

ἵνα Substantive Clauses in the New Testament

J. HAROLD GREENLEE

An examination of the Greek grammars seems to indicate that, in the past, scholars have attempted to deal with the conjunction ἵνα in the New Testament upon an inadequate basis. Since its meaning in classical Greek was almost exclusively "in order that", introducing a purpose clause, scholars seem to have felt that it was thus limited in New Testament usage. Often the translation has had to be modified from "in order that" to "that" to avoid doing violence to the obvious sense of the passage; but since in English "that" can serve either as a shortened form of "in order that" or as a conjunction introducing a substantive clause, grammarians have apparently long attempted to press some sort of purpose idea into almost every ἵνα clause.

Some progress has, indeed, been made toward freeing ἵνα clauses from this limitation in New Testament usage. Winer,¹ who wrote approximately a century ago, admits the occasional use of ἵνα as an object clause, but it is easy to see that he insists upon a purpose idea for ἵνα clauses where it is even remotely possible.² Dods refers to a statement by Simcox which is a bit more broadminded, admitting that "Sometimes, beyond doubt, ἵνα is used where the final element in the sense is very much weakened—some-

times where it is hard to deny that it has altogether vanished".³

The statement attributed to Simcox at least expresses the basic principle which many scholars seem to have used with reference to ἵνα—that its "proper" meaning had to be "in order that", and that ἵνα would adopt any other meaning only at the peril of committing linguistic heresy.

Scholars of recent years have come to recognize the existence of a more or less limited number of "non-final" ἵνα clauses—clauses without the idea of purpose. Yet the twilight existence which grammarians have too generally granted these clauses is typified by Machen's statement in his *New Testament Greek for Beginners*: "In addition to the use by which it expresses purpose, ἵνα with the subjunctive is very frequently used after words of exhorting, wishing, striving, and in various ways that are not easily classified".⁴ Burton⁵ is forced to use six categories for the uses of ἵνα. One of these is the purpose clause, one is the clause of conceived result (which for the purpose of this article need not be considered separately from the purpose clause), leaving four classifications to which Burton gives the following rather vague

¹ Winer, George Benedict, *A Grammar of the New Testament Diction* (2 vols.), translated by Edward Masson, 1859.

² See pp. 350-5, 483. See also Abbott, Edwin A., *Johannine Grammar*, 1906, sections 2094-2132.

³ In *Expositor's Greek Testament*, I, p. 730. Dods gives as the source of this statement Simcox's *Grammar*, a book which the present writer has not located.

⁴ P. 197.

⁵ Burton, Ernest De Witt, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek*, 1943, p. 84.

characteristics (*italics are Burton's*):

- Object clauses after verbs of *exhorting*, etc.
- Object clauses after verbs of *striving*, etc.
- Subject, predicate, and appositive clauses.
- Complementary and epexegetic clauses.

Abbott-Smith⁶ says that ἵνα as a conjunction is "properly" a final conjunction, denoting purpose; but that in late writers it may be definitive, as the equivalent of an infinitive, after verbs of wishing, striving, saying, and after certain substantives and other words.

The only recognition Green⁷ apparently gives at all to these non-final clauses is several lines of small print on pp. 320-1, and much of this seems to the present writer to be unsatisfactory. That Green considers these clauses of only minor significance is seen in his statement, "The Evangelist John often (with, occasionally, others of the New Testament writers) employs ἵνα as explanatory . . .; but in other passages the usual meaning of the particle may be taken . . ."⁸

Robertson⁹ devotes several pages to non-final ἵνα clauses, especially pp. 991-7. He designates them "sub-final clauses", and, while he acknowledges in parentheses that they are "really object or subject clauses like ὅτι clauses", yet he seems reluctant to admit that they have any independent identity. "There are a considerable number of clauses," he states, "which are not pure purpose and yet are not result. They are the bridge, in a sense, between the two extremes"¹⁰ He does, however, go further than Green as regards the frequency of their occurrence, commenting that "the examples in the N. T. are too numerous to give a complete list"¹¹

⁶ Abbott-Smith, G., *A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament*, 1944.

⁷ Green, Samuel G., *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, rev. ed.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Robertson, A. T., *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*, 1923.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 991.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 993.

Blass¹² is aware of one aspect of these non-final clauses. He points out¹³ that there are several usages which may be expressed either by an infinitive construction or by a "periphrasis". He illustrates the fact that in some instances the alternative to an infinitive construction is a ἵνα clause with the subjunctive mood, while in other instances the alternative is a ὅτι clause. The ἵνα clause, he states, is the alternative to an infinitive for an explanatory construction¹⁴ and after certain verbs which he lists,¹⁵ while the ὅτι clause is the alternative construction after other verbs.¹⁶ Yet, even though in his discussion of the use of a ἵνα explanatory clause he notes that "if the epexegetic phrase consists of facts, John uses not ἵνα but ὅτι", he apparently quite fails to see the principle upon which, throughout the New Testament, an explanatory clause is a ἵνα clause in some instances and a ὅτι clause in others.¹⁷

Moulton,¹⁸ however, takes a rather realistic view of this type of clause. He lists some examples of this "non-final" use of ἵνα from the papyri to illustrate his opinion that this usage cannot be attributed to Latin influence. He continues by saying,

In such clauses, which remind us immediately of Mt 43 1620, Mk 510 39 etc., the naturalness of the development is obvious from the simple fact that the purpose clause with ἵνα is merely a use of the jussive subjunctive . . ., which makes its appearance after a verb of commanding or wish-

¹² Blass, Friedrich, *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, translated by Henry St. John Thackeray, 1898.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 225-8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-3.

¹⁷ See also the later edition, Blass, Friedrich, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, vierte Auflage besorgt von Albert Debrunner, 1913.

¹⁸ Moulton, James Hope, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*. Vol. I, *Prolegomena*, 1906, p. 208.

ing entirely reasonable. . . . From such sentences, in which the object clause, from the nature of the governing verb, had a jussive sense in it which made the subjunctive natural, there was an easy transition to object clauses in which the jussive idea was absent. The careful study of typical sentences like Mt 10²⁵ 8⁸ (contrast 3¹¹) 18⁶, Jn 12⁷ (contr. Lk 15¹⁹) 43⁴ 15^{8.13}, Lk 14³ (for which Winer quotes a close parallel from Epictetus), will show anyone who is free from predisposition that ἵνα can lose the last shred of purposive meaning. If the recognition of a purpose conception will suit the context better than the denial of it, we remain entirely free to assume it; but the day is past for such strictness as great commentators like Meyer and Westcott were driven to by the supposed demands of grammar".¹⁹

It was apparently left for Dana and Mantey, in their *Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament*,²⁰ to deal with these clauses for the less advanced student. Putting it in a more elementary form than does Moulton, these scholars say,

Then ἵνα is also used frequently in a non-final sense in object-clauses in the New Testament. It is simply the equivalent of ὅτι scores of times. At such times the translation *that* suggests its force Or the ἵνα clause can be translated in many cases just as well by an infinitive clause".²¹

The illustration they use is that in Mark 7:26, καὶ ἤρωτα αὐτὸν ἵνα τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐκβάλῃ ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῆς, translating it by a substantive clause, "and she asked him *that he cast the demon out of her daughter*", or by an infinitive clause, "and she asked him *to cast the demon out*". Dana and Mantey also refer to ἵνα clauses used in apposition, quoting two examples, one of which is John 13:34, ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους, translating it, "a new commandment I give to you (namely) that you love one another".²²

Dana and Mantey thus seem ready to break with tradition and to let these clauses stand in their own right; yet

even they seem to have failed to go all the way in identifying and properly classifying this type of ἵνα clause. The purpose of the present article will therefore be threefold: 1) to point out the existence of ἵνα *substantive clauses* as a distinct type in the New Testament, 2) to classify them, and 3) to set forth a practical means for identifying them.

The FIRST BASIC HYPOTHESIS of the present article is as follows:

In New Testament Greek there are two separate and distinct usages of ἵνα which ought no more to be confused than the two distinct meanings of ὅτι. The first of these meanings is to be translated "in order that", and is to be used where the ἵνα clause is a *purpose* clause. This type of clause answers the question "Why?" The second of these meanings is to be translated "that", in the same sense in which ὅτι is translated "that", and is to be used where the ἵνα clause is a *substantive* clause. This type of clause answers the question "What?"

It is to be further insisted that ἵνα substantive clauses are not merely to be tolerated as being nothing more than wayward children from the fold of ἵνα purpose clauses. This article will not attempt to deal with their origin,²³ but simply maintains that in New Testament Greek these clauses are clearly distinct from ἵνα purpose clauses. As such, they deserve the right to their own identity and meaning, not only when the idea of "purpose" has tried and failed to embrace them within its compass, but rather at any time when the sense of the passage in question naturally calls for a substantive clause rather than a purpose clause.²⁴ Here again reference may be made to the analogous cases of the two mean-

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*

²⁰ By Dana, H. E., and Julius R. Mantey, 1927.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

²² *Loc. cit.*

²³ See Moulton, *loc. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

ings of ὅτι. There is no presumption in favor of one or the other of the meanings of ὅτι. If the context indicates that the ὅτι clause should be considered a causal clause, ὅτι is translated "because"; if the context indicates a substantive clause, ὅτι is translated "that". An even closer analogy is the usage of ὅπως. Even in classical Greek, from Homer on, ὅπως, in addition to its use in "final" clauses, was used to introduce object clauses after certain verbs meaning to strive, to effect, to plan, to take care, etc.²⁵ Liddell and Scott say that ὅπως with the subjunctive is sometimes used after verbs of will and endeavor, instead of the infinitive.²⁶

An important point in this discussion is that these "non-final" or substantive clauses are *not* of only rare or occasional occurrence in the New Testament, as most scholars seem to have maintained. Robertson²⁷ states that one scholar counts 746 ὅτι clauses in the Westcott-Hort text of the New Testament. An examination in Moulton and Geden's *Concordance to the Greek Testament*²⁸ indicates that over fourteen percent of these are undoubtedly ὅτι substantive clauses, with an additional eight percent deserving of consideration. Even if quite a number which here are counted as substantive clauses be charged to the over-enthusiasm of the present writer, there must still remain a sufficient number to demand thoughtful attention.

Having pointed out that ὅτι substantive clauses are of frequent occurrence in the New Testament and therefore of appreciable importance, the question of

proper identification suggests itself. Can a classification of them be made which will be more definite than that of Burton or that of Dana and Mantey?²⁹ An examination of these clauses and their contexts seems to indicate clearly that such a classification can be made, upon the following basis:

In Greek, as in English, indirect statements may be given in either of two forms—the first is a substantive clause, the second is an infinitive construction. The substantive clause would be introduced by the word "that". An example of English usage is as follows:

Direct statement: "He is a good man."

Indirect statement: "I say *that* he is a good man"; or, "I know *that* he is a good man."

"I say him *to be* a good man"; or, "I know him *to be* a good man."³⁰

These examples would accordingly appear in Greek as follows:

Direct statement: ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν.

Indirect (substantive clause): λέγω ὅτι ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, or γινώσκω ὅτι . . .

Indirect (infinitive): λέγω αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, or, γινώσκω αὐτὸν . . .

These examples, however, involve only the *indicative* mood of the verb within the discourse. What form will the indirect discourse take if the original statement is an imperative, a hortatory subjunctive, or some such idea? This possibility seems to be avoided by grammarians, so far as Greek is concerned. Burton does give his reasons for omitting these constructions from his discussion:

The term indirect discourse is commonly applied only to indirect assertions and indirect questions. Commands, promises, and hopes indirectly quoted

²⁵ Goodwin, William W., *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, 1880, pp. 73-9.

²⁶ Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (2 vols.). Revised and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie, 1940.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 985.

²⁸ Moulton, W. F., and A. S. Geden, 3rd ed., 1926.

²⁹ Pp. 155, 156 of this article.

³⁰ The participial construction in indirect quotation, which is sometimes used in Greek—e.g., I Jn. 4:2—need not enter into this discussion.

might without impropriety be included under the term, but are, in general, excluded because of the difficulty of drawing the line between them and certain similar usages, in which, however, no direct form can be thought of. Thus the Infinitive after a verb of commanding might be considered the representative in indirect discourse of an Imperative in the direct discourse; . . . while for the Infinitive after verbs of striving, which in itself can scarcely be regarded as of different force from those after verbs of commanding and wishing, no direct form can be thought of.³¹

The validity of these reasons may well be questioned. This article purposes to show that such constructions both *can* be classified and also *need* to be classified for a proper understanding of New Testament usage.

This classification can be made in English; and for the purpose of illustration the three forms of statement given above in the indicative mood are changed to the *imperative* mood, as follows:

Direct statement: "Son, be a good man."

Indirect (substantive clause): "I command my son *that he be* a good man."

Indirect (infinitive): "I commanded my son *to be* a good man."

Dana and Mantey agree with the present writer's conclusion that this sort of construction can be expressed in Greek under a regular rule. The substantive clause construction could be expressed by *ἵνα* with the subjunctive, the alternative form above being expressed in Greek, as in English, by an infinitive construction.³² Thus the Greek equivalents of the examples above would be as follows:

Direct statement: υἱέ, ἴσθι ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος.

Indirect (substantive clause): κελεύω τὸν υἱόν μου ἵνα ᾗ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος.

Indirect (infinitive): κελεύω τὸν υἱόν μου εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον.

This principle may be most simply

illustrated, as above, by using the indirect form of a statement of direct discourse—in the former illustrations, with the verb of the direct discourse in the indicative mood; in the latter, with the verb of the direct discourse in the imperative mood. However, from these rather obvious illustrations the principle may be extended from actual indirect discourse to include indirect statements after such verbs as knowing, thinking, feeling, beseeching, etc., and after certain nouns and adjectives. Abbott-Smith, Burton, Blass, and Robertson admit the existence of these constructions.³³ What they fail to do is to point out the principle involved—viz., that these constructions with *ἵνα* are the indirect form of a statement whose (actual or hypothetical) direct form would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

It is in the nature of some of the ideas expressed by the *subjunctive* mood that they should be expressed indirectly by some construction other than substantive clauses. When, however, such a thought is stated indirectly as a substantive clause, a *ἵνα* clause is regularly used. The following New Testament passages appear to be examples of this type:³⁴

Matt. 14:36 παρεκάλουν αὐτὸν ἵνα μόνον ἄψωνται τοῦ κρασπέδου τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ. "They were beseeching him (to the effect) that they might only touch the hem of his garment." The postulated original idea, "Permit us to touch the hem of thy garment", or, "May we touch the hem of thy garment?"

Mark 5:18 παρεκάλει αὐτὸν ὁ δαίμονισθεις ἵνα μετ' αὐτοῦ ᾗ. "He who had been demon-possessed was beseeching him (to the effect) that he might be with him." Original idea, "Let me be with thee."

John 11:50 συμφέρει ὑμῖν ἵνα εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ . . . "It is better for you that one person should die for the people . . ." In direct form, the thing which is "better

³¹ See above.

³² The subjunctive mood is regularly used in these substantive clauses as in the purpose clauses. No special notice need be taken in this article of the occasional use of the future indicative.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 298.

for you" would be something such as, "One person ought to die for the people", or "One person should die for the people".³⁵

Allowing, then, that not all the uses of the subjunctive are subject to being written indirectly in a substantive clause, the following may be given as the SECOND BASIC HYPOTHESIS of this article:

The majority of ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses whose content is the indirect statement of an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

The above hypothesis does not, however, include quite all of the ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament. There seems to be one other type, in which the idea seems to be practically a simple future idea. Here the direct statement would be in the future indicative, and therefore the clause would ordinarily be expected to be expressed by ὅτι with the future indicative; although in some cases the idea may be thought of as being a subjunctive idea.³⁶

The four probable examples of this type of clause in the Fourth Gospel are as follows:

12:23 ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα ἵνα δοξασθῆ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified."

13:1 εἰδὼς ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὅτι ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὥρα ἵνα μεταβῆ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου . . . "Jesus, knowing that his hour had come that he should depart from this world . . ."

16:2 ἔρχεται ὥρα ἵνα πᾶς ὁ ἀποκτείνας ὑμᾶς δόξῃ . . . "There comes an hour that everyone who kills you will think . . ."

16:32 ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ ἐλήλυθεν ἵνα σκορπισθῆτε . . . "An hour is coming and is come that ye will be scattered . . ."

³⁵ Abbott-Smith (*op. cit.*, p. 217) refers to this passage as an example of the substantive clause "after words expressing expediency, etc."

³⁶ It may be significant that this type of clause seems to be found only in the Johannine books, except for one example in Matthew.

These examples, all referring to an "hour", are obviously not purpose clauses³⁷ nor result clauses, in which case a further identification of the "hour" seems to be needed. They are almost, if not quite, the equivalent of temporal clauses with ὅτε ("when") and the future indicative. This Gospel freely uses ὅτε, however, and sometimes with the idea of "the hour has come"—e.g., 4:21, 5:25, 16:25; so it may be valid to see in these ἵνα clauses, as substantive clauses, a further identification of the "hour" rather than a temporal idea. The ἵνα clauses in the above examples might then be given in direct form as follows: "The Son of Man will be glorified", "I will depart from the world", "Everyone who kills you will think . . .", and "Ye will be scattered".

Approximately half of the examples of ἵνα substantive clauses expressing a future idea in Revelation are found after the verb ποιεῖν.

A tentative list of the New Testament examples of ἵνα substantive clauses expressing a future idea is as follows:

Matt. 18:14	John 16:32	Rev. 6:4	Rev. 13:15
John 11:37	I John 3:1	6:11	13:16
12:23	4:17	9:5	13:17
13:1	5:3	13:12	14:13
16:2	Rev. 3:9	13:13	19:8

To illustrate the principle involved, reference may be made to I John 5:3. In this passage, αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν—"For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments"—the ἵνα clause seems clearly to be exegetical of "the love of God". It is not too easy to put the thought into direct form, but it seems to be something such as, "We will keep his commandments; this is the content of the love of God."

Rev. 3:9, ποιήσω αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἤξουσιν καὶ προσκυνήσουσιν ἐνώπιον τῶν ποδῶν σου—"I will make them that they

³⁷ Contra Winer, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

will come and worship before thy feet . . ."—is clearly a noun clause expressing an idea in future time. (The verb in this clause, it will be noted, is a future indicative.) The ἵνα clause could be directly stated, "They will come and worship", or perhaps with a declarative sense, "They shall come and worship".

Rev. 6:11, ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς ἵνα ἀναπαύσωνται ἔτι χρόνον μικρόν—"it was said to them that they should rest yet a short time"—refers to the content of what was said, which is, stated directly, either "You will rest yet a short time", or possibly, "You may rest yet a short time." (The latter translation would place this example with the previously discussed type of ἵνα substantive clauses.)

The evidence of this list of references point to the THIRD BASIC HYPOTHESIS of this article:

A second and much smaller class of ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses which express indirectly an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the future indicative.

There now remains to be presented the evidence from the New Testament upon which these three hypotheses are based. For this purpose, herewith is given a list of examples from the New Testament which seem rather clearly to be substantive clauses. A second list is given of examples which may be debatable but which merit consideration. These examples are taken from Moulton and Geden's *Concordance* but are not classified as substantive clauses in that work.

ἵνα SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES

Matt. 4:3	Matt. 7:12	Matt. 20:33	Mark 6:12
5:29	8:8	24:20	6:25
5:29	10:25	Mark 3:9	6:41
5:30	14:36	5:23	6:56
5:30	16:20	5:43	7:26
7:1	18:6	6:8	7:32

Mark 7:36	Luke 7:36	John 15:12	Gal. 2:10
8:6	8:32	15:13	Col. 1:9
8:22	9:40	15:17	4:16
8:30	16:27	16:7	4:16
9:9	17:2	16:30	I Thes. 4:1
9:12	20:28	17:3	I Thes. 3:12
9:18	John 2:25	17:15	I Tim. 1:3
9:30	4:8	17:15	1:18
10:35	4:34	17:24	5:21
10:37	4:47	18:39	I John 2:27
10:48	6:29	19:31	3:11
10:51	6:39	19:38	3:23
11:16	6:40	Acts 17:15	4:21
11:28	8:56	19:4	5:16
12:19	11:50	I Cor. 1:10	II John 5
13:34	11:50	4:2	6
14:35	13:29	4:3	6
15:21	13:34	16:12	III John 4
Luke 4:3	13:34	16:12	Rev. 9:4
6:31	15:8	II Cor. 9:5	9:5
7:6			

ἵνα CLAUSES—POSSIBLY SUBSTANTIVE

Matt. 12:16	Luke 8:31	John 17:2	II Cor. 12:8
20:21	10:40	Acts 16:36	Gal. 2:9
20:31	18:39	27:42	Eph. 2:10
26:41	18:41	Rom. 15:31	6:19
26:63	21:36	16:2	Phil. 1:9
27:20	22:32	I Cor. 7:29	2:2
27:32	22:46	7:34	Col. 2:2
28:10	John 1:27	7:35	4:3
Mark 3:12	5:7	10:33	4:17
5:10	9:22	14:1	II Thes. 3:1
5:18	9:39	14:5	3:2
13:18	11:53	14:12	I Tim. 1:16
14:38	11:57	14:13	Tit. 2:12
15:11	12:10	16:10	3:8
Luke 1:43	13:15	II Cor. 1:17	

It is to be insisted once more that the above examples are not to be considered substantive clauses only if it is impossible to give them a purposive sense. Rather, both meanings should be equally considered and the interpretation given which best suits each example. There may, of course, be a difference of opinion concerning individual examples without invalidating the general claim.

Some discussion of a few of the examples in the above list may well be given, in order to illustrate the process of reasoning.

Matt. 4:3, εἰπέ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται—"Say that these stones should become bread", or, "Tell

these stones to become bread"—deals with the *content* of what is to be said, not the *reason* why something should be said.³⁸ The ἵνα clause is therefore a substantive clause, used as the direct object of the verb "say", not a purpose clause.

Luke 6:31, καθὼς θέλετε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι—"just as you wish that men (should) do to you"—deals with the *content* of the wish, answering the question, "What do you wish?" The hypothetical direct form of the "that" clause might be, "Oh, that men would do to me (thus)!" A purpose clause here would give the absurd idea that wishing would *serve the purpose* of inducing men to act in a certain manner. This example is therefore a ἵνα substantive clause.

John 2:25, οὐ χρεῖαν εἶχεν ἵνα τις μαρτυρήσῃ—"he did not have need that anyone should testify"—is an example of a ἵνα clause explaining the content of a noun. The content of the "need" which "he did *not* have" is, "Someone must testify". The passage is obviously not setting forth the purpose of the need.

I Cor. 4:2 reads, ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις ἵνα πιστός τις εὑρεθῇ. "it is sought in stewards that one (i.e., anyone, any steward) be found faithful". The "that" clause refers to the *content* of what is sought, not the reason why it is sought. The passage could be paraphrased, using a direct statement, "What is sought in stewards? Namely, he ought to be faithful (or, He must be faithful)." If the "that" clause were a purpose clause, it would be necessary to have something else stated as the object of the search. The thought would then be to the effect that "(Something or other) is sought for in stewards in order that they may be found faithful." This is clearly not

the meaning of the passage in question.

With these criteria for judging between substantive and purpose clauses after ἵνα it will not be necessary to depend upon the nondescript classification of "non-final clauses after various verbs of wishing, striving, exhorting, saying, commanding, etc., and other exegetical and object clauses". Indeed, one of the failures of Burton's classification is due to the fact that a ἵνα clause after such verbs might in some instances be a purpose clause, in other instances a substantive clause. For example:

Substantive clause: "Plead with him that he should be good."

Purpose clause: "Plead with him, in order that he may be good" (i.e., ". . . in order that your pleading may serve the purpose of helping him to be good.")

The verb "to say" generally requires an object. Therefore a ἵνα clause in the predicate of the verb "to say" will generally be an object clause unless there is something else to serve as the object. For example:

Substantive clause: "Say to this stone that it become bread." (Luke 4:3).

Purpose clause: "Say *the proper words* to this stone, *in order that* it may become bread."

With the phrase "the proper words" supplied to serve as the direct object of "say", the ἵνα clause may still be interpreted, however, either as a substantive or as a purpose clause. Interpreted as a substantive clause, the clause would be in apposition with the object of the verb, giving the meaning, "Say the proper words to this stone—namely, that you want it to become bread." In such a case the choice of meanings would be a matter of interpretation, just as is the case sometimes in determining whether a ὅτι clause is to be understood as a causal or a substantive clause. The verb "to pray", on the oth-

³⁸ Contra Winer, *op. cit.*, p. 351. But Winer unwarrantedly supplies the words "a word of power" as the object of "say".

er hand, may or may not take an object. Therefore in most instances of a ἵνα clause after the verb "to pray" it will be a matter of interpretation as to whether it is a purpose clause—"Pray, in order that this may come to pass"—or a substantive clause—"Let this be the content of your prayer." In many, if not most, of these instances in the New Testament, the sense seems to favor a substantive clause.

Up to this point, the discussion has dealt only with ἵνα. The related word ὅπως is found in the New Testament approximately 55 times, which is less than eight percent as often as ἵνα. Four of these instances seem definitely to be in substantive clauses; these are Matt. 8:34; Luke 7:3, 11:37; and Acts 23:20. The following additional instances are worthy of consideration in this classification:

Matt.	9:38	Luke	24:20	Acts	9:2
Mark	3:6	Acts	8:15		23:15
Luke	10:2		8:24		25:3

The fact that the grammarians have been slow to recognize the nature of ἵνα substantive clauses apparently implies that they have tacitly assumed that a statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood would be given indirect form by some other means. As a matter of fact, an examination of the New Testament would reveal that an infinitive construction is quite commonly used for this purpose.

With the two possible alternatives for expressing these ideas, the question might arise as to whether any reason could be given for using one construction in preference to the other in specific instances. In many instances of ἵνα substantive clauses there is no clear reason why this construction should have been preferred to the infinitive construction except that the writer simply chose to express it that way. There are, however, two possible

reasons for giving the ἵνα clause preference in some instances. First, if the subject of the verb in the substantive clause is not the same as the object of the verb governing that clause, then the infinitive construction might be less desirable, possibly being somewhat cumbersome; e.g., John 18:39, ἔστιν δὲ συνήθεια ὑμῖν ἵνα ἕνα ἀπολύσω ὑμῖν—"there is a custom with you that I should release one to you". An infinitive here would be translated, "There is a custom with you for me to release one to you". (See also I John 2:27, etc.) In other instances the writer may have desired to place emphasis upon the subject of the verb in the ἵνα clause, which may be the case in one of Paul's rare usages of the construction, I Cor. 1:10, παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς . . . ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες, καὶ μὴ ᾗ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα—"And I beseech you . . . that you all say the same thing and that there be not divisions among you". Moulton refers to I Cor. 14:5, in which the verb θέλω is followed by both the infinitive and the ἵνα substantive clause, and suggests that there may be found a greater urgency in the ἵνα clause than in the infinitive construction, which he says is demanded by the meaning of the passage.³⁹

Assuming, therefore, that the substantive clauses of the type under discussion may be expressed by ἵνα and the subjunctive mood, the question arises as to whether these ideas could also be expressed in a ὅτι clause, preserving as Machen puts it, "the same mood and tense as those which stood in the direct discourse lying back of the indirect".⁴⁰ An inspection of the ὅτι substantive clauses in the New Testament, in which the present writer was generously assisted by several of his students, brought to light only

³⁹ Moulton, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

two types of construction where the verb in such a clause was not in the indicative mood. One type was the idiom of strong negation, οὐ μή with the aorist subjunctive, which is not properly a subjunctive idea; the other was instances such as John 9:11 and Rom. 3:8, where ὅτι merely introduces a direct quotation and is not itself to be translated. This would seem to be additional evidence for the hypothesis presented in this article, that a ὅτι substantive clause expresses indirectly an idea of the indicative mood, while ideas of the subjunctive and imperative moods would similarly take ὅτι with the subjunctive mood.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to bring the foregoing discussion down to the level of practical application to the exegesis of the New Testament, some practical results may be pointed out.

If the hypothesis set forth in this article be accepted, the following outline of the uses of ὅτι clauses in the New Testament may be set forth as follows:

I. Purpose clause ("telic" or "final" use). Answers the question, "Why?" ὅτι is to be translated "in order that". Examples: Mark 3:10, Luke 5:24, Rom. 14:9. (ὅπως is similarly

used in the New Testament, but less frequently than ὅτι. Examples: Matt. 2:8, Acts 25:26.)

II. Clause of conceived result (infrequent use). Possible future result; to be distinguished from the more common ὥστε with the infinitive result clause. Examples: Rom. 11:11, I John 1:9 (?).

III. Substantive clause (noun clause). Answers the question, "What?" Deals with content rather than purpose. ὅτι is to be translated "that", in the same sense in which ὅτι is translated "that". (ὅπως is occasionally thus used in the New Testament; e.g., Matt. 8:34, Acts 23:20.) This type of clause is an *indirect* statement, or the extension of that idea, whose *direct* form would fall into one of the two following classes:

A. A statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood. Examples: Mark 5:43, John 4:8, II Cor. 9:5.

B. In a few instances, a statement in the future indicative (like a ὅτι clause), although perhaps closely related to a subjunctive idea. Examples: Matt. 18:14, Rev. 6:4.

Upon this foundation, the task of the exegete is to use his own experience with the Greek New Testament, together with the standard reference commentaries upon that text, to give the best interpretation to each passage.