

Mordechai LEVY
Izrael

Changes in Israeli collective identity as a source of tension in the political arena

Abstract: The positions of the political parties in Israel on the central issues that concern the Israeli society reveal a struggle between two social orientations regarding the desired character of the State of Israel. At one extreme stands the Jewish ethnic identity that draws its origins from the Jewish tradition and aspires to guaranty the Jewish nature of the state. The civic liberal identity that stands at the other end represents the aspiration of an equal and democratic state in the spirit of the values of the French Revolution.

For the first thirty years, Israel was ruled by left-wing socialist and secular parties who cultivated the civic identity. However, in 1977 a political upheaval occurred when the right-wing and religious parties took power and since then have operated to promote the Jewish ethnic identity. The strengthening of right-wing parties reveals a fundamental change in Israeli society.

A consequence of the strengthening of the Jewish ethnic identity is the adoption of a dichotomous world view by the Israeli government and uncompromising positions toward the international arena, including the EU. The current structure of Israeli society, together with the trend for the coming years, suggests the strengthening of the Jewish ethnic identity, and therefore the political gap between Israel and the EU widening.

Key words: Israeli society, Israeli party system, collective identity, voting behavior

The relation between Israel and the European Union is a complex system which runs in parallel in a number of dimensions. In the economic dimension, there is full cooperation between Israel and the countries of the European Union, expressed in the steadily increasing volume of trade. In contrast, in the political dimension, there are differences of opinions regarding the Israeli policy, primarily towards the way in which Israel acts on the Palestinian issue. During November 2015, it appeared that the two dimensions, the economic dimension and the political dimension, were combining, after the European Union Commission made decision 7834/F1 to obligate Israel to label products produced in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Golan Heights, territories conquered in 1967 and still held by Israel.¹ The Commission explained its decision as the desire to avoid the situation in which the European Union indirectly recognized the sovereignty of Israel over these territories, and as the desire to inform the consumer and to ensure fair trade.

The decision of the Commission inspired sharp responses on the part of officials in the State of Israel, which saw it to be an anti-Israeli step and, more strongly, as a decision directed against Jews. The Prime Minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu, accused the European Union of hypocrisy and double standards and warned against actions that

¹ European commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=3&year=2015&number=7834&language=EN>, 12.01.2016.

supported terrorism. Netanyahu even compared the requirement to label the products to periods of the past in Europe when Jews were required to label themselves.² The government of Israel released an official condemnation and decided to suspend dialogue with the European Union in certain areas, and the Minister of Justice announced that it would adopt legal steps against the decision to label the products. Another step that might illustrate the extent of the anger of the Israeli response was the summoning of the EU's ambassador to Israel, Faaborg-Andersen, for a reprimand from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It seems that the reciprocal announcements and the strident tone taken by both sides indicate a new chapter in the system of relations between Israel and the countries of the European Union. More than anything, this dispute reveals the gaps in the understanding of reality and in the reading of the international political map.

This paper argues that understanding the response of the Israeli government and the assessment of the nature of the relations expected in the future with the countries of the European Union requires looking inwards, into Israeli society and into the processes that are taking place in it as the source of the official policy of the government. In every society there are circles of conflicting collective identities, which compete over the right to represent the entire collective. The dominant identity generally controls the centers of political power and grants legitimacy to act to the government (Ben-Rafael, 2000, p. 491). Therefore, the government of Israel does not act in a void, and its responses reflect a public mood and collective identity that steadily is becoming established in the political centers of power of Israel.

The Israeli political system

The roots of the Israeli political system, like the rest of the social arrangements, can be found in the institutions and procedures that existed in the Zionist movement many years before the establishment of the state. The Zionist movement sought to adopt a political method that would suit the special reality of separate Jewish communities which are dispersed in different countries. Therefore, already in 1897, in the First Zionist Congress the method of proportional representation was adopted, with the intention to provide representation to all the Jewish communities in the Diaspora (Doron, Kook, 2004, p. 18). This method, of emphasizing representation, even at the cost of surrendering elements of performance and efficiency, would become in its continuation one of the prominent characteristics of the Israeli political system. The temporary state council that operated before the establishment of the state chose to continue the proportional method in the elections for the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. The assumption was that the method would become an inseparable part of the political tradition of the Jewish community and was intended to collect the different sectors and to prevent the departure of marginal groups in Jewish society that might have felt harmed by the new political order (Horowitz, Lissak, 1977, p. 305).


Israeli society is a young and diverse society. It is composed of many groups that differ in origin, culture and in the vision they have for the State of Israel. The combination

² Israeli Prime Minister's Office, <http://www.pmo.gov.il/mediacenter/spokesman/pages/spoke-start221115.aspx>, 12/01/2016.

of a heterogeneous Israeli society and proportional representation has created a highly divided political system which expresses the social mosaic. The number of parties that have been represented in the Knesset during the 68 years of the existence of the State of Israel ranged from a minimum of ten to a maximum of fifteen under every system of elections. It appears that political divisions have become so intrinsic that even attempts to raise the threshold percentage over the years did not succeed in halting this phenomenon. One of the ways of analyzing the Israeli political system, and from that to understand the social tensions, is through mapping the parties according to the main issues that are at the core of society. Israeli society is a young society which has not yet succeeded in establishing for itself an agreed collective identity. Existential topics that pertain to shaping the life of the collective remain disputed by the different groups. Of the many schisms that divide society, it is possible to note two that are considered most central: the religious schism and the ideological schism (Arian, Shamir, 2001, p. 21).

The **religious schism** exposes the division in Jewish society regarding the degree of desired involvement of religion in the life of the state. At the right extreme there are the religious ultra-orthodox (Haredi) parties, *Yahadut HaTorah* (United Torah Judaism) and *Shas*, which aspire to apply the laws of Jewish *Halacha* (traditional Jewish religious law) to the state. The current character of the state causes them to present an instrumental approach, in a way that does not obligate them to recognize the institutions of the state and its secular laws. The *HaBayit HaYehudi* Party presents a more restrained religious position. As a Zionist religious party, it aspires to shape the state according to *Halacha* and to instill the values of Judaism into the public, but also identifies with the state and participates actively in all its institutions. At the left extreme there are the secular parties such as *Meretz* and *Yesh Atid*, which call for disestablishing the relationship between religion and the institutions of the state, and for the end of religious coercion. A pragmatic outlook is presented by the large parties that are situated between the two poles. The *HaAvoda* (Labor) party calls for dialogue and compromise with the religious, and *Likud* adopts religious positions from a national connection. Figure 1 presents the sequence of the Israeli parties along the religious schism, with the secular parties at the left end, the religious parties' position on the right.

Figure 1. Parties sequence according to religious schism 2015




Source: Author's study.

The **ideological schism**, or the security schism, is the main schism that is addressed by Israeli society. Its considerable centrality caused the political system in Israel to be arranged according to the parties' position on this topic, and the composition of coali-

tions versus oppositions since the establishment of the state was dictated according to the position of the parties on the ideological continuum (Galnoor, Blander, 2013 p. 495). The continuum of right versus left, which can also be called ‘hawks’ versus ‘doves’, was determined according to the positions of the parties towards Greater Israel in general and the fate of the territories conquered in 1967 in particular. The right, hawkish position presents a perception according to which the conflict between the State of Israel and the Arabs is unsolvable, or at least unsolvable in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a policy of forceful deterrence. The right negates any territorial surrender as a basis of peace agreements with the Arab states and supports the Jewish settlement enterprise in the territories of Judea and Samaria. As we move leftwards, towards the dovish position, the perception that it is possible to reach a peace agreement with the Arab countries and with the Palestinians strengthens, and the willingness increases to negotiate over the future of the conquered territories and to withdraw from them in return for an agreement. At the right extreme there are the parties that support the idea of a Greater Israel. The position of the religious parties is derived from the belief in the religious right to the Land of Israel. At the left extreme there are the parties of the Arab List and *Meretz*, which call for the return of all the conquered territories and to retreat to the boundaries of the ‘Green Line’ from before the 1967 war. The *Likud* and *Labor* parties are situated in the center, where the *Labor* party tends to the left and displays a willingness for territorial compromises, while *Likud* presents more a pragmatic position and is based on security considerations. Figure 2 presents a left-right continuum of the Israeli political system with the dovish parties at the left end, the hawkish parties on the right.

Figure 2. Parties sequence according to ideological schism 2015




Source: Author’s study.

The conquest of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in the 1967 War put the ideological issue on the political agenda in Israel (Goldberg, 1992, p. 60). The connection to Jerusalem and to the historical parts of the homeland created considerable excitement in the Jewish population. Religious emotions began to flood society when a religious interpretation was given to the issue of the return to the holy places. The result was that positions towards the issue of the territories began to overlap with the positions along the religious schism, and the polarization between the groups in Israeli society increased. The religious and ultra-orthodox parties, which had presented moderate positions regarding foreign and defense policy before the war, shifted rightwards following the conquest of the territories, and today they are found on the hawkish side of the political system. Conversely, the secular workers’ parties, which saw the territories that had

been conquered to be a means for the resolution of the conflict with the Arabs, moved leftwards and adopted dovish positions.

Figure 3 presents the map of the parties today according to their position regarding the two main issues. The graph illustrates the overlap that has been created between the ideological positions and the religious positions. The left bloc, which includes the *Labor* Party, *Meretz*, and the Arab parties, is characterized by moderate positions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and liberal secular perceptions. This bloc is found today in the opposition. The right bloc, which includes the *Likud* Party, the ultra-orthodox parties, and the national religious party, presents rigid attitudes regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict

Figure 3. Parties map according to the ideological and religious schisms



Source: Author's study.

and religious perceptions regarding the characteristics of the desired society. This bloc of parties forms the coalition, and the ministers of the government of Israel, including those who responded sharply towards the European Union, come from it.

Struggle between collective identities

In every society, as a group, the following questions arise. Who are we? Who belongs to us and according to which rules? The collective identity of society includes the shared traits which shape social discourse and influence the way in which the collective draws its borders and defines its goals. The real world in society, and outside of it, is perceived by the individual through the shared images of the group, through which he positions himself inside of it and excludes those who do not belong from it (Ben-Rafael, 2000, p. 489). The collective identity is expressed in two dimensions:

1. The ideological dimension. The way in which the collective wants to see itself. In other words, the conscious identity that includes perceptions, the world of values and cultural standards that society attributes to itself and aspires to fulfill.
2. The practical dimension. The way in which the identity is expressed in practice. In other words, the practical translation of the identity, which is perceived in the form of the decisions, policies and patterns of action on the part of the dominant group (Ya'ar, Shavit, 2001, p. xxii).

The mapping of the parties relative to their positions in the topics of security and religion reveals two contradictory social orientations which struggle for the identity of the State of Israel. Each one pushes the desired boundaries of society inwards among the citizens of the state and outwards towards other countries, and presents a different world of values relative to the desired identity of Israeli society. The organization of the map of the parties, as can be seen in Figure 3, is not only an ideological continuum but also primarily a reflection of the two collective identities that cut across Israeli society and divide it into right and left.

1. Jewish-ethnic identity (right). A primordial Jewish identity based on ethnic relationships similar to those of a family. This ethnocentric identity perceives reality as bipolar, all the Jews on one side and the rest of the world on the other side (Kimmerling, 1999, p. 35). The aspiration that stands behind this identity is to ensure the Jewish character of Israeli society and of the State of Israel. Hence, this identity draws an inner border and differentiates between the Jews in the state and the non-Jewish groups. The outside border also includes the Jews who are found in the Diaspora, but the hostility that is attributed to the rest of the world leads to the presentation of rigid attitudes towards the Arab side and towards the diplomatic arena. Since the Jewish religion and tradition serve as a source of the structuring of the collective identity, the demand arises to integrate it and to give it the main place in the public life of Israeli society.
2. Civic-liberal identity (left). This identity is based on the liberal values shaped in the French Revolution, according to which society is a pluralistic civic entity, which has in it sub-cultures under one roof. The belonging to society, according to this identity, is determined according to a system of obligations and civic rights, and therefore

the internal boundary in society overlaps the political boundary and includes in it all the citizens of the state, Jews and non-Jewish groups. This identity perceives Israeli society as a democratic, secular and free society in which religion should not have a status that influences the conduct of the state or an impact on the determination of priorities. The aspiration for an equal, democratic, and civic society grants special status to the civic political institutions which serve as mechanisms of supervision and restraint against every trend of harm to civic equality.

In the practical dimension, the realization of the collective identity and the conversion of values and perceptions into deeds, obligate control over the power bases in society. Therefore, the Israeli political arena serves as a space in which the groups compete over the ability to realize in actuality the desired social identity and in this manner to shape society. In the first three decades from the establishment of the state, the hegemonic group in Israeli society was the secular and socialist 'Ashkenazi' group (Jews whose origin is the countries of Europe). This group, which controlled all the political centers of power, absorbed the masses of Jews and 'ground' them in the cultural and political grinder to make them into one nation in the format of the civic-secular identity. This dominance was expressed in the political supremacy of the *Labor* Party, which led the state unchallenged.


In 1977 there was a political upheaval in Israel, and for the first time the *Likud* Party, from the national right camp, succeeded in winning the elections, and with it appeared challenges to the previous collective identity. The first to rebel was the religious Zionist camp, which displayed frustration in light of the secular character of the State. Religious Zionism, which saw secular Zionism to be a necessary state for the fulfillment of religious redemption, sought to take its place and to lead society from this point, with the goal of ensuring the fulfillment of the religious vision (Kimmerling, 2001, p. 33). Additional criticism of the civic-liberal identity was presented on the part of the group of Jews from the countries of the 'East.' The Jews of the 'East,' who came in the 1950s from the Islamic countries in Asia and North Africa, had a traditional Jewish identity which was different from the identity they were required to adopt. The modern identity of the secular and socialist Jew did not suit the 'Mizrachi' (Eastern) Jews, who came from countries where the secular revolution had not occurred and where there had not been a liberal movement that challenged traditional society (Eisenstadt, 2004, p. 38). These communities saw the establishment of the State of Israel to be the realization of the religious vision and refused to surrender ethnic symbols, particularly in the State of the Jews. The 'melting pot' policy that the *Labor* Party had instituted to erase the identities of the Diaspora and to adopt the new Zionist identity created cultural distress and considerable frustration among the 'Mizrachi' Jews, who saw the *Likud* Party to be a more appropriate political home.

This trend was intensified following the dramatic events that occurred in the decade before the political upheaval. First, the conquest of Jerusalem and the territories of Judea and Samaria in 1967 only strengthened the religious understanding of the Messianic vision and Divine intervention, especially in light of the inability of the civic-liberal camp to explain or to justify the control over these territories. There was a reason why it was the religious Zionists who acted to establish the Jewish settlement enterprise in the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza which were conquered in the war. As the

settlement enterprise expanded, the perception that sees Israel to be a civic secular state weakened, and instead the geographic-historical concept of the ‘Land of Israel’ as defining the boundaries of the collective began to be established. The results of the war raised new issues such as the borders of the state, the future of the territories that had been conquered, the status of the Arabs in Israel and the re-definition of the collective identity. The appearance of the security issue in the form of the control of the territories that were conquered gave an ideological advantage to the *Likud* Party, which espoused the religious and historical right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel. The second event is the 1973 War. The Yom Kippur War was perceived as an event of trauma for the Jewish state, and it damaged the self-confidence of society while re-awakening difficult feelings from the past of existential threat to the Jewish people. The responsibility for the outcome of the war was assigned to the *Labor* Party, which appeared to have lost the public’s trust in its ability to provide a suitable answer to the problems of Jewish society and the State of Israel (Grinberg, 2001, p. 659), the first of which is the existential problem of the Jewish people. In this manner, the civic-liberal identity slowly became less relevant. The political upheaval expressed the profound systemic change of Israel society in terms of the social perceptions, political elites, and behavior of the voters. The Jewish identity, which had been concealed under the surface, broke out and began to take the place of the civic-liberal identity. This is very apparent in the change of the political power relations between the different parties.

Figure 4 presents the composition of the Knesset over the years, according to the two competing social identities, the civic-liberal identity and the Jewish-ethnic identity. It is possible to clearly see the watershed line of Israeli society in 1977, in which the dominant collective identity in Israeli society changes.

Figure 4. Knesset composition according to collective identity



Source: Knesset Website – Elections Results.³

³ Knesset website, recently viewed: 12.01.2016, <http://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/elections/Pages/default.aspx>.

Reinforcement of the argument that the voting for the Knesset is linked to the voter's social identity can be found in the correlation between the ethnic affiliation and party affiliation of voters in Israel. Many research studies have found that the 'Mizrachi' Jews, those who immigrated to Israel from the countries of North Africa and Asia and their children, vote significantly for the *Likud* Party and the rightwing parties, while the 'Ashkenazi' Jews, those whose origin is the countries of Europe and their children, vote for the *Labor* Party and the left (Arian, 1973, p. 41; Arian, 1997, p. 200; Arian, Shamir, 2001, p. 34; Diskin, 1998, p. 70; Galnoor, Blander, 2013, p. 549; Shalev, Levy, 2004, p. 252; Shamir, Arian, 1999, p. 58). The 'Mizrachi' Jews recoil from the very idea of the civic-liberal identity which is represented by the left parties (Ben-Rafael, 2000, p. 499). The components of the identity, such as secularity and civic equality, are perceived in their opinion as dangerous for the Jewish identity of the State of Israel and no less are perceived as a means of the 'Ashkenazi' Jews to preserve their supremacy and exclude the 'Mizrachi' public from the centers of power. The cultural and demographic characteristics of the 'Ashkenazi' voters can explain the connection to the civic-liberal identity. The aspiration for a democratic and modern secular society suits the voters of the left, most of whom are secular, educated and from the upper socioeconomic class (Shalev, Levy, 2004, p. 252). Beyond the ethnic division, there are additional characteristics that influence the positioning on the continuum between the two competing social identities. Minority groups, by nature not Jewish, support the liberal-civic identity, which allows them to integrate in Israeli society as equals. In contrast, the religious groups that aspire to ensure the status of the religion and the nature of Israel as a Jewish state are found at the head of the camp of the Jewish-ethnic identity.

The gaps between the identities are so great that in a survey conducted in 1999 more than 70% of the respondents answered that they do not see themselves as able to fit into the contradicting political camp (Arian, Shamir, 2001, p. 34). In other words, they are not capable of belonging to the other social identity.

Future trends

The data of a survey recently conducted by the Israeli Institute of Democracy illustrates the dominance of the Jewish-ethnic identity in Jewish society. The perceptions that arose from the findings can help us identify and delineate the characteristics and borders of the collective as Jewish society perceives them (Herman, Heller, Cohen, Bublil, 2015, p. 93–108).

Political identity: 49% defined themselves as supporting the parties of the right and the moderate right, versus 16% who defined themselves as supporting the parties of the left.

Character of the state: 37% noted that the Jewish character of the state is more important to them, while 35% noted that the democratic character is more important to them.

Arab Citizens: 67% noted the national tension between Jews and Arabs as the main social issue of Israeli society. Nearly 42% agree that most of the Arab public has not accepted the existence of the state and supports the elimination of Israel. 57% of the Jewish public agrees that the state must direct more budgets to Jewish communities than

to the Arab communities, and 56% agree that the human rights organizations cause harm to the country.

Most of Jewish society, according to these findings, supports the rightwing camp. The Jewish identity of the state is important to it no less than the democratic identity, and Arab citizens are not perceived by the Jewish majority as belonging to the State of Israel. The social border displayed is clear and sharp, and it separates between the Jews as such and all the rest. Since the political upheaval of 1977, this identity has steadily become established in Israeli society (see Figure 4), reflected in the political arena and influencing the way in which the governments of Israel act. This trend, which has political implications towards Israeli society and no less towards the international arena, is joined by a number of reasons:

1. The demographic factor. From a demographic perspective, the Jewish-ethnic camp is larger than the civic-liberal camp. In Jewish society, 48% define themselves as 'Mizrachi' and 40% as 'Ashkenazi' (Arian, 2009, p. 24). In terms of religious belief, most of the Jewish public believes in God, 20% define themselves as ultra-orthodox and religious, 38% define themselves as traditional, and only 42% define themselves as secular (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010, p. 1). The constant increase of the traditional and religious camp derives from the high natural increase that characterizes the religious public as opposed to the secular public.
2. The dimension of time. The young generation born into the reality of the Israeli control and Jewish settlement in the territories of Judea and Samaria does not differentiate between the concepts of the Land of Israel and the State of Israel, and sees these territories as a legitimate and inseparable part of the territory of the State. It is not surprising that every attempt to dispute Israeli legitimacy in the territories of Judea and Samaria on the part of the diplomatic system is interpreted as an attempt to harm the sovereignty of the state and to negate the connection between the Jewish people and its Promised Land, and thus produces angry responses.
3. The security reality. The security reality of Israeli society, in the form of Palestinian terror and wars with the Arab states, also strengthens the Jewish identity and casts in doubt the validity of the model of civic identity. The violence perpetrated by Arabs against the Jewish public contributes to the delineation of the social borders between Jewish citizens and Arab citizens and gives legitimacy to the negation of civic equality.

The electoral significance of these findings is that the bloc of right parties and religious parties is expected to become even more entrenched in Israeli politics in the coming years. The Israeli government, which is composed of representations of the Jewish-ethnic camp, analyzes reality through an ethnocentric, dichotomous and uncompromising outlook. Since the social borders separate Jews and the rest, any criticism voiced towards Israel is perceived as a threat to the Jewish people, and every factor that criticizes the conduct of Israel is catalogued as being from the enemy camp.

Summary

Conflicts and disagreements are an inseparable part of human society. Naturally, different groups compete over resources and interests and positions of influence. The main

claim that stands at the base of this paper is that the rational outlook alone is not sufficient in order to understand the complexity of the disputes in Israeli society, but there is a need to explore in-depth processes that relate to the social identity. Since social identity is a framework of understanding of the reality for the group, any change in it affects the way people choose to act, as can be seen across the years. Therefore, understanding the foreign policy of the Israeli government and its responses should be done through the framework of the dominant social identity. The decision of the European Union Commission to label products engendered sharp responses because of the understanding of the decision as the subversion of the religious and historical right of Jews to the Land of Israel, and because of the siding of the European Union with those who aspire to destroy the Jews. Since the Jewish-ethnic identity is steadily growing stronger in Jewish society, it can be expected that the differences of opinion between Israel, the Palestinians and the countries of the European Union will increase. Any diplomatic initiative on the part of the European countries will be rejected, and the forceful tone on the part of the State of Israel towards international criticism will continue.

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Zmiany w izraelskiej zbiorowej tożsamości jako źródło napięć na scenie politycznej

Streszczenie

Stanowiska obu stron wobec kluczowych kwestii dotyczących społeczeństwa izraelskiego, odsłania zmagania pomiędzy dwoma społecznymi orientacjami na temat kształtu państwa Izrael. Jedna z nich prawicowa, reprezentuje żydowską etniczną tożsamość, wywodzącą się z żydowskiej tradycji i dąży do zachowania żydowskiego charakteru państwa. Druga liberalna tożsamość, reprezentuje orientację opowiadającą się za otwartym demokratycznym państwem w duchu wartości francuskiej rewolucji.

Przez pierwsze trzy dekady, Izrael był we władaniu partii o orientacji lewicowej i świeckiej, które przyczyniły się do ukształtowania obywatelskiej tożsamości o proveniencji liberalno-świeckiej. Jednak w 1977 r. paradygmat ten radykalnie się zmienił, po dojściu do władzy prawicowo-religijnych ugrupowań, które zdecydowanie opowiedziały się za tożsamością żydowską. Umocnienie prawicowych partii oraz ugrupowań religijnych ukazuje fundamentalną zmianę w społeczeństwie izraelskim.

Konsekwencją umocnienia tożsamości żydowsko-etnicznej jest przyjęcie przez władze izraelskie dychotomicznego obrazu świata i zajęciu bezkompromisowego stanowiska wobec różnych kwestii w Izraelu jak i w stosunkach międzynarodowych, włączając w to Unię Europejską.

Obecna struktura społeczeństwa izraelskiego wskazuje, że tendencja do utrzymania tożsamości żydowsko-etnicznej mocni się w najbliższych latach, pogłębiając rozdziewki pomiędzy Izraelem a Unią Europejską.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczeństwo izraelskie, izraelski system partyjny, tożsamość zbiorowa, zachowania wyborcze