

Introduction

Old Barriers, New Openings

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The inspiration for this collection is straightforward. “Study problems, not periods,” Lord Acton advised; yet the 1980s – whether or not these years mark a distinct period – pose a significant problem for contemporary historians because of the rapidity of so many momentous changes in the world. The history of these years has only just begun to be examined, and for many scholars, it centers on a return to the high politics of the Cold War: the years between 1979 and 1989 saw a heightening of military tension between the superpowers, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the reinvigoration of conflicts across Latin America and Africa, reaching its worst point around 1983. This was followed by so dramatic a reduction in hostilities that contemporaries would declare the Cold War over by the end of the decade.

The effects of this change were particularly dramatic in and for Europe. Indeed, 1989 has entered the canon of international history with dates such as 1648, 1815, and 1914 as one of Europe’s major turning points. Germany would soon be reunified, the Soviet Union dismantled, and Europe, in U.S. president George H. W. Bush’s popular phrase, could become “whole and free.”¹ This narrative, tilted heavily toward the very end of the decade, has overlooked or underplayed nearly every other event from the onset of détente in the 1970s to the wars of Yugoslav succession.²

¹ Speech in Mainz, May 31, 1989; see <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm> (last accessed October 1, 2012).

² See, *inter alia*, John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: *The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., *The Fall of*

2 *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*

To many Europeans, the 1980s tell a different story. The year 1989 was a dramatic moment, to be sure, albeit one that few people predicted to the hour. Perhaps more significant in retrospect were the vastly different reactions to it throughout Europe. The Central European experience of 1989 was not shared uniformly by all Europeans, or even uniformly within Central Europe, least of all within Germany. This point, which would seem to be obvious to any historian writing about any major world event, remains contested within the historiography of this decade.³

The picture is not any clearer at its putative beginning. For all that the so-called second Cold War (ca. 1979–85) was an important development in the lives of many people in Europe – at its nadir around 1983 – it did not predetermine every aspect of the dramatic transformation that followed. For one thing, Europe and European concerns had ceased to be at the center of the world – or even, for that matter, of the Cold War – by the 1970s. Although the revolutions of 1989 dominated headlines then and since, they did not alter this reality, nor did they occur independently from globalization, which may have had as much to do with bringing about the revolutions in 1989 than any single sequence of political negotiations within or over Europe. The shape of Europe at the end of the century was not prescribed fully by the end of the Cold War, whenever and wherever it began. There was more to the story.⁴

Another important element, of course, was the long-evolving process of European integration. Whether and to what degree the putative end of the Cold War in Europe – or, alternatively, its acceleration a few years earlier – breathed new life into that process is open to debate. Both its power over nation-states and its territorial reach had grown consistently since the 1950s. The 1980s alone saw the European Community welcome Greece, Spain, and Portugal as new member states well before opening its doors to the nations of the former Communist bloc. When this took place formally in 2004, a reunited Germany was already more than a decade old, with the

the Berlin Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); the special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History*, “Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequences,” (August 2009); Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., *Europe and the End of the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2008); Andreas Rödter, *Deutschland, einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung* (Munich: Beck, 2009).

³ One of the earliest attempts at grappling with the variations is Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London: Cape, 1993).

⁴ See, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and the chapters in Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

former GDR having become part of not only the Federal Republic but also the EC in 1990. Another decade earlier, in 1980, the Community signed its first trade agreement with a Comecon member, Romania.⁵ And in 1986 came the Single European Act (SEA), which set into motion the process leading to the Maastricht Treaty six years later and the formal establishment of the European Union.

This enumeration of events epitomizes a basic fact about the integration project: enlargement not only reinforced the Community's economic and demographic potential, but also demonstrated the new political role it had acquired, or aimed to acquire, by the 1980s. In all three Mediterranean countries, EC membership helped stabilize the young democratic system and was accompanied by a new focus on human rights and democratization, in and beyond Western Europe.⁶ What perhaps looked like a late glimmering of Wilsonianism was indeed an expression of a new European idea, reinforced by actors such as the European Parliament with its more self-assertive role since the introduction of direct elections in 1979. Moreover, the SEA and even more the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated that the integration was moving incrementally beyond its focus on the economy and now increasingly included competences in fields as diverse as the environment, energy, home affairs, and culture.⁷

None of this happened in a vacuum; but neither did the end of the Cold War. To establish how best to connect the multiple narratives of and about Europe during these years is the central aim of this volume. Specifically, it weaves a transatlantic, Cold War perspective into the standard narrative of European integration – and vice versa. Why did European integration take so big a stride forward at the precise moment of greatest hostility between the superpowers? Is it possible to show that one set of tensions led to progress in mitigating or reversing another? Were the two trajectories essentially reinforcing, or independent? And where did the United States – and, broadly speaking, transatlantic relations – fit in the European story? How does the European integration narrative flow within

⁵ David Kennedy and David E. Webb, "Integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 28 (1990), 633–75; Suvi Kansikas, *Trade Blocs and the Cold War: The CMEA and the EC Challenge, 1969–1976* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2012).

⁶ See Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).

⁷ N. Piers Ludlow, "European Integration in the 1980s: On the Way to Maastricht?" *Journal of European Integration History*, 19 (2013).

the wider framework of an Atlantic Community?⁸ Was this a case of benign U.S. neglect? Or were there important, albeit indirect and perhaps even unrecognized, steps taken by Americans that facilitated the deepening, and paved the way for the later widening, of European institutions and governance? What does the relative paucity of European discourse in the United States during the early and middle 1980s – in contrast with earlier moments of high global tension, namely the late 1940s, mid-late 1950s, and early 1960s – suggest about the nature of the years leading up to 1989, and those that followed? Might the U.S. government have devoted more attention in public to nonmilitary issues like trade, the environment, and monetary policy earlier in the decade? And how did European attitudes toward the United States – which also reached new lows in the early part of the decade – affect those priorities? Were transatlantic scars still too raw to reopen from the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, which saw some disputes over market access and energy policy grow nearly as bitter for some people as those over life and death in Vietnam? These are just a few of the questions raised by the chapters in this volume. Its overall aim in suggesting answers to them is to establish and advance an agenda for research on the decade, loosely demarcated.

SCOPE, ORIENTATION, AND COVERAGE

The first task for the study of any historical period is to address its chronology. It includes when the decade began, when it ended, how it compares to earlier periods, and even whether the usual ten-year demarcation makes historical sense. As already suggested, the 1980s may be more of a “non-decade” or “long decade” than one would otherwise gather from the calendar. Recent research on the 1970s, for example, suggests that it was hardly the “dark ages” of European integration that most contemporaries and an earlier wave of research thought it to be.⁹ Yet, according to Matthias

⁸ For precedents, see Valérie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *European Community, Atlantic Community?* (Paris: Soleb, 2008); Giles Scott-Smith and Valérie Aubourg, eds., *Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?* (Paris: Soleb, 2011).

⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 1–39, here 8; as a contemporary example, see Sicco Mansholt, *La Crise* (Paris: Stock, 1974); one of the earliest, more positive reassessments of the decade is Joseph H. H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39–63; for more recent work by historians, see, e.g., Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds., *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011).

Schulz and Thomas Schwartz, the 1970s was the first decade in which European integration was acknowledged as an impediment to transatlantic relations: the United States continued to support the former rhetorically but did little to encourage or help it in practice, which had not been the case during the 1950s and early 1960s.¹⁰ Others like Geir Lundestad have gone even further to characterize U.S. support for, and interest in, European integration between 1977 and 1984 as going “from bad to worse.”¹¹

The term “Eurosclerosis,” coined in the 1980s to characterize the decade starting in the mid-1970s, may suffer a similar divided fate as research moves further into the 1980s. Instead, some have argued that the Community experienced “a sequence of irregular big bangs” during the years from 1973 to 1986, while others have disaggregated these years into even smaller units.¹² Obviously, distinct policy fields had different trajectories – for instance, with the Common Agricultural Policy being a problem child during most of the decade, whereas the Common Fishery Policy, the direct elections of the European Parliament, or the first Schengen Agreement on border controls signified new steps and modes of integration. Its pace and effects varied much from place to place, as they had always done. At the formal level, the 1980s saw considerable movement: on the one hand, three new countries joined the EC, but on the other, Greenland became the first and (so far) only country ever to leave the Community. Such variations mattered, and continue to matter. They are also a sharp reminder against any simplistic and teleological narratives of European integration.¹³ Yet it should still be possible to stand back and address the most important turning points and continuities.

Contending periodizations have produced different verdicts of achievement and failure. For this reason, we propose extending both the

¹⁰ Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, “The Superpower and the Union in the Making: U.S.-European Relations, 1969–1980,” in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds., *The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 355–73.

¹¹ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 201.

¹² See, e.g., Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 296; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 526; Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 4th edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010).

¹³ On this problem, also see, e.g., Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, eds., *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010); Mark Gilbert, “Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (2008), 641–62.

chronological and geographic scope of the decade and its topical parameters from the heretofore narrow and separate discussions of security or economic integration to national, regional, and global culture and the elaboration of each in the presence of the other. That is to say, by addressing the Atlantic and European dimensions of politics, economics, and society together, we may rediscover what many people probably understood at the time: the transatlantic narrative had one logic and hierarchy, with geopolitics at the top, while the European integration narrative had another that was defined by the language of center and periphery. But neither one could escape the other.

The chapters in this volume thus do more than blur the standard chronology. They also claim that, when seen in their interrelated totality, the transatlantic and European narratives accomplish something remarkable for one another during these years. Transatlantic relations improved dramatically, which helped further (again, indirectly) some real achievements in European integration insofar as Americans neither stood in the way nor gave the impression that hand-holding was needed or wanted. In other words, there was the semblance of a rise in sovereignty – for the Atlantic Alliance, which was no longer held hostage to intramural battles over codfish, grain, pipelines, or missiles; for the European Community, which was no longer expected to submit to the blessing or approval of non-Europeans; and for the members of the soon-to-be-former Soviet bloc, which was no longer so fearful of Soviet power and therefore could finally contemplate choosing a different set of European and transatlantic alignments.

All this was imagined and executed during a very short period of time in the mid-1980s, and ironically, soon after contemporaries said things could not get any worse for the West. For not only did the global basis of transatlantic relations continue to shift from a superpower duopoly to a more multipolar arrangement, but so did subjects like energy, the environment, and human rights continue to reappear in transnational fora.¹⁴ Even within Europe, there was a shift away from bipolarity as European governments (no longer just De Gaulle's France) took independent positions from the United States, for example, over the boycott of the 1980 Moscow

¹⁴ E.g., Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Bruce Mazlish, *The New Global History* (London: Routledge, 2006); chapters by Niall Ferguson and Charles Maier in *Shock of the Global*; Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald, eds., *Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969–1984* (Trier: WVT, 2004); Antonio Varsori, ed., *Alle origini del presente. L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2007).

Olympics; the imposition of an embargo on Soviet grain; the construction of a Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe; and on the trade and other disputes following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. None of these disputes was fatal to the Alliance, as the following chapters address, both separately and cumulatively; in fact, as some scholars have even argued about earlier challenges to U.S. hegemony, they may even have strengthened it.¹⁵

The transformation of relationships in and between Europe and the United States must be understood in a global context. World merchandise trade more than tripled between 1973 and 1983 – from \$578 billion to \$1,835 billion. In 1993, it stood at \$3,639 billion.¹⁶ Between 1978 and 1985, the number of intergovernmental organizations (IOs) jumped from 290 to 380, and the number of international NGOs from 2,400 to 4,700.¹⁷ The number of IOs as well as of NGOs experienced the fastest growth of any time since 1945. In sum, the world, especially the Atlantic world, was more closely connected than ever, while at the same time, Japan was perceived as both a political and strategic asset and as a real economic threat, while several other important economic actors in Asia emerged. The West was a beneficiary of globalization, but also now one of several contenders for global preeminence.

It is within this context that the so-called second Cold War – the collapse and replacement of superpower détente – occurred alongside the acceleration of European integration leading to the SEA. Each took place amid a transformation of global politics and society away from the bipolar order that had begun to compete, even within Europe, with alternative concepts, eventually including the “European common home” later championed by Mikhail Gorbachev. This concept – a Soviet rendition of the pan-Europeanism from the interwar period, which placed all European nations, including Russia and its fellow members of the Soviet bloc, into a single, regional idea – did not come suddenly into existence, but rather emerged over time, and with considerable variations across the Soviet bloc, as Europe’s own position in the world began to supersede East-West divisions over the course of the 1970s. This context helps explain why the second Cold War did not look perfectly like a replay of the late 1940s

¹⁵ See Michael Creswell, *A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

¹⁶ World Trade Organization, *International Trade Statistics 2000* (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2000), 28.

¹⁷ Yearbook of International Organizations, 1909–1999, table 2, online version: <http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php> (last accessed on October 1, 2012).

and early 1950s: while those years put Europe back on the center stage of world politics, the most recent literature reveals that the continent's eastern and western parts still managed to decouple themselves to a surprising extent from this simple formulation.¹⁸ A few years later, Gorbachev depicted Western Europe as his partner in reform, impressed, as he put it, by the EC as a “new giant developing one with a population of 350 million people, which surpasses us in its level of economic, scientific and technological growth.”¹⁹

If the last generation of Soviet rulers – and even more than them the intellectual elites of East-Central Europe – really did regard Europe and “Europeanness” as a positive orientation because of the perceived promise of closer relations with the European Community, the perception would, in effect, flip the Cold War pattern of causation on its head. It would mean that the progress of European integration of the mid-late 1980s, rather than being one of several results of the end of the Cold War, was in effect one of its primary stimuli, while at the same time, the role of the European Community in ending the Cold War – if only because of Gorbachev's views of it – was more important than most accounts have allowed. As the chapters by Piers Ludlow, Antonio Varsori, Angela Romano, and Philipp Gassert demonstrate, borders between conditions, causes, and consequences blur considerably by the middle of the decade, so much that a Panglossian interpretation of the entire period may present a strong temptation for authors of the grand narrative. In assigning subjects and scholars we tried our best to resist it. Indeed the various chapters differ on several points: for example, on the main thrust and import of peace

¹⁸ Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chapters 1 and 2; and Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989* (New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 18ff, 492–96, 641–43; Marie-Pierre Rey, “Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev's Diplomatic Concept,” *Cold War History* 4 (2004), 33–65; and, by the same author, “Perestroika and Its Effects Revisited: Gorbachev's New Thinking and Europe, 1985–89,” in Bozo, Rey, and Nuti, *Europe and the End of the Cold War*; José M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulińska-Jurgiel, and Christian Domnitz, eds., *Europa im Ostblock. Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945–1991)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008); Jacques Levesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2010).

¹⁹ Gorbachev at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw on July 15, 1988, published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991* (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 608.

movements on either side of the Atlantic vis-à-vis nuclear arms control and disarmament; the causal relationships between economic and political trends; the degree to which both were mediated by globalization, or more by internal (i.e., European) factors; the relative influence of second-tier states like Italy or Poland in advancing a wider process of historical change; and, ultimately, the structural, or stochastic, character of such change in the late twentieth century or, as several chapters suggest, a series of challenge and response cycles that recall the theories of Arnold Toynbee. The possibility of considering these and related questions is just one of the advantages of reconstructing the intertwined histories of Europe during this period from the inside out rather than derivatively from the outside in, or the top down.

Within Western Europe there was an effort to extend economic and political integration and to bolster Western military and economic strength beyond it. This took place, as Angela Romano describes, while the allies simultaneously advanced their opening to the East by way of the CSCE process with follow-on conferences to the 1975 meeting that produced the Helsinki Final Act, their associated Helsinki Watch Groups and related activities that sought to protect and promote human rights. European integration gained traction, we argue, precisely because of the perceived need to present an image of strength, not only to “other” Europeans (that is, in the Soviet bloc) whose rhetoric had come to equate reform in their countries with the wider coming together of Europe, but also to Americans, who regularly demanded a commitment to the same Helsinki process throughout Europe, particularly in these countries, as well as to some Western Europeans who, rightly or wrongly, questioned policies put forward by the United States.

That did not happen uniformly, to be sure: the chapters by Frédéric Bozo and Antonio Varsori, for example, illustrate important distinctions later on in French and Italian approaches. Images of what Europe could, and should, be continued to diverge throughout the long decade. However, this preliminary survey of the 1980s suggests that the deepening and widening of the transatlantic and European processes of integration were permeable inasmuch as they played off their mutual strengths, as well as the specter of mutual dilution. This does not necessarily mean that each was consistently present in the thought and action of most people on both sides of the Atlantic; the Polish crisis from 1980–81, for example, reveals, in Robert Brier’s chapter, that the language of Western unity differed from place to place but rarely took into account the EC per se, whereas Romano demonstrates the indirect effect such differences had

on European cohesion within the framework of the 1980–83 Madrid follow-on meeting of the CSCE. In these instances, the need to stand together for the purpose of gaining Soviet concessions on human rights for the most part overrode transatlantic disputes over the best approach to take, which, in turn, allowed the NATO caucus in Europe to encourage unity among EC members in this and similar forums.

On the domestic level, the complexities of each story present an unpredictable yet logical pattern of causation from moment to moment, as well as transitively: for example, in noting Brier's description of the similarities between Poland and Chile; or in recalling how important the Falkland Islands conflict was to Thatcher's political career, and how critical Thatcher subsequently was to making Gorbachev acceptable to Western skeptics, leads us to wonder whether a Chilean dictator or an Argentine junta was indirectly responsible for the peaceful end of the Cold War, however tendentious that may sound. Or in highlighting, as several authors do, that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative prompted much collective soul-searching in Europe and, apart from whatever effects it may have had on Soviet calculations, evidently reinvigorated the drive for integration in Western Europe. It may also be possible, therefore, to draw an admittedly circuitous line of causation between the SDI and the SEA. This was, as historians like to say, a very pregnant decade. When considered cumulatively and in light of fluctuating politics in each major country, as the chapters in this volume also describe, the two European narratives become nearly impossible to separate, and in fact appear to attract one another as would the force between the two poles of a magnet.

How and when did they come together? There were two phases, with the first having begun around 1977, lasting through the end of 1986, and then another one following from 1987 to 1992. The chapters of this book follow along this chronology. The first phase featured a reactive, even defensive, stance on both sides of the Atlantic vis-à-vis national and regional interests amid worsening global tensions, but it was neither new nor clear-cut. One recalls that the early 1970s brought the first enlargement of the EC and the reorientation of the United Kingdom, not necessarily away from the Atlantic, but toward a more composite position that sought to harmonize both transatlantic and European interests. That compromise survived and, arguably, thrived, as Western governments moved to recover from their mid-decade crisis over monetary and energy policies with important successes, particularly after 1975: the establishment of a post-Bretton Woods system for the coordination of monetary policy; the advent of a global human rights agenda within the framework

of détente; the rethinking of relationships between the developed and under-developed worlds; and the further entry of transnational, global issues like the environment and energy into the realm of high politics, all during a period when personal relationships between leaders on either side of the Atlantic (e.g., Henry Kissinger–Michel Jobert; Jimmy Carter–Helmut Schmidt) appeared dismal.

The Iranian hostage crisis, the declaration of martial law in Poland, the Soviet grain embargo, and the Falklands War brought them even further to the fore. Yet, as Gassert's and Varsori's chapters show in detail, NATO's 1979 dual-track decision and its implementation – resulting in the Euromissile deployments and then their subsequent elimination by treaty in 1987 – offset the difficulties and, to some extent, liberated negotiations in other areas while at the same time even forcing a reexamination – some of it collaborative and complementary – among the many groups opposing the deployments.

Meanwhile, by the mid-1980s, Europe – that is to say, the European project – again became fashionable, even in the United States.²⁰ But it was a particular Europe, with multiple identities acting in parallel. For some in the United States, as Mark Gilbert's chapter illustrates, it was a Europe that harkened back to the 1940s and 1950s and ahead to an ideal future – the center of action, the critical ally, the favored field of battle in the war of human progress. In much of Western Europe, it remained an integrating entity and a glass half empty, whereas in the East it was a bit of both. In all three regions there was, according to Gilbert, a shift in the character or essence of the question that seemed, at least then, to overtake the so-called structural constraints of previous decades, notably the one that set Atlanticism and Europeanism against one another as mutually exclusive policy orientations or visions. Seen in retrospect, that apparent dialectic had mostly to do with the moving contours of Germany and its dual status within postwar Europe, and less with the inherent meaning or value of either orientation.²¹ By about 1986, or, as Bozo's chapter concludes, certainly by 1992, it was no longer the case that European integration – either within Western Europe or across the East-West divide – had to happen at the expense of transatlantic solidarity, or vice versa. Three rounds of EC

²⁰ Not least among social scientists who, in the 1980s, returned to European studies with renewed interest in functionalism, “constructivism,” and related topics of the economic and political dimensions of regional integration. This interest also coincided with the emphasis of scholars like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, on questions of institutional governance and interdependence.

²¹ Cf. Schulz in Schulz and Schwartz, *The Strained Alliance*, 307.

enlargement, for which old alliances such as in the case of Britain (1973) and security concerns in the cases of Spain and Portugal (1981) as well as of Greece (1986) loomed large, are probably the best evidence for this new dynamic and also for the greater heterogeneity that now characterized the integration project. An Atlantic Europe could coexist with a Federal Europe, even with a Gaullist Europe. In other words, *multiple* Europes became fashionable during a time when the awareness and acceptance of multiple channels of intergovernmental action grew, thanks not only to such processes within Europe but also to the nascent G-7 and similar arrangements throughout the developed world. That the effect of such multiplicities converged in the mid-1980s was not entirely accidental; nor was it entirely planned.²²

The second half of the decade, roughly from 1987 to 1992, saw the EC finally make the leap from an intergovernmental body to a small but credible world actor. The United States meanwhile appeared to renew its commitment to European integration, reversing some earlier setbacks. To be sure, the extent to which the post-1986 period was a conscious reaction to the period before varied by sector and country, but on balance, this periodization best evokes the interrelationship of the transatlantic and European narratives on the one hand and of historical causation in both directions – before and after 1986 – on the other.²³

THE LONGER VIEW

To begin to understand this story requires a deeper examination of the sources of European Policy during the 1980s: the personalities, economic and social conditions, political realignments, shifting moods and attitudes, and, perhaps above all, the congruence of popular axioms amid the departure of an elite generation and its replacement by another in the wider regional, global, historical, and intellectual contexts. For while there were major differences in the 1970s over the ends of policy – within the West,

²² Cf. Kiran Klaus Patel, “Provincializing the European Communities: Cooperation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective,” *Contemporary European History* 22 (2013).

²³ E.g., see, also with a focus on 1975 to 1985, Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, “Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Einleitende Überlegungen zum historischen Ort des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses von 1979,” in Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, eds., *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), 13; Geir Lundestad, ed., *Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

between the West and the East, and even between the North and the South – as noted in the chapter by Antonio Varsori – most of these disappeared by the later 1980s or were replaced by differences over means.²⁴

Looking ahead, several chapters also compel the question of why so many achievements were followed by so much discord. Was the old Atlantic-European dialectic buried too hastily? Or are cultural differences just too endemic? This kind of quasi-biological historicism has proved popular in the writings of polemicists like Robert Kagan, as it had before him with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and others.²⁵ It is true that many Americans and Europeans remain geopolitically and culturally ambivalent; Donald Rumsfeld was neither the first nor the only public figure to tout the existence of an Old World/New World dichotomy. At one level both Americans and Europeans appear to recognize the continued interpenetration of one another's societies, although it must be admitted that this is much more palpable now in Europe. At another level, there are too many distinctions to enumerate, and increasingly, again because of globalization, it is much harder to assert that Americans and Europeans (and their interests) are any more alike and aligned than, say, Americans and Japanese, Mexicans, or Australians. Of course Europeans themselves continue to discuss their own place in the world with endless determination. Americans increasingly have begun to do the same thing, as the late Samuel Huntington's final book – *Who Are We?* – well attests.²⁶

Atlanticism and Europeanism were each born of the apparent desire of some Europeans and Americans to have two balls in the air at once: some wanted to stress solidarity yet at the same time to assert difference; others wanted to recognize a state of interdependence while also championing self-determination. Atlanticism and Europeanism have always coexisted and competed with one another, and with their respective paradoxes.

²⁴ Cf. Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008).

²⁵ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003). Cf. Alan K. Henrikson, "Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently: An Atlanticist's Rejoinder to the Kagan Thesis," *EUSA Review* (2003), 1–10; Christopher J. Makins, "Power and Weakness, or Challenge and Response? Reflections on the Kagan Thesis," unpublished paper, Atlantic Council of the U.S. (2003); Steven Walt, "The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," *National Interest* 54 (1998/1999), 3–11; and Ulrich Krotz, "The (Beginning of the) End of the Political Unity of the West? Four Scenarios of North Atlantic Futures," *RSCAS Working Paper* 2008/31.

²⁶ Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Who were the principal Atlanticists and who were the Europeanists? This question also is more complex than it appears. Too often, historians make the mistake of tracing a policy trajectory by way of the statements and presumed thoughts of the few people at the top. But there were other important players. In the U.S. State and Defense departments, for example, Atlanticists still held sway over policy during the 1980s. Almost none were Gaullists to the extent Kissinger, Nixon, and Brzezinski could be painted as having been. Men like Horst Teltschik in the Federal Republic, Charles Powell in the United Kingdom, Brent Scowcroft in the United States, Jacques Attali in France, Jacques Delors in Brussels, and Anatoly Chernyaev in the Soviet Union came, by the very end of the decade and in the early 1990s, to establish their own transatlantic policy network, much as their predecessors had done a generation before. Where they were unable to smooth the edges of politics, civic groups were needed to fill the gap and bring continuity – as Giles Scott-Smith’s chapter describes – often in response to the opposition led by the groups described in Philipp Gassert’s and Holger Nehring’s chapters. Therefore, to tell this story, one also must extend its coverage vertically, so to speak, to include many more protagonists and antagonists, as well as horizontally, over time.

Tracing the ebb and flow of policy networks is just one way to understand the importance of cross-cutting transnational alliances among bureaucrats and pressure groups and, not insignificantly, economic policy makers and business lobbies, as the chapters by Duccio Basosi, Ksenia Demidova, and Arthe Van Laer illustrate. Collaborative relationships and rivalries among these groups led in most cases to a borrowing and a blurring of policy models – seen especially in Basosi’s chapter – whereby Europeans fashioned an unwieldy combination of acquiescence to – and in some places, even praise for – Reaganism’s microeconomics with deep criticism of its macroeconomics and its effects on Europe. Jacques Delors’s trajectory from witnessing Mitterrand’s failed experiment of Socialist economic policy between 1981 and 1983 to sweeping up the pieces as minister of the economy and of finance in France and later on putting the European Community on a more neoliberal track is one of the better examples. Similar paths were followed in many other areas as well, from popular music and film to the academic disciplines. The extent to which these convergences mediated and conditioned high politics has only just begun to be understood.

Policy history meanwhile has only so much explanatory value. Bureaucracies are known to give priority to some areas that may turn out to be less salient over time; and the interests of bureaucracies may not match perfectly with the aims they claim to pursue. Determining the

fate of policies therefore comes down to much more than the relative prominence of its promoters and detractors. In this instance, most Atlanticists and Europeanists would have said that their general goals were consistent: peace, prosperity, and successful integration of Europe, first of the West, then of the East. Yet one set of goals and actors did not guarantee fulfillment by the other. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, or a powerful European Union, could have brought about an end to the Cold War, or the unification of Europe, on its own.

These rather obvious qualifications take us back to the role of leaders and leadership. We may extend the speculation, as several chapters do in this book, back further to argue that some like Kohl and Mitterrand drew inspiration from the Monnet method and example, not only in its passion and commitment to European unity but also and perhaps even more consistently to transatlantic partnership, alternately strengthening their own European “pillar” and persuading like-minded Americans to support it.²⁷ Delors was known to share many of these views, and was portrayed in the United States, as we learn from Mark Gilbert, as a latter-day Monnet. By and large, the United States under Reagan and especially with George H. W. Bush returned during this period to the axiom of Europe as a unifying project. In Europe, this augmented the effort led by Kohl and Mitterrand to lay a European basis for German unification by ensuring that a unified Germany would play a constructive role in European institutions. Bush and Kohl in turn helped ensure a similar result in transatlantic institutions. Both efforts built upon the earlier work of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher – who again had been the first major Western leader to bestow her endorsement upon the Soviet leader – to end the Cold War peaceably. If the history of this decade suggests anything about there having been some kind of broad, strategic dialectic in Europe, it existed both between the continent’s eastern and western centers of gravity, and between rival geopolitical visions within each bloc.

Atlanticism and European integration came to resemble more symbiotic than contending doctrines. This does not necessarily mean their rivalry was not significant. But it was not, and never really was, mutually exclusive. It would appear impossible for two distinct policy maps to exist simultaneously in the real world; but in this case, and during this decade, especially, there did.

²⁷ A central argument of Frédéric Bozo’s book, *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Reunification*. trans. Susan Emanuel (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).

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The discussion in the chapters that follow centers on the question of convergence, both among various ideas and images of Europe, and between those ideas and events on the ground. They do not all agree on causes and effects, or even on the same chronologies. Thus, while their coverage varies – and is meant to be selectively comparative rather than exhaustive – the aim of each chapter is to draw the various strands of the decade’s history together while planting the seeds of future scholarship. Archives with sources for these years have just begun to open; students are gravitating toward them, and the entire decade is finally being treated with some measure of objective distance. We are still at the beginning – the very beginning – of a long and rich path of discovery. Accordingly, our bias has been in favor of adding – both years and nuance – over subtracting.

We plot a course for others to follow with the aim, as the selection of authors and topics reveals, of extending historical European integration research into a new decade, of broadening the discussion of European international history in the 1980s from its heavy focus on the very end – in fact, the final year – of the decade, and of enriching Anglo-American historiography of the Cold War with more perspectives from Europe.²⁸ By integrating the transatlantic dimension of European integration and Europe’s role in the transatlantic relationship as best as sources will currently allow, we hope this portion of the international history of the last years of the twentieth century will not only resemble a Rubik’s cube – invented, incidentally, in 1974 and first sold on the market in 1980 – but also a finely woven fabric of silk and iron.

²⁸ Cf. Michael Cox, “Another Transatlantic Split? American and European Narratives and the End of the Cold War,” *Cold War History* 7 (2007), 121–46.