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Citation	Fonseca Galvis, Angela M. 2015. Essays on Political Economy. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.
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# Essays on Political Economy

A dissertation presented by

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to

The Department of Political Economy and Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the subject of  
Political Economy and Government

Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

April 2015

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## Essays on Political Economy

### ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three essays on political economy.

The first essay studies the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspapers in the period 1870-1910. We measure bias as the intensity with which different newspapers cover scandals. We collected data on 121 scandals and 157 newspapers. We also collected data on the partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation of the newspapers in our sample, as well as of the newspapers circulating in the same cities as those in our sample. Results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition party's politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their own party's politicians more lightly. We find evidence that competition decreases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibit less than 50% as much overall bias in coverage intensity.

The second essay shows how voters make choices even in single-party authoritarian elections where the number of candidates equals the number of parliamentary seats. Cuban citizens signal approval of candidates within the framework of the regime. Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and experience of local multi-candidate electoral contestation. Voters choose based not on clientelist incentives but on the limited political information available to them, namely, posted biographies and direct knowledge of local candidates, friends and neighbors, who run in their communities. Voters have chosen, however, without rejecting the Cuban Communist Party.

The third essay studies the unintended effects of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia. In a context with fragmented and clientelistic parties and an electoral system that incentivizes intra-party competition instead of party discipline, scholars such as Shugart and Carey (1995) recommend the adoption of electoral reforms. A reform such as this was implemented in Colombia. What was unexpected was that the reform would promote a significant increase in the number of candidates running in each district. The effect of this was a lowering of the minimum threshold of the vote share required to obtain a seat, thereby maintaining clientelism as a viable campaigning strategy.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful for the guidance and support of my dissertation committee: James A. Robinson, James M. Snyder, Jr., Jorge I. Domínguez and Candelaria Garay. I would also like to thank María Angélica Bautista, Jessica Blankshain, Mahnaz Islam, Paloma López de mesa, Johanna Mollerstrom, Pablo Querubín, BK Song, Chiara Superti and Ana María Tribín for their comments, support and friendship throughout my time at Harvard. I thank seminar participants at Harvard University, MIT and Universidad de los Andes.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, my sister and my husband Brian, without their love, support and constant encouragement this dissertation would not have been possible.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation consists of three separate papers on different topics on political economy.

The first essay studies the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspapers in the period 1870-1910. We measure bias as the intensity with which different newspapers cover scandals. Using automatic keyword-based searches, we collected data on 121 scandals and 157 newspapers. We also collected data on the partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation of the newspapers in our sample, as well as of the newspapers circulating in the same cities or towns as those in our sample. Our results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition party's politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their own party's politicians more lightly. More importantly, we find evidence that competition decreases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibit less than 50% as much overall bias in coverage intensity.

The second essay shows how voters make choices even in single-party authoritarian elections where the number of candidates equals the number of parliamentary seats. Cuban citizens signal disinterest in, or approval of, candidates within the framework of the political regime. Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of local multi-candidate electoral contestation. Voters choose based not on clientelist incentives but on the limited political information available to them, namely, posted biographies and direct knowledge of local candidates, friends and neighbors, who run in their communities. No other source of information, or level of education, helps voters distinguish between their choices. Voters have chosen, however,



without rejecting the Cuban Communist Party, whose leaders voters sometimes endorse.

Finally, the third essay studies the unintended effects of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia. In a context with fragmented and clientelistic parties and an electoral system that incentivizes intra-party competition instead of party discipline, scholars such as Shugart and Carey (1995) recommend the adoption of electoral reforms. A reform such as this was implemented in Colombia. What was unexpected was that the reform would promote a significant increase in the number of candidates running in each district. The effect of this was a lowering of the minimum threshold of the vote share required to obtain a seat. I show how for every district magnitude the vote share required to obtain a seat has decreased after the reform and argue how this decrease might make clientelism an even more likely strategy than before (based on Hirano (2006)).

## 2. NEWSPAPER MARKET STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR: PARTISAN COVERAGE OF POLITICAL SCANDALS IN THE U.S. FROM 1870 TO 1910<sup>1</sup>

How does media market structure affect what media outlets do? Does more competition lead to more intensive and accurate reporting (as in Besley and Prat 2006, and Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008), more “soft news” rather than “hard news” (as in Zaller 1999), more product differentiation and market segmentation (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), or something else?

In this paper, we focus on the effect of competition on partisan bias in coverage. We investigate this issue in the context of U.S. newspapers around the turn of the 20th century, from 1870 to 1910. This time period is especially interesting for three reasons: (1) newspapers and magazines were essentially the only mass media outlets, which means both that there was considerable variation in the media environment across geographic areas of the U.S., and that we can measure this variation accurately; (2) most newspapers were highly partisan, especially during the early part of our period of study; and (3) there was a noticeable trend towards independent newspapers over the course of the period, and therefore temporal variation in media market structure that we can exploit.

To measure bias, we focus on the agenda setting behavior of newspapers, that is, the degree to which journalists and editors cover certain topics while ignoring others, in a way that favors a political party or ideological position (e.g. Larcinese et al. 2011; Puglisi 2011; Puglisi and Snyder 2011).<sup>2</sup> The agenda setting bias of newspapers can have large effects on voters (e.g. McCombs

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<sup>1</sup> Joint with James M. Snyder, Jr., and BK Song, Harvard University

<sup>2</sup> Scholars have attempted to measure bias in several different ways, including analyzing the agenda setting behav-

and Shaw 1972). In fact, by exploiting their agenda-setting power, actors on the supply side of the media market can have strong and potentially harmful effects on the audience, especially if they aim at suppressing information. This is the case, because consumers find it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish the scenario “I did not see any news about X today because nothing important happened regarding X” from the less benign scenario “I did not see any news about X today because, although something important happened, the media decided not to publish it.” Game theoretic models by Puglisi (2004), Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), Bernhardt et al. (2008), and Anderson and McLaren (2012) all incorporate precisely this source of media bias, and show its effects on public policy decisions.

More specifically, we study the intensity with which different newspapers cover different scandals. It is relatively easy to identify scandals in a replicable manner (we use a specific set of sources and search terms to do this), and it is also easy to count the number of newspaper stories devoted to a given scandal relatively accurately (we use specific search strings to do this). In this study, we focus on financial scandals such as bribery, fraud, and embezzlement. Therefore, these scandals involving politicians have clear partisan implications – they are “bad news” for the individual politicians implicated, and also, by association, are bad news for the party to which the implicated politicians belong.

We investigate the following hypotheses regarding newspaper coverage of scandals. First, partisan newspapers should devote a large amount of coverage to scandals involving politicians of the opposing party, and less coverage – perhaps none – to scandals involving politicians of their party.<sup>3</sup> Second, partisan newspapers should behave this way especially if they are in a monopoly

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ior. The most direct way is to examine political behavior of editorial sections, as in Erikson (1976), Ansolabehere et al. (2006), and Ho and Quinn (2008). Another approach is to analyze the degree to which media outlets use the same language, or cite the same sources, as political groups with existing measures of ideological positions. Examples are Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).

<sup>3</sup> Puglisi and Snyder (2011) examine a similar issue in the modern era. Specifically, they study whether the media coverage of political scandals is related to endorsement patterns of newspapers. They find that newspapers which frequently endorse Democratic (Republican) candidates give more coverage to Republican (Democratic) scandals.

position, and do not have to worry about what newspapers associated with the opposition party are doing. Third, when they face competition, especially from a newspaper associated with the opposition party, then they must worry about “spin control,” and may find themselves devoting a substantial amount of coverage to scandals – even scandals involving politicians in the party to which they are attached – in order to respond to especially critical articles published in the opposition party’s newspapers.

Our sample contains 157 newspapers (from the *America’s Historical Newspapers* online archive) and 121 scandals. Approximately 60% of the scandals involve Republican politicians. We have collected the data on the number of articles devoted to each scandal in each newspaper. In addition, we have collected the total number of articles published by each newspaper during the period of each scandal. We use it to scale the number of articles devoted to the scandal itself. We have also collected data on the partisanship and circulation for all competing newspapers in the towns and counties of each newspaper in our sample. This allows us to construct measures of the media market structure for each newspaper in our sample.

Our main results indicate that newspaper bias, both in favor of the newspaper’s political party and against the opposition party, is statistically significant, substantively meaningful, and in the expected direction. Partisan newspapers publish more articles about scandals involving politicians from the opposition party, and they print fewer articles about scandals involving politicians from their own party, relative to independent newspapers.

Perhaps more interestingly, we also find that as the level of competition faced by a newspaper increases, the bias exhibited – both against the opposition party and in favor of the newspaper’s own party – decreases. Consider a newspaper in a monopoly market. On average, this newspaper would publish 90% more articles when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does not. By contrast, if a newspaper faces four competitors, then the degree of bias is only half as large as when it faces none. The results hold strong even after controlling for

county level demographics, as well as the underlying partisanship of voters in each newspaper's county, and time trends.

Our paper contributes to three lines of political science and political economy literature on media. The first is the empirical literature studying how competition affects the behavior of media outlets. George and Waldfogel (2006) study the effect national expansion of the *New York Times* on local newspapers. They show that local newspapers adopt differentiation strategy when they face competition from the *New York Times* and change their target audiences providing more local and less national news. The model in Chiang (2010) predicts that newspapers in competitive markets will differentiate and move closer to people with extreme ideologies. Chiang (2010) tests this with the *National Annenberg Election Survey* data, and finds ideologically extreme households are more likely to read newspapers when the newspaper market is competitive. Gentzkow et al. (2014) test whether competition increases ideological diversity in newspaper markets. Using structural estimation and simulation methods, they show that the number of markets with newspapers affiliated with each party, the proportion of households living in such markets, and the share of households reading newspapers affiliated with each party increase as markets becomes more competitive.<sup>4</sup>

Our research also contributes to the growing theoretical literature on media bias. Formal models provide different accounts of media bias, and make different predictions regarding whether market competition reduces bias. In the Besley and Prat (2006) model, competition prevents media capture by the government, because when the number of media outlets increases, it becomes harder for the government to bribe media outlets. In the Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) model, media bias emerges because media outlets want to slant their reports toward what customers believe to build a reputation of being accurate. In competitive media markets, however,

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<sup>4</sup> Market competition need not always be associated with beneficial outcomes such as the diversity of opinions. Zaller (1999) claims that competition lowers the quality of news, and presents evidence that competition results in less hard news and more sensationalism. Similarly, Jacobsson et al. (2008) argue that high levels of competition are correlated with low levels of journalistic performance.

readers have alternative sources of information to check the accuracy of a given outlet, thus media outlets have weaker incentives to distort the news. Therefore, competition mitigates media bias.

On the other hand, the Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) model predicts media bias can be greater in competitive markets. Their model assumes that readers hold biased beliefs and want to hear stories consistent with their prior views. The model predicts an increase in competition may make media bias worse, as newspapers cater to the taste of readers more aggressively to carve out a share of the market and make higher profits. The Anand et al. (2007) model also predicts that competition would not necessarily reduce media bias. According to their model, when consumer preferences are heterogeneous and most of the facts are not verifiable, media market works similar to differentiated product market. Therefore, competition would not lead to reduction of bias if readers' preferences are unchanged and facts are non-verifiable.

The model in Baron (2006) gives a supply-side explanation of why media bias may persist in competitive media markets. According to the model, a news organization may lower the cost of hiring by granting discretion to journalists.<sup>5</sup> However, since skepticism of customers about media bias forces the news organization to lower price, it tolerates bias only if gains from the supply side is greater than the losses from the demand side. Therefore, media bias is consistent with profit maximization and may persist with competition.

Thus, while theory can guide us to some degree, there are a variety of models with a variety of different predictions. Ultimately, the effect of market competition on media bias is an empirical question. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first attempts to estimate the relationship between competition and media bias directly on a large-scale basis.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The assumption is that if journalists can advance their careers or be influential by using the discretion granted by a news organization, they are willing to work for lower wages.

<sup>6</sup> Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find a negative but statistically insignificant effect of competition on media bias. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) tests whether competition reduces reporting bias in the market for security analyst earnings forecasts. They show mergers of brokerage houses are positively correlated with optimism bias in reporting, which is

The third line of work to which we contribute is the literature on the historical development of the media. Gentzkow et al. (2006) is closely related to our paper in terms of topic and time periods. They study how U.S. newspapers covered the Crédit Mobilier scandal in the early 1870s and the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s. The authors note that in the period between these scandals technological progress in the printing industry, coupled with the contemporaneous increase in the population and income of U.S. cities, induced an enormous growth in the size of the newspapers' market. In the competition for market shares and advertising revenue, newspapers faced strong incentives to cut the ties with political parties and become (at least formally) independent. The authors find that the coverage of the Crédit Mobilier scandal – which occurred in a period dominated by partisan newspapers – was more biased than the coverage of Teapot Dome – which occurred at a time when fewer dailies were directly linked to political parties. Petrova (2011) explicitly analyzes the link between potential advertising revenue across U.S. cities and entry and exit of partisan and independent newspapers during the 19th century. The author shows that markets with high advertising revenues are likely to have independent newspapers. Finally, Gentzkow et al. (2014) study the effect of market force on the ideological diversity using data on U.S. newspapers from the early 20th century.

The following section describes the data and empirical strategy. We then present the main results and robustness checks we implemented. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion of the broader implications of the results for research on media competition and bias and possible extensions to our study.

### *Data and Measures*

This paper studies how the media market structure present in the period 1870-1910 in the U.S. influenced how and whether partisan newspapers covered political scandals. In order to do

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consistent with the hypothesis that competition reduces bias.

so we put together a dataset with detailed information for 121 political scandals, including the partisanship of the politician involved and the type of each scandal (fraud, bribery, corruption, etc.). Additionally, we collected the number of articles about these scandals published by the 157 newspapers, and included descriptive information not only for these newspapers, but also for their local competition. What follows is a description of our data sources and the methods we used to build each part of the dataset.

### *Scandals*

There is no exhaustive list of political scandals for the period we are studying. We therefore constructed our own list using three sources. The result is a sample of 121 scandals.<sup>7</sup> Online Appendix Table A.2 lists each scandal, including the sources used to identify it. Some of these scandals involve more than one politician, and some politicians were involved in more than one scandal. In these cases we treat each politician as a separate observation, as well as each scandal in which a same politician was involved.

The first source is the combined archives of five of the largest daily newspapers in the U.S. at the time of study. Specifically, using ProQuest's archive of articles of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*, we conducted searches for all articles using a set of search terms that referred to different political offices (senator, mayor, etc.) as well as a number of offenses and legal actions that could be taken against them (words such as bribe, corruption, fraud, arrest, trial, etc.).<sup>8</sup> We restricted attention to scandals in which official legal action took place or which appeared in two or more of the five newspapers.

We chose these five newspapers to help identify scandals based on four criteria. First, all of them were large and well established newspapers at the time. Second, they were located in

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<sup>7</sup> As previously mentioned, we focus on financial scandals such as bribery, fraud, and embezzlement.

<sup>8</sup> The exact string used for this search is (*indict\** or *convict\** or *guilty* or *bribe\** or *corrupt\** or *scandal* or *impeach\**) and (*congressm?n* or *senator\** or *governor\** or *mayor\** or *representative\**), where \* and ? are wildcards.



five of the largest cities in the country at the time, where they faced highly competitive media markets, making them more likely to report scandals from both parties. Third, they broadly cover all regions of the country – northeast, midwest, south, and west – so even though each newspaper exhibits a regional bias, most of the country should be well covered by the five of them combined. Finally, we could collect articles from them using the same search string and search engine.

We do not include any of the five newspapers used to help identify scandals in our analysis, since including them could lead to obvious biases. To be even more conservative, we also drop all newspapers in other “large” markets – defined as markets with at least 10 newspapers – because the market forces acting on these newspapers might be similar to those acting on the five newspapers we used to identify scandals.

We complemented the ProQuest searches with two other sources. The first is the section “Politicians in Trouble or Disgrace” on the website Political Graveyard.<sup>9</sup> We chose only scandals involving corruption while in office – most of these scandals overlapped with those we found by searching the five newspapers. Second, we included all cases of contested elections in the U.S. Senate in which the reasons given for the contest included accusations of bribery or fraud in the election process, and where the Senate investigated the claims. The information is from the *Senate Historical Office*, which has a section on the Senate’s website describing each contested election, including information about the politicians involved, a summary of the case, and the dates at which the contestation process began and ended.

Our list of scandals includes 121 observations. Table 2.1 shows that slightly over 60% of these involve Republican politicians, which is likely due to the fact that the Republicans held a majority of government offices during our period of study. The scandals are evenly distributed between local and state level scandals, and these add up to 93% of the total observations.

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<sup>9</sup> See <http://politicalgraveyard.com>.

Table 2.1: Scandals by Political Affiliation and by Scope

Panel A: By Political Affiliation		
	Number	Percent
Democratic	45	37.2
Republican	76	62.8
Total	121	100
Panel B: By Geographical Scope		
	Number	Percent
National	8	6.6
State	59	48.8
Local	54	44.6
Total	121	100

### *Newspaper Articles*

We measure newspaper coverage by the number of articles published by each newspaper that mention the scandal while the scandal was ongoing. For each scandal, we define the relevant time period as follows. The period begins on the first day of the month in which the scandal began – i.e., an official body opened an investigation, or the politician was arrested or indicted – and the period ends on the last day of the month during which an official resolution to the scandal occurred – i.e., the investigation was closed, the politician was convicted, acquitted, or died. The newspapers in our data set are from the newspaper archive *America’s Historical Newspapers*, which contains issues for 157 newspapers for the period 1870-1910.

To identify the newspaper articles that mention each scandal, we constructed a search string that included the name and office of the politician involved, plus key words and phrases drawn from the information gathered when we first identified the scandal from the sources. Then, we constructed a separate search string tailored to each case. Two examples are (“*senator tweed*” or “*boss tweed*”) and (“*tweed ring*” or *tammany* or *embezzle\** or *arrest\** or *trial* or *convict\**) for the final

Table 2.2: Newspapers by Party and by Media Market

Panel A: By Party		
	Number	Percent
Democratic	59	34.7
Republican	82	48.2
Independent	29	17.1
Total	170	100
Panel B: By Media Market		
	Number	Percent
1	30	9.4
2	49	15.3
3	51	15.9
4	56	17.5
5	54	16.9
6 to 10	80	25
Total	320	100

scandal involving William Tweed, and (*congressman or representative*) and (*“star route” or “star-route”*) and (*indict\* or charge\* or bribe\* or trial\* or guilty or acquit\**) for the scandal involving William Pitt Kellogg. Since there are 121 such strings and some of them fairly long, we do not list them all here.<sup>10</sup> To scale the number of articles, we collected the total number of articles published by the newspaper during the relevant period of the scandal.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Newspaper Media Markets*

To describe the market environment facing each of the newspapers in our sample, we collected information about the newspaper’s partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation, as well as the partisanship and circulation of all other newspapers in the same city or town at

<sup>10</sup> A list with the exact search string used for each scandal is available on request. After searching we checked 2% of the results for all the scandals by hand, to check for false positives; in some cases this led us to modify our search strings.

<sup>11</sup> We used PERL scripts to automate the date-collection process.

that time. We collect this from *Rowell's American Newspaper Directory* and *N.W. Ayer & Son's American Newspaper Annual and Directory*. These were annual publications that together covered the period 1869 to 1922, and contained information about each newspaper published in every city, including partisanship, frequency of circulation and size of circulation, language of publication, and other information. Since we are mainly interested in the competition between partisan newspapers, our data set only has information for the newspapers that supported one of the major political parties or declared themselves to be politically independent or neutral. The independent newspapers constitute a "control group" to which we compare the Democratic and Republican newspapers.

We collected the media market information for all of the newspapers in our sample (from *America's Historical Newspapers*). Table 2.2 has the number of newspapers according to partisanship. About half of the newspapers from *America's Historical Newspapers* in our sample were Republican, almost 35% were Democratic, and a little under 20% were Independent.<sup>12</sup> Panel B in Table 2.2 classifies newspapers according to media market type. Since there were numerous changes in the number of newspapers in a city, and we count each change separately, the number of newspapers counted this way is about 320.

#### *Newspaper Variables*

The scandals in our dataset overlapped between one to four calendar years and the information that we have available on newspapers and the media market corresponds to those calendar years. In some cases, newspapers changed partisan affiliations during the course of a scandal. In other cases, the media market structure facing a newspaper changed during the course of a scandal. Since we study each scandal as a unit and in order to define each newspaper's partisan affiliation and market environment for each scandal, we averaged over the calendar years during

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<sup>12</sup> If a newspaper changed partisanship it appears multiple times, once for each partisan affiliation.

which the scandal took place.

More specifically, we define a newspaper as *Republican* during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers classified the newspaper as Republican for more than half of the time during the scandal period. Similarly, we define a newspaper as *Democratic* during a scandal if Rowells/Ayers classified it as Democratic for more than half of the time during the scandal period, and we define a newspaper as *Independent* if Rowells/Ayers classified it as Independent for more than half of the time.

As discussed above, one reasonable hypothesis is that a newspaper will be most biased in a monopoly situation, where it does not face any competition in its city, and that this bias will decrease as the number of newspapers in the city increases. We use the log of the total number of newspapers in the city to capture this effect. This is a convenient way to measure the effect of increased competition, since it is likely that the effect of an additional newspaper is stronger when this increases the number of newspapers in a market from 1 to 2, or 2 to 3, than when it increases the number of newspapers from 9 to 10. In some cases the number of competitors in a given newspaper's market changed over the course of a scandal. Therefore, for each scandal and newspaper we define *Log Newspapers* as the average number of newspapers circulating in the newspaper's town over the course of the scandal.

The dependent variable is *Relative Hits<sub>ij</sub>*, defined as the number of articles published by newspaper *j* about scandal *i* ( $h_{ij}$ ), divided by the total number of articles published by this newspaper during the period of scandal *i* ( $H_{ij}$ ), minus the average number of this ratio for all the newspapers that published articles about scandal *i*:

$$Relative\ Hits_{ij} = \frac{h_{ij}}{H_{ij}} - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_i} (h_{ik}/H_{ik})}{n_i} \quad (2.1)$$

where  $n_i$  is the number of newspapers in the sample during the period of scandal *i*. That is, we study how a newspaper's coverage deviates from the average coverage of the scandal, as a result of the type of scandal and the partisanship of both the newspaper and the politicians involved

in the scandals. Since the mean of  $h_{ij}/H_{ij}$  is only .000267, or 2.67 articles per 10,000, we rescale *Relative Hits* by multiplying by 10,000.

Bias in the coverage of scandals can be in two directions. A newspaper can choose to “over cover” scandals involving politicians of the opposition party (reminding readers as much as possible that the politicians in the opposition party are corrupt, dishonest, untrustworthy, and generally not deserving of their votes). A newspaper can also choose to “under cover” scandals involving politicians from its own party (possibly hoping that readers might not learn about the scandal, or at least trying to limit the damage to the party’s reputation by not reminding readers about the scandal). To capture the first of these, we define the variable *Opposition Party<sub>ij</sub>*; this variable is equal to 1 if newspaper  $j$  and the politician involved in scandal  $i$  belong to different parties, and it is 0 if they are attached to the same party or the newspaper is independent. To capture the second type of bias, we define the variable *Own Party<sub>ij</sub>*; this variable is equal to 1 if newspaper  $j$  and the politician in scandal  $i$  are both affiliated with the same political party, and it is 0 otherwise or if the newspaper is independent. Finally, putting the two types of bias together produces a measure of the overall bias of the newspaper, i.e., how much it “over covers” scandals related to the opposition party and “under covers” scandals related to its own party. To capture this, we define the variable *Overall Bias<sub>ij</sub>* = *Opposition Party<sub>ij</sub>* – *Own Party<sub>ij</sub>*; so, *Overall Bias<sub>ij</sub>* is equal to -1 when both scandal and newspaper are affiliated with the same political party, it is equal to +1 when they belong to opposite parties, and it is 0 otherwise.

It is reasonable to expect that newspapers will give more coverage to scandals that occur within their state or in the nearby states, while scandals that pertain to politicians in offices at the federal level will receive different treatment. In order to account for this difference in treatment, we created three different variables: *In State* is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the politician involved in scandal  $i$  works in the state where newspaper  $j$  is published; *In Region* is a dummy variable that equals one if the politician involved in scandal  $i$  is from a state that shares

boundaries with the state where newspaper  $j$  is located; and *National* is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the scandal involves a politician that occupies an office at the federal level.<sup>13</sup>

Newspapers also vary considerably in size, circulation, frequency of circulation, etc. To capture some of this variation we control for *Newspaper Frequency*, defined as 7 for daily newspapers, 3 for tri-weeklies, 2 for semi-weeklies and 1 for weeklies.

#### *Other Data*

We also include a variety of demographic and socio-economic variables, measured at the county level. These help control for factors such as the income, urbanization, and literacy of each newspaper in our sample. More specifically, we extract the following variables from the U.S. census files at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR Study 2896 by Haines 2006): total population, the number of white population, the number of male population aged 21 and older, the number of people living in towns with 2,500 or more residents, the number of people living in towns with 25,000 or more residents, the total dollar value of manufacturing output, the number of people employed in manufacturing, and the total annual wages in manufacturing. We linearly interpolate each number between census years.<sup>14</sup> We use these variables to construct the share of white population, the share of males aged 21 and older, the share of the population living in towns with 2,500 or more people, the share of population living in cities with 25,000 or more people, the total dollar value of manufacturing output per-capita, and the average wage in manufacturing.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> We also constructed *In County*, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the politician involved in scandal  $i$  works in the county where newspaper  $j$  is published. This variable turns out to be zero for all but a tiny number of cases, and due to perfect multicollinearity is dropped it from the analysis.

<sup>14</sup> The number of males aged 21 and older, the total dollar value of manufacturing output, the number of people employed in manufacturing, and the total annual wages in manufacturing are missing for the year 1910. We use the average of the 1900 and 1920 values for the year 1910 before interpolating these measures.

<sup>15</sup> All dollar values are in 1910 dollars.

Finally, in some specifications we also control for the partisanship of each newspapers' market area, using the Democratic vote share for president in the county of each newspaper in the most recent election prior to the scandal. Define the variable *Voter Partisanship*, as follows. Let  $D_{ij}$  be the Democratic share of the vote in the county where newspaper  $j$  is published, in the presidential election immediately prior to scandal  $j$ . Then  $Voter\ Partisanship_{ij} = D_{ij}$  if scandal  $j$  involves a Republican politician, and  $Voter\ Partisanship_{ij} = 1 - D_{ij}$  if scandal  $j$  involves a Democratic politician. Thus, *Voter Partisanship* is defined so that if voters are "cognitive dissonance avoiders" and newspapers published articles cater to this taste, then the relationship between *Relative Hits* and *Voter Partisanship* will be positive.<sup>16</sup>

Appendix Table A.1 contains summary statistics of all variables used in our main analysis.

### Results

We estimate models of the following form:

$$Relative\ Hits_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ Opposition\ Party_{ij} + \beta_2\ Log\ Newspapers_{ij} + \gamma'X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2.2)$$

and

$$Relative\ Hits_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ Opposition\ Party_{ij} + \beta_2\ Log\ Newspapers_{ij} + \beta_3\ Opposition\ Party_{ij} \times Log\ Newspapers_{ij} + \gamma'X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2.3)$$

where *Opposition Party* and *Log Newspapers* are as described above, and  $X_{ij}$  is a vector of control variables. The models are similar for the other bias measures, with *Own Party* or *Overall Bias*

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<sup>16</sup> Note that since newspaper markets are mainly towns or cities rather than whole counties, we would prefer to measure the demographic, socio-economic, and political variables at the town level rather than the county level. Unfortunately, these do not exist for our period of study, and constructing such measures would be an enormous if not impossible task.



substituted for *Opposition Party*.<sup>17</sup>

The first model gives a basic sense of the relationships between newspaper coverage of scandals and key variables presumed to affect this coverage. It also provides a baseline estimate of the average direction and magnitude of the bias in scandal coverage after controlling for some of these key variables, given by  $\beta_1$ . Given the discussion above, we expect that  $\beta_1 > 0$  for *Opposition Party* and *Overall Bias*, and we expect that  $\beta_1 < 0$  for *Own Party*.

The second model contains the main parameter of interest,  $\beta_3$ , which provides an estimate of how newspaper competition affects the bias in scandal coverage. If  $\beta_1 > 0$  and  $\beta_3 < 0$ , or  $\beta_1 < 0$  and  $\beta_3 > 0$ , then an increase in the number of newspapers is associated with a decline in the average amount of bias.

The vector of controls always includes scandal-specific fixed effects, *In State*, *In Region*, and *Newspaper Frequency*. In some specifications the vector of controls also includes the county-level demographic and socioeconomic described in the previous section, as well as a time trend. In other specifications, the vector of controls also includes the control for voter partisanship.<sup>18</sup>

### *Baseline Estimates*

Table 2.3 presents our “baseline” results. Columns 1-4 of the table show the estimates for the *Opposition Party* bias variable, columns 5-8 show the estimates for the *Own Party* bias variable, and columns 9-12 show the estimates for the *Overall Bias* variable. We include scandal specific fixed effects in all specifications. In the odd numbered columns, the additional controls are those

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<sup>17</sup> We do not run models with newspaper-specific fixed-effects, because we do not yet have enough within-newspaper variation in the key interaction variables. Identifying the coefficient on *Opposition Party*  $\times$  *Log Newspapers* requires newspapers that had an opportunity to cover different types of scandals (some involving the opposition party and some not) under noticeably different competitive situations. In our sample there are only a few such newspapers – e.g., there are only 15 newspapers that had the opportunity to cover both opposition and other scandals while in a monopoly or duopoly situation, and had the opportunity to cover both opposition and other scandals while facing two or more competitors.

<sup>18</sup> The variable *National* is never significant in any of the basic specifications, so we drop this variable.

shown in the table. In the even numbered columns, all of the additional demographic and socio-economic controls are included, as well as a time trend.<sup>19</sup> Standard errors, clustered by scandal, are in parentheses.

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<sup>19</sup> The estimates for these variables are not shown, but are available on request.

Table 2.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Newspaper Frequency	0.372 (0.202)	0.243 (0.215)	0.287 (0.223)	0.215 (0.225)	0.405 (0.202)	0.298 (0.210)	0.391 (0.217)	0.301 (0.217)	0.387 (0.201)	0.273 (0.212)	0.345 (0.219)	0.260 (0.221)
In-State Scandal	4.747 (1.429)	4.773 (1.434)	4.760 (1.435)	4.800 (1.437)	4.767 (1.423)	4.811 (1.426)	4.743 (1.439)	4.806 (1.441)	4.747 (1.426)	4.785 (1.429)	4.744 (1.438)	4.799 (1.439)
In-Region Scandal	1.989 (0.670)	1.914 (0.667)	1.973 (0.674)	1.910 (0.667)	1.992 (0.669)	1.919 (0.668)	1.996 (0.674)	1.911 (0.670)	1.999 (0.671)	1.924 (0.668)	1.994 (0.676)	1.917 (0.670)
Log Newspapers			0.472 (0.208)	0.366 (0.209)			-0.310 (0.196)	-0.479 (0.208)			-0.005 (0.153)	-0.083 (0.159)
Opposition Party	0.859 (0.273)	0.863 (0.272)	2.462 (0.742)	2.396 (0.759)								
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers			-1.200 (0.400)	-1.133 (0.410)								
Own Party					-0.633 (0.254)	-0.689 (0.260)	-1.753 (0.635)	-2.085 (0.676)				
Own Party × Log Newspapers							0.864 (0.342)	1.061 (0.369)				
Overall Bias									0.440 (0.151)	0.450 (0.151)	1.266 (0.399)	1.282 (0.399)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers											-0.627 (0.214)	-0.630 (0.215)
Observations	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Note first that by themselves the estimated coefficients on the bias variables are always statistically significant, substantively meaningful, and in the expected direction. Partisan newspapers publish more articles about scandals involving politicians from the opposition party, and they print fewer articles about scandals involving politicians from their own party, relative to independent newspapers. Consider, for example the coefficient on *Opposition Party* in column 2, which is 0.863. Recall that *Relative Hits* is measured in hits per 10,000 articles, and the average number of articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000. The point estimate therefore implies that, on average, partisan newspapers publish about 31% ( $100 \times 0.863 / 2.74$ ) more stories about a scandal when it involves an opposition party politician. Another way to view the size of the coefficient is to note that *Relative Hits* standard deviation of 5.35, so the difference between a newspaper-scandal pair with *Opposition Party* = 1 and a pair with *Opposition Party* = 0 is about 16% of a standard deviation in *Relative Hits*.

More interestingly, columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 show that newspapers are significantly *more* biased when they face less competition from other newspapers. This holds for all three bias measures, and the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level. In all cases, the point estimates indicated clear differences in bias between newspapers that face little or no competition and those that compete with many other newspapers. Consider again the *Opposition Party* bias measure, and focus now on column 3. The coefficients imply that if a newspaper has a monopoly ( $\text{Log Newspapers} = 0$ ), then it will publish 2.462 more articles per 10,000 when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does not. Since the average number of articles per scandal in our sample is 2.74 per 10,000, this represents an amount of coverage that is 90% above the average amount ( $100 \times 2.462 / 2.74$ ). By contrast, if a newspaper faces four competitors (so  $\text{Log Newspapers} = \text{Log}(5) = 1.609$ ), then it will only publish 1.291 more articles per 10,000 when a scandal involves a politician of the opposite party than when the scandal does not ( $2.462 - 1.2 \times 1.609 + .472 \times 1.609$ ). Thus, in relative terms, the degree of bias is only 52% as large

when a newspaper faces four competitors than when it faces none.

Figure 2.1 shows the predicted relationships between the three different types of bias and the number of newspapers, based on the point estimates from columns 3, 7 and 11 (and setting the relevant bias variable at 1). For example, moving from 1 to 4 to 9 newspapers, the *Overall Bias* falls from 1.266 to 0.39 to -.123.




Figure 2.1: Newspaper Bias vs. Number of Competing Newspapers

### *Adding Voter Partisanship*

Table 2.4 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but also include a control for the underlying partisanship of voters in each newspaper's county, *Voter Partisanship*.<sup>20</sup>

As Table 2.4 shows, when we add *Voter Partisanship*, the point estimates for the bias variables tend to increase in magnitude relative to those in Table 2.3, and remain statistically significant at the .05 level. This is true for the simple bias variables – *Opposition Party*, *Own Party*, and *Overall Bias* – and it is also true for the coefficients of interest – *Opposition Party* × *Log Newspapers*, *Own Party* × *Log Newspapers*, and *Overall Bias* × *Log Newspapers*.

Perhaps surprisingly, in all columns the estimated coefficient on *Voter Partisanship* is negative rather than positive; however, it is never statistically significant.<sup>21</sup>

In any case, the bottom line is that including *Voter Partisanship* does not weaken the estimated relationship between competition and newspaper bias.

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<sup>20</sup> The number of observations in Table 2.4 is smaller than the number of observations in Table 2.3, because when we add *Voter Partisanship* the newspapers published in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia are dropped.

<sup>21</sup> One possible reason for the insignificant estimates is measurement error, since the *Voter Partisanship* variable is measured at the county level rather than the town level.

Table 2.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Newspaper Frequency	0.201 (0.216)	0.171 (0.233)	0.207 (0.233)	0.155 (0.236)	0.129 (0.219)	0.184 (0.231)	0.178 (0.232)	0.196 (0.231)	0.160 (0.217)	0.179 (0.232)	0.190 (0.232)	0.176 (0.233)
In-State Scandal	4.789 (1.438)	4.853 (1.444)	4.830 (1.442)	4.888 (1.446)	4.801 (1.429)	4.895 (1.429)	4.859 (1.440)	4.923 (1.442)	4.787 (1.433)	4.869 (1.436)	4.842 (1.441)	4.903 (1.443)
In-Region Scandal	1.865 (0.667)	1.793 (0.656)	1.862 (0.668)	1.785 (0.656)	1.861 (0.668)	1.802 (0.657)	1.855 (0.669)	1.784 (0.656)	1.867 (0.668)	1.803 (0.657)	1.861 (0.669)	1.789 (0.657)
Log Newspapers			0.403 (0.242)	0.339 (0.261)			-0.882 (0.276)	-0.849 (0.276)			-0.234 (0.167)	-0.243 (0.191)
Opposition Party	0.997 (0.328)	1.030 (0.327)	2.863 (0.879)	2.893 (0.881)								
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers			-1.319 (0.450)	-1.311 (0.454)								
Own Party					-0.896 (0.315)	-0.889 (0.316)	-2.897 (0.883)	-2.865 (0.875)				
Own Party × Log Newspapers							1.403 (0.450)	1.401 (0.450)				
Overall Bias									0.559 (0.186)	0.560 (0.183)	1.558 (0.471)	1.549 (0.468)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers											-0.720 (0.237)	-0.715 (0.237)
Voter Partisanship	-1.094 (0.866)	-1.024 (0.843)	-1.406 (0.875)	-1.344 (0.857)	-1.019 (0.869)	-0.884 (0.845)	-1.402 (0.902)	-1.244 (0.879)	-1.262 (0.902)	-1.145 (0.876)	-1.571 (0.923)	-1.447 (0.900)
Observations	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316	3316

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.



### *Adding Time Trends in Bias*

Table 2.5 shows the results when we estimate the same models reported in Table 2.3, but also include linear time trends in the bias terms. That is, in the regressions focusing on bias against the opposition party, we include the variable *Opposition Party*  $\times$  *Year*, in the regressions focusing on bias in favor of one's own party we include *Own Party*  $\times$  *Year*, and in the regressions focusing on overall bias we include *Overall Bias*  $\times$  *Year*. This allows the specifications to incorporate other forces that might have been reducing (or increasing) bias nationwide, such as changing professional norms in journalism, and the general increase in advertising as a source of newspaper revenue.

As Table 2.5 shows, when we add the new variables the estimated coefficients on the main variables of interest – are similar to those in Table 2.3, and always statistically significant at the .05 levels.

Interestingly, the estimates on the time trend variables all suggest that the level of newspaper bias has declined over time, and all are statistically significant at the .05 or .10 level. The trends are relatively large, also. For example, the coefficients in column 5 suggest that between 1870 and 1910 the average *Overall Bias* fell by 97% (from 1.856 to 0.056). This is consistent with previous findings, such as Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Petrova (2011).

### *Bias in Coverage During Election Periods*

We also conducted analyses focusing on newspaper coverage during election periods. More specifically, for each scandal we identified the closest election that was held during or after the scandal, and counted the number of articles about the scandal printed in each newspaper during the two months leading up to election day. We then estimated the same models as in Table 3 with the election-period coverage dependent variable.

Qualitatively, the pattern of estimates when we focus on election-period coverage is quite

Table 2.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log Newspapers	0.376 (0.196)	0.296 (0.202)	-0.248 (0.183)	-0.416 (0.196)	-0.013 (0.154)	-0.076 (0.158)
Opposition Party	2.266 (0.686)	2.191 (0.699)				
Opposition Party × Log Newspapers	-1.002 (0.357)	-0.931 (0.367)				
Own Party			-1.578 (0.575)	-1.913 (0.620)		
Own Party × Log Newspapers			0.707 (0.308)	0.905 (0.338)		
Overall Bias					1.158 (0.365)	1.173 (0.366)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers					-0.531 (0.192)	-0.532 (0.194)
Year	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.033 (0.011)	-0.034 (0.010)	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.024 (0.005)
Opposition Party × Year	-0.041 (0.018)	-0.041 (0.018)				
Own Party × Year			0.030 (0.017)	0.030 (0.017)		
Overall Bias × Year					-0.020 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.010)
Observations	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

similar to that in Table 3. The magnitudes are smaller than those in Table 3, because the standard deviation of the dependent variable is much smaller.<sup>22</sup> For example, the estimated coefficient on *Opposition Party* in Equation 2 is 0.139, and the estimated standard error is 0.070. The estimated coefficient on *Opposition Party* in Equation 3 is 0.450 (standard error = 0.214), the estimated coefficient on *Log Newspapers* is 0.073 (standard error = 0.042), and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term *Opposition Party* × *Log Newspapers* is -0.232 (standard error = 0.109). Thus, as in the baseline specifications, the estimates indicate that newspapers exhibit bias in their election-period scandal coverage, but the size of the bias falls as competition increases.

### *Conclusion*

Much of the U.S. press in the 19th and early 20th centuries was highly partisan. The analysis above indicates that this partisan bias was reflected in the amount of coverage devoted to scandals depending on the partisan affiliations of the politicians involved. Partisan newspapers tended to cover scandals involving the opposition party's politicians more intensely, and they also tended to cover scandals involving their own party's politicians more lightly.

Perhaps more importantly, it appears that competition – measured simply as the number of competing newspapers – reduced the degree to which partisan newspapers skewed their coverage of scandals. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors would on average exhibit less than 50% as much bias in coverage intensity (using the overall bias measure), and a newspaper facing six competitors would exhibit no noticeable bias.

Our sample contains 157 newspapers. This is large enough to give us enough observations to have confidence in our regression estimates; also, we have no reason to believe that the sample is

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<sup>22</sup> In the interest of space we do not report the estimates in detail in yet another table. They are available upon request.

unrepresentative in ways that might bias our estimates. Nonetheless, the sample only represents a small fraction – about 2% – of the newspapers that circulated in the U.S. during the period of study. Enlarging the sample is crucial, especially in order to estimate models with newspaper-specific fixed effects.

It would be especially interesting to extend the time period covered, through the 1910s and into the 1920s. This would allow us to study whether newspapers responded to the structural changes in political institutions that began at the start of the 20th century – such as the introduction of primary elections, the direct election of U.S. Senators, and the shift toward non-partisan elections for local offices. One prediction is that under the direct primary, even highly partisan voters should be interested in learning about the malfeasance of state and local politicians in their own party, since they can vote against these politicians in the primary election. Did newspapers respond to this demand?

Although our study is historical, our findings are relevant even today. Media market competition in general, and the decline of the newspaper industry in particular, are highly salient topics. Readership, circulation, and advertising revenue of U.S. newspapers have all declined sharply (in relative terms) over the past fifty years. For example, daily circulation in the U.S. dropped from just over 1.0 newspapers per household in 1950 to about 0.3 per household in 2010. This has been associated with a substantial consolidation in the industry, with the number of newspapers falling from 1,772 in 1950 to 1,382 in 2011. Even some relatively large cities, such as Birmingham, Alabama, no longer have a printed daily newspaper. Our findings suggest that this might lead to an increase in media bias, especially in the coverage of local politics, since local politics is largely ignored by national outlets.

### 3. NON-CONFORMIST VOTING IN CUBA. INFORMED VOTER CHOICE IN AN AUTHORITARIAN ELECTION<sup>1</sup>

How do voters approach elections for which the number of candidates equals the number of seats? Do such voters find nooks and crannies in the authoritarian election design to exercise some choice? What informational clues may they employ? Are there whiffs in their choices that may set up pre-transition circumstances for subsequent political change? Cuba's 2013 National Assembly election provides us with a rare opportunity to examine these questions.

We find, contrary to expectations, that Cuban voters make choices even in elections where the number of candidates equals the number of seats. These choices are not based on clientelist incentives, regime mobilization, or fear. Voters signal disinterest in, or approval of, candidates based on the information gathered about the candidates, albeit within the framework of the political regime. Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of local multi-candidate electoral contestation; this is the voters principal information short-cut to evaluate retrospective performance. In so proceeding, voters have yet to reject the Cuban Communist Party, whose leaders they sometimes endorse.

Scholars of other authoritarian regimes that schedule elections point often to clientelist mechanisms to explain aspects of voting behavior (Blaydes 2011; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). We find little evidence of clientelistically-motivated voting in Cuba. And for the first time in the

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<sup>1</sup> Joint with Jorge I. Domínguez and Chiara Superti, Harvard University. We are grateful to Aaron Watanabe for his excellent research assistance and for comments from participants at the Harvard University Comparative Politics Workshop and the Latin American Politics Workshop. All errors are our sole responsibility.

2013 election, we find little evidence of vote mobilization or coercion. Instead, Cuban voters employ the information available, making use of their level of education and their direct experience with local inter-candidate elections. The further from the City of Havana, the key explanation for voting in National Assembly elections is the prior grassroots experience: vote for National Assembly Deputy for a friend or neighbor first elected in a multi-candidate local election. The outcomes of past local elections matter more to inform voters for National Assembly elections if they live far from the City of Havana or if they are less educated, and matter less near Havana or if voters' education levels are higher, in which case voters may use their education to find additional information about candidates and can compensate for the lack of direct experience with national politicians.

The bulk of the scholarly literature on elections in authoritarian regimes focuses on why authoritarian regime elites would allow and run regular elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009), or examine the limited possibilities for electoral competition in competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). As Brownlee (2011, 823) puts it, such elections are "political safety valves." Such research has focused on outcomes for the political regime, not on voting behavior.

We seek to understand voting behavior in a communist political system, mindful of regime consequences but focused on the choices of voters. Elections in communist systems have varied considerably. The Peoples Republic of China, at one end, does not have direct elections for its national parliament; members of the National Peoples Congress are chosen indirectly. The former Soviet Union had direct elections for the Supreme Soviet. In Soviet national elections, the number of candidates equaled the number of seats, with only one candidate per seat per district. Voters could abstain, vote blank, or void the ballot but had no ability to choose between candidates competing against each other (Gilison 1968). In Poland, at first the consolidated communist regime emulated the Soviet approach in time for the 1952 national parliamentary (Sejm) elections but, after the 1956 peaceful and limited revolution, Poland adopted a new electoral law. It permitted

multiple candidates for each seat and it permitted multiple parties to nominate candidates, but it did not permit opposition parties. There were 750 candidates for 459 seats in the 1957 Sejm election. Candidates were elected from various parties, with a plurality for the Communists, but all elected Deputies were members of the government coalition (Staar 1958). Research on Poland rarely focused on elections and, when it did, the emphasis was also on regime outcomes, not voting behavior.

Communist Vietnams elections stand at the other end of the spectrum and are the most pertinent reference; excellent research by Malesky and Schuler permits a comparison with Cuba. The 2007 National Assembly election in Vietnam featured at least two candidates for every national parliamentary seat. Most centrally nominated candidates won but just under half of the locally nominated candidates won. Only one self-nominated candidate won a National Assembly seat; all other elected parliamentarians had official sponsorship at the central or the local level. Vietnams Communist Party leaders assigned centrally-nominated candidates to safe seats, guaranteeing a good electoral outcome for these national leaders. Members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party performed best, as did incumbents in general. Local politicians, however, ran in less-safe districts, which explains why they performed less well (Malesky and Schuler 2009; Malesky and Schuler 2011). Are electoral outcomes the same in Cuba, with weakest support for politicians rooted mainly in local politics?

Cubas electoral system stands between the ends of the communist-regime spectrum. Unlike China, Cuba has had direct elections for its National Assembly since the early 1990s. Like the Soviet Union, the number of candidates has equaled the number of posts but, unlike the Soviet Union, Cuba clusters candidates in districts, yielding differentiated outcomes for candidates who are nevertheless assured of election. Like Poland and Vietnam, Cuban elections thus permit comparisons between the shares of votes for each candidate. Unlike Poland and Vietnam, no National Assembly Deputy has yet been defeated in Cuba, where defeat is legally possible because,

for election, the law requires winning more than half the valid votes cast. Thanks to a unique data set for Cuba's 2013 National Assembly election, we show how voters used a non-democratic election to make some choices without subverting the regime. In contrast to the experience in Vietnam, we will show that locally-rooted politicians performed best in this Cuban election, and that support for Political Bureau and Central Committee members was middling.

In Cuba, the state owns and operates all television and radio stations and all the daily newspapers. Individual candidate campaigning is prohibited, as is financing for individual campaigns. Only the Communist Party of Cuba is legal; the number of candidates equals the number of seats. In such a low-information authoritarian context in Cuba, voters must look for the few available clues. They know about the national leaders, above all members of the Communist Party Political Bureau who appear in the official mass media. But they have some additional means to learn about candidates. One is a set of officially-generated short biographies of each National Assembly candidate; these are posted in each district and are visible at or near the polling places. The other is that Cuba's municipal elections feature two candidates for every seat, and many of these municipal assembly officials are also nominated to run for the National Assembly. At the local level, therefore, the election and performance of the municipal assembly official chosen through a local multi-candidate election provides key information—these are the only politicians voters had chosen in elections featuring inter-candidate choice.

Since the early 1990s, from a tenth and rising to a quarter of Cuba's voters have not voted as the "official line" has indicated although, in this communist single-party system, citizens have not been able to vote against the political regime or the Communist Party of Cuba. We define a nonconforming voter as a citizen who goes to the polls to vote and chooses to cast a ballot that is blank, void, or not for the officially recommended united slate (to be explained below). Nonconforming voters show up to vote; abstention from voting may occur not only for political but also for nonpolitical reasons.



There are two puzzles. One is election turnout. Scholars of democratic societies have long pondered why any voter would turn out to vote when any voters impact on the outcome would be tiny (Aldrich 1993, Downs 1957, 260-276). The other puzzle is why do voters vote selectively. In Cuba's National Assembly elections, where the number of candidates equals the number of seats, a voters impact on the choice of a National Assembly Deputy has been exactly zero. Yet, in the 2013 National Assembly election, 1,846,691 (Calculated from "Resultados finales" 2013) Cubans cast nonconforming ballots (23.5 percent of voters). In this article, we focus on the second puzzle why are some candidates rewarded more than others and shed some light on the first puzzle.

Cubans exercise choice in these single-party elections in ways that evoke the behavior of voters in many countries (Blais et al. 2002; Tavits 2010). However, in Cuba this selective voting neither rejects nor endorses the Communist Party; instead, it reveals a relatively neutral stance with regard to the official institutions (the Communist Party and the government). Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and some experience of local electoral contestation between candidates (where one candidate wins and another one loses, which we call multi-candidate elections) or have earned recognition for their deeds, not just their political affiliation. In the stronger support for local over national politicians, Cuban voters differ markedly from Vietnamese voters.

### *Background*

We focus on the February 2013 National Assembly election because it is the first for which the government published the pertinent data and the first for which official institutions did not intensively campaign in favor of casting a ballot for the entire official single slate.

By 2013, Cuban voters had reasons for concern. Cuba's gross domestic product per capita in constant prices fell 34 percent from 1990 to 1993, when the first direct election was held for the National Assembly. There followed a slow recovery until the start of the new century, then

a growth spurt in mid-decade, followed by a marked deceleration, and then very slow growth since the 2008-09 financial crisis (Pérez Villanueva 2004, 51; Pérez Villanueva 2012, 22; Pérez Villanueva 2015). This growth slowdown coincided with Raúl Castro's replacement of his brother Fidel as Cuba's president (acting president August 2006-February 2008, president since then) and preceded the spike in nonconformist voting in the 2013 election.

By 2013, the voters may have felt freer to choose. Cuba experienced a gradual opening of the public sphere under Raúl Castro's presidency. There was a more open and vigorous debate at the University of Havana regarding economic and social policies. In the 1990s, *Temas* a social sciences journal written for a general university-educated reader, began publication and, during Raúl Castro's years, widened its scope. In 2005, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Havana launched a new magazine, *Espacio Laical*, to address contemporary topics in Cuban society, economy, politics, and diaspora, not just religious topics. In 2008, the communist party's official newspaper, *Granma*, resumed publication once a week of letters-to-the-editor, which it had suspended a quarter century earlier ("De la Dirección" 2008). Subsequently, *Granma's* digital edition began to publish comments on some of its articles. In 2011, Cuba had only 70 personal computers per thousand people and 232 people per thousand had some Internet access (Organización Nacional de Estadística e Información 2012, Table 17.4); thus only middle-class users access the *Granma* digital edition. Yet, those who do, argue vigorously. For example, in the four days following publication of a new foreign investment law in 2014, comments posted on *Granma's* site sharply criticized aspects of the new law ("Texto de la ley..." 2014). Similarly in February 2015, in anticipation of upcoming municipal elections, the newspaper *Juventud Rebelde* ("Concluyó entrevista..." 2015) hosted an online forum about the Cuban electoral system that generated significant criticisms. (To be sure, Internet traffic has grown as well outside official sites.) Discourse widened even within the Castro family. President Raúl Castro's daughter, Mariela, became a public advocate for gay rights, helping to shift the Cuban government from

its hitherto homophobic policies (1960s to 1980s). In a seemingly off the cuff remark at the December 2010 National Assembly plenary meeting, Raúl Castro remarked, “Why do we have to butt in on people’s lives?” Granma reported that the National Assembly burst into applause – the only such interruption during the entire meeting.

This greater openness of the public sphere and the serious economic constraints are consistent with Brownlee’s (2011) argument that elections in non-communist authoritarian regimes open a political safety valve that allows officials to collect information from this behavior, which in different ways Chinese officials do as well (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).

### *Cuba’s Electoral System*

Cuban revolutionary forces seized power in January 1959. The first national parliamentary elections were held only in 1976. From 1976 to 1991, Cubans voted directly only for municipal assembly candidates, who serve for 2.5-year terms, renewable; municipal assemblies chose the members of the provincial assemblies and the Deputies of the National Assembly. Deputies serve for five-year terms, renewable. The first National Assembly met in December 1976; 91.7 percent of the Deputies were communist party members and another 5 percent were members of the party’s youth wing, the Communist Youth Union. At that first National Assembly, 55.5 percent of the Deputies had also been elected as municipal assembly officials and were thus performing double duty. The remaining 44.5 percent of the Deputies were government and party officials, never elected in a direct election, who were chosen to become Deputies by the municipal assemblies (Domínguez 1978, 243-247). Since 1976, the National Assembly has met twice, at most three times per year, and each time for just a few days, including the committee hearings in the week before plenary sessions. It is not onerous for a municipal assembly member or a government official to serve as a Deputy while also holding a regular job. Cuba’s National Assembly has never defeated a government bill and never approved a bill introduced by Deputies without

prior executive support.

In response to the collapse of European communist regimes in 1989-1991 and the massive protests at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Cubas Fourth Communist Party Congress in 1991 amended the Constitution and the electoral law. In October 1992, the National Assembly approved the new electoral law to render it even more “perfect”, as its Preamble notes (for the law in effect for the 2013 election, “Ley Electoral” 2005; for a sympathetic account, August 2013, chapter 7; for a critique published in Cuba, Rafuls Pineda 2014). The following are the key characteristics of the National Assembly elections. The first four have detracted from the scholarly study of these elections; items five through seven indicate the variation that permits our analysis, notwithstanding single-party single-candidate-per-post elections.

1. Single party. The Communist Party of Cuba is the only lawfully authorized party (Constitution, Article 5).
2. Self-nomination is prohibited. Deputy candidates for the National Assembly are screened by candidacy commissions whose members are drawn from the officially-sponsored mass organizations of workers, women, peasants, university and secondary school students, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Ley Electoral, Article 68). These candidacy commissions submit their recommendations (at least two names for each candidacy, Ley Electoral, Article 89) to the municipal assembly’s candidacy commission for each municipality. Every candidacy is thus politically vetted in advance.
3. One post, one candidate. Only the municipal assembly chooses Deputy candidates and it must choose only one candidate for each post to be filled (Ley Electoral, Article 92).
4. Posting photos and biographies, and limiting campaigns. Only the electoral district commissions – not the candidates– may draft the biographies and post them and the photos of the candidates (Ley Electoral, Article 30ch). These biographies follow a standard format

and are posted outside each voting location for voters to see prior to voting. There is no candidate campaigning.

5. Multiple candidates per district. While the number of candidates equals the number of posts, each district votes on at least two candidates for two posts. The most populous electoral districts may elect more Deputies, though the number of candidates always equals the number of posts to be filled (Ley Electoral, Articles 14 and 15).
6. Voter choice. A voter “may vote for as many candidates as may appear on the ballot, with an X next to each name, but if “the voter wishes to vote for all the candidates [the voter] may write an X at the circle that appears at the top of the ballot (Ley Electoral, Article 110). The voter may leave the ballot blank, or void it. To be elected Deputy, a candidate must win more than half of the valid votes cast (blank and void votes are not counted as valid votes). In multi-candidate municipal assembly elections, many candidates fail to win a majority of the valid votes on the first-round election; a second-round election must be held between the top two vote-getters. No Deputy candidate for the National Assembly has been defeated but the legal possibility exists.
7. Candidate variation. Municipal assembly candidacy commissions may choose up to 50 percent of the Deputy candidates from among the members of the municipal assembly (Ley Electoral, Article 93). Deputy candidates who are not municipal assembly members need not reside in the district where they become candidates.

Therefore, the Cuban electoral law makes it possible for every voter to support *el voto unido*, marking an X for the entire official slate, or to vote for some but not all of the candidates even though all of the candidates will be elected. Voters may thus express support or displeasure at the voting booth in three ways: voting blank, voiding the ballot, or voting selectively, the sum of which we call nonconformist voting. Figure 3.1 shows the ballot. It prominently features the




Figure 3.1: Example of Ballot

option for the official united slate front and center, and then it lists the individual candidates in the event that the voters choose to vote for some but not all of them.

Note the relationship between candidacies for National Assembly and municipal assembly elections. The same Ley Electoral (Article 82) mandates that the number of candidates for the municipal assemblies must be at least two per local post to be filled. Municipal assembly elections are multi-candidate albeit single-party, with the same constraints on campaigning noted above. Members of municipal assemblies are also vetted as candidates for the National Assembly. Therefore, in National Assembly Deputy elections, the amount of voter information regarding the candidates differs. Some Deputy candidates will be national officials in government and party, not

elected to the municipal assemblies; other Deputy candidates will be better known at the local level because they had been previously elected to the municipal assemblies.

Three mechanisms underscore the salience and competitive challenges of municipal assembly officials. First, municipal assembly delegates are locally elected in multi-candidate elections. They face competition not only once they are on the ballot but also in getting placed on the ballot to run for re-election; for the 2015 municipal elections, for example, only 60 percent of the incumbent municipal delegates were renominated (“Un paso más cerca de elegir” 2015). Second, the law requires municipal assembly delegates to be accountable twice a year at a public assembly of constituents and to listen to their requests. Official statistics aver that over a fifth of the population attends such events (Amaro 1996). Between 2012 and 2015, citizens voiced nearly 1.2 million requests to their municipal representatives, of which three-quarters were reported as having been “solved” (“Elector-planteamiento-delegado” 2015). Third, municipal delegates act as problem solvers. As a Granma columnist put it, voters expect them to become a “one-man band,” noting also the risk that delegates would breach the law (Marrón González 2015). Because the allocation of resources remains very highly centralized, no municipal delegate may easily engage in clientelist electoralist practices, familiar in other countries, without the risk of arrest (“Las próximas elecciones” 2015). Nevertheless, jointly the multi-candidate local election, the accountability assemblies, and the problem-solving work render the municipal delegate an attractive political figure with significant roots in a community.

### *Voting Context: Non-conformist voting matters*

Senior officials have kept track of nonconformist voting. For example, following the nationwide April 2000 municipal elections, the president of the national election council (Comisión Electoral Nacional – CEN), Roberto Díaz Sotolongo, noted with satisfaction that voting abstention had dropped from the 1997 nationwide municipal election and that the proportion of blank

and void ballots had also fallen (Table 3.1, below). The CEN President added that voting in Cuba offered the option of voting for no candidate (Mayoral 2000).

The salience of the elections is also evident because neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, or groups of students, are officially tasked to contact voters to turn out, and job promotions or the allocation of benefits often include verification of having voted. These contacts increase turnout but may also create apprehension about the possible adverse consequences of voter abstention. (López 1993, 52; Guanche 2012, 78). Moreover, the leading mass organizations have publicly urged voters to cast their ballot for the single slate (“Llama la CTC al voto unido” 2008). The official newspaper’s report on the 2008 National Assembly election highlighted the “triumph of the united vote” (“¡Triunfó el voto unido!” 2008), thereby calling attention to nonconformist voting.

Cuban scholars have also highlighted the salience of elections. As Julio César Guanche puts it, “voters have responded highly and positively to the official requests for the united vote – for all the candidates – alongside with low blank and void voting... The elections have served as ‘virtual’ plebiscites...” on revolutionary rule (Guanche 2012, 71; see also Valdés Paz 2009, 149-170). Nonconformist voting matters.

In the early 1990s, the novelty was the direct election for national deputies, which gave voters the option to cast nonconforming national votes for the first time. Although Cuba’s government and economy were shaken badly by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies, Cuban leaders had faith that their communist party was different. Cuban scholars had carried out detailed research for the 1989 municipal elections. They found, first, that the communist party as an institution did not add much value to a candidacy. Only two percent of 150 voters surveyed mentioned membership in the communist party as a “desirable” quality in a municipal assembly candidate. Second, voters supported their friends and neighbors who were good in the community, worked hard, and were interpersonally effective. Third, seven out of ten Cuban municipal



assembly members elected in 1989 were communist party members, who were good workers, friends, and neighbors. Communist party candidates, as human beings, added value to a party that lacked popular prestige (Dilla, González, and Vicentelli 1994, 69-73). The Cuban leadership hoped that party members could rescue the party and lead the way out of the crisis blamed on the European communist collapse.

Cubans re-enacted V. O. Key's observations made in the 1940s regarding the voting behavior in the U.S. southern states. As Key wrote about voting in South Carolina in a section he called "Friends and Neighbors", "in the absence of well-organized politics," as in the one-party political regime then prevalent in that state, "localism will play a powerful role in the orientation of the voters' attitudes." In Alabama, "the friends-and-neighbors pattern reflects the absence of well-organized competing factions" (Key 1949, 132, 41). Cuban National Assembly elections, we will now show, feature such "friends-and-neighbors" effects.

Table 3.1: Nonconforming voting for Cuba's National Assembly elections (percentages)

	1993	2008	2013
Selective vote	4.6	8.7	17.6
Blank and void vote	7.0	4.8	5.9
Nonconforming vote	11.6	13.5	23.5

Source: Granma, March 11, 1993; January 30, 2008; and February 8, 2013.

In the first direct election for the National Assembly (1993), blank and void voting matched the pattern from municipal elections (Table 3.1). It took voters until the 2008 election, the first under Raúl Castro, to prefer the selective vote, which became the dominant means for nonconforming voting by the 2013 National Assembly election. In 2013, the official press refrained from calling for *el voto unido* for the first time ever (August 2014, 89), though the ballot itself did not change. In 2013, nearly a quarter of Cuban voters were nonconformists – over 1.8 million voters. The Cuban press reported the results but did not comment on them, nor did Cuban officials

refer in public positively or negatively to this result. They could have celebrated a democratic opening; they could have evinced embarrassment that the united slate had fallen significantly, but they did neither.

### *Embarrassing the Powerful?*

In Vietnam, the Communist party protected many central national leaders from electoral embarrassment. In Cuba, the Communist party protected fewer. Consider some candidates from the fourteen-member Communist Party Political Bureau (the country's top political leaders) who ran in 2013 in Havana province. Marino Murillo, the economic policy tsar, came in third and last in District 1, Plaza de la Revolución. His first vice minister, Adel Yzquierdo, also came in third and last in District 1, Playa. The two candidates who beat Murillo were municipal assembly delegates. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez also came in third and last in District 2, Diez de Octubre, defeated as well by a municipal delegate. Lázara López Acea, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Havana province, came in fourth and last in District 2, Boyeros; the award-winning visible chief of the national weather bureau won the district. Armed Forces Minister General Leopoldo Cintras and National Assembly President Esteban Lazo won their districts in Arroyo Naranjo but each just by two percentage points.

Political Bureau members who ran for the National Assembly in eastern Cuba did better but won no landslides. In Santiago province, Interior Minister General Abelardo Colomé won District 1 in Contramaestre, as did Army Corps General Álvaro López Miera in District 5, City of Santiago, each by a percentage point over the next candidate. National Second Secretary of the Communist party, José Ramón Machado, led by three points in District 1, Guantánamo.

The worst outcome was Salvador García Mesas, long-time leader of the Central Confederation of Labor (CTC), who trailed by nearly nine percentage points, in a two-member district, Santa Cruz del Sur, Camagüey. A strong endorsement, in Santa Clara's District 3, went to Miguel

Díaz-Canel, Raúl Castro's designated successor, who led the next candidate by thirteen points.

President Raúl Castro, with 98.046 percent of the votes in San Luis, led the other candidate by twelve percentage points. His brother Fidel only got 94.727 percent in District 7, City of Santiago, both brothers running in Santiago province. But Raúl may have noticed that, nationally, he was only the fourth highest vote winner.

In short, unlike in Vietnam, Communist party national leaders were not shielded from mediocre election results and those mediocre results give us greater confidence that the votes were counted as they were cast. Running in Havana province was tough. Had the Cuban leaders behaved like Vietnamese leaders, many more of the Cuban leaders would have been candidates in eastern Cuba, where the Castro brothers and top Generals won. These observations preview our statistical analysis: top national leaders did acceptably but did not outperform.

### *Hypotheses*

These six hypotheses may be set in the comparative context with Vietnam. If Cuba were like Vietnam, incumbents would do best, as would Communist party members and especially members of its Political Bureau and Communist party the first three hypotheses. In contrast, we show that Cubans are more likely to support municipally-rooted National Assembly Deputy candidates as well as those who earned job-related merits the fourth and fifth hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1* Incumbents running for re-election should win more votes. If they do not, it may reflect dissatisfaction with their performance.

*Hypothesis 2* Communist party Deputy candidates should obtain more votes than non-Communist-party candidates. This implies that the leadership's hunch was correct in the early 1990s: voters valued individuals who belonged to the party. Disproving the hypothesis implies that the threat to the regime was greater.

*Hypothesis 3* Members of the Political Bureau, the Council of State, the Cabinet, and the party's Central Committee should win more votes than those who are not.

*Hypothesis 4* Deputy candidates previously elected at multi-candidate municipal assembly elections should win more votes in Deputy elections than Deputy candidates not previously elected to local office. Voters value candidates for their local roots and for their winning an inter-candidate election. This implies that the leadership's democratizing hunch in 1992 may have been correct. The question for voters is not the communist party as such but whether Deputies have grassroots bases. Disproving this hypothesis implies that voters know national figures best and lack information about politicians active mainly at the local level.

*Hypothesis 5* Voters should support people who get things done. Those who have earned awards for their hard work or served in international missions should win more votes.

*Hypothesis 6* The outcomes of past local elections matter more to inform voters for National Assembly elections if they live far from the City of Havana, and matter less near Havana. It matters less where voter education levels are higher and where voters may use their education to find additional information about candidates. The grassroots premium works as an information short-cut where education is lower and voters lack alternative means to inform themselves. If distance and education are orthogonal to each other yet have this joint effect, then clientelism is unlikely to explain the grassroots premium for National Assembly elections because, under clientelism, the grassroots premium should be unrelated to distance from Havana.

For control purposes, we also look at the provincial assemblies. Cubans also vote directly for members of the provincial assemblies. In provincial elections, the number of candidates also equals the number of seats; other constraints on nominations and campaigns apply as well. We

expect that a candidacy for the National Assembly is neither stronger nor weaker if the National Assembly candidate had been previously elected to a provincial assembly. Unlike the multi-candidate municipal elections, the provincial elections are neither contested between candidates at risk of defeat on election day nor connect to grassroots bases. The voter obtains little additional information from provincial assembly elections.

In addition, in 2013 President Raúl Castro had indicated his priorities for the election. He was especially pleased that women were 48.86 percent of the Deputies; the respective statistic for blacks and mestizos was 37.9 percent. Moreover, he was pleased that 67.26 percent of the Deputies were on their first term (Castro 2013). Yet, we have no reason to think that any of these considerations matter much for the voters.

### *Data*

We collected and coded the biographies of all National Assembly members elected in 2013. The biographies include a photograph, information about the life of the candidates, educational background, employment, awards won, participation in various organizations, and previous political experience. In 2013, 621 candidates entered the assembly, of whom 301 were women and 500 had a university degree. One third of the candidates mention CCP membership and 27 percent were incumbents. We also have data on each candidates vote share in 2013; it ranged from 99.993 percent to 66.629 percent. Both the biographies and the vote shares were published by Granma, the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. The data about the municipalities come from the Anuarios Estadísticos Municipales 2013,<sup>2</sup> while their distance from the capital city of each municipality is taken from google maps.

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<sup>2</sup> Available at <http://www.one.cu/aedm2013.htm>.

## *The Variables*

We examine whether a Deputy candidate's participation in a prior multi-candidate local municipal election affects the likelihood of winning more votes in a Deputy election where no candidate loses. Does prior experience as *delegado municipal*, as compared to other types of experiences in the National Assembly or in the provincial assembly, which lack multi-candidate competition, affect the vote shares in the National Assembly Deputy elections?

We control for gender and race, collected from the candidates' biographies. The race variable was assigned by the coders who looked at the pictures and by comparing the candidates to a skin color chart (LAPOP Barómetro de las Américas 2012);<sup>3</sup> in some specifications, we dichotomized this variable using only black and white.

We also control for level of education. The majority of representatives (500) have at least a university degree and 121 have a post-graduate degree. We assigned a score of 0 to those with lower than a high-school level of education, 1 for high-school only, 2 for university degrees, and 3 for higher-than-university degrees.

We distinguish with dummy variables those candidates who have performed some internationalist service reported in the biography. The types of experiences vary. They include high-ranking political roles, such as Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz who has been the Cuban ambassador for the European Union, the United Nations, Belgium and Luxemburg; international academic training, as in the case of Marino Alberto Murillo Jorge who got his Economics degree in Moscow; or development tasks ("misión internacionalista") in various countries.

We identify whether an individual was awarded some special recognition. The most common award is the "Vanguardia Nacional" (National Vanguard), which is awarded based on outstanding performance in different realms.

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<sup>3</sup> We used the same chart used by the 2012 LAPOP survey. It has a scale of 11 skin colors, which is used to classify the respondents of the survey.

We insert variables that describe a parliamentarian's previous political or institutional experience, such as having been (or being) part of the FAR, the "Revolutionary Armed Forces," or being (or having been) a member of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). Within Communist Party membership, we distinguish between the posts held by the members.

We code for the previous experiences of the elected members of an assembly. We include provincial delegates elected previously through a non-competitive election for the provincial assembly, incumbents from the same National Assembly running for reelection, municipal delegates who have been through a multi-candidate municipal-assembly election, or those "new to electoral politics," a first time candidate who has never run in any election.

To test our hypotheses, we run models with different specifications. The first model, with district fixed effects, compares the vote share of the few individuals who run within the same district. This model keeps constant the political, economic, demographic, and cultural features of each district that might otherwise impact voting behaviors.

A second model analyzes the vote share's determinants across all candidates (within provinces). This model allows us to control for the district magnitude (i.e. the number of seats assigned to each district), which ranges from 2 to 5. The median district is size 3, but the most common district magnitude is 2. Given this distribution of district magnitudes, we operationalized this concept into two dichotomous variables that identify large versus small districts depending on two benchmarks: the mode (2) and the median (3).

In the section testing the explanatory mechanism, we include two variables at the municipal level. We calculate education as the number of secondary-school graduates who graduated in 2013 as a proportion of the population between the age of 15 and 19 for that year in a municipality. We also employed it as a dummy variable for high education, using as a threshold the third quintile of the distribution.

We measure as well distance of any municipality to the centrally located *Plaza de la Revolución*




Figure 3.2: Distribution of vote share. The vertical lines represent one and two standard deviations from the mean of the distribution

in the City of Havana, calculating from google maps distance in kilometers and distance in minutes of driving; the latter measures the challenges of transportation.

The dependent variable is the individual candidate vote share across all districts. Figure 3.2 shows its distribution, which goes from a minimum of .67 to a theoretical maximum of 1. The majority (95 percent) of the candidates receive a vote share between 80 and 97 percent.

### *Does Experience Matter?*

In Figure 3.3, we show the distribution of vote share for candidates who had been elected *delegados municipales* in multi-candidate election only, those who were *delegados provinciales* only, and those who were never elected in any election. In general, experience in electoral politics pays off. The difference between those who had previous experience and first-time candidates is substantively important and statistically significant at 1 percent, which represents a 1/4 of a standard deviation of the distribution of votes.

In Table 3.2, we test the claim that the prior experience of having won a multi-candidate local



election, defeating another candidate for the same post, and being elected delegado municipal, will increase the vote share of a Deputy candidate. The coefficient on the dummy variable *delegado municipal* is systematically larger and more significant statistically than other explanatory variables across all specifications (see also Figure 4).

In the first two columns, we control for district fixed effects. In the first column, we compare only the different previous political experiences known to the voter. Previous experience as an elected municipal assembly delegate plays the most important role, while being an incumbent is slightly helpful. In the second column, we test for all the information known to the voter through the biographies posted at the voting precinct. Previous contested election as a municipal assembly delegate remains significant and most important. Voters also reward candidate merit, such as winning a workplace award and also some international experience. Incumbent advantage vanishes, and none of the other political or demographic variables matter. (In the third and fourth columns, we do not control for district dummies but only for provincial dummies to allow us to verify the relationship between the vote share and the number of seats assigned in the different districts (M); we cluster the standard errors at the district level. Larger district magnitude is negatively correlated with the average vote share received by the candidates: votes are dispersed between more candidates, and other variables matter less, not surprisingly.)

Membership in the Communist Party, being a government minister or a military officer, or having been elected in noncompetitive provincial assembly elections, was never statistically significant. That is, voters sometimes supported candidates with such traits but just as often they did not. No demographic or socio-economic variable has any predictive power. The clearer finding is that candidates who have previously won a local contested election are also likely to obtain more votes in a National Assembly election.




Figure 3.3: Distribution of vote share of delegados provinciales, municipales and new candidates




Figure 3.4: Premium in vote share from having been a municipal delegate, a provincial delegate, or a National Assembly incumbent. These coefficients are taken from the full model with district fixed effects in Table 3.2

### *The Grassroots Premium: Information Short-Cut or Clientelism?*

Grassroots links, we have shown, impart a premium to National Assembly candidacies. Is that because municipal officials who subsequently run for National Assembly Deputy engage successfully in vote buying and voter coercion? Or is it because voters recognize candidates with local links more readily and value them for the local engagement grassroots links as an information short-cut for quality candidates? We show that the information short-cut explanation works.

In a low information context, grassroots connections substitute for wider knowledge: they are an easy-to-use short-cut (Shugart et al. 2006). National Assembly candidates who have been municipal delegates are more likely to be known in the district because they have competed in multi-candidate elections and have worked to earn their reputations.

We proceed in the following way. Recall that Cuba features an authoritarian election context

Table 3.2: Experience in Electoral Politics

	Dependent Variable: Candidates' Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Delegado Municipal	0.00949*** (0.004)	0.0118*** (0.004)	0.00541 (0.004)	0.0120* (0.007)
Delegado Provincial	0.00301 (0.006)	0.00416 (0.006)	0.00488 (0.005)	0.00505 (0.005)
Incumbent	0.00824* (0.004)	0.00460 (0.004)	0.00109 (0.004)	0.00103 (0.004)
Communist Party	0.00557 (0.004)	0.00625 (0.004)	0.00357 (0.003)	0.00356 (0.003)
Ministro	0.00444 (0.008)	-0.000856 (0.008)	0.00894 (0.006)	0.00824 (0.006)
Color		0.0000650 (0.001)	0.000205 (0.001)	0.000232 (0.001)
Gender		-0.00160 (0.004)	-0.00189 (0.003)	-0.00152 (0.003)
Education		-0.00210 (0.003)	-0.00381 (0.003)	-0.00383 (0.003)
International Experience		0.00813* (0.004)	0.00469 (0.003)	0.00445 (0.003)
FAR		0.00816 (0.006)	0.00539 (0.004)	0.00547 (0.004)
Awards		0.0111** (0.005)	0.00512 (0.004)	0.00476 (0.004)
M <sup>&gt;2</sup>			-0.0188*** (0.004)	-0.0148*** (0.005)
M <sup>&gt;2</sup> * Delegado Mun.				-0.0107 (0.007)
Observations	610	610	610	610

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

where little political information is available. In municipalities peopled with less well-educated individuals who are less capable of being exposed to wider political information, voters are more likely to be aware mainly of the local career of National Assembly Deputy candidates. In contrast, in municipalities with highly educated people or in areas closer to the capital city of Havana, it is easier to obtain alternative sources of information about the candidates and to have been exposed more to the national candidates whose work is mainly in Havana; the grassroots National Assembly election premium drops in these instances. The observable implication is a positive relationship between longer distance and higher vote share for municipal delegates, and a negative relationship between vote share and higher education of voters. In this respect, education and distance may be substitutes in the process to acquire information.

Alternatively, a clientelist explanation of the premium imparted by grassroots links to National Assembly candidates focuses on the ability of local politicians to access patronage, pressure voters, and buy votes. However, if clientelism were the correct explanation, we should not observe any relationship between the vote for candidates with previous municipal assembly experience and distance to Havana, once we show that such distance is orthogonal to education, which is indeed the case (see Figure 3.5). Alas, the closer to Havana, the greater the relative access to clientelist resources; thus, if clientelism were at work, closeness to Havana should impart an even greater grassroots National Assembly election premium, which we will show it does not.

A first step is to show (Figure 3.6) that there is a systematic increase in vote share received with an increase in distance from the municipality to Plaza de la Revolución, the headquarters of the Communist Party in Havana. In this non-parametric representation that does not assume any relationship between the data, the increased difference between municipal delegates and non-municipal delegates in their National Assembly candidacies is clear up until approximately 350 kilometers from Havana: municipal delegates get more votes in such National Assembly elections if they are far from Havana.




Figure 3.5: Relationship between distance and education

A more rigorous parametric analysis, with province and district magnitude fixed effects, confirms that municipal delegates have a significant National Assembly election advantage in areas far from Havana. In Figure 3.7, this advantage is magnified by level of education. Focusing only on areas located outside Havana by at least 334 kilometers (the median value of the distribution of the 'distance variable'), we plot the mean vote share for municipal delegates and non-municipal delegates by level of education. Figure 3.7 shows that, for non-municipal delegates (left panel), there is no significant difference in National Assembly mean vote share between the highly educated and the non-highly educated areas. However, for municipal delegates (right panel, Figure 3.7), the National Assembly mean vote share in non-highly educated areas is much higher. The vote share premium for National Assembly candidates with local roots is especially noteworthy in less-educated areas far from Havana. Figure 3.8 shows the same results but as seen from the perspective of the elected candidate. Municipal delegates do particularly well in low educated areas far from Havana, and much less well in highly educated areas far from Havana. (These findings are confirmed by a more rigorous analysis reported in the appendix.) We reject the clientelism hypothesis as inconsistent with these observations regarding distance.

The evidence displayed in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.9 combines the triple interaction of three variables: education, distance to Havana, and being an elected municipal delegate prior to election to the National Assembly. Figure 3.9 shows the coefficient for the municipal delegate based on the results from Column 1 in Table 3.3. In Figure 3.9, different levels of education matter more for a municipal delegate as distance to Havana increases, and this matters most in areas with lower levels of education. The figure displays the steep positive correlation between distance and vote share in red (and solid), which can be easily compared with the much less steep (although still significant) slope in areas with low education rates.




Figure 3.6: Distance from Havana and voter share




Figure 3.7: Education and vote share in cities that are far from Havana (more than 334 km)



Table 3.3: Investigating the mechanisms: education and distance

	Dependent Variable: Candidate's Vote Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Distance in Km		Distance in Min
Delegado Municipal	-0.0184* (0.010)	-0.0207** (0.010)	-0.0184* (0.010)
% HS Graduates	-0.0119 (0.019)	-0.0535** (0.027)	-0.00590 (0.020)
Distance to Havana	-0.0000219 (0.000)	0.000000745 (0.000)	0.0000377 (0.000)
Distance x % HS Graduates	-0.000305* (0.000)	0.000235 (0.000)	-0.000498* (0.000)
Distance x Delegado Mun.	0.0000918*** (0.000)	0.0000922*** (0.000)	0.000129*** (0.000)
% HS Graduates x Delegado Mun.	0.0896** (0.037)	0.0909** (0.041)	0.0908** (0.038)
Distance x % HS Graduates x Delegado Mun.	-0.000409*** (0.000)	-0.000406*** (0.000)	-0.000574*** (0.000)
Communist Party	0.00474 (0.004)	0.00681 (0.004)	0.00482 (0.004)
Delegado Provincial	0.00567 (0.005)	0.00866* (0.005)	0.00556 (0.005)
Incumbent	-0.00447 (0.003)	-0.00380 (0.003)	-0.00461 (0.003)
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	408	408	408

Standard errors in parentheses, errors clustered at the district level

District Magnitude Fixed Effects

Candidate controls in all columns: color, gender, education, international experience,

FAR, minister, awards

\* p<0.10, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure 3.8: Being a Delegado Municipal and vote share in cities that are far from Havana (more than 334 km)

### *Unpacking the CCP Influence*

The role of the Communist party in Cuban society is very important; 191 of the 612 candidates mention party membership in the biographies. Of these, 89 have been delegates to the party's national congress, 23 serve or have served in the party's political bureau, and 56 serve on the party's Central Committee; the rest held various roles at the provincial or municipal level.

For Table 3.4, we created a variable for high-ranking national level positions (party central committee and political bureau) and another for local-level party posts (party municipal committee or bureau). We control for district fixed effects in all specifications. We aim to unpack the influence of the party, that is, between highly visible and less-visible party leaders, and we also want to ascertain whether this distinction has an impact on the vote share apart from being or having been a municipal elected official. By controlling also for party's roles, we verify that this party-role variable does not cancel the significance of the *delegado municipal* variable.




Figure 3.9: Graph of the Effects. Municipal Delegate and Distance to Havana (Km): Effects for First Quartile (.25) and Third Quartile (.75) Levels of Education

Several of our key findings survive this test (see Table 3.4) across all specifications. Prior election in a multi-candidate contest at the local level remains statistically and substantively significant, contributing to a higher vote share. Earning awards for good work also has a positive impact on vote share, as does having had international experience. Demographic factors are not significant, nor having been elected in noncompetitive provincial assembly elections.

Additional new findings are worth highlighting from Table 3.4. The local or the national party variables are always positive; voters are not rejecting communist party candidates. In such a low-information environment, the party members at the middle ranks are less well known to the voters, which is why the local-level or the national-level candidates earn a higher vote share. Whereas just one party-level variable is statistically significant in the first four columns, the inclusion of both party variables along with other controls weakens the significance of such variables, though they continue to matter. In column 6, with all the variables, local municipal assembly election matters the most, followed by earning awards or serving as a local-level communist party official.

### *Conclusion*

On election day, Cuban voters remember that they live in an authoritarian political regime yet nevertheless they understand that there are choices they can exercise. We have focused on selective voting in a single-party election where the number of candidates equals the number of seats but voters may vote for some but not all candidates on the ballot.

Consider instead the standard skepticism regarding elections in communist political regimes, which the following quotation reveals: “A few questions are still hotly debated among students of the [Cuban] political system, but certainly the nature of [Cuban] elections is not one of them. Everyone agrees that they are more interesting as a psychological curiosity than as a political reality.” This opened a 1968 article on Soviet elections published in *The American Political Science*

Table 3.4: Unpacking the CCP

	Dependent Variable: Candidates' Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Delegado Municipal	0.00841** (0.003)	0.0113*** (0.004)	0.0109*** (0.003)	0.0124*** (0.004)	0.0108*** (0.003)	0.0126*** (0.004)
Delegado Provincial	0.00407 (0.006)	0.00579 (0.006)	0.00464 (0.006)	0.00532 (0.006)	0.00528 (0.006)	0.00637 (0.006)
Local Level Party Official	0.0146** (0.006)	0.0185*** (0.006)			0.0114* (0.006)	0.0159** (0.006)
National Level Party Official			0.0198*** (0.006)	0.0164** (0.007)	0.0177*** (0.007)	0.0129* (0.007)
Incumbent	0.0104*** (0.004)	0.00584 (0.004)	0.00421 (0.004)	0.00206 (0.005)	0.00477 (0.004)	0.00258 (0.005)
Color		-0.0000300 (0.001)		-0.0000576 (0.001)		-0.0000346 (0.001)
Gender		-0.00207 (0.004)		-0.00180 (0.004)		-0.00231 (0.004)
Education		-0.00237 (0.003)		-0.00224 (0.003)		-0.00266 (0.003)
International Experience		0.00881** (0.004)		0.00727* (0.004)		0.00821* (0.004)
FAR		0.0102* (0.006)		0.00604 (0.006)		0.00736 (0.006)
Awards		0.0116** (0.005)		0.0100* (0.005)		0.0114** (0.005)
Observations	610	610	610	610	610	610

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Review* (Gilison 1968, 814). In the brackets above, we simply substituted “Cuban” for “Soviet” because the same dismissive lack of study has applied to Cuba’s national elections. In this article, we demonstrate that Cuban elections already matter more.

We presented two striking puzzles: why would citizens vote selectively in a context where their choice has no impact on the outcome and why would they select some candidates over others? We presented evidence to address the second puzzle and thus focused on it. We show that selective voters reward candidates for either their grassroots links or some merits. They act based on the information available to voters about the candidates; in 2013, the voters were not fearful or coerced nor were they responding to clientelistic relationships. We find that Cuban voters value political experience and accomplishment in their politicians and, in this very low political information context, they use information short-cuts to find candidates to support. In particular:

- Voters are likely to reward those National Assembly candidates who had first proven themselves by winning a prior multi-candidate local election where some candidates win and other candidates lose (hypothesis 4)
- Voters are likely to reward those who get things done, that is, they have earned awards or, less markedly, performed international service (hypothesis 5).
- In areas with fewer well educated voters, or lower likelihood of exposure to national politicians, the grassroots links matter, and these are developed through multi-candidate local elections and constituency responsiveness.

Our negative findings are important as well. Above all, clientelistic favors are not the main incentive when voting. This is related to the finding above. Voters prefer *delegados municipales* especially in areas far from Havana, that is, far from where clientelistic resources would be. In addition, demographic variables are never statistically significant in the analysis of vote shares

for individual candidates. Serving as government minister is also statistically insignificant, as is serving as a military officer in most specifications. Voters ignore prior entirely-noncompetitive election to provincial assemblies in their assessments of candidates. There is no incumbent advantage in most specifications in standing for re-election, and mere affiliation with the communist party has no statistically significant impact on vote shares the first two hypotheses are rejected.

These findings, in turn, shed some light on the first puzzle, namely, why would voters even bother to vote selectively in this context. We suspect that a large minority of voters seek to send a signal to the Communist Party leadership. This selective vote is more common in more educated areas and closer to the Capital City where voters are informing the political elites without punishing or rejecting the communist party. Furthermore, as our forthcoming work will show, selective voting prevails in provinces other than from those where blank voting is most frequent; blank voting, not selective voting, is a much clearer sign of political protest and actual rejection of the ruling party (Superti, 2015). In turn, this permits two speculations, and a call for further research, regarding Communist Party and government motivations to forego the mobilization strategy of past National Assembly elections in order to permit a wider use of the selective vote. First, the selective vote implies greater acquiescence to the political regime than the protest-marked blank vote. And, second, the selective vote yields useful information for national leaders to ascertain the relative popularity of cadres, especially that of the municipal delegates running for National Assembly Deputy (for a similar motivation in China, permitting some but not all forms of expression on the Internet, see King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).

From the perspective of the continuation of an authoritarian regime, some news is good. Voters do not rush to support newcomers whom they do not know. Voters do not repudiate Communist national leaders. Voters are likely to support local communist party officials or national communist party officials at the expense of the more opaque middle party ranks. This is why we had to unpack the implications of our third hypothesis. Voters accept the validity

of officially-bestowed awards and officially-sponsored international service, which have been important policies across the decades. And the 1992 electoral reform was productive to support the political regime because voters value the capacity to send their favored local officials as Deputies to the National Assembly.

For the proponents of change, some news is also good. Voters reward those who submit their candidacy to voters where there is such competition, namely, at the local level. The reward for the award-winners also implies support for merit, not just for power-holding. The lack of substantial support for Government Ministers also augurs better for change. Further exposure to information (more education, proximity to Havana) throws an election more open. The local-competition and the awards variables do better than, or as well as, any of the party leadership variables when all factors are considered.

Yet, there are unanswered questions. Does the 1992 electoral reform strengthen the political regime because it worked as intended, or is it a political change that rulers will be unable to control if nonconformist voting continues to grow? Is the lack of support for electoral newcomers, evident in a low-information authoritarian regime, likely to be reversed and newcomers thus be welcomed if there is a further political opening? Should the veterans on the Political Bureau give way to politicians with local electoral experience? Will the reward for achievement extend to those who succeed in Cuba's emerging private sector?

To paraphrase the opening line of *The Communist Manifesto*, there is a specter haunting Cuba. It is the specter of political change. Neither regime supporters nor regime detractors have a good handle on the trajectory of change.



#### 4. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2003 ELECTORAL REFORM IN COLOMBIA

##### *Introduction*

The end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> witnessed what Mainwaring (2006) calls a “crisis of representation” in Colombia, as well as in the Andean region in general. Citizens’ disaffection with democracy came in part from their belief that they were not being adequately represented by those in power. This crisis was evident in public opinion polls that showed citizens’ lack of trust and confidence in political parties, congress and politicians in general; as well as in the rapid emergence of new parties and the increase in vote share for these parties and for political outsiders (Mainwaring et al (2006)). The crisis was evident too to politicians, for example, in a national address former president Pastrana said: “Our political system... is marked by a crisis of representation wherein citizens do not recognize their elected officials as the spokesmen of collective interests. Instead, these officials are generally identified as the purveyors of local favors and nothing else.” (Shugart et al (2006)) It was perceived that clientelism and the deterioration of the political parties were at the root of Colombia’s crisis.

One of the reasons for the prevalence of clientelism in Colombia that some of the literature has focused on is the electoral system that was in place since 1929.<sup>1</sup> The argument goes that in Colombia politicians provide particularistic or pork-barrel rewards that voters can link directly

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<sup>1</sup> Law 31 of 1929 established the basic features of the system that was in place until 2003, with some modifications introduced mostly during the National Front and then with the 1991 Constitution (Taylor 2009).

to them because the electoral system incentivizes this by promoting intra-party competition (see Crisp et al 2004, Carey and Shugart 1995, Cox and Shugart 1995). In a context with intra-party competition, then, during congressional elections campaigning on the basis of the party's reputation would not be a good strategy for the candidates, since they were competing against not just members of other parties but also members of their own parties. The main way to win votes and distinguish themselves from the other candidates, including their fellow party members, would be to offer clientelistic favors to the voters.

The main features of the electoral system that were said to promote intra-party competition were: 1) each party could have multiple lists running in a district; 2) the votes obtained by lists affiliated with the same party were not pooled to determine the total number of seats obtained by the party in that district, each list competed separately; 3) there was no minimum threshold for parties to be able to get seats; 4) the formula used to determine the number of seats for each list was the quota and largest remainders (also known as the Hare quota or formula). In this setup, candidates from the same party did not have incentives to cooperate with one another or promote the party's reputation instead of just their own. Also, the formula used rewards smaller parties (in this case lists, Shugart et al (2006)), so this combined with the lack of a threshold made it beneficial for parties to run as many lists as they could in each district. In the literature that studies electoral systems and the incentives created by them, for example Carey and Shugart (1995), Colombia's electoral system pre-2003 ranks as the most personalistic possible within the group of systems with proportional representation.

Through most of the 20th century Colombia had a two-party system. These two parties, however, were each the aggregation of multiple factions (Pizarro Leongómez 2006) and during congressional elections the factions would have their own lists, but still as part of the parties. During the 1990s the two traditional parties became even more fragmented and at the same time the number of parties increased. As a result, the number of lists registered in each district

increased significantly. In many cases parties had more lists than there were seats available in the district.

It was in the context of the “crisis of representation” and the changes in the party system that in July of 2003 Congress approved Legislative Act 1, a constitutional reform that changed many of the main features of the country’s electoral system. Colombian politicians had promoted the idea that an electoral reform would contribute to improve their image, as Fabio Valencia Cossio, president of the Senate during Pastrana’s government said “*O cambiamos o nos cambian*” (“Either we change or they change us” Shugart et al (2006)). There had been multiple attempts at reforming the electoral system during the late 1990s and early 2000s. It wasn’t until Congress faced the threat of a broader political reform initiated by the president and that depended on a referendum that Congress finally approved the electoral reform.

Thanks to the reform now parties are only allowed one list of candidates in each district for multi-member elections and they can choose whether the list is open, so that voters can choose a specific candidate from that party, or closed, so that the order of the candidates is determined beforehand. Each list can have as many candidates as there are seats in the district.<sup>2</sup> There is now a low threshold for Senate and House elections and the Hare formula was replaced with the d’Hondt formula (Acto Legislativo 1, 2003). This new formula is supposed to marginally favor larger parties over small parties.

In Carey and Shugart’s ranking of electoral systems according to the incentives they create for a personal vote, this new system ranks as less personalistic than the previous one. Now members of the same party that run for elections in the same department depend on each other to get elected, since seats are allocated to party lists, not individual candidate lists. This reform is seen as a ‘step in the right direction’. Shugart et al (2006) evaluate the process for its approval and the main components of the new system. They say “the new system is thus a radical departure

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<sup>2</sup> For the 2014 congressional elections parties running lists in districts with only two seats were allowed to run up to three candidates.

from the old one” (p. 204) and conclude this overhaul of the system should contribute to make parties stronger and politicians less personalistic.

What these authors failed to account for was the effect of the reform on the number of candidates running and the effect of having a much larger field of candidates on politicians’ incentives. Parties are now limited in the number of lists they can run, only one per district, but on a list they can have as many candidates as there are seats to allocate. Since votes for a list are pooled, the problem of spreading themselves too thin (having too many lists in the same district) is not there anymore, so parties will try to have as many candidates as possible. Given that all parties have the same incentive, after the reform the number of candidates running in each department has increased by around 80 percent in the departments with more than three seats and by around 60 percent in the departments with three or fewer seats. Such an increase in the number of candidates has meant that in the cases of open lists (most lists have been open lists) candidates can get elected with fewer personal votes (and a smaller vote share) than before.

So, even though the reform went in the direction suggested by the literature the unintended effect of it has been that the number of candidates increased significantly and each of them needs fewer votes than before to get elected. Since with open lists there is still intra-party competition, I will argue that the reform failed to change the incentive structure faced by candidates and we should not expect to see a decrease in the use of clientelism and an increase in party strength. In what follows, I will describe the previous electoral system as well as the reform and how the system works now. I will then discuss how the literature on electoral systems characterized the previous electoral system and its predictions for the effects of the new system on Colombian politics. After that, I will present some descriptive statistics and further show how with the new electoral system politicians are not being led to behave in a less personalistic manner.

This paper does not explore whether even if we see candidates requiring fewer votes to get elected some other aspect of the reform has led them to campaign in a less clientelistic manner

and instead focus on championing policies that benefit the population of their department, or the country, in general. The fact that candidates do not require more votes of their own than before and that most lists are open is a strong indication of what the reform did not do for the electoral system, at least in the short term. This is, however, a question that should be explored further.

I will present, however, some evidence in support of the argument that the reform did not change how politicians behave. Before the reform politicians' votes were fairly concentrated to a few municipalities within their departments. This is consistent with the idea that their way of doing politics was fairly personalistic and based on personal contact with the voters. If the new electoral system had decreased the incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote we would find politicians campaigning on their party's reputation and platform, so these would be more department wide policies, which we could expect would attract voters across the departments. If these were the case, then, after the reform we would see that politicians' votes would be less concentrated in a few municipalities within their departments. Following Myerson (1993 and 1999) and Hirano (2006), I will explain how by increasing the number of candidates and thereby decreasing the minimum share of votes a candidate needs to secure a seat, candidates should then target narrow constituencies, which can be defined geographically (there are other possible ways of defining them). Following also other studies on the Colombian Congress (Crisp and Ingall, 2002) I will present some empirical evidence that shows that politicians have not changed their behavior, and in the cases they have, they have targeted narrower constituencies. The final section of the paper will conclude and discuss some of the future steps of the research agenda.

### *Electoral System and the 2003 Reform*

In Colombia, representatives (161) are elected from 33 districts (*departamentos*), which range in magnitude from two to 18 (average district magnitude is 4.88). In the case of the Senate there is a nation-wide district that elects 100 senators, and two more are elected separately to represent

the indigenous groups. Up until 2003, seats in both the Senate and the House were assigned using the Hare proportional representation formula. There were as many lists linked to a party as there were politicians wanting to run under that party's label and the parties exerted very little control over their own labels. The lists were closed and votes for different lists of the same party were not pooled to decide how many seats a party should get. Also, there was no minimum threshold for a party or list to be eligible to win a seat. With this system candidates from the same party were pure competitors, they did not benefit from the votes obtained by members of the same party.

With the Hare formula, also known as "Hare Quota and Largest Remainders" seats were assigned to lists in the following way. The quota is the quotient of the division of the total number of votes in a district over the number of seats to be assigned. In this system seats are allocated first to lists according to integer multiples of the quota. The remaining seats (if there are any) are allocated in order of the largest remainders, which are the result of subtracting from each list's votes the quota times the number of seats already obtained by the list (Alesina 2005, 9). If the list did not obtain a seat in the quota stage then its total votes will be the remainder.

In the case of Colombia, during the 1990s and early 2000s in each district there were so many lists that very few lists reached the quota and most lists that got seats did it by largest remainders. In 2002 no list for the House of Representatives elected more than one candidate and in 1998 just two lists elected more than one representative. In practice, lists were ranked and the top  $M$  (number of seats in the *departamento*) got a seat. This is how Japan's old Single-Non-Transferable Vote worked. Japan's system had multi-member districts elected by plurality. Table 4.1 in the Appendix shows the number of lists registered for the 33 districts in the two elections before the reform and the two elections that have taken place after it. In 2002, on average, there were 27 lists per district.

In 2003 an electoral reform was implemented, its proponents claimed they wanted to promote

Table 4.1: Number of Lists, Parties and Candidates by Period

Number of	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
Candidates			1856	1131	1460
Lists	668	907	397	210	
Parties with lists	66	73	37	14	17
Winning parties	20	38	17	11	

more disciplined parties and contribute to fixing the fragmentation of the party system. The main changes to the system were: in each district each party could only have one list, with as many candidates as seats available; each party could decide, for each district, whether to have an open or a closed list; a threshold was set to limit the entrance of very small parties (2% of the votes in the Senate and 50% of the quota in the House<sup>3</sup>); and the d'Hondt electoral formula was adopted. Voters now can vote for a list, if the list is closed, and if it is open they can choose a candidate on the list or vote for the party. Votes for candidates in a list determine the final order of the candidates on it and the total sum of votes for the list and its members determines the number of seats that the party gets.

The d'Hondt formula allocates seats to parties in the following way. In each district there are  $P$  parties and  $M$  seats to allocate. The votes for each party are divided by one, two, etc., up to  $M$ . These results are ranked from the highest to the lowest. The  $M_{th}$  result is known as the distribution figure (*cifra repartidora*) and is used to assign the seats. Each party will get a number of seats equal to the number of times the distribution figure fits into its total votes. Table 4.2 shows an example with four parties and five seats. The numbers in bold are the top five results and the number with an asterisk (66,667) is the distribution figure, the last column lists the number of seats each party gets.

Now each politician is elected not only thanks to his or her own votes but also thanks to the

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<sup>3</sup> The threshold in the House of Representatives is 50% in the districts with more than two representatives and it is 30% in the districts with two representatives

party's and other party members votes, so at first glance the data shows that elected representatives need less of their own votes than before to get a seat in Congress.

*Table 4.2: Example of seat allocation with the d'Hondt formula*

	Votes	Votes/1	Votes/2	Votes/3	Votes/4	Votes/5	Seats
Party 1	200,000	<b>200,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>66,667*</b>	50,000	40,000	3
Party 2	120,000	<b>120,000</b>	60,000	40,000	30,000	24,000	1
Party 3	75,000	<b>75,000</b>	37,500	25,000	18,750	15,000	1
Party 4	40,000	40,000	20,000	13,333	10,000	8,000	0

### *Institutional Literature on the Colombian Electoral System*

There is a consensus in the literature that an electoral system such as the one Colombia had before 2003 promotes personalistic politics. Its characteristics made it one of the most personalistic possible and scholars studied its effects on the strength of political parties and the use of clientelism. I will present some of the main analyses and studies of the old system, and the reasons why it was said to promote personalism. I will then discuss the literature that focused on proposing reforms of the system or studied the actual 2003 reform and its implications.

Carey and Shugart (1995) rank electoral systems around the world based on the incentives each creates for politicians to cultivate a personal vote. The ranking is based on four variables of the electoral formula that influence the level of intra-party competition, these are: control over the ballot or the party label, whether there is vote pooling, the types of votes and, district magnitude. If the system has more incentives for politicians to promote the personal vote over the party vote, then clientelism is more likely. This mainly happens when there is intra-party competition during the elections. If there is intra-party competition it will be harder for politicians to just campaign based on the party's reputation and platform; it encourages "legislators to enhance their reelection prospects by providing particularistic or pork-barrel rewards for which they could personally or solely claim credit" (Crisp et al 2004, 826, see also Cox and McCubbins, 2001).



The variable control over the party label refers to the degree of control parties have over their own labels and endorsements and on the ranking of candidates on the ballot. If parties have little control over their label, then, personal reputation is more valuable for politicians. The second variable, vote pooling, focuses on whether a vote cast for an individual candidate contributes to the party's total votes and seat allocation or if it only contributes to the candidate's vote total. If votes for candidates from the same party are not pooled, then, personal reputation is very valuable. The next variable is the type of vote voters cast, that is, whether they cast a single vote for one party, votes for multiple candidates, or a single vote below the party label. A vote below the party level will mean that personal reputation is more valuable than party reputation, because members of the same party will be competing directly for votes. The combination of the previous three variables determines whether the electoral formula is personalistic or not, and the effect of district magnitude on personalism will depend on this; in systems with high levels of personalism, higher district magnitude will increase it, and in systems with low personalism, this will decrease as district magnitude increases.

From the description above it is possible to see why Colombia's pre-2003 electoral system was classified as one of the most personalistic possible. The main reason why this was the case was that members of the same party would compete against each other in the same way they competed against politicians from other parties, so they needed to distinguish themselves not just from the other parties but also from their fellow party members. Voters did not vote for a party but for a list among many of the party's lists, and these were essentially personal lists, only the top candidate on each list mattered and was visible to the voters. Parties had very little control over their labels and endorsed many candidates. Added to that, seats were allocated to the individual lists, not to the parties based on the votes of the sum of their lists. In this way each list depended only on its own effort to win enough votes to get a seat, and candidates had no incentive to cooperate with members of their same party that were on a different list.

From the point of view of the parties, this absence of vote pooling meant that each party could not reallocate votes from one list to another to increase the number of seats it obtained. As Cox and Shugart (1995) explain, “parties face a strategic problem of how to nominate candidates and allocate votes to those candidates.” Without vote pooling parties risk wasting votes. This happens, for example, when a candidate has received enough votes to obtain a seat but cannot share the remaining votes with a candidate from the same party that does not have enough votes to win a seat. Also, when there are multiple candidates or lists from the same party and none have enough votes to win a seat independently and cannot pool their votes to help one of them get elected for the party.

The formula used to allocate seats, the Hare quota (or *simple quota and largest remainders*) favors smaller parties over bigger ones in the allocation of seats (Shugart et al 2007). This made it beneficial for big parties to split into multiple lists, since, with the same total votes, they could get more seats by separating than by having a single party list.

This phenomenon of parties splitting into multiple lists to win more seats has been named *operación avispa*, or “wasp” strategy. This is also known as the war for the residuals, where parties by splitting into multiple lists would win seats not by quota but by residual and this means each seat would “cost” fewer votes than it would have if obtained by quota (see for example Pizarro, 2002, Shugart et al 2007, Bejarano and Pizarro, 2001)). Colombia’s Conservative and Liberal parties employed this strategy, each list would represent an electoral “micro-enterprise” that would work to elect the top of the list. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party, had many lists per department and in some cases had more lists than there were seats to be allocated in the district (see Table 4.3 with the number of lists by department that each of the traditional parties endorsed for the elections to the House of Representatives, together with the district magnitude for each department).

Scholars of Colombian political parties and electoral systems in general have focused on the

Table 4.3: Lists by Party, by Department - Before the 2003 Reform

Department	Seats (M)	Liberal Party		Conservative Party	
		1998	2002	1998	2002
Antioquia	17	25	16	5	2
Atlántico	7	6	19	1	1
Bogotá	18	78	143	7	12
Bolívar	6	6	6	1	2
Boyacá	6	8	5	5	6
Caldas	5	3	3	3	2
Caquetá	2	3	4	1	
Cauca	4	7	6	2	1
Cesar	4	8	6	1	2
Córdoba	5	6	2	3	1
Cundinamarca	7	19	17	2	2
Chocó	2	5	3	1	1
Huila	4	3	8	3	3
La Guajira	2	4	1	1	
Magdalena	5	6	4	1	
Meta	3	4	7	2	2
Nariño	5	3	5	2	2
Norte de Santander	5	4	3	2	2
Quindío	3	3	4		
Risaralda	4	7	6	1	2
Santander	7	9	7	1	2
Sucre	3	3	6		1
Tolima	6	9	9	2	3
Valle del Cauca	13	15	17	7	5
Arauca	2	4	4		1
Casanare	2	5	1		
Putumayo	2	3	3	1	1
San Andrés	2	3	3		
Amazonas	2	7	3	1	
Guainía	2	4	3	1	
Guaviare	2	3	2	1	1
Vaupés	2		4		
Vichada	2	4	4		
Total	161	277	334	58	57

effect of the institutional design of the electoral system on how parties work and have evolved through time. Pizarro (2002) argues, for example, that in the context of weakening parties the pre-2003 electoral system contributed to that “personalist atomization” of politics of the 1990s. There is a strong interest in the literature in understanding how electoral institutions can influence the behavior of politicians and the political party system and also lead to the preference of clientelism over the provision of public goods. Shugart et al (2007) state that “the much-decried clientelism and factionalism of Colombian political parties... is intimately tied to the incentives of SNTV... the clientelism of Colombian politics and the apparent chaos of the process, much noted in the literature, are in fact signs of strategic coordination within a personalistic electoral system.” (pp. 219)

Even though some of the literature shows how the traditional political parties were a collection of factions or were fragmented since their foundation (see Gutiérrez 2002, Taylor 2009, among others), the fragmentation of the 1990s and early 2000s was seen as directly influenced by the electoral system. In turn, an electoral reform was perceived as a way to contribute to strengthen parties and make the use of clientelism less attractive. The consensus is that the Hare quota, which makes it profitable for big parties to use the ‘operación avispa’, and the permission for parties to use multiple lists per district, were the main problems and the first issues to be addressed (Roland and Zapata, 2005).

Shugart et al (2007) studied both the previous electoral system and the one approved in 2003. The system precisely changes the electoral formula, from Hare quota and largest remainders to d’Hondt, and forces parties to run single lists in each district. They highlight that “a benefit of d’Hondt is that no party can ever obtain more seats by splitting into multiple lists than it could by running a single list” (p. 6). To show this, they re-calculate the outcome of the 1990 elections in the department of Huila (where  $M = 5$ ). With the previous system, the Liberals obtained three seats and the Conservatives two, but they only achieved this by dividing their candidates

in multiple lists. If they had had single lists, the electoral formula would have favored smaller parties and the Liberals would have received only two seats and a smaller new party would have won one. With d'Hondt, the result would be the same as with the Hare quota, but it would be achieved with unified lists, not divided lists. This counterfactual did not take into account the possibility that parties would have more candidates in their party lists than they did when they had multiple lists.

Even though the new electoral system allows the option of having open lists, where members of the same party will compete for the top spots on the list, the reform was presented as a definite improvement from the previous system. According to Shugart et al (2007), "the new electoral system,... appears to be bringing about a rationalization of the party system, evident in 2006 in the dramatic and immediate reduction of the number of different party labels contesting elections" (p. 257). On the intra-party dimension, the authors highlight that "the pooling of votes on party lists means that,..., a vote for any candidate within a party-or solely for the party-now contributes to the party's overall seat total" (p. 257), and argue this should help parties to coordinate their political activity and represent collective interests better than before.

Pachón and Shugart (2010) study the reform and the outcome of the first congressional elections after it was implemented. They focus on the effect of the adoption of party lists on intra-party and inter-party competition. They find a differential effect of the adoption on party lists on competition depending on the district magnitude. On one hand, in departments with low district magnitude, intra-party competition decreases, while inter-party competition increases. On the other hand, in departments with high district magnitude intra-party competition increases and inter-party competition decreases.

In low magnitude departments, now that parties that have to run unified lists, different factions within a party find it better to separate from the party and create a new one, and in this way avoid having their personal votes help rival candidates from the same party. This leads to

bigger parties breaking up, which increases the total number of parties (and inter-party competition) and at the same time decreases intra-party competition, since each party will be smaller than before. In this case competition between candidates takes place at the inter-party level, however, the opposite happens in high magnitude districts. In these departments the incentive is for smaller parties to aggregate and create larger party lists, since the electoral system now awards seats based on the performance of the entire party. Since parties are now bigger in these departments, there is more competition within the parties, especially in those that choose to have open lists (most do). These effects are seen in both the 2006 and 2010 elections (the next section shows evidence of this).

Even though parties are allowed to choose open lists, which promotes intra-party competition and the personal vote, Pachón and Shugart argue that the fundamental distinction is between personalized and listized systems. This change in the system fundamentally changes the electoral strategy or calculus that both candidates and parties will make. They conclude that “when collective vote totals matter, the incentive to cultivate a party vote dominates over the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. (p. 648) This dominance of party based incentives will matter even when parties choose to have open lists.

#### *Increase in Number of Candidates: The Unintended Effect of the Reform*

The studies cited above present the 2003 electoral reform as an improvement over the previous system in terms of promoting party discipline and discouraging clientelism. The effect of forcing parties to coalesce into single lists per department is seen as crucial in this task. What is missing from the analysis, however, is an evaluation of what happens with the total number of candidates running in each department and how that can affect politicians’ electoral strategies. Pachón and Shugart show how in high magnitude districts intra-party competition is now greater, so parties are bigger and have bigger lists than before. But, what should also be considered is that each

party, in both low and high magnitude districts, will try to have the largest list possible and include as many candidates as possible (the limit is the number of seats in the department).

Before the reform the lack of vote pooling meant that parties could risk endorsing too many candidates and diluting the party vote into too many lists, which could mean winning fewer seats than what was proportional to the party's aggregate votes. With unified party lists, however, this risk is not there anymore. Every candidate in an open list can contribute votes to the party total, which is what determines the allocation of seats, so for the party there is no downside to including in the list as many candidates as permitted. Parties also do not have to worry about funding campaigns for more candidates if they run larger lists, in Colombia congressional candidates bear most of the burden of financing their own campaigns. Since every party faces the same incentive, this has led to an increase in the total number of candidates running in all districts.

Why should an increase in the total number of candidates be relevant for the incentives faced by politicians? A significant increase in the field of candidates will mean that, assuming turnout does not change much and considering that most parties choose open lists, the total number of individual votes a candidate will need to get elected will be lower than before. In the case of Shugart et al's 1990 Huila counterfactual, for example, each of the parties running in the department could have included up to five candidates on their lists, instead of the two or three each had. Assuming voter turnout was not affected, the number of votes obtained by each candidate would have been much smaller, the approximately 180,000 votes cast would have been divided between a larger number of options.

If candidates need fewer votes than before then there is no incentive for politicians to be less clientelistic, especially in a context where clientelism is the usual strategy for winning votes. In fact, a lower 'personal' vote share threshold to get elected could actually incentivize politicians to target even narrower constituencies and win votes through clientelism.

Following Myerson (1993) and Myerson (1999), Hirano (2006) studies the effect of the change in electoral institutions in Japan over the type of constituencies that politicians target. Japan's electoral system was Single Non-Transferable Vote, which, as I mentioned before is the plurality version of how Colombia's electoral system worked in practice before 2003. In 1994 Japan implemented a mixed-member majoritarian system, with a single member district component and a proportional representation component. The reform was very different to Colombia's, but the model employed to analyze it is very pertinent to this case.

The model is based on the level of the vote share threshold that a candidate needs to secure a seat in the elections. This threshold depends on the number of seats and/or candidates in the district. I argue that the 2003 reform effectively lowered this threshold by incentivizing an increase in the number of candidates that run in each district and a lower threshold means that candidates are now more likely to target narrow constituencies over offering general public goods to their districts.

The main elements of Myerson's model are as follows. Assuming there are  $N$  seats in the district and  $K$  candidates, and voters prefer candidates who can give them the largest allocation of goods. Candidates can either offer a share of the budget (the more targeted good) or provide a public good that benefits the district as a whole. The budget is big enough that each voter can be promised \$1, while the public good gives each voter  $B > 1$ .  $Q^* = 1/K$  is the maximum vote share that does not guarantee a seat in congress. This  $Q^*$  will be the threshold<sup>4</sup>.

Myerson shows that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all candidates provide the public good when  $B > 1/Q^* = K$ . In this case, no candidate can offer to enough voters an allocation of the budget that is larger than  $B$ , which is what they would receive from competing candidates. When, however,  $B < 1/Q^* = K$  and all the other candidates offer the public good, a

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<sup>4</sup> Hirano defines  $Q^* = 1/N$ , while Myerson uses  $Q^* = 1/K$ . When competition is low and the number of candidates is uncertain,  $Q^* = 1/K$  might be preferable. The description of Myerson's results presented here follows Hirano's very closely.



candidate can offer  $B + \varepsilon$  to a fraction  $1/(B + \varepsilon)$  of the voters, where  $B + \varepsilon < 1/Q^*$ . In this case, the fraction of voters receiving the benefit is greater than the threshold, that is  $1/(B + \varepsilon) > Q^*$ , so that the candidate is offering a benefit greater than the public good to a large enough number of candidates to secure a seat. Since the candidate using the strategy cannot be defeated by those offering the public good, it is better for all candidates to use the same strategy.

Myerson's model shows that as the number of candidates increases and the threshold to get a seat is lowered (assuming open party lists), politicians will target a smaller constituency within their district, instead of offering general public goods. This result is, in a way, similar to Lizzeri and Persico (2004), where the extension of the franchise leads to a move from campaigns based on patronage and clientelism to the provision of public goods. In that example the extension of the franchise, which increases the threshold above which a candidate can secure a seat in absolute terms by enlarging the number of citizens that vote, makes campaigning on the base of clientelism and vote buying not efficient anymore.

In the case of Colombia, the increase in the number of candidates is responsible for lowering the threshold. Now seats are allocated to parties based on the aggregate amount of votes they get, but within the parties the allocation of seats will depend on the candidates' individual votes. A factor I have not considered here is whether having more competitors will affect the way candidates campaign and type of promises or offers they make. Could facing more competitors make politicians change the way they campaign towards the provision of more public goods? Considering that the initial context before the reform was that of campaigns based on clientelism and now politicians need fewer votes than before, the fact that these might be more demanded (by a larger number of candidates) will probably just make politicians offer more clientelistic goods to each voter. This is, however, an open question that should be addressed further.

In sum, I have argued that the electoral reform, by promoting an increase in the total number of candidates that run in a district, decreases the vote share required by candidates to get a seat

and this in turn leads to an increase in the use of clientelism or targeted promises in electoral campaigns. In the subsection that follows I will use the results of the last four elections for which data is available, two before 2003 (1998 and 2002) and two after (2006 and 2010) to show the effects of the reform on the number of parties, candidates and on the minimum vote share required to win a seat<sup>5</sup>.

The main way to test whether the decrease in the threshold has affected the type of goods or promises made by politicians would be to study the actual provision of public goods and the use of clientelism, however, that will be part of a future study. In the meantime, I will show that we observe that candidates' votes after the reform are not less concentrated than before. This follows the results from Myerson's model and Hirano's study of Japan, if candidates are better off targeting narrow constituencies instead of providing general public goods, the distribution of their votes will reflect that too. Myerson's model does not define how constituencies are targeted within a district. One possible way of defining constituencies is geography, candidates' electoral support can be geographically concentrated. Hirano studies geographic concentration of candidates' votes in their hometowns. I will test how geographically concentrated are candidates' votes within the departments in Colombia.

#### *Number of Parties, Candidates and Vote Share*

As Pachón and Shugart (2010) show for the 2006 elections, after the 2003 electoral reform there is an increase in the number of political parties running for Congress in districts with low magnitude (lower than 5), and a decrease in districts with high magnitude. This holds for the 2010 elections too. Figure 4.1 shows the difference in the number of parties after the reform, by district magnitude. This figure shows how the number of parties is increasing in district magnitude but the reform led to an increase in the number of parties in low magnitude districts

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<sup>5</sup> There were elections in 2014 but the data available is only preliminary

(below five), and a decrease in high magnitude districts (above five). The difference is statistically significant in districts with magnitude below four and above five.

Figure 4.2 shows how the total number of candidates running in a district increased after the reform across the board. The increase is statistically significant for districts with magnitude four and above. Before the reform the Liberal Party especially was known for running a very large number of lists (candidates). After the reform the Liberal Party can only run a number of candidates equal or below the district magnitude in each department, so for this party the reform meant that in some departments it had to run fewer candidates than before. The general results is, however, that parties run more candidates than before. Figure 4.3 presents the data, the increase is significant for departments with magnitude greater than three. In the departments with low magnitude each party can only have two or three candidates, so the number of candidates they run does not increase, but the number of parties does increase (Table 4.4 shows more detailed descriptive statistics).

The data shows how after the reform the number of candidates running in each district went up significantly. I will show how that has affected the minimum vote share candidates need to secure a seat. Figure 4.4 graphs the vote share received by the candidate elected with the smallest vote share, before and after the reform (see also Table B.1 in the appendix). There we can see how after the reform the minimum amount of votes required to win a seat in each district decreased after the reform, this difference is statistically significant in districts with magnitude equal or below seven. In districts with magnitude greater than seven there are too few data points to make a precise comparison. When we look at the vote share received by the candidate in each party in each department that was elected with the smallest vote share, this decrease in the threshold is also evident (see Figure 4.5 and also Table B.2 in the appendix). Figure 4.6 shows the vote share of all the candidates that won seats in each department. The decrease in the vote share required to secure a seat is also evident here, especially in low ( $\leq 7$ ) magnitude districts.




Figure 4.1: Number of Parties, Before and After the Reform




Figure 4.2: Number of Candidates, Before and After the Reform




Figure 4.3: Number of Candidates by Party, Before and After the Reform

Table 4.4: Number of Parties, Candidates and Candidates By Party

Pre-Reform (1998-2002)						Post-Reform (2006-2010)				
Number of Parties										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	4.54	1.89	9	2	24	8.54	1.84	12	4	24
3	9.17	2.23	11	5	6	11.5	2.74	16	8	6
4	10.25	3.99	17	6	8	10.38	2.07	14	8	8
5	10.5	4.33	17	3	10	10.9	2.64	17	8	10
6	13.83	4.36	21	8	6	11.67	2.07	14	9	6
7	21.67	4.76	28	15	6	13.17	3.37	19	10	6
13	30.5	6.36	35	26	2	13	2.83	15	11	2
17	29	4.24	32	26	2	12.5	2.12	14	11	2
18	59	4.24	62	56	2	20	9.9	27	13	2
Total	12.14	11.34	62	2	66	10.7	3.39	27	4	66

Number of Candidates										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	6.96	1.75	12	4	24	9.7	4.63	17	2	24
3	13	3.52	18	7	6	26	10.46	43	13	6
4	16.63	4.74	26	12	8	28.25	8.77	42	16	8
5	14.7	4.19	21	8	10	39.7	10.54	56	20	10
6	22.67	4.84	31	17	6	48.33	13.42	62	29	6
7	35.67	10.94	49	23	6	69.5	18.45	92	51	6
13	56.5	7.77	62	51	2	131.5	50.2	167	96	2
17	64	4.24	67	61	2	146.5	20.5	161	132	2
18	229	80.61	286	172	2	227	52.32	264	190	2
Total	23.84848	40.56	286	4	66	41.34	48.04	264	2	66

Number of Candidates by Party										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	1.53	1.16	7	1	109	1.13	1.21	3	0	205
3	1.41	1.21	7	1	55	2.26	1.1	3	0	69
4	1.62	1.68	8	1	82	2.72	1.61	4	0	83
5	1.4	0.98	6	1	105	3.64	1.92	5	0	109
6	1.63	1.77	9	1	83	4.14	2.5	6	0	70
7	1.64	2.77	19	1	130	5.27	2.49	7	0	79
13	1.85	2.82	17	1	61	10.11	4.34	13	0	26
17	2.2	3.77	25	1	58	11.72	5.49	17	0	25
18	3.88	14.91	143	1	118	11.35	7.38	18	0	40
Total	1.96	6.09	143	1	801	3.86	4.12	18	0	706




Figure 4.4: Vote Share of Candidates Elected with Smallest Vote Share

The figures shown here show the effects of the reform on the number of parties, number of candidates within each party and number of candidates within a district, and the effect of this on the minimum vote share (threshold) required for a candidate to secure a seat. This threshold is smaller now, especially in districts with magnitude lower than seven.

#### *Effect on Geographic Vote Concentration*

I am going to present here some preliminary evidence of the effect of a lower threshold on politicians' targeting of constituencies. If candidates need to reach a lower threshold to secure a seat then, the incentive is for them to target narrow constituencies with clientelism or targeted






Figure 4.5: Vote Share of Candidates Elected with Smallest Vote Share from Each Party




Figure 4.6: Vote Share of Candidates that Won Seats in Each Department

policies, instead of providing public goods for the district. One way of defining a constituency is in terms of geography, candidates can choose to limit their campaigning to a subset of the municipalities within the district. This, in turn, will mean that their electoral support will mostly come from those municipalities they targeted. If, instead, politicians were providing public goods, we would expect them to receive electoral support across the district.

Following Crisp and Ingall (2002)<sup>6</sup>, I will measure regional patterns of support using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) and candidates' municipal vote shares. Using the HHI for candidates, before and after the electoral reform, I will evaluate whether we see lower, higher or the same levels of vote concentration after the reform, and whether there is a difference depending on the district magnitude.

Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics for the HHI before and after the reform for the different district magnitudes ( $M = 18$  is excluded since that is Bogotá and the data is at the municipal level and not more disaggregated). For most of the district magnitudes the HHI is bigger after the reform, only in a couple cases is it smaller on average after the reform. To evaluate better the effect of the reform on vote concentration I run the following regression:

$$HHI_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 Post_t \times Seats_d + \gamma' X_{dt} + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (4.1)$$

Where *Post* is a dummy for the elections after 2003, *Seats* represents the district magnitude, and  $X_{dt}$  is a vector of control variables at the department level, I use area of the department and population, since they can affect vote concentration. The variable *Seats* is replaced for dummies for the different district magnitudes in some specifications. The main results are in Table 4.6, and show, essentially, that vote concentration was not affected after the reform. These results, in a way, coincide with what we see in the descriptive statistics, in the departments with mid-level

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<sup>6</sup> They studied the case of Colombia with a similar study that analyzed the patterns of support for Senators after the implementation of the 1991 Constitution that changed the election of senators from department districts to a nationwide district

Table 4.5: Hirschman-Herfindahl Index Before and After the Reform

Pre-Reform (1998-2002)						Post-Reform (2006-2010)				
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	0.53	0.28	1	0.07	167	0.48	0.26	1	0.08	233
3	0.34	0.19	0.79	0.07	78	0.38	0.18	0.86	0.06	156
4	0.26	0.14	0.75	0.04	133	0.32	0.18	0.89	0.06	222
5	0.29	0.18	0.75	0.04	147	0.32	0.18	0.87	0.04	397
6	0.22	0.17	0.75	0.02	136	0.26	0.17	0.93	0.02	290
7	0.27	0.2	0.85	0.02	214	0.25	0.17	0.88	0.01	417
13	0.32	0.14	0.68	0.08	113	0.39	0.19	0.89	0.06	263
17	0.24	0.13	0.62	0.05	128	0.25	0.13	0.76	0.03	293
Total	0.32	0.22	1	0.02	1116	0.32	0.2	1	0.01	2271

district magnitudes, there is a slight increase in vote concentration after the reform (see columns 3 and 9 in the Table). These results might be showing that candidates had already concentrated their votes very highly and the change in the electoral system did not significantly affect this, or, candidates have constituencies that are not defined by geography but by a different characteristic. A topic for future research would be to study this topic further and also study actual use of clientelism by politicians.

Table 4.6: Vote Concentration: Dependent Variable = HHI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post 2003	0.0150 (0.011)		-0.0111 (0.018)	-0.209 (0.123)		-0.292 (0.199)	0.00754 (0.054)		-0.0372 (0.061)
Post × Seats	0.00110 (0.001)	0.000872 (0.001)		-0.00225 (0.002)	-0.00150 (0.002)		0.00105 (0.001)	0.000783 (0.001)	
Year = 2002		0.0191 (0.009)			0.0194 (0.009)			0.0190 (0.009)	
Year = 2006		0.0517 (0.012)			-0.107 (0.122)			0.0377 (0.053)	
Year = 2010		-0.00655 (0.012)			-0.165 (0.122)			-0.0205 (0.054)	
Post × M=3			0.0359 (0.027)			-0.00252 (0.036)			0.0376 (0.028)
Post × M=4			0.0740 (0.024)			0.0260 (0.038)			0.0759 (0.024)
Post × M=5			0.0480 (0.024)			-0.00537 (0.041)			0.0491 (0.024)
Post × M=6			0.0447 (0.024)			-0.0133 (0.043)			0.0453 (0.024)
Post × M=7			-0.00831 (0.022)			-0.0736 (0.047)			-0.00613 (0.022)
Post × M=13			0.0831 (0.025)			0.00103 (0.059)			0.0839 (0.025)
Post × M=17			0.0263 (0.023)			-0.0623 (0.062)			0.0244 (0.023)
Post × <i>Population.it</i>				0.0177 (0.010)	0.0125 (0.009)	0.0240 (0.017)			
Post × <i>Area.dept</i>							0.000785 (0.006)	0.00145 (0.006)	0.00253 (0.006)
Observations	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in all columns

Department fixed effects in all columns

## *Conclusions*

This paper has briefly studied the effect of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia, focusing on the implications of the new rules on the number of candidates that run and how that, in turn can potentially change the incentives that politicians face when running for elections.

This is a very interesting reform and has multiple elements that are worthy of study and should be tackled in future research. One question has to do with the choice of open lists versus closed lists. Parties choose whether to have open or closed lists independently of other parties and can choose differently for each department in which they register a list. How parties make this choice and the characteristics of the politicians that are on these lists, would be an interesting topic of study. This paper focused on the House of Representatives and left the Senate aside. The reform changed elections for the Senate too and it would be useful to study how the different reforms implemented since 1991, with the new constitution, have affected the patterns of representation that we see in this body.

Finally, this essay focused mostly on describing the situation for politicians after the reform was implemented. The question of how the reform changed incentives for candidates should be addressed more formally and also study whether actual public outcomes have also changed due to the reform.

## APPENDIX

## A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1

*Table A.1: Summary Statistics*

Panel A: Baseline Estimates					
	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Relative Hits	-18.711	77.690	-0.015	5.353	3696
Scandal Hits/Total Hits	0.000	96.401	2.741	6.841	3696
Newspaper Frequency	0.143	1.000	0.681	0.410	3696
In-State Scandal	0.000	1.000	0.022	0.146	3696
In-Region Scandal	0.000	1.000	0.117	0.322	3696
Log Newspapers	0.000	2.303	1.266	0.650	3696
Opposition Party	0.000	1.000	0.362	0.481	3696
Own Party	0.000	1.000	0.470	0.499	3696
Overall Bias	-1.000	1.000	-0.108	0.906	3696
Panel B: With Voter Partisanship					
	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Relative Hits	-18.711	77.690	0.108	5.479	3316
Scandal Hits/Total Hits	0.000	96.401	2.925	7.087	3316
Newspaper Frequency	0.143	1.000	0.709	0.403	3316
In-State Scandal	0.000	1.000	0.024	0.153	3316
In-Region Scandal	0.000	1.000	0.127	0.333	3316
Log Newspapers	0.000	2.303	1.329	0.623	3316
Opposition Party	0.000	1.000	0.370	0.483	3316
Own Party	0.000	1.000	0.490	0.500	3316
Overall Bias	-1.000	1.000	-0.120	0.919	3316
Voter Partisanship	0.022	0.980	0.487	0.153	3316



Table A.2: List of Political Scandals

Name	Office	State	Party	Scandal	Time Window	Source*
Rufus Brown Bullock	Governor	GA	R	Bribery	3/1870 to 5/1870	(1)
Roderick R. Butler	Representative	TN	R	Fraud & forgery	7/1870 to 1/1871	(1)
William Woods Holden	Governor	NC	R	Misuse of state militia	9/1870 to 3/1871	(1), (2)
David Christy Butler	Governor	NE	R	Corruption	1/1871 to 6/1871	(1), (2)
Thomas Osborn	Senator	FL	R	Bribery & fraud	4/1871 to 4/1871	(1)
William H. Bumsted	Commiss Board of Works	NJ	R	Conspiracy & fraud	9/1871 to 6/1872	(1)
Abraham Oakey Hall	Mayor	NY	R	Malfeasance	10/1871 to 11/1871	(1), (2)
William Magear Tweed	State Senator	NY	D	Embezzlement	10/1871 to 11/1873	(1), (2)
Alexander Caldwell	Senator	KS	R	Bribery	3/1872 to 3/1873	(1)
James Wood	State Senator	NY	R	Bribery	3/1872 to 9/1872	(1)
John F. Hartranft	State Auditor	PA	R	Corruption	8/1872 to 11/1872	(1)
Henry Wilson	Senator	MA	R	Bribery	9/1872 to 3/1873	(1)
Oakes Ames	Representative	MA	R	Bribery	9/1872 to 2/1873	(1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine	Speaker of the House	ME	R	Bribery	9/1872 to 3/1873	(1)
James Brooks	Representative	NY	D	Bribery	9/1872 to 3/1873	(1), (2)
Henry Clay Warmouth	Governor	LA	R	Bribery	12/1872 to 1/1873	(2)
Lewis V. Bogy	Senator	MO	D	Bribery	1/1873 to 3/1873	(3)
Samuel Clark Pomeroy	Senator	KS	R	Bribery	1/1873 to 3/1875	(1)
William Seeger	State Treasurer	MN	R	Corruption	2/1873 to 5/1873	(2)
Edmund Jackson Davis	Governor	TX	R	Refusal to leave office	1/1874 to 1/1874	(2)
Josiah E. Hayes	State Treasurer	KS	R	High crimes & misdemeanor	1/1874 to 5/1874	(1)
William Adams Richardson	U.S. Treasury Secretary	USA	R	Tax revenue fraud (Sanborn Case)	3/1874 to 5/1874	(2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr	Governor	SC	R	Fraud & malfeasance	5/1874 to 10/1874	(1)
Tunis George Campbell	State Senator	GA	R	False convictions (while Justice of the Peace)	1/1875 to 1/1877	(2)
John Godfrey Schumaker	Representative	NY	D	Bribery	1/1875 to 11/1875	(1)
Richard Chappel Parsons	Representative	OH	R	Bribery	1/1875 to 11/1875	(1)
William Smith King	Representative	MN	R	Bribery	1/1875 to 11/1875	(1)

\*Sources:

(1): ProQuest's archive of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*

(2): Political Graveyard

(3): Senate Historical Office

Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.

Online Appendix Table A.2 – *List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page*

Name	Office	State	Party	Scandal	Time Window	Source*
Alexander K. Davis	Lieutenant Governor	MS	R	Bribery	9/1875 to 3/1876	(1)
Joseph Rodman West	Senator	LA	R	Bribery	1/1876 to 12/1876	(1)
Frederick Adolphus Sawyer	Asst Treasury Secretary	USA	R	Forgery & fraud	1/1876 to 10/1877	(1)
William Pitt Kellogg	Governor	LA	R	Embezzlement	2/1876 to 3/1876	(1)
George Eliphaz Spencer	Senator	AL	R	Bribery	2/1876 to 5/1876	(1)
William Worth Belknap	Secretary of War	USA	R	Bribery	2/1876 to 8/1876	(1), (2)
William Robert Taylor	Governor	WI	D	Corruption	3/1876 to 7/1876	(1)
James Gillespie Blaine	Speaker of the House	ME	R	Bribery & fraud	4/1876 to 6/1876	(1)
Rufus Brown Bullock	Governor	GA	R	Larceny	5/1876 to 1/1878	(1)
Michael Crawford Kerr	Speaker of the House	IN	D	Bribery	5/1876 to 6/1876	(1)
La Fayette Grover	Senator	OR	D	Bribery & fraud	3/1877 to 6/1878	(3)
John James Patterson	Senator	SC	R	Bribery	9/1877 to 1/1878	(1)
Robert Smalls	Representative	SC	R	Bribery	10/1877 to 11/1877	(1)
John O'Connor	State Representative	OH	D	False identity	4/1878 to 5/1878	(1)
John Sherman	Senate, Sec of Treasury	USA	R	Fraud	5/1878 to 6/1878	(1)
Stanley Matthews	Senator	OH	R	Fraud	5/1878 to 10/1878	(1)
La Fayette Grover	Governor	OR	D	Corruption & fraud	11/1878 to 2/1879	(1)
Stephen F Chadwick	Governor	OR	D	Corruption & fraud	11/1878 to 2/1879	(1)
Noble Andrew Hull	House & Lt. Governor	FL	D	Fraud	1/1879 to 1/1881	(1)
John J. Ingalls	Senator	KS	R	Bribery & fraud	2/1879 to 2/1880	(3)
Charles B. Salter	State Representative	PA	R	Bribery	4/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
Emile J. Petroff	State Representative	PA	R	Bribery	4/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
George F. Smith	State Representative	PA	D	Bribery	4/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
William Henry Kemble	State Treasurer	PA	R	Bribery	4/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
William F. Rumberger	State Representative	PA	R	Bribery	4/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
William Pitt Kellogg	Senator	LA	R	Bribery	6/1879 to 5/1880	(1)
Washington L. Goldsmith	State Comptroller	Genl GA	D	Embezzlement	8/1879 to 9/1879	(1)
John W. Renfroe	State Treasurer	GA	D	Embezzlement	9/1879 to 10/1879	(1)
Isaac Smith Kalloch	Mayor	CA	D	Bribery	5/1880 to 6/1880	(1)
Charles Henry Voorhis	Representative	NJ	R	Fraud & embezzlement	10/1880 to 10/1881	(1), (2)

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\*Sources:

(1): ProQuest's archive of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*

(2): Political Graveyard

(3): Senate Historical Office

Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.

Online Appendix Table A.2 – *List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page*

Name	Office	State	Party	Scandal	Time Window	Source*
William Mahone	Senator	VA	R	Corruption & conspiracy	3/1881 to 5/1881	(1)
Stephen Wallace Dorsey	Senator	AR	R	Fraud	4/1881 to 6/1883	(1), (2)
Thomas J. Brady	Asst Postmaster General	USA	R	Bribery	4/1881 to 7/1884	(1)
Henry M. Hoyt	Governor	PA	R	Corruption	5/1881 to 5/1881	(1)
Chauncey Depew	Senate (candidate)	NY	R	Bribery	6/1881 to 7/1881	(1)
Thomas J. Navin	Mayor	MI	R	Forgery	2/1882 to 3/1885	(1), (2)
Franklin J. Moses Jr	Governor	SC	R	Fraud	3/1882 to 6/1882	(1)
Daniel Wolsey Voorhees	Senator	IN	D	Corruption	5/1882 to 6/1882	(1)
Charles H. Houghton	U.S. Collector of Customs	USA	R	Fraud & embezzlement	5/1882 to 11/1882	(1), (2)
William Pitt Kellogg	Senator	LA	R	Bribery	7/1882 to 7/1884	(1)
Roscoe Conkling	Senator	NY	R	Bribery	8/1882 to 9/1882	(1)
William A. Wright	State Representative	OH	D	Bribery	11/1882 to 12/1882	(1)
William Bloch	State Representative	OH	D	Bribery	11/1882 to 3/1883	(1)
Marshall Tate Polk	State Treasurer	TN	D	Embezzlement	1/1883 to 7/1883	(1), (2)
James Gillespie Blaine	Senator	ME	R	Bribery & fraud	5/1884 to 9/1884	(1)
Franklin J. Moses Jr	Governor	SC	R	Fraud	10/1884 to 11/1885	(1)
John Rhoderic McPherson	Senator	NJ	D	Conspiracy & bribery	6/1885 to 9/1885	(1)
William Joyce Sewell	Senator	NJ	R	Conspiracy	6/1885 to 9/1885	(1)
Henry J. Coggeshall	State Senator	NY	R	Bribery	6/1885 to 11/1885	(1)
Henry B. Payne	Senator	OH	D	Bribery	1/1886 to 7/1886	(1)
Isham Greene Harris	Senator	TN	D	Bribery	2/1886 to 9/1886	(1)
Augustus Hill Garland	Attorney General	USA	D	Bribery	2/1886 to 12/1886	(1)
John L. Brown	State Auditor	IA	R	Malfeasance	4/1886 to 7/1886	(1)
James Herrington	Mayor	IL	D	Malfeasance	4/1888 to 12/1888	(1)
Benjamin W. Roscoe	City Treasurer	NY	D	Bribery	3/1889 to 4/1890	(1)
William L. Hemingway	State Treasurer	MS	D	Embezzlement	2/1890 to 7/1890	(1)
Stevenson Archer	State Treasurer	MD	D	Embezzlement	3/1890 to 7/1890	(1)
Lee F. Wilson	State Representative	IN	D	Fraud	4/1890 to 6/1890	(1)
Eli J. Henkle	Representative	MD	D	Forgery	7/1890 to 12/1890	(1)

\*Sources:

(1): ProQuest's archive of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*

(2): Political Graveyard

(3): Senate Historical Office

Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.

Online Appendix Table A.2 – *List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page*

Name	Office	State	Party	Scandal	Time Window	Source*
Daniel F. Beatty	Mayor	NJ	D	Violation of postal laws	10/1890 to 12/1890	(1)
John McLennan	Alderman	NY	R	Bribery	10/1890 to 12/1890	(1)
Sol Van Praag	State Representative	IL	D	Fraud & perjury	11/1890 to 12/1890	(1)
M.J. Doyle	State Representative	MI	D	Bribery	6/1891 to 7/1891	(1)
Charles W. Buttz	Lobbyst	ND	R	Bribery	5/1894 to 5/1894	(1)
George H. Morrison	County Treasurer	NY	R	Embezzlement	9/1896 to 11/1896	(1)
Joseph S. Bartley	City Treasurer	NE	R	Embezzlement	2/1897 to 6/1897	(1)
Henry Heitfeld	State Senator	ID	D	Bribery & fraud	3/1897 to 4/1897	(1)
W. Godfrey Hunter	Senate (Candidate)	KY	R	Bribery	4/1897 to 9/1897	(1)
Lant K. Salsbury	City Attorney	MI	D	Bribery	2/1901 to 12/1903	(1)
Albert Alonzo Ames	Mayor	MN	D	Bribery	6/1902 to 9/1903	(1)
John A. Lee	Lieutenant Governor	MO	D	Bribery	4/1903 to 11/1903	(1)
Frank H. Farris	State Senator	MO	D	Bribery	4/1903 to 8/1905	(1)
Edmund H. Driggs	Representative	NY	D	Fraud	6/1903 to 1/1904	(1)
George E. Green	State Senator	NY	R	Fraud	9/1903 to 6/1906	(1)
Charles H. Dietrich	Senator	NE	R	Bribery	11/1903 to 4/1904	(1)
Joseph Ralph Burton	Senator	KS	R	Bribery	1/1904 to 6/1906	(1)
Barney A. Eaton	State Senator	WI	R	Bribery	1/1904 to 3/1906	(1)
John H. Mitchell	Senator	OR	R	Bribery & fraud	1/1905 to 7/1905	(1)
Binger Hermann	Representative	OR	R	Fraud	1/1905 to 12/1910	(1)
Frank D. Comerford	State Representative	IL	D	Bribery	2/1905 to 4/1905	(1)
John N. Williamson	Representative	OR	R	Conspiracy & fraud	2/1905 to 9/1905	(1)
Francis E. Warren	Senator	WY	R	Graft	2/1905 to 2/1905	(1)
William Leib	U.S. Assistant Treasurer	USA	R	Civil service law violation	9/1905 to 11/1905	(1)
Frank J. Gethro	State Representative	MA	D	Bribery	5/1906 to 6/1906	(1)
George L. Lilley	Representative	CT	R	Corruption	12/1908 to 1/1909	(1)
Isaac Stephenson	Senator	WI	R	Bribery	2/1909 to 3/1912	(1)
Arthur C. Harper	Mayor	CA	D	Bribery	1/1909 to 3/1909	(1)
Jotham P. Allds	State Senator	NY	R	Bribery	1/1910 to 3/1910	(1)
Lee O'Neil Browne	State Representative	IL	D	Bribery	4/1910 to 9/1910	(1)
William Lorimer	Senator	IL	R	Bribery	4/1910 to 7/1912	(1)

\*Sources:

(1): ProQuest's archive of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*

(2): Political Graveyard

(3): Senate Historical Office

Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.

Online Appendix Table A.2 – *List of Political Scandals - Continued from previous page*

Name	Office	State	Party	Scandal	Time Window	Source*
John Broderick	State Senator	IL	D	Bribery	5/1910 to 5/1911	(1)
Joseph S. Clark	State Representative	IL	D	Bribery & conspiracy	5/1910 to 3/1911	(1)
Stanton C. Pemberton	State Senator	IL	R	Bribery & conspiracy	5/1910 to 3/1911	(1)
Thomas Pryor Gore	Senator	OK	D	Bribery	6/1910 to 3/1911	(1)

\*Sources:

(1): ProQuest’s archive of the *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Washington Post*

(2): Political Graveyard

(3): Senate Historical Office

Search strings for individual scandals are available upon request.

Table A.3: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.372 (0.202)	0.243 (0.215)	0.287 (0.223)	0.215 (0.225)
In-State Scandal	4.747 (1.429)	4.773 (1.434)	4.760 (1.435)	4.800 (1.437)
In-Region Scandal	1.989 (0.670)	1.914 (0.667)	1.973 (0.674)	1.910 (0.667)
Log Newspapers			0.472 (0.208)	0.366 (0.209)
Opposition Party	0.859 (0.273)	0.863 (0.272)	2.462 (0.742)	2.396 (0.759)
Opposition Party $\times$ Log Newspapers			-1.200 (0.400)	-1.133 (0.410)
Year		-0.014 (0.003)		-0.019 (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.232 (0.432)		-0.260 (0.457)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.083 (0.417)		-0.985 (0.406)
Share of Population that is White		-0.027 (0.619)		-0.044 (0.624)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-1.730 (1.584)		-0.700 (1.619)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.146 (0.135)		0.133 (0.128)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.837 (0.335)		0.831 (0.334)
Log Population		0.277 (0.175)		0.278 (0.167)
Observations	3696	3696	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 3.

Table A.4: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.405 (0.202)	0.298 (0.210)	0.391 (0.217)	0.301 (0.217)
In-State Scandal	4.767 (1.423)	4.811 (1.426)	4.743 (1.439)	4.806 (1.441)
In-Region Scandal	1.992 (0.669)	1.919 (0.668)	1.996 (0.674)	1.911 (0.670)
Log Newspapers			-0.310 (0.196)	-0.479 (0.208)
Own Party	-0.633 (0.254)	-0.689 (0.260)	-1.753 (0.635)	-2.085 (0.676)
Own Party $\times$ Log Newspapers			0.864 (0.342)	1.061 (0.369)
Year		-0.014 (0.002)		-0.019 (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.253 (0.441)		-0.350 (0.470)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.196 (0.443)		-1.142 (0.430)
Share of Population that is White		-0.037 (0.628)		0.166 (0.627)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-3.059 (1.550)		-4.264 (1.663)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.202 (0.148)		0.210 (0.146)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.694 (0.335)		0.732 (0.339)
Log Population		0.226 (0.170)		0.223 (0.161)
Observations	3696	3696	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 3.

Table A.5: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.387 (0.201)	0.273 (0.212)	0.345 (0.219)	0.260 (0.221)
In-State Scandal	4.747 (1.426)	4.785 (1.429)	4.744 (1.438)	4.799 (1.439)
In-Region Scandal	1.999 (0.671)	1.924 (0.668)	1.994 (0.676)	1.917 (0.670)
Log Newspapers			-0.005 (0.153)	-0.083 (0.159)
Overall Bias	0.440 (0.151)	0.450 (0.151)	1.266 (0.399)	1.282 (0.399)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers			-0.627 (0.214)	-0.630 (0.215)
Year		-0.014 (0.003)		-0.020 (0.004)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.240 (0.436)		-0.313 (0.465)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.161 (0.433)		-1.074 (0.419)
Share of Population that is White		-0.031 (0.623)		0.079 (0.622)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-2.471 (1.562)		-2.635 (1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.176 (0.141)		0.175 (0.137)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.756 (0.334)		0.774 (0.336)
Log Population		0.249 (0.172)		0.247 (0.164)
Observations	3696	3696	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 3.



Table A.6: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.201 (0.216)	0.171 (0.233)	0.207 (0.233)	0.155 (0.236)
In-State Scandal	4.789 (1.438)	4.853 (1.444)	4.830 (1.442)	4.888 (1.446)
In-Region Scandal	1.865 (0.667)	1.793 (0.656)	1.862 (0.668)	1.785 (0.656)
Log Newspapers			0.403 (0.242)	0.339 (0.261)
Opposition Party	0.997 (0.328)	1.030 (0.327)	2.863 (0.879)	2.893 (0.881)
Opposition Party $\times$ Log Newspapers			-1.319 (0.450)	-1.311 (0.454)
Voter Partisanship	-1.094 (0.866)	-1.024 (0.843)	-1.406 (0.875)	-1.344 (0.857)
Year		-0.026 (0.005)		-0.030 (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.228 (0.546)		-0.256 (0.577)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-0.877 (0.522)		-0.719 (0.521)
Share of Population that is White		0.376 (0.728)		0.349 (0.749)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-4.734 (2.264)		-3.826 (2.284)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.072 (0.197)		0.048 (0.199)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		1.183 (0.383)		1.262 (0.387)
Log Population		0.159 (0.197)		0.185 (0.189)
Observations	3316	3316	3316	3316

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 1-4 of Table 4.

Table A.7: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.129 (0.219)	0.184 (0.231)	0.178 (0.232)	0.196 (0.231)
In-State Scandal	4.801 (1.429)	4.895 (1.429)	4.859 (1.440)	4.923 (1.442)
In-Region Scandal	1.861 (0.668)	1.802 (0.657)	1.855 (0.669)	1.784 (0.656)
Log Newspapers			-0.882 (0.276)	-0.849 (0.276)
Own Party	-0.896 (0.315)	-0.889 (0.316)	-2.897 (0.883)	-2.865 (0.875)
Own Party × Log Newspapers			1.403 (0.450)	1.401 (0.450)
Voter Partisanship	-1.019 (0.869)	-0.884 (0.845)	-1.402 (0.902)	-1.244 (0.879)
Year		-0.027 (0.005)		-0.030 (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.397 (0.563)		-0.681 (0.634)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-0.869 (0.525)		-0.503 (0.513)
Share of Population that is White		0.269 (0.740)		0.421 (0.744)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-4.313 (2.276)		-3.030 (2.289)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.120 (0.208)		0.073 (0.205)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.979 (0.387)		1.057 (0.389)
Log Population		0.088 (0.194)		0.119 (0.186)
Observations	3316	3316	3316	3316

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 5-8 of Table 4.

Table A.8: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Newspaper Frequency	0.160 (0.217)	0.179 (0.232)	0.190 (0.232)	0.176 (0.233)
In-State Scandal	4.787 (1.433)	4.869 (1.436)	4.842 (1.441)	4.903 (1.443)
In-Region Scandal	1.867 (0.668)	1.803 (0.657)	1.861 (0.669)	1.789 (0.657)
Log Newspapers			-0.234 (0.167)	-0.243 (0.191)
Overall Bias	0.559 (0.186)	0.560 (0.183)	1.558 (0.471)	1.549 (0.468)
Overall Bias × Log Newspapers			-0.720 (0.237)	-0.715 (0.237)
Voter Partisanship	-1.262 (0.902)	-1.145 (0.876)	-1.571 (0.923)	-1.447 (0.900)
Year		-0.028 (0.006)		-0.031 (0.006)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.313 (0.554)		-0.477 (0.607)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-0.888 (0.527)		-0.615 (0.519)
Share of Population that is White		0.309 (0.734)		0.373 (0.745)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-4.410 (2.265)		-3.284 (2.293)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.094 (0.202)		0.059 (0.201)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		1.070 (0.383)		1.150 (0.386)
Log Population		0.122 (0.196)		0.150 (0.187)
Observations	3316	3316	3316	3316

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 9-12 of Table 4.

*Table A.9: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits*

	(1)	(2)
Newspaper Frequency	0.293 (0.222)	0.227 (0.223)
In-State Scandal	4.744 (1.436)	4.788 (1.436)
In-Region Scandal	1.952 (0.671)	1.895 (0.666)
Log Newspapers	0.376 (0.196)	0.296 (0.202)
Opposition Party	2.266 (0.686)	2.191 (0.699)
Opposition Party $\times$ Log Newspapers	-1.002 (0.357)	-0.931 (0.367)
Year	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Opposition Party $\times$ Year	-0.041 (0.018)	-0.041 (0.018)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.205 (0.453)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.086 (0.430)
Share of Population that is White		-0.160 (0.644)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-0.766 (1.616)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.148 (0.133)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.795 (0.326)
Log Population		0.260 (0.166)
Observations	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 1-2 of Table 5.

Table A.10: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)
Newspaper Frequency	0.386 (0.218)	0.297 (0.218)
In-State Scandal	4.735 (1.441)	4.795 (1.444)
In-Region Scandal	1.986 (0.672)	1.900 (0.668)
Log Newspapers	-0.248 (0.183)	-0.416 (0.196)
Own Party	-1.578 (0.575)	-1.913 (0.620)
Own Party $\times$ Log Newspapers	0.707 (0.308)	0.905 (0.338)
Year	-0.033 (0.011)	-0.034 (0.010)
Own Party $\times$ Year	0.030 (0.017)	0.030 (0.017)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.340 (0.466)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.158 (0.437)
Share of Population that is White		0.246 (0.630)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-4.109 (1.647)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.199 (0.143)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.695 (0.330)
Log Population		0.236 (0.163)
Observations	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 3-4 of Table 5.

Table A.11: Newspaper Biases: Dependent Variable = Relative Hits

	(1)	(2)
Newspaper Frequency	0.345 (0.220)	0.263 (0.220)
In-State Scandal	4.731 (1.440)	4.787 (1.440)
In-Region Scandal	1.977 (0.672)	1.901 (0.668)
Log Newspapers	-0.013 (0.154)	-0.076 (0.158)
Overall Bias	1.158 (0.365)	1.173 (0.366)
Overall Bias $\times$ Log Newspapers	-0.531 (0.192)	-0.532 (0.194)
Year	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.024 (0.005)
Overall Bias $\times$ Year	-0.020 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.010)
Share of Population Living in Cities 2.5K+		-0.281 (0.459)
Share of Population Living in Cities 25K+		-1.133 (0.435)
Share of Population that is White		0.076 (0.629)
Share of Population that is Male and over 21		-2.576 (1.579)
Log per Capita Manufacturing Output		0.175 (0.138)
Log Average Annual Wages in Manufacturing		0.731 (0.326)
Log Population		0.247 (0.165)
Observations	3696	3696

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by scandal.

Scandal fixed effects included in all columns.

Even numbered columns include all additional controls.

Corresponds to columns 5-6 of Table 5.

## B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4

*Table B.1: Vote Shares and Votes of the Candidates Elected With the Fewest Votes*

Pre-Reform (1998-2002)						Post-Reform (2006-2010)					
Vote Share of Last Elected in Department											
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	
2	23.84	5.18	31.93	13.87	24	17.22	3.91	26.89	10.91	20	
3	18.12	2.51	22.56	14.73	6	10.4	2.79	15.55	7.71	6	
4	10.72	1.88	12.97	7.14	8	7.27	2.91	13.45	4.46	8	
5	10.59	1.74	13.39	8.27	10	6.82	1.7	9.57	4.3	10	
6	8.24	1.5	10.71	6.35	6	4.46	0.81	5.64	3.61	6	
7	6.08	1.04	7.01	4.26	6	3.42	1.26	5.33	1.49	6	
13	3.11	0.15	3.22	3	2	2.05	0.12	2.14	1.96	2	
17	2.41	0.2	2.56	2.27	2	1.12	0.13	1.22	1.03	2	
18	1.18	0.2	1.32	1.03	2	0.99	0.17	1.12	0.86	2	
Total	14.73	8.52	31.93	1.03	66	9.49	6.4	26.89	0.86	62	
Votes of Last Elected in Department											
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	
2	8757	8937	35082	746	24	7042	7022	24453	786	20	
3	30893	8201	44365	24053	6	19143	8200	32559	11101	6	
4	22447	3889	28961	16669	8	15542	5533	25045	8772	8	
5	32917	7536	48302	24590	10	23242	9285	44924	11814	10	
6	27426	6776	38904	20464	6	15590	3170	20979	11969	6	
7	31483	8041	38768	18428	6	17573	6809	27667	6547	6	
13	26472	2884	28512	24433	2	17327	1571	18438	16216	2	
17	22399	432	22705	22094	2	11842	2503	13613	10072	2	
18	17413	1967	18805	16022	2	13732	3254	16033	11431	2	
Total	21065	12387	48302	746	66	14471	8754	44924	786	62	

Table B.2: Vote Shares and Votes of the Candidates Elected With the Fewest Votes by Party

		Pre-Reform (1998-2002)				Post-Reform (2006-2010)				
Vote Share of Last Elected of the Party in Each Department										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	26.88	6.8	44.87	13.87	40	18.72	5.03	33.65	10.91	33
3	20.71	4.53	29.89	14.73	15	12.81	3.22	18.85	7.71	14
4	12.59	2.71	18.34	7.14	21	9.86	3.41	16.11	4.46	22
5	13.11	3.76	25.75	8.27	37	8.17	1.94	12.46	4.3	34
6	9.76	2.6	17.53	6.35	20	5.78	1.47	9.47	3.61	22
7	7.56	1.94	12.13	4.26	29	4.88	1.41	6.92	1.49	23
13	4.19	1.89	10.46	3	14	2.53	0.51	3.56	1.96	12
17	3.11	1.23	6.75	2.27	12	1.99	0.88	4.17	1.03	12
18	2.96	2.16	7.6	1.03	27	1.38	0.31	2.06	0.86	11
Total	12.68	9.12	44.87	1.03	215	8.75	6.25	33.65	0.86	183
Votes of Last Elected of the Party in Each Department										
M	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N	Mean	St.D	Max	Min	N
2	9627	10572	49800	746	40	8878	8725	33131	786	33
3	35321	10483	53396	24053	15	23651	8756	39481	11101	14
4	26162	5117	34902	16669	21	21111	6820	33507	8772	22
5	40876	13081	82082	24590	37	27682	10031	48726	11814	34
6	32699	10851	63697	20464	20	20518	7256	38689	11969	22
7	39059	11302	66471	18428	29	24965	7946	37852	6547	23
13	34967	15141	85160	24433	14	21619	5966	33382	16216	12
17	29758	12618	67365	22094	12	20465	8694	40659	10072	12
18	44088	33376	117919	16022	27	18927	4710	29501	11431	11
Total	31630	19510	117919	746	215	20593	10089	48726	786	183



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