1979

Problems of Political Development in Bangladesh

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Eastern Illinois University
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PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

IN BANGLADESH

(TITLE)

BY

HAROON-AR-RASHID KHAN

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in Political Science

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1979
YEAR

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PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

IN BANGLADESH

BY

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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science at the Graduate School
of Eastern Illinois University

CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS
1979

After World War II the revival of the spirit of nationalism led to the emergence of many new states. Freed from the colonial domination, the new states were keenly interested in developing their societies as fast as possible. Many problems stand in the way of development. These problems are the problems of stability, unity, integration and socio-economic problems.

This study is concerned about the problems of political development in Bangladesh, which came into existence in 1971, as a result of the problems of of national integration in Pakistan. This study identifies some problems which stand in the way of political development in Bangladesh. These problems are: (1) the problems of integration, (2) the problems of unity and stability, (3) the lack of well-organized political parties, (4) the problems of bureaucracy, and (5) socio-economic problems.

After the creation of Bangladesh it was assumed that there would be no problem of integration in Bangladesh. But an analysis of the political situations will show that problems of integration still remain, though in different character, such as the lack of integration between the elites and the mass, the lack of integrative ideology, the separatist tendency in the tribal people, etc. Absence of stability is creating problems in the effective undertaking of any developmental plan. The chief causes of instability are: factionalism, frustration of the people, threat of India, loss of charisma, etc. Too many political parties with too many ideologies stand in the way of creating a stable government. The parties do not have any organizational basis, and are based on the personality of the leader. The parties are not effective in aggregating the peoples' demands and grievances. The lack of balance in the role of the bureaucracy

is also a problem. On the one hand, if the bureaucrats are given more power, they hinder the growth of political institutions. On the other hand, if they are given less power, they play an inactive role hindering the execution of policies. Bangladesh suffers from both the problems of bureaucracy.

The most pre-dominant problems which hamper political development in Bangladesh are socio-economic problems. The population problem, food problem, and unemployment create mass frustrations causing instability and disunity within the country. The attachment to the traditional values hinders the way of change. This study analyzes in detail all these problems and how they stand in the way of political development.

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CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH

Introduction

After World War II the revival of the spirit of nationalism led
to the emergence of many new states. Freed from the colonial domination
the new states were keenly interested in developing their societies as·
quickly as possible. Many problems stand in the way of development. The
most formidable problems of political development are the problems of
stability, unity, integration and socio-economic problems of development.

In this study, we will try to identify the problems of political
development in Bangladesh. Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan from 1947
to 1971. In 1947, British India was given independence with the creation
of Pakistan, which consisted of West Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Bangladesh came into existence through succession from Pakistan. The
study of Bangladesh marks a new trend in the politics of the developing
areas.

As a new-born country, it is filled with many problems of a poli-
tical, social and economic nature. This study will analyze the political
and socio-economic problems of Bangladesh by describing the problems and
analyzing their causes.

Hopefully, this study will serve as a useful guide to understanding
the problems of an emerging country. Political development is the chief

concern of the new states of Asia and Africa. But an analysis of the politics of the developing areas will show that many problems stand in the way of political development. The goals of political development is very much frustrated by the problems of stability, unity and socio-economic problems. By studying this, we can get an idea of the problems facing a new state.

This study will be helpful for understanding the problems of political integration, stability and economic development. The real problem of political development is economic. The greatest skill is dependent on the solution of economic problems. Though the developing countries are often led by a charismatic leader, unless he can resolve economic problems he is bound to fade away very soon. If these problems are not solved, people rise in revolution, which leads to political instability, disunity and disintegration.

Meaning of Political Development

The term "political development" is a very elusive concept. There is no consensus among the political scientists regarding the concept of political development. Political development is termed as change, but change has taken place in a variety of ways. Moreover, the concept of political development is very transitory in character. What was regarded as political development in the 1960's is regarded as politically under-developed in the 1970's. As such the conception of political development is fast changing. Rostow and L. Pye fashion their conception of "political development" around the notion of national political unity and broadening

base of political participation.[1] Pye, in addition to emphasizing the
need for stregnthening of national interests at the expense of parochial
concerns at the local or regional level, also argues that there ought to
be effective coordination between administrative and political groups and
institutions which are very weak and not very articulate.

E. E. Hegen, in exploring the possibilities for a framework for
analyzing economic and political development takes account of "deep seated
resistence to social change and of the need for changing some rather basic
attitudes."[2] He speaks of resistence, that is to say, traditional values
and ideas that stand in the way of any change towards development. Hegen
is a sociologist. So, he analyzes political development from the point of
social value, norms, etc.

Gabriel Almond defined political development as "the acquisition
by a political system of a new capability in the sense of a specialized
role structure and differentiated orientations, which together give a
political system the possibility of responding efficiently and more or
less autonomously to a new range of problems."[3] He speaks of four cap-
abilities for a politically developed society: (1) integrative capability,
i.e., the creation of national unity and centralized bureaucracy, (2) inter-
national accommodative capability, i.e., ability to engage in international
contacts of various governments, (3) participation capability, i.e., crea-
tion of a political culture of civic obligation and of a democratic poli-

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[1]Alfred Diamond, "Political Development: Approaches to Theory
and Strategy," New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, p. 20.

[2]Ibid., p. 21.

[3]Ibid.

tical structure, and (4) welfare or distributive capability, i.e., wide-spread dissemination of welfare standards and accommodation between political social structure.

Welch defines political development as "the development of an institutional framework that is sufficiently flexible and powerful to meet the demands placed upon it."[4] In short, the government must be fully capable of performing a wide variety of duties. Its capabilities must increase so that change can be accommodated within political channels. Political modernization is linked with economic growth and with social and psychological changes for the obvious reason that the capacity of a government to deal with demands is affected by economic and cultural factors.

The process of political modernization has three characteristics: (1) an increased centralization of power in the state coupled with the weakening of traditional sources of authority, (2) the differentiation and specificity of political institutions, and (3) increased popular participation in politics and greater identification of individuals with the political system as a whole.

In a more analytical way Huntington states that four characteristics of political development are referred to most commonly: (1) rationalization, (2) national integration, (3) democratization, and (4) participation. Paekenham takes a functional view of moderization and with some qualifications, identifies political development with it. Political

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[4]Claude E. Welch, Political Moderization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 7.

development according to him "is the will and the capacity to cope with and generate continuing transformation toward modernization while maintaining basic individual freedom."[5]

All these definitions reflect the same thing of political development. "The popular idea of a developed country is one that is able to provide its citizens with goods and services roughly equivalent to the highest level of goods and services available in any country at that time."[6] Indices of development range from per capita income through various ratios of fuel consumption, railroads, telephones, television sets, teachers, students, literacy and death.

Indices of political development are less tangible and convenient. Perhaps the best way to approach political development is in terms of the role the political system must play if the society as a whole is to enjoy the standard of living and other benefits generally associated with a modern industrialized society. Monte Palmer mentioned three areas for characterizing political development. First, the political system must be in a position to effectively control the population and resources of the country. Second, the political system in developing areas must increasingly bear responsibility for modernization of their state's human and material resources. The economic and social problems facing the developing areas are beyond the point at which private enterprise is willing to provide

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[5]Von Der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 6.

[6]Gerald A. Hegen, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 1-2.

adequate solutions. Third, the political system must successfully accom-
modate the demands occasioned by economic and social change without sur-
rendering its role of control and mobilization. Too frequently developing
areas have struggled to attain a substantial record of economic growth
only to see their economies stagnate because of their inability to cope
with the conflict and social disorganization precipitated thereby. A
system that cannot cope with the changes that it generates cannot be con-
sidered politically developed.

We can define a politically developed society as one which has
stability, orderly ways of change, effectiveness, higher rate of economic
growth, institutionalized institutions, groups with fractional speciali-
zation, unity and consensus in its fundamental ways and goals, legitimacy
of its government, popular participation balance between different sectors
of the society.

Problems

Political development has become the chief concern of the new
states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But political development creates
in its wake a lot of problems. The process of modernization involves change
in the structure of society in its attitudinal framework and in its capa-
city to respond effectively to the problems imposed upon the system. It
involves the shift from a predominantly rural agricultural society to an
increasingly urban, industrial society characterized by a cash and market
economy, occupational differentiation, high literacy and media access.
The parochial world of tradition is penetrated by mass support and communi-

cations facilities. The ascriptive determination of status by birth gives way to achievement orientations. The identity horizon of the individual expands beyond the particularistic loyalties of family, village and tribe to include increasingly universal and secular values.

The process of change creates new problems which are difficult for the political system to cope with. The character and direction of change will be the product of a dialectical interaction between tradition and modernity as each infiltrates and transforms the other. The relationship between tradition and modernity, the degree to which tradition is accommo- dated in the process of change, the ways it responds to the challenge of modernization, is a critical determinant of stability and development. The forces of tradition may buy short term stability at the price of revo- lution but a failure to accept the context of tradition, to use traditional structures as the vehicles of change may so undermine stability as to pre- vent the development of the institutional capacity to fulfill the promise of transformation.

"The process of change will give rise to new political demands which may strain the limited capacity of the system that institutionaliza- tion becomes increasingly difficult as participation expands. The process of modernization may unleash a revolution of rising frustrations as the gap widens between aspirations and achievements."[7] Regional linguistic and cultural minorities may become more self-conscious and as primoridal identifications are injected into political life, traditional communities

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[7]Helio Jaquaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), p. 207.

may take on the modern form of tribe and associations or of movements advocating separatism or linguistic nationalism. Conflict increases as new groups become participants but if they lack the minimum consensus necessary for the ordered resolution of conflict, the political system may be unable to accommodate expanded participation by means of its institutions.

The primary problem of politics writes Samuel P. Huntington "is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change."[8] The stability and development of any political system depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and political participation. As participation expands, the capacity of the political institutions to absorb change must also increase if stability is to be maintained. The elites of the new states stimulate the formation of demands in the process of inducing social change. Development programs may seek to create felt needs within one traditional society in order to facilitate innovation, but in an environment of scarcity, resources are limited and the system will be most responsive to those commanding political capital, wealth, status, votes. Traditional elites may be reinforced to ensure stability and to suppress widening popular involvement. Repressive rule supplants democratic response in the name of order, however, rather than through higher levels of institutionalization in response to expanding participation may be the harbinger of chaos.

Development defined as increasing institutionalization in response to expanding participation may require a dynamic gap between the two variables. With participation somewhat beyond the capacity of the institutions

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[8]Ibid., p. 195.

to respond, the attempt to close the gap serves as the stimulus to higher levels of institutionalization. The interaction between institutionalization and participation between order and response thus involves a staggered process of development as each reacts to the other. Beyond a critical range, however, an imbalance may be increasingly difficult to correct. Over-institutionalization is conducive to the establishment of repressive order; participation far beyond institutional capacity may foster unacceptable instability and political decay.

In the process of change there arises the problem of cultural lag. In situations of rapid change, the harmony between structure and attitudes that exists in traditional societies is replaced by discontinuity or dis-harmony referred to as cultural lag. "The discontinuities faced by changing societies go far beyond cultural lag. There are different sources of these discontinuities."[9] First, different segments of the population are sub-jected to differing pressures for change. These pressures are intense in urban areas. Discontinuous rates of change, in turn, result in discon-tinuous attitudes, loyalties, value expectation among various population segments. Such discontinuities pose one of the major impediments to poli-tical development.

Second, discontinuities occur because different groups within a state are more prone to change than others. Based on his study of Uganda, David Apter suggests that complex or highly differentiated tribes, such as the Buganda, are better able to absorb and accommodate change inputs than

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[9]Monte Palmer, The Dilemmas of Political Development: An Intro-duction to the Politics of the Developing Areas (Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 1.

their poorly differentiated counterparts. In the case of the former, tribal loyalties and belief systems are left very much intact. In the latter, pressures for change result in structural breakdown and in the concomitant disruption of the individual's values and his attitudes toward change.

Third, discontinuities in attitudes and loyalty patterns result from the variety of individual responses to the conflicts and ambiguities characteristic of rapidly changing environments. One response to this dilemma has been to minimize insecurity by withdrawal and non-involvement. Another response is the proliferation of religious and other tradition-oriented voluntary associations designed to compensate for the erosion of traditional beliefs. A related response has been to find security or mobility via the path of total commitment to future-oriented nationalist, socialist or communist movements. These and similar responses further contribute to the heterogeneity of values and loyalties with which political leaders in developing states must cope.

Another problem is that the social control mechanisms are breaking down faster than they can be replaced by modern control techniques.

Fifth, the erosion of traditional social structures and increased mobility associated with accelerated change means that increasingly smaller segments of the population are becoming predisposed toward, and available for recruitment into various political movements. If political stability is to be found, this increased politicization of the masses must be directed toward identification with the dominant regime and its values.

Another problem is the new states are poorly educated. There is imperfect information about the universe. The values of the game-role

definitions and expectations about the behavior of others are poorly
defined and frequently subject to change. Economic security is minimal.
The conflicting demands of political, economic, ethnic and religious
groups are frequently difficult to reconcile.

The bureaucracies are beset by problems of nepotism, by rigidity
and lack of innovation behavior and by a deficient sense of social respon-
sibility. Industrial workers are lazy, non-innovative, sluggish, peasant-
oriented, undisciplined, unproductive, and subject to frequent absenteeism.

"The image of rising expectation creates problems for political
development. The modern government has to mobilize the resources of the
country for undertaking large scale development programs. In order to
satisfy the popular demands the modernizing regimes have to choose between
conspicuous spending for welfare-type projects on one hand and long range
infra-structure industrial development on the other."[10] The former means
sport palaces, opera houses, cradle to grave security programs, palatial
buildings, hero statues and short run measures designed to create or
reinforce the legitimacy of a region. The latter may often disrupt normal
consumption patterns by necessitating austerity programs and import, export
and currency restrictions. The long range development programs may delay
profits that do little to gratify the immediate needs of the population
or to counter promises of immediate gratification offered by opposition
groups.

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[10] Robert L. Hargrave, Jr., India Government and Politics in a
Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970), p. 4.

As regimes or their predecessors opt for short-run conspicuous spending, vital capital resources are diverted from infra-structure development essential for long-range economic development and mass demands and expectations are stimulated. The more mass demands are aroused the more difficult the imposition of austerity and other restrictive measures becomes and the greater the temptation to embark upon an escalating cycle of promises and conspicuous programs which leave basic economic and social problems unresolved. The growing problems lead to the assumption of power by the military which also suffers from factionalization resulting from value discontinuities and personality conflicts. Because of more problems, control becomes the chief concern of the modernizing society, which compels the modern regimes to divert key developmental resources toward the control function, thereby crippling their ability to achieve their modernization goals. Political instability leads to severe disruption in the planning, promulgation and application of development programs; to decreased confidence in the government; to the increased unwillingness of private investors to invest in the long-range projects; to the postponement of solutions to major problems; and to the stimulation of competitive bidding among elites, thereby increasing mass expectations and demands.

Monte Palmer speaks of different problems of political development.[11] First, the severe heterogeneity of political attitudes and values and the inability of most governmental institutions to meet the popular demands. There is much opposition to the regimes.

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[11] Monte Palmer, op. cit., p. 62.

Second, there is the problem of the heterogeneity in the political values of the major political elites, i.e., those who through legal or extra-legal means are in a position to either control or heavily influence government policies. Because of the difference of values of the political elites, there will be no consistency in the developmental programs and policies.

Third, bureaucracies of developing areas are seldom perceived as impartial by incoming regimes, particularly where value orientations differ markedly from one regime to the next. As a result, regimes are prone to interfere in the bureaucracy in an effort to reward their own supporters and to eliminate individuals perceived as hostile. The result of this interference is that the planning, implementing and coordinating of development projects lacks continuity and is subject to frequent and severe disruptions. Also, the lack of sufficient insulation from the arena of political conflict reduces the willingness of administrators to take the initiative necessary for the ongoing operation of the government for fear of retribution.

Peter H. Merkl mentions different problems of political development such as:

1. Problems of Unity and Consensus: The problems of unity and consensus are partly geographical and partly social. The problems of nation-building and economic development are greatly complicated where there are geographical barriers as the separateness of East and West Pakistan or the islands of Indonesia. There is also social differences based on language, ethinicity, blood, which stand in the way of unification. Due to the disunity the basic consensus on the form of government, the roles of the political process, common concepts of justice or day by day policies at home and abroad are not established. There is always bitterness in the social and economic field.

2. Problems of Stability and Effectiveness: The
   developing countries are beset with the problem
   of stability and effectiveness. There is no
   orderly change in government. The government
   does not have the capacity to solve the ever-
   increasing problems.

3. Problems of Communication Between Leadership and
   the Masses: Prior to independence, the masses
   are united with the leadership on the question of
   independence. But after the independence, when
   practical problems confront the new states, there
   is the necessity of established channels, organs
   of public opinion or interest groups that can
   transmit demands and grievances. There is a con-
   siderable gulf socially and intellectually between
   the modernizing urban elite from which the leaders
   spring and the illiterate peasant masses and
   migrants to the city. These two groups are hardly
   able to communicate with each other and often lack
   appreciation of the crucial importance of communica-
   tion.

4. Problems of Lagging Interest Articulation: Due to
   the lack of organization, the different groups in
   the developing countries very often spur revolution
   which disturbs the stability and effectiveness of
   the government. The operation of political parties
   may resemble a conspirational net of clandestine
   groups or a social mass movement and lack many of
   the attributes typical of a more advanced stage.

5. Psychological Problems: The traditional outlook and
   way of life also stand in the way of change and
   development.[12]

These, in general, are the problems of political development.

Methodology

There are various approaches to the study of political development
such as historical survey, structural-functional system analysis, elite
theory, group theory, games, communications, etc.

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[12] Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 359-360.

But political development is a very elusive concept. It includes all phases of life. It is not a promise to study all phases of life related to political development by a single approach.

The politics of the developing areas are in the transitional stage. They are neither modern nor traditional. They are midway between traditional and modern elements. In most developing societies the formal structures of government were arbitrarily introduced from abroad during the colonial period and became autonomous forces within the society.

There is lack of well-institutionalized social and economic interest groups in many developing societies which also brings into question the roles of different classes of individuals. The institutions are very much diffused. As such it is not possible to distinguish between different institutions on the basis of roles. The lack of institutionalized groups creates a ban on the free interplay between demands, supports, and decisions which is emphasized by David Easton.

The elite character is also changing very fast. Different kinds of elite came in the political scene of Bangladesh. Moreover, different circumstances lead to different kinds of elites. In order to understand problems of political development we have to understand the different circumstances that led to the coming up of different kinds of leaders.

There is also the need for new kinds of data. In the developed society it is possible to accumulate data. Government agencies, the mass media, popular authors and private industry employ many of the categories the political scientists utilizes and thus gathers information that is useful for study. "But in the developing countries, there is usually little in the way of acceptable data available on even the most conven-

tional matters, and frequently nothing at all has been collected on subjects of interest for the innovative researcher."[13]

There is a lack of consensus among the people on the fundamental question of life. There exists ambivalence in the public mind. For the researcher these features of developing political systems call for a greater than ordinary problem of the relationships between individual experience and collective action. The task of measuring strength of opinion becomes extremely complex. Also, in such systems there is a greater need for concern with questions about the motivation of actors and what it is that compels them to take the positions they do from time to time.

In order to appreciate fully the human problems which can arise from profound cultural change, it is necessary to place the problems of individual psychology within the broader contact of social history. Research based upon intensive interviewing and the analysis of life histories is necessary in order to identify and characterize different patterns of individual reaction.

A common hallmark of all developing systems is the gulf between the ruling few and the mass of the population. In these kind of bifurcated societies there is often a profound problem of communication between the mass and the elite. As such, it is difficult for the communication theory to study the problem of the developing countries. This problem of the gap between the elite and the mass offers a wide range of challenging research possibilities. One of the most important indicators of the probable pattern of national development is to be found in the particular manner in

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[13]Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems for Research," Robert E. Ward (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964), p. 24.

which mediation between elite and mass is being strengthened. This funda-
mental problem of the gap between rulers and citizens suggests the great
importance of more research into the dynamics of political parties and
the problems of building voluntary associations.

The elites in the developing societies comprise an extraordinarily
small group of men. The fact that the leaders belong to an intimate and
restricted world places many serious limits on the possibilities of poli-
tics. The existence of a closed polity means that personality becomes
a desirable factor in determining the course of political energy. This
characteristic of developing political systems can pose some extremely
difficult problems for the researcher. Instead of dealing with formal
issues and matters of political doctrine the analyst must turn his atten-
tion to the political style of actors and the spirit which they conduct
their relations with each other. We are to take into account the dis-
proportionate influence that the personality of a single leader may have
on national political life. In most developing societies, especially in
Bangladesh, there is much room for general studies of the social and eco-
nomic groups which are politically important or which appear politically
significant. For many years there has been a need for more systematic
studies of such groups as students, intellectuals, journalists, business
communities, labor unions and even the more formally established organi-
zations such as the army or the civil service. We are to know how leaders
are recruited. Has there been any change over time in the importance and
the proper position of the different groups?

Such problems force the political scientists to engage in intensive
sociological and economic analysis. In order to discuss the prospects of

different potential leadership elements it is necessary to understand the prospects of fundamental economic and sociological change.

Due to these problems, the analytic descriptive method will be useful for understanding the problems of political development in Bangladesh which have the similar characteristics of the developing countries of the world. The analytic descriptive method will try to take into account historical survey, the nature of the elite, group dynamics, socio-economic changes and all other factions of the society.

Statement of Hypotheses

First, Bangladesh is like the other developing countries of the world striving for political development. The leaders and the people are eager to achieve political development as fast as possible. After the birth of Bangladesh every political scientist and leader of Bangladesh thought there would be no more problems of integration as it existed in Pakistan until 1971. But still the problem of integration is not solved. Bangladesh is still suffering from the problems of integration, hindering political development.

Second, like the other countries of Asia and Africa, Bangladesh is faced with the problem of stability. Within the span of a few years there has been many ups and downs. There is no orderly change of government. The government took different forms within these few years. There is no unity among the people and leaders on the form of government.

Third, the lack of well-organized party backing effective mobilization poses a problem of political development in Bangladesh. Bangladesh

is characterized by many political parties. But no political party is effective enough to mobilize people under one national ideology. This lack of a well-organized party creates confusion among the people causing a threat to stability and orderly change.

Fourth, the proper balance of the bureaucracy is an important problem of political development in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is facing the dilemma with regard to the effective balance of the bureaucracy. On the one hand, if bureaucracy is given too much power, it hinders the growth of political institutions. On the other hand, if the bureaucracy is not given much power, their non-cooperation hinders administration and the effective execution of politics.

Fifth, the most precarious problem which seriously hinders political development in Bangladesh is the problem of economic development. Failure in the solution of economic problems of the people leads to frustration leading to instability and ineffectiveness of the government.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION

The central problem in the developing countries is to achieve integration. Integration is the first requisite of political development. Without political integration the goal of political development cannot be achieved.

Myron Weiner has given several meanings to integration. "It means national integration, i.e., to bring together culturally and socially dis-- crete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity."[1]

The term integration covers a vast range of human relationships and attitudes--the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality; the integration of political units into a common territorial framework with a government which can exer- cise authority; the integration of the citizen into a common political process; and finally, the integration of individuals into organizations for purposive activities. As diverse as these definitions are they are united by a common thread. These are all attempts to define what it is which holds a society and a political system together.

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[1] Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development" in Welch (ed.) Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (London: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 130-131.

Bangladesh came into existence as a result of the failure of national integration after its establishment. The political scientists believed that there would be no problem of integration in Bangladesh because it had homogeneous population, geographic unity, and a common language. These are very important elements to form a nation, but if we take into account Myron Weiner's definition of national integration, we find Bangladesh still has problems with integration.

Bangladesh has a homogeneous people. "The Muslims constituted 80.4 percent of the population; the Hindus 18.4 percent. Almost 98 percent of the people speak Bengali."[2] The Hindus are the dominant minority. Because of a long history of Hindu-Muslim animosity the Hindus are still looked upon with suspicion by the Muslims.

The main threat to territorial and national integration came from the other national minorities in Bangladesh. "Their total number reaches 500,000. They are settled primarily in the outlying regions of the republic. In the southeast (the Chittagong Hill Tracts) live several small national groups of Assamese-Burmese descent; the Chakmas (in the Karmafully River valley and to the north of it); the Marmas, who are sometimes also called the Maghs (to the south of the Karmafully River); the Tipperas or Tipuras, the Morongs or Murungs; the Tanchaungs; Karris; Ryangs; lushies or Mizos, etc."[3]

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[2] Nyrop, An Economic Geography of Bangladesh.

[3] Lori V. Giankovsky, "The Social Structure of Society in the People's Republic of Bangladesh," Asian Survey, March 1974.

The largest of the Assamese-Burmese people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are the Chakmas, who inhabit the Ramgamati District. "They number, according to the estimate at the end of 1971, about 250,000 people. They are Buddhists. The Chakmas rebelled many times against the authority of the English colonizers, and until 1947 perceived a considerable amount of autonomy under the domination of the hereditary Rajah (king) of the Roy dynasty. The leaders of the several Chakma clans came out in 1947 against including the Rangamati District as a part of Pakistan and were suppressed by the East Pakistan authorities, some of whom later emigrated to India."[4] The infiltrations into the Chittagong Hill Tracts by tradesmen and entrepreneur-outsiders caused the politically active leaders of the Chakmas to try to achieve administrative autonomy for the region which they inhabited. This movement received support attested to by the victory of its leaders who stood as independents at the general elections in December, 1970. In the summer of 1972 the leaders of the Chakmas sent a memorandum to the Bangladesh government, pointing out the need to concede administrative autonomy to the Chittagong Hill Tract and to form a special legislative body there.

Bangladesh was created out of the regional disparity prevailing between East and West Pakistan. As such it has to pay special attention to the regional distribution because regionalism which started in the Pakistani period may distrub Bangladesh also. But as far as development is concerned, we can find some inter-regional differences within Bangladesh. Bangladesh is divided into four regions: north, south, center and

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[4]Ibid., p. 701.

east. The popularly-held view in Bangladesh generally casts the north and south as underdeveloped; and indeed certain disparities between the north and south and the center and east can be discerned. "The center-east has most of the big urban centers, the capital Dacca, the major port town Chittagong, and the major industrial center Narayangong, all lie in this region. The center-east has more people in non-agricultural labor (center 18.1%; east 13.8%, north 11.1%, south 16.5%) and a higher literacy rate (center 16.3%, east 19.3%, north 16.7%, south 17.7%)."[5]

The center-east is more modern; it also comprises most of the crowded districts and contains nearly half the province's population. There is more migration out of this region to the less crowded north and south. This internal migration creates some resentment of migrants in the north and south.

The north and south have developed more slowly. There is resentment in these areas against the central government. These are the large jute-producing areas. They are demanding a greater share in the distribution of wealth and are citing the example of the then East Pakistan, which was used to earn maximum of foreign exchange. Of course, the present government is trying to concentrate more in the north and south. The opening of TV stations in Natore (in the north) and Khulna (south) was directed to this end.

The creation of national ideology helps to solve the problem of national integration. It serves as a unifying force among the various segments of the population. Lack of an ideology to inspire the hetero-

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[5]Rounaq Johan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 5.

geneous population to indulge in various activities detrimental to national integration.

In order to unite the nations Bangladesh needed a national ideology. The six-point program which united the people of Bangladesh lost its significance after the creation of Bangladesh. That is why Sheikh Mujibar Rahman tried to unite the people of Bangladesh under the ideology of Mujibism, i.e., nationalism, democracy, secularism and social-ism. Mehden remarks that in order to be successful the ideology ought to be general enough in scope and wording so as to unite a large part of the population. "Doctrines that are too explicit may be difficult to win mass allegiance."[6]

A second element usually found in successful ideological programs is the combination of ideology with organization. An ideological cam-paign may fail if it is not accompanied by some long-term benefits. The failure of many new independent countries to attain the goals expected of independence has been one of the factors responsible for the high rate of military coups in the developing world.

If we try to analyze Mujibism on the basis of criterias given by Mehden, Mujibism is too general, without any substantive basis. Though it tried to embrace different ideologies such as democracy, socialism, secular-ism and nationalism, it could not specifically mention the characteristics of the four principles of Mujibism. It could not satisfy any group. None of the principles were satisfied fully.

The supporters of democracy criticized Mujibism because it gave excessive power to the Prime Minister giving him a chance of turning into

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[6]Von der Mehden, Politics in the Developing Nations.

a dictator. They also criticized the emergency provisions of the con-
stitution which incorporated Mujibism. The emergency provisions will
lead to a "perpetual emergency."[7]

The socialistic provision failed to satisfy the socialists who
thought that making socialism a part of the directive principles of state
without making that principle enforceable in a court of law, would not
lead to the establishment of socialism in Bangladesh. One Bengali intel-
lectual referred to the constitution "as a fundamental measure against
socialism, democracy, nationalism and secularism."[8]

The concept of secularism created much frustration among the people,
80.9 percent of whom are Muslims. The Muslims thought of secularism as no
religion and more satisfying to the Hindus. They also thought secularism
was an Indian ploy to have more dominance in Bangladesh.

As far as the second condition was concerned, though the Awami
League had a well-organized base in the local levels, it could not combine
the organization with ideology. Opposition was created within the organi-
zation. The main force of the Awami League, the Student League, was
divided on the issue of Mujibism. The Rab-Siraj faction of the Student
League severely criticized Mujibism and insisted on scientific socialism.

Moreover, this kind of ideology could not give any long range bene-
fits to the people. The main reason which influenced the Bangladeshi peo-
ple to get separation is that they were expecting a better life without

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[7]Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and
Political Polarization," Asian Survey, Feb. 1975.

[8]Ibid.

Pakistan because in Pakistani period East Pakistan presently Bangladesh used to earn the maximum of foreign exchange. When Bangladesh became independent, the people were expecting a happy and contented life. But on the contrary, they found the non-availability of essential goods, the ever-rising price index, the unequal sharing of austerity, the corruption and nepotism of the Awami League leaders, and Indian influences in Bangladesh. Mujibism, as an ideology, failed to satisfy the long-felt needs of the people. As such, it could not hold the population together.

Some observers in Bangladesh took it for granted that the country would not have any difficulty in the task of identity building, but subsequent events proved otherwise. The separation from Pakistan did not make it easier for the Bangladeshis to determine their identity and the search for identity in Bangladesh began soon after its separation from Pakistan. The Indian army, to whom the Pakistani soldiers surrendered, did not endear itself for long. Within a few weeks of the fall of Dacca, there were sporadic reports of clashes between Bengali soldiers of the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army. When Mujib assumed office, after being released from a Pakistani jail, he recognized the growing sentiment against Indian soldiers in Bangladesh and persuaded Prime Minister Indira Ghandi to withdraw them.

Even after the withdrawal of Indian troops, the strong influence of the Indian government persisted in Bangladesh. The numerous government officials, teachers, students, politicians and prominent individuals who had spent months in India during the 1971 liberation struggle were inclined to accept Indian influence in Bangladesh. They did not hesitate to raise the bogey of Pakistani collaboration against those who did not agree with

them. For a while, "patriotism seemed to be linked with pilgrimage to India."[9] The public reaction was very quick. One Dacca newspaper wrote in disgust that Bangladesh was a nation of 65 million collaborators. The returnees from India were sarcastically called "Hajis"[10] by the critics of the Awami League government.

As events developed, Bangladesh sought its identity through an opposition to Indian influence and predominance. Following the Indian model, Bangladesh became a secular state and all political parties with Islamic leanings were banned from the day the Awami League leaders assumed office in Dacca. To the critics, this ban was an Indian ploy to retain its influence in Bangladesh. But while officially Bangladesh remained a secular state, the Islamic identity was continuously stressed to or by the public. Bengali Muslims had not been serious in stressing a Muslim identity in Pakistan politics, but they seemed more anxious to do so in secular Bangladesh. Islamic identity became the center of resistance against Indian predominance in Bangladesh politics. In the summer of 1973, the so-called Muslim Bengali Movement was started by the right wing Islamic forces to revive Muslim sentiment and to resist the secularism propounded by the ruling Awami League.

The pro-Islamic forces began to rally around the octogerian leader, Maulana Bhasani, who professed socialism but believed in Islamic principles. He began advocating Islamic socialism. Within a few months of Bangladesh's independence, the Maulana began open and bitter criticism of Indian influ-

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[9]Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears," Asian Survey, Sept., 1977.

[10]Hajis--pilgrims from Mecca.

ence in Bangladesh. "He also criticized the Awami League's policy of secularism and gave tacit support to the "Muslim Bengali" movement by saying that within six months time there would be a new flag in Bangladesh—a euphemistic reference to the flag of Muslim Bengal."[11] However, the movement largely dissipated when several of its prominant leaders were arrested for clandestine activities. Although the Maoists did not openly admit it, there was a covert understanding between them and the right wing Islamists. There were numerous reports that the extreme left and moderate forces had struck an alliance on the basis of anti-Indian sentiment and opposition to the principle of Mujibism, i.e., nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy.[12]

Anti-Indian feelings and sympathy for Bangladesh's identity as a Muslim nation became so strong that even Mujib began to modify his policy. To the surprise of the Indian government and even his close political associates, he accepted an invitation to attend the Islamic conference held in Pakistan in the spring of 1974. The Islamic Summit proved to be a net diplomatic gain for Mujib because Pakistan used it to legitimize the decision to recognize Bangladesh. It also opened the door for Bangladesh to enter the United Nations and contact the Middle Eastern countries, which offered aid to new nations. Later in 1974, Mujib visited Egypt, Kuwait and other Muslim nations to promote understanding with those countries. The Awami League also granted clemency to the so-called Pakistani collaborators and sought an understanding with the Islamic forces. By this time,

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[11]Rashiduzzaman, op. cit.

[12]Bengali nationalism, popular idea of democracy, secularism based no discrimination against the Hindus or other minorities. Socialism, based on nationalization. All these ideas correspond to the ideas of Mrs. Indira Ghandi, the ex-Prime Minister of India.

there were numerous reports that the rightists were regrouping. At this stage, the Awami League government became concerned and arrested some old clemency. An official spokesman explained that some of these leaders were planning to set up a political party opposed to the principles of secularism.

Although Sheikh Mujibar Rahman formally concentrated all power in his hands and made Bangladesh a one-party dictatorship early in 1975, his secret preparations reportedly started much earlier. The para-military forces called the Rakkhi Bahini were widely used to suppress dissent. Hard-pressed by serious economic problems and challenges from the right as well as the left, the Awami League apparently sought a fresh identity for Bangladesh through the one-man dictatorship of a charismatic leader, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman. A brutal challenge to this endeavor came through the bloody coup of August 15, 1975. Immediately after the coup, the young military rebels went on the radio and announced that Bangladesh was an Islamic state. The new president, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, who took over from the leaders of the coup, later rescinded that announcement, evidently under Indian government pressure. But the question of Islamic identity remained alive and in April 1977, when General Ziaur Rahman became president, the constitution was amended to drop secularism and incorporate some Islamic principles.

The martial law administration had earlier made several gestures to the growing Muslim sentiment in Bangladesh. Soon after the August coup, ambassadors between Pakistan and Bangladesh were exchanged and communications re-established. The Collaborators Act, 1972, was repealed, which gave some legitimacy to those Muslim leaders who were alleged to have been

supportive of Pakistan in 1971. Several senior civil servants who were known to be sympathetic to Islamic views, were reinstated in important positions. After being outlawed for about four years, the religious parties were allowed a formal existence in 1976. Official delegations were exchanged with Muslim countries. High officials began to participate and encourage Muslim religious festivals. Air Vice Marshall Tawab, one of the military strong men, openly encouraged right wing forces and supported an Islamic ideology for Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman visited Saudi Arabia and attended the Islamic Conference in Istanbul in 1976. Internally, all these moves were also intended to mobilize the support of the Muslim forces who had opposed Mujib and his secularist policy.

There are several other questions relevant to the identity of Bangladesh. After Sheikh Mujibar Rahman who will be the father of the nation? Will the present national anthem be retained? Is Rabindra Nath Tagore of Nazral Islam the national poet of Bangladesh? Since the assassination of Mujib, his name has not been officially mentioned as the father of the nation except for the brief interval of Khalid Musharraf's counter coup in November 1975 when Mujib was reinstated as the father of the nation. There were suggestions to acknowledge Maulana Bhasani, who received a state funeral when he died after a prolonged illness in 1976, as the father of Bangladesh. But according to informed sources the military government does not intend to have any officially recognized father. There is also a question about the national anthem in Bangladesh. The conservative Muslims never accepted Tagore's song as the national anthem while the pro-Peking radicals thought of it as a subtle means of expanding Indian influence in Bangladesh. It will be no sur-

prise if the national anthem for Bangladesh is changed under assertive pressure from the right as well as the left. There is an inspiring campaign in Dacca to develop Nazral Islam as the national poet and adopt one of his songs as the national anthem. All these problems clearly show the problem of identity. The present government is emphasizing Islamic principles, nationalism and sovereignty which are not clearly in agreement on fundamentals.

The integration of values, as Welch remarks, it encompasses at a minimum means that there are acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict. All societies have conflicts and all societies have procedures for the settlement of conflict are not always satisfactory. There are societies where the right of traditional authority to resolve conflict remained intact during the early phases of modernization.

There is the need for the integration of values because the scale and volume of conflict increases in societies experiencing modernization. The status of social groups is frequently changed, even reversed, as education opens new occupational opportunities as the suffrage increases the potential importance of numbers and as industrial expansion provides new opportunities for employment and wealth. A caste or tribe once low in status and wealth may now rise or at least see the opportunity formobility and social groups once high in status, power and wealth may feel threatened. Traditional rivalries are aggravated and new conflicts are created as social relationships change.

The modernization process also creates new occupational roles and these new roles often conflict with the old. The new local government officer may be opposed by the tribal and caste leaders.

Welch suggests "there are two model strategies for integrating
values in the developing society. One stresses the importance of con-
sensus and is concerned with maximizing uniformity. The second method
is the way integrative values may be maximized emphasizes the interplay
of individual and group interests."[13]

A modern political system has no single mechanism, no single pro-
cedure, no single institution for the resolution of conflict; indeed, it
is precisely the multiplicity of individuals, institutions and procedures
for dispute settlement that characterizes the modern political system,
both democratic and totalitarian. In contrast, developing societies, with
an increasing range of internal conflict, typically lacks such individuals,
institutions and procedures. It is as if mankind's capacity to generate
conflict is greater than his capacity to find methods for resolving con-
flict; the lag is clearly greatest in societies in which fundamental eco-
nomic and social relationships are rapidly changing.

Integration of values has become a predominant problem in Bangla-
desh because it is endowed with so many ideologies and so many values.
There is not yet any consensus on the question of the fundamentals of the
state.

The constitution was passed on November 4, 1972, but it was severely
criticized by the opposition parties, especially from pro-Peking leftist
groups such as the National Awami Party-Bhasani, the communist party of
Bangladesh, the Revolutionary Students Union and the Bangla-Students Union.
They severely attacked the draft constitution and even challenged the right

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[13]Welch, op. cit.

of the Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution. According to

Maulana Bhasani "the Constituent Assembly was elected under the 1970

Legal Framework Order (LFO) of General Yahya Khan to frame the consti-

tution of Pakistan. It got its mandate in the 6-point program of the

Awami League. But it got no legal claim to frame the constitution of a

sovereign Bangladesh.[14] They demanded that the constitution be framed

by a national convention comprised of the representatives of all the

political parties and mass-organizations which had participated in the

liberation struggle and should be adopted by a referendum.

According to this group the draft constitution was neither social-

ist nor even democratic. Though some good words about socialism had been

incorporated in the fundamental principles of state policy there was no

guarantee of food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care and employ-

ment for the citizens. There was no provision for confiscation of foreign

capital and abolition of feudalism. Usual democratic human rights were

denied by providing for so many restrictions to be imposed by law in the

name of security, public order, morality and so on.

"The National Social Party, led by A. S. M. Abdur Rab and Major

M. A. Jalil, remarked that the constitution was worthless. It did not

reflect the hopes and aspirations of the people. It did not recognize

the class conflict nor was there any provision for removing economic

inequality and exploitation. Accordingly, the realization of socialism

was not possible through this constitution."[15]

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[14]Abul Fazal Hoq, "Constitution Making in Bangladesh," _Pacific Affairs_, Spring 1973.

[15]Talukdar Maniruzzaman, op. cit.

The National Awami Party and the Communist Party of Bangladesh hailed the draft constitution for its provision for parliamentary government and secularism and inclusion of fundamental rights but contended that fundamental rights had been infringed by imposing certain restrictions on them. According to the party, adequate provisions had not been made for the establishment of socialism which was one of the accepted fundamental principles of state policy. There was no constitutional guarantee of basic necessities of life. The Prime Minister had been given too much power and, as a result, the smooth progress of parliamentary democracy might be handicapped.

The existing government has been transferred to the presidential form of government. Accordingly, the election held gave a landslide victory to Ziaur Rahman. He announced for sovereign parliamentary election. Still, a majority of the people are unconcerned. The radical parties did not participate in the election.

Bangladesh faces the problem of elite-mass integration. As Welch remarks, since fundamental cultural and attitudinal gaps exist between the elite and the mass--the former being secular minded, English and Western educated while the latter remain oriented toward traditional values and are fundamentally religious, and vernacular speaking. The elite mass gap also implies that communication is inadequate, that is, the elite are oriented toward persuading the mass to change their orientation but the feedback of political demands is not heard or not responded to.

In all political systems, those of developing as well as developed societies, there are differences in outlook between those who govern and those who are governed. In a developed system, those who govern are

accessible to influence by those who are governed--even in a totalitar-
ian system and those who are governed are readily available for mobili-
zation by the government. In modern societies governments are so engaged
in effecting the economy, social welfare and defense that there must be
a closer interaction between government and the governed. Government must
mobilize individuals to save, invest, pay taxes, serve in the army, and
obey laws. Modern government must also know what the public will toler-
ate and must be able to anticipate, before the policies are pursued, what
the public reaction to a given policy might be. Moreover, the modern
government is increasingly armed with sophisticated tools of economic
analysis and public opinion surveys to increase its capacity to predict
both the economic and political consequences of its actions.

But in the new nations there is no such developed mechanism for
surveying public opinion. Moreover, what they often hear is always inapro-
priate.

If we analyze the elite structure of Bangladesh, we will see many
differences exist between the leaders and the masses. Before 1971, when
East Bengali was part of Pakistan absolute state authority was concentrated
in the hands of a narrow upper stratum of well-to-do classes. This stratem
consisted of the numerically insignificant monopolistic upper crust of the
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the upper layers of the landowners
and the civil and military bureaucracy. In the ethnic respect the elite
strata which ruled Pakistan was non-homogeneous and was dominated by those
of Western and Norhtern Indian extraction or representatives of West Paki-
stan. The formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh deprived this
elite layer of the ruling position which they had occupied in the former

Eastern Province of Pakistan. The leaders of the East Bengali National Movement and the social forces which they represented came into power in the young independent state.

A process of cosolidating the new elite is taking place in Bangladesh. Joining its ranks are especially the representatives of the East Bengali nationalist bourgeoisie, the landowners, intelligentsia leaders and Bengalis, who up until 1971 had occupied posts in the prominent civil, judicial and police services in East Pakistan, i.e., actually those who were by birth from these social strata of society.

But the elites have hardly any touch with the general public who live in the rural areas. The elites have little contact except on occasions generally before the elections. There are no organized groups for the peasants to mobilize the people so that their interests are not aggregated by the political system.

These problems of integration need to be solved. But a long process is needed for solving these problems. People should be integrated to national ideology and national goals which are basic requirements for development.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND UNITY

Like many underdeveloped countries the most precarious problems
which Bangladesh is facing is the lack of unity and stability. This is
one of the fundamental problems of political development. Peter H. Merkyl
in his book, Political Continuity and Social Change, has identified the
problem of unity and stability as one of the problems of political develop-
ment.[1]

These problems of stability and unity are present in many develop-
ing countries. For example, in Indonesia, Javanese imperialism has led to
four major insurrections in the Molucussor and Ambiona on two occasions in
1950-51 and 1954-55, in Sumatra in 1956-57 and a complex series of revolts
in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes in 1958-66.[2]

Before analyzing instability in Bangladesh, we must be clear on the
definition of instability. Claude Ake in his article, "Modernization and
Political Instability--A Theoretical Exploration," conceptualizes political
instability implicitly or explicitly as violence, conflict, civil disobedi-

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[1]Peter H. Merkyl, Political Continuity and Social Change (New York:
John Wiley Bros., 1967).

[2]Michael Breeher, "Political Instability in the New States of Asia,"
in Eckstein and Apter (eds.) Corporate Politics (New York: The Free Press,
1963), p. 18.

ence, disorder, short duration of government, lack of institutionaliza-
tion and so forth.[3]

Feieband used aggression of groups within the political system
as an indicator of political instability.[4] Jean Bhandel defines political
instability as lack of longevity of government. For Martin Needler, "a
country is stable if the government is chosen by free elections and if
the government acts constitutionally."[5]

We shall analyze instability in Bangladesh in the sense of poli-
tical disorder, armed revolts, and short duration of the government.

Soon after the creation of Bangladesh, infighting threatened the
stability of the country. There was infighting between the various sec-
tors of the Mukti-Bahini (the liberation forces).

Though the constitution was drafted within six months and became
effective on December 16, 1972, it faced bitter opposition from the oppo-
sition party though not in the Assembly which was dominated by the Awami
League. "The constitution was criticized as creating a type of dictator-
ship by the Prime Minister and the emergency provision as perpetual emer-
gency. The constitution failed to inspire the vast majority of the youth
who liked to see more radical provisions included."[6]

There were armed attacks on local law and order enforcing agencies.
"Between June and November there were armed attacks on 52 thanas (admini-

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[3]Claude Ake, "Modernization and Political Instability," World Poli-
tics, July 1974, p. 802.

[4]Ibid., p. 807.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1973: Nation Building in a New State,"
Asian Survey, Feb., 1977, p. 199.

strative unit composed of some villages) and police stations."[7] There were secret killings and kidnappings. There was growing antagonism within the Awami League. Its front organization, the Student League, was divided on the question of introduction of the scientific socialism and mixed economy. One faction, led by A. S. M. Abdur Rab, demanded scientific socialism and the other faction advocated Mujibism, i.e., socialism, democracy, secularism and nationalism. Factionalism also started in the top Awami Leaguers. On January 25, 1975, at the initiative of Sheikh Mujib and against the private sentiments of the majority of the members of Parliament, the constitution was amended to provide for a presidential form of government. The president was authorized to form one national party and to suspend the activities of all political groups that refused to join the new political party. The amendment further provided that Sheikh Mujib would be the president of the country for five years from the date of the constitutional amendment. Mujib announced on June 6. The constitution of the National Party called the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL). It was comprised mainly of the members of the Awami League. From the opposition, the National Awami Party (NAP). the Moscow faction and the pro-Moscow Communist Party welcomed it. It was followed by other authoritarian measures. All newspapers were brought under government management. Through a presidential ordinance on June 21, 61 districts were created by breaking up the existing 19 districts. On July 16, Mujib announced the names of 61 governors who were to take district administration on September 1, 1975. The governors designated were

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[7]Ibid., p. 200.

given special training starting July 21, which was to continue until August 16, 1975. There was also the plan to place half a battalion of the Jatiyo Rakki Bahini (the National Defense Force) under each governor. The governor would be under direct control of Sheikh Mujib. The Jatiyo Rakki Bahini units would be increased annually so that by the end of 1980 the total strength would be 130,000, one regiment under each governor. "The new system of copying the Soviet method but rejecting the ideology was designed to suppress every vestige of opposition and perpetuate the corrupt rule of the Sheikh Mujib tribe in the softest state in the world."[8]

Due to this change of government and growing frustrations among the public for the constant failure of Mujib to solve problems triggered the army coup of August 16, 1975, which killed Sheikh Mujib and his family. The army brought Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed, ex-Foreign Trade Minister, as the president of Bangladesh. He replaced General Ziaur Rahman as the Chief of Staff of the Army. On November 3, several senior officers led by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf staged a second coup. The leaders of the November 3 coup negotiated with President Mushtaque and allowed a safe passage to Bangladesh for the 15 military officers who were widely known to be connected with the August 15 coup. The leaders of the November 3 coup lost heart when the news spread in the evening of November 4 that four leaders of the BKSAL, Tajuddin Ahmed, ex-Finance Minister; Syed Nazral Islam, ex-Industries Minister; Monsoor Ali, ex-Prime Minister; and Qamruzzaman, ex-Commerce Minister, were found dead in the Dacca central jail. On November 5, Khaled Musharraf and his associates forced Mushtaque to hand over the presidency to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, A. S. M. Sayem.

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[8]Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization," Asian Survey, Feb. 1975.

On November 6, the Jawans (soldiers) and the Sepoys (non-commissioned soldiers) staged another revolution which killed Khaled Musharraf. Zia was able to restore discipline within the army, but he faced opposition from the disgruntled Awami Leaguers, many of whom left India's Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (the National Socialist Party) which believed in the establishment of scientific socialism. In February 1976, some sepoys in Chittigong rebelled, but it was suppressed.

General Zia became president when Justice Sayem resigned in early 1977. On May 30, 1977 there was a nation-wide referendum on confidence in Ziaur Rahman. He received 99 percent of yes votes. After the referendum two months followed without any kind of violence. On August 15, 1977, there were reports of clashes between the Awami League workers and the army when the Awami League tried to mourn the day for Sheikh Muzib. There were also reports of sporadic violence in the countryside.

Zia once again faced threats to his position and stability of the economy when an abortive coup on September 30 and October 2 killed 11 Air Force officers and 10 soldiers. The coup started in Bogra on September 30 and the rebels then struck Dacca on October 2 when Japanese terrorists hijacked a JAL plane to Dacca airport from where they bargained for the release of their jailed compatriots in Japan and a six million dollar ransom.

Almost the entire Bangladesh administration , including top Air Force officials, were negotiating with the terrorists at Dacca airport. It provided an ideal opportunity for the disgruntled elements within the armed forces to stage a revolution which was quickly suppressed. "Total casualties on both sides exceeded 230. About 500 people were tried for

alleged complicity and 92 persons received the death sentence for inciting rebellion."[9]

Although the abortive coup was quickly suppressed, it has shaken the morale of the military administration. Zia is under pressure from his colleagues who fear that such coup attempts might become a periodic feature in Bangladesh threatening the stability of the country unless drastic steps are taken to depoliticize the soldiers. This explains why the military tribunals went into action immediately after the coup.

"The influx of Muslims, numbering about 140,000 from the Arakan area of Burma, created further problems of stability in Bangladesh. They have been evicted by the Burmese government and they have rushed into the neighboring Muslim country of Bangladesh."[10] However, the problem has been settled by the bilateral initiatives of Bangladesh and Burmese governments.

All these show the prevailing instability in Bangladesh. We shall try to find out the causes of instability. First, the problem of legitimacy: the government body needs legitimacy. It is the main reason for the short duration of government in the underdeveloped countries.

According to Lucian Pye, "A legitimacy crisis is a breakdown in the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out of differences over the proper nature of authority for the system. A legitimacy crisis can thus take the form of a change in the fundamental structure or character of a government, a change in the source from which it claims

[9]Ibid., p. 215.

[10]The Bangladesh Observer, May 11, 1978.

to derive its ultimate authority or a change in the ideals it professes to represent. Basic to a legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in which governmental authority is conceived or itself acts."[11]

Lucian Pye has identified four principle causes or sources of legitimacy crises in the development process.[12] First, there is the breakdown of governmental institutions that occurs because of conflicting or inadequate bases for claiming authority in the society. Second, government structures may disintegrate because there is excessive and uninstitutionalized competition for power. Third, national leaders and the governmental divisions of authority may collapse because the justifications for the ideological or pragmatic claims to authority have been based on unacceptable readings of history or faulty predictions of future developments. Finally, and probably most basically, a legitimacy crisis may arise because people have been inappropriately socialized; their feelings about authority are not functional for the efforts of the current leaders.

If we analyze the situation in Bangladesh, almost all the causes mentioned by Lucian Pye prevail. There was a complete breakdown of the governmental machinery when the August coup took place in 1975. Since then there have been many uninstitutionalized groups which have tried to capture power by force. Many abortive coups took place within a short span of time. From August, many groups, especially the radical group, tried to capture power unconstitutionally. A vacuum has been created in leadership. The orderly means of transfer of power has been blocked.

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[11]Lucian W. Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis in the Developing Society," in Firkle and Gable (eds.), op. cit.

[12]Ibid., p. 542.

because no group has the legitimacy to assume power. The assumption of power by Mushtaque on August 15, President Sayem on November 3, and President Zia on January 1, 1977 does not have a great deal of legitimacy. There is no unity among the elites for the stable constitutional means of transfer of power. The leadership is divided and busy in gaining power by any means.

Legitimacy crisis arose because of the failure of leadership to fulfill people's expectations. The people of Bangladesh expected a better life after being separated from Pakistan. But Sheihk Mujib failed to satisfy the expectation of the people. Moreover, he disregarded the very inherent value of the people, for example, the most respected Islamic religion of the majority of the population of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib promised a better way of living within three years time, but three years passed without any improvement for the people. This greatly undermined the claims of authority of the leadership.

The existing military regime faced the problem of legitimacy because there was no popular sanction behind their assumption of power. That is why after assuming power, General Zia called a nation-wide referendum which gave him 99 percent of yes votes. Still, they could not fully establish his legitimate authority because there is distrust among the people on the turnout rate.

All these feelings convinced Zia to base his authority by popular support. He allowed political activities from April 1978. The election on June 3, 1978 gave Zia the legitimacy which he wanted very much. "Zia secured 76.72 percent while General (Rtd.) Osmani secured 21.65 percent

of the total votes cast."[13] Still, there are several allegations about
the election. In an interview with the newsmen after the election, Gen-
eral Osmani remarked that "the election was not free and fair." He put
forward several demands such as restoration of human and fundamental
rights, release of all political prisoners, and withdrawal of martial
law."[14]

Secondly, the loss of charisma. The rise of charismatic leaders
is one of the fundamental characteristics of the developing countries.
Instability is created when charisma loses its image. The charisma of
Mujib united all the people of Bangladesh under his command. The causes
of instability and disunity can be related to the loss of charisma in
national leadership.

The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an
individual's personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary
men and treated as if endowed with the supernatural, superhuman or at
least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.[15] These are not access-
ible to ordinary persons but are regarded as of divine origin or as exem-
plary and on the basis of them, the individual concerned is treated as a
leader. It is very often thought of as resting on magical powers.

> If a leader is to serve as a charismatic leader, he
> must be perceived as goal-fulfilling by the masses
> i.e., he must be perceived as offering a relevant
> solution to the problems of the identifying indi-
> viduals. At least three factors are involved:
> image formation, image communication and image
> reinforcement."[16]

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[13]The Bangladesh Observer, June 6, 1978.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Monte Palmer, The Dilemmas of Political Development (Ill.: F. E.
Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 102.

[16]Ibid., p. 79.

First, the aspirant to charisma, he states, must be able to create an image of strength and generally epitomize whatever other virtues are perceived as relevant among the target audience. Without the image of strength, real or imagined, the leader is in a poor position to serve as a beacon of reference and security for those plagued by the confusion of social or psychic organization.

An image of strength is made up of many things, both real and imagined. Most of the well-known charismats have slain real dragons. Nasser evicted the British from the Egyptian base, nationalized the Suez Canal and emerged victorious from the 1956 tripartite invasion of Egypt by England, France and Israel. Sheikh Mujib was successful in creating the image because he was the leader to demand liberation from Pakistani rule.

If a charismatic leader is to attract a national following he must communicate the image he has created and the program he has proposed to individuals with differing problems, aspirations, and backgrounds. Attempts to appeal to diverse audiences entail the danger of making contradictory statements. This problem, however, has seldom come to the force. Assuming a strong need to identify with a leader, target individuals appear more than willing to rationalize the conflicting aspects of the leader's image. They maintain that he really conforms to their interpretation of his image but he must say nice things to other groups as a matter of expediency. Charismats, in turn, have sought to mitigate such conflict by operating at a vague and abstract level. In this respect, Sheikh Mujib faced a problem because he had to satisfy different rival factions which competed with each other for power.

A third condition emphasized by Max Weber for a charismatic leader is that he must reinforce the image or continue to provide a meaningful crutch for the faithful. If his power wanes, if competitive purveyors of charisma appear more relevant, or if concrete programs fall in direct conflict with ther mass values, then the basis for the charisma is undermined and the quality and intensity of identification patterns decreases or becomes totally extinguished. A charismatic leader who fails to reinforce his image continually will more than likely cease to be goal-fulfilling for those who identify with him. To the extent that this occurs, he ceases to be a charismatic leader. He may remain in power by virtue of coercive or economic assets but no longer enjoys the ability to mobilize the masses by means of identitive assets based on their identification with him. In this respect, Sheikh Mujib was a complete failure. He failed to reinforce his image as a charismatic leader by gratifying the public demands. He could not keep his promises as expected by the people.

"In order to reinforce the image the charismatic leader must undertake different strategies"[17] such as first, the strategy of permanent crisis. Sheikh Mujib tried to relate everything to Pakistani colonial rule. But it did not satisfy the people because the question of the Pakistan domination does not arise at all after 1971.

Second, VIP strategy, i.e., the role as an international leader. For example, Sukarno opened up the Bandung Conference in 1955. Sheikh Mujib attended the Islamic Conference in Lahore in 1979 and the Common-

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[17]Ibid., p. 83.

wealth Conference in 1972, but he could not create any image as an international leader because he lacked the potential to create Bandung or Non-alignment like Nehru or Sukarno.

Third, the development plan as political strategy. In this respect, Sheikh Mujib was a complete failure because he could not undertake any development strategy. Moreover, he failed with the problems of inflation and food shortages which crippled his image.

Fourth, the elimination of competing prophets strategy, i.e., to eliminate the opposition. Sheikh Mujib banned all political activities and created one party rule by establishing the BKSAL, but this was criticized by the people.

Fifth, "...the strategy of ideology building—Nasser, Nkrumah Sukarno, Castro, all charismatic leaders, attempted to reinforce their images and to overcome some of the heterogeneity of their countries by providing a new ideology capable of integrating all the values."[18] In a similar way, Sheikh Mujib created Mujibism, which found bitter opposition even from his own party.

The nature of the charismatic relationships and the purpose of the charismatic strategies is to focus power in the hands of a single individual. As long as the leader's perceptions are in tune with reality and he uses his position to pursue policies based upon sound advice, his power might well result in the benefits of charisma. This, however, is not always the case.

As structural rigidities block outlets for change and mobility within the system, the only alternatives for change become those of vio-

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[18]Ibid., p. 86.

lence. When violence succeeds, the recriminations that follow are generally as violent as to fear as under the solidarity-building work of the deposed charismat, a process that must begin anew. The charismats were reluctant to give political institutions sufficient power to challenge their authority. They thereby crippled the ability of the major political institutions of their states to live in an independent existence. They also discourage the rise of a second man. With the passing of a charismat, therefore the potential for intensive and divisive conflicts run high. The more intense such conflict becomes, the greater the prospect that parochial conflicts submerged by the presence of the leader will be rekindled as contestants seek support for their respective positions.

The entire popularity of the Awami League was based on the personal appeal of Mujib. There was no institutionalized structure. His inability to build new institutions, to replace the one destroyed during the liberation struggle such as a respected bureaucracy, the viability of the opposition party, an impartial judiciary, a free enterprise economy, an open education system, brought about a crisis of leadership. It gave rise to a situation in which public confusion has increased and the chances of social mobilization have decreased.

The present government of Major General Ziaur Rahman, though a military leader, still bases his authority on charisma. He developed charisma during the liberation period when Sheikh Mujibar Rahman was taken prisoner by the army on March 26, 1977. Ziaur Rahman was the first man to declare independence of Bangladesh from the Chittagong radio station. He formed the resistance movement in Chittagong against the Pakistani Army.

He is trying to base his authority on economic development and sovereignty of the country. He has undertaken massive programs of economic development. Still, there are many problems confronting the existing regime.

An analysis of the military regime shows that the armed forces as a whole seldom rule. The military regime is a government in which particular military elite rule. These elites may or may not have the support of the rest of the armed forces. Gaining and maintaining that support is, in fact, generally a continual concern to the ruling military elites. There are cleavages within the army. Moreover, the cleavages within the military are often exacerbated after it seizes power and becomes further divided between those officers who assume positions in the government and those who do not. Zia is facing the problem of bringing unity among the army which is highly politicized. Moreover, there always arise conflicts between the officers and the Jawans which is highly destructive to army discipline.

Generally, military regimes are anti-political. They distrust political activities and try to avoid any kind of popular participation. In this respect, Zia is more tactful. Though at first he banned all political activities, he could feel that he could not continue his power in this way. That is why he announced the formation of a new party, The Nationalist Democratic Party, and opened up political activities after April, 1978.

He also held a presidential election on the basis of universal adult suffrage on June 3, 1978 which gave him a landslide victory over his opponent. Still, there is some question as to whether he is following

the footsteps of Ayub Khan. There is also doubt whether he will also suffer the same kind of fate as Ayub Khan in 1969. Ayub Khan came to power in the wake of the declaration of martial law in 1958. After assuming power he changed himself to civilian rule. As an army man he was very fearful of democracy. So, he created a cloak of dictatorship in the name of "basic democracy." People gradually demanded democracy which was suppressed by Ayub. As a result of this, the people rose in rebellion which ultimately forced Ayub Khan to resign in 1969.

Third, the threat of India. Bangladesh, which was created in 1971 through the direct intervention of India with the active support of Soviet Russia, soon found itself in a position of a dependent state of India. First, the Indian army, before they were withdrawn from Bangladesh, took to India the vast amount of arms and ammunition left by the surrendering Pakistani army and kept the nascant Bangladesh army virtually disarmed. Second, the Indian government imposed a trade agreement on Bangladesh providing for free trade within ten miles of the border of each country. Through this border trade agreement (which was terminated at the end of the first year of independence in the face of stiff public protest in Bangladesh), India siphoned off from Bangladesh a large part of foreign grants and huge quantities of jute, rice and other essential commodities. The Indian government also slackened the anti-smuggling operation along the Indian borders, as smuggling on the India-Bangladesh border went in favor of India. India always defaulted in the export to Bangladesh of items provided in the annual trade agreements, while Bangladesh exceeded targets in its exports to India. India's failure to export coal particularly hit the Bangladesh economy. In spite of all the concessions made to

India, the government of Sheikh Muzib could not even get a fair deal in the Ganges water dispute except for a face-saving interim government.

Naturally, the military elite who took over in Bangladesh in the August coup of 1975, especially those who came into power on November 7, 1975 after the abortive Indian-backed putsch of Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, took every possible measure to get the country out of the position of dependence on India, reflecting the changed mood of the people of Bangladesh. Since then the Indian government applied pressure to make the new government subservient to Indian desires. First, the Indian government began to divert the Ganges water at Farakka without prior consultation with the Bangladesh government, contrary to the April 1974 agreement.

> "The diversion of the Ganges water during the
> dry season (November 1975 to May 1976) adversely
> affected the irrigation system, navigation, indus-
> try, power generation, intrusion of salinity,
> fisheries, forestry, livestock, drinking water
> and public health in 37 percent of the total
> area of Bangladesh with 33 percent of the popu-
> lation.[19]

Second, the Indian government began to shelter the diehard Muji-bites (followers of Sheikh Mujib) led by Kader Siddiqui, a tough guerrilla leader of the 1971 liberation war who opened camps for training in guerrilla warfare and subversion. Since January 1976 these Bangladesh dissenters have launched raids on Bangladesh border posts with the support of the Indian Border Security Force. In the latter part of the year some of the dissenters infiltrated into Bangladesh in order to carry on sabotage activities.

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[19]Rashiduzzaman, op. cit., p. 216.

However, the relationship with India under the Desai government is much better than the previous government. Still, there is constant fear of India among the people because India is a great neighbor encircling Bangladesh on three sides.

Fourth, factionalism, the main cause of instability is widespread factionalism in every sector. In every group there are factions. There are divisions within the bureaucracy which are divided into collaborators, non-collaborators, and returnees from Pakistan. They are also aligned with the political leaders so when a change of government takes place, it leads to a change in the bureaucracy.

Factionalism exists within the army too, i.e., the freedom fighters, the returnees from Pakistan, and the national defense forces. The army is very much politicized. There are also differences between the soldiers and the officers. The radical parties created cells in the enlisted ranks who have revolted against the officers. It is very difficult to control such a politicized army. The army and the bureaucracy are very much aligned with the political leaders who use them for their necessity.

There are strong decentralizing tendencies within the political centers of the underdeveloped states.

> "The stability of any central coalition rests upon the various elites perception that their participation in the coalition is yielding rewards; on their ability to maintain control over their own individual followings; and whose elements of patrimonialism are present, on the ability of the patrimonial leader to keep his personal retainers from entrenching themselves and establishing their own political fiefdoms. The obvious difficulties in meeting these conditions explain much of the factional conflict that often appears in underdeveloped states."[20]

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[20]Robert P. Clark, Jr., Development and Instability (Tennessee: Dryden Press, 1974), p. 101.

The natural pattern of decentralization is exacerbated in a variety of ways. First, the central leadership frequently attempts to gain control over both the center and the periphery by expanding the government's scope through the organization of development agencies and the integration of voluntary association directly into the government. By offering the elites new sources of patrimony the new agencies increase both the complexity of the coalitions and the possibility of competition between elites.

Decentralization has also been exacerbated by political leadership that has proven, more often than not, to be less than competent. Ideological rigidity and limited understanding have caused many rulers of under-developed states to fritter away their small initial political capital of legitimacy, disruptive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in non-essential undertakings. More than this, a patrimonial leader's efforts to maintain his autonomy and authority seem, at times, self-defeating. The consequences of such incompetent leadership and rapid expansion of government activity is usually an escalation in factional conflict. Anxious to maintain their followings, but confronted with limited resources at the center, elites utilize a variety of different resources for their own personal ends. Reciprocity between elites breaks down and each seeks to mobilize resources on his own behalf rather than on behalf of a ruling coalition or patrimonial leader. Nation-building becomes faction-building.

Because of its bigness, the Awami League has opened up different fronts.as for example, the student league, the labor league, youth league and peasant league. This decentralization is helpful for gaining and gathering more support, but it is difficult to maintain a hierarchical

discipline within the fronts. Moreover, these fronts tried to establish an autonomous organization apart from the Awami League. For example, the chairman of the youth league, Sheikh Faziul Hoq Moni, openly stated that he had no connection with the Awami League. Thus, we see factional conflict has been aggravated by decentralization of power.

Factional conflicts are sometimes based on ideology.

> "The 1958 dispute between Milton Margai and
> Albert Margai in the ruling Sierra Leone
> People's Party which culminated in the
> latter's organizing an opposition party
> was based in large part on the desire of
> Albert Margai and supporters to speed up
> social reform."[21]

The influence of too many ideologies has led to the growing factionalism in Bangladesh. The factionalism in the Student League which led to the coming up of JSD was based in the ideology of introducing scientific socialism. The ideological contrasts will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

More generally, however, factional conflict seems to have its genesis in personal conflicts among the elites and in their efforts to consolidate their own personal support. Faction building focuses around the development of personal machines through which a particular leader can attract supporters. For the most part, such machines are depednent on the leader's continued access to patronage. Because they need such access factional leaders tend to stay within the government unless they enjoy enough traditional status or personal wealth to maintain a following or unless they perceive the possibility of oppositional elites actually cap-

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[21]Ibid., p. 106.

turing control of the government. In general, factional conflict remains within the confines of the regime with conflicting elites utilizing their control over ministries and party organs to provide spoils to their existing supporters and to attract new ones. Corruption, it should be noted, is an integral part of this process. Elites manipulate revenues to their own advantage and to the advantage of their supporters.

There was widespread corruption in the government. Even Sheikh Mujib admitted himself that he could not build up the country because of widespread corruption in every sector.

The process of modernization is highly destabilizing to political institutions and to the broader social system of which they form a part. S. N. Eisenstadt, for example, states that:

> "Disorganization and dislocation constitute a basic part of modernization and this process brings with it of necessity the growth of social problems, cleavages and conflicts between various groups and movements of protest. The causal factors are the well-known components of modernization: urbanization (which destroys rural family and clan ties), industrialization (which has undermined traditional occupational security and work discipline mores), political centralization and democratization (which has dislodged traditional elites from their favored positions), secularization (which has weakened the position of long-established values and standards of performance), and social mobilization (which has heightened mass awareness of deprivations and socio-cultural cleavages in the society)."[22]

All these dislocations and disorganizations, according to Eisenstadt, produce the continual growth of social problems which he defines as breakdowns or deviations of social behavior involving a considerable number of people which are of serious concern to many members of the society in which the aberrations occur.

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[22]Monte Palmer, op. cit., p. 73.

Samuel Huntington, in his excellent extended essay on political decay, finds there to be a strong correlation between rapid political mobilization and political instability. According to Huntington, the one inescapable component of political modernization is the expansion of political participation, the rapid mobilization of ever-increasing numbers of individuals who beat at the doors of the slowly evolving political structure with incessant demands for change. The integral parts of social mobilization--heightened awareness of relative levels of poverty and unequal distribution of wealth, increased exposure to political activism and its practical results and an enhanced sense of the latent power which lies in the hands of the mob are supposed to produce the systematic disruption which accompanies the modernization process.

Robert E. Clark identifies different sources of instability:[23] First, cognitive dissonance or stress engendered by an incongruence between image and expectation on the one hand, and perceptions of reality on the other. The lack of congruence between expectations and reality can be severely disruptive and can be illustrated with examples drawn from states in the process of rapid disjunctive modernization.

> "Indonesia has been wracked by mass killings which have had heavy overtones of the bloody confrontation of competing and antithetical value systems. The killings began after the failure of the attempted coup d' etat launched by Indonesian Communist Party against the Indonesian army in September 1965. In retribution, and in light of Indoneisan leader Sukarno's inability or unwillingness to punish the communists, the army initiated a series of raids against the communist party headquarters and strongholds. The result was the unleashing of intense

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[23]Robert E. Clark, op. cit., p. 215.

> popular hatred of the communists by the more
> traditional mystical Hindus who vented their
> anger by killing an estimated 250,000 to 350,000
> communist leaders and militants as well as many
> sympathizers."[24]

In the same way the causes of instability in Bangladesh can be related to as the gap between expectations and reality. Sheik Mujib could not satisfy any of the demands of the people who expected so much from him. He dissatisfied the army by creating Bangladesh Rakkhi Bahini and giving more power to them; dissatisfied the bureaucracy by threatening them with the precaution of the loss of job anytime; dissatisfied the people with the rising cost of living; by not giving due respect to the majorities religion. All these are responsible for creating frustrations which led to instability.

Second, deprivation: In this case, the actor perceives himself as being physically or affectively interfered with, severely restricted in activity, in stimuli or in social relations, or in extreme cases, actually deprived of the physical factors required for survival. The individual senses that his environment has become threatening and that a critical region has been approached in which his well being and stability can no longer be taken for granted. This deprivation was very much predominant in Bangladesh. Moreover, they realized that their economic condition had deteriorated more compared to the Pakistani period.

Ted Gurr has examined in great detail the nexus between the psychological phenomena of frustration aggression and relative deprivation on the one hand, and the recourse to civil violence on the other. He argues that frustration-aggression causes tension in human beings and this mechanism

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[24] Ibid., p. 216.

is triggered by the presence of relative deprivation. Relative depriva-
tion, which Gurr defines as "the perceived discrepancy between value
expectations and value capabilities, thus appears to be a principal
factor in impelling men to such levels of instability that they are led
to inflict damage on each other."[25]

Gurr has identified at least three broad patterns of relative
deprivation; each involves a rapid widening of the gap between one's
expectations and his capabilities. The first type of deprivation, which
Gurr calls aspirational, comes about when value expectations are increas-
ing rapidly and value capabilities remain relatively stationary. In July
1962 the civilian armed forces of Peru deposed the outgoing civilian govern-
ment of Manuel Prado in order to assure the subsequent election of Fernando
Belaunde Terry who had barely missed securing a plurality of the votes in
the national presidential election in June. At that time the army held
high aspirations for the Belaunde government. In the first place, Belaunde's
brand of reform promised to bring the modernization of the country's eco-
nomic and social system, which the army leaders believed would forestall
the popular uprising which had been threatening Peru for decades. Further,
Belaunde pledged to secure national control and ownership over the petro-
leum reserves of the country by nationalizing the holdings of the Inter-
national Petroleum Corporation. On both counts, while the army's expecta-
tions soared, their nation's capabilities remained stationary. By 1967
the country's economic problems had worsened to such an extent that urban
unrest, inflation and strikes alternated with alarms of guerrillas filter-
ing in from the rural areas. In the area of national control over natural

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[25]Ibid., p. 217.

resources, the Belaunde government proved as unable to deal with the
situation. The armed forces leaders drew the obvious conclusion, that
civilian politics, as usual, were failing to meet their high expectations
which had prompted them to put Belaunde into power in the first place.
On October 3, 1968, the armed forces of Peru overthrew the Belaunde govern-
ment and moved to establish an army regime of long standing endowed with
the necessary power and ideological conviction to deal decisively with
Peru's aggravated economic and social problems.

In the same way in Bangladesh, the Awami League government failed
in every respect. Inflation rose and government nationalization of indus-
tries was an utter failure due to corruption and mismanagement of the
administrators of the nationalized industries. These factors led to the
coming up of the military government like the developing countries of the
world.

Progressive deprivation, Gurr's second model, is seen to develop
from the much more complex situation in which value expectations and value
capabilities rise sharply together for a period, followed by a sharp drop
in capability, thereby opening a widening gap between the two variables.
"As Tanter and Midlarsky have indicated, Cuban/GNP/Cap increased steadily
every year from 1948 through 1951 and then turned downward sharply from
1951 through 1953 (the year of Castro's first assault on the Cuban govern-
ment in his attack on the Moncada barracks). Tanter and Midlarsky reason
that this dramatic illustration of progressive deprivation in the economic
sphere prepared Cuba for the onset of the guerrilla revolutionary war which
followed soon after and made them more receptive to Castro's movement."[26]

[26]Ibid., p. 218.

The third form of relative deprivation, which Gurr has labeled decremental deprivation, involves the maintenance of stable value expectations by a group confronted with declining value capabilities. For example, the calls by Tanzania's President Julius Nyreree to recreate a kind of communal, rural socialism in his country have also failed to guarantee a full and equitable distribution of rapidly dwindling agricultural resources. Thus, in the face of declining capabilities (land) and stable expectations (standard of living and a non-adaptive value structure), the typical East-African farmer is confronted by stress induced by deprivation of the decremental variety. The result has been internal conflict within family and kin groups, with the consequences that these essential elements of Tanzania's rural social structure are beginning to erode under the strain of land shortage.

In the same manner, Mujib's call for the establishment of one-party rule with supreme command under him was rejected by the democratic-minded people. His ideology of Mujibism created a negative response.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRACY

The bureaucracy is an important element in the development pro-
cess. In a new country like Bangladesh where viable political institutions
have not been developed bureaucracy plays a vital role. As Gerald A. Heegar
remarks, "The growing role of governmental bureaucracy has been one of the
most noted and discussed characteristics of developing political systems."[1]
For political development bureaucracy is an important instrument. The com-
plexity of issues in the modern state and the bureaucrat's expertise or
superior access to expertise necessitates a greater role for bureaucracy in
the initiation of policy.

The role of bureaucracy is very problematic. On the one hand, it
should play a role in the execution of policy. On the other hand, it should
not play so much a role as to jeopardize the role of other institutions. It
is very difficult to maintain a balance in the role of bureaucracy. The
bureaucrats should play their part, otherwise it will create problems in
the administration. On the contrary its power should not be so much as to
overrule other organizations of power.

As a new-born country, Bangladesh faces problems on both sides of
the role of bureaucracy. Political and economic development cannot be
achieved without a competent bureaucracy. Regardless of how lofty the

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[1]Gerald A. Heegar, "Bureaucracy, Parties and Political Development,"
World Politics, July 1973, pp. 600-601.

goals of the regime or how adept it is at generating enthusiasm for its programs, policy decisions are not self-enforcing. It is the bureaucracy which must transform hopes into reality.

Political development needs effective execution of public policy which requires an efficient bureaucracy. In the developing countries the bureaucracy plays a vital role, but is often plagued by many different problems. Monte Palmer has identified different problems of the bureaucracy. He mentions "(1) institutional and structural problems, (2) problems related to bureaucratic attitudes and behavior, (3) the lack of innovation and flexibility, and (4) problems of political intervention."[2]

The Bangladesh bureaucracy has a long tradition. It is the logical extension of the British and Pakistani bureaucracy. The major trend is that administration dominated East Bengali's political environment from the beginning of the British days until the emergence of Bangladesh. "The dominant approach followed in the British days and later in the Pakistan era to the problem of order and development was administrative."[3]

In the British period, the bureaucracy was a tool for controlling the people. The bureaucrats were trained to control rather than execute policy. The bureaucrats were used to be the sons of big landlords who used to work as a tool of the British government to control the people. In the Pakistani period, the bureaucracy had more influence than politics and politicians in the overall running of the country. Not only in the internal

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[2]Monte Palmer, The Dilemmas of Political Development (Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc,, 1967.

[3]A. T. R. Rahman, "Administration and Its Political Environment in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1974.

management of its systems, procedures and relationship but also in the decisions involving basic political, economic and social issues. The bureaucracy in association with the military played a decisive role. Many senior bureaucrats moved into key ruling positions before Ayub imposed the first martial law. During the Ayub era, it was again the bureaucrats who played the major role in the national decision-making process. Things did not change much during Yahya's regime although the military leaders allegedly set the outer limits of the influence that bureaucrats and other groups could exercise in the national system. The administration of the countryside for the whole Pakistan period was in the sole custody of bureaucrats.

The political environment was poorly organized. The ruling political party did not have sufficient organization, skills and resources to provide a reasonable base for exercising effective control over the bureaucracy. Interest groups in the society were not organized to any degree. The dominant ruling model was the vice-regal system and the experience in government of society was insignificant. Positively speaking, the administration maintained its basic colonial features--hierarchy of services, limited and strict entry points for each service, elite character of superior services. The structure of the services provided the basic parameter for mobility, communication and control functions within the system and for negotiation, bargaining and advancement with external groups outside the system. The control by the elite cadre was maintained by the monopoly control of all key administrative positions and by claiming for its members a major involvement in the new development institutions. "Thus the CSP secured 60 percent representation in the economic pool, held key positions in the

planning commission and claimed a major share of the chairmanships and directorships of new public enterprises. The members of the bureaucracy obtained the lion's share of facilities often given through foreign aid to develop necessary skills, both within and outside the country so that they could do their new jobs well without depending on expertise from such outside agencies as the universities."[4]

"Pakistan as a society is extremely insecure. Within that society, however, the higher civil servants are as secure as rules, regulations and constitutions can make them."[5] They, in fact, fear disciplinary action less than most of their counterparts in the West. It follows that many officers will devote less than full energy to their work, knowing their own position is secure. They may minimize the need for urgent action. This tendency is aggravated by the almost universal reluctance of a subordinate to tell his superior officer how bad things really are. Accomplishments will be readily reported and exaggerated; failures will be covered up. Hence, all indications are that progress is made and there is no need for special measures. To some extent this complacency might have been offset at the highest echelon by contract with the ministers and other related officials, but in Pakistan these politicians frequently lacked the necessary grass roots contacts with the voters and were not too well informed themselves about local needs.

The bureaucracy has no contact with the local people. The bureaucrats have hardly any idea of the village people. The success of any pro-

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[4]Ibid., p. 1001.

[5]Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

gram depends on the cooperation of the villagers because the policy is directed towards them.

The civil service, the kingpin in the administration of Bangladesh is caught right in the middle of this drama of slow and painful emergence of a viable system in the new state. During the 12 years of military rule, the service, composed of trained government officials, provided a stabilizing factor, working in a kind of partnership with the army. For this reason, the citizens of the new state look upon it as a legacy of the past. Bureaucracy, which has been synonymous with civil service, is therefore a much hated word in the political dictionary of Bangladesh.

Yet a large number of civil servants of former East Pakistan played another kind of role in the political struggle of their people. In the days of Ayub many of them openly sympathized with the Awami League and personally remained on good terms with the Shiekh. Privately many of these civil servants provided the Awami League leadership with materials which helped the Sheikh to argue his case for autonomy of the province. Some wrote anonymously for political journals including the Forum to highlight the economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan.

The officers who stayed in the country faced many troubles. Those who fled to India got quick promotion. The problem posed by officers who had once served with the provisional government in Calcutta had not been resolved even by April. "Later that month the government-owned Bangladesh News Agency released an official order directing the officers who were in the employment of central and provisional governments in Bangladesh on March 25, 1971, but were later recruited under Bangladesh (provisional

government) in Mujibnagar to go back to their posts they were holding on March 25, 1971. But except in a few cases, this directive was never put into effect."[6]

In effect, a sense of drift inside the Secretariat continued right through the whole year. If the army officials could put up with arbitrary appointments and promotions, they felt thoroughly demoralized by the methods used to screen out the so-called undesirable officials, including the former collaborators of Pakistani's army rule, corrupt civil servants or anyone who was allegedly guilty of inefficiency or gross misconduct. In September 1972 nearly ten months after the liberation, there was a kind of panic sweeping through the whole administration.

The fundamental drawback of the planning commission is the lack of experience of its individual members in government planning. The other weakness of the commission is that its members have had no formal training in any kind of socialist planning. They have not seen any socialist economy at work. Even in the universities where they studied, none of them had any specialized course in socialist planning. Moreover, the relation of the planning commission with the civil service is not cordial. The members of the planning commission were convinced in their mind that the entire senior cadre in the existing administration was out to sabotage the operation of the public sector. Having the status of State Ministers, i.e., ministers without cabinet ranks, the members of the planning commission rightly considered themselves senior to the secretaries of the various departments. Unfortunately, even the Sheikh often gave the impression

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[6]S. M. Ali, After the Dark Past (Dacca, Bangladesh, 1973).

that he personally attached more importance to the secretaries while he could half-jokingly refer to the members of the planning commission as "our professors," or worse still, "our theoreticians."[7]

If the members of the planning commission adopted an unhelpful attitude on the question of creating administrative cohesiveness, the civil servants also never missed the opportunity of obstructing the work of the planning commission, sometimes out of spite, and sometimes their approaches differed.

"One tragic casualty of this running feud between the planning commission and the civil service was the U.S. $320 million rehabilitation plan. The program, which covered a six-month period from January to June 1972, was prepared by the planning commission in late February and submitted to the Ministry of Finance for monetary sanction."[8] In May a member of the planning commission complained that the top civil servants in the Ministry had not yet passed the program. This meant that during that crucial period the rehabilitation work was carried out on the basis of a series of ad hoc decisions which were totally unrelated to the priorities set forth in the draft program.

Factionalism plagued the administration. First, there was a split between the Mujib-Nagar and Non-Mujib Nagar administration. In 1973, a second sehism was added by the returnees from Pakistan. "The jockeying for position by the three groups undermined the coherence and efficiency of the services."[9] The morale of the services was already low because of their job

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[7]Ibid., p. 201.

[8]Ibid., p. 204.

[9]Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1973: Nation Building in a New State," Asian Survey, Feb. 1977.

insecurity. After liberation, the civil service of Pakistan was abol-
ished and in the absence of the new structure, the top bureaucrats felt
insecure. Additionally, the civil services were used to: freedom from
political control during the Pakistan days and found it difficult to
adjust to the changed set up in a parliamentary system where they were
placed under political leadership.

The alienation of the civil bureaucracy was also caused by the
enormous concentration of power in the hands of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman.
His family members also regularly interfered with the civil servants for
their personal ends and political purposes. It was impossible to get
anything done without clearance from Bargabhavan, the official residence
of Sheikh Mujib. Even routine matters were referred to him for approval.
Senior officers spent more time waiting in line for his clearance than in
implementing policies. The inexperienced political appointees who flour-
ished in the post liberation period created a buffer between the senior
bureaucrats and the Prime Minister which unnecessarily complicated the
decision-making process.

There was growing frustration among the bureaucrats because many
young civil servants who fled to India in 1971 were given higher positions
over the seniors. A Services Reorganization Commission was set up, but
its recommendations were unacceptable to various segments of the bureaucracy.
The National Pay Commission's recommendations to fix the highest pay scale
at Taka 2,000 per month was intensely disliked. Numerous technocrats were
brought in with such higher status and facilities that the civil servants
felt uncomfortable about the incursion into their traditional positions.
As a result, there was indifference and continued non-cooperation inside

the bureaucracy. While the misery of the salaried people increased, the political appointees prospered through government patronage openly distributed by the AL. As economic conditions deteriorated, politicians started blaming the bureaucrats and even questioned their loyalty to the new state. Since decision making was monopolized by Sheikh Mujib and his associates, the bureaucrats resented any attempt to lay blame at their doors.

In early 1975, when BKSAL, the one national party was announced, Sheikh Mujib called upon the civil servants to join the party. Following the British tradition, Bangladesh civil servants were non-political and they abhorred the very idea of joining the BKSAL. Most of them somehow avoided doing so until a coup overthrew Sheikh Mujib.

This post-coup government is a partnership between the military and civil bureaucracy. The Council of Advisors consists of senior academecians, retired civil servants, and technocrats. Ziaur Rahman restored the prestige of the civil servants. The regime arrested many civil servants who joined the BKSAL and downgraded those officials who were unduly promoted by Sheikh Mujib. Zia reinstated those officials who were dismissed by the AL. He also took the initiative in restoring the confidence of the bureaucracy by formulating elaborate rules respecting seniority, qualifications and discipline. Steps were taken for the recruitment and training of young civil servants which had been lacking since 1972.

After the coup on August 15, 1975 the power of the bureaucracy increased tremendously because the existing government is a coalition of the army and the bureaucracy. This created many problems of development by giving widespread power to the bureaucracy. As Fred Riggs remarks,

"A phenomenon of the utmost significance in transitional societies is the lack of balance between policy making institutions and bureaucratic policy implementing structures. The relative weakness of political organs means that the political function tends to be appropriated in considerable measure by bureaucrats. Intra-bureaucratic struggles become a primary form of politics. But when the political arena is shifted to bureaucracies, a shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with civilian officials, the consequences are usually ominous for political stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness and democratic values."[10]

The problem which Bangladesh is facing is the over-dominance of the bureaucrats who are obstructing the healthy growth of the political institutions. The bureaucrats are controlling the affairs of the country from the Secretariat. Whatever policy decisions are taken are initiated by the bureaucracy which is creating excessive red tape within the system. The administration is centrally controlled by the bureaucracy. The nucleus of the administration is the District, which is headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who is generally a member of the civil service. He is the overall commander in the District Administration. He is responsible for maintaining law and order, collection of revenue, trying cases, and administration of the District Board. In a nutshell, he is everything within the district. The general leadership has no role in the administration of the district. There is no effective local government by the people.

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[10] Fred W. Riggs, Bureaucracy and Political Development (New Jersey: Orinceton University Press, 1963), p. 120.

The next administrative unit is the Thana which is composed of some villages. The Thana is an administrative unit for maintaining security within the Thana. It is headed by a police officer. There is no people's representative in the Thana.

The most basic unit of administration is the Union Council. It is composed of a chairman and some members who are elected by the people. But this elective body has virtually no power. Its main function is to distribute relief goods from within the villages. Local government is virtually non-existent. The policy is very much centralized. It is very difficult to get feedback on a particular policy as well as to execute any policy. The government policy is always without any reference to local needs and demands. In case of any emergency decision, the local institutions have to wait for central authority to give direction to the policy.

The dependence of development programs on foreign financial aid was unchanged. "Multi-lateral and bilateral teams from every major aid donor visited Bangladesh following the coups to reassess their roles. Total foreign assistance from 1972 to mid-1976 was $4.22 billion. After the coups the IMF established a special trust for Bangladesh. The World Bank arranged an aid consortium meeting in Paris for Bangladesh and the Islamic Development Bank, the International Development Association and the Asian Development Bank all announced major credits. While there were some integrated policy-making bodies, each program was usually the preserver of a separate ministry which guarded against attempts to coordinate implementation, thereby diluting its power."[11] Officials focused on poli-

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[11] Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs, Fall, 1976.

cies which affected their own immediate urban environments and their own futures, not on the rural sector which they left when they began their careers. None of the portfolios for local self-government, rural development or relief and rehabilitation were held by any of the military chiefs and their officials remained less prestigious and powerful than others.

The weakness of local institutions for implementing development programs was due to their origins, composition and relation to their national government. The Thana remained the major administrative unit for revenue, policy and development programs. The Union Councils continued to be the focus of local attention. The Union Councils were discredited under Mujib because they had been instruments of Pakistan and dis-credited under martial law because council members made private profit from relief distribution and government loans and contracts under Mujib. "The pattern in one Thana and confirmed in four others was that chairmen of the Thana councils were living in the police station for protection, for going to their homes under guard in the daytime and running their offices by carrying their seals and stamps in their pockets."[12]

Some frightened council members left the Thana to hide elsewhere. A powerful group was temporarily neutralized and in the eight months following the coups at least eight members of the Union Councils in this Thana were reported murdered.

While they were the final link of the national government with the villages, these councils had no real power in development programming. Minor policing and taxing powers could be superceded by Thana or district officials if necessary. Council members look to these officials for favor

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[12]Ibid., p. 896.

in carrying out their responsibilities and cooperated with them in patronage and corruption. District government officials did not really identify with council members and continued to wear western-style dress, arrive at the villages in jeeps and depart before sunset. The martial law administration hoped to inspire dedication among officials and set a new office-opening hour at 7:30 a.m. But this had been tried under Mujib and then as now few officials changed their daily routine and most arrived at 10 a.m. at almost all levels of society. The conduct of government officials, though disliked, remained mostly unchallenged.

The contradictions between development programs at the national and the local levels are not reconciled. Both senior military and civil officials were trained in Pakistan to believe that deference was the proper attitude of the people towards government authority. This continued in Bangladesh because there were no sustained training programs under Mujib's regime. Development programs from their perspective needed to be organized in tidy hierarchical and specialized systems. The role of foriegn aid donors increased the need they felt for separate accountability in spite of the use of the term integrated in policies. Such needs were opposed to stronger local institutions which could experiment and learn which kinds of development would be effective in their areas. The national government did not transfer to the existing institutions any major responsibilities in development, such as revenue investment or resource control because this would constitute a potential challenge to national authority. "The politics of exhortation thus substituted for the transfer of real responsibilities and power in development programs."[13]

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[13] Ibid., p. 897.

The machinery of administration has no coordination with needs of society and the actual operation. For example, food policy, i.e., administrations in Dacca (capital) have consistently chosen a food policy which supplied priority groups on the official statutory rationing list of civil servants, military, police, industrial workers and hospitals. This policy guaranteed the health and strength of those urban dwelling classes or those on government salaries and cemented the alliances between the bureaucracy, the military and the merchants who operated the food distribution system. Rural areas received under modified rationing only grains which were not absorbed by priority groups. At the times of the year when food was in short supply in the countryside, this was an example of punishing agriculture and rewarding industry. The same food policy tended to promote the growth of the bureaucracy and the military which were still as in Wilcox's terms, "the only two management instruments the society possesses."[14]

The government structure which controlled agricultural policy was highly centralized and remote from food producers, though its institutions directed programs which were to some extent competing for recognition and scarce resources. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation were joined by two policy bodies resurrected from the days of Pakistan--the Agricultural Policy Council and the Rural Development Council. These were additions to the elected political agency of official rural development plans, the National Swan-irvar Committee. Most of these bodies had interlocking memberships and represented alternate arenas for career building by ambitious members.

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[14]Ibid., p. 901.

These bodies became more significant that the Integrated Rural Development program which Mujib and foreign donors used as a channel for rural finance in which there were reports in February of promotion irregularities at management levels.

The Swanirbar movement was administered by Mahbub Alam Chashi from the President's palace in Dacca and involved all district level offices in high-visibility rural work projects, family planning and model development villages. It had to work through the rural power structure and appeared to be a non-party mechanism for providing rewards or incentives to powerful villagers who were faithful to the government. The coup in Dacca was reflected by changes in recipients of rewards in the countryside. Despite some admirable pleas and rhetoric the Swanirbar movement at the Bangladesh Economic Association in March between Chashi and others included the charges that it reinforced the relief-mentality and was just another method of agricultural input dumping without accountabilities.[15] The dual needs for stable political relations down to the lowest levels, and for accountable implementation of programs could not always be reconciled. "The undefined term "self-reliance" was contrasted with the hierarchical though equally ambiguous term "rural uplift."[16] Such needs and incongruous slogans were at the very heart of the politics of exhortation. The enthusiasm of the Swanirbar Committee for cooperation between civil servants generated resistance among those who were expected to share power and prestige with people of a similar role in other agencies and departments.

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[15]Ibid., p. 904.

[16]Ibid., p. 910.

CHAPTER V

LACK OF ORGANIZED PARTY

Lack of a well-organized party is also a problem of political development. A well-organized political party is necessary as a unifying force. It can marshall all the resources of the country into one direction, and mobilize people and the resources. Most of the developing countries gained independence under the leadership of a well-organized party. If the party is factionalized, it is not possible to unite the nation into one ideology. "Most of the developing areas have at one time or another experienced at least brief periods in which two or more competing political parties possessed reasonably equal chances of gaining control of the governmental apparatus through relatively fair elections. Rather than promoting developmental goals, the impact of party competition has been largely debilitating. Physical control by the central government over the human and material resources of the state has tended to weaken. Mobilization of the population towards the goals of economic and social development has tended to be fluctuating and sporadic."[1]

M. Weiner and J. Lapalombara in their article, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," discusses the different functions performed by the political parties. They are political participation, mobili-

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[1] Monte Palmer, <u>Dilemmas of Political Development</u> (Illinois: Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1971, p. 115.

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zation, legitimacy, national integration, conflict, management and political socialization."[2] A political party opens the avenue for political participation. Through the political party, people can place their demands on the political system. But one of the unfortunate problems of the developing areas is that the first generation of elites operating under party systems are confronted with participatory demands long before they have had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize party government.

The political party also performs the function of political mobilization but sometimes in the name of political mobilization, the political party supresses popular participation. The party government seeks to sanctify popular government and to associate itself with the populace. In fact, even the one-party state typically claims the mantle of democracy, that is, of popular rule, though a small oligarchy unaccountable for its actions may be in actual control of the government. In the developing countries, to establish authority with legitimacy is also a serious problem. Political parties provide the rationale for establishing legitimate authority. The political party also performs the function of national integration by bringing the desirable elements into one platform. It helps in the resolution of conflicts arising out of different groups. Political parties are also an instrument of political socialization. Its role as a socializing force is more predominant especially during the early phases of political development when they are among the few institutions concerned with affecting political attitudes. But these roles can be performed well by a well-organized party. If the party is not well organized, it creates more problems rather than find solutions for them.

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[2]Myron Weiner and J. Lapalombora, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," in

Bangladesh is characterized by a multi-party system. But it lacks a well-organized party. If we are to understand the party system of Bangladesh, we should analyze briefly the party system in pre-partitioned India. In British India, the two major political parties, Muslim League and the Congress, were organized on the basis of religion. For example, the Congress represented the Hindus and the Muslim League represented the Muslims. Though the present Bangladesh (formerly East Bengal) was separated from Pakistan, religion was the bond of unity among them. Accordingly, the Muslim League united the Muslims of East Bengal and the present Pakistan into one ideology, i.e., separate homeland for the Muslims. It led to the creation of Pakistan.

Soon after the creation of Pakistan, East Bengal demanded autonomy because it was separated from Pakistan by one thousand miles. Moreover, East Bengal, which had a majority of population, was afraid of being dominated by West Pakistan, which had a majority in the bureaucracy and the army. The Awami League came into existence in 1951 as the spokesman of the provincial autonomy for East Pakistan. The Awami League was the most organized party till the creation of Bangladesh. Its six-point formula ultimately led to the establishment of Bangladesh. But after the creation of Bangladesh, the Awami League lost its attraction and ideology. It tried to unite the people under the ideology of Mujibism which failed to draw much attention.

Different factions were fighting for different ideologies. The first open challenge occurred in May 1972, when the Student League split into pro-Mujib groups and anti-Mujib group on the basis of socialism or Mujibism. The advocates of scientific socialism later on formed the Jatiyo Samajtantisk Dal.

There were several inherent contradictions within the Awami League. The popularity of the Awami League centered around Sheikh Mujib who was the symbol of unity among different factions. He was ruling with his charisma. But later on, he found problems with his charisma. According to Max Weber, charisma is inherently unstable but its instability can be overcome by what he defines as "routinization of charisma," a concept which exemplifies the process by which charisma is transformed from an extraordinary and purely personal relationship into an established authority structure that is no longer necessarily dependent upon personal charismatic qualifications in the incumbent leader.

This transformation can best be affected by what I. L. Horowitz calls "party charisma, a synthesis of practical political consideration and symbolically-laden personalist authority."[3] Charismatic leaders like Nasser, and Mujib ostensibly tried to routinize their charisma by strengthening their party but they always ended up weakening it. For example, periodic reshuffling of cabinets both by Mujib and Nasser weakened the party structure by creating power divisions.[4]

Infighting within the charismat's own party also undermines the process of institutionalization. Both Nasser's Arab Socialist Union and Mujib's Awami League have suffered from internal conflict between rival party factions. In both cases the leader was considered by his party factions as an institution in himself which did not help the process of routinization. Instead, it widened the division within the party because

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[3]Zillar Rahman Khan, "Leadership, Parties, and Politics in Bangladesh," Western Political Quarterly, March 1976.

[4]Ibid.

each faction vied for his support as happened in the Arab Socialist Union between radical communists and Islamic Socialists. In Mujib's Awami League a split arose between the pro-Moscow socialists and pro-Washington democrats. Khondokar Mushtaque, the Commerce Minister, believed to be pro-western and Tajaddin Ahmed, the Finance Minister, believed to be pro-Moscow. There was open rivalry among the different front organizations such as the Student League, Labor League, Youth League, and the Peasants League. Having failed to coordinate the different factions of the party and having failed to solve the country's economic problems, Mujib tried to mobilize the nation by the declaration of a one-party system, the BKSAL. But it was mainly the Awami League. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in the August 15 coup and the assassination of four leaders of the Awami League on November 3, 1975 in Dacca Central Jail, the party was left with no leadership.

Khondokar Mushtaque Ahemd became the President of Bangladesh with the backing of the many who were involved in the August 1975 coup. He was alleged by the Awami Leaguers as conspiring for the coup because he was dissatisfied with Mujib's pro-Soviet-Indian policy. However, he was over-thrown in the November 3 coup. Later on he formed the Democratic League. He tried to attract many Awami Leaguers who refused to join his party. He is now undergoing imprisonment under the Zia government for his alleged corruption.

The death of Sheikh Mujibar created a vacuum in his party. There was constant rivalry between different personalities and groups. There was a constant danger of a split within the party. The split came on August 12, 1978. A new central committee was announced, headed by Mr. Mizanur

Rahman Chowdhury. The other group is headed by Abdul Malek Ukil and Abdur Razzak. There are two groups within the Awami League. One group believes in one-party presidential rule and the other believes in multi-party parliamentary system. Mizanur Chowdhury said, "that they believed in the pure parliamentary form of government. But the other group believed in the one-party presidential form of government"[5] Mizanur Rahman also blamed the other group for confusing Sheikh Mujibar Rahman. He also remarked that he was opposed to the formation of the one-party rule under the BKSAL.

Another faction from the Awami League was led by General M. A. G. Osmani, who was opposed to Shiekh Mujib's one-party rule. He left the Awami League and refused to join the BKSAL. When political parties were opened up, he formed the Janata Party. His party's main principle was the establishment of parliamentary democracy, safeguard of fundamental rights. He contested the June 3 election as a nominee of Gono Oikko Jote (People's United Front) which was composed of different parties, but he was defeated by Ziaur Rahman.

President Ziaur Rahman opened up a new political party, Bangla-desh Jutiyatabadi Dal (Bangladesh Nationalist Party). He emphasized (1) firm mass unity inspired and consolidated on the basis of Bangladeshi nationalism of mass-oriented politics, (2) national economic emancipation, self-reliance and progress achieved through the united and well-disciplined efforts of the people, but his party is also centered around him.

The National Awami Party led by Maulana Bhasani until his death in 1977 lacked an efficient organization. It was intrigued with so many

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[5]Ibid.

factions. Moreover, all the radical parties assembled there under the shadow of Bhasani. He professed Islamic socialism, but he could not specifically mention the meaning of Islamic socialism. The people think of his Islamic socialism in the same way as Bhutto's Islamic socialism. There was infighting between Kazi Zafar Ahmed, the General Secretary and Mashiur Rahman, the Vice-President. Kazi Zafar Ahmed later on, in collaboration with Captain (Rtd.) Abdul Halim Chowdhury formed the United People's Party, which believed in establishing social-ism within the country. Soon after factionalism started between Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Captain Abdul Halim Chowdhury. The United People's Party led by Abdul Halim Chowdhury decided to join Jatiyota Badi Dal of President Ziaur. This created anger among Kazi Zafar and other leaders of the UPP, which expelled Captain Halim and others who joined the Jatiyota Badi Dal.

Another faction from the NAP (Bhashani) was led by Dr. Aleem Al Rajee, who was the Vice-President of the NAP (Bhashani). He lost to Moshiur Rahman in ascendency of power in the NAP which led to the creation of the Bangladesh People's League under the leadership of Dr. Aleem Al Rajee.

The NAP, headed by Mr. Mashiur Rahman, has decided to merge with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Ziaur Rahman. Still there was some opposition from a group led by Anwar Zahid, who moved a separate reso-lution opposing the decision of Mr. Mashiur Rahman, but he was supported by only 29 out pf 1300 votes for Rahman.

The National Awami Party (Muzzaffar) led by Professor Muzzaffar Ahmed, and the Bangladesh Communist Party led by Moni Singh, have the

same ideological background, i.e., establishment of the Soviet-type of socialism. During the reign of Sheikh Muzib they worked as a team of the Awami League showing constant signs of support for pro-Soviet-Indian policy.[6] This has been very much discredited by the people because of their die-hard pro-Soviet policy.

The Jatiyo Samajtartnik Dal (JSD) came into existence as a result of antagonism between the Awami League because of its insistence on Muzibism. The JSD believe in the establishment of scientific socialism. The JSD is led by Major (Rtd.) Abdul Julil, a liberation hero and A. S. M. Abdur Rab, a student leader, both of whom were arrested by the present regime for alleged creation of disturbance within the country.

"The JSD, which believes that the Bangladesh liberation war was stopped just as it was about to become a real people's war, opposes the nationalist leadership who it says represents only 8 percent of the people but own 85 percent of the national wealth."[7] It considers itself to be the supporting force of a correct proletarian organization, the Bangladesh Communist League (BCL). It is an underground party led by the former Student League leader, Sirajul Alam Khan. He managed to get most of his followers trained in guerrilla warfare during the independence war and has since worked behind the scenes to bring about the splits in the Awami League group that led to the formation of the JSD. The BCL publishes a daily newspaper, Gomokanta (Voice of the People), which is edited by the well-known radical poet, Al-Mahmud.

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[6]The Bangladesh Observer, August 13, 1978.

[7]Talukdar Mariruzzaman, "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution," Journal of Asian Studies, August 1975.

The BCL, influenced by the Marxist ideas, analyzes the situation in Bangladesh in terms of inherent contradictions. The BCL sees three stages in the struggle for socialism of which the first two were achieved by the end of the 1971 liberation war. Remaining, however, is the third stage in which the contradiction between the ruling elite--the Awami League--and other agents of imperialism and the proletariat, will be resolved by a violent revolution. Parliamentary politics is seen as a means of perpetuating the rule of the exploiting classes, including feudal elements, intermediaries, and the rising middle class.

The BCL hopes that at a certain stage, China will come to sympathize with ts revolution, but it resists following any communist international line. There is a friendly tenor in its attitude toward pro-Chinese Marxist-Lenist parties. It is attempting to expand its membership and is supposed to have recruited most of the company commanders of the Mukti Bahini and the district and sub-divisional commanders of the Mukti Bahini. The members are being formed into cells joined by an underground newspaper, Lal Ishtehar (Red Bulletin). The main leader, Sirajul Alam Khan, is also arrested now.

Another radical opposition party is the Bangladesh Communist Party Leninbadi (the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Leninist--BCP(L). This party originated with four of the five groups of pro-Chinese communists that made up the Somonnoy (consultative) Committee formed in Calcutta during the period of liberation: (1) the Coordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries, (2) East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) EPCP (M-L), led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam, (3) some communists of Khulna led by Drs. Marouf Hossain and Sayeddur Dahar, and (4) some communists led

by Nasim Ali Khan. The leaders of these groups thought that the exist-
ence of so many communist parties in East Pakistan had prevented the left
from playing the leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh and they
issued a call for unification to complete their country's trancated
revolution. In order to achieve this goal, they formed a new party
BCP(L).

The BCP(L) adopted the strategy of working partly as an open
organization and partly as a secret party. The open section of the party
is led by Amal Sen, Nazral Islam, Nasim Ali Khan and others. The BCP(L)
has also formed a Student Front (Bangladesh Biplobi Chatra Union-Revolu-
tionary Students' Union) and a Labor Front (the Bangla Sramik Federation
Bengal Labor Federation) and some of its members are working through the
National Awami Party (Bhasani Group) and its peasant organization as well.
The names of the leaders of the underground sector of the party are not
known, but it is said to have established cells in three-fourths of Bangla-
desh's districts.

The ideology of the BCP(L) has much in common with that of the BCL.
Both believe that the revolution in Bangladesh is unfinished because the
bourgeosie were able to assume leadership of the nationalist struggle, that
Russian communism is revisionist and Russia's intentions in Bangladesh is
imperialistic and that India is also a potential imperialist power. "How-
ever, the BCP(L) opposes violence such as that used by the Naxalites in
India, whom it considers anti-Leninist because they are so undisciplined."[8]
The BCP(L) does not have a mass front such as the JSD and its student and
labor fronts are weak; so it does not have the appeal of the Communist
League.

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[8]Ibid., p. 756.

Despite the fact that the BCP(L) was formed in order to unify the left, it is experiencing conflict within its own ranks as well as with those factions of the East Bengal Communist Party and the East Pakistan Communist Party that did not choose to unite with the other groups in the first place. Within the BCP(L) there is dissention between those who chose to work within the National Awami Party (Bhashini) and its preasant organization and those who feel this is consorting with the enemy. The conflict between the communists who work in the NAP (B) and the non-communist members has also paralyzed the working of that party. In the council meeting of February, 1974, the two groups clashed and Bhashani was forced to postpone the session and to dissolve the central committee.

The fifth group that had belonged to the original Somonnoy Committee, but did not join the BCL(L) was the East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) led by Deven Sikdar and Abul Bashar. For example, the Sikdar-Bashar group saw the oppression of Bangladesh by West Pakistan as more direct, the present position of India as more dominant within the country and the Chinese Communist Party as more a political leader of Bangladesh's struggles than did the BCP(L) members. The Sikdar-Bashar group, now called the Banglar Communist Party (communist party of Bengal, BCP) also has an open and an underground section, a student front and a labor front. It regards participation in parliamentary parties as a strategy rather than a matter of basic principle. The leadership of the BCP comes from peasant and working class families and is without much formal education. This is in stark contrast to the BCP(L) leaders, who are generally upper class and university educated. It is these differ-

ences in background and attitudes of leaders and cadres that differentiates the two parties, not their minor ideological incompatibilities.

The Bangladesh Communist League, the BCP(L) and the BCP have adopted the tactics of working through both party cells and mass front organizations. However, there are four more revolutionary parties that work only through their underground cells and underground armed fronts. Of these two and factions of a group that joined the Somonnoy Committee --the East Pakistan Communist Party, one is a faction of the East Bengal Communist Party from which Sikdar and Bashar split to form the BCP and one is apparently quite separate in its origins from any of these.

The latter is the Sarbohara Party (Purba Bangla Sarbohara Party-- East Bengal Communist Party) which grew out of the East Bengal workers' Movement. The leadership of the Sarbohara Party is generally university educated, which may account for in part the fact that the party has been the most prolific of all Bangladesh's revolutionary parties in publishing party literature. In addition to Lal Jhanda (Red Flag) and Sangbad Bulletin (news bulletin), the party regularly publishes the proceedings of the meetings of its central committee and numerous other pamphlets.

The Sarbohara Party agrees with the others that the Bangladesh revolution was stopped too soon, with the Awami League serving as a puppet government of Inida, which has plundered East Bengal and has maintained its military presence there through arming, training and even clothing the vigilante group--the Rakhi Bahini. Russian and American imperialism are also seen as threats. They even claim that the nationalist revolution has not yet been completed; the JSD is held to be making a Trotskyist error in trying to complete the socialist revolution before the nationalist one.

However, the bourgeois leadership of the Awami League cannot be truly
nationalistic, as they draw their support from imperialist powers and
semi-feudal countries; only the party of the proletariat can pursue the
revolution correctly. In order to accomplish the revolution, the Sar-
bohara Party has formed a National Liberation Front including peasants,
workers and oppressed linguistic Biharis and members of the Chakma and
Santal tribes.

Because Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides by India, the
Sarbohara theoreticians are concerned that no outside help will be avail-
able for the revolution that the liberation front will have to depend on
its own resources. It has launched a "liberation war" procuring funds
and arms forcibly from pro-government sources. The National Awami Party
(Bhashani) is supporting it in this respect. The party appears to have
recovered from its heavy losses of fighters to both the Pakistan army and
the Mujib Bahini, and it claims responsibility for most of the police
station lootings, bank robberies, and river dacoities perpetuated since
liberation. It also claims to have taken the lives of several Awami
League workers, smugglers, betrayers of party secrets and some Hindus who
were said to be still oppressing Muslims. The geurrilla units lie low
during the winter and are most active during the rainy season, when govern-
ment troops are at the greatest disadvantage.

The Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist-Leninist) is another
underground revolutionary party, more commonly known as the Sammobadi Dal.
It is led by Mohammad Toaha and Sukhendu Dastidar, who brought about the
split in the original East Pakistan Communist Party in 1968 and formed its
pro-Peking wing. Toaha collected a number of red geurrillas to fight both

the Pakistan army and the Mukti Bahini, but these were decimated by the

opposing forces and were unable to set up their projected People's Demo-

cratic Republic of Bangladesh. After independence their newspaper,

Gono Shakti (People's Strength), began to subscribe to the common theory

that Bangladesh had not really been liberated but was headed by a puppet

government responsible to India and thus indirectly to Moscow. Like the

Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal regards the Rakhi Bahini as essenti-

ally an Indian army in Bangladesh receiving arms and ammunition from the

Indian government and taking direct aid from Indian armed forces to sup-

press rebels in the Chittagong Hill tracts and other areas in March 1972.

Also like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammonadi Dal has formed a national

liberation front under its direction and a guerrilla force recruited from

among frustrated freedom fighters. Their main activities center in the

districts of Rajshahi, Pabna, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur and Noakhali.

Some of the differences among the parties can be seen from the

ways in which they criticize each other. "The Sammobadi Dal criticizes

the BCP(L) and the BCP for their stands on imperialism since the latter

two parties have supposedly given their support to the Awami League by

saying that it was dependent on India rather than terming it a 'puppet

government.'"[9] The Sarbohara Party is dismissed as a mere terrorist group

misled by the upstart Sikdar into seeing the most important contradiction

as that between East Bengal and India rather than between socialist and

anti-socialist forces. For this reason, the Sammobadi Dal thinks that the

Sarbohara Party might be acting as a counter-revolutionary terrorist force,

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[9]Ibid., p. 778.

patronized by the U.S. in its attempt to oust Delhi and Moscow from Bangladesh. Similarly, the JSD, which is regarded as a mere falling out over patronage among junior AL members, is thought to be supported by India as a counterweight to keep Mujib's puppet government under strict control.

While most of the members of the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) formed the Sammobadi Dal under Toaha and Dastidar, a small section under Abdul Hoq, retained the old name of the party and a separate organization. This group is the most extreme in its interpretation of the liberation struggle; it does not recognize the existence of Bangladesh at all, preferring to see the war of independence as an expansionist move by India and the country now as a colony of India. The EPCP(M-L) has therefore launched its own people's war against the counter-revolutionary forces to resurrect East Pakistan. However, because of its continued use of the name "East Pakistan" it has been the subject of the strongest government action, and most of the cadres have been killed or jailed. Abdul Hoq remains at large.

The East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) EBCP (M-L) is the last of the underground parties. It is itself split into three groups, one of which, the group led by Sikdar and Bashar, joined the Sommony Committee to form the BCL. A second group led by Matin and Alauddin saw the liberation struggle as a fight between two "bourgeois dogs" and adopted the line of killing and the class enemies from the Pakistan army through feudal landlords to the Mukti Bahini.[10] This group then came under heavy

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[10]Ibid., p. 782.

attack by the Mukti Bahini after December 16, 1971, and it fled from Pabna to Attrai which was at that time under the control of Ohidur Rahman. He was persuaded to admit the error of supporting the Mukti Bahini and his group was recruited to the EBCP(M-L). Their terrorist activities led to reprisals by the government in a series of hard-fought battles. Both Motin and Ohidur Rahman were captured. Alauddin, who escaped, is continuing publication of Purbo Bangla (East Bengal), the party's newspaper.

The EBCP(M-L) theoreticians' analysis of Bangladesh's political situation is similar to that of the Sammobadi Dal, but the former put more emphasis on the contradiction between peasants and feudal elements, claiming nationalism cannot be achieved without a class struggle as well. They also seek collaboration with the revolutionaries in India, especially the Naxalites, who are distrusted by the other revolutionary parties of Bangladesh. The EBCP(M-L) is active in Attrai and in parts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Pabna and Kushtia districts.

The left revolutionary parties of Bangladesh are agreed that the war for independence left the revolution unfinished. There are not so many differences among these parties. Some differences of style and emphasis can be traced to the class origins of the members and their levels of education. Most of the factionalism is due to the result of personal animosities, desire for personal aggrandizement, accidents of geography, of history, and the groups encounters with the Pakistan army and Mukti Bahini. They are not worried about the growth of so many parties because they regard the situation as similar to Russia before the October Revolution when there were several communist parties. They

feel that the party with the correct strategy will ultimately lead the revolution.

There are so many parties in Bangladesh that it threatens the stability of the country. None of the parties are well organized to mobilize the people under one ideology. The parties are generally fragile. The main causes of too many parties are the personality conflicts, politics based on personality, too much influence on ideology. If we analyze the factionalism within the party, we find it is based on personality rather than ideology. For example, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh Mujibar Rahman could not tolerate each other. That is the reason why Ataur Rahman formed a new party. The main difficulty with the personality-based party is that if, in any way, that personality is lost, it loses the party. There is a tendency in Bangladesh to recognize the party by leader rather than by the party. This tendency led to the coming up of many parties. none of which are strong enough to form a majority. Government is bound to be formed by the coalition of different parties, which starts rivalry after assuming power. This is what happened in Pakistan. This was the m ain reason for the failure of the parliamentary system in 1958 —nd the coming of martial law.

In the June 3 election there was also a kind of coalition of parties such as Gono Oikko Jote (People's Union) which was a coalition of the Awami League, National Awami Party (Muzaffar), Bangladesh Communist Party, Jatiyo Janata Party. The Gono Oikko Jote nominated General Osmani as the presidential candidate. Th— other coalition is the Jatiyatabadi Front (Nationalist Front) composed of the Jatiyatabadi Gonotantrik Dal, the NAP (Bhashani, the United People's Party, the Bangladesh Labor Party, the Bangla-

desh Muslim League, and the Bangladesh Tapshil Federation. The coalition nominated Ziaur Rahman, who emerged victorious. He now faces the problem of distributing patronage among the coalition members. Moreover, it is very difficult to integrate the diverse elements into a coherent policy, because every party tries to maintain its separate identity. Ziaur Rahman very recently disbanded the coalition and is trying to organize the Jati-yatabadi Dal by encouraging others to merge with his own party.

Too much influence and insistence on ideology also creates faction-alism within the party. For example, scientific socialism and Mujibism which led to the breaking up of the Awami League and the coming up of JSD. There is no effective way within the party for the solution of conflicts. There is no organized interest group to articulate the interests of the people. The parties have no organizational base in the rural areas where the majority of the people live. The general people are unconcerned about party politics. Only during election time do party leaders become active for gaining popular support, which is completely based on demogoguery. Most of the groups are anomic groups who are utilized by the politicians for satisfying their own desires. Because of the poor aggregation of interest of the people, the demands are unheard, which creates problems in the input and output sector of the govenrment.

Following Duverger's classification of political parties, we may present a typology of the political parties of Bangladesh in the following table.[11] The political parties of Bangladesh do not differ very much in their organizational structure. Minor differences with ideology leads to

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[11] Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 4-5.

TABLE 1

Typology of Parties of Bangladesh

Party Caucus	Organization Branch-Cell	Articulation	Link Horizontal or Vertical	Centralized or Decentralized	Party Membership Cadre, Mass or Devotee
Awami League	Branch	Weak	Vertical	Centralized	Mass
NAP (Pro-Russia)	Branch	Weak	Vertical	Centralized	Mass
NAP (Bhashani)	Branch	Weak	Vertical	Centralized	Mass
Jatiyatabadi Dal	Branch	Weak	Vertical	Centralized	Mass
Janata Party	Branch	Weak	Vertical	Centralized	Mass
JSD	Branch & Cell	Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Mass
Bangladesh Communist League	Cell	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Mass
Bangladesh Communist Party (Leninist)	Cell & Branch	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)	Cell	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
East Bengal Communist Party	Cell & Branch	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
Bangaldesh Communist Party	Cell	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
Sammobadi Dal	Cell	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)	Cell	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee
Banglar Communist Party	Cell & Branch	Very Strong	Horizontal	Centralized	Devotee

Source: Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955).

the growth of other parties. The moderate political parties like the Awami League, NAP (Bhashani), the Janata Party, the Jatiyatabadi Dal, all work in branches and articulation is not very strong. Their relationship with the other branches has a subordinate relationship to the central party organization. These parties are strictly controlled from the center. The policies come as hierarchical orders from the center. All these parties appeal to the general mass for support. The radical parties like the JSD, Bangladesh Communist Party, and the East Bengal Communist Party are organized into branches and cells. These radical parties are strong in articulation, and have a horizontal relationship with other branches because they give equal footing to their fellow organizations based on cells or branches. Only the JSD comes closer to the mass party because of its appeal to the populace as a whole. All other leftist parties like the Bangladesh Communist League, East Pakistan Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist), Banglar Communist Party, Sammobadi Dal, and the East Bengal Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist) are characterized by cells, strong articulation, horizontal relationship with their supporting organizations, highly centralized and membership is very closed to the devotee party.

Analyzing the party system in Bangladesh, we may classify it in the words of Duverger as "polypartism or the tendency to extreme multiplication of parties which can be explained by general causes that are rather variable."[12] Many parties have emerged out of many reasons although Bangladesh is a homogeneous entity. The causes of the emergence of many parties are factionalism, worship of personality, too many ideologies, etc.

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[12] Ibid., p. 245.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The fundamental problem of political development is economic development. For a sound political system a sound economic system is an urgent necessity. Economic problems create frustrations among the people leading to instability and disorganization within the system. Problems of economic development are at the very root of politics. The economic disparity bewteen East and West Pakistan is responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. If we try to analyze the problems of stability, unity and integration, economic problems lie at the root of many political problems. The coup of 1975 that killed Sheikh Mujibar Rahman was due to the failure of Mujib to solve the economic problems of Bangladesh.

The economy of Bangladesh is completely undeveloped. In the post-liberation period she had to suffer the problem of reconstruction of the damages during the liberation struggle. A U.N. report estimated "the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million. Production in all sectors of the economy declined sharply. The jute industry output was 28 percent less than 1969-70 production. Exports were estimated to be 30 percent less than normal requirements."[1]

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[1]Jaast Faaland, and J. R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development (Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 46.

In the first two years after independence, war-ravaged Bangladesh was able to avoid a major economic crisis and a large-scale famine mainly because of the massive relief operations carried on by the United Nations Relief Organization in Bangladesh (UNROB) in December 1973.

The nationalization of industry was also a complete failure. The immediate result was chaos and confusion. While the so-called abandoned properties were placed under government-appointed administrators, who in most cases turned out to be political nominees, the big blunder of the government was to embark on the nationalization program without setting up the institutional framework to implement it. It has been criticized by Badaruddin Umar as "to introduce nationalization without setting up the institutional framework is a simple case of putting the cart before the horse."[2] In most of the nationalized industries the administrators appointed by the government were the AL workers who had no knowledge of either a socialist or capitalist system. The administrators grew rich over night by smuggling machinery and raw materials to India.

Another important reason for the economic crisis was the large-scale smuggling of relief goods, foodstuffs, and jute to India. The unequal real value between the Bangladesh taka and Indian rupee were exchanged at par shortly after liberation; but officially it is equal to 50 Indian ruppees. The smugglers sell essential commodities to Indian businessmen and in return bring cheap nonessential consumer goods worth double the amount of Bangladesh taka. "During the 1972-74 financial year an estimated 1.5 million tons of paddy and 800,000 tons of rice were

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[2]S. M. Ali, After the Dark Past (New Delhi: Thompson Press, Ltd., 1973).

reported smuggled to India."[3] While the economy of Bangladesh was on the
point of collapse the situation was further aggravated by the worst flood
in July and August 1974 which, according to the estimate of the planning
commission, caused damage to "more than 1 million tons of food grains and
10 to 15 million dollars worth of Jute exports. The price of goods
increased by 700-800 percent compared to 1969-70 levels."[4]

The most important of all these problems is the population problem.
It is creating pressure on the land, resources, and the food supply. With
the rise of population the unemployment is also increasing, causing frus-
trations and leading to disgruntled elements in the population. Frustrated,
these disgruntled people are joining the radical parties causing violence
and threatening the stability of the country. The U. N. Bulletin of
Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VII, No. 2, June 1977, gave the
following projection of the population in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and
Sr. Lanka. (See Table 2 , following page.)

In Bangladesh 7 babies are born every minute, 3.7 million every
year; about 1.33 million die yearly, thus, 2.37 million people are being
added to the total population. The birth rate is 47 per 1000 per year.
Therefore, the rate of increase is 30 per 1000 or 3 percent and at the
rate of natural increase it will take only 23 years to reach 156 million
from the present number.[5] In India, the birth rate is probably about 40

[3]Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of Mujib
Regime and Its Aftermath," Asian Survey, February, 1976.

[4]Jaast Faaland, and J. R. Parkinson, op. cit., p. 79.

[5]Md. Shah Jahan, "Population Boom and Food Production," The Bangla-
desh Observer, September 17, 1978.

TABLE 2

Population Growth in Bangaldesh and Neighboring Countries

Country	Area Square Kilometers	Date	Latest Census Estimate of Midyear Population (millions)								
			Population	1937	1963	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Bangladesh	142,998	1/3/74	71,479,071	----	53.21	69.77	71.47	73.21	74.99	76.82	78.66
India	3,287,782	1/4/71	548,159,652	303.63	462.03	551.07	562.91	574.81	596.66	598.43	610.08
Pakistan	796,095	6/9/72	65,309,340	----	45.47	62.43	64.30	66.23	68.21	70.21	72.37
Sri Lanka	65,610	9/10/71	12,711,143	5.73	10.65	12.61	12.86	13.10	13.28	13.51	13.73

Source: Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI, No. 4, December 1976 (New York: United Nations), p. 20.

and the death rate was thought to be 16; over 12 million people were added to the Indian population each year between 1965 and 1970. The growth rate in Pakistan averaged 2.5 percent per year during 1965-1970.[6] Though the above mentioned countries are overpopulated, Bangladesh exceeds all the neighboring countries in population growth.

With over 45 percent of the population under the age of 15, a nearly 3 percent rate of natural increase and a dependency burden not far from unity, the result is an indisputable burden of absolute numbers combined with virtually unaltered and enormous potential for further growth. "Population density in Bangladesh's 55,000 square miles of terrain would be 2.841 persons per square mile."[7]

The rapid rise of the population is due to the early marriage in Bangladesh. Nearly 50 percent of the women in the age group between 12 and 14 are married and about 90 percent of those aged 15 to 19.[8] Family planning is insufficient. In the villages, people are opposed to birth control. The lack of education stands in the way of proper implementation of family planning. Religion may be an obstacle to the adoption of family planning. Hafez Zaidi, in his study, emphasized the importance of superstition as well as religious teaching and concludes that 99 percent of the Muslims and 98 percent of the Hindus believe that man has no control over the means of livelihood.[9] It is assigned by God. What is written in his forehead will determine his destiny.

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[6] C. Stephen Baldwin, "Catastrophe in Bangladesh: An Examination of Alternative Population Growth Possibilities 1975-2000," Asian Survey, February, 1977.

[7] Jaast Faaland and J. R. Parkinson, op. cit., p. 84.

[8] Ibid., p. 85.

[9] Ibid., p. 87.

Due to the rise of population, Bangladesh has become a food deficit area. Agriculture is the mainstay of economic life in Bangladesh.

> "As much as 90 percent of the total population live in rural areas. Over 80 percent of all employment is in agriculture; about 60 percent of the national product is derived from agriculture; 90 percent of national exports are either agricultural or manufacturers of them. As land area cannot be expanded its use must be optimized. Expansion of new human settlement is forcing Bangladesh to lose about 28 percent of her 2.5 milliom acres of cultivable land every decade worsening the chronic food problem."[10]

The increasing population is creating a constant food problem. According to an estimate, "food production has increased from 9.4 million tons in 1961 to 1 crore 30 lakh tons in 1976 but per capita food availability has dropped from 16.5 ounces to 14 ounces per person per day."[11] This is because the growth rate of population has outpaced the production of food. This food problem is the most dominant problem of politics and economics. The main issue in Bangladesh politics is food. The success of a government depends on how effectively it can feed the people without any hunger.

The increasing population is also creating widespread unemployment leading to dysfunctional elements in the political system. Being unemployed these people have nothing to do but resort to sabotage and disorder. That is the main reason for the rise of radical political parties which take advantage of these disgruntled elements. It is likely that with the present rate of increase of population, there will be 8 to 20 million unemployment by the end of the century. Bangladesh has 30 percent unemployment

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[10]Ibid., p. 93.

[11]Ibid., p. 95.

which is a constant threat to political and social stability. By 2000, with 30 percent of the population unemployed, there will be great danger.[12]

The urban migration is also creating the problem of socio-political stability. While the bulk of the Bengali population is in rural areas, there is a persistent trend towards urbanization and more recently this phenomenon has accelerated. A National Quarterly sample survey conducted by the central statistical office of the erstwhile government of Pakistan in 1967-68 revealed that 5.97 percent of the total urban Bengalese population of age 10 years and above had migrated within the preceeding year.[13]

Information on the reasons which motivated such rural to urban migration was collected by this survey.

TABLE 3

Reasons Given by Rural Population Who Migrated
to the Urban Areas: 1967-68

Reasons for Rural-Urban Migration	Proportion of Total Migrants of Age 10 and Above
To seek job	39.37
To set up industry or business	4.07
To study	0.90
To marry	10.41
Others	45.25

Source: Iftikhar Ahmed, "Employment in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects," in A. G. Robinson, and K. Griffin, The Economic Development of Bangladesh Within a Socialist Framework (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, p. 252.

It is clear from the survey that in Bangladesh almost two-fifths of the total migrants of age 10 and above who migrated into the urban areas were

[12] Ibid., p. 98.

[13] Iftikhar Ahmed, "Employment in Bangladesh," in Economic Development of Bangladesh, p. 79.

looking for work. These migrants are readily persuaded to political vio-
lence or extremism. They are very much attracted by the radical parties
to create disturbance within the country.[14]

Another problem which threatens the security of Bangladesh is
widespread corruption in every sector. The development plan is very much
hampered by this kind of corruption. Whatever money is allocated is not
utilized. More than half of the money is wasted on undue bribes. There
is widespread hierarchy and red tapism within the administration. This
gives the officials a chance to take bribes. The politicians are also
corrupt. Corruption may alienate modern-oriented civil servants and cause
them to leave the country or withdraw or reduce their efforts. In addi-
tion to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs
in the form of restriction of governmental programs because of fears that
a new program might be ineffective in practice.

Industrialization is backward. The industrial production contri-
buted only 8 percent to the gross domestic product. The government has
established certain projects that are inadequately prepared and vested,
sometimes through political involvement by overstaffing of unskilled labor
and sometimes using traditional administrative services in the management
process. In general, Bangladesh has experienced great difficulty in raising
resources to cover current budgetary expenditures and to provide for that
part of the small development programs.

> "The budget of 1975-76 was the first to show
> a comfortable surplus on the current account.
> This surplus amounts to only $100 million at

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[14]_Ibid._, p. 80.

the current exchange rate. But this money is
quite insufficient for long-term development
programs."[15]

All these problems cannot be solved unless the basic problem of
establishing a stable government is solved. The first task is to carry
out the difficult and painstaking task of improving the machinery of
administration, training people to operate it, and giving incentive, hope
and leadership needed to do this. The following development scenario can
be presented. (See Table 4 , following page.)

The economic condition of Bangladesh improved significantly in
1975 from the totally dismal picture that had prevailed in 1974.

"By January 1975 the price of rice had risen by
500 percent over the 1969-70 level. By July the
price came down by 300 percent. From July to
September the price of rice fell by another 37
percent and the cost of living index fell by 9
percent. During the same period the money supply
declined by 3.5 percent and bank deposits by 5.6
percent."[16]

The military regime under the leadership of General Zia has been
particularly successful in the economic field. The government discarded
the socialist pretensions of the Mujib regime and took special measures
to boost private foreign trade and private investment in the industrial
sector. Private foreign and indigenous traders entered into the formerly
nationalized jute trade. Some of the nationalized industries were given
over to the private entrepreneurs. A ceiling of Taka 20 million fixed by
the Mujib government for private investment was raised to Taka 100 million.

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[15]Jaast Faaland, and J. R. Parkinson, op. cit., p. 93.

[16]Montgomery and Siffins, Approaches to Politics, Development and
Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1967), p. 20.

TABLE 4

Development Scenario 1975-2000

A. Population and Major Accounts Magnitudes	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Population (millions)	80	93	106	121	136	150
Gross Domestic Product (millions)	6400	8170	10930	14630	19610	26140
Gross Investment (millions)	550	1225	1965	2635	3530	4710
Net Capital Import (millions)	800	980	1310	1465	1570	1570
Domestic Savings Per Capita	250	245	655	1170	1960	3140
Consumption (millions)	6650	7925	10275	13460	17650	2300
Gross Product Per Capita (millions)	80	88	103	121	145	174
Consumption Per Capita (millions)	83	85	97	111	130	153
Domestic Savings Per Capita (millions)	-3	3	6	10	15	21
Gross Investment Per Capita GDP	8	15	18	18	18	18
Capital Import Percent of GDP	12	12	12	10	8	6
Domestic Savings Percent of GDP	-4	3	6	8	10	12

B. Annual Growth Rates and 25-Year Growth Index	1975/80	1980/85	1985/90	1990/95	1995/2000	1980/2000	Total Growth Index 1975/2000
Population	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.0	2.4	187
Gross Domestic Product	5.0	6.0	.60	6.0	6.0	6.0	401
Gross Investment	17.4	10.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	7.0	855
Gross Product Per Capita	2.0	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.5	218
Consumption Per Capita	0.6	2.5	2.9	3.2	3.3	3.0	184

C. Selected Ratios							
Capital-Output Ratio	(2.0)	2.7	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	n.a.
Marginal Overall Savings Rate (percent)	(28)	15	14	16	14	16	n.a.
Marginal Per Capita Savings Rate	(62)	32	24	20	22	21	n.a.

Source: Jaast Faaland, and J. R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: The Test Case for Development (Colorado: Westview, 1976).

To attract foreign investment, the government announced the policy of
non-nationalization and tax holiday for all new industries and home
remittance of net profits by foreign companies. The effect of these
policies has been a marked improvement in the private sector. "As
against the total investment of Taka 200.9 million in the two financial
years of 1973-74 and 1974-75, there was a total private investment of
Taka 850.9 million in the financial year 1975-76."[17]

The government launched a massive program of manual digging and
creation of canals and the building of roads and embankments under a
work for food program. By November 1976, 2,200 miles of embankment and
900 miles of road had been constructed and 2,200 miles of new canals
excavated. Lastly, the government appointed 12,000 family planning
officers thoughout the.country to popularize the family planning pro-
gram. The government has also been successful in checking smuggling
across the border. The cumulative effect of the government policies
has resulted in a marked improvement in all fields of the Bangaldesh
economy. "Both the annual reports of the Bangladesh Bank and the World
Bank, 1975-76, revealed that gross domestic product rose by 11.4 percent
in 1975-76, as against 2 percent the preceeding year. The overall cost
of living index was estimated to have declined by 20 percent during the
year as a against a rise of 31 percent during 1974-75. Industrial output
increased by 5 percent and for the first time since liberation, the pro-
duction of the all important jute industry went up by 7.3 percent. The
export target fixed at Taka 5540 million in 1975-76 was exceeded by Taka

[17]The Bangladesh Observer, September 26, 1978.

560 million. The improving trends in the economy showed acceleration in the first quarter of the financial year 1976-77, particularly in the export sector, which increased by 48 percent over the corresponding period in 1975-76."[18]

The economy does not look so good compared to 1976. A growth rate of 3 percent is estimated for the year compared to 9.7 percent during the previous year. The decline in the growth rate has been attributed to the short fall in the agricultural sector. Food grains production in 1977 was estimated to be short by about one million tons from the target of 13 million tons. Excessive rain and floods caused this decline. The industrial output increased because of a higher production of sugar, fertilizer, cement, paper, and other products.

"The highlight of the 1977-78 budget could be summarized as follows: (a) total revenue income Taka 11,560 million (official exchange rate is approximately $1 = Taka 15.50); (b) total expenditure Taka 20,960 million on development and Taka 400 million for food and work programs; (c) an anticipated growth rate of 7 percent; (d) agricultural sector projected to grow by 8 percent, industrial sector by 7 percent and other by 9 percent. The investment climate in the private sector looks favorable for the first time since 1972 as the government went ahead with its policy of encouraging entrepreneurs, both at home and abroad. There was no indication of further nationalization and the National Investmet Board opened

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[18]Philip M. Hauser, "Some Cultural and Personal Characteristics of the Less Developed Areas," in Finkle and Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 56.

new industrial units for private investment. About 200 smaller indus-
tries were denationalized by the government and returned to the private
sector."[19]

Although Bangladesh is far from achieving self-sufficiency in
food there are indications of serious efforts to achieve this goal.
Rural development received top priority in 1977 and substantial inter-
national aid was promised to increase agricultural productivity. The
program of Swanirvar (self-sufficiency) was launched in selected areas
to improve agriculture through voluntary labor offered by the villagers.
Zia was impressed by the showpiece of this program at Ulashi in Jes-
sore district and urged the villagers to follow the spirit of develop-
ment through self-reliance throughout the country.

Related to economic problems are the social problems. Social
problems are to politics and economics. As Hegen mentions, "political
development also means the change of traditional values. In exploring
the possibilities for a framework for analyzing economic and political
development, Hegen takes account of deep-seated resistance to social
change and of the need for changing some rather basic attitudes if
development is to succeed."[20]

The main problem in Bangladesh is mass illiteracy. The literacy
rate in the country was up by 4.4 percent in 1974 compared to that in
1961. The literacy rate now stands at 24.3 percent. The urban literacy

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[19]Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for Sur-
vival as an Independent State," Asian Survey, VII, February 1977.

[20]Montgomery and Siffins, Approaches to Politics, Development
and Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1967), p. 23.

rate of 44.0 percent is almost double than that of rural areas. Males have a higher literacy rate than females which stands at 32.9 percent and 14.3 percent, respectively. Due to the lack of education people are not socialized to national goals and ideology. They are not invovled in the national political culture.

In the developing societies the Bangladesh political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal relations. Among the most powerful influences of the traditional order in any society in transition is the survival of a pattern of politcal relationship largely determined by the pattern of social and personal relations with the inevitable result that the political struggle tends to revolve around issues of prestige, influence and even of personalities and not around questions of alternative courses of policy action.

The elite who dominate the national politics of most non-Western countries generally represents a remarkably homogeneous group in terms of educational experience and social background.

At the village level it is even more difficult to distinguish a distinct political sphere. The social status of the individual and his personality largely determines his political behavior and the range of his influence, a condition which places severe limits on the effectiveness of anyone who came from the outside to perform a political role, be it that of an administrative agent of the national government or of a representative of a national party. Political discussion tends rather to assume the form of either intracommunal debate or the attempt of one group to justify its position toward another.

The lack of a clearly differentiated political sphere means that political parties tend to be clearly oriented not to a distinct political arena but to some aspect of the communal framework of politics. In reflecting the communal base of politics they tend to represent total ways of life; attempts to organize parties in terms of particular political principles or limited policy objectives generally result either in failure or in the adoption of a broad ethic which soon obscures the initial objective. Usually political parties represent some sub-society or simply the personality of a particularly influential individual.

Despite the impact of colonization and the presence of a united veneer of Western technology and culture, the mass population have in the main retained their traditional values. The ingredients of the value system are in apparent conflict with the new national aspirations for economic advancement. For example, some of the cultural elements which appear to be in conflict with technological development and the attainment of higher levels of living are: the emphasis on spiritual rather than material values; the stress laid on the importance of afterlife or future existence; the pressure for conformance with an oftern intolerance with deviations from traditional patterns of thought and action, the relatively rigid definitions of roles of members of the family, the village and the social order at large, the parochialism of the diverse radical, ethnic, linguistic and territorial groups, the familistic orientation, the tendency to place savings in traditional channels of investments, including non-productive investments like jewels and precious stones and the allocation of relatively large amounts of life-space and energy to traditional cultural and religious rituals, ceremonies and festivals.

The traditional value systems do not provide the population with incentive for material gain or expectations of advancement based on merit and application. The prestige vocations and occupations tend to be those in government, religion, and agriculture, not the type of occupations identified with economic development. That is, occupations in commerce, industry and many of the professions and the services have yet to achieve prestige and attract competent people. Moreover, the traditional value systems do not provide the person with general orientation of the type necessary in a monetary as distinguished from a subsistence economy, including conceptions of work as a segmented area of activity requiring a fixed time, place, and an employer-employee nexus.

Very rigid stratification exists in the society. It undoubtedly has an adverse effect on individual incentive conducive to economic advance. It tends to restrict the access of persons with ability to education, training and opportunity consonant with effective utilization of human resources. There is a widespread tendency to restrict education, technical training, and the better vocational opportunities to members of the elite. In consequence, such limited opportunities as exist for training, both domestically and abroad, through various scholarships, fellowships and technical assistance programs are often made available on a nepotistic, familial, village, ethnic, religious or personal basis rather than strictly on merit.

There is a tendency to place a great premium on age. Seniority is often a major basis for status and prestige. The older person is regarded as a repository of the experience and knowledge of society and is treated with the utmost respect and deference. The privileges and

priorities of seniority are in the main rigidly fixed and rarely
impaired. This is particularly in evidence in those nations in which
a government civil service has been established. A younger man must
wait his turn for advancement. Greater competence on his part or
incompetence on the part of a senior officer is rarely an adequate
basis for the replacement of an older by a younger person. As a result,
the scarcity of skilled human resources to which reference has been made
above is often made even more acute by the inability of the culture to
tilize such skills as are available.

"Among the mass population's adherence to ancient tradition and
superstitious ways often directly interfers with economic advancement, wide-
spread beliefs, fears, inhibitions and behaviorisms generated by living
in a universe deemed to be controlled by astrological, numerological and
economic advance and a general orientation prepared to accept the method-
ology and fruits of science.[21] These socio-economic problems create prob-
lems in the execution of any new policy which is a very important part of
political development.

Bangladesh, as a society, fits within the trasitional stage; the
societal structure is not purely traditonal or modern. The socialization
process is not very modernized. Still the family and other inner insti-
tutions play a great part. Political roles are based on ascription rather
than achievement. The political leaders are judged on the basis of their
family background rather than on achievement. People are apathetic to
general welfare activities. They devote much time in useless discussion
rather than constructive work. The communication process is face to face
rather than organized. Bad communication systems alienate people from the

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[21]Philip M. Hauser, op. cit.

decision-making process. People are still attracted to the traditional values. For example, obedience to religion, to seniors and aristocrats, more values to men than women. They worship personality rather than institutions. All the characters of the transitional society are existing in Bangladesh. As a result of these, any developmental plan faces resistence from the society.

The values are changing very fast in the cities. But in the villages, the changes are very slow. It creates problems because the majority of the population lives in the villages. The elites values are often misunderstood by the populace. For instance, the theory of secularism advocated by Sheikh Mujib was misinterpreted by the people who interpreted secularism as no religion. As 80 percent of the population are Muslims, they could not appreciate secularism as an ideology. They regarded it as an opposition to Islam and a blow to the tradition of Islamic philosophy.

But the problem lies with the lack of communication. The new values can be implanted in the minds of the people by better communication media.

CONCLUSION

As has been mentioned in the introductory chapter political
development is a very comprehensive concept. Since it is very broad
in application its problems are also many. The preceding chapter ana-
lyzes the problems of political development in Bangladesh. An analysis
of the preceding chapter will show that Bangladesh is still facing the
problem of integration. The regional disparity between the north and
south has compelled the government to take certain steps for the satis-
faction of the needs of the northern people. Politics is becoming very
much regionalized. The tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are
demanding provincial autonomy in their area. They are also demanding
the preservation of their own culture and values. Bad communication sys-
tems have alienated the tribal people from the rest of the population.
Following the definition of Myron Weiner, Bangladesh is still facing the
problem with regard to elite-mass integration, value integration. There
is a wide gap between the elites and the mass. As such, there is a gap
between the input and output sector of the political system. The mass
cannot communicate their demands to the elites who are also unable to edu-
cate the people in policy implementation. In matters of national ideology,
Bangladesh is still in search of one which can unify the people. The indi-
cation of these problems rightly establishes the hypothesis that there is
the problem of national integration in Bangladesh.

The precarious problem which Bangladesh is facing is the problem of stability and unity. As Chapter III shows, soon after the creation of Bangladesh, there was complete disorder and instability. Inter-group and intra-group conflicts characterize the political situation. Within a few years different types of government came into being. People are not sure of the form of government. The existing government is also facing the problem of establishing legitimate authority. The rising expectations caused rising frustrations creating instability. The recalcitrant groups are busy in creating turmoil within the country. The radical parties resort to violence rather than finding any constitutional channel for the solution of the problem. The government is frequently shaken by revolts by different groups. All these pictures come very close to our hypothesis that the problem of political development in Bangladesh is hindered by the problem of stability and unity.

Chapter V. shows that Bangladesh is characterized by many political parties, none of which are organized to attract a large following. The parties lack organization at the grass roots level. The party structure is based on the personality of a single leader. There is no coherent ideology behind the parties. Even within the parties, factional conflicts threaten the very stability of the country. The radical parties are engaged in underground politics indulging in sabotage and disorder. This hampers the healthy growth of any political institutions. The lack of a well-organized party also stands in the way of national unity. People are factionalized on the basis of party.

Chapter IV establishes the problem of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. It inherited the system of the British administration, which trained

the bureaucracy in the art of control rather than direction of policy initiatives. This tradition of the bureaucracy hampered the growth of the formal political institutions. After the liberation the negative role of the bureaucracy also created a problem because the bureaucracy lacked the initiative in administration. This created a problem in administration which was needed very badly in a new-born state. To make a balance in the role of the bureaucracy is a serious problem. Upperhand in any way creates problems. After the coming of Ziaur Rahman, the bureaucracy again gained the upperhand. It has created problems in the growth of the political institutions. As such, we see the essay rightly confirms the view that the problem of making a balance in the role of the bureaucracy does exist.

The most dominant problem is the socio-economic problem. The problem of population, unemployment and low productivity creates growing frustration among the people. In the preceding chapters we see the main cause of the prevailing instability is the failure of the government to solve the economic problems like population, increase in the price index, etc. The essay clearly states population and other socio-economic problems lie at the root of all political problems. The traditional values and way of life are also ingrained in the people who obstruct the peaceful way of change of modernization. An analysis of the socio-economic problems of Bangladesh rightly establishes our hypothesis that the most precarious problem which hinders political development is the problem of economic development.

Analyzing different problems we find that Bangladesh is seriously facing the problem of political development. Of course, these problems

are not peculiar only in Bangladesh. All the developing countries are suffering from these problems. The problem is very acute in Bangladesh, which is a new-born country. Bangladesh is itself the creation of the problem of integration which creates problems in the developing countries. The birth of Bangladesh has created a kind of separatist tendency among the disgruntled elements. Politics have become regionalized. The tribal people of Chittagong Hill Tracts, taking account of their underdevelopment compared to other parts of the country, are demanding provincial autonomy for themselves citing the example of Sheikh Mujib who demanded provincial autonomy for the then East Pakistan on the basis of a six-point formula. The tribal people also try to base their demands by citing the separate culture and traditions of the people. If the government does not take effective steps for the satisfaction of their problems, one day it may lead to further problems threatening the security of the country. The main problem is due to the lack of communication between the tribal people and the other people. Because of the bad communication system they cannot come into contact with the rest of the population. They should be encouraged to participate in national politics. Because of the lack of participation their demands remain unheard and unredressed.

Though solutions are very difficult we can suggest some policy recommendations by giving due attention to the problems. As the majority of the people live in the villages, steps should be taken for integrated rural development. Unemployment in the villages, whether partial, seasonal or disguised, is widespread and efforts to uplift the rural areas by finding more employment for the people should get top priority. The cultivation of land has almost reached the saturation point in most parts of the country

and while the increasing of productivity is rightly getting full attention, the scope of employment in agriculture is limited.

Ways and means, therefore, have to be evolved to absorb the surplus manpower in the villages in gainful subsidiary occupations. The present government has laid emphasis on creating more employment opportunities and exercises are presently going on to explore all possible avenues to ahcieve this end. Augmentation of employment potential in the rural sector requires a multi-pronged approach.

"The strategy of the government for the purpose includes the setting up of small-scale industries all over the rural areas on a massive scale which will, of course, require huge investment and a gigantic training program."[1] For this, involvement of institutions like parks and industrial houses, is of prime necessity. In addition, cottage industries and village handicrafts are also to be encouraged in every way and markets should be explored for them.

Rural employment is an important issue which calls for urgent attention not only of the development planners but of all governments throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries. The present government has assigned top priority to the program of rural development. According to the goals defined, every able-bodied person should be provided with gainful employment within the next few years. It is undoubtedly the most challenging task. Its fulfillment would naturally call for all out efforts on the part of all segments of our society.

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[1]Mumtaz Khanam, "Integrated Rural Development," The Bangladesh Observer, August 14, 1978.

The most fundamental problem is illiteracy, which is blocking the smooth running of the country. Education lies at the root of all problems. Instability, disunity, factionalism, and lack of an organized party all are beset with the problem of illiteracy. Education is an urgent necessity. It is necessary for implanting values, tolerance and national political cultures. Unless people are educated to national political ideology and political culture of the country no attempt at political stabilization, economic development or unity will be successful.

Bangladesh needs to undertake ambitious plans and programs for attaining self-reliance in every stage of her economy as early as possible. The undertaking and execution of development plans and programs needs the development of the executive skills. The success of any program depends on the successful performance of the executives. Such executive skill should be developed, but this does not mean that this development of skill will supercede other development of the nation. The development strategies of executive skills should be well assessed to give room to every eligible one for the nation-building task. Abdur Rashid Khan in his article, Development Strategies for Executive Skills, gave certain suggestions:

1. He should be imbided with the spirit of nationalism and be dispirited with the feelings of self-interest.
2. His thought and expression in national interest should be well-evaluated to get optimum service from him.
3. His expertise in the respective field of work should be well renumerated for maximum utilization.
4. He should be given incentives for his higher efficiency and productivity in performance.
5. He should be encouraged for his constructive thinking and expression in national interest.

6. He should be given room to pass any con-
   structive comment for improvement of any
   policy which he is to implement, if there
   is any hinderance in the course of execution.
7. His power of motivation in getting the work
   done by others properly should be accounted
   for to his credit.
8. There should be a spirit of fair competition
   in developing executive skills.
9. He should be affixed with a definite respons-
   ibility to make him more cautious and responsible
   to the nation.[2]

But there should be checks and balances in the growth of the exe-

cutive skills which may jeopardize other development works.

For rural development, the most urgent necessity is the development

of the local government. Local bodies should be given more power because

it is the true representative of the people. The representatives of the

local bodies are very much attached to local needs. This will lessen the

bureaucratic dominance of administration. Very recently, President Ziaur

Rahman reiterated,

> "The government's firm determination to decentral-
> ize administrative machinery and delegate more power
> to the local government for a rapid and unhindered
> economic development. He also emphasized the greater
> role for the Thana Committee and Union Parishad
> (council)."[3]

There is also the need for the reorganization of the Thana admini-

stration which should be based on the peoples' representatives. The local

officials know better about the needs and demands of the local people and

there is another psychological reason that the local officials will have a

profound and sincere desire to develop his own area and as a common conse-

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[2]Abdur Rashid Khan, "Development Strategies for Executive Skills,"
The Bangladesh Observer, September 19, 1978.

[3]The Bangladesh Observer, September 1, 1978.

quence of it he will work for the local people more and more effectively
and wholeheartedly. It is also supposed that the local officials will be
able to motivate and mobilize the local people more effectively and effi-
ciently. The biggest reason for which this attempt of the government
deserves our praise is that there are many more channels of more and more
efficient and effective administration if the local officials work in close
collaboration with the local representatives and local people. Because the
complete administration at the Thana level will be conducted by the local
people, the Thana administration will be able to work as a self-government
which will add a stupendous and glorious chapter in the history of local
self-government in Bangladesh. In order to establish the Thana administra-
tion as a local self-government unit we are in great need of reorganizing
the Thana Councils.

Very recently the government has declared another plan to form a
Thana Development Committee in every Thana from the next financial year.
For the proper development in every sphere of life well-planned and well-
organized activities are essentially needed. The people have to be mobil-
ized so that they can spontaneously take part in the development activities
and in an organized way; the manpower should be utilized so that the best
possible achievement can be made to accomplish these objectives. To esta-
blish the Thana Development Committee we should first of all abolish the
existing Thana Council and a Thana Development Committee should be formed
in its place by taking peoples' representatives who would be elected dir-
ectly by the people. In this way people are encouraged to participate in
national politics.

There is also the need of proper village leadership. Without
leadership no organized goals, functions or aims can be achieved. Strong

well-organized and well-knitted leadership will ensure fruitful and far-reaching results. If leadership becomes weak, flexible and oscillating total expectations of the desired goals might be frustrated. As develping the nation's economy is based on agriculture, leadership in the village areas is the prime concern for all. Because leadership in the village areas means strong guidance in the field of agriculture, husbandry, cottage industry, etc. that ultimately increases GNP and thus standardize national life both internally and externally.

If we look at the villages of Bangladesh, we find leadership in village areas primarily originates from the following sources: (1) Village Mohajans, (2) Matbars, (3) Traditional families (middle class). Of them, village Mohajans and Matbars are permanent village dwellers who merely know the problems of the village but most of whom have no educational qualification and hence their understanding the conception of democracy, cooperatives, etc., are very primary.[4] They capture village leadership due to their increasing influence on poor peasants, handicraftsmen, fishermen and others because they hold vast land, a large sum of money and capital. By their power and wealth, they can easily motivate the poor people at their own interests. Further, it is found that allegiance to Mohajans and Matbars is created through generation after generation. With these advantages leadership in Mohajans and Matbars has become arbitrary against which poor villagers cannot do anything because of thinking of their sole dependence or subsistence on them.

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[4]Sinha M. A. Sayeed, "Leadership in Village Development," The Bangladesh Observer, February 12, 1978.

But the danger of this type of leadership is that as Mohajans and Matbars are generally not educated, cultured or well-informed of national development and problems, they become highly dependent on others. Further, the input of the political system, i.e., political socilaization, political recruitment, interest articulation, aggregation and political communication, cannot be well-spread and well-rooted under this type of leadership.

On the other hand, the traditional and middle class leadership are well-educated and conscious. The political system may work well if they take vigorous steps to make the policy of government a success.

The programs of the present government have ushered great hopes and enthusiasm among the people, especially the villagers. But if leadership in village areas is not constructive and benevolent, developmental schemes wil̇lnot materialize. Extension of the banking system, emphasis on cottage industry, agricultural development, adequate credits to peasants and other facilities should be extended to rural areas in order to hasten the process of developmental activities.

(a) Leadership in village areas should be formed in such a way so that all types of personalities may take part in molding society;

(b) In case of leadership of the middle class it should ask proper help from Mohajans, Matbars and others. Similarly, Matbars and Mohajans should extend their helping hands towards any developmental schemes.

(c) Village politics that create a hinderance to development should be brought to play their role in a constructive way and thus make development a success.

(d) Educationists, doctors, engineers and other professionals should go to villages which greatly helps to create strong leadership in village development, because leadership is the product of environment also.

> (e) Growing educated young generations may play
> a very positive role in this field. With
> stable and constructive development the
> village people will be able to have the
> fruits of political development.[5]

Efforts should be made for the control of corruption which ravages every sector of the society. Developmental programs are very much hampered due to the widespread corruption. The present government has taken certain steps in this respect. For example,

> Post-Bangladesh public leaders will have to submit
> their property statements within 60 days from January
> 25 to the coordination control cell for national security.
> Persons failing to submit the statement shall be punished
> with imprisonment for a term of up to two years and may
> also be disqualified for election or appointment to a
> public office for a period from five to seven years
> under the public leaders. (Improper Acquisition of
> Property Regulation, 1977-MLR x of 1977)[6]

But mere control of the public officials will not solve the problem unless efforts are taken to control it in every sector, especially the bureaucracy, the police, the businessmen. It is really difficult to control all these sectors. This can be controlled by people's participation. People should be vigilant to find out the corrupt elements and report to the authority concerned.

Exports should be diversified. Efforts should be taken for the increase of exports. President Ziaur Rahman called for creating a production base that would enable the country to offer different products, both primary and manufactured for export to the world market.

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[5] Ibid.

[6] The Bangladesh Observer, September 4, 1978.

The export earnings during 1976-77 reached the figure of Taka 625.50 crore as against Taka 306.14 crore in 1974-75 and Taka 551.67 crore in 1975-76.[7] This rise is no doubt encouraging but there is no room for complacency as we have to pay about three times our export earnings for making the payments on a heavy import bill on account of the import of capital goods, machinery, raw materials and consumer goods.

These are some guidelines for the solution of the problems. But the actual solution of the problems is very difficult. Unless society is stabilized, no plan or solution of the problems will be successful. Steps should be taken for the stabilization of the society.

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[7]Sinha M. A. Sayeed, "Road to Development," The Bangladesh Observer, September 12, 1978.

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