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PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Beverley M. Male

SUMMARY

The origins of Pakistan's relations with the Middle East lie in the history of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent before 1947 and their contacts with fellow Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, both Arabs and Turks, who had developed quite different traditions. Such interchange as took place involved only slightly those who eventually took leading roles in the government of Pakistan, and little thought was given to the kind of foreign policy Pakistan might follow once it came into existence.

Immediately after Partition internal problems engaged the attention of the Government, and hardly more attention was devoted to foreign policy than previously. In the early years, therefore, Pakistan did not have a clearly thought out foreign policy with regard to the Middle East, although relations with the countries of that region soon developed. During the first five years of Pakistan's existence the influence of those who might

be termed Pan-Islamists was particularly strong, carried high by the tide of religious fervour surrounding Partition.

Three main foreign policy problems concerned Pakistan from the beginning: the Kashmir dispute with India, the quarrel with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan, and the Palestine question. There were some hopes in Pakistan that the formation of a Muslim bloc in international affairs, which would take a neutral position between the Western and Soviet blocs, would assist Pakistan to gain its objectives with respect to these problems more effectively than had the British Commonwealth and the United Nations. Suggestions regarding the formation of a Muslim bloc did not appeal to the countries of the Middle East and were abandoned after 1952, although the ideal of closer collaboration with other Muslim countries was not forgotten in Pakistan.

Pakistan's drift towards alignment with America was a gradual movement which gained momentum after 1952. Membership of the Baghdad Pact, which Pakistan joined in 1955, was obviously connected with acceptance of American military aid, but Pakistan had been interested (though not active) in earlier attempts to establish a Middle East defence organisation. Although membership of the Baghdad Pact created difficulties for Pakistan's

relations with some of the Arab countries, it meant that for the first time Pakistan was allied to three other Muslim countries - Turkey, Iran and Iraq.

The concept of closer collaboration among the countries of the northern tier (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan) was first manifested in the Saadabad Pact of 1937. Pakistan had come to be considered one of the northern tier countries, and the ideal of closer collaboration within this region developed in Pakistan, along with wider ideas of Muslim solidarity, almost from this time. Some suggestions of confederation appeared from time to time but hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan precluded any agreement along these lines, and in any case while the idea of Muslim solidarity appealed to most Pakistanis, there was considerable opposition to any proposal which would limit Pakistan's national sovereignty.

The Baghdad Pact, renamed Central Treaty Organization in 1959 after Iraq's departure, provided for the first time an institutional framework within which the northern tier countries could operate. It accustomed them to consult regularly with each other on defence and foreign policy matters, although they have not always been in agreement. The formation of Regional Co-operation for Development in 1964 provided an alternative framework for this consultation outside

CENTO, and at the same time helped promote economic development on a regional basis.

The response of the countries of the Middle East to Pakistan's quarrel with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan and with India over Kashmir places this aspect of Pakistan's foreign relations in the context of its overall foreign policy, as does Pakistan's involvement in the Palestine question which is essentially an Arab problem. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely connected to the relations of each with the USA and the USSR, and the influence of such Middle Eastern countries as appear interested is negligible. On the question of Kashmir, with the exception of Egypt which maintained a position of neutrality, Pakistan received the verbal and/or diplomatic support of the other countries of the Middle East. This has been only marginally affected by Pakistan's relations with the USA and the USSR, but in turn the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries has not had any appreciable effect on the course or outcome of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has involved itself in the Arab-Israel dispute over Palestine, giving diplomatic support to the Arab countries, but Pakistan's intervention on the Palestine question has had no effect on its outcome.

Religious affinity with the countries of the Middle East has caused Pakistan to pay more attention

to the affairs of this region, of which it sometimes considers itself a part, than of any other outside the subcontinent. Differences existing among the Middle Eastern countries contribute to the difficulties experienced by Pakistan in the conduct of its policy in this region. This policy has from time to time been modified in order to take into account Pakistan's wider interests and its relations with the big powers.

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This thesis is my own original work.

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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's foreign policy is usually considered in the context of its relations with India, or from the point of view of its relations with the great powers. In both cases Pakistan is usually regarded as a part of the Indian subcontinent, and the Kashmir dispute tends to dominate the discussion. This study of Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East is an attempt to see Pakistan's foreign policy in another context and to look beyond the Kashmir dispute and the relationships with the USA, the USSR and China. It is impossible, of course, to ignore these questions, but it is useful to ask what other factors influence Pakistan's foreign policy, and to what extent. Where do Pakistan's relations with the Middle East fit into the entire spectrum of Pakistan's foreign relations? To what extent do its relations with the countries of that region affect other aspects of Pakistan foreign policy, and what influence does Pakistan exert in the Middle East?¹

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Most of the research for the thesis was done during a field trip to Pakistan, Turkey and Iran in 1967-8. Much reliance was placed on English language sources, particularly newspapers and periodicals, in Pakistan, and on conversations with diplomats and other officials in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Istanbul, Ankara and Teheran.

(cont.)

'The Middle East' is a slippery term and raises awkward problems of definition. When Pakistanis refer to the Middle East, they sometimes mean that area stretching south from Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, through the Fertile Crescent, to include the countries of the Arabian peninsula, and across the Red Sea to include Egypt. On other occasions, usually when questions concerning the Arab world are under discussion, the Muslim states of North Africa - Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Sudan - are included by implication, as members of the Arab League. In this thesis the first definition is used, although the writer is aware that in references to the Arab League the Muslim states of North Africa must be included, although their policies and attitudes have not been specifically discussed.

(cont.)

Because of the nature of the information thereby gained, many of these sources cannot be quoted. Such information has been used only to illustrate and not to sustain the main argument. Considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining Arab and Afghan sources. The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts proved invaluable in this respect, but at times there was no alternative except to refer to Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Asian Recorder. The period under consideration ends in 1967, and only brief reference to subsequent events has been made where this was considered relevant. In the case of Chapter VIII, dealing with the Kashmir dispute, discussion stops with the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.

There is, in addition, the question of whether Pakistan itself should be included in the Middle East. When the 'northern tier' is under discussion, Pakistan, along with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, is usually considered to be a member, and indeed Pakistan so considers itself. However, when the wider term 'Middle East' is used, although this generally includes the 'northern tier', Pakistan and Afghanistan, though peripheral and clearly associated, are rarely thought to belong. Pakistanis themselves are ambivalent on the question: there is a division of opinion (not only between people but by the same people on different occasions) as to whether Pakistan is primarily a part of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent or part of the Middle East. In support of their position, those who claim that Pakistan is part of the subcontinent frequently point to the large number of Pakistanis who were born in what is now India and who in many cases still have relatives there. They argue that Partition did not amount to rejection of their ties with the subcontinent, but gave the Muslims of India a separate state within it. Their survival as a community assured, they maintain that the objective of the Government should be to work for a modus vivendi with India, there being many opportunities for cooperation, particularly in economic matters. It is often claimed that Pakistanis know the Indians, while Arabs, Turks and Iranians are comparative strangers with whom

Pakistanis have nothing in common except religion, which in the modern world is not sufficient basis for a foreign policy. In addition, East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by over a thousand miles of Indian territory, can hardly be considered part of the Middle East, even if this is true of the West.¹

The continuing hostility between Pakistan and India, particularly regarding the Kashmir dispute, has progressively weakened the position of this group, for only a very small minority will, even in private, advocate a compromise over Kashmir. Until this issue is resolved progress towards cooperation with India cannot go far.

Those who see Pakistan's future bound up with the Middle East use the reverse arguments to support their case. Partition proved that Hindus and Muslims cannot get along together, that they are two separate peoples, and that Pakistanis therefore have much more in common

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The special position of East Pakistan is not discussed in the following pages. While East Pakistanis tend to differ from the people of West Pakistan on a number of issues, these are difficult to document. For the most part, power in Pakistan has been in the hands of West Pakistanis, and although some East Pakistanis have held office (for example, Mohammed Ali Bogra and Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy), the influence of East Pakistan on the conduct of foreign policy, especially with respect to the Middle East, appears to be very small.

with the Muslim peoples to the west, both in terms of history and culture. Their position is further reinforced by the special status of religion as a nation-building force in Pakistan, and by the concept of the unity of the Muslim community, the umma, which is deeply embedded in Islamic theology.

Fear of domination by a majority community who did not share their faith or their customs led the Indian Muslims to demand a state of their own - Pakistan. This state comprises several different groups, of which the largest are the Pathans, Sindhis, Baluchis, Punjabis and Bengalis, each with a strong sense of their separate identity, united by their religion and by fear of India, which is essentially a single issue. For this reason successive Pakistani leaders, although mostly modernists and secularists for whom their religion is a personal thing, cannot deny the strength of Islam as a political force within the country. In many ways the influence of the orthodox ulema works against the kind of development the Government wants to promote, yet it cannot undermine the strength of religion in the country without undermining national unity at the same time.

As this is true of domestic politics in Pakistan, so too it has some bearing on the conduct of foreign policy. The demand for a foreign policy oriented towards the Muslim world, especially towards the Middle East, is

an external manifestation of the internal demand for the establishment of an Islamic state.

It was found impossible to reconcile all the views of what an Islamic state should be and at the same time it was equally difficult to agree upon what was meant by Islamic solidarity when applied to the outside world. This question was further complicated insofar as it involved Muslims outside the subcontinent, who had different ideas on this question from those current among Pakistanis. The confusion arises largely from the vagueness about the concept of unity in Islamic theology, particularly as it applies to the modern world. The umma (Muslim Community) is said to be united, but on what basis and in what manner? Is it only a spiritual unity, or should it be something more? This vagueness permits the leaders of Muslim countries to give verbal support to 'Islamic unity' which in effect commits them to nothing, its meaning depending on the interpretation placed upon it by the audience. As a corollary to this, no leader of a Muslim country can deny Islamic solidarity, for this is to deny the concept of the umma, thus opening the way to criticism from the orthodox population that he is not a true Muslim, a serious accusation in an area where the majority of the population tends to be as conservative in matters of religion as in other respects. This is substantially true of all the Middle Eastern countries,

for even in Turkey and Egypt, where secularism is more acceptable, care must be taken not to offend orthodox groups. The stature of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was such that he could afford to appear anti-religious, but later Turkish leaders have been forced to compromise to some extent in such matters. Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt placed Arab unity first when he wrote The Philosophy of the Revolution, but he included Islamic solidarity as the ultimate goal.¹

For Pakistani leaders as well, Islamic unity is a goal, the nature of which is not made explicit, and the time span for its achievement, if not infinite, is certainly very long. Nevertheless, the concept of Muslim solidarity and the desire for Muslim support, combined with the deadlock in relations with India on the question of Kashmir, have impelled successive Pakistan Governments to seek closer relations with the nations of the region which lies to the west.

This has not always been a simple matter for Pakistan. The Middle East is by no means monolithic, but is divided between Arabs and non-Arabs, and again among the Arab countries themselves. There is a romantic view in Pakistan of the Arabs as the original

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Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Public Affairs Press: Washington, D.C., 1955), pp.111-4.

Muslims, whose language is the language of the Quran, and whom many Pakistanis tend to associate with the 'Golden Age' of Islam. This romanticism frequently clouds the vision of many Pakistanis in their dealings with the Arab countries. While they might admire them, few Pakistanis speak their language or understand the factors which cause the modern Arab world to act as it does, and as a result are inclined to ignore divisions within the Arab world which for the most part make it misleading to speak of an Arab point of view. Even a clear-eyed government encounters difficulty in following a policy of friendship towards the Arab countries because a policy calculated to please one group might well offend others: what is acceptable in Cairo might be anathema to Riyadh.

In addition, Pakistan's close relationship with the non-Arab countries, Turkey and Iran, which are in general distrusted by the Arab states, have not made relations with the latter easy, and Pakistani attempts to improve its relations with the Arabs have not always been welcomed in Ankara or Teheran.

CHAPTER I

Historical Background to Pakistan's Relations with the Middle East

1. Introduction

Although Pakistan did not come into existence until 1947 most of the attitudes which have since governed its relations with the countries of the Middle East had by that time already been formed. The conception of the role of Islam as a factor in relations between Muslim countries evolved separately and quite distinctly in the Indian subcontinent, and nationalism as it developed in the Middle East lacked the strong religious overtones which it acquired among the Indian Muslims. The Mughal Empire in India, vast and powerful in its day, in effect represented the control of a Hindu majority by a Muslim, often foreign (Iranian, Turkish or Afghan), minority. By the end of the eighteenth century the Mughal Empire had for all practical purposes ceased to exist, and Indian Muslims were dimly aware that something terrible had happened which they were virtually powerless to resist. The declaration of India as dar-ul-harb¹ by

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A land where Islam has no authority.

the leading ulema¹ had an important effect on the direction taken subsequently by Indian Muslim thought. The Muslims of the Middle East, while sometimes in revolt against the Turkish Empire, remained unquestionably under Islamic rule, and although deeply concerned with the need for rethinking large sections of Islamic theory, did not feel their religion to be under pressure. The Indian Muslims, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, were threatened not only with loss of power and wealth but also with the swamping of their religion and culture by Hindu revivalism and by Christianity, imported by British missionaries and supported by British power.

Originating in the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century A.D., Islam had within a hundred years been carried by Muslim Arab armies into Sassanid Persia, into Syria, across into Egypt and North Africa. It had been carried by Arab traders across the Oxus where it was adopted by the Seljuks in the tenth century. Sind had been conquered in the eighth century, but the northward expansion of Islam was blocked by Hindu rulers. Mahmud of Ghazni, descending from the Hindu Kush, reached Lahore in the eleventh century, and two hundred years later Afghan armies carried Islam across India to Bengal.²

1

The religious scholars, approximating to the role of the Christian clergy.

2

See H.W. Hazard, Atlas of Islamic History (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1952), and Tamara Talbot Rice, The Seljuks in Asia Minor (Thames & Hudson: London, 1961).

The Arab empire was shattered by the Mongol invasions of the twelfth century, and gradually three new empires came to dominate the Muslim world: that of the Ottomans in Turkey, the Safavids in Persia and the Mughals in India. While embassies were exchanged by the three Emperors, trade was carried on and there was considerable mobility among intellectuals, the general atmosphere was one of distrust, and almost constant warfare in the outlying borderlands between Turks and Persians and Persians and Mughals.

Geographically remote, the Indian Muslims were further cut off from the rest of the Islamic world by the action of the first Mughal Emperor, Babur, who in the early fifteenth century withheld recognition from the Turkish Caliph, reading the Khutba in his own name and striking his own coins,¹ no doubt on the assumption that the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph was too far away to undertake reprisals. The collapse of the Mughal and Ottoman Empires some three centuries later contributed further to the isolation of the Indian Muslims, for control of India passed out of Muslim hands and the Ottoman Empire, the last of the great Muslim states,

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The reading of the Khutba (Friday prayer) in the name of a particular ruler constituted recognition of allegiance to him, as did striking coins in his name. Babur's action amounted to a declaration of independence.

was too weak to take any measures to prevent it. The collapse of the Ottoman and Mughal empires contributed further to the separation of the Indian Muslims from those elsewhere.

2. The Decline of the Mughal Empire

The rapid decline of the Mughal Empire set in after the death of Alamgir I in 1707, but the seeds of disintegration had been sown much earlier by Aurangzeb, whose orthodoxy may have won him the praise of some among the ulema but probably did more than anything else to destroy whatever unity existed in his rambling empire. His intolerance was felt initially by his Hindu subjects, who suffered under disabilities and discrimination carefully avoided by Aurangzeb's more far-sighted if less saintly predecessors. Jizyah, the tax on non-Muslims, was reintroduced, and Hindus were no longer recruited to the government service. At the same time Muslims belonging to the Shi'i sect¹ were also discriminated

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The sectarian split between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims is almost as old as Islam itself. When the claim of the fourth Caliph, Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet (who succeeded in 656 A.D.), was disputed he took up arms to defend his title, later agreeing to submit to arbitration which went against him in favour of the first of the Ummayyad Caliphs, Muawiya. Ali's son, Hassan, resigned his claim to the Caliphate. During the reign of Muawiya, Ali's second son, Hussain, remained aloof from politics, but following Muawiya's death (both Ali and Hassan

(cont.)

against by the government. These internal differences were seized upon by the enemies of the Emperor, especially the Marathas, who found allies in the southern sultanates, and a stronghold in the Deccan hills. After the death of Alamgir the situation deteriorated rapidly into widespread anarchy.

The appearance of British power in India, the policies of the East India Company and the way in which they were carried out, served to make matters far worse for the Muslim population, especially in Bengal where it first felt the impact of British rule. By an agreement with the Emperor in Delhi, who appointed the East India

(cont.)

having died previously) Hussain revolted against Muawiya's successor Yazeed, whom he refused to recognise as Caliph. He and many of his followers, known as Shi'is, were defeated at the battle at Karbela in 680 A.D. The development of Shi'ism as a sect within Islam could be said to date from this time. The word Shi'i literally means 'one who dissents' and its followers deny the claims of the later Caliphs. Persia is the only country in which Shi'ism is the official religion. Many Shi'i holy places, including Karbela, are in Iraq, which is predominantly Sunni (orthodox), as are Turkey, Afghanistan and Arabia. While most Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are Sunni, there is a large Shi'i minority.

This difference was a bone of contention between the Safavids and the Mughals, and the Shi'i persuasion of the Deccan Sultans opened the door for Persian intervention. In the modern world the division has wide implications for relations among Muslim countries. See Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Penguin: Second Edition, 1956).

Company Dewan (revenue collector), the Company obtained legal status and took over the administration of the province. One of the principal sources of revenue was the duty imposed on internal transit of goods by road and river, for which the Company obtained exemption, but for which the local merchants were heavily taxed. Many were ruined, and the Nawab's revenue declined.¹

British changes in the system of land revenue collection also helped undermine the Muslim position. Previously the actual collection of the revenue had been in the hands of minor Hindu officials appointed by Muslims who held all the higher posts. Both were able to make a percentage on the transaction before the required amount was remitted to Delhi. Under the English Permanent Settlement of 1793, the positions of the Muslim officials were taken over by Company employees appointed to each district. This step, which deprived the Muslim nobility of an important source of income, at the same time allowed the Hindu collectors gradually to gain the status of landholders.²

This in turn had a serious effect on the traditional Muslim education system, whereby every Muslim nobleman

1

Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of British India (K. Paul, Trench, Trübner: London, 1902), p.19.

2

Ibid., p.162.

maintained a scholastic establishment where his sons and those of his poorer neighbours could be educated. The impoverishment of the Muslim nobility made the maintenance of the system impossible. A further blow to education was the resumption by the British of land which had been alienated from the government. Those hardest hit were usually the Muslim colleges and foundations (wagfs) which depended on their rent-free land, the loss of which forced most of them to close.¹

As a result of these measures, which undermined the position of the Muslim community, their religion assumed greater importance in the thinking and writing of Muslim intellectuals in India than of those elsewhere. The Muslim revival on the Indian subcontinent developed in two main directions: the traditionalist school seeking a solution in a return to what it believed to be classical Islamic values, and those modernists who adopted a kind of secular nationalism, although with strong Islamic overtones.

The roots of the traditionalist school may be found in the movement initiated by Shah Waliullah of Delhi in the latter half of the eighteenth century. His object was to stimulate a popular revival among the Muslims,

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W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (Trübner: London, 1872), p.177.

since it was obvious that Mughal power had collapsed so completely that it was pointless to hope for leadership from the government. When in 1803 the British took the Emperor under their protection, Shah Waliullah's son, Shah Abdul Aziz, one of the leading ulema, issued a fatwa (ruling) declaring that India had ceased to be dar-ul-Islam¹ and had become dar-ul-harb. It was thereby forbidden that Muslims should learn English, or work for the British, if such employment was directed towards the entrenchment of British power in India. Since English was soon to become the language by which preferment was obtained, replacing Persian, the language of the Mughal government, the Muslims were before long at a disadvantage, for the Hindus were prepared to learn English and work for the British just as they had earlier learned Persian and worked for the Mughals. The Muslims therefore did not send their children to the schools set up by the British, although it has been suggested that their reaction might have been different had the medium of instruction been English rather than Hindi, had the curriculum made provision for traditional instruction in Persian and Arabic given to young Muslims, and had the teachers not been mainly Hindus.²

1

A land ruled by Islamic law.

2

Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, p.177.

It is not surprising that the old Muslim ruling classes refused to accept the complete and permanent destruction of their power. Nor is it surprising that, finding themselves without any weapon with which to resist the British presence, they turned to religion in the hope of stimulating a mass reaction that would make British control impossible.

The followers of Shah Abdul Aziz began to turn more to the Muslim powers outside India, especially to Turkey, in the hope that assistance would be forthcoming on the cry of 'Islam in danger'. One of the leaders of the movement, Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi, in 1821 went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, the meeting place of Muslims from all parts of the world, where numerous plots were doubtless hatched and many ideas disseminated. There is a report¹ that he visited Constantinople in search of support from the Ottoman Sultan. If it is correct, this was a reasonable enough objective, but one doomed to failure, for it would indeed have been a rash Sultan who would then have chosen to go to war with Britain, which is what Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi was in effect asking him to do. Nevertheless alliance with Turkey came to form an important part of the programme of what was by this

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I.H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947) (Mouton and Co.: 'S Gravenhage, 1962), p.199.

time a well organised movement,¹ and in 1841 another attempt was made to enlist Turkish cooperation against the British, again without success.

In 1857 the Indian Mutiny put the final touches to the misery and degradation of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Although it was discovered later that many Hindus had also been involved in the Mutiny, the British at the time held the Muslims largely responsible. A number of prominent ulema were, however, deeply involved in the organisation and in the actual fighting, many of them followers of Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi.² Following the Mutiny a division grew among the Muslims between the followers of Barelawi and those who urged cooperation with the British, as the only means to improve the condition of their community. Two distinct schools of thought developed, one centred on the Darul-Ulum college at Deoband and the other on the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh.

1

Z.H. Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1963), p.19 n.

2

Evidence of this complicity was revealed at the trial in 1858 of the 'Maulavi of Fyzabad', who appeared to be the 'brain and the hand of the conspiracy' in Lucknow, and had been working 'in closest cooperation with the group of Wahabis and the followers of Sayyid Ahmed Barelawi'. K.M. Ashraf, 'Muslim Revivalists and the Revolt of 1857', in Joshi (ed.), Rebellion 1857 (Peoples Publishing House: New Delhi). (Cited, Faruqi, The Deoband School, p.20.)

The college at Deoband, established in 1867, represented a continuation by peaceful means of the attempt to gain the objectives for which the ulema had supported the Mutiny. Its founder, Maulana Nanawtawi, a follower of Barelawi, was determined that the religious and cultural heritage of the Muslims, apparently threatened by official British education, should be preserved. It might be said therefore that the college at Deoband was founded on a tradition of disloyalty to British rule.¹

The Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh was established in 1878 by Syed Ahmed Khan, the leader of the modernist school of thought which argued that Muslims should in self-defence accept the British presence and learn to work with it. Syed Ahmed had entered the service of the British about 1838 and by 1855 had risen to the position of sadr amin (subordinate native judge). At a time when it was no easy matter for Muslims to gain employment in the government service, Syed Ahmed's experience probably had considerable effect on the formation of his view that the British were too firmly entrenched to be ousted by force. He therefore opposed the Mutiny which he feared would end in disaster for the

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Faruqi, The Deoband School, p.25.

Muslims. He wrote a pamphlet, published in 1860,¹ in which he attempted to persuade the British that not all Muslims had been involved in the revolt of 1857 and that many were completely loyal.

Believing that the secret of the strength of Western Europe was based on intellectual progress, especially in the physical sciences, he was convinced that if his people were ever to make up the leeway between themselves and the advanced countries of Europe they must learn Western skills. The need as he saw it was for an institution in India which would teach these things to the Muslims while it imbued them at the same time with the values of Islam. Although he encountered some opposition from the orthodox who claimed that such an institution would teach young Muslims Syed Ahmed's own 'heresies', there was no lack of support from the small but growing Muslim middle class who shared his views, or from the British who by this time were patronising the modernist movement.² When the college at Aligarh was opened it was affiliated with Calcutta University and attracted students from all over the subcontinent as well as from neighbouring Muslim countries.³

1

Entitled The Loyal Mohammedans of India.

2

W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis (Victor Gollancz Ltd: London, 1946), p.18.

3

Qureshi, The Muslim Community, p.241.

3. The Clash Between the Aligarh and Deoband Traditions

Although the ideals and objectives of the two schools were quite different, the disagreement did not become a public issue until the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. Nanawtawi's successor at Deoband, Gangohi, declared that in certain matters cooperation with Hindus could be accepted providing Islamic principles were not thereby violated. In 1887 Syed Ahmed came out publicly against the National Congress. He feared that its aims could lead to an outbreak of violence similar to that of 1857, which, if the Muslims became involved, would spell their final ruin. Should the Congress succeed in establishing representative institutions, he believed that the consequences would be unfortunate for the backward Muslim minority, particularly as the growing Hindu revivalist movement's demands that Hindi replace Urdu as the language of the courts increased in tempo.

Syed Ahmed's support of the British had already brought him into conflict with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani¹ during the latter's visits to India, although al-Afghani won a number of supporters from among the younger generation of Muslims. The Deoband ulema were no less

1

S.A. Rizve, Aspects of Muslim Politics in India on the Eve of 1919 (unpublished paper, ANU (n.d.)), pp.11-12. For discussion of al-Afghani, see below p.24.

disapproving of Syed Ahmed's politics than Jamal al-Din, especially over the question of allegiance to Britain, the Egyptian revolt of 1881 and the Turkish-Greek war of 1897. So long as Turkish policy remained friendly to Britain Sultan Abdul Hamid's claims to the Caliphate,¹ and to the spiritual allegiance of all Muslims, were allowed to go unchallenged by Syed Ahmed. By 1897, however, the situation had changed and he wrote articles in the Aligarh Institute Gazette denying the Sultan's claim and exhorting support for British policy even if it were unfriendly to Turkey.

4. The Generation 'Who Knew not Syed Ahmed'

The turn of the century brought significant changes to the Muslim nationalist movement. The new generation at Aligarh was growing less receptive to Syed Ahmed's ideas. The Western education he had given them inclined them more towards the ideals of the National Congress and they were not prepared to wait patiently for the British to reward unconditional Muslim loyalty. This dissident group found a spokesman in Maulana Shibli who sensed the feeling of depression that had gripped the younger generation of Muslims and whose writing had considerable influence on the generation who came in contact with him,

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See below, pp.25-27.

one of the most important of whom was Maulana Mohammed Ali. Although Mohammed Ali died before Pakistan became a reality, he is claimed by many Pakistanis as one of those who was instrumental in shaping the Indian Muslims' sense of nationality. Born at Rampur, he was educated at Aligarh and Oxford, returning to India where he joined the services of the State of Rampur and Baroda. Although apparently successful, he was seized like many of his contemporaries by a deep discontent and restlessness. He decided to go to Calcutta in 1910, and the following year began publishing his own journal, The Comrade. Greatly affected by 'the shameless brigandage of Italy in Tripoli' he contemplated suicide in 1912 when he learned that the Bulgarians were only 25 miles from Constantinople.¹ He began what was to be a life-long struggle with the British authorities, through the pages of his newspaper, in which he was soon joined by his brother Shaukat Ali.

5. The All-India Muslim League

The Aligarh tradition was carried on by the Muslim League which was formed in 1906 in response to a growing demand for Muslim political organisation. By that time there remained few Muslims in the National Congress and

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Mohammed Ali, My Life: a Fragment (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, 1942), p.49.

the militant Hindu wing of the Congress was becoming more strident in its demands. A group of prominent Muslims led by Nawab Mohsin ul-Mulk, the successor of Sir Syed Ahmed at Aligarh, and the Agha Khan, in October 1906 sought an interview with the Viceroy, Lord Minto. Emphasising their loyalty to the British they asked at the same time for separate electorates for the Muslims to ensure that their rights as a minority would be protected. Their demands were accepted, but they felt the need to form an organisation to protect the gains already made, and in December that year convened a meeting of leading Muslims at Dacca, as a result of which the All-India Muslim League was established.

It was an association of wealthy, upper class Muslims, steeped in the English liberal constitutional tradition, many of them graduates of Aligarh. It is not surprising that it did not appeal to that generation of Muslims referred to earlier who 'knew not Seyyid Ahmed and regarded his teachings as obsolete',¹ nor is it surprising that it was with this organisation, pledged to promote loyalty to the British government, that the British later chose to deal.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, regarded by Pakistanis as the founder of their country, did not join the Muslim League

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Sir Valentine Chirol, India Old and New (Macmillan: London, 1921), p.137.

until 1913. Educated in England, he was a competent and highly paid barrister when he entered politics, bringing his ability for cold legal argument into the Viceroy's Executive Council in 1909. At first attracted to the nationalist ideals of the Congress, he remained aloof from the Muslim League because he disliked its pre-occupation with communal issues. After the revision of the partition of Bengal in 1911¹ the League was more inclined to the nationalist aims of the Congress and Jinnah was finally persuaded to become a member. As a member of Congress, the League and the Viceroy's Executive Council, he soon became an influential political figure, but found it difficult to appeal to the illiterate uneducated Muslims as Gandhi was able to appeal to the Hindus, and for many years regarded such an appeal as unnecessary, believing that he was right and that in time

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Bengal, a large unwieldy administrative unit, was partitioned by the British Government in 1905. A new province of East Bengal was established which was predominantly Muslim, leaving the old Bengal as a predominantly Hindu area. This arrangement was satisfactory to the Muslims of Bengal who were anxious to escape from a situation where they were dominated by a Hindu majority, but was opposed by the Nationalists as an attempt by the British to 'divide and rule'. Pressure against the decision from the Nationalists was so great that in 1911 the partition was annulled, a decision which diminished the faith of the Muslim community in the British government.

everyone else would see that he was right. He was instrumental in bringing about the 'Lucknow Pact' in 1916 whereby the League agreed to support certain Congress demands for self-government while Congress conceded separate electorates to the Muslims.

The leadership of Deoband had fallen to another militant, Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi, better known as Sheikh-ul-Hind, under whose direction Deoband began to participate in the politics of the subcontinent: its activity until then had been confined to attempts to make contact with the Turkish Government. At the same time, with the growing discontent among the Aligarh men, he attempted to bridge the gap between the two schools, and in 1910 organised a conference attended by some 30,000 Muslims of varying shades of opinion, including some from Aligarh.

Meanwhile Turkey was fighting in the Balkans, and the young Muslim nationalist press was choking with resentment at British refusal to intervene to protect Constantinople and the Caliph. Mohammed Ali began to collect funds to organise a medical mission to Turkey, which eventually set out in 1912.

6. The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

At this time, on the eve of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse. Although it had survived the Mughal Empire by more than

100 years it too had been in retreat from the end of the eighteenth century. Its strength had rested on superior organisation, manpower and technology, which at the end of the Middle Ages had given the Turks a decided advantage over Europe. Since then there had been little or no progress. From the Treaty of Jassy in 1792, Turkey's European frontiers were slowly driven back before victorious Russian armies.

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 England, France and Austria, with Russian consent, agreed to define and guarantee the integrity of the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, for they believed that the break-up of the empire would endanger the peace of Europe. The Sultan understandably viewed this as a humiliating intervention in Turkish affairs on the part of foreign powers and refused to have anything to do with the suggestion.

Superior Western technology and compulsive territorial expansionism were not at this stage the only sources of danger to Turkish security. The ideas of liberty, nationalism, of the rights of men and nations which grew from the French Revolution were seeping through, creating internal troubles with which Turkish Governors either could not or would not cope. Trouble with Greece occupied the Turkish Government throughout the 1820s as newly developed Greek nationalism, with Russian encouragement, made increasing demands on Turkey. As was becoming the custom with Turkish affairs, the

great powers of Europe once more took matters into their own hands, and by a series of protocols, treaties and agreements, the Danubian provinces were taken from Turkey and Greece became independent.

Reduced international prestige made the internal situation even more difficult to control, and in 1831 the Governor of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha, rose in revolt, with French support. In 1833 an agreement was reached with Russia whereby Turkey was offered Russian protection. By 1839 the European powers decided to save Turkey from this fate and forestall any Russian advantage. Pressure was placed on Mohammed Ali, who accepted the hereditary governorship of Egypt in return for the abandonment of other territorial claims.

Following the Crimean War of 1854-56, Turkish territorial integrity was once more guaranteed. This did not prevent French intervention in a Lebanese revolt in 1860 after which Turkey was forced to accept a Christian Governor of Lebanon, to be chosen by the European powers.

From the 1860s, Pan-Slavism gained increasing popularity in those areas where the Turkish writ still claimed to run. Trouble with Greek nationalism continued. A brutally suppressed Bulgarian revolt in 1876 lost Turkey much sympathy in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. The treaty of San Stephano and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, following another Russian victory, drove Turkey's European frontier back still further. This pattern

continued through the remainder of the century: in 1881 England occupied Egypt; in 1897 Turkey won a victory over Greece, the fruits of which were lost as a result of the intervention of the European powers, this time with the significant exception of Germany and Austria, who remained aloof. In 1911 war broke out with Italy, in which Turkey lost Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 deprived Turkey of all territory west of the Maritsa river, and led into the First World War, which ended in the final destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

7. The Development of Pan-Islamism

Modern Pan-Islamic ideals were founded on the basis of theories related to the Caliphate and to the classical (and largely theoretical) unity of Islam. The Caliphate was initially devised by the Companions of the Prophet in order to retain unity among the Arabs, to retain divine guidance in government and to give to both a new continuity. Although all of the first four Caliphs were chosen by different means, they were all chosen by the Community, and the choice was accepted as legitimate. Under the Abbasid Caliphate, established in the mid-eighth century, the ideals of unity, divine guidance and continuity came to be rigidly interpreted. Unity became strict political unity under one Caliph, divine guidance became divine

right, and continuity came to mean the hereditary right of the Abbasids to the Caliphal throne.¹

As the power of the Abbasids declined and individual Sultans successfully revolted and seized power without troubling to depose the Caliph, these theories were severely shaken. Some theoreticians took the view that the true Caliphate had ceased to exist, but to accept this would have been to admit that the entire Community was living in sin, without any spiritual guidance whatsoever, and would have destroyed the three pillars (of unity, divine guidance and continuity) which upheld the entire system. The confused jurists were rescued towards the end of the eleventh century by the bluntness of the theologian, el-Gazali:

Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whosoever exercised independent authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the Khutba and the Sikka²...the same is a

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Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1961), pp.13-14.

2

Refers to striking of coins in the name of the Caliph.

sultan, whose commands and judgements are valid in the several parts of the earth.¹

An extension of this rationalisation, following the disruption of the Mongol invasions, was the formulation of the theory that 'every righteous ruler who governs with justice and enforces the Shariah² is entitled to the style and prerogatives of the Caliphate.'³ This, rather than the classical theory, lay behind the use of the terms Caliph and Caliphate in Persia and Turkey.

It became clear to many Muslim intellectuals during the nineteenth century that Islam as it existed could not protect Muslim social institutions from the onslaught on Western liberalism, brought back to the Middle East from the universities of Europe, any more than Western technology could be prevented from defeating Muslim armies on the battlefield. There was a need for much rethinking, for modernisation and for unity. Three exponents of this argument were Namik Kemal, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and, for obvious reasons, Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey.

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Ihya ulum el-din, ii, 124, quoted in Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (OUP: London, 1950), vol.1, part 1, p.31.

2

Islamic law.

3

Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, pp.33-4.

Namik Kemal¹ argued that modernisation was the answer to Western advance, not simply a blind adoption of European methods, as some Westernisers believed, but an adaptation of these methods to Islamic values and way of life. In order to achieve this Kemal believed that all Muslims should unite under some strong leadership. Ottoman Turkey seemed to be the ideal candidate for this leadership, the Caliphate a ready-made rallying point.

While Namik Kemal put forward his views on paper, his contemporary, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,² travelled widely through the Middle East arguing for their adoption. Al-Afghani was genuinely disturbed by the apparent physical collapse of the Islamic countries before the European advance and advocated solidarity among Muslims as a means of damming the flood. Solidarity was the primary requirement of human society, and religion an effective means of producing this solidarity. In the course of his travels al-Afghani built up a large following, especially among the early Arab nationalists during his

1

Namik Kemal was born in Turkey in 1840. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Second Edition, (OUP: London, 1968), p.141.

2

Al-Afghani was born in Iran about 1839. See H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (University of Chicago Press: 1945), and N.R. Keddie, 'The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II', Middle East Studies, vol.3, no.1, October 1966.

eight year sojourn in Egypt from 1871 to 1879.¹ He visited India twice, briefly in 1869 and later in 1879 after his expulsion from Egypt, when he remained three years in Hyderabad and Calcutta, later travelling to France, Russia and Persia. He became thoroughly unpopular with the Shah and the orthodox ulema in Teheran,² and left Persia for Constantinople, probably sensing in Abdul Hamid a potential patron.

The appeal of Pan-Islamism to the Ottomans is fairly clear, as least insofar as it called on Muslims to rally around the Caliph and the Turkish Empire. In claiming the allegiance of all Muslims, the Sultan-Caliph sought to bolster his own tattered prestige, and perhaps even to increase his real power. The first hint of this claim appeared as early as 1774, long before the doctrine of Pan-Islam itself became important, and was put forward without any thought of its future implications. The Sultan, following a defeat by Russia, was forced in the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca to concede to the Czar certain rights of intervention on behalf of the Orthodox Church in Christian parts of the Ottoman Empire. In order to

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Sylvia G. Haim, (ed.), Arab Nationalism, an Anthology (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1964), Introduction, p.8.

2

Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Ernest Benn Limited: London, 1965), pp.99-104.

save face the Sultan insisted on the inclusion of the following article in the Treaty:

As to the practices of religion, the Tartars, being the same religion as the Muslims, and his Sultanian Majesty being as Supreme Mohammedan Caliph, they are to conduct themselves towards him, as is prescribed in the rules of their religion, without, however, compromising their political and civil independence, as has been laid down.¹

These claims to purely spiritual allegiance were a radical departure from established Islamic practice. The caliph was always, in theory at least, associated with the exercise of temporal power over certain sections of the Muslim community. To endow him with a kind of titular leadership outside this territory was indeed an innovation.

The Ottoman claims were put forward more strongly in the Constitution of 1876, by this time no doubt with greater awareness of their potential usefulness.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was drawn to the Court at Constantinople, seeing himself as 'the political guide who could further arouse Pan-Islamic feeling and could lead Abdul Hamid to the successful achievement of Muslim unity.'² While each

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Article 3 of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, cited Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p.323.

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Keddie, p.48.

may have thought he could work with or even use the other, their aims were divergent: Abdul Hamid adopted Pan-Islamism as a means to preserve his own power, while to al-Afghani it was a means whereby the integrity of Muslim culture might be preserved in the face of the advancing Christian West. Instead of enlisting al-Afghani as a major foreign policy adviser, the Sultan merely had him persuade 'a circle of Persian Shi'is, Babus and agnostics to write letters to the Shi'i ulema to support the Sultan's Pan-Islamic schemes.'¹ Even this function was no longer required once the Sultan began to suspect al-Afghani of joining schemes for the establishment of an Arab Caliphate.²

As official Ottoman policy, Pan-Islamism was successful only to the extent that support for the Turkish cause during the Turko-Greek war of 1897 and later during the Italian and Balkan wars was engendered among Muslims, especially in India. When the crucial test came at the outbreak of the First World War, Pan-Islamic calls for support for Turkey fell on deaf ears. The only response came from the Indian Muslims, but theirs was a special

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Keddie, p.64.

2

It has been suggested that although Abdul Hamid was at first attracted to al-Afghani's ideas, he later became apprehensive, and that al-Afghani's death in 1897 may have been engineered by the Sultan. See Haim, pp.19-20.

situation, and they failed to understand that non-Turkish Muslims could resent Turkish rule, even though the Turks were Muslims, as much as the Indians resented the rule of the British. It was probably unfortunate for the further development of Pan-Islamism that it had become so closely linked with the failing Ottoman regime, and was therefore regarded frequently as a scheme on the part of an imperialist government to maintain a grip on the peoples under its control.

8. The Conflict of Nationalism and Pan-Islamism

Rising Arab and Turkish nationalism also represented forces militating against the success of the Pan-Islamic ideal. The study of the eastern pre-Islamic Turks gave the Turkish nationalists a new awareness of their own history and of fellow Turks beyond the borders of their own country.¹ Though later renounced firmly by Ataturk,² Pan-Turanianism held a strong appeal for many of the Young Turks, with which Pan-Islamism, tainted as it was by the touch of Abdul Hamid, could not compete. If local nationalism among the Turks overshadowed Pan-Islamism it is not a matter for great wonder that the growing

1

Lewis, pp.343-53.

2

In a speech delivered on 1 December 1921, cited *ibid.*, pp.352-3.

nationalism of the Arabs, unfettered by the 1914-18 War and encouraged by the British, swamped it completely.

Before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 there was practically no agitation within the Ottoman Empire for a free Arab state. Once the Young Turks seized power propaganda, encouraged by the apparent liberalism of the new government in Constantinople, came out into the open, along with the claims of non-Arab Turkish subject peoples, demanding more than the Young Turks were prepared to concede. They were willing to give the Arabs certain civil liberties and parliamentary representation, but they were by no means prepared to admit Arab autonomy or secession from the Empire. The result was growing disillusionment and uncertainty among the Arabs, finally turning to revolt during the 1914-18 War.¹

Although the Arab nationalist movement did not gather momentum until the beginning of the twentieth century, much of the intellectual ground had been prepared earlier. The influence of al-Afghani in this regard should be noted, for he helped remind the Arabs that Islam was originally their religion, recalling to them the greatness of their history. In addition, by his emphasis on

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For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the Young Turks and Arab nationalism, see Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Khayats: Beirut, 1966), especially ch.5.

solidarity and his insistence on Islam as a mainspring of this solidarity, 'he placed it on the same footing as other solidarity-producing beliefs'¹ such as nationalism, and helped to spread among Middle Eastern intellectuals a secularist, activist attitude to politics, a necessary condition for the acceptance and spread of an ideology such as Arab nationalism.

The manner in which Islamic revivalism and Pan-Islamism drifted into Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism so that these ideas have, to some extent, remained linked, is demonstrated in the writings of later Arab nationalists. One of the foremost of these was Rashid Rida, who became Rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most important seat of theological learning in the Arab world. Although a Muslim before all else, Rashid Rida represented the beginning of a particularly Arab view of Islam, and his writing from time to time refers to the Arab origins of Islam and hints that the Turks, although Muslims, could not really be regarded as part of the umma.² One of his best known followers, al-Kawakibi, was even more explicit on this subject.³ He believed that the Ottomans could

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Haim, p.15.

2

Haim, p.18.

3

Ibid., p.26.

never preside over the regeneration of Islam. This should be the work of the Arabs who would provide a Caliph, residing in Mecca and acting as a kind of spiritual head of an Islamic union. He would have only religious authority, symbolising Arab unity, with no political power, a revolutionary idea in terms of Islamic theory. It seems that al-Kawakibi was not alone in taking this view for there were reports that Muslim Arabs, talking in the years before the First World War of a possible Turkish collapse, looked to Egypt to provide new leadership and suggested the possibility of an Arab Empire with the Sharif of Mecca as the spiritual head and the Khedive of Egypt as the temporal head.¹

The argument eventually developed that Arab unity was a prerequisite of Islamic unity:

It is not possible for any sane person to imagine union among Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, Kabul, Haiderabad, and Bukhara, or Kashgar, Persia and Timbuctoo, without there being union among Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Mecca and Tunis. It is not possible for any sane person to conceive the possibility of union among Turks, Arabs, Persians, Malayans, and Negroes, while denying unity to the Arabs themselves....The idea of Muslim unity is, it is true, wider and more inclusive than the concept of Arab unity, but it is not possible to advocate Muslim unity without advocating Arab unity. We have, therefore,

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Ibid., p.28.

the right to assert that whoever opposes Arab unity, in the name of Muslim unity or for the sake of Muslim unity he contradicts the simplest necessities of reason and logic.¹

9. The 1914-18 War and the Khilafat Movement

With the outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey's subsequent decision to join Germany and Austria, Britain decided it would be to the advantage of itself and its allies to encourage revolt in the disaffected parts of the Ottoman Empire. While Syria was probably ripest for revolt, it was too deep within Turkish territory to be accessible. British efforts were concentrated, therefore, on Arabia proper, although the task was divided between the Foreign Office and the India Office, each having slightly different objectives. The Indian Government, aware of the uneasy temper of the Indian Muslims, was opposed to fomenting widespread revolt against the Turkish Government, and was content merely to buy the neutrality of Aziz Ibn Saud, ruler of Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Office, in addition to its immediate objective of causing trouble within the Ottoman Empire, wanted to ensure, when the war was over, that a friendly Muslim state would replace the Turkish Empire as a buffer between Europe

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Sati al-Husri, 'Muslim Unity and Arab Unity', *ibid.*, pp.148-9.

and India, thus protecting British interests in that direction. The ruler of Mecca, Sharif Hussain, was willing to cooperate, and agreed to raise an army to fight the Turks following a British promise that he would, after the Turkish defeat, become king of an independent Arab state which would include the Holy Places, and receive in addition a British subsidy of £200,000 a month. An unofficial hint was dropped by Kitchener, then High Commissioner in Egypt, regarding the possibility of an Arab Caliphate. It is almost certain that Kitchener visualised the Caliphate as a spiritual office without realising that such an interpretation would not be shared by most Muslims. It is not unlikely that this rash suggestion helped kindle the ambitions of the Sharifian house, particularly of Hussain's sons, leading them to envisage Hussain replacing the Turkish Sultan as Commander of the Faithful, with sovereignty over the Muslim world.

The Indian Muslims had hoped that Turkey would either join the allies or remain neutral, but after Turkey joined the Central Powers, on 14 November 1914, they directed their efforts towards persuading the British to protect the holy places in the Middle East. The British Government, anxious not to antagonise its Muslim subjects, authorised the Viceroy to give an assurance that these holy places would be immune from attack so long as there was no interference with Indian pilgrims. This assurance was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Asquith, on

9 November 1914, and endorsed by the Governments of France and Russia.¹

Support for Turkey in India, however, was suppressed by the British. Mohammed Ali wrote an article in The Comrade in which he justified Turkish action in joining Germany, and the British responded by suspending the journal, confiscating the press and interning the Ali brothers. Most of the opposition press was treated similarly at this time and open support for Turkey in India virtually ceased for the duration of the war.

Deoband however was active as never before. It was felt that nothing could be done in India against the British unless the Central Powers attacked India through Iran and Afghanistan. So in 1915 Ubaidallah Sindhi² went to Afghanistan and Sheikh-ul-Hind went to the Hijaz in an effort to get in touch with the Turkish authorities. The

1

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Longmans: Pakistan, 1961), pp.28-9.

2

Ubaidallah Sindhi, a Sikh convert to Islam, and an ex-student of Deoband, had been closely associated with an organisation known as the Jamiyat-ul-Ansar, formed by Sheikh-ul-Hind in 1909, membership of which consisted of ex-students of Deoband. It seems to have been almost a secret society, and little is known of its objectives, except insofar as it appeared to function as a means of communication among likeminded men, to be used against the British if the need arose. See Faruqi, The Deoband School, p.57.

Sheikh arrived in Mecca in 1916, and by chance was able to contact the Turkish War Minister, Anwar Pasha, who was on a visit to the area. The Pasha reportedly promised to help the Sheikh to attack India through the Khyber Pass, and sent a message to the North-West Frontier tribes assuring them of all possible aid in their anti-British venture.¹ It is debatable that the Turkish government seriously considered such a plan, although Enver Pasha perhaps had it in mind.² In any case pressures on Turkey precluded its execution, and the King of Afghanistan, Amir Habibullah, was distinctly wary of incurring British or Russian displeasure by throwing his neutrality into question. Although Ubaidallah Sindhi was able to continue his fruitless campaign for several years, Sheikh-ul-Hind was captured when Sharif Hussain of Mecca revolted against the Turks in 1916.

The revolt of Sharif Hussain caused shock and disappointment in India. In November 1914 the Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam had issued a fatwa declaring jihad in the name of the Sultan-Caliph, and calling on all Muslims to take up arms and fight with the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. This appeal to Pan-Islamic sentiment fell on deaf ears except for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.

1

Rowlatt Committee Report, cited, *ibid.*, p.61.

2

See Lord Kinross, Ataturk, the Rebirth of a Nation (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1964), p.117.

To them,

the Arab nationalists were not patriots 'rightly struggling to be free' but traitors to the cause of Islamic solidarity - Muslims who had made common cause with the Caliph's enemies at a time when the duty to assist the Caliph was especially incumbent upon them. The resentment of the Indian Muslims towards the Arab Nationalists was a curious contrast to the attitude of the Turks who frankly recognized the fait accompli of Arab national independence and bore their former subjects no ill will for having asserted against Turkey a right which the Turks themselves were determined to assert against the Allies.¹

At the Delhi session of the Muslim League in 1918, following the Allied victory in November, the question of the fate of Turkey came very much to the fore. Although Jinnah argued that, under the Muslim League constitution it had no right to dabble in the foreign politics of the Government,² the weight of Muslim feeling was against this view, and a resolution in support of the Caliphate was adopted.

Although the fate of Turkey was a specifically Muslim grievance, there were other issues appearing at this time

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Arnold J. Toynbee, 'The Islamic World - Since the Peace Settlement', Survey of International Affairs, 1925, vol.I, (OUP: London, 1927).

2

Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.43.

which aroused anti-British feeling among both Hindus and Muslims, leading to their cooperation in a campaign against the Government. The Indians regarded the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which promised responsible government, but only in stages, as a poor reward for the cooperation extended to the British during the war by the vast majority of them. The Rowlatt Report, which led to the passage of the Rowlatt Acts, severely curtailing Indian civil liberties, aroused widespread resentment. The publication of these reports was followed by the incident at Amritsar in April 1919 when General Dyer opened fire on a crowd, killing nearly 400 people. A Committee of Inquiry made up of four Englishmen and four Indians under the Chairmanship of Lord Hunter was set up the following October. It divided on racial lines, and while the Government disavowed Dyer's view of the use of force, its disciplinary action was thought to be not strong enough.¹ Gandhi described it as a thinly disguised whitewash.²

1

Percival Spear, India: a Modern History (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1961), pp.347-8.

2

B.R. Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi (George Allen & Unwin Ltd: London, 1958), p.179.

Meanwhile, in May 1919, the Turkish peace treaty (the Treaty of Sevres) was published, its terms completely ignoring the demands of the Indian Muslims.¹

A conference was held in Lucknow in September 1919 to discuss the question of the Turkish peace treaty and the decision to establish the All-India Central Khilafat² Committee was made.³ The first Khilafat conference was held in November, and was attended by a number of Hindus, including Gandhi, who put forward a plan for a non-cooperation campaign. The Committee decided to send a delegation to England to place before the British Government the Indian demands that the Caliph should be permitted to retain custody over the three holy cities, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, that he should retain sovereignty over the whole Jaziratu'l-'arab⁴ and that he

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There is a report that Lloyd George 'had given assurances that the Allies had no intention of breaking up the Turkish Empire and that after the cessation of hostilities Turkey would be given back all its possessions.' Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan, the Formative Phase (Pakistan Publishing House: Karachi, 1960), p.47. See also Hector Bolitho, Jinnah (John Murray: London, 1954), p.81.

2

Caliphate.

3

Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.48.

4

The Arabian peninsula proper and the adjacent Arab countries of Iraq, Palestine and Syria.

should not suffer diminution of dominions as they existed at the outbreak of the war.¹ Although the delegation, which was led by Maulana Mohammed Ali, was received by Lloyd George, it was apparently unable to influence the British Government in any way.

Their faith in the usefulness of deputations to the British authorities gone, the Khilafatists agreed to join Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, and in September 1920 a special Congress meeting followed suit. The Muslim League also joined the movement in December that year despite a large group of dissenters, including Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who, while he condemned the Treaty of Sevres and the treatment of Turkey, refused to support the Khilafat movement.² Unable either to prevent the Muslim League joining the non-cooperation movement or to accept it himself, Jinnah virtually retired from politics until the end of the 1920s.

Gandhi's support of the Khilafat cause has been regarded by some, usually Muslim League supporters, as an attempt to lure Muslims into a gigantic Hindu trap, to persuade them to submerge their identity, organisation and interests in a Hindu campaign. Supporters of this view point to Gandhi's decision to call off the entire

1

Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p.49.

2

Bolitho, Jinnah, p.82.

civil disobedience campaign in 1922 following the attack on the police post at Chauri-Chaura, just as the campaign appeared on the verge of success. The Khilafatists, who were not committed to non-violence in any case, felt that they had been cheated. The other view, put forward by supporters of Gandhi, is that he saw an opportunity to unite Hindus and Muslims unlikely to occur again for a very long time, and while admitting that the Khilafat was a Muslim issue, argued that it was connected with Indian freedom, for an unfree India could do nothing to help Turkey.¹ Whatever Gandhi's motives in adopting the Khilafat cause, his sudden action in calling off the campaign left a legacy of bitterness between the Muslims and the Hindus.

The momentum of the Khilafat movement had been destroyed by Gandhi's action. Its raison d'être was removed by the Turks themselves. In November 1922 the Turkish Grand National Assembly stripped the Caliph of his functions. A well-meaning attempt by two venerable Indians, the Agha Khan and Sayyid Ameer Ali, one a member of the Privy Council and the other a Judge of the High Court of Appeal, to intervene in November 1923 on behalf of the Caliph did not prevent the abolition of the office the following March, and in fact antagonised the new Turkish Government. The Turkish Prime Minister,

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Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p.185.

Ismet Pasha, to whom their letter had been directed, denied their competence as Indian representatives to comment on the Turkish Constitution, or as Shi'is to comment on the affairs of a Sunni country. Underlying this resentment was a suspicion that the whole affair was a British plot to weaken the Nationalist government. The intervention was made doubly insulting by the unfortunate chance that the letter fell into the hands of the Constantinople press, for the most part opposed to the Ankara Government, before the original reached the Prime Minister himself.

Toynbee has suggested that there was a basic misunderstanding between the Indian Muslims and the Turkish nationalists: this seems to have been the case. The Indians, that is the Deobandis and the Ali brothers, supported the Turkish nationalists in the belief that they were 'loyal servants of the Caliph of Islam, fighting to rescue their master from a humiliating captivity in the hands of non-Muslim powers.' They gave enthusiastic support to both the Sultan-Caliph and to Ataturk, without taking into consideration the fact that the Caliph regarded Ataturk as an enemy of religion, and Ataturk viewed the Caliph as a traitor to the Turkish nation.¹

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Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p.48.

10. The Indian Muslims and the Middle East, 1924-31

Following the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turks the Islamic world was thrown into a dilemma. Could the Caliphate simply be abandoned? If so, what was to become of the community of Islam of which the Caliph was the head? Could there be an umma without a Caliph, and what would it be like? If not, then who or what was to replace the Ottoman incumbent so unceremoniously ejected?

At about the same time another problem arose as a result of the upheaval which had driven Turkish overlordship from the Holy Land and replaced it by an infidel, European protectorate. Linked with the problem of the Holy Land was the rivalry between the Hashemite rulers of the Hijaz and the Saudis of Najd, who made the protection of the Holy Land and the rights of pilgrims a pretext for their war against the Hijaz.

In Egypt there were two different reactions to the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. The leading ulema saw an opportunity of regaining for Egypt the position of primacy in the Islamic world held from the twelfth century until the Ottoman conquest in 1517. Immediately after the Grand National Assembly abolished the Caliphate, the Egyptian ulema declared that the Caliphate of Prince Abdul Mejid had never been a legal Caliphate, since the Islamic religion did not recognise the Caliphate in terms laid down by the Turkish

Government and accepted by him. They called for a conference to be held in Cairo in March 1925, under the auspices of the University of al-Azhar, with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem as President.¹

The Egyptian Government reacted quite differently from the ulema, arguing that the Ottoman Caliphate had been an object of suspicion to the European powers which had often led to acts of hostility against Turkey. Although the name of the King replaced that of the Caliph in the Khutba, it was made known that the Government had no wish to import the Caliphate into Egypt.²

Others were not so reluctant. As a result of his war-time alliance with Britain the influence of the Hashemite ruler of the Hijaz was considerably increased. His sons Faisal and Abdullah were made rulers of the British mandated territories of Iraq and Transjordan respectively, and Abdullah, foreseeing the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, was anxious that it should be replaced by an Arab Caliphate with his father as Caliph. Sharif Hussain realised that this move would not be welcomed by many Islamic governments and tried to protest, but

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Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p.82.

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Ibid., p.83.

to no avail.¹ Through March 1924 he was recognised as Caliph by one after another group of ulema in Palestine, Iraq and Syria, and finally by the ex-Sultan-Caliph himself.

The growing power of the Hashemites appeared to Ibn Saud of Najd to threaten his own position in the Arabian Peninsula, and their claim to the Caliphate provoked him to invade the Hijaz in August 1924, on the pretext that Hussain had failed to protect the rights of pilgrims visiting Mecca and Medina. Saud's action in carrying the war into the Holy Land was disliked in general by Muslims elsewhere who tended to regard his puritanical interpretation of Islam as heresy and distrusted his guarantees regarding the safety of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina. His suggestion of a conference to discuss the future of the Holy Land was resented by the Egyptians who suspected that he was trying to steal the thunder of their proposed Caliphate Conference.

Saud received the unqualified support of the Indian Khilafat Committee which had little time for Hussain. It is interesting to note that in their righteous indignation with the King of the Hijaz for rebelling against the Turks for British money, the Khilafatists overlooked the fact that Saud had remained neutral, also

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Ibid., p.65.

for British money, although not so much of it. Shaukat Ali was despatched at once as a delegate to the proposed conference. While in Cairo and Jedda in December 1924 he became involved in an argument with the Egyptian ulema who accused him of meddling.

As it happened, neither conference took place until 1926. The Caliphate Conference in Cairo was ignored by many Muslim governments, including those of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Najd. The lone Indian who attended did so in a private capacity. An explanation of this reaction may be that the subject for discussion was considered too controversial, or perhaps, by 1926, no longer of sufficient real importance to warrant participation in what could become acrimonious and useless discussion. The Conference decided that an Islamic Caliphate in conformity with the prescriptions of the Shariah was possible under existing world conditions, and that another conference should meet to appoint a Caliph. No date was set, however, and such a conference was never convened.

King Saud's conference in Mecca later that year was better attended: the administration of the Holy Land and Haj facilities were of importance to all Muslims, although the conference tended to bog down in minute and tedious detail. A decision to set up a permanent Standing Committee to confer annually in Mecca on

Islamic affairs was not implemented, but, more significant in terms of the effort to achieve Islamic solidarity were the divisions and rivalries which permeated the discussion. One example was the decision to adopt Arabic as the official language of the Conference, made possibly only because Arabic speaking delegates overwhelmingly outnumbered the others, and which was opposed by the Indian delegates, Shaukat and Mohammed Ali.

The next Islamic conference was held in 1931 in Jerusalem, convened at a time when Muslim opinion was aroused over the Palestine issue. The Conference arose from the efforts of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, and Mr Shaukat Ali. Invitations were sent to a wide group in an effort to have every shade of Islamic opinion represented. Reactions were mixed and suspicious, for the vagueness of Shaukat's announcement that the conference was to be held 'for the purpose of investigating the actual situation of Islam and the measures to be taken in defence of its interests'¹ left many wondering what the real purpose of the conference was. A section of modernist opinion in Egypt declared the proposal reactionary and contrary to the evolution of modern nation states, a view supported by the Turkish government. In addition, some Palestinian Muslims believed that the whole idea

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H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931', in Arnold J. Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1934 (OUP: London, 1935), p.101.

was a manoeuvre by which the Grand Mufti and Shaukat Ali hoped to strengthen their respective personal positions against rivals in their own countries.

The Conference met in December 1931. As a result an Executive Committee was set up consisting of a President and 25 members, as well as a Central Bureau of seven members, although little was achieved by them owing to a lack of funds. This time particular care was taken to avoid the appearance of a Pan-Arab rather than a Pan-Islamic gathering, and while the Arab delegates did hold an 'Arab Congress' and draw up an 'Arab Covenant', they 'met privately in another building and their action was not in any way associated with the Islamic Congress.'¹ This was the last attempt to hold an Islamic Congress until after the establishment of Pakistan.

11. The Muslim League, 1924-47

While Shaukat and Mohammed Ali represented a diminishing core of militants, the larger, more moderate

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Ibid., p.107.

group, after the collapse of the Khilafat movement and the abolition of the Caliphate, turned once more to internal affairs. Cooperation with the British became acceptable to both the Congress and the Muslim League.

The appointment in 1927 of the Simon Commission changed the atmosphere completely. Both Hindu and Muslim nationalists resented the appointment of an entirely British body to consider a future constitution for India. The Muslim League split on the issue, one group pledging complete loyalty to the British, the other, led by Jinnah (who was once more active in politics), advocating cooperation with the Congress in opposition to the Simon Commission. The publication by the Congress of the Nehru Report in 1928 dealt a severe blow to Jinnah's group, for the constitution it proposed ignored the provision of separate electorates for Muslims contained in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Jinnah sought a compromise which the Congress rejected on the grounds that he could not be regarded as the spokesman of India's Muslims.

Already shaken by Congress rejection of his proposals regarding the Nehru Report, Jinnah became thoroughly disillusioned with prospects for Hindu-Muslim unity during the Round Table conferences in London in 1930 and 1931. His view was shared by the poet and philosopher, Allama Iqbal, also a Muslim representative at the

Conference in 1930, and a close associate of Jinnah from that time. In his Presidential address to the Muslim League meeting at Allahabad in December 1930, Iqbal made the much-quoted statement that he would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan united into a single state, within or without the British Empire. It was ten years before this became official League policy.

Jinnah did not return to the subcontinent until 1935, when the Government of India Act gave India a new constitution and the campaign for the 1937 elections began. The Muslim community was still hopelessly divided and the League had not recovered from the effects of the Nehru Report. Representing the wealthier Muslim landowners, officials and professional men it was essentially conservative and had a limited appeal for the mass of poorer Muslims. Other groups appeared in the late 1920s and early 1930s which drew support from the lower middle class and the wealthier peasants. Most of the ulema supported the Jamiyat-al Ulama-i-Hind (the Indian Association of Muslim Clergy), one of whose main objectives was complete freedom for India. Believing that after the British withdrew Muslims and Hindus would be able to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi, the ulema were committed to unconditional support for the Congress, making them uneasy allies of any Muslim organisation.

They regarded the Muslim League as a puppet of the British and the League saw them as traitors and campfollowers of the Congress.

The Congress won widespread victories in the 1937 elections, and the discrimination experienced by the Muslims in many Congress-dominated areas between 1937 and 1939 convinced the various Muslim groups of the need to cooperate, a situation which the League was quick to exploit. Its membership increased rapidly. It was particularly effective in capturing the imagination of the young Muslims, largely through the medium of the All-India Muslim Student's Association, founded at Aligarh in 1937.¹ Aligarh became the emotional centre of 'Pakistan' before the idea of Partition was adopted by the League as its primary objective at Lahore in 1940. The demand was based on the argument, known as the 'two nation theory' that the Muslims of India constituted a separate nation on the subcontinent, and could not be regarded merely as a minority group. The idea of Pakistan was initially opposed by many Muslim groups outside the League who regarded it as a red herring which diverted Indian Muslims from what they considered its main objective: the independence of all

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Smith, Modern Islam in India, p.152.

India. It was argued by many of the ulema that to speak of nationalism in connection with Islam was to speak of the whole Islamic community, and to use the term in a territorial sense as did the Muslim League was either a contradiction in terms or a heresy. Many were eventually won over when the Muslim League leaders began to speak of a Muslim state. They no doubt meant by this simply a state for Muslims; to the ulema it meant a state governed according to the Shariah law. They became a little more interested, and if the Muslim League was aware of the misconception it remained silent about it. Many of the ulema remained suspicious and continued to oppose the demand for Pakistan to the last.

By the 1940s the League organisation was sufficiently powerful to exert authority over its provincial branches and eventually, on the basis of the 'two nation theory', to claim that it represented the majority of Muslims of the subcontinent. The Congress refused absolutely to accept this theory. It was, by this time, prepared to concede some measure of autonomy to the Muslim majority areas, but sought to persuade the League to join it in ejecting the British, after which the Muslim demands would be discussed. Jinnah was not prepared to trust in the good faith of the Congress leaders, and insisted on the acceptance of Partition before independence. Finally, in June 1947, the British government agreed to the League's demands, and on 15 August that year

Pakistan, consisting of the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan and the western Punjab, together with East Bengal and Sylhet, became an independent sovereign state.

12. Conclusion

By the time the new state of Pakistan was established there had been contact with and deep concern for the Middle East on the part of a quite large group of Indian Muslims, and the shape of the relationship which Pakistan was to have with the countries of that region was outlined in the previous century as a consequence of developments both in India and in the Middle East. The decline of the Mughal and Ottoman Empires reinforced the relative isolation of the Indian Muslims, and the importance of Islam as a rallying cry increased in the subcontinent as it diminished throughout the Middle East. Although Pan-Islamism originated in the Middle East, it was directed primarily against Western encroachment, and became a political weapon of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid. It was essentially a negative force, and proved no match for the rising tide of nationalism, both Turkish and Arab, which flooded the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. To the Muslims in India, under Western imperialist domination, surrounded by an overwhelming Hindu majority, the Pan-Islamic ideal represented the hope of salvation. This attitude

lingered on after the establishment of Pakistan, and it was a long time before it was understood there that, so far as the countries of the Middle East were concerned, religion took second place to issues of national allegiance. At the same time, Pakistan was assessed by many Middle Eastern governments in terms of values other than common religion, such as socialism and anti-imperialism.

By 1947 that group of Indian Muslims, the remnants of the Khilafat movement, who had maintained closest contacts with the Muslims of the Middle East, had formed certain preferences regarding several issues. Although disappointed in Turkey after the abolition of the Caliphate, they admired Ataturk for the manner in which he defended Turkey against the Allied plans embodied in the Treaty of Sevres. Most Indian Muslims aligned themselves with Ibn Saud in his dispute with the Hashemites, partly because they took the view that Hussain had betrayed their cause by rebelling against the Ottoman government in 1916, but also because they believed the Saudis were in a better position than any others to take over the leadership of the Muslim world, which had not so much slipped from the hands of the Turks as been cast aside by them. Their involvement

in this dispute brought the Indian Muslims into conflict with the Egyptians for the first time. At the same time a close relationship developed between the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and some of the Khilafatists. This is not to say that involvement with various factions in the Middle East was decisive in the subsequent formation of Pakistan foreign policy, but rather that attitudes formed before 1947 might well have influenced the hopes and expectations which developed in Pakistan at the time of Partition and immediately after.

When the Government of Pakistan was at last created, it fell however into the hands of the Westernised, modernist leaders of the Muslim League. While the League had adopted resolutions supporting the Palestine Arabs, after 1924 it had been too preoccupied with domestic issues to involve itself deeply in the affairs of the Muslim world. Policy making was therefore in the hands of men who shared with many of the leaders of the Middle East the attitude that the interest of the nation came before that of the Community. At the same time they were under pressure from the extremely vocal Pan-Islamist group within Pakistan. As a result Pakistan's leaders frequently expressed themselves in Pan-Islamic terms, although religion as such was not a major factor in the determination of foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

Some Factors Influencing the Formation of Foreign Policy, 1947-52¹

1. Introduction

Up to the time of independence, little thought had been given to this subject, and any expressions of policy objectives resolved themselves into a vague Pan-Islamism, appearing from time to time in the form of admiration for Turkey, the first Muslim state to defeat European attempts at domination, or of pleas to the British Government to abandon attempts to set up a Jewish state in Palestine. Such attitudes were a reaction to a particular set of circumstances, rather than a coherent policy. This situation evolved largely because there was no one in the Muslim League who had given much thought to the role of a possible Indian Muslim state in world affairs.

¹ Since the object of this chapter is to describe the context of the formation of foreign policy rather than to discuss the details of its implementation, the views of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, and Khwaja Nazimuddin, who succeeded Jinnah as Governor-General, are referred to only briefly, as is the International Islamic Economic Organization, the brainchild of Pakistan's astute Finance Minister (later also Governor-General), Ghulam Mohammed.

In more specific terms, there were many other difficulties encountered by Pakistan's policy makers after 15 August 1947. In addition to the lack of coherent thought on the subject there were huge technical difficulties. It was necessary to build up a foreign service right from the beginning. There was a shortage of senior Muslim administrators, and the few available, with assistance from some Englishmen who remained, had to cope with the seemingly overwhelming problems of creating the apparatus of government. As a completely new state Pakistan had the additional problem of establishing its identity in the eyes of the rest of the world. The name of Pakistan was unfamiliar, its leaders were little known outside the subcontinent, as were the policies they might adopt. In these respects Pakistan was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis India, and since competition with India was from the time of Partition a fact of life for Pakistani diplomacy this disadvantage was especially important. Economic and strategic factors also played an important part in the shaping of foreign policy: underdeveloped economically, divided into two wings separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory, Pakistan inherited many of the strategic problems of undivided India as well as acquiring new ones of its own. Problems of economics and strategy have been of continuing importance. The difficulty of reconciling a solution of these with the inclinations of ideology quickly became apparent.

These are the conditioning factors. What were the principal strands of thought which emerged? An examination of the statements of Jinnah and Iqbal¹ reveals at the most a sketchy view of Pakistan's role in the world, and in the Middle East in particular. Contemporary writing on foreign policy, with few exceptions, tended to be vague and emotional. The choice of Ahmed and Suleri² as examples rests on the availability and relative coherence of their writing, though it is reasonable to regard them as to a large extent representative of their less articulate countrymen. The activities of Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, a Muslim League leader though not an uncritical admirer of Jinnah, are also worth noting. His concept of 'Islamistan', his attempt to make it a reality, and the controversy thereby aroused throw interesting light on the climate of opinion existing in the years immediately following Partition. The Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami (World Muslim Congress) which also had ideals of Islamic unity, was established in 1949. It too made a considerable

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Claimed by Pakistanis as their leading poet and philosopher, Iqbal expressed a wish as early as 1930 that the subcontinent should be partitioned, but died in 1938 before Pakistan was established.

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Especially M. Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East (Kitabi Markaz: Karachi, 1948), and Z.A. Suleri, Whither Pakistan? (Eastern Publishers: London (n.d.)).

contribution to thinking on Pakistan's role in the world. This was the heyday of the Pan-Islamists (though they dislike this term). They and their ideas still exist in Pakistan, but both have lost much of their impetus.

2. Absence of a Coherent Foreign Policy

There were a number of reasons why the men who led the Muslim League had not really considered the kind of foreign policy they would follow in an independent state, perhaps the most important being that until 1940 the creation of a separate Muslim state did not become their official objective. Only in June 1947 was this objective achieved, and the form of the new state decided. In the meantime their energy had been totally absorbed by the internal struggle for Partition, a dual struggle against the Indian National Congress on one hand and the British on the other. As a result the Muslim League leaders acquired a deep suspicion of the Congress, which later became the Indian Government. There emerged also a tendency on the part of the League to look to the British for support against the Congress, although Mountbatten's apparent preference for the Congress and its leaders, and Radcliffe's decisions on Pakistan's boundaries with India, caused a deterioration in the relationship between Britain and Pakistan.

The Muslim League was also at a disadvantage in not having a 'foreign policy man' in the sense that Congress had Nehru. While Nehru had been vitally interested in world politics, and in the role India would fill after

independence, neither Jinnah nor anyone else in the Muslim League had given the same attention to this problem as it concerned Pakistan. The Muslim League had needed lawyers rather than foreign policy theorists, and the field was therefore left open to the sentimental Pan-Islamists. Nehru, of course, had had the advantage that, from the beginning, he could be reasonably certain that there would one day be an independent India.

As there had been no time to consider possible foreign policy for an independent Pakistan before August 1947, so, in the months immediately after, domestic issues were so overwhelming that there was still little time to think about it. The Boundary Award was not published until 16 August 1947. The movement of refugees was accelerated, and communal violence broke out again. Most of the Muslim refugees from India flocked to Karachi, capital of the new Pakistan. The trickle became a flood with which the Pakistan Government was barely able to cope, for the events of Partition placed an enormous strain on the slight administrative resources of the new state.¹ In

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The Civil Service of Pakistan was formed by 157 officers of the Indian Civil Service, 36 of whom were British, who came to Pakistan at the time of Partition. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Duke University Press: Durham, N.C., 1966), p.97. Of these, only one had the rank of Joint Secretary, and half a dozen the rank of Deputy Secretary. Statement by Liaquat Ali Khan, 6 March 1948, Government of Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates, 1948, vol.I, p.279. (In future referred to as CA(L)D.)

addition the Pakistan Government was faced with the problem of extending control into the frontier areas, and it was not until March 1948 that the Khan of Kalat was persuaded to accede to Pakistan.

3. Lack of Experienced Diplomats

Both India and Pakistan, after Independence, suffered from a lack of trained personnel capable of filling the diplomatic posts necessary, although India was a little better off in this respect. The Foreign Political Department had, until 1946, been concerned with the conduct of relations with the Princely States within India, and with the Gulf States, as well as the administration of special areas in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. After 1946 there were representatives in the UK, Ceylon, South Africa, Australia, Burma and Malaya. There were Indians employed in the British Embassy in Iran and in Afghanistan, and there was an Agent-General in China. India had sent a delegation to the League of Nations, and was represented at the San Francisco conference in 1945. Of these representatives, the majority were Hindus, Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan and Malik Firoz Khan Noon being the notable Muslim exceptions.

Immediately after Partition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was set up, the portfolio in the hands of the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. In December Zafrulla Khan took over from Liaquat.

The Ministry was housed in temporary accommodation in Karachi, and served by nine or ten diplomatic officers. Posts set up abroad before Partition were retained by the government of India, and Pakistan had to set about establishing diplomatic relations and opening offices of its own.¹

Almost immediately representatives were appointed to New Delhi, London, Washington, Kabul, Cairo and Teheran. The Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo was one of the few officials with previous experience, having been Indian Trade Commissioner in Egypt from 1945. In April 1948 Ambassadors were appointed to Egypt and Iran. Representatives of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Jordan were appointed to Karachi. These appointments were made on an ad hoc basis.

Not until November 1948 did the Pakistan Government announce its decision to establish the Pakistan Foreign Service. Its members were to be drawn from both Central and Provincial Services, from the armed forces and the public. Of the 85 posts advertised, 56 had been filled by March 1951.² Although the intention was that

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Partition Proceedings, Vol.III. Expert Committees Nos.III-IX, (Government of India Press: New Delhi, 1948). Report of the Expert Committee on Foreign Relations, p.209.

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CA(L)D, 1951, vol.I, 27 March 1951, p.450.

diplomatic personnel should be drawn as far as possible from this source, the government reserved the right to make appointments 'from public life' until sufficient career officers were available to fill senior positions.¹

Despite the steps taken to formalise diplomatic appointments, the difficulty of setting up an adequate service remained. No Ambassador could be found to fill the post at Ankara until April 1949. The man eventually chosen, Mian Bashir Ahmed, a member of the Muslim League Working Committee, was described as a writer, poet and barrister. The Ambassador in Teheran, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, also accredited to Baghdad, had been Pakistan's first Food and Agriculture Minister. Haji Abdas Sattar Saith, Ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia concurrently, had a reputation as an Islamic scholar. In May 1949 B.N. Qureshi, formerly Professor of Oriental Languages at Lahore University, was appointed Pakistan representative concurrently to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

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Zafrulla Khan, 24 December 1948. CA(L)D, 1948, vol. II, p.358.

4. The Problem of Identity

Another serious problem which confronted Pakistan was the need to make itself known throughout the world. In the process of Partition, an Expert Committee on Foreign Relations had been set up to discuss the legal implications of the partition of India, in terms of foreign relations. The most important question was that of 'international personality'. The Expert Committee immediately split into two groups, putting forward diametrically opposed opinions, with the result that no agreement could be reached.

The majority view was that, if certain parts were separated from the main body of India, the remainder would continue the international personality of India. It was a recognised principle of international law that a reduction in the size of a State, so long as an essential part remained, would not obliterate its identity. In the proposed Partition of India, nearly three quarters of the old State would remain. The majority went on to argue that the British government had recognised the position that the Dominion of India inherited the international personality of British India, although in the final resort the issue would be decided 'by appropriate international bodies'.

The Pakistan members of the Committee, Iskandar Mirza and Mohammed Ikramullah, refused to accept this view. They argued that on 15 August two independent

dominions of equal international status would come into existence as successors to the existing government of India which would disappear altogether as an entity. This argument was reinforced by the fact that two governments were functioning in the country, one for Pakistan and one for India, with equal status. In addition, they claimed, the wording of the Indian Independence Act lent no support to the view put forward by their colleagues and it set out to create two independent Dominions out of existing India.¹

They hoped, ultimately, that two new Dominions, Pakistan and Hindustan, would emerge from old India, thus at least setting both on an equal footing internationally from the start. Despite their efforts the Partition Council ultimately accepted the view of the majority of the Expert Committee that all international obligations assumed by pre-existing India would devolve on the Dominion of India and that Dominion would be entitled to the rights associated with such obligations. Into this category would fall India's membership of the United Nations.

After Partition, therefore, considerable effort had to be made by the Pakistan Government to gain effective

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Partition Proceedings, Report of Expert Committee on Foreign Relations, pp.203-6.

recognition. The name itself was unfamiliar to people. Pakistanis tended to feel that the world regarded their country as a theocratic, breakaway state. The need to negotiate new treaties and agreements, and set up new diplomatic missions, put Pakistan diplomatically behind India. This was of particular importance in the light of the almost immediate dispute with India over Kashmir.

The problems created for Pakistan by the decision of the Partition Council were accentuated by the personality of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, who was determined that India should claim a central role in international politics, particularly with regard to Asia. With this in mind he was instrumental in organising the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947. It was first intended that the Conference should be restricted to Southeast Asia, but finally 'it was decided to send invitations to all Asian countries (and to Egypt which is so closely allied to the Middle East countries in culture and general economic and political development) on the ground that psychologically this would have a more profound effect....'¹

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Asian Relations, being the Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947 (Asian Relations Organization: New Delhi, India, 1948), p.4.

Delegates included representatives of cultural associations, individual scholars and some government observers.¹

In his inaugural address to the Conference, Nehru expressed his belief regarding the role India was to play in the region:

The old imperialisms are fading away. The land routes have revived and air travel suddenly brings us very near to one another. This Conference itself is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination. As that domination goes, the walls that surround us fall down and we look at one another again and meet as old friends parted.

In this Conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis

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Delegations attended from Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Cochin China, Laos, Ceylon, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Korea, Malaya, Mongolia, Nepal, Palestine Jewish Delegation, Philippines, Siam, Tadjikistan, Tibet, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam, and observers from the Arab League, Australian Institute of International Affairs, the Australian Institute of Political Science, the India Institute (London), the Institute of Pacific Relations (Moscow), Institute of Pacific Relations (New York), Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), and the United Nations.

in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and Southeast-Asia....There you will find magnificent evidence of the vitality of India's culture which spread out and influenced vast numbers of people.¹

The Muslim League was significantly absent from the Conference. Jinnah's calculation was that if the Muslim League were to send a representative, this might be construed, since he would be part of the Indian delegation, as acceptance of India as one nation, and might at a later date jeopardise the creation of Pakistan. The effect of this decision was to leave the field open for India to make the first diplomatic moves. The Conference undoubtedly gained for Nehru much prestige, and wide acceptance of India as central to the Asian scene. An opportunity to lobby among the countries of the Middle East and the rest of Asia had been lost to the Muslims and, as it turned out, to Pakistan. It seems, according to those close to Jinnah at the time, that not only did he refuse to participate, he took special care to ignore the Conference completely. There were no unofficial contacts.

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Asian Relations Conference Report, pp.20-7.

Another advantage which India gained over Pakistan, small, but irritating to Pakistanis, was its ability to appoint Indian Muslim Ambassadors to Muslim countries: Syed Ali Zaheer, a Shi'i Muslim, was appointed Ambassador to Iran in October 1947 and Dr Syed Hossain was appointed to Egypt. This was a valuable initial propaganda advantage in the projection of the image of India as a secular state, and a reminder that there remained a significant group of Muslims (about 35 million) within India.

India's relative diplomatic effort in the Middle East has sometimes been overestimated. By 1952 Pakistan was represented by seven envoys in nine posts (out of a total of 30): two Ambassadors, two Ministers (one of whom was accredited to three capitals) and three Chargés d'Affaires. At the same time India had five envoys in eight posts (out of a total of 48): three Ambassadors, one of whom was accredited in four capitals, and a Minister. In terms of the number of posts, Pakistan gave proportionally more weight to the Middle East than India, but it should be noted that India's Ambassador in Cairo (Amman, Beirut and Damascus) was Sardar K.M. Pannikar, a man of considerable status and capacity.¹

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See The Statesman's Year-Book 1953. (Macmillan: London, 1953).

Much concern was expressed in Pakistan regarding Indian propaganda in neighbouring Muslim countries, and many questions were asked in the Constituent Assembly about counter measures taken by the Government. A Press Attaché had been appointed in Cairo, and in December 1948 it was announced that the Government hoped to send Press Attachés soon to Ankara, Teheran and Kabul.¹ A similar announcement was made on 7 March 1949 - the officials had apparently not been appointed.² Attempts were made to overcome the difficulties which arose from a shortage of available personnel by the formation of Cultural Associations, each of which received a subsidy of 1,000 rupees a year from the Pakistan Government.³ Arrangements were made for Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian and Turkish students to take up scholarships in Pakistan,

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Khwaja Shahabuddin, 21 December 1948. CA(L)D, 1948, vol.II, p.210.

2

Khwaja Shahabuddin, 7 March 1949. Ibid., 1949, vol.I, pp.466-7.

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These were the Pakistan-Iran, Pakistan-Turkey, Pakistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Arab Cultural Associations. It is significant that it was not thought necessary to differentiate among the Arab countries. (Statement by Fazlur Rahman, 18 December 1948. Ibid., 1948, vol.II, pp.106-7.)

and in return Pakistani students were to be sent to these countries. There were also exchanges of delegations of journalists, writers and academics from Egypt, Turkey and Iran.¹ By the end of 1950 broadcasts were being made by Radio Pakistan in Arabic, Persian, Pushtu, and arrangements were under way for similar broadcasts in Turkish. A publicity organisation in Karachi was issuing magazines and pamphlets in Arabic, Persian and Pushtu.² At the same time Pakistan had trade representatives in Teheran, Baghdad and Jiddah.³

5. Economic and Strategic Problems

The economic and strategic problems facing Pakistan were as important in conditioning the emerging foreign policy as the ideological climate. In fact, in the long run, they have probably proved stronger. The most striking of these problems was the division of the country into two wings, separated by India. The west wing, comprising North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan and the divided Punjab, accounted for approximately

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Mahmud Hussain, 20 March 1950. Ibid., 1950, vol.I, pp.190-2.

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Khwaja Shahabuddin, 24 November 1950. Ibid., 1950, vol.II, p.712.

3

Statement, 11 October 1950. Ibid., 1950, vol.II, p.410.

85 per cent of the area and only 45 per cent of the population.¹ While the east wing (East Bengal) was and has remained the major export producer, both East and West Pakistan were at a disadvantage following Partition, in terms of industrial development. There was no major urban centre in either wing. Dacca and Chittagong in the east, and Karachi and Lahore in the west, had to be quickly built up. The new capital, Karachi, previously capital of Sind and a fishing town with a population of about 300,000, had difficulty in immediately accommodating the necessary administrative apparatus to run a country. Karachi port was inadequate to handle the shipping which of necessity came there when previously it would have gone to Bombay.

Communications between the two wings were almost non-existent and rail communication depended to a large extent on the goodwill of India. In 1947 Pakistan's merchant navy consisted of three vessels with a total tonnage of 18,267.² Air communication was no better. In 1947-8 there were 'one or two usable airfields and some landing strips built for wartime use.' Two private

1

According to preliminary 1951 census figures, quoted by The Statesman's Year-Book, 1952.

2

Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Basic Facts, 1964-1965, Fourth Edition, Islamabad.

airlines between them had twenty DC3's and 5 Convairs, and a Super Constellation which had been leased for longer flights. They linked less than half a dozen towns.¹

In addition to the economic problems, partly created by Partition, partly common to the rest of the underdeveloped world, Pakistan had a number of strategic and defence problems. Some of these arose from Partition, but many were inherited from undivided India. The old India Army had to be divided between the two new Dominions, a necessity raising enormous difficulties. The decision was made to divide it on territorial rather than communal lines, but steps were taken to ensure that Muslim units were transferred, before Partition, to areas which would be in Pakistan. Although the division was not as disastrous to the efficiency of the fighting units as had been expected, it was some time before they could be properly equipped. An additional Pakistani grievance was the claim that India had refused to hand over defence supplies to which Pakistan was entitled. The fact that it was left without ordnance factories and that India retained the major training

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M. Aftab Khan, 'Vital Links', Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 June 1966. Supplement, 'Airlines of Asia'.

colleges presented further problems which had somehow to be overcome.¹

Defence was doubly complicated by the separation of East and West Pakistan. The Pakistan Navy was hardly better off than the merchant fleet. It received two destroyers from the Royal Navy in 1949 and another in 1951. According to 1953 figures, there were in addition four frigates, four fleet minesweepers, two trawlers, two motor minesweepers, motor launches and a fleet replenishment ship.² The three merchant vessels were thus no doubt adequately protected, but could not be said to provide proper inter-wing communication. The Pakistan Air Force, established in August 1947, retained one transport squadron, and two of the nine fighter squadrons belonging to the old Royal Indian Air Force. Pakistan had a slight advantage over India in that most of the pre-Partition training establishments and permanent stations, including the only repair and maintenance workshop, were located in Pakistan.³ The atmosphere of

1

Maj-Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (OUP: Pakistan (Lahore), 1963), especially Ch.III.

2

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1953.

3

Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1967), p.102, n.1.

hostility which quickly developed with India regarding Kashmir necessitated the concentration of forces in West Pakistan, leaving Bengalis feeling vulnerable to possible Indian reprisals for action taken in Kashmir. In the west, Pakistan inherited the North-West Frontier Province and the related problem of defence of the 'traditional invasion route' to the subcontinent. Although the relationship of the Pakistan government with the frontier tribes was somewhat better than that enjoyed by the British, increasingly bad relations with Afghanistan meant that West Pakistan was situated between two sensitive frontiers. There was also an awareness in Pakistan of the huge bulk of Russia, engaged in an unforgotten quest for a warm water port¹ and particularly menacing to the countries along its southern borders in the years following the Second World War. The suitability for Russian purposes of Karachi could not

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For reference to 'the time honoured aspirations of Russia' with regard to Turkey and the Straits, see Aide-Memoire from Russian Foreign Minister to British and French Ambassadors at Petrograd, 19 February/4 March 1915, in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, vol.II (D. Van Nostrand: New York, 1956), p.7. These ambitions were referred to again by the Russian government in 1940 and 1945. See Harry N. Howard, 'The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951', Department of State Bulletin, 19 November 1951, p.810.

be ignored and Pakistan became aware of the need to associate itself, for strength, with other nations, and its first thought was of a Muslim bloc, which would take a neutral position between East and West, giving mutual assistance in economic and defence matters. It seemed, just after Partition, that economic and defence needs coincided with ideological inclination. The efforts made by Pakistan to forge such a bloc and the gradual modification of this policy into acceptance of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact will be discussed in a later chapter.

6. The Views of Iqbal and Jinnah

Apart from economic and strategic considerations, which largely set the limits of foreign policy in the early years, the thinking of men like Iqbal and Jinnah on international questions also had an important though not very positive effect.

Iqbal bewilders us by the complexity and the many-sidedness of his genius. To get a glimpse of the pattern of mind and being that underlay the phenomenon that was Iqbal one has to study him closely. Only then one can realise the great miracle he has worked: he has moulded the minds of the present generation of Pakistanis.¹

1

S.A. Vaqid, Introduction to Iqbal (Pakistan Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), p.14.

Certainly it is true that whatever their political beliefs and objectives, whether they are orthodox Muslims or modernists with more or less secular views, most Pakistanis are able to find a quotation from Iqbal to support their arguments. A philosopher-poet rather than a politician, Iqbal was concerned with the fate of Islam not only in the Indian subcontinent but throughout the world. In the twentieth century he discussed the problem of the decline of Islam and the Islamic world taken up by al-Afghani in the nineteenth century. Iqbal's writing on the Middle East reflects this concern. He was aware of the need for what he called the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, but was at the same time distrustful of Westernisation and liberalism. He admired the revolution wrought by Ataturk in Turkey, although with some reservations:

The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the ideal to the real - a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle.¹

While he was in favour of some rethinking of Islam, he was by no means a modernist, and although he approved

1

Sir Muhammed Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, reprinted 1962), Ch.6, p.162.

of much that was being done in Turkey, he believed that the proper means of reconstruction was 'by healthy conservative criticism' to exert 'a check on the rapid movement of liberalism in the world of Islam.'¹ He disapproved of the secular policy of the nationalists who were determined to keep politics and religion separate. The idea of separation of Church and State, he argued, had been adopted from the history of European political ideas, and was misleading because this dualism did not exist in Islam.

When many Indian Muslims were taken aback, even seriously disillusioned with the Turkish Republic after the abolition of the Caliphate, Iqbal was able to overcome these objections. He upheld the concept of the right of Ijtihad² and supported the exercise of this right by the Turks:

Let us now see how the Grand National Assembly has exercised this power of Ijtihad in regard to the Khilafat. According to Sunni Law the appointment of an Imam or Khalifa is absolutely indispensable. The first question that arises in this connexion is this - Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey's Ijtihad is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly.

1

Ibid., p.153.

2

Ijtihad means independent judgment in a legal or theological question, based on interpretation of the law.

The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, so far as I know have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound.¹

To those who objected that the Caliphate was a necessity for the unity of Islam, he replied that the universal Imamate was no longer a workable idea, once the Empire of Islam had broken up and been replaced by several independent states.

Far from serving any useful purpose it has really stood in the way of a reunion of independent Muslim States. Persia has stood aloof from the Turks in view of her doctrinal differences regarding the Khilafat; Morocco has always looked askance at them, and Arabia has cherished private ambition....²

Iqbal is thus revealed as a supporter of Muslim unity, though not in the traditional sense. According to his view, each Muslim state should 'sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics.' He added:

It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial

1

Iqbal, Reconstruction, p.157.

2

Ibid., p.158.

boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.¹

He envisaged a vague spiritual unity, to be achieved some time in the future. He is not specific as to how it will be reached, except to rule out Imperialism, as attempted by Ottoman Turkey, and Nationalism as advocated by the Arabs.

What was to be Pakistan's role in this? He gave a hint in his presidential address to the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in 1930, in which he first put forward the proposal for partition of the subcontinent:

I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.²

Iqbal appears to have had in mind some messianic role for the newly created Muslim State, a view which was later taken up by many Pakistanis and extended until

1

Ibid., p.159.

2

Cited Vaqid, Introduction, p.46.

it amounted to a claim by Pakistan for the leadership of the Muslim world, a claim which did not help to enhance its popularity in the Arab Middle East during the early years of its existence. It is difficult, however, to build up any firm picture of Iqbal's views on the possible future relationships of Pakistan in the world in general and the Middle East in particular from these scattered references. His concern was only marginal, and he died before the prospect of Pakistan became a reality. Yet his close relationship with the Muslim League leaders suggests that he would not have been much at odds with the early policy which advocated a third Muslim bloc, independent of both the capitalist West and communist East, neither of which, it was asserted, had very much to give Islam, which in essence represented the hope of the world. It is doubtful whether he would have been a supporter of Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman's 'Islamistan' project,¹ but his statement that 'for the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self' until such time as all were strong and powerful, is perhaps an indication that he would have been among those who found Chaudhri Saheb's efforts premature and embarrassing.

1

See pp.90-7 below.

If Iqbal is regarded as having provided much of the inspiration for Pakistan, Jinnah holds a special place as father of the nation, as Quaid-i-Azam or 'Great Leader'. It is probably fair to say that he was responsible for the formation of Pakistan's early foreign policy, as he was responsible for so much else. It is certain that he tended to dominate his colleagues.

In many ways it is difficult to discover much about Jinnah. Although numerous biographies have been written, these are frequently of a sentimental nature, whether written by Pakistanis or by foreigners, and they tend to conclude with the achievement of Pakistan, with only a short postscript dealing with the vital 12 months of his Governor-Generalship. His own papers remained in the hands of his sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, until her death in 1967, after which they were quickly seized by the Government of Pakistan, and are as yet unpublished. Successive governments have assiduously worked at building up the legend of the 'Quaid-i-Azam' and not until the last two or three years, in fact, has even the mildest criticism of Jinnah, his personality or his decisions, been permissible. It is difficult therefore to make a fair assessment of the man or his policy, particularly with regard to independent Pakistan. If he had any firm views on foreign policy they are hard to trace, except as they appear through Muslim League

Resolutions which, at least after 1935, may be regarded as a reflection of his opinions. Those Resolutions containing any reference to foreign affairs are comparatively rare, and almost without exception refer to Palestine. It is said that the only issue on which he had any strong views was that of Palestine and he is reported to have given support in July 1946 to the suggestion that an 'All-Orient Pro-Palestine Conference' be held in India.¹

Despite his boycott of the First Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, and the propaganda opportunities thereby lost, Jinnah had, however, made contact with some Middle Eastern leaders, especially those of Egypt, when he and Liaquat visited Cairo and Basra in December 1946. In Cairo Jinnah explained the demand for Pakistan, saying: 'It is only when Pakistan is established that we [Indian Muslims and Egyptians] should be really free, otherwise there will be the menace of Hindu imperialist Raj spreading its tentacles right across the Middle East.'²

These episodes do not amount to a detailed and coherent foreign policy, and Jinnah's few public statements on this subject before Partition were couched in general terms.

1

Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.167.

2

Ibid., p.174.

In reply to questions at a press conference in Delhi in May 1947 he said: 'The foreign policy of Pakistan can only be for peace and friendly relations with all other nations, and we shall certainly play our part in membership of the United Nations'. He also envisaged a relationship between Pakistan and Britain which would 'be really beneficial to both', but refused to make any explicit statement on the form this relationship might take.

On possible relations with other Muslim countries he made no comment, except to repudiate any suggestion that he envisaged a Pan-Islamic state 'stretching from the Near and Middle East to the Far East after the establishment of Pakistan'.¹ Whatever he may have thought about Pakistan's more immediate role in the Middle East was not revealed. His statements as Governor-General were not frequent. During most of the year his health was seriously failing, his attention taken up with domestic matters and with the dispute with India over Kashmir. His public appearances became fewer, and he eventually died in September 1948, leaving the government in the hands of his Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the Governor-Generalship to the then Premier of East Bengal, Khwaja Nazimuddin.

1

The Times, 22 May 1947.

7. Liaquat and Nazimuddin and the Concept of a Muslim Bloc

During this period there developed in Pakistan, among intellectuals, officials and political leaders, the concept of a Muslim bloc standing between the Communist powers and the West. On one hand a manifestation of the overflow of the 'two nation' theory into foreign policy, satisfying a deep emotional leaning towards the idea of Pan-Islam and therefore commanding wide support, it was on the other hand a response to the feeling that the nations of the West, both in the United Nations and the Commonwealth, had not been particularly sympathetic to Pakistan's international aspirations, while communism was a philosophy repugnant to most Muslims. In international terms the solution to Pakistan's problem appeared to be an independent Muslim bloc.

Although the idea was generally favourably regarded, there were many ideas on just how this 'bloc' should be formed. Some saw it as a formal alliance, some as a kind of 'League of Nations', but for most people it represented simply an attempt to coordinate policy among nations with a common spiritual and cultural link. Liaquat Ali Khan probably falls into this last category. Westernised, politically acute, his main object was to strengthen Pakistan's position in the world vis-à-vis India. Pakistan should have friendly relations with all countries, but Liaquat saw the internal political appeal, and probably

the diplomatic value, of fostering closer relations with the neighbouring Muslim countries. He certainly made strenuous efforts in this regard. The emphasis remained however on the vague objective of 'fostering better relations', until 1951 when, in his 'Id al-Fitr address, he asked:

If the Western Democracies can enter into pacts to protect their way of life, if the Communist countries can form a bloc on the basis that they have an ideology, why cannot the Muslim peoples get together to protect themselves...?

So far we have only been showing sympathy to each other by passing resolutions or issuing statements, but the time has come when we must get closer together and jointly play our part in the councils of the world if we want to survive. There are different types of imperialisms raising their ugly heads. We must unite to defeat their evil designs....¹

This veiled reference to India, and the stronger view on Muslim unity, arose from Liaquat's conclusion that no effective support for Pakistan could be expected from either the United Nations or the Commonwealth, the two bodies on which Pakistani leaders had initially pinned their hopes.

1

Liaquat's 'Id al-Fitr Address, 6 July 1951. The Islamic Review, September 1951.

Most Pakistanis rejected the use of the term 'Pan-Islamism' as a Western invention which was designed to arouse suspicion of Pakistani intentions among its neighbours. Despite Jinnah's declaration that the theory of Pan-Islamism had long ago been exploded,¹ it was argued that the 'lie' (about Pakistan's Pan-Islamic ambitions) was being repeated with a view to creating a gulf between Pakistan and other Muslim states looking to a nationalist regeneration of the Middle East rather than a religious union.²

Statements in the British press from time to time describing Pakistan as a potential leader of the Islamic world did contribute to this suspicion,³ and efforts were made by Pakistani officials to alter this impression. A spokesman for Liaquat Ali Khan said, in May 1949, 'Pakistan also makes it clear that she is not striving for leadership of the Muslim countries but would welcome greater cohesion among them.'⁴ In December 1949 the Pakistan Ambassador to Egypt said that Pakistan was not

1

Jinnah, Press Conference 21 May 1947. The Times, 22 May 1947.

2

Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.208.

3

The Economist, 23 July and 30 July 1947.

4

Dawn, 11 May 1949.

running for leadership but was willing to serve wherever and whenever she could.¹ Nevertheless, the activities and writings of a number of people in Pakistan, and the actions of the government in giving them support, tacit or otherwise, only affirmed the feeling that if Pakistan was not striving for leadership, this was counted its automatic possession. In the years following Independence Pakistan initiated two World Muslim Congresses, both of which were held in Karachi. It was the founder of the International Islamic Economic Organization, in which the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, was the dominant figure.

If Liaquat displayed, for the most part, a reserve towards the more extravagant expressions of Islamic solidarity, Khwaja Nazimuddin was one of its more enthusiastic supporters. As Liaquat was westernised, so Nazimuddin was a strictly orthodox Muslim, both in appearance and in practice. His attachment to the idea of Islamic unity was not only a matter of policy, it was a primary conviction. As Governor-General he gave his support to such bodies as the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami. When Liaquat was assassinated in October 1951, Nazimuddin became Prime Minister. He carried on with enthusiasm the policy which his predecessor had only a short time before begun to pursue with conviction.

1

The Pakistan Times, 15 December 1949.

Nazimuddin was perhaps representative of a broad strand of opinion existing in Pakistan at the time. Numerous statements by religious leaders, journalists and academics were reported in the press describing the creation of Pakistan as an event hailed throughout the Muslim world, a great victory and a symbol of Islamic regeneration. They tended to create within Pakistan a false impression of the degree of Islamic consciousness which existed outside the country. The nationalist Arabs and the secular Turks looked askance at this ebullient addition to the community of nations.

Two examples of the writing which appeared in Pakistan at the time are M. Ahmed's Pakistan and the Middle East, quoted above, published in 1948 and perhaps the first book dealing with Pakistan's place in the Middle East, and Whither Pakistan? by Z.A. Suleri. Ahmed, a civil servant, did not continue to write, but Z.A. Suleri is today a prominent journalist.

Ahmed swayed between confidence and despondency in his discussion of the prospects of Islamic unity. He saw the need for 'some common written agreement' binding both Arab and non-Arab Muslims, perhaps an extension of the Arab League.² While recognising and regretting the

1

Referred to above, p.57, n.2.

2

Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.211.

differences existing between Muslim countries, he optimistically (and mistakenly, as it turned out) predicted that with the disappearance of the older generation of politicians, many of whom were 'trained in clan leadership, blood feuds and treated politics as a matter of personal deeds and personal alliances', these differences would be overcome, for 'the younger generation of political leaders, drawn chiefly from the graduates of Cairo and Beirut are far more nationalist than their elders' and consider 'the Arab League as the authentic answer to their long held and mounting desire for the unification of the Muslim States....'¹

Suleri also supported the idea of an Islamic bloc, which would take a neutral position between the two world power blocs. He maintained that a Muslim bloc, 'natural under any circumstances', became urgent 'in the light of anti-Islamic policies followed by the power groups.'² The United Nations had a Western bias; only when united could the Muslim states influence its deliberations. He referred in this connection to the recent vote to partition Palestine, though overlooking the fact that, on that occasion, the Muslim states even united were too few to be effective. The Muslim governments, Suleri

1

Ibid., p.205.

2

Suleri, Whither Pakistan?, p.83.

argued, should institute some consultative machinery and Pakistan should take the lead in helping to channel emotional unity into 'mechanical and constitutional forms.' There should be cultural exchanges and the Pakistan government should again take the lead in 'constituting a study group on the economic resources of all the Muslim countries.' The aim should be to avoid becoming economically dependent on the United States, the United Kingdom or 'any other country'. In this regard he reminded his readers of the strategic value to the countries of the Middle East of their oil reserves.¹

8. Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman's 'Islamistan' Project

While people like Ahmed and Suleri were content to write, others such as Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman took more direct action. From February 1949 Khaliquzzaman held the office of President of the Pakistan Muslim League. He began to promote his idea of Islamistan, in October 1948, when he expressed his intention of making a tour of the Middle East after the Muslim League elections 'with a view to sounding public opinion for the formation of a world Muslim League representing all Muslim countries.' Such an organisation, he insisted, would

1

Ibid., p.84. Suleri's arguments are an illustration of the kind of statement which helped to make Pakistan suspect in the Middle East.

be useless unless it had a 'genuine peoples' sanction behind it.'¹

Following his election to the presidency of the Muslim League, he again referred to his plan. He said he had discussed it with the delegates to the Fifth World Muslim Congress held in Karachi in February 1949, and received a sympathetic response. He would make the tour with the object of spreading his idea through personal contacts. He would not take it to government level unless Muslim peoples gave it support.²

It is not clear to what extent if at all he had the support of the Pakistan Government. While they dissociated themselves from his project, it seems they were content to let him test the atmosphere, to await the reception of his plan, without committing Pakistan officially one way or the other. Khaliquzzaman himself believed that Liaquat considered the Islamistan project too ambitious and, knowing he would fail, made no attempt to oppose the tour.³ At the same time, Khaliquzzaman's position as President of the Muslim League, at that time the governing party, lent a degree of official sanction

1

Dawn, 10 October 1948.

2

Ibid., 25 February 1949.

3

Interview, Karachi, 18 March 1968.

to his efforts which the Government subsequently found embarrassing.

He set out in September 1949, visiting Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia (for Haj) and Egypt, continuing his journey to London. Despite his insistence that this should be an appeal to people and not to governments, his approach in all capitals was at a high official level. Khaliquzzaman told reporters that he had received a generally favourable response, but that it would take time to work out the details. He was concentrating on 'selling the idea' of Islamistan, 'leaving it to the governments concerned to find the means of achieving it.' He believed that the proposed Arab Security Pact, which he discussed with Egyptian leaders, paved the way for a larger regional grouping including Turkey and Pakistan.¹

He was apparently becoming more ambitious as his tour progressed, and from Egypt he went on to London where he said:

I am not here as a propagandist, but as a negotiator. I am here to find out the British Government's reaction towards a grouping of Middle Eastern countries, that is, the Arab States, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.²

1

Dawn, 4, 8, 14, 29 and 30 October 1949.

2

Ibid., 30 October and 4 November 1949.

There is no record of his conversations with British officials. No doubt the British were wary of this self-appointed ambassador. At the same time there was probably some interest in the idea and in the reactions of the Middle East countries. There was at this time a Soviet propaganda offensive, particularly in Iran, and it was a time during which the British at least were anxious to establish some defence plan or organisation in the region. Khaliquzzaman reported that, though they had favoured the Arab League, they appeared dubious about an organisation uniting all Muslim countries.¹

Meanwhile, his activities had aroused apprehension in Pakistan. Dawn, close to the Government, expressed criticism of Khaliquzzaman's enthusiasm in an editorial on 15 November entitled 'Caution Islamistan':

...however well intentioned Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman's 'Islamistan tour' might have been it has actually resulted in far more harm than good to Pakistan. He occupies at present the position of head of the national organization of the Muslims of Pakistan which is the party in power. Naturally his move would be, and to our knowledge has been, misconstrued as a move which has the support of the Muslim League as well as the Government. This, of course, is a mistaken assumption. While a general desire for friendship and relations of brotherly cooperation among all the Muslims of the world naturally exists, the Muslim League as

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Dawn, 10 November 1949.

an organization has not accepted any such policy as the 'Islamistan' concept developed into a security pact connotes: nor can the Government have even considered it.

The editorial concluded by suggesting that 'Islamistan' be 'put in cold storage'. The forthcoming International Islamic Economic Conference in Karachi would be a much better way of bringing the Muslim countries together without creating doubt or ill-feeling anywhere.

In December 1949 the Pakistan Ambassador in Cairo hastened to correct any wrong impression that may have been made:

Pakistan is not trying to creat 'Islamistan' or even an 'Islamic bloc' from the countries between Indonesia and North Africa. The greatest need is to get individually strong and my government believes it is no use talking of alliances until the countries are strong enough.¹

Regarding the rumoured alliance between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in which the Arab League would be asked to participate, he said that such an alliance would only create suspicion. 'What Islamic countries need is solidarity and closer collaboration between them.'¹

The following month the Acting Foreign Minister, Mahmud Hussain, speaking in the Constituent Assembly,

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The Pakistan Times, 15 December 1949.

denied any government authorisation for Khaliquzzaman to negotiate 'security pacts' with other Muslim countries, or that the government had anything at all to do with his mission.¹ These statements appear to indicate some sympathy for Khaliquzzaman's objectives, and at the same time the embarrassment of the government at the reactions to the too hasty manoeuvres which were in many quarters outside Pakistan not only unwelcome but strongly objected to.

Afghanistan and India both reacted sharply. The Afghan view was that such an idea was not only untenable but un-Islamic, and that India had a better claim than Pakistan to leadership of the Muslim world on the basis of her support for Indonesian independence.² Nehru also condemned the proposal: 'I do not appreciate grouping based on religion. Cultural bonds can be exchanged but politics based on religion can be of no help at all and spell no peaceful aims.'³ Apart from this predictably negative reaction, it appears, despite the favourable reports sent back to Karachi by Dawn's enthusiastic correspondents, that Khaliquzzaman's proposals were

1

Mahmud Hussain, 9 January 1950. CA(L)D, 1949-50, vol.II, p.367.

2

Dawn, 6 October 1949.

3

Ibid., 5 November 1949.

received with coolness. He himself has commented, many years after the event, that while the Shah's views were encouraging, Nuri es-Said of Iraq (although he did not differ in principle from Khaliquzzaman's idea) was inclined towards 'a more co-ordinated and smaller group.' The Syrian government 'did not show any special liking' for the idea. King Abdullah of Jordan had his own worries about the Palestine problem and, while sympathetic, considered the idea premature. In Mecca there was more support, though it seems not at the highest level, and in Egypt again there was disappointment. Here, of course, the question of Palestine was discussed at great length, both with the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the Arab League. According to Khaliquzzaman, the only hope of the 'liberation' of Palestine was through the kind of grouping he envisaged. Much later he wrote:

I do not think the Pasha [Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister] appreciated my point of view and did not condescend to reply. That was practically the end of my hopes of seeing in my life-time a well-knit Islamic polity, for in that tour I found the Arab world completely unaware of world affairs, particularly of-Pakistan....¹

His mission, he now considers, was ill-timed. Pakistan was too new, too little known, and the governments of

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Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew It (Private publication: Karachi, 1966), also serialised in Muslim World (organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami) 21 May - 9 July 1966.

the Middle East were more concerned with their own disputes with their neighbours than with coming together in some kind of pact.

Following his retirement from the presidency of the Muslim League Khaliquzzaman attempted to found the Muslim Peoples' Organization. Similar in aim to the better organised Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami, it was not really successful. The attempt to set up a separate organisation possibly reflects the jealousy and political rivalry which afflicted even those with common goals.

9. The Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami

The foundations of the present Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami or World Muslim Congress are lost in a haze of post-Partition jealousy. Credit for its formation is claimed by the present Secretary-General, Inamullah Khan, and by the President of the Pakistan branch, Professor A.B.A. Haleem. Since the records of the organisation have been lost, if ever they existed, it is difficult to establish the details. It seems, however, that the Motamar was founded by a group of Pakistanis who wanted to revive the traditions of the World Muslim Conferences held before the Second World War. The first conference called by the new group was held in Karachi in February 1949, and Professor Haleem, then Vice-Chancellor of Sind University, as Chairman of the Reception Committee figured prominently in the press reports. It was an

unofficial conference, attended by delegates, mostly scholars, from fourteen countries.¹ It was emphasised that the objects of the Conference were religious, cultural, social and educational. The domestic politics of any country would not be discussed, although international questions affecting the Muslim world, and on which all Muslims were in agreement according to Professor Haleem, would find a place on the agenda.²

The Fifth World Muslim Congress opened on 18 February 1949 and lasted two days. It was treated very gingerly by the Pakistan Government: although the Congress was addressed by Mr Fazlur Rahman, Minister for the Interior, Education and Information, it was emphasised that he spoke only 'in his capacity as a Muslim'. Resolutions favourable to Pakistan were adopted on Palestine, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh, and the condition of the Indian Muslims. Other resolutions called for the setting up of a permanent organisation to carry on the work of the Conference, and the institution of Arabic as the common language of the Muslim world.³

1

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iran, Indonesia, Tunisia, Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Ceylon, Malaya and Hyderabad (Deccan).

2

Dawn, 16 January 1949.

3

Ibid., 20 February 1949.

By the time the Sixth World Muslim Conference took place in February 1951 the Motamar was better organised. The permanent organisation set up by the previous conference with its headquarters in Karachi had been active in making the Motamar and its objectives better known. One of its most publicised activities was 'Egypt Day', 10 December 1950, on which a public meeting was held 'to express the sentiments of the Muslims of Pakistan over the Anglo-Egyptian tussle.'¹

By the end of 1950 plans for the next Conference, to be opened on 9 February 1951, were well under way. This time delegates from 31 countries attended and, though the Conference was still unofficial, the Pakistan government participated readily and in force. The opening address was delivered by the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and speeches were made by three other Ministers, Fazlur Rahman, Khwaja Shahabuddin and Chaudhri Nazir Ahmed Khan. Liaquat told the Conference:

To us in Pakistan nothing is dearer than the prospect of the strengthening of the world-wide Muslim brotherhood. Any endeavour, from whatever direction it is made to bring the Muslims of far flung countries together and to stimulate in them brotherly feelings of mutual affection, understanding and cooperation readily finds an echo in the hearts of the Muslims of Pakistan.²

1

Dawn, 4 and 10 December 1950.

2

Pakistan News, 18 February 1951.

Despite Nazir Ahmed Khan's exhortation that words were not enough, that something concrete must be done about the backwardness and disunity of the Muslim world, the Conference broke up in a hail of resolutions reminiscent of the previous conference.

One positive achievement, however, was the adoption of a constitution for the Motaram-i-Alam-i-Islami. A Permanent Secretariat, situated in Karachi, was set up to deal with the problems of Muslims throughout the world.¹

While its publicity function continued effectively, the Motamar did not meet again in full conference until 1962, for the most part because of those international factors which put an end to the 'Islamic bloc' phase of Pakistan foreign policy. Arab delegates, particularly those of Egypt, began to feel that Pakistan was taking too much of the limelight. The Secretariat decided therefore that it was unwise to attempt to hold another conference in Pakistan, but no other venue could be decided upon. Indonesia was suggested, but the Masjumi government fell and its successor was reluctant to play host to an Islamic Conference. By this time Nasser had come to power in Egypt, and he too was reluctant to open the door to this kind of Conference: while the Motamar itself was pledged not to intervene in the domestic affairs of any country, some of the Muslim Brotherhood

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Dawn, 18 and 20 February 1951.

delegates from other Arab countries were not ready to give similar guarantees. In any case there was little real enthusiasm through the 'fifties for Islamic unity except among the faithful few in Pakistan.

10. Conclusion

The years before Partition had witnessed the growth of contacts between a number of Indian Muslims and some groups in the Middle East. Except for the passage of occasional resolutions, the Muslim League had remained aloof from these developments. Nevertheless the atmosphere of those years, particularly the emotions aroused concerning the Khilafat, left their mark even on men like Jinnah who did not support the campaign itself. The Palestine question, then as now probably the single most important issue concerning the Islamic world, was one to which no Muslim could remain indifferent. Pakistan's leaders were therefore predisposed in certain directions which did not necessarily ease the conduct of foreign policy. They supported the demands of the Palestine Arabs, but divisions within the Arab world, for instance between the Egyptians, the Saudis, and the Hashemite family of Jordan and Iraq, made it extremely difficult for Pakistan to remain on equally good terms with each. At the same time the attitude of most Pakistanis to Turkey was ambivalent: in its progress they took pride, but the abolition of the Caliphate and the implementation of secular policy within the country could not easily be accepted in Pakistan.

A set of emotional responses do not however constitute a coherent foreign policy. Such a policy was not developed either before Partition or for some time after so far as the Middle East was concerned. Preoccupation with legal questions before Partition, and with domestic issues immediately after, pushed consideration of foreign policy into the background.

In addition, as a result of the hostile relations which developed between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan's relative economic and military weakness, the options of the government were limited. The need for aid, both economic and military, soon made apparent the necessity of finding friends who were in a position to give it.

This led to an orientation of Pakistan policy away from Pan-Islamism, for it soon became clear that the countries of the Middle East were not in a position to assist Pakistan, and indeed expressed little evidence of wishing to do so. Diplomatically Pakistan started behind scratch in the region. Its resources in this respect were poor, and if it could be claimed that the Arabs did not understand Pakistan, it is equally clear that most Pakistanis (for whom their identity as Muslims had been the most important single driving force for perhaps two generations) did not even begin to understand the forces operating in the Arab world. The very enthusiasm for Muslim unity with which Pakistan overflowed served only to further undermine the tenuous diplomatic hold it had in the Arab countries.

It is not surprising therefore that when links were eventually forged with Muslim neighbours, with one exception these were, like Pakistan, non-Arab countries, and the step was taken under the auspices of a Western-oriented defence pact rather than Islamic solidarity.

CHAPTER IIIThe First Five Years: Developing
Relations with the Middle East1. Introduction

The domestic issues which preoccupied the Pakistan Government during the first years of independence - the dislocation which resulted from Partition, the difficulties of administration, the problem of the refugees - all contributed to the relegation of foreign policy to the realm of ad hoc response to crisis. Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East developed slowly during the first two years after Partition, gaining momentum towards the end of 1949 largely as a response to new problems facing the Government.

Three foreign policy issues which had important bearing on Pakistan's relations with the Middle East (and with the rest of the world) were the Kashmir dispute, the question of 'Pushtunistan',¹ and the question of Palestine.

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Pushtunistan refers roughly to the Pushtu-speaking areas along Pakistan's north-west frontier. It has never been precisely defined, and has sometimes been assumed to refer to the tribal areas, sometimes to all of West Pakistan west of the Indus River.

Each of these will be discussed in detail in later chapters, and it is necessary at this stage only to outline the early developments in relations with India and Afghanistan with respect to these disputes, in order to put into focus Pakistan's initial attempts to seek a solution through the United Nations and the British Commonwealth; its efforts to form some kind of Muslim grouping; and its subsequent abandonment of this objective for a policy of alignment with a Western defence system, albeit in an Islamic context in the Middle East. Pakistan's involvement in the Palestine question helped, along with Kashmir and Pushtunistan, to colour its view of the world, and of Pakistan's place in it.

The Pakistan Government's faith in the constitutional processes which the Commonwealth appeared to represent was considerable, and immediately after independence membership thereof was, along with membership of the United Nations Organization, one of the foremost planks of foreign policy. Disillusionment with both mounted through 1948 and 1949, and a change in the emphasis of Pakistan's foreign policy appeared after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of April 1949, when Liaquat Ali Khan began to seek a role for Pakistan outside the framework of the British Commonwealth. Part of this new direction in foreign policy was an attempt to establish relationships with the USSR and the USA. Another aspect of it was the attempt to draw closer to the countries of

the Middle East, which manifested itself, at least superficially, in a Pan-Islamic form. This attempt was not particularly successful, and ultimately gave way to the objective of a Western-oriented alignment in Pakistan's foreign policy. It can be argued that the basic ingredients of this policy of alignment have always been present in the minds of the men who ruled Pakistan, although they have not always been at one with public opinion in the country.

The greatest and, as it turned out, the most enduring of the crises facing Pakistan was the dispute with India over Kashmir.

In strict terms the issue revolves around Pakistan's refusal to acknowledge the accession of the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim state, to India, and its insistence that the Kashmiri people should be given the opportunity to decide for themselves what their future status should be (on the assumption that they would have chosen union with Pakistan rather than with India). In addition, however, Kashmir is of economic and strategic importance. West Pakistan is heavily dependent for water on the three rivers which rise in Kashmir, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, and Pakistan feared that if India were to control Kashmir this vital supply might be cut off altogether. In any

case it rendered West Pakistan hostage to India. The State was of strategic concern to both dominions. The Pakistan Government feared that Indian control of Kashmir would threaten the main strategic road and rail systems of West Pakistan, making the country's position 'absolutely untenable'.¹ As a result of its geographical position, sharing borders with China, the USSR and Afghanistan, India too regarded Kashmir as 'intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India.'²

The dispute centred on the question of a plebiscite to which India at one stage agreed, albeit in vague terms, and the question of the demilitarisation of Kashmir, inextricably and impossibly tangled with the first. Hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan following the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen from the North-West

1

Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, speech to the Security Council, 464th Meeting, 8 February 1950. Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year.

2

Nehru, statement to the Constituent Assembly (Legislature), New Delhi, 25 November 1947. Cited, Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After (The John Day Co.: New York, 1950), p.60.

Frontier at the end of 1947, and came to an end on 1 January 1949 with the United Nations call for a ceasefire, after which the diplomatic wrangling began. Pakistan, initially believing that the UN would support its cause, more easily justified on moral than on legal grounds, was consequently disappointed when the UN appeared both unable and unwilling to force a solution. Disillusion followed also with the Commonwealth, whose members refused to involve themselves in a dispute between two of their number. This was regarded by articulate Pakistani opinion as at best moral cowardice and at worst favouritism for India.

Although the question of Pushtunistan never assumed the importance of the Kashmir issue, this dispute with Afghanistan has been equally enduring and was particularly important during the first five years. The British had encountered much opposition from the tribes, and it appears that Afghanistan had some hope of wresting the area, along with Baluchistan, from a weak successor state, thus regaining the lands at one time ruled by the Afghan kings, and at the same time gaining access to the sea.¹ Afghanistan therefore put forward the demand that the people of the North-West Frontier Province should also

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W.A. Wilcox, Pakistan, the Consolidation of a Nation (Columbia University Press: New York, 1963), p.80.

be given the option of union with Afghanistan or independence, rather than a straight choice between India or Pakistan, and gave encouragement to dissident elements along the Frontier, including the small but determined Pushtu nationalist movement led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

Pakistan quickly showed itself stronger than expected and able to control the frontier areas at least as effectively as the British, but the Afghan attitude continued to poison relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It made the demands for autonomy for the North-West Frontier Province a more serious problem, particularly as it was suspected that the Afghans were encouraged by India in order to prevent Pakistan from concentrating its energy on the Kashmir frontier.

The third major foreign policy issue which engaged Pakistan's attention was the dispute between Arabs and Jews over Palestine, under consideration in the United Nations when Pakistan became a member in September 1947. On the question of Palestine the Muslim League had traditionally supported the Arabs, and now, as the Government of an independent state, they were in a position to do so effectively in a world forum. The development of the Palestine question was an important factor in the formation of Pakistan's attitudes towards the UN and the major world powers. The manner in which the UN operated against the interests of the Arabs and the cynical way

in which, so it appeared to Pakistan, this body was manipulated in the Jewish interest by the United States in particular, contributed along with its disappointment over Kashmir, to disillusionment with the United Nations as a means by which the interests of the small and weak could be protected. That the UN was able to take effective action over Korea, an issue in which the United States was directly concerned, seemed to many Pakistanis to underline its failure in the case of Palestine and Kashmir, both Muslim causes. This reinforced their conviction that the Western Powers which then dominated the United Nations were opposed to Islam. A latent tendency to see issues in terms of religion became more evident in Pakistan, leading to a determined effort to identify with the Muslim world, to generate some kind of effective unity among Muslim states. This effort in turn was doomed to failure.

2. Disappointment with the British Commonwealth

It took some time before disappointment in the Commonwealth crystallised, and was expressed in non-government circles in Pakistan before the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, eventually put it into words. In 1947 membership of the Commonwealth was one of the principal bases of Pakistan foreign policy, and it was with a great deal of optimism that Pakistan approached its first Prime Ministers' Conference in October 1948. After the

Conference, Liaquat said:

I shall return to my country with greater faith and courage in the ideals of the Commonwealth. With India, Pakistan and Ceylon coming in, the race and complexion of the Commonwealth have been completely changed.... I hope that, with greater understanding between the East and the West, the Commonwealth will be able to achieve more than it achieved in the past.¹

Liaquat incurred some criticism for his enthusiastic references to the Commonwealth connexion, particularly as he had received no quid pro quo regarding discussion of the Kashmir question.²

When the next Prime Ministers' Conference met in April 1949 India had announced its decision to become a republic, which raised the question of whether and under what conditions it would remain in the Commonwealth. This question was of particular interest to Pakistan whose Constitution was still under discussion. At this time there was difficulty in reaching agreement on a ceasefire line in Kashmir, and India appeared reluctant to take steps towards holding a plebiscite there. When

1

Speaking to a Muslim audience in London, 23 October 1948. The Times, 25 October 1948.

2

Round Table, vol.39. Despatch from Pakistan, January 1949, p.168.

the decision was announced providing for continued Indian membership of the Commonwealth despite its republican status, Dawn asked:

If Pakistan is not going to be any whit more benefitted by continuing to owe allegiance to the Crown than India although she has dispensed with that allegiance, then why should we owe any allegiance to the Crown at all?¹

The question reflected a deeper concern for the extent to which the Commonwealth was prepared to go to accommodate India, which, in addition to repudiating allegiance to the Crown, had made it clear that it would pursue an independent foreign policy, avoiding power blocs. To Pakistan, the Commonwealth was an association which represented some form of security and the opinion was expressed that 'if the Commonwealth is not to some extent a power bloc, it is not of great value to Pakistan.'² At the same time, if it could not or would not take the initiative in attempting to solve problems among members, then it was 'a nebulous and impotent sort of association.'³ This dissatisfaction was expressed by

1

Dawn, (Karachi), 24 April 1949.

2

Round Table, vol.39. Despatch from Pakistan, July 1949, p.365.

3

Ibid.

Liaquat Ali Khan who complained of a tendency in the United Kingdom to take Pakistan for granted.¹ Again, he was criticised at home. Dawn called for 'Deeds Not Words', saying that Liaquat was only now admitting what many of his countrymen had felt for some time.²

This Prime Ministers' Conference marked a change in Liaquat's approach to foreign policy. His new strategy appeared to contain two elements: to establish a closer relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union, on one hand, and with the Muslim countries of the Middle East on the other.³ Liaquat countered President Truman's invitation to Nehru to visit the USA by arranging an invitation for himself to visit Moscow, at the same time holding discussions with a Soviet economic delegation.

1

Dawn, 30 April 1949.

2

Ibid., 1 May 1949.

3

Pakistan was also interested in developing relations with other Muslim countries. President Sukarno of Indonesia was the first Head of State to visit Pakistan, in January 1950. Pakistan support was extended to the efforts of the North African Muslims to achieve independence. While these aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy are important, they do not form part of a discussion of its relations with the Middle East, and do not substantially alter the situation in any way.

In April 1949 the Pakistan Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, expressed the intention of visiting the USA in order to explain Pakistan's need for economic aid and the importance of such aid in the fight against communism.¹ In July the Defence Minister, Iskandar Mirza, toured US army installations and defence plants. His object, he said, was to establish liaison with US armed forces with a view to closer cooperation in the future.²

In December Liaquat Ali Khan announced his acceptance of President Truman's invitation to visit America. The news was received with coolness by the Pakistan press, but thereafter little was heard of plans to visit Russia.³ It is possible that the approaches to Moscow were tactical rather than genuine, and the statements of Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza indicate a Pakistani preference for the United States. The invitation to

1

The New York Times, 8 May 1949, p.35.

2

Ibid., 24 July 1949, p.13.

3

Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1964), p.129, suggests that the reason why the visit was never made was that, according to Newsweek, 21 December 1949, the Soviet Government never replied to communications from Liaquat asking for a date to be set.

Moscow served to regain much of the popularity which Liaquat had lost within Pakistan as a result of his Commonwealth policy, and relations with the USSR had in any case cooled slightly. Economic discussions were broken off when Pakistan refused to devalue the rupee, and the Soviet Union was strongly critical of the International Islamic Economic Conference, held in Karachi in November 1949.¹

In May 1950 Liaquat visited the USA and Canada, explaining Pakistan's problems, and emphasising its attachment to peace and freedom.² There was an immediate response in America:

Liaquat Ali Khan spoke with fervour to our Congress yesterday when he declared that 'no threat or persuasion, no material peril or ideological allurements' could deflect his country from its chosen path of free democracy. Those are strong words and they were spoken in an international atmosphere marked, as he noted, by ugly manifestations of greed, aggression and intolerance. They are a pledge that the Pakistanis will stand and be counted among those who are devoted to freedom, regardless of the cost.³

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See Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan, USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Asia ('Nauka' Publishing House: Moscow, 1964), p.169.

2

See Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: the Heart of Asia (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

3

The New York Times, Editorial, 5 May 1950, p.20.

Liaquat's immediate support of the United States position regarding Korea contributed to the general impression created in his speeches.

He followed this diplomatic foray with a refusal, in December 1950, to attend the coming Prime Ministers' Conference, unless Kashmir was placed on the agenda, a popular decision in Pakistan.¹ When the other Prime Ministers, already in London, agreed to discuss the question, albeit outside the formal conference, the news was headlined by Dawn: 'First Round for Liaquat Claimed',² but the following day it asked 'Should Liaquat Ali Khan have agreed to go to London even though he has scored this point that Kashmir must be jointly discussed by all the Prime Ministers?' and concluded that logically he was right to do so, but that Pakistan had been betrayed so often that one must conclude that Britain, the Commonwealth and 'the senior partner in the West' could not be said to have shown themselves the friends of Pakistan.³ The suggestion was made that Pakistan should look first and foremost to the Muslim countries of the

1

See Dawn, Editorial, 31 December 1950.

2

Ibid., 6 January 1951.

3

Ibid., 7 January 1951.

world for support.¹ This Liaquat had attempted to do, but at the same time some of his statements that the Commonwealth should guarantee the territorial integrity of India and Pakistan indicate that his belief in the usefulness of the Commonwealth had endured.²

3. Closer Ties with the Middle East

(i) Liaquat's Tour, 1949

The discussion of the Kashmir question at the 1951 Prime Ministers' Conference had demonstrated that:

the Commonwealth tie was useful in providing facilities for discussion, but could not provide an overall common interest when two member-States were separated by a real conflict of national interest.³

While Pakistan's disillusion with the Commonwealth increased after this incident, it had been present since the first Conference attended by Pakistan in 1948. Unwilling to allow its case regarding Kashmir to go by

1

Ibid., 8 January 1951.

2

Interview, C.L. Sulzberger, The New York Times, 13 April 1951, p.12.

3

J.D.B. Miller, 'Commonwealth Conferences 1945-1955', reprinted from The Year Book of World Affairs, 1956, vol.10 (Stevens & Sons Limited: London, 1956), p.160.

default to India, Pakistan remained a member of the Commonwealth, but at the same time turned increasingly to the Muslim world, that other group, however vague, with which it could identify itself. The argument that such a group might form a bloc which would be neutral between the West and the Communist bloc arose partly from conviction, but also as a response to the neutralism of Pandit Nehru which, at the time, appeared to Pakistanis to have paid such dividends. Up to 1949 little attention had been devoted to the Middle East by the Pakistan Government. In November 1947 Jinnah had sent Firoz Khan Noon as his special representative to the Middle East and diplomatic relations were established with most countries in the area during 1948. Liaquat had stopped in Cairo on his way home from London in November that year. This was the extent of the contact.

Liaquat's much publicised tour of the Middle East on his return from London in May 1949 had several objectives. The Pakistan press had been critical of his foreign policy, especially with regard to the Commonwealth, and there was growing pressure for a new initiative, particularly in the Muslim world. By making a tour of the Middle East Liaquat was able to allay this criticism and regain much of the popularity which he had lost. His tour had the additional objective of giving him an opportunity to explain Pakistan's problems throughout the area, where, it was felt, Indian propaganda had been

effective at Pakistan's expense. Aware, however, that the Middle East was a sensitive area, Liaquat was careful to state that his visits had no special purpose other than to acknowledge the invitations of the governments concerned and to study the constitutions and achievements of the countries he visited. He also made it clear that, although he would welcome greater 'cohesion' among the Muslim countries, Pakistan was not striving for leadership.¹

In Egypt, Liaquat had two meetings with the Prime Minister, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha, during which they reviewed the situation which had developed in the Muslim countries since Liaquat's previous visit to Cairo. There was at the time increasing strain in Anglo-Egyptian relations and a growing Western concern for the security of the Middle East, from which came most of Europe's oil supplies. Pakistan was then uncommitted in this regard, but it is likely that these were among the topics discussed by Liaquat and the Egyptian Prime Minister. It seemed that Liaquat hoped to jolt British opinion into awareness of Pakistan, as well as encourage 'cohesion' among the Muslim countries, and in an interview with the Cairo correspondent of The Times Liaquat said that it should be the concern of the Western powers to strengthen the Middle East countries, who in turn should realise that

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Dawn, 11 May 1949.

no country could stand alone, that the weaker should accept help from the stronger. Britain, he said, had long since dropped its policy of exploitation and domination, but this was not always realised in the Middle East. This suspicion could be overcome only 'by a large gesture such as only a great power could make.'¹

From Cairo Liaquat went to Baghdad and to Teheran where he had discussions with Iraqi and Iranian leaders. On his return to Karachi, he remarked that his tour had been 'interesting and happy' and that he had been received in the Muslim countries as though he was one of them.² Although he was hailed as 'a super ambassador of Pakistan' whose visits to Egypt, Iraq and Iran, 'brief though they were have cemented more firmly and closer than ever the brotherly ties which already existed,'³ his tour apparently had no practical results.

(ii) The International Islamic Economic Conference

The second half of 1949 also saw the beginning of a Pakistani attempt to promote a regional approach to

1
The Times, 13 May 1949.

2
Dawn, 19 May 1949.

3
Editorial, 'Welcome Back', *ibid.*, 18 May 1949.

economic development throughout the Middle East. The International Islamic Economic Conference, directed to this end, was held in Karachi in November 1949. The initiative came principally from the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed who, aware of the pressing need for economic development throughout the region, entertained the hope that the countries involved would cooperate for this purpose. Ten countries (including Pakistan) attended the conference.¹ The delegations for the most part consisted of businessmen, industrialists and economists. It was considered wiser at this stage not to pitch the conference at an official level.

Ghulam Mohammed explained his idea in his inaugural address.² While the Muslim countries had nearly all won political freedom, economically they were still 'in the iron grip of the powerful nations of the West.' Not until they were economically strong and independent would they be in a position to make their collective voice heard effectively on international matters. To achieve this it was necessary to modernise agriculture and improve the lot of the peasant, which required land reform. Young

1

26 November to 10 December 1949. Attended by delegations from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

2

The Islamic Review, February 1950.

people must be educated in science and technology: the traditional Islamic education system would have to be revised. Domestic capital must be channelled into industry. Foreign capital must be attracted, but without political obligation or domination. To prosper, however, industry required a sense of security, which was not encouraged by political despotism: the Muslim countries must hasten to establish democracy. Corruption in high places must be eradicated. All these suggestions, he argued, were embodied in 'Islamic politico-economic ideology as preached and practised by the Prophet and further implemented by his successors so long as Islam was a living force and a guiding principle.' The system would establish economic equality, 'a democratic republic designed to be a Welfare State.' In this way he was able to present a socialist system, along the lines advocated by the British Labour Party, in a manner which he hoped would appeal to the conservative Muslim governments of the Middle East. Far from advocating that the Muslim countries should adopt capitalism, he argued that, in an effort to attain social justice, the Western democracies were adopting age-old Islamic values. His opinion of the communist experiment came out clearly: while it had many achievements to its credit which one must admire, liberty had suffered at the expense of order, and its anti-religious bias tended to deny extra-economic values. This no Muslim could accept.

But unless the governments of the Muslim countries realised the need to improve the lot of the masses, particularly the peasants, they would run the risk of communism erupting in their midst. The Chinese writing was on the wall for all to see.¹

After the fortnight's discussion which followed, 11 committees presented their reports and recommendations.² It was decided that a permanent International Islamic Economic Organization should be set up with the object of developing trade, commerce, industry, mining, banking, insurance, communications and other forms of economic activity 'calculated to raise living standards and enhance the national prosperity of the people of the Muslim world.' A Secretariat was to be set up in Karachi. The recommendations embodied most of the suggestions made by Ghulam Mohammed, and it was agreed that they should be passed on to the governments concerned. Ghulam Mohammed himself was elected President of the IIEO.

1

The Islamic Review, February 1950.

2

These dealt with: Constitution, International Islamic Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Trade, Finance, Banking, Transport and Communications, Industrial Development, Technical and Scientific Education, Geological Survey, Agricultural and Agrarian Reforms, Travel Facilities and Labour.

The Times noted in an editorial the attempt to draw 'the Muslim countries together on the basis of lasting economic interests rather than of political alliances, which may be transitory and are always liable to be upset by personal or dynastic jealousies.'¹ The Soviet assessment was that the USA was making use of Pan-Islamic tendencies in Pakistan to increase its own influence, in collaboration with the Muslim League 'which hoped thereby to strengthen its prestige in the Muslim world and to take the helm in the Muslim bloc which was to be set up.'² The IIEC was attacked also in the Soviet press and broadcasts, and although it may have been 'far fetched and absurd [of the Russians] to suggest...that it had been engineered by the Western Democracies as part of their plan to build up a Muslim bloc as a bulwark against Communist encroachment'³ it seems fairly clear from the tone of Ghulam Mohammed's address that the prevention of the spread of communism was an objective which he could support. It appears also that the United States quickly

1

'Economics of Islam', 30 November 1949.

2

Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan, p.169.

3

Round Table, vol.40, 1949-50, p.166.

recognised that the IIEO was an organisation whose objectives ran largely parallel to its own.¹

The Second Conference of the IIEO was held the following October in Teheran and, in his Presidential Address, Ghulam Mohammed was unable to report much progress.² The delegates had returned home full of enthusiasm, but had not found opportunities to organise branches in their own countries. He repeated, in stronger terms, much of what he had said in Karachi the previous year, adding:

Our decadence has reached that extreme state at which one loses even the awareness of decay. So bereft are we of the consciousness of our needs that even the few opportunities that are offered to us to improve our conditions are not seized.³

The Middle East had not shown enough interest in the non-political work of the United Nations and the suggestion of establishing an Economic Commission for the Middle East had not evoked much enthusiasm from the countries themselves. The role of an Economic Commission was one which the IIEO itself could take over for the Middle East, but to do so it would need to have at least

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See statement by Avra Warren, US Ambassador to Pakistan, reported in Dawn, 22 June 1952.

2

For text of address, see The Islamic Review, February 1951.

3

Ibid.

semi-official status, and substantial financial assistance from the various governments. Ghulam Mohammed was able, however, to report some progress towards the establishment of a college to train economists (although this progress was largely due to his own efforts).

The Second International Islamic Economic Conference broke up with a set of recommendations reminiscent of the 1949 Conference, although it was felt that the technical nature of the recommendations which concerned banking, insurance, transport and communications, trade, agriculture and labour reform, needed expert planning. It suggested therefore that Committees of Experts meet in Cairo before the Third Annual Conference which was to be held in Damascus during the coming year.¹

Nearly three and a half years passed before the Third International Islamic Economic Conference met, in April 1954, in Karachi. It was convened, under extreme difficulties, by the Secretary-General of the IIEO, Mr Hussain Malik.² In his report to the Conference he explained that conditions in Egypt and Syria had been

1

Report of the Secretary-General to the Third Conference of the IIEO, Alhaiy'at, (Karachi), June-July 1954.

2

Karachi businessman, son-in-law of Ghulam Mohammed.

such that neither of the meetings could be held at the time or in the place scheduled. After consultation with the members' diplomatic representatives, stationed in Pakistan, it was agreed that both meetings should be held in Karachi. Even after this decision was reached, the opening of the Conference had to be postponed for three months, from January to April.¹

Except in some minor matters, Ghulam Mohammed's idealistic scheme was a failure: it had proved impossible to persuade the governments of the countries concerned to participate, and the organisation could not implement its ambitious plans without the financial and other support which would have been available had the IIEO been given official status.

In May 1952 the IIEO had been accorded consultative status by the United Nations, and submitted its first report to that body in May the following year. But apart from publishing a volume of statistics and economic information on the Middle East, nothing else was done. The one real achievement was the establishment of the institute for the training of economists, with considerable American assistance, in Karachi, which as the Institute of Development Economics has done important work in that field.

Many of the recommendations put forward by the various conferences were unpalatable to those in power, and Ghulam Mohammed's forthright references to the need for land reform and democratic reform were hardly calculated to appeal to the conservative elements powerful throughout the region (in Pakistan as elsewhere). Nor was the idea of international co-operation, with its implication that the wealthy should subsidise the less well-off, attractive to the only states in the area with sufficient resources to make the IIEO work: the oil-producing states.

The organisation suffered also from dependence on the efforts of a few men, especially Ghulam Mohammed who, after he became Governor-General, was too preoccupied to devote much attention to the IIEO. Other members felt that Pakistan was taking too great a role: two of the three Conferences were held in Karachi, the two Presidents, Ghulam Mohammed and Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan as well as the Secretary-General, Hussain Malik, were Pakistanis. The Secretariat was situated in Karachi. So was the Institute of Economics. The Arab states, particularly Egypt, tended to resent the central position taken by Pakistan, and set up their own Arab Economic Union, outside the IIEO. By 1954 discussion was taking place on the possibility of liaison between the two organisations. It is interesting to note, also, that while Lebanon had only just joined the IIEO before

the Third Conference, Turkey, though still a member, did not send a representative.

In the face of these difficulties, the IIEO simply withered away.

4. Development of Bilateral Relations with the Middle East Countries

Along with the attempt to establish a regional economic organisation, and the various demands for the formation of some Muslim political grouping (which were treated very gingerly by the Pakistan government), some efforts were made to extend Pakistan's bilateral relations within the region, particularly with Iran and Egypt. Taken together these activities do not amount to very much, and should be regarded as part of Pakistan's efforts to win a propaganda advantage over India.

In July 1949 Iran agreed to a Pakistani suggestion that a joint commission be set up to complete demarcation of the Baluchistan border, previously abandoned because of tension between British and Iranian commissioners. Progress in this direction was painfully slow: no agreement could be reached on the constitution of the

boundary commission until January 1951.¹ In October the Shah accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan and on 18 February 1950, shortly before his arrival in Karachi, a Friendship Treaty was signed in Teheran. The first Middle Eastern leader to visit Pakistan, the Shah received an enthusiastic welcome. In the course of an address to the Constituent Assembly, the Shah remarked that Pakistan and Iran which abided by the same principles and had similar beliefs had now revived their old relations and it would be 'perfectly logical to state that both of them will stand united to maintain peace in this part of the world.'² The visit gave rise to rumours that some sort of union was being contemplated, emphatically denied by Liaquat, who added that Pakistan was not seeking any military alliances.³ In November 1950 negotiations on a trade agreement opened and in the

1

The New York Times, 24 July 1949, and Dawn, 5 January 1951. The Pakistan-Iran boundary question was particularly difficult: demarcation was not completed until 1959, and the agreement reached the same year, which involved the transfer of some Pakistan territory to Iran, was not implemented until 1963.

2

CA(L)D, 1950, vol.I, 15 March 1950, p.37.

3

Interview with C.L. Sulzberger, The New York Times, 13 April 1950, p.12.

same month the flagship of the Iranian Navy paid a goodwill visit. A Pakistan military mission visited Iran in March 1951, but up to the end of 1952 the visit had not been returned: it was then revealed by a Pakistan Government spokesman that no invitation had been extended to the Iranians because Pakistan had been too deeply involved 'with other important duties'.¹

Attention was devoted also to relations with Egypt. An Egyptian Trade Mission had visited Pakistan in May 1949 and a Trade Pact was signed during the same month.² In 1950 both the Finance Minister and the Commerce and Education Minister visited Cairo. Liaquat Ali Khan stopped again in Egypt on his way back from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in January 1951, and later that year a Pakistan press delegation which included Altaf Hussain, the vocal and powerful editor of Dawn, toured Egypt. In August a Treaty of Friendship was signed.

For the most part the effort was on the Pakistani side, but reference should be made to the appointment of Abdul Wahab Azzam Bey as first Egyptian Ambassador to

1

CA(L)D, 1952, vol.II, 19 November 1952, p.357.

2

Dawn, 12 and 13 May 1949.

Pakistan. Frankly pro-Pakistan in his views, he was no doubt responsible for much of the enthusiasm for Egypt expressed in Pakistan, and his outspoken statements on Kashmir involved the Egyptian Government in some difficult exchanges with the Government of India.¹

Friendship Treaties were signed with Syria in August 1950 and with Saudi Arabia in November. A Trade Agreement with Iraq was concluded in March 1951, although an invitation to the Regent, Prince Abdul Ilah, extended the previous year, was not taken up until 1954.

Relations with Turkey, considering later developments, were slow moving during these years. The Pakistan Finance Minister visited Ankara, as did the President of the Pakistan-Turkey Cultural Association, Dr I.H. Qureshi, who was at the same time Deputy Minister for the Interior. On his return, he said it was his object to dispel the ignorance and misunderstanding among Pakistanis regarding Turkey, and passed on a message from his Turkish counterpart: 'Tell my Pakistani brethren that it is a calumny against Turkey to say they are not good Muslims.'² A Turkish military mission visited

1

See The Times, 6 January 1951, and The Times of India, 8 January 1951.

2

Address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, reported Dawn, 14 October 1950.

Pakistan in March 1950, and a Friendship Treaty was signed in July. Nevertheless, Turkey was preoccupied with its attempts to join the Atlantic Pact, and remained cool to professions of Muslim unity.

5. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute and the Anglo-Egyptian Dispute over Suez

Britain's disputes with Iran and Egypt raised a number of difficulties for Pakistan, since it wanted to offend neither the Muslim states involved nor its Commonwealth partner. The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute developed during 1951, bringing Iranian politics, already chaotic, to a state of near anarchy, and suspending the normal conduct of Iranian foreign policy for more than two years. While Pakistani sympathy lay with Iran in its decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,¹ the initial reaction of the press as well as the government, was one of caution.

Those who are today demanding the withdrawal of British technical experts, seem to bank on the Soviet offer to supply technical know-how after nationalization. Even if we take it for granted this is possible, such a replacement of British by Russian experts will not achieve the goal of liquidating foreign influence. Where is the guarantee that Russian

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AIOC.

influence would be more beneficial than British? Barring extremists, most people, we believe, will agree that a better course for Iran will be to defer complete nationalization until the entire industry can be taken over and manned by Iranians themselves....Too much emphasis by Britain on her own imperial interest may lead to her completely losing what she has and may yet partly retain, as well as to Iran finding her independence in jeopardy.¹

However, when the decision to nationalise the AIOC was eventually announced, Dawn assured the Iranian people that 'their struggle is being keenly watched by the people of Pakistan whose sympathy for their cause is sincere and natural because it stems from a common faith in the inviolability of national sovereignty over natural resources.'² The British should recognise the fact that Iran had nationalised its oil, and work towards some agreement whereby cooperation between the AIOC and Iranian Government was possible.³

Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, in a statement on 14 May, declared:

1

Editorial, 'Iranian Oil', Dawn, 16 March 1951.

2

Editorial, 'The Lesson from Iran', *ibid.*, 30 April 1951.

3

Ibid.

The situation is grave and delicate and has very sinister possibilities. I expressed the hope recently in London that a satisfactory and honourable solution and agreement might be reached. It has been quite obvious that the public opinion in Pakistan has been greatly perturbed over this matter, and our sympathies are completely with Iran.¹

This outspoken sympathy with Iran did not endear Pakistan to the United Kingdom. The Round Table correspondent, usually sympathetic towards Pakistan, remarked acidly that, while Pakistan 'feels quite naturally a sympathy for any country, particularly a Muslim one, fighting a battle which she has already won,' in supporting Iran in this way 'the people of Pakistan have overlooked the sanctity of a contract, the moral right of free enterprise to reward and, perhaps above all, the obligation of the Commonwealth to which Pakistan belongs.'²

During the same period the Egyptian Government was waging its own battle with the British over the 1936 Treaty which gave Britain the right to station troops in the Suez Canal zone. This issue, like that of Iranian

1

Pakistan News, 27 May 1951.

2

Round Table, vol.41, 1951-2, p.373.

oil, had wide ramifications for the security of British interests in and beyond the Middle East, and was one on which Pakistan again found itself in sympathy with the Muslim party to the dispute, yet was more reluctant to take too strong a position. Pakistan had very real interest in the fate of the Suez Canal, with which the question of Middle East security was inextricably linked.

It was assumed, at least in Cairo, that Liaquat Ali Khan would act as Egypt's spokesman at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in January 1951, should he decide to attend. While expressing understanding of Pakistan's position, an Egyptian spokesman said Egypt would regret Pakistan's absence, should Liaquat ultimately not go, because 'it would deprive us of a sincere friend who could help us in our troubles.'¹

At that time Egyptian relations with India exhibited signs of strain. The Egyptian Ambassador in Pakistan had publicly expressed the view that 'Kashmir is just as much a problem of Egypt as the Nile Valley, we fully reciprocate the sentiments of our Pakistani brethren who are one with us in the demand of liberation of Suez and the Sudan,'² thus bringing strong official protest from the Indian Government. At the same time Pandit Nehru,

1

Dawn, 6 January 1951.

2

Ibid., 2 January 1951.

passing through Cairo on 3 January, had remarked that the defence of democracy was a more pressing question than the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, thus apparently causing 'stunned incredulity' in Egyptian Government circles.¹ Needless to say, the Pakistan press took advantage of the situation: 'Political quarters are now convinced that it is Pakistan and not Bharat on which Egypt can depend for assistance in her national struggle.'²

The extent to which Liaquat Ali Khan demonstrated this dependability and fulfilled the role expected of him by Egypt during the Commonwealth Conference is not clear. The Egyptian Government conveyed its thanks to Pakistan for the 'sincere attitude' of the Pakistani people and the 'true efforts' made by their Prime Minister for the Egyptian case.³ While in Cairo, on his way home from London, Liaquat stated formally that, as the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were still continuing, 'I hope it will be possible to reach a settlement satisfactory to

1

The Times, 6 January 1951.

2

Dawn, 8 January 1951.

3

Egyptian Foreign Minister, Saleh el-Din, 14 January 1951, *ibid.*, 15 January 1951.

Egypt.' The Suez Canal could only be defended with the cooperation and assistance of Egypt.¹ Back in Karachi, however, Liaquat told the press: 'There was no question of taking any stand regarding the Middle East' at the Prime Ministers' Conference. 'These conferences are held for mutual discussion and taking stock of the situation. There was no definite decision taken with regard to the matter.' He added significantly: 'Now I am better informed with regard to these matters than I was before.'²

Public support for Egypt had been quite vehement in Pakistan towards the end of 1950, and the Government was later criticised for what was regarded in some quarters as a lukewarm attitude towards both the Iranian and Egyptian causes. One of the most vocal of these critics was Mian Iftikharuddin, who, through his newspaper, The Pakistan Times, and in the Constituent Assembly, accused the Government of subservience to British imperial designs.

The Government position was defended by the Acting Foreign Minister, Mahmud Hussain, who said that support

1

Ibid., 21 January 1951.

2

Ibid., 23 January 1951.

had been given to Muslim causes through the United Nations.

That is our policy which we propose to follow and which we shall continue to follow whatever suggestions Mian Sahib may make with the regard to the sending of rifles and troops. That is not the way of dealing with problems in a practical manner. That is not how states behave....¹

Throughout the following months Pakistan's official policy changed little. On 2 November 1951 Zafrulla, in London, told the press that Pakistan had very friendly relations with both Egypt and the UK since it was an Asiatic and Muslim country on one hand and a member of the Commonwealth on the other. There had been no formal discussion of mediation but if Pakistan 'should be in any position to assist in arriving at a solution, we shall be too happy to do so.' He emphasised that Pakistan was very keenly interested in the security of the whole of the Middle East, including the Canal zone, both for the purpose of maintenance of international peace and also from the viewpoint of Pakistan's communications with the West.² During the UN Session he was in almost

1

CA(L)D, 1951, vol.I, 27 March 1951, p.450.

2

Pakistan News, 11 November 1951.

daily touch with the Egyptian Foreign Minister regarding the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.¹

Zafrulla's London statement was carefully guarded, no doubt directed at a British audience. The Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, in a statement to parliament on 22 November 1951, made it clear that while Pakistan was 'vitaly interested in peace and security in the Middle East and in the prosperity and stability of the Muslim countries comprised in it', this peace and security could not be imposed from the outside. It could be maintained only 'with the willing consent of the people in the area affected.'²

6. The Attempt to Convene a Muslim Summit Conference, 1952.

During the United Nations Session at the end of 1951, Zafrulla had been in close touch with the Arab representatives mostly Foreign Ministers. This was a period of mounting crisis in the Middle East, and it no doubt appeared desirable that discussion initiated at this level should be continued

1

Statement by Zafrulla, CA(L)D, 1952, vol.I, 27 March 1952, p.615.

2

Ibid., 1951, vol.II, pp.294-5.

in the form of a conference at Prime Ministerial level. The plan to draw the Muslim countries together for discussion and, hopefully, for cooperation ended in total collapse and marked the end of Pakistan's attempts to bring about any unified action among the Middle Eastern states as a group.

Zafrulla's first step was to visit Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, a tour he was later accused of making at British and American instigation. This he denied outright: the invitation had been extended initially by the Turkish Foreign Minister and his acceptance on the advice of his Prime Minister had been a matter purely between the governments of Turkey and Pakistan.¹ The Turkish invitation had a significance which he did not mention, for in November 1951 Turkey, along with the USA, UK and France, had put forward what became known as the 'Four Power Proposals' on the defence of the Middle East. These proposals were rejected outright by Egypt and produced a revolutionary situation in Syria. The USSR sent Notes to all the Middle Eastern countries warning them against acceptance. Not only the USA and the UK, but also Turkey, were anxious that some agreement could be reached on regional defence arrangements, and wanted to narrow the gaps between the Arabs' position

1

Ibid., 1952, vol.I, 27 March 1952, p.615.

and their own. It was perhaps hoped that Zafrulla would be able to assist them in gaining this objective.

Whatever the hopes may have been, they were vague and unstated. Much later Zafrulla said that from the beginning, when he first put forward the idea in Cairo, he had in mind 'nothing more than that it was an invitation that we should get together for the purpose of devising a system of consultation upon matters of common interest.'¹ A communiqué issued by the Turkish Government, after his four-day visit to Ankara, was couched in vague terms, merely stating that the talks revealed that Turkey and Pakistan 'were unanimously in agreement as to the necessity for the different countries to live free from all pressure and from threat an honourable and peaceful life with its basis in equality' and 'agreed to the necessity of applying their efforts in this sense, while remaining faithful to the principles of the United Nations.'²

So far Pakistan had not been asked, even indirectly, to participate in any Middle East defence scheme, Zafrulla said, but was interested in such arrangements as were made, and would study any such invitation when

1
Press Conference, Dawn, 3 June 1952.

2
Ibid., 28 February 1952.

it was received. Zafrulla's view was that the Suez issue should be settled before any agreement could be reached regarding defence, and he urged Britain to accept the idea that the 1936 Treaty was a dead letter.¹

When he returned to Karachi, he told the press that he found a consciousness of kinship and common destiny throughout the Muslim world, but that in order to survive present dangers

we must now in all earnest begin to translate our consciousness of spiritual and cultural oneness into terms of practical politics. What is essential at this stage is the creation of an appropriate system of consultation in all matters which affect us as a whole.

No specific proposals had so far been made: only after initial consultation would it be possible to devise the shape of the machinery necessary for the implementation of Muslim unity and decide on ways and means to safeguard it.² Whatever identity of views Zafrulla found in Ankara, Beirut, Damascus and Cairo, he encountered difficulty in actually convening the conference.

1

Ibid., 25 and 26 February 1952.

2

Ibid., 28 February 1952.

At a Press Conference on 3 June he strongly denied the assertion that the proposed conference was a 'flop'.¹ At that stage no formal invitations had been sent out. With the exception of one or two Muslim countries who were hesitant, and which he declined to name, most had expressed willingness to attend such a conference.² The two countries indicating reluctance were Turkey and Lebanon. Both were apparently disturbed at the religious emphasis which they feared might be given the conference. Turkey declined on the grounds that, as a secular state, it could not attend a conference for which religion was the main criteria for invitation.³ Lebanon, always aware of its large Christian minority, was also wary of participating in associations with a strongly Muslim bias.

By mid-June it was announced that all the Arab League States except Lebanon had agreed to attend the Conference, expected to open on 15 July. Despite Zafrulla's insistence that no proposals had been made other than for a meeting, the issue became confused by talk of the

1
The Economist, 24 May 1952.

2
Dawn, 3 June 1952.

3
CA(L)D, 1952, vol.II, 12 November 1952, p.6.

formation of a Muslim bloc. The Secretary-General of the Arab League said that Pakistan had simply invited the Muslim countries to attend a Prime Ministers' conference in Karachi to study ways and means of evolving a system of consultation, and to this there was no objection. The question of a pact was purely hypothetical. This view was echoed by the Egyptian Foreign Minister who said that Egypt would attend the conference, although it had not been decided whether the Prime Minister would lead the delegation. Egypt too was probably slightly wary of becoming involved at a high official level in an Islamic conference which went beyond the bounds of Arab nationalism, and to which India would be very likely to take exception. Pakistan had the full support, however, of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, both extremist, orthodox Muslims who not only favoured the conference, but also the idea of a Pan-Islamic Pact.¹

Pakistan also had the support, which it might have preferred unvoiced, of the United States Ambassador in Karachi, who, speaking in Washington on 17 June, said that the purpose of the Pakistan Government in trying to create a consultative organisation of Muslim States was to encourage 'political and economic stability' in the

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Dawn, 18 June 1952.

Middle East. 'There is no doubt in my mind where Pakistan stands on issues which involve world morality, and real - not illusory - peace and security.'¹ The United States was in favour of regional conferences, and therefore supported the proposed Prime Ministers' conference. America believed that it was being convened to deal with regional problems and that the basis was not religion.²

Events, however, were working against the conference. On 29 June the Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a statement announcing its postponement:

It was hoped that by the end of Ramazan the pressing domestic problems with which some of the invited countries were occupied would have sufficiently eased to enable the Prime Ministers of these countries to attend. Unfortunately this has not proved to be the case.³

Conditions did not improve. On 23 July General Neguib seized power in Egypt, after which King Farouk abdicated and left the country. In a Press Statement, Zafrulla described the situation throughout the Middle East as

1
Ibid., 18 June 1952.

2
Ibid., 22 June 1952.

3
The Times, 30 June 1952.

precariously balanced between peace and disorder:

It is to be hoped that, in the first instance, law and order in all Middle East territories, in which Pakistan is also included, will be impartially, firmly, and, if necessary, even ruthlessly maintained, and that, in the second place, these policies will be put into operation with the single-minded purpose of promoting beneficent cooperation between different sections of the people of each country and between all the countries of the region.¹

The tone of the statement seems to indicate that Zafrulla himself had by this time given up hope of carrying through his plans of a summit meeting. In November a Government spokesman told the Constituent Assembly: 'In the present circumstances it is difficult to predict when the proposed conference is likely to be held.'² Its abandonment marked the end of what might be termed the 'Pan-Islamic' phase of Pakistan foreign policy. Thereafter, the drift towards alignment gained momentum.

7. Conclusion

In 1947 Pakistan sought a solution within the framework of the British Commonwealth and the United

1

Dawn, 25 July 1952.

2

CA(L)D, 1952, vol.II, 12 November 1952, p.6.

Nations to the international problems confronting it. The lack of success achieved by it within the latter organisation underlined the necessity for Pakistan to have friends on whom it could rely. These it expected to find within the Commonwealth. While the Commonwealth was prepared to give Pakistan support in its quarrels with countries such as Afghanistan who did not belong to the association, in the matter of Kashmir, which for Pakistanis was much more important, the Commonwealth refused to become involved in a dispute between two of its members, and Pakistan received little satisfaction.

There followed attempts to build up relationships outside the Commonwealth, with Russia and America, and with the other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. Religious fervour was high following the successful establishment of Pakistan, and the idealism which had demanded a separate state for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, and clamoured for a truly 'Islamic' Constitution (as yet undefined), clamoured also for the extension of Islamic ideals into foreign policy. If it had been a sufficiently strong force to gain the Indian Muslims a country of their own, might it not be strong enough to carry the united Muslim world forward on the crest of an irresistible wave to victory in all their international objectives?

The Government therefore had popular support for its Middle East policy. It is hard to know to what

extent Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza were spurred on by this Pan-Islamic fervour, for to even the most westernised Pakistani, his identity as a Muslim is of great importance. It was probably a stronger driving force for Zafrulla and Nazimuddin, both more orthodox in their beliefs and practice. Certainly Pakistan's need for friends was an objective which all recognised, and no doubt even Liaquat expected that the Muslim countries would be predisposed to support Pakistan, if only they were made sufficiently aware of its problems; Ghulam Mohammed hoped that, through the IIEO, economic cooperation could lead to the strengthening of the Muslim countries as a group, and ultimately enable Pakistan to gain its objectives; and Zafrulla hoped that if the Prime Ministers could be brought together they could devise some formal machinery for consultation and presumably cooperation.

It was obvious by the end of 1952, if it had not been obvious earlier, that religion was not an effective rallying cry in the Middle East, and that, while its bilateral relations with the countries of the region were on the whole good, Pakistan's hopes of organising them to take concerted action, especially on its behalf, were vain. Those who attempted to implement such a policy had overlooked, or misunderstood, many realities in Middle East politics. Before Pakistan was created the Arab states had set up their own machinery for

consultation in the Arab League. They preferred to cooperate, as best they could, on a basis of Arab nationalism rather than Islamic unity. They had their Council meetings, and Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers met frequently to discuss matters of interest to themselves. Suggestions that the Arab League should be extended to non-Arab countries did not find favour among its members. Even while participating in the IIEO, they signed a Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty¹ among themselves, and set up an Arab Economic Union. By the end of 1952 the Treaty had been ratified by Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Yemeni ratification followed in 1953. So far as the Arab countries were concerned, Pakistan was superfluous.

Pakistan also misunderstood Turkish aversion to participation in overtly religious organisations and the determination with which Turkey pursued a European identity. In any case, the rift between Turkey and the Arab countries was too deep for Pakistan to draw them together with pious phrases, or even such energetic diplomacy as Zafrulla at times displayed.

1

For text of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Among the States of the Arab League, 13 April 1950, see M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, vol.II (Khayats: Beirut, 1962), p.101.

Iran, isolated like Pakistan, was perhaps most receptive to ideas of unity, but its relations with the Arabs were not easy, and during the period 1947-52 the internal situation was so unstable as to make it more than usually difficult for Iran to operate effectively within any sort of Middle East grouping.

By the end of 1952 Iran was not the only country with severe domestic problems: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan had all experienced assassination, coup and counter-coup. Pakistan was forced to revise the strategy of its search for friends. It had tried hard in the Middle East, and ironically even the strength of its efforts helped defeat its purpose: the constant denials of a desire for leadership were not always considered convincing, sincere though they probably were.

Just as the Commonwealth was not totally abandoned by Pakistan, neither was the idea of Muslim unity. Even after the decision was taken to opt for a Western-oriented military alliance, the steps in this direction were initially with Muslim (albeit secular) Turkey and Iraq, and the drift towards alignment was guided as far as possible through Islamic channels. Hopes of economic cooperation were not forgotten either: these objectives were also pursued through the Baghdad Pact and later CENTO, and in Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) one finds more than a hint of Ghulam Mohammed's International Islamic Economic Organization.

CHAPTER IV

The Drift Towards Alignment in the Middle East, 1953-55

1. Introduction

Questions of a defence system for the Middle East had been discussed in Western capitals virtually since the end of the Second World War but, while Pakistan expressed concern for the security of the region from time to time, no move was made towards participation until the second half of 1953. It is in some ways unreal to set arbitrary dates in this way, for the drift towards alignment began before 1953, perhaps as early as 1951.¹ The exact date is debatable. What is certain is that the 'Pan-Islamic phase' did not outlast 1952: it had become perfectly clear that the Muslim countries, especially Egypt and Turkey, were less than enthusiastic about the ideas emanating from Karachi.

Pakistan's entry into the Middle East defence system is frequently linked without question to the decision to

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Maj.-Gen. Fazal Mugeem Khan in The Story of the Pakistan Army (OUP: Lahore, 1963), p.154, says that Ayub Khan was thinking along these lines as early as August 1951. See also Selig Harrison, 'Case History of a Mistake', New Republic, 10 August 1959.

align itself to the West:¹ first the agreement with Turkey in February 1954, then the Mutual Security Agreement with the United States in May, SEATO in September, then, a year later in September 1955, almost inevitably, adherence to the Baghdad Pact. This is perhaps an oversimplification. The negotiations for the agreements with Turkey and America are inextricably mixed, but they did satisfy two Pakistan policy objectives: to strengthen its defence vis-à-vis India, and to achieve close cooperation with other Muslim countries. This did not occur in the manner in which the Pakistan Government would perhaps have liked: an agreement concluded with Arab approval would have been preferable, as would have been the absence of US pressure and interference.

Considering these two policy objectives, there are several questions which need to be examined: why was the Turkey-Pakistan agreement not used as a basis for the Middle East defence system as, according to many statements at the time, was intended? Why, if a new

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See, for example, M.A. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts (East Publications: Karachi, 1958), p.101; Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security (Longmans, Green & Co.: Pakistan Branch, 1960), pp.121-4; L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (Faber and Faber: London, 1962), p.117.

pact was needed, was Pakistan not a founder member of it? Why did Pakistan's Government take so many months to announce its decision to join the Turkey-Iraq Pact, and so many more months before formal accession took place?

If answers are to be sought, it is impossible to treat Pakistani action in a vacuum: it is necessary to take into consideration the attitudes to defence of the Middle East of others concerned in it. The British, the Americans, the Arab states, the Turks and the Iranians all had their own views of the desirability of various systems of defence, as well as the Pakistanis. There were conflicting hopes and objectives. It is within this context that Pakistani decisions were made and action taken.

2. Attitudes to Defence of the Middle East before 1953

(i) Britain and the United States

After the Second World War British and American interests in the Middle East coincided to a very large extent, although there were some significant differences, particularly with regard to the question of Palestine. Britain, as a major European power with considerable interests in India and the Far East, had been accustomed to regard the security of the Middle East as strategically vital. Central to this strategy was the security of the

Suez Canal area. American interests in the region had by contrast been minimal, confined to a few missionaries, some educational institutions and a small but growing involvement in oil exploration and production, none of which had called for participation by the United States Government.

After 1945 the region gained new importance in the light of the developing cold war between Russia and the West, in that it was the source of most of Europe's oil supply, on which the economies of the West European countries were becoming increasingly dependent. This aspect was of special concern to Britain, but also to the United States, aware of the growing fuel needs of Western Europe and fearing America's inability to meet more than its own domestic needs.¹ There was some apprehension, particularly regarding the Iranian oilfields, that the Soviet Union could be in a position to deny oil to the West, even if it could not make use of the oil itself.²

1

Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (Cassell: London, 1952), pp.266, 294, 312, 241.

2

Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cassell: London, 1960), p.212. There was some disagreement on this point. The British argued that the Abadan oilfields were inaccessible to Russia, the Americans that a pipeline could be built to the Caucasus in a couple of years.

United States interest was directed therefore mainly towards the countries along the Soviet borders. In March 1947 President Truman, in response to Soviet pressure in the area, declared the defence of Greece and Turkey vital to the USA and agreed to give them military aid. Aid was also extended to Iran, whose internal security was thought to be threatened by the presence of Russian troops, and later by Russian activities in the north-west.¹ In May 1951 Truman introduced his Mutual Security Programme designed to assist the countries of the area to withstand the pressures exerted on them and to progress towards stability and improved living conditions.²

Britain was at this stage engaged in disputes with both Iran and Egypt over Iran's nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company³ and Egyptian demands that

1

Following an agreement between US and Iran in May 1950 under the provisions of the US Mutual Defence Assistance Programme of 1949.

2

Truman recommended \$415m. in military aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran, of which some might be made available to other Middle Eastern countries, and \$125m. economic aid for the Middle East, exclusive of Greece and Turkey, which received such aid under the European plan. See Department of State Bulletin (DSB), 30 July 1951, p.177.

3

AIOC.

Britain evacuate the Suez Canal base and recognise Egypt's claims regarding the Sudan. The British Government regarded the maintenance of a base in Suez and access to Iranian oil as vital, and Anthony Eden (who became Foreign Secretary once more following the Conservative victory in the October 1951 General Election) was especially concerned that British prestige in the region would be seriously threatened if Britain permitted international agreements such as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the agreements between the AIOC and Iran to be unilaterally denounced. This led him to take a more or less uncompromising line which the Americans, lacking sympathy for what appeared to them British colonialism, could not fully support. The American policy was to attempt to minimise the differences between the Middle Eastern countries and the West, and to convince the former that 'their best hope for survival lies in firm support of the principle of collective security.'¹ To this end the United States joined with Britain, France and Turkey in putting forward the plan (known as the Four Power Proposals) of an Allied Middle East Command to Egypt in October 1951. The Arab response to this plan was entirely negative, and the new Republican Administration which came to power in the United States

1

Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, July 1951. DSB, 30 July 1951, p.176.

in 1953, while still committed to the idea of regional security, revised its approach to the problem.

Following a tour of the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953, the new Secretary of State, Dulles, concluded that:

a Middle East Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.¹

1

Dulles, broadcast, 1 June 1953, DSB, 15 June 1953, p.835.

(ii) The Arab Countries

Although a single Arab attitude to the question of Middle East defence could not be said to exist, there were several fairly common reactions. The Arabs were in general unimpressed by Western fears of Soviet communism, replying that it was from the old colonial powers of Europe with whom they were now being asked to cooperate that they had suffered aggression in the past. Egypt was in the midst of a dispute over the presence on its soil of British troops, and Iraq was anxious to revise an old and increasingly unpopular treaty with the UK.

Consequently the Four Power Proposals of October 1951, suggesting the establishment of an Allied Middle East Command, in which the countries of the area able and willing to contribute to its defence should participate, were put to Egypt.¹ Egypt was invited to become a founder member, and the British base at Suez would then become an Allied base. The proposals were rejected out of hand by the Egyptian Government which said that it could not consider these or any other proposals concerning the differences outstanding between the UK and Egypt while there were British forces of occupation in Egypt and

1

Referred to above. For text of the Proposals see DSB, 22 October 1951, pp.647-8.

the Sudan.¹ This rejection was followed almost immediately by the abrogation by Egypt of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Despite the instability and lack of consensus which plagued Egyptian politics during the early 1950s the different men who came to power generally held the view that the evacuation of British troops from the Canal zone was not negotiable. All that remained to be discussed was the manner and time of their departure.

It was generally considered that the Arab Security Pact of 1950, which regarded armed aggression against one of the signatories to be aggression against all, was the proper framework for a Middle East defence system. If the Western countries were really interested in the defence of the region, they could contribute military assistance to this organisation.

This was not a satisfactory proposition to the US or the UK for a number of reasons. The Arab Security Pact was regarded by the signatories as directed primarily against Israel, and neither of these Western powers could support this. It was confined to members

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Statement issued Cairo, 14 October 1951. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1951, p.11776.

of the Arab League, and Britain and America were concerned that non-Arab countries, especially Turkey and Iran, should be part of any Middle East defence arrangement. Since, in any case, their objective was the containment of Soviet communism and the protection of their oil resources, such a pact did not suit their purposes at all. There was apparently, then, no meeting point between the Arabs' view of their own requirements and the Western conception of Middle East defence.

The unity of the Arab states on this question was however undermined by the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, and the antagonism which existed between the Saudis and the Hashemite kings of Jordan and Iraq. This was accentuated by the resentment which grew with time at Egyptian demands that its own disputes with the UK be settled before any Arab state should conclude an agreement with any Western country. It began to appear that the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was frozen into stalemate and Iraq in particular was unwilling to permit considerations of its own security to remain dependent on Egyptian policy. Consequently Iraq showed interest in the Turkey-Pakistan agreement of April 1954, and itself signed an agreement with Turkey in February 1955. The Egyptian reaction was one of violent opposition, in which they received Saudi support, for they regarded these agreements as the thin end of a wedge which would

destroy the unity of the Arab world and their own hopes of leadership within it. It led also to a struggle between these two for influence over the smaller Arab states, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which further undermined such unity as may have existed.

(iii) Turkey

Turkey was the only country of the region which, in the years just after the Second World War, shared the US and UK interpretation of the Soviet threat to the area.¹ The aid coming to Turkey under the Truman doctrine was therefore welcomed, but regarded as insufficient. Convinced that the security of Italy and the eastern Mediterranean depended on the security of Greece and Turkey, and that the Middle East should therefore be taken into account at well,² the Turks were anxious also

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L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p.148. Russia had a traditional interest in gaining access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and in 1940 and again in 1945 gave notice of a desire to alter the situation in its favour, demanding virtual control over the Straits and the cession of territory in the Kars and Ardahan region of eastern Anatolia. See DSB, 19 November 1951, p.811.

2

The Times, 21 March and 3 December 1949.

to establish their identity as part of Europe rather than the Middle East. Membership of NATO became their 'irreducible minimum demand' for which they pressed 'with all means at their disposal.'¹ They refused to accept the US view² that the countries of the region 'were still politically and militarily too weak and unreliable to offer solid ground on which an efficient organization like that of the Atlantic Pact can be built.' Finally Turkey was admitted to full membership of NATO by a protocol signed on 22 October 1951, effective the following February.

Having gained its objective of becoming part of the European defence system, Turkey was still anxious that its eastern and southern flank should be protected by some sort of security arrangement for the Middle East. For this reason the Turkish Government supported the Four Power Proposals of October 1951. Reactivation of the Suez base in the event of attack on Turkey remained a British demand, one to which the Egyptian Government reluctantly agreed in 1954. With this in mind, Turkey was anxious that an Anglo-Egyptian settlement be reached, and the

1

Thomas and Frye, p.150.

2

Put forward in Ankara by Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, The Times, 3 December 1949.

Ambassador in London urged Eden to come to an agreement with General Neguib, to which Eden apparently replied by suggesting that the Turks 'continue to impress upon him that he must go some way to meet us.'¹

Turkey had as little influence in Cairo as it appeared to have in London.² Although hopeful of persuading Egypt to come around to the Turkish point of view, Turkey meanwhile turned its attention, with US encouragement, to Pakistan and Iraq, two countries willing to follow the lead it was prepared to give in building up Middle Eastern defence.³

1

Eden, p.245.

2

The Turks attributed the distrust in a number of Arab countries to 'an emotional state of mind which prevents those countries taking a realistic view. Egyptian sensitiveness, it is believed, is aggravated by the fear that Turkey may displace Egypt in leadership of the Arab world, especially after the signature of the treaty between Turkey and Pakistan.' Report from The Times' Istanbul correspondent following a conference of Turkish diplomats in Arab countries, 12 July 1954.

3

J.C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers: New York, 1958), p.52.

(iv) Iran

There is in Iran a tradition of neutrality, and Iranians take pride in the survival of their nation for over two thousand years despite invasion and conquest, which, they proudly claim, they have never resisted. While under a direct threat from the USSR in the form of the presence of Soviet troops immediately after the War, and Soviet activity in Azerbaijan, conditions within the country were so chaotic as to make participation in regional defence arrangements impossible.

Under the Mossadeq regime a suddenly reawakened nationalism led to the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in May 1951, precipitating a dispute with the UK which lasted until 1954. Mossadeq had the support of leftist elements, especially the Tudeh Party which received financial backing from the USSR. Also strongly nationalist were some right wing groups, led in the Majlis by Maulana Kashani, who nevertheless was personally opposed to Mossadeq. The Fedayeen, bearing close resemblance to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, was also extremely nationalistic.

Between these two extremes the Shah held a precarious balance, which almost collapsed in August 1953 when he fled the country. The situation was, however, reversed by an army counter-coup led by General Zahedi, and Mossadeq was overthrown. Negotiations then

began towards a settlement with the British, finally achieved in August 1954. Not until over a year later did the Shah judge his position sufficiently secure for him to commit Iran to membership of the Baghdad Pact. The commitment was a personal one: of the Shah to the West; and, by inference, of the West, especially the USA, to the Shah.

(v) Pakistan

Pre-Partition India had been an important defence base for Britain. In the Persian Gulf area, as on the North-West Frontier, Pakistan inherited a strategic responsibility.¹ Although aware of the gap left by their

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'Any concept of defence in this region must take account of Pakistan as the largest, if not the most experienced, Muslim State, and of India as the geographical centre of southern Asia.' Thus wrote Olaf Caroe, an Englishman with long experience of India, and the last British Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, in 1949. He went on to argue for a defence organisation centred on the Persian Gulf which he maintained was far more the hub of the Muslim world than Cairo. See Round Table, March 1949. With the Persian Gulf oil in mind, he enlarged on this argument three years later: the regional grouping proper for the defence of the Nearer and Middle East was not around the Mediterranean. It was the ring of Muslim states of South-Western Asia, from Turkey to Arabia and Pakistan, roughly gathered around the Persian Gulf. See Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (Macmillan: London, 1951), pp.193-4.

withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, the British Government was reportedly at first reluctant to support plans for a defence system which would include Pakistan, fearing that such a move would antagonise the USSR unnecessarily, further alienate Nehru, and make a settlement of the Suez dispute more difficult.¹

Pakistan's view of Middle East defence and its own part in it took time to form. Pakistan took no part in the early discussions of Middle East defence. It was not represented at the Commonwealth talks on this subject held in London in January 1951. According to the British Defence Minister, the Pakistan Government was aware of the conference but did not indicate its intention of attending. Liaquat Ali Khan said that Pakistan had not attended the talks because it was unwilling to be involved in any such plans on account of its political and military responsibilities in Kashmir.²

Regarding the Four Power Proposals, the Pakistan view developed in support of the Egyptian stand that no such defence plan could be put into action until the major

1

Welles Hagen, writing in The New York Times, 29 January 1954, p.5.

2

Shinwell and Liaquat statements, reported Dawn, 23 June 1951.

disputes in the area had been resolved. 'It is inconceivable to me,' said Zafrulla Khan, 'that any kind of defence plan [could be implemented] without the consent and cooperation of the countries of the area concerned.'¹

Through 1953, rumours that Pakistan had been invited to join 'MEDO'² (as it was then called) proliferated, supported by Turkish statements that such an invitation should be extended³ and by the visit of US military experts to Pakistan.⁴ A change in Pakistan policy was foreshadowed in a speech by the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Professor Bokhari, who said that Pakistan needed friends to support it in the UN if it were to get a 'just and fair settlement' of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan had friends in the Middle East because of religious and cultural links, but the area had its own problems and difficulties, and was not as highly developed as Europe or America.⁵

1

Zafrulla statement, Pakistan News, 9 December 1951.

2

Middle East Defence Organization.

3

Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mehmet Fuad Koprulu, The Pakistan Times, 5 January 1953.

4

Ibid., 27 January 1953.

5

The Pakistan Times, 29 January 1953.

The need for aid was becoming more pressing as a result of falling jute and cotton prices following the end of the fighting in Korea in July 1953. If industrial development was to proceed at the necessary pace, much equipment had to be imported: the fall in foreign exchange earnings was therefore especially serious. In addition, through 1953, a growing food shortage placed even more pressure on the Pakistan Government to seek help elsewhere. There were, then, many indications that Pakistan would seek some kind of aid from the United States. But there was no particular reason to believe, at least at this stage, that its views on Middle East defence had altered.

In January the Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, denied that any talks of this nature were going on.¹ Zafrulla, visiting Cairo and Baghdad in February, said that Pakistan had received no invitation from the Western powers to join any Middle East defence organisation, although 'technical proposals' had been received. Pakistan was, however, interested in Middle East defence, and general discussions had taken place.²

1

Ibid., 30 January 1953.

2

Ibid., 22 February, 3 March 1953.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June the new Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, emphasised the importance of building up the defensive strength of the Middle East countries, but maintained that to achieve this disputes in the area should be settled.¹ After talks with Neguib and Nehru in Cairo later that month Mohammed Ali spoke of the need to organise collective defence in the Middle East, but added that Pakistan was whole-heartedly behind Egypt's case for full sovereignty over its territory.²

During the second half of 1953 Pakistan entered bilateral negotiations with the United States and Turkey. It became clear that US military aid was contingent on the signing of a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, and also to some extent on the development of a regional association. Pakistan would probably have preferred the former without the latter, for the establishment of a regional organisation was bound to offend the Arabs, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which Pakistan wished to avoid. The agreement with Turkey did have the advantage, however, in the context of domestic politics,

1

The Pakistan Times, 8 June 1953.

2

Ibid., 23 June 1953.

of permitting the Government to present the new policy in terms of furthering Islamic cooperation.

3. United States Military Aid to Pakistan and the Signing of the Turkey-Pakistan Friendly Cooperation Agreement

As 1953 was the year of the development of a new policy of alignment in Pakistan, so it was the year of the new Republican Administration in the United States, bringing some significant changes in the US approach to problems of Middle Eastern defence. The attempt to set up a Middle Eastern Command with Egyptian cooperation was clearly unacceptable to Egypt, and therefore unworkable. Some alternative had to be found. In May 1953 the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, toured Asia and the Middle East, assessing the situation and emphasising the need for collective regional defence. He had no formula to propose but said: 'I have a high regard for the contribution which Pakistan could make in the defence of freedom. I am confident that whatever the development, Pakistan will play a positive and constructive role....'¹

From the changed assessment of these two governments came a new policy, described by an Indian writer in the

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The Pakistan Times, 25 May 1953.

following terms:

There are two views of the development of this alignment. The one held by most Pakistanis is that after trying to maintain a neutralist position for five years, they discovered that Pakistan needed strong allies against India and it joined the United States in defence pacts. The other view is the one held by some US observers (eg. Selig Harrison) and some Indians that Pakistan was always anxious to do so and it is the United States which now had an administration which welcomed Pakistan.¹

There is probably considerable truth in both views, which are not entirely incompatible.

In the second half of 1953 feelers were put out by Pakistan for US military aid. At the same time tentative diplomatic approaches commenced between Turkey and Pakistan for the conclusion of some kind of pact of more substance than the Friendship Treaty signed in July 1951, or the Cultural Agreement of June 1953. While Pakistanis tend to present these two moves as separate diplomatic achievements, it is clear that Pakistan-US negotiations and Turkey-Pakistan negotiations were intricately interwoven. A quick glance at the chronological development reinforces this view. Although official

1

Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1964), p.136.

Pakistani statements were few and far between, the American press made several references to US involvement.¹

In mid-September the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, accompanied by General Iskandar Mirza, Under-Secretary for War, visited Turkey, and the United States, where he discussed the possibility of US aid in re-equipping the Pakistan forces.² The Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammed, was also in America at this time. Rumours that the United States was to be given bases in Pakistan in return for aid were denied by both Pakistan and US official sources.³

On his way home Ghulam Mohammed visited Egypt, where he was reported to have assured Egyptian leaders that

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For example, W.H. Waggoner, The New York Times, 6 January 1954, p.1, and C.L. Sulzberger, ibid., 19 January 1955, p.26.

2

The Times, 15, 16 September 1953.

3

Ghulam Mohammed, The Times, 20 November 1953. Dulles, on 16 November, had reassured the Indian Ambassador in Washington that no plan for military agreement existed, but refused to rule out the possibility of such negotiations in the future. At a press conference the following day he stated that no negotiations were taking place between the US and Pakistan regarding military aid or bases. Ibid., 18 November 1953.

Pakistan would not conclude an agreement with Western powers unless the Egyptian conflict was first resolved. From Cairo he went to Ankara, on what was officially described as a 'goodwill visit'.¹ The Times commented that while Turkish officials were likely to leave the initiative in any defence plan to American diplomacy, 'in view of the close relations between Ankara and Washington it is believed that Turkey would support any security plan that was sponsored by the US Government.'² The suggestion that Pakistan be drawn into a regional defence organisation had come from the Turkish Foreign Minister, Koprulu, as early as January 1953.³

On 17 December Mohammed Ali revealed that some informal talks about the supply of military equipment to Pakistan had taken place, but his government was neither negotiating any pact for the lease of military bases in Pakistan nor was it committing Pakistan to the defence of any area other than its own region.⁴ In a

1

The Pakistan Times, 6 December 1953.

2

The Times, 28 November 1953.

3

The Pakistan Times, 5 January 1953.

4

Press conference, Karachi, 17 December, *ibid.*, 18 December 1953.

broadcast on 1 January he said that any aid from the USA to Pakistan, military or otherwise, would be without strings attached to it.¹ The rumours of impending formal negotiations continued, but nothing definite occurred. Further delays were reported by The Pakistan Times, which said that in the US view military aid and some form of defence agreement were interdependent.²

Meanwhile Zafrulla Khan went on a tour of Middle East capitals, including Teheran, Damascus and Amman. This was apparently an attempt to gauge opinion in the region and perhaps to gain some support and allay suspicion regarding the forthcoming agreements, almost certainly planned at this stage. Whatever the discussions, an Iranian official spokesman referred to press speculation on a possible pact between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as 'the result of the fertile imagination of journalists' and appealed for more discretion in discussing the country's foreign policy.³ In Damascus Zafrulla tried to take the heat out of speculation: there had been no talks between Pakistan and the US for conclusion of a

1

Ibid., 2 January 1954.

2

Ibid., 26 January 1954.

3

The Times, 28 December 1953.

military pact, he said. All that had happened was that the Pakistan commander of the border areas had discussed with American authorities the possibilities of obtaining arms and equipment for the Pakistan army. Pakistan did not intend to interfere in the creation of a Middle East defence organisation, and was not working for the establishment of a third world bloc.¹

In January President Celal Bayar of Turkey visited the USA. His visit was immediately linked in press reports with the reports of US-Pakistan negotiations. It was suggested that Pakistan-US negotiations were held up until discussions had taken place between Bayar and US officials.² Turkey and Pakistan were ready, the reports said, to begin negotiations for a military pact which would be supported by US aid. Confirmation was claimed from 'authoritative sources' in Ankara.³ The Times' correspondent reported that Turkey, although willing to support such a plan, realised that the removal of political obstacles and the provision of adequate

1

The Times, 31 December 1953; The Pakistan Times, 1 January 1954.

2

The Pakistan Times, 26 January 1954.

3

Ibid., 27, 28 January 1954.

military assistance to the countries involved were essential, and that these objectives could best be achieved by appropriate action on the part of the US, with the cooperation and approval of other members of NATO. 'It is felt that this subject was probably examined during President Bayar's visit to Washington, to be followed by direct conversations between Ankara and Karachi.'¹ In mid-February the National Security Council decided to give military aid to Pakistan, but the decision was not to be announced until a treaty between Turkey and Pakistan was concluded. The aid would then be given to the organisation, which it was hoped Iran and Iraq might join.²

Mohammed Ali said on 14 February that Pakistan was negotiating a political, cultural and economic treaty with Turkey:³ defence cooperation was not mentioned. In a joint communiqué issued on 19 February it was announced that Pakistan and Turkey had reached agreement on the methods of achieving closer friendly collaboration

1

The Times, 29 January 1954.

2

Ibid., 15 February 1954; The New York Times, 23 February 1954, p.1.

3

The Pakistan Times, 15 February 1954.

in political, economic and cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their own interest and also in that of all peace loving nations.¹

On 21 February Pakistan formally sought US military assistance 'within the scope of the US Mutual Security legislation'. Before making the request Pakistan had informed itself of the requirements of the US Mutual Security legislation and found itself in agreement with them. In cooperation with other friendly and freedom loving nations, Pakistan could make an important contribution to the strength and stability of the region. As a preliminary step in that direction it had recently announced its intention of achieving closer collaboration with Turkey.²

President Eisenhower said on 25 February that the US would comply with Pakistan's request for aid, and welcomed the agreement with Turkey,³ which was eventually signed on 2 April. The Mutual Security Agreement between the United States and Pakistan was signed on 19 May.

1

Ibid., 20 February 1954.

2

Press conference, 22 February, The Times, 23 February 1954.

3

DSB, 15 March 1954, p.401.

4. Reactions to the Agreements with Turkey and the USA

(i) Britain and the United States

The reactions to these agreements varied from satisfaction in London¹ and Washington to disapproval bordering on hostility in Cairo, New Delhi and Moscow. The furore aroused by the Turkey-Pakistan pact was out of all proportion to the innocuous terms of the document: it was much more a reaction to the view, widely expressed, that this treaty was to be the basis of a regional defence system. Not only did it provide for extended membership, but the Foreign Ministers of both countries stated clearly that such a possibility had been actively considered.² In any case, a glance at a map revealed the nonsense of any

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Initial British objections were apparently only overcome when 'it was explained that the projected Turkey-Pakistan entente would not automatically commit either party to military or other means to assist others in the event of aggression. High ranking United States officials were reported to have assured the British that the accord envisaged political collaboration and military consultations. It did not embrace joint defense planning.' Welles Hagen, The New York Times, 29 January 1954, p.5.

2

Statements by Zafrulla and Koprulu, The Times, 22 February 1954.

other view:

So far, the Turkish-Pakistani pact, which it was hoped would be a cornerstone for a strong Middle Eastern edifice, has proved to be, as one observer put it, a 'formalization of a weakness'. Turkey is militarily strong - quite strong defensively; and Pakistan has inherent elements of military strength. But nearly all the vast area in between, with the exception of limited defensive strength in Israel and good but very small forces in Jordan, is virtually a military vacuum.¹

(ii) The Arab Countries

The instant US and UK approval and the obvious involvement of the latter gave the agreements a sinister hue when viewed from Cairo or Riyadh. It was not the pact itself but the fear that Iraq would be drawn into it that brought such a strong reaction, especially from Egypt. For the Egyptian Government believed that such a move would divide the Arab world while Egypt was still attempting to settle its differences with the UK, and while the Palestine question remained unsolved. Cairo Radio reported a statement by President Neguib that a pact between the United States and Pakistan would be regarded as a hostile act against the Arab countries. The Embassy in Karachi immediately denied the reports,²

1

Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, 16 November 1954, p.6.

2

The Pakistan Times, 2 February 1954.

but not long after Salah Salim revealed that a statement by Neguib, violently critical of Pakistan and against the policy of the National Revolutionary Council, had been suppressed.¹ The apprehension felt in Egypt had however been expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Hakim Amer, who said:

We would regard Iraq's possible gravitation towards the Middle East Defence Organization as a very serious matter. Iraq is a signatory to the Arab Security Pact and has no right unilaterally to drag her Arab sister nations into new military commitments.²

It would not be in the interest of Egypt or any other Arab country to join a Turkish-Pakistani alliance, or any other alliance before achieving full freedom and independence. The Arab Collective Security Pact was sufficient for the purpose of organising Arab defence.³

In Iraq the idea of association with the Turkey-Pakistan pact was opposed by extreme left and right wing groups, and the Egyptian press and radio

1

The New York Times, 27 February 1954, p.2.

2

The Pakistan Times, 29 December 1953.

3

Wing-Commander Abdel Latif Baghdadi, Egyptian Minister of War and Marine, in an interview with al-Ahram (Cairo). Quoted in The Times, 23 February 1954.

called on resistance to any such move from 'the streets of Baghdad'.¹ Although Iraq had not been invited to join the pact, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Fadhil Jamali, said that any such invitation would be considered in the light of the country's interests. Irritated by the Egyptian attacks, he added: 'We say to our sister Arab states and anyone else that Iraq will sign any pact she likes if and when she sees fit.'² Within a fortnight King Faisal, the ex-Regent, Crown Prince Abdul Ilah and Nuri es-Said visited Pakistan, amid reports that defence talks would take place. Nuri stated that it was the duty of the Iraqi government to undertake consultations with responsible persons in neighbouring states, for the safety of Iraq depended upon that of its neighbours. He assured apprehensive Arab listeners, however, that no matter what the results of the consultations might be, it was in the interests of Iraq to uphold the principle of not assuming any responsibilities or commitments outside its frontiers and those of the Arab states.³

1

The Times, 22 and 23 February 1954.

2

Ibid., 25 February 1954.

3

Ibid., 10 March 1954.

Arab opinion seems to have been taken quite seriously by the Pakistan Government, which made a number of attempts to explain away the aspects which the Arabs found unpalatable. Neguib apparently accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan but the visit was never made, either because of his own disinclination to do so or as a result of his uncertain position within Egypt. King Saud, also suspicious of the pact, visited Pakistan in April. There was speculation on the visit and the subjects discussed, but very few official statements of substance and no joint communiqué.

Just before the signing of the Mutual Security Agreement with the US, Zafrulla Khan paid a two-day visit to Egypt, during which he endeavoured to explain Pakistan's reasons for concluding these agreements before the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, despite previous pledges to the contrary, and to assure the Egyptians that this did not mean desertion of Arab causes on the part of Pakistan. While the Egyptian press was unimpressed,¹ Zafrulla appeared to have had some success at the official level. Major-General Hakim Amer, in an interview with al-Ahram, acknowledged that urgent

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The Cairo newspaper al-Akhbar reportedly stated that the pact with Turkey was not expected of a country whose leaders had previously assured Egypt that the Egyptian national cause was Pakistan's principal preoccupation. Ibid., 18 May 1954.

local and regional necessities lay behind Pakistan's decision to enter the pact with Turkey. He added, however, that any Arab state adhering to the pact would be regarded by Egypt as having violated the charter of the Arab League.¹

In June Mohammed Ali went to Turkey for the formal ratification ceremony, visiting Beirut and Damascus at the same time. Although not opposed to consideration of some kind of agreement with the West, Lebanon was disturbed at Turkish support for Israel.² Syria was in the throes of a cabinet crisis, and it is doubtful what influence his arguments could have had on the preoccupied politicians in Damascus, although he gave the assurance that Israel would not be allowed to join the pact. The Turkish Government also supported this view.³

(iii) India

India too opposed both US aid to Pakistan and the pact between Pakistan and Turkey on the grounds that the balance of power in the subcontinent would be upset and

1

The Times, 17, 18 May; The Pakistan Times, 15 May 1954.

2

The Times, The Pakistan Times, 10 June 1954.

3

The Times, The Pakistan Times, 17 June 1954.

the cold war brought to India's borders. Such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources, Nehru said, would be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India. Promising discussions between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question had taken place through the second half of 1953, particularly regarding the question of demilitarisation and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. The decision regarding US military aid led Nehru to declare: 'Inevitably it will affect the major question that we are considering, and, more especially, the Kashmir issue....The whole issue will change its face completely if heavy militarization of Pakistan takes place.' In those circumstances, he said, it became ridiculous to discuss the demilitarisation of Kashmir.¹

Indian hostility to the proposal probably contributed to the delay in the agreement between Pakistan and the US, for while the Defence Department was anxious to extend the

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Letter from Nehru to Mohammed Ali, 9 December 1953. Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan (July 1953 - October 1954), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 1954.

network of alliances, the State Department was hesitant about antagonising India.¹ The US Ambassador in New Delhi said in December that, while the Indian reaction to an American military alliance with Pakistan would be taken into consideration, India would not be allowed to veto it.² Despite attempts on the part of both US and Pakistani leaders to convince the Indian Government that such aid was not for 'aggressive purposes',³ Indian hostility did not diminish, and a US offer of similar aid to India was rejected out of hand by Nehru.⁴

(iv) The USSR

In a Note of 30 November 1953 the USSR drew the attention of the Pakistan Government to

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Eisenhower, in November 1953, had said that he thought the US would be most cautious about doing anything that would create unrest and disaster or failure or hysteria in the neighbouring nation, India. The Times, 19 November 1953. See also John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 'The Middle East and South Asia - the Problem of Security', DSB, 22 March 1954.

2

The Pakistan Times, 15 December 1953.

3

Mohammed Ali, Press Conference, 17 December, *ibid.*, 18 December 1953. Eisenhower statement, DSB, 15 March 1954.

4

Denise Folliot (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1954 (OUP: London, 1957), p.179.

the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to the news concerning the aforementioned negotiations [between Pakistan and the USA], since the conclusion of an agreement concerning the establishment of American air bases on the territory of Pakistan, that is to say, in an area situated near the frontiers of the USSR, and the joining of Pakistan in the plans to set up the aforementioned bloc in the Middle East have a direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union.¹

In reply Pakistan denied that there had ever been any question of granting bases to the USA. It did not contemplate taking any hostile or unfriendly step towards the USSR, but maintained that it was its duty to 'take every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan'.²

The USSR remained unplaced, and on 18 and 26 March 1954 sent Notes to the governments of Turkey and Pakistan respectively,³ protesting against the conclusion of the

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Note from the USSR to Pakistan on the Defence Negotiations Between Pakistan and the USA, 30 November 1953, in Denise Folliot, Documents on International Affairs 1953, (OUP: London, 1956), pp.266-7.

2

The Pakistani reply to the Russian Note of 30 November, 20 December 1953, *ibid.*, p.268.

3

Russian Note to Turkey, 18 March 1954, and Russian Note to Pakistan, 26 March 1954. See Documents on International Affairs 1954, pp.179 and 182 respectively.

Pakistan-Turkish agreement. On 8 July a Note was also presented to Iran, referring to the Soviet-Iranian Agreement on guarantees and neutrality of 1927, and seeking explanation of reports

regarding measures undertaken by the United States government and the governments of certain other countries for the purpose of drawing Iran into the aggressive military bloc being created in the Near and Middle East on the basis of the Turkish-Pakistan military alliance concluded last April.¹

5. Negotiation of the Baghdad Pact

Despite this strong regional opposition (perhaps, at least in the case of the Soviet response, because of it) negotiations towards a Middle East defence system continued. The Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq was signed on 24 February 1955. Pakistani accession was not however formalised until 23 September 1955, although Pakistan's intention to adhere had been announced early in July, and the decision was reported to have been made in May.

Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact was not a surprising development and the majority of books and articles dealing with it are content to note the

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Text of the Russian Note to Iran, *ibid.*, p.189.

occurrence and the date.¹ What is not immediately obvious is the reason why a new pact was found necessary after the publicity connected with and the hopes pinned on the Turkey-Pakistan pact; and why Pakistan was not a founder member of the Turkey-Iraq pact, once a new treaty had been found necessary, but waited until July to announce its decision, and September to finalise the arrangements.

The Turkey-Pakistan pact was inspired by the United States, and it was no secret that these countries hoped that the gap in the alliance represented by Iraq and Iran would be filled, and that other Arab countries might be induced to participate. Since Iraq and Egypt were the largest and most powerful Arab states it was regarded as necessary that one should be persuaded to join a defence organisation of which the Turkey-Pakistan pact was to be the nucleus, and desirable that both should be brought in. Although Iraq showed more inclination to agree than Egypt it was hoped that Nasser might be inclined to modify his position once the problem of the evacuation of British troops from Suez had been settled.

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See M.A. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, p.101, and Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p.124, as examples of this view.

Once Anglo-Egyptian agreement was reached in July 1954 hopes were raised regarding a change in Egypt's attitude to Middle East defence, but Nasser, forced to defend the agreement at a public meeting in Cairo, was not really in a position to push Egyptian opinion any further: 'If evacuation comes through peaceful channels, are we to refuse it? Should we not save the blood of our youth?' he asked.¹

An Egyptian military mission did visit the United States in September 1954, but the possibility of Egypt receiving US arms aid foundered on Egypt's refusal to accept an American military mission to supervise the distribution and use of the aid on the grounds that this would compromise Egyptian sovereignty.²

An attempt on his life in which the Muslim Brotherhood was deeply implicated took place in November, and no doubt helped to deter him from accommodating Western objectives. In any case, Saudi Arabia was already receiving American aid and the US had a base on

1

The Times, 23 August 1954. An Egyptian government statement issued in September said that Egypt was not ready for a pact, despite support for the West, because the people would not accept it. The New York Times, 3 September 1954, p.1.

2

Ibid., 15 September 1954, p.20, and 18 September 1954, p.7.

its territory, a circumstance which did not prevent the Saudi Government from opposing Iraqi association with the Turkey-Pakistan pact.

Attempts to extend the basic Ankara-Karachi axis gained impetus after Nuri es-Said returned to power in Iraq in August 1954. While Nuri was apparently equally happy to work with either Turks or Pakistanis, it has been suggested that at one stage he believed that Pakistanis might have been more acceptable allies to Iraqis than their former rulers, the Turks.¹ Soon after Nuri returned to office, the Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, Salah Salim, visited Baghdad. In the course of discussions Salim rejected the idea of working with Pakistan. The Egyptian position was that Pakistan had nothing whatsoever in common with any Arab state, militarily or geographically. The religious tie, of which the Pakistanis made so much, obviously counted far less with the Egyptians. Nuri suggested as an alternative that the Arab Security Pact be brought into line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and then be used as the basis for a regional defence pact which would be open to non-Arab countries, including Pakistan. This idea did not find favour with Nasser,² and was rejected

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Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958 (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1964), p.29.

2

Ibid., pp.23-4.

by implication by the Arab League Foreign Ministers at their meeting in December 1954.¹ Egyptian reluctance to be associated with Pakistan may then have been one reason for the decision to negotiate a fresh pact, leaving Pakistan out, at least for the time being.

The status of the Palestine question was another issue about which the Arabs were cautious, and Nuri es-Said had to be particularly careful in signing any agreement outside the Arab League. He had to be assured that on no account would Israel become a member of the pact, and that membership of the pact would not preclude Iraq from supporting other Arab states in the event of a war with Israel. On this question Iraq had to be left completely free. On the other hand, Turkey, which had cordial relations with Israel, was anxious that, in the event of such hostilities, it would not be obliged to take part. On this count the Turkey-Pakistan pact was not sufficiently specific. Article 6 provided that

Any State, whose participation is considered by the Contracting Parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present Agreement, may accede to the present Agreement under the same conditions and with the same obligations as the Contracting Parties....²

1

The Pakistan Times, 18 December 1954.

2

For text of the Turkey-Pakistan Agreement for Friendly Cooperation, 2 April 1954, see Documents on International Affairs 1954, p.185.

This clause could have been used effectively to exclude Israel, but, despite official statements that Israel would never become a member, this was not regarded as sufficient assurance by Iraq. The terms of the Baghdad Pact eventually provided that it should

be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the Security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties....¹

At the same time as the pact was signed, letters were exchanged between Nuri and Adnan Menderes, at the request of the former, containing the understanding

that this Pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.²

This represented a departure from Turkey's traditional policy of neutrality in the question of Arab-Israel

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For text of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, 24 February 1955 (the Baghdad Pact), see N. Frankland (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1955 (OUP: London, 1958), p.287.

2

For text of the letters, see Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Appendix IV, p.188.

disputes, and bears witness to the anxiety of Turkey and the Western powers to draw Iraq into the alliance.

It is also possible that the terms of the Pakistan-Turkey agreement were at the same time too limited and too specific for the purposes of the powers, especially the US and UK, who were anxious to set up the Middle East defence system. The Turkey-Pakistan pact pledged the signatories to cooperate in cultural, economic and technical fields, in very vague terms, and in the field of defence, in terms which were more precisely spelled out.¹ This was not the kind of agreement which could ultimately represent an extension of effective collective defence into the Middle East, at least without drastic revision. The Turkey-Iraq pact pledged the signatories simply to cooperate 'for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to

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Article 4 states: 'Consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:

- (a) Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress;
- (b) Endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the parties in the production of arms and ammunition;
- (c) Studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.'

this cooperation may form the subject of special agreement with each other.¹ Measures for the implementation of this Article were to be determined once the pact came into force: the wording was made vague, presumably in order not to frighten off other Arab countries making tentative movements in this direction. It was perhaps felt that Pakistan, already committed, could be left out for the time being.

These suggestions are for the most part speculation, and nothing definite can be concluded from them. A Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman was reported to have said that Pakistan had, before February 1955, sent invitations to all Middle East countries, including Iran and Iraq, to join the Turkey-Pakistan pact, but efforts in this direction were likely to be reviewed in view of recent developments in the Middle East. Pakistan would welcome bilateral as well as multilateral defence arrangements. Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan would not wait for Arab League countries to agree with them so far as

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Article I of the Baghdad Pact.

these defence arrangements were concerned.¹ At the time of the signing of the Baghdad Pact President Bayar was on a state visit to Pakistan. There were few reports of the talks between him and Mohammed Ali but, according to one, a senior Pakistani official had disclosed that Bayar and Mohammed Ali had completed plans for a series of defence alliances to link countries of the Middle East in a collective security system. In January 1955 a Pakistan statement had referred to the proposed Turkey-Iraq Pact, calling it 'an important step towards establishment of a collective security system for the region.'²

Pakistan's accession was expected. The Government, according to one American writer, 'was merely waiting for the best possible moment from the standpoint of its

1

The Pakistan Times, 18 February 1955. M.A. Chaudhri, however, argues somewhat simply that Iraq had not been invited to join the Turkey-Pakistan pact officially, and therefore decided to negotiate a pact with Turkey itself. Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, p.100. Interviews with senior Pakistani and Turkish officials were no more revealing. Most had forgotten, or chose to ignore, the defence clauses of the Turkey-Pakistan pact, and one, speaking of the delay in Pakistani accession said: 'Well, in those days, you know, we were all so intent on getting the Arabs in that I suppose we just didn't get round to it.'

2

Dawn, 21 January 1955.

domestic situation and the arrangements for arms aid from the United States.'¹

In March 1955 Eden visited Karachi and Baghdad on his way to the SEATO talks in Bangkok. The UK had, he said, supported the Baghdad Pact since its announcement in January. He believed it possible that it could grow 'into a NATO for the Middle East. There seemed a chance that Pakistan...would join, as might also Iran and Jordan.'² There were reports that Eden found considerable enthusiasm in Pakistan and Iraq for early integration of their separate pacts with Turkey,³ although Eden himself gave no details of any discussions.

During the Bandung Conference in April, the Iraqi leader, Jamali, took the opportunity of canvassing the idea of adherence among Pakistani and Iranian delegates. In a statement from Taipei he said that Pakistan would join the pact within a month, and that Iran was expected to adhere in mid-summer.⁴ But the Pakistan decision was

1
Campbell, p.59.

2
Eden, p.220.

3
The Pakistan Times, 7 March 1955.

4
The New York Times, 9 May 1955, p.7.

delayed: the question had been discussed by Cabinet, but until the full financial and military implications were examined, so the official story went, a decision would be deferred.¹

Towards the end of June, Ayub Khan visited Turkey. Nuri es-Said was also in Ankara: further discussions took place, in the course of which it seems the remaining difficulties were resolved, for Mohammed Ali in a broadcast on 1 July announced Pakistan's intention to adhere to the Turkey-Iraq Pact.² The Times, commenting on the delay, attributed it

partly to internal political conditions in Pakistan, and partly, perhaps to the delicate situation prevailing between the signatories to the pact and certain Arab countries....It is hoped, nevertheless, that a way can be found of reconciling this view with Pakistan's accession, without making Egypt feel that she would be accepting defence commitments too far afield.³

The assiduous attempts to cast the net over Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, carried out at high intensity over the preceding six months, had until then met with no success. By the time formal Pakistani accession took

1

The Pakistan Times, 7 June 1955.

2

Text of Mohammed Ali's broadcast, *ibid.*, 2 and 3 July 1955.

3

The Times, 4 July 1955.

place, Egyptian opposition to the pact had hardened, and support for Egypt came readily from Saudi Arabia, and also, though more reluctantly from Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. In September offers of Soviet military aid to Egypt dealt the final blow to any hope that the Baghdad Pact would be extended in that direction. It now had four members - the UK had joined in April. The Iranian decision was made in October, and in November the Pact held its first Council meeting.

6. Implications for Pakistan's Relations with the Middle East Countries

Having taken the plunge and joined the Baghdad Pact, what were the implications for Pakistan foreign policy in the Middle East? It is not altogether possible to separate this decision from decisions in other spheres: in more or less quick succession, Pakistan had signed a pact with Turkey, a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States, joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (September 1954) and involved itself in the Baghdad Pact.

The decision to participate in American-backed defence arrangements of any kind was bound to incur some degree of Soviet displeasure, but it is likely that it was Pakistan's involvement in the Middle East defence network, which the USSR could not but regard as a threat to itself, that aroused Soviet hostility, amply

demonstrated by statements made during and after the visits of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India and Afghanistan in December 1955.¹ It resulted also in increased Indian hostility. Whether or to what extent Nehru was genuinely alarmed at what he called the changed regional situation is difficult to tell; but Pakistan's new alliances gave him a pretext for jettisoning past commitments regarding Kashmir.

The Baghdad Pact effectively split the Arab states, at least for some time, and to the more militant Arabs, made Pakistan appear untrustworthy. Turkey they knew of old, and consequently they expected little from that quarter, or from Iran. Pakistan was for the most part untried and was hardly considered by them except in terms of support on the Palestine issue, which was largely taken for granted. Accession to the Baghdad Pact put Pakistan beyond the pale. In Saudi Arabia, the news caused astonishment and surprise:

Pakistan knows perfectly well that Turkey is putting its hand in the hand of the Zionist state of Israel, shows a considerable concern in its affairs and feels honoured cooperating with the Jewish state....It is hoped that Pakistan will review the decision they have taken, which is rightly considered to be a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim States at a time when all Muslim States should

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See Chapters VII and VIII.

have taken the stand of a united bloc against tyranny, suppression and occupation...¹

One result was the growth of a new-found fellow-feeling between Nehru and Nasser, who proceeded to issue joint communiqués deploring military pacts after their increasingly frequent meetings.² After September 1955 Pakistan expended a great deal of effort in the attempt to win back the ground thus lost to Indian diplomacy in the Middle East.

At the same time, however, Pakistan was formally allied for the first time to three other Muslim countries, Turkey, Iran, non-Arab states, and Iraq, the sole representative of the Arab world. Although the military aspects of the Baghdad Pact were not crowned with outstanding success, cooperation for the improvement of communications and for economic development grew and became perhaps the most important aspect of the alliance. Certain changes have taken place, including the withdrawal of Iraq in 1958, and the subsequent change in nomenclature to Central Treaty Organization. The organisation itself has varied in importance from time to time in Pakistan's

1

Radio Mecca, reported in The Pakistan Times, 26 September 1955.

2

See, for example, the joint communiqués of 17 February and 12 July 1955, Foreign Affairs Record, 1955, pp.28 and 137.

policy in the region, but it has never been abandoned, remaining an important aspect of the search for closer collaboration with its neighbours of the northern tier.

In joining the Baghdad Pact which was a predominantly non-Arab organisation, Pakistan was finally forced to recognise, at least implicitly, the division in the Middle East between Arabs and non-Arabs, and to choose between the two groups. Until then Pakistan had attempted to ignore this gulf, for instance in the International Islamic Economic Organization, and in Zafrulla Khan's attempt to convene a Muslim Prime Ministers' conference in 1952. Neither of these ventures, which sought to bridge the gap, met with success.

Although Iraq, an Arab country, did join the Baghdad Pact, in this case the exception proves the rule, for it was the apparent attempt to divide the Arab world (not the Middle East) which so enraged countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The revolution in Iraq, and Iraq's ultimate withdrawal from the pact, demonstrates the pressure exerted on Arab countries not to associate with states outside the Arab circle. Although Pakistan's decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact placed it firmly in the non-Arab camp so far as many Arab countries were concerned, Pakistan was not content to abandon attempts to gain Arab support, and one of the greatest problems for Pakistani diplomacy in the Middle East has been to maintain a balance between these two groups.

CHAPTER VThe Development of Closer Collaboration
in the Northern Tier, 1956-671. Introduction

Although the attempt to implement a policy based on the concept of Muslim unity was abandoned, the ideal of closer collaboration with its Muslim neighbours remained implicit in the conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was never spelled out clearly, and as a result there has been much confusion. With regard to the countries of the northern tier,¹ Pakistani leaders have usually meant something more specific. With Turkey and Iran a close relationship began to develop almost from the time of Partition. Relations with Iraq, the only Arab member of the group, have varied according to the vicissitudes of internal Iraqi politics. Iraq was one of the members of the Saadabad Pact² and later (until 1958) of the

1

This phrase was first coined by John Foster Dulles after his tour of the region in 1953 (see Chapter IV). It is taken to mean Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2

A Pact between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed in 1937. See below.

Baghdad Pact.¹ Although it is no longer formally allied to Pakistan, it is usually regarded as one of the group with which closer collaboration is possible. Iraq's position within the northern tier is, however, complicated by its long-standing differences with Iran and its identity as part of the Arab world. Afghanistan is also generally regarded in Pakistan as being within this group, but any hopes of persuading Afghanistan to participate more fully in the affairs of the region have been thwarted by the Afghans themselves who steadfastly refuse to be drawn into any formal regional grouping.

Within the region there is considerable shared experience in terms of history, and of current economic and strategic problems. No determined effort had been made by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to improve cooperation with each other until after the 1914-18 War, when revolutions took place in both Turkey and Iran. A series of bilateral friendship treaties were signed and eventually, in 1937, drawn together in the Saadabad Pact. This pact was a response to the increasingly tense situation in Europe, and the conviction of Ataturk and

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After the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959 the Baghdad Pact was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Henceforth it will be referred to as CENTO in general references to the organisation, and only as the Baghdad Pact where it is necessary to draw the distinction.

Reza Shah that an expression of regional unity would be an advantage in an area of traditional interest to the big powers.

Although Turkish sources claim that this agreement was 'of benefit to Turkey and her neighbours' for 'through these pacific endeavours and successes Turkey became a lasting force for peace in the near east and a true representative of Western civilization in the area',¹ the agreement was of little practical value.² Contrary to widely held belief at the time it was not designed as a defence agreement, but merely committed the parties to non-intervention in each other's affairs, to renunciation of war in the settlement of disputes and to consultation 'in all international conflicts affecting their common interests.'³ That it was encouraged by the British Government and accepted by the Russians is put forward as evidence 'that it was far from being a defensive

1

Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, Ataturk (Ankara University Press: Ankara, 1963), p.200.

2

General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (John Murray: London, 1964), p.266.

3

For text of the Saadabad Pact see Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East (Duke University Press: Durham, 1953), p.523.

alliance.'¹ Turkey and Iran did not go to the aid of Iraq at the time of Raschid Ali's revolt in 1941, and Turkey did nothing to assist Iran when it was invaded by Britain and the USSR.² For all its mildness the Saadabad Pact was significant as the first occasion on which the countries involved felt the need to express in formal terms their identity as members of a region.

One reason for the high level of mutual awareness which existed among these countries was their common religion, which gave rise to a common body of literature and language, Persian and Arabic being widely understood throughout the region. Turkey is perhaps an exception in this regard, having retreated since the Young Turks' revolution into its own language and literature, although Turkish is widely spoken and understood in north-west Iran.

While Islam provides a common substructure in the area, this is not as strong a unifying force as might at first be supposed: the split between orthodox (Sunni) Muslims and the sectarian Shi'is makes for bitter dissension at times.³ Iran is the only country where

1

Arfa, p.266.

2

Ibid., p.275.

3

For the origin of Shi'ism, see Chapter I.

Shi'ism is the state religion, although modern Pakistan has a fairly large Shi'i minority. The issue is not regarded as vitally important by the Turkish Government which claims to be completely secular, nor is it so important to Pakistan where there is a mixed population, but it is an irritant in relations between Iran and Afghanistan and a potential source of disagreement between Iran and Iraq, where many Shi'i shrines and holy places are situated.

All the countries of the region are economically underdeveloped and are heavily dependent on foreign aid for the progress of their development plans. While there is some division about the means of solving these problems, and there are some differences in the stage of development of each, all face the fundamental need for capital and technical knowledge. In a way this makes for certain regional difficulties, for none is in a position to give substantial help to the others. Strategically, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan all share a border with Russia, and the foreign policy of each is profoundly affected by the proximity of this immense and powerful neighbour.

Considering these factors, and the hostility between Pakistan and India, it is not surprising that Pakistan should have become part of this regional grouping. At the time of Partition in 1947, however, the Saadabad Pact had been clearly revealed for what it was, and only a

vague sense of regional identity remained, kept alive by a renewed and articulate Soviet threat directed towards both Turkey and Iran. Pakistan shared these strategic problems only in part: its concern was predominantly with India, and with the capability and possible intentions of that country.

Nevertheless, because the difference between Pakistan and India was expressed in religious terms, Pakistan tended to look to its co-religionists for support, to identify with them and ultimately to associate with them when this became possible. Pakistan's attention was not directed immediately and specifically towards its non-Arab Muslim neighbours but to the Middle East as a whole. The Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, did not prove very receptive: contact with Turkey and Iran came more easily, and out of this the Baghdad Pact was ultimately formed. Afghanistan's quarrel with Pakistan over Pushtunistan, and its determined brand of neutralism, which received Indian encouragement and Soviet support, kept that country out of a Western-backed pact. Afghanistan's attitude was a source of disappointment not only to the regional members, but also to the United States. Subsequent American efforts to woo Afghanistan away from its neutralist stance, although unsuccessful, have laid any suggestions of regional cooperation open to the charge that they are American-inspired.

2. The Concept of Closer Collaboration in Pakistan

The concept of closer collaboration with the other countries of the non-Arab northern tier, as opposed to Pan-Islamic demands for Muslim unity, was not publicly debated in Pakistan until 1958, after rumours spread that it was under discussion in Teheran and Karachi. There is some suggestion, however, that the idea was current much earlier: at the time of the Shah's visit to Pakistan in March 1950 one commentator wrote that there was 'apparently a scheme to bring Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan together, if it is possible, without aggravating relations with the USSR.'¹ It seems that discussions along these lines took place during 1951 and 1952, but they came to nothing and the following year the government began to negotiate the alliance with America.² There had been no public statements or discussion at the time.

1

M. Perlmann, 'Review of Events, January 1-March 1, 1950', Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1950.

2

This suggestion is based on discussions with a Pakistani who was close to government circles at the time, and who wishes to remain anonymous. The concept of closer collaboration had little to do with Pakistan's decision to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955, although membership of this organisation helped draw Pakistan, Iran and Turkey together. For discussion of the Baghdad Pact in this context see below.

The idea next appeared in April 1958 when the newly elected President of the Pakistan Muslim League, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, said that there was in the present world no longer room for small nations. Pakistan should not restrict its Islamic tie to the people of the two wings of the country, but must extend it beyond its frontiers and form 'an Islamic confederation with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, so that there may be two federations, one of the Arab countries and the other of the non-Arab countries.' In time these two federations could be united, thus establishing a really Islamic state embracing the entire Muslim world.¹ The Pan-Islamic overtones of this speech were strong, but the idea was being modified.

Later in 1958 the Prime Minister, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, stated that Pakistan was prepared for a federation with Iran and Afghanistan if they wanted it, adding that Pakistan was ready to do away with customs barriers, passport restrictions, and to have mutual defence arrangements.² This was the first time the Pakistan Government had advocated such a scheme, and one wonders exactly what the Prime Minister meant by it. In July

1

Dawn, 2 April 1958.

2

Ibid., 22 August 1958.

President Mirza had made state visits to Turkey and Iran, and speculation on the purpose of these visits was not lessened by reports that the Iranian Foreign Ministry was examining the possibility of 'federation' along the above lines, although no official move had been made.¹

While the idea of a federation might have been in the air, it was not very clear what was meant by it, as Noon's statement reveals: to speak of federation and then to illustrate it by suggesting the removal of customs barriers and passport restrictions and the implementation of a mutual defence scheme, does not suggest a carefully thought out plan for political unity, which was how his speech was interpreted by some sections of the local press.

Apart from the question of kingship in Iran and Afghanistan, would it be wise to take upon our shoulders the responsibility of looking after economies that are even more backward than ours? Would not the acute political problems faced by Iran and Afghanistan add greatly to our own troubles.... It is reasonable to suggest therefore that while we should continue to pursue a policy of seeking friendship with every neighbouring State - of course, without sacrificing any of our national rights - there should be no talks for the present of forming a federation or confederation with any other country.²

1

Ibid., 6 June 1958.

2

The Pakistan Times, 24 August 1958.

Even the usually pro-Government Dawn, at this time going through an anti-Noon phase, objected that it was 'a very irresponsible and reckless statement.'¹

Noon's speech was made, however, in the aftermath of the revolution in Iraq, and when some reorganisation of the Baghdad Pact was being contemplated. He was on the defensive about his foreign policy, especially regarding Afghanistan, the Middle East, and continued membership of the Baghdad Pact. Although some difficulties remained, 1958 was a year of improving relations with Afghanistan. Noon himself denied that Afghanistan was in any way hostile to Pakistan, and that earlier Pakistani governments had pursued a policy designed to force Afghanistan into submission. This had been a wrong approach because no self-respecting country would accept that position.² Noon had therefore attempted to improve relations with Afghanistan, and his government had negotiated a new Transit Trade Agreement in June 1958. The agreement itself aroused some criticism on the grounds that the Government had, under American pressure, made concessions to Afghanistan which would be of no benefit to Pakistan.³

1
Dawn, 24 August 1958.

2
The Pakistan Times, 27 August 1958.

3
See Chapter VII.

Noon's remarks about federation might have been an extension of his policy of friendship with Afghanistan, or perhaps a gesture to those who accused him of not seeking closer relations with the rest of the Muslim world. He might have wanted to test public reaction to such a suggestion, or to gain support for cooperation in economic and defence matters and been carried away by his own idealism. Whatever the explanation, he was left in no doubt that the idea did not find favour in the press.

Clarifying his remarks at a press conference, he said that he did not envisage any loss of sovereignty on the part of any participant, and that he had not approached either the Iranian or Afghan Government on the subject. Discussions of a possible economic union among the Baghdad Pact countries had been in progress for some time. If Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan could abolish passports and customs barriers among themselves this would be a beginning. He also said he had in mind a defence agreement whereby attack on one would be considered attack on all.¹ In its economic aspects, the Prime Minister's modified proposal did not go far beyond what had been discussed within CENTO meetings for some time.

1

The Pakistan Times, 27 August 1958.

The suspicion remained, however, that something further was contemplated. President Mirza's denial that he had discussed the possibility of federation during his visit to Teheran¹ had done little to silence the protests, and Dawn implied that too many rumours had been circulating for there to be no basis for this suspicion.² The rumours received fresh impetus from the visit of the Turkish President, Celal Bayar, to Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in September 1958, although Turkish participation had not been suggested. In addition the Shah was reported to have said that the idea of federation between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan would be received with joy in Iran.³ Despite Pakistan Foreign Ministry assertions that it was all 'pure speculation' and a Turkish Foreign Ministry statement that American reports of a proposed federation were 'premature',³ the controversy died down only after an Afghan statement that there was no question of Afghanistan forming such a

1

Dawn, 25 August 1958.

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid., 25 September 1958, and The Pakistan Times, 29 September 1958.

federation, and that neutralism would continue to be the basis of Afghan policy.¹

The issue was next raised in January 1962 when General Hassan Arfa, the newly accredited Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan, described confederation as the best solution for Afghan-Pakistan problems. Although this was his personal view, he maintained that the matter had been discussed previously between the Shah and the former Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon. The Shah, he said, supported the idea.²

In August President Ayub, addressing a public meeting at Quetta, and speaking in Urdu without a prepared text, said that he would welcome a possible confederation of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, adding that divided they could hardly hope to withstand pressure from without and would succumb one by one, but that united they could defend themselves.³ Although less outspoken than in 1958, the press again objected to the idea. Dawn, maintaining that the public were still opposed to the idea of confederation, refused to believe that the President meant more than 'the closest collaboration' and suggested that he had been widely misquoted.⁴

¹ Dawn, 7 October 1958.

² Ibid., 21 January 1962.

³ Ibid., 6 August 1962.

⁴ Editorial, 'We and Our Muslim Neighbours', ibid., 8 August 1962.

The Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali, found it necessary to clarify the President's remarks: a cultural, economic and political 'tie-up' did not mean a merger, an amalgamation or the establishment of a confederation or a federation.¹

The following June President Ayub raised the subject once more, in a public address at Peshawar. Again he spoke in Urdu and again without a prepared text. The Urdu daily, Jang, reporting the speech, used the English word 'confederation' written in Urdu script.² The English language dailies reported that he had advocated 'collaboration' between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, for the first time extending the scheme to include Turkey, and repeating the argument that none of these countries could defend itself against any of the big powers.³ Again there was an unfavourable reaction, particularly from the opposition weekly Outlook, which wrote:

The tenacity with which President Ayub at times champions lost causes could be

1

The Pakistan Times, 10 August 1962.

2

Jang, 14 June 1963. I am indebted to the staff of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, for the translation of this report.

3

Dawn, 13 June 1963.

admired but for the consequences. He has now revived the proposal for a confederation....¹

Because the President spoke in Urdu, and because the speech was unprepared, it is difficult even to discover what he actually said, let alone what he meant by it. There is apparently no official record of either speech available.² This suggests that President Ayub might not have wished to put forward a precise proposal, and that in any case it is something which the Pakistan Government or bureaucracy did not wish to preserve. On both occasions he was addressing tribal groups (in the frontier towns of Quetta and Peshawar), particularly sensitive on questions of religious orthodoxy and relations with Afghanistan. As on the occasion of Noon's speech in 1958, relations with that country had been bad, but were improving. It is possible that Ayub, for the benefit of both the frontier tribes and the Afghan Government, wished to encourage Kabul by assurances of Pakistani goodwill,³ and demonstrate his interest in Muslim solidarity.

1

Outlook, 22 June 1963.

2

See M.B. Naqvi, *ibid.*: 'His actual words are: "a sort of Confederation". Now "a sort of Confederation" is essentially a Confederation. It is therefore a major proposal.'

3

Ayub renewed the offer of friendship to Afghanistan in a speech at Quetta in August. The Pakistan Times, 7 August 1963.

The question of the US role in these suggestions has been raised by the Indian and Pakistani press,¹ and although there is no evidence of direct American involvement there are some indications that the US may have had an interest in the matter. The suggestions on each occasion came at a time of increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and followed a period of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The USA wished to lessen Soviet influence in Kabul and perhaps encouraged such appeals to the Afghan Government by the regional powers.

The next time the subject of closer collaboration arose, at the time of the Istanbul Accord of July 1964, the circumstances were somewhat different. President Ayub made no statement of his intentions before he left Pakistan on his way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. He stopped for talks in Kabul, Teheran and Istanbul, where it was announced that later in the month Ayub, President Gursel and the Shah should meet to discuss ways and means of cooperating 'outside the framework of CENTO.'² The three Heads of State later decided that the organisation they were setting up would

1

The Times of India, 28 July 1963, and The Pakistan Times, 23 August 1963.

2

Dawn, 6 July 1964.

be called 'Regional Cooperation for Development'. It was presented by Ayub on his return to Karachi as a strictly functional organisation: it did not exactly amount to a customs union, but might work to lower tariffs and create some areas of free trade. Certain joint ventures might be undertaken, but none of these would affect the internal arrangements of the participating countries.¹

This venture into the field of 'closer collaboration' differs from those mentioned above in several ways, but especially because on this occasion something concrete was achieved, and because it seems that for the first time the scheme had its origin in and gained its impetus from the region itself. The suggestion that Pakistani proposals for confederation offered in 1958, 1962 and 1963 were simply gestures to the Afghan Government made with US approval if not encouragement, does not hold for the Istanbul Accord in 1964. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan had been more or less satisfactory since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1963; there was no special alarm about Soviet activity in Kabul, and in any case American influence in Pakistan had diminished. Despite some murmurs that Regional Cooperation for Development² aimed at creating a new anti-communist,

1

Pakistan Observer, 25 July 1964.

2

See Chapter VI.

pro-Western bloc in the region, the obvious lack of American interest in RCD seems to indicate that the US bears no particular responsibility for its formation.

3. The Importance of the Baghdad Pact in the Development of Closer Collaboration

The ideal of closer collaboration within the region was translated into reality for the first time when the Baghdad Pact became fully operational at the end of 1955, thus providing a framework for cooperation in military and economic fields, albeit with the support of outside powers, and without Afghan membership.¹ The Baghdad Pact was primarily an American-inspired anti-communist defence alliance designed to fit in with US global strategy. It is in this light that it was considered by the USSR, by the Arab countries which did not become associated with it, and also by the governments concerned, although to some extent it served the national interests of each.

The object of building up a Muslim alliance was not a primary motive of Pakistan's political leaders at the time and stress was placed on the other aspects of the agreement. The preamble of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement

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For discussion of the development of this northern tier alliance and American association with it, see Chapter IV.

for Friendly Cooperation of April 1954 recognised the 'need for consultation and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their peoples' and expressed the conviction that 'such cooperation would be to the interest of all peace-loving nations, and in particular also to the interest of nations in the region of the contracting parties'; but it was the idea of collective defence which was uppermost, not regional cooperation. In the Pakistan-Turkey joint communiqué of 13 June 1954, this objective was more clearly stated,¹ and was reiterated by the Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, in a speech to the National Assembly in April 1956.²

The Suez crisis of 1956 had the effect of driving a wedge between Britain and the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact with the result that more emphasis was placed on the regional and Islamic aspects of the pact. At the Council meeting of June 1957 the Pakistan Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, referred to the association of four Muslim powers in the pact as evidence of the

1

For text of the communiqué see Denise Folliot (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1954 (OUP: London, 1957), p.188.

2

National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1956, vol.1, 26 April 1956, p.85.

fact that the Muslim world, after centuries of dissension and confusion was 'coming together once again in common enterprise and endeavour.'¹ By 1958 Dawn was writing: 'The one great blessing of the Baghdad Pact has been to bring us closer to three other Muslim nations. Whether the Pact remains or goes, the friendly ties forged between four nations will endure....'² In 1967 Ayub Khan, listing retrospectively the reasons for Pakistan's association with the Baghdad Pact, included the 'strong desire which has always existed in Pakistan that we should forge closer relations with our neighbours in the Middle East and particularly with other Muslim countries.'³ He argued that it was fear of communism which impelled the Christian world to help the Muslim world for the first time in history, while 'the Muslim world itself was at that time emerging from the domination of western powers' and needed material and technological assistance. 'There was no reason why we should not have taken advantage of the opportunity. For us, our own needs for

1

For text of speech see Dawn, 4 June 1957.

2

Editorial, 'At the Crossroads - II', *ibid.*, 31 January 1958.

3

Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, a Political Autobiography (OUP: 1967), pp.154-6.

development were paramount and that was the reason we joined the Pacts.' The major benefit of the Pact was the 'association and friendship which we were able to develop with the governments and peoples of Iran and Turkey.'¹

4. Cooperation within the Scope of the Baghdad Pact

Within the framework of the Baghdad Pact there were two principal areas of cooperation: defence and economic development. The Council, at its first meeting in 1955, set up committees to deal with both. Although the alliance was established primarily for defence, as time passed its economic activities took precedence over the military. Earlier attempts at economic cooperation had been restricted to bilateral trade agreements and more ambitious multilateral schemes had suffered from lack of funds. Within the scope of the alliance members grew accustomed to regional activity, and the funds contributed by the USA and to a lesser extent by Britain made work on larger projects possible. Although military cooperation was considered, it was interpreted differently by each of the members, and did not develop far beyond the discussion stage.

1

Ibid.

(i) Defence Cooperation

Although some initial moves were made towards setting up a joint command structure, and some rudimentary machinery was established, when the time came for major steps to be taken negotiations bogged down. There are two principal, interrelated reasons for this: the reluctance of the United States to involve itself in the organisation to the extent necessary to make such a plan work, and the inability of the regional members to set up a properly co-ordinated military structure on their own.

When the Military Committee was established in 1955, the USA was already giving military aid on a bilateral basis to all four regional members. At the Teheran meeting in April 1956 the US Observer to the Military Committee offered to establish a military liaison group at the permanent headquarters of the organisation. In the post-Suez atmosphere of 1957, the USA, more apprehensive than ever of apparent Soviet advances within the Middle East, announced its willingness to join the Military Committee, 'a further indication of our [America's] continuing strong support for the Baghdad Pact and of our determination to assist the Baghdad Pact States to meet any threat of communist aggression

against their territories.'¹ This decision was welcomed by all the Pact members, although the Pakistani statement that the US decision would strengthen members' determination 'to resist aggression from whatever quarter it may arise'² revealed the differing objectives of the Pact members (or at least Pakistan) and the USA, and gave warning of conflict to come.

The Military Committee, meeting concurrently with the Council, began for the first time to consider the question of setting up a joint command structure. The result was the establishment of the Combined Military Planning Staff, a permanent group whose duty it was to co-ordinate defence planning and organise training exercises.

On the major question, however, differences among the members of the Committee were reported. The Americans were reluctant to equip the organisation with a NATO-type co-ordinated joint command, believing that the primary

1

Loy Henderson, formally accepting the Council's invitation to join the Military Committee, June 1957 (my italics). For text of speech, see Dawn, 4 June 1957.

2

Ibid. (my italics).

task of the alliance was co-ordination of military assistance to members.¹

It was clear that if CENTO was to have a NATO-type defence structure, the USA would have to bear the cost of its establishment. The regional members, especially Iran and Pakistan, were anxious for closer US association with the pact, but the Pakistan view was that the threat of aggression to the area should be properly evaluated before any major decisions were taken.² This demand was apparently not pressed very hard, and the Council communiqué of June 1957³ reported the Military

1

The Pakistan Times, 31 March 1962. A similar reluctance on the part of America was evident as early as 1949 when the Turks were anxious that some collective defence organisation should be established for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, possibly in association with NATO. The US view was that the region was not sufficiently developed to support a sophisticated, integrated defence structure such as NATO required. (The Times, 3 December 1949.) When Turkey was finally admitted to NATO it proved its ability as a useful member, but the cost to the USA of setting up the required NATO defence infrastructure in Turkey was in the region of \$400 million. (Turkish Foreign Ministry statement reported by Turkiye Radyo Televizyon (T.R.T.), The Pulse, 19 June 1969.)

2

Dawn, 4 June 1957.

3

N. Frankland (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1957 (OUP: London, 1960), p.297.

Committee's agreement on the nature of the threat, and approved the establishment of a more comprehensive military planning structure.

Further consideration of the possibility of a joint command received a set-back with the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and Iraq's subsequent withdrawal from the pact. A Permanent Military Deputies group was set up in October 1959, to begin operation the following January. The USA had endeavoured to compromise on the question of greater involvement in the organisation by signing separate Bilateral Agreements with each of the regional members in March 1959,¹ but their anxiety for strengthening CENTO remained, together with their demand that the United States become a full member of the organisation. It was reported, at the end of 1959, that the possibility of large standing armies under the proposed joint CENTO command had been ruled out for the time being in view of America's non-participation in the organisation as a full member,² but in April 1961 it was decided to appoint a Commander, CENTO military

1

Identical Bilateral Agreements of Co-operation between the United States and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were signed in Ankara, 5 March 1959. For text, see Department of State Bulletin (DSB), 23 March 1959, p.417.

2

Dawn, 4 November 1959.

staff, to improve co-ordination of defence planning. Iran and Pakistan wanted the appointment of an American General who would have powers comparable to those of the NATO Supreme Commander, but the Americans felt that such an appointment would not be correct since they were not full members of CENTO. The British Government offered to make a General available, but this solution was not acceptable to Iran or Pakistan unless Britain and America agreed to 'put more teeth' into CENTO's military organisation. By this time the USA was more reluctant than ever to become further involved in CENTO since it did not wish unnecessarily to antagonise the USSR or any of the region's neutral countries, including India or Afghanistan. No agreement could be reached therefore, and the attempt to appoint a CENTO Commander was abandoned.¹

Later communiqués paid scant attention to military matters, merely agreeing that defence should be strengthened. From 1963 Pakistan, endeavouring to build up a relationship with China and the USSR, was reluctant to involve itself too deeply in the military aspects of CENTO, and after the 1965 war with India, refused to participate at all. Most Pakistan military personnel were withdrawn from CENTO headquarters and Pakistan did

1

The Pakistan Times, 31 March, 14 April and 1 May 1962. Dawn, 27 April, 2 and 4 May, 1962.

not attend the meeting of the Military Committee in February 1968. While registering disapproval, Pakistan did not take the extreme step of refusing to approve budgets, which could have crippled the work of the Committee.¹

Military cooperation within CENTO has been minimal, for without United States participation, much development was out of the question. In any case, as CENTO is not such a tightly drawn treaty as NATO, which commits its members to each other's defence much more specifically than does CENTO, one may ask whether an integrated defence structure would have been possible for the latter organisation. This is particularly important when Pakistan's reluctance to confine CENTO's functions to defence against Communism is recalled, for its allies were understandably unwilling to place themselves in a position which might have involved them in hostilities with India.² In these circumstances, the US view that CENTO's proper function lay in co-ordination of military aid and defence development was probably more realistic.

1

Christian Science Monitor, 5 November 1968, and The New York Times, 24 April 1968, p.19.

2

See Chapter VIII.

(ii) Economic Cooperation

The CENTO Council identified three main fields for economic cooperation. These were regional projects in the field of industry and communications, trade and technical assistance.

Development in the field of communications, though slow, has been the most successful of CENTO's achievements. Early in 1957 the USA offered to meet the cost of certain rail, highway and telecommunications surveys in the region, and announced that \$12,570,000 would be made available for this purpose.¹ The Economic Committee was able to report in July 1958 that tenders had been called for the supply of equipment for improvement and extension of radio-telephone links between London and regional capitals, that a team of US technicians was currently engaged in a physical survey for the establishment of microwave links between member countries, and that the US Government had pledged \$18,300,000 towards the cost.²

A direct radio-telephone link between Turkey and Iran had been inaugurated in September 1957, while survey work continued on road and rail links. Although the telecommunications project was finally completed and

1

DSB, 6 May 1957, pp.724, 730.

2

Economic Committee Meeting, 17-21 January 1958, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1958, p.16024.

handed over in April 1966, and the section of the highway linking Turkey and Iran has been completed, the remainder is unfinished, and the railway is not expected to be completed before 1970.

Improvements to the port facilities of Trabzon, a Turkish Black Sea town, have provided an opening for regional trade, and similar work in Iskanderun, an important Turkish naval base, is in progress.

The expansion of trade and the possible establishment of a common market or free trade area also engaged the attention of the Economic Committee, with little visible result. In May 1957 the Committee decided to make a detailed study of the possibility of establishing a customs union, a free trade area and a common market in the Baghdad Pact region 'with due regard to existing obligations and commitments of member countries.'¹ In September that year the Subcommittee on Trade recommended that study of a possible customs union along the lines of the European Economic Community should not be undertaken, but that consideration should be given to the establishment of a free trade area.²

1

Economic Committee Communiqué, 21 May 1957, *ibid.*, 1957, p.15617.

2

Communiqué issued by the Economic Committee Subcommittee on Trade, 24 September 1957, DSB, 28 October 1957, p.684.

The Baghdad Pact scheme envisaged that Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan would maintain full freedom regarding the extent and nature of restrictions imposed by each of them on outside countries, while establishing free trade among themselves. A Pakistani economist concluded:

The significant effect of the free trade area would be with respect to the future since each of the countries including Pakistan is on the verge of industrialisation and diversification of their agricultural and industrial production. It would influence as between members the lines of specialization in agriculture and industry and location of industries in the region, which would be different from the pattern which would develop otherwise in the protected market of each.¹

This view was apparently shared by the Pakistan Government. The scheme had been under consideration for over two years when Bhutto, then Minister for Information and Broadcasting, remarked that in order to gain reasonable benefit out of any such arrangement it would be necessary to achieve a minimum level of industrialisation.² The Iranian view was that the proposal sounded rational, but further discussion was necessary. If agreement could be

1

Nurul Islam, 'Pakistan and the Baghdad Pact Free Trade Area', Dawn, 8 June 1960.

2

Ibid., 2 January 1960.

reached between Iran and Pakistan, the matter could then be pursued with other members of the alliance.¹ The principal stumbling block to such cooperation, alluded to but not explicitly stated, was that each of the countries concerned wanted to build up its own industrial base, and was not prepared to allow industries believed vital for this purpose to be located elsewhere in the region.

Bhutto had already referred to a problem which was beginning to concern countries like Pakistan, and was to assume importance in the next few years:

What we need is stabilisation of prices of raw materials. While prices of manufactured goods and machinery are on the increase, the market for raw materials fluctuates to the detriment of producing countries. In the circumstances there is need for raw material producing countries to understand each other's problems. Whether there should be a common market or some other form of closer participation among these countries is a matter of evolution.²

This problem of industrialisation, together with the competitive nature of economic development within the region, complicated the question of expanded trade and

1

Ibid., 15 January 1960.

2

Bhutto, on the possibility of a CENTO Common Market, at a press conference in Istanbul, 15 October 1959, *ibid.*, 20 October 1959.

the establishment of a free trade area. Beyond bilateral trade agreements of a limited nature little progress was made.

The field of technical cooperation is both less spectacular and beset by fewer problems than the other fields of cooperation. Perhaps for this reason it has progressed at a continuous though modest pace, for the most part in areas such as disease eradication (both human and animal) and agricultural development. In 1959 the Multilateral Technical Co-operation Fund was set up to supply technical equipment to member countries and to exchange experts and trainees. It had an initial capital of \$150,000, of which one third each was contributed by the USA, Britain and the regional countries combined. A Research Institute for Nuclear and Applied Science was established at Teheran University and in 1966 the Economic Committee set up the Multilateral Scientific Fund. At the same meeting the Committee, noting that the major projects were coming to an end, decided that consideration of further development and the establishment of priorities and criteria should be undertaken. It agreed that cooperation should continue in agricultural development, technical and vocational training, health, science and development of water resources as well as communications.¹ While some more working groups have

1

Economic Committee Press Communiqué, 17 March 1966, Central Treaty Organization, Public Relations Division, Central Treaty Organization 1966, Ankara (n.d.), pp.24-6.

been established, no further major projects are planned after the completion of the highway and rail links.

After the 1967 meeting of the Economic Committee, a Pakistani observer asked if 'in the light of the creation of RCD there was any point in going along as a matter of routine with such academic exercises as the Washington meeting of CENTO's Economic Committee turned out to be?'¹ While the establishment of RCD makes CENTO appear redundant in some ways, CENTO officials maintain that there are some things which CENTO can do better, pointing to the communications scheme.² A senior member of the CENTO staff was quoted as saying:

CENTO has found in regional economic development of its members a means of keeping the organization alive at a time when it is unfashionable to insist on Soviet penetration of the area. It remains an insurance policy that could be very valuable if the times change.³

1

Ejaz Hussain, Dawn, 18 March 1957.

2

From conversations with CENTO and RCD officials during 1967 and 1968. It is interesting to note that RCD officials claim these as 'the RCD road' and 'the RCD railway'.

3

The New York Times, 25 April 1968, p.9.

5. Changing Attitudes towards CENTO

There has been much misunderstanding surrounding Pakistan's membership of CENTO. Announcing his Government's decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, had declared that Pakistan had become a party to securing the defence and promoting the welfare of a region vital and dear to the heart of the entire world of Islam.¹ According to the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Pakistan had joined because it was 'aware of the inherently predatory nature of Soviet foreign policy and also because their people, being deeply religious people, find repugnant the attitude which Soviet rulers take towards religion'.² Writing in 1967, President Ayub said that 'the crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility to us: we had to look for allies to secure our position.'³

When the Baghdad Pact is seen in the context of the East-West tension prevailing at the time of its

1

First-of-the-Month Broadcast, July 1955, The Pakistan Times, 3 July 1955.

2

Press conference, 7 February 1956, DSB, 20 February 1956, p.282.

3

Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.153.

formation in 1955 there can be little doubt that it was designed to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East, and it is difficult to imagine that the Pakistan Government was under any misapprehension in this regard. Pakistan's strategy appears to have been to involve the United States as deeply as possible in the defence of the region, perhaps hoping that once America was convinced of Pakistan's loyalty, support against India would be forthcoming.¹

Pakistan's interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957² as a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Baghdad Pact powers appears to be an attempt to make it seem true by saying that it was true.³ By the same token the Bilateral Agreement of March 1959 was taken as a commitment on the part of America to

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Official Pakistani statements that the country's loyalty over the years was poorly rewarded would seem to bear out this argument. See Bhutto statement to the Pakistan National Assembly, 17 July 1963, in Z.A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs: Karachi, 1964), pp.96-7, and Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.132.

2

See the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace & Stability in the Middle East, text in DSB, 25 March 1957, p.481.

3

See, for example, statements at the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting, June 1957, Dawn, 4 June 1957.

defend Pakistan. Even Ayub Khan, not given to exaggeration of this kind, refers to America's commitment to come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack.¹ The operative article of the Bilateral Agreement states that, in the case of aggression against Pakistan, the US Government,

in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability, in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.²

The Joint Resolution, to which the agreement refers, promised assistance to any nation or group of nations in the Middle East against 'armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism....'³ This can in no way, at least up to the present time, be interpreted to cover the possibility of Indian attack.

So long as Soviet-US tension continued, and the US regarded non-alignment as an international evil, these misconceptions were not placed under any great strain.

1

Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.153.

2

Article 1 of the Bilateral Agreement, see DSB, 23 March 1959, p.417 (my italics).

3

See p.237, note 2.

Although in March 1960 the Pakistan Foreign Minister stated that the alliance with the West was the sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy,¹ and in June that Pakistan was 'happy and proud to belong to SEATO and CENTO,'² the international scene was changing.

In May 1960 an American aircraft on an intelligence mission was shot down over the USSR. It was discovered to have taken off from Adana in Turkey, refuelled in Peshawar and flown north across Afghanistan to Russia. Later known as the 'U-2 incident', it brought a sharp Soviet reaction in the form of a threat against Peshawar, making Pakistanis ask if the risks inherent in such alliances were worthwhile.

During 1960 and 1961 Sino-Indian relations began to deteriorate, and India sought to build up its defences, a move which alarmed the Pakistan Government which suspected the new US Administration of taking a more tolerant view of neutralist countries like India. Criticism within Pakistan of membership of the pacts placed the Government on the defensive and in January 1961 the Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, asserted that Pakistan's peculiar geographical and political position

1

Manzur Qadir, reported in Dawn, 12 March 1960.

2

Ibid., 4 June 1960.

in Asia had necessitated entry into collective security arrangements. He added that these defence agreements were only meant to forestall threats of aggression and thus were not directed against any peaceful and friendly country.¹ The Pakistan Government regarded with distrust India's attempts to build up its defences, and President Ayub, while on tour in America warned that if the US gave arms aid to India, Pakistan would feel less secure and that 'tremendous strain' would be placed on friendship with America.² President Kennedy was apparently able to reassure him to some extent, and according to Ayub said that 'he was not thinking in terms of abandoning friends and embracing "neutrals": all he had in mind was that "neutrals" should not be treated as enemies.'³

Dissatisfaction with the American alliance in Pakistan grew, however, and in May 1962 Ayub told reporters that all Pakistan got from the alliances was 'an enlargement of our political difficulties and a lot of abuse and

1

Dawn, 16 January 1961.

2

Speaking to the National Press Club, Washington, 13 July 1961. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.IV, July 1961-June 1962 (Pakistan Publications: Karachi, n.d.), p.36.

3

Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.138.

pressure from Russia and neutralist India.¹ At the same time India was negotiating the purchase of Soviet jet fighters, a move which alarmed Pakistan and was opposed by America which feared that it would lead to Indian military dependence on the USSR.² There were reports that Britain and America were contemplating countering Soviet offers to India, and Ayub warned that US military aid might force some of India's neighbours to seek protection elsewhere.³

When in June 1962 the UAR and Ghana abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution on Kashmir which was favourable to Pakistan, and the USSR vetoed it, the mood of bitterness in Pakistan increased, and Pakistan's membership of the pacts was blamed for this unfavourable turn of events.⁴

The Sino-Indian border clash of October-November 1962 was followed by an Anglo-US decision to supply India with extensive arms aid, which Pakistan feared would upset the prevailing military balance on the

1

Interview with UPI, reported in The Pakistan Times, 11 May 1962.

2

The New York Times, 5 May 1962, p.10.

3

Ibid., 11 May 1962.

4

Dawn, 28 June 1962.

subcontinent. At the same time it was clear that CENTO would not be strengthened as Pakistan desired, and disappointment was also expressed with the scale and administration of economic aid under CENTO.¹

By 1963 Pakistan was carrying out a successful policy of rapprochement with China, and a border agreement and an air agreement were signed. Chou En-lai visited Pakistan the following year and expressed support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir.² It no longer suited the Pakistan Government to be deeply and overtly committed to the Western military pacts. At the same time the decrease in tension between Russia and America resulted in a slackening of Soviet pressure on CENTO and its members. Soviet press and radio still condemned CENTO, but increasingly as a spent force which Britain and America were desperately trying to maintain.³

While Pakistan was probably the first member of CENTO to become disillusioned with that organisation,

1

Lt.Gen. Sheikh, *ibid.*, 6 May 1962, and President Ayub, *ibid.*, 11 May 1962.

2

See joint communiqué issued at the end of talks between Ayub Khan and Chou En-lai, text, *ibid.*, 4 February 1964.

3

See Moscow home service commentary, 'A Parade or a Funeral', 19 April 1966. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, (BBCSWB), Part 1, Soviet Union, SU/2141/A4/3.

Turkish faith in the American alliance was deeply shocked by the US attitude during the Cyprus crisis which began at the end of 1963 and almost led to a Turkish invasion of the island in August 1964.¹ Iran, disappointed with the scale of US military aid and lack of American support in its propaganda war with Nasser, was also growing discontented with the alliance. The mood was ripe, therefore, for the formation of Regional Cooperation for Development in July of that year.

Although the members emphasised that RCD had no political aims, and that it was neither incompatible with CENTO nor opposed to it,² the formation of RCD had the effect of diverting the attention and energy of the

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In a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, in August 1964, President Johnson warned that if Turkey intervened in Cyprus and if as a result the USSR then attacked Turkey, Turkey's NATO allies would have to consider whether they would be under any obligation to help Turkey. The substance of this letter was published by Hurriyet (Istanbul), 13 January 1966 (The Times, 14 January 1966), and later by the US State Department (reported The Times, 17 January 1966).

2

See Bhutto, press conference Ankara, Ankara home service, BBCSWB, Part 4, Africa and the Middle East, ME/1613/E/5; Ayub Khan in London, Pakistan Observer, 16 July 1964; Foreign Ministers' Communiqué, 4 July, text in Dawn, 6 July 1964.

regional countries from CENTO's economic projects, and from CENTO itself.

Pakistan's final disillusionment with CENTO is said to date from the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965, but it is possible that the war simply provided Pakistan with a convenient pretext for withdrawing from the military aspects of the organisation. Bhutto is reported to have invoked CENTO in the face of the Indian attack on Lahore¹ but while CENTO sources states that informal Pakistani requests for aid had been received, Pakistan did not formally invoke the treaty.² While it is understandable that such informal requests for aid from its allies were made, it is unlikely that the Pakistan Government believed that CENTO was in any legal sense obliged to come to Pakistan's assistance.

There was some talk of Pakistan's leaving CENTO, but while military personnel were withdrawn from the headquarters and Pakistan ceased to participate in military exercises, or meetings of the Military Committee, no other action was taken. Pakistan's increasing involvement in Afro-Asian affairs, a diplomatic offensive

1

The New York Times, 7 September 1965, p.1.

2

The Times, Dawn, 8 September 1965.

which was paying dividends in terms of its rivalry with India, probably encouraged its disengagement from CENTO.¹

So long as Pakistan's allies Iran and (more especially) Turkey still have an interest in participating in CENTO's military projects, it costs Pakistan little to remain within the organisation. President Ayub has expressed a doubt that 'it would do anybody very much harm if both these pacts [CENTO and SEATO] were done away with. For the present, no member country wants to take the blame for breaking the arrangement.'² While Turkish sources deny exerting pressure on Pakistan to remain within the alliance, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Arshad Hussein, has stated bluntly: 'Turkey desires the preservation of CENTO and wants Pakistan to remain within the pact so we are staying.'³

Turkey and Iran, always more vulnerable to Soviet pressure than Pakistan, have in recent years enjoyed relative freedom from Russian hostility. Although both Governments have deliberately set out to improve

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See Chapter VIII.

2

Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp.157-8.

3

Speaking to a Turkish journalist, Daily News (Ankara), 29 June 1968.

relations with the USSR, their success has been to a large extent a fortuitous result of decreased tension in Russo-American relations. This situation could change in the future, and the imminent withdrawal of the British from the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf area, together with Russia's policy of naval expansion, has created an air of uncertainty in the region. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a reminder that Russia is still capable of such activity. The possible effect of these changes on the future of CENTO cannot be assessed at this stage. It remains, however, in the view of its present Secretary-General, a high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 'an instrument whose value far exceeds its material accomplishments. As a shield it continues to make it possible to talk about building bridges where bridges can be built.'¹

6. Cooperation Among the Regional Countries Outside CENTO

While CENTO may not have come up to the expectations of its regional members, either in military or economic terms, it had the effect of providing a framework for cooperation and consultation which was not previously available. The custom developed of holding high level

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Turgut Menemencioglu, The New York Times, 24 April 1968, p.19.

meetings of regional leaders, usually in response to a situation of crisis.

The first occasion on which such consultation was felt to be necessary was the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 when Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Pakistani leaders met, twice within a month, in Teheran and Baghdad. Iraq particularly had been placed in a difficult position by the British action, and suggestions were made that Britain should be asked to leave the Pact. The only solution appeared to be to hold meetings under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, but without UK participation. It seemed that disapproval of British action had the effect of confirming the regional countries in the realisation that they had an interest in maintaining their own sense of unity. As a result of action taken at these meetings, the four regional powers claimed some of the credit for the Anglo-French decision to cease hostilities.¹

Following this precedent, President Celal Bayar of Turkey called another conference in July 1958 in order to discuss the situation which had arisen following the announcement of the union between Egypt and Syria in January that year, and the resultant Iraqi-Jordan union. Since Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact and Jordan,

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These meetings are discussed more fully in Chapter IX.

although sympathetic to the West, was not, this had created a delicate situation. This particular problem was solved by the Iraqi revolution, during which King Faisal and Nuri es-Said were killed, which took place the morning the conference was scheduled to open. In an atmosphere of increased urgency the talks went ahead. There were reports that the remaining members of the Baghdad Pact were not anxious for continued Iraqi membership, and that in response to the new situation they would take steps to forge a closer unity among themselves.¹ Despite later denials that suggestions of confederation were discussed, something of this nature seems to have been in the minds at least of Iranian and Pakistani leaders, though public support for any decisive move at that stage was lacking.

The next meeting between the Heads of State took place in November 1959 at Teheran, the first foreign visit made by President Ayub Khan since he seized power in October 1968. Exercising the minds of the three leaders at this time was the Soviet propaganda campaign being carried on against the pact members, but especially against Iran, in the wake of the Bilateral Agreements with the USA earlier that year. Also current was the

1

Donald Wilber, 'Prospects for Federation in the Northern Tier', Middle East Journal, vol.12, no.4, 1958; The New York Times, 18 July 1958, p.7.

question of strengthening CENTO's military arm and the possibility of establishing a joint command. The talks were convened once more the following February at Lahore, where the discussions of November were continued.

By the time the Istanbul meeting, also called at short notice, took place in July 1964, all the participants were psychologically ready to agree to form an organisation of their own to promote the development of the region, a decision spurred on by the recommendations of the UNCTAD Conference earlier in the year.¹ Consultations were also held during the Kashmir war in September 1965, although not in such a formal fashion: the Iranian and Turkish premiers met first in Ankara, then the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Iranian Prime Minister went to Rawalpindi for talks with Pakistani leaders.² The next 'RCD Summit' (as these meetings came to be known) took place at Ramsar in Iran in August 1967 in response to the situation in the Middle East created by the Arab-Israel war in June. The three leaders also discussed

1

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development took place in Geneva during March-June 1964. It was particularly concerned with the problems of the less developed countries, and one of its recommendations was that these countries should, where possible, cooperate on a regional basis. See Chapter VI.

2

See Chapter VIII.

the progress made by RCD, and decided on a substantial reorganisation of its committee structure. They decided also that such meetings should be held regularly, and the next took place at Islamabad in December 1968.

While Pakistan, Turkey and Iran have thus availed themselves of the opportunity for increased consultation provided initially within the framework of the Baghdad Pact, such discussions have not always resulted in agreement. Some of the difficulties arising within RCD will be discussed in the following chapter: while they do not differ vastly from the problems which confronted CENTO discussions on economic cooperation, it is no longer possible to blame Britain or the United States for impeding progress.

Although the three countries are able to cooperate on many broad foreign policy issues, there are some significant points on which they differ. On the question of Kashmir, Turkey and Iran support Pakistan, but not to the extent of becoming involved in hostilities with India, with which both try to maintain good relations.¹ Pakistan and Iran give Turkey support over Cyprus: up to the present the Turkish Government has not asked for more than diplomatic backing. Iran has been less

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Especially Iran, which has an important trade relationship with India. See Appendix I. The Turkish and Iranian positions regarding Kashmir are discussed in Chapter VIII.

fortunate in its dispute with Iraq over navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab, for both Turkey and Pakistan have good relations with Iraq which they do not want to jeopardise. The best they can offer Iran is neutrality and, in the case of Turkey, its good offices to attempt to settle the dispute. In his longstanding quarrel with President Nasser, the Shah is also deprived of Pakistani support: in fact President Ayub's flattering references in his autobiography to President Nasser are reported to have angered the Shah considerably, and he is said to have raised the matter at the Ramsar conference.

With regard to the Arab-Israel dispute over Palestine, Turkish, Iranian and Pakistani policy differs substantially, for both Turkey and Iran recognise Israel and have enjoyed relatively good relations with that country, while Pakistan firmly supports the Arabs. There is some flexibility, however, as Turkey has sharply reduced its trade with Israel in an effort to win Arab support on the question of Cyprus. All three support the Arab case on the status of Jerusalem.¹

Differences have also arisen regarding Pakistan's relationship with China, which Turkey would prefer was

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See Chapter IX.

not quite so close. At the same time Pakistan's efforts to persuade Turkey to recognise China, while they have not as yet borne fruit, have not been rebuffed.¹

Despite these differences, the alliance remains intact and in Pakistan the ideal of closer collaboration continues to flourish. There are from time to time expressions of nostalgia for the return of Afghanistan and Iraq to the fold and while there has apparently been no direct approach it has been made clear to both these countries that their membership of RCD would be welcomed, if they were prepared to accept its objectives.

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While visiting Rawalpindi in March 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, told Turkish journalists that, during a visit to Afghanistan in 1960 he had discussed the question of Turkish recognition of China with the Turkish Ambassador in Kabul. Turkey had then displayed a positive interest, he said, and it was now up to Turkey to take steps to complete negotiations. Pakistan had informed China and Turkey of its willingness to act as a mediator. Chen Yi added that China regarded improvement of relations with Turkey as of prime importance. 'China is a wounded country. I understand that Turkey is also experiencing difficulties in its relations with big Powers. Both countries must co-operate.' (Voice of Cyprus, in Turkish, 28 March 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1822/C/1.) Although the Turkish Prime Minister, Suat Urganlu, denied that either China or Pakistan had approached Turkey with regard to recognition of China (Ankara home service, 29 March 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1823/C/2), the Foreign Minister, Hasan Isik, some days later told the press that universal acceptance of China would facilitate the establishment of world peace and that international conditions should be created to facilitate this acceptance (press interview in Teheran, Ankara Radio, 7 April 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1831/C/2).

CHAPTER VIRegional Co-operation for Development¹1. The Formation of RCD

Although attempts at regional economic cooperation had been made as early as 1949 when the International Islamic Economic Organization was established, and had been carried on within the framework of CENTO, there is little doubt that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,² held in Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964, provided the stimulus for the formation of RCD. The Conference met to discuss means of overcoming the trade gap faced by many developing countries which depended on the export of primary products whose prices were steadily declining relative to those of the manufactured goods they needed to import. It was attended by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, all belonging to the less developed group. Although they differed marginally on the measures which they believed

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See Appendix, Economic Survey of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

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UNCTAD.

should be taken to remedy their economic weakness,¹ they were in fundamental agreement regarding the problems involved. It was later noted:

Among the points which were stressed by them, and which form the basis of a common policy, are the shortage of foreign exchange, and the need for the import of know-how and capital goods, for the expansion of trade on a fair and rational basis, for large scale untied assistance from the developed countries and for opening the markets of industrialised countries more widely to the primary commodities which form the main item of export of developing countries, as well as their manufacture.²

One of the recommendations of UNCTAD was that the developing countries might benefit by exploring the possibilities of regional cooperation among themselves. Encouraged by discussions which had taken place during the conference, Turkey sent a representative to Teheran, where he found keen interest in regional cooperation.

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For example, Turkey was reluctant to support the sweeping measures which would have limited the trade benefits it enjoyed as a result of its association with the European Common Market. See Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964, vols.I and II (United Nations: New York, 1964).

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Dr Fuad Rouhani, 'Report on Secretary-General's Visit to Geneva and New York to Make Contact with UNCTAD', RCD Bulletin (Teheran), vol.2, no.3, March 1966.

He subsequently presented a report arguing that bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Iran was feasible. On learning of the Turkish-Iranian plans, Pakistan also apparently expressed interest, and a similar feasibility study was made vis-à-vis Pakistan.¹

The decision to establish RCD in July 1964 was, however, an unexpected development, following talks held by President Ayub in Teheran and Istanbul early that month. There had been no speculation in the Pakistan press regarding the President's intentions before his departure on the apparently hurriedly planned tour which took him to Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey on his way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Although Ayub has disclaimed special credit for RCD, it was in Pakistan widely held to have been his idea, and to have been proposed by him only during that tour.² As

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According to Turkish officials. Pakistani sources do not refer to these discussions, and President Ayub said in August 1964: 'nobody could ever think of such [an] arrangement two or three months back'. (Speech at Ramna Green, Dacca, 26 August 1964. See Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, July 1964-June 1965 (n.d.), p.20.) The speed with which the tripartite negotiations were concluded in July 1964 suggests, however, that the Turkish report is accurate.

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Dawn, 19 July 1964, also speech by President Ayub at the Thinkers' Forum at the University Campus, Lahore, 4 October 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, pp.44, 46.

a result of President Ayub's discussions in Teheran and Istanbul, it was decided that he and the Shah should come to Istanbul later in the month for formal discussions. The three Foreign Ministers met immediately on 3-4 July in Ankara, and discussed the possibilities of multilateral economic cooperation. Financial advisers to the three governments were summoned to Ankara, and formulated detailed proposals which were subsequently discussed by the Foreign Ministers on 18-19 July. The report of this Ministerial meeting¹ was adopted by the leaders of the three governments at their meeting on 20-21 July. The broad principles on which RCD was to be established were laid down in the Istanbul Accord,² and more detailed proposals were listed in the joint communiqué signed by the Heads of Government, which stated:

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Report of the Ministerial Pre-Summit Meeting at Ankara, 18-19 July 1964, to the Summit Meeting at Istanbul in July 1964 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Islamabad (mimeographed)).

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For the text of the Istanbul Accord, signed by the three Heads of State, President Ayub, President Gursel and the Shah, 22 July 1964, see Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Planning Division), Background Paper on RCD, Prepared by Mr Akbar Adil, for the First Joint RCD Course on Public Administration, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, October-November 1967, p.46.

The formation of economic groupings is one of the outstanding features of our time and one of the most important factors in the acceleration of economic progress. The efforts being made for regional economic co-operation have received international acceptance and the decision of the three countries to expand such co-operation between the countries of the region is designed to achieve the same objective - strengthening of development by constant regional co-operation.¹

At a press conference in Istanbul on 22 July, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, said that the agreement was the culmination of six-year-old developments in the three countries, in addition to a recent coincidence of events which helped its formation, including the 'greater credence and importance being given to non-alignment', the relaxation in tension between America and Russia, and a general tendency towards regional cooperation.²

According to President Ayub the summit talks represented 'a new grand concept', which would pave the

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For the text of the joint communiqué signed by the three Heads of Government, President Ayub, Ismet Inonu, and Hassan Ali Mansur, 22 July 1964, see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBCSWB), Part 4, ME/1613/E/2, Teheran home service, 22 July 1964.

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BBCSWB, ME/1613/E/5, Ankara home service, 22 July 1964.

way for more fruitful relations among all Muslim countries, from Morocco to Indonesia.¹ After the conference he said: 'What we have created is a small but tidy closely knit organization. This venture will be as important for us in the long run as the EEC is for the nations of Western Europe.'² The Iranian Prime Minister described RCD as 'the need of the hour',³ and later, speaking to the Majlis, referred to it as a turning point in relations between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and 'one of the major victories in the history of Iran.' He too emphasised the speed with which the decision was reached.⁴ The Shah, more cautious, merely said that cooperation had always been good and that the talks proved it could be better.⁵ Turkish statements were also restrained: Inonu said the agreement 'augured well for the future', while the Foreign Minister, Cemal Erkin, professed himself 'happy and satisfied'.⁶

1
Dawn, 21 July 1964.

2
Ibid., 24 July 1964.

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Ibid.

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Ibid., 9 August 1964.

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Ibid., 24 July 1964.

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Ibid.

The proposals put forward, however, had the appearance of a practical beginning for a strictly functional scheme. A distinction was drawn between measures of economic cooperation which could be worked out and implemented at once, and those which would require detailed study. A Regional Planning Committee was to be established to study development plans and make recommendations for long-term purchase agreements and joint projects which would be based on the needs of all three countries. Specific areas of collaboration were outlined and it was proposed to set up working groups to study them. There would be regular ministerial meetings, and the various working groups would report to the Ministers through the Planning Committee.¹

2. Organization

The RCD machinery was set up according to the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers, and confirmed in the Istanbul Accord. The Accord, which does not have the status of a treaty, and has never been presented for ratification in any of the parliaments of the participating countries, is the sole legal framework for the organisation. While this is a sufficient working basis, it presented certain difficulties regarding recognition by the United

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Report of the Ministerial Pre-Summit Meeting, and the Ayub-Inonu-Mansur joint communiqué, referred to above.

Nations. This informal situation appears satisfactory to each of the members, none of whom has made any move to place RCD on a firmer legal footing.

The highest authority responsible for making decisions is the Ministerial Council. It was envisaged that the Council, consisting of Ministers designated by each of the members, would meet once every four months, or more often if necessary. Its task was to study the report of the Regional Planning Council, to make decisions on the basis of this report regarding economic cooperation, and to follow up the decisions and progress made. The members are usually represented on the Council by their Foreign Ministers, and the meetings, lasting two or three days, are held in rotation in the three capitals. The initial optimistic suggestion that meetings be at four-monthly intervals has not worked out in practice, although they are still fairly frequent. Since its establishment in July 1964, ten meetings have been held, the most recent in Islamabad in June 1969.

The Regional Planning Council, composed of the heads of the three member planning organisations, is probably the most important single body in the functioning of RCD. Its reports, based on the reports of the various committees and sub-committees, are usually accepted with little debate by the Ministerial Council. Its meetings are geared to those of the Ministerial Council (or perhaps vice versa), and occur immediately before them.

The Planning officials usually remain on hand during the Council meetings.

At the first Ministerial Council meeting in October 1964, the working groups, of which there were 16, became known as permanent committees.¹ These committees met frequently and, with the large number in existence, the round of meetings was hectic. In the first year there were more than 50 RCD meetings of various kinds. At the Ramsar Summit (July 1967) the decision was taken to streamline the committee structure, and the number was reduced to seven: the Industry Committee (which deals with matters relating to Joint Purpose Enterprises); the Committee on Petroleum and Petrochemicals; the Committee on Trade, which combines activities relating to promotion of trade and removal of trade barriers, the RCD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Tourism, Banking and Insurance; the Committee on Transport and Communications, which replaces those on Transportation, Shipping, Roads and

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The 16 permanent committees were as follows: Joint Purpose Enterprises, Trade, Banking and Insurance, Petroleum, Petrochemical Industries, Technical Cooperation and Public Administration, Cultural Cooperation, Tourism, Shipping, Post and Telecommunications, Air Transportation, Roads and Railways, Budget and Administration, Information, Health and Family Planning, Co-ordination. In addition there were two ad hoc groups on Agriculture and Women's Cooperation. Background Paper on RCD, p.5.

Railways, Posts and Telecommunications; the Committee on Technical Cooperation, which deals with the technical assistance programme, public administration, health, family planning, agriculture and water resources development; the Committee on Social Affairs, which takes charge of cultural and information activities, and the Co-ordination Committee which deals with organisational matters relating to budget and administration, and co-ordinates the work of RCD generally.

The Committees have been described as the 'thinking cells' of RCD and are composed of technical experts appointed by each of the member countries. They provide direct contact with the various government agencies concerned.

Underpinning these other bodies is the permanent Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General. The Foreign Ministers recommended the establishment of a Secretariat in their report of 19 July 1964, and it was initially decided that it should be located in Teheran for the first year, and thereafter in each of the other capitals in rotation. The Ministerial Council later decided that it should remain for three years in Teheran, and it has since been established there permanently. Officials appointed to the Secretariat were to be paid by their own governments. The Iranian Plan Organization was to provide accommodation for it.

The Secretariat was opened on 29 August 1964, under the temporary Directorship of Dr Javad Vafa, a former Director of the Iranian Plan Organization.¹ On 18 March 1965 the Ministerial Council approved the appointment of Dr Fuad Rouhani for a period of three years. Dr Rouhani, a special adviser to the Prime Minister of Iran, had been Secretary-General and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and it was no doubt hoped that his experience of one international organisation would be helpful in setting RCD on its feet. His successor, Mr Masarrat Husain Zuberi, of Pakistan, previously Secretary in the Ministries of Industries, Fuel and Power and Natural Resources, as well as Communications, and a former member of the UN Transport and Communications Commission, was appointed in March 1968. Perhaps by then it was felt that experience of a different order would be an advantage to the organisation.

The staff of the Secretariat is small: there are two Directors and one Assistant-Director from each country. These may be (and in the case of Turkey usually are) diplomatic officers, but this is not necessarily so. Initially each Director was associated

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Dawn, 28 August 1964, and Ministerial Council Communiqué, 19 March 1965, Background Paper on RCD, pp.60-3.

with three or four committees, changing regularly in order to gain experience, which meant that the tempo of work was considerable.¹ The reduction in the number of committees has eased the burden on Directors and Assistant Directors to a very large extent.

The Secretariat is now housed in a small brown stone building in downtown Teheran, new and air-conditioned. The morale of the staff is apparently high, and they quickly developed a group feeling, an identity with the organisation. Irritation and frustration develops more frequently as a result of the slowness of their own governments to respond to RCD policy decisions than with each other. The relationship between the Directors and Dr Rouhani was remote, and some felt that Rouhani was perhaps too aloof a figure; on the other hand, there is some suggestion that Rouhani himself experienced a high degree of frustration as Secretary-General, and became rather dispirited about the organisation as a whole. At the time of writing,

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Especially for one Turkish Director who was required by the Ambassador in Teheran to work in the Embassy as well. He maintained there were some administrative economies: as Director he wrote himself letters in the morning to which, as First Secretary, he drafted replies after lunch, agreeing, naturally, to all his own proposals.

nothing is known of the relationship between the new Secretary-General and his staff.¹

Organisation within each of the member states varies, and only in Pakistan does it appear to have been constituted with sufficient authority to overrule individual ministries, and enable RCD policy to be executed.

In Turkey the administration of RCD policy is in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Initially an RCD Desk was set up in the Ministry's Department of Economic Relations, but in March 1968 a separate RCD Bureau was established with an expanded staff. Although still attached to the Economic Department it was better able, as a separate Bureau, to co-ordinate the various aspects - trade, tourism, communications - of RCD, which previously were dealt with by other branches of the Foreign Ministry. It is now through the Bureau that policy decisions are passed on to the relevant Ministries in the Turkish Government. The Chief of the Bureau, who also dealt with some matters relating to EEC, was of Acting Assistant Director-General rank. The Turkish Plan Organization appears to have little to do with RCD.²

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Conversations, necessarily unquotable, in Ankara and Teheran, August/September 1968.

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Interview with Nurver Nures, Acting Assistant Director-General and Chief of the RCD Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 21 August 1968.

The headquarters of the Iranian RCD organisation are to be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of this section was not clear how many staff he had working under him but he estimated there were six or seven.

The location of the Iranian RCD headquarters was, in 1964, the subject of a dispute between the Foreign Ministry and the Plan Organization. Dr Rouhani favoured its establishment within the Plan Organization, where the economic experts would be in control, rather than having decisions channelled through the Foreign Ministry. The then Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Mansur, had decided to leave direction of RCD affairs in the hands of the Foreign Ministry. As the Plan Organization, which is a separate authority directly responsible to the Shah, has its own source of funds (80 per cent of oil revenue and loans from abroad) and as any enterprise or project, regional or otherwise, must be approved by the Plan Organization, this body has effective control. The division between formal and actual authority does not, however, make for smooth handling of RCD matters. As late as 1966 it was reported that no allocation had been made in the Iranian budget for RCD. This was ascribed to the 'absence of mechanism in the administrative machinery of the government to exercise effective

administrative control over the policies and commitments made by the government on the regional level.¹

In Pakistan RCD matters come clearly within the authority of the Planning Division, the RCD Section of which was set up in August 1964. The head of the section is Mr Akbar Adil, who has held this position since the Section was established. He has the rank of Joint Secretary in the President's Secretariat, which gives him the necessary authority to give directives to the various Ministries. He is responsible to the Secretariat of Planning and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. There are two Deputy Chiefs in the RCD Section, an Assistant Chief and allied staff. Their task is to co-ordinate RCD activities with all the Ministries concerned and to liaise with the RCD Secretariat. Matters relating to RCD are referred to the Ministry concerned. All delegations to RCD meetings are sponsored by the Section, which co-ordinates the views of the Government and intimates the result to the Governments of Iran and Turkey.

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'Report of the Businessmen's Mission to the RCD Countries', First Joint Course in Public Administration and Management for Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, held at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, from October 8 to November 18, 1967, vol.II, Documentation, Speeches, Field Visits in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (Pakistan Administrative Staff College: Lahore, December 1967).

Akbar Adil is relatively the most senior administrator in charge of RCD matters in the region, and the machinery set up in Pakistan appears to be designed to work as efficiently as possible. The implications seem to be that, while Pakistan is serious about the implementation of RCD's economic objectives, both Turkey and Iran regard the organisation in terms primarily of diplomacy, and wish to keep the countries' relations with RCD firmly in the hands of the Foreign Ministry.

There is an obvious though unacknowledged relationship with CENTO, although the Pakistani view is that the only thing gained from CENTO was that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan learned to work together, and that, now UK and USA are absent from the conference table, things go much more smoothly. RCD has taken over none of the old CENTO machinery or apparatus, and, although there is some overlap, RCD has been able to work out methods which suit the members better. 'CENTO have their way of doing things, we have ours.'¹

One example of the confusion resulting from this is the CENTO road and rail project, which is financed by CENTO and directed by the CENTO Economic Committee. This committee structure is duplicated by RCD and does

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In the words of a Pakistani official.

not appear to be doing anything new or vital in the field. This does not happen only with respect to communications, however, as one news item in the Pakistan News Digest indicates. Headed 'RCD Plan to Check Epidemic Diseases', it goes on to describe a plan whereby Pakistan, Iran and Turkey would help each other in the event of an outbreak of cholera or smallpox, adding: 'This plan to co-operate was revealed at a meeting in Ankara of the CENTO working group of communicable diseases....'¹

The reason for this continued confusion is to a large extent financial, for most of the projects are dependent on some level of foreign financial or technical aid, which comes frequently through CENTO and its committees. No aid has been given to RCD as an organisation, or to any of the members for specifically RCD purposes, nor have they sought it.² Pakistanis are

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1 March 1968.

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RCD appears, in fact, to have been ignored by both the USA and the USSR. Moscow radio broadcasts in Turkish (18 July 1964) and Arabic (20 July 1964) said that the aim of the summit conference in Istanbul was to set up 'a new form of CENTO', and Izvestia on 21 July 1964 simply noted the arrival of Iranian and Pakistani leaders in Istanbul, without comment. Mizan, July-August 1964. Since then there have been practically no references to RCD by Russian sources. Similarly, the formation of RCD was reported by The New York Times, 19, 21 and 22 July 1964, but there was no official US comment.

especially proud that RCD is a purely regional organisation, without outside participation of any kind. So the situation has developed that some projects at least are claimed by RCD while receiving CENTO assistance. Since it makes no difference to the actual project, the only people who are perhaps a little regretful about it are the members of the CENTO Secretariat. Steps were shortly taken to transform the conceptual relationship with UNCTAD into something more formal. The UN Secretary-General, U Thant, had welcomed the formation of RCD and early in 1966 Dr Rouhani, at the invitation of Dr Raul Prebisch, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, visited New York to take part in discussions which centred on ways and means of providing finance for development projects undertaken by regional groupings. Rouhani gave the meeting a briefing on the background, objectives and achievements of RCD.¹ This aroused interest, especially among the countries of the Maghreb (then planning a grouping of their own) which sought advice from the RCD Secretariat. Rouhani and Prebisch decided that continued contact would be an advantage to both UNCTAD and RCD.

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Dr Fuad Rouhani, 'Report on Secretary-General's Visit to Geneva and New York', referred to p.254, n.2.

In August 1967 the Council of Ministers noted with satisfaction that the United Nations Economic and Social Council had very recently approved the establishment of relationship between RCD and the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies giving RCD consultative status

and that the Secretary-General should attend meetings of the UNCTAD Board in Geneva, and the meeting of the UNCTAD group on Economic Development later in 1967.¹

3. The Working of RCD: Objectives, Achievements and Some Problems Encountered

One of the difficulties involved in assessing the achievements of RCD is the need to decide exactly what its founders expected of the organisation. Were its objectives primarily economic, or were they also political? To what extent did political objectives enter into the decision to form RCD? Much confusion has resulted from the mass of propaganda which surrounds RCD, which has been referred to at times in extravagant terms by newspapers and officials. Yet to go back to the Istanbul Accord itself is to go back to a rather modest set of objectives erected by a group of men who appeared only too well aware of the difficulties involved in their task.

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Seventh Session of RCD Council of Ministers, Joint Communiqué. RCD News, vol.3, no.20, August 1967.

While Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are all among the less developed nations, there are differences in degree which can have important implications for foreign economic policy.¹ Turkey's per capita income is higher than that of Iran and almost three times that of Pakistan. Turkey hopes by 1972 to be self-supporting in food production and to have tipped the balance of its economy in favour of industrialisation. Its economy is approaching a point of self-sustained growth known to economists as a 'take-off'. In Iran the situation is different. Although it has the highest growth rate of the three countries, this is closely related to the oil industry, which provides a source of foreign exchange for Iran not available to Turkey or Pakistan. It cannot be claimed as Iranian industry, however, and in other respects Iran is little better developed than Pakistan.

While the figures relating to Pakistan's development appear encouraging, the success of its development plans is endangered by the sheer enormity of the problems involved, especially as regards population increase and the disparity between the two wings of the country which contributes to political instability.

Regional trade is not competitive, except insofar as Turkey and Pakistan are exporters of cotton, but both

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See Appendix I.

are only marginal suppliers on the world market. However, each finds its main market outside the region, and while there is some trade between them

it is clear that insofar as exports of primary products constitute the main source of foreign exchange for the RCD countries it will not be in their interest to divert trade away from the advanced countries from whom they obtain their much needed capital goods.¹

It is against this background that the implementation of the ten principal economic objectives of the Istanbul Accord should be viewed. The three Heads of State agreed in principle to:

- (i) a free or freer movement of goods through all practical means such as the conclusion of trade agreements,
- (ii) establish closer collaboration amongst existing Chambers of Commerce and eventually to set up a joint Chamber of Commerce,
- (iii) the formulation and implementation of joint proposed projects,
- (iv) reduce the postal rates between the three countries to the level of internal rates,
- (v) improve the air transport services within the region and the eventual establishment

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Nurul Islam, 'Regional Co-operation for Development', Journal of Common Market Studies, March 1967, p.287.

of a strong and competitive international airline among the three countries,

- (vi) investigate the possibilities of securing a close cooperation in the field of shipping including the establishment of a joint maritime line or 'conference' arrangements,
- (vii) undertake necessary studies for construction and improvement of rail and road links,
- (viii) sign at an early date an agreement with a view to promoting tourism,
- (ix) abolish visa formalities among the three countries for travel purposes and
- (x) provide technical assistance to each other in the form of experts and training facilities.¹

The three Heads of State ended with an expression of confidence that 'the combined efforts of their peoples to this end will open new vistas of hope and opportunity for them and thus contribute to world peace and to the prosperity of the whole region.'

There was really nothing startlingly new in these objectives. An increase in trade and investigation of ways and means of bringing this about had been the concern of CENTO for many years, and the CENTO Economic Affairs Committee had even gone into the possibility of a free

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Istanbul Accord, 22 July 1964, Background Paper on RCD, p.46.

trade organisation. Trade agreements had already been concluded between the three partners on a bilateral basis providing for most favoured nation treatment and transit facilities for trade, and restricting the re-export of goods imported from partner countries. The Iran-Pakistan trade agreement listed a number of commodities in which an expansion of trade was considered desirable by the signatories.¹

The idea of joint projects was not new either, although nothing had gone beyond the stage of discussion of possible areas of such cooperation. One such area was shipping. Another was oil exploration, between Iran and Pakistan. Cooperation among the airlines was also a matter discussed within the framework of CENTO. Work towards improved road and rail links had been begun by CENTO in 1957. The provision of technical assistance had also been in operation for some years.

What was new was the decision of the three Heads of State to undertake such projects by multilateral cooperation, and to establish administrative machinery with sufficient authority to take action once agreement was reached.

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Nurul Islam, p.291.

As a result RCD was able to boast of progress in several fields at the end of its first year. In their Joint Communiqué of 23 July 1965, the 3rd Session of the Ministerial Council reviewed past progress and approved plans for the coming year. In concrete terms they were able to report the establishment of a Joint Shipping Conference, 'RCD Shipping Services', in which Pakistan was entitled to a 50 per cent share of the total pooled trade, Turkey to 35 per cent and Iran to 15 per cent. Its headquarters were at Istanbul.¹ Tourism agreements had been signed and visas abolished for travel of nationals of the three countries within the region. Post, telegraph and telecommunication rates had been reduced. The Regional Cultural Institute had been established in Teheran. The RCD Reinsurance Centre was established in Karachi.

Other plans were still in the stage of investigation, or had been approved but were awaiting implementation. The Joint Purpose Enterprises Committee had identified 19 groups of industries for development as joint purpose enterprises, and studies of these industries had been

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Background Paper on RCD, p.66.

allocated among the three countries.¹ The subcommittee on air transportation had met three times and discussed matters relating to the establishment of a joint airline. The possibilities of establishing joint oil exploration companies were under study by the petroleum committee, as well as the establishment of new refineries and setting up of filling stations in border areas. Studies were also being made of the possibilities for establishing petrochemical industries in the region. Trade was said to have 'shown a healthy upward trend' but no further details were given.

Three years after its establishment, studies and discussions under RCD auspices were proliferating, and 'general agreements in principle' were thick on the ground. The RCD Shipping Service, plying from USA and within the region, had begun its operations in June 1966, although the number of ships involved or their tonnage was not revealed in the Ministerial Communiqué.² During

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Allocated as follows: Iran: electronics, aluminium, basic drugs and pharmaceuticals, dye stuffs, chemicals and lubricating oils; Pakistan: motor vehicles, electrical machinery and equipment, heavy engineering goods, machine tools, bank note paper, agricultural machinery and equipment; Turkey: cement, locomotives, sugar, ship-building, iron and steel and coal.

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Ministerial Council, 5th Session, Joint Communiqué, Background Paper on RCD, p.80.

the same period three Reinsurance pools were set up, Fire (Turkey), Marine (Hull and Cargo) (Pakistan) and Accident (Iran), operating from July 1966, representing a saving in foreign exchange usually paid outside the region for this facility. Implementation of agreements to establish joint purpose enterprises was somewhat slower. In August 1967 the Ministerial Council

noted with satisfaction that the Aluminium project located in Iran and Bank Note Paper project located in Pakistan are being implemented satisfactorily. The Carbon Black project, which was approved for implementation in Iran, was being revised by the Government of Iran and would be taken up for implementation shortly.¹

Negotiations were being finalised on the establishment of a locomotive industry in Turkey and three projects in Pakistan, cotton linter pulp, wires and cables and ball bearings.² The establishment of an oil refinery at Izmir was agreed upon in principle and the construction of an oil pipeline from Iran to Turkey was under study. In addition 13 studies related to various groups of industries were in preparation, in addition to feasibility reports on 26 specific industries.

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Ministerial Council, 7th Session, Joint Communiqué, *ibid.*, p.96.

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This situation appeared basically unchanged in April 1968. See Ministerial Council, 8th Session, Joint Communiqué (mimeographed).

The complete unanimity regarding the need to expand intra-regional trade had little apparent effect on the trade itself, which represents only a very small proportion of the members' total trade.¹

Despite the optimism of the Ministerial communiqués, the President of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce said in January 1967 that there had not been a substantial improvement in regional trade, due largely to traditional trading patterns of the members. What was more, in view of the imbalance, with Pakistan having a large deficit in trade with Iran (sharply reduced in 1964-6 period) and Turkey having a deficit with Pakistan,

if immediate steps are not taken, foreign exchange difficulties may lead to a shrinkage in the overall trade of the region. I would, therefore, stress that urgent action should be taken to finalize a scheme for introducing an RCD Payments Union....²

In so doing he was echoing the report of the Pakistani businessmen's mission which, with the encouragement of the Pakistan Export Promotion Bureau, had toured Iran and Turkey in March 1966. They had suggested a scheme under which payments should be made in the national currency of the buyer, the difference to be paid at the

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See Appendix I.

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'First Council Session and RCD Chamber of Commerce', Supplement, Dawn, 27 January 1967.

end of the year in hard currency.¹ Such a scheme would have been particularly attractive to Pakistan which probably has more severe foreign exchange problems than Turkey and Iran, but this proposal presented difficulties to all the governments involved because of other trade obligations.² Turkey made it clear that because of its commitments to the EEC and the unfavourable reaction of the IMF it would be difficult for it to enter into such an agreement.

A compromise was reached in April 1967, which, though only a small step, represented the first real effort to improve conditions of trade. The RCD Union for Multilateral Payments Arrangements provides for a credit of up to \$2m. to be extended by each of the members to the others, the balance to be paid in an acceptable convertible currency within a prescribed period. At the end of the financial year 50 per cent of the debts are to be paid, also in an acceptable convertible foreign currency, the remaining 50 per cent to be carried forward. Invisible payments, border trade and armaments were excluded from the agreements which, initially for two years, provided for possible extension and revision of the \$2m. limit. Unless the amount is increased, it is

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See 'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.

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See Nurul Islam, p.290.

difficult to see to what extent this agreement is going in fact to help improve the future of regional trade. Reluctance to accept any proposal for payment, even in part, in national currencies means that pressure on foreign exchange reserves is not greatly relieved except for the provision of the limited credit facility of \$2m.

While payments arrangements are an important aspect of trade promotion, there were other difficulties under which regional trade was labouring. Little is revealed in the official communiqués, but the businessmen's mission which toured Iran and Turkey, unhampered by the political and diplomatic inhibitions usually afflicting official delegations, produced a report which is particularly illuminating with regard to the problems encountered by intra-regional trade from the point of view of Pakistan.¹

Two principal points emerged. Poor communications and 'overland trade arrangements with Iran which were a legacy of British days' inhibited trade and aggravated the imbalance. In the case of Turkey, there was also an imbalance although in the reverse direction and, unless Pakistan was able to increase its imports from Turkey, they saw little prospect of overall increase. This situation too was aggravated by poor communications.

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See 'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.

Another factor which emerged was the competition faced by Pakistani jute exporters from Indian jute manufacturers. The mission pointed out that there was still

considerable trade in the hands of Hindus and Sikhs in Iran and Jews, Iranians and Greeks in Turkey who on account of their traditional ties with India and Britain resisted any orientation of mutual trade between the RCD countries which would dislodge them....

It was noted that India was the main supplier of jute to Iran.¹

Pakistan was at a serious disadvantage in Iran vis-à-vis Indian jute manufacturers because 'Indian suppliers enjoy the reputation of being able to supply goods at very short notice'. While there were direct sailings from Calcutta to Persian Gulf ports, the only direct vessel from Chittagong (in East Pakistan) which accepted cargo for Khorramshehr (on the Persian Gulf) with trans-shipment at Karachi, charged a higher rate than the Indian shipping companies. The Turkish Government was willing to issue single country licences for the import of jute in order to orient trade to Pakistan, but this was resisted by importers used to buying from India.

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Iranian imports from India are greater than from Pakistan and have increased since formation of RCD. See Appendix I.

It is essential that through arranging direct shipments from East Pakistan and enabling early deliveries to be effected Pakistan should strengthen the Turkish Government's hands.¹

They also urged that plans already begun for the establishment of a joint venture jute mill in Turkey be pursued. The nearness of Turkey to Europe emphasised the disadvantages Pakistan suffered through lack of regular sailings. Since the publication of this report the joint shipping line has begun operation but, with the closure of the Suez Canal and in the absence of any effective overland link between Turkey and the Persian Gulf, the problem remains acute.

Until the prerequisites of improved communications and a more constructive payments arrangement are met there is little prospect for a dramatic increase in trade.

The other major aspect of RCD cooperation is the establishment of joint purpose enterprises. The fact that in five years of its existence plans for only three such enterprises have actually been executed, and that of the three the bank note paper in Pakistan is the only one within sight of production, appears to point to some serious difficulties beneath the initial enthusiasm for joint efforts. The usefulness of the feasibility reports

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'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.

should not be minimised: they are a necessary step towards any more concrete cooperation. But the fact remains that until 1967, while everything was in the investigation stage, progress was apparently satisfactory.

Discussions on RCD Committees were generally amicable and there was practically never any serious disagreement among the members.¹ It has been suggested, however, that this was to a large extent because the sentimentality with which RCD had been surrounded made members reluctant to destroy the atmosphere of brotherly cooperation: agreement was reached frequently at the price of sincerity. Governments not wishing to fulfil obligations undertaken in the Committees resorted to prevarication and procrastination or simply ignored Committee decisions.²

For obvious reasons it is difficult to document these instances, but some examples are perhaps worth noting. Agreement was reached in May 1966 on the decision to establish a carbon black factory as a joint purpose enterprise. Carbon black, extremely important in the manufacture of synthetic rubber, may be

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This view was expressed by all those to whom I spoke who had had experience on RCD Committees.

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Interviews in Rawalpindi, Ankara and Teheran, May-September 1968.

manufactured from coal, but within the region Iran's high quality natural gas made it the most appropriate place for the establishment of the industry. Since it is an important industry, each of the members wanted to establish it themselves. Ultimately agreement was reached to set it up in Iran, as a joint enterprise between Iran, Pakistan and a foreign collaborator. The Iranian Government at the end of 1967 was still involved in negotiations with a foreign 'Government/Firm for technical and financial collaboration in this project'.¹ Turkey had previously indicated that it would not participate in the equity of any joint purpose enterprise in which foreign concerns from outside the region also participated on an equity basis; it favoured foreign participation through the purchase of licences and/or payment of royalties. Whether this statement was made with particular reference to the carbon black project (which Turkey had wanted for itself anyway) is not known.²

Another project which has encountered difficulties is the proposed oil pipeline from Iran to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Iskanderun. According to Turkish sources, the plan was initially to build the pipeline

1

Background, p.10.

2

See A Detailed Note on RCD, Appendix A (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Islamabad (mimeographed)).

from the northern Iranian oilfields, but there was insufficient oil there to make the project economical. The Iranians then proposed that it should be built from the southern oilfields, but the problem remains. The cost of building the 1750km. pipeline is estimated at about \$550m. For this to be economical it would have to transport 35m. tons of crude oil per annum. This the National Iranian Oil Company cannot supply, and negotiations must take place with the Consortium.¹ Turkish sources claim that they were misled by the Iranians who did not from the first make it clear that they could not supply the oil. Iranian sources claim that this is untrue, and that they quoted a price for the oil to the Turks, who used it to bargain with the Consortium.² Whether the accusations of bad faith are justified or not is perhaps less important in this case than the fact that they were made. (It is possible that the Iranian Government was unaware of the volume of oil needed to make the project pay, since this study was being done by the Turkish Government. They do have a limited amount of oil which they may dispose of themselves.)

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Hurriyet (Istanbul), 14 July 1969, reported in The Pulse, 14 July 1969.

2

Interviews with Turkish and Iranian officials in Ankara and Teheran, August-September 1968.

The delay in Iranian agreement to the acceptance of 'tourist cards' for travel by nationals of the three countries within the region also represents a breakdown in cooperation and has been officially attributed by the Iranian Government to the difficulty of getting the approval of the Majlis, an explanation which is not easy to accept in a country where the executive is in a particularly strong position to implement measures it considers desirable. The unofficial explanation is said to be reluctance on Iran's part to open its doors to the possibility of an influx of Pakistanis seeking work in Iran, with the attendant risk of the spread of diseases like cholera which are endemic in Pakistan, an objection Iran could hardly make explicit without endangering the spirit of brotherly cooperation so carefully nurtured.

Even with the most efficient cooperation there are problems which would be difficult to overcome. Studies and surveys are comparatively inexpensive. The establishment of industries and implementation of decisions regarding joint projects requires vast amounts of capital (e.g. the Iran-Turkey oil pipeline) which must come from outside the region, and is not often easy to obtain. A further restraint has been placed on this development by the conditions imposed by Turkey on its participation in joint purpose enterprises in which foreign capital would participate.

Co-ordination of national development plans would help to eliminate some of these difficulties, but although each of the three countries has entered a new plan period since the establishment of RCD, Pakistan is the only member which claims to have made any attempt to integrate RCD projects into the national plan. Since the Third Five Year Plan was initiated in 1965 it made only general provision for regional projects, and developments related to RCD are integrated into the Annual Development Programme. Greatest progress has been made in the field of petrochemicals.¹ The principal difficulty confronting regional co-ordination of development planning is that, in countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, which lack a national industrial base, national development of this base is usually given priority over wider regional development. The establishment of industries on a regional basis would lead to specialised development of each member, and thus to the dependence of each on the others.² At this stage none of the three feels able to

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Interview with Mr Zainal Abbouddin, Deputy Chief of the RCD Section, Planning Division, President's Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, 1 June 1968. See Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 (Manager of Publications: Karachi, 1967), p.457.

2

See Nurul Islam, pp.298-300.

permit this. It appears that, beyond a minimal fringe, economic collaboration is at present neither possible nor genuinely desired by the members.

4. Political Aspects of RCD

In view of the lack of any real development of economic collaboration since the establishment of RCD in 1964, and the difficulties encountered in implementing many of the decisions, it could be argued that RCD is not a particularly useful organisation. This is assuming that the objectives of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, in forming RCD, were purely economic, which is not necessarily the case. It is also arguable that despite the public statements each of the three members decided to participate for substantially different reasons. The economic surveys of the members make it clear that both Turkey and Iran are more advanced economically than Pakistan which probably has most to gain and little to lose from that kind of cooperative development.

The possibility of RCD evolving into a free trade area and later a common market has been under consideration at least in Pakistan since the foundation of the organisation. In December 1964 instructions were given the Pakistan delegation to the Trade Committee

meeting to pursue this objective.¹ The head of the RCD Section of Pakistan's Planning Division acknowledges that he sees a common market as the ultimate end of RCD,² an aim supported by sections of the Pakistan press.³ The Shah is also reported to have advocated the formation of a common market in an interview with Cumhuriyet in May 1968,⁴ although he was not very explicit about it. The Turkish Government is very cool about the proposal, and officially maintains that the possibility of the formation of an RCD common market has never been considered. This is no doubt a result of its association with the EEC.

Despite a reluctance to discuss the subject, the complications likely to arise through Turkey's

1

Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Planning Division), Brief to and Composition of Delegations to Meetings of RCD Committees to be held at Karachi on December 2, 1964 (Karachi, 26 November 1964).

2

Interview with Mr Akbar Adil, Chief and Ex-Officio Joint Secretary in Charge of the RCD Section Planning Division, President's Secretariat, 8 June 1968.

3

Dawn, 27 August and 5 September 1968.

4

Reported in The Pakistan Times, 30 May 1968.

increasingly close association with the EEC have not escaped the notice of officials in any of the three capitals. The most common reaction is that Turkish membership of EEC is a long way off, and that the problem will be dealt with when it arises. Pakistani officials make no secret of their belief that Turkish policy is misguided in attempting to integrate with Europe,¹ and some argue that Turkey itself is realising that it is primarily a Middle Eastern power, pointing to closer Turkish involvement in the Middle East since 1964. They are encouraged in this view by Turkish membership of RCD and a moderation of Turkey's pro-Israeli position, together with increasing trade and diplomatic relations with both the Arab and non-Arab Middle East. Their assessment is, however, only partly right, for Turkish

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This view has been bluntly expressed by President Ayub Khan: 'Well, after some discussions I began to push home some truths to the Turks....I told them, make up your mind as to what you are going to do. So far you have been saying that you will be part of Europe. But the Europeans will never accept you as Europeans. They are Christians and not Muslims. Even though some of you may not believe in Islam, you are suspected by them, for you have fought against them for six hundred years. They are not going to trust you....' Speech at the Thinkers' Forum at the University Campus, Lahore, 4 October 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, p.47.

advances towards the Arabs have sprung from quite different motives. During the Cyprus crisis of 1964 Turkey found itself very much alone, opposed by the USSR and the communist countries, deserted by the US and without support from any Arab state. As a result the Turkish Government decided to cultivate the support of the Afro-Asian and particularly the Arab world. At the same time Turkey is in need of markets for the manufactured goods it is beginning to produce, and is attempting to expand its trade with the Arab countries. Although Turkish concern with the Middle East has increased for these reasons, this does not signify any basic moderation of its Europe-oriented policy.

While Turkey and Pakistan might therefore gain from an increase in the level of development and trade within the region, Iranian participation can hardly be explained in economic terms. As the only member with access to large foreign exchange earnings, it could conceivably become a source of regional capital, but at the moment uses most of its oil income for Iranian development.

In any case, had economic cooperation been the sole or even the principal motive for the formation of RCD, it is reasonable to ask why the established machinery of CENTO was abandoned and why it was found necessary to duplicate much of CENTO's work without the access to financial assistance, however inadequate it may have appeared, provided by CENTO. At the risk of being

repetitive it is necessary to recall Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the old alliance structure, a dissatisfaction soon shared to a greater or lesser extent by Iran and Turkey: all three countries found it convenient to attempt to build a new international image for themselves by means of an independent regional organisation. Care was taken to emphasise that RCD, though parallel to CENTO, was quite separate from it.¹

All three countries found it desirable to improve their relations with the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian group and considered a neutralist pose useful for these purposes. This diplomatic initiative was welcomed by the USSR which seized the opportunity of improving its relations with northern tier countries and thus apparently weakening American influence in the region. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have derived some benefit from the new relationship with the USSR, but the gains made have not been spectacular. On the question of Cyprus the Soviet Union has moved from opposition to Turkey to a position of neutrality, maintaining that while the island should

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See the joint communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in Ankara, 4 July 1964, Dawn, 6 July 1964; statement by Turkish Foreign Minister, Cemal Erkin, 18 July, Pakistan Observer, 21 July 1964; and statement by Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, at a press conference at Istanbul, 22 July, BBCSWB, ME/1613/E/5, Ankara home service, 22 July 1964.

not be partitioned, 'the Cyprus Republic should continue to exist as an independent State',¹ that is, there should be no union with Greece (Enosis). Russia has also abandoned its policy of support for India in the Kashmir dispute and taken a strictly neutral stand, mediating between India and Pakistan following the Kashmir war in September 1965.²

More emphasis has been placed on the economic than on the diplomatic aspects of the relationship. Attempts have been made to increase trade between Russia and the countries of the northern tier. Russia is building a steel works, an aluminium plant and an oil refinery in Turkey;³ it has undertaken to build a steel mill in

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Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, in Ankara: 'We want a solution based on the principle of the existence of two separate national communities in the island and the preservation of their mutual rights. We believe the Cyprus Republic should continue to exist as an independent State'. Press conference, Ankara home service, 21 May 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1866/C/2.

2

The Tashkent Agreement which followed the Indo-Pakistan talks appeared to make concessions to the Indian point of view and was unpopular in Pakistan, especially West Pakistan. Soviet neutrality was not very helpful to Pakistan in this instance. See Government of India, External Publicity Division, Tashkent Declaration, January 1966.

3

Tass report, 20 August 1966, BBCSWB, SU/2253/A4/2, and Moscow radio and Tass report, Mizan, Supplement 'A', March-April 1969.

Iran, and to buy natural gas (for which a pipeline must be laid) in return.¹ Agreement has been reached with Pakistan for Soviet assistance in the construction of a steel mill, a nuclear power station, and port facilities at Gwadar in Baluchistan, not far from the Iranian border.²

Both Iran and Pakistan have concluded arms sales agreements with the USSR, Iran being the first American ally to do so. In Iran's case the agreement early in 1967 to buy an estimated \$100m. worth of military equipment was apparently an attempt to put pressure on the US to deliver two squadrons of Phantom jets ordered in 1966. The Russian equipment ordered was of an unsophisticated nature (such as armoured troop carriers) of which some was delivered towards the end of 1967. In

1

Arms Sales to Near and South Asian Countries. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967, p.15.

2

Dawn, 16 August 1968.

August 1967 the US agreed to deliver some of the jets ordered.¹ Pakistan also wished to buy American arms, to re-equip its forces following the war with India in 1965, but the American embargo on arms and spare parts forced it to turn elsewhere. The USSR was finally persuaded to sell some military equipment to Pakistan after Kosygin's visit to that country in April 1968, enough to irritate India² without satisfying Pakistan, which has said little about the Soviet arms.³

The material gains to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have not therefore been great, particularly compared to

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Estimates of the value of the arms deal vary from \$90m. to \$100m. (The New York Times, 8 February 1967, p.1), to \$110m. (Arms Sales to Near and South Asian Countries, p.1). The Iranian manoeuvre was apparently successful as the US, after the Shah's visit in August 1967, agreed to deliver some of the Phantoms (The Times, 2 September 1967). It should be noted, however, that Britain's decision to withdraw from 'East of Suez', announced in February 1967, might have influenced the US assessment of Iran's role in the Persian Gulf area.

2

See, for example, the speech by the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in the Lok Sabha, expressing concern on supply of arms to Pakistan by the USSR, text in The Times of India, 22 July 1968.

3

It is not clear exactly what Russian equipment has been delivered to Pakistan apart from 40 MiG-19 jet interceptors, listed in The Military Balance, 1968-1969, Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1968.

the scale of assistance received from the US and Western Europe, but the improved relations with the USSR have a propaganda value for the governments of the three countries involved, both in terms of their internal politics and in their relations with the Afro-Asian countries. This aspect is more important for Turkey and Pakistan, although the success of Turkey's efforts to acquire Afro-Asian, particularly Arab, support remains uncertain. Pakistan did, however, make clear diplomatic gains, particularly among the more militant Arabs.¹ This re-orientation of foreign policy on the part of these three countries is not, of course, a consequence of the formation of RCD,² but membership of a regional organisation which they can claim is quite apart from CENTO has probably given some credibility to, and thereby facilitated, their new diplomatic initiatives.

5. Conclusion

The success of RCD should not be judged in economic terms alone: it has permitted the members to project a new international image of themselves as, if not non-aligned, at least much less aligned than previously. It has also served a purpose in terms of restoring their

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See Chapter VIII.

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See Chapter V.

self-respect: meeting around a conference table at which British and American representatives are not present and making decisions in which these two powers have no part has a value of its own. Progress in economic development has been slow and cooperation among Turkey, Iran and Pakistan often difficult to achieve. Although this has in some cases arisen from circumstances largely beyond the control of the three countries involved (lack of capital, technological knowledge and inadequate communications have all hampered development) there is evidence which suggests that the members of RCD are unwilling to make some of the concessions necessary for successful co-ordination of regional development projects. It should be noted, however, that other regional economic organisations established among less developed countries have also been beset by difficulties frequently arising from the low level of economic development, and have had difficulty in policy co-ordination.¹ Even the European Economic Community, the most successful regional economic organisation, has encountered problems arising from a clash of interests among members, despite the high level of economic development they enjoy.

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See, for example, Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization, Autumn 1964.

RCD is important to Pakistan for several additional reasons. It is at least a partial fulfilment of the ideal of closer collaboration with other Muslim countries, particularly within the northern tier. It also represents a new attempt by Pakistan to find security. Both aspects of RCD were referred to frequently by President Ayub Khan, especially in the months immediately after the signing of the Istanbul Accord.

It had for long been my desire to bring about community of thought and action among countries of this region with whom we have bonds of brotherhood and common history....In entering this arrangement not only have we promoted the interests of our respective countries, but, I believe, we have promoted the interests of Islam, and have set an example for others to follow.¹

Cultural exchange has been an important part of the RCD programme, especially in Pakistan, and much emphasis has been placed on the 'bonds of brotherhood and common history'. RCD is popular in Pakistan where, although proposals for confederation did not win support,² there is a strong sentimental attachment to Turkey and Iran,

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First-of-the-Month Broadcast, 1 August 1964, Mohammad Ayub Khan. Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, p.16.

2

See Chapter V.

and to the ideal of Muslim solidarity.¹ Afghan membership of RCD would be welcomed by Pakistan, and the Istanbul Accord stated that the participation of other countries of the region would be considered by the members. Afghanistan has, however, remained aloof, and according to Pakistani officials care has been taken not to appear to put pressure on the Afghan Government to join RCD.²

Ayub Khan also saw membership of RCD as a means whereby Pakistan could increase its security:

Asia today is divided into three mighty countries on one side and smaller countries on the other....They can only expand at the cost of smaller countries in Asia. What then is the future of smaller countries in Asia except getting together on a common platform to be able to defend their freedom and to pool their resources to better their future....³

At a later date he spelled this point out in more detail, naming Russia, China and India as the three great countries which, if they were to expand, could only do so

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Turkey and Iran do not appear to place the same emphasis on this aspect of RCD.

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Interviews with officials in Rawalpindi, May 1968.

3

Speech at the Arts Council of Pakistan, Karachi, 25 July 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, p.10.

at the cost of the small states around them.¹ The precise nature of the threat is not mentioned and, while Pakistan fears India most of all, it is interesting that in this context Ayub referred to China, which Pakistan claimed as a friend, and Russia, with which it was attempting to improve relations.

As to what the organisation itself was designed to achieve, Ayub was and remained cautious. He referred to it as 'a common platform', saying: 'We have not entered into a pact with Iran and Turkey with any motives. We want only a hand of friendship and we have complete faith in each other.'²

He later stated: 'the benefits of RCD cannot be measured in material terms alone. As a concept, the philosophy behind RCD is of a much higher and superior order.'³

1
Speech at the Thinkers' Forum, Lahore, 4 October 1964, *ibid.*, p.45. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: a Political Autobiography, p.157.

2
Broadcast, 1 August 1964, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, p.16.

3
Inaugural address at the RCD Ministerial Council Session, Islamabad, 3 February 1966, *ibid.*, vol.VIII, p.86.

He has also referred to RCD as the nucleus of a 'constellation' of Muslim powers reaching from Morocco to Indonesia,¹ though how and when this was to be achieved he did not say. If the formation of a common market among the RCD countries is an objective of the Pakistan Government, Ayub did not refer to it publicly and officially, and his statements regarding the ultimate end of RCD generally reveal little:

The RCD has made a promising beginning. We are determined to develop it in depth in order to strengthen the economies of the three countries by consolidating and widening the collaboration between them.²

The replacement of Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan by General Yahya Khan in April 1969 does not appear to have altered Pakistan's attitude to RCD. President Yahya has made few statements dealing with foreign policy except to assure Pakistan's allies that there would be no changes, and the RCD Ministerial Council meeting went ahead as planned in June.

So far as Pakistan is concerned one might conclude that the fundamental aims of RCD are not purely economic and that Pakistan wishes rather to build up cooperation

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Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.181.

2

Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 28 January 1967. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.IX, p.86.

on a wider and vaguer basis. RCD provides a group to which Pakistan can belong, thus helping to eliminate the isolation it has felt since Partition, without the necessity to compete with India (as in the British Commonwealth), and without the international political liability of a British or American presence (as in the defence pacts). Economic development, particularly technical cooperation, is a welcome and important part of this design, for Pakistan has little to lose from increased economic integration in the region. On the contrary, the more deeply Turkey and Iran can be involved in Pakistan's development, the more they are likely to be committed to that country politically.

CHAPTER VII

Relations with Afghanistan, A Regional Problem

1. Introduction

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has always been tense. The basis for the conflict between them is both geographical and historical, and the internal weakness of each has made compromise difficult if not impossible. Afghanistan is a landlocked state, for which the cheapest and most convenient outlet route is through Pakistan, by road and rail through Quetta and Peshawar to the Arabian Sea port of Karachi. Fresh fruit is one of Afghanistan's major exports, and India one of its biggest customers, so the trade route through Pakistan assumes an even greater significance and means considerable dependence on Pakistani goodwill for its safety.

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a heterogeneous population, of which two groups, Pathans and Baluchis, are divided between the two countries. These people live in an area which is difficult to police and control, and have traditionally defied attempts to govern them from outside their own tribal structure, regardless of whether the attempt is made from Kabul, Rawalpindi or Delhi. While the Pathans are the largest single group

in Afghanistan, there are also a number of Persian-Tajik speaking groups in the west and the centre and Turki speaking groups in the north. In Pakistan, apart from the Bengalis of East Pakistan, there are Punjabis and Sindhis, as well as Baluchis and Pathans, in West Pakistan. There is strong provincial, or tribal, feeling within each of these groups, and as a result there is in both Afghanistan and Pakistan an element of uncertainty regarding national unity.

Superimposed on this situation is the question of Pushtunistan, a concept based on the linguistic Pushtu group (the Pathans, inhabiting the area along the north-west frontier of Pakistan), which calls in question the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known as the Durand Line, negotiated by the British and the Afghan king in 1893 and reaffirmed in a number of treaties between Britain and Afghanistan, the latest concluded in 1919. Afghanistan maintains that the Durand Line was forced on the Afghan ruler by the British, and repudiates the treaties which it claims were signed under duress. However, Afghanistan maintains that it has no territorial claim on Pakistan, and only supports the right of the Pushtu-speaking people to choose their own destiny. The Pakistan claim that the people in question were given a choice in the plebiscite in 1947 is denied by Afghanistan with some justification, since the choice before the North-West Frontier Province was of union with India or Pakistan, and did not include the possibility of

independence. Pakistan refuses to recognise the dispute, basing its position on the validity in international law of the agreement reached in 1893, and of the subsequent treaties, and its position as a successor state to Britain in this regard. Afghanistan, it argues, is bound by these treaties. This being so, there can be no boundary dispute, and any Afghan support for Pushtunistan amounts to interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

The relationship is further complicated by great power involvement. Britain is involved because it negotiated the boundary agreement and bequeathed the Durand Line and the frontier problem to Pakistan and is therefore committed to support the Pakistani position, which it has done. Russia became involved because the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan presented an irresistible opportunity to put pressure on an American ally, Pakistan. America became involved through a reluctance to see Russian influence growing in Afghanistan. Beneath all this was the awareness on both sides that the road through Kabul led to the Khyber Pass, the plains of West Pakistan, to Karachi and the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Since Afghanistan is part of the northern tier which includes Turkey and Iran as well as Pakistan, developments in Afghanistan cannot be ignored by the other countries of the region, and the tension which exists between Pakistan

and Afghanistan has from time to time been a matter of concern for Turkey and Iran.

2. The Background to the 'Pushtunistan' Movement

Despite Pakistani arguments, Pushtunistan is not solely an Afghan fabrication, although Afghanistan has magnified its significance. The nationalist movement in the North-West Frontier Province, slower to develop than elsewhere in India, was linked with the Indian National Congress, and its leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was known as 'The Frontier Gandhi'. Cooperation with a predominantly Hindu party did not appear unwise to the Muslims of the frontier, secure in a 94 per cent majority, and far from Delhi. Not until independence became an immediate prospect did the realisation of the full implications of the possibility of Hindu rule from Delhi dawn on the Frontier Congress. At this stage the need to hold a plebiscite in the North-West Frontier Province was being discussed, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, with the support of his party, asked that a third choice of 'a free Pathan State of all Pakhtoons' be given, in addition to that of union with either India or Pakistan.¹ While the Indian National Congress agreed to this proposition, Jinnah refused even to consider the

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D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Gandhi Peace Foundation, Popular Prakashan: Bombay, 1967), pp.439-41.

idea. Since the two major parties, the Muslim League and the Congress, could not agree, Mountbatten refused to alter the terms of the referendum. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan then called on his supporters to boycott the referendum, to be held on 6 July 1947, and it seems many of them did. Only 50.99 per cent of the electorate voted, although an overwhelming majority of these voted for union with Pakistan.¹

It was on the issue of the referendum that Afghanistan first intervened: on 3 July Notes were presented to the British and Indian Governments asking that the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan be given the right to decide between association with India or Afghanistan.² Both Hindu and Muslim press in India, as well as the two Governments, took strong exception to what was described as open intervention in the internal affairs of another country. However Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan may have felt about this unfortunate support he received from Kabul, he carefully avoided any mention of Afghan involvement, and later, in stating his demands, he seemed to envisage a state which would be autonomous in terms of internal administration,

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289,244 in favour of Pakistan, 2,874 against. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p.8734.

2

The Times, 3 July 1947.

but which would enter an agreement with Pakistan concerning matters such as Defence, External Affairs and Communications.¹

The North-West Frontier Province was not the only region where absorption into Pakistan aroused mixed feelings among those concerned. On 15 August 1947 none of the princely states within its borders had acceded to Pakistan, and there is some evidence that the Khan of Kalat had hopes of regaining independent status, and that he sought Afghan assistance to this end.² Pakistan quickly suppressed the badly organised rebellion that took place early in 1948, but despite the relative ease of this operation Baluchistan remained a problem to be handled delicately by successive Pakistan governments. In the context of relations with Afghanistan this is particularly important because of the Baluchi minority in Afghanistan, and because there are family connections between the Khan of Kalat and various Afghan families, which make a disaffected Baluchistan more dangerous to Pakistan. In addition, Baluchistan is a frontier area of strategic importance to Pakistan.³ The area of

1

G. Allana, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah (Ferozsons: Lahore, 1967), p.464.

2

W.A. Wilcox, Pakistan, the Consolidation of a Nation (Columbia University Press: New York, 1963), pp.75-81.

3

The Economist, 21 February 1948.

Baluchistan, taken with that of the North-West Frontier Province, forms a large proportion of West Pakistan through which westward communications must pass: trouble in these areas can only be of advantage to an unfriendly Afghanistan.

After Partition, the North-West Frontier Province proved somewhat less of a problem than was at first anticipated, perhaps because of the determined manner in which the Pakistan Government dealt with anti-Muslim League forces. Despite his declarations of loyalty to Pakistan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was felt to be a danger to the new state, and on 15 June 1948 he was arrested and the following day sentenced to three years' imprisonment. In September his organisation, the Khudai Khidmatgaran (Redshirts), was banned. It should be remembered that during 1948 Pakistan and India were virtually at war in Kashmir, which perhaps explains the hypersensitivity of the Pakistan Government to any activity which appeared even remotely subversive.

3. Relations with Afghanistan, 1947-52

It was not initially clear how effectively Pakistan would be able to establish control in the frontier areas, and Afghanistan perhaps overestimated the strength of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's organisation. Afghan opposition to Pakistan's membership of the United Nations in September 1947 should be seen in this context.

Pakistan, however, moved swiftly to remove cause for grievance on the frontier by withdrawing all regular forces by December 1947, and by allocating substantial funds to frontier development.¹ The preoccupation during 1948 of many of the tribesmen with the war in Kashmir, regarded by many of them as jihad (holy war), probably assisted the Pakistan Government to establish itself in the frontier.

At the end of 1947 Jinnah sent his personal envoy to Kabul, and shortly after an Afghan special envoy, Sardar Najibullah Khan, visited Karachi. Although agreement was reached on the exchange of Ambassadors,² consideration of a commercial agreement, including transit facilities and border questions, and of a friendship treaty did not progress beyond discussion stage.³ In December 1948, however, much goodwill was generated in Pakistan by the visit of a prominent Afghan divine, Hazrat Nurul Mashaikh of Shor Bazar, who made no

1

Said to be more than the total Afghan Budget. See The Times, 30 May 1949. One estimate of Pakistan expenditure in the region was £7.5m. sterling. The Economist, 6 August 1949.

2

The first Afghan Ambassador presented his credentials in May 1948.

3

Dawn, 24 January 1948; The Times, 9 February 1948.

secret of his support for Pakistan regarding Kashmir.¹ The Afghan Foreign Minister somewhat spoiled this effect by stating that the Afghan Government, as a friend of both India and Pakistan, wanted to see a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute and that Hazrat Sahib's views on jihad in Kashmir were entirely his own.²

In January 1949 large numbers of tribesmen returned to the frontier from Kashmir, and the Afghan Government perhaps entertained hopes that they might be drawn into a revitalised Pushtunistan campaign. The Pakistan Government was alive to this danger, and in March the Governor-General, Khwaja Nazimuddin, toured the North-West Frontier Province, where he declared that the tribal area formed an 'integral part of Pakistan'. The Afghan Government immediately objected to this statement, claiming that it was a denial of pledges given by Jinnah before his death.³ The diplomatic staff was withdrawn from the embassy in Karachi by the beginning of April,⁴

1
Dawn, 13, 16 December 1948.

2
Ibid., 23 December 1948.

3
Reported in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1949, p.10172.

4
The Times, 2 April 1949.

and at the same time the Afghan Prime Minister toured the eastern provinces of Afghanistan seeking support for his policy on Pakistan.¹ He later declared the determination of his Government to pursue a policy of 'rescuing our brother Afghans wherever they might be.'²

Tension increased in June following the Moghalgai incident when Pakistani aircraft bombed a town on the Afghan side of the border. However, a joint Pakistan-Afghan commission of enquiry reported that although Pakistan was responsible for bombing Afghan territory it was by a genuine mistake and Pakistan agreed to pay compensation.

Attempts by Afghanistan to secure support for its demands for a plebiscite in Pushtunistan were unsuccessful. Britain maintained that Pakistan was in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the former Government of India and of the British Government in the North-West Frontier, and that the Durand Line was an international frontier.³

1

Ibid., 6 April 1949.

2

Ibid., 29 April 1949.

3

The Times, 29 June 1949, and The New York Times, 1 July 1949, p.10.

Following the worsening of relations with Pakistan in March Afghanistan turned its attention to India, and Sardar Najibullah was sent as Ambassador to New Delhi. The Pakistan press reported discussion of the possibility of Indian financial assistance to Afghanistan and of the question of taking the Pushtunistan issue to the United Nations.¹

In January 1950 India and Afghanistan signed a five-year Treaty of Friendship, and two days later Nehru was reported to have said that he had already approached the Pakistan Government regarding the desirability of a joint declaration renouncing the possibility of war between them, but Pakistan had not replied.² India appeared however to treat with caution the suggestion of taking the Pushtunistan issue to the United Nations.³ Following the announcement of the Afghan-Indian treaty, Liaquat Ali Khan described Pushtunistan as 'a figment of the imagination of certain individuals in Afghanistan'.⁴ Dawn welcomed his statement, making no secret of its

1

Dawn, 28 April 1949.

2

The Times, 7 January 1950.

3

The Economist, 9 April 1949.

4

Statement, 9 January 1950, reported Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950, p.10568.

suspicious regarding Afghan-Indian relations, and virtually called for action to be taken against Afghanistan's trade routes through Pakistan.¹

In March 1950 King Zahir Shah toured the Middle East, visiting Cairo, Riyadh, Baghdad and Teheran. The Pakistan press reported that the Egyptian, Iranian and Saudi governments would urge Afghanistan to cease anti-Pakistan propaganda (although it is not known if they did so), and suggested that Egypt might offer to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan.² The only mediation offer, however, came from the Shah of Iran, with no tangible results.

At this time Pakistan's view of its place in the world was changing, and there was some disappointment with the British Commonwealth.³ Britain's affirmation of the validity of the Durand Line, though firmly stated, was not considered sufficient in Pakistan, and Liaquat was reported to have said that it would be 'useful' if Britain declared that any violation of the

1

Editorial, 'Afghanistan', Dawn, 12 January 1950.

2

Ibid., 2 February, 9 and 13 March 1950.

3

See Chapter III.

Durand Line by Afghanistan would be considered a violation of a Commonwealth frontier.¹

The appearance of American and Russian interest in Afghanistan complicated the situation in the early 1950s. The Afghan Government was said to be disappointed in its hopes for military assistance when an American loan of \$21m. was given for public works. American cooperation with Britain was thought to have eliminated the US as a possible close friend of Afghanistan.² At the same time Afghanistan appeared to welcome Soviet advances: since the conclusion of a boundary agreement in 1946 there had been little interest shown in Afghanistan by the USSR, but there were reports in January 1950 of Soviet technicians in Afghanistan and the visit of a trade mission to Kabul.³ In July 1950, Afghanistan concluded a four-year trade pact with Russia, the first attempt to regularise the trade which had been going on for some time.⁴ Just as the Americans were becoming apprehensive about Soviet approaches to

1

The New York Times, 13 April 1950, p.12.

2

Ibid., 23 January 1950, p.11.

3

Ibid.

4

The Times, 19 July 1950.

Afghanistan, the USSR was protesting that American specialists were making military roads and maps in Afghanistan.¹

During the second half of 1950, Pakistan-Afghan relations deteriorated further, and there was a suggestion that the Afghan Government may have been encouraged to step up border incidents by Russian statements accusing Pakistan of being a satellite of the Western powers.² Early in October the Pakistan Government complained that Afghan regular troops had taken part in a border raid near Chaman,³ a railhead for Afghanistan's transit trade through Quetta. Meanwhile the battle between Afghanistan and Pakistan was carried on by their respective Ambassadors in London in the columns of The Times.⁴

In December the United States, hoping to end the dispute, put forward a set of proposals which were

1

Ibid., 17 May 1950, p.2. A charge denied by the US State Department.

2

This followed Liaquat's visit to America and his support for US policy on Korea. See The Economist, 23 December 1950.

3

Liaquat statement, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates, (CA(L)D), 1950, vol.II, 7 October 1950, pp.260-1.

4

The Times, 10 and 12 October 1950.

satisfactory to neither party. While agreeing in principle to American mediation, Pakistan objected that the proposals appeared to make the Durand Line open to discussion, a suggestion it could not accept. The Afghan Government stated that it welcomed the American proposals and agreed with their suggestions, 'subject to some reservations, and to equal acceptance of the said suggestions by the government of Pakistan.'¹

The same month the 'All-India Pakhtun Jirga' was held in Delhi. Organised by officials of the Afghan Embassy, including Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Press Adviser to King Zahir Shah, and attended by a number of Afghans, mostly resident in India, the Jirga² demanded the release of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother and also urged India and other countries to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan to release the Redshirts imprisoned after Partition.³ Pakistan protested to the Indian Government, and Dawn concluded that India was 'trying to make other people do what she herself cannot with any show of propriety.'⁴

1

Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan Press Attaché in London, *ibid.*, 8 February 1951.

2

Tribal assembly.

3

Dawn, 1 January 1951.

4

Editorial, 'Open Scheming', *ibid.*, 25 January 1950.

The tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan continued throughout 1951. During June and July Pakistan reported border raids by Afghan tribesmen and regular troops near Chaman. At the end of August a proposal by the Afghan Embassy in London to hold a reception to celebrate 'Pushtunistan Day' on 2 September brought strong protest from the Pakistan High Commissioner.¹ The year closed with an Afghan statement that Afghanistan had no intention of annexing, incorporating, or in any way dominating the territories in dispute, but that it would not rest until the independence of Pushtunistan was finally recognised.²

4. The Afghan Response to 'One Unit' and American Military Aid to Pakistan

In December 1952 the Basic Principles Committee, established by the Pakistan Government to advise on the new Constitution, published its report in which, inter alia it suggested that the provinces of West Pakistan be drawn together to form one unit. Therein lay the seeds of a new crisis in relations with Afghanistan, for the integration of the North-West Frontier Province into

1

The Times, 31 August 1951.

2

Statement by the Afghan Ambassador in London, *ibid.*, 18 December 1951.

the administration of West Pakistan would make the possibility of detaching Pushtunistan from the rest of Pakistan more remote than ever.

Another move which, 12 months later, caused apprehension in Afghanistan, was the suggestion that Pakistan should enter a defence agreement with America. Afghanistan, which preferred to remain non-aligned, regarded the proposal that Pakistan should receive military aid from America as 'a grave danger to the security of Afghanistan.'¹ This trend in Pakistan's foreign policy also met with the disapproval of the USSR and India, thus providing Afghanistan with potential allies.

Although tension diminished slightly in November 1954 when the Afghan Foreign Minister, Sardar Naim Khan, visited Karachi, it became clear during the talks that Pushtunistan remained a preoccupation of the Afghan Government. Naim reaffirmed Afghanistan's desire that the people of Pushtunistan be given an opportunity to express themselves on their 'status and way of living', but added that there was no territorial claim involved.²

1

Statement by the Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan, 30 December 1953. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1954, p.13463.

2

Speaking at a press conference, Karachi, 7 November 1954. Dawn, 8 November 1954.

The progress of plans for the unification of West Pakistan brought a formal protest from the Afghan Government at the end of March 1955 and a wave of demonstrations against Pakistan, including attacks on the Embassy in Kabul and the Pakistan Consulates in Qandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistani demonstrators retaliated with attacks on the Afghan Consulate in Peshawar and the Embassy in Karachi. Pakistan closed its offices in Afghanistan and demanded that Afghan Consulates and Trade agencies leave Pakistan. In the face of an ultimatum that Afghanistan make adequate amends or face the consequences, the Afghan Government began mobilisation.¹

Mediation offers were made by several Middle Eastern countries. The first came from Egypt following visits by President Nasser to Pakistan and Afghanistan on his way to and from the Bandung Conference in April. The Egyptian offer was welcomed by Afghanistan and later, on 12 May, accepted by Pakistan. A Saudi offer to mediate was also accepted by Pakistan, as was a similar offer from Iraq. The Iraqi Ministers in Kabul and Karachi were appointed mediators. The Saudi representative reached Kabul and later Karachi in mid-May, and the Egyptian representative arrived in

1

The Pakistan Times, 31 March and 1 April 1955. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p.14217.

Karachi on 7 June. By the end of that month, however, all of the Arab mediators had admitted failure. In each case Pakistan accepted the mediation offers on the understanding that negotiations relate only to the recent incidents, and not to issues affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to Pakistani sources, the stumbling block was Afghanistan's refusal to suspend anti-Pakistan propaganda.¹

The next mediation attempt was made by the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, following a visit to Ankara by the Afghan Foreign Minister.² The first tangible result of his efforts was an Afghan order on 29 July demobilising forces called up in May and ending the state of emergency. Afghanistan finally agreed to Pakistan's demands, including the suspension of propaganda, on 9 September.³

Despite this apparent improvement in relations, Afghan opposition to the integration of the North-West Frontier Province into West Pakistan did not diminish, and when 'One Unit' became a reality on 14 October, Afghanistan protested, and three days later withdrew its

1

For details of negotiations see The Pakistan Times, May and June 1955.

2

Ibid., 17 and 20 July 1955.

3

Ibid., 13 September 1955.

Minister in Karachi. Pakistan replied by recalling its Ambassador in Kabul.

The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Afghanistan in December 1955 and the open support they gave the Afghan stand on Pushtunistan served only to stiffen the Afghan attitude and embitter Soviet-Pakistan relations.¹ At the same time the American Government also offended Pakistan by a reference to 'border territory differences' between Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus appearing to give status to the Afghan case which Pakistan denied.²

October 1955 had, however, brought Iskandar Mirza to power as Governor-General in Pakistan.³ An 'Afghanophile', his term of office was one of the most cordial and peaceful periods of Afghan-Pakistan relations. He visited Kabul in August 1956, and three months later

1

See Bulganin statement to Supreme Soviet, 29 December 1955, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan; Speeches and Official Documents, November-December 1955 (Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1956).

2

The Pakistan Times, 23 December 1955.

3

In most Commonwealth countries the office of Governor-General is not associated with the exercise of political power, but in Pakistan, following the precedent established by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General usually wielded considerable power. Iskandar Mirza was no exception.

Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan returned the visit. A joint communiqué issued on 1 December said that conversations on Pushtunistan had deepened understanding between them. Although a Pakistani spokesman said that the reference to Pushtunistan meant that the Afghan Government regarded this concept 'which was purely their own' as the only difference between them and Pakistan, the statement marked a relaxation in Pakistan's official attitude, for this was the first time that the subject had even been acknowledged as one for discussion under any circumstances.¹ In June 1957 the Pakistan Prime Minister, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, paid an official visit to Afghanistan, as a result of which Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to reappoint the Ambassadors earlier withdrawn.²

Such was the eagerness of both governments to maintain the air of cordiality lately come to their relations that when in February 1958 Afghan authorities in Jalalabad, anxious to gain a larger share of the transit trade for Afghans, detained 400 Pakistani trucks and drivers, agreement was soon reached in Kabul and Karachi that in future such difficulties would be removed

1

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1956, pp.15071, 15279.

2

Text of the communiqué issued 11 June 1957, Pakistan Horizon, June 1957, p.116.

without reference to the capitals. The Afghan Foreign Minister also gave an assurance that loudspeakers set up on the border near Torkham, broadcasting Kabul Radio programmes, would soon be removed. It was explained that these had been purely for the entertainment of Afghan troops stationed just across the border.¹ This gesture was accepted by Pakistan without comment on the presence of Afghan troops in the area. In March the Pakistan Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, announced that Naim Khan had assured him of Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line.²

5. The Effects of Soviet and American Involvement
in Afghan-Pakistan Relations, 1958-1961.

A new Transit Trade Agreement, sought by Afghanistan for some time, was eventually signed on 17 June 1958.³ It provided for elimination of duty on goods bound for Afghanistan in the first instance, rather than refund of duty later, and for greater facilities for the speedy clearance of goods. There was also a proposal that

1

The Pakistan Times, 15 February 1958; Dawn, 21 February 1958.

2

Dawn, 7 March 1958.

3

Dawn, 7 May and 22 June 1958.

railway lines should be extended into Afghanistan from Torkham and Chaman. That Afghanistan had had American support in its desire for a new agreement was confirmed by Firoz Khan Noon, who said that America had been instrumental in bringing about closer understanding and friendship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was due to US influence alone that the proposal to extend the railway into Afghanistan might take concrete shape.¹

The announcement of an American loan to Pakistan of over \$7m. to improve transport links with Afghanistan, and of a similar agreement to be concluded with Afghanistan, made on the eve of a visit by the Afghan Prime Minister to the USA, was further evidence of American interest.²

Although initially the Pakistan press had welcomed the negotiations, it later urged the Pakistan Government to ensure that, in return for improved transit facilities, Afghanistan should agree to abandon support for Pushtunistan and affirm its recognition of the Durand Line.³ When American involvement in the negotiations

1

The Pakistan Times, 5 June 1958.

2

Dawn, 2 July 1958.

3

Editorial, 'Kabul Talks', The Pakistan Times, 27 May 1958.

became clear, the fear arose in Pakistan that the USA might use Pakistan in an attempt to woo Afghanistan away from the path of non-alignment, and that Pakistan would be forced to make one-sided concessions to Afghanistan, in effect 'to pull the chestnuts out of the Kabul fire for Washington.'¹

Criticism of his policy did not disturb Noon, who tended to be pro-Western as well as pro-Afghan. Indeed, in his enthusiasm for closer relations with Afghanistan, he referred to the possibility of a federation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. This suggestion brought such a hue and cry that he was forced to repudiate the statement.² But Noon was growing unpopular and his government was soon to fall. In October 1958 Ayub Khan seized power and relations with Afghanistan began almost imperceptibly to sour.

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, like most other relationships in the region, was seriously affected as a result of the revolution in Iraq in July 1958. The negotiation of a new Bilateral Agreement between Pakistan and the USA³ following the

1

Ibid., 5 June 1958.

2

See Chapter V.

3

Identical agreements were concluded with Iran and Turkey.

reorganisation of the Baghdad Pact, now CENTO, was criticised by Afghanistan in December 1958¹ and again in February 1959, this time with the support of India.²

Towards the end of 1959 fear of increasing Russian influence in Afghanistan became evident in Pakistan. President Ayub referred to the improvement in strategic communications in Afghanistan which would ultimately be capable of carrying major military equipment and, being built in a north-south direction, could only carry it towards Pakistan.³ The USSR, which had reacted sharply to the new Bilateral Agreements, was waging a propaganda war against the Iranian Government, and both Iran and Pakistan were at the time seeking a joint command structure which would strengthen the military capacity of CENTO.⁴

1

Dawn, 5 December 1958.

2

Afghan-Indian joint communiqué following Daud Khan's visit to New Delhi, Foreign Affairs Record, 1959, p.15.

3

The Pakistan Times, 21 December 1959.

4

See Chapter V. Pakistan's objectives regarding Kashmir and the increasing Chinese pressure on India should also be kept in mind.

There was also increased tension along the Afghan-Pakistan border. An attempt by the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, to initiate talks with Naim Khan in New York in October 1959 was apparently unsuccessful¹ and Ayub later remarked:

If they [Afghanistan] think they can make Pakistan give up its position [regarding Pushtunistan] they are sadly mistaken. Pakistan has the means and knows how to defend its position.²

Through November and December the Pakistan press gave wide coverage to reports of unrest in southern Afghanistan, claiming that some 3,000 Afghan tribesmen had taken refuge in Pakistan from the 'un-Islamic' Afghan regime which, they complained, had fallen too much under Moscow's influence.³

In December, plans were made for the visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister, Naim Khan, to Pakistan the following January in order to discuss Russian involvement and the question of the tribesmen. Although care was taken by Pakistan to emphasise that President Eisenhower's tour of the region in December had nothing to do with

1

Dawn, 14 and 22 October 1959.

2

Dawn, 24 October 1959.

3

See, for example, Dawn, 2 and 11 November, and The Pakistan Times, 9 November 1959.

Naim's proposed visit, reports that America had encouraged the move were later apparently confirmed by the statement of the American Ambassador in Kabul that 'friendly relations between the two neighbouring countries...are quite essential in the larger interests of both.'¹

The effect of Naim's visit was if anything to embitter relations still further, and it seems there was little will on either side to reach agreement. On his arrival in Pakistan he said that the object of his visit was to attempt to settle political differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which he said were well known.² Nettled by his remarks the Pakistan press was antagonistic throughout his visit, which in any case was suddenly cut short. Back in Kabul he said that the 'completely negative attitude' of Pakistan's present regime had jeopardised relations with his country. He had wanted to discuss Pushtunistan, and his mission had failed because Pakistan had refused to do so.³

1

Dawn, 16 January 1960.

2

The Pakistan Times, 11 January, and Dawn, 12 January 1960.

3

Dawn, 29 February 1960.

It was not long before Russia entered the propaganda fray. Visiting Afghanistan in March 1960, Khrushchev assured the Afghans that the Soviet Union did not want to interfere in their internal affairs, but only to help them develop.¹ He promised an additional \$300m. economic aid.

The joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit stated that the question of the Pushtu-speaking people could be solved by means of self-determination,² and on his return to Moscow Khrushchev suggested that a plebiscite be held to determine whether the Pushtu people wanted independence or union with Afghanistan or Pakistan.³ These remarks brought an immediate reaction from Rawalpindi. In a statement issued on 7 March, Manzur Qadir challenged the Afghan Government to hold a plebiscite among the Pushtu-speaking people of Afghanistan giving them a similar choice to that demanded for their fellows in Pakistan, or to drop the subject of Pushtunistan altogether.⁴

1

The Times of India, 6 March 1960.

2

Ibid.

3

The Pakistan Times, 6 March 1960.

4

For text of statement, see Dawn, 8 March 1960.

In case the Soviet view should have been misunderstood, the new Ambassador in Karachi, immediately after presenting his credentials, repeated the demand for self-determination for the Pushtu people of Pakistan. He described Manzur Qadir's suggestion that a similar plebiscite be held among the Pathans of Afghanistan as a joke: since Pathans were the basic population of Afghanistan the question did not arise.¹ Pakistani reactions to his comments were summed up in an editorial entitled 'An Envoy We Can Do Without', published in Dawn on 14 March.

Relations between Pakistan and Russia deteriorated still further following the 'U-2' incident in May 1960.² While not of major importance in the relationship with Afghanistan, it gave the Afghans an opportunity to adopt a superior attitude towards Pakistan and confirmed them in their dislike of military pacts. Although they contented themselves with lodging a protest with the US and Pakistan Governments, the incident did nothing to improve the atmosphere of distrust which existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1

The Times, 14 March 1960.

2

See Chapter V.

The incidents contributing to increased tension continued, leading ultimately to the break in diplomatic relations which occurred in September 1961. From September 1960 Pakistan Government statements appeared protesting against concentrations of Afghan troops along the border, particularly around Bajaur.¹ The Afghans claimed that Pakistan was attempting to hide the fact of mounting unrest in the frontier regions and was using these accusations as a pretext to move military reinforcements into the area.² The Pakistan press continued to publish reports of unrest in southern Afghanistan. In March 1961 Ayub Khan stated that between five and eight brigades of Afghan troops were concentrated along Pakistan's borders. 'If they are so foolish as to cross into our territory, then we shall do the needful.'³

The extent to which the USSR was responsible for the Afghan policy cannot be determined. Certainly the Pakistanis held Soviet influence largely responsible for the increase in tension,⁴ and Daud's visit to Moscow in

1

The Pakistan Times, 29 September 1960.

2

The Times of India, 29 September 1960.

3

The Pakistan Times, 18 March 1961.

4

The Pakistan Times, 30 September 1960.

April, during which the Soviet stand on Pushtunistan was reaffirmed, tended to confirm this view. Ayub Khan spoke bluntly to US News and World Report:

They have infiltrated deeply into Afghanistan, and would like to intimidate us wherever it is possible. They want us to be knocked out of CENTO and SEATO. They don't like our alliances with you. They think that, if we can be knocked out, then the whole of the defence system in the Middle East and Southeast Asia will crumble. And I think there is some truth in that.¹

Soon after he gave the interview, the Pakistan Air Force destroyed 'enemy mortar and machine gun positions' attacking Pakistan posts in the Bajaur area. The question of the use of US arms was raised in America, and Ayub replied: 'At times our American friends seem to question our right to even defend our territory or to take such action that will bring about security.'²

On 12 June Pakistan again protested that Afghan activity on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line amounted to aggression, and announced that the free entry of nomadic Afghan tribesmen (powindahs) into its territory would be prohibited from the following year.

1

US News and World Report, 8 May 1961.

2

Dawn, 4 June 1961.

6. The Diplomatic Break, 1961-1963.

Complaining of harassment of Pakistani officials by Afghan authorities, and accusing Afghanistan of using its Consulates and Trade Agencies in Pakistan for subversive activities,¹ Pakistan ordered the closure of Afghan offices in Pakistan on 2 September 1961. The Afghan reaction was to close the border at Torkham on 3 September and three days later to break diplomatic relations.

It has been argued that the crisis was planned by Pakistan in the event of Ayub's failure to persuade the US to put pressure on India over Kashmir. Pakistan planned to make itself felt in the region by closing the Afghan offices and engineering the diplomatic break and border closure, thus depriving Afghanistan of its normal trade channels and forcing it to seek a settlement of the Pushtunistan question, or at least stop inciting the tribes. Pakistan succeeded in bringing about the border closure but failed in the larger objective since Afghanistan did not shun the idea of trade through the USSR.²

1

Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Closure of Afghan Consulates and Trade Agencies in Pakistan, 2 September 1961.

2

Louis Dupree, "'Pushtunistan': The Problem and its Larger Implications, Part II, The Big Gamble Continues', American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, South Asia Series, vol.V, no.4, December 1961.

This explanation is unnecessarily complicated: in any case there appeared at the time to be some confusion as to whether the border was actually closed and who closed it.¹ Pakistani charges against Afghanistan appear to have been justified, and while the closure of the Afghan trade offices in Pakistan was no doubt a punitive measure calculated to hinder the transit trade, it seems that Pakistan did not intend to stop it altogether.² Afghanistan argued that its decision to close the border completely was the only way to draw attention to the full implications of the Pakistani action in closing its trade offices, which made the proper clearance of goods impossible.³ If this explanation is correct the immediate logic of the Afghan action is not apparent, for they stood to lose most by the border closure. Fresh fruit for Pakistan and India is an important aspect of Afghanistan's export trade, and in September the ripe grape crop was ready for shipment by truck to markets in the subcontinent. Also important was the delay of US aid

1

The Times, 11 November 1961, seemed under the impression that it was Pakistani retaliation for the severed diplomatic relations.

2

Manzur Qadir in a speech to the Afro-Asian Cultural Council Meeting in Lahore said that Pakistan would honour its commitments under the 1958 Transit Trade Agreement. The Times, 19 September 1961.

3

Ibid., 26 September 1961.

goods, although Kabul appeared to regard the dislocation of the US aid programme as a loss for America rather than for Afghanistan.¹ The effects on Pakistan were minor. There was a shortage of fresh fruit in Peshawar, perhaps causing some discontent in the frontier region, but more important was the strain placed on Karachi port facilities and the rail junction of Lahore which were blocked by Afghan goods, thus slowing down deliveries throughout Pakistan. Perhaps as Pakistan had hoped to put pressure on Afghanistan by hindering trade, Afghanistan hoped to call its bluff, no doubt calculating that the USSR would swiftly offer help, as indeed it did. Planes were immediately sent to airlift the grape crop, much of which was bought by the USSR,² and Russia offered alternative transit facilities. It is possible that Afghanistan by turning to the USSR and dislocating the US aid programme sought to persuade America to exert pressure on Pakistan to re-open the trade offices and perhaps negotiate on Pushtunistan.

The US was certainly anxious that the dispute be settled, but its reactions tended to antagonise Pakistani opinion, particularly when a USIS handout referred to 'border disputes' between Pakistan and

1

The Times, 26 September 1961.

2

Louis Dupree, '"Pushtunistan": The Problem and its Larger Implications, Part III: The Big Gamble Continues'.

Afghanistan. As an ally, America ought, they felt, to be firmly on their side and not offering to mediate. Again the fear that the US might attempt to force Pakistan to make concessions to the Afghans was expressed in the Pakistan press.¹ Meanwhile the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington stated that Pakistan would not allow the goods question to be used as a political lever to force it to re-open the Afghan consulates: these were two separate questions.²

Despite Pakistan's lack of enthusiasm for US mediation, President Kennedy's special envoy, Livingstone Merchant, was accepted on condition that Afghanistan also accept, and that discussion be confined to the trade issue. In a statement on his arrival in Pakistan, Merchant agreed to these terms.³ After three weeks, on 10 November, he announced the failure of his mission, saying that future US mediation attempts would continue through normal diplomatic channels.⁴ A week later the US Secretary of State said that the break between

1

Editorial, 'Our Friends at it Again', Dawn, 7 October 1961.

2

Report, *ibid.*, 7 October 1961.

3

The Times, 21 October 1961.

4

Ibid., 11 November 1961.

Pakistan and Afghanistan was a world problem in which the US could have only a limited role as a 'friendly counsellor and adviser'.¹ This was the last overt US attempt to solve the dispute, although support was later given the Shah in his efforts, and through negotiations in Kabul the American Ambassador was able to persuade Afghanistan to re-open the border for eight weeks from 29 January 1962 to permit American aid to reach its destination.²

Meanwhile a serious attempt was made by Afghanistan to find other transit routes. A transit agreement was signed with Iran which was also anxious to prevent Afghanistan coming further under Soviet influence. Afghan goods were to be taken by truck to Meshed and then by rail to either Bandar Shahpur or Khorramshehr on the Persian Gulf. Imports from Europe and India as well as some US aid goods were shipped to Khorramshehr. The new route was more expensive and less convenient than the old Karachi route: Khorramshehr did not have port facilities equal to those available at Karachi, nor were there equivalent road and rail links. There were reports of increased pilferage on the way through Iran and a number of illegal imposts on the goods at

1

Dawn, 19 November 1961.

2

The New York Times, 23 January 1962, p.3.

various points. The route through the USSR was also longer and less satisfactory, at least to Afghanistan's Western trading partners.

The Shah, who had offered to mediate within days of the diplomatic break, renewed his offer during a hastily arranged visit to Rawalpindi early in July. Pakistan's acceptance was announced on 3 July, and a formal approach was made to the Afghan Government through diplomatic channels in Teheran. On 12 July the Afghan Ambassador in Teheran announced acceptance by King Zahir Shah. The Shah had talks with the Afghan King in Kabul on 27 and 28 August, flying to Rawalpindi on 31 July for discussions with Ayub and returning that evening to Kabul. On 1 August he was back in Teheran, his efforts so far without success. Neither side was ready to compromise: Afghanistan was anxious to have the Consulates and Trade Agencies re-established, while Pakistan was adamant that they should not be. The Pakistan Government wanted the border re-opened and the congestion at their railway junctions and at Karachi Port ended, and was prepared to re-open diplomatic relations. In addition there was in Pakistan an openly voiced desire to prevent the further development of Afghan-Soviet relations, a suggestion that the Afghan Government interpreted as an attempt to interfere with Afghanistan's chosen policy of non-alignment. In order to make it clear that this policy would not be modified, King Zahir Shah set off for Moscow as soon as the Shah departed.

An attempt to arrange a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Teheran at the end of August came to nothing, but Mohammed Ali and Naim Khan did eventually meet during the UN General Assembly Session in New York, and the ground was broken for later talks. Meanwhile Afghanistan and the USSR signed a transit trade agreement whereby all Afghan trade with Europe was to be routed through Russia. A 50 per cent freight concession had been made to Afghanistan, and Russia agreed to improve the road between Kabul and the Russian border.¹

A change of government in Afghanistan in March 1963 appeared to open the way for a settlement with Pakistan. Daud Khan, who had been deeply committed to the friendly relationship with the USSR and to the demand for Pushtunistan, was replaced by Mohammed Yusuf, the first time the office had been held by someone other than a member of the royal family. In an early statement, however, the new Prime Minister reaffirmed Afghan support for 'the legitimate demands of the people of Pushtunistan',² and said that Pakistan would not be permitted to use resumption of trade as a bargaining point to compel Afghanistan on the issue of Pushtunistan.³

1
The Pakistan Times, 23 October 1962.

2
Ibid., 17 March 1963.

3
Ibid., 22 April 1963.

When agreement was reached on 28 May, following talks in Teheran between the Afghan Minister for Information and Press, Qasim Rishtya, and the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the terms appeared a clear diplomatic victory for Afghanistan. The border was to be re-opened, diplomatic relations to be restored, and the trade and consular offices were to be opened again.¹ Little appeared to have changed in the attitudes of the two governments. Rishtya expressed the hope that this agreement would pave the way for the 'resolution of political differences.'² His veiled reference to Pushtunistan brought the customary response from Pakistan: Bhutto stated that the Pushtunistan issue was completely closed. In fact, as far as Pakistan was concerned it had never existed.³

The border was re-opened on 20 July when the new Afghan Consul arrived in Peshawar with his staff and his trade agent. Trade was resumed on 26 July, Ariana

1

Text of agreement, Dawn, 30 May 1963.

2

The Hindu, 31 May 1963. This is a phrase often used by Afghan officials to refer to the question of Pushtunistan.

3

Dawn, 31 May 1963.

Airlines began flights to Pakistan once more, and the Ambassador Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal returned to his post.¹

7. Relations, 1963-1968

In the five years following the restoration of diplomatic relations there has been an attempt, particularly by Pakistan, to work out a modus vivendi with Afghanistan which has been partially successful, although the basic position of both governments has not changed and the underlying tension remains.

In June 1963 Ayub Khan repeated the call for 'closer collaboration' with Afghanistan and Iran which he had made in 1962.² It was not well received in Pakistan and turned down flat in Kabul, but the message that Pakistan was prepared for increased cooperation was apparently understood. When the new Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan crossed the border at Torkham on 4 November he was greeted with bouquets and a guard of honour.³

1

Previously Press Adviser to King Zahir Shah (see p.318 above) and former Ambassador to Pakistan (1957-58). He subsequently became Prime Minister of Afghanistan.

2

See Chapter V.

3

Outlook, 16 November 1963.

In January 1964 a new Air Agreement was signed giving PIA and Ariana Airlines reciprocal rights. In March Pakistan agreed that two new Afghan trade offices in East and West Pakistan should be established and a new Transit Trade Agreement, replacing that reached in 1958, was announced.

Despite a willingness to participate in bilateral cooperation, Afghanistan remained wary of regional schemes. Before the conclusion of the Istanbul Accord in July 1964, and the formation of RCD, President Ayub stopped briefly in Kabul for talks with King Zahir Shah. He put his proposals for regional cooperation to the Afghan leaders,¹ but received a negative response. Nevertheless the hope of eventual Afghan participation in RCD was not abandoned, as was made clear in the Istanbul Accord itself and in later statements from members.² Afghanistan has, however, remained aloof, no doubt fearing that participation in such an organisation might jeopardise its non-alignment, despite assurances that RCD is a purely regional grouping, quite outside CENTO.

1

President Ayub Khan, speech at the Thinkers' Forum at the University Campus, Lahore, 4 October 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, July 1964 - June 1965 (Pakistan Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), p.46.

2

For example, the statement by the Shah of Iran, London. Dawn, 10 March 1965.

Politically, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have remained uneasy, and trouble in Baluchistan has contributed to the sensitivity of the Pakistan Government to Afghan statements (see below) of support for Pushtunistan. Although incidents in Baluchistan did not receive wide coverage in the Pakistan press, the weekly magazine, Outlook, later suspended, referred to a 'regrettable incident' early in 1964 when tribesmen ambushed a police party, killing nine of them. While the Government may have simply taken action to maintain law and order, the fact remained that most Baluchi leaders were in gaol. 'Whether one agrees with their politics or not, it is difficult not to be disturbed by the long stretches of imprisonment which has been the fate of some of them,'¹ the magazine declared. Through 1965, Kabul press and radio reported widespread revolt and fighting in the tribal areas, including Baluchistan.² By this time, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, having been released, had gone to Kabul and called on his followers to achieve an independent homeland for the Pushtu-speaking

1

Outlook, 14 March 1964.

2

Kabul radio, in Pushtu, 5 July 1965, BBCSWB, FE/1906/A3/8; Kabul radio in English, *ibid.*, FE/1949/A3/13; New Delhi in English, *ibid.*, FE/2865/A3/6; Kabul Times, 13 September 1965; reported in Asian Recorder, 1965, p.6721.

people.¹ In the first half of 1968, unrest in Baluchistan flared once more with the release of a popular Baluchi leader from a ten-year imprisonment. Quetta was for some weeks placed under curfew after a series of riots which ended in the shooting of a student.

At the same time the Afghan Government had made several statements in support of the 'demands of the people of Pushtunistan': King Zahir Shah referred to it in his Independence Day address on 23 August 1965;² the Prime Minister, Maiwandwal, spoke of Pushtunistan to a National Press Club luncheon in Washington in March 1967;³ and the Afghan representative to the United Nations, Mohammed Pazhwak, dealt with the subject at length in October 1968.⁴ Despite the Pakistan Foreign Ministry's adherence to the view that there are no problems in Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan, except in the imagination of the Afghan Government, Afghanistan's

1

Statement, 31 August 1965, Kabul radio, reported in Asian Recorder, 1965, p.6662.

2

Kabul radio in English, BBCSWB, FE/1945/B/3.

3

Dawn, 30 April 1967.

4

General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Twenty-Third Session, speech by the Afghan Permanent Representative, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, 1690 Plenary Meeting, 10 October 1968.

continued propaganda support of dissident elements in the tribal areas has contributed to a general air of bitterness between Kabul and Rawalpindi.

8. Conclusion

The hostility with which Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan began has continued for over 20 years and twice erupted into crisis, the first time leading to a suspension of diplomatic relations, the second to interruption of trade and a complete diplomatic break. Underlying the quarrel on both occasions was Afghanistan's support for the Pushtunistan movement. In 1955 Afghanistan objected to the unification of West Pakistan on the grounds that the wishes of the people of the North-West Frontier Province had not been ascertained. The crisis of 1961-3 arose from Pakistan's complaints that Afghanistan's offices in the frontier towns were carrying on subversive activities among the tribes.

Pakistan believes that the Afghan Government raises the issue of Pushtunistan whenever its position is threatened by internal instability. There is perhaps some truth in this, for the tribesmen in Afghanistan are as conservative and independent minded as those on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, and tend to object to modernisation, especially as it touches traditional education or the role of women in their society. It was from such measures, claimed to be Soviet-inspired, that

the refugees who came to Peshawar in 1960 were said to be escaping. There is, however, more reality in the Pushtunistan movement than Pakistan will acknowledge, and unrest in the tribal areas, especially in Baluchistan,¹ is sufficient to make the Government object to Afghan propaganda.

Although Afghanistan's position as a landlocked state makes it vulnerable to pressure from the countries through which the transit routes run - in this case Pakistan and the USSR, for the route through Iran is of minor importance - Afghanistan has managed to turn the situation to its advantage to a considerable extent. United States anxiety to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence has led to America's intervention whenever Afghanistan appeared likely to become dependent on the USSR. The US supported Afghanistan's demand for a new Transit Trade Agreement with Pakistan in 1958, and made grants to both countries to improve transit facilities, especially the extension of the railway across the border from Chaman to Spin Baldak in Afghanistan. It has assisted Afghanistan to build a road from Spin Baldak north to Kabul. When the Afghan-Pakistan border was

1

Although Baluchistan is not a Pathan area and does not fall within Pushtunistan proper, it is a tribal area and also has links with Afghanistan, and it is included in that definition of Pushtunistan which refers to all of West Pakistan west of the Indus.

closed in 1961 the US, anxious that its aid goods were not reaching their destination, persuaded the Afghan Government to temporarily open the border.

Afghanistan has taken advantage of this situation and welcomed Soviet assistance, which has been readily available: for instance, the building of a road from the Russian border south to Kabul and assistance in providing transit facilities through Russia. Although in material terms Soviet aid is less than that from the US, Russia has in the past given support to Afghanistan's political demands regarding Pushtunistan. In attempting to prevent an increase in Soviet influence in Afghanistan the US has taken a neutral position in the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it is likely that from time to time America has attempted to persuade Pakistan to make concessions to Afghan demands.

Other mediation attempts have been made by Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan is of little concern to the Arab countries, and only one attempt was made by them, in 1955, perhaps motivated by the heady spirit of Bandung and a desire to restore good relations between two Muslim countries. For the other members of the northern tier, Turkey and Iran, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are of more consequence. Both would be loath to see an expansion of Russian influence into Afghanistan which they regard as part of their region. At the same time they would like to see Afghanistan drawn into some

kind of regional grouping for which the now defunct Saadabad Pact provides a precedent. Both Turkey and Iran are acceptable mediators to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the efforts of Menderes in 1955 and the Shah in 1961-3 were welcomed by both parties. Whether the Turkish attempt succeeded is not known, but shortly after Menderes' visits to Karachi and Kabul an agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan was reached. The later efforts by the Shah did not appear, in 1962, to have been very successful, and were perhaps undermined by the suspicion that, having just visited America, he was acting on US initiative. When the reconciliation came it was nearly a year after the Shah's round of talks in the two capitals, and apart from the fact that the final agreement occurred in Teheran, it appeared to have little to do with Iranian mediation. However the Shah received much of the credit, just as Menderes had done in 1955.

Despite encouragement from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan has remained aloof from RCD. Although willing to develop bilateral relations with each of the members, Afghanistan prefers not to participate in a regional organisation, perhaps fearing that such a move would jeopardise its non-alignment, and assurances that RCD is quite outside CENTO have had no effect. It is also likely that Afghanistan has calculated that it will benefit from development of the region regardless

of its own participation, and perhaps will gain more by remaining outside the organisation.

Economic calculations aside, the question of Pushtunistan remains an important consideration for the Afghan Government. It may, as Pakistan claims, be a 'stunt' to gain support for an unstable regime, but it is also one to which many Afghans are deeply attached:

It is never to be forgotten that the present ruling family are the direct descendents of the Peshawar Sardars; the present King, Zahir Shah, and his leading ministers are the great-great-grandsons of Sultan Muhammad Khan. The lure of Peshawar is a passion, deep in their hearts.¹

So long as there is discontent on either side of the Durand Line, support for 'the demands of the Pushtu speaking people' is unlikely to be abandoned by the Afghan Government, and so long as the Afghan policy of playing the great powers off one against the other continues, the efforts of the regional powers to settle the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to draw Afghanistan into some form of regional cooperation, are unlikely to succeed.

1

Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C. - A.D. 1957 (Macmillan: London, 1958), p.435. Although under the Constitution of 1963 the royal family surrendered much of its power, the attitude of subsequent governments to the question of Pushtunistan has not changed.

CHAPTER VIIIKashmir: Middle Eastern
Responses to a Pakistani Problem1. Introduction

Pakistan's relationship with India tends to dominate its view of the world. The hostility which has existed between these two countries since Partition, and the fear of India which this hostility has generated, have been the mainspring of many Pakistani policy decisions. The central issue of this hostility is the question of Kashmir.¹ It is by its policy on this issue that Pakistan claims to know its friends.

Apart from the legal question, and the economic and strategic interests of both India and Pakistan, the

1

The basis of the Kashmir dispute was outlined briefly in Chapter III. For detailed discussion of the history of this question see, for example, Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (Ryerson Press: Toronto, 1953); Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1954); K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, Prepared for the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Manhattan Publishing Co.: New York, 1960); Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, a Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1964); Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1966); G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (Pall Mall Press: London, 1968).

basic philosophy which underlies the attitude of each probably contributes to the insolubility of the Kashmir problem. The partition of the subcontinent and the birth of the Muslim state of Pakistan arose directly from the 'two nation' theory, developed by the Muslim League, which argued that Muslims and Hindus constituted separate nations and should therefore have separate states. For Pakistan to abandon its demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir (the results of which Pakistanis generally believe would be favourable to them) is to abandon Kashmir to India and to admit that the Muslims of Kashmir can be absorbed into the Indian Union. Such an admission would strike at the roots of the 'two nation' theory, and the raison d'être of Pakistan itself.¹ This view is rarely articulated by Pakistanis, but it is implicit in many of their arguments relating to Kashmir. For India the problem is reversed: to abandon part of the Indian Union (which it maintains the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be) on the basis of the religious persuasion of its inhabitants would at once call in question India's claim to be a secular state and, especially since steps have been taken to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir within the terms of the Indian Constitution, might open the way for similar demands from other Indian States or groups. This way lies the spectre of disintegration.

1

This argument has been raised both by Keith Callard, Pakistan: a Political Study (Macmillan: New York, 1957), p.309, and Arif Hussain, Pakistan, its Ideology and Foreign Policy (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.: London, 1966), p.65.

This being the case, the international posture of the protagonists is closely defined, leaving little room for manoeuvre. So far as India is concerned, Kashmir legally acceded to India in 1947, and Pakistan has invaded and occupied part of that State. The question is therefore one of Pakistani aggression, and the dispute would be settled, India maintains, if Pakistan withdrew from Indian territory. Since India is in possession of the largest, most populous and wealthy part of Kashmir, it has little to gain by forcing the issue of Pakistani occupation of that area which in Pakistan is known as Azad (or Free) Kashmir. Pakistan, however, has little to lose and much to gain in keeping the issue of the plebiscite alive which, however, necessitates a double effort: it must prevent the question of Kashmir from disappearing from the international scene, by continually raising it in the UN and elsewhere, and at the same time attempt to gain a solution satisfactory to itself. India has thereby been forced to give attention to a matter it would much prefer to drop.

Pakistan's attempts to implement this policy in the Middle East have aroused a mixed though frequently favourable reaction. For the most part the Arab states have acknowledged Pakistan's case: Iraq has been a constant ally in this respect. Egypt has, however, presented a challenge to Pakistani diplomacy, and much of the following discussion is concerned with the policy

adopted by Egypt. In the non-Arab region, Afghanistan, for reasons related to its own conflict with Pakistan, has remained neutral with regard to Kashmir. Iran and Turkey, each valuing good relations with India, were initially reluctant to become involved, but the development of the CENTO alliance had the effect of making them, ultimately, Pakistan's best friends in the dispute.

2. The Middle East and Kashmir, 1947-55

'Muslim causes', so far as most Pakistanis are concerned, ought to be supported. In the years immediately following Partition the atmosphere of religious fervour then prevailing tended to encourage the Pakistan Government to assume that other Muslim countries would react in the same way.

Islam does not recognize any land frontiers and there is no difference between the Muslims of Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iran, Indonesia or any other Muslim country... The time has come when they should rise or fall together. They have to fight the Jewish menace in Palestine and the rising tide of Hindu imperialism in southern Asia... Muslim opinion has been outraged by the Maharaja of Kashmir's action in acceding to the Indian Union against the wishes of 90 per cent majority of the state.¹

1

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Premier of the North-West Frontier Province, at a press conference at Peshawar, 31 October 1947. The Pakistan Times, 2 November 1947.

This was wishful thinking: not only was the Muslim world outside Pakistan not outraged, it was hardly even aware. Pakistan had to make its presence felt throughout the region before support on the question of Kashmir could be sought with any assurance of success.

Although representatives were appointed to most Middle East countries within a year or two of Partition, it has been suggested that 'Pakistan always sent her able ambassadors to other countries rather than to the Middle East.'¹ With one exception, the first four appointees in the region were noted for their scholarship, particularly in religion, rather than for their diplomatic ability. One, the Ambassador to Turkey, was later recalled on the request of the Turkish Government because he was encouraging 'religious reactionaries'.²

The visits made by Liaquat Ali Khan and other Pakistani Ministers to various Middle East countries between 1947 and 1952 were more in the nature of public relations efforts to explain what Pakistan was all about rather than specifically to gain support over Kashmir. The Government of Azad Kashmir has a special relationship with Pakistan, which allowed the Azad Kashmir Foreign Minister and later its President to make tours of

1

Arif Hussain, p.140.

2

Ibid., p.139.

the Middle East in 1948 and 1950,¹ but it is probably true to say that at this time there was little awareness in Pakistan that a special effort had to be made. At that stage it still appeared possible that the United Nations might find a solution, or that the two governments might themselves be able to come to terms. Only after Nehru's statement of April 1954 did it appear that India would reject the proposed plebiscite, and the position of the two countries, never very flexible, finally hardened.²

Although the Pakistan Government itself made no special effort to win support in the Middle East, non-Government organisations such as the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami (the World Muslim Congress) were active in this respect. During the Motamar conferences in 1949 and 1951 Pakistan's point of view was canvassed among the delegates, and resolutions calling for self-determination in Kashmir and declaring that it was

1

Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, The Kashmir Saga (Ripon Printing Press Ltd.: Lahore, 1965), Chapter XX. Dawn, 20 December 1948 and 9 February 1950.

2

Nehru, letter to Mohammed Ali, 13 April 1954, Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan (July 1953 - October 1954), White Paper, Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India: 1954), p.85.

part of Pakistan were adopted.¹ In October 1950 the Motamar began a world campaign for support on Kashmir, collecting signed pledges demanding that the United Nations take 'determined action in the case of Kashmir to do justice by Kashmir and the Kashmiries.' Support for Pakistan was certainly forthcoming from religious organisations and leaders, wielding influence and commanding respect, but without the power to determine foreign policy. The leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was one such supporter, but this organisation was banned by the Egyptian Government in December 1948. Following the revolution in Egypt in 1952, it was implicated in an assassination attempt on Colonel Nasser and its leaders were condemned to death. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, seasoned campaigner against the establishment of Israel, also took Pakistan's part over Kashmir.² Following Liaquat's statement on 15 July that the bulk of the Indian Army had been concentrated on Pakistan's frontiers, the Grand Mufti declared that the duty of defending Pakistan devolved on the entire Muslim world.³ In Iran a group of religious leaders, of whom

1
Dawn, 20 February 1949 and 13 February 1951.

2
Ibid., 23 February 1950.

3
Ibid., 20 July 1951.

the most prominent was Maulana Kashani, the leader of the Fedayyeen Islam (an extreme right wing organisation), met and passed a resolution calling on the Iranian representative at the UN to 'do his utmost for the deliverance of the Kashmiri Muslims.' The same day the Iranian Senate adopted a resolution demanding an immediate and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.¹

At a press conference in May 1951 the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, said that since no Arab country was a member of the Security Council there was little they could do, but that Pakistan had Turkish support.² Referring to the Security Council resolution of March 1951³ the Turkish delegate called for arbitration on points of disagreement. He argued that a plebiscite was the only way to bring about a just

1

Pakistan News, 20 February, 11 March 1951.

2

Dawn, 15 May 1951.

3

This resolution decided to appoint a United Nations representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon to continue efforts to bring about the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir, and called upon India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all points of difference which remained after consultation with the United Nations Representative. Resolution 91(1951) of 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev.1), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1951, Security Council Official Records (SCOR), Sixth Year.

settlement, but that since both parties were agreed on this principle,¹ only minor points remained. Arbitration was the only way to settle them impartially.²

Turkey was nevertheless reluctant to offend India, and even after the announcement in February 1954 that Pakistan and Turkey had agreed to sign a treaty, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mehmet Fuad Koprulu, declared that Turkey was strictly neutral in international affairs not directly concerning it, including Kashmir, Palestine and Pushtunistan.³

Outside the Security Council, Turkey, Iran and the Arab governments had expressed the wish that the problem

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Indian agreement was conditional: '...once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognised democratic method of plebiscite or referendum....' Government of India, letter to the Security Council, 31 December 1947, SCOR, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 28.

2

Speech by Turkish delegate Selim Sarper, 538 Meeting, 29 March 1951, Security Council Official Records (SCOR), Sixth Year. See also Mehmet Gonlubol, Turkish Participation in the United Nations 1945-54 (Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara: Ankara, 1965), p.46.

3

Koprulu, 20 February 1954, New York Times, 21 February, p.24. Foreign Ministry spokesman, 3 March 1954, The Pakistan Times, 6 March.

should be quickly resolved.¹ The Iranian Foreign Minister informed the Indian and Pakistan Ambassadors that in Iran's view the Kashmir question should be settled peacefully and by referendum.² (At this stage Mossadeq was in power, and was in at least temporary alliance with Maulana Kashani over the issue of nationalisation of the AIOC.)

Egyptian official statements were cautious: in February 1950 the Egyptian Foreign Minister said that Egypt was anxious that India and Pakistan should reach a quick and peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, adding that if Egypt's mediation would be fruitful, it would not hesitate to mediate.³ One man responsible for the generation of much goodwill in Pakistan was the Egyptian Ambassador, Abdul Wahab Azzam Bey, who declared that Kashmir was just as much Egypt's problem as the Nile valley. These and other pro-Pakistan remarks, reported widely in the Pakistan press, were the cause of some strain in Egypt's relations with India, although the Ambassador's views were quickly disowned by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.⁴

1

Dawn, 15 May 1951.

2

Ibid., 2 August 1951.

3

Ibid., 22 February 1950.

4

Ibid., 2, 21 January 1951.

The Arab League Secretary-General, Azzam Pasha, was quoted by Dawn as stating on the occasion of 'Kashmir Day', held in Cairo in 1951, that the seven member states deplored the Indian attitude to Kashmir.¹ He was later reported as saying that the Arab League feared that a war between India and Pakistan would not be confined to the subcontinent, as it was absurd to imagine that the Arab States would remain mere observers when 80 million Muslims of Pakistan were in trouble.² Egyptian and Arab League offers of mediation were reportedly declined by India which felt it undesirable that a Muslim power or organisation should take this role.³

Impartial reports are few, and naturally the Pakistan press was anxious to give the impression that opinion, especially Arab opinion, was on their side. This is not to say that it was not. It is probably more reasonable to assume that when Arab leaders thought about it at all, it was always with the notion that while they might extend sympathy to Pakistan, India must not be offended. They tended in any case to be preoccupied with Palestine. Although the Indian Ambassador in Egypt was heard to express regret that

1

Ibid., 6 July, 12 August 1951.

2

Ibid., 7 August 1951.

3

The Times, 6 January 1951.

there was a great deal of sympathy with Pakistan in that country, Dawn pointed out that the Egyptian Government, as a government, had not spoken out in support of Pakistan in the context of the Kashmir question.¹

3. The Effects of the Cold War on Middle East
Reactions to the Question of Kashmir, 1955-62

Pakistan's decision to join the western military alliance system, especially the Baghdad Pact, brought it, and with it Kashmir, into the arena of the cold war, which in turn affected relations with the Middle East. The first major response was Khrushchev's statement, during his tour of India in December 1955: 'The question about Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has been decided by the people of Kashmir itself....' Lest he be misunderstood, he added:

We are confident that this Baghdad Pact will burst like a soap bubble and only unpleasant recollections of it will remain. We have never supported and we shall never support participants in the Baghdad Pact.²

The idea of the Baghdad Pact had been opposed also by Egypt and a number of Arab countries and after the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 the Pact became

1

Dawn, 5 October 1951.

2

The Pakistan Times, 11 December 1955.

even more suspect. Pakistan's qualified support for Egypt at that time received no thanks from Cairo.

A dislike of military pacts, and the discovery that Soviet support could be useful, no doubt helped to draw Egypt and India closer together. Nehru's ventures into the field of foreign policy before independence are well known. One of the primary aspects of this was support for the Arabs against Jewish demands in Palestine, mainly on the grounds that both were struggling against the British. In response to Pakistan's alliance with the United States, India sought to strengthen relations with the non-aligned Afro-Asian group, particularly with Egypt.¹ In February 1955 Nehru and Nasser declared that international disputes should be settled peacefully by negotiation, adding that military alliances and power entanglements, which increased tension and rivalry in armaments, did not add to the security of a country.² The Bandung conference

1

'Nehru was keenly mindful of the potential influence of Egypt after the 1952 revolution, and the ensuing Nehru-Nasser personal friendship cannot be discounted as a factor in India's Middle East policies.' R.J. Kozicki, 'Indian Policy Toward the Middle East', Orbis, vol.XI, no.3, p.790.

2

Joint Communiqué, 17 February 1955, Foreign Affairs Record, 1955, p.28. This affinity apparently appeared much earlier when Egypt urged India to take up the case of Indonesia in the UN. See Egypt and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group set up by the Egyptian Society
(cont.)

of April that year, attended by 29 Afro-Asian nations, was dominated by Nehru, although Pakistan was one of the sponsors. Nasser's brief visit to Pakistan on his way to Bandung was not an unqualified success, if the absence of any joint communiqué may be taken as an indication.

Following the conference, Nehru's contacts with Middle Eastern leaders increased. In March 1955 the Shah visited India, and King Saud went there in November. In July Nehru had visited Cairo. The following year he took part in a tripartite meeting with Nasser and Tito in July, visiting Syria in the course of his journey.

While Pakistan may have alienated the sympathy of Egypt, membership of the Baghdad Pact brought a more definite response from Turkey and Iran. In its communiqué in April 1956, the Baghdad Pact Council stated:

Specific problems which were causing tension in this area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular the Council emphasised the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes.¹

(cont.)

of International Law, Prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Manhattan Publishing Co.: New York, 1957), pp.73-4.

1

Text in Pakistan Horizon, June 1956, p.106. It is perhaps noteworthy that the SEATO communiqué of March 1956 took an even stronger line, in response to Soviet statements on Kashmir and Pushtunistan. See *ibid.*, March 1956.

In May the Turkish Government, in an aide-mémoire to the Indian Government, declared:

Since the Kashmir problem is causing anxiety to a member-country of the Baghdad Pact, it concerns the other members of the Pact and, consequently Turkey. Since the Kashmir problem is creating unrest in the Middle East, it concerns the Baghdad Pact, which was set up for the defence of that area and which consequently concerns Turkey as well.¹

The following month a similar aide-mémoire to India from Iraq declared interest in this question which was causing tension in the region.²

In July Adnan Menderes made what was probably the most outspoken Turkish statement up to that time: 'On the Kashmir issue we will always stand by the side of our brother and ally, Pakistan, not only because we are brothers and allies, but because we believe their cause is just and right.'³ This change in the Turkish attitude from the declaration of neutrality of 1954 was

1

4 May 1956. Referred to by Krishna Menon in a speech to the Security Council, 799 Meeting, 5 November 1957. SCOR, Twelfth Year.

2

Ibid., 26 June 1956.

3

The Pakistan Times, 25 July 1956.

perhaps attributable in part to Pakistan's support for Turkey on the Cyprus question in the United Nations in December 1954.¹

The attitudes which were developing towards the question of Kashmir revealed themselves clearly in the Security Council debate of 1957. Commenting on the January 24 resolution,² the Soviet delegate said that the question had been raised in the first place as one of protecting the population of Kashmir from the activities of certain hostile tribes from Pakistan territory and later from Pakistan forces. Attention was now being focussed not on settling the question by direct negotiation but on the preparation of a plebiscite with 'interference from outside.' The Kashmir Constituent Assembly, the Soviet delegate asserted, had settled the matter for themselves, and the State was now an integral part of the Indian Republic.³ The USSR, however, did not veto the resolution.

Nehru commented that it was unfortunate that some members of the Security Council were in military alliance

1

Ibid., 17 December 1954.

2

Resolution 122(1957), (S/3779), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1957, SCOR, Twelfth Year.

3

Speech to the Security Council, 765 Meeting, 24 January 1957, SCOR, Twelfth Year.

with Pakistan and some were not happy with India over a different issue, and as a result did not consider the Kashmir problem on its merits.¹ There were reports from Cairo claiming that the Indian view was shared by 'Arab political circles in the Egyptian capital' which maintained that the passing of the resolution at a time when the Baghdad Pact prospects were at a low ebb was intended to give a 'false impression' to any country belonging to the Pact that they would receive the support of the Big Powers.²

When the Security Council met to debate the report of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, a five power resolution, sponsored by the USA, the UK, Australia, Columbia and the Philippines proposed to send him back to the subcontinent to explore further ways and means of bringing about the demilitarisation of Kashmir. The Iraq delegate supported the resolution, although he added that his Government would have preferred action along the lines

1

Speaking at New Delhi, 3 February, The Times of India, 4 February 1957.

2

Ibid., 28 January 1957.

suggested by Pakistan, that troops be withdrawn from the ceasefire line and replaced by UN troops. The resolution was, however, opposed by India, which maintained that the question at issue was one of Pakistan aggression and military build-up,¹ and again the USSR abstained.

Although the revolution of 1958 resulted in Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, this did not fundamentally alter Iraq's policy on Kashmir, except that actions especially likely to antagonise India, such as the aide-mémoire of June 1956, were not repeated. On 30 May 1960 President Kassem's Foreign Minister told Pakistani journalists: 'I do not say that Kashmir should come to you or go to India but that the people of Kashmir should be given an opportunity to decide their own future.' As leader of the Iraq delegation to the Security Council under the previous regime, he supported Pakistan's case, not because they both belonged to the Baghdad Pact, but because he considered the Pakistan stand to be just and right.² In June 1962, Iraq was

1

Following the adoption of amendments submitted by Sweden, the Five Power draft resolution was adopted by the Security Council on 2 December 1957, by ten votes to none, with the USSR abstaining. Resolution 126(1957), (S/3922), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1957, SCOR, Twelfth Year.

2

The Pakistan Times, 1 June 1960.

host to the 5th World Muslim Congress, which was opened by President Kassem, and which passed resolutions in support of a plebiscite in Kashmir. This favourable attitude on the part of Iraq continued after the overthrow of President Kassem and in a Joint Communiqué in 1964 his successor, President Arif, and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan 'evinced a deep understanding' of Kashmir and expressed the hope that the dispute would 'be resolved early in accordance with the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity and in conformity with the spirit of the UN Charter and the UN Resolutions.'¹ It is difficult to assess the extent to which Iraq's attitude arose from genuine sympathy for Pakistan, and how much was perhaps the result of continuing rivalry between Iraq and Egypt.

Despite efforts made from time to time by Pakistan, relations with Egypt remained difficult. Pakistani press attacks on Nasser during 1958 brought protests from the Egyptian Embassy in Karachi to the effect that Nasser had never referred to Kashmir as part of India.² There are indeed few statements directly attributable

1

Dawn, 27 March 1964.

2

See Suhrawardy statement, Dawn, 4 August, The Pakistan Times, 5 August 1958.

to Nasser which express pro-Indian views on Kashmir, but his carefully neutral statements did not disguise a close relationship with Nehru in other respects. There was disappointment in Pakistan that outright Egyptian support was withheld. Considering the sentimental attitude of many Pakistanis towards the Muslim Arabs, such support would have been highly prized. After Ayub Khan seized power in October 1958, an attempt had been made to overcome the bitterness which had developed between Nasser and Pakistan's former leaders, especially Suhrawardy, Prime Minister during the Suez crisis, whom Nasser had snubbed in December 1956.

There were hopes, therefore, in Pakistan that Nasser's proposed visit in April 1960 would open a new era in Egyptian-Pakistani relations. Now that 'Pakistan has found its political bearings, after a decade of trials and tribulations, and the UAR has successfully consolidated its independence, the two countries are bound to come closer together...' Dawn wrote enthusiastically.¹ While Nasser was in India, prior to his visit to Pakistan, there were a number of reports that he had offered to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, some of which construed this as 'recognition

1

Editorial, 'President Nasser', 10 April 1960.

of Kashmir's right to determine its own future....'¹
These imaginative reports apparently annoyed Ayub Khan. 'Why do you want to embarrass a good friend?' he asked the press. Nasser would not offer mediation unless he was sure that India as well as Pakistan would accept it.² Nasser also was cautious. He had, he said, offered to use his 'good offices', though not to mediate. He would not comment on the issue of self-determination, arguing that this would undermine any influence he might have.³

The Joint Communiqué issued after Nasser's talks with Ayub called for a solution of the Palestine question in keeping with the UN Resolutions, but there was no mention of Kashmir.⁴ Returning the visit in November, President Ayub appeared to be anxious to clear up any misunderstanding regarding the role of Pakistan in the

1

The Pakistan Times, 10 April, commenting on Nasser's statement that he hoped for a settlement according to the principles of Bandung Declarations, which The Pakistan Times pointed out included the right of self-determination.

2

Dawn, 10 April 1960.

3

Ibid., 15 April 1960.

4

Text of Joint Communiqué, Pakistan Horizon, vol.13, no.2, 1960, p.163.

Suez crisis, saying that while he personally had supported Egypt, and Pakistan had taken a pro-Egyptian stand, 'there were misunderstandings', and the matter had been handled clumsily by Pakistani leaders at the time. He added pointedly that he understood the Egyptian reaction, for 'one gets hurt if one does not get the support from...friends in the manner you think it should be given.'¹ From Pakistan's point of view Ayub's visit to Cairo was not particularly successful. This time the Joint Communiqué was much shorter, without reference either to Palestine or Kashmir.² It was later suggested that despite Ayub's claims to support Arab causes, he refused to include Palestine in the communiqué.³ It is also possible that the Pakistan President regarded a reference to Kashmir as a reasonable quid pro quo for Pakistani support on Palestine. Nasser once again made his neutrality clear, however: 'Is it wise to say to one of

1

Address to National Union Rally, Cairo University, 7 November 1960, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.III, July 1960-June 1961 (Pakistan Publications: Karachi, 1961), pp.47-8.

2

Text of Joint Communiqué, Pakistan Horizon, vol.XIII, no.4, 1960, p.355.

3

Mustafa Amin, Editor of al-Akbar, reported in Asian Recorder, 1962, p.4739.

the two parties that I support you and thus bring myself in conflict with the other? What will be the effect? Will you get Kashmir?'¹

When in 1962 Pakistan brought the question of Kashmir before the Security Council, of which the UAR was then a member, it became clear that Egyptian policy had not changed. The resolution, urging a resumption of direct negotiations, which Pakistan was anxious to have adopted, was one of the mildest ever proposed, from Pakistan's point of view.² The UAR explained its refusal to sponsor the resolution, and its later abstention, saying that it did not favour any action which was not acceptable to both parties.³ The editor of al-Akbar argued that the UAR action should have been no surprise as it conformed with that country's policy, as a friend of both parties, of maintaining

1

Dawn, 12 November 1960.

2

Draft resolution S/5134, sponsored by Ireland, failed of adoption by the Security Council, 22 June 1962, with Rumania and the USSR voting against and the UAR and Ghana abstaining.

3

Speech by the UAR delegate in the Security Council, 1013 Meeting, 19 June 1962, SCOR, Seventeenth Year.

good relations with both.¹ Opinion in Pakistan was in no mood to take this view. So far as Pakistan was concerned, the UAR action in refraining from supporting Pakistan had the effect of supporting India. The fact that it was the Soviet veto which lost the resolution and not the UAR abstention appeared to count for little. The Pakistan Times summed up the attitude of many Pakistanis: 'The attitude of the Afro-Asian members, UAR and Ghana, caused more disappointment and shock to people here than the Russian veto....'² Another paper wrote:

Our hearts cry out in anguish at the agonising thought that...a great Muslim country...should have deemed it appropriate to withhold her support in an issue of such vital importance... not only to us but to millions of Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir....³

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, remarked: 'Unfortunately...we do not always get the same response

1

Mustafa Amin, of al-Akbar (Cairo), quoted in Asian Recorder, 1962, p.4739.

2

Editorial, 'Afro-Asian Stand More Shocking than Veto', 24 June 1962.

3

Morning News (Karachi), 26 June 1962.

to the emotions and sentiments which we display towards them at all times.'¹

There was much soul-searching in Pakistan as a result of the UAR action. It was intolerable to many Pakistanis that a Muslim country should not support them: the situation, as they saw it, did not admit the possibility of neutrality. Nor did it occur to those making the public outcry at the time that Pakistan's friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, and the agreement to sell arms to that country reached during the visit of the Saudi Defence Minister to Pakistan in December 1961, would be interpreted in Cairo as an unfriendly act, although this was made abundantly clear by the UAR protests against the arms sales in January 1963.²

Many Pakistanis blamed membership of CENTO and SEATO for Pakistan's isolation, and one member of the National Assembly urged the Foreign Minister to 'rush' to Cairo and Kabul and remove the suspicion and

1

Dawn, 28 June 1962.

2

The complaint was made by the Chairman of the UAR Executive Council, Aly Sabri, in New Delhi. The Pakistan Government confirmed that equipment was being supplied to Saudi Arabia, but denied knowledge of its use in Yemen. *Ibid.*, 15, 17 January 1963.

misunderstanding.¹ The Pakistan Times argued that, while there was reason to be shocked by the action of the UAR and Ghana, there was 'no reason whatever to change our friendly disposition towards them...instead of being halted in the process of rethinking that started some time ago, we must get on with it until better results accrue.'²

4. Changing Attitudes and Orientation, 1963-65

The Pakistan Government began to realise that its entire international posture was becoming unsatisfactory: it threw the non-aligned world (including the Middle Eastern Islamic members of it) into association with India, and made Soviet opposition to its objectives inevitable. At the same time there was a growing conviction in Pakistan that the benefits derived from its present foreign policy were inadequate. As a result the Government began to revise its position. Pakistan's gradual disengagement from CENTO was accompanied by greater participation in Afro-Asian affairs, previously inhibited by its identification with the West.

1

Ibid., 28 June 1962.

2

Editorial, 'The Soviet Veto', 25 June 1962.

While this is not directly related to the Middle East, it helped to make Pakistan more respectable in the eyes of those committed to non-alignment and for the first time placed it in a position to compete for support in a context similar to that of India. Although not spectacularly successful, Pakistan made steady progress, particularly in relations with UAR. This trend was no doubt accelerated by the death of Pandit Nehru in May 1964, which ended the special relationship existing between the leadership of India and Egypt.

In endeavouring to improve relations with the Arab countries the Pakistan Government initially placed emphasis on the development of trade relations, especially with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as the Gulf states. Towards the end of 1963 the former Foreign Secretary, S.K. Dehlavi, one of Pakistan's more capable diplomats, was appointed Ambassador in Cairo, where he set about explaining Pakistan's policy and laying the groundwork for the Pakistan diplomatic offensive which began in earnest in 1964 at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers in March and the Second Afro-Asian Preparatory Conference in Bandung in April. At both of these conferences Pakistan cooperated with China and Indonesia to keep the USSR and Malaysia out of the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, in opposition to India who supported participation of these two powers. Both of these conferences, attended by

delegates from all the Arab countries, gave Pakistan a valuable opportunity for lobbying among them on its own behalf.

Also in the first half of 1964, two Pakistan delegations toured the Middle East seeking support on Kashmir, which had once more come before the Security Council. Khwaja Shahabuddin, Minister for Information, visited Turkey where he received the assurance of support from the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu.¹ An unofficial delegation, led by Mir Waiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah visited Saudi Arabia, UAR, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Although it was received by Prince Feisal, then Saudi premier, by the Presidents of Iraq and Syria, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Iranian Prime Minister, Dawn's enthusiastic reports were perhaps exaggerated² for the tour was ignored by Arab broadcasts.

The Sixth World Muslim Congress, held in Mogadishu in December-January 1964-5 also represented a propaganda victory for Pakistan, although the absence of the UAR and Algeria from the list of 30 countries present

1
Dawn, 4 April 1964.

2
Ibid., 4, 7, 14 and 15 April 1964.

perhaps took something from the triumph. A controversy arose over the exclusion of two Indian delegates, which brought strong protest from India, although there was little which differed from the practice of earlier Congresses. Invitations had been sent to a number of Muslim organisations, but the Indian Government had refused them permission to attend. On this occasion, however, the Indian Government attempted to impose two of its own nominees as representatives, which the Congress 'unanimously decided to disallow.'¹ While this was no doubt part of Pakistan's revitalised anti-India campaign, it should be noted that the Indian action also was without precedent. After the expulsion of the two unwanted Indians, the Conference passed a resounding resolution calling on the United Nations to implement its resolution on the plebiscite in Kashmir.²

Pakistan's new image did not receive unqualified approval among old and valued allies, a point made clear by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Aram, at a press

1

Muslim World (the organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami), 2 January 1965. See also BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBCSWB), Part 4, Africa and the Middle East, ME/1747/B/4, from Nairobi in English, 30 December 1964, and ME/1748/B/3, from Mogadishu in Swahili, 31 December 1964.

2

Muslim World, 6 February 1965.

conference in Karachi in January 1964. Regarding objections raised by Pakistan to the proposed presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean, he said that it was for Pakistan to decide its own attitude but 'the US is our ally...and we find no objection to their coming into our waters.' Iran supported the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, provided all agreed to attend, and added that 'such conferences are useful only if they are not used for propaganda purposes to further one country's aims.'¹ Although there were no comments in the Pakistan press, 'The National Voice of Iran' referred in a broadcast to Aram's 'irresponsible' statements in Pakistan, declaring that it was his task to bring the West's displeasure to the notice of the Pakistan Government, and that consequently the visit ended with interference in Pakistan affairs.² In addition to its dislike of Pakistan's anti-Indian policy, which Iran was reluctant to join, Pakistan's attempts to woo Nasser were no doubt unwelcome in Teheran considering the increase in pitch

1

The Pakistan Times, 31 January 1964.

2

BBCSWB, ME/1478/D/1, 'The National Voice of Iran', broadcasting in Persian, 7 February 1964. 'The National Voice of Iran' is a clandestine radio station opposed to the Shah's Government.

of the radio battle between the Shah and the UAR President at the end of 1964.¹

The Cyprus crisis which flared in December 1963 and came very close to war in August 1964 was probably another source of embarrassment to Pakistan in its growing relationship with UAR. When the outbreak began Pakistan immediately declared its fullest support for Turkey. President Ayub at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in July argued the Turkish case, and succeeded in getting a reference to Cyprus included in the official communiqué.² As the Turkish Air Force made threatening gestures at the island, Damascus radio said that Syria could not ignore such incidents taking place near its coastline, and other reports said that a Turkish attack on Cyprus would be considered to jeopardise the security of the Arab states, including Syria.³ Medical supplies were sent to Cyprus from the UAR, and towards the end of

1

BBCSWB, ME/1745/i, 28-29 December 1964; ME/1754/D/1, 5, 7 January 1965; ME/1758/i, 13 January 1965; The New York Times, 28 December 1964, p.2.

2

Pakistan News Digest, 10 July 1964; The Times, 16 July 1964.

3

BBCSWB, ME/1627/i, Damascus radio, 9 August, and BBCSWB, ME/1617/C/3, Athens home service, 27 July 1964.

August Makarios visited that country. In the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of their talks Nasser and Makarios declared their support for 'full and unconditional independence' for the Cypriots and 'the preservation of the unity of their territory and their right of self-determination.'¹ While there is no evidence to suggest that Pakistan was involved in this controversy, it serves to underline the difficulties encountered by it in attempting to maintain good relations with all the states of the region.

As preparations for the Second Afro-Asian Conference gathered momentum, Pakistan gained an unexpected propaganda bonus as a result of Sheikh Abdullah's tour of the Middle East and the Indian reaction to it. The former Kashmir premier was opposed to the integration of Kashmir into India and set about explaining this, with Pakistani assistance, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. He met President Nasser and Ali Sabri in Cairo, and gave a press conference organised by the Pakistan Embassy, but the Cairo press and radio paid little heed to his visit. In Algeria, however, Sheikh Abdullah had a much publicised interview with Chou En-lai (who happened also to be there on a visit) during which he sought Chinese assistance for his

1

Report of Joint Communiqué, BBCSWB, ME/1645/E/1, Cairo home service, 31 August 1964.

campaign against the Indian Government. The Indian reaction was immediate: already under fire for permitting the Sheikh to make anti-Indian propaganda in Cairo, the Government decided to cancel the passports of the Sheikh and his party.¹ On their return to India early in May they were arrested and detained in south India. The result was an outbreak of rioting in Kashmir in which 'at least four persons were killed when Indian policemen opened fire on demonstrators in Srinagar....'² The Pakistan press made the most of what appeared to be a fine disregard for freedom and justice on the part of the Indian Government,³ and an Indian delegation was sent around various capitals to repair the damage and explain the Indian position on Kashmir. The UAR Government no doubt found the situation somewhat embarrassing, and the Egyptian Vice-President, Zakaria Mohie El-Din, in Bombay at the end of April (before the arrest of the Sheikh), stated that the UAR Government had extended to him the hospitality due to a citizen

1

The Times of India, 8, 16, 17 March and 6 April 1965.

2

The New York Times, 9 May 1965, p.1.

3

For example, see Editorial, 'A Grave Provocation', Dawn, 9 May 1965.

from a friendly country according to protocol. The Sheikh had also made press statements, but the press was free in the UAR, he said. Egypt had not, he assured the Indian Government, changed its point of view on Kashmir.¹ The realisation, however, was dawning on the Indian Government that assurances of neutrality in a dispute were not always satisfactory. Shastri visited Cairo in June, and though he was cordially received he was not given the welcome or the publicity given President Ayub who arrived soon after. In the Nasser-Ayub Joint Communiqué issued on 16 June, the two Presidents

reasserted the peoples' right of self-determination and their right to decide their futures by their own free will. They also asserted that this right forms a basic principle and should be effectively exercised. They further condemned the resort to force, terrorism and intervention in all its forms to prevent the exercise of this right,

adding that they 'expressed their hope for an early and peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan.'² Though not a clear declaration in favour of a plebiscite, this was the furthest

1

The Times of India, 16 April 1965.

2

Text published Dawn, 18 June 1965.

President Nasser had ever gone towards abandoning his neutrality in the Kashmir dispute in favour of Pakistan. While in Cairo, Ayub took part in talks with Nasser, Sukarno and Chou En-lai, all waiting until it was clear whether the scheduled Second Afro-Asian Conference would after all be held. Egypt was apparently well satisfied with the talks, a 'cornerstone for the Afro-Asian group,' which enhanced Cairo's reputation as a centre for such a meeting,¹ and Ayub Khan was well satisfied to be at last accepted as a member of the club.

5. The Middle East and the War, September 1965

An increasing number of incidents in Kashmir during July and August led to the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan in September 1965. The United Nations considered 5 August as the date on which violations of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side substantially increased, marking the beginning of the crisis, although Pakistan disputes this, for it was not until the Indian drive toward Lahore on 6 September that President Ayub declared 'we are at war.'²

1

Cairo radio, 29-30 June, BBCSWB, ME/1898/i.

2

Broadcast, 6 September 1965. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VIII, July 1965-June 1966 (Pakistan Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), pp.24-6.

It was not until after 6 September that any official reaction came from either Turkey or Iran - not, in fact, until after the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, called for assistance from Pakistan's CENTO allies.¹ Information on this subject is oddly vague: it seems that no formal request was made, although the Pakistan Ambassador in Ankara discussed the situation with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Isik. He also informally approached the representatives of the CENTO countries in Ankara, perhaps with the intention of asking for a meeting of the CENTO Council.² The British Government refused to be involved, but on 8 September both the Iranian and Turkish Governments issued statements in support of Pakistan. The Iranians referred bluntly to 'India's aggression' against Pakistan,³ and the Turkish statement declared that the situation had been aggravated by the fact that India had carried the conflict into Pakistan's territory.⁴ The Iranian Prime Minister,

1

6 September 1965. Dawn, 8 September 1965.

2

The Times, Dawn, 7 September 1965; The New York Times, 8 September 1965, p.1.

3

Text of the Iranian Government statement, Dawn, 9 September 1965.

4

Report of Urguplu's statement, BBCSWB, ME/1956/C/1, Ankara home service, 8 September 1965.

Abbas Hoveida, went to Ankara for discussions with his Turkish counterpart, Suat Urguplu, on 9 and 10 September. The two Prime Ministers supported the UN call for a ceasefire, and offered Turkish and Iranian troops for a UN peace force, if a decision should be made to send one, adding that unless a solution was found to the Kashmir question 'repetition of such grave incidents cannot be avoided.' The final paragraph of the communique¹ stated:

The Turkish and Iranian Governments confirm the solidarity among Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and that they are prepared to support their brother and ally Pakistan. The two countries will continue to watch future developments in the situation closely in the spirit of this solidarity. The two Governments will regard the continuation of the conflict as a grave development and will maintain constant consultations, both between themselves and with Pakistan, on the additional representations to be made and aid to be accorded.¹

They had already referred to their 'special commitments to Pakistan, not only within the framework of CENTO but also within that of the sincere friendship and close partnership binding the three countries.'²

1

Text of the Turkish-Iranian Communiqué. BBCSWB, ME/1958/E/1, Ankara home service, 10 September 1965.

2

Ibid.

It was clear, however, that CENTO could not be invoked by Pakistan since this was not a case of communist aggression,¹ and although Turkey did have a treaty commitment to Pakistan outside CENTO,² Iran did not. Nevertheless both these countries, taking into consideration the international obligations of each, went as far as they could in assisting Pakistan both materially and diplomatically.

Pakistan's special envoy, Air-Marshal Asghar Khan, previously Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, went to Ankara to ask 'all the help that Turkey can give us.' It was reported that this included jet fighters and pilots. The Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, wrote to Urguplu seeking clarification

1

This point was emphasised by officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the CENTO Secretariat during interviews conducted in August 1968. For discussion of this question see Chapter V.

2

See Article 4 of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement for Friendly Co-operation of April 1954. Denise Folliot (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1954 (OUP: London, 1957), pp.185-6. See also text of letters exchanged between the Turkish and Pakistan Governments amending the treaty, Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security (Longmans: Pakistan, 1960), Appendix II, pp.180-1.

of these reports,¹ but it soon became clear that Turkey's agreement to supply defence equipment to Pakistan was qualified by its obligations not to dispose of NATO and CENTO equipment, and on these grounds Asghar Khan's request was refused.²

On 14 September, the day on which U Thant's time limit for a ceasefire expired, Isik and Hoveida came for talks to Rawalpindi. There is little reliable detail regarding the discussions which Bhutto declared to be satisfactory. Hoveida stated that Iran was prepared to give full and closest support to Pakistan, and Isik promised Turkey's 'best assistance'.³ On his return to Ankara, however, he emphasised that it

is now definitely clear that so long as no final solution is found to the Kashmir question it is not really possible to hope for peace on the Indian subcontinent. Consequently it is the task of all peace-loving countries to ensure the cessation of hostilities on the subcontinent and, not content with that, also to find a final solution to the Kashmir problem. The final

1

The Times of India, 11 September 1965.

2

Ibid., 14 September, The New York Times, 15 September 1965, p.2.

3

Dawn, 15, 16 September 1965.

solution should be a just one agreed upon by both sides.¹

Although the version of his statement broadcast by Ankara radio carefully avoided any mention of a plebiscite, Dawn carried the report under the headline 'Turkey Backs Plebiscite'.²

Reports of the assistance which Pakistan received from Turkey and Iran vary, and are understandably difficult to document. Both Governments were warned by India that they should not take any steps which would give the impression that they were taking a partisan attitude in the conflict, and that any material help which they gave Pakistan would be considered an unfriendly act by India,³ but it is uncertain to what extent this warning affected their actions.

The sum of Turkish aid to Pakistan was said to be \$5m. worth of arms and ammunition, which Urguplu stated would be sent under an existing trade agreement.⁴ It

1

Text of Isik statement, BBCSWB, ME/1962/C/2, Ankara radio, 15 September 1965.

2

Dawn, 15 September 1965.

3

The Times of India, 17 September 1965.

4

Statement at a press conference at Izmir, 18 September 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1965/C/1, Ankara home service, 18 September 1965; The New York Times, 12 September 1965, p.3.

seems that Turkey made much more military equipment available, but problems of logistics were such that it could not be transported to Pakistan in time to be decisive in the fighting. When the war began Turkey apparently sent to Pakistan all its available stock from its own armaments industry, including an estimated \$150m. worth of equipment on order to West Germany.¹ There were reports of truckloads of Turkish guns coming through Iran, and a ship bound from Istanbul to Karachi, held up at Suez at the end of September following an Indian protest, was found to be carrying explosives, mine-laying equipment and arms supplied by Turkey.² Later reports of 200 Patton tanks sold to Pakistan to fill gaps resulting from the American arms embargo have been denied by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, although the results of a US Senate Committee discussion of this matter have not yet been published.³ There are also unconfirmed reports that rockets were supplied to Pakistan by Turkey and that Turkish munitions factories

1

Interview with a Turkish official, May 1968.

2

The Times of India, 30 September 1965.

3

Ulus (Istanbul) reported in The Pulse, 7 August 1969.

were subsequently retooled to produce ammunition for the Chinese weapons which Pakistan has obtained.¹

Details of Iranian assistance during the fighting are equally imprecise. The Iranian Ambassador in New Delhi denied that Iran had decided to stop oil supplies to India, and assured the Indian Foreign Minister that the Iranian Government had not made any supplies of arms to Pakistan, only sending essential articles on humanitarian grounds.² This apparently included oil, medical supplies and a field hospital. Like the Turks, however, the Iranians were more willing to assist Pakistan to replace equipment lost when the fighting was over. An Iranian General was sent on a buying expedition to West Germany on Pakistan's behalf, arranging for the purchase of the 90 Sabre jets which were 'loaned' by Iran to Pakistan.³

In the diplomatic aftermath of the war, both Iran and Turkey made statements in the General Assembly

1

See p.392, note 1.

2

The New York Times, 15 September 1965, p.3;
The Hindu (Madras), 22 September 1965.

3

Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967.

in support of Pakistan's case.¹ Iran maintained that the conflict should be settled on the basis of self-determination. Turkey has argued that the UN resolutions on Kashmir should be implemented, and has refused to accept the Tashkent Declaration as the basis for a settlement (as the Indian Government claims it is) but at the same time the Turkish Government is in a difficult position regarding the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir, for the principle could be turned against it on the question of Cyprus, where the Turks form a minority.²

While Turkey and Iran had certain obligations as allies of Pakistan, the Arabs did not and there was no question of more than diplomatic support for Pakistan, if that.

Most of the Arab Governments, including Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria had made statements in support of self-determination in Kashmir previous to the outbreak of hostilities. Such statements were repeated

1

GAOR, Twentieth Session, speech by Hasan Isik, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1343 Plenary Meeting, 30 September 1965, p.11, and by Mahdu Vakilk, Iranian delegate, 1362 Plenary Meeting, 14 October 1965, p.13.

2

Interview with a Turkish Foreign Ministry official, August 1968.

by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan and the Sudan between 11 and 15 September.¹

The UAR, however, had given no such assurance. In view of the prestige of the Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, particularly as a summit meeting of the Arab League was due to take place at Casablanca, the stand taken by Cairo was regarded as particularly important both in New Delhi and Rawalpindi. Although Cairo radio reported the conflict, there was no official comment from the UAR Government.² In his speech to the Casablanca Conference, Nasser was non-committal, saying simply:

We live in a world fraught with tension.
We cannot confine our attention to what is happening on our own soil. We cannot here ignore the bloody clash which causes us all sorrow which is taking place between India and Pakistan.³

The final communiqué of the Casablanca Conference, however, linked the question of self-determination with that of the Indo-Pakistan dispute in a much more

1

BBCSWB, ME/1956/i, 9 September 1965; Dawn, 11 and 16 September 1965.

2

BBCSWB, ME/1955/i, 8 September 1965.

3

Ibid., ME/1960/A/2, 13 September 1965.

pro-Pakistan statement than any that had previously been issued by the Arab League. The assembled Kings and Presidents affirmed

that the causes of freedom are indivisible and that aggression against one of them is tantamount to aggression against the whole, and call once again for the renunciation of the policy of force, for the solution of international questions by peaceful means and for respect for the right of self-determination.

Accordingly they express deep anxiety at the armed dispute between India and Pakistan and call on the two states to hasten to stop the fighting and settle the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations....¹

The communiqué was welcomed in Pakistan, but Indian sources were reluctant to recognise the implications of the document. The official Indian view intimated to the Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi was that India would have preferred the Casablanca conference to adhere to the convention of not discussing Kashmir, or Indo-Pakistani differences at all. If they wanted to refer to the issue they should draw a distinction between the present conflict and the issue regarding the status of Kashmir. India would not take exception to an appeal for the

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Text of the Casablanca Communiqué, *ibid.*, ME/1964/A/1, from Rabat and Cairo, 17 September 1965.

cessation of hostilities, since it had itself agreed to such a step.¹ The Casablanca communiqué, referring as it did to 'respect for the right of self-determination' in the context of the dispute between India and Pakistan, although avoiding any explicit mention of Kashmir, nevertheless represented a diplomatic defeat for India. One Indian press report claimed that the Casablanca Summit meeting had deleted references to self-determination from the draft submitted by the Foreign Ministers. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq had apparently wanted the inclusion of a declaration that the dispute should be solved on the basis of the United Nations' resolutions and self-determination. The report claimed that President Nasser had opposed this, asking the Summit to restrict itself to an appeal for cessation of hostilities and the settlement of the dispute 'peacefully in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations', which is very nearly the same thing, and only slightly more favourable to India.² In any case, while the Casablanca communiqué

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The Times of India, 17 September 1965. PTI report.

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Ibid., 19 September 1965. If there was a Foreign Ministers' draft worded more strongly in favour of Pakistan, which was modified at Nasser's insistence, the writer has found no other reference to it.

may have been a clear propaganda victory for Pakistan, it availed that country little insofar as the diplomatic outcome of the conflict was concerned.

The only Arab state in a position to assist the Pakistan case in any practical sense was Jordan, during 1965 a member of the Security Council, though as a non-permanent member its influence could be only marginal. Just as the activities of the UAR in the Security Council debate of 1962 had a tremendous effect on public opinion in Pakistan, despite the fact that it was the Soviet veto which killed the resolution Pakistan favoured, so the activities of Jordan on Pakistan's behalf, while in no way decisive, had the effect of raising Pakistani morale.

The Jordanian representative supported the Pakistan argument that the Council was called upon to propose practical means for settling the question, and that it should uphold the principle of self-determination as embedded and reaffirmed in all its past pronouncements on the problem.¹ He argued against the interpretation

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Speech by the Jordanian delegate, Abdul Monem Rifa'i, 1241 Meeting, 18 September 1965, SCOR, Twentieth Year.

of the 6 September resolution¹ which called on the parties to 'promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965' as 'marking the beginning of aggression by Pakistan against India' as suggested by the Indian delegate, maintaining that no judgment was implied in this resolution. This view was not accepted by the Malaysian delegate whose pro-Indian stand ultimately led to a break in diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Malaysia, further evidence of the store placed by Pakistan on the stand taken in the Security Council by Muslim members. When the 20 September resolution (which reiterated the demands of the earlier resolutions but continued to separate the questions of ceasefire and political settlement) came to the vote, Jordan, along with the USSR, abstained.²

At the end of October the Security Council resumed its discussion of the Indo-Pakistan question and Jordan again entered the fray, this time on procedural questions, in support of Bhutto who wished to discuss the internal situation in Kashmir which the Indian delegate claimed

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Resolution 210(1965), (S/662), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1965, SCOR, Twentieth Year.

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Resolution 211(1965), (S/6694), *ibid.*

was out of order. The argument continued to the point where the President of the Security Council decided to adjourn the meeting.

Since Jordanian action had little more than nuisance value nothing would be gained by going into the further detail on the Security Council debates which, in any case, were inconclusive: this is simply to illustrate the teamwork that took place between Pakistan and Jordan, and to point out, by reference to Pakistan's reaction to the actions of Malaysia, the weight attached to this by Pakistan.

7. Conclusion

If anything emerges from the discussion it is that the role of the Middle Eastern countries in the Kashmir dispute is at the most marginal, regardless of the policy followed by them. The great powers alone are able to influence developments, and then only when their policies tend to reinforce one another. In the war of September 1965, for example, United States suspension of military aid and the Chinese threat of intervention helped end hostilities, and Soviet diplomacy later brought the two parties together to negotiate the Tashkent agreement. For the most part Pakistan had the moral support of the Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Iran, and even Afghanistan (which took exception to reports of Indian air attacks on 'Pushtunistan' and was

said to be in sympathy with Pakistan's objectives).¹ Although this represented a propaganda gain and helped to raise Pakistani morale, it did not assist them in any way to gain their objective of bringing about a plebiscite in Kashmir, the possibility of which is as remote as ever. Insofar as Pakistan's objective is to keep the Kashmir issue alive and to mobilise international opinion, the implied reference to Kashmir in the Casablanca Communiqué and the support of the Jordanian delegate to the Security Council represented important achievements.

It is also clear that no one, not even Turkey or Iran, was willing to involve itself in the conflict, or to take any more risks than necessary in order to aid Pakistan. Within the limits imposed by other international obligations and interests Turkey and Iran did their utmost to support Pakistan during the 1965 war. It so happened, however, that the international obligations of both of them precluded their giving Pakistan the only assistance that may have been decisive: the immediate use of jet fighters and pilots. While Turkey calculated that India had already been antagonised, it was not at that stage willing to run foul of the

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BBCSWB, FE/1961/A3/4, Part 3, Far East, Kabul radio in English, 14, 23 and 25 September 1965.

United States by handing over NATO equipment to Pakistan. The same is true of Iran: the loan of the Sabre jets took place after the fighting had stopped. By the time it became known sufficient time had passed to considerably lessen US disapproval. Certainly Turkey sold arms to Pakistan when they were required, but for hard currency which Pakistan could ill-afford.

So far as Pakistan's cultivation of the Arab countries, especially the UAR, is concerned, while it brought propaganda advantages it also created difficulties in Pakistan's relations with Iran. At the same time the question of Cyprus, although never made a touchstone by either the UAR or Syria (the two states most strongly in support of Makarios), represented another issue on which Pakistan's declared policy brought it into disagreement with other friends. Even remaining aloof from Arab disputes was no easy matter so long as President Nasser and King Feisal were virtually at war in the Yemen. As the Saudi King and the Shah draw together with the object of keeping outside powers out of the Gulf, this dilemma will not diminish. For this reason Pakistan has been cautious about Feisal's proposal, made in 1966, for an Islamic summit conference, a suggestion strongly opposed by President Nasser.

At the same time, in 1965, there was a realisation in Pakistan that the Arab countries, and especially

the UAR, had done all that could be reasonably expected of them. That it was not enough was also clear. What emerges is that neither Pakistan on the one hand nor the states of the Middle East are in a position to render each other effective assistance, as the continued existence of both the Kashmir and Palestine questions demonstrates.

CHAPTER IXThe Palestine Question: Pakistan's
Involvement in an Arab Problem1. Introduction

The Palestine question is essentially an Arab problem, but one with which Pakistan has identified itself. This involvement has produced a conflict between sentimental attachment to the Arabs and the pragmatic requirements of foreign policy. It is a product of the history of the Muslims of the subcontinent, and of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the creation of Pakistan, which serve to reinforce and perpetuate the emotional attachment that the Muslims of India developed for the Muslim world, and the Arab Muslim world in particular. It is a unique issue in Pakistan foreign policy in that the Palestine policy was formed long before Pakistan itself came into being, the only case where newly independent Pakistan had, in August 1947, an articulate policy. It has continued as an issue of primary concern, perhaps more with the public than with the Government, for in the actual conduct of foreign policy other considerations have become progressively more important. Nevertheless, the statement that, Kashmir excepted, 'no issue that has ever come up before the United Nations has so stirred the people of Pakistan,

or has called forth such exertions from its representatives, as the question of Palestine'¹ is an accurate assessment of its importance. Another Pakistani, a senior official, told a European friend during the Arab-Israel war in June 1967: 'You must not expect us to be rational over Palestine.'

Many Pakistanis, deeply conscious of their identity as Muslims, tend to glorify the Arabs and Arab history and culture as the source of their religion. This emphasis is found among the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent perhaps because, almost alone in the Muslim world, they were surrounded by a non-Muslim majority and ruled by a non-Muslim colonial power. These factors contributed to a sense of insecurity which led them to place far more importance on their religion than did the Arabs, who for the most part took it for granted. The emphasis placed on religion by Pakistanis (from time to time irritating to their Muslim allies) may also arise from the fact that, being somewhat isolated from the rest of the Muslim world, they felt a need to prove themselves 'proper' Muslims. The fact that this need

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K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, prepared for the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Manhattan Publishing Co.: New York, 1960), p.165.

has apparently never been felt by the Iranians, although as members of an unorthodox sect they have frequently been regarded as something less than true Muslims by the purists of the Arabian peninsula, perhaps points to an uncertain sense of national identity among Pakistanis. Iranians are secure in the knowledge that Iran existed long before Islam, but for Pakistan Islam is the raison d'être, the foundations and the mortar without which the entire edifice would never have been constructed. Unquestioned support of Arab causes, of which the principal one is Palestine, is therefore an extension into the foreign policy field of the preoccupation with the Islamic basis of the state which in Pakistan is an essential part of the nation-building process.

This has over the years posed a number of problems for the Government of Pakistan. Egypt, particularly since Colonel Nasser came to power, has arrogated to itself the leadership of the Arab world. Egyptian leadership has not always been accepted by the other Arab countries, thus raising the question of which Arabs Pakistan should support. In the context of Palestine this is perhaps less important since the Arab states are in general agreement on this issue. When Pakistanis complain of Arab ingratitude, as they do from time to time, it is usually Egyptian ingratitude to which they refer. At the same time, Pakistan's consistent support of the Arabs has periodically produced strains in its

alliance with Turkey and Iran, neither of which is prepared to give such unqualified approval to Arab policy on Palestine, particularly in its Egyptian manifestations. The history of Pakistan's Palestine policy is therefore an illustration of the tightrope-walking in which it has been forced to engage by the demands of ideology and sentiment on the one hand and considerations of strategy and political affinity on the other, a dilemma which has grown more pressing and more obvious with the passage of time.

2. The Palestine Policy of the All-India Muslim League

As mentioned earlier,¹ throughout the 1914-18 war the Muslims of India had suffered the agony of divided loyalty, for the Government of India was at war with the Ottoman Empire, the seat of the Caliphate. When the fighting ended, they were anxious for the preservation of Turkey and of the Caliphate, and particularly anxious that the Jaziratu'l-'Arab, the holy land, in which they included Palestine, should not fall into the hands of a non-Muslim ruler. They were therefore opposed from the first to the British Mandate. Initially the campaign of opposition was carried on by the Khilafat movement, in which the Muslim League was not formally involved, although Jinnah did give support to its aims and objectives.

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See Chapter I.

At the time, however, the full implications of the Mandate were not appreciated in India, or for that matter anywhere except Palestine itself. It was a Class A Mandate, which meant that speedy development towards independence was an obligation of the Mandatory Power. At the same time, the League of Nations stipulated that Britain, to whom the Mandate was given, should implement the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. In effect the terms of the Mandate were impossible to implement, unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to accept the Balfour Declaration, which they refused to do. It was soon obvious that if Britain took steps towards instituting self-government in Palestine, giving the Arab majority control of their own affairs, they would be unable to guarantee the establishment of a National Home for the Jews. Meanwhile, as Jewish migration to Palestine increased, the Arabs began to fear that Britain would withhold self-government until a Jewish majority was established. They therefore pressed for an end to migration, and immediate self-government. In 1922 al-Hajj Muhammed Amin al-Husayni, who held the lifetime office of Mufti of Jerusalem (frequently referred to as the Grand Mufti) was elected President of the Supreme Muslim Council.¹ In his efforts to gain his political

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See J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (W.W. Norton: New York, 1950), ch.4, 'The Political Structure of the Arab Community'.

objectives, an end to Jewish migration and the sale of land to Jews, together with self-government with majority rule for Palestine, al-Hajj Amin was anxious to obtain the support of as many people outside Palestine as possible. In this connection he visited India in 1932. It seems likely that he was aware of the kind of pressure the 80 million Muslims of India could exert on the British Government, already feeling the strain of an increasingly restive Indian nationalism. He was no doubt also aware that the British Government was anxious not to antagonise the Indian Muslims and that it was sensitive to pressure from this quarter. In any case, the Grand Mufti's efforts at arousing Indian Muslim awareness of the problem of Palestine were apparently quite effective.¹ The result was a Resolution passed by the All-India Muslim League at its Delhi session in November 1933:

This Session of the All-India Muslim League places on record its emphatic protest against the British Government in trying to make Palestine the national home of the Jews and requests His Excellency the Viceroy to represent to His Majesty's Government the feelings of the Muslims of India that the Balfour Declaration be immediately withdrawn

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Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew It (privately published in Karachi, 1966, also serialised in Muslim World (organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami), 21 May - 9 July 1966).

as it is opposed to the fundamental rights of the people entrusted to their control.¹

By 1936 the Palestinian Arabs had made no progress towards their main objectives, and in April that year the Arab Higher Committee was formed under the presidency of the Grand Mufti in an attempt to unite the various Arab factions. The Arab Higher Committee's first action was to call a strike in order to achieve the objectives referred to above and put forward by the Arab delegation which had gone to London in 1930, only to return empty handed. The atmosphere precluded any possibility of constitutional change, at least in the opinion of the British Government, and in July 1936 a Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the situation in Palestine. It met with an Arab boycott until shortly before its scheduled return to England, when the Arab Higher Committee in response to a joint Iraqi-Saudi appeal agreed to appear before it.²

In its report, published in July 1937, the Royal Commission declared that the terms of the Mandate were incompatible, that promises to Jews and Arabs were

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Quoted, *ibid.*

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For detailed discussion of these developments, see Hurewitz, ch.5, 'Arab Revolt and Partition Proposal'.

contradictory and that the Mandate was unworkable, the first such official admission. It suggested that the partition of Palestine was the only possible solution. In a White Paper published at the same time the British Government supported this proposal, which was acceptable neither to the Jews nor the Arabs.

Interest among the Indian Muslims was mounting. An Indian Muslim delegate to the Imperial Conference in London in May-June 1937 had put the Arab case over Palestine in strong terms. In its Lucknow Session in October 1937, the All-India Muslim League came out equally firmly against the idea of partition, declaring

...in the name of the Mussalmans of India that recommendations of the Royal Palestine Commission and the subsequent statement of policy represented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament conflict with their religious sentiments and in the interests of world peace demands its rescission without further delay....¹

A Partition Commission sent to Palestine was unable to devise a suitable scheme. In the face of mounting opposition the partition proposal was dropped. Instead

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Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 1924-December 1943 (bound volume of photostats in the possession of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad).

it was proposed to call a conference of Jewish and Arab representatives, as well as the representatives of the Arab States, in London. The Indian Muslims made a bid to send representatives to the Conference also. In July the Muslim League declared that Palestine Day would be held on 26 August when Muslim organisations would hold meetings condemning 'the unjust repressive and inhuman policy that is pursued by the British and offer prayers for the complete success of our Arab brethren in their honourable and just struggle for freedom of their country.' At the same time a committee was appointed to consider the question of sending an influential deputation abroad, especially to Palestine and England. The committee was directed to consider ways and means by which effective pressure could be brought to bear upon the British Government and to advise the Muslim League Council with regard to the question of the boycott of British goods.

It was decided to send Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Maulana Irfan to attend the Palestine Conference in Cairo in October 1938, called by the Egyptian premier Allouba Pasha to discuss Arab demands in connection with Palestine. The Indian delegates remained in Cairo for about a month, at the end of which time it was decided that Khaliquzzaman and Siddiqi should go on to London to attend the London Conference on Palestine. On arrival in London they were, however, told by the

Colonial Secretary that as British Indian subjects they would not be allowed to attend the conference. Khaliquzzaman later wrote that they had wanted to return to India but were persuaded to remain by Allouba Pasha. They kept the Muslim League informed of developments, and a resolution was adopted at its Patna session in December 1938 accusing the British of using sympathy for the Jews as a pretext for incorporating Palestine within the British Empire, and frustrating the idea of an Arab federation and possible Muslim unity. The holy places of Palestine were to be used, the resolution claimed, as 'aerial and naval bases for their future military activities.' If Jewish immigration was not stopped and the Grand Mufti not included in the Arab delegation then the proposed conference would be a farce.¹

In London the disappointed Muslim League delegation made another attempt, in a statement submitted to the Secretary of State for India, to have its views on Palestine recognised by the British Government. When the conference finally opened in February 1939, parallel discussions took place, since the Arabs refused to recognise the Jewish Agency and would not participate in discussions with the Jewish delegation. The positions of the Jews and the Arabs were unchanged, but by this

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Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 1924-December 1943.

time the British Government was more inclined to make concessions to the Arab view. The international situation was such that Jewish collaboration with the Axis Powers was out of the question, while the Arabs had displayed no such reluctance. In the context of Palestine, the British felt they could afford to concentrate on removing Arab grievances and securing Arab cooperation, ignoring for the time being the likely effect of this policy on the United States.

The proposals put forward in the White Paper following the conference envisaged progress towards self-government over a ten year period. Jewish immigration was to continue for five years, after which Arab consent would be necessary. Certain restrictions were placed on the sale of land to Jewish immigrants. These proposals were unacceptable to the Jews and, indeed, considering the particularly terrible plight of the Jews in Germany and Eastern Europe, the British decision was open to much criticism. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations declared that the White Paper was incompatible with the terms of the Mandate. Nor were the proposals totally acceptable to the Arabs, who objected to any recognition of Jewish rights in Palestine. The British proposals were rejected by the Arab Higher Committee, despite the endeavours of Khaliquzzaman, who argued that the acceptance of the compromise would enable the Arabs as

a government to put an end to Jewish migration, and of the Jordanian Chief Minister, Tawfiq Pasha, who also counselled acceptance, since by this means the threat of having a Jewish majority would be removed forever.¹

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There is some evidence of Jewish pressure on the British Government and of a misunderstanding of British commitment and intention on the part of the Arabs. Hurewitz, in The Struggle for Palestine, briefly describes the progress of the conference: 'The British unfolded their proposals in two stages. At the end of February preliminary suggestions, confined to constitutional changes, were declared wholly unacceptable by the Jewish delegation, while the conditional Arab acceptance was tantamount to rejection', p.100.

Khaliquzzaman, in Only If They Knew It, deals with the proposals in more detail, obviously giving them much more weight than Hurewitz: 'In fact they [the British] assured the Arabs that the scheme of Partition of Palestine...had been given up and the British Government was contemplating establishment of a Central Government for the whole of Palestine to which, to start with, a few subjects of administration will be transferred immediately to complete this process within five years.' According to Khaliquzzaman 'we were all jubilant over the proposals, so much so that the Jews boycotted the official dinner on behalf of the British Government.' Within two days the British had gone back on their plan and 'modified it in a manner not to fix any positive date for the transfer of power from British to Palestinians although privately they extended the period of five years to ten years.' The Arabs, furious and disappointed, favoured rejection, and Khaliquzzaman's advised acceptance was ignored.

Khaliquzzaman, on leaving London, went to Rome with the intention of asking Mussolini to send military aid to the Palestinian Arabs, but before an interview could be arranged, Italy invaded Albania, a predominantly Muslim country, and the plan was abandoned. From Rome the Muslim League delegation went to Beirut where they met the Grand Mufti, and thence to Cairo where the Egyptian Prime Minister had called a second conference. Allouba Pasha offered a million pounds to Palestine 'so that the poor Arabs may not sell their lands in Palestine to the Jews,' and asked them to accept the British terms. The Mufti, consulted in Beirut by telephone, refused. This apparently surprised the Indian delegates who, 'sad and disappointed,' returned to India¹ after a nine-month absence during which they had endeavoured to make heard their views on Palestine, and had been politely ignored on all sides.

3. The Partition of Palestine and the Role of Zafrulla Khan

During the Second World War the Muslim League continued to pass resolutions on Palestine, calling on the British to give independence to the Arabs, and

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Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew It. This suggestion overlooked the fact that it was not the poor but the wealthy Arabs who were selling their land. The Mufti's continued refusal is not, therefore, surprising.

warning that delay and departure from the pledges to this effect given the Arabs by the British would arouse much resentment among the Indian Muslims.¹

On 25 September 1947 Pakistan (along with the Yemen) became a member of the United Nations, bringing extra support to the Arab group. The importance of Pakistan's participation was increased by the fact that its representative was Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, a distinguished lawyer with considerable diplomatic experience both as Indian representative to the League of Nations in 1939 and as Agent-General to China in 1942.

In April 1947, unable to find a compromise acceptable to both Jews and Arabs, Britain had handed the vexed question of Palestine over to the United Nations. In May the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was appointed. During its visit to Palestine it received cooperation from the Jewish Agency, but was boycotted by the Arab Higher Committee, who refused to recognise it. UNSCOP obtained the Arab point of view during visits to Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan. In its report, finally published on 31 August 1947, UNSCOP

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See Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 1924 to December 1943, also Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from January 1944 to December 1946 (published by Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary, All-India Muslim League, (n.d.)).

recommended that the Mandate be terminated at the earliest possible date and, itself unable to reach agreement on a solution, put forward two plans for the future of Palestine. The majority plan¹ envisaged partition into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with the city of Jerusalem separate. An alternative plan² for a federal state with Arab and Jewish areas and with the capital at Jerusalem was also put forward. When the United Nations General Assembly convened to discuss both the British decision and the UNSCOP Report, Iraq and Saudi Arabia submitted a proposal for the termination of the Mandate and the recognition of Palestine as one state. Both the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee accepted invitations to attend the meetings, but the Arab Higher Committee agreed to enter discussion only on the joint Iraqi-Saudi proposals since it recognised neither UNSCOP nor its Report. On 23 September the ad hoc Committee on Palestine comprising all the UN members was established to discuss these plans.

Two subcommittees were set up. Subcommittee I was to devise a suitable scheme for Partition, and consisted

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The majority plan was supported by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay.

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The minority plan had the support of India, Iran and Yugoslavia.

of those representatives who favoured this solution. Subcommittee II, made up of those who supported a solution along the lines of the Iraqi-Saudi proposal, was set up to recommend a suitable constitution. The representative of Colombia was elected President of Subcommittee II and Zafrulla Khan rapporteur. Subsequently the Colombian representative resigned and Zafrulla Khan was elected in his place, giving Pakistan its first opportunity to play a major role in the Palestine question.

The subcommittee divided into three working groups on legal, refugee and constitutional problems. Pakistan, Syria and Saudi Arabia made up the legal working group. It raised three important questions: Was the United Nations competent to make any decision regarding the partition of Palestine without reference to the people of Palestine? Was the concept of the national home for the Jews compatible with League of Nations objectives of self-determination and therefore was the Mandate itself legal? And, in any case, could the Mandate be said to have lapsed with the disappearance of the League of Nations? These questions, it said, should be referred to the International Court of Justice. Subcommittee II also recommended that the Mandate should be terminated and the powers of the Palestine Administration should be handed over to a unitary government, elected under a democratic constitution.

The Holy Places should be protected, as well as the rights of religious and racial minorities.¹ The proposals of Subcommittee II were all rejected, however, while on 25 November the recommendations of Subcommittee I, for partition with economic union, were with some revision accepted by the ad hoc committee. It was opposed by Pakistan and the Arab countries on the grounds that it violated the UN Charter and the principle of the right of self-determination of the population of Palestine.

The Partition plan was to come before the General Assembly on 26 November, but an adjournment was sought over Thanksgiving Eve and Thanksgiving Day. It has been argued that a number of smaller states which, on 25 November were prepared to oppose Partition, by

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'The Constitution shall recognize the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority' and 'shall ensure adequate representation in the Legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength.' It should also 'provide for adequate reflection in the Executive and the Administration of the distribution of representation in the Legislature.' Draft Resolution on the Constitution and Future Government of Palestine, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48 (Department of Public Information, United Nations: Lake Success, New York, 1949), pp.242-3.

29 November had been persuaded to vote in favour.

Those who have no access to what is going on behind the scenes have known enough from the Press to have fear in their hearts not only on this question - because this is one individual question - but that the deliberations on crucial questions of this great body, on which the hopes of the world for the future are centred, will not be left free.¹

Opposing the Plan, Sir Zafrulla said:

There are 1,300,000 Arabs in Palestine and 650,000 Jews - with room wanted for more - and the problem has become insoluble. It is said: therefore, let us divide because it would be unjust and unfair that thirty-three per cent of the population - which is the Jewish population of Palestine today - should occupy a minority status in a unitary State. Let us have a fair solution, the Arabs to have their State and the Jews to have theirs.

The boundaries were drawn accordingly. The Arab State will be an Arab State in the sense that there will be only 10,000 Jews in it and almost 1,000,000 Arabs. Very well, but what of the Jewish State? In the Jewish State there will be 498,000 Jews and 435,000 Arabs. Have you solved the problem? Jews are not to live as a minority under the Arabs, but the Arabs are to live as a minority under the Jews. If one of these is

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Speech by Zafrulla Khan, 28 November 1947, General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Second Session.

not fair then neither is the other; and if one is not a solution, the other is not.¹

He sought a delay in the final decision, in the hope that a more acceptable solution might be found. But not all Zafrulla's eloquence was enough to alter the UN decision. Partition was accepted by a vote of 33 to 13 with ten abstentions. The 13 included every single Muslim member of the UN.²

The validity of the vote was not accepted by the Arab world, or by Pakistan. In the first place, they never accepted the legal competence of the United Nations to deal with the matter, and in the second they objected to what they believed to be unfair pressures placed on some UN members by the United States to force the two-thirds majority necessary to adopt the decision, particularly as the Partition plan received only a simple majority in the ad hoc Committee.

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Ibid. Zafrulla apparently based his argument on the size of the minority in question. Pakistan was in a delicate position, however, for arguments against the partition of Palestine might well have been turned against it.

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The 13 negative votes were Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the Yemen.

The Partition Commission sent to Palestine to implement the decision found the task impossible, and Jews and Arabs shortly took to arms to settle the dispute. The result was the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. It gained widespread recognition, and was admitted to the United Nations in May the following year.

4. The 1956 Crisis

By the time the next major crisis involving the Palestine question arose, the pattern of world politics had changed in such a way as to preclude any close identity between Pakistan and Arab policy. In 1948 Pakistan had been, internationally, a free agent. By 1956 it had become deeply committed to the West, through the agreement with the United States in 1953, membership of SEATO in 1954, and in 1955 membership of the Baghdad Pact. This last, linking Pakistan in a military alliance with Iran, Turkey and Iraq, had been strongly opposed by the other Arab states, particularly by Egypt. Professions of sympathy for the Arab cause were met with reserve by Egypt, particularly as two of Pakistan's regional allies, Turkey¹ and Iran,² had

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Announced at Ankara, 28 March 1949.

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De facto recognition extended 15 March 1950.

extended recognition to Israel, and Turkey had gone so far as to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. In addition, Nasser found an affinity with Pandit Nehru whose neutralist views accorded more with his own than did the professions of Islamic brotherhood emanating from Karachi.

Although the Palestine dispute did not become directly involved in the Middle East crisis of 1956 until the end of October, it was a background issue which conditioned the actions leading up to the Sinai campaign and the behaviour not only of the Arabs but of the Pakistan Government also. In fact the Pakistani leaders appeared particularly anxious to keep the Palestine issue separate as long and as far as possible, in an effort to simplify Pakistan's position as an Arab sympathiser on the one hand and a user of the Suez Canal and an ally of Britain on the other. Pakistan initially attempted to take a neutral position, but as it became clearer that the use of force against Egypt was seriously contemplated, this position was much more difficult to sustain. Following the Anglo-French action against Egypt, it had to be abandoned, though reluctantly and too late to prevent a deterioration in relations with Egypt.

The United States decision to withdraw aid for the financing of the Aswan Dam was announced on 19 July 1956. There followed reports that the Baghdad Pact powers had

protested that the biggest single US aid project was being undertaken for a country not only neutral but from time to time actively anti-Western.¹ This was a likely enough reaction from America's allies and a means by which America could shift some of the responsibility for a decision unpopular in the Afro-Asian world. The half-hearted denial of the Pakistan Foreign Minister² that Pakistan had never been consulted when the offer was made to finance the dam, nor when it was withdrawn, and that therefore the question of Pakistani opposition to the aid did not arise, was hardly calculated to allay Arab suspicions. His earlier statement that he was sorry Egypt's project had received a set-back and that he hoped Egypt would be able to 'disentangle herself from the situation' was additional evidence of a lukewarm attitude, particularly when coupled with the remark that he neither approved nor disapproved of Egypt's neutralism, he was simply baffled by the word.³ His lack of enthusiasm was no doubt reinforced by the fact that Nasser had just concluded talks with Tito and Nehru at

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This seems at least to have been the attitude of Iraq. See Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cassell: London, 1960), p.421. See also Edwin L. Dale Jr., The New York Times, 21 July 1956, p.3.

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Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, statement to press, 27 July 1956, reported in The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1956.

3

Ibid., 23 July 1956.

Brioni, in the course of which they had reaffirmed their faith in this policy.

The report in The New York Times prompted a strong editorial attack on the Pakistan Government by The Pakistan Times, which urged that if the report were untrue Egypt and the other Arab countries should be immediately, officially informed of the fact. If, on the other hand, 'someone in the Foreign Office had blundered once again,' the Government should take steps to prevent a repetition.¹ The Government, however, disregarded the suggestion and there were no further public statements until after President Nasser's announcement of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. At the time the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was in Karachi. The Egyptian action was discussed between the Pakistani and Turkish leaders and official Pakistani sources were reported to have expressed full agreement with the position of the Turkish premier who, on departure for Ankara on 31 July, had said that 'internationalization would perhaps be better' than Egyptian control. The same day the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, said that Britain was consulting with other Commonwealth countries, including Pakistan, through 'normal diplomatic channels', but refused to

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The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1956.

comment further. It appeared that Pakistan was primarily concerned with 'safe and free' use of the Canal by all countries, and with the possibility that Egypt might use control of the Canal to obstruct traffic.¹ Since the bulk of Pakistan's trade went through the Canal, this was an issue of particular importance.² The cautious reaction of the Government was not fully endorsed in the press. The Pakistan Times maintained that fears of Egyptian interference with traffic were imaginary, and called on the Government to give full backing to the Egyptian action and to make a statement on 'British threats of force.'³

The Karachi Bar Association condemned British threats and warned 'that the people of Pakistan are in sympathy with Egypt and would do all to help her in her struggle to retain the control of the Suez Canal.'⁴ The leader of the East Pakistan Awami League (a Leftist party) and of the East Pakistan Muslim League, both

1

Ibid., 1 August 1956.

2

It remains particularly important. The closure of the Canal means for Pakistan up to two months' delay on goods coming from and going to some Mediterranean and European ports.

3

The Pakistan Times, 1 August 1956.

4

Ibid., 8 August 1956.

issued statements supporting Nasser's action.¹ After a motion to congratulate Nasser was disallowed by the Speaker, the opposition members of the West Pakistan Assembly left the chamber.² This general emotional reaction was probably reinforced by the statement of the Rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo calling for jihād to defend the Canal.³

On 4 August, without waiting for the Egyptian reaction, the Pakistan Government accepted the invitation to the Suez Canal Conference to be held in London, a decision which was interpreted as support for the Western plan for some form of internationalisation.⁴

The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, stopped in Cairo for talks with Nasser on his way to London, following which he expressed the belief that Nasser was ready to accept some organisation which would be set up to run the Canal, with Egypt in authority,⁵ despite Nasser's statement before the opening

1
Ibid., 4 August 1956.

2
Ibid., 2 August 1956.

3
Ibid., 4 August 1956.

4
Ibid., 5 August 1956.

5
Ibid., 16 August 1956.

of the conference that the proposed internationalisation of the Canal was a 'conspiracy'.¹

During the Conference the Pakistani delegation consulted with the Turkish and Iranian representatives in an endeavour to co-ordinate policy. Their attitude comprised two main points: they were anxious to see effective guarantees of the safety and continuity of their trade through the Canal, and feared that Nasser might at some time interfere with this for political purposes. This view was put forward most strongly by the leader of the Turkish delegation,² and though never explicitly stated officially by Pakistan it was generally accepted that it shared the Turkish view. In the second place the three powers were anxious to make it clear that they did not dispute Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal. This view was embodied in the amendments put forward by them, with the support of Ethiopia, to the United States proposals which envisaged

1

The phrase is Eden's. See Full Circle, p.443. Moraes of The Times of India argued that Nasser's view was that, while Egypt recognised the Canal as an international waterway, it could not be recognised as subject to international control, since this would derogate from Egypt's sovereignty. Frank Moraes, interview with Nasser, reported in The Times, 3 September 1956.

2

Dawn, 18 August 1956.

an international body, having effective sanctions to operate the Canal in conjunction with the Egyptian Government. Their amendments, which were for the most part of a technical nature, did not substantially alter the plan and were accepted by the Western powers. The Indian delegation claimed that these guarantees of Egyptian sovereignty could not be effective under such circumstances, and put forward counter proposals that the international body should be purely advisory. India did not therefore support the amended Dulles plan, which became known as the 18 Nation Proposals. The Indian Government had been in close touch with the Egyptian Government throughout the discussions, and in the light of Nasser's later rejection of the proposals, it appears that the Indians were better informed than the Pakistanis of the position of the Egyptian Government.

Egyptian displeasure with the Pakistan stand was expressed by Nasser who remarked that the Pakistan Foreign Minister had before the conference talked with him for three hours pledging support for Egypt's cause, and subsequently betrayed it at the Conference.¹ It was later suggested that pressure from the Western powers together with the influence of officials in the Pakistan

1

Interview with Frank Moraes, The Times, 3 September 1956.

High Commission in London contributed to the weakening of Chowdhury's resolve.¹

In any case, over the next few weeks the Pakistan Government shifted slightly from its pro-Western position. It was becoming clearer to the Pakistan leaders that the object of the United Kingdom was to impose a solution on Egypt, and that this was particularly unpopular among the Afro-Asian nations. With an eye to the coming United Nations debate on Kashmir, Pakistan was probably jolted by Nasser's forthright reaction to its policy, and by the obvious diplomatic capital being made by India in this regard. It was with some reluctance that Pakistan attended the second London Conference held in September, this time, following a change of Government, represented by Firoz Khan Noon as Foreign Minister. Disapproving of the proposed Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) as an attempt to impose a solution on Egypt, Pakistan, followed by Iran, withdrew from the working party set up to settle the details of SCUA. On this issue there was a definite split with Turkey which had suggested that the working party be set up.² On his return to

1

The Pakistan Times, 8 September 1956.

2

Ibid., 22 September 1956.

Karachi Noon was, however, at pains to dispel the impression that there was any weakening in the Baghdad Pact, which he declared had nothing to do with the Suez issue. Again he emphasised the economic importance of the Canal to Pakistan.¹ In answer to the internal critics of his policy, he emphasised that the days of Pan-Islamism were over and that Pakistanis should look to their own interests first. Since the Suez Canal issue had been referred to the United Nations Security Council early in October, and the chances of the use of force had receded, Pakistan was considering whether to join the Suez Canal Users' Association.²

As it turned out Noon's statement was wishful thinking. The Pakistan Government immediately condemned as aggression the Israeli invasion of Egypt which took place on 29-30 October. The position was complicated, however, when Anglo-French forces entered the Canal Zone almost immediately after. Pakistan's fear that the Palestine issue would eventually become mixed up with the question of Suez had been borne out. The Government was at first cautious. President Mirza, in Teheran, broke the silence on 1 November saying 'we have nothing but

1

Ibid., 29 September 1956.

2

Speaking in Lahore, 20 October, Dawn, 21 October 1956.

unreserved condemnation for the aggression.'¹ The following day the Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, followed his lead with an even stronger statement that if Britain and France did not accept the United Nations call to withdraw their forces immediately the rest of the world would be within their rights to join together and use force to free Egypt from the Anglo-French aggression.² Pakistan would give all possible help to Egypt 'after considering our own strength.' Shortly after, a hurried meeting of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact took place in Teheran to discuss the changed situation. In a communiqué issued on 8 November they referred to the 'regrettable' Anglo-French action and claimed credit for influencing the cease-fire decision.³ This was considerably milder than previous Pakistani or Iranian statements, and credit was given to Turkey for exerting a restraining influence on its allies. Certainly Pakistani statements were thereafter altered in tone. Noon even went so far as to say that Israel had come to stay and that it was important for

1

The Pakistan Times, 2 November 1956.

2

Ibid., 3 November 1956.

3

Text of the Communiqué, N. Frankland (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1956 (OUP: London, 1959), p.313.

the UN to fix a boundary for it.¹ Suhrawardy found it necessary to 'clarify' the Foreign Minister's statement three days later, saying that Pakistan had never recognised Israel and had no intention of so doing.² Again the Government's policy came under heavy fire at home, where on 3 November there had been violent anti-British and anti-French demonstrations in East and West Pakistan.³ The mildness of the Teheran communiqué brought another burst of rage from the Opposition parties. They demanded that Pakistan withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, or at least that Britain should be forced to leave it. The claim, confirmed by the United Kingdom, that the Baghdad Pact powers had influenced the British decision on the cease-fire, was seen as a device to shield the Pact from criticism, and at the same time enable Eden to save face.

Immediately following the Teheran conference, Suhrawardy set off on a tour of the Arab countries with the intention of explaining the stand of Pakistan and the other Baghdad Pact powers. His plan to include Cairo in his itinerary came to nothing when Nasser made

1

The Pakistan Times, 11 November 1956.

2

Ibid., 15 November 1956.

3

Ibid., 4 November 1956.

it clear that it would not be 'convenient' for him to receive the Pakistan Prime Minister at that time. Coming so soon after his refusal to have Pakistan troops included in the United Nations force to be sent to Egypt, there could be little doubt that it was his intention to snub the Pakistanis. In Pakistan there was a dual reaction to Nasser's attitude. On the one hand it was regarded 'as a sad return for all the sympathy which the people and government of Pakistan showed for Egypt in her hour of need.'¹ On the other there was a tendency to accuse the Government of permitting itself to be pushed around by Britain, and more demands were made for withdrawal from the Pacts.

The regional members of the Baghdad Pact met again, this time in Baghdad, from 19 to 22 November. It seems to have been on Iraqi and Pakistani initiative that the meeting was called, since the Iranian and Turkish leaders did not indicate their intention of attending until the last minute. The Iraq Government had also been under attack following the publication of the Teheran communiqué and there had been pro-Egyptian demonstrations in Baghdad. It seems that Pakistan and Iraq were anxious to modify the position of the Teheran communiqué, and to persuade Turkey and Iran to make some concessions to the

1

Ibid., 19 November 1956.

Arab viewpoint. The Baghdad communiqué¹ was short, and while reaffirming the earlier statement following the Teheran conference, added that the communiqué issued by the Arab Heads of State in Beirut on 15 November² was basically in agreement with their own views. This and the announcement of the Turkish decision to withdraw its diplomatic representative from Israel was seen as a shift in policy which opened the way 'for increased harmony among the Muslim countries of the region.'³

During December Suhrawardy and Noon toured Pakistan in an effort to explain their policy and gain support. Suhrawardy made it clear that he had no intention of taking Pakistan out of any of the Pacts, pointing out that during the recent war nobody had gone to the aid of Egypt who claimed to be neutral.⁴ Noon told the press: 'We are not going to commit suicide, and our first duty is to strengthen our defences.'⁵

1

Text in Documents on International Affairs, 1956, p.339.

2

Text, Muhammad Khalil, The Arabs and the Arab League: a Documentary Record, vol.II (Khayats: Beirut, 1962), p.818.

3

The Pakistan Times, 24 November 1956.

4

Ibid., 3 December 1956.

5

Dawn, 8 December 1956.

Speaking to students in Dacca, Suhrawardy said that Pakistan had not declared the UK and France aggressors, because the UN had not done so. Food, clothing and medical aid had been sent to Egypt, however, because 'one aspect of our policy is to cultivate brotherhood with Muslim countries.' But, he added:

We find that, whereas we go out in sympathy for them, there is hardly any reciprocity on the other side for us. We find that Egypt for instance, has declared that it is on the side of India on the question of Kashmir. We cannot help that.

Pakistan had to do its duty as a Muslim country whether Egypt liked it or not, but 'certain things which unfortunately Egypt has done have rather shaken our faith and made us pause a little and become a little more wise in the precipitancy of our actions....' He went on to say that he was in favour of Muslim unity, but 'the question is asked: Why don't we get together rather than be tied to a big Power like the UK or America? My answer to that is that zero plus zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero.'¹

An attempt to rationalise Pakistan's support for what appeared to be an upsurge of British imperialism,

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H.S. Suhrawardy, Address to a Meeting of Students at Salimullah Muslim Hall, Dacca, 9 December 1956, (Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan: Karachi (n.d.)).

this speech at the same time reflected the blow to Pakistani pride of Nasser's plainly expressed contempt, and also a degree of irritation that Nasser had not appreciated the extent, however limited, to which Pakistan had tried to stand up to its allies.

5. The Arab-Israel War, June 1967

The crisis leading up to the war of June 1967 and the diplomatic aftermath again demonstrate the Pakistan Government's caution and the emotionalism of the public reaction. Though the Government made statements in support of the Arabs, it seems clear that Pakistan had no intention of becoming involved in the dispute.

Despite attempts made by Ayub Khan after his seizure of power in 1958 to effect a reconciliation with President Nasser, relations with Egypt had improved only slightly. There was an exchange of visits in 1960, but in 1962 Egypt failed to support a UN resolution on Kashmir favourable to Pakistan, occasioning some bitter comment in the Pakistan press. A Pakistani diplomatic offensive followed in preparation for the UN Security Council debate in 1964, with some success, although in the 1965 war against India, Egyptian backing for Pakistan had been restricted to expressions of support couched in the mildest terms.¹ There is, however, an Arab League office

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See Chapter VIII.

in New Delhi, but none in Pakistan. In 1967, therefore, at least on the official level, there was little enthusiasm for a war which appeared to be largely of Nasser's making.

As the Israel-Syria border tension mounted through May, an official statement from the Pakistan Foreign Office condemned 'these provocative activities on the part of Israel' and reaffirmed its full support to the Arab countries 'in their efforts to defend themselves and to repel aggression.'¹ On 18 May U Thant, at Nasser's request, ordered the withdrawal of the UN force from the UAR, and his action was officially supported in the UN by the Pakistan representative. When four days later the news came through that Nasser had blockaded the Straits of Tiran, President Ayub told one of his close associates that war was inevitable.²

On 24 May the Foreign Minister, Sharifuddin Pirzada, promised that Pakistan would 'render every support to the Arab countries in their efforts to resist Israeli aggression.'³ Five days later, speaking in the National

1

The Pakistan Times, 21 May 1967.

2

Interview, Rawalpindi, May 1968.

3

The Pakistan Times, 25 May 1967.

Assembly, he reaffirmed this support, stating that in Pakistan's view the responsibility for the present crisis in the Middle East lay entirely with Israel, and denying that Israel had any right of passage in or through the Gulf of Aqaba.¹

Despite his assessment that the situation was leading inevitably to war, Ayub announced his intention to go ahead with plans for a three-day tour of Quetta and Kalat Divisions, a remote area in the south-west of West Pakistan, where he would be virtually inaccessible. The tour was to begin on 6 June. Before his departure, however, he plainly stated his position:

The recent crisis which has overtaken the Middle East is the inevitable result of the aggressive moves of Israel. On this issue, we have always given full support to the Arab viewpoint which is based on the principles of justice and right. These principles, we are confident, will overcome every other force. It is our earnest prayer that this crisis may be resolved in a peaceful manner. On such occasions, it is imperative to exercise a check on our emotions. When the issue relates to matters of principle and righteousness, it is necessary to consider with a cool mind every aspect of it, so that one could take a firm stand in support of justice.²

1

For text of statement, see *ibid.*, 30 May 1967.

2

President's First-of-the-Month broadcast, text *ibid.*, 2 June 1967.

President Nasser's special envoy arrived in Pakistan from India on 4 June, and was received by Ayub in Rawalpindi, where they had a half-hour talk. It is reported¹ that before he had time to begin Ayub offered Pakistan's support, adding that, of course, Egypt would not seek military assistance: had Pakistan in 1965 had the planes and other equipment that Egypt had in 1967, then the Indians would have been wiped off the map. The envoy later told the press that he was quite satisfied with his interview with President Ayub, and that he had not come to seek military assistance, but to explain Egypt's position. In any case, he cut short his visit to Rawalpindi and returned to Karachi, where he had long discussions with Pirzada.²

On 5 June Israel attacked Egypt, and on the following morning Ayub left for Quetta, handing over the conduct of Pakistan policy to his Foreign Minister. From Quetta he sent the following statement to the Heads of State of UAR, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria:

Israel's aggression against your country has come to me, as to all Pakistanis, as a great shock. We are watching with admiration the valour of your armed forces in defending your country. We have full confidence in

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By a source who understandably wishes to remain anonymous.

2

The Pakistan Times, 5 and 6 June 1967.

your ability not only to repel the attack, but carry the fight to the enemy's camp and deliver him crippling blows. All Pakistanis feel at one with their brethren in this crisis and wish to extend to them all possible assistance. Please feel free to call upon us for whatever material help you require and we shall do our utmost to render it within our capabilities. Our earnest prayers are with you and your people for victory.¹

Meanwhile public reaction in Pakistan was wildly and vociferously pro-Arab. In the early days of May the tone of editorials had tended to be that Israel was a grave danger to the peace of the Middle East, and it was up to the Arabs to settle their differences and put up a united front.² It was for Z.A. Suleri, a journalist with considerable prestige among many in Pakistan, to suggest that a battalion should be sent to join the Arab forces.³ Two days later another commentator boldly stated that 'the hundred million strong Muslim nation of Pakistan is ready today as it always was to give its last drop of blood in this holy "jihad".'⁴ At the same

1

Text, *ibid.*, 7 June 1967.

2

See, for example, editorials, *ibid.*, 17 and 25 May 1967.

3

Ibid., 24 May 1967.

4

Ibid., 26 May 1967.

time the Arab students in Karachi and Lahore were active, and gained ready sympathy from their Pakistani confrères. The United States Consulate-General and USIS offices in Lahore were mobbed, and an attempt was made to burn down the USIS library.¹ There were also demonstrations in Karachi. In all cases the police took measures to prevent serious damage being done.

On 29 May a move to force a debate in the National Assembly was adroitly foiled by the Government which argued that 'an adjournment motion was far too restricted by rules and regulations to be a suitable framework for full discussion.' The issue was vital and would be much better taken up during the foreign policy debate which would soon take place.² Meanwhile the National Awami Party and the Jamaat-i-Islami Party both passed resolutions supporting the Arabs. Unofficial recruiting centres were set up to enlist volunteers. It is not possible to discover the actual number which responded, but it has been suggested that, had the war not ended so quickly, Ayub may have found it difficult to resist the pressure to allow them to go and fight. Enthusiasm continued long after it became clear that Israel had won a decisive victory. The press for the

1
Ibid., 27 May 1967.

2
Ibid., 30 May 1967.

most part followed Cairo Radio reports, so that the news of the Arab defeat and the realisation of its implications took two or three days to filter through. The first reaction was bitterness against the West for supporting Israel, followed by anger against the USSR for what was felt to be a betrayal of the Arabs. It was emphasised that the error of the UAR was in placing its trust in a single great power and not following the path of neutrality!

In the diplomatic aftermath of the hostilities, under Pirzada's guidance, Pakistan gave active support to the Arab states. When the Security Council debate opened, the representatives of Israel and interested Arab countries were invited to participate in the discussion. Pakistan was also invited to take part, the only non-Arab Muslim country to seek such an invitation. In his statement to the Security Council, the Pakistan representative, Agha Shahi, criticised that body for failing effectively to check Israeli aggression. To simply call for a ceasefire without insisting on the withdrawal of forces was to perpetuate aggression. He recalled that such a withdrawal had been insisted upon in the case of the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965.¹

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Agha Shahi, Speech to Security Council, 1360 Meeting, 14 June 1967, SCOR, Twenty-Second Year.

It is said that what may be achieved by Israel's armies being permitted to remain on the soil of Egypt, Jordan and Syria is a peace of reconciliation. But we know better. It is not a peace of reconciliation which will result from permitting Israel's aggression to remain unvacated. It will be a diktat. But let me make one thing plain. We will not be a party to the imprimatur of the United Nations being lent to any scheme that, in reality, is nothing more than a plan to humiliate and coerce the Arab countries into submission.

The fate of the UN Charter was at stake, he said, and the damage done could be repaired only by taking three measures: first, Israeli aggression must be condemned; second, a demand must be made for the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the demarcation lines laid down in the Armistice Agreements, and third, when this had been completed, the Security Council should actively participate in the exploration of some means of implementing the UN resolutions relating to Palestine.

In a long statement on 22 June in the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, Pirzada defended Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran and argued that as a juridical issue it could not be regarded as justification of the use of force on the part of Israel. He pointed out that the call for a cease-fire came when Israel had accomplished most of its objectives, and was not accepted by Israel until these objectives had unquestionably been gained. Since there was no

accompanying demand for a withdrawal of Israeli forces, the United Nations had in effect countenanced the aggression.

He also raised the question of Israel's proposal to annex the Arab sector of Jerusalem, against which Pakistan had protested in a letter to the Secretary-General on 16 June. 'If Israel can invade and keep Jerusalem, why should not every other State invade and keep whatever territory it may covet?'

The root of the problem, he concluded, was that Palestine was the only former mandated territory where the principle of self-determination was totally disregarded, resulting in three wars in two decades. 'A lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be based on the perpetuation of injustice. The wrongs done to the Arabs must be righted. Only thus will conditions be created for a just and durable peace in the region.'¹

Pakistan was one of the co-sponsors of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned resolution calling for the withdrawal (under UN supervision) of the Israeli forces to their positions before 5 June. Another draft resolution, sponsored by the Latin American countries, was opposed by Pakistan on the grounds that it linked

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Sharifuddin Pirzada, speech to General Assembly, 1531 Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1967, GAOR, Fifth Emergency Special Session.

the withdrawal of Israeli forces with other questions at issue between the parties, whereas the withdrawal should be unconditional if it was to be in accordance with the UN Charter. This Pakistan regarded as the minimum requisite for any peace settlement.

In maintaining its troops in areas under the jurisdiction of other Member States, Israel is continuing to use force and to violate the Charter. But in withholding recognition from a State which has not fulfilled the conditions attached to its establishment by the United Nations, the Arab States are not violating the Charter.

Some may think - we do not - that they are wrong in doing so. But, in making them renounce what they deeply and passionately consider their national rights, the Latin American draft resolution would subject them to coercion. Can, and should, recognition be coerced, extorted or imposed by military occupation of the territories of non-recognizing States? That is the question we have to answer. The Latin American draft resolution, we fear, lends its authority and sanction to the imposition of recognition.¹

When the draft resolutions came before the Assembly for a vote, neither gained the necessary two-thirds majority.

1

Pirzada, speech to General Assembly, 1546 Plenary Meeting, 3 July 1967, *ibid.*

Pakistan did, however, play a considerable part in the passage of two, more limited, resolutions. One was the 'Humanitarian Assistance' Resolution.¹ The other, relating to the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem, was sponsored by Pakistan, along with Iran, Turkey, Guinea, Niger and Mali, and introduced by Pirzada on 4 July. It called on Israel to rescind all measures taken to absorb Old Jerusalem and to refrain from taking any further measures which would alter the status of the city. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the situation and the implementation of the resolution within a week of its adoption.² The Assembly then went into recess, reconvening on 12 July to hear the Secretary-General's report, which consisted of a letter from the Israeli Foreign Minister refusing to rescind any of the measures taken regarding Jerusalem. A new resolution, introduced by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, along with Afghanistan, Guinea, Mali and Somalia, deplored the Israeli reply and repeated the demands made in the earlier Resolution.³

1

Resolution No.2252.

2

Resolution No.2253, introduced by Sharifuddin Pirzada, 1548 Plenary Meeting, 4 July 1967, *ibid.*

3

Resolution No.2254, introduced by Agha Shahi, 1554 Plenary Meeting, 14 July 1967, *ibid.*

During the following week no progress was made and on 21 July a procedural resolution to return the matter to the Security Council was adopted. This resolution, regarded as a victory for Israel, was supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, opposed by all the Arab countries as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan, while Turkey, Iran and Israel abstained.¹ Dawn summed up Pakistan's view of this resolution as follows:

The emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, called to consider the Middle East crisis, has ended in a failure. It failed to call a spade a spade; it failed to secure the vacation of aggression; it failed even to condemn Israel for spurning the Assembly's near-unanimous call for annulling its annexation of Jordanian Jerusalem; in short, it failed to promote the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East.

The next effective UN move came on 22 November when the Security Council unanimously adopted a British resolution² calling for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory and the

termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political

1

Resolution No.2256. See The Times, 22 July 1967; Dawn, 24 July 1967.

2

Security Council Resolution No.242(1967).

independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

Freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area was to be guaranteed and a just settlement of the refugee problem to be achieved. The Secretary-General was requested to appoint a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to set about implementing these conditions. Although Syria rejected the resolution outright, the UAR, Israel and Jordan were persuaded to accept it, though each reserved the right to its own interpretation. The November 22 Resolution represented a failure for Pakistani diplomacy, which aimed at separating the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the question of belligerency, recognition and freedom of navigation. By the same token it represented a concession on the part of those Arab countries who had at least tacitly accepted it.¹

Pakistan found itself broadly in agreement with its allies Iran and Turkey over the issue, but there were

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Nasser, wary of too apparent agreement, called for a summit meeting of Arab leaders to discuss the resolution. While reaffirming his refusal to recognise Israel, saying that Israeli evacuation of the occupied territory was not subject to negotiation, Nasser was careful to leave the door open for discussion. The New York Times, 24 November 1967, p.13 L.

significant differences in emphasis. In contrast with Pakistan's whole-hearted expressions of sympathy for the Arabs and determination to see a solution favourable to them, both Turkey and Iran were more cautious.

During May 1967 the Arab states made an effort to obtain a statement of support from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. They had to be content with a statement which, while referring to the 'present close relations between Turkey and the Arab countries,' emphasised its belief 'in the necessity of refraining from all actions likely to lead to the violation of peace.'¹

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Caglayangil, assured the Arab Ambassadors that Turkey would not allow NATO bases to be used against them and that Turkish troops would not be concentrated on the Syrian frontier.² With this they had to be content. In any case it represented an advance in their relations with Turkey.

Following the outbreak of the war in June, the Prime Minister, Demirel, on being asked what measures Turkey would take, replied: 'What measures do you want? Turkey is not in the armed conflict that she should take

1

The Pulse (Ankara), 29 May 1967.

2

Statement, 2 June 1967, reported *ibid.*, 5 June 1967.

measures. It is obvious how the obligations of the State are run. The public knows very well what our commitments are.'¹

In the United Nations Turkey joined the call for Israeli withdrawal, but the tone of Caglayangil's speech differed markedly from that of Pirzada.

We have always stated that we consider inadmissible the use of force for the settlement of international disputes, for territorial aggrandizement, or for obtaining an advantageous position in negotiation. Nor can we accept faits accomplis as bases for the elaboration of settlements....The General Assembly must, therefore, insist that the Israeli forces evacuate the territories which they have occupied.

He concluded by saying: 'It is true that our ultimate objective should be to reach an over-all settlement which will enable us to achieve a lasting and firmly based peace in the Middle East.' This was a veiled hint that concessions should also be forthcoming from the Arabs. On the annexation of Jerusalem, however, which the Muslim world took to heart more thoroughly than any other Israeli action, Turkey and Iran both supported the Pakistani resolution. Caglayangil told the General Assembly: 'In particular, it must not confront the world with a fait accompli in Jerusalem. I must remind

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Ibid., 6 June 1967.

the Government of Israel of the very close interest of the Turkish people in the Holy Places in that city....¹ While the Turkish Government was giving carefully phrased support to the Arab case, the Turkish press, with a much more rugged tradition than that of the press of either Iran or Pakistan, gave them scant sympathy. The most common reaction seemed to be that Turkey should remain neutral, and as far as possible prevent hostilities from spreading. It was essentially a great power confrontation in which Turkey should not become involved. Underlying this was admiration for Israeli determination and military efficiency, coupled with a tendency to despise and distrust the Arab countries.²

At the official level there was difficulty involved in commitment of any kind, because of that element of contempt for the Arabs in Turkish opinion, together with a long period of relatively close cooperation with Israel. At the same time Turkey had recently attempted to improve its relations with the Arab states. Some diplomatic support for them was therefore necessary.

1

Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, speech to General Assembly, 1532 Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1967, GAOR, Fifth Emergency Special Session.

2

Cumhuriyet, Milliyet (both Istanbul), Son Havadis (Ankara), reported in The Pulse, 19 June 1967.

The Iranian position was also more restrained than that of Pakistan, for relations between the Shah and President Nasser have always been strained. At the outbreak of hostilities the Shah returned hurriedly from a European tour and stopped over in Ankara for brief talks with President Sunay, after which it was announced that Turkey and Iran had reached full agreement on their Middle East policies. On the question of oil the Shah said that Iran did not sell to Israel but to foreign oil companies which Iran could not control.¹ Egyptian attempts, through Pakistan, to persuade the Shah not to sell oil to Israel were apparently without effect.

Some days later the Shah returned to Turkey on a state visit. Rumours that no communiqué would be issued because of a disagreement on the Middle East situation were squashed when the document was presented for approval to the two Heads of State on 20 June. Their statement on the Middle East was restrained. They were in agreement. They were against gaining territory or political advantage by the use of force. They confirmed their friendship for the Arabs and the importance they attached to 'the protection of their legitimate rights,'

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Ibid., 8 June 1967.

but omitted any mention of what they considered these rights to be.¹

The pattern of the 1956 crisis was repeated when the three Heads of State met at a hurriedly arranged conference at Ramsar in Iran at the end of July. It is not clear on whose initiative they met, but it seems likely that the existence of policy differences, particularly over the Middle East, had much to do with the decision. Before the conference opened, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman said that the meeting had been planned for some time and should not be a surprise to anyone. 'There is considerable agreement between the three countries on the Middle East situation,' he said, adding that 'each country, however, has its sovereign right to take its own position on such issues.'² It is likely that the Shah took the opportunity of expressing his distaste for the extravagant press campaign being carried on in Pakistan, where the slightest statement in Iran favourable to the Arabs was exaggerated to imply Iranian backing.

Whatever attempts the Pakistan Government may have made to persuade its allies to take a firmer pro-Arab

1

Ibid., 22 June 1967.

2

The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1967.

line were not successful, at least as reflected in the Joint Communiqué issued on 31 July, which simply said that a withdrawal of the Israeli forces was essential for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and reiterated 'their firm opposition to the measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem....'¹

On his return to Pakistan, President Ayub told the press:

We had two days of useful discussions about the Middle East situation as well as our mutual problems. It was a very useful opportunity. We had not met each other for a long time and we now understand each other's point of view. One way or the other, it has been a profitable visit indeed.²

6. Conclusion

Pakistan continued to give diplomatic support to the Arabs, but the emotionalism which dominated the scene before and during the June 1967 war was tempered somewhat. Pirzada, a devout Muslim, was known to be sympathetic to the Arab cause, and at the same time was inexperienced in diplomacy. It appears that Ayub, after

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Text, RCD News, vol.3, no.19, July 1967.

2

The Pakistan Times, 1 August 1967.

himself having set the limits, was content to leave conduct of foreign policy during the crisis to his Foreign Minister. The demands of internal public opinion were thereby satisfied, and Ayub himself remained in the background. Pirzada's subsequent resignation points to the possibility that his enthusiasm, useful at the height of the crisis, had by the end of 1967 become something of an embarrassment to the President. As early as January 1968 it was known that Pirzada had submitted his resignation, although he was not replaced until 1 May (when Arshad Hussain was appointed Foreign Minister). There was a change of tone in many of the articles written about the Palestine issue, and for the first time there appeared to be a frank appraisal of the situation and of Arab shortcomings, rather than an uncritical acceptance of the view that Arab defeat was the result of Western interference on behalf of Israel.¹

Palestine remains, however, an issue on which, though policy may be modified in some respects, the popular attachment to the Arabs would make it impossible for any government to substantially change its course. Official statements tend to be vague about proposals for a

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See articles by H.K. Burki in The Pakistan Times, also Pakistan Horizon, vol.20, no.3 (the journal of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), which is devoted entirely to the Middle East crisis.

settlement of the dispute. They are confined to condemnation of Israel and exposition of the Arab case, and it is unlikely that Pakistan would take any lead in seeking a compromise solution.

Differences remain over the Palestine question with Pakistan's allies, Turkey and Iran. Pakistan's attempts to persuade them to take a more pro-Arab view have met with minimal success. Since Pakistan has disengaged to some extent from its previously total commitment to the Western pacts, and since for reasons of its own Turkey is seeking a rapprochement with the Arab states (some Pakistanis claim credit for this change of policy in Turkey), the objectives of these two countries in respect of Palestine are probably closer now than at any time in the past. Changes however are only marginal, since Turkish public opinion is as strongly anti-Arab as Pakistani opinion is sympathetic. In the recent crisis there were probably bigger differences with Iran, and rather than persuading Iran to take a more pro-Arab position, it has been suggested that Iran had more success in persuading Pakistan to take a quieter (if no less firm) course. Iran's growing neutrality has not brought it very much closer to the Arab position. Its system of government is frequently under fire from the 'progressive' Arab states, and the Shah has been a target of personal attack from Nasser and others. In addition, Iran's interest in the Persian

Gulf is a source of rivalry and suspicion between itself and the Arab Gulf states, as well as Egypt, although Egypt's potential for interference has been reduced somewhat since June 1967.

While the difficulties inherent in the situation have diminished a little since 1956, the Pakistan Government is still called upon to perform a delicate balancing act between the demands of Pakistan's alliance with Turkey and Iran and a sentimental attachment to the Arab cause, accentuated by internal pressure from the powerful traditional religious groups.

CONCLUSION

In the modern world Pakistan is a rare phenomenon: a state established purely on the basis of the religious convictions of the majority of its inhabitants in order to protect them against the threat of cultural and political suffocation as a minority in a wider community with different and incompatible beliefs.¹ Before Partition it was generally accepted by those who supported it that Pakistan would be an Islamic state. This phrase meant different things to the Westernised, secularist leaders of the Muslim League and to the orthodox ulema, who insisted on a voice in framing a constitution for the new State. Their inability to agree on what constituted an Islamic state, together with provincial rivalry within the country, kept Pakistan without a constitution until 1956.

Under its first Constitution it was known as 'The Islamic Republic of Pakistan'. The word 'Islamic' was dropped by President Ayub Khan in the Constitution

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A parallel with Israel can be drawn to some extent, but differences in the size of the two countries, and in the conduct of foreign policy by each, prevent the analogy from being carried further than the establishment of both states.

promulgated by him in 1962, but he was forced by pressure of opinion in Pakistan to replace it in December the following year, and Pakistan became once again an 'Islamic Republic'. The Constitution declared that 'the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed in Pakistan', and that 'the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.'¹ Exactly how they should do this is often a matter for heated debate.

It is sometimes argued that 'Islam has had little, if any, noticeable influence upon the reasoning, planning, decision-making, or expression of Muslim policy-makers',² and that a Muslim statesman, 'however

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The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan Press: Karachi, 1962), p.1. This phrase (my italics) was included under the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963. Dawn, 28 December 1963. The Constitution was abrogated by President Yahya Khan in April 1969, but there is no reason to believe that the pressures which produced these aspects of earlier Constitutions have substantially altered.

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Fayez A. Sayegh, 'Islam and Neutralism', in J. Harris Proctor, Islam and International Relations (Pall Mall Press: London, 1965), p.61.

nonsecular his approach to internal national affairs... is bound to act in international affairs as though he were secularly oriented.'¹

In terms of discussion of Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East this is not strictly correct. As Islam has from 1947 to the present been thought to have a definite role in the government of the country, it is also thought to have a place in the conduct of foreign policy. The Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 both contained a clause committing the Government to preserve and strengthen the 'bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries.' At the time of Partition it was a genuinely and widely held belief in Pakistan that Islam could be a force in international affairs, and that the objective of Muslim solidarity was one which could and should be pursued. This concept was, however, open to as many interpretations as the concept of the Islamic State itself. The Government of Pakistan, in 1947, was in the hands of the Muslim League leaders, men who had generally either been educated in Britain, or at least within the British system, and who therefore tended to have a Western outlook and approach to the problems of government. Many held the rather romantic view that Islam comprehends all that is good

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Ibid., p.93.

in the West, including democracy, and insisted that Islam is adaptable to modern conditions.¹ As a result of their vagueness on theological questions, the religious enthusiasm which surrounded the birth of Pakistan placed the orthodox groups in a strong position to influence the Government, including its foreign policy (a matter to which the Muslim League had paid scant attention), and particularly as this policy affected relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East.

Concepts of Muslim solidarity propounded in Pakistan in the years immediately after Partition were heavily coloured by other concepts of unity and international cooperation current at the time. The example of the British Commonwealth probably influenced the thinking of many Pakistani leaders. The Prime Ministers' meeting of October 1948 was attended for the first time by the leaders of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, giving rise to much optimism regarding the future of the Commonwealth. The United Nations, the Charter of which declared its faith in 'the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small', and which provided a forum for international discussion, was also an

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Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1961), p.7.

organisation which appeared to have a hopeful future. The end of the 1940s saw the development of two major ideologically based power blocs in world politics - one Soviet-Communist, the other Western-Capitalist. In addition, the Arab League had been established in 1945. Each of these four types of institution appeared to influence the various proposals for Muslim solidarity put forward at the time. Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman variously referred to his Islamistan project as an Islamic union with an Assembly in which all participating countries, regardless of size or population would have one vote,¹ as a 'World Muslim League',² a Middle East bloc,³ and an enlarged Arab League.⁴ The idea of a Muslim bloc had a special appeal to Pakistan, where neither of the major ideologies appeared attractive, and the alternative of non-alignment had been pre-empted by Pakistan's international rival, India. It seemed to many in Pakistan that the Muslim nations of the world provided ready material for another world bloc, to which

1

Dawn, 8 October 1948.

2

Ibid., 10 October 1948.

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid., 30 October 1948.

Pakistan would automatically belong, and in which it might even take a leading part. It would have the additional advantage of excluding India. Liaquat Ali Khan was among those who supported this idea.¹

Ghulam Mohammed had a similar idea in mind when he took part in the establishment of the International Islamic Economic Conference. Although the object of the organisation was to overcome the economic backwardness which weakened the Muslim countries, there was an underlying assumption that, if economically strong and united, they would be able to make their collective voice heard and impose their will with regard to relevant international problems such as Palestine and Kashmir.

In a more limited form, the concept of Muslim solidarity was embodied in proposals to hold conferences to discuss Muslim affairs, such as those held by the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami, or World Muslim Congress, a body which originated and disintegrated before the establishment of Pakistan but which was revived by a group of Pakistanis in 1949. As a medium for discussing matters of cultural and intellectual interest to Muslims,

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'Id al-Fitr address, 6 July 1951, The Islamic Review, September 1951, referred to above, Chapter II, p.85.

the Conferences held in 1949 and 1951 in Karachi (and in Baghdad in 1962 and Mogadishu in 1965) might have been useful. Resolutions adopted in support of the Arabs in Palestine and Pakistan over Kashmir were not backed by any power on the part of the delegates involved, for the most part Islamic scholars and dignitaries, and were therefore no more than unofficial expressions of opinion.

One attempt made by the Pakistan Government to convene an official Muslim Prime Ministers' conference in the Middle East in 1952 collapsed, and the Government did not try again.

This indicates a failure of 'Muslim solidarity' as a force whereby the countries of the Middle East might be galvanised into action to support Pakistan's international objectives, and in part appears to support the contention of Fayez A. Sayegh, referred to above. It points also to the fact that Pakistanis, for whom Islam was a motivating force, and who were for so long isolated from the Muslims of the Middle East, misunderstood the role of Islam in the politics of that region and failed to realise that Arab Nationalism (albeit based on Islam) was for the Arabs a more immediate unifying force than Islam. They underestimated the secularism in Turkish politics and failed to realise the gulf between the Iranians and the Arabs.

Pakistan is not, however, the only Muslim country in the region to have put forward schemes for Islamic

solidarity. President Nasser has referred to the desirability of a Muslim organisation to be based on the Haj, and announced plans for the establishment of an Islamic secretariat in 1954.¹ In 1963 he called an Islamic conference in Cairo,² but objected in strong terms to the attempts of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, during 1966 and subsequently, to convene a Muslim summit conference.³ Just as Pakistan had hoped to further its international objectives by initiating such schemes, Nasser was anxious to strengthen Egypt's claim to leadership of the Arab Muslim world and Faisal hoped to forestall such a development. The support Faisal received from the Shah and King Hussein of Jordan⁴ (both among the 'reactionary' forces which, along with Saudi Arabia, are frequently attacked by Cairo) lends credibility to this suggestion and to the wider

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The Times, 2 and 17 September 1954.

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Muslim World, 2 September 1963.

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Editorial, 'Old Bait', Egyptian Gazette, 24 February 1966.

4

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBCSWB), Part 4, Africa and the Middle East, ME/1882/A/2, Amman radio, 10 June 1965. Dawn, 4 May 1966.

speculation that calls for Islamic unity are used predominantly as a means of seeking international support by modern Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as surely as by Sultan Abdul Hamid half a century earlier, and with scarcely more success.

The caution displayed by the Pakistan Government in both these instances demonstrates an awareness of the political rivalry within the Middle East and the problem it poses for Pakistani diplomacy in the region. The initial division between Turks and Arabs during the First World War surprised and shocked many Indian Muslims who failed to understand that Turkish rule was as oppressive to the Arabs as British rule was to themselves. They were shocked even more deeply when the Turkish Government abolished the Caliphate and secularised the state. In the rivalry between the Saudis and the Hashemite ruler of Mecca, the sympathy of many Indian Muslims lay with the former, for the first time bringing them into conflict of opinion with Egyptian leaders who, even in the 1920s, distrusted the Saudi Arabian rulers. The leaders of Pakistan in 1947, however, had had little personal contact with the Middle East, and if they were aware of these divisions the full implications escaped them until much later.

Relations with Egypt have been consistently regarded as important by Pakistani leaders as well as

articulate Pakistani opinion, and Cairo was one of the first places in the Middle East visited by Liaquat Ali Khan in his efforts to explain Pakistan to the world. In Egypt's dispute with the UK over the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal zone, Pakistan, despite its reluctance to antagonise Britain, attempted to persuade the British Government to accede to Egypt's demands and supported the Egyptian view that negotiations on a Middle East defence pact could not take place until the question of Suez had been settled. The Egyptian reaction to Pakistan's treaty with Turkey in April 1954 was unfavourable, and it is likely that Pakistan's realisation that it could not continue to ignore the divisions within the Middle East dated from this time. It is not unlikely that Egypt's strong objection to the Turkey-Iraq Pact (Baghdad Pact) was a factor contributing to the delay in the Pakistan Government's accession to the Pact.

Despite the deterioration in Pakistan-Egyptian relations which followed Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, and more especially its equivocation regarding the Suez dispute of 1956, the Pakistan Government has by careful diplomacy avoided the kind of quarrels which in the case of Turkey and Iran led to diplomatic breaks with Egypt. Pakistan has consistently supported the Arab case on the Palestine

question, and refused to recognise Israel (the issue over which Egypt, or the UAR, severed relations with Iran in July 1960). When Syria seceded from the UAR in September, Turkey, along with Jordan, immediately recognised its new status, thus precipitating a diplomatic break with the UAR. Pakistan refrained from taking any action until some time after Nasser himself had accepted Syrian secession.

On the whole Pakistan has taken care not to involve itself in disputes between Middle East countries, an exception being the sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, which the UAR protested was being sent to the Yemen for use against Egyptian troops. Pakistan has remained neutral in Iraq's disputes with Iran and Kuwait, and has refused to commit itself officially in the struggle for supremacy in the Persian Gulf (referred to by Arab sources as the Arabian Gulf) in anticipation of British withdrawal.

This policy of neutrality together with its pro-Arab position regarding the Palestine question has proved successful to the extent that Pakistan remains on relatively good terms with all the countries of the region. Evidence of this success is the fact that most of the Middle Eastern countries support Pakistan, in varying degrees, over the question of 'self-determination' in Kashmir, and that none supports India. Even Egypt,

with which Pakistan's relations have been most difficult and which has enjoyed a particularly close relationship with India, never diverged from a policy of neutrality between India and Pakistan and although in the United Nations Security Council in 1962 the UAR failed to support a resolution favourable to Pakistan, in 1965 President Nasser supported the principle of self-determination in the context of India-Pakistan relations.

It says much for Pakistani diplomacy that its position of neutrality has been regarded as credible by the Arab countries, particularly the more militant 'Arab socialist' states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, when Pakistan is quite clearly allied with Turkey and Iran, each of which has disputes with its Arab neighbours and maintains relations with Israel. Certainly Turkey and more particularly Iran have from time to time objected to what appear to be Pakistani attempts to curry favour with Egypt.

Even if it is possible to conclude that Pakistan's Middle East policy has, in the long term, been successful, one must ask: what place does the Middle East have in the totality of Pakistan's foreign relations, and how important has this success been for Pakistan? Pakistan may be said to have two overriding objectives (which are to some extent linked). The

first arises from its rivalry with India and the dispute over Kashmir: it is of primary importance to Pakistan to keep the Kashmir issue before world opinion with the ultimate aim of securing 'self-determination' for the predominantly Muslim Kashmiri people, and the minimum aim of preventing India from completely absorbing the State. The second objective is economic development for which external assistance is necessary. These two objectives are linked because Pakistan believes that it must be prepared for hostilities with India at any time, and therefore needs a strong and efficient military machine, which cannot operate without a solid economic base. Pakistan's initiatives towards Muslim solidarity during the first five or six years of its existence should be seen in the light of these two major objectives.

Apart from any other considerations, Pakistan's consciousness of itself as a Muslim country resulted in a greater concern for the Middle East than for any other region, and its participation in the affairs of other areas has been slight. The decision to join the South East Asia Treaty Organization in September 1954 was an unexpected development. Possibly taken under American pressure, this step might also be seen as a concession to East Pakistani opinion, since East Pakistan is geographically more nearly part of South East Asia than the Middle East. By contrast, Pakistan's

membership of a Middle East defence organisation was rumoured, and was apparently under consideration from 1951 or 1952, when it was regarded as another aspect of Pakistan's objective of establishing some kind of grouping of Middle East countries.

What might be termed Pakistan's 'Pan-Islamic' phase ended in disillusionment at the end of 1952, but its involvement in the affairs of the region continued, despite the new trend discernible in Pakistan foreign policy from that time. This trend was influenced by factors quite apart from Arab disinterest in Pakistan's schemes for international cooperation in the Middle East.

There was a growing realisation, especially in Government circles, that even if such unity were possible the Muslim countries of the Middle East were not sufficiently advanced economically, despite the vast oil wealth of the region, to be able to assist each other's and Pakistan's development. They were therefore unlikely to be in a position of sufficient strength to gain either Pakistan's international objectives or their own. This weakness in the region was underlined by the virtual collapse of the oil industry in Iran when, after its nationalisation by the Iranian Government in 1951, the foreign technicians left the country. Its own economic weakness was brought home to Pakistan after

the Korean War ended in 1953, and falling jute and cotton prices seriously undermined Pakistan's balance of payments position. At the time exports were mostly of raw jute and cotton, and hardly any processing was done in Pakistan. Little attention had been devoted to planned economic development during the early years. The International Islamic Economic Organization, in which Ghulam Mohammed had placed so much hope, proved inadequate. When the third (and last) meeting was held in 1954 it was clear that it had achieved no more than a brief statistical survey of the Middle East and the establishment in Pakistan of an institute for the training of economists. The Pakistan Government sought economic aid and launched the First Five Year Plan (1955-60) with a high percentage of participation by American capital. This pattern has continued in subsequent Five Year Plans, although the Government is endeavouring to reduce the percentage of foreign capital participation relative to domestic capital.

At the same time Pakistan required military aid, and this too was offered by the USA, albeit conditionally upon Pakistan's participation in regional defence. Pakistan's acceptance of American aid placed it in a position where its policy was subject to American influence and perhaps pressure. The abandonment of its earlier non-aligned stand brought it into diplomatic conflict with the USSR and isolated it

from the non-aligned members of the Afro-Asian world. Pakistan lost little support in the Middle East on the question of Kashmir as a result of this move and gains to India in this respect were marginal. Although the UAR refused to support a pro-Pakistan resolution in the Security Council in 1962, it was Soviet action in vetoing the resolution which was decisive in that instance.

Membership of the Baghdad Pact, however, drew Pakistan into a more intimate relationship with Turkey, Iran and Iraq, which in the case of the latter endured after its withdrawal from the Pact. Even after Pakistan itself began to lose interest in the Baghdad Pact (or CENTO, as it had then become) it maintained its close and special ties with Turkey and Iran in Regional Co-operation for Development.

By the same token, Pakistan's gradual disengagement from active participation in the American-backed defence system had only a marginal effect on its relations with the countries of the Middle East, although in propaganda terms such improvement as was demonstrated in the communiqué issued by the Arab League following the Casablanca Conference in September 1965 was regarded as valuable by Pakistan. As previously, however, Pakistan's altered international posture had more effect on its relations with Russia, China and America than with the states of the Middle East.

Successful as its foreign policy might appear to have been in the Middle East, the support thereby gained has not assisted Pakistan to achieve its larger objectives. Nor has Pakistan been able to affect substantially developments in the Middle East.

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan hinge on Afghanistan's status as a landlocked state and its demands regarding Pushtunistan, and are characterised by a quiet hostility which occasionally flares into crisis. This relationship has consistently been subject to great power intervention, and reveals the inability of regional countries to take any effective action in the dispute. Both major crises, in 1955 and 1961-3, occurred at a period of high Soviet-Pakistani tension and followed Soviet statements supporting Afghan claims against Pakistan. The USA, anxious to prevent the USSR from extending its influence in Afghanistan, has continually encouraged Pakistan to extend better transit facilities to Afghanistan, and was particularly concerned at the closure of the border in 1961-3. Successful Turkish mediation in 1955 and Iranian mediation in 1963 coincided with American diplomatic activity and probable pressure on Pakistan. That the intervention of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (acting in a spirit which probably combined the ideas of Afro-Asian and Muslim solidarity) was ineffective,

suggests that Middle Eastern attempts to settle the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been unavailing because neither the will to compromise on the part of the protagonists nor the means to exert pressure on the part of the mediators existed. Only when the weight of an outside power - in this case the USA - was added, was regional activity effective.

In the case of Kashmir, a problem of no direct relevance to the Middle East, the activities of the countries of this region have been quite ineffective. Support for Pakistan in the case of the Arab countries, even at its most outspoken, has been restricted to diplomatic activity. Turkey and Iran were prepared to give Pakistan material assistance, including some military equipment, but neither was prepared to risk becoming involved in hostilities or jeopardising its larger interests. This was particularly evident in the case of Turkey's refusal to supply jet aircraft, a step which it feared would antagonise the United States, for despite some dissatisfaction with the American alliance this remains the keystone of Turkish foreign policy. Both Iran and Turkey assisted Pakistan to repair its damaged military machine after the hostilities ended, but neither this nor the diplomatic support extended by them in any way altered the course of the dispute. It can also be assumed that any attempt they made to restrain Pakistan in this instance was equally ineffective.

Even at the cost of irritating its non-Arab Muslim allies, Pakistan has been far more vocal in support of the Arabs' cause in Palestine than the Arab countries have been on Pakistan's behalf in the Kashmir dispute. It has not shown any inclination to commit itself to more than diplomatic assistance. It could be argued that in 1967, militarily weakened by its war with India in 1965, Pakistan was not in a position to give material aid to the Arab countries, even had it desired to do so and had the war against Israel continued long enough to make such assistance practical.

Several points emerge from this discussion. It is clear that Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East are incidental to the totality of its foreign policy: at no time has the Middle East been in an economic, military or diplomatic position to render effective assistance to Pakistan in the pursuit of its principal foreign policy objectives. Nor has Pakistan been able to act decisively in a Middle East context. This being the case, it is remarkable that Pakistan has paid so much attention to the region. Although the intensity and style of Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East have varied since 1947, from the naive Pan-Islamism of the early years to the concentration on relations with the non-Arab northern tier first within the context of the American alliance

system and later outside it, Pakistan's special interest in this region has persisted.

Many factors contribute to this interest. In geographical terms Pakistan's location on the periphery of the Middle East gives it the option of participating in the affairs of the region, and its quarrel with India has precluded identification with the subcontinent, Pakistan's other geographical alternative. Its sense of isolation has driven Pakistan to seek friends wherever it might find them: most obviously within the British Commonwealth and the Middle East. Other factors exert pressure in the opposite direction, pulling Pakistan away from the Middle East: an urgent need for economic and military aid forced it to involve itself outside the region, first with America, later with the Soviet Union and China at the possible expense of its friendship with some of the countries of the Middle East. Its quarrel with Afghanistan, also a Muslim state and a member of the northern tier, has not contributed to Pakistan's sense of nearness to the Middle East, and has persisted despite the intercession of other powers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

Despite these pressures to the contrary, Pakistan remains deeply involved in the Middle East. Through the entire fabric runs the thread of Islam, intricately woven into the pattern of Pakistan's

relations with the countries of the region, giving coherence and meaning to actions and attitudes which might otherwise appear incomprehensible.

APPENDIXEconomic Survey of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey

There are many similarities in the economic structures of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, all of which are among the less developed nations of the world, but each has special features which alter the approach of the respective governments to the common problem of economic development. Per capita income is low in all three, but Pakistan lags behind Turkey and Iran in this respect. Agriculture accounts for a large proportion of the gross national product of each and the majority of the work force is engaged in agriculture. They are all to some extent dependent on foreign capital, although Iran is in a much more favourable position by virtue of its oil wealth.

Industrialisation, self-sufficiency in food and elimination of dependence on external assistance are common objectives sought within the framework of national development plans.

Regarded as highly successful by United Nations experts, planning in Pakistan is organised over five-year periods, within an overall Perspective Plan (1965-85). The current (Third) Five Year Plan (1965-70) is implemented by means of Annual Development Programmes

which facilitate regular assessment and revision of the Plan where necessary. As a result of the postponement of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium meeting in July 1965 and the war with India in September that year the progress of this Plan was set back, but despite revision made to the 1965-6 Annual Development Programme the size, objectives and targets of the Plan were not altered.¹

The Perspective Plan aims at quadrupling the Gross National Product (GNP) from about Rs.43,000m. in 1964-5 to an estimated Rs.174,000m. in 1985, and doubling the per capita income from Rs.386 in 1965 to Rs.932 in 1985.² The objective of the current Plan is a minimum increase of 37 per cent in the GNP and an annual rate of increase of 6.5 per cent per annum.

In 1963-4 per capita income in East Pakistan was estimated at Rs.305 against Rs.388 for West Pakistan,³

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'Revised Phasing, Sectoral Priorities and Allocations of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', March 1967, p.1, in Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) (Karachi, 1967).

2

'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', June 1965, *ibid.*, p.17.

3

Ibid., p.127.

a telling reference to the difficulties inherent in a situation where more than half the population, and the most literate half, earn substantially less than the rest of the population. This is particularly galling to East Pakistanis who are aware that their Province is the greater foreign exchange earner. Within the overall target of growth, the Plan envisages elimination of this disparity in income between East and West Pakistan by 1985, and a reduction of disparity from 25 per cent in 1965 to 20 per cent in 1970.¹

Pakistan is heavily dependent on external assistance for the financing of its development plans, but it is expected that 68 per cent of the capital outlay for the Third Five Year Plan will come from internal resources,² and the Perspective Plan envisages the elimination of the need for external aid by 1985.

Under the current Plan the sectoral allocation for industries, fuels and minerals, while still the largest (24.9 per cent), is slightly less than under the Second Five Year Plan, and proportionately more attention has been given to the development of agriculture than

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Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-68 (Seventh Edition, Islamabad (n.d.)), p.110.

2

Ibid., p.114.

previously. Water and power, transport and communications are also high on the list of priorities for development. It is hoped thereby to develop basic industries so that further industrialisation can be met by the country's own capacity, and to increase food production, thereby reducing the expenditure of foreign exchange on food imports and improving the overall balance of payments position.¹

Also included in the Plan is progress towards full employment and universal literacy, which it is hoped will be achieved by 1985. The planners are, however, aware that their objectives are to some extent contradictory. The goal of full employment may conflict with that of raising the national income by 400 per cent, since this would imply wide use of modern technology which is frequently capital intensive. Equalisation of per capita income between the two Provinces might require restriction of West Pakistan's rate of growth, which would in turn affect the increase in national income.²

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See 'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', p.41, Table 1, for sectoral allocations under the Third Five Year Plan, and Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-68, p.112, for the revised sectoral allocations.

2

'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', p.18.

Much of the success of Pakistan's development plans depends on effective population control, for if the birthrate is not checked the population, estimated at 112 million in 1965, could double itself by 1985. According to Pakistan's planners, such an increase would defeat any attempts to raise per capita incomes 'by a significant amount'.¹

In Iran planning is the responsibility of the Plan Organization, a body directly responsible to the Shah. The current Fourth Development Plan (1968-73) aims at increasing the relative importance of the industrial sector, particularly in the fields of petrochemicals and natural gas. Major projects being undertaken under the Plan are a steel mill, two machine plants, a petrochemical complex, an aluminium plant and a tractor plant. In the agricultural field special emphasis is being placed on the expansion of sugar beet and cane production, as well as tea; except for these commodities Iran is self-sufficient in food, and by 1973 expects to rectify this deficiency. The Plan aims at a target of about 57 per cent increase in GNP, or an annual growth rate of about 9.3 per cent. Assuming an annual population growth of 2.6 per cent during the same period,

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Ibid., p.24.

per capita income is expected to rise from \$220 to \$307.¹ These plans are perhaps ambitious, and depend to a large extent on expected expansion in the oil industry.

The importance of oil in the Iranian economy is indicated by the fact that foreign exchange proceeds from oil paid for about 65 per cent of Iran's imports in 1966-67, and about 50 per cent of Government revenue originated from this sector, which accounts for 13 per cent of GNP.² Behind the Iranian oil industry and the National Iranian Oil Company stands the Consortium. Established following the Oil Agreement of August 1954, the Consortium is a group of eight companies of which the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now the British Petroleum Company) has the largest share, the rest being controlled by a group of American companies, a Dutch company and a French company. Under a 25 year agreement, the Consortium was to operate the oil fields of south-west Iran, and the refinery at Abadan. Profits were to be shared equally between Iran and the Consortium, and the 100,000 square mile area exploited by the Consortium

1

Regional Co-operation for Development, Report of the Planning Experts Group, Background Paper on Iran (mimeographed, Teheran (n.d.)), p.9.

2

Ibid., p.2.

was to be gradually reduced.¹ As time passed Iran wished to renegotiate this agreement, especially as since 1954 more favourable agreements had been negotiated with other oil companies. During 1966 an agreement was reached whereby the Consortium promised to increase production by 12 per cent in 1967 and possibly 13-14 per cent per annum thereafter. Net profit was to be shared on a 50-50 basis, and in addition the Consortium agreed to pay certain royalties. As part of the agreement Iran was to receive about 12-1/2 per cent payment in kind. An important aspect of the agreement is that all the oil is sold by the Consortium and Iran must have its acquiescence before oil can be sold elsewhere, although this is usually forthcoming for areas where the Consortium itself does not operate, such as Eastern Europe. Since the Consortium pays substantially more than the market price for oil (one estimate was 50 per cent more per barrel) there is little incentive to sell elsewhere. Although there are agreements with Italian, French and Canadian companies, the Consortium still produces the lion's share. A 1968 estimate was that

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Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Ernest Benn Limited: London, 1965), pp.453-4.

Iran would receive \$865m. from Consortium operations for that year, and \$30-35m. from the other companies combined.¹

Turkey is the most industrialised of the three countries, if one excludes from consideration the oil industry in Iran. It is hoped that during the current plan period (1968-72) in Turkey an average annual growth rate of 7 per cent will be attained, which will raise the GNP by approximately 40 per cent by 1972. The estimated growth rate for industry during this period is 11.1 per cent which should alter the structure of the economy giving industry a 30.7 per cent share of the GNP as against 26.6 per cent for agriculture. The projected growth rate for the agricultural sector is 4.2 per cent which it is hoped will permit Turkey to feed itself by 1972.² The current (Second) Five Year Plan aims at reducing the contribution of external assistance in both

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Precise, authoritative information regarding Iran's oil agreements is difficult to obtain. The above information was gained partly from Iranian officials. See also 'Iran's Breakthrough', The Economist, 14 January 1967, and Alfred Friendly, 'Iran Needs Oil Earnings to Fill Vacuum in Gulf', Washington Post, 16 June 1969.

2

Turkiye Is Bankasi, A.S., Head Office, Economic Research Department, Development Plan of Turkey, Second Five-Year (1968-72), Summary (Ankara (n.d.)), pp.1-2, 42-3.

amount and percentage, but the realisation of this objective is heavily dependent on Turkey's being able to carry out a successful import substitution programme and at the same time to increase its exports.

This aspect of Turkey's development is particularly important because under its agreement of association with the European Economic Community the 'Transitional Period' ends in 1969, after which Turkey must take steps to integrate its economy into that of the Community, gradually lowering its own tariff barriers.¹

The trading patterns of the three member countries reveal many similarities also. Both Pakistan and Turkey depend on agricultural rather than industrial exports (jute, cotton, tobacco, dried fruit, nuts, etc.), and both have an overall unfavourable balance of trade. Iran's exports, based on oil, give it a special trade pattern, and make it the only member of RCD with a favourable trade balance. All three, however, import machinery and other industrial goods needed for the development of their own economy. This means that they are not at present in a position to provide a market for each other's goods, and trade is mostly with North America and Europe, especially the European Economic Community.

1

Ibid., pp.40-1.

Table 1. Population and National Income Figures

	Pakistan		Iran		Turkey	
	1963	1966	1963	1966	1963	1966
Population Total (millions) ¹	99	105 ⁵	23	25	30	32
Percentage Rate of Increase 1963-6 ¹		2.1		2.8		2.5
Percentage Engaged in Agriculture ²		74		57		72
National Income (\$USm.) ³	5,482	9,724 ⁴	4,188	5,086	6,622	8,974
Per Capita Income (\$US) ³	82	95 ⁴	180	207	223	276

1

1967 Statistical Yearbook (United Nations: New York, 1968).

2

Production Yearbook 1967, vol.21 (F.A.O.: Rome, 1968), 1965 estimates.

3

Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1967 (United Nations: New York, 1968).

4

Figures refer to 1965.

5

This figure conflicts with the estimate given in the 'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', see p.485 above.

Table 2. Industrial Origin of the Gross National Product¹

By percentage

	Pakistan		Iran		Turkey	
	1963	1966	1963	1965	1963	1966
Agriculture	48	49	28	28	41	37
Industry	12	10	30 ²	30 ²	16	18
Construction	4	4	4	4	5	6
Transport & Communications	6	6	7	6	8	8
Wholesale & Retail Trade	12	12	8	9	8	8
Other	17	17	20	20	22	23

1

1967 Statistical Yearbook, Table 181. Estimates relate to Gross Domestic Product at current factor cost.

2

Includes extraction of crude petroleum.

Table 3. Average Annual Rates of Growth of Real Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost, 1960-66¹

By percentage

	Pakistan	Iran ²	Turkey
Overall Growth Rate	5.3	6.4	5.4
Per capita Growth Rate	3.1	3.4	2.3
Industrial Sector	8.9	8.6	7.7
Agricultural Sector	3.0	2.9	3.0

1
1967 Statistical Yearbook, Table 183.

2
Figures for period 1960-65.

Table 4. Regional Trade, including Trade with India¹
 (\$USm.)

1963

Exports to:

	Iran	Pakis- tan	Turkey	India
Imports from: Iran		34.9	6.4	80.8
Pakistan	1.2		0.3	27.4
Turkey	-	-		-
India	10.5	15.2	7.8	

1967

Exports to:

	Iran	Pakis- tan	Turkey	India
Imports from: Iran		39.3	0.2	73.8
Pakistan	3.4		5.0	0.1
Turkey	0.2	1.1		0.3
India	16.5	-	.6	

1

International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, a Supplement to International Financial Statistics, Annual 1963-67 (Washington (n.d.)). The figures are those given for exports for Iran (pp.212-3), India (pp.207-8), Pakistan (pp.285-6), and Turkey (pp.345-6). Comparison with import figures reveals some discrepancy, probably attributable to smuggling or to the 'leads and lags' problem in recording international trade.

Table 5. Trade Patterns of RCD Members¹

(\$USm.)

	Pakistan	Iran	Turkey
Exports 1967	645	1,930	523
Imports 1967	1,101	1,127	691
Largest Import Suppliers	USA 361 UK 141 Japan 95 Germany(F.R.) 93 Australia 50	Germany(F.R.) 243 USA 208 UK 139 Japan 77 France 59	Germany(F.R.) 135 USA 124 UK 89 Italy 50 France) 27 USSR)
Largest Export Buyers	USA 79 UK 75 Japan 36 China(P.R.) 34 Hong Kong 33	Japan 533 UK 431 Italy 67 S.Africa 66 USA 65	USA 93 Germany(F.R.) 84 Italy 36 UK 34 France 29
<u>Imports by Region:</u>			
N.America	395	210	126
EEC	196	426	240
Europe (excl. EEC and UK)	36	91	59
Soviet Bloc	93	68	91

(Table 5 cont.)

Table 5 (cont.)

	Pakistan	Iran	Turkey
<u>Exports by Region</u>			
N.America	83	101	94
EEC	78	262	177
Europe (excl. EEC and UK)	33	63	67
Soviet Bloc	84	56	88

1

Direction of Trade Annual, 1963-67.

Table 6. (i) Principal Exports of RCD Countries

Pakistan ¹		Iran ²		Turkey ³	
Commodity	% of Total	Commodity	% of Total	Commodity	% of Total
Raw Jute	24	Woollen Carpets	27	Nuts, Raisins & Citrus Fruit	25
Jute Manufactures	20	Cotton	18	Cotton	24
Raw Cotton	14	Dried & Fresh Fruits	13	Tobacco	22
Cotton Manufactures	6	Hides, leather	9	Industrial Products: (including Copper)	15
Rice	5	Mineral Ores	6	Chrome Ore & Other Minerals	4
Fish	2	Herbs, Seeds	4	Livestock	2
Wool	1	Gum Tragacanth	3	Mohair wool	2
		Caviar	2		

(Table 6 cont.)

Table 6 (cont.) (ii) Principal Imports of RCD Countries

Pakistan ¹		Iran ²		Turkey ³	
Commodity	% of Total	Commodity	% of Total	Commodity	% of Total
Machinery	23	Machinery & components	23	Machinery	33
Grain, pulses, flour	13	Iron & Ironware	11	Medicines, dyes	9
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof	9	Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals	9	Vehicles	9
Transport & equip.	9	Electrical Goods	7	Liquid fuel	8
Electrical goods	6	Sugar, wheat, tea	5	Iron and Steel	7
Oil minerals	5	Fats & oils	3	Textiles & yarns	6
Non-ferrous metals & manuf.	4			Wheat	3

¹ Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-1968, pp.71, 73. The percentages are approximate.

² Report of the Planning Experts Group, Background Paper on Iran, pp.5-6. The percentages are approximate. Figures relate to 1966. Exports exclude oil.

³ Turkiye Is Bankase, A.S., Head Office, Economic Research Department, Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1963-1967 (Ankara (n.d.)), pp.6-7. The percentages are approximate. Figures relate to 1967.

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