

1976

# City Planning and Politics in 136 Midwest Cities

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*Eastern Illinois University*

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CITY PLANNING AND POLITICS

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IN 136 MIDWEST CITIES

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(TITLE)

BY

JAMES A. OWEN

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1976

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## PREFACE

This study examines planning agency activities from a behavioral perspective. The study from beginning to end has involved the cooperation of over 100 individuals, all of whom I owe thanks.

In particular I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee chairperson, Dr. Thomas E. Scism, under whose supervision and direction this study was completed; and my thesis committee, Dr. Joe Connelly and Dr. Peter Leigh. I would also like to thank my typist, Frances Willis, and most importantly, the planning agency directors who responded to the survey mailed to them.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### The City Planning Process in Review

"One of the most striking changes accompanying the urbanization of the American population is the growth of municipal planning. Because of the increasing recognition of the importance of rationally constructed urban growth, both state governments and the federal government are increasing their support for planning at the local level. Today only a handful of cities of more than 10,000 persons lack some kind of planning programs."

--Robert Lineberry

The quotation<sup>1</sup> suggests the reason so much attention has been given to the city planning process among both the academic and the public sectors. City planning as a process not only determines future priorities, but is also responsible for bringing a great deal of federal and state fiscal aid into a particular community (not only for planning but for other service areas as well). As a result, planning affects not only those groups which have a direct stake in the planning process (i.e., real estate firms, contractors, subdividers, etc.) but virtually every sub-group in the entire community.

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<sup>1</sup>Robert L. Lineberry, "Community Structure and Planning Commitment: A Note on the Coorelates of Agency Expenditures," Social Science Quarterly 50 (December, 1969): p. 728.

## The Domain of City Planning

City planning has been assigned different purposes and definitions throughout its history. Past rationales, for example, have emphasized planning as being concerned with logical rural and urban development for the promotion of economic, social and physical purposes; it has been defined as an art, a science, guesswork, and some combinations of the above.<sup>2</sup> Local Planning Administration, published by the International City Managers Association, surveyed a number of definitions of city planning and has come up with the following common elements in the definitions:

1. City planning is concerned with ways of guiding or controlling the use and development of land in such a way that maximum benefits accrue to the people of the community being planned.
2. Planning is a combination of foresight and hindsight; it attempts to correct inequities of the past by preparing for the future.
3. Steps in the planning consist of:
  - specifying the objectives to be planned;
  - surveying existing situations;
  - collecting and analyzing data in order to make clear the alternatives which are useful to reaching the desired objectives;
  - choosing from among the alternatives the most feasible approach to meet the objective (this includes the development of an implementation procedure).<sup>3</sup>

These summations do not provide an end definition of planning; rather, they show the diversity which exists in planning definitions, a diversity which suggests that one reason "planning" has so many different kinds of practi-

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<sup>2</sup>Legalines: Casebook Approach to Land Use Controls (Gardena: Law Distributors, 1973), pp. 3-5.

<sup>3</sup>Mary McLean, ed., Local Planning Administration (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1959), pp. 40-43.

tioners is that different planners begin their work with different philosophical bases. There are, in fact, probably as many definitions of city planning as there are city planners.

For the purposes of this paper planning will be defined as an attempt by man, through government, to accomplish certain basic goals of individual communities and their affected society, by ordering and regulating physical environments.<sup>4</sup>

Planning as a process is not unique to the city. Almost every governmental and private unit is engaged in some form of planning, whether it be concerned with planning for the whole society within its boundaries or planning for its own future within its society. What distinguishes city planning from other forms of governmental planning is city planning's orientation towards the future of society as opposed to an orientation to its own position within society.<sup>5</sup> As a result of this orientation, the city planning process has been the focus of much speculation, research, and analysis by scholars, professionals, and, as such things go, by the more naive segments of a society.

Empirical research on city planning has used primarily two methodological forms: the case study and comparative analysis. Case studies examining city planning have come to basic agreement on two items:

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<sup>4</sup>Robert C. Weaver, "Major Factors in Urban Planning," in The Urban Condition, ed. Leonard J. Duhl (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 97.

<sup>5</sup>City planning agencies are not entirely unique in this aspect. Metropolitan, regional, state, and federal agencies in some cases take on planning functions for society as a whole. While most of their energies (city planning agencies) are devoted to society, they are also equally concerned with their position in society.

1. Planning is ultimately involved in the political process--it helps determine who gets what, when, and how; and,
2. The planners themselves are largely incapable of determining their own fate in the political process.<sup>6</sup>

Case studies, unfortunately, suffer from some methodological inadequacies, one of which is a lack of generalizability. (I am by no means asserting that case studies are not valuable, rather that the utility of a case study is limited to providing clues on the road to the development of theoretical underpinnings.) The few comparative empirical works suffer less from methodological underpinnings (which nevertheless sometimes detract from the research<sup>7</sup>) than from so much concentration on metropolitan planning agencies (for reasons of data accessibility).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Dennis R. Judd and Robert E. Mendelson, The Politics of Urban Planning: The East St. Louis Experience (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 176-201; Alan Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 358-365; Norman Beckman, "The Planner as a Bureaucrat," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 30 (November 1964): 325-6; Charles Edwin Patterson, Jr., "Politics of Planning in Small Cities: Case Studies of Four Illinois Communities" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1963), pp. 141-2; David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 110-12.

<sup>7</sup>Joseph Burby, III, "Planning and Politics: Toward a Model of Planning-Related Policy Outputs in American Local Government" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1968); Donald A. Krueckeberg, "Variations in Behavior of Planning Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly 16 (June 1971): 192-202; Francine Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

<sup>8</sup>Donald A. Krueckeberg, "A Multivariate Analysis of Metropolitan Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 35 (September 1969): 319-325; Lineberry, pp. 723-730.

### Theoretical Orientation

The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to carry out an empirical study of city planning agencies in non-metropolitan areas, and 2) to examine the city planning process using a theoretical orientation based on a variation of an Eastonian model of systems analysis.<sup>9</sup> (See Figure 1) The procedure of the paper will be to use this model in order to determine why some planning agencies are involved in more areas than are others, and why some planning agencies have their recommendations followed more closely than do others. The paper, therefore, will not attempt a qualitative analysis of planning agencies, but will examine the city planning process from a policy analysis perspective, and will attempt to discern some of the correlates of planning workload variations as well as variations in plan implementation.


Analyzing policy in the city planning process will be accomplished by using the following four types of variables: 1) input variables to the system, 2) outputs of the system, 3) outcomes, and 4) moderating variables. The input variables to the system consist of data gathered largely from census sources which measures certain sociological, economic, and political conditions within a community. It is hypothesized that certain inputs will effect the amount of work produced by a planning agency. Variables used to measure outputs (or the amount of work accomplished by an agency) consist of equally weighted workloads for the fiscal year 1970. Outcome variables, or variables which attempt to measure the impact of planning recommendations, consist of two types, both of which attempt to discern the amount of coordination between city governments and planning agencies regarding implementation of planning recommendations. Moderating vari-

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<sup>9</sup>David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics 9 (April 1957): 383-400.

Figure 1

Model of the City Planning Process  
Utilizing an Eastonian Perspective



ables like input variables are independent, however, they are hypothesized to effect the planning recommendations' political fate (i.e., the outcomes). These variables consist of planning agency organizational type, political culture of a community, and the political personality of a planner. Hypotheses have been developed which, rather than testing the whole model, test specific constructs. The final results of this paper attempt to sort out which independent variables are most strongly associated with the amount of work an agency conducts and that work's initial impact on society.

## CHAPTER II

### BODY OF KNOWLEDGE

#### Historical Developments in Planning

The development of the thesis of this paper depends in part on an understanding of the past development of planning in the U.S. Specifically, there are two major threads to consider: 1) changes in planning orientation; and 2) developments in the administration of planning.

The utility of city planning was first appreciated in the United States because of the need to lay out streets, blocks, and lots. Street and block patterns were for the most part laid out in grid fashion with few changes between communities. For the most part these first plans lacked character and merit.<sup>1</sup>

The 19th century was a period in the United States in which cities struggled with growing problems of locating streets and lots, water supplies, sewage disposal and transportation. During most of this period civic consciousness was at a low ebb. Slums grew due as much to ignorance of planning possibilities as greed. Eventually, slum conditions forced themselves on the attention of the reform movement. Reformers directed their energies towards the most obvious evils and their elimination--i.e., fraudulent elections, city employment, sanitation and water

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<sup>1</sup>There are, however, notable exceptions in the first layouts for the cities of Pittsburg and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Savannah, Georgia; and others. See: McLean, p. 5.



supplies, etc.--and left to later generations an assortment of problems of less compelling immediacy. Generally speaking, reform groups concentrated on overhauling local governments first, relegating to second place the needed physical improvements although municipal park movements, housing reform efforts, and other civic causes all made advances throughout the decade of the 1890's. The net result of the reform movement was to change the image of city planning from that of strict physical architecture to a general concern for social as well as physical problems through planning physical improvements.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the strongest impetus for city planning was the "City Beautiful Movement" originated in the United States by the Chicago World's Fair and Daniel Burnham's plan for a monumental and impressive Chicago waterfront.<sup>3</sup> The City Beautiful Movement inspired other cities to make plans which stressed the orderly arrangement of monumental buildings, roads, and grounds, and to implement these plans. Park planning and street planning were so designed that they encouraged an improvement in the beauty and efficiency of the cities.

In 1898, an Englishman named Ebenezer Howard proposed that new towns be developed with limited growth, incorporating industry to provide employment for residents, and permanent belts of parks and farms to enhance beauty and entertainment.<sup>4</sup> The impact of Howard's proposals was most strongly

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<sup>2</sup>Mel Scott, American City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 2, 40-42.

<sup>3</sup>McLean, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

felt in England where new towns were developed outside London. The movement spread quickly to the United States--most notably, the Greenbelt Towns built during the depression; Maremont, Ohio; Redburn, New Jersey; and Baldwin Hills, California.<sup>5</sup>

Most of these towns were significantly different from those in England in that they lacked incorporated industry so the towns could not become self-sufficient in terms of employment, and the land was not under single ownership: sections reserved for parks and farms quickly gave way to additional residential and industrial areas.<sup>6</sup> The new town movement within the United States, though not accomplishing the goals originally established, did serve the purpose of strengthening city planning, which became an integral part of new town construction.

The concept of comprehensiveness in planning--that is, taking into consideration not only physical elements before planning, but also historical, cultural, social, industrial, and hygienic data--was developed by Patrick Geddes in Scotland at approximately the same time as Howard's conception of new towns.<sup>7</sup> Geddes believed that the problems of the city could not be solved by looking at problems individually but rather he felt the city must be considered as a whole when planning. His ideas permeate contemporary European and United States city planning even though his writings are not particularly well known.

It was not until the 1920's that city planning emerged with a truly comprehensive view. At about this time it was recognized that com-

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Scott, pp. 339-342.

<sup>7</sup>McLean, p. 7.

prehensiveness would not only increase the efficiency of city planning but also cut down on the number of duplicated operations by centralizing the planning function in government.

Metropolitan planning is a useful illustration of the comprehensiveness of planning as it developed in the post-World War II era. It was recognized that planning for individual cities can have consequences for an entire area. State legislatures began passing enabling legislation in which cities were given the power to zone and control subdivisions in contiguous unincorporated areas varying from one-half mile to ten miles outside their legal boundaries.<sup>8</sup> The planning outlook became regional or metropolitan in nature when it was recognized that city developmental problems seldom end miraculously at invisible corporate boundaries, but extend beyond into fringe areas. Metropolitan planning made its first major stride when state legislatures passed further enabling legislation in the post-World War II era that empowered cities to enter into arrangements with other cities. Joint city-county agencies and joint county agencies are the most common form of administrative cooperative institutions created as a result of these forces.

The two developments which have helped the most to strengthen planning agencies have to do with finances. In the early 1930's it became apparent that the size and character of the physical plant of a city is determined in large measure by the city's desire and ability to pay for it. Accordingly, capital expenditure budgets began to receive attention. Since capital budgets in turn are directly related to annual administrative budgets, the need to correlate service programs, physical

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 8

planning, and financial planning became imperative. Recognition of the limits on community development imposed by limitations on ability to pay led progressive city planning agencies to embark on studies of community economic resources and methods of strengthening them.

The second major development was the federal government's post-World War II decision to adopt legislation that would aid cities in improving their older sections--urban renewal programs. Federal funding which became available with urban renewal provided a strong impetus for both large and small cities to increase their planning functions or to create planning agencies where they did not exist.<sup>9</sup> Urban renewal as conceived under the Housing Act of 1949 authorized:

810,000 new units of public housing over a six-year period and empowered the government to make loans and capital grants for redevelopment in the amounts specified by the administration (\$1 billion in loans and \$500 million in capital grants)...They (Congress) had declared that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people required housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing<sup>10</sup> through the clearance of slums and blighted areas.

Planning the improvements required by the Bill was to be a prerequisite for the funding of projects. For the first time since the beginning of city planning, city planners were being challenged to operationalize their theories regarding city redevelopment.

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<sup>9</sup> William T. Goodman and Eric C. Freud, eds., Principles and Practices of Urban Planning (Washington, D. C.: International City Managers Association, 1968), p. 27.

<sup>10</sup> Scott, p. 464.

Both urban renewal and planning were strengthened with the passage of the Housing Act of 1954. This legislation stressed the prevention of slums and blight. Title III of the Act pertained to:

slum clearance and urban renewal rather than to slum clearance and redevelopment, but since several other titles of the Act were related to this central program, the measure was in effect an urban renewal statute. As a condition for receiving federal assistance not only for the removal of slums but also for low rent public housing and the new F.H.A. insurance programs designed to facilitate clearance and rebuilding, the legislation required localities to put into operation a 'workable program' utilizing all means available to eliminate slums, rehabilitate still useful housing, and prevent the decline of areas as yet unaffected by blight. As indicated in the Act ...requirements (for funding) included a long-range general plan and such means of carrying it out as a program of public improvements, zoning ordinances, etc.<sup>11</sup>

The Act went further than providing funding for projects: it provided funding for general planning in cities of less than 25,000 in population and to official metropolitan planning agencies through Section 701 of the Act. Five million dollars in grants were authorized for this purpose.<sup>12</sup>

These two acts were the seminal works of a series of legislation which not only challenged planning agencies to put theory into practice in order to solve the problems of "the unheavenly city," but also recognized planning practices as the appropriate vehicle to attempt the solution of urban problems.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 501

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 502-503.

<sup>13</sup> Later acts of the federal government which have tended to increase both the scope and function of city planning are: The Housing Acts of 1956, 1957, 1959, and 1961; and more recently, the now defunct Model Cities Act. Planning thus has been strengthened and more fully incorporated into the scheme of city development.

Planning Organization and Administration<sup>14</sup>

Local planning agencies are, of course, governmental administrative organizations; certain descriptive and analytic concepts of public administration, therefore, apply to these agencies. It will be useful, here, to explain the role of some of those concepts as they relate to this work. We seek to describe three goals: 1) distinguish between line and staff functions of city planning; 2) describe the types of planning organizations which exist presently in the United States; and 3) set the stage for a more comprehensive review of the literature.

The terms "line" and "staff" activities attempt to refine areas of administrative responsibility. Traditionally borrowed from military terminology, "line" and "staff" functions refer to the type of duties an organization performs. "Line" is defined as any organization unit performing a direct governmental activity or service, such as municipal departments of police, fire, and public works. "Staff" is defined to include various activities that serve or assist line officials in the accomplishment of their programs. Personnel, budget, and administrative service units often have been cited as examples of staff agencies. Similarly, policy advisors to line officials and those engaged in aiding operating heads to develop program plans are considered staff rather than line officials.<sup>15</sup> In orthodox administrative theory, staff officials are said to be extensions of the personality of the executive, and in their relations with line agencies, are supposed to be representing

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<sup>14</sup>The following section relies heavily on: McLean, pp. 40-75.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

that official. "Staff" controls over line activities--i.e., budgetary constraints, personnel problems, are in reality not staff authority, but staff representing the executive and acting on that basis.

In city government it is difficult to distinguish between agencies carrying out line and staff activities. Heads of departments are line chiefs while directing their departments, but at the same time perform staff duties by advising the mayor or city council on actions needed in their departments. Where many departments are involved in both duties, it becomes difficult to classify them as line or staff. City planning departments are involved in both line and staff functions, although their primary duties seem to be within the definition of "staff" work. Their duties consist of deriving a number of solutions to existent problems within a community, selecting the best solution for the potential problem, and submitting it in recommendation format to their sponsoring agency; their sponsoring agency, in turn, submits it to the city council for action. Thus, unless city planning agencies are delegated line functions by their sponsoring agencies, their sole purpose is to draw up recommendations concerning solutions to problems or potential problems.<sup>16</sup>

Action is required by a legislative body to implement their recommendations or to not implement them. These recommendations appear to fall most often in the following general areas: 1) general advice on basic policy decisions in the areas of urban growth and development, 2) technical assistance to line agencies in certain technical areas, and 3) aid in coordination of various municipal activities through comprehensive planning.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-65. Note that most planning agencies are assigned further duties of the line type by their sponsoring organization.

Two major concepts of planning organization which need to be discussed are: 1) forms of planning agency organizational responsibility, and 2) organization of planning agencies. Planning agency organization consists of three different types (within the United States). Under these different forms the agency is directly responsible to one of the following governmental units: an independent planning commission, the city executive (mayor or manager), or the city council.<sup>17</sup> Planning agencies organized under an independent planning commission have been the most popular form in the United States. This is due in part to historic reasons and the nature of planning's origins. Planning, as noted earlier, has its origins deeply tied to the reform movement, part of whose philosophy was to decentralize decision making, thus making government more responsive to the general populace. The Standard City Planning and Enabling Act of 1928 prescribed an independent commission, composed of laymen, as the supervisory unit of planning agencies (or as the planning agency itself). This act had its basis in the reform ideology that "politics" should be kept out of planning and that "with a number of well-meaning citizens the best policy" would have to emerge.<sup>18</sup> The planning commissions were, ideally, supposed to hire professional staff<sup>19</sup> which would make recommendations to the commission. The commission, in turn,

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<sup>17</sup> Other organizational types are in existence; however, these three are the most common forms found today.

<sup>18</sup> Francine F. Rabinovitz and J. Stanley Pottinger, "Organization for Local Planning: The Attitudes of Directors," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 33 (January 1967): 27.

<sup>19</sup> Professional staff was not always hired due to fiscal constraints.



was to select the best recommendation and present it to the city council which, in turn, would take action on the recommendation.<sup>20</sup>

A good deal of criticism was (and still is) created by this administrative arrangement, the argument being that it led to inefficiency. Perhaps the harshest critic has been Robert Walker who urged that planning agencies be made directly responsible to the city executive since the city planner must serve as the liason for the agency in its relationships with the city manager, mayor, department head, etc.<sup>21</sup> In this type of arrangement the planning agency's recommendations go directly to the executive of the city (executive is referred to here as either mayor or manager) and the independent planning commission would be non-existent. The implications of this organizational pattern is that the mayor, who is most responsible for the recommendation's adoption, should be kept well informed on the recommendation in order to better promote the proposal. Similarly, Ranney points out in his book that executive sponsorship of planning proposals tends to increase its chances of adoption.<sup>22</sup>

The independent planning commission and the planning agency under executive sponsorship are the two most common forms of planning agencies in the United States.

In the early stages of the city planning movement the argument was advanced that planning agencies should be attached directly to the city council. Alfred Bettman and others argued that this arrangement would

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<sup>20</sup>Ranney, pp. 51-52.

<sup>21</sup>Robert A. Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), especially pp. 151 ff.

<sup>22</sup>Ranney, pp. 51-52.

protect planners from preoccupation with detailed administrative planning, which would come inevitably with subordination to the municipal executive departments.<sup>23</sup> However, contemporary authors seem to support executive sponsorship as the most efficient form of planning organization.

There are varied forms within planning agencies themselves throughout the United States. They may or may not have an executive director and professional staff (in small cities and towns the expense of maintaining a professional staff may be prohibitive; consequently, planning activities may be carried out by a private consulting firm or an independent planning commission composed of laymen). The agency may be combined with other departments (i.e., city development, urban renewal) or may be a single agency which is responsible for planning in several cities, a region, or a county. Like the administrative organization of planning agencies, virtually every form is unique; and in both cases, the best form for any individual city is that which works best in that city.

#### Review of the Literature

Since variations exist in both administrative and organizational forms one expects that there will be quantitative and qualitative variations in organizational performance, in the impacts of planning, and in areas of involvement in planning. The literature itself reflects these variations both in the areas of planning examined and the analytical approach used. Areas examined range from one specific issue<sup>24</sup> to broad

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<sup>23</sup>McLean, p. 71

<sup>24</sup>Harold M. Baron, ed., The Racial Aspects of Urban Planning (Chicago: Chicago Urban League, 1968).

models of planning behavior;<sup>25</sup> approaches used include those based on models of conceptual orientation<sup>26</sup> and those which are comparative empirical policy analyses.<sup>27</sup> Probably the most comprehensive model used to examine planning behavior was developed by David C. Ranney.

In his book, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis, he develops a conceptual model which utilizes characteristics of the community, of the planning agency, and of relationships among governments (i.e., funding), inputs into the planning process from sources within and outside of the government, and the planner developing the plan (see Figure 2.1).<sup>28</sup> According to the model, planning recommendations are determined by the needs and desires of the community as determined by the planner. His recommendations must not be based on reality alone but must also be based on potential feasibility. A plan which is politically infeasible will be rejected by the ultimate governmental decision-makers. Ranney further hypothesizes that the political culture of a community is the prime determinant of the position planning takes within a community.<sup>29</sup> Since planning is a reform activity it follows that communities with a decided "public regarding" attitude would be more likely to accept planning as not only a legitimate but desirable government activity, whereas non-reform oriented communities would be less likely to do so. In the final analysis, the decision about whether or not to implement

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<sup>25</sup>Ranney, chaps. 1-3 passim; Guy Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley: The Glendessary Press, 1972).

<sup>26</sup>Ranney, Benveniste.


<sup>27</sup>Lineberry; Burby.

<sup>28</sup>Ranney, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 145-147.

Figure 2.1

Planning Decisions as a Function of the Political System  
 (Source: David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis, p. 15)



the planner's recommendation is not as dependent upon community characteristics as it is on individual actors and the political relationships which characterize a community. Ranney's model not only shows actors' relationships, as based on their stakes in planning and influence within the system; it also treats the fact that a plan itself can hold political implications (See Figure 2.2).<sup>30</sup> Plans can take on political overtones as a result of: 1) the subject matter of the plan, 2) the scope of decisions made necessary in the plan, and 3) the specificity to commitment to action in the plan. If, for example, a plan drifts towards the policy planning area, with broad sweeping decisions, and a very specific commitment to implementation; it becomes politically difficult, perhaps even undesirable. Decision makers who must act upon the plan find it easier to make decisions if the plan can be kept physically oriented, with incremental decisions, and with a general commitment to implementation which is so structured that plans may be disregarded or temporarily halted if they become politically controversial. After a decision is reached by governmental actors on whether to implement a plan or not, feedback to all parts of the system provides new inputs into the dynamics of the plan. While Ranney's model is not comprehensive enough to analyze planning policies (as compared to planning decisions) it does provide a thorough and conceptually appealing orientation to the decision-making process in planning.

One problem which Ranney may be accused of underemphasizing is the potential political power which is available to the planner to defend his

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 142-143.

Figure 2.2

Dimensions of Planning as Determinants of Planning Policy  
 (Source: Ranney, pp. 142-143)

$\overline{AB}$  = Subject Matter of Plans

A = Physical Plan

B = Policies Plan

$\overline{CD}$  = Scope of Decisions

C = Incremental Decisions

D = Broad Sweeping Decisions

$\overline{EF}$  = Specificity of Commitment


E = General Commitment

F = Very Specific Commitment

O = Midpoint

Z = Plan Which Deals With  
 All Public Policies,  
 Extensive Changes, Very  
 Specific

X = Plan Which Deals With  
 Physical Environment,  
 Incremental Changes,  
 Vague Commitment



Proposals before the city council. The arguments advanced in this area range from "planners have no political power"<sup>31</sup> to "expertise and roles assumed by the planner along with his relative position in government,

<sup>31</sup>Judd and Mendelson, pp. 47, 110-117.

provide the planner with an equal role of (sic) decision-making in the planning process."<sup>32</sup>

Expertise, professionalism, and the position of the planner in the decision-making process have all been cited as tools available to planners with which to defend proposals made to city councilmen and/or city executives. Expertise--i.e., technical specialization in a relatively complicated field in which technical advisement is a necessity for policy decision-making--is perhaps the most potent weapon of the three. Several authors have pointed out that a bureaucrat's contribution to the decision-making process tends to increase as the area examined becomes more technically specialized.<sup>33</sup>

The relative specialization of some areas of city planning (transportation facility location, public facility location, public utility location) and the complex techniques available for city planning (i.e., industrial complex analysis, economic base techniques, forecasting land use requirements, interregional linear programming, etc.) means that planners may be characterized and indeed perceived by council members as having a

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<sup>32</sup>Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning.

<sup>33</sup>See, for example, Heinz Eulau, "Skill Revolution and the Consultative Commonwealth," American Political Science Review 67 (March 1973): 168-191; Jaleel Ahmad, The Expert and the Administrator (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1959), p. 12; Thomas E. Scism, "Fluoridation in Local Politics: Study of the Failure of a Proposed Ordinance in One American City," American Journal of Public Health 62 (October 1972): 1342-1344. Scism notes that experts "are influential in the process of decision making for most non-controversial issues, but that their influence declines as councilmen sense public interest to be either present or potential." This would seem to suggest another factor in expertise--that of public reaction to issues. It must be noted, however, that for the most part planning is viewed as a legitimate governmental function with little controversial concern.

high degree of expertise.<sup>34</sup> The potential political power of expertise is derived from the expert's knowledge of facts and his usage of them in an area which is relatively unknown to laymen.<sup>35</sup> In many cases a planner's recommendation is much like a doctor's diagnosis: the only person capable of verifying his findings is another person with similar skills. The use of a consulting planner is, however, sharply limited if the consultant must work from the studies carried out by the original planner. Given the same facts in the same situation, different planners are likely to come to the same general type of solution to a problem (although specifics may vary). In order to come to a new, independent conclusion, the consulting planner would have to conduct new base studies, which if not politically unfeasible is often economically impossible. Thus the planner, at times, stands unchallenged in his solutions to problems.

"Professionalism," like "expertise," is powerful precisely because specialization increases an individual's power. But more, "professionals" have an added dimension of legitimacy (from the public's viewpoint) by adding the dimensions of professional organization membership and social utility to the concept of "expertise."

Barr illustrates these concepts by defining a profession as having inherently "...a particular social usefulness. In addition to acquiring knowledge and mechanical skills, a professional seeks to demonstrate its

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<sup>34</sup> For a more complex treatment of analytic methods available to, and areas examined by city planners, see: Goodman and Freud, pp. 49-185.

<sup>35</sup> Benveniste, p. 33.



social utility. Professional organizations continually and publicly justify the professionals' social existence."<sup>36</sup>

Both professionalism and expertise tend to strengthen the power of planners, but two factors tend to weaken the impact of these sources of strength:

- 1) Planning is a special type of pre-action action. The immediate output of the act of planning is a decision about action--still an internalized action rather than one turned outward with direct impact on the environment. Thus planning is (at least) two steps removed from an actual environment-shaping activity.<sup>37</sup>

The planner is thus limited in the usage of his expertise to the formulation of the plan and its presentation to the city council. The decision for adoption or rejection of the plan may or may not be affected by his expertise.<sup>38</sup> Rather the decision on whether or not to implement the plan rests largely on the political values it pursues and the political constraints faced by the city council and executive.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Donald A. Barr, "The Professional Urban Planner," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 38 (May 1972): 155.

<sup>37</sup> Henry Fagin, "Advancing the State of the Art," in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. by Ernest Erber (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), pp. 133-134.

<sup>38</sup> Scism, p. 1342. Note that Scism argues the attitude of the public regarding the issue is one determinant of the impact expertise has on decision makers.

<sup>39</sup> Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "City Planning and Political Values," Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (March 1971): 341.

The second factor which tends to weaken the impact of a planner's expertise is that while agencies which handle areas of expertise tend to be stable once organized, the experts themselves are not.<sup>40</sup> Overt conflict with decision makers regarding the contents of a plan (regardless of the amount and quality of expertise and professionalism) is likely to result in someone changing jobs, or in the plan being discarded to protect larger interests. As a St. Paul planner put it:

"Any attempt to draw up a plan not in accordance with the political expectations was asking for ...controversy. Controversy was an obstacle to be avoided at all costs in order that a planning process be accepted politically. The planning process was more important to maintain than was any single plan."<sup>41</sup>

Expertise and professionalism, while they may be satisfactory tools to persuade laymen to support a plan,<sup>42</sup> cannot be considered effective in avoiding personal conflict with city politicians.

"Both the politician and the planner see themselves as being the best fit individual to coordinate public policy. The conflict between some planners and some politicians arises because each believes that he is best fit through training, experience, and institutional expectations--to serve the public as broker-mediator, coordinator, and goal maker. This conflict of identity can best be resolved, and the planner's effectiveness enhanced, if he is willing to accept the vital but more limited role that our system assigns to the public employee."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Benveniste, p. 32.

<sup>41</sup> Altshuler, p. 130.

<sup>42</sup> Scism suggests that expertise and professionalism may not even fulfill the role of laymen persuasion in many cases. Scism, p. 1344.

<sup>43</sup> Beckman, p. 324.

The placement of the planning function inside government can help legitimize a planner and the duties he performs in the public's viewpoint. However, this placement means little to other governmental employees and officials.

These personal characteristics (i.e., expertise, professionalism, personality, and position) do not, by themselves, explain variations between planning agencies when we shift our attention to outputs. Research indicates that when these characteristics are combined with characteristics of a community's political culture, then they serve as a weak (statistically) explicative of planning agency variations. Altshuler, in his study of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, found that as planners became attuned to the political climate of a city, they changed their behavior to correspond to the community's political culture; with a resultant increase in their effectiveness as measured by the number of their plans being implemented.<sup>44</sup> Rabinovitz, in a comparative case study of five New Jersey cities, came to a similar conclusion about the number of plans implemented in relation to the role a planner assumes within various types of communities.<sup>45</sup> (These two studies are discussed in more detail further on in Chapter II.) These two studies suggest that the degree to which a planner is politicized within the community may be a better determinant of variations between planning agencies than his expertise or professionalism.

Organization, as noted above, has generally been considered an important determinant of the effectiveness of a planner.<sup>46</sup> Planning's

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<sup>44</sup>Altshuler, pp. 52-59, 130, 256.

<sup>45</sup>Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning, p. 80.

<sup>46</sup>Walker, pp. 366-367.

position within the government structure has been determined in large part by people outside planning. The Department of Commerce's Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928 originally placed the planning function under an independent commission. The commission form, as originally intended, was to provide some insulation or protection from public officials (i.e.,--big city machines' graft and corruption).<sup>47</sup> However, the argument against placing the planning function under commissions (as developed by Robert Walker) was that unnecessary insulation from the executive and city council did not produce a cohesive working relationship.<sup>48</sup> Instead, it produced unnecessary tensions between planners and the final decision-making group regarding planning recommendations. It was hypothesized that if the city planner was made more responsible to the city's chief executive, and was allowed to bring the planning proposals before the city council, then:

- 1) The planner would be more politically stable.
- 2) City development as envisioned by the city administration and city planner would be more coordinated.
- 3) The planner could work with less tensions, since he would be working for the individual who was most responsible for his hiring and/or dismissal.
- 4) Planning proposals would become more politically pragmatic since there would be a closer working relationship with the mayor.

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<sup>47</sup> Henry Cohen, "The Changing Role of the Planner in the Decision-Making Process," in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), pp. 175-177.

<sup>48</sup> For a more detailed summary of organizational impact on planning agency efficiency see: Deil S. Wright, "Governmental Form and Planning Functions: The Relation of Organizational Structures to Planning Practice," in Planning and Politics: Uneasy Partnership, eds. Thad L. Beyle and George T. Lathrop (New York: Odyssey Press, 1970), pp. 68-105; and, Rabinovitz and Pottinger, pp. 27-33.

- 5) Planning proposals would have a better chance for adoption since the mayor would present them to the council as opposed to a member of an outside government agency--i.e., the planning commission. (Similar arguments exist for the planner being directly responsible to the city council.)

To date these claims have not been substantiated by empirical studies. Those comparative empirical works which have examined these hypotheses have found no evidence for their validity.

Perhaps the two harshest critics of the organization thesis (although in an indirect manner) have been Altshuler and Rabinovitz. Altshuler's study of Minneapolis-St. Paul found no evidence to support the organization thesis. By contrast, he argued that the independent commission was a source of strength rather than weakness, because:

- 1) Commissions gave independence to planners with whom they worked. No limitations were placed on them by the executive.
- 2) Neither of the cities' mayors had authority or desire to coordinate city development with the planning department.
- 3) In cases examined the citizen's commissions acted as an arbiter between the planners and the politicians.
- 4) The commission provided influence and prestige to the planning department when it was needed.<sup>49</sup>

Altshuler concludes that "organization" has no impact on the determination of planning effectiveness; the success of the planning department is dependent on the role planners play in relation to a community's political order.<sup>50</sup>

Rabinovitz, in a series of publications, continued to examine Altshuler's thesis that the roles which planners assume are determinants of

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<sup>49</sup> Altshuler, pp. 384-385.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 388-389.

city planning outputs.<sup>51</sup> In her book, City Politics and Planning, which is an examination of six different planners in five New Jersey cities, Rabinovitz carries the theories beyond Altshuler, although she came to conclusions similar to Altshuler's. She develops typologies of planning behavior which consist of various positions a planner can assume regarding plan formulation and the amount of political support he may expect to receive for his plan. These range from a "sell-out" position, where the planner ignores his own personal views regarding planning and the needs of a community and promotes the views of the city executive, to an "advocate" position, where the planner may be active in the pursuit of his own goals or some other interest. These typologies, in turn, are related to a community's political culture with regard to centralization of power within a community.<sup>52</sup> Rabinovitz's typologies thus link the success of planning (which is determined by the number and quality of plans implemented) to not only an individual planner's actions but to the actions as they relate to a community's political culture.

John C. Ries, in his dissertation prospectus, developed typologies similar to Rabinovitz's, for planning behavior. His typologies add the dimension of "Consensus on Values" found within a community as a supplement to the centralization of power found within a community. By cross-tabulating these two variables, Ries developed a four-cell table which defines the degree

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<sup>51</sup>Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Politics, Personality, and Planning," Public Administration Review 27 (March 1967): 18-24; Rabinovitz and Pottinger; Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning.

<sup>52</sup>Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning, pp. 45-112.

of centralization of power within a community and the degree of public support for planning proposals. Following this, Ries developed typologies of planning roles which fit into a community's political culture dependent upon the variables: 1) centralization of power, and 2) consensus on values. (See Figure 2.3) The roles, as characterized by Ries in his typology, can be characterized as:

- 1) Technician--the planner remains politically neutral, drumming up solutions to problems which exist within a community, and allowing proposals to be acted upon according to their merits.
- 2) Broker--the planner attempts to draw up solutions for one segment of the populace in such a manner as not to alienate other sections of the populace.
- 3) Mobilizer--a planner solicits support for his planning proposals through educative meetings which he deems appropriate.
- 4) Negotiator--the planner develops plans which attempt to meet the needs of competing interests or goals at the same time through compromise.
- 5) Sell-out--planner limits his activities to those deemed appropriate by the power center(s) within a community.<sup>53</sup>

Ries fits these characteristics of planning roles into his model of community power and value distribution according to the principle that a planner will never act against his own will (to do so could only result in non-decisions or unemployment). A planner will, of course, vary the role he assumes according to different types of situations; politically knowledgeable planners will (theoretically) always act in the role which will maximize their influence and interests (or, at least, minimize the risks and their consequences). Ries' typologies attempt to place the

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
<sup>53</sup>John C. Ries, Planners and Politics (Berkeley: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1969), p. 18.

Figure 2.3

Ries' Typologies of Planning Behavior as Determined by Value  
Consensus and Centralization of Power

(Source: John C. Ries, Planners and Politics, p. 18)

Key to planner's role  
according to value and  
resource distribution





planner in such a position that by his actions he neither offends the community power structure nor attempts to promote plans which would disturb a community's values.

Other studies, while not developing such explicit conceptual typologies, tend to relate planning outputs to a planner's position in a community and his politicization within that community.<sup>54</sup> One study attempted to find correlations between the characteristics of a community and planning agency expenditures, but found no substantial correlations between expenditures and any of the variables tested.<sup>55</sup>

To sum up, research in the area of this thesis in general argues that (at least as a theoretical orientation) outputs of planning agencies can be fruitfully explained by: 1) a community's political culture, 2) the organization of a planning agency, 3) roles which a planner assumes, and 4) a planner's personal characteristics. Other factors which may be related to the outputs of a planning agency include those defined by Ranney (described at the beginning of this chapter).

It must be kept in mind that empirical testing of the relationships hypothesized has been limited by two major reasons: 1) the unavailability of data, and 2) methodological constraints. As a result, comparative empirical works in this area tend to be limited in quantity and quality.

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<sup>54</sup> See: Judd and Mendelson, pp. 202-208; Patterson, pp. 86-87, 199-202; Krueckeberg, "Variations in Behavior of Planning Agencies," p. 202.

<sup>55</sup> Lineberry, p. 729. In the causal model developed, Lineberry is only able to explain 14% of the variance found between planning agencies using 24 variables. This may, however, represent a weakness in Lineberry's methodological approach to the problem rather than a weakness in his theoretical approach. His decision to use expenditures as the variable measuring planning agency outputs is somewhat tainted since many federal and state grants are available to certain planning agencies.

## CHAPTER III

### THEORETICAL ORIENTATION AND HYPOTHESES

Planning is essentially a reform activity, and planners themselves tend to be reform oriented. A survey of planning directors conducted by Professors Rabinovitz and Pottinger in 1965 clearly suggested that the great majority of planning directors viewed their role as something more than that of a technical specialist. Two important conclusions drawn from the findings were that: 1) most planning directors tend to view themselves and their positions as more important than politicians or the role politicians play; and 2) planners, as a group, viewed themselves as the exact opposite of their perceptions of politicians regarding personal and professional values and goals.<sup>1</sup>

If, historically and ideologically, planning and planners are linked to reformism, does this linkage have any impact on the work done by planning agencies?

Hypothesis 1. Reformism tends to be positively associated with the amount of planning outputs as measured by an agency's workload.

Along similar lines most studies have concluded that planning is promoted largely as a public-regarding value. Meyerson and Banfield found in

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<sup>1</sup>Rabinovitz and Pottinger, p. 28. Similar conclusions have also been reached by: Wright, p. 69; Frederick Gutheim, "The Politics of the Metropolis," in Planning and the Urban Community, ed. Harvey S. Perloff (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1961), pp. 89-92.

Chicago that planning officials, representing middle class public-regarding interests, were ordinarily supported by business interests and opposed by ethnic and working class interests.<sup>2</sup> Altshuler's study of planning notes that "businessmen have been the primary patrons of the urban planning movement since its beginnings."<sup>3</sup> Banfield and Wilson's theory regarding ethnic and working class elements being private-regarding would suggest their reservations about planning policy.<sup>4</sup> Wolfinger and Field tested the hypothesis that planning expenditures and the ethnic proportion of the population were negatively related and found no evidence to substantiate the hypothesis.<sup>5</sup> It will, however, be useful to see if any relationship emerges between class interests and the number of areas in which planning agencies are working. The next hypotheses are, then:

Hypothesis 2. Cities with larger middle and upper class groups in their populations will be involved in more areas of planning than will cities with smaller middle and upper class populations.

Hypothesis 3. Cities with heavy concentrations of ethnic minorities will be involved in less areas of planning activity than will cities with smaller concentrations of ethnic minorities.

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<sup>2</sup>Edward C. Banfield and Martin Myerson, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest (New York: Free Press, 1955), Chaps. 9-11, passim.

<sup>3</sup>Altshuler, p. 323.

<sup>4</sup>Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 234-240.

<sup>5</sup>Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review 60 (June, 1966): 322-324.

Since planning has its basis in reform and is supposedly guided by the rational model of decision making we can also hypothesize that those cities with the greatest need for planning will be involved in more areas of planning than cities with less community needs. More specifically, this hypothesis states:

Hypothesis 4. Cities with a higher degree of population density, population change, community poverty, and overcrowded housing will be involved in more areas of planning than will cities showing a lower degree of community need in these items.

The following hypotheses are designed to test correlations between various independent variables and Eastonian outcome variables (the degree to which planning agency recommendations are followed), and so require a different orientation and a different set of independent variables.

In some expositions of theory, centralization of power is considered a prime determinant of outputs (or outcomes) of public policy within cities. Terry Clark, in his study of 51 American communities, found that the more centralized the decision-making structure, the higher the level of outputs in a controversial area.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Crain and Rosenthal, while examining fluoridation decisions argued that communities with centralized power structures were more innovative than communities with less centralized power structures. Communities in the study with decentralized power structures were less capable of making decisions about fluoridation of water.<sup>7</sup> Hawley's

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<sup>6</sup>Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Cities," American Sociological Review 33 (August, 1968): pp. 588-589.

<sup>7</sup>Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Structure and Value in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation Decisions," Journal of Politics 28 (February, 1966): p. 186.

examination of urban renewal programs found in all cases centralized power structures producing a higher level of outputs than decentralized power structures.<sup>8</sup> With these findings in mind, and since the outcomes of planning agency recommendations are equivalent to city council outputs, it can be hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 5. Communities with centralized power structures will implement planning agency recommendations more than communities with decentralized power structures.

Since decentralization of power was an original goal of the reform movement, it follows that:

Hypothesis 6. Strongly reformed communities will implement planning agency recommendations less than will non-reformed communities.

Similar to the thesis espoused by Rabinovitz and Ries<sup>9</sup> that planners can control, at least in part, their own destinies by assuming different roles within different types of communities, it can be speculated that a planner who is closer to the power center will have more support for his agency than one who is not. An indirect measure of this relationship can be based on the degree to which a planner is "politicized" within a community. If, as has been suggested, a planner will act to promote his own existence, a politicized planner, realizing where power lies within a community, will closely associate himself with the true power structure. Thus:

Hypothesis 7. As planners become more politicized, the degree to which plans are implemented increases.

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<sup>8</sup> Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology 68 (January, 1963): p. 429.

<sup>9</sup> Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning, pp. 45-112; Ries, p. 18.

Walker's thesis, in conjunction with revisions regarding centralization of power seems to have some merit (at least theoretically).<sup>10</sup> It would appear that as a planner becomes more organizationally aligned with the city executive, he will have more knowledge of what is desired by the executive, and attune his plans accordingly, thus gaining more support for planning recommendations from the executive when before the city council. This increase in support is likely to increase the implementation of planning recommendations. It can be hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 8. As a planner becomes organizationally more responsible to the city executive, his recommendations are more likely to be implemented.

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<sup>10</sup>  
Walker, pp. 151ff.

## CHAPTER IV

### METHOD OF ANALYSIS

#### Subjects of Study

The 136 cities examined in this study were selected on the following basis: (1) Geographic location--due to time and fiscal constraints on this study the list of possible cities to be examined was limited to cities in the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin; (2) Population size--cities examined ranged from 25,000 to 3,400,000 in population according to the 1970 census. No cities were examined below 25,000 due to the relative difficulty in obtaining census data for cities of this size; (3) Planning agency requirements--due to the nature of this study, only those cities with professionally staffed planning agencies with legal jurisdiction of the city were examined. A list of such cities is available in the 1972 Municipal Yearbook;<sup>1</sup> (4) Census data--cities with planning agencies were further limited to include only those cities for which census information could be found in the City and County Data Book.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>International City Managers Association, 1972 Municipal Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: International City Manager's Association), pp. 66-79. Where incomplete information was listed the 1969 Municipal Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: International City Manager's Association), pp. 239-259, was used as a crossreference.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, County and City Data Book (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 629-797.

This sample of planning agencies is not random, but rather represents those planning agencies found within medium to large size communities which have professional staffs servicing the community itself. Where the staffs served a geographic area larger than the community, data were gathered regarding only that part of the planning agency servicing the community.

#### Description of the Sample

The mean population of the cities studied was 107,800, with population density ranging from 850 per square mile to 15,140 per square mile; the growth rate from 1960 to 1970 ranged from -19% to +748%.

Subgroups within the cities studied were quite diverse. First and second generation foreign population ranged from 3% to 17% of the cities' total population. Negro population as a percentage of the total population of a community ranged from 0% to 32% with a mean of 7.7%. The population of the cities examined exhibited a great deal of variance in education and income (see Chart 4.1). Apparently, the populations of the communities studied were relatively rich compared to the country as a whole.

#### City Government and Planning Agency Characteristics

Over 50% of the cities studied had a council-manager form of city government while 28% had a mayor-council form, and 3% had a commission form; the remaining 17% was unascertainable. A plurality of the cities studied had non-partisan elections (45%), with only 20% of the cities having partisan elections. Of those cities surveyed, 64% elected at least one member of their city council in at-large elections, while 36% held strict ward elections for city council members.



TABLE 4.1  
 EDUCATION AND INCOME OF THE POPULATION  
 OF THE CITY SAMPLE (1970 Figures)

Population Characteristics	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Median Education of Population-in years	136	9.6	16.6	12.32	.878
% of Population in White Collar Work Force	136	29.5	84.0	53.2	5.74
Median Family Income	136	7440	21757	11004	2455
% of Families with Income of \$5000 or Less	136	3.0	29.5	14.6	5.7
% of Families with Income of \$15,000 or More	136	9.1	71.6	25.5	13.2

Organizational forms of planning agencies within city governments in the sample varied greatly. Of the 136 planning agencies in the sample 41.2% were organized under an independent planning commission, 16% were organized as departments of the city executive, and 15% were organized as joint community development and planning agencies under executive leadership. The remaining agencies were either joint city-county units (12%) or were organized under some other form (15%).

Executive directors of the planning agencies were asked to whom they felt most responsible in city government for agency activities. Of the 136 agency directors surveyed, 16.9% felt responsible to the mayor, 33.1% felt responsible to the city manager, 8.1% to an independent planning

commission, 1.5% to the city council, 5% responded other and 35% did not respond. Executive directors of planning agencies in the survey were also asked about their socio-economic characteristics. The survey suggests that planning agency directors are recruited from a variety of educational backgrounds and have, as a group, a high amount of education.<sup>3</sup>

### Tasks of the Study

In addition to demographic and city government characteristics, other variables which were hypothesized to be relevant to planning agencies were gathered by sending a mail questionnaire to the executive director of the planning agency in each of the 136 cities in the sample. Enclosed with the questionnaire were instructions for its completion and a stamped, addressed, return envelope. Executive directors were requested to fill out the questionnaire and return it with any additional comments they wished to make within four weeks of receiving the questionnaire. Of the 136 executives surveyed, 89 or 65.4% completed and returned usable responses. All questions utilized in the mail survey were drawn from surveys used by other scholars and were adapted to planning agency activities where appropriate and/or necessary. A copy of the questionnaire is included in Appendix A.

### Input Variables to the Planning System

Input variables of this model are hypothesized to effect a planning agency's output (amount of work accomplished). Reformism, one of the inputs to the system, was defined by a scale created by counting the

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<sup>3</sup>Education of planners ranged from 15 to 24 years.

number of reform attributes which exist in a community. Characteristics looked at were: (1) at-large elections, (2) non-partisan elections, and (3) council-manager or commission forms of government. Where reform characteristics were present in a community, the reformism scale was equivalent to the number of reforms in that community. Where none of these reform characteristics were present, the community received a zero on the reformism scale. As with all other cases in the study, where complete data was not present for a case, it was eliminated from that phase of the analysis. Both the scale and the scoring system have been adopted from the article by Professors Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities."<sup>4</sup>

Community socio-economic status is a composite scale variable based on the population's: (1) median family income, (2) percentage of the work force in white collar occupations, and (3) median education. The variable ranks each community on a seven point additive scale which is based on the standard deviations of each of the components. In each case those cities with scores on the components of the scale below the standard deviation (s.d.) were scored one, the ones above the s.d. were scored three, and those within the s.d. were scored two. The scores of the three components of the scale were added together for each community producing a variable with values from three to nine, with three representing a community with a low socio-economic status and nine representing one with a very high status.

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<sup>4</sup>Robert L. Lineberry, and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review 61 (September 1967): 715.

Ethnic population was defined and measured as a variable combining the percentage of Negro population in a community with the percentage of foreign stock in the population. Community poverty measures the percentage of families in a community with income less than 5000 dollars in 1970.

### Moderating Variables

Moderating variables, as utilized in this study, are independent variables but differ from input variables in two ways: (1) they are hypothesized to effect outcomes as opposed to outputs, and (2) they may themselves be affected by input and output variables in the system. This study utilizes three such variables: (1) a planner's politicization, (2) organizational responsibility of the planning agency, and (3) centralization of power within a community.

The executive director's (or planner's) politicization is a composite measurement of a planner's acceptance or rejection of politics within a community. More specifically, the politicization variable used combines measures of attitudes towards: (1) political processes or a sense of the influence which flows from political power and the relevant activities to that end, (2) attitudes towards politics as a means of conflict resolution, and (3) political activity or a sense of political efficacy.

Pragmatic and legal constraints on a planner's political activity influenced the author of this study to weight political activity at half the value of the other two variables in the politicization scale. The result of this is to make the politicization variable less sophisticated than some of the others; although it still provides an essentially unobtrusive measure of politicization since those actors who are most strongly

bound to politics in the community are likely to be highly politicized.<sup>5</sup> The index was constructed by using a five-point Likert-type scale for each question and then combining questions to make a composite index.

The variable utilized to measure organizational responsibility of the planning agency relies on Walker's thesis that planning agencies which are organized under the city executive are more likely to have their plans implemented than other forms of organization due to their proximity to the chief executive. Consequently, organizational responsibility is a measure of the city unit under which the planning agency is organized, ranked according to executive centralization. The executive centralization typology is a modification of an existing variable designed to fit planning agency organization.<sup>6</sup> The ordering of the new variable is:

- |                                    |                     |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. council-manager                 | (most centralized)  |
| 2. mayor-council                   | ↕                   |
| 3. city-commission                 | (continuum)         |
| 4. independent planning commission | ↕                   |
| 5. other                           | (least centralized) |

Centralization of power within a community is operationalized as the distribution of power in a community according to the perceptions of the executive director of the planning agency. A 9-point scale allots values ranging from a wide dispersal of power (1 on the scale) to a high concentration of power within a community (9 on the scale).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Questions utilized in the politicization scale are adapted from the "civic duty and sense of political effectiveness" measure of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. See: John P. Robinson, Jerold G. Rusk, and Kendra B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research, 1972), pp. 479-481.

<sup>6</sup>Crain and Rosenthal, pp. 178-179.

<sup>7</sup>This scale was adapted from: Burby, Appendix A.

### Output Variables

In the proposed model outputs are a measure of the amount of work accomplished by an agency. In other models outputs have been operationalized as agency budget expenditures. However, budget expenditures are an unsatisfactory measure of planning agency outputs due to the large number of federal grants available to planning agencies.<sup>8</sup> The model used in this study seeks to correct for this inadequacy by using a weighted scale of planning workloads for the fiscal year 1970 as a measure of outputs.<sup>9</sup> Thus, while one agency may be doing work which is significantly better than another agency, both agencies are treated and scored equally if they are involved in the same number of work areas. This, however, is not an unmixed liability to this study in that it removes qualitative and/or subjective judgements from service decision performance.

### Outcomes

Outcomes, the second type of dependent variable in this study, are a measure of the impact planning agency recommendations have on society or the degree to which recommendations are implemented. Two measures have been developed for this variable. The first measure is a three-question index which asks the executive director to evaluate the success of his agency on the following criteria:

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<sup>8</sup>Lineberry, "Community Structure," pp. 729-730.

<sup>9</sup>The weaknesses of this type of scale have been discussed in more detail in other texts; however, the most serious limitations lies in the fact that all parts of the variable are treated the same. Kruekeberg, "Multivariate Analysis," p. 320.

1. implementation of new plans where opposition is not present,
2. blocking projects which the planning agency has deemed harmful to the community, and
3. shaping pet projects of the planning agency which run into opposition within a community.

A 7-point Likert-type scaling system is used for each question ranging from ineffective to extremely effective.<sup>10</sup>

The second measure of outcomes asks the executive directors of planning agencies to evaluate how the city administration conforms to the dictates of long-range comprehensive plans.<sup>11</sup> While the first scale uses more comprehensive criteria for evaluating outcomes, both scales seem valuable in determining the probable outcomes planning agencies have on society. Both of these scales at best can only be categorized as indirect measures of planning outcomes. However, these scales are not only the best tools available for measuring this quality, but also the only tools available.

### Data Analysis

The hypotheses presented in an earlier section of this paper are tested through the usage of parametric and non-parametric tests of association of variables available through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences on the CDC 6000 and Cyber 70 computers.<sup>12</sup> The specific

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<sup>10</sup>First utilized by Rabonovitz, this scale seeks to evaluate a planning agency's work impact. Rabinovitz's criterion is listed in: Douglas Harmon, "Can Planner Find Happiness in a Political World," Public Administration Review 30 (July 1970): 449.

<sup>11</sup>Adapted from: Burby, Appendix A.

<sup>12</sup>Norman Nie et. al., Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 604-613.

tests utilized for testing hypotheses were the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) used for testing cardinal and interval type data.<sup>13</sup> Kendall's tau ( $\tau$ ) was used with ordinal type data.<sup>14</sup> Significance tests used for both measures of association are derived from the use of Student's  $t$  in comparison with the number of degrees of freedom in the comparisons.<sup>15</sup> The accepted level of significance ( $p$ ) used is .05 or less for all coefficients.

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<sup>13</sup> Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Science (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 403-407; John Mueller, Karl Schuessler, and Herbert Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 307-324; Nie et. al., pp. 276-288.

<sup>14</sup> David C. Leege, and Wayne L. Francis, Political Research (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 289-303; Nie et. al., pp. 288-292.

<sup>15</sup> Nie et. al., p. 290.



## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES

#### Output Hypotheses-Analysis

Hypothesis 1--Reformism tends to be positively associated with the amount of planning outputs as measured by an agency's workload.


Statistical analysis did not substantiate reformism as being associated with planning outputs (see Figure 5.1). The Pearson correlation obtained between the two variables was neither strong ( $r = .05$ ), nor statistically significant ( $p > .05$ ). Reformism as measured in this study does not appear to be a determinant of planning outputs.

Hypothesis 2--Cities with larger middle and upper class groups in their populations will be involved in more areas of planning than will cities with smaller middle and upper class populations.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship between a community's socio-economic status and a planning agency's outputs. Contrary to the hypothesized relationships, the findings tend to verify the null hypothesis, i.e., cities with larger upper and middle class groups are involved in less areas of planning than cities with smaller middle and upper class groups in their population ( $\text{Tau} = -.28, p < .01$ ). Validity checks for this relationship were established by using education and income levels of a community's population as substituted independent variables for class groupings (see Table 5.1). In all cases, the new results tended to substantiate the null hypothesis.

Figure 5.1

Scattergram of the Relationship Between the Number of Reforms in a Community and the Areas of Work in Which a Planning Agency is Involved



$r = -.05$

$p > .05$

$N = 72$

Figure 5.2

Scattergram of the Distribution of Communities When a Communities Socio-Economic Status is Correlated with Planning Agency Outputs as Measured by Planning Agency Workloads in 1970




TABLE 5.1

The Relationship Between Socio-Economic Status, Education,  
and Income as Determinants of Planning Outputs

	SES	Income Greater Than \$15,000	Median Family Income	% of Population With More Than 16 Years Education
Planning Agency Workload 1970	Tau = - .28 p < .05 (N = 136)	r = -.17 p < .05 (N = 136)	r = -.14 p < .05 (N = 136)	r = -.15 p < .05 (N = 136)

Hypothesis 3--Cities with heavy concentrations of ethnic minorities will be involved in less areas of planning activities than will cities with smaller concentrations of ethnic minorities.

The results from testing Hypothesis 3 suggest there is no relationship between the two variables ethnic characteristics (as a percentage of the total population) and planning outputs. (See Figure 5.3;  $r = .08$ ;  $p > .05$ ). As a validity check, the relationship between the percentage of the population which was foreign stock and planning outputs was also tested. The results of this test tend to confirm the previous analysis. (See Figure 5.4) No linear relationship was found between the variables ( $r = -.07$ ;  $p > .05$ ).

Hypothesis 4--Cities with a higher degree of population density, population change, community poverty, and overcrowded housing will be involved in more areas of planning than will cities showing a lower degree of community need in these items.

Figures 5.5 through 5.8 are graphic displays of the various variables and their relationships suggested by Hypothesis 4. As demonstrated by Figure 5.5, population density is an inadequate prediction of planning

Figure 5.3

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated with Ethnic Groups as a Percentage of the Total Population




Figure 5.4

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated with Foreign Population as a Percentage of the Total Population


 $r = -.07$  $p > .05$  $N = 135$

Figure 5.5

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated  
with Population Density of Communities




Figure 5.6

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated with  
Population Change of Communities from 1960 to 1970



 $r = -.09$ 
 $p > .05$ 
 $N = 133$



Figure 5.7

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated with Community Poverty as Measured by the Proportion of Families in a Community Earning Less than \$5,000





Figure 5.8

Scattergram of Planning Workloads as Associated with the Percentage  
of Families Living in Overcrowded Housing  
(more than 1.01 persons per room)



outputs. The measure of association obtained between these two variables is extremely low ( $r = .03$ ) and is not statistically significant ( $p > .05$ ).

Figure 5.6, which examines the relationship between planning workloads and population change, also shows that there is no significant relationship between these two variables ( $r = -.09$ ;  $p > .05$ ). Of the four variables in Hypothesis 4, community poverty (as measured by the percentage of families in a community with income less than \$5,000) exhibits the strongest correlation with planning outputs (see Figure 5.7;  $r = .20$ ;  $p < .01$ ). Figure 5.8 represents community need as measured by overcrowded housing and its association with planning outputs. While a weak linear relationship is depicted by this scattergram ( $r = .10$ ), the significance level is high ( $p > .05$ ).

#### Output Hypothesis--Discussion

The analysis of the output hypotheses appears to open several new avenues for the study of planning outputs. Initially, it appears planning outputs cannot be explained by reformism, public-regarding values, or community need for planning. However, great care must be taken in interpretation of the findings since the sample was small and relatively homogeneous.

While it appears that reformism offers no explanatory power regarding planning agency outputs, other factors which are not discernible in a study of this nature may have had an impact on these two variables--for example, regionalism, age of the planning agency, community acceptance of the planning agency, etc. It is possible that in communities where

planning agency "legitimacy" is low or the agency is relatively new, the relationship between reformism and planning outputs may be more significant. Similar reasoning is also appropriate to communities where public regardingness is a basic value of citizens. Thus, while it seems apparent that the direct linkages between planning outputs and citizen values (reformism, public regarding and private regarding) cannot be established in this study, intervening variables may mask a strong relationship.

Community need, as measured by certain demographic factors of a community, is apparently a very weak determinant of planning outputs. Those independent variables which in part determine a city's physical crisis--i.e., a high population density or a high degree of population change--have no impact on planning outputs in this study. Those variables measuring certain social problems--i.e., overcrowded housing and community poverty--have much stronger significance levels yet are at best weak determinants of planning outputs.

One implication of these findings is that planning determinants tend to be socially oriented rather than physically oriented--i.e., planning outputs are associated more with problem areas which have direct social consequences than with problems which appear to be more of a physical concern. Although problems cannot be easily categorized into physical or social concerns due to the interrelated nature of problems and consequences of planning, the findings imply that concern for social welfare of the populace, which has been promoted by planning scholars in recent

years,<sup>1</sup> has had considerable impact on the impetus to plan. Whether the content of plans has promoted a tilt toward a more social perspective cannot be determined from this study; however, in cities where more social problems exist, more planning does take place.

#### Outcome Hypotheses--Analysis

Hypothesis 5--Communities with a high degree of centralized power structures will implement planning agency recommendations to a higher degree than will communities with less centralization of power.

Figures 5.9 and 5.10 are contingency tables which show the relationship between centralization of power and the implementation of planning agencies' recommendations. Figure 5.9 utilizes criterion developed by Rabinovitz for examining the implementation process, and shows no relationship between the two variables (and is not statistically significant ( $\text{Tau} = .02$ ;  $p > .05$ )). Figure 5.10, which utilizes Burby's criterion for examining the planning implementation process, demonstrates that as centralization of power within a community increases, a planning agency's recommendations are more likely to be conformed to by the city administration ( $\text{Tau} = -.14$ ;  $p < .05$ )

Hypothesis 6--Communities which are strongly reform oriented will implement planning agency recommendations to a lesser degree than non-reformed communities.

Figures 5.11 and 5.12 depict the relationship between plan implementation and the number of reforms found within a community. Neither

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example: Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31 (November, 1965): 332-333.

Figure 5.9

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Concentration of Power in a Community and the Degree to which Plans are Impelemnted (Rabinovitz's Index)

Low			1		1			
Degree of Implementation of Plans	1		1		6			
		1	1		10	1	8	
	3		5	1	15		10	1
	3			1	5		4	
High	4							
	(N=11)	(N=1)	(N=7)	(N=2)	(N=37)	(N=1)	(N=22)	(N=1)
	Dispersed				Concentrated			
	Level of Concentration of Power in a Community							
	Tau = .02		p > .05		N = 82			

Figure 5.10

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Concentration of Power in a Community and the Degree to Which the City Administration Conforms to the Dictates of a Plan (Burby's Index)

Rarely conforms to plan dictates

			1					
How does the city administration relate to planning?	1	1	2	1	9		5	
	9		3	1	9	1	9	1
					4	1	3	
Always conforms to plan dictates							1	
	(N=10)	(N=1)	(N=6)	(N=2)	(N=22)	(N=2)	(N=18)	(N=1)

Dispersed

Concentrated

Level of Concentration of Power in a Community

Tau = -.14

P < .05

N = 62

Figure 5.11

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Number of Reforms in a Community and the Degree to Which Plans are Implemented (Rabinovitz's Index)

Degree of Implementation of Plans	Low				1
					1
		1	2	2	2
			4	5	6
			7	8	14
	High	1	2	3	7
		(N=2)	(N=15)	(N=18)	(N=31)
		0	1	2	3
		Number of Reforms in a Community			

Tau = -.06

p > .05

N = 66



Figure 5.12

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Number of Reforms in a Community and the Degree to Which the City Administration Conforms to the Dictates of a Plan (Burby's Index)

Rarely Conforms to Plan Dictates			1	
Degree of Implementation of Plans		4	6	7
	2	9	9	9
Always Conforms to Plan Dictates		1	1	3
				1
	(N=2)	(N=14)	(N=17)	(N=20)
	0	1	2	3
	Number of Reforms in a Community			

Tau =  $-.07$ p >  $.05$ 

N = 53

Rabinovitz's criterion ( $\text{Tau} = -.06; p > .05$ ) nor Burby's ( $\text{Tau} = -.07; p > .05$ ) show a significant measure of association with the number of reforms in a community. In both cases the hypothesized relationship did not appear.

Hypothesis 7--As a planner's politicization increases so does the degree of implementation of his planning recommendations.

The relationship between a planner's politicization and the degree to which his plans are implemented is charted in Figures 5.13 and 5.14. Figure 5.13, using Rabinovitz's criterion for the assessment of the implementation of plans, shows a weak negative relationship between implementation and politicization ( $\text{Tau} = .13$ ), but is not statistically significant ( $p > .05$ ). Figure 5.14 tends to confirm the hypothesis with an acceptable degree of significance ( $\text{Tau} = .16; p \leq .05$ ). The implication of these findings will be discussed later on in this chapter.

Hypothesis 8--As a planner becomes organizationally closer to the legal power center within a community his recommendations are more likely to be implemented.

It is apparent from examining Figures 5.15 and 5.16 that the hypothesized relationship between these two variables has not been verified. Using Rabinovitz's scale of planning implementation the measure of association obtained was very weak with a low level of significance ( $\text{Tau} = -.07; p > .05$ ). Similar findings were obtained by using Burby's measure ( $\text{Tau} = -.02; p > .05$ ). These findings suggest there is no relationship between the two variables.

Figure 5.13

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Degree to Which a Planner is Politicized and the Degree to Which Plans are Implemented (Rabinovitz's Index)

Degree of Implementation of Plans	Low				1
					1
		1	2	4	4
		1	17	4	4
	3	26	2		
High	1	10	2		1
	(N=5)	(N=55)	(N=14)		(N=1)
	Low				High
Planner's Politicization Level					
		Tau = .13	p > .05	N = 75	

Figure 5.14

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Degree to Which a Planner is Politicized and the Degree to Which the City Administration Conforms to the Dictates of a Plan (Burby's Index)

Rarely Conforms to Plan Dictates				
How Does the City Administration Relate to City Planning	1	13	4	
	4	38	7	
	1	2	3	1
Always Conforms to Plan Dictates		1		
	(N=10)	(N=54)	(N=14)	(N=1)
	Low			High
	Planner's Politicization Level			

Tau = -.16

p &lt; .05

N = 79

Figure 5.15

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Organizational Responsibility of the Planning Agency and the Degree to Which Plans are Implemented (Rabinovitz's Index)

Degree of Implementation of Plans	Low	1				
		1				
		4	3			1
		11	5	2	3	1
		18	11		6	
	High	6	3		1	3
	(N=41)	(N=22)	(N=2)	(N=10)	(N=5)	
	City Manager	Mayor	City Council	Independent Planning Commission	Other	

Planner is Most Responsible to:

Tau =  $-.07$

$p > .05$

N = 80

Figure 5.16

Contingency Table Depicting the Relationship Between the Organizational Responsibility of the Planning Agency and the Degree to Which the City Administration Conforms to the Dictates of a Plan (Burby's Index)

Rarely Conforms to Plan Dictates					
How Does the City Administration Relate to City Planning	1				
	9	9	2	3	2
	9	9		7	3
Always Conforms to Plan Dictates	5	2		1	
	(N=24) City Manager	(N=20) Mayor	(N=2) City Council	(N=11) Independent Planning Commission	(N=5) Other
	Tau = .02		p > .05		N = 62

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been twofold: (1) to carry out an empirical study of city planning in non-metropolitan areas, and (2) to examine an Eastonian model of planning policies by testing crucial segments of the model. This concluding chapter will summarize the results and findings of the study, evaluate the effectiveness of the model as developed in Chapter I, and discuss the shortcomings, limitations, and theoretical implications of the study. A few concluding remarks are addressed to researchers and practitioners of the planning process in order to add a new perspective to an old problem.

#### Summary

A review of the analysis of the hypotheses points out the fact that community values, such as reformism and public regardness, have little or no impact upon the specific number of areas in which a planning agency works. It is also apparent that while needs of a community cannot be readily sorted into social and non-social (or physical) categories, a distinction can be made between those needs which have more direct social impact on a population than do others. For example, while population change and density both possess social implications which deal with movement, physical overcrowding, and strain on community services, problems such as low income or overcrowded housing have more immediate social

consequences for a community's population. Planning outputs are more clearly and significantly associated with variables which measure areas of high social impact than with areas of low social impact. While it is impossible to determine whether planning agencies' workloads are directed at solving problems which possess high social impact, the association between the two is clear, is somewhat weak.

Perhaps the most significant finding is that planning outcomes are associated more strongly with political characteristics than with organizational or community cultural characteristics. Although the degree of association is weak, planning outcomes are associated with centralization of power in a community and the degree to which a planner is politicized, whereas they (planning outcomes) are not associated with reformism or organizational structure.

Some implications of these findings tend to be somewhat surprising:

- (1) Although planning's purpose is essentially reform oriented and the roots of planning were lodged in the reform movement, neither planning outcomes nor planning outputs tend to be associated with the amount a community is reformed.
- (2) Although planning can be essentially defined as a public-regarding value premise, no clear empirical association can be found between characteristics of public-regarding communities and planning outputs.
- (3) Differences between types of community needs may be a useful explicative of planning agency behavior.
- (4) Of the four factors examined regarding outcomes, the two variables which clearly reflect political characteristics within communities are the most strongly associated with the outcome of planning agency proposals.



### Outcome Hypothesis--Discussion

Preliminary analysis of the outcome hypotheses would seem to open new dimensions and questions regarding the implementation of planning recommendations. An analysis of the data makes it appear that planning recommendations are more likely to be implemented in areas where power is centralized and planners have been indoctrinated into the local political system. Basic political assumptions can be made regarding these findings:

- (1) Where power is centralized, planners are likely to conform to the desires of the power holders for both personal reasons and professional advancement; and
- (2) Planners who possess a high degree of political awareness--i.e., politicization--are more apt to conform to the dictates of power holders in deriving their plans, thus producing plans which are more likely to be implemented.

While these assumptions may seem to be invalidated from the analysis of Hypothesis 6, it must be remembered that reformism as an attribute of a community is not synonymous with decentralized power structures. As such, while reformism may have as a goal decentralization of power, reformed communities, in this study, are not necessarily decentralized.

The rejection of Hypothesis 8 lends further evidence to support the importance of politics as being a major determinant of planning outcomes. This finding suggests that the placement of the planning function in urban government is not an important determinant of planning outcomes, as were both the power structure of a community and the politicization of the planner.

### The Model in Review

The tests for linkages within the model cast a negative perspective on the use of this type of model for examining bureaucratic decision-making units in city government. It is apparent through the analysis of the hypotheses that the hypothesized relationships between inputs and outputs, and moderating variables and outcomes are, in cases, non-existent. At best, the strongest relationship found between variables in this study can only be termed weak. Although reasons exist in the methodology (which are discussed later in this chapter) for the weak linkages, it is apparent the main explanation of the extremely low measures of association between variables lies within the model.

The model itself was originally conceived in order to isolate the planning system from other systems within the community, and to explore the relationship between planning output and input variables. However, by isolating the planning system from the rest of the political system (e.g., city council politics, community norms of planning) many facets of the planning process were lost. Perhaps this deficiency is the result of planning agencies themselves being non-decision making units. Their actions are limited to making recommendations, and the isolation of planning agencies from the governmental units responsible for the implementation of planning recommendations makes a total perspective of the planning process impossible to obtain.

While this isolation limits the utility of the model, it also provides insights to practitioners and students of planning about how the planning process can be affected through internal practices. Thus the model provides hints as to how intra-agency actions can be improved to

make the agency more effective (e.g., the finding which links politicization of the planner to outcomes, casts serious doubts upon the validity of the philosophic position that bureaucratic sterility from politics, which planners have at times strived for, will increase their effectiveness.) The model is also useful in that it is readily adaptable to other bureaucratic (non-) decision-making units for this same purpose; although further refinement is needed in order to sharpen the focus on problems.

#### Limitations and Shortcomings

The most serious problems encountered in this study were: (1) sample sizes and distribution, (2) quantification of variables, and (3) statistical limitations.

Selection of the sample and limitations of its size were the result of financial and time considerations. While a sample size of 136 cities allows for some insights into a problem, it does not permit a continuous distribution of values along the dimensions of many of the variables, especially when the sample is rather homogeneous. As a result of the geographic location and homogeneity of the sample, many variables prove to be useless, and many more variables; i.e., regionalism, public opinion of planning, age of the agency, elite opinion of planning; were either impossible to obtain or were discounted due to limitations mentioned earlier.

Quantification of variables in studies is often highly controversial, and certain approaches to measuring variables in this study are undoubtedly subject to dispute. One should, therefore, justify his measuring techniques as far as possible. Three potential problems and their justification follow:

- (1) The choice of the variable workloads as a measure of outputs of a planning agency may not present a completely accurate picture of planning agency outputs.

The criticism arises that the measure of outputs may not adequately measure differences between agencies. It is possible that variation in agency behavior may not be completely reflected through this variable, whereas some other variable, such as agency expenditures, may more accurately quantify differences between agencies. While this argument has many merits it should be noted that a large proportion of planning agencies' budgets are obtained through grants from the federal government; and as such, planning expenditures may not be an accurate measure of performance of activities, as a measure of the ability of planners to fill out grant applications. Through specifications in the grants as to what type of communities are qualified, many cities are eliminated from consideration. As a result, expenditures prove to be, at least theoretically, an unequally weighted variable among different sizes and types of communities.

- (2) Failure to provide a measure for outcomes other than those obtained through planning agency directors may lead to built-in biases in agency evaluations.

Although the measures utilized for outcomes are of the survey type and consist of the opinions of planning directors regarding the relationship of the city council and administration to plan implementation; they are the best means available for measuring these outcomes. In the case of Rabinovitz's scale for measuring planning effectiveness, the sample size and distribution did not allow for a statistically significant measure of association between it and other variables. As a result (even

though Rabinovitz's index was more comprehensive in evaluating agency performance), Burby's method of evaluation was more frequently relied upon.

- (3) In order to obtain a more comprehensive view of planning agency performance, surveys should not only have been administered to planning agency executive directors, but other key figures in the planning process.

Due to financial limitations, the only means available to accomplish this task would have been to limit the scope of the study and use a case study approach. Though perhaps this may have resulted in a more comprehensive viewpoint of planning, it would have severely restricted the sample size and, consequently, the usefulness of the study.

Perhaps the most serious limitation in this study is in the area of statistical techniques and for analysis purposes. Although it is often deemed appropriate to account for the total variance explained in a model, the variations between the different types of measures of association used make this impossible. Proportional reduction of error measurement (e.g., Kendall's Tau) may not be readily combined with regression measures (Pearson's product-moment correlation) to account for variance. Although both forms of measurement are based on linear relationships, differences encountered between ordinal data and interval data, and the means of incorporating these types of data into the measures, make it statistically impossible to account for the total variance.

Along similar lines ordinal level data is not readily convertible for usage to partial correlation methods. As a result, the only form of controls possible to use were of the physical type, and this would have limited the sample size and distribution even further, making signifi-

cance levels much more difficult to obtain. Although these problems have been given more consideration elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> the only single agreed upon method for solving these problems is to live with the deficiencies until new statistical approaches for interpretation are developed.

### Theoretical Implications

Many of the findings in this study are directly relevant to theoretical considerations in the areas of both policy analysis and the planning process. A brief summation of these considerations follows:

Much of the recent research in the area of policy analysis has dealt with the central question, "What type of inputs to a system are able to explain the most variance in policy outputs?" Perhaps the two most hotly debated types of inputs are: (1) political, and (2) socio-economic. The vast majority of quantitative research has indicated that socio-economic factors are capable of explaining more variance than are political variables.<sup>2</sup> However, it has been argued that the difference

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth E. Soutwood, Goodman and Kruskal's Tau-b as Correlation Ratio: Some Implications, Program in Applied Social Statistics, Urbana, Ill., August, 1973 (University of Illinois: Department of Sociology, 1973), pp. 16-20; Sanford Labovitz, "Statistical Usage in Sociology: Sacred Cows and Ritual," Sociological Methods and Research, 1 (August, 1972), 22-29. Both of these authors discuss the limitations of inter-level measurement and approaches to solving the problem. Southwood suggests that new statistical approaches need to be developed which will be readily convertible to different levels of measurement. Labovitz suggests the usage of dummies to create upper level variables from lower level variables.

<sup>2</sup>Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974), pp. 183-222.

between these two types of inputs in explaining outputs may be attributed to shortcomings within the variables chosen to represent outputs. When the output variables were shifted to allow for considerations of benefits and burdens to a polity, political variables accounted for more variance than socio-economic variables.<sup>3</sup> The findings of this study tend to emphasize the need to reevaluate the considerations within this argument.

When comparing the findings of this study to other studies, it is suggested that differences in variations explained are attributed to: (1) the area of the problem being examined, (2) the methodological approach used (which has already been discussed), and (3) the focus of the research.

Differences in the area of the problem being examined may account for wide variations in results. While state legislatures and their policies have had the most examination in policy analysis (due to the relative accessibility of data),<sup>4</sup> a shift of analysis to executive or bureaucratic decision-making, and the resultant policy, provides analysis of more inputs to a system and they may well explain more variance than either socio-economic or political variables (e.g., elitist impact, decision-maker personality). In the case of this study, this shift of area has shown that planners themselves are powerful actors in the system and other facets of planner's behavior may well explain more variation in planning outputs. Additionally, factors which are highly significant in one impact area (e.g., elitism influence) may be irrelevant when the area changes or the issue content changes.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Brian F. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, '64 (June 1970), 520-522.

<sup>4</sup>Hofferbert, p. 29.

<sup>5</sup>Scism, p. 1334.

The focus of the research may lead to conflicting findings, since studies are undertaken for different purposes. Overall, the focus of research may be described as a duel between process study and content study.<sup>6</sup> Both types of study have distinct advantages and disadvantages which have been summarized elsewhere, but a different focus will lead to an entirely different picture of the policy process.

The findings of this study would also seem to support the argument that community cultural values, such as reformism or public regardingness, may be, in the large part, irrelevant to policy areas which are well established and isolated due to bureaucratic position. In all probability specific areas of governmental action which are well established within a polity, are not affected by community values; however, in areas where governmental action is not well established these community values may have a definite impact. As a result, while the findings of this study show no relationship between planning and community values, the relationship may well be present when attitudes of the community toward planning are controlled.

Implications for planning theorists found in the study lie in the areas of decision making, power in planning, and the relevancy of planning organization to planning performance. Other studies note that planners, obviously, can have an impact upon an agency's performance levels. In this study, it appears that a planner's impact upon the implementation levels of planning recommendations is a variable based on the degree to which he is politicized within his particular community. This may be

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<sup>6</sup>Austin Ranney, The Study of Policy Content, Chap. 2.

<sup>7</sup>Hofferbert, p. 6.



attributed to several causes such as: personal association with decision-makers, realization of political desires and constraints in a community, or a modification of planning proposals to promote powerful interests. Whatever the primary cause, it seems important that planners can increase their influence and impact if they are willing to increase their political involvement in a community. While it is doubtful that a planner can ever be the equal of other participants in the planning process, his effectiveness can be increased.

At the same time it is also apparent from Walker's thesis that the placement of organizational responsibility of planning in city government may increase a planner's effectiveness holds little merit. The impact of decision-makers on planning, and in turn, a planner's influence, both have more explanatory power in determining planning outcomes than organizational placement (although intervening variables may have had an impact here as well). It appears that the most one can say about organizational location is that the best form of organizational responsibility for planning is that form which works best in a particular community.

Some evidence for the premise that planning is a rational decision-making process can be found within this paper since those cities with a higher level of social need for planning are involved in more areas of planning than are cities with lower levels of social need. This would seem to suggest that planning workloads are based upon need for planning --one element of rationality. However, no complete conclusion can be obtained from the evidence presented in this paper.

## Recommendations

The content of this study has for the largest part been concentrated on examining the planning process; however, meaningful recommendations can be made from this analysis which are not only relevant to the planning analyst, but the policy analyst as well. Macro studies have been exalted for their value in explaining the process of policy, while micro studies have been hailed for their value in determining area analysis, i.e., a complete examination of the policy process in specific areas. It is apparent, however, that process cannot be separated from content due to differences between political climates of policy making. If, as Hofferbert has defined it, policy analysis is in a specialized manner, the study of politics in society,<sup>7</sup> then justifiably there is a need for integration of process and content rather than separation. While it appears that process studies are more scholarly and likely to lead to more correct generalizations, content studies find their strength in specialized analysis. This specialization can lead to further understanding in the areas of evaluation and advisement to policy makers. Thus, through integration, not only can scholarly analysis be made, but practical advisement can also be given.

While most studies in the area of policy analysis have concentrated on correlates of outputs, behavioralism of actors has often been shirked due to difficulty of measurement. The study of human behavior, and in particular in planning, elite behavior, may lead to not only a further understanding of the policy process, but also to a further understanding of the politics of policy, i.e., how an individual's impact may

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<sup>7</sup>Hofferbert, p. 6.

affect policy. A need has been demonstrated in this study for the incorporation of the human factor in order to adequately explain any policy.

The strongest conclusion in this paper lies not in the findings, but in the demonstrated need for a more comprehensive view of the study of policy in any particular area. In the past the scapegoat has been that behavioral data was not easily accessible or that statistical analysis was unavailable to analyze policy in the appropriate format.

If the study of politics and policy is to approach the status of "science," then it should not opt out of important areas, but rather should strive for comprehensiveness, the development of new research procedures, and the standardization of methodologies in order to increase the use of replicative measures. Improvements are needed not only in research but also theory before the "political scientist" can become in truth a "scientist."

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## APPENDIX A

### Survey Questionnaire Utilized

The following questionnaire was distributed to planning agency directors in the sample. A stamped, self-addressed envelope was attached.

Political Science Department  
Eastern Illinois University  
Charleston, Illinois 61920

Dear City Planner:

I am presently working on completion of my graduate work in Political Science and am asking your cooperation in gaining some information on city planning and politics in your community. Enclosed is a questionnaire which seeks your opinion regarding the city planning process in your community. I would appreciate your filling out the questionnaire and returning it to me as promptly as possible in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. Feel free to add comments to any question which you feel needs clarification.

This information will only be used at the aggregate level and since the group I am sending questionnaires to is a highly select group of midwestern United States Planning Agencies, your response is extremely important. This information will in no way be used to identify your planning agency or reflect upon its work in any way. It is important that this questionnaire be filled out as accurately as possible. Please select the one answer to each question which best represents your opinion.

At the end of 4 weeks if I have not received the questionnaire, I will send a reminder to you in the mail. If you would like a copy of the final results, check the box at the end of the questionnaire and a copy of the results will be forwarded to you on this project's completion. I would like to thank you for your time and cooperation in this matter.

Very truly yours,

James A. Owen

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Please answer each of the following questions with the one answer which best describes city planning in your city. When completed return promptly in the enclosed envelope.

1 - Education (last year in school completed) \_\_\_\_\_

2 - Last degree obtained in... 1 - Planning \_\_\_\_\_  
 2 - Geography \_\_\_\_\_  
 3 - Architecture \_\_\_\_\_  
 4 - Engineering \_\_\_\_\_  
 5 - Public Administration \_\_\_\_\_  
 6 - Business \_\_\_\_\_  
 7 - Social Sciences \_\_\_\_\_  
 8 - Physical Sciences \_\_\_\_\_  
 9 - Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

3 - Actual number of years at your present position \_\_\_\_\_.

4 - Are you a member of the American Institute of Planners? 1-Yes \_\_\_\_\_ 2-No \_\_\_\_\_

The following questions are in reference to the planning agency you are presently working for.

5 - Budget of the planning agency for the present fiscal year \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

6 - Percentage of the present budget supplied through city funding \_\_\_\_\_%.

7 - Budget of the planning agency for the previous fiscal year \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

8 - Percentage of the previous budget supplied through city funding \_\_\_\_\_%.

9 - Number of full-time employees on the planning agency's staff? \_\_\_\_\_.

10 - Which one of the following individuals are you most responsible to as the chief city planner?

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1-mayor  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 2-city manager  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 3-city council  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 4-independent planning agency  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 5-other (please specify)

11 - There has recently been a considerable amount of interest in local leadership patterns. Which of the following best describes your community? (please check the one which is closest to your city)

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1- Local leadership tends to be concentrated in the hands of a few men who are in basic agreement about municipal policy questions. Decisions made by local officials do not generally contradict this consensus.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 2- Local leadership tends to be concentrated in the hands of a few men but they represent divergent opinions about the proper resolution of municipal policy questions. Policy decisions made by local officials generally represent one or the other viewpoints, but rarely those of both.

3- Local leadership tends to be exercised primarily by municipal officials and others with authority delegated by the voters. Policy decisions are made by local public officials' interpretations of what the citizens want, but not necessarily by the consensus of the citizenry.

       4- Local leadership tends to be exercised by a great number of individuals with no clear pattern of leadership carrying over from one policy question to the next. Policy decisions made by local public officials generally represent the particular alignment of persons and groups participating in the resolution.

       5- Other or modify any of the above to suit your situation (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

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12 - Are the elections for the mayor and city council in your community?

       1- partisan - candidates run under party affiliation.

       2- nonpartisan - candidates run without party affiliation.

Questions regarding the city planning process (please check only one; if you feel clarification is needed, write in the margin).

13 - Highly controversial planning proposals have a better chance of being adopted when they are sponsored by:

       1-The mayor

       2-The city manager

       3-The city council

       4-An independent planning commission

       5-Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

14 - How does the day-to-day administration of the city relate to long range comprehensive plans?

       1-Always conforms to the dictates of the plan.

       2-Almost always conforms to the dictates of the plan

       3-Conforms but may deviate if the situation requires it

       4-Entirely depends on circumstances

       5-Rarely conforms to the dictates of the plan

       6-Not applicable

15 - How close are your contacts with the city council?

       1-Extremely close contacts

       2-Moderately close contacts

       3-Infrequent contacts

       4-No contacts apart from city council meetings

16 - Apart from formal powers, duties, and responsibilities; how close is the contact you maintain with the day-to-day administration of the city?

       1-Extremely close contacts (once a day or more often)

       2-Moderately close contacts (about once a week)

       3-Infrequent contacts (once a month or less)

       4-No contacts

17- Which one of the following descriptions best fits the role you see yourself playing in the city planning process (even though you probably perform more than one of these roles in carrying out your duties, please check the one which you see yourself playing most often)?

\_\_\_\_ 1-Technician role, use expertise developed from experience and training to develop plans according to planning theory; try to avoid entangling political alliances.

\_\_\_\_ 2-Broker role, you view yourself as policy adviser and political confidant to the city council or executive (the group or person to whom you are most responsible); you work in the interests of your employing agency, considering the political marketability of a plan before proposing it.

\_\_\_\_ 3-Mobilizer role, you use political motivation to secure support for a plan outside city hall; you use your skill to develop a plan according to what you feel is important for the community, then you educate the public to that specific need.

\_\_\_\_ 4-Advocate role, you again utilize political motivation outside of city hall, however, you develop the plan according to what your clientele feels is important to the community.

\_\_\_\_ 5-Other or use any combination from above to explain your duties. \_\_\_\_\_

Please place an X in the box following each statement which corresponds to your level of agreement with that statement. Make only one choice per statement; feel free to add comments to any statement.

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
18. The use of political power is crucial in public affairs.					
19. Politics is basically a conflict in which groups and individuals compete for things of value.					
20. Differences of race, class, and income are important considerations in political decisions.					
21. Governmental institutions cannot operate without politicians.					
22. The politician is the key broker among competing within society.					
23. I figure that the city council and administration know what is best for planning policies, otherwise they would not have been elected.					
24. Helping to secure a plan's implementation is as important a job as developing a plan to the city planning agency.					
25. My superior does not accept me as a professional to the degree that my position, experience, and training entitles me.					

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
26. When drawing up plans, it is better to solve the problems the city administration and council think exist than to solve problems I think exist.					
27. The primary and foremost duty of a city planner is to develop plans which take into account classic city planning theory regarding spatial utilization and cost-benefit analysis.					
28. The city planning agency cannot become too aligned with one political faction in the city.					
29. My main political philosophy is don't fight city hall.					
30. Politics is an art which any public servant should feel free to use in order to better promote his own philosophy.					
31. If a person cannot find help in city hall, he should look for it outside city hall.					
32. The concept of public service means a city official is delegated to do what he thinks is best for the people.					
33. A planner's main responsibility is to promote the ideas of his employer.					
34. If a planning proposal cannot gain enough support from the city fathers on its merits, the planner should make an effort outside city hall to generate support for the planning proposal.					

Evaluate the success of the planning agency you are presently working for in the following areas (1- stands for "EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE"; 7- stands for "INEFFECTIVE"; the numbers between represent decreasing degrees of effectiveness).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. Implementing new plans where opposition is not present. . . . .							
36. Blocking projects which the planning agency has deemed harmful to the community. . . . .							
37. Shaping pet projects of the planning agency which run into opposition within the community. . . . .							

Thank you for filling out the questionnaire.