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The Ties that Bind: Railroad Gauge Standards, Collusion, and Internal Trade in the 19th Century U.S.

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Abstract:

Technology standards are pervasive in the modern economy, and a target for public and private investments, yet evidence on their economic importance is scarce. I study the conversion of 13,000 miles of railroad track in the U.S. South to standard gauge between May 31 and June 1, 1886 as a large-scale natural experiment in technology standards adoption that instantly integrated the South into the national transportation network. Using route-level freight traffic data, I find a large redistribution of traffic from steamships to railroads serving the same route that declines with route distance, with no change in prices and no evidence of effects on aggregate shipments, likely due to collusion by Southern carriers. Counterfactuals using estimates from a joint model of supply and demand for North-South freight transport suggest that if the cartel were broken, railroads would have passed through 50 percent of their cost savings from standardization, generating a 10 percent increase in trade on the sampled routes. The results demonstrate the economic value of technology standards and the potential benefits of compatibility in recent international treaties to establish transcontinental railway networks, while highlighting the mediating influence of product market competition on the public gains to standardization.

JEL Classification: F15, L15, L92, N71

Keywords: Railroad gauge; Standards; Integration; Incompatibility; Trade

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On November 10, 2006, seventeen Asian countries ratified the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agreement, under which they agreed to integrate into a continental railroad network by connecting lines but refrained from adopting standards for interoperability (UNTC 2006), namely a common gauge (track width). This agreement culminated over 50 years of negotiations, during which proposals were "frustrated to a large extent by a lack of uniform railway gauge" across national boundaries (UNESCAP 1996), much like similar proposed treaties in Europe and in the Middle East (UNTC 1991, 2003). To this day, there are at least five distinct gauges in use across the proposed Asian network, necessitating costly interchange where railroads connect.

Compatibility standards are not only an important feature of transportation infrastructure: they are pervasive in the modern economy, most notably in networked industries, as evidenced by the vast collection of standards and standards-setting organizations (SSOs) convened around the world today (Baron and Spulber 2015).^{1,2} In theory, incompatibilities impose a tax on transactions in the form of a fixed cost of conversion, but there is little evidence that documents whether these costs are large enough to materially affect economic activity or justify ex-post standardization of systems that naturally, and perhaps efficiently, evolved to be incompatible (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995) – especially when adapters are available to help bridge the gap. Due to the difficulty of tying economic outcomes to compatibility, and a lack of standards-adoption events at large enough scale to be of economic significance, questions such as these remain unanswered.

This paper studies the conversion of all 13,000 miles of non-standardized railroad track in the U.S. South to a standard-compatible gauge on May 31 and June 1, 1886 as a large-scale natural experiment in standards adoption. In the 1860s, breaks in gauge were pervasive across the U.S. railway network, with railroads constructed in as many as 23 distinct gauges (Siddall 1969). By the 1880s, this count had effectively narrowed to two: 5'0'' gauge in the South, and 4'8.5'' ("standard") gauge throughout the rest of the country. The gauge change instantly integrated Southern states

¹A significant economics literature on compatibility standards has developed over the last 30 years, in the context of research on information and communications technology with network effects. The theoretical literature traces back to the seminal contributions of Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986, 1988, 1992) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). The empirical literature is considerably less developed, due to a lack of data (as noted by Baron and Spulber 2015). Existing empirical research has studied related topics, such as standards battles in consumer electronics (Augereau et al. 2006) and the behavior, impacts, and antitrust treatment of SSOs (e.g., Simcoe 2012, Rysman and Simcoe 2008, Anton and Yao 1995). A third subliterature studies path dependence in standards and technological lock-in, concentrating on the history of the QWERTY keyboard as an example (Arthur 1989, David 1985, Liebowitz and Margolis 1990). However there are few papers that examine the impacts of standards directly.

²Technical standards for interoperability also have a long history: standardization was one of the hallmark features of the American system of manufacturing that propelled the U.S. to the forefront of industrialization in the 19th century and is now pervasive in the U.S. and abroad (Hounshell 1985). Even the adoption of a common currency can be interpreted as a technical standard for payments, yielding benefits from compatibility and integration (e.g., Frankel and Rose 2002, Rose and van Wincoop 2001).

into the national transportation network. Using historical freight traffic data from the Southern Railway & Steamship Association – a cartel of the major Southern railroads and steamship lines – this paper estimates the effects of railroad gauge standardization on trade between the developing South and the industrial North at the end of the century.

I find that the gauge change triggered a significant redistribution of freight traffic into the South from steamships to railroads but did not generate an increase in total shipments. Over this same period, records show that the cartel maintained its prices, implying that railroads did not pass through any of the cost-savings achieved by the conversion. I then estimate supply and demand for freight transport on the sampled routes and show that had the cartel been broken, the gauge change would have produced a 10 percent average decline in freight rates and a corresponding 9 percent increase in aggregate shipments on the sampled routes. The effects of the gauge change were thus large but simultaneously hindered by the collusive conduct of the industry.

The first U.S. railroads were constructed as local and regional enterprises to serve local needs. At this time, opinions over the optimal gauge varied, and technical specifications of each railroad were in the hands of the chief engineer. Without the vision of a national network, distinct gauges were adopted by early railroads in different parts of the country, and subsequent construction tended to adopt the neighboring gauge – leading to the formation of nine different "gauge regions" in the U.S., and a tenth in eastern Canada, by the 1860s (Puffert 2000, 2009). As a national network began to emerge, the costs of these incompatibilities became too great to bear, and railroads gradually converged on a common gauge, through conversion and new construction.

By the 1880s, nearly all U.S. railroads had adopted the 4'8.5" gauge, except for those in the South. Data from both the U.S. Department of the Interior and Poor's Manual of Railroads confirm that whereas other regions had 95% or more of their track in standard gauge, 75% of that in Southern states was in an incompatible, 5'0" gauge (even more if excluding Virginia and North Carolina). Though adapters had developed to overcome breaks in gauge, all were imperfect, and accounts suggest they were a substantial second-best to a fully integrated network.

In 1884 and 1885, two major 5'0'' railroads connecting the South to the Midwest converted their tracks to standard gauge, increasing pressure on the remaining Southern railroads to follow suit and providing a template for execution. In early 1886, the members of the Southern Railway & Steamship Association (SRSA) cartel, which together comprised a majority of mileage in the South, agreed to convert all track to the standard-compatible gauge of 4'9'' en masse over the two days of May 31 and June 1, 1886, with all traffic halting on May 30 and resuming by the evening of

June 1, effortlessly traversing the former breaks in gauge.³ The conversion was carefully planned, seamlessly executed, and thoroughly documented by contemporaries.

The principal purpose of the cartel was to create and enforce noncompetitive pricing. It pursued this goal with rate maintenance agreements and an enforcement mechanism whereby members were allotted a fraction of route-level traffic, and those in excess of their allotment would have to pay the excess revenue into a central fund for redistribution to other members. To implement this mechanism, the SRSA administrative office collected, by submission and audit, records of freight traffic carried to and from the Southern cities where two or more cartel members operated, which were then circulated to member railroad and steamship carriers.

I use SRSA freight traffic and revenue data for individual carriers at the route- by year-level to estimate the effects of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from the North into the South. Invoking a variant on a triple-differences design, I compare within-route traffic borne by railroads versus steamships before and after the conversion to 4'9'' gauge, relaxing the effects to vary with route distance. Steamships serve as a natural control for railroad traffic, as seaborne freight entirely circumvented the gauge breaks and was therefore operationally unaffected by the conversion to a compatible gauge. This framework identifies the elasticity of freight traffic with respect to the unit cost of a break in gauge, which will be inversely proportional to route length.

The source material yields a balanced panel of 52 routes with inbound merchandise shipments data both pre- and post-standardization. Within this sample, I find sharp effects of standardization on rail-borne merchandise traffic from the North to the South, with about a 250% relative increase in railroad traffic and revenue on short routes that decreases with distance; when split across the two all-rail pathways into the South, I find relatively larger increases for the less-trafficked path. Across all specifications, I find that the effects of conversion dissipate after about 700 to 750 miles. The results are robust to a variety of fixed effects and within assorted subsamples.

Market share models return similar results, showing a large redistribution of traffic from steamships to railroads, with effects dissipating at similar distances. However, I find no evidence of growth in aggregate shipments through 1890: the effects appear to be limited to substitution across modes. To better understand the reasons for this result, I examine cartel pricing for several routes in the

³The gauge of 4'9" was selected to conform to that of the Pennsylvania Railroad – an important connecting line – and with the belief that a smaller change would reduce the expense of converting rolling stock, but it was understood to be compatible with the 4'8.5" standard (Taylor and Neu 1956, Puffert 2009). As Taylor and Neu write, "such a deviation was not considered a serious obstacle to through shipment." The U.S. Government similarly noted in 1880 that "gauges from 4'9.375" to 4'8" may be considered standard," as the same rolling stock may be used on either "without objection" (U.S. Department of the Interior 1883).

sample, finding that prices were stable over the sample period. While the gauge change affected quality of service by improving rail transit times and reducing the risk of property loss, it evidently was not sufficient to attract new traffic to the market absent price adjustments. The cartelization of Southern transportation is thus critical to interpreting these results.

To evaluate whether the consumer welfare gains were constrained by collusion, I estimate a joint model of supply and demand for freight transport over the sampled routes, and use the estimates to evaluate a counterfactual in which all-rail and steamship carriers compete. I find that if the cartel were broken, the conversion to a compatible gauge would have increased total traffic by roughly 10 percent, primarily due to a significant reduction in prices: in stark contrast to realized history, on average 50 percent of railroads' post-change cost savings are passed through to consumers in the counterfactual. However, it is important to note that in a competitive environment, the gauge change could itself come into question, as collusion or common ownership was required for railroads to internalize the potentially large external returns to standardization, and non-competitive prices were essential to recouping the fixed costs of the conversion.

The results add a new dimension to existing research on how transport infrastructure historically facilitated trade (Donaldson 2015) and created economic value (Fogel 1964, Donaldson and Hornbeck 2016, Swisher 2014), bringing out the importance of compatible gauge in railway networks and physical and technological barriers to trade more generally. The results also offer lessons for present-day investments in compatibility, which this paper shows can have large effects on economic activity in settings where traffic is exchanged across interconnected networks, such as communications and transportation. In doing so, the paper contributes to a gap in the literature relating compatibility standards to trade, an issue which "has long been reflected in multilateral trade rules" (WTO 2005) but on which there is almost no empirical work (Gandal 2001), excepting two recent studies on containerization in international shipping (Rua 2014, Bernhofen et al. 2016). The present paper provides insight into the role that interoperability in transport networks can play in promoting trade, and the findings acquire increased urgency in light of recent efforts to integrate domestic railways into international networks without standardizing the gauge.

Finally, this paper highlights a tension between standardization and product market competition in networked environments: collusion (or consolidation) is necessary for developers to internalize the external returns to compatibility, but it also reduces the likelihood that resulting cost savings will be passed through to consumers, limiting the scope for welfare gains from standardization. It may be desirable to instead have a government simultaneously promote competition while mandating or subsidizing ex-post standardization, particularly if the social returns are believed to exceed the cost of conversion. To my knowledge, this tension has not been fully explored, but further study is beyond the scope of the paper, and I thus leave it to future research.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews U.S. railroad history and the natural experiment at the heart of this paper. Section 2 introduces the data and describes the empirical strategy. Section 3 estimates the effects of the gauge change on mode traffic shares and combined shipments and explores potential explanations, emphasizing the importance of the institutional environment. Section 4 then estimates supply and demand for freight transport, and Section 5 uses the results to evaluate the effect of the gauge change in a counterfactual with competition. Section 6 discusses the key lessons, particularly as related to (i) the benefits of interoperability and (ii) the mediating influence of product market competition, as well as implications for the design of international rail transportation agreements. Section 7 concludes.

1 History of U.S. Railroads and Gauge Standards

Diversity in gauge characterized U.S. railroads for most of the 19th century. The first railroads were built with a local, or at most regional, scope, and "there was little expectation that [they] would one day form an independent, interconnected" network (Puffert 2009), obviating any perceived benefits of coordinating on a common gauge. Gauges were instead chosen by each railroad's chief engineer, and without clear evidence of an optimal gauge standard, diversity proliferated. As Puffert (2009) recounts, the first wave of construction in the 1830s used four distinct gauges (4'8.5'', 4'9'', 4'10'', and 5'0''), a second wave in the 1840s added three broader gauges to the mix (5'4'', 5'6'', 6'0''), and a "third wave of experimentation" in the second half of the century introduced several narrow gauges, the most common of which were 3'0'' and 3'6''. Amongst this set, only 4'8.5'' and 4'9'' were mutually compatible and allowed for seamless interchange of traffic.⁴

The industry nevertheless recognized the advantages of interoperability, as subsequent construction typically adopted the gauge of neighboring railroads. By the 1860s, a national network had begun to emerge, but it was plagued by breaks in gauge as well as minor gaps in the physical network – such that there were nine distinct "gauge regions" in the U.S. during the Civil War, and a tenth in

⁴See Puffert (2009) for a comprehensive discussion of the origins of U.S. railroad gauge. To this day, experts' opinion over the optimal gauge varies, though the choice is (i) understood to vary with operating conditions, and (ii) involves tradeoffs, such that there is no dominating standard. Even so, experts tend to agree that wider gauge is preferable to the modern standard (4'8.5") for its speed, stability, and carrying capacity (Puffert 2009).

Canada, each predominantly using a different gauge than neighboring regions. Panel (A) of Figure 1 gives a flavor of the state of U.S. railroads east of the Mississippi River at this time, showing lines in 4'8.5'' ("standard" gauge), 5'0'' ("Southern" gauge), and other widths.

[Figure 1 about here]

Contemporaries in the 1850s noted that each break in gauge imposed a full-day delay on through shipments and necessitated significant labor and capital for transshipment, which at the time was performed manually, aided by cranes (Poor 1851, Taylor and Neu 1956). Diversity also required railroads to preserve a large fleet of idle rolling stock at each break for transferring freight. Several adapters developed to reduce these costs, such as bogie exchange (whereby each rail car would be hoisted, and its chassis replaced with one of a different gauge), transporter cars (which carried cars of a different gauge), adjustable-gauge wheels, and multiple-gauge track. Although bogie exchange was the most common means of interchange, it was time-consuming and yielded a mismatched car and bogie, which ran at reduced speeds and were prone to tipping on curves. The alternatives were equally deficient: transporter cars were difficult to load and similarly created instability; variablegauge wheels loosened, causing derailment; and third rails required a gauge differential of at least eight inches and were prohibitively expensive to construct and maintain.

After the Civil War, several pressures coincided to induce private efforts towards standardization, including growing demand for interregional freight traffic and increasing trade in perishable goods, which were heavily taxed by delays at breaks in gauge; competition within routes (to provide faster service); and consolidation across routes (internalizing externalities of conversion). Despite known technical shortcomings (Puffert 2009), 4'8.5'' became the standard to which railroads conformed: not only did standard gauge comprise a majority of U.S. mileage in every decade since the first railroads were built, but it was also the principal gauge in the Northeast and Midwest, the loci of trade in manufactured and agricultural goods. By the early 1880s, the common-gauge regions using 4'10'', 5'6'', and 6'0'' had all converted to standard gauge, effectively leaving only two gauges in widespread use: 5'0'' in the South, and 4'8.5'' in the rest of the country.⁵

⁵Concurrent with these conversions, physical gaps in the network were being closed around the country: cross-town connections between depots were being built (e.g., Richmond in 1867) and rivers were being bridged (e.g., the Ohio River at Louisville in 1868 and Cincinnati in 1877), such that differences in gauge were the only remaining obstacle to a physically integrated network. A third impediment to through traffic was the moral hazard inherent to relinquishing control over rolling stock on adjoining lines, or allowing other railroads' cars to use (and potentially damage) one's own tracks. These issues were resolved around the same time by contracting innovations that established joint ownership of rolling stock (Puffert 2009). Vertical relationships are discussed further in Appendix C.

1.1 The Southern Railway & Steamship Association

Concurrent with (but independent of) these trends, Southern freight carriers self-organized into the SRSA cartel in 1875, following a series of rate wars. The cartel's express purpose was rate maintenance: the preamble to the cartel agreement asserts the intent of achieving "a proper correlation of rates," to protect both its members and consumers from "irregular and fluctuating" prices and "unjust discrimination" that favored certain markets over others (SRSA 1875). Membership was open to all railroads and steamships operating south of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers and east of the Mississippi and included nearly all major carriers in the region.

Though it had a rocky start, the SRSA grew into a sophisticated and highly successful organization that was "one of the most powerful and disciplined" traffic pools in the country (White 1993) and has been documented several times over (e.g., Hudson 1890, Joubert 1949, Argue 1990).⁶ The cartel had its own central administration composed of representatives from its constituents, which had the responsibility of carrying out the terms of the cartel agreement, making new rules as necessary, and providing a venue for settling differences. This administration thus provided a government for Southern freight carriers, with an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary.

The cartel administration included a Rate Committee, which determined prices for each route. The mechanism used to ensure that members adhered to these prices was apportionment: carriers serving a competed route were allotted a fixed proportion of traffic, determined by "the average amount of freight hauled in past years" (Joubert 1949). In the early years of the cartel, carriers who exceeded their allotment were required to submit the excess revenues to the cartel for redistribution to other members, less a half-cent per ton-mile allowance for the expense of carriage. This plan quickly unraveled when members reneged ex-post, and the agreement was amended to require members to deposit 20% of revenue with the cartel at the time of shipment, out of which these transfers would be made. To enforce the agreement, the cartel installed agents at stations to record carriers' daily traffic and revenue, appointed inspectors to ensure that freight was being properly weighed and classified, and regularly audited members' accounting records. These records were compiled into monthly tables reporting traffic and revenue by route and carrier, which were then circulated to members – and which have since been preserved.

The SRSA initially governed inbound merchandise shipments, and outbound cotton and textiles,

⁶The SRSA in fact preceded, was the model for, and shared a common founder with the Joint Executive Committee, a cartel of railroads running between the Midwest and East Coast that has been widely studied in the economics literature (e.g., Ulen 1979, Porter 1983, Ellison 1994, and others).

between Atlanta, Augusta, Macon, and points in the North. Coverage soon grew to include several other interior Southern cities (e.g., Newnan, West Point, Opelika, Montgomery, Selma). In 1885, the cartel was expanded to cover passenger traffic on these routes, and in 1887, it folded rapidly-growing "Western" routes (between the South and the Midwest) into the agreement. Given the late addition of these routes to the cartel, this paper focuses on the effects of the gauge standardization on so-called "Eastern" traffic between the North and South.

The amended mechanism proved so effective that in 1887, the cartel reported that "since 1878, all balances have been paid and rates thoroughly maintained," excepting one month in 1878 (Hudson 1890) – a sharp contrast to frequent pre-cartel rate wars. There are several reasons why the cartel was successful, beginning with the mechanism itself, which muted carriers' incentives to cut prices to capture a greater share of traffic. Railroads that refused to join the cartel were denied through traffic, which effectively amounted to a boycott. And the SRSA demonstrated early on that when carriers (members or not) deviated from cartel prices, it would act quickly and decisively by cutting rates to destructively low levels until the deviator complied.

The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) in February 1887 presented a new kind of threat to the cartel. The ICA prohibited traffic pooling, making the cartel's apportionment mechanism illegal, however the act "by no means put an end to the power of the Association" (Hudson 1890).⁷ The SRSA responded by transitioning to a system of fines for price deviations, with mileage-based deposits, and it continued collecting and disseminating members' traffic and revenue. The SRSA continued to operate in this way until 1890, when the Sherman Act delivered the lethal blow by prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade. At this point, the cartel stopped circulating traffic tables. Though it took several years for the courts to resolve initial ambiguities over whether the SRSA met the statute's definition, by 1897 the cartel had dissolved.

1.2 The Gauge Change

As trade between the South and other regions accelerated during Reconstruction, incompatibilities became increasingly costly: by the 1880s, "not a prominent point could be found on the border [of

⁷The act had little impact in its early years, and if anything may have empowered carriers and helped stabilized prices (Prager 1989, Blonigen and Cristea 2013), consistent with the revisionist interpretation of Kolko (1965), who notes that railroads welcomed the regulation. Other sources suggest that the content of the ICA, and the Interstate Commerce Commission it created, were subject to near-total regulatory capture. Gilligan et al. (1990) point out that Albert Fink, the founder and first commissioner of the SRSA and "among the most respected railway officials in the nation" (White 1993), provided much of the structure for the ICA, and that southern railroads were among its "chief beneficiaries" as evidenced by abnormal stock price returns following its enactment – despite the fact that these were railroads with "allegedly the most effective private cartels."

the South] without its hoist and acres of extra trucks" (Hudson 1887), and the total cost of delays were growing one-for-one with volume. The first cracks in the 5'0" network developed in 1884 and 1885, when two major lines linking the South to the Midwest (the Illinois Central and the Mobile & Ohio) converted their tracks to standard gauge, increasing pressure on their Southern competitors and connections to follow suit, and providing a template for execution.

On February 2-3, 1886, cartel members convened to discuss the compatibility problem and agreed to convert all of their track to a 4'9", standard-compatible gauge on May 31 and June 1 of that year.⁸ The gauge change was carefully planned and seamlessly executed: in the weeks leading up to the event, railroads removed the ties on their tracks and took a subset of their rolling stock (rail cars, locomotives) out of service to adjust its gauge; then, on the evening of May 30, all traffic halted, and teams of hired labor worked up and down each line, removing remaining ties, shifting one rail 3" inwards, resetting ties, and moving to the next segment. By midday on June 1, 13,000 miles of track had been converted to 4'9", and traffic had resumed, with freight now moving freely across Southern borders in a physically integrated railroad network.⁹

The scale, operational details, and anticipated effects of the gauge change were widely discussed in railroad journals and Southern newspapers in the months leading up to the conversion (Appendix B). To verify the scale of the conversion, I collect individual railroads' gauges and mileage from Poor's Manual of Railroads (1882-1890), an annual compendium listing the universe of U.S. railroads. Table 1 shows the miles of railroad in 4'8.5-9'', 5'0'', and other gauges by region and year throughout the 1880s. Whereas other regions generally had 95% of their track in standard or standard-compatible gauge by 1881, nearly 70% of Southern railroad mileage began the decade in 5'0'' gauge. The discrepancy remained until the year of the gauge change: between 1885 and 1887, the total in 5'0'' gauge declined by 13,006 miles, and the fraction of Southern railroad in standard or standard-compatible gauge discretely jumped from 29% to 92%. Panels (B) and (C) of Figure 1 show the updated gauge of the 1861 railroad network as of 1881 and 1891, respectively (omitting new construction), illustrating the geographic scope of the conversion.

[Table 1 about here]

⁸The 4'9'' gauge was selected to match the Pennsylvania Railroad system, an important connection in the Mid-Atlantic, and because it was thought that smaller adjustments were less costly (Puffert 2009).

⁹The execution of the gauge change is covered in greater depth by several other sources. For extended summaries, see Taylor and Neu (1956) or Puffert (2009). For a detailed, contemporary discussion of the nuts and bolts of the planning and execution, see Hudson (1887). Extrapolating from the costs of converting the Louisville & Nashville system (detailed in its 1886 annual report) to all 5'0" mileage, the total cost of the gauge change was likely around \$1.2 million in 1886, equivalent to \$31 million today. To put the cost in perspective, the L&N's expenditure on conversion was roughly 30% of its investment in infrastructure in 1886 and 37% of net income.

The historical record indicates that network externalities were important in propelling the gauge change and were recognized by contemporaries. The returns to adopting a compatible gauge were low for railroads on the periphery if interior neighbors did not follow – the effect would be to shift the break from the top to the bottom of the line, with no benefits to through traffic – and negative for interior railroads acting alone. But the gains to all parties were high under a coordinated, regional conversion. Because the returns to conversion were increasing in the size of the standard gauge network, one large system could also induce a cascade of standardization.¹⁰

The cartel served three important roles that enabled conversion to take place. First, it provided an institutional venue for coordinating on a common gauge and organizing the conversion, similar to SSOs today. More importantly, collusion internalized the externalities to adopting the common standard, and non-competitive pricing ensured that railroads could recoup the expense of conversion. Without either collusion or consolidation, the gauge change itself would be in question, and integration would likely have been significantly retarded.

2 Data and Empirical Strategy

I use the SRSA records of freight traffic into and out of the South by railroad and steamship to study the effects of the gauge change. I restrict attention to annual totals of merchandise shipped from Northern port cities to the interior South, as merchandise shipments comprised the largest fraction of tonnage in the South (35% of total; see U.S. Department of Interior 1883) and an even greater fraction of revenue, and cotton shipments in the reverse direction yield a smaller sample and may be confounded if destined for foreign markets.¹¹ The sample throughout the paper consists of 52 North-South routes formally apportioned and monitored by the cartel both before and after the gauge change (4 origins x 13 destinations), and a sample period spanning the 1883-84 to 1889-90 fiscal years. Table 2 lists – and Figure 2 maps – the origins and destinations in the sample. The gauge change coincides precisely with the end of the 1885-86 fiscal year, such that the pre-period consists of FY84 to FY86, and the post-period FY87 to FY90.

¹⁰As one contemporary noted, once the Louisville & Nashville (the largest railroad in the South at the time, with over 2,000 miles) determined that it must adopt a standard-compatible gauge to compete for interregional traffic, other large systems recognized that they "must move with the Louisville and Nashville," and smaller railroads then "had no choice in the matter but to join ranks" (Hudson 1887, p. 668).

¹¹Invoking the annual data smooths out higher-frequency fluctuations and significantly simplifies the data collection, while still providing enough variation to identify the effects of the gauge change. The choice to restrict attention to inbound merchandise shipments is further motivated by the fact that outbound cotton shipments were dwindling over the period, diverted by growing demand from Southern textile manufacturers.

[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]

Due to the diffuse ownership of the network, shipments to the interior South necessarily traversed multiple railroads, or a steamship and a railroad, to reach their destination. The SRSA tables report sequence-specific traffic and revenue, which I aggregate up to mode: all-rail versus steamship. I include separate observations for the two all-rail paths into the South, the "Atlantic Coast Line" (ACL) and the "Piedmont Air Line" (PAL, see Appendix A), each of whose constituent railroads shared a common owner, and which are explicitly denoted in the SRSA tables. The primary sample thus has $1,092 (= 52 \cdot 3 \cdot 7)$ observations at the route-mode-year level.¹²

The empirical strategy compares all-rail and steamship traffic within routes before and after the gauge change. Because seaborne freight bypassed breaks in gauge, steamships were not directly affected by the conversion and accordingly provide a control group for the treated all-rail mode. In all cases, I relax the effects to vary with distance: breaks in gauge imposed a fixed cost on through traffic, such that the per ton-mile unit costs were inversely proportional to route length. The first set of specifications thus take the following form:

$$\ln(Q_{mrt}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Rail_{mrt} + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 Rail_{mrt} Post_t + \beta_4 Rail_{mrt} Post_t Dist_r + X_{mrt}\gamma + \varepsilon_{mrt} , \qquad (1)$$

where Q_{mrt} is pounds of traffic carried by mode m, on route r, in year t; $Rail_{mrt}$ is an indicator for the all-rail mode (ACL and PAL); $Post_t$ indicates the post-period; and $Dist_r$ is the distance from origin to destination. Throughout the analysis, I measure distance as straight-line distance, rather than traveled distance, which is not observed (contemporary sources indicate the two are in roughly fixed proportion; see Appendix A). The X_{mrt} term includes all other interactions plus fixed effects. In all specifications, I cluster standard errors by route.

As Appendix Table A.2 shows, the sampled routes provide sufficient variation in distance (from 500 to 1,100 miles) to identify the elasticity of all-rail traffic with respect to the distributed (unit) costs of gauge breaks. However, with imperfect competition in the market for freight transport, the gauge change may affect steamship traffic indirectly in general equilibrium, contaminating the control group. In a second set of specifications, I therefore estimate a model on market shares, rather than quantities, which can account for this interdependence. Suppose mode shares are generated by discrete consumer choices, where each mode has latent utility:

¹²To simplify the exposition, the specifications below are presented as if the ACL and PAL were aggregated into a single observation, but the tables in Section 3 include them as separate observations.

$$u_{imrt} = \left[\beta_0 + \beta_1 Rail_{mrt} + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 Rail_{mrt} Post_t + \beta_4 Rail_{mrt} Post_t Dist_r + X_{mrt}\gamma + \xi_{mrt}\right] + \eta_{imrt} \equiv \mu_{mrt} + \eta_{imrt} ,$$

where η_{imrt} is an error term distributed type-I extreme value. The market share for each mode is then $s_{mrt} = \frac{\exp(\mu_{mrt})}{\sum_{\ell=1,2} \exp(\mu_{\ell rt})}$, which is jointly determined with that of the other mode. Indexing railroads as m = 1 and steamships as m = 2, we can write:

$$\ln(s_{1rt}) - \ln(s_{2rt}) = \mu_{1rt} - \mu_{2rt}$$
$$= \tilde{\beta}_0 + \tilde{\beta}_1 Post_t + \tilde{\beta}_2 Post_t Dist_r + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{rt} , \qquad (2)$$

where the γ_r are route fixed effects (which will subsume the $Dist_r$ variable). This model can then be estimated by OLS on a sample of the all-rail observations.

Finally, to evaluate the effects of the gauge change on combined traffic, I collapse the sample to route-years and estimate a specification for total shipments:

$$\ln\left(Q_{rt}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 Post_t Dist_r + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{rt} \tag{3}$$

3 Standardization and Internal Trade

Though adapters like steam hoists were being used across the South by the 1880s, contemporaries nonetheless believed that the gauge change would generate substantial growth in all-rail traffic. As the secretary of the SRSA noted in a U.S. Treasury Department report on Southern transportation, "the [current] movement via all-rail lines is very small, but will in the next few years develop very much, because of the late change of all lines to one uniform gauge" (Sindall 1886, p. 679). Was the conversion to the 4'9" gauge a large-enough improvement over the available adapters to affect internal trade between the South and other regions, as predicted?

In this section, I show that the adoption of compatible gauge indeed provoked a large redistribution of freight traffic on North-South routes from steamships to railroads, but it does not appear to have increased shipments in the aggregate. It may be helpful to provide a roadmap to this section in advance. I first contextualize the event within broader trends in trade between the South and other U.S. regions, which was growing rapidly in the 1870s and 1880s. I then estimate the effects of the gauge change on all-rail and steamship traffic, as well as on aggregate shipments. At the end of the section, I consider explanations for these results, focusing on the ways in which collusion may have constrained consumers' gains from standardization.

3.1 North-South Trade

Southern freight traffic grew rapidly over the 1870s and 1880s, during and after Reconstruction. Until the early 1880s, the vast majority of Southern trade was with the North, and this trade was conducted almost entirely by coastal steamship, in connection with interior railroad lines running from those points (Sindall 1886, p. 679). However, with the growth of the Southern rail network (Table 1) and Midwest industry and agriculture, the Southern trade expanded to the west over the decade, to the point where "Western" traffic was incorporated into the cartel in 1887, and all-rail shipping became a viable alternative for "Eastern" routes as well.

Table 3 shows overall trends in merchandise shipments for the sampled routes from 1884 to 1890. Over the six-year interval, total shipments increased by 25%, driven by growth in steamship traffic. The table also demonstrates heterogeneity in all-rail shares across origins – though this variation will be subsumed by route fixed effects in regressions. Given the limited sample of routes, it will nevertheless be important to test robustness across individual origins and destinations in the data. Note that these totals likely understate growth in trade between the South and other regions, as they do not account for the growth in Western traffic and on routes that entered service over the decade as the transportation network expanded.

[Table 3 about here]

3.2 Effects of the Gauge Change

3.2.1 Distributional Effects

Table 4 provides the initial test of the effects of the gauge change, estimating the specification in Equation (1), which regresses log traffic at the route-mode-year level on indicators for the all-rail mode and the post-period, their interaction, and an additional interaction with route length (in units of 100 miles), with the remaining interactions included but not listed for brevity. Column (1) estimates this model as specified, while Columns (2) through (6) add an assortment of fixed effects for routes, modes, years, route-modes, and route-years.

[Table 4 about here]

The table shows the treatment effect and its interaction with distance, suppressing the other parameters. I find that the gauge change caused all-rail traffic to increase by 240-250% relative to steamship traffic on short routes, with the effect diminishing on longer routes, reaching zero after roughly 740 miles. This effect is stable across specifications.

In Table 5, I explore heterogeneity in these effects across the two all-rail paths between the North and South, the ACL and PAL. This exercise is also in part a robustness check to see that both lines were affected by the conversion to the new gauge. The results show that they were, with the less-trafficked line (the ACL) experiencing a larger percentage increase in traffic. I find that the effects dissipate at similar distances for both carriers, roughly 700 miles – statistically comparable to the break-even distance in the previous table at usual significance levels. The effects are again estimated to be larger relative to route-year averages versus other fixed effects.

[Table 5 about here]

As previously discussed, the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 may not be properly identified, due to the interdependence of all-rail and steamship traffic in an imperfectly competitive market.¹³ In Table 6, I estimate a model that accounts for this interdependence (Equation 2), in which the outcome variable is the log difference in all-rail and steamship shares. In taking this difference, most fixed effects from the previous table are eliminated, such that Table 6 includes only two variants of the regression: absent and with route fixed effects (Columns 1 and 2, respectively).

[Table 6 about here]

We continue to see positive effects of the gauge change on all-rail shares that decline with distance, significant well beyond the one percent level. The estimates are similar across the two specifications, and the effect of the gauge change is again estimated to dissipate at roughly 730 miles, as in Table 4. In Table 7, I split the effects out for the ACL and PAL. The effects are present for both carriers, continue to be relatively larger for the ACL (the smaller of the two carriers), and again dissipate after roughly 700 miles – much as in Table 5.

[Table 7 about here]

¹³In the language of causal inference, the risk is a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA): the assumption that untreated observations are unaffected by the treatment. In an imperfectly competitive market, steamships (the control group) may be indirectly affected by the gauge change if they lose traffic to railroads. In this case, a direct comparison would overstate its effects on growth in all-rail traffic.

I also examine variation in the effects of the gauge change over time. A priori it is not obvious whether the effects would be immediate or would phase in: on the one hand, the change was immediate and comprehensive, and improved service available from the first day after the conversion; on the other hand, it may have taken time for information to spread, and for shippers to adjust. To evaluate this question, as well as to test for pre-trends, Table 8 re-estimates the model in Equation (2), allowing the coefficients to vary by year.

[Table 8 about here]

Relative to the omitted year of 1884, the table shows that all-rail and steamship shares did not change in a statistically significant way over the next two years leading up to the gauge change (if anything, the signs of the estimates suggest all-rail shares were declining). Beginning in the first year post-gauge change, we see a significant jump in all-rail shares that grows each year through the end of the panel, and it appears to level out around 1890.

In Appendix D, I test the sensitivity of these results to dropping individual origins, destinations, and years from the cartel sample. Given the limited number of routes (52) and the somewhat short panel (3 years pre-gauge change, 4 years post), these checks are necessary to establish that the results are not driven by outliers or subsamples (for example, by routes originating in Baltimore, the origin nearest to the South). I find consistent results throughout. I also run similar regressions for revenue, which is provided alongside the traffic statistics in the SRSA tables, and find identical effects of the gauge change in sign and magnitude. This result is a natural consequence of the high correlation ($\rho = 0.99$) between traffic and revenue in the data.

3.2.2 Aggregate Effects

The previous results established that the gauge change caused growth in all-rail freight shipments relative to steamship traffic, but leave ambiguous to what degree this effect reflects displacement of existing traffic versus the generation of new traffic. Table 9 answers this question, collapsing the data to the route level and looking at the effects of the gauge change on total route traffic and revenue (Equation 3). The even-numbered columns include route fixed effects. Across all specifications, the change in traffic and revenue is not significantly different from zero. In particular, we see no increase in traffic on shorter routes (where previous tables showed the gauge change had the strongest effects on shares) relative to longer routes: the variation in the growth in route traffic and revenue vis-à-vis distance is a precisely-estimated zero.

[Table 9 about here]

3.3 Explaining the Results

That the standardization of railway gauge caused economic activity to shift to the all-rail mode is plausible, albeit not ex-ante obvious, given the widespread use gateway technologies pre-gauge change that reduced the cost of incompatibility. This evidence alone implies welfare gains for the switchers. But the lack of an effect on the extensive margin – the absence of an increase in aggregate shipments – is surprising, and suggests that the consumer welfare gains were in fact constrained to existing traffic. The most likely reason was the cartel itself.

Though the conversion to a compatible gauge increased railroads' capacity and reduced costs by eliminating interchange, cartel freight rates held constant around the conversion, which may have precluded any change in aggregate shipments. The SRSA's Circular Letters include tables with the issued rates for shipments between various cities within and outside of the South, which list prices by class of merchandise and were revised and republished every time rates were adjusted.¹⁴ These tables make it possible to track route-level price changes over time.

Figure 3 show the distribution of rate changes on the routes in these circulars that are also in the sample for this paper (total of 36 routes, out of the 52 routes in the previous tables). Each observation in the figure is a route-class; with 36 routes and 13 classes, there are 468 observations per period. The left panel of the figure shows the change in rates from February 1885 to March 1886 (a few months prior to the gauge change), and the right panel shows the change from March 1886 to July 1887 (over a year after the gauge change).

[Figure 3 about here]

An overwhelming fraction of routes do not update prices over this period. The handful of price adjustments following the gauge change were increases, rather than decreases, and were limited to two routes: Philadelphia-Montgomery and Philadelphia-Selma.¹⁵

¹⁴The SRSA classified freight into 13 different categories (classes) and set prices at the route and class level. More irregular, fragile, or valuable goods were classified into higher classes, which were charged the highest rates. Rates on lower classes were generally a fixed proportion of the first-class rate for each route.

¹⁵Cartel prices were not always so steady: until the early 1880s, prices were reduced regularly, under pressures of competition from alternative routing outside the scope of the cartel. Multiple sources have documented this decline, while also observing that price reductions ended in the early- to mid-1880s (e.g., Hudson (1890) documents prices from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to Atlanta from 1875 onwards, and shows that rate reductions occurred every 1-2 years until 1884, after which rates went unchanged).

Theoretical predictions for prices are ambiguous if demand for all-rail service shifted out concurrently with supply. But with the absence of an effect on total shipments, the evidence is puzzling: if demand and supply shift similarly, prices may hold but total traffic should grow. And if demand were insensitive to the gauge change, then prices should decline, with some of the railroads' costsavings passed through. Gauge-inelastic demand is also inconsistent with the growth in all-rail market share and the motivations for the gauge change itself.

A closer reading of SRSA documents suggests a potential reason why railroads' cost-savings may not have been passed through to prices: the rate-setting process was contentious, and revisions required the unanimous approval of a committee composed of representatives from member carriers. Compounding this obstacle was the fact that the cartel issued uniform rates for all carriers, likely to avoid perceptions that individual members were being favored, and without comparable cost reductions for steamships, it was difficult to get their representatives to consent to rate reductions on the grounds of the gauge change alone. However, in the event of deadlock, proposed rate changes would be evaluated by the cartel's board of arbitration, which would then issue a ruling by simple majority. In practice, many rate changes were enacted this way.

Another interpretation is that the cartel avoided pass-through and in turn suppressed the welfare gains that would have otherwise been realized by the conversion to a compatible gauge. The natural question is then: what would have happened to prices and total traffic had the cartel been broken? The remainder of the paper seeks to answer this question.

4 The Market for Shipping

To evaluate counterfactual prices and traffic under competition, I model the market for North-South freight shipment. The model assumes shippers in a given route and year make a discrete choice between the all-rail and steamship modes to maximize utility, and that railroads and steamships concurrently set prices to maximize joint or individual profits (under collusion or competition, respectively), under the constraint that collusive prices must be the same for railroads and steamships serving a given route – as was the case for the SRSA cartel.

In this model, markets are defined as route-years. Though there are $364 \ (= 52 \cdot 7)$ markets in the full sample, there are only 288 for which I have price data, such that the sample for this exercise will be restricted to N = 288 markets. Within each of these markets, I observe the share of traffic supplied by all-rail and steamship modes, but as in other models of demand I must assume a total

market size, which I fix to twice the observed traffic.

Each market is characterized by prices $\{P_{1rt}, P_{2rt}\}$, quantities $\{Q_{1rt}, Q_{2rt}\}$, and marginal costs $\{MC_{1rt}, MC_{2rt}\}$ where m = 1 denotes the all-rail mode and m = 2 denotes the steamship mode. Under the cartel, $P_{1rt} = P_{2rt} = P_{rt}$, whereas under competition mode prices are allowed to differ. Quantities throughout this and the next section are measured in 100-pound units, while prices and marginal costs are in dollars per 100 pounds of freight on the given route.¹⁶ Though the SRSA priced freight according to a complex classification scheme (with more valuable, irregular, or fragile goods charged higher prices, and bulk commodities charged the lowest prices), the SRSA traffic tables aggregate shipments across classes of merchandise. I thus calculate a weighted average price for each route, weighting by the share of route traffic in each class in 1880, and treat freight as being homogeneous in composition and priced at this index.

4.1 Demand

Suppose the latent utility of each mode m for shipper i on route-year rt is u_{imrt} , and shippers make a discrete choice over mode to maximize utility, as follows:

$$\max_{m} u_{imrt} = G_{mrt} \left(\beta_1 + \beta_2 Dist_r \right) - \alpha P_{mrt} + \gamma_m + \xi_{mrt} + \eta_{imrt} \equiv \delta_{mrt} + \eta_{imrt} ,$$

where G_{mrt} indicates that mode *m* requires transshipment in route-year *rt*, $Dist_r$ is distance between route *r* origin and destination, P_{mrt} is the price of mode *m* in route-year *rt* (calculated as the weighted average of rates across all classes of merchandise, as before), γ_m represents mode dummies, ξ_{mrt} is a mean-zero, route-mode-year specific unobservable, and ε_{imrt} is an i.i.d. type-I extreme value error. Mean utility of each mode is denoted as δ_{mrt} , and the outside option (withholding shipment) is indexed m = 0 and normalized to have $\delta_{0rt} = 0$.

Under this specification, consumers may have an inherent preference for each mode, but choices are also influenced by prices and by the necessity of transshipment. From this specification of utility, we get choice probabilities (market shares) of the following form:

$$s_{mrt}(P_{mrt}) = \frac{\exp(\delta_{mrt}(P_{mrt}))}{1 + \sum_{\ell} \exp(\delta_{\ell rt}(P_{\ell rt}))}$$

As in Equation (2), we can log-difference the outside market share to obtain the following reduced-

¹⁶Marginal costs should be interpreted as the cost of transporting 100 pounds on a given route, via a given mode, in a given year, which is a function of the mode, distance, and transshipment (if required).

form equation, which can be used to estimate the demand parameters:

$$\ln(s_{mrt}) - \ln(s_{0rt}) = G_{mrt} \left(\beta_1 + \beta_2 Dist_r\right) - \alpha P_{mrt} + \gamma_m + \xi_{mrt} \tag{4}$$

When this model is taken to the cartel data, P_{mrt} will effectively be reduced to P_r , as prices on the sampled routes are constant within routes across modes and nearly constant over time. I estimate this model by 2SLS, instrumenting for prices with route length, a principal determinant of costs and prices for long-distance freight shipment. The necessary assumption to satisfy the exclusion restriction is that distance only affects demand through prices.

4.2 Supply

The cartel is assumed to set prices on each route to maximize joint profits, subject to the constraint of a single price for all carriers. Formally, the cartel's problem is:

$$\max_{P_{rt}} \Pi_{rt} = \sum_{m} (P_{rt} - MC_{mrt}) \cdot Q_{mrt}(P_{rt})$$
$$= M_{rt} \sum_{m} (P_{rt} - MC_{mrt}) \cdot s_{mrt}(P_{rt})$$

with

$$MC_{mrt} = \lambda_m Dist_r + \theta_m G_{mrt} + \omega_{rt} ,$$

where λ_m is the marginal cost of shipping an additional 100 pounds of freight per 100 miles of route length via mode m, θ_m is the cost of interchange at breaks in gauge (for all-rail traffic) or transshipment at port (for steamship traffic), and ω_{rt} is a mean-zero cost shock shared by both modes on a given route, in a given year.

The cartel's first-order condition for each route-year is then:

$$(s_1 + s_2) + (P - MC_1) \cdot \frac{\partial s_1(P)}{\partial P} + (P - MC_2) \cdot \frac{\partial s_2(P)}{\partial P} = 0$$

which can be rewritten to be linear in the cost parameters, as in Equation (5) below. I invoke this

equation to estimate the supply parameters by OLS.

$$\begin{pmatrix}
P + \frac{s_1 + s_2}{\partial s_1 / \partial P + \partial s_2 / \partial P}
\end{pmatrix} = \lambda_1 \left(\frac{Dist_r(\partial s_1 / \partial P)}{\partial s_1 / \partial P + \partial s_2 / \partial P} \right) + \lambda_2 \left(\frac{Dist_r(\partial s_2 / \partial P)}{\partial s_1 / \partial P + \partial s_2 / \partial P} \right) \\
+ \theta_1 \left(\frac{G_1(\partial s_1 / P)}{\partial s_1 / \partial P + \partial s_2 / \partial P} \right) + \theta_2 \left(\frac{G_2(\partial s_2 / \partial P)}{\partial s_1 / \partial P + \partial s_2 / \partial P} \right) + \omega$$
(5)

4.3 Estimation

I proceed with estimation via a bootstrap procedure, in five steps:¹⁷

- 1. Estimate demand (Equation 4) via 2SLS, with clustered standard errors
- 2. Draw demand parameters from their joint distribution
- 3. Use draws to predict market shares and calculate elasticities
- 4. Estimate supply (Equation 5) via OLS with clustered SEs
- 5. Bootstrap: Repeat steps 2 through 5 (x2000)

This procedure will return a single set of estimates for demand, with standard errors clustered by route as before, and 2,000 sets of estimates for supply, which account for the parameters' sampling variance as well as the variance of the predicted market shares and elasticities entering the supply equation, which are generated from estimated parameters themselves.

4.4 Parameter Estimates

Table 10 shows the results for both demand and supply. The demand estimates (left panel) show an embedded preference for steamships over the all-rail mode and a negative effect of transshipment on demand, diminishing with route length as in previous results, breaking even around 800 miles. We also see that distance strongly predicts freight tariffs (F > 200), validating the choice of instrument, and a negative price coefficient of sensible magnitude ($\alpha = -9$).

[Table 10 about here]

¹⁷In concept, a supply and demand system can be jointly estimated via GMM or by a bootstrap, but a GMM procedure here is complicated by the different dimensionalities of the demand and pricing equations (specified at the level of route-mode-years and route-years, respectively) and sensitive to starting values. Given its transparency and computational simplicity in this setting, I opt for the bootstrap.

The marginal cost estimates (right panel) show that breaks in gauge impose a large fixed cost on interregional freight traffic, roughly \$0.08 per 100 pounds (over 10% of the median freight tariff for routes in this sample). This estimate reflects not only the direct cost of interchange, but also the indirect costs of time delays, the large fleet of idle rolling stock kept at points of interchange, and the purchase and maintenance of steam hoists themselves, which will be capitalized into prices (White 1993). Though expensive, bogie exchange was still cheaper than breaking bulk: transshipment costs at port are nearly \$0.21 per 100 pounds, due to the increased labor requirements, time delays, and risk of stolen or damaged goods. We also see similar operating costs per 100 miles of straight-line distance for each mode, at around \$0.04 per 100 pounds, or 0.8 cents per ton-mile. Though the cost of carriage by sea was at this time lower than costs by rail per mile traveled, steamships (and their last-mile railroad connections) would have had to travel a longer, less-direct path to interior Southern cities, offsetting this cost advantage in the estimates.¹⁸

Besides the functional form, recall that the principal assumption of this model is that the total latent market size for each route-year is twice the observed traffic. As in other examples of demand estimation (e.g., Berry et al. 1995), this assumption is necessary to compute outside shares, though its choice is validated by the fact that the estimates, and the counterfactuals simulated from them, are nonsensical under alternatives. The estimates and counterfactuals should nevertheless be interpreted as suggestive rather than incontrovertible evidence; in other words, the usual caution in interpreting structural estimates continues to apply.

5 Standardization with Competition

The question motivating the estimation was whether the gauge change would have increased trade in a competitive environment. To answer this question, I apply the estimates to simulate a counterfactual in which the two modes compete on prices in a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. This exercise assumes a single price-setter for each mode, and thus only partially breaks the cartel, since there were two all-rail service providers and multiple steamship lines. Given the limitations of the data (which, as previously described, are provided at the level of paths, which sometimes involved mul-

¹⁸To put these estimates in perspective, note that observers in the 1850s estimated that breaks in gauge generated handling costs of \$0.25-0.50 per ton in the 1850s and a delay of 24 hours, equivalent to roughly 300 miles' distance at typical speeds (Poor 1851, Dartnell 1858). These costs (handling and time delays) would have been significantly reduced by steam hoists and other adapters in use by the 1880s, which made breaking bulk unnecessary, but contemporaries' figures do not account for indirect costs (e.g., the cost of maintaining excess rolling stock), which may be large. As a benchmark for operating costs, recall that the SRSA permitted members exceeding their quota a 0.5 cent per ton-mile allowance for the cost of carriage before exacting penalties.

tiple carriers and were not all present in every market), as well as recurrent distinctions between all-rail and steamship modes in both the data and the narrative record (in which contemporaries predicted that all-rail traffic would grow relative to steamship traffic under a uniform gauge), reducing the dimensionality of the counterfactual to modes (rather than paths, or carriers) is a natural choice, and sufficient for evaluating the question at hand.

To simulate this counterfactual, we need to solve for the competitive equilibrium. Each mode m will set prices to maximize profits, with the following first-order condition:

$$s_{mrt}(P_{1rt}, P_{2rt}) + (P_{mrt} - MC_{mrt}) \cdot \frac{\partial s_{mrt}}{\partial P_{mrt}} = 0$$

This condition can be rearranged into the familiar pricing equation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_{1rt} \\ P_{2rt} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} MC_{1rt} \\ MC_{2rt} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial s_{1rt}}{\partial P_{1rt}} & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{\partial s_{2rt}}{\partial P_{2rt}} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} s_{1rt}(P_{1rt}, P_{2rt}) \\ s_{2rt}(P_{1rt}, P_{2rt}) \end{bmatrix}$$

into which we can plug the parameter estimates and numerically solve for prices $\{\tilde{P}_{mrt}\}$, which in turn imply quantities $\{Q_{mrt}(\tilde{P}_{1rt}, \tilde{P}_{2rt})\}$ and profits $\{\Pi_{mrt}(\tilde{P}_{1rt}, \tilde{P}_{2rt})\}$.

The results are provided in both tabular and graphical form in Table 11 and Figure 4. The table summarizes prices, traffic, and profits for the all-rail and steamship modes separately for the preperiod (Panel A) and the post-period (Panel B). In the pre-period, competition would drive down the average all-rail tariff by 27% and steamship tariff by 6%. The reduction in prices generates a 21% increase in total traffic, powered by a near doubling in all-rail shipments. Industry profits fall sharply, with a 56% decline for all-rail and 47% decline for steamships.

Recall that the gauge change eliminated a fixed cost of interchange at breaks in gauge. I find that in a competitive market, railroads would have passed nearly half of these cost-savings through to prices, yielding even larger reductions in all-rail tariffs and increases in all-rail and total traffic in the post-period. As in the pre-period, competition would drive down profits for all firms, with a net 33% decline in profits for Southern freight carriers as a whole – although railroad profits would have been insulated by their newly developed advantage in providing uninterrupted service post-gauge change. Figure 4 provides a visualization of these effects.

[Figure 4 about here]

A more direct test of impact that uniform gauge would have had on total shipments in a competitive market structure is to simulate a competitive post-period with and without breaks in gauge. This comparison avoids any potential contemporaneous changes in the market that could challenge the attribution of pre- versus post-gauge change differences in Table 11 to compatibility alone. Table 12 provides this comparison, showing that relative to a competitive post-period without the gauge change, compatibility reduces all-rail prices by 10% and increases total traffic by 9%, driven entirely by growth in all-rail traffic, which comes partly from stealing market share from steamships and partly by drawing new traffic into the market.

[Table 12 about here]

Results in Context: Standardization in Other Regions

Though data are not available to study earlier conversions in other regions, which anyway occurred piecemeal and at smaller scale, we can look to the historical record for external validation. The most quantitative discussion of the effects of standardized gauge on railroad operations comes from the Erie Railway Company in the early 1870s, when it was considering conversion from 6'0" to standard gauge. According to Blanchard (1873), the motivation for conversion was that the Erie's broad gauge was costing it substantial traffic, because shippers "demand quick time" and preferred routing that carried freight all the way to its destination "under lock and seal" as opposed to requiring transfers, which "increase the probabilities of loss, damage, and detention." As evidence of the potential returns, he evaluates the most recent example of conversion in North America (the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, in 1873), and notes that its net income in the subsequent nine weeks (up to the date of publication) had grown 15% over the previous nine weeks and over the same nine weeks in the prior year, due to both lower costs and greater revenue, while its Canadian and American competitors had concurrently lost revenue.

6 Implications for Research and Policy

These results offer lessons for both research and policy. The foremost lesson is that standards can be economically important. Despite a large theoretical literature on compatibility, and a recent body of work on standards-setting organizations, there is little evidence explicitly linking compatibility to economic outcomes. In showing that the standardization of railroad gauge in the 1880s materially affected trade, this paper has implications for other settings where traffic is exchanged across connecting, incompatible networks. For example, early efforts at computer networking yielded to multiple networks that developed alongside the Internet, each of which used a proprietary naming system for addressing email traffic; intercommunication was enabled by gateways but was so complex that that only the most technical users could do so until these networks adopted the domain name system as a common standard (Greenstein 2015, Partridge 2008).

The results also yield a deeper lesson on the interaction of standards with product market competition. In many settings, transactions must be executed via intermediaries who provide physical or digital infrastructure for transmission, such as freight carriers (for physical trade), Internet service providers (for communications), and financial exchanges (for asset purchases). These intermediaries often must interconnect with others for delivery. This paper shows that compatibility at connection points can generate large welfare gains – but only if the cost savings are passed through to consumers, which is unlikely to occur if service is not competed. Because these settings experience network effects and are inherently likely to be concentrated, a lack of competition is often a reality, and the results of this paper immediately relevant.

Direct Applications: Modern International Railways

In addition to these contributions, the results have direct bearing on modern-day railway networks. Breaks in gauge are still common around the world, especially in developing regions such as South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These breaks often occur at national boundaries, though in some cases they are present within them as well – most notably in India, which is nearing the end of an effort to standardize the gauge of its 100,000-mile network. Appendix Figure E.1 illustrates how pervasive the problem is, showing a world map of countries color-coded by the principal gauge of their railways. Developing regions generally have 3 or 4 gauges in use.

The problem has not escaped the attention of policymakers: resolving differences in gauge has been a focal point in repeated international negotiations to integrate domestic railways into transcontinental networks in places like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The most recent example of such an agreement was the United Nations-brokered Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) Network Agreement, ratified by 17 Asian countries in 2006 (UNTC 2006). The negotiations behind this agreement date back to the 1950s, when the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (now the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, or UNESCAP) set out to link Istanbul and Singapore (UNESCAP 1996). The intent was to establish more direct, overland routes between Europe and East Asia to support and promote international trade. Integrating the transportation network became increasingly imperative as trade grew over the following decades, but "this proposal, and the many that followed it, were frustrated ... by the lack of a uniform railway gauge ... and by the presence of gaps, or missing links, in the route" (UNESCAP 1996). Gaps could be filled, but it proved impossible to negotiate a common gauge standard, and when a treaty was finally ratified, it contained no provisions for standardizing the gauge.

As a result, while there are now major lines connecting all parts of the continent, freight moving between Europe and Southeast Asia must cross three breaks in gauge (see Appendix Figure E.2). These breaks remain costly, interrupting the movement of both passengers and cargo and imposing delays. And although more than a century has passed, the same adapters are still being used today: documentation points to transshipment, bogie exchange, and variable gauge as the principal means of interchange. The TAR is also not unique in this regard: a similar agreement in Europe (UNTC 1991) lists the stations where interchange would have to occur and specifies whether it would be conducted by transshipment or bogie exchange (Appendix Table E.2).

In this context, the results of this paper offer lessons for present-day treaties and policies governing transport network integration. The main lesson is that eliminating breaks in gauge significantly improves the quality of rail-based freight shipping services, enough to divert traffic from other modes – and if operators' cost-savings are passed through to consumers, enough to increase the total volume of trade. It is important to nevertheless be cautious in extending these results to a different time period, geography, and market structure (many railroads are nationalized), but given the parallels, it seems appropriate to view the evidence in this paper as instructive of the potential benefits of interoperability under a common gauge.

7 Conclusion

This paper studies the conversion of 13,000 miles of railroad in the U.S. South to a standardcompatible gauge in 1886 on internal trade between the South and the North. The gauge change integrated the South into the national railroad network and provides a large-scale natural experiment for studying the effects of interoperability standards on economic activity. Using comprehensive records of merchandise shipments on 52 North-to-South routes from a cartel that governed this traffic, I find that the gauge change precipitated a large transfer of market share from steamships to railroads that declines with distance but did not affect total shipments.

To reconcile these results, I turn attention to the cartel itself, which held prices constant around the conversion – likely limiting any response on the extensive margin. The natural question is then whether standardization would have led to lower prices and increased trade in a competitive market. To evaluate this question, I estimate a model of the industry and simulate counterfactuals in which the all-rail and steamship transport modes compete. The results of this exercise suggest that in a competitive industry, the standardization of the gauge would have generated a 27% reduction in all-rail prices and 20% growth in aggregate shipments.

The results offer several lessons, the foremost of which is that compatibility can have a large, material effect on economic activity in industries where exchange takes place over interconnected networks. The paper in particular sheds light on the potential benefits to standardizing the gauge of global railroad networks, which continue to suffer from breaks in gauge that necessitate costly interchange. Finally, the results point to a complex interaction of standardization and product market competition in networked environments. While collusion (or consolidation) increases firms' incentives to make their networks interoperable by internalizing the externality, it also harms consumers and limits the welfare gains from standardization. This tension presents an important tradeoff for antitrust regulators that is underappreciated in the literature on standards or competition but is ripe for attention, given recent antitrust scrutiny on several large Internet and communications firms with products that benefit from interoperability.


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Notes: Figure illustrates the United States' transition to a unified, standard-gauge railroad network in the second half of the 19th century. The Contemporary gauges for these same railroads or their subsequent acquirers in 1881 and 1891 were obtained from Poor's Manual of Railroads volumes for all railroads that could be matched. Over 99.5% of track miles in the 1861 network shown above were matched to the Poor's data left-most panel shows the state of the railroad network east of the Mississippi River in 1861, color-coding segments of railroad by their gauge. The middle and right-most panels show the gauge in use in 1881 and 1891, respectively, holding the network fixed (omitting new construction). Network and gauge data for 1861 railroads obtained from the Atack (2015) Historical Transportation Shapefile of Railroads in the United States. in both 1881 and 1891.



Figure 2: Map of Sampled Origins (North) and Destinations (South)

Notes: Figure shows the northern route origins and southern destinations for routes in the sample. These destinations are those for which data was reported by the Southern Railway and Steamship Association both before and after the gauge change. Freight transportation was available by all-rail routes traversing Virginia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas or by a combination of steamship and railroad, via southern port cities such as Charleston, Savannah, Norfolk, and Port Royal.




Figure 3: Distribution of Cartel Price Changes, pre-vs. post-Gauge Change

Notes: Figure shows the distribution of cartel price changes across routes and classes of merchandise from February 1885 to March 1886 (left panel) and March 1886 to July 1887 (right panel), for the subset of routes included in the SRSA rate tables. The handful of rate increases in the latter period come entirely from two routes: Philadelphia to Montgomery, and Philadelphia to Selma. Data from SRSA Circular Letters, Volumes 13-24.

0.80 250 400 Average rate (\$ per 100 lbs.) 200 Pre-gauge change (thousand \$s) Fraffic (million lbs.) 0.60 300 150 0.40 200 Profits | 100 0.20 100 50 0.00 0 0 0.80 250 400-Average rate (\$ per 100 lbs.) Post-gauge change 200 (thousand \$s) Traffic (million lbs.) 0.60 300 150 0.40 200 100 Profits (0.20 100 50 0.00 0 0 Ship Rail Ship Rail Total Ship Rail Total Collusion (as observed) Competition (counterfactual)

Figure 4: Prices, Quantities, and Profits in Competitive Counterfactual

Notes: Figure shows mean prices, total traffic, and est. profits for railroads and steamships, as observed and in a counterfactual in which they compete. The figure is a visual presentation of the data in Table 11.

	\mathbf{Pre}	-Gauge Cha	ange	Post-Gau	ge Change
New England	1881	1883	1885	1887	1889
Miles in gauge:					
4' 8.5-9"	6,060.2	6,082.6	6,237.8	$6,\!600.3$	6,627.6
5' 0"	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	191.1	201.2	180.4	184.6	116.5
Total Miles	6,251.3	6,283.8	6,418.2	6,784.9	6,744.1
Pct. 4' 8.5-9"	97%	97%	97%	97%	98%
Mid-Atlantic					
Miles in gauge:					
4' 8.5-9"	$14,\!855.0$	$17,\!590.3$	$18,\!923.4$	$18,\!648.6$	20,210.7
5', 0"	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.0
Other	990.2	997.4	868.3	772.0	682.5
Total Miles	15,845.6	18,588.1	19,792.2	19,420.9	20,893.3
Pct. 4' 8.5-9"	94%	95%	96%	96%	97%
Midwest					
Miles in gauge:					
4' 8.5-9"	$34,\!904.3$	$38,\!669.2$	$37,\!904.4$	42,241.2	45,938.1
5' 0"	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	2,342.1	$2,\!800.7$	$2,\!591.3$	1,318.3	1,028.7
Total Miles	37,246.4	41,470.0	40,495.6	43,559.5	46,966.7
Pct. 4' 8.5-9"	94%	93%	94%	97%	98%
South (focal region)					
Miles in gauge:					
4' 8.5-9"	$4,\!306.8$	4,759.6	6,048.6	$21,\!593.6$	25,252.7
5' 0''	$11,\!908.1$	12,964.5	$13,\!274.2$	268.2	19.5
Other	1,042.7	1,592.6	$1,\!371.5$	1,734.9	1,521.2
Total Miles	17,257.5	19,316.6	20,694.3	23,596.7	26,793.4
Pct. 4' 8.5-9"	25%	25%	29%	92%	94%
Western States					
Miles in gauge:					
4' 8.5-9"	$26,\!272.5$	$33,\!817.6$	$36,\!435.9$	$47,\!694.8$	54,352.6
5'0"	135.0	135.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	$3,\!427.4$	$5,\!623.2$	$4,\!642.0$	4,253.6	3,965.9
Total Miles	29,834.8	39,575.8	41,078.0	51,948.4	58,318.5
Pct. 4' 8.5-9"	88%	85%	89%	92%	93%

Table 1: Approx. Miles of Railroad in each Gauge, by Region, 1881-1889 (Poor's Manual of Railroads)

Notes: Table shows the approximate miles of railroad in the U.S. from 1881 to 1889 in two-year intervals, by region and gauge, confirming the scale of the conversion: 13,000 miles of Southern railroad converted from 5'0" to 4' 9" between 1885 and 1887. Data from Poor's Manual of Railroads, which provides a near-complete, annual enumeration of U.S. railroads. The data are subject to regional classification errors which tend to over-attribute mileage to the Midwest, pulling from the Mid-Atlantic and West, as a result of railroads with principal operations in the Midwest extending into these regions. The table uses the regional definitions of the Poor's Manual; the southern states are Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, the Carolinas, and Louisiana.

Destin (sou		$egin{array}{c} \mathbf{Origins} \ (\mathbf{north}) \end{array}$	
Albany	GA	Boston	MA
Athens	\mathbf{GA}	New York	NY
Atlanta	GA	Philadelphia	PA
Augusta	GA	Baltimore	MD
Macon	GA		
Milledgeville	GA		
Newnan	\mathbf{GA}		
Rome	\mathbf{GA}		
Montgomery	AL		
Opelika	AL		
Selma	AL		
A. & W. Pt. s	stations (GA)		
W. & A. stati	ons (GA)		

Table 2: Origins and Destinations for Sampled Routes

Notes: Table lists the origin and terminus of routes in the sample of Northern merchandise shipments used in the remainder of this paper. These 52 routes (4 origins x 13 destinations) are those for which data was reported by the Southern Railway and Steamship Association both before and after the gauge change. "A. & W. Pt. Stations" refers to stations on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad between East Point and West Point, GA (70 mi), whose traffic was reported collectively; "W. & A. Stations" refers to stations on the Western and Atlantic Railroad between Chattanooga, TN and Marietta, GA (87 mi). These destinations are geotagged to the centroid of their respective endpoints.

Pre-Gauge Change Post-Gauge Change 1889-90 1884-85 1885-86 1886-87 1887-88 1888-89 1883 - 84Panel A. Mean across routes <25th percentile distance Total traffic (million lbs.) 0.750.69 0.70 0.740.83 0.87 0.83(0.26)(0.24)(0.26)(0.27)(0.32)(0.29)(0.31)via rail 0.700.510.640.880.940.840.93(0.26)(0.21)(0.30)(0.33)(0.38)(0.33)(0.34)via steamship 0.800.88 0.760.600.720.910.72(0.26)(0.26)(0.22)(0.19)(0.24)(0.33)(0.24)Panel B. Mean across routes >75th percentile distance Total traffic (million lbs.) 0.970.94 1.280.961.13 1.131.43 (0.47)(0.42)(0.56)(0.44)(0.55)(0.55)(0.73)via rail 0.280.380.530.250.350.580.44(0.17)(0.24)(0.36)(0.41)(0.34)(0.17)(0.23)via steamship 1.671.501.991.391.832.012.50(0.59)(0.51)(0.67)(0.46)(0.67)(0.69)(0.93)

Table 3: Trends in Southern Freight Traffic, by Mode and Route Length (sampled routes only)

Notes: Table reports average merchandise shipments by year on shorter routes (<25th percentile) versus longer routes (>75th percentile), breaking out the totals by mode. The table illustrates the rapid growth in Southern freight traffic over the 1880s on a set of routes that were serviced throughout the decade. Southern trade growth would be even higher when considering routes that entered service over the decade, as the rail network expanded (Table 1 shows the growth in mileage). Standard errors of the mean shown in parentheses.

	Table 4	. Unange i	II mi-itan	manne		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.437^{***}	2.429***	2.425^{***}	2.484^{***}	2.466^{***}	2.541***
	(0.460)	(0.455)	(0.455)	(0.466)	(0.559)	(0.582)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.322***	-0.328^{***}	-0.328***	-0.334***	-0.331***	-0.341^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Breakeven distance	756.5	740.5	740.1	742.8	744.1	745.6
	(34.9)	(32.7)	(32.7)	(32.7)	(39.8)	(39.7)
N	1036	1036	1036	1036	1036	1036
R^2	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.75
Route FE		Х	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		X
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table 4: Change in All-Rail Traffic

Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from North to South. Observations are route-mode-years. The treated group consists of the all-rail mode; the control group, the steamship mode. The "breakeven distance" at which the effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. The dependent variable in all columns is log pounds of traffic. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A.C.L. x post-change	2.840***	2.852***	2.851***	2.826***	2.848***	2.809***
	(0.527)	(0.559)	(0.560)	(0.552)	(0.686)	(0.671)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.398***	-0.402***	-0.402***	-0.396***	-0.403***	-0.396***
	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.094)	(0.090)
P.A.L. x post-change	1.809^{***}	1.743^{***}	1.733^{***}	1.808^{***}	1.748**	1.829^{**}
	(0.555)	(0.610)	(0.609)	(0.607)	(0.754)	(0.754)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.238***	-0.244***	-0.243***	-0.248***	-0.247**	-0.253**
	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Breakeven distance (A.C.L.)	713.6	709.6	709.7	713.4	705.9	709.8
	(32.5)	(32.7)	(32.8)	(34.5)	(39.0)	(41.5)
Breakeven distance (P.A.L.)	759.0	715.7	713.5	728.3	707.3	723.9
	(53.2)	(58.6)	(58.8)	(55.6)	(70.4)	(66.5)
N	1036	1036	1036	1036	1036	1036
R^2	0.48	0.83	0.84	0.89	0.86	0.91
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table 5: Change in All-Rail Traffic, ACL and PAL

Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from North to South. Observations are route-mode-years. The treatment group consists of these carriers. The control group remains the steamship mode. The "breakeven distance" at which the effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. The dependent variable in all columns is log pounds of traffic. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table 0: Encous on	Traine Sugi	00
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.281^{***}	2.400***
	(0.428)	(0.450)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.315***	-0.327***
	(0.056)	(0.058)
Breakeven distance	724.6	734.4
	(32.3)	(32.6)
N	676	676
R^2	0.12	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table 6: Effects on Traffic Shares

Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on all-rail traffic shares. The dependent variable is the log difference in all-rail and steamship shares within route-years. The "breakeven distance" at which the effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)
A.C.L. x post-change	2.848***	2.809***
	(0.554)	(0.542)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.403***	-0.396***
	(0.076)	(0.073)
P.A.L. x post-change	1.461^{**}	1.647^{***}
	(0.593)	(0.576)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.216^{***}	-0.232***
	(0.076)	(0.076)
Breakeven distance (A.C.L.)	705.9	709.8
	(31.5)	(33.5)
Breakeven distance (P.A.L.)	676.8	708.8
	(73.1)	(57.3)
N	676	676
R^2	0.45	0.77
Route FE		Х

Table 7: Effects on Traffic Shares, ACL and PAL

Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on all-rail traffic shares. The dependent variable is the log difference in all-rail and steamship shares within route-years. The "breakeven distance" at which the effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)
All-rail x 1885	-0.914	-0.914
	(0.701)	(0.729)
* distance (100 mi)	0.071	0.071
	(0.093)	(0.097)
All-rail x 1886	-0.711	-0.630
	(0.863)	(0.813)
* distance (100 mi)	0.079	0.073
	(0.111)	(0.105)
All-rail x 1887	1.343**	1.500**
	(0.543)	(0.576)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.183**	-0.199**
	(0.074)	(0.078)
All-rail x 1888	1.622**	1.753**
	(0.751)	(0.790)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.271***	-0.282***
	(0.098)	(0.103)
All-rail x 1889	1.938^{**}	2.069^{**}
	(0.777)	(0.819)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.290***	-0.300***
	(0.102)	(0.107)
All-rail x 1890	2.040^{***}	2.197^{***}
	(0.678)	(0.720)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.314***	-0.331***
	(0.093)	(0.098)
N	676	676
R^2	0.12	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table 8: Increasing Effect on Shares over Time

Notes: Table estimates the effect of the gauge change on all-rail traffic shares by year, relative to the omitted year of 1884. The dependent variable is the log difference in all-rail and steamship shares within route-years. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	0		/	
	Ln(Freig	traffic)	Ln(Re	venue)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-change	0.039	0.051	-0.114	-0.091
	(0.230)	(0.222)	(0.183)	(0.186)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.000	-0.006	0.009	0.003
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)
N	360	360	360	360
R^2	0.01	0.96	0.01	0.97
Route FE		Х		Х

Table 9: Change in Total Traffic/Revenue

Notes: Table estimates the effect of the gauge change on total shipments. Observations are route-years. The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (2) is log pounds of traffic; in Columns (3) to (4), log dollars of revenue. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

14010 1	o. Supply	and Demand Estimates
Demand Parame	eters	Marginal Costs (\$ per 100 lbs.)
Break in gauge	-3.42***	Break in gauge 0.079***
	(0.71)	(0.027)
* distance (100 mi)	0.43^{***}	Transshipment 0.207^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.088)
Rail dummy	4.54^{***}	Distance, rail 0.044^{***}
	(1.11)	(0.008)
Steam dummy	6.41^{***}	Distance, steam 0.042^{***}
	(1.13)	(0.009)
Price ($\$$ per 100 lbs.)	-8.98***	N 244
	(1.54)	Mean R^2 0.77
Breakeven distance	792.7	
	(95.7)	
N	488	
R^2	0.62	
1st-stage F-stat	222.5	
Instrument	Distance	

Table 10: Supply and Demand Estimates

Notes: Table shows estimates from the joint estimation of demand and supply for freight traffic on the subsample of routes for which prices are available. Demand is estimated over a dataset at the route-mode-year level, with N=244 route-years and J=2 modes. Because cartel policy constrained railroads and steamships serving a given route to the same prices, there are only as many pricing FOCs as there are route-years, hence the halved sample for estimating costs. The price variable is computed as a weighted average of published class rates for the given route, weighting by the share of route traffic in each class in 1880. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Bootstrapped SEs are provided in parentheses.

Table	211: Pric	Table 11: Prices, Quantities, Profits, and Margins in Competitive Counterfactual	es, Profits	s, and M	argins in	Competi	tive Coun	nterfactua	ľ	
	Aver	Average price	Frei	Freight Traffic	ffic	Car	Carrier Profits	fits	Gr	Gross
	(\$ per	(\$ per 100 lbs.)	(m	(million lbs.)	s.)	(th	(thousand \$s)	$s_s)$	Mar	Margins
	Rail	$\mathbf{S}\mathbf{team}$	Rail	Steam Total	Total	Rail	\mathbf{Steam}	Total	Rail	\mathbf{Steam}
		P. d	Panel A: Pre-period (1884-1886)	re-period	(1884-188	(98				
Collusion (observed)	0.72	0.72	30.6	100.8	100.8 131.4	\$95.1	\$200.7	\$295.8	44%	28%
Competition	0.53	0.68	59.2	100.1	159.3	41.5	106.3	147.8	15%	17%
Percent change	-27%	-6%	94%	-1%	21%	-56%	-47%	-50%		
		P_{c}	Panel B: Post-period (1887-1890)	st-period	(1887-18:	<i>90</i>)				
Collusion (observed)	0.72	0.72	32.9	119.9	152.8	\$127.9	\$246.5	\$374.4	56%	28%
Competition	0.49	0.68	99.1	94.9	194.0	126.8	123.1	249.9	29%	20%
Percent change	-32%	-6%	201%	-21%	27%	-1%	-50%	-33%		

Notes: Table provides a summary of prices, quantities, profits, and margins under collusion (i.e., as observed) and in a counterfactual in which the all-rail and steamship modes compete on prices.

тат	JIC 17. L	rable 12. rost-renou competitive Outcomes. Without vs. With Gauge Change	madur	ve Outcol	THES: AA TOT	Touc vs.	א זויוו פמו	and Chang	D	
	Aver	Average price	Fr.	Freight Traffic	affic	Ca	Carrier Profit	ofits	Ū	Gross
	(\$ per	(\$ per 100 lbs.)	(r	dl noillion lb	ы.)	(t]	housand	ss	Ma	Margins
	Rail	\mathbf{S} team	Rail	Steam	Rail Steam Total	Rail	Steam	Total	Rail	Steam
No gauge change	0.55	0.69	72.9	104.8	104.8 177.8	\$69.7	8 \$69.7 \$136.1 \$205	\$205.8	20%	20% 20%
Gauge change	0.49	0.68	99.1	94.9	194.0	126.8	123.1	249.9	29%	20%
Percent difference	-10%	-1%	36%	-9%	6%	82%	-10%	21%		

Table 12: Post-Period Competitive Outcomes: Without vs. With Gauge Change

Notes: Table provides a summary of counterfactual competitive prices, quantities, profits, and margins in the post-period (1887-1890) without versus with a uniform gauge.

Appendix for Online Publication

A Data Appendix

This paper draws on several sources of data, most importantly the SRSA records of freight traffic on apportioned routes. As the paper describes, the SRSA collected daily data on the traffic and revenue of carriers on competed routes, compiled these data into monthly tables, and circulated these tables, as well as annual totals, to cartel members. These tables, as well as other SRSA circulars, were collected into semiannual volumes and have been preserved in original hard copy at the New York Public Library and Yale University archives.¹

Figure A.1 provides an example table from these records. The table shows pounds and revenue of merchandise shipments from Boston to Augusta, GA for the 1886-87 and 1887-88 fiscal years. The table lists five different paths that freight traveled for this route: three by steamship plus rail, and two entirely by rail. All-rail shipments can be identified as "via A.C.L." or "via P.A.L.", while the steamship line items indicate the intermediate ports where freight was transshipped (here, Savannah and Charleston). Similar tables are available for the remaining destinations, origins, and years, though in most cases a table provides data for one period only.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF I and June Ist, 1887, to	May 31st,	Restard States	m and thre	ough BOS'		Salar Contractor		1887,
ROADS AND ROUTES.	1886-3	1887.	1887-1	1888.	INCRE	ASE.	DECR	EASE.
ROADS AND ROUTES.	Pounds.	Revenue.	Pounds.	Revenue.	Pounds.	Revenue.	Pounds.	Revenue.
Central R. R. via Savannah	412,023 61,750 377,814	9,065 47 1,760 50 216 71 1,833 66 3,889 69	2,364,824 \$ 735,310 351,092 776,224	10,169 47 3,534 23 1,868 53 4,718 97	474 067 \$ 323,287 	5 1,095 00 1,773 ⁷ 73 34 87 829 28	61,750 26,752	\$ 216 71
Total	3,364,697	16,766 03	4,226,950	20,282 20	950,755	3,732 88	88,502	216 71

Figure A.1: Example of Table from SRSA Traffic Reports


Notes: Figure shows an extracted table from the source data. The table lists total pounds of traffic and revenue from merchandise shipments from Boston to Augusta, GA by carrier, for June 1 to May 31, 1886 and for the same period in 1887. All-rail paths (termed "routes" in the table) can be identified as either A.C.L. or P.A.L.

For the second half of the sample, the cartel operated on a June to May fiscal year and reported annual data accordingly. This accounting period is ideally suited to the purposes of this paper, as the gauge change occurred over May 31 and June 1, 1886 – such that the cartel's annual data provide the cleanest possible comparison. However, until 1886, the cartel operated on a September to August fiscal year. For this earlier period, I therefore collected year-to-date (YTD) traffic in May and August, in order to back out shipments for the June to May period. Concretely: The 1884 fiscal year spanned September 1883 to August 1884, but this paper requires totals from June to May. To obtain them, I transcribed data from three YTD tables in the cartel traffic reports: September 1882 to May 1883 (1), September 1882 to August 1883 (2), and September 1883 to May 1884 (3). I then impute June 1883 to May 1884 traffic as (2)-(1)+(3).

¹A subset of the content in these circular letters are also available on microfilm from HBS Baker Library, though the microfilm omits the monthly traffic reports which yield the data in this paper.

To make clear how all-rail freight reached Southern interior cities, Figure A.2 shows maps of the A.C.L. and P.A.L. circa 1885. Both served nearly every route in nearly every year, with a few exceptions: the P.A.L. did not deliver freight to Macon in 1884-86, Athens in 1886, or Albany in any year, and the A.C.L. did not deliver to Albany in 1890 (as inferred from their absence from the respective traffic tables). Additionally, no data is available for Albany in 1887. As a result, the sample reported in tables is reduced from $1,092 (= 52 \cdot 3 \cdot 7)$ to 1,036.

Figure A.2: All-Rail Paths connecting North and South ca. 1885



Notes: Figure provides maps of the two all-rail paths between the North and South, as of 1885: the Atlantic Coast Line and Piedmont Air Line. Each was established by mutual agreement among the traversed railroads to facilitate interregional traffic. Maps acquired from the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

On a few routes, merchandise shipments between Northern and Southern cities are occasionally indicated to have entered the South from the West, via the Louisville and Nashville or the Cincinnati Southern – crossing the Ohio River at Louisville and Cincinnati, respectively. In these cases, it remains ambiguous whether the active mode was all-rail versus river steamer plus connecting railroad. I thus omit these shipments from the analysis. As Figure A.3 shows, little is lost: the omitted shipments on average comprise 0.8% of traffic in any given year.




Figure A.3: Western paths' share of North-South traffic

Notes: Figure shows the annual proportion of total traffic on the sampled routes reported to have been by the L. & N. and the C.S. Railroads, ostensibly after having crossed the Ohio River. Due to ambiguity over the mode of westward travel, this traffic is omitted from all analysis.

To estimate effects that vary with route length, I must measure distances between origin and destination. Throughout the paper, I measure distance as "straight-line" (geodesic) distance, rather than traveled distance, which is not observed. Though traveled distance can in concept be computed for all-rail routes using maps and mapping software, the same cannot be done for steamships, and it is unclear what additional information is generated. Indeed, one early-twentieth century source (Ripley 1913) lists all-rail shipping distances from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to Atlanta, and as Table A.1 shows, straight-line distance is a roughly fixed proportion (85%) of the point-to-point track length between origin and destination.

Table A.1: Comparison of Straight-line and Track Distances

Origin	Destination	Straight-line (mi.)	All-rail (mi.)	Ratio
Boston	Atlanta	937	1089	0.86
New York	Atlanta	747	876	0.85
Philadelphia	Atlanta	666	786	0.85
Baltimore	Atlanta	577	690	0.84

Notes: Table compares straight-line (geodesic) distances and all-rail shipping distances between the points shown. Shipping distances from Ripley (1913).

With a limited sample of routes – and particularly, with origins all in the northeast and destinations in Georgia and Alabama – one might be concerned that the sample does not exhibit sufficient variation in distance to identify this source of heterogeneity. Table A.2 lays this concern to rest, showing that across the 52 routes in the sample, distance varies from 500 to 1,100 miles, with a 25th-75th percentile spread of over 300 miles.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Distribution of Route Distances

	1							
	Ν	Min	p10	$\mathbf{p25}$	$\mathbf{p50}$	p75	p90	Max
Route Distance (mi.)	52	501.0	585.8	661.1	749.5	889.0	971.7	1111.8
Neter Teble server		le linte	:1	- f	- in the		less sta	i alet line a

Notes: Table summarizes the distribution of routes in the sample by straight-line (geodesic) distance between northern origins and southern destinations. See Table 2 for a list of origins and destinations, and Figure 2 for a map.

Other Data

I also collect data from annual volumes of Poor's Manual of Railroads (1868) to confirm the scale of the gauge change. The Poor's Manual was an annual compendium of railroads in the U.S. and Canada that provides railroads' location, mileage, information on their financial performance (when available) – and conveniently, their gauge. These volumes allow me to calculate annual mileage by region and gauge for the universe of U.S. railroads, and thereby observe both the growth of the network and the standardization of gauge across the country.

To do so, I recorded the name, total mileage, and principal gauge of every railroad in five Poor's Manual volumes: 1882, 1883, 1886, 1888, and 1890 (which provide data from 1881, 1883, 1885, 1887, and 1889).² I also recorded the region in which each railroad had principal operations: New England (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT); Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA, DE, MD); Central Northern (OH, IN, IL, MI, WI); South Atlantic (VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL); Gulf and Mississippi Valley (KY, TN, AL, MS, LA); Southwestern (MO, AR, TX, KS, CO, NM); Northwestern (WY, NE, IA, MN, Dakota Territory); and Pacific (CA, OR, WA, NV, AZ, UT). In two of the sampled volumes, railroads are sorted alphabetically by these regions; in two other volumes, by state; and in one volume, at the national level. Where available, I use the Poor's Manual-designated region or state as a railroad's location. For the volume with national sorting, I infer each railroad's location from previous or later volumes, or from the address of its principal office (if not otherwise available). There was of course a great deal of new construction and consolidation over this period, but all of it is accounted for in these volumes – indeed, each volume concludes with a table listing all mergers and acquisitions since the first volume in the series was published in 1868.

The collection of the Poor's Manual data proved to be a painstaking process that required significant attention to detail, as many railroads owned subsidiary lines that were listed twice (alone and under the owner), and many railroads leased lines that were listed twice (alone and under the owner). All subsidiary and leased lines were therefore cross-checked against the entered to data to ensure they were not double-counted. The volumes also included railroads under construction, and every

²Please contact the author at dgross@hbs.edu if you would like to make use of these data. I extended a hearty thanks to the Historical Collections team at HBS Baker Library for providing access to the Poor's Manual volumes, and to Mary Vasile for her help in compiling the data.

effort was made to count only completed mileage – though this count includes railroads which were complete but not yet (or no longer) in operation. In a few cases, a gauge was not provided – when this occurred, I inferred the gauge from previous or later volumes, from separately-listed parents or subsidiaries, or from information obtained through Internet searches. There were also a few railroads which listed multiple gauges, and I count these railroads as standard-gauge roads of one of the listed gauges is standard gauge. Finally, in each volume there are a handful of railroads for which the gauge could not be determined, and these railroads are omitted from all analysis, as the cumulative mileage with unknown gauge in any given year is less than 0.1% of the network. In Table 1, I sum railroad mileage by year, region, and gauge, consolidating the Poor's regions into five super-regions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, and West.

I also make use of mapping data from two sources. I use the NHGIS state boundary shapefiles to sketch states east of the Mississippi River, and Atack's (2015) Historical Transportation Shapefiles to map the railroad network. The Atack (2015) railroad shapefile includes railroads constructed between 1826 and 1911; within this file, individual segments are identified by owner and gauge through the Civil War, but this identifying information is not available for later periods. Given the importance of this information to mapping the network by gauge, I restrict attention to set of railroads in operation by 1861. I use these data to illustrate the diversity of gauge in 1861 and then the standardization that took place through 1881 and 1891, leveraging the Poor's Manual data to identify later gauges of railroads in the Atack (2015) shapefile.

Appendix references not in paper:

Ripley, William Z. Railway Problems, Boston: Ginn and Company, 1913.

B Contemporary Accounts of the Gauge Change

The gauge change received broad coverage in contemporary railroad periodicals and Southern newspapers. The Atlanta Constitution reported on the SRSA's gauge change convention as it was underway (Figure B.1), and the Louisville Courier-Journal reported several weeks later on the planning, preparations, and procedure for converting 13,000 miles of track in one day (Figure B.2). Though not widely covered in the North, the impending gauge change was nevertheless reported in a lengthy article in *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* on May 29, where the paper acknowledges that "the matter is hardly attracting the attention it deserves," and the *New York Times* reported on May 31 that the Louisville and Nashville – the only Southern railroad of real importance to Northern shippers and investors – had completed its changeover that day, with no mention of the other railroads simultaneously converting to standard gauge (Figures B.3 and B.4).

Contemporary accounts were not limited to reporting on the mechanics of the gauge change: some newspapers speculated on the effects it might have, or was already having, on the Southern economy. For example, the *Wilmington Morning Star* wrote in April 1886 that to date, "very little lumber [goes] North by rail, for the reason that Southern roads [have] a different gauge from the Northern roads," and that "Southern lumber ports are bound to suffer a considerable loss of business" following the gauge change (Figure B.5) – a prediction consistent with this paper's results.

A year after the gauge change, in July 1887, *The Railroad Gazette* and other railroad journals published a detailed postmortem analysis (Figure B.6) – covering the history of Southern gauge and its "burden [on] both railroads and shippers," the SRSA's gauge change convention in February 1886 and the decision to convert to a 4'9" gauge on June 1, the plans and procedures for the day of the conversion and the months leading up to it, the engineering challenges, and even estimates of the aggregate expense of converting the rails and the rolling stock. For those interested, this article is the best source for understanding how 13,000 miles of railroad track could be converted to standard gauge in just 36 hours, and confirmation that it was.

Figure B.1: Report of the Gauge Change Convention (Atlanta Constitution, February 3, 1886)

THE NEW GAUGE.

AN IMPORTANT CONVENTION OF RAILROAD OFFICIALS.

A Large Meeting of General Managers ... eral portation, Roadway and Motive Power Departments of Southern Roads.

One of the most important conventions of railroad officials ever held in the south met here yes-terday. It was a meeting of the general managers and heads of the transportation readways, and machinery departments of nearly all of the broad gauge (five feet) roads east of the Mississippi and south of the Ohio river.

The meeting was held in rooms 10 and 14 of the Kimball, and was called for the purpose of fixing the day and arranging all details for the changing the cary and arranging at details for the classifier of the gauge of the railmonds in the territory named H. S. Haines, general manager of the Savanush. Florida and Western railmond, was called to the chair and F. K. Huger requested to act as serre-tary. The following

REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT. H. S. Haines, general manager, R. G. Fleming superintendent, George Riley master mechanic, Savannah, Florida and Western railroad; C. S. Gadsden, superintendent, J. W. Craig, master of roadway and master of transportation C. & S. rail road; Wm. Rogers, general superintendent, W. W. Starr, master of transportation, T. D. Kline, superintendent Southwestetn railroad, Georgia Central J. W. Thomas, general manager, Nashrille. Chai tanooga and St. Louis: J. W. Green, general mana ger, John S. Cook.master mechanic, Hamilton Wil-kins road master, Georgia railroad: J. W. Green, general manager, P. R. & A. J. T. Hanahan, general manager, R. Monifort, eu-gincer, R. Wells, assistant to president Louisvilleand Nashville; J. E. Beck, general manager, J. H. Averell, master of transportation, D. E. Maxwell, general superiotendent Florida railway and Nav-gation company South Carolinea railroad: Cecil Gabbott, general manager, J. E. Worwick, master-mechanic Atlanta and West Point, Western rati-way of Alabama. Cincinnati, Selima and Mobil-railway; C. H. Hudson, general manager, F. K. Huger, superintendent, W. H. Thomas, superin-tendeut inotive power East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia; S. B. Thomas, general manager, Peyton Randolph, assistant general manager, Peyton Randolph, assistant general manager, W. H. Green superintendent Richmond and Danville division superintendent Richmond and Danville division superintendent Richmond, road master. T. W. Gentry, master mechanic, Rome and Datom A. B. Andrews, president, Frank Coxe, vice president, V. G. McBe, superintendent, G. W. Gitis, master mechanic, Western of North Carolina; Joseph H. Sands, general manager, Frank Huger, superinten-dent, W. W. Coe, chiefengineer, S. B. Haupt, su-perintendent, Thos. Bernard, assistant en-gineer, C. P. Norfolk and Western, G. R. Talcott, superiendent, Took Bernard, assistant en-gineer, C. Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta Joseph H. Green, master incehanic (Aralita, and Charlotte, Ulumbia and Augusta Joseph H. Green, master incehanic Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line: William R. Mins, road master atlanta and West Point; R. Southgate, assistant en-gineer Columbia and Greenville; H. Walters, general manager Atlanta and Charlotte Air-Line; B. R. Dunn, engineer master mechanic Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line; William R. Mins, road master Atlanta and West Point; R. Southgate, assistant engineer Columbia and Greenville; G. M. D. Rilev, master of road way sav. Florida and Western; H. W. Reed, master of road way Savannah, Florida and Western, J. Y. Sog, conert superintendent Geor-gia Pacific railroad; J. F. Alexander, division ma-ter Goorgia Pacific railroad; J. F. Alexander, division ma-ter Goorgia Pacific railroad; J. F. Alexander, divisi

Mr. Haines upon taking the chair, briefly stated to the convention the object for which the meet-ing had been called, and announced that it would (ing has been called, and announced that it would be necessary to appoint several committees to take in hand and arrange all the details of the work, and submitteports to the convention showing how every detail connected with chance in the scree every detail connected with chance in the scree complished easily and satisfactory. The convention livened to him attentively and when he had concluded authorized him to appoint the convention livened to him attentively.

the committees and put them at work. Chairman Haines then appointed the following

Committees: Committees: Committees: Thomas, chairman: J. T. Horroban, C. H. Hudson, Wm. Rogers, H. R. Luval, Henry Walters, R. C. Fleming, J. W. Thomas, J. W. Green, J. H. Sands, R. A. Anderson, J. B. Peck, Cecil Gabbett, W. R. Kline.

R. A. Anderson, J. B. Yeck, Cecil Gabbett, W. R. Kline.
Committee on transportation -J. F. Devine, chairman: J. H. Averill, D. E. Maxwell, F. K. Hurert Peyton Randolph, A. B. Andrews, Frank Coxe, V. E. McBee, Frank Huger, C. S. Gal-den, W. Starr, L. Y. Sage, A. B. Bostwick, W. H. Creen, J. C. Jauli, C. Comittee on roadway-W. W. Coe, chairman, C. P. Haumond, M. H. Dooly, William Mims, H. W. Reade, J. N. Brown, K. Mulfert, Hamilton Wilk, Kins, G. R. Talcott, C. M. Bolton, Thomas Bernard, B. R. Junn, K. Southgate, J. T. Alexander, K. A. Bridges, J. W. Craig, E. Burkley, B. R. Swoop, Connittee on machinery-Teuben Wells, chairman, F. D. Kline, R. D. Wade, S. B. Haupt, Joseph H. Grene, G. M. D. Rilley, J. S. Cook, M. L. Collier, W. H. Thomas, T. W. Gentry, G. W. Gates, J. E. Worywick, W. T. Newman, The convention then, by manimous consent, adopted the Pennsyltania standard gauge for the trace and trucks. The meeting then adjourned until 4 p. n., so as to allow the committees in cent to work and prepare their reports to presented at that hour for consideration. At that hour the eroots were suggested, and they were recommitted, so that these changes could be properly considered and acted upon. The convention then adjourned to meet at H o'clock this morning.

Figure B.2: Preparations and Procedures for Conversion (Louisville Courier-Journal, March 23, 1886)

CHANGE OF GAUGE.

How the Work of Altering Nearly 18,000 Miles of Track is to Be Accomplished.

The Foresight and Preparation Necessary-Force to Be Employed-Estimated Cost

At a meeting of the General Managers, Boperintendents, and beads of the transpor-tation, roadway and motive power depart-ments of Southern roads, heid at the Kim-ball House, Atlanta, Ga., Feb. 3 and 3, 1580, called for the purpose of dhing date and arranging details for change of gauge, the following resolution, efford by Mr. E. B. Thomes, of the Ricamond and Dauville, was adouted:

B. Thomas, of the Richmood and Dauvius, was adopted: That i feet 0 inches is hereby adopted as the rande d surge of the roads represented is the potymetics, must that in changing surge a com-mines be appointed which shall communicate with the besting raisways which are 4 test 50 and feet 0 inch pan.e to agree upon a which and feet 0 inch pan.e to agree upon a which and feet 0 inch pan.e to agree upon a which and the shall be unitable for Load put are and that s.d committee report at an walf uay to an adjourned unerting of this covernition. It appears that all of the standard gauge reads morth of the Ohio river except the Pennsylvania, whose gauge is 4 feet 0 inches, tave a gauge of 4 feet 5 ji inches, and the committee's important duty was to

and the committee's important duty was to fix upon a wheel gauge which would for all time be interchaugeable with all of the roads in the country. At the adjourned Found in the country, as the appointed meeting of the committee made its re-port. Circulars had been sent out to all the leading railroads in the country asking their experience in running 4 feet Sig inches gauged cars over 4 feet 9 inches gauge track, or vice versa. The answers received demonstrated that no trouble was experidemonstrated that no trouble was experi-cosed, and the committee recommended that 4 feet 5% inches, allowing a variation of 1% of an inch either way, be adopted as a standard gauge between flauges. After bearing this previously arranged the date for the change, and adoption all the incontent committee previously arranged the date for the change, and adopting all the important committee reports, especially that of the Roadway Committee. This latter outlined the prepar-alions that were necewary, designing the proper tools, organization, methods, etc. Thus report recommends that the roadway forces should all be increased thirty days prior to be change, so that on the day of change they shall be double the usual num-ber. On the day, of change the furce must equal not have than three men to the mile. The organization for eight-mile sections laid down is as follows: Four men drawing inside suikes, 8 men driving outsile spikes, 4 men driving inside spike, 4 men throwing rain, 1 man with 5-foot gauge pole car, 1 man with standard insage lever car, 2 men extra, 24 men total. The changing of the gauge of the track from five to jour feet nine incidences with be done by newing one rait in three miches with out instructing its other rail at all. The prepar-ations for changing the road-ord will be preparation will consist in adaring or cutting the tie to a smooth and even sufface with the preparation will consist in adaring or cutting the tie to a smooth and even sufface with the spike tie to got the te for a space of not be moved in, so that when the change is not the inside and the other on the oralit tat is to be moved in, so that when the change is not be inside and the other on the oralit preparation will be drawn out before any second the spikes in werry third crossite us aligents and infastened to each crossite by two-pikes, one of the inside and the other on the oral strate is prepared to a curves. By means of a temprate to mean the spikes being that the spikes betroke sufficiently prepared to value the temprate the strate with the inside the spike betrok and the other on the other spike the temp of the track will not be spike the werry third crossite us aligents the spikes in werry third crossite the stangents the spikes in werry third crossite the temp is spike that the rail is to be moved a greater that in the spike between the to know is pro-sented to value between bett to know is spike the spike spike that have each will pro-per sufficiently when on the inside of the spike between the point of the spike that have teen bett to know is spike to be spike in even and the outside spikes to the spike spike that have teen bett to know is spike to be spike at hencer. This arrangement was spike the spike that have the teen bett on the spike spike the point of the spike teer bett on the point of the spike spike that have the teen bett on the point of the spike spike that hav

Even wange. Evolday, May 31, and Tuesday, June 1, Jave beeu designated as the days for gene-ral change of guuge. The following lines will change on Monday May 31: Louisville and Nashville, Nashville, Charlencoga and St. Louis, Neurphic and Charlencoga Ala-bama Great Scoubern, Chorinati Southern railway. Chiefmant, Senua and Mobile, Montgomery and Eufula, Soutwestern of Georgia, Penescola and Alatama, Florida Railway and Navagation Company. All other main lines will change ou Tuesday, Jame 1. June 1.

The bange will take place on Tuesday, International south charge on Tuesday, International south of the Charge on Huesday, International south of the Charge on almost training of the take of the Charge of the Charge mains of railway, massle up as follows: South Carolina, 1,820 miles; North Curolina, 960; Kentucky, 1,185; Frauessos, 1,886, and Virginia Wol mines. The Southern gange has been an endless mores of trouble, expense and incom-realistics, and its abaudonment has for a long time been regarded as a certainty, and all that was needed was for some one road to start the bail rolling. This the Mobile and Ohio did and the others are prompt to follow suit. When the work is completed bit to hin jortait systems in the United Sees while correspond sufficiently to Lave country alids agit reprogram. The second to distribute the work is completed before obstacle the first for secon-bersome obstacle the first fees for gauge presented to easy and rapid transportation; a general statement will suffice. It is esti-

a general statement will suffice. It is esti-mated tast sixty per cent, of the freight bunness going south over the L, and N, through Lounwille at present has to be ac-tually transferred from car to car at South Lounwille, the remaining forty per cent, going through the boist and requiring a change of 'rocks. The cost of homing each car is placed as about fifty cents, for trans-ferring from car to car teitween \$2 and \$3. These same figures; it is supposed, apply to the terminus of the Southern gauge at other paints.

The instructions, sick where the instructions in the second secon This gigantic undertaking has siready

structions for obsaying gauge of rolling-stock," "general instructions for change of gauge," reparate instructions to the differ-sut shops, and separate instructions to the different divisions. The instructions for the schange of rolling stock as Louisville give as mear as can be estimated the number of cars and engines to be changed here, the amount of inbor required, the extra material that must be on hand, the tools and splinances necessary, etc. The instructions to the first division are il-lostrative of those sent out to the other di-visions. The first division comprises 100 miles. This includes man, and side track.

This division, for convenience, is divided up into 17 sections. The instructions to the first section are after this order: Section I-Main track, 1.5 miles; side track, 10 miles; totai miles, 20.5. Men required, 40; band cars, 1; push cars, 1; claw bars, 14; spike mails, 14; lining bars, 8; track gauges, 8; track wrenches, 4; sizgs of spikes, 3. Toest are the men, the tools and appliances required in addition to those already in that section of that division. To total number of men per mile of track including side track, will be an accore than sections of that division. To total number of men per mile of track including side track, will be an accore than sections of that division. To total number of men per mile of track including side track, will be an accore than sections having more than the usual number addition, there will be one extra man with each gaug, to each hand or pub ear, to carry the water and push the car with the extra tools, supplies, etc. The men assigned to each section will be divided into two gauge, commencing to change as nearly in the middle of the section, as may be decided by the road master to be best, and working from each other, until each meets the gaug working owards them from the adjoining sections; the foreman will go with one of the gauge juanes i absed of his ganz. The work of the two gangs is not to be consined to their epoint in the fit of met so on-insten to be reard section. Initia, so as to complete the gauge planes absed of his ganz. The work of the two gangs is not to be consined to their epoint of 35 new engines of standard gauge being built by the Regers works will be re-cursed section. Initia, so as to complete the regardles of section limits, so as to complete the statis promotion. The row is be able and for any for sorted, put together and tested, so far as intai to provide and the section of service as nearly engines are possible to be changed the day the track is changed and after and. There will be two new 18-inch oylinder evich as nearly engines as possible to

nucteen consolidation and two pushing en-gines. The rolling stock to be changed at the sev-eral points specified in the instructions has been approximately estimated as follows: Engines, 267; passenger equipment cars, 204; Fullman skeepers, 385; freight cars and caboxer, 7,740. Some seven to ten days previoug to changing the track the work of etanging freight ars will begin, and will continue at the rate of 465 per day, in greater number if rosable, until the work is completed. The cost of the change of gauge is esti-mated by Mr. Wells at about \$300,000. When the work is completed in the short time given it will be a triumph of organized istor and intelligent, comprehensive fore-sight.

Figure B.3: Report on the Conversion (The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 29, 1886)

THE UNIFICATION OUR RAILROAD OF GAUGE.

On Monday and Tuesday next, according to previous arrangement and agreement, an important work will be undertaken and carried through. This is nothing less than the changing of the guage of all Southern roads will bring these lines more closely in conformity with the standard now in use in other parts of the country.

The matter is attracting hardly as much attention as it deserves. It is a task of no little magnitude. Practically it involves the taking up and relaying of one rail over the entire length of all the roads (and in some cases a change in the road bed and of course alteration of the rolling stock) in the territory bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the one side and the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers on the other, and comprising the States of Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida and North and South Carolina. Some of the newer systems in these States, like the Chesapeake & Ohio and its accessories, and the Louisville New Orleans & Texas, are of the standard Northern gauge, and so is the Southern Line of the Illinois Central, while the Mobile & Ohio was last year also altered to conform to this standard. But the vast bulk of the mileage in the Southern States at the present moment has a track which one can judge of the dimensions of the work. And as already said, not only will the track have to be changed, but the rolling stock-locomotives and cars-will have to be adjusted to the new guage (where it has not previously been done) the latter being really the most difficult part of the undertaking. All the preliminaries, however, have been completed, preparations for the event having been in progress for several months, and much of the equipment having been already altered, so when on the 31st of May and 1st of June the 14,000 or 15,000 miles of track are simul. readiness, and the business and operations of the roads proceed as if nothing had happened, while the means of will have been improved and our transportation interests benefited.

commonly accepted standard, but it will be so nearly so 9 inches, whereas the prevailing width is 4 feet 81 inches. The Pennsylvania, however, has a gauge of 4 feet 9 inches, used upon the track of the other, so that for all practical purposes the two gauges are identical. Moreover, these two gauges embrace together the greater part of the total track in the country at that time (July 1) 66-3 per cent belonged to the roads with 4 ft. $8\frac{1}{2}$ in. gauge, and 11.4 per cent belonged to those of the 4 ft. 9 in. gauge, making together 77.7 per cent, while of the 5-foot gauge (almost exclusively Southern roads and now to be changed)

there was 11.4 per cent more, giving in the aggregate the report of the Mobile & Ohio for the late fiscal year. over 89 per cent of the total track in the country. The The Mobile & Ohio was changed to standard gauge on the remaining 10 per cent was distributed chiefly between 8th of last July, and an itemized statement in the report roads with the 6-foot gauge, some of which have since places the expenditures on that account up to the close of been changed to the standard, and narrow gauge roads August at \$66,329, of which \$41,069 was paid out directly with the 3-foot gauge, the most of which contemplate for labor and \$25,260 for the necessary material. This changing where they have not already changed. It included all the track, engines, cars, tools, bridges, etcwhose width of track now is 5 feet, to a standard that follows, then, that after next week the mileage of the We infer, however, that it does not comprise the whole United States will be substantially of one and the charge involved in the work, for in his remarks we find same gauge, the exceptions of a wider or narrower Mr. Duncan saying that the total cost, which had been gauge

course an important one, both in its immediate effects in whole the cost of effecting the change (including rolling entailing an exceptional outlay in making the change, and stock and everything else) per mile of road would be a in its ultimate effects in bringing Southern lines in closer little over \$150. On the same basis, the 14,000 miles communication with Northern and Western systems. In now to be changed would involve an outlay of \$2,100,000, the latter particular the importance of the move can showing that the work is not only one of importance, but hardly be overestimated. The free interchange of traffic one also involving in the aggregate a great expense. The which a common standard will permit, we need hardly roads on which this burden of cost will chiefly fall are of say will be of benefit to all interests concerned. The course the larger systems like the Louisville & Nashville, shipper will be saved delays, the railroad will be able to the Richmond & Danville, the Cincinnati New Orleans cheapen the cost of handling the traffic, and the mercan. & Texas Pacific, the East Tennessee, the Norfolk & Westtile and financial community generally will feel the effects ern, and the Central R.R. of Georgia ; but the minor roads in the increased stimulus that this gives to the develop- all over the South will also have their expenses increased ment of trade and industry between the different sections. on the same account. Hitherto the South has been in a measure shut off from the rest of the country by this lack of uniformity. On gauge of 4ft. 8 in. and 4ft. 9in. has supplanted all other width of five feet, and it is estimated that next week's the north, the Ohio River marked the limit beyond which gauges. Only a few years ago, when hardly enough operations will embrace fully 14,000 to 15,000 miles, from Southern freight could not go without a transfer of the could be said by the advocates of the 3 foot gauge in content; of the car, or at least a change of trucks, and favor of the narrow guage plan, it seemed as if a new and on the West the Mississippi River also formed a dividing dangerous rival were about to arise. But a short trial line, for Texas and Arkansas roads are of standard gauge. has served to demonstrate that the advantages claimed for After the change however, this barrier will no longer the narrow guage system were largely illusory, and the exist, and traffic can then be moved to the North or West three-foot gauge has now fallen into pretty gen without breaking bulk. Aside from the saving of expense disrepute, while nearly all the companies that that this will involve, good results may be expected to follow from the fact that the equipment of Northern and Western roads will be placed at the service of Southern roads, which may prove of considerable advantage to these, especially during the months when the cotton movetaneously changed (some branches and minor pieces will ment is most active. And upon the sections was a road so deeply involved in financial and other diffi-be changed a day or two earlier), everything will be in themselves the effect of such an interchange culties as this, and when it finally succeeds in getting out in bringing the people closer together, is not to be lightly of the dilemma in which it now tinds itself, the road will be dismissed. It should even he'p to attract attention to the intercourse between the different sections of the country South as a field for the profitable employment of capital. That section has been comparatively neglected heretofore. There has of course been growth in recent years-very Denver & Rio Grande is the only narrow guage system The new gauge will not be precisely the same as the decided growth indeed,-but as compared with the West of consequence remaining, and there the mountainous and Northwest, the South has not gained as much as the character of the country renders a comparison with other as to be equivalent to the same thing. It will be 4 feet inducements she offers warrant. The flood of immigration sections out of the question. For short distances and especially has passed her by. It is unnecessary to inquire special kinds of traffic the narrow guage sometimes answers into the causes of this. It is sufficient to know that the very well, and there are some pieces of this character that and the Southern lines have adopted the same figure. In change of gauge will make the union between the sections pay, but on any large or extensive scale, and with ordireality, though, the difference-half an inch-is so small more complete, and in connection with the new industrial nary kinds of traffic, experience seems to have demonthat the rolling stock of the one can and is being freely development now miking such rapid progress, ought to strated that the narrow guage does not meet the require, tend to give greater prominence to that section here ments called for, and most of the companies of this kind after.

As to the cost of the change on such an extensive body disaster. railroad mileage of the country-the Southern roads with their five foot gauge forming the only important excep-tion. According to the Census Report of 1880, of the Reducing the gauge of track is, of course, a simple was changed to standard in 1878. Its principal connecproblem, but the adjusting of engines, equipment, tools tion-the Atlantic & Great Western-was also of six foot and the various paraphernalia connected with the opera guage, and this was changed in 1880. tion of a railroad, is what constitutes the largest propor- that the Canadian system is likewise of standard guage. tion of the expense. We have no exact data for There were varying gauges in Canada at first, but in 1873 estimating the cost of the work, but an approximate a common movement was made towards the adoption of ides of the amount required can be gained by using the standard, and since then that has been generally fol-

being so few as merely to emphasize the originally estimated at \$95,777, would probably be less than \$80,000. The Mobile & Ohio has 527 miles of main The step which the Southern roads have taken is of line and branches, and on the basis of \$80,000 for the

> It is interesting to note how completely the standard had built their lines on that guage have become discredited, and are in the hands of the officers of the law. The Toledo Cincinnati & St. Louis was to be the most brilliant exponent of the new theory, "the grandest narrow guage enterprise on the Continent," but alas! there never widened to the standard guage. Then there is the Texas & St. Louis, which also has an extensive narrow guage mileage, now to be changed to standard width. The formed in recent years have, as already said, met with

We may remark the figures which Mr. William Butler Duncan gives in lowed. The'Mexican Central (El Paso to City of Mexico)

Report on the Conversion (*CFC*, cont'd)

is also of 4ft. 8jin. gauge, and so is the Mexican Railway (Vera Cruz to City of Mexico), though the Mexican National is narrow gauge. Practically, therefore, it may be said that the whole railroad system of the North American Continent is of standard gauge. And elsewhere this gauge also chiefly prevails, that being the usual width in Great Britain and other European countries. In fact the experience of the world seems to have settled in its favor as offering a maximum of service at a minimum of cost.

Not the least significant feature about the change now to be made on Southern roads, is that it is undertaken voluntarily and without any external pressure whatever. In this it is like the adoption of a uniform time standard, effected not so very long ago. The roads are yielding simply to the demands of necessity. They find that a gauge at variance with that of the roads in most other sections of the country is an impediment which interferes greatly with the free operation and full development of their business. So they determine to remove the impediment. But there is no force or compulsion-no law except the natural law of trade, in obedience to which they make the change. They are exercising their own volition en-tirely. Nevertheless, the agreement between them is unanimous. Is there not in that a lesson to those who never weary in calling for legal enactments and Govern. ment intervention to accomplish this or that? When the necessity for an important step is clear and imperativeand who can be a better judge of this than those most directly concerned-railroad managers take that step (whether it be a reduction of rates or a change of custom or condition) promptly and without hesitation or com plaint. In fact in this way the laws of trade and the instinct of self preservation effect reforms and improvements that all the legislative bodies combined could not secomplish, as is so evident in the present case.

CHANGING THE GAUGE.

WORE ON THE LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE COMPLETED-OTHER SOUTHERN ROADS.

LOUISVILLE, Ky., May 30. - The great work of changing the gauge of the Louisville and Nashville Railway from wide to standard is completed. Eight thousand men were scattered over the divisions of the main stem at daylight this morning, and at sundown the track was standard all along the line, and test trains had been run over the different divisions and switches, and reports had been sent in to General Manager Harahan, in this city, pronouncing the work complete and everything in good shape. Some of the divisions were completed as early as 9:30 o'clock this morning. and the great bulk of the work was finished by noon, everything being finished up in proper shape by the middle of the afternoon. The day was propitious, the elements offering no interference at any point except Memphis, where thunder storms interrupted the work to some extent. But in spite of that the Mem-phis division was finished before noon. No trains were run out last night or to-day, but at midnight to-night the regular schedule will be resumed and the rolling stock of the Louisville and Nashville will have only been treated to a Sunday's rest. The follow-ing branches were changed yesterday: Pen-sacola and Atlantic Bailway, Metumpka branches; Owensborough and Nashville, Madi-sonville branch; Elkton and Gutbrie, Glasgow branch, Bardstown branch. The following are the roads changed to-day: Main stem, first and second divisions, Knoxville Division, South and North Division, Moblie and Montgomery Division, New-Orleans and Mobile Division, and Pensacola Railroad. finished by noon, everything being finished up

Figure B.5: Example of Anticipated Effects (Wilmington Morning Star, April 16, 1886)

A THREATENED LOSS, OF BUSINESS. Savannah News.

The change of gauge on Southern railroads, which, it is expected, will be made in July next, will bring about some important changes in the lumber business in the South. Southern lumber now reaches the Northern markets by sea. It is transported from the mills to the nearest ports, and sent by sailing vessels to the Northern distributing points.

This way of getting lumber from the producer to the consumer is rather slow. It has to be handled several times—once at the mills, once, and sometimes twice, at the port of shipment, generally twice at the port of its destination, and, finally, once at the place of consumption. It has to be insured against the of the sea, and frequent handlings often cause considerable breakage. Another drawback to shipments by sea is the long time required for lumber to reach the Northern markets after it has been shipped.

Very little lumber has gone North

by rail for the reason that Southern roads having a different gauge from the Northern roads, it is rather troublesome and somewhat expense to change the trucks.

Southern lumbermen say, however, that when the gauge of the Southern roads is changed they will be able to ship lumber without breaking the bulk direct from their mills in Georgia, Florida or any other Southern State to any point in the country, and that the difference between the cost of rail and water transportation will be more than overcome by the saving that will be effected in insurance, handling and breaksge. While much of the lumber will

While much of the lumber will continue to be shipped by sea, there is no doubt that a great deal of it will not seek the seaboard for transportation to market when it can be transported as cheaply and much more quickly by rail, and Southern lumber ports are bound to suffer a considerable loss of business. Other kinds of business, however, will doubtless take the place of whatever part of the lumber business that may be lost to them. 668

THE RAILROAD GAZETTE.

fOct. 14, 1887

The Change of Gauge of Southern Railroads in 1886.*

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
based upon the experiences of the Mobile & Ohio, and such other information as they could obtain, reported as fol-




The Transportation Committee reported upon the trans-portation feature of the problem, which chiefly pertation team of the standling of loaded and the return of foreign cars prior to the change, in order that each road might have only conjecture, as no one could tell in advance how many own cars on the day of change, or the fewesi possible cars of other roads. The Machine terms of the fewesi possible cars of other roads. The fewesi possible cars of the manufacture of the prior the fewesi possible cars of the stand-point in order that the work upon those away from home, or upon foreign road of the cars. Beyond that, they left each road to its own work upon the stand to be left each road to do its own work in the own way. The Committee on Roadway went more into detail, and * By C. H. Ruisen, member of the Mestern Scolery of Engi-werring Societies.








by then put through a nut put on the bolt, and a spring cotter put in a hole which had been drilled through the bolt. Another bolt through the other holes, and the strength the bars moved 8 in. the bolts repleced, and cut track was 4 ft. 9 in. Fig. 4 shows the bars as changed and ready to be put together. Fig. 5 shows a bar which took hold of the flange of the switch rail, treated in the same way. Fig. 6 shows another kind, and the manner of its treatment is readily seen by the sketch. A hole is drilled 3 in. back from the one through which there was more trouble, as the bars. With the "Wharton" there was more trouble, as the bars. Ould not easily be removed to be prepared for change. It was found however, that a casting could be made that could FIG. 7




be placed beind the elevated rail, which would hold it in 3 inches securely. a longer bolt being needed. Figs. 7 and 8 show this so plainly that no further description is needed. Five each of these bolts and castings were needed for each writch. The safety throw bar was simply disconnected to be lengthened and replaced at lesure.



by splice


requisite length, and then keeping the piece in place by splice bars till the day of change, when the cut pieces were taken out and one side moved up to proper gauge, see fig. 8. It was decided that the "sauge" rail was there to be moved. On lines without curves, or with way for whis was undoubledly correct; but where curves were frequent and long, some provision must be made to overcome the "crowd-ing." The committee recommended that the track be thrown out. The tendency of trackmen is so strong to run the tangent into the curve, and so much of our line was curved (45 per cent. upon one division, a large part of the curves being 6 degrees and upward), we felt that we must have some other "medy."


remedy. Fig. 10 gives an idea of the plan of the committee. It was




claimed that we could cut rails so as to leave room ; but our grades were high, and we folt that in the days that would elapse between any such preparation and the day of change our preparation and the day of the day

3 in.; we continue to move the inside rail till within six joints of the next tangent point, when we commence to re-verse the process. In the process of preparaton spikes have been driven at each of the points mentioned. Fig. 11 shows





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were used in this way without trouble until the day of change came; fiz. 15, original; fig. 18, changed. Some of the more recent engines had their wheel centres built expressly with a view to changing. They were placed upon the azle, and would be required with the new gange; built he rim projected outwardly an inch and a half more than usual, so that the itre could be placed for the 5 ft. gange and still have its full support. See fig. 17. When the tire was eventually moved

to the narrow gauge this outward rim would be turned off. Of course, we wave not able to take all our engines into the shop and press in their wheel centres, and had to be satisfied with some temporary arrangements that would give us the use of the engine until such time as it could be taken into the shop. We decided to set three in, leaving the centres un-changed. This gave an inside projection of 1½ in. plus what little projection there might have originally been. When the the tirk was solid, there was no trouble in this diff. 18), provided the tirk was not too thin. We fixed upon 2 u. as a limit safe beyond doubt. When the coring was in the middle and not beyond doubt. When the coring was in the middle and not found very large orres, and is, to middle end not have a set of the oring was in the middle and not have a set of the oring was in the middle and not have a set of the oring was in the middle and not have a set of the oring was in the middle and not have a set of the set of the outer or oright and the gave us a very small hold for our tire, and it was not deemed as fe or road services. To overcome this danger we purchased a few new tires 6% in, wide with the outer corner cut away, as shown in fig. 21. This gave us a bearing over the entire rim of the wheel, and was safe, no matter how large or in what position was the core. The corner was cut off to save material, and at the same time to asve the bad effect of a wide tire upon frogs and switches. The edge was left 1 in this star with of the road have the in many cases, been made of the proper width for the hear ray into the wheels had been built with a beavy hub projecting an inch and a bali in ward (fir. 22), or berift would hear against FIG. 21 FIG. 23 FIG. 24 FIG. 25






FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.22 FIG.23 FIG.22 FIG.23 FIG. 27




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
was simply to keep each brass upon its own journal. this the brasses were fastened to the axle by a piece o wire, and went with it to the lathe and press. W truck was reached, the brass was there with ite iournal To do y a piece of smal press. When it




out breases, of course, could not be put in, and new ones were substituted. The little trouble from that source that followed the change showed the efficacy of the remedy. The manner in which the tires of engines were to be changed, when the final day came, was a serious question. The old fashioned fire upon the ground could not be thought of. The Mobile & Obio had used a fire of pine under the wheel, which was covered by a box of sheet iron, so arranged that the flames and heat would be conveyed around the tirs, and out at an aperture at the top; it, 8.1. Many thought this perfect, while others were not satisfied, and began experiments for something better. A device for using gas had been patented, but it was somewhat complicated, as well as expensive, and did not meet with general favor. A very simple device was som hit upon. A two-inch pipe was bent around in a circle a little larger than the outer rim of the wheel. Holes to inch in diameter and 8 or 4 inches apart were drilled through the pipe on the outed of the circle. To this pipe was fastened another with a branch er fork upon it. To one branch and there connected a par-tive from the circler, while to the other was connected a par-tive from the circler, while to the other was experime to rime for the pipe.



connected a pipe from an air-pump. With the ordinary parsure of city gas upon this pipe it was found that the air-persure of 40 lbs. 'that the air presure of 40 lbs.' that the air presure of the the presure of the presure



urements were made from the head of the other rail. This was liked best, and, it is thought, gave the best results, as the moved rail was more likely to be in good line than when the





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the over the entire South was suspended practically three days. The work of changing was to commence at 3:30 a.m., but many of the men were in position at an earlier hour and did commence work as scon as the last train was over, or an bour or so before the first dime. Half-past three a.m., how-ever, can be set down as the general hour of commencement. For five or six hours in the cool morning the work went on brickly, the men working with much more than "edinary or late", so that so the set of the set

who got through first. Reports showed some vary early fin-ishes; but the facts seem to have been that under such er-coursgement the men were say to pull too many splice be-fore the change and put too free m while changing. They were thus reported through early, but their work was not done, and they took great chances. It was by mat consid-ered unwise to offer such prizes, preferring to have a little more taken and be sure that all was safe. Such lines seemed to get their trains in motion with as much promptoess as others. This, with freedom from accident, was the end sought.

to get their trains in motion with as much promptness as others. This, with freedom from accident, was the end sought. It was found after the work had been done that there had been little inaccuracies in driving the gauge spike, to which the rail was thrown, probably from various causes. The rail to be moved may not always have been exactly in its proper place, and then the template in the burry may not have been accurately placed, or the spike may have turned or twisted. Whatever was the cause, it was found that fre-quently the line on the moved aide was not be rail lined up and re-spiked. The more careful the work had been done, the less of this there was to do afterward. With rough track this was least seen. The nearer perfect the more noticeable it was.

The less of this there was to us are near perfect the more noticeable this was less seen. The nearer perfect the more noticeable to was. The was was used to be nearer perfect the more noticeable to course, sent to us: but when the interchange stopped, we found we had many foreign cars, which, of course, had to be changed. This subject had come up in convention and it had been voted to charge \$3 per car when axies did nut need turning, and \$5 where they did. By comparison with the cost of changing, as shown in this paper, it will be seen that to our company, at least, there was no less at these figures. The following statements will explain the work done upon the Louisville & Mashville, and Bast Tennessee, Virginia & Goorgia systems. The following statements will explain the work done upon the Louisving methed that the writer has not at hand in-formation regarding other roads that fuller statements and comparisons might be made and the showings be of greater value. Monitz a onto samans. (Commide from sinsus Report.)

			IO BAILROAD		
			Annual Rep		antroale sugi
	Number	Cost of			Average
	changed.	labor.	material.	cost.	cost.
Engines and		an arranged	anoso o secon	in the second	
teoders .	47	\$8,031.42	\$7,276.86	\$15,308.28	\$325 70
Pass., beg.					
and ex. c's	55	438,37	104.25	542,62	9.87
Freight c's,)					
1.361	1,46814	5,719.03	739.57	6,458,60	4.40
Fre't tr'ks. 1	-1/#			-1	
1071]					
Lever and					
push cars.		1.427.55	476 91	1.904.48	13.32
push cars.	Miles.	1,847.00	210 83	1.001.20	10.04
Track (in-					
cluding					
sidings)		17.109.53	7,275.14	24,384.67	
Bridges		1,896.60	190.00	2.086.60	3.58
Track tools.		170.72	1,405.74	1,576.46	2.70
Rhop tools.		419.70	2,982.90	3,402 60	5.83
Tem porary			and the second se		
side tracks	12.09	1,958.94	372 37	2 331.31	192 83
Switch's can		1.398.18	16.50	1.414.68	
Car hoists		2,499,38	4.419.34	6 918.72	
		4,100.00	4,110.01	0.01.1.1.	*******
Total cost.		41 080 49	\$25,259.60	\$66,320.02	
Total aven			400,000.00		\$113 68
TOTAL RADIE	ake coar h	er mine			\$119.00
	LOUISV	TLLE & NAS	HVILLE RAIL	ROAD.	
	(Com	oiled from	Annual Rep	ort)	
Main line			96.3; total,		
second survey		auto se arca, a			Cost per

Track :					Cost per
			84	7 010 21	mile. \$32 49
Carpenter lat Spikes Switches	or			7,910.21 3,799.19 0,873.70	1.82
Spikes			2	0,873.70	9 99
Switches				6.331.85	3.03
				2.749.50 5,691.39	1.31
Hand cars an	a subarie	B		0,091.39	2.72
Total				7,355 84	\$51.36
					Average
Equipment		Num	ber.	Total 3,450.98	202.58
Equipment Locomotives. Cars (300 of	these par	ssenger-	01 20	and the second second	
0.0 per 000			101	9 577 90	55.81
Total co	st	t per mile.	\$21	0,414.02	\$100.67
Totala	erageco	e per mile.			\$100.07
-	Number	Cost of	Cost of	Total	Average
	hanged.	labor.	material.	COSL	COSL.
Engines and				100	200 E 10 80 8
tenders	180	\$8,227.47	\$2,904.30	\$11,181.7	7 \$61.82
and mail					
CAFS	168	734.93	59.67	794 6	0 4 73
Freight cars		102.00	00.01	1010	
and caho's.	5,175	17 425.57	1,224.08		
M. of W. cars	439	2,038.44	549.47	2,587.9	1 5.59
	Miles.				
sidings)	1 590 7	27,718.17	40.912.09	65,630.2	6 44.78
Bridges	1 592 7	1,808.57	200.00	2,008 5	7 1.31
sidings) Bridges Track tools Storage tr'ks, inc. taking	1.532.7	194.48	2,573.83	2,768.3	1 1.80
Storage tr'ks.		100000000	10.000		-
inc. taking	1.000		0.000		or 1000 00
		9,825.41	1.481.59	11,307.0	
Shop tools		472.20	2.728.30	3.200.5	
100 Col 21 Col 21					
Total cos		\$68,445.24	\$52,633.33	\$121,078.5	7
Total average	e cost per	\$68,445.24 mile	\$52,633.33	\$121,078.5	7 \$79.06
A xies conden	a cost per	mile			\$79.06
A xies conden	a cost per	mile			\$79.06
Total average Axles conden Wheels cond Wheels burst	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102
Axies conden Wheels cond Wheels burst New axi-s us	e cost per nned emned	mile			\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102 2,783 8,316 23,954 10,723 5,347 180 \$264.46
Total average Axies condem Wheels cond Wheels burst New wheels Axies turned Wheels press New brasses Cars narrowe Engiues narr Average cost	ecost per aned wand ed ed.on.wit used ed.on.wit used of (aot ind owed of new c of cuttin	mile. hout turnin luding leve entres and o g off hub s	g axie r or push c prank pins, nd pressin	ars)	\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102 2,783 8,316 23,952 10,723 13,944 180
Total average Axies condem Wheels cond Wheels burst New wheels Axies turned Wheels press New brasses Cars narrowe Engiues narr Average cost	ecost per aned wand ed ed.on.wit used ed.on.wit used of (aot ind owed of new c of cuttin	mile. hout turnin luding leve entres and o g off hub s	g axie r or push c prank pins, nd pressin	ars)	\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102 2,783 8,316 23,954 10,723 180 \$344 180 \$344 180
Total average Axies condem Wheels cond Wheels burst New wheels Axies turned Wheels press New brasses Cars narrowe Engiues narr Average cost	ecost per aned wand ed ed.on.wit used ed.on.wit used of (aot ind owed of new c of cuttin	mile. hout turnin luding leve entres and o g off hub s	g axie r or push c prank pins, nd pressin	ars)	\$79.06 577 754 202 1,102 2,783 8,316 23,954 10,723 180 \$344 180 \$344 180
Total average Wheels condern Wheels cond Wheels burst New axl-s us New wheels New brasses New brasses New brasses New brasses New brasses new pins Average cost Average cost Average cost Average cost	e cost per aned emned used ed on wit used of an in of new c of cuttin of pressi of pressi of pressi	mile hout turnin, luding leve entres and o g off hub s ag old tires ng old tires publing on	g axie r or push c prank pins, nd pressin on old cepu on broad c new lires	ars) . etc. g wheels a rea entres	
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Since the preparation of this paper the general manager of the Norfolk & Western Railroad has kindly furnished the following items of expense for that line : Average No. Cost. cost. 95 \$37,730.00 \$397.16 5.615 37,994.65 10.51 Engines and tenders. 95 Cers (all kinde). 3,615 Track, miles (including sidings). 597.5 Tools and supplies. Cwitcher M. of W. equipment ... Splice Total track. 25,296,96 3,581.12 813.13 571.67 508.22 \$38,721.10 64.80 Engines and tenders. 75 476.31 (ars (parsequer). 95 4.67 "((reight) 1133 1.88 Track, inclusing sidings 01.76 44.49 Nothing was said about shop or other tools, storage tracks or changing of maintenance of way equipment. 34.31 19.26 28.71 No 13 .21 divided. 266.40 213.71 Not divided. \$44.72 \$57.55 MATERIAL OF VARI E.T. V.& Aver A N. R. R. G Ry. age. \$16.11 \$8546 Not {\$16.11 \$8546 .35 1.12 divided. 24 .37 1.25 2.30 26.83 17.55 1.67 2.03 4°.04 101 03 \$34.34 \$38.8:

Miles of track changed, about	14 000
Locomotives changed, about	1.800
Cars (pass, and freight) changed, about	45 000
	9.000
	20,000
	75,000
Wheels pressed on without turning axles, about.	220,000
	90,000
	50,000
	\$602,000
Cost of labor, about	730,000
Total cost of work, about	1.3:40 000
Amount expended on equipment, about	650,000
	680.000
about	140.000
	alles of track costport, and Cars (pass, and freight) changed, about. New arise used, about. New arise used, about. Wheels presed on without (urbing sales, about. Wheels presed on without (urbing sales, about. New bracks used, about. Cost of funderial used, about. Total cost of work, about. Total cost of work, about. Amout expended on track, about. Amout expended on track, about. Amout expended on track, about.

The work was done economically, and so quietly that the public bardly realized it was in progress. To the casual ob-server it was an every-day transaction. It was, however, a work of great magnitude, requiring much thought and mechanical ability. That it was ably handled is evidenced by the uniform success attained, the prompt changing at the agreed time, and the trilling inconvenience to the public.

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C Vertical Structure of Freight Shipping

Long-distance freight shipment in the 19th century had an inherent vertical character: to get from origin to destination, traffic had to traverse the tracks of multiple, separately-owned connecting lines. Frictions in the vertical transactions required for through shipment were the source of decades of holdup, and led to the formation of numerous innovative contractual relationships, which could be the subject of an entire separate paper – and indeed are the focus of a large contemporary and historical academic literature. For the purposes of this paper, a better understanding of vertical contracting arrangements is both useful context and important to evaluating the model used to estimate demand and supply and simulate competitive conduct.

C.1 How were long-distance shipments priced?

To fix terms, freight shipments borne by multiple, connecting carriers were known as "through" shipments, typically traveling long distances. Shipments which could be delivered by the originating carrier were "local" shipments. There were two approaches to pricing through shipments: the most primitive method was a combination of local rates, whereby a shipment from point A to point C would be charged the first carrier's local rate from A to B plus the second carrier's local rate from B to C, which were independently determined. Given the number of local rates that had to be considered on routes with many connections, and the frequency of rate changes, predicting the cost of shipping under combination rates was a formidable challenge for shippers.

To simplify pricing, railroads began to set joint rates (also/more often termed as "through rates"), which were point-to-point freight rates set jointly by carriers involved in the route, with a negotiated division of revenue. By the dawn of the regulatory era, through rates were by far the most common means of pricing through traffic. However, while there's abundant discussion of the definition and applications of through rates in historical records, there's unfortunately remarkably little coverage of how through rates were set, and how revenue was divided among carriers.

With effort, it was possible to unearth some contemporary references to the issue, which consistently point to prorating of through revenue according to the distance of each carrier's leg in the journey. Proportions were determined by the "constructive mileage" of each leg, which is derived from true distances but allows adjustments (Haney 1924). For example, in Congressional testimony in 1874, the P.A.L. general manager claimed to prorate through revenue with the water lines with which it connects (U.S. Congress 1874, p. 401), with ocean steamships prorating 3 miles for every 1 railroad mile. In the same Congressional record, a representative of the Green Line (a fast freight line, see next subsection) stated that all railroads in the organization received the same rate per mile from through revenue (p. 786). Division *pro rata* thus appears to have been the norm.

Joint pricing was not the only means of contracting around vertical transfers of shipments. Trackage rights were also common, which gave an originating carrier rights to travel freely over a connecting carrier's tracks. An alternative was vertical integration via merger or acquisition, which was also occurring at a rapid pace during and after the Reconstruction era.

C.2 Who owned/controlled the rolling stock?

Vertical transfers of rolling stock were an entirely different contracting problem that was resolved in a distinct way. While not as important to the paper as the process determining rates, it is useful to understand how rolling stock was transferred across railroads, and who maintained ownership and control, as freight traveled the tracks of multiple carriers along its route.

The root of the problem is that, to send shipments over long distances on the same car, originating railroads had to (i) send their rolling stock across connecting lines, and (ii) get it back. Conversely, intermediate railroads had to host the rolling stock of their connections. The moral hazard problems arise in several places: not only does the originating carrier have to relinquish control over its rolling stock, but it also retains liability for damage or loss of its shipments on connections. Moreover, different railroads might have different quality cars and different maintenance practices, and a low-quality or poorly-maintained car could damage the tracks it traveled. As a result, until the 1860s, freight had to be unloaded, unregistered, reregistered, and reloaded every time one line ended and another began, imposing enormous costs and delays on through traffic.

To address these issues, railroads around the country formed "fast freight lines" in the 1860s and 1870s, which were joint ventures between connecting railroads which pooled their freight cars into a shared rolling stock. The largest of these in the South was the Green Line fast-freight company, established in 1868. Under the agreement, members of the Green Line submitted rolling stock to the common pool in proportion to their total track mileage, and members were paid 1.5 cents per car-mile when other carriers used their cars. Ordinary maintenance was performed by the railroad operating the car and charged to its owner, but if a railroad damaged another carrier's car, it would be responsible for repairing or replacing it – though enforcement of this latter provision was inherently challenged by the difficulty of determining the party at fault.^{3,4}

C.3 What was the vertical structure in the South?

Though these contracting innovations were being developed around the country during Reconstruction, the key question for this paper is ultimately what vertical contracting arrangements were in place in the South around the time of the gauge change, to evaluate whether the model of industry conduct is appropriate. The fundamental issues are (i) whether SRSA freight rates were for endto-end North-South freight traffic, (ii) whether they applied to both railroads and steamships, and (iii) whether they were determined in coordination with Northern carriers (which comprised half of each all-rail route) and how revenue from each shipment was divided. If the answer to any of these questions is in the negative, or if revenue division was endogenous, the model of the market could require nonstandard features such as bargaining or a vertical dimension.

Details of the SRSA's vertical contracting arrangements are thin at best. What is clear from SRSA records is that the cartel rates were through rates, from origin to destination, and that these rates applied to all lines in the cartel. However, the records say nothing about how through revenue was divided among carriers down the line, nor about what role Northern railroads played in price-setting, and other sources have not yielded any insight. My understanding from cartel documents and later accounts is that the SRSA fundamentally controlled prices on shipments into and out of the South – in part due to its outsize influence over these routes, and in part because Southern traffic was relatively unimportant to Northern carriers in volume and value – and it is thus appropriate to model the SRSA as a price-setter.⁵ Revenue from each shipment was likely distributed *pro rata*,

³When asked by Congress "How do you know whether it is the fault of the road or ... the car?" a Green Line agent responded that the issue was an ongoing source of contention (U.S. Congress 1874, p. 788).

⁴For more information on the Green Line, see the following sources: Sindall (1886, pp. 680-861), Joubert (1949, pp. 31-40), Taylor and Neu (1956, pp. 67-76), and Puffert (2009, p. 134).

⁵Total railroad tonnage in the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes regions was over 10x that in the South in 1880, and the difference in ton-miles even greater (U.S. Department of Interior 1883).

following industry norms, such that revenue division is orthogonal to prices and would not enter or affect the cartel's profit-maximization problem.

Appendix references not in paper:

Haney, Lewis H. The Business of Railway Transportation, New York: Ronald Press Company, 1924.

U.S. Congress. *Reports of the Select Committee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874.

D Sensitivity Checks

D.1 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Origins

The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping observations with a given origin.

Table D.1. Change in An Hair Haine, Onnoting Doston						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	3.342^{***}	3.362^{***}	3.363^{***}	3.412^{***}	3.368^{***}	3.455^{***}
	(0.827)	(0.780)	(0.782)	(0.801)	(0.955)	(0.983)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.460***	-0.470***	-0.470***	-0.474***	-0.469***	-0.478^{***}
	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.141)	(0.144)
Breakeven distance	727.1	715.7	715.8	720.3	717.7	722.9
	(31.3)	(27.3)	(27.4)	(28.9)	(33.4)	(35.5)
N	777	777	777	777	777	777
R^2	0.34	0.69	0.69	0.72	0.71	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		X
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.1: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Boston

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with an origin of Boston. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.2: Share of Traffic, omitting Boston					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	3.369^{***}	3.471^{***}			
	(0.691)	(0.734)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.481^{***}	-0.487***			
	(0.102)	(0.107)			
Breakeven distance	701.0	712.1			
	(23.4)	(26.0)			
N	507	507			
R^2	0.29	0.48			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.2: Share of Traffic, omitting Boston

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with an origin of Boston. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	0		/	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.314^{***}	2.313^{***}	2.310^{***}	2.367^{***}	2.358^{***}	2.430***
	(0.460)	(0.449)	(0.449)	(0.469)	(0.548)	(0.590)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.301***	-0.308***	-0.307***	-0.314***	-0.313***	-0.321^{***}
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.075)
Breakeven distance	767.7	752.0	751.5	754.5	754.0	755.8
	(41.0)	(39.1)	(39.1)	(39.5)	(46.7)	(47.9)
N	777	777	777	777	777	777
R^2	0.28	0.67	0.67	0.71	0.70	0.73
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.3: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting New York

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with an origin of New York. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.4: Share of Traffic,	omitting Ne	w York
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.155^{***}	2.275^{***}
	(0.424)	(0.452)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.293***	-0.305***
	(0.055)	(0.057)
Breakeven distance	735.6	746.8
	(38.7)	(39.8)
Ν	507	507
R^2	0.14	0.37
Route FE		Х

Table D.4: Share of Traffic, omitting New York

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with an origin of New York. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	8-)	0	1	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.487^{***}	2.466^{***}	2.458^{***}	2.502^{***}	2.472^{***}	2.519***
	(0.489)	(0.485)	(0.484)	(0.495)	(0.585)	(0.606)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.323***	-0.327^{***}	-0.327^{***}	-0.332***	-0.327^{***}	-0.334^{***}
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Breakeven distance	770.6	753.6	752.7	754.0	755.9	754.8
	(37.3)	(35.4)	(35.4)	(35.0)	(43.3)	(42.3)
N	777	777	777	777	777	777
R^2	0.34	0.68	0.68	0.74	0.70	0.77
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.5: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Philadelphia

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with an origin of Philadelphia. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.6: Share of Traffic, omitting Philadelphia						
	(1)	(2)				
All-rail x post-change	2.320^{***}	2.396^{***}				
	(0.455)	(0.472)				
* distance (100 mi)	-0.313***	-0.321***				
	(0.057)	(0.059)				
Breakeven distance	740.3	746.2				
	(35.2)	(34.7)				
N	507	507				
R^2	0.13	0.50				
Route FE		Х				

Table D.6: Share of Traffic, omitting Philadelphia

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with an origin of Philadelphia. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	0		,	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.133^{***}	2.108^{***}	2.102^{***}	2.196^{***}	2.203^{***}	2.325**
	(0.653)	(0.644)	(0.645)	(0.676)	(0.807)	(0.870)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.289***	-0.293***	-0.292^{***}	-0.304***	-0.302***	-0.318^{***}
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.095)	(0.101)
Breakeven distance	737.9	719.5	718.8	723.3	728.6	731.9
	(55.3)	(54.0)	(54.2)	(53.4)	(63.6)	(63.1)
N	777	777	777	777	777	777
R^2	0.34	0.68	0.68	0.73	0.71	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		X
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.7: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Baltimore

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with an origin of Baltimore. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.8: Share of Trame, omitting Baltimore							
	(1)	(2)					
All-rail x post-change	1.905^{***}	2.088^{***}					
	(0.611)	(0.658)					
* distance (100 mi)	-0.273***	-0.293***					
	(0.071)	(0.076)					
Breakeven distance	697.7	712.5					
	(58.2)	(55.8)					
Ν	507	507					
R^2	0.03	0.36					
Route FE		Х					

Table D.8: Share of Traffic, omitting Baltimore

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with an origin of Baltimore. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

D.2 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Destinations

The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping observations with a given destination.

Table D.9. Change in An-Aan Traine, onitting Albany						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.298^{***}	2.288^{***}	2.281^{***}	2.328^{***}	2.348^{***}	2.405***
	(0.458)	(0.449)	(0.448)	(0.462)	(0.542)	(0.569)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.311^{***}	-0.316^{***}	-0.316^{***}	-0.319***	-0.322***	-0.327^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Breakeven distance	738.8	723.5	722.8	728.9	728.7	735.8
	(34.9)	(33.0)	(33.0)	(34.1)	(39.1)	(41.3)
N	992	992	992	992	992	992
R^2	0.32	0.66	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.74
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.9: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Albany

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Albany. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.10: Share of Traffic, omitting Albany					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.200^{***}	2.306^{***}			
	(0.427)	(0.449)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.309***	-0.317***			
	(0.055)	(0.057)			
Breakeven distance	712.5	726.8			
	(32.7)	(34.0)			
N	656	656			
R^2	0.11	0.44			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.10: Share of Traffic, omitting Albany

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Albany. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0.		, 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.199^{***}	2.178^{***}	2.179^{***}	2.247^{***}	2.210***	2.304^{***}
	(0.461)	(0.450)	(0.452)	(0.468)	(0.555)	(0.589)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.301***	-0.305***	-0.306***	-0.313***	-0.308***	-0.319^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.075)
Breakeven distance	731.0	713.2	713.1	717.9	716.6	721.4
	(38.3)	(36.1)	(36.1)	(36.4)	(43.6)	(44.3)
N	956	956	956	956	956	956
R^2	0.33	0.69	0.69	0.74	0.71	0.77
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.11: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Athens

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Athens. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.12. Share of Trainc, officting Athens						
	(1)	(2)				
All-rail x post-change	2.034^{***}	2.193^{***}				
	(0.426)	(0.464)				
* distance (100 mi)	-0.293***	-0.308***				
	(0.055)	(0.059)				
Breakeven distance	695.3	711.9				
	(36.4)	(36.9)				
N	624	624				
R^2	0.11	0.46				
Route FE		Х				

Table D.12: Share of Traffic, omitting Athens

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Athens. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	· · · · ·	J)	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.637^{***}	2.587^{***}	2.583^{***}	2.646^{***}	2.632^{***}	2.712***
	(0.475)	(0.467)	(0.468)	(0.478)	(0.574)	(0.597)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.339***	-0.342***	-0.342***	-0.349***	-0.346***	-0.356***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Breakeven distance	776.8	756.2	755.8	758.3	760.2	761.6
	(35.3)	(33.1)	(33.1)	(33.0)	(40.3)	(40.0)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.35	0.65	0.65	0.72	0.68	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.13: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Atlanta

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Atlanta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.14: Share of Trainc, offitting Atlanta						
	(1)	(2)				
All-rail x post-change	2.429^{***}	2.562^{***}				
	(0.438)	(0.462)				
* distance (100 mi)	-0.328***	-0.341***				
	(0.057)	(0.059)				
Breakeven distance	741.2	751.0				
	(32.4)	(32.8)				
N	620	620				
R^2	0.12	0.47				
Route FE		Х				

Table D.14: Share of Traffic, omitting Atlanta

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Atlanta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

)	,	0	0	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.634^{***}	2.532^{***}	2.527^{***}	2.594^{***}	2.576^{***}	2.658^{***}
	(0.529)	(0.513)	(0.514)	(0.528)	(0.631)	(0.659)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.341^{***}	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.344^{***}	-0.341^{***}	-0.352^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.082)
Breakeven distance	772.1	750.8	750.3	753.0	754.6	756.1
	(35.8)	(34.6)	(34.6)	(34.6)	(41.9)	(41.8)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.33	0.64	0.64	0.70	0.66	0.72
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.15: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Augusta

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Augusta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.10: Share of Trame, omitting Augusta					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.358^{***}	2.490^{***}			
	(0.485)	(0.514)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.321***	-0.334***			
	(0.061)	(0.064)			
Breakeven distance	734.5	744.3			
	(34.7)	(35.0)			
Ν	620	620			
R^2	0.10	0.42			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.16: Share of Traffic, omitting Augusta

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Augusta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0 -		, 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.353^{***}	2.354^{***}	2.351^{***}	2.362^{***}	2.340^{***}	2.348***
	(0.471)	(0.481)	(0.482)	(0.487)	(0.588)	(0.598)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.318^{***}	-0.319^{***}	-0.319^{***}	-0.322***	-0.317^{***}	-0.321^{***}
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Breakeven distance	740.2	738.5	737.9	734.0	739.1	731.5
	(36.3)	(36.3)	(36.3)	(35.8)	(44.8)	(43.6)
N	964	964	964	964	964	964
R^2	0.30	0.66	0.66	0.71	0.68	0.74
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.17: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Macon

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Macon. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.18: Share of Trame, omitting Macon					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.253^{***}	2.244^{***}			
	(0.454)	(0.462)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.309***	-0.311***			
	(0.059)	(0.059)			
Breakeven distance	729.8	721.8			
	(35.5)	(35.6)			
Ν	632	632			
R^2	0.12	0.43			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.18: Share of Traffic, omitting Macon

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Macon. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

			1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.218***	2.231^{***}	2.228***	2.296^{***}	2.271^{***}	2.358^{***}
	(0.478)	(0.479)	(0.480)	(0.493)	(0.590)	(0.617)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.297***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.313***	-0.309***	-0.320***
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Breakeven distance	745.9	730.4	730.1	733.6	734.6	736.9
	(39.9)	(37.7)	(37.7)	(37.6)	(45.6)	(45.6)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.32	0.66	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.74
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			Х			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.19: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Milledgeville

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Milledgeville. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.20: Share of Traffic, omitting Milledgeville		
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.047^{***}	2.193^{***}
	(0.444)	(0.473) - 0.303^{***}
* distance (100 mi)	-0.289***	-0.303***
	(0.057)	(0.060)
Breakeven distance	709.2	722.6
	(37.5)	(37.9)
N	620	620
R^2	0.12	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table D.20: Share of Traffic, omitting Milledgeville

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Milledgeville. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	0		,	0	0 ,	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.343***	2.366^{***}	2.362^{***}	2.428^{***}	2.407^{***}	2.496***
	(0.489)	(0.481)	(0.482)	(0.493)	(0.596)	(0.619)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.303***	-0.314^{***}	-0.314***	-0.321^{***}	-0.318***	-0.329^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Breakeven distance	774.1	753.8	753.4	755.8	757.2	757.8
	(39.2)	(35.7)	(35.7)	(35.4)	(43.6)	(42.7)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.30	0.68	0.68	0.73	0.70	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.21: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Montgomery

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Montgomery. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.22: Share of Traffic, omitting Montgomery						
	(1)	(2)				
All-rail x post-change	2.230^{***}	2.350^{***}				
	(0.455)	(0.475)				
* distance (100 mi)	-0.303***	-0.315***				
	(0.060)	(0.062)				
Breakeven distance	736.2	746.7				
	(34.6)	(34.9)				
Ν	620	620				
R^2	0.10	0.45				
Route FE		Х				

Table D.22: Share of Traffic, omitting Montgomery

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Montgomery. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	C C)	,	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.590^{***}	2.598^{***}	2.595^{***}	2.655^{***}	2.640^{***}	2.718***
	(0.469)	(0.467)	(0.468)	(0.479)	(0.576)	(0.600)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.346^{***}	-0.353***	-0.353***	-0.360***	-0.357***	-0.367***
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Breakeven distance	748.9	735.3	735.0	737.6	739.0	740.6
	(34.4)	(32.5)	(32.5)	(32.5)	(39.4)	(39.4)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.76
Route FE		Х	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.23: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Newnan

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Newnan. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.24: Share of Traffic, omitting Newnan						
	(1)	(2)				
All-rail x post-change	2.448^{***}	2.572^{***}				
	(0.440)	(0.464)				
* distance (100 mi)	-0.340***	-0.353***				
	(0.056)	(0.058)				
Breakeven distance	719.2	728.8				
	(32.0)	(32.5)				
Ν	620	620				
R^2	0.12	0.47				
Route FE		Х				

Table D.24: Share of Traffic, omitting Newnan

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Newnan. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	(· ر	,	0	1	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.440^{***}	2.443^{***}	2.438^{***}	2.498^{***}	2.485^{***}	2.559***
	(0.481)	(0.477)	(0.477)	(0.486)	(0.589)	(0.608)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.328***	-0.336***	-0.335***	-0.342***	-0.340***	-0.349***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Breakeven distance	743.1	727.1	726.7	729.7	730.8	732.8
	(35.3)	(32.7)	(32.7)	(32.9)	(39.7)	(39.9)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.32	0.68	0.68	0.74	0.71	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.25: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Opelika

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Opelika. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.26: Share of	Trame, omitting C	репка
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.291^{***}	2.414^{***}
	(0.451)	(0.470)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.323***	-0.335***
	(0.060)	(0.061)
Breakeven distance	709.9	720.1
	(32.0)	(32.5)
Ν	620	620
R^2	0.13	0.46
Route FE		Х

Table D.26: Share of Traffic, omitting Opelika

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Opelika. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0		, 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.835^{***}	2.828^{***}	2.823^{***}	2.898^{***}	2.863^{***}	2.958***
	(0.438)	(0.426)	(0.427)	(0.436)	(0.524)	(0.548)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.364^{***}	-0.370***	-0.370***	-0.378^{***}	-0.373***	-0.385***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Breakeven distance	779.2	763.9	763.4	765.9	767.4	768.4
	(30.6)	(27.9)	(27.8)	(27.4)	(34.4)	(33.5)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.30	0.68	0.68	0.73	0.70	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.27: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Rome

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Rome. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.26. Share of frame, officting Rome					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.658^{***}	2.817^{***}			
	(0.402)	(0.419)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.355***	-0.371***			
	(0.055)	(0.056)			
Breakeven distance	748.7	759.2			
	(27.0)	(26.7)			
N	620	620			
R^2	0.13	0.43			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.28: Share of Traffic, omitting Rome

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Rome. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		8		, 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.378^{***}	2.405^{***}	2.403^{***}	2.469^{***}	2.438^{***}	2.529***
	(0.504)	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.508)	(0.613)	(0.635)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.310***	-0.321^{***}	-0.321^{***}	-0.329***	-0.324***	-0.336***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.084)
Breakeven distance	766.9	748.3	747.8	750.2	752.2	752.9
	(38.7)	(35.2)	(35.2)	(34.9)	(43.1)	(42.3)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.29	0.67	0.67	0.72	0.69	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.29: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Selma

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of Selma. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.50: Share of Trainc, officting Senna					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.264^{***}	2.385^{***}			
	(0.469)	(0.489)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.310***	-0.322***			
	(0.063)	(0.064)			
Breakeven distance	731.4	741.7			
	(34.1)	(34.4)			
N	620	620			
R^2	0.09	0.43			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.30: Share of Traffic, omitting Selma

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of Selma. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	8)	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.442^{***}	2.447^{***}	2.441***	2.500^{***}	2.489^{***}	2.560***
	(0.488)	(0.482)	(0.482)	(0.492)	(0.597)	(0.616)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.319^{***}	-0.326***	-0.326***	-0.332***	-0.331***	-0.340***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Breakeven distance	766.1	749.4	748.9	751.9	752.3	754.1
	(37.8)	(35.2)	(35.2)	(35.2)	(42.7)	(42.6)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.33	0.69	0.69	0.74	0.71	0.76
Route FE		X	Х			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			Х			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.31: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting A. & W. Pt.

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of A. & W. Pt.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.32: Share of Traffic,	omitting A.	& W. Pt.
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.287^{***}	2.410^{***}
	(0.453)	(0.476)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.312***	-0.325***
	(0.059)	(0.061)
Breakeven distance	732.7	742.5
	(34.6)	(35.1)
N	620	620
R^2	0.13	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table D.32: Share of Traffic, omitting A. & W. Pt.

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of A. & W. Pt.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	сон ос	,	,	0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.298^{***}	2.300^{***}	2.294^{***}	2.354^{***}	2.342^{***}	2.416***
	(0.485)	(0.480)	(0.480)	(0.491)	(0.593)	(0.616)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.307***	-0.314^{***}	-0.314***	-0.321***	-0.318***	-0.328^{***}
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Breakeven distance	748.1	731.8	731.1	734.2	735.8	737.5
	(39.4)	(37.0)	(37.0)	(37.0)	(44.7)	(44.9)
N	952	952	952	952	952	952
R^2	0.33	0.68	0.68	0.74	0.71	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.33: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting W. & A.

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations with a destination of W. & A.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.34: Share of Traffic,	omitting W	/. & A.
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.143^{***}	2.253^{***}
	(0.453)	(0.471)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.300***	-0.311***
	(0.059)	(0.060)
Breakeven distance	713.6	723.6
	(36.8)	(37.2)
N	620	620
R^2	0.10	0.44
Route FE		Х

Table D.34: Share of Traffic, omitting W. & A.

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations with a destination of W. & A.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

D.3 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Years

The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping observations in a given year.

Table D.55. Change in An-Ran Traine, offitting 1864						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.730^{***}	2.712^{***}	2.704^{***}	2.777^{***}	2.746^{***}	2.837***
	(0.567)	(0.560)	(0.558)	(0.573)	(0.683)	(0.707)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.350***	-0.355***	-0.354^{***}	-0.363***	-0.357***	-0.368***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Breakeven distance	780.5	764.2	763.5	765.5	769.7	770.1
	(37.8)	(36.0)	(35.9)	(35.8)	(44.4)	(43.7)
N	888	888	888	888	888	888
R^2	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.35: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1884

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1884. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.36: Share of	Traffic, omitting	1884
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.563^{***}	2.685^{***}
	(0.532)	(0.545)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.341***	-0.354***
	(0.069)	(0.069)
Breakeven distance	751.8	758.9
	(35.9)	(35.6)
Ν	580	580
R^2	0.12	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table D.36: Share of Traffic, omitting 1884

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1884. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0.		·)···)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.291***	2.274^{***}	2.272***	2.330^{***}	2.277^{***}	2.354^{***}
	(0.455)	(0.447)	(0.448)	(0.465)	(0.537)	(0.572)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.318^{***}	-0.323***	-0.323***	-0.330***	-0.321^{***}	-0.331***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Breakeven distance	721.3	704.3	704.0	706.3	710.3	711.8
	(35.6)	(34.0)	(34.0)	(34.2)	(41.6)	(42.1)
N	888	888	888	888	888	888
R^2	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				Х		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.37: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1885

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1885. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.36. Share of Traine, offitting 1865					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.084***	2.182***			
	(0.411)	(0.445)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.303***	-0.314^{***}			
	(0.052)	(0.055)			
Breakeven distance	687.1	694.8			
	(35.3)	(36.1)			
N	580	580			
R^2	0.13	0.47			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.38: Share of Traffic, omitting 1885

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1885. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0		, (,	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.297^{***}	2.286^{***}	2.287^{***}	2.338^{***}	2.375^{***}	2.450***
	(0.484)	(0.494)	(0.495)	(0.508)	(0.621)	(0.651)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.300***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.310***	-0.317^{***}	-0.325***
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.087)
Breakeven distance	765.9	749.4	749.3	753.5	749.4	753.3
	(39.4)	(37.2)	(37.2)	(37.9)	(43.0)	(44.3)
N	892	892	892	892	892	892
R^2	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.39: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1886

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1886. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.40: Share of Trainc, offitting 1880					
	(1)	(2)			
All-rail x post-change	2.197^{***}	2.329^{***}			
	(0.480)	(0.512)			
* distance (100 mi)	-0.300***	-0.312***			
	(0.065)	(0.068)			
Breakeven distance	731.4	745.5			
	(34.3)	(36.3)			
N	584	584			
R^2	0.13	0.46			
Route FE		Х			

Table D.40: Share of Traffic, omitting 1886

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1886. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0.		, ()	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.561^{***}	2.571***	2.566^{***}	2.623^{***}	2.595^{***}	2.669***
	(0.512)	(0.515)	(0.516)	(0.534)	(0.631)	(0.664)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.346^{***}	-0.356***	-0.356***	-0.361^{***}	-0.358***	-0.366***
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.085)
Breakeven distance	740.7	721.9	721.7	726.1	724.8	728.6
	(35.9)	(33.7)	(33.7)	(34.5)	(40.6)	(41.8)
N	892	892	892	892	892	892
R^2	0.32	0.68	0.68	0.73	0.70	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.41: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1887

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1887. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

	anic, onneting	1007
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.406^{***}	2.533^{***}
	(0.489)	(0.522)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.341^{***}	-0.353***
	(0.063)	(0.066)
Breakeven distance	705.5	717.0
	(33.9)	(34.7)
N	580	580
R^2	0.12	0.45
Route FE		Х

Table D.42: Share of Traffic, omitting 1887

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1887. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0.1		·) · · · ·)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.483^{***}	2.477^{***}	2.473^{***}	2.532^{***}	2.496^{***}	2.567***
	(0.471)	(0.461)	(0.462)	(0.473)	(0.563)	(0.588)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.321^{***}	-0.327***	-0.327***	-0.334***	-0.328***	-0.338***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Breakeven distance	774.2	757.6	757.1	758.4	761.3	759.8
	(36.8)	(33.7)	(33.7)	(33.6)	(41.7)	(41.2)
N	884	884	884	884	884	884
R^2	0.31	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.43: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1888

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1888. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.44. Share of	frame, omitting	1000
	(1)	(2)
All-rail x post-change	2.318^{***}	2.440^{***}
	(0.433)	(0.457)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.312***	-0.325***
	(0.059)	(0.061)
Breakeven distance	742.2	749.9
	(32.4)	(33.2)
N	576	576
R^2	0.11	0.43
Route FE		Х

Table D.44: Share of Traffic, omitting 1888

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1888. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0.1		·) · · · ·)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.353^{***}	2.352***	2.348^{***}	2.405^{***}	2.389^{***}	2.454***
	(0.423)	(0.423)	(0.422)	(0.434)	(0.520)	(0.541)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.310***	-0.317^{***}	-0.317^{***}	-0.324^{***}	-0.322***	-0.331^{***}
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Breakeven distance	757.7	741.1	740.6	741.7	742.5	740.8
	(34.5)	(32.3)	(32.3)	(32.1)	(38.7)	(38.5)
N	884	884	884	884	884	884
R^2	0.31	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.76
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.45: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1889

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1889. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.40: Share of Trainc, officting 1889				
	(1)	(2)		
All-rail x post-change	2.214^{***}	2.327^{***}		
	(0.397)	(0.417)		
* distance (100 mi)	-0.306***	-0.319***		
	(0.052)	(0.053)		
Breakeven distance	722.5	730.3		
	(31.0)	(31.4)		
Ν	576	576		
R^2	0.11	0.44		
Route FE		Х		

Table D.46: Share of Traffic, omitting 1889

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1889. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

		0		, C	,	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All-rail x post-change	2.351^{***}	2.329^{***}	2.326^{***}	2.387^{***}	2.380^{***}	2.455***
	(0.497)	(0.488)	(0.489)	(0.502)	(0.593)	(0.622)
* distance (100 mi)	-0.311***	-0.312***	-0.312***	-0.319^{***}	-0.317^{***}	-0.326^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Breakeven distance	755.0	745.7	744.9	748.1	750.2	753.9
	(37.0)	(36.5)	(36.6)	(36.5)	(43.7)	(44.2)
N	888	888	888	888	888	888
R^2	0.32	0.67	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.75
Route FE		X	X			
Mode FE			X			
Year FE			X			
Route-mode FE				X		Х
Route-yr FE					Х	Х

Table D.47: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1890

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in 1890. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

Table D.46: Share of Trainc, onitting 1890				
	(1)	(2)		
All-rail x post-change	2.185^{***}	2.310^{***}		
	(0.454)	(0.480)		
* distance (100 mi)	-0.299***	-0.311***		
	(0.059)	(0.061)		
Breakeven distance	730.2	743.2		
	(36.3)	(36.6)		
N	580	580		
R^2	0.10	0.45		
Route FE		Х		

Table D.48: Share of Traffic, omitting 1890

Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 6, omitting observations in 1890. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.

E International Railway Agreements

This appendix provides more background on the persistence of breaks in gauge around the world today, accompanying the discussion in Section 6 on what these results might teach us regarding the value of standardizing railway gauge in the present. Though countries in North America and Western Europe have adopted a common standard, gauge breaks are prevalent in underdeveloped regions, including most of Asia, Africa, and South America.

To focus attention, I invoke two examples: Asia and the European periphery. Table E.1 shows the principal gauges currently used in countries in South and Southeast Asia. This diversity precluded an agreement to unify domestic railways into a transcontinental railway network for over 50 years, and the problem of incompatibility was never fully resolved: when the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agreement (UNTC 2006) was ratified in 2006, they skirted the issue, instead opting to continue using adapters at border crossings, which were enumerated in the agreement itself.

Similarly, when European countries agreed to unify their railway networks in 1991, no uniform standard was specified. Though much of Western Europe was on standard gauge, breaks persisted in various places. Table E.2 lists the interchange stations enumerated in the European Agreement on Important International Combined Transport Lines (UNTC 1991, p. 38), as well as the means of interchange at each station – which are (shockingly) the same technologies that were in use 100 years prior. These breaks are present mostly along the eastern periphery, though there are also two junctions where French and Spanish tracks of incompatible gauge meet.

To make the problem more concrete, Figures E.1 and E.2 illustrate the diversity in gauge in Asia and around the world. The former figure is taken from supporting documentation for the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agreement and maps the major lines in Asia, color-coding by gauge. The latter figure is from Wikipedia and shows a map of the world which color-codes countries by their principal gauge. Both figures make it visually obvious just how much of a problem breaks in gauge continue to be in less developed parts of the world: sending a rail car from Europe to Southeast Asia requires at least two interchanges, and from parts of Russia, three.

1050 1000 mm 1676 1668 1600 1524 1520 1435 1372 1067 950 914 762 750 610 600 4'11.8''4'8.5" 4'6" 3'6" 3'5.3" 3'3.4" 3'1.4" 2'6'' 2'5.5'' ft in 5'6" 5'5.67" 5'3" 5' 3' 2' 1'11.6"

Figure E.1: World Map, Color-coding Countries by Principal Gauge

Notes: Map illustrates the principal gauge of individual countries around the world, color-coding each country by gauge, thereby making the prevalence of breaks visually apparent. Figure obtained from Wikipedia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/Rail_gauge_world.jpg.




Figure E.2: Map of Principal Lines in Asia, Color-coded by Gauge (2006)

Notes: Map shows major lines in Asia covered by the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agreement (UNTC 2006), as well as links planned under the agreement, color-coding by gauge. Figure published in 1999 and available as part of the supporting documentation for the TAR.

· · ·	0	v		0
1,000 mm	$1{,}067~\mathrm{mm}$	$1{,}435~\mathrm{mm}$	$1{,}520~\mathrm{mm}$	$1{,}676~\mathrm{mm}$
$(3'\ 3.375")$	(3' 6")	(4' 8.5")	(6, 0)	(6', 6'')
Bangladesh	Indonesia	China	Armenia	Bangladesh
Laos		North Korea	Azerbaijan	India
Malaysia		South Korea	Georgia	Nepal
Myanmar		Iran	Kazakhstan	Pakistan
Singapore		Turkey	Kyrgyzstan	Sri Lanka
Thailand			Mongolia	
Vietnam			Russia	
			Tajikistan	
			Turkmenistan	
			Uzbekistan	

Table E.1: Railway Gauge of Trans-Asian Railway Members at Time of Agreement (2006)

Notes: Table lists the varying railroad gauge standards of the countries that were party to or affected by the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network at the time of ratification (November 21, 2006). Data from text of the agreement (UNTC 2006).

		Means of Interchange		
	Number of	Change of wagon	Transshipment by crane	
Countries	Interchanges	axles/bogies	or other equipment	
Hungary-Ukraine	2	Х	Х	
Romania-Moldova	2	Х	X	
Romania-Ukraine	2	Х	Х	
Spain-France	2	Х	Х	
Poland-Belarus	1	Х	Х	
Poland-Lithuania	1	Х	Х	
Poland-Ukraine	1	Х	Х	
Russia-North Korea	1	Х	X	
Russia-China	1	Х	X	
Kazakhstan-China	1	Х	X	
Slovakia-Ukraine	1		Х	

Table E.2: Gauge Interchanges on European Country Borders at Time of Agreement (1991)

Notes: Table counts number of gauge interchange stations on the border between country pairs, and the means of interchange used to transfer freight across gauges, at the time of the European Agreement on Important International Combined Transport Lines and Related Installations (February 1, 1991). Data from text of the agreement (UNTC 1991).