



Bowers, J. (2017). Parallel Distributed Processing theory in the age of deep networks. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 21(12), 950-961.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.013>

Peer reviewed version

License (if available):  
Unspecified

Link to published version (if available):  
[10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.013](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.013)

[Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research](#)  
PDF-document

This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via ELSEVIER at [www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/abstract/S1364-6613\(17\)30216-4](http://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/abstract/S1364-6613(17)30216-4) . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

## University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research

### General rights

This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:  
<http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms>

## **Parallel Distributed Processing Theory in the Age of Deep Networks**

Jeffrey S. Bowers

School of Experimental Psychology

University of Bristol

12a Priory Road, Bristol, BS8-1TU.

Email: [j.bowers@bristol.ac.uk](mailto:j.bowers@bristol.ac.uk)

### **Keywords**

Grandmother cell; localist representation; distributed representation; symbolic representation; deep neural network.

### **Abstract**

Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models in psychology are the precursors of deep networks used in computer science. However, only PDP models are associated with two core psychological claims, namely, that all knowledge is coded in a distributed format, and cognition is mediated by non-symbolic computations. These claims have long been debated within cognitive science, and recent work with deep networks speaks to this debate. Specifically, single-unit recordings show that deep networks learn units that respond selectively to meaningful categories, and researchers are finding that deep networks need to be supplemented with symbolic systems in order to perform some tasks. Given the close links between PDP and deep networks, it is surprising that research with deep networks is challenging PDP theory.

## **PDP and Deep Neural Networks**

**Parallel Distributed Processing** or **PDP** (see glossary) theories of cognition [1,2] have had a profound influence in psychology, and recently, in computer science. With regards to psychology, PDP theories are associated with a host of fundamental claims, but here I focus on two, namely, that knowledge is coded in a distributed rather than a localist format, and that computations are performed in a non-symbolic rather than symbolic manner (see **Box 1**). As detailed below, these claims are currently the prominent view in both psychology and neuroscience, and challenge many classic theories in psychology, linguistics, and artificial intelligence.

With regards to computer science, PDP models are the precursor to recent **deep networks** that have achieved state-of-the-art performance across a range of tasks, including speech [3,4] and object [5,6] recognition. This in turn has led to billions of dollars in investment in developing deep networks by Google, Facebook, Baidu, amongst other technology companies. Strikingly, these networks are in many ways similar to PDP models. Indeed, the most common way to train deep networks is through **the back-propagation** algorithm developed for PDP models in the 1980s. Perhaps the two most important differences between the models of the past and current models is that today we have more powerful computers and **graphical processing units (GPUs)** that have sped up simulations by orders of magnitudes, and we have vastly larger datasets of labelled data for training networks. This, along with the introduction of more efficient **activation functions** has made it possible to train networks with many layers, millions of units and billions of connections (a recent model included over 1000 hidden layers; [7]). Note that it is the many layers of these models that led to the term ‘deep’ networks, whereas earlier PDP networks tended to include only a few layers of units.

Given the similarities between PDP and deep networks, it might be expected that the successes of deep networks would lend general support to PDP theories of cognition. Indeed, the most common criticism of PDP models is that they are not powerful enough to explain human intelligence given their commitment to distributed representations [8] and non-symbolic computations [9–11]. Accordingly, the ability of deep networks to solve some complex tasks, sometimes at super-human levels, might appear to undermine this critique.

Here I argue just the opposite, and highlight how current work with deep networks is providing the most compelling demonstration to date that PDP theories of human cognition are fundamentally flawed. Two findings in particular pose a challenge for PDP theory, namely, deep networks learn highly selective representations under a range of conditions [12], and deep networks fail in solving those very tasks that proponents of symbolic systems predicted all along [13]. Similar findings have been found with PDP networks, both with regards to their learned representations [8,14,15] and their computational limitations [10,11]. But given the level of attention directed to deep networks, the deep learning results may have more traction in changing minds in psychology and neuroscience.

### **Localist versus Distributed Coding**

One of the common arguments put forward in support of PDP theories in psychology is that distributed representations are more biologically plausible than localist ones. Indeed, localist models in psychology are often rejected on the basis that grandmother cells are untenable [16]. On the grandmother cell hypothesis, high-level categories (e.g. familiar words, objects, or faces) are identified when a single neuron fires beyond some threshold. However, **grandmother cells** in the neuroscience literature and **localist representations** in the psychology literature are often defined differently [17], and accordingly, rejecting grandmother cells has little or no bearing on the biological plausibility of localist models. In fact, there is now compelling evidence that some single neurons in the hippocampus and the cortex respond to familiar high-level information in a highly selective manner [18], and single-unit recordings in localist models in psychology are consistent with a range of single-cell recording studies carried out on brains [19,20]. When grandmother cells are defined as localist representations (in order to make the grandmother cell hypothesis a well specified and serious hypothesis rather than the straw-man hypothesis that it often is), then grandmother cells are biologically plausible [17,18].

However, what is less well known, and the point I want to emphasize here, is that both PDP models and deep networks often learn localist representations.

*Localist representations in PDP models.* Within psychology, Berkeley et al. [14] were the first to carry out single-unit recordings on PDP networks in order to explore the conditions under which networks learn localist versus distributed representations for high-level information. After training their models on various complex input-output mappings,

they recorded the response of each hidden unit to a range of inputs. They then displayed the results using a scatter plot for each unit. Each unit's response to a specific input was coded with a point along the x-axis (ranging from 0-1), with values on the y-axis arbitrary (in order to prevent overlapping responses from different inputs; for illustration see **Figure 1a**). The key finding was that the networks learned some localist representations when they included **gaussian units** (what the authors called "value units"). By contrast, they failed to observe localist codes when their models included **sigmoidal units** that are typically used in PDP networks. This highlights that distributed representations are not an intrinsic property of PDP networks, but rather, associated with specific implementations of PDP networks.

More recently, we adapted these scatter plots to explore the conditions in which recurrent PDP models of short-term memory (STM) learn localist codes [8,15]. The models used sigmodal activation functions and were highly similar those developed by Botvinick and Plaut [21]. We found that the networks learned distributed representations when they were trained to recall single items, but learned localist representations when trained to recall sequences of items. That is, we found that PDP networks learned distributed codes when the models were trained to activate one item at a time in STM and localist codes when trained to co-activate multiple items in STM (see **Figure 1b**). We argued that learned distributed representations were unable to overcome the **superposition catastrophe** [22] in the later condition, and that the models were therefore forced to learn localist codes in order to succeed.

This computational explanation for the emergence of localist coding in our simulations complements an earlier analysis of Marr [23]. Just as Marr argued that long-term memory is coded in a highly selective manner in the hippocampus in order to encode new memories quickly without forgetting pre-existing memories (solving the so-called stability-plasticity dilemma, [24]; otherwise known as catastrophic interference [25]), we argued that long-term knowledge in the cortex is coded in a selective manner in order to support STM (solving the superposition catastrophe). More generally, Plaut and McClelland [26] argue that PDP networks "discover representations that are effective in solving tasks..." and this "provides more insight into why cognitive and neural systems are organized the way they are" (p. 489). Adopting this logic, the conclusion must be that there are computational advantages of localist codes in some conditions, and the findings may help explain why some neurons in cortex respond in such a highly selective manner.

*Localist representations in deep networks.* In contrast with the handful of single-unit recording studies carried out on PDP models over the past 30 years, there has been an explosion of single-unit studies carried out on deep networks. The striking finding across dozens of studies is that the networks learn highly selective representations for familiar categories across a range of network architectures and tasks (for a short review of single-unit recording studies in PDP and deep networks see [17]). Importantly, localist codes have been found in deep recurrent networks trained to co-activate multiple items at the same time [27] as well as deep networks trained on items one-at-a-time [28], highlighting that local codes are learned under a variety of network architectures and training conditions. **See Figure 1c** for an example of using single-unit recordings to reveal localist coding in a deep network.

In addition to the single-unit recording methods, selective units have been found in deep networks using a process called activation maximisation. In this method, rather than presenting a set of meaningful images to a network and recording how individual units respond (as in the scatter plot method), the experimenter generates (through various algorithms) images that best activate specific target units. At the start of the process a random input pattern (noise) is presented to a network that only weakly activates the target unit, and, through an iterative process, images are synthesized that more strongly activate the unit. At the end of the process an image is generated that drives that unit more strongly than any other sampled image, and the question is what sort of image is generated. If an interpretable image is synthesized it suggests that the unit has learned to code for meaningful high-level visual information, consistent with localist coding.

In fact, many reports of interpretable images have been documented [17], most often based on recordings from output units, but also from recordings of hidden units, as illustrated in **Figure 1d**. In a few cases, the selective units found in deep networks have been called “grandmother cells” [28], but for the most part, researchers do not make any psychological or neuroscientific claims. Rather, the authors are trying to understand how these networks work with the hope that this knowledge will inspire the creation of future models with better performance on applied tasks. But a better understanding of these conditions may also provide some insight into why some neurons selectively respond to meaningful inputs in hippocampus and cortex, and a growing number of single-unit recording studies have been carried out in deep networks with the goal of addressing psychological and neuroscience questions [29, 30, 31].

### **Symbolic vs. non-symbolic computations:**

A key distinction between network types is whether or not they implement symbols. On one view, sometimes called “implementational connectionism” [32] or “symbolic connectionism” [33], networks are endowed with special mechanisms in order to support symbolic computations. By contrast, on the PDP approach, neural networks may appear to support the computational capacities of symbolic systems under some conditions, but the underlying algorithms that mediate performance are simpler and non-symbolic [2,33].

In order to implement a symbolic neural network, words, objects, concepts, etc. need to be represented in long-term memory in a format that supports “compositionality” such that complex representations are composed from simpler parts in a regular fashion [9]. A key requirement of compositionality is that the parts maintain their identity in different contexts. This is achieved through a process of dynamically assigning the parts a role (or equivalently, assigning values to variables) to construct more complex representations, as described in **Box 1**.

The main motivation for symbolic theories is the claim that context-independent representations are necessary for human-like generalization that occurs “outside the training space” [11]. That is, symbolic systems can support generalization for new inputs that contain features that have not been trained on a given task. Marcus [11] gives the example of the identity function,  $f(x) = x$ , where it is necessary to assign a value (e.g., a number, word, object, etc.) to the variable  $x$ . If a person learns the identity function from a few examples, he or she can respond appropriately to an infinity of different inputs, including inputs that are highly dissimilar to the trained examples. For instance, after learning to respond “one” to the spoken word “one”, and “two” to the spoken word “two”, we have no difficulty generalizing to untrained numbers, or even untrained non-numbers presented in a different modality: Given a picture of a duck, we can respond “duck”, or draw a duck. Critically, the spoken words “one” and “two” share no input features with a picture of a duck, and nevertheless, generalization is trivial, reflecting the human ability to generalize outside the training space. Generalization outside the training space is required for many high-level cognitive tasks [9,10], but as detailed below, is also required for some memory and perceptual tasks. Generalisation outside the training space is analogous to extrapolation, where predictions are made beyond the original observation range.



*A role for symbolic processes in PDP networks.* Despite the claim that symbols are needed for human-like generalization, non-symbolic models continue to be the overwhelming approach to studying human cognition in psychology and neuroscience. One reason for this is that PDP models often appear good at generalizing because they are typically tested “within their training space”. That is, models are only tested on novel items that share all the relevant input features with trained items. For example, Botvinick and Plaut [21] emphasized that their recurrent PDP model of STM successfully recalled sequences of 6 letters despite the fact that the sequences were almost always novel (over 99.9% of the time; Simulation 1). However, although the specific sequences of 6 letters were almost always novel, the model had been trained many times with all letters in all list positions (e.g., although the sequence A-K-E-B-F-S may have been novel, the model was trained on many lists that contained A in the first position, K in the second position, etc.). When specific letters were excluded from specific list positions during training (e.g., the letter A was trained in all positions apart from position 1), the model did poorly when tested on sequences that included these letters in these positions [34, 35]. That is, the model failed to generalize outside the training space, just as critics of non-symbolic models would predict (for related finding see [36]).

Similarly, O’Reilly [37] developed a PDP model that identified horizontal and vertical bars presented in various positions and orientations on an input layer. The model was able to generalize to many unseen patterns based on limited training, and this was taken as a response to critics of non-symbolic connectionist theories. The authors wrote: “Such results should help to counter the persistent claims that neural networks are incapable of producing systematic behaviour based on statistical learning of the environment” (p. 1230-1231). But as noted by Dumas and Hummel [38], the training set in the simulations was “judiciously chosen to span the space of all possible input and output vectors” (p 79), and as such, the model was not tested outside the training space. So again, the success of the model does not address the persistent criticisms raised by critics of non-symbolic models.

Perhaps the best-known example of PDP models generalizing comes from models of single-word reading that not only successfully name trained words, but also many novel words (e.g., [39, 40, 41]; but see [42]). This was taken to undermine the dual route model of naming that includes a symbolic grapheme-phoneme conversion system for the sake of generalizing to novel words (as well as localist codes for the sake of naming irregular words)

[43]. However, once again, the PDP models were only tested within their training space (the models were only tested on novel words that included letters in trained positions).

The limitation of non-symbolic models of word processing was highlighted in a recurrent PDP model that was trained to learn the orthographic forms of words [44]. The model was claimed to solve the challenge of identifying familiar words (e.g., COW) in novel contexts (e.g., PINKCOW), what Davis [45] called the ‘alignment problem’. To illustrate the problem, a PDP model that learns to identify the word COW on the basis of position-specific letter codes (e.g., C-in-position-1, O-in-position-2, and W-in-position-3) cannot identify the COW in BROWNCOW on the basis of the untrained C-in-position-4, O-in-position-5, and W-in-position-6 letter units (a case of testing outside the model’s training space). Thus, Sibley et al.’s claim that their recurrent PDP model solved the alignment problem and could “capture the commonalities between wordforms like CAT, SCAT, CATS, and SCATS” (p. 742) was notable. However, the model was never actually tested on the alignment problem, and it was later shown that the model had no capacity to solve it [46]. Indeed, in a response article, Sibley et al. [47] wrote “We concede that according to their definition, the sequence encoder does not solve the alignment problem” (p. 1189). So again, a non-symbolic model failed to generalize outside the training space. In order to solve the alignment problem, Davis [45,48] developed symbolic models of visual word identification that includes context independent letter codes in order to identify familiar words in novel contexts. See **Figure 2** for an illustration of how context independent letter codes can be used to solve this problem.

*A role for symbolic processes in deep networks:* Of course, the limited generalization capacities of small-scale PDP models does not guarantee that more powerful non-symbolic models will also fail. Thus, it is important to emphasize that more powerful deep networks show the same limitations.

For instance, Graves et al. [13] trained networks to perform a set of calculations on one graph (e.g., learning the shortest distance between two nodes) and then assessed whether the model could apply this knowledge to another graph (a graph of the London underground). The authors found that standard non-symbolic deep networks failed to generalize, and that it was necessary to add an external memory that implements a symbolic system to support generalization. This is how they motivate their hybrid network/symbolic system:

Modern computers separate computation and memory. Computation is performed by a processor, which can use an addressable memory to bring operands in and out of play. This confers two important benefits: the use of extensible storage to write new information and the ability to treat the contents of memory as variables. Variables are critical to algorithm generality: to perform the same procedure on one datum or another, an algorithm merely has to change the address it reads from. In contrast to computers, the computational and memory resources of artificial neural networks are mixed together in the network weights and neuron activity. This is a major liability: as the memory demands of a task increase, these networks cannot allocate new storage dynamically, nor easily learn algorithms that act independently of the values realized by the task variables.... (p. 471)

This passage could have been written by Jerry Fodor 30 years ago.

In fact, there are a growing number of “memory networks” [49] that implement symbolic computations with specially designed memory systems that store items in a context independent manner. The reason why the generalization limitations of non-symbolic models is becoming more widely appreciated is that computer scientists are trying to solve real world problems that require more robust forms of generalization. The repeated successes of PDP networks within the training space cannot mask the limitations of this approach any longer. Interestingly, a number of theorists traditionally associated with the non-symbolic PDP approach have recently been exploring ways to implement symbols in neural networks to improve generalization as well (e.g., [38,50]).

Furthermore, the reliance on non-symbolic representations is part of the reason why PDP and deep networks need to be trained so extensively. For example, deep networks of object identification, including deep **convolutional networks**, do not support robust translation invariance. That is, learning to identify an object in one retinal location does not immediately allow the model to generalize to distal retinal locations. As a consequence, it is necessary to train each trained object at many different locations [51,52], or add special modules that spatially manipulate the input patterns [53]. Apart from increasing the amount of training, this is not how human vision works [54]. A nice example of the advantages of learning using context independent representations was recently reported by Lake et al. [55]

who showed how models with symbolic capacities can support one-shot learning of letters whereas deep networks need many training trials. And of course, in many cases, it is not feasible to adequately sample the test space during training, and in these cases, symbolic neural networks may be required.

*How can symbolic processes be implemented in neural networks?* No doubt one of the reasons why there are still so few examples of symbolic theories in psychology and neuroscience is that it is much easier to build non-symbolic networks. Indeed, it is not immediately obvious how to implement symbolic processes in an artificial neural network, let alone in neural tissue. As Gallistel and Balsam [56] write:

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to neurobiologists' acceptance of the view that the brain stores information in symbolic form, just as does a computer, is our inability to imagine what this story might look like at the cellular and molecular level. (p. 142).

In fact, there have been different proposals over the years regarding how to implement symbolic computations in neural networks, and all proposals entail fundamental challenges to the PDP approach to theorizing (above and beyond implementing symbols). On one approach, all learning and computation takes place in the connection weights between units, and specialized modules and circuits are introduced to networks in order to encode and operate on context independent representations [57]. This is a departure from the PDP approach according to which human cognition emerges from general learning algorithms operating on systems with minimal innate structure; the so-called “emergentist view” [58].

The more radical approach to implementing symbolic computation is to reject the core PDP claim that all learning and computation takes place at the level of the connections between units [59]. For example, Gallistel and colleagues argue that symbolic computations is mediated by memories stored at the level of molecules within neurons [56], Hummel and colleagues [10,60] argue that neural synchrony is used for variable binding, and Davis [48] argues that delay lines that alter the conduction times of neurons can be used to support symbolic computations. In fact, there is good evidence that learning and computation do take place outside the synapse [56], and as detailed in **Box 2**, recent evidence that myelin plasticity provides a biologically plausible mechanism for implementing delay-lines that have been used

to support symbolic computations. In all symbolic theories, networks are endowed with additional resources in order to build the compositional representations and variable binding needed for symbolic computation.

### **Concluding Remarks and Future Perspectives:**

PDP models developed in the 1980s continue to have profound impact on theories of mind and brain, and indeed, the rejection of localist codes and symbolic computations are the predominant views in psychology and neuroscience today. Given that PDP models are the precursor of deep networks, it is somewhat ironic that research with deep networks is providing some of the strongest arguments to date that localist representations and symbolic computations play an essential role in human cognition.

In the future, it will be important to explore in more detail the conditions in which artificial neural networks learn localist and distributed coding schemes and see whether these findings relate to how the brain codes for information. In addition, the computational limitations of PDP and non-symbolic deep networks should motivate researchers to explore how symbolic representations and computations might be implemented in cognitive models and neural tissue. This may not only provide new insights into how the brain implements cognition, but may lead to more powerful artificial neural networks for solving more difficult artificial intelligence problems. See **Outstanding Questions Box**.

### **Box 1. Two core theoretical debates**

It is important to distinguish between the localist/distributed and the symbolic/non-symbolic debates. The localist/distributed debate is concerned with the interpretability of individual units in an artificial or real neural network. Units in an artificial network are analogous to neurons in brains in that they both respond to inputs (e.g., firing rate of a neuron), and they connect to other units (neurons). The key feature of a localist unit is that it is most active to one meaningful category. For instance, in the Interactive Activation model [61], each word unit responds most strongly to a specific word, and as a consequence, it is possible to interpret the output of single units (if unit X is active beyond some threshold, the model has identified the word DOG). By contrast, a representation is distributed if each unit responds to multiple categories to the same degree, and as a consequence, the pattern of activation over a collection of units is needed in order to uniquely categorize an input. With this view, it is not possible to determine what the model has identified by observing the state of single units.

The symbolic/non-symbolic debate is concerned with how neural systems compute, and this entails a different claim about how knowledge is coded. A key feature of symbolic systems is that words, objects, concepts, etc. are represented in long-term memory in a format that support “compositionality” such that complex representations are composed from simpler parts that are context independent [9]. For example, in a symbolic model of word identification, words are coded from letters that maintain their identity in different context (e.g., the words DOG and GOD share the same set of letter representations despite the fact that the letters D and G occur in different positions). Critically, symbolic networks need methods to compute with context independent representations in order to dynamically assign items a role (in this case, assign letters a position), a process also called variable binding. This insures that DOG and GOD are similar to one another given that they share the same set of letter units, but different by virtue of the way the letters are assigned a position. This dynamic binding requires additional circuits [57] or additional computational mechanisms [10] compared to non-symbolic models that compute on context dependent representations where the binding are coded in long-term memory (e.g., *D-in-position-1* and *D-in-position-3*). Importantly, the use of context dependent representations obscures the similarity of items (DOG and GOD only share the O-in-position-2 letter code). It is often claimed that symbolic models support more widespread generalization, specifically, generalization “outside the training set” [11].

**Box 2. Learning and computation outside the synapse with myelin plasticity**

A fundamental claim of PDP theories is that all learning and computation is mediated by the connection weights between units [59]. This characterizes almost all deep networks as well. However, recent studies have demonstrated another locus of learning and computation, namely, the adaptive modification of myelin along axons that alters the neural conduction times of neurons; so-called myelin-plasticity. For example, learning is associated with changes in myelin in brain regions relevant for performing a task [62], adaptive changes in myelin are used to insure the coincident arrival times of spikes on postsynaptic cells [63], and blocking myelin production impairs new learning in some tasks [64]. For recent review of myelin plasticity see [65].

The potential significance of identifying a second locus for learning and computation is hard to overstate. First, the assumption that all learning and computation occurs at synapse has motivated artificial networks that compute with idealized units that are identical apart from the connections they make with other units. Consequently, models include units that take a fixed amount of time to pass information from input to output, and this in turn ensures that the relative timing of inputs on a postsynaptic unit are irrelevant. By contrast, actual neurons vary dramatically in their morphology, such that conduction times of communicating information between neurons vary dramatically. This is functionally relevant because the timing with which a postsynaptic neuron receives inputs (spikes) from multiple sources not only has a profound impact on the activation of the postsynaptic neurons due to temporal summation, but the timing impacts on learning due to spike-time-dependent learning [66]. Myelin plasticity provides a possible mechanism to adaptively modify the timing of neural signals in order to maximize the activation of post-synaptic neurons.

Second, myelin plasticity provides a possible implementation of delay lines that have been to support symbolic computations. Specifically, the symbolic Spatial Coding Model of visual word identification [48] uses the connection weights between units to code for the identity of letters within words (in a context independent manner) and uses delay-lines to dynamically code for the order of letters within words. Indeed, this model predicted a learning mechanism that adaptively alters the time it takes neurons to communicate information via delay-lines, precisely what myelin plasticity achieves. This model accounts for a large set of experimental results on visual word identification, and critically, solves the alignment problem.

**Glossary:**

**Activation Function:** The activation function of a unit determines the output of that unit given its inputs. Various activation functions have been employed across different networks, including sigmoidal, gaussian, and rectifier functions.

**Back-propagation algorithm:** A method for training PDP and deep neural networks. It is a 'supervised' form of learning as the model is provided the correct output for each input. The algorithm adjusts the weights between units across all layers of a network so an input does a better job producing the correct output on later trials.

**Convolutional Networks:** A deep network in which units in a convolutional layer are connected to a subset of spatially contiguous units in the preceding layer. Convolutional networks are faster to train than standard networks as they include fewer connections.

**Deep Neural Networks:** Any network that includes multiple hidden layers.

**Grandmother Cell:** A hypothetical neuron that codes for one meaningful category (e.g., an image of a specific person). It is a pejorative term intended to ridicule this hypothesis, and as a consequence, there have been few attempts to provide a formal definition. On one view, grandmother cells only fire to one specific stimulus, with separate neurons devoted to each possible perceptual experience. On another view, grandmother cells are the equivalent of localist representations in psychological models. The former hypothesis is clearly false, the later view is more plausible.

**Gaussian Units:** Units that use a non-linear 'bell-curved' gaussian activation function in which the output of unit changes non-monotonically with increasing inputs. Value units employ a specific form of the gaussian function.



**Graphics Processing Unit (GPU):** An electronic circuit that is well-suited for the matrix/vector math involved in training deep neural networks. The use of GPUs started in 2009 was estimated to speed up training of networks by approximately 100 times.

**Localist Representation:** A localist representation responds most strongly to one familiar meaningful category, such as a word, object, or person. Although localist representations encode one and only one thing, they do respond to other related items. For example, a localist representation of the word DOG fires most strongly to the word DOG, but also will fire (below some threshold) to related words such as LOG or FOG.

**Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP):** A form of artificial neural network developed in the 1980s that was associated with a host of psychological and neuroscience claims. Two central claims are that information is coded in a distributed format, and computations are symbolic.

**Sigmoidal Units:** Units that use a non-linear 's-shaped' sigmoidal activation function in which the output of a unit increases monotonically from 0 to 1 with increasing inputs. Most commonly used in PDP models.

**Superposition Catastrophe:** A hypothesis regarding a computational limitation of distributed representations. On this view, a network using distributed representations can unambiguously represent one item at a time, but superimposing two or more patterns over the same units can result in a blend pattern that is ambiguous in that there is no way to reconstruct the patterns from the blend. Localist representations do not suffer from this constraint.

## Figure Captions:

**Figure 1.** Different methods of displaying selectivity. Different methods for depicting the selectivity of single units across a range of networks trained on a range of tasks. (A). An example ‘scatter plot’ developed by Berkeley et al [14]. On this approach, a separate scatterplot is created for each hidden unit, and each point in a scatterplot corresponds to a unit’s activation in response to a specific input. Level of unit activation is coded along the x-axis, and distinct values are assigned to each point along the y-axis. Berkeley et al. observed banding patterns after training, with inputs within a band sharing a meaningful feature. The scatter plot above depicts a single hidden unit in a model trained to categorize a set of logical problems as valid or invalid, and the points in highly active band were all associated with the input feature ‘OR’. That is, this hidden unit is an ‘OR’ detector. (B) Scatter plot from [8] in which the points were labelled. This hidden unit responded selectively to words that contain the letter ‘g’. (C) Activation of a single hidden unit in a deep recurrent network trained to generate text after being trained with Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace and the source code of the Linux Kernel [27]. The unit was highly active (indicated in lighter grey) after it generated an opening quote character and remained active until the closing quote was output, at which point it turned off (indicated in darker grey). (D) Activation maximization method of depicting selectivity of single units in a deep convolutional network [12]. On this method images are synthesized that maximumly activate a specific unit. The five images are the product of five different simulations of synthesizing images that maximally activate a single hidden unit. The fact that most of the images are interpretable (as a lighthouse in this case) suggests that the unit was tuned to code for a specific meaningful thing.

**Figure 2** Coding letters in a context independent manner. (A) The same set of letters S, A, L, T are involved in coding for the words SALT, SLAT, LAST, and the order of the letters is coded through the level of letter activation, with earlier letters more active. (B) The use of context independent codes provides a potential solution the alignment problem. The pattern of letter of activation associated with the inputs CAT, HOLE, and CATHOLE is displayed. The critical point to note is that the inputs HOLE and CATHOLE not only activate the same H, O, L, E letter codes, but in addition, the pattern of activation over these units is the same, with H most active, followed by the reduced activation of O, L, and E. Accordingly, if the model has learned to identify the word HOLE in isolation, then the model will be able to identify HOLE when presented in the novel context CATHOLE, solving the alignment

problem [45]. This is not possible in PDP models in which letters are coded by position (e.g., there is H-in-position-1 in CATHOLE). This coding scheme, sometimes called a ‘primacy gradient’, was first developed by Grossberg [68] in the context of STM, and was similarly used by Page and Norris [69] in their symbolic model of STM. Delay

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Ella Gale for comments on an earlier draft of manuscript. This work was supported by a grant from The Leverhulme Trust RPG-2016-113 awarded to Jeffrey Bowers and Colin Davis. This project also received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement number 741134).

## References

- 1 Rumelhart, D.E. *et al.* (1986) Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 1) Foundations. *Cambridge MA: MIT Press*
- 2 McClelland, J.L. *et al.* (1986) Parallel distributed processing: Psychological and biological models (Vol. 2). *Cambridge MA: MIT Press*
- 3 Graves, A. and Jaitly, N. (2014) Towards end-to-end speech recognition with recurrent neural networks. In *JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings*, 32, pp. 1764–1772
- 4 Hannun, A. *et al.* (2014) Deep speech: scaling up end-to-end speech recognition. [arxiv.org/abs/1412.5567](http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.5567)
- 5 He, K. *et al.* (2016) Deep residual learning for image recognition. , in *2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*, pp. 770–778
- 6 Krizhevsky, A. *et al.* (2012) ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks. *Adv. Neural Inf. Process. Syst.*, pp. 1097-1105
- 7 Huang, G. *et al.* (2016) Deep networks with stochastic depth. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 646–661
- 8 Bowers, J.S. *et al.* (2014) Neural networks learn highly selective representations in order to overcome the superposition catastrophe. *Psychol. Rev.* 121, 248–61
- 9 Fodor, J.A. and Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1988) Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. *Cognition* 28, 3–71
- 10 Hummel, J.E. and Holyoak, K.J. (1997) Distributed representations of structure: A theory of analogical access and mapping. *Psychol. Rev.* 104, 427–466
- 11 Marcus, G.F. (1998) Rethinking eliminative connectionism. *Cogn. Psychol.* 37, 243–282
- 12 Nguyen, A. *et al.* (2016) Synthesizing the preferred inputs for neurons in neural networks via deep generator networks. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 3387–3395
- 13 Graves, A. *et al.* (2016) Hybrid computing using a neural network with dynamic

- external memory. *Nature* 538, 471–476
- 14 Berkeley, I.S.N. et al. (1995) Density plots of hidden unit activations reveal interpretable bands. *Conn. Sci.* 7, 167–187
- 15 Bowers, J.S. et al. (2016) Why do some neurons in cortex respond to information in a selective manner? Insights from artificial neural networks. *Cognition* 148, 47–63
- 16 Rolls, E.T. (2017) Cortical coding. *Lang. Cogn. Neurosci.* 32, 316–329
- 17 Bowers, J.S. (2017) Grandmother cells and localist representations: A review of current thinking. *Lang. Cogn. Neurosci.* 32, 257–273
- 18 Bowers, J.S. (2009) On the biological plausibility of grandmother cells: Implications for neural network theories in psychology and neuroscience. *Psychol. Rev.* 116, 220–251
- 19 Gubian, M. et al. (2017) Comparing single-unit recordings taken from a localist model to single-cell recording data: a good match. *Lang. Cogn. Neurosci.* 32, 380–391
- 20 Page, M. (2017) Localist models are compatible with information measures, sparseness indices, and complementary-learning systems in the brain. *Lang. Cogn. Neurosci.* 32, 366–379
- 21 Botvinick, M.M. and Plaut, D.C. (2006) Short-term memory for serial order: A recurrent neural network model. *Psychol. Rev.* 113, 201
- 22 Von Der Malsburg, C. (1986) Am I thinking assemblies? In *Brain Theory* pp. 161–176, Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- 23 Marr, D. et al. (1991) Simple memory: A theory for archicortex. In *From the Retina to the Neocortex* pp. 59–128, Birkhäuser Boston
- 24 Grossberg, S. (1980) How does a brain build a cognitive code? *Psychol. Rev.* 87, 1–51
- 25 McCloskey, M. and Cohen, N.J. (1989) Catastrophic interference in connectionist networks: The sequential learning problem. *Psychol. Learn. Motiv.* 24, 109–165
- 26 Plaut, D.C. and McClelland, J.L. (2000) Stipulating versus discovering representations. *Behav. Brain Sci.* 23, 489–491
- 27 Karpathy, A. et al. (2015) Visualizing and understanding recurrent networks.

arxiv.org/abs/1506.02078

28. Le, Q. V. (2013) Building high-level features using large scale unsupervised learning. *Proc. 2013 IEEE Int. Conf. Acoust. Speech Signal Process.* DOI: 10.1109/ICASSP.2013.6639343
29. Hannagan, T., *et al.* (2014) Deep learning of orthographic representations in baboons. *PloS one*, 9(1), e84843
30. Kheradpisheh, S. R., *et al.* (2016) STDP-based spiking deep neural networks for object recognition. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01421*.
31. Pinker, S., and Prince, A. (1988) On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed processing model of language acquisition. *Cognition*, 28, 73-193
32. Holyoak, K. J. and Hummel, J. E. (2000) The proper treatment of symbols in a connectionist architecture. In E. Dietrich & A. B. Markman (Eds) *Cognitive dynamics: Conceptual change in humans and machines*, pp. 229–63. Erlbaum
33. McClelland, J. L. (2010) Emergence in cognitive science. *Topics in Cognitive Science*, 2, 751-770
34. Bowers, J.S. *et al.* (2009) A fundamental limitation of the conjunctive codes learned in PDP models of cognition: comment on Botvinick and Plaut (2006). *Psychol. Rev.* 116, 986–997
35. Bowers, J.S. *et al.* (2009) Postscript: more problems with Botvinick and Plaut’s (2006) PDP model of short-term memory. *Psychol. Rev.* 116, 995–997
38. Kriete, T. *et al.* (2013) Indirection and symbol-like processing in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.* 110, 16390–5
37. O’Reilly, R.C. (2001) Generalization in interactive networks: the benefits of inhibitory competition and Hebbian learning. *Neural Comput.* 13, 1199–1241
38. Doumas, L.A.A. and Hummel, J.E. (2005) Approaches to modeling human mental representations: What works, what doesn’t and why. In *The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning* (Holyoak, K. J. and Morrison, R. G., eds), pp. 73–91, Cambridge University Press
39. Seidenberg, M. S., and McClelland, J. L. (1989). A distributed, developmental model of word recognition and naming. *Psychol. Rev.* 96, 523- 568

40. Plaut, D. C., *et al.* (1996) Understanding normal and impaired word reading: computational principles in quasi-regular domains. *Psychol. Rev.* 103, 56-115
41. Sibley, D. E., *et al.* (2010) Learning orthographic and phonological representations in models of monosyllabic and bisyllabic naming. *European Journal of Cognitive Psychology* 22, 650-668
42. Mousikou, P. *et al.* (2017) Moving beyond the monosyllable in models of skilled reading: Mega-study of disyllabic nonword reading. *J. Mem. Lang.* 93, 169–192
43. Coltheart, M. *et al.* (2001) DRC: A dual route cascaded model of visual word recognition and reading aloud. *Psychol. Rev.* 108, 204–256
44. Sibley, D. *et al.* (2008) Large-scale modeling of wordform learning and representation. *Cogn. Sci. A Multidiscip. J.* 32, 741–754
45. Davis, C.J. (2001) The Self-Organising Lexical Acquisition and Recognition (SOLAR) model of visual word recognition. (Doctoral dissertation, ProQuest Information & Learning)
46. Bowers, J.S. and Davis, C.J. (2009) Learning representations of wordforms with recurrent networks: Comment on Sibley, Kello, Plaut, & Elman (2008). *Cogn. Sci.* 33, 1183–1186
47. Sibley, D.E. *et al.* (2009) Sequence encoders enable large-scale lexical modeling: Reply to Bowers and Davis (2009). *Cogn. Sci.* 33, 1187–1191
48. Davis, C.J. (2010) The spatial coding model of visual word identification. *Psychol. Rev.* 117, 713–758
49. Weston, J., *et al.* (2014) Memory networks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.3916*
50. Botvinick, M.M. and Cohen, J.D. (2014) The computational and neural basis of cognitive control: Charted territory and new frontiers. *Cogn. Sci.* 38, 1249–1285
51. Dandurand, F. *et al.* (2013) Computational models of location-invariant orthographic processing. *Conn. Sci.* 25, 1–26
52. Di Bono, M.G. and Zorzi, M. (2013) Deep generative learning of location-invariant visual word recognition. *Front. Psychol.* 4, 635
53. Jaderberg, M. *et al.* (2015) Spatial transformer networks. In *Advances In Neural*



*Information Processing Systems*, pp. 2017–2025

- 54 Bowers, J.S. *et al.* (2016) The visual system supports online translation invariance for object identification. *Psychon. Bull. Rev.* 23, 432–438
- 55 Lake, B.M. *et al.* (2015) Human-level concept learning through probabilistic program induction. *Science* 350, 1332–1338
- 56 Gallistel, C.R. and Balsam, P.D. (2014) Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Time to rethink the neural mechanisms of learning and memory. *Neurobiol. Learn. Mem.* 108, 136–144
- 57 Kriete, T. *et al.* (2013) Indirection and symbol-like processing in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.* 110, 16390–5
- 58 McClelland, J.L. *et al.* (2010) Letting structure emerge: connectionist and dynamical systems approaches to cognition. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 14, 348–356
- 59 Rogers, T.T. and McClelland, J.L. (2014) Parallel distributed processing at 25: Further explorations in the microstructure of cognition. *Cogn. Sci.* 38, 1024–1077
- 60 Hummel, J.E. and Biederman, I. (1992) Dynamic binding in a neural network for shape recognition. *Psychol. Rev.* 99, 480–517
- 61 McClelland, J.L. and Rumelhart, D.E. (1981) An interactive activation model of context effects in letter perception: I. An account of basic findings. *Psychol. Rev.* 88, 375–407
- 62 Bengtsson, S.L. *et al.* (2005) Extensive piano practicing has regionally specific effects on white matter development. *Nat. Neurosci.* 8, 1148–1150
- 63 Seidl, A.H. *et al.* (2010) Mechanisms for adjusting interaural time differences to achieve binaural coincidence detection. *Journal of Neuroscience* 30, 70–80
- 64 McKenzie, I.A. *et al.* (2014) Motor skill learning requires active central myelination. *Science* 346, 318–322
- 65 Purger, D. *et al.* (2016) Myelin plasticity in the central nervous system. *Neuropharmacology* 110, 563–573
- 66 Dan, Y., and Poo, M. M. (2004) Spike timing-dependent plasticity of neural circuits. *Neuron* 44, 23–30

67. Nguyen, A. *et al.* (2016) Synthesizing the preferred inputs for neurons in neural networks via deep generator networks. *arXiv* at [arxiv.org/abs/1605.09304](https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09304)
68. Grossberg, S. (1978) Behavioral contrast in short term memory: Serial binary memory models or parallel continuous memory models?. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, *17*, 199-219
69. Page, M., and Norris, D. (1998) The primacy model: a new model of immediate serial recall. *Psychol. Rev.* *105*, 761-781

Figure 1a




Figure 1b




Figure 1c

Cell that turns on inside quotes:  
 "You mean to imply that I have nothing to eat out of.... On the contrary, I can supply you with everything even if you want to give dinner parties," warmly replied Chichagov, who tried by every word he spoke to prove his own rectitude and therefore imagined Kutuzov to be animated by the same desire.  
 Kutuzov, shrugging his shoulders, replied with his subtle penetrating smile: "I meant merely to say what I said."

Figure 1d



Figure 2a




Figure 2b

