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Event Pattern Identification in Anonymized System Logs

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There are detectable patterns in the system logs.

Such patterns help system administrators detect irregular activities.



System logs may contain sensitive and confidential data (e.g., user credentials). Protecting privacy is a major goal.



Data mining methods are well known for system log analysis [2].

Most data mining methods employ statistical approaches.



Anonymization can efficiently reduce the size (in Bytes) of system logs. Data in anonymized logs is still useful for further analysis [3] (e.g., failure early-detection).

Motivation and Challenges

2.

The

Method

More than 77% of system logs are related to 23 different events.				
10% of system logs are responsible for more than 90% of syslog network traffic.				
25% of system logs are related to a single event and can safely be ignored.				
The most alarming events are among the less than 1% of all system logs.				
Events related to several errors, including "file system" failures, are located among the 74% of all system logs.				

Event ¹ frequency	Event patterns	Total events	Percentage
1 - 5	358	630	0.04%
6 - 100	233	12,885	0.85%
101 - 200	52	7,493	0.49%
201 - 300	442	91,000	5.98%
301 - 400	12	3,902	0.26%
401 - 500	86	35,694	2.34%
501 - 1000	40	29,414	1.93%
1001 - 4000	55	83,848	5.51%
4002 - 10000	13	73,207	4.81%
10001 - 100000	22	803,452	52.77%
100001 - 150000	1	381,172	25.03%
ALL	1312	1,522,697	



System log form	Data size in Bytes
Raw system log	99,079,741
De-identified	98,006,233
De-identified + Hashed (anonymized)	50,250,651
Double hashing	4,386,137
Smart hashing	150,000 – 400,000

Based on system logs, collected during 10 days on 99 nodes of Taurus² HPC system

 \succ (root) CMD (/usr/lib64/sa/sa1 1 1) Accepted publickey for siavash from 192.43.85.67 port 742 ssh2 pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user Siavash Normal exit (1 job run) pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user Siavash (admin) CMD (/usr/libgz/ra1 3 5)

Raw system log entries (list of events)

(#USER#) CMD (#CMND#)

Accepted publickey for #USER# from #IPV4# port #PORT# ssh2

pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user #USER#

Normal exit (1 job run)

pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user #USER#

 \succ (#USER#) CMD (#CMND#)

Anonymized (cleansed) system log entries





RACIITS

Filtered data requires ~95% less storage space.

Data filtering, significantly speedsup the identification process.

Removing the **25%** of most frequent events, resulted in ~50%



Events timeline based on raw system logs



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