



# Electoral Politics Amid Africa's Urban Transition: A Study of Urban Ghana

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# **Electoral Politics amid Africa's Urban Transition: A Study of Urban Ghana**

A dissertation presented

by

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to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

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# **Electoral Politics amid Africa's Urban Transition: A Study of Urban Ghana**

## **Abstract**

Africa is rapidly urbanizing. With so many African voters now living in cities, understanding African electoral politics now requires understanding the politics of urban areas. How does urbanization affect the accountability relationships between voters and politicians? Answering this question means answering a series of more specific empirical questions: what do urban voters want from the government? Which types of urban voters participate in politics and which do not? How do urban voters choose which candidates to support? How do politicians campaign in cities? Which types of urban voters do politicians seek to favor with state resources?

Electoral politics in African cities received significant attention in the independence era, but little political science research has examined these cities in the contemporary democratic period. The small literature that has is largely supportive of modernization approaches. Modernization theories expect a series of socio-economic transformations created by urbanization to reduce the political importance of ethnicity and the prevalence of clientelism and other forms of patronage-based politics. But I argue that urbanization also simultaneously creates conditions that reinforce incentives for patronage distribution, clientelism, and ethnic voting. Scarcity in the provision of basic services in contexts of low state capacity encourages politicians to continue employing patronage-based appeals. This solidifies many voters' incentives to support ethnically-aligned parties and drives the new urban middle class away from active political participation, lowering pressure on urban politicians to engage in programmatic, policy-based competition.

I explore these incentives through a detailed study of Greater Accra, the largest metropolitan area in Ghana. I combine original survey data and survey experiments, fine-grained geo-coded census data, and extensive qualitative evidence to explore voters' policy preferences, vote choices, and patterns of political

participation, as well as politicians' strategies in a cross-section of urban neighborhoods. The findings suggest that rather than pulling political competition in one direction, as modernization theories expect, urbanization in Africa instead moves political outcomes in multiple directions at once: reinforcing ethnic competition and clientelism in some neighborhoods, while undermining these forms of political competition in other neighborhoods within the same city at the same time. Studies of the effects of urbanization must recognize that these dual realities co-exist within African cities.

In addition to building our understanding of urban politics in Africa, the dissertation contributes to broader political science debates about the emergence of programmatic competition, determinants of political participation, patterns of distributive politics, the importance of neighborhood context, and the causes of ethnic political competition in new democracies.

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# 1 | Elections in an Urbanizing Africa

## 1.1 The Changes and Challenges of Urban Growth

By the mid-1980s, Accra, the capital city of Ghana, already had over one million residents. But you did not need to drive far from the city center to find rural life. Seven miles (12km) northwest of downtown, for example, was Gbawe, a farming community nestled in the sloping hills overlooking the city. The 1984 census counted 837 residents. Almost all were Ga, the indigenous ethnic group of the Accra area. Most worked on small family farms. A chief's palace sat at the center of the village, surrounded by traditional compound houses belonging to the community's original Ga families (Gough & Yankson 2006). A photo of Gbawe taken a decade later in 1995, included in Gough & Yankson (2006), shows thatched reed roofs on the homes surrounding the palace, typical of poor villages in rural Ghana.

But a major change began in the 1990s. As the city grew and Accra became increasingly crowded, residents sought new land on the city's outskirts (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012). Accra rapidly expanded westward. By 2000, Gbawe's population mushroomed to 29,000. By 2010, it reached 68,000. Gbawe's population density is now over 24,000 people per square mile (9,300 per sq. km), nearly double that of Boston and greater than every US metropolitan area except New York. Only 25% of the residents were Ga as of 2010. These original inhabitants had been dwarfed by the Akan, an ethnic group from elsewhere in Ghana, who now make up 58% of the community.

Visiting Gbawe today, you can see vestiges of the original village. The chief's palace still sits in the center of the community. The homes immediately surrounding it still belong to the original Ga families. But they have been renovated, now looking like other lower class houses throughout the city instead of village dwellings. The chief retains some power among the Ga who remain in Gbawe.<sup>1</sup> But the new residents who

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<sup>1</sup>There have been prominent conflicts within the Ga community in Gbawe and surrounding "villages" over chieftaincy, especially in Oblogo, a directly neighboring community. The Oblogo chief was murdered in 2012 as part of a dispute between the Gbawe

now form the majority in the community have little relationship with him. Walk a few blocks past the palace in either direction and you find yourself in a diverse lower class neighborhood that looks indistinguishable from others throughout Greater Accra. A mile north of the chief's palace, on what was farm land two decades ago, you come to a quiet suburban neighborhood of single-family homes for Accra's growing professional middle class.

The transformation of Gbawe from a small village on the outskirts of a city to a dense urban community in the middle of a major metropolitan area is indicative of broader changes occurring across sub-Saharan Africa. Africa's urban population has increased by a quarter billion people since 1990, with nearly 100 million new urbanites in West Africa alone (United Nations 2014). This mirrors the trend across the developing world, where there are now one billion new urban residents since 1990, *excluding* the well-documented urban growth in China (United Nations 2014). Table 1.1 shows urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa and provides a comparison to other regions of the developing world. Southern Africa has long been relatively more urbanized than the rest of the continent, due to industrialization in South Africa. But near majorities of the population in West and Central Africa now live in cities as well, despite significantly less industrialization. This includes Ghana, where more than half of the population now lives in cities for the first time. Cities represent a smaller proportion of the population in East Africa, but current rates of urbanization are faster there than in every world region except East Asia.

Urban growth has coincided in the last two decades with the longest period of sustained economic growth since independence in many African countries (Radelet 2010). Annual GDP growth in Ghana averaged 5.5% since 1985, among the highest rates in the world. The country is now considered "middle income" by the World Bank. The majority of African countries had growth rates averaging over 3% annually over the last 30 years.<sup>2</sup> The re-introduction of multi-party electoral competition in many African countries has coincided with this urban growth. As of 2014, the 29 sub-Saharan countries listed in Table 1.1 are either now democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections.<sup>3</sup> These are countries in which the study of elections is important for explaining political outcomes, even if not all are fully democratic

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royal family and Ga families from elsewhere in Accra over land ownership in that community. These conflicts are indicative of the continued relevance of chieftaincy to segments of the Ga population. For example, see: Rocklyn Antonio and Linda Tenyah, "Chief Murdered in Accra," *The Daily Guide*, 10 April 2012.

<sup>2</sup>See [databank.worldbank.org/data](http://databank.worldbank.org/data).

<sup>3</sup>These countries are defined based on Freedom House (2014) scores of "Free" or "Partly Free" and/or Polity IV (2014) scores of 1 or greater.

Table 1.1: Urban Population in Sub-Saharan Africa in Democratic or Hybrid Regimes

<i>Region / Country:</i>	% Urban (1965)	% Urban (1990)	% Urban (2015)	Annual % Change (2010-2015)	F.H. (2014)	Polity IV (2014)
<b>West Africa (total)</b>	16.6	30.2	45.1	1.6	–	–
Cote d'Ivoire	24.5	39.3	54.2	1.4	Partly Free	4
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>54.0</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>Free</b>	<b>8</b>
Liberia	22.1	55.4	49.7	0.8	Partly Free	6
Guinea-Bissau	14.3	28.1	49.3	1.7	Not Free	6
Nigeria	16.6	29.7	47.8	1.9	Partly Free	4
Benin	12.5	34.5	44.0	1.0	Free	7
Senegal	26.4	38.9	43.7	0.7	Free	7
Togo	15.0	28.6	40.0	1.3	Partly Free	-2
Sierra Leone	20.4	33.3	39.9	0.9	Partly Free	7
Mali	12.6	23.3	39.9	2.1	Partly Free	5
Guinea	13.0	28.0	37.2	1.3	Partly Free	4
Burkina Faso	5.2	13.8	29.9	3.0	Partly Free	0
Niger	6.8	15.4	18.7	1.3	Partly Free	6
<b>Central Africa (total)</b>	19.7	32.2	44.0	1.2	–	–
Gabon	23.8	69.1	87.2	0.3	Not Free	3
D.R.C.	23.4	30.6	42.5	1.2	Not Free	5
<b>Southern Africa (total)</b>	42.9	48.8	61.6	0.8	–	–
South Africa	47.2	52.0	64.8	0.8	Free	9
Botswana	3.8	41.9	57.4	0.4	Free	8
Namibia	20.0	27.7	46.7	2.3	Free	6
Lesotho	6.4	14.0	27.3	2.0	Free	8
<b>East Africa (total)</b>	8.9	17.9	25.6	1.7	–	–
Djibouti	56.1	76.0	77.3	0.1	Not Free	4
Zambia	23.4	39.4	40.9	1.1	Partly Free	7
Madagascar	12.4	23.6	35.1	1.9	Partly Free	6
Zimbabwe	14.6	29.0	32.4	-0.5	Not Free	4
Mozambique	5.8	25.0	32.2	0.8	Partly Free	6
Tanzania	6.0	18.9	31.6	2.3	Partly Free	-1
Kenya	8.6	16.7	25.6	1.7	Partly Free	9
Malawi	4.9	11.6	16.3	0.9	Partly Free	6
Uganda	5.5	11.1	16.1	2.1	Partly Free	-1
Burundi	2.3	6.3	12.1	2.5	Partly Free	6
<b>Sub-Sah. Africa (total)</b>	20.6	31.3	40.4	1.4	–	–
<i>Comparison Regions:</i>						
<b>South America (total)</b>	55.8	74.1	83.3	0.3	–	–
<b>Central America (total)</b>	50.2	65.1	73.8	0.4	–	–
<b>Caribbean (total)</b>	42.5	57.9	70.4	0.8	–	–
<b>Mid-East (W. Asia) (total)</b>	40.4	61.1	69.9	0.5	–	–
<b>East Asia (total)</b>	25.0	33.9	60.0	2.0	–	–
<b>Southeast Asia (total)</b>	19.9	31.6	47.6	1.4	–	–
<b>Central Asia (total)</b>	40.8	44.6	40.5	0.0	–	–
<b>South Asia (total)</b>	18.4	26.5	34.8	1.2	–	–

*Population figures and sub-region classifications from United Nations (2014). Sub-region totals include all countries. Individual countries listed are the subset within regions with either Freedom House (F.H.) ratings of at least "partly free" or Polity IV scores over 0 (higher scores are more democratic). The table excludes small island nations that the UN classifies as part of sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Seychelles, Mauritius).*

(Levitsky & Way 2010). The urban population has grown in all but one of the countries listed in Table 1.1 since 1990. At least one third of the electorate now lives in cities in 19 of these countries.<sup>4</sup>

With so many African voters living in cities, understanding African electoral politics now requires understanding the politics of urban areas. How does urbanization affect the accountability relationships between voters and politicians in African democracies? Answering this question means answering a series of more specific questions about how electoral competition in urban settings actually operates: What do urban voters want from the government? Which types of urban voters participate in politics and which do not? How do voters choose which candidates to support in urban areas? How do politicians campaign in cities? Which types of urban voters do politicians seek to favor with state resources? These are the core empirical questions examined in the dissertation.

Urbanization has brought major socio-economic changes to African cities that affect the answers to these questions. These include the emergence of large urban middle classes in many countries, alongside the simultaneous expansion of impoverished slums (Kessides 2006, UN-Habitat 2010, African Development Bank 2011). Traditional social institutions, such as chieftaincy, have adapted to new urban conditions. The composition of urban populations has also changed with rural-urban migration, with many cities becoming highly ethnically diverse, bringing different groups into greater social contact and interaction than in rural areas.

Parallel to these societal changes, urban growth is also producing challenges for Africa's governments. We can only understand the political effects of the socio-economic changes associated with urbanization – the emergence of an urban middle class, the declining importance of traditional elites, and rising ethnic diversity – if we examine how these interact with the incentives created by new urban governance challenges. Fundamentally, these challenges are rooted in scarcity. Population growth creates massive demands for basic public services and infrastructure. Entire urban neighborhoods have emerged as if out of nothing in short periods of time, with what had been rural villages rapidly transforming into the urban periphery. These new areas often urbanize despite lacking basic infrastructure – paved roads, running water, sewers, trash collection, and public schools. Population growth is also overwhelming pre-existing infrastructure in older urban neighborhoods. City centers suffer from traffic jams, blackouts, dry water taps, flooding sewers,

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<sup>4</sup>Worldwide, over 80% of the urban growth in the developing world outside of China has come in countries that now hold multi-party elections. This is calculated from United Nations (2014) population data, classifying non-OECD countries (excluding China) based on 2014 Polity IV scores of 1 or greater.

and over-capacity schools and hospitals.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, even as the middle class and formal sectors grow, the majority of urban residents remain in the informal sector economy (Kessides 2006). These workers are often separated from village-level institutions that provide social insurance and shut out from formal sources of capital (Nichter and Goldmark 2009, Grimm et al. 2012). This leads residents in the informal sector to place significant demands on politicians for access to stable jobs and financing for businesses. In addition, politicians must address rising tensions in many cities over access to land and housing.

Elected governments have been failing to respond to many of these challenges, hampered by low state capacity and significant resource constraints. In the words of one media account, cities in Africa are “outstripping the ability of weak and plodding central governments to manage... them.”<sup>6</sup> Most urban growth is unplanned and unregulated, occurring in spite of whatever national government policies are in place to control it (UN-Habitat 2014). Demand for new infrastructure and services is now simply far greater than what most governments can provide. But precisely because politicians lack the capacity to address all of these challenges, urbanization creates new opportunities for them as they seek election. These politicians control many of the most valuable resources in the urban economy – the ability to decide who gets goods like new roads, running water, or public sector employment, and, importantly, who does not. Their distributive decisions rest at the heart of urban electoral politics.

Many recent discussions of urban politics in Africa suggest that the socio-economic changes associated with urbanization should all pull political competition toward more programmatic and policy-based elections, and away from ethnic competition and patronage-based politics. These studies often argue that electoral competition in urban Africa is somehow inherently different from that in rural areas, where ethnic competition and patronage distribution are commonly assumed to prevail (e.g., Lindberg 2010, Harding 2010, Koter 2013*b*, Resnick 2014). Ethnicity is thought to lose its central importance in elections as social identities change in urban melting pots (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2009, Green 2014, Resnick 2014). The rise of the urban middle class and the decline of traditional elites is thought to change voters’ preferences and free them from the constraints of patron-client relationships (e.g., Wahman and Boone 2015), reducing politicians’ reliance on patronage-based strategies (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Koter 2013*b*, Stokes et

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<sup>5</sup>Wealthy urban residents privately provide some services to themselves, at great cost. Elsewhere, some communities organize on their own to build basic local public goods. But these are imperfect solutions. Most urban residents still place significant demands on elected leaders for infrastructure and services.

<sup>6</sup>Howard W. French, “How Africa’s New Urban Centers are Shifting Its Old Colonial Boundaries,” *The Atlantic*, 1 July 2013.

al. 2013). Taken together, these studies mirror the predictions of “modernization” theories from the mid-20th century (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960), either explicitly or implicitly.

But these studies often exhibit two shortcomings. First, studies focusing on the effects of the social transformations of urbanization give only half of the story, missing the countervailing incentives created by the governance challenges outlined above. Even as wealth rises and cities “modernize,” scarcity in access to basic state resources created by urbanization allows politicians to persist with patronage distribution. Distribution of state resources to favored ethnic groups then continues to polarize politics along ethnic lines in many urban neighborhoods, even as the social importance placed on ethnicity in daily social life in cities declines. And entrenched patronage practices lead middle class voters to withdraw from political participation rather than place electoral pressure on politicians to forego clientelistic appeals.

Second, existing studies often implicitly view cities as homogeneous entities, taking insights that may only apply in parts of a city and applying them to all of urban politics in general. This misses key intra-urban variation. I argue that variation in the local wealth and ethnic diversity of urban neighborhoods, as well as in the social importance of traditional elites, creates incentives for politicians and voters to engage with each other in different ways in different neighborhoods. I show that there are neighborhoods where ethnicity does not influence vote choice and little patronage is distributed. But elsewhere in the same city, sometimes just a few blocks away, ethnic voting and clientelism can remain extensive.<sup>7</sup>

These latter neighborhoods are not anachronistic holdouts. They are not places still in the process of transitioning, or in which the social transformations of urbanization and modernization have not yet had the time to take hold. Instead, a core insight of the dissertation is that the neighborhoods in which ethnic political competition and clientelism persist are just as representative of modern urban politics and the political effects of urbanization as the neighborhoods where ethnic voting and clientelism are rare. Rather than pulling political competition in one direction, as modernization theories expect, urbanization instead

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<sup>7</sup>The use of terms such as “clientelism” is inconsistent in the literature. I use clientelism to refer specifically to contingent exchanges between politicians and voters in which particularistic goods (private or club goods) are given in expectation that voters comply with support (Hicken 2011). This involves repeated interactions over time between politicians and voters, with politicians attempting to monitor recipients so that future benefits can be withheld if they do not comply. Particularistic goods (private or club goods) can also be distributed selectively based on political criteria, but given in a single-shot exchange in which the politician does not expect all recipients to follow through with support or seriously attempt to monitor them. I refer to this latter type of distribution more generally as “patronage distribution.” Some of what others label clientelism or vote buying in Africa (and elsewhere) is actually in this second category, not the first (Kramon 2011, Guardado & Wantchekon 2014). “Programmatic” or “universalistic” distribution occurs when similar benefits are distributed based on universally applicable criteria (e.g., need) and not targeted based on political variables. See Stokes et al. (2013) and Golden and Min (2013) for related discussions of these distinctions, albeit with slightly different terminology.

moves political outcomes in multiple directions at once. Urbanization creates more diverse, middle and upper class neighborhoods, where I find the connection between ethnicity and vote choice is fraying and clientelism is rare. But urbanization also means the rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010), where I show incentives for ethnic voting are being reinforced and clientelism remains common. I show that ethnic voting also remains common in ethnically segregated neighborhoods, even when they are wealthy. We cannot point to the wealthy, diverse neighborhoods within cities alone and claim that modernization theory's predictions are being borne out, while ignoring the effects of urbanization in the remainder of these cities. Instead, studies of the effects of urbanization must recognize that these dual realities can co-exist within the same city.

Electoral politics in urban Africa received significant scholarly attention in the independence era (1950s-1970s). But little political science research has examined African cities in the contemporary democratic period; much of our recent theory about contemporary elections in Africa comes instead from studies of predominately rural data. I change course and engage in a detailed study of elections and political behavior in the Greater Accra metropolitan area, the largest urban area in Ghana and the ninth largest in sub-Saharan Africa. I attempt to offer a fuller picture of electoral politics in African cities than existing literature by examining voters' preferences, vote choices, and patterns of political participation, as well as politicians' strategies for building support in a representative cross-section of neighborhoods in this city.

The dissertation also contributes to political science debates beyond the study of urbanization or African politics. As outlined below, I expand upon theories about the emergence of programmatic politics, the determinants of turnout, patterns of distributive politics, the importance of local ethnic geography, and the underlying causes of ethnic political competition in new democracies.

## **1.2 Theories of the Political Effects of Urbanization in Africa**

### **1.2.1 Modernization and Post-Independence Africa**

Prominent early predictions about the political effects of urbanization were rooted in modernization theory. Classical modernization theory predicts that as societies urbanize and develop, the social and political importance of ethnicity and traditional kin-based ties should decline. Class-based political movements and social identities should emerge in their place, mobilizing an increasing share of the populace into active political

participation around parties articulating class-based policy platforms similar to those in Western democracies (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960, Deutsch 1961). Central to this transformation is the emergence of an educated urban middle class, with high levels of participation in cross-cutting forms of associational life (e.g., unions) instead of traditional ethnic-based institutions (Lipset 1960, Inkeles 1966). This urban middle class then becomes the backbone of the modern democratic electorate, better able to hold politicians accountable for performance than impoverished voters bound to leaders by primordial kin-based ties. As politicians compete for votes of the educated urban middle class, the quality of governance improves, raising prospects for future economic growth in the process. A self-reinforcing cycle emerges in which growth begets better government and democracy, which then begets more growth (Lipset 1960).

But these types of predictions did not find empirical support in the first generation of scholarship on urbanization and growth in Africa. A large literature studied the political effects of urbanization in Africa in the late colonial and early post-independence periods (1950s-1970s), when the first electoral competition occurred in Africa. A central contribution of this literature was its rebuttal of modernization hypotheses about urbanization and political change.

Ethnicity instead became *more* politically important as cities and economies grew in newly independent African states, not less. Rather than losing their connections to rural village life, urban residents were often described as “absentee villagers” working in the urban economy, but remitting income back to home villages where their families remained (Gugler & Flanagan 1978).<sup>8</sup> New forms of associational life did emerge in urban areas and become the basis for political organizations, as modernization theorists expected. But these associations were often explicitly ethnic in nature (Epstein 1958, Little 1964, Wallerstein 1964). Rather than providing cross-cutting social ties, ethnic youth associations and similar groups helped rural-urban migrants sharing a common rural region of origin find their place in the urban economy and lobby for access to government benefits. Independence-era ethnic associations in urban areas were often more powerful than labor unions, and served as support bases for the first political parties.

While political parties that grew from independence movements were often initially multi-ethnic (Coleman 1954), ethnic-based electoral competition was central to post-independence urban politics.<sup>9</sup> Studies of ur-

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<sup>8</sup>Ekeh (1975) describes political implications of the social pressures rural families placed on urban dwellers to send back wealth gained in the city.

<sup>9</sup>In Ghana, however, salient ethnic political cleavages emerged before independence with Ashanti and Akyem opposition to Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) (Allman 1993, Rathbone 2000). A similar ethnic cleavage remains salient in



ban Nigeria, for example, document significant ethnic political competition in Lagos and Port Harcourt immediately upon independence (Baker 1974, Wolpe 1974). Melson (1971) shows that urban workers in Nigeria supported parties aligned with their ethnic groups rather than socialist parties offering policy platforms that favored their class-based interests. Summarizing a large body of literature, Bates (1983) describes politics in this era as a competition among ethnic groups to capture wealth in the modern urban economy and redistribute it back to rural homelands. Rather than fading away, new ethnic identities emerged in cities, aggregating previously distinct sub-groups into unified political blocs. These identities were sometimes conscious constructions of urban political elites seeking to mobilize larger coalitions of voters (Bates 1983).<sup>10</sup> This then carried over into rural politics, with ethnic bloc voting in rural areas fueled by ethnic favoritism by governments that disproportionately targeted state resources to aligned regions.

Early political parties also did not take on the characteristics expected by modernization theories. Consistent with Lipset (1960), Deutsch (1961), and others, these parties did mobilize voters to a significantly greater degree in urban than rural areas (Zolberg 1966). Many of these parties had lofty official platforms steeped in socialist language that made explicit class-based appeals. But Zolberg (1966) demonstrates that this ideological content often bore little relation to how the first generation of African parties governed once in office. Instead, most ruling parties either became clientelistic political machines or institutions of authoritarian control (Zolberg 1966, Scott 1969, Lemarchand 1972).

But even though modernization theories found little empirical support in post-independence literature on urban African politics, contemporary scholars have reasons to reconsider these predictions. Most importantly, it may simply have been too early in Africa's development for the changes envisioned by modernization theorists to have occurred. Middle and upper classes were minuscule in the 1950s-70s, both in absolute terms and by comparison to contemporary cities. Studies from this period also examined politics before sustained democratization. Many countries became single party states almost immediately after independence. The democratic period was brief even where elections were initially more competitive, with military coups dispatching elected governments. Patterns of electoral competitive may be significantly different once

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Ghanaian politics into the present (see Chapters 2 and 5).

<sup>10</sup>This built on the solidification of new ethnic identities during the late colonial period. Epstein (1958) and Posner (2005) describe the creation of new ethnic identities in urban Zambia during colonialism. Schildkrout (1976) describes a similar process among migrants in Kumasi, Ghana. Cohen (1969), Baker (1974), and Wolpe (1974) do the same for several cities in Nigeria. Vail (1989) documents this process throughout Southern Africa.

democracy becomes institutionalized.

Moreover, key features of the post-independence era that prevented modernization theory's predictions from occurring may no longer be relevant. Early literature on urban Africa placed a central focus on rural-urban migration. Urban growth in these decades was mainly due to migration from rural areas (Gugler & Flanagan 1978). But recent growth in African cities is due more to higher rates of natural increase in urban than rural areas than to migration (Kessides 2006). The majority of current urban residents in Ghana, for example, have lived in cities for their entire lives (Ghana Statistical Service 2008). They are more often the children and grandchildren of rural-urban migrants than migrants themselves. Ethnic youth associations, which used to play a central role in integrating rural-urban migrants into urban life, are now much less active.<sup>11</sup> Theories about first-generation migrants are ill-suited to explain the behavior of much of the current urban electorate. In particular, the high salience of ethnicity discussed in the earlier literature could be unique to the migrant experience. For example, Severino & Ray (2011) argues that, similar to American history, first generation urban residents may rely on ethnic ties to establish a foothold in the urban economy, but longer-term forces of assimilation may ultimately reduce the importance of ethnicity for subsequent generations. Because of these differences in context, more recent studies of urban politics in Africa (see below) have either returned to arguments similar to modernization theory or otherwise now suggest that ethnicity and patronage are less important in urban areas – both in comparison to contemporary rural areas and to urban areas in the earlier historical period.

### **1.2.2 Urban-Rural Differences in Contemporary African Politics**

A much smaller literature examines urban politics in the contemporary period, after multi-party elections became routine in many countries. The central focus in this newer literature has been on differences between urban and rural areas. Several studies explain these urban-rural differences using modernization theory.

Focusing on the individual-level importance of ethnic identity, Robinson (2014) finds that Afrobarometer respondents in urban areas are more likely than those in rural areas to rank their national identity as

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<sup>11</sup>For example, the survey from Greater Accra analyzed in later chapters finds that less than 5% of residents belong to such an association. Resnick (2014, p. 125) finds similarly low levels of associational participation among poor voters in Lusaka, Zambia. In addition, I find in Chapter 5 that urban voters' ties to ancestral rural homelands no longer have any explanatory power for voting behavior.

more important than their ethnic identity.<sup>12</sup> Green (2014) also uses Afrobarometer data to show that respondents in Botswana are less likely to emphasize their ethnic identities as they become integrated into the urban economy. Green (2014) and Robinson (2014) explain these results by directly referencing classical modernization theory. These Afrobarometer questions are not measures of political behavior, however. There may be an important difference between the ways in which people socially define themselves and the political uses of ethnicity. Existing theories of ethnic voting in African politics – including literature from the post-independence era – already make this distinction explicit. Instrumental theories of ethnicity argue that voters do not support co-ethnic candidates and parties out of “expressive” social allegiance to identity groups, but because of strategic incentives created by patterns of patronage distribution (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). Even if social attachments to ethnic groups change in cities, incentives to support co-ethnic parties and candidates can persist if voters expect ethnic favoritism in the distribution of state resources.

But looking more directly at political behavior, Conroy-Krutz (2009) also finds less overall self-reported voting for co-ethnic parties among urban than rural Afrobarometer respondents in a cross-section of African countries, again linking this finding to a modernization hypothesis. Resnick (2012, 2014) examines voting behavior of poor informal sector workers in Lusaka, Zambia and Dakar, Senegal. She argues that parties that are best able to build support with these voters place less emphasis on ethnic appeals than they do in rural areas and instead campaign on populist policy messages that appeal to class-based rather than ethnic interests.<sup>13</sup> In terms of distributive politics, Koter (2013b) argues that urban voters in Senegal are less susceptible to clientelism because of the declining importance of traditional elites in urban areas, who are not available to serve as clientelistic brokers for the ruling party in the same way that they are in rural areas. Lindberg (2010) argues that MPs in urban areas of Ghana are less able to buy votes than in rural areas

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<sup>12</sup>Wealthier and better educated respondents are also more likely to emphasize national over ethnic identities on these surveys, consistent with a modernization hypothesis.

<sup>13</sup>Despite this argument, however, Resnick (2014) still finds that ethnicity predicts vote choice among the urban poor in Zambia (p. 138). She also notes that the opposition party most successful with these voters, the Patriotic Front (PF), still employed patronage-based strategies; 77% of respondents in Lusaka reported private goods distribution by opposition parties before the 2008 election (p. 131; also see p. 80). Moreover, while promises to lower taxes and rein in Chinese investment were clearly programmatic, much of the PF’s campaign rhetoric that Resnick labels programmatic – such as promises to provide jobs, housing, and various club goods (water, sanitation, etc.; see Resnick 2014, p. 76-79) – is observationally equivalent to the campaign rhetoric that would be expected from an entirely patronage-based party. Similarly phrased promises are made by both parties in Ghana, including the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which styles itself as pro-business and would never be labeled “populist.” See Chapter 3.

because urban voters are generally more sophisticated than rural voters and harder to bind in clientelistic relationships.<sup>14</sup>

Harding (2010) also finds urban-rural differences in voting behavior in cross-national Afrobarometer data. He argues that urban voters are more likely to support opposition parties than rural voters, regardless of their ethnicity. This contrasts with widespread ethnic voting in rural areas. But rather than a modernization argument, Harding (2010) attributes this to governments engaging in “rural bias” after democratization, with urban voters differentially opposing ruling parties because more state resources are being directed to rural communities (Stasavage 2005, Bates & Block 2013). This idea that urban voters are often inherently more likely to support opposition parties has been echoed by other scholars (e.g., Resnick 2011, Koter 2013*b*, Wahman and Boone 2013).<sup>15</sup>

In addition to these studies on Africa, a variant of modernization theory remains prevalent in contemporary scholarship that examines transitions between patronage-based and policy-based political competition. In line with the national-level correlation between levels of wealth and the extent of programmatic politics, there is a general expectation that rising incomes and the emergence of the middle class will lead to declines in patronage-based competition in favor of policy-based competition, particularly in competitive electoral environments (Kitschelt 2007, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 2014).<sup>16</sup> There are clear exceptions to this pattern – wealthy countries in which forms of clientelism have persisted, such as Italy and Japan late into the 20th century. But even in these cases, patronage-based political competition has usually been most prevalent in less urbanized or less economically developed regions (Chubb 1982, Scheiner 2006, Scheiner 2007).<sup>17</sup>

Outside of the academic literature, similar ideas rooted in modernization theory now hold significant

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<sup>14</sup>Unlike Koter (2013*b*) and Lindberg (2010), however, Paller (2014) provides evidence of significant clientelism in slums in urban Ghana. The empirical findings in Koter (2013*b*), Lindberg (2010), and Paller (2014) need not be mutually exclusive if we consider variation across types of urban neighborhoods – a point I return to below.

<sup>15</sup>But Harding (2010) finds that rural-urban differences in incumbent support attenuate as the urban proportion of a country’s population rises and the incentives for rural bias by governments decline. Cities are not especially likely to support opposition parties in the most urbanized African countries. Moreover, Table 1.3 below shows that very few of the largest cities in African democracies are strongholds of any specific party.

<sup>16</sup>Wealth is not the only key variable in literature on the decline of clientelism in advanced democracies. Others have emphasized the importance of supply-side factors, such as institutional reforms to bureaucracies that prevent favoritism in resource allocation (e.g., Shefter 1994). See further discussion below, and in Chapter 7.

<sup>17</sup>Luna (2014) and Weitz-Shapiro (2012, 2014) find similar variation in the presence of patronage distribution across municipalities with different levels of wealth within Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina.

weight in popular discussion of African urbanization and growth. As an example from the policy world, Severino & Ray (2011), of the World Bank and the *Agence Francaise de Developpement*, predict the “end of ethnicity” as a relevant political identity as Africa urbanizes. They argue that ethnic identities are losing political salience among the urban middle class due to forces of modernization and inter-ethnic assimilation, especially through cross-cutting social ties similar to those theorized by Lipset (1960).<sup>18</sup> In the recent press, the growth of the urban middle class is commonly linked to predicted improvements in democratic accountability and to the declining importance of ethnicity. As one of many such examples, *Reuters* describes Africa’s emerging urban middle class as “enlightened voters” and “drivers of democracy,” who are “more likely to vote according to policies and issues rather than automatic or traditional allegiances to any party or ethnic group.”<sup>19</sup> Now that they can have “preoccupations beyond where the next meal is coming from,” *The Guardian* argues that Africa’s new urban middle class is “an agent of change” that will improve democratic governance.<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Policy* predicts the middle class will be “a massive boom to political growth,” unwilling to “to put up with [political] business as usual.”<sup>21</sup> Writing in *The New York Times*, David Brooks describes Africa’s “main story” as an “impressive surge of growth, urbanization, and modernization,” defined by a “cosmopolitan trend,” including a “greater mixing of tribal groupings” in urban areas, that is changing social and political attitudes and improving the quality of governance.<sup>22</sup>

Considered together, the more recent academic literature and the popular discussions of African urbanization suggest that electoral politics in contemporary African cities with growing middle classes should differ significantly from patterns typically assumed to hold in rural areas. In direct contrast to the post-independence era evidence, these sources suggest that: (a) urban politics should be characterized by reduced reliance on patronage-based appeals in comparison to rural areas, with greater emphasis instead on policy-based, programmatic competition, especially along class lines; and (b) ethnicity should be less important for

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<sup>18</sup>In more general terms, Radelet (2010), of the Brookings Institution, describes a series of African countries as now being in beneficial feedback loops of economic growth, improving democratic accountability, and better policy implementation, with Ghana foremost among them. The language echoes earlier modernization theories about how economic growth and democracy should be mutually reinforcing.

<sup>19</sup>Pascal Fletcher, “Africa’s Emerging Middle Class Drives Growth and Democracy,” *Reuters*, 10 May 2013.

<sup>20</sup>David Smith and Lucy Lamble, “Africa’s Burgeoning Middle Class Brings Hope to a Continent,” *The Guardian*, 25 December 2011.

<sup>21</sup>Elizabeth Dickinson, “Middle Class Africa,” *Foreign Policy: Passport Blog*, 6 May 2011.

<sup>22</sup>David Brooks, “The Real Africa,” *The New York Times*, 8 May 2014.

vote choice in urban than rural areas.

But in the subsequent chapters I show empirically that neither of these two predictions appear to hold in much of urban Ghana. I find that patronage distribution remains extensive in many neighborhoods. There is little evidence of a sustained shift to policy-based competition, even in the wealthiest urban areas. Urban politicians continue to use ethnicity as a key criterion for deciding how to target their resources, both during campaigns and once in office. Ethnicity still strongly predicts vote choice for many voters, even among those who do not list their ethnic identity as salient at an individual level in questions similar to those in Green (2014) and Robinson (2014). Middle class voters are as likely to support ethnically-affiliated parties as poor voters. None of these features of electoral politics are inherently different in urban than rural areas. Why?

### **1.3 The Argument**

Urbanization does affect political competition. But rather than producing changes to political outcomes that all move in the same direction – towards more policy-based competition and less reliance on ethnicity – the socio-economic transformations and the governance challenges associated with urbanization often create mutually conflicting incentives. I explain these mixed effects for the three societal changes discussed above. These are changes to: (a) the wealth of voters, (b) the power of traditional social institutions, and (c) the ethnic composition of local neighborhoods.

#### **1.3.1 Wealth and the Urban Middle Class**

The first main explanatory variable is the wealth of voters.<sup>23</sup> The urban middle class is growing quickly in many countries, with rising incomes and expanding formal sector employment (Radelet 2010, African Development Bank 2011).<sup>24</sup> At the same time, however, this growth has been uneven and unequal; many

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<sup>23</sup>While increases in wealth are not a direct outcome of urbanization itself, it is appropriate to consider the impact of wealth as part of the broader process of urbanization. Recent gains in wealth have been concentrated in urban areas, where the overwhelming majority of the upper and middle classes live. More importantly, the emergence of the urban middle class is a central component of the existing theories about the effects of urbanization discussed above.

<sup>24</sup>There is debate about how to define the poverty line, which leads to disagreement about the size of this middle class (e.g., Freemantle 2014 vs. African Development Bank 2011; also see Thurlow et al. 2015). But there is consensus that the middle class is growing significantly, however defined. This is occurring despite little industrialization and is not solely due to oil and mineral extraction (Kessides 2006, Radelet 2010). I describe how I define the middle class in more detail in Chapter 2, drawing on definitions proposed by Thurlow et al. (2015).

other urban residents remain poor, living in slums (UN-Habitat 2014). In other settings, rising incomes have been argued to account (in part) for transitions to more policy-based, programmatic politics by changing voters' preferences. Wealthier and middle class voters are said to be less susceptible to clientelistic and patronage-based strategies because they do not value the types of patronage goods that politicians can provide, the marginal cost of buying their votes becomes prohibitively high, or because their time horizons are longer, allowing them to place greater emphasis in voting decisions on major public policies and long-term performance over more immediate benefits from patronage (e.g., Kitschelt 2000, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013). Differences in preferences are then expected to change the strategies available to politicians – where fewer voters demand patronage goods, politicians should face electoral incentives to forgo patronage distribution and clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 2014).

But in low capacity states with long histories of corruption, favoritism, and failed policy implementation, an increase in the proportion of wealthy voters can have different downstream effects. Consistent with existing literature, I show in Chapter 3 that middle class and wealthier voters in urban Ghana have different preferences than poorer voters. Middle class and wealthy voters are less likely than poor voters to want private patronage benefits from politicians, and instead more likely to want reforms to major public policies or demand the provision of truly public goods. In a setting of low state capacity, however, politicians face a credibility problem in satisfying these preferences (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). Past governments have often failed on promises to implement large-scale public policies. When implemented at all, these policies are often mired in corruption, rent-seeking, or favoritism.<sup>25</sup> I argue in Chapter 3 that unable to commit to delivering the policies that middle class voters want, politicians avoid costly efforts to build support among these voters and largely refrain from mobilizing their turnout during campaigns. Voters who want major public policies instead of patronage goods then differentially abstain from political participation. They are not being mobilized to turn out and have few options on the ballot that they trust will actually address their preferences. This allows the electorate and political party organizations to be dominated by poorer voters who are still susceptible to patronage-based appeals, which only reinforces politicians' incentives against making credible policy-based appeals to middle class voters in the first place. A programmatic transition

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<sup>25</sup>There is also often little prior history of policy-based competition in African democracies (van de Walle 2007), especially compared to democracies in Latin America studied in much of the literature cited above. Such a history would help solve the credibility problem by informing voters' expectations about the probability that programmatic campaign promises will be successfully implemented.

does not occur, even as the urban middle class grows.<sup>26</sup>

Chapter 3 finds empirical support for this argument using a combination of survey data on turnout in national elections and participation in party organizations and other local political associations, a survey experiment on voters' trust in campaign promises, and interviews with local politicians and middle class voters from Greater Accra. Chapter 6 extends this argument, finding lower turnout in local district assembly (city council) elections in neighborhoods where more middle class and wealthy voters live.

This contributes to the general study of transitions to programmatic politics by suggesting that the emergence of "dual" clientelistic and programmatic linkages, common in many other middle income democracies, especially in Latin America (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014), cannot be taken for granted in settings with lower state capacity or where there are class-based differences in political participation.<sup>27</sup> This chapter also expands existing work on the relationship between socio-economic class and turnout in the developing world (Kasara & Suryanarayan 2014), suggesting new mechanisms for why the middle class and wealthy often turn out at lower rates than the poor in developing countries, in the opposite pattern of advanced democracies (e.g., Verba et al. 1995).

Even though there is not a significant transition away from patronage politics, I argue that the use of individual-level clientelism is not uniform within cities. As noted above, informal slums are also expanding in African cities, concentrating larger numbers of poor voters into dense, impoverished neighborhoods, even as the urban middle class grows as well (Paller 2012, UN-Habitat 2014). I argue in Chapter 4 that political parties concentrate their provision of private goods in these poor slums, where many voters demand the private benefits that parties can provide. This focus on poor neighborhoods is especially the case for the distribution of the most valuable private benefits, such as patronage jobs, loans, and money for health and schooling expenses, that politicians can give to voters as part of longer-term clientelistic relationships. But building the grassroots patronage networks needed to sustain relationships with large numbers of voters becomes too costly in middle class and wealthier neighborhoods of the city. Clientelism is rare in wealthier neighborhoods, even among poor voters who live there. Chapter 4 provides evidence of these differences in

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<sup>26</sup>This should not cycle indefinitely. For example, eventually the middle class may grow so large that politicians have no choice but to appeal to middle class preferences to win elections. I discuss several ways this cycle may be broken in Chapter 3.

<sup>27</sup>It is important to note, however, that voting is mandatory (and enforced) in the Latin American cases examined in Levitsky (2003) and Luna (2014), such that the class-based differences in political participation I discuss in Ghana do not exist. Where middle class and wealthy citizens must turn out to vote, parties face different incentives to appeal to the preferences of these constituencies.



private goods distribution and individual-level clientelism between poorer and wealthier neighborhoods of Greater Accra using survey data and interview evidence.

Despite these neighborhood-level differences in the distribution of private goods in clientelistic relationships, Chapter 4 shows that parties continue to use the selective distribution of local public, or “club,” goods as patronage in both middle class and poor neighborhoods as a means of building political support.<sup>28</sup> Because of low existing levels of service provision in cities, both middle class and poor voters often demand club goods from the government.<sup>29</sup> These club goods can then be selectively targeted to specific neighborhoods.

As a result, ethnicity remains an important determinant of vote choice, even for middle class voters. Among those middle class voters who do turn out to vote, the provision of club goods affects voting behavior. And because ethnicity affects where voters expect club goods to be targeted by different political parties (see below), ethnicity remains politically relevant for middle class voters.<sup>30</sup> Using survey data on individual vote choices, I find in Chapter 5 that wealthy and middle class voters are just as likely to vote for co-ethnic parties as poorer voters, in contrast to predictions that the urban middle class should place less emphasis on ethnicity.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>I refer to local public goods, such as roads, schools, health clinics, water mains, sewers, electricity poles, etc., as “club goods.” These are goods that are locally non-excludable, benefitting everyone within their catchment areas but not beyond. Unlike public goods, club goods can be targeted by politicians as patronage to specific groups of voters. Truly public goods have universalistic benefits and cannot be targeted as patronage. I use “club goods” instead of “local public goods” to keep this distinction explicit. Note that some existing literature refers to both types of benefits interchangeably as “public goods.”

<sup>29</sup>Even if wealthier urban residents can privately provide some services to themselves, I show in Chapter 3 that they still want club goods from the government. Private provision is a costly substitute in lieu of state provision, not a permanent replacement. These residents would still be better off they had paved roads, running water, and stable electricity from the government rather than having to pay large sums for imperfect private work-arounds (e.g., generators, water delivery services, etc).

<sup>30</sup>Similarly, Burbidge (2014) uses extended observation of a small group of voters in Kenya to suggest that middle class voters there still overwhelmingly support co-ethnic parties and candidates when voting, even as they simultaneously place less emphasis on ethnicity in their own daily lives and believe personally that reflexive support for co-ethnic politicians is not normatively justifiable.

<sup>31</sup>Throughout the dissertation, I define ethnic voting as support for the party affiliated with each voter’s ethnic group (if an affiliation exists), not only as a direct match between the ethnicity of a candidate and voter. The major parties in Ghana draw support from stable coalitions of groups, even as presidential candidate ethnicities vary. Unless a single group is large enough to win on its own, even the most ethnically-based parties in Africa combine support from coalitions of groups (Arriola 2012), with members of groups in the coalition engaging in bloc voting for the party. This definition is discussed further in Chapter 5.

### 1.3.2 Traditional Intermediaries in Rural versus Urban Areas

The second explanatory variable is the power and importance of traditional elites. Forms of social organization evolve as populations shift from village to city. Chiefs and other traditional village-level elites play significant roles in rural politics in much of Africa. They serve as intermediaries between citizens and the state, clientelistic brokers who provide blocs of votes to allied candidates, and decision makers controlling access to land and other local resources (Baldwin 2013, Acemoglu et al. 2013, Koter 2013*a*, Boone 2014, de Kadt and Larreguy 2014). While enclaves with powerful traditional authorities persist in some urban areas, such as among the Ga ethnic group in Greater Accra (see below), residents in urban Africa are often less connected to traditional authorities than in rural areas (Gugler & Flanagan 1978).<sup>32</sup> Politicians must engage with urban voters through other channels.

But I argue that rather than simply reducing the amount of patronage that is distributed, the weakness of traditional leaders instead encourages more direct, individual-level contact between political party organizations and voters in some urban neighborhoods. This is particularly true in poor slum communities, where many poor voters who demand private goods from politicians are densely concentrated. I argue in Chapter 4 that it is in these communities that political parties build their most extensive patronage networks, with party agents and activists deeply embedded in the social fabric of poor urban neighborhoods. Informal and formal leaders of poor neighborhoods in Greater Accra – ranging from district assembly members (city councilors) to landlords and pastors – are often simultaneously local political party leaders, serving formal roles within party organizations (Paller 2014).<sup>33</sup> These local party leaders use their dual roles to distribute patronage and engage in long-term clientelistic relationships with residents, binding them to their party.

This is in contrast to both middle class and wealthy neighborhoods of the city, as noted above, and also to rural areas. In rural areas, it can be more cost effective for political parties to engage with voters indirectly through village elites rather than maintaining individual relationships with voters across a series of far-flung villages. Moreover, in rural areas that are strongholds of an opposing party, it can be particularly costly for a party to build networks capable of targeting voters with clientelistic benefits and monitoring their behavior

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<sup>32</sup>The declining importance of traditional leaders may be related to the declining individual-level importance of ethnic identity in urban areas observed in Robinson (2014) and Green (2014). But it does not necessarily reduce levels of ethnic voting (see Chapter 5).

<sup>33</sup>By contrast, it is illegal for traditional chiefs to be openly affiliated with a political party in Ghana. They cannot serve simultaneously as local political party leaders. Many chiefs are informally aligned with one of the major political parties, however.

at an individual level, especially if local elites are aligned with the opposing party and erect barriers to activities by a new party. Rather than build ties to individual voters, parties can provide club goods that benefit entire rural villages at once, in return for bloc support from the community organized by village leaders (Lindberg 2010). Parties can then monitor behavior of recipient villages from aggregate election results without having to spend the organizational costs of maintaining individual clientelistic relationships with many voters. In many urban neighborhoods, there simply are not local elites capable of serving as intermediaries and delivering these blocs of votes.

Survey data and interview evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that direct clientelism between a party and individual voters can be more extensive in the poorest urban slum neighborhoods in Greater Accra than in the typical rural village, especially in comparison to villages that are in stronghold regions of an opposing political party.<sup>34</sup> But individual-level clientelism is still less common in wealthier urban neighborhoods than in most rural areas. These differences in the prevalence of private goods distribution and clientelism then have carry over effects into voting behavior, examined in Chapter 5 (see below).<sup>35</sup>

### 1.3.3 Ethnic Composition of Local Neighborhoods

Third, settlement patterns change as cities grow. Urban neighborhoods can be very diverse. Due to past decades of rural-urban migration, residents whose families are originally from many different regions of a country often live together in one neighborhood in urban areas to a significantly greater extent than in most rural communities.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, there are also still homogeneous, segregated neighborhoods within cities.

Literature on ethnic politics in Africa often assumes a close connection between ethnic groups and geographic territories. Competition over state resources is described as contestation over *where* these resources

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<sup>34</sup>Private goods distribution clearly still occurs throughout rural areas in Ghana, especially the non-clientelistic distribution of small gifts (food, t-shirts, etc.) immediately before elections. The main contrast I make in Chapter 4 is in the overall proportion of voters engaged in relationships directly with political parties between slums and rural villages.

<sup>35</sup>Importantly, the Ga are the one ethnic group in Greater Accra for whom traditional elites still play a significant role in life within the city. In Chapters 5 and 6, I find that the political behavior of the Ga differs significantly from other urban residents and attribute this to the ability of traditional leaders in the Ga community to mobilize support for specific parties and candidates using the distribution of private and club goods. For example, I find in Chapter 5 that the strongest predictor of vote choice among Ga voters in Greater Accra is their degree of interaction with Ga chiefs. But interactions with traditional chiefs have no explanatory power for voting behavior among all other residents in the urban area.

<sup>36</sup>There are exceptions – rural regions with very diverse populations, and some relatively homogeneous cities – but in general, urban areas have significantly higher levels of ethnic fractionalization than rural areas. I demonstrate this using census data for Ghana in Chapter 2.

go. Club goods or other types of policies targeted to different rural territories are seen as benefiting distinct ethnic groups as patronage (e.g., Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006, Kasara 2007, Franck and Rainer 2012, Burgess et al. 2015, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). This assumption is at the heart of existing theories of both ethnic voting and ethnic conflict.<sup>37</sup> But this logic breaks down in local areas that are diverse. Club goods that politicians commonly distribute, such as roads, schools, and health clinics are locally non-excludable. A club good will benefit voters from the many different ethnic groups living in a diverse neighborhood, including core supporters of opposing candidates or parties. Politicians cannot engage in favoritism by strategically target club goods on the basis of ethnicity in diverse areas. But in homogeneous areas, these goods can be used to target voters from a specific ethnic group.

Chapter 5 considers the effects of the ethnic composition of neighborhoods on voting behavior in urban areas. Extending an earlier argument originally developed in Ichino & Nathan (2013) to explain vote choice in rural areas, I model vote choice as a function of voters' expected benefits from electing a party after the election. I show that these incentives explain significantly more of the variation in voting behavior than voters' individual-level attachments to their ethnic identities or levels of social interaction with other ethnic groups. When there is ethnic favoritism in the distribution of club goods, voters living in a homogeneous area surrounded by their own group have clear instrumental incentives to support co-ethnic candidates or parties. These voters will expect to receive better performance after the election – better access to club goods controlled by the government – if a co-ethnic wins. But this is not necessarily true in diverse areas. Once reaching office, politicians may still build club goods in diverse areas to improve their overall reputations of performance, as I suggest they do in Ghana in Chapter 4. But because they cannot favor specific ethnic groups with club goods in diverse areas, there is no reason for voters systematically to expect a co-ethnic party to favor a diverse neighborhood after the election to a greater extent than a non-co-ethnic would. Voters have less of an incentive to support co-ethnic parties in these areas. Under the same logic, when voters live as a local ethnic minority surrounded primarily by voters from ethnic groups affiliated with a different political party, these voters may expect better access to club goods if that other party wins the election, rather than their own ethnically-affiliated party. This creates incentives for cross-ethnic voting by local minorities (Ichino & Nathan 2013).

But these incentives are complicated by patterns of private goods distribution – an outcome of the first

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<sup>37</sup>For an example of adaptations of this idea in the conflict literature, see Cederman et al. (2011).

two explanatory variables discussed above. In poor urban neighborhoods where private goods distribution and individual-level clientelism is extensive, voters can still expect to receive significant private benefits from a co-ethnic party should it win the election, even if they do not expect differences in club benefits they will get from each party. To the extent that voters value private goods over club goods, they still face incentives to support co-ethnic parties in these poor neighborhoods, regardless of their neighborhood's ethnic composition. Controlling for voters' individual characteristics, I expect significant ethnic voting in poor urban neighborhoods, as long as ethnically-affiliated parties have developed patronage networks in these neighborhoods, but little ethnic voting in diverse, middle class or wealthy neighborhoods. I also expect cross-ethnic voting in middle class and wealthy neighborhoods where a greater share of residents are from ethnic groups affiliated with another party.

I find empirical support for this argument in Chapter 5, using a combination of survey data on vote choice and polling station election results. A survey experiment shows that these differences in vote choice vary with voters' expectations of the private and club goods they will receive from each major party after the election in different neighborhoods. Rather than there being uniformly less emphasis placed on ethnicity in voting decisions in urban areas, there is significant ethnic competition in some urban neighborhoods, and virtually none in other neighborhoods, even as voters choose among the same candidates in the same election. This variation in voting behavior is orthogonal to measures of the social importance that voters place on their ethnic identities.

This extends existing theories of instrumental ethnic voting in Africa to account for patterns of voting behavior in both rural and urban areas and adds additional empirical support to this approach to studying ethnic politics (Bates 1983, Chandra 2004, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). Following this literature, my results suggest that ethnicity is not an innately relevant variable in African elections, but instead serves as a means to an end for voters. The ethnic affiliation of politicians is a useful heuristic for a voter that aids in the identification of which politicians are most likely to perform in her best interest. In areas where this cue does not indicate that a voter will receive more benefits from a co-ethnic party or candidate, ethnicity stops being a significant determinant of voting behavior. "Expressive" theories of ethnic politics, which focus instead on the social attachments that voters place on their ethnic identities (e.g. Horowitz 1985) and are implicit in Green (2014) and other modernization approaches to ethnic politics, cannot account for this variation. In addition, by focusing on variation in the importance of ethnicity across

neighborhoods, my argument is among the first to consider the relationship between ethnic context and political behavior in new democracies.<sup>38</sup> The evidence of geographic variation in voting behavior in Chapter 5 suggests that to explain voting behavior in the developing world, we must account for how differences in local contexts alter voters' incentives.

Together with Chapter 4, this argument also joins a small recent literature examining how politicians adopt geographically varied patronage strategies, appealing to voters in areas with different demographic characteristics with different bundles of particularistic goods (e.g., Magaloni et al. 2007, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). In doing so, I argue for the need to move past recurring debates in political economy literature over whether parties in developing countries are more likely to target swing or core voters with benefits (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1996; see Golden and Min 2013 for a literature review). Similar to several other studies suggesting that this presents a false dichotomy in the study of distributive politics (Albertus 2013, Faller 2013, Kramon and Posner 2013, Stokes et al. 2013, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015), I suggest instead that parties in urban Ghana simultaneously employ both strategies. They target unaligned voters and diverse neighborhoods with some types of club and private goods in a non-conditional, non-clientelistic fashion, especially during campaign periods. But they also favor core, co-ethnic supporters and co-ethnic neighborhoods over time in the distribution of other benefits, including through individual-level clientelism. These latter actions sustain incentives for ethnic voting in many neighborhoods.

## 1.4 Ghana and Beyond

Empirically, I examine electoral competition in a single major city: the Greater Accra metropolitan area. As described in Chapter 2, I combine original survey data and fine-grained geo-coded census data, which is rarely available for African cities, alongside local election results and a series of qualitative data sources. By choosing this case and using these sources, I attempt to strike a middle ground between two types of existing studies on urban politics in Africa. Detailed "large-N" comparisons across a representative sample of neighborhoods within one city allow me to examine the interplay of neighborhood conditions and political competition much more closely than is possible in cross-national studies, which usually have to average

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<sup>38</sup>Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Kasara (2013) are key exceptions. A much larger literature on American politics has examined how local ethnic context affects voter attitudes and behavior (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010, Enos 2014).

over any intra-urban variation in outcomes.<sup>39</sup> I also present a more representative picture of the range of outcomes within cities than is possible in studies that focus narrowly on a single class of voters or type of neighborhood, or which lack detailed data on local demographic conditions.<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless, there are risks to external validity when drawing on a single overall case. I discuss key scope conditions here.

### 1.4.1 The Case

Ghana is as prime a candidate as any country in sub-Saharan Africa to experience the political transitions predicted by modernization theories. It is at the forefront of each of the trends described at the beginning of the chapter. It is now officially a “middle income” country and has regular elections, a stable two party system, a free press, and little political violence. Ghana recently became a majority urban country (see Table 1.1) and has experienced sustained economic growth, with annual GDP growth over 5% in every year in the last decade except during the global downtown of 2009. Ghana has now held five competitive national elections, with two peaceful transitions in power.

Greater Accra, Ghana’s capital and largest metropolitan area, is an ideal case in which to explore the political effects of urbanization. It is a rapidly growing city that contains significant variation across neighborhoods in the presence of the three main explanatory variables highlighted above.<sup>41</sup> The area’s population has more than doubled its 1990 total, reaching approximately 4 million people.<sup>42</sup> Greater Accra has a large, educated middle class; 22% of adults in the metropolitan area as of the 2010 census had formal sector em-

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<sup>39</sup>Afrobarometer surveys, such as those used in Conroy-Krutz (2009), Harding (2010), Green (2014), and Robinson (2014), provide overall representative samples at the national level, but do not provide representative samples of specific urban areas within countries. This precludes making comparisons at the level of specific cities or neighborhoods within cities.

<sup>40</sup>For example, Resnick’s (2012, 2014) main results come from non-representative survey samples of voters from a subset of a single socio-economic class in Lusaka and Dakar (informal sector poor voters who happen to work in traditional markets). Paller (2012, 2014) observes a single type of neighborhood in Ghana (slums). Paller (2012, 2014) does examine variation across different types of slums, however.

<sup>41</sup>There are three other major metropolitan areas in Ghana – Kumasi, Takoradi-Sekondi, and Tamale. I focus on Greater Accra because these other cities have more limited census data, required to estimate key explanatory variables for the analysis I conduct in Chapters 3-6. Each of these cities is also more homogenous in terms of wealth and ethnic composition, allowing for fewer comparisons across local neighborhoods within the same overall setting.

<sup>42</sup>Population figures for Accra vary across sources because there is no consistent definition of the city’s boundaries. The city is far larger than its official boundaries, known as the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). The AMA has actually shrunk in area over time, with two new districts carved out as independent municipalities. But the city now stretches as an uninterrupted urban agglomeration from Kasoa at the border of Ghana’s Central Region, 15 miles west of central Accra, to Kpone, on the outskirts of Tema, 20 miles east of central Accra. This encompasses 11 other district governments in addition to the AMA and 28 parliamentary constituencies in total. United Nations (2014), used for the other cities in Table 1.3 below, excludes Tema and several of the other outlying districts from its definition of Accra, resulting in a population of 2.3 million instead of 4 million.

ployment, some secondary education, and were literate in English.<sup>43</sup> Approximately half of the population lives in slums, while the other half does not. The city suffers from a long list of infrastructural deficits, in both poor and wealthier neighborhoods. The city is very diverse, but contains segregated enclaves dominated by specific ethnic groups. Finally, Greater Accra is politically competitive, containing strongholds for both parties alongside competitive neighborhoods. These features are typical of many other large African cities, including many of those listed in Table 1.3 below.

## 1.4.2 External Validity Across Countries

There are several scope conditions at both the national and city level that should affect how the argument extends to other cases. I consider the national-level conditions first. To provide a comparison to other new democracies in Africa, Table 1.2 again lists the 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa from Table 1.1 that are either democracies or hybrid regimes with multi-party elections. Each column of Table 1.2 corresponds to a scope condition.

First, I argue that Ghana's low state capacity and lack of a history of competition between programmatic political parties present key constraints on the ability of politicians to make credible policy-based electoral appeals (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). With politicians unable to commit to delivering the policies that middle class and wealthy voters want, I describe a cycle in which these voters abstain from political participation and allow politicians to continue winning with patronage-based strategies in urban areas. The first column of Table 1.2 roughly approximates state capacity using the "Bureaucratic Quality" index from Political Risk Services Group (2014).<sup>44</sup> While Ghana's capacity is lower than that of many Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile, key cases of "dual linkage" politics examined in Levitsky (2003) and Luna (2014), Ghana has among the highest levels of state capacity in sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that the credibility problems I see in Ghana may be more extreme elsewhere.<sup>45</sup> Ghana's history of little programmatic

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<sup>43</sup>Accurate income-based measures of socio-economic class are not available. This likely provides a lower bound for size of the middle class, as discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup>This index is also used in Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) to measure a similar concept. It runs from 0 to 4, with 4 being the highest capacity states (e.g., Germany, Sweden).

<sup>45</sup>In some cases, local state capacity within municipal governments could differ from national state capacity. For the most part, local governments in Africa often have limited budgets and lack bureaucratic independence, however (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). An exception is Lagos State, in Nigeria, where recent widely documented improvements in tax collection may indicate higher levels of state capacity locally than in Nigeria as a whole. But Lagos' success has received so much attention specifically because it departs significantly from the norm in other African cities. See de Gramont (2015) and Kaplan (2014).



Table 1.2: Characteristics of Democratic or Hybrid Regimes in Sub Saharan Africa

Country:	State Capacity	Programmatic Parties	Party System Stability	Ethnic Cleavages	Recent Political Violence	Avg. GDP Growth (1985-2015)
Benin	-	No	1	0.30	No	4.1%
Botswana	2.0	No	5	0.00	No	6.1%
Burkina Faso	1.0	No	4	0.00	Yes	5.4%
Burundi	-	No	-	0.26	Yes	2.1%
Cote d'Ivoire	0	No	-	0.49	Yes	2.3%
D.R.C.	0	No	-	0.80	Yes	0.8%
Djibouti	-	No	-	-	No	1.7%
Gabon	1.5	No	-	0.21	No	2.0%
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>5.5%</b>
Guinea	2.0	No	-	0.48	Yes	3.3%
Guinea-Bissau	1.5	No	2	0.05	Yes	2.3%
Kenya	2.0	No	2	0.57	Yes	3.9%
Lesotho	-	No	1	0.00	No	4.1%
Liberia	0	No	-	0.62	Yes	4.5%
Madagascar	1.0	No	0	0.00	Yes	2.3%
Malawi	2.5	No	2	0.55	No	3.9%
Mali	0	No	1	0.13	Yes	4.0%
Mozambique	1.0	No	5	0.36	No	6.4%
Namibia	2.0	Yes	5	0.55	No	3.9%
Niger	1.5	No	2	0.51	Yes	3.7%
Nigeria	1.0	No	3	0.66	Yes	4.9%
Senegal	1.0	No	5	0.14	No	3.3%
Sierra Leone	0	No	3	0.56	Yes	3.1%
South Africa	2.0	Yes	6	0.49	No	2.3%
Tanzania	1.0	No	5	0.59	No	5.2%
Togo	0.0	No	-	0.49	No	2.9%
Uganda	2.0	No	-	0.63	Yes	6.1%
Zambia	1.0	No	2	0.71	No	4.3%
Zimbabwe	1.5	No	-	0.41	Yes	1.2%

Sources: PRSG (2014) Elischer (2014) / Riedl (2014) Riedl (2014) Posner (2004) ACLED (2014) World Bank

The first column is the "Bureaucratic Quality" from Political Risk Services Group (2014), which runs on a scale from 0-4, with 0 being the lowest capacity states. The second column is coded based on qualitative case descriptions of party systems in Elischer (2013) and Riedl (2014). The fourth column is ethnic fractionalization among Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG), as calculated in Posner (2004).

competition is also similar to most other African countries (van de Walle 2007), as indicated by the lack of programmatic parties in most countries in the second column.<sup>46</sup>

Second, I emphasize the role of local political party organizations in distributing patronage and mobilizing voters. Ghana's parties are among the most institutionalized and organized in Africa (Riedl 2014). The third column in Table 1.2 codes countries based on party system institutionalization as measured by Riedl (2014).<sup>47</sup> In settings with less institutionalized parties, party organization may be less extensive in poor urban neighborhoods, reducing the amount of clientelism. Under the argument in Chapter 5, this may reduce incentives for ethnic voting in poor, ethnically diverse neighborhoods within cities.<sup>48</sup> But while the results for ethnic voting may differ somewhat in these weaker party systems, weak parties should be even less able to make credible policy-based appeals. This may exacerbate the class-based differences in participation described in Chapter 3, further dis-incentivizing transitions to more policy-based competition in cities despite the growth of the urban middle class.

Third, unlike in Ghana, there are some African countries where there has never been significant ethnic political competition. This distinction is indicated by the column for "Politicized Ethnic Cleavages" in Table 1.2. This is defined based on the "PREG" variable from Posner (2004), which measures ethnic fractionalization across "politically relevant ethnic groups" in each country. Ghana is near the middle of the distribution. But my arguments about ethnicity are less relevant in countries like Senegal and Mali, which have always had less ethnic competition and have little history of ethnic voting (Posner 2004, Koter 2013a). My other arguments about class-based differences in preferences and political participation, and about variation across urban neighborhoods in patterns of clientelism, can still apply in these cases, however.

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<sup>46</sup>One exception on each front could be South Africa. Although the dataset in Table 1.2 rates South Africa as having lower state capacity than Ghana, others have argued that South Africa has significantly higher capacity state than other African countries, even higher than other middle income countries outside the region (Lieberman 2003). South Africa also has several parties that consistently campaign on ideologically distinct policy platforms. In South African cities, the class-based differences in political participation that I discuss in Chapter 3 may not exist, as middle class voters have alternatives on the ballot that can promise to address their preferences more credibly than any party in Ghana.

<sup>47</sup>Riedl (2014, p. 41) codes party system institutionalization on a 6 point scale, with higher scores indicating greater institutionalization. For simplicity, I round these scores to the nearest whole number. Riedl (2014) does not include all countries in Table 1.2.

<sup>48</sup>Moreover, Ghana's parties have developed clear affiliations with different ethnic groups that inform voters' expectations about the likely beneficiaries if a party wins. There could be concern that these expectations will be less defined in settings where new emerge in each subsequent election, resulting in less ethnic voting. But overall rates of ethnic voting, along with voters' expectations of ethnic favoritism, appear to remain very high in countries like Kenya and Zambia, even though they have unstable parties. For example, Arriola (2012) describes how endorsements made by ethnic elites still clearly signal to voters which newly formed party is most likely to act in their interest after the election.

On the other end of the spectrum, the cross-ethnic voting that I find in diverse, middle class neighborhoods in Greater Accra (and Ichino & Nathan (2013) finds in rural areas) may be less likely in settings where ethnic cleavages have become so hardened by histories of violence that voting for a party affiliated with an opposing group is unthinkable. Some other countries have much more significant experiences with violence than Ghana, indicated by the “Recent Political Violence” column in Table 1.2.<sup>49</sup> But there are reasons to doubt whether past violence is enough to override instrumental incentives to vote across ethnic lines. This is exemplified by Kenya. One election after serious violence, Kalenjin voters overwhelmingly supported a Kikuyu candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, who was simultaneously on trial for instigating mass killings of Kalenjins. The prospective patronage benefits of empowering the Kalenjin leaders, such as William Ruto, who had joined Kenyatta’s coalition, appear to have outweighed Kalenjin voters’ concerns about past violence.

Finally, some countries have experienced less significant economic growth than Ghana and likely have much smaller urban middle classes. Data is not available with which to directly estimate and compare the size of the middle class across countries. As a rough proxy, the final column of Table 1.2 provides the average annual GDP growth rate in each country over the last three decades. In countries growing less quickly, such as Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo, smaller proportions of the urban population will live in middle or upper class neighborhoods compared to Ghana. Other countries, such as Burkina Faso or Mali, are growing as rapidly as Ghana, but started from lower baselines. Cities in these countries also likely have smaller middle classes. Where the middle class is smaller, there should be less variation within cities in voters’ policy preferences and the presence of clientelism than I observe in Ghana.

### **1.4.3 External Validity Across Cities**

There are also differences in characteristics of cities that should affect the applicability of the argument. First, I argue that scarcity in access to basic public services leads voters to place significant demands on politicians which can be addressed through patronage distribution. In cities that have experienced less rapid population growth, voter demands for basic services may be less acute. Table 1.3 lists the 25 largest metropolitan areas in the democracies or hybrid regimes in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. But comparing growth rates between 1985 and 2015 to these other larger cities, Greater Accra is at the middle of the distribution, not an

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<sup>49</sup>This column is coded using data from ACLED (2014), with a country marked as having significant recent political violence if there are at least two incidents of violence involving the state or competing political forces in the dataset from 2001-2014 with more than 20 reported fatalities per incident.

outlier. Existing infrastructure and service delivery has likely been overwhelmed to an even greater extent in cities experiencing more extreme population growth, such as Abuja, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, and Kumasi. Voters in these cities may place even greater pressure on politicians for access to scarce club and private goods.

Table 1.3: Twenty-Five Largest Urban Areas in Countries with Elections

<i>City, Country:</i>	Metro Area Pop. (1985)	Metro Area Pop. (2015)	% Change (1985-2015)	Locally Competitive?
Lagos, Nigeria	3,500,000	13,123,000	275%	Yes
Kinshasa, DRC	2,812,000	11,587,000	312%	–
Johannesburg, S. Africa	3,446,000	9,399,000	173%	Yes
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	1,137,000	5,116,000	350%	Yes
Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire	1,716,000	4,860,000	183%	Yes
<b>Greater Accra, Ghana</b>	<b>1,431,000<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>4,010,000<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>180%</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Nairobi, Kenya	1,090,000	3,915,000	259%	Yes
Cape Town, S. Africa	1,925,000	3,660,000	90%	Yes
Kano, Nigeria	1,861,000	3,587,000	93%	Yes
Dakar, Senegal	1,162,000	3,520,000	203%	Yes
Ibadan, Nigeria	1,436,000	3,160,000	120%	Yes
Durban, S. Africa	1,446,000	2,901,000	101%	No
Ouagadougou, Burk. Faso	424,000	2,741,000	546%	No
Antananarivo, Madag.	742,000	2,610,000	252%	Yes
Kumasi, Ghana	532,000	2,599,000	389%	No
Bamako, Mali	608,000	2,515,000	314%	–
Abuja, Nigeria	204,000	2,440,000	1096%	Yes
Lusaka, Zambia	636,000	2,179,000	242%	Yes
Pretoria, S. Africa	763,000	2,059,000	170%	Yes
Lubumbashi, DRC	588,000	2,015,000	243%	–
Mbuji-Mayi, DRC	509,000	2,007,000	294%	–
Conakry, Guinea	766,000	1,936,000	153%	Yes
Kampala, Uganda	595,000	1,936,000	225%	Yes
Harare, Zimbabwe	778,000	1,501,000	93%	Yes
Benin City, Nigeria	480,000	1,496,000	212%	Yes

*Population figures from United Nations (2014) for “urban agglomerations” around each city. a: Population for Greater Accra is adjusted using 2010 census data to include Tema and other surrounding urban districts, as discussed in the text. The UN figures underreport Accra’s population by excluding these districts. Local political competitiveness calculated using data sources described in the Appendix for the most recent election for which results are available. Local results were not available for the D.R.C. and Mali.*

Second, some cities are either significantly poorer than Greater Accra, with very small middle classes, or significantly less diverse, dominated by a single ethnic group. Smaller middle classes should largely be

an outcome of differences in national-level economic conditions, as discussed above. Homogeneity on both of these dimensions (wealth and diversity) should also be more likely in smaller cities, especially those that are not national capitals, which have served as particularly significant magnets for rural-urban migration (Gugler & Flanagan 1978, Ades & Glaeser 1995). For example, ethnic fractionalization in Kumasi, Ghana's second largest metropolitan area, is half of that of Greater Accra, with most neighborhoods of Kumasi predominately inhabited by indigenous Ashanti (Akan) residents. Even if the underlying argument above is correct, the full range of outcomes predicted above should be less visible in cities that have less variation on the explanatory variables.

Finally, Greater Accra is highly politically competitive, with a significant local presence from each major political party in Ghana. Both parties have grassroots organizations that can reach voters throughout the city, especially in poorer neighborhoods. Other cities may not be so competitive. If a single party dominates local political competition, other parties may not have strong local organizations, even if they are well organized elsewhere in the country. Under the argument I make in Chapter 5, voters from ethnic groups affiliated with the locally weaker party in these cities should be less likely to receive private goods from their own co-ethnic party, even in poorer neighborhoods. They may then have stronger incentives to vote across ethnic lines when living in a poor neighborhood surrounded by the other party's affiliated ethnic groups, consistent with the argument in Ichino & Nathan (2013). But most of the largest African cities are fairly competitive, as shown by the final column in Table 1.3. Even if urban voters in some countries are marginally more likely to support opposition parties than rural voters (Harding 2010), few cities are clear opposition strongholds. This column codes whether one party won more than 65% of the vote in the city in the last election for which results are publicly available.<sup>50</sup> In all but 3 of these 25 cities, no party reached this threshold.<sup>51</sup> Where the losing party still manages to win 35% or 40% of the vote, or the urban vote is split many ways across numerous parties, multiple parties likely have a local presence in the city and are capable of engaging with individual supporters who live there, similar to Greater Accra.

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<sup>50</sup>A list of election results used for each city is the Appendix.

<sup>51</sup>Moreover, in two of three cases where a single party dominates in the city, it is the ruling party, not the opposition party. The exception is Kumasi, Ghana, where the NPP won 70% of the vote in the last presidential election. This is not an arbitrary outcome of the cutoff used. If the threshold is lowered to 60% of the vote, only two additional cities would be coded as strongholds of a particular party: Anatananarivo, Madagascar and Lusaka, Zambia. The ruling party won in Lusaka; the opposition party in Anatananarivo.

## 1.5 Taking Modernization Back Out, Keeping Institutions In

Following in the footsteps of modernization theorists, recent discussions of politics in urban Africa often assume a model of political development in which all good things seem to go together. Urbanization interacts with economic growth and democratization in a virtuous cycle, reducing the importance of ethnicity and clientelism. Class-based political movements are thought to emerge in their place, with politicians, especially those associated with opposition parties, winning support based on the policy proposals that best address the needs of urban voters, rather than the distribution of patronage. I find little support for this argument. Instead, I join older post-independence literature on urban Africa in pushing back against modernization theories of urbanization.

Processes of socio-economic change in Africa's urban areas are just as likely to create perverse incentives that perpetuate sub-optimal governance outcomes as they are to lead to more accountable forms of political competition. Pre-existing patterns of patronage distribution and ethnic politics will persist in many parts of African cities despite the societal changes created by urban growth as long as the majority of voters continue to rely on the state for scarce basic goods and services, politicians remain able to distribute these services based on political criteria, and voters have reason to doubt the capacity of governments to carry out broader programmatic promises. At the same time, there are some urban neighborhoods where clientelistic relationships are rare and voters do not have strong incentives to line up behind co-ethnic candidates. Accepting that both good and bad outcomes co-exist as part of the same urban political experience is necessary for identifying policy approaches that can best address the challenges presented by urban growth in a way that aligns with political realities on the ground.

African cities mirror some aspects of the historical American experience. As waves of immigrants poured into American cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, urban governments became bastions of clientelism and ethnic politics. This persisted in some cities for decades, despite the emergence over time of large middle classes as well as significant inter-ethnic social interaction and assimilation. This "machine era" ended as much because of institutional constraints imposed to restrict the ability of urban politicians to distribute patronage (e.g., civil service reforms that professionalized bureaucracies) as because of any socio-economic transformations (Erie 1988, Shefter 1994, Trounstine 2008).

The potential for negative effects of urbanization in the absence of these types of institutional changes

is shown in Chapter 6, which combines arguments from the previous chapters to examine local municipal elections. Rather than sparking a transition to better urban governance, I show that wealthy and middle class voters have almost entirely withdrawn from participation in local elections in Greater Accra. Candidates for local offices need only compete for the support of the poor, and local elections become heavily clientelistic, with significant ethnic voting. A minority ethnic group (the Ga) that is better organized at turning out its members and distributing clientelistic inducements is then able to capture disproportionate power in municipal governments, and uses this power to redistribute local government resources to itself. This further hampers the municipal government's ability to address needs for goods and services in the city at large and only reinforces the dissatisfaction of most voters with the local government.

Reforms similar to those in the US that limit politicians' opportunities for patronage distribution may ultimately prove more important for transforming patterns of electoral competition in African cities than rising wealth, the declining importance of traditional leaders, or increasing ethnic diversity. Such reforms can reduce poor voters' dependence on politicians for access to government benefits. In addition, mandatory turnout laws, similar to those in Argentina and Chile, could also force middle class and wealthy voters to participate and place more demands on politicians for policy-based campaigns. More substantive decentralization that empowers local governments could increase trust among middle class voters that policy-based electoral appeals are credible and create buy-in with the local government system. I discuss this potential of institutional reform to transform urban politics in Chapter 7.

## **1.6 Roadmap**

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the Ghanaian case and Greater Accra, as well as my main data sources. The subsequent empirical chapters are then organized by dependent variable, examining the interplay of the three explanatory variables highlighted above for a series of related outcomes. Chapter 3 examines the relationships between voters' policy preferences – the demands they place on politicians for goods and services – and patterns of political participation. The chapter explores how differences in participation based on variation in preferences among socio-economic classes affect politicians' incentives to engage in patronage-based campaigns. Chapter 4 explores distributive politics in urban areas from the perspective of political parties, examining patterns of clientelism and patronage

distribution across different neighborhoods of the city. It also compares these patterns to rural areas. Chapter 5 studies voter behavior in national elections, showing significant variation across urban neighborhoods in the importance of ethnicity for vote choice. Chapter 6 combines insights from the previous chapters in a case study of local government elections in the Greater Accra metropolitan area. Chapter 7 addresses alternative arguments about the political effects of modernization and considers how patronage-based appeals and the political importance of ethnicity could be reduced through institutional forms that change the incentives underlying political competition in urban areas.



## **2 | The Case and Data: Urbanization in Greater Accra**

### **2.1 Introduction**

The previous chapter describes urban growth in Gbawe, a small farming village that rapidly became a dense urban community in the 1990s and early 2000s. Gbawe's transformation is indicative of broader changes that have been occurring across urban Ghana in recent decades. It speaks to the emergence of Ghana's urban middle class, with parts of the village now settled by middle class, formal sector workers. Gbawe represents variation in the importance of traditional social institutions within urban Ghana, with chiefs from the indigenous Ga ethnic group retaining importance, while other residents are disconnected from rural traditional authorities. Gbawe is also now substantially more diverse than ever before, due to in-migration from other areas of the city and country. In this chapter, I describe these three socio-economic changes in the Greater Accra metropolitan area, introduce the larger political setting in which they have been occurring, and lay out the primary data sources used to examine their political effects in the remaining chapters.

### **2.2 Ghana's Political System**

Ghana reintroduced multi-party democracy in 1992, ending over two decades of near-continuous military government. The country has now held five consecutive competitive national elections, beginning in 1996.<sup>1</sup> There have been two peaceful transitions in power between political parties, after the 2000 and 2008 elections. Presidential elections use a majoritarian run-off system: all votes count equally in a single national constituency; the top two finishers compete in a second round if no candidate initially wins 50%. Mem-

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<sup>1</sup>The 1992 elections were marred by claims of fraud in the presidential election and an opposition boycott of the parliamentary elections.

bers of Parliament (MPs) are concurrently elected in 275 single-member districts, called “constituencies.”<sup>2</sup> Ghana’s parliament remains weak relative to the presidency. MPs do not introduce independent legislation or engage in significant executive oversight. Party line voting is near absolute and legislation from the president’s party essentially always passes (Lindberg & Zhou 2009, Lindberg 2010).<sup>3</sup> Real power is vested in the President and his cabinet. While MPs control a small discretionary constituency development fund, control over the clear majority of state resources depends on the presidential election, typical of many African countries (van de Walle 2003).<sup>4</sup> The powerful MPs are those chosen to serve in the cabinet; constitutionally, at least one half of national ministers are sitting MPs.

Presidential elections also determine control over every local government in the country. Ghana is divided into 10 regions and 216 administrative districts.<sup>5</sup> Districts serve as the main tier of local government. The president appoints a local ruling party leader as District Chief Executive (DCE), akin to a mayor, to lead each district.<sup>6</sup> There is a local legislative body equivalent to a city council called the District Assembly serving below the DCE. In each district, 30% of the assembly members are appointed by the national president and remainder are elected from single-member wards called Electoral Areas. Assembly members are elected to four year terms, off cycle from the presidential and parliamentary elections. Presidential appointment of 30% of assembly members gives the ruling party a majority on almost every District Assembly. Combined with the appointment of the DCE, this means that the party that wins the presidential election gains direct control over local spending decisions, even in opposition stronghold districts.<sup>7</sup> As discussed in Chapters 4-6, this allows for favoritism by the ruling party in state spending *within* each district, not only across broader regions of the country. District governments have little independent policy-making authority

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<sup>2</sup>The number of MPs has expanded before each recent election, from 200 in 2000 to 275 by 2012.

<sup>3</sup>Divided government is constitutionally possible, but has never occurred.

<sup>4</sup>Despite their weak position at the national level, MPs are key local political actors in Ghana. As the most powerful local political patron in most communities, MPs often gain de facto control over the local party organization in their constituencies, resulting in strong lobbying influence over local government appointments and the allocation of district resources if their party wins the presidential election (and takes control over the district government, see below).

<sup>5</sup>The number of districts has also expanded significantly in recent decades from 110 in 2000 to 216 before the 2012 election. The 275 constituencies nest within the 216 districts, with a one-to-one match in rural areas and a many-to-one correspondence in larger districts, especially the cities.

<sup>6</sup>District Chief Executives are instead called Municipal or Metropolitan Chief Executives (MCE) in larger districts, but these terms are used interchangeably in common practice.

<sup>7</sup>The local government system and separation of powers between assembly members and the DCE is explored in more detail in Chapter 6.

and often struggle to raise independent tax revenues. Instead, their primary task is making local distributive decisions about budget allocations they receive from the national government.<sup>8</sup> These include the District Assemblies Common Fund, an annual formula-based allocation guaranteeing a minimum budget for each district (Banful 2008).

Two political parties dominate Ghanaian politics: the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), in power 1992-2000 and 2009-present, and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), in power 2001-2008. Recent presidential elections have had razor thin margins between these parties, with the 2008 election decided by less than a percentage point. The NDC is a successor to the previous PNDC (Provisional National Defense Council) military government, and was formed by PNDC leader Jerry Rawlings as he transitioned from military dictator to elected president in 1992. The party styles itself as socialist, building in part on the legacy of Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) from the independence era. The NPP was formed before the 1992 election, but grew from a series of earlier political parties active in Ghana's brief prior democratic periods in the 1950s to 1970s.<sup>9</sup> The NPP describes itself as a more conservative pro-business party, dating to opposition to Nkrumah by earlier incarnations of the party. These self-assigned ideological labels bear little relation to how these parties now govern, however, as shown in Chapter 3.

Both parties are among the most institutionalized in Africa (Riedl 2014). They have official membership rolls and permanent committees of local activists at the polling station, constituency, and regional levels who create a permanent roster of party agents who campaign on their behalf. Local party members vote in competitive primary elections to select both parliamentary and presidential candidates (Ichino & Nathan 2012). These parties remain active even when in opposition; both have access to private sector financing to continue party activities and some patronage distribution to supporters.

The NDC and NPP both have stable roots in society, drawing on distinct ethnic bases. Because no single ethnic group in Ghana is large enough to form a national majority, both parties have built coalitions of groups, similar to the other African cases explored in Arriola (2012). Members of these groups can engage in significant ethnic bloc voting for their party (see Chapter 5), even if the presidential candidate

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<sup>8</sup>Many national government programs are also administered separately by district, with district-level ruling party leaders choosing local beneficiaries based on a fixed amount of benefits allocated to each district by the national government.

<sup>9</sup>These are primarily the United Party (UP) of the late 1950s and 60s, which itself grew from the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM) of the early 1950s, which opposed Nkrumah and the CPP during the independence period.

is not always from their own ethnic group.<sup>10</sup> The NPP's strongest support comes from the cocoa farming belt in the center of the country, particularly the Ashanti and Eastern Regions. These areas are home to the Akan, Ghana's largest ethno-linguistic group, which forms the majority across much of southern and central Ghana. The NPP's strongest base is the Ashanti (Ashanti Region), Akyem (Eastern Region), and Akuapem (Eastern Region) sub-groups within the Akan, as well as multiple smaller Akan sub-groups.<sup>11</sup> The ruling NDC draws strong support from the Ewe from Ghana's Volta Region, the ethnic group of its founder, Jerry Rawlings, and many predominantly Muslim groups from Ghana's three northern regions, especially now that the current NDC president is from Northern Region. The connection with the NDC does not hold for every northern ethnic group, but dates to extensive patronage from the NDC to northern Ghana under Jerry Rawlings in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as strong ties between the Rawlings regime and Northern migrants in southern Ghana (Kobo 2010).<sup>12</sup> The NDC historically has also drawn most votes of the Ga, the indigenous ethnic group of the capital, Accra.<sup>13</sup> Existing research shows an overall pattern of ethnic voting among each of these groups, while also indicating that some voters cross between the parties (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013, Ichino & Nathan 2013). A series of smaller ethnic groups, such as the Guan and Konkomba, are not closely affiliated with either party.

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<sup>10</sup>Or in the case of John Evans Atta Mills of the NDC in 2000, 2004, and 2008, is from a group outside the core coalition of the party all together. Mills was a Fanti (an Akan sub-group), but still received overwhelming support from Ewes and other core ethnic groups of the NDC.

<sup>11</sup>This partisan alignment dates back to Akan opposition to Nkrumah in the independence era, as discussed above.

<sup>12</sup>Many northern groups are politically split in the north along sub-group, or clan lines, due to internal chieftaincy disputes. As discussed below, chiefs own most of the land in Ghana, so control over chieftaincy positions is valuable in rural areas. The most prominent example of this is the Dagomba, the largest ethnic group in northern Ghana (and the largest group within the Mole-Dagbon census category). The majority (approximately 80%) are from the Andani "gate" (or clan), which is strongly aligned with the NDC, with very high rates of ethnic bloc voting for the party. But a smaller rival gate within the Dagomba, the Abudu, has become closely tied to the NPP because the NPP government supported the Abudu in their pursuit of the violently contested Dagomba chieftaincy in an apparent attempt to win back some Dagomba votes (MacGaffey 2006). Despite these intra-ethnic disputes within the rural north, northern migrants who live in southern Ghana are largely viewed as affiliated with the NDC. The overwhelming majority of Dagombas in Accra are Andanis, for example. These migrants in the south often live in segregated, Muslim neighborhoods known as "zongos" (a Hausa term for foreigners' quarters), which are popularly seen as major NDC strongholds. In the interviews described below, local politicians and party leaders in Greater Accra consistently discuss "zongos" and other Northern-migrant communities in Greater Accra as strong bastions of NDC support, such that is appropriate to treat these groups as generally aligned with the NDC in the analysis of voting behavior within Greater Accra.

<sup>13</sup>The NPP is affiliated, however, with a few clans among the Ga because the previous NPP government backed their claims for disputed chieftaincies. This is similar to the NPP's strategy in northern Ghana.

## 2.3 Urbanization in Greater Accra

Less than a quarter of Ghana's population lived in cities at independence in 1957. Today, 54% of Ghana's 25 million people live in urban areas (United Nations 2014, World Bank 2015). Ghana has four large metropolitan areas, Greater Accra (combining Accra, Tema, and surrounding districts), Kumasi, Tamale, and Takoradi-Sekondi. Figure 2.1 shows these four metropolitan areas on a map of Ghana. Two of them, Greater Accra and Kumasi, now count among the 25 largest cities in sub-Saharan Africa. Smaller cities in Ghana have been expanding even faster than the major metropolitan areas in recent decades (World Bank 2015). But Greater Accra, as the national capital, retains a dominant position in the national economy. It has attracted the most rural-urban migrants and contains the most internal economic and ethnic diversity compared to Ghana's other major cities.

The Accra area was first home to a series of small fishing communities inhabited by the Ga ethnic group. These villages were originally at the far periphery of the pre-colonial economy; West Africa's powerful pre-colonial kingdoms in medieval times were located far to the interior. But beginning in the second half of the 15th century, Ghana's Atlantic Coast became home to a series of European forts and trading installations, which became central export points for gold and the Atlantic slave trade. Several European forts built along the Accra coast in the 17th century remain important landmarks in the contemporary city.<sup>14</sup> The arrival of European trade gradually transformed Accra into a commercial hub linking the powerful Ashanti kingdom in central Ghana to European markets. The city grew further after becoming the capital of the British Gold Coast colony in the late-1870s, and especially after the British built a railway in the early 1920s linking Accra to the gold and cocoa producing regions of central Ghana. The basic street layout of Accra's central business district dates to this period. Accra received rural-urban migrants throughout the colonial era, but the Ga ethnic group remained the majority and dominated both colonial-era and independence-era politics in the city (Parker 2000).

After independence, Accra and surrounding communities grew rapidly due to rural-urban migration. With Accra serving as the seat of government and hub of the national economy, every major ethnic group in Ghana developed a significant foothold in the city. The Ga gradually became a minority in their own

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<sup>14</sup>These are Ussher Fort, by the Dutch in 1649, Christiansborg (Osu) Castle by the Danish in the 1660s, which became Ghana's seat of government from 1957 until 2013, and James Fort, built by the British in 1673.




Figure 2.1: *Map of Ghana*: The 10 administrative regions are labeled, along with the 4 major metropolitan areas (highlighted in black). The 5 parliamentary constituencies included in the rural comparison survey (described below and in Chapter 4) are shaded in gray.

homeland. By the mid-1990s, the Akan (Twi) language had replaced Ga as the primary *lingua franca* of the city, alongside English (Kropp Dakubu 1997). In recent decades, however, continued growth of the city has been driven more by higher rates of natural increase in urban than rural areas than migration from rural areas (Ghana Statistical Service 2008, World Bank 2015). By the beginning of the 21st century, Accra had spilled far past its official city boundaries to consume surrounding districts within the Greater Accra Region and become fully contiguous with the nearby city of Tema. Figure 2.2 shows the 12 current urban administrative districts that now make up the Greater Accra metropolitan area, of which the official city of Accra – the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) – is only one.<sup>15</sup> The metropolitan area’s population is now approximately 4 million, up from 2.8 million in 2000 and 1.4 million in 1984.

Much of this growth has been unplanned. In the late-1950s, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, drew up a plan for the city that led to the construction of several well laid out residential neighborhoods ringing the central business district. In the mid-1960s, Nkrumah also oversaw construction of an industrial port city at Tema, east of Accra. Tema still retains its neatly arranged street grid from this period. But after these early efforts, major urban planning in Accra became rare. Similar to other cities across the developing world, many neighborhoods have emerged over the past decades in a haphazard, uneven fashion, lacking basic infrastructure. This growth has been most extensive in peri-urban communities on the outskirts of the original city, which have exploded with urban sprawl. An example is Ga South (Weija) District on the western edge of Accra, home of Gbawe, the village described in Chapter 1. The district was almost entirely rural two decades ago, but grew in population by nearly 300% between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. It is now home to 485,000 people, even though some neighborhoods in the district have lower levels of service provision per capita – fewer paved roads and public schools, less running water – than many rural towns.

Over time, Greater Accra has become very politically competitive. The city is a key contested region in presidential elections. In 2012, the NDC won 50.6% of the presidential vote in the metropolitan area’s 28 urban constituencies, compared to 48.8% for the NPP. This was similar to the 50.3% and 47.8% won by each party, respectively, in 2008. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 shades the 238 Electoral Areas (ELAs), or wards, within the metropolitan area by 2008 presidential election results.<sup>16</sup> The ruling NDC has strongholds in pre-

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<sup>15</sup>As noted in Chapter 1, “Greater Accra” refers here to all urban districts within the Greater Accra Region. This excludes six rural parliamentary constituencies in the official administrative region: Ada, Ningo-Prampram, Shai Osudoku, Sege, Domeabra-Obom, and Amasaman. The current population of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is now approximately 1.9 million.

<sup>16</sup>Because of missing data at this level of aggregation for the 2012 results (see Chapter 5), I used 2008 data for the visualization




Figure 2.2: *Greater Accra Metropolitan Area*: The 12 district governments that comprise the Greater Accra metropolitan area are labeled here. These districts cover 28 parliamentary constituencies. Two districts – Ga South and Ga West – include rural and urban parliamentary constituencies. The rural portions of these districts are shaded in gray (Domeabra-Obom and Amasaman). The official city of Accra – the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) – is labeled in bold. The points are the GPS locations of the 48 clusters of respondents in the main urban survey. The triangles are the locations of the focus groups discussions with voters.



dominately Northern slums such as Mamobi-Nima and Ashaiman, as well as in the original Ga communities along the Atlantic coast and in the peri-urban areas where Gas remain most numerous. The opposition NPP dominates in the majority Akan neighborhoods that line the northwestern rim of the city, as well as in parts of Tema.<sup>17</sup> Other areas of the city are very competitive, however.

## **2.4 Major Changes Due to Urbanization**

Greater Accra is representative of the series of developments common to major African cities presented in the previous chapter. The city faces significant shortcomings in service delivery, which sustains demands in the electorate for goods that politicians can target as patronage. The city has an emerging middle class, even as there are also growing slum communities. There is variation within the city in the importance of traditional elites. Finally, the city has very diverse neighborhoods alongside more segregated ethnic enclaves.

### **2.4.1 Challenges in Service Delivery**

Growth has strained public infrastructure and service provision, in newly urbanized areas and older neighborhoods alike. As will be shown in Chapter 3, these shortcomings affect voters' preferences over what they want from the government, which then affect the forms of electoral political competition within the city. The neighborhoods of central Accra (inside the AMA), as well as in central Tema and other areas that were created as part of the early city plans in the late 1950s and early 1960s, still have better infrastructural endowments and access to basic services than much of the rest of the city, but still suffer from overuse and years of delayed maintenance. As a result, both the center city and outlying areas have significant needs for improvements to infrastructure and services.

In outlying districts such as Adenta, Ga East, and Ga South, most roads other than the major thoroughfares are unpaved. In the center city, most are paved, even within some of the slums. But both paved and unpaved roads can incur serious damage during each rainy season due to flooding exacerbated by in-

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here. Results are highly correlated between these elections in the areas for which data is available in both years.

<sup>17</sup>Downtown Tema was originally settled in large numbers by Akans who came to work at the new port and factories created in the 1960s.





Figure 2.3: *Politics, Wealth, and Diversity*: (a) Electoral Areas (or wards) in Greater Accra by 2008 presidential vote share. “Strong” areas are where a party received more than 65% of the vote, “lean” where a party received between 55% and 65%, and “competitive” where neither received more than 55%. 2008 results are used because of missing data at the Electoral Area level for 2012 (see Chapter 5); (b) Electoral Areas by the proportion of adults on the 2010 census who have formal sector employment, some secondary education, and fluent English literacy – the definition of middle class status used throughout; (c) Electoral Areas by their majority ethnic group.

adequate drainage and trash collection.<sup>18</sup> Where they exist, the city's sewers and storm drains are almost all open air, continually collecting trash and debris. Some neighborhoods organize volunteer community labor campaigns to clear them, but these efforts are not systematic. Many drains are never regularly cleared. Annual flooding ensues. Recent floods in central Accra have caused hundreds of deaths, including through a fuel station explosion in 2015 that attracted international media attention, as well as recurring cholera outbreaks.<sup>19</sup> Regular flooding on the outskirts of the city washes out numerous roads every year. District governments lack the funds to repair all that are damaged, let alone expand roads in all neighborhoods that still lack them.

The electricity grid covers the entire metropolitan area, with connections available to all who can afford them. But generating capacity cannot meet demand. There have been extended rolling blackouts in recent years. Consistent electricity is only available to those who can purchase diesel generators. Running water availability is also problematic. The center city has a pipe network, but in sizable portions of Adenta, Madina, Ga South, Ga East, and Ga West districts there are still no pipes in the ground.<sup>20</sup> Even in areas where the pipe network exists, water flows irregularly. Many neighborhoods only receive pipe-borne water once a week. Elsewhere it is even less frequent. Rather than rely on public pipes, many residents purchase water privately. Wealthier residents either get regular tanker truck deliveries to their homes or dig boreholes with electric pumps on their property. Poor residents often buy water from local business that stockpile water in tanks and sell it to surrounding residents at a markup.

Overcrowding in public primary schools in central Accra forced education officials to adopt a shift system with students only attending for half of each school day. This continues in parts of the city as of early 2015, despite a major school construction push by the NDC government, funded by international donors, and a public declaration of the end of the practice by Accra's mayor in 2011.<sup>21</sup> In newly urbanized communities on the outskirts of the city, some neighborhoods still have no public schools at all. Public

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<sup>18</sup>Local governments throughout the metropolitan area have significantly expanded curbside trash collection in recent years. But many neighborhoods across the city still must dump trash at a central location.

<sup>19</sup>For example, see: "Accra Floods: More than 100 Feared Dead After Explosion," *The Daily Guide*, 4 June 2015; Serious Kale Dery, "Cholera Outbreak Worsening in Gt. Accra; Over 6000 cases recorded," *The Daily Graphic*, 26 August 2014.

<sup>20</sup>The NDC government significantly expanded the pipe network in Adenta and Madina in late 2014, however, using development assistance from the Chinese government. This was after all data collection for the dissertation. For example, see: "Confirmed: Water Starts Flowing at Adenta," *Peace FM Online*, 24 December 2014.

<sup>21</sup>For example, see: "Shift system still exists in Accra schools," *Ghana Web*, 13 February 2013; Charles Ando, "New School Block Inaugurated at Darkuman-Kokompe," *The Daily Graphic*, 30 April 2014.

primary education is free, but families living in these areas have to pay to send children to private schools. Those who cannot afford private school tuition often seek assistance with tuition payments from politicians, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, opening avenues for clientelism. Public hospitals in the center city suffer from similar overcrowding. Budget shortfalls and delays in government payments of health care providers salaries have also led to recurring strikes by public sector doctors and nurses, denying services to those who cannot afford care at private clinics.<sup>22</sup>

The city also has a housing shortage. This applies in all of urban Ghana, which is estimated to be approaching a 2 million unit housing deficit (World Bank 2015). There has been significant recent construction of high end housing by private developers around Accra (Grant 2009), but these homes rent at rates comparable to some US cities, far beyond the budget of the majority of the city's residents. Construction of non-luxury housing has not kept pace and the government abandoned efforts at providing public housing decades ago as part of donor-backed "structural adjustment" reforms (Arku 2009). Lower class residents are instead often forced into informal slums by high rents. With supply constrained, landlords now charge renters two years cash advances on most rentals (Arku et al. 2012). This violates rent control laws, but they are rarely enforced. Housing shortages and upfront rent payments severely constrain the ability of residents to sort across neighborhoods in search of better access to local public services, as discussed further in Chapter 5. The World Bank argues that "the inability of the existing housing... supply to meet effective demand results in a situation where many urbanite[s]... are forced to live in slums or areas of poor housing conditions characterized by overcrowding and low-quality or absent basic services" (World Bank 2015, 22).

#### **2.4.2 Emergence of the Middle Class**

Despite these service delivery challenges, urbanization in Ghana has come hand-in-hand with major economic progress. Ghana's economy hit rock bottom in the early 1980s, but in the three decades since the country has had annual average GDP growth over 5%, among the fastest rates in the world (World Bank 2015). GDP growth reached as high as 14% in 2011, and has remained over 4% annually throughout the last decade. Importantly, most of this sustained growth is not due to oil and mineral extraction; large-scale

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<sup>22</sup>For example, see: "Doctors in Ghana continue to strike over salary dispute," *BBC News*, 12 April 2013; "Junior Doctors On Strike Over Unpaid Salaries," *The Daily Guide*, 3 June 2015; "35,000 Nurses, Midwives Declare Strike," *Peace FM Online*, 2 July 2014.

oil production only began in 2011.<sup>23</sup> Similar to other African cities (Kessides 2006), the economy in urban Ghana is increasingly dominated by the service and commercial sectors, especially in Greater Accra.<sup>24</sup> Although this economic growth has created considerable inequality, there have also been substantial reductions in poverty (World Bank 2015).

Growth has produced a large urban middle class, similar to many other African countries in recent decades (Resnick 2015). The middle class in Africa is not consistently defined or measured in existing literature. Some sources use income based cutoffs. These include African Development Bank (2011), the most widely cited recent report estimating the size of the African middle class, which defines middle class as those with incomes over US\$4 per day. But incomes in Ghana and other developing countries are difficult to measure accurately using self-reports on surveys, and can be highly variable over time, especially for those employed in the informal sector economy.<sup>25</sup> In a comprehensive effort to define the African middle class consistently across countries, Thurlow et al. (2015) instead proposes identifying the middle class by more concrete indicators for the probability that someone has escaped poverty and has the necessary skill set to compete in the modern economy. They highlight secondary education and formal sector employment as the two strongest indicators of middle class status across Africa, alongside housing quality. Following this approach, I measure membership in the middle class in the subsequent chapters through measures of formal sector employment and education (see below and Chapter 3). Both of these factors are likely highly correlated with the higher incomes available in the city's modern, professional economy.<sup>26</sup>

Using individual-level 2010 census data (which does not attempt to measure income), 22% of working-age adults in Greater Accra are now employed in the formal sector (private or public), are literate in English

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<sup>23</sup>Ghana's economy has suffered a recent downturn in 2014 and 2015, but it is not yet clear whether this is a temporary slowdown or a long-term departure from the growth previous trends.

<sup>24</sup>Combined with the new oil money entering the country, Accra is also increasingly the home of the regional (Africa or West Africa) headquarters of major multinational corporations, as well as many international organizations and NGOs. This has stimulated further investment in the high end service economy in the city. Growth has also been fueled by reinvestment of wealth from the Ghanaian diaspora, beginning in the mid-1990s. Upper class Ghanaians who had emigrated to the US and Europe during the 1980s have now returned in large numbers and repatriated wealth (Grant 2009). This foreign investment has not produced significant industrialization, however. Industrial employment is actually falling in urban Ghana as the rest of the economy expands (World Bank 2015).

<sup>25</sup>Moreover, income-based cutoffs do not account for the cost of living, which can fluctuate significantly against the US dollar within short periods of time in economies that suffer from unstable exchange rates, such as Ghana.

<sup>26</sup>To the extent that some in the informal sector economy may also have high incomes, this likely provides a lower bound on the true size of the city's middle class. I discuss the implications of using a conservative definition for middle class status in Chapter 3.

(the language of official business), and have some secondary or tertiary education.<sup>27</sup> Using this definition, the middle class has clearly been growing. Employment in the formal sector in the city rose from 24% of working-age adults in the 2000 census to 30% in 2010. This represents roughly 350,000 additional formal sector workers in a ten year period. Adults with at least some secondary education rose from 32% to 43% of the city over the same period.

Contrary to cities elsewhere in the developing world, especially in Latin America (e.g., see Luna 2014), Greater Accra's middle and upper class is not overwhelmingly concentrated into certain districts of the city. Instead, many middle class and poorer residents often live intermixed within the same administrative districts and parliamentary constituencies. This mixing has long been typical of West African cities (Gugler & Flanagan 1978). While more gated upper class housing developments are now being constructed (Grant 2009), there still are not majority middle class districts within the city. Residents with formal sector employment, literacy, and secondary education make up the majority of adults on the 2010 census in only one of the 28 urban parliamentary constituencies in Greater Accra, with 53% in Ayawaso West, a constituency within the AMA that houses the main national university and the wealthiest neighborhood in the country (East Legon). The median urban constituency is 23% middle class. On the other end of the spectrum, concentrated slums with significant poverty have developed in Greater Accra. But other poor residents live mixed in among middle and upper class residential neighborhoods, often as squatters or in other informal, temporary housing arrangements.

Panel (b) of Figure 2.3 shades Electoral Areas (wards) in the metropolitan area by the proportion of adults on the 2010 census with formal sector employment, some secondary education, and English literacy, which I use as a proxy for the presence of the middle or upper class. The presence of large slums is visible in the areas surrounding Ga Mashie (Jamestown), at the heart of central Accra, and other traditional Ga communities along the Atlantic Coast, such as Teshie and Nungua. In addition, concentrated poverty in majority Northern slums such as Sabon Zongo, Agbogbloshie, and Mamobi-Nima within the AMA is visible.<sup>28</sup> Upper class areas are visible at Legon and around the airport in the Ayawaso West constituency of the AMA, as well as along the Spintex Road in Ledzokuku-Krowor District, where construction of new

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<sup>27</sup>Public education is only free through middle school ("Junior Secondary") in Ghana. There is a large discontinuity between middle school and secondary school ("Senior Secondary") attendance due to socio-economic class.

<sup>28</sup>Geo-coded census data is missing for Tema and Ashaiman districts. The Ashaiman and Tema New Town slums are thus not visualized in Panel (b) of Figure 2.3. Wealthy neighborhoods in Tema West constituency are also not shown.

upper class housing developments has been most extensive. But across most wards in the city, Panel (b) shows that wealthier and poorer residents are more mixed.

### **2.4.3 Traditional Accra: The Ga Ethnic Group**

Greater Accra also has significant internal variation in the importance of traditional ethnic institutions. Traditional chiefs retain their importance among the indigenous Ga ethnic group, but serve little role in daily life for others in the city. Despite being the original inhabitants of the region, the Ga are now a minority in their own city. As of 2010, the Greater Accra Region had become 40% Akan, 27% Ga, and 20% Ewe, with the remaining 13% comprised mostly of Northern ethnic groups.<sup>29</sup> The city still has segregated Ga neighborhoods, however, in the locations of many of the original Ga villages. These include parts of Ga Mashie (Jamestown), Bawaleshie, La, Osu, Teshie, Nungua, Kpone, and Bortianor. Many of these original Ga communities have become economically marginalized over time (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012), with some of the most concentrated poverty in the city (Weeks et al. 2006).<sup>30</sup>

These Ga communities are distinctive from other parts of the city, with prominent chief's palaces, such as the one described in Gbawe at the beginning of Chapter 1, and traditional family houses, which serve as central meeting points for the extended Ga families, or clans, originating from each neighborhood. Ga residents who live elsewhere in Greater Accra often return to these family houses for social events and weekly or monthly family meetings, maintaining strong ethnic social networks within the community. Traditional Ga festivals celebrated in these original communities remain major events in the city. For example, an annual ban on "noise making" decreed by Ga chiefs closes bars and nightclubs, silences mosque minarets, and subdues church services for a month each year throughout the city. The ban is enforced by the district governments.

Traditional chiefs in Ghana are constitutionally granted ownership of most land in the country. In rural areas, land ownership can give chiefs significant social power, with the ability to reallocate lands among families, charge tribute or taxes to outsiders who have settled in an area, and lease community lands to investors or business interests (Goldstein & Udry 2008, Onoma 2010). As the indigenous ethnic group of Greater Accra, Ga chiefs formally own most land in the city. Their property rights are irregularly enforced,

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<sup>29</sup>The city of Accra (AMA) was only 23% Ga in the 2010 census.

<sup>30</sup>This can be seen visually by comparing the Ga majority areas in panel (c) of Figure 2.3 with panel (b).

however (Firmin-Sellers 1996, Onoma 2010). Large tracts of land in the city have been seized by the government and leased to other users, cutting Ga chiefs out of opportunities for rent extraction. This is a source of significant discontent within the Ga community, many members of which see themselves as unfairly compensated for the use of their land by outsiders (Yeboah 2008); this irregular enforcement of Ga property rights is used to politically mobilize Ga voters around a perception that they are losing status, threatened by newcomers to the city (Paller 2015). Accra's courts are the site of numerous land cases in which Ga chiefs or families sue current users (or the government) to reestablish property rights. Adding to the complexity are disputes within the Ga community over which Ga families are the rightful holders of some of the chieftaincies in Greater Accra. This has led to legal battles within the Ga community, as well as some intra-ethnic violence.

Some of these internal disputes have become politicized, with the NDC and NPP aligning themselves with rival families in search of Ga votes. Ga elites, including chiefs, have become closely tied to the political party leadership in Greater Accra, especially to the NDC, which has historically drawn the most Ga votes.<sup>31</sup> This gives Ga an outsized, favored position in politics within the city. Constituency-level leaders and parliamentary candidates are drawn heavily from the Ga community, particularly for the NDC. Gas won half of the 28 urban parliamentary seats in 2012, despite comprising only a quarter of the electorate. Almost all DCEs (or mayors) appointed by the NDC to lead the city's district governments are Ga, as discussed in Chapter 6. Party agents describe campaigning in Ga communities as a central part of voter mobilization in Greater Accra, using chiefs and family heads as intermediaries to reach Ga voters in a way that they cannot with other ethnic groups in the city.<sup>32</sup> Local politicians from both major parties describe approaching Ga chiefs to pay their respects and ask for permission to begin any projects, such as building new local public goods.<sup>33</sup> Ga chiefs can mount legal challenges and mobilize local residents against a project, tying it up for years. This power allows Ga chiefs to extract concessions and spending from local governments in return

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<sup>31</sup>Chiefs are formally barred from political activity, but in reality, chiefs across the country are sometimes intimately involved in local politics, and encourage residents in their communities to support specific electoral candidates.

<sup>32</sup>Interview with NPP party agents, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014; interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 27 February 2014; interview with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014; interview with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 5 March 2014; interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 26 March 2014.

<sup>33</sup>Interview with district assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014; interview with district assembly member, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February 2014; interview with district assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014; interview with district assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.



for their support.

Other residents lack similarly powerful traditional leaders in Greater Accra. Instead, consistent with what modernization theories expected to occur as a result of rural-urban migration (see Chapter 1), many of the remaining residents of the city are increasingly disconnected from traditional authorities. The Akan, the largest ethnic group now living in Accra, have chiefs who play important roles in village life in Akan regions of the country and in the city of Kumasi, capital of the Ashanti kingdom and the Asantehene, the most powerful traditional authority in Ghana. But their authority does not extend to Accra. Some Northern ethnic groups have posted sub-chiefs to live within the city's "zongo" communities (Northern migrant settlements), but because these chiefs do not own land, they have significantly less local power than they would in a rural area in the north. Imams and other religious leaders often play a more important leadership role among the Northern community in Accra than chiefs. To the extent that ethnic social networks remain important among these other ethnic groups, they tie residents of Greater Accra back to their ethnic home regions elsewhere in Ghana, rather than creating dense social ties within the city that can be used for local political mobilization. Ultimately, the ability of the parties, especially the NDC, to campaign in Ga communities by enlisting the assistance of Ga elites and working through locally dense Ga social networks means that Ga voters are easier to target with patronage than other residents of the city. This is explored further in Chapter 5.

#### **2.4.4 Ethnic Diversity**

Finally, similar to other major African cities, Greater Accra has become very ethnically diverse. Panel (c) of Figure 2.3 displays the majority ethnic group in each Electoral Area of the metropolitan area. As discussed above, there are still homogeneous Ga enclaves along the coast, as well as segregated Akan communities, especially on the northwestern rim of the city. There also slum areas populated primarily by groups from northern Ghana. But most wards in Figure 2.3 have no majority ethnic group.

By contrast, most rural villages in Ghana are the homeland of a single ethnic group or a small set of related groups. While most rural communities have some outsiders living there as local minorities, indigenous groups usually make up the clear majority. Almost all rural territories in Ghana are viewed as belonging to a locally dominant ethnic group, with government spending directed to these areas seen as a transfer in favor of that specific group. There are some exceptions to this pattern. Ghana also has a history of rural-rural labor migration, especially around the cocoa farming industry, which is the largest source of

rural employment across southern Ghana. Seasonal migrants from the three northern regions have long travelled down to work on cocoa farms in central Ghana. Akans from the Ashanti and Eastern Regions have also gradually migrated into Ghana's Western and Brong Ahafo Regions in search of more productive land (Hill 1963). But this has not produced ethnic diversity at the local level on anything near the scale of urban areas like Greater Accra.

These differences can be seen clearly in Figure 2.4. The top panel is a density plot of the distribution of the standard Herfindahl index of ethnic fractionalization in each enumeration area, or census tract, in all rural areas of the country on the 2010 census.<sup>34</sup> Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected people from an enumeration area are from the same ethnic group. The median rural enumeration area has ethnic fractionalization of 0.17. The distribution of ethnic fractionalization by enumeration area in the Greater Accra metropolitan area is in the second panel. Here, the median enumeration area has ethnic fractionalization of 0.60. Figure 2.4 shows that there are still some homogeneous local areas within Greater Accra, but much of the city is diverse. The final two panels give similar distributions for all major metropolitan areas in Ghana (adding Kumasi, Tamale, and Takoradi-Sekondi) and for all cities, adding several smaller cities such as Sunyani, Cape Coast, and Ho. In each panel, ethnic fractionalization within these cities is clearly much higher than in rural areas.<sup>35</sup>

## 2.5 The Data

I examine the political effects of urbanization using a mixed-methods approach. The main inferences are drawn from analysis of original survey data on voter attitudes and behavior, combined with local election results and fine-grained census data. This census data allows for significantly more detailed measurement of urban neighborhood characteristics than has been possible in past studies of urban Africa. Together, these data sources are used for "large-N" comparisons of political outcomes across a representative cross-section of neighborhoods within the city. This analysis is complemented by a series of qualitative sources that aid in understanding the underlying motivations behind these outcomes: interviews with local politicians and

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<sup>34</sup>Each of the country's 37,000 enumeration areas contains several hundred people.

<sup>35</sup>But there is relatively less ethnic diversity in the smaller cities than in Greater Accra because they have attracted less rural-urban migration over time.




Figure 2.4: *Ethnic Diversity by Enumeration Area*: Density distributions of ethnic fractionalization for each 2010 census enumeration area (tract) for: (a) all rural areas of Ghana; (b) Greater Accra metropolitan area; (c) the four major metropolitan areas (Greater Accra, Kumasi, Tamale, Takoradi-Sekondi); and (d) all Ghanaian cities (the four metro areas, all regional capitals, Obuasi, Ejisu, Techiman, Bawku).

political party leaders, as well as focus groups with ordinary urban residents conducted during intensive field research between 2012 and 2014. In this section, I introduce basic features of these data sources, including several key variables from the survey and census data that will reappear throughout the subsequent analysis.

### 2.5.1 Survey and Census Data

The main survey analyzed throughout the text interviewed a representative, random sample of 1008 residents of Greater Accra in November-December 2013. The survey interviewed 21 respondents at their households

in 48 small sampling clusters, or neighborhoods, in 10 parliamentary constituencies within the city.<sup>36</sup> The sample was selected after stratifying all parliamentary constituencies in the metropolitan area by wealth, ethnic diversity, and 2012 NDC vote share, and then selecting random start points within constituencies after stratifying on wealth and ethnic diversity using geo-coded census data.<sup>37</sup> Interviews were conducted in four languages (English, Akan/Twi, Ga, or Ewe) by local enumerators using smartphones. From each of the 48 start points, respondents were selected via a standard random walk procedure.<sup>38</sup> The points in Figure 2.2 above display the centroids of the 48 clusters of respondents in the survey.

At an individual level, the survey measures a series of demographic characteristics of each respondent. These include age, ethnicity, religion, wealth, types of living arrangements, and socio-economic class. Wealth and socio-economic class are measured using indices based on a series of questions on basic assets, education, and types of employment. The first, referred to as the education/employment index, is the first dimension of a factor analysis of indicators for: having more than a middle school education, English literacy, and formal sector employment. This is meant to match the definition of middle class status discussed above. In the absence of reliable data on income, I rely on this index as the primary measure of class, as discussed above. A separate index measures basic household assets of each respondent and is based on the first dimension of a factor analysis of indicators for owning a car, a television, a computer, having running water, a flush toilet, electricity, and a home security gate.<sup>39</sup> These variables were chosen so as to avoid incorporating access to local public services into the measure of assets.<sup>40</sup> An additional series of demographic questions measures respondents' residential histories, which are used in Chapter 5 to examine how long respondents have lived in each neighborhood and how they sorted into living there. Other questions measure respondents' social attitudes about their ethnic groups.

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<sup>36</sup>13 interviews are dropped in all analyses due to enumerator errors, leaving  $N = 995$ . The parliamentary constituencies are Ayawaso East, Ayawaso North, Ablekuma North, Ablekuma Central, and Okaikwei Central, within the city of Accra (AMA), and Weija-Gbawe, Bortianor-Ngleshie Amanfro, La Dade Kotopon, Ledzokuku, and Krowor, in the surrounding area.

<sup>37</sup>See the Appendix for more detail on the sampling procedures.

<sup>38</sup>40% of interviews were on weekends and holidays so employed and wealthy respondents were more likely to be available. Interviews alternated by gender.

<sup>39</sup>Both of these indices are scaled in standard deviations from mean values of 0. I also make a count variable of each indicator of education and employment, ranging from 0 to 3, and repeat all analyses with this variable, finding substantively identical results (not shown).

<sup>40</sup>In particular, even though running water and electricity can be provided publicly, middle class and wealthy residents in Greater Accra often privately provide these services to themselves, as discussed above, such that access is more a measure of wealth than public service provision.

In addition to these basic demographic questions, the survey asks respondents a series of questions about political preferences and political behavior, examined and explained in the subsequent chapters, as well as about their ties to chiefs and other local community leaders. Randomized survey experiments measuring voters' perceptions of the credibility of campaign promises and their expectations about where patronage will be targeted by the major parties are also included. These survey experiments are analyzed in Chapters 3 and 5.

Separately, two main explanatory variables at the neighborhood level – neighborhood wealth and ethnic composition – are measured using geo-coded enumeration area (tract) level census data, using a 10% individual-level random sample of Ghana's 2010 census.<sup>41</sup> Calculating these variables requires a definition of "neighborhoods." Neighborhood boundaries in any city are nebulous social concepts. People living in the same place often disagree about the boundaries of their neighborhood (Wong et al. 2012). Universally agreed-upon definitions of neighborhood boundaries do not exist in Greater Accra, except for in a few geographically distinctive communities. Moreover, census enumeration area boundaries provide an inappropriate means of defining neighborhoods; as elsewhere, (Wong et al. 2012) enumeration areas in Ghana are politically and socially irrelevant creations of the census bureau. Taking enumeration areas as the unit of observation may also suffer from the "modifiable areal unit problem" (Openshaw 1983), in which arbitrary choices over how to impose discrete boundaries on continuous geographic data can significantly bias a study's results.

I attempt to mitigate the risk of bias by defining local neighborhood characteristics as weighted averages of census characteristics from all census tracts around each individual survey respondent, with information closer to the respondent weighted higher, and all data outside a given radius weighted as 0. This smooths the census data over the enumeration areas rather than imposing discrete, arbitrary neighborhood boundaries and follows a well-established approach used in the Sociology literature to measure ethnic segregation (Reardon and O'Sullivan 2004, Lee et al. 2008), and also mirrors Ichino & Nathan (2013). Because of the small scale at which urban club goods benefit voters in Greater Accra, the city's very high population density,<sup>42</sup> and the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate local pockets of ethnic homogeneity within the city from more heterogeneous surroundings at larger distances, the main radius for these weighted averages used

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<sup>41</sup>This is a 10% sample of individual-level census returns within each enumeration area, selected by the Ghana Statistical Service.

<sup>42</sup>Population density reaches over 90,000 / sq. km in the city.

is 500 meters around each respondent.<sup>43</sup> This means that each neighborhood in the analysis is measured relative to each respondent's *own location*. This approach also accounts for population density, with the weights a function of both distance and population density around the respondent. See the Appendix for detail on the specific weighting function used.<sup>44</sup>

Using this spatially-weighted census data, the wealth of each respondent's neighborhood is calculated as the first dimension in a factor analysis of census data on assets, education, and employment, mirroring the individual-level indices that measure assets and socio-economic class in the survey.<sup>45</sup> The neighborhood wealth index is scaled in standard deviations from the city-wide mean of 0 and is calculated over all enumeration areas in urban Greater Accra. In the survey sample, the variable ranges from -1.4 to 3, with a mean of -0.10. Higher values indicate greater local wealth in the radius around each respondent. In addition, the ethnic composition of the area around each respondent is measured using the weighted average of the ethnic group population shares within the same radius. Local ethnic diversity is measured as a standard Herfindahl fractionalization index calculated using these population shares for the nine census categories for ethnicity: Akan, Ga-Dangbe, Ewe, Mole-Dagbon, Guan, Gurma, Grusi, Mande, and Other.<sup>46</sup> Population density is measured as the population of the enumeration areas covered by each sampling cluster, divided by the area (in sq. km). Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the core variables from the survey and geo-coded census data that appear repeatedly throughout the analysis in text. Other variables from the survey and census data measuring specific outcomes are introduced in the later chapters as needed, with separate summary statistics provided.

In addition to the survey on urban areas, a companion survey was conducted in five rural constituencies of Ghana to allow for comparisons to outcomes in rural areas (see Chapter 4). This rural survey was conducted in five parliamentary constituencies, randomly selected from all rural constituencies in five re-

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<sup>43</sup>Because these weights decay with distance, the results using this approach are robust to small changes in the maximum distance used for this radius, such as using 600 or 700 meters instead.

<sup>44</sup>The median census enumeration area is 0.03 sq. km in area, smaller than the 0.79 sq. km of each radius around respondents.

<sup>45</sup>Variables that only measure service provision, not wealth, are excluded. The index includes: % in the radius around each respondent with running water (privately provided by wealthier residents via tanker or borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a single-family home (excluding informal structures); % with a computer; % adults with more than a middle school education; and % adults employed in the formal or public sectors.

<sup>46</sup>Because a subset of the latter 6 categories are northern groups, more Northerners in an area will be correlated with fractionalization. I also calculate an alternative index that collapses to 5 categories: Akan, Ga-Dangbe, Ewe, Northern, and Other. This is highly correlated with the 9 category measure ( $r = 0.92$ ). Results for ethnic fractionalization are robust to using either.

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Urban Survey

	mean	min.	max.	sd	N
NDC Vote in 2012 presidential elec. (0,1)	0.53	0.00	1.00	0.50	804
NPP Vote in 2012 presidential elec. (0,1)	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.50	804
Self-Reported Turnout in 2012 (0,1)	0.84	0.00	1.00	0.36	995
Co-Ethnic Party Vote (0,1)	0.76	0.00	1.00	0.43	797
Neighborhood Wealth Index (500m)	-0.10	-1.40	3.02	0.80	995
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)	0.69	0.39	0.86	0.11	995
Ga % (500m)	0.25	0.05	0.76	0.19	995
Akan % (500m)	0.37	0.13	0.67	0.15	995
Ewe % (500m)	0.16	0.05	0.35	0.07	995
Northern % (500m)	0.12	0.01	0.53	0.13	995
Population Density per sq. km (by cluster)	28710	1650	95120	27050	48
Party member (0,1)	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.37	995
Education/employment index	0.00	-1.04	1.74	1.00	995
More than middle school education (0,1)	0.51	0.00	1.00	0.50	995
Formal sector employment (0,1)	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.36	995
Fluent in English (0,1)	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.50	995
Assets/wealth index	0.00	-1.10	2.30	1.00	995
Ethnicity most "salient" social identity (0,1)	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.50	995
Moved for Family / Ethnicity (0,1)	0.75	0.00	1.00	0.44	995
Age	35.54	18.00	93.00	13.07	995
Muslim (0,1)	0.20	0.00	1.00	0.40	995
Male (0,1)	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.50	995
Akan (0,1)	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.49	995
Ewe (0,1)	0.18	0.00	1.00	0.38	995
Northerner (0,1)	0.18	0.00	1.00	0.38	995
Ga-Dangme (0,1)	0.30	0.00	1.00	0.46	995
Years in neighborhood (0,1)	15.34	0.00	80.00	14.28	995
Percent life in Greater Accra	0.69	0.00	1.00	0.33	995
Met chief in last year (0,1)	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.35	995

*Ethnic categories do not add to 1 because some respondents are from multiple groups. Chapter 5 discusses how this is addressed when measuring support for co-ethnic parties.*

gions of southern Ghana (excluding Greater Accra Region).<sup>47</sup> The selected constituencies are indicated by the light gray shading in the map of Ghana above (Figure 2.1). The sample contains two very homogeneous, stronghold constituencies (Kpando, Volta Region, 89% NDC in the 2012 presidential election; Manso Nkwanta, Ashanti Region, 82% NPP), two less homogenous constituencies that leaned to each party (Lower Manya Krobo, Eastern Region, 67% NDC; Offinso South, Ashanti Region, 65% NPP), and a highly

<sup>47</sup>The sampling frame for this comparison survey of rural areas was limited to southern Ghana, excluding Greater Accra Region itself, because of the logistical complications of conducting the survey in northern regions with Accra-based enumerators.

diverse, competitive constituency (Offinso North, Ashanti Region, 50% NPP, 47% NDC).<sup>48</sup> Enumerators interviewed 21 randomly selected respondents in five villages or towns within each constituency, for a total of 105 respondents per constituency. The sampling procedure for respondents within villages was identical to the urban survey, with random start points for enumerators selected through a similar process. The survey questionnaires were the same.

Finally, in addition to the survey and census data, I also draw on localized polling station-level election results from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections and Electoral Area level, or ward (clusters of polling stations), results from Ghana's 2010 local government elections. These results are paired with the census data to estimate demographic characteristics around polling stations and within Electoral Areas, based on a random sample of geo-coded polling station locations collected by a team of enumerators. These data sources are described in more detail as they are analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. In the process of creating this dataset on polling station and Electoral Area locations, enumerators also conducted a separate, smaller survey on club goods delivery by the local government in a representative, random sample of locations throughout the Greater Accra metropolitan area. This additional survey is discussed in Chapter 6.

## **2.5.2 Interviews and Voter Focus Groups**

I also rely on a series of interviews with politicians and ordinary voters to develop theory and interpret patterns in the quantitative data. This includes 47 semi-structured interviews, listed in the Appendix, conducted with Members of Parliament, constituency-level political party executives, local party agents, and District Assembly members (city councilors), representing both the NDC and NPP.<sup>49</sup> The specific questions varied based on the type of politician interviewed, but generally focused on the ways in which they interact with voters during campaigns and once in government, how they explain voters' political behavior, and how they believe urbanization has affected political competition within the city.

These interviews were conducted in two main waves. In the first wave, in 2012 and 2013 before the survey was fielded, subjects and locations were selected non-randomly to cover a cross-section of parliamentary constituencies and types of neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan area, as well as a range of different

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<sup>48</sup>This is in line with the actual distribution in southern Ghana, where there are relatively fewer diverse or politically competitive constituencies in comparison to urban areas, as shown above.

<sup>49</sup>Several of these 47 interviews involved more than one politician, such that the total number of politicians interviewed is somewhat larger.



types of politicians. In addition, a separate wave of interviews conducted in 2014 focused more intensively on four randomly selected parliamentary constituencies, with the goal of getting detailed insight into local politics in these specific areas of the city. The constituencies were selected after stratifying on political competitiveness, to insure interviews were conducted in an NDC stronghold (La Dade Kotopon), and NPP stronghold (Ablekuma North), and two competitive constituencies (Krowor, Okaikwei Central). Within constituencies, I randomly selected one wealthier neighborhood and one poorer neighborhood to focus on, after dividing all Electoral Areas, or wards, based on the median value of the neighborhood wealth index described above. Snowball sampling was used for interview subjects, with interviews with constituency-level party leaders followed by asking for contacts to local party agents in the selected neighborhoods.

Finally, in addition to these interviews, I draw on 13 focus group discussions conducted with small groups of ordinary urban residents. These are used to provide greater context with which to interpret the survey results. Locations were selected to provide a representative cross-section of poorer and wealthier areas in the metropolitan area, as well as reach residents both within the city of Accra (AMA) and in outlying areas. At each location, participants were recruited using a random walk sampling method, similar to the survey, and were offered a small amount of compensation to assemble later for a group discussion. Each group composed 4 to 8 people, all mixed by age and gender. The conversations were semi-structured, with open-ended questions about political preferences and voting behavior, as well as about typical campaign tactics the participants had witnessed in their communities.

## 3 | Policy Preferences and Political Participation

### 3.1 Introduction

Poverty is believed to sustain the distribution of particularistic benefits by politicians in return for support. Economic development, urbanization, and the growth of the middle class have all been argued to spur transitions to more policy-based competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013). While many Ghanaians are poor, Greater Accra contains a burgeoning middle class, as described in the previous chapter. One quarter of adults in this city of 4 million have at least some secondary education, English literacy, and employment in the formal sector. Nearly 80% earn over US\$4 per day (Ghana Statistical Service 2014).<sup>1</sup> Unlike cases of clientelistic persistence in the face of economic growth elsewhere (e.g., Kitschelt 2007), Ghana has a liberalized economy and is highly politically competitive. But despite the rise of the urban middle class, politics remains predominantly particularistic and patronage-based (Lindberg 2010, Whitfield 2011), centered around the distribution of localized public services and patronage goods, rather than a contest over public policies. This has been shown even in cities like Accra (Paller 2014).

I provide an explanation for the persistence of particularistic linkages between parties and voters in the face of urbanization and economic growth by examining the interaction of voters' preferences with politicians' incentives to supply different types of goods to voters. I focus on urban areas, where growth of the middle class has been concentrated and existing literature suggests that programmatic competition should be most likely to emerge first. Urban middle class voters are more likely than poor voters to want major universalistic policies from politicians than narrow particularistic benefits that can be targeted as patronage. But these preferences do not translate into significant policy-based electoral competition. Politicians are

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<sup>1</sup>This is the benchmark often used to define the African middle class (e.g., African Development Bank 2011; also see Thurlow et al. 2015). Calculated at the November 2013 exchange rate.

unable to commit to delivering on campaign promises to voters who want these policies (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). This creates short-term incentives to ignore voters' universalistic preferences – even as they become more common – and to avoid wasting campaign effort on middle class voters. As a result, voters who want universalistic policies are more likely to abstain from participation, both because they are not being mobilized to turn out and because they do not trust that their preferences will be addressed. Electoral participation remains dominated by poorer voters who are more susceptible to patronage appeals. This could then stall the emergence of policy-based competition despite demographic changes in the electorate that should be encouraging it.<sup>2</sup>

Using the data sources from Greater Accra described in the previous chapter, I show in this chapter that middle class voters, defined by their education and participation in the formal sector economy,<sup>3</sup> are more likely than poorer voters to want universalistic policies that cannot be targeted as patronage. But voters who want these policies are also less likely to turn out to vote and more likely to refrain from other forms of participation. Through interviews and a survey experiment, I suggest that these voters abstain for two reasons: they are unlikely to be mobilized to turn out by parties that do not believe they can credibly convince middle class voters to support them, and because voters who want universalistic policies are especially unlikely to believe politicians' campaign promises. Patronage-based appeals then persist in Greater Accra, sustaining incentives for the ethnic political competition documented in subsequent chapters.

This chapter offers a new explanation for the persistence of patronage-based appeals even in contexts of high intra-party competition and low state intervention in the economy, counter to theories in Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) and Kitschelt (2007). My argument suggests that the dual programmatic-clientelistic linkages seen in many Latin American countries (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014), with parties simultaneously competing for middle class votes based on policy proposals and support from the poor based on clientelism, may not emerge if there are class-based differences in participation.<sup>4</sup> Instead, these findings reinforce that demand-side changes in voters' preferences are not enough to spur transitions to policy-based competition

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<sup>2</sup>I focus on the poor and middle class, not the wealthy elite. Wealthy elites may demand patronage, as those most directly engaged in business with the state, and may also participate at high rates, as the ruling political class. They may also fund campaigns in return for contracts and access. But because they are such a small portion of the electorate (and are also unlikely to consent to survey interviews) the wealthy are not well represented in the data below and are not a focus of any analysis here.

<sup>3</sup>See Chapter 2 and Thurlow et al. (2015) for further discussion of this definition.

<sup>4</sup>Unlike most new democracies, voting is compulsory (and enforced) in the main Latin American cases in which “dual linkages” have been observed (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile), reducing the possibility of class differences in participation. The importance of compulsory turnout is discussed further in Chapter 7.

without institutional changes that also alter politicians' strategic incentives to supply patronage (e.g., Shefter 1994, Hagopian et al. 2009, Hicken 2011). In addition, the chapter extends research on class-based turnout differences in Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) to explore additional reasons why middle class voters may participate less than the poor in many developing countries.

### **3.2 Class and Political Competition**

There is a general expectation that as the middle class emerges and economies develop, political competition will become less particularistic. Demand for patronage may decline in the electorate, through processes of modernization, or the supply of patronage may be constrained by bureaucratic reforms or economic liberalization (e.g., Erie 1988, Shefter 1994, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hagopian et al. 2009, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013). This correlation is imperfect; clientelism remained prevalent deep into the 20th century in countries like Japan and Italy. But existing literature argues that this is explained by hegemonic parties with significant control over economic resources (Chubb 1982, Scheiner 2006, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Kitschelt 2007).<sup>5</sup>

Demand-side explanations for the presence of patronage-based appeals are based on poorer voters gaining greater marginal utility from patronage benefits that politicians can provide (Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013). Because poor voters more acutely need private goods like food, housing, or jobs, as well as local public, or club, goods, such as running water and paved roads, they are more susceptible to appeals that strategically target or withhold these goods. Poorer voters may also be more risk averse, preferring upfront, targeted benefits over promises of broad future policy changes (Kitschelt 2000). By contrast, wealthier voters may judge patronage distribution as normatively unacceptable, punishing politicians engaging in it (Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

In middle income democracies, clientelism often co-exists with policy-based appeals (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Many Latin American parties woo poor voters with selective transfers, while engaging middle class voters with policy (Luna 2014).<sup>6</sup> Luna (2014) argues that dual appeals are most likely when the poor are

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<sup>5</sup>Within these countries, clientelism has been most prevalent in rural or poor regions and built on traditional social institutions, still consistent with a modernization hypothesis (e.g. Chubb 1982, Putnam 1993, Scheiner 2007).

<sup>6</sup>Luna (2014) documents this in Chile and Uruguay and Levitsky (2003) in Argentina. Weitz-Shapiro (2012) shows differential use of clientelism across Argentine municipalities with different levels of wealth. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015) document similar "portfolio diversification" in Mexico. Sometimes one party specializes in patronage distribution while others avoid it (Calvo &

segregated from the middle class and rich into separate electoral or administrative districts. This allows local politicians to specialize in either a particularistic or policy-based appeal without bringing the two into conflict.<sup>7</sup> In addition, these studies make an implicit assumption that there is high enough state capacity that politicians can credibly commit to implementing policy platforms. But this is not the case in settings with little previous history of policy-based parties successfully implementing distinct programs (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007), as in much of Africa.

A separate literature documents class-based differences in political participation. In advanced democracies, the wealthy and middle class are more likely to vote than the poor, and also to participate in a range of other political activities (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba et al. 1995; but see Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). The preferences of the rich are then better represented (Gilens 2012). Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) demonstrates that this reverses in many developing countries, however. In developing countries with low capacity to tax and little ideological polarization between parties, the poor vote more than the wealthy.<sup>8</sup> They argue that when the rich are not threatened by taxation, they do not need to participate to prevent redistribution.

But while costs of abstention are lower when wealthier voters are not threatened by taxation, the benefits to participation are also lower where politics is patronage-based. Turnout buying may inflate the turnout of the poor through distribution of inducements that the rich do not value (Nichter 2008). And clientelism likely affects participation in other areas beyond voting. For example, where parties are engines for patronage distribution, members join in pursuit of rents rather than ideology, as Ichino & Nathan (2012) describe for Ghana.<sup>9</sup> The reward structure to participation in such an organization is unlikely to be aligned with the goals of middle class voters seeking to advance specific ideologies or policies. But if middle class residents do not participate, the demand-side pressure that the literature above expects politicians face for making

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Murillo 2004). Counter to the argument below, however, turnout is compulsory in these countries (though not enforced in Mexico).

<sup>7</sup>This segregation is much less the case in African cities, especially in West Africa (Gugler & Flanagan 1978). Where poor and wealthier voters are intermixed, these strategies can directly conflict: patronage distribution can be punished by wealthier voters (Weitz-Shapiro 2012), but foregoing the targeting of services constrains opportunities to commit the support of poorer voters through clientelism.

<sup>8</sup>Relatedly, Croke et al. (2014) argues that more educated voters are less likely to participate in competitive authoritarian regimes because they do not want to legitimate authoritarian rulers, using evidence from Zimbabwe. But as I argue below, educated middle class voters may find participation futile even in a significantly more democratic context.

<sup>9</sup>Similarly, Hite-Rubin (2015) shows that party membership declines rapidly in the Philippines when voters no longer depend financially on the patronage benefits they get from joining a party.

policy-based electoral appeals above may not occur, even as the middle class grows.

### 3.3 Patronage Politics and Participation as Reinforcing

In a country transitioning to democracy where the major parties are not initially ideologically differentiated, most voters are poor, and ethnicity is salient, the politicians who are at first most successful will be those who can best target patronage benefits to key constituencies and ethnic bases, not those with strong policy commitments.<sup>10</sup> But what happens when economic growth and urbanization subsequently reduce aggregate preferences for patronage in the electorate? Even in highly competitive political systems, politicians may still face incentives to use predominantly particularistic appeals.

I extend existing work on programmatic transitions (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) to make clearer an implicit distinction between voters' preferences for two classes of resources: particularistic goods or universalistic policies. Particularistic goods encompass both private goods, targetable to individuals (e.g., cash payments, jobs), and local public, or club, goods that can be targeted as patronage to specific communities (e.g., local roads, schools). Universalistic policies instead necessarily affect many other people and cannot be targeted as patronage to specific voters or communities.<sup>11</sup> The extent of particularistic preferences in the electorate provides an upper bound on the proportion of voters who can be won over with patronage-based appeals. Particularistic preferences *could* be satisfied via universal distribution based on rational-technical criteria. But if many people want particularistic benefits from the government, patronage-based appeals remain a viable option for politicians, who can build support by selectively distributing benefits. By contrast, where a large number of voters have universalistic preferences, patronage-based appeals are no longer a viable strategy; voters' preferences cannot be satisfied by patronage.<sup>12</sup> Instead, space opens for programmatic competition between ideologically-differentiated parties.

Particularistic preferences should be explained by individual and local needs (Stokes et al. 2013). People

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<sup>10</sup>The initial party organizations that emerge and determine which politicians subsequently gain opportunities for political contestation will similarly emphasize patronage over program.

<sup>11</sup>Universalistic policies include those concerning overall economic management, foreign investment and trade, natural resources, major infrastructure, and corruption, as well as tax rates, education policies, subsidies to industries or agriculture, utility prices, price controls, labor and immigration laws, etc.

<sup>12</sup>That voters have preferences for particularistic goods does not mean that politicians will always engage in clientelism. But if most voters instead make universalistic demands, politicians cannot compete by distributing patronage.

who are poor and lack employment and education should be more likely to demand jobs, loans to start businesses, and assistance with basic expenses from politicians. In contrast, those in the middle class should be less likely to rely on politicians, instead having more universalistic preferences. Local needs for public services should also affect preferences. If paved roads and running water, for example, are not available in a neighborhood, middle class residents may still want particularistic goods from the government.

If middle class voters have greater overall preferences for universalistic goods, politicians' electoral pressures should change as the middle class grows. Politicians who have already specialized in patronage-based appeals can respond in two ways: they can diversify their approach and make real policy promises to middle class voters, or they can "stay the course" with patronage appeals, making only cursory efforts to address universalistic preferences. Each entails costs: the first, the transaction cost of making policy-based appeals credible and restricting the supply of patronage by committing to distribute some benefits universally; the second, the opportunity cost of foregoing votes from those wanting universalistic policies. In urban African settings, the second choice – "staying the course" – may often be less costly than the first.

It is essentially costless for politicians to include rhetoric about large-scale policy proposals in platforms and manifestos, but the existence of this rhetoric does not mean that voters will believe it. Where the state has a long history of failing to deliver on policy promises amid budget crises, corruption, and ethnic or partisan favoritism, voters will initially discount the credibility of these promises (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007).<sup>13</sup> Even if specific leaders become committed to a universalistic agenda, the bureaucracies and other politicians charged with implementing it will often fail to deliver; a rich literature documents persistent corruption and favoritism in policy implementation across Africa (e.g., van de Walle 2001, Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Franck and Rainer 2012). Moreover, making policy-based appeals will be difficult for parties that have already invested instead in providing patronage. Implementation of universalistic policies often means foregoing existing opportunities to deliver patronage and extract rents. Even if politicians in middle class districts support universalistic policies, they confront a costly collective action problem: in many policy areas, they cannot act on their own – they need the cooperation of others in the political system (bureaucrats, legislators, branches of government) who may not face the same incentives.<sup>14</sup> For example, rural legislators

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<sup>13</sup>In contrast to most of Africa, in key cases of "dual linkage" politics in Latin America, such as Chile and Argentina, there have been long histories of competition between ideologically-differentiated, policy-motivated parties, sometimes even predating the large-scale use of clientelism (Levitsky 2003). In these contexts, parties will have less difficulty signaling policy credibility.

<sup>14</sup>Cruz & Keefer (2015) and Persson et al. (2012) describe these constraints in policy implementation in depth.

or party leaders may block policies preferred by those in middle class districts unless it does not constrain their own distribution of patronage.<sup>15</sup>

Building credibility requires long-term investments in successful implementation of policy proposals, taking more time than a politician with a short time horizon has. But this credibility is crucial for policy-based appeals to work. Any politician can buy support through particularistic goods because these can be delivered upfront, before the election. But voters must trust politicians to follow through later for policies that require longer-term implementation (Kitschelt 2000).<sup>16</sup> Importantly, the better-educated, middle class voters who actually want these universalistic policies may be those most aware of past policy failures and most dissatisfied with the status quo policy environment. These voters may be most skeptical and least likely to believe universalistic campaign promises. This leads to two theoretical expectations. First, in settings of low state capacity, few voters will see campaign promises as credible. Second, voters who prefer universalistic policies will be especially unlikely to see politicians' promises as credible.

Remaining focused on particularistic appeals can instead be less costly to politicians. As long as changes in preferences are gradual, politicians can still win in the short term only by delivering the patronage to poor voters that they have already specialized in providing, foregoing the costs of building policy credibly. A party can employ surface-level rhetoric about universalistic issues, but they need not focus significant mobilization efforts on the middle class, as there is no reason to waste effort on voters that a party does not believe it can convince to support it. This only becomes costly if another party does make credible policy-based appeals and corners the votes of the middle class. But any opposing party also faces the same credibility and coordination problems. Moreover, because some middle class voters do still want particularistic club goods because of shortcomings in service delivery, as discussed above, a party can still secure at least some middle class votes by selectively targeting club goods to neighborhoods with poor service provision. As a result, beyond costless rhetoric, politicians will largely avoid mobilizing middle class voters that it believes are not susceptible to particularistic appeals.

But a particularly important reason parties can afford to "stay the course" despite the growth of the middle class may be a lack of participation from voters who want universalistic policies. These voters will

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<sup>15</sup>Barkan (2008) discusses similar coordination problems in African legislatures.

<sup>16</sup>Moreover, performance in the delivery of particularistic goods is far more observable, allowing voters to more immediately verify the trustworthiness of particularistic promises.



have few options to choose from that they credibly believe will give them what they want. With no palatable choice on the ballot, they may become disillusioned and stop turning out.<sup>17</sup> And if party organizations and other politically-active associations are built around the distribution of patronage, voters who do not value patronage benefits may avoid them. In addition, a large literature shows that an important determinant of turnout is whether voters, or those in a voter's surrounding neighborhood, are mobilized to turn out by parties (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Gerber and Green 2000, Feddersen 2004, Nichter 2008, Cho and Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010). While parties may devote significant patronage resources to mobilizing participation of the poor through turnout buying (e.g., Nichter 2008), if parties ignore middle class voters in their campaigns, these voters may not vote simply because they are not being mobilized. Combining these factors, I thus expect that voters who want universalistic policies should be less likely to vote or participate in electoral politics in other ways. Moreover, voters who want universalistic policies should be particularly unlikely to participate when they are not being mobilized.

This may create a feedback loop. If voters who want universalistic policies withdraw, the median voter shifts towards those preferring particularistic benefits. Party organizations remain dominated by those seeking patronage and the main barriers to entry for politicians continue to select for politicians best able to deliver patronage, not policy. In turn, politicians avoid the middle class audience costs of clientelism theorized by Weitz-Shapiro (2012) and can forego costly investments in making universalistic appeals credible.<sup>18</sup> But this may only encourage more of those who want universalistic policies to stay away. This will not cycle indefinitely – a shock, such as an economic crisis, could spark greater turnout, or the middle class may eventually grow so large that parties have no choice but to include wealthier voters in electoral coalitions. But in the medium term, even if economic growth reduces aggregate preferences for particularistic goods in the population, patronage politics can be “sticky,” with the form of political competition lagging well behind voters’ preferences.

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<sup>17</sup>Research on Latin America shows that voters who are disillusioned with systemic corruption and believe they cannot create real change through voting are less likely to turn out (McCann and Dominguez 1998, Davis et al. 2004, Chong et al. 2014).

<sup>18</sup>It is possible that voters with universalistic preferences remain active in other ways, for example through civil society. Research on India suggests, for example, that while the urban middle class is less likely to turn out to vote or participate in party organizations than the poor, the middle class remain active in civil society groups (Chatterjee 2004, Harriss 2006). But even if this allows for indirect lobbying into government decision-making, these voters will not affect politicians’ behavior through channels of electoral accountability – patronage-based appeals remain a more viable path to elected office and the predictions here should still hold. Moreover, while growing in importance, the influence of civil society is often argued to be weaker in African democracies compared to new democracies elsewhere (e.g., Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

Why do disaffected voters not organize a new party or reform an existing one to offer themselves universalistic policies? Staying home is the lowest cost response in the face of large collective action problems, particularly if these voters are dispersed across neighborhoods, not already embedded in unions or other organizations that provide a framework for collective organization, and cross-cut the main ethnic cleavages in society.<sup>19</sup> An outside entrepreneur with a policy-based appeal could emerge, but this is unlikely in the near future in more institutionalized party systems, such as Ghana, where the barriers to an outside campaign are significant (Riedl 2014).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, an outsider faces the same constraints and collective action problems to making credible policy appeals. Ultimately, to the extent that such a credible outside option does emerge, the predicted differences in participation should decline.

### 3.4 Data Sources

I examine the theory by combining data on voters' preferences and participation with interview evidence. Voter-level data is from the main survey of residents of Greater Accra conducted in a random sample of 48 sampling clusters (or neighborhoods), as described in Chapter 2. Preferences were measured by adapting an Afrobarometer question, similar to that in Lieberman & McClendon (2013), which asks respondents to list up to three issues that they want the government to address.<sup>21</sup> Enumerators recorded up to three sentence-long responses instead of coding pre-defined categories. Responses were subsequently blind-coded as indicating preferences for private goods, defined as preferences that could be addressed by targeting specific people, club goods, defined as preferences that could be addressed by targeting a specific neighborhood, or public/universalistic goods, defined as preferences that could only be addressed by a public policy affecting many people.<sup>22</sup> The coding rules are intentionally conservative, counting all pref-

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<sup>19</sup>There is also not necessarily ideological consensus in what policies they want, hampering their ability to coalesce around a coherent platform.

<sup>20</sup>The closest examples of insurgent policy-based campaigns in Africa are the populists documented by Resnick (2014), such as Michael Sata in Zambia, a former regime insider who emerged in a significantly less institutionalized party system. Fusing policy appeals and clientelism, Sata targeted his message to the urban poor, not the middle class, and would not have ended the turnout disparities predicted here.

<sup>21</sup>"In your opinion, what are the most important issues or problems that you think the government should address?" This was asked before other questions about politics, to avoid priming. Enumerators indicated that these could either be national or local – "this is either in Ghana generally or in your area here" – if asked for clarification. A level of government was never specified to allow unprompted responses.

<sup>22</sup>See the Appendix for coding rules.

erences that *could* be satisfied through a targeted transfer as particularistic (private or club), to produce a lower bound estimate of universalistic preferences and an upper bound on the voters potentially susceptible to patronage-based appeals. Because respondents gave up to three responses, these categories are not mutually exclusive; I operationalize universalistic preferences both as an indicator for whether a respondent named any universalistic good among their three responses or as the percentage of total responses that were universalistic.

Turnout is measured by asking if respondents voted in the December 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. 84% reported turning out, compared to an official rate of 76% in the same parliamentary constituencies. While desirability bias likely leads to some over-reporting, wealthier and better educated respondents are thought to be most likely to over-report voting (Karp & Brockington 2005, Ansolabehere & Hersh 2012, Kasara & Suryanarayan 2014). This would *bias against* my results if those preferring universalistic policies, who are wealthier and better educated, overreport turnout relative to poorer, less educated voters who want particularistic goods.

As described in Chapter 2, I rely on an index of questions on education, literacy, and employment as the primary measure of socio-economic class. I also include an index of basic assets.<sup>23</sup> These are continuous measures; I do not discretely define respondents as middle class or poor, but only refer to those with more of these characteristics as more likely to be middle class. Controlling for differences in basic assets, education, literacy, and formal sector employment are all likely to be highly correlated with socio-economic status. This follows Thurlow et al. (2015), which argues that rather than income-based definitions, which are often very unreliably measured in Africa, the African middle class is best defined as those who have achieved “security from economic vulnerability” and have skills necessary for “social mobility” (1). They argue that secondary education and formal sector employment are among the strongest indicators that a person has permanently escaped poverty in most African countries.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>The education/employment index includes: having more than a middle school education, English literacy, and formal sector employment. The assets index includes: owning a car, television, and computer, having running water, a flush toilet, electricity, and a security gate. As discussed in Chapter 2, these indices are the first dimension of factor analyses of each set of variables, scaled in standard deviations from mean values of 0. I also make a count variable of each indicator of education and employment, ranging from 0 to 3, and repeat all analyses below with this variable, finding substantively identical results (not shown).

<sup>24</sup>Measuring class from education and employment status is intentionally conservative. Some respondents may be wealthy, but working in the informal sector. Others may themselves be uneducated, or in the informal sector, but be in a clearly middle class family. In either case, classifying these respondents as poor biases against the main hypotheses here, making it less likely to find differences in behavior between poor and middle class respondents.

Neighborhood characteristics and service provision around each respondent are measured using geo-coded enumeration area census data in the manner detailed in Chapter 2. I also overlay geo-coded 2010 census enumeration area data on top of similar geo-coded data from the 2000 census to measure changes over the 10 year period in total population in each 500 meter radius around respondents. This provides a proxy for need for local infrastructure by measuring the population pressure on existing roads, water systems, public schools, etc. In addition, survey questions measure the availability of running water and enumerators recorded the quality of roads, gutters, and other public infrastructure in each respondent's neighborhood.

### 3.5 Empirical Analysis

I find that middle class respondents are more likely to prefer universalistic policies than poorer voters and that those who want universalistic policies are less likely to participate in politics. I then show that this connection between preferences and participation may exist for two reasons: because of little campaign mobilization of middle class voters and because the low credibility of campaign promises.

#### 3.5.1 Preferences and Participation

Overall, 55% of respondents named at least one universalistic policy among the three issues they wanted the government to address. Over one third (36%) named two or three universalistic policies. The most common preferences are presented in Table 3.1. Being in the middle class is a strong predictor of universalistic preferences. Neighborhood-level needs also predict these preferences. I estimate a series of multi-level models following the form:

$$y_i = \alpha_j + \beta_1 EducEmploy_i + \beta_2 Assets_i + \mathbf{X}_i \delta + \epsilon_i$$

$$y_i = \alpha_j + \beta_1 EducEmploy_i + \beta_2 Assets_i + \beta_3 Pop10Yrs_i + \beta_4 NeighWealth_i$$

$$+ \beta_5 Water_j + \beta_6 Road_j + \beta_7 Density_j + \mathbf{X}_i \delta + \epsilon_i$$

where  $y_i$  is either an indicator for respondent  $i$  naming any universalistic policy among her responses, or instead the percentage of universalistic policies listed by each respondent. Intercepts are partially-pooled by

Table 3.1: Typical Preferences by Category and Topic

<b>Universalistic/Public</b>	
<i>Category:</i>	
Rates and taxes (34%)	“reduce water and electricity bills” “better policies... to check prices” “free secondary and tertiary education” “reduce prices of fuel” “deal with corruption in civil service” “... better pension policies” “NHIS should cover all diseases...”
Economy (20%)	“reduce taxes” “create more industries in ghana” “train more... teachers” “reduction of fuel prices” “fight corruption” “increment in gov’t workers salary” “the health insurance is not working”
Education (9%)	“... deal with... foreigners in our markets” “put up universities in each region” “reduce rates of fuel” “posts to those who deserve, not politically” “increase teachers salary” “health care system is bad in the country”
Petroleum prices (7%)	
Corruption (5%)	
Wages / pensions (4%)	
Health (3%)	
<b>Local Public / Club</b>	
<i>Category:</i>	
Sanitation (31%)	“construct community gutters” “lay more pipelines here” “construct roads here” “build a JHS for us”
Water supply (27%)	“proper waste dump” “we need water here” “provision... of streetlight” “... public school in my locality”
Infrastructure (27%)	“build toilet facilities” “pipe problem here” “tar the community road” “build... school in the area”
Education (8%)	
<b>Private</b>	
<i>Category:</i>	
Unemployment (56%)	“provide youth employment” “give scholarships” “give loans to businessmen” “housing facilities must be built” “support... in terms of food”
Education (19%)	“we need job” “supply free education materials” “give out loans to traders like myself” “reducing of rent fee” “assist the aged financially”
Loans (7%)	“provide more job opportunities” “skills training... for the youth” “support to open our own businesses” “reduce rent” “solve financial problems”
Housing (3%)	
Social welfare (3%)	

Within each type (public, club, private) responses were coded into a list of over 20 topics, using the same topics as the Afrobarometer and Lieberman & McClendon (2013). The most common topics are listed here, with the percentage within each broader type in parentheses. “JHS” is a Junior High School (middle school). “NHIS” is the National Health Insurance Scheme. Lightly edited for spelling and length.

the 48 sampling clusters  $j$ , to account for clustering in the sample (Gelman & Hill 2007).<sup>25</sup>  $EducEmploy_i$  is the index of survey questions on literacy, education, and formal sector employment, which I use to define middle class, and  $Assets_i$  is the index of assets.  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is a matrix of individual controls: age, gender, membership in each major ethnic category, an indicator for being Muslim, a measure of the percentage of each respondent's life lived in the urban area, an indicator for whether the respondent prefers state spending be targeted to a home region instead of her current neighborhood,<sup>26</sup> and an indicator for moving to the current neighborhood to satisfy preferences for club goods.<sup>27</sup> <sup>28</sup>

The second model adds neighborhood-level predictors:  $Pop10Yrs_i$  is the percentage change in population around respondent  $i$  between 2000 and 2010, to measure strain on local infrastructure;  $NeighWealth_i$  is a factor analysis of census variables measuring neighborhood wealth around respondents (see Appendix);  $Water_j$  is the percentage of respondents in sampling cluster  $j$  who report that running water is regularly available;  $Road_j$  is an indicator for whether the largest road in sampling cluster  $j$  was paved;<sup>29</sup> and  $Density_j$  is population density in the census enumeration areas covered by sampling cluster  $j$ .<sup>30</sup>

Results are in Table 3.2. From column 3, I estimate that a respondent with secondary education, English literacy, and formal sector employment is 10.7 percentage points (95% CI: 0.7, 20.6) more likely to list at least one universalistic policy among her preferences than than a respondent without these characteristics.<sup>31</sup> In particular, poorer respondents are especially more likely to demand private goods than middle class

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<sup>25</sup>The main results are robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown). The model is a logistic regression when the outcome is binary and OLS otherwise. I also replace the percentage measure with a count of universalistic preferences per respondent (from 0 to 3) and replicate Table 3.2 using an ordered logistic regression, finding identical results (not shown).

<sup>26</sup>Together with the measure of the percentage of the respondent's life lived in the urban area, this controls for whether respondents' preferences are made with respect to a rural home region instead of their current urban neighborhood. This would weaken any relationship between preferences and service provision in current neighborhoods.

<sup>27</sup>Respondents able to sort to meet needs may have fewer particularistic preferences because they have already been satisfied.

<sup>28</sup>Two additional indicators control for interview quality and measurement error in all models: whether enumerators made logistical errors during the interview (12% of interviews), and whether enumerators noted respondents were cooperative (90%).

<sup>29</sup>Questions about water were only asked to a random subset of respondents in each cluster, so this data is aggregated to the sampling cluster level ( $j$ ).

<sup>30</sup>Population density can also proxy for need for club goods. The densest parts of the city are in the original downtown, where existing endowments of infrastructure are overwhelmingly concentrated. Less dense neighborhoods on the periphery of the city have significantly less basic infrastructure.

<sup>31</sup>There could be concern that the measure of middle class status includes whether a respondent is employed in the formal sector, while demands for employment are a common particularistic preference (see Table 1), putting employment on both sides of the regression. In the Appendix, I re-estimate Table 3.2 both after re-defining middle class status based only on education and literacy, as well as after dropping all respondents who reported demands for employment. Results are identical (see Appendix).

Table 3.2: Universalistic Preferences, by Socio-Economic Status and Local Need

	1	2	3	4
<i>Outcome:</i>	Binary	Percentage	Binary	Percentage
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	0.176* (0.084)	0.041*** (0.012)	0.177* (0.083)	0.041*** (0.012)
<i>Assets Index</i>	-0.114 (0.085)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.117 (0.087)	-0.015 (0.013)
<i>Pop. Change 10 Years (500m)</i>			-0.012 (0.026)	-0.003 (0.004)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>			0.275 (0.177)	0.043 (0.027)
<i>Running Water (by cluster)</i>			0.708* (0.341)	0.119* (0.052)
<i>Paved Road (by cluster)</i>			0.462† (0.255)	0.071† (0.039)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>			0.017** (0.006)	0.002* (0.001)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	987	987	987	987

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Columns 1 and 3 are logistic regression coefficients, columns 2 and 4 are OLS. Intercepts are partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome is either a binary indicator for listing at least one universalistic policy (column 1 and 3) or the percentage of total preferences that were universalistic (columns 2 and 4). For readability, population density is scaled as 1000s / sq. km.

respondents.<sup>32</sup> In columns 3-4 of Table 3.2, I find that all respondents are more likely to want universalistic goods when in neighborhoods with better existing service provision, while still preferring particularistic goods in areas without running water and paved roads.<sup>33</sup>

But respondents who want universalistic policies are less likely to turn out to vote than those only wanting particularistic goods. In Table 3.3, I estimate similar multi-level logistic regressions in which the outcome is turnout in the 2012 election. The main explanatory variable is either the binary or percentage measure of universalistic preferences.<sup>34</sup> I include the same controls as above, as well as several additional

<sup>32</sup>Middle class respondents are 15.2 percentage points (95% CI: 4.4, 25.3) less likely to mention at least one private good than poor respondents. Middle and lower class respondents are equally likely to want club goods (water, roads, etc.), however, consistent with some middle class voters still wanting these goods because of poor service provision in their neighborhoods, as discussed above (see Appendix).

<sup>33</sup>All first differences are conducted as in Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).

<sup>34</sup>Because preferences and turnout must be measured in the same survey, preferences are observed after the decision to vote, yet are being used as an explanatory variable. A series of robustness tests in the Appendix address concerns that preferences reported on the survey could have been influenced by factors arising after the voting decision. But if the classification of preferences has been muddled, with some respondents mis-assigned to the wrong category (universalistic vs. particularistic), the measurement error

predictors that may affect the campaign strategies that voters are exposed to: competitiveness in each respondent's electoral ward,<sup>35</sup> ethnic fractionalization around each respondent, the neighborhood wealth index, and population density.<sup>36</sup> Simulating from columns 2 and 4, I find that respondents who list at least one universalistic preference are 7.1 percentage points (95% CI: 2.6, 11.6) less likely to vote, and respondents who list exclusively universalistic preferences are 7.8 percentage points (95% CI: 0.7, 15.7) less likely to vote, than respondents with only particularistic preferences.<sup>37</sup>

I also identify respondents who have withdrawn from politics in general. I make an indicator for whether a respondent has done none, or only one, of the following five forms of participation: voted in the 2012 election, is an active member of a party, knows an agent or leader from any party, knows or has met with her district assembly member (city councilor), and/or participates in a non-party association (such as a church group, union, civil society, or neighborhood group) that discusses political issues at least "some of the time."<sup>38</sup> Over a third (36%) of respondents are what I label "minimum participators," people who have done zero or only one of these activities.<sup>39</sup> I use this binary indicator as the outcome variable in columns 5-6 of Table 3.3. Respondents who want at least one universalistic policy are 8.5 percentage points (95% CI: 2.4, 14.2) more likely to refrain collectively from these forms of participation than those who only want particularistic goods. In addition, middle class respondents are more likely to abstain from these activities in general. Simulating from column 5, respondents with English literacy, at least some secondary education, and formal sector employment are 10.5 percentage points (95% CI: 0.8, 20.2) more likely to abstain than those without those characteristics. In addition, middle class respondents are an estimated 7.1 percentage

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would bias against seeing different behavior between the two groups.

<sup>35</sup>This is the absolute value of the difference in two party vote between the NDC and NPP in the 2008 presidential election.

<sup>36</sup>I also include parliamentary constituency fixed effects. Constituency-level party leaders decide on local campaign strategies in Ghana. Features of local parliamentary races could also affect turnout because parliamentary and presidential elections are concurrent.

<sup>37</sup>In Table 3.3, however, it is not the case that middle class respondents in general are less likely to vote – instead, only those middle class respondents with universalistic preferences are less likely to vote. This is consistent with the theory above: middle class respondents who still want many particularistic goods (better services for their neighborhood) may still believe their preferences can be addressed by politicians.

<sup>38</sup>Importantly, these latter two indicators – meeting with local government representatives and, especially, participation in associational life – measure some of the primary ways voters who do not vote or participate in parties could still remain politically active. Including these variables thus partly accounts for concerns that voters with universalistic preferences may still be participating in politics through other informal means even if they refrain from direct engagement with the electoral process.

<sup>39</sup>74% of these only vote, but have done none of the other activities. 18% of respondents are "maximum participators" who have done 4 or 5 of these activities.



Table 3.3: Turnout and Participation, by Universalistic Preferences

Outcome:	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Universalistic Preferences (binary)</i>	Turnout -0.532** (0.200)	Turnout -0.600** (0.199)	Turnout -0.484† (0.286)	Turnout -0.589* (0.281)	Withdrawal 0.381* (0.156)	Withdrawal 0.381† (0.230)
<i>Universalistic Preferences (percentage)</i>						
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	-0.071 (0.111)	-0.063 (0.111)	-0.077 (0.112)	-0.066 (0.111)	0.199* (0.088)	0.199* (0.089)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.153 (0.118)	0.126 (0.115)	0.154 (0.118)	0.130 (0.115)	-0.127 (0.092)	-0.129 (0.092)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.036 (0.194)	0.020 (0.190)	-0.039 (0.194)	0.007 (0.188)	0.154 (0.158)	0.152 (0.156)
<i>2008 Competitiveness (by ward)</i>	-2.565† (1.349)	-1.867† (1.031)	-2.442† (1.344)	-1.763† (1.015)	0.223 (1.120)	0.115 (1.104)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	0.871 (1.615)	0.383 (1.300)	0.983 (1.615)	0.505 (1.280)	-0.342 (1.326)	-0.477 (1.303)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.010 (0.009)	0.012† (0.007)	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Constituency FEs</i>	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
N	986	986	986	986	919	919

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . The outcome in columns 1-4 is self-reported turnout in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. The outcome in columns 5-6 is an indicator for doing only 1 or 0 of the 5 forms of participation discussed in the text. All models are logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). Constituency fixed effects included, except in columns 2 and 4. Additional observations missing in columns 5 and 6 because some respondents refused to answer some of the additional participation questions. Note that competitiveness is higher when the competitiveness variable is smaller (absolute difference in vote shares between NPP and NDC), such that there is more participation in places that were more competitive in the last election.

points (95% -0.5, 14.2,  $p = 0.07$ ) less likely to be party members than poor respondents. Local party members are the most immediate people to whom politicians in Ghana are accountable, serving as the primary voters who select local and national candidates.

### 3.5.2 Mobilization

There are two reasons these voters are less likely to participate. First, voters with universalistic preferences are less likely to be mobilized to vote. Ghanaian politicians are well aware of the correlation between class and preferences in Table 3.2. In interviews, parliamentary candidates and party agents from both parties described how they use class as a heuristic for which voters are convincible, avoiding middle class voters because these politicians do not believe they can effectively engage with them. Instead, politicians describe campaigns as focused on mobilizing poorer voters through selective distribution of private and club goods.

For example, an NPP parliamentary candidate argued when asked about his approach with middle class voters, "People are more aware of what they really want than before. Before you could use money to change their minds, but... your money can't buy most of them now like it used to." As a result, "you don't convince them [middle class voters] much at all. They know what is going on." But he argued, "the poor people... somebody brings them a big bag of sugar, tomorrow rice – what they eat is what they are thinking about," and went on to describe efforts to engage with poor voters by distributing particularistic goods.<sup>40</sup> A local NPP executive made a similar argument about the difficulty of engaging middle class voters: "I would say they are politically awakened, so they can discern now more than before. Formerly, people could fool them. But now you cannot fool them... They know exactly what is happening when you come to them, whether you are deceiving them or not... You must be very careful if you are dealing with them."<sup>41</sup> Another NPP candidate argued: "When people have a certain level education, they are able to clearly understand the issues. I don't mind whether they support me or they support the NDC, but they have some logical arguments to make their choices. So I really don't worry about that. My focus is on those... who are susceptible to the deceptions of politics... I am focusing my effort in the informal communities."<sup>42</sup> An NPP executive similarly

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<sup>40</sup>Interview with NPP candidate, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 6 June 2012.

<sup>41</sup>Interview with NPP executive, Dome-Kwabinya constituency, Greater Accra, 26 June 2012.

<sup>42</sup>"Informal" communities refers to those in informal housing amidst the wealthier homes in the constituency. This candidate was campaigning in the wealthiest constituency in the city, with the greatest ability to focus on middle class voters of any candidate, yet focused on poorer voters. Interview with NPP candidate, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 16 July 2012.

acknowledged that his party focused on poor voters more dependent on politicians for access to benefits: “Yes, we have them [wealthier voters]... But we don’t normally follow them so much... Most of the people want to see their MP assisting their wards, for example, getting school admissions, getting employment and other things” – typical benefits delivered in clientelistic exchanges in Ghana.<sup>43</sup>

NDC politicians described similar difficulties campaigning among middle class voters. A constituency executive said, “There are areas any time you go house to house, there’s somebody there. But my area [a wealthier neighborhood], you spend one hour at somebody’s gate ringing the bell, they will not come out.” Instead, he described his focus on poorer voters, characterizing his patronage relationships with them in familial terms: “We become their father and their mother, we become their parents... I build these relationships with the people for a very long time.”<sup>44</sup> An NDC activist made a similar point discussing differences in campaigning between middle class and poor areas: “Somewhere like the Zongo and other places where poverty is high, everybody is trying to reach out for [benefits]. They do understand you when you talk. But the residential [neighborhood], when we go there they don’t listen to you... Before you go in they tell you we have made up our mind, we know what we’re doing.”<sup>45</sup>

Some middle class voters may be unreceptive because parties canvass with a message that does not address their preferences for major policy changes. An NDC executive noted that the party did not emphasize policy messages when going door-to-door, instead focusing on promises of small-scale club goods for specific neighborhoods: “You target your message... It depends on the area you go. You look at the need of the area and target it... Their drainage is very bad, or there is flooding in this area. That is what you tell them you are going to fix.”<sup>46</sup>

I systematically examine mobilization before the 2012 election by asking respondents about campaign activities in their neighborhoods.<sup>47</sup> I find less effort from the parties to mobilize turnout among middle class

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<sup>43</sup>Interview with NPP executives, Okaikwei North constituency, Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.

<sup>44</sup>Interview with NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012.

<sup>45</sup>A “Zongo” is a Muslim slum. Interview with NDC ward executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 1 March 2014.

<sup>46</sup>Interview with NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.

<sup>47</sup>The questions are: “Think back to before the elections last year. Did any political parties come door-to-door in this neighborhood to meet with voters in their homes?” and “Think back to before the elections last year. Do you remember if any of the political parties gave out any gifts, such as t-shirts, food, or money to some people in this neighborhood?” While previous studies suggest that there is under-reporting in self-reports of vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), the wording here explicitly does not ask respondents if they themselves accepted gifts, only whether they knew about them. Overall, 49% of respondents reported that gifts were distributed and 67% reported door-to-door campaigning.

Table 3.4: Campaign Mobilization, by Local Wealth and Socio-Economic Status

	1	2	3	4
<i>Outcome:</i>	Door to Door	Door to Door	Private Gifts	Private Gifts
<i>Educ/Empl. Index</i>	-0.004 (0.090)	-0.008 (0.091)	-0.117 <sup>†</sup> (0.092)	-0.186* (0.093)
<i>Assets Index</i>	-0.219* (0.090)	-0.216* (0.090)	0.029 (0.092)	0.053 (0.093)
<i>Universalistic Preferences (binary)</i>		-0.199 (0.157)		0.190 (0.162)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.486** (0.161)	-0.513** (0.164)	-0.096 (0.173)	-0.150 (0.177)
<i>2008 Competitiveness (by ward)</i>	-2.558* (1.098)	-2.980** (1.119)	-1.426 (1.262)	-1.501 (0.170)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-0.337 (1.267)	-0.601 (1.283)	-1.935 (1.503)	-1.561 (1.471)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.020* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Constituency FEs</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	930	923	930	923

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is knowledge of door to door campaigning in columns 1 and 2 and gift distribution in columns 3 and 4. Logistic regression coefficients with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). For readability, population density is scaled as 1000s / sq. km. Additional observations are missing because some respondents refused to answer these two questions. Note that competitiveness is higher when the competitiveness variable is smaller (absolute difference in vote shares between NPP and NDC), such that there is more mobilization in places that were more competitive in the last election.

voters, consistent with the interviews. In columns 1-2 of Table 3.4, the outcome is an indicator for whether a respondent reports that she saw party agents going door-to-door in her neighborhood before the election.<sup>48</sup> In columns 3-4 of Table 3.4, the outcome is an indicator for reporting that she either saw or “heard about” a party distributing private gifts before the election. The models are multi-level logistic regressions with the same predictors as in Table 3.3.

Respondents are less likely to report door-to-door mobilization efforts in wealthier neighborhoods. From column 1, respondents are 10.1 percentage points (95% CI: 3.4, 17.1) less likely to report door to door mobi-

<sup>48</sup>Door-to-door canvassing remains the main tactic used by both parties in Ghana to get voters out to the polls. There are not well-developed separate means for the parties to mobilize the middle class. For example, while the use of TV advertising is a major means of engaging the middle class in Latin America, this is still in its infancy in Ghana. None of the interviewed politicians mentioned broadcast or online media at all when asked to describe campaign activities. Moreover, because Ghanaian campaigns are decentralized, with constituency-level party organizations conducting local mobilization for the party’s presidential and parliamentary candidates, the efforts described in the interviews above represent the main mobilization that all voters are exposed to.

lization after increasing local neighborhood wealth by 1 standard deviation. Middle class respondents were significantly less likely to be exposed to gift giving before the last election. From column 3, respondents who are fluent in English, have some secondary education, and are employed in the formal sector are 8.8 percentage points (95% CI: -1.1, 19.2,  $p = 0.07$ ) less likely to report gift distribution than respondents with none of these characteristics. While the parties cannot easily observe individual-level preferences when deciding who to approach, they can observe socio-economic class – they are unlikely to go door to door in middle or upper class neighborhoods in the first place and unlikely to offer gifts when they do interact with middle class voters.

In the results above, however, I find that those with universalistic preferences, not the middle class in general, are less likely to turn out. But there is a connection between mobilization and these results – voters with universalistic preferences are especially unlikely to turn out to vote when they live in an area that is not subject to campaign mobilization. In an additional model similar to Table 3.3, column 4 above, I interact universalistic preferences with the percentage of respondents in each sampling cluster reporting door to door mobilization before the election (see Appendix for corresponding table).<sup>49</sup> In sampling clusters with the minimum canvassing (17% of respondents aware of it), respondents who want universalistic policies are dramatically less likely to turn out to vote than those preferring exclusively particularistic goods (28.4 percentage points less likely, 95% CI: 1.5, 56.9). But in areas with the maximum reported mobilization (95% of respondents reporting it), those with universalistic preferences are not significantly less likely to turn out than other voters (95% CI: -8.7, 13.9).<sup>50</sup>

### 3.5.3 Credibility of Promises: Survey Experiment

Voters with universalistic preferences are also those least likely to see campaign promises as credible. In the absence of some external pressure pushing them to the polls, these voters may see participation as unlikely to result in desired changes to policy, become disillusioned, and stay home.

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<sup>49</sup>Because existing literature suggests that mobilization in a voter's local context or neighborhood can affect turnout, I use aggregate reported mobilization by sampling cluster (Feddersen 2004, Cho and Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010). This also reduces the odds that any interaction is only the result of desirability bias, with respondents who deny voting also being those most likely to deny knowledge of campaign activities. Models for the individual-level interactions are similar (not shown).

<sup>50</sup>Even if door to door appeals are unlikely to work as effectively on those with universalistic preferences, as described in the interviews, there may be higher turnout by voters with universalistic preferences who do live in neighborhoods with significant mobilization because everyone else around them is also participating at higher rates, creating pressure to participate (Cho and Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010).

On the surface, the NDC and NPP both employ some universalistic rhetoric in their campaigns (although the NPP has recently gone further in this direction). Elischer (2013) describes these parties as somewhat programmatic and ideologically-differentiated based on an analysis of their manifestos.<sup>51</sup> But characterizing these parties as programmatic is problematic. There are strong reasons for voters to doubt these promises and the importance of this rhetoric for vote choice is dubious. As discussed above, including universalistic proposals in manifestos is essentially costless; following through and implementing them is crucial for whether voters believe in them. Many of the most prominent universalistic promises from each party have been marked by failures of implementation. Even if formally universalistic as described in manifestos, policies based on each party's most recent major campaign promises have often actually been clientelistic in how benefits were distributed, been mired in corruption, never happened, or only been partially implemented after significant delay.<sup>52</sup> Voters are well aware of these implementation failures, which are covered extensively in the popular press.

In addition, the opposition NPP claims that their party is center-right, and the party maintains a following among the wealthiest business elite. NDC leaders sometimes describe their party in socialist terms, in line with the "revolutionary" rhetoric of their founder, Jerry Rawlings. But the actual records of NDC and NPP governments belie their self-proclaimed ideologies. Voters are unlikely to have clear expectations that these parties will govern in line with distinct policy orientations. The NDC oversaw neoliberal structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, with widespread privatization of the economy. The NPP created much of Ghana's (still nascent) welfare state, focusing on pro-poor policies such as a national health insurance system, and centered its 2012 manifesto on a pledge to make secondary school free. The current NDC government has further liberalized the economy, reducing subsidies for fuel, water, and electricity, and is negotiating a new loan agreement with the IMF that will restrict any socialist agenda. Both parties also have

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<sup>51</sup>Importantly, Elischer (2013) notes that this was more the case in Ghana's initial elections in the 1990s than in recent years – even though the middle class is now much larger than in the 1990s.

<sup>52</sup>Prominent recent examples include: national youth employment programs, widely said to be used as patronage and embroiled in a major corruption scandal which revealed dramatically fewer beneficiaries than claimed; rural electrification and school construction programs distributed as patronage (Briggs 2012, Fallor 2013); an NDC pledge to build hundreds of new schools, of which only a small minority were constructed; a national health insurance system created by the NPP that repeatedly denies guaranteed services to policyholders due to funding difficulties and in which membership is distributed by local politicians as patronage; a major NDC 2008 campaign pledge to construct affordable housing, for which no houses were ever constructed; delays in payments to contractors building national highways, resulting in a large section of the main national highway remaining unpaved for over 5 years; failures to implement public wage reforms championed by the NPP, resulting in repeated delays in payments to civil servants and prominent strikes, including by the doctors and nurses in public hospitals.

a history of adopting each other's proposals; in 2014, the NDC government announced it would attempt to implement the free secondary education policy championed by the NPP. The current NDC government also embraced other programs originally established by the NPP, such as youth employment and loan programs that the NDC had criticized when in opposition.

Participants in 13 focus groups were skeptical of campaign promises in the 2012 election. Multiple participants pointed to their lack of trust as their reason for staying home on election day, expecting corruption and clientelism in the implementation of promised universalistic policies, if they were ever carried out at all.<sup>53</sup> For example, one participant in a middle class neighborhood said of the NPP's main 2012 national campaign promise to make secondary school free, they "will 'chop' [*steal*] the thing, and the benefits will not be extended to the poor. So its not going to be free at all."<sup>54</sup> A woman in another middle class area similarly argued "you can say you will bring free education, but when you win, you will not do it."<sup>55</sup> An accountant in the Odorkor neighborhood argued, "When they promise, they [MPs] will do some small work within the period that the election is coming on and they will come and clear the gutters and everything... Then after that, you vote, and they are gone. We don't believe in anything they are telling us."<sup>56</sup> A hair-dresser in Adenta explained that "this [MP candidate] will say this today and then tomorrow he does another thing. The other one too... he says this and then he will not even do anything... The person will go and enjoy it with his or her family... So there is no need for me to vote."<sup>57</sup> Instead of trusting these promises, middle class participants emphasized their self-reliance. A statement from a nurse in Dzorwulu is typical: "We struggle for ourselves. They [politicians] think about themselves, we also think about ourselves."<sup>58</sup> Another middle class participant in Odorkor tied his disillusionment to the fact that he does not want particularistic goods: "I'm not looking at the MP to do something for me. I can help myself. But that's what they've [MPs]

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<sup>53</sup>The 2012 presidential contest was decided by 3% of the vote and many of the parliamentary races in Greater Accra were similarly competitive. Respondents did not stay home due to a lack of competition.

<sup>54</sup>The participant's prediction was accurate. In September 2015, two years after the focus group interview, the NDC government (now seeking to implement the NPP's campaign proposal, see above) announced the "free" senior high school policy it would implement for the coming school year would not actually be free – parents would still need to pay several hundred dollars per year in administrative fees. See William Yaw Owusu, "NDC Free SHS Costs GHc380" *Daily Guide*, 18 September 2015. The quote is from: focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.

<sup>55</sup>Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, Greater Accra, 7 August 2013.

<sup>56</sup>Focus group, Odorkor "Official Town", Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.

<sup>57</sup>Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, Greater Accra, 7 August 2013.

<sup>58</sup>Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.

been doing to get the illiterate people."<sup>59</sup>

Interviewed politicians recognized this lack of trust. An NDC parliamentary candidate describing his reception while campaigning said, "I think there is a collapse of trust in politicians generally... The complaint we usually get is that we've voted for this party for 16 years, nothing has come out of it. What are the guarantees that you will be different from the rest?"<sup>60</sup> An NPP constituency executive noted this distrust and tied it to turnout: "People were peeved, because they didn't get what they expected from us [when NPP was in power]... Some of them didn't vote at all. A lot of people didn't vote because they were not happy."<sup>61</sup>

Others acknowledged that voters did not see policy messages in their platforms as credible. Local executives from both parties complained about how they performed poorly despite having the "better message," accusing the other side of winning by buying votes.<sup>62</sup> As one NPP activist said after describing his party's promise about free secondary education: "I don't want to be misleading... The fact is Ghanaians don't vote on issues. That's what every politician, that's what the NDC knows." Along with many other local activists, he believes that vote choice is instead explained by particularistic preferences, not policy promises. Voters are "influenced by petty, petty things," he argued. "The money problem comes first. They see that your partner [the NDC] has given them money and if you aren't giving your money they are shouting on you... So they are not voting on issues."<sup>63</sup> This sentiment was widely shared in the interviews.

An embedded vignette experiment on the survey allows me to test which voter characteristics explain beliefs about the credibility of campaign promises. Each respondent was read two sets of paired vignettes about hypothetical parliamentary candidates. The candidates in the vignettes randomly varied along three dimensions: their ethnicity, cued via names;<sup>64</sup> their professional background;<sup>65</sup> and policies they promised

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<sup>59</sup>Focus group, Odorkor "Official Town", Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.

<sup>60</sup>Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 20 June 2012.

<sup>61</sup>Interview with NPP party executive, Weija/Gbawe constituency, Greater Accra, 29 July 2013.

<sup>62</sup>E.g., interview with NDC executive, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 25 March 2014; interview with NPP executive, La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 4 March 2014; interview with NPP executives, Okaikwei North constituency, Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.

<sup>63</sup>Interview with NPP party agents, Ledzokuku constituency, Greater Accra, 1 August 2013.

<sup>64</sup>Names unambiguously cue membership in one of the four major ethnic categories: as an Akan, Ga, Ewe, or Muslim northerner. Two names were used per ethnicity to average over idiosyncratic features cued by specific names. Full texts of the vignettes are in the Appendix, with balance statistics.

<sup>65</sup>These were doctor, lawyer, businessman, or university lecturer; all are common backgrounds for MPs.



to deliver after the election, selected from two examples each of universalistic, club, or private goods.<sup>66 67</sup> After being asked to vote in a mock election between the two candidates in each pair, respondents were asked about one randomly selected candidate per pair: “Do you think a politician like [NAME] will actually deliver on a promise like [PROMISE]?”. This provides a measure of beliefs about the credibility of promises to deliver the cued policies.

Overall, few respondents saw these promises as credible – only 28.4% of respondents answered “yes,” with the lowest rates for the universalistic (27.2%) and private (27.8%) goods, and highest for club goods (30.4%). In Table A.11, I analyze responses using similar multi-level models to those above, while also including indicators for each treatment condition as controls, as well as an indicator for whether the promise was made by a co-ethnic to the respondent. I estimate results separately for each type of promise (universalistic, club, and private).<sup>68</sup>

Consistent with the argument above, respondents who want universalistic policies are the least likely to believe that politicians’ promises are credible. Simulating from column 1, respondents who only want particularistic goods are 6.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.9, 13.4,  $p = 0.07$ ) more likely to believe the promise to deliver a universalistic policy than respondents who actually want at least one universalistic policy. Although those with universalistic preferences are similarly skeptical about promises to deliver particularistic (club, private) as well as universalistic goods, this skepticism creates a particularly important hurdle for politicians seeking to reach these voters through policy-based appeals. As discussed above, politicians cannot target these policies to voters upfront in the same way that they can with particularistic goods (Kitschelt 2000); low credibility poses a significantly greater hurdle to policy-based campaigns than patronage-based campaigns because policy platforms will only build support if voters trust that they will be implemented over time. But ultimately, the voters with the greatest preferences for universalistic policies

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<sup>66</sup>The example policies were chosen from answers that respondents gave to a pilot of the main survey question on preferences they want addressed. For universalistic goods, the treatments were “lobby for keeping the price of fuel and utilities low so that everyone in Ghana can continue to afford fuel and electricity” or “lobby for construction of new water production facilities in Ghana, so the water flows more regularly around the country.” For club goods, “construct and tar more of the roads in the constituency” or “build new classroom blocks and resource centers at schools in the constituency.” For private goods, “find jobs for some of the youth in the constituency” or “provide scholarships to some families in the constituency to pay school fees.”

<sup>67</sup>There were no similar treatments about presidential candidates. It would be implausible for respondents to believe a cue for a presidential candidate from all of these ethnicities, or for a presidential candidate to directly promise private goods (which would be delivered indirectly through a party organization). In addition, the experiment did not cue partisanship. Pilots revealed that a party cue would overwhelm the other treatments – with reflexively favorable answers about preferred parties creating ceiling effects.

<sup>68</sup>In the Appendix, I also pool all responses across all promises and find similar results.

Table 3.5: Survey Experiment: Credibility of MPs' Campaign Promises

Promised Good:	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Public	Public	Club	Club	Private	Private
<i>Universalsistic Preferences (binary)</i>	-0.354 <sup>†</sup> (0.198)		-0.437* (0.192)		-0.390* (0.197)	
<i>Universalsistic Preferences (percentage)</i>		-0.418 (0.309)		-0.759* (0.305)		-0.493 (0.304)
<i>Co-Ethnic Candidate</i>	0.496* (0.200)	0.477* (0.200)	0.451* (0.195)	0.441* (0.195)	0.274 (0.200)	0.259 (0.199)
<i>Example 2: Low Utility Prices</i>	0.063 (0.196)	0.066 (0.195)				
<i>Example 2: New Classrooms</i>			0.078 (0.190)	0.056 (0.190)		
<i>Example 2: Scholarships</i>					-0.009 (0.192)	-0.011 (0.192)
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	0.038 (0.119)	0.039 (0.119)	0.093 (0.111)	0.106 (0.112)	0.064 (0.113)	0.067 (0.114)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.047 (0.120)	0.047 (0.120)	0.092 (0.114)	0.091 (0.113)	0.123 (0.117)	0.120 (0.117)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Neighborhood-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Name and Background Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	611	611	611	611	613	613

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is whether a respondent believes the MP in the vignette will actually deliver the cued good after the election. Columns 1-2 are for the public goods treatments (promise: water production or lower utility prices), columns 3-4 are for the club goods treatments (promise: construct roads or build classrooms), columns 5-6 are for the private goods treatments (promise: jobs for the youth or scholarships to families). All models are logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007), and include the same individual-level and neighborhood-level controls as in Table 3.4 and 3.3, as well as controls for each additional treatment condition in the experiment: indicators for each possible candidate name (among 8 options) and each candidate background (among 4 options). Two thirds of the respondent received a prompt about each type of good.

– those most likely to support a politician based on her platform – are those least likely to believe in any politician’s promise to deliver these policies.<sup>69</sup>

### 3.6 Conclusion

While existing work has established an overall negative association between wealth and patronage-based competition at both the national (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) and sub-national levels (e.g., Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Luna 2014), much less research has examined the process by which contemporary societies actually transition from one form of competition to another as wealth increases.<sup>70</sup> By examining a new democracy in flux, where there have been rapid gains in wealth, this chapter zooms in on this process and see whether the growth of the middle class does translate into new forms of competition.

I find that while the urban middle class wants universalistic public policies from the government, politicians in Greater Accra do not believe that they can credibly convince these voters to support them. I suggest that this may create a feedback loop in which politicians continue winning elections based almost entirely on particularistic appeals despite increases in wealth and education that existing literature suggests should instead lead to the at least partial emergence of programmatic, policy-based competition. While wealth and programmatic competition are correlated cross-nationally, the findings in this chapter emphasize that the connection between these variables can be very indirect.

In the next chapter, I expand the analysis on campaign mobilization above to consider how particularistic competition in Greater Accra actually operates, examining which types of voters and neighborhoods are targeted with particularistic benefits as the parties compete for support.

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<sup>69</sup>Separately, columns 1-4 in Table A.11 also show that there is a co-ethnicity treatment effect in the experiment, with respondents significantly less likely to trust promises about universalistic goods from non-co-ethnic politicians compared to co-ethnics. In line with the literature on ethnic favoritism and ethnic voting (e.g., Posner 2005), respondents may not believe that universalistic policies promised by rival ethnic groups will actually be universalistic, but instead only favor that other group. This creates an additional hurdle for the credibility of policy-based appeals.

<sup>70</sup>Comparatively more attention has focused on historical transitions from clientelism in the US and Europe (e.g., Erie 1988, Shefter 1994, Stokes et al. 2013, Kuo 2014). Kitschelt & Kselman (2013) emphasize the need for greater focus on whether wealth actually leads to less patronage-based competition outside of these advanced democracies; after excluding the world’s wealthiest democracies, they find little remaining national-level correlation between wealth and clientelism. I discuss the implications of their findings further in Chapter 7.

## 4 | Distributive Politics in Urban Areas

### 4.1 Introduction

Ghana's two major parties put out glossy platforms each election year that contain some universalistic policy proposals, such as the NPP's 2012 pledge to make public secondary school free. But Chapter 3 suggests that most urban voters discount the credibility of these promises and that the parties themselves recognize that their platforms do not affect many voters' choices, even among the urban middle class. In addition, Chapter 3 shows that there is little substantive differentiation between proposals that the NDC and NPP make, giving policy-motivated voters little basis on which to pick one over the other. If Ghana's major parties are not winning votes based on policy appeals, how do they build support with the urban electorate?

A key means is the distribution of particularistic goods, often as patronage.<sup>1</sup> Urban voters place significant demands on the government for access to better economic opportunities and to scarce public infrastructure and services. The parties are distinguished more by who can expect to benefit from the particularistic goods they distribute to address these demands than by their specific policies. In this chapter, I examine distributive politics within urban areas, focusing on how parties distribute particularistic goods during campaigns and once in office.

In campaign periods, parties and candidates widely distribute small-scale private benefits in one-off interactions with voters, passing out gifts during door to door canvassing, as well as after rallies and other public events, such as church services. The ruling party also makes short-term investments in club goods before the election – for example, temporarily paving more roads or cleaning out more gutters and sewers. Much of this activity is targeted at those perceived to be unaligned or swing voters, or occurs in politically

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<sup>1</sup>As I discuss further in Chapter 5, access to particularistic goods is not the *only* factor affecting vote choice in Greater Accra. Voters' macro-economic performance evaluations of the major parties are also correlated with vote choice, for example (see Chapter 5). But expectations about particularistic goods explain significant variation in voting behavior.

competitive neighborhoods where co-ethnics of both parties live. But none of these actions are clientelism, as defined by Hicken (2011) and Stokes et al. (2013). Parties cannot monitor or enforce vote buying transactions with the many voters receiving these benefits before the election. These goods are not given as part of repeated relationships in which voters expect that continued benefits are conditional on their vote choices. These actions conform more instead to logics of “reputation building” than vote buying, as argued by Kramon (2011) and Guardado & Wantchekon (2014), with particularistic goods handed out unconditionally to improve perceptions of performance rather than directly commit voters to a party. Longer-term, however, the parties also engage in sustained clientelistic relationships with co-ethnic voters, distributing private goods, and also favor co-ethnic neighborhoods with public spending on club goods. This involves the distribution of many of the more valuable patronage benefits a party gains control over once taking power, such as public sector employment and government anti-poverty programs, as well as local government spending on public infrastructure.<sup>2</sup>

I argue that sustained clientelistic relationships in which these more valuable spoils of office are distributed are most extensive in poorer areas of the city. But clientelism is rare in middle class and wealthy neighborhoods, where the costs of maintaining individual-level relationships with voters are too high relative to the benefits. In the distribution of club goods each party also has incentives to engage in longer-term favoritism to co-ethnic neighborhoods over areas dominated by groups affiliated with the opposing party. This is consistent with the broader literature on ethnic favoritism in the distribution of club goods in Africa (e.g., Bates 1983, Kimenyi 2006, Franck and Rainer 2012, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). Diverse areas where co-ethnics of each party are mixed, or areas where many unaffiliated voters live, can receive club goods from both parties before elections, as the parties seek to build performance reputations. But homogeneous areas are only likely to receive significant investments in club goods from an ethnically-aligned party.

I explore this argument by combining interviews and focus groups with the urban survey data. I focus most empirical attention on the distribution of private goods.<sup>3</sup> I describe how parties conduct unconditional

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<sup>2</sup>Both major parties in Ghana have some funding to engage in the distribution of particularistic goods even when not in power, especially during the campaign. But their ability to engage in long-term clientelistic relationships with individual voters and to favor co-ethnic neighborhoods with club goods increases significantly if they win the presidential election and take direct control over every local district government, as described in Chapter 2.

<sup>3</sup>Due to measurement limitations described below, it is not possible to test directly all implications of my argument about the distribution of club goods. Data in Chapter 6, however, provides some evidence of favoritism to ruling party areas, as well as to co-ethnics of local government leaders, in the distribution of school and road construction within the Greater Accra metropolitan area. More importantly, the results for voting behavior in Chapter 5 are observationally consistent with the predictions about club

distribution of small private benefits immediately before elections, while also engaging in longer-term clientelistic relationships, primarily with co-ethnic, core supporters. I find that these clientelistic relationships are most common in poor urban neighborhoods, expanding on the evidence in Chapter 3 that parties disproportionately focus campaign efforts in poorer neighborhoods. Finally, I use data from a similar survey implemented in five rural parliamentary constituencies to compare goods distribution in urban and rural areas. I present suggestive evidence that individual-level patronage relationships directly between the parties and voters are more common in the poorest urban neighborhoods and slums than in the typical rural village. Instead, the parties place greater emphasis on distributing club goods in rural villages, targeting entire communities with benefits rather than specific individual voters.

This chapter shows that two different types of patronage distribution occur alongside each other in Ghanaian campaigns – one represents clientelism, with sustained exchanges of benefits for support between patrons and clients, and one does not, with unconditional distribution of patronage goods that is not vote buying. Existing literature often conceptually lumps these together, taking empirical observation of either as evidence of clientelism and vote buying.<sup>4</sup> But I suggest that these are distinct strategies that address different goals and respond to different constraints. In doing so, I demonstrate that patronage-based parties engage in geographically varied strategies, using different types of patronage goods to reach voters in different places (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015, Albertus 2013, Luna 2014). I suggest that similar dynamics occur in African cities, where they have rarely been studied.

Moreover, I follow Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015) and Stokes et al. (2013) in arguing that the trade-off between targeting core and swing voters emphasized in much of the existing distributive politics literature has been over-stated (e.g., see summaries in Golden and Min 2013 and Kramon and Posner 2013). Parties often face incentives to do both.<sup>5</sup> In particular, canonical “swing voter” approaches such as Dixit & Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) provide an inappropriate framework for analyzing

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goods presented here. This includes survey experimental results on voters’ perceptions of where club goods are most likely to be distributed by each party.

<sup>4</sup>Golden & Min (2013) draw attention to a similar problem, discussing how different patronage strategies that require distinct theoretical explanations are often discussed in existing literature using the same terminology, creating theoretical confusion. Along similar lines, Gans-Morse et al. (2014) model how parties choose among a series of distinct patronage strategies depending on various features of the electoral and party systems.

<sup>5</sup>The original model from which much of this debate emerged, Cox & McCubbins (1986), is usually cited as arguing that core voter strategies are more likely. But this model actually suggests that politicians will often play mixed strategies, targeting benefits to both core and swing voters, even if core voters receive relatively more from risk averse politicians.

settings where co-ethnicity defines who is a core voter and an instrumental logic explains ethnic voting (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). These theories model a party's core voters as ideologues who evaluate the utility of electing an ideologically-aligned party alongside the separate benefits of monetary transfers offered by each party. But where the relationship between ethnicity and partisanship is instrumental, the core status of a party's co-ethnics is conditional on their continued expectations of receiving benefits, or transfers, from that party. Parties cannot bank on the support of core voters and concentrate their focus on swing voters, as predicted in Dixit & Londregan (1996).<sup>6</sup> Parties must instead continue favoring core co-ethnics in order to maintain their status as core supporters, even as they also seek to build additional support among other voters with the remainder of their resources to form a winning coalition.<sup>7</sup>

Ultimately, the use of these dual strategies of patronage distribution mean that the already limited resources that urban governments control are not allocated in a manner that best addresses the pressing needs of growing urban areas for public services.<sup>8</sup> This only deepens the government's failure to address the governance challenges created by urbanization. Urban residents' demands for private goods, such as jobs and financing for small businesses, and demands for club goods, such as for new roads and sewers, are usually only satisfied when it is politically expedient.<sup>9</sup> Residents must make do with short-term patches, rather than sustained commitments to improving service delivery: long-neglected roads are suddenly paved weeks before an election, only to wash away again in the next rainy season; poor residents get jobs through government anti-poverty programs, only to have these positions handed over to someone else when a new

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<sup>6</sup>Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) and Gottlieb and Larreguy (2015) also develop related theories that endogenize the core status of voters, contrary to classic models such as Dixit and Londregan (1996).

<sup>7</sup>I assume that each party's co-ethnic voters are not enough on their own to form an electoral majority. This is empirically the case in Ghana, as described in Chapter 2. If core ethnic groups did form a majority, parties would clearly not have incentives to provide goods to other voters outside these core groups, even in the Dixit and Londregan (1996) model.

<sup>8</sup>Colloquially, the political provision of patronage is usually discussed in the language of providing or bringing "development" to a politicians' community. This language normatively justifies practices that lead to inefficient, ineffective delivery of public services compared to less politicized allocations.

<sup>9</sup>Importantly, there are some investments in public goods that benefit the entire urban area. For example, the past NPP government completed an expressway linking Accra and Tema. The current NDC government has begun creating a series of key highway interchanges to improve traffic congestion and embarked on a large-scale school construction effort within the AMA (city of Accra). But these projects are often funded by external donors, representing distributive decisions made outside the regular budgeting process. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation paid for the new highway (now named for George W. Bush) and Brazil is funding some of the interchanges. USAID and the Chinese government are funding the school construction effort as part of a donor-led "Millennium Cities" project. Delivery of more every day government resources – public hiring, choosing recipients for programs, decisions about which residential streets to pave – can be far more targeted.

government, with a new set of clients, takes power. Moreover, this patronage distribution sustains incentives for ethnic political competition, which is examined in Chapter 5.

## **4.2 Mixed Patronage Strategies in Urban Areas**

I argue that the major parties target particularistic goods to individual voters and different neighborhoods using a combination of two strategies: clientelistic distribution to core supporters over time and unconditional distribution of benefits to build perceptions of performance, especially among unaligned and swing voters during campaign periods. Each strategy involves the distribution of private goods, targeted to individuals, and club goods, targeted to neighborhoods. But more valuable private or club goods, especially those that involve repeated interactions between the distributor and recipients (e.g., jobs, loans, building a new road), are more commonly distributed as part of clientelistic relationships, while less valuable goods that can be given in single-short interactions (e.g., handouts of cash or food, re-paving a pre-existing street) are more often distributed as part of unconditional reputation building strategies.

Where each of these strategies is most prevalent depends in part on the wealth and ethnic composition of urban neighborhoods and individual voters. The ethnic composition of neighborhoods and voters helps determine where clientelism is used versus unconditional reputation building, with individual-level clientelism primarily among core, co-ethnic voters and long-term favoritism in club goods to core, co-ethnic neighborhoods, while diverse neighborhoods and swing voters benefit from unconditional transfers during campaign periods. Wealth affects where private goods are used versus club goods. The parties distribute private goods extensively in poor areas, but avoid this in many middle class and wealthier areas. Club goods are used to build support in both poor and wealthier communities.

### **4.2.1 Who is Targeted**

A large literature has explored whether parties in developing countries primarily target core or swing voters with resources, often theorizing these strategies as an “either-or” trade-off (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996, Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Golden and Min 2013). The canonical political economy approaches modeling this as a trade-off are Dixit & Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck & Weibull (1987). These models treat core voters as ideologically motivated, evaluating the positive utility of electing an ideologically-aligned party



against direct transfers offered by the other party. Swing voters are those with less of an initial bias in favor of either party in their utility functions. As long as the transaction cost of giving transfers to swing voters is not prohibitive, parties can take the support of core voters for granted and instead target most of their resources to swing voters (Dixit & Londregan 1996). But empirical evidence about which types of voters are most likely to be targeted with resources is highly varied and often does not align with these predictions. For example, Stokes et al. (2013) shows that parties in Latin America and India engage in more favoritism to core supporters than Dixit & Londregan (1996) predicts. Kramon & Posner (2013) find considerable variation within African countries in the extent to which core or competitive districts are favored by the same governments with different resources. One explanation for this empirical variation is that parties prioritize both types of distribution at once – going after unaligned voters with one set of resources, while favoring core supporters with another.

Conceptually modeling core voters as voters having an innate valence shock in favor of an aligned party – as in the many models based on Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan (1996) – does not translate well to contexts where core voters are defined based on their ethnicity and ethnicity has an instrumental relationship with vote choice (see Chapter 5). In these settings, the valence shock of electing an ethnically-aligned party and the transfers a voter expects from that party become the same thing: the importance of co-ethnicity to the voter is an outcome of her expected transfers from electing a co-ethnic party. Co-ethnic voters cannot be taken for granted. If these voters stop expecting to be favored by their party compared to the other party, they will stop being core supporters. Empirical support for this claim is in Chapter 5. I find that when co-ethnic voters do not expect to be favored with benefits by their co-ethnic party, they stop being especially likely to vote for that party and become swing voters, with similar probabilities of supporting each party.

The core status of voters is then conditional on their expectations of continued benefits from their party, similar to the model in Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015).<sup>10</sup> Parties must continually transfer some of resources to co-ethnic voters to maintain support in future periods and perpetuate their' expectations of favoritism. But this does not require all of a party's resources – only that the party continue providing more to these core

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<sup>10</sup>Also see Gottlieb & Larreguy (2015), which also emphasizes that the ability of core voters to defect requires incumbents to continue favoring them in resource distribution.

voters than the other party (Padro i Miquel 2007).<sup>11</sup> A party can also attempt to expand its base by targeting the remainder of its budget to unaligned or swing voters, especially in the period right before the election.<sup>12</sup>

In this conditional model, swing voters are more complicated to define; rather than being defined exogenously as in Dixit & Londregan (1996), the definition of who is a swing voter is partly endogenous to the previous distributive decisions that the parties have employed. Swing voters are a combination of the minority of each party's co-ethnics who do not expect to benefit significantly more from their co-ethnic party than the other party, or voters from unaligned ethnic groups that have not been affiliated with either party. Both of these latter types of voters likely swing between the parties from election to election based on perceptions of performance as well as other valence (quality, trustworthiness, personality) characteristics of the parties and their candidates. Attempts to build better reputations of performance in the period before the election may help win over at least some of these voters.

#### **4.2.2 How They are Targeted**

The manner in which parties engage with core and unaligned or swing voters differ, however. Existing literature argues that a key constraint on the ability of parties to engage in clientelistic transactions with unaligned voters is whether or not they can monitor and enforce vote buying transactions (Stokes 2005). If parties cannot explicitly monitor vote choice (which they cannot in Ghana, see below), a party cannot be sure that an unaligned voter who takes money or other benefits will follow through with her vote. Where this is the case, Nichter (2008) argues that parties focus instead on using inducements to mobilize core supporters, who are unlikely to renege and defect to the other party, rather than attempting to buy off unaligned voters. Moreover, where local party organizations and local politicians are primarily drawn from a party's core ethnic groups, parties will have significantly more information on co-ethnic voters than voters from unaligned ethnic groups or ethnic groups affiliated with the other party, better able to identify their individual needs and monitor their political activities over time.<sup>13</sup> Giving a patronage good to a co-ethnic voter is a significantly

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<sup>11</sup>This does not mean that parties must provide a large amount of benefits in absolute terms to co-ethnic voters, only that they provide enough to maintain co-ethnic voters' expectations that they will receive more from their aligned party than the alternative (Padro i Miquel 2007).

<sup>12</sup>Faller (2013) makes a closely related argument about variation across the electoral cycle, suggesting that the Ghanaian parties target competitive districts with club goods in election years, while favoring core districts in the years after the election.

<sup>13</sup>The Dixit & Londregan (1996) model does suggest that when parties are somehow constrained in their ability to identify and engage with swing voters they will target transfers to core voters instead.

less risky proposition, because there is a much greater probability that a co-ethnic voter is a core supporter. A party is better able to ensure that this results in electoral support (Cox & McCubbins 1986). As a result, individual-level clientelism is more likely with a party's co-ethnics. Similarly, investments in club goods in neighborhoods where more co-ethnics live are the most likely to be returned with support.

But rather than withholding resources entirely from unaligned or swing voters, or from ethnically diverse neighborhoods that are not clearly affiliated with a party, a third option is also available: parties can accept that they cannot bind these voters to support them, but still provide particularistic goods in an attempt to build positive reputations of performance that could sway some of these voters' decisions. Kramon (2011) and Guardado & Wantchekon (2014) argue that much of what is called "vote buying" during campaigns in Africa conforms instead to a logic of "reputation building," with particularistic goods given out mainly to enhance reputations of performance, not as a clientelistic exchange or enforceable contract for votes. Because there is such significant demand for particularistic goods in the urban electorate, many urban voters equate good performance with a politician or party's ability to deliver better local public infrastructure and services. Among voters who do not have clear long-term expectations that they will get better service delivery from one party or the other, short-term spending on particularistic goods could sway them to a party's side. As long as voters are myopic in their perceptions of the performance of each party, unconditional distribution of particularistic goods is most valuable in the period immediately before the election. By contrast, clientelistic distribution meant to maintain the core status of co-ethnic voters over time can be politically useful throughout the electoral cycle.

Moreover, if one party distributes benefits to swing voters in this fashion, the opposing party may feel obligated to do so as well, fearing that swing voters will punish the party for being stingy and disrespectful if it withholds similar benefits. For example, Lindberg (2010) suggests that many MPs in Ghana distribute gifts and handouts to voters to avoid the negative reputation costs of not providing them, even though the MPs know some of these gifts will not commit recipients to support them. Because voters who receive these benefits may still vote for the opposing party, a party will like invest less valuable benefits on this strategy. In terms of private goods, this means giving small gifts of food, clothing, or petty cash rather than public sector jobs, loans, or other more substantial benefits that require more extensive, repeated interactions between the party and recipients. These more valuable benefits can instead be distributed as part of longer-term clientelistic relationships with co-ethnic voters, who the party can better and monitor over time and are

more likely to respond with support.

### **4.2.3 What is Distributed**

Parties can use either private or club goods to engage in each of these strategies: clientelism with core voters or distributing patronage goods to build reputations of performance with a broader set of voters. Whether parties use private goods will depend primarily on the wealth of urban neighborhoods. Whether they distribute club goods will depend more instead on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods.

As shown in Chapter 3, poorer voters highly value private goods from politicians, while middle class and wealthy voters usually do not. Pre-election handouts of private goods are thus more likely to be effective in poor neighborhoods, where parties meet more poor voters as they canvass and hold rallies – the two main ways handouts are distributed. In addition, distributing private goods as part of longer-term clientelistic relationships is also more cost effective in poor neighborhoods. Single-shot, pre-election gifts can be distributed without detailed knowledge of the recipients or having any local organization in place, but clientelistic distribution requires gathering information on and building sustained relationships with individual voters. This means investments in a local organization of party agents, deeply embedded in communities. Maintaining this level of organization is most worth the cost in poor neighborhoods, where a greater number of residents value the private goods that these party agents can provide.

It is more difficult to develop an extensive patronage network in areas where few residents are potential recipients. Some voters in middle class and wealthier neighborhoods will still be poor and value private benefits. But settlement patterns and social ties among residents in poor neighborhoods are more conducive to penetration by party patronage networks than in middle class and wealthier areas. In poor urban neighborhoods, residents live in close daily proximity, often sharing cooking facilities, toilets, and various public social spaces. This allows party agents in the neighborhood opportunities for regular interactions with voters. In middle class or wealthier areas, residents are more likely to live walled off from each other, with less social interaction and more anonymity within the community. The poor residents who do live in wealthier neighborhoods are also more likely to be transient, changing residences on a regular basis because of the insecurity of their property rights in these areas.

Unlike private goods, club goods can be used to build support in both poor and middle class neighborhoods. Middle class and poorer voters both demand these services, as shown empirically in the previous

chapter. The probability that a party builds club goods in an area should depend instead on the area's ethnic composition (Ichino and Nathan 2013, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). Benefits from club goods are geographically excludable; all residents, regardless of ethnicity, within the catchment area of the good usually benefit, while people beyond that area do not. In homogeneous areas dominated by a party's aligned ethnic groups, a party can reach many co-ethnics with a club good; few benefits will be wasted on voters supporting the opposing party, as they would if club goods were distributed in homogenous areas dominated by the other party's co-ethnics.<sup>14</sup> But in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, a party cannot specifically target its co-ethnics by building a club good. Voters from many different groups will benefit, including those aligned with the other party. Similar to the distribution of private pre-election gifts, the ruling party can engage in reputation building with club goods in diverse neighborhoods, increasing spending on local infrastructure to demonstrate its performance for voters. But there is no reason for one party to systematically favor diverse areas of the city over the other with these types of benefits. In more ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods dominated by each party's core ethnic groups, however, only the party aligned with those groups is likely to make significant investments in club goods.<sup>15</sup>

### 4.3 Evidence

Using interview and focus group evidence, I show that two different types of private goods distribution occur in Greater Accra, with unconditional distribution of handouts during campaigns alongside sustained clientelistic relationships with core supporters. Next, combining the qualitative evidence with survey data, I show that this private goods distribution is concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods of the city, while club goods are delivered in both poor and wealthier neighborhoods.

Because of measurement difficulties, however, I cannot directly test whether club goods are targeted more often by the NDC to urban neighborhoods dominated by its affiliated ethnic groups than to neighborhoods inhabited by co-ethnics of the NPP. My survey data primarily allows for observation of whether club

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<sup>14</sup>If the core status of co-ethnic voters is conditional on continued access to benefits, as argued above, it is theoretically possible for a party to woo co-ethnic voters of the opposing party by distributing resources to them. But this is unlikely to work absent a substantial, sustained investment of resources over time that can offset these voters' pre-existing, established expectations that they are more likely to benefit from their own co-ethnic party.

<sup>15</sup>In line with this argument, I find in Chapter 5 that voters do not expect to benefit more from a co-ethnic party than a non-co-ethnic party in the distribution of club goods in diverse urban neighborhoods, but expect significant favoritism from ethnically-aligned parties in more homogenous neighborhoods.

goods have been built in a specific place, not which actor built them and when. This data thus likely captures goods distributed by different political actors at different points in time. Even if all of these politicians engaged in ethnic favoritism, there may not be clear patterns of favoritism in the aggregate data.<sup>16</sup> Despite this, I show in Chapter 5 that voters' expectations of where they will receive club goods from the two major parties are consistent with the predictions about club goods above. In Chapter 6, I use the limited data on club goods delivery that is available to provide suggestive evidence that district governments in Greater Accra appear to target more spending on road and school construction to their co-ethnics and to NDC stronghold neighborhoods.

### **4.3.1 Two Types of Private Goods Distribution**

Focus group participants as well as local party executives, polling station agents, and parliamentary candidates described two different types of private goods distribution in Greater Accra. First, during campaigns there is widespread distribution of small gifts to mobilize voters. But voters and politicians alike made clear that these gifts were distributed even to voters that parties knew were unlikely to support them. It is not possible for the parties to monitor vote choices of people receiving these gifts; many go to voters with whom the parties do not have any pre-existing relationship. Separately, voters and local politicians both also described private goods distribution to core supporters of the winning party after the election. The parties engage in more sustained clientelistic relationships with these voters.

Discussing the first type of private goods distribution, a resident of Kpone, made clear that voters do not believe parties can monitor or enforce voting behavior after giving gifts during the campaign: "At the end of the day, when I come to the booth, it's between me and God. They may not know whether I voted for them... But normally they do go around and give people things to convince them."<sup>17</sup> As a focus group participant in the ethnically diverse Ashaiman slum described it, "The MP will come and say take these Ghana cedis... and since that person has taken that money, they will say 'oh I will vote for you.'" But this statement is not meant

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<sup>16</sup>The national ruling party is not the only actor capable of building club goods. As described in Chapter 2, MPs (including those from the NPP) control a discretionary constituency development fund that they also use to make small-scale investments in basic club goods such as roads and schools. Other club goods may have been built by the previous NPP government, before the NDC came to power.

<sup>17</sup>As another resident of Kpone described, "Last year, they had a campaign team that goes round house to house to do their campaign... Door to door... They give money. They buy drinks... It's not only the NDC, [but also the NPP]." This is typical of participants' descriptions of the main campaign activities undertaken by the parties throughout the different focus groups. Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.

to be sincere: “its up to you to decide who you want to vote for. You have the power to vote.”<sup>18</sup> Participants in the Kaneshie neighborhood of Accra, another ethnically diverse area, expressed similar sentiments: one said, “for the money, I will just collect it, but it will never have any influence on you”; another argued, “even though I don’t want the person to win, I will collect it if they bring it.”<sup>19</sup> Participants in Kaneshie made clear that this type of gift distribution only occurs before the election and is not part of a repeated exchange. “During the elections, they came to give chairs, furniture, and some bags of rice... So they just brought these things to flatter us during the election.” But the participant continued, “its only during the election... After the election, nothing. You won’t even see them [the party agents], let alone their shadow.”<sup>20</sup>

Party leaders and agents also noted that these gifts did not create enforceable commitments. For example, an NPP party agent complained: “We say ‘take it, vote for me’... Some people do it... But some... [they] still won’t vote for you. ‘I’ll take it, but I’ll not vote for you. Because when I get to the polling booth, I’m the only person there. It’s only me and God.’ This is our complaint. ‘Hey, I voted for you’, but it’s a lie!”<sup>21</sup> But consistent with the discussion above that parties feel pressure to distribute these gifts to maintain reputations of performance, this party agent strongly believed the party had to give gifts when canvassing to avoid negative consequences: “if [our parliamentary candidate] says he doesn’t have [anything to give], they’ll go and say ‘Oh, that man is a bad man!’... So that makes the politicians think they must bribe the people with money. If they don’t give out, they won’t vote for you.”<sup>22</sup> An NDC parliamentary candidate in Accra similarly described his gift distribution as a means to maintain his reputation: “What I do is I have a wad of notes [*flashes a thick wad of cash*]. When I get pestered too much while campaigning, here’s something small for water, just get off my back so we can move on.”<sup>23</sup> Another local NDC executive also argued that campaign season gifts do not bind people to the party, but are meant to improve the party’s reputation: “[We] don’t give money like ‘I am sharing money, take this and vote for me.’ No... For example there is a church here and I want to speak to the church people so that they vote for me. After speaking to

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<sup>18</sup>Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, Greater Accra, 3 July 2013.

<sup>19</sup>A similar attitude about gift giving is captured in Lindberg (2010), which argues that urban voters treat campaign periods as a “harvesting season” for handouts they can collect from parties and candidates. But these gifts are not seen as binding.

<sup>20</sup>Focus group, Kaneshie, Okaikwei South constituency, Greater Accra, 26 June 2013.

<sup>21</sup>The party agents who were interviewed frequently stated that they had no way of monitoring vote choice (e.g., interview with NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency, 19 March 2014).

<sup>22</sup>Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, 29 June 2012.

<sup>23</sup>Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency, 23 July 2012.

them... I will acquire some paint and get the place painted. And they will announce it at church. ‘He has painted the church. Praise God. The NDC has painted our church.’”<sup>24</sup>

This gift distribution often extends beyond core, stronghold neighborhoods, with some benefits even going to voters from ethnic groups affiliated with the other party. The parties know that many people will take the gifts and not support them. The goal is to pick up enough votes in competitive areas and front non-co-ethnics to add to their core supporters and form a winning coalition. For example, one NPP parliamentary candidate said he often gave out small gifts in areas where he knew his co-ethnics – Akans – were less numerous, even though many of the recipients would likely support the NDC. “I target most where our people are not many because I know if I win just a little there to add to where my people are... I will have won.”<sup>25</sup>

But his co-ethnic core supporters are still favored in the distribution of private benefits over time, especially if his party’s presidential candidate wins and the party takes control over each district government. Both the focus group participants and local politicians described significant private goods distribution after the election, with core supporters of the ruling party disproportionately benefitting. Unlike the campaign gifts, these exchanges are described as involving repeated interactions between the party and voters that the party already “knows” (the word of choice among interview subjects). For example, NPP party agents in Ledzokuku constituency discussed their expectations that loyal party supporters would get jobs in the local municipal government if the NPP had won in 2012: “When you are in the party and... the party gets into power, definitely there are positions. Automatic positions for you. You see Ghana politics is a winner take all system. Like LEKMA assembly, there are so many positions and they are going to be automatic for you in the party when your presidential candidate wins.”<sup>26</sup> A NDC constituency executive in Accra described using his party connections after the NDC took power in 2009 to find civil service jobs for local supporters: “People in my community, they need job... So when they come to me I say, ‘I’ve learned [the Prison Service]

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<sup>24</sup>When campaigning door to door, he claims private gifts are a way to show respect to voters: “You can’t invite somebody... sit them down, talk to them... then when you finish you say, okay, let’s see you tomorrow. At least some motivation – something to drink or something to eat – it’s okay.” Interview with NDC party executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.

<sup>25</sup>Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, 6 June 2012.

<sup>26</sup>LEKMA is the Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal Assembly, the district government in the area. Interview with NPP party agents, Ledzokuku constituency, Greater Accra, 1 August 2013.



is doing recruitment. If you are interested... I'll go and lobby for you.' This is what we did."<sup>27</sup> Supporters who own small business are also first in line to receive work from local governments if their party takes power. As the NPP party agent in Madina described it, "this man [*gesturing to an NPP supporter*], he's a... [cement] block maker. So if you want somebody to buy blocks from, where are you going to go and buy the blocks from? That contract will go to him." Similarly, "we have carpenters [who support the party]. If there's any contract, our carpenters go ahead" of non-NPP carpenters.<sup>28</sup>

In addition, an NPP executive in Weija constituency described how the NPP MP invested in the businesses of supporters once taking power: "The women who are poor. You see? They expect that when you come to power, you will help them... Our MP was giving money to the women to trade. 100 Ghana cedis each. About 200 women."<sup>29</sup> Similarly, NPP constituency executives from Okaikwei North in Accra described how the MP in their constituency provided long-term financial support for poor market traders and also paid health insurance registration fees for supporters after winning the election: "If you go to the markets, she did a lot for the market women... When we come to health insurance... many people were not able to afford registering for the NHIS. About 4000 people, she registered for them. She pays the fee."<sup>30</sup> A focus group respondent in Kpone described: "Some people have been put into trading by the [NDC] MP. He's trying to let them get something to do on their own. They're in the training process. So some of them, he volunteers to give them machines, hair driers for the hair dressers, so it will help them... With regards to those who sew, he gave them machines." The participant continued: "But he hasn't done it for everybody. It's some few people," indicating that NDC supporters were favored in this assistance for small businesses.<sup>31</sup> This gift distribution is sometimes openly formalized; NPP constituency executives in Okaikwei Central described running a micro-finance loan scheme for local party supporters directly from their branch office.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Interview with NDC constituency executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012.

<sup>28</sup>Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 29 June 2012.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with NPP constituency executive, Weija constituency, Greater Accra, 29 July 2013.

<sup>30</sup>NHIS is the "National Health Insurance Scheme," established by the previous NPP government. Chapter 3 discusses how NHIS insurance registration is often distributed as patronage, even though the program is meant to be available to all Ghanaians. Interview with NPP constituency executives, Okaikwei North constituency, Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.

<sup>31</sup>Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.

<sup>32</sup>Interview with NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, 4 March 2014; interview with district assembly member and former NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, 12 March 2014.

Focus group participants had clear expectations that these benefits would go primarily to core supporters. As another participant in the Kpone focus group described: “Here it is a political environment... So if for example, if you’re from party A, you’ll be helping me during the campaign. And [then] if you come to power, I know that you’ll help me out. But if you come to power and... [I’m] not part of your party, it will be difficult.”<sup>33</sup> A nurse in the Dzorwulu neighborhood stated: “But most of their gifts are given to the party members, to those they already know. It’s not everybody it comes to. It’s to whom they know.”<sup>34</sup> A resident of Tema had similarly expectations about who would get patronage jobs: “If you go for a job and you don’t have a party card, they never give you a job. It’s about who you know.”<sup>35</sup>

These expectations extend to benefits from official government programs. For example, when asked about a micro-finance program initiated by the previous NPP government, a resident of Odorkor reported: “MASLOC? I’ve heard of it. It came under the NPP time... I had a friend who was part of the NPP team and he got the MASLOC loans. But people like us... who are not part of the party, didn’t get it... If it wasn’t for him, I wouldn’t even know that there was MASLOC.” Another participant in the same focus group concurred: “if you are not a member of that [party]... when the loan comes and you want to get some, they wouldn’t give it to you.”<sup>36</sup> A participant in the Mataheko neighborhood had similar expectations: “Things like this... the distribution of the money, it will go to the people who are close to the party.”<sup>37</sup>

While local party organizations cannot explicitly monitor vote choice, they are deeply embedded in the social fabric of some urban neighborhoods, especially in poorer communities. These organizations are capable of identifying individual party supporters, targeting personalized support, and repeatedly interacting with them over time, all of which are necessary for the clientelistic distribution of private goods. Ghana’s parties have active committees of agents at each polling station in most urban neighborhoods (clusters of 1000-2000

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<sup>33</sup>Being among those who are said to be “part of” or “close to” a party is very loosely defined in Ghana. This is largely another way of saying “strong supporter.” A subset of these people will actively participate in party campaign activities as party agents. But overall, party members are far more often regular people who are the recipients of patronage than the activists who participate in distributing it. Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.

<sup>34</sup>Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.

<sup>35</sup>Pilot survey discussion with randomly selected respondents, Tema Community 8, Tema Central constituency, Greater Accra, 23 August 2013.

<sup>36</sup>MASLOC is the government’s “Micro-finance and Small Loans Centre.” It is meant to be a universalistic program assisting the poor nationwide, but in practice benefits are often distributed as patronage. This is similar to the other national anti-poverty programs is in Chapter 3, and mirrors patronage distribution of officially universalistic anti-poverty programs in other countries (e.g., Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Focus group, Odorkor, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.

<sup>37</sup>Focus group, Mataheko, Ablekuma Central constituency, 1 October 2013.

voters) reporting to ward-level coordinators, who in turn report up to constituency-level executives and MPs. Under these polling station committees there can sometimes be informal networks of party members ("foot soldiers" or "party boys") who assist local party leaders with various activities.<sup>38</sup> As noted by Paller (2014), informal community leaders in slum areas often simultaneously serve as leaders within these party organizations. Ward-level city councilors (district assembly members; see Chapter 6), who serve as the formal leaders of urban neighborhoods and help determine where local government spending is delivered, are often also simultaneously party executives at the constituency or polling station levels.

These organizations sometimes collect systematic data used to identify and keep track of local party supporters. For example, an NPP MP candidate and a constituency executive each described systematically going through official voter rolls to identify potential supporters based on the ethnicity of their surnames.<sup>39</sup> An NDC constituency executive in Okaikwei Central similarly described: "Every polling station is a branch. We encourage the [party agents] to identify the people there [at the polling station]. So in every house when I enter the house, I already know that in this house we have 10 NPP, 5 NDC."<sup>40</sup> The NPP MP candidate also described using additional data collection to help register co-ethnic supporters before the 2012 election: "Before the voter registration we went to houses, wrote their names, which party they belong to, did you vote last time, or are you a new voter, your age. We did all the statistics. So before we move into voting registration we knew how many new voters were coming in and where they are from."<sup>41</sup> More recently, the NDC has announced plans to create an official "biometric register" of its members, issuing ID cards so that it can identify supporters in each community.<sup>42</sup>

This information can then be used to target private goods and government programs to supporters. An NDC party agent in La Dade Kotopon constituency described using a database of local supporters to allocate

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<sup>38</sup>Qualitatively, the proportion of local members who actively attend meetings and participate with campaign activities appears to vary significantly across neighborhoods. Systematic data on the number of party members is not available.

<sup>39</sup>The candidate showed me his printed copy of the voters' register, which had check marks by each Akan name. Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 6 June 2012; interview with NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 4 March 2014.

<sup>40</sup>Interview with NDC party executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.

<sup>41</sup>"Where they are from" is a general indicator of ethnicity. Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 6 June 2012.

<sup>42</sup>It is still unclear whether this effort will be successfully completed, or whether the party will then use this database to target government benefits. For example, see "NDC sets May deadline to register all members biometrically," *My Joy Online*, 9 April 2014, <http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2014/april-9th/ndc-to-finish-biometric-registration-of-members-by-may-ending.php>.

patronage jobs after the party took power: "I've made a database of all our people, I'm updating it, what skills do you have... We are prioritizing 'foot soldiers,' but also people out of that... So per this database, we can know who wants work, what skill sets you have, and then we can match you to a job. We can look at the vacancies and push for you. So that's what we are doing for our people."<sup>43</sup> Moreover, local party organizations may have inherently more information about the needs (and identities) of co-ethnic supporters than voters from other ethnic groups. While representative data on the composition of party organizations is not available, it appears that the local polling station- and constituency-level executives for each party are mostly drawn from the ethnic groups affiliated with that party: the clear majority of NPP party agents and leaders interviewed were Akans; nearly all from the NDC were Gas, Ewes, or Northerners. Given the likely ethnic nature of many social networks, this may give parties more information on local co-ethnics than other voters.

But why do local party organizations funnel these benefits after the election to voters who already support the party? In line with the theoretical discussion above, the party agents interviewed described this both as necessary to reward core voters for their support and to ensure that they continued to be core voters in the future. The NDC agent in La explained it concisely: "it's like a blackmail situation." Supporters often threaten to leave their party if they do not receive enough patronage. For example, the La party agent described, "I had to get some jobs for them yesterday, for the youth in the constituency... This lady who called marshaled 20 people to me, to bring a protestation that [they] would switch to the NPP based on failed promises from [the NDC MP]. And I had to plead with them, but the deal was that I had to get them jobs. So that's what I'm doing."<sup>44</sup> This is a common news item in the Ghanaian press, with groups of ruling party supporters holding press conferences to publicly threaten to switch to the opposition party unless more patronage is given. Based on their frequency, these protestations must often have the desired effect.

### **4.3.2 Private Goods in Poor vs. Wealthy Urban Neighborhoods**

Both of these types of private goods distribution are concentrated within poorer neighborhoods of the city. As a telling example, polling-station-level NPP party agents in a wealthier neighborhood of the Krowor constituency said they distributed financial assistance and other private goods to supporters, much like similar

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<sup>43</sup>Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.

<sup>44</sup>Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.

agents elsewhere in the city. But they described driving to a nearby slum (Nungua) and concentrating their efforts there even though it was outside the catchment area of their own polling station. These practices would be more viable in the poorer area.<sup>45</sup> Focus group respondents in wealthier neighborhoods similarly believed that most patronage distribution was concentrated in poor areas. For example, when asked about access to government anti-poverty programs, such as the MASLOC program noted above, a poor participant in Dzorwulu, a wealthy neighborhood, said: "This area consists of high class people of the society. So when such things are given, they rather give it to those parts, the slum areas surrounding here, because they are in need. It seems like sometimes the government thinks, 'these people... they don't need such things, so why not channel it to the slum zones?'" But the participant noted that despite living in a wealthier area, he himself was just as poor as those in the slums (he lived in a temporary wooden structure) and he also wanted these benefits. "Government thinks that because you are here, in this residential area, you have money," even if you do not.<sup>46</sup>

The reason he is excluded may be more nuanced, however. Wealthier neighborhoods in urban Ghana – and in many other African cities – are not uniformly wealthy, as described in Chapter 2. Poor residents, like this focus groups participant, often live among the wealthier homes. But these voters are more difficult for party organizations to build sustained relationships with. Some poor residents live in wealthier neighborhoods as household staff, laborers on construction projects, or as street-side shopkeepers.<sup>47</sup> Many others live there as "caretakers." Developers and wealthier families in urban Ghana often build homes in stages. In the interim, poor families are invited to squat on the property in order to keep watch (Gough & Yankson 2011).<sup>48</sup> The remaining poor residents are squatters in illegal structures in empty lots. These types of residents can be very transient. This makes it more difficult for local party agents to develop long-term relationships necessary for clientelism; there is little guarantee that a caretaker or laborer who receives support from a party

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<sup>45</sup>They claimed to have (illegally) registered supporters from this nearby slum to vote at their wealthier polling station. A higher vote total would signal their competence as agents, supporting possible promotions to higher positions in the party. Interview with NPP party agents, Krowor constituency, Greater Accra, 23 February 2014.

<sup>46</sup>Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.

<sup>47</sup>It is typical in Ghana for roadside shopkeepers to live in informal structures behind their shops and for construction workers to bring their families to live in temporary housing next to their worksites.

<sup>48</sup>Many homes are built one floor or room at a time, as funding permits. In other cases, land remains vacant for several years until the owner raises construction funds. Caretakers prevent thieves from stealing construction materials and prevent others from squatting on the lot in return for free (temporary) housing.

agent today will be in the area to vote for the party by the next election.<sup>49</sup> Even if parties distribute some handouts and gifts to reach these poor voters in wealthy areas during the campaign, the parties appear to concentrate efforts at building patronage relationships in more uniformly poor communities.

These differences across levels of neighborhood wealth can be seen more systematically using the survey data. In addition to the questions about door to door campaigning and gift distribution during the campaign examined in Chapter 3, the survey includes questions about the distribution of more valuable private benefits in non-election periods, which can better measure the presence of clientelism. Respondents were asked open-ended questions about whether they knew of any benefits local politicians, including the MP, had delivered to residents of their neighborhood.<sup>50</sup> Up to four verbatim responses were recorded for each respondent and subsequently blind-coded as representing club goods (those with benefits to a neighborhood) or private goods (those with benefits to specific individuals). Separately, respondents were asked whether they knew about anyone in their neighborhood benefitting from a series of prominent government anti-poverty programs, which are frequently alleged to be distributed as patronage to individual ruling party supporters (see above; or Chapter 3).<sup>51</sup>

Overall, 36% of the respondents could report at least one activity done by local politicians in their area. 30% of the total respondents could name at least one club good, and 10% of the total respondents named at least one private good.<sup>52</sup> Table 4.1 lists typical responses to the open-ended questions about activities by local politicians in the neighborhood. The private goods that most respondents reported are consistent with the more valuable clientelistic benefits described in the previous section, not with small gifts during the

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<sup>49</sup>E.g., interview with NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 19 March 2014.

<sup>50</sup>This involved two separate questions: "Think about your MP. Do you know of any activities or projects your MP has done for people here? This could be to help the whole community or to help individual people here. Can you give examples?"; immediately followed by: "Think about other politicians in this area. Do you know of any activities or projects other politicians have done for people here in the community? This could be to help the whole community or to help individual people here. Can you give examples?"

<sup>51</sup>"Do you know anyone in this neighborhood here who has received a job or loan facility through a government program, such as NYEP, GYEEDA, MASLOC, or LESDEP?" The NYEP is the "National Youth Employment Program," created under the NPP government and renamed GYEEDA ("Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency") by the NDC government. The program provides jobs and job training to unemployed young people. MASLOC, discussed above, is a micro-finance loan program. LESDEP is the "Local Enterprises and Skills Development Program," which also provides micro-finance and job training to the poor.

<sup>52</sup>It is likely that each of these questions undercounts the full extent of private goods distribution because of social desirability bias about reporting receiving private benefits (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). But after controlling for respondents' own wealth, education, and other personal characteristics below, it is unclear why the degree of bias would vary systematically across types of neighborhoods.

Table 4.1: Typical Goods Delivered by Local Politicians (Urban Sample)

<b>Club Goods</b>	
<i>Category:</i>	
Infrastructure (48%)	“construction of roads”
Sanitation (23%)	“cleaning of gutters”
Education (8%)	“school building”
Water Supply (6%)	“water storage tanks...”
Health (6%)	“construction of hospital”
<b>Private Goods</b>	
<i>Category:</i>	
Education (21%)	“help in paying school fees...”
Unemployment (19%)	“jobs for the youth”
Money (17%)	“helped some youth financially”
Health (11%)	“paid people’s health insurance”
Support business (7%)	“help the market women”
	“provided some streetlight”
	“built some drainages”
	“... computers to some schools”
	“laying of pipes”
	“building of polyclinic”
	“... send some people to school”
	“help to acquire jobs”
	“financial support”
	“bringing doctors to check our health”
	“help hairdressers... acquire machines”
	“school uniforms”
	“send youth to train in trade of their choice”
	“given money to some people...”
	“solve some [people’s] medical problems free...”
	“sharing of tailoring machines to the youth”
	“tarring of road”
	“... sweeping the community”
	“... cement to build Arabic school”
	“... borehole for the community”
	“supply of hospital equipment”

Within each category (club, private) responses were coded into a list of over 20 topics. The most common topics are listed here, with that topic’s percentage within the broader category listed in parentheses. Responses are lightly edited for spelling and length.

campaign.<sup>53</sup> The most common were support for education (typically tuition assistance for the children of poor voters) and assistance finding jobs. For the question about job and loan programs, 30% of respondents personally knew or had “heard about” a beneficiary in their neighborhood. Importantly, a job, loan, or tuition payments for a child are types of benefits that can be revoked in future interactions. Once voters receive these benefits from a local politician, they are likely more dependent on the politician for continued support than when receiving a handout such as cash or food – common pre-election gifts – which do not require continued goodwill from the politician over time to enjoy.

Knowledge of private goods distribution was more common in poor neighborhoods. Figure 4.1 plots summary statistics to these two sets of questions, as well as the question on door to door campaigning (see Chapter 3), aggregated by each of the 48 sampling locations in the survey. On the x-axis is the average value of the neighborhood development index for each location.<sup>54</sup> The city-wide mean on this index is 0, such that areas to the left of 0 are poorer than the average neighborhood in Greater Accra, and areas to the right are wealthier. On average, 36% of respondents in the poorer survey locations – and as many as 60% in one location – knew recipients of the government anti-poverty programs, as shown in the top-left panel of Figure 4.1. Only 23% on average knew about recipients in middle class and wealthy neighborhoods, with fewer than 10% aware of recipients in the wealthiest areas in the survey. For the open-ended questions, an average of 15% of respondents in poor neighborhoods could name specific instances of private goods distribution compared to just 3% in the wealthier neighborhoods, as shown in the top-right panel. In over three quarters of the middle class and wealthy survey locations, 0% of respondents reported any private goods distribution at all in the open-ended questions, suggesting that this is relatively rare in wealthier neighborhoods. By contrast, respondents reported that local politicians delivered club goods at fairly equal rates in wealthier and poorer neighborhoods, consistent with the argument above that politicians target club goods to both poorer and wealthier voters. This is shown in the bottom-left panel.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>The respondents made clear that they viewed small pre-election handouts in a categorically different manner from the other types of private goods that politicians distribute. The majority of respondents (69%) reported knowing about distribution of these gifts when asked about it directly, but essentially none mentioned small gifts of food, cash, or clothing in response to the open-ended questions about politicians’ activities. Instead, only more valuable types of private benefits were discussed in the open-ended questions on goods distribution. For this reason, it is appropriate to view these open-ended questions as measuring goods distribution that is separate from the small handouts passed out during the campaign period.

<sup>54</sup>See Chapter 2 for definition of this index.

<sup>55</sup>The final panel shows that door to door campaigning is also more common in poorer areas for comparison. This is also shown in Chapter 3.






Figure 4.1: *Summary Statistics, Reported Goods Delivery by Sampling Cluster (Urban Areas)*: Each panel plots the percentage of respondents in each of the 48 sampling clusters, or neighborhoods, in the urban survey who reported knowledge of the outcome listed at the top of each panel. The x-axis is for the average value of the neighborhood wealth index for each sampling cluster. The mean neighborhood in Greater Accra is a 0 on this index. The hashed lines plot the averages across locations to the left and right of the city-wide mean.

These differences persist after controlling for individual-level characteristics of the respondents, as well as for other neighborhood characteristics. Table 4.2 reports the results of a series of multi-level logistic regression models (Gelman & Hill 2007), which take the form:

$$P(y_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 \text{NeighWealth}_i + \mathbf{X}_i\delta + \mathbf{Z}_j\gamma)$$

where  $y_i$  is a binary indicator for one of the questions in Figure 4.1. Intercepts are partially-pooled by the 48 sampling locations ( $j$ ) in the survey, to account for the clustered nature of the sample,<sup>56</sup> and I also include constituency fixed effects for each constituency ( $k$ ) to control for baseline differences in strategies across constituencies.<sup>57</sup>  $\text{NeighWealth}_i$  is the development index for the 500 meter radius around each respondent  $i$ , calculated as described in Chapter 2. All models include two sets of controls;  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is at the individual level, and includes: age, gender, an indicator for being a Muslim, indicators for each major ethnic group, the education/employment and assets indices described in Chapter 2, and two indicators for the quality of the survey interview.<sup>58</sup>  $\mathbf{Z}_j$  includes the population density of the sampling location and 2008 presidential vote share in the Electoral Area (ward) of the sampling location, to account for possible partisan patterns in goods distribution.

Consistent with Figure 4.1, I find in Table 4.2 that neighborhood wealth is a significant predictor of respondents reporting private goods distribution, but not club goods distribution. Simulating from column 1, as a respondent moves from a neighborhood 1 standard deviation below the citywide mean in wealth to a neighborhood 1 standard deviation above the mean, the respondent is 12 percentage points (95%CI: -1.7, 25.3,  $p = 0.08$ ) less likely to be aware of people in her neighborhood benefitting from government job or loan programs.<sup>59</sup> Simulating from column 2, as a respondent moves from a neighborhood 1 standard deviation below the citywide mean in wealth to a neighborhood 1 standard deviation above the mean, the respondent is 18 percentage points (95%CI: -0.3, 34.8,  $p = 0.051$ ) less likely to name at least one private

<sup>56</sup>Results are also robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown).

<sup>57</sup>Party organizations are structured by constituency, with campaign strategy decisions made separately by party executives and MP candidates at the constituency level.

<sup>58</sup>These are whether respondents were reported as being cooperative and whether the enumerator made errors in filling out the survey form.

<sup>59</sup>All simulations are  $N = 1000$ , using the method from Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).

Table 4.2: Respondent Reports of Goods Distribution (Urban Sample)

	1	2	3	4
<i>Outcome:</i>	Jobs and Loans	Private Goods	Club Goods	Door to Door
<i>Neighborhood Wealth Index (500m)</i>	-0.324 <sup>†</sup> (0.188)	-1.362 <sup>†</sup> (0.696)	0.101 (0.179)	-0.307* (0.154)
<i>NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share (by ELA)</i>	-2.419 (1.744)	-4.375 (4.341)	1.901 (1.625)	1.096 (1.316)
<i>Population Density (by cluster)</i>	0.017* (0.007)	0.026 (0.017)	0.014 <sup>†</sup> (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
<i>Years in Neighborhood</i>	0.016* (0.008)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 <sup>†</sup> (0.008)	0.014* (0.007)
<i>Age</i>	0.001 (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.013 <sup>†</sup> (0.007)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.735* (0.366)	0.544 (0.534)	-0.150 (0.373)	-0.767* (0.336)
<i>Male</i>	0.111 (0.185)	0.318 (0.308)	-0.034 (0.183)	0.211 (0.155)
<i>Ewe</i>	0.207 (0.244)	0.115 (0.438)	-0.134 (0.245)	-0.129 (0.207)
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.685 <sup>†</sup> (0.389)	-0.394 (0.566)	-0.175 (0.390)	0.586 <sup>†</sup> (0.356)
<i>Ga-Dangme</i>	-0.168 (0.246)	0.717 <sup>†</sup> (0.414)	0.407 <sup>†</sup> (0.231)	0.227 (0.205)
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	-0.050 (0.108)	0.074 (0.177)	0.158 (0.105)	-0.011 (0.089)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.048 (0.111)	-0.260 (0.197)	-0.145 (0.109)	-0.202* (0.090)
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	669	669	669	930

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Multi-level logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, as in Gelman and Hill (2007). All models include parliamentary constituency fixed effects. The outcome in column 1 is whether a respondent is aware of people in the neighborhood benefiting from government job and loan programs. The outcome in column 2 is whether a respondent listed any private good among the goods she is aware of local politicians delivering in her neighborhood. The outcome in column 3 is whether a respondent listed any club good among the goods she is aware of local politicians delivering in her neighborhood. The outcome in column 4 is an indicator for the respondent remembering door to door campaigning by the parties in the neighborhood before the 2012 election. The questions in columns 1-3 were only asked to a randomly chosen two thirds of respondents in each location. Akan is the omitted ethnicity category.

good in response to the open-ended question about activities by local politicians.<sup>60</sup>

The private and club goods identified by respondents in the open-ended questions (columns 2 and 3) could be provided by multiple different actors: the NDC national government, municipal governments (controlled by the NDC), MPs (from either party), district assembly members (from either party), or local agents (from either party). Because of this, it is not possible to ascertain from these questions whether there was partisan or ethnic targeting of these benefits. But the job and loan programs in column 1 could only have been distributed by the NDC, through control over each local government. While there is strong reason to believe based on the qualitative discussion above (and the survey experiment in Chapter 5) that individual NDC supporters are the primary recipients of these programs, the insignificant coefficient on NDC 2008 vote share in column 1 suggests that the NDC government does not target these benefits differentially to core *neighborhoods* within the city. This suggests that NDC supporters can access patronage benefits from their party in poor neighborhoods even when many of the surrounding residents are supporters of the NPP. This follows the theoretical discussion above and differs from the results for rural areas (see below). I discuss the implications of this for voting behavior in Chapter 5.

Finally, the models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.2 indicate that Ga respondents were particularly likely to be aware of goods distribution throughout in Greater Accra, consistent with the unique position of the Ga ethnic group within the city discussed in Chapter 2. Ga respondents were 65% more likely to name at least one private good distributed by politicians than other respondents.<sup>61</sup> Ga respondents were also 8 percentage points (95% CI: -0.3, 16.9,  $p = 0.08$ ) more likely than other respondents to know about club goods distributed in their neighborhood. Both are consistent with Gas having more access to patronage goods (whether private or club) throughout the metropolitan area. I return to this result for Gas respondents in the discussion of voting behavior in Chapter 5, in which patterns for Gas diverge from the other ethnic groups in the city, likely because of their greater access to patronage goods from the ruling party than other voters throughout Greater Accra.

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<sup>60</sup>But in Column 3, I find that neighborhood wealth does not predict where respondents report club goods delivery as occurring. Column 4 replicates the results for door to door campaigning from Chapter 3 for comparison.

<sup>61</sup>6 percentage points more likely than other respondents (95%CI: -0.4, 12.8,  $p = 0.08$ ).

## 4.4 Comparison to Rural Areas

In rural areas, parties may place less emphasis on individual-level clientelism, especially outside of the large rural towns and in areas dominated by an opposing party's co-ethnics. Instead, there is likely more emphasis on using club goods to build support among rural voters. This is for two main reasons. First, parties do not need to take on the costs of building dense patronage networks capable of engaging in repeated clientelistic interactions with large numbers of individual voters if they can use local elites as intermediaries to engage with voters on their behalf (Koter 2013a). Traditional chiefs and other village-level elites can serve this role in much of rural Africa, delivering blocs of votes from their communities in return for benefits given to these local elites, not directly to individual voters (e.g., Baldwin 2014). For example, Lindberg (2010) discusses how rural MPs in Ghana often respond to demands from village chiefs to provide club goods that benefit entire communities and then expect the chief to organize political support in return. In urban areas, however, traditional leaders are far less socially powerful. In most urban neighborhoods, there simply are not universally recognized local elites capable of serving as intermediaries and organizing residents to vote in a bloc. Parties must instead either engage with voters individually or distribute club goods without a local enforcer capable of ensure that the party receives support from the community in return.

Second, there are higher costs to maintaining individual-level patronage networks in sparsely populated rural communities than in most urban slums. While parties can engage with many poor voters who live in close proximity and are in regular daily interaction by embedding agents in slum neighborhoods, developing a patronage network in a rural area often requires having capable party agents who can distribute benefits and monitor voters stationed in many different villages. In small villages, where few voters live, the costs of identifying and empowering such an agent may not be worth the potential benefits, especially in comparison to just distributing club goods to the entire village or working with existing village leaders. Parties can still distribute small handouts before the election in villages where they do not have a strong local organization, but clientelism entails greater costs. In larger rural towns, however, more potential patronage recipients are concentrated in the same place, similar to urban neighborhoods, and developing local party networks capable of individual-level clientelism may be more cost effective. In addition, maintaining patronage networks may be especially difficult in villages that are enclaves of an opposing party's ethnic groups. There are fewer potential agents to employ as brokers in these areas and fewer voters that could be won over absent a

substantial investment of resources. Village leaders aligned with the opposing party may also erect barriers to organization and campaigning by a new party.<sup>62</sup> Considering these two factors together, there may be more individual-level clientelism and private goods delivery by parties in the poorest slum neighborhoods in cities than in the typical rural village.

These differences are well summarized by an interview with an NDC constituency executive who managed his party's campaign in an urban constituency in Greater Accra (Krowor) during the 2008 election and then in a rural constituency in Eastern Region (Akropong) during the 2012 election.<sup>63</sup> Comparing the differences in how the NDC interacts with voters between these urban and rural constituencies, he said:

“In Akropong the money [distributed to voters] will not be so much like in Krowor. In Krowor, the money is more. Because in Akropong you have 11 or 12 villages comprising the constituency... You need to travel from one town to another town, some villages are up on mountains... If they need something you can go help them by, let's say, building a public toilet... In Accra here people will be coming to you differently... People will be coming to you [directly] because almost everybody knows you [the party agent]. In Akropong, they wouldn't know you. The village leaders will know this man is good, so let's go support him, and then they [the voters] all follow. But in Accra it's not like that. In Accra you have to work so hard house to house... In Akropong Township it's done like that, but just in the main town... But in some villages where it's not a big place, you tell the NDC coordinator who is in that village to organize people who love your party to come for a meeting and then you can go and talk to them together. You don't go to each house. You go to somebody's house in the villages if the person is an opinion leader, just for really important people. But in Greater Accra you need to move to all the individual work places, shops [to interact with voters].”<sup>64</sup>

The party leader touched on several key contrasts. He said it is more difficult for the party to engage with individual voters in far-flung villages in the rural constituency than in the urban constituency (or the large rural town). Instead, he described the party as engaging with voters in rural villages all together at once, either by providing a club good that brings benefits to an entire village (building a public toilet) or by

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<sup>62</sup>Moreover, many party activities in Ghana and other countries are locally financed at the constituency level. Financing to support local organizations and attract new members with patronage is likely lower in rural constituencies dominated by an opposing party than in more competitive areas or a party's own strongholds. But this difference is likely less pronounced in urban areas, where financing for party activities may be higher across the board because of the significantly larger business communities seeking access to government contracts in urban areas. Urban party organizations should be better financed, and thus relatively better able to engage in clientelism, even in neighborhoods where a party's co-ethnics are less numerous.

<sup>63</sup>The party leader is originally from Akropong, but lives in Krowor. Krowor is a competitive constituency (53% NDC, 46% NPP in the 2012 presidential election) split between a large slum – Nungua – and several middle and upper class neighborhoods. Akropong leans more to the NPP (65% NPP, 34% NDC in the 2012 presidential election) and consists of villages surrounding a single large town (Akropong). This is among the wealthier and most densely populated rural areas in Ghana; the contrasts the party leader describes may be even more stark in less developed rural areas.

<sup>64</sup>Interview with former NDC constituency executive, Krowor constituency, Greater Accra, 19 March 2014.

working through village elites (“opinion leaders” and “village leaders”) as intermediaries. These will often be chiefs or elders from the indigenous ethnic group in a village. The party leader still noted a strategy of favoring core supporters, gathering those “who love your party” for rallies or meetings in each village, at which attendees are often given gifts and small amounts of money. But the local party organization was not directly engaging with these supporters at an individual level. By contrast, in the urban area, the party leader suggested that individual voters have direct relationships with the party organization and that the party does not reach them through traditional elites.

This is in part because the types of village elites that the party leader described working with in Akropong are not socially powerful in the city, especially among non-Gas. For example, when asked about the role of traditional elites in a focus group in Ashaiman, the largest non-Ga slum in Accra, one participant noted that traditional leaders from various ethnic groups live in the community – as private citizens – but have no social or political power: “The chiefs are many here. They have more than 20 northern tribal chiefs... We barely see them. Even if a chief is passing by you, you would never know it’s a chief.” Instead, the strongest community leader in his neighborhood is an elected official working directly for the NDC: “[The assemblyman] is the person who has the kind of cohesion of everyone. It’s the assemblyman who is the more important leader.”<sup>65</sup> Many of these assembly members in Accra are local executives in one of the major parties (see Chapter 6).<sup>66</sup>

These differences between urban and rural areas can be seen by comparing the two surveys. The rural survey was conducted in five parliamentary constituencies, randomly selected from all rural constituencies in five regions of southern Ghana (excluding Greater Accra Region).<sup>67</sup> The sample contains two very homogeneous, stronghold constituencies (Kpando, Volta Region, 89% NDC in the 2012 presidential election; Manso Nkwanta, Ashanti Region, 82% NPP), two less homogeneous constituencies that leaned to each party (Lower Manya Krobo, Eastern Region, 67% NDC; Offinso South, Ashanti Region, 65% NPP), and a highly diverse, competitive constituency (Offinso North, Ashanti Region, 50% NPP, 47% NDC).<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, Greater Accra, 3 July 2013.

<sup>66</sup>Paller (2014) also documents how powerful community leaders in other slums in Greater Accra have direct ties to the local party organizations, rather than drawing on traditional social authority.

<sup>67</sup>The sampling frame and selection procedures are described in more detail in Chapter 2.

<sup>68</sup>This is in line with the actual distribution in southern Ghana, where there are relatively few diverse or politically competitive constituencies in comparison to urban areas (see Chapter 2).

In the open-ended questions about activities that local politicians had carried out in the community, urban and rural respondents were similarly likely overall to say that private goods had been delivered (10% urban vs. 9% rural). But clear differences appear between poor urban neighborhoods and rural villages when examining variation across sampling locations (neighborhoods or towns/villages). Distribution of valuable private goods, such as those listed in Table 4.1, were reported in the poorest urban neighborhoods at significantly higher rates than in almost all of the rural survey locations. For example, in 5 of the urban survey locations (all of which are below 0 on the neighborhood wealth index; see Figure 4.1) more than 30% of respondents reported that these types of private goods had been delivered to residents; the percentage reporting private goods was lower in every rural survey location. In 10 of the 48 urban locations, more than 20% of respondents reported private goods delivery, compared to in just 3 of the 25 rural survey locations. In 6 rural survey locations, no respondents reported any private goods delivery at all, similar to the many wealthier survey locations in the urban sample where no private goods delivery was reported (see Figure 4.1).<sup>69</sup>

As discussed above, there are two main reasons there may be less private goods delivery in rural communities. First, parties face higher costs in less developed, less densely populated areas than in dense urban slums to maintaining grassroots patronage networks capable of monitoring and interacting with a large number of individual voters over time. These costs are especially high outside of the larger rural towns, as argued by the NDC leader quoted above. Second, parties have less of a reason to invest in building relationships with individual voters if they can use powerful local elites – such as traditional village leaders – as intermediaries, targeting benefits to these leaders, who then organize support for the party in the community. The urban and rural respondents reported significantly different rates of interaction with local traditional leaders. Only 15% of the urban survey respondents in Greater Accra reported meeting with a chief or other traditional leader in the last year, with many of these responses coming from the indigenous Ga ethnic group.<sup>70</sup> By contrast, 42% of rural respondents reported interactions with a traditional leader.

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<sup>69</sup>Overall rates of gift distribution in the immediate period before the election were similar, however. In the rural areas, 86% of respondents knew about or “heard about” the distribution of small gifts to voters during the campaign period, more than the 69% who knew of these handouts before the election in urban areas. Unconditional gifts can be given even in areas where a party does not have a dense local organization and does not require longer-term relationships between party agents and voters. The percentage aware of these gifts in rural areas is likely higher because the average rural voter is poorer than the average urban voter and, as documented in Chapter 3, the parties avoid giving campaign gifts to middle class and wealthier voters.

<sup>70</sup>In Chapter 5 I show that these ties to chiefs are an important determinant of vote choice for Ga respondents in the urban area, but play no role in voting behavior for respondents from other ethnic groups.



Logistic regressions in Table 4.3 provide evidence consistent with these two reasons for an urban-rural difference in goods distribution. In models similar to Table 4.2 and the equation above, I regress binary indicator variables for whether the rural survey respondents know about the different types of good delivery on a series of individual characteristics, as well as the neighborhood wealth index. In rural areas, this index captures differences in overall levels of development among communities. Large towns typically have better infrastructure and more educated populations and thus score more highly on the index than small villages, which will lack most of the types of infrastructure included in the neighborhood wealth index (see Chapter 2 for definition of this variable). Because rural communities can be much more spatially dispersed than urban neighborhoods, I now calculate the neighborhood wealth index as a weighted average of census characteristics in a 2km radius around respondents, rather than the narrower 500m radius used for analysis in the urban sample. In each column of Table 4.3, I also include indicators for whether each respondent is a member of political party and has met with a traditional chief in the last year.

Voters with direct ties to political party organizations or to traditional chiefs were more likely to be among the small minority (9%) of rural respondents who reported private goods delivery in the open-ended questions about politicians' activities. In column 1 of Table 4.3, I find that respondents who are self-reported members of a political party are more likely to know about private goods delivery.<sup>71</sup> This suggests that in the rural communities where party networks are more active, private goods delivery may be more common.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, I estimate that respondents in each rural constituency are 6.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.3, 14.0,  $p = 0.08$ ) more likely to report private goods delivery if they have met with a traditional chief in the past year.<sup>73</sup> The probability of reporting private goods delivery on the open-ended questions is nearly zero among rural respondents who did not interact with their local chief. This is consistent with many of the private goods that do reach rural voters being delivered through chiefs who serve as intermediaries. By contrast, in a similar model among non-Ga respondents in the urban survey, contact with traditional chiefs does not predict whether the respondents know about politicians distributing private goods (not shown). Non-Ga respondents in the urban survey are those for whom traditional leaders are not active within the city.

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<sup>71</sup>When including constituency fixed effects in column 2, this difference is signed similarly, but no longer statistically significant ( $p = 0.13$ ).

<sup>72</sup>This is also consistent with Lindberg (2010), which suggests that a small group of local party members receive the majority of private benefits distributed by rural MPs, while most voters receive nothing. These local party members serve as voters in primary elections and can use that position to extract concessions from MPs (Lindberg 2010, Ichino & Nathan 2012).

<sup>73</sup>Ties to chiefs are also signed as positively correlated with awareness of private goods delivery in column 1, but with  $p = 0.14$ .

Table 4.3: Respondent Reports of Goods Distribution (Rural Sample)

Outcome: Sample:	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		
	Private All	Private All	Club All	Club All	Jobs/Loans All	Jobs/Loans All	Club All	Club All	Jobs/Loans All	Jobs/Loans All	Jobs/Loans All	Jobs/Loans All	NPP Consts.	Jobs/Loans Consts.	Jobs/Loans NDC Consts.	Jobs/Loans NDC Consts.	
<i>Neighborhood Wealth Index (2km)</i>	-0.267 (0.465)	-0.167 (0.525)	-1.094** (0.396)	-0.490 (0.387)	1.324** (0.431)	1.069* (0.450)								1.673* (0.713)	1.210† (0.684)		
<i>Voted for NDC (2012 pres. elec.)</i>														0.345 (0.498)	1.588† (0.827)		
<i>Party Member</i>	0.776† (0.445)	0.694 (0.468)	-0.010 (0.325)	-0.087 (0.324)	0.523 (0.347)	0.588† (0.276)								0.067 (0.503)	1.349* (0.622)		
<i>Met Chief</i>	0.627 (0.431)	0.794† (0.455)	0.100 (0.283)	0.151 (0.282)	0.299 (0.302)	0.276 (0.302)								0.092 (0.437)	0.608 (0.503)		
<i>Age</i>	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.017)	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)								-0.016 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.017)		
<i>Male</i>	0.289 (0.436)	0.399 (0.446)	0.301 (0.272)	0.302 (0.273)	0.192 (0.291)	0.179 (0.291)								0.735† (0.441)	-0.228 (0.477)		
<i>Muslim</i>	-0.005 (0.947)	0.862 (0.993)	0.234 (0.555)	0.554 (0.579)	0.106 (0.666)	0.086 (0.672)								0.467 (0.819)	-1.158 (1.565)		
<i>Ewe</i>	-0.240 (0.597)	-1.919† (1.109)	-0.946* (0.429)	0.302 (0.659)	0.769† (0.434)	0.756 (0.613)								-15.553 (591.207)	0.907 (1.605)		
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.200 (0.738)	-1.144 (0.841)	-0.688 (0.462)	-0.541 (0.480)	-0.318 (0.584)	-0.397 (0.599)								-0.531 (0.744)	0.355 (1.946)		
<i>Ga-Dangme</i>	0.150 (0.562)	--	-2.457*** (0.643)	--	0.047 (0.496)	--								--	0.197 (1.652)		
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	0.079 (0.198)	0.029 (0.212)	0.129 (0.139)	0.133 (0.142)	0.101 (0.141)	0.087 (0.141)								0.194 (0.209)	0.341 (0.249)		
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.280 (0.189)	0.343† (0.198)	0.175 (0.142)	0.190 (0.144)	-0.043 (0.146)	-0.048 (0.147)								-0.094 (0.282)	0.024 (0.213)		
Constituency FEs	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y								N	N		
N	321	321	321	321	321	321								181	121		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Multi-level logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, as in Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome in columns 1-2 is whether a respondent listed any private good among the goods she is aware of local politicians delivering in her neighborhood. The outcome in Columns 3-4 is whether a respondent listed any club good among these responses. The outcome in Columns 5-8 is whether a respondent is aware of people in the community benefiting from government job and loan programs. Columns 7-8 restrict to constituencies won by the NPP and NDC in the 2012 presidential election, respectively. These questions were only asked to a randomly chosen two thirds of respondents in each survey location. Akan is the omitted ethnicity category. The indicator for Ga-Dangme is omitted in the columns with constituency fixed effects because all Ga-Dangme respondents were in one constituency (Lower Manya Krobo).

In columns 5-8 of Table 4.3 I analyze the question about official government job and loan programs. While the open-ended questions capture private goods that could have been delivered by multiple actors, including NPP MPs, these job and loan programs are all controlled by the NDC. Rural respondents were significantly more likely to know recipients of these programs in more developed locations – towns – rather than in small villages. As the neighborhood wealth index changes from the value for the least developed village in the rural survey (Apatem, Offinso North constituency) to the value for the wealthiest town (Kpando, Kpando constituency) respondents are 36 percentage points (95% CI: 14.7, 56.0) more likely to know recipients of the government job and loan programs, based on the model in column 5 of Table 4.3. This is the exact opposite of the pattern for urban areas, seen in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. In urban areas, valuable private benefits are more likely to be distributed in the poorest neighborhoods, not more developed areas. But as described in the quote above from the NDC party leader, the parties may only distribute these types of benefits in major towns in rural areas where they have organizations capable of maintaining clientelistic relationships with larger numbers of individual voters.

Despite this difference in awareness of beneficiaries of these private goods across levels of development within rural areas, urban and rural respondents were similarly likely overall to be aware of program recipients. In each sample, 30% of respondents knew recipients of these programs. But differences become apparent when responses are broken out by constituency. In the two constituencies in the rural survey that the NDC won in the 2012 presidential election, 44% of respondents knew beneficiaries of these NDC-managed job and loan programs, higher than the urban average. But in the three constituencies in the survey won by the NPP, only 20% of respondents knew about program beneficiaries.<sup>74</sup> The percentage in rural NPP constituencies is less than the percentage of respondents knowing about program recipients even in the average wealthy urban neighborhood in Figure 4.1.

This difference is consistent with it being more difficult for the party to maintain a grassroots organization that can identify and monitor individual recipients in rural regions that are strongholds of the opposing party, as argued above. Both parties in Ghana have offices and local executives in every parliamentary constituency in the country. But the extent to which those local organizations are active at the grassroots, especially in villages outside the constituency capital, may vary significantly. For example, in Akan villages

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<sup>74</sup>In urban areas, this difference was less pronounced, with 32% of respondents knowing recipients of jobs or loans from the NDC government in constituencies that the NDC won in the 2012 election, compared to 26% in the NPP constituencies.

in the Ashanti Region, there likely are not many active NDC party agents, even if there are NDC executives sitting in the constituency-level office. The NDC may not have the on-the-ground knowledge about many individual voters in these opposition constituencies necessary to target jobs and loans to core supporters as efficiently as the party can do in urban areas, or in its rural strongholds. Within these NPP constituencies, NDC supporters, or co-ethnics of the party in general, do not appear more likely than NPP supporters to know the people who receive any benefits from these programs that are still distributed there.<sup>75</sup> In column 7 of Table 4.3, I repeat the model from column 5, sub-setting to the three NPP constituencies in the rural sample. Respondents who voted for the NDC are not particularly likely to know beneficiaries of these programs; neither are Northern or Ewe respondents who have ethnic affiliations with the NDC.<sup>76</sup> By contrast, in the rural NDC strongholds (column 8), respondents who voted for the party are significantly more likely to know about program beneficiaries, consistent with these benefits being targeted as favoritism to the party's core supporters, similar to what is argued to occur in the urban areas (see above).<sup>77</sup>

Finally, the rural survey supports the argument of the NDC leader quoted above about the relatively greater importance of club goods distribution in underdeveloped rural areas. Where the costs of private goods distribution are too high, parties can instead build support through club goods that benefit entire villages, as described above. The rural respondents were significantly more likely to report the delivery of club goods than urban respondents: 42% of rural respondents named a club good in response to the open-ended questions about politicians' activities compared to 30% of urban respondents. As shown in Column 3 of Table 4.3, reports of club goods delivery were especially common in the least developed rural communities, in the inverse of the pattern for the job and loan programs. Simulating from column 3, I estimate that respondents in the least developed rural survey location were 36 percentage points (95% CI: 10.0, 57.9) more likely to report club goods delivery than in the most developed rural location. It is especially in these poor, remote rural communities where individual-level clientelism is most costly and club goods distribution becomes a more cost effective alternative. Taken together with the results for private

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<sup>75</sup>These anti-poverty programs are typically administered by district, with some minimum amount of program benefits allocated to each district. The ruling party thus has some jobs and loans to provide even in opposition constituencies, and cannot concentrate all funding on these programs in its own strongholds.

<sup>76</sup>32% percent of respondents supported the NDC in these constituencies and there were also many Northern respondents. But there were only 7 Ewes, which explains the large standard errors on the Ewe indicator in column 7.

<sup>77</sup>When repeating column 8 after removing the NDC vote variable, Ewe respondents (NDC co-ethnics) are also significantly more likely to know about program recipients (not shown). Being Ewe and being an NDC supporter is highly correlated.

goods in rural areas, this suggests that voting behavior in many rural villages will depend more on voters' expectations about where parties will distribute club goods than their expectations of who is more likely to benefit from private goods. I return to this point in Chapter 5.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter suggests that patterns of distributive politics in urban Ghana are affected by each of the major features of urban growth described in Chapter 1. Scarcity in access to basic services creates demand for particularistic goods in the electorate, including demands for club goods from many poor and middle class voters alike. This makes patronage-based appeals viable. Differences across neighborhoods in the wealth of voters affect where clientelism in the distribution of patronage resources is most effective. Differences in the political importance of chiefs and other traditional leaders create variation in how politicians build support among Ga voters versus other urban residents, as well as between urban and rural voters overall. And, finally, differences in the ethnic diversity of urban neighborhoods affect whether club goods can be targeted as patronage. Ultimately, the chapter describes variation in distributive outcomes across multiple dimensions: between strategies of clientelism and reputation building, between the use of private or club goods, and across different types of voters and neighborhoods.

If the types of benefits voters can receive from politicians are so varied within a single city, there should also be intra-urban variation in patterns of vote choice. And if the ways in which parties engage with voters differ between rural and urban areas, voting behavior should also differ between cities and rural areas overall. In the next chapter, I apply the argument about distributive politics developed here to an examination of voting behavior in Greater Accra. I show that voters have significantly different incentives to support each major party depending on where they live within the city and argue that voters' expectations about club and private goods are weighted differently in their voting calculations between urban and rural areas.

## 5 | Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Urban Areas

### 5.1 Introduction

Modernization theories predict that the political importance of ethnicity should diminish as societies urbanize and develop due to a series of individual-level social transformations (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960, Severino and Ray 2011). Urban voters are thought to develop cross-cutting social ties, placing less emphasis on traditional identities and social institutions like chieftaincy that bind them to their ethnic group. Wealthier and better educated voters, heavily concentrated in Africa's cities, are thought to be more policy-motivated, less likely to automatically support co-ethnics. Consistent with these hypotheses, recent studies suggest that ethnicity is less salient at an individual-level among urban Africans (Green 2014, Robinson 2014). Others find that there is less ethnic voting reported in national-level surveys in urban than rural areas (Conroy-Krutz 2009), and that class-based identities may be more politically important in cities than ethnicity (Resnick 2014).<sup>1</sup>

Changes in the social importance of ethnicity brought about by modernization should primarily affect the prevalence of ethnic voting if we assume an "expressive" theory of ethnic voting (Horowitz 1985; also see Ferree 2006), in which voters are thought to have innate preferences in favor of co-ethnic politicians. As social identities change and voters become better educated, the strength of innate preferences in favor of co-ethnic politicians are expected to diminish. But such a prediction is in contrast to the dominant theory in recent literature on ethnic voting in Africa. Instrumental theories of ethnic voting argue instead that ethnicity is not an innately relevant variable for voters, but a means to an end: voters support co-ethnics politicians or parties affiliated with their ethnic group if they expect better performance – access to state spending – from them (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). In line with this

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<sup>1</sup>But as described in Chapter 1, this reverses literature on mid-20th century urbanization, which argued that ethnic competition was instead exacerbated in cities (Epstein 1958, Melson 1971, Baker 1974, Wolpe 1974, Ekeh 1975, Gugler & Flanagan 1978).

view, I argue that urbanization in Africa does not affect ethnic voting directly through the individual-level transformations described by modernization theories, but instead indirectly through changes to patterns of distributive politics, which determine voters' expectations of the prospective benefits of electing ethnically-aligned politicians.<sup>2</sup>

But as the previous chapter demonstrates, patterns of distributive politics are not uniform within African cities. Chapter 1 describes how urbanization is creating heterogeneity in local neighborhood characteristics. In particular, while cities are now home to growing middle class and wealthy neighborhoods, urbanization has also meant the simultaneous rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010). Moreover, while rural-urban migration has made some urban neighborhoods incredibly diverse, ethnically segregated enclaves within cities also persist and continue to grow. Chapter 4 argues that these differences create incentives for parties to engage with urban voters in these areas in different ways. In turn, there is neighborhood-level variation in voters' incentives to support co-ethnics. As a result, where a voter lives within a city significantly affects how she votes.

Building directly from Chapter 4, I develop a theory about how the interaction of two neighborhood characteristics – local ethnic composition and wealth – influences urban voters' expectations about receiving the two types of goods commonly distributed where patronage politics is prevalent: club and private goods. The ability of politicians to reward ethnically homogeneous concentrations of co-ethnics with geographically excludable club goods – such as schools, roads, and water – is at the root of existing explanations for ethnic voting in rural areas in Africa (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006). But I predict that voters in much more diverse urban neighborhoods are less likely to expect that club goods will be targeted on the basis of ethnicity, lowering incentives to support co-ethnic parties. And in more homogeneous urban neighborhoods, voters face incentives to vote across ethnic lines when living as a local minority in an area where they can benefit from club goods delivered by a non-co-ethnic party (Ichino & Nathan 2013). But neighborhood wealth moderates these effects of neighborhood ethnic composition. In the poorest neighborhoods, dense concentrations of poverty allow politicians to extensively distribute private benefits to co-ethnics. In poor areas where private goods distribution is prevalent, voters have strong incentives to continue supporting their

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<sup>2</sup>Separate from changes in the salience of ethnic identity, wealthier voters could also have different policy preferences (Kitschelt 2000), changing the instrumental value of a co-ethnic. But I find that middle class urban voters are just as likely as the poor to demand local public (“club”) goods from the government (see Appendix), due to short-comings in service provision in urban areas. Because of these demands, relatively prosperous voters still can have incentives to support ethnically-aligned parties.

ethnically-aligned party, regardless of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood.

I examine voting in presidential elections in Greater Accra to study the contest with the greatest influence on distribution of state resources, and to hold candidate characteristics – such as ethnicity, policy programs, and economic performance – fixed, comparing voters facing the same exact choice across neighborhoods. I define ethnic voting as support for the party affiliated with each voter's ethnic group (see below).

I find that support for ethnically-aligned parties ranges from neighborhoods where ethnicity perfectly predicts vote choice to those where ethnicity and vote choice are uncorrelated. I find no evidence, however, the mechanisms expected by a modernization hypothesis explain this variation. Individual characteristics such as wealth or education do not predict ethnic voting, and there is no evidence that there is less ethnic voting among voters for whom ethnicity is less salient.

But neighborhood characteristics do predict differences in ethnic voting, similar to Ichino & Nathan (2013). Using enumeration area-level census data, I find that ethnic voting is less common among otherwise similar voters in two types of neighborhoods: diverse, middle class areas, where voters generally do not receive private goods and expect to receive similar amounts of club goods regardless of a party's ethnic profile; and middle class areas where voters live in the local ethnic minority and benefit from club goods targeted to that area by their non-co-ethnic party. But ethnic voting remains very prevalent in slums and in wealthier, segregated areas where voters are in the local majority. I also find suggestive evidence of similar patterns in polling station results. An original survey experiment measuring the hypothesized mechanism finds that voters' expectations of benefiting from each party vary across neighborhoods in line with the argument. I find little support for alternative explanations, such as endogenous residential sorting or socialization.

Although a nascent literature documents overall rural-urban differences in voting and ethnic politics in Africa (Conroy-Krutz 2009, Harding 2010, Koter 2013*b*, Resnick 2014), a full understanding of these differences is not possible without considering variation within cities. Existing studies average over or ignore the intra-urban variation documented here, extrapolating from patterns that may only hold in specific parts of a city to make claims about urban Africa in general. By considering this variation directly, I develop a more comprehensive explanation for how urban context influences voting. This extends existing theories of ethnic voting to show that differences between rural and urban voters can be accounted for by a common underlying model. More broadly, this suggests that to explain vote choice in the developing world, we must account for how local neighborhood contexts affect political behavior. A large literature examines the



influence of neighborhoods in the United States (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010, Enos 2014), but other than Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Kasara (2013) there have been few examinations of neighborhood effects on political behavior in Africa.

## 5.2 Ethnic Voting in African Democracies

There is often a strong, but imperfect, correlation between ethnicity and vote choice in Africa. But many accounts, implicitly or explicitly drawing from modernization theories (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960), expect less ethnic voting in urban areas, especially among the wealthier and better educated voters who are concentrated there (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2009). These accounts suggest that as voters move into urban areas and become wealthier and better educated, the social salience of ethnicity should decline and voters should lose their ties to traditional ethnic institutions (e.g., chieftaincy) (Severino & Ray 2011, Green 2014).<sup>3</sup> As these identities lose salience and voters gain social and economic independence from ethnic elites, voters should become less beholden to ethnicity at the ballot box. These expectations are often implicitly rooted in “expressive” theories of ethnic voting, in which voters are thought to support co-ethnics as an act of allegiance to their identity group (Horowitz 1985).

But expressive explanations for ethnic voting find little empirical support in recent literature, which instead supports an instrumental theory arguing that voters support co-ethnics if they expect better performance from them (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Carlson 2015a).<sup>4</sup> In this second theory, ethnicity has a conditional relationship with vote choice; a candidate or party’s ethnic profile serves as an informational cue about the benefits voters can expect after the election; voters only disproportionately support co-ethnics when they expect more benefits and access to state resources from them. Even if urban voters place less individual emphasis on ethnic identity in daily life (Robinson 2014), instrumental incentives to support co-ethnics can persist in cities if voters expect ethnic favoritism in the distribution of valuable state resources.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Early Africanist research in fact suggested the opposite: ethnicity *gained* salience among rural-urban migrants (e.g., Gugler and Flanagan 1978).

<sup>4</sup>Expressive explanations cannot account for links between ethnic voting and performance expectations in experimental research (Conroy-Krutz 2013, Carlson 2015a) or for variation in ethnic voting after changes in electoral institutions (Posner 2005).

<sup>5</sup>For example, Burbidge (2014) qualitatively documents how middle class voters in Kenya still vote along ethnic lines even as they place little emphasis on ethnicity in their daily lives.

These expectations grow from a long record in many countries of ethnic favoritism in distribution of state resources (Franck & Rainer 2012).<sup>6</sup> This includes the distribution of private goods, but especially the distribution of club (local public) goods (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006). When ethnic groups are spatially clustered, as they are in much of rural Africa, club goods – with benefits excludable outside, but not within, a given area – can be targeted to specific groups based on where they are built. This is often a more efficient means to favor ethnically-aligned areas than private goods distribution; if an area is homogeneous, parties can reach many voters at once with a club good and monitor their behavior through aggregate election results, avoiding the organizational and monitoring costs of individual-level patronage strategies (Ejdemyr et al. 2015).<sup>7</sup>

An instrumental theory predicts geographic variation in ethnic voting if there are differences in voters' expectations of benefits – private and club goods – in different places. Ichino & Nathan (2013) argues that when voters expect a party to target club goods to areas where more of its co-ethnics live, a voter's probability of benefitting from a non-co-ethnic party is increasing in the population of that party's ethnic groups in the surrounding area, regardless of a voter's own ethnicity. Consistent with this argument, Ichino & Nathan (2013) finds significant cross-ethnic voting when voters live as local minorities in rural areas of Ghana dominated by groups aligned with their non-co-ethnic party.<sup>8</sup> Similar variation in ethnic voting within urban areas should also occur if parties target different types of resources to different places.

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<sup>6</sup>Although Kramon & Posner (2013) finds that the empirical record of favoritism is mixed in many countries, many voters still believe there will be favoritism in resource distribution. For example, Posner (2005) shows that voters in Zambia believe that government co-ethnics are systematically favored even in cases when this is false; these voters' beliefs are entrenched by past experiences of favoritism. The survey experiment below shows empirically that voters in urban Ghana have strong expectations of ethnic favoritism.

<sup>7</sup>Some Africanist literature views club goods as “developmental goods” distinct from patronage (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). But this departs from the much larger literature theorizing club goods distribution among the set of non-programmatic, patronage-based strategies parties could employ (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Cammett and Issar 2010, Hicken 2011, Kramon and Posner 2013, Stokes et al. 2013, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015). Classifying club goods delivery as a possible patronage strategy does not imply that delivering these resources cannot also represent good performance. For example, clientelistic politicians perform well from the perspective of voters who benefit from goods they distribute. The logic of instrumental ethnic voting is that voters support politicians they expect to perform best for them – ethnicity is an indicator for who this is likely to be. In this model, performance and patronage expectations are not competing explanations for voting.

<sup>8</sup>Ichino & Nathan (2013) do not find this pattern in urban areas, but have a limited, non-representative sample of urban respondents and less detailed urban census data than in this study.

### 5.3 Expectations Across Urban Neighborhoods

Taking instrumental theories as a starting point, I develop a theory showing how differences in the characteristics of urban neighborhoods can affect the importance of ethnicity for vote choice. I begin with the simplifying assumption that voters support the party they expect to benefit from most after the election. In reality, voting behavior may also be affected by voters' assessments of a party's macro-economic performance, major policy proposals, and/or candidate (and valence) characteristics.<sup>9</sup> But while these variables may help explain aggregate shifts in election outcomes, they cannot explain systematic differences in vote choice between otherwise similar voters in nearby neighborhoods of the same city choosing among the same options in the same election because each of these features is held constant between these voters.<sup>10</sup> What is not constant across neighborhoods are the types of patronage goods that each party is likely to deliver after the election. Predicting vote choice then requires a theory of distributive politics – of what voters living in different neighborhoods can expect to receive. By generalizing from the argument in Chapter 4, I develop predictions about where within cities voters will expect to benefit the most from ethnically-aligned parties.

These predictions are most easily illustrated using a simplified example of an African city. Consider a hypothetical city with two ethnic groups – *A* and *B* – and six types of neighborhoods, as in Figure 5.1. There are neighborhoods made up mostly of each group, while others are more mixed. Within these neighborhoods (diverse, *A* dominated, *B* dominated), some are slums, while others are upper or middle class. Typical of most African cities, in poor neighborhoods, most residents are poor themselves, while upper and middle class neighborhoods have a mix of poor and wealthier residents.

Each group has an affiliated party – party *A* and party *B* – competing in an election, with all votes counting equally.<sup>11</sup> Assume that the parties do not offer ideologically-differentiated policies – similar to most African parties, including in Ghana (see Chapter 3) – but motivate voters through patronage and lo-

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<sup>9</sup>For example, Posner & Simon (2002), Bratton et al. (2011), and many others, find that African survey respondents' evaluations of the incumbent's economic performance predicts vote choice. There are reasons to be concerned, however, that performance evaluations on surveys are outcomes (not causes) of party support, rendering their correlation with vote choice uninformative (see below, and Carlson (2015*b*)).

<sup>10</sup>Aspects of government performance that have highly localized impacts usually pertain to the delivery of club goods (e.g., was a road built in this neighborhood?), and thus remain within the theory below. Partisanship for some voters may also be fixed. But if most voters' choices are fixed and not affected by current incentives, the neighborhood variation in vote choice predicted here should not exist.

<sup>11</sup>Voters cannot take an *A* victory for granted just because they live in a locally-*A* area.

<b>Expectations of a Group A Voter</b>			
	(i) Diverse	(ii) Group A Dominated	(iii) Group B Dominated
(1) Upper or Middle Class Neighborhood	Club: <i>Same</i> Private: <i>Nothing</i>  <b><i>Less ethnic voting</i></b>	Club: <i>More from Party A</i> Private: <i>Nothing</i>  <i>Ethnic voting for A</i>	Club: <i>More from Party B</i> Private: <i>Nothing</i>  <b><i>Less ethnic voting</i></b>
(2) Poor or Slum Neighborhood	Club: <i>Same</i> Private: <i>More from Party A</i>  <i>Ethnic voting for A</i>	Club: <i>More from Party A</i> Private: <i>More from Party A</i>  <i>Ethnic voting for A</i>	Club: <i>More from Party B</i> Private: <i>More from Party A</i>  <i>Ethnic voting for A</i>

Figure 5.1: Predictions in “ideal type” neighborhoods.

calized services – by providing private or club goods. After the election, the winning party gets a budget to allocate in each area; party leaders can vary its size across neighborhoods, but there is some non-negligible minimum to be spent at each place. For each neighborhood, party leaders choose how much (above that minimum) and what type of good(s) to deliver. All else equal, club goods will be more cost effective for parties than private goods. Club goods benefit many voters at once without incurring large organizational costs to the party. But a party must identify and monitor individual private goods recipients through long-term patronage relationships, requiring a dense local organization.<sup>12</sup>

Consistent with patterns of ethnic favoritism, and the argument in Chapter 4, both parties avoid giving benefits to voters they expect will not support them and use ethnicity as a heuristic for who is a likely supporter. The parties may target benefits to perceived swing neighborhoods, but they have little incentive to provide club goods where most residents are from the opposite party’s ethnic group.<sup>13</sup> And because vote buying transactions are not fully enforceable, they do not direct private goods to the opposite party’s group (Nichter 2008). The parties must also consider voter demands. Middle class and poor voters both

<sup>12</sup>Following the evidence in Chapter 4, private goods are not only one-shot payments immediately before elections, but the broader range of private goods – such as jobs, loans, and on-going assistance with expenses – delivered by machine parties as part of long-term patronage relationships. I assume that this latter group of benefits is more important for vote choice than small unconditional gifts just before elections.

<sup>13</sup>Chapter 4 argues that parties will target a mix of goods to core and swing areas. But the exact ratio of core versus swing targeting is not relevant for the predictions about vote choice here, as long as the parties play similar strategies. The only assumption necessary is that each party avoids targeting significant resources to core groups of the opposing party. This assumption is shared by all of the canonical swing and core voter models of distributive politics described in the previous chapter (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996).

demand club goods from politicians.<sup>14</sup> But demands for private goods are primarily from poor voters, for whom benefits that directly address pressing economic needs (unemployment, a child's tuition) can be more immediately valuable than services for the neighborhood.

Chapter 4 argues that the ethnic composition of neighborhoods influences where each party invests in club goods, while the wealth of neighborhoods affects distribution of private goods. In *A* dominated neighborhoods (column *ii*), party *A* will invest the most in club goods, as primarily *A* voters will benefit. The same holds for party *B* in *B* neighborhoods (column *iii*). Neither party promises many club goods in neighborhoods dominated by the other group. In diverse neighborhoods (column *i*), the parties cannot target club goods to a specific ethnic group because any benefits reach both groups. Even if some club goods are still distributed in diverse areas, there is no systematic reason why one party is more likely to favor diverse areas than the other.

Chapter 4 also demonstrates that in wealthier neighborhoods (row 1), relatively few voters demand private benefits or can be reached through social networks by clientelistic brokers (Koter 2013*b*, Luna 2014), and middle class voters may punish parties seen engaging in clientelism as corrupt (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). The poor voters who do live in these areas are often more transient, making it harder for the parties to build sustained patronage relationships with them over time. Ultimately, too few potential recipients live in these neighborhoods to justify the organizational cost of patronage networks needed for private goods distribution. In poor neighborhoods (row 2), by contrast, there are large concentrations of poor voters who highly value private benefits, often more than club goods. Through sheer population density and close social ties within slums, party agents can reach individual voters more directly and at lower cost than in wealthier neighborhoods or in rural villages.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>See Chapter 3. Following the argument in chapter 3, some urban voters will primarily demand universalistic policies. Vote choice for these voters likely does not depend on expectations about where particularistic goods will be delivered. But Chapter 3 shows that these voters are significantly less likely to turn out to vote in the first place. And to the extent that they do turnout, their presence in the electorate should *bias against* finding significant differences across neighborhoods in voting behavior among otherwise similar voters.

<sup>15</sup>A party's local organization is likely relatively weaker in poor urban neighborhoods where the other party's ethnic groups dominate (row 2, column *iii*) than in its own stronghold neighborhoods (row 2, column *ii*). But there are still incentives for the party to deliver private goods to the small number of co-ethnics who live in minority neighborhoods. Because all votes count equally everywhere in the election, a party still benefits from targeting some resources to co-ethnics in these neighborhoods to maintain their support rather than ignoring the areas completely and allowing co-ethnics who live there to vote for the other party. Moreover, because institutional rules insure that the winning party has some minimum budget to spend in each local area (see Chapter 4), the winning party will still have to spend some amount on voters in these neighborhoods, and this can be most valuably channeled as private goods to the party's co-ethnics who are in the area.

These differences in goods distribution inform a voter's beliefs about what she is likely to receive. In diverse neighborhoods, a Group *A* voter's expectation of benefitting from club goods will not depend on the ethnic profile of each party because she receives similar benefits regardless of which party wins (column *i*). In *A* neighborhoods (column *ii*), mainly party *A* will be expected to deliver club goods. But when she lives as a local minority in a *B* neighborhood (column *iii*), party *B* is more likely to deliver club goods, which still benefit the *A* voter.

An *A* voter's private goods expectations will depend on the wealth of her neighborhood. In upper or middle class neighborhoods (row 1), she expects little from either party, even if she is poor herself. But if the *A* voter is in a poor neighborhood (row 2), she can benefit from valuable private goods from party *A*. This is even the case in poor neighborhoods where the *A* voter is in the local minority (row 2, column *iii*). Even if party *A*'s organization is relatively weaker in these neighborhoods than in its strongholds, party *A* will gain control over distribution of valuable private benefits in the neighborhood if it wins the election (see above). As one of the few *A* residents in the area, an *A* voter in a poor *B* neighborhood may be one of the first in line to benefit from party *A*'s victory. As a result, an *A* voter may get relatively more private benefits from party *A* when living in a poor neighborhood with fewer other *A* voters than when surrounded by many other potential recipients of party *A*'s private goods.

Predictions for vote choice come from adding together each cell of Figure 5.1. Rather than ethnic voting being uncommon across the entire city, support for party *A* by an *A* voter will be relatively low in two types of neighborhoods: (a) in wealthier, diverse neighborhoods (row 1, column *i*), there is no difference in the club or private goods an *A* voter expects from either party, making her indifferent between parties; (b), in wealthier, *B* areas, the *A* voter receives few private benefits from either party, but club goods from party *B*, encouraging cross-ethnic voting for party *B*. But in the other four neighborhoods, the *A* voter still has incentives to support her co-ethnic party. Where there are many other *A* voters (column *ii*), the voter will expect more benefits from party *A* than *B*. In poor, diverse neighborhoods (row 2, column *i*), the voter expects private benefits from party *A*, pushing her to support party *A*. Finally, in poor, *B* neighborhoods (row 2, column *iii*), the *A* voter is likely poor herself (living in a poor neighborhood, as described above). To the extent that this means she values private goods that address immediate needs over club goods for her neighborhood, she has an incentive to still vote more for party *A*.

Compare this to predictions for rural areas in Ichino & Nathan (2013). A similar pattern holds in the

distribution of club goods, depending on the ethnic composition of each local area. But in comparison to urban slums, fewer rural voters are likely to receive private goods directly from each party. While there is non-conditional distribution of small gifts before elections, African parties typically lack the grassroots organizations in rural areas to engage in long-term patronage relationships with a large set of individual clients spread out over sparsely populated areas (van de Walle 2007). This is especially in the rural homelands of the opposite ethnic group – party *A* will often lack the networks to reach many individual *A* voters with private benefits in primarily-*B* villages. Instead, as argued in Chapter 4, while parties engage in clientelistic relationships in rural areas, this often is targeted as club goods to entire (relatively homogeneous) communities. Private goods that are distributed are often delivered indirectly through chiefs or other traditional elites, absent in almost all urban neighborhoods (Lindberg 2010, Koter 2013a). As a result, in rural areas, spatial variation in vote choice in this model predominately follows expectations about club goods. As Ichino & Nathan (2013) find for rural Ghana, a rural *A* voter will support party *A* in *A* areas, but has incentives to vote instead for party *B* instead when living in predominately *B* areas. The analysis below instead tests the predictions for urban areas.<sup>16</sup>

## 5.4 Data Sources

I combine data from the main voter survey analyzed in the previous chapters with the census data and polling station results from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. The main explanatory variables – neighborhood wealth and ethnic composition – are measured from the census data. As described in Chapter 2, I follow Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Reardon & O’Sullivan (2004), defining local neighborhood characteristics as weighted averages of census characteristics around each survey respondent, with information closer to the respondent weighted higher, and all data outside a given radius weighted as 0. This means that each neighborhood is measured relative to each respondent’s own GPS location. The main radius used is 500m around each respondent.

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<sup>16</sup>I do not attempt to replicate Ichino & Nathan (2013) and examine rural vote choice using the rural survey data analyzed in Chapter 4. Because the rural survey is based on a sample of only 5 districts, there did not end up being enough variation in the ethnic composition of the areas around respondents of each ethnic group to estimate the vote choice of *A* voters living in locally-*B* areas. For example, only 6 Akan respondents on the rural survey were interviewed in areas where the majority of the population is non-Akan. Only 7 Ewes were sampled in majority Akan areas. All of the Ga respondents were in a single district – Lower Manya Krobo – which is majority Ga. Afrobarometer surveys have more variation on these dimensions in rural areas, but this is the data already analyzed in Ichino & Nathan (2013).

I measure neighborhoods at a smaller scale than parliamentary constituencies for several reasons.<sup>17</sup> First, given the structure of Ghanaian local governments highlighted above, much of the opportunity for ethnic favoritism in the distribution of local public spending involves targeting by district and constituency-level leaders (all from the president's party) to local areas *within* constituencies and districts, not only among them. Second, many club goods (e.g., new drains and public toilets, paving residential streets) have benefits at a very localized scale within cities due to the high population density (over 90,000 per sq. km. in some areas). These goods reach areas much smaller than constituencies. Third, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate pockets of ethnic homogeneity at higher levels. An area comprised of two separate, segregated neighborhoods with different ethnic groups would appear as uniformly heterogeneous at higher aggregation. But as long as politicians can selectively target resources to only one of the two neighborhoods, which they can in Ghana, more localized measures are needed.

Neighborhood wealth is calculated as the first dimension in a factor analysis of census questions on assets, education, and employment.<sup>18</sup> Local diversity is measured as the Herfindahl fractionalization index for the weighted average of the ethnic group shares within the same radius. Population density is the population of the enumeration areas covered by each sampling cluster, divided by the area. At an individual level, wealth, education, and employment status are measured through the same indices used in the previous chapters. Importantly, because there are poor voters living amidst otherwise wealthy neighborhoods, there are sufficient numbers of poor respondents in wealthy neighborhoods to estimate relationships between neighborhood wealth and voting while controlling for individual wealth. The wealth and ethnic diversity of neighborhoods also are not strongly correlated, such that the six types in Figure 5.1 are present in the sample.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The average sampled constituency is 29.8 sq. km, larger than the 0.79 sq. km circles measuring neighborhoods.

<sup>18</sup>Variables that only measure service provision are excluded. The index includes: % with running water (privately provided by wealthier residents via tanker or borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a single-family home (excluding informal structures); % with a computer; % adults with more than a middle school education; and % adults employed in the formal or public sectors. The index is scaled in standard deviations from the city-wide mean of 0. In the survey sample, the variable ranges from -1.4 to 3, with a mean of -0.10.

<sup>19</sup>In areas with above average ethnic fractionalization, the wealth index ranges from -1.1 to 2.4. In areas with below average fractionalization, the range is -1.4 to 3.0.



## 5.5 Empirical Results

### 5.5.1 Vote Choice

The main outcome is whether a voter's ethnicity explains how she voted in the 2012 presidential election. Focusing on the presidential election allows me to hold candidate characteristics fixed while comparing voters facing the same choice in different places. The presidential election also has by far the most influence on the distribution of state resources. The president's party controls most state spending in Ghana through national ministries and through local governments via the appointment of District Chief Executives (mayors).<sup>20</sup> This means that the ruling party controls resources that can be targeted as favoritism to different areas *within each district*, even in opposition stronghold regions. In addition, the president's national ruling party places leaders of its constituency-level party organizations into positions in each district government from which they steer local spending and, sometimes, run clientelistic networks distributing private goods to local ruling party supporters.<sup>21</sup>

I define ethnic voting as support for the presidential candidate of the party affiliated with each respondent's ethnic group (if one exists), not only as a direct match between the ethnicity of candidate and voter.<sup>22</sup> As described in Chapter 2, the opposition NPP draws strong support from the Akan, particularly the Ashanti, Akyem, and Akuapem sub-groups. The ruling NDC draws support from the Ewe and many predominantly Muslim groups of northern Ghana, especially now that the NDC president is a Northerner.<sup>23</sup> The NDC

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<sup>20</sup>The president also appoints one third of each (otherwise elected) district assembly, solidifying the ruling party's control over every local government in the country.

<sup>21</sup>By contrast, parliamentary elections in Ghana are ill-suited for examining the theory. First, MPs have very little control over state spending, with access only to a small constituency development fund. Second, many parliamentary contests are intra-ethnic, with both candidates from the same locally dominant group. Third, the selection of parliamentary candidates is itself endogenous to neighborhood characteristics, complicating estimation of independent effects of neighborhood conditions on vote choice separate from differences in the candidates on the ballot in different places. In robustness tests in the Appendix, however, I consider whether features of each parliamentary contest may have carry-over effects on voting in the presidential election. The results below are unaffected.

<sup>22</sup>In African countries where no group is large enough to win on its own, many parties combine support from multiple groups, even as their presidential candidate is only from one at a time (e.g., Arriola 2012). But when over 90% of Ewe in rural districts of Ghana's Volta Region voted for non-Ewe NDC presidential candidates in the country's last four elections, or similar super-majorities of Kalenjin voted for a Luo and then a Kikuyu in Kenya's 2007 and 2013 elections, this is "ethnic voting." Ethnicity overwhelmingly explains these voters' choices, even though no Ewe or Kalenjin presidential candidates contested. A narrower definition that defines ethnic voting based only on a match between candidate and voter would ignore these voters, arbitrarily understating the importance of ethnicity. Nonetheless, I re-estimate the main results below for only co-ethnics of the two presidential candidates, not each party, and find substantively identical results (see Appendix).

<sup>23</sup>There are several dozen small Northern ethnic groups, not all of which are affiliated with the NDC (see Chapter 2 for more detailed

historically has also drawn most votes of the Ga. Thus, for Akan respondents, I code ethnic voting as support for the NPP candidate, while I code support for the NDC candidate as ethnic voting for Ewe, Ga, and Northern respondents.<sup>24</sup>

Respondents were asked to mark their vote choice in the 2012 presidential election on a confidential ballot, obscured from the enumerator, and to place it in a sealed box. This replicates a procedure from Carlson (2014, 2015a) that has been shown to mitigate post-election desirability bias and non-response bias in self-reported vote data.<sup>25</sup> Vote choice is only measured for respondents who reported turning out in the election. Seventy-six percent (76%) of respondents reported support for their ethnically affiliated party. But there is variation across locations: in 13 survey locations, over 85% of respondents reported support for their ethnically-affiliated party, indicating that ethnicity strongly predicts vote choice; but in 7 locations, the rate was below 60%, with little correlation between ethnicity and voting.

To explain this variation, the theory makes two central predictions: (a) that there will be less ethnic voting in more diverse areas, primarily when the area is wealthy (row 1, column *i* of Figure 5.1); and (b) that there will be cross-ethnic voting when voters are surrounded by a larger population from groups affiliated with a non-co-ethnic party, especially in wealthier neighborhoods (row 1, column *iii* of Figure 5.1).

To test the first prediction, I regress a binary indicator for support for each respondent's co-ethnic party on neighborhood- and individual-level predictors. The preferred specifications are multi-level logistic regressions, which partially pool intercepts by sampling location to account for clustering in the sample (Gelman & Hill 2007).<sup>26</sup> Models follow the form:

$$P(y_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 \text{Fractionalization}_i + \beta_2 \text{NeighWealth}_i + \beta_3 \text{Density}_j + \beta_4 \text{Fractionalization}_i * \text{NeighWealth}_i + \mathbf{X}_i \delta)$$

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discussion). But a shared Northern identity is politically relevant in southern Ghana, due to significant north-south cultural and religious differences and the clustering of many Northerners in the south into set-aside slums known as "Zongos."

<sup>24</sup>181 respondents reported that they are members of two groups. They are coded as members of the first group mentioned to the enumerator, and then indicators control for whether respondents are members of other ethnicities.

<sup>25</sup>Non-response was 4% and the survey responses closely match the real election results, suggesting it is unlikely that there was response bias: 53% reported voting for the NDC and 45% for the NPP, compared to 52% and 47% in the same constituencies in official results.

<sup>26</sup>Results are robust to instead clustering standard errors by location. Location fixed effects are not possible because there is not sufficient variation in the explanatory variables (neighborhood characteristics) within survey locations.

where  $i$  indexes respondents,  $j$  indexes sampling clusters, and  $k$  indexes constituencies.  $y_i$  is an indicator for voting for the ethnically-aligned party.  $Fractionalization_i$ ,  $NeighWealth_i$ , and  $Density_j$  are defined above. All specifications include parliamentary constituency fixed effects,  $\theta_{k[j]}$ , to identify localized variation while controlling for baseline differences in party organizations and local governments.<sup>27</sup>  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is a matrix of individual-level predictors: the assets and education/employment indices, age, gender, and whether the respondent is Muslim, indicator variables for each ethnic group, whether respondents or their immediate family are party members, and whether a respondent reported her ethnicity as the type of identity she feels “closest to,” to measure the individual salience of ethnicity. To control for endogenous sorting (see below), I also include indicators for whether a respondent found her current home through family or ethnic group ties and the number of years each respondent lived in the neighborhood.<sup>28 29</sup>

In Table A.12, I find no evidence consistent with the individual-level mechanisms of modernization theory. The wealth and education/employment indices do not predict ethnic voting; middle class and wealthy voters are just as likely as the poor to vote for ethnically-affiliated parties.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, the salience of ethnic identity at an individual level does not predict whether respondents vote for an ethnically-affiliated party, inconsistent with “expressive” theories of ethnic voting and predictions that changes in social identity should reduce ethnic voting.<sup>31</sup>

But after controlling for these individual-level characteristics, greater diversity in each voters’ neighborhood predicts lower support for co-ethnic parties in column 1 of Table A.12 ( $p = 0.08$ ), consistent with less ethnic voting in more diverse neighborhoods. A 1 standard deviation (10.7 percentage point) increase in fractionalization around each respondent is associated with a 27.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for a co-ethnic party (95% CI: -36.9, 8.8).<sup>32</sup>

In column 2 of Table A.12, I interact fractionalization and neighborhood wealth. Consistent with the

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<sup>27</sup>The agents distributing benefits differ by constituency, as do their budgets. It is also possible that features of each concurrent parliamentary race have spillover effects on the presidential election. I add additional controls for this possibility in the Appendix.

<sup>28</sup>Two additional indicators control for interview quality: whether enumerators made logistical errors (12% of interviews) or noted respondents were uncooperative (10%).

<sup>29</sup>Voters may also choose parties they believe will perform better economically, but the main results hold controlling for economic performance evaluations (see Appendix).

<sup>30</sup>I also show this using additional measures of education (see Appendix).

<sup>31</sup>Social identification is measured exactly as in Eifert et al. (2010), asking respondents to name which identity group they feel closest to (see Appendix).

<sup>32</sup>Predicted probabilities calculated following Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).

Table 5.1: Support for Co-Ethnic Party in the 2012 Presidential Election

	1	2	3	4
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-2.513 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)	-3.522* (1.528)		-3.506* (1.529)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.163 (0.170)	2.091 <sup>†</sup> (1.165)		2.066 <sup>†</sup> (1.164)
<i>Eth. Fract.* Neigh. Wealth</i>		-3.396 <sup>†</sup> (1.740)		-3.362 <sup>†</sup> (1.739)
<i>Pos. NDC Econ. Performance</i>				0.149 (0.262)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)		-0.011 (0.007)
<i>Assets/Wealth Index</i>	0.074 (0.107)	0.066 (0.108)	0.036 (0.101)	0.064 (0.108)
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	-0.083 (0.104)	-0.073 (0.105)	-0.092 (0.103)	-0.079 (0.105)
<i>Ethnic Identity "Closest"</i>	-0.083 (0.181)	-0.078 (0.181)	-0.095 (0.179)	-0.082 (0.181)
<i>Moved for Family / Ethnicity</i>	0.047 (0.205)	0.053 (0.206)	0.054 (0.205)	0.049 (0.206)
<i>Age</i>	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.137 (0.374)	0.141 (0.374)	0.020 (0.370)	0.126 (0.375)
<i>Male</i>	-0.110 (0.182)	-0.119 (0.182)	-0.084 (0.181)	-0.124 (0.183)
<i>Ewe</i>	0.439 <sup>†</sup> (0.266)	0.465 <sup>†</sup> (0.268)	0.403 (0.267)	0.452 <sup>†</sup> (0.269)
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.836* (0.388)	-0.859* (0.389)	-0.865* (0.386)	-0.860* (0.389)
<i>Ga</i>	-0.420 <sup>†</sup> (0.235)	-0.402 <sup>†</sup> (0.236)	-0.356 (0.232)	-0.406 <sup>†</sup> (0.236)
<i>Years in neighborhood</i>	0.005 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
<i>Party member</i>	0.226 (0.202)	0.242 (0.203)	0.223 (0.201)	0.241 (0.203)
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	797	797	797	797

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Logistic regressions partially pooled by sampling location. The outcome is 2012 vote choice for each respondent's co-ethnic party; those who did not vote in 2012 or who do not have a co-ethnic party are dropped from this analysis. Akan is the omitted, baseline ethnicity category. Note that the minimum value of ethnic fractionalization in the data is 0.38, not 0.

difference between diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods being greater in wealthier areas, I find that ethnic voting is less common at high levels of diversity in wealthier neighborhoods ( $p = 0.051$ ). Figure 5.2 shows

significantly less ethnic voting after a 1 standard deviation increase in diversity around each respondent in wealthier neighborhoods, but no difference in poorer neighborhoods. The effect of neighborhood wealth is also signed as predicted. There is not a significant difference in ethnic voting from a 1 standard deviation increase in wealth in the most homogeneous neighborhoods, but a predicted 7.7 percentage point decrease in ethnic voting ( $p = 0.051$ , 95% CI: -16.3, 1.0) after similarly increasing wealth in the most diverse neighborhoods.<sup>33</sup>




Figure 5.2: First differences in the probability of voting for co-ethnic party after a 1 standard deviation increase in fractionalization, by neighborhood wealth, with 95% confidence intervals.

The interaction between neighborhood diversity and wealth in Figure 5.2 persists after controlling for other variables expected to affect voting behavior. In column 4, I repeat the model from column 2 while adding an indicator for whether each respondent evaluates the incumbent NDC government’s economic performance positively. As expected by Bratton et al. (2011), I show in the Appendix that macro-economic performance evaluations are positively correlated with voting for the incumbent NDC. But column 4 of Table A.12 shows that controlling for these performance evaluations does not alter the relationship between

<sup>33</sup>The theory argues that the reason for this interaction is the presence of private goods delivery in poor, but not wealthy areas. Consistent with this argument, I show in Chapter 4 that respondents are significantly more likely to report distribution of private goods in poorer neighborhoods, consistent with the theory.

neighborhood characteristics and support for co-ethnic parties depicted.

For the second main prediction of the theory, I find less ethnic voting in wealthier neighborhoods where respondents are more likely to benefit from club goods from their non-co-ethnic party. I change the outcome variable to a binary indicator for NDC vote and replace the fractionalization variable with the share of the population from each major ethnic group around each respondent. While there are not clear differences in the full sample, this changes once Ga respondents are removed. As described in Section 4, the minority Ga occupy a unique position in Greater Accra. As indigenes, Gas have greater access to patronage benefits than other residents regardless of where they live, particularly from the NDC. Clientelism is targeted to the Ga through chiefs and family heads, who are more powerful than for other groups in Greater Accra, providing networks that the NDC uses to distribute goods. Chiefs also use land ownership to lobby for club goods in Ga neighborhoods and Gas are heavily represented in local governments, as well as in the local leadership of the NDC. This allows for higher rates of both club and private goods distribution by the NDC to Ga communities relative to other voters.<sup>34</sup> If voting is influenced by differences in expectations of benefits between the parties, Gas are least likely to be sensitive to the composition of other groups around them.

Once Ga respondents are removed, I find evidence of cross-ethnic voting in neighborhoods dominated by other groups. Figure 5.3 shows that a 1 standard deviation (15 percentage point) increase in the Akan population around each respondent predicts lower NDC support (greater NPP support), particularly at higher levels of neighborhood wealth – even among respondents affiliated with the NDC. This is consistent with all respondents voting more for the NPP where only the NPP likely will deliver club goods. Similarly, a higher Ewe and Northern population – or Northern population alone – both predict more NDC support, especially at higher neighborhood wealth.<sup>35</sup> In the bottom-right panel of Figure 5.3, however, I find no similar relationship between NDC vote and the Ga population in each area (see Appendix). I report results for Ga respondents in the Appendix.

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<sup>34</sup>I find that whether Ga respondents have close ties to traditional chiefs is a strong predictor of vote choice for the NDC (see Appendix). But ties to traditional leaders do not predict vote choice for all other respondents (see Appendix). Chiefs for non-indigenous groups are not active within Accra; these groups lack the local organization of the Ga.

<sup>35</sup>Because the percentage of Ewes in all neighborhoods in the survey is very low, I use the combined percentage from the Ewe and Northern groups as a measure for non-indigenous NDC groups in each area.




Figure 5.3: First differences in probability of voting for NDC after a 1 standard deviation increase in neighborhood population share of each of the listed groups, with 95% confidence intervals. Corresponding table is in the Appendix.

### 5.5.2 The Mechanism: Favoritism Expectations

The proposed mechanism for these patterns is voters' expectations about which party is more likely to benefit them in each area. I measure these expectations using a survey experiment similar to an "endorsement experiment" (Bullock et al. 2011). Each respondent was read a prompt about a hypothetical activity to be conducted by the government and asked if they expected that they (or their families) would benefit. The first treatment cued whether the activity would be done by the NDC or an NPP government, had they won in 2012. The second treatment was the project – one of three examples each of either a private or a club

good.<sup>36</sup> Collapsing across examples, this makes 4 conditions (NDC v. NPP, club v. private goods).<sup>37</sup> The treatment effect of interest is the difference in the proportion of respondents expecting to benefit from their co-ethnic party versus their non-co-ethnic party for each goods type.<sup>38</sup> This is the causal effect on anticipated benefits from switching between a co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic government. This can also be re-labeled as the difference in expectations between the NDC and NPP for all respondents. Each treatment effect thus measures the *relative difference* in expectations between parties, not the overall level of goods expected.

Consistent with instrumental theories, respondents have clear overall expectations of favoritism from their co-ethnic party relative to their non-co-ethnic party. I estimate the co-ethnic party treatment effect in multi-level logistic regression models with the same predictors as above, where the outcome is expecting to benefit from the good in the prompt (see Appendix). Overall, respondents are 13.7 percentage points (95% CI: 7.8, 19.4) more likely to expect to benefit from their co-ethnic than non-co-ethnic party.<sup>39</sup>

More importantly, expecting to benefit from a co-ethnic party in the experiment is strongly correlated with actual ethnic voting. Among those receiving the co-ethnic party treatment ( $T = 1$ ), respondents were 20.6 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 12.6, 28.0) to vote for that party when answering that they expected to benefit from the example good. Sub-setting instead to the reverse condition ( $T = 0$ ), I similarly find that respondents are 20.7 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 11.5, 31.0) to report cross-ethnic voting for the non-co-ethnic party when expecting that it would benefit them instead.

Not only are expectations in the experiment correlated with ethnic voting, but the treatment effects vary across neighborhoods in patterns consistent with the theory and the results for vote choice. I discuss the results for the experimental questions about club goods and private goods separately. For club goods, I find

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<sup>36</sup>Multiple examples were used to average over idiosyncratic features of any specific good. They are: loans, job training, or financial assistance for private goods; school construction, water pipes, or drains and public toilets for club goods. All six are among the most common goods respondents reported politicians delivering in their areas in open-response questions.

<sup>37</sup>To address the risk that respondents would answer more favorably about preferred parties simply as an expression of partisanship (Carlson 2015b), prompts began with discussion of scarcity to decouple answers about the specific example from judgments of a party overall. Respondents were willing to admit they would not receive goods from a favored party: 50% of NDC voters and 52% of NPP voters said they would *not* benefit from the good from their party. Example wording: “The national government has limited resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t do it everywhere. They have to do it in some places first before going to other places. If the NDC government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that neighborhoods like this would get it or would they do it more in other places? I’m asking for your personal opinion.” See the Appendix for full wording.

<sup>38</sup> $T = 1$  for Akans asked about the NPP and Ewes, Northerners, and Gas asked about the NDC. Balance statistics are in the Appendix.

<sup>39</sup>Favoritism expectations are also positive and significant for the club and private goods separately.



that the co-ethnic party treatment effect for club goods is smaller at higher levels of neighborhood diversity. Panel (a) of Figure 5.4 shows the expected difference in club goods from a co-ethnic versus non-co-ethnic party declines as local diversity increases, consistent with voters expecting no difference in the club goods they will get from either party in diverse neighborhoods (Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.4: First differences for the co-ethnic party treatment effect for questions about: (a) club goods expectations, by ethnic fractionalization; and (b) private goods expectations, by percentage of population in the local neighborhood from ethnic groups affiliated with the respondent’s co-ethnic party. Both panels include 95% confidence intervals. See Appendix for table.

Also as in Figure 5.1, respondents are more likely to expect club goods from the party not affiliated with their ethnic group when surrounded by more co-ethnics of that party.<sup>40</sup> Restricting to non-Gas for comparability to Figure 5.3, I reclassify the treatment effect as the difference between the NDC and NPP cues for club goods and interact an indicator for the NDC treatment with the population share of each ethnic group in the area. I estimate these models for all neighborhoods, as well as after splitting the sample by the mean value of the neighborhood wealth index (-0.1), to test the double interaction between neighborhood composition, wealth, and the NDC treatment (see Appendix). Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of the Akan percentage in areas with above average wealth results in a predicted 26.4 point increase in expected favoritism

<sup>40</sup>This only holds in wealthier areas, but this is where club goods expectations are most important for vote choice under the theory.

for club goods from the Akan-affiliated NPP over the NDC ( $p = 0.08$ , 90% CI: -49.8, -2.2), regardless of each respondent's own ethnicity. Similarly, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of Northern population in neighborhoods with above average wealth results in a 31 percentage point shift in expectations of favoritism for club goods towards the Northern-affiliated NDC (95% CI: 2.8, 62.5).<sup>41</sup> Also mirroring Figure 5.3, expectations about club goods do not vary across the share of Gas in the neighborhood.<sup>42</sup>

Results of the survey experiment for private goods are also consistent with the theory. This is shown in two ways. First, I find that respondents' expectations about private goods in the survey experiment only correlate with their support for ethnically-affiliated parties in poorer neighborhoods where respondents report that private goods distribution actually happens (see Appendix). This is consistent with private goods expectations primarily influencing ethnic voting in poor neighborhoods, as predicted in Figure 5.1, but not in wealthier neighborhoods, where these goods are rarely distributed (as shown in Chapter 4).<sup>43</sup>

Second, in the theory above I argue that voters may be particularly likely to benefit from private goods distribution from their ethnically-affiliated party when they live in a poor neighborhood in which they are in the local ethnic minority. As one of the few co-ethnics of the government living in these neighborhoods, minority group voters may be first in line in these areas to benefit from private goods that their co-ethnic party gains control over if it wins the election. Consistent with this argument, in Panel (b) of Figure 5.4 I interact the co-ethnic party treatment in the experiment with the percentage of residents in the respondent's neighborhood from ethnic groups affiliated with the respondent's co-ethnic party. I show that expectations of ethnic favoritism in the distribution of private goods are largest in neighborhoods where respondents are in the local minority. This means, for example, that Akan voters particularly expect to benefit from private goods from the NPP instead of the NDC when living in poor neighborhoods with few other Akans. As discussed above, this can explain why there is still significant ethnic voting in poor neighborhoods even when voters are in the local ethnic minority.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>The combined Ewe and Northern percentage variable does not significantly predict differences in the NDC treatment effect, however, although the interaction is still signed in the expected direction.

<sup>42</sup>Expectations for Ga respondents alone also match the results for vote choice, consistent with the unique position of Gas (see Appendix).

<sup>43</sup>In wealthier neighborhoods, the survey experiment asks a question about who respondents think would benefit from hypothetical private goods distribution that rarely occurs in practice.

<sup>44</sup>Figure 5.1 suggests that voters should have expectations of ethnic favoritism in private goods distribution in poor neighborhoods at all levels of ethnic fractionalization (all columns of Figure 5.1). Consistent with this prediction, I also find that expectations of favoritism about private goods in the survey experiment are constant across levels of neighborhood fractionalization.

### 5.5.3 Polling Station Results

Official polling station returns similarly suggest that there is less ethnic voting in more diverse neighborhoods. This is even though analysis of polling station results is constrained by data limitations and rests on ecological inferences that less accurately capture individual behavior than survey data. Voters in urban Greater Accra cast ballots at 2090 and 3654 polling stations in the 2008 and 2012 elections, respectively. Because there is no official map of locations, research assistants physically located a random sample of 37.8% of polling stations for 2008 and 37.3% for 2012. In addition, because of missing data, it is only possible to analyze voting at 19 constituencies in 2008 and 17 constituencies in 2012.<sup>45</sup> I am thus only able to analyze the relationship between neighborhoods and voting at 587 and 650 polling stations in 2008 and 2012, respectively.<sup>46</sup>

To approximate catchment areas for each station, I calculate the weighted population share from each ethnic group in the 500m radius around it. I then measure characteristics of the broader neighborhood around those voters as the same characteristics in a 2km radius. With NDC presidential vote share as the outcome in a series of OLS regressions, I examine how the correlation between a station's results and the composition of its electorate (the smaller radius) varies with ethnic diversity in the area around the polling station (the larger radius).<sup>47</sup> I combine the 2008 and 2012 results, including constituency-year fixed effects.

Consistent with an overall pattern of ethnic voting, I find that the Akan proportion of the population at each polling station predicts greater NPP vote share and the Ewe, Ga, and Northern proportions predict greater NDC vote share (see Appendix for table). And consistent with less ethnic voting in more diverse areas, I then find that the correlation between the Akan population at the polling station and NDC vote share significantly weakens in the most diverse areas. Similarly, I find a significantly weaker correlation between the Northern population and NDC vote share in more diverse areas (see Appendix). I also show that the

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<sup>45</sup>While all 2008 election results are available, results for 7 of the 28 urban constituencies are missing in official 2012 polling station results. In addition, digitized boundaries for census enumeration areas in 4 other constituencies in 2012 (3 constituencies in 2008) have not been produced by the Ghana Statistical Service.

<sup>46</sup>These are at 492 and 342 unique locations for 2008 and 2012. I aggregate to a single observation per location. Results in this subset are similar to the full results (see Appendix).

<sup>47</sup>I do not test the second prediction of cross-ethnic voting for the party affiliated with the largest nearby group. There is significant imprecision defining catchment areas for urban polling stations. Without a catchment area map (none exists), it is unclear whether any correlation between vote share and the population of an ethnic group around the station (larger radius), controlling for that group's population at the station (smaller radius), is evidence of a neighborhood effect of living near more people from that group or instead evidence that some of the people slightly outside the smaller radius also vote at the polling station.

correlation between Ga population percentage and NDC vote share reduces at higher levels of diversity (although  $p = .16$  on this last interaction, see Appendix).<sup>48</sup>

## 5.6 Alternative Explanations

Because neighborhoods are not randomly assigned, the selection, or sorting, process of voters into neighborhoods may confound any correlation between neighborhoods and vote choice. And even if these correlations are real, a different mechanism, such as cross-ethnic socialization, may be operating. I find little support for either alternative, however. Importantly, each of these alternative explanations – sorting and contact – likely operates as much in poor areas of the city as in middle or upper class areas.<sup>49</sup> This is inconsistent with the interaction terms above between neighborhood ethnic composition and wealth; if the correlation between ethnic context and voting was driven by sorting or social contact, the correlation should be at least as strong in poor as in wealthier areas.

### 5.6.1 Endogenous Sorting

Two different types of sorting could confound the results. First, voters could have explicitly selected into neighborhoods on the basis of partisanship, choosing locations in a way that creates a spurious correlation between neighborhoods and voting. Second, voters may have implicitly sorted if their ability to choose locations was constrained by individual characteristics, such as ties to their ethnic groups, which also affect vote choice.

In the first type of sorting, Akans who support the NDC could be more likely to move to non-Akan neighborhoods than Akans who support the NPP. Respondents were asked open-ended questions about how they came to live in their current homes. But zero respondents listed partisanship as a motivation for choosing their residential location.<sup>50</sup> Greater Accra suffers from a severe housing shortage (see Chapter 2),

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<sup>48</sup>In a second series of models, I test the double interaction between ethnic composition, neighborhood wealth, and ethnic diversity, to see if there evidence of less ethnic voting in less diverse areas primarily when they are wealthy, as predicted above. The coefficients on the double interaction are not significant for any of the four ethnic groups, although the interaction terms for the Akan, Ewe, and Northern percentages are signed in the predicted directions.

<sup>49</sup>There is little reason respondents would sort based on partisanship in wealthy neighborhoods but not also in poor neighborhoods. And there is likely more direct interaction among neighbors in dense slums than wealthy neighborhoods with private, single family homes.

<sup>50</sup>10.8% of survey respondents listed access to club goods and public services among their reasons for choosing a neighborhood.

with high rents relative to income, and real estate markets are informal, with high transaction and search costs to re-location (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012, Arku et al. 2012). Residents face a limited menu of neighborhood options, constraining the extent to which they can explicitly sort based on non-economic factors like partisanship.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, if this type of sorting is a confounder, there should be a correlation between having moved (and thus actively chosen a neighborhood) and vote choice. But re-estimating Table A.12 including an indicator for whether a respondent moved shows no correlation between moving and ethnic voting (see Appendix).

But some respondents are better able to sort than others. As in Hopkins & Williamson (2012), I identify respondents most likely to have been able to sort on non-price factors if they had wanted. Respondents were asked if they had considered living in other neighborhoods when searching for a home, or only considered one community. Overall, 20.3% overall reported searching in multiple neighborhoods, which indicates having chosen a neighborhood among alternatives. But there are no differences in the results when controlling for this and explicitly choosing neighborhoods is not correlated with ethnic voting (see Appendix). Wealth is also a key determinant of the ability to explicitly chose neighborhoods. All analyses above already control for measures of wealth, employment, and education. I also drop the top 25% of the sample on the wealth or education/employment indices, removing those likely to have had the widest range of neighborhood choices. Results remain the same (see Appendix).

That many residents are constrained, however, raises concern over the second type of sorting. By far the most common means respondents reported finding housing was through family members or co-ethnics; 75% of respondents came to their current locations to join family or people from their home town or ethnic group. This would account for the results if voters with closer ties to their ethnic group, or for whom ethnic identity is more salient, are both more likely to find housing where more family and co-ethnics live, and also more likely to vote for their ethnically-aligned party. But respondents who found their homes through these ties are not actually more likely to live in less diverse areas, inconsistent with this being a confounder. All models already control for whether respondents moved for these reasons and this does not predict voting

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But the main results hold when either controlling for this or dropping these respondents entirely (see Appendix).

<sup>51</sup>Ghanaian landlords typically require two years rent in advance and tenants have little recourse to reclaim it upon moving, further constraining sorting (Arku et al. 2012). Even in the United States, where residential mobility is substantially easier, practical concerns over neighborhood quality, commuting, and housing costs have been shown to trump preferences for living near co-partisans (Nall & Mummolo 2013). Abrams & Fiorina (2012) also shows that there is not strong evidence of large-scale partisan residential sorting in the US.

(Table A.12). In addition, all results already control for the individual salience of ethnicity (Eifert et al. 2010) and it also does not predict voting behavior (Table A.12).

The results may also be due to ties to rural areas.<sup>52</sup> Earlier literature attributes the politicization of ethnicity in urban areas to a struggle among rural-urban migrants to capture wealth and target it back to rural homelands (Ekeh 1975, Gugler & Flanagan 1978, Bates 1983). This would explain the results if respondents in neighborhoods with larger populations from their own ethnic groups are more likely to have these rural ties, and vote for co-ethnic parties because of them. I control for ties to rural areas in three ways. First, results in Table A.12 are robust to controlling for whether respondents regularly visit home regions outside Accra.<sup>53</sup> Respondents were also asked if they prefer that the government focus more resources on the community where they live now or the community “they hail from.” Controlling for whether respondents prefer that state resources be targeted outside Greater Accra does not change the findings and is not correlated with ethnic voting. I also control for the percent of each respondent’s life lived in Greater Accra, as a measure of recency of rural-urban migration, and find no differences.

## 5.6.2 Socialization and Contact

A different mechanism could also explain the results. Voters in more diverse neighborhoods will have more socialization with other ethnic groups. This could explain the results if these voters develop more positive views about other groups and become more likely to vote for parties affiliated with them.<sup>54</sup> The most direct form of cross-ethnic contact is when voters have family members or share their homes with people from other ethnic groups. The survey recorded the ethnicity of the other people in each respondent’s household; 24.5% of respondents live with family or other household members from a group aligned with their non-co-ethnic party. Re-estimating Figures 5.2 and 5.3 controlling for this returns substantively identical results, however, and this does not predict vote choice (see Appendix). Among respondents with the most contact with other ethnic groups, the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting is unchanged.

In addition, a socialization mechanism would explain the results if the neighborhood variables used here are proxies for voters’ social ties. But these variables are likely poor measures of social networks. All

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<sup>52</sup>The majority (55%) of respondents in the survey were born in Greater Accra and are not migrants.

<sup>53</sup>This is also robust to controlling for remittances sent outside Greater Accra. Neither variable predicts vote choice.

<sup>54</sup>Kasara (2013) shows how inter-ethnic contact affects trust in other groups in Kenya. Ichino & Nathan (2013) finds no correlation between these same attitudes and vote choice in Ghana, however.

urban residents likely have regular interactions with people from other groups, regardless of the specific composition of the area within 500 meters of their homes. This is especially the case for the 36% of respondents who commute to a different neighborhood. For those spending much of their time away from home, a variable measuring the ethnic composition of the area directly around their home is least likely to accurately measure their social network. If the results are only due to social ties, correlations between neighborhood characteristics and voting should be significantly weaker for these respondents. I repeat the analysis interacting an indicator variable for those respondents who commute to work elsewhere with the neighborhood characteristics variables (see Appendix). I find no significant interactions – among those who do commute, correlations between neighborhood characteristics and voting behavior are the same as for those who do not, suggesting that differences in social ties are unlikely to explain the results.

## **5.7 Conclusion**

Modernization accounts predict that African democracies will transition away from ethnic competition as they continue to urbanize. But rather than uniformly less ethnic voting in urban areas, I find significant within-urban variation in ethnic voting. This is not explained by the mechanisms expected by modernization theories: differences in voters' wealth, education, or social identification. Instead, this variation is due to differences in voters' instrumental expectations of the resources they will receive in different places within the same city. Ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods areas is strengthened by patronage distribution that breeds on shortcomings in service provision that characterize many African cities.

While I can only examine a single city, focusing on Greater Accra allows me to study the relationship between highly localized neighborhood characteristics and voting using census data at a level of detail not available for most other African cities. As highlighted in the discussion of external validity in Chapter 1, I expect similar results to hold elsewhere as long as three underlying assumptions hold. First, there is variation in neighborhood diversity and wealth within cities. Second, ethnicity is politicized in the party system and there is ethnic targeting of state resources, as in many African counties. And third, ethnic cleavages are not so ossified by violence or inequality (e.g., as along racial lines in South Africa) that it is implausible to benefit from club goods targeted to a nearby group.

Ultimately, these results suggest that rather than consistently reducing ethnic political competition, urban

growth may be pulling ethnic politics in two directions at once. Even as urbanization creates more diverse, middle and upper class neighborhoods, where I find the connection between ethnicity and vote choice is fraying, urbanization also means the rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010), where incentives for ethnic voting are being reinforced. Ethnic voting also remains common in ethnically segregated neighborhoods, even when they are wealthy. We cannot point to the wealthy, diverse neighborhoods alone and claim that modernization theory's predictions are being borne out, while ignoring the remainder of these cities. As urban slums grow and ethnic segregation persists, political dynamics in the neighborhoods with significant ethnic voting are just as much outcomes of urbanization as in the neighborhoods without it. Accounts of the political effects of urbanization must recognize that these realities can co-exist next to each other in the same city at the same time.



## 6 | Capture and its Consequences in Local Governments

### 6.1 Introduction

The previous three chapters have focused on national-level electoral competition in urban areas, examining the distributive decisions of the major parties alongside turnout and voting behavior in presidential elections. But many of the same patterns found in Chapters 3-5 are apparent in local government elections in Greater Accra as well, with neighborhood-level variation in political participation, patronage distribution to politicians' co-ethnics, and ethnic voting. These outcomes each also have significant effects on the quality of democratic accountability in the city's municipal governments.

Chapter 3 finds that voters in the urban middle class who do not want particularistic goods from politicians that can be targeted as patronage are less likely to turn out to vote or to participate in other forms of political life. The effects of low participation by policy-motivated and middle class voters may be most observable in elections for urban municipal governments. Successful candidates need only cater to the particularistic needs of narrow groups of poor voters to win local elections. Candidates from ethnic groups that have more at stake in winning local power and can draw on pre-existing social networks to mobilize support can dominate municipal elections, even if they only comprise a minority of the population. These groups can then steer a disproportionate share of local government resources to themselves, resulting in widespread dissatisfaction with local government performance – among poor, middle class, and wealthy voters alike.

Local elections in Ghana are held separately from presidential and parliamentary elections, with voters selecting representatives from single member wards to serve on "district assemblies," equivalent to city councils. These wards, called "Electoral Areas" (ELAs), have an average of 14,200 residents in the urban districts of Greater Accra. ELAs usually cover several neighborhoods of the city. Assembly members become official leaders for these communities and can provide particularistic goods to constituents, often

targeted in practice as political patronage. Voters who instead prefer universalistic public policies, especially those who can privately provide basic public services to themselves, are unlikely to see these local assembly members as useful sources of support and are less likely to vote in local elections.

I examine the determinants and effects of participation in local elections by combining results from the 2010 local government elections and survey data on the performance of assembly members and the distribution of several local public goods in Greater Accra. I find that turnout in assembly elections is 50% lower in urban than rural areas of Ghana, and is especially low in urban neighborhoods where more middle and upper class residents live. This is consistent with lower turnout in areas where fewer voters want the particularistic benefits that local politicians can provide. But turnout in local elections is higher in urban strongholds of the ruling party, where voters can expect more patronage benefits from municipal governments. And while they are partially empowered by the appointment decisions of the national government, I show that low turnout in local elections helps the Ga ethnic group control municipal governments in Greater Accra; this minority group can better mobilize supporters both by drawing on pre-existing networks that other ethnic groups in the city lack and by playing on a sense of threat about the group's diminishing position within the city. Ga candidates are significantly more likely to win assembly seats in wards with lower turnout, allowing an ethnic group with one quarter of the metropolitan area's population to hold half of local government seats.

Overrepresentation of this ethnic minority reduces approval of local government performance. Ga residents are significantly more likely to see their local assembly member as helpful than other residents. But in general, the city's residents disapprove of the performance of Ga assembly members compared to local representatives of other ethnicities. I find that this is especially the case when survey respondents live in ethnically segregated wards where assembly members can target resources to small geographic areas where Gas are concentrated while ignoring surrounding communities.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, when survey respondents live in wards with high turnout, they are substantially more likely to have positive experiences with their assembly members, consistent with these representatives facing greater pressure to serve their constituents and deliver services where more voters participate in local elections. Finally, data on the distribution of new schools, roads, and streetlights within Greater Accra suggests that Ga overrepresentation in district governments leads to favoritism to Ga neighborhoods in the distribution of some locally controlled club goods,

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<sup>1</sup>This is consistent with recent research suggesting that local public goods in Africa are particularly likely to be targeted to areas where a politician's co-ethnics are spatially segregated from other groups (Ejdemyr et al. 2015).

while other goods are instead targeted to ruling party strongholds in the city.

This chapter provides further evidence for the relationship between class differences in political participation and the persistence of patronage-based politics discussed in Chapter 3; despite a large middle class in Greater Accra, I show that municipal politics remains centered on the targeted distribution of particularistic goods, in contrast to evidence from Latin American cities suggesting that local governments will forego clientelism in municipalities with relatively large middle class populations (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Luna 2014).

But these findings also have broader implications for understanding the effects of decentralization in Africa. District governments in Greater Accra were created through a decentralization process in the late 1980s similar to the widespread decentralization reforms seen elsewhere in Africa and the developing world in recent decades (Bardhan 2002, Grossman & Lewis 2014).<sup>2</sup> While proponents view decentralization as a means to improve local accountability by “bringing government closer to the people,” the capture of local governments by local elites, who siphon off resources either as private rents or as selective benefits for a subset of residents, has been a persistent problem stymying decentralization reforms (Olowu & Wunsch 2004, Reinikka & Svensson 2004, Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006). Along these lines, national governments are believed to create new local government units, like those in Greater Accra, as a form of patronage to the local majority ethnic groups that national leaders expect will be able to capture and control local governments (Green 2010, Hassan 2014). But I suggest that because of low turnout, local governments can be dominated even by local minority groups. Moreover, I show that capture by narrow ethnic interests occurs even in the most cosmopolitan urban areas and is not exclusively a phenomenon of the rural countryside in Africa (Boone 2003*a*, 2003*b*). This occurs where economic development and the growth of the middle class has been the strongest and the overall social power of traditional elites is lowest, not only in rural communities dominated by a traditional elite (e.g., Acemoglu et al 2013).

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<sup>2</sup>Decentralization reforms in other African countries have sometimes devolved greater powers to local governments than in Ghana, however (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Ghanaian districts are still headed by national government appointees and depend on the national government for much of their budget (Section 3 below).

## 6.2 Turnout, Capture, and Service Delivery

Much of the variation in turnout in these local elections, both across and within districts, can be explained with a simple assumption: those who have the most to gain (or lose) from the selection of municipal level officials will turn out to vote and those who have less at stake will not. Past research on Ghana has attributed low turnout and apathy in local elections to voters' beliefs that under-funded district governments will not be able to deliver the resources that voters want (Ayee 1996, Crook 1999, Wunsch 2001). But the extent to which voters stand to gain from the local government is not uniform within administrative districts.

Voters who do not want the particularistic goods that district officials can actually provide, or do not believe that they will ever get what they want from these officials, have weaker incentives to turn out than poorer voters who have more immediate needs for basic services. Local elected officials are often explicitly constrained to only being able to provide basic constituent services to voters; as described below, district-level governments in Ghana, and much of Africa overall, cannot create their own legislation or initiate major public policies without action from the national government (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Local-level elected officials may face similar credibility problems to those discussed for higher-level politicians in Chapter 3 when campaigning instead on policy promises (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007).<sup>3</sup> They may see middle and upper class voters who do not demand particularistic benefits as especially hard to convince and be unlikely to try to mobilize support among these voters to begin with (similar to the evidence in Chapter 3). For each of these reasons, there should be lower turnout in local elections in middle class as opposed to poor areas within each district. There should also be lower turnout in urban areas overall, with middle class voters concentrated in cities.

In addition, members of the ruling party and voters living in local strongholds of the ruling party within each district should be more likely to turn out in local elections. Local governments in many African countries are closely tied to the national government; the president appoints leaders of district governments and

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<sup>3</sup>Even if a policy area is largely within the administrative purview of the local government, promises to implement that policy will still be necessarily more difficult for *individual* candidates in local government elections to commit to; implementation requires coordination with multiple other local politicians (such as the mayor; a national government appointee in many countries, including in Ghana, Kenya, and elsewhere) and often with other branches of local government (such as the district offices of national ministries; i.e., ministry of health, education, etc.) that face different political incentives and may not support the proposed policy change. Basic particularistic goods can be provided more immediately and directly by individual local politicians, and more credibly promised to voters. In Chapter 7, I consider how these turnout incentives would change if significantly more policy-making power were devolved to local governments.

national government transfers fund the local budget (Wunsch 2001). In political systems where many voters have significant expectations of ethnic or partisan favoritism in the distribution of state resources (e.g., Posner 2005, Franck and Rainer 2012),<sup>4</sup> ruling party members and residents in ruling party strongholds within districts likely expect to be the greatest recipients of resources from local governments. Successful candidates for councilor positions in ruling party strongholds within each district can be expected to have significantly more power to make distributive decisions than those in opposition party wards. A local election in ruling party areas within districts is thus more likely to have real distributive consequences, affecting which voters within that jurisdiction benefit most from local spending. But in opposition wards within districts, voters should expect few resources regardless of which candidate wins the local election because few resources are expected to be approved for the area by the mayor in the first place. As a result, there should be higher turnout in ruling party stronghold neighborhoods within each district.

But where few voters turn out, the candidates most likely to win local elections will be those who can draw upon pre-existing networks to mobilize their supporters to participate at higher rates than other voters. In general, these could be candidates from any local interest group that has a dense degree of local organization that gives it an advantage in the clientelistic mobilization of poor voters. In addition to ethnic groups, this could be candidates from a powerful union, trade association, or local party machine.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, candidates from such a group will be advantaged if they can supplement regular campaign mobilization tactics by turning out members by appealing to a shared grievance or sense of threat, especially if the group's favored position in the local power structure is threatened by demographic changes.<sup>6</sup> Candidates from other groups, lacking such a mobilizing issue, can only rely on traditional electoral inducements to turn out their supporters (e.g., Nichter 2008), raising the costs of a successful campaign.

More specifically, in contexts where ethnic voting is common, candidates from ethnic groups with the highest levels of local social organization and the most at stake in winning local power will have these advantages in local elections. This is especially for indigenous urban ethnic groups in African cities. As

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<sup>4</sup>See Chapter 5 for data on expectations of favoritism in urban Ghana.

<sup>5</sup>Anzia (2011, 2012) makes a closely related argument to explain outcomes in off-cycle local elections in the US, where turnout is often similarly low. Teachers unions – a local interest group with advantages in mobilizing turnout among its supporters compared to other voters – are able to dominate low turnout school board elections and then use their ability to capture school board seats to enact more favorable policies for union members.

<sup>6</sup>More generally, the use of “ethnic threat” as a mobilizing issue for local minority groups fearing the loss of local political power has been observed far beyond the African context, such as among white voters in the US (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010).

urban areas expand and new residents migrate into cities, the original ethnic groups residing in an urban area may be united by a sense of threat about losing control of a city that has traditionally been theirs. These indigenous groups may find themselves economically disadvantaged relative to new urban residents and pushed out of traditional settlements by developers and governments. This can create a shared sense of grievance among these groups that local candidates can also play on to mobilize voters in local elections. Long-settled ethnic groups are also likely to have the highest levels of traditional social organization, with active traditional leaders and social ties within the group that candidates can draw upon in campaigns, including as a means to distribute patronage. But, as described in the preceding chapters, these traditional networks are usually weaker among ethnic groups originating outside the city. For each of these reasons, indigenous urban ethnic groups – or other interest groups with a grievance motivating local participation and dense local social networks that candidates can draw on – can win a disproportionate share of local power, especially if much of the remaining population refrains from voting.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to capture by these groups, low turnout also alters the incentives of elected local representatives to provide services to their constituents. Where turnout is low, winning candidates in local elections can win with very small bases of support. Elected officials can maintain their power by providing particularistic goods only to narrow sets of supporters, while consuming the remaining local government resources as rents. But where turnout is higher, local officials need to build significantly larger winning coalitions, distributing constituent services to a larger number of voters. In higher turnout areas, the quality of residents' interactions with their local elected officials may improve, as local residents receive better service provision from municipal representatives.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Similarly, Hajnal & Trounstein (2005) show that low turnout in local elections in large US cities leads to the systematic underrepresentation of Latino and Asian-American politicians relative to white and African-Americans politicians on city councils and in mayoral races. This can be explained in part by similar differences in degrees of mobilization and pre-existing political organization between newly arriving immigrant communities and longer settled ethnic groups.

<sup>8</sup>This can clearly be circular: in areas where more responsive services are provided, residents may be more invested in the local government system and turnout at higher rates, which in turn will lead local officials to provide more responsive services.

## 6.3 Local Government in Greater Accra

### 6.3.1 The Ga Ethnic Group

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Ga have become a minority in their own city. As of 2010, the Greater Accra metropolitan area was 27% Ga, with the remaining population 40% Akan, 20% Ewe, and 13% primarily from northern, Muslim ethnic groups. Accra itself was only 23% Ga in 2010. Despite this influx of new ethnic groups, Greater Accra still has segregated Ga neighborhoods in locations of the original Ga settlements described in Chapter 2, such as Ga Mashie, La, Osu, Teshie, and Nungua. But many of these neighborhoods have become economically marginalized (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012), with some of the most concentrated poverty in the city (Weeks et al. 2006). Despite this, Gas still maintain a favored position in the politics of the city, despite their increasing economic marginalization. Leaders from the major political parties in Greater Accra, especially the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), are drawn heavily from the Ga community. In addition, 13 of the 19 District Chief Executives who have been appointed to lead the urban districts of Greater Accra since the NDC came to power in 2009 have been Gas.<sup>9</sup> Gas won half of the 28 urban parliamentary seats in 2012.

The Ga community is well poised to take advantage of low participation rates by other voters in local elections. As they increasingly become a minority in a territory that they have traditionally controlled, Ga elites can mobilize Ga voters by appealing to a shared sense of threat about the group's declining status and the need to maintain its favored position in local politics. Paller (2015) describes how Ga political opinion is shaped by this sense of threat, which Ga political elites can play up to mobilize votes. He writes, "Residents of indigenous settlements [in Accra] fear that they are losing control of their city to outsiders or migrants... To bolster their own personal agenda, political entrepreneurs instigate this fear by taking advantage of their constituents' sense of insecurity" (19). In reaching out to voters by playing to this sense of threat, local Ga politicians can use traditional ethnic social institutions (chiefs, family heads, etc) to mobilize support

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<sup>9</sup>While DCEs are directly appointed by the president, they are subject to confirmation votes by elected assembly members, which they do not always pass. When the opposition NPP was last in power it also favored Gas in the appointments of DCEs, even though the NDC draws significantly more electoral support from the Ga (see Chapter 5). Four of the eight DCEs serving in these same districts in the second term (2005-2009) of NPP president John Kufuor were Ga (the number of districts increased since then). The other four were Akans, the ethnic group closely affiliated with the NPP. By contrast, only one of the NDC's 19 DCEs in the metropolitan area since 2009 has been Akan.

that other groups of voters lack within the city.<sup>10</sup> For example, Paller (2014) documents the use of Ga social networks to mobilize support for a Ga parliamentary candidate in the Ga Mashie neighborhood of the Accra, showing how the candidate successfully drew on his familial ties to Ga leaders in the community to build a clientelistic network of support. This included ties to leaders from traditional lineage (clan) heads, who still hold significant sway in local affairs, to pastors in Ga churches. The ability to draw on similar networks gives Ga candidates an advantage in local electoral mobilization that candidates from other ethnic groups lack.

### **6.3.2 The District Assembly System in Practice**

Ghana is now divided into 216 administrative districts (also see Chapter 2). There are 16 districts in the Greater Accra Region, 12 of which cover the metropolitan area.<sup>11</sup> The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is the district government of the city of Accra, covering the original city and central business districts.<sup>12</sup> Each district is headed by the DCE (or MCE), equivalent to a mayor, who is appointed directly by the president and is a member of the national ruling party (currently the NDC).<sup>13</sup> Below the DCE there is a local legislative body equivalent to a city council called the District Assembly, for which 30% of the members in each district are appointed by the national ruling party and the additional 70% are elected from single member wards called Electoral Areas (ELAs). Assembly members are elected to four year terms, off cycle from the presidential and parliamentary elections, with the most recent election held in December 2010.<sup>14</sup> There are currently 255 ELAs in the 12 urban districts in Greater Accra.

Assembly members are meant to serve as the official leaders of their communities, provide basic constituent services for residents, and advocate for funding for these communities with higher levels of gov-

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<sup>10</sup>Traditional leaders from other ethnic groups are instead active in the homelands of these groups elsewhere in Ghana.

<sup>11</sup>46 new districts were created before the 2012 presidential election, subdividing the previous 170 districts. As of 2010, there were 11 districts in the Greater Accra Region, with 9 covering the metropolitan area. The current 12 urban districts are further subdivided into 29 parliamentary constituencies (22 as of the 2008 election). Note that one of these parliamentary constituencies, Amasaman, is still predominately rural, although the other half (Trobu) of its parent district, Ga West, is urbanized.

<sup>12</sup>Because it is so large, the AMA is further sub-divided into sub-districts called "sub-metropolitan assemblies." Some administrative functions are further devolved to this level.

<sup>13</sup>District Chief Executives are instead called Municipal or Metropolitan Chief Executives (MCE) in larger districts, but these terms are often used interchangeably in practice.

<sup>14</sup>The next assembly elections have been delayed indefinitely because of an on-going legal dispute involving the Electoral Commission.



ernment, including the DCE (or mayor). The appointed DCE is also subject to a confirmation vote from the assembly members, and these appointments are sometimes rejected, as happened twice in the Adenta District in Greater Accra in 2013. In theory, the district assembly votes on budgetary allocations within each district, and elected assembly members are supposed to provide additional oversight over local spending by participating on various sub-committees of the assembly, such as the public works or urban roads committees. The main sources of funding for the district governments include the District Assemblies Common Fund, a formula-based allocation from the national government that funds each district (Banful 2008), as well as locally collected taxes.<sup>15</sup> Part of the district budget is set aside for each elected assembly member as an annual "Electoral Area Fund," a discretionary amount for projects each assembly member can fund in her ELA.<sup>16</sup>

Policy platforms are absent from campaigns for district assembly seats. Instead, candidates focus on promises to deliver particularistic goods and basic constituent services. In interviews, assembly members describe distributing private goods to individual voters as their main activity, both once in office and as part of their campaigns. This includes everything from money and food, to longer term support with health expenses and health insurance fees, school tuition, and rent payments. As one assembly member described, he pays "money, school fees, rent, whatever... Every weekend people come for funeral donations, and you have to do it."<sup>17</sup> Another assembly member said, "They ask for hospital money. If there is a dowry or engagement or marriage, if you don't go and donate they say 'it's a bad assemblyman.'... There are some areas we cannot walk out in that area, because they will ask you for money... If you don't [give], it means you're not a good assembly member and then they go after you."<sup>18</sup> A third assemblyman described the clientelistic benefits of these payments. After paying school tuition for teenage boys in his neighborhood, "they have completed and now they are loyal to me, they respect me," and help him with political party

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<sup>15</sup>The national government and Members of Parliament both also control separate streams of financing for local public spending. For example, funding for school construction often comes through the national Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND), which is led by national appointees of the ruling party. Separately, MPs control a discretionary common fund, roughly US\$30,000 in recent years, to distribute independently of the national and local governments (Lindberg 2010). As a result, decisions made by the district assemblies only account for part of the total goods distribution occurring in the urban area.

<sup>16</sup>Members of the AMA report that this fund has been roughly US\$5000 per year in recent years.

<sup>17</sup>Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.

<sup>18</sup>Interview with assembly member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27 August 2013.

activities in the area.<sup>19</sup>

Assembly members also use their Electoral Area Fund to provide local public goods to their ELAs. This discretionary fund is small, but supports projects such as new streetlights, digging new drainage gutters and sewers, and providing better waste dumps. For larger projects, such as building a road, school, or market, assembly members must obtain approval from the full assembly and DCE, or instead secure financing independently from the Member of Parliament or a national government ministry.

ELAs in Greater Accra had an average of 14,200 residents as of the 2010 census, ranging from less than 2,000 to more than 60,000 residents. Many wards comprise multiple neighborhoods, and current assembly members were open in interviews about concentrating their efforts on the subset of neighborhoods within their ELA where their supporters live. For example, an assembly member in the Okaikwei Central constituency in the AMA described providing a series of goods to the slum where he lived, including a new drainage system, Islamic primary school, and market building, while not securing resources in a middle class residential neighborhood that made up the other half of his ELA.<sup>20</sup> But in a neighboring ELA, the pattern reversed: the assembly woman described providing most of her resources in the middle class neighborhood where she and her supporters lived, while ignoring the slum community in her ward.<sup>21</sup> When an assembly member's supporters are clustered in one part of an ELA, other neighborhoods may be disadvantaged in the distribution of resources from the local government.

Assembly elections are officially non-partisan and it is illegal for candidates to campaign as members of a party (Crook 1999). But partisan politics play a significant role in practice. Almost all assembly members are affiliated with one of the two major parties – the NDC or opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) – and many simultaneously hold local executive positions in their party. Candidates openly flout the law and campaign as members of a party.<sup>22</sup> Sitting members in many districts hold party caucus meetings to decide on strategy before assembly meetings.<sup>23</sup> But nominations are open, with no partisan candidate selection.

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<sup>19</sup>Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 23 July 2012.

<sup>20</sup>Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014.

<sup>21</sup>“Before, all the development was concentrated on [the slum area]. They got roads in [the slum area] before I was elected... So I'm trying to bring more development to *my* area,” she argued. Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 12 March 2014.

<sup>22</sup>Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.

<sup>23</sup>Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.

Many races become intra-party contests; the average assembly election in urban Greater Accra in 2010 had 3.5 candidates, with as many as 9 in one ELA.

The partisan nature of the assemblies gives the DCE discretion to direct local spending in line with the political priorities of the ruling party. In combination with the elected members, the 30% of members who are appointed to each assembly give the national ruling party a majority in nearly every district, allowing the DCE to dominate disbursement decisions.<sup>24</sup> In interviews, NPP assembly members repeatedly discussed how NDC DCEs in Greater Accra steer more of the district budget to favored ELAs. While many of the NDC assembly members interviewed denied favoritism by current district governments, they leveled identical accusations for the period when the NPP was last in power (2001-2008).

For example, one NPP assembly member described how requests for funding for projects in her area result in consistent delays because the DCE is “appointed by the government in power. The person is only willing to help those who are on their ticket, those who are on their side... So when you write to request for something, they will tell you follow up, follow up, because your party is not in power... When you get to the NDC assembly member’s area, to their community, you will see they are having a whole lot of projects.”<sup>25</sup> Another NPP assembly member said that because of delays in approval for funding projects in his ELA, he has stopped requesting support through the normal district budget process, instead appealing directly to the MP or individual bureaucrats in national ministries: “The power alone resides with the mayor. Because the president appoints him, he has everybody, so if he says to do this, they’ll do it. But then your project, you have to spend years chasing it before you get the money..... I don’t bother going to the mayor’s office... because the mayor has his own agenda, his own political agenda... The other assemblymen will have finished their projects, and they’ll be saying no money for you.”<sup>26</sup>

While denying these accusations of favoritism under the current DCE, an NDC assembly member described similar favoritism under the NPP. “[I]t was not easy for you to have a project in this community... Back in that time when the NPP was in power, they did what we call [in Twi] ‘pick and choose, pick and choose.’ So they would pick and choose... they would say ‘oh, that project that’s going in our area, we like

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<sup>24</sup>Many DCEs either concurrently hold local executive positions in the ruling party or did before their appointment.

<sup>25</sup>Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 12 March 2014.

<sup>26</sup>Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.

it, so it will go there.’”<sup>27</sup> But another NDC assembly member who served during both the NPP and NDC governments, admitted that there was favoritism by both parties. Describing requests for funding for his ELA under the NPP, he said, “it wasn’t easy at all... [If] the man is NPP, they collaborate with the assembly man. But if the assembly man is NDC, it doesn’t happen.” With the NDC in power beginning in 2009, this changed: “[It’s] better access. You move freely to most of the offices where you can go for development. [My area] gets its fair share.... He’s [the DCE] a government appointee and I’m also from the same government... He listens to the NDC assembly members more than the others. It’s the norm.”<sup>28</sup> Another NDC assembly member who also serves as a local executive in the NDC denied that there was favoritism by his current DCE, but admitted that he had special advantages for securing projects for his area as a party member: when asking for funding, he argues, “they see me, they know ‘oh, this man is our party man.’ They will have time for me and sit down and talk to me.”<sup>29</sup>

In particular, the assembly members interviewed described Ga neighborhoods in Accra as major recipients of favoritism from the district governments. For example, one NPP assembly member in the AMA argued, “Some areas are benefiting more than the other areas. For example, looking at Accra itself...” – within Greater Accra, “Accra” refers to the predominantly Ga neighborhoods of the center city – “the district government concentrates here. The other communities that don’t even have the road tarred, they don’t bring money there... Most of the decisions have a political undertone.”<sup>30</sup> An NDC party executive serving as one of the appointed assembly members in the AMA admitted that Ga areas get additional resources, but defended the practice: “That’s how it’s supposed to be. Compare it to other regions. You go to a [rural] region, the district is made up of one tribe so when you go to the assembly, the members of the assembly were elected from that same tribe. When the benefits come, they come to that tribe’s area. Now when you come to Accra, it is a metropolitan area. Everybody is in Accra now and... the Ga should continue to fight to be recognized.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014.

<sup>28</sup>Interview with assembly member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27 August 2013.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 23 July 2012.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 19 July 2012.

<sup>31</sup>Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.

## 6.4 Data Sources

I bring together several different sources of data to examine local elections in Greater Accra. First, I use 2010 assembly election results at the Electoral Area (ELA) level. These are available for all but two districts in Greater Accra.<sup>32</sup> I also have national-level assembly election turnout figures at the district level. In addition to measuring turnout in assembly elections, I use these results to identify the ethnicity of each winning assembly member and the other candidates contesting in Greater Accra.<sup>33</sup> Because many first and last names are clearly identifiable with distinct ethnic groups in Ghana, the ethnicities of each candidate were coded from their names by a team of Ghanaian research assistants.<sup>34</sup> Each name was coded by three RAs and each RA ranked one to three guesses for the ethnicity of the name. Using coding rules described in the Appendix to resolve conflicts in codings between RAs, I am able to identify the major ethnic category of 91% of the candidates and sitting assembly members. These are coded as belonging to one of four categories: Ga (including Dangmes), Akan (all subgroups), Ewe, or as a member of an ethnic group from Northern Ghana. The remaining names are dropped from all analysis.<sup>35</sup>

The election results are combined with the 2010 census data to measure demographic characteristics of each district or ELA. There is no official map of ELA boundaries available in Ghana with which to match ELAs to the census data, however.<sup>36</sup> As a result, I create a digitized map of ELA boundaries for Greater Accra by sending a team of RAs to physically locate a random sample of the polling stations falling within each ELA in Greater Accra.<sup>37</sup> I use these located polling stations and official lists of community names in

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<sup>32</sup>Assembly election results are not centrally collected or recorded at the ELA level by the Electoral Commission or any other government body in Ghana. These results were individually collected from paper records stored in district Electoral Commission offices. The two missing districts (Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor) no longer had any records of these elections as of 2014. The names of the current assembly members are available for all ELAs, however, including in the otherwise missing districts.

<sup>33</sup>It is not possible to systematically code the partisanship of these candidates. While most who were interviewed freely identified themselves as members of a party, partisanship is not listed in any results (or on the ballot).

<sup>34</sup>The RAs were university students in Accra and were drawn from diverse backgrounds so they would be familiar with names associated with different ethnic groups. There were two northerners, one Ga, one Ewe, and one Akan.

<sup>35</sup>The remaining 9% of names are a combination of those from smaller ethnic groups (e.g., Guan ethnic groups) that the RAs could not identify with confidence, or instead names that indicated membership in two distinct groups (e.g., hyphenated Akan and Ga surnames), leading the RAs to be internally divided in their coding.

<sup>36</sup>Instead, ELAs are legally defined in two ways: (1) as a written list of the villages, towns, or neighborhoods that fall within each ELA, given in the Legislative Instruments from Parliament that demarcate the country into administrative districts; (2) by the list of polling stations used in local and national elections within each ELA. The Electoral Commission also has no official map of polling station locations, however.

<sup>37</sup>This is the same sample of polling stations used to locate the polling station results analyzed in Chapter 5. Polling stations

each ELA to trace the boundaries of each ELA. To calculate demographic characteristics at the ELA level, I then overlay this map of ELA boundaries on the digitized map of census enumeration areas and take sums of the census characteristics within each ELA.<sup>38</sup>

Using the census data, I calculate several measures of wealth or development in each ELA. To measure the number of poor versus middle and upper class residents, I employ the same definition of membership in the middle class from Chapter 3, counting the proportion of each ELA's population that has at least some secondary education, English literacy, and formal sector employment. I also code a continuous education/employment index at the individual-level from the first dimension of a factor analysis of these variables (also as in Chapter 3) and count the proportion of each ELAs population falling above the mean value of this index. Separately, I make a local development index to measure differences in overall levels of wealth in each ELA. This is the same neighborhood wealth index defined in Chapter 2 and used in the other chapters.<sup>39</sup>

I use attitudinal data from the survey analyzed in the previous chapters. The survey does not include a question about turnout in the 2010 assembly election, but measures perceptions of assembly members' performance. I combine this main survey data with data gathered from the sample of polling stations described above to produce a rough measure for local club goods distribution in the metropolitan area.<sup>40</sup> After locating the random sample of 238 polling stations, RAs interviewed three residents in the immediate vicinity of each polling station, randomly selected via a standard random walk procedure beginning from the polling station. Residents who reported living in that area for less than 5 years were replaced with a new respondent selected via the same procedure. Respondents were then asked a series of factual questions about whether several club goods had been built in the last 5 years (the period in which the NDC had been in power) in the immediate vicinity of their home: roads, schools, streetlights, and public toilets. They were asked to

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were sampled from all districts in Greater Accra, with the number per district proportional to the number of registered voters (in 2012), and the probability of selecting each polling station within districts weighted again by the number of registered voters. A minimum of 1 polling station was selected per ELA. Over 95% of the selected polling stations were successfully located. Combined with additional polling stations located by matching station names to street maps, I can geo-locate 37% of the polling stations in the metropolitan area

<sup>38</sup>For enumeration areas that cross ELA boundaries, I sum census characteristics after weighting the census data by the proportion of the surface area of each enumeration area that falls within each ELA.

<sup>39</sup>As described in Chapter 2, the index includes: % with running water (privately provided by wealthier residents via tanker or borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a single-family home (excluding informal structures); % with a computer; % adults with more than a middle school education (public education is free through middle school); and % adults employed in the formal or public sectors.

<sup>40</sup>No systematic data on the delivery of these goods is available from official sources.

point out these goods to the RA, if possible, so the RA could visually confirm their existence.<sup>41</sup> These same questions about club goods were also repeated on the main voter survey analyzed in the previous chapters.<sup>42</sup> Because there is inconsistency among respondents within locations on both surveys in answers to these questions, I collapse all of the responses to a binary indicator per location, in which survey locations are coded as having had a good delivered during the past five years if more than half of respondents at that location reported it.<sup>43</sup> Combining the surveys, I have data on goods distribution at 286 random locations throughout the metropolitan area.

## 6.5 Empirical Analysis

I use these data sources to establish several patterns consistent with the discussion above. First, I show that turnout in assembly elections is lower in urban than rural areas, and especially in urban wards with large middle class populations. Second, I show that low turnout allows the Ga minority to disproportionately win assembly seats. Third, I examine the negative implications of low turnout and the overrepresentation of the Ga on performance evaluations of assembly members. I end with suggestive evidence that Ga overrepresentation in the assemblies has led to favoritism to Ga areas of the city in the distribution of some, but not all, types of club goods.

### 6.5.1 Turnout in Assembly Elections

Turnout in the 2010 district assembly elections was lower than in the 2008 and 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, with 35% of registered voters turning out nationwide in 2010, compared to 73% in 2008

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<sup>41</sup>Question wordings were: “In the last 5 years, have any roads been tarred or constructed in this neighborhood?”; “In the last 5 years, have any new streetlights gone up in this area?” ; “In the last 5 years, have any government schools been built or renovated in this area? ”; and “In the last 5 years, have any new public toilets opened in this neighborhood?” In cases where one respondent answered “don’t know” to multiple of these questions, the RA was prompted to randomly sample an additional respondent, and the uninformed respondent’s responses were dropped.

<sup>42</sup>In the main voter survey, a randomly selected third (7) of the respondents interviewed in each of the 48 sampling clusters were also asked these questions. Respondents who reported living in their home for less than five years were skipped.

<sup>43</sup>If a respondent in either survey reported that a good was delivered, she was asked a follow up about who she believed was responsible (the local government, the MP, the national government, an NGO, or private citizens). Attribution for the same project was often inconsistent, however, in part because multiple actors often collaborate on, or at least claim credit for, the same projects. Because of this, I do not attempt to separate out responses based on the actors attributed, using only the overall reports of whether a good was delivered at all. The one exception is for public toilets. Nearly 90% of responses reporting new toilets attributed them to NGOs or private citizens, not politicians. As a result, I do not analyze results for public toilets below, as they may not indicate anything about government spending.

and 79% in 2012. Since democratization in 1992, local elections in Ghana have always had lower turnout than national elections (Crook 1999). Turnout may have been especially low in 2010 because the election was postponed due to logistical difficulties at the Electoral Commission and eventually held staggered by district between December 29, 2010 and January 4, 2011. While these delays may have depressed turnout overall, this cannot account for the extensive variation in turnout across and within districts.<sup>44</sup> In the rural Upper East, Upper West, and Northern Regions, turnout was over 50%. In Greater Accra Region, turnout was only 19%. In Kumasi, the second largest city, it was 22%. There was also wide variation by ELA within Greater Accra. In Taifa South electoral area in the Ga East district, only 3.4% of registered voters turned out to vote. But 58% turned out in Akweitse-Gon electoral area in the peri-urban Kpone-Katamanso district.

Nationwide, turnout is significantly lower in urban than rural areas, and especially in areas that are more developed, with more middle and upper class residents. This is consistent with turnout for assembly elections being highest where more voters demand the particularistic goods that assembly members can actually provide. The average turnout rate in rural districts was 44% of registered voters, while half that – 22% – in urban districts. I estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions for turnout by district, weighing observations by the number of registered voters (see Appendix for table).<sup>45</sup> I find that districts nationwide that are 1 standard deviation more developed on the development index described above have 8 percentage points lower turnout. I also estimate that a district with a middle class population percentage that is 10 percentage points larger had 7 percentage points lower turnout.

Focusing on the urban area where turnout is lowest – Greater Accra – I examine more localized turnout by ELA. In Table 6.1, I regress turnout by ELA on similar measures of the level of development or wealth in each ward, as well as population density and ethnic or partisan composition. As before, I weigh observations by the number of registered voters to account for size differences across ELAs. I also include district-level fixed effects, to control for baseline differences in turnout across administrative districts. Because of missing turnout data in two districts (Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor) and missing geo-coded census data in two additional districts (Tema and Ashaiman), it is only possible to estimate these regressions for 131 ELAs.

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<sup>44</sup>Moreover, turnout in 2010 in Greater Accra was actually slightly higher than in 2006, when 16% of registered voters turned out in the metropolitan area. The 2006 results are no longer available at the ELA level, however.

<sup>45</sup>Districts vary widely in size. District-level turnout is available at the sub-metropolitan assembly level (sub-district level) within Accra, so the unit of observation here is the district nationally and sub-district (more equivalent in size to other districts) within Accra.



Table 6.1: Turnout by Electoral Area in 2010 Assembly Election, Greater Accra

	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Middle Class %</i>	-0.123** (0.044)				
<i>Development Index</i>		-0.011* (0.005)			
<i>Middle Class (Index) %</i>			-0.118** (0.040)	-0.101** (0.037)	-0.086* (0.038)
<i>Ga % in ELA</i>				0.141*** (0.032)	0.102** (0.037)
<i>NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share</i>					0.101 <sup>†</sup> (0.053)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i>	-0.153** (0.048)	-0.161** (0.049)	-0.161** (0.048)	0.022 (0.061)	-0.046 (0.070)
<i>Population Density</i>	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	0.405	0.397	0.410	0.493	0.508
$N$	130	130	130	130	130

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is turnout as percentage of registered voters per Electoral Area (ELA) in the urban districts of Greater Accra. Weighted Least Squares regressions, with weights by number of registered voters per ELA, and district-level fixed effects. Excludes ELAs where census data missing (Tema and Ashaiman districts) and ELAs where turnout data missing (Ga South and Ledozkuku-Krowor districts). Population density is scaled in 1000s per sq. km.

A clear pattern emerges, similar to the national data. In column 1 of Table 6.1, I show that the percentage of adults in each ELA who are in the middle class strongly predicts lower turnout in the 2010 assembly election. In column 2, I replace this measure with the same development index as above, and find a similar correlation – significantly lower turnout in more developed ELAs. In column 3, I use a third measure of wealth, counting the percentage of adults in each ELA with above average scores on the individual-level education/employment index described above. Again, I find significantly lower turnout in ELAs with larger middle and upper class populations. In column 4, I show that the proportion of an ELA’s population that is Ga also predicts greater turnout in the assembly elections, consistent with Ga voters having the most to gain from participating in these elections. Finally, in column 5 of Table 6.1, I find that NDC vote share in the previous presidential election also predicts higher turnout.<sup>46</sup> If voters anticipate the patterns of partisan favoritism in the approval of projects and disbursement of funds described by the assembly members in the interviews above, assembly seats will be more valuable in NDC strongholds within each district.

The average winning coalition for an assembly seat in Greater Accra in 2010 was only 6.5% of an ELA’s registered voters. In the Dzorwulu and Abelenkpe electoral areas in Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), mixed middle and upper class communities, the winning assembly members each won only 1.7% of registered voters in multi-candidates races. Elsewhere, winning candidates had to bring together 15% or 20% of the voters, requiring significantly more effort to win the seat. Where this threshold to winning is small, candidates who can draw on pre-existing local networks of mobilized and motivated voters can win even if they only represent a small minority in the ELA. As discuss above, the Ga are such a group throughout Greater Accra. Along these lines, low turnout appears to allow the Ga minority to become overrepresented in the district assemblies. The coding of assembly member names described above shows that 48% of the elected assembly members in Greater Accra were Ga in 2010, compared to 27% of the population. Combined with members who are appointed to each assembly by the ruling party, this makes Gas the majority of assembly members across the urban area. Ga candidates won 52% of the seats in the AMA, despite being only 23% of the city.<sup>47</sup> By comparison, the Akan are the most underrepresented. Only

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<sup>46</sup>As a fitting example, Taifa South, the electoral area with the lowest turnout in Greater Accra mentioned above is one of the largest opposition NPP strongholds in the city.

<sup>47</sup>This is not unique to the 2010 election. Ga candidates also appear to be overrepresented in the similarly low turnout 2006 local elections. I estimate that Ga candidates won 47% of the seats in the AMA and 42% in the larger metropolitan area in 2006 based on my own coding of these names; the 2006 winner’s names were not included in those coded by the RAs. Eighty-six (from 169 to 255) new ELAs were created between 2006 and 2010, however, so candidates in the 2006 election competed for support in

28% of elected assembly members in the metropolitan area are Akan, compared to 40% of the population, and only 20% are Akan in the AMA, from 38% of the city's population.<sup>48</sup>

I estimate the probability that a Ga candidate won each assembly election in 2010 using logistic regressions with a Ga victory as the outcome and the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1, as well as percentage turnout in each ELA. Controlling for the Ga population percentage in each ELA, which understandably predicts whether a Ga candidate wins, Gas are also most likely to win where turnout in the elections was lowest (see Appendix for table). Simulating from this model, I estimate that a Ga candidate is 10 percentage points more likely to have won an assembly seat after a 10 percentage point decrease in turnout in the election (95% CI: 0.01, 14.6). Where turnout was higher, by contrast, the winner of the assembly seat was more likely to reflect the actual ethnic composition of the ELA.

### 6.5.2 Where are Assembly Members Helpful?

Ga overrepresentation in the district assemblies comes at the expense of popular approval of local government performance. Survey respondents in the larger survey of residents of Greater Accra were asked, "In your opinion, is your local assembly member in this area able to help community members when they have problems?" Because the main role of district assembly members is to provide constituent services, this question serves as a basic performance evaluation of the assembly members. Overall, 19% of the 995 respondents answered that their assembly member was either always or sometimes helpful.<sup>49</sup> Six percent said that their assembly member only helped other people, never the respondent, and the remainder either said that the assembly member was never helpful to anyone (30%) or that they did not even know who their assembly member was (45%).

I regress these responses on a series of individual-level and neighborhood-level characteristics of respondents. These are multi-level logistic regressions (Gelman & Hill 2007) taking the general form:

$$P(y_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 \text{GaAssembly}_j + \mathbf{X}_i\delta + \mathbf{Z}_j\gamma)$$

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significantly larger ELAs.

<sup>48</sup>Gas were also more likely to run for assembly seats in the first place. From the ELAs where I can code the ethnicity of all candidate names, 45% of candidates were Ga, compared to 31% Akan. At least one Ga candidate contested for over 75% of the seats.

<sup>49</sup>Note that this is the same percentage as the turnout rate in Greater Accra in 2010.

where  $y_i$  is a binary indicator for respondent  $i$  reporting that her assembly member is at least sometimes helpful. Intercepts are partially-pooled by the 48 sampling locations ( $j$ ) in the survey, to account for the clustered nature of the sample,<sup>50</sup> and I also include district fixed effects for each district  $k$  to control for baseline differences in performance across local governments.<sup>51</sup> In the specification above,  $GaAssembly_j$  is an indicator for whether the assembly member in location  $j$  is a Ga. All models include two sets of controls;  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is a matrix of controls at the individual level, while  $\mathbf{Z}_j$  is a matrix of controls at the neighborhood level.

At the individual level, I include indicators for whether each respondent is an active (meeting attending) member of a political party, whether the respondent is Muslim, the respondent's gender, and membership in each of four major ethnic categories in Ghana.<sup>52</sup> In addition, I control for the respondent's age, the years the respondent has lived in the neighborhood, and an indicator for whether each respondent moved to the area specifically because of the quality of public services there.<sup>53</sup> Finally, I include the assets index and education/employment index used in the prior chapters. At the neighborhood level, I include NDC vote share in the respondent's ELA in the 2008 presidential election, the neighborhood development index for the immediate area around each respondent to control for differences in wealth of the surrounding community, and population density. Results are in Table 6.2.

Ga respondents are among the most likely to approve of their assembly member. This alone may be evidence of favoritism to Ga residents by assembly members. Simulating from column 1, Ga respondents are 7.3 percentage points (95% CI: 0.6, 14.0) more likely to report the assembly member as helpful than other respondents. In addition, active members in local political party organizations have better performance evaluations of assembly members, particularly the minority of respondents (9%) who are ruling party members, as shown in column 2.<sup>54</sup> Because assembly members are often closely tied to parties, local party members are likely to be prime beneficiaries of their patronage. And given the allegations of partisan favoritism dis-

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<sup>50</sup>Results are also robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown).

<sup>51</sup>Because sample sizes are larger within each district in the survey than in the analysis of ELA results above, I can define the fixed effects at the level of the sub-metropolitan assemblies (sub-districts) within the AMA.

<sup>52</sup>Akan is the omitted baseline category in all models.

<sup>53</sup>As in all prior models with this data, two additional indicators control for interview quality and measurement error: whether enumerators made logistical errors during the interview (12% of interviews), and whether enumerators noted respondents were cooperative (90%).

<sup>54</sup>Because not all respondents reported their partisan affiliation, 191 responses are dropped in column 2. See Chapter 5 for more information on how partisanship is measured.

Table 6.2: Reported Helpfulness of Assembly Members

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Turnout in 2010 (by ELA)</i>						18.570* (8.982)
<i>Ga Assemblyman (by ELA)</i>			-0.808 <sup>†</sup> (0.439)	-1.927* (0.954)	1.779 (1.358)	
<i>Ga % in ELA</i>				-7.814* (3.814)	-7.164** (2.659)	-4.828 (3.479)
<i>Ga Assemblyman * Ga %</i>				5.127 (3.476)		
<i>Ga Segregation in ELA</i>					-2.393 (1.774)	
<i>Ga Assemblyman * Ga Seg.</i>					-9.708 <sup>†</sup> (5.203)	
<i>Party Member</i>	0.720** (0.228)		0.621* (0.251)	0.629* (0.250)	0.549* (0.252)	0.698* (0.272)
<i>NDC Member</i>		0.751* (0.295)				
<i>NPP Member</i>		0.423 (0.360)				
<i>Muslim</i>	0.848* (0.357)	0.899* (0.393)	0.795* (0.376)	0.780* (0.376)	0.730 <sup>†</sup> (0.378)	0.857* (0.405)
<i>Male</i>	0.654*** (0.190)	0.688** (0.213)	0.723*** (0.205)	0.716*** (0.206)	0.706*** (0.208)	0.817*** (0.234)
<i>Ewe</i>	-0.636* (0.307)	-0.452 (0.333)	-0.565 <sup>†</sup> (0.326)	-0.605 <sup>†</sup> (0.326)	-0.525 (0.329)	-0.642 <sup>†</sup> (0.381)
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.259 (0.384)	-0.307 (0.428)	-0.285 (0.404)	-0.327 (0.406)	-0.233 (0.413)	-0.231 (0.433)
<i>Ga</i>	0.551* (0.250)	0.617* (0.282)	0.547* (0.275)	0.580* (0.275)	0.598* (0.283)	0.734* (0.322)
Full Individual-level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Neighborhood-level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	995	804	793	793	752	584

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is a binary indicator for whether respondents report that their assembly member is at least “sometimes” helpful. All models are multi-level logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007) and include district-level fixed effects (including for the sub-metropolitan assemblies within the AMA). All models include the full set of individual and neighborhood-level controls described in the text (not shown for space). Missingness in column 2 is for respondents who did not identify the party they belong to. Missingness in columns 3-5 is because the RAs could not agree on ethnicity codings for all assembly members. Respondents from Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor districts are dropped in column 6 because turnout data was not available.

cussed in the interviews above, NDC assembly members may be particularly able to steer benefits to ruling party members. From column 2, I estimate that respondents who are NDC members are 11 percentage points (95% CI: 2.8, 20.4) more likely to approve of their assembly member than respondents who are not members of a party. By contrast, opposition NPP members are no more likely to find assembly members helpful than those who are not in a party.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, other respondents find Ga assembly members to be particularly unhelpful. This is seen in column 3, which includes an indicator for whether the current assemblyman is Ga.<sup>56</sup> In column 4, I interact the indicator for Ga assembly member with the Ga population percentage in each ELA. Although the interaction is not significant at conventional levels ( $p = 0.14$ ), it is signed in a direction suggesting that respondents believe Ga assembly members are unhelpful primarily in ELAs with few Gas. In these areas, Ga assembly members likely won with support from only a small minority of total voters and may be targeting benefits narrowly to the few Gas in the area. From column 4, I estimate that in an ELA with the 10th percentile in Ga population for Greater Accra (9.8% of the population is Ga), respondents are 21.0 percentage points (95% CI: 2.2, 38.7) less likely to see Ga assembly members as helpful than assembly members of other ethnicities. But in an ELA at the 90th percentile in Ga population for Greater Accra (51% of the population is Ga), respondents see Ga assembly members as no more or less helpful than others (95% CI: -18.0, 12.6).

A different way to measure this interaction is by examining the segregation of Gas within each ELA. Ga assembly members may be most unhelpful where the Ga community is spatially segregated from surrounding neighborhoods. In an ELA with a segregated Ga enclave, a Ga assembly member is likely to primarily target spending on local public goods to that part of the ELA, at the expense of everyone else, similar to the patterns of selective effort within wards described by assembly members in the interviews above. I measure the presence of these enclaves using a “dissimilarity” index of spatial segregation, as defined in Reardon & O’Sullivan (2004). This is based on comparing the Ga population percentage in each census enumeration area within an ELA to the overall Ga population percentage in the full ELA.<sup>57</sup> The index is scaled from 0, where all enumeration areas within an ELA have the same Ga population percentage, to 1, where all Gas are

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<sup>55</sup>NDC voters are not particularly likely to see assembly members as helpful – only NDC party members. NDC vote share in each respondent’s ELA also does not predict helpfulness of the assembly members (see Appendix for full Table 6.2).

<sup>56</sup>202 observations are dropped in columns 3-5 because the ethnicity of an assembly member is unknown.

<sup>57</sup>This cannot be calculated in two ELAs in the survey data that correspond to only a single polygon in the enumeration area data. An additional 41 respondents are dropped.

clustered in only one enumeration area, and ranges from 0.02 to 0.55 in the ELAs in the survey. In column 5, I find that respondents are significantly less likely to approve of Ga assembly members when living in ELAs where Gas are spatially segregated from other residents. As the Ga segregation index in the ELA increases by 1 standard deviation (0.12), I estimate that respondents become 11.1 percentage points less likely to see Ga assembly members as helpful (95%: 2.3, 16.7). But in areas where Ga residents are spatially intermixed with the rest of the community, respondents do not find Ga assembly members to be unhelpful compared to those of other ethnicities.

Finally, I find that turnout in 2010 is positively correlated with perceived helpfulness of assembly members. I include turnout in each respondent's ELA in the 2010 assembly election as an explanatory variable in column 6.<sup>58</sup> I estimate that as turnout in each respondent's local assembly election increases by 10 percentage points, the respondent is 15.2 percentage points more likely to approve of the local assembly member (95% CI: 0.8, 29.4). This is consistent with assembly members providing better constituent services where they must maintain support of a larger group of voters to remain in office and face electoral pressure to address the needs of more constituents. But where turnout is very low, approval of the assembly members is also dramatically lower, consistent with the evidence above that it is in the low turnout areas that local government seats are most often captured by a local ethnic minority.

### **6.5.3 Implications for Goods Distribution**

Finally, the combined survey data on the delivery of club goods provides suggestive evidence of distributive impacts of Ga overrepresentation. As described in the interviews above, many of the benefits that assembly members provide to constituents are private goods and are thus largely unobservable, although the individual-level performance evaluations in the previous section provide evidence of who may be benefiting most from these private goods. But assembly members also allege favoritism in approval of funding for local public goods to both ruling NDC strongholds and Ga areas of Greater Accra.

I find different patterns of distribution for three club goods measured in the combined survey data that respondents believed were mostly delivered by government or politicians.<sup>59</sup> Table 6.3 shows results of a

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<sup>58</sup>Because assembly election results are not available for two districts included in the survey sample, an additional 168 respondents are dropped.

<sup>59</sup>Responses about new public toilets are not examined here because respondents overwhelmingly attributed new toilets to private initiatives, not to government or politicians (see above).

series of logistic regressions where the outcomes are indicators for whether respondents at each location reported a road, school, or streetlight being constructed in the previous five years (since the NDC came to power).<sup>60</sup> Predictors include NDC vote share in each location's ELA in the 2008 presidential election, the proportion Ga in the ELA, the local development index (see above), and population density, as well as indicators for which of the two surveys each observation comes from and whether the survey enumerators noted that the location was in a commercial or residential area. I also include a measure of the population growth in the surrounding ELA for each location between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, which provides a measure of need for new club goods in the area. All models include district fixed effects to control for baseline differences in delivery of these goods across different local governments.

Controlling for variables that measure baseline needs for new roads in each location, I find in column 1 that survey locations in ELAs with a larger Ga population are significantly more likely to have reported road construction and maintenance in the previous five years than locations in ELAs with smaller Ga populations.<sup>61</sup> Simulating from column 1, I estimate that a location in an ELA with the 90th percentile in Ga population proportion in Greater Accra (51%) is 19.6 percentage points (95% CI: 0.1, 24.7) more likely to have road construction or maintenance than an otherwise similar location in an ELA with the 10th percentile in Ga population (9.8%).<sup>62</sup> In column 4, I repeat the model from column 1 but replace the Ga population percentage in the survey location's ELA with the Ga population percentage in the 500m immediately surrounding the sampled location (an area much smaller than the full ELA). Again, I find that survey locations in local neighborhoods within ELAs with larger Ga populations are more likely to have reported road construction, consistent with favoritism to Ga areas.

In columns 2 and 4, I change the outcome to an indicator for school construction and renovations. Unlike for roads, I do not find evidence of favoritism to Ga ELAs or Ga neighborhoods in school construction. Instead, there is evidence of partisan targeting to NDC areas. Controlling for differences in poverty, popula-

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<sup>60</sup>For roads, this includes reports of road maintenance (such as re-paving). For schools this includes new government schools and renovation of existing schools.

<sup>61</sup>I also repeat column 1 of Table 6.3 sub-setting only to the reports of road maintenance, which is entirely under control of district governments, and find identical results (not shown).

<sup>62</sup>Conditional on being in the same place, Ga respondents are not more likely to report road construction than other respondents. In robustness tests in the Appendix, I regress an indicator for whether each respondent in the larger survey of residents reported road, streetlight, or school construction on indicators for their ethnicity, controlling for survey location with survey location fixed effects. While responses vary across locations, there are no differences in reporting any of these club goods by ethnic group, except that Ewe respondents are slightly less likely to report knowledge of roads construction (see Appendix).



Table 6.3: Distribution of Roads, Schools, and Streetlights in Greater Accra

<i>Good:</i>	1 Road	2 School	3 Streetlight	4 Road	5 School	6 Streetlight
<i>NDC 2008 Vote Share (ELA)</i>	-2.04 (1.73)	4.97* (1.96)	1.31 (1.89)	-1.70 (1.69)	4.97* (1.99)	1.05 (1.90)
<i>Ga % (ELA)</i>	2.61* (1.29)	1.37 (1.59)	-0.79 (1.38)			
<i>Ga % (500m)</i>				2.00 <sup>†</sup> (1.16)	1.45 (1.42)	-0.21 (1.29)
<i>Development Index (ELA)</i>	0.55* (0.24)	-0.02 (0.24)	0.10 (0.24)			
<i>Development Index (500m)</i>				0.82*** (0.24)	-0.28 (0.25)	0.27 (0.24)
<i>Commercial Area (0,1)</i>	0.48 (0.35)	0.04 (0.38)	-0.27 (0.39)	0.77* (0.36)	-0.10 (0.39)	-0.21 (0.40)
<i>Population Density (ELA)</i>	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
<i>%age Growth 2000-2010 (ELA)</i>	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.05)
<i>From Voter Survey (0,1)</i>	0.88* (0.40)	-2.58*** (0.47)	18.17 (909.24)	1.02* (0.40)	-2.67*** (0.48)	18.22 (913.00)
District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	246	225	224	243	222	221

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Outcomes are binary indicators for whether each good listed above was delivered to the immediate area around the polling station or survey sampling cluster. All models are logistic regressions, with district-level fixed effects to control for baseline differences across local governments. Data is from a combination of two sources – a survey of a random sample of polling station locations in Greater Accra, and a representative survey of voters in Greater Accra, as described in the text. All but one location in the voter survey reported streetlights being delivered (columns 3 and 6), accounting for the large standard errors on the survey indicator variable in these columns.

tion growth, and population density that should predict underlying needs for public schools, survey locations in ELAs with higher NDC presidential vote share in the 2008 presidential election are more likely to have reported school construction. As NDC vote share in the 2008 presidential election in the ELA increases by 10 percentage points, survey locations are 8.1 percentage points (95% CI: 0.02, 11.8) more likely to report school construction. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 I repeat these models for the construction of new streetlights. I find no patterns of either ethnic or partisan favoritism in the distribution of streetlights.<sup>63</sup> Visual depictions of these results are in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, which shade ELAs in the 12 urban districts of Greater Accra by either Ga population percentage or 2008 NDC presidential vote share, and then project the locations of road and school construction measured in the combined surveys on top of the ELAs.

It is not surprising that there is no evidence of favoritism in the distribution of streetlights. Streetlights are the least expensive of these three goods, and the easiest for assembly members to provide from their discretionary Electoral Area Fund without approval of the DCE or the rest of the assembly. For goods small enough that all assembly members can fund them on their own, regardless of partisanship or ethnicity, aggregate patterns of favoritism may be difficult to observe, as these goods are likely delivered in every ELA.<sup>64</sup> Roads and schools are both more capital intensive projects that require funding from the DCE and the rest of the assembly, which can deny funding in opposition or non-Ga areas.

But why are Ga communities within Greater Accra favored in road building, while all NDC communities are favored in school construction? A possible explanation is that construction and maintenance of local roads is entirely within the purview of each district. Requests for local road work from assembly members go to the Urban Roads Department at each district assembly, controlled by the DCE and works committees of the assembly.<sup>65</sup> With Gas dominating the district assembly, Ga areas may be most likely to receive road work. By contrast, while district governments fund some school construction through their normal budgets, significant funding also comes directly from the national government, with national level politicians above the DCE involved in allocative decisions about schools. For example, beginning in 2011, the AMA embarked on a major campaign to construct public schools in the city funded by foreign donor money,

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<sup>63</sup>There is also no favoritism towards other ethnic groups – measures of the Akan, Ewe, or Northern population at each ELA also return null results for streetlights (not shown).

<sup>64</sup>Almost all assembly members interviewed (see above) reported providing streetlights to their communities from this discretionary fund, including NPP affiliated assembly members, even as they complained about being blocked from delivering larger projects.

<sup>65</sup>These departments are funded by a national road fund allocated to each district, but decisions over the use of this fund are entirely localized.

## Road Construction by Proportion Ga




Figure 6.1: *Goods Distribution in Greater Accra – Local Roads*: Electoral Areas (ELAs) shaded by the proportion Ga, with darker color equal to larger Ga population. Shaded points are locations where the combined voter and polling station surveys indicate roads were constructed. Hollow points are locations where the combined surveys indicate no road was constructed. Gray shading indicates missing geo-coded census data (areas dropped from all analysis).

### School Construction by NDC 2008 Pres.~Vote Share




Figure 6.2: *Goods Distribution in Greater Accra – Public Schools* : Electoral Areas (ELAs) shaded by the NDC vote share in the 2008 presidential election, with darker color equal to higher NDC vote share. Shaded points are locations where the combined voter and polling station surveys indicate public schools were constructed. Hollow points are locations where the combined surveys indicate no public schools were constructed. Gray shading indicates missing geo-coded census data (areas dropped from all analysis).

organized through the national government.<sup>66</sup> Many other school projects are funded by the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND), a national organization controlled by national government appointees.<sup>67</sup> If the DCE and assembly leaders are not the only politicians approving school projects, there may instead be pressure to favor NDC areas in general, not only the Ga in particular.

These last results must be interpreted with caution, however. Because it is not possible to identify the exact funding source of each of project, the responses likely included some roads and schools provided by different actors, especially when individual MPs pay for local public goods out of their own discretionary funds. Second, while conditional on living in the same place, respondents from different ethnic groups are not more or less likely to report any of these goods being delivered, NDC voters are more likely to have claimed knowledge of school construction than NPP voters. The pattern of NDC favoritism in column 2 and 5 of Table 6.3 (and Figure 6.2) could thus be confounded by partisan response bias – with ruling party supporters attempting to make the current government look better than opposition supporters by responding more positively about school construction.<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, the models in Table 6.3 provide some evidence that Ga areas of Greater Accra differentially benefit in the distribution of club goods that are controlled directly by district governments.

## 6.6 Conclusion

Local government elections are often viewed as a means to prevent local capture and improve the quality of local service delivery in developing countries (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Ferraz and Finan 2011, Martinez-Bravo et al. 2012, Beath et al. 2013). But in this chapter I suggest that low turnout in local government elections, especially from middle class voters, allows a well-organized local ethnic minority to capture disproportionate power in the local government system and redirect municipal resources to themselves at the expense of the city at large. As described in Chapter 1, local governments in major African cities like

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<sup>66</sup>By comparing media reports and the survey data, I can confirm that these schools are included in Figure 6.2.

<sup>67</sup>For an analysis of nationwide partisan favoritism through the GETFUND, see Faller (2013).

<sup>68</sup>Controlling for being in the same location, NDC voters were no more or less likely to report new roads, streetlights, or toilets, however, only schools (see Appendix). It is not clear why there would be partisan response bias about only one type of club good but none of the others. It is not possible to control for this in Table 6.3, however, because vote choice was only measured on the 48 location residents survey, not the 238 location polling station survey (because of the complexity of measuring vote choice accurately, see Chapter 5). Note that this partisan bias cannot account for the evidence of Ga favoritism in the provision of roads.

Greater Accra likely already lack the resources and bureaucratic capacity necessary to confront all of the developmental challenges posed by urbanization. But the capture of local governments by narrow ethnic interests may only exacerbate this problem, with the resources that are available not being used to efficiently address the city's infrastructure and basic service deficits. Local city councilors in Greater Accra can get away with this inefficient distribution of resources because their primary electoral incentive is to deliver patronage to the narrow sets of supporters they need to win low turnout local elections.

The electoral incentives of district assembly members in Greater Accra may be self-reinforcing. Following the logic developed in the previous chapters, if urban municipal governments cannot address voters' needs for basic public services, particularistic preferences will remain prominent in the urban electorate and patronage-based appeals that selectively target access to these services will remain viable routes to elected office. And if local governments politically target their resources based on the ethnicity and partisanship of neighborhoods, as shown above, incentives for ethnic voting remain pronounced. But this only encourages ethnic groups like the Ga, which believe their access to local resources is being threatened, to band together politically to protect their interests at the expense of other urban residents.

The capture of local urban governments by narrow ethnic interests is not unique to African cities like Greater Accra. Indeed, the situation in Greater Accra shares many similarities to the history of Irish and Italian American political machines in many US cities in the early 20th century (e.g., Banfield and Wilson 1960, Erie 1988, Trounstine 2008). But the control of ethnic political machines in American cities largely collapsed in the second half of the 20th century. Existing literature suggests that was not primarily a result of modernization or economic growth. Instead, institutional reforms that constrained the ability of machine politicians to target patronage to narrow interest groups changed the underlying electoral incentives that allowed machines to gain power in the first place. Examining these historical experiences, I propose in the next chapter that similar institutional reforms could allow Greater Accra to break out of the pernicious cycle described here.

## 7 | The Way Forward

### 7.1 The Way Forward

Even though early literature on the political effects of urbanization in Africa offered little support for modernization theories, these hypotheses once again characterize many current arguments about urban politics. But the preceding chapters suggest that the socio-economic changes produced by urbanization in Africa do not have uniform effects on electoral competition in urban areas. The incentives underlying ethnic competition and patronage-based appeals are as much reinforced by processes of urbanization as they are undermined. These features of electoral competition are not all declining in importance as urban populations become wealthier, better educated, and lose ties to traditional ethnic social institutions. I show instead that urbanization is pulling political competition in multiple directions – solidifying the use of individual-level clientelism and the importance of ethnicity for vote choice in some neighborhoods, even as these are less common in other urban neighborhoods.

Ethnic voting and patronage politics both stymie the ability of democratization in developing countries to lead to genuine political accountability, with voters able to incentivize good performance by leaders through elections. If we want to improve the quality of accountability in African cities like Greater Accra, what is the way forward? Perhaps the intra-urban variation in electoral competition I document is merely an artifact of observing a moment of flux, as the city transitions from one form of political competition to another. I only view Greater Accra in detail at a single point in time. Maybe the answer is to wait longer, giving processes of modernization more time to play out? In this concluding chapter, I reject this argument, suggesting that there is little reason to believe based on the evidence in the preceding chapters that simply waiting longer for development to progress will lead to substantial changes to the patterns described here in the near or medium term.

Instead, we need to take seriously the conclusions of the earlier generation of scholars studying urban politics in Africa (see Chapter 1) and move on from viewing modernization theory as a useful paradigm for explaining African politics. In line with what Bates (1974) already called for over 40 years ago, we can gain deeper insights into how patterns of political competition might change in African cities if we stop teleologically expecting further development to translate into new political outcomes and instead think more carefully about what would actually change the underlying incentives of the main actors in urban politics. Using this framework, I examine the experiences of other countries and conclude by arguing that a series of institutional reforms in Ghana may ultimately be more likely to change the patterns of electoral competition I have documented in Greater Accra than further modernization.

## **7.2 Keep Waiting for Modernization?**

The middle class in Greater Accra is booming. But the majority of urban residents are still poor and the urban middle class is still a small share of the overall national electorate. Although Ghana is among the most urbanized African countries, with over half of its population in cities, the urban population is much smaller compared to developing democracies in other world regions where competition has become significantly more programmatic (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014).<sup>1</sup> If we just waited longer and looked again, giving the effects of urbanization and economic development more time to manifest themselves, perhaps real programmatic competition will have emerged and ethnicity significantly lost its political importance.

But the theoretical argument in the dissertation suggests that this is unlikely. If Ghana becomes much more like an advanced democracy – substantially wealthier, with a majority of the population firmly out of poverty – the parties may have no choice but to stop most of their patronage distribution and instead seriously engage with voters' universalistic preferences. But there are few indications that Ghana is another Taiwan or South Korea; that dramatic of a developmental leap is not happening any time soon. Restricting instead to more plausible counterfactuals, there are clear reasons to doubt that gradual improvements in development will lead to significant shifts away from the patterns documented in the previous chapters, at least in the medium term.

For example, existing literature shows a clear cross-national correlation between levels of development

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Argentina's population is now 92% urban, Chile is 90% urban, Peru is 80% urban, and Brazil is 86% urban (United Nations 2014)(United-Nations 2014).



and indicators of clientelism (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; discussed in Chapter 3), consistent with modernization theories. But Kitschelt & Kselman (2013) shows that this correlation disappears if the most advanced democracies are removed from the sample. Among poor and middle income democracies, there is not strong evidence that marginal increases in levels of wealth are associated with significant reductions in clientelism. Instead, consistent with my argument in Chapter 3, political dynamics in poor countries instead often appear to be incredibly sticky, not easily fading away.

More importantly, I have described how several characteristics of African cities interact to encourage patronage-based political competition and ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods: low state capacity, significant scarcity in access to basic public services – among the poor and middle class alike – and the concentration of the urban poor in dense slum communities. Marginal increases in urbanization and economic development would not change the incentives created by these factors. In some cases, this would only serve to deepen the incentives sustaining the patterns of political competition I document.

In chapter 3, I argue that Ghana's low state capacity hampers the implementation of universalistic policy promises, creating a credibility problem in which middle class voters who want universalistic policies do not trust that any politicians in the current political system are likely to deliver them. I suggest that this credibility problem leads to the differential abstention of voters with universalistic preferences, reinforcing politicians' incentives for patronage-based appeals. Low state capacity also directly feeds into the inability of the government to meet demands for public services as cities grow. Scarcity then reinforces voters' dependence on the state for particularistic goods, sustaining patronage strategies that strategically target and withhold these benefits as a viable route to elected office. And as described in Chapters 4 and 5, because this patronage is often targeted along ethnic lines, low state capacity and scarcity of basic services then affect voters' expectations of the benefits they will receive from different parties, reinforcing the importance of ethnicity for vote choice in many neighborhoods.

But the large literature on the origins of state capacity views it as developed through long-run historical processes, gradually built over decades, or centuries (Tilly 1990, Herbst 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2000, Centeno 2003, Fukuyama 2004). It is not a variable that quickly responds to short-term changes in economic conditions. Ghana's state and bureaucratic capacity is unlikely to substantially change after another decade of growth (see below). The government will still fail to meet some of the challenges presented by urbanization described in Chapter 1. Scarcity in access to services in urban areas will persist as cities grow, and

may even get much worse. Demands for particularistic goods in the electorate not fade away in the face of additional urbanization. Patronage-based appeals will continue, which by extension, will perpetuate the political importance of ethnicity.

Moreover, I argue in Chapter 4 that the concentration of the urban poor in slums allows Ghana's parties to engage in clientelistic relationships with voters more directly at an individual-level than in many rural areas, where chiefs and other traditional elites instead often serve as intermediaries. As argued in Chapter 5, this also influences incentives for ethnic voting in poor urban neighborhoods. But these slums are themselves a direct outcome of urbanization (UN-Habitat 2014). With the government seemingly unable to redirect the demographic and market forces driving rural-urban migration and urban population growth, or to solve persistent urban housing shortages, slums are one of the only place for excess urban population to go. Even if there is simultaneous growth in the size of the urban middle class, urbanization will also mean the further emergence of slums.<sup>2</sup> The growth of the urban middle class and the growth of slums are both outcomes of urban growth; we cannot ascribe the effects of urbanization to one of these changes, while ignoring the other. If urbanization leads to growth of slums, waiting for more urbanization to take place could lead to more individual-level clientelism, not less.

### **7.3 Or Stop Waiting? Potential Institutional Reforms**

Rather than simply waiting for more urbanization and economic growth to play out, existing research on transitions away from clientelistic politics in other countries suggests that institutional reforms that alter politicians' incentives to provide patronage to voters and exhibit favoritism to co-ethnics may have more immediate effects, reducing the prevalence of patronage-based appeals and the importance of ethnicity in electoral competition. None of these reforms will be easy to implement, but they offer the potential for more direct ways forward for improving electoral accountability in cities like Greater Accra. I consider three here: efforts to restrict the supply of patronage and create bureaucratic autonomy in the distribution of state resources, substantive decentralization that empowers urban municipal governments, and compulsory voting and registration laws. Each of these can concretely alter the incentives underlying the theoretical argument in the dissertation.

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<sup>2</sup>Because they have become embedded in local power structures, pre-existing slums in Accra are also not easy for the government to dislodge and will likely persist well into the future.

### 7.3.1 Closing Off Opportunities for Patronage

Clientelism, ethnic favoritism, and ethnic voting are not unique to the developing world. They persisted in many US cities into the mid-20th century. In patterns not unlike the stereotypical Africa democracy, machine party organizations serving the interests of specific ethnic groups captured urban municipal governments for decades at a time, maintaining support by targeting patronage to ethnic bases and intimidating potential opposition supporters by threatening to cut off their access to government services. Though early scholarship tied the eventual demise of these ethnic political machines in the US to the rising power of the urban middle class (Banfield & Wilson 1963), in arguments akin to modernization theory, more recent work suggests that the emergence of the middle class was not enough on its own to undermine patronage-based electoral competition. Instead, a series of new state and federal policies that constricted the supply of patronage available to urban politicians gradually starved machines to death. It was often only after local party organizations became unable to pay out enough patronage to keep their coalitions from splintering that middle class reform movements were able to sweep into power in these cities and end the machine era (Erie 1988, Trounstein 2008). As a result, the end of clientelism in the US appears to be less of a story about demand-side changes in voters' preferences, as theorized in the development-focused accounts described in Chapter 3, than about supply-side changes to the ability of politicians to sustain patronage-based strategies (Hicken 2011).

Several reforms worked in tandem to undermine the power of ethnic political machines. First, civil service reforms adopted first at the federal level, and then gradually at the state level, created bureaucratic autonomy within the agencies charged with determining access to state resources (Greenstein 1964, Shefter 1994, Trounstein 2008, Kuo 2014). This restricted the ability of politicians to give out bureaucratic jobs as patronage, which in turn constrained their ability to direct the bureaucracy to target resources to favored voters. Second, the creation of national-level universalistic social welfare programs, especially New Deal programs such as Social Security, took control over supply of the main particularistic resources on which the urban poor relied out of the hands of the machine parties and instead gave it to non-partisan federal bureaucrats (Erie 1988). Access to governments benefits became determined by rational need-based criteria (or was not means-tested at all, as with Social Security) rather than by voters' ties to politicized urban bureaucracies. Finally, many state governments seized various fiscal powers from city governments, restricting

the budget available for patronage distribution within cities (Trounstein 2008). While many died out, some machine parties managed to survive for decades despite these reforms, such as the Daley organization in Chicago. But Erie (1988) argues that these machines only survived if they were able to de-emphasize clientelism and switch to building support with new coalitions of non-co-ethnic voters through the universalistic distribution of welfare benefits.

This American historical experience gives useful insights for how forms of political competition can be changed in contemporary developing democracies. In particular, the recent success of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America closely echoes aspects of the US experience. Universalistic social welfare programs targeted at the poor in Brazil and Mexico – *Bolsa Familia* and *Progresas*, respectively – have received considerable attention for their perceived ability to break patronage-based modes of distribution (De La O 2013, Zucco Jr. 2013). Much like programs such as Social Security centralized the distribution of particularistic goods that had previously been distributed by clientelistic party agents in the urban US, conditional cash transfer programs have centralized the distribution of private goods to poor voters in Brazil and Mexico, giving control to non-partisan national-level bureaucrats charged with dispersing benefits based on clearly defined, objective need-based criteria (Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Evidence in De La O (2013) suggests that, at least in Mexico, these benefits are being distributed programmatically and have not become a new avenue for clientelism.

If Ghana introduced similar forms of non-clientelistic distribution of particularistic benefits on a large scale, it would change the incentives of voters that I document in Chapter 5. Scarcity in access to state resources would persist, and voters' underlying preferences for particularistic goods would be unchanged. But the model in Chapter 5 implies that if these preferences were no longer satisfied via the clientelistic distribution of resources on the basis of ethnicity, the importance of ethnicity for vote choice should decline, even in the poor urban neighborhoods where I show that ethnic voting is now extensive.<sup>3</sup> The adoption of programs similar to *Progresas* and *Bolsa Familia* is not unthinkable in Ghana. In fact, the current NDC government is already slowly scaling up a similar social welfare program, known as *LEAP* ("Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty" Program). This program was originally introduced by the NPP government

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<sup>3</sup>Introducing these types of universalistic social welfare programs for poor voters, however, would not change the incentives of the middle class to participate in politics, as middle class voters would not receive program benefits and do not necessarily demand access to the particularistic resources provided by these programs in the first place. The argument from Chapter 3 would remain in place.

in 2008 and is being funded (in part) by the World Bank. The current number of beneficiaries is still limited, but *LEAP* could theoretically be expanded into a larger-scale *Progesa*-style program.

But there are reasons to doubt whether such a program would be similarly successful at curbing patronage distribution in Ghana. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Ghanaian governments have already introduced other supposedly universalistic social welfare programs targeted at these poor. But these programs have been dogged by corruption and implementation failures. Access to benefits is often described as clientelistic. For example, as Chapter 3 notes, a corruption scandal in the main national employment assistance program, called GYEEDA (Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency; formerly the National Youth Employment Program), revealed that there were dramatically fewer program beneficiaries than claimed. Instead much of the program's funding was siphoned off through no-bid contracts to businesses with close ties to the ruling NDC who then did not provide the employment and job training programs they were supposed to.<sup>4</sup> The benefits that were given out have been described as a major source of patronage to ruling party supporters.<sup>5</sup> Supposedly universalistic government micro-credit programs have faced similar accusations of being used a source of patronage (e.g., MASLOC and LESDEP, see Chapter 4). Even the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), meant to provide universal basic health coverage to poor Ghanaians, has not been truly universalistic. Due to funding shortfalls, health care providers have repeatedly turned away policy holders. Many Ghanaians still believe that they will receive sub-standard service, or be denied altogether, without the ability to pay in cash despite having NHIS membership (Dalinjong & Laar 2012).<sup>6</sup> In addition, because enrollees must pay fees upfront to join, the enrollment of poor voters has become a private good used by politicians from both parties, who describe signing up voters and paying their fees as part of their pre-election goods distribution.<sup>7</sup>

In general, unless the bureaucracy that controls these programs is itself depoliticized, the programs may simply become a new source of patronage resources for politicians to distribute. For example, Weitz-Shapiro (2014) shows how similar programs have been clientelistic when implemented in Argentina, attributing this

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<sup>4</sup>For example, see "The GYEEDA Report," *Citi FM Online*, <http://datablog.peacefmonline.com/pages/blog/32/>.

<sup>5</sup>For media coverage, see "Teach the Foot Soldiers How to Fish," *The Ghanaian Chronicle*, 3 August 2010; from the fieldwork, for example, focus group, Odorkor "Official Town," Ablekuma North constituency, 1 October 2013

<sup>6</sup>Also see Kent Mensah, "Ghana's successful but unpopular healthcare," *Al Jazeera*, 6 August 2014.

<sup>7</sup>For example, interview with NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012; interview with district assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency, 25 February 2014.

to differences in the bureaucracies controlling access to benefits. *Progresa* and *Bolsa Familia* are both distributed by centralized national-level agencies.<sup>8</sup> Benefits in Argentina's program are instead controlled by municipal-level politicians. District-level ruling party officials retain influence over access to benefits in programs like GYEEDA and MASLOC in Ghana. But in the US context, the federal bureaucracies that took over distribution of many particularistic goods through New Deal era programs were insulated from urban machine leaders.

In settings like Ghana with substantially lower state capacity, how do you get the bureaucratic autonomy needed for these programs to work? A central insight of Shefter (1977, 1994) is that if civil service protections and norms of bureaucratic autonomy do not precede the introduction of democratic political competition, subsequent governments are unlikely to allow bureaucratic autonomy to develop – doing so would constrain their ability to distribute the patronage that they have used to get into power in the first place.<sup>9</sup> International development agencies, such as the World Bank, have invested heavily in recent decades in programs to reform bureaucracies in developing countries to create autonomy and prevent patronage distribution and corruption. But Cruz & Keefer (2015) shows that these reforms have often failed precisely because pre-existing clientelistic political parties have stymied their implementation in order to protect access to patronage and rents.<sup>10</sup> Grindle (2012) observes that where bureaucracies have successfully been depoliticized in Latin America, this has taken decades of very gradual, piecemeal reforms. Indeed, Kuo (2014) describes how civil service reforms in the US only emerged over decades as the result of a gradual alignment of business interests, who eventually began losing more to corrupt, inefficient administration than they were gaining from buying off government officials, with the partisan electoral incentives of the Republican Party. Similar to the literature on the development of state capacity discussed above, the development of bureaucratic autonomy is a long-term process, unlikely to improve significantly in Ghana in the near term.

The successful conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America offer a potential solution, however. As Weitz-Shapiro (2014) and De La O (2013) describe, rather than reforming the existing bureaucracy, Mexico side-stepped it entirely, creating a new independent agency run by technocratic elites without strong

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<sup>8</sup>And even in Brazil, recent research by Broilo et al. (2015) suggests that access to *Bolsa Familia* is still partially manipulated before elections as a form of political targeting.

<sup>9</sup>This is similar to the argument in Chapter 3 about why politicians who have specialized in providing patronage will often be unlikely to invest instead in universalistic appeals.

<sup>10</sup>Similarly, Persson et al. (2012) describe the large collective action problems governments face in reforming corrupted, politicized bureaucracies.

partisan ties to distribute *Progresa* benefits. A series of laws and regulations were enacted to protect this agency from subsequent political interference, including placing hard caps on the amount of program benefits that could be distributed before elections. Creating a single new agency is a significantly more plausible task for a developing country like Ghana to replicate in the short term than reforming the entire state bureaucracy. This would allow social transfer programs to at least begin partially breaking clientelistic ties with the poor through universalistic distribution of some benefits even if the remainder of the bureaucracy remains politicized.

But under the logic of Shefter (1994), why would current incumbents agree to create such agencies? Because there now appear to be large electoral rewards to doing so. De La O (2013), Zucco Jr. (2013), and Labonne (2013) all show significant electoral benefits to incumbent governments for implementing cash transfer programs similar to those the World Bank is now advocating in countries like Ghana. That these programs benefit incumbents is one of the main selling points to the many governments in the developing world that are now considering adopting them. The ruling party in Ghana may be able to reap similar rewards; this may be why the NDC government is investing in the *LEAP* program to begin with. By systematically and efficiently reaching a large number of voters with the particularistic goods that they demand, similar programs may actually be a more efficient means of building support with unaligned voters than the relatively inefficient “reputation building” strategies I describe in Chapter 4. Worryingly, as with Ghana’s other “universalistic” programs, *LEAP* is currently being administered by a pre-existing bureaucracy, not an independent, insulated agency, raising the risk it will still be used as patronage.<sup>11</sup> But if this were to change, and the program were significantly scaled up, this type of program could be a means to change incentives for ethnic voting I document in Chapter 5, repeating a similar historical process to what ended the incentives sustaining the ethnic machine parties in US cities.

### **7.3.2 Devolution and Local Elections**

Another institutional change that would alter the incentives I document involves moving in the opposite direction. Rather than undermining patronage by centralizing control of particularistic resources in an autonomous national bureaucracy, Ghana could devolve significantly greater fiscal and policy-making powers

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<sup>11</sup>LEAP is still a new program with a limited set of recipients. To my knowledge, there is currently no evidence one way or the other on whether LEAP is being used as patronage by the ruling party.

to district governments and introduce local elections for District Chief Executives (DCEs, or mayors).

As discussed in Chapter 6, many African governments have adopted decentralization reforms in recent decades, primarily by creating additional local-level administrative units (Hassan 2014). But as Grossman & Lewis (2014) describe, these reforms have not involved giving real substantive power to local tiers of government; if anything, decentralization has allowed national governments to re-centralize power by diluting the bargaining power of local governments and projecting central state authority into additional local communities. Decentralization has had these effects because national governments typically retain significant control over local tiers of government in Africa, appointing local-level officials and controlling their budgets (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). In the terminology of Boone (2003*a*), these states are “deconcentrated,” but real powers are not “devolved” to the local level. In the typology of Falleti (2010), there has been administrative decentralization, but not fiscal or political decentralization.

The local government system in Ghana examined in Chapter 6 is an archetypical example of this pattern. The leader of each district – the DCE – is a direct presidential appointee. There are local elections to district assemblies, but 30% are direct presidential appointees, ensuring that the president’s party retains a working majority in effectively all districts. The national government – controlled by the president’s ruling party – controls the purse strings; most of the local budget depends on transfers from the center. District governments have the ability to engage in limited local tax collection, but most revenue streams are monopolized by the national government. District governments have no explicit policy-making authority within their jurisdictions and do not have the capacity to initiate major projects on their own. Instead, they only can oversee local implementation of policies decided on by the national government.

These limitations directly feed into the outcomes documented in the prior chapters. The only activity that elected districted assembly members can credibly engage in is the distribution of small-scale particularistic goods. Not valuing the services that these local officials can credibly provide, I find large-scale withdrawal of the middle class from participation in local elections in Chapter 6, which then allows minority interests to capture disproportionate local power and govern narrowly for their own benefit. More generally, because the national ruling party controls most disbursements at all levels of government, there is favoritism to co-ethnics of the ruling party in goods distribution everywhere, even within otherwise opposition-leaning districts, which helps create the incentives for ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods shown in Chapter 5.



But these incentives could change if DCEs were locally elected, all district assembly seats were elected, rather than 30% appointed by the national government, and district governments were given more fiscal and policy-making autonomy. With more power, district-level officials could more credibly propose delivering a broader range of policies and goods to voters, rather than only providing small-scale targeted benefits. Under the logic of the argument in Chapter 6, there would then be higher turnout in local elections. Higher turnout would make minority ethnic groups like the Ga less likely to capture disproportionate local power; the benefits of local elections that other studies have identified in preventing local capture would become more evident (e.g., Ferraz and Finan 2011, Beath et al. 2013). More importantly, with the ability to now implement some of the policies that middle class voters demand, at least on a local scale, there will be a greater incentive for local politicians to compete for middle class votes. Chapter 3 argues that a key constraint on the ability of politicians to satisfy universalistic preferences of the middle class is a coordination problem with other branches of government. Even if politicians in wealthier urban districts want to implement specific policies, in the status quo system they would need approval from the rest of their party, which may be unwilling to make broader policy changes that hurt their ability to distribute patronage in other areas. But if real authority is devolved to local governments, local politicians can now adopt new policies within their districts, even as patronage practices continue elsewhere in the country. As a result, middle class turnout in local elections may rise.

These reforms would begin to allow for more substantive diversification in programmatic versus clientelistic modes of political competition at the local level across districts within urban areas, similar to the municipal-level variation that has been documented extensively in Latin America (Luna 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2014, ?)<sup>12</sup> As Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 note, districts in Greater Accra are not nearly as segregated by wealth as in many Latin American cities. But middle class coalitions may be able to win on truly programmatic platforms in relatively wealthier urban districts, even as patronage-based appeals remain entrenched in relatively poorer urban districts. The intra-urban variation in patterns of political competition that I observe in the previous chapters would intensify, but now there would be real programmatic competition in the areas where individual-level clientelism is less prevalent.

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<sup>12</sup>This is most likely where cities are split across many different municipal or district-level administrative units. In many US cities, such as New York, Chicago, or LA, a single municipal government controls a huge swath of territory and a single machine party can dominate the entire city. But more like many major South American cities, Greater Accra is split into 12 separate municipal governments, allowing for different outcomes in different parts of the city.

These changes would take place in the context of local elections, and would not immediately alter the overall character of competition in presidential elections. But by potentially allowing programmatic political competition to emerge at the local level, political and fiscal decentralization would create space for new policy-based urban electoral coalitions to form. Similar to the idea that US states can be “laboratories” of democracy in which new policy ideas are first attempted and then eventually exported nationwide, these local policy-based coalitions in wealthier districts could eventually aggregate into political forces that become influential in national-level politics. If this occurs, the class-based differences in participation in national-level politics observed in Chapter 3 should decline.

But as with the universalistic social welfare programs described above, is it plausible that incumbent national governments would ever agree to such political and fiscal decentralization? In general, national governments are assumed to prefer to maintain their current powers (Falleti 2010).<sup>13</sup> But O’Neill (2005) suggests that governments will support these types of decentralization if they have long time horizons and expect to be in the opposition in the near future. Devolving authority to lower tiers of government allows a party to smooth its consumption of political power – giving up some power in the present to ensure that they can maintain local power, at least in stronghold areas, deep into the future even if they lose the next national-level elections.

With its two highly institutionalized parties that regularly rotate in power, Ghana may be the African case in which the argument in O’Neill (2005) best applies. Unlike many other African leaders and ruling parties (e.g., Bates 2008), democratic competition is sufficiently institutionalized in Ghana that the parties have long time horizons. There is a reasonable expectation that they could take national power, or instead lose it, in each subsequent national election. They both have strong regional bases, as described in Chapter 2. If power were devolved to the local level, they would be able to maintain control in these home regions even if they lost a national election. Along these lines, proposals for fiscal and political decentralization – especially the local election of DCEs – have already received significant consideration at high levels within the Ghanaian government. Recently, a Constitutional Review Commission created by the NDC publicly recommended the same changes I propose above. Senior leaders of both major parties have now endorsed

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<sup>13</sup>Indeed, in Kampala, Uganda, for example, the national government undid fiscal and political decentralization, seizing back control over budgets and policy-making in the city after opposition politicians took over the local city council and began implementing an independent policy agenda. This local policy-making independence was seen as a political threat to the president, in part specifically because it was helping to engender a new opposition political coalition at the grassroots level in a similar manner to what I anticipate above (Lambright 2014).

these proposals on the record (at least in theory), although the current NDC government has stalled at taking significant action to set them into motion. Despite this, these types of decentralization reforms are realistic possibilities in Ghana's near future, especially if a new government more committed to the Constitutional Review Commission's proposals takes power after the next election.

### **7.3.3 Compulsory Registration and Voting**

A third possible institutional reform would involve changes to electoral administration. Chapter 3 argues that politicians in Ghana will not face pressure to make credible policy-based electoral appeals that address the preferences of the middle class, even as the middle class grows in size, if there is declining participation and engagement by middle class voters with universalistic preferences. Compulsory voting laws and automatic voter registration could help change this dynamic, creating a new set of incentives that encourage middle class voters to turn out in high numbers even if current parties are not explicitly addressing their preferences. If this happens, there would be renewed electoral pressure for Ghanaian politicians to offer policies meant to address middle class preferences and secure the votes of this segment of the electorate. If that happens, programmatic competition could begin to emerge as politicians compete for support of the urban middle class.

As described in Chapter 3, Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) finds that poor voters are more likely to turn out than wealthier or middle class voters in much of the developing world, in the opposite of the pattern commonly assumed to hold in developed democracies, where wealthier voters often turn out more than the poor.<sup>14</sup> But one region of the developing world that appears to deviate from the overall pattern Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) documents is Latin America, where cross-national analyses do not show evidence of significant class-based differences in turnout rates, in either direction (Fornos et al. 2004). A key difference setting this region apart is that compulsory voting laws are common throughout Central and South America, but rare elsewhere in the developing world, including in Africa.<sup>15</sup>

Compulsory voting laws have long been advocated as an institutional remedy for class-based disparities in the composition of the electorate (Lijphart 1997, Hill 2006). They are argued to produce high turnout rates

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<sup>14</sup>Although see Ansolabehere & Hersh (2012), which suggests that the true extent of turnout inequality in developed democracies may itself be overstated due to measurement problems.

<sup>15</sup>For a full list of countries with compulsory voting, see: [http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory\\_voting.cfm](http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm).

and significantly reduce turnout inequality even without full enforcement (Nichter 2008). Even if many non-voters are never punished, the existence of penalties for not voting can change norms about turnout and lead most voters to the polls (Lijphart 1997). This is consistent with a large literature showing that small marginal changes to the cost of voting can have big effects on turnout decisions (e.g., Brady and McNulty 2011).

Jaitman (2013) leverages a natural experiment created by age-based cutoffs in the schedule of penalties for not turning out to vote in Argentina to show that the country's compulsory turnout law has large effects on turnout rates, even though the official penalties are rarely imposed for not voting. Jaitman (2013) estimates that the mere possibility of penalties for not voting increases turnout by as much as 18 percentage points among otherwise similar voters. This has the effect of leveling out class-based differences in the composition of the Argentine electorate. Other changes to electoral procedures can similarly increase turnout and reduce class-based disparities. For example, Wolfinger & Rosenstone (1980), Lijphart (1997), and Hill (2006) discuss how making voter registration automatic can significantly increase turnout among previously low turnout populations as opposed to making voters voluntarily choose to go through a potentially complicated bureaucratic process in order to register. In addition, these types of laws are thought to have downstream effects on the political preferences that are represented in the party system (Jensen & Spoon 2011). As the range of policy preferences in the electorate changes when previously low turnout groups begin voting at high rates, parties in many countries have begun catering more to the preferences of these new voters, as I predict above.

The existing work looking at the effects of these new rules has been focused on reducing class disparities in turnout that run in the other direction than in Ghana – with the goal being to increase the turnout of the poor relative to the rich. But while Jaitman (2013) shows that effects of compulsory voting laws in Argentina are larger among less educated, lower skill voters, the laws still were estimated to have a positive effect on turnout among wealthier and more educated voters. With the poor in Ghana already turning out at very high rates, there are likely ceiling effects on how much more compulsory voting or automatic registration could increase turnout of the poor. As a result, these rules would likely still increase the turnout of the middle class and wealthy relative to the poor. In addition, Kuenzi & Lambright (2007) show that aggregate turnout levels in African democracies are associated with the same underlying institutional factors as have been found to affect aggregate turnout in Latin America (Fornos et al. 2004). There is no clear reason why the effects of compulsory voting and registration laws should operate fundamentally differently in the African context.

While Ghana's state capacity would constrain the ability of the government to enforce compulsory voting rules, the research above on the effects of these laws show that they can be effective even with incomplete enforcement. Moreover, automatic voter registration appears relatively achievable for the Ghanaian state. The country is currently creating a national identification card for all citizens and there have been high-level proposals that the Electoral Commission could now use this system to automatically register voters.<sup>16</sup> Currently, Ghana's voter registration process erects significant costs to registering – higher than many US jurisdictions, where automatic registration is already expected to have significant effects on turnout (Hill 2006). There is no rolling registration in Ghana; people can only register, or update their registration to a new home, in specific one or two week periods. These typically occur at some point before each presidential election, but they are often only announced at the last minute, poorly advertised, and frequently postponed. The parties engage in significant clientelistic mobilization of the poor to ensure that they register during these narrow windows, but those who are not actively mobilized to register and work full-time jobs in the formal sector, commuting to work away from their homes, face greater hurdles to registration. Automatic registration through the national identification system would eliminate this disparity.

Ultimately, compulsory voting reforms will not undermine all of the incentives I describe in the previous chapters. Ethnic voting will likely continue as long as patronage-based appeals continue alongside programmatic competition. But if paired with the other institutional reforms suggested above, these changes could collectively have concrete downstream effects on the forms of political competition that prevail in African cities like Greater Accra.

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<sup>16</sup>For example, see Godwin A. Allotey, "We don't need new voters' register, we need national ID - Nduom" *CitiFM Online*, 30 August 2015, <http://citifmonline.com/2015/08/30/we-dont-need-new-voters-register-we-need-national-id-ndoum/>. The main purpose of automatic registration for its Ghanaian proponents is to cut down on electoral fraud, in which parties either pay supporters to register – and then vote – multiple times or register minors and foreign nationals to vote for the party (Ichino & Schuendeln 2012). But such a rule could also have broader effects on the composition of the electorate.

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## **A | Appendix: Supporting Information**

### **A.1 Chapter 1**

#### **A.1.1 Election Results by City in Table 1.3**

The column for political competitiveness in Table 1.3 codes whether a single party won more than 65% of the vote in each city in the last election for which results were publicly available. Due to difficulty in obtaining disaggregated district or constituency results for many countries, the election used here is sometimes the second most recent national election, rather than the most recent one. Many cities are also now significantly larger than their official district boundaries. Where possible I use results for the entire administrative region surrounding a city (e.g. all of Lagos State) to err on the side of including the full metropolitan area. I list the election year, type, data source, and main result for each city in Table 3 here:

Table A.1: Data Sources for Table 3

<i>City, Country:</i>	Election Year	Election Type	Source	Winning Party	Vote Share
Lagos, Nigeria	2015	Pres.	Election commission website	APC	55%
Kinshasa, DRC	–	–	none available	–	–
Johannesburg, S. Africa	2014	Nat. Assem.	Election commission website	ANC	54%
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	2010	Pres.	Election commission website	CCM	51%
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire	2011	Parl.	<i>Election Passport</i> <sup>a</sup>	RHDP	52%
Greater Accra, Ghana	2012	Pres.	Official EC data	NDC	51%
Nairobi, Kenya	2013	Pres.	Election commission website	ODM	49%
Cape Town, S. Africa	2014	Nat. Assem.	Election commission website	DA	59%
Kano, Nigeria	2011 <sup>b</sup>	House of Rep.	<i>Election Passport</i>	PDP	35%
Dakar, Senegal	2012	Pres. (1st Rd)	<i>African Elections Database</i> <sup>c</sup>	APR	27%
Ibadan, Nigeria	2011 <sup>b</sup>	House of Rep.	<i>Election Passport</i>	ACN	37%
Durban, S. Africa	2014	Nat. Assem.	Election commission website	ANC	65%
Ouagadougou, Burk. Faso	2010	Pres.	Election commission website	CDP	>65% <sup>d</sup>
Antananarivo, Madag.	2013	Pres.	Election commission website	AVANA	61%
Kumasi, Ghana	2012	Pres.	Official EC data	NPP	>70%
Bamako, Mali	–	–	none available	–	–
Abuja, Nigeria	2015	Pres.	Election commission website	PDP	50%
Lusaka, Zambia	2015	Pres.	Election commission website	PF	61%
Pretoria, S. Africa	2014	Nat. Assem.	Election commission website	ANC	51%
Lubumbashi, DRC	–	–	none available	–	–
Mbuji-Mayi, DRC	–	–	none available	–	–
Conakry, Guinea	2013	Nat. Assem.	<i>Election Passport</i>	UDFG	45%
Kampala, Uganda	2011	Pres.	Election commission website	FDC	46%
Harare, Zimbabwe	2013	Parl.	<i>Election Passport</i>	MDC	53% <sup>e</sup>
Benin City, Nigeria	2015	Pres.	Election commission website	PDP	55%

a: David Lublin, *Election Passport*, Ó American University, <http://www.electionpassport.com>. b: Kano State and Oyo State both include many rural areas not in Kano city or Ibadan . Local-level results that allowed for a disaggregated estimate of city vote shares itself were only publicly available for 2011. c: African Elections Database, <http://africanelections.tripod.com/>. d: Local-level results not publicly available, but based on the landslide in favor of the CDP in national-level results, it is clear than the party won more than 65% within the capital. e: Unofficial results from Election Passport were used for Zimbabwe given the widespread allegations of rigging in the officially released totals.

## A.2 Chapter 2

### A.2.1 Sampling Procedure for Urban Survey

The survey was conducted in a stratified random sample of urban Greater Accra. Using 2010 census data, the parliamentary constituencies in urban Greater Accra were stratified by wealth (top or bottom half of the distribution on the same wealth index in the paper), ethnic diversity (top or bottom half of the distribution of ethnic fractionalization), and 2012 presidential vote share (as NDC or NPP stronghold, or as competitive). Ten constituencies were then randomly selected, with the number per stratum determined by the proportion of the total population in the stratum and the selection probabilities within each stratum weighted by constituency population in 2010.

Within each constituency, five 2010 census enumeration areas were sampled with replacement, again stratifying by ethnic diversity and wealth, with the number chosen per stratum proportional to the stratum's share of the constituency population and the selection probability of enumeration areas within strata weighted by population. Only 4 enumeration areas were selected in two constituencies that are significantly smaller than the others (Ayawaso East and Ayawaso North). Finally, random GPS starting points for enumerators were chosen within each selected enumeration area. These starting points were projected onto Google Maps for the enumerators, who began sampling respondents upon confirming via GPS coordinates that they had reached the sampled start point. This final step ensured that the random walks to select respondents did not only begin in the more commercial part of each neighborhood, as would be the case if using polling stations or the community center as each starting point.

Surveys were conducted by enumerators using smartphones (ODK Collect) to enter survey responses. To select 21 respondents around each starting point, the smartphone gave each enumerator a new random direction and number of houses to count off to recruit each respondent. The first walk began at the start point and then the enumerators continued each new walk from the previous respondent's home. Within households, the phone assigned a gender to be selected (alternating by interview) and randomly selected a specific person of that gender after ranking household members by age. Enumerators conducted "call backs" for respondents who were initially unavailable and otherwise sampled replacements (from new households) via the same random walk procedure.

### A.2.2 Calculation of Neighborhood Characteristics

I follow Reardon & O'Sullivan (2004) and Lee et al. (2008) by calculating neighborhood characteristics around respondents (and polling stations) as a weighted average of census characteristics falling within a set radius from the respondent. This is the same approach taken in Ichino and Nathan (2013).

In this approach, the spatially weighted population share of group  $m$  around a respondent at point  $p$  is  $\tilde{\pi}_{pm} = \frac{\int_{q \in R} \tau_{qm} \phi(p, q) dq}{\int_{q \in R} \tau_q \phi(p, q) dq}$ , where  $\tau_q$  is the population density at point  $q$ ,  $\tau_{qm}$  is the population density of group  $m$  at point  $q$ ,  $dist(p, q)$  is the distance in kilometers from the respondent at point  $p$  to the centroid of a surrounding census enumeration area (EA) at point  $q$ , and EAs are weighted by the function  $\phi(p, q) = (dist(p, q) + 0.5)^{-1}$ , as in Reardon and O'Sullivan (2004), up to a maximum distance, after which all EAs are weighted as 0. This is calculated via the `seg` package in R. I set the maximum radius to 500 meters for the reasons discussed in the text. This approach finds a middle ground between calculating neighborhood characteristics as only each respondent's own EA or calculating these characteristics to a pre-defined unit much larger than actual neighborhoods, such as a district or parliamentary constituency. The former approach implicitly weights all other EAs as 0 even though neighborhoods are larger than EAs and EA boundaries are arbitrary and not socially meaningful. The latter approach will miss significant within-

district variation in neighborhood characteristics. Because the weights approach 0 further away from the respondent, small changes in the size of the maximum radius (e.g., to 400m or 600m) do not significantly affect these measures. This procedure is described in more detail in Chapter 5 as well.

### **A.2.3 Interviews and Focus Groups in Greater Accra, by Constituency**

#### **Interviews**

##### *Ablekuma North*

Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 20 June 2012

Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 19 July 2012

Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014

Interview with NPP party agent, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 14 March 2014

Interview with NDC constituency executive, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 25 March 2014

##### *Anyaa-Sowutuom*

Interview with NPP constituency executive, Anyaa-Sowutuom constituency, 20 July 2012

##### *Ayawaso Central*

Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 4 July 2012

Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 19 July 2012

Interview with district assembly member and NDC member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27 August 2013

##### *Ayawaso West*

Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 16 July 2012

Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 23 July 2012

Interview with NPP constituency executives, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 6 August 2013

Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 20 August 2013

##### *Dome Kwabenya*

Interview with NPP constituency executive, Dome Kwabenya constituency, 26 June 2012

##### *La Dade Kotopon*

Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, La Dade Kotopon, 19 August 2013

Interview with district assembly member and NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February 2014

Interview with district assembly member and NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February 2014

Interview with NPP party agent (#1), La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014

Interview with NPP party agent (#2), La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014

Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 27 February 2014  
Interview with NPP constituency executive, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 4 March 2014  
Interview with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 5 March 2014  
Interview with NDC constituency executives and NDC MP, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 24 March 2014  
Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 26 March 2014

#### *Ledzokuku*

Interview with NPP constituency executive, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 August 2013  
Interview with NPP party agents, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 August 2013  
Interview with district assembly member and NPP party agent, Ledzokuku constituency, 3 August 2013

#### *Krowor*

Interview with former NPP constituency executive and former NPP parliamentary candidate, 6 June 2012  
Interview with NPP current and former constituency executives, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agent, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agents (#1), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agents (#2), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agents (#3), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agent (#4), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014  
Interview with NPP party agents (#5), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014  
Interview with former NDC constituency executive, Krowor constituency, 19 March 2014

#### *Madina*

Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, 6 June 2012  
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Madina constituency, 18 June 2012  
Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, 29 June 2012

#### *Okaikwei Central*

Interview with district assembly member and NDC party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014  
Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014  
Interview with NDC party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 1 March 2014  
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 4 March 2014  
Interview with district assembly member and former NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 12 March 2014  
Interview with NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 19 March 2014

#### *Okaikwei North*

Interview with NPP constituency executives, Okaikwei North constituency (AMA), 6 August 2013

#### *Weija-Gbawe*

Interview with NPP constituency executive, Weija-Gbawe constituency, 29 July 2013

#### **Focus Groups**

Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, 19 June 2013  
Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 21 June 2013



Focus group, Anyaa, Anyaa-Sowutuom constituency, 24 June 2013  
Focus group, McCarthy Hill, Weija-Gbawe constituency, 24 June 2013  
Focus group, Kaneshie, Ablekuma South constituency (AMA), 26 June 2013  
Focus group, Labadi Market, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 27 June 2013  
Focus group, Teshie, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 July 2013  
Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, 3 July 2013  
Focus group, Madina Zongo, Madina constituency, 30 July 2013  
Focus group, Dansoman, Ablekuma West constituency (AMA), 1 August 2013  
Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, 7 August 2013  
Focus group, Odorkor, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 1 October 2013  
Focus group, Mataheko, Ablekuma Central constituency (AMA), 1 October 2013

## A.3 Chapter 3

### A.3.1 Coding Rules for Preferences

Responses to the question about preferences were blind-coded, with all respondent information removed except a ID number. Responses were coded on two dimensions: the category of preference and the specific topic or issue. In terms of the category, responses were coded as either being universalistic or particularistic and then as private or club goods within particularistic preferences. Universalistic preferences were those that could only be satisfied by a public policy that necessarily would affect many other people, not only the respondent or respondent's immediate neighborhood. Club goods were preferences that could be satisfied by providing something to a specific neighborhood or community. Private goods were preferences that could be satisfied by providing something directly to an individual, especially the respondent. The key defining criteria thus was: could this preference be satisfied by a politician through a clientelistic transfer or instead only through a major public policy that affects everyone? The goal is to provide a conservative lower bound on the extent of universalistic demands. Responses were also coded for the substantive topics within these categories. These topics were adapted directly from the coding categories for a similar question on the 3rd Round of the Afrobarometer surveys (Question #63), also analyzed in Lieberman and McClendon (2013).<sup>1</sup>

There were several ambiguities in coding the broader categories of preferences. First, demands for club goods in which the respondent specifically specified that the beneficiaries be someone other than herself or community are coded as universalistic. Examples include "Government has to extend the electricity in a way that people in the rural areas could also have access to it" and "Put up education facilities in the rural areas." Coming from urban respondents, these are statements in support of pro-rural public policies and were coded as universalistic. But when the respondent did not specify a recipient, preferences for club goods were always coded as particularistic. For example, "tar bad roads" would be coded as particularistic and a club good, in the same way that the response "tar bad roads in my area" would be coded. But "tar bad roads in rural areas" would be coded as universalistic.

Second, respondents asking for support with education expenses could have been making two different types of demands – those asking for direct assistance for themselves or families, and those demanding the NPP's national free secondary education policy, which was a central element of its 2012 campaign platform, as described in the main text. The first preference is private and particularistic and can be satisfied by patronage to a specific voter. Indeed, local politicians in Ghana describe support for school tuition as one of the main private goods they distribute to voters in clientelistic relationships. But the second preference is universalistic and regards a major national public policy. To separate these preferences, any statements that directly and specifically mentioned making secondary education free (e.g., "free shs education" or "make shs free", where SHS is "senior high school") were coded as universalistic. But statements that made vaguer demands for support for education expenses were coded as particularistic (e.g., "reduce cost of education" or "make school fees affordable"), as these preferences could still be satisfied by more targeted assistance to the particular respondent.

Third, many respondents said that they wanted the government to improve employment. These preferences were coded as universalistic only if the respondent specifically said that they wanted jobs created for

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<sup>1</sup>The full list of topics that respondents raised are: 1. rates and taxes; 2. education; 3. corruption; 4. petroleum; 5. unemployment; 6. health; 7. water supply; 8. economy; 9. infrastructure and roads; 10. housing supply; 11. sanitation; 12. support to local business; 13. governance; 14. poverty; 15. loans; 16. electricity; 17. crime; 18. social welfare; 19. farming; 20. political divisions / conflict ; 21. social problems; 22. public sector wages; 23. food shortages; 24. land; 25. flooding; 26. transportation; 27. orphans.

Table A.2: Universalistic Preferences (Replication of Table 3.2)

	1	2
<i>Outcome:</i>	Binary	Binary
<i>Version:</i>	Educ/Literacy Only	No Employment Demands
<i>Educ/Literacy Index</i>	0.184* (0.092)	
<i>Educ/Empl. Index</i>		0.207† (0.113)
<i>Assets Index</i>	-0.104 (0.083)	-0.234* (0.106)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	987	619

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Logistic regression coefficients, with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). All models otherwise identical to column 1 of Table 3.2 in the main text.

everyone (e.g., “create jobs for all” or “create more jobs in Ghana so that living standard will improve”). Any other statement that was vague about whether or not the respondent herself wanted the new job was coded as particularistic (e.g., “create more jobs” or “provision of jobs”). This preference could still potentially be satisfied by a patronage job for that respondent, her family, or those in her immediate community.

### A.3.2 Table 3.2 Results without Employment

To ensure that the correlation between being in the middle class and having universalistic preferences is not a mechanical outcome of the fact that the definition of middle class includes whether or not a respondent is employed in the formal sector and one of the most common particularistic preferences is a demand for employment, I repeat the main model from Table 3.2 after either: (a) only defining middle class status based on literacy and secondary education, not employment; (b) dropping all respondents who list employment as one of their preferences and using the original definition of middle class. Results in both alternative specifications are substantively identical to those in Table 3.2.

Table A.3: Preferences for Club Goods

	1	2
<i>Educ/Empl. Index</i>	-0.057 (0.089)	-0.055 (0.089)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.092 (0.091)	0.101 (0.093)
<i>Pop. Change 10 Years (500m)</i>		0.075* 0.035
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>		-0.211 (0.200)
<i>Running Water (by cluster)</i>		-0.938* (0.397)
<i>Paved Road (by cluster)</i>		-0.566 <sup>†</sup> (0.294)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>		-0.013* (0.006)
<i>Moved for Club Goods</i>	-0.570* (0.246)	-0.557* (0.247)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	987	987

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Logistic regression coefficients, with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome is either a binary indicator for listing at least one club good among the responses. Other than the outcome variable, the models are the same as columns 1 and 4 of Table 3.2 in the main text

### A.3.3 Outcome as Demand for Club Goods

I also repeat the models for Table 3.2 with the outcome as a binary indicator for demanding any club good (gutters, roads, etc). I find that differences in wealth and socio-economic class do not predict whether respondents want club goods, such as new roads or water supply. But the variables measuring the quality of existing service provision in the neighborhood are all strong predictors of preferences for club goods, as described in the main text. In addition, having moved into your current neighborhood because of the public services there (controlled for in all models), predicts lower demand for club goods, consistent with the discussion of this in the text.

### **A.3.4 Removing Electricity and Water Prices, Removing Free Secondary Education**

Because turnout cannot be measured until after the election, and preferences and turnout must be measured in the same survey, preferences are observed after the decision to vote, yet are being used as an explanatory variable. Preferences could have been influenced by factors occurring after the election. The assumption above is that the types of people who prefer universalistic versus particularistic goods are correlated over time, such that respondents prioritizing universalistic policies after the election were also those most likely to prioritize universalistic policies before the election.<sup>2</sup> If the classification of preferences has been muddled by post-hoc measurement, with some respondents mis-assigned to the wrong category (universalistic vs. particularistic), the measurement error should bias against seeing significant differences in political behavior between the two groups.

But this does not mean that the specific issues that voters raise within these broader categories of universalistic or particularistic goods will be the same over time. The clearest example of this is that the government announced increases in water and electricity prices immediately before the survey was fielded – this likely explains the prominence of preferences for lower electricity and water prices seen in Table 3.1 of the main text.<sup>3</sup> In the table below, I drop all respondents who would only have been coded as having universalistic preferences because of complaints about electricity or water prices and re-estimate Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 of the main text. I find substantively identical results in the first column of the three tables below, suggesting that the findings are not explained by a topical issue that arose after the election.

Moreover, when those with universalistic preferences did turn out to vote, they were more likely to vote for the NPP than the NDC, even controlling for differences in ethnicity and individual-level wealth. This is consistent with the NPP putting somewhat more emphasis on policy-based appeals in its campaign, as noted in the main text, and with the NPP being the only viable opposition party that voters dissatisfied with the status quo could turn to. There could be concern, however, that universalistic preferences measured after the election are outcomes of NPP support. This is especially for those who wanted free secondary education nationwide, which was mentioned by some who spoke about education (see Table 3.1 in the main text, 10% of total universalistic preferences were on education). This was by far the main universalistic policy issue emphasized in the 2012 NPP platform and campaign. In another robustness test in the second column of the three tables below, I drop all respondents who would only have been coded as having universalistic preferences because they wanted the NPP's secondary education policy and re-estimate the results in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 of the main text. I find no substantive differences with the results in the main text.

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<sup>2</sup>Similarly, I make an assumption that measurement of who is in the middle class is correlated over time.

<sup>3</sup>These rates are set by the government, with a single price nationally, and thus involve a universalistic policy.

Table A.4: Universalistic Preferences, Dropping Utility Price and Education Demands

	1	2
<i>Outcome:</i>	Binary	Binary
<i>Dropped Respondents:</i>	Utility Prices	Education
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	0.191* (0.091)	0.182* (0.084)
<i>Assets Index</i>	-0.182† (0.097)	-0.131 (0.088)
<i>Pop. Change 10 Years (500m)</i>	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.025)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	0.436* (0.198)	0.272 (0.175)
<i>Running Water (by cluster)</i>	0.882* (0.372)	0.685* (0.339)
<i>Paved Road (by cluster)</i>	0.588* (0.276)	0.420† (0.252)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.021*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	862	961

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Logistic regression coefficients with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome is the binary indicator for listing at least one universalistic policy. Models are the same as Table 3.2 in the main text.

Table A.5: Turnout and Participation, Dropping Utility Price and Education Demands

	1	2	3	4
<i>Outcome:</i>	Turnout	Turnout	Withdrawal	Withdrawal
<i>Dropped Respondents:</i>	Utility Prices	Education	Utility Prices	Education
<i>Universalistic Preferences (binary)</i>	-0.389 <sup>†</sup> (0.219)	0.381* (0.168)	-0.544** (0.201)	0.365* (0.158)
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	-0.125 (0.125)	0.233* (0.096)	-0.071 (0.112)	0.195* (0.090)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.204 (0.136)	-0.164 (0.100)	0.164 (0.121)	-0.116 (0.094)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.094 (0.215)	0.178 (0.163)	-0.039 (0.196)	0.153 (0.160)
<i>2008 Competitiveness (by ward)</i>	-3.153* (1.492)	0.622 (1.129)	-2.438 <sup>†</sup> (1.367)	-0.003 (1.143)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	1.236 (1.804)	-0.458 (1.342)	0.852 (1.638)	-0.354 (1.348)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.007 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.007)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Constituency FEs</i>	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	861	799	960	895

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome in columns 1-2 is self-reported turnout in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. The outcome in columns 3-4 is an indicator for doing only 1 or 0 of the 5 forms of participation discussed in the text. All models are otherwise the same as Table 3.3 in the main text.

Table A.6: Credibility of MPs' Promises, Dropping Utility Price and Education Demands

<i>Promised Good:</i>	1		2		3		4		5		6	
	Public	Utility Prices	Club	Utility Prices	Private	Utility Prices	Public	Education	Club	Education	Private	Education
<i>Dropped Respondents:</i>												
<i>Universalsistic Preferences (binary)</i>	-0.374 <sup>†</sup> (0.216)		-0.485* (0.215)		-0.380 <sup>†</sup> (0.215)		-0.387 <sup>†</sup> (0.194)		-0.439* (0.197)		-0.396* (0.199)	
<i>Co-Ethnic Candidate</i>	0.502* (0.217)		0.346 (0.212)		0.254 (0.214)		0.580** (0.206)		0.467* (0.198)		0.293 (0.201)	
<i>Example 2: Low Utility Prices</i>	-0.105 (0.212)						0.093 (0.202)					
<i>Example 2: New Classrooms</i>			0.107 (0.208)					0.138 (0.192)				
<i>Example 2: Scholarships</i>					0.007 (0.205)						-0.032 (0.193)	
<i>Educ/Emply. Index</i>	0.019 (0.129)		0.092 (0.122)		0.030 (0.122)		0.027 (0.122)		0.079 (0.113)		0.042 (0.115)	
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.107 (0.133)		0.114 (0.123)		0.090 (0.127)		0.102 (0.125)		0.105 (0.116)		0.152 (0.118)	
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
<i>Neighborhood-level Controls</i>	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
<i>Name and Background Controls</i>	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
<i>N</i>	531		534		540		593		595		598	

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is whether a respondent believes the MP in the vignette will actually deliver the cued good after the election. All models are the same as Table 3.5 in the main text.



### A.3.5 Table for Interaction of Demands and Mobilization

This is the corresponding regression table for the model used to simulate differences in turnout between those with and without universalistic preferences at different rates of reported door to door mobilization.

Table A.7: Turnout and Mobilization

	1
<i>Outcome:</i>	Turnout
<i>Universalistic Preferences (percentage)</i>	-2.407* (1.105)
<i>Door to Door Mobilization % (by cluster)</i>	-0.508 (1.124)
<i>Universalistic * Door to Door</i>	2.852† (1.584)
<i>Educ/Empl. Index</i>	-0.071 (0.113)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.156 (0.119)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	0.027 (0.220)
<i>2008 Competitiveness (by ward)</i>	-2.174 (1.422)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	1.130 (1.641)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.009 (0.009)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y
<i>Constituency FEs</i>	Y
<i>N</i>	986

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The outcome in columns 1-4 is self-reported turnout in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Logistic regression coefficients, with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). All other modeling details are identical to Table 3.3 in the main text.

Table A.8: Treatment Values in the Survey Experiment

<i>Treatment:</i>	Value 1	Value 2	Value 3	Value 4
<i>Ethnicity:</i>				
AKAN	James Prempeh	Emmanuel Owusu Ansah	–	–
EWE	Joseph Dzorkpe	John Dodzi	–	–
GA	Alfred Nii Tawiah	Richard Laryea	–	–
NORTHERN	Isaac Yakubu	Amadu Muntari	–	–
<i>Promise:</i>				
PUBLIC	Water and fuel prices	National water production	–	–
CLUB	Roads in the constituency	Classrooms in the constituency	–	–
PRIVATE	Jobs for youth	Scholarships to families	–	–
<i>Background text:</i>	Doctor	Lecturer	Lawyer	Businessman

### A.3.6 Experimental Vignettes

Respondents were read two pairs of vignettes about two hypothetical candidates each. After being asked to say which of the two candidates they would rather vote for (analyzed elsewhere), respondents were asked the follow-up question about credibility of one of the two candidates in each pair: “Do you think a politician like [NAME] will actually deliver on a promise like [PROMISE]?” (with the treatments inserted). The candidate that this follow-up question was asked about was randomly chosen from each pair. Each respondent thus answered this question on credibility twice, with two different conditions for NAME and PROMISE.

The vignettes about candidates varied on three dimensions: the name (and thus ethnicity) of the candidate, the good he promised to deliver, and his background. Table A.8 lists the possible values of each treatment. Inserting example treatments, the vignettes took the form:<sup>4</sup>

[AKAN 1, PUBLIC GOOD 1, LECTURER]: “Candidate A is named JAMES PREMPEH. He is a lecturer and teacher who graduated from KNUST.<sup>5</sup> He lives in the constituency here. If elected, he is promising TO LOBBY FOR KEEPING THE PRICE OF FUEL AND UTILITIES LOW so that everyone IN GHANA can continue to afford fuel and electricity. With your support, JAMES PREMPEH believes he can bring about a transformation in the development of this community.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup>All prompts were translated into three local languages (Akan, Ewe, Ga), or instead read aloud in English for respondents who preferred the interview in English. Enumerators could select which translation they wished to have appear on the smartphone before reading aloud the prompts.

<sup>5</sup>This is one of the three major national universities in Ghana – the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.

<sup>6</sup>The “background” treatment also includes the “filler” text of the vignette. So for doctors, the final sentence was always “[NAME] wants you to wants you to vote for him so he can improve the lives of people in this community.” For lecturers it was: “With your support, [NAME] believes he can bring about a transformation in the development of this community”, etc. This ensured that the exact wording of the vignette was not exactly the same for each of the four candidates and varied across the ethnicity and promise conditions.

[EWE 1, PRIVATE 1, DOCTOR]: "Candidate B is named JOSEPH DZORKPE. He is a doctor who lives in this constituency and is running for parliament. He received his medical training at the University of Ghana Medical School.<sup>7</sup> In return for your support, he is promising TO FIND JOBS FOR SOME OF THE YOUTH in the constituency. JOSEPH DZORKPE wants you to vote for him so he can improve the lives of people in this community."

In each pair of candidates, respondents always received one candidate from their own ethnic group (based on their response to a question about their own ethnicity earlier on the survey) and the other candidate's ethnicity was then selected at random.<sup>8</sup> The specific names within these ethnicities were also selected at random. In the second pair of vignettes, respondents received the other name from their own ethnic group and a name from one of the two ethnic groups that they had not received in the first vignette, again selected at random. The four backgrounds were randomly allocated to the four candidates, without replacement, such that each background treatment occurred once. In all pairs the candidates promised the same category of good, with one promising the first example and the other promising the second example, again assigned at random. The category of the first pair was selected at random with equal probability from the three categories (PUBLIC/UNIVERSALISTIC, CLUB, PRIVATE) and then the category of second pair selected at random from the remaining two. The order of each specific example within these categories (PRIVATE GOOD 1 vs. PRIVATE GOOD 2) was also randomized with equal probability, as was the order of all the other treatments within the pairs (names, backgrounds).

For example, a single Akan respondent would receive treatments such as: PAIR 1: [AKAN NAME 1, PUBLIC GOOD 1, LAWYER] vs. [NORTHERN NAME 2, PUBLIC GOOD 2, BUSINESSMAN]; PAIR 2: [AKAN NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 1, DOCTOR] vs. [EWE NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 2, LECTURER]. And then the follow-up question about credibility could have been: [NORTHERN NAME 2, PUBLIC GOOD 2, BUSINESSMAN] for the first pair, and [AKAN NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 1, DOCTOR] for the second pair. The questions on credibility would then take the form:

"Do you think a politician like AMADU MUNTARI will actually deliver on a promise like CONSTRUCTING NEW WATER PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN GHANA?"

"Do you think a politician like EMMANUEL OWUSU ANSAH will actually deliver on a promise like CONSTRUCTING AND TARRING MORE OF THE ROADS IN THE CONSTITUENCY?"

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<sup>7</sup>This is the main national medical school.

<sup>8</sup>For respondents who were not members of any of these four ethnic categories all names in the experiment were assigned at random, with equal probability.

Table A.9: Responses to Credibility Question by Co-Ethnicity and Good Promised

<i>Promise:</i>	Public/Universalistic	Club	Private
<i>Co-ethnic Name:</i>	99 “Yes” (32%) N=313	96 “Yes” (34%) N= 285	88 “Yes” (30%) N=292
<i>Non-co-ethnic Name:</i>	69 “Yes” (23%) N=303	90 “Yes” (28%) N=327	84 “Yes” (26%) N=327

### A.3.7 Summary Statistics for Credibility Question

In Table A.9 I provide summary statistics for responses to the follow-up question about credibility. These are the counts of respondents in each treatment category who answer “yes,” that they expect a politician to follow through on his promise. Treatment conditions here are defined by whether respondents’ received a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic name and by the category of good promised. More respondents overall received the non-co-ethnic name treatment because respondents from minor ethnic groups always received non-co-ethnic names.

### **A.3.8 Balance for Credibility Question**

In Table A.10 I provide balance statistics for differences in means for key covariates between the respondents receiving the credibility question in the experiment about a co-ethnic or about a non-co-ethnic. These statistics are listed separately by the type of good referenced in the question. Balance remains imperfect after the randomization, especially for the club goods promises. Because of this, all analysis of the survey experiment the paper includes co-variates as controls to adjust for remaining imbalance across these conditions.

Table A.10: Differences in Means, Co-Ethnic Name Treatment

<i>Variable:</i>	difference in means	p-value
<b>Promise: Universalistic/Public</b>		
Universalistic preference (0,1)	0.037	0.235
Male (0,1)	-0.009	0.778
Some Secondary Education (0,1)	0.003	0.926
Formal Sector Employment (0,1)	0.016	0.493
English Literacy	-0.023	0.466
Education/employment index	-0.004	0.944
Assets index	-0.056	0.373
Moved for club goods (0,1)	0.014	0.467
Age	0.281	0.731
Neigh. Wealth index	0.033	0.527
Eth. Fractionalization	-0.017	0.016
Population Density	-1.773	0.318
<b>Promise: Club Good</b>		
Universalistic preference (0,1)	0.086	0.007
Male (0,1)	-0.009	0.780
Some Secondary Education (0,1)	0.086	0.007
Formal Sector Employment (0,1)	0.063	0.007
English Literacy	0.094	0.003
Education/employment index	0.226	0.000
Assets index	0.046	0.476
Moved for club goods (0,1)	0.039	0.041
Age	-0.119	0.887
Neigh. Wealth index	0.101	0.042
Eth. Fractionalization	-0.002	0.747
Population Density	-1.211	0.485
<b>Promise: Private Good</b>		
Universalistic preference (0,1)	0.063	0.047
Male (0,1)	-0.087	0.006
Some Secondary Education (0,1)	-0.090	0.005
Formal Sector Employment (0,1)	-0.017	0.460
English Literacy	-0.057	0.070
Education/employment index	-0.152	0.016
Assets index	0.024	0.707
Moved for club goods (0,1)	-0.009	0.629
Age	1.034	0.217
Neigh. Wealth index	-0.007	0.885
Eth. Fractionalization	-0.008	0.216
Population Density	-0.415	0.806

### A.3.9 Experimental Results Pooled Across Goods

I confirm that universalistic preferences predict less trust in politicians' promises – and the respondents are less trusting of promises from non-co-ethnics – in a single model that pools across the types of goods being promised (universalistic/public, club, private). This model involves double counting individual respondents, however, as each respondent answered two versions of the credibility question, one each about two of the three types of promises.

## A.4 Chapter 5

### A.4.1 Main Ethnic Voting Result for Akans and Northerners Only

I also replicate the main result of the paper from Table 1 in the main text after coding only co-ethnics of the presidential candidates as potential ethnic voters, rather than also including voters from ethnic groups affiliated with the party overall (e.g., Ewes). The NDC candidate (and winner) in 2012 was John Dramani Mahama, a Northerner from the Gonja tribe. The NPP candidate was Nana Akuffo Addo, an Akan, from the Akyem sub-group. In this revised definition of “ethnic voting”, only Akan and Northern respondents are included in the model and all others are dropped, because they do not have a co-ethnic to vote for in the race.<sup>9</sup> I find that the results in Table 5.1 are identical in this sub-set of respondents. The interaction between ethnic fractionalization and neighborhood wealth remains as before. Individual-level wealth, education, and the salience of ethnic identity still do not predict ethnic voting. The results in the main text are thus robust to using this alternative, narrower definition of ethnic voting instead of the definition used in the text.

There is also another clarification about how I define the Akan ethnic group. The Akan group is comprised of multiple sub-groups. While most are strongly linked to the NPP, the Fanti sub-group has been less aligned, in part because the NDC candidate was a Fanti in 2000, 2004, and 2008.<sup>10</sup> But the 2012 election occurred after his death, with a Northern candidate now on the ballot for the NDC instead. Fantis in 2012 voted more in line with other Akan groups; 71% on the survey reported supporting the NPP. All results for vote choice are robust to either including the 103 Fantis as Akans or coding Fantis as unaffiliated with any party. Results presented throughout the text are the former.

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<sup>9</sup>I code all Northern respondents as potential co-ethnics of Presidential Mahama (NDC candidate) because there are only two respondents from the Gonja tribe, his direct tribal co-ethnics, in the entire survey. The Gonja are a minuscule group in Ghana, representing only a small fraction of both the national and urban populations, and are a sub-group counted at a level of aggregation below the main ethnic classifications used on the census. Mahama is generally seen as a “Northerner” in national Ghanaian politics, targeting resources back to Northern interests, and many Northerners are proud that he is the country's only major Northern president (the only other, Hilla Limann, served briefly before being deposed in a coup).

<sup>10</sup>In an attempt to broaden their appeal beyond their core ethnic groups, the NDC appears to have strategically preferred this candidate in part *because* he was not from these already aligned ethnic groups. This itself is evidence for why only defining ethnic voting based on candidate ethnicities is inappropriate in a setting where ethnic voting is common but parties are trying to build multi-ethnic winning coalitions. Specifically because there is ethnic voting for parties affiliated with your ethnic group, the NDC knew it could count on bloc support from many voters in its core groups, so it didn't have to nominate a candidate from those groups. But a narrower definition of ethnic voting that focused only on direct candidate ethnicities, rather than longer-term party-group affiliations, would assume this away in all of these elections.

Table A.11: Survey Experiment: Credibility of MPs' Campaign Promises

	1
<i>Promised Good:</i>	All
<i>Universalistic Preferences (binary)</i>	-0.374** (0.114)
<i>Co-Ethnic Candidate</i>	0.409*** (0.113)
<i>Club Promise 2: New Classrooms</i>	0.039 (0.186)
<i>Public Promise 1: New Classrooms</i>	-0.197 (0.186)
<i>Public Promise 2: Low Utility Prices</i>	-0.070 (0.186)
<i>Private Promise 1: Jobs</i>	-0.071 (0.186)
<i>Private Promise 2: Scholarships</i>	-0.080 (0.185)
<i>Individual-level Controls</i>	Y
<i>Neighborhood-level Controls</i>	Y
<i>Name and Background Controls</i>	Y
<i>N</i>	1835

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is whether a respondent believes the MP in the vignette will actually deliver the cued good after the election. Logistic regression with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). Includes the same individual-level and neighborhood-level controls the main text, as well as controls for each additional treatment condition (name, background, etc).



Table A.12: Support for Co-Ethnic Party in 2012: Akan and Northerners Only

	1	2	3
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-5.322* (2.400)	-5.637* (2.380)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.472† (0.283)	5.033* (2.550)	
<i>Eth. Fract.* Neigh. Wealth</i>		-8.236* (3.845)	
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.030** (0.011)	
<i>Assets/Wealth Index</i>	0.236 (0.149)	0.237 (0.150)	0.195 (0.139)
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	-0.154 (0.134)	-0.139 (0.136)	-0.125 (0.133)
<i>Ethnic Identity "Closest"</i>	0.022 (0.246)	-0.001 (0.247)	0.073 (0.243)
<i>Moved for Family / Ethnicity</i>	0.083 (0.262)	0.050 (0.264)	0.096 (0.260)
<i>Age</i>	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.072 (0.507)	0.050 (0.501)	-0.031 (0.497)
<i>Male</i>	-0.626** (0.243)	-0.632** (0.244)	-0.556* (0.240)
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.521 (0.499)	-0.547 (0.497)	-0.659 (0.490)
<i>Ga</i>	0.770 (0.812)	0.817 (0.808)	0.818 (0.802)
<i>Years in neighborhood</i>	0.011 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	0.009 (0.011)
<i>Party member</i>	0.214 (0.264)	0.220 (0.265)	0.176 (0.259)
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y
N	458	458	458

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . This exactly replicates Table 5.1 in the main text, but subsets to only Akan and Northern respondents – co-ethnics of the two presidential candidates.

#### A.4.2 Controlling for Characteristics of the Parliamentary Race

I focus on voting in presidential elections for the reasons outlined in the main text. There could be concern, however, that some features of the concurrent parliamentary race in each constituency could have carry-over effects on the party that each respondent supports in the presidential race. In particular, one key feature of parliamentary races in Ghana is that both parties often nominate local parliamentary candidates from the same ethnic group, selecting whichever ethnic group is the largest in the local area. Indeed, the NDC and NPP nominated candidates from the same ethnic group in 8 of the 10 constituencies in the survey sample. In Ablekuma North (an NPP stronghold), the NPP nominated an Akan and the NDC nominated a Muslim Dagomba Northerner. In Bortianor Ngleshie Amanfro (an NDC stronghold), the NPP nominated a Ga and the NDC nominated an Ewe.

In an additional series of robustness tests, I replicate the main result for presidential vote share from Table 1 in the text (column 2), controlling for aspects of the concurrent parliamentary races in each constituency. First, I control for whether respondents were in a constituency where both parliamentary candidates were from the same ethnic group. This could change local ethnic dynamics in the campaign. Second, I control for whether the parliamentary candidates for each party were from the respondent’s own ethnic group. This could alter local incentives to support co-ethnics. But I find that the main results for presidential vote choice in the paper are unaffected by these features of the parliamentary race.

Table A.13: Interaction of Local Fractionalization and Private Goods Delivery

	1	2
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-3.522* (1.528)	-3.504* (1.541)
<i>Neighborhood Wealth (500m)</i>	2.091† (1.165)	2.083† (1.165)
<i>Eth. Fractionalization* Neighborhood Wealth</i>	-3.395† (1.739)	-3.401† (1.740)
<i>Parl. Candidates from Same Ethnic Group</i>	0.891† (0.486)	
<i>Co-ethnic Party’s Parl. Cand. from Respondent’s Group</i>		-0.583 (0.415)
<i>Non-co-ethnic Party’s Parl. Cand. from Respondent’s Group</i>		0.638 (0.474)
Individual-level Covariates	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y
N	797	797

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . This replicates Column 2 of Table 1 in the main text, including additional control variables. The outcome is still vote choice for the ethnically-aligned party in the presidential election, not the parliamentary election.

### **A.4.3 Additional Tests for Education or Employment**

To demonstrate that education or employment status do not consistently predict ethnic voting, I repeat the model from Table 5.1, column 1, where the outcome is ethnic voting, while replacing the education/employment index with each of its component variables, as well as other variables that measure education or employment status. As discussed in the text, only one of these – having more than a middle school education – is correlated with ethnic voting (at  $p = 0.1$ ). Other measures of education (english fluency, other levels of schooling) are not correlated with ethnic voting, however, showing there is no robust correlation between ethnic voting and education.

Table A.14: Additional Tests for Education or Employment Status

<i>Outcome:</i>	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting	Ethnic Voting
<i>Ethnic Fract. (500m)</i>	-2.495 <sup>†</sup> (1.430)	-2.491 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)	-2.524 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)	-2.515 <sup>†</sup> (1.429)	-2.509 <sup>†</sup> (1.429)	-2.525 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)	-2.525 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.165 (0.170)	-0.164 (0.170)	-0.165 (0.170)	-0.176 (0.171)	-0.172 (0.170)	-0.173 (0.170)	-0.173 (0.170)
<i>Assets/Wealth Index</i>	0.095 (0.104)	0.064 (0.104)	0.036 (0.101)	0.034 (0.105)	0.045 (0.101)	0.041 (0.099)	0.041 (0.099)
<i>More than Middle School (0,1)</i>	-0.333 <sup>†</sup> (0.201)						
<i>Less than Middle School (0,1)</i>		0.195 (0.223)					
<i>Tertiary education (0,1)</i>			-0.220 (0.290)				
<i>English Fluency (0,1)</i>				0.034 (0.201)			
<i>Formal Sector Employment (0,1)</i>					-0.054 (0.251)		
<i>Full-time Employment (0,1)</i>						-0.020 (0.193)	
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	797	797	797	797	797	797	797

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$ . Replicates the same model in Table 5.1, column 1 of the main text, replacing the education/employment index with other variables. The other covariates are the same, but not shown.

#### **A.4.4 Question on Salience of Ethnic Identity**

The main measure of the individual-level salience of ethnic identity replicates a question from Rounds 1 and 2 of the Afrobarometer surveys. This question asks respondents how they define themselves, recording which of multiple possible identity groups they feel they closest to. Typical responses could be an ethnic identity (e.g., “an Akan”), a professional identity (e.g., “a nurse”), a regional identity (e.g., “native of Accra”), a religious identity (e.g., “a Catholic”), etc. This same question has been used in multiple studies to measure how individuals socially identify themselves, most notably by Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) in *AJPS*, which finds that the proportion of respondents on Afrobarometer surveys identifying with their ethnic groups increases during pre-election periods in African democracies.

The question wording I used was (in translation): “Ghanaians describe themselves in many ways. Some people describe themselves by their ethnic group or their religion, others describe themselves in economic terms such as middle class or as a farmer, and others by the place where they live. Besides being a Ghanaian, which specific group of people do you feel you belong to first and foremost? ” Overall, 48.7% of respondents named their ethnic group as opposed to religious (28.4%), occupation-based (11.0%), location-based (7.3%), or other types of identities (4.5%). As noted in the main text, respondents who reported their ethnic identity as most important to them personally were not any more likely to support the party affiliated with their ethnic group.

Table A.15: Controlling for Economic Performance Evaluations

<i>Outcome:</i>	NDC Vote	NDC Vote
<i>Positive Econ. Performance</i>	0.866** (0.316)	0.836** (0.316)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	1.868* (0.754)	-0.419 (0.297)
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>	-2.334* (2.111)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>	-3.763 (1.843)	
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>		11.679*** (3.452)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>		9.989*** (2.971)
Covariates	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	592	592

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Replicates columns 1 and 2 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see below). Outcome is support the NDC for all respondents, not support for the co-ethnic party. The full set of covariates is included, but not shown for brevity.

#### A.4.5 Economic Performance Evaluations on NDC Support

Performance evaluations are measured through a question asking respondents if they believe the economy has been getting better or worse over the last five years, a time period corresponding to when the current NDC government had taken power. This is similar to the measure of economic performance by incumbent governments used in papers on economic performance voting in Africa such as Bratton et al. (2011). I code respondents reporting the economy is getting better as 1, and those who report it is the same or worse as 0. In the table below I replicate the main models from Figure 3 in the main text, including the economic performance variable. I find that my results are unaffected by including this variable, but also that positive economic performance evaluations predict NDC support, consistent with existing literature.

While this is strongly correlated with NDC support, it is not clear that this is particularly meaningful. A positive opinion of NDC economic performance could just as easily be an outcome of pre-existing partisanship as a cause of it (Carlson 2015b). The large literature on partisan bias in surveys suggests that many voters who already support the government will claim the economy is doing well as an expression of support for the government (and vice versa for opposition supporters).

Table A.16: NDC Vote by Percentage of Surrounding Ethnic Groups

	1	2	3	4
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	1.867* (0.749)	-0.441 (0.294)	-0.511 (0.508)	0.103 (0.431)
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>	-2.265 (2.075)			
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>	-3.808* (1.819)			
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>		12.031*** (2.967)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>		10.162*** (1.165)		
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>			3.691* (1.605)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ewe/Northern %</i>			2.164 (1.629)	
<i>Ga % (500m)</i>				-1.827 (1.456)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ga %</i>				-0.115 (1.335)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	592	592	592	592

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Logistic regressions pooled by sampling location. Non-Ga respondents only. The outcome is 2012 NDC vote choice, not ethnic voting. Coefficients for the covariates (same as Table 5.1) are not shown.

#### A.4.6 Regression Table for Figure 5.3

The regression table corresponding to Figure 5.3 in the main text is included here.

#### **A.4.7 Separate Results for Ga Respondents, Including Ties to Chiefs**

Unlike the results for non-Ga respondents in Figure 5.3 of the main text, there is no consistent pattern for Ga respondents between vote choice and the share of other groups in the neighborhood. In Table A.17, I replicate the models from Figure 5.3 of the main paper for Gas only. Only the % Akan in the surrounding area, and only at low, but not high levels of neighborhood wealth (interaction in the opposite direction of Figure 5.3) is significantly correlated with Ga voting. For non-Gas these models are consistently signed, this is not the case for the Gas.

Notably, the strongest predictor of Ga support for the NDC in all these models is whether respondents reported contact with a traditional chief in the last year (top row of Table A.17). This has no predictive power for other ethnic groups, however, for whom traditional authorities are not active in the city. Contact with a chief is associated with a 19.5 percentage point greater probability of NDC support (95% CI: 5.9, 33.7) for Gas. This is consistent with the argument in the text about how the Ga have privileged access to benefits from the NDC through strong ethnic networks that do not exist for other groups in the city.

In addition, in column 5 of Table A.17, I find suggestive evidence that Gas are more likely to vote for the NDC when surrounded by more Gas ( $p = 0.11$ , with  $N = 212$ ).

#### **A.4.8 Survey Experiment Wording and Conditions**

Six specific examples of goods were used, three for private goods and three for club goods. These were randomly inserted into one of two texts (one each for private and club goods). The goods were then either to be delivered by the NDC or NPP. Each respondent received one randomly assigned permutation of the prompt (e.g., NDC, private goods example #1 or NPP, club goods example #3).

The good examples were: “giving out loans to people”, “creating training programs for unemployed youth”, or “giving financial assistance to people to help pay their bills and buy food” for private goods; “school construction”, “laying new water pipes”, or “constructing more drains and public toilets” for club goods. Each represents a common good actually delivered by politicians in Greater Accra. The examples were selected because they were the most common responses to open-ended questions asking about politicians’ activities during a pilot version of the survey.

The full prompts were as follows. For the private goods examples (in this case when cued as NPP): “The national government has limited resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t do it for everyone. They have to do it for some people first, before giving it to other people. If the NPP had won the 2012 election, and the NPP government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that people like you and your family would get it or would they do it more for other people? I’m asking for your personal opinion.” For the club goods examples (in this case when when cued as NDC): “The national government has limited resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t do it everywhere. They have to do it in some places first before going to other places. If the NDC government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that neighborhoods like this would get it or would they do it more in other places? I’m asking for your personal opinion.”

#### **A.4.9 Balance in the Survey Experiment**

I report univariate balance statistics after randomization for the survey experiment here for the difference between respondents receiving treatment and control conditions when these are defined either as: (a) receiving the cue from your co-ethnic party vs. non-co-ethnic party, or (b) receiving the cue for the NDC versus the NPP. Because balance remains imperfect (due to the limited sample sizes) I control for all of the same covariates as in Table 5.1 in the main text in all analysis of the survey experiment.



Table A.17: Ga NDC Vote by Surrounding Ethnic Groups

	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Met Chief</i>	1.902* (0.755)	2.090** (0.796)	2.024** (0.776)	1.964** (0.757)	1.883* (0.750)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-1.838* (0.916)	-0.317 (0.448)	-0.781 (0.703)	0.548 (0.700)	0.075 (0.443)
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>	-2.610 (4.344)				
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>	5.154* (2.541)				
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>		-9.522 (5.838)			
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>		1.466 (5.543)			
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>			-3.822 (3.464)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ewe/Northern %</i>			2.823 (2.755)		
<i>Ga % (500m)</i>				3.109 (2.731)	4.049 (2.545)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ga %</i>				1.374 (1.583)	
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	212	212	212	212	212

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Ga respondents only. The outcome is NDC vote choice. The models are the same as in the table for Figure 5.3 in the main text (see above). Coefficients for covaries not shown.

In Table A.18 I provide differences in means for the main binary covariates, along with p-values, and show that the only variable with a significant difference between treatment and control groups for the co-ethnic party treatment is having moved to join family or co-ethnics. For the NDC treatment there is a significant difference between treatment conditions for the ethnicity salience variable. I thus control for both of these in regression models for all analysis of this data. In Figure A.1 I give quantile-quantile-plots of the balance between the same treatment and control groups for the continuous covariates. The weakest balance is for the individual assets/wealth index for the NDC treatment, which is also controlled for in all analysis.

Table A.18: Differences in Means (Treated v. Control) for Binary Covariates

Variable	Co-Ethnic Party Treatment		NDC Treatment	
	Diff. Means (T v. C)	p-value	Diff. Means (T v. C)	p-value
Male	-0.013	0.679	-0.007	0.827
More than Middle School education	0.031	0.323	0.013	0.691
Formal Sector employment	-0.020	0.390	-0.007	0.770
Fluent English	0.022	0.478	-0.002	0.962
Party Member	0.003	0.902	-0.059	0.028
Ethnicity Salient	-0.035	0.232	0.080	0.007
Moved for Family or Ethnic Group	-0.058	0.037	-0.014	0.598

#### A.4.10 Overall Treatment Effects in Survey Experiment

To estimate the co-ethnic party treatment effect, while controlling for remaining imbalance, I estimate variants of the following models:

$$expects_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 CoEthnicParty_i + \beta_2 PrivateGood_i + \beta_3 QuestionOrder_I + \beta_4 Fractionalization_i + \beta_5 NeighWealth_i + \beta_6 Density_j + \mathbf{X}_i \delta + \epsilon_i \quad (A.1)$$

$$expects_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 CoEthnicParty_i + \mathbf{ClubExample}_i \lambda + \beta_2 QuestionOrder_I + \beta_3 Fractionalization_i + \beta_4 NeighWealth_i + \beta_5 Density_j + \mathbf{X}_i \delta + \epsilon_i \quad (A.2)$$

$$expects_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + \theta_{k[j]} + \beta_1 CoEthnicParty_i + \mathbf{PrivExample}_i \lambda + \beta_2 QuestionOrder_I + \beta_3 Fractionalization_i + \beta_4 NeighWealth_i + \beta_5 Density_j + \mathbf{X}_i \delta + \epsilon_i \quad (A.3)$$

where  $expects_i$  is a binary indicator for respondent  $i$  expecting to receive the good in the prompt,  $CoEthnicParty_i$  is an indicator for the party cued in the experiment,  $PrivateGood_i$  is an indicator for whether the question was about a private or club goods example,  $\mathbf{ClubExample}_i$  and  $\mathbf{PrivExample}_i$  are vectors of indicators for each specific example of good, and  $QuestionOrder_i$  controls for whether the question came before or after a similar question about goods delivered by Members of Parliament (analyzed elsewhere). The other covariates, modeling approach, and constituency fixed effects remain as described in the main text in models for vote choice. Using equation 1, I simulate the overall size of the co-ethnic party treatment effect as discussed in the text. The corresponding regression table is Table A.27 and  $\beta_1$  is the coefficient of interest.




Figure A.1: *Balance Plots for Survey Experiment Treatment Conditions*: When points fall along the center line, the data is balanced for that covariate between the treatment conditions labeled on the axes.

Table A.19: Co-Ethnic Party Treatment Effect (Eq. 1)

	1
<i>Co-Ethnic Party Treatment</i>	0.673*** (0.144)
<i>Private Goods Treatment</i>	-0.403** (0.143)
<i>Question Order</i>	0.237† (0.142)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	0.023 (1.167)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.177 (0.145)
<i>Pop. Density (by cluster)</i>	0.013* (0.006)
<i>Assets/Wealth Index</i>	0.041 (0.087)
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	-0.038 (0.085)
<i>Ethnic Identity "Closest"</i>	-0.133 (0.147)
<i>Moved for Family / Ethnicity</i>	-0.070 (0.167)
<i>Age</i>	-0.015* (0.006)
<i>Muslim</i>	-0.375 (0.313)
<i>Male</i>	-0.044 (0.148)
<i>Ewe</i>	-0.087 (0.201)
<i>Northerner</i>	0.377 (0.323)
<i>Ga</i>	0.221 (0.148)
<i>Years in neighborhood</i>	-0.005 (0.006)
<i>Party member</i>	0.135 (0.166)
Constituency FEs	Y
N	986

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ ,  
†  $p < 0.1$ . Overall estimate of the co-ethnic party treatment effect for all respondents, following equation 1 above.  
Constituency fixed effects not shown.

#### A.4.11 Private Goods Expectations and Actual Private Goods Distribution

In the main text I show that expectations of goods delivery reported in the survey experiment are closely correlated with actual ethnic voting behavior: respondents who receive the treatment about their co-ethnic party are more likely to report voting for that party if they say they expect to benefit from the example good from that party. This holds for expectations about both the club and private goods examples, but there are some differences in responses by the type of good cued in the prompt.

Respondents who received the co-ethnic party treatment ( $T = 1$ ) are 27.9 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 16.7, 38.8) to report ethnic voting when expecting to benefit from a club good from that party than when expecting “other places” to benefit from the club good instead. This is compared to only 12 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 0.6, 22.7) to report ethnic voting when expecting to benefit from a private good from that party compared to expecting “other people” to benefit instead.

But private goods expectations are significantly more correlated with ethnic voting in local neighborhoods where private goods distribution is empirically more common. By contrast, in the neighborhoods where private goods distribution doesn’t happen often (i.e., top row of Figure 1 in the main text), expectations about benefiting from private goods from the co-ethnic party do not correlate with voting behavior for that party.

I show this by using the survey question discussed above that measures whether respondents know about government private goods distribution in their neighborhood. I aggregate these responses by sampling cluster to produce a measure of the percentage of respondents in each neighborhood who are aware of private goods distribution. In Table A.20, I split the sample to only those respondents who received the co-ethnic party treatment ( $T = 1$ ) and estimate a multi-level model in which the outcome is ethnic voting and the main explanatory variable is whether you report expecting to receive the good from your co-ethnic party. I find a significant interaction between expectations of receiving the private good and actual private goods distribution (column 4), but there is no similar interaction for expectations about club goods distribution – instead, club goods expectations are correlated with ethnic voting everywhere (see column 2), consistent with the assumption in the theory section that club goods are distributed by the parties in both poor and middle class neighborhoods (both rows of Figure 1).

Table A.20: Ethnic Voting by Club or Private Goods Expectations from Co-Ethnic Party

	Club Only	Club Only	Private Only	Private Only
<i>Expects Good</i>	1.990*** (0.447)	1.350* (0.664)	0.961* (0.459)	0.039 (0.668)
<i>% Reporting Patronage (by cluster)</i>		-2.455 (2.139)		-1.241 (2.392)
<i>Expects Good * % Patronage</i>		3.686 (2.892)		6.666† (3.877)
<i>Club Example (Water)</i>	0.420 (0.478)	0.400 (0.481)		
<i>Club Example (Drains/Toilets)</i>	-0.125 (0.507)	-0.090 (0.514)		
<i>Private Example (Training)</i>			0.286 (0.507)	0.138 (0.522)
<i>Private Example (Expenses)</i>			0.544 (0.529)	0.405 (0.538)
<i>Question Order</i>	-0.003 (0.403)	0.020 (0.408)	-0.224 (0.424)	-0.161 (0.432)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	201	201	207	207

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is ethnic voting in 2012. Subset to respondents who received the co-ethnic party treatment ( $T = 1$ ). Columns 1 and 2 look at questions about club goods. Columns 3 and 4 are for private goods. The third, omitted baseline club goods example indicator is for school construction; the omitted baseline private goods example indicator is for loans. All other covariates as before are included, as well as constituency fixed effects, but coefficients are not shown.

#### **A.4.12 Club Goods Expectations by Surrounding Ethnic Group**

I find that the NDC treatment effect for club goods varies with the proportion of Akans and Northerners around non-Ga respondents in a similar pattern to Figure 5.3 in the main text. The estimates in the text are simulated from the models in Table A.21 below.

Table A.21: Club Goods Expectations by Surrounding Ethnic Groups

	Club Rich Neighs.	Club Rich Neighs.	Club Rich Neighs.	Club Rich Neighs.
<i>NDC Treatment</i>	3.182 <sup>†</sup> (1.784)	-1.656 <sup>†</sup> (0.950)	-0.846 (1.201)	-0.362 (0.778)
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>	0.427 (4.498)			
<i>NDC Treatment * Akan %</i>	-6.046 <sup>†</sup> (3.476)			
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>		-39.967* (15.569)		
<i>NDC Treatment * Northern %</i>		32.869 <sup>†</sup> (17.005)		
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>			-9.764* (4.403)	
<i>NDC Treatment * Ewe + Northern %</i>			4.120 (4.715)	
<i>Ga % (500m)</i>				3.771 (3.250)
<i>NDC Treatment * Ga %</i>				2.658 (3.525)
<i>Club Example (Water)</i>	-0.009 (0.463)	-0.086 (0.475)	0.063 (0.472)	0.037 (0.466)
<i>Club Example (Drains/Toilets)</i>	0.539 (0.481)	0.489 (0.490)	0.559 (0.481)	0.527 (0.480)
<i>Question Order</i>	0.258 (0.381)	0.296 (0.389)	0.363 (0.385)	0.300 (0.382)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	183	201	207	207

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is expecting to benefit from the cued club good, for non-Ga respondents only (for comparison to Figure 5.3). Restricted to neighborhoods with above average wealth. Covariates as before are included. Coefficients not shown.



Table A.22: Table for Figure 4

<i>Outcome:</i>	Club Goods Expectation	Private Goods Expectation
<i>Co-Ethnic Party Treatment</i>	3.289* (1.309)	2.996*** (0.841)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	1.544 (1.969)	
<i>Co-Ethnic Treatment * Ethnic Fract.</i>	-3.579 <sup>†</sup> (1.888)	
<i>% Groups Affiliated with Co-Ethnic Party (500m)</i>		2.430 (1.640)
<i>Co-Ethnic Treatment * Groups Affiliated (500m)</i>		-4.996** (1.920)
<i>Club Example (Water)</i>	-0.093 (0.244)	
<i>Club Example (Drains/Toilets)</i>	0.359 (0.241)	
<i>Private Example (Training)</i>		0.091 (0.334)
<i>Private Example (Expenses)</i>		(-0.126) (0.325)
Covariates	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	510	345

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . In column 1, the outcome is expecting to receive the club good in the prompt. In column 2, the outcome is expecting to receive the private good in the prompt. All other covariates as before are included, as well as constituency fixed effects, but coefficients are not shown for brevity.

#### A.4.13 Table for Figure 5.4

This is the corresponding table for Figure 5.4 in the main text. The first column corresponds to Panel (a) and shows that the co-ethnic party treatment effect for club goods declines in all neighborhoods as ethnic diversity rises, consistent with the theory in Figure 5.1 of the main text. The second column corresponds to Panel (b) and shows that respondents have the largest expectations of favoritism in private goods from the co-ethnic party when living in a neighborhood surrounded by fewer other co-ethnics of that party. The latter column is subset to non-Ga respondents only, as discussed in the main text.

#### **A.4.14 Favoritism Expectations of Ga Respondents**

Ga respondents expect significantly more private goods from the NDC than the NPP where there are more Gas in the surrounding neighborhood and Gas occupy most party and local government positions (column 1 of Table A.23). The size of the NDC treatment effect for club goods for Gas is also greatest where there are more Gas (columns 2 and 3 of Table A.23). But this does not vary with the Akan or Northern proportion in the neighborhood, consistent with whether Ga voters receive club goods being less tied to the presence of other groups around them (columns 4 and 5 of Table A.23),

Table A.23: Club and Private Goods Expectations, Ga Respondents Only

	Private	Club	Club	Club	Club
<i>NDC Treatment</i>	-2.359*	1.672**	-0.538	3.086*	2.157**
	(1.072)	(0.524)	(0.989)	(1.268)	(0.713)
<i>Ga % (500m)</i>	-1.000	-1.976	-5.722		
	(2.714)	(3.272)	(3.585)		
<i>NDC Treatment * Ga %</i>	4.306†		5.842*		
	(2.263)		(2.340)		
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>				-1.192	
				(6.216)	
<i>NDC Treatment * Akan %</i>				-4.364	
				(3.494)	
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>					15.999†
					(8.885)
<i>NDC Treatment * Northern %</i>					-6.478
					(5.700)
<i>Private Example (Training)</i>	1.033†				
	(0.578)				
<i>Private Example (Expenses)</i>	0.762				
	(0.600)				
<i>Club Example (Water)</i>		-0.989	-0.851	-0.928	-0.951
		(0.628)	(0.644)	(0.622)	(0.636)
<i>Club Example (Drains/Toilets)</i>		0.332	0.344	0.333	0.254
		(0.590)	(0.599)	(0.590)	(0.599)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	132	132	132	132	132

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is expecting to benefit from the cued club good, for Ga respondents only. The NDC is the co-ethnic party. All other covariates as before are included, as well as constituency fixed effects, but coefficients are not shown. Because of the small sample size with Ga respondents alone, it is not possible to split the sample by the mean value of the neighborhood wealth index (model will not fit). The omitted baseline club goods example indicator is for school construction; the omitted baseline private goods example indicator is for loans.

#### A.4.15 Difference between Located Polling Stations and Full Results

Results for many polling stations are dropped, as described in the text, because (a) they have not been geo-located or (b) census GIS data is not available for that constituency. The remaining polling stations used in the analysis still have very similar distributions of election results compared to the full set of available polling station results for each election year. This can be seen in Table A.24 below.

Table A.24: Polling Station Results, Included v. Full Set

	2008, Full	2008, Included	2012, Full	2012, Included
Mean NDC Vote Share at ps	51.4%	52.0%	51.2%	51.8%
Median NDC Vote Share at ps	49.6%	49.7%	51.4%	52.0%
25th percentile NDC Vote Share at ps	40.0%	41.6%	40.6%	43.1%
75th percentile NDC Vote Share at ps	60.6%	61.2%	60.8%	59.4%
Mean Turnout at ps	66.6%	65.9%	76.4%	76.5%
Median Turnout at ps	67.0%	66.6%	77.4%	77.5%
<i>N</i>	2158	587	2823	650

#### **A.4.16 Regression Table for Polling Station Results**

The main OLS regressions for the analysis of polling station results are included here. In each model I control for the share of the population at the polling station from un-affiliated ethnic groups, but omit the groups affiliated with the other party, such that the coefficients on the share of Akans at the polling station in columns 1 or 2, for example, represent the predicted change in NDC vote share from replacing an NDC-affiliated voter with an Akan (NPP-affiliated).

Table A.25: NDC Presidential Vote Share, 2008 and 2012 Polling Station Results

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Akan % in 500m</i>	-0.450*** (0.042)	-1.343*** (0.291)				
<i>Akan % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)</i>		1.352** (0.434)				
<i>Ga % in 500m</i>			0.436*** (0.043)	0.755** (0.236)	0.426*** (0.045)	0.438*** (0.044)
<i>Ewe % in 500m</i>			0.512*** (0.056)	0.494*** (0.059)	0.270 (0.377)	0.503*** (0.059)
<i>Northern % in 500m</i>			0.269*** (0.068)	0.210** (0.076)	0.245*** (0.073)	1.838** (0.640)
<i>Ga % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)</i>				-0.506 (0.362)		
<i>Ewe % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)</i>					0.339 (0.552)	
<i>Northern % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)</i>						-2.104* (0.839)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (2km)</i>		-0.498** (0.186)		0.237† (0.139)	0.025 (0.150)	0.238* (0.111)
<i>Other Groups % in 500m</i>	-0.060 (0.073)	-0.023 (0.080)	0.414*** (0.080)	0.353*** (0.090)	0.384*** (0.090)	0.369*** (0.089)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.010† (0.005)	-0.012† (0.007)	-0.011† (0.007)	-0.012† (0.007)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (2km)</i>		0.003 (0.008)		0.000 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)
<i>Population Density at PS</i>	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
<i>Registered Voters at PS</i>	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Constituency-Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
<i>N</i>	834	834	834	834	834	834
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.442	0.449	0.451	0.453	0.452	0.456

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . OLS regressions with parliamentary constituency-year fixed effects (not shown). The outcome is NDC presidential vote share in the 2008 or 2012 election at the polling station level for Greater Accra, with missing data as described in the text. Polling stations that share the same location are collapsed into a single observation. For readability, population density is scaled as 1000s per sq. km and total registered voters per polling station scaled to 100s per station.

Table A.26: Results for Vote Choice, Dropping Respondent Sorting on Demand for Club Goods

<i>Outcome:</i>	Ethnic Voting	NDC Vote	NDC Vote
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-3.152* (1.576)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	1.750 (1.190)	1.892* (0.827)	-0.412 (0.311)
<i>Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth</i>	-2.859 (1.788)		
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>		-2.520 (2.216)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>		-3.968* (1.956)	
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>			11.558** (3.785)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>			9.415** (3.214)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y
N	757	525	525

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The first column replicates column 2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The second and third columns replicate columns 1-2 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only). Both are for dropping all respondents who report choosing their neighborhood because of demand for club goods. Covariates included, but not shown.

#### A.4.17 Respondents Who Move for Public Services

10.8% of respondents noted that the reason they had moved to their current location was because of the club goods in that area – for better schools, roads, water, etc. – or because of the security from crime in that area, which can also be seen as a club good (police effort and capacity vary by location). Adding an indicator controlling for having moved to a neighborhood because of demands for club goods does not affect any of the results (not shown). In addition, the results are robust to dropping this subset of respondents who sorted on demands for club goods. Table A.26 below replicates the key results after dropping these respondents. Note that the p-value on the interaction term between ethnic diversity and neighborhood wealth is  $p = .11$  in the first column of Table A.26. Results for the survey experiment when dropping these respondents are also similar (not shown).

#### A.4.18 Having Moved

Having moved – and thus having explicitly chosen a neighborhood – is not predictive of ethnic voting. I repeat the model from column 1 of Table 5.1, including an indicator for having moved and find no correlation. The negative correlation between ethnic voting and local diversity remains unaffected. While this does not rule out confounding from other types of sorting (as discussed in the text), it does suggest that most of the reasons people move between neighborhoods are not correlated with whether they support co-ethnic parties.

Table A.27: Ethnic Voting on Having Moved

	1
<i>Has Moved (0,1)</i>	0.156 (0.349)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-2.513 <sup>†</sup> (1.428)
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.161 (0.170)
Covariates	Y
Constituency FEs	Y
<i>N</i>	797

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ ,  
<sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . Repeats column 1 from  
Table 5.1 in the main text, controlling  
for whether respondents moved at some  
point in their lives (and thus selected into  
a neighborhood). All other covariates and  
modeling approach remain as in Table  
5.1, but coefficient not shown for space.



#### **A.4.19 Controlling for Searching Multiple Neighborhoods**

The main results for vote choice from Tables 5.1 and Figure 5.3 in the main text also hold when controlling for an indicator for whether respondents searched for housing in multiple neighborhoods. Moreover, these respondents who had the widest range of choices of neighborhoods – and thus could have sorted on partisanship or other non-price factors – are also not more or less likely to vote for co-ethnic parties. Table A.28 repeats column 2 of Table 5.1 and columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above) controlling for this.

Table A.28: Results for Vote Choice, Controlling for Choosing Among Multiple Neighs.

<i>Outcome:</i>	Ethnic Voting	NDC Vote	NDC Vote	NDC Vote
<i>Search Multiple Neighs.</i>	0.100 (0.248)	0.146 (0.276)	0.161 (0.279)	0.198 (0.280)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-3.538* (1.530)			
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	2.066† (1.167)	1.879* (0.751)	-0.437 (0.294)	-0.546 (0.512)
<i>Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth</i>	-3.349† (1.743)			
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>		-2.255 (2.077)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>		-3.824* (1.822)		
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>			12.023*** (3.451)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>			10.252*** (2.977)	
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>				3.668* (1.605)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ewe + Northern %</i>				2.331 (1.651)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	797	592	592	592

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The first column replicates column 2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The remaining columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only). All covariates included, but not shown.

#### **A.4.20 Dropping Wealthiest Respondents**

Because wealthier respondents are the most likely to have been able to sort explicitly among neighborhoods, I re-estimate the main results for vote choice dropping the top 25% of the sample on either the assets index or education/employment index. The results remain substantively robust, although with the smaller sample sizes some of the interaction effects are no longer statistically significant (but still signed in the same directions with the same magnitudes). Table A.29 replicates column 2 from Table 5.1 and columns 1-2 from the table for Figure 5.3 (see above) dropping these upper class respondents.

Table A.29: Results for Vote Choice, Dropping Wealthiest Respondents

<i>Outcome: Dropped:</i>	Ethnic Voting Drop Assets	NDC Vote Drop Ed/Empl.	NDC Vote Drop Assets	NDC Vote Drop Ed/Empl.	NDC Vote Drop Assets	NDC Vote Drop Ed/Empl.
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-3.753 <sup>†</sup> (1.951)	-4.157 <sup>†</sup> (2.344)				
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	2.850* (1.376)	1.613 (1.679)	1.598 (1.003)	2.489* (1.212)	-0.197 (0.343)	-0.498 (0.401)
<i>Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth</i>	-4.829* (2.131)	-3.018 (2.611)				
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>			-3.638 (2.582)	-2.853 (2.921)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>			-3.824 (2.302)	-6.114* (2.809)		
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>					7.120 (4.871)	5.428 (5.288)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>					6.270 (4.115)	6.614 (4.421)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	580	495	428	366	428	366

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$ . The first two columns replicate column 2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The remaining columns replicate columns 1-2 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only). All covariates included, but not shown.

#### **A.4.21 Ethnic Sorting and Diversity**

Respondents who found their home through their ethnic group ties are not actually more likely to live in neighborhoods that are less diverse, as would need to be the case for this type of sorting to explain Table 5.1. I estimate this by regressing ethnic fractionalization around each respondent (using OLS) on the indicator variable for whether a respondent is living in a place because of family or ethnic group ties, controlling for the same set of covariates as in all other models. Living in at a place because of family or group ties does not predict each respondent's neighborhood's diversity (coef=  $-0.004$ ,  $p = 0.33$ ) suggesting that this type of sorting cannot account for the results in Table 5.1 in the main text.

#### **A.4.22 Living with Other Groups**

24.5% of respondents live with people from a group aligned with the opposite, non-co-ethnic party. Re-estimating the models for column 2 of Table 5.1 and columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above) in Table A.30 while controlling for this returns substantively identical results, however, and this type of contact with other ethnic groups does not predict vote choice.

Table A.30: Results for Vote Choice, Controlling for Living with Opposite Ethnic Group

<i>Outcome:</i>	Ethnic Voting	NDC Vote	NDC Vote	NDC Vote
<i>Live w/ Other Party Group</i>	0.180 (0.213)	0.076 (0.256)	-0.012 (0.257)	0.036 (0.256)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-3.557* (1.530)			
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	2.131† (1.165)	1.875* (0.749)	-0.442 (0.296)	-0.505 (0.510)
<i>Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth</i>	-3.445* (1.739)			
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>		-2.283 (2.076)		
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Akan %</i>		-3.813* (1.820)		
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>			12.041*** (3.450)	
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Northern %</i>			10.174*** (2.975)	
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>				3.691* (1.605)
<i>Neigh. Wealth * Ewe + Northern %</i>				2.151 (1.631)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	797	592	592	592

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . The first column replicates column 2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The remaining columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only). All covariates included, but not shown.

#### **A.4.23 Commuting**

As discussed in Chapter 5, I interact each of the main neighborhood explanatory variables in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 with an indicator for whether respondents commute to work somewhere else outside the neighborhood. Table A.31 shows selected results of this analysis, indicating that there are no significant differences in the effects of the neighborhood variables between those who do and do not commute to work somewhere else.

Table A.31: Results for Vote Choice, Interacting Neigh. Variables and Commuting

<i>Outcome:</i>	Ethnic Voting	NDC Vote	NDC Vote	NDC Vote
<i>Commutes</i>	1.786 (1.230)	-1.113 <sup>†</sup> (0.593)	-0.470 (0.315)	-0.043 (0.524)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)</i>	-1.576 (1.546)			
<i>Neigh. Wealth (500m)</i>	-0.155 (0.171)	0.392 (0.249)	0.238 (0.225)	0.125 (0.230)
<i>Commutes * Ethnic Fract.</i>	-2.627 (1.747)			
<i>Akan % (500m)</i>		-3.358 (2.093)		
<i>Commutes * Akan %</i>		1.558 (1.435)		
<i>Northern % (500m)</i>			3.299 (2.364)	
<i>Commutes * Northern %</i>			-0.269 (1.597)	
<i>Ewe + Northern % (500m)</i>				4.455** (1.688)
<i>Commutes * Ewe + Northern %</i>				-1.529 (1.528)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constituency FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	797	592	592	592

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The first column replicates column 1 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party, interacting the ethnic fractionalization measure with the indicator for commuting. The remaining columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only), now interacting the share of each surrounding ethnic group with the commuting indicator. All covariates included, but not shown.



## **A.5 Chapter 6**

### **A.5.1 Coding Rules for Determining Ethnicity from Names**

Names in Ghana are often clearly associated with different ethnic groups. The names of candidates in the district assembly elections were coded by a group of 5 Ghanaian research assistants. These RAs were university students in Accra and came from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Each name was given to 3 of the 5 RAs to code. Each RA was asked to code a first, second, and third guess for each name. They were instructed to fill out only the first guess in cases where they were confident of the exact ethnicity and fill out the second and third guesses in cases where they were less confident. These guesses were aggregated using the following rules to successfully identify the major ethnic category (Akan, Ga, Ewe, Northern) of 91% of the candidates' names: (1) if two of three, or three of three, agreed on a single ethnicity coding, the name was assigned that ethnicity; (2) if all three put different ethnicities for the first guess, but two RAs put the same ethnicity for their second guess that the third RA put for his first guess, the name was assigned to that ethnicity. In all other cases, the name was coded as missing.

Table A.32: Nationwide District-Level Turnout in 2010 Assembly Election

	1	2	3
<i>Urban District</i>	0.002 (0.029)	-0.093* (0.026)	-0.092* (0.026)
<i>Development Index</i>	-0.082* (0.011)		
<i>Middle Class %</i>		-0.691* (0.157)	-0.703* (0.158)
<i>NPP 2008 Pres. Vote Share</i>			0.026 (0.039)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i>	-0.091* (0.034)	-0.134* (0.036)	-0.137* (0.036)
<i>(Intercept)</i>	0.440* (0.018)	0.540* (0.022)	0.530* (0.027)
$R^2$	0.643	0.580	0.581
$N$	177	177	177

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is turnout as percentage of registered voters per district. Weighted Least Squares regressions, with weights by number of registered voters per district. There are 177 observations for the 170 districts because the district-level data was decomposed into sub-metropolitan assemblies – sub-district level – for the Accra Metropolitan Assembly. One district did not hold assembly elections in 2010 because of pending legal action. Results for 2008 NDC vote share are similar (not shown).

### A.5.2 Regressions of Nationwide District-level Turnout in Local Elections

I use district-level turnout figures for the entire country in the 2010 district assembly election to examine how aggregate turnout rates vary with district-level demographic characteristics. As discussed in the text, I find significantly less turnout in urban districts and in district with larger middle class populations. These weighted least square regression (with districts weighted by the number of registered voters) are shown in the following table. Weights are used because Ghanaian districts can vary dramatically in size.

Table A.33: Probability of Ga Victory

	1
<i>Turnout in ELA %</i>	6.129 <sup>†</sup> (3.516)
<i>Middle Class (Index) %</i>	-3.565 (2.606)
<i>Ga % in ELA</i>	6.604** (2.459)
<i>NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share</i>	1.530 (3.131)
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i>	-7.443 (4.659)
<i>Population Density</i>	-0.034 <sup>†</sup> (0.019)
District FEs	Y
N	130

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is a binary indicator for whether a Ga candidate won the assembly election in each ELA. These are logistic regressions with the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1 in the main text.

### A.5.3 Relationship Between Ga Victory and Turnout by ELA

I estimate the probability that a Ga candidate won each assembly election in 2010 using logistic regressions with an indicator for a Ga victory as the outcome and the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1, as well as percentage turnout in each ELA (the outcome in Table 6.1). Controlling for the Ga population percentage in each ELA, which understandably predicts whether a Ga candidate wins, Gas are also most likely to win where turnout in the elections was lowest.

#### **A.5.4 Full Version of Table 6.2**

Coefficients for several control variables in the version of Table 6.2 in the main text are not included so the table fits on a single page. The full table, with all coefficients, is reproduced here. It shows that NDC vote share in each respondent's ELA also does not predict helpfulness of the assembly members, as noted in the text.

Table A.34: Reported Helpfulness of Assembly Members – Full Version

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Turnout in 2010 (by ELA)</i>						18.570* (8.982)
<i>Ga Assemblyman (by ELA)</i>			-0.808† (0.439)	-1.927* (0.954)	1.779 (1.358)	
<i>Ga % in ELA</i>				-7.814* (3.814)	-7.164** (2.659)	-4.828 (3.479)
<i>Ga Assemblyman * Ga %</i>				5.127 (3.476)		
<i>Ga Segregation in ELA</i>					-2.393 (1.774)	
<i>Ga Assemblyman * Ga Seg.</i>					-9.708† (5.203)	
<i>Party Member</i>	0.720** (0.228)		0.621* (0.251)	0.629* (0.250)	0.549* (0.252)	0.698* (0.272)
<i>NDC Member</i>		0.751* (0.295)				
<i>NPP Member</i>		0.423 (0.360)				
<i>NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share (by ELA)</i>	-1.917 (2.273)	-1.396 (2.413)	-4.076 (2.718)	-3.327 (-3.327)	-0.822 (3.173)	-5.288 (3.937)
<i>Development Index (500m)</i>	-0.071 (0.267)	-0.061 (0.282)	-0.361 (0.317)	-0.696* (0.355)	-0.845* (0.350)	-0.233 (0.553)
<i>Population Density (by cluster)</i>	0.025* (0.010)	0.024* (0.011)	0.025* (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.019 (0.013)
<i>Years in Neighborhood</i>	0.011 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.011 (0.009)	0.015† (0.009)	0.015 (0.010)
<i>Age</i>	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.010)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.848* (0.357)	0.899* (0.393)	0.795* (0.376)	0.780* (0.376)	0.730† (0.378)	0.857* (0.405)
<i>Male</i>	0.654*** (0.190)	0.688*** (0.213)	0.723*** (0.205)	0.716*** (0.206)	0.706*** (0.208)	0.817*** (0.234)
<i>Ewe</i>	-0.636* (0.307)	-0.452 (0.333)	-0.565† (0.326)	-0.605† (0.326)	-0.525 (0.329)	-0.642† (0.381)
<i>Northerner</i>	-0.259 (0.384)	-0.307 (0.428)	-0.285 (0.404)	-0.327 (0.406)	-0.233 (0.413)	-0.231 (0.433)
<i>Ga</i>	0.551* (0.250)	0.617* (0.282)	0.547* (0.275)	0.580* (0.275)	0.598* (0.283)	0.734* (0.322)
<i>Assets Index</i>	0.024 (0.116)	-0.009 (0.129)	0.070 (0.127)	0.090 (0.127)	0.100 (0.130)	0.024 (0.148)
<i>Education/Employ. Index</i>	0.099 (0.109)	0.109 (0.124)	0.093 (0.120)	0.100 (0.120)	0.090 (0.121)	0.116 (0.135)
<i>Move for Club Goods</i>	0.574† (0.310)	0.588† (0.356)	0.804* (0.329)	0.852** (0.331)	0.948** (0.334)	1.075** (0.410)
District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	995	804	793	793	752	584

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is a binary indicator for whether respondents report that their assembly member is at least “sometimes” helpful. All models are multi-level logistic regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007) and include district-level fixed effects (including for the sub-metropolitan assemblies within the AMA). All models include the full set of individual and neighborhood-level controls described in the text (not shown for space). Missingness in column 2 is for respondents who did not identify the party they belong to. Missingness in columns 3-5 is because the RAs could not agree on ethnicity codings for all assembly members. Respondents from Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor districts are dropped in column 6 because turnout data was not available.

### **A.5.5 Reports of Club Good Construction by Ethnic Group and Partisanship**

There could be concern that response bias is driving the patterns of favoritism in goods distribution that I find in Chapter 6. This would be an issue if respondents who live in the same exact place give different answers to the factual questions about whether specific club goods are distributed based on their own partisanship or ethnicity. I test for this by taking the questions about club goods from the main voter survey (where I have a full set of individual-level covariates) and estimating if respondents who live in the exact same place gave different responses by including survey location-level fixed effects for each of the 48 locations in the sample. Controlling for differences across locations, I find that Ewe respondents were slightly more likely to report road construction. This does not line up with the aggregate results I report in the paper, in which I find that Ga areas are favored in the road construction. This result indicating Ga favoritism is thus unlikely to be affected by this response bias.

However, I find that NDC supporters are significantly more likely to report school construction, even when including survey location-level fixed effects. This could indicate that the favoritism to NDC areas I see in school construction is an artifact of NDC voters being more likely to claim that the NDC constructed a school. But for this type of partisan response bias to be a serious concern, one would expect NDC supporters to also be more likely to claim that the NDC delivered the other types of goods as well. But this is not the case, as shown in the table below. Ultimately, this result that NDC supporters are more likely to claim that schools were constructed conditioning on survey location-level differences may simply be noise from the small samples within each survey location. Only 7 respondents in each location were asked these questions about club goods, as described in the main text.

Table A.35: Individual-Level Characteristics and Reports of Club Good Construction

	Roads	Streetlights	Schools
<i>Voted NDC in 2012</i>	−0.792 (0.500)	0.057 (0.448)	1.604* (0.675)
<i>Male</i>	−0.126 (0.389)	0.266 (0.372)	−0.289 (0.505)
<i>Muslim</i>	−0.051 (0.941)	0.745 (0.937)	2.221 (1.661)
<i>Ewe</i>	−1.505 <sup>†</sup> (0.807)	−0.016 (0.648)	−1.008 (1.058)
<i>Ga</i>	0.923 (0.676)	0.225 (0.644)	−1.030 (1.074)
<i>Northerner</i>	0.290 (1.056)	−0.718 (1.029)	−0.218 (1.737)
Survey Location FEs	Y	Y	Y
N	256	256	256

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . The outcome is a binary indicator for whether a respondent reported that each good was delivered in her community in the last five years. These are logistic regressions that include survey location fixed effects for each of the 48 neighborhoods in the main voter survey. This estimates within-location differences in the probability of reporting a specific good is distributed, even though the factually correct answer should be the same for each location. Akan is the omitted ethnicity category.