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Closing The Door: A Roll Call Analysis of Immigration Voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses

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Closing The Door: A Roll Call Analysis of Immigration

Voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses
(TITLE)

BY

Murray Stewart Leith

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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To Stewart Leith

My Father

Wish you could have stuck around to see this Dad.

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To acknowledge everyone who has helped me reach this goal in my life would be a task as difficult, and as long, as this work itself. To all of those who have - I now say thank you.

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Murray Stewart Leith

ABSTRACT

The research focus of this study is the voting behavior of the elected members of the United States House of Representatives on the issue of national immigration. This work specifically focuses on selected immigration roll call votes taken during the 99th and 104th Congresses. An examination of the voting behavior of the 435 elected representatives from each year will be examined by considering eight hypotheses that question the immigration voting behavior of various sub groups within congress.

During the 1980s and 1990s Congress took several major legislative actions in regards to the issue of national immigration. It was hypothesized that not only the tone, but the voting manner of the United States House of Representatives, has become more restrictive on immigration issues during that period. In examining the results of the hypothesis a clear distinction between the voting behavior of the House in 1986, and the voting behavior of the House in 1996 became apparent. Also, the Republican party has clearly become more supportive of greater immigration controls, whereas their Democrat counterparts have remained constant in their support for less restrictive immigration policies. In a final analysis of the two Houses a pattern of polarization in immigration voting was evident, with the majority of

movement being towards the more restrictive end of the scale.

In conclusion it was found that support for more restrictive immigration policies has grown between the 99th Congress and the 104th Congress, and that this support has not been confined solely to the Republican party. It was also found that immigration has become a more divisive issue, both within the two parties and within the House overall. A more conservative viewpoint on immigration is now the norm in the United States House of Representatives

DEDICATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1.	Immigration - Back to the Fore	1
2.	Development of Roll Call Analysis and Vote Studies	14
3.	Methodology and Hypotheses	31
4.	Results from 1986 and 1996	46
5.	Temporal Comparison of Voting Behavior	69
6.	Conclusion	87

Appendixes

Appendix A: Selected Roll Call Votes	92
Appendix B: Vote Coding Lists	102
Bibliography	1 0 4

Chapter One

Immigration: Back to the Fore

Research Question

This study focuses on the voting behavior of the elected members of the United States House of Representatives on the issue of national immigration. This work focuses on selected immigration roll call votes taken during the 99th and 104th Congresses. An examination of the voting behavior of the 435 elected representatives from each year will be examined, specifically 10 roll call votes taken during their respective terms.

Introduction

The issue of immigration is one of the perennials in the flower garden of the American body politic. The issue has come to the fore time and again, often resulting in much discussion in Congress, the media, and the country as a whole, but with very little, if any legislation issuing from the discussions. Yet, the 1980s and the 1990s have seen a change from this previous pattern of behavior. Congress,

regarding immigration as a domestic concern (Wildavsky 1969), has taken the lead in reshaping American immigration law. During the last two decades the Congress has passed, and the sitting Presidents have signed into law, several major immigration statutes. These laws have been passed as a result of the growing strength of those who argue that immigration, as a whole, has a negative effect on the United States - not just economically, but socially and politically as well. Those who hold such a view argue that action must be taken now to head off greater problems in the future (Beck 1996; Brownfeld 1993; Dalton 1992; James 1991).¹

Only four years after the immigration procedures of the United States received a major overhaul, Congress, in 1990, mandated the creation of the United States Commission on Immigration Reform. The mandate charged that commission to report recommendations for changes to existing U.S. immigration policy, and put forward proposals that would shape the immigration policy of this country for the next several decades (U.S. Commission Report 1995). Although having issued several interim reports, the final report of

¹. The word conservative, as used in this study, is generally used in reference to people who fall into this category.

the commission is not due until later in this year. Nonetheless, the 104th Congress has passed several far reaching legislative measures, only some of which agree with the recommendations put forward by the commission. These changes will have a great effect on future immigration, and the manner in which immigrants are treated - regarding the policies of both federal and state governments.

As mentioned, the main thrust of the reports so far have been in line with the legislative actions taken; namely a reduction in all levels of immigration, a reduction in the quotas for various forms of immigrant visas issued, and a reduction, and significantly smaller cap, in the waivers issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to individuals who would otherwise be ineligible for immigration or subject to deportation (U.S. Commission Report 1995). However, the changes in entitlement programs, and the exclusion of immigrants from such programs, not to mention the changing status of many immigrants from South America, that the 104th Congress has enacted, were not included in any report from any body studying immigration.

In order to examine the voting behavior and attitudes of the elected representatives in respect to immigration

issues, votes from the 99th and 104th Congresses were selected and examined. The 1986 house voting selected was taken on the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act, one of the most sweeping reviews of immigration policy and regulation to take place during the 1980s, and the greatest changes in immigration policy, up to that point in time, during the latter part of this century. Some of the most discussed issues included in the legislation were the provisions which granted amnesty and legal status to millions of illegal immigrants who were physically in the United States at the time of the bill becoming law.

The selected votes used for 1996 were taken from the voting on immigration issues and changes contained within the omnibus bill which overhauled the immigration laws yet again, and added several new provisions to immigration regulations. These new laws were some of the most restrictive passed since the 1924 National Origin Act. The various changes that these new laws introduced ranged from restricting legal immigrants' access to federal and state welfare programs, restricting the appeal rights of immigrants by decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, raising the fiscal requirements for

immigrants to gain access to the country, and limiting the number of immigrants from all areas of the world.

This study has been undertaken in order to examine the stance of various representatives on the immigration issue, and the related issues briefly discussed above, and consider any group differences between parties, gender, races, ages, and other given variables. The selection of two congresses ten years apart will allow examination of any changes over the decade between the two Houses to also be discussed.

The statistical results provided from the data will allow a ranking of the various representatives, individually and by group variables, on a scale of one through ten as regards their stance on the immigration issue. A total of eight hypotheses have been developed and they will be tested using the results culled from the voting study.

The final data will allow several generalizations to be made about the voting behavior of the members of the respective congresses regarding to immigration.

The Issue - Immigration

Immigration has been a fact of life in American politics since the inception of the nation itself. America

was not even a generation old before the appearance of the first anti-foreigner acts. The Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 18th Century were actually enforced and several people were imprisoned before President Jefferson pardoned, and apologized, on behalf of the nation to those individuals prosecuted and convicted. The history of the anti-Chinese, anti-Irish, anti-Catholic, or even general anti-immigrant laws are well recorded, and can be found in any history text. Many people would declare such days to be behind us, and today to be a more modern, enlightened, accepting era.

However, there is still a stringent anti-immigrant voice in America. In 1992 the Inter University Consortium of Political Science Research election study revealed that almost 50% of the respondents were firmly in support of further restricting, and reducing, the immigration flow to this country. In 1994 the National Election Study questioned respondents on whether or not immigration to the United States should be increased, remain constant, or be decreased. Only 5 percent supported an increase, with 29 percent arguing for current levels. However, an overwhelming 64 percent of those surveyed stated that immigration to the United States should be decreased from

its current levels. Thus a gap of two years saw a significant increase in support for decreased immigration. Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California stated that "If you love everybody, you love nobody. And that's the bottom line. And we've got to love our own people first" (Isbister 1996, 209). Porter Goss, a representative from Florida said that "We are strained at the seams taking care of those we have" (House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Print 1995, 29) He went on to say that the nation had finite resources and that this meant that immigration should be more firmly controlled.

The discussion of the various members of the House over the immigration issue has been critical of many of the ideas advanced - and critics have crossed party lines. Although the vast majority of the new, stricter immigration controls have been advanced by Republican party members, some Republicans have been heated in their opposition to some of their fellow representatives' ideas. Republican Sam Brownback, a Kansas representative, and Richard Chrysler, of Michigan, have joined with Howard Berman of California in opposing any cuts to legal immigration, and have strongly lobbied the GOP caucus for support from their fellow

Republicans (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:12). However, Democrats Anthony Beilenson of California, and John Bryant of Texas, strongly supported the immigration bills that stood before the 104th Congress, especially the bill limiting the size of overall immigration. Indeed, Bryant co-sponsored HR2202, saying legal immigration could not be ignored (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:12). These provisions eventually became law in the shape of PL 104-208, and the reaction to this bill has caused some Republican representatives to become very wary of how their party is viewed on the immigration issue (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V55:20). Peter Long, a House Republican from New York stated "The Republican Party is going to needlessly run the risk of antagonizing immigrant voters..." (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V55:20).

The media has also taken on a most strident voice regarding immigrants, as they addressed the recent issue of "foreign influence" in fund raising by the Democratic and Republican party. Such reporting, often taken from both extremes of the immigration argument has caused a backlash in party behavior. In fact, the Democratic party has announced that it will no longer accept money from resident

aliens - a perfectly legal and long accepted practice (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:49). Such a move can only be considered to be a knee jerk reaction to bad press. The media has long been a public forum for supporters of all sides of the immigration issue. Sara Diamond, a sociologist from California, is regularly published attacking the right wing "nativist bigots" and anti-immigrant activists" (Leone 1994). Diamond claims that these elements, and groups such as FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform) and AICF (American Immigration Control Foundation), perpetuate the worst aspects of American culture. Also, the Los Angeles Times has long supported, through the use of editorials and guest columnists, the immigration cause, and immigrants themselves. Through articles by such people as Sergio Munoz, member of a think tank for Southwest issues, the paper presents pro-immigration arguments and questions statements by politicians who argue against immigration (Leone 1994). However. the same newspaper has carried stories that present immigration in a serious light, such as "Chinese Refugees Take to High Seas" (Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1993).

Also, the several pieces of immigration legislation that have been enacted during the last two years have been described in the popular press as "draconian" in nature, if not downright anti-foreigner. It is now illegal for a legal immigrant to obtain numerous forms of federal assistance, including such things as Food Stamps, Medicaid, Medicare and Supplementary Social Security. However, any income they make is still directly taxed for such purposes. The same time period has also seen the passage of a law which limits the immigration quota, and another which eliminates the right of immigrants to appeal decisions of the INS to the federal court system (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:12). Yet, Congressional Quarterly also reports that the last few years have seen a major rise in the number of registered voters from recent immigrant groups, and also a rise in the number of new citizens - new citizens who have been actively encouraged to register to vote - the number of one million naturalized citizens in 1996, is expected to double to 2 million in 1997 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V55:20).

The new "anti-immigration stance that many Americans seem to affect has also given rise to several new

publications addressing the issue. John Isbister, who describes himself as a defender of immigration, argues that the changes that are wrought by the current levels (meaning the pre 1996 legislation levels) of immigration are both far reaching and desirable (Isbister 1996). Yet, he also acknowledges that Americans are threatened by immigration - that they always have been, and probably always will be. For example, Negative Population Growth, Inc., a social/political anti-immigration agency, has carried large advertisements in major periodicals proclaiming "Because we have allowed our nation to become seriously overpopulated we are in deep trouble...we must halt illegal immigration and sharply reduce legal immigration" (Isbister 1996, 121). Such a view is also supported by others, who argue that immigration has put a serious strain on American security, social services and native U.S. workers (Brownfeld 1993; Harrison 1992; James 1991).

Beck (1996) provides several arguments against immigration, and also many in favor of sharply reduced immigration levels. He argues that the actions of Congress during the 1960s unleashed what he called the "harshest" wave of immigration yet. He further argues that the

American people have been seeking, for several years, lower immigration levels and have finally found a responsive federal government (Beck 1996). It is very interesting to note that Beck provides a foreword to his book in which he addresses his reasons and motives for writing his work. He disclaims the label "nativist" and even argues that he is pro-immigrant because reduced immigration would also help recent immigrants, who "suffer" most from the economic effect of increased or further immigration.

The new legislative actions of 1996 have taken place a mere ten years after one of the most sweeping overhauls of the nations' immigration laws. Although the bill initiated criminal, rather than just civil, penalties for immigration violations, it also granted amnesty and pardon to several million illegal immigrants. This amnesty allowed many to become citizens, after obtaining legal status, and also enhanced their ability to obtain immigrant visas for their family members still abroad. Yet, one decade later the tide has reversed and both legal, as well as the illegal immigrants, have become the target of new, much stricter laws. Immigration has once again come to the fore as a

campaign issue in local, state and federal elections, in such states as California, Florida, and New York.

There are many questions about the issue of immigration and the immigration debate, as well as many popularly held hypotheses about immigration. Who supports it; who does not? Is it an issue throughout the United States, or only in some states? Do clear distinctions exist between people of differing age, ethnicity, party identification, and region? Are these differences reflected in the voting behavior of the elected representatives of such groups? This roll call analysis of the voting behavior of the 99th and 104th House of Representatives will, by testing eight hypotheses, search for and identify any differences. Furthermore, the changes in the tone of the debate on the immigration issue over the last ten years will also be tested by a temporal comparison of the data for each House.

Chapter Two

Development of Roll Call Analysis and Vote Studies

Roll Calls - Critique and Validity Studies

The literature which exists on roll call analyses and studies is wide and varied. If an individual so chose, he or she could go back to the pre-war years in an attempt to fully review the subject. However, I began my study of relevant materials with MacRae's statistical study of the 81st Congress (1958). MacRae provides a discussion on how to conduct a roll call analysis. Although many of his points have been superseded by time and structural changes, his scale analysis, and his observation of those factors which influence voting behavior, remain quite valid. MacRae states that the roll call votes, and any statistical study thereof are just the final end result of a variety of influences. These influences include such items as the attitude of the representative and the policy situation applicable to the vote (MacRae 1958). This latter point was later reiterated by Mathews and Stimson (1975). MacRae strongly warns that any position(s) inferred from roll call

analysis do not necessarily indicate the attitudes of members of Congress, or the pressure a member is receiving from the constituency. Nor is MacRae alone in this assertion (Kingdon 1992). Both argue that positions and votes are the end result of such aforementioned influences, plus the influence of a number of other, like related factors. These factors include pressure from such sources as interest groups, cues from fellow legislators, pressure from the party organization, or the current administration, (MacRae 1958) (Kingdon 1992) and any relevant audiences with whom the member may be in contact (MacRae 1958). Two other important factors that enter the decision-making process, and must be considered in any analysis of votes to pass a bill are an understanding of the content of a bill (Clausen 1973) and compromise (Enelow 1984).

The MacRae study was one of a number which took place in the early post-war years. Many of these studies were critiqued by Wilder Crane in his A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting (1960). Crane examined the use of roll call studies in order to specifically test the measure of importance of party in legislative actions. His study did not examine the U.S. Congress. He used roll call results

and a series of personal interviews with members of the 1957 Wisconsin Legislature. Crane bemoaned the fact that such a study could not be conducted at the national level due to the limited number of roll call votes taken during any one session. However, due to many of the reforms and behavioral changes that have taken place in Congress during the last few decades this is no longer an issue when studying Congress (Kingdon 1992; Weisberg 1978).

Crane challenged a number of assumptions of the time by questioning the argument that party was the most important factor when it came to voting. He questioned whether or not legislators were voting to uphold party position, or whether they were actually responding to other, broader factors (Crane 1960). Crane used a Rice Cohesion Index of Party Likeness (IPL) in voting, and directly compared the results of that to partisan statements taken from personal interviews. He concluded that there was in fact not necessarily a correlation between roll call vote results and the actual degree of party pressure applied upon individual legislators.

Crane further concluded that a high IPL did not reveal to what extent the party was actually a factor. He also

concluded that a low IPL could suggest factors of a partisan nature when none may well be present. Finally he rejected two widely held scholarly assertions. First, party loyalty could not be measured simply by how a majority of the party votes, and secondly party loyalty is not a constant factor in voting behavior (Crane 1960).

In a direct response to Crane, two authors critiqued his work and concluded that Crane's discussion had several statistical and conceptual problems that weakened his argument considerably (Greenstein and Jackson 1963). It was argued that Crane's IPL was (in direct contrast to Crane's interpretation) a valid measure of party influence in the roll call study. Furthermore, the roll call cases used for measurement were criticized as being unrepresentative as a sample (Greenstein and Jackson, 1963). The conception and measurement scales were also refuted as being inadequate. Greenstein and Jackson argued that Crane's partisan measurement statistic was an inadequate index of party influence and that his overall conclusions about party influence, or lack thereof, were very much suspect.

Another work also reviewed the major theories of roll call voting fifteen years later. Weisberg (1978) considered

the major philosophical issue involved, setting criteria for evaluation of theories of roll call analysis and he developed several baseline models against which he could measure those theories that he revised. Weisberg evaluated the theories against his criteria, and in light of the results he discussed how a legislative model of voting behavior should be constructed.

Weisberg concluded that even with a minimal amount of information (usually just party affiliation) the prediction level of any roll call study is fairly high, and he further stated that each of the theories that he reviewed provided little improvement beyond that point. He provides that time and time again the best predictor of votes in the U.S. House of Representatives is the party affiliation of the legislator in question. Weisberg argues that with that statistic alone it is possible to correctly predict, on average, 82.4 percent of the votes. Therefore, he concludes that a model or theory with an 88 percent predictive rate success (which several of those he critiqued claimed) cannot be considered validated (Weisberg 1978).

However, Weisberg's and Greenstein and Jackson's conclusion that party is the major factor in influencing

voting behavior is opposed. There are many scholars who argue that party is not the sole, nor the major influence of a congressional vote. Many hold that the influences include party, but also include other factors. These factors are: influence of pressure groups, the Administration, members of the constituency, state delegations, other legislators, and several other factors (Clausen 1973; Jackson 1974; Jackson and King 1989; Kingdon 1992; MacRae 1958; Mathews and Stimson 1975; Shannon 1968).

Influencing Factors - Party Versus Others

This issue of party, and its importance on voting, as compared to other factors, has been a much debated one, as has been the issue of the importance of constituency. Fenno has directly approached the issue - using a different method than roll call studies (Fenno 1978). He observed the behavior of 18 representatives of the U.S. House by spending time with them in their districts. He argued that the results of this study were important in that it would provide an insight into how the representatives perceived their respective constituencies. Recognizing that most research on the views of national legislators takes place in

Washington, Fenno argued that it is while in their districts that the relationships between the legislator and constituents are "...created, nurtured, and formed" (Fenno 1978, xiii).

Fenno stated that each representative can view their constituency in four distinct ways. He labels these views as being geographic, re-election, primary, or personal in nature. Fenno concludes that each of these views, and how the representatives view them in importance, can have a direct effect on the recorded voting behavior of those representatives. Thus, Fenno argues that constituency is a major influence in voting behavior.

The interview style was also employed for another examination in the voting decisions of members of Congress (Kingdon 1992). Kingdon interviewed a group which he called a "cross sectional" sample of members of Congress. He concluded that there were a variety of factors which affected the voting behavior of legislators and that constituencies were very important. However, Kingdon pointed out that constituencies were comprised of several elements. Among these elements were active and attentive elites, and in order to avoid any major problems with "the

folks back home" members usually ensure that their stated or voted position is not contrary to constituency wishes. Or, to be more specific, contrary to the wishes of the active, or the attentive elites (Kingdon 1992).

Kingdon further argued that political parties, and the inter party (and intra-party) differences also have an impact on legislative behavior. This clearly points to the importance of ideology in voting behavior, as well as a distinct overlap between the factors of ideology and party. There is also an overlap between the issue of party, constituency, ideology and pressure from the sitting Administration. Kingdon states that the stance of the Administration is important because partisan constituents are usually aware of the position of the Administration and the legislator and that problems can arise if there is a difference between the two (Kingdon 1992)

Also, Kingdon examined the influence of interest groups. Indeed, he stated that in this age of ever increasing election costs the ability of Political Action Committees to channel money to candidates means that the importance of interest groups is a great factor in decision making.

Economic Models

Political scientists are not the only scholars who have sought to understand the influences on legislative voting behavior. Although pursued with different objectives in mind, economists, or political scientists with an economic issue in mind, have also created models to explain legislative behavior.

Jackson and King (1989) created a model of legislative behavior by addressing the 1978 Tax Reform Act. One of the main topics within their work was the issue of how representatives are influenced in their voting behavior. Using votes taken from various actions on the 1978 Tax Reform Act to test a model of representatives roll call voting, they found that constituent preferences (mainly about income redistribution) played a large part in how legislators voted. Jackson and King stated that the vote of any individual legislator could be roughly measured in mathematical terms as; personal preference of the representative, plus the demands of the party, plus the preferences of constituents multiplied by any factors related to constituent influence.

The authors also listed several related factors. These included the electoral margin, the sophistication of the electorate, homogeneity (or lack of) in the district, and the seniority of the member. Jackson and King also noted a much greater degree of party voting from the Republican representatives, while at the same time noting the Democratic representatives exhibited a pattern of better representing constituent preferences (Jackson and King 1989).

Another study done from an economic standpoint was conducted by Kau and Rubin (1993). They approached roll call voting in an attempt to explain the passage of certain forms of regulatory legislation. While recognizing that they, as economists, would address problems differently from the manner of political scientists, Kau and Rubin argue that two main hypotheses exist for the passage of such laws. First, laws may be passed to benefit various special interest groups, or secondly laws may be passed for ideological reasons. Kau and Rubin state that these two hypothesis are not inconsistent with one another.

The authors present a model based on the idea that there is a connection between the voting behavior of

representatives, the representatives' constituents, and donors to the representatives campaigns (Kau and Rubin 1993). Thus, there is agreement with the ideas put forward on constituency importance (Fenno 1978) and donor money (Kingdon 1992).

Roll Call Studies - Recommended Guidelines and Requirements

Most scholars who have reviewed roll call studies, or presented models for discussion have included several requirements and guidelines for any future undertakings. Crane (1960) argued that any roll call study attempted, whatever the subject, had one major "pre-condition" - knowledge of the specific bills in question. Greenstein and Jackson (1963) provided several concluding statements for those who would engage in further study. First they provided that any future attempts to conceptualize roll call voting should employ a "refined conceptualization" of the influence of party voting. In other words, they wished to see party voting explained in terms both deeper and more scientifically testable than Crane's. Second, they argued that any roll call analysis should allow for random selection from a range of different populations - different

legislatures at different times. Thus, any validation measurements can be tested beyond a limited time sample/selection. Furthermore, they argued that any studies should take into account, over everything else, the "complexity" of the particular phenomenon which is under analysis. This is more than just an echo of Crane's demand of knowledge of specific bills, Greenstein and Jackson are obviously requesting a deep understanding of all factors relating to the area of study.

Mathews and Stimson (1975) state that there are major limitations which should be addressed in any study. First, roll calls focus on the final decision - the floor vote - and this should be clearly considered and stated, a fact noted by others (MacRae, 1958). An examination of causal factors is necessary for any model that claims to provide answers. Therefore any model, or roll call analysis, must discuss and address the phenomena which occurs early in the process of decision making. Also, the authors state that the decision strategies of individual legislators are formed throughout their whole career. Thus some events that have an effect on how an individual votes on any given issue can

take place a long time before the vote in question. (Mathews and Stimson 1975).

Weisberg also provided a section on how to construct a model of legislative behavior. He argues that any theory that is to be presented should include both long and short term elements, but should clearly distinguish between both. He also strongly argues that verisimilitude is necessary for any model that purports to explain how the house majority, or party majority, is so successfully predictive (Weisberg 1978).

Conclusions And Questions

This review of the various critiques, models and studies provides several conclusions and issues. Perhaps the most important issue to be addressed from the above is that of Greenstein and Jackson and Weisberg. They suggest that roll call studies are either impossible to carry out, or unworthy of the time invested in them due to the overwhelming influence and importance of party affiliation. However, in reply I would employ not only the statements of the several other authors included but also of Greenstein and Jackson themselves. Their argument has not lost any lustre over the

last thirty years. They argue that any roll call study should employ a more refined conceptualization of the influence of party voting. I argue that this is the crux of the problem: How to measure, and conceptualize party voting. What exactly is part of the factor which is party voting, and what is part of another close, but separate factor - such as ideology, cue taking, constituency, etc? Is the study of party actually the study of ideology, or the study of constituency?

Shannon (1968) addressed this very point. He asked two major questions: One, do constituency factors account for inter-party differences (read ideology), and two, are parties different because constituencies are different (read constituency)? In his answer to these questions Shannon stated that in any roll call analysis the influence of party and constituency cannot be completely separated. The differences in the constituency base of the parties (for Shannon stated that the constituencies that elect the different parties are different) lead to the differences in the voting behavior of the representatives (Shannon 1968). Therefore, if the constituency bases are different and elect different people the ideology of the constituency must have

a basis in selecting the ideology of the representative, which is shown in that individuals' voting record. Kingdon (1992) agrees with this statement. While he admits that most studies point to the central importance of party, party voting may well be a function, or combined function, of other factors. These factors include, but are not limited to; constituency, coalitions, party leadership requests, party leadership demands, cue taking, etc.

Also, in recent years a number of representatives, and not a few senators have switched parties. They have done so claiming that the ideology they have is not shared by the party which they have just left. Yet, with a quick review of the voting records in the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, their party loyalty vote before the changeovers took place did not seem so significantly different in most cases to cause comment - it did not set them apart from their peers. A closer study of these "switchers" and their party voting (both before and after the action) could prove interesting.

In conclusion, therefore, it would seem that Weisberg is highlighting the wrong issue. It is not that party voting is such a high predictor of roll call voting - it is

just that the need of Greenstein and Jackson - a more refined conceptualization of party voting - remains unmet. Or, it may well be that Kingdon is correct and the factors work in a combined fashion that we are unable to separate.

So, the model for voting behavior remains unclear in its makeup. Weisberg (1978) says party is enough, and Greenstein and Jackson (1963) seem to reservedly agree with him. Crane (1960) argues that a knowledge of bills is a must, and that other broader factors also come into play. Jackson and King (1989) provide a model that includes the demands of the party, but these demands constitute only a major third of the whole equation. The other two major parts being personal preference, which overlaps with Kau and Rubin's ideology argument (1993) and the constituency, and the influence that that constituency has with the legislator (Fenno 1978).

Whatever the influence on a given representatives' actions and votes, this study will not attempt to fully define them. The stated purpose, a study of immigration voting behavior, will allow us to examine which groups and individuals vote in which manner. It will give us an insight into certain common characteristics that such groups

possess. It will answer in relative comparison - what is the immigration ideology of the Republican/Democratic parties, what is the party voting stance on immigration issue, and when do legislators follow party and when do they not on immigration issues? Therefore, this study is, in part, a model. It is a model that is incomplete in that it will not allow us to predict behavior on immigration voting. Nor will I be examining all the variables, or how such variables would interact. But this study will provide insight into immigration voting behavior and representatives views on immigration.

Chapter Three

Methodology and Hypotheses

In order to achieve the research focus of this study, as previously mentioned, the major immigration bills of 1986 and 1996 were chosen for study, with ten house floor votes being selected as the roll call votes for study in each data set. All of the 435 elected representatives were included in the study. The non-voting delegates to Congress were disregarded. Although both years include major legislative action on immigration, they were specifically chosen due to their contrasting nature. In 1986 the House was firmly under the control of the Democratic party (and, of course, had been for some time) and the White House was Republican. However, the 104th Congress in 1996 was under the control of the Republican party, which also held a reasonable majority, and the White House was Democratic.

The votes selected for the data set² were chosen from all the votes related to the passage of the bill³. In 1986

². For a description of each of the selected votes, please see Appendix A.

³. It should be noted that the selected votes were chosen by the author to represent a cross section of immigration voting in each particular session of congress. The choice was a

all but two of the subject votes were substantive in nature - the remaining two being votes on procedural motions. In 1996 only one of the votes was a procedural motion. In all other nine cases the votes were to pass, or strike, amendments, or to pass the bill, or conference report, itself. The number of votes represents no significance beyond the fact that by choosing ten from each year I could present the research in a hospitable mathematical form.

All representatives who registered a score for all ten votes have received a final overall score between zero and ten. Thus, the higher the score for a representative, the more restrictive that representative is considered on immigration issues. Any Representatives who did not record a vote (or stance) on one of the votes did not receive a final overall score, nor are they included in the statistical analyses in this work.

Each vote was considered on its individual merits and given a stance of either Favor Immigrant, or Not Favor Immigrant. Depending upon the manner of the vote, and the direction in which each representative voted in regards to that particular vote, every representative was given a

subjective one on the author's part, and others may have chosen different votes for different reasons.

score of one or zero. A score of one (1) indicated that in that particular vote the representative had taken a Not Favor Immigrant stance. A score of zero (0) indicated that the representative had taken a Favor Immigrant stance. Any representative who had no actual recorded vote, but who publicly announced for or against the vote in question, was provided a value in keeping with the announced position. Therefore, the actual vote count, as recorded in the House, and the vote count as recorded in the data set may not match in all circumstances.⁴

All the information pertaining to the votes of representatives, or their announced positions, was drawn from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1986, or the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report for March 23, 1996, and September 28, 1996.

Each individual representative was also coded for five separate variables; state, party, sex, race, and age. Where a seat changed hands, or was vacant during the period

⁴. The author wishes to note here that each of the decisions on labelling the votes either Favor, or Not Favor, could be considered subjective. The decision was based upon the sole assessment of the author and it could well be that other students or scholars of political science would choose to interpret the information in a slightly different manner.

studied, the last three variables were not recorded⁵. The age variable consisted of placing each representative in one of five categories⁶. Membership of each group was decided by the age of the representative at the start of that congressional term - not at the time the vote was recorded; it was surmised that very few representatives had birthdays which would cause them to change to a higher group. In the case of party for Bernie Sanders, the independent representative from Vermont, he was coded as a Democrat. This decision was taken in light of the fact that in all the recorded votes he voted with a majority of the Democratic party all but once, and in that singular case he voted with a sizable minority of said party.

Certain variables that could be considered to be important factors affecting the voting behavior of a representative were considered but not used. First, the nature of a representative's constituency, whether it could

⁵. In the 1986 data set, there were two seats that fell into this category. In the 1996 data set there were four seats.

⁶. This five set range was set up in the following manner; Group One consisted of representatives under the age of 34, Group Two was made up of thirty five to forty four year olds, Group Three was forty five to fifty four year olds, Group Four was fifty five to sixty four year olds, and Group Five was for those sixty five and over.

be classified as urban, suburban, or rural, was not used. This decision was taken for one major reason. Namely, the difficulty in coding each constituency in such a manner. Several constituencies crossed the definitions of more than one style, some even encompassing all such regions - especially in the case of the less populated states.

Secondly, the ethnic/racial/immigrant population of the constituency was not considered. This was due to the difficulty in conceptualizing such a variable. While the government does provide census data that records the national or ethnic backgrounds of percentages of the population within each congressional district, there is no indication of how many generations those individuals families have resided in the United States. Indeed, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report states that immigration groups argue that immigrants who are used in such studies tend to be those who have been in the United States for some time, as newer immigrants tend to be less comfortable with the use of English, or with answering questions for pollsters (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 55:20). Thus, any attempt to gauge the immigrant

population, or recent immigrant population of representatives constituencies was not undertaken.

Lastly, the electoral margin of victory in the previous House election was not considered. This decision was taken due to the large number of resignations, primary losers, and vacancies that had preceded the 104th congress. This would have meant a significantly smaller number of variables from the second data set to be examined and compared to the first data set.

The data set will be utilized to subject the hypotheses to testing by the use of cross tabulations and T-Tests. Each separate hypothesis will be tested individually for each year, and then the last hypothesis will be an examination of the changes that have taken place between the 99th and 104th Congress.

Formulation And Statement of Hypotheses

Eight hypotheses were formulated so that two tasks could be undertaken. In the first place the data could be utilized to empirically test each individual hypothesis in regards to certain opinions and stances on immigration issues. Secondly I could examine how certain

representatives would vote on immigration issues, either individually or in groups.

The hypotheses were formulated using a number of widely held assumptions. Given the Republican party's more conservative stance on social issues in general, and immigration in particular, plus the actions of certain recent congressional Republicans (such as Henry Hyde, author of the restrictions on deportation appeals and welfare restrictions), it seemed that the Democrats were more immigrant "friendly" than the Republicans. This gave rise to hypothesis one which states - Republican Representatives favor more restrictive immigration laws than do Democratic Representatives.

Hypothesis two was formulated in light of the fact that the conservative alliance is a studied phenomena, and that the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, provide the votes for the Democratic party as a whole, and subdivided into northern and southern states. Also, the more conservative slant of the southern populace towards immigration, and the influx of new immigrants should be reflected in the voting of their representatives. Hypothesis two states - Southern Democrats

will tend to favor more restrictive immigration laws than northern Democrats.

The third hypothesis was formulated with the existence of groups such as America for Americans (based in California), Arizonians for English (a group supporting the English language as the official U.S. language, active at both the national and state level), and the other groups discussed in Chapter One, such as the AICF, or the Federation for Immigration Reform. Also, the actions and comments of politicians from states such as California, New York, and Arizona seem to show a polarization of the issue in those states where immigration is more widespread, and discussed. Hypothesis three states - Representatives from the immigrant heavy states will tend to favor more restrictive immigration laws than Representatives from states where immigration is not so prevalent, or such a salient issue.

Hypothesis four takes into account the arguments that women are supposedly more socially accepting than men. In support of this is the documented evidence of the gender gap - more female support for Democrat than Republican candidates. It has been argued that the gender gap exists

due to the fact that women are more nurturing and compassionate than men (Erikson and Tedin 1995). Hypothesis Four states - Female Representatives tend to favor less restrictive immigration laws than do male Representatives.

Hypothesis five was formulated in order to test the idea that most minority groups would be supportive of policies that benefit like groups. Consider the existence of the Rainbow Coalition, which was specifically formed to create a united front among minorities. Also, the electoral support of many minority legislators is made up of recent immigrants or their relatives. Hypothesis five states - Minority Representatives will tend to favor less restrictive immigration laws than do non-minority Representatives.

The next hypothesis, number six, is almost an outgrowth of study into number five. The reputation of Gus Savage (D-IL) is a good example. An African-American legislator he was often accused of being most unfriendly towards other ethnic groups, especially Asians and Sino-Asians. Indeed, the Rainbow Coalition was formed in an attempt to heal certain rifts between the minority groups and present a united front. Therefore, it was surmised that perhaps there could be a significant difference between the voting records

of various minority groups. Hypothesis six states - Hispanic representatives will tend to favor less restrictive immigration laws than do African-American Representatives.⁷

Hypothesis seven was formulated with ideas that reflect some of the same ideas as hypothesis two. A distinction between the generations in the political parties has been documented - older Democrats have often been considered more socially conservative than their younger colleagues. Many younger Republicans, especially the freshman class of '94 have often been referred to as more ideologically right wing than more senior members of the Republican caucus. Hypothesis seven states - Younger non-minority Democrats will tend to favor less restrictive immigration policies than do older non-minority democrats. Younger, non-minority Republicans will tend to favor more restrictive immigration than do older, non-minority Republicans.

Hypothesis eight reflects the temporal differences that are expected to be found in the data. Given the language and nature of the 1986 legislation, and the more conservative language and nature of the 1996 legislation, a

⁷. The presence of other minorities in Congress is far too small to allow an investigation of other minority groups. The data set confirmed the presence of only a handful of minority members outside of Hispanics and African-Americans.

discernable movement is expected in the average scores, and the scores of the previous seven hypotheses. Hypothesis eight states - The data from the 99th Congress and the data from the 104th Congress will show a shift towards a more restrictive view of immigration in the House of Representatives at all levels, and within all groups.

Subject Legislation

Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986

The 1986 bill, finally signed into law as PL 99-603 by President Ronald Reagan, was the second attempt in a row to alter the existing national immigration laws. The previous Congress had passed similar legislation but had been unable to agree on a conference report and it had died with the end of the second session.

The same path had seemed to be in line for House proposal HR 3810 in the 99th Congress. On September 26, 1986, the House rejected a rule limiting floor amendments to the bill, a touchy issue as the subject of farm worker related provisions had been hotly debated. However, with a modified amendment on that issue the bill came back to the

House on October 9, and although hotly debated once again, was finally passed by a clear margin of 230-166

The issue of the farm workers provisions, submitted by Charles Schumer (D-NY), was considered to be the booster that allowed the bill to pass with such strong support (a similar bill in 1984 had scrapped by with only 5 votes to spare). The major difference was that while in 1984, 138 Democrats had voted against immigration changes, arguing that migrant workers could be exploited under the proposed rules, in 1986 only 61 voted in such manner.

California, where immigration has been, and still remains, a very important issue, the change in the Democratic party was reflected in the Democratic caucus of that state with an almost exact numerical turn around from opposition to support by half of the members between 1984 and 1986.

The Senate had already passed an immigration bill, and after a successful conference between the chambers, the conference report was adopted by the House on October 15, 1986, with the Senate following suit two days later.

HR 2202 - 1996 Immigration Bill (HR 3610)

Unlike the 1986 bill this legislation received much less overall bipartisan support. with one major exception - attacking legal, as well as illegal immigrant. Indeed, there was much debate, in the House, and among interested parties about the very nature of including restrictions on both illegal and legal immigrants in the same bill. On March 21, 1996 the House voted to remove most of the restrictions on legal immigration from the bill. The main author of the bill was Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chair of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, who claimed disappointment at the removal of further legal restrictions on immigration. However, his bill, which would have restricted the number of overall visas especially in the field of reunification (where family members are reunited in America) was lobbied against by several Republican freshmen, including Chrysler of Michigan and Brownback of Kansas. Like many members of the House, they sought to distinguish between legals and illegals. However, there was some Democratic support for limiting legal immigration, especially from those members from the front line state of California. Anthony C. Beilenson (D-CA) was fully in

support of Smith's bill, arguing that communities were becoming overwhelmed by the "burden" of providing various social services to new immigrants.

However, in its final form, the legislation does affect both legal and illegal immigrants. On the legal side there are now several restrictions forbidding aliens from receiving public assistance up to ten years after they enter the country. A pilot telephone system for checking of documented aliens has been set up in the five states with the largest immigrant population. Deportation of both legal and illegal immigrants is now much easier, with harsher penalties for those individuals who enter illegally or overstay their legal welcome. One of the most heated provisions within the bill was sponsored by House Republican Gallegly of California. His amendment would allow states to bar illegal immigrants of school age or children of illegal immigrants (who are illegal themselves) from attending school - from kindergarten through 12th grades. These provisions were supported, but removed from the bill after the threat of a presidential veto. They were later passed in the House as separate legislation. The final passage of the legislation into law took place as part of HR 3610, the

Omnibus Spending Bill, which the House passed 370-37 on September 29, 1996. Already passed by the Senate, President Clinton signed HR 3610 into law on September 30, 1996.

Chapter Four

Results from 1986 and 1996

Analysis of 1986 Data Set

The 1986 data set proved to be very complete with respect to the personal variables of the House members, with only half of one percent of the individual representatives information being absent. However, one of the most immediate striking results was that 79 Representatives had incomplete voting records on all 10 recorded votes. This means an overall average absentee rate of just over 18 percent.

Also, the data set provided an excellent view of the average United States Representative of 1986. Obviously, the Democratic party held an overwhelming majority in the House, a pattern that would remain unbroken for another eight years. The ethnic groupings also saw a heavy slant in favor of white, non Hispanics, with 93.6 percent of the House members being in that category. The next largest identified ethnic group were African-American legislators, who numbered 19. The other two identified ethnic groups, Asians, and Hispanics, consisted of two and five members,

respectively. Two members of the House were unidentified in terms of ethnicity/race.

In the gender group there was also a rather large disparity between the subgroups - with males making up 95.2 percent of the House membership. This statistic is very much out of sync with the overall makeup of the American population.

The one variable that showed a much more diverse result was age. Here the result provided an almost classic bell curve result, with the largest group being within the ages of 45 to 54. The smallest age group being those Representatives under the age of 34 - this group was only 2.8 percent of the total House. It is interesting to note that those Representatives over retirement age (65) were better represented, with 11 percent of the House falling into this category.

With almost 82 percent of the House receiving an overall Favor/Not Favor Immigrant score the results provided several noteworthy statements. There was no large collection at either end of the scale. Instead, the results showed two small groups, spread over several values, clustered at both ends of the total vote graph (See Table

7). Only three Representatives scored a perfect zero (total Favor Immigrant support) and only two Representatives scored a perfect 10 (total Not Favor Immigrant support).

Also, 41.4 percent of Representatives fell under the five point level, showing quite a large Favor Immigrant group. On the other hand, only 31.4 percent scored above five; the vast majority of this group actually scoring eight or less. Thus, the 99th Congress seems, overall, to lean more in the direction of favoring immigrants than in passing more restrictive immigration. Indeed, there seems to be an absence of any major identifiable anti-immigrant coalition in the 99th Congress. A closer analysis of each hypothesis will prove or disprove this statement more closely.

Hypothesis One (Table 1)

This examination of party differences supported the hypothesis. The Democratic Representatives scored a mean of 3.55 on the scale, with a deviation of 2.03. However, the Republican score was 6.29 - a full 2.74 points higher. The Republican and Democratic deviation were almost exactly alike, the Republicans recording a level of 2.09. In 1986 therefore, it can be stated that the Republican

Representatives do favor more restrictive immigration laws than their Democratic counterparts.

Hypothesis Two (Table 3)

The southern elements of the Democratic party have long been regarded as being more conservative than their fellow party members to the north. In this examination of the voting behavior of these two groups in 1986 a clear difference did emerge. In the 99th Congress Democrats from the Southern States⁸ recorded a mean score of 4.82, almost two full points higher than their northern counterparts score of 2.99. There was greater deviation within the Southern Democrats group, 2.13, than the Northern Democrats, 1.72. Therefore, in 1986 there was a distinct intra-party difference within the Democratic party when geography is taken into account. Indeed, the Democrats from the Southern states fall into the area between their own fellow party members from the other states, and the Republicans. The difference between the Republican mean and the Southern

⁸. The Southern States are those classified as such within the Congressional Quarterly Almanac voting record: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

Democratic mean is actually smaller than the gap between the Democrats of the South and the rest of their party. The existence of a southern conservative group, at least in relation to immigration issues, in 1986 is fully supported by these results. The clear difference that exists between the two groups of Democrats is one of an obviously more socially conservative nature, with Southern Democrats being more in favor of restrictive immigration laws and policies.

Hypothesis Three (Table 3)

Bearing in mind the oft quoted phrase, "All politics is local" the hypothesis that more restrictive immigration laws would be supported in the areas where immigrants are more numerous could be argued. However, the data for the 99th Congress House of Representatives does not support this statement. Indeed, the average mean for both groups of states are almost identical, with only half a point difference. The immigration heavy states⁹ recorded a mean of 4.388, with a standard deviation of 2.52. The other

⁹. In 1996 Congress created a 800 telephone "hotline" pilot program for checking on immigrants employment status. The states that were chosen for this hotline were also chosen for this study to represent the immigrant heavy states.

states recorded a higher mean - 4.88 - but with a lower deviation rate, 2.41. Thus, the hypothesis was rejected.

In considering the data set, the results from the previous hypothesis, and the fact that Democrats had registered as the majority party in the immigration heavy states, I decided to rerun the equation, controlling for party. This was done to ensure that the Democrats who, as previously discussed, had recorded a lower mean than the Republicans, were not masking a higher Republican mean in the immigrant heavy states. The results on hypothesis three, when controlled for party were not significant at the 95 percent level. But the Democratic group results were significant at the 90 percent level, and bearing this in mind the results are given below.

The Democrat mean for the states with greater numbers of immigrants was 3.22, with standard deviation of 2.03. The mean for the Democrats from all other states was 3.72, with a very similar deviation of 2.03. Therefore, the Democratic party figures were, although lower (as is to be expected bearing in mind the results from hypothesis one) were the same difference, a half a point, as the overall results for all Representatives.

The rerun of the data on hypothesis three, controlling for party, did not give a statistically significant result, at the 95 percent level, for the Republican party. The mean for the Republicans in the immigrant state group was 5.98, with a standard deviation of 2.26. Continuing the fashion of results for this hypothesis the other states recorded a greater mean - 6.46. The standard deviation for this group was 1.98. There could be a number of reasons for this result being statistically insignificant, but the fact that the behavior between the groups is so similar may well be the reason.

Considering that the sub sets cannot be used, then the third hypothesis must be rejected - as the results do not show that Representatives from those states with greater immigrant populations favor more restrictive immigration laws. In fact, the results show that, with a smaller difference, the Representatives from other states actually prefer more restrictive immigration laws. It may very well be that the immigrant heavy constituency is at work here, with immigrants pushing for support in those areas.

Hypothesis Four (Table 2)

The most obvious fact, when comparing the gender groups of the 99th Congress, is that the vast majority of Representatives are male. Furthermore, when absenteeism is taken into account, only 11 female Representatives were included in the statistical comparison of gender voting rates. Due to this very small sample the results were not statistically significant. However, they are included for descriptive purposes.

The mean for males in the 99th was 4.71, with a deviation of 2.47. This reading, just below the halfway measure, makes the average male Representative in 1986 more "Favor Immigrant" than not - although just barely. However, in comparison, the mean for the females included in the sample was 5.00, with a standard deviation smaller than their male counterparts - 2.05. While the hypothesis could not be statistically tested, due to the above results, and therefore neither supported nor rejected, it can be said that the 11 female members of the House of Representatives included in the roll call analysis were actually slightly more conservative (though admittedly by a very small margin) in 1986 than their male counterparts. Indeed, there is no

evidence of any major gender difference in voting with regards to immigration, not in the 99th Congress House of Representatives.

Hypothesis Five (Table 6)

This hypothesis was able to be tested, despite the small sample for the number of minority legislators, which was once again further reduced due to absenteeism on the part of several members. Thus, the sample for minority legislators contained only 23 cases.

The results showed a clear, statistically significant difference between the two groups. The non-minority group scored a mean of 4.82, with a standard deviation of 2.48. In comparison, the numbers for the minority members were much smaller in both cases. With a mean result of 3.13 and a standard deviation of only 1.51, the minority Representatives were clearly much more in support of immigrants than their non minority House members. The difference between the two, 1.69, shows a clear identifiable gap. Not only that, but the minority group are also much more cohesive, showing less of a range than their

counterparts. Therefore, Hypothesis Five is supported - minority Representatives do favor less restrictive immigration laws than do other Representatives. However, the minority group of legislators is actually made up of several smaller groups. In order to examine the behavior of these subgroups, Hypothesis Six was also tested.

Hypothesis Six (Table 6)

This hypothesis compared the voting behavior of Hispanic and African American legislators. Due to the very small number of Hispanic legislators elected to the 99th Congress any comparison would not be statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis Six could not be tested with the 1986 data set. However, a comparison of all of the ethnic groups considered was undertaken to consider the differences between them.

This provided the following four groups for study: White, non minority Representatives (n=333), African American Representatives (n=16), Hispanic Representatives (n=5) and Asian Representatives (n=2). Due to the small number of Hispanic and Asian legislators they were compared

separately, and any results drawn from the equation are not statistically significant.

The non minority Representatives had a mean result of 4.82, and the highest standard deviation score overall - 2.48. The African American legislators had the lowest overall mean for minority legislators, averaging 2.93, with a standard deviation of 1.52. This result is somewhat surprising in light of the literature on immigration stances within the minority community. The Hispanic Representatives would have been expected to have a lower mean than the African American members, as the two communities have often been considered to be at odds with each other, and African American legislators have often supported greater immigration controls than other minority Representatives. However, the Hispanic mean of 3.8 is almost a full point higher (although the deviation of 1.63 for Hispanics is very similar to the African American result). The Asian mean was 3.00, with a standard deviation of 1.41. However, as mentioned above, the hypothesis itself could not be tested in light of the limited data provided from the 99th Congress.

Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)

The ages of the Representatives of the 99th House were the most wide ranging of all the variables. In order to compare the differing attitudes of the older and younger representatives they were combined into two major groups - the 54 and under group, and those 55 and over. Somewhat disappointing is the fact that once again the results obtained were not statistically significant - in any of the cases. Therefore, it would seem that age has no effect. A discussion of the results will provide for a view of any minor age related differences nonetheless.

Before controlling for party the results provided us with two groups with very similar voting behavior. The younger group recorded a mean of 4.78 with a standard deviation of 2.44. This was closely matched by their older brethren who had a slightly lower mean of 4.59, and an almost like, but slightly higher deviation of 2.51. Therefore, across party lines, there is bare difference between the two groups.

The Democrats had, in keeping with all previous results, a lower mean score as a party, in both cases. The younger Democrats had a mean score of 3.61. This was almost

identical to the older Democrats mean score of 3.44. The deviation with the groups was also extremely close, 2.06 and 1.99, respectively. Thus, although not statistically significant, the results are that younger Democrats actually score a higher mean than their elders in the party. The two groups are split between the elders (who come from the WWII generation, and before) and the younger groups, which starts with, and is mostly comprised of baby boomers.

The same does not hold true for the House Republicans in the 99th Congress, the younger members having a lower mean than their older party members. Once again, however, the differences are very small. The younger Republicans had a mean result of 6.26, with a deviation of 2.04. The older group had a mean score only one tenth of a point higher, 6.36, and an almost alike deviation of 2.20. So, although the hypothesis was not tested, the results, on their face, do not support such a contention in 1986.

Analysis of 1996 Data

The 1996 data set showed a number of changes from Congresses of previous years. The face of the average United States Congressional Representative had not changed

dramatically, but it had nonetheless changed. The average Representative was still a Congressman, but the number of women had jumped significantly; there were 44 female legislators contained within the data set. The ethnic makeup of the 104th Congress was still overwhelmingly non minority with 87.4 percent of the body being white. However, the data set now included 34 African American legislators and 14 Hispanics. The ages of the various Representatives were still providing the classic bell curve style, with the 45 to 54 year olds still comprising the largest single group.

Of course, the biggest difference of the 104th Congress was the party makeup. The House now saw a Republican majority; indeed, several of its members had not been alive the last time that this had taken place. Considering the results from the previous data set, these changes could mean much in the discussion and testing of the various hypothesis. Another factor that could affect the results was the state influence. Due to the population changes within the last census, California alone now comprised 12 percent of the House of Representatives and California has long been on the "front line" of the immigration issue. The

question could be asked why California is more hostile than New York, which also has a large immigrant population. There are several possible answers to this question, but perhaps the most important could be that New York City sees the largest concentration of immigrants, and recent immigrants, in one place. California has several immigrant communities spread all over the southern part of the state.

The 1996 data set provided several interesting statements. With 91 percent of the House providing full roll call voting records, the data set was well rounded in many respects. The total vote record showed a grouping at both ends of the spectrum, with only 16.7 percent falling into the middle values. Indeed, 49.5 percent of the Representatives scored 7 or over on the overall Favor/Not Favor Immigrant values. 39 Representatives scored a 10 (perfect Not Favor voting record) closely followed by 43 members who scored a nine. At the other end of the scale 28 Representatives scored zero (a perfect Favor Immigrant voting record) closely followed by 34 like minded individuals who scored one.

A pattern of more restrictive immigration voting seems to be evident solely from an analysis of the overall

picture. An examination of the individual hypothesis will now test this statement.

Hypothesis One (Table 1)

With the Republicans now in the majority it could well be surmised that the majority of legislation, if Hypothesis one is supported, will be Not Favor immigrant in nature.

Although not all of the bills/amendments/motions to be voted on on the House floor are presented by the majority party, it is a simple fact of political life that the majority of them are, and these are the ones also destined to pass.

Therefore, with a higher number of Not Favor Immigrant votes, the Not Favor Immigrant party, which according to hypothesis one, are the Republicans, should record a high mean. The results of the data set confirm both this statement and the hypothesis in question.

The Republicans score both a high mean, 8.10, and a low standard deviation, 1.66. This is in direct comparison to the Democratic mean of 3.27 and the Democratic deviation of 2.75. With such a clear difference of over four and one half points, the statement that Republicans favor more restrictive immigration laws than do Democrats cannot be in

doubt in this case. Not only are Republicans more in favor of restrictive immigration laws than Democrats, but they also vote in a much more cohesive manner on the issue than do the Democrats.

Hypothesis Two (Table 3)

The conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans has led to many comparisons of the voting record of those Democrats from the old states of Dixie. In the 104th Congress there is very little difference between the voting behavior of these two groups. Furthermore, the result was not statistically significant, and the hypothesis cannot be supported.

The Southern Democrats had a mean of 3.80, with a fairly high deviation of 3.34. The deviation for the Democrats from the other regions was lower, at 2.45, but the mean was very similar indeed, 3.08. Therefore, by an examination of behavior it would seem that on the issue of immigration there is very little regional difference in the Democratic party - except perhaps that the Southern Democrats tend to be less cohesive as a unit when it comes to immigration voting. It could be surmised therefore, that

the southern coalition is gone - at least with regards to the immigration issue.

Hypothesis Three (Table 4)

The Representatives from the immigration heavy states did have a fairly high mean of 5.24. They also had a wide standard deviation of 3.5. This would certainly seem to make them more in favor of restrictive immigration policies than not. However, the Representatives from the non immigrant heavy states had a higher mean of 6.30, and although they also had a wide standard deviation it was smaller than the comparison group at 3.07. So, it would seem that in the 104th Congress the Representatives from the states with less immigrant populations actually prefer more restrictive immigration laws.

One major factor must be taken into consideration with this result. There could be a significant influence of partisanship in the result; the Republican Representatives have already recorded a much higher mean than their Democratic counterparts. In light of this, party was controlled for and the hypothesis was tested again. The Republican Representatives from the first group (the

immigrant heavy states) had a mean score of 7.90, in comparison to their Democratic counterparts mean of only 2.42. The partisan deviations were only 0.36 apart, with the Republicans having the lowest with a 2.00 deviation. But, once again, the other groups, in both party cases, had higher means. The Republicans in the second group had a mean of 8.20, and a much smaller deviation of 1.45. The Democrats in the second group had a mean higher than the Democrats in the first, recording 3.81. They also had the highest deviation for all four of the groups, with 3.81. While the Democratic result was statistically significant at the 95 percent level, the Republican result was not.

Therefore, the hypothesis can be rejected overall, and can be rejected for the Democratic party in particular. In the case of Republican Representatives the hypothesis has not been rejected or supported. It could be argued that this is because the results of the two sub-groups are so similar that the regional, or constituency, influence has very little effect on a Republican Representative when it comes to the immigration issue.

Hypothesis Four (Table 2)

As mentioned above, there were 44 female Representatives included in the overall data set. Only 39 of them recorded a vote, or stance, on all ten roll call votes studied. This provided a large enough sample to test the hypothesis. The result was that women in Congress did indeed prefer less restrictive immigration laws than their male counterparts. The female mean was 4.02, with a standard deviation of 3.21. Although the male deviation was only 0.01 higher, their mean was over two full points higher at 6.12. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported for the 104th Congress.

It is possible that there were other factors that could have affected the voting behavior of the female Representatives. It could well be that party, minority status, or even age, could have all played roles in their voting record. This was not testable due to the fact that subdivision of the female group did not provide enough examples within each sub group to test. So, beyond stating that women do prefer less restrictive immigration policies than men, no other statement can be made.

Hypothesis Five (Table 6)

The minority representation within the 104th Congress was, in comparison with previous years, fairly significant. In all 46 minority Representatives could be included in the sample. These 46 individuals recorded one of the smallest means in the study, having an average total vote score of 1.93. This was very much in contrast with the non minority mean of 6.47. The difference of over four and a one half points provides a clear contrast in the voting behavior of Representatives based on their race/ethnic status. The deviation for each group was very alike, with the minority group having the smallest deviation of 2.54, only 0.4 points lower than their counterparts.

The hypothesis can be fully supported - minority Representatives do favor less restrictive immigration laws than their fellow non minority Representatives, and support restrictive laws, such as those proposed and passed in the 104th Congress, by a much smaller level.

Hypothesis Six (Table 6)

Minority Representation is not monolithic in nature. The interests of the African American Community and the

Hispanic community are not identical. Therefore, the hypothesis that Hispanics would favor less restrictive immigration laws than African Americans was also tested. It cannot be accepted or rejected though, mainly due to the small number of Hispanic legislators. Only 14 recorded full roll call vote scores. However, of those 14 the average mean was the lowest mean in the study - 0.857. The Hispanic group also recorded the lowest standard deviation of all - 0.864. Indeed, no Hispanic Representative, irrespective of state, party, or gender, recorded a total vote score above 2, and several had a perfect zero. On the issue of immigration the Hispanic Representatives deserted their party colleagues and voted with their minority bedfellows.

The African American legislators also achieved a very low mean of only 1.93, although their deviation was much higher at 2.65. So, in examined behavior these two minority groups are very much in favor of less restrictive immigration policies than the non minority House Members. This was not the case for the Asian Representatives. Three Asians recorded a mean score of 3.66, with a wide ranging deviation of 5.50. It would seem that the Asian Representatives range widely in individual behavior.

Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)

An overall comparison of the voting behavior of the different age groups in the 104th Congress did not prove significant. The hypothesis examined this behavior at the party level, however, and here the results for the Republican party did prove to be marginally significant¹⁰. This did mean that the hypothesis was proven. On the other hand, with the older group of Republicans in the 104th Congress having a mean of 8.36, in comparison to their younger colleagues mean of 7.96, the older, non minority Republicans had the edge on preferring more restrictive immigration laws. Both had very small deviation within each sub group - the older group being more cohesive by 0.32, with a standard deviation of 1.43.

The Democrats, even though their data was not statistically significant also gave an opposite view of the proposed hypothesis. The younger non minority Democrats had a mean of 3.55, just under a point higher than their older colleagues score of 2.89. The deviations were almost identical, the younger group being 0.01 point lower at 2.73.

¹⁰. The actual significance of this cross tabulation was 0.088. The Democratic variable had a significance of 0.114.

Chapter Five

Temporal Comparison of Voting Behavior

The two data sets clearly provide the view of a changing pattern of immigration voting. Moreover, they provide a view of a changing Congress. An examination of the Representatives from the 99th Congress and the 104th Congress shows us more - more women, more African Americans, more Hispanics, and more Republicans. In most cases the growth is not significant in real numbers, but in percentage growth it is often huge. Also, the changes as to how the House as a whole, and how Representatives as individuals, operate have been well recorded elsewhere. There have been many reforms, both as an institution, and with the new Republican majority, in how the majority party operates.

Another significant change is the drop in absenteeism rates on the selected roll call votes. In the selected votes from 1986, 79 House members had incomplete records. By 1996 this number had dropped by half to 39 - a significant change in vote attendance of just over 50 percent.

All of these changes reflect upon the House in general. In regards to changes on immigration voting in particular, there are also significant findings. The cohesiveness of both parties within the House have also changed. In 1986 the House had, as had been the standard for some time, a Democratic majority. With this majority the Democrats also had the lowest deviation rate of 2.03, with their respected opponents across the aisle being fairly similar at a rate of 2.09. In 1996 the House majority party, now the Republicans also had the lowest deviation rate, which stood at a low 1.66. In contrast to this, the Democrats had seen their cohesiveness disappear, and they now recorded a standard deviation on immigration issues of 2.75. A party that had lost the majority now seemed to have lost some of the glue that held that majority together.

The age groups of Representatives had also undergone changes. In 1986 both parties had a ratio of almost 2:1 in favor of the under 54 crowd. But, in 1996, only two years after the "fabled" entrance of the Republican freshman class

of 1994 the over 55 Representatives had grown in size - in both parties.¹¹

I shall now examine each separate hypothesis, by directly comparing the results from each separate data set, bearing in mind Hypothesis Eight; The Data from the 99th Congress and the Data from the 104th Congress will show a shift towards a more restrictive view of immigration in the House of Representatives, at all levels, and within all groups.

Comparison of Hypothesis One (Table 1)

The party scores show two distinct movements. As discussed above, the cohesiveness of both parties have changed. The Republicans have become more cohesive in their voting on immigration since they have become the majority party, while the Democrats have moved in the opposite direction. But, most important of all, is the obvious shift of the Republican majority towards a more restrictive view of immigration. This is especially important as they are now the party in control of the House agenda.

¹¹. Nonetheless, the Republicans were the "youngest" party in terms of younger members - the largest group of over 55+ being Democrats, who comprised 42 percent of their House caucus.

The Democrats, in direct contrast to the stated hypothesis have actually moved towards a less restrictive stance on immigration - although this movement has been fairly small and accompanied by a larger growth in the party standard deviation rates on immigration voting. The movements by the parties do not bode well for those individuals who support a more liberal view of immigration in the United States

Comparison of Hypothesis Two (Table 3.1)

The argument over a possible realignment of the voting behavior of the South of the United States has not been made in this paper; it is well recorded and discussed elsewhere. What can be discussed, and has been highlighted, is the difference in the voting behavior of Southern Democrats and their party colleagues from the North. The obvious differences between the two groups was well displayed in the immigration voting behavior of the 99th Congress. However, by the 104th Congress this behavior had changed to such a level that it was difficult to attach any statistical significance to the results between the two groups. This is possibly due to the fact that the differences between the

groups had become almost non-existent. Whatever the fortunes of the Democratic party in the South, there seems to be a lessening of regional differences when it comes to the immigration issue. Although we can attach no statistical significance to the results from 1996 it is important to note that the mean figures dropped, once again the Democrats have not agreed with the proposed hypothesis statement. It is also interesting to note that the deviation rates for the Democrats (in both areas) rose again, a pattern that seems to be repeating itself.

Comparison of Hypothesis Three (Table 3.1)

Another look at regions, first across party lines, also recorded some interesting changes. Even though the hypothesis was rejected in both cases, there was a clear movement by both regional groups of Representatives to move towards a more restrictive view of immigration. Not only that, but the Representatives from the Non Immigrant Heavy states actually increased their support for restrictive laws at a greater rate than their opposite numbers. At the same time, the Representatives from Immigrant Heavy states saw a significant increase in their deviation rates - perhaps an

indication that the voting in those areas has become more extreme - at both ends, rather than just supportive of less restrictive laws.

In examining the changes when accounting for party the Democrats have become more supportive of restrictive immigration laws, in both groups, but only by very small increments, almost non-existent in the less immigrant populated state group. At the same time their deviation rate as a party has increased again. This latter fact is fast becoming a staple trend in each hypothesis.

On the other hand the Republicans' behavior has yet again not proven to be statistically significant. But, on face value, it can be seen that they have increased their support, in both groups, for restrictive immigration policies - at a higher rate than their Democratic counterparts. Also, their deviation rates have fallen in both areas, keeping in line with the party norm.

Comparison of Hypothesis Four (Table 2)

The significant increase in the number of female Representatives between 1986 and 1996 made the results for the second data set just that - significant. What is

noteworthy is that the female group, like the Democratic group in Congress, (the two, of course, overlap heavily) moved against the majority tide and recorded a lower mean for the 104th Congress, unlike their male counterparts, who recorded a fairly significant rise. This is tempered by the fact that both groups also saw a fairly significant rise in the deviation rates. There can be no doubt, though, that there is a clear difference in voting behavior on immigration based on gender, and that Hypothesis Four is clearly supported in 1996.

Comparison of Hypothesis Five (Table 4)

The comparison of the minority and non-minority voting behavior provides one of the most contrasting examples of voting behavior on immigration issue in either Congress. This is most clearly the case in 1996. During the ten year period between data sets both groups moved, in opposite directions. While the non-minority group has supported the final hypothetical statement, the minorities have not. They are now the most obvious supporters of less restrictive immigration policies, with their voting record having shifted almost fifty percent in favor of more restrictive

policies. Once again this drop in the mean has also seen a rise in the corresponding deviation. The deviation rate for minorities is still fairly small, compared to other identifiable groups (such as the Democrats, or female Representatives) but the rise is still fairly strong.

There can be, however, no argument over the difference between minorities and non-minorities when it comes to voting on immigration issues; the almost five point gap provides a clear battle line based on minority status that crosses all other lines, party, gender, age or region.

Comparison of Hypothesis Six (Table 4)

An examination of the separate minorities supports the assertions made above. Such an examination also clearly supports Hypothesis Six. The Hispanic Representatives in Congress not only recorded a much smaller mean in the 104th Congress, their group deviation was almost nonexistent. While both the African American group and the Hispanic group record low support for restrictive immigration policies there is a significant drop in that support by the Hispanic group. Like the Democratic party (to which the majority of both minorities, but not all, belong) they have recorded a

drop in their mean, against the stated hypothesis, and the Hispanics have done so while recording a drop in their deviation rates - no other group has done that in this study.¹²

Comparison of Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)

The hypothesis based on age was not proven due to the fact that all but one of the data set results proved to be statistically insignificant. Although a discussion of their face value shows that, overall, they rise in both mean support for restrictive immigration policies, and deviation rates within the two groups.

At the party level, the Democrats again, by recorded action, disprove the hypothesis in question. The mean for each age group did drop between the 99th and 104th Congresses, but once again the deviation rates for the Democrats rose - in direct contrast to the deviation rates of the Republicans which fell. Indeed, the one statistically significant cross tabulation of hypothesis

¹². While not included in the hypothesis, and the results not being statistically significant, it is interesting to note that the Asian Representatives went against the majority tide. In recording a higher mean in 1996 they also recorded the highest deviation of any identified group.

seven was the 1996 comparison of older and younger Republicans. Both groups had higher means, and lower deviations, than their counterparts in the 99th Congress. But, in contrast to what many would, expect, the older Republican party members in the 104th Congress recorded a higher mean than their younger counterparts. It would seem that the fabled GOP "freshman" are either less ideologically right wing on immigration than is generally thought, or that the group contains a number of older members.

All in all, Hypothesis Seven was rejected, due in all but one case to insufficient statistical data, and in the other by the proven statistical behavior of older, non-minority Republicans.

Hypothesis Eight

The support for Hypothesis Eight has proven to be great. The tables below provide example after example of growing support for restrictive immigration policies. Although a few groups have recorded declines of various sizes in their mean score, such changes are either small in scale, or the groups themselves are small in number. Also, the fact that the majority party (Republicans) and the

majority ethnic and gender group (non-minority males) have recorded significant increases in their means outweighs any gains for the pro immigrant groups.

Also, an examination of Table six provides a glaring example of the changes in immigration policy and support for immigration restrictions. The clear polarization that has occurred between 1986 and 1996, and the fact that this polarization has been rather one sided, leaves very little doubt about where the vast majority of Representatives stood in the 104th Congress. The percentage increases in those Representatives scoring eight or above, when compared to those scoring three or below, is staggering when one considers that the period of time that involved such a move was a scant ten years. Clearly, Hypothesis Eight, while not overwhelmingly supported (the increase in support for more restrictive immigration laws has not occurred at all levels, or within all groups) is supported.

Table 1

Party Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Party	1986 Mean	1986 Deviation	1996 Mean	1996 Deviation
Dem.	3.55** (205)	2.03	3.27** (179)	2.75
Rep.	6.29** (151)	2.09	8.10** (217)	1.66

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

** Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 2

Gender scores on Immigration Roll Call voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Male	1986	1986	1996	1996
	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Deviation
Males	4.71	2.47	6.12***	3.22
	(345)		(356)	
Females	5.00	2.04	4.02***	3.21
	(11)		(39)	

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

** Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 3

Regional Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Party	1986	1986	1996	1996
	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Deviation
Dem.				
(South)	4.82***	2.13	3.80	3.43
	(63)		(47)	
Dem.				
(North)	2.99***	1.72	3.08	2.45
	(142)		(132)	
IM"	4.38	2.52	5.24***	3.50
	(121)		(144)	
Non-IM	4.88	2.41	6.30***	3.07***
	(235)		(252)	

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

** Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

" Those states regarded by Congress as immigrant heavy.

Table 4

Regional Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996. Controlling for Party.

Party	1986	1986	1996	1996
	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Deviation
IM" (D)	3.22*	2.03	2.42***	2.36
	(70)		(70)	
Non-IM(D)	3.72*	2.02	3.81***	2.85
	(135)		(109)	
IM" (R)	5.98	2.26	7.90	2.00
	(51)		(74)	
Non-IM(R)	6.46	1.98	8.20	1.45
	(100)		(143)	

" Those states regarded by Congress as Immigrant Heavy.

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

** Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 5

Immigration Roll Call Voting Comparison by Age in the 99th and 104th Congress - 1986, 1996.

Age	1986 Mean	1986 Deviation	1996 Mean	1996 Deviation
Under 54	4.78 (237)	2.44	6.06 (239)	3.12
55 Plus	4.59 (119)	2.51	5.69 (156)	3.49
Controlling for Party...				
Dem.				
Under 54	3.61 (133)	2.06	3.55 (103)	2.73
55 Plus	3.44 (72)	1.99	2.89 (76)	2.74
Rep.				
Under 54	6.26 (104)	2.04	7.96* (136)	1.76
55 Plus	6.36 (47)	2.20	8.36* (80)	1.43

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 6

Immigration Roll Call Voting Comparison by Minority Status
in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Status	1986 Mean	1986 Deviation	1996 Mean	1996 Deviation
Non	4.82*** (333)	2.48	6.47*** (349)	2.49
African- American	2.93*** (16)	1.52	1.93*** (29)	2.65
Hispanic	3.80 (5)	1.64	0.85* (14)	0.86
Asian	3.00 (2)	1.41	3.66 (3)	5.50

* Significant at the 0.10 level.

** Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 7

Actual Score of All Representatives for Selected Roll Call
Votes

Total #	# of 1986 Reps.	# of 1996 Reps.	% Change
0	3	28	933
1	27	34	26
2	48	26	-46
3	63	27	-57
4	39	20	-49
5	40	19	-52
6	30	27	-10
7	39	36	-8
8	46	66	43
9	19	70	370
10	2	43	2150
No Total	79	39	
<hr/>			
Total	435	435	

The total figure is the sum of each representative Favor Immigrant/Not Favor Immigrant voting record.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The changes in immigration law that have taken place within the last ten years have been almost staggering in their volume. In 1995 - 1996 alone, there were three major immigration reform bills passed and signed into law by the United States government. All of these bills have been, in general, more restrictive in nature than the existing framework and regulations then in place. The changes have been so fast and furious that the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been unable to advise immigration groups or lawyers about what the (then) current law means. These changes have been one indication of the changing nature of the support for immigration, and related immigration policies, within the United States Congress. This study has been another.

An overview of the hypotheses, supported or not, upon which this study is based has shown great movement towards a more restrictive view of immigration overall.

The results from the various statistical analysis show major support for Hypothesis Eight. Upon close examination, it can be seen that the support for more restrictive immigration policies has grown between the time of the 99th Congress and the time of the 104th Congress. Except for a

few exceptions, this support has transcended regional and party lines. While the Democratic mean actually dropped, the change in deviation shows that support for more restrictive immigration policies is not confined to the Republican party alone.

We are left with the question of what the data results mean. In considering the results we should consider two things. First the changes in support for immigration reform (read restrictions), and second, the changes in the tone and nature of the legislation. There can be very little doubt by examining the vote synopsis in Appendix A that the language of the debate in the 104th Congress was much more severe in nature than that of the 99th. Plus, the intent of the majority of 1996 immigration bills supporters was to restrict immigration, both legal and illegal, give greater authority to remove immigrants, again from either group, within the United States, and restrict the rights and privileges of those now in the United States, or likely to come in the future. The most obvious conclusion that one can make from all of the above data and examination is that the congressional support for restrictive immigration has grown considerably in the last few years and the supporters of restrictive immigration policies now constitute a large majority of the House of Representatives of the United States.

It can also be clearly concluded that the immigration issue has become more and more a factitious one, and that divisions within parties, and other identifiable groups exist within the U.S. House. Also, the supporters for greater restrictions on immigration, and the detractors from these policies have become more extreme in their recorded behavior. A clear polarization in the debate has occurred.

However, these conclusions are based upon a study that, like any study, is not complete nor exhaustive. Perhaps one of the most obvious shortcomings of this study is that, as with many roll call studies, it does not address every immigration roll call vote taken in the respective congresses. Rather, it is based upon a numerical representation and shorter selection of the votes available. It may well be that the inclusion of all immigration votes taken in the House during the 99th and 104 Congress would provide a deeper insight into the behavior and manner of such voting.

Also, the limitation of variables within the study has also restricted the results and the view of my analysis into the 99th and 104th Congress. With only five variables on each Representative, the limitations on any further examination are numerous. The presence, or perhaps I should say absence, of larger groups of minorities and women in the respective congresses also restricts my ability to comment

on their behavior. With a smaller group to study it is often difficult to portray that behavior as truly representative of either minorities or women. Rather, it is only a representation of those specific individuals.

Future Possibilities for Study

Given the limitations stated above, there are several ways in which this study could benefit from further growth. Given the time and resources, a full analysis of all roll call votes on immigration issues in the 99th and 104th Congress could be made. An increase in the number of individual variables, and a further definition of some of the current variables could also be made. These could include such things as an examination of the nature of each Representatives' constituency, consideration of the presence of any foreign born Representatives (there are some), the actual number of immigrants that are present within constituencies, and the consideration of the electoral margin at the last general election.

The statistical tools employed in the analysis of the data could also be increased. With greater information and data at hand, and a more in depth study, the next step would be a multi-variate analysis and the creation of roll call models to explain, and predict, voting behavior of Representatives on immigration issues. This study is

important in that it provides an insight into the changing ideological balance within the United States House of Representatives regarding immigration, and the rights of immigrants. It clearly shows a movement towards a more conservative viewpoint on the part of the 104th Congress, and on the part of the Republican majority in that chamber. Further study, and deeper analysis of the results could yield a greater understanding of why and how these changes have taken place.

Appendix A

Selected Roll Call Votes

Selected 1986 Votes

The following ten votes were selected from the larger number of recorded roll call votes that were taken in relation to the house legislation, and the conference report. All the recorded roll call votes were considered and the final ten listed below were selected as being a representative group which would provide wide ranging examples of support for or against particular immigration controls or regulations. (See previous footnote). An indication of the President's position is given only if one was known. Each vote is labeled with the CQ House Vote number from the 1986 CQ Almanac.

H413 - Adoption of House Resolution 580

The vote was to adopt House Resolution 580 to provide for House floor consideration of and to waive points of order against the bill to revise the nation's immigration laws. The vote was in favor of adoption by 278-129. The Republicans were almost evenly split, 88-81, while the Democrats were more solidly aligned for, with a vote of 190-48.

H415 - Amendment to the Bill - Bartlett (R-TX)

The vote was on an amendment to allow civil, rather than criminal, penalties for those employers who knowingly engage in the practice, or have a practice of hiring undocumented or illegal aliens. It was rejected by a vote of 137-264, with the Democrats voting three to one against but the Republicans being much more evenly split with only a 26 vote difference between support and rejection.

H416 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Sensenbrenner (R-WI)

The vote was on an amendment to strike the provisions which barred discrimination based on citizenship status, and also upon setting up a special Justice Department office to investigate and prosecute non-citizen bias claims against employers. Those voting Yea were in support of the President's position. The amendment was rejected by a vote of 140-260 with strong partisan differences. Only 25 Democrats supported the amendment and only 54 Republicans opposed it.

H417 - Amendment to the Bill - De la Garza (D-TX)

The vote was on an amendment to the bill which would require the Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and employees to obtain warrants before searching working parties operating in open areas and fields for those

violating immigration laws. Those voting Nay were in support of the President's position. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 221-170. The Republican party was almost evenly split on the issue, with the Democrats having 45 more votes in support than not.

H418 - Amendment to the Bill - Gonzalez (D-TX)

The vote was on amendment to the bill which would have made any family that applied for housing assistance eligible if one member was so eligible regardless of the legal status of other family members. The amendment was soundly rejected by a vote of 73-310, with only five Republicans and only 68 Democrats supporting it.

H419 - Amendment to Strike - McCollum (R-FL)

The vote was on an amendment to strike those provisions that would grant legal status to millions of aliens who were currently illegal under existing law, as long as they met specific set requirements contained within the provisions in question. Rejected by a very close vote of 192-199, the Republicans were strong in support with a split of 124-40, and the Democrats were strongly in opposition with a vote of 68-159.

H420 - Amendment to Strike - Fish (R-NY)

The vote was on an amendment to strike the provisions of the bill that would grant temporary refugee status to Nicaraguan or Salvadorean citizens already in the United States. This was the closest vote of any of the bills included in this study was only rejected by two votes, 197-199. The Republicans voted 145-22, while the Democrats were in opposition with a stance of 52-177.

H421 - Passage of the Bill

The vote was on passage of the bill to overhaul the immigration laws then in force. The bill would create a system of criminal and civil penalties against those employers who wilfully or knowingly hire illegal or undocumented aliens. It would further provide legal status to millions of aliens who were currently illegal or undocumented but present in the United States. A special program was created for certain foreign born individuals who could prove a history of working in American agriculture to gain legal status. The bill was passed 230-166, with solid Democratic support of 168-61. The Republicans opposed the bill with a more split vote of 62-105.

H432 - Adoption of the Rule (H Res 592)

Vote to adopt the House rule to waive any and all points of order against House Floor consideration of the conference report on the bill to overhaul the nation's existing immigration laws. Adopted by a vote of 274-132. The Democrats supported it overwhelmingly with a vote of 204-33. The Republicans were very split with a vote of 70-99.

H433 - Adoption of the Conference Report

Vote to adopt the conference report. The report contained most of the provision in the original house legislation and the summary of vote number H421 discussed above. Passed by a vote of 238-173, the Republicans vetoing 77-93 and the Democrats split two to one in favor by voting 161-80.

Selected 1996 Votes

The following ten votes were selected from the larger number of recorded roll call votes that were taken in regards to the House legislation, and subsequent Conference reports. All the recorded roll call votes were considered and the final ten listed below were chosen as being a representative group which would provide wide ranging examples of support for or against particular immigration controls or regulations. An indication of the Presidents

position is given only if one was known. Each vote is labelled using the CQ House Vote number from the respective CQ Weekly for that time period.

H72 - Amendment to the Bill - McCollum (R-FL)

The vote was on amendment to direct the Social Security Administration to alter the material used, and change the design of, the Social Security Card. This would be done in an effort to improve them against fraud and counterfeiting. Rejected by a vote of 191-221. The main swing vote was from Republicans, who voted 100-129, who argued this was one step closer to a national identity card, The Democrats were split evenly 91-91.

H73 - Amendment to the Bill - Bryant (R-TN)

The vote was on an amendment to the bill to require medical facilities open to the public to provide the Immigration and Naturalization Service with information about illegal aliens that were treated at those facilities. This would be a condition of receiving public monies and would be applicable to those aged 18 and over only. It was rejected by a vote of 170-250. This result was reached with strong Democratic opposition of 9-178. The Republicans were more in favor of support with a vote of 161-71.

H74 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Velazquez (D-NY)

The vote was on an amendment to strike provisions from the bill which provided for keeping undocumented aliens from applying for various forms of federal or state aid (such as food stamps) on behalf of their U.S. born children.

Receiving support from both sides of the aisle, but mainly from the Democrats, the amendment failed 151-269. The Republicans were strongly opposed, 21-211, while the Democrats were more split, 129-58.

H75 - Amendment to the Bill - Gallegly (R-CA)

The vote was on an amendment to the bill that would allow states, if they so chose, to deny public education to illegal aliens. The amendment did include provisions that would allow a challenge to schools decisions if the parents of the child, or child, could prove they were citizens or legally present in the U.S. The amendment was strongly opposed by the White House, a nay being a vote in favor of the President's position. The amendment passed 257-163. The Republicans voted for overwhelming support, 213-20, while the Democrats were more opposed, 44-142.

H76 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Chabot (R-OH)

The vote was on an amendment to strike provisions from the bill which established a voluntary system under which

employers in five of the seven states with the highest number of illegal immigrants could use a telephone system to verify the immigrant status of employees. The bill was rejected 159-260. It received equal support from both Republicans, 79-152, and Democrats, 79-108.

H78 - Amendment to the Bill - Canady (R-FL)

The vote was on an amendment to the bill which would require new immigrants who were arriving under the Diversity Immigrant Program or the Employment Based Class to be able to pass a standardized English test administered by the Department of Education. This was the closest vote on any amendment to the bill and passed by three votes 210-207. The amendment received strong support from the Republicans. 182-50, but scant support from the Democrats, 28-156.

H88 - Motion to Recommit - Bryant (D-TX)

The vote was on a motion to recommit to the House Judiciary Committee the complete bill, with instructions to require limitations on situations where U.S. workers could temporarily be replaced by foreign workers. The motion was rejected by a vote of 188-231. The Republicans vetoing 14-219 and the Democrats voting 173-12.

H89 - Motion to Pass

The vote was on a motion to pass the bill to limit legal and illegal immigrants access to public benefits, reduce the types of documents that could be used to prove eligibility for employment, increase the border controls and size of border patrols, increase penalties for fraud in immigration cases. The bill would also establish a voluntary telephone system for verify employment eligibility. Passed by a vote of 333-87. The Republicans voted as a block, 228-6, while the Democrats were more divided, 105-80.

H432 - Adoption of the Conference Report

Adoption of the Conference Report on the bill which would increase the number of border patrol agents, install fences along the California-Mexico border, and make it easier to detain and deport illegal immigrants. The bill also imposed higher income requirements on sponsors of illegal immigrants (up to two times the poverty level), and deny federal programs to both illegal and legal immigrants. Adopted and sent to the Senate by a vote of 305-123. The Republican vote was a solid 229-5, while the Democrats were in opposition to the bill, 76-117).

H433 - HR 4134 Passage of the Bill

The vote was on passage of HR 4134, which was originally part of HR 2202. This bill would allow states to bar illegal immigrant children from public education, effective as of July 1, 1997. States would not be permitted to bar children who had already started their schooling from finishing that current phase. A vote of nay was in agreement with the President's stated position. The bill was passed by a vote of 254-175. with the Republicans voting 213-21, and the Democrats 41-153.

Appendix B

Vote Coding Lists

A score of 1 indicates a Not Favor Immigrant stance

A score of 0 indicates a Favor Immigrant stance.

1986 Vote Coding List

H16 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H415 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H416 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H417 Yes Vote = 0

No Vote = 1

H418 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H419 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H420 Yes Vote = 1

No Vote = 0

H421 Yes Vote = 0

No Vote = 1

H432 Yes Vote = 0

No Vote = 1

H433 Yes Vote = 0
No Vote = 1

1996 Vote Coding List

H72 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H73 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H74 Yes Vote = 0
No Vote = 0

H75 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H76 Yes Vote = 0
No Vote = 1

H78 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H88 Yes Vote = 0
No Vote = 1

H89 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H432 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

H433 Yes Vote = 1
No Vote = 0

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