

1-1-2011

Why does the United States give foreign aid?

Abalo Awesso

Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in [Political Science](#) at Eastern Illinois University. [Find out more](#) about the program.

Recommended Citation

Awesso, Abalo, "Why does the United States give foreign aid?" (2011). *Masters Theses*. 856.
<http://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/856>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

*******US Copyright Notice*******

No further reproduction or distribution of this copy is permitted by electronic transmission or any other means.

The user should review the copyright notice on the following scanned image(s) contained in the original work from which this electronic copy was made.

Section 108: United States Copyright Law

The copyright law of the United States [Title 17, United States Code] governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted materials.

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that use may be liable for copyright infringement.

This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. No further reproduction and distribution of this copy is permitted by transmission or any other means.

THESIS MAINTENANCE AND REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE


TO: Graduate Degree Candidates (who have written formal theses)

SUBJECT: Permission to Reproduce Theses

The University Library is receiving a number of request from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow these to be copied.

PLEASE SIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.



12/14/2011

Author's Signature

Date

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University **NOT** allow my thesis to be reproduced because:

Author's Signature

Date

This form must be submitted in duplicate.

Why Does the United States Give Foreign Aid?

(TITLE)

BY

ABALO AWESSO

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

M.A. in Political Science

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

2011

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

Ryan Herndl

THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIR

12/17/2011

DATE

Jeff Kelly

DEPARTMENT/SCHOOL CHAIR
OR CHAIR'S DESIGNEE

12/13/11

DATE

Dave H. Caswell

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

12/13/2011

DATE

Melinda Mueller

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

12/14/11

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my thesis director, Dr. Ryan Hendrickson, for agreeing to be my mentor, providing me feedbacks, comments, and guidance throughout the entire process. I would also like to show him my gratitude for his availability and his willingness to help me complete this thesis on time. I am grateful to Dr. David Carwell and Dr. Melinda Muller for agreeing to serve on my committee.

Table of Contents

Introduction	2
Chapter 1: Literature Review	9
Factors Explaining the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid	9
Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior	14
Foreign Lobbying	21
Chapter 2: Factors Explaining the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid	30
Methodology	30
Test and Findings	36
Conclusion	48
Chapter 3: Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior	51
Introduction	51
Theoretical Model	51
Data and Methodology	55
Findings	58
Case study	68
Conclusion	72
Chapter 4: Foreign Lobbying	75
Introduction	75
Egypt	78
Why Egypt used the PLM Group	80
The PLM Group lobbying on behalf of Egypt	81
American Chamber of Commerce	89
Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter & Associates lobby on behalf of Egypt	93

Patton Boggs-----	95
Discussion and Conclusion-----	95
Conclusion-----	100
References-----	105
Appendices-----	124

Abstract: This thesis examined many controversies surrounding the distribution of U.S. foreign aid, most precisely the factors explaining the allocation of U.S. foreign aid, the congressional foreign policy behavior related to foreign aid decisions, and the impact of foreign lobbying. The findings suggest that the United States' security interests appear to be the central basis on which the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, the congressional foreign policy behavior reveals that even though the Democrats are more likely to sponsor most foreign aid bills the Democratic Party's control in Congress does not guarantee that all or at least the majority of foreign aid bills introduced in Congress will be enacted or the United States' ODA will increase. The congressional foreign policy behavior suggests also that the ideologies of the chairmen of the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations do not seem to influence the ODA the United States allocates every year. Also, a complementary case study reveals that that foreign aid legislation follows an unorthodox lawmaking processes. Furthermore, a case study investigating the actions Egypt takes to obtain U.S. development assistance shows that in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Egypt used U.S. domestic lobbyists to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States.

Introduction

Although U.S. foreign aid has been both the subject of clashes between the U.S. Congress and president and a battle between the Republican and Democratic parties, there is a consensus among scholars that it has always been an essential tool of American foreign policy. This raises the question “why does the United States give foreign aid?” This thesis will investigate United States foreign aid from three different perspectives. That is, first, the thesis will examine the kind of countries who receive U. S. foreign aid. Second, it will examine congressional foreign policy behavior and how decisions are reached regarding foreign aid. The third perspective will investigate what the recipient countries do to become eligible for U. S. foreign aid.

This topic is important because the factors that regulate U. S. foreign aid distribution have been a subject of an ongoing debate within the country. This problem is significant from a policy perspective and needs additional investigation. Also, the topic is important because it investigates whether the previous relationships drawn between the U.S. foreign aid and factors such as human rights principles, democracy principles, and human need in the recipient countries are purely symbolic or factors that truly determine aid decisions. Furthermore, since the Marshall Plan, United States foreign aid has been transformed into a more strategic instrument of foreign policy, and thus knowing why the United States gives aid is important for understanding U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, the research at this time is not clear on many aspects of foreign aid.

Many books and articles have been written concerning U. S. foreign aid. One of the most interesting analysis to the question of how one can determine the recipients of

U. S. foreign aid in a given year was proposed by Apodaca and Stohl (1999). According to them, the better way to conclude if a country will be among the recipients of the U. S. foreign aid is to determine if it was a recipient the previous year. A lot of existing scholarship on U. S. foreign aid argued that the primary purpose of U. S. foreign aid is to protect the United States' strategic interests around the world. For example, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) highlighted that the choice of recipient countries and the amount allocated to each of them is determined by American foreign policy goals. Apodaca and Stohl (1999) confirmed Meernik, Krueger, and Poe's (1998) argument and added that the United States' development assistance allocation is determined by ideological goals as well. As matter of fact, Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) revealed that the United States gives aid to certain African countries in order to protect its strategic interests in the Middle East. Likewise, Fair (2009) affirmed that the United States development assistance to Pakistan is determined by some political motives. She complained that the United States sent billions of dollars to Pakistan although it was not a democratic country. Two important studies done by Zimmermann (1993) and Ruttan (1996) came to the same conclusion that foreign aid is used by the United States as a tool to attain its foreign policy goals.

Studies examining the relationship between the voting at the U.N. General Assembly and the allocation of the United States foreign aid found mixed results. Kegley and Hook (1991) argued that the U. S. aid has no influence on how recipient countries vote at the U.N. General Assembly, whereas Lundborg (1998) affirmed that the United States used its development assistance to buy other countries' support. Lundborg's (1998) position was confirmed by Wang's (1999) conclusion that there is a positive relationship

between the U.S. development assistance and the voting at the U.N. General Assembly. While examining U.S. disaster assistance allocation, Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) highlighted that foreign policy and domestic factors both influence disaster assistance allocations and are the overriding determinants.

On the one hand scholars who have a negative view of the U. S. foreign assistance believe that it has had and continues to have a detrimental impact on the recipient countries. Some of these studies argued that instead of allocating its foreign assistance to accomplish social, economic, and civil development, the United States allocates its foreign aid to corrupted and nondemocratic governments. For example, Doran (1978) noted that Latin American recipients of both U.S military and economic assistance between 1948 and 1965 suffered from major political instability. Moreover, research done by Burnside and Dollar (2000) concluded that the allocation of foreign aid does not guarantee that the intensions and the policies associated to it are beneficial to the recipient countries.

On the other hand scholars who have a positive view of U. S. foreign aid believe that its purpose is to promote the interest of the recipient countries. That having been said, Talbott (1996) and Lipset, (1996) think the United States does not use its foreign policy to serve its national self-interest; instead, its uses it to promote liberal goals as well as humanitarian goals. Moreover, Dixon (1994) and Maoz and Russet (1993) argued that in order to encourage democracies and because democracies are less likely to fight each other, the United States tends to allocate its aid to democratic countries. According to Lancaster (2000), the U. S. foreign aid has benefited both the United States and the recipient countries. Lancaster explained that foreign aid was an extremely useful tool of

U.S. diplomacy during the second half of the twentieth century. He believes that it helped contain the expansion of communism in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; promoted economic and social development in those regions; and provided humanitarian relief in emergencies. In this same line of idea, Poe and Meernik (1995) suggested therefore that the United States should provide a lot of aid to liberal states and use its foreign assistance to help recipients.

Many other scholars have tried to understand whether the terrorist attack of September 11 has changed both the United States foreign policy and foreign aid allocation. For example, Owusu (2007) examined the importance of the terrorist attacks of September 11 in understanding changes in U.S. foreign aid allocation, and pointed out the multiple and conflicting objectives of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign-aid strategies. Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion on whether U. S. foreign aid will end terrorism or at least reduce it in a long run. For Graham (2002), the U.S. aid does not fight terrorism; however, in the long term foreign aid, given selectively and not saddled with a myriad of objectives, can encourage economic development and reduce poverty and therefore improve the lives of many people. Harrigan, Wang, and El-Said (2006) saw a link between the September 11 terrorist attack, U. S. foreign aid and the U. S. foreign policy when they highlighted that the United States has used its foreign assistance as the means to achieve its foreign policy because of both its ongoing War on Terror and the sake of the national security.

Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate among scholars regarding whether U. S. foreign assistance promotes the respect or the abuse of human rights in the world. Some studies concluded that the United States allocates most of its foreign aid to countries

which are experiencing extreme violations of human rights. For example, Schoultz (1981) argued that the United States had used its foreign aid and foreign policy to support the Latin America governments which both violate their population's rights and keep the citizens from enjoying their freedom and exercising their political rights. Muller (1985) demonstrated that the purpose of U. S. foreign aid is not to promote democracy in the world because both its military and economic assistances contributed to the deterioration of many democracies. Muller went far to claim that the different purposes of U. S. foreign aid are not compatible with each other. In opposition to these conclusions, Abrams and Lewis (1993) rejected other empirical analysis suggesting that foreign aid is perversely distributed in favor of regimes which violate human rights and affirmed that the U.S. foreign aid appears to serve a variety of widely cited humanitarians and national-interest objectives and, most importantly, rewards governments for promoting and protecting human rights.

Overall, much quantitative and qualitative research has examined the United States' foreign aid, and unfortunately a clear and definitive consensus has not been found on the reasons for aid decisions, its impact, or the factors that shape aid decisions. The research presented in this thesis fits into the broad research because it is going to reinvestigate the relationship between the allocation of the U. S. foreign aid and the relevance of human rights practices, democracy principles, voting at the UN General Assembly, the level of human need, the War on Terror and American political parties in shaping aid decisions. Given that the previous scholarships provided mixed results and were therefore inconclusive, the purpose of this thesis is to reexamine the relationships between the U.S. foreign aid and these factors in order to confirm or reject the previous

findings. That having been said, to test the previous research, this thesis tests a set of propositions. Each proposition will be set up in a manner that it will be consistent with the previous findings on U. S. foreign aid allocation, the role played by the Congress in the allocation of the United States foreign aid, or how the recipients of U. S. foreign aid lobby members of Congress, staff, and officials in the executive branch in order to obtain the aid. In addition, some case studies will be conducted to complement some of the quantitative models as well.

The first chapter will extensively discuss the previous research related to the U. S. foreign aid. The second chapter examines the kind of countries who receive U.S. foreign aid. To test who receives aid, this chapter examines the top ten recipients of the Gross Bilateral ODA, 2007-2008 average from the United States. The next chapter will follow by examining congressional foreign policy behavior, and will do so by investigating whether there is a relationship between the changes in the United States Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 1989 to 2009 and the congressional years controlled by the Democratic or Republicans Party. The foreign aid bills introduced in the United States Congress during the tenth Congress (2007-2008) will be examined in this chapter as well. Chapter four will examine foreign lobbying by investigating the actions recipients countries take so they can obtain U.S. development assistance. Chapter five will combine the findings, link them to the research question and discuss whether they are consistent with the findings in previous scholarships. In each chapter different methodological approaches are used to assess these aspects of foreign aid. Each individual chapter will explain these different methodologies. There is a value in using different methodologies because each methodology will be set up in the way that will be

suitable for each of the three perspectives from which U.S. foreign aid is being investigated in this thesis. Thus, using the appropriate methodology allows us to bring the best out of each perspective and obtain meaningful results.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Factors Explaining the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid

The problem of distribution and conditionality of foreign aid is one of the most discussed topics in International Relations. Many political scientists and policymakers have written books and articles to study the factors that explain the distribution of foreign aid. Exploring the usefulness of an alternative conceptualization of foreign assistance policy process, Travis (1995) found that foreign aid decisions are not simply made with an eye towards the domestic scene but because of the domestic scene. In accord with the general argument that the United States gives more aid to countries that are under threat from enemies of the United States or countries located in strategically valued places, Lai (2003) found a positive relationship during 1991-1996 period between U.S. security interests and aid allocation. Also, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) identified a positive relationship between foreign aid allocations and human rights practices. As well, Hattori (2003) has identified the donations of states to multilateral grant-giving organizations in the postwar era as a collective endeavor of the former colonizing states. Furthermore, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that factors such as colonial past of recipient state and voting patterns in the United Nations explain more of the distribution of the aid than the political institutions or economic policy of recipients.

The issue on whether foreign aid is a good or a bad initiative is the subject of controversy among scholars and policymakers. On the one hand, some scholars and policymakers believe that donors are helping developing countries by giving foreign aid. These scholars and policymakers think that foreign aid contributes to the economic development in the recipient countries because it is used to invest in many sectors of the

economy such as agriculture, industry, commerce, and education. For example, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Trap (2004) reexamined the effectiveness of the foreign aid theoretically and empirically using a standard overlapping-generations (OLG) model. Overall, they found that aid has been effective in spurring growth, but the magnitude of effect depends on climate-related circumstance. Burnside and Dollar (2000) found robust evidence that aid has had a more positive impact on growth in good policy environments. That is, these scholars and policymakers believe aid is used to finance social service projects such as the construction of hospitals, pharmacies, schools, shelters, roads, and clean water fountains. These scholars and policymakers argue also that foreign aid helps developing countries build a strong political economy. For them, based on the fact that most foreign aid programs have certain eligibility requirements, the recipient countries are willing to do everything it takes in order to obtain this aid. As a result, they start conforming themselves to these requirements. Also, because there are policies that regulate the way the aid should be used, the recipient countries try to respect these policies in order to still be eligible every year. By respecting all these policies, the undeveloped countries build a very good and strong political economy.

Furthermore, these scholars and policymakers agree that foreign aid emphasizes democracy. Knack (2004) highlighted that foreign aid can contribute to democratization through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislature and judiciaries as check on executive power, and the promotion of civil society organization including a free press through conditionality, and by improving education and increasing per capita incomes. Studying the effect of foreign aid on terrorism, Graham (2002) claimed that U.S. aid does not fight terrorism; however,

in the long term foreign aid, given selectively and not saddled with a myriad of objectives, can encourage economic development and reduce poverty and therefore improve the lives of many people.

On the other hand, some others scholars and policymakers believe foreign aid is an obstacle to the economic growth of the recipient countries. They think the availability of aid not only leads the government of the recipient countries to underestimate their internal revenues, but also makes long-term projects planning really difficult or impossible. Kimbrough (1986) found that the optimal fiscal policy response to an increase in government foreign aid receipts is reduction in tax rates and a rise in government purchase. Similarly, Williamson (2010) explored the failure of foreign aid relying on the role of both incentives and information. According to her, when taken as a whole, it is almost impossible for the current top-down, central planning like style of foreign aid to overcome both the incentives and information problems for both donors and recipients. She agrees that combining these issues, we should not be surprised that foreign aid does not actually achieve its intended results.

Moreover, these policymakers and scholars believe that because the governments of undeveloped countries are willing to do whatever it takes to be eligible for foreign aid, they make and implement policies that are going to fulfill the requirements of this aid instead of focusing on policies that can make the country foreign aid free. That is, when the undeveloped countries' governments focus more on foreign aid requirements than the adjustments that need to be done in order to obtain an economic and politic independence, foreign aid keeps undeveloped countries from experiencing economic growth and poverty reduction. For example, Moyo (2009) argued that donors have tended

to tie aid in three ways. She explained that the first is tied to procurement because countries that take aid have to spend it on specific goods and service, which originate from donor countries or a group selected by them. She continued that the donor can reserve the right to preselect the sector and/or projects that their aid would support. Moyo added that the third tie is that aid flows only as long as the recipient country agrees to a set of economic and political policies.

Furthermore, Mavrotas and Nunnenkamp (2007) highlighted that it is not sufficient to double aid effort by simply raising and transferring more money. They think substantial effort needs to be taken in order to delve deeper into the various routes and transmission mechanism through which the various types of aid operate. Also, Chong, Gradstein, and Calderon (2009) maintain that aid by itself does not have a statistically significant effect on inequality and poverty reduction. These policymakers and scholars also argued foreign aid leads to increasing expenditures in the recipient countries because, as the assistance is easily provided to these recipient countries, their governments spend it without further research and analysis because it does not come out of the country's federal or national reserve bank.

Additionally, these scholars and policymakers agree on the idea that foreign aid damages the receiving countries' institutions. For example, Moyo (2009) pointed out that with aid's help, corruption fosters corruption; nations quickly descend into a vicious cycle of aid. For her, foreign aid props up corrupt governments providing them with freely usable cash. She continues that these corrupt governments interfere with the rule of law, the establishment of transparent civil institutions and the protection of civil liberties, making both domestic and foreign investment in poor country unattractive. Also,

according to these scholars and policymakers, when aid is available, the government institutions do not really take their job seriously because whether they reach their goals or not, there is back up money available. They also claim foreign aid makes the receiving countries less democratic because the leaders of the governments used these aids to buy guns, build their own army, and strengthen their power in order to be able to run the country for years. Morrison (2007) highlighted that natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Some other scholars believe that there is a negative relationship between trade and foreign aid. Lundsgaarde, Breunig and Prakash (2007) examined whether imports from developing countries have a displacement effect on aid commitments. Their research suggests that the trade, not aid argument has had a significant policy impact in donor countries and that increased imports from developing countries have displaced foreign aid.

Studies have also examined how Americans feel about U.S. foreign aid. On the one hand, Moore (1997) highlighted that the bitter irony is that no area of the budget is more unpopular with voters than foreign aid and claimed that poll after poll reveals that by two-to-one margins Americans want foreign aid ended, not mended. Moore emphasizes that the public has an intuitive understanding of what 40 years of economic evidence tells us to be true: that foreign aid programs waste tax money by spending it on unnecessary international issues. On the other hand, Milner and Tingley (2006) maintain that both labor and capital groups support foreign aid, implying that the coalition supporting aid is broader than the one supporting international trade.

Overall, the research on factors explaining the distribution of U.S. foreign aid is very mixed. While many scholars and policymakers claim that foreign aid donors are

helping developing countries by giving foreign aid, others believe foreign aid is an obstacle to the economic growth of the recipient countries. The research is also inconclusive and contradictory on which among factors such as human rights principles, human need in the recipient countries, colonial past of recipient state, voting patterns in the United Nations, democracy principles, or U.S. security and strategic interests regulate the aid allocation. That having been said, the research at this time is not clear on many aspects of foreign aid and needs additional studies to reexamine the factors explaining the distribution of U.S. foreign aid.

Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

Recently many scholars suspected that the primary goal of American foreign policy is to dominate the world. For example, Fareed Zakari (2009) qualified American foreign policy as an “imperial policy.” Szabo (2009) also argued that despite the ever-growing role of the rest of the world in America life, Washington continues to see the world through its own lens and continually surprised and disappointed when the world refuses to conform to its expectations and paradigm. Other political scientists concluded that American policy legitimacy is declining. For example, Scott and Ambler (2007) affirmed the perceived legitimacy of US foreign policy plummeted in the wake of the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, Betts (2005) argued that the legitimacy of American foreign policy has eroded while Tucker and Hendrickson (2004) claim that the United States has lost the legitimacy of its power.

Some political scientists have tried to examine Congress's role in foreign policy. In fact, until today, studies on congressional foreign policy behavior are inconclusive because of the mixed results. Baldwin (1965) claimed that in the isolationist atmosphere of the years preceding World War II, Congress took only a passive interest in foreign policy and highlighted that the profound changes that have taken place in U.S. foreign policy since 1945 have altered substantially the role of Congress in foreign affairs. He emphasized that Congress is opposed to foreign programs and added that the White House must annually sell the program to Congress through a combination of arm twisting, cajolery, subterfuge and flag waving. Baldwin thinks the easiest way to get Congress to agree to a foreign program proposal is to suggest something which Congress likes, things that make their constituents happy, or forms of aid that will benefit domestic groups. According to Carter (1986), while many assume congressional assertiveness in foreign policymaking has only been a major phenomenon since the latter stages of the Vietnam War, independent congressional foreign policy behaviors have made up a full quarter of all congressional foreign policy actions since the decade of the 1950s. Carter maintains that the overall pattern of congressional foreign policy behaviors were basically the same for the Vietnam decade of the 1960s as it was for the post-Vietnam period of the 1970s and early 1980s. In his part, Fordham (2008) argues that the effect of liberal-conservative ideology on congressional voting has changed over time because since the early 1960s, liberals and conservatives have roughly switched places. He explains that during the early Cold War era, liberals were the principal supporters of military spending, foreign aid, and intervention, while congressional conservatives were skeptical of all these policies.

In his study of Congress's behavior in crisis circumstances, Gibson (1994) reported that in crisis issues, the rally-round-the-flag effect on public opinion and the perception that the nation's interests are at stake contributed to legislative reluctance to oppose the President. He explained that members of Congress fear that a dissenting vote will be used against them in the next reelection campaign, while supporting the President is essentially a win-win stance for them. Gibson continues that if the action succeeds, they claim credit for having supported it, whereas if it fails, they blame the President but claim credit for having supported him in the interests of national unity.

Many other political scientists have tried to answer the question "Who influences U.S. foreign policy?" Among them, those known as the neoliberals (Keohane 1984, Frieden 1991, and Frieden 1991) claim that interest groups have tremendous influence on American foreign policy. They maintain that in order to obtain campaign contribution from interest groups or reward interest groups for their campaign contribution, members of Congress bargain with them on important foreign policy issues. Another group of scholars, Hass (1992) and Hall (1989) claim that through their advice to policymakers, the members of the epistemic community, composed of academics, think tanks, and other experts, influence American foreign policy. A third group of scholars argues that public opinion has a strong influence on American foreign policy. For example, Holsti (1996), Sobel (2001), and Russett's (1990) studies highlighted the influence of public preference on American Foreign policy. Jacob and Page (2005) confirmed the claim advanced by these three groups of scholars when they affirmed that business may exert the most consistent influence on government officials but policymakers' views may also be affected by labor, experts, and, to a lesser extent, public opinion. According to Jacob and

Page, three of the most prominent lines of analysis of foreign policy the interest group, epistemic community, and public opinion approaches, each have some merit.

Some studies investigating the relationship between Congress and U.S. foreign aid allocation concluded that Congress has been trying to make changes to U.S. foreign aid programs. In *Congress Considers Foreign Aid F67*, an article from Congressional Digest, the author maintains that over the more than two decades since the end of the World War II, the United States has maintained a continuing program of foreign aid; however, since its inception the program has been the subject of much controversy, often involving the whole question of U.S. foreign policy. In this same line of idea, another article from Congressional Digest titled *Controversy in Congress over the Future of U.S. Foreign Aid* argued that recurringly over the quarter-century of its existence, U. S. foreign assistance program has been subjected to particularly critical review by Congress. As a matter of fact, Senator Jesse Helm (R.N.C.), former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for the disbanding of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. foreign aid office and said that he wanted all U.S. foreign aid channeled through private charities and religious groups. He also promised that if his plan was implemented, he would support an increase in foreign aid spending. Likewise, Hocking (1991) points out that Congress has come to assume an increasingly central role in foreign policy, particularly in the foreign economic policy area. He believes that it is also significant that with the breakdown of the seniority system on Capitol Hill, power within Congress has become more dispersed and so channels of influence are more diffuse.

Many other studies examined congressional support for foreign aid. Fleck and Kilby (2001) investigated the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts spending across congressional districts within the United States. They believe that the amount of foreign aid, as well as how and where that money is spent, depends critically on the degree to which aid spending serves a variety of interests and thereby helps to maintain a coalition. Fleck and Kilby reported that econometric analysis, based on data for all USAID contracts active during the 104th Congress, reveals only weak links between the geographic distribution of USAID contract spending within the United States and support for foreign aid in Congress. They also found little evidence that the economic benefits of aid translate into support for foreign aid in Congress. According to Fordham (2008) the export orientation and import competition of senators' home states, particularly in manufacturing, have influenced their willingness to support military resources, foreign aid, and intervention.

Some political scientists believe Congress is hindering the success of U.S. foreign aid mission. Sullivan (1996) argues that congressional meddling in the aid programs has been a primary obstacle to the success of U.S. economic assistance programs in various countries. He believes that compounding this meddling are the turf wars waged against USAID by other U.S. agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce. He went so far to claim Congress has placed increasing restrictions on USAID's missions in terms of determining the level and purpose of development assistance. Sullivan emphasizes that not only has Congress placed stringent reporting requirements on USAID, but it often dictates specific projects that must be pursued, even if USAID sees

no development purpose in such projects. He concluded that the politics of aid disbursement and development choices includes bureaucratic turf battles on both sides of the aid process and political manipulation of aid monies. Chaddock (2003) claimed that since the late 1960s, foreign aid has been one of the toughest sells on Capitol Hill and complained that after years of wrangling over the need for foreign aid, Congress is closing one of the strongest packages of assistance for poor nations in decades. Before Sullivan and Chaddock, Fiorina (1989) argued that the Senators and Representatives in U.S. Congress pressure USAID with the aim to gain some contracts for their constituents.

Other scholars accused Republicans of obstructing congressional support for foreign aid. Lippman (1996) argued that the reduction of approximately 3,000 USAID staff and the reduction of U. S. aid programs and missions around the world are the consequences of the control of Congress by the Republican Party following the 1994 congressional elections. Lippman's argument is supported by Fleck and Kilby's (2001) claim that in June 1995, when an already lean foreign aid appropriations bill reached the House floor, the Republican majority pushed through a rule allowing unlimited amendments, a move widely seen as an attempt to allow further paring down of aid spending. Additional studies concluded that Republicans are more likely to oppose certain types of aid. For example, Moore (1997) argued that what is most offensive to conservatives is the nearly \$1 billion a year still spent out by the U.S. at the time USAID for International Development (AID) and the State Department to International Planned Parenthood and other alleged vanguards of the abortion lobby for population control programs. Furthermore, in *House Cuts Foreign Aid Appropriations Measure (2000)*, on July 13, 2000, Nancy Pelosi accused Republicans of ignoring the spirit of the American

people, who in her view want to alleviate poverty, stop the starvation of children throughout the world, recognize our interdependence in terms of health issues, infectious diseases and environmental degradation internationally.

Many other scholars view foreign aid as one of the causes of both conflict between Republicans and Democrats and coalition formation in Congress. Travis (2010) claims the foreign aid program has often been a centerpiece in battles between the Republican and Democratic parties over foreign policy. Furthermore, Sullivan (1996) reported that the politics of foreign assistance is, after all, the art of generating majority support in Congress from different groups that may have only a tangential interest in the program. He continued that conservatives and progressives alike recognize this reality, even as they critique the same reality from divergent perspectives and recommend vastly different solutions to what both see as the failure of aid.

In conclusion, while some studies claim that congressional foreign policy behavior has changed since 1945, others affirm that it has been the same. Furthermore, scholars have not reached a consensus regarding who influence U.S. foreign policy. Further studies argued that U.S. foreign assistance program has been subjected to particularly critical review and change by Congress. Moreover, the conclusions of a large number studies are contradictory on whether Congress is supporting foreign aid, or hindering the allocation of aid and the success of U.S. foreign aid mission. Additionally, those who view foreign aid as one of the causes of conflict between Republicans and Democrats parties accuse Republicans of obstructing congressional support for foreign aid. Taken as a whole, the previous research on congressional foreign policy behavior, most precisely Congress attitude towards foreign aid, is not clear. Also, this previous

research failed to investigate whether the gender, or the region of congressmen affects their support for foreign aid bills.

Foreign Lobbying

In opposition to what one would expect, studies concluded that American lobbying industries and lobbyists promote foreign interests over their own country interests. Ettinger (1946) reported that foreign interests are using every conceivable device of publicity and public relations to win the friendship of the American people. Hocking (1991) recognized that one of the central difficulties of the debate about foreign interest lobbying in the United States, from wherever it comes, is the sheer scope of the activities which the term is intended to cover. He claims at one level, all political activity can be regarded as lobbying in some form or other. He believes attempts by foreign governments to gain influence are seen in a different and less favorable light than those conducted by, for example, American business interests. According to Hocking, it has been estimated that in the 1986 congressional elections over 100 foreign companies contributed \$1.1 million to campaign funds through political action committees (PACs) and the use of professional lobbyists, many of whom have held high office in the United States government. For him, the unspoken objective of foreign interest lobbying, whether from Japan or other sources, is to exert influence over American political processes and to shape American policy in key areas such as trade and foreign investment. Hocking explained that frequently, lobbyists are hired simply to provide information which would not otherwise be available to foreigners and continue that these lobbyists may also be able to suggest strategies by which specific goals can be achieved. Hocking is confident

that the major aim of employing lobbyists in Washington or at the level of local American politics is to guide those who are unfamiliar with them through the complexities of a foreign political terrain.

In this same line of idea, Glickman and Woodward (1989) argued foreign lobbyists have been joined by scores of former presidential advisors and members of Congress, military officials, and others who work directly for the governmental relations office of foreign companies or for industry groups. They also highlighted that foreign PACs have contributed to the 1985-86 elections. For Chang (1986), in international relations, weak actors rely on lobbying in order to influence the strong actors. Moon (1988) agreed with Chang when he affirmed that with the rise of interdependence, transnational lobbying has emerged as an important instrument of bilateral bargaining among nations and continued that weak actors may indirectly influence the policy-making of the strong by coalition formation or grass-roots mobilization, exploiting mutual interests, or ideological and ethnic tie. Moon explained that apart from building coalitions through tapping mutual interests, the weak may appeal to ideological and ethnic ties in a target country because ethnic ties and cultural connectedness provide the weak with an additional means of access to domestic actors of the target country, especially at the grass-roots level. Moon highlighted that the weak prefers direct lobbying to indirect lobbying because direct lobbying is more effective than indirect lobbying in order of: access to power, technocratic, coalition-building grass-roots mobilization. He continued by saying that it is because direct lobbying is guided by intense preference and subject to immediate control and supervision, while indirect lobbying depends on loose coalitions based on voluntary participation of diverse groups.

Likewise, Schlozman and Tierney (1986) claimed that weak actors can influence strong actors through constituency pressure, which can be done by organizing meetings between Congress members and their constituents, making campaign contributions, organizing direct lobbying, or using the Congress members' voting record to turn their constituents against them.

Further studies have compared domestic and foreign lobbyists. For example, Berman and Heineman (1963) felt that the government is more receptive to American citizens than to foreign nationals. They assert that especially when the stakes are high, foreign interests appear convinced that they are wise to employ United States citizens to promote their cause. Berman and Heineman argue that American who acts as a foreign lobbyist finds himself at a serious disadvantage compared with a lobbyist who represents domestic interests because the domestic lobbyist has power behind him, for in the final analysis he represents votes. Berman and Heineman continue that as a consequence, congressmen will tend to treat him with respect, even if the legislation for which he is campaigning is illogical in terms of the national interest. They also explained that in contrast, the lobbyist for a foreign nation can exercise no such legitimate pressure, for he commands the votes of no American citizens. Berman and Heineman claim as well that some foreign principals attempt to provide incentives for their lobbyists in the form of contingency agreements and added that the typical such contract calls for payment of a base fee to the lobbyist, with additional sums hinging upon the size of the quota that the principal is awarded. They are confident that the payment of contingent fees is only one

of the methods employed by foreign governments to make up for the fact that they cannot exert normal political pressures.

Campos and Giovannoni (2007) view lobbying as the preferred means for exerting political influence in rich countries, and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. They therefore examine the relationship between lobbying and corruption. Campos and Giovannoni conclude that lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership. Lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries. Additionally, while examining theoretically and empirically the effects of foreign lobbying on the domestic economy, Husted (1991) highlighted that an interesting issue has to do with the fact that foreign lobbyists may be natural allies of one or more domestic groups. He continued that foreign lobbyists would want to ally with the specific factor in the home export industry. According to him, under plausible conditions, foreign lobbying may even raise domestic welfare.

Further studies examined the relationship between foreign aid allocation and lobbying by ethnic groups. For example, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000) believe in a multi-cultural donor country, the importance of various ethnic groups may not be underestimated because these groups often lobby the government for the benefit of the countries of their origin and cited lobbying groups, such as the Jewish lobby in the United States, the Arab and African lobbies in France, the Indian lobby in the United Kingdom, and the Turkish lobby in Germany. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller investigated whether ethnic composition in the donor country, the degree of corruption in the donor country

given by the weight attached to political contributions, and the extent of aid-fatigue are responsible for a larger proportion of aid going to relatively more prosperous countries, and found that to be the case. They therefore concluded that lobbying is done by ethnic groups who are altruistic to specific recipient countries.

Moreover, studies examining the influence of foreign lobbying groups on U.S. Congress are mixed and inconclusive. On the one hand, some studies concluded that foreign lobbying groups have tremendous influence on Congress. Chaddock (2003) revealed fully half the Senate and a third of the House joined more than 2,000 delegates of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for its annual policy dinner in 2003. He also reported that the message from the top Republicans and Democrats was the same: support for Israel is a given. Moreover, Szabo (2009) argued that the Congress in particular magnifies the importance and impact of lobbies to the point that coherent realist policy is not likely to be achieved. He emphasized that this vulnerability has been fully exploited by foreign interests who hire high-priced lobbyists and media consultants who work the system as effectively as domestic lobbyists. On the other hand, many other scholars claim that Congress is combating foreign lobbying groups. For example, Husted (1991) highlighted that reports in the popular press suggest that lobbying activity is by no means negligible in the United States and continue that Congress, for its part, seems concerned over the influence foreign lobbyists might have on U.S. policy. Husted declared also that legislation that would limit the ability of former government officials to lobby for foreign interests is being considered.

Additional studies found that lobbies and ethnic groups have a tremendous impact on American foreign policy. Haglund and Kertzer (2008) affirmed that American foreign

policy can be and at times is subject to influence associated with ethnic diasporas. Additionally, Terry (2005) believes that that small lobbyists are very influential in The United States although it is a democracy system because American institution are democratic and that any request may be brought before the Congress for its approval. He continues that this process gives the opportunity to domestic and foreign lobbyists, interest groups, ethnic groups and pressure groups to lobby Senators and Representatives.

In *The Israel Lobby*, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) discussed how the Israeli lobby influences American foreign policy. They start by claiming that the driving forces of U.S. policy in Middle East are both the domestic politics, and more importantly the Israeli lobby's activities. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the power of the Israeli lobby explains America's support for Israel. They identified the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations as the key Israel lobbying organizations. Mearsheimer and Walt reported that Jewish Americans have set up an impressive array of organizations to influence American foreign policy and added that AIPAC was ranked second most influential lobbying organization behind the American Association of Retired People. Mearsheimer and Walt revealed that the lobby also includes Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, who are both former majority leaders in U.S. House of Representatives, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer, and Ralph Reed who are prominent Christian evangelicals. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, in its basic operations, the Israel lobby is no different from the farm lobby, steel or textile workers' unions, or other ethnic lobbies because for the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise it are only doing what other special interest groups do, but doing it very much better. They believe that in order

to accomplish their goals, the lobby uses two approaches. First, it exerts its influence in Washington, by pressuring the executive branch and Congress in order to make them support Israel interests. Second, the Israeli lobby ensures that the image of Israel is portrayed in a positive way by the media and the authorities. For Mearsheimer and Walt, even though the Israeli lobby influence in Congress is the most effective, it has other sources of power. Mearsheimer and Walt pointed out that the Israel lobby uses pro-Israel congressional staffers and Jewish voters, or think tanks to reach its objectives. They also highlighted that the Israeli lobby stifles debate in colleges and university campuses, keeps an eye on what professors teach and write, exerts pressure on certain academics and universities or boasts of its influence and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it.

While examining the nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India, Kirk (2008) claimed that the transformation of U.S. India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. He explained that Indian-American citizens' groups in the United States, and the efforts of an increasingly professional and well-funded India lobby on Capitol Hill were critical in pressing members of Congress to support the agreement and added that this episode may portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. According to Kirk, ethnic lobbies are becoming more visible, and may be finding more points of access to influence U.S policy process. To show that ethnic lobbies are influencing U.S policy process, Kirk discussed Indian-American political activism. He described that started in 1994, the House's India caucus included 115 members by 1999. Kirk pointed out the U.S. India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) as Indian-American most recent lobbying

organizations. He emphasized that USINPAC trained young people who graduated from reputed United States universities to become full-time professional and legislative staff, organizes youth symposia, fundraisers, and receptions in Washington. Kirk added also that Indian-Americans take additional action such as giving campaign contributions to candidates who support Indian interests, or to the opponent of incumbents who opposed Indian interests. Kirk thinks that the success of Indian lobby is due to the fact that India and India-American interest receive a bipartisan support in Congress given Indian-American did not officially embrace Republican or Democratic Party. Additionally, Kirk is confident that USINPAC continues to lobby in order to improve the United States economic and environmental policy towards India.

Haney and Vanderbush (1999) investigated the role of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy and proposed a number of determinants factors that contribute to ethnic interest groups success. One of these factors is the organizational strength which they defined as an organizational unity, a professional lobbying apparatus that provides useful information, and financial resources. They view membership unity, placement, and voter participation as important sources of the organizational strength. The salience and resonance of the message a group promotes is another factor that Haney and Vanderbush believe contribute to the effectiveness of ethnic interest groups. According to Haney and Vanderbush, permeability of and access to the government and the mutually supportive relationships between ethnic interest groups and policymakers are additional factors that contribute the success of ethnic interest groups.

Most scholars and policymakers agree that the unspoken objective of foreign interest lobbying, is to exert influence over American political processes and to shape

American policy. For them, foreign lobbyists have been joined by former presidential advisors, members of Congress, and military officials, whose major role is to guide those who are unfamiliar with American politics through the complexities of a foreign political terrain. These scholars and policymakers argued that although the government is more receptive to American citizens than to foreign nationals, various ethnic groups may not be underestimated because these groups often lobby the government for the benefit of the countries of their origin. Further studies concluded that foreign lobbying groups have tremendous influence on Congress, whereas others affirmed that Congress is combating foreign lobbying groups. Still, additional studies that investigate how the countries recipients of the United States foreign lobby members of Congress, staff, and officials in the executive branch in order to obtain U.S. foreign aid is necessary.

Chapter 2

Factors Explaining the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid

Introduction

Many Americans wonder how the United States can continue to distribute millions or billions of dollars to foreign countries while the country is experiencing an economic crisis that translates into the economic slowdown, a high rate of unemployment, and an increasing number of foreclosures. Of course, these people are right to be upset given the national government's primary duty is to serve its citizen, not foreigners. This chapter is going to try to answer the question "Why does the United States give aid?" by examining the kind of countries who receive U.S. foreign aid.

Methodology

To answer the question "Why does the United States give aid?" this chapter is first going to look at the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2007-2008 average from the United States. ODA 2007-2008 average is the total of ODA received during 2007 fiscal year and the total of ODA received during 2008 fiscal year divided by two. These ten countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest recipients. They are ranked in the following order: Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Colombia, Pakistan, Kenya, Israel, and Uganda. These data are from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008).

Second, this chapter will test five propositions. The purpose of each proposition is to test whether the United States allocates its foreign aid, most precisely its Gross Bilateral ODA, in response to such principles as level of human rights performance and level of human needs. Also, each proposition will be set up in a manner that it will be consistent with the previous findings on the factors that have ostensibly determined the U. S. foreign aid allocation. The main purpose here is to determine if the results will support or reject the previous literature on the factors determining the distribution of U.S. foreign aid.

The first proposition is the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a concern for democratic principles. This proposition is consistent with some of Travis's (1995) conclusions that there is a strong positive relationship between economic support fund (ESF) aid and democratic standards. ESF's primary goal is to promote economic and political stability throughout both balance-of-payments support and short-term project assistance. To test this proposition, we are going to determine if correlations exist between the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 and the Freedom House (Freedom House, 2011) rankings both in 2006 and 2007.

Every year, Freedom House measures the level of democratic freedom in all the countries in the world, and classifies them as free, partially free, or not free. The measurement of freedom is done through a survey. The survey measures political rights and civil liberties. The political rights questions focus on the electoral process, political pluralism and participation. It also focuses on the functioning of government. The civil liberties measurement takes into account the freedom of expression and belief, the associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and the personal autonomy and

individual rights. The goal here is to find out how each of the top ten recipients of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average was classified by Freedom House in 2006 and 2007. If a country is classified as free, we assume that it respects the democratic principles; however, if it is classified as not free, that means it does not respect democratic principles. Also, if a country is classified as partially free, we assume that it barely respects the democratic principles.

The second proposition to be examined is whether United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a human rights performance in the recipient country. This proposition is used because it is reliable with Poe and Meernik (1995), and Apodaca and Stohl's (1999) findings. These scholars found a positive relationship between foreign aid allocations and human rights performance. To test this proposition, we are going to look at the 2006 and 2007 Political Terror Scale Score (PTS) of each of the top ten recipients of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average. The Political Terror Scale Score (PTS) was developed by Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood way (Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., 2011). This Political Terror Scales is used because scholars such Neumayer (2005) also used that to measure personal integrity rights. Furthermore, Poe, Vazquez, and Carey (2001) claimed that the U.S State Department's data on Political Terror Score is biased because the United States tends to favors its allies. In order to solve this problem, the research used both U.S State Department and Amnesty International's data on Political Terror Score.

The political Terror Scale Levels used are coded in the following method. When a country scores five in a given year, it means that in this particular year, terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the

means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. A Political Terror Score of four implies that civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. A Political Terror Score of three indicates an extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. A political Terror Score of two stands for a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. A Political Terror Score of one is attributed to countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

The third proposition is the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of voting at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This proposition is used because Wang (1999) argued that the United States has spent considerable time during the past decade trying to establish a linkage between aid allocations and UN voting coincidence rates. Furthermore, his findings suggest that the U.S. government has successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign policy compliance in the UN on issues that are vital to America national interests.

In order to test this third proposition, we are going to identify the number of identical and opposite votes each of the top ten recipients of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average casted with the United States in the 61st session (2006) and 62nd session (2007) of the United Nations General Assembly. It is important to highlight that

these data are taken from the U.S. State Department's website (U.S. State Department 2010). Although this data may not contain the record of all votes it is close to the record on all votes at the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, Wang (1999) also used the State Department' data on votes at the UN General Assembly.

The fourth proposition is whether the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA according to human need. This proposition is consistent with Poe's (1992) analysis which concluded that there is a significant relationship between the United States foreign aid distribution and human needs in the recipient countries. To test this proposition, we are going to look at the ranking of each of these top ten recipients countries based on their Gross National Product (GNP) (Students of the World 2005). We will take into account the ranking of each of these ten recipient countries out of the total of 224 countries. The purpose here is that as the lower the ranking is, the higher the human needs are. We will look at 2005 data.

The fifth proposition examines if the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance on the basis of security interests. This fifth proposition is consistent with Lai's (2003) findings, which demonstrate a significant positive relationship between security interests and aid allocation for the period of 1991–1996. To test this proposition, we are going to examine data from Department of Defense active military personnel strength by regional area and by country in December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007 (U. S. Department of Defense, 2008). Our goal here is to look at the number of U.S. troops in each of the top ten recipients of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2208 average, in 2006 and 2007.

It is important to highlight that the five propositions should be considered "exploratory." They are lagged in the data measured because we assume that foreign aid for a given year may be allocated based on how well the recipient countries met the United States requirements in the years preceding the fiscal year they receive the aid. For example, to test whether the United States gives aid based on human right performance, or democratic performance, we look 2006 and 2007 data because we believe that they are the data the United States is taking into account while providing foreign aid respectively in 2007 and 2008. This methodology is the appropriate methodology for two reasons. First, it allows us to set up hypotheses that are consistent with previous findings on factors explaining the distribution of U.S. foreign Aid. Second, this methodology will allow us to compare our findings with previous conclusions giving us thus the opportunity to either confirm or reject them.

Test and Findings

Table 1: Distribution U. S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-08

Top ten recipient countries	Amount received in USD million
Iraq	3246
Afghanistan	1816
Sudan	779
Egypt	684
Ethiopia	592
Colombia	520
Pakistan	398
Kenya	383
Israel	351
Uganda	327

Source: **(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008)**

Proposition 1: *the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a concern for democratic principles.*

Freedom House classified Iraq as “a not free” state both in 2006 and in 2007. Meanwhile, Afghanistan was given a status of partially free in 2006, and 2007. Also, Ethiopia was classified by the Freedom House as a partially free state in 2006 and in

2007. Just like Iraq, Sudan and Egypt were classified by the Freedom House as not free states in 2006 and 2007. As well, Pakistan's status changed from a not free state in 2006 to a partially free state in 2007. Additionally, Kenya, Columbia and Uganda were classified by the Freedom House as partially free in 2006, and 2007. Israel is the only country that was classified by the Freedom House as a free state both in 2006 and 2007.

Table 2: Freedom status in the top ten countries recipients of ODA 2007-2008 average from the U. S.

Recipient State	Status	
	2006	2007
Iraq	Not free	Not free
Afghanistan	Partially free	Partially free
Sudan	Not free	Not free
Egypt	Not free	Not free
Ethiopia	Partially free	Partially free
Colombia	Partially free	Partially free
Pakistan	Not free	Partially free
Kenya	Partially free	Partially free
Israel	Free	Free
Uganda	Partially free	Partially free

Source: (Freedom House, 2011)

Our data suggest that out of the top ten countries recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States, only one country was classified by the Freedom House as a free state in 2006 and 2007. Among the nine remaining countries, five were classified as partially free while four were attributed the status of a not free state in 2006. In 2007, six were classified as partially free while three were attributed the status of a not free state. Overall, because only one country among the top ten countries recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States was free in 2006 and 2007, these findings indicate that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a concern for democratic principles for the recipient states.

Proposition 2: The United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a human rights performance.

On the Political Terror Scale's website, two Political Terror Scale Scores are attributed to each country every year. Gibney et al. attributed one based on the view of Amnesty International, and the other based on the view of the U.S. State Department. As was mentioned in the methodology, the Political Terror Scale Level is coded from 5 to 1.

In 2006 and 2007, based on the view of Amnesty International, Gibney et al. attributed respectively the Political Terror Scores of five and five to Iraq. Likewise, in both years for the U.S. State Department, they attributed to Iraq the same score. From these political Terror Scores, it clearly appears that human rights were absolutely not respected in Iraq. Afghanistan was also experiencing the same phenomenon in 2006 and 2007. Based on the views of both Amnesty International and U.S. State Department, they

attributed to Afghanistan an identical Political Terror Score of five in 2006 and five in 2007.

In 2006 and 2007, human rights violations in Kenya were lesser compared to human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For Amnesty International, Gibney et al. attributed to Kenya a Political Terror Score of four in 2006 and three in 2007. In the meantime, for the U.S. State Department, they attributed to Kenya a Political Terror Score of four in both 2006 and 2007. The Political Terror Score Gibney et al. attributed to Pakistan in 2006 and in 2007 for Amnesty International and the U.S State Department were not totally different from the one they attributed to Kenya. That is, for both Amnesty International and the U.S State Department, Gibney et al. attributed to Pakistan an identical Political Terror Scale Score of four in 2006 and 2007. We can therefore say that human rights were continually violated in Kenya and Pakistan; however, terror activities did not expand to the whole population.

In 2006 and 2007, Egypt was attributed the Political Terror Score of four by Gibney et al. based on Amnesty International's report. Meanwhile, based on the U.S State Department's view, they attributed to Egypt the Political Terror Scores of four in 2006 and three in 2007. Colombia was attributed the Political Terror Scores of five and four based on the view of Amnesty International respectively in 2006 and 2007. This implies that the respect of human rights has increased in Colombia in 2007 according to Amnesty International. Meanwhile, in both years, for the U.S. State Department, they attributed to Colombia an identical score of four.

Amnesty International's report led Gibney et al. to attribute to Uganda a Political Terror Score of four in 2006 and 2007. Likewise, in both years, for the U.S. State Department, they attributed to Uganda the same score of four. Just like Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2006 and 2007 Sudan experienced extreme human rights violations. As a result, based on the views of both Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, Gibney et al. attributed to Sudan a Political Terror Scale Score of five in 2006 and 2007. On the one hand, based on Amnesty International's report, Gibney et al. attributed to Ethiopia a Political Terror Score of three in 2006 and four in 2007. These scores imply that according to Amnesty International, the respect of human rights has decreased in Ethiopia in 2007. On the other hand, in both years, for the U. S. States Department, they attributed to Ethiopia an identical Political Terror Score of four.

Table 3: Political Terror Score

Recipient State	Political Terror Scale attributed by Amnesty International		Political Terror Scale attributed by U.S. State Department	
	2006	2007	2006	2007
Iraq	5	5	5	5
Afghanistan	5	5	5	5
Sudan	5	5	5	5
Egypt	4	4	4	3
Ethiopia	3	4	4	4
Colombia	5	4	4	4
Pakistan	4	4	4	4
Kenya	4	3	4	4
Israel	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Uganda	4	4	4	4

Source: (Gibney, Cornett, & Wood, 2011)

Our data demonstrate that among the top ten countries recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States, the top three recipients are the countries that received the highest Political Terror scores. To be more precise, in 2006 and 2007, for Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, Gibney et al. attributed an identical Political Terror Score of five to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan. This

result implies that the countries in which the human rights are being extremely violated are the countries that received the major portion of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average. Furthermore, none of these ten recipient countries has a Political Terror Score below three. This remark indicates therefore that human rights are not respected in any of the top ten countries recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States. All things considered, our findings suggest that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a human rights performance.

Proposition 3: The United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of voting at the United Nations General Assembly.

Israel is the only country that truly voted with the United States at the United Nation General Assembly in 2006 and 2007. In fact, Israel voting record in the 61st session of the United Nations General Assembly shows that Israel cast 64 identical and 12 opposite votes with the United States, while in the 62nd session, it cast 51 identical and eight opposite votes with the United States. The most shocking part is that some among these ten recipient countries cast less than five identical votes with the United States. For example, in the 61st session of the United Nations General Assembly, out of 94 votes, Iraq and Sudan cast only five identical votes with the United States. Likewise, in the 62nd session, Sudan cast only four identical votes with the United States, while Egypt, Ethiopia, and Columbia cast only five identical votes with it. The evidence that Iraq, Egypt, and Sudan who are among the top six recipients are unfortunately the countries that cast five or less identical votes with the United States lead to the question “Why the United States distributes most of its ODA to countries whose positions at the UN General Assembly differ from the United States position more than 95 percent of the time?”

Likewise the same thing can also be said about Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Colombia, Kenya, and Pakistan. The argument here is that even though these recipient countries cast more than five identical votes with the United States, none of them cast more than 17 identical votes with it. As matter of fact, respectively, in the 61st and 62nd session of UN General Assembly, Afghanistan cast 17 and nine identical votes with the United States, Kenya cast 12 and seven identical votes with the United States, Pakistan cast 15 and eight identical votes with the United States, while Uganda cast 11 and six identical votes with the United States. Based the amount received by these ten top recipients, we expected that because Iraq is the first top recipient, it will have the highest number of identical votes with the United States, but that is not the case. Surprisingly, Iraq is among the recipients that have the lowest number of identical votes with the United States and whose position is different from the United States position more than 95 percent of the time. Unexpectedly, the ninth top recipient, Israel cast the highest number of identical votes with the United States. Also, Uganda which is the tenth top recipients cast more identical votes with the United States than Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia who are among the top ten recipients did.

Overall, when we count the number of times the United States and each of the other nine countries recipients cast identical and opposite votes, there is no doubt that the number of opposite votes is much higher than the number of identical votes. The most surprising result is that the number of identical votes is very insignificant. The argument here is the if the United States was allocating its Gross Bilateral ODA based on the voting at the United Nations General Assembly, countries such as Colombia, Egypt, Iraq and Sudan which cast a very small number of identical vote with the United States would

have not been among the top ten recipient of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average. That having been said, we can clearly affirm that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of voting at the United Nations General Assembly

Table 4: Record of identical and opposite votes each of the top ten recipients of U.S Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average casted wit U.S in 2006 and 2007 at the U N General Assembly.

country			Iraq	Afgh-anistan	Ethiopia	Sudan	Egypt	Pakistan	Kenya	Colombia	Uganda	Israel	
Country Voting at the UN General Assembly	2006	In	Total vote	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	
		Identical	5	17	11	5	6	15	12	12	11	64	
		Vote with U.S.											
		Opposite vote with U.S.	67	68	68	75	75	70	46	67	36	12	
		Abstained	12	0	9	11	13	7	10	14	23	18	
	Absent	10	9	6	3	0	2	26	1	24	0		
	2007	In	Total vote	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
		Identical	7	9	5	4	5	8	7	5	6	51	
		Vote with U.S.											
		Opposite vote with U.S.	68	70	59	73	74	65	63	63	41	8	
Abstained		2	0	5	2	3	9	6	14	3	12		
Absent	2	3	13	3	0	0	6	0	32	11			

Source: (U.S. State Department 2010).

Proposition 4: *The United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of the level of human needs.*

The data suggest that four among the top ten recipients are ranked among the top 50 countries with the highest GNP in the world. That is, Israel was ranked 36th country with a GNP distribution of 129 billion dollars, Pakistan was ranked 43th highest with a GNP distribution of 107 billion dollars, Egypt was ranked 49th with a GNP distribution of 92.9 billion dollars, while with a GNP distribution of 105 billion dollars, Colombia was ranked 45th highest GNP. It clearly appears that the United States does not distribute its ODA to the needy countries because Israel, Pakistan, and Colombia will not be among the top ten recipients of its ODA if the distribution was done on the basis of human needs. Even though the rest of the top ten recipient countries, most precisely Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Colombia, Pakistan, Kenya, and Uganda are not ranked among the top 50 countries with the highest GNP, they are at least all ranked among the top 115 highest GNP. This data suggest also that Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Colombia, Pakistan, Kenya, and Uganda are not among the countries that have the highest levels of human needs and that the United States does not distribute its aid on the basis of the level of human needs.

Furthermore, this data demonstrate that the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States are not the countries that need economic assistance the most. Ranked 115th with a GNP distribution of 6.96 billion, Afghanistan is the country with the lowest GNP among the ten countries recipients of the U.S Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average. However, if one compares Afghanistan's GNP which is 6.96 billion dollars to Grenada's GNP which is 0.42 billion dollars, it is clear that the

U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA is not given to the countries that need economic assistance the most. If they U.S. was allocating its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of human needs, countries such Grenada, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea-Bissau which have a low GNP would have been among the top ten recipients of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average. The argument here is that when the GNP of 224 countries in the world is examined the data indicated that the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States are not the countries that needed the economic assistance the most. Based on these findings, we can affirm that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of the level of human needs. In short, if the United States was distributing its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of the level of human needs, the top ten recipients of its Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average would have been the ten countries that have the lowest GNP in the world.

Proposition 5: The United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of security interests.

Our data on active military personnel strength by regional area and by country in December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007 show that there were 164,700 and 196,600 U.S troops in Iraq respectively at the end of 2006 and 2007. The United States has stationed in Afghanistan 22,200 U.S troops at the end of 2006. At the end of 2007 the number of U.S. troops jumped to 57,700.

In Egypt, the number of U. S. troops in active-duty decreased from 372 in December 31, 2006, to 261 at the end of 2007. In Israel, the number of U.S. troops

remained unchanged in 2006 and 2007. In fact, in 2006 and 2007, only 46 U.S. troops were present in Israel. 32 and 35 are the total number of U.S troops who were stationed in Pakistan respectively in 2006 and 2007. The number of U.S. troops stationed in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda was correspondingly 10, 43, and 11 in 2006, and 9, 40, and 11 in 2007. In Columbia, the number of U.S troops increased from 96 at the end of 2006 to 106 at the end of 2007. Meanwhile, only two U.S troops were present in Sudan in both 2006 and 2007.

From our analysis, among the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from the United States, only two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan have thousands of U.S troops in their territories. Among the eight remaining countries, Egypt is the only country in which the U.S has stationed more than 110 troops. Three countries, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan have less than 15 U.S stationed troops. Overall, because among the top ten recipients of Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average from U.S, two countries have within them more than 22,000 U.S troops stationed on their territories our conclusion is the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of security interests.

Our conclusion can also be supported by the fact that among the top ten recipients, the top two recipients, Iraq and Afghanistan are the only two countries in which the U.S. has stationed thousands of troops. Moreover, Iraq and Afghanistan are the countries on the front line anti-terror. The point here is that the distribution of the United States Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average was influenced by President George W. Bush's global war on terror. As matter of fact, with over 164, 700 stationed U.S troops in active-duty on its territory, Iraq received \$ 3,246 US million. One important implication

is that the amount received by Iraq is 4.1 times higher than the amount received by Sudan, 5.6 times higher than the amount received by Ethiopia, and 8.5 times higher than the amount received by Pakistan. Furthermore, with over 22, 200 stationed U.S. troops in active-duty on its territory, Afghanistan received 1,816 US million. This implies that the amount received by Afghanistan is 2.3 times higher than the amount received by Sudan, 3 times higher than the amount received by Ethiopia, and 4.5 times higher than the amount received by Pakistan. This analysis shows that the United States allocated the majority of its Gross Bilateral ODA 2007-2008 average to countries in which it has stationed thousands of troops and which serves as the ground for the Global War on Terror. This analysis supports our conclusion that the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of security interests.

Conclusion

This chapter was designed to investigate why the United States gives foreign aid. In this chapter, the findings indicate that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a concern for democratic principles. This result does not support some of Travis's (1995) findings which maintain that there is a strong positive relationship between economic support fund aid and democratic standards. Furthermore, our findings that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a human rights performance challenge Poe and Meernik (1995), and Apodaca and Stohl's (1999) conclusions that there is a positive relationship between foreign aid allocations and human rights performance. Moreover, our conclusion that the United

States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of voting at the United Nations General Assembly diverge from Wang's (1999) findings that the U.S. government has successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign policy compliance in the UN on issues that are vital to America's national interests. These results challenge his argument that Washington has spent a considerable time during the past decade trying to establish a linkage between aid allocations and UN voting coincidence rates as well.

Poe (1992) concluded that there is a significant relationship between the United States foreign aid allocation and the need of the recipient countries; however, the result of our research suggests that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of the level of human needs. Overall, security interests appear to be the only basis on which the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA. This conclusion supports Lai's (2003) findings that there is a significant positive relationship between security interests and U.S. aid allocation for the period of 1991–1996.

This research has some limitations. First, the research looked at only ten countries which is a small sample. The examination of only ten countries is not enough to provide a definitive answer to the controversies surrounding the distribution of U.S. foreign aid distribution. Furthermore, the research examined only the average of two years of data. That having been said, the average of two of years data is too narrow to lead us to affirm with one hundred percent confidence that the findings are unquestionable. Moreover, future research needs to look at the top 20 or 30 recipients of U.S. ODA, as well as additional years of data.

Chapter 3

Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior

Introduction

On October 12, 2011, the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton notified Congress that if both the State Department budget and foreign aid are cut the State Department will not be able to fulfill all its obligations (Lee, 2011). Thus, through its critical role in foreign aid funding and budget approval, Congress is a key player in American foreign policy-making and can therefore shape the America foreign policy. Consequently, understanding the congressional foreign policy behavior is one important way to understand American foreign policy as well as the politics of American foreign aid.

Theoretical Model

A lot of studies pointed out that foreign aid is one of the causes of both conflict between Republicans and Democrats and coalition formation in Congress. Travis (2010) claims foreign aid decisions have often been at the center of battles between the Republican and Democratic parties over foreign policy. Democrats are often viewed as the pro foreign aid whereas the Republicans are accused of obstructing congressional support for foreign aid. Lippman (1996) argued that the reduction of approximately 3,000 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staff and the reduction of U. S. aid programs and missions around the world are the consequences of the control of Congress by the Republican Party following the 1994 congressional elections. Furthermore, Fleck

and Kilby (2001) claimed that in June 1995, when an already lean foreign aid appropriations bill reached the House floor, the Republican majority pushed through a rule allowing unlimited amendments, a move widely seen as an attempt to allow further paring down of aid spending. Additional studies concluded that Republicans are more likely to oppose certain types of aid. For example, Moore (1997) argued that what is most offensive to conservatives is the nearly \$1 billion a year still spent by the United States at the time, U.S. to International Planned Parenthood and other alleged vanguards of the abortion lobby for population control programs. Additionally, on July 13, 2000, Nancy Pelosi accused Republicans of ignoring the spirit of the American people, who in her view want to alleviate poverty, stop the starvation of children throughout the world, recognize our interdependence in terms of health issues, infectious diseases and environmental degradation internationally (Congressional digest, 2000). Cason (1997) affirmed that in the surface in Washington, it appears that the much trumpeted Republican assault on foreign aid is succeeding because by 1996 the U.S. Congress had cut development assistance to Africa by almost 25 percent and effectively eliminated a special law that sought to direct funds particularly to grassroots, long-term development projects. This literature on political party and foreign aid relationship yield to the first hypothesis of this chapter:

Hypothesis 1: *The United States foreign aid increases when Congress is controlled by Democrats and decreases when Congress is controlled by Republicans.*

Baldwin (1965) argued that the House, which was once-ignored lower chamber, came to play a key role in foreign policy through its power over the public purse and that much of

this power is concentrated in the subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee, which oversees the budgets of the State Department and the foreign aid program. Cohen (1999) claimed that the chairs in Congress are the most powerful and influential players in the legislative process because of the power they have in their committees and conference committees, in the agenda setting, and on the floor. Reeves (1993) went far to emphasize that the manner in which the committees in Congress are organized and operate is shaped not only by the chairs' political ideologies and goals, but also by their personal policy. These led to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The United States foreign aid increases when the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in both the Senate and the House are liberal on foreign issues.

Fleck and Kilby (2001) discussed the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts pending across congressional districts within the United States. After analyzing some voting records, they found that House Democrats are five times more likely to vote in favor of aid than the House Republicans. Furthermore, Bandow (1995) reported that most Republicans in the House have never cared for foreign aid. He went far to claim that the former chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee governing foreign assistance, Republican Sonny Callahan, has never voted for a foreign aid bill. He also reported that Jesse Helms, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Mitch McConnell, former chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, have proposed to make major cuts

in foreign aid. The behavior of Republicans and Democrats toward foreign aid displayed by these scholars yield to the third hypothesis of this chapter:

Hypothesis 3: *The Democrats are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills.*

Jewell (2009) affirmed that in recent years, many southern members of Congress, long regarded as the bulwark of internationalism have begun to challenge some of the administration foreign policies. He continued that this has been evident in the increasing proportion of southern votes cast in Congress against these policies, particularly foreign aid. Moreover, Leogrande and Brenner (1993) reported that their preliminary examination of the floor votes on contra aid to Nicaragua in the House of Representatives during the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses indicates that party and region were both salient factors. They explained that since the regression analysis controls for the member's ideology in assessing the influence of region, their theoretical interpretation is that the effect of region represents a constituency influence, perhaps reflecting the more conservative ideological preferences of mass opinion in the South. Furthermore, while studying the congressional vote on foreign aid between 1939 and 1958, Rieselbach (1964) found that Democrats from the Midwest were consistently more internationalist than those from the South, particularly after the 77th Congress. He also found that Southern Republicans were consistently more isolationist than Republicans from the coastal region. Rieselbach concluded therefore that regional group within the two parties have behaved quite differently on foreign aid bills. These conclusions led to the fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills.

Diamond (1977) claimed that men and women legislators are likely to express different policy opinions on issues, like welfare, that affect children, women, and families in particular. Burrell (1994) also highlighted that female legislators at all levels of American governments are more likely to support and promote women's issues, which have most commonly been viewed as abortion, education, health care, and welfare. Poggione (2004) found that women hold more liberal preferences on welfare policy than their male colleagues, even after accounting for other factors like constituency demands, party, and ideology. He also found that Democratic and liberal women typically hold more liberal welfare policy opinions than Republican and conservative women and Democratic men; Republican and conservative women hold significantly more liberal preferences than Republican and conservative men. Additionally, Matthew, Witt, and Page (1994) reported that former Representative Barbara Jordan affirmed in 1991 that women have a capacity for understanding and compassion, which a man structurally does not have. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 5: Women are more likely to sponsor more foreign aid bills.

Data and Methodology

To test my first hypothesis this chapter will examine the changes in the United States Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 1989 to 2009 and Congress from 1989 to 2009. The data on ODA are from the Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011). That is, the investigation will consist of determining if the United States Official Development Assistance has increased in the congressional years controlled by the Democratic Party or decreased in the congressional years controlled by the Republicans Party.

To test the second hypothesis, we will be investigating whether in both chambers there is a relationship between the ideology of the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations and the Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocation. That is, the investigation will consist of comparing and drawing a relationship between the ideology of the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in both the Senate and the House, from 1989 to 2009 and the United States Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 1989 to 2009. The data on chairmen ideology are from the Almanac of American Politics (Barone, Michael and Cohen E Richard, 2010). Generally, each year, the Almanac of American Politics rates the members of Congress ideology on foreign issue as liberal or conservative. In this particular case, the chairmen of the Committee on Appropriation will be attributed the ideology in which they receive the highest rating. The United States Official Development Assistance (ODA) data are from OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011)

To test the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses, 50 random foreign aid bills introduced in the United States Congress during 110th Congress (2007-2008) will be examined. These foreign aid bills are from www.govtrack.us/ (Govtrack, 2010). The 50 bills are coded in SPSS. The 50 bills studied are located in the appendix. Four variables will be examined. They are coded in the following way. The first variable is the party of

the sponsor. A value of one is attributed when the sponsor is a Democrat and a value of two when the sponsor is a Republican. The second variable to be examined is the gender of the sponsor. A value of one is attributed to a female sponsor and a value of two to a male sponsor. The third variable that will be examined is the region of the sponsor. A value of one is attributed when the sponsor was from a state located in the north of the country and a value of two is attributed when the sponsor's state is located in the south of the country. The fourth variable to be examined is the status of the bill. A value of zero is attributed when the bill is introduced in Congress without any further action. When the bill was referred to committee or reported by committee, a value of one is attributed. When the bill was passed only the Senate, a value of two is attributed. When the bill passed only the House, we attributed a value of three. When the bill passed both the House and the Senate, but was not signed by the president, we attributed a value of four. A value of five is attributed when the bill passed both the House and the Senate and was signed by the president.

Finally, a case study of H. R. 4637: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989 will be provided to complement the quantitative model. This legislation is a foreign aid bill that funded foreign operations along with other federal programs. Furthermore, this legislation is chosen randomly because the goal of this case study is to investigate whether foreign aid bills were following the unorthodox law making process in the late 1980s as Sinclair (2007) claimed. In fact, Sinclair's studies have concluded that legislative process on major legislation has changed since the early 1970s and is now regularly characterized by a variety of what were once unorthodox practices and procedures. Sinclair provided the

case studies of some legislation to support her argument; however, none of the legislation she examined was foreign aid legislation. That having been said, this case study is worthwhile because its primary goal is to build upon Sinclair's research by investigating whether foreign aid legislation are also regularly characterized by a variety of what were once, according to her, unorthodox practices and procedure. It is important to mention that this is an exploratory case study.

Findings

Hypothesis 1: The United States foreign aid increases when Congress is controlled by Democrats and decreases when Congress is controlled by Republicans.

The House and the Senate in the 101st (1989-1990), 102nd (1991-1992), 103rd (1993-1994), 110th (2007-2008), and 111th (2009-2010) Congresses were dominated by the Democratic Party. Given that the majority party in the Congress uses the legislative structure and process to manage the appropriation process (Kiewiet and McCubins 1991), we expect that Democrats will use their privileges as majority party to increase the United States foreign aid in general, in particular, the United States ODA. On the one hand, as expected increased while the Democratic Party had the majority in both chambers. That is, the data suggest that 11,262 million dollars in 1991, the U.S. ODA increased to 11,709 million dollars in 1992. Also, estimated at 21,786.9 million dollars in 2007, the U.S. ODA increased progressively to 26,841.93 million dollars in 2008 and 28,831.34 million dollars in 2009 while the Democratic Party controlled both chambers. On the other hand, the data suggest also that U.S. ODA decreased during congressional

years the Democratic had the majority in both chambers. In fact, the United States ODA decreased considerably from 11,709 million dollars in 1992 to 9,927 million dollars in 1994 although Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party. There was as well a decrease of the United States ODA from 1990 to 1991 even though the Democrats had the majority in both chambers. It clearly appears that the United States ODA does not always increase when the Democratic Party controlled the House and the Senate. Thus, the analysis suggests that the presence of Democratic Party majority in the Senate and the House does not guarantee the augmentation of United States foreign aid, particularly ODA.

Because of the argument that aid decreases when the Congress is controlled by the Republicans, we expect a decrease of the United States ODA in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 given that the Republicans Party controlled the House and the Senate in these years. As expected we found evidence that the U.S. ODA decreased in some of these years. That is, 9,377 million dollars in 1996, the U.S ODA decreased to 6878 million dollars in 1997. It also decreased from 27934.74 million dollars in 2005 to 23532.14 million dollars in 2006. Unexpectedly, the data demonstrates also that the United States ODA increased when the Republican Party controlled the House and the Senate. That is, estimated at 7,367 million dollars in 1995, the United States ODA increased to 9,377 million dollars in 1996. Also, the U.S. ODA increased progressively from 8,785 million dollars in 1998 to 9,954.89 million dollars in 2000. This means that even though the Senate and the House were controlled by Republicans in 1998, 1999, and 2000, the U.S. ODA increased in these years. Furthermore, even though the 108th (2003-2004) and 109th (2005-2006) Congress were controlled by Republicans, between 2003

and 2005 the ODA increased expansively from 16,319.52 to 27,934.74 million dollars. This increase of the U.S. ODA from 2003 to 2005 is the highest increase that occurred between three consecutive years. One can therefore claim that the highest increase of U.S. ODA occurred when the Republican Party had the majority in both chambers. Thus, it appears that the control of the House and Senate by the Republican Party does not guarantee that United States ODA is going to decrease.

In sum, the analysis demonstrates on the one hand that the Democratic majority in the Senate and the House does not guarantee the augmentation of the United States ODA. It also suggests on the other hand, the control of the House and Senate by the Republican Party does not mean that the United States ODA will decrease. Based on these conclusions, we reject our hypothesis that the United States foreign aid increases when Congress is controlled by Democrats and decreases when Congress is controlled by Republicans.

Hypothesis 2: The United States foreign aid increases when the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in both the Senate and the House are liberal on foreign issues.

From 2000 to 2001, the Committee on Appropriations in the House was chaired by the Republican Bob Livingston, while the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate was chaired by the Republican Ted Stevens. Given that both chairmen were conservative on foreign issues, we expected the United States ODA to decrease in 2000 and 2001. Contrary to our expectation, the U. S. ODA, which was 9,145.26 million dollars in 1999 increased steadily to 9,954.89 million dollars in 2000 and 11,429.35 million dollars in

2001. Also even though in 2004, 2005, the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee of Appropriations were both chaired by congressmen who were conservative on foreign issues, the U. S. ODA increased in these years. That said, the data suggest the absence of relationship between the ideology of the chairmen of the Committee on Appropriations in the House and Senate and the amount of ODA the United States allocates. In short, if the ideology of the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in both chambers was affecting the allocation in 1989 to 2001 and 2004 to 2005, the U.S. ODA should have decreased given that the chairmen were conservative on foreign issues.

In 2008 and 2009 the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee on Appropriations were chaired by congressmen who were liberal on foreign issues. The Data in 2008 and 2009 confirm our expectation that the United States ODA will increase in these two years. That is, 21,786.9 million dollars in 2007, the United States ODA augmented to 26,841.93 USD million in 2008 and 28,831.34 million dollars in 2009. However, the data in 1993 did not confirm our expectation. That is, in 1993, the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in the Senate and the House, respectively Robert C. Byrd and William H. Natcher were liberal on foreign issues. Yet, the United States ODA which was 11,709 million dollars in 1992 decreased to 10,123 million dollars in 1993. Furthermore, the U. S. ODA went down again in 1994 even though the House and the Senate Committees on Appropriations were also chaired by Senator Robert C. Byrd and Representative David Obey who is also a liberal on foreign issues. The data demonstrates that the fact that the chairmen of the Senate Committee on

Appropriations and the House Committee on Appropriations are liberal on foreign issues does not guarantee the increase of U.S. ODA.

In a number of congressional years, the chairmen of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee on Appropriations have divergent views on foreign issues. In these circumstances it is difficult to predict whether the U.S. ODA will increase or decrease. For example, in 2002 and 2003, the Senate Committee on Appropriations was chaired by a liberal on foreign issues, while the House Committee on Appropriations was chaired by C. W. Bill Young who was conservative on foreign issues. Even so, our data demonstrate that the United States ODA grew in these two years. That is, the United States ODA expanded from 11,429.35 million dollars in 2001 to 13,290.07 million dollars in 2002, and 16,319.52 million dollars in 2003. Furthermore, between 1995 and 1999, the chair of Senate Committee on Appropriations was liberal on foreign issues, while the chair of the House Committee on Appropriations was conservative on foreign issues. The United States ODA which was 7,367 million dollars in 1995 increased to 9,377 million dollars in 1996, decreased suddenly to 6,878 million dollars in 1997, and grew steadily to 8,785.98 million dollars in 1998, and 9,145.26 million dollars in 1999. The fact that the chairmen of Committees on Appropriations in both chambers had opposing views on foreign issues does not affect the allocation of U.S. ODA because the ODA was not only increasing, but also decreasing in the congressional years one chairman is liberal and the other is conservative on foreign issues.

Overall, the analysis demonstrates that the ideologies of the chairmen of the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations do not seem to influence the ODA the United States allocates every year. On the one hand, in years such as 2004, 2005 and

2006, even though the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee on Appropriations were both chaired by conservative on foreign issues, the United States ODA increased. On the other hand, in 1993 and 1994, although the House and the Senate Committees on Appropriations were chaired by Congressmen who were liberal on foreign issues, the United States ODA decreased. Based on these findings, we reject the hypothesis that the United States foreign aid increases when the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations in both the Senate and the House are liberal on foreign issues.

Hypothesis 3: *The Democrats are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills.*

Table 2 displays the results of the descriptive statistics illustrating the relationship between the sponsored foreign aid bills and the sponsors' political parties. The results demonstrate that out of the 50 foreign aid bills coded, 36 were sponsored by Democrats, while 14 were sponsored by Republicans. That is, 72 percent of these foreign aid bills were sponsored by Democrats, whereas only 28 percent were sponsored by Republicans. It clearly appears that in the United States 110th Congress, the Democrats sponsored most of foreign aid bills. Thus, these findings confirm the hypothesis that Democrats are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills. These findings confirm also Therien and Noel's (2000) argument that leftist parties, in particular, have an effect on a country's level of foreign aid.

TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Party of Sponsors of Foreign aid Bills Introduced of the 110th Congress

Sponsors Party	Number of Sponsors by Party	Percentage of Sponsors by Party
Democratic party	36	72.0
Republican party	14	28.0

Hypothesis 4: *The northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills.*

Table 3, illustrates the descriptive statistics of the relationship between the sponsored bills and region of sponsors. The data demonstrates that out of the 50 foreign aid bills examined, 44 were sponsored by northern members of Congress, while only six were sponsored by southern member of Congress. In other words, the northern members of Congress sponsored 88 percent of these foreign aid bills, whereas Congressmen from

the south sponsored only 12 percent of bills. Hence, the results suggest that northern members of Congress did the sponsorship of foreign aid bills in the 110th Congress. These findings confirm our hypothesis that the northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills. These findings confirm also Jewell's (2009) conclusion that in recent years many southern members of Congress, long regarded as the bulwark of internationalism have begun to disagree with some of the government foreign policies, particularly foreign aid.

TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Region of Sponsors of Foreign aid Bills Introduced of the 110th Congress

Region of Sponsors	Number of Sponsors by Region	Percentage of Sponsors by Region
North	44	88.0
South	6	12.0

Hypothesis 5: women are more likely to sponsor more foreign aid bills.

Surprisingly, in contrast to previous studies, our findings suggest that men sponsored more foreign aid bills than women in the 110th Congress. That is, the table 4

shows that out of 50 bills examined, nine were sponsored by women, whereas 41 were sponsored by men. In other words, 82 percent of these foreign aid bills were sponsored by men, while only 18 percent were sponsored by women. These results reject our hypothesis that women are more likely to sponsor more foreign aid bills. The findings challenge Poggione's (2004) conclusion that women hold more liberal preferences on welfare policy than their male colleagues (2004).

TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics of the Gender of Sponsors of Foreign aid Bills Introduced of the 110th Congress

Sponsor Gender	Number of Sponsors by gender	Percentage of Sponsor by gender
Female	9	18.0
Male	41	82.0

Additionally, in the 110th Congress, the Democratic Party controlled both the House with 233 seats and the Senate with 51 seats. As consequence we expect the majority of these foreign aid bills to be enacted because with the majority in both chambers, Democrats can use the legislative structure and process to shape the appropriation. Yet, the results in table 5 show that only eight percent of the foreign aid bills examined were enacted, two percent passed the Senate and the House, 40 percent passed the House only, 12 percent passed the Senate only, and 38 percent died in the

reported committee. Contrary to our expectation, although the Democrats have the majority in both chambers, the results maintain that only eight percent of the foreign aid bills examined were enacted. These results suggest therefore that the Democratic Party's control in Congress did not guarantee that all or at least the majority of foreign aid bills introduced in Congress will be enacted. The findings reject also the hypothesis that the United States foreign aid increases when Congress is controlled by the Democrats.

TABLE 5. Descriptive Statistics of the Final Status of Foreign aid Bills at the end of the 110th Congress.

Status of the bill at the end of the 110 th Congress	Number of bills at each stage of legislative process	Percentage of bills at each stage of legislative process
Referred / reported	19	38.0
Passed Senate only	6	12.0
Passed House only	20	40.0
passed Senate and House only	1	2.0
Enacted	4	8.0

One explanation to the fact that only few foreign aid bills were enacted while the Democratic Party controlled both the House and the Senate is that the lawmaking process

is becoming unorthodox. In reality, there are many different explanations to why foreign aid bills introduced in Congress failed to be enacted; however, in this chapter, the focus is exclusively on the unorthodox lawmaking process. That having been said, a case study will follow on foreign aid legislation H. R. 4637 to determine whether it followed the unorthodox lawmaking process.

Case study

In her book *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*, Sinclair (2007) affirmed that the legislative process on major legislations has changed since the early 1970s and is now regularly characterized by a variety of what were once unorthodox practices and procedures. Sinclair highlighted that in the Senate, the real possibility of filibuster shapes the process, making it necessary for the majority leader to build an oversized coalition through negotiation. She argued that for major legislation, the final conference agreement has to be worked out by a much larger and more diverse group of members than 1970. Sinclair maintained that the legislative process is now bifurcated to a considerable extent. Furthermore, she affirmed that rather than being sent to one committee in each chamber, many measures are considered by several committees, especially in the House, while some measures bypass committees altogether. Also, Sinclair continued that omnibus measures of great scope are regularly part of the legislative scene and formal executive congressional summits to work out deals on legislations are no longer considered extraordinary. She explained that certainly the increase in workload, the alteration in the political social environment, and the

strategic behavior of parties and members as individual were determinant in the changed in the legislative process. In this case study of H. R. 4637 which became Public Law No: 100-461, we are going to investigate whether the legislation of foreign aid bill follows the unorthodox lawmaking process described by Sinclair.

H. R. 4637: Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989

Instead of being introduced in the House first, H. R. 4637 sponsored by Representative David R. Obey from Wisconsin 7th congressional district, was referred to House Committee on Appropriations and Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on February 18, 1988. The subcommittee hearings were held respectively on March 2, and April 28, 1988. On May 5, 1988, the subcommittee mark-up was held and the legislation was forwarded by the subcommittee to the full committee. The committee consideration and mark-up session was held on May 19, 1988 and the legislation was reported to the House by the House Committee on Appropriations under the name of Report No: 100-641. It was placed on Union Calendar No: 379. Five days later, on May 24, 1988, the Committee on Rules granted a rule waiving all points of order against specified provisions of the bill. In the House, a total of seven amendments proposed to the bill were referred to Committee of the Whole. However, only four among these amendments passed in Committee of the Whole by voice vote. The House agreed to amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole, and the amendments passed the House (328–90). At this stage of legislation some aspect of the legislative process are consistent with

Sinclair observation that rather than being sent to one committee in each chamber, many measures are considered by several committees, especially in the House. In other words, there is evidence that in the House, more than one committee (House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, and Committee on Rules) were involved in the legislative process of H.R. 4637.

H. R. 4637 was received in the Senate, read twice and referred to the Committee on Appropriations on May 26, 1988. On Jun 20, the subcommittee on Foreign Operations approved for full committee consideration with amendments favorably. The Committee on Appropriations reported H. R. 4637 with its amendments to Senate under report No. 100-395 on July 22 and it was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders Calendar No. 755. On July 7, 1988, 32 amendments were added to the bill. It was presented to the Senate with unanimous consent and passed the Senate (76-15). Just as in the House, in the Senate, there was more than one committee (Committee on Appropriations, subcommittee on Foreign Operations) involved in the legislative process before it was presented to the Senate for vote. Thus, the legislative process of H.R. 4637 in the Senate is also consistent with Sinclair's observation that legislation is sent to more than one committee.

The House disagreed with the Senate amendments by voice vote. In order to find a consensus, both chambers appointed their conference committee members. The Senate conference committee included Senators Dennis DeConcini, Daniel K. Inouye, John C. Stennis, Patrick Leahy, Don Nickles, Mark O. Hatfield, Frank R. Lautenberg, Warren B. Rudman, Al D'Amato, Bob Kasten, Tom Harkin, Ted Stevens, and Steve Symms. The House conference committee included Representatives Don Edwards, Richard H.

Lehman, Julian C. Dixon, Jerry Lewis, John Edward Porter, Kenneth J. Gray, Silvio O. Conte, Jamie L. Whitten, David R. Obey, and Matthew F. McHugh. Although, the Senate conference committee appears to include more members than the House conference committee, both are composed of a larger and more diverse group members. This is consistent with Sinclair's argument that for major legislation, the final conference agreement has to be worked out by a much larger and more diverse group of members since the 1970s is consistent because of the composition of the conference committee of H. R. 4637. Also, the sponsor of the bill, Representative Obey, was also part of the conference committee.

Conference Report 100-983 was filed in House on September 26, 1988 and the Rules Committee Resolution H.Res.554 was reported to House two days later, on September 28, 1988. The House receded and concurred in all Senate amendments and agreed to conference report (327- 92) the same day. The next day, conference papers on House action was presented to the Senate. On September 30, the Senate concurred in certain House amendments to Senate amendments, and agreed to certain House amendments to the Senate amendments. Afterward, a message on Senate action was sent again to the House. Among these amendments, the House agreed only to the amendment 119. However, it disagreed to Senate Amendments 176 and 182. Following these actions by the House, a message on the House action was sent back to the Senate who signed it. On October 1, 1988, H. R. 4637 was signed by the president and became Public Law No: 100-461.

In sum, this case study H. R. 4637 followed an unorthodox lawmaking processes. That is, the legislative process of H. R. 4637 illustrates some characteristics consistent

with the unorthodox lawmaking processes described by Sinclair. First, in both chambers (Senate, House), instead of being sent to one committee, H. R. 4637 was reported to different committees that took many different measures. In other words, there was more than one committee involved in the legislative process before it was presented for vote. Second, both the Senate conference committee and the House conference committee included diverse group members. In conference committee, H.R. 4637 was worked out by a larger and more diverse group of members just like Sinclair described the unorthodox lawmaking process. Third, Representative Obey who was the sponsor of the bill, was also appointed in the House conference committees. Finally the presence of many conflicting amendments within and between both chambers means that there were disagreements between the House and the Senate, among Senators and among Representatives and therefore much compromise had to be made in order find a consensus on the legislation.

Conclusion

Consistent with previous work examining the relationship between political parties and foreign assistance, the findings suggest that the Democrats are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills. These findings confirm Therien and Noel's (2000) argument that leftist parties, in particular, contribute to the increase of country's level of foreign aid. Furthermore, our findings that the northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills confirm Jewell's (2009) conclusion that in recent years many southern members of Congress, viewed as the contestant of internationalism have begun to challenge some of the administration foreign policies,

particularly foreign aid. However, our findings that in Congress, men sponsor more foreign aid bills than women challenged previous studies which concluded that female legislators at all levels of American government are more likely to support and promote women's issues (Burrell 1994). These findings challenge also Poggione's (2004) conclusion that women hold more liberal preferences on welfare policy than their male colleagues. Moreover, our conclusion that the Republican Party majority in the Senate and the House does not guarantee the decrease of the United States Official Development Assistance (ODA) challenges Fleck and Kilby's (2001) argument that the advent of the Republican controlled Congress has eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid. Additionally, the conclusion that the ideologies of the chairmen of the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations do not seem to influence the Official Development Assistance the United States gives every year challenges Reeves' (1993) argument that the manner in which the committees in Congress are organized and operate is shaped not only the chairs political ideologies and goals, but also by their personal policy.

This research has some limitations. First, to test the third, fourth and fifth hypotheses, the research looked at foreign aid bills introduced only in one congressional year. Second, the research examined only 50 foreign aid bills, which is a small sample. The data indicate an increase of U.S. Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending from 2003 to 2009. This increase can be explained by American conflicts abroad, most precisely the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the War on Terror, and the War on Drugs. In fact, since September 11, 2001, the United States has been involved in all these wars, which increase foreign aid spending. These wars have impacted U.S. foreign aid spending because the United States spent trillions of dollars in order to find or

to protect its allies, to protect its strategic interests, and to support its troops on battlefields. For example, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the United States more than three trillion dollars. Also, in order to fight the War on Terror, the United States became ally with countries such as Pakistan, which come to be since then, one of the top recipients of the U.S. Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance. Furthermore, because Americans believe that there is a relationship between drug trafficking, organized crimes, drug-violent conflicts, and terrorist group's activities around the world, they are involved in the War on Drugs around the world. In other words, the United States allocates more aid to governments in drug trafficking countries so that they can successfully fight drug producing and trafficking. All these reasons may explain why the U.S. ODA spending from 2003 to 2009 increased substantially.

Chapter 4

Foreign Lobbying

Introduction

On February 2, 2011, ABC News reported that the dramatic events that started in Egypt on January 25, 2011, which have left a coterie of top Washington lobbyists quietly scurrying to respond to the unexpected developments in the nation they represent, caught off guard by the apparent end to President Hosni Mubarak's long reign (ABC News, 2011). This report raises many questions such as how will top Washington lobbyists be affected by the end of President Hosni Mubarak's reign in Egypt? Is there a relationship between Mubarak's government and these lobbyists? Moreover, this recent news report highlights the extent of foreign states' lobbying practices in American domestic politics.

This chapter will examine what the recipient countries do to become eligible for U. S. foreign aid, which provides a third perspective and analysis on how and why U.S. foreign aid is disbursed. That is, this chapter will examine foreign lobbying by investigating the actions recipient countries take so they can obtain U.S. development assistance. This chapter will use exclusively a case study approach and will examine a set of hypotheses. Research on case studies has some advantages. In contrast to statistical analysis that provides limited information, case studies examine or investigate specific behavior, events, or phenomenon and give much more in depth and complete information. Thus, case studies provide rich explanation and as a result, enrich our understanding of the behavior, events, or phenomenon in question. With these in depth

and complete information, case studies allow researchers to make a connection between quantitative and qualitative research or to complement a quantitative analysis with a case study. Furthermore, case studies capture well the leading factors as well as the causal patterns of the cases and may contribute to the development of different theory. Research on case studies has also some weaknesses. That is, case studies are tricky to generalize because the implication captured in case studies depend on the subjective explanation of the individual or specific case, leading therefore to an impermanent theory. It is also difficult to generalize the outcome of case studies because they may reveal solely the interest of the researchers or be guided or shaped by the historical data available to the investigator. Furthermore, each individual case provides alternative causal patterns, limiting its generalization to a particular framework. The personal unknown biases can also shape the outcome of a case study making it less credible. (Georges, 1979).

Previous studies on foreign lobbying have extensively examined how foreign lobby influences American foreign policy. As was noted in the literature review, chapter one, scholars such as Hocking (1991) explained that frequently, lobbyists are hired simply to provide information which would not otherwise be available to foreigners and to suggest strategies leading to the achievement of specific purposes. For Moon (1988), with the rise of interdependence, transnational lobbying has emerged as an important instrument of bilateral bargaining among nations. He claimed that weak actors may indirectly influence the policy- making of the strong by coalition formation or grassroots mobilization, exploiting mutual interests, or ideological and ethnic tie. Moon explained that the weak may appeal to ideological and ethnic ties in a target country because ethnic ties and cultural connectedness provide the weak with an additional means of access to

domestic actors of the target country, especially at the grassroots level. Likewise, while investigating the relationship between foreign aid allocation and lobbying by ethnic groups Haglund and Kertzer (2008) affirmed that American foreign policy is subject to influence associated with ethnic diasporas. Further studies on foreign lobbying concluded that foreign lobbying groups have tremendous influence on Congress. Szabo (2009) argued that Congress in particular magnifies the importance and impact of lobbies to the point that coherent realist policy is not likely to be achieved. He emphasized that this vulnerability has been fully exploited by foreign interests who hire high-priced lobbyists and media consultants who work the system as effectively as domestic lobbyists. These findings and conclusions lead to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The countries that receive U. S. foreign aid are affiliated to American lobbying firms whose staffs include former members of Congress, campaign advisors and officials in the United States government and foreign government relations offices. This hypothesis is consistent with Glickman and Woodward's (1989) conclusion that foreign lobbyists have been joined by former presidential advisors, members of Congress, military officials, and others who work directly for the governmental relations office of foreign companies or for industry groups.

Hypothesis 2: The countries that receive U. S. foreign aid are affiliated to more than one lobbying firm. This hypothesis squares with Husted's (1991) findings that foreign lobbyists may be natural allies of one or more domestic groups.

These two hypotheses will be tested through a case study on Egypt. Egypt was chosen because it is among the leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and has been among

the top ten recipients of the United States Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2007, 2008, and 2009 which was also part of the dataset in chapter two. This case study will study Egypt's efforts and the extent to which Egypt used U.S. domestic lobbyists to advance Egypt's national interests in the United States. The data are collected from foreign lobby influence tracker (Sunlight Foundation, 2011), Lexis Nexis, online newspaper articles, the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt's website,(American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011) and Opensecret.org (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011).

Egypt

The historic Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 has been the foundation of the U.S. Egypt relations. The signature of this historical peace treaty was preceded by the 1978 Camp David Accords which took place at Camp David, between Egypt and Israel, on September 17, 1978 under the supervision of the United States. The vital significance of this treaty is that it resulted in an immediate allocation of United States aid to Egypt. Since this Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, Egypt has always been among the countries recipients of United States ODA. However, nearly 30 years later, this treaty does not explain by itself why Egypt has been among the top ten recipients of the United States ODA in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The argument in this chapter is that in order to become eligible for U.S. foreign aid, Egypt lobbies members of Congress, Congressional staff, officials in the executive branch and foreign relations offices, and military officials on issues and legislation related to foreign aid. A full research of Lexis Nexis and other sources revealed that Egypt used lobbying as primary strategy to advance its national interest in the United States. That is, the search showed that Egypt was affiliated with the

following U.S. domestic lobbying firms: the PLM Group, Patton Boggs, and Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter and Associates (CLS & Associates). The search revealed also that Egypt used the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt to lobby for Egypt's national interests in the United States.

First, this chapter looks at the PLM Group because it played a central role that contributed to the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt in 2008, and 2009. Furthermore, Egypt used the PLM Group to improve its relationship with the United States. In 2007, the government of Egypt and the PLM Group signed an agreement stipulating that Egypt will use the PLM Group for its strategic lobbying services. In recompense, Egypt will pay some fee to the PLM Group for its services and expenses. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). Second, this chapter looks at CLS & Associates because Egypt used it for its image-building in the United States in 2009. Third, we focus on the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt in 2007, 2008, and 2009. It was central to the trade, economic, technique partnership and relation between Egypt and the United States. Finally, the chapter looks at the lobbying firm Patton Boggs because in 2008 and 2009, Egypt's government used it to handle the legal litigations hindering the success of Egypt's lobbying and to advance Egyptian national interest in the United States.

Why Egypt used the PLM Group

Egypt used the PLM Group to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States for many reasons. First, Egypt used the PLM Group because the PLM Group is formed by Livingston Group, Podesta Group, and Moffett Group (Private Public Solutions LLC), three well organized and strong American lobbying groups that emerged together in 2007. Second, Egypt used the PLM Group because its leaders and members have strong political skills and background. For example, Bob Livingston, Tony Podesta, and Toby Moffett, who are co-chairs of the PLM Group, are former Congressmen and campaign advisors. Toby Moffett, the chair of Moffett Group, served in U.S. House of Representatives for nearly eight years. Between 1975 and 1983, he was the Representative of Connecticut's 6th congressional district. Anthony T. Podesta, chair of Podesta Group, has been campaign advisor of many former Congressmen such as Patrick Murphy, Joe Sestak, and Chris Carney. Bob Livingston, is a former House Representative who, from 1995 to 1999, chaired the Appropriations Committee and was in line to become Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Unfortunately he resigned because of guilt of an affair he had. It clearly appears that the three co-chairs are important and powerful figures in American politics (Eggen, 2011; Nation, 2011; Memmott, 2011; Stone, 2007; Good, 2011; Birnbaum, 2007; Lichtblau, 2011; Overby, 2011; and Elliott, 2011)

Egypt used also the PLM Group because the PLM Group has hundreds of clients around the world. These clients include but are not limited to foreign countries such as Egypt, Kenya; automotive industries such as Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Honda North America, and BMW North America; and commercial companies such as AT&T Inc,

Wal-Mart Stores, eBay Inc, JPMorgan Chase & Co, and Coca-Cola Co. Thus, Egypt used the PLM Group because it is well organized American lobbying firms that could successfully advance Egypt's national interest in the United States. (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011; Birnbaum, 2007; and Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Good, 2011; Gura, 2011; Lichtblau, 2011; Overby, 2011; Elliott, 2011).

The PLM Group lobbying on behalf of Egypt

Between 2007 and 2009, Egypt used the PLM Group to lobby nearly 1,873 U.S. policymakers, officials in the government, and military officials in the national interest of Egypt. In 2007, Egypt used the PLM Group to perform lobbying activities that focused principally on U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. That is, the mission of the PLM Group was to guarantee the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt for the 2008 Fiscal Year. In order to attain this goal, Egypt used the PLM Group to interact with various members of Congress and Congress staff in order to lobby them to support the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to the government of Egypt in 2008. Egypt used the PLM Group to target a number of key players in Congress, most precisely Congressmen who served on the Committee on Appropriations. For example, in October 2007, Toby Moffett known as Egypt's U.S. lobbyist and a member of the PLM Group met with Rosa L. DeLauro, a Congresswoman from Connecticut. On behalf of the government of Egypt, Moffett discussed during the meeting with DeLauro the legislative status of the proposed U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. At the time, Representative Rosa L. DeLauro was co-chair of the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and a member of the Committee on Appropriations. Based on her committee assignments and the leadership role she plays in her party, one can affirm that she had the power to

influence foreign aid legislation and distribution. Thus, Moffett lobbied Representative Rosa L. DeLauro so that she can influence the legislation regarding U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year in the interest of Egypt and to convince her colleagues to support the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt for the 2008 Fiscal Year. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Bloomberg, 2011; Memmott, 2011; Stone, 2007; Good, 2011; Gura, 2011; Lichtblau, 2011; Overby, 2011; and Elliott, 2011).

Furthermore, Egypt used Moffet to lobby many other members of Congress on the same program, U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. Moffett met with Congressman David Price, and Congressman Nita Lowey to talk about the legislative status of the proposed U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. Just like Rosa L. DeLauro, Representatives David Price and Nita Lowey were also serving at the time in the House Committee on Appropriations. Egypt used Toby Moffet to contact Congress staff as well. In the month of November 2007, Moffett e-mailed both Julie Nickson, and Ven Neralla, respectively chief of staff and legislative director in the office of Representative Barbara Lee. The purpose of these e-mails was to check the legislative status of the proposed U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. Representative Barbara Lee was at the time a member of the House Committee on Appropriations. While Egypt was using Moffet to lobby Representatives in the House Committee on Appropriations, it was also using Miner, another member of the PLM Group, to lobby members of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. For example, in the month of November 2007, on behalf of the government of Egypt, Miner met with Joel Rubin, legislative assistant in Senator Franklin Lautenberg's office, to discuss the legislative status of the proposed U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year. Senator

Franklin Lautenberg was serving in Senate Committee on Appropriations in the 110th Congress. It appears that in order to guarantee that Egypt will be beneficiary of U.S. foreign aid program for the 2008 Fiscal Year, Egypt's government used the PLM Group to target and lobby Representatives and Senators who serve respectively in the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Also, in 2009, Egypt used Moffet to lobby, Anna Eshoo, Betty McCillum, and Barbara Lee to discuss U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. Representatives Betty McCillum and Barbara Lee were serving in the House Committee on Appropriations at the time (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Memmott, 2011; Stone, 2007; Good, 2011; Gura, 2011; Lichtblau, 2011; and Elliott, 2011).

One of the factors that appears to determine the allocation of foreign aid is the relationship that exists between the donor and the recipient country. That is, donor will be more likely to allocate aid to countries that have a good relationship with them. In other words, to expect U.S. foreign aid, a country must at least have a good relationship with the United States. Thus, in order to be eligible for U.S. foreign aid, Egypt used PLM Group's staff to maintain and improve its relationship with the United States. For example, in October 2007, Andrew Kauders, member of the PLM Group called and e-mailed Andrew Row and Janna Swamidos about U. S. and Egypt relations. At the time, Andrew Row was Senator Patty Murray's legislative aide, while Janna Swamidos was Senator Inouye Daniel's legislative assistant. Egypt used also the PLM Group to lobby for the establishment and maintenance of a military relationship and partnership between Egypt and the United States. In January 2008, Egypt used Dana Bauer, a member of the PLM Group to contact U.S. military officials concerning respectively the U.S security

assistance to Egypt and Egypt and U.S military partnership. More precisely, on behalf of Egypt's government, Dana Bauer emailed both the former ambassador of United States to Egypt, Frank Ricciardone, and Jim Beatty, Cdr. Chief of Sea Forces Division - U.S. Office of Military Cooperation Cairo, about U.S military aid to Egypt. Additionally, in the month of April 2008, she contacted Jim Beatty twice. The discussions focused on the allocation and increase of U.S. military aid to Egypt and a visit of senior Egyptian military officers in the United States, most precisely Washington. Moreover, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy, Egypt's Minister of Defense at the time visited Washington and Florida in March 2008. During the visit, he was accompanied by the members of the PLM Group to all his meetings. He met with former, Vice President Cheney, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense. Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy met also with the CentCom Commander, Commander Admiral William Joseph Fallon during his visit at the U.S. CentCom Headquarters located in Florida. His discussions with these officials in the executive branch and Commander Fallon focused on U.S-Egypt relations, U.S. military assistance to Egypt, and the military partnership between both countries. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Chatterjee, 2011; Inside Egypt, 2008, Egyptian Press and Information, 2011; Elliott, 2011).

In addition to lobbying for military assistance, Egypt used the PLM Group to organize the visit of senior Egyptian military officers in Washington. During the visit, the Egyptian military officers have had the opportunity to participate in various meetings and to meet and lobby in the national interest of Egypt many Congressmen and U.S. officials at the Middle East Program, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which is a think tank. To ease the lobbying process for military officers, Egypt used the

personnel of the PLM Group to accompany them at their meetings and to introduce them to U.S. policymakers and officials. For example, upon their arrival in Washington, the senior Egyptian military officers were accompanied by Tony Podesta to their meeting with Senator Diane Feinstein and Representative Marcy Kaptur. They were also accompanied by Dana Bauer to meet Jon Alterman and Haim Malka who were respectively Senior Director and Deputy Director of Middle East Program, the CSIS. In fact, Bauer's mission was to help Egypt interact with think tanks. This meeting was very important to Egypt given its key role in Middle East regional security. One can argue that the purpose of this meeting was about security policy and military assistance Egypt needed from the United States in order to maintain peace and security in Middle East. The most interesting evidence that there is a relationship between Egyptian officers visit and Egypt lobby for U.S military assistance is the fact that a few days after the meeting between the military officers and Jon Alterman, Egypt used the PLM Group to contact many members of Congress, and Congressional staffs regarding Egypt's interest in maintaining security on its border. It seems that there is a relationship between the visit of the senior military officers at Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Egypt government's project to maintain security on its border. The argument here is that Egypt sent its senior military officers to learn about the appropriate military strategies Egypt can implement in Middle East. Thus, knowing the appropriate strategy for Egypt allowed the government of Egypt to develop a suitable lobbying agenda that shaped their lobbying on military assistance (Sunlight Foundation, 2011 and International Committee of the Fourth International, 2011; Chatterjee, 2011; Inside Egypt, 2008; Egyptian Press and Information 2011; Elliott, 2011).

A lot of scholars found the human rights practices and the respect of democracy principles are factors determining the distribution of U. S. foreign aid. That is, Poe and Meernik (1995), and Apodaca and Stohl's (1999) found that there is a positive relationship between foreign aid allocations and human rights performance. Also Travis's (1995) concluded that there is a strong positive relationship between economic support fund aid and democratic standards. That having been said, there is evidence that Egypt used the PLM Group to lobby officials in the executive branch and foreign relations offices on the human rights practice in Egypt. For example, Dana Bauer who is also a member of the PLM Group called Ryan Casteel, Egypt desk officer in the bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Department of State, in order to talk about the human rights practices in Egypt. In fact, Freedom House classified Egypt as a not free state in both 2006 and 2007. Also in 2006 and 2007, based on the view of Amnesty International, Gibney et al. attributed the Political Terror Score of four to Egypt. Meanwhile, based on the view of the U.S. State Department, they attributed Egypt the Political Terror Scores of four in 2006 and three in 2007 meaning that the country experienced torture, murders, and disappearances as well as an extreme violation of both political and civil rights. As consequence, in order to penalize Egypt for the violation of democracy and human rights principles, Congress passed in 2007 a law allowing the withdrawal of \$ 100 million of dollars from the U.S. aid to Egypt every year. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Freedom House 2011; Gibney, Cornett, and Wood, 2011; Eggen, 2010, Anarchitex, 2011; Overby, 2011; Elliott, 2011; Gibney, 2010; and Nation, 2011).

Likewise, in 2008 and 2009, based on the view of the U.S State Department, Gibney et al. attributed Egypt an identical Political Terror Score of three. For Amnesty

International, they attributed Egypt an identical Political Terror Score of four. Also, Freedom House classified Egypt as a non free country in 2008 and 2009. From this point, it clearly appears that human rights and democracy principles are being violated in Egypt. This means that the 2007 law allowing the withdrawal of an amount of \$ 100 million of dollars from U.S. annual aid to Egypt because of the violation of human rights was still in effect. To solve this issue, in 2009, Egypt used lobbyist Ashley Coulanges, a member of the PLM Group to contact the staffers of the following members of Congress, George Miller, Steve Rothman, and Senators John Kerry, Jack Reed, and Byron Dorgan in order to set an appointment between these Congressmen and the Egyptian Human Rights delegation. In fact, the government of Egypt was aware of the violation of human rights and democracy principles in Egypt. Hence, knowing that the practice of human rights and democracy principles are important factors determining the distribution of U. S. foreign aid, and wanting to avoid having its aid cut, Egypt hired the PLM Group to lobby members of Congress, and officials in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, Labor Department, and the State Department. Here, the evidence demonstrates that Egypt's lobbying does not only target a particular group of people, but also focuses on specific issues such as violation of democratic and human rights principles that can negatively affect U.S. aid to Egypt. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011, Freedom House 2011; Gibney, Cornett, and Wood, 2011; Eggen, 2010; Anarchitex, 2011; Overby, 2011; Elliott, 2011; Gibney, 2010; and Nation, 2011).

Furthermore, Egypt used the PLM Group to introduce various members of Egyptian government to U.S. Congressmen and officials and accompanied them to their meetings. For example, in November 2007, Moffett met separately with Representatives

Shelley Berkley, Betty McCollum, and Joe Pitts. During these meetings, Moffett introduced Fayza Abounaga, the Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation, to these Congressmen. Furthermore, Tony Podesta, co-chair of the PLM Group, accompanied Fayza Abounaga to her appointment with Representative Pete Visclosky from Indiana's 1st congressional district. In April 2008, Moffet accompanied Aboul Gheit, Egyptian Foreign Minister at the time, to meet the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This meeting gave the opportunity to Aboul Gheit to meet many Congressmen. She met Representatives Nita Lowey, Howard Berman, Gary Ackerman, Gene Green, Sheila Jackson Lee, Ron Klein, Donald Payne, and Ileana Rose-Lehtinen with whom she discussed the status of U.S. Egypt relations and plead for the continuation of U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt. Aboul Gheit has had the opportunity to increase both his network in Washington DC and the number of supporter of U.S. aid to Egypt in Congress. The argument is that having more pro-Egypt foreign aid in Congress will guarantee the allocation of aid to Egypt despite the violation of human rights and democracy principles within the country. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Inside Egypt, 2008; Good, 2011; Lichtblau, 2011; Overby, 2011; Elliott, 2011).

The PLM Group received payments from the government of Egypt in form of fee. Between 2007 and 2009, the government of Egypt made six payments of \$277,500.00 to the PLM Group for all its lobbying activities in the national interest of Egypt. The government of Egypt made also individual payment to two of the three groups that emerged to form the PLM Group. That is, in 2009, Egypt made two payments of \$144,000.00 and \$72,000.00 to Moffett Group (Private Public Solutions LLC) and one payment of \$138,000.00 to the Livingston Group. In this same line of idea, Eggen (2010)

reported that between 2006 and 2009, Egypt has increased its spending on U.S. lobbying from \$214,000 to \$1.5 million. The evidence discussed demonstrates that one of Egypt's lobbying strategies is to increase both its network in Washington and the number of supporters, of U.S. assistance to Egypt, in Congress. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that lobbying firms working on behalf and in the interest of Egypt receive payments from the government of Egypt (Eggen, 2010; Good, 2011, and Sunlight Foundation and ProPublica, 2011 Lichtblau, 2011; Gura, 2011; Overby, 2011, Elliott, 2011).

American Chamber of Commerce

Egypt used the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt to lobby members of Congress, Congress staff, officials in the executive branch. In 2007, 2008, and 2009, Egypt used the visit of American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt's delegation to the United States to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States. For example, from March 11 to March 20, 2007, and in November 2007, Egypt used the visits of two delegations of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt to respectively in Washington DC and Houston to do both lobbying and business in the interest of Egypt. The delegation that went to Washington met more than one hundred Congressmen, U.S. Officials, and powerful businessmen and interest group's leaders. During their conversations and meetings in Washington, the delegates lobbied in the interest of Egyptian government and businesses by positively talking about the U. S. and Egypt's economic and trade relations. The delegates pointed out also that Egypt is experiencing a

successful economic development due to the positive political and economic reforms adopted by the government since 2004. In order to convince Congressmen, officials in the government, and businesses leaders that Egypt is experiencing a flourishing economic development, the delegates presented data and various cases concerning Egypt's development. Most importantly, on behalf of Egypt, these delegates talked frequently about the importance of the continuation of U.S. aid to Egypt. Overall, although some Congressmen and officials in the government seemed concern about the practice of human rights and democracy principles in Egypt, many other reassured the delegation that Egypt is still a good friend of the United States and that the United States assistance to Egypt will continue. (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011; Reema, 2007; Zaid, 2011; Egyptian Press and Information Office, 2010).

In November 2007, Egypt used the business visit of the delegation of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt in Houston Texas to lobby business leaders to invest in Egypt. The delegates were invited by Sheila Jackson-Lee who was representing the 18th district of Texas in the House. Just like during previous visits in Washington, whether it is during one-on-one or group meetings, the delegates talked constantly about the recent successful economics and politics reform as well as the existence of economic opportunity in Egypt. For example, at a lunch hosted by the Chamber of Commerce in Egypt the delegates had the opportunity to meet and talk with nearly 200 businesses leaders in Texas. The former secretary of state James A. Baker, a powerful figure in American politics, was present at the lunch and was the key speaker. During the lunch, the leader of the delegation gave Baker an honorary membership. (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011; Reema, 2007; Egyptian Press and Information Office, 2010).

Also, during a dinner organized by the CEO of Energy Allied International (EAI), later that same day, Representative Jackson-Lee declared that the aim of the whole visit was to strengthen Egyptian-US relations. She also received an honorary membership in the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. As important political figures in Washington, Baker and Jackson-Lee have political skills and the capacity to increase the number of Egyptian supporters in Washington. The argument here is that Egypt used Baker and Jackson-Lee's membership in the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt as a means to expand the number of Egypt supporters in Washington. More importantly, in his speech, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt talked about the ongoing development in Egypt and called for the continuation of Egyptian-U.S. relations. (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011; Egyptian Press and Information Office 2009, 2010; Zaid, 2011).

Egypt used the visit of the delegation of American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt in Washington, from April 7 to April 11, 2008, to lobby for the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) Agreement. Four year earlier, in December 2004, Egypt and the United States signed the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) Agreement. This bilateral agreement gives the opportunity to a number of manufactures in certain zone in Egypt to sell their products in the United States without having to pay quotas. At nearly 90 meetings, these delegates had the opportunity to talk with members of Congress, Congressional staffs, and officials in the executive branch. At these meetings, on behalf of Egypt, the delegates lobbied Senators and Representatives to support and expand this program to many other areas and zone in Egypt. Five of the 90 meetings were with Senators, 37 with different Representatives, and 12 with a range of officials in the

executive branch. They also talked about the political, strategic, and economical historical role played by Egypt in the Arab World with the aim to convince the Senators and Representatives to assist Egypt in its politics in Middle East (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011; Daily NewsEgypt, 2009; Egyptian Press and Information Office, 2009, 2011; Zaid, 2011).

In his speech at Cairo University, Egypt, in June 2009 President Obama called for the reprise of a good economic politics and education partnership between the United States and the Arab World. Aware of Obama administration's openness to partnerships with the Arab World, Egypt used the visit of the delegation of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt in Washington, from June 22 to 26, 2009, to lobby American policymakers and officials to favor the allocation of U.S. assistance to Egypt, in areas such as education, commerce, market development and technology. During the visit, on behalf of Egypt, the delegates met powerful figures in the Obama administration, particularly U.S. secretary of commerce, Gary Locke. As a result, at the meeting, Gary Locke acknowledged that the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt has been a strong lobbyist on behalf of Egyptian business community and a key player in the U.S-Egypt relations and promised to contribute to the consolidation of U.S-Egypt relations and partnerships (American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, 2011; Embassy of Egypt Washington DC, 2008; Shokry, 2009; Zaid, 2011; Egyptian Press and Information Office, 2010; Business Council for International Understanding, 2009).

Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter & Associates lobby on behalf of Egypt

In 2009, Egypt used Chlopa, Leonard, Schechter & Associates (CLS & Associates) for Egypt's image-building in the United States. Egypt chose CLS & Associates for many reasons. First, as a corporate communications and public affairs firm, CLS & Associates work include, but is not limited to public affairs, global public relations, crisis communications, image building international political consulting. CLS & Associates is known for its capacity to change its target audience opinion on important and critical issues and to solve various types of problems. Second, CLS & Associates has hundreds of clients among which can be cite the governments of countries such Brazil, Egypt Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Georgia, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal; the organization such as American Red Cross, Americans for Secure Retirement, United Nations Development Program, and United Nations Foundation. Third, Egypt chose CLS & Associates because its team includes former congressional campaign advisor, executive and deputy Director in congressional campaign, and communication specialist who have the skills necessary to build a positive image of Egypt in the United States. For example, Robert Chlopak, a member of CLS & Associates, held the office Executive Director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and Deputy Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Charles Leonard, another member of CLS & Associates, was in 1988 George Bush's senior campaign advisor. Eggen (2011) reported that Egyptian government and agencies pay firm such as CLS & Associates, for a variety of public relations work (Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter and Associates, 2011; Memmott, James, 2011; Connelly, 2011; Mungai, 2011; U.S. Department of Justice, 2009; McCauley, 2011; Elliott, 2011; and Eggen, 2011)

In 2009, Egypt did not use CLS & Associates to directly lobby for U.S. assistance to Egypt; instead, Egypt used CLS & Associates to lobby for Egypt's image-building. Egypt used CLS & Associates to lobby American news media such ABC News, NBC News, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, USA Today, Dallas Morning News, New York Times, Reuters, National Journal, Business Week so that they can provide good advertisement on Egypt and portray Egypt as a good friend of Americans. Egypt's main purpose was to inform the population about the visits and activities of members of Egypt government in Washington. Thus, on behalf of Egypt, CLS & Associates has to convince these types of communications media to positively shape American perception of Egypt. Even if this lobbying technique employed by Egypt does not directly focus on U.S. Egypt relations, and U.S. assistance to Egypt, at least, it produces an indirect impact on public opinion, which is a key factor influencing American foreign policy. The argument here is that a positive public opinion on U.S. Egypt relations may positively impact U.S aid to Egypt as well as U.S. policies penalizing Egypt for the violation of human rights and democracy principles. For example, in December 2009, Laura Hosny, an employee of CLS & Associates e-mailed all the various types of communications media cited above regarding, the former Egypt's Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry, Rachid Mohamed Rachid, visit in the United States. Overall, Egypt used CLS & Associates to contact these different types of communication media so that the media describes this visit as a symbol of U.S. Egypt relations in order to shape positively American public opinion on Egypt. Just like the PLM Group, CLS & Associates received payments from the government of Egypt as recompense for its Egypt's image-building services. In 2009, the government of Egypt paid an amount of \$45,000 to CLS &

Associates every month. The evidence shows that Egyptian lobbying includes Egypt's image-building. More precisely, Egyptian lobbying used image-building as tool to shape American public opinion on Egypt and to indirectly influence American foreign policy towards Egypt (Sunlight Foundation, 2011; Memmott, James, 2011; Connelly, 2011; Mungai, 2011; McCauley, 2011; Elliott, 2011; and Nation, 2010).

Patton Boggs

In 2008 and 2009, Egypt used also Patton Boggs to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States. First, Egypt used Patton Boggs because it is the American domestic lobbying firm that is tie Democratic Party. Second, the team of Patton Boggs includes but is not limited to former Senators, State Department officials and ambassadors. The firm includes also hundreds of lawyers. Egypt used Patton Boggs to lobby for U.S. military assistance and partnership and to advance and protect the interests of Egyptian businesses in the United States. Patton Boggs reported that the government of Egypt hired it to work with and lobby for the Egypt Economic Development Agencies and Egyptian military. Often, while confronted with legal problem such as violation of democracy and human rights principles, Egypt uses Patton Boggs to handle the issue in the way that advance the national interests of Egypt (International Committee of the Fourth International, 2011, Bennett, 2011; Martin,2011; Fisk, 2011; Stolberg, 2011; and Baxter, 2011).

Discussion and Conclusion

The case study provides a general understating of Egypt's efforts and the extent to which Egypt used U.S. domestic lobbyists to advance Egypt's national interest in the

United States. The evidence demonstrates that Egypt was affiliated with at least three American lobbying firms. That is, Egypt government used the PLM Group, CLS & Associates, and Patton Boggs to advance Egypt's national interest. These findings confirm both the hypothesis that the countries that receive U. S. foreign aid are affiliated to more than one lobbying firm and Husted's (1991) findings that foreign lobbyists may be natural allies of one or more domestic groups.

Each of the U.S. domestic lobbying firms Egypt used is formed by or includes former Congressmen, campaign advisors, ambassadors, and officials in the in the government. Moreover, these former Congressmen, campaign advisors, ambassadors, and officials in the government are also American citizens. This evidence confirms the first hypothesis that the countries that receive U. S. foreign aid are affiliated to American lobbying firms whose staffs include former members of Congress, campaign advisors and official in the United States government and foreign government relations offices. The evidence confirm also Glickman and Woodward's (1989) conclusion that foreign lobbyists have been joined by former presidential advisors, members of Congress, military, and others who work directly for the governmental relations office of foreign companies. Furthermore, the case study demonstrated that Egypt used also the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt to lobby in the interest of Egypt.

There is evidence that other countries such as Angola, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and also used U.S. domestic lobbyists to advance their countries' national interest in the United States. For example, in 2007, 2008 and 2009, Angola used Washington Global Consultants, LLC, Samuels International Associates, and Patton Boggs to contact more than 90 members of Congress, Congress staff, and officials in the executive branch in the

national's interest of Angola. As recompense, for their works, Washington Global Consultants, LLC, Samuels International Associates, and Patton Boggs received 11 lobbying payments from the government of Angola. Moreover, in 2007 and 2008, Ghana used the Whitaker Group to contact 77 members of Congress, Congress staff, and officials in the executive branch in the national interest of Ghana. In recompense, Whitaker Group received two payments of \$300,000.00 and one payments of \$150,000.00 from the government of Ghana. Furthermore, in 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea used Cassidy & Associates, Opinion Makers LLC, and Sidley Austin LLP to contact 24 members of Congress, Congress staff, and officials in the executive branch on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. These three U.S. domestic lobbying firms received a total of nine lobbying payments from the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. (Sunlight Foundation, 2011)

From the evidence provided above, it seems clearly that just like Egypt, many other countries such as Angola, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea are also affiliated to U.S. domestic lobbying groups; yet, they were not among the top ten recipients of the United States Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2007, 2008, and 2009. This situation can perhaps be explained by the fact that Egypt and these countries used different U.S. domestic lobbying firms. Between 2007 and 2009, Egypt used the PLM Group to lobby nearly 1,873 U.S. policymakers, officials in the government, and military officials in the national interest of Egypt while Angola, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea were not affiliated to the PLM Group. That having been said, we can conclude that the U.S. domestic lobbying firm a country uses to advance its national interest in the United States contributes to whether the country will obtain U. S. foreign aid or will be among

the top ten recipients of the United States Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Additionally, studies have concluded that the United States protects its strategic interests by giving much foreign aid to Egypt. As was pointed out earlier, the United States started providing more security and economic assistance to Egypt in 1979 after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Although this treaty is relevant today, it will be naïve to affirm that it is the main reason the United States is still giving a lot of aid to Egypt. What appears to explain the flow of a lot of United States Official Development Assistance to Egypt is that the United States and Egypt have in common one objective, which is to maintain peace in Middle East. That said, the United States' goal while giving most of its Official Development Assistance to Egypt is to convince the government of Egypt to maintain a peaceful relation with Israel and to not join other Arab countries.

This research has some limitations. First, the research did a case study on only one country. The evidence found on one country is not enough to provide a better and complete understanding of foreign lobbying. Furthermore, the case of Egypt is unique for two reasons. First, compared to many other countries, Egypt can employ powerful American domestic lobbying firms because it is a wealthy country. Second, Egypt is always in competition with Israel, which has a well organized diasporas, who lobby in the interest of Israel's national interests in the United States. Among these Israel lobbying organizations can be cited the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The argument here is that in order to guarantee that Egypt's national interests are also being advanced in the United States, the government of Egypt employed American domestic

lobbying firms. Future study needs to do comparative case studies and use data from primary sources such as interviews.

Conclusion

This thesis brought a light to many controversies surrounding the distribution of U.S. foreign aid, most precisely the factors explaining the allocation of U.S. foreign aid, the congressional foreign policy behavior related to foreign aid decisions, and the impact of foreign lobbying. Previous scholarship investigating why the United States gives foreign aid concluded that factors such as human rights principles, human need in the recipient countries, voting patterns in the United Nations, democracy principles, or U.S. security and strategic interests regulates the distribution of U.S. foreign aid. This investigation of the top ten recipients of the Gross Bilateral ODA, 2007-2008 average from the United States, in the second chapter, reveals that only one of these factors determines the allocation of U.S. foreign aid. That is, these findings suggest that the United States does not distribute its Gross Bilateral ODA on the basis of a concern for democratic principles, human rights performance, voting at the United Nations General Assembly, and the level of human need. The United States security interests appear to be the central basis on which the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA. Meanwhile, the examination of the congressional foreign policy behavior, more specifically, the relationship between political parties and foreign assistance reveals that even though the Democrats are more likely to sponsor most foreign aid bills. The Democratic Party's control in Congress does not guarantee that all or at least the majority of foreign aid bills introduced in Congress will be enacted. Also, the Democratic Party or Republican Party majority in the Senate and the House does not guarantee the augmentation or the decrease of the United States ODA. The findings on congressional foreign policy behavior suggest also that the ideologies of the chairmen of the Senate and

the House Committees on Appropriations do not seem to influence the ODA the United States allocates every year. Additional findings maintain that the northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills. The relationship between gender and foreign aid bill sponsoring showed that men sponsor more foreign aid bills than women. The case study investigating the legislative process of H. R. 4637, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989, illustrates that foreign aid legislation follow an unorthodox lawmaking processes.

Furthermore, in chapter four, the case study investigating the actions Egypt takes to obtain U.S. development assistance shows that Egypt used U.S. domestic lobbyists to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States. That is, in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Egypt was affiliated to three American lobbying firms, namely, the PLM Group, CLS & Associates, and Patton Boggs. These U.S. domestic lobbying firms Egypt used are formed by or includes American citizens who are former Congressmen, campaign advisors, ambassadors, and official in the in the government. Unexpectedly, the findings pointed out that in 2007, 2008, and 2009 Egypt also used the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt to advance Egypt's national interest in the United Sates.

These findings are consistent with the conclusions of many previous scholars. That is, our conclusion that the U.S. security interests appear to be the only basis on which the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral ODA is consistent with Lai's (2003) findings that there is a significant positive relationship between security interests and U.S. aid allocation for the period of 1991–1996. The findings that the Democrats are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills confirm Therien and Noel's (2000) argument that leftist parties, in particular, contribute to the increase of country's level of

foreign aid, while the findings that the northern members of Congress are more likely to sponsor most of foreign aid bills is consistent with Jewell's (2009) conclusion that in recent years many southern members of Congress, who are often viewed as opposed internationalism, have begun to challenge some of the administration foreign policies, particularly foreign aid. Furthermore, the case study on H. R. 4637, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989, corroborates Sinclair's (2007) claim that the legislative process on major legislation has changed since the early 1970s and is now regularly characterized by a variety of what were once unorthodox practices and procedures.

Moreover, the evidence that Egypt used three U.S. domestic lobbying firms, the PLM Group, CLS & Associates, and Patton Boggs to advance Egypt's national interests supports previous conclusions that foreign lobbyists may be natural allies of one or more domestic groups (Husted, 1991). Additionally, the evidence that these three American lobbying firms include former members of Congress, campaign, advisors and official in the United States government supports previous studies claiming that foreign lobbyists have been joined by former presidential advisors, members of Congress, military, and others who work directly for the governmental relations office of foreign companies (Glickman and Woodward, 1989).

Even so, it is important to recognize that this thesis has some limitations. First, the study in chapter two examined only a small sample composed of the top ten recipients of the Gross Bilateral ODA, using only the average of two years of data, 2007-2008. A study focusing on only ten countries and using the average of two years of data is not sufficient to offer a definitive response to the controversies surrounding the factors

determining the distribution of U.S. foreign aid. Likewise, the study in chapter three looks at only 50 foreign aid bills introduced in one congressional year. A study looking at one congressional year is too limited. Moreover, the increase of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA spending between 2003 and 2009 due to American conflicts abroad, most precisely the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the War on Terror, and the War on Drug, is also a limitation to the findings in chapter three. The argument here is that the findings in chapter three could have been different if American conflicts abroad, the War on Terror, and the War on Drugs did not provoke a sudden increase of U.S. Gross Bilateral ODA spending between 2003 and 2009. Chapter four has some limitations as well. The case study focused on only one country. The findings from one single case study do not guarantee a full understanding of foreign lobbying. Furthermore, the findings are also limited because Egypt is a rich country and can hire powerful, prestigious, and well known U.S. domestic lobbying firms, which many other countries would not be able to afford. Egypt is also in competition with Israel, and in this respect, forces additional pressures succeed with American legislators.

Future research investigating the kind of countries who receive U.S. foreign aid should look at a sample composed of the top 20 or more recipients of U.S. ODA. The research should also examine five to ten years data. Moreover, further research examining the relationship between political parties and foreign assistance should look at a much larger sample of bills introduced in Congress during many congressional years. These congressional years should be the ones during which Americans were not involved in conflicts abroad, the War on Terror, and or the War on Drugs. Additionally, in the future, scholars examining foreign lobbying should do a comparative case study on three

to five recipient countries. While choosing the countries on which the comparative case study is going to be done, the investigators should include both the rich countries and poor countries recipients of U.S. foreign aid. Doing a comparative case study on rich and poor recipients of U.S. foreign aid will allow the researcher to investigate whether the wealth of the recipient country, lobbying for U.S. assistance, is a determinant factor in foreign lobbying. Additionally, further research on foreign lobbying with more time and more resources should use primary data. They can obtain more reliable and direct information on lobbying by interviewing the lobbyists about the issues they talked about with Congressmen and official during their meetings, phone calls or in the e-mail. The investigators can also interview U.S. policymakers and officials for the same purpose.

References

- ABC News. 2011. "Lobbyists For Egypt Forced to Adjust to Sudden Change." Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/mubarak-regime-paid-washington-lobbyists-millions/story?id=12811865> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Abrams, A. Burto and Kenneth A. Lewis. 1993. "Human Rights and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid". *Public Choice* 77 (4): 815-821.
- Alesina, Alberto and Dollar David. 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (1): 33-63.
- American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. 2011. "Missions to the U.S." Available at: <http://www.amcham.org.eg/Operation/Doorknock/Doorknock.asp> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Anarchitex. 2011. "Freedom House: Freedom Maps & Meddling with the Middle East." Available at: <http://anarchitext.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/freedom-maps/>(Accessed November 2011.)
- Apodaca, Claie, and Michael Stohl. 1999. "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1) 185–198.
- Baldwin, A. David. 1965. "The Congressional Politics of Foreign Aid." *Challenge* 14 (1): 22-25.
- Bandow, Doug .1995. "A New Aid Policy for a New World." *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* No. 226

- Barone, Michael and Cohen E Richard. 2010. *Almanac of American Politics*. Washington, D.C.: National Journal Group ; Bristol : University Presses Marketing.
- Baxter, Brian. 2011. "Patton Boggs Adviser Is Special Envoy to Egypt." Available at: <http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/02/pattonboggsegyp.html>. (Accessed November 2011.)
- Bennett, Laurie. 2011. "Frank Wisner's Business Ties to Egypt." Available at: <http://news.muckety.com/2011/02/07/frank-wisners-business-ties-to-egypt/30371?tpLink> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Berman, M. Daniel and Robert A. Heineman. 1963. "Lobbying by Foreign Governments on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1962." *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (2): 416-427.
- Betts, Richard K. 2005. "The Political Support System for American Primacy." *International Affairs* 81 (1): 1-14.
- Birnbaum, H. Jeffrey. 2007. "Podesta, Livingston Look for Balance Brawn in New Partnership." Available at: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopic/academic/> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2002. "Policies and Growth." *The American Economic Review* 90 (4): 847-868.
- Burrell, Barbara. 1994. *A Woman's Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.

Business Council for International Understanding. 2009. "Egypt: 3/24 Luncheon in Washington, D.C. with H.E. Mohamed Lotfy Mansour." Available at: http://bcIU.org/wip02/online_event_invitation.asp?currentorpast=&eventsorprograms=events&IDNumber=1248&ProgramIDNumber=0&Keycode=6435968. (Accessed November 2011.)

Campos, F. Nauro and Francesco Giovannoni. 2007. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence". *Public Choice* 131, (1-2): 1-21.

Canavire, G., Nunnenkamp, P., Thiele, R., & Triveño, L. 2006. "Assessing the Allocation of Aid: Developmental Concerns and the Self-interest of Donors." *Indian Economic Journal* 54 (1): 26-51.

Carter, G. Ralph. 1986. "Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior: Persistent Patterns of the Postwar Period." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16 (2): 329-359.

Cason, Jim. 1997. "The US: Backing out of Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 24 (71): 147-154.

Center for Responsive Politics. 2011. "PLM Group". Available at: <http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?id=F19710&year=2008> (Accessed November 2011.)

Chaddock, Gail Russell. 2003. "In Congress, foreign aid loses stigma of the past." Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0718/p12s01-usfp.html> Accessed November 2011.)

Chan, Steve 1987. "The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the U.S.," *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (3): 251-29

Chatterjee, Pratap. 2011. "Egypt's Military-industrial Complex with US-made Tear Gas Canisters Fired on Protesters in Cairo, Washington's Role in Arming Egypt is under the Spotlight." Available at:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/feb/04/egypt-arms-trade>.

(Accessed November 2011.)

Chatterjee, Pratap. 2011. "Lobbyists Help Egyptian Officials Get Aid, Support from U.S." Available at: <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54362>. (Accessed November 18, 2011)

Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter and Associates. 2011. Available at <http://clsdc.com/Home> (Accessed November 2011.)

Chong, Alberto, Mark Gradstein, and Cecilia Calderon. 2009. "Can Foreign Reduce Income Inequality and Poverty"? *Public Choice* 140 (1): 59-84.

Moon, Chung-in. 1988. "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States." *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1): 67-89.

Cingranelli, David L. & Thomas E. Pasquarello. 1985. "Human Rights Practices and the US Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (3): 539-563.

Cohen, Richard E. 1999. "Crackup of the Committees". *National Journal*, 31 (31): 2210-2218.

Congressional Digest. 1966. "Congress Considers Foreign aid F67." 45 (8/9): 193-194.

Congressional Digest. 1973. "Controversy in Congress over the Future of U.S. Foreign aid." 52 (3): 67-67.

Congressional Digest. 2000. "House Cuts Foreign Aid Appropriations Measure." *Human Events* 56 (29): 22-22.

Connelly, Joel. 2011. "Hosni's helpers: Mubarak hired top U.S. Lobbyists." Available at: <http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2011/02/03/hosnis-helpers-mubarak-hired-top-u-s-lobbyists/> (Accessed November 2011.)

Daily NewsEgypt. 2009. "US-Egypt Trade Relationship Bolstered by Mubarak Visit." Available at: <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/USEgypt+trade+relationship+bolstered+by+Mubarak+visit.-a0206495549> (Accessed November 2011.)

Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Trap. 2004. "On the Empirical of Foreign Aid and Growth." *The Economic Journal* 114 (496):191-216.

Denis J. Sullivan J. Denis. 1996. "The Failure of U.S. Foreign Aid: An Examination of Causes and a Call for Reform." *Global Governance* 2 (3): 401-415.

Diamond, Irene. (1977). *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dixon, William. 1994. "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1): 14-32.

Dollar, D., & Levin, V. 2006. "The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2003." *World Development* 34 (12), 2034-2046.

Doran, Charles. 1978. "U.S. foreign aid and the unstable polity." *Orbis* 22 (2): 435-52.

Dunning, Thad. 2004. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa." *International Organization* 58 (2): 409-423.

Drury, A. Cooper, Olson, Richard Stuart, and Van Belle, Douglas A. 2005. "The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995." *Journal of Politics*, 67 (2): 454-473.

Eggen, Dan. 2010. "Egypt Pushes Back against Senate Resolution." Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/08/AR2010090807369_2.html (Accessed November 2011.)

Eggen, Dan. 2011. "In Washington, a Strong Lobbying Force Mobilized." Available at: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>(Accessed November 2011.)

Egyptian Press and Information Office. 2009. "Egypt is Home to the Oldest American Chamber of Commerce in the Middle East." Available at: <http://www.modernegypt.info/one-hundred-facts-about-egypt/fact/49/> (Accessed November 2011.)

Egyptian Press and Information Office. 2010. "U.S.-Egypt Commit to Entrepreneurship at American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt Luncheon." Available at: <http://www.modernegypt.info/online-newsroom/egypt-news-archive/us-egypt-commit-to-entrepreneurship-at-american-chamber-of-commerce-in-egypt-luncheon> (speech by Greg Lebedev, chairman of the board of the Center for International Private Enterprise and senior adviser to the president of the US Chamber of Commerce), (Accessed November 2011.)

- Egyptian Press and Information. 2011. "History of Partnership." Available at:
<http://www.modernegypt.info/egypt-us-relations/history-of-partnership/> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Elliott, Justin. 2011. "Who's Doing Mubarak's Bidding in Washington?" Available at:
http://www.salon.com/2011/01/28/egypt_in_washington/. (Accessed November 2011)
- Embassy of Egypt Washington DC. 2008. "Egyptian AmCham Delegation Visits Washington (April 6th-16th 2008)". Available at:
<http://www.egyptembassy.net/showmarticle.cfm?id=164> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Ettinger, E. Karl. 1946. "Foreign Propaganda in America." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (3): 329-342.
- Fair, C. Christine. 2009. "U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Planning and Accountability. Testimony presented before the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2009." Available at:
http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/Fair_Pakistan_Aid_12_9_09.pdf (Accessed October 2011.)
- Fiorina, P. Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment*. 2nd edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Fisk, Robert. 2011. "US Envoy's Business Link to Egypt: Obama Scrambles to Limit Damage after Frank Wisner Makes Robust Call for Mubarak to Remain in Place as Leader." Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-envoys-business-link-to-egypt-2206329.html>(Accessed November 2011.)

Fleck, K. Robert and Christopher Kilby. 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts." *Southern Economic Journal* 67 (3): 598-617.

Fordham, O. Benjamin. 2008. "Economic Interests and Congressional Voting on Security Issues." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (5): 623-640.

Freedom House. 2011. "Freedom in the World Country Rating 1972-2011." Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439> (Accessed October 2011.)

George, L. Alexander. 1979. "Case Studies and Theory Development: the Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." Free Press: 43-68.

Gibney, James. (2010). "Zero Out Aid to Egypt and Israel." Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/special-report/ideas-2010/archive/2010/07/zero-out-aid-to-egypt-and-israel/59317/>. (Accessed November 2011.)

Gibney, Mark, Cornett, Linda, & Wood, Reed. 2011. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2008." Available at: <http://politicalterror scale.org/ptsdata.php> (Accessed October 2011.)

Gibson, Lieber Martha. 1994. "Managing Conflict: The Role of the Legislative Veto in American Foreign Policy." *Polity* 26 (3): 441-472.

Glickman, J. Norman, and Woodward P. Douglas. 1989. *The New Competitors. How Foreign Investors are Changing the U.S. Economy*. Basic Book, Inc.

Good, Chris. 2011. "Egypt's High-Powered D.C. Lobbying Ties." Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/egypts-high-powered-dc-lobbying-ties/70407/>. (Accessed November 2011.)

- Govtrack. 2010. "Congress> Legislation." Available at:
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billsearch.xpd?PostFormID=billsearch&session=110&q=110th+congress+foreign+aid+bill&sponsor=&cosponsor=&status=&sort> (Accessed October 2011)
- Graham, Carol. 2002. "Can Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not with Magic Bullets." *The Brookings Review* 20 (3): 28-32.
- Gura, David. 2011. "When a lobbyist's Client is Egypt." Available at:
<http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/new-egypt/when-lobbyists-client-egypt>.(Accessed November 2011.)
- Haney, Patrick J., and Walt Vanderbush. 1999. "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 341-361.
- Harrigan, J., Wang, C., & El-Said, H. 2006. "The economic and political determinants of IMF and World Bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa." *World Development* 34 (2): 247-270.
- Hattori, Tomohisa. (2003). "The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid." *Review of International Studies* 29 (2): 229-247.
- Helms: Religious groups can handle foreign aid.* (2001). *Christian Century* 118 (4): 7-7
- Hocking, Brian. 1991. "Japanese Lobbying in the United States: Foreign Threat or Domestic Politics?" *The World Today* 47 (4): 64-66.

- Hollist, W. Ladd, and Thomas H. Johnson. 1979. "Political Consequences of International Relations: Alternative Explanations of U.S./Latin American Noncooperation." *Journal of Politics*, 41 (4): 1125 - 55.
- Holsti, Oli. 1996. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- House Cuts Foreign Aid Appropriations Measure*. (2000). *Human Events* 56 (29): 22-22
- Husted, Steven. 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis." *Eastern Economic Journal* 17 (1): 89-99.
- Imbeau, Louis-Marie. 1988. "Aid and Ideology." *European Journal of Political Research* 16 (1): 3-28.
- Imbeau, Louis-Marie. 1989. *Donor Aid-the Determinants of Development Allocations to Third World Countries: A Comparative Analysis*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Inside Egypt. 2008. "Egypt's Ministry of Defense Visits Washington and Florida." *The Quarterly Magazine of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt* 3 (3): 1-12.
- Inside Egypt. 2008. "Minister of International Cooperation Visits Washington." *The Quarterly Magazine of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt* 3 (2): 1-12.
- International Committee of the Fourth International. 2011. "Democrats on the Mubarak Payroll." Available at: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/feb2011/lobb-f09.shtml>(Accessed November 2011.)
- Jacobs, R. Lawrence and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *The American Political Science Review* 99 (1): 107-123.

- Jeydel, Alana and Andrew J. Taylor. 2003. "Are Women Legislators Less Effective? Evidence from the U.S. House in the 103rd-105th Congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (1): 19-27.
- Kegley, C.W. Jr., & Hook, S.W. 1991. "U.S. foreign aid and U.N. voting: did Reagan's linkage strategy buy defense or defiance?" *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (3): 295–312.
- Kimbrough, P. Kent. 1986. "Foreign Aid and Optimal Fiscal Policy." *The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'Economique* 19 (1): 35-61.
- Kirk A. Jason. 2008. "Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?" *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (3): 275–300.
- Knack, Stephen. 2004. "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (1): 251-266.
- Lahiri Sajal and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. 2000. "Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation." *The Economic Journal* 110 (462): 62-79.
- Lai, Brian. 2003. "Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991-96." *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (1): 103-128.
- Lancaster, Carol. 2000. "Redesigning Foreign Aid." *Foreign Affairs* 79 (5): 74 – 88.
- Lee, M. J. 2011. "Hillary Clinton: Don't cut my budget." Available at <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65731.html>. (Accessed October 2011)
- Leogrande, M. William and Philip Brenner. 1993. "The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras"." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18 (1): 105-136.

- Lichtblau, Eric. 2011. "Arab Unrest Puts Their Lobbyists in Uneasy Spot". Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/world/middleeast/02lobby.html?_r=3 (Accessed November 2011)
- Lippman, Thomas W. 1996. "It's a Smaller World after Budget Shrinkage." Washington Post, March 21, p 15.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1996. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lundborg, P. 1998. "Foreign aid and international support as a gift exchange." *Economics & Politics* 10 (2): 127–142.
- Lundsgaarde, Erik, Christian Breunig and Aseem Prakash. 2007. "Trade versus aid: donor generosity in an era of globalization." *Policy Sciences*, 40 (2): 157-179.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace 1946 -1986." *The American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 624–638.
- Martin, Patrick. 2011. "Democrats on the Mubarak payroll." Available at: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/feb2011/lobb-f09.shtml> (Accessed November 2011)
- Mavrotas, George and Peter Nunnenkamp. 2007. "Foreign Aid Heterogeneity: Issue and Agenda." *Review of World Economics* 143 (4): 585-595.
- McCauley Kevin. 2011. "CLS & A Falls to 'Arab Spring'." Available at: <http://www.odwyerpr.com/blog/index.php?/archives/2011/05/C5.html> (Accessed November 2011.)
- Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. 2006. *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux

- Milner, H, Tingley D. 2010. The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Politics of Donor Countries. *Economics and Politics* 22 (2): 200-232.
- Memcott, James. 2011. "Egypt Has a Well-paid Presence in Washington." Available at: <http://news.muckety.com/2011/01/30/egypt-has-a-well-paid-presence-in-washington/30221>. Accessed November 2011.)
- Meernik, James; Eric Krueger & Steven C. Poe. 1998. "Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War." *Journal of Politics* 60 (1): 63-85.
- Moore, Stephen. 1997. "Republican congress should reject international socialism on foreign aid." *Human Events* 53 (12): 6-6
- Morgan, Dan. 1995. "Where Foreign Aid Gets Down to Business." *Washington Post*, June 12, p 4.
- Morey, D., & Lai, B. 2003. "Liberalism, realism, and United Nations voting: an empirical test of contending theories." *Department of Political Science, University of Iowa*.
- Morrison, M. Kevin. 2007. "Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case Scenario." *Public Choice* 131 (3-4): 365-386.
- Moyo Dambisa. 2009. *Dead Aid*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Muller, Edward M. 1985. "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World." *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (4): 445-70.
- Mungai, Christine. 2011. "Why Kenya Opts for K-Street PR to Clean up its Battered image abroad." Available at:

<http://www.africareview.com/Special+Reports/Kenyas+love+for+Washington+DC/-/979182/1189246/-/1jbvb6/-/index.html>. (Accessed November 2011.)

Neumayer, Eric. 2003. "The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and United Nations Agencies." *International Studies Quarterly*. 47 (1) 101-122.

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (6): 925-953.

O'Leary Lizzie and James Rowley. 2011. "Egypt Hired Top Washington Lobbyists to Protect Alliance, Gain U.S. Access." Available at:
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/egypt-hired-top-washington-lobbyists-to-protect-alliance-gain-u-s-access.html> (Accessed November 2011.)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2008. "The Top Ten Recipients of Gross Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2007-2008 average from the United States." Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/788142061774> (Accessed October 2011.)

Overby, Peter. 2011. "Amid Protests, Egypt's D.C. Lobbyists Draw Scrutiny." Available at: <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/07/133566260/amid-protests-egypts-d-c-lobbyists-draw-scrutiny>. (Accessed November 2011.)

Owusu, Y. Francis. 2007. "Post-9/11 U.S. Foreign Aid, the Millennium Challenge Account, and Africa: How Many Birds Can One Stone Kill?" *Africa Today* 54 (1): 3-26.

Poe, C. Steven. 1991. "US Economic Aid Allocation: The Quest for Cumulation." *International Interactions* 16 (4): 295-316.

Poe, C. Steven. 1992. "Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1): 147-167.

Poe, C. Steven, and James Meernik. 1995. "US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis". *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (4): 399-41.

Poe, Steven C., Tanya C. Vazquez, and Sabine Carey. 2001. "How are these pictures different? A quantitative comparison of the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International human rights reports, 1976-1995." *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (3): 650-77.

Poggione, Sarah. 2004. "Exploring Gender Differences in State Legislators' Policy Preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (2): 305-314.

Radelet, Steven. 2003. "Bush and Foreign Aid." *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (5): 104-117.

Reema Ali. 2007. "Egypt what Needs to be Done." Available at:
http://www.secid.org/usefsociety/pdf/reema_ali_statement.pdf(Accessed November 2011.)

Reeves, Andree E. 1993. *Congressional Committee Chairmen: Three Who Made an Evolution*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Rieselbach, N. Leroy. 1964. "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958." *The American Political Science Review* 58 (3): 577-588.

Russett, Bruce. 1990. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Ruttan, V. W. 1996. *United States development assistance policy: the domestic politics of foreign economic aid*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schlozman, K. L. and J. T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Schoultz, Lars. 1981. *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America*. Princeton N, J: Princeton University Press.
- Schraeder, P., S. Hook, and B. Taylor. 1998. "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows." *World Politics* 50 (2): 294–323.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 2007. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. 3rd ed. CQ Press.
- Sobel, Richard. 2001. *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam*. Ithaca, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shokry, Sameh. 2009. "Choice of Speech Site Affirms Egypt's Importance in World". Available at: <http://www.modernegypt.info/online-newsroom/e-alerts/choice-of-speech-site-affirms-egypts-importance-in-world/>(Accessed November 2011.)
- Stokke, Olav. 1989. *The Determinants of Aid Policies: Some Propositions Emerging from a Comparative Analysis.* "In *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden*, ed. Olav Stokke. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Stolberg, Sherly. 2011. "Eyebrows Raised Over Envoy to Cairo." Available at:
<http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/eyebrows-raised-over-envoy-to-cairo/>(Accessed November 2011.)

Stone, Peter. 2007. "Egypt Bulks Up." Available at:
<http://www.abrahamgroupllc.com/view/resources/8-11-07%20Qatar%20Calling.pdf>
(Accessed November 2011.)

Students of the World. 2005. "Countries of the World Gross National Product (GNP) Distribution-2005." Available at:
<http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/rank/PNB2.html> (Accessed October 2011.)

Sunlight Foundation. 2011. "1783 Contacts on behalf of Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt." Available at:
<http://foreignlobbying.org/client/Government%20of%20the%20Arab%20Republic%20of%20Egypt/> (Accessed November 2011.)

Szabo, Stephen F. 2009. "The Washington Bubble: Why US Foreign Policy Is Oversized." *Current History* 108 (721): 368-373.

Talbot, Strobe. 1996. "Democracy and the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (6): 47–63.

Terry, J. Janice. 2005. *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. London, Pluto Press.

Thérien, Jean-Philippe and Noel Alain. 2000. "Political Parties and Foreign Aid." *The American Political Science Review* 94 (1): 151-162.

Travis, Rick. 1995. "U.S. Security Assistance Policy and Democracy: A Look at the 1980s." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 29 (4): 541-562.

Travis, Rick. 2010. "Problems, Politics, and Policy Streams: A Reconsideration US Foreign Aid Behavior toward Africa." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (3): 797-821.

Tucker, Robert W. and David C. Hendrickson. 2004. "The Sources of American Legitimacy." *Foreign Affairs* 83 (6): 18-32.

U. S. Department of Justice. 2011. "Draft Retainer Agreement." Available at:<http://www.fara.gov/docs/5825-Exhibit-AB-20071130-2.pdf>(Accessed November 2011.)

U. S. Department of Defense. 2008. "Active Military Personnel Strength by Regional Area and by Country in December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007." Available at: <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0712.pdf> (Accessed October 2011.)

U.S. State Department. 2010. "General Assembly Overall Votes 2006." Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82642.pdf> (Accessed October 2011.)

U.S. State Department. 2010. "General Assembly Overall Votes 2007". Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/104488.pdf> (Accessed October 2011.)

U.S. Department of Justice. 2009. "Chlopak Leonard, Scheser & Associates Registration 5774." Available at: <http://www.fara.gov/docs/5774-Exhibit-AB-20090629-6.pdf>. (Accessed November 2011.)

- Wang, T.Y. 1999. "U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 199-210.
- Williamson, Claudia. 2010. "Exploring the Failure of Foreign Aid: The Role of Incentives and Information." *The Review of Austrian Economics* 23 (1): 17-33.
- Witt, Linda, Karen M. Paget, and Glenna Matthews. 1994. *Running as a Woman Gender and Power in American Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Zaid Jilani. 2011. "How The U.S. Chamber Of Commerce's Egyptian Affiliate Went To Bat For The Egyptian Dictatorship." Available at:
<http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/01/27/141179/us-chamber-egyptian-dictatorship/>.
(Accessed November 2011.)
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2009. "Ending Our Imperial Foreign Policy." Available at:
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/fareed_zakaria/2009/03/americas_imperial_foreign_poli.html. (Accessed November 2011.)
- Zimmermann, R. 1993. *Dollars, diplomacy and dependency dilemmas of U.S. economic aid*. Colorado: Lynne Reiner.

Appendices

List of Foreign Aid Bills Coded

-H.R 7177 Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008

-S.Res. 690: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the conflict between 4-Russia and Georgia..

-H.R. 7110: Job Creation and Unemployment Relief Act of 2008

-H.R. 5443: United States-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation Improvement Act of 2008

-S. 1007: Western Hemisphere Energy Compact

-H.Con.Res. 344: Recognizing the disproportionate impact of the global food crisis on children in the developing world.

-H.R. 5501: Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008

-H.R. 6306: To authorize United States participation in, and appropriations for the United States contributions to, the fifteenth replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association and the eleventh replenishment of the resources of the African Development Fund, and for other purposes.

-S 2166: Jubilee Act for Responsible Lending and Expanded Debt Cancellation of 2008

-H Res. 1230: Condemning postelection violence in Zimbabwe and calling for a peaceful resolution to the current

-H.R. 6028: Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008

-S.Res. 541: A resolution supporting humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians, accountability for abuses in Somalia, and urging concrete progress in line with the

Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia toward the establishment of a viable government of national unity.

-H.Res. 1195: Expressing condolences and sympathy to the people of the People's Republic of China for the grave loss of life and vast destruction caused by the earthquake of May 12, 2008 in Sichuan Province.

-S.Res. 569: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the earthquake that struck Sichuan Province of the People's Republic of China on May 12, 2008.

-H.Res. 1181: Expressing condolences and sympathy to the people of Burma for the grave loss of life and vast destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis.

-S.Res. 554: A resolution expressing the Sense of the Senate on humanitarian assistance to Burma after Cyclone Nargis.

-H.Res. 1011: Calling on the United States Government and the international community to promptly develop, fund, and implement a comprehensive regional strategy to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian operations, contain and reduce violence, and contribute to conditions for sustainable peace and good governance in Chad, as well as in the wider region that includes the northern region of the Central African Republic and the Darfur region of Sudan.

-S.Res. 494: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on the need for Iraq's neighbors and other international partners to fulfill their pledges to provide reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

-H.R. 2634: Jubilee Act for Responsible Lending and Expanded Debt Cancellation of 2008

-S.Res. 470: A resolution calling on the relevant governments, multilateral bodies, and non-state actors in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan to devote ample political commitment and material resources towards the achievement and implementation of a negotiated resolution to the national and regional conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Darfur, Sudan.

- S. 2731: Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008.
- H.R. 1084: Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008.
- 24-S. 1418: United States Commitment to Global Child Survival Act of 2007.
- S. 2271: Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007.
- S. 2461: A bill to authorize the transfer of certain earmarked funds to accounts for operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- H.Res. 842: Expressing sympathy to and pledging the support of the House of Representatives and the people of the United States for the victims of Cyclone Sidr in southern Bangladesh.
- H.Res. 811: Condemning the November 6, 2007, terrorist bombing in Afghanistan and expressing condolences to the people of Afghanistan and the members of the Wolesi Jirga.
- H.Res. 812: Expressing the sympathy and pledging the urgent support of the House of Representatives and the people of the United States for the victims of the devastating flooding in southern Mexico.
- S. 2340: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 2008.
- H.R. 2705: Compacts of Free Association Amendments Act of 2007.
- H.R. 3222: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008.
- H.R. 2949: Eurasia Foundation Act.
- H.R. 1567: Stop Tuberculosis (TB) Now Act of 2007.
- H.Res. 726: Calling on the President of the United States and the international community to take immediate steps to respond to and prevent acts of rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Darfur, Sudan, eastern Chad and the Central African Republic.

- S.Res. 352: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 20th anniversary of United States-Mongolia relations.
- H.Res. 738: Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the Government of Syria's continued interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon.
- H.Res. 651: Recognizing the warm friendship and expanding strategic relationship between the United States and Brazil, commending Brazil on successfully reducing its dependence on oil by finding alternative ways to satisfy its energy needs, and recognizing the importance of the March 9, 2007, United States-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on biofuels cooperation.
- H.R. 2003: Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007.
- H.Res. 676: Declaring that it shall continue to be the policy of the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
- H.Res. 564: Recognizing that violence poses an increasingly serious threat to peace and stability in Central America and supporting expanded cooperation between the United States and the countries of Central America to combat crime and violence.
- H.R. 1302: Global Poverty Act of 2007.
- H.R. 3096: Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2007
- S. 968: Stop Tuberculosis (TB) Now Act of 2007.
- S. 805: African Health Capacity Investment Act of 2007.
- H.Res. 629: Extending the condolences and sympathy of the House of Representatives to the Government and the people of Greece for the grave loss of life and vast destruction caused by the devastating fires raging through Greece since June 2007.
- 49-H.R. 176: Shirley A. Chisholm United States-Caribbean Educational Exchange Act of 2008.

-H.Res. 426: Recognizing 2007 as the Year of the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia, and offering support for efforts to ensure that the internally displaced people of Colombia receive the assistance and protection they need to rebuild their lives successfully.

-H.Res. 196: Supporting the goals and ideals of World Water Day.

-H.Res. 24: Establishing the House Democracy Assistance Commission for the One Hundred Tenth Congress.

-S.Res. 31: A resolution expressing support for democratic forces in Serbia and encouraging the people of Serbia to remain committed to a democratic path.

Source: (Govtrack, 2010)

Table 1: U.S Official Development Assistance (ODA) Flow 1989-2009

Year	ODA in USD million
1989	7677
1990	11394
1991	11262
1992	11709
1993	10123
1994	9927
1995	7367
1996	9377
1997	6878
1998	8785.98
1999	9145.26
2000	9954.89
2001	11429.35
2002	13290.07
2003	16319.52
2004	19704.91
2005	27934.74
2006	23532.14
2007	21786.9
2008	26841.93
2009	28831.34

Source: (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011)