts between groups often produce anger. If an outgroup is blocking the goals and actions of the ingroup, frustration will occur. Disgust arises when an outgroup is appraised as violating moral standards (...). In addition, these emotional reactions will often prompt specific intergroup behaviour. (p.111)

In order to test these ideas Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) created an appropriate context for emotional reactions by using subjective conflict (i.e., conflict of values) between groups supporting different views on some attitudinal issues (e.g. illegal drug use, rights of homosexual couples, etc.). The aim of this research was to investigate to what extent the perceived power of the ingroup relative to the outgroup would trigger negative emotions and action tendencies.

In a first correlational study on illegal drug use, they addressed the issue that negative emotional reactions and behaviours (or more correctly behavioral intentions) should be differentiated in an intergroup context. The authors introduced a conflict of values, explaining to participants that disagreement between people is based on the fact that people often do not share the same values. An initial pretest showed that the issue of illegal drugs related to a conflict between social order (stability of society) and freedom values (freedom of action and thought), and that two groups corresponded to these two currents of opinion (i.e., the participants categorized themselves as supporting one or the other opinion on the illegal drug issue). Mackie and colleagues also measured group identification, appraisal of collective support (i.e., perception of the ingroup of being either stronger or weaker than the outgroup), emotional reactions (i.e., anger and fear), offensive and defensive action tendencies and the importance of social order and freedom as values for the ingroup and outgroup.

As the authors expected, participants perceived a clear value conflict between ingroup and outgroup. In addition, two negative emotions (i.e., anger and fear) could clearly be differentiated in this intergroup context. They also examined the extent to which group identification and appraisal of collective support were related to specific emotional reactions and action tendencies. They found that identification and appraisal of collective support predicted expression of anger toward the outgroup and the willingness to take action against it. The more ingroup members identified with the ingroup, and appraised it as being stronger than the outgroup, the more they expressed anger and were willing to move against the outgroup. They found in addition that anger mediated the effects of group identification and appraisal of collective support on offensive action tendencies. Thus, the results of this study show that the more individuals saw themselves as group members, the more they experienced specific emotions and the more they were willing to act accordingly.

In another study, Mackie and colleagues created subjective conflict by using the issue of rights of homosexual couples, and actually manipulated the appraisal of collective support for the ingroup relative to the outgroup. Furthermore, they examined the impact of this manipulation on emotional reactions and behavioural intentions. Similarly to the first study, the authors found that such conflicts over values provoke anger, regardless of the perceived power of ingroup in relation to the outgroup. Finally, these studies point to the fact that self-definition in terms of certain group membership is predictive for group behaviour but conflict and the negative emotions triggered by conflict can modify the pattern of the relationship. Thus, offensive actions toward the outgroup can be explained not only through group identification mechanisms but also by the emotional charge of the intergroup context. In this sense, the intergroup emotion account supports the idea that intergroup conflict

is a contextual factor which should play a determining role in the processes underlying group behaviours.

Finally, there is another approach to intergroup conflict which focuses specifically on explaining *collective action* including violent behaviour from a social identity and crowd behaviour perspective. This approach is represented mainly by researchers such as Reicher, Stott, Drury and Hutchinson. They investigated various violent social events ranging from violent confrontations between students and police to football collective violence. Their analysis of collective violence in terms of intergroup dynamics is based on social identity and crowd behaviour accounts. Following Tajfel (1978, 1982) and Turner (1982), Stott and Reicher (1998b) argue that:

(...) any given person may adopt a range of social identities corresponding to the various social categories of which they consider themselves to be a member. This range will differ from person to person as a function both of their own choices and of what is allowed to them by others (...). When individuals act in terms of any specific social identification, they will conform to the norms and beliefs, which define the relevant category and react to others in terms of whether or not they form part of the same category. (p.358).

Based on a number of studies, they discovered a specific pattern of crowd disorder. Initially the crowd is composed of individuals who consider themselves as belonging to different social categories, more specifically most of the people from a crowd define themselves in opposition to other violent subgroupings. They argue that, to the extent to which the opposing subgroup (e.g. police, army, etc.) perceive the crowd as a homogenous threat and treat them in an undiscriminated way, this alters

their individual self-perceptions, and they come to see each other as sharing a common group membership. Moreover, because they perceive themselves to share a illegitimate and repressed common fate, resistance to the opposing group is perceived as an appropriate response. Thus, “even if the violence of some in the crowd may provoke police action, this action is a necessary component of processes of escalation (...).” (Stott & Reicher, 1998b, p.359).

Reicher (1996) uses this social identity model of crowd behaviour to explain initiation and development of collective conflict in the case of a violent confrontation between students and police during a demonstration held in November 1988 (the so called ‘Battle of Westminster’). His analysis concentrates on how the conflict originated and how it developed and he used a variety of sources including television reports, newspaper articles, student magazines, written accounts of participants’ experiences, and tape-recorded interviews. Finally, a group of seven participants were shown a video-compilation of the events and then they were asked questions about their perception and reactions to the events portrayed in the video.

Following the analysis of these materials, he advanced three hypotheses that may account for the processes by which crowd members become involved in conflict:

1. Crowd members will only enter into conflict with an outgroup where: (a) conflictual behaviour is seen as legitimate, (b) outgroup action is seen to violate concepts of proper social practice, and (c) conflictual tactics are considered an effective way to meet desired ends.
2. The legitimacy of conflict, the concepts of proper social practice, and both identification of ends as well as the calculation of whether these ends will be reached are all defined by reference to the collective beliefs of the relevant social

category. Hence, in order to understand which actions may initiate crowd conflict it is necessary to understand the perspectives of the groups which are involved.

3. The incidents out of which crowd behaviour originates are not incidental to the underlying causes of conflict. Rather, they are the points at which conceptual differences in the concept of proper social practice as held by different groups become concretely enacted. (Reicher, 1996, p.129)

Clearly, the model proposed proved to be very useful for understanding the mechanisms of conflict in general and more specifically of crowd violence in real life settings from an intergroup dynamic perspective. As Reicher (1996) noted, “there is clear match between respondent’s accounts of legitimacy and the onset of conflict, between their accounts of their changing participation in the event and between these broadening self-definitions and the increasing homogeneity of the crowd (...)” (p.132).

In another paper, Stott and Reicher (1998a) investigating collective football crowd disorder this model was also applied. The event analyzed was the violent confrontation between England supporters and Italian police during the 1990 World Cup. The authors argue that collective football violence needs to be understood in terms of intergroup dynamics rather than in terms the personal characteristics of crowd members (e.g., hooligans versus police).

The analysis of this account was based mainly on one of the authors’ direct observations as a participant in the events. Similar to the previous account, the role of interactive processes in drawing football fans into collective conflict was evident. It was shown that treating members of the crowd as a homogenous mass and a potential threat resulted in violent responses from the crowd members. That is:

(...) where police treat all fans as if they are potentially dangerous and treat all forms of collective self-assertion (singing, chanting, marching, etc.) as actual danger, then many supporters may experience what they perceive as legitimate rights to be denied (...) and /or may experience what they perceive as illegitimate forms of external constraint (...). In either case, resistance to police action can be construed by participants as a reassertion of rights rather than commitment to conflictual norms. (Stott & Reicher, 1998a)

More recently, Stott, Hutchinson and Drury (2001) investigated the incidents that took place during the 1998 Football World Cup Finals in Marseilles, France where English supporters were involved. In the analysis of these events the role of dynamic intergroup context was again central. The authors argue that such violent incidents cannot be explained simply in terms of conflictual norms to which the 'hooligans' are committed. More specifically, where the outgroup actions were perceived as illegitimate from the ingroup perspective, the ingroup members redefined their identity in such a way that violent action against the outgroup comes to be seen as legitimate and even necessary, in order to protect ingroup members. On the contrary, where the outgroup hostility was not present and the ingroup was not perceived as 'hooligans' by the outgroup, ingroup members also define themselves through contrast with the 'hooligans'.

The data were collected in June 1998, during an ethnographic study of football fans. The main data sources employed by the researchers were field notes consisting of observations, informal conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, songs and chants, and descriptions of specific events, places, and people. Other data included videotapes filmed during some of the events, newspaper articles, television,

video and radio programs, and questionnaires obtained from the Football Supporters Association. Given the nature of the data, they were primarily analyzed through qualitative methods. The analysis focused on both English and Scottish supporters and it revealed the different factors (for both categories) which can explain the dynamic involved in the subsequent 'crowd disorder' incidents. For English supporters these factors were:

1. Initial perceptions of the normative dimensions of English football fan identity (i.e., English supporters described their intentions and normative dimensions of their ingroup in terms of non-violent and legitimate activities);
2. A hostile intergroup context (i.e., supporters from the sample had contact with Marseilles youth described a general hostility from them toward English supporters);
3. Variation in the form and content of English supporters identity (i.e., conflict came to be understood by people involved as a legitimate response to protect ingroup members from hostile outgroup action);
4. 'Englishness' defined through a continuing history of antagonistic relations to other national groupings (i.e., supporters talked about previous similar situations in which they found themselves).

For the Scottish supporters these factors were:

1. Perceptions of the normative dimensions of Scottish football fan identity (i.e., similarly to the English supporters, Scottish fans described the ingroup in terms of non-violent, legitimate actions);

2. A non-hostile intergroup context (i.e., in contrast to the English supporters, Scottish fans perceived the outgroup behaviours as legitimate);
3. Variation in the form and content of Scottish supports identity (i.e., Scottish supporters positively differentiate their own group identity from the perceived group identity of English supporters; they defined the ingroup norms and values in terms of “social relations in the distal intergroup context”, p.372);
4. Scottishness defined within a continuing history of positive intergroup relations (i.e., Scottish supporters perceived a continuity of positive relations between them and other national group in previous international tournaments).

This analysis applied to both English and Scottish supporters is in line with the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) which emphasizes the more general point that:

(...) crowd events are characteristically intergroup encounters. As such, identity processes within a crowd do not simply determine collective action in an one-way process; rather, identity processes involve the dynamic of intergroup relationships. These intergroup dynamics function to change the nature of the social relations facing crowd participants, which in turn redefines their initial social identity and its associated norms, thus changing the shape of collective action. Therefore, rather than context being seen as something merely external to identity, the context in which any one group acts is formed by the identity-based actions of other groups. (p.363)

This study demonstrates once again the role played by the dynamic process of inter- and intra-group interaction in changing the nature of people's collective identities in situations where conflict escalates. In essence, this account of intergroup conflict offers insightful explanations as to how conflict originates and escalates through interactions between two opposing groups as well as on how perceptions of both groups about themselves and the outgroup influence the dynamic of conflictual behaviours. However, this account, being mainly developed in natural settings rather than in laboratory, does not explicitly measure such things as degree of identification with the ingroup, degree of self-definition at a given moment in time, etc. Thus, this approach can be considered as a valuable complement to the previous perspectives which are more experimental and laboratory-orientated.

Conclusion

However, for the purpose of this thesis, the most important point regarding intergroup conflict and its consequences is that intergroup conflict is a contextual enhancer of the relationship between different aspects of self-definition as a group member and behaviours and mainly the first two sets of studies supports this point. More specifically, the idea emerges that intergroup conflict is one of the factors that determines whether group members will act more in line with the norms of the group they identify with. Of course, beside intergroup conflict, there are other variables which also may be called enhancers of this relationship and one of them concerns group norms and the degree to which anticipated group behaviours correspond to these norms. Thus, the next chapter will focus on normativeness of behaviours as one of the factors contributing to the enhancement of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour.

CHAPTER 4

NORMATIVENESS OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR AS AN ENHANCER OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

Besides contextual factors which enhance the relationship between identification, salience and group behaviour such as intergroup conflict, another factor which plays an important role in this relationship is the degree to which behaviours prescribed by a specific group membership correspond with the group norms (i.e., the normativeness of group behaviour). Hence, the main idea I will focus on in this chapter is the point that people tend to be more likely to follow behaviours which are highly normative for a group they strongly identify with. The idea that norms are good predictors of behaviours or behavioural intentions has received quite a lot of attention in social psychology. However the empirical support for this idea is not always strong. It is useful therefore to explore the reasons for this relative lack of support. One explanation is that group norms are predictive of behaviours but only for people who identify with the respective group. Thus, group norms should moderate the relationship between identification and group behaviour, rather than directly predict group behaviour.

Another important idea I will discuss is that social category salience should be a good predictor of group behaviour only when the group behaviours are normatively congruent. In order to develop this argument, different sections of this chapter will deal first with basic conceptualizations of group norms as predictors of group behaviour, I will then review some research investigating the role of group norms in predicting behaviours on the basis of subjective group membership. Finally, I will

draw some conclusions reflecting the ways that group norms act as enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviours and I will introduce a third factor (opinion-based group membership) which will be the focus of the next chapter.

Group Norms and Their Relationship to Group Behaviour: The Predictive Power of Group Norms for Behaviour

Social interaction, in general, produces norms that regulate behaviours in social situations, so that group norms can be considered to be emergent properties of groups (Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991). Once groups are formed, they provide members with information about how to behave in various situations, that is, through group norms people get to know what behaviours they should adopt in different circumstances. Thus, norms have a high informative value for group members, and it is evident why they should also be predictive of behaviours. Sherif (1936) defined norms as “customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals” (1936, p.3). Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1963) argue that norms are “standards, shared among the members of a group and representing the behaviour and attitudes they expect of one another” (p.136). Finally, Turner (1991) defined a social norm as:

(...) a generally accepted way of thinking, feeling, or behaving that is endorsed and expected because it is perceived as the right and proper thing to do. It is a rule, value or standard shared by members of a social group that prescribes appropriate, expected or desirable attitudes and conduct in matters relevant to the group. (p.3)

Nevertheless, there is obviously more to norms than the idea of preferring some behaviour to others. As Turner (1991) noted “ the idea of norm conveys a

feeling of ‘oughtness’ about certain behaviours” (p.3) that is, there is also “an element of moral obligation, duty, right justice” (p.3) about norms. Another theoretical concept which is fundamental to understanding what social norms are, is subjective validity (Festinger, 1950; Turner, 1991). Subjective validity describes the subjective aspect of holding a social norm and it refers to the feeling of confidence in its appropriateness, correctness and social desirability given by engaging in some particular action:

If a social norm is a shared belief that a certain course of action is appropriate in a given situation, then, when individuals act in line with the norm, they experience their behaviour as subjectively valid.
(Turner, 1991, p.4)

McGarty (1999a, p.199) elaborates this point arguing that feelings of correctness follow from the development of consensual understandings or explanations and:

(...) cognitively speaking, norms are representations of the mind’s operation as an interpretative/explanatory system. In particular, norms are explanations of behaviours or beliefs, whether they be planned, past or current.

Self-categorization theory introduces another theoretical principle in relation to the role played by norms in achieving group distinctiveness. This because norms provide ways for groups to differentiate themselves from outgroups. More specifically, the fit between categorization and group norms should be higher when ingroup norms are different from outgroup norms, allowing maximal differentiation between them. Under these conditions, norms provide a clear way of differentiation from the outgroup (Turner et al. 1987; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996).

However, conceptualizing and operationalizing norms in different contexts can pose a few problems. For example, Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) pointed out the definitional difficulty of the concept of a norm. They argue that it is especially important when considering the normative influence on behaviours, to distinguish between descriptive and injunctive meaning of social norms. In his view, the descriptive norm describes what is typical or normal, while the injunctive meaning of norms refers to rules or beliefs which constitute a morally approved or disapproved way of behaving. Although it seems hard to differentiate between these two types of norms in real social situations (as what is seen as typical or normal comes to be accepted and viewed as moral over time and what is moral can become typical, too), it is clearly important to make this distinction as the two types of norms should have a different impact upon behaviour.

Perhaps a more productive question is to ask how norms can influence behaviour. One of the best-known attempts to answer this question has been made by the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and its more recent extension, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) conceptualization of norms is that they are the extent of perceived pressure from others to perform certain behaviours instead of others.

It is important to understand that the theory of reasoned action is focused on predicting behaviour on the basis of behavioural intentions. Thus, when we ask why, from the multitude of behaviours that can be adopted in a certain situation are only some of them preferred, then according to the theory of reasoned action the answer is that behaviour can be best predicted by a person's intention or willingness to perform the respective behaviour. Intention, in turn, is determined by two conceptually different components: *an attitudinal component* which refers to the favourableness of

people's evaluation of the behaviour, and a *normative component* (subjective norm) which reflects people's perception of the extent to which important others think that they should perform the behaviour. Thus, in this approach, norms represent one of the two key predictors of behavioural intentions.

However, research in support of these theoretical assumptions reveals that norms are not as good a predictors of behaviours as might be expected. In fact, the link between norms and behavioural intentions is much weaker than the link between attitudes and intentions, that is norms only weakly influence people's intentions to behave in certain ways (see Ajzen, 1991). This apparent lack of influence of norms on behaviours was explained by Terry and colleagues (see Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000; Terry & Hogg, 1996) in terms of the way Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conceptualized norms as additive factors, that is, a norm exists if a number of significant others endorse a particular course of action. Another factor might be that although they treated norms and attitudes as two factors which independently influence behaviour, there can in fact be an interplay between attitudes and norms, whereby ultimately norms are created by people's attitudes.

However, as Terry and colleagues argue, the social identity perspective approaches norms in a different way. According to their reading of self-categorization theory, groups influence people's attitudes and behaviours through the process of self-categorization. Psychologically belonging to a particular group involves categorization of oneself as a group member, which, through the process of depersonalization, transforms one's self-concept and attitudes, feelings and behaviours in such a way that they are consistent with the group prototype. Importantly, the group prototype can be regarded as the *cognitive representation of*

the group norm. If a particular social identity is salient, it becomes a basis for self-definition and the self is then perceived to be increasingly prototypical of the ingroup. From this perspective, norms are viewed as properties of social groups derived from shared attitudes and behaviours that become prescriptive and descriptive of group membership.

In particular, self-categorization theorists such as Turner (1991) argue that when a social identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in behaviour which is highly normative:

It is assumed that depersonalization, the creation of mutually perceived similarity between group members, (...) leads to more consensual behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group (...). (p.16)

That is, in an intergroup situation, or when a social identity becomes a basis for self-categorization, people's behaviour will be highly normative. In such situations it is more likely that people will conform to group norms and will behave in group stereotypical terms, so that highly normative behaviours are more likely to be preferred to less normative ones. Thus, social identities should influence group behaviour through the mediating role of group norms. In other words, group members will be more likely to engage in a particular behaviour if it is in accordance with the norms of a behaviourally relevant group membership, particularly if identity is a salient basis for self-definition (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; Terry & Hogg, 1996; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). In cases where group membership is not salient, it is more likely that people will behave in terms of their individual characteristics rather than following group norms, so that individual norms should play a more important role in predicting behaviours.

An important point made by McGarty (1999a) is that norms provide explanations and justifications for group relevant action. As he noted:

To the extent that the action is appropriate it will be seen in a positive light (i.e., it will be understood to reflect some current ingroup consensus) and will provide a basis for that action. Where some group consensus is not seen to explain or justify action then this is not a true norm. Instead it reflects the operation of a power process, where the individual is opposed to the will of an outgroup. (p.199)

Thus, group norms established through a real consensus should be highly informative about the action that might be taken by the members of a particular group. Consensus seems to play an essential role in both internalisation of group norms and becoming committed to follow behaviours prescribed by the respective group membership.

Studies Investigating the Relationship between Norms, Subjective Group Membership and Group Behaviours

There is a large number of studies investigating the role of group norms in relation to group behaviours. I would distinguish between three different but highly interrelated categories of studies:

1. Studies investigating the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship from a social identity perspective;
2. Studies investigating the idea that the relationship between identification and group behaviour (e.g., displays of ingroup bias) is moderated by group norms;

3. Studies investigating the idea that normative behaviours are more positively evaluated and more likely to be followed by group members compared to non-normative or less normative behaviours.

The next section will involve presenting some studies that can be included in each of these categories. Generally, studies falling in all three categories support the point that norms play an essential role in relation to behaviour and it is not possible to make accurate predictions in relation to behaviour of group members if the normative context is ignored. However, the third category of studies seems to be the most relevant from the perspective of this thesis. This is because they are specifically focusing on the situation where the relationship between self-definition as a group members (e.g., identification) and group behaviour is stronger, that is, in a highly normative context.

The first category of studies I will focus on comprises research investigating the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship, but from the perspective of social identity and self-categorization theories. This line of research mainly revolves around work done by Terry and colleagues. Wellen, Hogg, and Terry (1998) proposed that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour should become significantly stronger “under conditions in which people categorize themselves and identify with an in-group that defines membership in terms of specific behaviourally and attitudinally prescriptive norms” (Wellen et al., 1998, p.49). These authors thus base their arguments on social identity theory and self-categorization theory, in that they explain the attitude-behaviour relation as a function of depersonalization. In addition, they consider norms and attitudes as not independent from one to another. In their perspective, attitudes and behaviours become normative to the extent that they

characterize group membership, and they influence people to the extent that the respective group is salient for them in the context of interest.

These authors treat attitudes in a different way to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), more specifically they see them either as personal in some cases (i.e., judgements of the favourableness of a behaviour), but also as socially shared and tied to specific group membership, and in this latter case they are perceived to be normative. Wellen et al. (1998) also consider norms as highly context-dependent but at the same time they regard the content of norms as “emanating from group prototypical attitudes and behaviours rather than from information available in the immediate context” (Wellen et al., 1998, p. 49). Specifically, they investigated the effects of ingroup norms on the relationship between people's attitudes and their behaviour. They expected that these effects would vary depending mainly on the salience of group membership and they focused on participants' attitudes toward students being responsible for picking up litter on a university campus.

They found that the effects of the attitudinal congruency of norms varied indeed as a function of group salience and also ingroup norms were more influential for high salience individuals than for low salience individuals. More specifically, their findings suggested that ingroup norms influenced behavioural decision making for individuals high in group salience but only when there was an opportunity to carefully process the normative information.

Terry, Hogg, and White (1999) further examined the role played by self-definition as a group member in the attitude-behaviour relationship. More specifically, in one study, they investigated first the effects of self and social identity on intentions and behaviours, and secondly, the effects of identification as a function of past experience of performing the behaviours. In the context of this chapter, the first part

of the study is of more relevance. The study conducted was concerned with the prediction of intention to engage in household recycling and reported recycling behaviour.

Beside social identity perspective, they based their prediction on identity theory (Stryker, 1968, 1980, 1987), arguing that there is a direct link between self-identity and behavioural intentions. In identity theory, self is “conceived as a collection of identities that reflects the roles that a person occupies in the social structure” (Terry et al., 1999, p.226). Thus, in order to predict behaviour, it is necessary to consider the self and the wider social structure as being closely linked.

In an attempt to reconcile the social identity perspective and identity theory, the authors tested the proposal that group norms, at least for people who identify strongly with the group, would influence behavioural intentions. The study had a longitudinal design, with a first questionnaire assessing participants intention to engage in recycling behaviour, and a second questionnaire (distributed two weeks later), assessing the reported behaviour for the last two weeks. The authors also included measures of attitudes towards the target behaviour, perceived social pressure (subjective norm), perceived behavioural control, importance of behaviour for self-identity, perceived group norm, strength of identification with the reference group, and past recycling behaviour.

The results showed that the perceived norm of a behaviourally relevant reference group was related to behavioural intentions for people who strongly identified with the group, but not for those who did not. The study results point to the fact that, in order to get valid behavioural predictions, it is necessary to take into consideration the relevance of the behavioural role for self-definition, in addition to the salience and norms of behaviourally relevant social identities.

Finally, Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000) tested the hypothesis derived from social identity and self-categorization theories that attitudes are most likely to predict behaviour when they are supported by a congruent ingroup norm. Thus, in two experiments, they examined the effects of ingroup norms, salience of group membership, and mode of behavioural decision-making.

First, they manipulated norm congruency and mode of behavioural decision-making (spontaneous and deliberative) in a between-subjects study of career choice in psychology. The salience of group membership was assessed as strength of identification with the group membership. Following social identity and self-categorization theories, they predicted that participants exposed to an attitudinally congruent ingroup norms (norm-consistent information) would be more likely to behave in accordance with their attitudes than participants in a no-norm condition (norm neither attitudinally congruent, nor incongruent), who, in turn, would be more likely to behave in accord with their initial attitude than participants exposed to an attitudinally inconsistent norm (norm-inconsistent condition). Moreover, they expected that this effect would be stronger for high identifiers. In line with their prediction, they found that participants exposed to an attitudinally consistent norm toward their preferred career choice were more likely to display attitude-behaviour consistency than those exposed to an attitudinally inconsistent group norm.

In a second experiment, they replicated and extended the first one by including a manipulation of ingroup salience. Consistent with predictions and findings from the first experiment, participants exposed to an incongruent norm displayed greater attitude-behaviour inconsistency than those exposed to a congruent ingroup norm. However, contrary to predictions, they found that this effect did not vary as a function

of group salience. Finally, the results suggested that perceived identification with the group moderated the influence of norms on attitude-behaviour consistency.

Another line of research focuses on the role of norms in relation to discrimination and prejudice and is based on the idea that the relationship between identification and ingroup bias is moderated by group norms. It is argued that the inconsistent relations that have been observed in past research between the level of group identification and the displays of ingroup bias (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; see also chapter 2) can be explained by the fact that norms have not been taken into account.

Jetten, Spears, and Manstead (1997) advance the idea that:

(...) group norms that prescribe or proscribe differentiation can express important aspects of group's identity and these group norms will particularly influence high identifiers' willingness to display ingroup bias. (p. 604)

They argue that in different intergroup situations, specific group norms are salient and they can influence the willingness to display ingroup bias. Jetten and colleagues (1996), anticipated that the ingroup norm would be a stronger predictor and a more direct predictor of reward allocation in a minimal-group setting, in comparison to the outgroup norm. This was because "conformity to the in-group norm expresses one's salient social identity, assuming some degree of identification with the in-group" (p.1223). More specifically, their prediction was that an ingroup norm of fairness would lead to more fairness, while an ingroup norm of discrimination would lead to more discrimination toward the outgroup.

The authors were also interested in the ways that the tendency to show ingroup bias and conformity to ingroup norms interact and relate to each other. Thus, another goal of this study was to investigate the relative strengths of the processes of

conformity and ingroup bias when they were in conflict, so in order to achieve this they manipulated orthogonally both ingroup and outgroup norms of fairness and discrimination. They predicted that, manipulating ingroup and outgroup norms, would vary not only the sort of behaviour they sanction or prescribe for the respective groups, but also the relation of similarity or dissimilarity of ingroup and outgroup norms.

Thus, in their first study Jetten et al. (1997) examined the influence of ingroup and outgroup norms on levels of ingroup bias in a modified minimal-group setting. They measured ingroup bias and positive differentiation by using the Tajfel et al. (1971) reward matrices. Specifically, they hypothesized that the ingroup norm would have a disproportionate influence on allocation strategies, although an ingroup norm of discrimination would be more influential than one of fairness, because the latter conflicts with the positive distinctiveness principle. Hence, they predicted that, once again, positive differentiation would be higher when the ingroup norm was discriminatory than when it was fair, and they argued that this was due to the enhancement motive of social identity theory.

The norms were manipulated by giving participants false feedback about the reward strategies used by both ingroup and outgroup members. As dependent variables, besides ingroup bias and differentiation, they also measured identification with the ingroup and outgroup, and prototypicality.

In line with their predictions, they found that the ingroup norm was indeed a more important factor for the allocation of rewards than the outgroup norm. Interestingly, ingroup bias or favouritism could be dramatically reduced when the norm was against this strategy. The outgroup norm did not have any significant effects and the authors explained this by the fact that the equity principle might have

been overshadowed by conformity and ingroup bias effects in this study. They also found that, in line with self-categorization theory principles, high comparative fit, reflected in dissimilar norms, produced a sense of group distinctiveness that resulted in positive discrimination.

In a second study, they tested exactly the same hypotheses, but in a context of natural social groups. The results from this study suggested that the outgroup norm had more of an effect on ingroup bias compared to the first study. Thus, anticipation of fairness from the outgroup resulted in slightly more fairness, while anticipation of discrimination from the outgroup resulted in slightly more ingroup bias, but this effect was qualified by the higher order interaction between ingroup and outgroup norms on ingroup bias and differentiation measures. The authors suggest that these interactions reflect the predicted tendency for participants to differentiate more when the group norms were similar than when they were different, especially when they reflected discrimination. In general, the results from both studies point out the importance of conformity to ingroup norms as well as the relationship between ingroup and outgroup norms as influences on group members' willingness to express ingroup bias.

In another paper by Jetten, Spears and Manstead (1997), they advanced the idea that level of ingroup bias can be moderated by a salient group norm that prescribes or proscribes bias. Based on the social identity perspective, they argue that since high identifiers should be more concerned about achieving and maintaining a positive social identity, salient group norms should particularly influence high identifiers' willingness to behave in accordance to group norms.

Thus, in one experiment, they manipulated fairness and differentiation as two different group norms. Group identification was also manipulated by making positive or negative aspects of group membership salient by linguistically framing the items.

The authors predicted that participants who were high identifiers (as a result of the salience of positive aspects of group membership), should act more in line with group norms. Consequently, high identifiers should display less ingroup bias if the group norm is fairness and more ingroup bias if the group norm is differentiation, compared to low identifiers.

The results showed that, in line with the predictions, participants who strongly identified with the group conformed more to the group norm representing positive differentiation. However, they did not find any evidence for the conformity to fairness norm, that is high identifiers did not display more fairness compared to low identifiers. The authors explained this finding by the fact that introducing a fairness norm might conflict with a more general tendency to show ingroup bias as a mean of enhancing social identity. Jetten et al. (1997) argue that:

for high identifiers the processes of being more motivated to act in accordance with group norms and at the same time being more eager to show ingroup bias might have cancelled each other out, leading to similar levels of ingroup bias for high and low identifiers. (p.608)

However, this study demonstrates the importance of group norms in regulating group behaviour such as displays of ingroup bias. The finding that for high identifiers the level of ingroup bias can vary with the salient group norm suggests that also displaying low levels of ingroup bias might be consistent with maintaining a positive identity for high identifiers when this is in accordance with a salient group norm.

Finally, another slightly different line of research advances the idea that normative behaviours are more positively evaluated and more likely to be adopted by group members than non-normative ones. Similar to the other approaches previously mentioned, this perspective also builds on ideas from social identity and self-

categorization theories. This perspective emphasizes the role played by norms in group processes and, more specifically, in predicting group behaviour. This approach supports the idea that by manipulating group norms judgements of group members and their behaviours can be influenced as well.

A good example for this approach is research done by Marques, Abrams, Paez, and Martinez-Taboada (1998). Based on social identity and self-categorization theories, they predicted that group members seek both intergroup distinctiveness and legitimization of ingroup norms.

According to conformity and social identity literature, normative differentiation among individuals (regarding an ingroup norm) or category differentiation (regarding their category membership) can both affect evaluations of group members. Marques and colleagues consider the situation in which category membership and behaviour are either consistent or inconsistent with one another. They argue that both category differentiation and normative differentiation operate together, so that category differentiation establishes the category membership of group members (e.g., male or female), while normative differentiation establishes the extent to which ingroup members adhere to category norms (e.g., masculine or feminine traits or behaviours).

In their research they investigated how perceivers react to inconsistencies between category membership and normative behaviour. They predicted that, in general, perceivers would attempt simultaneously to sustain category differentiation and to seek legitimization for ingroup norms. As a result, perceivers would make derogatory judgements for ingroup deviants and positive judgements of people endorsing group norms. Marques et al. (1998) examined category and normative differentiation in four experiments using minimal group procedures. They

manipulated category membership and normative position for five group members. They also measured group identification, and asked participants to evaluate the group (global impression), and each group member. The results from all four experiments conducted, consistently supported the hypothesis, and most importantly from the perspective of this thesis, they show that norms play an important role in the process of self-categorization. More specifically, normative behaviour which is more in accordance with a particular group membership, is seen as more valuable and desirable as it contributes to increase the perceived cohesion of the ingroup.

There is also more recent research by McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, and Hogg (2003) which investigated the influence of different group norms on the evaluations of group members who display behaviour in accordance to these norms. They focused on the ways in which evaluations of collectivist and individualist behaviour are influenced by group norms that endorse collectivism or individualism. Their argument was that, usually, collectivist behaviour is perceived as 'good' and acceptable as group behaviour, while individualist behaviour is seen as deviant from the group norm. However, they predicted that preferences for collectivist behaviour can be attenuated, or even reversed, by manipulating group norms, more specifically, when group members are motivated to conform to group norms that prescribe individualism. Thus, they built on other research showing that normative group behaviour is more positively evaluated than is non-normative behaviour (e.g., Marques et al., 1998).

Their hypothesis was that when group norms are individualistic, group favouring of collectivist behaviour becomes non-normative, while individualist behaviour (traditionally regarded as deviance from group norms) becomes normative. Thus, they predicted first that there would be a general tendency for collectivist

behaviour to be more positively evaluated than individualist behaviour. The second prediction was that this tendency would be affected by the content of the group norm. In other words, when the group norm was collectivist, members who displayed collectivist behaviour would be evaluated more positively than members who displayed individualist behaviour. On the contrary, when the group norm is individualistic, individualist behaviour would become norm-consistent behaviour and therefore should be evaluated more positively than might be normally expected.

Thus, in one study, the authors experimentally manipulated norms of individualism and collectivism in an organizational role-play and also behaviour of group members so that they reflected individualism and collectivism. Results showed that, consistent with predictions, collectivist behaviour was more positively evaluated than individualist behaviour but this tendency was attenuated when the norm was individualist. Thus, by manipulating group norm (i.e., individualistic versus collectivist), individualist behaviour became normative and preferred by group members. This piece of research points to the importance of group norms for behaviours. Self-definition as a group member is certainly one predictor of group behaviour, but the preferred behaviour to be adopted by group members depends also on the normative content prescribed by the respective group membership.

To sum up, the body of research presented in this section reflects the role played by group norms in predicting behaviours. More specifically, Wellen, Hogg, and Terry (1998) found that the effects of the attitudinal congruency of norms varied as a function of group salience and also ingroup norms were more influential for high-salience individuals than for low salience individuals. Terry and colleagues (1999, 2000) found that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour was moderated by perceived group identification. Similarly, Jetten and colleagues (1996, 1997) found

that participants who strongly identified with the group conformed more to the ingroup bias norm. Finally, in the last set of studies, Marques and colleagues (1998) found that group normative behaviour, is seen as more desirable by group members (as it contributes to increase the perceived cohesion of the ingroup), and McAuliffe and colleagues (2003) found that the preferred behaviour by group members depends on the normative content of the group membership.

It seems that although attitudes and group identification are essential factors in relation to group member behaviours, they are not the only variables involved in the process. It is important to recognize that in order to make more accurate predictions about behaviours it is crucial to take into consideration the normative context, that is the particular norms prescribed by a certain group membership. The research reviewed demonstrates the importance of norms as moderators of these processes. However, as we have seen this is only one factor that plays a role in the process, and there are also other factors, which have to be taken into the consideration (e.g., intergroup context, type of group, etc.). Another general observation that can be made regarding the existing research is that none of this work has empirically addressed or satisfactorily resolved the distinction between identification and salience. The study by Terry et al. (2000) which failed to demonstrate effects of salience in the attitude-behaviour relationship, is one case in point here.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to emphasize the importance of group norms in the relationship between self-definition as a group member (i.e., identification and salience) and group behaviour. Intergroup conflict (see chapter 4) is one contextual factor which contributes to the enhancement of the link between identification, salience and group behaviour, but after reviewing this material it seems certain that

there is another important factor involved in this relationship which is the *normative context*.

The normative context or more specifically, group norms, influence this relationship between self-definition as a group members and behaviour by increasing the likelihood that members will prefer behaviours which are in accordance with group norms (i.e., highly normative) to others which are not or are less normative. That is, those behaviours which correspond to a higher degree with the norms prescribed by a specific group membership are more likely to be adopted by members, and this should be especially true for people who strongly identify with the group. Thus, in situations where anticipated behaviours are highly normative, the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be stronger, too.

Finally, besides intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviours, there is another factor which should have an impact upon the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. This is the specific type of group membership, and I would emphasize that there is a particular type of group, which is highly suitable for investigating the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behaviour. The reason is that this relationship seems to be particularly strong for such opinion-based groups, and they will constitute the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

OPINION-BASED GROUPS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF- DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

In this chapter I will discuss the idea of the opinion-based groups, a type of group which I consider to be very useful for studying the mechanisms explaining how group identification, salience of social identity, and group behaviour relate to each other. Just as intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviours (see Chapters 3 and 4) can act as enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour, the type of group, in this case opinion-based groups, can also play an important role in this relationship. My argument is that this specific type of group is particularly well-suited for capturing the processes involved in predicting group behaviour in different social situations, and I will present a series of reasons for why that should be the case in this chapter.

Most importantly, in this type of group the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is particularly clear, partly because such groups are often engaged in social conflict, and partly because they have features which make it easy for relevant behaviour to be defined as normative. That is, in opinion-based groups the existence of the other two factors which enhance the relationship of interest are relatively common.

Thus, the focus of this chapter will be first on defining and explaining the concept of the opinion-based group, and secondly, on the differences between opinion-based groups and other types of social groups and social categories. Finally I will review some previous research which has employed this type of group (though without explicitly using the concept) and, I will present some implications of the opinion-based group concept for studying social identity processes.

What are Opinion-based Groups?

Commitment to artificial groups or broad social categories seems only sporadically related to commitment to take collective action or decision to become involved in intergroup behaviour in general. As shown in Chapter 2, the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is not always as strong as would be expected. The pattern that can be inferred by looking at the previous research investigating this relationship suggests that there is a particular type of group which seems especially appropriate for studying the identification - salience - intergroup behaviour link. As detailed in Chapter 2, studies such as those conducted by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), and Simon, Stürmer and colleagues (1998, 2000, 2003) suggest that the relationship is stronger when identification with particular activist groups rather than broad categories is measured. The point that commitment to only some types of group, are particularly relevant to action, is well illustrated by the comment of Klandermans (2000), who noted that even where mass action is taken by members of ethnic groups (i.e., broader social categories), this action is actually taken by people who hold shared opinions and are committed to the action rather than by everybody who shares the particular ethnic background.

Opinion-based groups are psychological groups (as opposed to membership groups or sociological categories) in the sense used by Turner (1982), but which have a social identity defined by a shared opinion. For example, pro-life versus pro-choice opinion-based groups can be defined in terms of opinions on the issue of abortion. Thus, members of such groups perceive themselves as sharing a certain opinion about a specific issue (in this case abortion), and this opinion group membership becomes part of their self-definition, when the context is relevant.

Opinion-based groups possess a set of characteristics that make it easy to distinguish them from other types of groups and social categories. In the next sections of this chapter I will outline these characteristics and present in detail how exactly opinion-based groups differ from social categories and some other specific types of group.

Characteristics of Opinion-based Groups

Opinion-based groups *are formed around a belief or a set of beliefs* rather than mere preference. They usually involve an evaluative dimension, taking a position on a certain issue is equivalent to evaluate, judge and decide on the view to adopt on some state of affairs.

For example, people who merely prefer to wear the colour black would rarely come to constitute an opinion-based group (as these people merely share a preference for a colour). However, where black-clad people come to perceive their colour preference as a shared attribute, perhaps because of some organized set of beliefs or constructed ideology which would offer explanations as to why black is better than other colours, they could come to form opinion-based groups (e.g., Gothics would be one example).

Thus, sharing an opinion is not sufficient, but that shared opinion (or in some cases the place of a single opinion is taken by a more organized set of beliefs) needs to become part of their social identity. In this way, group members might come to perceive and define themselves in terms of their opinion group membership, depending on the context, in the same way as with any other psychologically meaningful social category or group. Just as when any other social category is salient, when the context is relevant to a particular opinion-based group membership, the

opinion-based group membership becomes switched on, so that people come to act and think in accordance with that membership.

Opinion-groups are most visible in relation to *controversial issues* (partly because conflict makes them visible) and we can easily make a parallel between oppositionally defined opinion groups and the conformity-deviance framework. In other words, there are opinion-based groups which aim to change the social world in some way (the “deviants”) and, on the contrary, groups which aim to preserve the status quo (the “conformists”). This dynamic is very well illustrated by the research of Sani and Reicher (1998; 1999) and Sani and Todman (2002) on schism. Schism refers to “the division of the group into subgroups, and the ultimate secession of at least one group from the parent group” (Sani & Reicher, 1998, p. 624). The process of schism provides an excellent example of opinion-based group formation.

For instance, Sani and Reicher (1998) had first focused on the analysis of the split in the Italian Communist Party, suggesting that schism was due to the different and irreconcilable opinions on the essence of the parent group identity. In this case the broader group (i.e., the Italian Communist Party) was split into at least two opinion-based groups around core ideological issues concerning the party.

The authors argue that schismatic process is based on the idea that “while group members may expect to achieve consensus, the issue of where that consensus should reside may be a matter of argument” (Sani & Reicher, 1998, p.623). They also suggest that, although often, intragroup negotiation and discussion may lead to an eventual consensus, there may be times where such unity is not reached or even where it comes to be seen as unreachable. This would be most likely to occur when one faction within the group sees the positions of another faction as not only different to their own but as subverting the very nature of the group (p.626).

In such cases, members do not choose compromise as a strategy of resolving the conflict because this would mean that “the group is acting against their social identity where social identity is what makes group behaviour possible” (p.626). Thus, they no longer psychologically belong to the same group and disagreement regarding the essence of group identity is a precondition of schism. They further examined these ideas by looking at the division of the Italian Communist Party into the Democratic Party of the Left and the Party for Communist Refoundation. The authors investigated the way in which members of the two factions, which are in my terms members of two different opinion-based groups, would describe both the ingroup and the outgroup. Their suggestion was that members of both factions would characterize their own group as representing the essence of the Italian Communist Party as opposed to the other faction that was seen as subverting this essence. In short, this paper clearly exemplifies how oppositionally defined opinion-based group can form within a broader political organization.

In two other studies Sani and Reicher (1999) investigated the split in the Church of England over the controversial issue of ordination of women as priests. Basically, the broad initial category had split into two new opinion-based groups made up by proponents and opponents of the change within the Church of England. Sani and Reicher (1999) suggest that:

(...) where the position of some in the group is seen by the others as contradicting the essence of group identity, then consensualization is blocked and difference becomes non-negotiable. In such conditions, it is not only that consensualization fails to lead to consensus, but it actually exacerbates dissensus (...). In a nutshell, where differences are construed by either side as subverting the group essence,

consensualization processes produce schism rather than agreement.

(p.281)

Following these studies, the model of schismatic process was finally tested in another study conducted by Sani and Todman (2002). For this research, they investigated officials of the Church of England who were against the ordination of women to priesthood. The authors described the model based on data collected on Italian Communist Party and Church of England schisms as follows:

Members of a subgroup will express schismatic intentions if they believe that a proposed new norm fundamentally changes a central aspect of group identity. The effect of this perception on schismatic intentions is mediated by the belief that group identity has been subverted. In turn, the effect of subgroup members' perception of identity subversion on schismatic intentions is mediated by the perception that they have no voice and that the group as a whole has low entitativity. (Sani & Todman 2002, p. 1649)

The account of schism is relevant here as it illustrates the particular case of opinion-based group formation around controversial issues in a broader group or category. It is also important to note the role of consensus, or more specifically lack of consensus in the case of schism. The lack of consensus, together with the subsequent perceived lack of group entitativity are considered by the authors to be the main mechanisms responsible for schism here, but by the same token, reaching consensus in the new faction created following schism is the basis of opinion-based group formation.

These examples of research on schism also point out the *contrastive* nature of opinion-based groups. Being formed around controversial issues within a broader

social category or group, there is always some degree of opposition between one opinion-based group and another. In most cases opinion-based groups are actually mutually exclusive, that is they are defined in an all-or-none manner by their member's commitment to some position so that where somebody is a member of one opinion group they are automatically precluded from being a member of another at the same time and on the same issues. It is difficult, for example, for one individual to *both* support and be opposed to a certain presidential candidate at the same time (as opposed to merely being undecided or ambivalent), even though a group or institution such as a political party (which is not a mutually exclusive opinion group) can contain individuals who are supporters and opponents of that particular candidate.

Following from this point, in opinion-based groups there is almost necessarily *competition* between groups as to which of their conflicting views is actually correct. Even though it is (barely) possible to argue that an opposing group has an opinion that is no less valid than the ingroup's it is not logically coherent to argue, from an ingroup perspective, that the other group's view is better than the ingroup. Such an argument would be likely to be followed by a change in group membership. If you believed that some other group's view is better than your group's view on the single crucial group-defining dimension then subjectively you are a member of that other group (see McGarty, 1999a for a discussion of related points). Qualitatively then, all opinion groups members must believe that their opinions are at least as correct as the alternatives. Quantitatively they may differ in the degree of the strength of their conviction that their own group's view is more correct. Thus, subjective conflict is comprised in the very nature of opinion-based groups. Then, once subjective conflict is present, there is always the possibility to transform into an objective conflict in the sense of competition over resources (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1970).

These characteristics and some others suggest that opinion-based groups are conceptually distinct from social categories and other types of group. In the next section, I will therefore focus on differences and potential similarities between opinion-based groups and social categories, artificial and natural groups, institutions or organizations, and action groups.

How Do Opinion-based Groups Differ from Social Categories and Other Types of Groups?

Firstly, opinion-based groups are not reducible to *social categories*. In fact, they can often be formed within a broader social category. To give one example of an opinion-based group within a category, within the category *women*, there can be women who are feminists, and within the same broad category, there can also be an anti-feminist group (in opposition to the feminists) and also a group of people who do not belong to either groups, and who probably do not have a strong view about the issue or they are undecided (see Figure 5.1). Of course, exactly the same process can take place in the case of social category men or society in general. Particular social category memberships may be stereotypically associated with certain social categories but there is no restriction from the point of the perceiver on the opinion-based group memberships held.




Figure 5.1. *Opinion-based group formation within a broader social category*

It is important to note that the opinions that are the basis of opinion-based group formation are often actually *about social categories*, or more specifically, about relations between social categories (or groups in general). This is the case with feminist and anti-feminist opinion-based groups, which are groups formed around ideologies about relations between gender social categories and, in the case of feminist activist groups, their behaviour is aimed to change the existing relations between men and women, according to an ideology about how these relations should be. Thus, the shared opinion which is the basis of many opinion-based groups is an opinion about intergroup relations. Thus, in the case of supporters of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the US (see McGarty, & Bliuc, in press): not all Whites are KKK supporters and being a White high identifier is not sufficient to make someone KKK supporter. In order to be a KKK supporter one must accept the White supremacist beliefs of KKK, so that members of this opinion-based group share an opinion about how the relationships between Whites and other races are (or should be).

It is also worth noting that social categories are not always broader than opinion-based groups. Opinion-based groups can be inclusive of social categories as,

for example, pro-apology opinion-based group in Australia probably completely includes the category aboriginal (i.e., all aboriginal people and others are supporters of an official apology from the Australian government).

To give a better idea about exclusively defined opinion-based groups which are about social categories and relations between them it is useful to consider another example. When we see a pro-gay pride parade followed by an anti-gay rally, there is obviously an intergroup conflict but it can be a serious mistake to assume that conflict is between heterosexuals and homosexuals (which are social categories). Rather, the conflict is probably between supporters and opponents of *intolerance of homosexuality*. These two groups are exclusively defined opinion-based groups (nobody simultaneously supports and opposes intolerance of homosexuality), which are made up of people who hold a particular view on some issues and reject the alternative view. In this particular example, the issue which is the basis for group formation is intolerance toward homosexuality but other such groups are supporters versus opponents of animal rights, supporters versus opponents to a certain political party, and so on.

Things such as ethnicity, gender, preference for a colour (i.e., any given category) as well as a particular opinion can all potentially become bases for group formation. However, unlike some other attributes, sharing an opinion should provide a ready basis for cooperation and common action. This is, because opinion-based groups are formed around opinions, subjective membership in such groups is routinely informative about the basis of consensus and consequent behaviours compared to other category membership. Opinion-based groups help people to define an intragroup consensus more easily.

Unlike social categories, they also tend to have greater normative fit as they are often formed around a single opinion and the normative content and the social meaning of such groups are easier to detect. They also tend to be characterized by low intragroup ambiguity which is mainly due to the fact that members of such opinion-based groups are all either in favour or against some issue. For example, in a debate involving two oppositionally defined opinion-based groups (pro and anti-war on terror) it should be relatively easy to distinguish between the two groups. First the context of the arguments employed by the two groups would be starkly different (high normative fit) and secondly, there should be a high degree of agreement and uniformity within each group regarding these arguments (low intragroup ambiguity). Both high normative fit and low intragroup ambiguity lead to a stronger basis for consensus.

Opinion-based groups cannot be equated with the *artificial groups* that are habitually used in experimental settings. Obviously, opinion-based group can be formed in experimental settings by giving participants a certain issue and asking them to take a position either in favour or against.

However, in real opinion-based groups, members define themselves in terms of a position they genuinely hold about some issue, so that such groups tend to have a psychological significance for their members. Unlike most artificial groups, opinion-based group members will tend to have expectations about what sort of behaviours are consistent with the social meaning of their group. Even in experimental settings when a relatively novel issue is used it is still possible that some participants have previously used and identified with the respective opinion. This is even more probable if the issue used is prevalent in the historical context (as for example the position regarding the war with Iraq).

Another distinction can be made between opinion-based groups and *institutions*. This distinction is based on the fact that, as I mentioned before, opinion-based groups are psychological groups, and of course, they need not involve an organized structure of rules and prescriptions as in the case of institutions. However there are certainly institutions which initially developed from opinion-based groups (e.g., Amnesty International, RSCPA, etc.), and within institutions and organizations there can exist factions which are actually opinion-based groups (as in political parties or religious institutions, see Sani & Reicher, 1998).

Finally, opinion-based groups are different from *action groups*. Most action groups are based on shared opinions, so that opinion-based groups can be regarded as an incipient stage of action groups. That is, the formation of action groups can be considered as emerging from opinion-based groups. Within a broader opinion-group, there can be a faction which is committed to take action (see fig 5.2).




Figure 5.2. Example of an action group formed within an opinion-based group that is, in turn, formed within a broader social category

Thus, an action group is usually made up of members of a broader opinion-based group who not only hold a shared opinion but they are also ready to take action

in terms of this opinion. For example, within a feminist opinion-based group all members share more or less the same view on gender issues, but only some members are involved in and committed to action, and these particular members form a feminist action group.

To make it absolutely clear, I do not suggest that opinion-based groups form in relation to all opinions, or that all social behaviour that is related to opinions derives from membership of such groups. In addition, just as in the case of social categories and other groups, opinion-based group membership might not be psychologically significant for members, and this is determined by the social context. Rather, I suggest that where genuine collective action does take place in relation to opinions the idea of the opinion-based group can be useful for understanding the social psychological processes involved, and that this is especially true for political opinion. Thus, political opinion-based groups are a special case especially suitable for studying these processes.

Some Previous Research Involving Opinion-based Groups

Although opinion-based groups have often been used in past research on group polarization, minority influence, and group-based persuasive communication, the term itself has not been used explicitly and the unique features of these groups have not been examined. Indeed, other terminology that has been used in relation to groups does not capture the content of opinion-based group concept. For example, social psychologists distinguish between reference and membership groups (Turner, 1991). A reference group can be defined as a group that is psychologically significant for members' attitudes and behaviours. Of course, an opinion-based group can also be a reference group in the sense that it might be psychologically significant for members and certainly influence their attitudes and behaviours. However, the two concepts

cannot be equated, reference groups being far more general and inclusive than opinion-based groups.

On the other hand, a membership group is “one a person is in by some objective criterion, but which that person may not refer to psychologically for self-evaluation and social values” (Turner, 1991, p.5). Clearly, the concept of membership group does not include opinion-based groups. In relation to membership and reference groups, it is clear that the concept of opinion-based group can be regarded as closer to the latter rather than the former.

Considering other terminology in the literature the closest usage to the idea referred to here is probably the term “single- issue pressure group” used by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995). Such single-issue pressure groups included Women for Safe Transport, Women for Peace, and so on. However, this term is more exclusive than opinion-based groups referring especially to those people from an opinion-based group who actually take action in relation to their shared ideas. In much the same way as action groups which can be formed within a broader opinion-based group, single-issue pressure groups can be considered as crystallisations of opinion-based groups.

Nevertheless there is plenty of research that uses such groups. To give one typical example of research using opinion-based groups, in a minority influence study, David and Turner (1999) exposed moderate feminist participants to another ingroup minority. This was either the broad opinion-based group of feminists (or pro-feminism) or an extreme subcategory (pro-separatism). A very high proportion of published minority influence studies can be seen as investigating relationships between different opinion-based groups.

As mentioned before (see Chapter 2), the ‘single-issue pressure groups’ that were studied by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) and the activist groups such as Gray

Panthers, gay movement, AIDS volunteer service organization and fat acceptance movement, investigated by Simon et al. (1998; 2000) and Stürmer et al. (2003), can be regarded as directly emerging from opinion-based groups. These were groups formed in order to bring about social change, and they can be considered as being derived from broader opinion-based groups. In these studies the relationship between identification as an activist and identification with the broader social category and participation in political actions was compared. In all these studies, it was shown that identification with an activist group was much more relevant to action than identification with the broader category. It can be inferred, then, that it is identification with an opinion-based group (e.g., pro-feminism, pro-gay movement, pro-AIDS volunteerism or fat acceptance movement) which actually strongly predicts collective behaviour and it is part of an activist identity. In particular, Simon et al.'s (1998, 2000, 2001) and Stürmer et al.'s (2003) studies are discussed in relation to the model of politicized collective identity (see Chapter 2). Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue that identification with the more specific organizations (i.e., Gray Panthers, gay movement, fat acceptance social movement, and AIDS volunteer service organization) is more related to a politicized collective identity than the broader categories and this is why these identities are more relevant to action. They note in relation to these studies that:

identification with the broader recruitment category made no unique contribution to the prediction of behavioural intentions or actual participation, whereas identification with the more politicized social movement organization had a reliable and unique (positive) effect.

(Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 328)

It is certainly not claimed here that single-issue pressure groups and activist groups are identical to opinion-based groups. Rather, the claim that I am making is that single-issue pressure groups and activist groups are based around a commitment to take action in line with a shared opinion. Activist groups are therefore opinion-based groups *par excellence*. There are, however, opinion-based groups that are more diffuse and less well-organized (and indeed in studies to be detailed in later chapters I explore artificial and minimal opinion-based groups).

Another piece of research which can be interpreted as being highly related to opinion-based-groups was conducted by Herrera and Reicher (1998). Theoretically, they argue that the definition of social categories should be open to discussion and include a rhetorical dimension. In particular, they suggest that speakers “construct the boundaries and the content of social categories so as to render the position they are proposing as normative for the largest possible proportion of their audience” (Herrera & Reicher, 1998, p.982). In other words, they propose that the content of arguments regarding the use of a social category is flexible and will tend to reflect the position that would appear as normative for the majority of ingroup. Put in terms of opinion-based groups, it can be inferred that the flexibility of category content depending on the normative position of the majority of ingroup can be regarded as an alignment of the content of a category with a particular opinion-based group.

In previous research by Reicher and colleagues (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a,b; Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997), the authors followed this argumentation by focusing on politicians and social movement activists. Herrera and Reicher (1998) had shown:

how speakers use categories in order to define their project as
normative for their audience as a whole and how different speakers

employ very different categories in order to characterize the same event as a function of their attempts to mobilize people in support of different positions. (p.983)

Herrera and Reicher (1998) used what I term opinion-based groups made-up of people holding pro and anti positions towards the 1991 Gulf War. The authors argued that depending on which position they held, pro- or anti-war, people described the social categories involved in the conflict in very different terms. For example, in pro-war political discourse, such as a speech by George Bush about war, the figure of Saddam Hussein was used to stand for the Iraqi force, transforming the ingroup into a global category (i.e., victims of Saddam), and the outgroup into a one-man group. On the other hand, Marjorie Thompson who was one of the speakers from a major anti-war rally in London in February 1991 referred to “financiers and politicians who sought profit without regard for the cost” (p.983) as opposed to “the losers...the mothers and fathers, the husband and wives, the orphan children”.

The authors examined how a sample of non-activists construed the categories involved in the Gulf War. They expected that pro-war participants and the anti-war participants would describe the sides involved in the conflict in opposing ways. They used undergraduate students as participants and the study had two phases. In the first phase, participants answered a 10-item questionnaire concerning their views on Gulf War. Although they did not explicitly measure categorization in opinion-based groups, they designed four items in order to measure support for war, or in other words a sense of commitment to one or another opinion-based group (e.g., “I support the way in which the Coalition conducted the war”).

In the second phase, participants were asked about the impact of Gulf War images. More specifically, they were first asked to recall and describe images from

the war which had the most powerful impact on them, and then participants were shown images taken from the media and asked to rate their impact on them on a 10-point scale. Additionally, participants were asked to explain why the image did or did not have an impact on them.

Herrera and Reicher's hypotheses were supported by the data. They found that pro- and anti-war participants did recall, select and rate images very differently. In other words, people belonging to different opinion-groups use different categories to describe the same event. As they expected, they also found that participants' choices matched the category constructions of the respective movement leader. Hence, the way in which each opinion group used the categories reflected the most prototypical ingroup position (this was especially true in the case of pro-war respondents).

This paper is especially illustrative and of importance to opinion-based groups as it reflects, on the one hand, the actual formation of the opinion-based groups in relation to a relevant social issue (i.e., the 1991 Gulf War). On the other hand, it exemplifies how these opinion-based groups variously reflect the social categories involved and the relations between these social categories. This paper, thus, supports the point discussed earlier that opinion-based groups are often about categories and relations between categories. Moreover, the paper shows how, by shaping members' perceptions about the social world, opinion-based groups influence the subsequent behaviours of their members.

These studies show that opinion-based groups were used by other researchers in the field, even if they were not formally recognized as such. They also emphasize the previous point that opinion-based groups are especially relevant for studying participation in different forms of collective action (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al. 1998, 2000, 2001; Stürmer et al., 2003) but they are also used to elaborate

the point of how the content of social categories is constructed and changed (Herrera & Reicher, 1998). After focusing on several examples about how opinion-based groups has been previously employed in the literature, in the next I will deal with two main classes of process on which opinion-based could have a high impact: social identity and minority influence processes.

Implications of the Opinion-based Group Concept for Studying Social Identity and Minority Influence Processes

Opinion-based groups seem to be well suited for capturing the relationship between collective self-definition and group behaviour for a number of reasons. First, opinion-based groups are often formed primarily *to convert broad ideologies or affinities into collective action*. As I mentioned earlier, unified social action is aimed either to create social change or to preserve, the status quo. Adopting early social identity ideas (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and building on Klanderman's (2000) suggestion, such action is not simply taken by people who have a social change belief system. Those people must also share an opinion about achieving or rejecting social change. Depending on the opinion they hold, they can be considered to be members of one opinion-based group or another (e.g., pro or anti-change of the status quo). The consequence of that is that members of such groups may be particularly prone to take action. This is because, although social mobility is practically possible and relatively easy compared to other types of groups, there is still little reason for social mobility, due primarily to the fact that membership in such group is based on members' commitment to hold a certain opinion in relation to some issue (subjectively the membership involves a personal choice). According to social identity theory, the one option left to members is the social change alternative. If we follow this logic, these

groups should be especially orientated towards social change, and they should commonly have more collective action type behaviours associated with them.

Secondly, following from the first point, compared to many other groups, opinion-based groups are *less ambiguous in relation to associated group behaviours*. This is because, opinion-based group membership hinges on agreement between the members and this agreement implies some courses of action and rules out other alternative actions. Moreover, in the case of social categories the content of that respective category will determine what members will do or not (i.e., the definition of category content determines the direction of behaviour or action), but in the case of opinion-based groups appropriate content will tend to correspond with the opinion which the group is based on. Thus, in the case of opinion-based groups the direction of action should be much clearer for members than in the case of many social categories. As Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) showed, being a woman does not imply a particular stance on gender equality, but membership of a feminist opinion-based group will tend to imply much clearer stances and courses of action. In opinion-based groups behaviours that are usually preferred and adopted by members should be easier to predict. Thus, in opinion-based groups, highly normative behaviours are much easier to detect and define compared to other types of groups or social categories.

In addition, opinion-based groups can be psychologically significant for their members and can provide a basis for strong opinions (also being usually oppositionally defined), which tends to make them associated with *intergroup conflict* in a higher degree than other types of groups or social categories. As shown in Chapter 3, that intergroup conflict is a contextual enhancer of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behaviour. As social identity and self-categorization theories maintain, in conditions of intense intergroup conflict the

salience of group membership is increased, and this makes group members behave more in line with their group norms (Haslam et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). The implication here is, then, that in such opinion-based groups where conflict is implicit, the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be stronger and more evident compared to other types of groups and social categories.

Thirdly, another important implication of the concept of opinion-based group in relation to the relationship between self-definition as group member and group behaviour is that *identification with a particular opinion-based group seems to be a much better predictor for group-relevant behaviours compared to identification with a broader social category*. This argument is strongly supported by research conducted by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), and Simon and colleagues (Simon et al, 1998, 2000; Stürmer et al., 2003). To take another example, if we look for instance at emotions of collective guilt and associated behaviours of Australians in relation to the treatment of Indigenous Australians, commitment to an official apology by the Australian government is not so well predicted by national identification with the broader category Australians. Identification with an opinion group made-up of people who are supporters of an official apology, that is they share an opinion that official apology is an appropriate response, would be a much better predictor of associated behaviours such as signing a sorry book, going to a rally, and voting for a pro-apology party (see McGarty & Bliuc, in press).

Finally, the idea of opinion-based groups also has implications in the *minority influence processes* (Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Mugny & Perez, 1991). For instance, in the process of minority conversion, there is always a minority that consistently represents a clear and coherent position differing

from that of the majority which can change the viewpoint of the majority (Clark, 2001). It can be argued that when a broader group or social category is divided into two opinion-based groups, often there is 'minority opinion-based group' which attempts to achieve some change in a majority view as illustrated by the previous example of gender categories and feminist opinion-based groups.

Another good illustration of this point is Reginald Rose's play *Twelve Angry Men*. This is the story of a group of 12 jurors who are brought together to deliberate and decide after hearing the facts in a seemingly simple murder trial case. At the beginning, the group of jurors is composed of two subgroups, one representing the majority position and the other one the minority, which actually consists of only one member. The way in which the two factions see the "objective facts" presented during the trials is completely different, the majority members are convinced that the defendant is guilty of murder and they see every fact as a proof of his guilt, while the minority member is convinced of the opposite, his innocence. Thus, in this case, there are basically two opinion-based groups formed in relation to the position of members regarding the guilt/innocence of the defendant in the murder trial. This minority influence paradigm was actually experimentally tested by a series of several studies conducted by Clark (1999a, 1999b, 1998, 1994, 1990) who showed that persuasive minority arguments could indeed affect a majority.

The Twelve Angry Men paradigm is, of course, an extreme example based on a fictional account, but it captures the minority influence dynamics very well, especially in relation to opinion-based groups. For instance, the point that the minorities seem to be more consistent is illustrated by the fact that the minority member is presented as much more coherent and certain about his point compared to the majority members. The persuasion process is nicely illustrated next when,

following the certain minority member's arguments, the members of the majority change their position one by one and finally they all reach consensus about the innocence of the defendant. The relevance of this fictional account consists of two important points. Firstly, the account is a good example of the way opinion-based groups are created in everyday life. The second point relates to theories of minority influence processes and Moscovici's (1976) model of social influence, and specifically to the idea that minority groups are more influential because they are consistent. It is important to note here that their great consistency stems from and conveys certainty about the minority group's position (Moscovici, 1976). According to Moscovici and colleagues (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972) the most important behavioural style in the process of minority influence is *consistency*, and as Turner (1991) also observes "consistency is a sign of certainty and commitment to a coherent choice" (p.87).

This idea is relevant in relation to the next section in which I focus on the importance of the certainty concept in opinion-based groups, where I make the argument that the salience of opinion-based groups can be measured in terms of certainty.

Capturing the Social Identity Salience in Opinion-based Groups

Social identity salience is generally recognized by researchers as a difficult variable to measure compared with other social identity constructs such as identification or ingroup favouritism. As other authors have also noted, social identity salience is rarely measured directly even though attempts are often made to manipulate it (Haslam et al., 1999). Early studies on religious group membership manipulated salience through "vivid reminders" or increasing the awareness of group membership (Charters & Newcomb, 1952). In such studies, participants were made

aware of a particular group affiliation or through such procedures as open and public group identification, or simply being told that they were participating in research as group representatives (Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Festinger, 1947; Kelley, 1955; Lambert, Libman, & Poser, 1960; see Oakes, 1987, p.119). Other manipulations of salience include using intergroup comparisons (Bochner & Ohsako, 1977; Bochner & Perks, 1971; Bruner & Perlmutter, 1957; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984), intergroup conflict (Myers, 1962; Ryan & Kahn, 1975), separateness and clarity of categorization (Brown & Turner, 1979; Buss & Portnoy, 1967), and public commitment to a group membership (McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994).

There have been several attempts to manipulate salience by manipulating the accessibility of a social identity. Accessibility-based manipulations of salience generally involve attempts to increase or decrease participants' awareness of their membership in a particular group (and hence their readiness to perceive themselves in terms of that categorization). Basic strategies to increase accessibility include assigning only some participants to groups (Grieve & Hogg, 1999), making some participants wear a group-relevant uniform (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 1998), or decorating participants' response environment with group-relevant signs such as posters or banners (see Haslam, 2001).

Expressed social identification was also often used as a mean of measuring salience, especially as a check where salience was manipulated (Haslam, 2001; McGarty et al., 1994). For example, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) manipulated the salience of social identity and in order to check their manipulation they used identification items from scales of Luhanen and Crocker (1982) and Rosenberg

(1965). Other researchers such as Hogg and colleagues frequently used perceived group identification as a mean to check salience of social identity (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993, Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Wellen et al., 1998). This is a reasonable way of capturing salience because, according to McGarty (1999a), one of the consequences of depersonalized self-perception are expressions of identification:

One common example of such group normative behaviour is the public statement of private recognition of one's identity as a group member. That is, under conditions of salient social categorization people are more likely to express identification with the group. In other words, if we measure identification under conditions of high social category salience we will find that identification is high. (p.193)

Haslam and colleagues (1999) manipulated social identity salience by asking participants questions intended either to activate a national social identity or a personal identity. This research is of interest to the empirical work of the thesis because it included a manipulation check of salience. Their manipulation check was a single item measure related to the *importance* of the category (nationality) to the perceiver ("Being a member of Group X is important to me", see Haslam, 2001, p.367). They assumed that nationality would be perceived to be more important when a nationality-based social category was salient.

Given that importance relates to centrality and strength of a group membership it is reasonable to use it as an indicator of salience. For opinion-based groups it might be easier to capture salience in other ways. That is because when a particular opinion-based group membership is salient, sharing the respective opinion becomes part of collective self-definition, so that generally speaking, the degree of certainty associated with that opinion should reflect salience in a reasonably accurate way. I suggest that

the certainty with which the categorization is applied to the self should be the best indicator of salience for such opinion-based groups.

This is also because, according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), a category is salient when it is cognitively prepotent or switched on. That is, in order to be salient the perception of the category has to be strong and powerful. I would argue that the clearest definition of a strong perception is one that the perceiver is certain about. Conceptually, certainty is a subjective sense of conviction or validity about one's attitude or opinion (Festinger, 1950, 1954). As Gross, Holtz, and Miller (1995) note, appropriate synonyms of subjective certainty are perceivers' sense of attitude or opinion confidence, conviction, commitment, correctness, surety, or firmness. According to self-categorization theory, features such as clarity, coherence and separateness of the identity are expected to increase when a social identity is salient. As all of these relate to certainty perceivers should be more certain that some group membership describes them when it is psychologically salient (for a different view see Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Thus, in opinion-based groups where group formation is actually based on a set of beliefs or shared ideas, certainty of self-definition in relation to that particular opinion should be the most direct way to capture salience. The strength of these beliefs or certainty about their correctness as well as certainty of self-definition seem to be the most probable and direct indicators of salience especially for such groups.

Moreover, when one particular social category is salient, according to the social identity approach, individuals should be motivated to seek positive distinctiveness between ingroup and outgroup, that is people who become aware of their group membership search for ways to distinguish their group from the others. Thus, between- category differences and within-category similarities are accentuated,

and this also leads to the polarization of group-definitional norms (McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992; Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989). It is suggested that group polarization depends on subjective group membership, which enhances the perceptual extremization of group characteristics occurring during the process of categorization (see also Mackie & Cooper, 1984). Haslam and Turner (1992, 1995) also explore the idea that extreme positions are a self-categorical basis for polarized judgements. They emphasize the point that:

extremists tend to make more polarized judgements of social stimuli than do the moderates, and thereby tend to accentuate (or exaggerate) the differences between different classes of such stimuli. (Haslam & Turner, 1995, p. 341)

In other words, the extremists perceive the social world more in “self-categorical terms, more black and white” (p.368) than do the moderates, thus for the extremists social stimuli are much clearer and distinctive which entails that they will be more certain about their perceptions. Haslam and Turner (1995) also argue that “a given stimulus will be perceived to share the same social category membership as the stereotyper (i.e., be representative, *prototypical*, of the stereotyper’s ingroup)” (p.343). It can be inferred then, that prototypicality in the case of extremist perceivers can be equated to certainty and clarity of perception which actually reflects a salient self-category. Following from this point, it can be argued that extremity of opinion should be a reflection of opinion-based group membership salience. However, I would suggest that in this situation, the most extreme opinion need not be merely the most radical, but the one people are most certain about.

However, it is important to clarify that the construct of certainty is not related to salience in any way for social categories or other types of groups. This construct as

an indicator of salience works only for opinion-based groups which are highly contextually variable but in the case of social categories for instance, things are different (e.g., somebody can always be certain that she is a woman, but variably certain that she is a pro-feminist).

Finally, it is worth noting that other researchers have used certainty as a way to assess attitude strength. For example Bassili (1993), used measures of certainty for the purpose of predicting discrepancies between voting intentions and actual voting behaviour. Measures of certainty have been previously shown to moderate the relationship between attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Davidson, Yantis, Norwood, & Montano, 1985; Fabio, & Zanna, 1978; Sample & Warland, 1973). Certainty was assessed in this case by a single question about the finality of the voting intention (i.e., “Would you say that your choice of the _____ party is final, or that you may still change your mind?”, Bassili, 1993, p. 57). However, in this example, this certainty measure reflects more a construct of confidence about future behaviours rather than certainty about self-definition as holding a particular opinion.

Conclusion

The idea of the opinion-based group which is expanded in this chapter seems to get us to a resolution concerning the circumstances in which the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is the strongest possible. While Chapters 3 and 4 pointed out factors such as intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviour which enhance this relationship, the present chapter presents a type of group with features which enable it to comprise both factors.

Specifically, there are three key points about opinion-based groups. Firstly, the way in which opinion-based groups are formed means that conflict will often be present. Secondly, the very nature of opinion-based groups makes group normative

behaviour much easier to detect and define for members of such groups. Finally, studying this type of group would enable researchers to actually capture the relationship between identification, salience and group behaviour in a more accurate way. Using opinion-based groups helps address the unresolved problem of how to assess social identity salience in a valid way. Certainty about position in the case of opinion-based groups is potentially a good indicator of their social identity salience. These ideas provide the basis for a series of hypotheses which are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE
LINK BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP
BEHAVIOUR AND OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK TO BE
PRESENTED

Introduction

The main objectives of this chapter are firstly, to offer a short overview of the most important theoretical ideas presented up to this point as they relate to the questions addressed in this thesis. Secondly I will present the main hypotheses formulated on the basis on the theoretical review, and finally, I will introduce the empirical work conducted in order to test these hypotheses.

As I mentioned in the first chapter the main question addressed in this thesis is *when do people decide to take collective action in relation to shared ideas*. From social identity perspective collective action is determined by the group members' self-definition and the present social context. In other words, the relationship between self-definition as a group member (i.e., identification and salience) and group behaviour, depends to a considerable degree on the conditions created by the intergroup context. Based on the previous literature review in Chapters 3 and 4, the conditions or the specific factors which contribute to the enhancement of the relationship between group self-definition and relevant behaviours are *intergroup conflict* and *normativeness of group behaviours*. In the next section I will focus on summarizing some previous points about the relationship between self-definition as a group member and relevant group behaviour and the factors which might enhance this relationship.

When Should the Relationship between Group Self-definition and Relevant Group Behaviour be Strong?

Returning to the main question of the thesis, the answer proposed here is that self-definition as a group member is likely to lead to a decision to take politically relevant action:

1. where group members define themselves in terms of a shared group membership which is psychologically significant and also relevant for action. That is, firstly, they should identify with a certain group which is action-orientated or it has the potential to become one, and secondly, this group membership should be salient in a given social context;
2. where intergroup context is defined in conflictual or at least oppositional terms (i.e., if there is an identifiable outgroup which can be perceived as opposed to or in competition with the ingroup), and
3. where norms in relation to behaviours are easy to detect for group members (i.e., there are behaviours which are clearly normatively consistent with collective action associated to this group).

Thus, politically relevant collective action is more likely to occur under these conditions, but these conditions are often simultaneously met with politically relevant opinion-based groups. That is, opinion-based groups are usually highly relevant to action. As detailed in Chapter 5, opinion-based groups represent vehicles which serve to convert broad ideologies or shared opinions into collective action. Powerful social movements and associated actions are often based on a single predominant idea or opinion (e.g., anti-war on terror movements or 'single-issue pressure' groups, Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995).

Moreover, they can be psychologically significant for their members and there is always a potential for intergroup competition when opinion-based groups are involved, as they tend to be oppositionally defined and mutually exclusive. Another important point is that in opinion-based groups normative behaviours can be easier to detect compared to other types of groups or social categories. As explained in Chapter 5, opinion-based groups, being formed around one clear position, are usually associated with unambiguous courses of action. Thus, normative behaviours are more likely to be adopted in such groups, as there is a general consensus about what these behaviours are. For example, in the case of “anti-war on terror” activists (I use this example because it clearly involves an action group formed around an opinion), certain options for behaviour are limited by the norms and nature of the group. For example, members can participate in a peaceful march or rally, join an organized group having the same objective, express their views by writing, or campaign against their government, but a violent demonstration might be rejected as inconsistent with the peace-oriented ideals of the movement, and to take a more fanciful example, a donation to a terrorist group would be rejected out of hand (because the movement is not pro-terrorist but “anti-war on terror”).

Furthermore, the predictive power of self-definition as an opinion-group member in relation to group behaviours might improve if we can find measures which do a better job of capturing salience than the customary salience measures do. It is proposed here that for opinion-based groups such measures would include certainty items (such as certainty of self- definition, certainty about the position held).

Considering these points, it seems crucial to investigate the relationship between group self-definition and different forms of collective action using opinion-based groups. It is also worth emphasizing the empirical advantages of using opinion-

based groups in research. For almost any socially relevant issue in a given historical context it should be possible to find two opinion-based groups which are likely to be psychologically significant for many members. Thus, it is plausible that people will identify with such groups even in laboratory settings and this should make it easy to detect the impact upon variables such as behavioural intentions.

The Predictive Role of Group Self-definition of Collective Behaviours.

General Predictions Regarding this Relationship

Having in view all these points, a number of generic hypotheses can be formulated. Firstly, self-definition as a group member is influenced by the intergroup context, or in other words, self-definition as a group member is highly context-dependent. That is, according to the social identity approach, the specific intergroup context such as perceived intergroup conflict should make group members see themselves more in terms of their group membership, rather than as separate individuals. Thus, following intergroup conflict, the extent to which people perceive themselves as sharing a common group membership should increase.




Figure 6.1. The relationship between intergroup conflict and self-definition as a group member

Secondly, according to the self-categorization theory, there is another important link to focus on. That is, self-definition as a group member should also predict group behaviour. More specifically, to the extent to which people come to

perceive themselves in terms of a particular group membership rather than in terms of individual entities, the likelihood for them to behave in line with the group norms should increase. Group self-definition should predict normative group behaviour but considering the effect of intergroup context on this relationship, this relationship should be especially strong in conditions of clear intergroup conflict.




Figure 6.2. The relationship between self-definition as a group member and group relevant behaviour

In addition, self-definition as a group member should be an even better predictor of group behaviour related to collective action in the case of groups which are highly relevant to action, which include many opinion-based groups. Thus, the link between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be relatively strong in opinion-based groups especially when they are formed around politically or socially relevant issues (e.g., groups of feminist activists, supporters of political parties, etc.). In this case, opinion-based groups are particularly useful, as they can be directly relevant to collective action.

Finally, self-definition as an opinion-based group member should be a better predictor of group behaviour when the behaviours involved are perceived to be highly normative for the group. Thus, where behaviours are highly relevant for group members and strongly in line with group norms, the link between self-definition as a

group member and group behaviour should be stronger as well. In addition, this link should be weaker, or should not exist at all, in the case of non-normative or less normative behaviours.




Figure 6.3. The relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and normative and non-normative behaviours

Overview of the Empirical Work

to be Presented

In the next four chapters I will present a number of experiments and surveys I conducted involving different opinion-based groups in order to investigate these ideas. A number of more specific hypotheses derived from the general predictions presented here also have been tested. The opinion-based groups used ranged from minimal artificial opinion-based groups to real political opinion groups formed around political or social issues. There are two streams of research that I will anticipate here.

In Chapter 7 I will present two experimental studies (Studies 1 and 2) involving minimal opinion-based groups. These studies are based on the literature review on the effects of intergroup conflict on self-definition as a group member and group behaviour (see Chapter 3). More specifically, according to social identity theory, in conditions of clear and intense intergroup conflict, group members come to behave more in line with norms prescribed by their group membership. As self-categorization theory argues, group members behave more consistently with their group norms because, in conditions of intergroup conflict they come to perceive themselves more in group terms as their group membership identities become more salient. Therefore, in Studies 1 and 2 intergroup conflict was experimentally manipulated. The main hypothesis tested here was that intergroup conflict should impact upon self-definition as a group member, which should be reflected in an increase in expressed identification, certainty about ingroup position and normative responses such as ingroup favouritism. In these initial studies I was primarily interested in variations in the *mean* level of responses and not in the strength of the relationships between variables.

Then in Chapter 8 I will start the presentation of a series of studies using real opinion-based groups that are (potentially) the basis for actual political activity. In these studies I will be focusing on testing the hypothesized relationships between the constructs. That is rather than looking at variation in the mean levels of (say) identification and salience I will be looking at the relationship between measures of these constructs and intention to take a variety of different forms of action in multiple contexts.

CHAPTER 7

THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT ON THE RELATIONSHIP
 BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP
 BEHAVIOUR: STUDIES 1 AND 2

Introduction

In this chapter I will present two experiments testing some ideas that stems from the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 3 on intergroup conflict. To reiterate one of the main points of Chapter 3, intergroup conflict should act as a contextual enhancer of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. In other words, from a social identity perspective intergroup conflict should increase the salience of group memberships and thereby lead to attitudes and behaviours that are more in line with group norms and values. Thus, in conditions of intergroup conflict increased self-perception in terms of a particular group membership should lead to behaviours which are more in line with the respective group norms. According to social identity theory, the relationship should be:




Figure 7.1. The relationship between intergroup conflict, self-perception in terms of a group membership and group behaviour

Exploring the relationship anticipated by social identity theory enables us to refine the understanding of the basic effects of conflict. That is, as self-categorization

theorists argue, conflict should lead to salient self-categorization at the group level (depersonalization) and according to McGarty (1999) this should be followed by:

- a) *stronger expressions of identification* with the group;
- b) *stronger confidence* in the ingroup position (strength of position or certainty);
- c) group-normative responses including *stronger ingroup favouritism* (because ingroup favouritism is likely to be viewed as a highly normative behaviour in conditions of conflict).

In order to examine these ideas from a social identity perspective, the empirical challenge is to create conflict between groups without introducing competition over resources or conflict of interests (and thereby introduce an alternative realistic group conflict explanation). In this regard, I believe that of all groups, exclusively defined opinion groups are particularly useful.

As detailed in Chapter 5, opinion-based groups seem to be particularly appropriate for investigating the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group-based responses. To reiterate the main arguments presented in Chapter 5 one important reason why opinion-based groups are particularly useful for studying intergroup conflict is that in such groups there is almost inevitable *competition* between groups as to which of their (conflicting) views is actually correct. Such groups tend to be exclusively and contrastively defined and where this is the case their positions cannot be both correct at the same time to the same degree. In such groups intergroup competition can therefore be appropriate and highly normative.

In addition, opinion-based groups can be psychologically significant for their members and can provide a basis for strong opinions, which means they can be

associated with clear intergroup conflict. In the real world opinion-based groups do not exist in a vacuum, there is a communication between and within them. Group members naturally provide feedback to each other in the form of validation and invalidation of opinion. For example, the behaviour of people participating in a rally to support a certain position is all about providing strong ingroup validation and outgroup invalidation of a view. Ingroup validation and outgroup invalidation thus provide the essential core of political protest carried out by members of opinion-based groups (i.e., we carry out protests to communicate that 'we' are right and 'they' are wrong). Members of opinion-based groups cannot invalidate the ingroup position and validate the outgroup position without effectively leaving the group. For example, someone cannot define themselves as a supporter of a gay rights movement but believe at the same time that the substantive position of the opposite group (anti-gay rights) is *more* correct than that of their own group. Of course, they could potentially accept an individual stereotypic outgroup position (e.g., that a particular form of protest was ineffective) but logically they cannot believe that an anti-gay right stance is in general *more correct* than the pro-gay rights stance. At best, it could be slightly less correct from that view point.


Consequently, group validation of position can be used as a way of manipulating conflict between opinion-based groups. Where both groups strongly validate their own position conflict should be clear and both groups would be expected to act in line with their norms. Where both groups weakly validate their own position conflict is vague and group normative action would be lessened. Logically, there are four logical possibilities, however:

1. Both groups can strongly validate their own position, so in this case the disagreement between groups is strong and this corresponds to a high

degree of comparative and normative fit. People would expect that two contrastingly defined opinion groups will strongly disagree with each other by validating their own position and invalidating the outgroup position. This creates conditions of *clear conflict*.

2. The ingroup could strongly validate its own position while the outgroup weakly validates its own position. This *ingroup superiority claim* should still entail relatively high fit from the ingroup perspective.
3. The outgroup could strongly validate its own position where the ingroup only weakly validates its own position (lower fit). This creates conditions of an outgroup superiority claim and relatively lower fit than cases 1 and 2 from the ingroup perspective, though it may also amplify outgroup threat.
4. Both groups could weakly validate their own positions, creating *vague conflict* and relatively low fit.

These four cases are illustrated in Figure 8.1. In each case the figure shows the position of the ingroup and outgroup in terms of the degree to which they see themselves as superior to the other group.






Figure 7.2. Four cases of validation of ingroup and outgroup positions

As indicated, the fit between expectations and reality in these cases should affect the salience of the social categorization. According to the principle of meta-contrast (Turner, 1985; Oakes, 1987, see Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995), the ratio of interclass differences and intraclass differences should be proportional to salience. Ingroup members expect strong ingroup validation and strong outgroup invalidation (especially in the case of exclusively defined opinion-based groups), so the highest salience should be where there is stark disagreement.

These considerations lead to the formulation of the following *hypothesis*: strong intergroup conflict produced by a combination of strong ingroup validation and strong outgroup validation of the ingroup position should increase salience and hence group normative responses.

In order to investigate this hypothesis minimal opinion-based groups were artificially created. The groups are minimal in the sense that they had no prior history and no real meaning for the members as they are formed around a trivial issue (choosing one or the other classification for a series of eight political statements). It was considered that using minimal opinion-based groups would be suitable for exploring the basic processes that occur in these groups in conditions of intergroup conflict. Using these minimal opinion-based groups would also enable us to create a subjective conflict (i.e., subjective conflict) and to explore opinion group formation in relation to stark disagreement. Given the decision to explore these questions using minimal opinion-based groups, theoretical and practical considerations dictated some empirical choices that need to be explained here. One question was how to measure salience. The default strategy in the literature appears to be to use expressed social identification (e.g., Haslam, 2001; McGarty, 1999a; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998). Given the issues raised in Chapter 5, however, I also incorporated a measure of subjective confidence in the position, the reasoning being that certainty in the position should be related to self-definition as an opinion-based group member.

The other key issue was how to measure the group normative responses that would follow from salient opinion-based group membership. Given the focus of this thesis the most obvious measures would be intentions to take politically relevant action. Given that these groups were minimal in the sense of having no past (and no plausible future) this would have been unrealistic. I therefore measured group normative responses in terms of ingroup favouritism. The argument is that where group members are prepared to favour the normative view of their ingroup they may be more likely to act in line with this view.

In summary, the prediction was that clear intergroup conflict would increase a) expressed identification, b) certainty in the ingroup position, and c) ingroup favouritism.

Study 1

Method

Overview and Design

The experiment involved a 2 (strong or weak ingroup validation) X 2 (strong or weak outgroup validation) X 2 (phase) design with repeated measures on the last factor. The experiment involved assigning participants to artificial opinion-based groups on the basis of asking them to perform an attitude statement classification task and then to evaluate their own group and the outgroup, before and after receiving feedback from both the ingroup and outgroup about the relative self-perceived statuses of the two groups.

Participants

The participants were 74 female and male first and second year psychology students at Petre Andrei University of Iasi, Romania. They were randomly allocated to one of the conditions. Their participation in this experiment was as part of a practical activity class.

Procedure

Participants attended their normal practical classes. The experiment involved three main phases.

Pretest

Participants were classified into two groups on the basis of their completion of an attitude classification task. First the participants received identical sheets with eight statements concerning attitudes about one large minority group (in Romania,

Romanians of Hungarian descent, most of whom live in or are from Transylvania) and/or attitudes to minorities in general. Half the statements were about Hungarians and half the statements were about minorities in general. Half the statements expressed favourable attitudes toward a minority or minorities and half expressed unfavorable attitudes. Participants had to choose between two classifications of these statements each of which included all the statements in two classes of four statements. These classifications involved separating the statements in (A1) those about Hungarians and (A2) those not about Hungarians or (B1) favourable to minorities and (B2) unfavourable to minorities. As it happened 27 participants chose the first classification and 47 participants chose the second one. As the differences between classifications were trivial in terms of the purpose of the experiment, the data below have been collapsed across the two classifications.

The preference of participants for one or the other of these classifications was used as the basis of a social categorization. Participants were told that they would receive feedback from members of two groups: both their ingroup which had classified the statements in the way they had themselves and the outgroup (which had chosen the other classification). It is important to reiterate that the participants were *not* classified on the basis of their agreement with the statements (i.e., it did not matter whether the participant was pro- or anti-minority). These groups are minimal in terms of their having no prior history or personal meaning associated. They are opinion-based because the basis of classification is an opinion (i.e., either classification A is better than B or classification B is better than A), and they are exclusively defined because a participant could not prefer both classifications at the same time.

Next, the participants completed a number of ratings in each case using a scale from 1 to 100. First, as a measure of ingroup favouritism they evaluated both

their own group's and the outgroup's classifications on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 100 (extremely good). They also rated their confidence that their choice was correct ("Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about how certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization."). They then rated ingroup performance ("How well do you think your group performed the classification task?"). Next, they completed a six-item identification scale based on items drawn from work by Ellemers, Kortekaas and van Ouwerkerk (1999) and other social identity researchers. The items measured long term identification ("Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling of belongingness to this group"; "I identify with other members of this group"), current identification ("Being a member of a group is an important part of how I see myself at this moment"), and social self-esteem ("Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about yourself as a member of this group", "My membership in this group is important to me"). Finally they rated perceived similarity to other ingroup members ("Please write down the number that corresponds best to your perception of how similar you are to other members of your group"). Their responses were collected and ostensibly were collated.

Feedback phase

After about half an hour the participants received feedback sheets which contained their own ratings of the ingroup and outgroup classifications and the purported average ratings given by the ingroup and outgroup of both the ingroup and outgroup classifications. Each of the four ratings was either high (in the range 83 to 85) or moderate (in the range 52 to 55). Given that the groups had been formed on the basis of their preferred rating we ensured that each group's self-rating was at least one

point higher than its rating of the other group. Thus, the participants were given feedback on the average rating of the ingroup and outgroup (see Appendix I).

There were four different conditions:

1. Clear intergroup conflict: both groups perceived themselves to be superior to each other as in the example given above (strong ingroup validation/strong outgroup validation):

“The average rating of your own group classification by your group was 85 points.
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.
The average rating of the other group classification by the other group was 83 points.
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 53 points.”

2. Ingroup superiority claim: the ingroup perceived itself to be superior to the outgroup/ and the outgroup perceived itself as approximately equal to the ingroup (strong ingroup validation/ weak outgroup validation):

“The average rating of your own group classification was 85 points.
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.
The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points.
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 51 points.”

3. Outgroup superiority claim: the ingroup perceived itself to be approximately equal to the outgroup and the outgroup perceived itself to be superior to the ingroup (weak ingroup validation/strong outgroup validation):

“The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.

The average rating of the other group classification was 83 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 54 points.”

4. Vague intergroup conflict: both groups (ingroup and outgroup) perceived themselves to be approximately equal in status (weak ingroup validation/ weak outgroup validation):

“The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 52 points.

The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 50 points.”

These four cells entail a 2 X 2 between-subjects design with the factors being ingroup validation (strong or weak) and outgroup validation (strong or weak).

Table 7.1. The experimental design (feedback stage)

		Ingroup validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup validation	Weak	Vague intergroup conflict	Ingroup superiority claim
	Strong	Outgroup superiority claim	Clear intergroup conflict

Validation here refers to self-validation by the ingroup or outgroup of the superiority of their own group's classification, so that both strong and weak outgroup validation, for example, are also invalidation of the ingroup position, differing only in degree. As explained in the Introduction, this is an essential precondition for the existence of logically coherent disagreement between opinion-based groups.

Posttest

Following this feedback, participants completed the entire set of dependent measures again.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

The first step was to establish whether participants actually identified with the contrasting opinion groups we had created. Identification was based on a scale of six items. The Cronbach's alpha for these six items was .83 at the pretest and .87 at the posttest. The grand mean for the six items at pretest phase was 61.43 declining (nonsignificantly) at posttest to 59.17 (see Table 7.2). This indicates that the participants expressed an average level of identification that was significantly above the scale midpoint at both pretest, $t(73) = 5.73, p < .001$, and posttest, $t(73) = 3.85, p < .001$. It is worth noting also that responses on the identification item measuring the subjective importance of group membership was significantly higher than the scale midpoint for participants at both pretest ($M = 62.86$), $t(73) = 4.43, p < .001$ and posttest, ($M = 63.31$) $t(73) = 4.51, p < .001$.

Table 7.2. Means and standard deviations of identification, ingroup favouritism and certainty at the pre-test and post-test.

		Pre-test	Post-test
Identification	<i>M</i>	61.42	59.17
	<i>SD</i>	17.42	18.22
Ingroup favouritism	<i>M</i>	31.22	23.42
	<i>SD</i>	24.91	23.54
Certainty	<i>M</i>	65.13	66.74
	<i>SD</i>	18.84	17.85

Given that it was expected that intergroup conflict would have a moderating effect on identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism at the posttest, it is important to establish that ingroup favouritism actually existed at the pretest. The level of ingroup favouritism was 31.22 points, that is, the ingroup was, on average, rated 31.22 points higher than the outgroup, $F(1, 70) = 111.81, p < .001, \eta^2 = .615$. In other words, almost 62% of the variance in group ratings was accounted for by differences between groups at the pretest phase. This is an extremely large effect size as the F ratio converts to an R of .78. The level of ingroup favouritism was approximately the same as the level of favouritism provided in the feedback in the strong validation cells (30 points). However, the mean ratings of ingroup (69.48) and

outgroup (38.26) classifications were rather lower than the mean group scores (84 and 59) that were subsequently provided in the feedback.

Main Analyses

In order to test the prediction that, in conditions of clear intergroup conflict (given by the interaction of strong ingroup position validation and strong outgroup position validation), identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism should increase, I conducted an analysis of change (gain) scores using ANOVA.

The first step was to compute the change scores for each variable involved that is, to compute the differences between pre-test and post-test values for identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism. Then, I conducted ANOVA with the interaction of ingroup position validation and outgroup position validation as independent variable and the change scores of identification, certainty in ingroup position and ingroup favouritism as the dependent variables.

The results showed that for identification, the interaction of ingroup position validation and outgroup position validation had a significant effect, $F(1, 74) = 4.37, p < .05$. The change score means of identification for each of the conditions are shown in Table 7.3. Follow up tests by the Bonferroni method revealed no significant differences.

Table 7.3. Means and standard deviations of identification change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	-6.44	1.92
	<i>SD</i>	9.86	10.77
	Strong		
	<i>M</i>	-1.19	-3.00
	<i>SD</i>	9.34	11.46

Contrary to the predictions, the interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation did not have any effect on certainty about the ingroup position ($F(1, 74) = 0.24, ns.$). However, there was a main effect revealing that certainty about ingroup position was increased by ingroup validation ($F(1, 74) = 6.33, p < .05$). The means for this variable are shown in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4. Means and standard deviations of certainty about ingroup position change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	-6.61	3.24
	<i>SD</i>	15.26	12.74
	Strong		
	<i>M</i>	0.00	8.71
	<i>SD</i>	10.57	21.25

In line with predictions, there was a significant interaction between ingroup and outgroup position validation on the ingroup favouritism change score ($F(1, 74) = 5.22, p < .05$). The means for ingroup favouritism change scores in each of the conditions are shown in Table 7.5. Follow up tests revealed that the difference

between the vague conflict and ingroup superiority condition was significant ($p = .051$).

Table 7.5. Means and standard deviations of ingroup favouritism change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	-13.72	4.47
	<i>SD</i>	27.27	13.64
	Strong		
	<i>M</i>	-8.83	-11.81
	<i>SD</i>	19.62	16.49

Finally, for the single item evaluating the relative ingroup performance there was no performance evaluation item, there was no significant effect ($F(1, 74) = .65, ns.$).

Discussion

This study has yielded a number of key findings. It is worth noting that ingroup favouritism in this study was extremely strong. Mullen, Brown and Smith's (1992) meta-analysis suggests that ingroup bias effects tend to be of moderate size. The effect we obtained at the pretest shows a stronger ingroup favouritism effect than any study included in Mullen et al. (1992)'s meta-analysis (the largest r being .73 compared to the .78 found here). This is all the more notable because this experiment involved artificial groups that were not competing over scarce resources and were of equal size and status. In other words, the conditions that Mullen et al. associated with strong effects were not implicated in this design.

The hypotheses that intergroup conflict should affect group members' self-perception and consequently have an effect on identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism were partially supported. Certainty about ingroup

position was increased by ingroup validation rather than conflict (the interaction of ingroup position validation and outgroup position validation). This finding is highly consistent with the argument that agreement with similar others (i.e., ingroup members) provided by ingroup validation should increase the feeling of subjective validity (Festinger, 1954; Turner, 1991) because:

The perceived, expected or believed agreement of similar others in the same situation implies that our behaviour is a function of the objective world rather than our personal biases, prejudices and idiosyncrasies.
(Turner, 1991, p.161)

Importantly, identification and ingroup favouritism were affected by the intergroup conflict manipulation. In particular, ingroup favouritism was low where intergroup conflict was vague.

Of the three variables investigated, identification was the only one that did not vary with the experimental manipulation. The relative stability of identification might be due to the way in which identification was measured. The first point here is that identification was measured both at the pretest and posttest. The pretest may have created pressures for self-consistency resulting in resistance to influence it at the posttest. Although, it is, of course, possible that the self-consistency pressures on identification are no stronger than pressures applying on other items.

Secondly, identification measures, unlike certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism measures are intended to capture long-term and relatively stable attributes of group members. It is also possible that identification was measured in a way that was not sufficiently sensitive to the changes brought about by the manipulations. Some authors (e.g., McGarty, 1999b; Turner, 1999) have argued that it is wise to use contrastive measures of identification (i.e., identification with the

ingroup versus identification with the outgroup) in order to detect the dynamic changes in self-perception suggested by self-categorization theory. Given this argument, the same hypothesis was tested again in a second study, with a different method for measuring identification.

Additionally, I sought to improve the reliability of the certainty measure by adding more items. These reflected perceived accuracy of the ingroup position, situational certainty (certainty related to the specific task given to participants), and perceived task difficulty (see Mullin & Hogg, 1998).

Study 2

Method

Overview and Design

As in Study 1, this experiment involved a 2 (strong or weak ingroup validation) X 2 (strong or weak outgroup validation) X 2 (phase) design with repeated measures on the last factor. The experiment involved asking participants to perform a classification task and then to evaluate their own group and the outgroup, before and after receiving feedback from both the ingroup and the outgroup about the relative perceived statuses of the two groups. The changes from Study 1 are detailed below.

Participants

Participants were 64 male and female psychology students at Petre Andrei University of Iasi, Romania, in their first or second year of study who participated in this experiment as part of their normal practical classes. Participants were randomly allocated to experimental conditions.

Procedure

There were few key changes to the procedure that was used in Study 1. First, in order to provide a more comprehensive measure of certainty additional items were

added. These included a measure of judgemental confidence (How sure are you that the option you chose was correct?), and perceived accuracy (How accurate do you think your option/answer is?). Measures of situational certainty (How well have you understood the instructions?), and task difficulty (How difficult do you consider the task?) were also included. All items were measured on scales from 1 (not at all) to 100 (complete). Task difficulty, which measured uncertainty rather than certainty, was reverse scored to make it consistent with the other measures for the analyses.

Secondly, identification was measured only at the post-test and was measured contrastively. That is, participants were asked which of the two groups they most identified with, rather than just how much they identified with their ingroup. Identification was measured using a scale comprising eight items, all of which measured standard aspects of identification such as similarity, commitment and interest in future social interactions with the groups (Please indicate which group you see yourself as most similar to? Which group do you most identify with? Which group do you more strongly feel that you belong to? Which group is more important to you at the moment? Which group are you more committed to? Which group do you think should feel more pleased about its performance? Other two items were added in order to reflect perceived social attractiveness of the group (Which group do you think that you would enjoy meeting and talking to?) and preference for one or another group in the case that they would had another choice (If you had the choice again which group would you prefer to be a member of?).

Another change from Study 1 to Study 2 was in the feedback stage. The feedback stage in Study 1 required participants to compute themselves the difference between the groups' positions. The feedback stage in Study 2 was changed in order to make it easier to understand. Instead of giving participants a sheet with all ratings

(ingroup and outgroup average ratings), they received a sheet with the differences between scores, that is, it was explained exactly how groups rated each classification. That is, strong self-validation involved the group favouring its own position by between 27 and 32 points. Weak self-validation involved the group favoring its own position by 2 to 5 points. For example, in the equal status condition (where each group rated their own classification as being approximately equal to that of the other group) the participants were told: your group rated its own classification 5 points better than the outgroup classification; the other group rated its own classification 3 points better than your group's classification. Finally, as the single performance evaluation item did not seem to be particularly sensitive to the intergroup conflict manipulation, it was not included in this version of the questionnaire.

Results

Preliminary analyses

First, a composite measure of certainty was constructed at pretest and posttest using the four items. Cronbach's α at pretest ($\alpha = .71$) and posttest ($\alpha = .77$) were acceptable.

Identification was based on a scale of eight items measured at post-test. The Cronbach's alpha for these eight items was $\alpha = .84$. The grand mean for the eight items was 76.19. This indicates that the participants expressed an average level of identification that was significantly above the scale midpoint, $t(61) = 13.95, p < .001$. The response on the subjective importance of group membership item was also significantly above the midpoint, ($M = 77.82$) $t(61) = 10.91, p < .001$ (see table 7.6).

Table 7.6. Means and standard deviations for identification, ingroup favouritism and certainty at the pre-test and post-test.

	Pre-test		Post-test
Identification*	<i>M</i>		76.19
	<i>SD</i>		14.22
Ingroup favouritism	<i>M</i>	27.94	31.06
	<i>SD</i>	25.75	29.43
Certainty	<i>M</i>	70.44	73.07
	<i>SD</i>	19.32	20.58

Note: Identification was measured only at the post-test.

As Table 7.6 shows the level of ingroup favouritism was 27.94 points at the pretest and 31.06 points at the posttest. The ingroup favouritism effect at the pretest was significant with $F(1, 58) = 71.87$ $p < .005$, $\eta^2 = .553$. That is, 55% of the variance in group ratings was accounted for by differences between groups, this is an extremely large effect and corresponds to an R of .74.

Main Analyses

The hypothesis that strong intergroup conflict should be expressed in an increase in identification, certainty about ingroup position, and ingroup favouritism was tested again by conducting an analysis of change (gain) scores using ANOVA.

First, only the change scores for certainty and ingroup favouritism were computed, as identification was measured only in the second phase, at the post-test.

Unlike Study 1, it was found that the interaction of ingroup and outgroup position validation did not affect identification ($F(1,62) = 2.707, ns$). The means for identification are shown in Table 7.7, but follow up Bonferroni tests revealed that there was not a significant difference between the means.

Table 7.7. Means and standard deviations of identification.

Outgroup position validation	Ingroup position validation		
		Weak	Strong
Weak	<i>M</i>	74.74	71.14
	<i>SD</i>	16.72	15.86
Strong	<i>M</i>	75.00	83.00
	<i>SD</i>	11.69	10.53

The prediction that the interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation should increase certainty about ingroup position was also checked. It was found that certainty change score is significantly affected by ingroup validation and outgroup validation interaction, $F(1, 62) = 7.96, p < .01$. The mean of certainty change score was significantly higher in the clear conflict condition than in the ingroup superiority claim condition ($p < .05$) and in the outgroup superiority claim conditions ($p < .05$, see Table 7.8).

Table 7.8. Means and standard deviations of certainty about ingroup position change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	0.61	-0.67
	<i>SD</i>	10.18	9.84
	Strong		
	<i>M</i>	-.4.83	13.94
	<i>SD</i>	22.02	10.40

The analysis was repeated using the same single item certainty score as in Study 1. The results showed, as in Study 1, a significant ingroup validation effect, $F(1, 98) = 6.59, p < .05$, but this effect was substantially qualified by a highly significant interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation, $F(1, 98) = 10.79, p < .01$. As Table 7.9 shows this effect was of a similar form to that for the full scale (a bigger increase in certainty in the clear conflict condition).

Table 7.9. Means and standard deviations of single certainty item change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	-0.40	-5.0
	<i>SD</i>	17.06	15.11
	Strong		
	<i>M</i>	-10.93	26.59
	<i>SD</i>	38.09	24.07

Finally, the prediction that intergroup conflict should increase ingroup favouritism was investigated. It was found that the interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation was significant ($F(1, 62) = 4.68, p < .05$). Importantly, the mean

level of ingroup favouritism increased more in the clear intergroup conflict condition than in the outgroup superiority claim condition, $p < .05$ (see Table 7.10), and this effect qualifies a main effect for ingroup validation $F(1, 98) = 5.06$, $p < .05$. The effect for outgroup validation was not significant.

Table 7.10. Means and standard deviations of ingroup favouritism change scores.

		Ingroup position validation	
		Weak	Strong
Outgroup position validation	Weak		
	<i>M</i>	0.67	1.13
	<i>SD</i>	12.08	14.51
	Strong		
<i>M</i>	-7.47	16.41	
<i>SD</i>	26.04	27.10	

Discussion

These results represent clear support for the hypothesis that intergroup conflict should affect certainty about ingroup position and group normative responses such as ingroup favouritism. In this study, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism were clearly increased under conditions where the groups competed over the validity of their own positions that is, in conditions of clear intergroup conflict. In particular, certainty and ingroup favouritism were especially high when there was intergroup conflict which should be associated with high salience. This is consistent with specific self-categorization theory predictions but is also in accordance with earlier social identity theory ideas about the importance of intergroup conflict, for expressions of ingroup favouritism. It can be argued then that, in this study, competition over who is actually correct which is actually a form of subjective conflict, operated in a similar way to competition over resources or objective conflict.

General Discussion

It is important to note that findings in the two studies are not entirely consistent. First, in relation to identification, the effect of intergroup conflict in the first study was clearly significant but the change score mean was not significantly increased in the clear intergroup conflict condition more than in the other conditions. In the second study, identification was measured contrastively and only at the post-test in order to avoid possible pressures of consistency from pre-test to post-test. Contrary to the suggestions of McGarty (1999a) expressed identification items do not seem to be good measures of salience because they did not capture the variation that were produced on the measures on other items.

Secondly, changes in certainty about ingroup position in Study 1 were not affected by the interaction of ingroup and outgroup position validation. There was a main effect due to ingroup position validation alone. However, in Study 2, where a more comprehensive certainty measure was used (as supplementary items were included), in line with initial predictions, certainty was increased more by clear intergroup conflict than in the other conditions. These findings suggest that the certainty measures used were more sensitive to the contextual changes induced by the manipulation than the expressed identification measure. This is an important finding suggesting that, in line with arguments in Chapter 5, other ways of capturing salience (e.g., by certainty items) might enable us to more accurately reflect the processes involving identification, salience and relevant group behaviour.

Finally, the clearest result was shown in relation to ingroup favouritism. In both studies, in line with the predictions of self-categorization theory and consistent with previous research on the effects of perceived intergroup conflict on displays of ingroup bias and negative racial attitudes (Jackson, 2000; Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra,

Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, & Renfro, 2002) ingroup favouritism was affected by the contextual changes induced by the intergroup conflict manipulation. In particular, ingroup favouritism increased especially in the condition of clear intergroup conflict (see Study 2), that is, where both groups strongly endorsed their positions. This finding is also in line with the argument, if not always the results of previous researchers (Jetten et al, 1996, 1997; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999) that in conditions of salient group self-perception, group members tend to behave more in line with the norms of their group membership, assuming, of course that ingroup favouritism can be considered as an analogue of behaviours for the members of the minimal opinion-based groups explored here.

Conclusion

To sum up, the two experiments using a minimal opinion-based groups partially supported the point suggested by research on intergroup conflict (see Chapter 3) that stark disagreement might be sufficient to increase identification, certainty about ingroup position as well as normative group behaviours such as ingroup favouritism. Such findings can have substantial implications in studying conflict in real opinion-based groups or real groups in general. Although the possibility to generalize the findings for different contexts is limited, the results provide evidence of the role played by intergroup context in determining increased group self-definition and group behaviours. In line with social identity theory and self-categorization theory predictions, the results show that the perceived social structure of intergroup relationships had an impact upon self-definition as a group member (identification and certainty about ingroup position in this case) and group behaviour (ingroup favouritism). Moreover, the fact that these relationships were found using minimal

opinion-based groups suggests that similar processes relate to subjective and objective forms of intergroup conflict.

However, the next challenge is to investigate if these processes apply in the case of real opinion-based groups and implicit conditions of conflict. A further step would be to test the idea that self-definition as an opinion group member that is, identification in terms of opinion-based group and salience of such a group membership, are good predictors of commitment to take political action. Thus, in the next chapter I will present two studies testing the similar relationships but dealing with actual political opinion-groups.

CHAPTER 8

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS AN OPINION-BASED
GROUP MEMBER AND POLITICAL GROUP BEHAVIOUR: STUDIES 3 AND 4

Introduction

The two experiments presented in the previous chapter suggest that, variations in intergroup conflict are related to variations in self-definition as a group member and group normative responses. However, these two experiments involved artificial minimal groups and ingroup favouritism rather than real opinion-based groups and commitment to politically relevant action.

The question is then, can these findings be replicated in natural settings involving real political opinion-based groups and relevant political behavioural intentions? It is important to emphasize that the focus in this thesis is on political behavioural intentions rather than actual behaviours. However, according to several models such as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), attitude-behaviour theory (Triandis, 1980), and protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983), the most immediate and important predictor of a person's behaviour is his or her intention to perform it. Behavioural intentions are "instructions that people give to themselves to behave in certain ways" (Triandis, 1980, p.303), and they reflect "people's decisions to perform particular actions" (Sheeran, 2002, p.2). Additionally, there is a large number of studies in which intentions were used to predict a wide variety of behaviours ranging from consumer and leisure decisions (e.g., Warshaw & Davies, 1984), diet (e.g., Conner & Sparks, 1996), physical activity (e.g., Norman & Smith, 1995; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), weight loss (e.g., Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990), smoking (e.g., Norman, Conner, & Bell, 1999), academic activities and achievement

(e.g., Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998) to voting (e.g., Bassili, 1995) and prosocial behaviours (e.g., Warshaw, Calantone, & Joyce, 1986).

Finally, one potential problem with the first two studies is that salience of opinion-based group membership was not explicitly measured. It can be assumed that expressed identification and certainty about group position indicated higher levels of salience, but these measures are, at best, indirect. Moreover, the identification measure used did not seem to be very sensitive to, or to accurately capture, the variation in the level of salience that should have been induced by the intergroup conflict manipulation. Measuring the salience of a particular group membership has not proved to be easy, however, and the next section deals with problems and challenges regarding capturing salience as an independent social identity construct.

Measuring the Salience of Opinion-Based Group Memberships

One problem with previous research in this area is that there have been few attempts to make a clear empirical distinction between social identification and social identity salience. Nevertheless, there are clear theoretical differences between social identification and social identity salience. Perhaps the most concrete difference is that identification has a more long-term nature than salience. That is, identification is a relatively stable variable whereas salience is more context-dependent. As per McGarty's (1999b) analogy of climate and weather, the relationship between identification and salience is analogous to the relationship between climate and weather. In the same way that climate reflects relatively stable and repeatable characteristics of some geographic region and weather reflects what is happening at any instant, identification can be thought of as a long-term variable which should be strongly related to, but not identical to, salience.

The relatively stable nature of identification should make it less difficult to capture empirically. Indeed, in the social psychological literature it is relatively easy to find a number of different social identification scales (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & van Ouwkerk, 1999; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Karasawa, 1991; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; see Haslam, 2001, for a summary), but it is harder to find well-established measures of salience. However, it is worth noting that although identification measures are widely used and often shown to be reliable, there has been almost no work on their validity.

As other authors have noted, social identity salience is rarely measured directly even though attempts are often made to manipulate it (see Chapter 5). For example Haslam and colleagues (1999) building on an earlier study by Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) manipulated salience by activating participants' either national social identity or personal identity. In this research they actually assessed salience by including a manipulation check of salience. Their manipulation check was a single item measure related to the importance of the category (nationality) to the perceiver, assuming that nationality would be more important when a nationality-based social category was salient.

Clearly, Haslam et al's (1999) measure of salience in terms of importance is not unreasonable. However, for the case of opinion-based groups I would suggest that the certainty with which the categorization is applied to the self and not the importance of the self-categorization should be a better indicator of salience. This is because according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), a category is salient when it is cognitively switched on. That is, in order to be salient the perception of the category has to be strong and powerful, and a strong perception is

actually one that the perceiver is certain about. Thus, as detailed in Chapter 5, especially for the case of opinion-based groups which are formed around issues on which people hold and sometime express strong opinions, certainty of self-definition as a person who holds and shares this position with other people should be a more direct way to capture salience.

Having clarified the distinction between salience and identification and specified a possible way to capture salience of behaviourally relevant group memberships, the next step is to investigate these ideas empirically. It was predicted that in line with self-categorization theory that both opinion-based group identification and salience of an opinion-based group membership would predict political behavioural intentions, but that the salience measure would be a predictor of political behavioural intentions over and above identification, because salience should be, according to self-categorization theory, a more direct predictor of group normative responses.




Figure 8.1. Predictors of political behavioural intentions

Study 3

Method

Overview

The predictive role of self-definition as an opinion group member for group behaviour was tested in a survey of political opinion-based groups in Romania. The data were collected two weeks before a general election in late 2000.

Participants

The participants were 101 Romanian second year undergraduate psychology students (85% female, and 80% in the age category 18-25).

Procedure

After reading a short introduction about the general election, the participants categorized themselves as being either supporters of the government in power or supporters of the opposition. To do this they circled one or the other of two statements either, *I am a supporter of the government*, or *I am a supporter of the opposition*). The two opinion-based groups formed were thus exclusively defined.

After categorization, participants completed measures of social identification, social identity salience and collective behavioural intention. The items were worded to refer to both opinion-based groups generally. For each item, participants indicated their position by circling a number from a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.

The measures of identification with the opinion group were a modified version of Ellemers et al.'s (1999) three-component scale. As the original version can be considered to be more appropriate for measuring identification in organizations or working teams, some items were excluded and other were modified. These changes meant that social identification was measured by the following five items:

1. I am like the other people who voted for the same political party as me.
2. I identify with other people who voted for the same political party as me.
3. I am content about my choice of political party.
4. I have respect for the other people who voted for the same political party as me.
5. I think in the future I will vote for the same political party.

In line with the arguments that in opinion-based groups salience can be assessed through certainty of self-definition and following previous work on subjective certainty (e.g. Gross et al., 1995), that suggests this construct is related to confidence and conviction, four items were devised (one involving self-definition per se and three relating to certainty) in order to assess social identity salience. These were as follows:

1. I define myself as a supporter of the group I will vote for.
2. I am confident that the political option I have chosen is the best.
3. I am confident that I am a real supporter of the political group I will vote for.
4. I am confident that being a supporter of the political group I will vote for really reflects my ideas about the future of Romania.

Political behavioural intentions were measured with the following four items:

1. It is likely that I will join the political group I vote for.
2. It is likely I will join a non-political group supporting similar ideas to the group I will vote for.
3. It is likely I will participate in a rally to support the political group I will vote for.

4. It is likely I will put my signature on a list to support the candidate of the political group I will vote for.

The last of these behaviours is a relatively common political behaviour in Romania.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

The hypotheses involve the relationships between three constructs: identification, salience, and collective behavioural intention. All had acceptable alpha levels: identification, $\alpha = .74$ (five items), the salience measure $\alpha = .68$ (four items) and political behavioural intentions, $\alpha = .70$ (four items). All three measures are highly correlated (see table 8.1.).

Table 8.1. Means, standard deviations and correlations for identification, salience and political behavioural intention measures.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3
1. Political behavioural intentions	3.42	1.43		.760**	.595**
2. Salience measure	5.75	1.88			.592**
3. Identification measure	4.09	1.00			

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Main Analyses

In order to test our hypothesis a hierarchical regression analysis was performed using the identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions as the criterion (see Table 8.2). Both identification ($\beta = .22, p < .001$) and salience ($\beta = .63, p < .001$) predicted political behavioural intentions but, as expected, the salience measure predicted political behavioural intentions over and above identification. When the salience measure was entered into the equation, it significantly added to the predictive value of the model $R^2(\text{change}) = .256, p < .001$.

Table 8.2. Regression analysis for identification, salience and political behavioural intentions measures.

Criterion	Predictor	β	Change in R^2	p
Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.595	.354	.000
	Identification	.224		
	Salience	.628	.256	.000
	Total $R^2 = .610$			

The model does also not reveal a high level of redundancy between the identification and salience measures. These variables were highly related ($\beta = .59, p < .001$) but they were clearly separate constructs as shown in the additional prediction contributed by the salience measure.

Discussion

These results clearly show that the identification and salience measures are related but distinct constructs. In line with predictions both identification and salience measures were strong predictors of political behavioural intentions, but the salience measure for these political opinion-based groups was a stronger predictor than identification. These results provide a strong direct and integrated test of the central relationships that form the basis of the self-categorization theory account of collective behaviour. The strength of support in terms of the predictive power ($R^2 = .61$) is particularly worthy of note, as effect sizes of this magnitude are rarely found in social psychological surveys. These relationships involves much larger effect sizes than those found by de Weerd and Klandermans, Kelly and Breinlinger, and Simon and colleagues reviewed in Chapter 2.

Consequently, the results suggest that high levels of identification might not be sufficient to predict political activity rather identification is best seen as one strong but indirect predictor of it. The results also suggest that the certainty measures are a good way to capture social identity salience (or at least for opinion-based groups).

Two explanations can be considered to account for the particularly strong link between salience and political behavioural intentions. The first is that the political context of the imminent election may have served to make these categories behaviourally relevant and increase the plausibility of the political actions. This explanation can be tested by examining whether the same relationships hold when an election is not imminent. The second explanation relates to the methodological innovation of using opinion-based groups. If identification with social class or some other politically relevant category would have been measured it would be expected that this relationship would be weaker.

Of greater concern is the question of whether the certainty measures used actually are indicators of salience. That is, although these results provide strong support for the idea that salience and identification are two separate constructs, there are no independent means of verifying that the certainty measures used did indeed capture salience.

To answer this it is useful to consider the consequences of salience and, according to self-categorization theory, one of the consequences of salience is depersonalized self-perception. Depersonalization is seen as “ (...) the basic process underlying group phenomena (social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, co-operation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action, shared norms and social influence processes, etc.)” (Turner, 1987, p.50). Thus, one way to validate the measure of salience used would be to show that it is associated with perceptions of the ingroup as being depersonalized (I will term this *perceived ingroup depersonalization*) and as being psychologically significant for participants. It is important to note that perceived ingroup depersonalization is not synonymous with the process of depersonalization itself, by which people come to perceive themselves as interchangeable with other ingroup members. The (subtle) difference here is between perceiving the ingroup to be genuinely collective and acting in terms of that collective identity. This idea of perceived ingroup depersonalization and the context of imminent election were addressed in Study 4.

Study 4

In an attempt to validate the measure of salience used in the Study 3 the degree to which the ingroup was perceived as depersonalized by its members was measured. In order to do this the perception of the ingroup as depersonalized was assessed by examining the degree to which there was perceived to be a sense of shared identity,

values, and common goals. The degree to which participants explained similar behaviours by group members in terms of such shared identities, values, and goals was also measured (I termed this *group attributions*)

It was expected that perceived ingroup depersonalization would increase with salience and that explanations for similar behaviour by group members that invoked this perceived ingroup depersonalization (i.e., group attributions) would be preferred. This is because, as self-categorization theory argues, increased salience is reflected through the process of depersonalization, so that salience “tends to increase the perceived identity (similarity, equivalence, interchangeability) between self and ingroup members” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Where self-perception is depersonalized in this way people “come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category rather than as unique personalities” and this is believed to be the basis for underlying group phenomena including collective action. Oakes (1987, p.135) further argues that “the same conditions will produce *attributions to ‘persons’ (people) as social category members* rather than to personality (or external factors)”.

Perceived collective qualities and behavioural explanations in terms of these qualities therefore seem to be theoretically plausible ways of validating our measure of salience. The relationship anticipated by self-categorization theory between salience and the new variables is as follows:




Figure 8.2. Relating salience, perceived depersonalization and group attributions

In a fourth study the same relationships as in Study 3 were investigated but using an Australian sample and including additional measures. Unlike Study 3 where the data were collected two weeks before the general election, the data here were collected several months prior to a federal election in 2001. It was expected that the same relations as those obtained in Study 3 would hold, but in addition, that salience would predict the degree to which participants perceived the ingroup as depersonalized which would in turn predict the degree to which participants explained similar behaviours collectively.

Method

Participants

Participants were 101 first year psychology Australian students (79% female, and 90% in the age category 18-25 years).

Procedure

As in Study 3, participants were first asked to categorize themselves either as supporters of the governing coalition of the Liberal and National Parties, parties which were in power at the time of the data were collected, and are commonly referred to as “the Coalition”, or as supporters of non-government parties. Parallel forms of the questionnaire were provided in different columns on the response sheet, the left side for Coalition supporters and the right side for non-government party supporters. In describing the items below I refer to the Coalition version of the questionnaire.

Identical measures of identification and salience to those in Study 3 were included. Different measures of political behavioural intentions were used to reflect the fact that different political behaviours are relevant in Australia. In particular,

political parties rarely have public rallies and there are no signed lists of names to support candidates. For political behavioural intention the items were:

1. It is likely that I will become a member of one of the parties from the Coalition.
2. It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the Coalition.
3. It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the Coalition.

The items included to measure perceived ingroup depersonalization and group attributions in terms of this depersonalization were:

1. Coalition supporters share a sense of identity.
2. Coalition supporters share common ideals or values.
3. Coalition supporters share common goals.

For the group attributions the items were:

1. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared identity.
2. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared ideals or values.
3. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their common goals.

As with Study 1 all items were answered on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.

Results

The hypotheses again involve the relationships between three central constructs: identification, salience, and political behavioural intentions. On this occasion, however, one supplementary objective was to simultaneously validate the

salience construct by demonstrating that salient social identity independently predicted perceived ingroup depersonalization. It was expected that perceived ingroup depersonalization would in turn predict the degree to which similar behaviour was explained in collective terms (group attributions).

Preliminary Analyses

The observed predictor variables in this case were similarly to Study 3, identification, based on five items with a Cronbach's α of .76 and salience based on four certainty items with a Cronbach's α of .89. There were three observed criterion variables, political behavioural intention, based on three items with a Cronbach's α of .76, perceived ingroup depersonalization (three items, $\alpha = .86$), and group attributions (three items, $\alpha = .85$). A simple correlational analysis comprising the independent variables (identification and salience measures) and the dependent variables (political behavioural intentions, perceived group depersonalization, and attributions of common behaviour) is also shown in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3. Means, standard deviations and correlations for identification, salience, political behavioural intention, perceived group depersonalization and attributions of common behaviour measures.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Political behavioural intentions	2.78	1.42		.760**	.676**	.505**	.418**
2. Salience measure	3.64	1.49			.761**	.519**	.474**
3. Identification measure	4.09	.97	.			.503**	.432**
4. Perceived group depersonalization	4.20	1.23	.				.780**

5. Attributions of
common
behaviour

4.13 1.29

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Main Analyses

As in Study 3, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed with identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions as criterion (see Table 8.4). This revealed that the salience measure ($\beta = .584, p < .001$) was a stronger predictor of political behavioural intentions than the identification measure alone ($\beta = .232, p < .02$). In particular, when the salience measure was entered into the model it significantly added to the predictive power of the overall model $R^2(\text{change}) = .144, p < .001$.

Table 8.4. Regression analysis for identification, salience, political behavioural intention and perceived group depersonalization measures.

Criterion	Predictor	β	Change in R^2	p
Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.676	.457	.000
	Identification	.232		
	Salience	.584	.144	.000
	Total $R^2 = .601$			
Perceived ingroup depersonalization	Identification	.504	.254	.000

Identification	.259		
Saliency	.322	.044	.016
Total $R^2 = .298$			

Hierarchical regression with the identification and saliency measures as predictors and ingroup perceived depersonalization as criterion was performed again in order to test the hypothesis that the saliency measure was a better predictor of perceived ingroup depersonalization than the identification measure. The results revealed that the saliency measure was a stronger predictor of perceived ingroup depersonalization ($\beta = .32, p < .001$) compared to the identification measure ($\beta = .26, p < .001$), and added significantly to prediction (see Table 8.4). In turn, perceived ingroup depersonalization strongly predicts group attributions ($r = .78, p < .001$). This provides good evidence that the measure of saliency is valid.

Discussion

The findings from Study 4 provided support for the hypothesis that, in opinion-based groups, the identification and saliency measures are both strong predictors of behavioural intentions. However, at least for this case of political opinion-based groups, the saliency measure is a better predictor of political behavioural intentions than identification alone.

In addition, the new items measuring perceived ingroup depersonalization were all highly related to the saliency measure. This suggests that to the extent that people define themselves in terms of these opinion group membership (i.e., where saliency is high) they will see their group as being depersonalized, that is as sharing collective qualities and norms and explain common behaviour in terms of these collective qualities. This also suggests that the groups were perceived to be real and

meaningful for the people for *whom they were salient*. This provides strong evidence of the validity of the measure of salience.

General Discussion

Despite the fact that data were collected in widely varying cultural contexts, the results of the two studies are completely consistent. In both studies, in line with predictions, self-definition as an opinion-based group member was a strong predictor of political behavioural intentions. That is, both the identification and salience measures predicted political behavioural intentions, although the salience measure seems to be a more direct and a stronger predictor than the identification measure. This qualification is important in the light of the self-categorization theory argument that salience of a certain social identity and not identification is the most proximal predictor of group behaviour. It is also certainly worth noting that the overall level of prediction of behavioural intention was high in both studies ($R^2 = .61$ and $.60$).

These results also extend an important body of research on collective action participation reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2 and also discussed in Chapter 5 (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998; 2000, Stürmer et al., 2003). This research has shown that identification with an activist group is a better predictor than identification with a broader social category. Although in the present two studies identification with the broader category was not measured, even stronger relationships between self-definition as an activist and relevant political behavioural intentions were found using opinion-based groups.

There are two initial points that must be made here. The first is that the measures used provided an extremely high level of predictive power for collective behavioural intentions. The predictors, social identification and social identity salience were theoretically specified as psychological constructs and in the case of

salience did not even refer to behaviours (however, one of the identification items referred to behaviour). If it is assumed, in line with research on theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour that such specific intentions would be good predictors of actual behaviours these results are particularly important (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen & Madden, 1986).

Secondly, this research shows a strong link between identification and political behavioural intentions but this is only one part of the story. Consistent with self-categorization theory it was found that social identification is a good predictor of collective behavioural intentions, but an indirect one, they being directly predicted by the salience measure. As detailed in Chapter 2, identification predicts group normative behaviours but only through salience which is determined by perceiver readiness and fit and which causes self-perception to become depersonalized, that is people would come to perceive themselves in group terms rather than individual terms (Turner et al, 1987).

These two studies thus may represent a successful attempt to measure salience in a way that distinguishes it from identification (see McGarty, 2001) and illustrates the importance of this variable in predicting political behaviour. A valid collective self-definition measure should be a good predictor of political behavioural intentions but the question has been how to create good measures and to improve the predictive power of standard identification measures. The solution offered here is to try to take measures which are more closely related to salience, such as the certainty of self-definition items.

It is important to acknowledge that that salience measure employed might be a good predictor of behavioural intentions because it captures not salience directly but one of its antecedents (perceiver readiness or fit). This idea will be further explored

later, perceiver readiness being considered the best candidate to be reflected by the certainty measures.

The findings of these studies also demonstrated the utility of the idea of opinion-based groups and indeed this may have been why such strong relations were obtained. Certainty may work especially well as a measure of salience or its antecedents for opinion-based groups because it is natural to express certainty or doubts in relation to opinions (and this may flow on to opinion-based groups). Arguably, such certainty-based measures would not work well for social categories or other types of groups. For example, most people would express complete certainty about their gender or nationality on almost any occasion that they were asked and therefore their level of certainty in this case is not particularly informative in any way to the salience of these social categories. The strong relations might also have been shown, however, because opinion-based groups are highly relevant to the behaviour of their members.

Given that such strong relations between the salience measure and collective behavioural intentions were found it is worth asking just how distinct these constructs are. Could it be that certainty about belonging to an opinion-based group and commitment to act in line with this opinions are the same thing? There are several reasons why they should not be equated.

First, the measures of salience used (unlike some items commonly used to measure identification) made no reference to behaviours. It is not plausible therefore that behavioural intentions and certainty are the same thing.

Second, there is strong evidence in Study 4 that opinion-based groups were perceived to be psychologically meaningful, and their members to share collective qualities. Thus, opinion group salience actually predicts other theoretically relevant

properties that real groups should have. In particular, people who define themselves in terms of opinion group membership, that is that particular membership is salient, were more likely to see the ingroup as being depersonalized (i.e., having collective qualities) and to explain similarity of behaviour in terms of these collective qualities (i.e., to make group attributions).

Third, our behavioural intention measures were related to group action, rather than to individual commitment to act in a particular way (e.g., participating in a rally, expressing open support for a political party). Even voting can be seen not merely as an individual behaviour but as an individual's action aimed to change or preserve a collective situation.

Conclusion

This series of studies demonstrates that both identification in terms of political opinion-based groups and the salience of this group membership predict political behavioural intentions. However, the fact that the salience measure is a better predictor than the identification measure supports the argument that they are clearly distinct constructs. Importantly, in these studies a measure of salience in terms of certainty of opinion-based group membership was developed. We can be confident about this measure because of its strong relationship with collective qualities related to a salient social identity. There is more work to be done to investigate the scope of the relationships outlined so far. In particular, there is a need to determine the extent to which these findings can be replicated with other sorts of opinion-based groups that deal with supporting or opposing particular social changes or issues rather than political groupings.

Thus, Studies 3 and 4 results point to the idea that group action seems to be taken not simply by committed group members but by people who currently see

themselves as members of normatively relevant groups defined by shared opinions. This observation is fully consistent with recent analyses of cases of actual emergent action (e. g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury, 1998). Bearing in mind the findings from these first four studies, a useful next step is to attempt to integrate them by investigating the relationship between self-definition as a opinion group member and group behaviours both in real opinion groups and in context where conflict is normative. This can be achieved by conducting a study where conflict is manipulated in real opinion-based groups.

CHAPTER 9

MANIPULATING INTERGROUP CONTEXT: INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
HOSTILITY: STUDY 5

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is to present a fifth study in which the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behavioural intention was again tested but additionally, the intergroup context was experimentally manipulated. The main objective of this fifth study was thus to investigate the relationship between subjective group membership and political behavioural intention in varying conditions of intergroup conflict.

Study 5

For this experiment opinion-based groups were formed around the participants' positions on financial reparation for the descendants of slaves in Holland. At the time when the study was conducted there was a debate in Dutch society on whether a financial restitution should be paid or not to the descendants of slaves from the colonial period.

This study was also intended to allow an integration of the results of Studies 1 and 2 in which group validation was used in order to create conflict and Studies 3 and 4 which used political opinion-based groups formed around a real societal issue. To this end, the main questions addressed here is whether the general relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions that was observed in Studies 3 and 4 is strengthened under conditions of conflict (which approach overt hostility).

On the basis of the review, it would be expected that intergroup conflict would make the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behavioural

intentions stronger. To test this, intergroup conflict was directly manipulated using real opinion-based groups (as opposed to minimal groups used in Studies 1 and 2).

For this study the following hypotheses were formulated:

1. a) Consistent with the findings from previous studies (see Chapters 7 and 8) the identification measure and the salience measure should be predictors of political behavioural intentions. Moreover, it is expected that, as in Studies 3 and 4, the salience measure will contribute to the prediction of political behavioural intentions over and above the identification measure.
b) In addition, and consistent with the results of Study 4, perceived group depersonalization should be predicted by the salience measure, which in turn should predict group-based attributions of this depersonalization.
2. Overall, intergroup conflict (and in particular intergroup hostility) should make the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and behavioural intentions stronger. In other words, self-definition as an opinion-based group member will be more clearly associated with political behavioural intentions under conditions of high (hostile) intergroup conflict.

Similarly to Study 1 and 2, different degrees of validation from the ingroup and the outgroup were used to create conflict. It was assumed that when there are two exclusively defined opinion groups which strongly validate their own position at the expense of the outgroup position, this should provide the preconditions for intergroup conflict. Conflict should be lower when both groups recognize that they have different positions but they "agree to disagree", so that they only weakly validate their own

position. On the other hand, conflict should be further enhanced when strong validation is combined with derogation of the outgroup by the ingroup and of the ingroup by the outgroup. These three levels of conflict correspond to the three conditions of this study:

1. *Weak conflict condition*: both groups admit that they have different positions but they are equally good, they agree that it could be a different way of approaching things. This is analogous to the vague conflict condition in Studies 1 and 2.
2. *Strong conflict condition*: where both groups strongly validated their own positions. This is analogous to clear conflict condition in Studies 1 and 2.
3. *Hostility condition*: higher conflict and hostility are created through strong validation of group position and outgroup derogation. Thus, in addition to strong group validation both groups are informed about derogation of the other group.

Method

Overview

The hypotheses were experimentally investigated using opinion-based groups formed around the issue of financial restitution to be paid by the government to the descendants of slaves. Thus, as in Studies 3 and 4, the issue used for the formation of opinion-based groups is a real one in the society and was widely discussed at the time the data were collected.

Participants

A total of 292 students from the University of Amsterdam participated in the study. They were enrolled in this study as part of their required yearly research participation.

Procedure

First, participants read an introduction concerning the historical conditions of the slave trade involving Dutch ships in the colonial period and the current discussions on the issue:

In 1635 the Dutch began to participate in the African slave trade. Dutch slave ships sailed to the coast of West-Africa, where they bought the slaves from traders who had bought or directly abducted these slaves in the interior of Africa. After this the ships sailed to Brazil or the Caribbean islands, where the slaves were sold to plantation owners. By 1800, the Dutch had traded around 300,000 African slaves in this way. As a consequence of the UN conference against racism in South Africa, there are now some discussions in the Netherlands about the possibility of paying some financial reparation to descendants of the slaves by the Dutch government. This reparation would involve money to be paid to the Surinamese government in order to improve the general welfare system.

Then, participants categorized themselves as being either in favour or against financial reparation being paid by the Dutch government.

After this, a feedback stage followed where participants were informed about (a fictional) discussion between the two opinion-based groups on the financial reparation issue. Thus, the conflict between the two opinion-based groups was experimentally manipulated by providing participants with feedback from both ingroup and outgroup, corresponding to the three different conflict conditions.

In the weak conflict condition participants were told that in previous research investigating perceptions of people who are in favour or against financial reparation

from the Dutch government, comments had emerged from group discussion. First people were informed that:

Both groups (i.e., people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who were against financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government) were confident that their position was different but not better than that of the other group. They both appreciated the other group's views.

Then, fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships between the groups) were provided:

"I don't agree with you but I can still see your point."

"I know that my views are correct but you can also be right if you see things from your perspective".

For the strong conflict condition, conflict was created by telling participants that:

"Both groups were confident that their position was superior to that of the other group. They believed that their own position was correct and the other's group position was incorrect."

In this case, the examples of a group discussion between the members of two groups were:

"I can't believe you can possibly be right",

" I strongly believe that our position is the one that any reasonable person should have".

Finally, for the hostility condition participants were also informed about derogation from the outgroup, as the following sentence was added to the paragraph

from the strong conflict condition: “Moreover, each group thought that members of the other group misunderstood the issue, and did not know the facts on the matter”. The fragments from a typical group discussion between members of the two groups (in which strong derogation was added) were:

“I can’t believe you could be so moronic to say this”,

“Your argument is really an aberration, the most stupid thing I’ve ever heard.

You must be either crazy or very stupid to believe this”.

Then a number of measures were taken in order to check the categorization and conflict manipulation. Categorization was checked using the item “Where would you place your view on a scale from extremely against financial reparation to extremely in favour of financial reparation?”. To check the manipulation of conflict, the items used involved perceptions of conflict and hostility between the two groups. The items were: “How much conflict do you perceive in the relations between members of the two groups?”, and “How much hostility do you perceive in the relations between members of the two groups?”. Finally, involvement in a potential discussion was used to assess involvement concerning the issue of financial reparation (i.e., “If you would participate in such group discussions how involved you would be?”).

The main dependent variables measured were: identification, salience of opinion-based group membership, and likelihood of engaging in group behaviours (political behavioural intentions). Identification was measured by a four item scale (Doosje, 1995): “I identify with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation”, “I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation”, “I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation”, and “I feel strong

ties with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation”. The same certainty and self-definition items that were used in Studies 3 and 4 were used to measure the salience of opinion-based group membership.

Political behavioural intentions were measured by the following items: “How likely is that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your views on the financial reparation issue?”, “How likely is that you will attend meetings of people who share your views on the financial reparation issue?”, “How likely is that you will take part in actions to promote your views on the financial reparation issue?”, and “How likely is that you will sign a petition supporting your position on the financial reparation issue?”. The items used in Studies 3 and 4 suffered minor modifications in order to fit the less overtly political content of these groups and also two new items were included: “How likely is that you will express your views on the financial reparation issue in public?” and “How likely is that you will explain to your friends why you hold your views on the financial reparation issue?”.

As in Study 4, there were also items measuring perceived ingroup depersonalization and group attributions (the same items as in Study 4 were used). Finally, in order to explore the effects of intergroup conflict on other group variables were expected to vary according to different degrees of intergroup conflict, some supplementary items such as ingroup and outgroup perceived variability, and collective emotions were included. Analysis and discussion of these measures are beyond the scope of this thesis, but the items used can be seen in the Appendix. The scales for all items used seven points ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very much.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

First, it is worth noting that 169 participants (57.7%) were in favour, and 106 participants (32.6%) were opposed to financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government. The next step was to compute all the scales used and to check their reliability. Except for the items used to assess perceived group depersonalization in the case of anti-financial reparation group ($\alpha = .42$), all the other scales had reasonable Cronbach alpha coefficients: salience scale, $\alpha = .89$, identification scale, $\alpha = .90$, political behavioural intention scale, $\alpha = .71$, and perceived group depersonalization scale (for in favour of financial reparation opinion-based group), $\alpha = .83$.

The manipulation of conflict was checked across the three experimental conditions. The data revealed that our manipulation of conflict was successful, as the variation of conflict across the three conditions, $F(1, 292) = 131.69, p < .001$, was significant (with the means being 2.55 in the weak conflict condition, 5.45 in the strong conflict condition, and 5.54 in the hostility condition, all significantly different from each other).

Moreover, conflict strongly impacted upon hostility, $F(1, 290) = 205.676, p < .001$. The hostility mean for the weak conflict condition was 2.09, for the strong conflict condition was 5.10, and for the hostility condition, was 5.65, and they were all significantly different from each other.

The scores for the two groups were analysed separately and compared in order to see if there were any differences between them. Significant differences in the identification and salience measures as well as political behavioural intentions between the two groups were observed, with the pro-financial reparation group having higher scores than the anti-financial reparation group (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. Means and standard deviation for identification, salience, political behavioural intention, perceived group depersonalization and group attributions in the two different groups.

		Pro-reparation group	Anti-reparation group	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Identification	<i>M</i>	3.17	2.14	5.96	.000
	<i>SD</i>	1.49	1.19		
Salience	<i>M</i>	4.11	3.40	4.46	.000
	<i>SD</i>	1.30	1.27		
Political behavioural intentions	<i>M</i>	4.31	3.43	6.21	.000
	<i>SD</i>	1.12	1.26		
Perceived group depersonalization	<i>M</i>	4.47	4.17	2.23	.026
	<i>SD</i>	1.09	1.02		
Group attributions	<i>M</i>	4.26	4.06	1.31	.190
	<i>SD</i>	1.26	1.21		

Note: *df* are 271 for all analyses except identification (270) and political behavioural intentions (249).

Although political behavioural intentions provided a reliable scale it was obvious on inspection that there were variations between the items in the extent to which they correlated with the predictors. As can be seen in the Table 10.2 the correlations with the salience and identification measures were relatively strong for items 1 (“How likely is that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your views on the financial reparation issue?”), and 2 (“How likely is that you will attend meetings of people who share your views on the financial reparation issue?”) and relatively weak for the other four items (“How likely is that you will express your views on financial reparation issue in public?”, “How likely is that you will take part in actions to promote your views on financial reparation issue?”, “How likely is that you will explain to your friends why you hold your views on the financial reparation issue?”, and “How likely is that you will sign a petition supporting your position on financial reparation issue?”).

Table 9.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations, for the salience and identification measures and political behavioural intentions (each individual item).

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Political behavioural intentions 1	4.01	1.84		.656**	.026	.032	.059	.032	.479**	.525**	.435**
2. Political behavioural intentions 2	3.77	1.87			.076	.081	.094	.143*	.541**	.562*	.504**
3. Political behavioural intentions 3	5.53	1.59	.			.330*	.471**	.376**	.572**	-.045	-.096
4. Political behavioural intentions 4	3.35	1.90					.626**	.772**	.750**	.118	.202**
5. Political behavioural intentions 5	4.00	2.03	.					.572**	.748**	.086	.152*
6. Political behavioural intentions 6	3.18	1.76							.751**	.195**	.188**
7. Political behavioural intentions	3.97	1.18								.384**	.371**
8. Salience measure	3.84	1.32	.								.539**
9. Identification measure	2.82	1.50									

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

It is worth noting that the overall scale correlation conceals wide variation in the individual items. For example, items 1 and 2 had moderate to high relationships with the identification and salience measures while the others had smaller relationships.

Main Analyses

The hypothesis that self-definition as an opinion group member should predict behavioural intention was tested using a hierarchical regression analysis with the identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions as criterion. It was expected that both identification and salience measures would predict behavioural intentions related to financial reparation issue but the salience measure would be a stronger predictor than the identification measure. It was found that, the identification measure ($\beta = .232, p < .001$) and the salience measure ($\beta = .263, p < .001$) predicted political behavioural intention but the salience measure was a better predictor than the identification measure (see Table 9.3). R^2 increased significantly when the salience measure was entered into the prediction model $R^2(\text{change})=.050, p < .001$.

Table 9.3. Regression analyses for overall data with the identification and salience measures predicting political behavioural intentions and perceived group depersonalization.

	Criterion		Predictor	β	R^2 change	p
Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.372	.138	.000		
	Identification	.232				
	Salience	.263	.050	.000		
Perceived group depersonalization	Identification	.331	.110	.000		
	Identification	.135				
	Salience	.365	.094	.000		

These results are in line with hypothesis 1a. It is worth noting that these relationships are almost entirely driven by two items, as four of the items were virtually unrelated to the predictors (see Table 9.2). Given this discrepancy the data were reanalysed using a two-item scale. The results of this analysis are reported at the end of this section.

Given the differences between the means it was also interesting to consider each group separately. For the pro-reparation group, the salience measure was an even stronger predictor of political behavioural intentions ($\beta = .361, p < .001$), than the identification measure ($\beta = .148, p < .09$). When the salience measure was entered into the model, it significantly added to the predictive power of identification ($R^2(\text{change}) = .095, p < .001$). On the contrary, in the anti-financial reparation group, neither identification ($\beta = .122, ns.$) nor salience measure ($\beta = .123, ns.$) predicted political behavioural intentions. This finding seems especially important in relation to the difference in the intentions to take action between the two opinion-based groups (the anti-reparation group expressed a much lower level of commitment to take action).

Then, hierarchical regression analysis with identification and salience measures as predictors and perceived group depersonalization as the criterion was used again in order to test the hypothesis (1b) that salience should predict perceived group depersonalization which in turn predicts attribution of this depersonalization to group reality. The results show that for the pro-reparation group, perceived depersonalization for this group was more strongly predicted by the salience measure ($\beta = .365, p < .001$), than by the identification measure ($\beta = .135, p < .05$). However, in the case of the anti-reparation group, contrary to the hypothesis, the identification measure was a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization ($\beta = .182, p <$

.01) than the salience measure ($\beta = .114, p < .09$). As predicted, for both groups, perceived group depersonalization also predicted attribution of depersonalization to perceived group reality ($\beta = .490$, respectively $\beta = .556, p < .001$).

Hypothesis 2 that intergroup conflict should make the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions stronger was also tested using standard regression in each condition with the identification and salience measures as predictors of political behavioural intentions. From Table 9.4 can be seen that the size of R^2 is much the same in all three conditions. Although there is a slight increase in the strength of the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions depending on the level of conflict, this is not significant, thus there is limited support for Hypothesis 2.

Table 9.4. Regression analysis across conditions with identification and salience measures predicting political behavioural intentions and perceived group depersonalization.

<i>Condition</i>	<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Predictor</i>		β	R^2 change	p
Weak conflict	Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.395	.156		.000
		Identification	.296			
		Saliency	.197	.029		.078
				Total $R^2 = .185$		
	Perceived group depersonalization	Identification	.370	.137		.000
		Identification	.129			
Saliency		.471	.164		.000	
			Total $R^2 = .301$			
Strong conflict	Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.278	.077		.008
		Identification	.097			
		Saliency	.356	.094		.002
				Total $R^2 = .171$		
	Perceived group depersonalization	Identification	.274	.075		.006
		Identification	.059			
Saliency		.400	.114		.000	
			Total $R^2 = .189$			
Hostility	Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.442	.195		.000
		Identification	.300			
		Saliency	.245	.040		.045
				Total $R^2 = .235$		
	Perceived group depersonalization	Identification	.340	.115		.001
		Identification	.217			
Saliency		.217	.032		.074	
			Total $R^2 = .147$			

It is interesting though to consider separately the effects of both variables (identification and salience) in the overall predictive link. For the weak conflict and hostility conditions, the salience measure ($\beta = .197, p < .10$, and $\beta = .245, p < .05$) seems to be a weaker predictor than identification ($\beta = .296, p < .001$, respectively, $\beta = .300, p < .01$). As a consequence, for these two conditions R^2 change was modest when the salience measure was entered into the equation ($R^2(\text{change}) = .029, p < .10$, and $R^2(\text{change}) = .040, p < .05$).

However, the situation is rather different in the strong conflict condition where only the salience measure ($\beta = .356, p < .001$) is a significant predictor of political behavioural intentions. The link between identification and political behavioural intentions is not significant in this condition ($\beta = .097, ns$). In this case the change in R^2 for salience is $.094 (p < .01)$ for the salience measure and $.077 (p < .01)$ for the identification measure.

Finally, given the different relationships between political behavioural intention items and the measures of salience and identification a scale with the most relevant behaviours regarding the opinion-based groups involved was computed. The scale comprised two items (i.e., “How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your views on the financial reparation issue?”, and “How likely is that you will attend meeting of people who share your views on the financial reparation issue?”) and had a Cronbach’s α of $.79$.

Following hierarchical regression analysis it was revealed that when the data were collapsed across conditions, the salience measure ($\beta = .454, p < .001$), was again a stronger predictor than the identification measure ($\beta = .269, p < .001$), and this was more pronounced than for the political behavioural measure based on all items.

Similarly, when the salience measure was entered into the model it added significantly to the predictive power of the identification measure, $R^2(\text{change}) = .146, p < .001$.

Next, the data were analysed across conditions for the case when only highly normative behaviours were included in the political behavioural intention scale. For all three conditions the salience measure was a stronger predictor than identification. More specifically, for the weak conflict condition $R^2(\text{change})$ was .162 when the salience measure was entered in the equation ($\beta = .470, p < .001$). For the strong conflict condition the same relationship held ($\beta = .396, p < .001$) but $R^2(\text{change})$ was smaller than in the previous condition, $R^2(\text{change}) = .112, p < .001$. Finally, in the hostility condition, the relationship is the clearest. When the salience measure is entered in the model, the identification measure did not predict political behavioural intentions anymore ($\beta = .509, p < .001$ decreasing to $\beta = .167, ns.$). Thus, it is noteworthy that in this case the relationship between identification and political behavioural intentions is actually mediated by the salience measure. In this case $R^2(\text{change})$ is also bigger than in all previously analysed case, $R^2(\text{change}) = .176, p < .001$.

Discussion

It is noteworthy that again self-definition as an opinion group member (including both identification and salience measures) was an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions. Moreover, an overall analysis of the data reveals that, as predicted, the salience measure is a stronger predictor of political behavioural intentions than the identification measure.

The fact that the salience measure in this study again (as in Study 4) predicted perceived ingroup depersonalization supports the idea that the salience measure used is valid. More specifically, salient opinion-based group membership was associated

with participants perceiving their own group as sharing common ideals, values and goals. Moreover, common behaviours by ingroup members were attributed to those shared ideals, values and goals. In short, those people who saw their group membership as salient saw their group as more real as acting for real reasons.

It is also noteworthy, however, that the results show little variation in the strength of the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions as a function of the level of the manipulated intergroup conflict. Perhaps, the relative weakness of such effects can be explained by the potential meaning, or more exactly lack of meaning, of the conflict in the current context. In particular, in this specific context, conflict and hostility might have been perceived by participants as inappropriate responses. The reason for this might be that the perceived degree of opposition between the two opinion-based groups used was not as high as in the political groups investigated in Studies 3 and 4. That is, there may not be a very high perception of conflict between the two groups, and neither group probably sees the outgroup as threatening. It is perhaps slightly implausible that an actual conflict would be generated in regard to this issue and even if some degree of hostility might exist, this would not be of great intensity.

It is also interesting to consider the two predictors, the identification and the salience measures in relation to their link to political behavioural intentions across conditions. One noteworthy aspect is that salience seems to be a stronger predictor than identification but only in the strong conflict condition. This can be explained by the fact that this condition might have been perceived by the participants as the most realistic one. In the weak conflict condition a weaker relationship would be expected anyway, but the weaker effect in the hostility condition could be due to the fact that the experimental manipulation might not be totally credible in the real social context.

Although the issue of financial reparation was a frequent topic of discussion at the time when the study was conducted, it is possible that angry rhetoric about the outgroup created low fit between the norms of these groups and the observed behaviour.

Another important aspect is the fact that the results were clearer and stronger in the case of pro-reparation group than in the case of the anti-reparation one. The results may have been generally weaker in the anti-financial group because this opinion-based group does not really exist in a form that could be expected to be associated with action. The salience and identification measures revealed lower levels of both salience and identification for this group. It is perhaps unlikely that they would consider taking action in relation to their position. People with such opinions that reflect the status quo may inly rarely form intentions to take actions in line with their views and they are an example of what politicians refer to as “the silent majority” (Price, 1989) - whether or not they are a majority in practice. This term was used to define that part of a population formed by people who share an opinion but perhaps without real consensus that would motivate them to act in order to support that opinion or view.

Moreover, the meaning of these groups is probably not oppositionally defined in the same way as support for political parties is defined. Most probably, supporters and opponents of reparation do not see themselves as engaged in a political or ideological struggle. High conflict and hostility are probably inappropriate in terms of the social meaning of these groups (such behaviour would reduce normative fit). Exhibiting open hostility and derogation toward the outgroup might not be seen as normative for prototypical group members. This observation is consistent with research done by Noel, Wann, and Branscombe (1995) which suggested that more

'peripheral' group members are likely to show derogation toward the outgroup (in order to enhance their low status), rather than 'core' members.

More importantly, the fact that the relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural intentions was only strong in restricted circumstances (e.g., when only two political behavioural intentions items were considered) demonstrates the importance of intergroup conflict but also points out another factor that must be taken into consideration. This returns us to the degree of normativeness of intergroup behaviour discussed in Chapter 4.

According to self-categorization theory, when a certain group membership is salient, group members come to perceive themselves in a depersonalised manner and this leads them to follow behaviours which are highly in line with group norms (Turner, 1991). Thus, when the salience of self-categorization is high, clearly normative group behaviours will be also present. There is a considerable body of research investigating related ideas (e.g., Marques et al., 1998; Terry et al., 1996, 1999; Wellen et al., 1998; White et al., 1994) and these results seem to follow the same line as previous research. Importantly, they also suggest the next empirical aspect to focus on here and this is the role of group behaviour normativeness in the process. More specifically, it is of interest here to further explore how behaviours which are perceived as more normative by group members are more likely to be followed by them when that specific group membership is salient.

Finally, considering the results from Studies 3, 4 and 5, both identification and salience measures seem overall good predictors of political behavioural intention but it is quite difficult to empirically differentiate the exact role played by each of the variables in the process of predicting behavioural intentions. Theoretically, from a self-categorization theory perspective, there are three main constructs involved in this

process. These are identification, perceiver readiness, and salience (see Chapter 2). In Study 3, identification had an explicit measure and salience a potential measure. In Studies 4 and 5, in order to get a more complete picture of the variables involved, measures of perceived group depersonalization were added. The measure of perceived group depersonalization was not intended to capture the actual process of depersonalization (which would constitute yet a more difficult task), but to validate the salience measure.

Perceiver readiness was not explicitly measured in any of these studies but it is plausible that aspects of perceiver readiness are actually captured by the certainty items and this is why they are so close of salience (perceiver readiness being a main determinant of salience, Oakes, 1997, see also McGarty, 1999a). However, although in theory there is a clear separation between the constructs, when they are empirically measured there may always be some degree of overlap between these measures, as can be seen in Figure 9.1.




Figure 9.1. The overlap between the different measures and the corresponding theoretical constructs

Thus, a standard measure of identification probably captures the theoretical construct of identification more accurately than it captures anything else, but in practice it might also capture, to a lesser degree, perceiver readiness and salience. Similarly, the salience measure seems to capture salience better than do identification measures, but we cannot tell whether it achieves this by capturing determinants of salience (perceiver readiness) or is a direct indicator of salience. Due to the complexity and fluidity of these constructs it is difficult to find or devise measures which would perfectly match the respective theoretical constructs. Thus, what the results of these three studies might actually suggest is that empirically it is useful to refer to a general construct such as self-definition as an opinion-based group member (which includes the theoretically latent constructs of identification and salience but also perceiver readiness and depersonalization), which predicts political involvement. However, when the components of this construct are measured separately, it is likely that they will overlap as in the case of the identification and salience measures. Importantly, in spite of the overlap between measured constructs and the difficulty of measurement, the results have shown that the salience measure consistently predicted political behavioural intentions over and above identification, and the only plausible conclusion that is consistent with the theorising here is that the salience measure is a better predictor because it is measuring a construct that is closer to salience than identification measures alone.

Conclusion

This study shows once again the consequences of perceiving oneself as an opinion-based group member on intention to engage in relevant group action. This is an important finding (in the context of this thesis) as well as in relation to real social behaviour. The results of these studies have provided a potential fruitful insight on the

mechanisms involved in the relationship between holding and sharing a certain opinion and political engagement.

Rather than intergroup conflict alone being an important determinant of intentions to take relevant group action, group norms need to be considered. Of course, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that conflict could have substantial effects on the relationship in some settings. However, the study also suggested a higher variation in the strength of the relationship on the basis of the normativeness of behaviours and the content of the group identity. Certain behaviours may be considered more or less appropriate depending on the defining features of group membership (the content of the social identity). In some situations outgroup derogation and intense intergroup conflict could be considered to be inconsistent with a particular group identity (e.g., pro-peace activist) and in others it can be highly consistent (e.g., as a KKK supporter). Consequently, in the next chapter I will explore the effects of normativeness of group behaviour as another enhancer of the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions.

CHAPTER 10

INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF NORMATIVENESS OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR
IN OPINION-BASED GROUPS: STUDY 6

Introduction

Although the results of Study 5 do not suggest that conflict has clear effects they do imply that there is another factor which affects the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and behavioural intentions. This factor is *the degree of normativeness of certain group behaviours*. The relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and behavioural intentions seems particularly clear for some behaviours. It is plausible that these are the most normatively relevant behaviours for the groups in question. This would be consistent with previous research exploring the role of group norms in predicting behaviours (Terry et al., 1999, 2000; Wellen et al., 1998, see Chapter 4). These authors argue that some behaviours become normative when they characterize a particular group membership, in other words, people with a salient identity behave in a way which is consistent with the respective group norms.

Thus, the main question addressed in this chapter is whether the relationship between self-definition as a group member and political behavioural intentions is stronger for behaviours, which are normative for the group concerned. There are good reasons to believe it should be based on the research reviewed in Chapter 4 and the results of Study 5. However, the key problem with Study 5 is that it cannot be directly inferred that the two behaviours that stood out in that study were in fact normative.

Study 6

To address this problem a sixth study was conducted where the normativeness of behaviour was directly manipulated by providing ingroup consensual validation of some behaviours. The expectation was that, if the certainty measure really is a measure of salience, then its predictive power relative to the identification measure should be enhanced for behaviours that are consensually validated as norms of the relevant ingroup. That is salient group identity will only predict normative behaviours (i.e., those behaviours consistent with the social meaning of the group). It is easy to derive this prediction from self-categorization theory which argues that when a social identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in highly normative behaviour: "It is assumed that depersonalization, (...) leads to more consensual behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group (...)" (Turner, 1991, p.16). In line with this, the hypotheses formulated were:

1. Self-definition as an opinion-based group member should predict political behavioural intention but the salience measure should be a particularly good predictor of political behavioural intentions for clearly defined group normative behaviours.
2. The salience measure should be a superior predictor (when compared to the identification measure) of perceived group depersonalization which in turn will predict attribution of common behaviours to group reality.

The main objective of this study was to show the effects of manipulating the perceived normativeness of group behaviours. Such a manipulation of group behaviour normativeness should provide a clear test of the ideas suggested by the theoretical review in Chapter 4 which took a clear shape at the end of Chapter 9. In

particular, it is important to explore the relationship between self-definition in terms of an opinion-based group membership and relevant political behaviours, but in conditions in which these behaviours are highly consistent with the normative content of the respective group membership.

Considering the important role played by consensus in the opinion-based group formation, the manipulation of group behaviour normativeness consisted of a validation manipulation. More specifically, behaviours on which group members agree that they are highly normative should increase the likelihood that these particular behaviours will be adopted. In other words, group members come to perceive relevant behaviours as highly normative if they are previously consensualized. Self-categorization theorists (Turner et al., 1987), relate normative behaviour directly to the salience of self-categorization (through normative fit) and they also point out to the high influential power of ingroup validation in this process (see Turner, 1991).

One key question, however, was how to manipulate consensual validation. Study 5 shown that there were differences between groups in terms of their support for group membership and action. Given the plausibility of such differences in this study I decided to manipulate validation by providing consensual feedback from the ingroup and outgroup that some behaviours were more normative than others for both groups in this context. In the terms used by McGarty (1999a) this involved an attempt to establish a shared normative framework for these two groups (on this particular matter).

In order to test these hypotheses, exclusively defined opinion-based groups were created. The groups were formed using participants' position regarding proposed changes to an existing law about homosexual behaviour. More specifically

participants had to indicate if they were in favour or against proposals aimed to update legislation in Romania so as to fit European Union standards. The old article concerning homosexual relations was perceived by many people as highly discriminatory against the homosexual population, but this view was rejected by many others. At the time of conducting this study, there was a lively dispute in Romania about the necessity of changing the existing law, so this created the necessary conditions for the spontaneous formation of the two different opinion-based groups (e.g., pro-legislative change and anti-legislative change) regarding the issue.

Method

Design

The experiment involved a 2 (validation) x 2 (behaviour) design with repeated measures on the second factor. The hypotheses involved exploring the relationships between the identification, salience and behavioural intentions measures in these four settings rather than variations in the means. The design is shown in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1. Experimental design of Study 6.

	Normativeness of group behaviours based on pre-test (within-subjects)		
Ingroup endorsement of group behaviours (between-subjects)		Less normative behaviours (4 items)	Highly normative behaviours (4 items)
	Control condition (no manipulation)	weakest relationship expected	moderate relationship expected
	Experimental condition	moderate relationship expected	strongest relationship expected

Pretesting of Norms

In a pretest using 80 participants from “A.I.Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania, the normativeness of group behaviours of each of the two opinion-based groups (i.e., pro-legislative change and anti-legislative change) was measured. Participants had to rate ten behaviours in terms of their perceived normativeness on a seven point scale (see Appendix). More specifically, after participants categorized themselves depending on their position regarding the proposal as either in favour or against of legislative change, they were asked “How likely is that you will adopt the following behaviours to support your position regarding this matter?”. The pretest indicated that participants preferred certain behaviours to others. The four behaviours that were indicated as most normative by the participants were:

- To join an organized group which reflects their view ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.90$);
- To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they support ($M = 2.78$, $SD = 1.81$);
- To sign a petition to show support or opposition ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.97$);
- To try to persuade other people about their position ($M = 3.38$, $SD = 1.90$).

The four least normative behaviours were:

- To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing their views ($M = 1.90$, $SD = 1.57$);
- To participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.82$);

- To actively participate in the organization of a rally ($M = 2.25$, $SD = 1.62$);
- To write letters to newspapers to show support for their position ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 1.63$).

The following two behaviours with moderate ratings were dropped: to express views reflecting their position in public ($M = 2.47$, $SD = 1.68$) and to participate in an organized rally in order to support their position ($M = 2.60$, $SD = 1.80$). Three of the behaviours indicated as less normative by the pretest sample would be classed by many as indicators of real activism. Results of this pre-test were used to manipulate group behaviour normativeness in the current study.

Participants

Participants were 100 psychology students at A.I.Cuza University of Iasi, Romania in their first or second year of study and who participated in this experiment as part of their practical classes. Participants were randomly allocated to the two conditions of the study.

Procedure

First, participants received an introduction where they were informed that there is a proposal (called in Romania a “law project”) which aims to replace the old article concerning homosexual relations and to modify other articles from the penal code concerning “sexual crimes” in such a way that there would be only one law for both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Participants were also informed about the existence of two main organizations or activist groups (already quite well-known in Romania), which either support or reject this new law project. They were also told that “(...) generally, supporters and opponents of this law project represent two different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters believe that Romanian

society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't agree and believe that the law should not be modified".

Next, participants indicated whether they were in favour or against this proposal. Thus, they categorized themselves either as belonging to "in favour of the proposal" or "against the proposal" opinion-based groups. As in Study 5, the categorization was checked using the item: "Where would you place your view on this issue from a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)?".

Then, the manipulation stage followed where the normativeness of group behaviours was manipulated by asking participants in the experimental condition to read a paragraph. The manipulation consisted of giving participants information stating that in a survey previously conducted using the same type of sample (psychology students from the same university), it was found that even if supporters and opponents disagreed about their position they both strongly agreed that there are some actions that are the most important to take and some others that are less important for members.

The manipulation was conducted in this way because we did not know in advance which group participants belonged to. This information would have been required to give individualised feedback on the position of each group (without also giving potentially inconsistent and confusing feedback about the outgroup norms). Given the fact that activist groups supporting both positions were taking action in the Romanian society at the time that broadly matched the range of behaviours included here, this strategy seemed reasonable.

Participants then read a list of four actions that had been most strongly endorsed at the pretest (i.e., "To join an organized group which reflects their view", "To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they support"; "To

sign a petition to show support or opposition”; “To try to persuade other people about their position”).

Then, they were told that participants in this survey also agreed that some actions were less likely to be taken or less appropriate (i.e., less normative) and the less normative behaviours indicated in the pretest were presented to the participants (i.e., “To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing their views”; “To participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates”; “To actively participate in the organization of a rally”; “To write letters to newspapers to show support for their position”). It was expected that after reading this paragraph group normative behaviours would be perceived as more normative than in the control condition where participants did not learn anything about the previous survey.

Dependent measures

The normativeness of group behaviour was checked by asking participants to rate all eight behaviours. More specifically, they answered the question “How appropriate do you consider the following behaviours for the supporters of one of the positions?” (these and all other items used seven point scales).

Then, participants completed the same salience measures as in previous surveys (i.e., certainty of self-definition as an opinion group member, certainty about the correctness of own position, certainty about the fact that they are real supporters or opponents of the proposal, and certainty that holding this particular position really reflects their views). In order to better reflect the dynamic nature of the construct of salience the word “at the moment” was added for some of the salience measures. It is argued that salience indicates the extent to which people come to see themselves as members of a particular group at a certain moment in time, so this change in the items should capture this temporally varying aspect of salience. Participants were reminded

that on the front page they indicated their position regarding the proposal (in favour or against). They were asked next to rate the following statement: “I define myself as holding this position at the moment”, “I am confident that my ideas regarding this proposal are the right ones”, “I am confident that I am a real supporter/opponent of this proposal”, and “I am confident that holding this position really reflects my views and beliefs at the moment”.

Identification with the opinion-group was measured using the same four item scale as in Study 5 (i.e., “I identify with other people who hold the same position as me about this proposal”, “I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this proposal”, “I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this proposal”, and “I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me about this proposal”). Then, the same items used in Study 5, the same items were used to measure perceived ingroup depersonalization and attribution of common behaviours to group reality were included.

Finally, political behavioural intentions were measured by the following items: “How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your views on the proposal?”, “How likely is it that you will become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support?”, “How likely is it that you will sign a petition or something similar supporting your position?”, “How likely is it that you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position?”, “How likely is it that you will try to stop the supporters of the other side to express their views?”, “How likely is it that you will participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates”, “How likely is it that you will participate in the organization of a rally?”, and, “How likely is it that you will write letters to

newspapers to show support for your position?'. All the measures in this study were answered on seven-point scales. At the end of the questionnaire, participants provided demographical information about their age and gender.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

First several scales such as identification of four items ($\alpha = .85$), salience of three items ($\alpha = .67$), highly normative behaviours of four items ($\alpha = .86$) and less normative behaviours of four items ($\alpha = .86$) were formed.

Concerning self-categorization in the two available opinion-based groups, 72% of the participants were in favour of the new law project and 28% against. The manipulation check revealed a significant difference in the means of the perceived normativeness of highly normative behaviours and less normative behaviours ($MS = 4.49$, and 3.43 , $t(1, 99) = 25.17$, $p < .001$). The correlations between the main variables (salience, identification and political behavioural intentions) as well as the means and standard deviations are presented in Table 10.2 below. There are no significant differences between the experimental and control conditions in the means for any of the variables. It is worth noting that normative behavioural intentions seem to be more strongly correlated with both the identification and the salience measures than the less normative items.

Table 10.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations, for the salience and identification and political behavioural intention measures.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4
1. Political behavioural intentions (normative items)	3.22	1.51		.699**	.356**	.445**
2. Political behavioural intentions (less normative items)	2.29	1.30			.255*	.371**
3. Salience measure	4.48	1.33				.396**
4. Identification measure	3.86	1.49				

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Main Analyses

The hypotheses were tested using four hierarchical regression analyses with the identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions (highly normative political behavioural intentions and less normative political behavioural intentions) as criterion, one for each cell of the 2 x 2 design (see Table 10.3).

Table 10.3. Regression analyses for each cell at the 2 x 2 design in Study 6

Condition	Criterion	Predictor	β	R^2 change	p
Control	Political behavioural intentions (normative items)	Identification	.606	.367	.000
		Identification	.637		
		Saliency	-.058	.002	.675
		Total $R^2 = .369$			
	Political behavioural intentions (less normative items)	Identification	.548	.301	.000
		Identification	.540		
		Saliency	.014	.000	.926
		Total $R^2 = .301$			
	Perceived ingroup depersonalization	Identification	.686	.471	.000
		Identification	.562		
		Saliency	.239	.042	.056
		Total $R^2 = .513$			
Experimental	Political behavioural intentions (normative items)	Identification	.245	.060	.100
		Identification	.127		
		Saliency	.442	.181	.003
		Total $R^2 = .242$			
	Political behavioural intentions (less normative items)	Identification	.203	.041	.170
		Identification	.159		
		Saliency	.167	.026	.275
		Total $R^2 = .067$			

Perceived ingroup depersonalization	Identification	.500	.250	.000
	<hr/>			
	Identification	.364		
	Saliency	.508	.240	.000
Total $R^2 = .490$				

In the control condition, the identification measure was a significant predictor for less normative behavioural intentions ($\beta = .540, p < .001$) but the saliency measure did not add significantly to prediction. A similar pattern occurred with the more normative behaviours ($\beta = .637, p < .001$) with a nonsignificant change when the saliency measure was added.

In the experimental condition neither the identification nor the saliency measures were significant predictors for the less normative items. For the normatively validated items, however, the saliency measure ($\beta = .442, p < .005$) was a stronger predictor than the identification measure ($\beta = .127, p < .005$) and it also added significantly to prediction.

The link between the self-definition as an opinion-based group member and perceived group depersonalization (Hypothesis 2) was tested next. In the control condition, the identification measure ($\beta = .562, p < .001$) was a stronger predictor than the saliency measure ($\beta = .239, p < .05$). In the experimental condition, the results were consistent with the prediction, the saliency measure ($\beta = .508, p < .001$) being a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization than the identification measure ($\beta = .364, p < .001$) and added significantly to prediction.

Finally, the link between perceived group depersonalization and attribution to common behaviours to a group shared reality was investigated. For the overall data

set, consistent with the hypothesis, perceived group depersonalization ($\beta = .637, p < .001$) strongly predicted attribution of common behaviors. The relationship was stronger in the control ($\beta = .747, p < .001$) than the experimental condition ($\beta = .486, p < .001$).

Discussion

Results of this study show that the construct of self-definition as an opinion group member is, on the whole, a good predictor of political behavioural intentions. This finding is consistent in Studies 3, 4, and 5 and, also with a whole body of research on the link between group self-definition and relevant group behaviours (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998, 2000; Stürmer, et al., 2003; Terry, et al., 2000; de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999)

However, the two components of the self-definition as an opinion-based group member, which are opinion-based group identification and the salience, seem to play different roles in predicting relevant political behavioural intentions. That is, their predictive power seems to vary depending on the contextual changes imposed by the experimental manipulation.

It was found that that when neither normative nor less normative behaviours are endorsed (control condition), the best predictor of both types of behaviours was opinion-based group identification. The salience measure did not add substantially to prediction for either set of behaviours.

In line with predictions, when certain behaviours were normatively validated the situation changed dramatically. In this case, the salience measure was a better predictor of normative behaviour than the identification measure. In fact, for clearly normative endorsed behaviours the salience measure was the only significant predictor of political behavioural intentions. This is an important finding suggesting

that, by manipulating the perceived degree of group behaviour normativeness, the link between salient self-perception and intentions to participate in relevant actions can be improved. This means that by validating certain behaviours, people might become more ready to take action in relation to their ideas. This finding is significant in relation to work on collective action participation that shows that self-definition in terms of an activist identity predicts intentions to participate in relevant collective action (Simon et al., 1998, 2000; Stürmer, et al., 2003) and also actual participation (de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995), but it suggests that it may be possible to improve this link by using ingroup validation strategies.

However, where the normative behaviours were endorsed, neither identification nor the salience measures predicted less-normative behaviours. That is, the link between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intention was actually eliminated when participants were made aware that these particular behaviours were not highly normative. Although this is a more extreme finding than anticipated, it is still consistent with the initial predictions.

Taken together these findings have important implications for understanding the relationship between subjective group membership and the mobilization of group action (assuming all along that intentions do provide useful indications of potential for action). Making it clear that certain actions are normative was not more likely to lead people to intend to take those actions, but it was found that those who strongly defined themselves as members of the relevant opinion-based groups were more likely to support normative actions but *no more* likely to take less normative actions. This was despite the fact that some of the “less normative” actions were things that real committed activists do actually do. This is also consistent with studies showing that high identifiers act in one way, and low identifiers in another (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers,

& Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000), but the current research extends and qualifies the previous work by pointing to the importance of the normatively validated character of the behaviour.

To sum up, the results support the initial hypothesis that the link between the salience measure and political behavioral intention is stronger when the behaviours involved are validated as highly normative. This finding is highly consistent with previous social identity research on the influence of group norms on behaviours (Jetten et al., 1997, 1996; Wellen et al., 1998) but in particular with studies showing that normative group behaviour is more positively evaluated by members and consequently more likely to be adopted by group members than is behaviour perceived as non-normative behaviour (e.g., Marques et al., 1998; McAuliffe et al., 2003). It is also worth mentioning that in research conducted by Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000; see Chapter 4) it was found that participants exposed to an incongruent norm displayed greater attitude-behaviour inconsistency than those exposed to a congruent ingroup norm. Their results suggested additionally that perceived group identification moderated the influence of norms on attitude-behaviour consistency. Although the present study does not directly focus on the attitude-behaviour relationship, the specific finding that the salience measure is a particular good predictor of political behavioural intentions when behaviours involved are highly normative is clearly consistent with Terry and colleagues work

Secondly, it was expected that the salience measure would be a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization than the identification measure. This was indeed the case on average, but only (strongly so) in the experimental condition. This could be explained in terms of the effect of the validation manipulation making the salient identity more relevant to a broader range of consequences of

depersonalization. When people are told that some behaviours are endorsed by their groups then the salience of their group membership should also be more relevant to explaining common behaviours in terms of collective identities and emerging consensus.

Finally, the last prediction that perceived group depersonalization should predict attribution of common behaviours to group reality held in both conditions. This result has emerged in a consistent way in Studies 4, 5, and 6. In all cases there is evidence of perceived group depersonalization which means the relevant social identity has been made salient.

It is important to note the role played by ingroup validation in this study. According to self-categorization theory, consensus within a relevant group leads to external attribution of the shared response, that is ingroup validated responses are perceived as more correct and appropriate. The behaviour of other group members “provides information about appropriate attitudes and actions in so far as it exemplifies the norms of some reference group (an ingroup self-category)” (Turner et al, 1987, p. 72). This was exactly the process which made the normativeness manipulation used here so effective. As self-categorization theory argues, when ingroup members learn the stereotypical norms of their group they also discover that some behaviours within a certain group are seen as more appropriate, expected or desirable because they are highly consistent with the group norms. When they internalize and assign these norms to themselves, their behaviour becomes more normative as their category membership becomes salient (Turner et al, 1987).

Conclusion

The main finding of this study was that the link previously found between the salience measure and political behavioural intentions varies with the normative validation of certain behaviours. Thus, when the context is highly normative for ingroup members and the relevant group behaviour is made salient and easy to detect, the salience measure overtook the predictive power of the identification measure. This result provides very strong support for the empirical strategy of introducing the salience measure. It also demonstrates the importance of the normativeness of group behaviour as a contextual factor affecting the relationship between group self-definition and political behavioural intentions.

CHAPTER 11

THE ROLE OF SELF-DEFINITION AS AN OPINION-GROUP MEMBER IN
PREDICTING POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Main Questions and Summary of the Theoretical Review

Initially, the main general question addressed in this thesis was *when do people decide to take politically relevant action in relation to shared ideas*. The social identity approach offers the general answer to this question that collective behaviour is determined by people's self-definition as group members in a given social context. A more refined general question was then, in which conditions *is the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour the strongest*. The literature review in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provided two general answers to this question.

The first answer is that, it seems that the relationship between self-definition as a group member and relevant group behaviour should be stronger in conditions of intergroup conflict. As detailed in Chapter 3, according to social identity theory intergroup group should make group members see themselves more in terms of their group membership rather than in terms of individual entities, and consequently behave more in line with their group membership as a function of this membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As self-categorization theory further explains, during overt and intense intergroup conflict, group memberships become salient and then, individuals' self-perception tends to become depersonalized. As the social identity becomes salient, people come to act in terms of this social identity, so the likelihood of adopting group normative behaviour is increased (Turner et al., 1987).




Figure 11. 1. Relating intergroup conflict, collective self-definition and group behaviour

In spite of the importance of the topic at the broader societal level, at the moment, there is surprisingly little modern social psychological research on the direct effects of conflict. However, recent research focused mostly on exploring the role of conflict in the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias or negative racial attitudes (Jackson, 2002; Stephan et al., 2002).

Intergroup conflict can also take the form of a threat to social identity. There is an extensive body of research to support the idea that, under identity threat the relationship between identification and different forms of group behaviour (e.g., ingroup bias, derogation, coping strategies, etc) is stronger (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998; Ellemers et al.1993; Grant, 1993; Grant & Brown, 1995; Spears et al., 1997).

Finally, another important stream of research focused on intergroup conflict by particularly investigating explanations of collective disorder through self-categorization processes (Reicher, 1996; Stott et al., 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998). These authors argue that crowd disorder is better explained in a dynamic, intergroup manner that considers the interplay between perceptions and self-categorization of both groups in conflict. As detailed in Chapter 3, these authors argue that, to the

extent to which the opposing group (e.g. police, army, etc.) perceives the crowd as a homogenous threat, their consequent behaviour toward the crowd will be determined by this perception. Next, crowd members come to perceive the outgroup behaviour as oppressive and illegitimate and this alters their self-perception from seeing themselves as separate individuals in the crowd. Thus, crowd members come to see themselves as sharing a common group membership, and even more, an illegitimate and repressive common fate, which makes the (potentially violent) resistance to the opposing group to be perceived as an appropriate response. As the authors noted, the conflictual relations become more intense as “even if the violence of some in the crowd may provoke police action, this action is a necessary component of processes of escalation (...).” (Stott & Reicher, 1998, p.359). In brief, this account approaches the intergroup conflict in a dynamic way, emphasizing the role played perceptions of groups in conflict on group self-definition and normative behaviour of group members which finally impact upon the way intergroup conflict itself develops. In Stott and Reicher’s view, there is a cyclic dynamic between social identity, group behaviour and conflict as intergroup conflict impacts upon the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour which in turn impacts upon the intergroup conflict itself by increasing its intensity.

The second answer provided by the literature as detailed in Chapter 4 is that the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be stronger when the relevant group behaviour is clearly normative for the ingroup members. That is, people tend to be more likely to follow behaviours which are highly normative for the group they are strongly committed to, thus, the predictive power of self-definition as a group member for relevant group behaviours should be higher when the behaviours involved are highly consistent with group norms.

According to self-categorization theory, when a social identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in behaviours which are highly normative (Turner, 1991). Thus, salience of self-categorization should lead through depersonalization to highly normative behaviours.




Figure 11.2. Relating salience of self-categorization, depersonalized self-perception and highly normative behaviours

The idea is that when a particular social identity is salient people are more likely to conform to group norms, so that highly normative behaviours are preferred to less normative ones) was further explored by researchers such as Terry, Hogg, and White (Terry et al., 1999; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Wellen et al., 1998; White et al., 1994). They argue that the attitude-behaviour link (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991) was not consistently found as strong as expected because the content of group norms was not appropriately considered. That is, in situations where behaviours are congruent with group norms, attitudes should more strongly predict group behaviours.

Other researchers focused on the influence of norms on the relationship between group identification and discriminatory attitudes (Jetten et al., 1997, 1996). They investigated the idea that high identifiers will be more likely to display such discriminatory attitudes but only if they are in line with group norms.

Finally, there is another line of research on the influence of group norms on behaviours (McAuliffe et al., 2003; Marques et al., 1998). These researchers tested the idea that normative behaviours are more positively evaluated, thus more likely to be adopted by group members than are non-normative ones.

In brief, all of this research points out the crucial role played by group norms in the link between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. In order to make accurate predictions about behaviours, it does not seem sufficient to take into consideration only variables such as attitudes and group identification, but also it seems important to explore how group norms come into the process. It was suggested that the picture would not be complete if the normative context is not taken into account, and in particular the meaning of norms for group members when they are prescribed by a certain group membership and they are context-relevant.

The body of literature summarized up to this point suggested that the two main enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour are intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviour. That is, the relationship should be stronger when the context involves intergroup conflict and where the behaviours are highly normative in relation to the respective group membership.

Relevance of Opinion-based Groups for Predicting Political Involvement

The final fundamental idea explored in this thesis was that *the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be especially clear in opinion-based groups*. It was argued in Chapter 5 that in opinion-based groups the existence of the other two factors that are considered to enhance the relationship, intergroup conflict and high normativeness of investigated group behaviour, are easy to detect. More specifically, in opinion-based groups the

relationship between self-definition as group member and group behaviour is particularly clear, partly because to the extent that such groups are oppositionally-defined they will often be engaged in social conflict, and partly because these groups have features which make it easy for group behaviour to be defined as normative.

Opinion based-groups are particularly relevant in relation to political involvement and action, and this is because many collective forms of behaviour are driven by views on societal issues which for different reasons have a high relevance for people that come to be involved in such actions (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998, 2000; Stürmer et al., 2003). In other words, with whom people stand is informative about who they are and what they are going to do about the issues involved. When people come to express their opinions through support or opposition to these groups, they actually come to define themselves in terms of support or opposition in relation to the respective issue (Price, 1998). Shared support for, or opposition to, a particular cause, or in other words, self-definition as an opinion-based group member will determine which course of action is taken by such members. Thus, opinion-based group membership becomes crucial for predicting imminent group-relevant behaviours.

Individuals' opinions depend not only on their own cognitive framework (i.e., previous experiences, own beliefs, values, expectations, ideas, goals, etc.) but also on surrounding issues from the broad social context. Consequently, the social identities formed around these opinions usually relate to issues of high interest at some moment in time in some societal context. This high level of interest means that the opinions are more likely to be perceived as shared with other people and this gives the prospective activist nature of opinion-based groups. If an opinion is seen to be associated with at least some interest on the part of others in a society, then this

increases the plausibility that it will be shared with other people, but it also increases the potential dynamism of the opinion in the sense that others may take action in relation to it. If we know that there is little interest in, say getting drivers in the UK or Australia to drive on the right hand side of the road, then there is little chance that we will encounter like-minded others who will attempt to turn this idea into a political program. In other words, when opinion-based groups are formed around issues of interest of the broad society level, they are usually likely to become activist groups or even social movements having as their objective either to achieve social change or to preserve the status-quo (see Chapter 5) and this is why they seem to be especially suitable for exploring political involvement.

Given the relevance of opinion-based groups for action in general, and for the relationship between people's self-definition as group members and group behaviour in particular, all the empirical work conducted involved opinion-based groups. Thus, all social identity constructs used for exploring group processes in general, were applied to opinion-based groups. The opinion-based groups employed ranged from minimal opinion-based groups to strictly political ones (as such made up of supporters and opponents of some political parties) or opinion-based groups formed around other salient societal issues in different cultures (e.g., financial reparation in Netherlands and implementation of a law reform against gay discrimination in Romania). It is important to state again that the term 'political' was used in a broad sense here, comprising not only purely political behaviours such as voting or supporting a particular party, but also behaviours which are usually associated with various activist groups formed to support or oppose different social issues. Thus, 'political involvement' refers here to all behaviours which are likely to be adopted by people

supporting or opposing to some current of opinion, in other words behaviours specific to activists involved in political or social movements.

Summary of Studies 1 and 2

The objective of the first two studies was to address the basic effects of subjective intergroup conflict (as opposed to competition over resources) on group self-definition and subsequent behaviours. In order to do that subjective conflict was manipulated in minimal opinion-based groups. Ingroup favouritism was assessed as the most relevant form of group behaviour which can occur in such groups. The hypothesis investigated here was that, consistent with self-categorization theory, conflict should lead to salient self-categorization at the group level, and according to McGarty (1999) this should be followed by:

- d) stronger expressions of identification with the group;
- e) stronger certainty about ingroup position; and
- f) stronger ingroup favouritism.

Thus, in these studies I was primarily interested in variations in the *mean* level of responses. Experimental designs were therefore used to attempt to produce these variations.

In relation to the predictions the conclusions drawn from these studies were as follows. Measures of expressed identification did not seem to be particularly sensitive to contextual manipulations. Contrary to suggestions by McGarty (1999a) and others, such measures are probably not good indicators of salience.

Certainty that the ingroup position was correct did increase under conditions of intergroup conflict when a more comprehensive measure of certainty was used in Study 2. This finding suggested that certainty-based measures were well worth exploring further in relation to self-definition as a group member.

Finally, ingroup favouritism varied in much the same way, as did certainty measures in Study 2. It increased when there was clear intergroup conflict.

Studies 1 and 2 offered a good platform for the subsequent studies which were primarily conducted in order to explore the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behavioural intentions for political opinion-based groups rather than differences in the mean levels of responses. The objective was to further explore the dynamics involved in predicting different forms of political involvement using this particular type of group which was expected to be highly relevant for political action.

Measuring Self-definition as an Opinion-based Group Member. Summary of Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6

Given existing concerns with establishing the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political involvement a key point was to find the best way to measure self-definition as an opinion-based group member. Two candidate measures were employed, an identification measure based on standard identification items and a salience measure based on items which reflected the certainty of self-definition. These two measures were used to address the two more refined questions of the thesis:

1. Which of the measures (identification or salience) is a better predictor of political behavioural intentions? and,
2. What is the effect of independent variables (i.e., intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviour) on the relationship between self-definition as an opinion group member and political behavioural intentions?

In order to be able to answer these questions, one empirical challenge was to find the most valid way of capturing the theoretical constructs involved. The relatively stable nature of identification should make it less difficult to capture empirically.

Indeed, in the social psychological literature it is relatively easy to find a number of different social identification scales (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & van Ouwerkerk, 1999; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Karasawa, 1991; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; see Haslam, 2001, for a summary), but perhaps because of its elusive nature it is harder to find well-established measures of salience. However, as it was argued in Chapter 5, measuring certainty of self-definition seems to be a plausible way of capturing the salience of group membership in opinion-based groups. It was argued that certainty of self-definition in terms of holding a particular opinion should be the closest indicator of salience but this was true exclusively for opinion-based groups (in the case of social categories or other types of groups certainty does not need to be related to salience in any way).

A number of hypotheses were formulated which built on the self-categorization theory argument that the most proximal predictor of group behaviour is not identification but salience of self-categorization, through the process of depersonalization which is “ (...) the basic process underlying group phenomena” (Turner et al, 1987, p.50). Salience of self-categorization was captured by a series of certainty items. Secondly, intergroup conflict and group normativeness as contextual enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour were also considered. The hypotheses were:

1. Certainty should predict political behavioural intentions over and above identification because certainty measures are more closely related to (if not direct indicators of) salience.
2. If this is true, the salience measure should also be a better predictor of perceived group depersonalization.

3. The relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural intention should be strongest for the clearly group normative behaviours.
4. Finally, intergroup conflict should make the relationship between self-definition as an opinion group member and political behavioural intentions stronger.

These hypotheses were tested across four studies (two experimental studies and two surveys) involving different types of opinion-based groups. All of the studies involved different types of political opinion-based groups which were formed around various issues.

The hypothesis that the salience measure predicted political behavioural intentions over and above identification was consistently supported across the studies (see Table 11.1).

Table 11.1. Hierarchical regression for Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the identification and salience measures as predictors of political behavioural intentions.

Study	Criterion	Predictor	β	Change in R^2	p
Study 3	Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.595	.354	.000
		Identification Salience	.224 .628	.256	.000
Study 4	Political behavioural intentions	Identification	.676	.457	.000
		Identification Salience	.232 .584	.144	.000
Study 5	Political behavioural intentions (weak conflict)	Identification	.395	.156	.000
		Identification	.296		

	Saliency	.197	.029	.078
Political behavioural intentions (strong conflict)	Identification	.278	.077	.008
	Identification	.097		
	Saliency	.356	.094	.002
Political behavioural intentions (hostility)	Identification	.442	.195	.000
	Identification	.300		
	Saliency	.245	.040	.045
Study 6 Highly normative political behavioural intentions/ control condition	Identification	.606	.367	.000
	Identification	.637		
	Saliency	-.058	.002	.675
Less normative political behavioural intentions/control condition	Identification	.548	.301	.000
	Identification	.540		
	Saliency	.014	.000	.926
Highly normative political behavioural intentions/experimental condition	Identification	.245	.060	.100
	Identification	.127		
	Saliency	.442	.181	.003
Less normative political behavioural intentions/experimental condition	Identification	.203	.041	.170
	Identification	.159		
	Saliency	.167	.026	.275

Results from the whole set of studies indicated that the salience measure generally predicted political behavioural intention better than the identification measure (larger β s) and in most cases added to prediction over and above the identification measure. This suggests that standard identification measures are good predictors of political behavioural intentions for opinion-based groups as also showed by research on political participation (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995, Simon et al., 1998, 2000; Stürmer et al., 2003), but that the accuracy of prediction can be improved by including the salience measure.

The most interesting point is that, in Study 6, the salience measure only added to prediction for highly normative and validated items (in the experimental condition). Thus, the hypothesis that the relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural intentions should be the strongest for the clearly group normative behaviours was supported by the results of Study 6. That is, the salience measure was a particularly good predictor of political behavioural intentions for highly normative behaviours that were also normatively validated by the ingroup. This represents strong support for self-categorization theory argument that when a social identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in behaviour which is highly normative. As Turner (1991) noted:

It is assumed that depersonalization, the creation of mutually perceived similarity between group members, (...) leads to more consensual behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group (...). (p.16)

Thus, salience through the process of depersonalization, should directly predict behaviour which is highly consistent with the norms of the respective group. This was exactly what Study 6 results revealed in line with other research reviewed in Chapter

4 on the influence of norms for the relationship between group self-definition and relevant behaviours

Across the set of studies the situation where the salience and identification measures provided the weakest prediction of political behavioural intentions was in the experimental condition of Study 6 for the less normative items. This is an interesting finding in itself, indicating that even though salience did not vary across the conditions, that its predictive power was affected by the normativeness manipulation. In particular, it seems that the salience measure almost completely lost its predictive power in relation to behaviours that came to be perceived as less normative for members in a given context. Importantly, the experimental manipulation shows that the absence of a relationship was not due to the behaviours per se but to the explicit invalidation of these possible actions.

In addition, the hypothesis that the salience measure should be a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization was consistently supported in that the salience measure was indeed a better predictor of perceived group depersonalization than the identification measure in most of the conditions across studies (see Table 11.2).

Table 11.2. Hierarchical regression for Studies 4, 5 and 6 with the identification and salience measures as predictors of perceived group depersonalization.

Study	Criterion	Predictor	β	Change in R^2	p
Study 4	Perceived ingroup depersonalization	Identification	.504	.254	.000
		Identification Salience	.259 .322	.044	.016
Study 5	Perceived ingroup depersonalization (weak conflict)	Identification	.370	.137	.000
		Identification Salience	.129 .471	.164	.000

Perceived ingroup depersonalization (strong conflict)	Identification	.274	.075	.006
	Identification	.059		
Perceived ingroup depersonalization (hostility)	Saliency	.400	.114	.000
	Identification	.340	.115	.001
	Identification	.217		
	Saliency	.217	.032	.074
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Study 6 Perceived ingroup depersonalization (control condition)	Identification	.686	.471	.000
	Identification	.562		
Perceived ingroup depersonalization (experimental condition)	Saliency	.239	.042	.056
	Identification	.500	.250	.000
	Identification	.364		
	Saliency	.508	.240	.000
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Although the perceived group depersonalization measure was not designed to actually capture the process of depersonalization itself (which would necessitate a much complex set of measures which would constitute a interesting and difficult pursuit in itself but was not within the scope of this thesis), it was used to establish the validity of the saliency measure. The reasoning was that when a group membership was salient perceivers would be more likely to attribute depersonalization to their group. That is, they would be more likely to perceive their own group members as sharing goals, ideals and values and they would also be more likely to explain identical behaviours in terms of common group membership (Turner et al., 1987). The fact that the saliency measure was more closely related to perceived group depersonalization than the identification measure, represents another indication to

support the argument that the certainty items were indeed closer to salience than any other related construct.

On the other hand, the hypothesis investigating the effects of intergroup conflict on the relationship between self-definition as a group member and political behavioural intentions was not supported by the results of Study 5. More specifically, explicit conflict or hostility did not serve to strengthen the overall relationship between group self-definition and political behavioural intentions. As discussed at the end of Chapter 9, this finding suggests that intergroup conflict might not be as relevant for the relationship between self-definition as a group member and political behavioural intentions as the review suggested.

As results of Study 6 suggest, the extent to which relevant group behaviours are perceived as highly normative by members in a given social context seems to play a much more important role (see also, Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; Wellen, Hogg, & Terry, 1998; Terry & Hogg, 1996; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). This is a crucial finding for this thesis, but its power strongly relies on the validity of the salience measure employed.

Although a reasonable confidence can be expressed regarding the validity of the salience measure used in the six studies, there might still be some concerns related to the fact that the certainty measures used are really the closest to salience and they do not better reflect some other related constructs. It will be argued next that the measure of salience used is best at capturing the theoretical construct of salience rather than other related constructs.


Further Considerations Regarding the Salience Measure

According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), a category is *salient* when it is cognitively prepotent or switched on at some moment in

time in a given context. From this, it can be implied that in order to be salient the perception of the category has to be strong and powerful. Arguably, the clearest definition of a strong perception is one that the perceiver is certain about. The fact that in opinion-based groups, group formation is actually based on a set of beliefs or shared ideas, suggests that certainty in relation to that particular opinion should be the most direct way to capture salience. The certainty about correctness of this opinions as well as certainty of self-definition seem to be the best candidates for capturing important aspects of salience. It is important to note, though that such measures can probably only be applied to opinion-based groups, as certainty is probably not at all that informative in relation to social categories or even other types of groups. As discussed in Chapter 5, these arguments would not hold in other sorts of groups or social categories (e.g., people's certainty about their gender is not going to reflect the salience of their gender identity).

Theoretically, according to self-categorization theory, the constructs which are most directly involved in predicting collective behaviour are group identification, salience of self-categorization, perceiver readiness and fit. These include proximal predictors of salience such as perceiver readiness and fit, and more distal ones such as long-term identification. To the extent to which the most proximal predictors are measured, they are going to be better measures of salience (see Figure 11.3).

Self-categorization constructs predicting group behaviour



Measures of these self-categorization constructs used in this thesis




Figure 11.3. Self-categorization constructs involved in predicting group behaviour and the measures employed in Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6

As previously discussed (see the end of Chapter 9), from a theoretical point of view all of these constructs are highly related. For example, as McGarty (1999a) explains perceiver readiness (together with fit) is a pre-determinant of salience, which through depersonalization impacts upon long-term identification. At the same time, long-term identification “the degree of internalization of or identification with an ingroup-outgroup membership, the centrality and evaluative importance of a group membership in self-definition” Turner, 1987, p. 55) is considered to be one of the determinants of perceiver readiness. Matters are further complicated because:

Group formation proceeds on the basis of the interaction of perceiver readiness and fit but once groups are formed the strength of identification and the degree of internalization of that group become determinants of future readiness to perceive oneself in terms of that categorization. (McGarty, 1999a, p.191)

This example illustrates the great complexity of the dynamics in which these constructs are involved and their interrelated nature. More specifically, there is a complex causal chain in which long-term identification is both a consequence and an antecedent of salience (see Figure 9.1, McGarty, 1999a, p.191). At the empirical level of measuring these constructs, we would also expect a high overlap between the items design to capture them (see Chapter 9). It is plausible then, that the certainty measures captured not only salience but also aspects of these related constructs. However, it is argued here that although it is possible that the certainty measures reflect, to some degree other related constructs (the best candidates are identification and perceiver readiness), they mostly capture salience for the particular case of opinion-based groups.

Given the pattern of the results, there are only really three logical possibilities:

1. The certainty measures might reflect another construct drawn from self-categorization theory (e.g., better measures of identification, or perceiver readiness);
2. They might reflect another construct which does not have anything to do with self-categorization theory (e.g., certainty as an individual characteristic related to self-advocacy, self-awareness, etc.);
3. They might really reflect salience.

Considering the first of these, there is the possibility that the certainty measures might reflect one of the other main self-categorization theory constructs, and the likely candidates are identification or perceiver readiness. Given the original definition of identification as internalisation of individuals' group membership as an aspect of their self-concept, that is individuals should be subjectively identified with the relevant ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), certainty about the group position does not seem immediately related to identification.

However, if we consider identification as "the extent to which individuals identify and commit themselves to a social category as a whole" (Spears et al., 1997a, p.541), the possible connection between certainty and identification becomes more evident. In particular, commitment to an opinion-based group might be related, to some extent, to certainty about group position and self-definition as a group member, but clearly, the concept of commitment has a much broader scope. Given the three-dimensional model of social identity (Ellemers, et al., 1999), which distinguishes between self-categorization (cognitive component), commitment to the group (affective component) and group self-esteem (evaluative component), the certainty items might also reflect cognitive aspects of commitment (i.e., self-definition in terms of holding one position). However, it is more difficult to argue for any relation with the other two components of this construct (the affective and evaluative), which are probably much more accurately captured by standard identification scales. In short, it is surely possible that the certainty items capture to some degree aspects of identification.

Secondly, as advanced in Chapters 8 and 9 it is plausible that the certainty items do capture some more enduring aspects of salience which are mostly related to the perceiver readiness construct. Perceiver readiness is considered to help to

improve the veridicality of perception and its basic effects are summarized by Oakes et al. (1994) as follows:

1. Through the influence of perceiver readiness stimuli are *elaborated* in terms of categories provided by one's own past experience and the body of ideas, theories, and knowledge acquired from one's culture (a perceiver not primed in this way is one who has literally learnt nothing and categorized in ignorance).
2. Perceiver readiness lends to the *selective* categorization of the world in a way that is *meaningful, relevant, and useful* in terms of the needs, goals, and purposes of the perceiver.
3. It ensures that the categories used by the perceiver *evaluate* reality from the perspective of his or her own standards, norms and values.
4. It represents and judges reality *from the vantage point of one's own place in it*, from the perspective provided by one's own particular position. (p.201)

Given the importance of perceiver readiness for how people come to perceive the social world and how they consequently organize their behaviours in relation to this, it is essential to find possible ways of capturing it. Aspects of perceiver readiness as "the tendency for certain ways of categorizing to be more accessible as a function of the perceiver's expectations, motives, values and goals" (Oakes et al., 1994) might be well captured by the certainty items used. For example, it is likely that certainty about self-definition as holding some opinion to be a result of perceiver's past experience, beliefs, values and expectancies. In this case, the certainty items may have been successful in capturing those aspects of perceiver readiness given by perceiver's past experience, beliefs, values and expectancies. That is, certainty items reflect

saliency to the extent to which they capture some of the more enduring aspects of the perceiver readiness construct. Perceiver readiness is one of the most important determinants of saliency, so items capturing this construct should also be accurate indicators of saliency.

To draw an analogy which illustrates a similar dynamic, we can consider working conditions as a predictor of job satisfaction which is itself a direct predictor of desire to stay in a job. If we have a measure of working conditions then we can predict desire to stay in a job but we will have an even better predictor of desire to stay in a job if we instead measure job satisfaction in some valid and reliable way.

Of course, in measuring working conditions, job satisfaction, and desire to stay in the job, we might find that there was overlap between the constructs. Perhaps people who were dissatisfied come to see their conditions less favourably. Those who decide to leave may then become dissatisfied.

Similar possibilities may apply here. The current saliency measure might pick up perceiver readiness and identification, and the current identification measure might pick up perceiver readiness and saliency. It is nevertheless easy to see, on the basis of these results, that the saliency measure is closer to the saliency, rather than the identification, end of the causal chain. This is because the saliency measure is a better predictor of behavioural intentions (especially in Study 6 group-normative and validated behavioural intentions), and it is a better predictor of perceived group depersonalization – a variable that should be more closely related to saliency than identification.

If we accept these arguments it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that the saliency measure is more closely related to saliency than identification measures are, at least for opinion-based groups. In practice, it might not matter much

whether the actual construct measured is more closely aligned to perceiver readiness or salience, as the measures seem to be such good predictors at this level of generality.

That being the case, it is still certainly possible in principle that the salience measure used here instead captures some other construct that has not been anticipated in self-categorization theory. Given the focus of this thesis on clarifying the social identity approach to political activism I will not address this idea in detail. Suffice it to say that it appears that any theory that attempted to reconcile the three constructs that have been measured here would probably need to share quite a few details with self-categorization theory.

To sum up, it is very likely that the certainty measures do reflect salience. Probably, the most plausible interpretation is that the salience measure is a good indicator of salience for opinion-based groups because certainty of self-definition captures the construct of perceiver readiness which is considered by self-categorization theorists to be a direct determinant of salience.

Implications and Future Directions of Research

Before considering possible directions of research opened by the present work, I will summarise the most important findings here and their implications. Firstly, it was found that commitment to opinion-based groups is an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions. When measured by certainty of self-definition items, it seems to be a better predictor of such intentions than previous research indicated (see the literature review in Chapter 2). This is especially true for Studies 3 and 4, where the effect sizes were very large ($R^2 = .61$, and $R^2 = .60$). In addition, the salience measure tends to be a much better predictor than the identification measure. Secondly, the relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural intentions holds especially well for normatively validated items, but there is no

evidence that conflict per se increases the strength of the relationship (which is not to say that there are not other circumstances where it might).

The main implications of these findings are firstly that opinion-based groups are certainly worth studying in relation especially with political participation (see also, Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998; 2000, Stürmer et al., 2003). Secondly, certainty of self-definition measures are much closer to the self-categorization theory construct of salience than standard identification items. Using such measures might improve the prediction accuracy of group behaviours in general. Finally, given the excellent prediction of behavioural intentions, it would be worth looking at actual behaviours in relation to commitment to opinion-based groups. It is also crucial to explore commitment to activism and the way in which politicized collective identities are related to political participation (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Despite an impressive body of research consistent with the social identity approach, the field has struggled to demonstrate the relevance of identity-based concepts for predicting collective action (Turner & Reynolds, 2000). The current body of research suggests a series of promising directions for future enquires.

Firstly, a further exploration of the salience measure seems like the most logical direction to be pursued next. Although this measure was repeatedly used in four studies in the context of this thesis, it is important to find new ways of examining the more dynamic aspects of salience. For example, a longitudinal design could provide useful insights and a strong additional test of this salience measure. Specifically, in order to more clearly differentiate the salience and identification constructs, it would be particularly informative to measure more collective self-definition constructs (i.e., identification and salience) at multiple points in time, and then to assess the more

dynamic aspects of these constructs again in the moment when decisions about action are made, together with the intentions to take action or even the actual action.

Given the weak effect of the intergroup conflict manipulation from Study 5, an additional challenge would also be to find particular contexts where conflict, and perhaps even hostility, are perceived as more normative. One possibility would be to investigate these processes in opinion-based groups actually formed around a highly conflictual issue and using group members who are more likely to accept conflict as normative (e.g., activist members rather than mere opinion-based group members).

More work need to be done in order to be able to further develop and test the opinion-based account which only started to take shape in this thesis. It would be useful broaden the area of investigation, by considering different types of groups or social categories. A comparative investigation at this point including opinion-based groups, other types of groups and social categories might be especially informative in terms of strengthen or moderating the claims in relation to this account. Further explorations of the relation between opinion-based groups and relevant activist groups might help us to better understand and predict political involvement. In particular, studying how the opinion-based group idea relates to the Simon and Klandermans' model of politicized collective identity might prove especially useful for the understanding of mechanisms involved in real political struggles, in situations in which there not only two oppositionally defined groups but also third parties (e.g., government or other authorities) becomes involved in the struggle (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

In none of the studies here were people recruited on the bases of activism or other features that would indicate the existence of a politicized collective identity for any significant sub-sample. Nevertheless, we found strong relationships between self-

definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions for these non-activist groups. This implies that, if we choose the right type of group membership and measure self-definition in the right way, we can obtain strong relationships suggesting the potential emergence of politicized collective identity without explicitly consider some of the preconditions specified by Simon and Klandermans such as engagement in the power struggle or involvement of a third more powerful parties.

Of course, we do not know whether the participants in the present set of studies (even the highly committed ones) actually followed up their behavioural intentions with the genuine forms of activism that Simon and Klandermans are interested in. So, perhaps a better way to interpret the current results is that they show the ways in which ordinary non-active subjectively committed supporters of a cause come to develop intentions to take action which might transform into real activism at some later stage. The results therefore suggest some implications for broadening the base for activist movements.

Finally, assessing the actual behaviours rather than behavioural intentions in relation to different opinion-based groups should also prove to be a fruitful direction of research considering the present broad political context. Although there is a large body of research showing that behavioural intentions are good predictors of a variety of behaviours (e.g., Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990; Bassili, 1995; Calantone, & Joyce, 1986; Conner & Sparks, 1996; Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998; Norman et al., 1999; Norman & Smith, 1995; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000; Warshaw & Davies, 1984), it is still important to explore how commitment to opinion-based groups would predict actual behaviours.

Conclusion

To return to the example of the collapse of the communist regime in Romania from the beginning of Chapter 1, it can be concluded that the identification-saliency-political involvement account of opinion-based groups seems to make a great deal of sense. This observation is fully consistent with recent analyses of cases of actual emergent action (e. g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury, 1998). Large social movements take place when people come to perceive themselves as sharing a collective social identity and to consequently act in terms of this common social identity. In addition, the range of behaviours adopted by participants in such movements highly depends on the content and meaning of the relevant social category in a given intergroup context. That is the content of crowd behaviour will be limited by the nature of the relevant social category (Reicher, 1987, 1984). In addition, the treatment received from the opposed group can be perceived as unfair and illegitimate by the members of the group involved in collective action and in this case the conflict suddenly increases. The opposed group action is then “a necessary component of processes of escalation (...)” (Stott & Reicher, 1998, p.359). As in the case of the downfall of Ceausescu regime in Romania, people involved in the violent action preceding its collapse perceived themselves as holding a shared opinion (i.e., that the Ceausescu regime must go) and a collective social identity but it was not until the police and army forces brutally stopped a relatively small anti-Ceausescu rally that the ‘Romanian revolution’ began. The violent and illegitimate action of authorities was responsible for the strong and widespread collective action that followed and culminated in the collapse of the regime.

As McGuire (1997) notes, social psychological research often confronts the frustrating truth that it can be very difficult to find more than weak evidence for ideas

that seem obviously true. The measurement technique that was used here, along with the theoretical refinement offered by the idea of opinion-based groups, may offer intergroup social psychology the sort of strong empirical platform for the systematic research that it needs to answer many questions of interest in the field.

This systematic research is necessary in part because we live in an age of opinion-based groups. In the days following September 11, 2001 leaders of the USA and other nations exclusively defined every person on the planet as a supporter of the War against Terror or as a supporter of terrorism, explicitly ruling out the prospect of distinguishing between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who support them. The war against terror, we are told, is not a war between countries or religions. If this is true it is hard to see what it could be other than a war between opinion-based groups.

Finally, the research conducted here confirms the fact that group action will be taken not simply by committed group members but by people who currently see themselves as members of normatively relevant groups defined by shared opinions, and where that action is normatively endorsed as relevant and appropriate by the group they belong to, that is, it is consistent with the social meaning of the group. It is crucial though when researching different forms of involvement in political action to consider the roles of opinion-based group, not least because it is clear that we have a productive way of measuring commitment to and self-definition in terms of these groups.

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APPENDIX I QUESTIONNAIRES

Study 1 Questionnaire (translated from Romanian)

Attitude Statement Classification Task

Questionnaire on attitudes toward other ethnic groups in Romania

Please read carefully all the statements below and then sort them into two classes labelled A and B. You will need to choose one or the other of the following classification schemes:

Classification 1: The statement is about Hungarians (A) or not about Hungarians (B)

or

Classification 2: The statement is favourable towards minorities (A) or unfavourable towards minorities (B).

First indicate which of the classifications you prefer by circling one of them.

Classification 1

Classification 2

Now please label each statement A or B according to your classification.

Ethnic minorities are very important for the cultural diversity of our country.

Answer....

2. Hungarians from Transylvania could never be loyal to Romanian state.

Answer....

3. Ethnic minorities have to have more rights than the majority in order to help them to preserve their own cultural heritage.

Answer....

4. Hungarians are more chauvinist than Romanians.

Answer....

5. Members of minority groups are far more likely to break the law of our country.

Answer....

6. Hungarians from Transylvania should have an educational system in their own language.

Answer....

7. Ethnic minorities cause a lot of harm to political stability of our country.

Answer....

8. It is a good thing that Hungarian minority is well represented in the Romanian Parliament.

Answer....

Pre-test questionnaire

1. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the classification you have chosen.

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor

Answer....

2. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the alternative classification.

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor

Answer....

3. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your feeling about how certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization

1 _____ 100
 not at all extremely
 certain certain

Answer....

3. How well do you think your group performed the classification task?

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best

poor

Answer....

4. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling of belongingness to this group.

1 _____ 100
 not at all very much

Answer....

5. I identify with other members of this group.

1 _____ 100
 not at all very much

Answer....

6. Being a member of a group is an important part of how I see myself at this moment.

1 _____ 100
 not at all very much

Answer....

7. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about yourself as a member of this group.

1 _____ 100
 not at all very much

Answer....

8. My membership in this group is important to me.

1 _____ 100
not at all very much

Answer....

9. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your perception of how similar you are to other members of your group.

1 _____ 100
not at all very much

Answer....

3. Feedback stage sheets for each condition.

1. Condition 1: clear conflict (strong ingroup position validation / strong outgroup position validation)

Your own rating of your own group was....

Your own rating of the other group was....

The average rating of your own group classification by your group was 85 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by the other group was 83 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 53 points.

2. Condition 2: vague conflict (weak ingroup position validation /weak outgroup position validation)

Your own rating of your own group was....

Your own rating of the other group was....

The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 52 points.

The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 50 points.

3. Condition 3: outgroup superiority claim (weak ingroup validation/ strong outgroup validation)

Your own rating of your own group was....

Your own rating of the other group was....

The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.

The average rating of the other group classification was 83 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 54 points.

4. Condition 4: ingroup superiority claim (strong ingroup position validation/ weak outgroup position validation).

Your own rating of your own group was....

Your own rating of the other group was....

The average rating of your own group classification was 85 points.

The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points.

The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points.

The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 51 points.

3. *Post-test questionnaire*

5. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your perception of how similar you are to other members of your group.

1 _____ 100
not at all very much

Answer....

6. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the classification you have chosen:

1 _____ 100
extremely the best

poor

Answer....

7. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the alternative classification.

1 _____ 100
extremely the best

poor

Answer....

9. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your feeling about how certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization

1 _____ 100
not at all extremely
certain certain

Answer....

10. How well do you think your group performed the classification task?

Study 2 Questionnaires (translated from Romanian)

1. Attitude Statement Classification Task

Questionnaire on attitudes toward other ethnic groups in Romania

Please read carefully all the statements below and then sort them into two classes labelled A and B. You will need to choose one or the other of the following classification schemes:

Classification 1: The statement is about Hungarians (A) or not about Hungarians (B)
or

Classification 2: The statement is favourable towards minorities (A) or unfavourable towards minorities (B).

First indicate which of the classifications you prefer by circling one of them.

Classification 1

Classification 2

Now please label each statement A or B according to your classification.

1. Ethnic minorities are very important for the cultural diversity of our country.

Answer....

2. Hungarians from Transylvania could never be loyal to Romanian state.

Answer....

3. Ethnic minorities have to have more rights than the majority in order to help them to preserve their own cultural heritage.

Answer....

4. Hungarians are more chauvinist than Romanians.

Answer....

5. Members of minority groups are far more likely to break the law of our country.

Answer....

6. Hungarians from Transylvania should have an educational system in their own language.

Answer....

7. Ethnic minorities cause a lot of harm to political stability of our country.

Answer....

8. It is a good thing that Hungarian minority is well represented in the Romanian Parliament.

Answer....

2. Pre-test questionnaire

8. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of classifications:

a) Statements about Hungarians

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor

Answer....

b) Statements about minorities in general

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor

Answer....

9. How sure are you that your classification is the best?

1 _____ 100
 not sure very sure

Answer....

10. How accurate do you think your option/answer is?

1 _____ 100
 not accurate extremely accurate

Answer....

11. How well have you understood the instructions?

1 _____ 100
not at all very well

Answer....

12. How difficult do you consider the task?

1 _____ 100
very easy very difficult

Answer....

3. *Feedback stage sheets*

Condition 1: clear conflict (strong ingroup position validation / strong outgroup position validation)

Your group considered its own classification to be 32 points better than the other group's.

The other group considered its own classification to be 27 points better than your group's.

Condition 2: vague conflict (weak ingroup position validation / weak outgroup position validation)

Your group considered its own classification to be 2 points better than the other group's.

The other group considered its own classification 5 points better than your group's.

Condition 3: outgroup supremacy claim (weak ingroup validation/ strong outgroup validation)

Your group considered its own classification to be 2 points better than the other group's.

The other group considered its own classification to be 27 points better than your group's.

Condition 4: ingroup supremacy claim (strong ingroup position validation/ weak outgroup position validation).

Your group considered its own classification to be 32 points better than the other group's.

The other group considered its own classification 5 points better than your group's.

3. Post-test questionnaire

We would now like to consider the two groups. The group which made the same response as you and the group which made the opposite response.

1. Please indicate which group you see yourself as most similar to:

1 _____ 100

Extremely similar
to other group

Extremely similar
to own group

Answer....

2. Which group do you most identify with?

1 _____ 100

Strongly identify with
other group

Strongly identify
with own group

Answer....

3. Which group do you feel that you belong to more strongly?

1 _____ 100

strongly belong to
other group

strongly belong to
own group

Answer....

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

13. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of classifications:

c) Statements about Hungarians

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor
 Answer....

d) Statements about minorities in general

1 _____ 100
 extremely the best
 poor
 Answer....

14. How sure are you that your classification is the best?

1 _____ 100
 not sure very sure
 Answer....

15. How accurate do you think your option/answer is?

1 _____ 100
 not accurate extremely accurate
 Answer....

16. How well have you understood the instructions?

1 _____ 100
 not at all very well
 Answer....

17. How difficult do you consider the task?

1 _____ 100
very easy very difficult

Answer....

Please finally indicate:

Your gender: Male Female

The age category you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6)

65-

Study 3 Questionnaire (translated from Romanian)

Opinions about Romanian political parties

This research is being conducted as part of a doctoral program at the Australian National University. This research is only for academic purposes and it is not associated with any political party. It involves answering questions about your opinions of Romanian Political groups. The questionnaire will take about five minutes to complete.

In November 2000 there will be a general election. At this election will you be a supporter of the Government in power or will you be a supporter of one of the Opposition parties? Please tick one of the choices below (if you are undecided please tick the political group you favour most):

I am a supporter of the Government.

I am a supporter of one of the Opposition parties.

If you are a supporter of the government please complete the items in Column A. If you are supporter of an opposition party, please complete the items in Column B. For each item circle the response that best reflects your view.

A

B

<p>It is important to me to be a supporter of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>It is important to me to be a supporter of the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>Supporting the government is the best political option.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Supporting the opposition parties is the best political option.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I define myself as a supporter of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I define myself as a supporter of the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>It is likely that I will become a member of one of the parties from the government.</p>	<p>It is likely that I will become a member of one of the opposition parties.</p>

<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>I am similar to other people who are supporters of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I identify with other people who are supporters of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I feel good about being a supporter of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I have little respect for other people who are supporters of the government.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I think that people who are supporters of the government have little to be proud of.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p> <p>I am similar to other people who are supporters of the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I identify with other people who are supporters of the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I feel good about being a supporter of the opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I have little respect for other people who are supporters of opposition parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I think that people who are supporters of the opposition parties have little to be proud of.</p>
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<p>I would rather not tell others that I am a supporter of the government.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I would rather not tell others that I am a supporter of the opposition parties.</p>
<p>Being a supporter of the government really reflects who I am.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Being a supporter of the opposition parties really reflects who I am.</p>
<p>I will continue to support the government in future elections (after 2000).</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I will continue to support the opposition parties in future elections (after 2000).</p>
<p>I am confident that I really am a supporter of the government.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that I really am a supporter of the opposition parties.</p>
<p>I am confident that it is important to be a supporter of the government.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that it is important to be a supporter of the opposition parties.</p>
<p>I am confident that being a supporter of the government really reflects who I am.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that being a supporter of the opposition parties really reflects who I am.</p>
<p>I am confident that supporting the government really reflects my political opinions.</p>	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that supporting the opposition parties really reflects my political opinions.</p>
	<p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>

Finally we would like to ask you a few demographic questions. Please circle the appropriate response in each case.

What is your sex? Male Female

Which age category do you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

Study 4 Questionnaire

Opinions about Australian political parties

We would like you to think about the current Federal Parliament. Currently the Government is made up of a Coalition of the Liberal Party and the National Party.

In 2001 there will be a Federal election. At this election will you be a **supporter of the Coalition** or will you be a **supporter of one of the non-government parties** (such as the Labor Party and the Australian Democrats)? Please tick one of the choices below (if you are undecided please tick the political group you favour most):

I am a supporter of the Coalition.

I am a supporter of one of the non-government parties.

If you are a supporter of the Coalition please complete the items in Column A. If you are supporter of a non-government party, please complete the items in Column B. For each item circle the response which best reflects your view.

A

B

<p>It is important to me to be a supporter of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>It is important to me to be a supporter of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>Supporting the Coalition is the best political option.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Supporting the non-government parties is the best political option.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I define myself as a supporter of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I define myself as a supporter of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>It is likely that I will become a member of one of the parties from the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p>	<p>It is likely that I will become a member of one of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely likely</p>

It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

I am similar to other people who are supporters of the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I identify with other people who are supporters of the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I feel good about being a supporter of the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I have little respect for other people who are supporters of the Coalition.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think that people who are supporters of the Coalition have little to be proud of.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

I am similar to other people who are supporters of the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I identify with other people who are supporters of the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I feel good about being a supporter of the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I have little respect for other people who are supporters of the non-government parties.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think that people who are supporters of the non-government parties have little to be proud of.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

<p>I would rather not tell others that I am a supporter of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I would rather not tell others that I am a supporter of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>Being a supporter of the Coalition really reflects who I am.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Being a supporter of the non-government parties really reflects who I am.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I will continue to support the Coalition in future elections (after 2001).</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I will continue to support the non-government parties in future elections (after 2001).</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that I really am a supporter of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that I really am a supporter of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that it is important to be a supporter of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that it is important to be a supporter of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that being a supporter of the Coalition really reflects who I am.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that being a supporter of the non-government parties really reflects who I am.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that supporting the Coalition really reflects my political opinions.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that supporting the non-government parties really reflects my political opinions.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I expect to agree with other Coalition supporters on political issues.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I expect to agree with other non-government party supporters on political</p>

<p>I expect to agree with Coalition supporters on non-political issues. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>On political issues I expect to be able to convince Coalition supporters that my views are correct. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>On political I expect to be able to convince non-government party supporters that my views are correct. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Coalition supporters share a sense of identity. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Coalition supporters share common ideals or values. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Coalition supporters share common goals. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared identity. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>issues. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>I expect to agree with non-government party supporters on non-political issues. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>On political issues I expect to be able to convince non-government party supporters that my views are correct. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>On political issues I expect to be able to convince Coalition party supporters that my views are correct. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Non-government party supporters share a sense of identity. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Non-government party supporters share common ideals or values. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Non-government party supporters share common goals. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p> <p>Where non-government party supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared identity. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
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<p>Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared ideals or values.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Where non-government party supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared ideals or values.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their common goals.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Where non-government party supporters behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their common goals.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>Coalition supporters share a sense of pride in the achievements of the Coalition.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>Non-government party supporters share a sense of pride in the achievements of the non-government parties.</p> <p>not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>

Finally we would like to ask you a few demographic questions. Please circle the appropriate response in each case.

What is your sex? Male Female

Which age category do you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

Study 5 Questionnaires

(the final version of this questionnaire was translated in Dutch)

Pre-manipulation questionnaire

Questionnaire about attitudes on financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch
government to the descendents of slaves

In 1635 the Dutch began to participate in the African slave trade. Dutch slave ships sailed to the coast of West-Africa, where they bought the slaves from traders who had bought or robbed these slaves in the interior of Africa. After this the ships sailed to Brazil or the Caribbean, where the slaves were sold to plantation-owners. By 1800, the Dutch had traded around 300.000 African slaves in this way. As a consequence of the UN conference against racism in South Africa, there are some discussions now in Netherlands about the possibility of paying some financial reparation to descendants of the slaves by the Dutch government. This reparation would involve money to be paid to the Surinamese government in order to improve the general welfare system.

Which of the following best describes you? Please tick one.

I am a in favour of financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government.

I am against financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government.

(If you are not clearly either tick the one towards which you lean.)

Where would you place your views on a scale from extremely against reparation to
extremely in favour of financial reparation?

extremely against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely in favour

Feedback manipulation sheets for each condition.

1. Weak conflict: weak ingroup validation x weak outgroup validation (decrease of conflict)

In a previous research investigating perceptions of people who are in favour of financial reparation from the Dutch government about themselves and about the people who are not in favour of such reparation, and vice-versa (perception of people who are against financial reparation about themselves and about the people who are in favour), we found:

Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch government) were confident that their position was different but not better than that of the other group. They both appreciated the other group's views.

Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships between the groups):

"I don't agree with you but I still can see your point."

"I know that my views are correct but you can be also right if you see things from your perspective..."

2. High conflict: ingroup validation x outgroup validation (strong disagreement)

Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch government) were confident that their position was superior to that of the other group. They believed that their position was correct and that the other's group position was incorrect.

Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships between the groups):

e.g. "I don't believe you can possibly be right!"

"I strongly believe that our position is the one that any reasonably people should have"...

3. Hostility: strong ingroup validation x strong outgroup validation (increase of conflict/active opposition + derogation)

Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch government) were very confident that their position was superior to that of the other group. They strongly believed that their position was correct and that the other's group position was incorrect.

Moreover each group thought that members of the other group misunderstood the issue, and did not know the fact on the matter.

Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships between the groups):

e.g. "I can't believe you can be so moronic to say this..."

"Your argument it's really an aberration, the most stupid thing I've ever heard... You should be crazy or very stupid to believe this..."

Post-manipulation questionnaire

How much conflict do you perceive in the relations between members of the two groups?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How much hostility do you perceive in the relations between members of the two groups?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How true are the following statements?

Reading about the other group position made me feel angry.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Reading about my group position made me feel proud.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

If you would participate in the group discussion described above you would feel:

a) pride

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

b) anger

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

c) fear

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

If you would participate in such group discussions how involved would you be?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How good is to be in favour of financial reparation?

extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

bad

good

How good is to be against financial reparation?

extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
bad good

How confident are you that your position is correct ?

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs.

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

I am confident that it is important to hold this position.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I am confident that holding this position group really reflects who I am.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I am confident that an organized group which share my views on the financial reparation issue would be the right place for me to express myself.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I am confident that my ideas regarding the financial reparation issue are the right ones.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I define myself as holding this position.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

People who are in favour of financial reparation are intelligent.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation are intelligent.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation are well informed.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation are well informed.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation are conscientious.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation are conscientious.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation are too emotional.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation are too emotional.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation are too rational.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation are too rational.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

On financial reparation-relevant issues I expect to be able to convince people who are AGAINST pro-reparation that my views are correct.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

On financial reparation-relevant issues I expect to be able to convince people who are IN FAVOR of reparation that my views are correct.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation share a sense of identity or solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation share a sense of identity or solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are in favour of financial reparation share common values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

People who are against financial reparation share common values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Where people who are in favour of financial reparation behave in the same way this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Where people who are against financial reparation behave in the same way this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Where people who are in favour of financial reparation behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Where people who are against financial reparation behave in the same way on relevant issues this is usually because of their shared values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think the Dutch people should feel guilty about the negative things they did to African slaves during the slave trade period.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think the Dutch people should feel regret for their group's harmful actions toward African slaves during the slave trade period.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think the Dutch people should feel regret about things their group did to the African slaves during the slave trade period.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I think the Dutch people should feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the African slaves which were brought about by Dutch during slave trade period.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How similar do you think members of your group are?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How similar do you think members of the other group are?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

To what extend do you think your group forms a cohesive solid block?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

To what extend do you think the other group forms a cohesive solid block?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I identify with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I am glad that I am belonging to the group of people who hold this position on financial reparation.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your views about the financial reparation issue?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

How likely is it that you will attend meetings of people who share your views about the financial reparation issue?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

How likely is it that you will express your views about the financial reparation issue in public?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

How likely it is that you will take part in actions to promote your views about the financial reparation issue?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

How likely it is that you will explain to your friends why you hold your views about the financial reparation?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

How likely is that you will sign a petition supporting your position on financial reparation?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

Which age category do you belong to: 1) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

What is your gender: Male Female

Study 6 Questionnaires (translated from Romanian)

*Pilot Study questionnaire*Attitudes toward modification of article 200 (concerning homosexual behaviour)
questionnaire

There is a law project in Romania aimed to abrogate Article 200 (concerning homosexual relations) and to modify other articles concerning “Sexual crimes”, in such a way that there will be only one law for homosexuals and heterosexuals. The main organizations supporting and opposing this law project are respectively ACCEPT and ASCOR. In general, supporters and opponents of this law project represent two distinct current of opinion on this matter. Supporters believe that Romanian society needs this law to be changed. Opponents disagree with this and believe the law should not be changed.

Please now take a moment to think about your position regarding this matter and then indicate your position by ticking one option

I am in favour of this law project

I am against this law project

1. Where would you place your views on a scale from extremely against this law project to extremely in favour of it?

extremely against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely in favour

2. How likely is that you will adopt the following behaviours to support your position regarding this matter?

- to join an organized group which reflects your view

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to participate in a rally organized by such organizations

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to express views in public

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to become actively involved in promoting the position you support

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to sign a petition to show support for your position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to write letters to newspapers in order to show support for your position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to actively participate in organizing a rally

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to participate in a counter-demonstration

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

- to try to stop the supporters of the other position to express their views

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

3. Please now indicate your position regarding the following statements. If you are a supporter of the law project please fill in column A, and if you are an opponent of the law project, in B.

A.

B.

<p>I define myself now as a supporter of this law project. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I define myself now as an opponent of this law project. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that I am a real supporter of this law project. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that I am a real opponent of this law project. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>
<p>I am confident that being a supporter of this law project really reflects ideas. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>	<p>I am confident that being an opponent of this law project really reflects ideas. not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much</p>

4. Finally, please indicate:

Which age category do you belong to: 1) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

What is your gender: Male Female

Version 1 of the questionnaire (control condition)

Questionnaire on attitudes about changing article 200 from Penal Code

There is a new law project in Romania which aims to abrogate article 200 (concerning homosexual relations) and to modify other articles concerning "Sexual crimes" in such a way that there is going to be only one law for both homosexuals and heterosexuals. The main organizations which support this new law is ACCEPT and the one that rejects this is ASCOR. Generally, supporters and opponents of this law project represent two different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters believe that the Romanian society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't agree and believe that the law should not be modified.

Please indicate your position regarding this issue.

I am in favour of this new law project

I am against this new law project.

Where would you place your views on this issue on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)?

total disagreement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total agreement

1. How appropriate do you consider the following behaviours are for the supporters or opponents?

- To join an organized groups which reflect their views

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To sign a petition to show support or opposition

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To try to persuade other people about their position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To participate in a counter-manifestation

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To actively participate in the organization of a rally

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To write letters for newspapers to show support for their position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

2. On the front page you indicated your position regarding the Law project (in favour or against). To what extent do you define yourself as holding this position at the moment.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

3. I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

4. I am confident that I am a real supporter/ opponent of this law project.

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

5. I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs at the moment.

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

6. People who have the same view as me on this law project share a sense of identity or solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

7. People who have the same view as me on this law project share common values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

8. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity.

Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree strongly

9. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way on relevant issues. This is usually because of their shared values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

10. I identify with other people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

11. I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

12. I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

14. I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

15. How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group that shares your views on this law project?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

16. How likely is it that you will become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

17. How likely is that you will sign a petition or something similar supporting your position on this law project?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

18. How likely is that you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

19. How likely is that you will try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

20. How likely is that you will actively participate in the organising of a rally?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

21. How likely is that you will write letters for newspapers to show support for your position?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

Finally please indicate:

The age category you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

Gender: F M

Version 2 of the questionnaire (experimental condition)

Questionnaire on attitudes about changing article 200 from Penal Code

There is a new law project in Romania which aims to abrogate article 200 (concerning homosexual relations) and to modify other articles concerning “Sexual crimes” in such a way that there is going to be only one law for both homosexuals and heterosexuals. The main organizations which support this new law is ACCEPT and the one that rejects this is ASCOR. Generally, supporters and opponents of this law project represent two different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters believe that the Romanian society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't agree and believe that the law should not be modified.

Please indicate your position regarding this issue.

I am in favour of this new law project

I am against this new law project.

Where would you place your views on this issue on a scale from 1(total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)?

total disagreement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total agreement

In a survey previously conducted using psychology students we found that even if supporters and opponents disagreed about their position they both strongly agreed that the most important actions to take to support their position were:

- To join an organized group which reflect their views
- To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they support
- To sign a petition to show support or opposition
- To try to persuade other people about their position

They agreed that the less important actions they could take to support their position were:

- To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing their views
- To participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates
- To actively participate in the organising of a rally
- To write letters to newspapers to show support for your position

Please now indicate your position by circling a number for the following questions and statements:

1. How appropriate do you consider the following behaviours are for the supporters or opponents?

- To join an organized groups which reflect their views
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
- To become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
- To sign a petition to show support or opposition

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To try to persuade other people about their position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To participate in a counter-manifestation

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To actively participate in the organization of a rally

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

- To write letters for newspapers to show support for their position

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

2. On the front page you indicated your position regarding the Law project (in favour or against). To what extent do you define yourself as holding this position at the moment.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

3. I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

4. I am confident that I am a real supporter/ opponent of this law project.

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

5. I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs at the moment.

not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident

6. People who have the same view as me on this law project share a sense of identity or solidarity.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

7. People who have the same view as me on this law project share common values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

8. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity.

Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree strongly

9. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way on relevant issues. This is usually because of their shared values and goals.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

10. I identify with other people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

11. I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

12. I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

14. I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me about this law project.

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

15. How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group that shares your views on this law project?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

16. How likely is it that you will become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

17. How likely is that you will sign a petition or something similar supporting your position on this law project?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

18. How likely is that you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

19. How likely is that you will try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

20. How likely is that you will actively participate in the organising of a rally?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

21. How likely is that you will write letters for newspapers to show support for your position?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely

Finally please indicate:

The age category you belong to: 1) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 65-

Gender: F M

STATISTICAL APPENDIX (II)

Study 1

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: IDENTIFICATION change score

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	643.326(a)	3	214.442	1.970	.126	.078
Intercept	347.818	1	347.818	3.195	.078	.044
IGPVAL	196.719	1	196.719	1.807	.183	.025
OGPVAL	.496	1	.496	.005	.946	.000
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	475.564	1	475.564	4.368	.040	.059
Error	7620.897	70	108.870			
Total	8643.361	74				
Corrected Total	8264.223	73				

a R Squared = .078 (Adjusted R Squared = .038)

Note: IGPVAL is ingroup position validation, OGPVAL is outgroup position validation.

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: CERTAINTY change score

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2368.013(a)	3	789.338	3.160	.030	.119
Intercept	130.999	1	130.999	.524	.471	.007
IGPVAL	1583.514	1	1583.514	6.339	.014	.083
OGPVAL	671.883	1	671.883	2.689	.106	.037
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	5.891	1	5.891	.024	.878	.000
Error	17487.622	70	249.823			
Total	20047.000	74				
Corrected Total	19855.635	73				

a R Squared = .119 (Adjusted R Squared = .082)

Note: IGPVAL is ingroup position validation, and OGPVAL is outgroup position validation.

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: POTTEST INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	2569.652(a)	3	856.551	1.583	.201
Intercept	40824.105	1	40824.105	75.464	.000
IGPVAL	779.109	1	779.109	1.440	.234
OGPVAL	44.851	1	44.851	.083	.774
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	1856.783	1	1856.783	3.432	.068
Error	37868.362	70	540.977		
Total	81023.000	74			
Corrected Total	40438.014	73			

a R Squared = .064 (Adjusted R Squared = .023)

Note: IGPVAL is ingroup position validation, and OGPVAL is outgroup position validation.

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: INGROUP FAVOURITISM change score

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	3547.767(a)	3	1182.589	2.999	.036	.114
Intercept	4107.862	1	4107.862	10.419	.002	.130
IGPVAL	1064.314	1	1064.314	2.699	.105	.037
OGPVAL	596.450	1	596.450	1.513	.223	.021
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	2059.844	1	2059.844	5.224	.025	.069
Error	27599.585	70	394.280			
Total	35662.000	74				
Corrected Total	31147.351	73				

a R Squared = .114 (Adjusted R Squared = .076)

Note: IGPVAL is ingroup position validation, OGPVAL is outgroup position validation, and IGF1 is pretest ingroup favoritism.

Study 2

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: IDENTIFICATION

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1223.083(a)	3	407.694	2.126	.107	.099
Intercept	356807.379	1	356807.379	1860.550	.000	.970
IGPVAL	74.517	1	74.517	.389	.535	.007
OGPVAL	568.015	1	568.015	2.962	.091	.049
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	519.144	1	519.144	2.707	.105	.045
Error	11122.962	58	191.775			
Total	372341.516	62				
Corrected Total	12346.046	61				

a R Squared = .099 (Adjusted R Squared = .052)

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: CERTAINTY change score

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	3234.361(a)	3	1078.120	5.519	.002	.222
Intercept	316.990	1	316.990	1.623	.208	.027
IGPVAL	1182.046	1	1182.046	6.051	.017	.094
OGPVAL	324.028	1	324.028	1.659	.203	.028
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	1554.407	1	1554.407	7.958	.007	.121
Error	11329.591	58	195.338			
Total	14996.438	62				
Corrected Total	14563.953	61				

a R Squared = .222 (Adjusted R Squared = .182)

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: CERTAINTY change score for the single item

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	13497.236(a)	3	4499.079	7.079	.000	.268
Intercept	406.312	1	406.312	.639	.427	.011
IGPVAL	4187.524	1	4187.524	6.589	.013	.102
OGPVAL	1712.784	1	1712.784	2.695	.106	.044
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	6854.966	1	6854.966	10.786	.002	.157
Error	36862.651	58	635.563			
Total	51051.000	62				
Corrected Total	50359.887	61				

a R Squared = .268 (Adjusted R Squared = .230)

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: POSTTEST INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	4834.050(a)	3	1611.350	3.561	.020	.156
Intercept	446.084	1	446.084	.986	.325	.017
IGPVAL	2289.915	1	2289.915	5.061	.028	.080
OGPVAL	197.248	1	197.248	.436	.512	.007
IGPVAL * OGPVAL	2117.701	1	2117.701	4.680	.035	.075
Error	26244.918	58	452.499			
Total	31686.000	62				
Corrected Total	31078.968	61				

a R Squared = .156 (Adjusted R Squared = .112)

Note: IGPVAL is ingroup position validation, and OGPVAL is outgroup position validation

Study 3
Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.595(a)	.354	.348	1.15383	.354	54.319	.000
2	.781(b)	.610	.602	.90121	.256	64.282	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	72.316	1	72.316	54.319	.000(a)
	Residual	131.801	99	1.331		
	Total	204.116	100			
2	Regression	124.523	2	62.262	76.661	.000(b)
	Residual	79.593	98	.812		
	Total	204.116	100			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.047	.484		-.097	.923
	IDENTIF	.848	.115	.595	7.370	.000
2	(Constant)	-.629	.385		-1.634	.106
	IDENTIF	.319	.112	.224	2.857	.005
	SAL	.477	.060	.628	8.018	.000

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.592(a)	.351	.344	1.52141	.351	53.446	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	123.711	1	123.711	53.446	.000(a)
	Residual	229.154	99	2.315		
	Total	352.865	100			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.220	.639		1.911	.059
	IDENTIF	1.110	.152	.592	7.311	.000

a Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Study 4

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.676(a)	.457	.451	1.05944	.457	82.439	.000
2	.775(b)	.601	.592	.91329	.144	34.874	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	92.531	1	92.531	82.439	.000(a)
	Residual	109.997	98	1.122		
	Total	202.528	99			
2	Regression	121.619	2	60.810	72.904	.000(b)
	Residual	80.908	97	.834		
	Total	202.528	99			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENT, SAL

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.		
		B	Std. Error	Beta				
1	(Constant)	-1.278	.460		-2.780	.007		
	IDENT	.992	.109	.676			9.080	.000
2	(Constant)	-.645	.411		-1.570	.120		
	IDENT	.341	.145	.232			2.347	.021
	SAL	.558	.095	.584			5.905	.000

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.761(a)	.578	.574	.97562	.578	134.481	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	128.003	1	128.003	134.481	.000(a)
	Residual	93.279	98	.952		
	Total	221.282	99			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-1.134	.423		-2.679	.009
	IDENT	1.167	.101	.761	11.597	.000

a Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.504(a)	.254	.247	1.06465	.254	33.072	.000
2	.546(b)	.298	.283	1.03827	.044	5.993	.016

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.626	.462		3.517	.001
	IDENT	.633	.110	.504	5.751	.000
2	(Constant)	1.925	.467		4.121	.000
	IDENT	.326	.165	.259	1.971	.052
	SAL	.263	.108	.322	2.448	.016

a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.780(a)	.609	.605	.81423	.609	152.723	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	101.251	1	101.251	152.723	.000(a)
	Residual	64.971	98	.663		
	Total	166.222	99			

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.683	.291		2.349	.021
	DEPERS	.822	.067	.780	12.358	.000

a Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS

Study 5

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.372(a)	.138	.135	1.09408	.138	41.940	.000
2	.434(b)	.188	.182	1.06408	.050	15.928	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	50.203	1	50.203	41.940	.000(a)
	Residual	312.422	261	1.197		
	Total	362.625	262			
2	Regression	68.238	2	34.119	30.133	.000(b)
	Residual	294.388	260	1.132		
	Total	362.625	262			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.158	.143		22.059	.000
	IDENT	.292	.045	.372	6.476	.000
2	(Constant)	2.587	.200		12.952	.000
	IDENT	.182	.052	.232	3.527	.000
	SAL	.230	.058	.263	3.991	.000

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics
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					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.331(a)	.110	.107	1.03799	.110	35.020	.000
2	.452(b)	.204	.199	.98313	.094	33.581	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	37.731	1	37.731	35.020	.000(a)
	Residual	305.987	284	1.077		
	Total	343.718	285			
2	Regression	70.189	2	35.094	36.309	.000(b)
	Residual	273.529	283	.967		
	Total	343.718	285			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.685	.131		28.033	.000
	IDENT	.243	.041	.331	5.918	.000
2	(Constant)	2.952	.178		16.629	.000
	IDENT	.099	.046	.135	2.142	.033
	SAL	.297	.051	.365	5.795	.000

a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.539(a)	.290	.288	1.13729	.290	116.094	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	150.158	1	150.158	116.094	.000(a)
	Residual	367.332	284	1.293		
	Total	517.490	285			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.467	.144		17.125	.000
	IDENT	.485	.045	.539	10.775	.000

a Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.913(a)	.834	.834	.51384	.834	1445.555	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	381.677	1	381.677	1445.555	.000(a)
	Residual	75.778	287	.264		
	Total	457.455	288			

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-386	.124		-3.100	.002
	in favour group perceived depersonalization	1.050	.028	.913	38.020	.000

a Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	COND = 1 (Selected)						
1	.395(a)	.156	.147	1.07419	.156	16.680	.000
2	.431(b)	.185	.167	1.06145	.029	3.175	.078

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19.247	1	19.247	16.680	.000(a)
	Residual	103.850	90	1.154		
	Total	123.097	91			
2	Regression	22.823	2	11.412	10.129	.000(b)
	Residual	100.273	89	1.127		
	Total	123.097	91			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which COND = 1 (WEAK CONFLICT)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.113	.233		13.344	.000
	IDENT	.303	.074	.395	4.084	.000
2	(Constant)	2.639	.352		7.493	.000
	IDENT	.227	.085	.296	2.678	.009
	SAL	.180	.101	.197	1.782	.078

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which COND = 1 (WEAK CONFLICT)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	COND = 2 (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.278(a)	.077	.066	1.13880	.077	7.266	.008
2	.413(b)	.171	.152	1.08560	.094	9.735	.002

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9.423	1	9.423	7.266	.008(a)
	Residual	112.827	87	1.297		
	Total	122.250	88			
2	Regression	20.896	2	10.448	8.865	.000(b)
	Residual	101.353	86	1.179		
	Total	122.250	88			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which COND = 2 (STRONG CONFLICT)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.371	.262		12.866	.000
	IDENT	.231	.086	.278	2.696	.008
2	(Constant)	2.674	.335		7.976	.000
	IDENT	.081	.095	.097	.852	.397
	SAL	.304	.098	.356	3.120	.002

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which COND = 2 (STRONG CONFLICT)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	COND = 3 (Selected)						
1	.442(a)	.195	.185	1.08580	.195	19.382	.000
2	.485(b)	.235	.216	1.06502	.040	4.152	.045

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	22.851	1	22.851	19.382	.000(a)
	Residual	94.316	80	1.179		
	Total	117.167	81			
2	Regression	27.560	2	13.780	12.149	.000(b)
	Residual	89.607	79	1.134		
	Total	117.167	81			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which COND = 3 (HOSTILITY)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.987	.256		11.679	.000
	IDENT	.337	.077	.442	4.403	.000
2	(Constant)	2.439	.368		6.629	.000
	IDENT	.229	.092	.300	2.493	.015
	SAL	.215	.106	.245	2.038	.045

a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which COND = 3 (HOSTILITY)

Study 6

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.452(a)	.204	.193	1.36259	.204	18.481	.000
2	.475(b)	.226	.204	1.35362	.021	1.957	.166

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	34.312	1	34.312	18.481	.000(a)
	Residual	133.678	72	1.857		
	Total	167.990	73			
2	Regression	37.897	2	18.949	10.342	.000(b)
	Residual	130.092	71	1.832		
	Total	167.990	73			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.469	.422		3.485	.001
	IDENT	.438	.102	.452	4.299	.000
2	(Constant)	.811	.630		1.288	.202
	IDENT	.392	.106	.405	3.689	.000
	SAL	.187	.134	.154	1.399	.166

a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.394(a)	.156	.144	1.11462	.156	13.079	.001
2	.408(b)	.167	.143	1.11511	.011	.937	.336

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16.249	1	16.249	13.079	.001(a)
	Residual	88.208	71	1.242		
	Total	104.457	72			
2	Regression	17.414	2	8.707	7.002	.002(b)
	Residual	87.044	70	1.243		
	Total	104.457	72			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.035	.348		2.973	.004
	IDENT	.303	.084	.394		
2	(Constant)	.662	.519		1.276	.206
	IDENT	.275	.088	.358		
	SAL	.108	.112	.112		

a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj. R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	VERSION = exp condition (manipulation) (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.203(a)	.041	.004	1.35467	.041	1.114	.301
2	.426(b)	.181	.116	1.27668	.140	4.273	.049

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.043	1	2.043	1.114	.301(a)
	Residual	47.713	26	1.835		
	Total	49.757	27			
2	Regression	9.009	2	4.504	2.764	.082(b)
	Residual	40.748	25	1.630		
	Total	49.757	27			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.068	.625		3.309	.003
	IDENT	.165	.156	.203		
2	(Constant)	-.046	1.180		-.039	.970
	IDENT	.143	.148	.175		
	SAL	.485	.235	.375		

a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)						
1	.590(a)	.348	.333	1.26441	.348	23.490	.000
2	.590(b)	.348	.318	1.27902	.000	.001	.982

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	37.554	1	37.554	23.490	.000(a)
	Residual	70.344	44	1.599		
	Total	107.898	45			
2	Regression	37.555	2	18.778	11.478	.000(b)
	Residual	70.343	43	1.636		
	Total	107.898	45			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.047	.528		1.983	.054
	IDENT	.606	.125	.590	4.847	.000
2	(Constant)	1.036	.694		1.494	.143
	IDENT	.604	.141	.589	4.284	.000
	SAL	.004	.157	.003	.023	.982

a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj. R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	VERSION = exp condition (manipulation) (Selected)						
1	.203(a)	.041	.005	1.28688	.041	1.123	.299
2	.292(b)	.085	.012	1.28205	.044	1.197	.284

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.860	1	1.860	1.123	.299(a)
	Residual	43.058	26	1.656		
	Total	44.917	27			
2	Regression	3.826	2	1.913	1.164	.329(b)
	Residual	41.091	25	1.644		
	Total	44.917	27			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.524	.594		2.568	.016
	IDENT	.157	.148	.203	1.060	.299
2	(Constant)	.401	1.185		.339	.738
	IDENT	.145	.148	.188	.981	.336
	SAL	.258	.236	.210	1.094	.284

a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)						
1	.532(a)	.283	.266	.99255	.283	16.940	.000
2	.532(b)	.283	.249	1.00420	.000	.008	.930

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16.689	1	16.689	16.940	.000(a)
	Residual	42.361	43	.985		
	Total	59.050	44			
2	Regression	16.697	2	8.348	8.279	.001(b)
	Residual	42.353	42	1.008		
	Total	59.050	44			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.641	.422		1.519	.136
	IDENT	.408	.099	.532	4.116	.000
2	(Constant)	.671	.545		1.231	.225
	IDENT	.413	.114	.538	3.620	.001
	SAL	-.011	.127	-.013	-.088	.930

a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.444(a)	.197	.179	1.22945	.197	10.785	.002

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

ANOVA(b,c)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16.302	1	16.302	10.785	.002(a)
	Residual	66.508	44	1.512		
	Total	82.810	45			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

c Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.825	.513		5.504	.000
	IDENT	.399	.122	.444	3.284	.002

a Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.674(a)	.454	.442	1.06272	.454	35.805	.000
2	.714(b)	.510	.486	1.01948	.055	4.725	.035

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.444(a)	.197	.179	1.22945	.197	10.785	.002

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

ANOVA(b,c)

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16.302	1	16.302	10.785	.002(a)
	Residual	66.508	44	1.512		
	Total	82.810	45			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

c Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.825	.513		5.504	.000
	IDENT	.399	.122	.444	3.284	.002

a Dependent Variable: SALIENCE

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
	VERSION = control cond (no manip) (Selected)				R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.674(a)	.454	.442	1.06272	.454	35.805	.000
2	.714(b)	.510	.486	1.01948	.055	4.725	.035

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE
ANOVA(c,d)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	40.437	1	40.437	35.805	.000(a)
	Residual	48.563	43	1.129		
	Total	89.000	44			
2	Regression	45.348	2	22.674	21.816	.000(b)
	Residual	43.652	42	1.039		
	Total	89.000	44			

a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION

b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE

c Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.089	.459		4.551	.000
	IDENT	.644	.108	.674	5.984	.000
2	(Constant)	1.321	.565		2.339	.024
	IDENT	.536	.115	.561	4.674	.000
	SAL	.272	.125	.261	2.174	.035

a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.747(a)	.557	.548	.93308	.557	57.941	.000

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

ANOVA(b,c)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	50.446	1	50.446	57.941	.000(a)
	Residual	40.049	46	.871		
	Total	90.495	47			

a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION

b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS

c Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

Coefficients(a,b)

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.934	.478		1.954	.057
	NF	.739	.097	.747	7.612	.000

a Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTION

b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip)

