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By, Holly Thomas

The Curse of Diamonds

Sierra Leone and Liberia have exported rough diamonds since the discovery of diamonds in the Mano River basin in the 1930s.ⁱ It was not until the late 20th century when these minerals were nicknamed conflict diamonds, lootable resources sold to fund rebel movements and terrorist organizations. Conflict diamonds have been linked to civil war, corruption, and human rights violations. Both countries suffered through bloody civil wars, slow development, and a low standard of living. Sierra Leone's civil war resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of one-third of the countryⁱⁱ. Liberia's civil war resulted in over 200,000 deaths and displacement of more than a million Liberiansⁱⁱⁱ. Could diamonds be the link to these two countries' misfortune? Could a diamond curse exist as scholars have speculated The Oil Curse?

Literature Review

Oil wealth and mass poverty has come to be known as The Oil Curse. Political Scientists and Economists have long debated about the curse of natural resources with the most notorious natural resource under scrutiny being oil. According to the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, Africa is home to eight of the nine worst performing oil producers in the world. The curse of oil is not just implied to developing countries in Africa, but also to those in the Middle East (Ross 2008) and Russia (Goldman 1999 and Goorha 2006), as well as mild forms of the curse

in the Western world (Listhaug 2005). Scholarship on The Oil Curse follows along the themes of civil war, rentier state concept, bad governance and slow development, and human rights violations.

Conflict and Civil War

Scholars have found that oil-dependent states are more likely to be at risk for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2001; Okrhulik 1999). Scholarship has found that oil is robustly correlated with the onset of civil war (Ross 2006). Collier and Hoeffler argue that resource-linked conflict can be explained by two mechanisms: rebel greed and grievances of ethnic or political marginalization. Resentment of oil wealth distribution can cause violence among rebels leading to civil war (Ross 2004; Smith 2004; Torvik 2002; Wantchekon 1999). Natural resources that are lootable (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to cause conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch, & Gilmore 2005) and countries with lootable resources are more likely to have rebel groups that use random violence rather than rebels in countries with fewer lootable resources, which use violence strategically (Weinstein 2006).

Other scholars argue that to explain oil-linked conflict more mechanisms must be analyzed as well as rebel greed and grievances, such as the greedy outsider mechanism (greed of other states that seek natural resources), feasibility mechanism (oil can be a way to finance rebellions either by the control of production or sale of 'booty' futures), weak states mechanism (weak state structures due to the lack of taxation and government accountability), and sparse networks mechanism (natural resource impact on the

economic relations between citizens due to weak manufacturing sectors) explain the link between natural resources and conflict more efficiently (Humphreys 2005). In regards to the sparse network mechanism, citizens compete rather than work together for oil wealth and donor aid (Shaxson 2007). Unlike in agriculture states where citizens are more likely to work together, in oil-enriched states the competition for wealth among citizens can lead to conflict.

Scholars have argued against The Oil Curse, stating that there is little convincing evidence that an abundance of oil causes conflict (Di John 2007). These scholars believe that natural resources may prolong war, but do not cause war. On the contrary, scholarship that argues the curse of oil exists, have found that natural resource conflicts are more likely to end quickly, not with negotiation, but with a clear victory for one side (Humphreys 2005). Collier states that the most dangerous level of natural resource dependence is 26% of GDP and a country at this level has a conflict risk of 23%, however if all circumstances of this country were the same with the exception of an abundance of commodity exports, the risk would drop to .5% (Collier 2000). Michael Watts disagrees with Collier stating it is not a curse, but an oil complex. He states that conflict in oil-enriched states is due to restructuring pre-existing forms of government (Watts 2004).

The argument of natural-resource-linked-conflict is not purely black and white. Sometimes natural resources “fuel civil war” as in Congo- Brazzaville in the 1990s and yet other times natural resources do not. This gray area is explained by the stability of the government (Englebert & Ron 2004).

Rentier State Concept

A rentier state refers to a state whose fiscal budget relies mainly on the export revenue 'rent' from its natural resource. In the past this has referred to gold, but in recent scholarship it is mainly attributed to oil (Okruhlik 1999). Oil production has been linked to authoritarian rule (Karl 1997; Ross 2001; Wantchekon 1999) and affects a country's social structure (Ross 2008). Scholarship finds three explanations for why rentier states can fall doomed to the curse of oil and hinder democracy: the rentier effect, repression effect, and the modernization effect (Ross 2001).

Rentier Effect

The rentier effect refers to resource-enriched (notoriously oil) governments that use low tax rates (or enforce no taxes) and patronage to relieve themselves of great accountability to their citizens. Scholars attribute the rentier effect to reasons why governments and institutions are weak (Amuzegar 2008; Goorha 2006; Okruhlik 1999; Ross 2001)). Weakening state institutions are then prone to conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Snyder & Bhavnani 2005). There are three ways in which this effect may occur in rentier states. The first is called the *taxation effect* (Ross 2001). When governments derive their majority of revenue through the sale of oil, they do not tax heavily or at all. In return, the public is less likely to demand government accountability. Okruhlik states this as the opposite of democracy. For in an authoritarian oil-enriched state, there is "no representation without taxation." Second is the *spending effect*, in which oil wealth leads to spending on patronage and helps reduce the pressures for democracy (Ross 2001).

These governments raise food and fuel subsidies, increase welfare payments, provide free or low-cost healthcare, provide cheap education that is all financed by oil, simply buying off support for a non-democratic rule (Amuzegar 2008). Third is the prevention of social groups independent of the state called the *group formation effect* (Ross 2001). This effect prevents groups that may demand political rights. Ross states that all three effects of the rentier effect together imply “that a state’s fiscal policies influence its regime type: governments that fund themselves through oil revenues and have larger budgets are more likely to be authoritarian; governments that fund themselves through taxes and are relatively small are more likely to become democratic.” Shaxson and Wantchekon agree that oil-dependent states tend to undermine democratic government and find democracy hard to sustain. Countries that depend on oil for its wealth also have difficulty developing a market-based economy (Goorha 2006). The increased size of the public sector reduces the free-market sector (Amuzegar 2008).

Repression Effect

Oil wealth and authoritarian rule can be linked to repression. Governments of oil-dependent states have the revenue to increase their spending on internal security, thus putting a stop on democratic aspirations of its citizens. The attraction of larger militaries includes the nation’s self-interest along with response to rebel conflict (Ross 2001).

Modernization Effect

Social and cultural changes that tend to sustain democracy rely on certain development growths such as education and occupational specializations. If governments

do not spend more money on higher education and do not support non-oil sectors, democracy is hard to attain (Ross 2001).

Bad Governance and Slow Development

Oil companies have shifted the blame on governments arguing that The Oil Curse does not exist, but simply bad governance is to blame (Shaxson 2007). Some scholars agree with the notion of bad governance and oil corruption is a result of weak states (Karl 1997; Shafer 1994.) Fearon and Laitin argue that oil states are more likely to have weak structures because they have less need for bureaucracies to raise revenue. Scholarship has attributed The Oil Curse to bringing about the Dutch Disease (Amuzegar 2008; Goorha 2006; Shaxson 2005; Smith 2004). The Dutch Disease occurs when large inflows of exchange cause real exchange rates to rise, in return damaging the local non-oil sectors, thus creating fewer jobs (Shaxson 2005). The Dutch Disease therefore stunts the development of other sectors (Goorha 2006). Another problem with contracting a ‘Dutch Disease’ is that while oil prices are high, governments raise their spending, but when oil prices fall, it’s hard for governments to cut back, raising their national debt (Shaxson 2005). Financial crisis can then lead to conflict as well.

Oil and mineral production has been linked to slow economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995). Scholarship has produced debates on the slow economic growth and has attributed it to export volatility (Lutz 1994), however, Sachs and Warner found in their study that countries that export natural resources suffer from slow growth even after controlling for the impact of export instability. There is another argument that resource-

rich states are not cursed by their resource wealth but rather by how they precede in the formulation of energy development strategies. State leaders pursue strategies that are most likely to ensure their political survival. These strategies are more politically rational and not necessarily economically rational (Luong 2001). In some cases, such as Russia, oil monies are improperly distributed to private individuals (Goldman 1999). Goldman states that rewards for unethical behavior are too high as well as the mismanagement of resources. Other scholars agree that mismanagement of oil wealth has a devastating effect on oil-enriched economies (Karl 1997; Goorha 2006).

When discussing economic growth and corruption, scholarship suggests that political scientists and economists cannot simply look at a country as having a 'national economy,' because the problem lies in fragmentations whether ethnic, religious, or political (Di John 2007; Shaxson 2007). Unequal distribution of rent (revenue from oil) among these fragmentations is the root cause of corruption (Ross 2004; Shaxson 2007; Smith 2004; Torvik 2002; Wantchekon 1999) along with oil companies bribing politicians (Shaxson 2007).

Human Rights Violations

Oil fields are frequently located in countries with bad human rights records. Scholarship on human right violations in regard to the curse of oil suggest that oil corporations can be part of the human rights problem instead of the solution (Eide, Ole Bergesen & Goyer 2000). Extraction of oil also leads to gender inequality (Amuzegar 2008; Ross 2008). Oil production tends to reduce the role of women in the work force

and in return helps explain the low influence women have on government in oil-rich states. The reduced presence of females in the workforce increases fertility rates, decreases education for girls, and decreases the likelihood women would lobby for expanded rights (Ross 2008).

With petrodollars flowing into the government, in theory, longevity would increase, infant mortality rates would decrease, and literacy rates would increase, but oil-dependent states do not fare better than countries without an abundance of oil (Katz 2004). The curse of oil has attributed to the bypass of health and education. Though some oil-dependent states provide free or low-cost healthcare and education to their masses (Amuzegar 2008) the low literacy rates and life expectancy and high infant mortality rates are evidence of their ineffectiveness.

Amuzegar argues that oil-enriched states increasingly violate human rights. He uses Iran as an example stating their government violates human rights by restricting freedoms such as religion, speech, conducting unlawful search and seizure, assaults on press freedom, restricting parliamentary elections, tightening Islamic code, vote tampering, disallowing labor unions, and restricting feminism study.

A Curse of Diamonds

Attention has been drawn to The Oil Curse, but not much scholarly literature has been devoted to the curse of diamonds. Few scholars have exclusively studied the impact diamonds have on an economy, government, and society. Most scholarship on diamonds is in regard to civil war. Diamonds can be directly correlated to the onset of war (Ross

2006), yet scholars argue as to what types of diamonds cause what types of conflict. Humphreys argues all diamonds can cause all types of conflict, however, some scholars have found that primary diamonds (nonlootable) reduce the prevalence and likelihood of ethnic wars whereas secondary diamonds (lootable) are more likely to fund rebel regimes and prolong ethnic wars (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005). Studies also have found secondary diamond production weakens the state, which increases the risk of civil war (Snyder & Bhavnani 2005). Englebert and Ron argue that if a country has a stable government, more than likely conflict will not occur even if the country has an abundance of natural resources. They use the example of Botswana, a country with an abundance of diamonds, yet no civil war. They attribute this phenomenon to Botswana's success at building institutions. Other scholars also point to strong institutions being the difference when comparing countries such as Botswana and Sierra Leone (Collier et al. 2003). However, Botswana has primary diamond deposits rather than secondary. A country such as Sierra Leone that has suffered from civil war contains secondary diamonds (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005).

Methodology

This paper argues that the mechanisms attributed to The Oil Curse can be interrelated to diamonds as well. I test mechanisms attributed to The Oil Curse, changing the independent variable from oil to diamonds, on the two cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, two diamond-enriched countries. I chose these two cases because of the limited scholarly literature on the possibility of a diamond curse. Since most scholarship on this

topic focuses on diamond-linked civil war, I chose two countries that have suffered through civil war.

I test six hypotheses commonly attributed to the Curse of Oil, changing the independent variable from oil to diamonds. (H1) Diamonds help fund rebel organizations. (H2) Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to cause conflict and prolong war. (H3) Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that seeks the natural resource. (H4) Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. H5 Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow development. (H6) Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights violations. My findings provide evidence for mechanisms that could be attributed to a diamond curse, different from those of the Oil Curse.

Case 1: Sierra Leone

Freed slaves from the United States, Nova Scotia, and Great Britain settled in Sierra Leone in 1787. Thousands of other freed slaves joined the settlement called "Freetown" and it soon became one of Britain's first colonies in West Africa. The returned Africans came to be called Krio, descendants from all areas of Africa. Freetown was a peaceful coastal trading center throughout most of the 20th century. Sir Milton Margai, appointed Prime Minister, led Sierra Leone into a peaceful transition of independence in April 1961. Sir Albert Margai succeeded his brother as Prime Minister in 1964 under the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP).^{iv}

Elections were held in March 1967, Siaki Stevens, the All Peoples Congress

(APC) leader and Mayor of Freetown, was declared the new Prime Minister. In 1978, Stevens amended the constitution, banning all political parties, other than the ruling APC. During his time in office, Stevens built tax handles from informal deals made with a small group of Lebanese diamond merchants. Diamond channels not under Lebanese-control were suppressed by government troops. To prevent a military coup and ensure political survival, Stevens weakened the state's coercive capabilities by limiting the military budget and capped the recruitment to 2,000 troops, a very small military for a country of 4 million. Tax handles that Stevens built began to deteriorate at the end of his rule, which increased the risk of an economic crisis. Lebanese merchants became less dependent on Stevens because of the wealth they acquired under his rule ironically allowed them to hire personal armies. Balance of coercive power began to shift in favor of the Lebanese diamond traders, initiating a trend of declining government revenue: about 70% of exports left the country through non-formal, nontaxable channels, and little revenue went into the state treasury (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Stevens remained in office until 1985, peacefully transitioning power to APC military commander, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh.

On October 1, 1985, Momoh was elected President, however, he did amend the constitution in 1991, re-establishing a multi-party system.^v Momoh inherited a country on the verge of collapsing (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Because the APC abused power, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of a former-corporal, began terrorizing villages in eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border. The RUF gained control of the diamond mines in the Kono district and pushed the military back to Freetown.^{vi} Momoh lacked the coercive resources^{vi} to fight off the RUF because Stevens

had reduced the size of the military. Stevens made sure his successor would be weak so that he could remain in Sierra Leone and enjoy his wealth without being threatened. Momoh attempted to gain control of the country's diamonds but failed. Sierra Leone reported \$22,000 in diamond exports in 1988; however, the Lebanese exported \$250 million worth of diamonds annually. In 1989, only 12 carats were exported through official channels (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).

Momoh could not pay the army because of the lack of revenue. When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an invasion from Liberia in 1991, the Sierra Leone's under-funded military disintegrated. The RUF seized control of Sierra Leone's diamond fields and used the income from diamonds to finance a decade of violence and civil war.^{vii} During this conflict, civilians were terrorized. Women and young girls were raped by the RUF. Children were kidnapped and served on the front lines for the rebels. Girls were kidnapped and given to rebels as slave wives and some fought as soldiers (Park 2006; Mazurana and McKay 2006). Rape was used as a weapon during Sierra Leone's civil war (Ferris 2007). In a report published in 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children UK found that women in Sierra Leone faced sexual violence in the country, on the way to and in refugee camps. Sexual exploitation was also "perpetrated by aid workers, peacekeepers, and community leaders" (Ferris 2007, 585). The government later began recruiting children to fight as well. During this time many children, especially girls, did not attend school in fear of the violence. An estimated 70 percent of children had no access to education (Maclure & Denov 2009, 613). Healthy men were also forced to work in diamond mines. While RUF controlled most of the diamonds, the people of Sierra Leone were among the poorest in

the world. The RUF used fear tactics such as amputation, rape, and murder to terrorize civilians. Over one-third of the civilians were displaced and those who were sent to refugees fared no better due to starvation and high disease rates. Global Witness published a monograph *For a Few Dollars More* that stated al Qaeda operatives purchased Sierra Leonean diamonds from the RUF, between December 2000 and November 2001, and sold them in Europe (Grant & Taylor 2004).

A military coup was launched on April 29, 1992, which forced Momoh into exile and gave the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) control of Sierra Leone. The NPRC could not repel the RUF and they continued to terrorize more and more of the country. The NPRC hired mercenaries from the private firm Executive Outcomes that pushed the RUF from the countryside to the borders. After international pressure, the NPRC agreed to transition the country back into a civilian government and elections were held in April 1996. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the presidential election and the country returned to a parliamentary system until the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the President on May 25, 1997. Atrocities grew when the RUF joined the new government, but with the help of the ECOMOG forces, democracy was restored 10 months later. With the assistance of the international community, President Kabbah and the RUF leader signed the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999. This agreement gave the RUF positions in the government. The ECOMOG and UN sent troops in for additional peacekeeping. In April 2002, ECOMOG forces departed and soon after the RUF began violating the agreement. On May 8, 2000, members of the RUF killed 20 people in Freetown protesting against RUF violations. As a result, RUF leaders were stripped of their government positions, though fighting continued in the country.

The Guinean forces were able to attack the RUF bases in Sierra Leone in late 2000. The government of Sierra Leone began to reassert its authority and disarmament progressed; about 72,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed and demobilized by 2002. President Kabbah officially declared the civil war over on January 18, 2002 and peacekeeping forces were withdrawn throughout the next five years. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in 2002 with the help of the United Nations to try those who bore the responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of humanitarian law. The SCSL issued indictments against warring factions including former Liberian President Charles Taylor.^{viii}

Alluvial diamond mining continues to account for nearly half of Sierra Leone's exports. With the help of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, conflict diamonds have decreased. The increase in political stability has led to a revival of bauxite and rutile mining, adding revenue to the country. The government's current priorities include creating jobs for the public, enhancing development, and stopping corruption.^{ix} Sierra Leone continues to rely on significant amounts of foreign assistance, focused on the consolidation of peace, democracy, human rights, health education and care.^x

Case 2: Liberia

Freed African-Americans slaves along with a group of immigrants, who became known as Americo-Liberians, settled in Liberia in 1820. Following settlement, thousands of freed American and African-American slaves joined. The Republic of Liberia declared its independence on July 26, 1847; however, indigenous Africans were excluded

from citizenship until 1904. Joseph Roberts, born in America, served as the first Liberian President. The new republic, monopolized by the Americo-Liberian elite, was a one-party state ruled by the True Whig Party with a government and constitution built along similarities to the United States. The Liberian economy relied on the mining of iron ore and the export of natural rubber. The country was peaceful except for occasional opposition from the indigenous Africans, but on April 12, 1980, peace was disrupted when indigenous Liberian Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, of the Krahn ethnic group, staged a military coup and began a decade long authoritarian rule after executing the President and many Americo-Liberian officials, formulating the People's Redemption Council (PRC).

Ethnic tensions and hostility rose as Doe began promoting members of the Krahn ethnic group, who soon dominated the government and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The economic growth rate slowed due to a decline in the demand for iron ore and government mismanagement. An increase in human rights abuses and corruption, and a decrease in the standard of living and economy followed. Despite Doe's poor human rights record and lack of democratic characteristics in policy, Doe received U.S. financial support from President Ronald Reagan, an ally, however, on December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his rebels, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire and soon gained the support of many Liberians. A former member of the NPFL formed a breakaway movement called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) who killed Doe on September 9, 1990. Former AFL soldiers that had taken refuge in Sierra Leone founded the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), to fight back the NPFL and INPFL.^{xi}

During the civil war, these warring factions recruited and kidnapped children to use as soldiers and slave wives (Human Rights Watch 1994; Mazurana & McKay 2006). Rape was used as a weapon during Liberia's civil war (Ferris 2007). In a report published in 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children UK found that women in Liberia faced sexual violence in the country, on the way to and in refugee camps. Sexual exploitation was also "perpetrated by aid workers, peacekeepers, and community leaders" (Ferris 2007, 585). Rebels, child soldiers, and Liberian military forces raped and murdered civilians (Human Rights Watch 1994).

After several peace accords, disarmament and demobilization of warring factions followed after Taylor agreed to special elections in Liberia. On July 19, 1997, Charles Taylor and the NPFL won the election primarily because Liberians feared a prolonged civil war, however, the NPFL did nothing to improve Liberians' standard of living with little investment made in the country's infrastructure. For their six-year rule, unemployment and illiteracy rose above 75 percent.^{xii} Instead of supporting the needs of Liberians, Taylor supported the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. The RUF smuggled conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone into Liberia. Liberia became a major blood diamond exporter smuggling conflict diamonds in from Sierra Leone and Angola. Liberia had also become a channel for al Qaeda to purchase conflict diamonds (Le Billon 2006). In early 2003, armed rebellions, such as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerged from Taylor's former adversaries because of his misuse of power.

The civil war devastated the country's economy. Iron ore production stopped, major businesses were destroyed, and foreign investors and businesses left the country.

Liberia gained no revenue on timber and diamond exports because of the UN ban on conflict diamonds and other natural resources funding armed conflict. Fighting continued regardless of several cease-fire agreements between the government, LURD, and MODEL, at the civilians' expense. President Taylor resigned on August 11, 2003, after pressure from the U.S. and the international community. Taylor's departure into Nigeria prompted a peacekeeping mission by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with 3,600 troops, followed by 12,000 troops from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

The UN lifted sanctions on Liberian timber in 2006 and diamonds in 2007. And the economy has begun to slowly progress gaining revenue also from rubber exports and revenue from its maritime registry program. In 2005, Liberia held presidential elections, the most fair and peaceful elections in the country's history. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, of the Unity Party, won and became Africa's first elected female president. Since the elections, Liberia's progress has increased rapidly. The public and the country's elites support President Sirleaf, reasserting the government's authority and the public's hope for better living standards. President Sirleaf works closely with international donors on Liberia's development, aiming at rebuilding the country's infrastructures and economic recovery. Over 100,000 ex-combatants have been disarmed and with the help of the U.S., the country's military has been reconstructed.^{xiii} The government's current priority is creating jobs in the new gold mining sector, attracting foreign investment, and providing the public with better education and healthcare programs including the improvement of other essential needs to the masses.^{xiv}

Findings

Sierra Leone

Hypothesis 1: Diamonds help fund rebel organizations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The RUF seized control of the diamond mines and used the revenues to fund their movement for over a decade. Liberian President Taylor supported the RUF and in return the RUF smuggled diamonds into Liberia. Terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, purchased conflict diamonds.

Hypothesis 2: Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to cause conflict and prolong war. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The diamonds were lootable making it easily accessible to rebels; however, Sierra Leone had earned revenue from alluvial diamonds since the 1930s. Other variables accounted for the cause of Sierra Leone's war, such as weak structures, weak military, corruption, political instability, and an economy in crisis. Diamonds did fund the RUF and kept them armed prolonging war, but one could not say alluvial diamonds caused the war. Because of Sierra Leone's accessible diamonds, the RUF was able to easily smuggle diamonds into Liberia, helping fund rebel leader Taylor, prolonging Liberia's civil war.

Hypothesis 3: Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that seeks the natural resource. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Stevens built tax handles by constructing informal deals made with Lebanese diamond merchants. Balance of coercive power began to shift in favor of the Lebanese diamond traders, resulting in low diamond export

revenue for Sierra Leone. Neighboring Liberia became a major trader in conflict diamonds thanks to the RUF smuggle diamonds into the country, exporting over \$300 million in diamonds annually.

Hypothesis 4: Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. There is partial evidence that diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect, even though Sierra Leone is more properly categorized as a merchant state. The country was under authoritarian rule from 1978-1991, when Stevens banned political parties other than his own. A conflict prolonged by alluvial diamonds hindered the progress of democracy in Sierra Leone by further weakening the state. Because of informal tax handles and smuggled diamonds, the country was cheated out of revenue and could not provide for its civilians. A lack of investment in development and other revenue sectors infected the country with the Dutch disease. The government and rebels violated human rights before and during Sierra Leone's civil war. Democracy is slowly progressing in the country that has suffered from inequality in income distribution. The government created a mining community development fund, which returns a portion of diamond revenue to mining communities, raising local stakes in the legal diamond industry.

Hypothesis 5: Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow development. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Sierra Leone's economy prospered until Stevens took office and the country fell into authoritarian rule. Stevens built tax handles from informal deals that cheated the country out of diamond revenue. A balance

of coercive power began to shift in favor of Lebanese diamond traders Stevens formed deals with and most of Sierra Leone's diamond revenue was gained by the Lebanese. Stevens weakened the state by not investing revenue into development and social welfare programs. He also weakened country's coercive capabilities by limiting the military budget and placing a cap on recruitment. During his time in office, the economic growth rate slowed because of a decline in the mining sector and an increase in government corruption. When President Momoh was elected, he re-established the multiparty system, but could do little to improve the state's economic crisis. The country's main revenue export, diamonds, were no longer under the country's control. Momoh inherited a weak military that could not repel invading rebels leading the country into a civil war funded by diamonds. Much of Sierra Leone's formal economy was destroyed during this time. Civilians lived in terror, while the government could not protect them. Human rights violations increased while education and healthcare declined as the country tore itself apart.

Hypothesis 6: Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights violations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The state itself violated human rights by not providing efficient education, healthcare, and security. The civil war caused the displacement of over one-third of the population and thousands of lives were lost. Rebels amputated those they did not kill or kidnap. Children were forced to serve on regime's front lines, forced into marriages, and served as slaves. Even the refugee camps violated civilians' human rights by sexual violence and disease.

Liberia

Hypothesis 1: Diamonds help fund rebel organizations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Warring factions such as the ULIMO and NPFL, along with other breakaway movements, funded their armies with diamonds. President Taylor and the NPFL supported the RUF, while they smuggled diamonds into Liberia. The Washington Post reported that following September 11, 2001, al Qaeda had purchased millions of dollars worth of rough diamonds from the RUF, using Liberia as a channel.

Hypothesis 2: Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to cause conflict and prolong war. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The diamonds were lootable making it easily accessible to rebels; however Liberia had earned revenue from alluvial diamonds since the 1930s. Other variables accounted for the cause of Liberia's war, such as weak structures, corruption, political instability, and a decline in the economy. Diamonds did fund Liberia's corrupt government and hostile rebels, keeping them armed and prolonging war, but one could not say diamonds were the cause of war. Because of the accessibility of Liberian, Angolan, and Sierra Leonian diamonds, rebels and corrupt government officials easily smuggled them in and out of Liberia, prolonging war.

Hypothesis 3: Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that seeks the natural resource. I did not find evidence for this hypothesis. Liberia exported diamonds from neighboring countries, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, more so than other countries seeking Liberian diamonds.

Hypothesis 4: Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. There is partial evidence that diamonds hindered democracy due to the rentier effect, even though diamonds are not Liberia's main sector and more properly categorized as a merchant state. During Liberia's authoritarian rule, the country did suffer from the Dutch disease, as the government let other mining and business sectors decline. Doe's rule caused ethnic tensions and hostilities when the Krahn group dominated politics and the military. The standard of living deteriorated, human rights violations increased, and the economy declined. Smuggling diamonds and earning revenue from these conflict minerals were hard to tax, and the government invested little in infrastructure and development. Democracy was hindered by violence that was funded and prolonged by alluvial diamonds. Today, democracy is progressing in Liberia.

Hypothesis 5: Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow development. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Liberia was a major world exporter in iron ore, but when Doe staged a military coup and the country fell under his authoritarian rule, revenue-gaining sectors were neglected and the government mismanaged resource wealth, not investing money into bureaucracies or social welfare programs. Corruption and human rights violations increased while the economy declined, which prompted a civil war. Though democracy was re-established through elections, President Taylor did little for Liberians. He focused his support for the RUF, neglecting Liberia's business sectors and needs of the masses. For example, roads, schools, and hospitals were destroyed and bypassed. Unemployment rose, education

declined, and atrocities became more violent. The country's civil war destroyed businesses and devastated foreign investment. Diamonds and other natural resources such as Timber were used to fund rebel movements, while Liberians lived in terror. The standard of living deteriorated for Liberians while their government did little to improve their safety, health, and wellbeing. Many civilians lived without running water or electricity.

Hypothesis 6: Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights violations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The state itself violated human rights by not providing efficient education and healthcare. The military was strong, but did not provide security for Liberians. The civil war caused the displacement of more than one million civilians that did not fare better in refugee camps. Refugees were raped or tortured or suffered from lack of basic needs. Many children were kidnapped to serve as soldiers and slave wives. Over 200,000 Liberians were killed during the civil war.

Conclusion

I found that the Curse of Oil mechanisms could be found in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia when changing the independent variable from oil to diamonds. However, there is not full support for all of the hypotheses. I found support for # out of the six hypotheses in the case of Sierra Leone and # out of the six hypotheses in the case of Liberia. Major differences in my findings lead me to believe that other factors attribute to the Curse of Diamonds. Consolidating past scholarship on the Curse of Oil,

one would hypothesize that the curse exists (a) when the country contains an abundance of oil, (b) the government owns the oil, (c) the government falls doom to the rentier effect, (e) the country suffers from slow development and (f) conflict arises from rebels, (h) and all actors violate human rights.

After identifying the Curse of Oil in a model format, I formulated another model in which evidence in the two cases support for a theory on the Curse of Diamonds. My theory suggests that a Curse of Diamonds exists (a) when a country is enriched with alluvial diamonds, (b) the government mismanages revenue, (c) weakens the state, (d) causing conflict, (e) rebels fund their organizations with the diamonds, (f) engage in conflict, (g) distribute diamonds to other rebel organizations, and (h) all actors violate human rights. Since six out 15 alluvial diamond-producing states experienced civil war between 1990-2002, I believe this model should be tested on the remaining four states that experienced civil war to see if this curse exists. It is important to analyze cases that may be correlated with the Curse of Diamonds because of the current situation in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both countries are showing signs of mechanisms related to the same Curse of Diamonds Sierra Leone and Liberia fell under. Human Rights Watch^{xv}, Al Jazeera^{xvi}, and The Associated Press^{xvii} reported atrocities linked to conflict diamonds in the two countries. Rape warfare, torture, and murder are being conducted according to these reports. Could the curse account for Zimbabwe and the D.R. of Congo's misfortune?

- ⁱ See http://www.allaboutgemstones.com/conflict-diamonds_liberia.html
- ⁱⁱ See The CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html>
- ⁱⁱⁱ See The CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>
- ^{iv} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^v See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^{vi} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^{vii} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^{viii} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^{ix} See The CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html>
- ^x See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm>
- ^{xi} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm>
- ^{xii} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm>
- ^{xiii} See The U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm>
- ^{xiv} See The CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>
- ^{xv} See <http://www.hrw.org> Human Rights Watch “Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe” (2009) and “DR Congo: Civilian Cost of Military Operation is Unacceptable” (Oct. 13, 2009) and “DRC: Clinton Should Highlight Rape and Justice Issues” (Aug. 10, 2009) and “Diamonds Deadly Toll” (June 26, 2009)
- ^{xvi} See <http://AlJazeera.net> AlJazeera “Rape Used as Weapon in D.R. Congo” (Oct. 23, 2009)
- ^{xvii} Associated Press “Diamond Watchdog Gives Zimbabwe Time to Comply” (Nov. 6, 2009)

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The Booth Library Awards for Excellence in Student Research and Creativity Jury,

In the fall of 2009, I began my first semester of graduate school in the Political Science Department. Though I learned excellent writing skill from Eastern's undergraduate program in Journalism, my research skills were amateur at best.

I was nervous when I began researching and did not know how to proceed until Jocelyn Tipton gave a lecture in an orientation style Political Science course where she outlined the resources Booth Library and staff provided.

I contacted Jocelyn in less than a week from when she spoke. She was quick to set an appointment and told me not to stress out about it because she would help. During a 30-minute appointment, she helped me use the research computers and showed me the simplest and most beneficial way to search through the online journals. Before the end of our appointment I had already found 10 literary scholars that I could use for my paper titled, "IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds."

Jocelyn said I could set up another appointment if I needed, however, I was able to complete my research and paper early in the semester using the library's resources and using the techniques I was taught to use my time well.

I enjoyed the research so much that I kept the same topic for another paper titled, "Curse of Diamonds," also completed in Fall 2009. Because I began my research early and had a motivator in my corner (Jocelyn), my research papers were not a burden, but an accomplishment that I thoroughly enjoyed completing. I am even going to be the first EIU Political Science graduate student to present internationally (in May 2010), with my first graduate research paper, "IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds."

I have attached both research papers in hopes of one or both of them becoming a part of the Booth Library Student Research and Creativity Collection. I hope other students have found how to use the library's resources to further their own studies! I owe a great deal to the library staff and Eastern for providing me with such advanced resources to use for my research.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Holly Thomas". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Holly Thomas

By, Holly Thomas

IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds

Abstract

Blood diamonds, or “conflict diamonds,” have funded rebel movements and terrorist organizations worldwide. Bloodshed over these diamonds, the conflicts they prolonged, and the horrific human rights violations associated with the competition for this natural resource, resulted in an international effort to regulate rough diamonds, and has become a top priority for states, institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), media, and the public. Forums were held in 2001, known as the Kimberley Process, to discuss the threat of conflict diamonds. With the United Nations’ support, state and non-state actors devised the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a non-legally binding agreement to stop the import and export of conflict diamonds. What accounts for the creation of the Kimberley Process? What accounts for state compliance in regards to the KPCS? It is important to account for this cooperation because of the threat blood diamonds pose on an individual, sub-systemic, and systemic level. Countries currently violate the KPCS and are engaging in human rights violations and endanger the legitimacy of the diamond industry. Success and sustainability of the KPCS is essential to combat blood diamonds, promote human rights, and keep the industry afloat. This paper examines the utility of three International Relations theories, realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, to help explain the existing cooperation of governments, industry, and civil society to address this problem. The findings indicate all three theories lack a complete explanation for state compliance and the role of non-state actors regarding the KPCS. The analytical limitation of these theories calls for a new model to explain world politics shifted by government, industry, and civil society.

Diamonds symbolize love, marriage, scarcity, and wealth. This illusion has been engrained in people’s heads since the De Beers Diamond Trading Company’s successful marketing campaign with slogans such as “A Diamond Lasts Forever.” (Gooch 2008; Spar 2006) Little girls are taught to dream about that big, shiny rock that they will one day wear. Americans buy half of the diamonds jewelry worldwide (Gooch 2008, 189) for weddings, anniversaries, and other occasions for sentimental gifts. But before that

diamond is placed on her left hand, its journey there may have financed a gun in the hands of a child, drug running, or even a terrorist attack.¹

Blood diamonds, also known as “conflict diamonds,” are rough diamonds that rebel movements sell to fund armed conflict aimed at overthrowing legitimate governments.² Terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, have been known to fund their attacks with blood diamonds as well. (Gooch 2008, 190; Grant & Taylor 2004, 388; Pickrell 2002, 90; Le Billon 2006, 778) The nature of the atrocities executed by such rebels as Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Angola’s Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Liberia’s United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), caught the international community’s attention in the 1990s. Blood diamond greed was linked to citizen displacement, rape, amputation of limbs and murder.³ It also groomed a generation of illiterate child soldiers to steal, rape and murder. (Ferris 2007; Human Rights Watch 1994; Mazurana & McKay 2006)

Blood diamonds account for 3 to 15 percent of the global diamond trade, generating as much as \$7 billion per year in revenues. To put this in perspective, “\$1 million could buy 100,000 second-hand Kalashnikov rifles.” (Bukhalter 2003, 73)

Bloodshed over the diamonds and the conflicts they prolonged caused global governance

¹ The 2009 PAC Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review stated, “Before 2003, about 25% of the world’s diamond trade was in some way illicit. Diamonds, completely unregulated, were used for money laundering and tax evasion, for drug running, gun running, sanctions busting and terrorist financing. Human Rights Watch and Global Witness also published reports of diamonds funding crime from 1998-currently.

² The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Preamble available at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>

³ Global Witness, PAC, and Human Rights Watch reported atrocities available at www.globalwitness.org, www.partnershipafricacanada.org, and www.humanrightswatch.org.

on regulating rough diamonds to become a top priority for states, institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), media, and the public. (Grant & Taylor 2004)

A forum was held in Kimberley, South Africa, to discuss the threat of conflict diamonds. With support from the United Nations, the answer to reducing conflict diamonds from emerging into the legitimate diamond business became known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.⁴ Since blood diamonds are usually indistinguishable from legit diamonds (Pickrell 2002), states would need a certification of origin tracing the diamond shipments' every move from the original mine. States were encouraged to enforce internal securities as well. (Wright 2004, 699) Governments, the World Diamond Council and other industry leaders, and NGOs discussed the process for over two years in a series of intergovernmental meetings known as the Kimberley Process.⁵ (Bukhalter 2003, 73; Grant & Taylor 2004) On January 1, 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was implemented⁶ however; some participants were not prepared and were given a grace period issued until July 31, 2003. (Grant & Taylor 2004) Seventy-four countries currently participate in the Kimberley Process.⁷

The KPCS is not a legally binding treaty between states, but a set of standards regulated by its own national legislation dealing with the import and export of rough diamonds from its territory. (Wright 2004, 699) What accounts for the creation of the Kimberley Process? What accounts for state compliance in regards to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme? I first test the utility of three International Relations

⁴ See id. 2

⁵ Information on meetings conducted prior to scheme implementation can be found at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>

⁶ See Id. 2

⁷ A current list of participating countries can be found at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com> as well as <http://www.diamondfacts.org>

theories, realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, on the international phenomenon of governments, industry, and civil society working together in global affairs. I argue in this paper that all three theories provide insight on world politics in the case of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, and no one theory accurately analyzes the big picture of cooperation. It is important to account for this cooperation because of the threat blood diamonds pose on an individual, sub-systemic, and systemic level. Though the civil war in Sierra Leone that brought attention to conflict diamonds is over, countries such as Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo are currently in violation of the KPCS by exporting and importing blood diamonds.⁸ These countries are engaging in human rights violations, endangering the legitimacy of the diamond industry and countries that participate in the KPCS. The possible backlash of blood diamonds could devastate economies such as in Botswana and India that depend on legitimate diamond sales. (Wright 2004, 698-99) Success and sustainability of the KPCS is essential to combat blood diamonds, promote human rights, and keep the diamond industry afloat.⁹

Literature Review

Scholars have attempted to analyze state cooperation through various International Relation theories such as realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. These theories explain state behavior by focusing on different key actors in decision-making,

⁸ See Id. 3 Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, and AlJazeera (available at <http://www.AlJazeera.net>) reported KPCS violations in Zimbabwe and D.R. of Congo. The 2009 PAC Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review also reported both countries in violation. The AP reported the threat of blood diamonds in Zimbabwe in the article, "Diamond Watchdog Gives Zimbabwe Time To Comply."

⁹ See Id. 3 also review "Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War" published by the UN available at <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html>

analyzing the state's benefits for cooperation, and prediction for duration of such a commitment.

Realism

Hans Morgenthau dominated International Relations with his classical realism theory whereas nation states are the primary actors in international affairs and strive for survival and success regardless of morality, a response to idealism. Nation states are seen as rational actors living in a world of anarchy that behave in their own self-interest and compete for distribution of power, a characteristic rooted in human nature. Realism defines interest in terms of power because moral laws that govern the universe are different for each state. (Morgenthau 1961) Kenneth Waltz built upon Morgenthau's theory stating neorealism "contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to traditional realism's unit-level explanations." (Waltz 1990, 34) He stated that realists fail to consider structure as a force that shapes states and their behavior. Neorealists focus on anarchy being the driving force of state behavior rather than human nature, as classical realists such as Morgenthau stated. (Waltz 1990; Morgenthau 1961) Since the structure of anarchy has not changed since the end of the Cold War, state behavior should not expect to change. States will cooperate with each other, but still have conflicting interests and lust for power that could lead to war. (Mearsheimer 2002) Realists find war to be a "legitimate instrument of statecraft" (Mearsheimer 2002, 25) and unpreventable due to anarchy. (Waltz 1959)

Realists have a pessimistic outlook on prospects for international cooperation and capabilities of international institutions. Realism finds two major barriers to international

cooperation: state's concerns about cheating and relative achievements of gains. (Grieco 1988) States maintaining their position in the system is their first concern rather than increases power. (Waltz 1979) States must pay attention to their partners' gains because they act as independent actors in anarchy and fear for their survival. Realists believe international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation slightly. (Grieco 1988) States would not join unless they expected to receive proportionate advantages. (Morgenthau 1961) If a state believed that its partners are achieving or likely to achieve relatively greater gains, the state would decline to join, leave the institution, or limit its commitment. States would prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement so they could easily end it if they believed partners were gaining more than them. Opposed to the neoliberal theory that argues states would prefer a small number of partners for verification and sanctioning advantages, realism suggests states would prefer a larger number of partners. (Grieco 1988) A larger number of states in a cooperative arrangement "enhances the likelihood that the relative achievements of gains advantaging better-positioned partners could be offset by more favorable sharing arising from interactions with weaker partners." (Grieco 1988, 506)

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism was a response to neorealism with the belief that realism is too narrow and does not account for all actors that play key roles such as international institutions that are looking out for the self-interest of their membership. Neoliberal theory defines interests in solely individualistic terms. Neoliberals agree that nation-states are the major actors, but contrary to realists, neoliberals argue institutions can change state behavior. Unlike realism that argues anarchy impedes the achievement of

cooperation between states, liberalism argues that international institutions can promote cooperation between states even with the constraints of living in anarchy. (Keohane 1984) Even if anarchy does present constraints on state cooperation, states can work together with the assistance of these institutions seen in example cases of the United Nations, NATO, and WTO.

Though states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains, institutions can help states overcome this need and promote joint action through common interests. Unlike realism, whereas cheating and absolute gains are the primary concerns, neoliberals believe states can achieve absolute gains through these joint actions, cheating is feared to be worst-case scenario. If states are allies, neoliberals argue that states will less likely compete and be concerned with fellow institutional participants' gains. And as realism points out that there are no guarantees that an institutional formation will yield overall welfare benefits (Keohane 1984), neoliberal theory presumes that states will define norms that benefit their common interests. The theory suggests norms facilitate cooperation in a world in anarchy. (Kay 2004) Neoliberals are optimistic that these institutions and common ideology will guide states behavior.

Institutions play a role in security relations, according to Celeste Wallander, by providing assets to help maintain state cooperation and reducing transaction costs. In the case of NATO, the alliance developed assets for consultation, decision-making, and for military action to "cope with" the threat of the Soviet Union. These rules and procedures shaped state behavior enough so that NATO was able to adapt to new security threats. Therefore, states will cooperate when it is in their interest. (Wallander 2000) Institution adaptation is preferred because of the cost of creating new ones. In regards to transaction

costs, "Neoliberal theory focuses on international bargaining as measurement of effective reduction of transaction costs." (Kay 2004)

Constructivism

Constructivists argue key aspects of International Relations are formed through processes of social practice and interaction. Structure and power politics are socially constructed, therefore, transformed by social practice. Constructivism seeks to explain identities and interests; the main determinants of state behavior, as structure or process are the focus in other theories. (Wendt 1992) Interests entice state behavior while norms constitute identities and interests along with offering a range of policy options in dealing with the issues at large. Constructivists believe norms can play a role in policy change. (Klotz 1995)

Constructivists believe that realism and institutionalism do not take in account transnational actors and the possibility of identity change. (Klotz 1995) Advocates of the two leading theories believe states identities and interests do not change. The significance of states relative to other actors is declining. "Postmodern forms of world politics" deserve more attention than they have received in the past, even though sovereign states will remain the dominant actor. (Wendt 1992, 424) A self-proclaimed statist and realist; Alexander Wendt is an advocate of constructivism. He argues that statism should not be bound by realist ideas about what the term *state* must mean. Wendt stated identity and interests could not be explained from the principle of anarchy alone, that anarchy is what states make of it. (Wendt 1992) State identities and interests can be collectively transformed by individual, domestic, systemic, or transnational factors within anarchy. (Wendt 1992)

Realists and Neoliberals also neglect important questions in understanding international relations. Martha Finnemore posed the question, "How do states know what they want?" She explained that since paradigms in International Relations are framed in terms of power and interests, the sources of state interests should matter. Neorealists and neoliberalists make assumptions as to what these interests are: power, security, and wealth. A constructivist agrees that states do desire power, security, and wealth, but asks, what kind of power? What kind of security? What does security mean? What kind of wealth? Wealth for whom? She stated interests are constructed through social interaction. (Finnemore 1996) Neorealism cannot predict whether two states will be allies or enemies, or recognize each other as sovereign states. Anarchy cannot explain these behaviors, but constructivism can. (Wendt 1999)

Constructivists are often seen as more optimistic about progress in International Relations than realists. Identities and interests are not grounded in material forces such as human nature or anarchy, but as the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas. Identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. (Wendt 1999) Constructivists reject anarchy as the determining effect of behavior of international actors. Actors are not governed by anarchy's constrain on self-help system, their identities and interests are important in analyzing how they behave. Structure is an idea, not a consequence of nature, while ideas and processes tend to explain the social construction of identities and interests, such ideas and processes form a structure of their own which impact upon international actors. (Finnemore 1996; Wendt 1992) Realists believe structure constrains cooperation, while liberalism believes process can generate cooperation. (Wendt 1992) Constructivists argue

shared ideas, identities, and interests of actors determine cooperation, constructed by these shared ideas rather than rooted in human nature. Anarchy is then defined in cultural rather than materialistic terms. (Wendt 1999)

Political Science and Diamonds

Political scientists have yet to theoretically explain the phenomenon of the Kimberley Process; only minimum emphasis has been placed on the 'clean diamond club' in the field. Grant and Taylor (2004) did explain the evolution of conflict diamonds and described the formation of the Kimberley Process with constructivism read in between the lines. Assessments were also made of the accomplishments and challenges of the KPCS. This paper's intent is to test the International Relations theories of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism hypothesizing that all three are necessary to analyze the creation of the Kimberley Process and understanding state compliance in regards to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. There is a gap in Political Science scholarship on the Kimberley Process. My methodology differs from all other scholarly literature because it is the only study that formally tests International Relations theories with the specific case of the KPCS. Data will also be collected by reports conducted by Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, World Diamond Council, United Nations as well as journalistic articles by Aljazeera and The Associated Press, and Presidential statements and official documents on the KPCS and the CDTA.

Methodology

This paper tests the three theories noted above through an assessment of a set of expectations for how each theory would explain the creation of the Kimberley Process

along with the voluntary cooperation of states participating in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. First, I give history behind the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as well as the United States' legislation, The Clean Diamond Trade Act, which implements the scheme. Second, I test realism by analyzing the U.S. involvement in the Kimberley Process and its compliance with the scheme. (H1) Major Powers (a) created the Kimberley Process and (b) implemented the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme because of their national security interest. Third, I test neoliberalism by analyzing the role of the United Nations in the creation of the Kimberley Process and US compliance with the scheme. (H2) International Institutions mattered in (a) the creation of the Kimberley Process and (b) made a difference in state compliance in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Fourth, I test constructivism by analyzing the role of non-state actors, such as NGOs, De Beers, and consumers, in the creation of the Kimberley Process and how the existence of a new norm influenced the international community to comply. (H3) Major Powers were not the dominating actors in (a) the creation of the Kimberley Process and (b) states complied with the KPCS because of a new existing norm. The last section concludes my findings. My approach to these tests is strengthened by the variety of key role players that justify each theory such as states, institutions, NGO's, business corporations and the media.

Background

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)

Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) first reported on human rights violations going on in African countries enduring civil wars funded by the illegal

trade of rough diamonds. NGO's and the media immediately began urging the diamond industry and governments to formulate a plan of action against blood diamonds. NGOs lobbied corporations on the issue of blood diamonds urging them to take action and responsibility for crimes linked to diamonds in conflict areas. NGOs pressured industry leaders to make changes in their business structure by launching anti-conflict diamond campaigns to bring awareness to consumers about the inhumane acts linked to diamonds.¹⁰ The media publicly reminded corporations of the prior fur boycott and the devastation that a diamond boycott could bring to the industry (Spar 2006). In response to international pressure from non-state actors, diamond trading and producing countries, World Diamond Council, and NGO's met in Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000, to discuss a solution to the illegal trade of rough diamonds. The General Assembly of the UN passed Resolution 55/56 on December 1, 2000 to expand the KP, giving the forum to detail a proposal for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds.¹¹ On November 29, 2001, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Commission, and 32 countries met in Gaborone agreeing to measures to put an end to blood diamond trade. The Gaborone meeting mandated the UN Security Council to pass a resolution, endorsed by the General Assembly, to put in place trade mechanisms to ensure that rough diamonds will in future be exported in tamper-proof containers accompanied by an official certificate of origin. The three-year negotiating process, known as the Kimberley Process, established an international certification scheme to

¹⁰ "Global Witness Is Working To Prevent Diamonds From Fuelling Conflict, Human Rights Abuses and Terrorism" available at http://globalwitness.org/pages/en/conflict_diamonds.html

¹¹ See Id. 9

ensure diamonds could be a positive force for development, and not fuel civil wars.¹²

The KP requires each participant to enact legislation:

- To ensure shipments of rough diamonds, imported or exported, are sealed and accompanied by a validated Kimberley Process Certificate;
- To ensure no shipments of rough diamonds are imported from or exported to non-participants;
- To collect and maintain official production, import and export data, and exchange data with other participants;
- To bring criminal penalties on individuals or companies involved in illegal rough diamond trade.

The KP also required the diamond corporation to adopt an ethical code of conduct in regards to conflict diamonds and labor practices. The U.S. along with 47 other countries announced in the Interlaken Declaration of November 5, 2002, the launch of the KPCS, calling on participants to have their national legislation and rough diamond origin certification schemes in place by Jan. 1, 2003.¹³ The KP extended the deadline to July 31, 2003, and on that date, 54 countries including all 15 members of the EU gained official recognition as participants. (Taylor & Grant 2004)

KP participants and observers (diamond industry and NGOs) meet annually to

¹² See Id. 10 information on the Gaborone meeting can also be found at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>

¹³ The Interlaken Declaration official document can be found at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/document/interlaken_declaration_en.html

have criticized the KPCS describing it as “a poorly written process that’s not enforced²².”

Other organizations believe the KPCS has made a difference in limiting conflicting diamonds and that it does not need to be redesigned, but its provisions need to be enforced.²³ KP members have also voiced their opinion on the matter. When the European Community chaired the KP in 2007, they claimed the process was at a “crossroads” and stating “implementation should be further strengthened and that the KP continue to be vigilant and deal swiftly and effectively with emerging difficulties²⁴.”

The Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA)

The US passed the CDTA as legislation for implementing the KPCS. Although the US is not a producer of rough diamonds, it is significant global trader of both rough and polished diamonds, and the world’s largest consumer market for diamond jewelry.

(Gooch 2008) The CDTA requires the US to:

- Ensure all shipments of imported rough diamonds are in a sealed tamper-proof container and accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate;
- Ensure all shipments of rough diamonds imported to the US are from KPCS participants only;
- Ensure all shipments of rough diamonds exported from the US are to KPCS participants only;

²² “Diamonds Still Bloody Despite Efforts at Reform, Critics Contend” by Katie O’Brien published on Oct. 22, 2009, available at <http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news>

²³ See Id. 15

²⁴ Review the 2007 Program of Action for the KP, “From Conflict Diamonds to Prosperity Diamonds,” published by the EC

- Designate importing and exporting authorities;
- Establish an interagency KP implementation coordinating committee to oversee US implementation efforts;
- Collect and exchange US import and export data of rough diamonds
- Mandate criminal penalties for any person or corporation that violates the terms in the CDTA. Customs laws also apply to rough diamonds imported in violation of the CDTA.²⁵

The WDC and over 100 NGOs supported the Clean Diamond Trade Act that proposed legislation banning the importation of conflict diamonds into the USA. (Grant & Taylor 2004) The US Senate and House of Representatives passed the CDTA on April 8, 2003.²⁶ President Bush signed the CDTA on April 25, 2003, in order to implement the KPCS.²⁷ On July 29, 2003, Bush signed Executive Order 13312 implementing the CDTA. The Act requires that except to the extent that the President can modify the regulations.²⁸ NGOs welcomed the passage stating the CDTA will cut terror funding, human rights violations while protecting legitimate trade. Passage was credited by these NGOs to activists, colleagues in the anti-conflict diamond campaign, American jewelers, and “friends” in the House and Senate.²⁹

²⁵ “The Clean Diamond Trade Act” Public Law 108-19 108th Congress – April 25, 2003

²⁶ “UN Backs Scheme to Block Blood Diamond Trade” published April 15, 2003, available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33834.html>

²⁷ See Id. 23

²⁸ Executive Order 13312, effective date: July 31, 2003, “Implementing the Clean Diamond Trade Act

²⁹ “Statement on the Clean Diamond Act,” by Adotei Akwei, advocacy director for Africa amnesty International, published on April 9, 2003, available at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2003/usa04092003.html>

The United States Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA) is comprised of US agencies and the private, not-for-profit entity. The USKPA implements the international provisions of the CDTA as well as domestic provisions with assistance from the State Department, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce. The USKPA is responsible for facilitating the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificates reporting the statistics to the US government and KPCS participants. The US government currently does not have a plan for monitoring the USKPA, “a major weakness in US diamond law.” (Gooch 2008, 191) and the USKPA does not have a plan to supervise licensees that issue Kimberley Process Certificates. There have been reported problems with the KP certificates it has issued, raising the possibility that the certificates could have been tampered with. (Gooch 2008) Another weakness that has raised concerns with KPCS participants is the lack of a US agency confirming imports of rough diamonds. A United States Government Accountability Office report stated blood diamonds could enter the US because of major weaknesses in the implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act.³⁰ The US sought to enhance data reporting and accuracy by implementing two amendments to the CDTA in 2008. The first amendment called for all shipment values of rough diamonds, even those valued under \$2,500, to be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate. The second amendment called for all US rough-diamond importers and exporters to file an annual report by April 1 of the year following the reported period.³¹ A report published on October 28, 2009, stated the US Department of the

³⁰ Information on the GAO report can be found at http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the_kimberley_process.html

³¹ “Feds Amend Clean Diamond Trade Act: Tweaks Aim to End Conflict Diamond Trade” published on May 28, 2008, available on the National Jeweler Network at <http://www.printthis.clickability.com>

Treasury began to push the enforcement of the new KPCS requirements on importers and exporters of rough diamonds in June 2009 by issuing subpoenas to diamond dealers who were not in compliance with the CDTA.³² Since the implementation of the CDTA, criminals have been charged with smuggling conflict diamonds into the US; however, CDTA prosecution efficiency awaits the verdicts of these cases.³³ (Gooch 2008)

Analysis

Table 1: IR Theory Expectations for State Cooperation in the KP

	Realism	Neoliberalism	Constructivism
Dominate Actors in the creation of the Kimberley Process	Major Powers	Major Powers and International Institutions	Non-state Actors
Reason for state compliance with the KPCS	National Security Interest	International Institutions	New Existing Norm and Interests

Realism

Hypothesis 1: Major Powers (a) created the Kimberley Process and (b) implemented the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme because of their national security interest. There is partial evidence for this hypothesis in the case of the United States. President Bush confirmed in a statement about the signing of the CDTA that the

³² "Kimberley Annual Reports: Enforcement Begins" published on Oct. 28, 2009, by the Jewelers Vigilance Committee available at <http://www.jvclegal.org/index.php?categoryid=303>

³³ On Feb. 4, 2007, Maliki Mohamad Diane and Kouate Saoud were arrested and charged with violating the CDTA after the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies seized 11,000 carats of diamonds.

US “played a key role over the past two years in forging an international consensus to curb such damaging trade and has therefore strongly supported the KP³⁴.” The US was one of the initial countries to get involved in the KP, being a participant in the Interlaken Declaration announcing the launch of the KPCS.³⁵ The world’s superpower and largest diamond consumer took part in the KP, without the US support, the system could have collapsed. (Gooch 2008; Grant & Taylor 2004) Therefore, the US was essential for the prospects of finding a resolution for blood diamonds and the passing of the CDTA was necessary to comply with KPCS. Major powers played leading roles in implementing the KPCS, through legislation, regulation and administrative procedures. (Wright 2004) States were the enforcers of the new diamond law and were responsible for punishing those who did not comply. The US implemented the KPCS by passing the CDTA. Those who violate the CDTA can face up to \$50,000 in criminal penalties and \$10,000 in civil penalties per violation.³⁶ There is evidence that the US was a dominant actor in the creation of the KP and enforcing the KPCS, however, Realism fails to explain why the US implemented the scheme.

A realist would assume the US would act in a manner of their own national security interest. NGOs and scholars pointed out the threat of blood diamonds in regards to the US because of their role in funding al Qaeda. Global Witness published a monograph *For a Few Dollars More* that stated al Qaeda operatives purchased Sierra Leonean diamonds from December 2000 to November 2001 (Grant & Taylor 2004). It was in the US’s self-interest to reduce blood diamonds from entering the diamond market

³⁴ “Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act” published by The White House on April 25, 2003

³⁵ See Id. 13

³⁶ See Id. 23

in fear of funding terrorism, however, the President did not mention national security in his statements regarding the KPCS or CDTA during the time of signing or implementation. President Bush stated the KP was “an important foreign policy objective” because “diamonds are critical to the economic growth and development of African and other countries³⁷,” a statement that gives merit to the theory of a new existing norm influencing policy. Also if compliance with the KPCS were a national security issue, the President would have been timely in signing the CDTA. Although Congress passed the Act in 2001 and 2002, it had to be “reintroduced each year as the Bush Administration was hesitant to sign the bill into law over concerns of loopholes and possible conflicts with WTO parameters.” (Grant & Taylor 2004) The US also did not implement the KPCS until after deadline. National security interest has little merit in explaining the state’s compliance.

Neoliberalism

Hypothesis 2: International Institutions mattered in (a) the creation of the Kimberley Process and (b) made a difference in state compliance in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. There is little evidence for this hypothesis in the case of the United Nations and US. The UN mattered slightly in the creation of the KP. The KP was not a UN negotiation (Wright 2004), but was supported by the UN.³⁸ Though the UN gave KP “status” (Wright 2004, 702), by backing requested mandates. Scholars have noted the KP “took off” because of early UN support, however, scholars also believed the World Diamond Council was influential. (Grant & Taylor 2004; Wright 2004) The UN

³⁷ See Id. 28

³⁸ See Id. 9 and 10

made somewhat of a difference in state compliance in the KPCS by urging members, such as the US, to comply with the KPCS and announcing sanctions on illegal diamonds from countries such as Angola and Liberia.³⁹ The UN initially made a difference in US state compliance by supporting the KP, however, it was not effective in the US implementing the scheme before the initial deadline announced in the Interlaken Declaration. The UN remains ineffective in US compliance with the KPCS as the US currently struggles with enforcing the scheme and providing adequate data.

Constructivism

Hypothesis 3: Major Powers were not the dominating actors in (a) the creation of the Kimberley Process and (b) states complied with the KPCS because of a new existing norm. There is partial evidence for this hypothesis. NGOs, the media, and the diamond industry played key roles in the creation of the KP; however, major powers were key as well during the Kimberley Process. NGOs and the media were dominant actors in bringing public awareness to the atrocities linked to blood diamonds and putting conflict diamonds on the international agenda. “Global Witness, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), and other NGOs have had an unusual level of involvement in developing and building support for the scheme, helping to write the Kimberley Process Technical Document, and playing an active role in negotiations and implementation⁴⁰.” Launching campaigns that provoked the diamond industry to re-systemize out of fear of consumer boycotts (LeBillion 2006), pushed the creation of the KP as well. De Beers soon realized

³⁹ See Id. 9

⁴⁰ Statement published by Global Witness at http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the_kimberley_process.html

a certification scheme would keep excess diamonds off the market, keeping the diamond “rare” and “valuable.” The company managed to turn “a potential attack on their business into a substantial windfall.” (Spar 2006, 206) With support from diamond giants De Beers, the industry formed the World Diamond Council (WDC) to represent the diamond sector in the KP.⁴¹ NGOs and the diamond industry observe KP meetings and monitor compliance; however, they have not been effective in current state compliance. For example, Global Witness called for Zimbabwe’s suspension in the KPCS due to “the country’s non-compliance with the KP requirements and wide-spread government-sponsored human rights abuses⁴².”

There is partial evidence state compliance with the KPCS is due to a new existing norm. Over 100 American NGOs signed public letters on the issue of blood diamonds to diamond corporations. A coalition of human rights, religious, humanitarian, peace and development groups mailed information packets to 4,000 American jewelry industry’s concern, urging them not to take the path of fur. (Grant & Taylor 2004) The United States did not have legislation prior to the Clean Diamond Trade Act regarding the import and export of rough diamonds. International pressure from governments, industry, and NGOs with a shared idea on blood diamonds pressed the US to join the KP and pass the CDTA.

The rapidness of conflict diamonds becoming an international priority is an example of the non-governmental sector, the corporate world and state governments coming together to resolve what was fast becoming a major human security concern. (Grant & Taylor 2004) The anti-conflict diamond campaign “has been largely successful

⁴¹ See <http://www.diamondfacts.org>

⁴² “Failure to Suspend Zimbabwe From Blood Diamond Scheme Undermines Efforts to End Abuses and Clean up International Trade” published on June 6, 2009 available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php

in altering the foreign policies” of states that import and/or export diamonds. (Taylor & Mokhawa 2003) Similar to the anti-apartheid movement, in which Klotz demonstrated the campaign was constructed around the global norm of racial equality, the anti-conflict diamond campaign was constructed around a new global norm. The campaign successfully established the norm that “the purchase of diamonds from conflict-ridden spaces is no longer acceptable.” (Taylor & Mokhawa 2003, 264) Norms on human rights linked to blood diamonds guided NGOs to broadcast the importance for state compliance in the KP. NGOs advanced the issue on the international agenda, persuading states to change their policies on the import and export of rough diamonds and industry to change their business structure around the norm. However, the US has struggled to efficiently implement the KPCS (Grant & Taylor 2004; Gooch 2008; Wright 2004), questioning the significance and legitimacy of this new norm.

Conclusion

Table 2: US Cooperation on Blood Diamonds

	Realism	Neoliberalism	Constructivism
Assumed Dominant Actors	United States	United States and United Nations	NGOs, Diamond Industry
Dominant Actors	Partial Evidence	Partial Evidence	Partial Evidence
Assumed Reason for State Compliance	National Security Interest	Membership in the UN	Global Norm on Blood Diamonds
Reason for State Compliance	No Evidence	Very Little Evidence	Partial Evidence

All three IR theories are needed to analyze state compliance in the KPCS because each theory fails to explain the case fully. I found NGOs were dominant actors in putting the issue of conflict diamonds on the international agenda, while institutions legitimized the KP; states were the dominant actors in enforcing the KPCS. All three theories lack a complete explanation for state compliance in the KPCS to combat blood diamond. The US did not comply with the KPCS out of a national security interest, as realism would have assumed. Institutions mattered only slightly in initiating state compliance in the KP, but are ineffective in state implementation of the KPCS. Constructivism proved non-state actors played a key role in the KPCS creation and may have brought to light a new existing global norm, but non-compliance and ineffective ways to address it bring the norm in doubt. This research adds a case to the “exceptions” of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivist theory. The triple theory failure calls for a new model to explain world politics shifted by government, industry, and civil society.

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