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# Tanzania-Zambia Railway: Escape Route from Neocolonial Control?

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## TANZANIA-ZAMBIA RAILWAY: ESCAPE ROUTE FROM NEOCOLONIAL CONTROL?

ALVIN W. WOLFE\*

THE FIRST REQUISITE for African development is that African countries combine what little wealth and power they have toward the end of getting a greater share of the products of world industry. They may be able to get that greater share by forcing through better terms of trade or better terms in aid, but they will never get any greater share by continuing along present paths, whereby each weak and poor country "negotiates" separately with strong and rich developed countries and supranational entities such as the World Bank and major private companies. If they hope to break those neocolonial bonds, Africans must unite—if not in one pan-African political unit that can truly plan and carry out the economic development of this resourceful continent, then at least in African communities that can strike a better bargain to avoid further depressing exploitation.<sup>1</sup>

Many discussions of African economic development and of African economic integration lead into lengthy discussions of the variety of technical models applicable and inapplicable, using concepts such as fiscal restraint, equilibrium growth rate, capital-output ratio, structure of production, intersector balance, and so forth. Without denigrating these valiant and no doubt necessarily complicated efforts, it is suggested that much of the problem of development is a matter of power and intent. Inefficiencies due to ignorance of economic details or to asocial motives may slow development in particular cases but they do not make for the differences between the developed and the "less-developed," differences that are still growing as the rich get richer and the poor get relatively poorer.<sup>2</sup> Power makes the difference, and intent makes the difference. If the three-quarters who are poor had the power and the intent they would so arrange affairs that the price of primary products did not fall as the price of industrial products rises. In fact, if they had the power and intent they could reverse the process so as to "exploit" the producers of industrial goods until something closer to parity exists.

Inefficiencies in the "developed systems" are well known. The waste of natural resources, the pollution of the earth and sky with unused and unusable junk, the expenditure of energy and resources on many inefficient, dysfunctional activities, all tell us that carefully measured

\* *The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Andrew Carvely in the research and writing of this article on the Tanzania-Zambia rail link.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. René Duménil, *False Start in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1969), and Guy Hunter, "The New Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 48, July, 1970, pp. 712-725.

<sup>2</sup> For studies on African development, see Lester B. Pearson, et al., *Partners in Development. Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969) and Andrew M. Kamarck, "African economic development: problems and prospects," *Africa Report*, vol. 14 (January, 1969), pp. 16-37.

factors in "purely" economic models are not the explanations that some would have us believe. South African industry can absorb a host of inefficiencies and still pay off well to investors who are willing to exploit the powerless. Or, looking at it the other way, those oft-sighted inefficiencies of the Nkrumah period could easily have been borne by the Ghanaians if the relative prices of cocoa and manufactured goods had not deteriorated by a factor of five.<sup>3</sup> That it took five times as much cocoa to pay for a ton of steel in 1965 as it had in 1951 explains more about the failure of Ghana to "take off"<sup>4</sup> than any number of sports stadiums or four-lane highways. The producers of steel can consume five times as much cocoa for no greater effort but they are not really efficient. Any wonder that the rich get richer? And when the poor need either food or financing they tend to have to beg it, for if they are not obsequious it is not granted. Witness U. S. and World Bank reactions to the needs of Sekou Toure's Guinea in 1959, of Lumumba's Congo in 1960, of Nkrumah's Ghana in 1965. Contrast these with U. S. and World Bank reactions to the promise of Tubman's Liberia, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, Kenyatta's Kenya, Tshombe's Congo, the Generals' Ghana. The virtue of the rich nations is not that they are more efficient but that they are more powerful, powerful enough to give only when they receive more than equal measure.

So Africans must find ways to get more for what they give if they are to end their exploitation by others. How can they generate the power to do this? Political cooperation toward economic ends can help to put them in situations where they can take advantage of weaknesses of the positions of wealthier countries. That such actions are more than mere pipe dreams is suggested by what is going on in East-Central Africa. Specifically, Tanzania and Zambia are cooperating meaningfully in ways that make it possible for them to have greater control over their own destinies.

The key here is the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, now being built with Chinese financing from Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam. Almost parallel to this new rail line, Western engineers, Americans and others with World Bank financing, are constructing a solid, all-weather highway that will further contribute to the freedom of choices available to Tanzanians, Zambians, and hosts of other Africans in the Central Region. The Economist Intelligence Unit called the "Tan-Zam Rail Link" contract the single most promising element in the Zambian economy in the first quarter of 1970. If all these plans succeed in the next decade, the resultant development will have been due to the political courage and acumen of the leaders of Tanzania and Zambia. Instead of bowing, each separately, to Western "advice" and demands, they planned together to accomplish what they knew to be in their common interest and thus in the interest of Africa. The story of the Tan-Zam Railway serves as an excellent object lesson for the Third World.

<sup>3</sup> Ghana today is capable of attaining economic self-sufficiency and development. See R. W. Apple, Jr. "Vital Foreign Aid Drying Up in Black Africa," *The New York Times*, November 24, 1969, p. 12C. Basil Davidson raised the following excellent point regarding the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah:

After their *coup* the soldiers showed a laudable energy, as General Aguiyi-Ironsi had done in Nigeria, in exposing scandals of corruption. With one of their principal aims, however, the blackening of Nkrumah's reputation, the truth was far from simple. There was much other evidence to show that the Nkrumah regime had accumulated funds for purposes quite other than personal comfort. Not a few struggling independence parties in countries still under colonial rule had reason to be grateful for substantial though secret gifts from non-budgetary sources in Ghana. In one such case, known to me personally, a Central African independence party, in desperate need of money for political purposes, received a (to them) critically useful cheque for £10,000 from President Nkrumah's London representative. To the Sandhurst-trained soldiers who made the *coup*, of course, all this was deplorable subversion: they, after all, were the strictly non-participant and 'respectable' beneficiaries of the struggles for African independence, a cause for which they themselves, as good exponents of the 'middle class solution', had precious little sympathy.

[Basil Davidson, *Which Way Africa?* (Mumfordsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 172, fn.]

<sup>4</sup> For another perspective on why the Nkrumah government failed economically, see Douglas Rimmer, "The Abstraction from Politics: A Critique of Economic Theory and Design with Reference to West Africa," *The Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 5 (April, 1969), pp. 194-196.

The economy of Zambia is heavily dependent on copper mining, and this has been the case for a long time. The British South Africa Company, in return for shouldering the "burden" of administering "Rhodesia" in the 1880's, received from Great Britain all Rhodesian mineral rights, until the year 1986. In 1923, the government of Southern Rhodesia purchased those rights back from the Company, but this was not done for Northern Rhodesia until 1965 when the government of Zambia, by that time independent, agreed to pay the British South Africa Company some additional millions of pounds, even though the Company had been collecting royalties for forty years on all copper extracted from the Copperbelt. By the nineteen-sixties the value of the copper being shipped out was running about £130 million annually.

During those forty years, from 1928, the actual mining was carried out by two related groups: Rhodesian Selection Trust, now called Roan Selection Trust (RST), is controlled primarily by American interests.<sup>5</sup> Of the \$53 million American investment in Zambia \$43 million was invested in RST.<sup>6</sup> The second major group is Zambian Anglo-American Corporation (formerly Rhodesian Anglo-American) which, despite its name, is controlled primarily by South African interests,<sup>7</sup> especially H. F. Oppenheimer. They have now moved their headquarters to Bermuda, as "a neutral tax base." In the Colonial period, the Northern Rhodesian economy was geared toward the south. The rich copper-producing area became a hinterland of the politically dominant Southern Rhodesia. The main source of electricity for the copper mines is generated by water stored behind Kariba Dam, built in 1955. Although the dam straddles the Zambezi, the power station was built on the southern bank—in Southern Rhodesian territory.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the fuel for the copper industry smelters and for the locomotives in the territory was coal which came exclusively from the Wankie coal fields near Victoria Falls in Southern Rhodesia.

The rail lines which transported almost all of the copper to its European and American markets also ran southward. Rhodesia Railways, owned jointly by both governments (by the "Federation" in its time) runs from the Copperbelt through Southern Rhodesia to Livingstone and then to the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique. That same line continues from Livingstone down into South Africa.

A second route used runs through a portion of the Congo to Benguela in Portuguese Angola. According to a tripartite agreement among the colonial powers and the companies, Benguela Railways, owned by a British firm, Tanganyika Concessions Limited, was allowed to carry 20% of Northern Rhodesia's copper for shipment to Britain. Rhodesia Railways, however, during the Federation period, made competition difficult for Benguela Railways by imposing stiff rates on the portion of their own line which Benguela-bound trains had to traverse in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Advertisement sponsored by the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia, *The New York Times*, March 26, 1967, p. 4E. Also see Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, *Unity or Poverty: The Economics of Pan-Africanism* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968), p. 102. Also see *The Wall Street Journal*, Midwest Edition, July 3, 1970, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *The New York Times*, October 9, 1968, section 3, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> For an outline of the ownership of the copperbelt mines, see Richard Hall, *Zambia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), Appendix III, p. 312.

<sup>8</sup> See Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 368.

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda described the anger on the part of Northern Rhodesians (now Zambians) when they learned that the Kariba Dam was to be constructed. Federal authorities had promised to first build a dam to harness the Kafue River in Northern Rhodesia. [Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall be Free* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 71-73.] See also speech by Kenneth Kaunda at the Second Conference of Nonaligned States in Cairo, 1964, reprinted in Colin Legum (ed.), *Zambia: Independence and Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1966), p. 146.

<sup>9</sup> Robert C. Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), p. 173.

Finally, South Africa has always had an important interest in the economy of the Rhodesias. In addition to the involvement of the South African Anglo-American Corporation previously mentioned, South African businesses generally provided the channels through which imports to the Rhodesias flowed.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the Anglo-American Corporation which had an interest in seeing the public-owned Rhodesian Railways functioning smoothly, extended large loans to the Railway to buy equipment when the line threatened to become a bottleneck.<sup>11</sup>

These interests and the consequent orientation of the whole complex toward the south and "white Africa" rather than toward the north and Black Africa, proved a problem with political and economic ramifications after Northern Rhodesia became independent Zambia and even more of a problem when Southern Rhodesia declared its "independence" unilaterally in late 1965 under a white government.

## II.

Plans for the construction of a railroad between the Zambian Copperbelt and Dar-es-Salaam were seriously considered by Prime Minister Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Nyerere of Tanganyika as both territories moved toward independence. But the concept of such a railroad was even then not a new one. It had first been proposed by Cecil Rhodes as a part of his Cape to Cairo route. Also, the Germans had planned to construct a rail line in Southern Tanganyika, but World War I interrupted their plans. During the 1920's the idea recurred as a part of white settlers' dreams of a domain from Kenya to Southern Rhodesia. The proposed thousand-mile link was actually surveyed in 1942, but the idea was rejected apparently because there was not enough trade at that time to justify the expense of building it.<sup>12</sup>

After 1963 there were compelling reasons—economic and political—why the rail link became not only more feasible but also more desirable.

The effect of a rail line upon the economy of a developing nation is not easy to estimate, but there is no doubt that a rail line *plus* an injection of capital—in agriculture for example—would stimulate production. The fertile but relatively undeveloped regions of northern Zambia and of southern Tanzania would benefit economically if there were ways of distributing their produce to other parts of their own countries and to other countries of East Africa, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya, and even, through the port of Dar-es-Salaam, abroad.

The mere construction and maintenance of a railroad could provide many Zambians and Tanzanians with work, especially in those underdeveloped regions. In a developing economy, these effects may be important. Even without the Zambia link, the East African Railways employed more people in Tanzania than any other single industry.

Tanzania has important coal resources, of good quality and in thick veins easily mined, that could well be economically exploited if a Zambia line made its transport feasible, either to markets in Zambia, elsewhere in East Africa, or abroad.

Moreover, the link could justifiably be pointed to as an example of African cooperation and could stand as a model for all of Africa. Mr. Kaunda told a gathering in Dar-es-Salaam, "We want to build this rail line; we do not only want to build it, we have decided to build it so that our people can move around from Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam and see each other." He stressed the importance of unity among as many African nations as possible, for in unity there lay social, cultural and economic strength. Mr. Nyerere also had long been talking of such things.

<sup>10</sup> C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, *Ed. Dobson, Ltd.*, 1954), p. 106.

<sup>11</sup> Baldwin, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

<sup>12</sup> *The Times* [London] April 8, 1965, p. 13.

## III

In July, 1963, before Zambia achieved independence, a preliminary survey to assess the feasibility of the rail link was undertaken by Lonrho, Ltd., a London-based firm.<sup>13</sup> Lonrho estimated the cost of construction at £60 million.<sup>14</sup> In a meeting with Kenneth Kaunda, Lonrho let it be known that in exchange for building the railroad they would request sole copper rail transport concessions. Kaunda met with Tanganyika's Transport Minister Mr. Amar Jamal and a representative of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration to discuss the offer: however, no action on the matter was taken—probably due to lack of funds.

In 1964, two other reports were published dealing with the feasibility of the Tan-Zam railroad one by the World Bank (IBRD) and another by a UN team formed by the Economic Commission for Africa.<sup>15</sup>

The World Bank—which in 1958 had given the Central African Federation \$59 million to modernize the Rhodesian Railways—virtually reiterated Lonrho's estimate of £60 million, stating that the construction would cost not less than £48 million, with an addition of £7 million interest during construction and with £3 million for necessary rolling stock and locomotives.

The World Bank team estimated that the Tanzania-Zambia line would not be cheaper, even in the long run, than the already existing rail lines—to Beira, in Mozambique, and to Benguela, in Angola, which were, it said, "operated efficiently and cheaply, have ample spare capacity and will be able to expand capacity by relatively small investments." Although the Tan-Zam line would be about 150 miles shorter than the shortest of the existing lines (Ndola-Beira), the report stated that operating costs would be raised considerably on the proposed line due to a change in gauge in Tanganyika and due to the high gradients there. The World Bank team estimated that the Tan-Zam line would run at a financial loss until at least 1990 when it would carry enough copper to create a profit.

The Report concluded that "The urgent need for investments in other parts of Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika and in other sectors of the economy raises doubts about the advisability of concentrating such a large amount of money on one single project at this time." It recommended that improvement of existing roads and construction of new ones between the Copperbelt and eastern Tanganyika would be cheaper than a rail line. Roads, furthermore, would do more to foster local economic development, especially in Zambia's impoverished Northern Province, than would a rail line.

The UN report, also, gave only qualified support to the proposal. Although a preliminary ECA report made in December, 1963, recommended that a Northern Rhodesian-Dar-es-Salaam rail link be developed,<sup>16</sup> in 1964 the ECA/FAO team warned of "a risk of an expensive mistake setting back the country's development perhaps seriously, since a heavy subsidy for many years seems inevitable."<sup>17</sup>

Development of alternative, less costly, routes, then would have been more attractive to Western financiers and the Benguela Route became an increasingly attractive alternative. Benguela Railways had not suffered seriously from the diversion of Copper Belt copper to Rhodesia Railways because it carried all the Katanga copper during the years of turmoil in the

<sup>13</sup> The Tanzanian government recently took control of a Tanzanian daily owned by Lonrho Ltd. See *The Globe & Mail* [Toronto], February 5, 1970, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> *The Times* [London], July 11, 1963, p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank Mission, *Report on the North East Rail Link* (Lusaka: Zambia Ministry of Transport and Works, 1964) and *Report of the ECA Industrial Coordination Mission to East and Central Africa*, E/CN.14/247, December 24, 1963.

<sup>16</sup> E/CN.14/247. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> *The Times* [London] report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], January 24-February 13, 1965, p. 977.

Congo. When Moise Tshombe became Prime Minister in 1964, however, some Katanga copper began to move along the Congo's "National Route", and Benguela had capacity to spare.<sup>18</sup> The Benguela route was the same length over land as the railroad route to Beira (approximately 1,400 miles) but the distance from Angola to Europe was between 2,000 and 2,500 miles shorter than the distance from Mozambique to Europe. Furthermore, at a cost of approximately £5 million, Benguela could have eliminated the major bottleneck in the line and transported copper smoothly. Western financiers were more inclined to provide the £5 million necessary for the streamlining of Benguela operations than the £60 million necessary to build the Tam-Zam link although the latter, if constructed, would be a shorter overland route and would have greater impact on African development. In 1965 Benguela Railways lowered freight rates in order to compete successfully with Rhodesia Railways and the Congo route on the transport of Zambia copper and Katanga copper.<sup>19</sup> One should keep in mind that Benguela Railways is owned by the British Company Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., with some participation by the Portuguese government. The chairman, Captain C. Waterhouse, was a man whose political sympathies had been with the Federation in its day and with Tshombe's Katanga (for Tanganyika Concessions also owned a considerable share in Union Minière).

In summary, then, despite many differences, the various reports agree that the rail link was technically feasible but would be economically unprofitable for some years. But simple economics may not have been the decisive factor that delayed the project. Many rail lines in other nations have been constructed on a non-profit-making basis. Political considerations are frequently overriding, and in African affairs these years of 1963 to 1965 were politically difficult. The Tanzania-Zambia rail link seems to have been a victim of the conflicting interests of 1964.

#### IV

In the first place, the Zambian economy after independence remained tied to Rhodesia's, forcing Zambia into economic cooperation with that nation whose reluctance to give political control to the black majority was highly abhorrent to Zambians as well as to other black Africans. For the moment, there was little that Zambia could do except cooperate. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, realistic about his nation's dependence upon the colonial powers, in 1964 had offered to exchange ambassadors with South Africa. The old patterns of economic activity seemed to continue.

Zambian-Southern Rhodesian relations regarding Rhodesia Railways were difficult.<sup>20</sup> After the breakup of the Central African Federation, the Zambian and Southern Rhodesian governments agreed that if either constructed a new connecting line which was not desired by the other government, payment would be made to compensate Rhodesia Railways for loss of revenue. It was estimated that the construction of the Tanzania link would result in losses to Rhodesia Railways of £9 million yearly in copper freight revenues—money which would have to be repaid to the Railways.<sup>21</sup>

Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust, moreover, would, it seems, have preferred to continue transporting goods over Rhodesia Railways rather than over a new line. It was expected that Rhodesia's reaction to the new line would be an increase in freight prices for copper moving through Rhodesia while the new line was being built. Since the link might take seven years to complete, Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust would have to pay higher prices

*The Times* [London], September 22, 1965, p. 8.

<sup>20</sup> For a comment on some of the difficulties, see "The Rail Link" (editorial), *Zambia Mail* [Lusaka], September 65, p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> *The Times* [London], July 11, 1963, p. 8d.

during that period when one of their major aims was to keep copper prices stable so as to discourage substitutions in the world market.<sup>22</sup>

Other African interests were also involved in the rail link. The Tanganyikan rail lines had, since 1948, been operated by the East African Railways and Harbours Administration as a single system with those of Kenya and Uganda, and after Tanganyika's independence the rail transport cooperation among the three nations continued. The "Tan-Zam" link, then, required the concurrence of all three of the East African nations. Any loans incurred to finance the project would have to be underwritten by the governments of Uganda and Kenya as well as by Tanzania and Zambia. An EARHA 1963 report estimated that 60% of the construction costs would be incurred in Tanzania. The governments of Uganda and Kenya, understandably enough, might well have been reluctant to risk such obligations until their own transport needs were met. Even without Zambian involvement, cooperation in East Africa was strained during those first years of independence when their common market appeared to be favoring Kenya, already the most industrially developed of the three territories. Tanzania, especially, seemed to be pulling away, not only economically but politically.<sup>23</sup>

Both Kenya and Uganda tended to disapprove Tanzania's apparent drift toward the left. Tanzania supported the radical rebellion against the American-butressed Congo regime, apparently even with arms transported on the Tanganyika railroad. It was also reported that Chinese arms moved across Tanganyika for use by Chinese-supported groups in Burundi. Certainly, the Chinese Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam was an important post for Chinese relations with many Africans, including liberation groups recognized and supported by the OAU Liberation Committee headquartered there. The revolution in Zanzibar, because of its anti-West and pro-Chinese implications, frightened Western representatives, and the calling upon British troops early in 1964 to protect the governments of all three countries (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) against military mutinies made everyone in the area sensitive to the difficulties of the times. Then the beginnings of serious fighting in Mazambique from bases in Tanzania added to the tension. And, in November, 1964, the joint American-Belgian paratroop assault on Stanleyville heightened tensions in the area to such a pitch that little constructive cooperation was possible by the end of that year.

Mr. William Attwood, who was deeply involved in these affairs as American Ambassador to Kenya,<sup>24</sup> made their neocolonial aspects perfectly clear, in retrospect:

The weakness and impotence of newly independent Africa had been harshly and dramatically revealed to the whole world, and the educated African felt deeply humiliated; the white man with a gun, the old plunderer who had enslaved his ancestors, was back again, doing what he pleased, when he pleased, where he pleased. And there wasn't a damn thing Africa could do about it, except yell rape.

The yelling started on November 25th and lasted for several weeks.<sup>25</sup>

The times were not opportune to find the necessary financing for a Tanzania-Zambia rail link.

As relations between Tanzania and the West became strained those between Tanzania and the Communist nations improved. By the summer of 1965, the Chinese made a direct

<sup>22</sup> See Ray Vicker, "Zambia-Tanzania Railway could sever dependence on white supremacist areas, upset political balance," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 27, 1965, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> For an examination of some of the issues causing strain in East Africa immediately after independence, see A. J. Hughes, *East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 231-260.

<sup>24</sup> Mr. Attwood is currently Editor-in-Chief of *Look* magazine. His book, *The Reds and the Blacks*, dealing with confidential affairs of a Kenyan minister, embarrassed Washington's diplomatic relations with Nairobi. [C. L. Sulz-

<sup>25</sup> William Attwood, *The Reds and the Black: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper and Row p. 2



offer of aid to get the Tanzania-Zambia rail link project underway.<sup>26</sup> The Chinese offered, at the least, to survey the entire route at their own expense. Western pressure was immediately brought to bear upon President Nyerere. In June he visited Britain to attend the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference. In a speech in Dar-es-Salaam shortly after the Conference, Nyerere said that when the proposed railway link was discussed, Western representatives questioned him about Chinese interests in Tanzania in general about the project in particular,<sup>27</sup> and he felt that the questions were being put to him not to ascertain the facts but rather to display disapproval of the Chinese offer. He was given the impression that he and Kenneth Kaunda would be "committing a crime" if they accepted Chinese aid. Finally, he reiterated Tanzania's determination to be nonaligned, saying:

This is a very poor country, but it is very independent. If people want to help us build this railway, they can say so. I don't care whether I get communist or western money. I want this rail link and I am not going to be stopped.<sup>28, 29</sup>

In 1965 the railway became more than a project that would lessen Zambia's dependence on the south, more than a project that would foster regional economic development, and more than a project politically important to African nationalists.<sup>30</sup> It also became a project in the cold war.

Between August 6-8, 1965, Kaunda conferred with Nyerere in Dar-es-Salaam regarding the rail link, and their Finance and Transport Ministers met simultaneously to discuss more technical aspects of the matter.<sup>31</sup> President Kaunda let it be known that he was particularly anxious that the project get under way,<sup>32</sup> but President Nyerere dared to be much firmer at that time than was President Kaunda. Zambia's economy was intricately enmeshed with those to the south. And the white Rhodesians were putting pressure on Great Britain to relinquish demands for constitutional reform leading to greater African participation in government. Kaunda was pleading for a strong pro-African stand on Britain's part and felt he must not affront her. Instead of accepting the Chinese offer, President Kaunda approached Britain, France, West Germany and the United States for equivalent help, but the West offered aid only very cautiously. Britain, countering China's bid, offered to finance only half of the survey costs (approximately £75,000).<sup>33</sup> Tanzania requested that Britain pay for the entire survey as China promised to do. During such negotiations, a 12-man Chinese team arrived in Dar-es-Salaam to make a preliminary survey of the Tanzanian section only, since the government of Zambia, under increasing neocolonial pressure, refused to receive the Chinese in Zambia even for the preliminary survey. On September 20, the British Ministry of Overseas Develop-

<sup>26</sup> See *East African Standard* [Dar-es-Salaam], August 10, 1965.

<sup>27</sup> *The Times* [London], July 3, 1965, p. 7.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> The West and South Africa have continued to interpret the acceptance of the Chinese offer to build the rail link as evidence that Zambia and Tanzania are becoming Communist. For President Kaunda's refutation of these allegations, also see *The Times* [London] report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], February 26-March 11, 1970, p. 2471. Both President Kaunda and President Nyerere have stated that their nations are pursuing policies of nonalignment. [*Ibid.*, and *The Nationalist* [Dar es Salaam] report, March 14, 1970, and *Standard Tanzania* [Dar-es-Salaam] report, March 14, 1970, summarized in *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter], March 1-31, 1970, p. 1737.] Richard Hall also pointed out that neither President Nyerere nor President Kaunda are tools of Peking. Also see Richard Hall, "Kaunda's Long Road to Dar." *Venture* [a publication of The Fabian Society, London], vol. 20 (May, 1968), pp. 21-22, 24.

<sup>30</sup> For background information regarding the TanZam link and its economic significance and political importance to African nationalists, see Aaron Segal, "Tanzania-Zambia Rail Prospect." *Venture*, vol. 17 (June, 1965), pp. 12-18.

<sup>31</sup> *East African Standard* [Dar-es-Salaam], August 9, 1965; *Ibid.*, August 9, 1965.

<sup>32</sup> *The Times* [London], August 5, 1965, p. 8. President Kaunda said of Zambian-Tanzanian cooperation regarding the rail link: "We have always been shouting 'African unity, African unity' but here are leaders who shout and put things into action." [*East African Standard* [Dar-es-Salaam], August 7, 1965.]

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

ment announced that Great Britain and Canada would together cover the full costs of a survey for the proposed line (obviously not the costs of the Chinese survey).

Meanwhile, requests had been sent from both governments (Tanzania and Zambia) to all these developed countries for proposals concerning construction costs. On September 21, 1965, China offered an interest-free loan to cover full construction costs. No other country or multilateral agency proposed any aid for the project.

With the Rhodesian situation worsening, leading ultimately to the unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Smith regime,<sup>34</sup> Zambia was in such serious jeopardy, both economically and militarily, that President Kaunda and his government were increasingly dependent on the West, for diplomatic maneuvering and for sheer survival.

Once again, the Tanzania-Zambia rail link, the need for which was never more apparent than in early 1966, was set aside while politicians argued and while vast sums of money and resources were expended on air lifts and makeshift truck convoy operations which proved much less economical than any of the previous rail link plans would have been.

V

The succeeding months, through 1966 and into 1967, saw dashed again the hopes Africans had of achieving real gains against white rule in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa. Despite impassioned pleas, neither Great Britain, nor the United States, nor the United Nations, would take actions strong enough to bring down the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, Zambia achieved only limited success in disengaging her economy from Rhodesia's. Coal was still necessary, and Rhodesia, the only economical source; copper had to be exported, and it proved impossible to get it all out by the various other makeshift arrangements so much of it was still carried on Rhodesia Railways; electricity, absolutely necessary for the copper industry, had to come from Rhodesia. Freight rates were increased, prices generally moved upward as shortages were felt in many areas, and unemployment and strikes combined to reduce production. Much concern was expressed in the world (Great Britain, United States, Economic Commission for Africa) about the need for regional economic integration of East and Central Africa and of the transportation and communication systems on which such integration would have to depend. But they spoke in those days of roads,<sup>36</sup> not of railroads. Meanwhile the attempts to haul out copper and haul in petroleum fuels were proving almost disastrous in loss of trucks and cargoes and lives.

At last, in June of 1967, President Kaunda paid a state visit to China, much as President Nyerere had two years earlier. He returned, as Nyerere had, with apparent enthusiasm about the Chinese. Within a few months an agreement was signed between Tanzania, Zambia and China, whereby China would extend an interest-free loan for construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, construction to begin after a two-year survey. In June, 1968, a 300-man Chinese engineering team arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, this time with the full approval for the survey in both Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> For President Nyerere's views on Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), see Julius K. Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 44 (April, 1966), pp. 373-386. Also see *The Financial Times* [London], October 7, 1965.

<sup>35</sup> See George W. Shepherd, "The failure of the sanctions against Rhodesia and the effect on African states: a growing racial crisis," *Africa Today*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1967), pp. 8-12.

<sup>36</sup> One of the most important road links between the Zambian copper mines and Dar-es-Salaam is the Great North Road which has been called "the Zambian lifeline", "the worst road in the world" and "Hell Run." For a report on U.S. aid to build the 1,270-mile road, see David K. Willis, "Countering Peking: U. S. helps on key African road," *The Christian Science Monitor*, (West Edition), February 16, 1966, pp. 1, 5.

<sup>37</sup> The Chinese have assisted with other projects: On December 31, 1969, China and Zambia signed an agreement under which China would give Zambia three radio transmitters. [*Zambia News* report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], February 26-March 11, 1970, pp. 2471-2472.] Tanzanians recently opened an army bar-

Many other events of 1968 were also relevant. Zambia's critical fuel shortage was relieved when the Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline was opened, built with £20 million loan at 6¼% from Italy.<sup>38</sup> Zambian exports improved, and a smaller proportion had to go through Rhodesia. The United States pledged financial aid for improving the road from Ndola toward the Tanzanian border. Later in 1968, the United States also granted to Tanzania a long term loan of \$13 million (@ 2–2½%) for rebuilding the road from Tunduma to Iyayi in Tanzania's Southern Highlands.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, the British firm of Lonrho, which had five years earlier considered building the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, received a commission from the Congo government to undertake a feasibility survey for a 1000-mile railway which would link the Katanga-Kasai railroad directly with the port of Matadi on the Atlantic Ocean, giving Congo an all-rail "national route" instead of the current one which required breaking loads several times. The hope was to organize an international consortium including Lonrho, Cominière (a subsidiary of Union Minière which has the management contract for Congo's mines), and various Japanese, American and Scandinavian companies which could raise the necessary \$150 million to build the line. It was interesting that this proposal of a line which competed directly with the other existing lines (Benguela, Beira, Rhodesian) and with the Tan-Zam link should have been introduced by Western interests immediately after the Chinese made possible the realization of the latter.<sup>40</sup>

Apparently very much on or ahead of schedule, the Chinese survey team completed its work in 1969, and Zambia, Tanzania and China agreed in July 1970 upon final details for the construction of the rail link. China will lend Zambia and Tanzania £68 million to cover the cost of the rail link which will take five years to build. The loan is interest free and is repayable over a 30-year period, beginning in 1973. The rail link will run from Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambian village of Kapiri Mposhi, which is on the existing railway network.<sup>41</sup>

Construction was scheduled to begin in March, 1970,<sup>42</sup> on a route passing through Kasama in northern Zambia and passing near Mbeya in southern Tanzania. Instead of simply connecting with the Tanganyika Central Line the new line, of wider gauge, will run parallel to it into Dar-Es-Salaam.<sup>43</sup> Thus, Zambia should, in a few years, have direct access to a port over lines controlled by Africans.<sup>44</sup>

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racks built with Chinese aid. [*Standard Tanzania* [Dar-es-Salaam] report, summarized in *Africa Diary* [New Delhi], January 15–21, 1970, pp. 4793–4794.] Construction of a naval base was begun with Chinese aid at Dar-es-Salaam. [*Time*, vol. 96 (June 1, 1970), p. 28.]

<sup>38</sup> Installations at a pumphouse on the pipeline in Tanzania were blown up December 24, 1969. While repairs were made and the flow of oil resumed, Zambia is constructing a refinery to relieve its dependence on the pipeline. [*The Times* [London] report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], January 29–February 11, 1970, p. 2448; *The Nationalist* [Dar-es-Salaam] report, summarized in *ibid.*; *East African Standard* [Nairobi] report, summarized in *African Diary* [New Delhi], February 12–18, 1970, p. 4835.]

<sup>39</sup> According to appreciations of the U. S. Department of Commerce, the U. S. trade role in Tanzania is small but one of the areas of particular interest to U. S. manufacturers is road-building. ["Tanzania shows promise," *International Commerce*, vol. 76 (June 8, 1970), pp. 34–36.]

<sup>40</sup> For general studies vis-a-vis Chinese involvement in Africa, see Emmanuel J. Hévi, *The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Sven Hamrell and Carl Gösts Eidstrand (eds.), *The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964); John K. Cooley, *East Wind Over Africa; Red China's African Offensive* (New York: Walker & Company, 1965).

<sup>41</sup> ["Tanzam railway: With Chinese cash," *The Economist*, vol. 236 (July 18, 1970), pp. 68–69. The Dar-es-Salaam–Kapiri Mposhi route was one recommended by the 1963 ECA report [E/CN. 14/247, *op. cit.*, p. 63 and Annex III, "Suggestions for the development of Transport in East and Central Africa," p. 2.]

<sup>42</sup> For a report on the enrollment of young people to work on the construction of the rail link, see *The Standard Tanzania* [Dar-es-Salaam] report, summarized in *Africa Diary* [New Delhi], March 12–18, 1970, pp. 4873–4874.

<sup>43</sup> These data on costs and routes are taken from *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter] July 1–31, 1969, p. 1472.

<sup>44</sup> For recent articles on the TanZam rail link see "The East African Community and the Tanzam's Railway," *East African Standard* [Nairobi], August 19, 1969, p. 10; "China Pressing Zambia Rail Plan," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1969, p. 11; *The New York Times*, November 23, 1969,

There seems more reason for optimism for Zambians (and East Africans) in 1970 than in any year preceding. They are beginning to shake free of the Rhodesian bonds. Alternative transportation routes are becoming available.<sup>45</sup> Their integration into the East African Community (which had a rebirth in 1967) appears a distinct possibility. They are planning to build, with a World Bank loan, a power station on the Zambian side of Kariba. Their foreign exchange situation is good. And their government has successfully arranged for majority ownership of the copper companies, Roan Selection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation, the costs to be paid out of future copper earnings. And, controlling thus the copper industry in the country, the Zambian government has joined formally with others, Congo (Kinshasa), Chile, and Peru, which produce about half the copper in the world, in establishing the Intergovernmental Council of Copper-Exporting Countries, aiming at stabilizing prices and increasing production to maximize what they can get for what they produce.

## VI

If there is reason for optimism, there is also good reason to warn of dangers that continue to threaten Zambia and Tanzania as they attempt to develop economic productivity and political independence.<sup>46</sup>

The ramification of transportation systems in East and Central Africa will help a great deal, but both countries still rely heavily on the export of primary products. And Zambia, especially, continues to rely on the mining industry to earn the foreign exchange necessary for her own internal economic development.<sup>47</sup> Zambian hopes in this regard may be misplaced. There is considerable evidence from widely different areas of the world that extractive industries generally (and metal ore mining enterprises particularly) contribute very little if at all to regional economic and social development as measured by usual indices.<sup>48</sup> Owning the resources underground, as Zambia does, is not enough to ensure their contribution to development. Nor is owning a majority of the shares of the operating companies, as Zambia also does, enough to ensure that the mining enterprise will contribute to the development of the rest of the local economy. The extraction and first processing of ores is, in all circumstances, an interdependent part of a larger scale world industrial system. Even if the price of the metal on the world market remains stable at a profitable point, the continued development of mines and mining techniques requires considerable reinvestment *right back into mining*. And reinvestment within the industry has little, almost no, impact or spin-off effect in the local economy. In other words,

p. 23; *The Times* [London], February 10, 1970, p. 6; "TanZam railway. No ants yet." *The Economist*, vol. 233 (October 18, 1969), p. 79; *The Christian Science Monitor*, Midwest Edition, November 18, 1969, p. 10. Also see Charles Mohr, "American Road Builders Are Reported to Have Clashed with Red Chinese Rail Workers in Tanzania." *The New York Times*, March 25, 1970, p. 15c; "Final Talks End: All Clear for Tanzam Railway." *Africa and the World* [London], vol. 6 (December, 1969), p. 8.

<sup>45</sup> For a report on some of these routes, see "New Road Transport Service to Dar-es-Salaam." *The African Business Monthly* [Beirut], vol. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 85-86.

<sup>46</sup> See Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: party transformation and economic development* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a report on some of Zambia's economic problems, see Ray Vicker, "Struggling Africa: Tribes, Economic Ills Plague Kaunda Effort to Keep Zambia Stable." *The Wall Street Journal*, Midwest Edition, October 28, 1969, pp. 1, 16. On the recent Zambian move to take majority control of two oil producers' outlets in Zambia, see *The New York Times*, October 20, 1969, p. 31.

<sup>47</sup> For Zambian plans to increase production, see *The New York Times*, May 18, 1970, p. 47. For reports on Zambia's taking majority control of copper mines, see *The Times* [London] report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], January 1-14, 1970, p. 2427; *The Times* [London] report, summarized in *African Recorder* [New Delhi], February 26-March 11, 1970, p. 2471; *The Times* [London], April 7, 1970, p. 28; *The New York Times*, August 26, 1969, pp. 53C, 55C; R. W. Apple Jr., "Long Copper Talks Likely in Zambia." *The New York Times*, September 23, 1969, p. 1; "Copper Talks in Zambia Bubbled Around the World." *The New York Times*, December 14, 1969, p. 1F.

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, Claudio Soares, *Economic Development and Political Radicalism* (Doctoral Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, 1965), and Thomas R. DeGregori, *Technology and the Economic Development of the Tropical African Frontier* (Cleveland: Press of Case-Western Reserve, 1969).

despite good intentions on the part of Zambia's economic planners, world industrial conditions might still make it impossible to use the mining industry to kick off a more general economic and social development of Zambia.

Another, more immediate, problem about which these two countries should be concerned is political. Positive actions of the kind that have been reviewed here are not taken without engendering political animosities and jealousies, both at home and abroad. Certainly their support of African liberation movements has earned these two countries the enmity of the Portuguese, the Rhodesians and the South African whites. This leads not only to violent, military-type measures, such as the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, the secret mission into Zambia of South African Police, the "reprisal" raids against villages in Zambia by Portuguese armed forces, and the sabotage of the Tanzania-Zambia Pipeline,<sup>49</sup> it undoubtedly leads also to clandestine support for some variety of internal political opposition that could deter Zambia and Tanzania from fulfilling their dreams of economic and political freedom.

When the Tanzania-Zambia Railway leads toward considerable increase in trade across the Indian Ocean, it should be very easy for those external and internal enemies of Nyerere and Kaunda (or their successors) to convince the "West" that a threat to the "free world" exists.<sup>50</sup> The not-so-benign "nexus" which made it necessary, or feasible, for Zambia and Tanzania to accept the Chinese offer to build the railway will not last if the project appears highly successful in reducing dependence on the West. Conor Cruise O'Brien has noted how commonly the first action of a new African government after a coup is to expel the Chinese Ambassador. He said:

It may safely be assumed that when a new African government expels Chinese Embassies it does so not in a spontaneous outburst of indigenous sinophobia but because of either a prior bargain with United States agencies or the importance which it attaches to securing prompt United States recognition.<sup>51</sup>

It is all too easy to imagine two more performances of this drama.

The road to freedom from neocolonial control is not an easy road. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway, in conjunction with availability of alternate routes, makes the trip appear possible but arrival at destination is in no way guaranteed.

<sup>49</sup> See footnote no. 38.

<sup>50</sup> Washington is currently supporting Botswana on its claim to a border with Zambia despite opposition from South Africa. [Charles Mohr, "U. S. Backs Botswana on Zambian Border Issue," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1970, p. 16.] Washington has also announced plans to discourage American investment in white-ruled South West Africa. [*The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 21, 1970, p. 11A.] For a report on the proposed Zambezi highway linking Zambia and Botswana, see *The New York Times*, April 19, 1970, p. 11.

<sup>51</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Epilogue: Illusions and Realities of Nonalignment," *Nonalignment*, ed. J. W. Burton (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966), p. 128.