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
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Coercion in U.S. Foreign Policy: Evaluating the Utility

of the Jentleson and Whytock Model

(TITLE)

BY

John D. Hamilton

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
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IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

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**Coercion in U.S. Foreign Policy: Evaluating the Utility
of the Jentleson and Whytock Model**

John Hamilton
Political Science Department
Master's Thesis
Fall of 2009

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to test the utility of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, which stems from their study of U.S. foreign policy with Libya. Their study established a model of foreign policy coercion, which they maintain helps explain why Libyan foreign policy changed so radically during the presidency of George W. Bush. The model is applied to American policy, implemented from the Carter administration to that of George W. Bush, towards Iran, Burma (Myanmar) and North Korea. The coercive strategies used by each administration are compared against the prescription and projection purported by the model in order to determine if it accurately predicts the success or failure of past policy and thus, offers predictable utility for projecting future outcomes for foreign policy. The findings indicate that the model has some utility and largely explains success or failure in past American coercion towards Iran, Burma and North Korea. It neglects, however, particular mitigating external factors which were evident in some coercion cases, as well as unique internal characteristics of other states that may either enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of prescribed coercive strategies in achieving future diplomatic goals.

DEDICATION

*For Olivia, Zara, Tiera and Jennifer, who were gracious enough to tolerate the sacrifice
of so much time to help their dad make it happen.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The use of coercion in dealing with foreign states, cultures and societies is likely as old as human society itself. The merits of coercive diplomacy as an option to direct use of the military have a recorded history of some 2500 years. Sun Tzu, in *The Art of War* (translation by Sawyer 1993), claimed that the pinnacle of warfare is to achieve victory without engaging your enemy in battle. Had he lived in our modern era of political diplomacy and global relations, he might well have modified this statement to claim that the pinnacle of coercive diplomacy is to convince your enemy to change his policies without bombing or invading his country. Similarly, assuming Clausewitz's dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means is true, then coercive diplomacy could be rightly said to be "a continuation of policy by limited means."

Historically, U.S. policymakers have deemed economic sanctions as a politically inexpensive coercive strategy of foreign policy towards states deemed with threatening behavior. Franssen and Morton (2002) note that sanctions are the most common form of coercive strategy employed by the United States. But sanctions as a form of coercion are popular in the foreign policy of many states. By the mid 1990s, 47 states were subject to economic pressure through sanctions employed by other states (Marinov 2005).

The U.S. government responded to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, by taking a more aggressive posture towards states deemed to present threats to U.S. security and interests. Page and Bouton (2006:100) note that "since the terrorist attacks in September, 2001, there has been a substantial willingness to use force" against real or

perceived enemies, “but most Americans (still) prefer diplomatic methods with force as a last resort.” Over the next few years, there were periodic media reports of discussions in the Bush administration about the possibility of an invasion of Iran or air strikes to eliminate suspected nuclear sites that might produce weapons grade material which could be used against Israel or the United States (GlobalSecurity.org 2007). Similar discussions and random speculations have appeared concerning North Korea as well.

Research by Jentleson and Whytock (2006) has revealed coercive strategies can be slow in producing results and the temptation to resort to the use of force to alter state behavior may appear to be the simple answer for an administration when patience for success with the target state is lacking. Such was the choice for the Ronald Reagan administration when it decided to launch air strikes against the Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. The decision to send airstrikes was based on a belief that this action would display American resolve for changes in Libyan policy and would subsequently persuade the Libyan public to withdraw its support for the leader. Their study also revealed that the perception of the Reagan administration was ultimately incorrect and the result of that action was increased support for the Libyan dictator among the population, increased resistance to U.S. pressure and a continuation of the undesirable behaviors the United States had hoped to change.

The increasing proliferation of nuclear technology to states with unknown motives and with histories of aggressive behavior or connections to terrorist organizations exponentially increases the importance of successful U.S. foreign policy for national security. Policy failure can bring with it the potential for significant costs in both

economic terms and in human life, in addition to the risks to national security. Thus, the questions concerning which coercive strategies are most likely to be successful for U.S. foreign policy have arguably taken on greater importance today than ever before.

This thesis focuses on three states; Iran, North Korea and Myanmar (Burma), where U.S. coercive diplomacy is currently active and whose current behaviors ostensibly present a threat to U.S. national security and interests abroad. U.S. relations with Iran have been uneasy at best since the ouster of the U.S. supported Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the hostage crisis of 1979. Its powerful influence in the Middle East, defiance of U.N. mandates, threatening posture towards Israel and continued pursuit of nuclear technology all present a serious and broadly recognized concern for global security. Nuclear weapons testing by North Korea, threatening rhetoric from an arguably unstable dictator and missile technology that could allow a nuclear warhead to strike Japan, would seem to require a careful strategic approach to achieve success.

Myanmar is ruled by a military junta which overthrew an ineffective democracy in 1962. After rejecting the results of a democratic election, this junta imprisoned the opposition leader, and committed a long list of human rights abuses, including imprisonments and killings. Its close relationship with China, who has supplied advanced weapons, military development and training in exchange for greater access to the Indian Ocean for its military has become an increasing concern to the United States and allies such as India (Bert 2004).

Given the inherent risks and high stakes associated in dealing with such foreign states today, would military strikes actually accomplish America's policy goals for

behavioral change in such governments which are currently hostile to U.S. and global security interests? Would such actions more likely incur negative consequences; perhaps hardening their resistance to change? What coercive strategies are most likely to succeed? These are the central questions this thesis will examine, through focused case studies of past and current U.S. foreign policy coercion towards these three states.

This thesis draws upon the core coercion concepts and theories of Alexander George (1971, 1991), and builds upon the research presented by Jentleson and Whytock (2006) who analyzed and compared the coercive strategies employed by the United States from the Reagan administration to that of George W. Bush towards Libya. These authors maintained that the Libya case would be significant to policy debates concerning coercive diplomacy in relation to other states, specifically noting Iran, and that their model helped provide insight on how successful coercive diplomacy strategies may be employed in the future by U.S. policymakers.

The goal of this thesis is to facilitate a continuation of the concepts proposed by Jentleson and Whytock in order to evaluate the utility of their model as well as the prospects for similarly effective coercive strategies to be implemented with other states. The findings of the U.S. diplomatic coercion cases of Iran, North Korea and Myanmar will help us better understand the utility of the Jentleson and Whytock model as these states share some common characteristics, but differ in others as well. The consistency of any model of coercion is essential in determining its value as a tool for planning foreign policy. In accordance with the Jentleson and Whytock research, this thesis employs the

same two sets of variables; coercer state strategy, and the target state's domestic politics and economy.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

Coercive strategies in foreign policy are actions, short of military confrontation, taken by one state to force or intimidate another state to comply with its demands. To paraphrase George (1971:18, 1991:5), the aim of coercive strategies is to convince the opponent (target country) that the costs of noncompliance will be so unbearable, it will lose its motivation to continue its course of action. Jentleson and Whytock (2006) maintain that successful coercion is about striking a balance between the benefits and costs offered by the coercer, whereas the target must have more to benefit from compliance and much to lose from noncompliance.

Coercion is used to persuade a target to stop, undo or reverse a course of action. It is not to be confused with deterrence, which is employed against another state to prevent an action or aggression before it has begun (George 1971, 1991). Coercive strategies can take several forms including sanctions, threats, limited aggressive action (such as the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the waters near the target state's coast) or a combination of these forms. Economic sanctions can also take several forms as well. Formal sanctions include a general trade ban between states which affects most of the trade between the two parties. Economic warfare is a more aggressive form of enforcing trade restrictions which often includes the use of the military, such as a naval blockade of the ports of a target state (Wallensteen 1968).

Specific economic actions are another form of sanctions, such as an arms embargo or manipulation of economic aid to states, which can be used to alter and shape

state behavior of the target state by the coercer (Wallensteen 1968). United Nations Resolution 986, adopted in 1995 as a measure against Iraq (which was under multilateral economic sanctions), provides an example of specific economic actions as coercion policy. This action allowed Iraq to sell one billion dollars of oil every 90 days, but required the return on the sale to be used to pay war reparations, to fund the agencies providing relief to the Kurds and to purchase general relief supplies (Koshy 1995). Tariff wars are another type of sanction, which place a high tax burden on imports from the target state in an effort to create economic pressure for compliance to the coercer state's demands (Wallensteen 1968). According to Marinov (2005:565), economic coercion "forms a middle ground between words and war."

Sanctions, or the threat to impose sanctions, have been used to alter the human rights practices, trade, or foreign policies of other governments (Eaton and Engers 1992). The length of time these sanctions may be in place varies greatly, depending on the time necessary for sufficient economic harm to take effect and the willingness or ability of the target state to comply with coercer demands. Some sanctions have lasted months and others, such as the United States trade sanctions against Cuba, have lasted for decades. In some cases where sanctions fail to produce a change in the target state necessary for relief, a change in leadership in the coercer state may be the only means of ending sanctions against the target (McGillivray and Stam 2004).

In some cases, threats to impose coercive measures against a state may be sufficient to compel compliance without taking formal action. Drury and Li (2006) maintain there are three basic tenets of a successful coercive threat. First, the target must

understand what is being asked of it by the coercer. A demand must be stated clearly to avoid confusion over what constitutes compliance. A target will not take accommodating actions if it is unsure that action will help comply with the demand or if their efforts cannot be measured precisely. Ambiguity in a demand creates a disincentive for the target to comply as it risks losing an accommodation without the gain of any benefit.

The second factor noted by Drury and Li is the perception of the target state concerning the coercer's capacity to cause harm and its willingness to use such capacity to achieve its objectives. A coercer must possess some advantage over the target which it can exploit and be perceived as willing to suffer damages as well, economic or otherwise, in order to obtain compliance. A third factor involves the perception that the stated goal of the coercer is the sole objective of the intent in the threat. If a target believes the intent of the threat is linked to domestic or international reputation goals, the threat will not be considered valid by the target state.

A number of authors have researched foreign policy coercion, ranging from viewpoints of its theoretical concepts to studies of specific cases or specific coercive strategies, which may or may not have been successful. Drezner (1998) for example, used a game-theoretical model to show how expectations of future conflict have a paradoxical effect on coercion events. This study revealed that target states are less likely to make concessions when the chances for frequent conflict with the coercer are high. Similarly, coercer states are less likely to threaten sanctions when there is a low probability of future conflicts unless they incur minimal costs and cause the target to suffer significantly.

Considerable research centers around the economic impacts of coercion on a target state, most frequently as a result of economic sanctions leveled by the United States. McGillivray and Stam (2004) revealed a strong correlation between the duration of economic sanctions and leadership change in both nondemocratic coercer and target states. Lektzian and Souva (2001) have shown that jointly democratic dyads return to their pre-sanction levels of trade faster than non-jointly democratic dyads. Their research shows that democratic institutions help reduce transaction costs and facilitate the return to normative trade relations once sanctions have ended by promoting trust between economic agents of the respective states that commerce can be maintained.

Using a logit examination to re-test data from previous research by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990) for significance, Drury (1998) confirmed that the cost incurred by a target state from sanctions as a portion of its GDP has a positive and significant effect on the effectiveness of the sanctions. Essentially this implies that the ability of a target state to compensate for the losses incurred from a sanction is a critical factor for policy makers to consider. Additionally, when another state attempts to subvert the sanctions of a coercer state, it is only successful if the target state is in need of imports. In light of this, he suggested coercer states should attempt to craft sanctions, which cut off a target's exports. By doing so, the target state eventually incurs a trade imbalance that cannot be sufficiently overcome. While taking longer to succeed, this approach to sanctions would eliminate the suppressive effects of replacement partners in trade and states directly attempting to subvert the sanctions through trade with the target state.

Drury's finding on the relationship of the GDP of a target state to sanction success is also supported in the research of Jentleson and Whytock (2006). Their data shows that Libya was able to successfully withstand U.S. sanctions as long as replacement parts for their oil industry were obtainable through the black market or from trade with nations not participating in or supporting the sanctions. When the availability of these parts finally disappeared, the oil economy, which was the primary source of income through trade for Libya, began a rapid decline and contributed significantly to Libyan compliance with U.S. demands.

Drury (1998) also emphasized the value of international organizations as a mitigating influence in sanctions. His research suggests that when a coercer state obtains international cooperation, it should also seek the assistance of an international organization to implement the sanction. He notes (pg. 507) that

“Cooperation can be a serious detriment to success without an organization to coordinate the selection and initiation of the sanctions as well as administer and give legitimacy to them. That is, an international organization not only creates a forum in which sending nations may coordinate their effort, but also gives legitimacy to the sanctioning effort in the world community.”

Others such as Horowitz and Reiter (2001) have conducted empirical tests of multiple coercion strategies to evaluate their level of effectiveness. Their findings have revealed that successful coercion is much more likely when the coercer state does not demand regime change. While the authors consider the use of airpower as a form of coercion, distinct from the interpretation of most other researchers, they similarly conclude with others that the regime type and the vulnerability of a target state are important factors in the success of coercion attempts.

George has written extensively on the subject of coercive diplomacy. Included in his works are a number of case studies which address the uses of coercion by the United States in crisis situations such as Laos, Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971, 1991) and the Persian Gulf, Pearl Harbor, Nicaragua and Libya (1991). Much of his work has offered insights into the effects of different coercion strategies from these case studies, which are useful in projecting what effects similar strategies may produce when employed against other states in the future. Like George, other authors such as Greffenius and Gill (1992) have written about the value of reciprocity in the success of coercion, sometimes referred to as the “carrot and stick” approach. It was their finding that pure coercion is more likely to induce a target to fight, whereas demonstrating resolve while offering a “carrot” for compliance can effectively begin to diffuse hostility and encourage further compliance. Bert (2004:279) similarly surmised that “a policy that offers carrot to reward change and sticks to discourage (bad behavior)” is most likely to be effective.

George maintains that the construction of a coercive strategy requires policymakers to make choices among four critical variables with regard to a specific situation. They must decide (1) what should be demanded of the target state; (2) if and how to create a sense of urgency for the target to comply with the demand(s); (3) if and what kind of punishment should be threatened for noncompliance; and (4) whether to rely solely on threats or to offer incentives for compliance (George 1991). These variables can be implemented alone or in combination depending on the objectives of the coercer and the characteristics of the target involved in a given situation.

Additionally, George (1971, 1991) offers four ways in which these choices can be manifest. First, there is the “ultimatum” (1991:7), which makes a demand of the target, sets a time table for compliance and offers a credible threat of punishment. George provides an example of this in the secret negotiation between Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy over the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy offered incentives for Russian compliance (missiles in Turkey) while setting a strict timetable for compliance. At the same time, preparations were completed for an invasion of Cuba which was allowed to be verified by Soviet and Cuban intelligence (a credible threat). The ultimatum can be a risky endeavor. Despite U.S. plans to dismantle the missiles in Turkey even before the crisis, had it not been for this visible concession offered by Kennedy (which allowed Russia to “save face”), the strategy might have failed, leading possibly to war.

The second manner of employing coercion, a variant of the first, is the “tacit ultimatum” (George 1971:27, 1991: 7-8) where the coercer *indirectly* conveys the urgency of the target’s compliance. In this case he maintains the coercer may imply the gist of urgency by maneuvering military forces in a manner which signals a credible threat to the target state in conjunction with a stern warning that noncompliance will have consequences. Examples of the tacit ultimatum include the deployment of U.S. aircraft carrier fleets to the the Persian Gulf in 1991 (Iraq) and the Indian Ocean 1979 (Iran). In each of these cases, an indirect threat of the use of force was conveyed to the target states by the military presence of the naval forces within striking distance of the target state.

A third variant is the “gradual turning of the screw” approach (George 1991:8). The coercer employs an action with a threat that additional measures will follow. For

example, a coercer state may impose specific economic sanctions against a target state initially, such as an arms embargo. Failing to see an effort by the target to change its policies, the coercer upgrades to full sanctions and later to the deployment of naval forces to the region. Subsequent measures are added incrementally to gradually increase pressure on the target state for compliance.

The final variant is aptly referred to as the “try and see” approach (George 1971:27, 1991:8). As the name suggests, the coercer implements one action at a time and evaluates the effectiveness of the strategy. Subsequent action is postponed until the impact of this action is clear but does not involve impressing upon the target a sense of urgency or timetable for compliance (George 1971, 1991).

Economic sanctions are the form of coercive strategy used most frequently by the U.S., at least initially in confrontations, and have been generally viewed by U.S. administrations as a low cost alternative to foreign military intervention (Franssen and Morton (2002). Drury (2001:485) similarly notes that economic sanctions have become “an attractive option for states wanting to coerce other states,” because of increased economic interdependence that has occurred over the past few decades, increased international cooperation through the United Nations and a desire to avoid the costs inherent to the use of military force. Despite this favorable disposition, the true effectiveness of economic sanctions has been debated at length with little consensus (McGillivray and Stam 2004). A study conducted by the Institute for International Economics in 1997 concluded that unilateral U.S. sanctions had achieved foreign policy goals only 13 percent of the time since 1970 (Paulson 1999). Carter (1987) suggests part

of the reason sanctions are a popular coercion policy with U. S. administrations is due to the laws which give a president nearly unobstructed authority to cut off government programs and exports, but offer much less (nonemergency) authority in other areas. This imbalance, he contends, skews decision making in favor of easily imposed sanctions, which may not be in the United States best interests.

Sanctions represent something akin to a “diplomatic slap on the wrist” (Davis and Engerman 2003:187). Sanctions can take on different characteristics of influence depending on how broadly they are applied. The United States, for instance, can impose economic sanctions (unilateral), which restrict the purchase from or sale of goods to a target country. The target country, however, may be able to absorb the loss of trade if it is able to find a suitable substitute trading partner. The effectiveness of sanctions can be improved if countries allied or institutionalized (as in the United Nations, for example) with the coercer participate in the sanctions jointly (multilateral). However employed, sanctions are used as a means to create internal economic and ultimately social pressure on national leaders for policy change if not regime change (Jentleson and Whytock 2006).

Some have argued, however, that comprehensive and international sanctions can be even more destructive to the citizens of a country than military strikes. Mueller (2004) postulates that the sanctions implemented against Iraq did more damage to the Iraqi people than both of the Bush-led, U.S. wars against Iraq combined. Mueller (in Paulson 1999) also claims there were more deaths in Iraq caused by U.S. sanctions than in all those killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs. His sentiment is not new to

debates over the consequences of sanctions. Miller (1926) argued that under the state system, the effect of a sanction (of any type) is to inflict punishment on the innocent of the target country. He further elaborates that the most innocent part of the population, the children who know nothing about the conflicts of governments and have no part in it, often suffer the most as a result of the sanctions.

Marinov (2005:564) similarly argues that while economic sanctions do destabilize the leaders of a target country, “such measures have a certain and large negative impact on the welfare of the targeted populations.” Indeed, it would be difficult to externally create social pressure on a regime if the citizens of a target country were not suffering the consequences of a sanction, which can be attributed to the policies or behavior of their government. Sometimes, however, sanctions can harm innocents in the coercer state as well. Eaton and Engers (1992:918) note that U.S. farmers “bore the brunt of the U.S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union.”

In spite of these arguments, some research shows that sanctions were an effective component of strategy in causing change in the behavior of Libya. Over time, the security of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime was threatened internally and oil production (the heart of the national economy) was seriously threatened by the inability to acquire needed parts of U.S. manufacture to sustain their equipment (Jentleson and Whytock 2006). The history of the effectiveness of economic sanctions appears mixed, however. It takes time for the impact of sanctions to be felt, which requires patience from the coercer, and if employed in too harsh of a manner they can potentially have an opposite effect from what was intended.

George (1991) provides a classic example of this in his case study of U.S.-Japanese relations, which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. When threats to cut off oil supplies to Japan (which accounted for 80 percent of its supply) failed as a deterrent strategy, the U.S. implemented an embargo as a coercive strategy to force Japan cease its aggression in Southeast Asia. The “sharpness” of the coercion combined with the high stakes for Japan in its conquests and no “carrots” offered for compliance, backed the Japanese into a proverbial corner. George maintains that these actions left war as their only option and precipitated the attack on the United States at Hawaii.

Military or “offensive” forms of coercion, to take a phrase from George (1971), offer the *potential* for direct, limited strikes against a target government without visiting harm on the population of a country. Unfortunately, the reality is not always as successful as it is in theory. Regardless of how smart “smart-bombs” and advanced targeting systems have become, they cannot be programmed to identify mistakes or correct for errors. Civilian casualties have been incurred inadvertently in some cases, mostly due to human or “institutional” error (Thompson 1999). Even when they do not kill civilians, such attacks are often viewed as “outsider meddling,” which can actually increase the popular support for the target government. An example of this is offered by Jentleson and Whytock (2006). The U.S. bombing of targets in Libya in 1986 by the Reagan Administration, which was intended to precipitate a military coup, actually increased Qaddafi’s domestic support, if only temporarily.

While limited with respect to coercion, military options may be necessary and effective under certain circumstances, but research reveals they can also be particularly

self-defeating if they are excessively punishing. Similar to overly “sharp” economic sanctions, George (1971) notes that if military action is too damaging, it may have the adverse effect of causing the target to escalate the conflict in order to compensate for the political or military injuries to the regime. An example of this was the bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq by the Israelis in 1981. According to Khadir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear official, the bombing of the reactor had destroyed that facility, but accelerated the nuclear program by driving it underground (Cirincione 2005).

Despite the existing research on coercion, much more is still needed to better understand the impact of coercive strategies on target nations and foreign policy outcomes. Only a limited number of case studies examining U.S. coercion against specific states, many by Alexander George, appear in the literature that may be useful in erecting a predictive model, despite the volumes of coercion research available. At this time, no one has attempted to build upon the model of Jentleson and Whytock (2006), which presents a framework for analyzing coercion case studies. Additionally, structured, focused analyses of U.S. strategic coercion policies in cases such as Iran, Myanmar and North Korea have yet to be examined by any similar model. By applying their model to the past, currently active, and possible future U.S. coercion tactics used against these states, this thesis offers an important opportunity to increase our understanding of coercion and to lay the groundwork for future studies using this model.

METHODOLOGY

The Case Study Approach

The case study approach can be an appealing and effective tool for increasing our understanding of events in context, as it provides a means for the examination of many levels of political activity. This approach provides political scientists, particularly in the field of international relations, with a means to extensively examine a specific phenomenon in history in order to answer the important questions which concern us in contemporary situations. Schramm (in Yin 2003:12) notes “the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is it tries to illuminate a *decision* or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.”

Yin (2003:13-14) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry which “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” He notes that this method of inquiry

“copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, in one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”

George (1979) emphasizes that by deliberately drawing upon a variety of cases in a systematic and differentiated manner, a broader range of experience and more dependable conclusions may be obtained. A good case study with a comparative analysis

of cases is essential in the conversion of data into a theory, which can potentially capture the essence of the phenomena being studied and what “lessons” the data ultimately reveals. Conducted properly, a good case study will provide useful knowledge and leave few unknowns. By using a structured, focused approach to the case study, the research seeks to be replicable and contribute towards the development of theory in future research. In the interest of foreign policy making, this effort also aims for the creation of a predictive model which could be tested in subsequent cases and potentially serve as a resource in the policy making process.

The Limitations of Case Studies

Case studies are not without its critics. It can be a hazardous experience if single cases are drawn upon too broadly, as they have a limited capacity for theory building and are difficult to generalize outside of the context of the single case. Yin (2003:53) likens single case studies to putting “all your eggs in one basket.” Single case designs are significantly more vulnerable to error and the chances of doing a good case study with even two cases are greatly increased.

The lessons taken from one case could easily be contradicted by or inconsistent with another case. Therefore, reliance on single cases is inappropriate, potentially dangerous for policy makers and can subsequently lead to policy error since even similar cases may have distinct and unique features. Political scientists have usually addressed this problem by grouping cases into classes, which allow them to be studied as similar events. These groupings have allowed for the identification of indicators which have

predictive value. By conducting structured, focused case studies using multiple cases, George (1979) argues these limitations can be overcome.

Research Objectives

This thesis will focus on the coercion strategies employed by the United States against Iran, Myanmar and North Korea. Most of the literature on coercion focuses on the measurable effects and characteristics of particular strategies. The consensus of most of the research is that coercion strategies relying on sanctions have largely failed to achieve its objectives. These perceptions are likely due, in part, to an absence of accurate theoretical models, which can be used to guide policy makers when making decisions in implementing coercive strategy against other states.

This thesis is unique in that it attempts to examine multiple cases together as a test of the model for successful coercion presented in the research of Jentleson and Whytock (2006). It will examine the coercive strategies employed by the United States, its context and the outcomes of the coercion attempt in each case. In comparing multiple cases, this study seeks to provide greater insight for understanding coercion and the utility of the Jentleson and Whytock model as a predictor for coercive strategies in U.S. foreign policy.


A critical component of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) study, which contributed significantly to their findings, was off-the-record interviews with senior government officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations. Similar data will not be gathered for this thesis. However, a sufficiently large quantity of data exists, which can

be adequately tested in this thesis and contribute to our understanding of U.S. foreign policy coercion.

Study Variables

As a structured, focused case study, this thesis will follow the approach of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) case study of U.S. coercion against Libya, from which their model originates, and analyze and compare coercion attempts by the United States against Iran, Myanmar and North Korea. Coercion histories will be grouped by the U.S. presidential administration, from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush, against each target state in which they were implemented. Additionally, the Reagan and H.W. Bush administrations are analyzed together in this thesis as policy between these administrations differed only minimally. This grouping by administration will foster comparable timelines of implementation, which enhance the comparability between the cases. The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model focuses on two variables that they believe are key to the success or failure of coercion: a) a three-part coercer state strategy and; b) the vulnerability of the target state's domestic politics and economy. Following this model (see Figure 1), I will analyze coercer state strategy according to the three critical attributes used by Jentleson and Whytock: proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility (credible threat). These strategies are then combined to the vulnerability characteristics of the state and compared with the model's prescription for success against the actual coercive policy outcome.

FIGURE 1: The Coercive Diplomacy Success Model



In the first variable of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, proportionality refers to the instrument employed by the coercer relative to the scope and nature of the objective (the ends and means). The value of proportionality, which they derive from George (1971, 1991), claims that when the measures are too harsh or too weak in comparison with the ends sought by the coercer state, the coercion attempt will fail. For example, threatening military intervention for the release of a political prisoner from an opposition party in the target state is not a proportional response and would not likely achieve success.

Reciprocity is the proverbial carrot and the stick. The carrot (something the target wants) is offered to entice the target to move forward (something the coercer wants). This works, of course, as long as the target does not think it can gain the carrot without moving. In the reverse, the target must believe the coercer will reciprocate the carrot if it does comply with demands placed upon it. If the target state does not believe the coercer will follow through with its offer for compliance, there is no real impetus for the target state to comply with the coercer state's demands.

Finally, credibility is the extent to which the coercer is able to convince the target of the consequences (costs) of noncompliance. A target state must perceive the credibility of the threats posed against it, militarily or economic, in order to become convinced of the costs to be incurred by its defiance. Military superiority is not sufficient to do this by itself. Studies of U.S. coercion where a clear military superiority existed revealed failure more often than success (Jentleson and Whytock 2006).

The second variable, target state politics and economy, relates to the vulnerability of the target to coercion. The domestic political and economic conditions will determine the target state's ability to compensate for the power imbalances with the coercer and will influence its assessment of costs and benefits relative to compliance or noncompliance. I will apply this model to past and present U.S. coercive strategies towards Iran, Myanmar and North Korea and evaluate the possible effects of future coercion attempts by the United States against these states. I thus offer the hypothesis that the Jentleson and Whytock model will accurately predict why coercive strategies have failed or succeeded in the cases of Iran, Myanmar and North Korea.

Selection of Cases

Each of the three cases selected for this thesis, Iran, Myanmar and North Korea, represent ostensibly failed U.S. foreign policy coercion efforts. Substantial research has been done on each of these states and U.S. foreign policy towards them. Cottam (1988) conducted a Cold War case study of Iran which explored the history of relations with the United States. Cordesman and Al-Rodhan (2006) and Chubin and Litwak (2004) explored the questions of Iranian WMD ambitions. Sick (2004) analyzed Iran's purported connections to terrorist organizations and the characteristics of state government.

Seekins (2005) analyzed the effects of U.S. sanctions against Myanmar, while Bert (2004) explored the foreign policy implications of the triad relations of the United States and China with Myanmar. Englehart (2005) examined the state capacity problems of Myanmar to meet the demands placed upon them by the United States and the

European Union for regime change. O'Hanlon and Mochizuki (2004) considered policy strategies which address the underlying issues of North Korean nuclear ambitions.

Henriksen (1996) explored U.S. foreign policy in North Korea during the Bill Clinton Administration and Becker (2005) examined the "rogue" behavior and character of North Korea. None of the many authors who have studied these countries have used the particular approach presented by Jentleson and Whytock (2006) however, and no focused, structured case studies been constructed which could be used to potentially explain or predict U.S. foreign policy coercion outcomes.

Each of the states selected for this thesis have policy relevance today. Iran was recently discovered to have a hidden nuclear facility previously not disclosed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials. This revelation has heightened fears in the west that Iran has geared their nuclear program for weapons grade material, which current American President Barak Obama has claimed presents a direct challenge to the international community (Spetalnik and Heinrich 2009). Additionally, past use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, known and suspected ties to terrorist organizations and hostile rhetoric in the media towards Israel are factors which combine to increase the potential consequences of failed coercion.

Myanmar (formerly Burma) is a compelling case for reasons which differ from the other two cases selected for this study. It does not seemingly present any global military threat in particular as its level of modernization and technical capacity is low, but pressure from human rights NGOs in the United States and international community has possibly driven policy in Myanmar out of moral humanitarian concern. Due to a long

history of human rights abuses that has typified the behavior of its various military regimes, heroin production and the undemocratic nature of the regime, U.S. foreign policy has annually renewed sanctions and has been strongly motivated by these moral considerations for regime change (Bert 2004).

North Korea has been the longest-standing adversary of the United States, which has maintained sanctions against it in some form since the armistice in 1953 (Feffer 1999). In 1994, the United States considered using force to halt North Korea's nuclear programs after IAEA inspectors were refused access to two unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste. An accord was eventually signed that year in Geneva which seemed to resolve the issue, but North Korea cancelled the agreement in 2002 and resumed its uranium enrichment program (GlobalSecurity.org 2005). Ogden and Anderson (2008:72) note that North Korea "continues to demonstrate the propensity to proliferate high-lethality weapons, and threatens regional stability with these weapons and its aggressive military posture." While talks have progressed and regressed over time, the current Obama administration inherited a difficult policy situation after North Korea pulled out of nuclear disarmament talks in April, 2009. The U.S. responded by tightening sanctions which are currently maintained by the United States (Landler 2009).

Each of these three cases differ in some manner and are not perfectly analogous to the others, but possess some characteristics that are useful for comparison. Both Iran and North Korea present potential global threats though nuclear ambitions and purported connections with terrorist organizations. Myanmar and North Korea are both Asian Peninsula states with close diplomatic ties to China. Because of the starkly different

circumstances which have incurred U.S. foreign policy coercion against Myanmar, it also provides an important opportunity to evaluate whether or not the Jentleson and Whytock model is applicable to another type of coercion situation, or is more suited as a guide for coercive strategic planning under particular conditions.

CHAPTER 2: IRAN

Historical Background

The United States has a long, intimate political history with Iran. In August of 1953, the United States assisted a coup to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh. He had aligned himself with the communist Tudeh Party and out of Cold War fears that the regime had become pro-Soviet, the United States intervened with the belief that regime change would be more favorable to its interests. Mossadegh had been a popular nationalist leader and the intervention brought to power the repressive regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Rubin 2004). Cottam (1988) argues that the government under Mossadegh had some of the characteristics of a seedling democracy. He posits that, had the United States not intervened; had Mossadegh and his more liberal allies in the clergy remained in power at that critical junction in Iranian history, a democratic government could have potentially emerged and remained closely allied with the United States. Prior to American intervention, the United States was generally viewed by Iranians as their protector. It was U.S. foreign policy, he asserts, which eventually turned strong goodwill towards the United States into strong resentment.

The persisting break in U.S.-Iranian relations occurred with the revolution in 1979, which ousted the authoritarian Shah Pahlavi, who was still politically allied with and supported by the United States. Rubin (2004) notes that (along with resentment of the Shah) the behavior of the U.S. government in (many years of) supporting the repressive

regime made it a target of the 1979 revolution and the actions of 1953 made the events of 1979 inevitable. The revolution, he contends in part, was revenge for U.S. actions in 1953. The United States, he maintains, has initiated an array of coercive strategies in attempting to influence or counter Iranian state behavior in the years that have passed since the 1979 revolution, including sanctions, incentives, diplomacy, and military force. O'Sullivan (2003) notes that the mainstay of U.S. strategy against Iran has been sanctions.

Beeman (2003:683) reveals that, at the time the 1979 revolution occurred, Iran had

“a demoralized population, an economy sprawling and out of control, and a repressive, autocratic government that allowed its citizens no influence.....in policies that affected them directly; not even the right to complain.”

He goes on to add that the cause of anti-American sentiment which ultimately led to the taking of approximately 70 American hostages in November of that year, was the symbolic role played by the United States in the oppressive rule of the Shah. From out of this conflict emerged the unflattering moniker for the United States, the “Great Satan,” which has since become culturally popularized throughout the Middle East and persisted symbolically throughout the region (Pollack and Takeyh 2005, Beeman 2003).

From the beginning of the Islamic revolution to the present day, Iran has been plagued by accusations of involvement in terrorism (Sick 2004). O'Sullivan (2003:45) maintains the United States has “repeatedly expressed its concern over Iranian efforts to obstruct peace efforts in the Middle East, particularly through state support of anti-Israel groups espousing violence.” Despite being included as a member of the “Axis of Evil” as

declared by George W. Bush (Bush 2002a), determining the extent of Iranian “rogue” behavior, such as sponsoring or aiding terrorism, is both complex and muddled. As Sick (2004:231) notes, “Iran may often be falsely accused (of involvement). Many of these (acts of terrorism) were never solved and the degree of Iranian official responsibility may be overstated.”

Still, indictments in some cases have been brought against Iran, such as the 1996 bombing of the U.S. military barracks at Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia (Pollack and Takeyh 2005, Sick 2004). Mostashari (2005:1) maintains that

“Some of (the) claims are substantiated, while others are based on speculation and circumstantial evidence. Overall, this portfolio of Iran’s transgressions has been used to characterize it as a “rogue” state that is dangerous to its neighbors and to the world.”

Iran’s displayed capacity for chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of activities by Iran to make fissile material for nuclear weapons (Pollack and Takeyh 2005), when combined with threatening statements towards Israel, Iran presents a tangible global threat which most western powers agree must be addressed in the Middle East.

The status of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is similarly as muddled as it was with Libya in the 1990s. In 1991, congressional reports and CIA assessments claimed Iran had acquired perhaps all the necessary components for constructing up to three nuclear weapons. Initial predictions suggested such weapons would be operational by April of 1992, while later predictions fluctuated considerably between 8 to 15 years until

successful construction. In every case, such predictions have proved extremely unreliable (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006, Chubin and Litwak 2004).

There are four principal causes for the difficulty in assessing the nuclear capabilities of Iran as well as other potentially threatening states or terror cells. (1) Deception and denial efforts by would-be proliferants have greatly improved over time; (2) There is increasing access to dual-use technologies which help mask their intentions; (3) Increased expertise available for advancing WMD and missile programs and; (4) the accelerated proliferation of information and technology worldwide. In addition to the difficulties of assessing the progress of programs and acquisitions, it is even more difficult if not impossible to discern the precise intentions of a particular state once these weapons have been acquired (Ellis 2004).

Ironically enough, Iran has never denied and openly claims that it is pursuing a wide range of research on nuclear technology. In 2005, Iran contended that it has a national, inalienable right for access to nuclear energy for *peaceful* purposes and, on this contention, the United States, European Union and United Nations all agree (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006). O'Sullivan (2003) maintains that the objective of current U.S. sanctions has been the containment of Iran's ability to acquire nuclear *weapons* through influencing its desire to engage in procurement activities. Much of the problem with U.S. efforts has been a lack of transparency and, as Pollack and Takeyh (2005) note, the very mixed messages Iran conveys to the U.S.

The record for Iran on state-sponsored terrorism is a little clearer comparatively, but much still remains largely unproven. Part of the confusion over Iran's intentions owes

to a dual personality exhibited by the state. The first part of that personality belongs to a president and ministries which are held accountable through public review and frequent elections. The second part consists of a supreme leader, oversight committees such as the Guardian Council and Expediency Council, and the security services. In the case of the latter, they are dominated by the conservative clergy who are officially beyond reproach (Sick 2004).

This division of personality is most clearly evident in the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, the two presidents preceding Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani made concerted efforts to rebuild political and economic ties with the west, which were subsequently sabotaged by “shadowy” forces within the government who were neither identified nor made to be publicly accountable, possibly because they were members of a protected group; individuals near the top of the conservative Iranian power structure. Khatami, who repeatedly condemned the killing of men, women and children who are not involved in confrontations, illustrates another example (Sick 2004).

When several Iranian intellectuals were murdered in 1998, Khatami launched an investigation which resulted in the arrest of a group of ultraconservative officials. At the head of this group was the deputy director in the Ministry of Intelligence, Saeed Emami. Before the trial, Emami apparently committed suicide which led to broad speculation he had been killed to prevent him from implicating figures at the highest levels of the clerical leadership. This case ultimately confirmed suspicions that extremists inside and outside of the leadership structure had been operating without approval of the elected government of Iran (Sick 2004).

Iran is known to have backed a number of groups considered terrorist organizations by the United States, such as Hizballah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Hizballah is believed to have been responsible for the bombings of the U.S. marine barracks and embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and an Argentinian court concluded in 2003 that Hizballah received support from the Iranian embassy for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center (Sick 2004). These actions (financing and material support) were made possible because of Iran's large oil and natural gas revenues.

Two potentially severe problems for U.S. foreign policy concern effectively escaping the legacy of past relations with Iran and judicial legislation passed by the United States Congress which allows Iranians to be prosecuted in U.S. courts for alleged support of terrorist activities by militant organizations. This decision is in contrast to opposition for Americans being tried at the International Criminal Court or in other countries. As Sick (2004:241) notes, "the past must be dealt with, but (this present judicial policy) will only complicate future efforts to settle past grievances."

Another potential issue facing U.S. policymakers is that, unlike other Middle Eastern states, the Iranian people have an unusually high pro-west disposition which may have important implications for future coercive strategies. This supportive sentiment became apparent when the US wrestling team competed in the Takhti Cup wrestling tournament in Tehran in 1998; the first time Americans had represented their country in an event in Iran since the hostage crisis. Interestingly, the crowd cheered loudly for both American and Iranian victories (Marks 1998).

Another event was perhaps more revealing of the Iranian population's reversal of attitudes towards America; the terrorist attack of September 11. Iran offered official condolences to Americans, but there were also unofficial candlelight vigils held across Iran in support of the American people (Sick 2004). Such an action was not likely contrived by government and suggests that future strategies should consider avoiding actions that would alienate the general population unfavorably to US interests.

Chubin and Litwak (2004:258) note that the "consequences of a military strike on Iran could be highly adverse" and such actions might "trigger an anti-U.S. backlash" which could undermine the prospects for rapprochement between the states and any chance at near-term political change in Iran. In support of their summation, they note an Iranian public opinion poll in 2002 which revealed 70 percent of the population then favored normalization of relations with the United States and engagement with the global community; something that could be lost as a result of military strikes. Ansari (2004) similarly discovered that a poll conducted by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence revealed public dissatisfaction over Iranian policy towards the United States was so great, that some officials concluded popular support would be lost if the U.S. were to be attacked.

The overall relationship between the United States and Iran could be characterized as a story of extremes. The United States devolved from being seen as the beloved protector of the Iranian people (Cottam 1988) to the incarnation of evil known as "The Great Satan" (Pollack and Takeyh 2005, Beerman 2003). In the 1990s, the pendulum seemed to swing back positively again among the Iranian people, who displayed support for America at international sporting events and in the days that

followed the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Shortly after the 1979 revolution took place, but before the hostages were taken, President Carter (1979a:352) characterized a positive view of Iran, stating “I think it’s obvious the present government in Iran would like to have good relations with us.” George W. Bush (2002a) would later refer to Iran as a rogue state and part of an “axis of evil.”

The interim of these extremes has been filled with rhetoric and rebuttal, demands by the United States for changes in Iranian state policy (such as suspension of uranium enrichment activities) and defiance of those demands. Publicly, the United States has (through the George W. Bush administration) refused to engage the Iranian government in a face-to-face dialog over their discord. The relationship has been a stalemate until recently; an impasse on the issues of contention may see a renewed discourse as the current Obama Administration has indicated it may be willing to open direct talks with Iran.

US-IRANIAN COERCIVE HISTORY: The Carter Administration

The United States initiated unilateral sanctions as a coercive strategy immediately following the take-over of the US embassy by Iranian students in Tehran in November 1979. Since Iran and the United States had normalized relations prior to 1979, the primary goal of U.S. coercive diplomacy was to secure the release of the American hostages. Carter (1979b:2240) affirmed this position on December 13 in a media interview, explaining that the United States “has no confrontation (with Islam or)

Moslem countries. As far as the hostages are concerned, they are the only issue for us.”

In a subsequent public statement on December 28, Carter (1979b:2287) states that

“We must never lose sight of our basic goals in this crisis....the safety of our fellow citizens and the protection of the long-term interests of the United States. A thoughtful and determined policy which makes clear that Iran will pay an increasingly higher price for the illegal detention of our people, is the best policy to achieve these goals.”

The first measure employed by the Carter administration to force Iranian compliance was Proclamation 4702, which banned US imports of Iranian oil. Ten days later, Executive Order 12170 froze all assets (an estimated \$12 billion USD) owned by the Central Bank and Government of Iran within US jurisdiction. Executive Orders 12205 and 12211 soon followed, which placed an embargo on all US exports to, imports from and financial transactions with Iran (Franssen and Morton 2002). By April of 1980, Carter had a total trade ban in place, numerous voluntary sanctions from other governments and complete ban on travel between the United States and Iran (O’Sullivan 2003).

The economic effects of these sanctions took awhile to seriously impact Iran, but they ultimately did impact its economy. Despite a Soviet veto for multilateral sanctions in the UN Security Council, many states gradually joined the US effort and reduced trade with Iran. Thus, as the sanctions dragged on, Iran was deprived of critical supplies and spare parts which it desperately needed. This forced Iran to make expensive deals with unreliable sources to meet their needs.

The invasion by Iraq in September, 1980 exacerbated the problems caused by sanctions and Iran found both the supplies for fighting a ground war and international

support hard to come by. Iraq attacked Iranian ports, the (then) main export terminal for crude oil at Kharg Island, production and refinery facilities and Iranian tankers in the Persian Gulf. These attacks decreased Iran's industrial and petroleum development capacity, as well as seriously damaging its agricultural sector (Library of Congress 1987).

The greatest harm to the Iranian export economy would not be felt until 1984, well after the Hostage Crisis had been resolved. However, the combined strain of multilateral sanctions, declining oil prices, Iraqi attacks and subsequent destruction of facilities such as the Abadan refinery contributed to a severe economic crisis nonetheless (Library of Congress 1987). The difficulties of obtaining supplies, a decline in oil revenues and failed efforts to recover frozen assets were the cumulative result of US-led multilateral sanctions and arguably an effective means proportional to the desired US objective ends (Carswell 1981).

Even though the rescue attempt of the hostages by the American military in April 1980 failed, the case could be made that this action served as a credible threat which heightened the Iranian sense of vulnerability. The US maintained a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean, which could have been used for a strike against Iran. The broad support for the US in the United Nations and no sign of a softer stance by incoming President Ronald Reagan left Iran facing a difficult economic and security future. Thus, Iran was willing by 1981 to release the hostages if the US would reciprocate by negotiating the release of some of its frozen assets (Carswell 1981).

Until the end of the crisis when Iran finally agreed to release the hostages, the coercion strategy of the United States lacked either sufficient reciprocity or the effects of

coercion had failed to impact Iran sufficiently (in the short term) to accept any possible reciprocal offers being made secretly. Once the return of Iranian assets had been worked out between the parties, Iran complied with the demand to release the hostages (Franssen and Morton 2002). The exact level of internal political pressure on the post-Shah regime is difficult to assess, but the economic consequences were severe and possibly inhibited the ability of elites to insulate the Iranian leadership.

Given the malleable financial demands made by Iran in return for compliance, it appears that Iranian elites may have put pressure on the regime to resolve the issue when continued support might have been disastrous economically and could well have undermined regime support. Additionally, the resource strain caused by the Iran-Iraq may have had a significant impact on the Iranian decision to come to terms, which is a factor external to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. With the noted exception of the Iran-Iraq War contributory effects, the Carter coercion strategy accomplished the objective of the release of the American hostages and reflects the findings of effective coercion in the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model.

Using appropriately proportionate sanctions and a credible threat, the US coercion was successful in its primary goal by 1981, once the costs of noncompliance became too high and the sufficiently beneficial “carrot” for compliance was offered as a reciprocal factor. Despite the subsequent ease of sanctions, the state of National Emergency with respect to Iran, declared by Carter on November 14, 1979 remained in effect, however, and would be renewed each year by subsequent administrations as tensions between the United States and Iran continued to persist. This suggests the United States had other

objectives (as may be often the case in coercion policy) in addition to the release of the hostages, but only the primary goal of coercion was accomplished.

The Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations

The terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, and later information suggesting Iranian involvement, initiated a new round of coercive diplomacy focused on sanctions that were intended to punish Iran for its purported involvement and dissuade future support of terrorist organizations. In January 1984, President Ronald Reagan declared that Iran was sponsoring international terrorism which made them ineligible for U.S. foreign aid or loans from financial institutions controlled by the United States. The US Arms Export Control Act in 1986 prohibited the sale of weapons and arms-related parts to Iran, functioning as an arms embargo (Franssen and Morton 2002).

On October 26, 1987, Reagan announced a full embargo on Iranian imports, and exports to Iran of 14 categories of U.S. goods. Reagan (1987:1228) explained that the accumulation of U.S. coercive strategies were in response to active, state-sponsored support of international terrorism, attacks on U.S. forces and merchant vessels, and Iran's disregard for U.N. Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a ceasefire in the war with Iraq. He noted that "These measures will remain in place so long as Iran persists in its aggressive disregard for the most fundamental norms of international conduct." The

stated goal of Reagan coercive diplomacy was, broadly, to compel Iran to modify its behavior.

Reagan also declared Iran a major narcotics-trafficking country. A new round of sanctions followed, essentially duplicating those enacted earlier (O'Sullivan 2003). After George H.W. Bush succeeded Reagan as president, a CIA report raised concerns that Iran had invested \$2 billion in pursuing weapons of mass destruction. In response, Bush included Iran in the arms non-proliferation act originally targeted at Iraq in 1992 (Franssen and Morton 2002). O'Sullivan (2003:50) explains that this act "tightens exports to Iran by banning the sale of items on the U.S. munitions list, suspends dual-use technical exchange agreements, and ends economic aid." She adds that the act also provided sanctions against individuals or firms who assist Iran in conventional weapons programs.

In a press conference on June 5, Bush (1989c:841) explained the objective of U.S. policy, stating "they know what they need to do. They have been a terrorist state. And as soon as we see some move away from oppression and extremism of that nature, we will (then) review our relationship." Bush (1989d:866) reiterated the point three days later, stating "to have improved relationships (would require) a renunciation of terror. We can't have normalized relations with a.....terrorist state." In essence, the Bush strategy was one of containment of Iran's nuclear ambitions and pressure for state behavioral change.

These imposed coercion strategies were a response to actions taken by Iran for which the United States demanded change (support of terrorism, WMD research). While the actions taken by Reagan and Bush were clearly all coercive measures intended to

elicit compliance as changes to state behavior, they seem to lack most of the requirements for successful coercion as proffered by the Jentleson and Whytock model. Only an arms embargo, aid and loan restrictions and sanctions against individuals or entities which trade military use items were implemented to pressure Iran to change its activities in international terrorism, conventional weapons programs and WMD research. There is no indication that the sanctions of these administrations were combined with a credible threat for non-compliance, nor is there any concise empirical (public) evidence of significant reciprocal benefits for compliance being offered, save the ease of sanctions.

Unlike the sanctions initiated by the Carter Administration, there was not significant multilateral support present. As long as Iran could find other states (substitute trading partners), such as China, to buy their oil and engage in trade, US sanctions had little hope to affect Iran politically or economically by itself. For example, despite the threat of trade sanctions under the non-proliferation act of 1992, nine Chinese companies were barred from trade with the United States (between 2002 and 2003) for shipping restricted goods to Iran (US Department of State 2008). The coercive strategies used by the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations were summarily unsuccessful in altering Iranian state behavior. If the Jentleson and Whytock model is correct, the failure of U.S. coercion efforts by these administrations was due to a lack of reciprocal offers sufficient to compel compliance, a credible threat of harm to convince Iran of U.S. resolve, and sufficient international support to raise the costs of non-compliance to the level necessary for achieving success.

The Clinton Administration

The dissolution of the Soviet Union as a superpower brought an end to bipartisan US foreign policy. Clinton was willing to concede to sanctions desired by the republican-controlled congress in exchange for cooperation on domestic issues. He also saw sanctions as a low cost alternative to military intervention (Franssen and Morton 2002). Clinton (1993a:2239) renewed the state of National Emergency with Iran on November 1, 1993, stating that because diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran have not returned to a normalized state, “I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities that are needed in the process of implementing the January 1981 agreements with Iran.”

Citing Iran’s support for international terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process and continued efforts to develop WMD, Clinton authorized Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 1995. This order prohibited any U.S. involvement in the development of the Iranian petroleum industry (O’Sullivan 2003). The next month on April 30, 1995 Clinton (1995a:741), while speaking at a dinner in New York City, explained the goals of U.S. coercive strategy, stating “our policy towards these rogue states is simple: They must be contained.” On May 6, 1995, Clinton authorized an expansion of existing sanctions which included a total trade and investment embargo on Iran. Speaking at a conference the next day, Clinton (1995b:780) explained these expansions were part of an increased effort to “counter Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism (and) its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.” Nearly one year later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which continued the containment strategy

by prohibiting any financial activities with Iran and cutting off aid to any country that was providing Iran with military assistance (O'Sullivan 2003).

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, implemented in 1996, was directed at foreign companies (especially petroleum investors) making substantial investments in Iranian oil and natural gas development, which made other countries more reluctant to agree to multilateral sanctions amid fears they would have to pay severely for what was perceived as a US domestic political agenda. The alienation of European allies led to numerous acts of defiance and challenges to the ILSA prohibitions in Iran which undermined any chance for sanctions to be effective in forcing Iranian compliance with U.S. demands to cease support for terrorists and its pursuit of nuclear weapons (Franssen and Morton 2002, O'Sullivan 2003).

On August 19, 1997, Clinton issued Executive Order 13059, which placed restrictions on U.S. exports to third party countries when those goods would be re-exported to Iran. Its primary function was to reiterate the banned status of trade and investment activities to the global community (O'Sullivan 2003). The next year, however, Clinton's actions on Iran seemed to regress from those policies of preceding years.

On May 18, 1998 Clinton issued an investment waiver to Total, an oil and gas company, for investment in Iran's South Pars oil field. The following month, he vetoed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act (O'Sullivan 2003). This act proposed sanctions against any person or entity which transfers items which contribute to Iranian efforts to acquire, produce or develop ballistic missiles, or provides technical assistance

or facilities for that purpose (U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee 1998). Clinton issued a second waiver to Boeing in 1999, which allowed the transfer of spare parts for aircraft under warranty that were purchased before sanctions were in place which was essentially all warranted Boeing aircraft, since sanctions had banned all trade (O'Sullivan 2003)

The Iran Nonproliferation Act was enacted on March 14, 2000, and prohibited the export of any goods on the banned list to any foreign entity that had provided weapons or technology to Iran. Specifically, it was designed to pressure Russia by withholding funding for the International Space Station until the president was confident that Russia was not providing aid to Iran for its weapons programs. Three days later, in a seemingly contradictory move, the administration eased trade sanctions with Iran by allowing the non-petroleum exports of carpets, caviar and pistachios from Iran (O'Sullivan 2003).

As was the case with the coercive sanctions employed under Reagan and George H.W. Bush, these sanctions implemented alone and with the absence of international support were ineffective as strategic coercion. At times the actions of the Clinton Administration seemed contradictory or gave the impression of wavering commitment as it offered waivers that appear to undermine the objective impacts of the sanctions. If the broad goal was containment of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons (by cutting off its ability to pay for them), as Clinton (1995) has suggested, allowing American companies to expand oil fields or provide important parts needed to maintain elements of the Iranian infrastructure would seem highly counterproductive. Based upon Iran's continued efforts to enrich uranium, sanctions applied in this manner were not able to significantly harm

Iran economically or convince it that these coercive policies could not merely be “waited out.” These policy characteristics made the goal of containment; creating internal pressure for halting support for terrorist groups and dissuading research or acquisition activities on WMD by the regime improbable. According to the Jentleson and Whytock model, for coercion to be successful, the target state must perceive itself as vulnerable to the coercion directed at its economy and political leadership.

A target nation, knowing that other nations will trade with them and that sanctions are not supported multilaterally either formally through UN resolutions or informally by choice, has little impetus to comply with coercer demands or fear any crippling effects of the coercion attempt. In essence, Iran could feel secure in knowing that the United States would suffer more economically under such sanctions as long as its own export markets remained intact. Similarly, any evidence of wavering commitment on sanctions could do nothing but encourage Iran to resist compliance (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, Drury 1998). Indeed, there appears to be little indication that Iran was placed in a vulnerable position by these U.S. coercion efforts.

The US coercive decisions since the Carter Administration to this point appear similar to what George (1971:27, 1991:8) refers to as a “try and see” approach which, in these cases, never seemed to evolve into a complete, focused coercion strategy once it became clear that Iran was not compelled to comply with US demands. In regards to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, there appears little evidence there was any proposed timetable for compliance with the demand for Iran to cease its pursuit of nuclear weapons technologies or a renunciation of terrorism, sincere reciprocal offers

sufficient to entice compliance or any credible threat presented which conveyed a resolve to enforce compliance with US demands if Iran balked. The concept of containment, which was the broader strategic goal, is also somewhat ambiguous. Questions to what constitutes successful containment arise; is it merely limited ability of Iran to advance their nuclear ambitions or, is success measured by total stoppage of its proliferation attempts? The effectiveness of a containment strategy can be difficult to measure for both the coercer and the target and, as Drury (2006) posits, if there is any question as to what measurable actions constitute terms of compliance, the target has a disincentive to comply with coercer demands.

In sum, there seems to be little evidence that sufficient costs were presented to the Iranian leaders which would convince them that compliance was in their interest or to their benefit. It is interesting that Rafsanjani did make attempts to ease relations between the United States and Iran during this time period. His efforts were sabotaged, however, by the clerical elite who are arguably the real political power in Iran (Sick 2004). Based upon the lack of change in Iranian state behavior, there appears to be little evidence that U.S. coercive efforts created a sense of vulnerability in Iran or sufficient internal pressure for the leadership to negotiate, which could likely only come through the clerical leadership.

The George W. Bush Administration

Faced with a veto-proof majority in congress to extend ILSA sanctions, Bush signed an extension of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act into law in August of 2001 despite its having cost US industry billions of dollars in lost business and its failure to stop the flow of foreign investment in Iran (Franssen and Morton 2002). The events of September 11 had arguably swung the political pendulum away from the milder coercion strategies employed by the US since 1981 however. In June 2003, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had released its report on the Iranian nuclear disposition, George W. Bush (Bush 2003a:819) asserted his policy goals toward Iran, stating that

“We call for a halt to proliferation activities in a way that is demonstrable and verifiable. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA, remedy all failures and answer all questions.”

The IAEA report helped fuel increased pressure on Iran from Russia and the EU who were likewise angry at Iranian attempts to circumvent or “cheat” inspections and compliance with international restrictions (Chubin and Litwak 2004). The Administration’s subsequent national security strategy made clear that the US would not tolerate inaction (by its allies) and it would act preemptively if necessary (Lennon and Eiss 2004).

The attack of September 11 ultimately caused the reshaping of US coercion efforts aimed at Iran which, in some ways, resembled those employed by the Carter Administration. The United States stepped up pressure on foreign banks to block them from dealing with Iranian financial institutions, froze Iranian assets under U.S. jurisdiction, was able to successfully pressure the international community to restrict

business with Iran by threatening to cut off access to US markets and gained limited multilateral sanctions via UN Resolution 1737. There were no U.N. sanctions included in these actions as the US strategy was to compel compliance with international demands for nuclear inspections and monitoring and the abandonment of sponsorship to terrorist organizations by financially squeezing the government of Iran while simultaneously avoiding hardship on the Iranian people. In this manner, the US effort resembled the disinvestment campaign which was used against apartheid South Africa (Beehner 2007).

The political and economic effects of these US coercion efforts appear to have been minimal. Despite a stagnating economy, Iran was faring better than its neighbors in the Middle East who were not the target of sanctions. More damaging to the Iranian economy than coercion efforts, were the sharp declines in oil prices on the global market (Beehner 2007). Whenever oil prices decline, income from oil decreases and its effect is particularly damaging to the oil-dependent economies of states such as Iran. Because oil is Iran's primary export commodity, any decline in oil prices significantly affects the stability of the national economy. Any decline can be damaging, but a large drop in market prices can seriously harm program funding and markets in such a country.

The US did offer incentives for compliance with the demand to suspend uranium enrichment and has, according to Perkovich (in Gwertzman 2008), made increasingly lucrative incentives in an effort to get Iran to negotiate. While there appears to be few public statements articulating the specific incentives that have been offered Iran, reciprocity appears to have been present in U.S. strategy under Bush. On May 23, 2008 Bush (2008a) again referred to reciprocal incentives offered to Iran, stating

“We need to prevent them from learning how to enrich uranium. And I have made it clear to the Iranians that there is a seat at the table for them if they would verifiably suspend their enrichment. And if not, we'll continue to rally the world to isolate them.”

Despite many important facets for successful policy posited by the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model being in place, all of these efforts still ultimately failed to alter Iranian state behavior.

The failure of US coercive diplomacy targeting Iran since the Carter Administration seems evident by its failure to organize a focused, multifaceted program for achieving success. Efforts to gain multilateral sanctions through the UNSC were not supported by Russia or China which has limited the capacity of U.S. sanctions alone. Sanctions have thus not materialized in such a way as to seriously harm the Iranian economy in a manner which could produce the internal pressure necessary for policy change by the regime. At times there have been strong statements made by U.S. administrations, but the United States has not displayed a credible threat (visible forces lurking in the region which could be unleashed on Iran at any time) which conveys a resolve for timely compliance with their demands. U.S. military forces in Iraq or Afghanistan do not suffice for this purpose as they are engaged in security operations and could not be remobilized quickly for any effective posture that would make Iran feel vulnerable. When “carrots” have been offered as part of the U.S. strategic effort, the lack of sufficient pressure from other coercive strategies has undermined their value as an enticement tool for compliance with U.S. demands.

CASE SUMMARY

The analysis of past US coercion strategies against Iran has produced a surprising finding that could be a significant contributing factor in enhancing the effectiveness of future actions aimed at convincing Iran to abandon its pursuit of WMD; an unplanned, intervening variable which was the Iran-Iraq War. This situation greatly exacerbated the effects of multilateral sanctions during the Carter administration on the Iranian economy and, combined with a credible threat and sufficient reciprocal offers, at last compelled Iran to agree to US demands to release the hostages. In all other situations where coercion was used, the strategies appeared to be implemented piecemeal, not supported multilaterally, not sufficiently balanced with threats and tangible benefits, and not significantly damaging to the economy (judging by the outcomes) to create political pressure against the regime for policy changes. In each instance, failure or success appeared directly related to the proportionality of the means to the ends, the reciprocity, and credible threat requirements which Jentleson and Whytock (2006) found to be the critical factors in their study of US coercion in Libya.

The potentially contributing influence of the Iran-Iraq War on the Iranian economy is especially interesting because of another event which recently took place; the extreme drop of prices for crude oil on the international market. Because oil exports make up 85 percent of the Iranian economy (CIA World Factbook 2009), strong multilateral economic sanctions had the greatest chance for severely impacting the Iranian economy in a shorter time period under such external conditions than at any time

since 1981. This means that the time necessary to produce significant internal pressure for compliance with U.S. demands is greatly reduced in such circumstances and could provide a window of opportunity for similar coercive strategies to be successful as long as market prices remain or can be maintained at a low rate. This reflects back to the findings of Drury (1998) who suggested coercion policy should be targeted at diminishing the export markets of a target state as a means to create a trade imbalance which precludes the target from maintaining levels of trade necessary to resist coercer demands.

Predictions for a successful coercion strategy are always an educated gamble, but based on past coercion history and its relevance to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, it appears that there is strong support suggesting a comprehensive coercion strategy can be successful if employed against Iran. While economic and trade sanctions can hardship the population, the government is extremely dependent on oil for its pursuits and is therefore should be highly vulnerable to sanction effects under the right conditions or application of strategies. With increased global support for Iranian compliance to abandon its WMD activities, the possibility for the multilateral sanctions needed to cripple the economy of Iran by cutting off its export markets and create internal pressure on the regime and the elites who insulate seems to be very favorable.

Reciprocity, or the “carrot,” has been shown in this case study to be an ineffective factor when coercive strategies do not sufficiently squeeze the Iranian economy and when a credible threat does not exist concurrently. Reciprocal offers can only entice a target when the effects of other facets of coercive diplomacy have a significant impact. Like the

Jentleson and Whytock (2006) study of Libya, each of these three variables must work in conjunction sufficiently for the coercion strategy to cause a desired modification of state behavior.

In conclusion, this case reveals that the coercive strategy most likely to succeed in convincing the regime in Iran to abandon its program to develop weapons of mass destruction is one of rigidly enforced multilateral sanctions in combination with a sustained regional military presence which has the *recognizable* ability to strike Iran (such as a carrier fleet) if it fails to comply. Airstrikes or any other attack against Iran should be avoided to prevent losing western support among the population; support which will likely be very critical in helping to stabilize the Middle East. As Sariolghalam (2004:289) notes, “failure to address the deep sensitivity all Iranians attach to their national sovereignty is ill advised.” Only in the most extreme of circumstances should military force be a consideration, such as an eminent attack by Iran against another country with a nuclear device.

The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model for successful coercion compares favorably with the outcomes revealed by the Iranian case, with the exception of the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly there appears to be some utility to the model, however, the external influences on the political and economic environment that exists for a target state may fall outside the scope of the “vulnerability” variable as used by the model, which I interpret as meaning “internal characteristics or attributes of the target state.” As such, it seems possible that the model could be enhanced by including this additional facet as part of the consideration of the target state politics and economy in the model.

CHAPTER 3: MYANMAR (BURMA)

Historical Background

The political and economic isolation of Myanmar by the United States is something of an anomaly in the Southeast Asia sub-region, comparable to other regional authoritarian regimes. Ott (1996) contends that during the Cold War, the United States considered Myanmar geopolitically irrelevant. Bert (2004) elaborates that its displayed disdain for human rights and democracy and the good relations the United States has with neighboring Thailand diminished U.S. economic interests there and any strategic concerns over Chinese influence. However, Englehart (2005:623) asserts that U.S. policy towards Myanmar has to this point ignored deeper structural problems at the heart of the state behavior to which the United States currently objects; “conditions which led to the origins of military rule in the collapse of democracy” in 1962. Because, as noted by Renard (1996), the academic (and political) preference in the United States is to use the term Burma as opposed to Myanmar, that is the term that will be used henceforth for this thesis.

Burma began its post-colonial identity as a democracy following independence from Britain in 1948 after the Second World War. Burmese officials inherited a weak administrative apparatus and constitution from an unpopular and coercive colonial government. The Burmese officials employed by Britain had been very corrupt and were mistrusted by much of the population. This weak administration was never sufficiently able to control the undermining opposition from criminal organizations (narcotics

syndicates), local bosses or insurgent groups (which had also plagued the Japanese during the occupation years), or summarily establish the security, stability and legitimacy of the state government. These failures set the stage for military intervention in national politics and the eventual take over of the government by the military (Englehart 2005).

Whether or not the United States considered Burma geopolitically irrelevant, there was not a total disinterest. Monetary assistance had been provided by the United States and other bilateral donors, such as Japan and (then) West Germany, and project funding had been disbursed by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for a number of years (Lambertson 1989). There was also limited U.S. business interests and investment operating in the state. Burma is distinguished, however, by a xenophobic personality; nationalism, self reliance and distrust of all foreigners, that is largely responsible for its political isolation and limited outside investment (Bert 2004).

Burma's xenophobic character was illuminated for the world in 2008 following cyclone Nargis. President George W. Bush (2008b) ordered U.S. Navy ships operating in the region to take disaster relief supplies to Burma as aid for the subsequent humanitarian crisis. The military government initially refused entry of aid from the U.S. and other countries, despite a situation in which many of their citizens were dying or in serious need of basic supplies. Bush explained (p.1110) his administration's position and reaction, stating

"I don't think it would have been helpful for the Burmese people had there been a conflict over the delivery of aid. What we don't want to do is compound a terrible situation. In other words, if we just.....sent people in, our military in without visas or permission from the Government, there's no telling what the reaction would have been. And so therefore, we were trying to make the problem better, not worse.

In 1988, the domestic situation in Myanmar began a problematic turn of events which altered U.S. policy and, as posited by Kurlantzick (2002:133), turned the state into an “international pariah.” The military had operated a dictatorship since 1962 with limited contestation, but a popular, non-violent uprising for a return to a democratic, multi-party system emerged in September (19-21) of that year in which millions of Burmese citizens took to the streets in protest. This protest had followed earlier riots in June over police brutality against students the previous March, the regime’s repression of political rights and general discontent with the national economy. As a result of the earlier protests, Ne Win, the leader of the military government resigned (Lambertson 1989).

The appointment of Sein Lwin as Win’s successor, who many considered responsible for the deaths of protestors in the August demonstrations, set off the September 19 protests and the military responded with lethal violence. Junta troops opened fire on protestors in several cities killing what U.S. officials and other eyewitness observers estimated were 1,000 people. In one instance, officials at the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon witnessed these shootings right outside of their building. The United States and other bilateral donors responded immediately by suspending all foreign assistance programs with Burma (Lambertson 1989).

Since that time, the domestic situation has continued to cause great concern, not only in the United States but among many in the global community as well. In a report to

the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on the situation in Burma, Havel and Tutu (2005:2)

maintain

“In recent years, it has become clear that Burma’s troubles are causing serious and possibly permanent problems that go well beyond human rights violations. Burma has now become a problem for the region and international community.”

In comparatively assessing the factors present in Burma with other states in which the UNSC has taken action on internal conflict, such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Rwanda, they subsequently contend that Burma is the only case where every major factor of concern is present and, exists in considerably worse degree in Burma than in any other state.

Burwen et al. (2008:2) maintain that “what is unclear is whether US sanctions are having an impact on, or can be correlated with, human rights abuses or (these) humanitarian conditions on the ground.”

The narcotics problem in Burma is perhaps equally as distressing to the United States and the United Nations as human rights violations. In 1991, the U.S. government estimated Burma was producing 2,350 tons of opium and heroin, which ranked highest among nations globally at that time. Opium as a cash crop was originally imported by the East India Company of Great Britain. After independence, opium production as a means of subsistence took on a life of its own and proliferated throughout Burma (Renard 1996).

As severe as the situation is purported to be, there appears to be a general disdain for the opium business in Burma, even by the drug warlords themselves. Renard (1996) maintains that a number of major warlords have embraced United Nations projects for crop-substitution and one, Khun Sa, even submitted a proposal for crop replacement to U.S. President George H.W. Bush in 1989. Some, he proffers, have even expressed a

preference for earning their income from a legal crop. In several cases, the United States has resorted to purchasing opium crops and destroying them, rather than see them go into distribution. Unfortunately, the crop-substitution efforts have either been inconsistently implemented or under funded and the flow of illicit narcotics out of Burma continues.

Burma does maintain strict narcotics laws and has systematically destroyed many crops in the field, but the vast network of production and rugged terrain in some areas has limited the effectiveness of the Junta's efforts. Particularly complicating is the stagnant economy of Burma which leaves little else as a sustainable income producer for some Burmese. The primary (legal) export commodity of Burma is wood, though natural gas is emerging as an industry. With an underdeveloped industrial base, opium is still one of the few viably profitable exports available for some Burmese (Renard 1996).

Despite repeated denials by the military government, a number of persisting accusations have been made concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Burmese Army. It was believed by some that Burma was trying to acquire the capacity to produce mustard gas as early as 1981. Insurgent groups such as the Karens and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have reported being targeted by air-deployed gas weapons, but such reports have not been confirmed by independent observers. It is known that during the 1980s, aerial spraying of U.S. supplied herbicides was so intense and indiscriminant, that there were many villagers suffering extensive toxicity and some deaths. While it does not appear that Burma has any interest in obtaining nuclear weapons, the possible use of chemical weapons by Burma is a policy concern (Selth 1999).

Another potential concern for U.S. foreign policy is the economic and military penetration of Burma by the Chinese. There has been substantial immigration of Chinese into northern Burma and, in some cases, the junta forcibly relocated ethnic Burmese to accommodate the Chinese. China also has invested billions in infrastructure improvements (roads, railways and communications) in Burma as part of an exchange to gain economic and military access to the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean, which has caused concern in neighboring India and other states. The Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean and arms supplied to Burma present an important consideration for U.S. security interests when dealing with Burma (Bert 2004).

The relationship between the United States and Burma today is summarily very limited. The United States maintains an ambassador to Burma (Shari Villarosa), and some humanitarian assistance programs. Some pre-sanction contracts have also been allowed to continue (Burwen et al 2008), but for the most part, Burma remains isolated economically and politically from the United States. Most aid programs have remained suspended since 1988, and there has been no clear indication to date that either state intends to expand the relations between them or take a new approach to resolve differences.

US-BURMA COERCIVE HISTORY: The Carter Administration

Consumed by the Cold War, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks and human rights issues with Russia, President Jimmy Carter paid little policy interest to socialist Burma. While the United States was not supportive of rule by the military Junta, they did begin to disperse aid in 1978 along with other western allies after Burma submitted a request for aid. Much of that aid was agriculture and healthcare related, although some was to assist the Junta in combating narcotics traffickers (U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007). During and preceding this administration, Burma had made positive overtures to the capitalist west and had warmed up to Thailand and the economic partnership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in an effort to improve its stagnant economy. The actions taken by Burma, given more pressing areas of national security concern, deflected serious policy initiatives over opposition to Junta rule from consideration by the administration (Kamm 1980).

In 1977 however, Congress passed legislation which would later guide U.S. foreign policy coercion against Burma; the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA). This act falls under the authority of the National Emergencies Act (NEA) which stipulates that an emergency declared under this act must be renewed annually if it is to remain in effect, and can be terminated by a resolution from Congress. The main advantage of the IEEPA was that it granted the president broader powers to sanction nations hostile to U.S. interests than the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), which it superseded. From this point forward, presidents could invoke more punitive trade sanctions under a national emergency without a state of war (Kerouani et al. 2001).

While some mechanisms for sanctions to be levied against Burma were in place, there were not sanctions in effect at this time or a full sanction effort against Burma in place.

The Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations

Immediately following the violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in September of 1988, President Ronald Reagan suspended all assistance programs and arms sales with Burma, except for humanitarian aid (Lambertson 1989, Burwen et al. 2008). The administration offered to resume assistance (revoke coercion measures) if Burma undertook meaningful political and economic reform. This constituted a coercion policy goal of governmental reform. The following February, Burma's election commission subsequently announced plans for an election to be held in the spring of 1990, but the United States did not resume aid programs or ease sanctions at that time (Lambertson 1989). Reagan had also suspended all trade with Burma following the 1988 military crackdown. Even shipments of commodities already heading for Burma were diverted elsewhere (U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007). With the events in Burma transpiring at the end of his administration, Reagan did not personally make any public statements articulating the policy goals of coercive measures.

In 1989, President George H.W. Bush removed Burma from the list of states that were cooperating with anti-narcotics efforts. This was a sanction action that blocked Burma from receiving aid or loans from the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and all international financial institutions that were receiving US

funds. Removal from the list also revoked trade benefits for Burma under the Generalized System of Preferences, which promotes economic growth in the developing world by providing preferential duty-free entry on their commodities (Burwen et al. 2008). On April 13, in a letter to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, Bush announced the indefinite suspension of Burma's GSP status, as a consequence for failure to comply with internationally recognized worker rights under the Trade Act of 1974 (Bush 1989b).

The elections promised by the ruling junta took place in 1990, but the results were refused when the military's favored party was defeated by the National League for Democracy (NLD). In response, Congress added a provision to the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (CTA) that enabled the president to levy comprehensive trade sanctions against the Burmese government and keep them enforced until the election results of 1990 were honored and progress had been made in controlling narcotics trafficking. Bush employed this power in 1991 by refusing to renew a bilateral textile agreement with Burma (Burwen et al. 2008).

In addition to the policy goals set forth by the CTA, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater issued a statement summarizing the general goals of George H.W. Bush on October 14, 1991. In that statement, Fitzwater (1991:1445) articulated that the Bush administration "urges the Burmese military regime to transfer power to the duly elected civilian government and release all political prisoners." The only action taken by George H.W. Bush during his administration under the CTA also came in 1991, when he refused

to renew a textile agreement with Burma that had expired the previous year (Burwen et al. 2008).

The actions of the Reagan and Bush administrations appear to be limited in scope as they were strictly manifested as coercive economic sanctions. While there was some limited multilateral support for sanctions, mainly from western allies, it was not significant enough to economically coerce Burma and the impact potential of these actions appears to have been very minimal. Ott (1996) contends that trade between China and Burma expanded from around \$15 million in 1986 to \$800 million by 1996, suggesting that Burma turned to other markets and buyers when the U.S. levied sanctions.

Very few statements regarding Burma were made by either administration and there was little evidence that strong demands for compliance were articulated to the Burmese government outside of those statements issued by the State Department. There does not appear to be any indication of reciprocal offers made by these administrations in exchange for transitioning to a democracy or for the release of political prisoners, such as increased financial or technical assistance to assist the transition or improve the economic and structural stability of Burma. The coercive strategies used by Reagan and George H.W. Bush were summarily unsuccessful in altering Burma's state behavior.

Assuming the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model to be correct, the failure of U.S. coercion to compel the government of Burma to honor the 1990 elections and, to a lesser extent, improve its anti-narcotics efforts was due to the absence of reciprocity and a credible threat as part of a complete coercion strategy. There were few adjustments to the sanctions levied against Burma, which could indicate that the situation in Burma was

not a top priority of these two administrations. Congress was significantly more interested in Burma and the human rights issues, meeting multiple times to review the issue in hearings. While speculative, it is possible that the limited actions of these administrations reflect the pursuit of domestic political interests more greatly than that of sincere coercion for change in Burma.

The Clinton Administration

The Burmese military government was still holding political prisoners and refusing the results of the 1990 elections when Bill Clinton assumed the U.S. presidency. On May 19, 1993 Clinton (1993b:913) issued a statement on the human rights issues in Burma which laid out the administration's foreign policy goals, stating

“I strongly urge the Burmese government to release Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, to respect the results of the May 1990 elections, and to commit itself to genuine democratic reforms.”

On July 20, 1993 Clinton (1993c: 1408-1409) reiterated U.S. demands, calling upon the Burmese government to

“release unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and all other prisoners of conscience, to respect the the results of the 1990 elections and to undertake genuine democratic reforms.”

On February 10, 1994 Clinton (1994) sent a letter to the imprisoned Burmese opposition leader reiterating United States support for democracy and for her plight, which was delivered in person by Congressman Bill Richardson (D- NM) on February 14.

However, his letter (p.297) hinted that his administration's strategy would take a more passive policy approach to accomplishing political change in Burma. To that effect he stated

“I also want to assure you of the United States' continuing support for the struggle to promote freedom in Burma. The 1990 elections handed your party an overwhelming mandate from Burma's people and firmly rejected military rule. Obviously, the path to democratic change *must be worked out by the Burmese themselves.*”

While Clinton frequently referred to Burma in speeches about the United States global efforts at promoting democracy, his only substantive actions regarding Burma prior to 1996, were the yearly declarations, beginning in 1994, that Burma was one of the states which were not meeting the standards set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA) for combating narcotics trafficking. The FRAA had been introduced by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D- IN) in 1993 as a legal tool for governing foreign assistance appropriations, including arms sales and control in regards to other states (Govtrack.us 2009). These two acts were utilized each year in trade restrictions with Burma from the Clinton administration onward, as Burma failed to meet significant goals in restricting the movement of narcotics from the state.

With no progress being made towards compliance with the United States demands, Clinton issued Proclamation 6925 on October 3, 1996. This proclamation suspended the entry of persons into the United States who were involved in the formulation or implementation of policies which impede the transition to democracy in Burma, or other persons who benefit from such policies. This was a measure stemming

from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which empowered a president to restrict immigration or entrance to the United States if such entry would be detrimental to U.S. interests (Clinton 1996). In support of this action, Clinton (1996:1957) reasoned

“The regime has failed to enter into serious dialogue with the democratic opposition and representatives of the country’s ethnic minorities, has failed to move toward achieving national reconciliation, and has failed to meet internationally recognized standards of human rights.”

On May 20, 1997 Clinton (1997) sent a letter to Congress declaring a national emergency with respect to Burma, via Executive Order 13047, pursuant to the National Emergencies Act. Similar to its invocation against Iran, this declaration automatically prohibited any new investment in Burma by persons in the United States and any approval or facilitation by persons in the United States of any transaction with a foreign person which would result in a prohibited investment. In addition, this order prohibited ownership or equity interest in development of resources, as well as the receiving of any royalties, earnings or profits from ownership. The trade sanctions and restrictions also required a review of Burmese progress every six months to evaluate whether or not the policy should be maintained.

Clinton annually renewed the declaration of emergency, as well as declaring Burma to be performing poorly in combating narcotics trafficking until the end of his presidency. He did not, however, take additional measures to elicit Burmese compliance to U.S. demands. Overall, there is little similarity between the measures taken by Clinton and the prescription for successful coercion posited by the Jentleson and Whytock model. There was no credible threat for failure to comply with administration demands, and there

appeared to be no substantially lucrative offers to convince the Burmese government that the benefits of compliance and costs of non-compliance were irresistible.

Englehart (2005:623) critically maintains that a core policy demanding the unconditional release of the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and a transition to democratic rule was too difficult as a policy (to be successful) because “the policy requires a complete transformation of the regime before sanctions can be lifted.” It was, he also posited, following an assumption that political and human rights reform are all that are necessary to solve the problems of Burma. Notwithstanding any potential structural problems complicating a transitional change of the regime, the evaluation of the impact of sanctions employed by this administration by Clinton’s “observers” may be highly overstated.

Bert (2004) maintains that since 1988, when the United States began to restrict trade, China’s economic penetration of Burma has been significant. Previously noted, Ott (1996) maintained that trade between China and Burma expanded from around \$15 million to \$800 million between 1986 and 1996. Bert (2004) similarly notes that trade between these countries was officially \$300 million USD in 1989, but was an estimated one billion dollars by 2004. As was the case with Iran, as long as a substitute trading partner was available, sanctions employed by the United States had little effect on the Burmese economy and it was likely not as seriously harmed by sanctions as the administration purported.

The coercive strategies used by the Clinton Administration were summarily unsuccessful in altering Burmese state behavior (repression, political imprisonment,

violence, forced labor) or in compelling a regime transition to democracy. If the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model is correct, the failure of U.S. coercion efforts under Clinton was due to a lack of the reciprocal and credible threat components, which together with sanctions form a balanced and complimentary strategy. The employment of sanctions alone with limited multilateral support was a one-dimensional strategic approach, and limited adjustment to coercive measures during the 8 year administration did not appear responsive to the situation in Burma. In sum, the limited, static strategy of the Clinton administration failed to generate sufficient coercive pressure necessary for achieving success.

The George W. Bush Administration

Despite the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and the intensive policy maelstrom of the war against terror, Burma was still given due attention by President George W. Bush. A breakthrough seemed to be in the works in May of 2002 when, due to the diplomatic efforts of United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from detention by the Burmese government. In a statement issued on May 6, Bush encouraged continued progress towards restoring democracy and called for greater involvement from the international community, ASEAN and Japan in facilitating the process (Bush 2002b).

In June, 2003 Congress (U.S. House Committee on International Relations 2003:57) enacted the “Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act” with the objective

“To sanction the ruling Burmese military junta, to strengthen Burma’s democratic forces and support and recognize the National League of Democracy as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people, and for other purposes.”

On July 28, 2003 Bush (2003b) announced his yearly renewal of the state of emergency with respect to Burma, under the NEA and IEEPA. However, he also issued a supplementary measure, Executive Order 13310, which expanded the sanctions outlined in Executive Order 13047 under Clinton in 1997. This executive order came in response to an attack on the evening of May 30, 2003 on the motorcade of Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near the town of Depayin, northwest of Mandalay. In that attack by an armed, pro-government gang, the government reported there were 4 killed and 50 wounded, though independent sources suggested as many as 70 or 80 people killed in the attack (Seekins 2005). In the days that followed the attack. The Burmese government forcefully closed all of the NLD offices nationally (Buwen et al. 2008).

Burma’s leading democratic figure was placed in confinement once again along with other supporters, and Bush invoked provisions of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, as well as adding additional restrictions by the executive order. Bush (2003c:994) noted these additional measures, stating

“The Order blocks all property and interests in property of the State Peace and Development Council of Burma, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank, the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), and the Myanmar Economic Bank as well as all property and interests in property of (senior officials or those acting on their behalf).”

The order also prohibited the provision of any financial services to Burma or the import of any product produced there. Burwen et al. (2008) notes that the visa ban included members of the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), the civil

organization (associated with the junta) purportedly responsible for the motorcade attack, and managers of state-run enterprises and their family members. They also maintain that, in addition to prohibiting financial services, U.S. officials at international financial institutions were instructed to actively oppose any loans that were not already prohibited to the government of Burma. These measures appeared to be aimed at punishing Burma, as Bush made no clear demands at the time. On December 10, however, Bush (2003d:1782) iterated the goals of administration in Proclamation 7744, stating

“We will continue to call on Burma’s ruling junta to release political prisoners and engage in an inclusive dialogue with the democratic opposition to bring democracy to Burma.

Seekins (2005:440) maintains that advocates in the administration and Congress for tough sanctions on Burma believed that, if enough pain was inflicted on the regime, the military government “will make the desired concessions.”

After pro-democracy protests were again violently suppressed in 2007, Bush issued Executive Order 13448. This order implemented what were referred to as “smart” sanctions (Burwen et.al. 2008:8) which targeted specific Burmese business entities and their owners. Burwen et al (2008) notes that significantly among these was Tay Za, who was chairman of the Htoo group of companies and owner of several others which were involved in natural resources, trade, and transportation.

In April 2008, Bush issued Executive Order 13464 which included three state-owned companies that were to be targeted by “smart” sanctions, which were involved in the commodities of pearls, timber and gems. More-so than previous administrations, the Bush sanctions and particularly “smart” sanctions, were enjoined by western allies

(European Union, Australia and Canada). Canada was the only US ally, however, to adopt all of the Bush sanctions against Burma (Burwen et al 2008).

The failure of US coercive diplomacy targeting Burma under George W. Bush, in consideration of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, seems evident in the one-dimensional nature of the strategy toward Burma which has characterized all presidential administrations since 1988. While sanctions appear comprehensive and well targeted and, while some critical multilateral support was present during this administration, there also appears to be an absence of reciprocal offers which could enable a stable transition to democracy and benefit the ruling junta to a degree that compliance would be encouraged. Similarly absent is any form of credible threat for harm to the junta should they fail to comply. This may be due in part, however, to security considerations with respect to China, which is closely allied with Burma.

CASE SUMMARY

Burma policy implemented by U.S. administrations since 1988 has universally failed to meet the focused, multifaceted program for achieving success proffered by the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model and, has appeared to be consistently one-dimensional. Despite the increasing complexity and broad reach of sanctions in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, limited multilateral support reduced the potential for economic harm to Burma. China's close relationship with Burma and

expansion of trade between the two during the time coercion was taking place (Bert 2004, Ott 1996) was likely a large contributor to the limited impact of U.S. sanctions as well.

There appears to be minimal effort by any U.S. administration at making substantive reciprocal offers to entice the Burmese government to comply with demands or that might enhance the viability of a stable democratic government if the transition were to take place. As noted by Englehart (2005), it was instability and the inability of the previous democracy to establish legitimacy and internal security that led to the military takeover in 1962 originally. By including reciprocal offers that address these past problems of Burmese democracy and allow for an enjoiner of the military junta in an important and influential capacity in the new government, it seems at least possible the junta would be more receptive to and willing to accept such a transition.

Absent during any of these administrations was any indication that a show of military presence was discussed or attempted. The credible threat in coercer state strategy is an integral part of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, but it is possible in this particular case that the model's prescription for presenting such a credible threat may not be feasible, given Burma's close relations with China and the nature of U.S. grievances. The involvement of China in supplying arms to Burma, infrastructure development projects and both its strategic and economic interests for access to the Indian Ocean present the *potential* for a credible military threat, as required by Jentleson and Whytock (2006), which could alarm the Chinese and create a superpower confrontation. While speculative, such considerations could potentially limit the viability of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) prescription for a credible threat in this case.

The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model's prescription for reciprocity to elicit compliance seems to be the most critical facet relative to the conditions in Burma. The structural problems of Burma, which may prevent it from complying with United States demands, would have to be addressed through reciprocal offers in order to create conditions more conducive to compliance. Assuming the noted assertions of Englehart (2005) to be true, for a democracy to become stable in Burma, it will be necessary for the viable (legal) production of commodities to develop which provides a level of economic opportunity for Burmese citizens and growth potential. A reasonably stable economy facilitated through targeted reciprocal measures as prescribed by the Jentleson and Whytock, could contribute to less social unrest and promote public confidence in a fledgling democracy in Burma that would need to establish legitimacy early in its tenure in order to survive. Reciprocal measures such as the crop-substitution programs attempted by the United Nations could be a key reciprocal factor in resolving a number of internal problems with and grievances against Burma.

In the Burma case, it seems that strategic reciprocal offers could create the greatest impact towards success, based on the particular dynamics of the state. In addition to crop-substitution, offers to expand investment in extracting natural gas, which is the most promising rising export currently in Burma (Turnell 2008) and proliferating industrial development, at the very least, are areas of great benefit to this underdeveloped state that promise substantial and long-lasting benefits to Burma. As Renard (1996) notes, the various insurgencies against the junta have been funded by narcotics trafficking, which is still one of the most viable economic exports of Burma (Cornell 2005). A broad

offer for creation of economic opportunities has the potential to both supplant the reliance on narcotics (opium and heroin) for income and diffuse the insurgencies, encouraging greater social order and the likelihood that democracy could become more acceptable to the military government in Burma.

In conclusion, the test of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model in this case is limited by the narrow scope of U.S. coercion in Burma. The failure of policy to compel Burma to honor the results of the 1990 elections, respect human rights and improve anti-narcotics efforts is supported by the model. Questions about the viability of the credible threat, in light of Chinese penetration of Burma, remain unanswered. Despite such potentiality, the model appears correct in explaining coercion failure, in which a credible threat was absent in U.S. policy. While the model again appears to have some utility here, the full extent of that utility may remain undetermined until future research resolves such questions by indicating the consequential effects of China's disposition relative to Burma.

CHAPTER 4: NORTH KOREA

Historical Background

North Korea is the longest-standing adversary of the United States, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since the signing of the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953, the United States has continued to maintain military forces near the mile wide demarcation line known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th Parallel, protecting South Korea from invasion. North Korea is currently ruled by Kim Jong-il, who succeeded his father Kim Il-sung after being named Chairman of the National Defense Commission in 1998 (U.S. Department of State 2009).

The Stalinist-style regime in the north is characterized by Becker (2005:ix) as “the quintessential rogue regime” in that its (state) behavior is rash, it subjugates its population, it is hostile to the ideologies and interests of the free world” and, among other things, it engages in human rights violations, counterfeiting, support of terrorism and the trafficking of weapons and narcotics. Oh and Hassig (2003:44-45) illuminate the nature of this state behavior, maintaining that the authoritarian leader exports a “xenophobic nationalistic ideology” that reinforces the “principle of *juche*,” which equates to self-reliance and independence. They note that, according to the logic of this “perverted” belief, the North Korean people can only be masters of their own destiny “if they blindly follow (Kim Jong-il).”

The Kim Dynasty in North Korea was originally established by the Russians, who elevated a (then) little known resistance leader, Kim Il-sung, as head of the government

following the north's liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945. Following Stalin's heavy industrial model, North Korea successfully rebuilt its economy after the war. As the global political climate has shifted away from communism in many respects, however, North Korea found itself increasingly estranged diplomatically and the refusal of the Kims' to modify their philosophy with the times has been damaging economically (Clark 1992).

North Korea was strong economically prior to and even initially after the Korean War. It maintained some 80 percent of the peninsula's heavy industry, 75 percent of the mining production and 90 percent of the power generation capacity. By the 1960's, North Korea was devoting roughly 20 percent of its GDP to the military, compared to about 5 percent for South Korea. Its heavy industry was largely devoted to military production and it had low levels of foreign trade. The trade it did have was primarily with eastern bloc states. With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, North Korea lost most of its export markets and access to the subsidized oil which its economy greatly depended on. Even with some replacement of oil imports by favorable trade with China, the North Korean economy went into a steady decline. By the 1990s, starvation emerged as a serious national problem (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003a)

The recent North Korean economic atrophy, which has been largely the result of its excessive conventional military (one of the largest in the world) and failed command-economy system, seems to be the root cause of its nuclear proliferation (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003b). With the loss of political and economic support from the Russians and an economic liberalization in China that made it less compatible with the North

Korean regime, Henriksen (1996:30) maintains that Kim Il-sung used the threat of producing nuclear weapons to “gain aid, international status and contact with the United States.” Albright and Brannan (2006) contend, however, that North Korea has been accumulating weapon usable plutonium since 1986. Regardless of when North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons began, Becker (2005) maintains it was attempting to use the nuclear issue as bargaining power, or extortion, to alleviate domestic and particularly economic problems. With North Korea already exporting missile technology to Libya, Iran and Syria, there was deep concern by many in the international community that it might also begin selling nuclear weapons and technology to those states.

Henriksen (1996:30-32) also posits that “the adroitness and boldness of (the late) Kim Il-sung’s initiative.....are under appreciated.” With the increasingly long-range of the North Korean Taepo Dong class missiles, the regime possessed the potential to strike Japan or the U.S. base on Guam with a nuclear warhead and it was estimated they would soon (with the Taepo Dong II class missile) be capable of striking targets in the continental United States. In this respect, North Korea presented the United States with a dilemma not presented by any other similar “rogue” state in which coercive strategy was being employed.

The severity of North Korea’s internal food supply problems is extreme. Lee Min-bok (in Becker 2005:101-102) maintains that it is the internal economic system that is responsible for perennial shortages, not external factors such as disasters or reduced foreign aid. He posits that North Koreans were short on food and basic goods as early as the 1980s. The North Korean government tried to address the problem by using a food

distribution system to deliver food throughout the state, but the system was steadily breaking down over time. People had been dying of starvation long before the system “finally ground to a halt” in 1990, after which workers and state employees “began dying in large numbers” from starvation. Ogden and Anderson (2008) maintain that the economic instability in North Korea poses a potential humanitarian and economic crisis that threatens the stability of the entire region. Because North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, this condition greatly increases the possibility that a political miscalculation could result in regional conflict.

Among human rights violations particularly grievous to the United States and international community, have been kidnappings and torture conducted by North Korea. In 2001, a Japanese naval patrol engaged what appeared to be a fishing vessel, in Japanese coastal waters, in a firefight. The vessel sank, but after being raised by the navy in 2002, it was revealed this vessel had a surface-to-air missile launcher and a bay for a small submersible. The vessel also was found to have a self-destruct button, which the crew had ultimately used to avoid capture (Becker 2005).

The discovery resolved disturbing questions about how the North Koreans had been able to kidnap numerous Japanese and South Korean citizens (sometimes from European cities) and smuggle them back to North Korea; political prisoners who were tortured and sometimes killed. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il admitted and apologized for 13 Japanese kidnappings. Of those 13, eight were found to be dead and the remaining five were still not allowed to return home. He also refused any requests about additional Japanese citizens who were believed to have been abducted. Fortunately, some

abductees, such as South Korean actress Choi Un-hee and her husband escaped captivity (after 6 years) and returned with substantive evidence of Kim Jong Il's personal involvement in the state's kidnapping activities (Becker 2005).

Despite these revelations, neither Japan nor South Korea has been willing to invoke tougher policies against North Korea to assist U.S. efforts to alter such behaviors. Another problem O'Hanlon and Mochizuki (2003a:2,) maintain is that if the United States pursues regime change as a hard-line solution by strangling the North Korean economy with intensive sanctions, it would actually increase the risk that North Korea would be even *more* inclined to proliferate nuclear materials to other states or terrorist organizations as they would be more motivated to sell them to gain funding and supplies. Perhaps in consideration of this, they note that U.S. policy has been largely narrow and tactical, "focusing almost exclusively on North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs." They posit (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003b:157) that "the most promising route" to resolving these issues would be for the United States to be able to enjoin Japan, China and South Korea in a "grand bargain" with North Korea.

Prior to 1991, the United States and North Korea had relatively little relations with each other since the armistice in 1953. Interaction has been increasing since 1988, however (Clark 1992). The United States has supported engagement and dialog between North and South Korea, who had begun discussions about the prospects of reunification as early as 1971. North Korea has signed on to a number of treaties, such as the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, but did not agree to the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. Department of State 2009).

After negotiations in 2005, the United States and the D.P.R.K. committed to undertake steps to normalize their relations. In 2007, the Initial Actions agreement established bilateral working groups between the United States and North Korea on normalization of relations, which have met several times. That same year, the United States began the process of removing North Korea's designation as a state sponsoring terror. The current relationship is strained by the denuclearization issue but engagement is still taking place (U.S. Department of State 2009).

The current situation with North Korea, however, appears ominous. On April 5, 2009 the North Koreans launched a missile over the Sea of Japan in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718. After the act was condemned by the UNSC, Kim Jong-il responded by withdrawing from talks and ordering the expulsion of IAEA inspectors and U.S. technical experts who had been monitoring the nuclear site at Yongbyon. In May, North Korea announced it had conducted a second nuclear weapon test (U.S. Department of State 2009). Ferguson and Reed (in Bajoria 2009) posit that North Korea may have been testing the Obama administration to see if it could get a better deal than it was able to get from George W. Bush. In July, 2009 it fired several more missiles into the Sea of Japan, further raising concerns for the Obama administration and regional allies about the future of regional security and stability (U.S. Department of State 2009).

US-NORTH KOREA COERCIVE HISTORY: The Carter Administration

During the time Jimmy Carter was president, the United States had only minimal relations and contact with North Korea. Carter (1979c:1657) renewed a general trade embargo each year against North Korea under the “Trading With the Enemy Act” (TWEA) and modified the embargo administration through the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Lee and Choi 2007). By renewing this act, he prevented persons under U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in unlicensed commercial or financial transactions, or from importing or selling merchandise from North Korea. Broadly stated, he iterated the desires or goals of his administration, asserting that these embargoes shall continue until the policies of North Korea “make it appropriate for us to modify our restriction on trade and financial transactions.”

Carter inherited the Cold War, and with it U.S. foreign policies of containment and deterrence. Due to the extensive commitment by Carter in Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) talks with Soviet Russia, nonproliferation of nuclear technology and material had become a top policy endeavor for the administration. On March 10, 1978 Carter signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which laid the groundwork for future U.S. policy in nonproliferation, including policies that would emerge later with respect to states like North Korea. Carter (1978a:499) maintained that this act would establish a clarified U.S. policy on the use and provision of atomic fuels, while providing “rigid constraints which would prevent the acquisition of explosive capability by nations that are not part of the nuclear explosive club.”

The security of the Korean Peninsula was a significant foreign policy concern for Carter and his primary objective in Korea. As part of his overall goals of arms reduction, he also sought to readjust U.S. force commitments in the Western Pacific, including Korea. On January 19, 1978 Carter (1978b:122) stated

“We are seeking to readjust our military presence in Korea by reducing our ground forces on the peninsula and undertaking compensatory measures to ensure that an adequate balance of forces remain.”

On July 26, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment warning Carter against further troop withdrawals from South Korea, possibly out of concern that a reduction of forces could weaken the security of the peninsula and that North Korea might view troops leaving as an opportunity to invade. The promised troop withdrawals began on November 4, 1978, but were only expected to comprise roughly 3,400 soldiers and other personnel by the end of the year (Council on Foreign Relations 1990).

The next year initially looked promising for Carter’s general goals for peace on the Korean Peninsula. In January 1979, North and South Korea agreed to renew talks about reunification and peace and later met for the first time since 1973 (Council on Foreign Relations 1990). Speaking about foreign policy at his alma mater, Georgia Tech, Carter (1979d:69) iterated his general foreign policy goals stating

“America has four fundamental security responsibilities: to provide for our own Nation’s strength and safety; to stand by our allies and friends; to support national independence and integrity of other nations; and to work diligently for peace.”

Carter (1982:206) also discussed North Korea with Deng Xiaoping in a visit to China that same month. He had requested the Chinese use their influence with the communist north

to help keep the peace. Xiaoping assured Carter there was “absolutely no danger of a North Korean attack” and expressed support for continuing reunification talks.

By summer however, the prospects for peace on the peninsula were looking less favorable. After the United Nations Command accused North Korea of fortifying the DMZ within 100 yards of the border line, Carter and South Korean President Park called for three-way talks with the North. North Korea rejected talks and Carter responded on July 20, 1979 by halting any significant future troop withdrawals from the ROK until at least 1981 (Council on Foreign Relations 1990).

It does not appear that Carter explicitly implemented a comprehensive coercive strategy to achieve particular goals, beyond the limited actions intended to deter aggression by North Korea. There are few elements of Carter’s actions which substantially relate to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. Action was limited largely to deterrence-oriented policies. Carter only continued a preexisting embargo under the TWEA and requested other states (namely China) use their influence to moderate North Korea’s state behavior. Reciprocity was very limited, including minor troop withdrawals and an offer to enjoin the North in talks. There was little indication of a credible threat being manifested, outside of the nuclear armaments preexisting in the U.S. arsenal in South Korea. While the continuation of that potential threat could qualify for the purposes of the model, there is little evidence to merit a measurable policy of coercion. Summarily, the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model cannot be effectively evaluated under the foreign policy of deterrence employed by this administration.

The Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations

In February 1981, President Reagan decided to dispose of Carter's troop withdrawal plan from South Korea altogether after meeting with South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Washington. Instead, he reinforced security in the South by providing additional technology and military aid (Shinn 1982), while pledging to maintain 39,000 U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea. On March 26, the United States also agreed to send the ROK 36 F-16 fighter jets (Council on Foreign Relations 1990). Despite subsequent and intense anti-American rhetoric, North Korea indicated an interest in opening a dialogue with the United States concerning the armistice agreement and for increasing scholarly contact on a reciprocal basis between the two states. On August 26, however, the United States accused North Korea of firing an anti-aircraft missile at an SR-71 reconnaissance plane which was purportedly in South Korean airspace. Despite North Korea's denial, the administration vowed to take whatever steps were necessary to ensure the safety of future flights (Shinn 1982).

While 1982 saw little policy or action by the administration with regards to North Korea with the exception of the yearly renewal of the national emergency embargo (Lee and Choi 2007), the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, authorized in 1983 by Reagan in conjunction with ROK military forces, went ahead as scheduled. Kim Il-sung denounced the exercises as a dangerous provocation that threatened to ignite another war in Korea. Despite this perceived antagonism, North Korea continued to pursue official ties with the United States. In April, North Korea was reported to have proposed bilateral talks to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. The administration responded initially by

reciprocally easing some of the restrictions on contact with the north. After North Korea was implicated by the Burmese government in a bombing in Rangoon that killed 17 South Koreans (including four cabinet members) and four Burmese, this offer was rescinded. Reagan then visited Seoul from November 12-14. This act further intimidated the North who likened the visit to that of John Dulles in 1950, which they claimed precipitated the outbreak of the Korean War (Kihl 1984).

North Korea was known to have become an active nuclear state in 1960 when the Soviets assisted construction of a five megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. The beginnings of North Korea's nuclear weapons program during the Reagan administration is somewhat obscure, but was believed to have been assisted by Pakistan in exchange for missiles. Pakistan purportedly supplied designs or centrifuge rotors to North Korea, which allowed the process to begin (Squassoni 2004). On December 12 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but did not sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. It subsequently conditioned signing of the IAEA agreement to the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. Reagan was unwilling to reciprocate this condition and North Korea refused safeguard inspections (FAS Congressional Research Service 2006).

Few policy initiatives were implemented by Reagan against North Korea between 1985 until the end of his second term in 1988. There were minor incidents with the North, but little evidence suggests there was a specific policy target aimed to elicit compliance with specific administration goals. Ogden and Anderson (2008) posit that the Reagan administration conducted a Cold War containment policy with North Korea; not a direct coercion strategy. Lebovic (1988:116) notes that Reagan's policies (towards North

Korean and other communist states) reflected “a bipolar, security-oriented conception of the world where strength was important.” Given this view, it appears Reagan approached dealing with North Korea by maintaining an appearance of strength in a pure strategy of deterrence, rather than coercive diplomacy.

George H.W. Bush (1989a:240) announced on February 25, 1989 that he would keep American forces in South Korea, continuing the security policy of the Reagan administration. He stated that

“There are no plans to reduce U.S. forces in Korea. They will remain (there) as long as the government and the people of South Korea want us there and as long as we believe it is in the interest of peace to keep them there.”

In addition to maintaining troops to counter potential threats posed by North Korea, he also continued the Reagan policy of bolstering the South Korean Military capacity by selling advanced arms. On October 25, 1989 Bush and South Korea agreed to the purchase of 120 more advanced fighter jets for the ROK air force (Council on Foreign Relations 1990).

One of the concessions demanded by North Korea from the United States, in return for greater cooperation, had always been the removal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea. The U.S. nuclear arsenal in Korea was comprised of ground-launched tactical or “theater” nukes, which could be fired by artillery on land or at sea. On September 27, 1991 Bush (1991:1349) announced in a national address that he was “directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched nuclear weapons.” This indirectly was a concession to North Korea, though it

was not offered or given with specific demands as typifies a reciprocal “carrot” as a coercive action.

It did mark the beginning of a policy change away from Cold War containment or deterrence, and the beginning of a coercive approach to North Korea. On July 2, 1992 Bush (1992a:1193) articulated the administration goals stating that the removal of tactical nukes from South Korea is “evidence of our good faith,” and that North Korea needs to “comply with IAEA (inspections) and other rules.” On September 25, Bush (1992b) also reported to Congress that sanctions had been implemented against a number of international companies in connection with exports of missile technology; two of which were North Korean.

Only at the end of the George H.W. Bush administration did goals or measures appear that could be justifiably considered strategic coercion comparable to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. These administrations were dominated by containment and deterrence policy, and the limited employment of coercive strategy is difficult to evaluate meaningfully with the framework of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. Even construed liberally, the removal of tactical nukes from the ROK does not qualify as a reciprocal offer because the “carrot” is given without requiring a concessionary act by North Korea in exchange. The sanctions are very limited in scope and there is little evidence suggesting a credible threat is presented. Despite over 30,000 U.S. troops being permanently stationed in South Korea, these troops had been garrisoned there since the end of the Korean War as part of U.S. deterrence strategy. Previous administrations had recalled some of those forces and, combined with the removal of tactical nukes by Bush

from South Korea, the administration effectively decreased a potentially credible threat to the North. While most of these administration's policies are not applicable to the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, the emerging coercive policy apparent at the end of the George H.W. Bush administration, does offer some support for the model in regards to its failure to compel change in North Korea.

The Clinton Administration

The Clinton Administration was presented with an early and unexpected crisis by North Korea. Henriksen (1996:30) notes that, late in 1992, "satellite evidence had emerged that North Korea was cheating on the NPT by reprocessing plutonium." When North Korea refused IAEA inspectors access to the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, international fears that the North had developed or was trying to develop a nuclear weapon were heightened. He critically maintains that the administration's response was typical of other Clinton efforts in that "at first (he) sounded resolute about the brewing crisis.....but then backed off in favor of a conciliatory approach." Clinton (1992:436) appeared to convey this preference for a conciliatory policy at a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, stating "I'm hoping very, very much that they will reconsider their decision and permit the inspectors to come again."

On March 12, 1993 North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). On June 11, it reversed that position stating that North Korea would temporarily "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT--but would not agree to the special inspections demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA). At the time, North Korea was undergoing a difficult adjustment to an uncertain post-Soviet world. Its government was deeply concerned that any political or economic reform would have the same fatal consequence that it had for the former Soviet Union and that the United States, South Korea, and other perceived "enemies" would stop at nothing to overthrow the communist regime (Shinn 1993). On July 12, 1993 while visiting Japan, Clinton (1993d:1274) iterated the administration's policy goals stating that North Korea needs to

“stay in the NPT and to fully comply with all the requirements of doing so. The United States will honor its commitments to our allies and friends in this region on the nuclear issue and on security issues generally.”

After gaining the high-level talks with the United States it desired, North Korea proposed disposing of its nuclear program entirely in exchange for light water nuclear reactors from the United States. Clinton subsequently demanded North Korea comply with IAEA inspections and restart its dialog with South Korea. Talks did not ultimately resolve the North Korea issue and the IAEA continued to have difficulty in conducting inspections (James and Ozdamar 2008).

In March of 1994, the IAEA determined that North Korea was indeed developing nuclear weapons. Concerns increased when it was learned that the North was preparing to change the fuel rods from the reactor at Yongbyon; some eight thousand fuel rods capable of producing enough extractable plutonium for several nuclear weapons. Aggressive rhetoric by North Korea did nothing to allay the administration's fears, which responded by reinforcing South Korea with Patriot missile batteries and the deployment of extra forces to the western Pacific. Clinton also pushed for U.N. sanctions against

North Korea unless it agreed to allow IAEA inspections to resume (Henriksen 1996).

There was some early consideration of bombing the Korean nuclear reactor, but Clinton ultimately rejected the idea (Feffer 1999, James and Ozdamar 2008).

From September 23 to October 21, 1994, U.S. and North Korean officials met in Geneva in an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The result of that meeting was the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the United States agreed to supply light water nuclear reactors, which were proliferation *resistant* and shipments of fuel to North Korea in exchange for its commitment to cooperate with the United States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy (K.E.D.O. 1994). Under this agreement, North Korea would freeze its major nuclear programs and it promised to undo whatever progress it had made towards developing nuclear weapons (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2004a).

Henriksen (1996:31) maintains that Clinton's eagerness to reward Kim Il-sung for being "obstructionist," reinforced the dictator's desire to hold out for a better settlement. In essence, North Korea had gained concessions from the Clinton administration for merely returning to the status-quo. O'Hanlon and Mochizuki (2004a:12) similarly note that "at the time, the United States was accused of giving in to North Korean Blackmail."

The 1994 agreement, which aimed to gain compliance by giving North Korea reciprocal incentives, seemingly had serious flaws. Although the light water reactors were *proliferation resistant*, spent fuel could still be diverted by North Korea for weapons purposes. North Korea was also left in possession of its spent fuel rods. Ultimately, the United States (and North Korea) did not carry out the full extent of its commitments under the agreement, so the inherent value of the 1994 accord was that it

bought time (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2004a). Henriksen (1996:36) also notes that the Clinton administration suspended "Team Spirit" military exercises without "a quid pro quo from the North" and gave away important leverage when he agreed to an exchange of liaison officers five years before IAEA inspections were slated to begin. Additionally, Clinton had eased some of the embargo restrictions and frozen assets that had been in place since 1950; for the promise of the regime to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons programs (Congressional Quarterly 1994).

After North Korea launched a missile over Japanese territory in 1998, the Clinton administration focused on North Korea's missile programs. The North had also initiated a secret uranium enrichment program, but it was unknown to U.S. and allied intelligence at that time. Clinton was mostly concerned with missile exports and considered "buying out" Korean missiles to keep them from other troublesome states, but such an approach risked encouraging North Korea to develop dangerous weapons as a means of profit (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2004a).

The Clinton Administration had considered adding sanctions against North Korea for a number of years, but Clinton typically backed away from this strategy in preference for conciliatory measures (Henriksen 1996). Frank (2006:14-19) maintains there was a genuine concern that strangling the already abysmal North Korean economy could drive "a cornered regime (to) undertake a last-ditch military effort if it has nothing more to lose." He further asserts that "North Korean leaders have repeatedly stressed that they would regard sanctions as an act of war." In any event, Clinton did maintain (until 1999) the Cold War embargo on the North and restrictions under the Export Administration Act

of 1979 on dual use item exports (Fergusson et al. 2003), but there is little evidence to suggest that a comprehensive sanctions regime was pursued by his administration. In September 1999, Clinton eased the restrictions on the embargo for a suspension of long-range missile testing by North Korea while negotiations on a more permanent ban progressed (Sanger 1999).

The Clinton administration appeared to approach foreign policy with North Korea from a more conciliatory position that was less coercive and strategic (Henriksen 1996). While he did renew the national emergency embargoes under the TWEA every year (Lee and Choi 2007), he was hesitant to employ restrictive measures, eager to concede reciprocal “carrots” for promises of compliance without substantive gains from North Korea and seemed averse to presenting a credible threat. Even more so than the Carter administration, Clinton pursued engagement that appeared more in tune to Cold War goals of preserving the peace on the Korean peninsula, though his approach could possibly be viewed as more like an appeasement strategy than Carter’s attempts at dialog with the North or Reagan’s pure deterrence strategy.

In conclusion, Clinton’s policy choices compare poorly with the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, which appears to explain the failures of his foreign policy coercion well. The model’s prescription for reciprocity is that “carrots” are to be used to entice compliance as an exchange of wants between the coercer and the target. While Clinton made a number of significant reciprocal offers to North Korea, there is little evidence that Clinton withheld reciprocal offers until compliance had been achieved *beforehand*. While it is possible that North Korean threats of war (if the United States

were to impose sanctions) may have influenced his policy decisions, he failed to meet the demand for a credible threat to compel change by the North (despite considering bombing the nuclear reactor), and seemingly failed with regard to proportionality of measures prescribed by Jentleson and Whytock in his collective failure to resolve the crisis.

The George W. Bush Administration

The voice on George W. Bush's shoulder as he began his term in 2001, that of Vice-President Dick Cheney, quickly began to make the argument that terrorism + WMD= an intolerable threat (Weisberg 2008). As such, the United States needed to take on not just groups such as the Taliban, but the most vexing and dangerous state proliferators of WMD. This view eventually led to Bush's famous "axis of evil" statement, which included North Korea, in his 2002 State of the Union Address. Bush would later avow to not stand by idly as the dangers presented by certain states increased; that America would not be threatened with mass destruction weapons (Weisberg 2008).

On March 7, 2001 Bush (2001) endorsed the engagement policy of South Korea and reaffirmed the United States commitment to the Agreed Framework of 1994 that the Clinton administration had made with North Korea. He subsequently called upon the North to keep its commitments under the agreement. Citing "new" threats posed by advanced delivery systems in conjunction with WMD, Bush affirmed that U.S. policy would be aimed at defense and deterrence.

The Export Administration Act of 1979, which had been passed by Congress during the Carter administration as part of the TWEA, expired on August 20, 2001. While a renewed version was still being worked out by Congress, Bush extended export control authority over trade to North Korea and other states by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In doing so, he was able to restrict the sale of dual-use items to North Korea, such as equipment, materials, software, and technology that was not already regulated by the Arms Export Control Act (Fergusson et. al 2003).

Daalder and Lindsay (2003) note that despite warnings by the administration of the threat a nuclear Iraq could propose in the future, it was silent or dismissive with regards to the immediate threat posed by North Korea. They contend that the silence on this issue reflected a belief that a different strategy would be needed for North Korea and Iran than was being pursued in Iraq at the time. They also maintain that the administration withheld North Korea's admission of its illicit uranium enrichment program until after Congress had authorized the war with Iraq in October of 2002. Bush subsequently declined direct engagement with the North, redirecting engagement to multilateral forums such as the IAEA and UN Security Council.

In October, 2002 North Korea confirmed it had reactivated its nuclear weapons program, expelled IAEA inspectors and declared it would withdraw from the NPT. The United States, along with Japan, South Korea and the European Union responded by suspending all shipments of fuel oil to North Korea (Rennack 2003). As participants in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), they also suspended construction of the light water reactors agreed to in the 1994 Framework, which were

scheduled to be completed in 2003. North Korea then withdrew from the NPT three months later Rennack (2006)

In January 2003, the Congress proposed the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 (NKDA), which declared that the actions of North Korea had rendered the Agreed Framework of 1994 null and void. Consequentially, it demanded North Korea fully comply with its commitments under the NPT, completely dismantle its nuclear weapons and related facilities and submit to international inspections. It also empowered the president authority to impose full sanctions or any other needed actions against North Korea, including interdiction of weapon-related shipments, and barred the implementation of any sanction regime that was less restrictive than that which was in place prior to 1999 when sanctions were eased by the Clinton administration (U.S. Senate 2003). While the 2003 bill did not ultimately pass, the North Korean Human Rights Act emerged from it and was enacted in 2004. In addition to pressing Bush to include human rights issues in future negotiations with North Korea, it provided funds for North Korean refugees fleeing the country. It was, however, a very weak bill that took little substantive action (Morita 2008). The administration also enacted the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 which granted the interdiction authority proposed in the NKDA (BBC News 2006).

On February 11, 2004 Bush (in Orcutt 2004:10) articulated the administration's policy goals stating

“North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.”

In September, 2005 after accusing North Korea of counterfeiting and drug money laundering, the Bush administration froze the assets of eight firms linked to North Korean proliferation efforts and also sanctioned a bank in Macau, China for purportedly assisting the communist regime (BBC News 2006). After North Korea launched several test missiles and claimed it had tested another nuclear weapon on October 9, 2006 the United Nations issued multilateral sanctions (Resolution 1718), which they had been hesitant to do previously, and condemned the actions of North Korea. This sanction regime instructed all member states to cut off all aid to North Korea, all military-usable items and arms, severely limited trade and directed each state to prosecute any private entity in their jurisdiction who engaged in trade, proliferation or financial transactions with the North. The resolution fell short of authorizing the use of force however, which the Bush administration had requested (U.N. Security Council 2006). Authorized under the U.N. sanctions, the United States subsequently took action against 12 companies and one individual for violations (BBC News 2006.)

In January 2007, Bush re-imposed some of the sanctions lifted during the Clinton Administration, publishing a list of luxury items prohibited for export to North Korea. After six-party talks on February 13, however, the United States acquiesced to the Initial Actions agreement which started the process of removing North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and initiated the termination of the TWEA with respect to North Korea (Lee and Choi 2007). On June 26, 2008 Bush officially terminated the TWEA application to North Korea in Proclamation 8271. The import and transfer restrictions remained in force

under other authorities and Bush also issued Executive Order 13466, which extended two of the TWEA restrictions, providing penalties of up to 20 years in prison and one million dollars in fines for individuals involved in prohibited transactions with North Korea (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008).

CASE SUMMARY

Despite having a different approach to North Korea than previous administrations, Bush frequently allowed opportunities that could have merited the imposition of new sanctions pass by with no action. In his first term, he issued no new sanctions against the North (Lee and Choi 2007). While Bush tweaked existing sanctions on several occasions, he did manage to gain some multilateral sanctions through the UN Security Council that were acceptable to both Russia and China. Much of his sanction activity, similar to that he exercised with Burma, was targeted at companies, banks and individuals who engaged in business with North Korea.

In the North Korean case, the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model appears to explain the failure of the Bush administration's coercive policy. With regards to both proportionality and reciprocity, administration policy compares poorly to the model. The Administration passed on opportunities for a more stringent sanction regime and reciprocal measures were given to North Korea without an equitable return on United States demands. It is possible that the request by the administration for United Nations

authorization to use force to bring North Korea into compliance could be conveyed as a credible threat, since the North Korean ambassador was likely well aware of the request. Summarily however, the Bush administration's policy actions failed to compel North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program or to comply with much of any of the United States demands. The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model subsequently explains the failure of coercion policy under George W. Bush very well.

CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

The three cases examined in this thesis demonstrate a variety of contexts in which coercive strategies were employed by the United States in order to achieve foreign policy goals with regard to specific states. Each of the target states presented unique circumstances juxtaposed with similarities, which enabled a novel analysis of U.S. foreign policy coercion comparatively with the prescription of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. While it appears from the data that U.S. foreign policy coercion has overwhelmingly failed to achieve its stated goals in these cases, these failures in contrast to the single success of the Carter administration with the Iran hostage crisis have provided valuable support for and insight into the utility of the Jentleson and Whytock model for successful coercive diplomacy.

Explanatory Power

While the Carter administration arguably benefitted by a primary goal that was narrowly focused, it was the only instance where the elements for success prescribed by the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model were fully utilized and the only instance in which the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model explained a successful coercion by a U.S. presidential administration among these three cases. Finding that all of the failed foreign policy shared the common bond of not meeting the requirements of the model for

successful coercion, while the one success did successfully meet the model requirements, is significant in that it reinforces the explanatory utility of the model.

The George W. Bush administration came very close to the model in the case of Iran, implementing two of the three prescribed facets of coercer state strategy. While the argument could possibly be made that more broadly stated goals by the administration made success less likely, the subsequent failure of those goals while only implementing two of the three facets also presents a strong case in support of the model's explanatory power. At no time were discrepancies found that contradicted the explanatory power of the model. Therefore, the first finding of this thesis is that the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model performs extremely well in explaining both the success and failure of U.S. foreign policy coercion in all three of the cases in this thesis.

Predictive Power and the Model

While the application of strategies varied considerably at times between administrations, there was little evidence, with the exception of a few potentially important limitations, suggesting that the model was flawed as a policy prediction tool. While the Burma case presented little direct challenge to explanatory power of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, the data did raise critical questions about the viability of a credible threat as a prescriptive facet of coercion policy required by the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model in every case where foreign policy coercion might be appropriate. The disproportionate economic penetration of Burma by China relative to other states, in consideration of China as a world power traditionally in political

opposition to the United States, may present policy dilemmas outside of the scope of coercive strategies that would be unhindered in other cases.

Unlike the Iranian relationship with Russia, China also borders Burma. Since part of that penetration has included military objectives for access to the Indian Ocean, a credible threat presented to Burma by the United States could potentially threaten relations with neighboring China or possibly even facilitate conflict if the Chinese perceive their own interests or national security threatened by the presence of U.S. military forces so near their own soil. Future research with a focus on the China-Burma relationship is needed and could provide useful insight into the consequences for U.S. foreign policy coercion when employing a credible threat, which could also be relative to other states closely tied to China, such as North Korea.

Similarly, the case of North Korea presents its own questions that are left partially unresolved concerning the credible threat prescribed by the model. Unlike Iran, North Korea has a fully developed nuclear program with missile technology sufficient to cause significant harm to the United States and its allies in the Southeast Asia region. While the request by George W. Bush for the use of force through the United Nations sufficed to present a tangible threat in terms of the model, the dangers in utilizing a credible threat against a nuclear armed and capable state could be a dangerous gamble with serious consequences at stake, particularly in regards to an oppressive regime that is desperate to maintain power.

The data in the Iran case does raise the question of minor flaws in the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model however. Specifically, the coercion employed by Carter

likely benefitted in its impact due to the intervening factor of the Iran-Iraq War. This devastating war damaged Iran's industry and infrastructure and seriously drained the resources from Iran which would have aided its resistance to U.S. coercion efforts. While there is little reason to believe that Iran would not have eventually complied with U.S. demands under the strategies employed by Carter, a case could be made that the time-frame of compliance would likely have been significantly longer had Iran not been engaged in a war.

Therefore, the second finding of this thesis is that the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model in its capacity to predict successful coercion does offer some utility as a predictive tool, though some questions remain with regards to certain measures included in the model under some case-specific circumstances. The prescription of the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model could be enhanced by expanding the second variable to include external factors occurring in the political and economic environment in which states exist. Currently, the second variable is somewhat ambiguous and it is taken for granted that the variable is limited to internal characteristics of the target state's political and economic vulnerability under normal or average conditions. Such improvement to the model could contribute to better accuracy and consistency in its predictive capacity.

Critical Analysis and Policy Implications

A second event that impacted Iran that was dissimilar to the Iran-Iraq War, which occurred roughly six months before this thesis was written, had a striking similar impact

on the Iranian economy; a drastic drop in global oil prices. Since Iran is about 80 percent reliant on oil for its revenues, it was seriously harmed economically by this external event. Based upon the findings that the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model explains the success of Carter policy in the Iran Hostage Crisis and the significance of the impact of the Iran-Iraq War, it is possible that if United States had been able to implement coercive strategies of similar intensity during the oil market decline, those coercive measures would have been similarly enhanced and increased the likelihood of coercive success and of a shortened time-frame for compliance.

The Burma case raises important questions *within* the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model about the proportionality of approaches to elicit compliance from target states that will be an important consideration for policymakers. Unlike North Korea, Burma once was governed by a democratic government that failed. As noted by Selth (1999), Burma does not possess nuclear weapons and is adamantly opposed to *any* state possessing or developing them, although the possession of chemical weapons is still a possibility. The data suggests that a coercive strategy that is more imbalanced than the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model would indicate, which includes extensive reciprocal offers in return for measured and incremental compliance, might possibly be more effective than the static prescription of the model.

Because of the particular characteristics of the internal situation in Burma, the conditions which enable Burma to comply with coercer demands would likely be critical to the success of coercion policy. The extensive poverty throughout Burma and a continuing reliance on narcotics for a means of living by many Burmese could likely be worsened by

most economic sanctions and a credible threat would likely have far less positive impact than in other cases. The characteristics of the Burma case lead to the third finding of this thesis in that a balanced coercer state strategy may not always be the appropriate approach as generally prescribed by the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model. This case suggests a well-devised imbalance of specific types of strategic measures may be more appropriate to achieving goals in specific cases under some conditions.

Similar to Burma, North Korea is impoverished and the data suggests it has been economically deteriorating for many years. Certain manifestations of the credible threat specified in the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model could not only potentially provoke a nuclear response of defensive desperation, but if it is enjoined by a sanction regime that further strangles that economy, it could dangerously accelerate nuclear proliferation to states or terror groups in other parts of the world. Additional research which examines the characteristics of North Korean policy and attitudes from the Korean perspective could shed important light on the potential consequences of these particular facets of coercive strategy if they are employed by a future administration.

Contributions to Research

The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) study of U.S. foreign policy coercion with respect to Libya was focused on a single case study in formulating their predictive model. This thesis examined three separate cases against the prescription of the model to test its utility beyond explaining the success of U.S. coercive strategy in Libya. The findings, based upon the structured focused case study methodology of Alexander George,

supplement the Jentleson and Whytock study by building a foundation of knowledge through multiple cases examined in relation to the model. Future research will subsequently be able to use the findings for comparison with other cases and further test or modify the Jentleson and Whytock model, or possibly contribute to the generation of new coercion models and theory.

Limitations of the Research

The Jentleson and Whytock (2006) study of coercion in U.S. foreign policy used against Libya benefitted significantly from access to inside information from officials close to the events and policymaking process. Using off-the-record interviews with senior government officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations, they were able to obtain very specific and detailed information, which allowed them insight into those decisions and events that could not be equally derived by other means. Similarly, access to officials within the administrations of the target governments could have offered insight that could not be offered by other forms of available data. This thesis did not have the benefit of access to such data, which potentially limited the insight into the internal dynamics of the respective target states and the decision-making processes involved in the policy choices of each administration.

The ability to interview persons involved in the decisions and discussions of these administrations could have provided useful information and a more comprehensive account of events. Understanding how choices were arrived at and the interpretations by officials involved in making decisions of the actions taken by other states would offer a

much clearer understanding than was otherwise available for this thesis. Time constraints were also a limiting factor. Additional time available for research for this thesis may have provided the opportunity for additional discoveries of useful data that could have affected the findings. Despite a considerable quantity of other important data, which was adequate for the purpose of this thesis in testing the Jentleson and Whytock (2006) model, access to such additional types of data could have significantly enhanced the findings of this thesis.

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