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Shipboard Insurrections, the British Government and Anglo-American Society in the Early 18th Century

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My research has focused on slave insurrections on board British ships in the early 18th century and their perceptions both in government and social circles. In all, it uncovers the stark differences in attention given to shipboard insurrections, ranging from significant concern in maritime circles to near ignorance in government circles. Moreover, the nature of discourse concerning slave shipboard insurrections differs from Britons later in the century, when British subjects increasingly began to view the slave trade as not only morally reprehensible, but an area in need of political reform as well. In the early century, on the other hand, Britons—some of whom occasionally chastised the slave trade and slavery as morally repugnant—fell short of calling for efforts to reform the system. In sum, these observations reveal elements critical to understanding the British world-view in the early 18th century, which was not yet ready to push beyond a simple moral criticism of the slave trade, a task that would be left for Britons of a later generation.

Booth Library played an indispensable role in the course of this research, especially in the early stages. At the most basic level, the library provided nearly all of the secondary sources essential in forming the bedrock of my understanding of the British world in the 18th century, specifically its relation to the slave trade and the various obstacles presented to the slave trade. Digging deeper, the library's online databases provided a significant proportion of my primary sources. *British Periodicals*, arguably the most helpful, provided valuable sources concerning views on shipboard insurrections. Trial versions of *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*, too, provided a considerable amount of primary sources. Moreover, the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* provided important biographical information. Additionally, *Early English Books Online* and the *Oxford English Dictionary* were extremely helpful in research leading up to the present project—a project that extends and borrows from my previous research. Subject-specific online databases (*JSTOR, Historical Abstracts,* and *Project Muse*) were helpful in locating nearly all articles used in this research. (See Bibliography attached as Exhibit "1").

Finally, Booth Library extended professional courtesies in helping me locate essential primary source British government documents housed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. These parliamentary documents supplied the foundation of my understanding of government reactions to slave shipboard insurrections. The remainder of my research took place in various archives and museums in and around London, England over the summer of 2009. This research, supported by a Honors College Undergraduate Research Council Grant, and the documents ascertained in this last leg of my journey, however, could never have been found—nor would have been relevant—without the sound and secure foundation of documents, both primary and secondary, encountered at Booth Library.

Ultimately, the benefit of Booth Library's resources is displayed by the honors thesis that I was able to write. Dr. David Smith, one of the three faculty reviewers of my thesis, observed, it sought to answer "the historian's most difficult" task, "why something *didn't* happen." (A copy of Dr. Smith's memorandum is annexed as Exhibit "2"). My thesis advisor, Dr. Charles R. Foy, believed the thesis of sufficient merit to nominate it for College of Sciences Writing Award, while Newton Key, a second member of my thesis panel, is nominating the paper for the annual

North American Conference of British Studies Undergraduate Writing Award. I have little doubt that without the resources and support of Booth Library such honors for my work would not have been possible.

"A Master's Care and Dilligence Should Never be Over:" the British Government and Slave Shipboard Insurrections[i]
James Buckwalter

Captain Francis Messervy, first time captain on the slave ship *Ferrers* and perhaps overly ecstatic after his most recent successes at sea, maneuvered unprotected below deck to inspect his newly purchased Africans. As he lurched further down into the *Ferrers*, Messervy would have seen sailors whose duty it was to guard against insurrection and the three hundred or more Africans he had recently purchased following a war between two neighboring polities near Cetre-Crue. What Messervy perceived as good fortune, fellow captain William Snelgrave saw as cause for concern, noting that controlling "many Negroes of one Town and Language" had its inherent risks. These suspicions, borne from experience as a slave ship captain, proved correct a few months later when news on the Guinea coast highlighted a large-scale insurrection aboard the *Ferrers*. Captains and tars alike shared tales of Africans who "beat out his [Messervy's] brains with the little Tubs," and of the ensuing battle in which nearly eighty Africans died.[ii]

Despite perceptions among the British public concerning the transatlantic slave trade, slave insurrections such as that on the *Ferrers* in 1722 occurred quite frequently. The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database ("*TASD*") documents twenty-seven slave insurrections occurring on British ships during 1713-1743, as well as an additional five instances in which Africans attacked British slave ships near the coast—amounting to just over one instance per year. To be sure, the number of reported insurrections would increase as the century went on, in part due to an increase in slaving in regions associated with slave insurrections. However, the number of insurrections in the early eighteenth-century was enough to significantly inhibit the profits of slave traders.[iii] What is more, the captains, officers, crew, and financiers of slaving voyages were aware of such insurrections and took considerable measures to prevent them. Captain William Snelgrave in his *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade* (1734), wrote extensively about slave shipboard insurrections. Snelgrave's autobiographical account discussed four slave insurrections over a period of less than two decades.[iv] Moreover, in response to resistance by enslaved Africans, slave traders had by the early 18th century adopted numerous defense mechanisms.

These included fortified settlements scattered on the African coast, increased manpower, and the barricado, a wooden barrier notorious on slavers for providing protection to seamen from rebelling slaves.[v] The public, too, had access to descriptions of insurrections at sea in periodicals. Most importantly, those who wrote about slave insurrections, including Royal Navy surgeon John Atkins, emphasized their importance and suggested methods of prevention. In fact, Atkins soberly noted in his reflections: "there has not been wanting Examples of rising and killing a Ship's Company...but once or twice is enough to Shew, a Master's Care and Dilligence should never be over till the delivery of them."[vi]

While many eighteenth-century slave ship captains may have been diligent about preventing slave insurrections, the frequency, impact, and transparency of slave insurrections have evaded the eyes—and pens—of historians until the last decade or so. This should be no surprise as British government papers, a significant source for slave trade historians, are largely silent on the issue. Undeterred by this, some historians have begun to analyze slave shipboard insurrections.[vii] Moreover, historians have shifted away from European-centered studies of the slave trade, opting instead for inquiries that focus on the victims, introducing a new perspective on the slave trade.[viii] For instance, Eric Taylor has carefully examined the frequency, magnitude, and success of shipboard insurrections, while David Richardson and Joseph Inikori have assessed insurrections' economic effects and Stephanie Smallwood has provided an analysis of women's roles in slave ship insurrections. Lost in this maelstrom of historical analysis is the British government's silence in face of slave shipboard insurrections and attacks by Africans on the coast and how, if at all, the status of race and anti-slavery in the early 18th century Britain relates to this silence.

The British government's limited involvement in controlling shipboard insurrections is anomalous considering these incidents directly threatened the profits of influential British merchants and politicians. Instead, the government discussed taxing slaves, financing African forts, preventing insurrections in its colonies, suppressing piracy, and competing with the other European powers. In each of these instances, we see the British government concerned with issues inhibiting the profits of influential slave trade financiers. What emerges is a situation where the government failed to investigate shipboard insurrections while simultaneously investigating the multiple enemies making similar attempts

to lessen the profits of the slave trade. In the end, the British government's silence regarding shipboard insurrections reflects a silence in British society on the the slave trade.[ix] While accounts of insurrections were made available to the public, the lack of concern given by the government reflects an inability by early 18th century Britons to make meaningful enquiries into the slave trade.

The Slave trade and the Early Eighteenth-century

Marcus Rediker defines mutiny as any "collective effort, planned or spontaneous, to curtail the captain's power and, in the most extreme case, to seize control of the ship."[x] While Rediker refers to sailors and their attempts to resist rigid maritime class distinctions, his definition in many ways parallels attempts by Africans to resist the slave trade. Surely, both seamen mutinies and slave insurrections were collective efforts and both were occasionally planned. Seaman mutineers desired to seize power, as did African insurrectionists, although Africans desired a redistribution of power based on race while seamen desired one based on class.[xi] With this in mind, shipboard insurrections can be defined as any planned or spontaneous collective effort by Africans to resist European power or take control of slave ships.

Similar instances, albeit more ambiguous, involve free coastal Africans attacking European slave ships. Often referred to as being "cut off," attacks like the one experienced by the *Ruby* in 1731 when she was "attacked by the natives" can be defined as any collective attempt by Africans to violently resist European involvement in the slave trade.[xii] Unfortunately, the historical record falls short of providing complete and accurate details for these instances. In the case of the *Ruby*, Francis Moore (a Royal African Company ("RAC") geographer) considered the events that took place an attack by native Africans; however, the *New England Weekly Journal* on March 20, 1732 noted that the captain was "purchasing Negroes" when they "finding an opportunity rose on the ship's company, kill'd Capt. Collwell, and run the ship on shore."[xiii] One possible explanation for this discrepancy holds that the *New England Weekly Journal* and Francis Moore had conflicting definitions of "natives" and "slaves."[xiv] Either way, these conflicting accounts are emblematic of the ambiguity surrounding instances of being "cut off." However, because the government similarly ignored these instances and because of the ambiguity surrounding these attacks, shipboard attacks and attacks by coastal Africans are combined for the purposes of this study.

The early 18th century provides an effective arena for examining shipboard insurrections. Broadly, the slave trade increased exponentially and, although it was a shadow of what it would later become, it was already an integral part of British economic and political life.[xv] Additionally, 1713 saw the end of the War of Spanish Succession, ushering in a quarter-century of relatively undisrupted peace. On the surface, the coming of peace would appear to liberate Parliament from issues of war and international competition, allowing other domestic and imperial issues to be discussed. In addition, one year prior to the treaty Parliament ended RAC's monopolist control over the trade. In terms of the slave trade, this meant that a Parliamentary "vacuum" was created.[xvi] Furthermore, with the burden of the free trade debates lifted, it would appear again that Parliament would have more opportunities to discuss the nature, effects, and prevention of shipboard insurrections. Put another way, lacking the immediate threats of war and issues of how the slave trade would be run, the years after the Treaty of Utrecht appear to have opened new doors for Parliament to deal with threats to the slave trade, such as shipboard insurrections.

Peace, however, lacked staying power. By 1739 Britain was again at war with Spain. Yet the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1743) provides an important glimpse into the slave trade and the issues surrounding it during times of war. Being limited in nature (before it blossomed into the War of Austrian Succession) and at least partly growing out of international competition with the British and Spanish in the 1730s, the War of Jenkins' Ear therefore allows for a comparison between Parliamentary enquiries into shipboard insurrections during both war and peace.

In contrast, traditional studies of the slave trade and its abolition have focused on the last half of the eighteenth-century or later. There are a number of reasons for this, most notably, the fact that the 1720s and 1730s are some of the least documented decades of the slave trade. However, most historians relish a good challenge, so the lack of documentation does not fully explain the lack of historical enquiry. More importantly is the lack of a sustained, and well-organized enquiry into the slave trade. In contrast, the decades surrounding 1700 saw organized debate concerning the organizational nature of the slave trade and the latter eighteenth-century saw the organization of the abolition movement. By this overview, 1713-43 seems like a period in which the slave trade was of little relevance to British authorities.

Yet the slave trade did matter. And it mattered to more than just the Jamaican merchant who referred to the "African trade" as "barbarous" and "inhuman." True, the merchant was arguing in favor of increased productivity, but he also asserted that "it has never yet throve, nor do I believe ever will, till 'tis manag'd with more Justice and Humanity."[xvii] Similarly, William Snelgrave and a host of other mariners wrote about the slave trade and the inherent dangers threatening its well-being and profitability, including slave insurrections, which in many cases "occasioned a terrible Destruction."[xviii] Moreover, historian Christopher L. Brown notes that "Anti-slavery sentiment did circulate in the early eighteenth-century," while conceding "organized efforts to abolish the slave system would not develop until much later."[xix] As these accounts suggest, the burgeoning slave trade of the early 18th century, despite Westminster's inattention and the lack of organized abolition movements, played a pivotal role in British society. Thus, the early eighteenth-century may prove to be the best place to examine the relationship between how both government officials and slave ship mariners regarded the threats that accompanied the slave trade.

The volume of the British slave trade in the early eighteenth-century experienced many hills and valleys. The *TASD* identifies 2,053 British slave voyages during the period 1713-43—an average of 68.4 voyages each year. When broken into smaller periods (1713-1715, then five successive five year periods followed by 1741-1743), we uncover that the late 1720s and the late 1730s experienced the highest yearly averages, with 76.6/year and 80.8/year respectively. On the other hand, in 1713-1715 an average of only thirty-two slave ships sailed each year.[xx] Taking into account the two years prior to 1713 and the years after 1739, the data suggests that war had at least some effect on the volume of the slave trade. Overall, the number of embarked slaves roughly accelerated during 1713-15, 1718-20, 1724-26, 1729-31, and 1736-38, and declined in the remaining years, followed by a general decrease after war broke out. In all, the volume of the slave trade during this period appears to be one characterized by alternating 2-4 year periods of increase and decline. At the very least, insufficient record keeping during this period renders it impossible to cite a precise number of ships sailed or slaves embarked. Moreover, threats from other European powers, pirates, and natural disasters figure prominently into the number of slaves embarked each year. With this in mind, however, the average recorded number of slaves embarked during 1735-39

indicates that nearly 26,000 slaves were transported annually compared to a paltry 15,000 per year during 1713-16, a significant increase in slave trading during the early 18th century.

Detailing Shipboard Insurrections

A total of thirty-three instances of shipboard insurrections or attacks by coastal Africans between 1713 and 1743 have been uncovered by review of the *TASD*, newspaper reports and Eric Taylor's *If We Must Die*.[xxi] This means that 1.6% of British slave ships during our period experienced a *recorded* slave insurrection or attack by coastal Africans. Some factors clouded those figures, including port and financial records, from which much of the data available concerning specific voyages (*TASD*) comes, and the underreported nature of shipboard insurrections.[xxii] This is not surprising. Captains had near authoritarian rule and a vested interest in protecting their reputation.[xxiii] For many, this may have included covering up incidents of ship insurrection. While agents in the Atlantic world as well as ship captains often relayed information back to London concerning other ships, agents of correspondence were sparse while at sea. Under these circumstances, successful—or unsuccessful but non-deadly—slave insurrections might never be reported. In all, any figures on slave ship insurrections can never be fully accurate. Despite these murky waters, Behrendt, Eltis, and Richardson hazard a guess at the true percentage of slave shipboard insurrections. They postulate that, accounts of entire voyages taken by officials at Nantes from 1715-1777, the figure is likely closer to 10% than 2%.[xxiv] What is accurate, therefore, is the prevalence of slave insurrections on British slave ships in the early 18th century.

If slave insurrections occurred on nearly one in ten slave ships, where then did they occur? Traditionally, ship captains and historians have concluded that insurrections were most likely to occur near the African coast. While discussing the process of enslavement, Snelgrave noted that he would unfasten the slaves' irons "soon after we have sail'd from the coast".[xxv] Snelgrave's conduct was consistent with the view of many captains that, "all the Time he [the captain] lied there [on the coast of Africa] he runs the Hazard of the Sickness and Rebellion of those Slaves he already has, they being apter to rise in a Harbour than when out at Sea."[xxvi] In response, ship captains often rushed their slaving procedures to prevent the "increased" risk of mutiny near the coast of Africa.[xxvii] In the face of such

convincing assessments of the slave trade, historians have recently differed on the issue. Eric Taylor has emphasized that reduced manpower near the coast, both due to sickness and European activity on the coast of Africa, led slave ships to become increasingly susceptible to rebellion.[xxviii] Others have disagreed. David Richardson notes that slave ships often spent nearly twice as much time on the coast than at sea, providing a possible explanation the notion that insurrections occurred more frequently near the coast.[xxix]

Another dimension of the location of slave shipboard insurrections manifests itself in the ethnicity of Africans. Snelgrave observed that determining ethnicities were key to understanding revolts. When conversing about the insurrection on Captain Messervy's *Ferrers*, he noted that Messervy had been naïve having "had on board so many Negroes of one Town and Language, it required the utmost Care and Management to keep them from mutinying."[xxx] John Atkins hinted at the magnitude of ethnicity, noting that "Slaves differ in their goodness, those from the Gold Coast are accounted best…an Angolan negro is a proverb for worthlessness."[xxxi] Exactly why the Angolans were described as worthless is uncertain; however, with Atkins' previous experience with slave insurrections, it is possible that their tendency to rebel affected their worth. David Richardson, too, has observed that many captains believed the location of slaving significant; "European shippers of slaves believed that members of some ethnic groups were more prone to rebel than others."[xxxii] While cautioning that his research is tentative, Richardson postulates that the breakdown of political economies may have influenced African rebelliousness toward their European captors. Specifically, his analysis of the slaving and politics of the Senegambia region suggest that increased slave trading may have contributed to "a breakdown of political authority," which induced groups within Senegambia to lash out against slave ships.[xxxiii] While these assertions remain tentative they nonetheless underline one of the key features of slave shipboard insurrections: regional differentiation.

In addition to location of the ship and ethnicity of its slaves, ship captains and modern historians alike have desired knowledge of the specific circumstances of rebellion. Eric Taylor supplies the most comprehensive assessment of these circumstances.[xxxiv] To begin, attacks from pirates or other warships could provide enough of a distraction for slaves to revolt. In the case of the *Elizabeth* in 1721, Snelgrave noted that the Captain and Mate were dead and the ship, "had afterwards been taken to Cape Lahoe…by

Roberts the pirate," until order was finally restored to the second mate.[xxxv] Realizing that this turbulent course of events could lead to rebellion, Snelgrave attempted to force his way with the new captain, suggesting that he hand over all his slaves to Snelgrave. Fearing a mutiny from his sailors, the new captain refused Snelgrave's advice. Mutiny would come, however, but from slaves rather than seamen. Snelgrave's account of the *Elizabeth* thus illustrates that political instability, brought on by skirmishes with pirates or other European ships, could incite a group of slaves to rebel.

Attacks from pirates and warships were not the only forces that could interfere with the political stability of a slave ship. Bad weather, which often forced sailors on deck to navigate and repair damage, could provide a sufficient distraction to incite to a revolt. Slaves also took advantage of a calm night, as did those on the ship *Martha*, who "had form'd a Design to surprise the Crew in the Night Time."[xxxvi] Moreover, many slaves took advantage of the relaxed atmosphere at mealtimes to revolt. On the *Ferrers* in 1721, the slaves rose while eating, using "little Tubs" that held the slaves' food to assault the sailors.[xxxvii] This incident speaks to the dangerous nature of mealtimes; slaves were not only unchained and congregated together, but given instruments that could be used as weapons as well.

Despite the plethora of precautions taken by slave ship personnel, captain and crew negligence hastened insurrections. In fact, Eric Taylor contends that crew negligence the most common factor in slave shipboard insurrections. On the *Ann and Pricilla* in 1716, the crew, forgetting that they left pieces of wood lying on the deck, brought slaves on deck to hoist the vessel's boat. The slaves, taking advantage of their situation, used the pieces of wood to kill the captain and take control of the ship.[xxxviii] Five years later, aboard the *Cape Coast*, slaves took advantage of Captain Wilson venturing ashore to kill a seaman and a boy. RAC agents criticized the Captain's foolishness, declaring that "it would be a very unaccountable history that Thirteen men & four boys Slaves should attempt to rise upon Seven White Men was it not that it seems they were all out of Irons by ye Master's orders."[xxxix] Similarly, William Snelgrave assigned blame to the captain, "who by his over-care, and too great kindness to the Negroes on board his Ship, was destroyed by them."[xl] In short, the captain's lax procedures, absence from the ship, and "over-care" toward slaves all commonly led to slave shipboard insurrections.

While relaxed rule could bring rebellion, "ill usage" of slaves could similarly cause revolt. In order to prevent mutinies, Snelgrave declared it "my principle care, to have the Negroes on board my ship kindly used."[xli] Likewise, rumors frequently spread through the slaves' quarters that their white masters would eat them. Believing these "nonsensical Falsities," as Captain Japhet Byrd termed them, meant that preemptive strikes by the slaves were possible if they perceived an imminent threat to their safety.[xlii]

What is more certain, however, is that slaves aboard slave ships often revolted due to their desire for freedom. In their quest, nearly one quarter of slave insurrections resulted in freedom for at least one slave.[xliii] In 1729, the slaves on the *Clare Galley* revolted near the Gold Coast and took control of its firearms and gunpowder. This convinced the captain and crew that defeat was inevitable, causing them to flea in a longboat. Exactly what occurred after this is subject to debate, however, we do know that some slaves found the freedom they were looking for and that the ship was eventually blown up.[xliv]

Each of these possible explanations of slave shipboard insurrections—desiring freedom, taking advantage of the time, location, "ill usage," or relaxed control—fails to acknowledge the slave trade's violent nature. To be sure, violence employed by Europeans to buttress the slave trade provides the clearest explanation for African violence in their attempts to destroy the Transatlantic slave trade system. Arguably the best support of this claim comes not from instances of slave insurrection but from methods employed by Africans on shore to resist the slave trade. The Balanta people migrated to the coast to escape the grasp of the Muslim slave trade, where terrain and coastal diseases served as a defense. Similarly, Tabancas, or high-walled villages were built by many African societies to resist the slave trade.[xlv] John Oriji identifies a number of measures of resistance, including poisoning the food and drink of slave traders, building walled cities, engaging in armed combat, erecting elaborate roadblocks, and banding together in common defense.[xlvi] Africans also employed panyarring (attacking European slave ships) to secure control of a ship or to retrieve an enslaved family member.[xlvii]

As these examples show, Africans responded similarly to a variety of different encroachments. They fortified their cities, poisoned food, and engaged in armed combat to discourage slave traders. In short, the commonality in each of these instances is the encroachments and violence of the slave trade, not

the other factors described above. True, acts of slave shipboard insurrections could depend on issues such as the time, the location, and the presence—or absence—of Europeans, but the underlying cause of rebellion was the violence of the slave trade system, not the immediate factors preceding each act.

With this in mind, slave shipboard insurrections could end any number of ways. The most common outcome was a failure to take control of the ship. The *Sylvia Galley* (1715), *Robert* (1721), *Elizabeth* (1721), *Ruby* (1723), *Industry* (1729), and countless others suffered this fate. On the *Industry*, a slave woman was found attempting to smuggle gunpowder and ammunition through a small hole in the wall separating the men's and women's quarters. To terrorize other slaves, the crew shot the woman multiple times after her capture and dropped her into the sea.[xlviii] Eight years earlier, on the *Elizabeth*, William Snelgrave gathered the captains of slave ships to decide on the fate of a slave who confessed to an insurrection and murder of the ship's cooper. The captains decided that Snelgrave should "put him to death" to "prevent future Mischiefs." Snelgrave had "all their Negroes upon Deck at the time of Execution," at which time the slave was beheaded and thrown overboard.[xlix]

Slave insurrections occasionally ended in the complete destruction of the slave ship. In 1742 Captain Nathaniel Roberts and the *Mary*'s entire crew were killed in a slave insurrection that resulted in freedom for the slaves and the ship entirely destroyed.[l] When slaves aboard the *Dolphin* revolted in 1735, the ship exploded resulting in death for all on board.[li] Astonishingly, seven crewmembers survived the *Victorious Anne*'s explosion after her slaves rose in rebellion.[lii] In all, there are four cases in which slave insurrections led to the destruction of the ship in our period. By these admittedly incomplete numbers we can surmise that over 10% of slave shipboard insurrections led to the destruction of a slaver.

In spite of this, not all insurrections led to failure. Nearly one-quarter of insurrections resulted in freedom for at least one slave. However, not all successes were similar.[liii] An August 28, 1717 letter Drewry Ottley gives a "melancholy acc't of that unfortunate ship," the *Anne Galley*. The letter notes Captain Clarke's untimely death in June 1717 in the Gambia River. Taking advantage, the slaves rose in July, resulting in the deaths of all but sixteen slaves. Nonetheless, six slaves later managed to jump overboard and escape to freedom near the island of Montserrat.[liv] On September 6, 1721, slaves aboard

the *Cape Coast* took advantage of Captain Wilson's absence, running the sloop ashore. For seven of the seventeen who left the ship alive, freedom was gained.[lv] Running a ship ashore after wresting control from whites represents another common outcome of slave shipboard insurrections. Just as slaves occasionally gained control of a vessel, they could subsequently lose control of the vessel. While little is known about the 1739 insurrection aboard the *Expedition*, we do know that slave deaths were substantial, and that the ship was eventually re-captured by the crew.[lvi] Thus, declaring slaves the "victor" in their rebellions would give little indication of events that transpired. Even when slaves did gain complete control of the vessel, many could have died during the struggle or could be subsequently re-captured.

These examples roughly canvass the spectrum of possible outcomes of slave shipboard insurrections. For historians the picture is imprecise as there is insufficient information for the number of slave shipboard insurrections. For example, on August 30, 1739, slaves aboard the *Princess Carolina* revolted killing some seamen. And yet the subsequent fate of the remaining slaves, crew, and captain are unknown.[lvii] Moreover, Captain Richard Sayers of the *Anne and Pricilla* (1716) allowed slaves on deck to assist the crew. After finding pieces of stray wood lying on the deck, they rose, killed Sayers, and took control of the vessel. Even though the ship was near Gambia, the fate of the crew, the ship, the slaves, and their endeavors for freedom are unknown.[lviii] So, while slave insurrections resulted in myriad outcomes, the fates of many confirmed cases of slave insurrections are shrouded in mystery.

Major Publications and Slave Shipboard Insurrections

As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections came in a number of forms, resulted from a multitude of situations, and had diverse outcomes. This is evident from the accounts of slave shipboard insurrections by various Britons in their personal correspondence, business correspondence, publications, and periodicals discussed above. However, these few examples do not represent fully the entire scope of knowledge that Britons received concerning insurrections. For that, we look deeper into the world of publications, newspaper articles, and RAC and South Sea Company ("*SSC*") correspondence.

Men involved in the slave trade wrote detailed accounts of insurrections in major publications. While they provide detail and specificity, there exists only three major published works during 1713-1743

that deal at length with slave shipboard insurrections. Arguably the most detailed, William Snelgrave's *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade* (1734), has proven immensely useful for slave trade historians.[lix] Snelgrave enjoyed success in his ventures and survived nearly three decades in the violent world of slave trading to publish his accounts. A separate trader, Snelgrave seemed to be popular among his peers and merchants in London (he dedicated his work to the London Merchants).

A New Account takes the reader on an epic journey through the violence of the transatlantic slave trade. Snelgrave's account begins with his first voyage to Old Calabar in 1704, details his service on the *Anne* in the last year of the War of Spanish Succession, followed by his capture by pirates in 1718, and describes his trading at Whydah in 1727 and 1729.[lx] Snelgrave incorporates a detailed discussion of slave mutinies, including methods of prevention and, early on, places mutinies at the center of his discussion by providing a small anecdote as a preface to his accounts. He recalls an instance while on the coast of Africa in which, appalled by the Africans' attempt to sacrifice a small child, he buys the child. Upon returning to his ship, the captain notices that one of his slaves is the child's mother. The mother—and the rest of the slaves—see this reunion as an act of goodwill on the part of Snelgrave, who notes that following this act, the slaves held "a good notion of white men; so that we had no Mutiny in our ship, during the whole voyage."[lxi] By initiating his work with this tale, Snelgrave embraces the centrality of rebellion (and the importance of preventing rebellion) in the life of the slave ship captain.

Following a general discussion of slave trading ventures, Snelgrave arrives on the topic of mutiny once again, declaring that slave mutinies were generally brought on by "ill usage" of the slaves. In contrast, treating the slaves with "humanity and tenderness" would limit the possibility of mutinies as well as preserve the health of slaves.[lxii] Tenderness and humanity would not always suffice, however. Occasionally, Snelgrave would meet with "stout stubborn people," who despite "being kindly used" "nevertheless mutinied." This was the case in 1721 aboard the slave ship *Henry*. When the crew discovered slaves attempting to mutiny, Snelgrave opted for leniency, agreeing not to punish them. A few days later, however, one of the ship's African linguists unearthed another plot to revolt. After this, Snelgrave admits "uneasiness, for I knew several voyages had proved unsuccessful by Mutinies."[lxiii]

In all, Snelgrave's accounts of mutinies "that have ended in a very tragical manner" had the potential to serve as a gentle warning to his fellow traders and merchants. Additionally, while Parliament focused on attempts to maximize profits by dealing with pirates, European competition, and the duties imposed by African traders, personal accounts, like Snelgrave's, took a starkly different stance by focusing on the ability to manage the slave population and prevent rebellion. For Snelgrave, duties, European traders, and even pirates posed little threat to the slave trade regime when compared to the threat of slave mutiny. Snelgrave even refers to the pirate Davis as a "generous friend."[lxiv] While one should not confuse these sentiments with overall goodwill toward pirates, Snelgrave clearly places the threat of slave shipboard insurrection on par with, or above, the threat posed by piracy.[lxv]

Francis Moore's *Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa* offers a similar dynamic between threats posed by pirates, duties, Europeans, and slave shipboard insurrections. Moore essentially writes to articulate the importance of government funding of RAC forts and castles in Africa to the continued well-being of the slave trade. Yet unlike other RAC writers, Moore takes account of slave shipboard insurrections. On November 14, 1730, for example, Moore notes that "about midnight our Ensign was called down by the Centinels, who were then on Duty, in order to prevent the Slaves from making their Escape [from the *Guinea*]." The following month he notes the *John and Anne* was "seized by the Natives" due to "not paying his Customs to the King of Barrah."[lxvi] In April 1732, after leaving Yanimarew, Moore heard tales of a "New England Scooner...cut off by the Natives."[lxvii] Finally, on February 5, 1733, Captain Williams' slaves rose, "killed a great Part of the Ship's Crew; the Captain himself had his Fingers cut by them in a miserable Manner, and it was with great Difficulty he escaped being killed."[lxviii] *Travels*, therefore, argues for government funding to RAC castles and forts and uses instances of slave resistance as evidence. What is more, by employing Moore, the RAC implicitly sanctioned the use of such instances as evidence—an interesting decision, especially considering that MPs (whom this work is no doubt directed towards) rarely acknowledged these threats to the slave trade.

Finally, John Atkins echoes some of Snelgrave's and Moore's themes in his 1737 *A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies*. To begin, Atkins characterizes the relations between Europeans and

Africans as one of "mutual distrust," and in Snelgravian fashion, explicitly warns captain and crew to "to

treat them with all Gentleness and Civility."[lxix] In the case of the *Dove*, Atkins notes the commonplace

occurrence of panyarring.[lxx] To add, Atkins, like Snelgrave and Moore, leaves the reader with a grim

reminder of the dangers of insurrection by debunking the common assumption that "the Negroes

Ignorance of Navigation will always be a safeguard," warning instead that "there has not been wanting

examples of rising and killing a Ship's Company." Finally, Atkins concludes that "once or twice is

enough to Shew, a Master's Care and Dilligence should never be over till the delivery" of the slaves.[lxxi]

In short, Snelgrave, Moore, and Atkins provide Britons with astounding accounts of the danger

associated with the slave trade. In each example, the author provides both warnings and suggestions to

prevent violence. Moreover, each characterizes the threats of insurrections and attacks from coastal

Africans on par with the threats acknowledged by Parliament (piracy, European competition, and African

coastal duties). With these three examples in mind, popular publications regarding the slave trade tended

to emphasize insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans as a central feature of the slave trade system.

Periodicals and Slave Shipboard Insurrections

The publications detailed above appealed to diverse audiences. Snelgrave wrote for London

Merchants. Moore wrote for MPs and influential members of government. Atkins, in all likelihood,

wrote for both. And while the ordinary Briton may have occasionally stumbled across these accounts, the

main avenue for information about the slave trade was periodicals. Publishing numerous accounts of slave

shipboard insurrections—although not as numerous as accounts of piracy or international competition—

periodicals represented the most likely place Britons learned about such instances.

Periodical accounts of slave shipboard insurrections often reached the level of detail apparent in

published accounts but rarely presented the insightful discussions apparent in the latter. A typical

newspaper account might be as short as this September 15th, 1730 account in the *London Daily Post*: "Our

Merchants receiv'd Advice, that the Ship Queen Caroline was lately lost of the Coast of Guinea."[lxxii] On

the other hand, some could run for paragraphs, providing incredible narratives and succinct historical

detail. Moreover, periodical accounts often appeared in multiple periodicals. For example, editors of the

Maryland Gazette printed news of the *Queen Caroline* revolt over a year before and with much more detail that the *London Daily Post* dispatch. Readers of the *Maryland Gazette*, therefore, could read of the Grometto who betrayed Captain Halladay by persuading the "purchased Negroes to rise." When the slaves set out to take over the ship, "One [slave] took an Iron Bar out of the Fire-Hearth, with which he killed the Captain, and all the rest were soon murdered."[lxxiii] The dual accounts of the insurrection in both London and colonial periodicals speak to the "Atlantic" nature of slave shipboard insurrections.

An equally detailed account of shipboard insurrections appears in London's *Daily Journal* on July 4, 1729. After receiving a letter from aboard the *Industry*, the publishers printed the detailed account outlining the slaves' plan "to rise upon the Ship's [*Martha*] Crew," by making themselves "Masters of Gunpowder, Muskets, Shot etc." Unfortunately for the slaves, the rebellion failed and one captured female slave, being unfit for the market, was chosen for punishment. The crew "hoisted her up to the Fore Yard Arm, in View of the other Slaves (who they had disarm'd) and fired half a Dozen Balls thro' her Body; the last Shot that was fired cut the Rope which she was slung by, so that she tumbled…into the Sea at once." Naturally terrified, the remaining slaves arrived at Barbados without any major disturbances.[lxxiv] Like most accounts of shipboard insurrection in London's papers, this account appears in not one, but many periodicals, including the *London Evening Post*, the *Weekly Journal*, and the *London Journal*.[lxxv]

The *Queen Caroline* and the *Martha* represent two of the many slave insurrections aboard British ships that found their ways into colonial newspapers. The insurrection aboard the *Ruby*, for example, appeared in the *New England Weekly Journal* in March 1732.[lxxvi] Similarly, the *Dove*, "was surprised by the Negroes they were trading with, who destroyed the ship, and murdered all her crew, except one of her mates," an account of which appeared in the *American Weekly Mercury* in early 1733.[lxxvii] Not surprisingly, then, accounts of insurrections aboard colonial ships often reached London papers. In October, 1730, an extract of an affidavit of Peter Harlee, who served on the *William* of Boston, appeared in the *Weekly Register*. In the affidavit Harlee states that "the Negro Slaves rose, killed the master and eight men." Harlee was left alive with two boys in order to sail the ship back to Africa, and by feeding the slaves "Opium in Wine and Water" was able, with some assistance, to retake the ship and execute the

leaders of the slave insurrection.[lxxviii] Again, these accounts show insurrections in a decidedly Atlantic light; Britons, both in Britain and its colonies, read about issues relating to slave shipboard insurrections.

Company Correspondence and Slave Shipboard Insurrections

While published accounts of the slave trade and periodicals often featured discussions of slave shipboard insurrections, the RAC and SSC, in their official papers, dealt with insurrections on a much more implicit level. If, for the purpose of this argument, we envision British slave trading society as a hierarchy with those directly involved with the slave trade (captains, crew, etc.) at the bottom, government-affiliated companies (the RAC and SSC) in the middle, and MPs and government officials at the top, those at the bottom acknowledged slave shipboard insurrections far more often than those nearer the top. Insurrections deeply troubled captains and seamen enough to lead them to publish their accounts or send news of insurrections to London and colonial periodicals. The RAC and SSC, while concerned with insurrections, discussed them much less explicitly. MPs rarely acknowledged these incidents.

Instructions to slave ship captains often provided a useful arena to discuss insurrections; to be sure, many RAC letters of instruction hinted at the possibility of insurrection. Instructions to the captain of the *Oxford* (1712) emphasized a secure placement of the ship's gunpowder and the captain taking "good care of the Negroes."[lxxix] From these suggestions, one might be able to logically infer that RAC officials feared someone, crew or slave, using the ship's armaments for ill. Moreover, humane treatment of slaves serves the dual purposes of ensuring that slaves could be sold and guaranteeing the safety of the crew. One year later, RAC officials cautioned the captain of the *Joanna* to "always keep a good guard both at sea and in port to prevent surprise."[lxxx] Once again, officials fell short of explicitly discussing slave rebellion, yet their warnings infer that the RAC considered slave insurrections a pressing issue. More explicitly, *Pindar Galley* records evidence that officials counseled the captain to keep "a watchfull eye over the negroes…that they…be prevented from doing any mischief.[lxxxi]

RAC instructions to their captains followed a loose pattern from 1704 to around 1720, often including individualized warnings to captains of the dangers of the voyage. The cases of the *Oxford*, *Joanna*, and *Pindar Galley*, documented above, represent examples of these; each captain was warned

about various dangers, most notably ensuring the docility of their crew and slaves. Around 1720, however, ship instructions begin to follow a much stricter pattern. In fact, many instructions are not fully copied into the RAC record books.[lxxxii] Instead, they were abbreviated, suggesting that by this time, the RAC began to formalize its records. Further evidence of this increased formality comes in the form of an outline for all instructions at the beginning of RAC record books. After 1720, RAC instructions all began to follow this outline more strictly. Additional changes following this increased formality include an increased focus on documentation of the ship's progress. For example, the RAC initiated a requirement to captains to "take notice of all Negroes…on board your ship" and to "number them [slaves], and enter every such number, with their quality, into the book."[lxxxiii] Officers, too, were required to sign the book to ensure its validity. The RAC additionally required all captains to "render Us an account in writing of every particular taken on board your ship," and within ten days of arriving in London to deliver the record book to RAC Sub Governor or Deputy Governor.[lxxxiv] In short, formalization of RAC instructions focused more energy on the documentation of events of the voyage. With this in mind, the RAC, in implicitly warning its captains of insurrections and requiring draconian documentation of their voyages surely had significant knowledge of slave shipboard insurrections. Yet despite this, the RAC and SSC rarely, if ever, mentioned insurrections explicitly in their correspondence with factors and agents in the Atlantic world.

An examination of RAC Committee of Correspondence records provides further evidence of the RAC's implicit concern for slave insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans. For example, in September 1713, the RAC sent Captain William Cooke and thirty-two individuals, thirteen of which were soldiers, to Gambia Fort in order to "give security."[lxxxv] Nearly two years later, the RAC agreed to "Draught of a petition to her Majesty for some Naval Force to be sent to Africa."[lxxxvi] Another regiment was sent to Cape Coast Castle in February, 1716; once again, the largest portion of the men sent (68) was a group of soldiers (25).[lxxxvii] To be sure, soldiers played an integral part of preserving order at RAC forts and castles. Of the nine salaried staff at Dixiecove, five were soldiers, a ratio which appears to be close to the norm. While the larger forts generally housed less military personnel as a proportion of total Europeans, the average fort had a military/non-military personnel ratio of 67:100 as of August, 1723.[lxxxviii]

Despite the RAC's implicit acknowledgment of slave shipboard insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans, some evidence of reported insurrections appears in RAC letters. On September 30, 1721 Cape Coast Castle factors wrote to the RAC, telling of "the night the Slaves took the opportunity of the Capt. Being on Shoar and the People's Negligence to rise upon them." The slaves killed one man and a boy, but managed to take control of the vessel and run it ashore. The ship captain being on shore, "procured the assistance of the Towns People," to re-capture some of the slaves.[lxxxix] In other words, the RAC had at least some knowledge of slave shipboard insurrections on board their ships—knowledge that would not translate into explicit RAC, or governmental, concern.

Rather than establishing explicit concern for shipboard insurrections, the RAC, like Parliament, focused much of its efforts on eliminating or containing the disastrous effects of piracy, European competition, and coastal duties. While instructing the *Oxford's* captain the RAC noted that pirates "frequently infest the Coast of Africa."[xc] When factors requested an additional man of war to patrol the African coast, they cited a need to protect English forts and ships from "pirates on the coast."[xci] Moreover, on January 25th, 1721, RAC's Committee of Trade and Correspondence took account of "the loss upon the Onslow" captured by pirates.[xcii] The next year, the same committee considered Captain Stoakes' (of the *Guinea*) "Sufferings when taken by the pirates."[xciii] The SSC engaged in similar actions regarding damages to its ships by pirates. In 1717 the SSC declared that it was "not chargeable with Freight for the Twenty Eight negroes taken out of the *Royal Africa* Captn. Foott by the Pyrates."[xciv] In other words, the RAC and the SSC spent considerable efforts attempting to control the effects of piracy on the slave trade in the absence of explicitly tackling the problems posed by slave shipboard insurrections.

European competition, too, played a large role in RAC efforts to maximize the slave trade. Instructions to William Parr requested that he become informed on the "pretensions of the French to the sole Trade of Portodally."[xcv] Additional enquiries into the trade at Portodally were made on February 28, 1715, when the Committee of Trade sought to debunk the French claims of the "sole right to trade" in the region.[xcvi] The threat of the French involved serious consequences. In late July, 1714, the Committee of Correspondence investigated accounts of RAC ships "taken by the French in and about the River

Gambia," and resolved to "make a charge" for the "losses the Company sustain'd."[xcvii] The RAC also

instructed Martin Bladen, newly appointed Commissary to His Majesty, "to procure Satisfaction" for the

"considerable Damages by the Depredations made by the French in time of peace."[xcviii]

The Dutch and Spanish presented similar threats to the RAC and the slave trade as a whole. In

1722, the Committee of Trade and Correspondence ordered that affidavits be taken for men aboard the

Unity, which was "taken by the Spanish Privateer." Two years later, the RAC's Committee of Trade

wrote to the SSC enquiring "in relation to the Negroes taken…in the Ship Unity."[xcix] The same

committee, in 1721, discussed "part of the letter from Cape Coast Castle" which disclosed a description

of a Dutch ship "seizing…the Hanibal & Dispatch, two of the Comp. Ships."[c] With this in mind, piracy

and European competition concerned the RAC to a considerable degree and may help to explain the near

absence of explicit discussions of slave shipboard insurrections.

British Government and Slave Shipboard Insurrections

Like the RAC's peculiar relationship with slave shipboard insurrections, the British Government

rarely discussed these numerous and destructive incidents. In some sense, this should not be a surprise.

In fact, Christopher L. Brown asserts; "From 1713-1787, when the British slave trade reached its apex,

the traffic in African captives only rarely became the subject of sustained discussion in parliament."[ci]

However, Brown's article considers the slave trade as a whole, and concedes a number of exceptions to

this rule. To be sure, while our period (1713-1743) revealed no sustained enquires into the *method* of

trading slaves, the British Government, including parliament, exerted considerable energy toward

addressing threats to the slave trade. By and large, these included piracy, European competition, and,

possibly as an extension of the previous two, funding for the operation of British establishments on the

coast of Africa. With this in mind, the government's systematic failure to address slave shipboard

insurrections, which impacted the profits of the slave trade on a massive scale, is very peculiar indeed.

Maintenance of forts in Africa and the West Indies provided the most common and direct avenue

for the British Government to address the slave trade. On March 9, 1714, for example, the Colonial

Office petitioned Lord Bolingbroke for continued support for the fort at Port Royal, citing its importance

"for the security and defence by H.M. ships, of the Island, and the trade thereof."[cii] Similarly, the Board of

Trade informed the Colonial Office in March 1726 that at the present time, "Forts and Settlements…are

not capable of protecting the ships of your Majesty's subjects," thereby establishing a grave need for

government funding[ciii] Two months later, a Captain "Snelgrove" (possibly the William Snelgrave

discussed earlier) addressed the Board of Trade and Plantations, asserting that the "present forts and

settlements" remained in "bad condition," to the "great disadvantages" of the slave trade.[civ] A few days

earlier, a Captain Bonhan testified to the "mean condition of the forts."[cv]

Similarly, the House of Commons ("HOC") discussed issues relating to forts. In 1729, the HOC

requested an account of the condition of the various African forts and castles, including the quantity and

names of the employees. In February, 1730, the Commons requested an estimate for the maintenance and

defense of the African forts, a request they repeatedly made in subsequent years. [cvi] Moreover, in

February, 1743, the HOC estimated that during the 1730s such costs averaged around £12,000 per year.[cvii]

One of the main reasons for concern over the establishment and continued maintenance of forts—

aside from the RAC's attempts to stop hemorrhaging money—was the incessant attacks by pirates on

slave ships. In concordance with this, the secretary of the Colonial Office appealed for "one or more of

H.M. ships" in order to protect Jamaica from "the great number of pirates that do at present infest those

seas."[cviii] The Board of Trade and Plantations, in an attempt to ascertain the number of ships needed to

protect the African coast from pirates in 1716, asked Mr. Pierce and Mr. Benson of the RAC for their

opinions. They responded, calling for six ships to protect the Company against "Sallee Rovers" and

"several pirates on the coast of Africa.[cix] Ten years later, a captain advised the Board of Trade and

Plantations that "ships of war will be the only proper and effectual protection to the trade."[cx]

Likewise, the House of Lords chimed in on the issue of piracy in 1720, discussing a bill that

would make the recent act of "effectual" suppression of piracy perpetual.[cxi] Further bills for suppressing

piracy were introduced in the Commons in March 1728.[cxii] Additionally, the Commons received several

petitions claiming abuse from pirates on February 20, 1717. Five days later, the HOC again discussed the

"methods for suppressing pirates." Then, on the 27th, Mr. Chetwynde of the Lords Commissioners of

Trade and Plantations presented his relevant papers concerning piracy.[cxiii] For years merchants petitioned Parliament arguing that "pirates do increase, and gather strength daily" inflicting greater losses "than were suffered during the late French wars."[cxiv] In response to these unending pleas for assistance, the Commons frequently sent instructions to ships of war "as they relate to their protecting of His Majesty's Subjects for cruising against pirates.[cxv] As this exhausting list emphasizes, the government dealt with issues of piracy and its effects on the slave trade on fairly consistent basis.

And if incessant pirate attacks were not enough to grasp the government's attention, European competition—mainly through acts of privateering—would. On March 6, 1731, the House of Commons called in numerous merchants to consider their losses at the hands of the Spanish. Richard Copithorne, owner and Captain of the *Betty*, related his story to his fellow countrymen in a plea for assistance. On June 29, 1727, the *Betty* was "attacked by a Spanish Privateer under Turkish Colours." The privateer, according to Copithorne, "charged him with his whole Fire," beginning a violent battle for control of the ship. After five hours of fighting, Copithorne watched his deck "blow up," before he was carried off to the privateer ship.[cxvi] One of the more extreme cases of "Spanish Depredations," the case of the *Betty* had significant implications for those engaged in the slave trade. More specifically, cases like the *Betty* provided merchants with apparitions of the dangers of the slave trade.

A month before the Commons considered the *Betty* Bristol merchants sent a petition "complaining of the Spanish depredations." Liverpool merchants seconded that notion later that month, sending their own complaints on February 25th, 1731. The Commons likewise considered both petitions the day before discussing the *Betty*, calling for a letter to the King requesting a continuance of "his Endeavours to prevent the Depredations of the Spaniards for the future." [cxvii] Continuing in this manner, the Commons contemplated a petition from the *Ann Galley* relating to the "unjust capture and seizure of their ship...and her cargo by the Spanish." Moreover, the Commons considered complaints of the seizure and detention of the *Scipio* by the Spanish.[cxviii] Once again, the Commons responded to these complaints and others by relating them to the King in a series of "humble Addresses." [cxix]

The Board of Trade and Plantations dealt with similar issues. In November 1715, four RAC members addressed the Board, claiming "their trade was in great danger…from French and Dutch rivals."[cxx] Likewise, in December 1715, the Board read a letter from a Mr. Harris that posited "the assistance of a ship of war was necessary to preserve the interests of the Company there."[cxxi] Similarly, the RAC sent Mr. Hopegood and others to the Board of Trade and Plantations in August 1719 to inform the Board of "the ships taken from them by the French in the time of peace."[cxxii] With this in mind, merchants and RAC officials alike continuously pestered the Commons and the Board of Trade for assistance in dealing with European competition regarding the slave trade.

While piracy and European competition presented formidable threats to the slave trade, the government occasionally recognized other threats, including natural disaster, shipwreck, desertion, and, in one instance, mutiny. Dealing with shipwreck, the HOC received a petition for a bill for a "more effectual" recovery of ships and goods driven ashore by "distress of weather."[cxxiii] Similarly, the Commons took measures to prevent seamen from deserting merchant ships on the coast of Africa and attempted to thwart mariners' engaging in "private service" or taking any "craft" belonging to any merchant ship.[cxxiv] In other words, parliament sought to curb the hemorrhaging of both men and goods from slave ships. The House of Lords in 1717 announced a bill to make perpetual an act calling for the "preservation of all such ships and goods which shall happen to be found on shore, or stranded," in parts of the empire.[cxxv] Apparently, the government was concerned about the profitability of the trade so much so that they would resort to discussing and codifying bills aimed at scavenging stranded ships. Finally, in one instance the HOL addressed ship mutinies—whether the Lords directed this proviso toward slave insurrections or seamen mutinies is unclear. The specific proviso was added by the Earl of Clarendon to the act mentioned above and called for a death sentence to anyone "who shall willingly destroy" a ship.[cxxvi] In sum, the British Government exhibited a strong interest in addressing threats to the profitability of the slave trade. The Commons, Lords, and various committees and offices directed their efforts toward suppressing piracy, securing reparations from the Spanish and French, and providing enough funding to maintain African and West Indian forts to prevent attacks from the former. In all, the

British Government directly confronted every significant hazard to the slave trade other than slave shipboard insurrections.

Conclusions

As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections played a fundamental role in the British slave trade. Because insurrections and other acts of African resistance endangered the success of individual voyages, ship captains and mariners found the prevention of such acts the key to continued safety and success of the slave trade. London and colonial papers, too, frequently printed accounts of slave shipboard insurrection. Thus, those directly involved in the slave trade and readers of periodicals would not have been surprised when encountering descriptions of revolt. Others involved in the slave trade, such as RAC factors and agents, recognized slave shipboard insurrections as well. Accounts by RAC factors and agents, however, occur much less often. Moving upward through the social hierarchy, influential members of the RAC rarely addressed insurrections explicitly. Nevertheless, the RAC implicitly acknowledged the need to protect against insurrections by frequently requesting assistance from the Royal Navy in defending their forts and settlements. Furthermore, ship captains could read between the lines of instructions from the RAC and infer that preventing a slave rebellion would be central to the success of their voyage. Like the top echelons of the RAC, government circles rarely—if ever—took notice of slave shipboard insurrections. Paradoxically, parliament and the various boards and committees spent inestimable amounts of time dealing with piracy, European competition, and funding RAC forts and settlements—all of which posed threats to the profitability of the burgeoning slave trade.

The question thus remains: Why did the British government fail to recognize slave shipboard insurrections as a formidable threat to the slave trade? Answering this question is problematic, as research may never uncover the true motives of those individuals involved with governmental decisions in the early eighteenth-century. Still research can uncover the possible factors at play.

A few essential conclusions may be derived from the evidence. First, one may conclude that the government simply had insufficient time to tackle slave shipboard insurrections because they were bombarded with other issues relating to the slave trade. While this conclusion has its merits, it not only

fails to explain the lack of discussion for shipboard insurrections, but overstates what may simply be an effect of the lack of discussion, not a cause. In other words, it is unclear whether the lack of discussion of insurrections provided time for the discussion of the other threats to the slave trade, or vice versa.

The more pessimistic conclusion to be drawn from the paradox holds that government officials avoided acknowledging shipboard insurrections because acknowledging such acts would, in effect, concede that there were a significant and active "resistance movement," against the slave trade. In other words, resistance to the British slave trade by pirates and other Europeans would not pose a moral threat to the slave trade because pirates and Europeans were motivated by self-interest and profit. Resistance from the victims of the slave trade, however, might be seen as an enquiry into the morality of the slave trade.[cxxvii] While this thesis seems alluring, it is significantly flawed. For example, the complete omission of slave shipboard insurrections would have required an unattainable conspiracy with the compliance of numerous individuals. Moreover, the government's significant discussion of slave resistance in the West Indies counteracts, in some way, this thesis. Presumably, explanations for slave rebellions in the new world (which include the uncivilized heathen nature of the slave) could simply be superimposed as a justification of shipboard insurrections. Officials, therefore, would be able to discuss and help prevent slave shipboard insurrections without widespread moral enquiry into the slave trade.

Finally, the nature of British society, its conception of race, and its relationship with the slave trade help provide yet another conclusion. In *Moral Capital*, Christopher L. Brown characterizes the sudden indignation toward the slave trade by Britons in the second half of the eighteenth-century as a "decision to act" on a previously held conception of slavery as "abhorrent."[cxxviii] While the failure to pinpoint the stimulus for this decision represents one of the limitations of *Moral Capital*, the stimulus that led individuals to question the morality of the slave trade may help us make sense the government's lack of discussion about slave shipboard insurrections earlier in the century.[cxxix] Put another way, the government's failure to discuss slave shipboard insurrections reflects Britons' relationship with the slave trade at the time, which was one of perceived moral injustice, yet reluctant acceptance of the system.

Lynn Hunt, author of *Inventing Human Rights*, provides yet another hint as to the factors underlying this paradox. Hunt ultimately concludes that a new sense of "empathy" developed in the mid-18th century, one that fostered from increasing connections between various groups of inherently different people. Novels played an integral role in this transformation by making "the point that all people are fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings."[cxxx] Moreover, it was not until the 1760s that human rights—derived from feelings of similarity between humans—and "new attitudes about both torture and humane punishment first crystallized."[cxxxi] For the purposes of this study, these assertions carry enormous weight. They hint that in the early 18th century, Britons may not have held the capacity (which ultimately could be acquired over time) to feel the equivalent to today's definition of "empathy." This means that individuals who ran operations in London, without significant interactions with Africans and with a definition of "empathy" that inherently excluded Africans, were unable to see actions made by Africans during the middle passage as individual actions legitimized through the common link of humanity. In fact, revolting Africans were not seen as individuals at all. Furthermore, members of the government and RAC would not have equivocated revolting Africans with a moral challenge to their economic system. Neither grand conspiracy nor moral enquiry, it seems, could have occurred.

Considering the hierarchical levels of concern for shipboard insurrections and Lynn Hunt's assertions concerning the British mindset and "human rights" issues, it is clear that this system arose from the inability of individuals (absent from direct contact with Africans) to connect acts of resistance with a moral challenge to the slave trade. Had they been able to do so, they could have either conspired to explicitly ignore these actions or they could have acted to reform their injustices. To the twenty-first century observer, these two choices appear the only viable options. Without a new meaning of "empathy," however, early 18th century government officials likely failed to characterize acts of resistance as a moral challenge—a connection they *would* make later in the century—and therefore, failed to both conspire against or reform to accommodate acts of African resistance. Thus, government officials continued to ignore—although not knowingly—shipboard insurrections until new definitions of empathy took hold of the popular consciousness, demanding an encompassing moral inquiry into the slave trade.

ENDNOTES

[i] The author would like to thank EIU's Honors College, who provided research funds, my thesis advisor Dr. Charles R. Foy, Dr. Newton Key, and Dr. David Smith.

[ii] William Snelgrave, *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade* (London, 1971), 185-191; Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (New York, 2007), 213, 287; Eric Robert Taylor, *If We Must Die: A History of Shipboard Insurrections During the Slave Trade* (Ann Arbor, 2000), 145; Stephanie Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora*, (Cambridge, 2007), 103-4.

[iii] David Richardson, "Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade," *William and Mary Quarterly ("WMQ")*, Vol. 58:1 (Jan., 2001): 77. David Eltis, David Richardson, and Stephen Behrendt estimate that nearly one in ten slaving vessels from 1698-1807 experienced a slave revolt. Stephen Behrendt, David Eltis, & David Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion: African Agency in the Pre-Modern Atlantic World," *Economic History Review* 54-3 (2001), 456.

[iv] William Snelgrave, *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade*, (London, 1971), 165, 168, 174, 185. The four insurrections were on the *Eagle Galley* in 1704, the *Henry* in 1721, the *Elizabeth* in 1721, and the *Ferrers* in 1722.

[v] Rediker, *The Slave Ship*, 70. Pretexat Oursel's lithograph "Transport des Negres dans le Colonies," depicts a barricado on a French slave ship. *The Slave Ship,* Illustration insert, p. 5; Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion," pp. 467-9.

[vi] John Atkins, *A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies* (London, 1737), 175.

[vii] Eric Taylor, *If We Must Die: A History of Shipboard Insurrections During the Slave Trade* (Ann Arbor, 2000); David Richardson, "Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade," *WMQ* 58-1 (Jan., 2001), 69-92; Joseph Inikori, "The Volume of the British Slave Trade, 1855-1807," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 32-128 (1992), 643-688; Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery*, 33-34, 56-56, 102-103, 162; Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion," 454-476.

[viii] Anne C. Bailey, *African Voices of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Beyond the Silence and the Shame* (Boston, 2005); Sylviane A. Diouf, ed., *Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies* (Athens, 2003).

[ix] To be sure, while some individuals rebuked the slave trade in the early eighteenth-century, they limited themselves to moral criticisms, rather than acting on their written assertions or questioning the Empire's policies. Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, 2006), 2-3.

[x] Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750* (Cambridge, 1989), 227-8.

[xi] An example of captains' behavior that could lead slave ship mariners to mutiny was vividly described by Thomas Vincent in a letter to New York's Attorney General. Undated letter from Thomas Vincen to William Kempe, Kempe Papers, Box 16, Folio 1, New-York Historical Society ("he chained me down Between Decks among his Slaves and Suffered [Negro] Boatmen and Boys to use me ill").

[xii] Francis Moore, *Travels*, in Elizabeth Donnan, *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, Volume II: the Eighteenth-century* (New York, 1965), 399n; Christopher Fyfe, 'Moore, Francis (*bap.* 1708, *d.* in or after 1756)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

[xiii] *New-England Weekly Journal,* March 20, 1732, Issue 261.

[xiv] Accounts of the slave trade in the half century after 1688 seem to prefer the term "native" when referring to a free African not in the service of Europeans while reserving the term "negro" or "slave" for enslaved Africans or Africans employed by Europeans. With this in mind, there still remains some degree of uncertainty in many instances.

[xv] Inikori, "The Volume of the British Slave Trade, 1655-1807," 651.

[xvi] Christopher L. Brown, "The British Government and the Slave Trade: Early Parliamentary Enquiries, 1713-83," *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007, Supplement), p. 41.

[xvii] *A Letter from a Merchant at Jamaica to a Member of Parliament in London, Touching the African Trade,* (London, A. Baldwin, 1709), 11-13.

[xviii] William Snelgrave, *A New Account of some Parts of Guinea, and the Slave Trade* in Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, 361. Additionally, Francis Moore and John Atkins wrote about slave insurrections aboard slave ships in great length.

[xix] Brown, *Moral Capital,* 36. See also Philip Gould, *Barbaric Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Cambridge, 2003), 15.

[xx] This figure does not include slave ships whose period is known, but whose exact year not. There were 72 examples of unknown dates during 1711-1715. By assuming that the real figure for the years 1713-1715 is somewhere within the middle 50% of the 72 cases (or, between 18 and 54 instances) the figure jumps from 32/year to between 38 and 50 per year, the latter of which is still considerably lower than the rest of the years in this study.

[xxi] Taylor, *If We Must* Die, 162, 206, 273, 275-6; *American Weekly Mercury,* January 11, 1733 (680); *Boston Gazette,* November 8, 1725 (310); *New England Weekly,* September 30, 1735 (443); *Maryland Gazette,* April 22, 1729 (85); *Daily Journal* (London), January 23, 1729, (2510); *Weekly Journal* (London), January 25, 1729 (192); *Daily Journal,* August 31, 1725 (1443); *Weekly Journal,* September 4, 1725 (19); *London Journal,* September 4, 1725 (219); *British Journal* (London), September 4, 1725 (155); *Daily Journal* (London), June 9, 1727 (1998); *Parker's Penny Post* (London), June 12, 1727 (329); *Daily Post* (London), June 9, 1727 (2406); *British Journal* (London), June 10, 1727 (246); *Weekly Journal* (London), June 10, 1727 (169). The nine instances of slave ship insurrections that Taylor identifies are the *Queen Caroline* (1728), *Restoration* (1729), *Ann* (1729), *Cape Coast* (1721), *Dove* (1733), *Princess Caroline* (1737), *Martha* (1725), *Dolphin* (1735), and *George* (1727).

[xxii] Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion," p. 455. The figures outlines above correspond roughly with Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, who characterize port and financial records as "biased against information about what happened during the voyage itself, particularly if the voyage was terminated prematurely." Taylor, *If We Must Die,* p. 4.

[xxiii] Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea,* p. 124.

[xxiv] Behrendt, Eltis, & Richardson, "The Costs of Coercion," 456. Because slave ships that experienced insurrections often experienced increased mortality among mariners, both due to African disease and the violence of the insurrections itself, it is likely that insurrections were underreported by sailors as well as captains. Rediker, *Slave Ship,* 173.

[xxv] William Snelgrave, *A New Account of Guinea,* 163.

[xxvi] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II,* 402, 281

[xxvii] Taylor, *If We Must Die,* 86.

[xxviii] Ibid., 105, 110.

[xxix] Richardson, "Shipboard Revolts," 75.

[xxx] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative : Volume II,* 360.

[xxxi] Ibid., 282.

[xxxii] Richardson, "Shipboard Revolts," 79.

[xxxiii] Ibid.,89.

[xxxiv] Taylor, *If We Must* Die, 112-117.

[xxxv] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II,* 356.

[xxxvi] *Boston Gazette,* November 8, 1725 (310).

[xxxvii] Snelgrave, *A New Account of Guinea,*185-191.

[xxxviii] Taylor, *If We Must Die,* 117.

[xxxix] "CCC to London, 30 September 1721," T70/7 ff. 30-31v, British History Online ("BHO"), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/

[xl] Snelgrave, *A New Account of Guinea,* 185.

[xli] Ibid.,162.

[xlii] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative : Volume II,* 460. Explaining attacks by coastal Africans is more difficult to assess. Because these attacks were often planned on land, they tend to reflect personal issues and commercial disagreements. For example, Thomas Stoneham, captain of the *John and Anne,* ventured ashore in 1730 and was "seized by the Natives, for anchoring at the Port of Gillyfree, and not paying his Customs." Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II,* 397. Moreover, the *Ruby,* discussed earlier, had similar problems with natives who erupted to kill Captain Colwell.

[xliii] Taylor, *If We Must Die,* 258.

[xliv] Ibid., 192, 275; Rediker, *Slave Ship*, 298.

[xlv] Walter Hawthorne, "Strategies of the Decentralized: Defending Communities from Slave Raiders in Coastal Guinea-Bissau, 1450-1815," in Sylviane A. Diouf, ed., *Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies* (Athens, 2003), 156.

[xlvi] John Oriji, "Igboland, Slavery, and the Drums of War and Hedonism," in Diouf, ed., *Fighting the Slave Trade*, 125.

[xlvii] Diouf, "The Last Resort: Redeeming Family and Friends," in Diouf, ed., *Fighting the Slave Trade*, 112.

[xlviii] Taylor, *If We Must Die*, p. 156.

[xlix] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, pp. 356-9.

[l] Taylor, *If We Must Die*, 280.

[li] Ibid., 278.

[lii] Ibid., 271.

[liii] Ibid., 258.

[liv] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, 232n ; Taylor, *If We Must Die*, 272.

[lv] Taylor, *If We Must Die*, 273; Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery*, 33-4.

[lvi] Taylor, *If We Must Die*, 279.

[lvii] Ibid., 279.

[lviii] Ibid., 117, 272.

[lix] Archibald Dalzel [*formerly* Dalziel] (1740–1818), who published *The History of Dahomy* in 1793 drew from Snelgreave's work; James A. Rawley, "Dalzel [*formerly* Dalziel], Archibald, Historian and Slave Trader," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

[lx] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, 342n.

[lxi] Snelgrave, *A New Account of Guinea*, Introduction.

[lxii] Ibid.,162.

[lxiii] Ibid.,168-173.

[lxiv] Ibid.,280.

[lxv] Ibid.,265.

[lxvi] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative : Volume II*, 397.

[lxvii] Ibid. 409.

[lxviii] Ibid., 410.

[lxix] John Atkins, *A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies*, 2nd ed. (London : Ward and Chandler, 1737), 58; Donnan, *Documents Illustrative : Volume II*, 271. Donnan, *Documents Illustrative : Volume II*, 281.

[lxx] Atkins, *A Voyage to Guinea*, 152.

[lxxi] Ibid. 173-5.

[lxxii] *London Daily Post*, September 15, 1730 (429).

[lxxiii] *Maryland Gazette*, April 22, 1729 (85).

[lxxiv] *Daily Journal* (London), July 4, 1729 (2649).

[lxxv] *London Evening Post*, July 3, 1729 (246); *Weekly Journal* (London), July 5, 1729 (215); *London Journal*, July 5, 1729 (518).

[lxxvi] *New-England Weekly Journal* (Boston), March 20, 1732 (261).

[lxxvii] *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia), January 11, 1733 (680).

[lxxviii] *Weekly Register*, October 17, 1730 (28), 104.

[lxxix] Royal African Company, "Copies of Instructions From the Royal African Company of England to the Captains of Ships in their Service No. 4 From August the 3rd 1704 to November the 4th 1719," National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom ('TNA') T70/63, p. 115.

[lxxx] RAC, "Copies of Instructions," TNA T70/63, p. 116.

[lxxxi] Ibid.,150.

[lxxxii] RAC, "Copies of Instructions from the Royal African Company of England to the Captains of Ships in their Service, No. 5 From November the 4th 1719 to October 1744," TNA T70/64, p. 136.

[lxxxiii] Ibid.

[lxxxiv] RAC, "Copies of Instructions given by the Royal African Company of England to Captain of Ships and Mates in their Service from May the 5th 1737," TNA T70/65, p. 3.

[lxxxv] RAC, "Minute Book of the Committee of Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England No. From January the 20th 1712 to April the 27th 1716," TNA T70/120, 17 September 1713.

[lxxxvi] RAC, "Minute Book of the Committee of Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England," TNA T70/121, 15 September 1715.

[lxxxvii] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/ 121, 9 February 1716.

[lxxxviii] RAC, "Carlyle: Journal, 1680-1681," TNA T70/1216, 2 August 1723; Data was taken from the ten forts with available data: Dixiecove, Succondee, Commenda, Annamaboe, Agga, Tantumquerry, Winnebah, Accra, Cape Coast Castle, and Gambia. The total percentage of all military personnel was 39%.

[lxxxix] RAC, "Letters and reports from Cape Coast Castle to the Court of the Royal African Company in London," TNA C113/274, part 1, pp. 24-5.

[xc] RAC, "Copies of Instructions," TNA T70/63, p. 114.

[xci] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/121, 1 November, 1716; Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, 243.

[xcii] RAC, "Minute Book of the Bye-Committee of the Committee of Trade and Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England No From June the 10th 1720 to January the 4th 1722," TNA T70/123, 25 January, 1721.

[xciii] RAC, "Minute Book of the Committee of Trade of the Royal African Company of England No From February the 6th 1722 to April the 7th 1725," TNA T70/124, 27 March, 1722.

[xciv] Donnan, *Documents Illustrative: Volume II*, 229.

[xcv] RAC, "Copies of Instructions," TNA T70/63, p. 168.

[xcvi] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/121, 28 February, 1715.

[xcvii] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/120, 29 July, 1714.

[xcviii] RAC, "Instructions for Martin Bladen Esq. appointed His Majesty's Commissary to treat with the Commissary or Sommissaries to be appointed by the most Christian King," TNA C78/166, p. 16.

[xcix] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/123, 28 November, 1722; T70/124, 1 May, 1724.

[c] RAC, "Committee of Correspondence," TNA T70/123, 15 August, 1721.

[ci] Christopher Leslie Brown, "The British Government and the Slave Trade: Early Parliamentary Enquires, 1713-83," *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007), 27.

[cii] "9 March, 1714," *Calendar of State Papers: Colonial, America and West Indies*, Volume 27, BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 606.

[ciii] "19 May, 1726," *Calendar of State Papers: Colonial, America and West Indies*, Volume 28, BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 150. Ibid., 251-270.

[civ] Journal, May 1726: Journal Book C.C', *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 5: January 1723 - December 1728* (1928), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 251-270.

[cv] Ibid., 251-270.

[cvi] House of Commons, *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 21 (1803), 476, 631.

[cvii] House of Commons, *Journals*, UIUC, Vol. 24, 552.

[cviii] 12 April, 1717," *Calendar of State Papers: Colonial*, Volume 29, BHO, p. 526.

[cix] 'Journal, October 1716: Journal Book S', *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 3: March 1715 - October 1718* (1924), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 184-186.

[cx] 'Journal, May 1726: Journal Book C.C', *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 5: January 1723 - December 1728* (1928), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 251-270.

[cxi] House of Lords, *Journals of the House of Lords*, UIUC, Vol. 20 (1803), 315.

[cxii] "6 March, 1728," *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 21, 251.

[cxiii] 27 March, 1728," *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 18, 750-1.

[cxiv] "9 February, 1721," *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 19.

[cxv] "31 March, 1729," *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 21, 303.

[cxvi] "Introduction: Minutes of 1731, illustrative," *The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons: Volume 9: 1734-1737* (1742), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, I-XIII.

[cxvii] "First Parliament of George II: Fourth session - begins 21/1/1731," *The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons: volume 7: 1727-1733* (1742), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 69-86.

[cxviii] *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 23, 297.

[cxix] "Second Parliament of George II: Fourth session (5 of 9, begins 3/3/1738)," *The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons: Volume 10: 1737-1739* (1742), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 96-159.

[cxx] "Journal, December 1715: Journal Book R," *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 3: March 1715 - October 1718* (1924), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/,, 95-101.

[cxxi] "Journal, October 1716: Journal Book S," *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 3: March 1715 - October 1718* (1924), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/,, 184-186.

[cxxii] "Journal, August 1719: Journal Book V," *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Volume 4: November 1718 - December 1722* (1925), BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 88-103.
Journals of the House of Commons, UIUC, Vol. 22 http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 603, 805.

[cxxii] *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 23, p. 310.

[cxxiii] *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 22 http://www.british-history.ac.uk/, 603, 805.

[cxxiv] *Journals of the House of Commons*, UIUC, Vol. 23, p. 310.

[cxxv] *Journals of the House of Lords*, UIUC, Vol. 20, p. 598.

[cxxvi] *Ibid.*, p. 642.

[cxxvii] This is not to say that slaves were motivated by a desire for just commerce or morality. Slaves who revolted, in all likelihood, did so out of necessity and, as discussed previously, were likely pushed to do so by the extreme violence associated with the slave trade system.

[cxxviii] Brown, *Moral Capital*, p. 3.

[cxxix] Some historians have proposed suggestions, including Richard Huzzey, who posits that a shift in the concept of providence led individuals to act of their inhibitions concerning the slave trade.

[cxxx] Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights* (New York, 2007), 39.

[cxxxi] Ibid., p. 75.

Bibliography

Manuscripts

Manuscripts found in the National Archives at Kew provided the bulk of primary sources used in my research. In all, these sources built on information located at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign but found by Booth Library librarians. These documents largely buttressed assertions which were built on research done primarily at Booth Library, yet at the same time added additional documents and perspectives.

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Undated letter from Thomas Vincent to William Kempe, Kempe Papers, Box 16, Folio 1.

Periodicals and Newspapers

I used periodicals and newspapers primarily for detailing instances of shipboard insurrection. These accounts also became useful in determining exactly what information early 18th century Britons had access to regarding of shipboard insurrections. I found the majority of the following periodicals in London at the British Library; however, initial research conducted at Booth Library using *Eighteenth Century Collections Online* and *British Periodicals* was extremely helpful in identifying periodicals to research in London.

England:

British Journal (London)
Daily Journal (London)
Daily Post (London)
Grub-Street Journal
Universal Spectator
London Journal
London Evening Post
Parker's Penny Post (London)
Weekly Journal (London)

Weekly Register

North America:

American Weekly Mercury (Philadelphia)
Boston Gazette
Maryland Gazette
New England Weekly
New-England Weekly Journal

On-Line Databases

Containing government papers from the early 18th century, *British History Online* proved to be one of the most fertile sources for British government documents during the course of my research. The plethora of documents available in this database provided a firm background into the nature of British government records as well as an idea of what I might find on the final leg of my journey. The *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, furthermore, provided information on individuals I encountered in my research.

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Published Primary Sources

The following primary sources helped establish the British government's discourse concerning slave shipboard insurrections. The journals of both the House of Lords and House of Commons were found at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign library; however, these would not have been located without invaluable assistance from Booth Library's librarian staff. Additional primary sources listed below assisted in forming an understanding of shipboard insurrections from the perspective of individuals directly involved in the slave trade.

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Secondary Sources

Secondary sources proved immensely useful during my research. The titles listed below range from sources which describe the slave trade as a whole to much more specific topics within my research, such as, piracy, human rights, and abolition. A few of the most useful titles include Eric Taylor's groundbreaking work on shipboard insurrections, David Richardson, David Eltis, and Stephen Behrendt's collective work on the costs of shipboard insurrections, and Marcus Rediker's *The Slave Ship*. Booth Library assisted in providing these works through online databases and interlibrary loan services.

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