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Age Is Just a Number: Using Economic and Social Models in the Millennial Generation to Predict Policy Support and Political Beliefs

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
Age is Just a Number: Using Economic and Social Models

In the Millennial Generation to Predict Policy Support and Political Beliefs

(TITLE)

BY

Lindsey E. Juszczak

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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Abstract

Generational succession is an interesting phenomenon that occurs in all social sciences. The human generations overlap one another, but researchers have defined several generations to which a certain age belongs: Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y, and the Millennials. Being born in a particular time frame could affect the attitudes, beliefs, and values a person holds in general. This paper looks at the generational variable to predict six policy areas, asking the question: is there a millennial age difference that predicts policy support for Social Security spending, military spending, abortion, same-sex marriage, environmental spending, and climate change? Using data from the ANES 2012 and GSS 2012, logistic regression models were run for an economic model, social model and a full model combining both. Age may just be a number, but this preemption could affect a person's policy preferences, which is essential in understanding why people may or may not favor a certain policy. From the results, there is evidence that some policies are more controversial than others. The results also show that some policies that were once salient to the public are not as salient to generations. Perhaps there are other factors that should be included and controlled for in future analyses.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The millennial generation in the United States is projected to have nearly 75.3 million as of 2015, surpassing the Baby Boomers with 74.9 million.[1] Because of this trend, the millennial generation will greatly impact both the economy and societal norms in the future as the Baby Boomers have in the past.[2] Research has focused on the millennial generation because individuals in this generation are more diverse, educated and tech savvy than any of the previous generations.[3]

Millennials are different than other generations racially, religiously, and socially. Nearly 43% of millennials are non-white. According to the Census Bureau, by 2043 the majority of the U.S.[4] population will be non-white. More than 73% of Baby Boomers and 69% of Generation X say they believe in God, whereas 58% of millennials say they believe in God.[5] These statistics show differences in religion between generations. Also, millennials have lower social trust. 19% of millennials say they generally trust people. This generation may not trust people, but they do have higher optimism about the United States' future, where 49% of millennials believe that the best years of the U.S, are in the future.[6] Quite the opposite can be said about other generations, such as Generation X,

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[1] 2015. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/16/this-year-millennials-will-overtake-baby-boomers/ (September 1, 2015).

[2] 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf (September 1, 2015).

[3] Ibid.

[4] 2014. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/#millennials-by-age-and-race (September 30, 2015).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

Silent, and Baby Boomers, where all three groups have higher social trust. 31%, 40%, and 37% of each generation respectively believe people can be trusted generally.[7] However, all three generations have lower optimism about the nation's future with 42% of Generation X, 39% of Silent, and 44% of Baby Boomers to believe that U.S.'s better years are ahead.[8] Lastly, the millennial generation has grown up in a technological, making this group adapt to technology and social media a lot easier than the older generations.

Besides age differences, the millennial generation varies from the older generations when it comes to viewpoints, attitudes, and beliefs on political candidates, issues, and activism. Studies have found that the millennial generation is more progressive than previous generations. Since individuals in the millennial generation are more diverse than any other generation, it is not difficult to understand that progressivism is widespread through the millennial generation.[9] Diversity leads to new ideas, viewpoints, attitudes, and beliefs.

An important question that some political scientists have looked into is why there are these differences of political attitudes and beliefs between generations. Some authors believe attitudes between generations differ because of what is called the life cycle explanation. The life cycle explanation argues that as people become older, they become conservative. In sum, the theory assumes that the political attitudes of individuals changes when they age.

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

Other studies argue for a generational explanation of political attitudes. A punctuation, or sudden event, such as 9/11, the Boston Bombings, or Sandy Hook has a particularly strong effect on younger people who live through these events. Specifically, the generational explanations claim that the differences in opinions that are related to age are due to unique events that have occurred when a specific age groups was young.

This thesis will explore and analyze the differences of political attitudes between the millennial generation and the older generations. Of the two theories that explain political attitudes, the generational explanation will be used more than the life cycle explanation. However, this does not mean the life cycle explanation will be not be mentioned, because it complements the generational explanation. The life cycle explanation may also be helpful when explaining the data and results.

This paper uses a generational variable to predict attitudes in six policy areas, asking the question: is there a millennial age difference that predicts policy support for social security spending, military spending, abortion, same-sex marriage, climate change, and environmental spending? Two logistic regression analyses will be conducted using ANES and GSS data from 2012. Three models, economic, social, and a combined model, will be examined using binary logistic regression analysis.

The generation or age variable is the most important factor when looking at the political attitudes of individuals in the millennial generation. The addition of both economic and social variables to the binary logistic regression analyses will control for the age variable, as well as see whether economic or social factors may have more influence on people's political attitudes in the millennial generation. Many factors may

affect the political attitudes of individuals, and for this reason these control variables are needed.

Generational explanations for political attitudes are important to study and understand as the younger generations will have years of influence on social changes, the economy, and norms in the United States. Research on generations is also important in more recent times because the millennial generation is less likely to run for an elected office than those in the older generations. Although, this may simply be a matter of age. Political scientists have a fascination with the younger generation, because the younger generation will become the dominant generation in America, influencing policy, the economy, and societal values. Questions such as, "What makes the millennial generation so unique, diverse, and progressive?" arise from some of the interesting findings on the likelihood on millennial running for office. Other questions such as, "Does the millennial generation have different political attitudes on policies than Baby Boomers and Generation X?" arise.

This thesis looks at this question using 2012 survey data from the ANES and GSS. Analyzing this data and the results will allow some of the gaps in generational research to be filled. There is a new perspective on one of the long-lasting questions on generational explanations of political attitudes.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Many researchers have looked at various aspects of the generation and party identification, together and separately. Miller's research examines the Pre-New Deal and Post-New deal generations, looking at policies that affect their opinions (1992). He finds that the policy preferences of the post-New Deal generation in the 1980s further polarized party differences between Democrats and Republicans. Miller's work is useful in understanding the policies the millennials and non-millennials support.

Generation Research

Similar to Miller (1992), Billingsley and Tucker (1987) identify five political generations in the United States based on the theory of operant conditioning. Although this research is not exactly like the research presented, this is a different perspective on what makes generations different rather than statistically testing generations. Trevor (1999) looks at the gender gap between men and women and how the partisanship gap may affect outcomes. Research by Trevor (1999) is helpful to this current research, because there can be gaps not only in generations, but between genders. Conducting research on policy support and generational gaps will add to the literature specifically to age gap research, but also to other statistical analyses that have examined demographic gaps.

Recent studies like Kroh and Selb (2009), look at the attachment of party identification from childhood. They use a panel study to determine party identification of children at an early age. Kroh and Selb (2009) show that party loyalties acquired through parental influences confirm the traditional view that party identification and political attitudes are formed in the early stages of a person's lifetime. Although an individual's

party identification may be influenced by family, friends, and associates at a young age, this research does not account for generational difference, meaning age can be predict what policy a person may support. In fact, looking at age may show that there is a shift or gap in society between generations when examining policy preferences.

Carsey and Layman (2006) argue that partisanship and issue attitudes cause changes in one other, but the pattern of influence varies systematically. Partisanship and political attitudes can relate to the idea of generations having specific viewpoints, feelings, attitudes, and beliefs on certain policy areas. It is important to look at, because there may be certain attitudes each generation has on a policy. All of the research previously conducted is helpful in understanding the difference between party identification and generation differences.

Ng et. al. (2010) study the millennial generation, academic performance, and career expectations using demographic factors. Data from a national survey of millennial undergraduates at universities was used in a multivariate analysis. From the results, millennials had realistic expectations about finding their first job out of college, by learning new skills and adapting their already learned skills to get the job complete (Ng et. al. 2010). Ng et. al's research (2010) views millennials as advocates for innovation in the new era of technology and policy.

Policy Research

Fullerton and Dixon (2010) conduct research on generational differences and policy. support, specifically examining Americans' attitudes on education, health, and Social Security. They use GSS data from 1984 to 2008, and the results show inconsistencies with hypotheses that older individuals are more likely to want

government to spend money on health and Social Security, but not education (Fullerton and Dixon 2010). Yet, Fullerton and Dixon (2010) do conclude by saying that people born prior to 1930 or reaching retirement age are more likely to have a livable amount of money from Social Security. People in this age group will not fear they do not have enough money to support themselves. Conclusions in this research suggest that the American's policy support and attitudes are still divided (Fullerton and Dixon 2010). Their research directly relates to the research at hand, as this study is looking at support and attitudes on four policy areas.

Street and Cossman (2006), like Fullerton and Dixon (2010), conduct research with the GSS to examine the preferences for increased spending on education, health and Social Security based on age and self-interest. Prior literature has focused on the elderly's support of Social Security and healthcare spending and the exclusion of other generations (Street and Crossman 2006). Street and Crossman's (2006) findings show that a larger percentage of elderly are going to favor increasing spending on social security, whereas other age groups will not, according to Street and Crossman (2006).

The previous research allows for a new generational study with different policies the generations may support. In fact, there is not much work on specific groups of individuals, such as the millennials. Many surveys by Pew and Gallup show there continues to be generational differences on many issues, such as healthcare, foreign policy, gun control, same-sex marriage and the like.

Although there is not research that can directly relate to military spending, there is research on the public's attitudes on foreign policy and conflicts. Cutler (1970) looks at the relationship between the public's foreign policy attitudes and the influence of

generational experiences, specifically examining the influence of the policy attitudes.
Generations are a factor, according to Cutler (1970), because this can cause beliefs and
attitudes to vary from each generation. His findings indicate the younger a cohort is they
are more likely to support foreign aid than military intervention.

Holsti and Rosena (1980) research the most salient foreign policy episodes people
from different generations have experienced, anywhere from World War II to Vietnam.
The dividing line for most salient foreign problems comes from event leading up to
World War II and the involvement in Southeast Asia. Holsti and Rosena find that these
most salient foreign policy episodes exist within occupations and generations (1980). The
second hypothesis can be justified, since previous research shows generational
differences when it comes to foreign policy issues between younger and older people.

Research by Jelen and Wilcox (2003) show there are generational differences in
support for legal abortion persist. Their article specifically reviews empirical research on
attitudes on legalizing abortion. Like Jelen and Wilcox (2003), Scott (1998) examines the
generational changes in both men and women's attitude on abortion in the United States
compared to other European counties. A time-series analysis was used in order to
understand the difference between men and women. She states that gender differences in
attitudes on abortion are rare, but generational differences are based on gender (Scott
1998). In the results, Scott finds that women are becoming more liberal on abortion,
whereas men are not. Generational difference combined with increases secularization are
likely factors when predicting political attitudes on abortion (Scott 1998). Scott's
research justifies the third hypothesis in this study, along with the research conducted by
Jelen and Wilcox.

Most of the research on same-sex marriage uses religion and attitudes to frame the issue and policies. Gaines and Garand (2010) look at moral and religious attitudes, along with concern for civil rights, feeling towards gays and lesbians, and gender roles to understand people's support for same-sex marriage. In the end, Gaines and Garand (2010) find that attitudes toward same-sex marriage are a function of moral and religious considerations, attitudes toward gays and lesbians, and gender roles.

Like Gaines and Garand, Walls et. al. (2014) examines the impact of religion on support of same-sex marriage among undergraduate college students in the United States. They find that college students use personal theologies and social interactions to influence the students' support for same-sex marriage (Walls et. al. 2014). As stated by Walls et. al., the personal theologies that predict same-sex marriage support can be studied further to understand the entire nuance (2014).

This thesis will add a new perspective that many researchers have discussed. In fact, this thesis combines policies, including same-sex marriage, Social Security, and abortion, which have previously been researched into one paper. Also, this thesis compares two data sources to see if there are similar results between the two data sources, making the results generalizable. In sum, this research will explore generational difference that predicts policy support with an updated version on Miller's (1992) research.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Two binary logistic regression analyses will be conducted in this research project to understand the millennial generation's support for specific policy areas. Data from the American National Elections Study and the General Social Survey from 2012 will be used to test all hypotheses. This analysis looks at two separate groups, the millennial generation and non-millennial generation. These two groups are measured by age: the millennial generation is between ages of 17 and 34, while non-millennial generation is ages 35 and above. This cutoff point was selected because other researchers have defined the millennial age as those who are born after 1980. Age is one of the independent variables used in this analysis to hopes to predict policy support. Three models, economic, social, and a combined model, will be run using binary logistic regression analysis.

The individuals that took the surveys are quite different when it comes to marital status. Most millennials have never been married, whereas the non-millennials are married. There is a distinct break between millennials and non-millennials. Consistent with the U.S. statistics, both groups are mostly Caucasian. Finally, both the millennials and the non-millennials have more people with either a GED or a little bit of college than are college graduates.

Dependent Variables

ANES and GSS 2012 respondents gave answers about several issues, and policies, but six areas were selected for this analysis: Social Security spending, military spending, abortion, same-sex marriage, environmental spending, and climate change. These six areas can be broken down into two areas. Social Security, military spending,

and environmental spending will be grouped together as these are budget and spending policy areas. Abortion, same-sex marriage, and climate change are the traditional, non-economic, controversial political issues, so these three policies are grouped together.

In order to run the binary logistic regression, the dependent variables will be recoded. Tables 1 and 3 show the measurements of the dependent variables that will be used in the binary logistic regression model to be run on SPSS.

Independent Variables

Two groups of independent variables were used in this study: economic and social. As shown in Tables 2 and 4, a list of all economic, income, education, parents' education and social, race, gender, marital status, party identification, and religion variables were used in the regression analyses.

Of the two economic variables, only the education variable was recoded. Five new categories were created, less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college or associates degree, bachelor's degree, and post-graduate degree. These were coded 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

All of variables except for party identification were turned into dummy variables. For race, Hispanic turned into a dummy variable, since the millennial generation has a larger population of Hispanics according to the demographics run for both data sets. Hispanic =1 whereas all other races = 0. Those respondents who did not answer or know their race where thrown out of the recoding of the race variable.

Gender, as seen in Tables 2 and 4, were originally coded 1 = Male and 2 = Female, but was recoded to 1 = Male and 0 = Female. To make gender a dummy variable, or what is not called Male, was coded 1 for male and 0 for female.

Since the demographic frequencies show that there is a significant difference between millennials and non-millennials when it comes to divorce and not married, these two marital statuses where made into dummy variables. For the divorce dummy variable divorce = 1 and all other marital statuses = 0, and for the not married dummy variable, not married = 1 and all other marital statuses = 0. Both the divorce and not married dummy variables were coded the same way as the Hispanic dummy variable was coded. Ages 0 through 34 were coded 1, while ages 35 and above were coded 0. The generation variable is the most important independent variable in this paper, but other independent variables were added as controls.

Hypotheses

Street and Cossman (2006), like Fullerton and Dixon (2010), conduct research with the GSS to examine the preferences for increased spending on education, health and social security based on age and self-interest. Literature focused on the elderly's support of Social Security and healthcare spending and the exclusion of other generations (Street and Crossman 2006). The findings show that a larger percentage of elderly are going to favor increasing spending on social security, whereas other age groups will not do (Street and Crossman 2006). Street and Crossman's research helps justify the first hypothesis in this paper.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to favor decreasing Social Security spending.

Although there is not research that can directly relate to military spending, there is research on the public's attitudes on foreign policy and conflicts. Cutler (1970) looks at the relationship between the public's foreign policy attitudes and the influence of

generational experiences, specifically examining the influence of the policy attitudes. Generations are a factor, according to Cutler (1970), because this can cause beliefs and attitudes to vary from each generation. His findings indicate the younger a cohort is, they are more likely to support foreign aid than military intervention.

Holsti and Rosena (1980) research the most salient foreign policy episodes people from different generations have experienced, anywhere from World War II to Vietnam. The dividing line for most salient foreign problems comes from event leading up to World War II and the involvement in Southeast Asia. Holsti and Rosena find that these most salient foreign policy episodes exist within occupations and generations (1980). The second hypothesis can be justified, since previous research shows generational differences when it comes to foreign policy issues between younger and older people. Millennials support a decrease in spending because of the 9/11 attacks. This generation has seen war their entire lives and they think policies dealing with education are more important than military policies.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to favor decreasing military spending.

Research by Jelen and Wilcox (2003) show there are generational differences in support for legal abortion persist. Their article specifically reviews empirical research on attitudes on legalizing abortion. Like Jelen and Wilcox (2003), Scott (1998) examines the generational changes in both men and women's attitude on abortion in the United States compared to other European counties. A time-series analysis was used in order to understand the difference between men and women. She states that gender differences in attitudes on abortion are rare, but generational differences are based on gender (Scott

1998). In the results, Scott finds that women are becoming more liberal on abortion, whereas men are not. Generational difference combined with increases secularization are likely factors when predicting political attitudes on abortion (Scott 1998). Scott's research justifies the third hypothesis in this study, along with the research conducted by Jelen and Wilcox.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to favor making abortion.

Most of the research on same-sex marriage uses religion and attitudes to frame the issue and policies. Gaines and Garand (2010) look at moral and religious attitudes, along with concern for civil rights, feeling towards gays and lesbians, and gender roles to understand people's support for same-sex marriage. In the end, Gaines and Garand (2010) find that attitudes toward same-sex marriage are a function of moral and religious considerations, attitudes toward gays and lesbians, and gender roles.

Like Gaines and Garand, Walls et. al. (2014) examines the impact of religion on support of same-sex marriage among undergraduate college students in the United States. They find that college students use personal theologies and social interactions to influence the students' support for same-sex marriage (Walls et. al. 2014). As stated by Walls et. al., the personal theologies that predict same-sex marriage support can be studied further to understand all the nuance (2014).

While this research shows that religion is a factor when looking at same-sex marriage, this can be directly related to age. The older a person gets the more likely they

are to attend church.[10] Usually, not born-again religious people do not support same-sex marriage.[11] Therefore, people in the older generation are less likely to support same-sex marriage, while people in the younger generation are, justifying the fourth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to favor same-sex marriage.

The research on the millennial generation and climate is lacking, as there are not research articles that verifies that the younger generation is more likely to believe or think that climate change is a problem. On the contrary, there are many survey studies that have been conducted on people's attitudes on climate change. Some of these surveys claim that the millennial generation "owns" the climate change problem. Other surveys have said that even though the millennial generation is passionate about climate change, this does not mean they are environmentalists, as some might argue.[12] Some people claim that the millennial generation have strong attitudes towards climate change, but are not acting on the feelings they have on this issue.[13] Hypotheses 5 and 6 can be justified through the implications the survey data has shown.

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[10]Nagourney, Eric. 2012. "Why Am I Back in Church?"

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/booming/04question-booming.html?_r=0 (March 6, 2015).

[11]2014. "Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage." http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/24/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (March 6, 2015).

[12]2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/10/11/355163205/millennials-well-help-the-planet-but-dont-call-us-environmentalists (March 6, 2015).

[13]2015 http://ecoaffect.org/2015/06/02/millennials-and-climate-change-closing-the-gap-between-attitudes-and-actions/ (August 30, 2015).

Hypothesis 5: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to favor

increased spending on environmental policies.

Hypothesis 6: Individuals in the millennial generation are more likely to believe

in climate change.

Table 1 and Table 3 show the original and recoded measurements of the dependent

variables from ANES 2012 and GSS 2012, while Table 2 and Table 4 show the recoded

measurements for the economic, social, and age variables from ANES 2012 and GSS

2012.

Table 1: Dependent Variable Measurements from ANES 2012					
Policy	**Recoded Measurement**		**Original Measurement**		
Social Security	1 = increase	0 = decrease	1 = increase	2 = decrease	3 = keep about the same/kept about the same
Military Spending	1= favor	0 = oppose	1 = favor	0 = oppose	3 = neither favor nor oppose
Abortion (Woman's Choice)	1 = favor	0 = oppose	1 = favor	2 = oppose	3 = neither favor nor oppose
Same-Sex Marriage	1 = yes	0 = no	1 = same-sex couples should be allowed to legally marry	2 = same-sex couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry	3 = there should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple's relationship
Climate Change	1 = yes	0 = no	1 = has probably been happening	2 = probably has not been happening	
Environmental Spending	1 = increase	0 = decrease	1 = increase	2 = decrease	3 = keep about the same/kept about the same

Table 2: Independent Variables from ANES 2012			
Economic	**Social**		**Generation Variable**
Income (by $10,000)	Race (1 = Hispanic; 0 = White, Black, and other)		Age (1 = 0-34; 0 = 35+)
Education (by grade or degree completion)	Gender (1 = male; 0 = female)		
	Marital Status Dummy 1 (1 = Divorced; 0 = Married: spouse present, Married: spouse absent, Widowed, Separated, and Never Married)	Marital Status Dummy 2 (1 = Never Married; 0 = Married: spouse present, Married: spouse absent, Widowed, Separated, and Divorced)	
	Party ID (1 = strong Democrat; 2 = not very strong Democrat; 3 = Independent Democrat; 4 = Independent; 5 = Independent Republican; 6 = not very strong Republican; 7 = strong Republican)		
	Religion (1 = Not religious; 0 = Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Undifferentiated Christian, Jewish, and Other Religion)		

Table 3: Dependent Variable Measurements from GSS 2012							
Policy	**Recoded Measurement**		**Original Measurement**				
Social Security	1 = increase	0 = decrease	1 = too little	2 = about right	3 = too much		
Military Spending	1 = increase	0 = decrease	1 = too little	2 = about right	3 = too much		
Abortion (Any Reason)	1 = yes	0 = no	1 = yes	2 = no			
Same-Sex Marriage	1 = no	0 = yes	1 = always wrong	2 = almost always wrong	3 = sometimes wrong	4 = not wrong at all	5 = other
Climate Change	1 = yes	0 = no	1 = has probably been happening	2 = probably has not been happening			
Environmental Spending	1 = increase	0 = decrease	1 = too little	2 = about right	3 = too much		

Table 4: Independent Variables from GSS 2012			
Economic	**Social**		**Generation Variable**
Income (by $10,000)	Race (1 = Hispanic; 0 = all other races)		Age (1 = 0-34; 0 = 35+)
Education (where credit was received)	Gender (1 = male; 0 = female)		
	Marital Status Dummy 1 (1 = Divorced; 0 = Married: spouse present, Married: spouse absent, Widowed, Separated, and Never Married)	Marital Status Dummy 2 (1 = Never Married; 0 = Married: spouse present, Married: spouse absent, Widowed, Separated, and Divorced)	
	Party ID (1 = strong Democrat; 2 = not very strong Democrat; 3 = Independent Democrat; 4 = Independent Republican; 5 = not very strong Republican; 6 = strong Republican; 7 = Other)		
	Religion (1 = None; 0 = Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other, Buddhism, Hinduism, Other Eastern, Islam, Orthodox Christian, Christian, Native American, and Inter-Nondenominational)		

Chapter 4: Data and Results

This section will analyze the logistic regression models run for both ANES 2012 and GSS 2012. Three models, economic, social, and a full model including both economic and social are discussed in detail. The economic model uses income, education, and age as independent variables, while the social model uses Hispanic, male, divorced, never married, party identification, and not religious as independent variables. All independent variables from the economic and social models are used in the full model to predict policy support. The six hypotheses have been divided into two categories, budgeting and spending or controversial social issues.

ANES

Budget and Spending: Social Security

Table 5 shows the results for the model predicting support for Social Security. All three independent variables, education, income and age are significant. Millennials are less likely to support an increase in social security spending. As for the social models with the both divorced and never married independent variables, they are all significant. Both social models indicate a negative relationship between millennials and support of Social Security. In other words, millennials are less likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Between the two social models, the first social model has a stronger relationship between millennials and support of social security spending than the second social model.

In the full model, all independent variables, but Hispanic, are significant in the first full model regression analysis. However, when examining the second full model, a

person who has never been married is insignificant. The strength of the relationship between being age and Social Security support are mostly the same.

Budget and Spending: Military

Table 6 shows the results of the logistic regression for military support. Like, the Social Security tables, all of the independent variables in the economic model are statistically significant. This includes the age variable, the most important variable in the analysis. The relationship between age and the support of military spending is positive, meaning that millennials are more likely to support an increase in military spending. However, in the social models, age is not a significant factor. In the first social model, gender, party identification, and not religious were all significant, whereas Hispanic, divorced, and age are not significant. Males and not religious individuals are more likely to support an increase in military spending in both of the social models, whereas Republicans are less likely to support an increase in military spending. In the second social model, the same variables, gender, party identification, and not religious, are significant like the first social model.

The full model in both cases shows that age does not have an effect on military policy support. Although the age variable is not significant in the first model, income, education, Hispanic, gender, party identification, and not religious are all significant factors. People with more income and education are more likely to support an increase of military spending, as well as Hispanics, and not religious individuals. Identifying as a Democrat makes a person less likely to support an increase in military spending, the only significant variable with an inverse relationship with the dependent variable. The second full model has the same significant variables as the first full model does. Unlike both

social models, that shows Hispanic as a non-significant factor, the Hispanic dummy variable become significant in both of the full models.

Budget and Spending: Environment

The last policy in the budget and spending group is environmental spending. From Table 7, the three independent variables, including the age variable, are all statistically significant. There is a strong positive relationship between age and environmental spending. In other words, millennials are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. The first social model has Hispanic, party identification, and age as significant factors when analyzing environmental spending. The Hispanic dummy variable has a strong positive relationship with environmental spending. Like the economic model, the relationship between age and support of an increase with environmental sending is positive and strong. The second social model has the same significant factors plus the not married dummy. In both Tables 5 and 6, the not married dummy was not significant in the second social model, but it is in Table 7. Being unmarried in relation to environmental spending is both strong and positive.

In the first full model, income, education, Hispanic, party identification, and age are all significant. The education variable is both positive and strong like the age variable. The second full model income, education, Hispanic, party identification, not religious, and age are all significant. Individuals who have more income and education are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. Also, people who identify as a Democrat are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. Through all of the models, age has remained positive, strong, and significant, until the second full model where the strength drops a bit. Millennials, ages 34 and younger, are more likely to

support an increase in environmental spending. Like age, the Hispanic dummy variable through the social and full models has stayed strong, positive, and significant when analyzing environmental spending policy. Hispanics are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending than all other races combined.

Traditional Controversies: Abortion

Economic variables, income and education, are the two variables that are significant in Table 8. This means if individuals have a higher income and more education, they are more likely to support abortion when it is a woman's choice. Both variables are strong and positive; however, education is a little stronger than income in the economic model. In the first social model, Hispanic, divorced party identification, and not religious are all significant. Both divorced and not religious individuals are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. Individuals who identify as Republican and Hispanic are less likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. The second social model shows that the same factors are significant, only not married is replaced by divorced. From the first social model to the second social model, the marital status dummies change in strength—not married is stronger than divorced, and the second strongest variable in the second social model right behind not religious, that again, is above 2. Individuals who have never been married nor are non-religious are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice, whereas individuals who identify as Republicans and are Hispanic, they are less likely to support abortion as a woman's choice.

Age has been an insignificant factor in both the economic or social models, and age remains insignificant through the two full models as shown in Table 8. All variables

except divorced and age are significant in the first full model. Individuals with more

income and education are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. Females

are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice, whereas Hispanics and those

who identify themselves as Republicans are less likely to support abortion as a woman's

choice. Like the economic model, income and education have strong, positive

relationships with abortion as a woman's choice, and again, education is a bit stronger

than income. This means that individuals with more income and education are more

likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. Divorced was a significant variable in the

social model, but it becomes insignificant in the full model. The second full model shows

that all, but age are significant. Never married is a strong significant factor in the second

social model, and never married has remained strong and positive in the full model, but it

has become a bit strong from the social to the full model. People who have never been

married before are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice.

Traditional Controversies: Same-Sex Marriage

Table 9 shows the results of the logistic regression analyses run for same-sex

marriage. Education and age are significant factors in the economic model, while income

is not. Individuals with more education are more likely to support same-sex marriage.

Age has a positive relationship with the same-sex marriage dependent variable.

Millennials are more likely to support same-sex marriage than non-millennials. In the

first social model, all variables besides Hispanic and divorced are significant. Again, age

has a positive relationship with same-sex marriage support, meaning millennials are more

likely to support same-sex marriage than non-millennials. Women are more likely to

support same-sex marriage, as well as individuals who are not religious and those who

identify as Democrats. All variables, but Hispanic, are significant in the second social model. Not religious, age, and never married are the three strongest independent variables. Again, women, not religious, and those who identify as Democrats are all more likely to support same-sex marriage. Finally, individuals who have never been married are more likely to support same-sex marriage seen in Table 9.

Both of the full models show that all independent variables except for Hispanic and divorced are significant. Millennials are more likely to support same-sex marriage than non-millennials. Individuals that are not religious are more likely to support same sex marriage, and so are women, and Democrats. People who have more income and education are more likely to support same-sex marriage.

Traditional Controversies: Climate Change

In the economic model, education is the only significant variable in the equation. Two variables in the first social model are significant, Hispanic and party identification. The Hispanic dummy variable is strong and positive, whereas the party identification variable is negative and relatively strong. The second social model has the same significant favors and relative strength.

In the first full model, income, education, Hispanic, divorced, and party identification are all significant. Divorced is about as strong as the Hispanic variable, and both of these variables are positive. In the second full model, the same variables are significant. Hispanic is the strongest variable then education and income follow close behind.

Now the GSS data results for the models predicting support for Social Security, military, environment, abortion and same-sex marriage will be discussed.

<u>GSS</u>

Budget and Spending: Social Security

Table 11 shows the logistic regression models run for Social Security spending. In the economic model, education is the only significant variable. Education is a relatively strong factor, and it is also negative. This means the less education a person has, they are to more likely to support an increase in social security. Age, the most important variable in this research, is not significant, and it is not significant in any of the models.

In the first social model, gender, and party identification are the only significant variables. Both of the significant variables, gender and party identification, have negative relationships with the dependent variable. Republicans and women are more likely to support Social Security than Democrats or men. In the second social model, more variables are significant than in the first social model. All independent variables except Hispanic and age are significant. People who have never married are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Republicans are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Women are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Finally, people who are religious, are more likely to support Social Security spending than those who are not religious.

The first full model shows three variables as significant—education, gender, and party identification. All three variables have an inverse relationship with support of Social Security. People with more education are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Women and Republicans are both more likely to support an

increase in Social Security spending rather than mean and Democrats. In the second full model, half of the independent variables, including education, gender, never married, and party identification are significant. Like the first full model, people with less education are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Again, women and Republicans are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. Also, those who have never married are more likely to support an increase in Social Security spending. With the economic model, both party identification and not religious are significant factors, yet this is not the same outcome when looking at the second full model, as party identification is the only significant factor. Never married is the only variable that is directly effects support of Social Security, while education, gender, and party identification are all inversely related.

Budget and Spending: Military

In the economic model, education is the only significant variable. Education has a relatively strong effect on military spending. This variable is also inversely related to the dependent variable, meaning people with less education are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Of the independent variables in the first social model, gender, party identification, and not religious are significant. Party identification is the only significant factor that has a direct relation to military spending. Democrats are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Gender follows party identification with relative strength to the dependent variable. Women are more likely to support an increase in military spending. The second social model shows gender, never married, party identification, and not religious as significant factors.. Gender, never married, and not religious are all inversely related to military spending, whereas party identification is

directly related. This means that women, people who are married, and people who are religious are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Democrats are more likely to support an increase in military spending.

Both of the full models are similar in nature. The first model has half of the independent variables as significant—education, gender, party identification, and not religious. Education has an inverse effect on military spending, along with gender, and not religious. This means that people with less education, women, and people who are religious are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Party identification is the only variable with a direct relationship with the dependent variable, meaning Democrats are more likely to support an increase in military spending. The second full model shows education, gender, never married, party identification, and not religious as significant. People with less education are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Women and Democrats are also more likely to support an increase in military spending, People who have been married and religious people are more likely to support an increase in military spending. Through every model, party identification has been the only significant factor that has a direct relationship with the dependent variable.

Budget and Spending: Environment

In the third and final budgetary policy, Table 13 shows the results. All three factors, income, education and age, are significant in the economic model. The education variable shows that people with more education are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. Income is the only variable that has an inverse relationship with the dependent variable, which shows that people with a lower income are more likely to

support an increase in environmental spending. Finally, millennials are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending.

In the first social model, party identification, not religious, and age are significant. Not religious people are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. The second social model shows never married, party identification, and not religious as significant. With the addition of the never married dummy and elimination of the divorced dummy, age is insignificant in the second social model. Not religious is still the strongest factor in the equation, with party identification following close behind. Of the significant factors, never married and not religious are directly related to environmental spending, while party identification is the only variable that is inversely related. Those individuals who are neither married nor religious are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending.

Education, party identification, not religious, and age are significant in the first full model. People with more education are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. Individuals who are not religious are also more likely to support more money spent on environmental policies. Millennials are more likely to support an increase in environmental spending. Party identification is the only factor of the significant variables that has an inverse relationship with the dependent variable. The second full model shows education, never married and party identification as significant. People with more education and people who are not married are more likely to support in increase in environmental spending. Not religious could be said to be marginally significant with a significance value of .07. All three significant factors have relatively strong effects on environmental spending. Never married has a stronger effect than

education, while education has a stronger effect than party identification. Like the second social model, age is insignificant when the never married dummy is added and divorced dummy is subtracted from the model.

Traditional Controversies: Abortion

In the economic model, education is the only significant factor. The more education a person has, the more likely they are to support abortion as a woman's choice. The first social model shows Hispanic, party identification, and not religious as significant. Of the three factors, not religious is the only factor that had a direct relation to abortion. Hispanic, party identification, not religious, and age are all significant in the second social model. Hispanic, party identification, and age all have an inverse relationship with the dependent variable, leaving not religious as the only factor that has a direct relationship to abortion. Because Hispanic, party identification and age have an inverse relationship with the dependent variables, this means that being Hispanic, Republican, and a millennials makes a person less likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. A person who is not religious is more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice.

In the first full model, income, education, party identification, and not religious are all significant variables. Of the significant factors, party identification is the only variable that has an inverse relation to abortion. This means that Democrats are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice, whereas Republicans are less likely to support abortion as woman's choice. The remaining significant factors have a direct relationship to the dependent variable. The more income and education a person has, the more likely they are to support abortion as a woman's choice. Also, not religious people

are also more likely to support abortion a woman's choice. Income, education, never married, party identification, not religious, and age are significant in the second full model as shown in Table 14. Like the social models, age is significant in the second full model, but not the first. Age and party identification have an inverse relation to the dependent variable, while income, education, never married, and not religious have a direct relation. Again, people who identify as Democrats are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. People who make more money and education are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice. Lastly, individuals who are not religious and never married are more likely to support abortion as a woman's choice.

Traditional Controversies: Same-Sex Marriage

The economic model shows education and age as significant factors. Individuals with more education are more likely to support same-sex marriage. Millennials are also more likely to support same-sex marriage. Both factors are directly related to support of same-sex marriage. In the first social model, gender, party identification, not religious, and age are significant variables. Gender and party identification have an inverse relationship with same-sex marriage, whereas not religious and age have a direct relationship.

All independent variables, except Hispanic, are significant in the first full model. Gender, and party identification are inversely related to the dependent variable, while the remaining significant variables are directly related. Women and Democrats are more likely to support same-sex marriage. In the second full model, all independent variables except Hispanic and never married are significant. Of the significant variables, gender

and party identification are the two factors inversely related to same-sex marriage. Again, women and Democrats are more likely to support same-sex marriage.

Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	-.07 (.96)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	-.03 (.97)*	.00*	-.03 (.97)*	.00*
Education	-.34 (.71)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	-.35 (.71)*	.00*	-.35 (.71)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	.20 (1.21)*	.01*	.20 (1.22)*	.01*	.04 (1.04)	.58	.04 (1.05)	.58
Male	--	--	-.28 (.77)*	.00*	-.29 (.75)*	.00*	-.22 (.80)*	.00*	-.22 (.80)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	.31 (1.36)*	.00*	--	--	.20 (1.23)*	.01*	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.17 (1.19)*	.02*	--	--	.02 (1.02)	.83
Party ID	--	--	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.18 (.83)	.00*	-.18 (.83)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	-.19 (.83)*	.00*	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.24 (.79)*	.00*	-.24 (.79)*	.00*
Age										
Generation	-.32 (.73)*	.00*	-.15 (.87)*	.03*	-.27 (.77)*	.00*	-.26 (.77)*	.00*	-.30 (.74)*	.00*
Constant	1.21 (3.34)	.00	.85 (2.33)	.00	.88 (2.42)	.00	1.86 (6.43)	.00	1.91 (6.77)	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .09 N = 5551		Pseudo R^2 = .07 N = 5675		Pseudo R^2 = .07 N = 5675		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5463		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5463	

Table 5: Logistic Regression of Support for Social Security Spending in Millennials Using ANES 2012

Table 6: Logistic Regression of Support for Military Spending in Millennials Using ANES 2012										
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	.01 (1.01)*	.01*	--	--	--	--	.02 (1.02)*	.00*	.02 (1.02)*	.00*
Education	.35 (1.42)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.40 (1.49)*	.00*	.40 (1.49)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	.09 (1.10)	.24	.10 (1.10)	.23	.22 (1.25)*	.01*	.23 (1.26)*	.01*
Male	--	--	.51 (1.66)*	.00*	.51 (1.67)*	.00*	.47 (1.60)*	.00*	.46 (1.59)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	-.13 (.88)	.12	--	--	-.09 (.91)	.31	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.05 (1.05)	.51	--	--	.15 (1.17)	.06
Party ID	--	--	-.27 (.77)*	.00*	-.26 (.77)*	.00*	-.30 (.74)*	.00*	-.29 (.75)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	.41 (1.50)*	.00*	.40 (1.49)*	.00	.43 (1.54)*	.00*	.07 (1.07)	.00*
Age										
Generation	.17 (1.19)*	.01*	.04 (1.04)	.60	.04 (1.04)	.67	.12 (1.13)	.11	.07 (1.07)	.41
Constant	-1.30 (.27)	.00	-.02 (.98)	.78	-.06 (.94)	.38	-.86 (.42)	.00	-.93 (.39)	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .04 N = 5210		Pseudo R^2 = .11 N = 5307		Pseudo R^2 = .11 N = 5307		Pseudo R^2 = .16 N = 5128		Pseudo R^2 = .16 N = 5128	

Table 7: Logistic Regression of Support for Environmental Spending in Millennials Using ANES 2012

Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Si.	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	-.03 (.97)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	-.01 (.99)*	.00*	-.01 (.99)*	.01*
Education	.07 (1.07)*	.06	--	--	--	--	.11 (1.11)*	.00*	.10 (1.11)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	.35 (1.42)*	.00*	.36 (1.44)*	.00*	.35 (1.41)*	.00*	.36 (1.43)*	.00*
Male	--	--	-.05 (.95)	.43	-.06 (.95)	.33	-.04 (.97)	.55	-.05 (.96)	.43
Divorced	--	--	-.01 (.99)	.88	--	--	-.03 (.97)	.75	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.25 (1.28)*	.00*	--	--	.22 (1.24)*	.01*
Party ID	--	--	-.37 (.69)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	.11 (1.12)	.11	.09 (1.09)	.20	.10 (1.11)	.15	.09 (1.09)	.22
Age										
Generation	.35 (1.43)*	.00*	.36 (1.43)*	.00*	.25 (1.28)*	.00*	.35 (1.42)*	.00*	.26 (1.30)*	.00*
Constant	-.12 (.89)	.07	.83 (2.30)	.00	.78 (2.18)	.00	.80 (2.23)	.00	.73 (2.08)	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .02 N = 5582		Pseudo R^2 = .18 N = 5706		Pseudo R^2 = .18 N = 5706		Pseudo R^2 = .18 N = 5493		Pseudo R^2 = .18 N = 5493	

Table 8: Logistic Regression of Support for Abortion in Millennials Using ANES 2012										
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Si.	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	.02 (1.02)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.03 (1.03)*	.00*	.04 (1.04)*	.00*
Education	.21 (1.24)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.24 (1.27)*	.00*	.23 (1.26)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.36 (.69)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*	-.24 (.79)*	.01*	-.21 (.81)*	.01*
Male	--	--	-.09 (.92)	.14 .63	-.10 (.91)	.10	-.17 (.85)*	.01*	-.19 (.82)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	.04 (1.04)*	.00*	--	--	.15 (1.16)	.08	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.29 (1.34)*	.00*	--	--	.45 (1.56)*	.00*
Party ID	--	--	-.26 (.78)*	.00*	-.25 (.78)*	.00*	-.29 (.75)*	.00*	-.28 (.76)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	1.00 (2.71)*	.00*	.98 (2.66)*	.00*	1.04 (2.83)*	.00*	1.02 (2.76)*	.00*
Age										
Generation	.13 (1.13)	.07	.01 (1.01)	.92	-.14 (.87)	.09	.09 (1.09)	.25	-.14 (.87)	.10
Constant	-.96 (.38)	.00	.39 (1.48)	.00	.34 (1.41)	.00	-.37 (.69)	.00	-.46 (.63)*	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .03 N = 5188		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5284		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5284		Pseudo R^2 = .17 N = 5107		Pseudo R^2 = .18 N = 5107	

Table 9: Logistic Regression of Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Millennials Using ANES 2012										
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	-.01 (1.00)	.16	--	--	--	--	.01 (1.01)*	.02*	.01 (1.01)*	.00*
Education	.19 (1.20)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.23 (1.26)*	.00*	.23 (1.25)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.02 (.98)	.80	-.00 (1.00)	.96	.04 (1.04)	.65	.06 (1.07)	.44
Male	--	--	-.27 (.77)*	.00*	-.28 (.76)*	.00*	-.29 (.75)*	.00*	-.31 (.73)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	-.01 (.99)	.91	--	--	.06 (1.07)	.46	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.35 (1.41)*	.00*	--	--	.44 (1.54)*	.00*
Party ID	--	--	-.30 (.74)*	.00*	-.30 (.75)*	.00*	-.32 (.73)*	.00*	-.31 (.73)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	1.22 (3.39)*	.00*	1.20 (3.31)*	.00*	1.24 (3.44)*	.00*	1.21 (3.36)*	.00*
Age										
Generation	.75 (2.11)*	.00*	.69 (1.99)*	.00*	.53 (1.70)*	.00*	.75 (2.12)*	.00*	.55 (1.74)*	.00*
Constant	-.82 (.44)	.00	.32 (1.38)	.00	.25 (1.28)	.00	-.18 (.83)	.05	-.30 (.74)	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .04 N = 5545		Pseudo R^2 = .21 N = 5668		Pseudo R^2 = .21 N = 5668		Pseudo R^2 = .22 N = 5459		Pseudo R^2 = .23 N = 5459	

Table 10: Logistic Regression of Support for Climate Change in Millennials Using ANES 2012

Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	-.01 (.99)	.10	--	--	--	--	.01 (1.01)*	.04*	.01 (1.01)*	.04*
Education	.11 (1.12)*	.01*	--	--	--	--	.14 (1.15)*	.00*	.14 (1.15)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	.25 (1.28)*	.02*	.25 (1.28)*	.02*	.31 (1.37)*	.01*	.32 (1.38)*	.00*
Male	--	--	-.07 (.93)	.34	-.08 (.93)	.29	-.10 (.91)	.19	-.11 (.90)	.14
Divorced	--	--	.21 (1.23)	.06	--	--	.25 (1.28)*	.03*	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.08 (1.08)	.42	--	--	.17 (1.18)	.11
Party ID	--	--	-.35 (.70)*	.00*	-.35 (.70)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*	-.36 (.70)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	-.02 (.98)	.85	-.20 (.98)	.83	-.03 (.97)	.77	-.04 (.96)	.69
Age										
Generation	-.00 (1.00)	.97	-.07 (.93)	.42	-.13 (.88)	.18	-.01 (.91)	.92	-.11 (.89)	.26
Constant	1.40 (4.05)	.00	1.88 (17.81)	.00	2.91 (18.37)	.00	2.54 (12.67)	.00	2.56 (12.94)	.00
N = 5914	Pseudo R^2 = .01 N = 5487		Pseudo R^2 = .13 N = 5612		Pseudo R^2 = .13 N = 5612		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5405		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 5405	

Table 11: Logistic Regression of Support for Social Security Spending in Millennials Using GSS 2012									
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	.01 (1.01)	.75	--	--	--	--	.02 (1.02)	.44	.03 (1.03)	.28
Education	-.28 (.75)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	-.30 (.74)*	.00*	-.03 (.74)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.07 (.93)	.60	-.08 (.92)	.56	-.26 (.75)	.06	-.03 (.74)	.05
Male	--	--	-.36 (.70)*	.00*	-.37 (.70)*	.00*	-.37 (.70)*	.00*	-.38 (.68)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	.22 (1.24)	.11	--	--	.11 (1.11)	.46	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.29 (1.33)*	.02*	--	--	.28 (1.32)*	.04*
Party ID	--	--	-.10 (.90)*	.00*	-.10 (.91)*	.00*	-.10 (.91)*	.00*	-.09 (.91)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	-.21 (.81)	.09	-.24 (.78)*	.05*	-.18 (.83)	.16	-.22 (.81)	.10
Age										
Generation	-.05 (.95)	.67	.01 (1.01)	.90	-.15 (.86)	.23	.05 (1.05)	.68	-.08 (.92)	.54
Constant	1.04 (2.84)	.00	.70 (2.01)	.00	.70 (2.02)	.00	1.44 (4.24)	.00	1.34 (3.83)	.00
N = 1974	Pseudo R^2 = .04 N = 1681		Pseudo R^2 = .03 N = 1852		Pseudo R^2 = .03 N = 1852		Pseudo R^2 = .07 N = 1667		Pseudo R^2 = .07 N = 1667	

Table 12: Logistic Regression of Support for Military Spending in Millennials Using GSS 2012										
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	-.02 (.98)	.43	--	--	--	--	-.012 (.98)	.60	-.03 (.97)	.30
Education	-.21 (.81)*	.00*			--	--	-.23 (.80)*	.00*	-.23 (.80)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.37 (.70)	.16	-.36 (.70)	.16	-.34 (.71)	.22	-.32 (.73)	.25
Male	--	--	-.39 (.68)*	.02*	-.35 (.70)*	.03*	-.42 (.66)*	.02*	-.37 (.69)*	.04*
Divorced	--	--	-.17 (.84)	.44	--	--	-.15 (.86)	.52	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	-.52 (.60)*	.02*	--	--	-.66 (.52)*	.01*
Party ID	--	--	.25 (1.29)*	.00*	.24 (1.27)*	.00*	.24 (1.27)*	.00*	.23 (1.26)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	-.74 (.48)*	.00*	-.67 (.51)*	.00*	-.70 (.50)*	.00*	-.62 (.54)*	.01*
Age										
Generation	-.32 (.73)	.07	-.17 (.84)	.33	.08 (1.08)	.70	-.18 (.84)	.36	.11 (1.12)	.60
Constant	-.15 (.86)	.00	-1.43 (.24)	.00	-1.40 (.25)	.00	-.57 (.57)	.13	-.32 (.73)	.41
N = 1974	Pseudo R^2 = .03 N = 858		Pseudo R^2 = .11 N = 952		Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 952		Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 851		Pseudo R^2 = .13 N = 851	

Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Table 13: Logistic Regression of Support for Environmental Spending in Millennials Using GSS 2012										
Income	-.08 (.92)*	.04*	--	--	--	--	-.07 (.94)	.09	-.04 (.96)	.31
Education	.21 (1.23)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.21 (1.23)*	.00*	.21 (1.23)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.18 (.84)	.38	-.18 (.83)	.37	-.19 (.83)	.41	-.20 (.82)	.38
Male	--	--	-.16 (.85)	.24	-.12 (.84)	.21	-.08 (.92)	.57	-.10 (.91)	.52
Divorced	--	--	-.06 (.94)	.744	--	--	-.11 (.90)	.596	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.60 (1.83)*	.00*	--	--	.63 (1.87)*	.00*
Party ID	--	--	-.22 (.81)*	.00*	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.23 (.80)*	.00*	-.21 (.81)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	.45 (1.58)*	.02*	.38 (1.46)*	.04*	.44 (1.56)*	.03*	.37 (1.45)	.07
Age										
Generation	.37 (1.45)*	.03*	.36 (1.44)*	.03*	.11 (1.12)	.55	.37 (1.45)*	.04*	.14 (1.15)	.47
Constant	.44 (1.55)	.30	.76 (2.14)	.00	.65 (1.91)	.00	.92 (2.52)	.04	.53 (1.69)	.25
N = 1974	Pseudo R^2 = .03 N = 828		Pseudo R^2 = .08 N = 910		Pseudo R^2 = .10 N = 910		Pseudo R^2 = .11 N = 820		Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 820	

Table 14: Logistic Regression of Support for Abortion in Millennials Using GSS 2012										
Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	.03 (1.03)	.29	--	--	--	--	.06 (1.06)*	.05*	.07 (1.07)*	.03*
Education	.37 (1.45)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.36 (1.44)*	.00*	.36 (1.43)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.49 (.61)*	.01*	-.50 (.61)*	.01*	-.27 (.77)	.20	-.28 (.75)	.18
Male	--	--	-.07 (.93)	.57	-.08 (.93)	.53	-.12 (.89)	.38	-.13 (.88)	.32
Divorced	--	--	.20 (1.22)	.24	--	--	.34 (1.40)	.06	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	.24 (1.28)	.13	--	--	.38 (1.46)*	.033*
Party ID	--	--	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.20 (.82)*	.00*	-.21 (.81)*	.00*	-.20 (.82)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	1.13 (3.10)*	.00*	1.10 (3.01)*	.00*	1.26 (3.54)*	.00*	1.22 (3.39)*	.00*
Age										
Generation	-.07 (.94)	.63	-.21 (.81)	.14	-.36 (.70)*	.03*	-.18 (.84)	.27	-.40 (.67)*	.02*
Constant	-1.59 (.21)	.00	.24 (1.27)	.05	.24 (1.27)	.05	-1.49 (.23)	.00	-1.53 (.22)	.00
N = 1974	Pseudo R^2 = .08 N = 1106		Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 1230		Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 1230		Pseudo R^2 = .20 N = 1097		Pseudo R^2 = .20 N = 1097	

Table 15: Logistic Regression of Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Millennials Using GSS 2012

Economic	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig	B (exponential values of B)	Sig
Income	.03 (1.03)	.29	--	--	--	--	.07 (1.07)*	.03*	.06 (1.07)*	.04*
Education	.43 (1.54)*	.00*	--	--	--	--	.43 (1.53)*	.00*	.42 (1.52)*	.00*
Social										
Hispanic	--	--	-.21 (.81)	.25	-.23 (.80)	.21	.05 (1.05)	.82	.03 (1.03)	.89
Male	--	--	-.50 (.61)*	.00*	-.50 (.61)*	.00*	-.60 (.55)*	.00*	-.60 (.55)*	.00*
Divorced	--	--	.29 (1.33)	.09	--	--	.42 (1.53)*	.02*	--	--
Never Married	--	--	--	--	-.05 (.95)	.74	--	--	-.13 (.1.04)	.84
Party ID	--	--	-.13 (.88)*	.00*	-.13 (.88)*	.00*	-.14 (.87)*	.00*	-.13 (.88)*	.00*
Not Religious	--	--	1.33 (3.78)*	.00*	1.33 (3.79)*	.00*	1.39 (4.01)*	.00*	1.36 (3.96)*	.00*
Age										
Generation	.73 (2.08)*	.00*	.66 (1.92)*	.00*	.64 (1.89)*	.00*	.69 (1.99)*	.00*	.60 (1.81)*	.00*
Constant	-1.95 (.14)	.00	-.07 (.60)	.60	.00 (1.00)	.99	-2.02 (.13)	.00	-1.86 (.16)	.00
N = 1974	Pseudo R^2 = .12 N = 1098		Pseudo R^2 = .15 N = 1222		Pseudo R^2 = .14 N = 1222		Pseudo R^2 = .23 N = 1089		Pseudo R^2 = .22 N = 1089	

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

This section will discuss the results from chapter four, confirming or denying if results have evidence to support the six hypotheses. From the tables in chapter four, half of the hypotheses, one, four, and five, show there is there a generational difference that predicts policy support, while hypotheses two, three, and six show little to no evidence. This chapter also discusses the application of the results to real life experiences. Lastly, this section covers possible future areas of research.

There are a few findings from the results that are important. First, the results between ANES and GSS did not match as closely as one would have thought, since both data sources are the most widely used for research in social sciences. If researchers use either ANES of GSS data, they should be aware that results might not match. Conflicting results between the data set could be from wording of the questions or the samples. Second, the GSS results for abortion, found in Table 14, show that millennials are less likely to support abortions than all other generations. As previously stated, this could be because of the difference of wording in the questions. The ANES asks the respondents whether they support abortion as a woman's choice, whereas the GSS asks respondents if they support abortion if a woman wants one for any reason. Finally, the not religious dummy variable in both the abortion and same-sex marriage is always significant, even with exponential B values above two and three in some instances. These results show that there are cleavages in the United States based on religion.

Social Security Spending

The first hypothesis for both the ANES and GSS data presented in Table 5 and Table 11 has conflicting results. In Table 5, there is strong evidence for hypothesis 1, as the age variable has an inverse relationship to the dependent variable. The significant

variables, Hispanic, never married, and not religious reflect the demographics of the sample. Because there are more millennials in the sample that are Hispanic, never married, and not religious the significant variables make sense. On the contrary, Table 11 shows no evidence that millennials are more likely to support a decrease in Social Security spending.

With the conflicting outcome between the ANES and GSS data, this can support the conflicting research and survey data. Retired individuals typically live off of their social security income only, making it hard to make ends meet with low finances.[14] Those between the ages of 18 to 60 make an average of $48,430 a year compared to those between the ages of 65 to 79, earning $35,690 and those 80 and older, earning $23,370.[15] The older generation would like the government to spend more on Social Security, so they do not have to worry about paying bills.[16] On the other hand, the younger generation is not concerned about increasing social security spending, as they are all very young, far from retirement age.[17] The results from ANES align with research conducted by scholars, previously, such as Street and Crossman (2006) and Fullerton and Dixon (2010).

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[14]2012. http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-top-ten-facts-about-social-security?fa=view&id=3261 (March 6, 2015).

[15]Gould, Elise and Cooper David. 2013. http://www.epi.org/publication/economic-security-elderly-americans-risk/ (March 6, 2015).

[16]Reznik, Gayle L. Dave Shoffner, and David A. Weaver. http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n4/v66n4p37.html (March 6, 2015).

[17]Gould, Elise and Cooper David. 2013. http://www.epi.org/publication/economic-security-elderly-americans-risk/ (March 6, 2015).

Military Spending

Unlike the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis, stating that millennials are more likely to support a decrease in military spending, from both ANES and GSS data show similar results. There is no evidence to support the second hypothesis as shown in Table 6 and Table 12. All of the significant factors in Table 6 are the same in Table 12. Although, never married is significant in the GSS interpretation of support of military spending, unlike the ANES table.

The conflictual data on military spending could be the reason there is no supporting evidence of the second hypothesis. Some survey research does show there is growing support for less spending in America overall and specific to national defense.[18] In fact, there is stronger support from the younger generation to spend money on domestic needs rather than foreign needs.[19] This data can assume that the younger generation does not want to spend money on foreign defense. In 2012, the public supported a large defense cut overall, which can deny the hypothesis at hand.[20] Yet, some polls show that America remains divided on the military spending issue.[21]

Literature on millennials and their approval of military spending is not quite clear. Further research on the public's attitudes on military spending and foreign policy should

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[18]2011. http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/section-3-the-deficit-and-government-spending/ (March 6, 2015).

[19]Ibid.

[20]Smith, R. 2012. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/05/10/8856/public-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts (March 6, 2015).

[21]Newport, Frank. 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/167648/americans-remain-divided-military-spending.aspx (March 6, 2015).

be conducted to receive clearer results for generational differences. More specifically, this research needs to look at why millennial support an increase or decrease in military spending. Future research needs to focus on the differences between humanitarian missions, drone strikes, and the like. In other words, new research conducted should look at major military actions the U.S. has been or continues to be involved. One question that should be answered in future research: do millennials support an increase in military spending when the U.S. is involved in more humanitarian actions than air strikes and boots on the ground? Further research on the public's attitudes on military spending and foreign policy should be conducted to receive clearer results for generational differences.

Abortion Controversy

The third hypothesis has a narrowing of the generational differences with support of abortion, unlike the second hypothesis with conflicting data and analyses. Both of the logistic regression models show no relationship to age. Gallup "shows that generational differences in support for broadly legal abortion have diminished over the past decade."[22] The survey data can back up the non-significant logistic regression analysis outcome in in Table 8 and Table 14. However, other survey, interest group, and organizational data show that younger individuals are more likely to support abortions when women are further along in their pregnancies.[23] This data, along with research from the Advocates for Youth website, show that millennials are more likely to support abortion, as these

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[22]Saad, Lydia. 2010.http://www.gallup.com/poll/126581/generational-differences-abortion-narrow.aspx (March 6, 2015).

[23]New, Michael. 2013. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352597/women-and-young-adults-more-likely-support-20-week-abortion-ban-michael-new (March 6, 2015).

individuals are committed to the availability of abortions for young people.[24] Because

surveys do find that there is narrowing of generational differences with support to

abortion, one can conclude that abortion policy is not as salient to each generation as it

once was, not aligning with Jelen and Wilcox's research (2003).

However, the data from this paper could mean that the older generation is slower

in adopting new attitudes than the younger generation is. The questions from both the

ANES and GSS are slightly different. The ANES asks the respondents whether they

support abortion as a woman's choice, whereas the GSS asks respondents if they support

abortion if a woman wants one for any reason.. Because of the different wording between

the ANES and GSS questions on abortion, there is a difference in the logistic regression

results. Future research should focus more on advocacy and interest groups, as well as

attitudes on the availability of abortions.

Same-Sex Marriage Controversy

Research shows that millennials reached an all-time high for same-sex marriage

support in 2013.[25] This alone is reason enough support for hypothesis four, indicating that

millennials are more likely to support same-sex marriage. Table 9 and Table 15 show

significant evidence of the hypothesis tested. Older individuals are more likely to support

the traditional marriage, as this comes from a religious background, as seen in the

methodology section of this paper. However, as time goes on, more and more people

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[24]2014. http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/publications/publications-a-z/2296-abortion-and-young-people-in-the-united-states (March 6, 2015).

[25]Kingkade, Tyler. 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/millennial-support-gay-marriage_n_2924993.html (March 6, 2015).

from all age groups seem to support same-sex marriage more times than not, because same-sex marriage is not a politically decisive issue anymore.[26] In fact, same-sex marriage is an evolving issue that will most likely gain supports from all generations.[27] More research on generations, same-sex marriage, and religion should be conducted in order to understand the dynamics and relationship combining age, religion, and support for same-sex marriage.

Environmental Spending and Climate Change Controversy

Results in Table 7 and Table 13 show evidence to support hypothesis five. However, Table 10 does not have evidence to support the sixth hypothesis. The research on the millennial generation and climate is lacking, as there are not research articles that verifies that the younger generation is more likely to believe or think that climate change is a problem. Because there is conflicting literature, there are conflicting results. On the contrary, surveys show that millennials are passionate about climate change. This does not mean millennials are environmentalists, as some might argue.[28] Some people claim that the millennial generation have strong attitudes towards climate change, but are not acting on the feelings they have on this issue.[29] More research on both support of environmental spending and climate change should be conducted.

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[26]Basu, Yanya. 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/why-more-americans-accept-gay-marriage-than-ever/386707/ (March 6, 2015).

[27]Ibid.

[28] 2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/10/11/355163205/millennials-well-help-the-planet-but-dont-call-us-environmentalists (August 30, 2015).

[29] 2015. http://ecoaffect.org/2015/06/02/millennials-and-climate-change-closing-the-gap-between-attitudes-and-actions/ (August 30, 2015).

Conclusion

From the results of this research paper, there is a confirmation that some policies are more controversial than others. The results also show that some policies that were once salient to the public are not as salient to generations. Perhaps there are other factors that should be included and controlled for in future analyses.

Other researchers could look at other policy areas like legalization of marijuana, the Affordable Healthcare Act, immigration, among others. The same question: is there a generational difference that predicts policy support? Future research could also look at both ANES and GSS data but for a length of time rather than one year. Looking over time will allow researchers to better understand the generational and life cycle theories.

Human generations are an important social phenomena to study in political behavior. Researchers have focused on age as a variable to predict policy support, but it has not been the primary variable in analyses. This paper looked into the millennial generation and policy support for four policies included social security spending, military spending, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Two of the four hypotheses about social security and same-sex marriage were confirmed through the binary logistic regression analysis. Researchers should look at more policy areas by using other data sources to confirm or reject that age is an important factor when trying to explain policy support. Age may just be a number, but it is an essential part of every person, and allows for researchers to understand political beliefs, attitudes, and support.

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