

CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF
KODRAT PEREMPUAN:
LOCAL DISCOURSE OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S
LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA

DE TEGENWOORDIGE INTERPRETATIE VAN
KODRAT PEREMPUAN:
HET LOKALE DISCOURS OVER VROUWELIJK
LEIDERSCHAP IN INDONESIA

Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This study discusses the contemporary interpretation of local women's leadership framed in the lens of constructed female nature, and of cultural citizenship. The study contests the view which asserts that constructed woman kodrad deeply impedes woman's social engagement. It argues that *kodrat* does hinder women's participation but not totally. In other words, the perception of *kodrat* supports limitedly women's participation. It means women have space and opportunity to socially engage but within the limitation of the perception of *kodrat*. The scope of this limitation is fluid and can be changed over times and contexts depending on women's situation and capacities themselves. The more conducive the context they live in and the more capacities they have, the more probable women are able to engage socially. So, basically it discusses women's strategies (experiences) in their effort to bypass the limitations. In this *Reformasi* era, where democratization and gender equity development are occupying greater space in the Indonesian landscape, opportunities for women's social engagement are also greater. The challenges of cultural (locally derived) exclusiveness and religious radicalism may also hinder women's space and opportunities for social activity. However, these challenges certainly will not close space and opportunity to do so, because the opposite powers – democratization and the gender equality movement- are supporting an increased engagement of women in society.

The study focuses on the women leadership based on four cases of woman as *Nyai*, *Ibu* or *Ummi*, *Posyandu Kader*, woman head of village or urban village, of sub-district, and female member of local parliament (MP) in Tasikmalaya Regency and City. On in one hand, it deals with leadership experience of women in these four cases. On the other hand, it also examines the dynamics of their experience. It is interesting to see on how their struggle to have more public space within their marginality had gone so far, as well as on how they take advantages of the new situation, the *Reformasi* era for their own interests of their leadership.

As a descriptive study, this thesis deploys Anthony Giddens's perspective of agency in discussing its findings. The data are arranged into categories, sub-categories and terms, identifying internal and external factor that influence woman social engagement. Internally, it examines woman's strategies in handling barriers they face, and shortcomings they have. Externally, it also discusses influences that create conditions for women's participation through the analysis of state policies and media's coverage of women's issues, particularly in the four targeted themes. The study is based on the field work in Tasikmalaya *Kota* and *Kabupaten* which

was conducted 8 months from the middle of August 2008 to middle of April 2009 and about the same period from April to November 2010.

This study concludes that the perception of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* is an important factor that determines many women's civic engagement in the site where the study took place, Tasikmalaya Regency and City. The significance of this study is that it concentrates on the perceptions of various agents -- including the State, religious and social agents, educators, politicians, health activists, etc., -- who all participate in the formulation of what they see as women's ideal roles and by so doing construct the *kodrat perempuan*. This study confirms Robinson's and Blackburn's conclusion that *kodrat perempuan* has often been framed as a source of the restriction of women's civic engagement (Robinson, 2009. p. 192; Blackburn, 2004. p. 223, 229). However, this study finds that women in Tasikmalaya deal with *kodrat* pragmatically and realistically use it as source of engagement. Rather than seeing *kodrat* only as a restriction, in Tasikmalaya, women actually managed to create certain degree of space, opportunity and links to engage in social activities. In other words, outside the existing restrictions, women empower themselves and they find solutions suited to them to enable them to get actively engaged in local leadership. Finally, the study also finds that in its wider discourse where the interrelation of the practices of the agents, the State, and the news take place, woman's civic engagement, seeing from the expression of cultural citizenship, represents their effort to pave the way to become fully equal citizens.

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I dedicate this monograph to my parents: my father H. Oking Azhuri, my mother Siti Habsyah, as well as my brothers: Zeni Nurdin, Pendi Supendi, Syam Agus Solihin, Bubung Lukman Hakim, Anton Firmasyah and Dani Yusuf Akbar, and my sisters: Hani Hanifah, Ina Nabila, and Asri Fitria Annisa. Finally, I thank to my wife Awalia Rahma who took care the family during my absent, and to my daughters Ayisha Amana Rahma, and Raia Tanaya Kusmana, and my son Daneesh Aydin Amirina. This thesis is also dedicated for them.

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A NOTE OF TRANSLITERATION

In this study, I have applied modern spelling for all Indonesian terms. I have used the international system of transliteration for Arabic names and terms which are not part of the Indonesian language. I do not add 's' for the plural forms of Indonesian words, but I have maintained certain Arabic words in its grammatical structure. For the translation of Qur'anic verses, I use *Translation of the Meaning of The Noble Qur'an in the English Language*, translated by Dr. Muhammad Taqī-ud-Dīn Al-Hilālī, and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khān (1417 H).

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Part I.

Introduction:

Framing, Focus, method, and Organization of Study

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. Framing

Don't, girls, don't go to school! It will be more than enough if you can cook rice, do the gardening, and serve your husbands. That is enough to gain entrance to Paradise.¹

Providing education for girls at that time was the shortest and most appropriate way to stop the further decline of women's status. Thus, Dewi Sartika's efforts were noble attempts to improve the standards of her gender community towards a fairer and more equal status with their opposite partners. In addition to that, as a private education development project independent of formal educational institutions, Dewi Sartika's thoughts and activities successfully produced women who were capable of living independently, who not merely depended on their life partners, and who were skillful and independent but who did not transgress their *kodrat*.²

Married women were singled out as a group with a crucial role in this new approach. This resulted in the initiation of the Applied Family Welfare Program (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga- PKK), a movement which is meant to reach women at every level of society including the village level. The official conception of women status and function as "good citizens" is marked by wom-

¹ "Entong, awewe mah entong sakola! Asal bisa nutu-ngejo, bisa kekerod, bisa ngawulaan salaki, geus leuwih ti cukup, ganjaranana ge manjing sawarga..." Rochiati Wiri-
aatmadja, 1983/1984. Dewi Sartika. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan,
Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, p. 89.

² "Memberi pendidikan kepada kaum wanita pada masa itu merupakan jalan yang terpendek dan paling tepat untuk menghentikan proses kemerosotan kedudukan kaum wanita lebih jauh. Maka usaha Dewi Sartika adalah usaha mulia untuk meningkatkan derajat kaumnya menuju ke kedudukan yang lebih wajar dan semartabat dengan lawan jenisnya. Di samping itu, sebagai usaha pendidikan swasta di luar lembaga pendidikan resmi, fikiran-fikiran dan perbuatan Dewi Sartika telah berhasil dalam mengejar tujuannya membentuk wanita-wanita dewasa yang mampu hidup sendiri tidak lagi tergantung semata-mata dari teman hidupnya, berkecakapan dan berpendirian yang tidak melampaui kodratnya." Ibid, p. 2.

en's customary roles as homebound child bearers and rearers, and loyal supporters of their husbands (Sullivan, 1983, 1994).³

Kodrat perempuan is for a woman to be her husband's companion, a house wife delivering babies and to be her husband's counterpart, in addition to being a minor member of society. When a woman would become president or minister, she must still look after her family. After all, a wife must take responsible for [the family]. Those who have businesses, or have become president or minister, of course still have to take care of their husband and children, and have to manage their work at the office. Like me, as a house wife, I dedicate myself 100% to my husband and children.⁴

The first quotation originates from the late nineteenth or early twentieth century West Javanese context. It gives the opinion of the State as represented by the Regent of Bandung, R.A.A. Martanegara (1893-1918). He advised Dewi Sartika not to open a school for girls in the first place because he feared potential resistance from society. The second quotation dates from the 1980s, when Rochiati Wiriaatmadja wrote her book about Dewi Sartika. It reveals that Rochiati Wiriaatmadja sees that Dewi Sartika's efforts for education for girls did not transgress the areas deemed appropriate to women's *kodrat*. The third quotation shows the 1990s' context where scholars like Sullivan (1983, and 1994), as quoted by Cynthia L. Hunter, offered her ideas on women's social engagement. It refers to the State's continued discriminatory position regarding women's roles and status. The last quotation is much more recent and was made in 2008. It refers to a *Posyandu* (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu/Integrated Village Health Service Post) cadre who was a housewife whose gender awareness seems to have progressed only slightly from the ones presented in the three other quotations.

The four quotations, be they from the State or from the people, show how strong the influence of the perception of *kodrat* is perceived either by the women themselves or by other agents who not only perceive but also formulate women's roles and status. Seen from the times the statements were made it becomes clear how the notion of *kodrat* persistently influences women's engagement, and how little it has changed. However, the last quotation was made more than a decade

³ Cynthia L. Hunter, 1996. "Women as 'Good Citizens': Maternal and Child Health in a Sasak Village," in *Maternity and Reproductive Health in Asian Societies*, edited by Pranee Liamputtong Rice and Lenora Manderson. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, p. 169.

⁴ *Kodrat perempuan itu sebagai pendamping suami, penerus keturunan, pengurus rumah tangga, melahirkan anak, sebagi pendamping suami, selain sebagai bagian kecil dari masyarakat. Kalaupun jadi presiden atau menteri harus tetep ngurus suami tetep ngurus rumah tangga. Istri kan harus tanggung jawab. Ya ngatur-ngatur waktu bagi yang punya perusahaan, yang menjadi pegawai atau menteri itu harus tentunya ngatur waktu buat ngurus anak, suami dan ngurus urusan kerja di kantor. Seperti saya ibu rumah tangga sepenuhnya untuk suami dan anak anak 100 %."* Interview with Tini Yatini Medina, Tasikmalaya City, November 26, 2008.

after 1998 when the *Reformasi* started and Indonesia had started to face new challenges and opportunities. The 1998 collapse of Soeharto's New Order regime⁵ that had ruled Indonesia for more than three decades opened a new phase in the democratization process in the country. Various new discourses emerged, including those on political Islam and democracy.⁶ In a way, this change offered more room to make Islamic issues visible, the decentralization policy that was adopted in 2001 to some extent caused the emergence of the spirit of interpolating religion in the public sphere and many agencies started their efforts to incorporate religious teachings and indigenous values into new local regulations. These new regulations, in addition to the effects of global influences, resulted in Islamization right in the midst of the democratization process.

The change in politics from those of the New Order to those after the start of the *Reformasi* put the democratization and Islamization processes at the vanguard of the changing nation. Moreover, this change challenges democracy in general and the position of women in particular. The process of change is colored by its imbedded injustice, discrimination, intolerance and democracy's tyrannical side.⁷ In addition, the democratization and Islamization processes prompted intense debates about women's social involvement and their political roles, leadership, dress codes, the effects of polygamy, etc. In terms of gender relations, three general approaches⁸ are usually adopted. One is an approach that frames the processes pertaining to what is called *kodrat perempuan* or women's constructed nature and the term has become the target of criticism but simultaneously remained a term of reference. This study uses *kodrat perempuan*⁹ as the normative principle

⁵ The New Order refers to the administration of President Soeharto from 1966-1998.

⁶ Sonja van Wichelen, 2010. *Religion, Politics and Gender in Indonesia: Disputing the Muslim Body*. London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, p. 1.

⁷ This refers to the non democratic tendency of the majority to enforce its will onto the minority.

⁸ The three general approaches taken in the study of women are *kodrat perempuan* (women's nature), a balanced or "Yin-Yang" stand, and a woman's power stand. The first approach sees the object of study from the perspective of *kodrat perempuan*, which basically can be formulated as the view that the status and role of women should properly follow their nature. As this nature is fluid, their areas of status and roles are also dynamic and follow their and their communities' horizons. The second approach is the balanced or "Yin-Yang" stand of the gender perspective. It may be defined as the stance that each gender -- male and female -- has equal rights and needs, and complements each other, and that rejecting one gender will cause imbalance. Proponents of gender equality usually hold this approach. The women's power stand may be defined as the stand that women are seen as more powerful than men as they easily adapt to changing circumstances and manage to survive under almost any conditions. Feminists usually hold this approach. *Ulumul Qur'an*, no 5 and 6, Vol. V, 1994, pp. 43-4, 48, 50-1.

⁹ Below, I simply use *kodrat* for *kodrat perempuan* for efficiency's sake and I use the term in the sense of constructed *kodrat* or constructed nature. I will specify it when I use the term in its natural or essential meaning.

to shed light on women's civic engagement. It means that in this study the term is used to denote the mixture of women's innate physical capacities such as the ability of becoming pregnant, delivering babies, menstruate, and breastfeed, as well as non-physical ones such as their duty to take on their traditional roles of caring, rearing, and doing household duties.

Different from feminists who use the term *kodrat* only to point to the restrictions it puts on women's activities,¹⁰ this study perceives the term as a construction that formulates woman's roles and status in relation to those of men in the private and public sphere. In Indonesia, women engage socially within the potentials and limitations of their socially constructed *kodrat* which changes in time, and which offers them more or less room to engage socially.¹¹

I believe that the current discourses' use of the term *kodrat* tends to accentuate its supportive construction for women's activism rather than its potency to limit it. In this study, I discuss to what extent *kodrat* as a norm remains a determining factor in the acceptance or non-acceptance of women's participation in social engagement. It is for this reason that in this study I contend that the normative use of the term *kodrat* is fluid. It is understood, situated, interpreted and negotiated differently by different agents and in different contexts and periods and thus is made up of a combination of internal and external factors. The internal factors refer to the way women experience, socialize, perceive and construct themselves by and through their social activities. External ones refer to the way the State and the public discourse inform women's appropriate roles and the extent of their opportunities in society. The fluidity of the concept of *kodrat* actually provides women with opportunities to develop their social engagement. State policies on democracy, gender equality and civil societies, as far as this study is concerned, are heading towards offering women more room to empower themselves and to increase their roles, capacities, skills, and opportunities. Thus, in this study, I discuss women's civic engagement within the scope of two areas: those deemed appropriate and those considered inappropriate for women. In this case, I study Muslim women in the local contexts of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City.¹²

On the one hand, this study deals with the public's anxieties about Islam and gender and it examines how processes of Islamization and democratization have shaped gender relations at a local level. On the other hand, this study scru-

¹⁰ Kathryn Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*. London & New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group; Susan Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*. Victoria: Monash University; Saskia Wieringa, 2002. *Sexual Politics in Indonesia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹¹ Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*. pp. 77-84, Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, pp. 11, 25-6, 50-51, 103, 139, 151, 223, and 229.

¹² In the rest of the monograph, I will use Tasikmalaya to mean Tasikmalaya City and Tasikmalaya Regency. When the City or the Regency are meant they will be added to Tasikmalaya.

tinizes how gender has informed these processes at the district level. In terms of the local perspective on women's social activities, the study focuses on four topics by paying special attention to women's leadership. These cases are important for public social constructions and they consist of women's social activities, for instance as health officers at Posyandu,¹³ as educators at *madrasah*, *majlis taklim*, or in *pesantren*, as heads of public institutions like villages and sub-districts, and as member of the regional parliament members, (locally known as MP).

The first two issues deal with areas deemed "appropriate for women." These roles are usually supportive and, at the same time, limited to healthcare and education and perpetuated by powerful agencies such as the State. Throughout Indonesia's history and especially during the New Order era, healthcare and education were considered ideal domains for women, and they were urged to become involved in them. This trend continued after Soeharto's downfall and it is therefore interesting to discuss the dynamics of women's social engagement, particularly women's leadership in these areas in spite of the confinements being imposed on women through the construction of *kodrat perempuan* in both their private and public lives. The focal point for the discussion of *kodrat* in the healthcare sector is the activities of women as Posyandu cadres.

The second case is women's involvement in Islamic education, i.e. in *majlis taklim*, *madrasah* or *pesantren*. A *nyai*, or the wife of a *pesantren* head, is an important agent in the Islamic education process and she derives her role and status mostly from the support she offers to her husband's career. In this context, two other terms are also used, *ibu* and *ummi* which both share the similar meaning of 'mother.'¹⁴ In this study, the three terms (*nyai*, *ibu*, and *ummi*) are used to illustrate women's social engagement in the educational sector. In Indonesia, within the course of time, their roles have improved alongside the modernization of education and socio-economic development. Introduced by the Dutch, the modernization of education began at the end of the nineteenth century. Islamic education started at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁵ The government of the newly independent country paved the way for its own kind of educational development. The New Order government intensified its educational program in both the secular and Islamic educational sectors and it has treated both systems equally (Law no 20/2003, on the National Education System).

Because of this development, many *nyai* and female Muslim teachers have also upgraded their capacities and roles. Many of them were not only trained in traditional *pesantren*, but also in modern Islamic educational institutions from

¹³ *Posyandu* (*Pos Pelayanan Terpadu*/Integrated Village Health Service Post) are Indonesian State's integrated health care institutions for mothers and children under five. Nathalie G.E. Kölmann, 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu in Central Java: A Case Study*. Paper presented at the Workshop Health Care in Java, Past and Present, Leiden 7-8 May 1992. Leiden: KITLV, p. 2.

¹⁴ As all three terms are intended to denote the same meaning, for short, when the writer only mentions *nyai*, he covers the nuances of the three terms.

¹⁵ Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, pp. 33-51.

the *madrasah* up to university levels (State College for Islamic Studies/STAIN, State Institute for Islamic Studies/IAIN and State Islamic University/UIN).¹⁶ In addition, many Muslim women who have become involved in Islamic education have graduated from secular universities in a number of disciplines¹⁷ This development in turn enables them to play increasingly more roles in education either as teachers, preachers or as managers of Islamic educational institutions such as *pesantren*, *madrasah* and *majlis taklim*.

The question for the first two cases is what changes have taken place in women's social engagement in their roles as *nyai* (female educators) and Posyandu cadres? How are they involved? How do they perform? To what extent does the way *kodrat* is constructed and perceived --- perpetuated either by the State or by other social agencies like NGOs, etc. --- support or interfere with their engagement in healthcare and education? What does their relationship mean for the discourse on female leadership in the Sundanese area of West Java in particular, and in Indonesia in general?

The two other cases deal with women politics, an area accused of being 'stereotypical' or 'dirty business' and therefore deemed inappropriate for women. The misperception about the possibility of women's political participation is supported not only by the fact that political science has only recently begun to pay attention to women's political roles, but also by the fact that women's representation in politics is still limited despite its potential to increase.¹⁸

In fact, many believe that there are dynamics in female politics. They point to the fact that women play positive roles and where they get involved in politics, they tend to make a difference:¹⁹ women play a role in both deciding and influencing policies; women's presence in political processes can be interpreted as a possible contribution; when they are part of political activism, women tend to be more trustful of the government, especially at the local level; and women are expected to feel better when they have female representatives in political institutions.²⁰ Two cases will be discussed. The first deals with female village and sub-

¹⁶ Pieterella van Doorn-Harder, 2006. *Women Shaping Islam. Indonesian Muslim Women Reading the Qur'an*. Champaign-Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

¹⁷ Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*. pp. 51-5.

¹⁸ The following works make the above points. Maila Stevens, 1991. *Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics*. Monash: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies. Monash University; and Syla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds) 1987, *Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

¹⁹ Karp and Banducci quote the following works Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006), Atkeson (2003), Burns et al., 2001, Hansen (1997) to make this positive point. Jeffrey A. Karp, and Susan A. Banducci, "When politics is not just a man's game: Women's representation and political engagement," *Electoral Studies* 27 (2008), p. 106. http://www.astrid-online.it/Le-pari-op/Studi-ric/KARP-BANDUCCI-ElectoralStudies-n.27_03_2008.pdf accessed December 20, 2009.

²⁰ Karp and Banducci, "When politics is not just a man's game." p. 106.

district heads and the second deals with cases where women have become local parliament members.

This study focusses on the one hand, on the dynamics of local women's leadership in the case of women who have been elected as village heads (including *kelurahan*/urban villages) and sub-districts in the contemporary period. On the other hand, it examines the dynamics of the brief periods of the administration of seven female sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya from 2001 to 2006. It is worthwhile to discuss the emergence of women leaders especially in modern-day Tasikmalaya as most of history of the region shows an absence of women as village or sub-district leaders. What factors enabled women to be elected and to lead? What trajectories did they follow in their leadership capacities? How did women in the area usually create their leadership trajectories? In what way did their efforts and leadership roles make a difference to the improvement of the conditions for women themselves and for the people in general? How did the people assess their status and performance? To what extent did the way *kodrat* is constructed and perceived support or interfere with their leadership engagement? What has been the import of their leadership on the discourse on woman leadership in the Sundanese context in particular and in the Indonesian context in general?

The case of women's political performance deals with women's experiences in parliament. It is plotted in the context of the implementation of the decentralization policy within the enactment of the liberal democratic representation system and of the policy of the 30% quota for female parliamentary representation. The term 30% quota will be explained later. How did local woman politicians circumvent the existing stereotypes against female representation in politics? How did they enter into the world of politics? What problems did they encounter and if they solved them, how? How did they view the 30% quota for female candidacy? How did this policy help them or how did they take advantage of it for their political purposes? How was their performance in parliament?

B. Objective of the Study

The initial impetus for my research on female leadership in local and religious societies derived from the difficulty I encountered in finding literature on gender, religion and politics in Indonesia at the local level. Though literature on the issue at the Indonesian national level had started to flourish as evidenced by the works of Robinson (2009), Wieringa (2002), Martyn (2005)²¹, Blackburn (2004), van Wichelen (2010), and others, the study of the situation at local levels has so far been neglected. For an example of a local study we may refer to Van Doorn-Harder (2006), but her work only covers women's roles in education.

Another motive for my study was the fact that for a long time, politics had disregarded gender and its relation to religion and did not see it as one of its con-

²¹ Elizabeth Martyn, 2005. *The Women's Movement in Post-Colonial Indonesia. Gender and Nation in a New Democracy*. London [etc.]: Routledge Curzon.

cerns. Recently, in terms of a redefinition of politics, a growing need has come up to discuss gender and politics to include matters pertaining to gender-interrelations between politics and the construction of gender, and the adequate inclusion of the gender perspective in political processes (Waylen, 1998;²² Blackburn, 2004; Martyn, 2005; Robinson, 2009). However, these studies failed to address the relations between gender and religion, focusing instead on social, economic, cultural and political aspects.

I was also stimulated to study this subject further because religious groups continue to be among the most problematic groups in the democratization process,²³ particularly *vis-à-vis* gender issues at local levels. As public piety has been occupying the public sphere for more than three decades in Indonesia, the decentralization process provides opportunities for religious groups to develop their interests in addition to those promulgated by the State and social groups with secular tendencies. The different characters of these groups have certainly influenced women's social engagement in many and various ways.

Finally, it seems that *kodrat perempuan* has hardly been addressed in studies on religion, gender and politics that deal with female leadership in Indonesia. This contradicts the fact that at present, many studies on gender issues such as those on women's rights, reproductive rights, polygamy, veiling and pornography, etc., have been published.

C. Research Questions

1. Research Questions

This study explores the changing and multifaceted dynamics of women's political engagement from the latter part of the New Order period up to 2010 when decentralization was well on its way and the democratization process in Tassikmalaya consolidated. It examines the inter-discursivity²⁴ of Islam and gender in terms of civic and political participation. It reviews how in a contemporary local context, Islamization and democratization processes influenced women's leadership engagement. It also studies how gender and religion co-influenced this democratization process. The study examines how the term *kodrat* affects gender relations in terms of women's leadership engagement. Finally, the study deals with two opposite general assumptions regarding women's social involvement: the field which Indonesian Muslims, particularly those who belong to Sunni Islam, deem

²² Georgina Waylen, 1998. *Gender, Politics and the State*. Co-edited with Vicky Randall. London: Routledge.

²³ Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvath, 1997. *Islam in an Era of Nation-States, Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 3-40.

²⁴ This means "the limitless possibilities of creativity in discursive practice" Norman Fairclough, 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis, the Critical Study of Language*. London and New York: Longman, p. 134.

appropriate for women and those deemed inappropriate.²⁵ In short, the study examines how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* informs women's leadership.

The main research question of this study is the following: what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social activities in a local context? This core question is divided into two other central questions: What are the dynamics of Muslim women's leadership engagement in the areas deemed appropriate for women to work in, i.e. healthcare and education, and what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social abilities in the fields supposedly inappropriate for them to get involved in such as public leadership and occupying seats in parliament. All other questions that will be discussed in the different parts of this introduction are interpolated into these two main research questions and categorized as supporting research questions. They will be answered in terms of women's leadership experiences.

2. A Hypothesis

The term *kodrat perempuan* plays an important role both in the way women perceive themselves and in the way they are perceived by the government and in public discourses where they are active in social engagement in different ways. This hypothesis contends the common view that the perception of *kodrat* among Indonesian Muslim society stands in the way of women's participation in social activities. However, I think that many women have the room, opportunity and network to engage in just as many different social activities as men including occupying leadership positions in education, healthcare, and politics. Although *kodrat perempuan* may limit their social participation, it certainly offers opportunities and room for women to engage socially. Throughout Indonesian history, patriarchal values have influenced gender roles, limiting women's role in society. At the same time that women are progressing, their room for opportunity is growing wider, too. In the present Reformasi era, democratization and the development of gender equality take up more space in the Indonesian social landscape and opportunities for women to indulge in social engagement are also increasing. However, the challenge posed by culture, locally derived exclusiveness and religious radicalism may also hinder women's space and their opportunities to busy themselves with social activities. However, they certainly will not be able to completely close women's space and opportunity, because the opposite powers--democratization and the gender equality movement---are increasingly supporting women's social engagement.

²⁵ Sunni Islam may be defined as groups of Muslims who associate with the orthodoxy of Islam in contrast to others groups known as Shi'i who affiliate with the heterodoxy of Islam. CE Bosworth, et al. (Eds.). 1997. (New Edition). *Encyclopedia of Islam*. Volume IX. Leiden: Brill, p. 876. This group constitutes the majority in Indonesia.

3. Site of the Study: *Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City*

Previous studies were largely concerned with developments at the national level.²⁶ As conducting local studies has been gaining momentum since the start of the implementation of the decentralization policy, Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City are among the regions where the new contestation between Islamization and secularization came to the surface. Virtually the entire population of the region is Muslim---99.9% (1,505,301 of 1,505,488) in Tasikmalaya Regency in 2008²⁷ and 98.7% (530,302 of 537,291) in Tasikmalaya City in 2007.²⁸ Like adherents to other religions, Muslims try to live religiously and Muslims use the norms of *kodrat* to guide the way they think and act. Many Muslims in Tasikmalaya, as in other religious communities, use the term *kodrat* to literally perceive and define the roles of women they think appropriate, especially in social activities.

Another reason for choosing Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City as the sites for this study is that Muslims in these districts are affiliated with many local,²⁹ national³⁰ and transnational³¹ religious organizations. These affiliations are nurtured together with the increase of ethnic awareness and play increasingly more important roles in local government practices. Interestingly these organizations and ethnic movements promote non-democratic and discriminatory values. These social forces define gender social construction in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City as they allow religious and ethnic radicalization to flourish. Tasikmalaya is a growing rural and semi-urban area where most inhabitants are involved in agribusiness, small and medium-sized businesses particularly handicraft and confection and in home industries. The district takes part in the modernization process through the adoption of the democratic system and democratic values. Education in the site is provided by secular schools and Islamic educational institutions such as *raudatul atfal* (pre-school), *pesantrens* (Islamic boarding

²⁶ Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*; Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*; Wieringa, 2002. *Sexual Politics in Indonesia*.

²⁷ Tasikmalaya Regency in Figures 2008, BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik/Center for Statistics) Tasikmalaya Regency, p. 110.

²⁸ Tasikmalaya Dalam Angka 2007, BPD (Badan Perencanaan Daerah/Office for Regency's Plan) Tasikmalaya and BPS Tasikmalaya, p. 68.

²⁹ Such as *Adat Istiadat Karuhunan* (local custom based on the teachings of their ancestors) at Kampung Naga, Amanah Keagamaan Illahi (AKI/Devine Trusted Religion), Perguruan Pencak Silat (PPS/Center for Self Defense Study) Panca Daya, al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah (Foundation of Islam), al-Qur'an Suci (the Holy Qur'an), Isakiyah, Islam Nyunda (Sundanese Islam).

³⁰ Such as *Lembaga Dakwa Islam Indonesia/LDII* (the Indonesian Islamic Institution of Dakwah), *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia/DDII* (Indonesian Council for Islamic preaching), *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI* (the Council of Jihad Fighters) and *Front Pembela Islam (FPI)*.

³¹ Such as *Hizbu al-Tabrir/HT* (Party of Liberation), the *Salafi*, and *Jamadh Islamiyah/JI* (Community of Islam).

schools), *madrasahs*, and institutions of higher religious education.³² Education and the economy are two important ingredients for the strengthening of civil society and the consolidation of democracy in which women's civic engagement is also invested. One consequence of these developments and of the educational programs has been the emergence of a local middle class (Hefner. 1997: 90-4). I use the term middle class here in a general sense which appreciates the power of knowledge and skills besides capital ownership and status. Religious educators and leaders play a pivotal role in consolidating the democratization process.

Another reason for choosing Tasikmalaya is because the region is well known for its history of resistance. Apparently, the Tasikmalaya people often used their acute sense of justice to become involved in resistance movements. Its history is marked by many movements. For example, Wiradadaha I assisted Sultan Agung of the Mataram Kingdom in squashing Dipati Ukur's revolt in the seventeenth century. On another occasion, H.Z. Mustafa led the people in the regency to rise against colonial power, and he also headed them in their fight against the Japanese occupation of the region. The people in Tasikmalaya and Garut were involved in the resistance movement against the central government known as the DII revolt (Darul Islam Indonesia/Islamic State of Indonesia) and during the revolt, Tasikmalaya was used as one of DII's base camps.³³ The ethnic Chinese community was several times the target of the people of Tasikmalaya's anger, most recently in 1996.³⁴

Recent events, such as the religious violence against the Ahmadiyah in 2007³⁵ and the 1996 riots that threatened ethnic Chinese and Christians are evidence of Tasikmalaya's deep concern with religious intolerance and the events received both national and international attention. Another disquieting phenomenon is the emergence of local regulations based on Islamic views which potentially discriminate against women and minority groups. A proposal for the implementation of the Shari'a which was advocated by various organizations and especially by young Muslim religious leaders known in Tasikmalaya as Ajengan Bendo, has recently been passed as Law No 12, 2009 entitled "Pembangunan Tata Nilai Kehidupan Kemasyarakatan yang Berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama

³² Tasikmalaya Regency in Figures 2008, BPS Tasikmalaya Regency, pp. 52-79, 108-33; Tasikmalaya Dalam Angka 2007, BPD Tasikmalaya and BPS Tasikmalaya, pp.32-51, 68-80.

³³ Karl D. Jackson, 1990. *Kewibawaan Tradisional, Islam, dan Pemberontakan: Kasus Darul Islam Jawa Barat*, (trans. Of *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*). Jakarta: Grafiti Press; C. van Dijk, 1981. *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam* Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

³⁴ Lukman Sutrisno and Mohtar Mas'oed. (et al.), 2001. *Kekerasan Kolektif: Kondisi dan Pemicu*. Yogyakarta : Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan & Kawasan, Universitas Gadjah Mada (P3PK UGM).

³⁵ Amin Mudzakkir, 2008. "Politik muslim dan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya." A paper presented at the International Seminar *'Politik identitas agama, etnisitas, dan ruang/space dalam dinamika politik lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara.* Salatiga: Lembaga Persemaian Cinta Kemanusiaan (Percik).

Islam dan Masyarakat Kota Tasikmalaya” (Development of a Value System for Communal Living Based on Islamic Teachings and the Social Norms of Tasikmalaya Society). Locally, the regulation is known as Perda Tata Nilai, and basically consists of Islamic teachings on theology, worship, Islamic *dakwah*, and regulations pertaining to the necessary bodies to support the implementation of this regulation.

The study has been conducted both in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City because the two were only separated a decade ago and the transition process has not yet been completed. The history and the characteristics of both are relatively similar, culturally as well as politically.

Finally, this study exemplifies the exclusivity of the influence of *kodrat* on woman’s leadership in a local context in Indonesia. It assumes that the influence of the understanding of *kodrat* is strongly felt in many local areas in Indonesia including Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City.

D. Previous Studies

Work on women’s civic engagement is still rather scarce, particularly that on women’s leadership roles in Muslim communities. Existing studies either deal with specific cases or are of a general nature mainly focusing on the national context. Robinson’s work (2009) stresses that the State used *kodrat perempuan* to construct women’s social role, which was to support their husband’s success. Soeharto’s New Order government defined women’s roles in society within the concept of PKK (Pembinaan Keluarga Kesejahteraan/Family Welfare Movement, now known as Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/Family Empowerment for Welfare). The idea was derived from a naturalistic viewpoint which fashioned women’s role in accordance with their physical bodies and their tendencies as women. Robinson emphasized that these constraining aspects forced women into more difficult situations than men.³⁶ Susan Blackburn (2004) believes that *kodrat* agrees with Indonesian Islam.³⁷ She defines it as “character,” “destiny” or “innate nature.” Like Robinson, she also identifies the way the New Order formulated men and women’s roles: men were primary income-earners, and women were child-rearers and housewives. Accordingly, women were encouraged to engage socially as the up-bringers and educators of the young generations. In addition, as life became increasingly more competitive, she identified another task, which is that wives were also responsible for their family’s welfare.³⁸ Hellwig’s stand (1990) was similar to that of Robinson and Blackburn, but she looked at Indonesian literary works. She used the Arabic meaning of the term *kodrat*, meaning: powerfulness or divine power, nature, and destiny. In Indonesian, the following terms are used: *kodrat Allah* (God’s will) and *kodrat alam* (*sunnatullah* or natural

³⁶ Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 5, 10.

³⁷ Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, p. 51.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-6, 50-51.

law). Hellwig identified the meaning of *kodrat* in 25 novels and three long stories that were published between 1937 and 1987. She found that the term *kodrat* was used in the sense of the difficulties women have to escape from their natural destinies, i.e. their procreative functions and motherhood. This inevitability influenced gender relations and roles as reflected in the works she studied.³⁹ She concluded that "...women are portrayed as the second sex, and a double sexual morality remains intact, notwithstanding Indonesia's modern, more urban and westernized kind of society."⁴⁰ Elis Suryani (et al.) came to a similar conclusion as Hellwig in their book, *Peran Wanita Sunda Dalam karya Sastra Sunda* (2000) [The Role of Sundanese Woman in Sundanese Literary Works]. By adopting a gender perspective, they defined the term *kodrat* and they criticized the people's perception of *kodrat*. By contrast, they used the generic meaning of the term. They argued that the people's perception on child rearing and the management of the beauty and cleanliness of the house as being part of *kodrat perempuan* had a strong impact on the imposition of women's traditional roles.⁴¹ She concluded that "wanita dalam menjalankan fungsi sosialnya di lingkungan keluarga masih menunjukkan perannya sebagai wanita tradisional yang cenderung mengikatkan diri pada suami untuk pemerolehan kebutuhan, ekonomi, dan status sosialnya."⁴² (in fulfilling their social functions within the family, women still play traditional roles in which they tend to commit them to their husbands in order to achieve their needs, economic necessities, and social status).

Reggie Baay wrote a very important book, published in 2008, on the history of Indonesian women who lived with European spouses during the period of the Dutch East Indies.⁴³ There are two points that we should mention about this book. Firstly, the women discussed in it are known as Nyais. Here the term refers to a rather negative labeling and unjust treatment that those Indonesian women who were the concubines of Dutch men received.⁴⁴ Secondly, Baay informs us that the presence of this type of Nyai during this period contributed to the social construction of women's role and status which focused their activity in the home and made them as second-class human beings. This practice itself began at the arrival of the Dutch to the archipelago in the 17th century and lasted until the end of their colonization in the 1940s. This means that this form of injustice and discrimination towards certain women in the country entered into the pro-

³⁹ Christine Maria Soelie Hellwig, 1990. *Kodrat Wanita: Vrouwbeeld in Indonesische Romans*. PhD Dissertation. Leiden: Leiden University, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Hellwig, 1990. *Kodrat Wanita*, p. 212.

⁴¹ Elis Suryani (et al.), 2002. *Peran Wanita Sunda dalam Karya Sastra Sunda: Suatu Kajian Gender*. Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, p. 8.

⁴² Ibid, p. vii.

⁴³ I use the Indonesian version which was published in 2010. The translated book was based on its version which was published in 2009 by Athenaeum-Polak & Van Genep, Amsterdam. Reggie Baay, 2010. *Nyai & Pergundikkan di Hindia Belanda*. Depok: Komunitas Bambu, p. xiii.

⁴⁴ Baay, 2010. *Nyai & Pergundikkan*, p. xiii.

cess of acculturation which treated them as norms and values. Baay's study confirms that of Hellwig and adds the fact that the constructed perception of *kodrat* is rooted in the history of Indonesia.

From a feminist perspective, Julia Suryakusuma saw proper gender relations as basic human rights where everybody has to be treated equally. She basically defined *kodrat* as "true nature", criticizing the use of the term in social practices for "wives and mothers", and thus she adopted the same position as other feminists. In her view, the common expression in society that women are welcome to "participate in the development process, but at the same time to be mindful of their *kodrat*..." was manipulated and that the State endorsed it to domesticate women. She contends that by doing so, the State tried to idolize *keibuan* (maternal) qualities by encouraging women's so-called traditional role and by proposing their image as "pillars of the nation"⁴⁵ The impact of the State's construction of these roles for women is intertwined with religious and cultural values which accord with the State's ideology known as State *Ibuism* (motherhood).⁴⁶

Other Indonesian scholars have also written on the subject. In 1999, an anthology was published entitled *Memposisikan Kodrat: Perempuan dan Perubahan dalam Perspektif Islam* [Positioning *Kodrat*: Women and Change in Islamic Perspective] edited by Lily Zakiyah Munir and written by leading Indonesian scholars including herself. The book discussed the term *kodrat* from the human rights and Islamic viewpoints, rationalizing it either from an essentialist point of departure where *kodrat* was not seen as a hindrance to woman's social engagement, and from an Islamic rationalized point of view where traditional wisdom was explained to modern audiences. One of the contributors to the book is Nasaruddin Umar.⁴⁷ His article was republished separately a year later (2000).⁴⁸ Umar differentiated the terms *kodrat* and *kodrati* and the perception of *kodrat*. *Kodrati* in terms of *kodrati* means 'God-given, innate nature' and *kodrat* in terms of its perception of 'the necessary roles people have to play in society based on their biological make-up'.⁴⁹ Umar actually meant that on the one hand, he accepted the feminist definition regarding *kodrat* in its essential meaning, and on the other, he tried to appreciate its uses in different social practices. He did this by referring to the Qur'an, saying that the Qur'an basically treats men and women equally. What differentiates one from the other is his or her *taqwa* (piety) towards Allah.

⁴⁵ Julia I. Suryakusuma, 1988 1st ed., 2000. *State Ibuism: The Social Construction of Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶ Julia I. Suryakusuma, 1996. "The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia." in *Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia*, edited by Laurie J. Sears. Durham and London: Duke University Press. pp. 101-2; Julia I. Suryakusuma. 1988, 2000. *State Ibuism*.

⁴⁷ Nasaruddin Umar, 1999. "*Kodrat Perempuan dalam Perspektif al-Qur'an*," in Lily Zakiyah Munir (ed.), *Memposisikan Kodrat: Perempuan dan Perubahan dalam Perspektif Islam*. Bandung: Mizan, pp. 91-110

⁴⁸ Nasaruddin Umar, 2000, *Kodrat Perempuan dalam Islam*. Jakarta: Fikahati Aneska.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

However, the Qur'an's different use of *kodrat* in different social practices in some verses on polygamy and inheritance, illustrate discrimination.⁵⁰ He explained that the Qur'an's conflicting dealings with gender relations had become the site of different interpretations by Muslim scholars. He himself affiliated with those who approach the subject contextually, treating *kodrat* in its essential meaning and concurrently trying to make contextual sense of the Qur'an's so-called discriminative verses.⁵¹ Two other scholars who happen to be his seniors and who, like him, come from Sulawesi share his views: Ali Yafie and M. Quraish Shihab.⁵²

Another Indonesian Muslim scholar who discussed the issue is Zaitunah Subhan (2004). She differentiated the terms *kodrati* (God-given nature) and *non-kodrati* (non-God-given nature). In her view, the term *kodrati* refers to biological *kodrat* and *non kodrati* to general *kodrat*. Biological *kodrat* points to women's God-given physical aspects such as menstruation, pregnancy, delivering a baby, and breast-feeding.⁵³ By contrast, general *kodrat* refers to both men and women. Each has their own nature. She defined *kodrat perempuan* as "*Sunnatullah or kekuasaan Tuhan, yang tidak dapat diubah, dan akan tetap melekat sesuai dengan sunnahNya yang berjenis kelamin perempuan*"⁵⁴ (Natural law or the power of God which is unchangeable and permanently attached in accordance with His nature, the female sex.). With *non-kodrati*, she points to the differences between men and woman as social constructions. Different from *kodrati*, *kodrat perempuan* here is fluid and changeable and depends on space and time.⁵⁵ However she does not explain further what this actually means. Instead the book discussed *kodrat perempuan* from the *kodrati* point of view. Faqihuddin Abdul Kadir (2004) also participated in the *kodrat* discourse in Indonesia. He considers it from the gender perspective, placing men and women as equals before God, each having the same humanitarian tasks and rights.⁵⁶ It is from this point of departure that he criticized perceptions of *kodrat perempuan* that discriminate women's roles.⁵⁷ He equated these perceptions by using the strong term, *kezaliman* (tyranny or atrociousness), which we have to fight in order to rid the world of these perceptions.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 44-9, 58.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 60-61.

⁵² K.H. Ali Yafie, 1999. "*Kodrat, Kedudukan, dan Kepemimpinan Perempuan*," in Lily Zakiah Munir (ed.), *Memposisikan Kodrat: Perempuan dan Perubahan dalam Perspektif Islam*. Bandung: Mizan, pp. 66-9; M. Quraish Shihab, 1999. "*Kodrat Perempuan versus Norma Kultural*," in Lily Zakiah Munir (ed.), *Memposisikan Kodrat: Perempuan dan Perubahan dalam Perspektif Islam*. Bandung: Mizan, pp. 79-82.

⁵³ Zaitunah Subhan, 2004. *Kodrat Perempuan: Taqdir atau Mitos*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, pp. 10-12.

⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 11-2.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 12-3.

⁵⁶ Faqihuddin Abdul Kadir, 2004. *Bangga Jadi Perempuan: Perbincangan dari Sisi Kodrat dalam Islam*. Jakarta, Gramedia, p. viii and 11.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 8.

Another work on *kodrat* worth mentioning is Iswanti's book *Kodrat Yang Bergerak* (2003) [*Mobile Kodrat*], in which she defined *kodrat* as a fluid, space and time dependent mixture of given and constructed qualities. What she meant by *kodrat's* fluidity is its perception. As it is fluid, on one hand she believed that a female Christian is able to manage her life in response to the demands of her time. On the other, external factors including the Church have no reason to impede on women's engagement including their engagement in religious activities.⁵⁹

Having discussed these works on *kodrat*, we conclude that the term *kodrat perempuan* is a norm⁶⁰ or a cultural value⁶¹ and its justification can be found either in religion, the State's ideology or in cultural precepts that confine women within the boundaries of their bodily construction and representation. Existing understandings, including that of Robinson's, are restricted to constraining factors. However, these understandings and hindering factors provide room for activism, representation, and signification.⁶² This means that while the relations between these processes are constantly negotiated, they are themselves dialectical and open, and this makes them dynamic. Their dynamicity is made possible because of objective needs and because of other rivaling dominant discourses and genres that oppose dominant discursive practices. In this case, democracy and gender, a more inclusive interpretation of religious teachings and the exploration of more inclusive cultural values influence the meaning of *kodrat perempuan* in different ways.

The inclusive and equal discursive practices of gender and democratic values challenge the passive meaning of the representation and the signification of *kodrat perempuan* to support women's civic engagement. The challenge becomes even stronger because the passive meaning of the expression still leaves space and the possibility for dynamism as in the case of the interpretation of *kodrat perempuan* in the New Order context. In this context, supported by various religious and cultural interpretations,⁶³ the State offered women opportunities and facili-

⁵⁹ Iswanti, 2003. *Kodrat Yang Bergerak*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, pp. 246-7.

⁶⁰ Basically, a norm is "a standard that is considered by most people to be usual practice." It is "a cultural rule that associates people's behaviour or appearance with rewards or punishments." Johnson, 1995, 1997. "Norm" in *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology*, pp. 190-91.

⁶¹ It is the "beliefs about ideal behaviours and goal expectation shared by the members of a culture" A cultural value is the "shared idea about how something is ranked in terms of its relative social desirability, worth, or goodness." Allan G. Johnson, 1995, 1997. "Cultural value" in *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A user's Guide to Sociological Language*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., pp. 309-10.

⁶² Norman Fairclough, 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 64; Van Wichelen.2006. *Embodied Contestations*, p. 25.

⁶³ For example, Quraish Shihab describes the ideal role of women according to Islam. He explains that "Pada prinsipnya menurut ajaran Islam seorang *perempuan* tidak wajib mencari nafkah, melainkan laki-laki. Akan tetapi dengan melihat kondisi, misalnya, untuk membantu atau menyelamatkan keluarga boleh saja *perempuan* ikut bekerja asal pekerjaan yang dilakukan harus sesuai dengan *Kodrat* wanita dan tidak mengurangi har-

ties to develop, particularly in the fields of healthcare and education deemed appropriate for them. This dynamism within constraints deserves both appreciation for analysis and better treatment as it is the fundamental basis for further development. It is therefore that in this study I would like to fill this gap by analysing the term and women's leadership.

Cynthia L. Hunter (1996) wrote about the notion of women as citizens in the case of women's activism in Posyandu in the New Order period. Posyandu, according to her, have become the public space where women can participate in social activities and in a sense they actualized female citizenship.⁶⁴ But the question remained what kind of citizenship they were exercising? She discussed the way the State formulated female status and women's roles as citizens. The constitution guarantees the equality of men and women before the law. However, women's roles at home and outside the house were constructed under male influence. Women were expected to be their husband's supportive agents. It was clear that Posyandu were places for maternal and child healthcare and that they were established in the interest of women and coincided with women's main task of bearing and rearing children. However, simultaneously, women's health and child bearing and rearing were matters of family interests and thus also of the husbands whom they should offer their share of attention. These different discursive practices were interrelated and created gender relations which in this case were discriminative because women were subordinated.

Hunter also found that the State formulated women's gender roles through enacting the Pancasila ideology. It restricted women's main tasks to caring for the family. She considered that this role made them good citizens because they were encouraged to take care of their family's/husband's business at home.⁶⁵ Using the same argument as I did above, I contest her analysis because she stopped at this hegemonic interpretation of the discourse on women's role in the public sphere. She left open the gap that women were being restricted in social activities. In fact, within this constrained construction, there was room for women to engage in so-

kat-martabat *perempuan* itu sendiri. Seorang istri yang membantu suami mencari nafkah (bekerja) belum dapat dikatakan sebagai ibadah, itu hanya sebagai toleransi karena tetap suami yang wajib mencari nafkah. Dan seorang istri yang diizinkan suaminya bekerja dapat dibebaskan dari kewajiban mengurus rumah tangga asalkan ada kompensasi, misalnya, melalui seorang pembantu, dan tetap dengan batas-batas tertentu." (According to Islamic teachings, basically, a wife is not obliged to be a breadwinner, but a husband is. However, by considering the family situation, for example, she may work as long as the work is in accordance with her *Kodrat* and does not reduce her own dignity. The wife having a job cannot be called as *'ibāda* (part of religious worship), it is only a tolerance, because the husband is the breadwinner. And the wife who was granted by her husband to work can be freed from her obligation to take care of the home and family as long as there is a servant helping them to do household chores, and of course it is done within certain constraints.) Lies Marcoes Natsir and Johan Hendrik Meuleman (ed.), 1993. *Wanita Islam Indonesia dalam Kajian Tekstual dan Konteksual*. Jakarta: INIS, pp. 14-5.

⁶⁴ Hunter, 1996. "Women as "Good Citizens," p. 175

⁶⁵ Ibid.

cial activities. This space, though limited, was crucial and strategic. It was crucial because it was the fundamental site where women had the opportunity to start developing their skills, knowledge and experience and where they could address the backwardness they saw when they compared themselves with their male partners. If they would not use their opportunities as wisely as possible, they probably would remain in a lower and weaker position compared to men. Furthermore, to establish social change, including a change towards more equal gender roles, the woman empowerment program required that certain preconditions were met and the restricted space and opportunity, in my opinion, was the exact spot where the process of closing the gap towards more progressive advocacy and woman empowerment might take place. In other words, as “good citizens,” women did not need to necessarily consider child bearing and rearing as their main tasks but also came to see them as part of their husband’s duties. At the same time, when a husband did his duty in child bearing and rearing, the wife might participate in other activities, including those that usually belonged to her husband. Although her possibility largely fell within the restrictions of her constructed *kodrat*, there was still valuable space that offered her the opportunity to become involved.

Susan Blackburn (2004) discussed education’s impact on women’s civic engagement. Blackburn explained that in the last four to five decades of the colonial era, as well as during the Old Order, girls’ education in Indonesia contributed to women’s social engagement in a transformative sense particularly by encouraging nationalism among women and, in the New Order era, by domesticating them. The educational sector only started to gain its transformative power during the last decade of the New Order and up to the present in the Reformasi period that followed it. The point she made is that though education was once used to domesticate women, its significance in the process of women’s empowerment in the country could not be denied. The point here is that there is no other effective way for a successful women empowerment program other than through enhancing skills, knowledge, and education. Yet, education is also not free from discriminative values towards women. Blackburn, however, showed that over the last two decades, the educational trend in Indonesia had been positively geared towards more gender equal educational processes.

I concur with Blackburn’s train of thinking and I will discuss it within a descriptive-analytical approach. In terms of *kodrat*, education is a field appropriate for women when they want to engage in social activities, but in reality, women’s engagement in social activities challenges other practices that do not always contribute to liberalizing women or to allow them to indulge in more equal social engagement. Of course Blackburn’s stand does not concern *kodrat*, but the gender perspective. Since both *kodrat* and the gender perspective treat education as an important discursive resource, women are basically welcome and supported. The question is to what extent this contestation and restriction hamper women’s social activities. I believe that by considering a trend towards a more critical and egalitarian educational mode, women will not only derive more benefit from education itself but will also have more space and opportunity to engage in the educational field. In addition they will also contribute to enhanced gender

sensitivity in educational processes. At present, this is not only supported by the change in global and national political climate but also by the commitment to inclusive education of the central and local governments. This point is reflected in the increase of the national budget for educational programs to 20 % of the national budget.

As my study focuses only on *nyais* or Muslim female teachers' social engagement in Islamic education, Blackburn's works relate to this study at least on two levels: context and social practice. She rightly contextualizes the impact of educational development on women. I use it to discuss *nyai* and female teacher practices in the discourse on gender relations in Indonesia with special reference to female leadership. In terms of discursive practices, I consulted her work in my discussion on the women's educational discourse in the country.

Furthermore, Van Doorn-Harder (2006) dealt with women's civic engagement in Central Java focusing on the role of female Muslim leaders in society. She compared women's educational engagements within the two largest Indonesian Muslim mass organizations: the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in Central Java. She particularly discussed the way Muslim women at different levels and in various fields in Islamic education contributed to the social development of Muslim societies. She contended that this contribution was important and she called it "Women making Islam". Following her, I try to discuss women's educational engagement but in a different context. She shares with Blackburn that secular educational modernization and, in her study, the modernization of Islamic education have produced new generations that are better equipped with skills and knowledge. This in turn has extended women's role in Islamic educational engagement. In other words, women's engagement in educational practice increases their role and this means that their *kodrat* needs to be redefined to offer them more room and opportunities. A *nyai* extends her role from mainly supporting her husband's success to taking part in the educational process as a teacher, preacher, or as manager of an educational institution.

Jude Howell (2008)⁶⁶ argued that the dearth of female leaders is essentially due to 'social beliefs, practices and processes of socialization' which have a propensity to support 'gender stereotypes'.⁶⁷ Taking villages in China as the site of her study, she found that the people in China believe the assumption that women's place is in education and healthcare.⁶⁸ She discovered that many people still consider politics a field unsuitable for women, and that over time, the State and the public have internalized and embodied this in various social structures. She explains that the term 'innate nature' refers to people's perception that "men and women are biologically different and in particular women are weaker and there-

⁶⁶ Jude Howell. 2008. "Gender and Rural Governance in China," in Kazuki Iwanaga (ed.), *Women's Political Participation and Representation in Asia: Obstacles and Challenges*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp. 55-80.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 61.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 67.

fore more vulnerable than men.”⁶⁹ It also constitutes the social division that a man’s place is outside the house, while that of a woman is inside it. She calls this a “gender ideology that promotes an image of women that emphasizes hard work, moral purity, self-sacrifice, loyalty to Party goals (in the case of China),⁷⁰ and the virtue of motherhood.”⁷¹ As a result, she concludes, that at the local level, women face serious challenges in becoming public leaders. She also includes that external influences such as women’s migration and the global democratization process are factors that influence women empowerment programs.⁷²

It seems that in the case of China, ‘State-derived feminism’ was at least a minimal step towards processes that set the pre-conditions for women’s empowerment. It is in this situation that women found ways to participate in social activities, including political participation. However, in Indonesia, available opportunities and space seem more inclusive and comprehensive. The State adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women/ CEDAW in 1984 (UU RI No. 7, 1984) and it established Komnas *Perempuan*/ National Commission on Violence against Women, in 1998 (Presidential Degree No. 181/1998, renewed by Presidential Degree No. 65/2005). In addition to that, the State established the Indonesian Commission of Human Rights (well known as Komnas HAM) by Presidential Decree No. 50, 1993.⁷³ In politics, the State implemented a female candidacy quota of a minimum of 30 percent women among the total number of candidates.

The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 strengthened civil society in Indonesia. Since 1998, educational, mass, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have gained solid footing for the dissemination of their discourses and activities for the promotion of female equality and women rights. Their concerns include issues that were covered in CEDAW. A number of NGOs have come into existence since the 1990s.⁷⁴ Women’s participation in formal politics, however, is still inconsequential. In 2004, the average of women representation in legislature

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 75.

⁷⁰ This addition in parentheses is mine.

⁷¹ Howell, 2008. “Gender and Rural Governance in China,” p. 73.

⁷² Ibid, pp. 72-6.

⁷³ <http://www.komnasham.go.id/home/index.php?/32> Accessed on February 21, 2008.

⁷⁴ Examples of general backgrounds are Derap Warapsari (Indonesian police women wing, established in 1998), Indriya-Nati, Yayasan Jurnal *Perempuan* (1995), Kapal *Perempuan*, Kelompok Peduli *Perempuan* dan Anak (KPPA) Bali (2004), Lembaga Studi Pengembangan *Perempuan* dan Anak (LSPPA) Yogyakarta (2000), Mitra *Perempuan* (2000), Sahabat *Perempuan* (2004), Sekertariat Bersama *Perempuan* Yogyakarta (SBPY) (1999), Suara *Ibu* Peduli (1998), Yayasan Keumala (2005), LBH APIK (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi *Perempuan* Indonesia Untuk Keadilan) established in 1995, etc. Some NGOs affiliated with Islam also came into existence, such as Rahima, Jakarta (2000), Rifka Annisa, Yogyakarta (1993), Islamic Women Center, Fahmina Institute, (2000), Puan Amal Hayati (2000), etc. Their focuses of interests are Islam, gender and women’s rights.

in the world was 15 percent. Only twelve countries boasted 33% or more seats for women in parliament (UNDP Report, 2005). More than a hundred years after women were emancipated, their voices still continue to be underrepresented in institutional structures in governments, political parties, NGOs and in the private sector.⁷⁵ Dahlerup explained that nowadays, the globe is witnessing a worldwide shift towards greater gender sensitivity in the political realm, undermining 'the hegemony of male dominance in politics.' As an impact, she believes that the "all-male political assembly has lost its democratic legitimacy." One global undertaking that influenced this trend may be the UN Platform for Action originating from the Beijing Women Conference of 1995. In its goals, it mentioned the importance of female political participation which it stated "as 'gender balance' in politics, not just, as previously, 'more women in politics.'"⁷⁶

Joni Lovenduski discussed the arguments of women's representation in politics.⁷⁷ She identified three types of arguments why female representation matters: an argument of equality or justice, a pragmatic argument, and an argument of difference. She based her argument of justice on the idea that in a democratic State it is unjust if parliament only consists of men. Therefore, women deserve to be elected as members of parliament. The pragmatic argument considers the increasing tendency of female voters towards electing female candidates. Both female voters and female candidates have become important factors in increasing the number of women representatives. Finally, her argument of difference is based on the belief that in political processes women will perform differently, smoother and better, and that that will be advantageous to all. According to her, all these arguments evolved from the notion of universal citizenship in which the creators of the modern State system in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were men and that women only started to be recognized as full citizens in the twentieth century.⁷⁸

One of the things that have been done to boost women's representation in parliament is the implementation of a quota policy. Lovenduski defines it as "a regulation that requires an inclusion or recruitment of a number or a certain comparison of women in a forum or a parliamentary institution."⁷⁹ There are basically two kinds of quota: candidate quotas 'which set a minimum percentage

⁷⁵ <http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Gender-Pub-21stcentury.pdf> Accessed on February 21, 2008.

<http://www.undp-pogar.org/publications/gender/karam1/section1.html> Accessed February 21, 2008; Norma Sullivan, "Gender and Politics in Indonesia," in Maila Stivens. 1991. *Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics*. pp.61-86.

⁷⁶ Drude Dahlerup, 2008. "Gender Quotas in Politics: Empowerment from above or below?" in *Women's Political Participation and Representation in Asia: Obstacles and Challenges*, edited by Kazuki Iwanaga. Copenhagen. NIAS Press, pp. 298 and 306.

⁷⁷ Lovenduski, 2008. *Politik Berparas Perempuan*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, pp. 31-86.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 48-53.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 171.

of women (or other groups) on the parties' lists for public election,' and reserved seat quotas 'which mandate a certain number of a special grouping, in this case women, to be elected.'⁸⁰ In terms of an electoral democratic system, Dahlerup defines electoral gender quotas as "a certain number or percentage of the candidates for election or of those actually elected shall be women."⁸¹

Relevant questions regarding women's representation concern the way they are elected in the context of the implementation of a candidacy quota policy. How is their performance in parliamentary activities? Scholars like Lovenduski and Dahlerup discuss the dynamics of these processes. Lovenduski explains that three discursive resources play important roles in supporting women into becoming representatives in parliament: through a (liberal) democratic mechanism, a multi-party system, and women's advocacy.⁸² Dahlerup added other discursive resources of women's trajectories in the political realm, such as education, gainful employment, etc.⁸³ Questions querying the perspective of how women actually experience the implementation of a quota policy and how they participate in parliamentary activities have been left unexplored. Lovenduski discusses how *kodrat perempuan* both hinders and supports women's parliamentary participation. Referring to Lister (1997), she discusses the idea that women only became visible as citizens with the rise of the suffragists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and only quite recently as female parliamentary representatives. Women's invisibility as citizens may be traced to the social practice that caused her *kodrat* to be constructed by men and making them second class and less capable than men. The divide of the private and public spheres did not involve women in the public sphere at all as they were considered incomplete citizens. Rather, they belonged to the home/private sphere.⁸⁴ With the challenges caused by the democratization process in general and gender advocacy efforts in particular, *kodrat perempuan* once again gained momentum in the transformation of women into complete citizens, equivalent to male citizens. Following this argument, this study discusses women's experiences in both the implementation processes of the quota policy and their participation in parliamentary activities. By exploring their experiences, light is shed on the dynamics of women's political participation in formal politics at the local level.

E. Method of Study

In this study I adopt a descriptive approach. I will describe the collected data in the three following plots: "the setting, the people, and the events that

⁸⁰ Dahlerup, 2008. "Gender Quotas in Politics, p. 299.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 298.

⁸² Lovenduski, 2008. *Politik Berparas Perempuan*, p. 36.

⁸³ Dahlerup, 2008. "Gender Quotas in Politics, p. 298.

⁸⁴ Lovenduski, 2008. *Politik Berparas Perempuan*, pp. 53-9.

have taken place.”⁸⁵ The study offers a profile of persons, events and situations. One of the data collection techniques I used is the snowball effect and this study is therefore designed with certain flexibility.⁸⁶ It groups the information in analytical schemes that ultimately narrate the story of women’s social engagement as seen from *kodrat perempuan* perspectives in a local context. I edited texts from interviews to make them easier to read.

1. Fieldwork

The fieldwork for this study was conducted mainly Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City and took 16 months. It was divided into two periods: the first fieldwork was conducted from August 16, 2008 to April 14, 2009, while the second was from March 28 to November 28, 2010. I interviewed respondents using the snowball effect technique.⁸⁷ The first fieldwork brought me not only to Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, but also to Bandung and Jakarta to shop for general information on female leadership in the local context. I collected unpublished documents and published data, including newspapers. I also made observations, and interviewed 33 male and 34 female Muslim intellectuals who hailed from various backgrounds. During the second fieldwork period, I conducted 72 interviews with female respondents and 36 interviews with male ones. Having done the first fieldwork and having studied the data I had collected, the second fieldwork was designed to look for specific information on the four cases of my study: women’s leadership in education, healthcare, public, and parliamentary engagement. I failed to have an interview with two female members of the DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/ Regional House of Representatives) in Tasikmalaya Regency in the period 2004-2009 for various reasons. Instead, I looked for the necessary information about them in documents and by asking contact persons for their profiles and activities.

2. Interviews

I conducted interviews to elicit information about external realities (e.g. facts, events) and internal experiences (e.g. feelings and meanings).⁸⁸ The main focus of this study is on internal experiences and most data were derived from interviews and they were analysed as to the possibilities and constraints women face

⁸⁵ Colin Robson, 1993 first Edition, 2002. *Real World Research. Second Edition*. Malden, Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, p. 59.

⁸⁶ Robson, 1993 first Edition, 2002. *Real World Research*, p. 320.

⁸⁷ W. James Potter, 1996. *Thinking and Research about Qualitative Methods*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., pp. 126, 151-3; B.G. Glaser and AL. Strauss, 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine.

⁸⁸ D. Silverman and A. Marvasti, 2008. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Comprehensive Guide*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 195.

in their social engagement. By exploring internal factors, I tried to understand how women perceive themselves in their roles in social activities. Also external factors were studied to discover as to how the government and society perceive women's appropriate social roles as reflected in government policies and local media coverage. In addition, observation was deployed to check the outcomes of my interviews, to understand the context and to balance the information gained through interviews. A review was made of local newspapers articles, official State and other printed documents such as books and pamphlets, etc. to see how gender is constructed in public discourse.

Using Giddens's perspective of agency, the study treats interviews as its main data sources. In Giddensian terms, the women I interviewed were the discourse makers or the capable agents. Government policies and local media coverage constitute the context of the study where the influence of gender roles and more specifically *kodrat perempuan* is constructed and negotiated. They all make up the discourse.

3. Method of Construction

In this study, grounded theory and triangulation are used as methods of construction.⁸⁹ I deployed grounded theory during my first fieldwork to enable me to identify the core problems I was to encounter in my fieldwork and in the process of my study as a whole. It resulted in the selection of the four core cases in this study. The second fieldwork was conducted to search for information about the four cases.

Triangulation, on the other hand, is a method used to strengthen the argument of a study by analysing different sources of data.⁹⁰ In this study, I mixed different data sources, including previously conducted studies on similar subjects and the different concepts and terms they used to formulate sound arguments.

4. Method of Analysis: *Female Agency as Social Practice*

This study uses Anthony Giddens's agency perspective. He equates agency with action and defines it as "the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world."⁹¹ In his view, agency is directly related to praxis (performance, application of skills or established practice such as established customs or habitual practices) which is seen as "an ongoing series of practical activities".⁹² He selects important aspects of

⁸⁹ Potter, 1996. *Thinking and Research about Qualitative Methods*, pp. 151-4.

⁹⁰ Ibid, pp. 153-4.

⁹¹ Anthony Giddens, 1993. *New Rules of Sociological Methods*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 81.

⁹² Ibid, p. 81.

subjectivity and objectivity and what lies in between,⁹³ and he places the relation between these aspects within the duality of agency and structure which is situated in social practice.⁹⁴ Social practice is seen as a number of living practices which are continuously taking place in time and space over an extended period. Facility is the result of the continuous process of the reproduction, modification, and production of its agents. Giddens's perspective focuses on agents' role in identifying situations in which social practices become possible.⁹⁵ As changing a social practice depends on internal and external factors, social practices thus also depend on internal and external influences to be maintained, modified, or recreated. So, female agency in this study is characterized by these enabling and constraining factors which influence the reproduction, modification and production of a social practice.⁹⁶ A social practice consists of systems, norms, values, structures, institutions, etc. I mainly discuss *kodrat perempuan* as a norm.

The data are arranged into categories, sub-categories and terms, using coding techniques and they have been interpreted within Giddens's agency perspective. Three kinds of coding have been employed: open, axial and selective.⁹⁷ In open coding, I made categories, sub-categories and terms of information about *kodrat perempuan* and women's leadership from the data I collected in my first and second field work. In axial coding, I developed a more general category to organize information by paying attention to the central theme, causal conditions, specific strategy, context and intervening conditions, and consequences or outcomes. Finally, in selective coding, I integrated all the categories, sub-categories and terms I used in my analysis processes. Meanwhile, by adopting Giddens's agency perspective, my interpretation of the data focused on illustrating the dynamics of women's leadership within the nuance of the perception of *kodrat perempuan* as a representation of Muslim women's efforts to signify their existence in society as citizens.

In this study, the research questions are discussed as a discourse⁹⁸ and they highlight the fluidity of female agency. The two main research questions are answered in three presentations: context, case study and the projection of the study.

⁹³ Anthony Giddens, 2010. *Teori Strukturasi: Dasar-dasar Pembentukan Struktur Sosial Masyarakat*. Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, pp. 1–3.

⁹⁴ B. Herry-Priyono, 2003 (second edition). *Anthony Giddens: Suatu Pengantar*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, p. 22.

⁹⁵ Giddens, 2010. *Teori Strukturasi*, p. 4.

⁹⁶ Ibid, pp. 248-9.

⁹⁷ Robson, 2002. *Real Worl Research*, p. 194.

⁹⁸ Fairclough, 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis, the Critical Study of Language*. London and New York: Longman; Lilie Chouliarki and Norman Fairclough, 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 53-73; Fairclough, 2001a. "Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research," in R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London, UK: Sage Publications, pp.121-138.; Fairclough. 2001b. *Language and Power* (2nd ed.). London, UK: Longman.

Each part is guided by a number of supporting questions. With regards to context, the subject matter is discussed by explaining factors that support and/or interfere with the social construction of the nature and extension of women's social engagement in the dynamic context of a period of about twelve years since the implementation of the decentralization policy, and democratization and Islamization processes.

The discussion of the four cases is directed under the following considerations: the extent that the perception of gender's *kodrat* construction--perpetuated either by social agencies or by the State or news---supports or interferes with women's leadership practices; the context that constitutes and constructs social self/identity; social relationships between people and systems of knowledge and belief; problems that are misrepresented; how unfulfilled needs influence women's civic engagement; problems related to women's civic engagement that are being tackled; problems that sustain the existing social arrangement; and possible ways of removing obstacles for effective women's leadership for Posyandu activists, educators, village heads and members of parliament. They all function to grasp the identity, network and ideology of the discourse on women's leadership in a local context.⁹⁹ The last part of the discussion will be guided by a question that focuses on defining the prospect of women's leadership, taking this study as a lesson learned.

All the findings in the four case chapters and the findings in chapter two on the context of the study are brought to an abstraction where I describe and analyse my findings. The intersections inform the female leadership discourse which is discussed in two main nuances: representation and negotiation. There are two kinds of representation: representation or the exposure of the agents' leadership itself and the representedness of female leadership. As leadership here deals mainly with the cultural areas of engagement, the analysis entails one expression: female leadership as the expression of cultural citizenship. In the representation aspect, the discussion focuses on what female social engagements mean for the female agents themselves. In representedness, the discussion focuses on what leadership engagements of the female agents and of other female agents' activism reported in the news means in relation to the expression of cultural citizenship. Finally, the study ends with a conclusion where answers, recommendations and suggestions for further studies are made.

F. Organization of the Study

This thesis contains nine Chapters and is grouped into four parts. The first part consists of chapter one to chapter three. Chapter one discusses the framing, focus and organization of the study. It is framed within the contestation of democratization and Islamization processes. The Introduction closes with a presentation of the outline of the study.

⁹⁹ Chouliarki and Fairclough, 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity*, p. 64.

Chapter two constitutes the Conceptual Explanation, and discusses the context of democratization and Islamization processes, concepts, terms, and nuances. It closes with a conclusion.

Chapter Three discusses the Context of the Study. It deals with two main themes. The First is a description of the context of the study, demography, history, and strategic plan. The Second deals with democracy, decentralization and local regulations. This chapter offers general information about the background of the study.

The following two parts, Part Two and Three, illustrate the discussion of three main practices: those of the agents, the State and the news. The agent's practice deals with leadership trajectory and experience. The State's practice informs about the State's policy and programs relevant to the study. Lastly, the news' practice reports exposure and representation, and the representedness of female leadership in related cases.

The Second Part consists of two chapters, Chapter Four and Chapter Five, and discusses women's civic engagement in the fields deemed appropriate for women. Chapter Four discusses women as Posyandu cadres. It deals with their leadership trajectories and practices at Posyandu and networks, discourses, State policies and Posyandu related programs. It also deals with news' reports on Posyandu and their activities as well as with State policies and programs on primary healthcare issues. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

Chapter Five discusses *nyai* and female Muslim teachers' roles in education in terms of their profile, trajectory, and experiences, State educational policies and programs, Islamic educational institutions and their relation to female educational involvement, and the news reports on them. In the conclusion, a shift is seen from women as supporting to equal partners in education.

The Third Part talks about women's political engagement in the fields deemed inappropriate for women. It comprises Chapters Six and Seven. Chapter Six discusses women as village and sub-district heads. It focuses on leadership trajectory, election and re-election processes, leadership experience, State policies and programs and news on leadership in general and on women's public leadership in particular, and news regarding women's political engagement. Prior to the discussion in Chapter Seven, a conclusion is drawn. Chapter Seven explains women as district parliament members. It examines their motivation, leadership trajectories, and performances in parliament. It also discusses women as a supplementary or equal partners, State's policies, especially on the quota, and news on parliamentary issues pertaining to women.

The Fourth Part consists of Chapter Eight and Nine. Chapter Eight talks about widening women's civic engagement. It discusses the constructed *kodrat perempuan* and women's leadership discursive practice. It illustrates the interrelation of the practices of the agents, the State, and the news. The chapter discusses two main themes: women's leadership practice and the representation of female citizenship. The first main theme is discussed in relation to the perception of *ko-*

drat perempuan. Whereas the second theme focuses on female leadership as the representation of an expression of cultural citizenship framed within the perception of *kodrat perempuan*.

Chapter Nine is the Conclusion. It answers the questions of the study and recommends suggestions for future studies.

CHAPTER TWO

KODRAT AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: CONTEXT, CONCEPTS, AND TERMS

Introduction

The main research question of this study is the following: what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social activities in the local context? What are the dynamics of Muslim women's leadership engagement in the area deemed appropriate for women to work in, i.e. in the health and education sectors? And what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social efficacies in the areas supposedly not appropriate for them to get involved in, i.e. public leadership and parliamentary performance? Before answering these research questions, contexts and related concepts and terms are discussed. Practically, the discussion in this chapter is designed to show the relation between contexts, concepts, key terms and the study, i.e. women's leadership discourse and practice seen from the *kodrat* nuance. As the study uses a descriptive approach, all of contexts, concepts and terms explained here are used to provide a description and analysis of local processes that have not been studied before and provide information about local women's leadership engagement as well as shed light on local processes as seen from *kodrat* perspectives.

A. Context of Study

The first relation is between this study and its context. The discussion of *kodrat* and civic engagement in terms of female leadership is contextualized within the contestation between the process of democratization and that of current forces of Islamization. Through democratization, gender equity, justice, human rights, and democracy characterize the discourse and practice of both the State and people. Islamization is another process which may challenge or accompany the State and public discourse and practice. The interaction between the two appears as contestations which basically take form as perspectives. These perspectives may be grouped into two camps: the perspective that accepts democracy and that which is anti-democracy. In the perspective which accepts democracy, people believe that Islam and democracy meet universal values of justice, transparency,

consultation, dialogue and accountability. Within these values, democracy in Indonesia is contextualized into existing indigenous values, but with the tendency not to place democracy over cultural and religious understandings. This camp strongly criticizes parochial understandings of Islam and cultural practices. At the same time, some of them believe in Islam's potential to bring about democracy. They can be categorized into three camps, those of liberalist, reformist, and revivalist view towards democracy.

Liberalist camp sees democracy and human rights as being in accordance with Islam. It attributes binding values, rights and obligations to every member of society, and its operations are open and non-discriminatory. Contemporary Indonesia is essentially on this democratic Islamic track. These three systems – Islam, human rights and democracy – are leading the recovery of the country after the fall of the New Order regime, as the State and civil society exercises more democratic interaction and communication.¹

The reformist² camp balances Islam and democracy. It is similar to the first one, but maintains a balance between implementing gender equity, democracy and human rights, and Islam. The modernist principle, *al-muhāfadha bi qādimi al-Sāli wa al-akhdu bi al-jadid al-asla* (maintaining the existing teachings which are right, and adopting the new ones which are the best) is usually used to relate Islam with modernity. The basic premise of this camp is compatibility between Islam and democracy, but with the inclination to make Islam the measurement of democracy and not the other way around. When there are principles or practices with no precedence in Islamic communities, such as freedom and equality, they are generally willing to adopt them from the democratic tradition itself. In a Western context, these two values have been contextualized into democratic practices and institutions. In Indonesia, including in Tasikmalaya, inter-personal relations and practices are still paternalistic, creating differences between the people and the elite. Elite citizens have more decisive roles than ordinary citizens, who are sometimes collectively characterized in Indonesia as the 'floating masses'.³

The revivalist camp may be called 'Islamist' for their exclusive use of Islam as their perspective. Its proponents accept democracy, gender equity and human rights, but in ways according to their own understandings. They invoke the term 'democracy' only to support their interests. This camp believes that Mus-

¹ Blackburn. 2004. *Women and the State*, pp. 227-8; Robinson 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy*, pp.1-9.

² The key term of the reformist is the word *sharing*. It derives from the verb *to share*, and it can be meant as *to have a share in something*. AP. Cowie (Chief Editor). 1994 [4th edition] *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1165. Here, the word is used to illustrate a group of persons who adhere to the idea of accepting Islam and democracy by either mixing them or electively choosing similar ideas from both discourse resources.

³ Maswadi Rauf. 2009. "Prolog Mengungkapkan Hubungan Budaya Politik Lokal dan Demokrasi," in R.Siti Zuhro (et al). *Demokrasi Lokal Perubahan dan Kesinambungan*. Yogyakarta: Ombak, pp. xv-xvi.

lims should regulate their lives by Islam, the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunna*. They criticize Muslims who do otherwise. However, they do not all see involvement in politics the same way. Some criticize other *kyais* who involve in politics, saying that their ideal role is as guardians of morality. If they become involved in politics, they will find it difficult to maintain noble values and their authoritative role in society, as they may become trapped by their political interests. They consider the spirit of the *Medina Charter*⁴ as the authentic model of democracy, because this charter provides the first example of Islamic public affairs with direct relevance to democracy and concepts such as the social contract, mutual understanding, accountability, and honoring the rights and obligations of all parties.⁵ Others strongly believe that Muslims should implement *Shari'a* through the existing system. They agree with the initiative of interpolating religious values in the regulations for local government known as the movement of formalizing the principles of *Shari'a*.⁶

On the other hand, the anti-democracy camp rejects the concept of democracy simply because it is not considered as Islamic. However, empirically their refutation is negotiated, and they consider the present situation as temporary. Their opinion on leadership is that although a system or ruler may not be Islamic, they see this as better than society without a system or ruler. They share this view with the revivalist camp. The difference lies in this camp's rejection of the concept of democracy, whereas the other camp criticizes it rigorously.

The contestations between the two perspectives certainly influence the dynamics of women's leadership discourse and practice. The discussion of its dynamism is focused in the form of citizenship expressions.

B. Concepts and Terms

The second relation is between this study and the use of some concepts and key terms. *Kodrat* is nurtured by different forces. It is influencing people's mind and activities, including women's. It is placed as the influential factor of the study in which it is discussed as nuances of women's social activity. The main category is female leadership. The term is treated as part of a broader category, civic engagement. This term may differentiate into various types. However, in this study its types are restricted only within three areas of engagement: education, health and political engagement. The first two discusses only one case, and the last type discusses two cases. The discussion of the dynamism of women's leadership seeing from the *Kodrat* nuance is framed theoretically through these main categories. In addition, the discussion of female leadership here is also contextualized within the expression of cultural citizenship. So, female leadership is framed within the

⁴ Medina Charter is known also as Constitution of Medina. It is a treaty to regulate the interaction and co-existence between Muslims and Jews in Medina. The charter was documented by Ibn Ishaq in his *Sira*, II, 147-50. *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*. Vol. 3, J-O. Leiden and Boston: Brill, p. 33.

⁵ Interview with Miftah Fauzi, February 11, 2009.

⁶ Interview with Mahfudz Shiddiq, February 13, 2009.

common view of the relation between *Kodrat* and women's leadership practices, the area deemed appropriate with it and the area deemed not appropriate with it. Following the scheme of different types of engagement, they all are grouped into these two areas. As explained in the previous chapter, female leadership in the first area -in Islamic education institution, i.e. *Nyai's*, *Ibu's* and *Ummi's* leadership and in health institution, i.e. *Posyandu cadre's* leadership- is discussed. In the second area, two cases from the field of political participation are discussed: female public leadership and female MP's leadership. Certain key terms and or sub-categories, and other related terms are employed to discuss each case.

The term is used to discuss the female leadership experiences in terms of citizenship nuances. These nuances constitute the dynamics of female leadership experience. The discussion focuses on elements of enabling and enacting of women's leadership in terms of negotiation and representation in meanings within the language of cultural citizenship. What their leadership trajectory and experience mean as expression of citizenship? What their negotiations with the family or society in participating in social activities represent? How they experience the election process and leadership process? How their leadership experience seeing from citizenship influences gender relations? In which direction the female leadership is likely heading in if we consider their experiences in the discussed case studies, etc.? These exemplary questions are used to discuss the dynamics of women's leadership experience as expression of citizenship.

1. Kodrat

a. Kodrat

The term *kodrat* comes from the Arabic word "*qudra*," which means "pre-determination", "measurement" or "power."⁷ The Qur'an also uses the similar derivation of the word in the same sense, i.e. power, measurement and pre-determination, such as in Q. 4: 133⁸ (power), 42: 27⁹ (measurement) and Q. 74: 18 (predetermination).¹⁰ The *Hadith* also uses the term but only in one meaning, as 'power', such as in the eight *Hadiths* by Bukhari, illustrating God as having power

⁷ Louis Malouf.1975. *al-Munjid fi al-Lughah wa al-A'lam*. Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, pp. 611-2.

⁸ 'If it were His will, He could destroy you, O mankind, and create another race; for He hath power this to do. ' (Q. S. 4: 133); 1. We have indeed revealed this (Message) in the Night of Power: 2. And what will explain to thee what the night of power is?; 3. The Night of Power is better than a thousand months. (Q.S. 4: 133)

⁹ "If Allah were to enlarge the provision for His Servants, they would indeed transgress beyond all bounds through the earth; but he sends (it) down in due measure as He pleases. For He is with His Servants Well-acquainted, Watchful." (Q.S. 42:27)

¹⁰ "For he thought and he plotted" (Q.S. 74:18)

over everything.¹¹ *Kodrat* is thus in essence the pre-determined, God-given nature or distinctive, original and natural quality of being.¹² When it is conjugated to the term *perempuan*, and becomes *kodrat perempuan*, it may be defined as the processes relevant only to the body of a woman such as pregnancy, menstruation, giving birth, and breast feeding. However, these specific and natural abilities bring about a number of specific inclinations and activities which, in the perspective of some, also belong to a woman's *kodrat*, such as fulfilling household duties, babysitting or rearing children, and certain work deemed only appropriate for women. For example, the idea of production and reproduction is basically derived from practices which place the husband in the position of breadwinner and being responsible for the work this role demands while the wife is considered the housekeeper and in the same manner responsible for the work this role demands of her, as well as from religious directives such as given in QS. 4: 34 and supported by its law products (*fiqh*). Women are thus to have mainly the biological reproductive task of giving birth and to execute assignments like child-bearing and rearing and social reproductive jobs such as the process of reproduction itself and the preservation of human beings.¹³ Additional characteristics constitute the nurturing aspect of the term *kodrat*. The usage of the term *kodrat* in dictionaries, including English, Malay-Indonesian and dictionaries of local languages,¹⁴ refers to the generic and constructed or nurtured meaning of the term. The generic meaning of the term is characterized by its natural aspect, whereas the constructed one is evident from its nurturing aspects. The constructed sense is influenced by religious, ethnic or cultural, educational, civil society, States and the news' discursive resources that are references to social practices that determine the use of the term. In this study, the expression is used to discuss women's leadership in terms of representation and representedness. Representation pertains to the way female leaders as agents represent what their leadership or experience of leadership means in the larger

¹¹ http://www.searchtruth.com/searchHadith.php?keyword=qudra&translator=1&search=1&book=&start=0&records_display=10&search_word=all 24 Mei 2010

¹² Munir Baalbaki and Ramzi Baalbaki. 2008. *Al-Mawrid al-Hadeeth: A Modern English-Arabic Dictionary*. Beirut: Dar El-Ilm Lilmalayeen, p. 760.

¹³ See Ratna Sapatri and Brigitte Holzner. 1997. *Perempuan dan kerja perubahan Sosial: Sebuah pengantar Studi Perempuan*. Jakarta: Grafiti and Kalyanamitra, p. 16, as quoted by Faiqoh. 2003. *Nyai Agen Perubahan di Pesantren*. Jakarta: Kucica, p. 88.

¹⁴ Peter Salim. 1985. *English-Indonesian Dictionary*. Jakarta: Modern English Press, pp. 826, 1032, 1237-8, 1462; W.J.S. Poerwadarminta. 1982. *Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia*. Jakarta: PN Balai Pustaka, pp. 100, 282-3, 515, 943, 987, 1149; J.S. Badudu and Suta Muhammad Zain. 1994. *Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan. p. 704; Mahmuh bin H. Bakyr. 2003. *Kamus Bahasa Melayu Nusantara*. Lapangan Terbang Lama: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Bruinai, pp. 1380, 1449, 2653; Panitia Kamus Lembaga Basa dan Sastra Sunda. 1975. *Kamus Umum Basa Sunda*. Bandung: Lembaga Basa dan Sastra Sunda, p. 253; Oyan Sofyan Unsasi, Maman Sumantri and Maryati Sastrawijaya. 1993. *Kamus Bahasa Indonesia-Bahasa Sunda I*. Jakarta: Depaertemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, p. 389; R. Satjadibrata. 1954. *Kamus Basa Sunda*. Jakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementerian PP dan K, did not mention the term *kodrat*; Jonathan Rigg. 1862. *A Dictionary of the Sunda Language or Java*. Batavia: Lange & Co, p. 231.

discursive practice of women's social engagement. Representedness indicates the way news or the State covers or transforms women's leadership practice in wider social engagement.

b. Nature

In terms of nature, *kodrat* is seen in its essential usage. It may be defined as the female biological nature embedded in the body of a woman or in her biological reproductive necessities. This essential usage strictly emphasizes the importance of the purely innate nature attached to the female body such as in the processes of pregnancy, menstruation, baby delivery and breast feeding, and regards other characteristics as well that were assumed to be part of it but socially constructed and open to change.¹⁵ By restricting the term *kodrat* to female biological aspects, the proponents of this definition expect that women will be able to overcome their cultural barriers and accordingly engage socially in as many fields as men do. They differentiate between the innate characteristics of the female *kodrat* with its extended meanings such as femininity and household and children's education. By restricting the term to only physical characteristics, the perception of *kodrat* in their opinion will not necessarily hinder women's social engagement.

c. Nurture

Kodrat in terms of nurture has a pragmatic usage. In this sense, *kodrat* may be defined as the female biological nature embedded in the body of a woman such as in the processes of pregnancy, menstruation, baby delivery and breast feeding, and other, closely connected characteristics like femininity, kismet or fate, custom or habit, and the rights and obligations which are assumed to be part of it and which are socially constructed and open to change. As different discursive resources influence the term, *kodrat* in this constructed sense is more dynamic. The fluidity of the term is reflected in the formulation of dictionaries as mentioned above and also in social practices as norms.¹⁶

It is in this sense that the term is used in this study. In this sense, *kodrat* is influenced by the following discursive resources: religion, local culture, State and democratic values or values that are supported by civil societies and contextualized according to their response to democracy in accepting- and anti-democracy camps. As illustrated in Diagram 3 below, the perception of *kodrat* defined as nature is characterized by its reception towards gender equality, human rights and democracy. Hence, it is supportive of women's social engagement.

¹⁵ Hussein Muhammad. 2001. *Fiqh Perempuan : Refleksi kiai atas Wacana Agama dan Gender*. Yogyakarta: LKIS, pp. 3-16.

¹⁶ Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir. 2004. *Bangga Jadi Perempuan: Perbincangan dari Sisi Kodrat dalam Islam*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, p. 4.

Another camp which may have similar characteristics is the liberalist one. This camp is somewhat different from the nurture's stand by its tendency to rationalize democracy, human rights and gender equality through a religious understanding. The reformist camp is characterized by its reception of the same modern forces and its measurement of them through its understanding of Islam and local culture. They are supportive of women's leadership but advise women not to forget their *kodrat*. The revivalist camp is characterized by its reception of gender equality, human rights, and democracy and its sturdy criticism of them by measuring them with their understanding of Islam. They are more inclined to restricting women's leadership engagement.

Meanwhile, the anti-democracy camp is characterized by its rejection of democracy, gender equality, and human rights. However, it allows itself temporarily to live in the context of the existing political system, including the democratic system, in the absence of an Islamic political system. It is more inclined to restricting women's social leadership and rejecting female political participation.


Agents, which here could be women themselves as citizens or State officials, can be grouped into two camps: Accepting democracy, and anti-democracy. The accepting democracy camp consists of three sub-categories: liberalist, reformist, and revivalist camps. The other camp, the anti-democracy camp, which may include women and men, includes Muslim citizens who hold on to a certain ideological stand that rejects democracy such as the *Salafi* group. On the one hand, the State through its government policies formulates the role, space and opportunity women have for social engagement. The State's attention in this matter also changes, following the demands of the age. On the other hand, citizens in this study are restricted to a certain space in society known as civil society. Civil society is the cultural resource of social capital, in Robert Putnam's definition. This space consists of a milieu, systems and groups. To a certain extent, the term civil society refers to social organizations such as "clubs, religious organizations, business groups, labor unions, human rights groups, and other associations located between the household and the State and organized activities on the basis of voluntarism and mutuality. The idea here is that for formal democratic institutions to work, citizens have first to acquire the habit of participating in local voluntary associations. It is through such 'networks of civil engagement', one hears said, that citizens learn the habit of participation and initiative later generalized to the whole of political society".¹⁷ Civil society accounts for the positive aspects of both horizontal and vertical groupings, meaning that both kinds of groupings have a positive potential to contribute to the discourse and practice in democracy.¹⁸ In this study, the term refers to individuals within organizations who decided to participate in one of the civic engagement activities, namely a *nyai*, *ibu* and *ummi*, *Posyandu cadre*, village or sub-district head, or female MP, as well as to those citizens who also construct *kodrat*. Like the State, civil society also has a specific

¹⁷ Robert Hefner. 2005. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 22-5.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 22-5.

stand towards *kodrat*. Generally, it is strongly inclined to reduce the term to reproductive nature and rationalize its cultural construction aspects to give more room for women's social engagement but with different agents, i.e. civil society.¹⁹ Like in the sense of the nature of *kodrat*, the proponents of this camp are those who are deeply concerned about democracy, human rights and gender issues. They come from various civil society elements. One of the prominent elements are NGO activists. Their area of concern usually deals with democratic, human rights and gender issues. However, in practice they contextualize these issues in order to maximize the people's acceptance by, for example, contextualizing some concepts of Western origin to fit with local culture. The idea of giving more space to gender relations and roles which provide wider room for women's civic engagement is actualized through introducing ideas of justice and equality in religious terms, or by carrying out workshops for religious figures, public leaders, teachers and lecturers. Similar to the advocates of *kodrat* that is influenced by State policies, this camp seems to pay more attention to democratic values. This means that people who hold this stand tends to encourage women to engage socially. Diagram 1 below illustrates the use of the term *kodrat*.

Diagram 1: Dimensions of the use of the term *Kodrat*



¹⁹ Ibid. 2005. *Civil Islam*, pp. 22-5.

2. Civic Engagement

The concept of civic engagement has been used, in the first place, in the context of younger people who participate in volunteering and community activities. However, the concept has started to be used also in the context of older people to discuss their social involvement in societies formally, informally, and in the political and non-political realms.²⁰ It has been used extensively to illustrate the activities of voluntary networks of mutual trust and reciprocity that ultimately benefit the participating members. Civic engagement here refers to Robert Putnam's (2000) and David Crowley's views (n.d.). In Putnam's definition, the concept includes informal and formal social activities as well as community and political participation. He refers to the concept as 'the entire gamut of activities that build social capital.'²¹ Crowley focuses on movement aspects, in order to emphasize its social change dimension.²² In this study, the category is used at two levels. The first is in terms of female leadership, a discussion of which will follow below. The second is in terms of its division into three dimensions: health care engagement, educational engagement, and political engagement. The first two dimensions are grouped into the area deemed appropriate with *kodrat*, and each dimension is discussed by using one case: a female volunteer for health care engagement, known as a Posyandu cadre, and female agency for educational engagement, known as *nyai*, *ibu* or *ummi* (wife or daughter of *kyai/ajengan/ustadz/ulama*, or teacher at an Islamic educational institution such as a *madrasah* or a *pesantren*).

The last dimension, political engagement, is grouped into the area deemed incompatible with *kodrat*. This category discusses the political leadership dimension in two cases: female public leaders (head of village [*kepala desa*] and head of sub-district/*kecamatan* [*camat*]), and female MPs (*anggota parlemen*). Political engagement here is defined as political leadership where female agency is discussed in two different cases: female public leadership and female MPs.

3. Female Leadership

The term *leadership* is used not only as 'an activity practiced by individuals' but also as 'a process located in social activity.'²³ Leadership here is contextualized or situated in a phosteroic (a model of leadership which positions it as a shared experience and as a social practice),²⁴ participative and democratic nu-

²⁰ Adler, R. P., & Goggin, J. 2005. "What do we mean by "civic engagement"?" *Journal of Transformative Education*, 3(3). pp. 236-53.

²¹ Robert D. Putnam, 2000. *Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 19-28.

²² Adler. 2005. "What do we mean by "civic engagement"?" p. 239.

²³ Valerie Stead and Carole Elliott. 2009. *Women's Leadership*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 16.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 17.

ances²⁵ seeking space and opportunity for women's leadership in the mainstream tradition. In other words, leadership is active, situational, contextual and relational.²⁶ Women's leadership is marginal as it is still very rare compared to male leadership.²⁷ Women in the context of leadership are commonly considered as being "out of place" or as "travelers in the male World."²⁸ This means that women who enter the world of leadership face double barriers: their own barriers as outsiders who enter a world that by nature is not theirs and as agents who are less experienced than men and in some cases have less knowledge, skills and networks. They also meet barriers from the male world which tends to maintain their traditional roles by adopting a patriarchal and discriminative attitude towards women.

Gender is created through social interaction. It is commonly found that "men and women interact in a way that is seen as appropriate to their gender, that is, they 'do' gender."²⁹ Creating spaces that are deemed appropriate for women, for example, is treated as an effort to keep women subordinated. In analyzing this phenomenon, certain focuses are given to undo gender in order to describe women's efforts to uncover the barriers in their leadership practices. The way the study discusses it is in two dimensions: leadership trajectory and leadership performance or experience. Leadership trajectory here refers to an enabling process from one's initial experience of learning leadership to the matters, skills, and networks needed in exercising leadership. Enabling leadership may occur before or during the period that one has an assignment to lead. Meanwhile, leadership performance refers to women's experience of leadership itself.

4. Educational Engagement:

Two elements of educational engagement are discussed: institution and agency. Three institutions are explained: *madrasah*, *pesantren* and *majlis taklim*, and in terms of agency, *ibu* and its related terms –*ummi*, *nyai* and *ibuism* are also defined.

a. *Madrasah*, *Pesantren* and *Majlis Taklim*

Madrasah derives from the Arabic word *darasa*, meaning 'to study.' In the Arabic-speaking world, the term *madrasah* is used to describe all kinds of schools, both schools that teach Islamic subjects as well as general ones. However, in the non-Arabic speaking world, the term is understood in a stricter manner. Here, the term *madrasah* is a school for the transformation of Islamic knowledge. For generations students have learned in this institution to become Muslim religious

²⁵ Ibid, p. 25.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 36.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 15-9, 130.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 58.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 96.

specialists or *ulama* or they merely study basic knowledge on Islamic teachings. The institution is important in “sustaining, preserving, promoting and transmitting the Islamic tradition over the generations.”³⁰ *Madrasah* (and *pesantren*) are frequently criticized for their traditional way of teaching and learning and their rejection of any form of modernization. However, in Asia, specifically in South-east Asia, the term *madrasah* reflects modernity and development. For example, in the formative eras, the institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia utilized an alternative mode of education in spite of the existing educational institutions established by the Dutch and British colonial authorities in Indonesia and Malaysia. Regardless of the exaggeration of the media’s negative coverage as grounds for ‘obscurantism,’ the institution is trying in its own way to express modernity and development, for example by adopting other methods of teaching traditions in schools, modern education management, and integrating general subjects into religious educational institutions such as *pesantrens*.

A *Majlis Taklim* may be defined as a venue for Islamic instruction.³¹ Some define the term as religious study group.³² Besides *kyai*, *ustadz* (male Muslim religious teacher), and *muballigh* (local religious teacher), a *nyai*, *ummi*, or *ibu* who have a relation to a *pesantren* or *madrasah* is commonly the teacher in a *Majlis Taklim*. She is commonly called a *muballighah*. She usually addresses Islamic teachings regarding everyday life by either giving her own elaboration or talking about one of someone else, or by interpreting the *Hadiths* or the Qur’an regarding prayer or other aspects of everyday life. On other occasions, she may act as a mediator to explain various “aspects of everyday secular life, such as interpersonal relations, norms of society in general, family life, health, education, and other social, cultural, economic, and even political aspects - for all of which she claims to be able to give wise counsel based on Islamic teachings.”³³ Moreover, a *Majlis Taklim* is often used as a place where government programs regarding health care, small economic programs, etc. are delivered. Activities for political campaigns such as the dissemination and explanation of a candidate’s work plan often take place in a *Majlis*. As they have the capacity to deliver religious sermons or teachings, *nyai*, *ummi* or *ibu* often get involved in *Majlis Taklim* activities either as preachers or organizers. *Majlis Taklim* are almost as ubiquitous as mosques, *mushalla* and *langgar*. *Majlis Taklim* activities may take place in these Islamic in-

³⁰ Martin van Bruinessen. 2008. “Tradionalist and Islamist *Pesantrens* in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand, and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.). 2008. *The Madrasa in Asia: Political activism and Transnational Linkages*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 219-20.

³¹ Direktorat Pendidikan Diniyah dan Pondok Pesantren, Departemen Agama RI. 2009. *Regulasi Majlis Taklim: Pedoman Pembinaan Majlis Taklim*. Jakarta: Departemen Agama, pp.1-2

³² Lies M. Marcoes, 1992. “The female preacher as a mediator in religion: A case study in Jakarta and West Java,” in *Women and Mediation in Indonesia*, edited by Sita van Bemmelen, Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, et al., Leiden: KITLV, p. 204.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 205.

stitutions but also in offices or houses. More and more people consider the Majelis Taklim as a strategic and potential place to use for various purposes.

b. *Nyai, Ibu and Ummi*

Nyai is basically a neutral term that designates a woman in general.³⁴ However, the term can also mean *adik*, *adinda*, *ade*, *rayi* (younger woman) or *dewi* (goddess) such as Nyai Loro Kidul, or *priyayi* (aristocrat) like Nyai Dewi Sartika. The term may also point to *gundik* or *perempuan simpanan* (mistress), usually accompanying a foreigner. An older woman is also sometimes called a *nyai*.³⁵ In the past, writers used *nyai* as a source of imagination in their literary works. For example, Mayon Soetrismo wrote *Nyai Wonokromo* and *Nyai Adipati*. He wrote the two novels in the setting of the late nineteenth century East Indies colonial setting.³⁶ In fact, the term *nyai* is commonly used in Islamic educational institutions including in *pesantren*, particularly in Java. For example, Suratmin wrote a book about *Nyai Ahmad Dahlan* (1977).³⁷ In this instance the use of the term *nyai* refers to the wife of a *kiai* or of a religious teacher in a *pesantren*, the daughter of a *kiai*,³⁸ or to herself as a religious teacher. There are other terms also used to designate a similar position, such as *ibu* in Indonesian or *ummi* in Arabic. The terms *ibu* and *ummi* will be used also in this book as long as both represent the role of a *nyai* in educational engagement.

³⁴ R. Satjadibrata. 1954. *Kamus Basa Sunda: Katut ketjap-ketjap Asing Nu Geus Illahar*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Perguruan Kementrian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, p. 262; Panitia Kamus Lembaga Basa dan Sastra Sunda, 1975. *Kamus Umum Basa Sunda*. Bandung: p. 335; JS. Badudu and Sutan Muhammad Zain. 1994. *Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, p. 950;

³⁵ Satjadibrata. 1954. *Kamus Basa Sunda*: p. 262; Panitia Kamus Lembaga Basa dan Sastra Sunda. 1975. *Kamus Umum Basa Sunda*. p. 335; Badudu and Zain. 1994. *Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia*. p. 950; Dato Paduka Haji Mahmud bin Haji Bakyr. 2003. *Kamus Bahasa Melayu-Nusantara*. Selangor: Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, p. 1895; Oyan Sofyan Unsasi, Maman Sumantri, Maryati Sastrawijaya. 1993. *Kamus Bahasa Indonesia-Sunda II*. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan; and jonathan Rigg. 1862. *A Dictionary of the Sunda Language of Java*. Batavia: Cange and Co., p. 231.

³⁶ Mayon Soetrismo, (n.d.) *Nyai Wonokromo*. Jakarta: Progres. The book has two parts: Nyai Wonokromo (the first) and Nyai Adipati.

³⁷ Suratmin, 1977. *Nyai Ahmad Dahlan*. Jakarta: Proyek Biografi Pahlawan Nasional P & K, PP.

³⁸ Lies M. Marcoes. 1992. "The Female Preacher as Mediator in Religion," pp. 205-6. Faiqoh, 2003. *Nyai: Agen Perubahan di Pesantren*. Jakarta: Kucica, p. 33; Eka Srimulyani, 2009. "Women Leadership in Islamic Educational Institutions in Java and Aceh: A Comparison between Pesantren in Java and Dayah in Aceh." In *Kultur: the Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures*. Vol. 4, Number 2: pp. 159-73

c. *Ibuism*

Ibuism first came to be known in combination with State, as State *Ibuism*. It is a term introduced initially by Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis to describe the blend of two cultural sources – the Dutch *petit bourgeois* and traditional priyayi values – “housewifization” and priyayi *Ibuism*. She formulated it as “an ideology that sanctions any action taken by a mother who looks after her family, a group, a class, a company, or the State without demanding any power or prestige in return.”³⁹ Julia I. Suryakusuma used the term also to describe women as “appendages of their husbands and casts female dependency as ideal.” Women are seen as “dependent wives who exist for their husbands, their families, and the State.”⁴⁰ She related the term to the discussion of the Indonesian State’s political system in the New Order era in which integralistic constitutional premises were applied. She then inferred that the New Order’s interpretation of the term State *Ibuism* was in line with the State’s political ideology, i.e. in its biological meaning, regardless of the fact that the term can also be used for women who have no children.⁴¹ She identified the ideal roles of women as “procreators of the nation, as mothers, as educators of children, as house-keepers, and members of Indonesian society.”⁴² Following Suryakusuma’s and Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis’s conceptualization of the term State *Ibuism* which was used to control Indonesian women, a similar term with different agents can be used, that is *cultural Ibuism*, because the State included certain elements it took from cultural values and practices. As the term is fluid, the construction of the term may result in different meanings at different times due to its diverse and even controversial ingredients derived from patriarchal, cultural and religious values versus democratic and gender equality values. *State* and *cultural Ibuism* are always in contestation. Theoretically, this contestation may result in one or more of the following gender relations: centralized gender relations where husbands are dominant; shared gender relations where power, rights and obligations are shared among men and women; and equal gender relations where both men and women agree to equal gender relations, rights and obligations. In practice, this contestation is categorized into the two dimensions of the perception and practice of *kodrat* in relation to democracy: the pro- and anti-democracy stands. Adding to the possible role described by Suryakusuma, the role of a woman may also be as a politician or an MP, active citizen, and public leader. All of these roles signify women’s civic engagement as ideal, equal partners of men.

³⁹ Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, (n.d.). “*Ibuism* and Priyayitization: Path to Power?” in *In Elsbeth Locher-Scholte and Anke Niehof* (eds.), *Indonesian Women in Focus: Past and Present Notions*, p. 44; as quoted by Suryakusuma. 1996. “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia”, pp. 101-02.

⁴⁰ Suryakusuma. 1996. “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia,” p. 98.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 101.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 101.

The relation between the term State *Ibuism* and the terms *nyai*, *ibu* and *ummi* lies in the use of the term *ibu* in the cultural sphere which has similar representations and meanings but within a smaller scope, i.e. discussed only in the area of an Islamic educational institutions where women's roles basically consist of those explained by Suryakusuma. However, the emergence of new practices derived from democratic and gender equality traditions offer them alternative roles. Accordingly, they not only receive traditional influences which are patriarchal and discriminative but also other influences which are democratic and equal. The encounter of these values creates their dynamic civic engagement.

5. Health Engagement:

a. Primary Health Care (PHC)

Primary Health Care (PHC) is a term that was popularized by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the 1970s and was formulated formally and given international recognition in 1978 through the Alma-Ata Recommendation. The Alma-Ata Conference was convened by WHO and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and supported by 134 countries, 67 international organizations, and numerous non-governmental organizations.⁴³ Since then, PHC has become the key focus for the endorsement of global health development. The Alma-Ata Conference formulated four focuses for its PHC programs: "(i) universal accessibility and coverage on the basis of need, (ii) community and individual involvement and self-reliance, (iii) intersectoral action for health, and (iv) appropriate technology and cost-effectiveness in relation to the available resources."⁴⁴ The term may be simply explained as the implementation of simple and affordable health technologies in community health programs, community participation through helping paramedical staff, a focus on preventive rather than curative care, and specific attention given to "accessibility of care and equity, and the integration of care and intersectoral coordination."⁴⁵

Since its establishment in 1978, PHC has been applied in many developing countries,⁴⁶ including in Indonesia. In many countries, the implementation of the Alma-Ata Declaration was challenged by objective circumstances such as the impact of the cold war, economic crisis, and significant reduction in public spending, political instability in many developing countries. It also challenged

⁴³ Stephen Gillam and De Maeseneer, 2008. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, Vol. 336, No. 7643 (March 8, 2008), p. 536.

⁴⁴ E. Tarimo and E.G. Webster, 1996. *PHC Concepts and Challenges in A Changing World: Alma-Ata Revisited*. n.p.: Division of Analysis, Research and assessment. WHO, WHO/SHS/CC/94.2, p. 3.

⁴⁵ Richard Heaver, 1995. *Managng Prirmary Health Care: Implications of the Health Transition*. Washington D.C: the World Bank, p 5.

⁴⁶ Solita Koesobjono-Sarwono, 1993. *Community Participation in Primary Health Care in an Indonesian Setting*. Leiden: A PhD Thesis at University of Leiden, p. 1.

previous ideological oppositions, and had difficulty to be fully accepted in capitalist market-oriented countries. Hospitals in these countries were reluctant to share a significant part of their services with local health economies.⁴⁷ However, because health is a basic need of human beings, the primary health care initiated by WHO is an important program. Gillam and De Maeseneer point out that PHC is necessary for at least two reasons: “patient and family contact”, and “extending care to communities and vulnerable groups”. In this respect, community participation and an effective and suitable mechanism with each context play a pivotal role in supporting PHC’s programs.⁴⁸ Its potency is positioned “in linking different sectors and disciplines, integrating different elements of disease management, stressing early prevention, and the maintenance of health.”⁴⁹

Judi Fortuin has a more optimistic response towards PHC, setting five characteristics as transformative elements. The five characteristics are availability, affordability, acceptability, appropriateness, and accessibility.⁵⁰ Koesoebjono-Sarwono believed that the PHC program with these five basic expectations offers hope to developing countries.⁵¹ In Indonesia, the PHC program actually preceded the WHO’s program (way back to the colonial times)⁵² and developed in accordance with its contextual needs, though it was still rudimentary. After Indonesia became independent in 1945, the government interpolated the community participation aspect into its development.⁵³ In the New Order era, some developments were introduced and adjusted with the vision and mission of the WHO including the Alma-Ata recommendation in 1978 and its promotion of *Health for All in 2000* (HFA 2000), such as *Puskesmas*/Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat (Public Health Centre) in 1968. *Puskesmas* focused on how the State delivered its health care program and did not pay attention to voluntary community par-

⁴⁷ Gillam and De Maeseneer, *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, Vol. 336, No. 7643, p. 536.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 537.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 538.

⁵⁰ Judi Fortuin. “Primary Health Care: A Framework for Transformation,” in *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, No. 27, Reproductive Rights (1995), p. 21.

⁵¹ Koesoebjono-Sarwono, 1993, *Community Participation in Primary Health Care in an Indonesian Setting*, p. 5.

⁵² The colonial government actually initiated a community health care program known as BKIA (Centre for Mother’s and Child’s Health Care) in 1931. According to Azrul Azwar, BKIA is the abbreviation of Balai Kesejahteraan *Ibu* dan Anak. However, the term *kesejahteraan* can be defined more appropriately as welfare. Meanwhile, the BKIA program dealt more with maternal and child health care. It is therefore that Koesoebjono-Sarwono did not explain what BKIA stood for, but instead defined it as Centre for Maternal and Child Care. Many other sources do the same and define it as the centre for health care, not welfare.

⁵³ In 1952, the Old Order government renamed the existig institution into *Dinas KIA/Dinas Kesehatan Ibu dan Anak* (office for the welfare of mothers and children), focusing on the maternal and child care program. Koesoebjono-Sarwono, (1993). *Community Participation in Primary Health Care in an Indonesian Setting*, p. 5.

ticipation. The institution was actually part of the Indonesian government's community health program, called *Pembangunan Kesehatan Masyarakat Desal* PKMD (Village Community Health Development Programme) which was introduced in 1977, a year before the WHO formulated the concept of Primary Health Care in the Alma-Ata Conference. Along with local practices and the new international strategy through PHC's target and promoted by the WHO in 1979,⁵⁴ Indonesia accepted this new approach and began to introduce village health workers' programs on a nation-wide scale in the third five-year-plan (1979-1984). The Indonesian government used the term *cadre* to denote a voluntary health worker. That program is *Posyandu*. Since then it has been an important State program for the execution of the PHC program.

In the *Reformasi* era, *Posyandu* was revitalized in accordance with the State's decentralized health policy and integrated into other PHC programs.⁵⁵ The potential impact of other programs on the activities of *Posyandu* cadres is promising as in many cases they allowed these cadres to become involved due to their badly needed experience and skills.

b. Community Participation

Community participation which basically requires public acceptance⁵⁶ is influenced by many factors when it is related to PHC. Elene Padilla identified three important factors that influence the concept of community participation in the PHC program: voluntary association, community organization, and consumer expectations of having quality assurance, public accountability, and patient's rights.⁵⁷ This means that the concept of community participation which was influenced by the WHO is restricted. It defined community participation in health development as community involvement and considered it as

“the process by which individuals and families assume responsibility for their health and welfare and for those of the community, and develop the capacity to

⁵⁴ World Health Organization. 1979. *Formulating Strategies for Health for All by the year 2000*, guiding principles and essential issues. WHO, Geneva.

⁵⁵ Examples of other programs which involved community participation in the Reformasi Era are *Desa Siaga* (Alert village) or *RW Siaga* (Alert Hamlet), *Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/PKK* (Family Empowerment and Welfare Movement), *Gerak PKK-KB-Kesehatan* (Family Empowerment and Welfare and Family Planning Health Movement), *Pos Kesehatan Desa/Poskesdes* (Village Health Post), *Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak/P2TP2A* (Integrated Service for Women and Children Empowerment) and *Program Terpadu Peranan Wanita Menuju Keluarga Sehat Sejahter/P2WKSS* (Women's Integrated program for Prosperous and Healthy Family), etc.

⁵⁶ Craig Amundsen, (1982). “Community Participation” in *Design Quarterly*, No. 117, Hennepin Avenue, p. 25.

⁵⁷ Elene Padilla, (1997) “Community Participation in Health Affairs,” in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 3, Health Service: The Local Perspective (1997), p. 227.

contribute to their and the community's development. They come to know their own situation better and they are motivated to solve their common problems. This enables them to become agents of their own development instead of passive beneficiaries."⁵⁸

However, the reasoning behind the importance of community participation in the PHC program still infers its transformative elements due to its power to combine the State's PHC program and the people's basic health needs (Judi Fortuin. 1995: 21). It is in this area of meaning that the concept of community participation is applied in this study.

In Indonesia, the government interpreted voluntary participation in a health care program in terms of support, reliance, agreement and action. Formally, these four kinds of participation were formulated in three kinds of integration as reflected in section 7 of LKMD (Village Community Resilience Body): integration of activities on 'the health status of women and children', 'integration among sectoral activities concerned with health, nutrition and welfare of the family and the community', and 'integration between professional and community care to improve the health status of women and children.'⁵⁹ *Posyandu* is an exemplary program where community participation is greatly supported in the sense of these three integrations.

c. *Posyandu*

Posyandu/Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Integrated Village Health Service Post) is the Indonesian State's integrated health care program for mothers and children under five. The program was actually a continuation of the former community health program, *Pembangunan Kesehatan Masyarakat Desa/PKMD* (Village Community Health Development Program) which was introduced formally by the government in 1977. In a way, PKMD was an Indonesian government effort to encourage community participation in health care programs. It was part of the improvement of existing government training programs and the employment of traditional birth attendants or *Dukun Beranak* (traditional midwifery), recruiting volunteers for community health education, and providing *Dana Sehat Desa* (Village Health Fund).⁶⁰ The government developed the concept through *Posyandu* pilot projects which were carried out in South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and Central Java in 1983. Having taken advantage from the lessons learned and by keeping the best elements from the former practices and particularly from the pilot project experience, the New Order formally implemented *Posyandu* nation-wide

⁵⁸ Ministry of Health, 1993. *Posyandu and Primary Health Care*: p. 37

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 14-5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 27-8.

in 1984 by incorporating it into the fourth Five Year Development Plan (RELI-TA IV) 1983/84-1988/89.⁶¹

The establishment of Posyandu aimed at reducing the fertility rate and the child and infant mortality rate. It was also designed to improve the average health status of mothers and children.⁶² It is a health program based on village community participation. It was implemented under the motto “from, for and by the people”.⁶³ Community participation was endorsed as favorable for villagers. People were urged to take part in developing basic public health care in which their own efforts were greatly appreciated. They were given opportunities to define their goals, increase their access to health care, and assist further in attempts towards proper health care intervention.⁶⁴ It was expected to provide an accessible and continual distribution of mother and child care to the community. The community’s knowledge and skills regarding basic health care were also supposed to improve. Finally, as it was voluntary, *Posyandu* would contribute to the efficiency and usefulness of services, manpower and funds.⁶⁵

In the *Reformasi* era the government, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, issued “A Letter of Announcement” (Surat Edaran) No 411.3/536/SJ of the *Revitalisasi Posyandu* (*Posyandu* revitalization) which was refined by the General Guidelines for the *Posyandu* revitalization No. 193/697BPM 2001. It was revitalized because the *Posyandu* institution was considered to be a reliable front strategy for developing the basic health program and the community’s nutrient status. It was also expected that through *Posyandu* revitalization, community participation in the basic health care program could be significantly increased.

d. *Posyandu* cadre (village health care volunteer)

A *Posyandu* cadre may be defined as a village health care worker who executes his/her activities voluntarily. A cadre is the key to the *Posyandu*’s success. Each *Posyandu* has ideally at least five volunteers, each handling one table of service. However, the average number is about four to five cadres in each post.⁶⁶ Kölmann described their functions in four tasks: management, execution, education and administration. *First*, cadres manage meetings. They usually make sure that all necessary things and facilities are ready at the post. If they do not

⁶¹ Ministry of Health, 1993. *Posyandu and Primary Health Care in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Dit.Gen. Community Health, p. 2; Kölmann, 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu in Central Java*, p. 2; Hunter, 1996. “Women as ‘Good Citizens’, p. 175.

⁶² Corrie van Vegel, 1992. *The Information System of Posyandu*. paper prepared for the Workshop Health Care in Java, Past and Present, Leiden 7-8 May 1992. Leiden: KITLV, p. 1.

⁶³ Kölmann, 1992, *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, p. 2.

⁶⁴ Hunter, 1996. “Women as ‘Good Citizens,’ p. 175.

⁶⁵ Kölmann, 1992, *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, p. 4.

⁶⁶ Van Vegel, 1992. *The Information System of Posyandu*, p. 2.

have a post yet, they coordinate with other workers to decide on the post. They usually have their office in the house of one of the volunteers or in local *madrasah diniyyah* or similar venue. They also organize the event with other related agencies or agents such as PKK, LKMD, the head of the *Dusun* (hamlet) and staff of a *Puskesmas* or, nowadays, the village nurse. In the post, they arrange the tables and chairs properly. They also fix the bed if they have one which is used by a nurse or local staff member of a *Puskesmas* for examining the health of babies and pregnant women. Finally, they are responsible for spending the funds. They usually receive irregular incentive funds from the State, or they get a budget or donations from the post's members. The money is spent on covering activities like immunization. They usually spend a small amount of money to buying their own uniforms to fit the dress code or on themselves, for instance, for an annual picnic somewhere. *Second*, the cadres execute their tasks at Posyandu gatherings. They weigh the children and measure their height. They distribute *oralit* (oral anti-dehydration salt) if someone has diarrhea. They are also recommended to distribute contraceptives such as tablets and condoms to women who want to prevent pregnancy. *Third*, they offer explanations to their members about the five programs and sanitary and nutritional and reproductive practices. They also persuade mothers to frequently come to Posyandu meetings. They consult with the local health care staff of a *Puskesmas/Pustu* (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat Pembantu/Community Health Sub-Center) or, nowadays, a village nurse if they cannot provide the patient with the necessary information or if they find peculiarities in a patient's health status. *Fourth*, they record the health status of every member: weight, the inoculations they have had and other health information on a Growth Monitoring Card. In the case of family planning, they are assisted by the health center staff and the family planning field worker (PLKB: Petugas Lapangan Keluarga Berencana). The professional staff, such as nurses and local doctors, examines pregnant women or give information on the insertion of long term contraceptives like IUD or implant.⁶⁷

6. Political Engagement:

a. Political Participation

Included with civic engagement is political participation and both terms are actually interrelated. Almond and Verba (1963) and Verba et al. (1978) imply that discussions of political participation are partial without the inclusion of the civic engagement aspect. Political participation may refer to any participation that seeks to influence government policy outcomes (Uhlener, 2001) or more broadly to direct and indirect forms of participation that are meant to influence policy outcomes or that look for change (Stone, 2002; Huntington and Nelson,

⁶⁷ Kölmann, 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, p. 6.

1976; Verba et al., 1993, 1995).⁶⁸ In this study, I see political participation as part of formal civic engagement in the broader sense of the term. Women's political participation here is discussed under the assumption that it is an area deemed inappropriate for women, because of the prevalent gendered understanding of politics. Since today, efforts and occasions offered either by the State or by civil societies have tried to prove otherwise, many women themselves engage in political activities (Robinson. 2009). Together with their male partners they try to contribute to the betterment of society. In this case, I discuss how women enable and enact leadership as village or sub-district heads and as members of parliament in the context of the implementation of the 30% quota policy for woman candidacy.

b. Decentralization policy

Decentralization is actually not a new political practice in Indonesia but its earlier practice was not related to the process of democratization and the strengthening of civil society.⁶⁹ The decentralization policy in this country took a new shape after independence in 1945. Following Dormeier-Freire and Maurer (2002), there were three decentralization policies in Indonesia: “1. as the delegation of specific tasks while the center retains its overall responsibility, which is comparable with the law of 1974;⁷⁰ 2. De-concentration, which refers to a relocation of decision-making within a centralized State, which is reflected in the law of 1957; and 3. devolution which concerns the actual transfer of power to lower levels of government, and this was implemented in 2001.”⁷¹

Decentralization in Indonesia is a dynamic practice. Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken illustrate that “decentralization comes into this world not as a *deus*

⁶⁸Udaya R. Wagle, (2006). “Political Participation and Civic Engagement in Kathmandu: An Empirical Analysis with Structural Equations.” *International Political Science Review*. 2006: 27, p. 302.

⁶⁹Under colonial rule, decentralization initially took place without the inclusion of democratization and the strengthening of civil society. Urban European elites were given limited authority of self-government in 1903, however no autonomy was given. A transfer of a range of administrative functions to provinces and large districts was granted in the following decades. In 1922 a decentralization law was passed, creating new provinces with a fair degree of administrative autonomy, but a decade later, in 1931, colonial rule was re-centralized due to confusion and irritation. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 2007. “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁰Law no. 5, 1974 sanctioned the domination of the centre over the regions. This law was strengthened by the issuance of Law No. 5, 1979 on the village government which made the administration of the villages the same all over the country. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken. 2007. “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, p. 11.

⁷¹Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007. “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries*, p. 12.

ex machina but as a rearrangement of existing force fields.”⁷² The ‘existing fields’ influence the implementation of the policy, either for the purpose of maintaining political powers like in the colonial, Old Order and in the New Order era,⁷³ or for democratic and civil society empowerment such as in the *Reformasi* era.⁷⁴ It is in this last sense that the term decentralization policy is used in this study.

a. Cultural Citizenship

Cultural citizenship is a term used to designate “the engaged citizen.” It refers to an *attribute* of an individual, “a capacity to participate as an effective citizen,” and “a set of cultural competences that individuals had or did not have.”⁷⁵ The cultural competences may be in the sense of membership, belonging, rights or obligations. Women were, and over and over again continue to be, seen as neglected State citizens, and even considered as occupying the lowest citizenship

⁷² Ibid, p. 2.

⁷³ In the Old Order era, though the government issued Law No. 1, 1957 on the decentralization of the provincial and regional government which gave the provincial and district government the power to appoint their own governor and district head through their local representative body, this law was abrogated by the Presidential Decree No. 6, 1959. Accordingly, the local government was dependent on the central government. They were powerful only in terms of recruitment of State employment and administration of government funds. However, the policy endorsed the increase of provinces from only 12 in 1950 to 20 in 1958. Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007. “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries*, pp.10-11.

⁷⁴ The *Reformasi* era was marked by the democratization process, at least as seen from the freedom of the press, permission to establish new parties, the granting of a referendum for East Timor (now known as Timur Leste) and administrative decentralization. Basically, the issuance of Law No 22, 1999 on decentralization made the local government regain some power of administration similar to the power given to it in Law No 1, 1957. However, the issuance of Law No. 25, 1999 on the frame of financial distribution gave the central government the ability to manage ‘the main sources of revenue of the regions, namely 80% of the income tax, value added tax, import duties and export taxes and foreign aid, while it still controlled a sizable number of government enterprises.’ Prior to the end of Megawati’s presidency, the central government issued Law No 32, 2004 on Regional Government and Law No. 33, 2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regional Government amending the previous laws. Law No. 32 did impact on the democratization process and the empowerment of civil society while Law No. 33 did not much influence the balance between the centre and the regions. Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007. “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries*, pp. 13-4.

⁷⁵ Caroline Andrew Monica Gattinger (eds.), 2005. *Accounting for Culture: the Thinking through Cultural Citizenship*. Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, p. 4.

rank throughout most of human history.⁷⁶ They have been struggling to improve their citizenship status, employing different perspectives, strategies, and methods. One of these shifts is through cultural citizenship expressions as an alternative to refute this misunderstanding about them. To date, contemporary democratization processes situate women as affirmative agents in various social engagements. They are also trying to gain more equal footing as citizens through the social practices in which they engage. They are situated in this discriminative stand and try to engage socially, taking advantage of citizenship spheres such as the public or political sphere, family, civil society, cultural spheres, in addition to their formal-State citizenship. Like men, they practice citizenship as democratic citizens, citizens that are “capable of acting both autonomously and responsibly.”⁷⁷ In this study, their social expressions of citizenship are restricted to their roles as educator, health volunteer, public leader or MP.

b. Female Public Leadership

The term ‘female public leadership’ refers to the kind of female leadership discussed above. The addition “public” is intended to categorize female public leadership in two different cases: as head of a village or head of a sub-district. A village head is elected by the constituents of that village, administered by a local committee under the coordination of a BPD/Badan Perwakilan Desa (Village’s Consultative assembly). A BPD holds a consultation meeting in which the BPD members, the village head, and staff of the village administration and other local organizations and figures participate to determine the temporary village head before a new one is elected and before a Panitia Pemilihan Kepala Desa/PPKD (Committee of Head of Village Election) is drawn up. If the temporary village head intends to run for a second round, she/he is eligible to act as temporary administrator of the village as long as the committee approves. The selected committee then works within a certain time constraint and conducts the following: announce the election in order to recruit candidates, evaluate the eligibility of the candidates, determine eligible candidates, verify eligible voters, verify and handle voters’ election papers (surat suara), schedule and organize the campaign, organize the election, and report all the processes to the district government and so forth. The election of village head follows the procedure of the election of the president and vice president, governor and vice governor, district and municipality head (major); it is a one man-one vote electoral system.

In contrast, a *lurah* (head of a village or in-city territory) is appointed and the heads of a *kelurahan* and sub-district are State civil servants. Ascription of the position is through an election mechanism under the recommendation of a team of the Baperjakat/Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Pangkat (Advisory Board for Posts and Ranks) that consists of a district secretary (sekda) as chairperson, head

⁷⁶ Nick Stevenson. 2003. *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*. Berkshire: Open University Press, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 7.

of the civil servant division as secretary, three district assistants, inspector, and or head of BKPLD/Badan Kepegawaian Pendidikan dan Latihan Daerah (Body of Education and Training for Local Civil Servants) and the head of the mutation division.

c. Female Member of Regional Parliament

A Member of Parliament or MP is elected through a general election. In Indonesia, like a man, a woman who has to have at least graduated from senior high school to be eligible to be elected as an MP. Having gone through the tiring process of the parliamentary election, a female member of the House of Representatives only begins her real fight after she has been elected. The promises and programs that she has made and the peoples' aspirations she has heard during her campaign enter into a new phase, a phase in which she has to turn them into reality. Like male members, female MPs first of all receive an orientation about the workings of the House of Representatives. As they come from political parties, they all have their own secretariat to support them in their work, in addition to the secretariat of the House of Representatives itself. For example, in playing their role in making legislation, and in controlling and evaluating the executive programs, in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the executive's budgeting processes and expenses, and in ensuring the fulfilment of the peoples' aspirations, members of parliament need adequate data and comprehensive understanding of the problems in order to be able to carry out their tasks.

d. Quota Policy

The gender quota may be defined as "a certain number or percentage of the candidates for election or of those actually elected shall be women."⁷⁸ About 50 countries in the world have adopted gender quotas in their political system.⁷⁹ The consequences of this policy have been remarkable.⁸⁰ Though quotas are not always effective tools to achieve the stated goals, they do increase the number of female political participation in a country but only in the years after the quotas were put into practice. They do not need a country's entire trajectory.⁸¹

⁷⁸Drude Dahlerup. 2008. "Gender Quotas in Politics: Empowerment from Above or from Below? In *Women's Political Participation and Representation in Asia, Obstacles and Challenges* edited by Kazuki Iwanaga, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, p. 298.

⁷⁹Ibid, p. 298.

⁸⁰Paxton, Pamela, Melanie Hughes and Matthew Painter, "Growth in Women's Political Representation: A Longitudinal Exploration of Democracy, Electoral System and Gender Quotas," *a paper*, The Ohio State University, Columbus, pp. 1, and 10-11. http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/ducis/GlobalEquity/documents/Paxton_paper.pdf, May 25, 2008.

⁸¹Paxton et al., "Growth in Women's Political Representation," pp. 10-11; Dahlerup. 2008. "Gender Quotas in Politics: Empowerment from Above or from Below? In *Women's Political Participation and Representation..*, pp. 298-9.

Nowadays, women are still very much under-represented in national politics, with the average of only 17.4 % of women in parliaments as reported by the International Parliamentary Union in August 2007. Nevertheless, this figure reflects a significant improvement. In 1945, only 2% of world parliamentarians were women, 5% in 1970, 9% in 1990 and 11.7% in 2000.⁸² According to IPU 2006, Indonesia is situated on the 89th place of 187 countries with an average of 11.3 % of female representation, way below Rwanda with a level of female representation of 48%, South Africa with 32.8 %, Timor Leste with 25.3 % and the Philippines with 15.3%.⁸³

Past studies⁸⁴ on women's representation demonstrated that political factors such as quotas contribute to higher percentages of women representation in national legislatures.

Conclusion

Having discussed the relation between contexts, concepts, key terms and the study, the following chapter discusses further the use of kodrat in a contextualized democracy in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City.

⁸² Paxton, et al., "Growth in Women's Political Representation," p. 4.

⁸³ Ani Soetjipto 2011. *Politik Harapan: perjalanan Politik Perempuan Indonesia Pasca Reformasi*. Tangerang: Marjin Kiri, p. 86.

⁸⁴ Paxton, et al., mention some of them: Norris 1985; Rule 1987; Paxton 1997; Matland 1998; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Tripp and Kang 2007.

CHAPTER THREE

TASIKMALAYA REGENCY AND
TASIKMALAYA CITY:
*KODRAT PEREMPUAN IN A
CONTEXTUALIZED DEMOCRACY*

Introduction

Scholars like Max Weber¹, Karl A. Wittfogel², Samuel Huntington³ and Bernard Lewis⁴, are believed to have established that Islamic societies are critical of modernity and democracy because of their inequalities and their discriminative position towards gender and followers of other religions.⁵ Paul Marshall's anthology⁶ documents the appalling impact of the rise of extreme "Shari'a law on human rights, in particular on women rights and religious freedom in Muslim countries. Lewis agrees with Huntington's view on the incompatibility of Islam and democracy due to the absence of free elections in many Muslim societies. He further asserts that a democracy is "... a polity where the government can be changed by elections as opposed to one where elections are changed by the government."⁷

¹ Max Weber, 1963. *The Sociology of Religion*, transl. of vol. 2, Ch. 4 (1963) of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Basic Concepts in Sociology*, trans. by H.P. Secher (1962).

² Karl A. Wittfogel, 1957. *Oriental Despotism: A comparative Study of Total Power*. New Heaven etc.: Yale University Press.

³ Samuel Huntington P., 1996, 2002. *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: The Free Press.

⁴ Bernard Lewis, 2002. *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and the Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵ Azyumardi Azra and Wayne Hudson (eds), 2008. *Islam Beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory*. Burlington: Ashgate, p. 1.

⁶ Paul Marshall (ed.), 2005. *Radical Islam's Rules: The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari'a Law*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing inc.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, 2003, "A Historical view," in *Islam and Democracy in Middle East*, edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore and London:

However, many other scholars have refuted this contention, among them Hefner⁸, Bowen⁹, Robinson¹⁰, Muzani¹¹ and Van Doorn-Harder¹². Others whose works have been collected in *Islam Beyond Conflict* (2008), edited by Azra and Hudson, send out a similar message. They, for example, assert the importance of democracy as the operative concept of today's modern nations. However, they also note that its application should take into consideration new contexts and the establishment of the necessary pre-conditions in order for democracy and human rights to operate in a new context. In addition, quoting Stout (2004), they also suggest that the best way Western countries can encourage democracy is by exemplifying its best practice to other countries.

Even though women are in the majority demographically speaking, the present strategic plans and programs continue to pose a challenge to women's civic engagement in general and women's leadership practice in particular. The current attitude of the State agents I interviewed and who adopted a position of neutral gender policy sends out a serious warning to women and urges us to pay serious attention to the implication it has for women. The regulations in force in the place where they live, for example Tasikmalaya, necessitate them to struggle for an equal position and equal treatment. Various resources for the discourse, both old and new, such as the Basic 1945 Constitution, the quota policy, the gender mainstreaming policy, etc., contribute positively to women's leadership engagement. However, in practice, this positive current has to negotiate with the opposite current of the prevailing attitude of State agents that hampers women's social engagement. Underneath this contestation there is always a current that operates as a melting pot between these two opposite currents. That current is the perception of *kodrat perempuan*. Through the constructed perception of *kodrat*, these two opposite forces intersect. This amalgamation can make the way both easy and difficult for women to engage socially. What happens at the level of the State is that although it offers an umbrella to support women, in practice State agents themselves or the people's aspirations often take a neutral position, leaving women to fight for themselves to reach their goals in the midst of the male-dominated world.

The Johns Hopkins university Press, p. 209.

⁸ Robert W. Hefner, 1993. *Islam, State and Civil Society*. New York: SEAP Cornell University; Hefner. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, NJ (etc.): Princeton University Press; *Islam, State and Civil Society*, and *Civil Islam*, 2000.

⁹ John R. Bowen, 2003. *Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*.

¹¹ Saeful Mujani, 2003. "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *A. Dissertation*. Ohio: The Ohio State University.

¹² Pieterella van Doorn-Harder, 2006. *Women Shaping Islam: Indonesian Women Reading the Qur'an*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Previous female leadership experiences (the rule of two queens) failed to significantly inspire women to lead or the people of Tasikmalaya to entrust local leadership to a woman. Only a few precedents of female public leadership have emerged since the early modern time or the colonial era up until the present. Because of this, in terms of public leadership, women still find themselves in an unequal position.

However, even though members of the anti-democracy camp reject democracy because it is unIslamic, their practical stand is to accept the existing system, considering that it is preferable to having no system of leadership at all. The other, the accepting liberalist, reformist, and revivalist camps have a more inclusive stand towards democracy. The proponents of the liberalist camp who constitute the majority in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, contextualize the democratization process in their area. It is for this reason that religious institutions and local ethnic values that are embedded in social practices will always get along with this process. Reviving religious and local ethnic values which are compatible with democratic ones will certainly contribute to an improved democratization process. The remaining reformist and revivalist camps adopt a more narrow attitude towards women's social engagement but believe in using Islam as their measure.

In short, Tasikmalaya is a locality where women's leadership engagement is framed within existing ideas about what is good for them. Here, *kodrat perempuan* is constructed dynamically in order to ensure the continuation of the situation where women confine themselves to their ideal roles. Situated between the competition between the democratization process, where the State and civil society enter as influential agents, and the Islamization process where radical Muslims - who are not dominant - are turning over stones to interpolate Islamic teachings into the State's regulations and system of operations, it is clear that women's civic engagement faces new opportunities and challenges.

In the global context, where the compatibility of Islam and democracy is still questioned such as in the Middle Eastern countries, the Tasikmalaya case suggests that democratization could work in Muslim societies. However, some cautionary advice is needed: they ought to leave Islam and democracy open to forming a synergy.

This chapter aims at setting and framing the background of this study which is plotted in the contestation between democratization and Islamization processes. In doing so, the discussion begins with a brief exposition of the history, demography and the strategic plan of the Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City. The discussion will continue with a sub-chapter on democracy in this local context in which three themes will be elaborated upon: contextualized democracy, decentralization policy and the emergence of *Perda Shari'a* (local regulations that contain Shari'a), and the responses to democracy and *Perda Syari'a*. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn and points related to the next chapter will be laid out.

A. Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City

The basic assumption of this study is that women's status and role follow their perceived natures as well as their own and their community's and State's horizons. In other words, the nurtured *kodrat perempuan* strongly or moderately supports and restricts women's engagement, depending on the context in which women live or on their own efforts and capacity to engage.

1. History and Demography

Like other districts, Tasikmalaya's cultural capital¹³ supports and restricts women's leadership. These capitals are embedded in ideologies, norms, and traditions, and in the people's perceptions of *kodrat perempuan* that range from opposing or intersecting meanings that are supportive of women's social activities and those that restrict them.¹⁴ This flux is also reflected in Tasikmalaya's history in which dynamics of the perception of *kodrat perempuan* took the form of interaction between supportive and restrictive dimensions and thus provided women with the possibility to act as leaders but simultaneously, dominant values which were patriarchal and unequal towards women had to be maintained as reflected, for instance, in a manuscript written in 1518 known as *Sanghyang Siksakanda ng Karesian*.¹⁵ The manuscript deals with the main norms for daily life, social relations and relations with nature. The manuscript stresses neutral gender relations but emphasizes hierarchical respect: children have to behave well towards their parents, students have to respect their teachers, citizens have to obey their leaders, and wives are dutiful to their husbands.¹⁶ Batari Hyang, known as Sang Sadu Jati (Wise Woman),¹⁷ is known to have been the first queen of the Kingdom of Galunggung, Tasikmalaya, which was established in the twelfth century.

The kingdom was led by another queen, Sri Gading Anteg, in the seventeenth century after which the kingdom was moved to Sukakerta. It had its capital in Danyeuh Tengah, identified today as Salopa. In this period, Muslim

¹³ Cultural capital may be defined as "capital at play in society," and it "determines social power and social inequality". It is a concept that has several dimensions: objective knowledge of arts and culture; cultural tastes and preferences; formal qualifications (e.g. university degrees, music exams); cultural skills and know-how (e.g. the ability to play a musical instrument); the ability to be discriminatory and to make distinctions between "good" and "bad". Phillip Smith. 2001. *Cultural Theory: An Introduction*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc., p. 137.

¹⁴ Smith, 2001. *Cultural Theory*, p. 139.

¹⁵ This manuscript belongs to the Indonesian National Library in Jakarta and is registered as MSB (Manuscript Sunda B) Number Kropak 630.

¹⁶ Atja and Saleh Danasasmita, 1981. *Sanghyang Siksakanda ng Karesian: Naskah Sunda Kuno Tahun 1818 Masehi*. Bandung: Proyek Pengembangan Permuseuman Jawa Barat, p. 28.

¹⁷ *Sejarah Jawa Barat: Rintisan Penelusuran Masa Silam*. Jilid ke-3, Pemda Tk 1 Jawa Barat Tahun 1983-1984, pp. 1-3.

missionaries from Cirebon and Demak were spreading Islam. It is believed that Sunan Gunung Jati and his followers for the first time began to call people to Islam in the early sixteenth century, and the key figure who called the local people to convert to Islam in the district was Syekh Abdul Muhyi. In this phase of Tasikmalaya's history, another element was added to the construction of *kodrat perempuan*: Islam. With Islam, women's role and status came to be formulated differently. Women's role and status evolved from having been neglected before the arrival of Islam, to having been liberated in the period of the Prophet Muhammad, negotiated in the following periods but with a tendency of being restricted, and confiscated since the medieval period.¹⁸ Since the arrival of Islam in the archipelago in the thirteenth century and in particular to Tasikmalaya where the district welcomed Islamic missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the role and status of women were formulated in a spirit of providing space, opportunity and access but within the constraints of the male world and patriarchal values.¹⁹

In Indonesia in the 1950s, women became involved not only in the spheres deemed appropriate for them such as education, handicraft production, and in activities relating to health, but also in social and political movements. Saskia Wieringa claims that in spite of existing opposition, Indonesian women were active in political activities, too. She identifies Gerwani/Gerakan Wanita Indonesia as a case in point to illustrate women's efforts to fight at the political level. Compared with women's political participation in other countries, including in European countries, Indonesian women enjoyed considerable freedom in the political realm. For example, there was a Woman's Fraction in parliament.²⁰ However, the situation shifted to restricting women to their "proper" space and status in the New Order period. Since then, women's space, opportunity, and status were reformulated to support the world of men and male tradition. To illustrate what restriction towards women's civic engagement felt like up until the 1980s, including in participation in education, Wiraatmadja explains that many people were reluctant to send their daughters to school beyond elementary level. He recognized eight factors that restricted girls in participating in educational programs: "1. Education for girls was deemed unnecessary or its benefits were not seen yet; 2. It was considered not good for girls to study in the same class as boys as people did not yet accept co-education; 3. From a very early age, girls were helpful in doing household chores; 4. It was seen as contradictory to local customs (*adat*); 5. A daughter used to get married at a very young age; 6. An educated girl was believed to have difficulty in finding a husband as she would no longer want to do house

¹⁸ Leila Ahmed. 1992. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ Barbara Watson Andaya. 2006. *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 226-32; Ann Kumar. 2008. *Prajurit Perempuan Jawa: Kesaksian Ihwal Istana dan Politik Jawa Akhir Abad ke-18*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, pp. xi-xiii.

²⁰ Saskia Eleonora Wieringa. 1999. *Penghancuran Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Garda Budaya, pp. xi, xlviii, and 246.

hold tasks; 7. Though a girl might study, after that she most probably would not be easily absorbed into the work force, so her education was considered a waste; 8. An educated wife might be disrespectful of her uneducated husband; and for other similar reasons.”¹ Remnants of this way of thinking are still felt today and they are even nurtured by certain revitalized discursive resources.

Indonesian women began to get new inspiration in the 1990s as information about feminism, gender, and human rights’ movements began to circulate among Indonesians. Figures such as Fatimah Mernissi, Amina Wadud, Asghar Ali Engineer, and Mazhar Haq Khan were introduced to the Indonesian public through interpretations of their works.² The Indonesian Government established a human and women’s rights commission in addition to assigning a minister for women’s affairs. It also ratified CEDAW. In addition, NGOs and other organizations that focused on gender issues participated in this dynamism. These movements and their undertakings created new discursive resources that supported women’s social engagements and this trend has evolved up to the present day.

How has Tasikmalaya developed in the second half of the twentieth century? Until 1975, Tasikmalaya covered only one district with two administrative authorities, that of the regency and that of the administrative city.³ The city had three sub-districts/*kecamatan*s: Cipedes, Tawang and Cihideung. Now, a transformation has taken place due to the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No 1/2001 and the two administrations have now been separated for more than a decade. Both local administrations have erected their own buildings for their new offices and they are now developing their areas. Nevertheless, the new offices in the areas are still inadequate to house the civil servants the administrations employ. Some of the institutions are still situated in their former locations and Tasikmalaya City shares offices with other work units.


Tasikmalaya Regency is located in southeast West Java on the southern national road which stretches across Java. To its north are Tasikmalaya City, Ciamis Regency and Majalengka Regency; at the south is the Indian Ocean; to the west is Garut Regency; and to the east is Ciamis Regency. Administratively, Tasikmalaya Regency consisted of 1.707.297 individuals in 2008 divided into 850.842 males and 856.455 females. The on-average density of the population is 629 individuals/km². The most densely populated area is Singaparna with 3,256 individuals/km² and the least one is Panca Tengah with 214 individuals/km².⁴

¹ Rochiati Wiraatmadja, first ed. 1980, second ed. 1983. *Dewi Sartika*. Jakarta: Depdikbud, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, p. 47.

² See for example *Ulumul Qur’an* No. 5 and 6 Vol. V 1994. This special double issue dedicated about half of its 200 pages to feminism and women’s issues.

³ The division was possible due to the Law (Undang-Undang) No 5, 1974 which States that a regency can have an administrative city area. *Evaluasi Kinerja Pembangunan Pra dan Pasca Pemekaran Wilayah: Studi Kasus di Kabupaten dan Kota Tasikmalaya*. 2004. Bandung: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, p. 42.

⁴ *Tasikmalaya Regency in Figures 2008*. Tasikmalaya: BPS Tasikmalaya, Pp. 32-4.



Map of Tasikmalaya Regency, and City

To date, the perception of *kodrat perempuan* in Tasikmalaya Regency is contested. Although the number of male and female citizens in both districts is about the same, the existing vital discourse resources of religious, social and educational institutions, as well as local directives, reveal that the construction of *kodrat perempuan* as a code of conduct is implemented in different ways ranging from the most supporting to the most restricting agents. In this contestation, *kodrat perempuan* is perceived as a point of reference as well as a benchmark of the “new moral order”, as Suzanne Brenner calls it,²¹ where a woman is supported or restricted. It is a term of reference because it has always been treated as such. It is a new moral order because the elites of the State and the general public tend to interpolate religious and local values into existing positive law. This tendency will be discussed in another part of this chapter. *Kodrat perempuan* is used in different currents. Borrowing Bourdieu’s view, by using the term, certain elite groups in Tasikmalaya formulate what is acceptable and what is not.²² The way they do so is by promoting “higher culture” such as religious teachings and local norms and measuring popular ones. A case in point is the dress code. Before the advent of the Reformasi era, wearing a *jilbab* (head covering) was simply seen as a religious and private matter, while at present it is also treated as a matter of the State. Consequently, wearing a *jilbab* suddenly came to be seen as an indicator of a woman’s properness in the public sphere.

²¹ Suzanne Brenner, 2011. “Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratization, Islam and Gender in Indonesia,” in *American Anthropologist: Journal of the American Anthropological Association*. Vol. 113. Number 3 September 2011, p. 479.

²² Smith, 2001. *Cultural Theory*, p.138.

The following sub-chapter deals with the local State strategic plan to discuss further how the State perceives *kodrat perempuan* and influences its stand on women's role and status.

2. Strategic Plan: *Vision and Mission*

a. Strategic Plan

Tasikmalaya City adopted its strategic plan from local regulation, Law No 2/2003 on *Rencana Strategis City Tasikmalaya Tahun 2002-2007* (Tasikmalaya City's Strategic Plan 2002-2007) and 2007-2012 and its RPJM 2007-2012 (Medium-Range Development Plan 2007-2012).²³ Like Tasikmalaya Regency's vision and mission, the local government formulated Tasikmalaya City's vision and mission in relation to the national as well as to West Java's vision and mission.

b. Vision

The vision of Tasikmalaya Regency of 2010 is that "Tasikmalaya, the religious/Islamic regency, is the regency that is advanced, prosperous, and competitive in *agribusiness* in West Java". This vision is a continuation of the previous one, from 2001-2005. Local Law No 13/2003 was passed to continue the existing vision because it was still valid. In West Java's vision, the designation "religious/Islamic" is actually phrased as *īmān* (faith) and *taqwā* (piety).²⁴ In Tasikmalaya, the terms "religious" and "Islamic" are differentiated; "religious" refers to the basic quality of religious piety towards Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (God, the One) in daily life. This means that 'religious' is meant for all citizens regardless of their particular faith. "Islamic", on the other hand, refers to the fact that in 2005, 99.9% of its population were Muslims. It is therefore that Islam influences communities' values and cultures. The communities in Sukapura²⁵ converted to Islam in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Syekh Abdul Muhyi, a religious teacher from East Java, is considered to have made a great contribution to this conversion process. He was connected with national and even international figures such as Syekh Abdul Rauf al-Singkel and Syekh Yusuf al-Makasari. They shared the spirit of opposition against the Dutch. This is a token of Tasikmalaya's

²³ <http://kota-tasikmalaya-resik.blogspot.com/#visi>, accessed Nov. 3, 2009; Bapeda Tasikmalaya Kota. 2003. *Kota Tasikmalaya: Buku Potensi Ekonomi Kota Tasikmalaya*.

²⁴ West Java Law No 1/2003, "Jawa Barat dengan Iman dan Taqwa sebagai Provinsi Termaju di Indonesia dan Mitra Terdepan *Ibu Kota Negara Tahun 2010*" (West Java with Faith and Piety Becomes the Most Progressive Province in Indonesia and the Front line Partner of the State Capital City in 2010).

²⁵ Sukapura was the district's name before it was changed into Tasikmalaya in 1913 under the leadership of Tumenggung Wiratanubaya who administered the region from 1844 to 1855. Iip D. Yahya. 2006, *Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi KH. Moh. Ilyas Rubiat*. Yogyakarta: LKiS Pelangi Aksara, p. 14.

contribution to the national struggle against colonial power. It means that Islam and Muslims are supposed to continue their contribution to national development.²⁶

Supported by religious understandings and local cultural values, Tasikmalaya Regency is most likely to link its development to the Regency’s religious and cultural precepts. Other key words, such as “advance”, “prosperity”, “competitiveness” and “agribusiness” are supported by its motto, *Sukapura Ngadaun Ngora, Makarya Mawa Raharja* and *Sabanda Sariksa* (Sukapura [Tasikmalaya] excels, works hard to gain welfare and has a strong sense of belonging towards the region).²⁷ These values are embedded in the key terms which are summarized in the meaning of “welfare” and “agribusiness”. Welfare is also derived from the GBHN 1999-2004 (Garis Besar Haluan Negara/Broad Outlines of the Course of the Nation) which has welfare as one of its key visions. This means that the local government’s vision is coupled to the central government’s vision. Agribusiness is seen as the road to prosperity and social welfare. Its potency is going to develop further. The local government sees the relations between the three key terms as a Virtuous Triangle, drawn as follows:




Diagram 1. the relations between the three key terms as a Virtuous Triangle

(Source: RPJM Regency Tasikmalaya 2006-2010: V-3-6)

This Virtuous Triangle is measured by the figure in the Human Development Report/HDR (weak: 0-49; middle: 50-79; and high: 80 and above). The local government modified it based on the HDR average in West Java and divided it into only two categories: high: > 65 and middle: <65. Using these measurements, the local government projected an HDR increase to 72 and adopted it as the targeted indicator in its competition with the developed districts in West Java in 2010. On the other hand, in actualizing the local government’s vision, agribusiness has become the priority. The formulators argued that in 2004, 36.72% of its annual revenue derived from the agribusiness sector. The fact that about 41.13% of the population work in this sector supported this point.²⁸

It seems that the vision has a neutral position with regards to women. The national government’s vision uses the term *justice*, and in its mission the RPJM

²⁶ RPJM Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2006-2010: pp. V-3 - V-6.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. V-1.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. V-5-6.

translated the term into human rights and equality, and paid only little attention to gender issues.²⁹ For example, Tasikmalaya regency delegated only some activities to introduce gender awareness to village heads. The local government does not yet have any plan to organize the same activity for its people.

Tasikmalaya City's vision was written after the national and provincial visions had been studied. Tasikmalaya City's vision is laid out in its long term development and strategic plan. In the *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang/RPJP* (Long Term Development Plan) of Tasikmalaya City for the 2005-2025 period, its vision is that “*Dengan iman dan taqwa, Tasikmalaya Kota sebagai Pusat Perdagangan dan Industri Termaju di Jawa Barat*” (With faith and piety, Tasikmalaya City is to become the foremost Trade and Industry Centre in West Java) (Local Law No 9/2008). The long term plan is broken down into five strategic plans. In its strategic plan for the period 2007-2012, this target was localized only in the region of East Priangan---the eastern part of West Java. Its vision was, “*Dengan berlandaskan Iman dan Taqwa, Tasikmalaya Kota menjadi Pusat Perdagangan dan Industri Termaju di Priangan Timur Tahun 2012* (With Faith and Piety, Tasikmalaya City has become the foremost Center for Trade and Industry in East Priangan in 2012),³⁰ and its motto, RESIK, stems from *Rukun/Ramah Endah Sehat Iman & Taqwa Kerta Raharja* (Peaceful/Polite, Beautiful, Faithful & Pious and Prosperous). Like the vision of Tasikmalaya Regency, Tasikmalaya City's vision is also linked to the vision of the central government and that of West Java. Like Tasikmalaya Regency, the City seems to adopt a neutral policy towards gender equality in line with the ideology of the State and religion that contextualizes gender equality into the nation's ideology and in Sundanese³¹ and religious values. Although the State ideology as represented in its constitution treats men and women equally, the State still treats them in accordance with national and religious traditions. In the New Order era, the State maintained its State *ibuism* position (the wife as supporting agent of her family), and in the Reformasi era adopted the ideology of the wife as³² partner in the family.

In the past, gender relations among the Sundanese were neutral but a hierarchical respect is still maintained today. Sundanese values center on harmony, similar as the State ideology. In addition, Islam is seen to be in accordance with this value. It provides women with the space and the opportunity to participate

²⁹ Ibid, pp. V-2 -4-5, VI- dan 71-2.

³⁰ <http://kota-tasikmalaya-resik.blogspot.com/#visi>. nov 3, 2009; **Bapeda Tasikmalaya Kota. 2003. Kota Tasikmalaya: Buku Potensi Ekonomi Kota Tasikmalaya.**

³¹ *Sundanese* is derived from the word *Sunda*, meaning clean, beautiful and good. The adjective is Sundanese, referring to the name of the place, kingdom, and ethnic group. Elis Suryani NS. 2008. *Merumat Warisan Karuhun Orang Sunda Yang Terpendam dalam Naskah dan Prasastri*. Tasikmalaya: Alqa, p. 244. The Sundanese people now mostly live in the provinces of West Java and Banten.

³² Julia Suryakusuma. 1987. “State *Ibuisim*: The Social Construction of Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order”. *M.A. Thesis*. The Hague, 1996. “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia,” pp. 92-119.

in social activities, but within their constructed *kodrat*. In short, while both the vision of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City provide women the space and opportunity as men, it is mostly applied within the constraints of the *kodrat perempuan* construction.

c. Mission

As its vision, the missions of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City are formulated in line with the national and provincial missions. While the national mission literally mentions the terms *adil* (justice) and *demokratis* (democratic) and the West Javanese mission mentions *politik* (politics), *hukum* (Law) and *HAM* (Human Rights),³³ the mission statements of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City do not cite any terms pertaining to gender issues. It seems that both the Regency and the City take their mission to be gender neutral.³⁴ Tasikmalaya Regency pays limited attention to gender issues in the articles on civic engagement where women are encouraged to participate in social activities, and at the same time are expected to support the construction of a *keluarga sakinah* or 'happy family'.³⁵ Tasikmalaya City's government does not specifically mention the gender empowerment aspect in the objective of its RPJP (Long Term Development Plan) which only mentions key terms such as democracy, transparency, participation, social justice, accountability, freedom, human rights and law supremacy.³⁶

The visions and missions described above are measured by the matrix of the program development plan priority indicators. In the case of Tasikmalaya Regency, the government formulated ten indicators.³⁷ The gender issue is related to only two indicators: social and women's and children's empowerment. The policy of social empowerment is designed to protect the public and it is translated into institutional capacity building in societies on the village level, in village resource development, simple technology application and gender mainstreaming. However, the gender mainstreaming aspect is not seen in its programs, outcomes or activities. What the government has formulated are activities for societies in general such as developing clean water facilities and offering mini grants to the poor. In the women and children's empowerment category, the local government adopts

³³ *RPJM Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2006-2010*, pp. V-15-6.

³⁴ *Ibid*, pp. V-1 or V-19; and **Bapeda Tasikmalaya Kota. 2003. Kota Tasikmalaya: Buku Potensi Ekonomi Kota Tasikmalaya. However**, in the following source, the mission on mentioned 6 point, minus no. 4. <http://kota-tasikmalaya-resik.blogspot.com/#visi> . November 3, 2009.

³⁵ *RPJM Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2006-2010*, pp. V-20-7 and 37-43.

³⁶ *RPJP Tasikmalaya Kota 2005-2025*, pp. 3 and 42-5.

³⁷ The ten indicators are general service, law and order, economy, environment, housing and general facilities/infrastructure, health, tourism and culture, religion, education, and social protection and women empowerment. *RPJM Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2006-2010*, VI-2-70).

two policies: improving women's participation in the political process and in strategic public positions and improving social services and basic social aid. The first policy translates this point into a gender and child mainstreaming body to advocate for women and children and protect them from violence. This policy's indicators of outcomes and activities include socialization, coordination meetings, advocacy and providing facilities to victims.³⁸

To support gender mainstreaming programs, the local government included a sub-division of the gender mainstreaming program in the social welfare division at the municipality and its related State bodies such as at the office of the local police for female and infant victims of violence. During my fieldwork I found that the local government and the police have been cooperating with NGOs such as Puan Amal Hayati, Tasikmalaya Branch in attending to social problems.

In short, though Tasikmalaya twice had female leaders before the colonial era, local leadership in the region has belonged to men since early modern times up to the present. From the discussion above we see that both Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City in general adopt a neutral gender policy. Women's civic engagement is basically as open and free as that of men, but in practice, including through its vision, mission, and programs, the local government mainstreams women's social engagements only minimally.

B. Democratization and Islamization: *the Contemporary Context*

1. Contextualized Democracy

The State's discursive practice in Indonesia since its proclamation of independence has always been that of a contextualized democracy.³⁹ Since independence in 1945, Indonesia has adopted contextualized democratic political systems which varied from time to time, beginning with guided democracy a few years after independence, followed by the implementation of liberal democracy in the 1950s, *Pancasila* democracy during the New Order and back in 2004 to liberal democracy in the present Reformasi era with new practices and a one man-one vote system for the election of the president and vice president, governor and vice governor, head of regency or major and vice head of regency and vice major. The present transformation enters a new phase in the democratization movement where gender equality, human rights, and democracy are endorsed with a greater spirit of equality and justice.

Meanwhile, the Islamic movement, supported by the fact that Muslims make up the majority of the Indonesian population (85% of its citizens),⁴⁰ also

³⁸ *RPJM Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2006-2010*, pp. VI-69-70 and 71-2.

³⁹ When the term "democracy" refers to a system of politics, a certain adaptation is inevitably applied to it in order for it to operate in a new context. I designate this adaptation 'contextualized democracy'.

⁴⁰ There are about 237.641.000 Muslims. Rusman Heriawan. 2011. *Perkembangan Beberapa Indikator Utama Sosial-Ekonomi Indonesia*. Jakarta: BPS, p. 11.

responded to this new democratization process through various windows of expression, one being through the use of the perception of *kodrat perempuan*. The term has become the site of contestation, grounded in secular, ethnic as well as religious ideological stands. With regard to the Islamic movement, the majority of Muslims, whether belonging to liberal or conservative Islam, believe in democracy as the key in the future development of Indonesia. According to Suzanne Brenner, this transformation resulted in “conservative gender-morality politics.” She explains that there is a strong current to establish a “moral ascendancy over the perceived immorality of the previous regime and with building a new moral order as the foundation of a democratic nation.”⁴¹ This movement adheres to at least three points: (1) “the adoption of Islamic law (Shari’a) and behavioral codes, particularly concerning women’s dress and movement in public; (2) to place new restrictions on materials and actions broadly deemed ‘pornographic’ and (3) to stop the government’s interference in family matters such as polygamous marriages and various forms of domestic abuse, which many conservative Muslims believe should be governed by Islam, rather than the State.”⁴²

In these democratization and Islamization processes, each group constructs *kodrat perempuan* to formulate new roles, status, and opportunities for women’s movement in public. The two movements sometimes run in the same direction to support women’s leadership while at other times they have different opinions with regard to supporting or restricting women’s leadership. To discuss this topic further, the following sub-chapters will deal with decentralization and the adoption of Islamic law and the public’s response to democracy in terms of constructed *kodrat perempuan*.

2. Decentralization and the Adoption of Islamic Law

As explained in the previous chapter, decentralization (Law No. 22/1999) is the delegation of authority and power to the regional authorities, aiming at promoting the democratization process, strengthening civil society, and encouraging community participation. The central government remains in authority mainly in the areas of the judiciary, security and defense, foreign policy, and monetary and religious affairs. Meanwhile, the provinces, regencies and cities are given the authority to administer all other State activities.

One consequence of the adoption of the decentralization policy was the emergence of *Perda Syari’a*. Like local regulations on tax and retribution, the emergence of *Perda Syari’a* is perceived as “problematic” because in practice these regulations are seen as discriminatory particularly towards women and minorities. Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia/KPI (Indonesia’s Women Coalition) noted that there were 106 and according to *Komnas Perempuan* even as many as 154 *Perda*

⁴¹ Suzanne Brenner, 2011, “Private Moralities in Public Sphere”, pp. 478-9.

⁴² Ibid, p. 479.

Syari'a which were seen as discriminatory towards women.⁴³ Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City issued local government letters, announcements, encouragements, and instructions, as well as a local law with religious nuances. Since the Reformasi era up to 2011, Tasikmalaya Regency has produced more than 176 regulations,⁴⁴ and a number of them are related to *Perda Syari'a*. Although in the first decade of its existence up until November 2008 Tasikmalaya City produced 92 local regulations, the city has only a few regulations, instructions, and announcements related to *Perda Syari'a*.

The draft of the implementation of various Shari'a regulations was sent to Tasikmalaya City on March 3, 2009. The local parliament reviewed the proposal and adapted it to local circumstances. The draft was proposed by the Presidium Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari'at Islam/PKPPS (Presidium of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of the Shari'a) in Tasikmalaya City. It consists of six drafts: *Islamic Syari'a* Implementation; the relations between the job descriptions of members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama/MPU (Consultative Assembly of *Ulama*) and executive and legislative bodies and other institutions; Islamic Syari'a Courts; the implementation of Islamic Shari'a Courts on *aqida* (theology), *'ibāda* (worships) and *shi'ār al-Islām* (Islamic glorification), *khamr* (alcoholic drinks) and the like; *maysir* (gambling); and *khalwat* (adult males and females who are not married to each other, relatives or *muhrim* being together in a remote place for obscene purposes). The local parliament ratified and passed the draft as Law No 12, 2009 entitled *Pembangunan Tata Nilai Kehidupan Kemasyarakatan yang Berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama Islam dan Masyarakat Kota Tasikmalaya* (Development of a Value System for Communal Living Based on Islamic Teachings and the Social Norms of Tasikmalaya Society).

Historically speaking, the status of women in the archipelago or Southeast Asian countries in general has been relatively equal to that of men. Their subordination is a later development.⁴⁵ Up to the early colonial era, women's civic engagement was constructed culturally, influenced by local rulers and values that situated women differently all over the archipelago. With the increase of Dutch power in the second half of the nineteenth century, a general notion of women's civic engagement came up and they were increasingly subordinated to the home as an effect of the Dutch policy to both modernize the public sphere, where the Western legal system was interpolated formally in 1917, as well as to maintain in power in the archipelago. Before this, there was a situation of an irregular implementation of *Syari'a* regulations in parts of southeast Asia as early as the seven-

⁴³ R. Siti Zuhro and Eko Prasoj, 2010. *Kisruh Peraturan Daerah: Mengurai Masalah & Solusinya*. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak and the Habibie Center, pp. viii and 5.

⁴⁴ This calculation originates from regulations produced between 1999 and 2001 which were gender insensitive.

⁴⁵ Barbara Watson Andaya, 2006. *The Flaming Womb*, p. 226.

teenth century.⁴⁶ The indigenous people peacefully embraced Islam.⁴⁷ It continued to evolve culturally and Muslims practiced Islam's religious teachings in their daily lives. Partial implementation of the Shari'a was organized by the ruler and religious figures as early as the 17th century, such as the enforcement of criminal law in Banten and marriage law in Aceh.

In the Old Order period, women's civic engagement, though still within the Western legal system the government used as *ius constitutum*, enjoyed considerable space and women had the opportunity to be involved in social and political life. In the New Order era, women's civic engagement continued within the Western legal system, but a more contextualized effort was made to build a *Pancasila* model of women's civic engagement where the State *ibuisism* ideology played a significant role.⁴⁸

From the start of the Reformasi in 1998 to the present, female civic engagement has enjoyed a space and opportunities to some extent similar to those which women experienced in the era before the Dutch introduced the Western legal system before 1800, and during the Old Order when women enjoyed social and political participation. However, having directed social construction in the New Order era for over 32 years and with the concurrent emergence of local initiatives with the new autonomy policy, women's civic engagement continues to be interpreted within the confines of the contested *kodrat perempuan*. According to Law No 14/1970, the Indonesian legal system consists of four courts: civil court, religious court, military court and administrative court. As a consequence of the government's granting of special autonomy to Aceh Province through Law No 18/2001 and after the president ratified it by Presidential Decree No 11/2003, another court system should be added to the existing system, i.e. Shari'a court. This Shari'a Court is an adapted version of the region's earlier Religious Courts (*Pengadilan Agama*) which were part of the Indonesian national legal system rather than of a regional one. In terms of Religious Judicature Law 1989, the *Mahkamah Syari'a* which was established in Aceh during early Indonesian independence, was transformed into *Pengadilan Agama* (Religious Courts)

⁴⁶Mark E. Cammack. 2007 "The Indonesian Islamic Judiciary" in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds) *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*. Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, p. 147.

⁴⁷Earlier information about the arrival of Islam in Nusantara tells that it was as early as the 7th century, but this information is restricted to the existence of small colonies of Muslim traders coming either from China or Gujarat, India. On the other hand, it is believed that in the 13th century Muslim communities or even kingdoms were founded in the area. Azyumardi Azra, 1994. *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII-XVIII*. Bandung: Mizan; Badri Yatim, 1997. *Sejarah Peradaban Islam*. Jakarta: Rajawali Press; Kusmana. 2000. "Al-Tijârah wa al-da'wah al-Islâmiyyah : dirâsh li Qadiyyati dukhûl al-Islâm fi Indûnisiyyâ," *Studia Islamika : Indonesian journal for Islamic studies*. vol. 7 (2000), issue 3, pp. 111-139.

⁴⁸Julia Suryakusuma, (1988) 2011. *State Ibuism*, pp. 8-10.

through Law No 7/1989, which mainly deals with marriages, divorces and inheritance issues.⁴⁹

The emergence of Perda Syari'a was probably prompted by the adoption of the decentralization or district autonomy Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999 and its amended regulation Law 32, 2004. These laws decide the scope of the local authority and the principles to be adopted in formulating local regulations. The advent of the Perda Syari'a trend was probably also triggered by the central government's granting of Aceh's autonomy and its permission for them to implement the Shari'a.⁵⁰ In addition, the spirit is also supported by the historical precedence of the inclusion of Islam as the philosophical fundament of the State in the Jakarta Charter and in the *Dar Islam* movement in Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java and other Muslim political movements that spring up from time to time.⁵¹ This reasoning is also supported by the assertion that by using democracy, the proponents of Perda Syari'a use a legal political mechanism to express their aspiration. They fight for its implementation as far as the Perda Syari'a do not violate higher positive law (*Undang-Undang*) and they receive public agreement. However, Arskal Salim criticizes these proponents for being discriminative. He argues that democracy is not the same as the majority and that each citizen has the same rights.⁵² It is also believed that this emergence is a political drive rather than a religious one. It is of little interest to elite politicians. It is used for image building for elite politicians as well as an effort to gain the sympathy of Muslim voters.⁵³ To some extent, Law 22/1999 and Law 32/2004 may drive this tendency as they provide the authority to regulate the management and administration of the district autonomously in social matters and in keeping social order. Komnas *Perempuan*, further, explains that Law 32/2004 on local government was revised. It now allows for the direct election of the *bupati* (regency head) and mayors. This is why the number of PERDA/Peraturan Daerah (local regulation) increased significantly from 2003 to 2005.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Moch. Nur Ichwan, 2007. "The Politics of Shariatization: Central Governmental and Regional Discourses of Shari'a Implementation in Aceh." in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds) *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*. Cambridge: Islamic legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, pp. 193-4.

⁵⁰ This granting refers to Law 44/1999 on the Special Status of the Province of Aceh giving it the means to govern its religious, cultural and educational life, and pursuant to Law 18/2001, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, with 'a more extensive form of self-government and a larger share of the profits from its natural resources.' Nur Ichwan, 2007, pp. 197-203; Tim Lindsey and M.B. Hooker with Ross Clarke and Jeremy Kingsley, 2007. "Shari'a Revival in Aceh," in R. Michael Feener Mark E. Cammack *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia Ideas and Institutions*, Cambridge: Islamic legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, pp. 219-20.

⁵¹ Arskal Salim, "Perda Syari'a Berbasis Agama dan Perlindungan Konstitusional Penegakkan HAM," in *Jurnal Perempuan* No. 60 September 2008, p. 8.

⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 13-4.

⁵³ *Ibid*, pp. 15.

⁵⁴ Komnas *Perempuan*. 2009, pp. 15-6.

Perda Syari'a basically deal with regulations about public order. Its emergence is ideological and also meets the aspirations of various Muslims.⁵⁵ The Shari'a is understood as the sum of the Islamic injunctions which were revealed to the Prophet and which were recorded in the Qur'an and which are quoted from the Prophet's divinely guided lifestyle (*Sunna*). In this sense, the Shari'a is divine because it is derived from something divine and eternal.⁵⁶ The Shari'a should not be equated with *fiqh*. Lubis explains that there are three differences between the Shari'a and *fiqh*: 1. Shari'a is the body of revealed law found in the Qur'an and in the Sunna, while *fiqh* is a body of laws deduced from the Shari'a to cover specific situations not directly touched on in Shari'a law; 2. Shari'a is fixed and unchangeable, whereas *fiqh* changes according to the circumstances under which it is applied; and 3. The laws of the Shari'a are for the most part general. They lay down basic principles. By contrast, *fiqh* laws tend to be specific and demonstrate how the basic principles of Shari'a should be applied in given circumstances.⁵⁷ He furthermore asserts that "Indonesian Muslims did not inherit anything like fully theorized political and legal principles, let alone an explicit Islamic constitutionalism. Instead, constitutionalism was a doctrine they came round to in stages as a result of gradual accommodations of Islamic insight and Western political and legal thought."⁵⁸ The collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998 ushered in further hopes for the implementation of Islamic values and the application of the Shari'a in Indonesia.⁵⁹ However, he is not sure about this trend because "as time passed it became clear that political Islam was not the choice of the Indonesian people at large."⁶⁰

The adoption of the decentralization policy aimed initially at boosting development and empowerment in local areas as the leader is closer to the people there. In practice it has positive impacts, as Komnas *Perempuan* (National Commission on Violence Against Women) has shown by identifying non-discriminative regulations with regards to women. There are about 40 regulations in 14 categories: citizenship, life, self-capacity development, freedom of thought and election, information, work and good living, ownership and housing, health care and a healthy environment, marriage/family, law and justice, free from threat, discrimination and violence, protection, fight for rights, and governance.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Nur Ichwan, 2007. "The Politics of Shariatization...", pp. 193-4; Lindsey. 2007. "Shari'a Revival in Aceh...", pp. 219-20; Salim. 2008. "Perda Syari'a Berbasis Agama dan Perlindungan Konstitusional Penegakkan HAM," in *Jurnal Perempuan*, p. 10.

⁵⁶ N.A. Fadhil Lubis, 2008. "Islamic Perspectives on the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism," in *Jurnal Perempuan* No. 60 September, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 13.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 13-4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 14.

⁶¹ Komnas *Perempuan*, 2009. "Atas Nama Otonomi Daerah: Pelembagaan Diskriminasi dalam Tatanan Negara-Bangsa Indonesia," in *Laporan Pemantauan Komnas Perempuan di 16 Kabupaten/Kota pada 7 Provinsi*, pp. 4-5.

However, the adoption has also resulted in unexpected outcomes; it has not always been as expected because it could not guarantee its implementation to direct change as planned.⁶² Komnas *Perempuan* identified that between 1999 and early 2009 there were 154 regional regulations. About two-thirds of them, or 80 local regulations, were produced between 2003 and 2005. They consisted of 19 regulations at the provincial level, 134 regulations in regencies or cities and 1 policy in a sub-district. All regulations or policies were issued from 69 regencies/cities within 21 provinces. Komnas *Perempuan* found that 64 out of 154 regulations may be considered directly discriminative, consisting of 21 regulations pertaining to dress code/control over the body, 38 regulations of criminalization on women (37 on prostitution and 1 on *khalwat/improper behavior*), 4 regulations on migrant workers and 9 regulations against the Ahmadiyah. The rest was indirectly discriminative towards women and included 82 regulations on religious life/worship.⁶³ The provinces that have been adopting supposedly discriminative regulations, according to Komnas *Perempuan*, are West Java with 35 policies, West Sumatra with 26, South Kalimantan with 17, South Sulawesi with 16, Nusa Tenggara Barat with 13, and East Java with 11. In terms of discrimination against women pertaining to freedom of speech, West Sumatra was identified to have issued 8 policies, West Java 5 policies and South Sulawesi 3 policies.

In terms of gender issues, West Java is estimated to be the province that most frequently produced discriminative policies towards women with 8 such policies, followed by East Java with 7 and West Sumatra with 6 policies.⁶⁴ West Java, the province with a land mass of 55,000 km², is one of the most densely populated provinces in Indonesia with about forty million people. The majority of its citizens, 97.3%, are Muslim.⁶⁵ The ethnic majority is Sundanese. They are known to be an Islamic community. In history, together with Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and South Sulawesi, West Java is known as a province where the DI/TII (Dar al-Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) movement took place.⁶⁶ Perda Syari'a in West Java often occur not in Bandung, the capital of the province, but in regencies and cities such as Cianjur, Garut, Indramayu, Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, Ciamis, and included Banten before it was transformed into a province of its own.⁶⁷

With regard to the emergence of Perda Syari'a and its relation to women's civic engagement, in both Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City some regulations have been passed which potentially affect citizen's rights. The first Perda

⁶² Ibid, p. 1.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 13.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 13-4.

⁶⁵ Litbang Kompas, 2004. *Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum 1999-2004*. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, p.224.

⁶⁶ Nashir, 2007. *Gerakan Islam Syariat*: p. 283; Cees van Dijk 1981; Karl D. Jackson.1990.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 354.

Syari'a materialized in 2000 when a number of Muslim organizations, including *pesantren* student associations, affiliated with the Forum Bersama Pemuda Islam/FBPI (Muslim Youth Forum) emphasized the importance of Islamic values in society and proposed it to the local government. The local government responded to the initiative and since then it has been a local concern.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the city municipality as mentioned earlier has produced Perda Syari'a No. 12, 2009 on *Pembangunan Tata Nilai Kehidupan Kemasyarakatan yang berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama Islam dan Norma-norma Sosial Masyarakat City Tasikmalaya* (Development of a Value System for Communal Living Based on Islamic Teachings and the Social Norms of Tasikmalaya Society), locally known as *Perda Tata Nilai* (Local Government's Values Governance).

3. Response to Democracy and Perda Syari'a

The Muslim intellectuals I interviewed in Tasikmalaya generally measure the relations between Islam and democracy from religious perspectives. Most of them confirm Azra's and Hudson's affirmation of the compatibility of Islam with modernity. Only some of them saw things differently, and their attitude towards the existing system was one of non-violence. They accepted democracy, and placed it and Islam in a mutually sharing relation; however they still eye the concept of democracy with keen suspicion.

Generally, Muslim intellectuals in Tasikmalaya think that in public life, Muslim women have the same rights, opportunities and access as men have. In terms of Islam, they refer to human efforts and piety towards God as the fundamental measurement of their status,⁶⁹ as suggested by Dudung A. Kasah, the former head of the MUI (Majlis Ulama Indonesia/Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars) branch in Tasikmalaya City.⁷⁰ However, when it comes to functions and tasks in private and public life, respondents see things differently. Some relate rights to obligations, saying that rights and obligations should be fairly apportioned, as Asep Mausael, head of Pesantren Miftah al-Huda, Tasikmalaya Regency asserted.⁷¹ They rationalize, for example, that the reason for the natural attribution of leadership to the husband is because he has the obligation of being the breadwinner, besides that of nurturing the family. They see natural justice in this 'job description'. Some religious leaders, educators in *pesantren*, activists and civil servants hold this view, such as Miftah Fauzi, a local preacher and member of the

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 372.

⁶⁹ "O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other)). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)." (the *Qur'an*, *Al-Hujurat* 49: 13).

⁷⁰ Interview with Dudung A. Kasah, Tasikmalaya *City*, February 10, 2009.

⁷¹ Interview with Asep Mausael, Tasikmalaya *Regency*, October 14, 2008. When he was interviewed he was not elected to be a member of DPR RI yet.

Ajengan Bendo group⁷² and Lia Srimulyani, a local activist.⁷³ Kathryn Robinson also makes this point in her study.⁷⁴

Other people embrace a more flexible view, seeing the relative roles and responsibilities of men and women as dependent on the situation. Raising a family, for example, is not a simple matter, and requires complex interdependencies. Thus when a husband is sick or when a woman is considered more capable of handling things than her husband, she is entitled to represent her family. They ground their argument in the fact that men are not innately superior to women, or vice versa. Among them who use this reasoning are Djudju Djubaedah (a *madrasah* teacher)⁷⁵, Lia Srimulyani⁷⁶ and Noneng Masithoh, a lecturer at Siliwangi University.⁷⁷

A limited number of people in Tasikmalaya criticize democracy because it is unIslamic. They are largely confined to, for example, members of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah which adheres to the Salafi political ideology, or to the Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia/LDII (Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Institution),⁷⁸ or to Hijbut Tahrir/HT (Party of Liberation).⁷⁹ The Salafi political ideology rejects the current political system, although its followers concede that it is better than hav-

⁷² Interview with Miftah Fauzi, Tasikmalaya *City*, February 11, 2009.

⁷³ Interview with Lia Srimulyani, Tasikmalaya *Regency*, November 24, 2008.

⁷⁴ Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 68-88.

⁷⁵ Interview with Djudju Djubaedah, Tasikmalaya *Regency*, September 1, 2008.

⁷⁶ Interview with Lia Srimulyani, Tasikmalaya *Regency*, November 24, 2008.

⁷⁷ Interview with Moneng Masithoh, Tasikmalaya *City*, November 21, 2008.

⁷⁸ LDII actually does not confront the prevailing political system. It first came up as Yayasan Karyawan Islam (YAKARI), established on January 3, 1972 in Surabaya, and was changed into Lemkari in its *Musyawarah Besar* (Big Conference) in 1981, and then changed again in 1990 into the present name because the acronym resembled that of Lembaga Karate-Do Indonesia (Indonesian Institute for KarateDo), as suggested by General Rudini, the Internal Affairs Minister at that time. (<http://www.ldii.or.id/content/view/39/26/lang.id/August 19, 2009>) However, the organization has been criticized for having associated with Islam Jama'ah or Darul Hadits established in 1952 by Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis. Having been affiliated with Golkar in the past, LDII shifted its political stand to a neutral position in 2005. LDII also reaffirmed its neutral stand and open attitude towards others in 2007 in response to MUI's Fatwa No 3, 2006 on religious life in Indonesia. Habib Setiawan, Robi Nurhadi and Muhammad Muchson Anasy, 2008. *After New Paradigm: Catatan Para Ulama tentang LDII*. Pusat Studi Islam, Madinah Institute.

⁷⁹ HTI is the Indonesian branch of transnational HT. HT's main goal is the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. It is active in over 43 countries in the world. HTI is one of the largest members of the HT in the Muslim world. Sheikh Taqiuddin Nabhani, the founder, proposed a universalist Islam stand in response to the problems of the Muslim world. In contrast to Western political concepts, he advocated the caliphate and a single *ummah* instead. Many observers believe that this idea is "fundamentally at odds with the goals of the nation-State." Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Nawab, "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Reviving the *Khilafah* in the Nusantara (Malay World)", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DI-

ing no system at all and having to live in a power vacuum. Although we cannot understand the Salafi movement without looking at its history, it has little connection with the *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia* (DDII - Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching),⁸⁰ the *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI - Community of Islam)⁸¹ and the *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI - The Council of Jihad Fighters).⁸² Politically, while some of them dream of establishing an Islamic State,⁸³ the majority do not share that dream. Along with other current Muslim figures and organizations they support the idea of incorporating the Shari'a into local government regulations. However, the Salafis make no effort to formally encourage proposals for Perda Syari'a or to impose the Shari'a through local government regulations.

All of these responses can be grouped, as explained in the previous chapter, into two camps: one that accepts democracy and the other that is anti-democracy. The first camp consists of three groups: liberalist, reformist, and revivalist camps. The other constitutes one single group. As mentioned above, and in the previous chapter, Muslims' response to democracy in relation to the construction of *kodrat perempuan* is commonly supportive towards women's civic engagement. The dif-

VIDES, Hilton San Francisco, 2008. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253842_index.html, accessed August 19, 2009.

⁸⁰ DDII was established in 1967 by a number of Muslim leaders on the initiative of Mohammad Natsir, the former head of the Masyumi Party (Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia) and former Indonesian Prime Minister. Among other important figures were Prawoto Mangkusaswito, Burhanuddin Harahap (former Prime Minister RI), Syafrudin Prawiranegara (former tentative President RI and Governor of BI), Mohammad Rasjidi (First Minister of Religious Affairs), Mohammad Roem (former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs RI), K.H. Hasan Basri (former head of the MUI), K.H. Faqih Usman (former Minister of Religious Affairs RI), K.H.M. Yunan Nasution, K.H. Taufiqurrahman, H.M.D.Dt. Palimo Kayo, Osman Raliby, Anwar Harjono, K.H.M. Rusyad Nurdin, H.A. Malik Ahmad, etc.

⁸¹ JI or Darul Hadits was established in 1952 by Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis. At the same time Pondok Pesantren Burengan Kediri was also founded. In 1963 the leadership of Pesantren Burengan was handed down to Nurhasym and Lubis who were still active there. It is believed that since then a number of practices are considered to have derailed from mainstream Islam. Through the Mahkamah Agung/MA (Supreme Court) the State responded to this delicate issue and it banned the organization by MA decree, No. Kep-089/D.A/10/1971. Setiawan, Nurhadi and Anasy, 2008. *After New Paradigm*, pp.1-2.

⁸² The MMI was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta and at the same time recommended that its political stand should be neutral. It criticizes the State for using democracy rather than Islam as a political tool. For them, democracy is not Islamic and instead they propose the formalization of the Shari'a. MMI also considers democracy a stumbling stone because the proponents of the Shari'a are far less in number than the proponents of democracy. Organizationally, MMI does not participate in political practices to maintain *Muslim ummah* solidarity. However, the organization allows its members to individually participate in whatever political party they want. <http://majelisujahidin.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/profil-majelis-mujahidin/#more-4> accessed August 20, 2009.

⁸³ Martin van Bruinessen, *Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travails of Pluralism in Indonesia*, n.d., pp. 1-12.

ference lies in its intensity. Both camps define *kodrat* from its bodily aspect, so a woman is not restricted by her femininity or cultural construction as she can build alternative constructions which are more supportive for her civic engagement. All obligations that are commonly seen as part of her *kodrat* can then be renegotiated with her spouse. This means that a woman basically has as many opportunities and may have as many occupations as a man. She is welcome, for example, to take on public leadership as long as she fulfills the objective requirements and has a strong desire to do so. The problem comes from external agents who take opposite stands. During my eight months of field work in 2008 and 2009 and another for the same duration in 2010 in Tasikmalaya, I hardly found anyone in Tasikmalaya Regency or in Tasikmalaya City who embraced *kodrat* in the pure sense of the term. It is as if in this context, this awareness is still unfamiliar. Among the few who were aware was Enung Nursaidah, directress of Puan Amal Hayati Cipasung Branch in Tasikmalaya Regency. For her, *kodrat perempuan* merely consists of the four God-given qualities and she considers other, assumed meanings as constructed. However, she found it difficult to put this attitude in practice, particularly in Tasikmalaya as local *kyai* opposed her participation in promoting gender equality, arguing that it would disturb existing practices.⁸⁴ Therefore, she made sure not to confront the existing understanding with critical feminist thinking. Instead, with her colleagues, she urged women to improve their fate and their role in their social engagement.⁸⁵ They are critical of the emergence of Perda Syari'a, considering the importance of substance rather than the formal aspect of the implementation of religious teaching. For them, the important thing is how the local government and its people reduce corruption practices, for example, rather than formalizing some of the religious teachings into the State's positive law.

The reformist camp basically adopts a similar attitude towards democracy, which is receptive and supportive of women's civic engagement. However they expect that in their social engagement women will not forget their *kodrat*, meaning that their tasks at home should be maintained. This camp balances Islam, local culture, and democracy. It treats all these sources of discourse as shared values, but uses Islam as referential yardstick. It treats local culture the same as it does democratic values, i.e. measured by Islam. In these camps, women's room to engage socially is open, the trend being for them to have more room. This camp constitutes the majority in Tasikmalaya society. Many Muslims affiliated to major Muslim mass organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis hold this stand. For example, Heni Novianti, the wife of Kiai Endang Rahmat, one of the *kyais* in Pesantren Riyāḍ al-Ulūm wa al-Dakwa in Condong, Cibeurem, Tasikmalaya City, known as Pesantren Condong, has the following perception of *kodrat*. She understands *kodrat perempuan* from a religious and cultural perspective in that she explains its common usage in public, namely *istrimah heuret langkah* (a woman has short steps). She is aware of the direct implications of women's bio-

⁸⁴ Interview with Enung Nursaidah, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 6, 2008.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

logical innate nature---pregnancy, menstruation, giving birth and breast feeding--on female activities. In her opinion, women regards this identification as a space they have to properly deal with internally. Externally, she has to negotiate with others who often claim that a woman encounters many restrictions about her space, time and role. Religion in this case also explains how a woman has to deal with these four natures. As a spouse, a woman has to maintain good communication with her husband. One way of doing this is by turning her husband's permission and pleasures into the basis of her communication and job description. However, she also reminds us that in pursuing their careers, wives and husbands must maintain mutual respect and understanding, otherwise conflict and disharmony will certainly arise.⁸⁶ In short, this camp believes that Islam and democracy can co-exist considering the positive aspect of both traditions. It considers the emergence of Perda Syari'a as merely the implementation of its rights. For its members, as long as its implementation is in accordance with existing State laws, this initiative deserves to be appreciated.

The revivalist camp had certain similarities with the anti-democracy camp, because both hamper women from engaging socially. Although the revivalist camp accepts democracy, in practice it has the same tendency as the anti-democracy group in that both agree to establish the Islamic political system in Indonesia. The revivalist camp tends to work within the existing system and to try to interpolate Islamic teachings into the State's ideology and political system, whereas the anti-democracy camp tends to work from without, accepting the contemporary situation as an emergency. Meanwhile, it builds an Islamic way of doing things within its own community that differs from the existing operative political system. However the way they translate their position is inconsistent. They reject democracy but accept other products of modernity such as teaching materials, methodology, and many others, arguing that what they refuse is limited only to ideology such as democracy. Thus these two camps tend to restrict women's social engagement but with an inclusive outlook by which I mean that they have an open attitude and view Islam as a barometer to measure other value systems and ideologies. In this regard, the revivalist camp actually accepts democracy as a procedure and a basic principle but substantiates it with Islamic values. Women's role in society is allowed within this framework as long as women's basic rights and obligations, particularly in the family, are met. Certain restrictions are applied simply to make sure that these basic necessities are upheld. Going further from the other two camps, this camp considers that the emergence of Perda Syari'a is the demonstration of Muslims' right to express themselves. Democracy for them is acceptable and may be used as a vehicle to express their political aspirations, including their efforts to interpolate Islamic teachings into positive law.

The anti-democracy camp also takes an inclusive position towards non-Salafi members. The proponents of this camp can accept, for example, a Muslim woman to be an MP provided she is not a Salafi. Furthermore, the anti-democracy camp defines *kodrat perempuan* in the same way as the pro-democracy camp

⁸⁶ Interview with Heni Novianti, Tasikamalaya City, August 4, 2010.

but they exclude the aspect of non-Islamic influences. They reject democracy, gender equality and human rights simply because they are not Islamic. This does not mean that Islam does not have a notion of freedom, gender equality, justice and respect for humanity as reflected in democratic ideas. Islam, according to the proponents of this camp, supports these ideas. So, in terms of *kodrat perempuan*, women may engage socially in the same way as men but within certain constraints which aim to respect women themselves. In this case, the idea of *muhrim* (segregation; people that are allowed to interact, basically spouses and their children, and the spouse's parents and relatives) which recommends not to engage in *ikhhtilat* (mingling between people regardless of gender in social interaction) plays an important role in formulating women's roles and statuses. In their idea, *kodrat perempuan* not only refers to biological nature but also to relevant factors such as femininity, and female rights and obligations. The ideal role for women to engage socially is in the areas where they can keep up *muhrim* and evade *ikhhtilat*. For girls, education would be the recommended field par excellence for women's social engagement. Abu Qotadah Suherlan, the leader of Pesantren Ihyā al-Sunna, explained that Islam has its own way of appreciating women properly. He argues that gender relations in Islam are based on differences and not on similarities. The differences concern the different functions and inclinations men and women have, as well as their different natures. This difference in Sharī'a is actually not designed to subordinate women, but rather to honor them.⁸⁷

To illustrate this camp we may consider Ummi Husna's case. She is the wife of Ustadz Heri Imam and the head of the female junior high school students in Pesantren Ihyā al-Sunna. She explained that "*kodrat* is *taqdir* (divine predestination). Actually, a woman's main task is to be a house wife (*Ibu Rumah Tanggal* IRT) and an educator. The first and most important *madrasah* for children is their mother. A wife is the companion of her husband and it is the wife's obligation to protect the house."⁸⁸ Ummi Husna prefers to elucidate *kodrat* not in its natural sense but in its nurturing one, restricting it to God's predestination and women's obligations in the family. She seems to accept the Salafis' basic views on gender relations which are restricted by the concepts of *muhrim* and *ikhhtilat*. Her acceptance of these values seems to be internalized as reflected by her attitude about engaging in activities where she cannot be alone but should be accompanied by her *muhrim*, which she describes as *ribet* (complicated) and which causes her to be *malas* (lazy) to do so. She also shies away from *ikhhtilat* with partners of the opposite sex. She feels fine with this restriction because she and other women who share the same point of view still have the space and the opportunity to do many activities in their homes, such as sewing, knitting and teaching female students. She argues that, indeed, a female teacher may teach male students as long as she meets the necessary requirements to do so. Today in Pesantren Ihyā al-Sunnah,

⁸⁷ Interview with KH. Abu Qotada Suherlan. Tasikmalaya City, February 17, 2009.

⁸⁸ Interview with Ummi Husna, Tasikmalaya City, November 1, 2010.

male teachers have the needed qualifications. She finally decided only to teach early-age school students.⁸⁹

With regards to the emergence of the Shari'a, Suherlan thinks that it is a necessary thing in the fight for Muslim rights. However, he advises Salafis against involving themselves in formal politics because Indonesian politics follow the non-Islamic democratic system.⁹⁰ In practice, he himself voted in the last West Javanese governor and vice-governor elections. He argued that he did so in an attempt to do the least bad thing. Ahmad Heryawan, the elected governor, who was accompanied by Yusuf Macan Effendi from Partai Demokrat, hails from the PKS/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Islamic-based Prosperous Justice Party). It seems that Suherlan somehow trusted this political party even though he adheres to the principle that a democratic State should only be allowed because is better than a society without a system or no ruler at all.⁹¹

Basically, the proponents of the accepting camp suggest that women may play roles in society in the same areas as men as long as they maintain their *kodrat*. Here, they seemingly engage socially in a context where people tend to “do gender” by applying the principle of ‘gender neutrality’ (“having no bias in favor of either sex”),⁹² but in terms of putting religious and local norms over democratic values. Within the existing restrictions, such as the expectation that women execute their role of caring for their homes and families, women make efforts to have a certain public role and career. At least, they carry through this role at home. For example, Nyai Nina Munawaroh, wife of K.H. Mahmud Farid of Pesantren Riyadul Ulum wa Dakwah in Condong, Cibeurem, Tasikmalaya City. Although she studied at a university in Tasikmalaya City for three years and majored in informal education, in the end she did not formally use her expertise. Instead, she plays a symbolic role as a *nyai* and provides meals three times a day for a number of the *pesantren*'s students. She established what is called a *Dapur Keluarga*, literally meaning Family Kitchen. Within her small business she is fully in charge. For her, it is a matter of preference not to get involved in her husband's educational work. She also sells snacks to the *pesantren*'s canteen. In other words, she is able to have other activities while maintaining her expected duty as the wife in the family.⁹³ In her case, female leadership is a leadership where the public sphere is brought inside the private sphere. By doing this, she manages to have other activities besides her traditional role as a house wife.

One important agent which is worth mentioning in this context is civil society due to its tendency of having a useful attitude towards social engagement. Civil society's perception of *kodrat perempuan* should ideally be inclined to limit

⁸⁹ Interview with Umami Husna, Tasikmalaya City, November 1, 2010.

⁹⁰ Interview with Suherlan, Tasikmalaya City, February 17, 2009.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Valerie Stead and Carole Elliott, 2009. *Women's Leadership*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 90.

⁹³ Interview with Nyai Nina Munawaroh, Tasikmalaya City, August 4, 2010.

the purport of the term to reproductive nature and to rationalize its aspects of cultural construction in order to offer more room for women's social engagement.⁹⁴ Civil society groups such as educators, healthcare volunteers, female public leaders, and female MPs are apprehensive about democracy, human rights and gender issues. They actualize their idea of offering more space to improved gender relations and wider room for women's civic engagement by introducing religious terms of justice and equality and by organizing workshops for religious figures, public leaders, teachers and lecturers. This discursive resource gives women more space to engage socially. For example, Noneng Masitoh, a lecturer at Siliwangi University, Tasikmalaya City, sees *kodrat* in a more natural sense. She rationalizes the nurturing aspect of the term to build an argument for providing space and opportunity for women's civic engagement. Her progressive perception of *kodrat* may be traced back to the way she was oriented, socialized, and educated, from her childhood to the present. Her professional workplace at a secular university as well as being active in activities related to gender issues also contribute to her inclusive perception of *kodrat*. She was raised in a family of small traders in the Sukaratu ward of her village Sukamahi, Tasikmalaya City, and educated in secular school from elementary to a higher education level (she is an undergraduate in economics and graduated in management) and works professionally at a secular university. At the same time, she pays special attention to gender issues, especially to advocating women to stand up for themselves. She is critical towards the nurturing aspects of *kodrat* constructions. She criticizes various understandings of religious teachings and local cultures which discriminate women. For instance, she thinks that the interpretation that a husband's leadership applies inside and outside the house is incorrect. For her, the expression *al-Rijāl qawwāmūna 'alā al-nisā* (husbands are leaders of the wives) [QS. al-Nisa/4: 34] only applies to the home. Outside the house women have the same space and opportunity to engage socially. An instance of a local culture that is discriminative against women is the Sundanese 'wisdom' that suggests women to totally obey their husbands. It is problematic as in practice this value is often abused. She even firmly criticized a Sundanese value which says, "*Istimah Dulang Tinande* (wife only accepts and follows)" by saying *suami ka liang cocopet oge istrimah kedah ngiring ka liang cocopet* (if a husband goes to the hole of the cockroach, she has to follow to the hole) to illustrate women's impotency in their relation to their men. For her, her *kodrat* rests mainly on her biological necessities. However, it does not mean that a wife negates her husband's leadership, particularly at home.⁹⁵

In general it can be said that for more than a decade, Indonesia has been heading in the direction of an increasingly democratic State.⁹⁶ Coupled with an

⁹⁴ Robert Hefner, 2005. *Civil Islam*, pp. 22-5. The definition of the term used in this study can be checked in Chapter one.

⁹⁵ Interview with Ir. Noneng Masitoh, MM. Tasikmalaya City, November 21, 2008.

⁹⁶ Henk Schulte-Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), 2007. *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post Suharto Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV, p. 1.

“abundance of civic resources” and living with “ethnic and regional diversity”⁹⁷ in the past before Western influence penetrated into the archipelago in the seventeenth century, contemporary Indonesian civic resources were nurtured not only by the State’s civic discursive practices but also by those of its civil society. They act as influential agents in a discursive practice. In the Tasikmalaya case, activists of Puspita Puan Amala Hayati and Nahdina Cipasung, *Aspirasi Perempuan* (Asper) and LKaHAM (Lingkar Studi Agama dan HAM/Study Circle for Religious and Human Rights Studies) are cases in point. Puspita Puan Amal Hayati Cipasung Branch is an offshoot of the Central Puan Amal Hayati based in Jakarta. The NGO (Non Governmental Organization) contributes to the efforts for the protection of female and infant victims of abuse. Other women’s organizations such as Nahdina (the name of a local NGO, and it literally means our renaissance) and Asper/*Aspirasi Perempuan* (Women’s Aspiration) contribute to the hard works in disseminating the importance of gender equality to the people by giving workshops and trainings. Meanwhile LKaHAM focuses its concerns on the dissemination of the importance of human rights and democracy issues and by taking part in responding to local political practices. Tasikmalaya is an example of the implementation and the implication of democracy for the local people. Following the current in the central government, democracy in Tasikmalaya is also contextualized and characterized by the current State policy on decentralization and gender mainstreaming. Accordingly, under these new conditions, new environments have come up which have caused a more dynamic contestation between democratic and undemocratic forces in which, through the construction of *kodrat perempuan*, contemporary ideal roles for women are continuously formulated.

Conclusion

The natural aspect of *kodrat perempuan* is negotiated to allow the incorporation of other meanings. Its history informs us that women in Tasikmalaya have precedents of female leadership, though it has been absent for a long time now. After the emergence of its two local queens some centuries ago, Tasikmalaya only has only had one female leader in 1988 in the person of the head of Margaluyu village. After 1998 with the start of the Reformasi era the number of female leaders has increased, though not yet to the level of district head. There was one female district head candidate in the 2011 general election, but she failed to be elected.

Nowadays, Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City show a new situation where the contestation between democratization and Islamization processes has taken a new form of expression and where the two processes intersect in different social practices. Both discursive resources---democracy (including gender and human rights issues) and Islam---have more room for actualization. In their response to democracy, Muslims in Tasikmalaya can basically be divided into two

⁹⁷ Hefner, 2005. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. p. 25.

groups: one that accepts democracy and one that is anti-democracy. The accepting group is differentiated in three groups – a liberalist camp that accepts democracy, a reformist camp that accepts what is considered good from both Islam and democracy, and a revivalist camp that Islamizes it--- and constitutes the majority; the anti-democracy group is the minority in Tasikmalaya. It is interesting that both groups share in the construction of *kodrat perempuan* with the difference lying in the level of intensity, as they all support women's civic engagement but within constraints. The liberalist and reformist groups tend to allow more space and opportunity for women's leadership practices, whereas the revivalist group that Islamizes and the group that is anti-democracy tend to restrict women's leadership engagement. Situated in this contestation and faced with this variation of responses towards democracy, the State---Tasikmalaya Regency administration and Tasikmalaya City municipality---adopt a neutral gender policy, sailing between the two currents: democratization and Islamization. Accordingly, though the local governments provide desks to mainstream gender issues, in practice they also consider local wisdom which is nurtured by Islam and local norms. The following chapter will discuss female leadership in the health care sector, the area deemed commensurate with *kodrat perempuan*.

Part II.

Women's Civic Engagement:
Women's Leadership in Health and Education
Engagement

CHAPTER FOUR

FEMALE CADRE POSYANDU: *PAVING THE WAY TO BEING AN “EQUAL CITIZEN”*

Introduction

This chapter discusses citizenship as seen from the perception of *kodrat perempuan* in an area deemed appropriate for women's leadership, i.e. health care, using female cadres (volunteer workers) of a Posyandu. As explained in the previous chapter, Posyandu/Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Integrated Village Health Service Post) is part of the Indonesian State's integrated health care program for mothers and children under five. The program is actually a continuation of the previous community health program, Pembangunan Kesehatan Masyarakat Desa/PKMD (Village Community Health Development Program) which the government formally introduced in 1977. The WHO (World Health Organization) and UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund) organized an International Conference on Primary Health Care (PHC) in Alma Ata in 1978 which produced the Alma Ata Declaration. The following year in 1979, the WHO introduced PHC.¹ These initiatives called on all governments in the world to formulate national PHC policies, programs and strategies.² The main concern of this new strategy was community participation.³ The strategy aimed to involve the community in health services by recruiting volunteers and training them on basic health matters and skills. People among the communities themselves were the targets of this recruitment of health workers because they were assumed to

¹ WHO, 1979. *Primary Health Care*, WHO, Geneva.

² Solita Koesoebjono-Sarwono, 1993. *Community Participation in Primary Health Care in an Indonesian Setting*. Leiden: PhD Thesis University of Leiden, p. 6.

³ Nathalie G.E. Kölmann. 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu in Central Java: A Case Study*. Paper prepared for the Workshop Health Care in Java, Past and Present, Leiden 7-8 May 1992. Leiden: KITLV, pp. 1-2; Ministry of Health. 1993. *Posyandu and Primary Health Care in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Dit.Gen. Community Health, p. 23.

be closer to villagers than the State's health staff and because the people counted on them.⁴

Posyandu are part of the Department of Home Affairs at the local level through the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa/LKMD (Village Public Security Institution) section 7 which deals with health and family planning as well as section 10 that covers Pembinaan Keluarga Kesejahteraan/PKK (Family Welfare Development), now known as Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Empowerment for Welfare). Posyandus are also facilitated by the Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat or Puskesmas (Public Health Clinic) or Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat Pembantu/PUSTU (Subsidiary Public Health Clinic) of the Department of Health. Posyandus implementation was coordinated by two groups: State agents and village health workers from surrounding society.⁵ It is hierarchically organized from the village level up to sub-district, district/city, provincial, and finally to the central government. These are mediating bodies between the State and the people. Kölmann illustrates it as a top-down organization.⁶

The task of a Posyandu cadre is to provide PHC, nutrition, advice, diarrhea control, family planning advice and basic medicines like vitamins and medicines that may be given without a doctor's prescription, and immunization against everyday diseases. Once a month, pregnant women, women with babies (0-1 year) and children under five (*balita*) are called to come to a local Posyandu by either a village official, a hamlet head⁷ or sometimes by one of the cadres themselves.

As the core idea of Posyandu centers on community participation on a voluntary base, cadres or village health workers are ideally expected to be ordinary members of society. The manuals the government provide a note that a cadre may be defined as, "...seorang yang dipilih oleh masyarakat untuk bersama-sama menangani masalah kesehatan masyarakat dengan penuh kesadaran dan pengabdian."⁸ (...an individual who is selected by the community [and who] together with them is expected to participate in [the] PHC program with a deep awareness and dedication...). In this definition, anybody belonging to the community, regardless of gender, and as long as they are literate, are eligible to become a cadre. The cadre's gender neutrality is also emphasized in the guidelines for trainers and Posyandu volunteers, published by the Indonesian Government (1992), which

⁴ Kölmann, 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*: p. 2.

⁵ Cynthia L. Hunter, 1996. "Women as 'good citizens': maternal and child health in a Sasak village." In *Maternity and Reproductive Health in Asia Societies*, edited by Pranee Liamouttong Rice and Lenore Manderson, p. 175; Kölmann., 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, p. 5; Ministry of Health, 1993. *Posyandu and Primary Health Care in Indonesia*, p. 14.

⁶ Kölmann, 1992. *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, p. 4.

⁷ Hunter, 1996. "Women as 'Good Citizens', p. 175.

⁸ As Van Vegel quoted from *Warta PKP*, July-September 1989. Van Vegel, 1992. *The Information System of Posyandu*, p. 11.

says that there is no gender restriction in becoming a Posyandu cadre.⁹ In other words, a cadre may be a female or male citizen who is interested in volunteering in community primary health care activities. However, when Van Vegel described the selection criteria, she only mentioned female candidates, saying that “1. She must be elected by the community and approved by the LKMD; 2. She must have a sense of responsibility and a ‘social spirit’; 3. She must be able to read and write; 4. She must be willing and able to do voluntary work; 5. She must have enough time to work for the community.”¹⁰ In spite of the fact that she herself quoted the definition of the cadre’s gender neutrality, her decision to mention only the female candidates may be because in practice most cadres are women.

Each cadre is expected at least to have been trained in handling basic health care problems in a Posyandu. The training aims at improving the cadres’ knowledge and skills in providing the Posyandu’s basic maternal and child health care. The subject matters that are discussed pertain to general knowledge on PHC, dealing with mothers, pregnant women, babies and children under five at the post.¹¹

A. Leadership Trajectory

Using the snow ball effect technique and purposive sampling (targeted respondents), I interviewed twenty-six Posyandu cadres. Five of them were men. Their involvement in the post was mainly stimulated by their interest in the PHC, and only one occasionally received an income.¹² The female cadres I interviewed constitute thus the majority.¹³

A female Posyandu cadre’s leadership trajectory can be discussed through either recruitment or through constructing knowledge, skills and networks. My fieldwork and the interviews I had revealed interesting dynamics in terms of re-

⁹ *Pedoman pengelolaan Pentaloka Pelatihan/Pembina dan Pelatihan Kader Posyandu UPGK/Usaha Perbaikan Gizi Keluarga*. Jakarta: Depatemen Kesehatan RI, Ditjen Pembinaan Kesehatan Masyarakat, Direktorat Bina Gizi Masyarakat collaborated with UNICEF, p. 5.

¹⁰ Van Vegel, 1992. *The Information System of Posyandu*: p. 11.

¹¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs and Autonomy Number 193/697 BPM on Guidelines for the Revitalization of Posyandu; *Pedoman pengelolaan Pentaloka Pelatihan/Pembina dan Pelatihan Kader Posyandu UPGK/Usaha Perbaikan Gizi Keluarga*. Jakarta: pp. 10-11.

¹² Koko Kosasih, a cadre at Posyandu Puspa Indah in Margalaksana, Tasikmalaya City, has massage skills and the knowledge and skills of a Dukun Beranak (traditional midwife). He also received basic, modern midwife training. Because of these he could be accepted in the post. Emuk Mukhlis was initially assigned by the head of Awipari Village to open a post due to his PHC knowledge and skills. The other three male cadres---Yadi Saptari, Dayat Ruhiyat, and Amien Muhaimin---got involved in the post because they were interested in it and acquired their knowledge and skills from training they attended.

¹³ *Data Kinerja Promkes 2009* (Health Programme Performance Data 2009). Dinas Kesehatan (Health Unit), Tasikmalaya Regency.

cruitment in the leadership trajectory of female Posyandu cadres. As being a Posyandu cadre is within the domain deemed appropriate with the constructed *kegiatan perempuan*, recruiting female cadres would supposedly not meet any serious hindrances due to the fact that PHC is everybody's basic need. In practice, this normative assumption indeed helps female candidates to become cadres and to get involved in PHC activities.

There are at least two kinds of recruitment: formal and informal recruitment. Formal recruitment may be formulated as the recruitment of a cadre from below through a representative selection process. I found two kinds of formal recruitment: the selection of a cadre by a coordination forum and the selection of a cadre by a State employee through direct assignment. Regarding the first type of formal recruitment, after the staff members of an RT/Rukun Tetangga (neighborhoods) and local religious and social leaders have convened a meeting, each RT in an RW/Rukun Warga (hamlet) sends its representatives to the village office, which is usually run by the Task Force IV of PKK (this is the PKK group that deals with social affairs). The decision whether these representatives are selected is made by the Task Force. The leadership trajectory of a cadre ideally follows this State model path of recruitment of PHC volunteers.

However, in practice this ideal, formal way of recruitment often does not work effectively. Formal recruitment thus takes another form: direct appointment by a State employee. Quite often the State, either through PKK or a village nurse, faces difficulty in finding people interested in becoming a cadre for various reasons. For example, Wiwin Windarti, the Awipari village nurse, explained that in order to overcome the difficulty of recruiting a new cadre, she deployed at least two methods: door-to-door-visits and persuasion through formal gatherings. She made door-to-door-visits to ask mothers to join the post. Meanwhile, she tried to persuade people through formal gatherings when she convened her three monthly PHC meetings during which they were asked to join the post. To ensure that her proposal was accepted, she routinely asked permission from the spouses of the targeted candidate cadres.¹⁴

Besides formal recruitment there is also informal recruitment which is characterized by its practicality. In this method there are three types of leadership courses: self-efficient cadres, persuaded cadres, and recruited cadres based on family relations. The first refers to community members who present themselves to join in the Posyandu's activities. They are usually motivated to do so because they themselves and/or their babies need basic PHC treatment but find it difficult to visit a center or simply because they want to kill their spare time. The second type is a persuaded cadre. This practice is relatively common. A Posyandu head usually asks participants to help her or him in handling one or two tasks in the post or to replace a cadre who has resigned or who can no longer be active. In some cases he or she also persuades eligible candidates to join the post. The last type, the third type, is the recruited cadre who is recruited based on family relations.

¹⁴ Departemen Kesehatan RI, 1990/1991. *Pedoman Kerja Puskesmas Jilid I*. Jakarta: Departemen Kesehatan RI, p. B-52.

This type is the same as the persuaded recruitment type in terms of not using the procedural schema of recruitment set up by the State and the direct persuasion of eligible candidates. In practice, this scheme appears to be an alternative model to offer temporary solutions to the constant difficulty of recruiting new cadres. Out of the 26 cadres I interviewed, I found eight cadres who were recruited based on family relations.

Posyandu cadres enhance their knowledge, skills, and networking which contributes to their leadership paths. Of the 26 cadres I interviewed, 13 were graduates of senior high school, six of junior high school, four of primary school and three of a higher education level. As the criteria to become a cadre only requires the ability to read and write, which may have been acquired from an education level as low as primary school, anyone who completed this level of education is basically eligible to become a cadre. However, only four among the cadres I interviewed had discontinued their education after primary school graduation and only one of them was a female cadre.¹⁵ She is Khoyah Rukhayah. Though she has a modest educational background, she was supported by other knowledge, skills and networking which she had acquired either before she became active as a cadre or in the course of being one. She had been involved in the village PHC program before becoming a cadre.


Meanwhile, Rukhayah and other cadres also gained knowledge and skills about PHC and family planning through participating in various kinds of training sessions and activities in the field. Posyandus do not only attract graduates with a basic educational level, but also those who have studied at university such as Imas Musiadah, Dewi Hikmah and Ati Widiawati. However, senior high school graduates were the majority and they are also the cadres the community prefers. In addition, the cadres had enhanced their skills and networking through participation in various training sessions about management, PHC, or other health issues such as family planning and population control. Gaining experience from different Posyandu activities ranging from routine activities to competitions among cadres at different levels also built up their abilities. As their networking expanded over time, their communication skills did as well.

Cadres' networking development happens in a variety of areas: within health department organizations such as Puskesmas; in the local health department; in other government institutions such as a village administration, in sub-district and regency/city offices; in non-governmental institutions, particularly religious institutions such as *majlis taklim*, mosques or private *madrasahs*. All of these enable them to construct their leadership. Through these activities, cadres increase their capacities, extend their roles, and exercise active citizenship.

¹⁵ They are Khoyah Rukhaya (female), Posyandu Melati in Cihideung I, Babakan Margaluyu, Manonjaya, Emuh Mukhlis (male), Posyandu Semangka in Awipari Tengah RW III, Awipari, Cibeurem, Koko Kasasih (male), Puspa Indah, Margalaksana, Tawang, and Dayat Ruhayat (male), Posyandu Pandan III in Sukarasa, Manggungsari, Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya Regency.

The female Posyandu cadres' leadership trajectories discussed above are illustrated in Diagram 1 "Posyandu Cadre's Leadership Trajectory". The arrows signify that recruitment opens the door for cadres to develop and improve in many different ways.

Diagram 1. A Posyandu Cadre's Leadership Trajectory



From what has been said above becomes clear that the leadership trajectory of female cadres mostly does not follow the State model of recruitment. On the one hand, this model seems useless because of the unrealistic recruitment procedures in which many parties are advised to get involved, including government representatives, community and religious leaders, and representatives from each RT. On the other hand, in addition to the fact that many women are busy with their household chores, child rearing and bearing and supporting the family economically, a cadre's position is voluntary. It is therefore that in practice, nurses, professional PHC and family planning workers, and existing cadres play key roles in recruitment processes.

In terms of recruitment, female agents were often quite able to negotiate or to overcome the implications of the perception of *kodrat perempuan* by directly asking their spouses' permission to become a cadre, or by asking senior cadres or medical workers to help them to convince their spouses. It is interesting to note, though, that the perception of *kodrat perempuan* indeed hinders female agents to get involved in Posyandu activities but that does not reduce their interest in the idea of PHC civic engagement itself. It is rather for practical reasons that they do not want to become involved, which is that their tasks and burdens at home take up all their time. Many community members think that voluntary participation is not enough to meet their needs. Many rural as well as urban societies are seek-

ing desperately to satisfy their economic needs in order to survive. As the majority of breadwinners are still men, many of them often feel that they do not have the time to engage in Posyandu activities.

Keeping these different conditions of the cadre leadership path in mind and by examining how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* influences female agency, it is interesting to discuss female leadership experiences when women were able to involve themselves in leadership processes. The following sub-chapter will consider this issue.

B. Leadership Experience

1. Leadership Experience

Civic engagement as represented in the Posyandu program can be seen as an example of a lived citizenship experience. A lived experience citizenship is a cultural aspect of citizenship expression that operates within a specific context and is based on a routine practice.¹⁶ It means that cadres are actually converging in the following key elements of citizenship: rights and responsibilities, belonging, participation, and in their routine activities.¹⁷ As citizens, when engaging socially as volunteers in the implementation of PHC and the Family Planning Program, cadres actually participate in the State's civic virtue and duty program. At the same time, they also exercise their rights and responsibilities through their voluntary work. In fact they show their belonging by expressing their civic virtue and duty through participating in Posyandu activities. In short, by participating, cadres may practice a lived experience citizenship through a regular public activity. This specific area of engagement is also the site of analysis for measuring the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* in female agent's social Posyandu activities. As discussed above, constructed *kodrat perempuan* hampers as well as supports the leadership trajectory of Posyandu' female cadre agency, particularly that on the level of access due to the common norm of having to ask permission and also to practical considerations such as fulfilling their real and basic needs and carrying out daily family tasks.

Like in their leadership trajectories, cadres leadership experiences must face the norm of *kodrat*. However, the norm's influence is less because basically, once a female agent has been recruited as a cadre, she has essentially overcome the norm. The potential problems that female cadres may encounter arise during their engagement in Posyandu activities. During this period, cadres generally find ways of negotiating the limitations resulting from the norm. Another thing is that as Posyandu is one of the State's programs that involves community participation, the area of cadres' civic engagement largely falls within these boundaries. This

¹⁶ Ruth Lister (et al.), 2007. *Gendering Citizenship in Western Europe: New Challenges for Citizenship Research in a Cross-National Context*. Great Britain: The Polity Press, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 26.

area does not refer merely to the area of the State's agency. It includes also other areas where the community can play a role not only as target, but also as the active subject or capable agent in negotiating choices and opportunities on the one hand, and limitations and hindrances on the other.

All the cadres I interviewed, except Deti Mardianti, were married and shared the same role as a house wife in a patriarchal family where the husband was the main and in many cases only breadwinner. In other words, when these mothers were initially recruited as cadres, their main role had only been that of IRT/*Ibu Rumah Tangga* (house wife). This means that they were generally positioned in the ideal as suggested by the norm of *kodrat*, i.e. as female agents who take care of their family and rear their children. Although this situation constrains female agents' social activism, it also necessitates cadres to see to the well-being of the family, including the PHC status especially of themselves and their children and thus, soon after having given birth, they find themselves in the position of needing health care for themselves and their babies. This situation leads them to go either to a Puskesmas or a Posyandu for health care treatment. The situation becomes difficult if they do not get the treatment they need. In regards to this case, two mothers I interviewed shared their experiences, i.e. Yatini Medina, the head of Posyandu Teratai Merah and Dewi Hikmah, the head of Posyandu Ciponyo. At first they started to become active in the post because they desperately needed health care for their own babies for which they had to go to the city because the health care status of the local community was very poor. Then, as they knew that the government had a PHC program called Posyandu, they went to the nearest Puskesmas and asked the medical staff there about the possibility of establishing a Posyandu in their own neighborhood.¹⁸

The immediate impact of being active at a post for cadres who have babies is actually that they gain the opportunity to improve their and their babies' health. After receiving treatment while at the post, they are expected to share their experiences to set an example for other families. In this regard, they actually perform their leadership by offering a model to members of the post and to mothers in their neighborhoods. This is common practice, at least as reflected in the situation of most of the cadres I interviewed who had babies and children under five. This way of leadership, in the case of Dewi Hikmah, for example, was effective, because it is difficult for poor mothers who follow the traditional way of maintaining their health to shift from asking favors from a *dukun beranak* (traditional midwife) to the modern health care system such as the post provides. When people learn that a cadre's family has become healthier after it participated in a Posyandu program and also that a Posyandu does not charge any fees, many of them begin to show interest in taking their babies to the post.

In terms of the influence of the perception of *kodrat perempuan* on female agents' engagement, Medina and Hikmah are examples who fit the basic assumption of this study that it is supportive of female social engagement. They took advantage of this norm in a dynamic and affirmative way, finding solutions

¹⁸ Interview with Dewi Hikmah, November 6, 2008 and Fieldwork 2010.

for their PHC problems by proposing themselves to become cadres, establishing a Posyandu and opening their houses to host the posts' activities. Medina even had a special room for Posyandu activities which was equipped with basic PHC facilities. As assumed normatively, their traditional perception of *kodrat* did not become a hampering factor for their PHC engagement.

Kölmann explained that a cadre is assigned to take roles interchangeably in four tasks: the management of the post, the execution of its program, basic health care education and family planning matters, and the administration of its implementation. For many cadres, going through these processes allows them to experience leadership beyond enhancing knowledge, skills, and networking. They either enjoy restricted leadership within a group or many even extend their leadership in other ways. For example, Enok Tati Rohayati, the head of Posyandu Puspa Indah in Margalaksana, Kahuripan, Tawang, Tasikmalaya City, takes on leadership within the Posyandu setting. Before she got married in 1976, she was a *madrrasah* teacher and a tentative worker at an insurance company. However, she began to face serious social engagement limitations soon after she got married. She told me during the interview that her husband, who was a public transport driver, asked her, "How much money did you get from teaching and working as an insurance agent?" She replied that it was only a small amount of money. He cynically said to her, "From now on, stop teaching and working and spend most of your time as an IRT (house wife). I will pay you double [from what you are earning now]". As a Muslim wife who adhered to the norm of *kodrat* which declares that a good wife should respect and obey her husband, she resigned from being a teacher and as staff member at the insurance company, obeying her husband's order.¹⁹ It took her twenty years from the year she got married in 1976 to 1996 before she joined the Posyandu post. Within a year of being active at the post, she took up another voluntary public activity and became a member of Task Force IV of PKK, health care division. Being an active Posyandu and PKK cadre, she often had the opportunity to improve her networking and enhance her knowledge and skills by doing all the four different Posyandu tasks and by working on related issues regarding basic health care, family planning and sometimes on contagious diseases containment. For instance, she attended a basic Posyandu training session in 2004 at the village level and she was trained at a higher level in 2009. She also took part in a KB (Family Planning) training in 2004. With a number of cadres, she participated in a workshop on democracy organized by Yayasan Sumbangsih Nuansa Tasikmalaya/YSNT, a local NGO.²⁰

In addition, Rohayati's educational background as a graduate of a senior high school for teacher's training equipped her with basic skills and knowledge of communication. After she had been a cadre for just a couple of years, she was entrusted to be the head of the Posyandu and secretary of Task Force IV of Kahuripan village's PKK (1998). She then waited for two years before she was finally elected as head of Task Force IV in 2002. Her leadership did not stop there. As a

¹⁹ Interview with Enok Tati Rohayati, Tasikmalaya City, August 7, 2010

²⁰ Ibid.

result of her hard work in these areas, in 2004 she was given the opportunity to lead the same division but on the sub-district level in Tawang Sub-district, Tasikmalaya City.

As Posyandu is an integrated program, different State departments pay attention to it including the military forces, ABRI. Rohayati is a case in point. The army asked her to cooperate with them in implementing the KB program. The army needs cadres because they are familiar with the villagers. Rohayati played her leadership role on the front line by inviting mothers and young couples to participate in the family planning program. Meanwhile, the army provided cars to transport KB participants to a Puskesmas or to a hospital. The picture below illustrates Rohayati, second from the left, together with her cadre colleague, two military officers, five KB acceptors and one child from Kahuripan Village, waiting for the car which will bring them to a clinic in Kahuripan, Tasikmalaya City on August 7, 2010.



Rohayati also played an important role in the implementation of P2WKSS/ Peningkatan Peranan Wanita Menuju Keluarga Sehat dan Sejahtera (Enhancing Women's Role towards a Healthy and Prosperous Family). In 2007, Rohayati's village, Kahuripan, was selected as a target of the P2WKSS's program in Tasikmalaya City. According to Reni, a local staff member, the local government usually chooses a village to be included in the implementation of P2WKSS, i.e. by selecting one that is considered to have a high capacity for development and occupies a place between the poorest and the most developed village. Situated in Tawang Sub-district, Kahuripan village was considered to meet these criteria and the development was concentrated in RW 16. As reflected in P2WKSS's purpose, the program developed here mainly focused on two areas: health and the environment. In terms of the environment, the program consisted of growing vegetables in a designated area in the village. Concerning the PHC program, Rohayati explained that they developed a Bina Keluarga Balita program (PHC for Mothers with Babies). Through Posyandu and its related bodies such as Puskesmas, village nurses and PKK, cadres, doctors and nurses asked mothers who have babies between one month and one year old to exclusively feed their babies with breast milk. Meanwhile, mothers were also urged to pay attention to their own food and drink intake. Rohayati and colleagues monitored them and visited them regularly within that year (2007). If a village member needed medical treatment, the cad-

re would be the first agent to recommend her to go to a local nurse, doctor or to visit the Puskesmas. If they could not be treated there, the Puskesmas was to give them a recommendation to go to the local hospital. The scheme continued all the way to the highest level until the patient received adequate treatment. As a result, the implementation of P2WKSS in Kahuripan village in 2007 made Tasikmalaya City the third champion in West Java Province.²¹ Similar with Rohayati's leadership experience, various other cadres extended their leadership to other public programs such as Desa Siaga (Alert Village), for instance Mimin Mintarsih, the head of a Posyandu in Rajapolah Village²² to the PNPM/Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment), for example Ika Kartika, the head of Posyandu Teratai;²³ and to a small business development such as was undertaken by Yayah Sofiah, the head of Posyandu Mawar 7 in Rajapolah.²⁴

In short, by being active in Posyandu activities as cadres, women actually create space for themselves to express their citizenship. They use this space to extend their role from mainly being an house wife to being an active citizen by participating in PHC and family planning activities, gaining their right to basic PHC as well as fulfilling their obligation for the benefit of others. The influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* here follows the current of the area of engagement where female agents have considerable opportunities and roles that provide them not only with the site and a role of engagement but also with opportunities to meet key elements of citizenship. Another important aspect for a female cadre in civic engagement in Posyandu is the experience they gain in generating income, which will be discussed in the following sub-chapter.

2. Economic Activity

At first, cadres often expect to receive some material return for their dedication, but then realize that their participation is voluntary. Many family members nowadays find that in practice, traditional breadwinners frequently need additional economic support. Some of them feel called on to help. In other cases, wives would also like to have their own income. This is why from time to time many cadres make an effort to gain additional income, other cadres withdraw from the post to concentrate on finding additional income, while many others remain. Among the twenty-one female cadres I interviewed, only three did not have additional income. Their spouses provided for their daily needs.

It is interesting to note that the constructed *kodrat perempuan* also influences women's economic activities within the context of PHC engagement. Cadres who carry out economic activities can be divided into two groups: cadres who

²¹ Ibid.

²² Interview with Mimin Mintarsih, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 13, 2008.

²³ Interview with Ika Kartika, Tasikmalaya City, August 2, 2010.

²⁴ Interview with Yayah Sofiah, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 24, 2008.

have a regular and those who have an irregular income. The first group consists of cadres who develop their own economic activities. The first subcategory of the first group consists of female agents who have their own business but do not target their Posyandu networking. For instance, Tati Nurhayati, Ristiyani, and Ati Widiawati. Nurhayati and Ristiyani have stalls in front of their houses and Widiawati has a business away from her home. They can run their businesses while they also take care of their household chores and child bearing and rearing. Before she opened her stall, for instance, Nurhayati taught at a local junior high school from 1985 to 1987 and in a Madrasah Tsanawiyah from 1987 to 1988. She first opened a stall in 1997 with the support of her husband. She started with IDR 2,000,000 (equivalent to IDR 18,000,000 in 2010), selling basic needs and cigarettes. Over 13 years she has constructed a studio of approximately 9 x 7 m and she uses it as her sales venue.²⁵

The second subcategory of the first group consists of female agents who develop their own business but use their Posyandu's links as their business targets. They are similar to the previous subcategory in the way that they run their business and manage their tasks at home. During my field work, I found that they sold their products, usually fried snacks like peanut crackers, by using their Posyandu's network. For example, Imas Musida and Aas Aisah sell fried food to other Posyandu cadres in addition to general customers. Meanwhile, Roli also uses her link for her catering services. Wiwin Windarti, the Awipari village nurse, played an important role in supporting cadres' attempts to generate income. She always suggested the cadres to be creative and encouraged them to use her links in PHC and family planning programs by allowing them to sell their products. Sometimes she also bought their products herself. Meanwhile, Ika Kartika attended an embroidery course in 2003 but then she developed a home clothing industry (selling *baju koko* [Muslim shirts for males] and bags for *rukana* [female prayer clothes]). She employed four mothers (some of whom were cadres) who lived nearby. She got the materials to be sewed from a relative while another relative sold her products in the local market. When the month of Ramadan came, she usually baked cakes and sold them in her neighborhood. Another cadre is Yayah Sofiah. Collaborating with her elder brother who was also a retired State employee, and supported by her husband, Sofiah established a group of small businesses called Mawar Rancage.²⁶

²⁵ Interview with Ati Widiawati and Tati Nurhayati, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 13, 2010.

²⁶ Sofiah started her business with IDR 500,000 as starting capital. She managed to get that amount through telling others about her idea. First of all, she explained the plan in a meeting in the village office on the occasion of the distribution of BLT/Bantuan Langsung Tunai (Direct Cash Aid). She convinced a number of mothers and they invested some of their and in this way Mawar Rancage got her first capital, which amounted to about IDR 100,000. She also convinced her elder brother to invest IDR 400,000. With this initial capital of IDR 500,000, she started to run her Nilem Fish Processing business. The market responded positively to her initiative and she attracted much attention, including from the local government. Through the implementation of Bantuan Khusus Mas-

In addition to cadres who manufactured products and sell goods, there were also cadres who used the knowledge and skills they got in PHC and family planning and their networks to offer services for those who needed them. The cadres I interviewed used different ways to generate income. Having been trained in and having knowledgeable about PHC, family planning and common diseases, and having substantial connections with local PHC institutions, Enok Tati Rohayati was the right person to ask for technical and networking help. Many members of the community asked for her assistance to get an insurance card (Askeskin [Health Insurance for the Poor] or Jamkesmas [Community Health Insurance]) to pay for their health treatment. Many others also asked the cadre's assistance to get a free or affordable family planning program package. In return, they usually gave her some incentive, the amount of which, according to her, was not fixed. Although this income was irregular, she at least found it useful for survival. Enung and Ika, the generation younger than Rohayati's, did not only depend on their Posyandu knowledge, skills and networking but also on their own efforts. As explained above, Kartika had a small sewing clothes business and she baked cakes. In the meantime, Nurhasanah sold souvenirs and Komala had a business of handicrafts and small Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) containers.²⁷


In conclusion, women have not only successfully created room for their civic engagement, but most of them (23 out of the 26 cadres I interviewed) also managed to gain additional income in various different ways, some by getting a regular income from their own businesses and others got irregular income from selling their own products by using their Posyandu links or by offering services in PHC and the Family Planning Program. Diagram 2 below summarizes this sub-chapter which relates to the previous sub-chapter. Both are framed within the constructed *kodrat perempuan*. The cadre's leadership trajectory links to this part with two significations: the first, marked with an arrow, shows a cadre's leadership experience; the second shows the continuous process of leadership learning. Both enabling and enacting leadership processes are actualized in practice and they are described in four dimensions: role model, restricted leadership, extended leadership, and a cadre's economic independency. All these dimensions are translated as reflections of the cadres' perception of *kodrat* and as expressions of cultural citi-

arakat/BKM (Direct Aid for Community) of the PNPM program, Mawar Rancege got two machines: a fish processing machine and a packing machine, with a total price of about IDR 70,000,000. As a result, her business developed rapidly and she sold her products in various local markets and during food exhibitions in Jakarta and Bandung. In addition, Sofiah's businesses developed into a site for comparative study where visitors from different districts and even from abroad often came to visit. Sofiah was supported by 15 local women who worked in her business. Each woman received about IDR 120,000 per month, working three times a week in their spare time, depending on the availability of Nilembu fish. As Mawar Rancege was a collective business and each business was meant to help the others, Sofiah, supported by her husband who was apparently also the head of the RT, and her elder brother, focused only on the production of fish. Other sections of work were managed by others. Interview with Yayah Sofiah, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 24, 2008.

²⁷ Interview with Komala, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 30, 2010.

zanship in terms of rights and responsibilities, belonging, and participation. Later, I found that each of the four expressions of cultural citizenship contributed to shifting their role from being house wives to active citizens. In the previous part, the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* was also found in the following nuances: keeping their main roles in the home as house mothers, child rearers and bearers, having husbands as the main breadwinners, and asking their permission for their public engagements.

Diagram 2. Female Cadre's Leadership



It is now time to discuss the State's discursive practice regarding the implementation of PHC and the Family Planning Program in relation to the role of cadres.

C. Cadres and the State

What is the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* on female agents in Indonesia's PHC programs? By referring to female cadres' social practic-

es in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, the constructed *kodrat perempuan* certainly has been influencing the formulation of the State's PHC program. Its influence can be found in its constraints as well as in its flexibility. The constraint as a result of the perceived *kodrat perempuan* may be found in the norm in which women's role and status are traditionally idealized. Its flexibility in the context of the implementation of the State's PHC program can be found in the nature of Posyandu which enables women to widen their social perspectives because they get introduced to more levels of society than ever before. Accordingly, the State initially implemented the Posyandu program in 1984 by adopting a neutral gender policy. To date this policy is still maintained. Nevertheless, the majority of its cadres have consistently been women. It seems that it is kept that way to allow possibilities which help it to manage the implementation of its PHC programs. For example, in 1984, the local government found it difficult to recruit cadres. To solve this problem, the head of Awipari Village assigned Emuh Mukhlis, a male staff member, as head of the Posyandu because of the gender neutrality of the program's policy. In addition, he was also considered capable because he was seen to have the requirements a cadre should have such as having undergone basic PHC training. He had also gained experience so that he could play a significant role in public health care in Awipari.²⁸ At the time of my field work, five out of the twenty-six cadres I interviewed were male. Their involvement in the post was mainly stimulated by their interest in the PHC program and only one held the potential to earn an income. The majority of cadres in the history of Posyandu have been women, including in the sites of this study.²⁹

In general, cadres play a very important role and have become important targets of capacity building development because of their brokerage function between the State's programs and the community's health needs. To illustrate this point, we may have a look at the way Posyandu cadres often play an important role in the implementation of the State's program called P2WKSS. It is a State's attempt towards poverty alleviation and the improvement of women's roles in national development and it involves other units of the local State apparatus to improve family welfare and well-being.³⁰ The program was instituted for the first time in 1979,³¹ but over the course of time it became clear that its implementation was ineffective. It lasted until after the decline of the New Order in 1998 and into the early stages of the Reformasi era. It was revitalized in 2005 (Presidential Decree No. 2, 2005). In its new form, the program's first specific objective is the improvement of the health status of women, children, and the elderly and Posyandu are treated as important bodies to help address this concern. The implementation of the program is concentrated in certain villages which were selected based

²⁸ Interview with Emuh Mukhlis, Tasikmalaya City, October 12, 2010.

²⁹ *Data Kinerja Promkes 2009* (Health Program Performance Data 2009). Dinas Kesehatan (Health Unit), Tasikmalaya Regency.

³⁰ Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan RI (KPP RI), 2007. *Pedoman Umum revitalisasi Program Terpadu P2WKSS*: KPP RI, p. 8.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 4.

on objective conditions pertaining to social, economic, educational and health aspects.³² Reni Sekarini, the Head of the Local Women's Empowerment Program in Tasikmalaya Regency, explained the program:

This program is like a *Bedah Kampung* (Hamlet Make-over). It is a provincial program that is implemented in the form of a competition. It was implemented for the first time in the New Order era and has been maintained up unto the present. P2WKSS is an inter-sectorial activity which is decreed by a letter signed by the head of the regency. Institutionally, P2WKSS is coordinated by the Women's Empowerment Division of *Badan Pemberdayaan Desa dan KB* (Village and Family Planning Empowerment). Each year this division selects a village usually based on a survey, budget constraints, the moderate conditions of the village, local government support [sub-district and village support] and community support. The team also considers the village's potentials/PKK, pre-welfare family (about 70%), and KS/Keluarga Sejahtera [welfare family] (there is KS 1, 2, 3 plus based on the Family Planning's data collection). For 2010, we have selected Mandala Village in Salopa Sub-district. Other factors that are also considered include lifestyle, literacy, the availability of PAUD (Early Age Education) and play groups, equal distribution of the program, PHC including Posyandu, UP2K-PKK/Usaha Peningkatan Pendapatan Keluarga - Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (An Attempt to Increase Family Income - Family Empowerment and Welfare Movement) in the form of soft loans and trainings. For example, the local government trained Suka Panca village's community how to produce steamed fish, salted eggs and wajit (sweet fruit). Mothers in this village have access to the market, so the government gave them soft loans and the necessary training. The Industry Division of the Local Government also helped them in packaging their products. Another example is when Rajapolah Sub-district was led by Euis Kaswati. Dawagung Village was selected and the government trained people there how to process mendong into handicraft products.³³

Another illustration of the way Posyandu cadres play a vital role was in the State program known as *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/PKK* (Family Empowerment and Welfare Movement).³⁴ Policy directives for the most fundamental development programs began in the family, as "that was the most fundamental social institution that formed the roles, values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns on which fruitful development depended."³⁵ The mechanism for acti-

³² Ibid, pp. 13 and 25.

³³ Interview with Reni Sekarini, Head of Women Empowerment of *Badan Pemberdayaan Desa and KB* (Village and Family Planning Empowerment) Tasikmalaya Regency. April 26, 2010.

³⁴ Hunter, 1996. "Women as 'good citizens', ..." pp. 171-72. Originally, the PKK was developed in Central Java in 1967. Then, in 1972, all governors in the country were expected to develop PKK programs in their provinces. Ten years later, the PKK was extended into a national policy which necessitates all villages to have a PKK. Departemen Dalam Negeri, 2006. *PKK*. Jakarta: Tim Penggerak PKK Pusat, p. 9.

³⁵ Sullivan, Norma. 1983. Indonesian Women in Development: State theory and urban kampung practice. In *Women's Work and Women's Roles: Economics and Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore*, edited by Lenore Manderson. Canberra: Develop-

vating PKK standards was composed of the PKK's own internal organizational structure and the State's civil administration framework, "mediated" by Persatuan Istri Karyawan dan Karyawati or PERTIWI (The Union of Wives of Male Employees and Female Employees) in the Department of Home Affairs. On the central government level, the PKK was aligned with the central bureaucracy via the PERTIWI leadership executive, the ex-officio head of which was the wife of the Minister of Home Affairs. The Bureau of Village Development, in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has regional offices, advised PKK executives at various levels on general administrative and technical matters. The provincial PKK leaders were female relatives of the provincial governor and they often held high regional positions in PERTIWI as well. Moving to the lower levels of the administrative structures, at the regency level, the Bupati's wife was ex-officio the head of both PKK and PERTIWI. Below this, on the sub-district level (*kecamatan*), the sub-district head's wife, who was also a member of PERTIWI, was titular head of the PKK. At the village level, the village head's wife or close relative was titular head; and finally on the hamlet level the wives of each of the hamlet heads were the local heads of the PKK.

As emphasized by Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis and Suryakusuma, the ideology behind State programs such as PKK and Women's Integrated Program for a Prosperous and Healthy Family in how it extends the concept of the ideal role of a woman as a mother with the addition of heavier tasks is an exemplification of patriarchy. A wife begins by only taking care of the family and then shifts to larger representation in which she undertakes a symbolic role by means of caring for others such as a group, a class, or even the State.³⁶ Suryakusuma considers these ideal roles as being attached as "appendages" to illustrate the heavy burdens a wife has to carry.³⁷ The norm behind this ideology is certainly the constructed *kodrat perempuan*, because the norm and the characteristics Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis and Suryakusuma identified are similar. The case of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City follow the direction of the central government in that PHC is treated as one of the mothers' most important tasks. Posyandu cadres not only represent the role of the mother of a family but also of larger areas of PKK engagement, such as the village, sub-district or even regency/city, province and the State. They fulfil a symbolic role as ideal mothers who take care of the well-being and health status of the people in the area.

In the Reformasi era, the State made some refinements to the understanding of female agency, which brought about another rationalization to the perception of *kodrat perempuan*. The nuances of its meaning, however, are still largely

ment Studies Centre, Australian National University, p. 148; Hunter, 1996." Women as 'good citizens'...": p. 171.

³⁶ Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, n.d. "Ibuisism and Priyayitization", p. 44; as quoted by Julia I. Suryakusuma, 1996. "The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia.", pp. 101-02.

³⁷ Julia I. Suryakusuma. 1996. "The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia.", p. 98

traditional. Unlike during the New Order period when female agency was restricted, the State became more supportive of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* in the Reformasi era and by so doing created more space and opportunity for female agency. This point can be seen, for example, from the fact that PKK's abbreviation was changed and now stands for Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Empowerment for Welfare). In this sense, female agency is treated as the subject as well as the object of the PKK program. As the subject, female agency is expected to play an active role in PKK community programs based on community participation in order to improve family well-being.³⁸ The relevance of Posyandu cadres in PKK lies in the fact that it has ten programs, called Dasawisma (Ten Basic Programs), which are divided into four task forces. The fourth group deals with health and social welfare issues. Health issues are actually the seventh of the ten basic programs. The job of this task force is to provide information to the concerned families, motivate them to lead a healthy life, and make notes about the health status of the families in various fields, such as pregnancy, nursing breastfeeding mothers, children under five, family illnesses, illiteracy, etc.³⁹

Programs at Posyandu often become the concern of other State programs such as those that have been developed in the Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat/PNPM (The National Program for Community Empowerment), Mandiri,⁴⁰ Kader Pemberdayaan Masyarakat/KPM (Community Development Volunteer) of the Desa Siaga program,⁴¹ Tentara Manunggal KB Kesehatan/TMKK (The Integrated Army Service for PHC and Family Planning), Bakti TNI KB Terpadu/BTKT (The Integrated Service of the Army in Family Planning Program) of the Indonesian National Armed Forces programs.⁴² All of these programs provide and open more opportunities for cadres to engage in PHC activities.

To conclude this sub-chapter, the State's policy regarding community participation in the implementation of PHC and population control seems to extend the role of female agents in civic engagement, creating more space and links for their dynamism though within constraints due to the norm which is nurtured from their perception of the constructed *kodrat perempuan*. The shift of the State's discursive practice in this case significantly supports civic engagement as indicated in the discussion above. Having said this, it is important to consider how the mass media develops its discursive practice by covering the implementation of these policies and how people react to them.

³⁸ Departemen Dalam Negeri, 2006. *PKK*. Jakarta: Tim Penggerak PKK Pusat, p. 9

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 10

⁴⁰ <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIA-PACIFICEXT/INDONESIAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21732806-menuPK:3949640-pagePK:1497618-piPK:217854-theSitePK:226309,00.html>. Accessed March 31, 2011.

⁴¹ Abdurrahman (et al.), 2007. "Ringkasan Eksekutif," in *Kesiapan Kajian*: pp. 63-4.

⁴² http://www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailkaryanas.html&nw_code=334 and <http://www.demakkab.go.id/kesejahteraan-sosial/767-kamis-20-mei-2010-bakti-tni-kb-terpadu.html>. Accessed April 19, 2011.

D. Cadres and Mass Media's Coverage

In this sub-chapter, the discussion will focus on how newspapers cover Posyandu cadres. I gathered information about them particularly in *Kompas* (a national daily) and *Radar Tasikmalaya* (a local daily) that were published from 2008 to 2011. The information regarding Posyandu female agents is framed in two themes: coverage of cadres and Posyandu and representation of women's civic engagement, and on what these expressions mean in terms of the perception of the nurtured *kodrat perempuan*.

1. Coverage

The coverage of cadres at the post in the first half decade of the Reformasi era was marked by a decrease of attention given to matters of public health care and population control since the political uprising in 1998. This situation can be seen from the fact that the health status of mothers, pregnant women, babies and children declined and in some cases deplorable conditions as malnutrition occurred: an astonishing number of about four million babies and children faced malnutrition.⁴³ The new government realized that the revitalization of Posyandu had to be one of its priorities. Posyandu is considered to have an important role in continuing the PHC program and population control, as well as in encouraging public participation in State programs. In addition, Posyandu cadres are not only expected to handle PHC and Family Planning matters but also public diseases such as worm infections.⁴⁴

The media also documents the role of NGOs and private companies in implementing PHC programs through their Corporate Social Responsibility divisions (CSR). In this domain Posyandu cadres were reported to have roles, too. For instance, *Kompas* documented the initiative of the NGO World Vision Indonesia/WVI which collaborated with the local government of Surabaya City to train cadres in community empowerment. WVI was motivated to participate in the PHC program by the fact that there were many children under five with a poor health status due to malnutrition. WVI trained cadres in community empowerment and provided assistance after they had finished their training to help them encourage the community to participate in PHC activities.⁴⁵

The media also covered that during the Presidential Election in 2009, the State promised to revitalize Posyandu. In spite of the main target being to attract voters, the promise also showed a strong conviction of the effectiveness of the posts for PHC and Family Planning Development programs. Boediono, one of

⁴³ *Kompas*, "Gizi Buruk Ancam 4 Juta Anak Indonesia." August 11, 2008. <http://female.kompas.com/read/2008/08/11/22340095/gizi.buruk.ancam.4.juta.anak.indonesia>

⁴⁴ *Kompas*. "Wah 800,000 Warga Ramai-ramai Minum Obat Cacing." June 5, 2008.

⁴⁵ Yurnaldi. "Ayo Aktifkan Lagi Posyandu!" *Kompas*, May 13, 2009; *Kompas*, "Pemberian ASI Menuntut Peran Laki-laki," December 22, 2009. <http://health.kompas.com/read/2009/12/22/08161237/Pemberian.ASI.Menuntut.Peran.Laki-laki> .

the vice president candidates at the time, convinced the public about the plan to revitalize Posyandu in three contexts of the revitalization of Family Planning and PHC, saying that:

“Family Planning needs to be revitalized because its present management is in practice declining and needs to concentrate on its target, the poor or the nearly poor. A preventive approach should be adopted to improve basic health services. The Family Planning Program requires reorganization, revitalization and re-coordination with the local government... Two children are enough because taking care of them is affordable and public houses are restored. For all these purposes, the State will increase its budget within its budget constraints. Posyandu is also a part of the programs that should be developed at the same time. We need to pay attention to village nurses and doctors.”⁴⁶

Moreover, it was reported that in 2007, there were more than 267,000 Posyandus throughout the country located in more than 70,000 villages and the number of cadres in each post was 2 to 5 individuals. This means that the total number of cadres in Indonesia is between about 534,000 and 1,335,000 or even more because, according to *Kompas*, the number of cadres in a post could be up to 15.⁴⁷ Their number makes cadres a strategic and important target in the political process. In a political debate on another occasion, Boediono, saw Posyandu together with Family Planning and Puskesmas as primary health care and population control programs in need to be revitalized.⁴⁸ *Kompas* also spoke of using Posyandu's influence to attract the political sympathy of the voters. The newspaper reported that prior to the Presidential elections of 2009, the First Lady and the Minister of Health convened a meeting attended by the representatives of Posyandu cadres. Being aware of the context, some of them reacted to the answer of the Minister of Health, saying “*Wah. Wah. Ini kampanye,*” (*Wah...wah...this is just for the campaign*), when they saw that the Minister had deliberately responded to their demand by saying that the government would take their request to receive a free health care policy as cadres into serious consideration.⁴⁹

Kompas linked female cadres to another form of civic engagement, i.e. waste management. Djuariah Djadjang (born in 1953), a Posyandu cadre in Tamansari Village, Bandung Wetan Sub-district, Bandung City, West Java, extended her role to include being a waste manager. Having only graduated from senior

⁴⁶ Inggried Dwi Wedhaswary. “Boediono: KB Direvitalisasi, Puskesmas dan Posyandu Diberdayakan,” *Kompas*, June 30, 2009.

⁴⁷ *Kompas*. “Menkes: Pengobatan Gratis untuk cadre Posyandu Tergantung SBY,” May 29, 2009. <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/05/29/15345175/Menkes.Pengobatan.Gratiskadre.Posyandu.Tergantung.SBY>.

⁴⁸ *Kompas*, “Boediono: KB Direvitalisasi, Puskesmas dan Posyandu Diberdayakan,” - June 30, 2009. <http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2009/06/30/20063850/Boediono.KB.Direvitalisasi.Puskesmas.dan.Posyandu.Diberdayakan>

⁴⁹ *Kompas*, “Menkes: Pengobatan Gratis untuk cadre Posyandu Tergantung SBY,” May 29, 2009 <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/05/29/15345175/Menkes.Pengobatan.Gratiskadre.Posyandu.Tergantung.SBY>

high school in Bandung, Djuariah has proved herself to be an efficacious citizen after having been part of the post for more than two decades. In 2008, her involvement in the Posyandu was rewarded with the title of Model Cadre (Cadre Teladan/Exemplary Cadre) in Bandung City. At the same time, she was also granted the title of Aseptor KB Teladan (Model as Acceptor of Family Planning). She extended her role to being a pioneer in waste management in her village. The shift began to take place in 2005 when Koalisi untuk Jawa Barat Sehat/KuJBS (a local NGO dealing with health care) offered assistance to the local people in waste management by sending village representatives who were recruited from cadres who had attended a Training of Waste Management in Surabaya to learn how to make goods such as pencil containers, bags, containers for tissue paper, sandals and prayer rugs from waste. At first, it was difficult to invite people to join. However, after working so hard, many of her neighbors decided to learn the trade and enjoy the benefit. As a result, not only have the piles of garbage been reduced significantly, many mothers since then have gained additional income from selling their home products. Their waste management and their products were appreciated and in 2008, their community has received rewards for its concern with waste in West Java.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the media also followed the cadres' well-being. Although their work is voluntary, from time to time cadres received a small incentive. The State and other financial resources were advised to heed the cadres' welfare. A common problem a Posyandu faces is lack of and irregular funding.⁵¹ Although still limited, the Posyandu cadres I interviewed in Tasikmalaya confirmed this problem and added that the local government did not always provide a budget. When it did, it allocated very little money and it did not distribute it to them regularly every month. For example, Deti Mardianti and Yeti Rosmiati explained that every six months the Puskesmas allocated a small budget of IRD 150,000. They usually secured additional funding from various sources such as *kencleng* (a money box which participants were regularly asked to contribute to), *arisan* (fundraising collected through members of a social gathering, who each receive a turn to win; done regularly [every month]), village office or from the RT's or RW's financial resources. In some cases, husbands financially supported their wives' activities in the post. For example, Yatini Medina received about IRD 100,000 for each Posyandu meeting from her husband to be used for PMT (Pemberian Makanan Tambahan/Providing Additional Meal for Babies). In another case, cadres themselves provided PMT and spend their own money or gave the food they had.

⁵⁰ Lis Dhaniati. Kompas, "Oase: Djuariah Djang, Si Guru Sampah," February 16, 2009. <http://m.kompas.com/news/read/data/2009.02.16.14035719>

⁵¹ Runik Sri Astuti. Kompas November 1, 2010, "Posyandu: *cadre* Posyandu Tak Dapat Insentif," <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/11/01/1912462/cadre.Posyandu.Tak.Dapat.Insentif>; Josephus Primus. Kompas, "cadre Posyandu Cuma Dibayar 'Duit Hijau'," May 14, 2010; Radar Tasikmalaya, "cadre Posyandu Harus Sejahtera," July 17, 2010, p. B.

Finally, the media also documented the involvement of cadres in MDGs programs (Millennium Development Goals). Although some were disappointed with the accomplishments of the MDGs objectives, particularly regarding maternal health care, as reported in *Kompas* of April 21, 2010, there were signs of success in Tasikmalaya City. As reported in an article in the local newspaper entitled “Tiga Target MDGs Bisa Tak Tercapai,” Tasikmalaya City received an award from Metro TV (November 25, 2009) for the city’s success in reducing infant mortality and maternal deaths in childbirth by up to 75%.⁵²

In general, we may conclude that the media framed its coverage of Posyandu activities in the most generally accepted sense of the term. It reported about PHC and other related matters which were dear to women, including family planning, and about the roles and dedication of female and male Posyandu agents.⁵³ In this regard, the mass media took care not to overstep the expectations of the constructed *kodrat perempuan*.

2. Representation

The media’s coverage on cadres’ civic engagement leadership illustrates at least three important points. Firstly, female cadres’ activities can be considered a strategy of female leadership. Civic engagement in this case is an expression of “the duty to contribute to the common good.”⁵⁴ Female cadres’ involvement in PHC and the population control program constitutes an important element of active citizenship. This is a strategy for them to negotiate space and opportunity in the public sphere where they can engage together with the State in the interest of the public. This strategy not only makes them active citizens, but also allows them to gain extended or even new roles in society such as illustrated above in the case of Djuariah who had become a beneficial citizen as a waste manager in Tasikmalaya. Dewi Hikmah had become a public leader as RT head, a village head in the case of Ade Mustikawati (former head of Margaluyu Village), and Nia Rahmi Kaniati as former head of Pasir Panjang Village.

The second point is a way of transgressing the restriction from the implication of the perception of *kodrat perempuan*. One of the common roles derived from the perception of *kodrat* is that of a married woman as an IRT (house wife). In fact, often the IRT role is perceived as the only fundamental role for a wife to have. Many cadres, including the cadres I interviewed, mainly act as IRT. Being active as cadres, mothers are taught new skills and they are provided with knowledge about different agents and institutions. As illustrated in the reports mentioned above, mothers were transformed into social agents who were able to

⁵² *Radar Tasikmalaya*, “Pemkot Raih MDGs Award Berprestasi di Bidang Kesehatan,” November 30, 2009, p. 6.

⁵³ *Kompas*, “Pemberian ASI Menuntut Peran Laki-laki,” December 22, 2009. <http://health.kompas.com/read/2009/12/22/08161237/Pemberian.ASI.Menuntut.Peran.Laki-laki>.

⁵⁴ Lister (et al.), 2007. *Gendering Citizenship...*, p. 20.

contribute positively to the common good of the public, in this case PHC and population control. The cadres' new roles were not only within the realm of PHC and family planning, but also in other areas of social and economic engagement such as the case with Djuariah as a waste manager as reported in the news, Yayah Sofiah in Rajapolah Sub-district in Tasikmalaya as manager of a Nilem fish food processing home industry, and with Komala in Rajapolah with her mendong leaf handicraft home industry. Their social engagement in the post represented a shift towards being efficacious citizens and in a sense it may also elevate their status from being dependent on a male breadwinner to becoming a second breadwinner⁵⁵ as some cadres also expanded their role into the economic sphere such as Sofiah and Djuariah.

Finally, the third point is that the media's coverage on Posyandu cadres' activities may be considered an important way to express female lived citizenship. As the majority of cadres are women and their practices are supported both by the State and by society, female cadres actually construct a gender regime where balances are maintained between voluntary and professional work, State and private involvement, and where funds (though limited) are allocated and men and women share time either at home or in the workplace.⁵⁶ Women are formally active in Posyandu once a month, but as many cadres also engage in similar activities and most commonly in PKK's activities, they end up being involved in social engagements rather often. This means that they were actually shaping routine and cultural practices, which led to constructing gender culture. Cadres' civic engagement in PHC and population control represented an understanding of citizenship as a lived experience. Female cadres' practical side of citizenship reflected, as explained above, an extension as well as a shift from merely being IRTs to active citizenship and even to the extent of paving the way to having become equal citizens. The relation between cadres as subjective resources of discourse and Posyandu as an objective resource of discourse in the context of other resources of discourse represents a continuous effort of women's citizenship actualization. Media covers their social engagement in different events and occasions and directs them into the public's attention.

In short, mass media's coverage on the issues of PHC and population control in relation to the role of cadres dealt with the State's policy, its budgeting, implementation and evaluation. Cadres' coverage in mass media caused them to be exposed on a wide scale, not only in a nationwide context where people understand the language used in the Indonesian press, but also to global audiences people can access through the internet or on television. On one hand, these reports construct a strong representation of women's leadership engagement in the field of health and on the other create an important way for expressing citizenship by extending women's roles from IRTs to active citizens.

⁵⁵ Using the term used by Lister. Ibid, p. 24.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 3.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, the impression is given that the present practice still supports Hunter's conclusion that female Posyandu cadres represent an expression of citizenship which entails women to be "good citizens" due to the State's discursive practice of placing them as supporting agents. However, Hunter's argument rests more on external factors, i.e. State ideology, Pancasila, PKK and the like. These external factors shape women's ideal roles for them. Although directed, cadres in her opinion are at the same time also restricted and not treated as equal agents. In addition, these discursive practices of the external factors seem in her eyes undeniable. So, for her, the appropriate way to describe Posyandu cadres' role is as "good citizens". However, this study suggests that she overlooks the implications of the existing restriction. This study finds that cadres have plenty of opportunity and space to engage in and, as experienced by the cadres I interviewed, that they can pass over existing boundaries.

The cadres I interviewed were mostly IRTs (house wives). This means that women are supporting agents, are second class citizens and are not equal partners in line with their ideal role as prescribed by the constructed *kodrat perempuan*. But, after having been active in Posyandu activities for a while, cadres are armed with new knowledge, trained in basic health science, make new friends, are channeled to different organizations, and above all they construct their leadership trajectory and legacy. These facts suggest that, because it is defined by the State's discursive practices, the restriction is not stagnant but fluid. Cadres are subject to change as they begin to play more dynamic roles as soon as they improve their skills, knowledge and networks.

A cadre's leadership trajectory takes different forms, ranging from derived, achieved to a blended form of authority. As literacy is used as a basic requirement, cadres educational background certainly helps them to be considered as eligible candidates. However, since the world of PHC and Family Planning is new to most new cadres, the information and skills they get through meetings, classes, workshops and in training sessions open up new doors and certainly could extend their role in society.

As their leadership trajectories improve through being active in Posyandu and other similar activities, conducted either by the State or by private industries and elements of civil society such as NGOs, cadres' leadership experiences to some extent help women to extend their role from being only IRTs to having an important function in their neighborhood. In addition, women find that by being active as cadres they discover links and markets for initiating and developing small businesses. In return, these opportunities and initiatives help them develop, and in some cases, rediscover their economic independency.

Finally, being a Posyandu cadre can be seen as a way of expressing citizenship in terms of rights and responsibilities, belonging and participation. This expression is actually an interesting effort of women as citizens. Their activity as cadres is a representation of female active citizenship. Their effort so far could be considered as a significant effort in paving their way to being equal citizens.

CHAPTER FIVE

LEADERSHIP IN ISLAMIC EDUCATION: *THE FEMALE FACTOR*

Introduction

Islamic educational development is one of the important themes that arise when discussing modernization and Islam. Initially, Islamic education was modernized in the context of the modernization of Muslim society or Islamic reform in the eighteenth century in South Asia, and in the nineteenth century in other areas. In India, Shah Waliullah (1702-63), for example, proposed Islamic reform by promoting the formative period of Muslim history as a model.¹ Included among the efforts of Islamic reform was educational reform in which boys and girls were welcomed to study. Girls received special attention in education although mainly in certain subjects. In Egypt, education for girls began in the first half of the nineteenth century, but with a restricted number of students, and it began to target a larger number of female students in the second half of the century.² The subjects offered included handicrafts, etiquette and midwifery. The argument behind these subjects was in the first place appropriateness. It was very much based on the appropriateness of *kodrat perempuan*. This practice was ubiquitous all over the world including the West. Education for girls in the West itself is traceable back to the sixteenth century and used the same arguments.³ Countries such as France, Italy, England, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, had schools for girls. It seems that Islamic education was also influenced by European practices, but they certainly also had their own arguments, be they based on their religious discursive resources or on cultural ones.

The impact of offering education for girls also appeared in Indonesia. Here, women began to participate in a modern schooling system in the late nineteenth

¹ Ira M. Lapidus, 1988 1st Edition, 1996 Edition. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 462.

² Arief Subhan, 2009. *Lembaga Pendidikan Islam Indonesia Abad ke-20*. Jakarta. UIN Jakarta Press, pp. 29-45.

³ Barbara J. Whitehead (ed.), 1999. *Women's Education in Early Modern Europe. A History, 1500-1800*. NY: Garland Press, p. xv.

century as one of the consequences of the Dutch Indies' policy. This trend grew stronger in the beginning of the twentieth century when women had opportunities to participate in education in both secular and religious schools. Since then there has been a trend towards supporting education for women by offering them more space and opportunities. The reasons behind the emergence of schools for girls in this country were similar to those in other areas of the world, which was the appropriateness of the subjects with *kodrat perempuan*.⁴

Many studies have been conducted to shed light on Islamic educational reform in Indonesia.⁵ Their discussions cover many different aspects ranging from institutional developments and the roles of its agents and leaders in the process, to the roles of their institutions and alumni in society and politics. Many studies focused their analysis on male leadership while few studies have paid attention to female leadership and the role of elite female leaders, as done by Faiqoh 2003, Van Doorn-Harder 2006, Kharirah 2010, and Srimulyani 2012. This study takes another look at these agents but within a different context and it is complementary to the existing studies as now it includes the agents that are called *ummi* and *ibu*. This chapter discusses local female leadership in *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City within the frame of *kodrat perempuan*.⁶ I visited *pesantrens* of different backgrounds such as NU, PERSIS, Muhammadiyah, Tarekat Idrisiyah and Ma'had Salafi. I interviewed 46 respondents based on the snowball technique selection, consisting of 29 women and 17 men. Among the men were spouses, colleagues, and activists concerned with Islamic education, and the women comprised of the wives of *kyais* and *ustadz*s and their daughters, teachers, and students. This chapter discusses leadership trajectories, leadership experience, women and State educational development, and media coverage on female leadership.

A. Leadership Trajectory

Based on my fieldwork and observations in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, Muslim women who are engaged in Islamic educational institutions consider the perception of *kodrat perempuan* to be an influential factor in their leadership trajectory. Muslim women leadership in Islamic educational in-

⁴ Edi S. Ekajati (et al.), 1986. *Sejarah Pendidikan Daerah Jawa Barat*. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Dan kebudayaan, pp. 42-8, 107-18.

⁵ See for example Karel A. Steenbrink 1974; Mona Abaza 1993, 1994; Djunnaidi Abd. Syakur (et al.) 1998; Taufik Abdullah 1971; Bahatin Aksit 1994; Azyumardi Azra 1977, 1988, 1997, 1999, 2003; Martin van Bruinessen 1999; Ronald Alan Lukens Bull 1997; Jajat Burhanuddin 2007; Zamakshari Dofier 1982 and 1999; Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qosim zaman (eds) 2007; Sidney Jones 1991; Abdurrahman Mas'ud 1997; Malik Fajar 1998, Noor, Sikand and van Bruinessen (eds) 2008; Mastuhu 1994; Faiqoh 2003; Van Doorn-Harder 2006; Eka Srimulyani 2012; Arief Subhan 2009, etc.

⁶ As the focus of the discussion in this chapter is women's leadership in Islamic educational institutions, from now I will only use term *nyai* for efficiency but it also covers the terms *ibu* and *ummi* which will only be used when explicitly necessary.

stitutions can be classified into two types: inherited and achieved. An inherited female leader may be defined as a Muslim woman who is called a leader in a *pesantren* because she is the daughter of the founder or married to one of his close relatives. An achieved leader may be defined as a Muslim woman who is called a leader in a *pesantren* because she established a *pesantren* or occupies an important position in it. The trajectory of Muslim female leadership here refers to Muslim women leaders who take power when they are needed by playing an important role in a *pesantren* and in society. People then begin to assign her this respectful status, usually that of *nyai*, *ummi* or *ibu*. In another case, she can be called a *muballighah* or an *ustadzah* for her role as (female) religious preacher. However not every *muballighah* and *ustadzah* is called a *nyai*.⁷

1. Inherited Leadership

In the inherited type of leadership, the influence of the perception of *ke-drat perempuan* on the female leadership trajectory can be identified in at least two important paths: blood ties and marriage, and education. The first path is a common way to transfer leadership. By marriage, a *kyai* usually expects that the management of the *pesantren* is maintained and even developed. For example, an endogamous marriage will be the choice of a head of a *pesantren* who does not have a son who is interested to be his successor but has a daughter who is concerned with the existence of the institution.⁸ The *kyai* will find a future husband for her daughter, whom quite often is his brightest student, or if he cannot find one he will use his so-called “*kyai* network” to find one. A *nyai* in this type is gifted with the genealogical capital of blood and marriage. This added value alone gives power and she can use her father’s and her husband’s charisma to construct her own leadership path. As the daughter of a *kyai*, through taking advantage of what she and her family have she has the opportunity and support needed for her to develop her knowledge, skills and networks.

A Muslim woman leader who is not a daughter of a *kyai* but is married to a *kyai* can also be a *nyai*. This type is often found in both traditional and modern *pesantrens*. The girl could be a student of a *pesantren*, general school, university or a graduate. She receives the status of *nyai* because of her marriage to a *kyai*. However, she usually attains charisma soon after she gets married. She sometimes can have a big influence if she herself develops her role and if her husband de-

⁷ An *ustadzah* most likely gains achieved power on her own in contrast to a *nyai* who commonly has derived power. An *ustadzah* also does not necessarily own an Islamic institution such as a *pesantren* or Islamic school; rather she may have a number of members of *majlis taklims* who usually go to see her for instruction. She is not always from a *pesantren* family. She may be from an ordinary family who has gone through an adequate Islamic education and/or general education. Sometimes she may be supported by her rhetoric skills. Lies M. Marcoes 1992. “The Female Preacher as Mediator in Religion”, pp. 205-6.

⁸ Zamakhsyari Dhofier. 1982. *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*. Jakarta: LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial), pp. 61-2.

cides to play a decisive role in that development. As is often the norm in society, the husband is the head of the family and the family members are advised to have his consent before they engage socially. For example, Nyai Devi Setiani, the wife of K.H. Asep Sujai, the head of Pesantren Cintawana in Singaparna, Tasikmalaya Regency, was initially a graduate of a senior high school and her father was a teacher and her mother a house wife (*Ibu Rumah Tangga*/IRT). Her leadership route started when she was a little girl when she joined in a parade and acted as a physician. She often took part in art and sport activities when she was a student in junior high school. As an SMA student she was not so active because she also had to study both at the senior higher school (SMA) and in Pesantren Cipasung. Her husband not only gave her his permission but also encouraged her to teach the Qur'an to younger students. She then pursued her studies at Diploma 2⁹ level majoring in teaching early age in 2005 and she graduated in 2007. In 2008, she began her higher education with the S1 program. Helping the general treasurer of the *pesantren*, she was responsible for managing the menu and for shopping for the daily meals of about 300 students. In the *pesantren* there is a Posyandu/Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu (United Health Service Post for Maternity, Child and Elderly Care) and A Poskestren/Pusat Kesehatan Pesantren (Centre for Pesantren's Health Care) and she helps the local nurse in the Posyandu by running activities and distributing medicine to the patients.¹⁰

A Muslim woman can become a leader because of her blood ties or because she deserves to occupy a leadership position due to her role in a *pesantren* and in society. The difference is that here marriage is not used for the purpose of institutional human resource development, but rather a God given happening. For example, *Ibu* Imas Maesharah Amin,¹¹ the daughter of K.H. Aminullah, the founder of Pesantren Benda in Tasikmalaya City, was married to Asep Mansur, an ordinary man. After a while the family had two daughters and they moved to Sulawesi. They lived there and opened an optic store. She divorced her husband in 2000 because she felt she had to develop the *pesantren* and she could not live with such a long distance marriage as the *pesantren* is located far away, separated by the Java Sea. Her family legacy consisted of the leadership of her father and brothers and destined her to be a leader in the *pesantren* also. As K.H. Aminullah's daughter she only had the opportunity to pursue her education at a higher level in religious studies. She seems to be a logical person and fond of thinking things through to the roots. She once asked permission from her father to continue her education at Driyarkara University Jakarta, majoring in Philosophy, but her father refused. She explained that "his own policy of education for his children was

⁹ In Indonesia the undergraduate level consists of a one year training program called Diploma 1 (D1), a two years training program called Diploma 2 (D2), a three years program called Diploma 3 (D3), and four to six years programs called Strata 1 (S1). A Diploma program is regulated under the Constitution of the National Education System no 20, 2003, article 19.

¹⁰ Interview with Nyai Devi Setiani, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 18, 2010.

¹¹ According to Ustadz Budi Setiadi, in Persis *pesantrens*, *nyai* are usually called *ibu* or *ustadzah*. Interview with Ustadz Budi Setiadi. February 7, 2011.

that boys were allowed to study secular sciences besides religious knowledge at a higher educational level, and daughters were only allowed to immerse themselves in religious studies. It was considered enough for his daughters to study secular knowledge on a basic educational level.” She pursued her undergraduate studies at IAIN (subsequently called UIN) Sunan Gunungjati in Bandung majoring in Dakwah management. At the time of my fieldwork in 2010 she is finishing her M.A. degree in the same field at the same university.¹²

Maesarah’s leadership path actually started when she was in primary school when she was asked to become the secretary of her class. As secretary of the class, little Maesarah was trained to communicate not only with her friends, but also with her teachers. Her blood ties were instrumental when she was in junior and senior high school when she was elected as the head of Ummahāt al-Ghadd (the Future Mother) at both the junior (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) and senior level (Madrasah Aliyah) in Pesantren Benda. The main task of the student body was to coordinate student activities and to represent their interests in the education process. Her leadership was developed further when she was a student at UIN Bandung where she was active in both the internal and external student bodies. At the campus, she was active as the treasurer of the Student Senate Body, while off campus she was affiliated with HMI from 1984 to 1989.

In general, *nyais* went to a *pesantren* and a *madrasah* or to a *pesantren* and a general school. Some pursued their education to a higher level, commonly at an institute for higher Islamic Studies or a *ma’had ‘ali* or general university. Some *kyais* still prioritize education for their sons and allow their daughters to pursue education only in a *pesantren* from four years (more or less similar with the junior high school level) to eight years (more or less similar with graduation from a 2-year diploma program) and to stop their schooling just before getting married. For example, Pesantren Miftahul Huda in Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya Regency, established a policy not to offer secular sciences.¹³ Hj. Daliah Mutiara Afandi, who is married to K.H. Enjang, one of the senior *kyais* in the *pesantren*, only finished the basic level of formal school. She then pursued her studies in her father’s *pesantren*. The *pesantren* provides her with opportunities to teach and preach either in the *pesantren* itself or within its network which reaches throughout Tasikmalaya. After her father passed away she began to work on her leadership. Since then she has become one of the *pesantren*’s leading religious teachers with the busy schedule of preaching and counselling in many places in Tasikmalaya. She seems to have developed her leadership talent by combining her blood ties capital as the daughter of a *kyai*, her *pesantren*’s networks, and her own efforts to increase her knowledge and her skills.

Some others send their daughters to a *pesantren* as well as to a *madrasah*, as experienced by Nyai Imas Mus’idah. She is the first daughter of K.H. Busthomi (the former head of Pesantren Bahru al ‘Ulūm, in Awipari in Tasikmalaya

¹² Interview with *Nyai* Imas Maesarah Amien, July 29, 2010.

¹³ Interview with, K.H. Asep Akhmad Mausael, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 14, 2008.

City). She studied in her father's *pesantren* during her childhood and in Pesantren Cipasung while she also enrolled in junior and senior high school. In formal education she completed the six-year program of PGA/Pendidikan Guru Agama (Religious Teacher's Training) in 1959. As the daughter of a famous *kyai* with a solid genealogy---her ancestors reach back to Syekh Abdul Muhyi---she was given the opportunity to teach basic Islamic subjects in her *pesantren* since she was thirteen years old. Since then (1967), teaching has become her career when the State assigned her to teach at a Religious Primary School (Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah). In the course of time she also taught at different levels of schooling from the elementary up to senior high school. Besides teaching she also loved to organize activities. She got involved in organizational activities of the women's wings of the NU's such as Fatayat and Muslimat NU and participated in political practices where she affiliated with the PPP and, since the start of the Reformasi era, with the PKB.¹⁴

Some *kyais* send their daughters both to an Islamic and to a secular school, as goes the story of Nyai Ida Nurkhalidah and Nyai Enung Nursaidah, the daughters of K.H. Ilyas Ruhiat, the former head of Pesantren Cipasung in Singaparna, Tasikmalaya Regency. Nyai Nurkhalidah married Abdul Chobir, the son of the leader of Pesantren Nurul Huda in Tulungagung, and Nyai Nursaidah married Jajang Rudi Haman, son of H. Endang Sukirman, a former senior staff member of the Pesantren Cipasung foundation.¹⁵ Nyai Nurkhalidah studied in her father's *pesantren* and also enrolled in the Islamic junior and senior high school which were also located inside the *pesantren*. She graduated as the best student. She pursued her undergraduate and graduate studies at the IKIP (Institute for Teachers' Training), now known as UPI Bandung (Indonesian Education University) and she majored in chemistry.¹⁶ Nyai Nursaidah also studied in a *pesantren*, did her Islamic junior and senior high school in the *pesantren* and also graduated as the best student. She also continued her undergraduate and master's degree at IKIP Bandung, but majored in biology.¹⁷ Both women were active in Fatayat NU. They are also active in NGO activities as leaders of organizations like Nahdina and PUSPITA Puan Amal Hayati, Tasikmalaya Branch.

What is interesting here is that Muslim female engagement is operational within the ideal role and status of women as commonly prescribed by *kodrat perempuan* norms. The influence of these norms is found in the form of the limitation of the areas of social engagement such as that a woman could only pursue her studies to a higher level in religious studies or could only engage socially in religious activities and those usually done by women, and the implementation of the wife's necessity to obtain her husband's consent to engage socially.

¹⁴ Interview with Nyai Ida Mus'idah, Tasikmalaya City, July 29, 2010.

¹⁵ Iip D. Yahya, 2006. *Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi KH. Moh. Ilyas Ruhiyat*. Yogyakarta: LKiS, pp. 78-84, and 84-91.

¹⁶ Yahya, 2006. *Ajengan Cipasung*, pp. 78-84.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 84-91.

2. Achieved Leadership

In achieved leadership, the influence of constructed *kodrat perempuan* on the leadership trajectory of female agency falls into two categories: creating one's own carrier and dedication. The first refers to a Muslim woman leader who is educated in Islamic studies and who married a man educated in the same discipline and who together establish a *pesantren* to create their own leadership. This trajectory, for instance, is the experience of Nyai Etti Tismayanti. She married K.H. Mukhsin al-Sadili. Both are State employees as teachers. She formally became a *nyai* after she and her husband established Pesantren al-Ikhwan, in Condong, Setia Nagara, Tasikmalaya City in 1989. The land on which the *pesantren* was built was endowed by Hj. Djuhaenah, a local female donator. Tismayanti was born on August 10, 1957 in Ciakar, Cijulang, Ciamis Regency. Her father, H. Masfuddin, and her mother Hj. Siti Khadijah are religious. They sent all of their four children to school up to the undergraduate level. Tismayanti finished her primary level in her village, her junior level in Cijulang, one year of her senior level in Pangandaran and six years in Sukamanah, Tasikmalaya. She graduated in 1974. She continued to higher education to do a three year program at Faculty of Tarbiyyah, YPPI Tasikmalaya and graduated in 1978. She married her husband in 1977 when he was a student at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. She continued to study for her S1 at the same institution, but it was transformed into STAI (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam/Islamic Higher Education) Tasikmalaya and graduated in 1991. She pursued a Master's degree at UIN Sunan Gunungjati in Bandung with a focus on Islamic education and she finished in 2006. She immediately continued with her S3 program and graduated for her doctorate in 2008. In addition to her primary task as a State employee (teacher), she is also an active *nyai* in the *pesantren* and she leads many programs there. She developed her knowledge, skills and networking at both State schools where she works daily and in private schools as she runs and manages a *pesantren* and the schools inside her *pesantren*. She is also active in mass organizations like Fatayat NU and Muslimat NU, the local women's organization, GOW, and in *majlis taklim* both in neighboring areas and in the regency's mosque.¹⁸

In terms of the dedication path, a Muslim woman leader in this course is an *ibu* who is not the daughter of a *kyai* and not married to a *kyai* but an activist in Islamic education and married to an ordinary man. She gets the status of *ibu* after she has dedicated herself to a *pesantren* in a significant way in the role of educator, manager or *muballighat* (female preacher). For example, Ibu Aisyah. She, the daughter of a shopkeeper at a local market in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya Regency, has an important role in Persis's Pesantren called Cibereukah as the head of student affairs and the head of early age education. This role became her leadership tract after she had passed various learning and activism processes. She did her basic studies from primary to junior high school (finished in 2001) in Pesantren Cibereukah in Rajapolah, and finished her senior high school in 2004

¹⁸ Interview with Nyai Etti Tismayanti, Tasikmalaya City, August 4, 2010.

in Madrasah ‘Aliya in Cilembang, Tasikmalaya. She was also determined to finish her undergraduate studies and graduated in Galuh University in 2009 with a major in English.

Aisyah’s began her leadership abilities when she was in the fourth class of primary school. Initially, she took on public responsibility as the treasurer of her class. At the time she was defeated in the election for head of class. Being defeated, however, did not cause her to withdraw from public responsibility. She accepted the offer to be the treasurer. When she was in the second class of Madrasah Tsanawiyah of Pesantren Cibereukah, she was elected head of Ummahāt al-Ghadd (the Future Mother), defeating another candidate who happened to be the daughter of the head of the *pesantren*. However, once she decided to interrupt her leadership path when she declined her friends’ urgent suggestion to become the president of the English Department Student Body at Galuh University because she believed that that this leadership role was beyond her *kodrat* as a woman. She believed that the president of a student body should be a man. Thus, she accepted the role as the treasurer of the body. While she was a student at Galuh University, *Ibu* Aisyah was also active in Persis’s sister organization, PERSISTRI. Before being elected as the head of PERSISTRI of Rajapolah sub-district for the period of 2010 to 2014, she was assigned to coordinate its Dakwah division. It seems that activism is in her nature because she has also been active in local radio broadcasting for the last five years. At the same time she has participated in the Forum Komunikasi Remaja Muslim/FKRM (Communication Forum for Muslim Adolescents). She is quite often invited as a *muballighat* in Rajapolah or Ciawi sub-regencies.¹⁹

Having discussed the trajectory of Muslim female leaders, it may be said that their trajectories are mostly constructed along the line of their educational progress starting from elementary school up to higher educational levels. Other factors also contribute to their trajectories such as family relations, activism, and networking. The perception of *kodrat perempuan* influences their engagement but in its constructed meanings. Its influence is latent in that it is hidden, dormant, yet capable of being developed. Therefore, it determines the scope of women’s engagement, which mainly falls within the socio-religious sphere.

B. Leadership Experience

Like the trajectory of Muslim female leadership, women’s leadership experience is also discussed within the same two types of inherited and achieved leadership.

¹⁹ Interview with *Ibu* Aisyah, Tasikmalaya Regency, July 28, 2010.

1. Inherited Leadership

Having discussed the trajectory of Muslim women's leadership in *pesantrens*, the discussion will now continue with women's leadership experiences. How they played their roles within the institution they led can basically be divided along the definition of the two groups: those who developed and extended their roles and who were in the majority compared to those who restricted their roles who were comparatively few. Regarding the first group, it seems that in terms of developing and extending their roles, there is no difference between *nyais* who belong to families who run *pesantrens* and wives of *pesantren* leaders, whether they have a NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, or Salafi background. Husbands, of course, have an interest in making their leadership successful, and their wives are their closest and the most reliable and trustworthy agents. Understandably, they give permission for and support their wives' involvement in *pesantren* affairs. For women, offering assistance and collaboration is a duty and an opportunity, and if they are enthusiastic, it is a kind of "*gayung bersambut*" (mutual benefit) for the women as well as for their husbands. The fact that the beginning of this kind of opportunity is different from the other we discussed above determines its dynamics. Here, both agents use their perception of *kodrat* to find grounds for their engagement and to actualize their engagement through permission and support.

Female leadership commonly develops within the constraints of their umbrella institutions. From within their *pesantrens* or *madrasahs*, women leaders get involved in activities conducted by wing institutions such as *majlis taklim*, Aisyah (Muhammadiyah's female wing organization), PERSISTRIS (Persis's female wing organization), Fatayat NU (NU's organization for girls) and Muslimat NU (NU's organization for women). This extension may reach other organization within these organizations which are usually related, such as local *majlis taklim* organizations like BKMT (Badan Koordinasi Majelis Taklim/Majlis Taklim Coordination Body), or a local women's organization such as GOW (Gabungan Organisasi Wanita/Women's Organizations Group). For example, Nyai Yoyoh Joharah, the head of the female students in Pesantren Cintawana in Singaparna, Tasikmalaya Regency, attained her power to lead her *pesantren* for girls by inheritance. Before he died, her father handed down the mandate to lead the *pesantren* to her. Her *pesantren* for female students is part of the main *pesantren* and is located within the grounds of the main *pesantren*. The *pesantren* offers both traditional Islamic ways of learning through *sorogan*²⁰ and *bandongan*²¹ and includes *madrasahs* or general schools. There are three kinds of students. First, students who only study at a *madrasah* or school, which constitute the majority among the 1800

²⁰ *Sorogan* means submitting. It is a method of learning used in traditional *pesantrens* in which one or more *santris* (*pesantren* students) report the progress of their learning to a religious teacher and the teacher listens to and corrects their readings and explanations.

²¹ *Bandongan* means listening to. It is, contrary to *Sorogan*, a method of learning in traditional *pesantrens* in which *santris* (*pesantren* students) listens to a teacher's reading and explanation, and write notes written in under the line of *Kitab Kuning* (a name used to illustrate the reference book used in traditional *pesantrens*) or the learned book.

students who are scattered over various programs from early education to senior high school in both religious and secular programs. The second refers to those students who study at a *pesantren* and at a *madrasah* or general school. This kind numbers about 270 male and female students. The third and last kind is *santris* (*pesantren* students). There are about 80 *santris* in the special program of the *pesantren* (*pesantren takhassus*) to educate them more specifically in Islamic subject so that they may become a *kyai*.

Nyai Yoyoh Johara felt obliged to honor her father's will to lead the *pesantren* for female students. Her father had stated his will to her uncle K.H. Odang and he had said that "*budak awewe diceukel ku Yoyoh*" (female students are to be led by Yoyoh). Having been authorized to lead the *pesantren*, she dedicated her life to it. There are now 105 female students who fall under her responsibility. Apart from teaching, she acts as the girls' mother, listening to their complaints and at the same time offers them advice and rewards or punishes them. Her education stopped after she graduated from senior high school and she studied Islam in her father's *pesantren*. She only studied for one month outside her institution at Pesantren Bantar Gedang in Cibeurem, Tasikmalaya City. In order to strengthen her position as a *nyai* she usually tried to increase her knowledge through self-study and when necessary by asking her husband's advice. She also learned from senior *kyais* who teach every Friday and Saturday night. The subjects spoken about include Hadith, Tafsir and *fiqh* (Islamic Law).²²

The following examples concern the wives of *kyais* or *ustadzahs*. *Ibu Ai Kurniasih* of a Persis background only graduated from senior high school. Nevertheless, she not only had the tasks of handling the institution's financial affairs and organizing the daily meals for 600 students, she also taught religious subjects. She administered the funds according to the expenses agreed upon and controlled them carefully. After her husband passed away, the new management of the *pesantren* continued to trust her to handle the institution's funds.²³ *Ibu Kurniasih* acts as leader under the shadow of her husband who is the leader of Pesantren Benda. She did not let her husband down after he died as the *pesantren* still assigns her the tasks she used to have and even added other teaching obligations to her duties.

Nyai Heni Novianti has an NU background. Although she only graduated from junior high school (1991) and studied at Pesantren Riyad al-'Ulum wa al-Dakwa for about four years, she frequently taught at the *pesantren*. To improve her teaching skills and knowledge, she continued her education after marrying K.H. Endang Rahmat in 1995 by participating in Package C²⁴ in 2007 and grad-

²² Interview with Nyai Yoyoh Joharah, Tasikamalaya Regency, October 29, 2010.

²³ Interview with *Ibu Ai Kurniasih*, Tasikmalaya City, October 26, 2010.

²⁴ A package program is a replacement program for the basic education level. This package is intended to give an opportunity for those who did not take formal basic education programs and to decrease the number of illiteracy in Indonesia. Package A is equivalent to primary school, Package B is equivalent to junior high school, and Package C is equivalent to senior high school.

uating in 2008. In 2009 she began her higher education and she majored in Islamic education at a local institute for Islamic studies. When I interviewed her she was in her third semester. One year after she got married in 1995, she began to teach the following subjects: etiquette for girls, *fiqh* (Islamic Law), *tauhid* (theology), Arabic grammar and the Arabic language. In 2001, she began to teach junior high school students on the subject of *imlā'* (Arabic dictation), *mahfuḍāt* (Arabic proverbs), introduction to Islamic law and Ḥadīth and in 2004 she started teaching senior high school students on the subjects of *Ḥadīth*, *Tafsīr Jalālain* and *tauhid*. Different from other *nyais*, she confined her area of engagement to education only.²⁵

Ummi Husna had a Salafi background and she is the wife of Ustadz Heri Imam, the head of SMP and Kesantrian Putri (Female Student Affairs) of Ihya al-Sunna Ma'had, a Salafi *pesantren*. The followers of the Salafi Manhaj (Method of the Early Generations of Muslim Societies) used to take Arabic names. Ummi Husna is her sobriquet. Her real name is Nurhidayati Mukhtar and she is from Garut (West Java) origin. She graduated from Diploma 3 (a three year program) of the Akademi Kesehatan Lingkungan (Academy of Environmental Health) in Surabaya and when I interviewed her she was 36 years old. She found that her social engagement was limited because she had to meet many obligations, such as obtaining her husband's consent, considering if a man was her *muhrim* or not, remembering her role as a house wife and the need for her to be flexible during her educational work. At the beginning, she did not use her higher educational background because she felt that it was difficult to avoid interactions with a *ghayr al-muhrim* (the opposite sex whom she is not allowed to be with) and so instead taught at a primary school in Lembang, Tasikmalaya.

At the time of my fieldwork in 2010, Ummi Husna helps her husband to manage female student affairs by acting as the coordinator of the female student division. The foundation is headed by a Muḍīr al-Ma'had (Head of Pesantren). There are two divisions: a teaching and learning division, and a student affairs division. The first division is divided up in accordance with the programs: kindergarten class, primary school, and junior and senior high school. In the near future, a new program will be added to this division, i.e. early age education. The second division is divided into six sub-divisions: health, *musrifah*/counselling, logistics, sports, security and visitors. Each student is expected to memorize the Qur'an, or at least 10 *juzs* while attending the program. The way to do this is by dividing the students into classes of 40 students headed by a leader. Each class is divided into small groups of 7 to 10 students. Ummi Husna is responsible for the counselling sub-division. One of her tasks is to help students who have problems related either to their wellbeing in the *pesantren* or to their studies.²⁶

I have found few examples during my fieldwork of *nyais* who only enacted their roles of mothers and wives. Nyai Nina Munawaroh, the wife of K.H. Mahmud Faried, the leader of Riyād al-'Ulūm wa al-Dakwa in Condong, Tasikmalaya

²⁵ Interview with Nyai Heni Novianti. Tasikmalaya City, August 4, 2010.

²⁶ Interview with Ummi Husna, Tasikmalaya City, November 1, 2010.

City, is a case in point of a *nyai*'s role as mother and wife. Munawaroh's father was a State employee. Though Munawaroh once studied in higher education, she was not interested in pursuing her education or to teach at the *pesantren*. Besides being a mother to her children and a wife to her husband, Munawaroh's role as a *nyai* was only symbolic as a mother for the students (*ibu pesantren*), providing daily meals for a number of students in her family kitchen. In addition, she also sold snacks in the *pesantren*'s canteen. In contrast to other *nyais* who took part in social activities, Nyai Munawaroh did not and also she was not a preacher in a *majlis taklim*. It may be that the activities in the *pesantren* made it difficult for her to manage her schedule outside of the *pesantren*.²⁷

Ibu Entin Komariah, the wife of K.H. Cece Syamsuddin, the head of Pesantren PERSIS in Cibeurekah, seemed not to play any role in the *pesantren* because her role was taken up by others: Ibu Eka was responsible for the female dormitory and Ibu Nurifah took up the role of *murabbi* (educator) while Ibu Aisyah handled student affairs. Ibu Entin seemed mostly to be a housewife. While Munawaroh did not have activities outside of the *pesantren*, Komariah, in contrast, did take part in activities outside, though in a highly limited fashion. She helped her husband with his side job, i.e. whitening mendong leaves (mendong is plant usually used as raw material for making handicrafts). She also joined her husband in his position as the head of an RT/Rukun Tetangga (a small group of citizens). For example, she coordinated the distribution of Raskin/Beras untuk Orang Miskin (Rice for the Poor) to her neighbors. One reason why she preferred doing this was the fact that she only graduated from primary school.²⁸

2. Achieved Leadership

Apart from usual female inherited leadership in the *pesantren*, achieved female leadership was also found on the site. Two cases may illustrate this. The first is Nyai Etti Tismayanti, the wife of K.H. Mukhsin al-Sadili, the head of Pesantren al-Ikhwan in Condong, Setia Nagara, Tasikmalaya City. Her leadership performance in education affairs had evolved from teaching Islamic science subjects to managing an educational institution. She formally became a *nyai* after she and her husband had established Pesantren al-Ikhwan in 1989. She taught at primary school and then at junior high school, and now she teaches at senior high school, SMAN 1 in Tasikmalaya. The *pesantren* has an early age educational program, traditional *pesantren*, Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan/SMK (Senior Vocational High School), a Youth Mosque Organization and a *majlis taklim*. There are 95 *pesantren* students and 40 SMK students. Nyai Tismayanti's role at the institution is vital. She leads all formal educational activities and preaches twice a month in the *pesantren*'s *majlis taklim*. In society, she also regularly preaches in about 20 other *majlis taklims* scattered around the city. As a NU cadre she has been active in Fatayat NU and in Muslimat NU and she has been the head of Fatayat NU

²⁷ Interview with Nyai Nina Munawaroh, Tasikmalaya Regency, August 4, 2010.

²⁸ Interview with K.H. Cece Syamsuddin, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 12, 2010.

in Tasikmalaya for two periods, from 2002 to 2009. At the time of my fieldwork in 2010, she is active in Muslimat NU as the head of its Research Development. Once a month she delivers religious sermons at Tasikmalaya's Masjid Jami (Great Mosque). Her activism seems to reach beyond the traditional boundary of the NU's main organization. Her status as a State employee helps her to play this role when she deals with a larger audience, i.e. teaching at a *madrasah* and general school. In addition, in 2007 she was assigned to be the head of Gabungan Organisasi Wanita/GOW (Bond of Women Organizations whose members consist of the representatives of the women organizations in a regency or a city). In her case, she had become a *nyai* not merely because in 1977 she married her husband whose destiny was to end up as a *kyai*, but also because she assisted in the establishment and further development of the *pesantren*. In short, she also became influential by her own efforts through educational and social engagement.²⁹

Another Muslim leader is *Ibu* Aisyah of PERSIS Pesantren Cibeurekah in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya Regency. Married not to a member of the *pesantren*'s family but to a layman, her leadership covers teaching, management and social affairs. She is responsible for student affairs because of her leadership competence in the *pesantren*, PERSISTRI and in PERSIS itself in neighboring areas, and of course because of her educational background as well, having graduated from S1 with a major in English. She acts as a consultant for the student body staff, the Umamahāt al-Ghadd (the Future Mother) and for daily student affairs in general. The *pesantren* also entrusted her to head early age education. Her main task is to develop the kindergarten which has recently opened. She was also the head of PERSISTRI (2010-2014) in Rajapolah sub-district. During the election for this position she crushed two other candidates by receiving a vast majority of the votes: 94% (64 out of 70 votes). Her name is well known among the female members of PERSIS in Rajapolah, Jamanis and Ciawi because she frequently preaches in their *majlis taklims*. She also preached on local radio from five to six in the morning twice a week for five years and she was an activist in the Forum Komunikasi Remaja Muslim/FKRM (Communication Forum for Muslim Youth).³⁰

To extend their leadership influence as women, some *nyais* expand their capacities by pursuing education. Some *nyais* when they got married only attended school until the junior or senior high level and in some cases they only graduated from a traditional *pesantren*. Many discontinued their formal education at the primary level. In this case, many took advantage of package B or C programs such as Nyai Heni Novianti who took package C. She is now enrolled in a higher education program with a major in religious education. Some other *nyais* continued their higher education after they married, such as Nyai Devi Setiani and Ummi Eni Herniati. They can also increase their influence by teaching students and preaching in *majlis taklims*. Some *nyais* are already qualified to teach but others are not. In many cases they feel that they have to pursue further education in order to improve their skills. The way they improve their knowledge is by attend-

²⁹ Interview with Nyai Etti Tismayanti, Tasikmalaya City, August 4, 2010.

³⁰ Interview with Nyai Aisyah, Tasikmalaya Regency, July 28, 2010.

ing formal education from which they receive a degree and this was done by Nyai Setiani, *Ibu Maesharah*, Nyai Novianti and many others. Another way to gain more knowledge is by attending informal classes. This is what Nyai Joharah does. She attends two classes a week to enhance her religious knowledge. Meanwhile, others develop their knowledge by becoming State employees. By doing so, they add to the family's income and at the same time they enhance their knowledge and develop their network.

3. Economic Independency

Like in other parts of Indonesia, in West Java, women's dependency on their husbands is not only supported by ethnic and religious practices, but also by the State. Accordingly, husbands are the heads and breadwinners of the family and the wives stay at home. This situation has made women dependent on their husbands, particularly in economic matters. However, modernization, which began in the nineteenth century, intensified in the early twentieth century, continued in the Old Order era from 1945-1965 and then intensified again in the New Order period,³¹ has been democratizing the educational sector up to the present as well as increased women's capacities and thus gave them more opportunities to increase their independence.

Nyais, in the case of Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, generally obtained and increase their economic independence within the limits of their inherited power. A woman who is married to a *kyai* has influence right after her wedding and a *nyai* who is the daughter of a *kyai* has power soon after she starts to participate in the *pesantren's* activities. The *pesantren* may provide opportunities for them such as teaching, participating in managing the kitchen, opening a small canteen or selling snacks in the *pesantren's* canteen, and allowing them to act as preacher in a *majlis taklim* which may be organized under or outside the administration of the *pesantren*. Some *nyais* get additional income from their work as coordinators of students' daily meals such as in the cases of Nyai Setiani of Pesantren Cintawana and Nyai Kurniati of Pesantren Miftahul Huda, *Ibu Ai Kurniasih* of Pesantren Benda and Nyai Munawarah of Pesantren Riyād al-'Ulūm wa al-Dakwa. Until today some *pesantrens* have a large kitchen to prepare the students' daily meals. At the same time, various *nyais* have the opportunity to open a family kitchen where students can eat. Each family could have from 15 to 100 students who eat in their kitchen. Other *pesantrens* only have a general kitchen such as in Pesantren Benda or Pesantren Cintawana. Each student has to make a monthly payment to cover things like their tuition, accommodation, electricity, and meals. The amount of money varies from *pesantren* to *pesantren*. For example, in Pesantren Miftahul Huda, each student has to pay only IDR 200,000.00 per month, in Pesantren Cintawana IDR 300,000.00 and in Pesantren Benda IDR

³¹ Steenbrink explains the history of the modernization of education in Indonesia from the late 1800s to early in the New Order era. Steenbrink. 1974. *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah*: pp.1-102.

400,000.00. Nyai Munawarah sells snacks in the *pesantren*'s canteen. Nyai Sobariah of Pesantren al-Hasanah has another source of income. She earns money by selling clothes to *pesantren* alumni through her *pesantren* network in Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi. Umni Eni Herniati of Pesantren al-Furqan gains additional income from her various businesses which include a small canteen in the *pesantren*, and a motorcycle wash outside the *pesantren*. In general, their monthly additional income ranges from IDR 200,000.00 to IDR 1,000,000.00.

Many of them receive extra income from teaching at the *pesantrens* such as Nyai Setiani of Pesantren Cintawana, Ibu Kurniasih and Ibu Maesaharah of Pesantren Benda, Ibu Aisyah of Pesantren Cibeurekah, Umni Husna of Ihya al-Sunna Ma'had and many others. Many others teach in *majlis taklims*. The income from these activities is not as high as *nyais* who teach in *madrasabs* or schools. Since the standard salary for teachers in district areas is less than that in big cities, their monthly salary ranges from as low as IDR 100,000.00 to over IDR 1,000,000.00. The payment depends largely on the number of students they teach and the type of *pesantren*. Traditional *pesantrens* which have a very low tuition fee cannot be expected to pay their teachers a reasonable salary. However, a higher salary can be expected from a *pesantren* which has many students as well as from a *pesantren* which has a better organized management.

There are still many traditional *pesantrens* in which the *nyais*' income does not depend on the number of students because the students organize their lives in *pesantren* themselves. Kyais do not receive payment because of their belief that no money should be paid for (religious) knowledge. Instead they receive gifts either from their students or their parents or from *pesantren* alumni. Students are responsible for electricity, water and the environment of the *pesantren*. So, they pay a certain sum of money which is distributed in the interest of all, including paying for the electricity for the *kyai*'s house. In this situation, a *nyai* faces a more difficult situation in terms of having space and independence to earn her own income.

Being able to enhance their achieved influence, some *nyais* are also able to get more income. They manage to become State civil servants. Their income basically follows the level and the duration they have worked in their department. In addition to a basic salary, a State educator also receives regular incentive and certified incentive money.³² Although how to be selected as a State civil servant is another story in which her husband's influence may have some impact, a *nyai* who becomes one seems to be able to improve her leadership due to the increased power she gets in terms of finance and knowledge or in networking. For example, Nyai Ida Nurkhalida, the daughter of K.H. Ilyas Rukhiyat (former head of Pesantren Cipasung and of the NU) is a State educator employee. At the moment, besides teaching, she is the head of MAN Cipasung. In this position, Nyai Nurkhalida not only has a supplementary income but she also makes a considerable contribution to her family's income. This revenue helps her to improve her lead-

³² A new policy of giving incentives to teachers and lecturers to improve their performance. It is bestowed on them based on their performance as teacher or lecturer.

ership. She has now been entrusted to be one of the leaders of the Association of Senior School Heads in West Java. She is also active in the local Fatayat NU and has been its leader for two periods. She is also the director of Nahdina, an NGO that deals with gender issues.³³ Another case is Nyai Enung Nursaidah, the younger sister of Nyai Ida Nurkhalida.

Nyai Ida Mus'idah of Pesantren Bahrul al-Ulūm, on the other hand, was initially assigned to be a State religious teacher at the primary level but she moved to teaching at higher levels in junior and senior high school. As with other *nyais*, Nyai Mus'ida was also able to enhance her social efficacy by becoming the head of Muslimat in Tasikmalaya for two periods and by being active in the PKB.³⁴ Another important figure who deserves to be mentioned is Nyai Etti Tismayanti of Pesantren al-Ikhwan. She studied up to the post-graduate level (S3) and she was assigned to be a State religious educator in primary school. Now she teaches at SMA 1 in Tasikmalaya City. At the same time she is responsible for the *madrasahs* and SMK/Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (Senior High Vocational School) operative in her own *pesantren*, al-Ikhwan. From these activities she certainly receives a salary and incentive money. In addition to spending her revenue to help meet her family's needs, she also spends it on engaging socially in Fatayat and Muslimat NU in Tasikmalaya City.³⁵

Having discussed Muslim women's leadership trajectory and experience, this study confirms the findings in previous studies that knowledge, skills, and networks contribute to their leadership. The economic independence women gain both from their own efforts and from their husbands' support, sustains, increases, and extends their social engagement. In general, however, their engagements are restricted because they have to get the consent and support of their husbands. Though Muslim women have to negotiate with existing values which are reflected in their own perception and people's understanding of *kodrat perempuan*, through their leadership they express their actualization of cultural citizenship in terms of exercising membership, obligations, rights, and participate in the effort of improving the public's well-being. This point will be discussed further in chapter seven.


The two sub-chapters above can be illustrated as follows:

³³ Interview with Nyai Ida Nurkhalida, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 25, 2008.

³⁴ Interview with Nyai Ida Mus'idah, Tasikmalaya City, July 29, 2010.

³⁵ Interview with Nyai Etti Tismayanti, Tasikmalaya City, August 4, 2010.

Diagram 1. Muslim Women’s Leadership Trajectory and Experience



Background of Nyai, Ibu, and Ummi: 1. A daughter of a *kyai*, married to a *kyai*, 2. A daughter of a *kyai*, married to a non-*kyai*, 3. A non-*nyai* woman married to a *kyai*, 4. A woman trained in Islamic studies married to a man trained in the same discipline who together establish a *pesantren*, and 5. A woman trained in Islamic educational activities and married to an ordinary man and who (the woman) has achieved important responsibilities in Islamic education.

Leadership Trajectory and Experience Resources: A. Genealogical Resources: Family Blood Ties and Non-Family Blood Ties, B. Education: Primary level (SD or MI), Secondary Level (SMP, SMU/MTs, MA), Pesantren, Higher Education, C. Activism: Instructional process, student body, religious and secular mass organization, religious educational institution management, social organization, political participation, and D. Networking Construction: within her own educational institution and similar ones, and with other, educational and non-educational institutions.

Female Leadership Trajectory and Experience Construction: Inherited leadership, achieved leadership, economic independence, and cultural citizenship.

In this study, Muslim women’s leadership trajectory in Islamic educational institutions is outlined with five examples of women leaders who have a common educational background, from basic *pesantren* training up its higher level, known as Ma’had ‘Āli (which is similar to D2 of the general higher education level), and in the modern schooling system from the basic educational level up to the higher education level with one exception, Nyai Etti Tismayetti, who pursued her education up to the doctoral level. In addition to education, the women also nurtured their knowledge and skills through teaching students and preaching Islam-

ic teachings to other women and men in neighboring areas and beyond, and by participating in organizations such as student bodies, mass organizations, NGOs, and in political processes, with the latter being a rare case. During my fieldwork I only found two women from the Pesantren Cipasung family who were engaged in political processes by having been DPRD members in Tasikmalaya Regency from 2004 to 2009: Nyai Laela Soraya and Nyai Neng Madinah. Nyai Neng Madinah was elected as a DPRD member for West Java for the period 2009-2014. They also developed and extended their leadership skills by extending their social networking in educational institutions and in State and mass organizations. The women leader's interactions and experiences with all these activities, institutions, and networking contributed to their leadership trajectories and experiences. Muslim women's leadership in Islamic education represents their actualization of their cultural citizenship as educators. In terms of how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* supports or hinders their construction of their leadership trajectories and experiences, it seems that women's leadership construction is operative within constraints that are characterized in the following four points: the permission of their spouse or parent, the support of their spouse or parent, appropriateness with religious teachings and/or local norms, and the commonness of their practices.

Having discussed the internal factors in the previous two sub-chapters in which the nurtured perception of *kodrat* influences Muslim women leaders in constructing and experiencing leadership in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, the following two sub-chapters will discuss the external ones by considering how the State and the media (newspapers and bulletins) influence female leadership. The role of the State in dealing with female leadership, how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* influences the State's educational development for girls and how this colors female leadership will be taken into account.

C. Women and State Educational Development: *Nurturing Kodrat Perempuan in Islamic Education*

As mentioned in the introduction, history shows that *kodrat perempuan* has always been nurtured and used as a part of people's view and imagination in formulating women's ideal roles and status. The presence of both Islam and the West in the archipelago since the 1800s and the emergence of hinterland kingdoms that developed a more hierarchical construction and stratification as the ideal model for society influenced the autonomous and dependent characters of Indonesian women, pushing women to exist mainly at home. This tendency is also emphasized by the emergence of schools for girls developed by important female figures such as R.A. Kartini from Central Java, Dewi Sartika in West Java and Rohana Kudus and Rahma El-Yunusiyahs in West Sumatra. In addition, there was also another kind of school called Taman Siswa (Garden of Pupils) established in 1922 by R.M. Suwardi Suryaningrat, popularly known as Ki Hajar Dewantara and his wife, Nyi Hajar Dewantara. What strikes us, as argued by Susan Blackburn, is that although the ideas of Western liberal education such as

those of Montessori, Fröbel and Steiner were introduced in these schools, *kodrat perempuan* remained to be used as a resource value to formulate what is best for women. Education for girls paid more attention to preparing them to become good mothers so that they could educate the next generations. Priyayi values such as the norm of husband as a breadwinner, of wife as a supporting agent, and of man as a leader and of woman as a follower were the backbone of this construction where women's *kodrat* was put forward as the basis for education for girls.³⁶ This tone was also felt in educational development in general from the implementation of the Ethische Politiek (Ethical Policy) in 1901 up to the 1980s.³⁷

To illustrate the points outlined above, up until the 1980s women were still the victim of the very negative impact of this construction of their *kodrat*. Rochiati Wiraatmadja in the 1980s identified eight factors that obstructed girls from participating in educational programs: "1. Education for girls was unnecessary or its benefits were not yet seen; 2. It is considered not good for female girls to study in the same classroom with boys as people still did not accept a co-education; 3. From a very early age girls have been helpful in doing house hold chores; 4. It was seen as contradictory to the local customs (*adat*); 5. A daughter used to get married at a very young age; 6. An educated girl was believed to have difficulty in finding her future husband and did not want to do house work anymore; 7. Though a girl might study, after that she most probably would not be absorbed into the work force easily, so her education was considered a waste; 8. An educated wife would be arrogant towards her uneducated husband; and other similar reasons."³⁸ The other group held that "education for girls rested on moral and social outcomes: the ability of educated women to raise the moral tone and thus the status of Indonesian society, especially by helping to combat social evils, and to become suitable mothers and wives for male leaders in the new age of progress."³⁹ Clarissa Adamson calls this tendency 'moral hierarchy', a concept which says that individuals uphold a value system in order to maintain order and harmony and to take ideal action and play a proper role in society.⁴⁰ These two groups actually share the same line in that both tend to limit the space and opportunity for women's social engagement. The difference lies in its intensity.

Actually, educational development in Indonesia in the last five decades of the colonial era had a transformative character in the form of the introduction of a Western model of education. A similar spirit also arose during the period of the Old Order, in the form of a nationalist movement in which women actively engaged. It was only in the last few years of the New Order that the education-

³⁶ Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State*, p. 51.

³⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 51-6.

³⁸ Rochiati Wiraatmadja, 1983 2ed., 1980 1st ed. *Dewi Sartika*. Jakarta:Depdikbud, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, p. 47.

³⁹ Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State*, pp. 55-6.

⁴⁰ Clarissa Adamson, 2007. "Gendered Anxieties: Islam, Women's Rights, and Moral Hierarchy in Java," in *Anthropological Quarterly* 80.1: p. 8.

al sector began to gain its transformative power. The State educational program seemed to offer much hope to the female population while yet maintaining a strong tendency to keep them at home.⁴¹ Continuing in the direction of the last decade of the New Order's policy on educational development, the Reformasi era improved its transformative direction by advancing women's capacity, skills and opportunity as well as by creating just policies for both male and female citizens. For example, the national budget for educational development has increased to up to 20% of the total national annual budget since 2004. The National Education Department receives this increased national budget and redistributes it other departments or ministries which have educational sectors including the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

MoRA (Ministry of Religious Affairs) has received a wider mandate to improve education under its watch.⁴² Although the percentage of State Islamic educational institutions is less than 15%, private Islamic educational institutions such as *madrasah*, *madrasah diniyya*, *pesantren* and *majlis taklim* have become part of the national education system (Law No. 20/2003, National Education System). This recognition provides opportunities for development either in management, teaching and the educational process and financial support. Now, the status of religious education is the same before the law as secular education. In the meantime, the adoption of Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy affects Islamic educational development because only MoNE (Ministry of National Education) can delegate its managerial authority down to the regency,⁴³ whereas religious education is still centralized under the administration of MoRA. This policy affects MoRA seriously as the increased capacity of regional authorities, particularly in terms of budget, did not contribute much to religious education immediately after the adoption of the decentralization policy. However, the commitment of the government to increase the national education budget to 20% of the total national budget certainly offers some optimism to religious educational institutions as well.

⁴¹ Blackburn, 2004, *Women and the State*, pp. 55-6.

⁴² Kusmana and J.M. Muslimin, 2008a. *Paradigma Baru Pendidikan: Retrospeksi dan Proyeksi Modernisasi Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Direktorat Pendidikan Tinggi Islam Depag. RI; Kusmana (et al. eds), 2008. *Paradigma Baru Pendidikan Islam: rekaman Implementasi IAIN Indonesia Social Equity Project (IISEP) 2002-2007*. Jakarta: Direktorat Pendidikan Tinggi Islam Depag. RI; Moch. Nur Ichwan, 2006. *Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD Dissertation. Tilburg: Tilburg University.

⁴³ Together with BAPPENAS, the World Bank, MoNE conducted a series of activities, responding to the implementation of the 1999 Decentralization Law. Fasli Jalal and Dedi Supriadi (eds), 2001. *Reformasi Pendidikan dalam Konteks Otonomi Daerah*. Yogyakarta: DEPDIKNAS, BAPPENAS and Adicita Karya Nusa.

D. *Kodrat Perempuan* and Islamic Education in Tasikmalaya

The construction of *kodrat perempuan* in the Islamic educational development program today faces two challenges: budget constraints and neutral gender policy. Unlike the management of educational development in general, the management of education under the Ministry of Religious Affairs is still centralized because it is not included in the decentralization policy. One immediate consequence is budget constraints. The fact that MoRA's annual budget is always far less than that of MoNE has restricted the development of Islamic education. The centralized management of Islamic education at the lower level worsens the difficulty of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to develop its program. From this point we may infer that the difficulty of gender mainstreaming in MoRA is greater than that in MoNE due to its inclination to preserve the traditional model of women's roles. The increase of the annual budget for educational development has had an important impact on *madrasahs*. The *madrasahs* began to receive financial support from MoNE in the form of BKS/Bantuan Khusus Sekolah (Special Financial School Support and BKM/Bantuan Khusus Murid (Special Financial Pupil Support) in 2001. Later, MoRA began to receive BOS/Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (Financial Support for the Operation of Schools) in 2004. However, the centralist character of Islamic educational management limits its own capacity to carry out its programs by providing additional funds, such as what DKI Jakarta does. Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, however, receive their annual budget from MoRA's budget alone.

In practice, the construction of *kodrat perempuan* in educational development, including Islamic educational development in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City adopts a neutral gender policy.⁴⁴ Though the local government normatively follows the policy and the development program of the central government, including on the matter of gender mainstreaming, the local government in fact maneuvers the policy to accord with its interests and local agendas. For example, the local government opened a special office to deal with gender equality. Tasikmalaya Regency established a gender desk at BPM dan KB/Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Keluarga Berencana (Body of Community Empowerment and Family Planning), and Tasikmalaya City a KKB dan PP/Kantor Keluarga Berencana dan Pemberdayaan *Perempuan* (Office of Family Planning and Women's Empowerment). Nia Kurniati, head of BPM dan KB, explained that the focus of gender mainstreaming in Tasikmalaya Regency is to make gender issues better known to its staff. As the body has only recently been established, its focus largely falls on leaders and staff members in village offices. They disseminate basic understandings of gender issues and how local leaders need to

⁴⁴ *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah/RPJMD 2006-2010* (Local Development Middle Term Plan 2006-2010) November 21, 2006; *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang/RPJPP* (Long Term Development Plan) of Tasikmalaya Kota period of 2005-2025.

pay attention to them in their daily work.⁴⁵ Judging from the program of this institution, gender awareness among the local government is still low. During my fieldwork I found that many bureaucrats I interviewed have an ambiguous understanding regarding the nature of gender equality. Many of them seemed not yet to understand gender issues adequately. A friend of mine told me a story about how poorly a local State employee understood the term “gender”. He was one of the speakers to discuss democracy in a local context. When a dialogue session was open, he innocently said “*sok ayeuna mah bagean ‘gender’ nu tumaros,*” while looking at female audience members. His sentence literally means “Now it is the turn for ‘gender’ to ask a question”. He meant “women” by the term “gender” rather than the constructed relations between men and women.

The neutrality policy of the local authorities is in fact a reflection of a construction of *kodrat perempuan* that idealizes women as the mothers of the next generation. It is because the authorities interpret neutrality as including not only fair competition between men and women, in which the local authorities push women to the side, but also as a strategy to discriminate women for the sake of maintaining harmony with local values and Islam. Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City appear to contextualize gender equality within the nation’s ideology and Sundanese and religious values. Though the State ideology represented in its basic constitution treats men and women equally, the State still places both in such a position that it accords with the national and religious tradition. The State adopted State *Ibuisism* as its ideology, which meant in the New Order era that the wife was the supporting agent of the family⁴⁶ and in the Reformasi era a partner of the family. This tendency also colored educational development including Islamic educational development. *Kodrat perempuan* is the key term to illustrate the ideal role of women in both the private and public sphere.

What I found on site during my fieldwork is that the neutrality part of the gender policy was used to discontinue the gender mainstreaming program. A State employee, Agus Abdullah, explained that in addition to budget constraints, the reluctance of the local government to mainstream women in the educational program was because the State has to accommodate different aspirations of which patriarchal values were the main resources. He claimed that “if there is an opportunity and a girl is also qualified, the highest probability is that she will participate in and possibly engage better than a boy”. He argued that the number of female students in Qur’anic recitation and interpretation competitions has always been high and that some of them won, even at the national level.⁴⁷ He gave the impression that female citizens are supported to engage socially just as much as

⁴⁵ Interview with Nia Kurniati, Head of BPM and KB Tasikmalaya Regency, April 22, 2010.

⁴⁶ Julia Suryakusuma, 2011. *State Ibuisism: The Social Construction of Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order*, pp. 8-10; Julia Suryakusuma. 1996. “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia,” pp. 92-119.

⁴⁷ Interview with Agus Abdullah, a staff member of Kandepag (Local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs), Tasikmalaya Regency, November 6, 2008.

men as long as their engagement stays within the constraints of local values and Islamic teachings. This means that the construction of *kodrat perempuan* that restricts women's educational engagement is in operation. Female participation in a competition is not seen as an opportunity to mainstream female students, but rather as a basic right. The problem is that the world is still dominated by men.

What is startling is that Abdullah's standpoint, which is commonly held by both State employees and the people in general in Tasikmalaya, is supported by the local wisdom that constructs *kodrat perempuan* as the operative cultural values that determine the role and the status of female citizens. This local wisdom is formulated as a public identity that is usually constructed by a collaborative team consisting of agents like religious figures and bureaucrats. The State and religious figures often go hand in hand in many aspects of life as reflected in the practice of PKK in the New Order period when women's ideal role was formulated as being that of supporting agents. It is therefore that *kodrat perempuan*, which discriminates against women, is nurtured by both the State and society. Tasikmalaya people have a long history of collaboration between *umara* (government) and *ulama* (religious figures). R.A.A. Wiratanuningrat, the head of the regency, collaborated with local ulama and, in 1926, established an organization called Idhar, which stands for Idhāratu Baeti al-Muluki and Umara (Government House). About 1350 Kyais were affiliated to this body. The spirit behind this body was "*turut ka ratu, tumut ka pamarentah nagara,*" (obedience to the Queen and to the government). As the establishment of the body was a government's initiative, local *ulamas* were co-opted and it functioned to please the government. Idhar was transformed into a local branch of MUI in the post-colonial era and maintained its initial function, i.e. to please the local government,⁴⁸ though the central MUI has tried hard to play a more just role for the people and the State. In the Reformasi era, the MUI not only collaborates with the local government, but also with religious agents including a group of young religious scholars known locally as Ajengan Bendo. The construction of *kodrat perempuan* that promotes that women should be at home receives additional support from this group. Even, according to one Salafi group, *kodrat perempuan* is once again treated as a site to construct the idealized model of a good mother. These religious groups were among the organizations that proposed local regulations with religious nuances, such as the Perda Tata Nilai (Local Government's Values Governance) mentioned in chapter two.

Having explained to what extent the construction of *kodrat perempuan* influences the State's educational development program, the following sub-chapter discusses how the printed media covers Muslim women's education experience and performance, particularly that of *nyais*.

⁴⁸ Amin Mudzakkir, 2006. "Menjadi Kota Santri: Wacana Islam dalam Ruang Urban di Tasikmalaya," in *Afkar*, no. 20, pp. 91-20.

E. Women's Educational Engagement in Media

The media seldom cover or discuss *nyais* as efficient agents in society, particularly not by newspapers and bulletins. For example, from 2008 to 2010, *Kompas* and *Radar Tasikmalaya* hardly ever reported on *nyais*' social engagements. What appeared in their news was coverage on the celebration of the birthday of the female national figure R.A. Kartini. The celebrations of the birthdays of other, less well known and not seen as national figures such as R.A. Dewi Sartika and R.A. Lasminingrat from West Java, and Rohana Kudus from Padang were not as exuberant as those for R.A. Kartini. None of them were figures from *pe-santren*. This might mean that *nyais*' social role is weakly reported but this needs further investigation. Another event that causes enthusiastic festivities is Mother's Day. In its celebration, the State usually takes advantage of this day more formally. Normally each year the President or a minister offers a message signifying the day. For example, in 2008, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, proposed the creation of a Creative Day to mark 2009's Mother's Day, thus joining the two festivals, Creative Day and Mother's Day, into one event. Nila, a committee member, explained that the integration of the two festivals was to assert that women are part of the total national development within their constructed *kodrat* constraints. She explained further that women are expected not to forget their role as mothers and educators of the family with the full support of the husband.⁴⁹

In addition *Kompas* also pays attention to local figures. In the case of West Java, it featured R.A. Dewi Sartika and R.A. Lasminingrat. As Sartika was labelled a national heroine for her pioneering contribution towards girls' education, the media not only covered her role in education but also mentioned that her name is used as the name of a street, an educational institution, and a commercial body such as the Dewi Sartika Bank. In contrast, R.A. Lasminingrat, who is of Garut origin, is documented as the first female Sundanese intellectual.⁵⁰

Like the national media, local newspapers also cover important figures. The angle of their coverage of women's social engagement falls largely into the dominant patriarchal stand even for female activists. For example, *Radar Tasikmalaya* on February 2, 2010 published K.H. Mahpuddin Noor's article "Hilangnya Nilai-nilai Ke-Ibuan" (The Loss of Motherhood Values). Noor is a local writer as well as a religious figure. In his article, he is concerned with the decline of education for girls. He responds to the impact of modernization or democratization or more specifically gender issues which encourage women's efficacy. In his view, the influence is negative towards the existing and long maintained virtues of motherhood such as caring, patience, sincerity and dedication to the family.

⁴⁹ *Kompas*. December 22, 2008. See, <http://m.kompas.com/news/read/data/2008.12.22.09393461> February 4, 2011.

⁵⁰ Fandy Hutari, "RA Lasminingrat, Tokoh perempuan Intelektual Pertama". *Kompas*. December 19, 2009. Accessed February 4, 2011. <http://edukasi.kompas.com/read/2009/12/19/11400322/RA.Lasminingrat.Tokoh.perempuan.Intelektual.Pertama>

In his article, he invites people not to forget the traditional values which keep women mainly at home in order to reduce the negative impact of modernization. Furthermore, he explains:

“... women are clearly different from animals. For a female creature (human) motherhood is a mixture of innate nature and cultural behavior, i.e. an achieved thing and also one influenced by the social environment. Therefore, if the environment does not support motherhood education, its innate nature will not develop, but will even be suppressed and may disappear and be buried. In turn, without motherhood education, be it in a formal or informal form, a woman cannot immediately show her proper, solid and sincere motherly attitude and behavior in family communication.”⁵¹

Supporting the above point, *Radar Tasikmalaya* once again reported on a woman's ideal in the family. One of its reports, entitled “Pria Takkan Bisa Gantikan Peran Ibu” (A Man Cannot Replace a Mother's Role), asserted this point. The title was extracted from a seminar held to commemorate Mother's Day. Helfi Hanifah, one of the speakers, explained that a woman who has a career inevitably carries a double burden because her duties such as pregnancy and breast feeding are implicit parts of her nature which men cannot possibly replace. The problem is that she also included child rearing, caring, and doing household chores in her description of women's nature.⁵² Thus a woman has the double burden of having to work professionally and also keep up with household chores. Her financial contribution does not count as family income. In her experience, hiring a maid is not considered a replacement for her own duty to do the household chores. She is still responsible for everything.

From these two examples, it seems that the media in the local context maintains dominant beliefs and practices. This is also the case in many other areas. The problem commonly found with local commercial publications is that its market is its fundamental capital. The publication of a newspaper is in practice related to how it can survive in the context of competitive businesses. Apart from its income from commercial advertisements, local newspapers also find local governments, parliament and local political parties as prospective economic sources of income. As a result, issues which have little impact on their existence receive less priority. Another reason may be provided by referring to the fundamental problems the country faces: corruption and poverty. The efforts to decrease these

⁵¹ “...sosok seorang wanita jelas berbeda dengan hewan, pada wanita (manusia) keIbuan itu merupakan perpaduan naluri *kodrati* dengan perilaku budaya, yakni sesuatu yang diperoleh dan dipengaruhi oleh lingkungan sosial. Oleh karena itu, apa bila lingkungan tidak menunjang terhadap pendidikan keIbuan, maka naluri keIbuan itu tidak bisa berkembang, bahkan tertekan, tersumbat, dan bahkan hilang terkubur. Pada gilirannya, tanpa pendidikan khususnya keIbuan, apakah bentuknya formal atau informal, seorang wanita tidak dapat serta merta menunjukkan sikap dan perilaku keIbuan yang baik secara tepat dan ikhlas dalam komunikasi keluarga.” KH. Mahpuddin Noor. *Radar Tasikmalaya*. February 6, 2010, p. 14.

⁵² “Pria Takkan Bisa Gantikan Peran Wanita”. *Radar Tasikmalaya*. December 24, 2009, p. 6.

problems meet difficult challenges due to weak law enforcement and the latent practice of corruption which tends to extend not only to local government officials and politicians but to other actors as well. As a result, the discourse on *nyais* receives the least attention.

NGOs usually pay more serious attention to Muslim women's engagement in their coverage in their media. For example, Rahima, a NGO founded in 2000, focuses its activities on women empowerment within the frame of Islam and it uses the media *Swara Rahima* to report on its discourse and activity.⁵³ *Swara Rahima* is a three monthly publication that covers Islam, women's rights and Rahima's activities. In its rubric on portraits, it reports on the experience of institutions and women in social engagement. Of 29 editions, six editions covered *nyais'* social engagement experiences in West Java and in Banten Province⁵⁴ and three of the six dealt with female figures from Tasikmalaya. In *Swara Rahima*, Number 23. "K.Hj.⁵⁵ Nonoh Hasanah: Perintis Pesantren Puteri di Jawa Barat," [Hj. Nonoh Hasanah: The Pioneer of the Pesantren for Girls in West Java] (2009) Wiwi Siti Sajarah, the author, merely summarized the writing she published in *Ulama Perempuan Indonesia* [Indonesian Female Ulama] (2002).⁵⁶ She explained that through her contribution Nyai Hasanah became a pioneer for *pesantren* for girls in West Java. The other writing is Number 17, "Bu Nyai Djuju Djubaedah:⁵⁷ Aktivistis pejuang perempuan yang Tak Kenal Lelah" [Bu Nyai Djuju Djubaedah: The Activist Who Knows no Fatigue] written by Maman A. Rahman. Rahman describes her as a tireless female activist in her striving for her goals, playing various roles from teaching at junior and senior high school during the day, to teaching from *Kitab Kuning* (Yellow Book/classical religious texts) in Pesantren Cipasung at night. She occasionally gave lectures in local institutions for Islamic studies, and she was a strong activist in various organizations such as LP3ES, Rahima, Nahdina, Tasikmalaya Regency's office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs,

⁵³ http://www.rahima.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=343&lang=in accessed February 9, 2011.

⁵⁴ *Swara Rahima*. Number 23. "K.Hj. Nonoh Hasanah: Perintis Pesantren Puteri di Jawa Barat; Number 29: Ratu Vina, 'Ratu' Banten Pejuang Pendidikan *perempuan*"; Number 11. 2009: Nahdina, Mimpi Yang Nyata; Number 20: Memberdayakan Umat dan Peduli *Perempuan*; Number 18: Afwah Mumtazah Membuka Akses Pendidikan bagi *Perempuan*; and Number 17. Bu Nyai Djuju Djubaedah: Aktivistis Pejuang *Perempuan* yang Tak Kenal Lelah.

⁵⁵ KHj is another common title for woman leader at traditional *pesantren*. The use of this title does not follow common title for wife or relatives of a *kyai*, that is *nyai*. So, it is unusual to call woman leader of a traditional *pesantren* Kyai Hajjah.

⁵⁶ Jajat Burhanuddin, 2002. *Ulama perempuan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

⁵⁷ The name in the title refers to the same person who is on the Rahima board. So, the right name should be Djuju Zubaedah.

to mention some. She was even entrusted to head the Rahima Foundation for the period 2005-2009.⁵⁸

In short, newspapers and bulletins continue to pay little attention to the role of women in *pesantrens*. If the coverage on women's social engagement in these kinds of publications is insignificant, it is certainly even worse in the case of *nyais*.

Conclusion

This study confirms earlier studies that found that the life of women in and outside *pesantrens* is dynamic (Lies Marcoes [1992] Jajat Burhanuddin [2002], Faiqoh [2003], Van Doorn-Harder [2007], and Eka Srimulyani [2007, 2008, 2009, and 2012]). This study also finds that women play active roles mainly in socio-religious education, that they have only small economic engagements and are sometimes engaged in political activities.

This study finds that women's dynamism still falls largely in the area of the perception of *kodrat perempuan* which is in practice more effective in restricting women's roles and opportunities rather than honoring or even liberating them. The study finds that permission and support from their spouses or parents and respect for religious precepts, local norms and traditions are greatly emphasized. Women's leadership experience is characterized by these operative practices, putting women leaders in positions of continuous negotiation in order to attain their ideal role and life. The perception of *kodrat perempuan* to an extent determines a *nyai's* role. A *nyai* who has the full capacity a successful woman needs, can refine her leadership trajectory over the course of time through job experience and pursuing higher education. In contrast, if a *nyai* feels satisfied with the derived power she received only, she will most likely only play her role within this constraint or end up as merely a mother symbol for all.

In spite of its ideology in which people's understanding of *kodrat perempuan* has often been a mixture between its nature and nurture characteristics, the State policies and practices in Indonesia towards education have been offering opportunities to educate women and transform their roles beyond their traditional function. However, the common problem of the unavailable funds and how they are managed, as well as the application of the gender neutral policy, prevent a change of the construction of *kodrat perempuan* from its essential nature. Women only manage to tackle these obstacles when they have sufficient opportunities and networks in addition to satisfying other objective requirements such as knowledge, levels of skill, and blood ties.

⁵⁸http://www.rahima.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=264%3Apotret-edisi-17-bu-Nyai-djuju-djubaedah-aktivis-pejuang-perempuan-yang-tak-kenal-lelah&catid=42%3Apotret&Itemid=331&lang=en February 4, 2011.

Part III.

Women's Political Engagement:
Women's Leadership in Political Sphere

CHAPTER SIX

MUSLIM WOMEN'S PUBLIC LEADERSHIP:
*FEMALE VILLAGE AND SUB-DISTRICT
HEADS IN TASIKMALAYA*

Introduction

After the demise of the New Order regime in 1998, democratic practices which for over thirty years had been restricted, grew stronger for more than a decade. Freedom of speech, public participation and gender equality emerged as keystones of the new Indonesian democratic practice. For example, the decentralization policy which was ratified by Law 22/1999 allocated more power to local governments based on the principles of democracy and equality. Many scholars believe that decentralization encourages more public participation and that it supports equality between women and men at the local level.¹ Local agents, including women, are expected to engage in political processes.

However, notwithstanding the progress being made, the challenges of a patriarchal culture, local exclusiveness and religious conservatism and radicalism emerged as accompanying factors in the democratization and gender equality movement. As space and opportunity increased, all sorts of actors from a wide variety of groups, often opposite to one another in ideology and practice, came to the front and competed in the public space and they used democratic principles to support their interests. With regards to the implementation of decentralization, abuses of democracy emerged through religious, ethnic, and local expressions. For example, in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, religious

¹ Susan Halford, 1992. 'Feminist Change in a patriarchal organization: the experience of men's initiatives in local government and implications for feminist perspectives on State Institutions,' in Anne Witz, and Mike Savage (eds) *Gender and Bureaucracy*. UK: Blackwell Publishers; Fiona Mauclay, (1998). 'Localities of Power. Gender, Parties and Democracy,' in Haleh Afshar (ed.) *Women and Empowerment. Illustrations from the Third World*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd; Jo Beal, 1996. *Urban Governance Why Gender Matters*. <http://www.unifemundp.org/bkmon/htm>. Accessed on May 4, 2010; Asima Yanty Sahaan 2003. *The Politics of Gender and Decentralization in Indonesia*, Budapest: The Center for Policy Studies, Central European University and the Open Society Institute.

figures perpetuated a social and moral movement to participate in maintaining law and order. These social phenomena which have a tendency to determine the perception of *kodrat perempuan* in a restrictive way erupted in the midst of the effort of many, including the State and civil society, to offer women more space and opportunity to engage socially, including in public leadership affairs.

One of the social practices that emerged in this competitive context is women's leadership. The history of Indonesia after Independence witnessed the marginality of female leadership. It records only one female president, Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004); one female governor, Ratu Atut Chosiah, Governor of Banten Province (2006-2014); and a few female heads of districts, municipalities and villages. Since the beginning of the Reformasi era, Tasikmalaya Regency elected 15 female village heads. Since its existence (2001), Tasikmalaya City has had only one female village head, Imas Susilawati, in Panyingkiran, Indihyang Sub-district (2001-2006). It has also had 2 female sub-district heads, Iis Iriani, head of Tawang Sub-district (2002) and Yani Nur Jamaniah, head of Mangkubumi Sub-districts (2004).

A. Leadership Trajectories

The general picture of the female leadership trajectories varies from case to case. However, to be a leader, every woman has to have basic knowledge and skills, as well as links in order to be able to meet the basic requirements. This is a learning process which I call an enabling process. Some confirm the conviction that those with genealogical capital are the most probable candidates for public leadership positions. This kind of leadership is assumed to ascribe authority through blood ties with predecessors or through marriage relations. For example, one village head in Tasikmalaya, Ade Mustikawati of Margaluyu Village (1988-2007) discovered that her grandfather had once been a sub-district head in Ciamis District. Graduating from primary school in 1968, she pursued her studies until senior high school level. She continued her higher education in Tasikmalaya majoring in law, but that only lasted six months because she married a teacher of the same age as her (20 years old). Although she was a passive student and never received or asked for any responsibility either as a secretary or head of class, she began to be active when she took on her role as a mother. She was active in a local youth organization, AMS Pitaloka, and once she acted as the head of the organization. She was also active as a cadre of PKK (The Family Welfare Movement), and of a Posyandu in Margaluyu village, Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya Regency. When the leadership position in Margaluyu village in 1988 was vacant and it seemed that only few people were interested in taking it on, her family, including her husband, encouraged her to become a candidate, saying, "*Sok atuh nyalon, moal teu menang da aya turunan,*" (Please State your candidacy, you will certainly win because you have blood ties). There were 2400 out of 3000 potential voters and three candidates: two women, Ade Mustikawati and I'ah, and one male candidate, Didi. Ade won 40% (900 votes) while the rest gained 30 % (700 votes)

each.² In her case, she had not only an inherent genealogical leadership talent, but also had already gained leadership experience as described above.

Ade Mustikawati's experience is similar to that of Eti Maryati, the head of Ciandum Village, Cipatujah (1999-2011). Her father, Abdurrahman, was the head of Ciandum Village for two 8-year periods (1978-1994). Her leadership was preceded by another figure, Eka Taneka, who led the village for only 5 years as he withdrew before his term ended. Born into a large family of twelve brothers and sisters, Maryati, the fifth, was an active figure. She became the head of her class undisturbed from class 1 to 5 in primary school. She was head of RT/Rukun Tetangga (a small community unit within an area) of Cipatujah Village for 2.5 years, a Hansip member (local security staff) for 1 year in the same village, and a cadre of PKK and Posyandu for about 2 years. In 1991 she followed her husband to Batam where he did business as a vendor selling things door to door and offering his clients to pay in installments. She did not propose herself to be a candidate but people asked her to run for the position after having asked her older brother, Maman Rustaman, first, but he declined. She decided to run after she got her family's support, particularly that of her husband, and because of four main other considerations: because the people had asked her, her experience, the position provided a new opportunity for her to learn, and because of her blood ties (her ancestry).³

Mumu Turnia's leadership also has a genealogical background. She is currently the head of Sukahening Village, Sukahening Sub-district. She was elected village head for the period 2007-2013 after her husband had been elected to the same position in 2003 but was forced to resign in 2005 due to people's protest over his affair with another woman. She showed her resolve and asked her husband to divorce her. This event contributed to people's sympathy for her and they asked her to register to run in the election. Born in 1949, Turnia's leadership trajectory was nurtured much more by the fact that her father was village head for a long time, 28 years (1952-1980). She only graduated from senior high school and she spent most of her time after her marriage as a mother. Her stay in the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, for about 30 years (1972-2002) to follow her husband in his career, gave her the proper knowledge and mentality to shoulder public responsibility. In addition, during her husband's leadership she undertook a leadership role as the head of PKK in Sukahening Village for three years. As other female leaders, she also actively engaged in *majlis taklim* activities. These activities provided her with networks, leadership experience and the social capital she needed to run for public village leadership. Her leadership trajectory was also supported by other leadership experiences like those of Nina Herlina, the head of Sukaharja Village in Cisayong Sub-district, Nia Rahmi Kaniati, head of Pasir Panjang Village in Manonjaya Sub-district and Ade Mustikawati, the head of Margaluyu Village in Manonjaya Sub-district.

² Interview with Ade Mustikawati, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 25, 2008 and April 10, 2010.

³ Interview with Eti Maryati, Tasikmalaya Regency, May 27, 2010.

In Tasikmalaya Regency, Nur Iriani, head of Jamanis Sub-District, also has a fortunate social background. Her father, Muhammad Abbas Mahmud, was the head of Karang Ampel, Indramayu. Her formal higher education also fostered her career. Having graduated from the department of education with a major in informal education, she began her career as a staff member at a local education unit. A few years later, she was entrusted to act as the education evaluator in Jamanis Sub-district. At the same time, she was also assigned to take care of informal education. Together with her husband, she owns the al-Gozali Informal Education Center in Suka Mulya Village, Jamanis, which was later transformed into a PKBM/Pusat Kegiatan Berbasis Masyarakat (Center for Community Based Activities). The center consists of pre-school education, Package B and C (a substituted program of learning for subsequently junior and senior high school level, offering those who did not formally study at junior and senior high school level). The PKBM was considered successful and many other education centers paid a visit for comparative study. Thus, practically before she was appointed head of Jamanis Sub-district and supported by her physical height of 172 cm, she seemed to possess everything necessary to be a promising candidate. In addition, before her assignment as the head of Jamanis Sub-district, her husband, Asep Usman, had been a lecturer in an institute of Higher Islamic Education and a member of the local parliament for the Golkar Fraction and because he had a similar background and area of concern, she felt she was fortunate and supported.⁴

There are two ways to obtain a post: *assignment* and *one man-one vote*. In terms of the assigning scheme for sub-district/kecamatan heads, only two Sub-district heads had a linear educational background, i.e. Iis Iriani and Yani Jamaniah. They were senior and junior students at the Akademi Pemerintah Daerah Negeri/APDN (State Local Government Academy), now known as Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Daerah Negeri/STPDN (State Local Government Higher Education Institution) when they took their higher education with a major in local government. The five other heads came from various education backgrounds: Wiwin Windarya studied banking (undergraduate), Nur Iriani and Neneng Wida Yuansih pursued their studies in education (undergraduate), Dewi Kania continued her higher education in management (master's) and Euis Kaswati gained her degree in economy (undergraduate).

In terms of the *one man-one vote* scheme, most of the female village heads had discontinued their education at the senior high school level, except for Juju Juariah who pursued her education until D3 in education, majoring in geography at a university in South Bandung. Only four of them graduated from junior high school: Euis Ruhiyani, head of Kamulyan Village, Manonjaya Sub-district; Euis Nurhayati, head of Giri Jaya Village, Bojong Asih Sub-district; Ety Maryati, head of Ciandum Village, Cipatujah Sub-district; and Herliati Sukmawati, head of Cikondang Village, Cineam Sub-district. Junior high school is one of the pre-req-

⁴ Interview with Nur Iriani, Tasikmalaya Regency. May 17, 2010.

uisites for someone interested in running for village head.⁵ The fact that many women completed the nine years of obligatory basic education enabled them to run in a public leadership election. For example, in the case of the Cikondang Village election, there were four candidates: Rahman, Mustafa, Iding Sardi and Edy Wahyudi. Only Edy Wahyudi met the requirement of at least having proof of having completed his junior high school education. The committee then reopened the registration to fill the quota of at least two candidates in the election. Herliati Sukmawati was encouraged and agreed to run for the election.

This regulation actually matches the policy of the government on 9-years obligatory education for every Indonesian citizen. With this policy, there is normally no discrimination between male and female students to access to basic education. In the Reformasi era, this policy has become one of the State's priorities, and the State has started to design and implement a policy of 12-years obligatory education. Having completed 9-years obligatory basic education, one is assumed to have the ability to read independently, differentiate things and to think rationally. These abilities to some extent are also supposed to help individuals develop their skills and knowledge independently when a case calls for them to do so. In the New Order era, in Tasikmalaya, only one female village head had the opportunity to run for and win the actual position: Ade Mustikawati (1988).

In the Reformasi era, the number of female village heads increased significantly in Tasikmalaya Regency but not in Tasikmalaya City. In Tasikmalaya Regency there were 14 new female village heads, including the head of Panyinkiran Village, Imas Susilawati, who was elected village head when the area was still part of Tasikmalaya Regency (2001-2003). However she is a special case because after two years she was appointed as *lurah* [area head in a city] (2003-2006) in Tasikmalaya City after the region had been split into two (Regency and City) in 2003 and her village became part of Tasikmalaya City. With the assignment falling to her, Imas believed that the authorities would prefer to have a smooth transformation as she was elected directly by the people. She was also in charge of executing the transformation at the lowest level of the government hierarchy in Panyinkiran Village. Her idea of smooth transformation in this matter was confirmed when I asked the assistant of Municipality 3, General Administration, Dindin Saefudin about this.⁶

Other than education there is also knowledge and network building. For example, Herliati Sukmawati comes from an ordinary family: her father was a vendor and her mother a farmer. Before she was elected as head of Cikondang Village, Cineam, people in the village knew her. She regularly visited them door-to-door for business purposes. She sold clothes to them using a small credit system. For example, one sold item could be paid for in five installments and she would visit the buyers at least for the five times as scheduled. She was also a cadre

⁵ Law on local government such as Law 32/2004 on local government, regulation No 72/2005 on village and Local Government Regulation, Tasikmalaya No 12/2006.

⁶ Interview with Imas Susilawati and Dindin Saefudin, Tasikmalaya City, May 11 and April 24, 2010.

in the village in PKK in Posyandu activities for 23 years (1984-2007). Through these activities, she got to know many Cikondang people. Having finished junior high school and two years of religious education in Pesantren Sukahideung, she also sometimes delivered talks in *majlis taklim*. She herself did not have the intention to run for village head but many people urged her to do so, including religious figures. She had also sought the confirmation of the local religious leaders. This encouragement and assistance was enough for her to win the election, capturing more than 61% of the votes (1151 out of 1881 votes).⁷

Another example is Nina Suherlina, the head of Pameutingan Village that became a village in the 1970s, located in the mountain peaks in Cipatujah Sub-district. Her parents were farmers. She was born in 1967 in the area and she finished her primary school in her village, her junior high school in Cipatujah and senior high school in Tasikmalaya. She was not active in village activities before the election. Her leadership trajectory began when she became secretary of her class in primary school. She was also active in sports since primary school and studied at a senior sports high school in Tasikmalaya. In 1980, after marrying Dede who only graduated from primary school, she joined him in his business. They started with a brick business which lasted for more than two decades and started to sell Albasia wood four years ago. She often went to Tasikmalaya to conduct business. She usually went from the village at 23.00 and arrived in the market of Tasikmalaya at 04.00 in the morning. Although as mentioned she was never active in village activities, she was well-known among the people in Pameutingan Village before the election as she often visited them for business purposes. As a result, she won with 59% (about 1000 out of 1700 votes), defeating Euis Nurlaela who gained 4 % of the votes.⁸

Another interesting case is Juju Juariah, the head of Cibalanarik Village, Tanjungjaya Sub-district. She was born in 1963. She is a rather active person and hails from a family of traders: her father was a butcher and mother a meal vendor. She has four siblings, but only Juariah and her sister pursued their studies until they obtained a diploma, while the other three got a far lower education. During basic education, Juariah was active in sports and arts. She learned traditional dance and performed at annual school events. She also played volleyball and participated in a local competition. In primary school she was often asked to be the secretary of her class. From 1989 to 1991 she was active in the local AMS Pitaloka and she became head of the organization in 1991. In 1992, she married Iwan whose formal education was only up to the junior high level. Four years after their wedding (1996), they began an embroidery business. It started when Iwan became a driver for the Tasikmalaya-Tanah Abang (a large market in Jakarta) route, transporting their products in 1995. In 1996, a vendor in Tanah Abang gave Iwan the order to provide him with 600 pieces of embroidery a day. Iwan and his wife, Juariah bought the requested fabrics at the local market in Tasikmalaya. It marked the start of their business. Iwan resigned as a driver, and started

⁷ Report of Head of Cikondang Village Election, April 10, 2007.

⁸ Interview with Nina Suherlina. Tasikmalaya Regency, May 27, 2010.

to rent trucks to transport his products and he gave orders to the local people to provide them. Later on his business grew bigger and he owned his own trucks. At the peak of this business, she explained they could make IRD 200,000,000.00 per month. They claimed to have more than 100 machines and 30 workers in their house, as well as 15 branches with 15 workers in each branch. This business lasted until 2005. From 1999 to 2004 (five years), the family diversified its business and started transport between Tasikmalaya-Jakarta. They ran four buses. In 2005 their business declined drastically because business orders from Tanah Abang decreased. Meanwhile they had to pay their debt to the bank. At present, her husband runs a truck transportation business. She tried to start her life all over again and began teaching geography at PKBM al-Riyadul Hasanah, in Cibalanarik Village. She wanted to become a State civil servant, but she was not accepted. Having a lot energy and the social capital she and her husband got from their investment and with her husband's permission she proposed to run in the village head election in 2009. She won by winning 59% of the votes (2228 out of 3768 votes), beating the other two candidates by far, Makmur with 25% (943 out of 3768 votes) and Ade with 16% (597 out of 3768 votes).⁹

B. Leadership Experience:

1. Election of Sub-district/*Kecamatan* Female Leadership

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, a head of a *kecamatan* (sub-district) is a State civil servant who is appointed through an election mechanism under the recommendation of a team of the Baperjakat/Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Pangkat (Advisory Board for Posts and Ranks). The team is responsible for considering the careers of all the civil servants in a district/municipality. They assess potential candidates and make considerations to determine who is eligible for what posts. Part of the selection process is an interview and a fit and proper test before a decision is made. Tatang E. Kadarusman, the head of the mutation sub-division unit in Tasikmalaya Regency, explained that the team evaluates the following aspects of the proposed candidates: seniority, position in the regency structure, and the distance between their home and the workplace. They also evaluate through the lens of neutral gender policy but still consider whether a post is appropriate for women. Sutisna, the head of the Mutation Division of the BKPLD in Tasikmalaya Regency explained further that the local government actually does not differentiate between women and men. The team only assists people in their aspirations and considers what is best for the women themselves. In this case, they think that division head is a woman's proper place in the strategic structure. Having given a number of women the position of sub-district heads in 2001 and 2003, the team evaluated their performance and listened to the local people's expectations and then it made the decision that women should get involved in the local government's internal affairs. However, that did not close the

⁹ *Laporan Pemilihan Kepala Desa* [Formal Report of Village head election], Tasikmalaya Regency, 2009.

door for women to be made sub-district head or secretary. When their abilities and other factors are conducive, the team does not hesitate to promote women, Sutisna asserts.¹⁰ It is clear that their understanding of *kodrat perempuan* lies behind their determination of the role and the place for women. Gender equality is translated into, or more precisely restricted to, the area of what is best and appropriate for women.

In the election of a female sub-district head in Tasikmalaya Regency, which was held between July and August 2001, the Baperjakat implemented the selection process. The team was coordinated by the vice head of the district, Dede Uran. First of all, the team identified 40 potential female candidates. Euis Kaswati had the impression that 11 eligible candidates had been selected while Neneng Wida Yuansih thought there were 18. The team then invited the selected candidates one-by-one for an interview. Kaswati told me that the candidates were invited separately. Some were interviewed by one member of the team, others by two, and others by the full team. After the first selection, the selected candidates were interviewed by the vice head of the district. Kaswati discovered that because she was invited for the interview by the vice head of the district, and he informed her that she was one of the selected candidates. Finally, the Baperjakat made its decision of the five women they would to assign to become sub-district heads: Neneng Wida Yuansih was appointed head of Cikatomas, Nur Iriani head of Jamanis, Dewi Kania head of Cisanyong, Wiwin Windarya head of Salawu, and Euis Kaswati head of Salopa. At this stage, the vice head of the district invited the five selected candidates. For example, Neneng Wida Yuansih told me that she was invited to visit the committee four times, including one visit to the vice head of the district. Wiwin Windarya and Nur Iriani, on the other hand, were invited only two times, first by the Baperjakat team and secondly by the vice head of the district. Euis Kaswati was reappointed as head of Rajapolah Sub-district in 2003, two years after having lead Salopa Sub-district. The way she was selected was not the same as the first appointment as she was selected directly and not from among a number of other eligible candidates, probably because the team already knew who she was.

The team tested the women by asking the candidates a number of questions on a variety of topics ranging from knowledge about the main job description of a State employee, national issues, decentralization issues, local government programs, how to deal with the public, technical terms, local leadership and challenges for State employees, particularly those who are women and must work at night. The candidates did not know why they were interviewed because none of them had had any formal training in local government administration as that traditionally offered in an APDN (State Local Government Academy), now known as STPDN (State Local Government Higher Education Institution). Euis Kaswati initially had the idea that the interview was to promote her to a higher position in the department where she worked (1996-2001). Already familiar with

¹⁰ Interview with Tatang R. Kadarusman and Sutisna, Tasikmalaya Regency, May 19, 2010.

the vice head of the district, she jokingly told him that she had no intention of becoming village head because of the lower salary. If she could choose, she would like to be the head of a sub-district because of the beautiful white uniform that she would have to wear. In fact, maybe she actually had in mind to join the military. Hearing her surprising statement, the team smiled. Finally, she realized that she was one of the selected candidates to become head of a sub-district when the vice head of the regency invited her personally and asked her to find a white uniform for her inauguration on August 15, 2001.

Neneng Wida Yuansih was invited four times. She saw that the number of interviewees decreased after each round. According to what she had heard, the number had come down from 18 female candidates to five. She was also asked whether she would like to become a village head and she had answered innocently that she preferred to hold a position in education. This question made her think about why they had asked that question in the first place given the fact that a village head should be elected by the people.¹¹

In the case of the selection of a female sub-district head in Tasikmalaya City, the Baperjakat seemed to apply only the first method, i.e. directly assigning the eligible candidate. The team assigned Iis Iriani to be the head of Tawang Sub-district in 2002 and Yani Jamaniah as the head of Mangkubumi Sub-district in 2004. Iriani and Jamaniah explained that as State employees they could not be elected but only appointed. It transpired that the assignment was influenced by national and thus regional politics that were in favor of gender mainstreaming and equality, and this was later confirmed by District Assistant 3, General Administration, Dindin Syaefuddin.¹²

2. Women's Response to Village Head Election

When a village head's term of office has ended, the BPD/Badan Perwakilan Desa (The Village's Consultative Assembly) conducts a consultation meeting with the village head and his staff and other local organizations and figures to determine a temporary village head before electing a new one. The Panitia Pemilihan Kepala Desa/PPKD (Committee of Village Head Election) subsequently organizes everything including the election itself and submits a report of the election procedures when a candidate has been chosen. In practice, these procedures are not always followed for various reasons. An incumbent who is interested in having a second term or has a candidate he supports will make some effort to make either himself reelected or his candidate elected. This also greatly depends on objective circumstances. Manipulations will only work effectively when the actual situation is carefully assessed because if not, they will face the people's protest. For example, Euis Ruhiyani, the head of Kamulyan Village in Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya Regency (1998-2006) did not run for a second term because she met with resistance from the village staff and from the people because of her weak leader-

¹¹ Interview with Neneng Wida Yuansih, Tasikmalaya Regency. April 24, 2010.

¹² Interview with Iis Iriani and Yani Jamaniah, Tasikmalaya City, May 17, 2010.

ship. In contrast, Ade Mustikawati, the head of Margaluyu Village in Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya Regency, did not face that problem as the people supported her. She was even reelected several times (1988-1997, and 1998-2006).¹³

Women in Tasikmalaya Regency usually respond reluctantly to the notion of becoming a village head. They usually started to respond positively when other people began to support them. For example, when asked whether she wished to run for the election, Nia Rahmi Kaniati, the present head of Pasir Panjang Village, answered that she had no intention to do so. When one of her supporters, Joko Susilo, heard of her reply, he said it was not true and explained that she actually was interested but still reluctant. The case was the same with Nina Ruspina, the head of Pusparahayu Village in Puspahiyang Sub-district. She did not express any desire to enter the election. She only became convinced that she should after various local community leaders had asked her repeatedly to do so and after her husband, Uyun, the Pusparahayu's previous head had given his consent. Euis Ruhiyani, the head of Kamulyan Village in Manonjaya Sub-district, Imas Susilawati, the head of Panyingkiran Village in Indihiang Sub-district, and Eti Maryati, the head of Ciandum Village in Cipatujah Sub-district pursued their candidacy after members of their family had declined to do so. Ruhiyani took it up after her husband refused because of his status as a State civil servant. Susilawati began to run seriously in the election after her father supported her. Finally, Maryati did so after her older brother declined and gave her a chance.

In contrast, two female village heads proposed themselves as candidates in a village head election. Juju Juariah, the elected head of Cibalanarik Village in Tanjungjaya (2009-2015) herself was eager to run in the village head election and told her husband and family of her intention. Her case is unique because she wanted to run in the election as a kind of protest against the State out of frustration that she had been rejected as a State teacher employee. She had had the impression that her expertise in geography was really needed in the educational institutions in the village but was astonished that she had been rejected. By getting involved directly in the election, she wanted to prove that she was really a worthy figure to serve the public. It seems that she is the kind of person who is fond of being active at all times. She could not remain silent when faced with the fact that her family business declined dramatically. She thought that being a village head could do something positive for the public. Another reason is that she found that only men stepped forward as candidates: Ade and Makmur. She contended that there should also be a female candidate and therefore she asked herself why she should not herself become one. She consolidated her move by first asking her husband's opinion and permission. Having received his approval, she visited her parents and members of her extended family, as well as local community leaders, telling them of her intention and hoping for their support. External factors that supported her candidacy were the fact that the people had protested against the

¹³ During the New Order era, there was no restriction on the length of the term of a village head. One could be elected often as long as the people wanted him or her. Fieldwork, Tasikmalaya and Tasikmalaya Regency, April -November 2010.

previous village head and he was forced to leave his office because he had been inactive for more than six months and because he indulged in polygamy which distracted him from acting as a public leader.¹⁴

Euis Nurhayati, the head of Girijaya, Bojong Asih Sub-district, was brave enough to run in the village head election. She thanked her assertive and efficacious character to a number of facts. Her grandfather was a village head in 1912 and her father was known for his courage. She had been active in the village office in PKK and Posyandu activities, and for four consecutive years she was treasurer and secretary. Her husband, a primary school teacher, not only agreed with her participation in the election, but also acted as her campaigner. He invited local community leaders to his house and explained her plans. Other factors that encouraged her to run included the location of her house which sits near the village office. Furthermore, she had no other activities besides mothering. All of these factors contributed to making her brave enough to run in the election.¹⁵

3. Campaign

Unlike the campaigns for the national and regional general elections which vary, village election campaigns are homogenous. The Panitia Pemilihan Kepala Desa/PPKD (Committee of the Village head Election) arranges a one-day or longer campaign. The campaign may be held in a mosque, mushalla (small mosque), *majlis taklim*, or outdoors. The place and time of the campaign is determined in a PPKD meeting with the village head candidates, *dusun/kampung* (hamlets) heads, RT/Rukun Tetangga (smallest community unit in a village) heads and community leaders. For example, the PPKD of Cikondang village, Cineam sub-district, conducted such a meeting on March 10, 2007 and decided that the campaign would take place for three days from March 12-14, 2007 in Cigalagah, Sukahurip, Campaka, Margalulyu and Mekarjaya hamlets.

The candidates come together in the campaign area and each is given the opportunity for about 10 to 15 minutes to deliver their vision, mission, programs and promises. For example, for her campaign, N. Herliati Sukmawati wrote an article entitled *Program Kerja Calon Kepala Desa periode 2007-2013* (Work Plan of the Candidate for Village head, Period of 2007-2013). She divided her article into five parts: introduction, governance and coordination, village context, development programs, and social issues. She framed the concept within the context of the decentralization policy, citing Law 25/1999 and Local regulation 21/2000 and 3/2001 about the Strategic Plan and the normal workload of a village head, and she described the objective conditions, structure and job description of the village head of Cikondang. By doing this, she cleverly identified the objective needs in the public economy, education, health and governance. For public economy, she was concerned with the fact that local *salaks* (small brown thorn fruit) were not as sweet as *pondoh salak* and that they were also much cheaper. The area

¹⁴ Interview with Juju Juariah, Tasikmalaya Regency. June 1, 2010.

¹⁵ Interview with Euis Nurhayati, Tasikmalaya Regency. May 31, 2010.

is moreover mountainous which makes transportation expensive. As an illustration, the normal price of local salak is about IRD 1000/kg to IRD 2500/kg. The price usually dropped by up to 50% or even more to under IRD 500/kg in the rainy season because of the product's abundance. Because transportation is difficult and the labor costs high many farmers no longer wanted to grow them because they did not make any profit. Thus she proposed a program to plant *pondoh salak* to boost the public economy because they worth much more than the local salak (its price is about IRD 7000. to IRD 10,000.-) as people like them much better because they much sweeter. Because she managed to make the people enthusiastic, the government took over the idea and helped to finance the innovation through its own programs.

In terms of education, she pointed to the fact that the village had only three primary schools, one junior high school and a few pre-school institutions such as TKA/Taman Kanak-Kanak Al-Quran (Quranic Kindergarten), or TPA/Taman Pendidikan Al-Quran (Quranic Kindergarten) and MD/Madrasah Diniyah (Religious School). She found that the primary school buildings were in poor condition, those of the junior high school still unfinished and that the TKA/TPA and MDs only needed maintenance. In terms of health, she counted only one health post, the presence of one midwife and only 15 health cadres. She was concerned with the poor condition of the building of the health post. In terms of governance, she was concerned with the vacancies in the village office, where she pointed to four unoccupied positions including that of secretary of the village office. She proposed to make these vacant positions available to the public and that an internal team should choose the right employees from among them.

However, for the most part, candidates merely wrote sketches such as Ade Mustikawati, Euis Ruhiyani, and Ety Maryati did. Village head candidates generally made not many promises. Imas Susilawati and Imas Maslaha, for example, explained that as candidates they only expressed their commitment to develop the village while asking for the people's collaboration in doing so. At most, they promised to try to solve the most common problems. For example, Imas Susilawati promised to try to solve the problem of Panyingkiran Village's land conflict. The problem was that a staff member in the village office had sold a piece of land that belonged to the village and was meant for the construction of the village office building. As State land cannot be sold legally unless there is a very urgent and important reason, the staff member failed to get a new, valid certificate for the land. The public protested and this became one of the village's problems. So far she has kept her promise by successfully ordering this staff member to replace the illegally sold land with new property.

4. Election of Woman Village head

Contemporary political practices in Tasikmalaya show that women's political participation is dynamic, as illustrated below:

Table 1. Female Leadership in Tasikmalaya Regency and City

Rivals' Result	Result	Period	Sub-district	Village	Name	No
I'ah (F) and Didi (M) 30% each ((720/2400 votes	40% 960/2400) (votes	1988- *1997	Manonjaya	Margaluyu	Ade Musti-kawati	01
Asep Kamal (M) 3 (% (90/3000 votes	% 97 2910/3000) (votes	1998- *2006				
Asep Mukhlis (M) 30% (900/3000 votes) and Herdis (M) 10% ((300/3000 votes	% 60 1800/3000) (votes	2001- *2006	Manonjaya	Pasir panjang	Nia Rahmi Kaniati	02
Oman Usman (M) 39% (1155/2999 votes	61% 1844/2999) (votes	1998- *2006	Manonjaya	Kamulyan	Euis Ruhiyani	03
The rest is divided between three other candidates: Dahrun (M), Usman (M) .(and Datim(M	65% 1300/2000) (votes	2000- *2005	Cisayong	Sukaharja	Nina Herlina	04
Eman Suherman (M) 30% ((750/2500 votes	70% 1750/2500) (votes	2005- *2011				
Sadin (M) 10.47% ((171/1633	89.53% (1462/1633)	2009- 2015	Bojong Gambir	Giri Mukti	Oon Saonah	05
Warip (M) 47.7 % ((1090/2283 votes	52.3% 1193/2283) (votes	2007- 2013	Puspahiyang	Pusparahayu	Nina Ruspina	06
Jajang (M) 9.86% (200/2029), Memed (M) 19.91% ,(404/2029	45.98% (933/2029)	2007- 2013	Bojong Asih	Sindang Sari	Imas Maslahah	07
Sunarya (M) 37.5%(600/1600) and Dudi Ardiana (18.75% (300/1600	43.75% (700/1600)	1999- *2006	Bojong Asih	Giri Jaya	Euis Nurhayati	08
Ahmad (M) 29.39% (556/1892), Yoyo Mulyana (M) (16.97% (321/1892	53.65% (1015/1892)	2007- 2013				
Euis Nurlaela (F) 41.19% (739/1794 votes	58.9% 1055/1794) (voters	2007- *2013	Cipatujah	Pemeutingan	Nina Suherlina	09
Wawan (M) 35% (700/2000), Atang (M) 25% ((500/2000	40% (800/2000)	1999- *2004	Cipatujah	Ciandum	Eti Maryati	10

Rivals' Result	Result	Period	Sub-district	Village	Name	No
Agus Komarudin (M) 9.63% (253/2627), Miskat (M) 25.69% (675/2627), Jeje (M) 12.45% (327/2627), Dindin (M) 9.55% ((251/2627)	32.43% (852/2627)	2005- *2011				
Edi Wahyudi (M) 39.8% (730/1881 (votes	61.2% 1151/1881) (voters	2007- 2013	Cineam	Cikondang	Herliati Sukmawati	11
Elis Heryani (M) (45.68% (566/1239	54.32% (673/1239)	2007- 2013	Cineam	Ancol	Imas Heryani	12
A Makmur (943/3568), Ade Yusup Suryadi (M) 16.73 % ((597/3568	26.42% 56.83% (2028/3568)	2009- 2015	Tanjung Jaya	Cibalanarik	Juju Juariah	13
Nandang Nurdinata (M) 16.91% (410/24242), Entjo Suherman (M) 23.43% (568/24242), Deni Kurniawan (M) (4.16% (101/2424	59.81% 1450/2424) votes	2007- 2013	Sukahening	Sukahening	Mumu Turnia	14
Oman (M) 37% (1122/3000), Yoyo (M) 4% (120/3000), Yamin (M) 4% (120/3000), Cepi (M) 15% ((450/3000	40% (1200/3000)	2001- *2003	Indihiang	panyingkirian	Imas Susilawati	15

Note: *Data extracted from my fieldwork. The rest is quoted from *Laporan Pemilihan Kepala Desa* (Formal Report of Village head Election), Tasikmalaya Regency, 2007-2010.

Table 1 shows female leadership in Tasikmalaya Regency from 1988 to 2010 and in Tasikmalaya City from 2001 to 2010. It demonstrates that Tasikmalaya has not had a female district head in the entire period. There has been one female candidate, Dedeh T. Widarsih of the Golkar Party, who ran for vice-regency head in the 2011 local election, but she had failed. Learning from Widarsih's experience, having won the internal election in the Golkar party, Widarsih finally ran as candidate for vice-regency head, giving the opportunity of the candidacy of regency head to a male PPP candidate. When I asked her why she did so, she replied that she felt the time was not yet ripe for a woman to be regency head. I got the impression that Widarsih had calculated the people's perception of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* which includes that the ideal role for women was not

to be at the highest leadership levels. If she had persisted in running for district head, she predicted that she would have had to face challenges that she was not yet ready to face.¹⁶ In addition, the male candidate, Subarma was in fact defeated in the election during the convention of his party, PPP. The opportunity was given to a cadre who is now the head of the district, Uu Ruhuzzaman. Widarsih's defeat in the general election may have been caused by various factors, but the fact that Subarma's party, PPP, had not formally supported her male counterpart contributed significantly to it because PPP is the biggest party in the regency.

Only six of the sub-districts in Tasikmalaya Regency had a female head. They were five women because two sub-districts were headed by the same woman, Euis Kaswati. This opens a new page in Tasikmalaya history. In spite of the fact that these assignments were criticized for having been too politically-driven seeking to please the central government that since the start of the Reformasi era had adopted a gender mainstreaming policy, this precedence is a social capital to which the people of Tasikmalaya can refer when they support female leadership. One thing that should be paid attention to is the Baperjakat/Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Pangkat (Advisory Board for Posts and Ranks). If this body and the regency/municipality head consider female leadership an important alternative to existing and common male leadership, women have a promising opportunity to become public leaders. Conversely, if this is not the case, women have to fight much harder to become sub-district heads.

At the lower level, the picture of female leadership has become more promising after 1998. Although up to 1997, a year before the demise of the New Order, Tasikmalaya Regency had only one female village head (Ade Mustikawati, head of Margaluyu Village, Manonjaya Sub-districts, started in 1988), the number of female village leaders has increased significantly. After 1998, the beginning of the Reformasi era, Tasikmalaya Regency has elected 15 female heads of village. This means that there has been a noteworthy increase of about 4.02% from only 0.28% (1 out of 351 villages) before 1998 to 4.3% (15 village heads out of 351 villages) today. The trend is positive because the number of female candidates has increased over the last decade as reflected in the data from the years 2007-2009 which documented 23 female candidates for village head from 19 village elections.

Female leadership in Tasikmalaya City is still new. Since its emergence (2001), Tasikmalaya City has had one female village head, Imas Susilawati, head of Panyingkiran, Indihyang Sub-district (2001-2006), but this constituted only 1.44 % (1 out of 69 villages). A more positive outcome was found in the case of female sub-district heads which was 25% (2 out of 8 villages).¹⁷

¹⁶ Interview with Dedeh T. Widarsih, Tasikmalaya City, October 19, 2010.

¹⁷ They are Iis Iriani, head of Tawang Ward (2002) and Yani Nur Jamaniah, head of Mangkubumi Wards (2004). Fieldwork, Tasikmalaya and Tasikmalaya Regency, August 2008-April 2009 & April-November 2010.

This positive trend is furthermore also reflected in female leadership performance. Of the 15 village heads in Tasikmalaya Regency, four were re-elected (25%): Ade Mustikawati, head of Margaluyu Village in Manonjaya Sub-district (1988-2007); Nina Herlina, head of Sukaharja Village in Cisayong Sub-district (2000-2011); Euis Nurhayati head of Giri Jaya Village in Bojong Asih Sub-district (1999-2004 and 2007-2013); and Eti Maryati, head of Ciamdum Village, in Cipatujah Sub-district (1999-2011). It can be inferred from their experiences that the public has started to accept female leadership. In addition, women also have a good chance to win their second term.

5. Women Candidacy

To give an impression of female candidacy in the region the following could be found in formal documentation. From 2007 to 2009 only 9 elections resulted in female winners. The documentation states that there were 23 female village head candidates in 19 village elections,¹⁸ among them were four villages---Tanjung Sari-Gunung Tanjung, Gunajaya-Manonjaya, Singajaya-Cibalong and Mekarwangi-Cisayong---who had two female candidates.¹⁹ Euis Nurlaela participated in the village election twice: first in April 2007 when she was defeated by Koko Komadin and then around June 2007 because Komadin resigned from his post; however she was again defeated, this time by Nina Suherlina. In the 1988 Margaluyu village election, there was also a female candidate besides the female winner, Ade Mustikawati, i.e. P'ah. If they are added to the number of elected female village heads and the number of defeated female candidates, there must have been 39 women²⁰ running in village elections in Tasikmalaya

¹⁸ The 19 villages are Pameutingan- Cipatujah, Paremitan-Ciawi, Parungponteng-parungponteng, Singajaya-Cibalong, Kiara Tanjung-Sukahening, Gunung Tanjung- Gunung Tanjung, Cikalong-Cikalong, Tanjungsari-Gunung Tanjung, Mekarwangi-Cisayong, Ciheras-cipatujah, Cineam- Cineam, Ancol- Cineam, Sukasetia-Cisayong, Sukapancar-Sukaresik, Gunajaya-Manonjaya, Madiasari-Ciarum, Nangelasari-Cipatujah, Lengkongjaya-Cigalontang, and Cikadu-Cisayong. The election in Pameutingan village was held twice in the same year, 2007, because the elected candidate Koko Komadin resigned from the post.

¹⁹ Ani Susanti and Yati Mulyati in Tanjung Sari-Gunung; Wiwin W. and Entin S. in Tanjung Gunajaya-Manonjaya; Iis Lia Dadia and Usmawati in Mekarwangi-Cisayong; and Iis Suhardini and Ai Novianti in Singajaya-Cibalong.

²⁰ They are P'ah, Ade Mustikawati from Margaluyu, Nia Rahmi Kaniati from Pasir panjang, Euis Ruhiyani from Kamulyan, Wiwin W. and Entin S from Gunajaya-Manonjaya (6 women), Imas Nurpaidah from Cineam, Herliati Sukmawati from Cikondang, Imas Heryani from Ancol, Elis Heryani from Ancol-Cineam (4 women), Oti from Namgelasari, Yati Rusyati from Ciheras, Nina Suherlina from Pameutingan, Eti Maryati from Ciamdum, and Euis Nurlaela from Pameutingan-Cipatujah (5 women), Lilies Widaningsih from Cikadu, Iis Lia Dadia, Usmawati from Mekarwangi, Siti Jaharah from Sukasetia and Nina Herlina from Sukaharja-Cisayong (5 women), Imas Maslahah from Sindangsari and Euis Nurhayati from Giri Jaya- Bojong Asih (2 women), Mumu Turnia from Sukahening and Diana Ratnawati from Kiara Tanjung-Sukahening (2 women), Iis Suhardini and Ai

Regency in modern times. Of the female candidates, three became temporary village heads: Lilis Widaningsih from Cikadu-Cisayong, Iim Siti Rohimah from Tanjungsari-Gunung Tanjung and Edah from Parungponteng-Parungponteng.²¹

6. Participation

To discuss the relation between the perception of *kodrat perempuan* and women's political participation, we must look at their participation in the general elections, as illustrated in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Potential Voters in Tasikmalaya Regency

Potential voters where a female candidate failed, 2007-2009 in only 9 villages	Potential voters where a female candidate won, 2007-2009 in only 9 villages	Village of the winning and failing female candidates	Tasikmalaya Regency in 2009	Potential Voters
386 ,28	981 ,12	41,343	426 ,625	Male voter
187 ,28	610 ,13	797 ,41	028 ,618	Female voter
549 ,56	592 ,26	140 ,83	454 ,243 ,1	Total

Note: *Data extracted from my Fieldwork, August 2008-April 2009 and April-June 2010. The rest is quoted from *Laporan Pemilihan Kepala Desa* (Formal Report of Village head Election), Tasikmalaya Regency, 2007-2010.

Table 2 shows the numbers of potential voters in Tasikmalaya in 2009 and 2007-2009 for the nine villages where female candidates won the election. Actually, at 51%, the percentage of potential female voters in the national election was slightly higher than that of men.²² On the local level the situation is not always the same. In some districts the number of potential female voters is higher than that of men and in others it is less. As illustrated in Table 2, the number of potential female voters is generally slightly less than that of men in Tasikmalaya Regency. We may assume that when the number of potential female voters is high, it may have an effect on the outcome of the election. The villages where women candidates won, as far as the available data are concerned, confirm this. Five out

Novianti from Singajaya-Cibalong (2 women), Ani Susanti and IIm Siti Rohimah from Tanjungsari, and N. Yani Nurhayati from Gunung Tanjung- Gunung Tanjung (3 women), Juju Juariah from Cibalanarik-Tanjung Jaya, Oon Saonah from Giri Mukti-Bojong Gambir, Nina Ruspina from Puspahayu-Puspahiyang, Nia Kania from Paremitan-Ciawi, Edah from Parungponteng- Parungponteng, Yati Mulyati from Cikalong-Cikalong, Eti sumiati from Sukapancar-Sukaresik, Yani Heryani from Mediasari-Ciarum, Imas susilawati from Panyingkiran-Indihiyang, and Iin Nuryani from Lengkong Jaya-Cigalontang.

²¹ Laporan Pemilihan Kepala Desa [Formal Report of Village head election], Tasikmalaya Regency, 2007-2010.

²² Melani Budiante, 2006. "Decentralizing Engagement: Women and Democratization Process in Indonesia," in *Sign: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 41: p. 916.

of the nine villages had 465 more potential female voters than male ones, whereas the remaining four villages had 78 women voters less than men. In line with this argument, 11 villages where female village heads candidates failed, the number of potential male voters was higher by 645 voters than that of women (78 voters).

However, this confirmation is not found everywhere. Overall, woman village heads constitute only 4.3% in Tasikmalaya Regency and only 1.44% from 2003 to 2006 in Tasikmalaya City, and now 0%. Furthermore, in eight villages where women candidates failed, the number of female potential voters was higher by 474 voters than male ones, however this did not guarantee the success of the woman candidates. This may relate to the candidates' trajectory and relation to their genealogy and family (spouse), on the one hand, and the increase of rational voters amongst the public, on the other.²³

There is a famous joke regarding the work of village heads and it represents their situation well. It goes: *kuwumah gaduh tanggung waler ngalereskeun sagalarupi urusan tikawitan perkawis sajadah dugi ka perkawis haram jadah* (A village head is expected to be responsible to handle things ranging from the praying mattress [meaning noble things] to son of a bitch things [meaning bad or nasty things]). This statement means to illustrate the complexity of village heads' work. This is in addition to the fact that they have to be available to the public 24 hours a day/ seven days a week. At the same time, they used to have no salary, only a *bengkok* (an area of land to be cultivated), and they basically depended on its products to meet their everyday needs, and other sources which were uncertain such as a *kencleng desa* (village saving box), *iuran desa* (village routine payment) and government incentive for collecting tax depending on the amount of tax collected. The money from these financial sources was spent not only on their salaries but also on the villages' operational costs. Now they receive monthly incentives, which are still low and paid irregularly. In short, normally the work of a village head is work inspired by dedication.

Leadership in an organization like a village is similar to that in other State organizations, meaning that it operates under a scheme known as TUPOKSI/ Tugas Pokok Organisasi (Main Task of Organization). It consists of three main working areas: government, development, and public affairs. The management of this workload is basically grouped into two: internal and external affairs. Internal affairs deal with both staffing governance and administrative matters. External affairs cope with communication, networking, searching for programs to serve their needs, financial aid and funding and carrying out village' programs. Although they are responsible for all of the things related to the village's business, village heads usually concentrate on external affairs. In practice, village heads have to adjust to objective circumstances.

The way female village heads perform in Tasikmalaya Regency is interesting. They have ways to cope with their workloads and adjust to the situation

²³ *Laporan Pemilihan Kepala Desa* [Formal Report of Village head election], Tasikmalaya Regency, 2007-2010.

creatively. From my field work it became clear that women leadership was characterized by honesty, diligence and transparency. This I saw from the fact that they were more than willing to enter into dialogue or look for *musyawarah* when they were about to implement financed and unfinanced activities. Many of them confirm this, such as Eti Maryati, Nina Herlina, Ade Mustikawati, etc. For example, Maryati in Ciandum reported to her staff every financial resource she received including transport fees for meetings. Herlina from Sukaharja claimed that she always held a *musyawarah* to decide how to spend the funds that the village received, while Mustikawati from Margaluyu always had discussions either with the internal staff of the village or with community leaders on the best ways to spend the village's funds.

During their time in leadership women could also exercise firmness. For an example, we may look at the resolve Euis Nurhayati, the head of Giri Jaya Village demonstrated. She adopted a procedural method and sought justice in handling her village's problems by taking a humane approach. Regarding the first method, she reported a young individual who had been caught red-handed by the police when he was stealing a chicken. The police took him to court and jailed him for three months. At first, the public challenged her, particularly the thief's family. She then took a second, humane approach, by regularly visiting him in prison, even the day before *Ied al-Fitri* (celebration day for Muslims after performing one month of fasting during Ramadhan). This changed the public's attitude, and they no longer protested against her but now admired her. The boy himself even visited her before going to his family after he was released. Once she stopped a transport truck full of materials by standing in the middle of the road. She was only willing to allow the driver to pass if he would repair the street, which had been damaged by the passage of heavy trucks like his. After a quarrel, the driver came back and it was agreed that every truck would pay an amount of retribution for the restoration of the sub-district's streets. But when she found out that this was ineffective, she resorted to another method. She asked a local stone trader to lend her stones which would be paid from the transport retributions. She dumped about 60 trucks of stones along the damaged street in her village and paid the owner of the stones gradually over more than one year.²⁴

Another case is Ade Mustikawati who used a play-around tactic to help a community member who needed health treatment. A citizen had to pay IDR 10,000,000 to a local clinic but he belonged to one of the poor families in the village. Having heard of the case, Mustikawati first followed existing procedures while she tried to understand the situation. She discovered that the local government has a *Reksa Desa* Program (a flexible program aimed at helping village development) which has an annual budget of IRD 100,000,000. To receive part of this fund, a person has to meet certain requirements. One of them is getting a recommendation from a local doctor. The problem was that the local medical doctor was reluctant to give one because he thought that if he gave one too easily it would he might be considered to perform badly. She then made a move within

²⁴ Interview with Euis Nurhayati, Tasikmalaya Regency. May 31, 2010.

the existing procedure by allowing some members of her society to demonstrate in front of the clinic, while she herself wrote a letter to the Health Unit of Tasikmalaya Regency telling about the challenges she was facing and the efforts being done to counter them. Hearing about this, the health division through its local clinic granted money to the family to pay the bill.²⁵

A second term may be considered a strong indication of the acceptance of female leadership. Of the 15 female village heads in Tasikmalaya Regency, four managed to sit a second term. They were: Ade Mustikawati, the head of Margaluyu Village in Manonjaya Sub-district (1988-2007); Euis Nurhayati, the head of Giri Jaya Village in Bojong Asih Sub-district (1999-2011); Nina Herlina, the head of Sukaharja Village in Cisayong Sub-district (2000-2011), and Eti Maryati, the head of Ciandum Village in Cipatujah Sub-district (1999-2013). To illustrate this, one of their success stories is worth mentioning. During her first period, Ade Mustikawati concentrated on internal consolidation and the people's acceptance of the village government. She felt that she needed to revitalize the internal regularity of the work by making clear job descriptions and by working with her colleagues in the office as often as possible. Externally she managed to gain the public's sympathy and acceptance by restoring the village's roads, which aimed at providing easy access for the public and to make it easier for the people to carry out their everyday activities. She did this by establishing good relations with her superiors both at the Manojaya Sub-district and the District level, particularly with strategic posts, such as the development division, and by using her communication skills she had picked up as an AMS Pitaloka activist. She found this strategy effective and she gained considerable authority and charisma which helped her a lot in increasing her influence and were very useful campaign tools to help her win her second term.²⁶

During her second term before the start of the Reformasi era, she concentrated on external affairs, specifically looking for additional income for the welfare of the village employees in spite of the existence of public programs. She developed six initiatives outside of the conventional ways of *kencleng desa*, *iuran desa* (village's deposit box, village's regular payment) and the incentive for tax collection. First, as the old long Cirahong Bus-Train Bridge was still in place in Margaluyu village, she asked the people who regulated traffic over the bridge to give the village a monthly share and they agreed to give IRD 60.000/month. Second, she let part of the village land for a telecommunication tower and the village received IRD 50,000,000 for a rental period of five years. Third, when Tasikmalaya Regency gave land to a number of villages, she asked to have a small piece of land in the city. She built two rooms there to rent out monthly. From this the village received about IRD 200,000 to IRD 300,000/month. Fourthly, she managed to get a *Reksa Desa* grant from the government, of which she spent 40% for construction and the rest for economic development such as for savings and small

²⁵ Interview with Ade Mustikawati. Tasikmalaya Regency. November 25, 2008 & April 21, 2010.

²⁶ Ibid.

soft loans. Fifthly, she developed UED/Usaha Ekonomi Desa (Village Economic Development) through saving and offering small soft loans. Sixth, she opened a market to sell life stock. The village asked for retribution from the animal sellers for renting the market, but it did not run well.

Because of her efforts in internal and external affairs she became well accepted. While running for a second term she was appointed as the head of AP-DESI/Asosiasi Perangkat Desa Indonesia (Association of the Indonesian Village Staff) in Manonjaya Sub-district and she was its treasurer at the district level. She was also appointed as temporary village head after her first and second terms had ended. She has been appointed as head of *Desa Siaga/Alert Village* (a new program passed in the Reformasi Era to allow people to help themselves, particularly in health matters for example by taking pregnant women to the nearest hospital to get the necessary treatment by using the car of a neighbor. She assisted in the accommodation and consumption section for the workers on the reconstruction of the local historical mosque which had collapsed during the 2009 earthquake. Finally, at the same time she was appointed as the head of the political party, PKPB/Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa in Tasikmalaya Regency. All of these achievements illustrate the dynamics of her leadership.²⁷

C. The State and Female Public Leaders: *Prospects and Challenges*

As Stated in chapter One, after independence, Indonesia has been a contextualized democracy. Since more than a decade, Indonesia has once more been a liberal democracy. A number of refinements or changes were made to adapt to the process of democratization. The State's practices at the village level came to fall under the scheme of village head elections. They are ruled by a number of State regulations.²⁸ There is an additional rule for the village secretary that mainly regulates the bureaucratic rank of the post and its salary.²⁹ The village head election follows the scheme of the election of the president and vice-president, governor and vice-governor, district head and head of municipality (major): it is a one man-one vote electoral system. In contrast with the elections of a *lurah* and a sub-district head, which are hierarchical, the election of village heads is more open, and largely depends on the acceptance of the candidate by voters.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Law 14/1950 on the formation of districts in West Java, Law 25/2000 on the authority of the local government, Law 8/2005 on local government, Law 72/2005 on villages, Regulation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 63/1999 on the terms of reference and the terms used in village administration, Local government regulation of Tasikmalaya 23/2000 on village regulations, Local government regulation of Tasikmalaya 12/2006 on technical guidance for candidacy, election, inauguration and declining a village head and its staff, Local government regulation of Tasikmalaya 13/2006 on Badan Permusyawaratan Desa/BPD (Village Consultative Body) and Head of Tasikmalaya District's letter on technical guidance for the implementation of the Local government regulation of Tasikmalaya 12/2006.

²⁹ Regulation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No 33/2004.

Prior to the assignment of the five female sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya Regency in 2001, the situation was marked by a number of events and policies which were conducive for public female leadership. Two months before they were assigned, Abdurrahman Wahid was replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri as the President for the 2001-2004 period. Wahid's policy on gender issues developed into a national movement for gender mainstreaming and there arose a structure of gender mainstreaming bodies at the lower levels.³⁰ Stimulated by what was going on in international and national political undertakings, the local government was also partial to pay attention to gender issues, particularly in relation to public leadership. It is also believed that there was a strong political will amongst members of the local elite who were concerned with the issue. During my fieldwork, many referred to one person in particular, namely Dede Uron. He was a vice head of Tasikmalaya Regency at that time. It seemed that he played an important role in mainstreaming female leadership, which could be seen from his direct involvement in the selection processes.

The issue of women's leadership in Muslim communities is controversial and has been hotly debated from time to time. It pops up when it gains momentum. Islam permits women to be active in developing communities. However, this matter becomes controversial when it deals with the question of whether this permission is free or exists within the boundaries of the Shari'a. The Qur'an states equality and inequality at the same time. For example, Qur'an 2: 228 stresses that a woman has similar rights as a man,³¹ and Qur'an 4:2 explains that man and woman only receive what they have earned.³² The same message may be found in Qur'an. 49: 13 and Qur'an. 16: 97. But, Qur'an 4: 34 mentions that the man is the overseer of woman.³³ This has become one of the discursive resources that do not support woman's civic engagement. In practice, Benazir Bhutto's success in the 1989 elections in Pakistan, Khalida Zia in the 1991 election in Bangladesh, Corazon Aquino in 1986 and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2001 in the Philippines, and Shaikh Hasina in the 1996 election in Bangladesh have inspired many women in Asia, including in Indonesia, to pursue leadership positions.³⁴

³⁰ Kathryn Robinson, 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*. London & New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 150-63; Susan Blackburn. 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*. Victoria: Monash University, pp. 29-31.

³¹ "And women have rights similar to the rights against them (i.e. the rights of men) according to what is equitable and men have a degree over them." [The Qur'an. 2: 228].

³² "And do not covet that which Allāh favors some of you with over others - men will receive the reward of what they earn and women will receive the reward of what they earn. And ask Allāh of his bounty. Verily Allāh has full knowledge of all things". [The Qur'an 4: 32].

³³ "Men are overseers of women because Allāh Ta'āla granted virtue to some of them (i.e. men) over others (i.e. women) and because of their spending from their wealth". [the Qur'an 4: 34].

³⁴ Farida Jalalzai and M. Krook, "Beyond Hillary and Benazir: Women's Political Leadership Worldwide," in *International Political Science Review* 31 (1), p. 7.

In Indonesia the idea of a woman running for president has been a national debate since the last decade. During the presidential election in 1999, Megawati Soekarnoputri was proposed by her party to run for president and this geared the public debate. The debate was opened alongside the rise of the implementation of the democracy system. The MUI³⁵ was seen as among the agents that were reluctant to support a female president. The organization at that time was not acting as it usually did in the New Order period when the body always supported the running government. After Soeharto's fall, the MUI alone or together with other Islamic organizations took an opposing position in the 1999 general election, suggesting Muslim communities not to vote for the party that supports a "reemergence of communism and secularism." Despite the fact that the PDIP-P was not referred to by name, many believed that it was the party the MUI had in mind.³⁶

D. Female Public Leadership in the Media

Newspapers documented the pros and cons of female public leadership.³⁷ As a result of the gender mainstreaming policy, in August 2001 Tasikmalaya Regency assigned five women to be the heads of the sub-district of Salopa, Cikatomas, Salawu, Cisayong and Jamanis. In 2003, the local government also assigned a female head to Rajapolah Sub-district but by replacing the existing female head of Salopa Sub-district by Euis Kaswati. Tasikmalaya City also assigned a female head to Tawang Sub-district in 2002, Iis Iriani as the head of Tawang Sub-district, and another female, Yani Nur Jamaniah, became the head of Mangkubumi in 2004. In 2003, Tasikmalaya City also assigned a female *lurah*, Imas Susilawati, to be the head of Kelurahan Panyingkiran (similar to a village but in an urban territory) by reassigning her after she had been the head of Panyingkiran Village in 2001 where she was elected directly by the people. It was done so, according to Dindin Saefudin, District Assistant 3, for the purpose of a smooth transformation.³⁸

Not long after the five women were inaugurated in Tasikmalaya as sub-district heads on August 15, 2001, pros and cons emerged in society. For example, *Priangan*, a local newspaper, issued a report entitled, "Diprotas Pengangkatan

³⁵ MUI/Majlis Ulama Indonesia (The Indonesian Council of Ulama) was founded in July 26, 1946. As other similar recognized religious organizations, the MUI was aimed at providing a forum "for internal consultation purposes and as an interlocutor between their respective communities and the government."

³⁶ Kees van Dijk, 2001. *A country in despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000*. Leiden: KITLV press, pp. 441-3.

³⁷ For example, *Republika*, June 30 1999 entitled Keputusan Rembang Bukan Keputusan PBNU, *Duta Masyarakat Baru*, July 22, 1999, entitled Gus Dur: Mega Patut Jadi Presiden, *Kompas*, July 17, 1999, entitled Ulama NU Dukung Presiden wanita, *Media Indonesia*, July 3, 1999, entitled Ratusan Ulama NU Tolak Presiden Wanita.

³⁸ Interview with Dindin Saefuddin, Tasikmalaya City. June 30, 2010.

Lima Camat wanita di Tasik [Inaugurating Five Women as Sub-district heads, Protested].³⁹ Budi Ali Mukhsin criticized the assignment because it is contravened the district's Islamic vision. He explained, "Kami sangat menyesalkan pengangkatan kelima camat wanita karena bertentangan dengan visi Islami [We very much regret the inauguration of the five female sub-district heads because it contradicts the Islamic vision]".⁴⁰

Another news story was entitled "Jadi Polemik Diangkatnya Lima Wanita di Tasik: Bupati Tasik dituduh Melecehkan Dewan [Inaugurating Five Women as Sub-district Heads has led to a Polemic: The Head of Tasikmalaya Regency is Accused of Degrading the Local Representative Body]".⁴¹ The consideration that public leadership is an area deemed inappropriate for women as perpetuated by various members of parliament and some figures in the regency is caused by their religious vision. They used it as point of reference and at the same time as a measurement to outline that the criticized act has violated the legislative body's grace.

Priangan also issued an opposing report entitled "Tokoh Perempuan Kacam Pemertes Camat Wanita [A Female Leader Criticizes the Protestors of the Inauguration of the Female Sub-district Heads]". In it, Lia Sudarma, a former member of the Local Legislative Body, criticized the protestor, explaining that this criticism hurts women's feelings and that it is an expression of parochialism, narrow-mindedness, and stupidity. Before the law, men and women enjoy the same rights, including the right to take on public leadership roles in State organizations.⁴² It is interesting that this supporter of female public leadership used a different discursive practice as she pointed to the State's Constitution which guarantees equality before the law for both men and women. By referring to the Constitution of 1945, she demonstrated the weakness of their arguments in maintaining the equality of gender in female public leadership.

Since 2004, both in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City no other women have been appointed as sub-district heads. In the same period, there also has not been a female village head in Tasikmalaya City. When asked about this, the local government in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City explained that they evaluated the previous assignment of public leadership to women and concluded that considering the context, it was still seen as less appropriate for women to hold the post due to practical reasons, the distance of the workplace and the field of work, the culture and society's perception but more accurately because of concerns among the community's religious leaders. From my interviews and field work it became clear that there is a hidden agenda behind this: politi-

³⁹ *Priangan*, August 23, 2001.

⁴⁰ The Local regulation no 3/2001 was used as the reference to criticize the inauguration. Two years later, the regulation itself was corrected by local regulation no 13/2003, aimed at making sense of the term *religius/Islami* by clarifying *religius* as pertaining to adherents of other religions and *Islami* to Muslims. But overall, the spirit of both versions remains the same. *Priangan*, August 23, 2001.

⁴¹ *Priangan*, August 25, 2001.

⁴² *Ibid.*

cal considerations. As politicians, the local elites face a situation that necessitates them to keep their constituents and this can be done at the sub-district and municipal levels. For incumbents, the State administrative bodies, particularly that of the sub-district, are effective institutions to ensure that their political interests are met. It is understandable that the bearer of the post has kept changing since the start of the Reformasi era. Meanwhile, when the fact of the absence of women leaders was taken up with the local authority in the BKPLD of Tasikmalaya Regency, he just kept silent and explained that he would try to re-promote female sub-district heads and female sub-district secretaries if their capacity and other factors were conducive for promotion. Whereas in Tasikmalaya City, the district assistant I interviewed explained that there is no such consideration and that in the future he will make efforts to promote sub-district female heads and female *lurahs*.⁴³

The discursive practice of female public leadership in terms of village and sub-district heads has been negligible and only began to increase in the Reformasi Era, with a slight but positive development in the case of village heads (there are 14 other female village heads in Tasikmalaya Regency) a stagnant one in the case of sub-district heads in both Tasikmalaya Regency (there were six female sub-district heads of which one occupied the office two consecutive times) and in Tasikmalaya City (there were only two female sub-district heads) and also of *kelurahan* heads in Tasikmalaya City. Female public leadership both in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City since the early twentieth century up to the decline of the New Order (May 21, 1998) included only one female village head and did not include any female sub-district heads. When Tasikmalaya City was established in 2001, it noted one female village head in its new territory, i.e. Panyingkiran Village in Indihiang Sub-district, and her status was then changed into head of Panyingkiran Kelurahan in 2003.

What is the prospect of female public leadership in Tasikmalaya? Or, a more pertinent question, why have no female staff members been assigned as sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City since 2004 and no female head of *kelurahan* in Tasikmalaya City since 2006? And what does it mean that there are 15 female village heads in Tasikmalaya Regency? With regards to the sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya and *kelurahan* heads in Tasikmalaya City, it seems that their chances depend on both objective and political considerations. The 2009 and 2010 data show that actually of the 80 staff members eligible for the post of sub-district head (Rank 3 A), there were six (7.5%) female staff members in 2009 and five (6.24%) in 2010 in Tasikmalaya Regency. There were five (10.20%) out of 49 female staff members in this rank in Tasikmalaya City. And there were 109 female staff members (29.17%) out of 387 eligible for *kelurahan* leadership. These data can be interpreted as signaling that women actually still have a chance to gain leadership positions, but doing so needs much effort from

⁴³ Interview with Dindin Saefuddin and Sutisna, Tasikmalaya and Tasikmalaya Regency. June 30, and May 19, 2010.

the women themselves and support from others particularly of local government elites, the local community and religious leaders.

E. Female Public Leaders and the Nurtured *Kodrat Perempuan*

In Indonesia, *kodrat perempuan* has been operative in determining women's roles in the private as well as public spheres. The term has mostly been used to differentiate women's nature from that of men and to illustrate the good qualities of Indonesian women as opposed to the negative picture of Western women.⁴⁴ It is also used to illustrate women's normative roles like mothers, daughters, housewives, or homemakers, and to illustrate the roles that may come along with womanhood like those of career-women (Brenner, 1999). After all, according to Van Wichelen, women were advised not to neglect their natural or female destiny of caring and reproduction.⁴⁵

As indicated in the previous chapters, the perception of *kodrat perempuan* has been nurtured by socio-cultural and formal State resources as well as by the media. The experience of women public leaders is similar to that of women Posyandu leaders in that both are nurtured under the strong influence of formal State resources such as the Constitution, human rights and the gender equality policy. Like other women leaders in the previous chapters, female village and sub-district heads commonly feel there is nothing wrong with asking permission from their husbands to pursue leadership positions. This permission functions to ease their conscience so that they do not feel they are wrong by taking on public leadership responsibility. At the same time, they expect that they will be supported by their family which in many cases contributes to the success of their leadership. It is therefore that they see asking permission not as a burden, but rather as a necessity and as a strategy to engage socially. It is necessary because it is like a door through which they can enter into the designated world that is the social world, while it is strategic because they can manipulate internal barriers to participate in social activities. For example, Ade Mustikawati explained that though leadership is open for men and women, it is important for women to obtain their husband's permission. Without his permission, she would not have taken the opportunity to run in the village head election in the first place because it would create an unpleasant situation at home which of course would influence her leadership engagement.⁴⁶ Another example is the experience of Iis Iriani, the former head of Tawang Sub-district, as well as that of Imas Heryani, the head of Ancol Village. They believe that family matters are important and that wives' roles are central in them. In whatever situation, she finds herself placed in, Iriani always tries to do what a

⁴⁴ Hatley, 2002, p. 152 in Sonja Judith van Wichelen. 2006. Embodied Contestations: Muslim Politics and Democratization in Indonesia through the Prism of Gender. Ph.D. Thesis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University, p. 101.

⁴⁵ Van Wichelen. 2006 *Embodied Contestations*, p. 102.

⁴⁶ Interview with Ade Mustikawati. Tasikmalaya Regency. November 25, 2008, and April 21, 2010.

wife would usually do at home. In the morning before she leaves to go to the office she always makes sure to prepare breakfast and the clothing for her family. In doing so she often works alone and does not feel burdened or exploited. Heryani, meanwhile, does the same, although she has a somewhat lighter load because her husband is often away due to his job as a truck driver.⁴⁷

Another factor where the perception of *kodrat perempuan* influences people is the importance of women's role in the family. Their role in the family has been persistently constructed within the boundary of the people's understanding of *kodrat*. This point is reflected in the experience of female public leaders where their public leadership engagement still obliges them to maintain their role in the home, at least in the understanding of the State where its leaders constructed its policy and programs with an emphasis on women's ideal role which is in the family. The same tendency is also reflected in the reports of newspapers, bulletins, etc., where the interpretation of the ideal role of a wife in the family is repeatedly propagandized. However, an alternative stand where democracy, gender equality, and human rights are considered is also covered. The interpretation of women's main role and function in the family as an ideal mother is apparent in society, including in Tasikmalaya where woman public leaders accommodate it as part of their ideal roles. This kind of interpretation is deeply influenced by people's nurtured understanding of *kodrat perempuan*. It is therefore religious precepts, local norms and culture that construct the perception of *kodrat perempuan*, commonly in a restrictive way. Woman leaders find an alternative voice out of these discursive resources. Nationally, they find them from the State's Constitution, its policy on human rights and gender equality, and from civil society's discourse and practices. Internationally, through the information media, they are also exposed to different gender and human rights' undertakings in different countries in the world.

In practice, woman public leaders in Tasikmalaya apply a flexible method in responding to these contradictory discursive resources. In the family, they use religion and culture as discursive resources. In it, they contend that religion and culture have formulated the ideal role for every member of the family. In public spaces, they refer to the National Constitution in which men and women are treated equally. So, as citizens, women and men are open to compete with one another. In this they believe that skills and networking play a significant role. For example, Neneng Wida Yuansih, a former head of Cikatomas Sub-district, related the leadership in the family to religion and she quoted Qur'an 4: 34 while she referred to the National Constitution to explain the possibility of the presence of women in public leadership. According to her, in the family wives are expected to support the leadership of their husbands and this support does not mean that in the public sphere women do not have the same rights as men have. Both men and women are the same before the law. Therefore, women have the right to do everything that men have the right to do, including being involved in public leadership. Herliati Sukmawati's, the head of Cikondang village shared Yuansih's view.

⁴⁷ Interview with Iis Iriani and Imas Heryani, Tasikmalaya and Tasikmalaya Regency. May 18 and 31, 2010.

She did not think negatively of female leadership when it was offered to her. She finally accepted it with the understanding that men and women have the same constitutional rights.⁴⁸

Female public leaders sometimes meet barriers set up by those who translate the area of female public leadership in a restricted sense. They see the possibility for women to act as public leaders but not in areas where they would have to deal directly with the people without a time limit such as in the case of village sub-district heads. They see that public leadership in internal affairs, like that of division head in the structure of the State government, as more appropriate for women. This view is seen clearly in the present Baperjakat's stand. The members of the body I interviewed either in Tasikmalaya City or Tasikmalaya Regency vented this conviction. They preferred a neutral gender policy in the sense of implementing democratic principles and human rights. They also gave a humane reason for why they saw female leadership in such a restrictive manner, such as that they did not want to put a female leader in difficult circumstances like working at night. All of these reasons explain why they have not assigned any women as sub-district heads after the five women in 2001 and 2004 in Tasikmalaya Regency and the two women in 2002 and 2004 in Tasikmalaya City.

In short, people's perception of *kodrat perempuan* does to a certain extent influence women's public leadership as reflected in the experiences of the female village and sub-district heads discussed above. Internal and external factors determine which nurtured meanings each woman leader holds in supporting her political engagement. One common picture is that external factors, particularly the Constitution, democracy, gender equality and human rights, are used to manipulate the barriers they face. In spite of doing so within constraints, they find a way to be able to engage socially such as by asking for their spouses' permission and support.

Conclusion

Having discussed female public leadership in the case of village and sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya through the lens of the concept of *kodrat perempuan*, the writer finds that the people's perception of the term indeed plays a role in determining women's civic engagement. The influence of this perception among the agents in society varies, depending on their knowledge and their contested discursive practices. Education is a discursive resource that significantly supports female public leadership. However, this strong positive factor very much needs other factors which are by nature in contestation with the opposite ones, the external factors. The supportive factors may refer to democratic processes perpetuated either by the implementation of the State's democratic political system, international and national human rights movement, international and national gender mainstreaming movements, political will of the State's (local) elites, reli-

⁴⁸ Interview with Neneng Wida Yuansih and Herliati Sukmawati, April 24, and May 15, 2010.

gious groups and society. On the other hand, unsupportive factors may also refer to the same discursive practices such as religion, culture, ethnicity, and the political will of the State's elites, religious groups and the community, but with the opposite spirit, such as religious and ethnic radicalism or tyranny of democracy.

Women leaders generally respond carefully to a public leadership position. They usually ensure that they have enough support internally and externally before they accept it. They do so because whether they are aware or unaware of the restrictive nature of their context, they certainly need sufficient support for their social engagement. By doing so, these woman leaders can manipulate existing barriers.

This study shows the scarcity of female village heads, 4.3% or 15/351 villages, and 15.4 % or 6/39 sub-districts of Tasikmalaya Regency for the period of 1988-2010 and 1.44 % or 1/69 *kelurahan* and 20% or 2/10 sub-districts of Tasikmalaya City for the period of 2001 to 2010. In the case of ascribing a post by assignment, female public leadership still finds this to be a difficult way as it is highly dependent on external factors, particularly the political will of the elites. The political will of these elites itself seems to play a decisive role as reflected in the case of the sub-district head elections both in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City.

However, the picture is more promising in the case of village heads. The study in Tasikmalaya Regency shows that in the villages where women ran in the village head elections, the number of voters who supported women public leaders was significant. The percentage of the people who voted for women who won in these village elections amounted to 38.46% or 15/39 female candidates. Though their perception of *kodrat perempuan* is still overshadowed by cultural and particularly religious understandings, they find ways of supporting women's public leadership either through education, differentiation between religious precepts and the State Constitution or finding room within the constraints such as by asking permission and support from spouses, family and local social and religious figures.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN THE
LOCAL CONTEXT:
*THE INFLUENCE OF THE
CONSTRUCTED KODRAT PEREMPUAN
IN FORMAL POLITICS*

Introduction

An important aspect of the democratization process in the Reformasi era is the general elections for members of the central and local parliaments. In a democracy, these parliaments are key institutions in which public goods and the public's interests are discussed and fought for through the formulation, clarification, evaluation, and approval and/or disapproval of government policies and programs. The performance of a parliament depends on its members, who are elected through general elections, the main procedure of a democracy. After the fall of the New Order, Indonesia has held relatively free general elections in the years 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. There were four general elections in 2004: the legislative election for the House of Representatives (DPR), the House of Regional Representatives (DPD), the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) at the provincial level, and the DPRD at the Regency/City level.¹

In general elections, candidates at all levels are essentially treated the same. However, politics are still widely considered as a male trade. Male politicians dominate political parties, and accordingly they influence the selection and staff of their positions and their candidates for Members of Parliament (MP). Being aware of unjust practices towards women, special attention has been given to them since colonial times. In the Reformasi era, attention towards women's political participation took a new, measured step: a gender quota was introduced

¹ Syamsuddin Haris and Moch Nurhasim. 2007. "How Political Parties Work in DPRD: Some Introductory Notes," in Sri Nuryati (ed.), *Political Parties' Performance at Local Parliament in Indonesia*, Jakarta: LIPI Press, p. 1.

in 2003 and it was first applied in 2004. This effort, a 30% quota for female candidates, was pioneered by different agents (particularly feminist movements) and has had a positive impact on women's representation due to increased representation. This policy creates a new perspective for the social construct known as *kodrat perempuan*, meaning that women are encouraged nationally and locally to enter the world of politics which is a world that has traditionally been dominated by men.

The way women are recruited and how they perform as MPs are interesting subjects. This chapter discusses how Muslim women adopt dynamic roles in the election process and in parliament. It examines, in a contemporary local context, how gender and religion co-influence the democratization process; how the religious ideal of *kodrat* informs gender relations in terms of women's engagement in leadership; and how different themes, such as elections, quota policies, parliamentary participation, and women's leadership influence women's social engagement. In other words, this study investigates how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* supports or hinders women's leadership in election processes and in their work at the regional parliament of Tasikmalaya City and Tasikmalaya Regency.

A. Leadership Trajectory

While traditional roles which reflect the construction of *kodrat perempuan* continue to function, recent external factors, such as the implementation of the 30% quota policy and the gender mainstreaming policy, have encouraged Indonesian women to participate in politics. They are supported when they attempt to enter formal politics. However, they must be equipped with knowledge, skills, networking, and other capitals if they want to perform well in this competitive and male-dominated field. Other capitals that pave the way for woman candidates to be elected as members of parliament include their family background, fame, and economic capital. In the case of Tasikmalaya, coming from a family of religious leaders, community figures, or successful business people contributes to a candidate's electability. Though there are many Islamic educational institutions in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, only few women who have a background in these institutions have been elected. Woman candidates from families of religious leaders have to make serious efforts to win the support of society. In doing so, these women also need financial support, among other things, to promote their efforts to gain a seat. To what extent women prepare and project themselves in this field can be traced from their leadership trajectories.

A discussion about how women are elected as MPs cannot be separated from how their leadership trajectories are nurtured and how their perception of *kodrat perempuan* influences their political engagement. The following two tables provide the background information for further discussion.

Table 1. Female MPs in the Tasikmalaya Regency DPRD

Date of Interview, or other sources	Political Party and Period as MP	Income	Family Background	Education	Status	Name	No
October 23, 2008	,PPP 2009–2004	Occasionally running a small dress business	Dress Business	Elementary to senior high school, a student at local college	IRT, dress seller (housewife)	Evi Elvinadianty	01
October 24, 2008 and October 19, 2010	,Golkar ,1995-1999 ,2004–1999 ,2009–2004 ,2014–2009	Occasionally running a small dress business	State employee	Elementary to undergraduate level	IRT of a State Employee, Head of Transportation Affairs, Tasikmalaya Regency	Dede T Widadsih, SE	02
October 23, 2008 and October 18, 2010	,PKS ,2009–2004 2014–2009	A private madrasa teacher	Active in Islamic education	Elementary to religious senior high school a student of a local college	A private madrasa teacher	Ucu Dewi S	03
October 28 and 29, 2010	,PPP 2014–2009	-	State employee	Elementary to undergraduate level	IRT of a state employee	Siti Nurjanah	04
October 28, 2010	,PDIP 2014–2009	Merchant	Trader family	Elementary to senior high school, a student at a local college	IRT, merchant	Titin Sugartin	05
August 5, 2010	PAN, 2009–2014	Private employee and merchant	Trader family	Elementary to undergraduate level	IRT, merchant	Yane Sriwigantini	06
October 18, 2010	,PKS 2014–2009	-	State employee	Elementary to undergraduate level	IRT	Rossy Herawati	07
Fieldwork	,PPP ,2004–1999 2009–2004 2014–2009 of DPRD West Java Province	-	Religious family, relative of the founder of Cipasung pesantren	Elementary to Undergraduate Level	IRT	Neng Medina Ruhiat	08
Fieldwork	PKB, 2004–2009	-	Religious family, relative of the founder of Cipasung pesantren	Elementary to Undergraduate Level	IRT	Laela Suroya	09
October 28, 2010	,PPP 2014–2009	-	Religious family	Elementary to senior high school level, a student at a local college	IRT	Mimi Rohmiati	10

Sources: *Memori DPRD Masa Bhakti Tahun 2004–2009* (Report of DPRD Period 2004–2009) of Tasikmalaya Regency, Interview and Fieldwork August 2008–April 2009 and April–November 2010 in Tasikmalaya and Tasikmalaya Regency.

Table 2. Female MPs in the Tasikmalaya City DPRD

Date of Interview or Other (Source(s))	Political Party, Period and Status as MP	Income	Family Background	Education	Status before being an MP	Name	No
Memori 2002–2004	PPP	-	Religious family	Elementary up to senior high school	IRT	Nurkamilah	01
Memori 2002–2004	PKB	-	Religious family	Elementary up to undergraduate level	IRT	Tien Mastini	02
December 11, 2009	,PAN 2009–2004	-	Religious educator	Elementary to senior higher school	IRT	Ani Nuraini	03
July 30, 2010	,PDIP 2014–2009	Merchant	Trader family	Elementary to senior high school	IRT and trader	Eti Guspi-tawati	04
August 3, 2010	Golkar, 2009–2014	-	State employee	Elementary to senior high school	IRT	Ratnawulan	05
October 19, 2010	,PPP 2014–2009	Helping her husband in managing a factory	Family trader	Elementary to senior high school	IRT	Ai Popon Purnawati	06

Sources: *Memori DPRD City Tasikmalaya 2002–2004* (Report of DPRD period 2002–2004), *Memori DPRD Masa Bhakti Tahun 2004–2009* (Report of DPRD period 2004–2009) of Tasikmalaya City, Interviews and Fieldwork, August 2008–April 2009 and April–November 2010 in Tasikmalaya City and Tasikmalaya Regency.

As seen from these MPs' family backgrounds, their constructed *kodrat* is like that found with other female roles in that it is closely tied with the traditional roles of women in the family, including that of housewives (locally known as *Ibu Rumah Tangga*, or IRT), and thus predominantly deals with the management of their households and the education of their children. They are expected to ask permission in order to become active in social engagements and to play supporting roles for the family's success and harmony. Over the course of time, their main role as IRTs is negotiated in accordance with their circumstances. This is because in this area of engagement women are directly given alternative sources of discourse which treat men and women as equals, including in gender issues, human rights, and UUD/Undang-undang Dasar (Constitution). Accordingly, in addition to their general role as housewives, they extend their roles to becoming managers of family businesses, educators in institutions, preachers in religious study groups, religious activists, or politicians, as seen in the case of Rossy Hermawati of the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of PKS. Before becoming a member of parliament, Hermawati was active in the Tarbiyah Kampus (campus-level dakwah [religious call] movement, popular in the 1990s) during her studies in Bandung (1994–1998). The year 1998 was a historical one for her because she graduated

and joined the new political party, Partai Keadilan (PK),² which was derived from the Tarbiyah Kampus movement in which she was active. She belongs to the first generation of women who joined the party.³

In areas deemed inappropriate for women the traditional perception of *kodrat perempuan* is rationalized to respond to external factors which tend to define *kodrat* in an essentialist manner, i.e. using a naturalistic view. To pave the way for their political careers, women deploy the traditional perception of *kodrat*, which includes that women have to ask permission to become politically active. Through this strategy, they not only gain permission, but also practical support. For example, Yane Sriwigantini from Tasikmalaya Regency, and Ai Popon from Tasikmalaya City, were both IRTs when the opportunity to become an MP arose. In addition, initially neither reacted swiftly to their political opportunities, rather they only acted after they had obtained their husbands' permission and support. In some instances, husbands became supportive agents for the political campaigns of their wives by leading their campaign teams.⁴

Female MPs' leadership trajectories are nurtured by different sources of discourse: religious and local norms, family backgrounds, as well as State and media discourses. Of the MPs with a family background in business, Titin Sugiartini of the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of the PDIP and Ai Popon of the Tasikmalaya City branch of the PPP may serve as examples. Their leadership paths were mostly formed through their family's business lives. Sugiartini's father, Ugan Suganda, began his kerosene business in 1948, serving distribution needs in Tasikmalaya Regency. After 44 years as the regency's main agent, in 1992, his business had to be adjusted as a result of the "Rayonisasi" (area of distribution) policy, meaning that the company could distribute the kerosene to only seven *kecamatan* (sub-districts) ranging from Indihiang to Kadipaten. Sugiartini entered the business at the same time as this policy measure came into effect. What is interesting in her case is that her father provided her with an economic link which she used to make contacts with her constituents. Her father also taught her how to run her kerosene business in a mutually beneficial manner. Having this skill was useful in her campaign. In other words, her leadership was formed in part through her business interactions with other people. Her business activities not only provided economic opportunities for many people, but also created a network in which her family members and business partners maintained their relations. Two years after having become active in kerosene distribution, Sugiartini became active in politics and she joined the PDIP in 1994. Soon afterwards, she was made the treasurer of the sub-district's branch of the PDIP, and later became the secretary of the organization. She was active in the party for 15 years before running in the local parliamentary election in 2009. She sees *kodrat* as emphasizing originality,

²As the party had to adapt with new regulations, PK was transformed and became known as PKS/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera in 2004.

³Interview with Rossy Hermawati. Tasikmalaya Regency, October 18, 2010.

⁴Interview with Yane Sriwigantini, August 5, 2010 and with Ai Popon, Tasikmalaya City, October 19, 2010.

that which originally belongs to women's nature and is not shared by men. This negotiated understanding of *kodrat* was nurtured by her experiences in managing her kerosene business and through her participation in politics, through which she often dealt with different types of people. This has eased her engagement in the public sphere, including politics.⁵

Like Sugiartini, Ai Popon Purnawati of the Tasikmalaya City branch of the PPP (serving in local parliament from 2009 to 2014), also comes from a business background. Her father's and her husband's businesses, in which she plays an important role, contributed to her leadership trajectory. Her public engagement can be traced back to her childhood when she was appointed head of class in the fourth grade of Karang Sambung Primary School and she retained this position until she graduated in 1983. Her leadership trajectory was also nurtured in her junior high school years when she became class treasurer. In 1992, at the age of twenty-two, she joined the PPP. Her family and her husband were strong supporters of the party. Her husband has a PPP political background and Tamansari in Tasikmalaya City is a PPP stronghold. After having been an active party member for eight years, she was elected village treasurer of Tamansari in 1999, representing the PPP. She held this position for seven years before she was chosen as First Head in 2006, dealing with the party's internal organization. Three years later, she was elected as the party's leader in Gobras Village and four months later she was also chosen as the party's head in Tamansari Sub-district, a position which she continues to hold.⁶ These capitals, among others, increased Purnawati's chances of being elected as an MP.

For Purnawati, *kodrat perempuan* is "to take care of children, husband and the family." She fulfilled this function by becoming an IRT after she married in 1989. At the same time, she believes that women must be economically independent. In Islam, wives are not obliged to financially support their families, and when they do have income, it belongs to them and they may spend it as they wish. Purnawati used her income to liberate her from her dependency on her husband, spending her money on both family needs and herself. Unlike Sugiartini, who considers *kodrat perempuan* to be not very influential on women's social practices, she negotiates *kodrat* by playing both private and public roles.⁷ She approaches this double burden creatively, by managing them with her husband's support.

Eti Guspitawati (PDIP, Tasikmalaya City), Yane Sriwigantini (PAN, Tasikmalaya Regency), and Evi Elvinadianty (PPP, Tasikmalaya Regency), also have business backgrounds. Their husbands are local businessmen who produce and sell one of the region's most famous commodities: Muslim attire. Although they are housewives, they are also involved in their family's businesses.

⁵ Interview with Titin Sugiartini, Tasikmalaya City, October 28, 2010.

⁶ Interview with Ai Popon Purnawati, Tasikmalaya City, October 19, 2010.

⁷ Ibid.

As *majlis taklims* (religious study groups) are the main place for women to participate in religious studies, many consider them as important means for social engagement. All female MPs I interviewed used *majlis taklim* as important sites for their political campaigns. For Evi Elvinadianty, a *majlis taklim* is a place for social engagement. Like many other participants, her leadership trajectory in a *majlis taklim* began when she started fundraising in her neighborhood to support the management of the *majlis*. Originally from Tangerang, she moved to Tasikmalaya in 1998 but she did not see herself as an outsider as people accepted her warmly. Her helpfulness may explain her ready acceptance. She became affiliated with the PPP in 1993 while she lived in Tangerang. In Tasikmalaya, she joined the local party and was soon made the head of Tasikmalaya Regency's Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan/WPP (Women for United Development). One of its activities was religious preaching at a *majlis taklim*. Evi Elvinadianty predominantly deals with *majlis taklims* in areas with a strong PPP presence, allowing her to grow from being a housewife, into becoming the caretaker of a *majlis taklim* and subsequently into becoming a politician. When the 30% quota policy was implemented in 2003, she was one of the women in Tasikmalaya who was nominated for parliamentary candidacy; she won her seat a year later.⁸

It is interesting to note that the assumption that politics are both a male field and a corrupt one has caused the absence of female Muslim politicians from *pesantren*. Most MPs are men who have a *pesantren* educational background, either as *santri* (a *pesantren* student) or as both a *santri* and *madrasah* (junior/senior high schools with *pesantren* management) student. One way to explain this is that Islamic educational institutions emphasize women's role as supporting agents, not as equal partners. Traditional *pesantrens* maintain this norm up to the present and thus follow Nawawi Banten (1813 - 1897) who says in his *Uqud al-Lujain fi Huquq al-Zaujain* that wives have to serve and obey their husbands, and stay at homes, rear their children and protect their property.⁹

In most cases, teachers in Islamic educational institutions idealize Muslim women as obedient agents in the family who prioritize housework and the education of their children. Local norms seem to support this ideal. Accordingly, women (particularly Muslim women) are influenced by this discourse in Tasikmalaya. This is why so few women from *pesantren* backgrounds become MPs. Only two women MPs in Tasikmalaya Regency in the last decade hailed from a *pesantren* family: Neneng Madinah of the PPP and Laela Suroya of the PKB. There are at least two explanations for the small number of female MPs coming from *pesantren's* families. First is the general assumption of a woman's ideal role in which the perception of *kodrat* is usually used to support the formulation of

⁸ Interview with Evi Elvinadianty, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 28, 2008.

⁹ Pieternella van Doorn-Harder. 2007. "Reconsidering Authority: Indonesian Fiqh Text About Women." and "Religious Authority, Politics and Fatwas in Contemporary South Asia," in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds), *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*, pp. 49- 65; Martin Van Bruinessen. 1995. *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan, p. 122.

this role. Second is the particular position of the *pesantren*. Pesantren Cipasung, to which the two women MPs belonged, is known as an inclusive one, particularly with regards to the position of women. Both MPs are the daughters of K.H. Ruhiat and Nyai Badriyyah, who established the *pesantren*.¹⁰ Though he maintained his neutrality in politics, K.H. Ruhiat was a nationalist citizen who once said that “Biar, bagian politik itu sudah ada ahlinya, akang memimpin pesantren saja, jangan sampai semua ke politik. Kalau pesantren ditinggalkan, bagaimana nanti jadinya negara merdeka ini kalau penduduknya tidak berakhlak agama?” (Leave politics to the experts. Let me take care of my *pesantren* and not engage in political activities. What would happen in this independent country if the people don’t behave religiously?) He did not prohibit his students or his family members from political engagement and some of them participated in political activities, including his two daughters, both of whom became involved in politics long after their father’s death in 1977. Another factor may be that the women (the *nyais*), including Madinah and Suroya, were, unlike their male siblings, not expected to become leaders in their *pesantren*. This allowed them to become active socially, including in politics. Although her term in local parliament has ended (2004–2009), Suroya is still an active PKB member in the regency. Neng Madinah Ruhiat’s political career, meanwhile, has developed further; she was elected a member of West Java’s parliament in 2009, and is a member of the D Committee dealing with provincial development.

In short, we may conclude that female politicians must also go through processes which equip them with the knowledge, skills, and networks needed to engage in politics. At the same time, other social and cultural capitals (such as their families’ economic and structural backgrounds, or having family members who are government or religious leaders) also help them to successfully reach their goals. Most female politicians I interviewed played their roles of housewives in the private sphere and were politicians in the public sphere. In this case, their perceptions of *kodrat* are contextualized and compromised by existing religious and social engagements, as well as by the mainstreaming of the new adaptations of their traditional roles. How their perceptions of *kodrat* influence their leadership experiences is discussed below.

B. Leadership Experiences

Women’s political engagement and leadership experiences consist of the following four elements: their campaign, candidacy, election, and experiences as MPs.

¹⁰ Iip D. Yahya. 2006. *Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi KH. Moh. Ilyas Ruhiat*. Yogyakarta: PT. LkiS Pelangi Aksara, pp. 34–5.

1. Candidacy

The stereotype that politics is dirty business may influence women's participation in parliamentary candidacy. In the case of Tasikmalaya, this is further influenced by the construction of *kodrat*. As a result, women are generally reluctant to become involved in formal political processes even when external factors encourage them to do so. These factors are gender equality, human rights, and the 30% female candidate quota policy. The first two factors are imposed by the State through its policies, regulations and institutionalizations, or by NGOs through workshops and training sessions that contribute significantly to creating a conducive context for women's political participation. The other factor, the 30% quota policy, certainly plays a significant role in giving women more exposure in the public sphere, as seen in the candidacy of female MPs.

The female MPs I interviewed experienced such reluctance, overcoming it only after a number of agents supported their involvement. Their husbands were generally the most determinant factors in encouraging women to engage in parliamentary elections. Many of the local female politicians I interviewed said they had their husband's support. One common aspect of patriarchal families is that husbands are the heads of their families, meaning that wives must ask their permission before engaging socially. This value is retained in the context of Tasikmalaya. Although political parties have generally paid more attention to their male cadres, after the implementation of the 30% quota they have been strongly recommended to make serious efforts to accommodate a minimum of 30% woman candidates.

The recruitment pattern of political parties is shown by the eight political parties (Golkar, PDIP, PKB, PAN, PPP, Partai Demokrat, Gerindra and PKS) that passed the parliamentary threshold in the 2009 general election. This required them to select woman candidates from internal cadres, either from women's organizations or among general party members who are senior and qualified candidates, professionals, or persons with fame and wide social recognition. The recruitment process for woman candidates is similar to that for men. Female candidates are proposed by either the lower or higher structures of the party, internal teams, or on their own initiatives. In the case of political parties that do not have their own cadres, leaders or selection teams may invite female candidates with a high electability from outside the party. To maintain fairness in the recruitment process, the team members come from the parties' managing body. In practice, political leaders and their secretariats may play decisive roles in choosing woman candidates. Only few political parties have adopted the 30% quota in the structure of their party or in the selection of legislative candidates.¹¹ Of the eight leading political parties in the period from 2005 to 2010, the largest percentage of

¹¹ Ani Soetjipto. 2011. *Politik Harapan: Perjalanan Politik Perempuan Indonesia Pasca Reformasi*, Tangerang: Marjin Kiri, pp. 58-9.

woman politicians was 26%, or 13 out of 50 staff members, in the structure of the PKB. The lowest was 5.8%, or 4 out of 69 staff members, in the PKS.¹²

The *kodrat* construction plays an invisible role in the process, but is evident in different attitudes and expressions. Its influence can be found before the formal selection, during the selection process, or in determining the candidates for the highest position in a regency or city. Before the formal selection, female candidates must evaluate whether or not they want to run, establish whether their closest family members support them or not, and determine whether or not others (including their political parties) support them. During the selection process, some of the *kodrat* values come to the fore, including the fact that woman candidates are not considered a priority, even after the implementation of the 30% quota. Women's reluctance to involve themselves in politics is deeply rooted in their perception of *kodrat*, as experienced by candidates such as Ucu Dewi Syarifah and Rossy Hermawati of the PKS and Ani Nuraini of PAN, who said that they would not have run had their families (husbands and sometimes parents) and political parties not supported them. Only once they had been given permission and were supported did they participate in their parties' selection procedures.

The situation explained above shows that women in Tasikmalaya politics may still have to face a cultural barrier. This barrier is known in social studies as the glass ceiling effect. It puts women's leadership and competence in a situation where they are treated as having "masculine characteristics."¹³ In this case, some female politicians in Tasikmalaya faced a cultural norm which restricts their political engagement. Although this is not common in other parts of the country, some scholars have encountered it as well, such as Pieterella van Doorn-Harder. She argues that it is important to understand this in the context of "the underlying cultural construct" which influences people.¹⁴ She explains that

"In Java, cultural and religious forces joined to create the so-called glass ceiling that women face. At the same time, Javanese culture undergirds the commitment of these women: they think relationally and perceive individuals within their family, community, and environment. For the women leaders, how one handles this microcosm ultimately testifies to one's relationship with God. They see this as more important than seeking personal gain or stardom."¹⁵

¹² Golkar Party 12% (13/108 staff), PDIP 14.8% (4/27 staff), PKB 26% (13/50 staff), PAN 10% (5/50 staff), PPP 9% (2/22 staff), Democrat Party 10% (8/77 staff) and PKS 5.8% (4/68 staff). Ani Soetjipto (*et al.*). 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*: p. 23. The data of the structure of PDIP mentioned in this book, PDIP 14.8% (14/27 staff), is incorrect; the correct number is not 14 female members, but only 4. "Susunan Pengurus DPP PDIP, Pramono Agung Sekjen". *Detik News*. March 31, 2005.

¹³ Jerlando F.C. Jackson and Elizabeth M. O'Callaghan. 2009. "What Do We Know About Glass Ceiling Effects? A Taxonomy and Critical Review to Inform Higher Education Research," in *Research in Higher Education*, Vol. 50, No. 50, p. 463.

¹⁴ Van Doorn-Harder. 2006. *Women Shaping Islam*, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 20.

Furthermore, I found that Dede T. Widarsih, a senior politician of the Golkar Party, experienced this dilemma. She was reluctant to become a regent candidate for Tasikmalaya Regency, instead proposing to become deputy regent. She considered the role of women in her regency to be still perceived traditionally, and found this value to be supported by both religious understanding and local precepts.¹⁶ This being so, and considering her party's calculations, it is understandable why she decided not to run for the position of regent. Though in the first interview Widarsih told me that *kodrat* does not influence women's political participation significantly,¹⁷ her decision, in which *kodrat* was an important consideration, proved otherwise. It was a political calculation she had to make. She says that "we have to obey religious teachings and we have to consider where the current is flowing in politics."¹⁸

In the case of how women are recruited in the parliamentary candidacy process, parties have been told to implement the 30% quota of woman candidates. This has led to an increase in political parties offering candidacy to women. This has been a surprise for many women, as they were marginalized in, and to some extent absent from, the political arena, and thus have weaker precedents and traditions in the field than their male counterparts. They act as if the political sphere is alien to them, tending to wait for opportunities, reluctantly accepting them when they come, and then worrying about being incapable of handling them. As mentioned above, they must be convinced to become candidates. For example, Ai Popon Purnawati of the Tasikmalaya City branch of the PPP only accepted her candidacy after her husband and local religious and community leaders gave her their support. Yane Sriwigantini, of the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of PAN, accepted the offer only after her husband and family convinced her to participate in the candidacy process.

In the case of the PKS, women's participation in parliamentary elections has been considered imperative since the party decided to offer the opportunity to its woman cadres. In case the candidate or her spouse refused, the party's local board would persuade them to accept the opportunity. The party sees it as part of its religious mandate known as *dakwah*, a movement for social change. Rossy Hermawati and Ucu Dewi Syarifah accepted their candidacies only after their political party had persuaded their husbands to allow them to do so. Hermawati explained that as a member of the PKS she is obliged to participate in *dakwah*. The organization itself is a *tarbiyah* movement (*tarbiyah* literally means education, here it is a religious movement which initially called on people in campuses in 1990s Indonesia to abide to Islamic teachings), and believes that a political vehicle is necessary for the effective implementation of *dakwah*. In other words, they use their political party to realize institutional objectives. This is why each member of the movement, including women, must support it. When husbands

¹⁶ Interview with Dede T Widarsih. Tasikamalaya City, October 19, 2010.

¹⁷ Interview with Dede T Widarsih. Tasikamalaya Regency, October 14, 2008.

¹⁸ Ibid.

protest, the party's local boards persuade them to grant their wives permission to participate in the political process.¹⁹

Some husbands actively encourage their wives to participate in politics, including as parliamentary candidates, as experienced by Mimi Rohmiati and Siti Nurjannah, who both belong to the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of the PPP. Rohmiati, though a housewife, already had experience in public engagement which she got during the two periods her husband served as the regent of Tasikmalaya Regency. As first lady of the regency, she was made the leader of State-supported organizations such as Dharma Wanita, PKK, and Badan Koordinasi Majelis Taklim (BKMT). Aware of his wife's capacities and his own influence both as regent and as an important PPP member, Rohmiati's husband, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, suggested that she run for MP.²⁰ Siti Nurjannah's experience was similar. Her story began in 1999 when her husband declined to become the treasurer of the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of the PPP because he was a State employee. Instead, he proposed that his wife take the position. The party agreed and Nurjannah became a politician. Prior to the general election in 2009, she served concurrently as the local PPP treasurer, treasurer of the BKMT (since 2006), and the treasurer of the Forum Da'i Tasikmalaya Regency (Forum for Muslim Preachers in Tasikmalaya, 2007–2009). Her candidacy in the 2009 general election came after she had already held an important position in the party for quite a while.²¹

There are yet more women who were motivated to engage socially. Of the interviewees, Titin Sugiartini and Ratnawulan seemed the most assertive. Sugiartini has been involved in PDI(P) activities for more than two decades. She became more active in the party after her second husband, Suwito, had died in 2006 and she has since been entrusted with a number of responsibilities. Ultimately, the party proposed that she be one of the PDIP's candidates in the 2009 election, and she won a seat in the Tasikmalaya Regency parliament for the 2009–2014 period.²² Ratnawulan, on the other hand, is the wife of a State employee who became active in Golkar's activities in 1995, participating in her husband's activities in both the local government and in Golkar. Her political participation intensified in the 2000s after her husband had died. Prior to the election, Ratnawulan was made the leader of the Forum Kota Sehat Siaga (FKSS; Forum of an Alert and Healthy City). Normally, this position should be occupied by the mayor's wife, but because she declined, Ratnawulan was made leader. She explained that she was given the task because of her previous involvement in governmental organizations, including Dharma Wanita and Gabungan Organisasi Wanita (GOW; Union of Women's Organizations). As part of FKSS, which coordinates and supports the implementation of sub-district, village and neighborhood Alert Health Programs, she met people in different positions and from different organizations, including PKK, Posyandu, local governments, and NGOs, who were concerned

¹⁹ Interview with Rossy Hermawati, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 18, 2010.

²⁰ Interview with Mimi Rohmiati, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 28, 2010.

²¹ Interview with Siti Nurjannah, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 28, 2010.

²² Interview with Titin Sugiartini, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 28, 2010.

with basic health development. By the time candidacies were opened, she had an important position and could not easily be ignored.²³

All interviewees from different political party backgrounds (Golkar Party, PKS, PPP, PDIP, PAN, PKB) mentioned the following considerations in terms of how women are selected as candidates: seniority, position in the party structure, loyalty, popularity, and wealth, as well as having social, cultural and economic capital. Generally, political parties elites (such as local board members) select a number of candidates based on the aforementioned criteria. The names of the candidates are selected through the parties' internal mechanisms, which is typically a bottom-up processes from the sub-district level up to the regency or city one; on the lower level, the approval of candidates is confirmed. However, in practice these standardized procedures do not always come up with the expected results or the number of candidates needed. In that case, political elites turn to direct recruitment as an alternative way to find candidates. This also happens when the elites play for their own political interests, despite objective considerations and external influences, such as the 30% quota.

In short, female political candidacy is celebrated, but partly within the precept of the perceived *kodrat*. This is evidenced from the fact that woman MPs asked their husbands' permission before becoming involved, as well as from their reluctance to take the highest leadership positions (as experienced by Dede T. Widarsih in the election of the regent). However, women are finally engaging politically and once they receive the support of their families, political parties, and communities, they can start their campaigns. The question of how *kodrat* influences the campaign process is discussed below.

2. Campaigns

How does the perception of *kodrat perempuan* influence women's campaigns? A campaign is crucial for candidates to win elections, and it is only implemented after candidates have decided to run. Candidates' and voters' perceptions of *kodrat* may influence the decision-making process and whether or not female candidates will join the political process. The aim of a campaign is to gain people's support and thus does not explicitly deal with the cultural value of an idealized woman. However, campaigns may relate to values when they are attached to certain acts which require value judgments, such as when female candidates are asked to campaign at night in a remote area, or they may require creativity which may lead to thinking or acting in a way that is incongruous with her *kodrat*. Female candidates generally run their campaigns in accordance with the assumed *kodrat* and the local ideal of propriety. For example, they use *majlis taklims* as one of the sites for their campaign. They take advantage of different forms of media and advertising, including banners, billboards, and pamphlets, stickers, and business cards distributed either by campaign teams or by the candidates themselves during campaign stops, including in *majlis taklims* or by door-to-door visits. Ban-

²³ Interview with Ratnawulan, Tasikmalaya City, August 3, 2010.

ners and billboards are installed in places where they can potentially be seen by many people, particularly at intersections and in business districts. In the media, they may indicate the voting steps to direct voters to vote for them, including using slogans and general themes for which they will fight, or simply show off their pictures and the logo of their affiliated party. Furthermore, fieldwork indicates that one female candidate used her culinary expertise as a campaign tool in the 2004 general election and won significant support (more than 2000 votes), but failed because of regulations which were based on rank.²⁴

Like male candidates, women also give financial aid to develop public facilities, including the construction of *gardus* (security posts), mosques, and *majlis taklims*. They also contribute funds for the food people consume during their rallies and in gatherings. As many places are visited, they usually share the costs with other candidates. In terms of constructing public facilities, Sugiartini of the Tasikmalaya Regency branch of the PDIP, for example, paved several alleys and named them Gang (alley) Ummat 1, Gang Ummat 2, etc. Many alleys in rural areas of Tasikmalaya are muddy during the rainy season, meaning people have difficulty passing through. She considered the paving necessary to allow people to move more quickly to enhance their mobility. Another thing is that by using the term Ummat (meaning community, here in the sense of Muslim community) her candidacy could be more readily accepted as she was calling on their religious sense of belonging.²⁵ This approach was effective because it was implemented in the context of the growth and dissemination of Islamic ideals, as reflected in the recent Perda Syariah movement. In this context, the *kodrat* construction played a role because this kind of political activity deals with areas that affect everybody, regardless of gender. A more direct influence of the *kodrat* construction could be seen with candidates who used the perceptions of women for their political campaigns. For example, teaching others how to bake cakes was a campaign strategy women used and which was very much influenced by the constructed *kodrat* (though this strategy is still rare).

Female local MPs in Tasikmalaya come from different family backgrounds. It appears that these backgrounds contribute to some extent to their chances of success in an election. The electability of candidates cannot be separated from their social capital. They must have popularity, economic resources, and networks. Many of the candidates, such as Sugiartini, Sriwigantini, Guspitawati, Purnawati and Elvinadianty, come from a business background. Others come from a family of civil servants, such as Nurjannah, Rohmiati, Widarsih and Ratnawulan, or of educators, such as Ucu Dewi Syarifah and Ani Nuraini. A candidate with a family in business has the advantage of merchant and customer networks, as well as employer and employee relations. For example, Ai Popon Purnawati and her husband have two different kinds of businesses: furniture and footwear production. These businesses deal with many people: business partners,

²⁴ Interview with, Heni Hendini, Tasikmalaya City, April 22, and November 1, 2010.

²⁵ Interview with Titin Sugiartini, Tasikmalaya Regency, October 28, 2010.

customers, and employees. There are numerous employees and business partners and they generally live nearby in Tamansari, the area of her campaign. These agents expected that, when she was elected, she would pay more attention to their area's development. On the one hand, people at least expected that their business relations with Purnawati's family business would be maintained if they voted for her. On the other hand, she received adequate political support to win her seat. Once she was elected, the possibility of her meeting their expectations could be measured from a privilege owned by members of parliament, namely the Aspiration Fund (Dana Aspirasi), which amounted to about IDR 300,000,000 annually in the Annual Budget of 2010. These business relations explained for example, why Purnawati got 7400 votes. Though it was 600 votes less than the minimum, it was the highest number of votes in her campaign area for her party (PPP), and thus she had priority for membership in the Tasikmalaya City DPRD for 2009–2014.²⁶ As with financial aid, the use of social capital is not directly related to the use of *kodrat* in social engagements. A relation may be drawn when female candidates use their understanding of *kodrat* to increase their electability by, for example, using their and their family's areas of influence to promise in the campaign that they will pay attention to mothers' and children's interests, as was done in Rohmiati's campaign. For her, this was a measured and feasible promise because she had headed the PKK for two periods when her husband was the regent of Tasikmalaya. Once again, however, this is a rare case.

Though female political campaigning is generally done in areas which are under the influence of women's closest male relations, such as their husbands, brothers and fathers, external factors provide the space and opportunity for them to pursue their political campaigns. In other words, the patriarchal culture manages to adapt to the situation. This gives more space and opportunities for women's political campaigns. The construction of *kodrat* has an indirect role in supporting women's political campaigns as the campaign itself is neutral, as well in the key roles of women's closest agents (husbands, fathers, and brothers), who are very influential.

3. Elections

How does the perception of *kodrat perempuan* influence women's elections? As with campaigns, elections are an important step for candidates to become MPs, but are not directly related to their understanding of *kodrat*. This relation depends mostly on external agents' construction of *kodrat* and the support (or lack of it) for women's electability hinges on voters' tendencies. However, female candidates' understanding of *kodrat* may affect their speech and actions, thus influencing their campaigns and persuading voters to elect them. Female

²⁶ Interview with Ai Popon Purnawati, Tasikmalaya City, October 19, 2010.

candidates' marginal electability in Tasikmalaya is reflected in the election results shown below.

Table 3. Female MPs in Tasikmalaya Regency

Percentage of Female MP	Period	Male MPs	Female MPs	No
11.1%	2004–1999	41	51 ²⁷	1
11.1%	2009–2004	40	²⁸ 52	2
15.6%	2014–2009	38	²⁹ 73	3

Table 4. Female MPs in Tasikmalaya City

Percentage of Female MPs	Period	Male MPs	Female MPs	No
4.4%	2004–2002	43	³⁰ 24	1
2.2%	2009–2004	44	³¹ 15	2
6.7%	2014–2009	42	³² 36	3

Based on the number of elected woman MPs, the electability of women remains weak compared to that of men. The highest percentage of women elected was 15.6% in the 2009 general election in Tasikmalaya Regency, which is still far short of the 30% quota; the lowest number is much worse with 2.2% in the 2004 General Election and 6.7% in the 2009 General Election in Tasikmalaya City.

²⁷ They are Dede T. Widarsih of Golkar, Tien Mastini of PKB, Sobariah of PPP, and Laela Suroya of PKB. Sobariah, Suttini Tirtaatmadja of TNI-POLRI and Suroya. In the course of time, Sobariah replaced Farhanul Hakim, and Suroya replaced S.D. Nurdin. Meanwhile Mastini moved to the DPRD in Tasikmalaya City, which was newly established for the period of 2002-2004. *Memori DPRD Kota Tasikmalaya 2002–2004*, p. 31-2, and *Memori DPRD Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, Masa Bakti 1999-2004*, pp. 33-8. The total number (5) is the accumulation of all female MPs during the period of 1999–2004. The number changed over time as some were substituted or moved to another DPRD as a consequence of the administrative separation of Tasikmalaya City and Tasikmalaya Regency.

²⁸ They are Dede T widarsih of Golkar, Laela Suroya of PKB, Neng Madinah Ruhiat of PPP, Evi Elvinadianty of PPP, and Ucu Dewi Syarifah of PKS. *Memori DPRD Tabulate Tasikmalaya, Masa Bakti 2004–2009*, pp. 7–8.

²⁹ They are Dede T Widarsih of Golkar, Ucu Dewi Syarifah of PKS, Mimi Rohmiati of PPP, Siti Nurjannah of PPP, Rossy Hermawati of PKS, Titin Sugiartini of PDIP, and Yane Sriwigantini of PAN. Fieldwork, Tasikmalaya Regency. April–November 2010.

³⁰ They are Nurkamilah of PPP and Tien Mastini of PKB. *Memori DPRD Kota Tasikmalaya 2002–2004*, pp. 31–2.

³¹ She is Ani Nuraini of PAN. *Memori DPRD Kota Tasikmalaya 2004–2009*: p. 35.

³² They are Ai Popon Purnawati of PPP, Eti Guspitawati of PDIP, and Ratnawulan of Golkar.

Based on the number of woman candidates from the leading political parties in the 2009 General Election for the local parliament of Tasikmalaya City, the 30% quota significantly influenced the percentage of woman candidates: the lowest percentage of the leading parties was over 10% (11.8%, PKB), and the highest percentage was over 60% (66.7%, PKPI), as shown in Tables 5 and 6. Although the number of woman candidates is much higher than the number of elected women, the implementation of the 30% quota has certainly compelled more women to become politically engaged. Does their perception of *kodrat perempuan* influence their participation in this process? The answer is yes, but only indirectly. This means that direct influences are external factors, namely State regulations. However, in practice, the way in which women are recruited has difficulty conforming to existing gender relations, which are heavily influenced by the construction of *kodrat perempuan*. As such, woman candidates have to deal with their parents, husbands, families, and even local religious and community leaders in order to be elected as a candidate. Permission and support, as the result of their efforts to respond to external imperatives such as the quota policy, indicate that the construction of *kodrat perempuan* influences their candidacy in one way or another.

Table 5. The Leading Parties in the 2009 General Election, Tasikmalaya City (7 out of 38 political parties)

Percentage of Female Candidates	Male Candidates	Female Candidates	Total	Political Party
22.5%	31	9	40	PDIP
20.5%	31	8	39	PPP
28.1%	23	9	32	Golkar
18.8%	39	9	48	PKS
11.8%	15	2	17	PKB
16.1%	26	5	31	PBB
7% .16	25	5	30	Demokrat Party

Table 6. Political Parties with more than 30% women candidates, Tasikmalaya City

Percentage of Female Candidates	Male Candidates	Female Candidates	Political Party
50%	2	2	PDS
50%	3	3	PKPB
66.7%	2	4	PKPI
50%	1	1	PPI
33.3%	4	2	PKP
50%	3	3	PPDI

There were 395,697 voters in Tasikmalaya City, consisting of 198,663 men (50.2%) and 197,121 women (49.8%), in the 2004 General Election. The level

of participation was very high at 90.04% (352,061 voters) for the 2004 legislative general election.³³ This high level of female political participation has not led to a high level of women's representation in local legislature, as indicated above. Joni Lovenduski explained that women who participate in or are offered parliamentary candidacies tend to be weaker than male candidates in terms of property, knowledge, and political experience. She also found that domestic tasks consume much of their time, resulting in them having little time to engage in, for example, parliamentary work. This belief that domestic work should be done by women, she found, comes from the perception that such work is appropriate to women's constructed nature. As an example, she noted that conservative political parties in England had been unsupportive of women's participation in politics, citing the "nature" of women as their reason.³⁴ Finally, she argued that political tasks are considered male, a perception believed to hinder women's entry into politics.³⁵

My interviews and observation indicate that Lovenduski's three points are also applicable in Tasikmalaya. Some religious figures remain unsupportive of women's civic engagement, worrying that these women will be less serious about carrying out traditional roles such as child bearing and housework. They believe that the role of women as formulated in, for example, the book *Uqud al-Lujain fi Huqūq al-Zaujain*³⁶ is the ideal role for women.³⁷ The book has been circulated and taught to senior students at traditional pesantrens since early twentieth century. The book says that women are expected to be familiar with the work in three areas of their home: the bedroom, kitchen, and the area around the water source (such as a well). These are the main duties expected of women and only these should be the focus of women's time, thoughts, and energy. However, these duties can be so time consuming that there is not enough time for them to take on other activities. This, according to these religious leaders, is a practical reason why many women can simply not engage in other intensive fields, including becoming MPs.

The above value is supported by a precept belonging to the local Sundanese culture: *istri dulang tinande* (women are the vessels of accommodating things), which is often interpreted as putting an emphasis on the need for wives to obey their husbands. Obedience here is understood dynamically, as wives should not merely obey their husbands' commands but also organize things in their household without openly challenging their husbands. In general, this value is often used to limit a woman to being merely a housewife. Modernization, introduced since the early twentieth century, has opened wider spaces and opportunities for women to engage in social and political affairs. What is interesting to see is that the education policy in Indonesia allows both boys and girls to pursue as much education as possible. This has resulted in an increase of women with high levels

³³ KPUD Tasikmalaya City, 2004. *Pemilu 2004: Legislatif (DPR,DPD,DPRD Provinsi, DPRD Kab./City & Presiden & Wakil Presiden*. Tasikmalaya: KPUD, p. 61.

³⁴ Joni Lovenduski. 2008. *Politik Berparas Perempuan*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, p. 94.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 88.

³⁶ Van Bruinessen. 1995. *Kitab Kuning*, p. 122.

³⁷ Interview with Enung Nursaidah, Tasikmalaya Regency, November 6, 2008.

of education in different backgrounds. However, women have not taken the same strategic positions as men, particularly in public leadership. This may be because the Sundanese value is nurtured through familial socialization and educational institutions, both religious (such as *pesantrens* and *madrasahs*) and secular ones. This value is reflected in one interview I had in which someone said that women only need basic education as they are expected to predominantly focus on their role at home. In another case, a respondent was encouraged to pursue higher education, but in a religious discipline. Imas Maesharah, the daughter of the founder of Pesantren Benda, explained that her father advised her not to pursue education in a non-religious discipline, assuming that religious knowledge would help her raise her future family better.³⁸

Many political parties have not made the commitment needed to recruit woman politicians as MP candidates. As shown in Table 6 above, only six of the 38 political parties in Tasikmalaya City met the 30% quota policy in 2009,³⁹ and all seven leading political parties proposed less than the required quota. Women approached by political parties are generally considered to be qualified because of their strong family tradition in political activism, or because of their knowledge, abilities, and/or other social capital. For example, Laela Suroya and Neneng Medina have parents who are religious leaders, and Titin Sugiartini, Epi Guspitawati and Ai Popon Sugiartini have husbands who are well-known local merchants. Women without such qualifications are not being offered, or taking, chances in the political process.

To conclude, in the context of the 30% quota policy, the marginality of women's representation is reflected not only in the number of elected MPs, but also in the number of candidates. This marginality has three causes. First are woman candidates' lower human resource capabilities. Second is the double burden woman candidates face in managing their household tasks while being involved in politics and administration, which arises as the result of the existence of patriarchal precepts and the constructed *kodrat* which focus women's role in the household. Third is the scarcity of woman candidates, which can be explained by a weaker commitment by political parties or the parties' difficulty in finding female candidates in order to implement the 30% quota policy. These women's experiences as elected MPs will be detailed below.

4. Female MPs

Although an election is a tiring process, female MPs only begin to face their real challenges afterwards. The promises and programs they delivered and peoples' aspirations that have been gathered during their campaigns enter a new phase: an attempt to realize them. Like male MPs, women receive training and orientation about parliament. As they come from political parties, MPs have their

³⁸ Interview with Imas Maeshara Tasikmalaya City, July 29, 2010.

³⁹ M.B. Wijaksana. Mrach 2004. "Perempuan and Politik: Ketika yang Personal adalah Konstitusional," in *Jurnal Perempuan Untuk Pencerahan dan Kesetaraan* 34, pp. 84–5.

own secretariat to support their work, in addition to the secretariat of the parliament itself. For example, in formulating legislation, controlling and evaluating executive programs, ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the executive's budgeting processes and its expenses, and in fulfilling peoples' aspirations, MPs need adequate data and a comprehensive understanding of the problems in order to be able to carry out these duties.

How the perception of *kodrat* is operative in parliament can be seen from the formation of committees. Lovenduski's finding that female legislative members are given tasks within the sphere of the constructed female nature is verified by this study. During my field work, I found that woman MPs were usually grouped into committees deemed appropriate to their constructed *kodrat*, such as those related to education and health matters. This was experienced by the woman MPs in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City in the period 2002–2004 and by the members in the city regional parliament from 2004–2009 and 2009–2014. For instance, Ani Nuraini of PAN was first assigned to the social welfare development committee. Only rarely are female MPs assigned to committees not dealing with educational or social matters. This was the experience of Dede T. Widarsih whose placement was due to a number of reasons, particularly her higher education (majoring in economics), her experience as head of Organisasi Angkutan Darat (Organda; a transformational organization that organizes owners and drivers of public transportation in a district) for more than two periods, her affiliation with Golkar (which was at that time still the leading political party), and her husband's status in the municipality. In practice, there are numerous considerations behind the formation of committees. The consideration of equality appears to have been used later to redistribute members of committees and to offer them new experiences. Another consideration is professionalism: legislators get to know each other better, and they amass new knowledge, skills and interests. Political interests are a third consideration, in that male politicians tend to deal with "*komisi basah*" (wet committees), that is committees which deal with large projects or programs. By placing female MPs in "*komisi kering*" (dry committees), committees with small budgets, they face less competition. However, over the course of time, female MPs who were initially placed on committees considered appropriate to their *kodrat* also received opportunities to deal with other matters as their knowledge, networking, and experience improved.

With regards to how female MPs challenge executive programs and policies and make serious efforts to promote the interests of women or the general public, Lovenduski argued that female politicians may best actualize their political careers through what is commonly perceived as being best for women. Woman MPs must work to increase their autonomy in this sphere while at the same time improve their knowledge and skills through daily political activities on a level similar to that of male politicians.⁴⁰ That which is perceived to be best for women cannot be seen in isolation from the common understanding of *kodrat*. In the case of Tasikmalaya, though women may seem to be treated the same as

⁴⁰ Lovenduski, 2008. *Politik Berparas Perempuan*, p. 281.

men in public engagements, certain restrictions remain prevalent. For instance, women are treated differently in regards to up what time at night they work, how far their workplace is from their home, and what areas of work they can function in. It seems that female legislative members in Tasikmalaya are not free from these barriers, however they may be less restrictive because these woman MPs have been equipped with basic knowledge, skills, and social capital, and have gone through the experiences necessary for politicians. For example, Yane Sriwigantini of the PAN Tasikmalaya Regency branch faced no objections against having to work at night or driving from her home to the local parliament (it used to be a one hour drive before it was moved closer to her home). She had become independent while working several years in Jakarta before she got married.⁴¹ Eti Guspitawati of the PDIP Tasikmalaya City branch restricted herself to working no later than one hour before midnight, and always asked her husband's permission to do so. Her husband supported her involvement in political activities.⁴²

In summary, looking at female MPs in the context of Tasikmalaya, they challenge the assumption that the appropriate topics for them to deal with are education and health. This assumption remains strong for new MPs. Those who receive tasks and responsibilities outside of their constructed *kodrat* are perceived as having the necessary qualifications and are daring enough to do so, such as in the cases of Dede T Widarsih and Evi Elvidadianty.

C. State, Constructed *Kodrat Perempuan* and Political Participation

Three State policies--democracy, general elections and the 30% quota--among other things are the main factors that the State can utilize to best promote women to engage politically. However, the resurgence of patriarchal values perpetuated by the revival of religious understanding, a new sense of locality in response to globalization and the decentralization policy create serious challenges to the forces of the gender mainstreaming movement. Next will be examined to what extent the construction of *kodrat perempuan* may or may not encourage woman leadership in the contestation of these State forces and the opposite forces embedded in the culture of the country.

1. Democracy and General Elections

Democracy has once again been reinforced in Indonesian politics after the start of the Reformasi era and women's political engagement has been supported by the ratification of the 30% quota policy in 2003 (UU No. 12/2003) while general elections are no longer engineered as they used to be under previous regimes. However, while the number of female political representatives is still be-

⁴¹ Interview with Yane Sriwigantini, Tasikmalaya Regency, August 5, 2010.

⁴² Interview with Eti Guspitawati, Tasikmalaya City, July 30, 2010.

low the expected number, there is a positive trend of female representation in the country, as illustrated in Table 7 below.

Table 7. Percentages of Female MPs Since the Implementation of the 30% Quota Policy

Male MPs		Female MPs		Number of Female MPs at DPR	Period
%	Number	%	Number		
90.3%	500	9.70%	54	554	1997-1999
91.6%	500	8.4%	46	546	1999-2004
88.5%	487	11.5%	63	550	2004-2009
82.00%	459	18.10%	101	560	2009-2014

The question is what the figures in the table above say about the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* vis-à-vis this low participation of women? The New Order manipulated the interpretation of *kodrat perempuan* by only making women the supporting agents of their male counterparts. The New Order regime encouraged women's social participation but in its own way. For example, through the Panca Dharma (the five services) issued by Ministry of the Interior in 1978, the New Order formulated a woman's roles as (1) supporting her husband's career and duties; (2) procreating for the nation; (3) caring for and rearing children; (4) being a good housekeeper; and (5) being the guardian of the community.⁴³ Unlike before, now, similar with the New Order regime, the political party elites were also influenced by this particular construction of *kodrat* which tended to position women in a similar way as the New Order did through its politically inspired regulations and programs. In the Reformasi era the construction of *kodrat perempuan* has been used in a more diverse negotiation process, carrying a tendency towards greater role mainstreaming for women as one of the effects of the implementation of the 30% quota policy.

People see female representation at the local level in Tasikmalaya in a variety of ways. Pro- and anti-democracy camps regard women's representation in opposite ways. Despite the fact that women have made an important step forward in accessing education and professions, women continue to be clearly marginal in the Tasikmalaya political vista. As illustrated in Table 3 and 4 above, women only occupied two out of 50 seats (4%) in the period of 2002-2004 and one out of 51 seats (1.96%) for the period of 2004-2009 of Tasikmalaya City's DPRD. Meanwhile they held three out of 51 seats (5.88%) for the period of 1999-2004 and five out of 51 seats (9.8%) for the period of 2004-2009 of Tasikmalaya Regency's DPRD.

⁴³ Asima Yanty Siahaan, 2002/2003. *The Politics of Gender and Decentralization in Indonesia*, n.p.: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, the Open Society Institute, p. 10; Saraswati Sunindyo, 1998. "When the Earth is Female and the Nation is Mother: Gender, the Armed Forces and Nationalism in Indonesia," in *Feminist Review* 58, pp. 1-21.

The political interventions either through the 30% quota policy, the amendment of the Constitution and the reformation of KPU/D meant to increase women's independency but have not yet boosted women's political engagement in a substantial way. Internal factors such as women's lack of knowledge, skills, networking and experience as well as external ones such as religious and cultural values are hindrances towards female social engagement. In other words, the constructed *kodrat perempuan* is operative within constraints in encouraging women's political participation.

2. Quota Policy

UU No. 12/2003, article 65, States that “*Setiap Partai Politik peserta Pemilu dapat mengajukan calon anggota DPR, DPRD Provinsi dan DPRD Kabupaten/Kota untuk setiap daerah pemilihan dengan memperhatikan keterwakilan perempuan sekurang-kurangnya 30%.*” (Each political party that participates in the general election may propose candidates for members of the DPR, Provincial DPRD and regency or City DPRD in each electoral district with a consideration of at least 30% female representatives).⁴⁴ Half of the political parties met this 30% quota for female candidacy in the 2004 general election. However, this regulation was not seen as very effective in encouraging women to participate in formal political processes. This is because UU No. 12/2003, article 65, does not guarantee that at least 30% women of the total candidates nominated by a political party are women. This is due to the fact that its implementation is lax and does not include a sanction for a party that does not meet the 30% quota. This article cannot effectively pave the way towards greater female political participation. Another reason is that this affirmative policy has not yet been supported by other laws on political parties. While UU No. 31/2002 on Political Parties regulates the way to select candidates democratically, the understanding and interpretation of the law depends solely on the political parties. The KPU or the public can also not control how a political party determines who its candidates will be. Another reason is that female politicians are still on the fringes of the positions within the political parties. This marginality may result in women having little influence in the decision making processes of the party.

Finally, the regulation was not thoroughly made known over all political structures at the provincial and regency/city levels. This caused misunderstanding and resistance towards the 30% quota and the placement of female candidates at the first rank. Seeing from the 2004 general election, there were only 14 political parties which met the 30% quota while other political parties did not. The two biggest political parties, Golkar and PDIP, only got as far as 28%. Of the seven political parties that passed the electoral threshold, only three political parties managed to have more than 30% female candidates: PKS, PKB and PAN.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Ani Soetjipto (et al.), 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*, pp. 14-5.

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 15-7 and 19.

Learning from the 2004 general election, female candidacy faced internal and external challenges. Internally, many women found themselves in need to improve their knowledge and skills, increase their experiences in political activities, and expand their social basis and networking. They also found themselves having a lack of funds and access to the mass media. The world of politics is dominated by their male counterparts. Though women may be supported by the quota policy, they nonetheless encounter serious challenges within the political processes of the country. Externally, the 30% quota was also not considered strong enough to guarantee their electability as members of parliament due to the fact that the final decision in proposing candidates was still exclusively left to political parties themselves.

In 2008 the implementation of UU No. 12/2003 was criticized. The State then issued UU Pemilu No. 10/2008, obliging each political party to propose at least 30% female candidates. The revised regulation also attracted controversy and was sent in the same year to the Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK (Constitutional Court) to be reviewed. The Court then issued its decision with Number 22-24/PUU-VI/2008 on the Judicial Review of UU No. 10/2008 December 23, 2008, annulling various points which were discriminative to guarantee that democratic values were not violated for the sake of gender mainstreaming policy. However, UU No 10/2008 with its MK revision still has a positive impact on female participation in formal politics because the 30% quota policy has been maintained and has even been made imperative at the candidacy level. As a result, the 2009 general election showed that there was an increase of female representatives in parliament, though still below 20% in the DPR, Provincial DPRD and Regency/City. The KPU reported that the total number of female candidates was 34.6% in DPR RI. Table 10 shows that of 38 participants in the general election, PKPI/Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia proposed the largest percentage of female candidates at 45.08%. The least number of female candidates was proposed by Partai Patriot with 19.66%. There were about eight political parties that proposed more than 40%.⁴⁶ About 24 other political parties registered about 30% woman candidates. There were only six political parties which did not manage to register 30% of their female candidates.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ They are Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia (44.8%), Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (45.08%), Partai Persatuan Daerah (42.77%), Partai Demokrasi Pembangunan (40.8%), Partai Matahari Bangsa (40.59%), Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (41.04%), Partai Bintang Reformasi (40.45%), and Partai Nahdatul Ummah Indonesia (44.55%). See Table 11.

⁴⁷ They are Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional (26.04%), Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (29.29%), Partai Amanat Nasional (29.7%), Partai Republika Nusantara (29.87%) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (26.91%), and Partai Patriot (19.66%). See Table 11.

Table 8. Male and Female Candidate of the 2009 General Elections⁴⁸

Percent-age	Female	Male	Candi-date	Political Party	.No
30,74	186	419	605	Partai Hanura	01
39,01	55	86	141	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	02
44,8	125	154	279	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia	03
26,04	75	213	288	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional	04
29,29	116	280	396	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	05
37,68	104	172	276	Partai Barisan Nasional	06
45,08	142	173	315	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	07
36,61	212	367	579	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	08
29,7	177	419	596	Partai Amanat Nasional	09
36,36	20	35	55	Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru	10
36,84	91	157	248	Partai Kedaulatan	11
42,77	68	91	159	Partai Persatuan Daerah	12
33,67	134	264	398	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	13
34,53	96	182	278	Partai Pemuda Indonesia	14
33,91	39	76	115	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme	15
40,8	164	238	402	Partai Demokrasi Pembangunan	16
34,17	68	131	199	Partai Karya Perjuangan	17
40,59	123	180	303	Partai Matahari Bangsa	18
30	15	35	50	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	19
41,04	103	248	251	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan	20
29,87	69	162	231	Partai Republika Nusantara	21
37,61	41	68	109	Partai Pelopor	22
30,27	194	447	641	Partai Golongan Karya	23
26,91	127	345	472	Partai Persatuan pembangunan	24
35,91	116	207	323	Partai damai Sejahtera	25
33,53	58	115	173	Partai Nasional Banteng Kerakyatan Indonesia	26
33,67	133	262	395	Partai Bulan Bintang	27
35,41	222	405	627	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	28
40,45	127	187	314	Partai Bintang Reformasi	29
19,66	23	94	117	Partai Patriot	30
32,94	221	450	671	Partai Demokrat	31
32,19	47	99	146	Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia	32
38,8	123	194	317	Partai Indonesia Sejahtera	33
33,67	99	195	294	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama	34
34,83	31	58	89	Partai Merdeka	35
44,55	45	56	101	Partai Nahdatul Ummah Indonesia	36
35,43	45	82	127	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	37
34,39	76	145	221	Partai Buruh	38
34,6	3910	7491	11,130		Total

Source: KPU (www.kpu.go.id)

⁴⁸ Ani Soetjipto (et al.), 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*, pp. 34-5.

Table 9 below shows that no political party achieved 30% elected female candidates.

Table 9. Number of the Elected MPs for DPR RI of 2009 General Elections

Total	Male Mps	Female MPs	Political Party	.No
149	(76.5%) 114	(23.5%) 35	Partai Demokrat	01
106	(83.1%) 88	(16.9%) 18	Partai Golkar	02
94	(81.9%) 77	(18.1%) 17	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	03
28	(75%) 21	(25%) 7	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	04
46	(84.8%) 39	(15.2%) 7	Partai Amanat Nasional	05
57	(94.7%) 54	(5.3%) 3	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	06
38	(86.8%) 33	(13.2%) 5	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	07
16	(75%) 12	(15.4%) 4	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	08
560	(82.1%) 460	(17.9%) 100		Total

Source: Ani Soetjipto (et al.), 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*, p. 36.

Why is female representation in formal politics in Indonesia still marginal in spite of the implementation of the 30% quota policy? Ani Soetjipto identifies three reasons to explain this reality. First, she believes that there is still a lack of understanding among policy makers about the affirmative policy for women. The idea was to increase the number of female legislative members which in turn would create change for the betterment of society. Second, it seems that women's political participation is not yet the priority of existing political parties. They are not yet managed democratically. Recruitment in a number of political parties is lax, ad hoc and nepotistic. In turn, the regeneration process does not run effectively. Third, poverty and cultural precepts which place women in the home may contribute to a decrease in women's political participation. Human development is a part of the women's empowerment movement. Like all male legislative members, female members also require skills, knowledge and networking to engage effectively and fruitfully. In places where shortages of property, ignorance, narrow religious interpretations and a lack of understanding of politics by local leaders is apparent, women are likely to find difficulty in being elected as members of the local House of Representatives. The last point is the problem of the territorial bases of female representation. Women who reside on the mainland have a higher probability of being elected than women who stay in maritime areas.⁴⁹ Soetjipto's explanations can also be applied to the Tasikmalaya context. A lack of resources for women, less attention given by existing political parties towards female politicians, and cultural barriers are the factors behind women's triviality in political processes.

To sum up, the 30% quota policy does indeed contribute to an increase in female representation in politics. However, this policy may be challenged by

⁴⁹ Ani Soetjipto, 2011. *Politik Harapan*, pp. 56-65.

many things, including the impact of the MK's decision to implement general elections based on the voter majority base, lack of human resources, weak support of the political parties for women's political participation, and cultural and religious precepts and interpretations. In this case, the constructed *kodrat* is rationalized in order for women to be able to participate in the political representative process.

D. Constructed *Kodrat Perempuan*, Women's Political Participation and the Mass Media

Parliamentary activities are always covered by the media. The mass media covers how legislative institutions perform including the role its female members play. The media reports on the House of Representatives' activities by describing its members' activities and sometimes by reporting on their activities in terms of their own (the media's) ideal purposes. The following sub-chapter discusses the mass media's coverage within two themes: the implementation of the 30% quota for female candidacy and the coverage of female legislative members' performances as seen from the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan*.

1. The 30% Quota Policy and Female Candidacy

The media covered the controversy surrounding the implementation of the 30% quota policy. Newspapers presented the proponents of women's political participation critically, covering different opinions. For example, the daily *Kompas* presented the discourse of the affirmative policy by documenting various opinions but it was inclined to support female representation in politics. It reported Maria Hartiningsih's view who stressed the importance of enhancing women's skills and knowledge⁵⁰ and Lily Zakiyah Munir's opinion that was in favor of the implementation of the 30% quota.⁵¹ The newspaper also covered ideas which were contrary to those of Hartiningsih and Munir, such as those of Wila Chandrawila, who did not agree with the affirmative action policy. For her, affirmation is a form of injustice and it potentially brings about conflicts among candidates and government institutions. She explains that:

“The KPU's offer to privilege female legislative candidates is a form of injustice. The affirmative action potentially triggers conflict among candidates or State institutions” Wila Chandrawila, member of Commission III DPR [*Kompas*, Monday, January 26, 2009]. “If the KPU insisted in proposing the affirmative policy to the elected female candidates, it is a kind of indulgence and injustice for the male candidates. It is also a negative construction of democracy”.. “In the fu-

⁵⁰ Maria Hartiningsih. April 1, 2009. “Merebut Esensi Demokrasi.” in *Kompas*, p. 6.

⁵¹ “Kebijakan kuota 30 persen itu diambil sebagai langkah sementara guna mendorong keterwakilan perempuan. Secara kultural, dunia politik masih dicitrakan dunia lelaki karena pandangan patriarkis.” Lily Zakiyah Munir. March 30, 2009 “Tantangan Kuota Perempuan,” in *Kompas*, p. 36.

ture, political parties should recruit qualified female cadres. Women constituents should also be continuously trained by female politicians”.⁵²

Kompas also published the views of one of the senior scholar on Indonesian politics, J. Kristiadi, who argued that gender inequality is universal and rooted in history, culture, mores, religion and local norms. It is interesting to note that *Kompas*' coverage of the discourse on women's affirmative policy cleverly hides the influence of *kodrat perempuan*. The word *kodrat* is absent from its report, but its presence is still felt by the three scholars' use of other terms that illustrate women's hindrances and weaknesses in political engagement such as culture, mores, religious values, and local norms. In general, these hindrances and weaknesses refer to norms operative in Indonesian society, one of them being the constructed *kodrat perempuan*. This means that the perception of *kodrat perempuan* still influences people's formulation of women's roles and female social engagement.

2. Female MPs' Performance

Newspapers cover the influence of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* in their documenting of female MPs' performances. For example, in 2009, *Bewara Sukapura* reported the opinion of the head of Tasikmalaya Regency, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, on the occasion of the Mother's Day celebration. In this report, he explained that women are the equal partners of their male counterparts in various fields of life.⁵³ However, he added that this equality should be within the perception of what is best for women, i.e. in his perspective as motivators or agents behind the scene who stimulate their male partners to be successful. In his idea, women may best play their role within the areas deemed appropriate for them. He cited Dewi Sartika's educational engagement and the State's supported organizations such as PKK and Posyandu.⁵⁴ His speech sent a message to female legislative members saying that in general, women can engage in as many fields as men, but they are expected to only pay attention to the areas deemed appropriate for them. At the same time, he also expects male legislative members to support their female counterparts, particularly in these areas.

⁵² 'Sikap KPU untuk memberikan keistimewaan kepada calon anggota legeslatif *perempuan* adalah bentuk ketidakadilan. Kebijakan afirmatif itu juga berpotensi memunculkan konflik antar caleg maupun antar lembaga negara.' Wila Chandrawila, anggota Komisi III DPR (Kompas, Senin, 26/1/2009) 'Kalau KPU tetap mengajukan kebijakan afirmatif kepada caleg *perempuan* agar terpilih, itu adalah pemanjaan dan ketidakadilan pada caleg pria. Ini juga konstruksi demokrasi yang buruk.' .. "Yang harus dilakukan partai politik dimasa depan adalah memilih caleg *perempuan* yang potensial. Harus ada pula pendidikan politik berkesinambungan kepada konstituen *perempuan* oleh politisi *perempuan*." *Kompas*, "Afirmasi Bentuk Ketidakadilan: Presiden Bisa diMakzulkan jika Perpu Bertentangan," January 27, 2009, pp. 1 and 4-7.

⁵³ *Bewara Sukapura*, 1st edition, 3rd year, 2009, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

Bewara Sukapura and *Buletin Indeks* reported on female legislative members' activities. For example, *Bewara* reported about the activities of Dede T. Widarsih of the Golkar party, Ucu Dewi Syarifah of the PKS and Laela Suroya of the PKB as spokespersons who delivered their fraction's responses. Widarsih and Syarifah became their fractions' spokespersons in responding to UU (Regulation) No. 14 2003 on employment. Widarsih and Syarifah on behalf of their fractions accepted the enactment of this regulation.⁵⁵ Both were assigned by their fractions to deliver the fraction's responses in the case where women's destiny was discussed. In addition, Syarifah was also entrusted once again to represent her fraction, Keadilan Sejahtera. She questioned why Tasikmalaya Regency has such a small share in Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum/PDAM (local potable water company) compared to other regencies' shares in West Java. She also criticized the very slow progress in the construction of the Ciawi-Singaparna Highway. Finally, she questioned the ineffectiveness of the implementation of the *musrebang/Musyawahar* Perencanaan Pembangunan [Community Discussion on Development Planning] (A bottom up proposal of development planning for local community-proposed development).⁵⁶

Bewara Sukapura also informed the public that her faction had assigned Laela Suroya to propose a parliamentary initiative on reproductive health. It is said that she proposed the draft of a regulation to support a program called *Penyelenggaraan Kesehatan Reproduksi Komprehensif* or PKRK (Comprehensive Reproductive Health Implementation) in Tasikmalaya Regency. It is reported that "Hj. Laela Suroya Stated the seriousness of the council members to ensure that the draft of this PKRK regulation in Tasikmalaya Regency will turn into a regulation and that for her it is an important service at the end of her tenure and needs the support from all because it relates to the future of the nation's mothers and children and is in the interest of the public at large."⁵⁷

The quotation above is an example of a fraction's support for its female member to represent it in deliberating its stand in the domain deemed appropriate to the female *kodrat*, i.e. health, and mother and child care. As female members are given space and opportunity, they actually have a good chance of utilizing them effectively. To this effect Suroya did very well by saying that she not only related the regulation to the importance of the mother and child health program but also to her own and all other members' performance in the House of Representatives and to the people's interest at large.⁵⁸ However, Suroya was not always

⁵⁵ *Bewara Sukapura*, 2nd edition, 3rd Year, 2009, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁶ *Bewara Sukapura*, 6th edition, 3rd Year 2009, pp. 26-7.

⁵⁷ "..., Hj Laela Suroya mengungkapkan, keseriusan anggota dewan untuk menyukseskan Ranperda PKR di Kab Tasikmalaya sebagai usul inisiatif DPRD untuk menjadi Perda merupakan pengabdian yang besar di akhir masa jabatannya dan perlu mendapat dukungan semua pihak, karena berhubungan dengan masa depan *ibu* dan masa depan anak bangsa serta kepentingan rakyat banyak." *Bewara Sukapura*, 2nd Edition, 3rd Year, 2009, p. 12.

⁵⁸ *Bewara Sukapura*: 2nd Edition, 3rd Year, 2009, p. 11.

assigned tasks within her constructed *kodrat*, but was also given an opportunity to represent her fraction, PKB, in a wider sense. On one occasion, she emphasized the important sectors of agribusiness, small and middle industry, animal husbandry, plantation, mining and tourism.⁵⁹

Local newspapers also documented female MPs' opportunities to represent their fraction's stand on more general themes. For example, responding to the executive report on the general election on April 9, 2009, they reported that Ucu Dewi Syarifah appreciated its peaceful implementation. However, she sharply criticized a number of events that had taken place during the election in 2009. She, for instance, questioned why, before the event, the government focused on providing financial aid to socio-religious matters and other things like welfare and religious education and the availability of water for society. Meanwhile, she also made fun of one executive to make sure that he would be more serious about carrying out good and clean governance by criticizing, for example, the bidding process for projects and their distribution to local contractors.⁶⁰

The mass media monitored the performance of the three female members of DPRD of Tasikmalaya City 2009-2014: Ratna Wulan Adil from the Golkar, Ai Popon Purnawati from the PPP and Eti Guspitawati from PDIP. Ratna Wulan Adil and Eti Guspitawati were reported to execute their functions as MPs in the areas deemed appropriate with their *kodrat*, i.e. dealing with the appreciation and evaluation of healthcare and small business. Adil was reported to have assessed the importance of community health care programs such as Rukun Warga/RW⁶¹ Siaga and explained that "Dengan RW Siaga, masyarakat Kota Tasikmalaya bisa mencapai derajat kesehatan dan termotivasi untuk mengembangkan kesehatannya."⁶² (With RW Alertness, the people of Tasikmalaya City's will have a higher degree of health and they will be motivated to improve their health status). The media also covered Guspitawati's visit to the villages so see what her role might be to improve the economic position of peanut farmers there which gave her much more visibility in the rural areas.

Another interesting female figure who was often covered by the press is Titin Sugiartini of the PDIP fraction of the DPRD in Tasikmalaya Regency. The press know her as an active figure and, as other members, they covered her membership of the PDIP fraction and her position as the head of Badan Legislasi/

⁵⁹ *Bewara Sukapura*, 7th Edition, 3rd Year, 2009, p. 17.

⁶⁰ *Bewara Sukapura*, 4th Edition, 3rd Year, 2009, p. 9-12.

⁶¹ Rukun Warga/RW is an informal organization in a village consisting of several other smaller bodies known as Rukun Tetangga/RT. It functions as a brokerage between the interests and aspirations of the people and those of the government at the village level.

⁶² *Humas Kota Tasik Info*. "RW Siaga Siap Mewujudkan Derajat Kesehatan masyarakat" February 23, 2010 <http://www.humaskotatasik.info/2010/02/pemberian-penghargaan-pada-ketua-rw-24.html> accessed November 1, 2011.

Banleg (Legislation Council)⁶³ as well as the vice head of DPRD Tasikmalaya Regency well.⁶⁴ She is a woman who overcame the barriers of the norm of *kodrat perempuan* by doing things men usually do. She not only demonstrated who she was through her performance of her formal tasks, but also in cultural events and in doing spontaneous acts in the people's interests. For instance, during a cultural event, she pulled a minibus full of passengers, including the head of the DPRD in Tasikmalaya Regency, Ruhimat, Yamin Yusuf and a few members of GIBAS/Gabungan Inisiatif Barudak Anak Siliwangi (an NGO in Tasikmalaya Regency), with her bare hands on March 20, 2011. The event marked the GIBAS's first birthday.⁶⁵ Sugiartini's contribution towards helping patients from poor families who needed immediate medical treatment but were refused by the local hospital was also documented.⁶⁶ Her efforts caught the attention of the head of Tasikmalaya Regency, Tatang Farhanul Hakim.⁶⁷

To summarize this sub-chapter, media's coverage on female MPs informs women's roles in both the fields deemed appropriate and those inappropriate for them to be active in. This means that women managed to overcome some of the challenges originating from the perception of the constructed *kodrat* that urge women to just play their role in the domains deemed appropriate: education, health and women's affairs. Basically, the assumption that these areas are appropriate for women to be involve in is still latent as almost all female members are commonly assigned in these commissions. However, female MPs were also given the opportunity to deal with matters and events outside the areas deemed appropriate for them.

Conclusion

As discussed above, female political representation in Tasikmalaya exemplifies women's transformation from housewives to politicians. Women's political engagement, particularly in legislative candidacies and legislative performance in Tasikmalaya, is celebrated within the confines of the people's construction of the female *kodrat*. Their construction of *kodrat* is characterized by the term's dual nature-nurture aspects. Within this larger scope of the term *kodrat*, women's civic engagement operates within the consciousness of women themselves and of the people who adhere to this constructed understanding of *kodrat*. It is therefore understandable that women's situation remains problematic due to their less-com-

⁶³ DPRD Kab Tasikmalaya Kaji 10 Perda in *Pelita* <http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=87934> accessed November 1, 2011.

⁶⁴ *Diambil sumpah, hj. Titin grogi* in kabar priangan.com. <http://www.kabar-priangan.com/news/detail/1083>, accessed September 20, 2011.

⁶⁵ Anggota DPRD Tasikmalaya Melakukan Aksi Menarik Mobil, <http://www.sukapurafm.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/anggota-dprd-tasikmalaya-melakukan-aksi-menarik-mobil.mp3> accessed September 15, 2011.

⁶⁶ *Pikiran Rakyat*, August 4, 2010.

⁶⁷ *Pikiran Rakyat*, July 29, 2010.

petitive human resources, political parties who are not supportive of women's political engagement, and because of religious and cultural barriers. As the case of Tasikmalaya informs us, it can also be inferred that women need other agents in order to be successful in their political engagement. In this way, families, political parties, communities, and the State are important supporters of women's political engagement. Other factors, including women's own abilities, skills, and networks, and external forces such as the 30% quota for female candidates, certainly contribute to women's participation and representation. Media coverage on female legislative members touches on female roles in both the areas deemed appropriate and those deemed inappropriate for them. Some female legislative members managed to overcome some of the challenges derived from the perception of the constructed *kodrat* that traditionally concerns education, health and women's affairs. Others simply could not avoid being situated in commissions which are commonly considered appropriate for women. This happens because the tendency of placing them within these three fields is still present. Almost all female members take a turn to work in a commission in these three areas. However, the other factors only become effective after women themselves are able to overstep the norms of *kodrat* in their family and their community.

Challenges for female politicians in obtaining political opportunities come from internal and external factors. Internally, they face their own weaknesses. Externally, they face values which are nurtured by religious and/or cultural understandings and practices. These values persistently position women's social engagements within the model perceived as ideal for them: free to engage socially, but advised to be mindful of their *kodrat* and their traditional roles at home.

Part IV.

Conclusion:
Broadening Women's Civic Engagement

CHAPTER EIGHT

*KODRAT PEREMPUAN AND THE
FEMALE LEADERSHIP DISCOURSE IN
LOCAL CONTEXT:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM
TASIKMALAYA*

Introduction

Shifting to a more contextualized democratic political practice in Indonesia resulted in new kinds of contestation. One contestation as discussed in this study is between the democratization and Islamization processes where the spirit of regionalism also enters. It is from this point of departure that the female leadership discourse, which is framed in the construction of *kodrat perempuan* and the gender lens, is discussed. Four cases were discussed in the previous chapters: education, health, public leadership and parliamentary representation in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City. In this chapter, the female leadership discourse is discussed in terms of representation, identity and projection. The discussion begins with female leadership discourse, which deals with two dimensions: the leadership process and representation where female leadership is examined in the citizenship nuance. Another sub-chapter scrutinizes the State's discourse which offers opportunities and challenges for women's civic engagement. The next sub-chapter discusses another representation of female leadership discourse as reflected in news coverage. Here, the female leadership discourse is analysed in the light of a larger narration and through its representation in meanings as constructions of collective identity. In it, the discussion focuses on how the news covers the fluidity of the collective identities of female leadership engagement. And it is framed in two key ways, through negotiation and in shifts in doing things. In all sub-chapters the writer pays attention to the prospects and the challenges for female leadership practice in contemporary times.

A. Female Leadership Discourse

This sub-chapter discusses two dimensions of female leadership: the leadership process (trajectory and experiences) and the expression of citizenship.

1. The Leadership Process: *Trajectory and Experience*

Tasikmalaya female leadership experience, as seen from the four cases, exemplifies social agents' efforts to improve women's social practices as well as to influence other civic-discursive practices. Their experiences reveal to us the relation between trajectory and performance or between enabling and enacting leadership processes. The female agents I interviewed shared their experiences of integrating these procedures and to some extent this helped them to adapt to new situations as well as to carry out their leadership roles.

In the Islamic educational sector, women's social engagement generally occurs in three places: *pesantren*, *madrasah* and *majlis taklim*. *Nyais* usually join their husbands' educational responsibilities while others have their own students or audiences. In actualizing these roles, some of them surpass their husbands' areas of influence such as Nyai Titi Suryati, the wife of K.H. Maman Abdurrahman, in Pesantren al-Taqwa in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya Regency.¹ A few *nyais* also engage in social and political activities in addition to their traditional tasks in the educational processes such as becoming a politician, an MP or an activist, or they act as members of the KPUD's official selection committee. Based on their experiences, female leadership represents dynamics within the existing constraints where female leaders find ways for their social engagement by trying to uncover the barriers they encounter through the use of different strategies, from bringing activities home while maintaining their duties of looking after their homes and families to creating job descriptions between spouses for the fulfilment of their obligations, rights and careers as many have done.

Nyai Djudju Zubaedah and Nyai Ida Nurhalida found that their efforts to disseminate knowledge about the gender discourse in Singaparna always met religious discourse barriers perpetuated by local religious leaders and their influential religious educational institutions. In this case, the barriers did not originate from inside the Nahdina organization, (a local NGO which is concerned with gender issues), as the two *nyais* had founded it, but from the surroundings where they wanted to execute their programs. So, the barriers they faced did not prevent female agents to achieve the highest position in their organization,² but prevented the organization from reaching its goal. Here, they faced familiar barriers, i.e. the male world and patriarchal traditions that prevented them from optimally benefiting from the achievements of the gender equality movement within their area of organizational influence.

¹ Interview with Nyai Titi Suryati, Tasikmalaya Regency, July 28, 2010.

² Stead and Elliott, 2009. *Women's Leadership*, pp. 45-6.

In the *pesantren* and *madrasah*, Nyai Etty Tismayanti takes on more responsibilities than her husband and she is active in social activities such as in *majlis taklim* and women's organizations. Her husband's role is confined to being a State employee, a preacher and a symbolic leader in the *pesantren*. When her leadership was confirmed to, for example, one of the male teachers, it seems that she faced the problem that he did not accept her leadership because they were in an organization which is male dominated by tradition. While I was interviewing her, I sensed that the male and female teachers reluctantly respected her. Nyai Ida Mus'idah had to face similar barriers. Although she managed to have some influence in the *pesantren* and in society where she was also active as a preacher, a social activist in the local NU organization and as a politician affiliated with the PPP and later the PKB, Nyai Mus'idah's leadership role was complementary because she was a leader in a patriarchal and traditional religious institution which only supported women in their conventional responsibilities and obligations at home and within their families. When I interviewed her she was in her 60s and her husband had already passed away. Being one of the children of the founder of Pesantren Bahrul Ulūm allowed her to have a leadership position in the *pesantren* as the head of the primary level, whereas her brother got the general leadership of the *pesantren*.

Muslim women from *pesantren* families offer interesting leadership experiences. We may refer to the discursive leadership practices of Nyai Devi Setiani, Nyai Enung Nursaidah, Nyai Etti Tismayanti, Nyai Ida Nurkhalida and Nyai Neng Madinah. These women come from or are connected to *pesantren* families, due to either marriage such as the case of Nyai Setiani or to the establishment of a *pesantren* such that of Nyai Tismayanti. From a very young age they were oriented to religious teachings which they studied in a *pesantren* or in a *madrasah*. Some of them received secular education either just at the elementary level or at the elementary and secondary levels, and they continued their studies by enrolling in higher secular educational programs or by shifting to religious studies programs. Nyai Setiani attended a secular primary school, but moved to a *madrasah* for her junior high school level and then back to a secular school for her senior high school level. She ended up in the D2 program and majored in early age education. Unlike Nyai Setiani, Nyai Nurkhalida always attended secular schools, from elementary to higher educational levels and she graduated from UPI (Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia/Indonesia Education University) with a Master's Degree in Chemistry. But, at the same time, particularly up to her senior high school level, she studied religious subjects at Pesantren Cipasung and with her parents who were the heads of the *pesantren*. Nyai Tismayanti, by contrast, only received education in Islamic educational institutions from elementary school up to the higher educational level at UIN Bandung where she graduated with a doctoral degree in 2010. These women have different leadership experiences: educational, social and political. In Nyai Setiani's case, she did not manage to get the position as the head of the higher level educational institutions in Pesantren Cintawana as they were given to direct members of the founder's family. She herself comes from an ordinary family background and she was married to the present head of

the *pesantren*, K.H. Asep Sujai. However, in the course of time, Nyai Setiani was strongly supported, particularly by her husband who encouraged her to take the D2 course. Having been educated to this level, she then was entrusted to be the head of young age education in the *pesantren*. In addition, she also increased her leadership experience in the *pesantren* by accepting the job as treasurer of meal management for students, administrator of Poskestren/Pos Kesehatan Pesantren (Pesantren's Health Post), and as a Posyandu volunteer. She extended her leadership again by accepting the responsibility of leading Persatuan Orang Tua Penderita Thalassemia (Union of Parent of Thalassemia Patients) with as main task helping parents to obtain free health services or at least at low prices for their children's health treatment. The bottom line of her leadership experience is that she exercised her leadership within the range deemed appropriate with her *kodrat*. By doing so, her husband fully supported her. Her leadership shows that although her education was secular oriented up to the D2 level, she not only dealt with basic religious education for early young aged children but also with secular matters either in meal management and health service activities. Her leadership was thus operative only within the perceived *kodrat*, i.e. the main female *kodrat* of caring for the home and for the family.³

More progressive female agency may be discerned in the cases of Nyai Nurkhalida, Nyai Tismayanti and Nyai Madinah. They sat higher education and were exposed to democratic and gender issues in training sessions and by participating in workshops and they also gained experience working within the democratic atmospheres in their own work environments. Nyai Nurkhalida and Nyai Tismayanti have been officials and leaders in the activities of educational and mass organizations and NGOs, and as educators and heads of *madrasahs* and schools. Meanwhile, Nyai Madinah has developed her leadership experience as an MP for almost a decade. Externally, she has successfully extended her political area from the regency up to the provincial level, as she was also a member of the West Java DPRD for the period 2009-2014. Internally, although she mainly worked in the designated area within her *kodrat*, the social and women's affairs commission, she actually managed to work in different commissions as well but not as intensive or for a similar long period of time as in the social and women's affairs commission.

The four cases discussed in this study---female leadership experience in education, health, public leadership, particularly of a leader elected directly by people, and parliamentary membership, illustrate how civil societies are successfully encouraged. The perception of *kodrat perempuan*, in this respect with reference to Posyandu cadres, for example, reflects women's ability to take advantage of and create strategies to engage socially within the constraints they face. Many not only asked their husbands' permission to engage in social activities because of the obvious benefits of mother and children health care, but also to develop and extend their social roles. In this case, women's civic engagement managed to alter the existing perception of *kodrat*, particularly the restrictive nuances by arguing that this activity is perfectly in line with their *kodrat*. Although Posyandu cadres

³ Interview with Devi Setiani, Tasikmalaya *Kabupaten*, October 18, 2010.

have been trained mainly in health matters and health management, many of them have been also been trained in other kinds of knowledge such as democracy, community development, and followed computer and small business courses.⁴ These additional trainings are seen as extensions of their civic engagements which transform them into more active citizens.

In other areas deemed appropriate with *kodrat perempuan* but in patriarchal contexts such as the cases of Nyais' educational engagement, women also find ways of altering their perception of *kodrat* by looking for consent and support from people close to them such as their spouses, parents, and other relatives. This kind of support (or consent) has become effective because it is a key to opening the Pandora box for a female traveler in a male world.⁵ Alongside women's engagement in supported areas, some women have also been able to extend their activities to other forms of social engagement such as social empowerment or political participation. Whether in the health or educational sector, they manage to surpass the barriers they face without confronting existing patriarchal discursive practices.

The area deemed inappropriate for women, the political realm, shows similar practices but stresses other points. The areas deemed appropriate and inappropriate to *kodrat perempuan* depend on the agents' qualifications and on women's efforts in carrying out their social engagement when external factors support them. Though there are barriers that result from an area's normative value, be it appropriate or inappropriate to their *kodrat*, in the cases of study, the social agents found ways to solve their problems once they had been given the space and the opportunity to do so, as experienced by the Posyandu cadres I interviewed. In the course of time, they seemed to have gained their independence after having been subordinated to only play their roles as housewives. Actually, they simultaneously were able to have and exercise leadership roles. As these matters are dear to motherhood, they seem to also execute a feminine style of leadership, characterized by self-giving, femininity and a motherhood style of leadership.

Meanwhile female leadership in public and parliamentary politics is experienced differently. Female public leadership as head of a *kelurahan* (village in a municipality) or of a sub-district, seems trapped in either glass ceiling or glass cliff leadership due to the barriers they face. External factors play important roles in determining their assignment as such, as reflected in this case study. Contrarily, female public leadership which was assumed through winning in a general election seems to have more space and opportunity for enabling or enacting leader-

⁴ For example, the Posyandu cadres in Tawang participated in health and democratic issues and had also taken computer courses. These courses were held by the local NGO, Yayasan Sumbangsih Nusa Indonesia, in Tasikmalaya.

⁵ Stead and Elliot use the phrase "a traveller in the male world" from Marshall (1984). The term illustrates the stereotypical feature of women's leadership. They also agree with West and Zimmerman (2005) who see women as 'out of place'. Their leadership is "operative outside the narrow range of what is deemed appropriate female behaviour", Stead and Elliott, 2009. *Women's Leadership*. p. 58.

ship. Finally, female parliamentary leadership seems to have barriers which can be included in the glass ceiling metaphor and they have them on at least two levels: on the political party level and in the leadership of the local parliament itself. However, women who were elected found ways to overcome the barriers they faced by using a combination of their inherited, social and cultural capitals, in addition to their personal qualifications.

Women certainly have to take appropriateness into consideration before becoming creative. If religious and local cultural discursive resources values are restrictive towards gender relations, female leadership will most likely face barriers that typically derive from this resource of reference, such as placing women's ideal role at home. For example, when various women were assigned to be heads of sub-districts in Tasikmalaya (in the period of 2001-2006), many lasted only for a one-year period, or even for only two or three months. The short duration of these terms of female leadership shows to some extent how the perception of *kodrat perempuan* played a key role in their existence. The study finds that the notion of women as public leaders is still open to heated debates. In addition, of the seven women who were assigned, only two graduated in the relevant discipline (STPDN/State Local Government Higher Education Institution). So, the idea of assigning women as sub-districts heads in this context was determined by external factors: the influence of the State's policy, the electoral system, human rights and gender equality, and international practices of these values and systems.

2. Representation: *Female leadership as an Expression of Citizenship*

Besides discussing female leadership based on the information I got from my fieldwork in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City, it can be also discussed from the angle of citizenship. As the term was explained in the first chapter, women's citizenship can be seen as an effort to fully include them in society as citizens. Having been neglected or given lower ranking in citizenship in human history, women are now positioned better because of contemporary democratization processes and they are trying to gain more equal footing as citizens through their own social practices. Nowadays women are in a more equal position and are trying to engage socially, taking advantage of public citizenship fields in the political, family, civil society, and cultural spheres, in addition to the formal-State citizenship spheres. One of the main issues is the matter of women's inclusion and exclusion as full citizens. In Indonesia, like in other countries, women's inclusion and exclusion as members of society was and is determined by both internal and external factors. The internal factors may refer to their knowledge, skills, networks, and the mentality of the women themselves. External factors may include 'the general nature of the practices and contexts' which were and are patriarchal. One thing is common. Women's ability to engaging in and enacting social activities take place within their perceived *kodrat*. Within the basic elements of citizenship such as membership, belonging, and rights and obligations, women's cultural citizenship represents a continuous effort to shed the assumption that they are lower and second class citizens, "incorporated into explicit consideration of fami-

ly and as extensions of men's agency."⁶ The nature of inclusion and exclusion may refer to a sense of belonging. In this assumption, women belong to the family, and this is basically in accordance with their general perceived *kodrat*. This constitutes their ideal role, space and opportunity. Their role, space and opportunity outside this construction are considered different. However, whether within the traditional constructed *kodrat* or within new influences, women have dynamics which are characterized as fluid and in continuous contestation and negotiation.

The history of women in Indonesia reflects the extension and limitation of their social roles and social engagement. In everyday life, as illustrated by Barbara Andaya and Ann Kumar, South-East Asian women had the space and the opportunity to engage in both the private and public spheres.⁷ The trend of restricting women's civic engagement actually started as a consequence of external influences such as those from the Western⁸ and Middle Eastern countries. In the course of time, this trend placed women mostly at home. Up to the present, women's civic engagement has navigated between restricting and liberating discourse resources while women now tend to have more room for a liberating resource discourse.

In following two sub-chapters, women's leadership experiences are discussed from the point of view of cultural practices. Considering culture as "the dialogic production of meaning and aesthetics through a variety of practices,"⁹ women's political practices discussed here focus on processes that allow them to participate in social life as democratic citizens "capable of acting both autonomously and responsibly."¹⁰ Within political processes, women exercise and experience rights and obligations as citizens. The discussion pays attention to their struggle to fulfil their rights and obligations in their leadership practices.

a. Cultural Citizenship within the Area Deemed Appropriate for Women

Taking the lessons learned in the Tasikmalaya context, the exclusion or inclusion of women's citizenship depends on the women themselves and on the contexts that situate them. As their capacities increase over time, women's social engagement evolves more dynamic. They started with gaining support, usually from their spouses and families, and then they themselves tried to improve their abilities and enhance their influence by pursuing education at higher levels, as

⁶ Nick Stevenson, 2003. *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions*. Berkshire: Open University Press, pp. 185-6.

⁷ Barbara Watson Andaya, 2006. *The Flaming Womb*, p. 226-32; Ann Kumar, 2008. *Prajurit Perempuan Jawa: Kesaksian Ihwal Istana dan Politik Jawa Akhir Abad e-18*. Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, pp. xi-xiii.

⁸ Reggie Baay, 2010. *Nyai & Pergundikkan di Hindia Belanda*. Depok: Komunitas Bambu, p. xiii.

⁹ Stevenson, 2003. *Cultural Citizenship*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 7.

some women did, or by resorting to the learning-by-doing strategy. At the same time, they received training, participated in cadre workshops and competitions as in the case of Posyandu. All this knowledge, experience, skills, participation and networking refined their traditional identities and constructed new ones. Within their traditional roles at home, women confidently accept other roles as long as they have their husbands' consent and their families' support. Spouses and family members usually support women's involvement in Islamic educational institution activities as long as the women themselves have the necessary knowledge, skills and intention to do so. In the course of time, their roles increased and extended to other areas of activities. This increase could be in the number of classes where they teach, the level of the education they provide or in their teaching field, whereas the extension could be from teacher to preacher, or even from social activist to politician.

Spouses also supported women's involvement in health program activities because they consider health and mother and child care important for the well-being of their own families. Posyandu cadres commonly added that the reason for their participation in the posts' activities was to learn and to make friends. Once they had committed themselves as cadres, they were exposed to new opportunities, spaces and networking. They used their basic knowledge and skills in administration and in the management of the health post. They were also introduced to new spaces and networks such as at health posts (in their own houses or at independent posts), Puskesmas/Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat (Community Health Post), village offices, ward administration, the city's or regency's health offices, and other offices such as the military post at the city or regency level which have the same program on mother and child care. Occasionally, some of them were also introduced to offices at the provincial or even national level for the purpose of annual competitions or to attend coordination meetings with other Posyandu volunteers. For example, Enok Tati Rohayati, transformed from housewife to the head of the cadres of Posyandu Puspa Indah in Tawang, Tasikmalaya City, and she became coordinator of Family Planning Information in the Tawang Sub-district. She developed her links not only within local health offices, the local village, Sub-district and city office administration, but also in military offices to help them disseminate information and to accompany mothers and children to get health services. Many of her neighbors trusted her to assist them to get health care. Though it was a voluntary brokerage, she was happy because her efficiency was needed and in return she also earned some money from the service she offered. She often participated in coordination meetings, competitions and workshops on health and democracy issues.¹¹

Female Posyandu cadres' experiences confirm the assumption that although their cultural citizenship actualization functions within patriarchal precepts, in fact it extends female's agency in society. They all confessed to have asked their husbands' permission and had considered the potential benefits to help them improve their health status. Their social engagement also reflected the

¹¹ Interview with Enok Tati Rohayati, Tasikmalaya *Kota*, August 1, 2010.

extension of male agency in terms of how their involvement in social activities represented the family. One of them told me that mothers would not come with their children to the post if their husbands had not granted them permission. To some extent, their cultural citizenship seemed operative within the sphere of their husbands' influence. However, these points do not negate the fact that being involved in voluntary activities which are in line with their constructed *kodrat* gave them the opportunities and the space to enable them to join and enact leadership at the same time. Here, inclusion and exclusion as parts of their full citizen membership reflects the women's continuous negotiation with their cultural identities.

b. Cultural Citizenship within the Area Deemed Inappropriate for Women

Women's social engagement in this political area in contemporary Tasikmalaya reflects also the women's own efforts to extend their formal education by pursuing education at higher levels. At the same time, they receive training, attend workshops, and also participate in academic forums such as public discussions and seminars held by political parties or other institutions. With regard to education, women who were elected as MPs mostly continued their higher education in the political sciences. Women who were assigned to be sub-district heads mostly hold an undergraduate degree. Normatively, heads of *kelurahan* and sub-districts are selected from graduates of the relevant educational institution (STPDN/State Local Government Higher Education Institution). In practice, women with different educational backgrounds had been assigned as sub-districts heads under the assumption that each State employee had the basic knowledge and the standard skills necessary to operate in a State organization. Since its establishment in 2001, Tasikmalaya City has not had a female *kelurahan* head who had graduated from STPDN. The only woman who was assigned to the position was Imas Susilawati.

In its recent history, Tasikmalaya has had female public leaders at the village and ward levels, and a small number of female MPs. In terms of citizenship, Tasikmalaya hosts a dynamic female leadership discursive practice. It is seen as a predominantly male world, however. Like in many other districts in Indonesia, in Tasikmalaya, people are almost religiously homogeneous and one ethnicity dominates, i.e. the Sundanese. Socio-cultural factors play key elements in its social construction, including in the perception of *kodrat*. The frequent reconstruction of patriarchal values certainly still influences the female leadership trajectory. Many social agents among the public or government officials hold these values as reflected by the opinions of the Baperjakat (Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Pangkat/Advisory Board for Posts and Ranks) committee, and those of some local religious figures. Appreciating the space and time that women have in spite of their role in the family, the committee is convinced that women still face many barriers and challenges. The assignment of the seven women as sub-districts heads from 2001 to 2006 in Tasikmalaya reflects the local response towards the democ-

ratization process and gender main-streaming policy which was strongly recommended down to the local level in the early Reformasi era.

In the New Order period (1966-1998), women were encouraged to support the success of their husbands as formulated in the ten programs of the PKK/ Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Development Program). Iwu Dwisetyani Utomo wrote that throughout the twentieth century, women's social position in Indonesian society was consistently poor. Though women began to have a better life in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the remnants of the values, social structures and policies of the previous century continued to potentially hamper their expectations. She explained that the development of the educational program in which women are subordinated is a case in point. She found that there are limits to freedom in the education process. She suspects that "the lessons taught in school can promote gender roles that disadvantage women, and, without efforts to promote critical thinking, women and men can easily accept the inequalities of such roles without questioning them."¹²

The process of exclusion also happens because of the public discourse that keeps women at home. This means that culturally, the public tends to prioritize men over women as citizens, and supports the actualization of the principle of husbands as breadwinners. In Tasikmalaya some women were able to experience leadership, though within constraints. It seems that their expression of citizenship in formal political activities took the form of creating identities other than their traditional ones as housewives. For example, most female ward leaders I interviewed used their leadership as a vehicle to actualize their social engagement because they had the space and the opportunities, but they had not thought of themselves as neglecting their household obligations. They felt that these obligations were important. Iis Iriani, the former head of Tawang Sub-district in Tasikmalaya City (2002), admitted that she prepared breakfast and ironed her husband's clothes while she was a public leader. She did not have the idea that she was forced to do so but considered these tasks as part of being a wife. In the office, like many other men and women, she exercises her leadership based on the existing standards of the system in operation.¹³ As leadership in a sub-district organization is part of the bigger body of government organization, she played a role within this constraint as well. This means that in her case she enabled and enacted leadership through the existing perception of *kodrat*.

A different story is that of Dewi Kania, the former head of Cisanyong Sub-district in Tasikmalaya Regency. Internally, the staff in the Cisanyong office accepted her as their new leader. Externally, the story was different in that local socio-religious figures were reluctant to accept a public female leader in their sub-district because social interactions with female leaders were not as free and convenient as those with male leaders. In addition, men have a much greater

¹² Iwu Dwisetyani Utomo, "Women's Lives: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity," in Terence H. Hull (ed.), 2005. *People, Population and Policy in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing Ltd., pp. 71-2.

¹³ Interview with Iis Iriani, Tawang Tasikmalaya City, May 18, 2010.

preference for public leadership than women.¹⁴ In short, once a woman leader fails to win the audiences sympathy whether from her colleagues or from public socio-religious figures, she most probably will find it very difficult to enact her leadership effectively.

In the case of female public leaders who are directly elected by the people such as village heads, women also face forms of exclusion caused by religious interpretations and the cultural understanding of properness and the ideal role of female leadership. Through the perception of *kodrat*, women are judged for their eligibility to be a public leader. One opinion commonly found during my fieldwork was that women are eligible to be leaders, but certain conditions must be applied. As long as there were eligible men, women would better not run for election. Their eligibility as leaders was less apparent if it was for top positions or in areas not close to their *kodrat*. As a Muslim woman cannot be the leader in congregational prayers where men are present, this is sometimes used as an argument for the inappropriateness of female public leadership. Other forms can be the use of religious terms such as *muhrim* (near family and relatives who are forbidden to marry each other) and *ikhtilat* (intermingling between men and women), the understanding of which can lead to the restriction of female leadership.

In addition, cultural values may also restrict women's political participation such as the idea that Sundanese women should ideally act as supporting partners. A Sundanese wife is seen to perform best if she stays behind the success of her husband. Elis Suryani explained that a Sundanese wife has to live with the precept that *istrimah dulang tinande* (the wife has to obey her husband).¹⁵ All of these values were found during my fieldwork and all female village heads I interviewed admitted that these values are active in society and that they themselves still feel influenced by them. The common characteristic of these values is that it discourages women to become leaders. Most of them react passively towards the notion that they could be elected as village head and they responded with a wait-and-see attitude. They only accepted the opportunity to run in an election once they had gained the support from near family and relatives, particularly from their husbands and socio-religious figures or, sometimes, from young local activists.

Having discussed the factors that exclude women from the opportunity to act as full citizens through political participation, some points can be made. Lower levels of education, a mentality of inferiority compared to that of men, a lesser number of precedents in female leadership, and a restricted understanding of the religious and cultural precepts that are reflected in their perception of *kodrat*, hinders women's enabling and enacting leadership. However, these do not altogether stop women's civic engagement, because some women have been elected as public leaders or MPs.

¹⁴ Interview with Maman and Eko, staffs of Cisanyong ward, Tasikmalaya *Kabupaten*, May 21, 2010.

¹⁵ Interview with Elis Suryani, Tasikmalaya *Kota*, November 24, 2008.

To summarize, the female leadership discourse in this study reveals the interesting dynamics of their leadership experiences and of their expressions of cultural citizenship, mainly in the domain of education, activism, and social capital building. In their social engagement, women adjust to their given roles. Accordingly, the style of leadership they adopt is also close to their constructed *kodrat* which is generally still inclined to a feminine style characterized by giving selflessly, femininity and motherhood. However, the situation is restrictive in practice. The women I interviewed usually found ways to overcome barriers, as illustrated in the experiences of *nyais*, Posyandu cadres, female public leaders, and female MPs. The metaphors of the glass ceiling and the glass cliff only applied to certain cases as women found their own ways and performed either as a queen bees, iron maidens, selfless heroines, or as effective and caring leaders. A more progressive picture was found in women leaders who were efficacious and who proposed themselves to run for candidacy in a general election.

B. The State's Discourse: *Opportunities and Challenges*

Through its government policies, the State formulates the role, space and opportunity for women's social engagement. The State's attention in this matter also evolves according to the demands of the time. In the New Order period (1966-1998) the State formulated women's role as the *mitra pendukung* (supportive partners) of their spouses which in the last decade of its existence changed into *mitra sejajar* (equal partner) but with a weak accentuation of gender equality. However, in the Reformasi era (1998-present) the State re-emphasizes women's role as their spouses' *mitra sejajar* (equal partner) and is more inclined to gender equality. The formal State discourse regarding *kodrat perempuan* in the New Order era also consisted of the cultural construction of the term. Thus, it is influential up to the present, though the State has changed its policy towards more equal gender relations for more than a decade. In the case of Tasikmalaya, this change is seen in the present stand of the Baperjakat (Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Pangkat/ Advisory Board for Posts and Ranks). The members of the body I interviewed in Tasikmalaya City and Tasikmalaya Regency indicated this conviction. They preferred a neutral gender policy with regards to implementing democratic principles and human rights. They also gave a reason which they considered humane about why they did not assign any women as sub-district heads after having assigned five women in 2001 and 2004 in Tasikmalaya Regency and two women in 2002 and 2004 in Tasikmalaya City. The reason was that it was difficult and risky for women to work long-distance and at night.¹⁶

The State uses socio-religious reasons to differentiate leadership in the family from that in the public sphere. Inside their homes, the women I discuss in this thesis tended to use religion and culture as discursive resources. They argued

¹⁶ Interview with Drs. Sutisna: Kabid Mutasi BKPLD and Totong R. Kadarusman: Kasubid Mutasi BKPLD, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, Wednesday, May 19, 2010; and Dindin Saefudin Asda 3 Bagian Administrasi dan Umum, Tasikmalaya City, June 30, 2010.

that both religion and culture formulate the ideal roles for everybody in the family. Meanwhile in the public sphere, they referred to the Indonesian Constitution where men and women are treated equally. Thus, as citizens, women and men may compete to see who is the best or merely do what they prefer to do. They believed that knowledge and networking played an important role. As these women still considered religious and cultural values as their norms, their perception about their role in the family remained patriarchal. They had no problem to see their husbands as the heads of their families and to put family matters under their coordination. What made them take this stand was their attachment to tradition and their understanding of the religious precepts that situate men in this position. They generally used human rights, gender notions and State laws to legitimize women's involvement in activities deemed appropriate or inappropriate for them. So, they still applied patriarchal norms which confine women to the domestic sphere. Even though the husband is the head, or the manager who is responsible for the family, when his wife needs to develop her career, she may propose, for instance, to run in a public leadership election, or fight for a post in an office without feeling guilty or being prohibited to do so. In this case, she can use the Indonesian Constitution, for example, to argue that doing these activities is part of her rights, just the same as they are her husband's rights. Ade Mustikawati, the former head of Margaluyu Village in Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya Regency (1989-2008), has this attitude. She explained that though leadership is open to men and women, it is important for here to have her husband's permission. Without his permission she would not have used the opportunity to run in the village head election in the first place, because it would create an uncomfortable situation at home.¹⁷

There is a new way of governance that interpolates religious teachings into the State's Constitution and regulations. In the Reformasi era, local regulations emerged with religious nuances, popularly known as *Perda Syari'a*. In Tasikmalaya Regency, for example, the regency head issued a Letter of Instruction ordering State civil servants to wear proper dress in accordance with religious teachings. As the people in the regency are almost all Muslim, women and men were encouraged to wear Muslim garb. In Tasikmalaya City, the municipality has produced *Perda Syari'a* No. 12, 2009 on *Pembangunan Tata Nilai Kehidupan Kemasyarakatan yang berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama Islam dan Norma-norma Sosial Masyarakat Kota Tasikmalaya* (Development of a Value System for Communal Living Based on Islamic Teachings and the Social Norms of Tasikmalaya Society),¹⁸ locally known as *Perda Tata Nilai* (Local Government Regulation's Set of Values). This initiative emerged because of the romantic idea that an Islamic State had several times been proposed and once Muslims had succeeded to insert the so-called seven words (also called *Piagam Jakarta*) regarding the enforcement

¹⁷ Interview with Ade Mustikawati. Tasikmalaya Regency. November 25, 2008.

¹⁸ *Perda Syari'a* No. 12, 2009 on *Pembangunan Tata Nilai Kehidupan Kemasyarakatan yang berlandaskan pada Ajaran Agama Islam dan Norma-norma Sosial Masyarakat Kota Tasikmalaya*. Fieldwork, Tasikmalaya Kota, 2010.

of Islamic law for Muslims in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, but it was thrown out. This historical precedence inspired many Muslims to try to revive the proposal. In addition to that, as Muslims are in the majority, proposing this initiative aimed at attracting more voters to the polls. Though these kinds of discursive practices were intended to offer the government an alternative way to solve problems, in practice they will most probably pose new restrictions on women's social engagement. For example, Tasikmalaya municipality authorized Satpol PP (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja/Civil Service Police Unit) to ensure the implementation of Perda Tata Nilai. There were at least two particular events among women's social activities that the Satpol PP asked them to halt because they were considered inappropriate: a massive fitness exercise outside a big local supermarket and a fashion contest in wearing jeans products conducted in the same venue. Satpol PP used the Perda Tata Nilai to inform the events' organizing committees that they had to stop the activities. This disapproval may have a negative impact on the people's creativity, and especially on women's social engagement. Such disapproval can also cause alarm that may restrict women's social activities.¹⁹

The State discourse influenced different styles of leadership. Female leadership experience in the Tasikmalaya context represents this within the operative gendered context where opportunities and challenges intersect with each other. Female leadership practice in general appears to be enabling leadership because their leadership practice is considered not to threaten men's traditional leadership roles.²⁰ The four cases show that the dynamism of their leadership was reflected in the variety of their leadership experiences at least on two levels: the barriers they faced and the leadership positions they held. In terms of the barriers they faced, they encountered what might be regarded as either glass ceiling barriers,²¹ in particular for those women leaders who were involved in organizations. Here, assuming the position was through assignment.

In the case of assuming a position through a general election, few of the female candidates in Tasikmalaya were able to break through the glass ceiling barrier, such as in the case of the general village head elections. However, this finding was only an instance, because the number of women who were elected as regency heads followed the trend of assuming a position through assignment. In the 2011 general election in the regency, some women ran for candidacy such as Dede T. Widarsih of the Golkar Party and Helvy Haniah of the Demokrat Party.²² The PDIP in Tasikmalaya named Cucu Cahyati, a Dangdut singer, as one of its poten-

¹⁹ Fieldwork, Tasikmalaya City, 2010.

²⁰ Stead and Elliott. 2009. *Women's Leadership*, p. 38.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 43 and 129.

²² *Radar Tasikmalaya . Srikandi Demokrat Nyalon Bupati.* July 14, 2010.

http://www.radartasikmalaya.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3692:srikandi-demokrat-nyalon-bupati&catid=104:pilkada&Itemid=45 accessed February, 17, 2012

tial candidates for the vice head regency election.²³ However, only Dede T. Widarsih managed to participate in the election as a candidate for the vice head of the regency, accompanying Subarna as the candidate for the head of the regency. Her decision to run in the general election only for the position of vice head of Tasikmalaya Regency in spite of having the opportunity to be a candidate for the head of the regency from her party, Golkar, contributed to the assumption that women still face glass ceiling barriers in their quest to assume top positions. She participated in the election together with seven other candidate pairs,²⁴ and won only the third place.²⁵

Throughout history, women leaders at the lower level in the regency have also always been absent, except between 2001 and 2006 when seven women were appointed as sub-district heads and one woman, Euis Kaswati, was appointed as the head of two sub-districts, Salopa (2001-2003) and Rajapolah (2003-2005), each for a period of two years rather than the usual four years. When we look at the length of their occupation in office, it would seem that the seven women who were selected as sub-district heads was merely a test. Only Nur Iriani stayed in office for four years but two others only for a few months (Dewi Kania, the head of Cisanyong, and Wiwin Windarya, the head of Salawu). Neneng Widayansih (the head of Cikatomas) led her sub-district for a period of one and a half

²³ *Rakyat Demokrasi*. "Giliran Cucu Cahyati Diajukan Calon Wakil Bupati", July 15, 2010. <http://rakyatdemokrasi.wordpress.com/2010/07/15/giliran-cucu-cahyati-diajukan-calon-wakil-bupati/> Feb 17, 2012.

²⁴ They are Endang Hidayat-Asep Ach mad Djaelani of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), Uu Ruzhanul Ulum-Ade Sugianto of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, and Partai Amanat Nasional), Achmad Saleh Kartamiharhja-Ucu Asep Dani of Partai Demokrat and 11 other parties which do not have legislative voice, and four independent candidates who come from the bureaucrat of the local government: Harmaen Muchyi Wiratanuningrat-Tacman Iding Husein, Ade Sumia Hendriana-Nanang Mamur, Endang Kusaeni-Suparman, and Endang Hidayat-Akhmad Juhana. *Kompas*, "Pilkada Tasikmalaya: Empat Dugaan Politik Uang Mencuat," January 9, 2011.

<http://female.kompas.com/read/2011/01/09/20561738/Empat.Dugaan.Politik.Uang.Mencuat>. February, 17, 2012.

²⁵ Uu Ruzhanul Ulum-Ade Sugianto of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, and Partai Amanat Nasional appeared to be the winner of the general election for the period of 2011-2016 with 263.099 votes or 32.25 % from the accepted number of 815.824 votes, and with only 28.209 rejection votes, the second place was the male pair of H.E. Hidayat SH MH-Drs H. Asep Achmad Djaelani (Haji) who occupied the second place with 221.554 votes or 27.16 %. Meanwhile Subarna- Dede T Widarsih gained the third place with only 171.873 votes or 21.07%. *Antara*. "Saksi Tujuh Pasangan calon Tidak Tandatangani Pleno." January 17, 2011; <http://www.antarajawabarat.com>; <http://www.kpu.jabarprov.go.id/index.php/subMenu/informasi/berita/detailberita/236/196> February 17, 2012; *Radars Tasikmalaya*. "Pilkada 2011 Satu Putaran: Uu-Ade Terpilih Jadi Bupati dan Wakil Bupati." January 16, 2011.

http://www.radartasikmalaya.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8688:pilkada-2011-satu-putaran&catid=104:pilkada&Itemid=45 February 17, 2012.

year. The rest, including Eusi Kaswati (head of Salopa and Rajapolah), Iis Iriani (head of Tawang), and Yani Jamaniah (the head of Sukabumi) were given about two years to run their sub-district. In other words, they were only given a short time to lead as the regent replaced them by others using their performances as the reasons but in fact it was for political reasons. As was explained in the previous chapter, the 2009 and 2010 data show that there were in fact a number of female staff members who were eligible to take up posts as village or sub-district heads. However, none of them were appointed at least up to the time when I did my second fieldwork in 2010 and early 2011.²⁶ These figures indicate that the majority of women eligible to occupy strategic posts still found it very difficult to overcome the barriers, metaphorically described as glass ceilings that prevent them from leading.

When this study was carried out, the Baperjakat in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City was headed by men and its members were also mostly men. The gender neutral principle which was the basis of its institutional policy regarding gender relations in practice actually prevented women from attaining strategic posts. The reason why they did not assign women as either heads of *kelurahan* (urban village) or of sub-districts was because women were still considered less capable of occupying these posts. They also argued that it was difficult for women to work at night and in areas that are difficult to reach, as well as to travel long distances from one place to another.

Women who were either assigned as sub-districts or *kelurahan* heads were trapped under glass ceilings due to the barriers they faced, while the fifteen women who were directly elected by the people as village heads had more chance to prosper in their positions. They successfully overcame their barriers and they managed to have more experiences in political processes which varied from one woman to another. They finally came forward as candidates after they had received the support from either family members, socio-religious figures or the people in general. Two of them even nominated themselves to run in the election and won: Euis Nurhayati from Girijaya in Bojong Asih for the period of 1999-2006 and Juju Juariah from Cibalanarik Village, in Tanjungjaya ward for the period of 2009-2015. Contrary to the general candidacy processes for women as found in this study, Juariyah and Nurhayati were competent and they believed that they could contribute to the betterment of society. Juariyah's competence is evident from the fact that she was invited to participate in the village head election. Her initiative was made easier by her membership of the Badan Permusyawaratan Desa/BPD (Village Consultative Council) for three years prior to her candidacy, her family embroidery business which employed about 450 workers who lived

²⁶ See Chapter Five or Kusmana, 2011. "Local Discourse and Practice of Women's Leadership: Contemporary Interpretation of *Kodrat Perempuan* in Public Engagement," in *Social Justice and rule of Law: addressing the growth of a pluralist Indonesia democracy*. Edited by Thomas J. Conners, Frank Dhont, Mason C. Hoadley and Adam D Tyson. Semarang: Diponegoro University and Yale University, pp. 323-4.

in the same village, and the inadequate performance of the sitting village head.²⁷ Nurhayati inherited her ability from her family as her grandfather had also been a village head. She was active as a village staff member before she ran in the election. Her husband was also supportive of her candidacy and acted as her campaign leader. Because of his influence, she could invite social and religious figures and inform them of her intention.²⁸

Like in politics, opportunities and challenges in the education and health sectors highlight women's role as important agents as members of society. Although policies and programs in these sectors potentially exclude them as full citizens such as the New Order's decree of women's ideal role as supporters of their spouses' success, their educational achievements and participation in health program development programs provides them with the knowledge, skills, network, and experience needed to transform these challenges into opportunities as active citizens. In practice, the female agents I interviewed in the four cases illustrate their hard efforts.

C. Female leadership and Exposure: *Constructing Collective Identities*

Another cultural factor which is important in discussing women's cultural citizenship is the media and in this case newspapers and bulletins that offer "a model of democratic communication."²⁹ They give readers or writers the opportunity to contribute to or at least read about the four basic cultural rights: information, knowledge, experience and participation. The information they offer may function not only as news and information but also to enhance public awareness.³⁰ The concept of identity as a cultural production as proposed by Stuart Hall (1992: 4) may be useful here. He explains that "identities are increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiple and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions."³¹ According to Stevenson, Hall aims at making "the ways in which individuals or groups identify or indeed fail to identify" factors inside and surrounding them that make them different.³² In relation to women, Stevenson, quoting Calhoun (1994), argues that "identities are increasingly represented as the site of contestation and struggle, and as multiple and fragmented rather than pre-given and natural (Calhoun 1994)."³³ The women's identities discussed here are mother, junior or senior Muslim woman, teacher or lecturer, preacher, activist, Posyandu volunteer, housewife, wife or daughter of a *kiai (nyai)*, advo-

²⁷ Interview with Juju Juariah, Tasikmalaya *Kabupaten*, June 1, 2010.

²⁸ Interview with Euir Nurhayati, Tasikmalaya *Kabupaten*, May 31, 2010.

²⁹ Stevenson, 2003, *Cultural Citizenship*, p. 100.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³³ *Ibid.*

cate, nurse, trader, politician and MP, etc. In all of these cases, women have different identities.

As the dimensions of cultural and formal citizenship may intersect in processes of cultural participation, constructing social capital and nurturing feelings of identity, female leadership experiences as covered by *Kompas*, *Radar Tasikmalaya*, *Priangan*, *Pikiran Rakyat*, and *Bewara Sukapura* in Tasikmalaya Regency, *Buletin Indeks* in Tasikmalaya City, and *Rahima* represent women's negotiation in creating enhanced feelings of inclusion as active, effective, equal and full citizens. The media usually cover female leadership experiences at different occasions ranging from the commemoration of national heroines, Mother's Day festivities, the implementation of national and local government programs, law-making and law enforcement procedures, leadership performance, and information sessions on the issues that women face. In all of these events women sort out their own different identities whether as housewives, family managers, educators, preachers, primary health volunteers (Cadre of Posyandu), waste managers, coordinators of PKK cadres, traders, agents of social change, public leaders, MPs, etc. Women use all these identities as pathways to create a greater sense of inclusion as citizens. Although in practice the media have to be market-oriented in order to survive, they also have to consider the acceptability of what they write to keep their readers who all have different backgrounds and ideologies. One thing is certain which is that maintaining the main-streamed construction of *kodrat* is supposedly an effective means to please the audience. Marketing newspapers have to navigate between the two opposite groups---those who entertain a conservative construction of *kodrat* and those who maintain a more liberal one. Looking at cultural citizenship expressions, the fluidity of their collective identity constructions may represent at least two things: negotiation and shifts in doing something.

1. Negotiation

Women's transformation from housewives (IRT) to a plethora of other identities is a continuous process of their civic engagement. Negotiation refers to women's reactions to the space and the opportunities they meet. Newspapers and bulletins are often interested in the patterns behind their reactions in order to form a clearer picture of women's social engagement. In this way, they sometimes write about women in the same way as they do about their male counterparts and by so doing pave the way for the attainment of equality between the two genders. In a sense, this helps women's idealization process as equal citizens. For example, *Bewara Sukapura* and *Buletin Indeks* regularly inform their readers about the performance of women MPs as discussed in the previous chapter. At other times, they cover the leadership cases of women who have difficulties or who are themselves weak. For example, the local newspaper reports about the wrongly distributed funds for the village alert incentive development in Tasikmalaya City. This is understandable because the media's normative principle is to maintain neutrality. Generally, women reacted mostly reluctant towards new situations. Only some of them displayed their qualified character. Their reluctance means at least two

things. First, it may indicate women's confusion of what to do with what they have just achieved or received. However, this phenomenon is temporary, because in the course of time they manage to overcome the barriers they initially faced, in part or totally. They were either confused as to how to maintain good relations with their spouses while they executed their professional work in the office or how to adapt to new situations and obligations. This was the case for many new female MPs who reacted to this confusion by basically just following their political party's stands. As a result, they initially started with enabling leadership to comprehend the situation and the work to be done before they commenced with enacting leadership. Female heads of villages and sub-districts had similar difficulties but they presented themselves as external factors: how to deal with socio-religious public figures who are usually men. Some of them were successful and won the public's acceptance of their leadership. Others did not manage to last in their leadership position for a considerable period of time due to a variety of reasons including local public figures' resistance towards female leadership.

Second, their confusion may stem from the fact that women must deal with the commonly-held belief that they are seen as inferior and incapable of dealing with new situations. Incapability in the four cases discussed here was actually rarely found because all the interviewees were going through processes of selection, be it systematically as was done by Baperjakat, by a political party's task-force, or naturally such as promoted or supported by groups of people in the case of female candidacy for a village head. Feelings of incapacity usually appear when women are running in a general election or apply for a vacant post. For example, the critique of being incapable may be addressed to the two female village heads of Kamulyan and Pasir Panjang in the Manonjaya Sub-district, Tasikmalaya Regency. Their leadership met with many difficulties and they did not manage to survive until the second period. From my interviews and fieldwork, I found that there were various barriers ranging from management, communication, networking and their private issues where they had to deal with amorous involvement among each other. It seems that both did not do their homework efficiently as many other female village heads managed to do in spite of carrying out their office duties.³⁴

The remaining sources of inferiority, less experience and less networking, were more commonly found among women leaders. This is understandable as they operated in fields not deemed appropriate for them, because they belong to the male world. Women there are often seen only as outsiders or travelers. However, similar problems were also found among women in fields deemed suitable for them. In the selection process these assumptions became disadvantages, but after they had been selected as leaders, they had opportunities to learn and to prove otherwise. In the course of time, some of them turned out to be strong, effective and good leaders. For example, the four female village heads who were re-elected for a second term: Ade Mustikawati, the head of Margaluyu Village;

³⁴ Interview with Nia Rahmi Kaniati, April 26, 2010; and Euis Ruhiyani, Tasikmalaya *Kabupaten*, April 26, 2010.

Nina Herlina, the head of Sukaharja Village; Euis Nurhayati, the head of Giri Jaya Village; and Eti Maryati, the head of Ciandum Village in Tasikmalaya Regency. These women enabled and enacted their leadership in their own ways and were more accepted by the people.

On one hand, newspapers cover the commemoration of national heroines, the festivities of Mother's Day, the implementation of national and local government programs, and law-making and enforcement processes. On the other, bulletins pay attention to female leadership performance, knowledge building and activism. In all these publications, women's social engagements were described as efforts to nurture greater feelings of inclusion as citizens. They negotiated their space and opportunity to express their citizenship culturally either through participation, leadership, volunteering or engagement, be it in education, health, public leadership or parliamentary practices.

It seems that the perception of the constructed *kodrat* lies in all of these media-covered negotiation processes. The understanding of *kodrat*, whether it is inclusive or restrictive, provides and accommodates women's social engagement. In general, there will be an endless battle between the pros and cons of information which is inclusive and that which is restrictive towards female leadership practices and it will always influence women's negotiation in their cultural citizenship practices.

2. Shifts

Another thing that newspapers and bulletins relate about female leadership experiences are the different kinds of shifts in individual, group and social and State discursive practices such as paradigm shifts, shifts in governance, in the aims of public policies, in understandings of culture and in cultural citizenship which influences female leadership discursive practices. The State offers financial, legal and political resources, while society offers time, energy and mobilization.³⁵ Through providing these resources, each party intersects with the others, creating influences that may lead to shifts in their discursive practices. One of the big shifts that marked the change from the New Order to the Reformasi is the implementation of a more democratic political system.³⁶ Greater freedom and more protection are now becoming parts of Indonesian political discursive practice. The media, including newspapers and bulletins pay serious attention to this democratization process. Discourses often appear in the opinion columns and practices are reported every day, and they are even more intensively covered when there is a general election or when a case of corruption has come to light.

³⁵ Caroline Andrew (et al., eds.), 2005. *Accounting for Culture: Thinking Through Cultural Citizenship*. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, pp. 2-4.

³⁶ Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 2007. "Introduction," in *Rene-gotiating Boundaries*, p. 1.

Related to the cases of this study, the media participated in reporting and evaluating the implementation of State policies, programs and activities. At the same time, the media also reported the public's responses to and participation in the implementation of these policies and programs. It informed about the State's systematic educational program development and the increase of its national education budget by 20 %, primary health care by providing health insurance for all, and a 30% quota policy for women's parliamentary candidacy. At the same time, it also evaluated the way these policies were implemented.

The media still rarely cover the thoughts and experiences of *nyais*. Tatik Hidayati's study (2012) discussed the intensity of the *nyais'* use of TV and radio in increasing their cultural, economic and political capitals.³⁷ A number of female preachers appeared on TV and radio programs. This study confirms Hidayati's findings, muslim woman increases cultural citizenship and capital using electronic media as in the case of Aisyah. She, a Persis activist from Pesantren Cibereumkah, was active as a female preacher for five years in the 2000s and she was on the air twice a week at 05.00 in the morning.

The discourse on the female leadership of Posyandu cadres as covered by newspapers show that cultural citizenship expression may be seen as having at least two important imports: exposure and representation. In terms of the first, newspapers cover the exposure of cadres in relation to the State's efforts to revive the Posyandu after they had declined during the last periode of the New Order, in relation to population control and family planning efforts, the welfare of the cadres, and other important issues like infectious diseases, women's economic empowerment and political issues, as discussed in chapter three. The issues of PHC, population control, and infectious diseases alone are undeniably important for public health and being part of this process is certainly a vital expression of cultural citizenship. Meanwhile, in terms of the second meaning, newspapers provide three representations of female cultural citizenship expressions: as a strategy of female civic engagement, a way of passing over restrictions and barriers in civic engagement, and an important way of expressing women's experiences as citizens. The media witnessed the transformation of women from being only housewives (*IRT/Ibu Rumah Tangga*), to primary health care agents, brokers, RT leaders, waste managers, etc. All of these roles reflect the active cultural engagement of their citizenship practice.

The media covered at least two shifts in female leadership discursive practices: shifts in policy and in regulations. In the first shift, the media embraced at least two important policies: gender main-streaming and the protection of women and children. Since the decline of the New Order, the State has adopted a gender mainstreaming policy through Presidential Instruction No. 9, 2000. This policy was handed down to the regency and city levels. In addition to the existence of the Ministry of Women's Empowerment, women's affairs are coordinated and administrated in a special division at each level of the government's

³⁷ UIN Yogyakarta. 2012. <http://www.uin-suka.ac.id/berita/dberita/528> March 12, 2012.

administrative structure. In Tasikmalaya Regency, the office is a sub-division of the Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa/BPMD (Agency of Village Community Empowerment) and in Tasikmalaya City it is located in the Kantor Keluarga Berencana dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan/KKBPP (Office for Family Planning and Women's Empowerment). When I visited these divisions, they were headed by women: Elin Herlina in Tasikmalaya City and Nia Kurniati in Tasikmalaya Regency. A year after the regulation was issued Tasikmalaya Regency had five female Sub-district heads and Tasikmalaya City in the period of 2004-2006 appointed two women as Sub-district heads. The newspapers documented the pros and cons of the assignment of women as sub-district heads.³⁸ The emergence of resistance against women acting as public leaders and the Baperjakat's adoption of the gender neutral policy has created barriers that hinder women's potentiality.

The State also issued a policy to protect women and children from abuse, under regulation No. 23, 2004. At each level down to the regency and city, police officers have a desk to administer and follow up on legal reports of woman and child abuse. The newspapers followed the process of the implementation of this regulation. The women's movement took part in this process. At the time the regulation was passed, Megawati Soekarnoputri, the first woman President of Indonesia, proudly claimed that it was partly the result of her leadership.³⁹ The newspapers participated in spreading the State's effort to open the Pandora box of silence on woman and child abuse. *Kompas* for example, reported that wives, ex-wives, and young girls suffered most from abuse.⁴⁰ As a result, there was a significant increase in the number of abuse cases that were reported to the police and the issue was advocated by NGOs.⁴¹ In Tasikmalaya, there is one NGO, Puspita Puan Amal Hayati that deals with woman and child abuse cases. The newspapers also reported on the cultural roots that cause this pathological problem. Newspapers also keep an eye on the law enforcement aspect and how the State deals with victims of violence particularly in the health realm.⁴²

³⁸ For example, *Priangan* Agustus 23, 2001; and *Priangan* August 25, 2001.

³⁹ *Kompas*. June 17, 2009. "Mega: UU KDRT Saya Klaim!". <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/06/17/15075292/Mega.UU.KDRT.Saya.Klaim>. March 13, 2012.

⁴⁰ *Kompas*. June 1, 2010, "LBH APIK: Pengaduan KDRT Terbanyak," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/01/06/10574872/LBH.APIK.Pengaduan.KDRT.Terbanyak>; December 20, 2009, "Miris! Pelajar Menjadi Korban KDRT Terbanyak," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/12/20/15154234/Miris.Pelajar.Menjadi.Korban.KDRT.Terbanyak>;

December 1, 2009, "Banyak Kasus KDRT Tidak Dilanjutkan," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/12/01/18260333/Banyak.Kasus.KDRT.Tidak.Dilanjutkan>. March 13, 2012.

⁴¹ *Kompas*. July 24, 2009. "Makin Banyak Korban KDRT yang Melapor," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/07/24/16484711/Makin.Banyak.Korban.KDRT.yang.Melapor>, March 13, 2012.

⁴² *Kompas*. December 1, 2009, "Banyak Kasus KDRT Tidak Dilanjutkan," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/12/01/18260333/Banyak.Kasus.KDRT.Tidak.Dilanjut>

An important shift also took place in regulations. There are at least two important regulations that influence women's political practices: the regulation of one man-one vote such as included in Law 32/2004 on the Local Government, regulation No. 72/2005 on Village and Local Government Regulations, Tasikmalaya, regulation No. 12/2006 on the same subject and the regulation of the 30% quota policy for female candidacy, as reflected in the following regulations: Law No 31/2002 on Political Party, Law No. 12/2003 on the 2004 general election, Law No. 2/2008 on Political Parties, and Law No. 10/2008 on the 2009 General Election.⁴³ Part of the 30% quota policy discourse was abrogated by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK) in its decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008, December 23, 2008. It revised the policy. The abrogation resulted in the removal of the candidates' consecutive numbers (*nomor urut calon*) to provide just competition between all the candidates and this means that this decision lessens the full benefit of the affirmation policy. Women are mainstreamed at the candidacy level. They depend on themselves, on their political machines i.e. their political parties and success teams, to win the election.

On the one hand, though the one man-one vote scheme has been in practice since 1955, its revitalization in the Reformasi era has provided a new atmosphere for women to engage in political processes in the village context. In Tasikmalaya Regency, since the start of the Reformasi, there have been 39 women candidates for village heads out of the 351 existing villages, and 15 of them were elected. Since the start of this era, women's political engagement has been encouraged through positive discriminative policies and open general elections. As a result, many women have been elected beginning with the elected president Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2001. Others include the heads of province such as Ratu Atut Chosiah of Banten Province who was the first female governor in 2006 and re-elected for a second term in 2011; heads of regencies and cities such as Christiany Eugenia Tetty Paruntu, of South Minahasa, North Sulawesi (2010); Airin Rachmi Diany, mayor of South Tangerang (2010, and 2015), Banten; Rina Iriani Sri Ratnaningsih, head of Karanganyar Regency, Central Java (2003 and 2008); Rita Widayarsi, head of Kutai Kertanegara Regency, North Kalimantan (2010); Siti Nurmakesi (2008-2009) and Widya Kandi Susanti (2010), heads of Kendal Regency, Central Java, and many others.

On the other hand, the implementation of the 30% quota policy for women candidacy has increased the number of female candidates and MPs as mentioned in chapter six. The candidacy and selected members of Parliament DPR RI, in the 2004 and 2009 general election show an increase of 3% from 8.8% in 2004 to 11.3% in 2009 and of 6% from 21% in 2004 to 27.27% in 2009.⁴⁴

kan; January 6, 2010, "Korban KDRT Dapat Pelayanan Kesehatan Gratis," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/01/06/12130381/Korban.KDRT.Dapat.Pelayanan.Kesehatan.Gratis>. March 13, 2012.

⁴³ Ani Soetjipto. 2011. *Politik Harapan: Perjalanan Politik Perempuan Indonesia Pasca Reformasi*. Tangerang: Marjin Kiri, P. 45.

⁴⁴ Ani Soetjipto (et al.) 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*, p. 37.

At the lower level, seeing from the periods of 2004-2009 and 2009-2014, there was an increase in the number of elected female members of 11.6% from 10% (188/1778) to 21.6% (385/1778 total female members in 33 provinces). In Java the number of female legislative members in these periods increased in all provinces with a considerable increase in the western part of the island: Banten from 5% (4/75) to 18% (14/75), West Java 9% (9/100) to 25% (25/100) and DKI Jakarta from 14% (11/94) to 28% (27/94). North Maluku was an anomaly, where the increase in the number of female legislative members was phenomenal, from 0% in 2004-2009 to 12% in 2009-2014.⁴⁵

Seeing from the nuance of cultural citizenship, what do these shifts of one man-one vote and of the 30% quota policy with the MK abrogation for female leadership discourse mean for women? One thing is certain. In a situation of open competition and elections, women are likely to have less chance of occupying a post in large organizations like villages, regencies, cities, or the State, than in a situation that uses assignment to fill a post. In the latter, women often face glass ceiling and glass cliff barriers which make it very hard for them to succeed. The difficulty does not always stem from their own lack of capacity, experience, and networking, but from determining external factors such as what happened in 2001-2004 in Tasikmalaya Regency where five women were assigned as sub-district heads and in 2004-2006 in Tasikmalaya City where two women were assigned. It is understandable that the five women assigned as sub-district heads did not remain in office for long. On the contrary, though still trivial, the chance for women to be elected in an open competition such as in the election of head of village or MP is greater in relation to the present local practice. The 30% quota policy contributes to women's efforts to enter the male world, at least at the candidacy level.

Conclusion

The female leadership discourse is struggling to pave the way to provide women with a greater feeling of inclusion as equal citizens. Their struggles may be illustrated by two key terms: negotiation and representation. Taking the term negotiation to mean finding ways to solutions, female leadership discourse consists of female circumstances, learning processes, barriers, efforts to overcome problems, and performance. In all of these areas, the construction of *kodrat perempuan* becomes part of the processes that operate dynamically depending on internal and external factors. The dynamism of the female leadership discourse sends out the message that their practices resemble those of men--- fluid, and fractured. Initially, their negotiation may meet with confusion, but there is a natural step that everybody has to make when put in a new situation. Of course, weaknesses such as incapability, lack of experience and weak networking mark some female leadership practices as they do with that of some men. However, these situations are temporary, because many women who were elected, assigned or active, as far as I

⁴⁵ Ani Soetjipto (et al.), 2010. *Menyapu Dapur Kotor*, pp.37-8.

can see from my study, finally managed to overcome obstacles. Others certainly did not perform as expected. Over time, women themselves learned to overcome their obstacles by pursuing education and by participating in workshops, seminars, trainings and competitions as in the case of the Posyandu cadres, or simply through learning by doing.

In addition to internal factors that hamper female leadership, external ones also exist such as the religious and cultural values embedded in the patriarchal tradition, at least as seen in Tasikmalaya. They are operative within the construction of *kodrat perempuan* perpetuated by women themselves, socio-religious figures, State agents and society in general. Accordingly, barriers are still a considerable part of the female leadership discursive practice. Religious fundamentalism as expressed by anti-democracy, Islamizing or sharing group and traditional Sundanese values sends its own message of idealizing women's roles in social engagement. In the domain of Islamizing and democratization processes, the emergence of these movements colors the contestation of the public spheres among social agents. In a way they may hamper female leadership discursive practice, however the opposite currents which are more supportive have gained solid footing.

The glass ceiling metaphor may work if it is addressed to women in State organizations such as *kelurahan* (urban village) and *kecamatan* (sub-district). In these organizations, to get a top position is not through election in a one man-one vote system, but rather by appointment by a committee, in this case by Baperjakat. The Baperjakat team in Tasikmalaya which were pre-dominantly occupied by men, when I carried out my fieldwork, applied neutral gender policy and did not appoint any woman staff to be head of urban village or head of sub-district post 2006 up to the period of this study, 2010, in midst of the availability of potential female staffs.

In a sense, the female leadership discourse is characterized by various experiences in which women metaphorically play roles as selfless heroines or they resort to feminine, masculine, or an iron maiden style of leadership. Furthermore, their practice is actually dynamic, enabling and enacting leadership by using the standard operational system to form creative and innovative ways of discovering ideal and achievable programs and activities. In short, when they were given the opportunity and the space to take on authority or a position or were situated in open competition such as in village head elections, women often accepted the challenge either reluctantly or affirmatively. Once they did so, they tried their best to enable and enact leadership. In all of these processes, the presence of the construction of *kodrat perempuan* emerged, whether it is influential as in most cases because of determinant religious and local cultural values, or not as a serious factor in which case other discursive resources such as the national basic constitution, human rights and gender sensitivity were utilized.

The female leadership discourse is not only about how women occupy leadership positions or how they perform as top leaders in organizations, but also about leadership within organizations which may play a role as part of the whole system such as the Posyandu cadres, *nyais* in *pesantren*, or female MPs. In these

arenas, the female leadership discourse presents ways of trespassing barriers and forming strategies to actualize citizenship which in turn transforms them into active and emphatic citizens, as well as making efforts towards being recognized as equal citizens. All of these expressions may be considered as attempts to create greater feelings of inclusion as full citizens.

Taking the term “representation” to understand performance, seen from the expression of cultural citizenship and framed in a broader social narrative, female leadership discourse constitutes the dynamism of women’s collective identities. The existing female leadership practices as reflected in the four cases as covered by broader social narratives such as in newspapers and bulletins offer a compelling image. As the shift in paradigm to a more democratic practice resulted in new policies and regulations which offered more protection and mainstreaming for women, women in the last decade performed in an environment that offered them more opportunity and space. Accordingly, they had greater feelings of inclusion and were able to resolve feelings of exclusion in citizenship as long as they managed to deal with the discriminative nature of the context and the gender nature policy of the organizations in which they were involved, as well as lessen feelings of incapacity and inferiority. Their stories as covered in the media constitute their expressions of cultural citizenship. In this sense, their experience does not lessen their sense of belonging as citizens in a traditional way, but actualizes it through cultural rights expressions such as the right to information, knowledge, experience, and participation.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

This study deals with women's activities at the local level. This sort of case study has rarely been done. The significance of this study is marked by the fact that politics and power became closer to the people with the change of the political order that started with Soeharto's downfall in May 1998 and which was followed by the enactment of the decentralization policy in 2003. The decentralization policy offered opportunities and challenges as well as freedoms and restrictions because its regulations supported and impeded on women's movement. Democratization, human rights and gender issues which were formerly the concern of central government in Jakarta through the Ministry of Women Affairs were administratively structured down to the regional and local levels starting in 2000. However, these administrative innovations did not only offer prospects for increased women's movement but were simultaneously challenged by other, opposite currents. The local resurgence of Islamic revivalism and ethno-nationalism in which particular local values and religious understandings were misapplied colored this new phenomenon (Blackburn, 2004, p. 228; Robinson, 2009, p. 192). Indeed, the constructed *kodrat perempuan* actually came to face new contestations especially because of the upsurge of Islamic revivalism that tends towards putting women back into the home. Women were given more opportunities such as more access to political roles, yet at the same time they also had to deal with new challenges like those imposed on them by women unfriendly Islamic groups. As this situation has already been a reality for almost two decades, studies on women's leadership deserve to receive a much wider academic response.

This study concludes that the perception of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* is an important factor that determines many women's civic engagement in the site where the study took place, Tasikmalaya Regency and City. The significance of this study is that it concentrates on the perceptions of various agents -- including the State, religious and social agents, educators, politicians, health activists, etc., -- who all participate in the formulation of what they see as women's ideal roles and by so doing construct the *kodrat perempuan*. This study confirms Robinson's and Blackburn's conclusion that *kodrat perempuan* has often been framed as a source of the restriction of women's civic engagement (Robinson, 2009, p. 192; Blackburn, 2004, p. 223, 229). However, this study finds that women in Tasikmalaya deal with *kodrat* pragmatically and realistically use it as source of engagement. Rather than seeing *kodrat* only as a restriction, in Tasik-

malaya, women actually managed to create certain degree of space, opportunity and links to engage in social activities. In other words, outside the existing restrictions, women empower themselves and they find solutions suited to them to enable them to get actively engaged in local leadership.

The women I interviewed operated in four different areas---they were Nyais in education, Posyandu cadres in health care, and female public leaders and MPs in the political sector--- and by so doing, they illustrated the diversity of female leadership practices in Tasikmalaya. The political shift that started in 1998 from the New Order to the Reformasi Era marked the new contextualization of democracy in Indonesia where the democratization process, gender mainstreaming and human rights offered new space, opportunities, links and, most importantly, legal protection. Concurrently though, the shift also provided room for religious fundamentalism which found its expression in intensified Islamization and ethno-regionalism to flourish. Propelled by the implementation of the decentralization policy that followed the start of the Reformasi era, the *kodrat* entered a new historical phase in which women contest it more openly.

In this study, I used the experiences of women in Tasikmalaya Regency and Tasikmalaya City as examples for my discussion of the dynamics of female leadership discourses within the confines of *kodrat*. These extended dynamics of women's leadership were caused by the fact that the new situation offered more space and opportunities. When women indeed used these new opportunities and they entered the world of female leadership they were able to extent their networks.

The shift offers more cultural forms of expression in practical citizenship for women as leaders. This shift may be seen from a variety of phenomena. Women are now more protected, and their protection has been incorporated into the State's discourse. Moreover, the democratization process, supported by the implementation of the 30% quota for female candidates in political elections add to women's increased citizenship engagement. Gender mainstreaming policies have been ratified after the start of the Reformasi era and have found their way in the administrative structures down to the regional and city levels. Finally, efforts for more protection against woman and child abuse have also been put in place.

The construction of *kodrat* in contemporary Indonesia finds itself in a new contestation between the process of increased democratization and that of democracy-weary Islamization (religious radicalism) and ethno-regionalism. The way women in Tasikmalaya engaged in social activities was creative and dynamic enabling them to enhance their access to information and improve their skills to break existing barriers. They found ways to deal with these barriers either by involving themselves in the areas deemed appropriate and inappropriate for them. Their leadership trajectories started at a very young age when they already shouldered responsibilities and thereby developed effective citizen spirits. All female leaders I interviewed admitted to have nurtured their leadership aspirations since childhood. They used their family ties to contribute to their leadership achievement. Many women choose to use the *kodrat* for their own ends by adopting a feminine style of leadership characterized by care, patience, and a strong tenden-

cy towards transparency. However, others tended towards an opposite style, i.e. by adopting an iron maiden leadership but they still adopted a feminine attitude as well. In addition to gaining leadership experience by doing, some women, for instance the members of parliament studied in this book, also learned how to improve their leadership role by educating themselves at higher educational levels, especially in the field of political science. Women in other positions also tried to enhance their knowledge and skills each in their own ways and at their own levels, for instance by following health care training and such.

In this study I found that in their leadership practices, there were no differences in the way women could extend their experiences whether they were involved in areas appropriate or those deemed inappropriate for them. This happens because despite the barriers and obstacles resulting from the perception of the constructed *kodrat*, the perception actually still provided space and opportunity. They took advantage of this space and these opportunities to manipulate and tackle these barriers as well as their own shortcomings. In the course of time, as they were enhancing the knowledge and the skills they needed, they also learned how their leadership role should be performed and they acted upon it. As they engaged as leaders within constraints, they mostly adapted the way they enacted their leadership to accord with existing practices, in particular in the religious educational sector. Some of the women I interviewed were leaders in Islamic educational institutions, *pesantren*. They played different leadership roles ranging from merely symbolic such as mothers of the *pesantren* students to being teachers, managers of the institution's finances and student accommodation and meal services, preachers, social activists and politicians. A few of them also participated in knowledge construction, particularly in the dissemination of information on gender issues in *pesantren* circles. They took advantage of the understanding of *kodrat* imposed upon them as a means to gain the support they needed to engage in social leadership. They agreed to seek the full consent and support of their husbands when they engaged in roles that fell within the boundaries of the perception of *kodrat*. Equipped with their spouse's consent and support, they engaged socially and they found they had many possibilities from which they could choose. Although they ran a high risk of being trapped in the manner described by the glass ceiling metaphor due to the central role of the *kyai* in Islamic educational institutions, *nyais* managed to enact their leadership contributively, taking on the different roles the institutions needed. Similar with *nyais*, Posyandu cadres easily obtained their spouses' consent and support due to the fact that primary health care is fundamental to the family's health. The cadres I interviewed described their various experiences. Their leadership trajectories were commonly characterized by the female style of leadership as selfless heroines (givers) following the qualities outlined by women's *kodrat*, such as helpfulness, femininity and motherly instincts (Stead and Elliot. 2009. p. 120). In this way, they developed a phosteroic leadership model (leadership as a shared and social practice in which everybody has a voice) (Stead and Elliot, 2009, p. 17), in the Posyandu.

Within the area deemed inappropriate according to *kodrat*, such as politics, female leaders also gained leadership experience leading to a more dynam-

ically situated leadership trajectory. Although women had to tackle their own internal perception of *kodrat* which accepts the political sphere as a male trade and thus inappropriate for women, the Indonesian Constitution and its policy on women and children offered a different but supportive discursive resource which supported their political engagement. Regardless of the ways they received benefits from this discursive resource as a part of the *kodrat* construction, women found ways to manage both the private and public spheres. They did this by conducting a *musyawarah* (dialogue) or by establishing a domestic division of labor with their spouses. The same as within the area deemed appropriate for women, in this area too women considered their spouse's consent as the initial gate for them to become politically engaged. Their husband's consent functioned as a key to open the door of opportunities in which they not only received permission but also support for their political participation. Having received consent, further discussions on their social activities also became possible. At this stage, they usually used other discursive resources, including religious and cultural ones, i.e. external factors such as the Indonesian Constitution, the political system and policies on gender issues.

Placing women's leadership experience into a leadership discourse, this study covers two main points: negotiation and representation. The first point, negotiation, women's leadership discourse characterizes women's continuous efforts to overcome barriers, settle problems, and diminish shortcomings. There is a common picture at the beginning of each of their leadership roles where their negotiation may initially be confusing. This is because there is little historical precedence of female leaders and also because they have to struggle against their weaknesses or assumed shortcomings such as inabilities, less experience and weak networking.

However, these situations are temporary because many of them who were elected, assigned or active finally managed to overcome their barriers, in part or in total, either internally by pursuing higher education or learning through experience, or externally by supportive policies and circumstances. Women's leadership discourse in the first category tended towards the strengthening of socio-religious understandings which reemphasized the idealized roles of women as housewives. This was reinforced by the emergence of religious groups that desire to return to the formative period of Islam known as *al-Salaf al-Salih* (Muslim generations from the era of Muhammad up to the followers of the followers) and by revitalizing the State's philosophy of maintaining 'harmony'. Accordingly, women are situated within this rather moral movement in such a way that their space and opportunities for social engagement are threatened. As women's statuses and roles in Indonesia also have improved along with the State's gender equality discourse, women today are better equipped to deal with new situations including the emergence of religious and local radicalism. As a result, women's negotiation in pursuing their leadership practice makes them pursue further study to enable them to do so and also for some to indeed enact their leadership roles.

Women's leadership discourse in the second category met with more supportive circumstances. It was backed by more State regulations and protective measures and by the women's movement resulting in advocacy of women rights, gender discourse and equality, all constructions perpetuated by civil society. All of these practices contribute to the construction of a new kind of *kodrat perempuan* that provides more space and opportunity for women's civic engagement. Women enjoy considerable support to actualize their activities be it in the areas deemed appropriate or inappropriate with their *kodrat*. Different resources of women's leadership discursive practice intersect one another and bring about new directions such as the emergence of Perda Syari'a, or Perda Tata Nilai in the case of Tasikmalaya City, the establishment of the women's empowerment division in the structure of the regional government, the 30% quota policy for woman candidacy, and NGOs which are concerned with gender issues such as ASPER, LKaHAM, Yayasan Sumbangsih Nusa Indonesia (YSNI), and Puspita Puan Amal Hayati Tasikmalaya.

In the second point, representation, women's leadership discourse is one of the expressions of cultural citizenship. The past and contemporary experiences of female leaders provide the elements of this expression. Although women's leadership is still rare, existing women's leadership practices as covered in wider social narratives such as newspapers and bulletins offer stories telling of various expressions of citizenship, at least as reflected in the four different spheres of education, healthcare, public leadership and parliamentary politics. In relation to the construction of *kodrat*, through the existing understanding of the term, women actually take on a variety of collective identities such as those of teachers, preachers, educational managers, health volunteers, social activists, political leaders and MPs. They manipulate the restrictions emanating from the construction of *kodrat* by transforming them into space and opportunities. Furthermore, they take advantage of that space and these opportunities, build on them and in so doing develop their linkages. These transformations from simple housewives to a variety of social agents should be considered as constituting the dynamism of the roles woman leaders adopt. In addition to the actualization of formal citizenship, the roles that these women play are indeed expressions of their citizenship and commonly termed in cultural expressions as explained in chapter One and Seven. The shift to more democratic political practices resulted in new policies and regulations in support of women's civic engagement. Because of this, women nurtured intense feelings of inclusion. They were able to resolve their feelings of exclusion in citizenship as far as they managed to deal with the discriminative nature of the context and the gender neutral policy of the existing organizations they were involved in, and they lessened their feelings of incapacity, inferiority, and of having less experience and less networking.

Their stories as covered in the media constitute their expressions of cultural citizenship. In this sense, their experiences do not lessen their sense of belonging as citizens in the traditional way, but they actualize it through expressions of cultural rights such as the right to information, knowledge, experience, and participation. The media cover these cultural citizenship expressions to inform us about

women's progress towards becoming equal citizens and about the transformative processes they undergo into different identities and roles within the constraints of their perception of *kodrat*.

In addition, as part of women's leadership discourse, the media also include the interchangeable roles they play between formal citizenship, such as occupying a position of State public leader or MP, and cultural citizenship, such as participating in social events and the transformation of knowledge and skills, community development, etc. Their experiences signify women's ability to enact leadership. In certain situations, women have been able to run for more than one term as in the case of four female village heads in Tasikmalaya Regency and one female head of Karanganyar Regency, Central Java or in other instances in South Tangerang, Banten, etc. in the rest of Java. This means that the philosophical viewpoint and empirical precedence as reflected in this study sends a strong message that women also deserve to have more space and opportunity to play more public roles.

It is also worth to mention here that this study speaks about the function of women's economic independence. Living in a marriage tradition which considers the husband the breadwinner of the family, many Muslim women simply remain *Ibu Rumah Tangga*/IRT (housewife), depending on their spouse for meeting their economic needs. Some women try to gain additional income by engaging in social activities directly related to generating income such as by working as a State employee such as a teacher or female MP or indirectly by doing voluntary social activities that sometimes give some financial incentive. Others engage in economic activities and work as small vendors and snack sellers. This means that by being able to create regular or irregular economic independence, women actually level off their status and increase their feelings of inclusion in the membership of an organization or as meaningful, active, and contributing citizens.

The subject of women and the construction of their *kodrat* in relation to civic engagement is unquestionably important. Studies in this area are still rarely carried out and the present study is only an initial effort. The nature of this study is interdisciplinary in the theme it addresses and in the approach it takes. In practice, the direct and indirect intersection of the relation between the perception of *kodrat perempuan* and women's social activities provides invaluable data which need to be examined further. Social and human sciences including religious studies, gender studies and anthropology are vital to shed light on the *kodrat* that promotes women's leadership discourse. Women increasingly use citizenship expressions including cultural ones as strategies to increase greater feelings of inclusion as full citizens. These new practices add to the significant use of the interdisciplinary approach to further study the subject. Women's leadership experience is an interesting and unexplored area of study. As the present study is only one of few that have been undertaken in this field, further studies in this area of concern are urgently needed. One thing is certain. There is an urgent need for serious efforts towards ensuring that the female voice is heard. Extending the areas of citizenship actualization to the sphere of culture provides space and op-

portunity for women to participate in creating a more equitable world where everybody can exercise responsible, respectful, and pleasurable forms of dialogue. Although commonly women's leadership operates within learning processes, the fact that there have been precedences of women enacting leadership tells us what projections can be made for the future. Putting the perception of the *kodrat* into these considerations, women's future leadership practice may be at its best if it pays attention to both enabling and enacting leadership, with more focus on the former aspect. In spite of the scarcity of female leaders, the existing precedence is a good example for women and other leaders to take advantage of in comprehending important lessons and formulating plans for the future. Thus they can learn faster and better, which in turn helps them in enacting their leadership. In this case, the media, including newspapers and bulletins, can give voices to silent, marginal and discriminated groups such as women. The coverage of women's success stories and experiences when enacting leadership signifies the promotion of cultural forms of female citizenship which are now considered as helping women to become equal citizens.

Another important area is religious studies, especially Islamic Studies which includes Qur'anic and Hadith studies as well as studies on Muslim communities. In a normative sense, there is an urgent need to reconceptualize or re-interpret religious precepts about *kodrat* to provide religious laws and theological umbrellas to meet the contemporary context. This urgent need is also supported by the fact that the shift in political paradigm and new policies which encourage and protect women (and children) provide new supportive discursive resources. There are at least two kinds of further research that need to be done: textual and empirical studies. Further research on the relation between the constructed *kodrat perempuan* and social engagement as seen from the Islamic perspective also needs to be carried out. Moreover, Muslim woman leaders' experiences in Islamic and non-Islamic organizations, in addition to Muslim woman leaders' experience in governmental bodies, are important to be studied.

Globalization which is marked by the development of information technology is another contemporary development in which women are situated in new contestations. Shifts in the political paradigm, economic movements, religious resurgence, and different massive cultural exposures through media (printed, electronic and virtual media) inform women with various yet often contradictory information. In Indonesia, the impact of globalization is coupled with the lingering existence of the State's interpretation of *kodrat* as "a biologically determined destiny" (Robinson, 2009. p. 192) commonly known as a "State Ibuism" ideology (Suryakusuma, 1996. pp. 101-1) which was exercised during the New Order period (1966-1998). Within the forces of globalization is the force of Islam. Though the force of Islam on one hand has a moderate voice, its fundamentalist voice is also gaining momentum. This tells us that there are two kinds of influences: global-local-ties (global undertakings influence local practices) and local-global-ties (local undertakings influence global practices). The construction of the term will certainly also be influenced by both ties with their contradictory information.

Having said so, it is clear that the interpretation of the *kodrat* is at the heart of this contestation. Seen from the regional perspective, the global-local-ties influence characterizes women's civic engagement. Women will certainly face those efforts being made to revitalize the existing habit of the context strengthened by the spirit of religious fundamentalism and ethnic resurgence. This means that there is an urgent need to take advantage of the supported elements of the recent developments and at the same time deal with its challenges. In doing so, the lesson learned from this study is that understanding the operative perception of the *kodrat* may help the decision makers, whether the State or social agents, to formulate policies and programs which encourage the progress of women. There is a risk of manipulating the conceptualization of the term for the sake of the regime's interest as happened during the New Order period. The regime at that time interpreted the term *kodrat* to introduce a gender regime known as State-Ibuisism which placed women in the position of supportive agents. In fact, understanding the operative perception of the *kodrat* could be geared towards more egalitarian and equal gender relations. It seems that the State has corrected its mistake since the start of the Reformasi era and has reformulated the role of women as *mitra sejajar* (equal partners). The problem is how the State and civil society institutions use and interpret this fundamental change and turn it into their new ideology, vision, mission, program and activity. Referring to the context of this study, in its strategic plans, the State still fails to take advantage of the new interpretation of the ideal role of women. Accordingly, on one hand the central government and its lower level institutions need to be aware of this unsupported practice and to follow up their correction of the ideal role for women into practices which will result in women's empowerment. On the other hand, civil society also needs to find out the operative perception of *kodrat* and to make its revision catch up with recent developments. In addition, they also can help the government (local and central) to formulate its policies and programs based on people's understanding of *kodrat*. At the same time, they do the same for their own interests and programs. Finally, they try to contribute their share in reformulating the term in accordance with the needs of the time.

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Field Work

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SAMENVATTING

Deze studie handelt over de activiteiten van vrouwen op lokaal niveau. Dit soort case study is vrijwel nog nooit gedaan. Het belang van deze studie is gelegen in het feit dat met de verandering in de politieke orde na Soeharto's val in mei 1998 en de implementatie van de decentralisatiepolitiek in 2003, politiek en macht dichterbij het volk kwamen te liggen. De decentralisatiepolitiek betekende mogelijkheden en uitdagingen maar ook vrijheden en beperkingen omdat de regelgeving in deze politieke situatie zowel de vrouwenbeweging ondersteunde als tegenwerkte. Vanaf 2000 werden democratisering, mensenrechten en gender zaken die voorheen ressorteerden onder de centrale regering via het Ministerie van Vrouwenzaken nu administratief gestructureerd tot op het laagste regionale en lokale niveau. Desondanks boden deze administratieve vernieuwingen niet alleen mogelijkheden voor een grotere bewegingsruimte voor vrouwen. Ze werden tegelijkertijd tegengewerkt door andere, tegengestelde stromingen. Dit nieuwe fenomeen werd gekleurd door de lokale terugkeer van islamitisch opleving en etno-nationalisme waarin bepaalde lokale waarden en religieuze begrippen verkeerdt werden toegepast (Blackburn 2004: 228; Robinson 2009: 192). De geconceptualiseerde kodrat perempuan kwam in feite te staan voor nieuwe geschilpunten, voornamelijk omdat de terugkeer van islamitische opleving de neiging heeft om vrouwen terug te plaatsen in hun huizen. Vrouwen hadden meer mogelijkheden om politieke rollen te spelen maar tegelijkertijd moesten ze zich ook teweer stellen tegen nieuwe uitdagingen die hen werden opgelegd door vijandige moslimse groeperingen. Aangezien deze situatie nu al twee decennia een realiteit is verdienen studies over vrouwelijk leiderschap een groter academische gehoor.

Het beeld van kodrat perempuan (geconceptualiseerde vrouwelijke eigenschappen) die is ingebed in sociale praktijken wordt verondersteld de maatschappelijke betrokkenheid van vrouwen te beperken. Deze studie bestrijdt dit beeld en stelt daarentegen dat kodrat inderdaad de rol van de vrouwen beperkt, maar niet in zijn geheel. Met andere woorden, de perceptie van kodrat ondersteunt gedeeltelijke de beperking van de participatie van vrouwen, maar de reikwijdte van deze beperking is vloeiend en onderhevig aan geleidelijke en context-bepaalde veranderingen afhankelijk van de situatie waarin vrouwen zich bevinden en van hun eigen capaciteiten. Des te bevorderlijker de context waarin zij leven en des te meer capaciteiten ze bezitten, des te meer mogelijkheden vrouwen hebben om voor social engagement. Dit boek bespreekt derhalve de strategieën (ervaringen) van vrouwen in hun pogingen om deze beperkingen te omzeilen.

De belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag in deze studie is de volgende: wat is de dynamiek achter het sociale engagement van moslimse vrouwen in een lokale context? Deze kernvraag is opgeplijst tot twee andere centrale vragen: wat is de dynamiek van de deelname in leiderschap van moslimse vrouwen in gebieden die voor vrouwen geschikt worden geacht om in werkzaam te zijn, zoals gezondheidszorg en onderwijs, en wat is de dynamiek achter de sociale vaardigheden van moslimse vrouwen in gebieden waarvoor zij ongeschikt worden geacht zoals publiek leiderschap en zitting te nemen in het parlement. Alle andere vragen die in de verschillende delen van dit boek worden behandeld zijn geïnterpoleerd in deze twee onderzoeksvragen en gecategoriseerd als ondersteunende onderzoeksvragen. Ze zullen beantwoord worden in termen van de ervaringen van vrouwelijk leiderschap die zijn gevat in uitdrukkingen van cultureel staatsburgerschap.

De focus van deze studie is moslimse vrouwelijk sociale betrokkenheid gezien vanuit hun perceptie van geconceptualiseerde kodrat. De discussie is beperkt tot vier kwesties die zijn gegroepeerd in twee gebieden: gebieden die als geschikt worden gezien en gebieden die ongeschikt worden geacht met betrekking tot de kodrat van vrouwen. De eerste twee gevallen betreffen gebieden die 'geschikt zijn voor vrouwen'. Deze rollen zijn meestal ondersteunend en, tegelijkertijd, beperkt tot gezondheidszorg en onderwijs en ze worden in stand gehouden door machtige instanties zoals de Staat. Gedurende de gehele geschiedenis van Indonesië en meer in het bijzonder tijdens de Nieuw Orde werden gezondheidszorg en onderwijs gezien als ideale gebieden voor vrouwen en ze werden aangespoord om daar in bezig te zijn. Deze trend zette zich voort na Soeharto's val en het is derhalve interessant om de dynamiek van vrouwelijk maatschappelijk engagement te bediscussiëren, meer in het bijzonder de beperkingen die opgelegd worden aan vrouwen door de geconceptualiseerde kodrat perempuan, zowel in hun privé als in hun openbare leven. De focus van de discussie over kodrat in de gezondheidszorg sektor is de activiteiten van vrouwen als active leden van Posyandu. Posyandu/Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Geïntegreerde Gezondheidszorg Post) is het Indonesische Staatsprogramma voor geïntegreerde gezondheidszorg voor moeders en kinderen onder de vijf jaar. De Posyandu werden ingesteld om de vruchtbaarheids- en kindersterftecijfers te verlagen. Het is een gezondheidszorgprogramma gebaseerd op dorpsgemeenschaps participatie. In de era van de Reformasi heeft de regering het instituut van Posyandu gerevitaliseerd (Circulaire No. 411.3/536/SJ) omdat de regering het ziet als een betrouwbare frontstrategie voor de ontwikkeling van een basis gezondheidszorgprogramma en de verbetering van de voedingsstatus van de bevolking maar ook voor de toename van de participatie van de bevolking zelf in het basis gezondheidszorgprogramma. Het tweede geval binnen de eerste groep is vrouwelijke betrokkenheid in moslim onderwijs in zogenaamde majlis taklim (religieuze studie groepen), madrasah (scholen voor de transmissie van islamitische kennis) en pesantren (islamitische kostscholen). Een nyai, ofwel de vrouw van het hoofd van een pesantren, is een belangrijke figuur in het islamitische onderwijsproces en ze ontleent haar rol en haar status voornamelijk aan de ondersteuning die ze geeft aan de carrière van haar man. In deze context worden ook twee andere termen genoemd, ibu en ummi die beiden ongeveer

zoveel betekenen als ‘moeder’. In deze studie worden de termen (nyai, ibu, en ummi) gebruikt om de sociale betrokkenheid van vrouwen in de onderwijssector te illustreren. In Indonesië zijn de met de modernisering van onderwijs en socio-ekonomische ontwikkeling de rollen van vrouwen verbeterd. Beginnend aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw zijn door de Nederlanders onderwijsvernieuwingen geïntroduceerd. Islamitisch onderwijs begon aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw. De regering van het nieuwe, onafhankelijke Indonesië effende de weg voor haar eigen soort van onderwijsontwikkeling. De Nieuwe Orde regering intensiverde het onderwijsprogramma zowel in de seculiere als in de islamitische onderwijssectoren and het heeft beide systemen als gelijkwaardig behandeld (Wet no 20/2003 over het Nationale Onderwijssysteem).

De twee andere gevallen gaan over vrouwelijke politiek, een gebied vaak beschuldigd als zijnde ‘stereotypisch’ of ‘vuil werk’ en dus ongeschikt voor vrouwen. De misvatting over de mogelijkheid van vrouwelijk politiek engagement wordt ondersteund niet alleen door het feit dat politieke wetenschappen pas recentelijk zijn begonnen om aandacht te besteden aan de politieke rol van vrouwen, maar ook door het feit dat vrouwelijke representatie in de politiek nog steeds beperkt is ondanks het potentieel dat het heeft.

Velen geloven in feite dat de stem en de activiteiten van vrouwen er wel degelijk toe doen en bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van de mensheid in het algemeen. Ze wijzen op het feit dat vrouwen positieve rollen spelen en dat, waar zij betrokken zijn in de politiek, zij vaak een verschil uitmaken: vrouwen spelen een rol zowel in het nemen als in het beïnvloeden van politieke beslissingen; de aanwezigheid van vrouwen in politieke processen kan worden geïnterpreteerd als een mogelijke contributie; als ze deel uitmaken van politiek activisme, vertrouwen vrouwen meer in de regering, zeker op het lokale niveau; en vrouwen worden verondersteld zich beter te voelen als zij vrouwelijke vertegenwoordigers hebben in politieke instituties. Twee gevallen worden bediscussieerd. De eerste handelt over een vrouwelijke dorps- en onderdistrictshoofden terwijl de tweede gaat over gevallen waar vrouwen zitting hebben genomen in lokale parlementen.

Deze studie focust aan de ene kant op de dynamiek van lokaal vrouwelijk leiderschap in het geval van vrouwen die gekozen zijn als dorps- en onderdistrictshoofden in de contemporaine periode. Aan de andere kant onderzoekt het de dynamiek van de korte perioden van het bestuur van zeven onderdistrictshoofden in Tasikmalaya van 2001 tot 2006. Het is de moeite waard om de opkomst van vrouwelijke leiders te bespreken, zeker omdat in het huidige Tasikmalaya – en gedurende bijna de gehele geschiedenis van de regio - vrouwelijke dorps- en onderdistrictshoofden vrijwel afwezig waren. Welke factoren hebben vrouwen in staat gesteld om gekozen te worden en een leidersrol op zich te nemen? Welke trajecten hebben ze gevolgd in hun leiderschap kwaliteiten? Hoe hebben vrouwen in de regio in het algemeen hun leiderschapstrajecten gecreëerd? Op welke wijze hebben hun pogingen en hun leiderschapsrollen een verschil uitgemaakt in de verbetering van de omstandigheden van

vrouwen zelf en voor de mensen in het algemeen? Hoe hebben de mensen hun eigen status en prestaties beoordeeld? In hoeverre heeft de manier waarop kodrat is geconceptualiseerd en begrepen hun engagement in leiderschap functies ondersteund of juist gehinderd? Wat voor invloed heeft hun leiderschap gehad op het discours over vrouwelijk leiderschap in the Sundanese context in het bijzonder en in de Indonesische context in het algemeen?

Het geval van vrouwelijke politieke prestaties handelt over the ervaringen van vrouwen als parlementsleden. Het is ingebed in de context van de implementatie van het decentralisatiebeleid in de uitvoering van het liberale democratische vertegenwoordigingssysteem en van het beleid van een 30% quota for vrouwelijke parlementaire vertegenwoordiging. Op welke wijze hebben lokale vrouwelijke politicie bestaande stereotypen over vrouwelijke vertegenwoordiging in de politiek weten te omzeilen? Hoe zijn ze in de politieke wereld terecht gekomen? Welke problemen zijn ze daarin tegengekomen en als ze die hebben opgelost, op welke wijze? Hoe zien zij de 30% quota voor vrouwelijke kandidaatstelling? Hoe heeft dit beleid hen geholpen of hoe hebben ze hiervan gebruik gemaakt voor hun politieke doeleinden? Wat waren hun prestaties in het parlement?

Aangezien dit een descriptieve studie is, gebruikt dit proefschrift Anthony Giddens' perspectief van vertegenwoordiging in de analyse van mijn bevindingen. Hij stelt vertegenwoordiging gelijk met actie en hij definiëert het als "stroom van werkelijke of veronderstelde causale interventies van concrete wezens in het lopende process van gebeurtenissen-in-de-wereld." In zijn ogen is vertegenwoordiging direct gerelateerd aan praxis (prestatie, toepassing van vaardigheden of vaststaande praktijk zoals vaststaande gewoonten of gebruikelijke praktijken) dat gezien wordt als een "lopende serie van praktische activiteiten." Hij selecteert belangrijke aspecten van subjectiviteit en objectiviteit en wat daar tussen in ligt, en hij plaats de relatie tussen deze aspecten in de dualiteit van vertegenwoordiging en structuur die gelegen zijn in sociale praktijken. Sociale praktijken worden gezien als een totaal van levende praktijken die voortdurend plaatsvinden in tijd en plaats over een langdurige periode. Geschiktheid is het resultaat van het continue process van de reproductie, aanpassing en productie van de agents. Giddens' invalshoek focust op de rol van de agents in de identificatie van de situaties waarin sociale praktijken mogelijk zijn. Aangezien een verandering in sociale praktijken afhangt van interne en externe factoren, hangen ze dus ook af van van interne en externe invloeden die moeten worden gehandhaafd, aangepast of gerecreëerd. Dus, de agency van vrouwen in deze studie is gekarakteriseerd door deze mogelijkmakende en tegenhoudende factoren die de reproductie, modificatie en productie van sociale praktijken beïnvloeden. Een sociale praktijk bestaat uit systemen, normen, waarden, structuren, instituties etc. Ik bediscussieer voornamelijk de kodrat perempuan als een norm.

Interne en externe factoren zijn geïdentificeerd als zijnde van invloed op de sociale betrokkenheid van vrouwen. Intern gezien bestudeert deze studie de strategieën van vrouwen in de wijze waarop de omgaan met de barrières waarvoor ze staan en de tekortkomingen die ze hebben. Extern gezien bediscussieerd het de

invloeden die de condities creëren voor vrouwelijke participatie via een analyse van het beleid van de Staat en de berichtgeving van de media voor vrouwenzaken meer in het bijzonder in de vier doel themas. De studie is gebaseerd op acht maanden veldwerk in het Regentschap en de Stad Tasikmalaya van augustus 2008 tot mid-april 2009 en van april tot november 2010.

De studie is verdeeld in vier onderdelen: introductie, de maatschappelijke betrokkenheid van vrouwen, vrouwelijk politiek engagement en de conclusie. Het eerste deel bestaat uit hoofdstuk Een tot en met Drie. Hoofdstuk Een bespreekt de opzet, de focus en de organisatie van de studie. Het is opgezet binnen de contestatie van de democratisering en islamisering processen. Hoofdstuk Twee bestaat uit een conceptuele uiteenzettingen en bespreekt de context van deze democratisering en islamisering processen. Hoofdstuk Drie bespreekt de context van deze studie. Het behandelt de twee voornaamste themas. Het eerste is een beschrijving van de context van deze studie, de demografie, geschiedenis en het strategies plan. Het tweede behandelt democratie, decentralisatie en lokale verordeningen. Dit hoofdstuk geeft de algemene informatie over de achtergrond van deze studie.

In Delen Twee en Drie bespreek ik de drie voornaamste praktijken: die van de agents, de Staat, en Nieuws Media. De praktijk van de agent behandelt leiderschapstrajecten en ervaring. De praktijk van de Staat informeert over het beleid van de Staat en de programma's die relevant zijn voor deze studie. Ten laatste geeft de praktijk van de Nieuws Media een beeld van de publiciteit en de vertegenwoordiging en vertegenwoordigheid van vrouwelijk leiderschap in relevante zaken.

Het Tweede Deel bestaat uit hoofdstukken Vier en Vijf en bespreekt vrouwelijk maatschappelijk engagement in die gebieden die voor vrouwen geschikt worden geacht. Hoofdstuk Vier bespreekt vrouwen in hun rol van Posyandu kaders. Het behandelt hun leiderschapstrajecten en de praktijk in Posyandu, hun netwerken, discourcen, Staatsbeleid ten aanzien van Posyandu en Posyandu gerelateerde programma's. Het behandelt ook de berichtgeving over Posyandus, hun activiteiten en het beleid en de programma's van de Staat ten aanzien van primaire gezondheidszorg kwesties. Hoofdstuk Vijf bespreekt de nyai en de rol van vrouwelijke moslim onderwijzers in het onderwijs voor wat betreft hun profiel, trajecten en ervaringen, het onderwijsbeleid en onderwijsprogramma's van de Staat, islamitische onderwijsinstellingen en hun relatie tot vrouwelijke betrokkenheid in het onderwijs en de berichtgeving herover.

Het Derde Deel bespreekt vrouwelijke politieke betrokkenheid in die gebieden die voor vrouwen geschikt worden geacht. Het bestaat uit Hoofdstuk Zes en Zeven. Hoofdstuk Zes bespreekt vrouwen als dorps- en onderdistrictleiders. De focus is op de leiderschapstrajecten, verkiezings- en herverkiezingsprocessen, leiderschap ervaring, beleid en programma's van de Staat ten aanzien van leiderschap in het algemeen en vrouwelijk publiek leiderschap in het bijzonder en de berichtgeving over vrouwelijk politiek engagement. Hoofdstuk Zeven handelt over vrouwen als district parlementsleden. Het onderzoekt hun motivatie, leidersc-

hapstrajecten, en prestaties in het parlement. Het behandelt ook vrouwen als toegevoegde of als gelijkwaardige partners, Staatsbeleid – met name aangaande de quota – en de berichtgeving over parlementaire zaken ten aanzien van vrouwen.

Het Vierde Deel bestaat uit Hoofdstuk Acht en Negen. De bevindingen uit de vier case hoofdstukken en Hoofdstuk Twee over de context van de studie worden op een abstract niveau gebracht terwijl mijn analyses en bevindingen worden beschreven in Hoofdstuk Acht. De intersectie vormt het discours over vrouwelijk leiderschap die wordt bediscussieerd in twee aspecten: representatie en negotiatie. Er zijn twee soorten representatie: vertegenwoordiging of de blootstelling van het leiderschap van de agents zelf, en de vertegenwoordigheid van vrouwelijk leiderschap. Aangezien hier leiderschap voornamelijk handelt over de culturele gebieden van betrokkenheid beperkt de analyse zich tot één expressie: vrouwelijk leiderschap als de expressie van cultureel staatsburgerschap. In het representatie aspect richt de discussie zich op wat vrouwelijk sociaal engagement betekent voor de vrouwelijke agents zelf. In de vertegenwoordigheid richt de discussie zich op welke leiderschapbetrokkenheid van vrouwelijke agents en ander activisme van vrouwelijke agents worden gerapporteerd in het nieuws in relatie tot cultureel staatsburgerschap. De studie eindigt met een conclusie waarin antwoorden worden gegeven en recommendaties en suggesties voor verder onderzoek worden gedaan. Het laatste is Hoofdstuk Negen, de conclusie.

De studie concludeert dat de perceptie van de geconceptualiseerde kodrat perempuan een belangrijke factor is die het maatschappelijk engagement van veel vrouwen bepaalt in het gebied waar deze studie werd uitgevoerd, het Regentschap en de Stad Tasikmalaya. Het belang van deze studie is dat het zich concentreert op de percepties van verscheidene agents – de Staat, religieuze en sociale agents, onderwijsdeskundigen, politicie, gezondheidszorgactivisten, etc. – die allen bijdragen tot de formulering van wat zij zien als de ideale rollen voor vrouwen en op basis daarvan de kodrat perempuan conceptualiseren. Deze studie bevestigt de conclusies van Robinson en Blackburn dat kodrat perempuan vaak is gezien als een bron van de beperking van vrouwelijke sociale betrokkenheid (Robinson 20: 192; Blackburn 2004: 223, 229). Desalniettemin vond deze studie dat vrouwen in Tasikmalaya pragmatisch en realistisch omgaan met kodrat perempuan en dat ze het gebruiken als een bron van betrokkenheid. In plaats dat ze kodrat alleen zien als een beperking zijn vrouwen in Tasikmalaya in staat om een zekere vorm van ruimte, mogelijkheden, en verbanden te creëren waardoor ze betrokken zijn in sociale activiteiten. Met andere woorden, naast de bestaande beperkingen maken vrouwen zich sterk en vinden ze de voor hen geschikte oplossingen om actief een rol te spelen in lokaal leiderschap. Ten slotte vond de studie ook dat in een wijder discours waar de interrelatie tussen de praktijken van de agents, de Staat, en het nieuws plaatsvinden, vrouwelijk maatschappelijk engagement, gezien vanuit de expressie van cultureel staatsburgerschap, een representatie is van hun pogingen om de weg te banen tot het bereiken van de status van volledig gelijkwaardige burgers.

SUMMARY

This study deals with women's activities at the local level. This sort of case study has rarely been done. The significance of this study is marked by the fact that politics and power became closer to the people with the change of the political order that started with Soeharto's downfall in May 1998 and which was followed by the enactment of the decentralization policy in 2003. The decentralization policy offered opportunities and challenges as well as freedoms and restrictions because its regulations supported and impeded on women's movement. Democratization, human rights and gender issues which were formerly the concern of central government in Jakarta through the Ministry of Women Affairs were administratively structured down to the regional and local levels starting in 2000. However, these administrative innovations did not only offer prospects for increased women's movement but were simultaneously challenged by other, opposite currents. The local resurgence of Islamic revivalism and ethno-nationalism in which particular local values and religious understandings were misapplied colored this new phenomenon (Blackburn, 2004. p. 228; Robinson, 2009. p. 192). Indeed, the constructed *kodrat perempuan* actually came to face new contestations especially because of the upsurge of Islamic revivalism that tends towards putting women back into the home. Women were given more opportunities such as more access to political roles, yet at the same time they also had to deal with new challenges like those imposed on them by women unfriendly Islamic groups. As this situation has already been a reality for almost two decades, studies on women's leadership deserve to receive a much wider academic response.

The perception of *kodrat perempuan* (constructed female characteristics) embedded in social practices, is believed to have over the years hampered women's civic engagement. The study contests this view, arguing that *kodrat* does hinder women's participation but not totally. In other words, the perception of *kodrat* supports limitedly women's participation. The scope of this limitation is fluid and can be changed over times and contexts depending on women's situation and capacities themselves. The more conducive the context they live in and the more capacities they have, the more probable women are able to engage socially. So, basically it discusses women's strategies (experiences) in their effort to bypass the limitations.

The main research question of this study is the following: what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social activities in a local context? This core question is divided into two other central questions: What are the dynamics of Muslim women's leadership engagement in the areas deemed appropriate for women to work in, i.e. healthcare and education, and what are the dynamics of Muslim women's social abilities in the fields supposedly inappropriate for them to get involved in such as public leadership and occupying seats in parliament. All other questions that will be discussed in the different parts of this study are interpolated into these two main research questions and categorized as supporting research questions. They will be answered in terms of women's leadership experiences which are framed in cultural citizenship expressions

The focus of this study is Muslim women social engagement examined from their perception of constructed *kodrat*. The discussion is confined in four cases which are grouped into two areas: areas deemed appropriate, and areas deemed not appropriate with woman *kodrat*. The first two cases deal with areas deemed "appropriate for women." These roles are usually supportive and, at the same time, limited to healthcare and education and perpetuated by powerful agencies such as the State. Throughout Indonesia's history and especially during the New Order era, healthcare and education were considered ideal domains for women, and they were urged to become involved in them. This trend continued after Soeharto's downfall and it is therefore interesting to discuss the dynamics of women's social engagement, particularly women's leadership in these areas in spite of the confinements being imposed on women through the construction of *kodrat perempuan* in both their private and public lives. The focal point for the discussion of *kodrat* in the healthcare sector is the activities of women as Posyandu cadres. Posyandu/Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Integrated Village Health Service Post) is the Indonesian State's integrated health care program for mothers and children under five. The establishment of Posyandu aimed at reducing the fertility rate and the child and infant mortality rate. It is a health program based on village community participation.¹ In the *Reformasi* era the government revitalized the Posyandu institution ("A Letter of Announcement" [Surat Edaran] No 411.3/536/SJ) considering it as a reliable front strategy for developing the basic health program and the community's nutrient status, as well as for the increase of community participation in the basic health care program. The second case of the first group is women's involvement in Islamic education, i.e. in *majlis taklim* (religious study group), *madrasah* (a school for the transformation of Islamic knowledge) or *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). A *nyai*, or the wife of a *pesantren* head, is an important agent in the Islamic education process and she derives her role and status mostly from the support she offers to her husband's career. In this context, two other terms are also used, *ibu* and *ummi* which both share the similar mean-

¹ Kölmann. 1992, *The Management and Utilization of Posyandu*, paper prepared the Workshop Health Care in Java, Past and Present, Leiden 7-8 May 1992. Leiden: KITL p. 2.

ing of ‘mother.’² In this study, the three terms (*nyai*, *ibu*, and *ummi*) are used to illustrate women’s social engagement in the educational sector. In Indonesia, within the course of time, their roles have improved alongside the modernization of education and socio-economic development. Introduced by the Dutch, the modernization of education began at the end of the nineteenth century. Islamic education started at the beginning of the twentieth century.³ The government of the newly independent country paved the way for its own kind of educational development. The New Order government intensified its educational program in both the secular and Islamic educational sectors and it has treated both systems equally (Law no 20/2003, on the National Education System).

The two other cases deal with women politics, an area accused of being ‘stereotypical’ or ‘dirty business’ and therefore deemed inappropriate for women. The misperception about the possibility of women’s political participation is supported not only by the fact that political science has only recently begun to pay attention to women’s political roles, but also by the fact that women’s representation in politics is still limited despite its potential to increase.⁴

In fact, many believe that women’s voices and activities matter and contribute to human developments in general. They point to the fact that women play positive roles and where they get involved in politics, they tend to make a difference:⁵ women play a role in both deciding and influencing policies; women’s presence in political processes can be interpreted as a possible contribution; when they are part of political activism, women tend to be more trustful of the government, especially at the local level; and women are expected to feel better when they have female representatives in political institutions.⁶ Two cases will be discussed. The first deals with female village and sub-district heads and the second deals with cases where women have become local parliament members.

This study focusses on the one hand, on the dynamics of local women’s leadership in the case of women who have been elected as village heads (including *kelurahan*/urban villages) and sub-districts in the contemporary period. On the

² As all three terms are intended to denote the same meaning, for short, when the writer only mentions *nyai*, he covers the nuances of the three terms.

³ Susan Blackburn, 2004. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33-51.

⁴ For example, Maila Stivens, 1991. *Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics*. Monash: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies. Monash University; and Syla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds) 1987, *Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

⁵ Karp and Banducci quote the following works Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006), Atkeson (2003), Burns et al., 2001, Hansen (1997) to make this positive point. Jeffrey A. Karp, and Susan A. Banducci, “When politics is not just a man’s game: Women’s representation and political engagement,” *Electoral Studies* 27 (2008), p. 106. [http://www.as-
trid-online.it/Le-pari-op/Studi--ric/KARP-BANDUCCI-ElectoralStudies-n.27_03_2008.
pdf](http://www.as-
trid-online.it/Le-pari-op/Studi--ric/KARP-BANDUCCI-ElectoralStudies-n.27_03_2008.
pdf) accessed December 20, 2009.

⁶ Karp and Banducci, “When politics is not just a man’s game.” p. 106.

other hand, it examines the dynamics of the brief periods of the administration of seven female sub-district heads in Tasikmalaya from 2001 to 2006. It is worthwhile to discuss the emergence of women leaders especially in modern-day Tasikmalaya as most of history of the region shows an absence of women as village or sub-district leaders. What factors enabled women to be elected and to lead? What trajectories did they follow in their leadership capacities? How did women in the area usually create their leadership trajectories? In what way did their efforts and leadership roles make a difference to the improvement of the conditions for women themselves and for the people in general? How did the people assess their status and performance? To what extent did the way *kodrat* is constructed and perceived support or interfere with their leadership engagement? What has been the import of their leadership on the discourse on woman leadership in the Sundanese context in particular and in the Indonesian context in general?

The case of women's political performance deals with women's experiences in parliament. It is plotted in the context of the implementation of the decentralization policy within the enactment of the liberal democratic representation system and of the policy of the 30% quota for female parliamentary representation. How did local woman politicians circumvent the existing stereotypes against female representation in politics? How did they enter into the world of politics? What problems did they encounter and if they solved them, how? How did they view the 30% quota for female candidacy? How did this policy help them or how did they take advantage of it for their political purposes? How was their performance in parliament?

As a descriptive study, this thesis deploys Anthony Giddens's perspective of agency in analyzing its findings. He equates agency with action and defines it as "the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world."⁷ In his view, agency is directly related to praxis (performance, application of skills or established practice such as established customs or habitual practices) which is seen as "an ongoing series of practical activities".⁸ He selects important aspects of subjectivity and objectivity and what lies in between,⁹ and he places the relation between these aspects within the duality of agency and structure which is situated in social practice.¹⁰ Social practice is seen as a number of living practices which are continuously taking place in time and space over an extended period. Facility is the result of the continuous process of the reproduction, modification, and production of its agents. Giddens's perspective focuses on agents' role in identifying situations in which so-

⁷ Anthony Giddens, 1993. *New Rules of Sociological Methods*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 81.

⁸ Giddens, 1993. *New Rules of Sociological Methods*, p. 81.

⁹ Anthony Giddens, 2010. *Teori Strukturasi: Dasar-dasar Pembentukan Struktur Sosial Masyarakat*. Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, pp. 1–3.

¹⁰ B. Herry-Priyono, 2003 (second edition). *Anthony Giddens: Suatu Pengantar*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, p. 22.

cial practices become possible.¹¹ As changing a social practice depends on internal and external factors, social practices thus also depend on internal and external influences to be maintained, modified, or recreated. So, female agency in this study is characterized by these enabling and constraining factors which influence the reproduction, modification and production of a social practice.¹² A social practice consists of systems, norms, values, structures, institutions, etc. I mainly discuss *kodrat perempuan* as a norm.

Internal and external factor are identified as influential over woman social engagement. Internally, the study examines woman's strategies in handling barriers they face, and shortcomings they have. Externally, it also discusses influences that create conditions for women's participation through the analysis of state policies and media's coverage of women's issues, particularly in the four targeted themes. The study is based on the field work in Tasikmalaya Regency and City which was conducted during eight months from the middle of august 2008 to middle of April 2009 and about the same period from April to November 2010. The organization of the study is divided into four parts: introduction, women's civic engagement, women's political Engagement, and conclusion. The first part consists of chapter one to chapter three. Chapter one discusses the framing, focus and organization of the study. It is framed within the contestation of democratization and Islamization processes. Chapter two constitutes the conceptual explanations, and discusses the context of democratization and Islamization processes. Chapter Three discusses the Context of the Study. It deals with two main themes. The First is a description of the context of the study, demography, history, and strategic plan. The Second deals with democracy, decentralization and local regulations. This chapter offers general information about the background of the study.

In part two and three, I discuss three main practices: those of the agents, the state and the news. The agent's practice deals with leadership trajectory and experience. The state's practice informs about the state's policy and programs relevant to the study. Lastly, the news' practice reports exposure and representation, and the representedness of female leadership in related cases.

The Second Part consists of two chapters, chapter four and chapter five, and discusses women's civic engagement in the fields deemed appropriate for women. Chapter four discusses women as Posyandu cadres. It deals with their leadership trajectories and practices at Posyandu and networks, discourses, State policies and Posyandu related programs. It also deals with news' reports on Posyandu and their activities as well as with State policies and programs on primary healthcare issues. Chapter five discusses *nyai* and female Muslim teachers' roles in education in terms of their profile, trajectory, and experiences, State educational policies and programs, Islamic educational institutions and their relation to female educational involvement, and the news reports on them.

¹¹ Giddens, 2010. *Teori Strukturasi*, p. 4.

¹² Giddens, 2010. *Teori Strukturasi*, pp. 248-9.

The Third Part talks about women's political engagement in the fields deemed inappropriate for women. It comprises Chapters six and seven. Chapter six discusses women as village and sub-district heads. It focuses on leadership trajectory, election and re-election processes, leadership experience, State policies and programs and news on leadership in general and on women's public leadership in particular, and news regarding women's political engagement. Chapter seven explains women as district parliament members. It examines their motivation, leadership trajectories, and performances in parliament. It also discusses women as a supplementary or equal partners, State's policies, especially on the quota, and news on parliamentary issues pertaining to women.

The Fourth Part consists of chapter eight and nine. All the findings in the four case chapters and the findings in chapter two on the context of the study are brought to an abstraction where I describe and analyze my findings in chapter eight. The intersections inform the female leadership discourse which is discussed in two main nuances: representation and negotiation. There are two kinds of representation: representation or the exposure of the agents' leadership itself and the representedness of female leadership. As leadership here deals mainly with the cultural areas of engagement, the analysis entails one expression: female leadership as the expression of cultural citizenship. In the representation aspect, the discussion focuses on what female social engagements mean for the female agents themselves. In representedness, the discussion focuses on what leadership engagements of the female agents and of other female agents' activism reported in the news means in relation to the expression of cultural citizenship. Finally, the study ends with a conclusion where answers, recommendations and suggestions for further studies are made. This last chapter constitutes chapter nine, conclusion.

This study concludes that the perception of the constructed *kodrat perempuan* is an important factor that determines many women's civic engagement in the site where the study took place, Tasikmalaya Regency and City. The significance of this study is that it concentrates on the perceptions of various agents -- including the State, religious and social agents, educators, politicians, health activists, etc., -- who all participate in the formulation of what they see as women's ideal roles and by so doing construct the *kodrat perempuan*. This study confirms Robinson's and Blackburn's conclusion that *kodrat perempuan* has often been framed as a source of the restriction of women's civic engagement (Robinson, 2009. p. 192; Blackburn, 2004. p. 223, 229). However, this study finds that women in Tasikmalaya deal with *kodrat* pragmatically and realistically use it as source of engagement. Rather than seeing *kodrat* only as a restriction, in Tasikmalaya, women actually managed to create certain degree of space, opportunity and links to engage in social activities. In other words, outside the existing restrictions, women empower themselves and they find solutions suited to them to enable them to get actively engaged in local leadership. Finally, the study also finds that in its wider discourse where the interrelation of the practices of the agents, the State, and the news take place, woman's civic engagement, seeing from the expression of cultural citizenship, represents their effort to pave the way to become fully equal citizens.

GLOSSARY

Ajengan

The title of ‘ulama used in West Java, equivalent with the term kiai in Central, and East Java.

Ajengan bendo

A name of a group of contemporary religious figures given by Tasikmalaya’s society for the code of dressing they wear. They wear a white *gamis* or a long dress. *Bendo* literally means hat, here refers to white hat covered with long veil, and the person who wears it, dressed in a white skirt similar to the dress worn by Pangerang Diponogoro.

AIK

Adat Istiadat Karuhunan (Local Custom Based on the Teachings of Their Ancestors) at Kampung Naga

AKI

Amanah Keagamaan Illahi (Divine Trusted Religion)

BKIA

The abbreviation of Balai Kesejahteraan Ibu dan Anak. However, the term *kesejahteraan* means more appropriately as welfare. The program of BKIA dealt more to maternal and child health care.

BKKBN

Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (Indonesian Population and Family Information Network). This organization was established initially by medical doctors’ association in 1950s, and was transformed into a state body which dealt with population health and planning in the New Order era.

DDII

Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia [Indonesian Islamic missionary Council]

FPI

Front Pembela Islam (Defender Front of Islam).

HT

Hibru al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation)

HMI

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association of Muslim University Students)

HMI MPO

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (Council of Organization Saviours of the Association of Islamic University Students)

IAIN

Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies)

JI

Jama'ah Islamiyah (Community of Islam).

LDII

Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia [Institute of Indonesian Islamic Propagation]

LKBN

Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional (the Family Planning Institute)

MMI

Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia [Indonesian Mujahedeen Council]. It was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta. It does not participate in political practice to maintain *Muslim ummah* solidarity. However, the organization allows its members, individually to participate in any political parties.

Madrasa

Classical Islamic school in general including pesantren education institution, In particular it is similar to secular school in Indonesia with the difference on the certain proportion of Islamic subjects of its curriculum.

Majlis Taklim

A Religious Study Group. It is the informal institution where Muslims usually from those of older generation study Islamic teaching and recite the Qur'an.

MUI

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars)

Muhammadiyah

The reformist Muslim organization, established in 1912.

NU

Nahdlatul Ulama. Literally means the awakening of 'ulama, used to denote the traditionalist Muslim organizations, established in 1926.

PERSITRI

An autonomy body for women in PERSIS organization, established on December 25, 1936.

PPS

Perguruan Pencak Silat (Center for Self Defense Study)

Sunna

The traditionalist religious practices based on the emulation of the life and the conduct of the Prophet Muhammad.

Toliban

An Islamic local movement, pioneered by KH. Zenzen, head of al-Irsyadiyah Pesantren, situated at Jalan Paseh Tasikmalaya City different from from Taliban, a radical movement headed by Usamah bin Laden.

UIN

Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University)

CV

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Kusmana

