Tabulae Imperii Europaei:
Mapping European Empire

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Thesis Supervisors:

Prof. Hartmut Behr
Dr. Alex Jeffrey
Dr. Nick Megoran

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Abstract

This thesis examines the unclear political nature of the European Union and current academic theories on how to understand and classify the EU. Placing the EU in the macrohistorical context from which it emerged, the project first critiques competing definitions of "empire" before examining the etymological and philosophical genealogy of *imperium*. It then uses textual analysis to trace how evolving interpretations of *imperium* and "empire" have influenced European historiography and political philosophy. This analysis demonstrates that "empire" is not a descriptive taxonomy but a normative discourse, expressing an imagination of power, legitimacy and sole sovereignty, used to validate the inherent inequality and manifest destiny of an imagined European community. This discourse must be publicly expressed in order to have validity, and it is most effectively conveyed in visual language. The study demonstrates that of the many forms of visual language, by far the most powerful is cartography. But while maps *represent* the world rather than *reflect* it, mapreaders ascribe to maps an authority that is rarely questioned, accepting maps' portrayals as truthful.

Having established and justified a methodology based in semiotics and semantics, the project moves into an analytical focus by semiotically deconstructing the most publicly-accessible EU maps in print and virtual form and on Euro currency. These analyses demonstrate that EU maps intersect with EU iconography and inadvertently construct an imagined community defined by the discourse of empire. Such maps show the Union not *as it is* but *as it should be* – the sole sovereign of European civilisation, with supreme power, exclusive legitimacy, a manifest destiny to unite the Europeans, and inhabited by an imagined community whose imagined history partly masks an inherent, yet acknowledged, inequality. This dissertation concludes that the EU is not a *sui generis* construct but instead embodies a familiar historical discourse – the European Union as Empire.

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ii.   Acknowledgements

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Russell Foster
Newcastle, September 2013

This thesis is for my Uncle Les.

He would have been proud to read it.

'EUROPE manageth all Arts and Sciences with such dexterity, that for the invention of manie things shee may truely be called a Mother, and for the conservation of many rare things, to beare the title of a Nurturing Mother of humane wisdome: shee hath in her most excellent Academies, for all manner of learning, whereas other Countries are all of them, overspread with Barbarisme.'[1]

<div align="right">
Gerardus Mercator
Atlas, 1595
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[1] Gerardus Mercator, *Atlas [Amsterdam, 1606 English edition (orig. 1595)]* (Amsterdam: Novus Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), p. xxiv.

Introduction

The Non-Imperial Empire

'Sometimes I like to compare the European Union, as a creation, to the organisation of empires. Empires! Because we have the dimensions of empires. But there is a great difference. The empires were usually made through force, with a centre that was imposing a diktat, *a will, on the others. And now we have what some authors call the first "non-imperial empire".'*

<div align="right">

José Barroso
President of the European Commission
10th July 2007

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At a press conference in Brussels in July 2007, José Barroso, President of the European Commission, answered a reporter's question on the nature of the European Union with a comparison to empire. Within minutes his words had been transcribed, and video footage of his speech uploaded, onto that limitless repository of instant-access, one-click information – the World Wide Web – proclaiming his perceptions to the planet.[2] Yet aside from a few predictably peeved pundits in Britain's eternally eurosceptic broadsheets the next morning,[3] remarkably little attention seems to have been paid to his words. This is surprising. For not only is "empire" a dirty word in today's political arenas, a term from which politicians go to great effort to distance themselves,[4] but even more significantly Barroso equates the European Union with what appears to be a logical paradox. A 'non-imperial empire'. This frames our initial research question: what *is* empire to begin with, and how could empire exist in the form of the European Union?

Together, these are the principal questions which this thesis seeks to answer. Empire is one of the most contested terms in contemporary International Relations and Political Geography: a word which refers not merely to the archaic hegemons of the 'marble and sepia pasts'[5] but a word whose subtleties and nuances are argued over at great length. It is a word

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[2] José Barroso, 'European Union is "non-imperial empire" (long version)', 10 July 2007, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-I8M1T-GgRU.

[3] 'Barroso hails the European "empire"', *The Telegraph*, 11 July 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1557143/Barroso-hails-the-European-empire.html.

[4] Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe [trans. Ciaran Cronin]* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), pp. 60-62.

[5] Michael Cox, 'The Empire's Back in Town: or America's Imperial Temptation – Again', *Millennium* 32:1 (2003), pp. 1-28.

which is deployed loosely, even lazily, to castigate policies and polities which individual writers simply do not like.[6] It is in this context that discussion of the European Union as empire has emerged. Barroso's comment in 2007 was not the first mention of the EU as empire, neither was it the last.[7] The imagination of EU Empire has been created, and it requires investigation.

1.1   Background of the Project

Studying the European Union as empire is germane for two reasons. The first is that the Union is a political structure which evades neat classification. It is what Jacques Delors calls an 'unidentified political object'[8] which stubbornly refuses to be pigeonholed into one of our neat, Western, post-Westphalian political categories.[9] Even Barroso's comment – a 'non-imperial empire' – sheds light on the inability to catalogue the Union using modern concepts. This warrants critical and sustained investigation, particularly as the Union does not exist in static isolation. It does not stand still but is expanding, racing to gobble up the remnants of its fallen Soviet rival, rushing towards the horizon yet at the same time drawing a line and stating that *this* is where "Europe" ends. Neither does the European Union exist in isolation – it serves as the standard to which other regional organisations, especially its African counterpart, earnestly measure themselves.[10]

The second reason for studying EU empire is more immediate. When this research project began, the Union was a proud and unassailable fortress: the standard of civilisation by which non-Union European states were measured, the progressive political project petitioned by polities desirous of gaining membership in what appeared to be 'EU-topia'.[11] Yet since the project began, the severe weakening of the Union's financial foundation has left the European Union, as of the time of writing, facing not only economic collapse but also the potential

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[6] Russell Foster, 'Tege Imperium! A defence of empire', *Global Discourse* 1:ii (2009), pp. 2-23.

[7] *Russia Today*, 'EU – empire destroying peoples' freedom', 8 April 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/eu-destroys-freedom-marine-lepen-488/.

[8] Cited in Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 7.

[9] For discussions of the EU's unclear nature see, among others, Luiza Bialasiewicz, 'The Uncertain State(s) of Europe?', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 15:1 (2008), pp. 71-82; Gerard Delanty, 'The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization', *International Review of Sociology – Revue Internationale de Sociologie* 15:3 (2005), pp. 405-421.

[10] Samuel Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 3-7.

[11] S.E. Gross and A. Benavot, 'Realizing "EU-TOPIA": Insiders' views on an emerging EU research community', *Innovation – The European Journal of Social Science Research* 20:3 (2007), pp. 287-301.

withdrawal of members.[12] We can but hope that this organisation, which has created (or coincided with) the longest period of peace in Europe's hostile history, weathers the storm. But the Union's prestige is apparently unaffected. Even if it succumbs and the European Union vanishes into the history books, its legacy will resonate through Europe far into the future. For if the study of Europe teaches us anything, it is that the continent has always spawned movements to unify Europeans into a single community.[13] The European Union emerged from the European Community, and before that the European Coal and Steel Community, emerging from the ashes of a world war fought to defeat the previous, ghastly attempt at European unification. That prior attempt was the partial result of an earlier world war wrought in part by the aggrandising aggressions of Victorian vainglory and Bismarckian braggadocio – and these movements, too, were shaped and formed by the past, emerging from the centuries of struggle between Europe's self-anointed sovereigns distantly descended from those peoples, lost in the mists of time, who scavenged over the carcass of Caesar's Rome.

This is putting it simplistically, but the idea of a historical chain linking all efforts at European integration – past, present, and future – is well-commented upon.[14] Like all attempts at unifying Europe – violent and peaceful, long-lived and fleeting – the European Union is part of a historical chain: one more link connecting the disparate peoples of the continent with their imagined pasts and their unrealised futures. The drive to unify Europe has endured for millennia and it continues today, and we can confidently presume that it will continue to be maintained or sought under Europeans who are as far distant in time from the bureaucrats and legislators currently quibbling in the glittering glass conference-halls of

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[12] Anita Kiamba, 'Commentary – Crisis in the System of States: The Financial Crisis in the European Union', *Geopolitics* 18: 1 (2013), pp. 1-5; Veit Bachmann, 'Commentary – Europe's Lack of Visions', *Geopolitics* 18:2 (2013), pp. 1-7.

[13] Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992).

[14] For various discussions of the idea of a historical chain in European politics, see among others: William Outhwaite, *European Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 1-43; Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) *[passim]*; Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 1-50; Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992) *[passim]*; Bronisław Gremek, *The Common Roots of Europe [trans. Jan Aleksandrowicz, J.K. Fedorowicz, Rosemary Hunt, Agnieszka Kołakowska and Shayne Mitchell]* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) *[passim]*; Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, 'European Union: A Polity in Search of a Mission?', *European Journal of Science and Theology* 8:1 (2012), pp. 15-27; Bo Stråth, 'A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept', *European Journal of Social Theory* 5:4 (2002), pp. 387-401; Gary Marks, 'Europe and its Empires: From Rome to the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50:1 (2012), pp. 1-20; Nicholas Henry, 'Politics beyond the state: Europe as civilization and as empire', *Comparative European Politics* 8:2 (2010), pp. 262-280; Magali Gravier, 'The Next European Empire?', *European Societies* 11:5 (2009), pp. 627-647. Even before the European Union existed, this chain was recognised – and indeed was predicted to produce a pan-European community: Richard Hoggart and Douglas Johnson, *An Idea of Europe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1987), pp. 5-27, 105-150.

Brussels, as we are from the praetors and proconsuls who ambled amidst the marble monuments of Rome. And like all efforts to create a single community, the legacy of the Union will endure far longer than the polity itself. It is for these reasons that this study has been written. This thesis is a response to the contemporary curiosity on just what the European Union *is*, and how its nature is conveyed to its populace.

The title of the thesis reflects the nature of "empire" by using the ultimately untranslatable word *imperium*.[15] As we shall see in the next chapter, although this Roman word is the root of the noun "empire" in modern English and its equivalents in all contemporary Romance and Baltic languages, *imperium* cannot be neatly distilled into a dictionary definition. As L.G. Price comments, 'we cannot help speaking Latin and using Roman terms',[16] when our current languages lack an equivalent. Yet what allows us to unfold one particular set of assumptions about *imperium*, and not another? We may look to the original language to elucidate meaning, but we cannot simply use *imperium* as the Romans did. We must first acknowledge our historiographical position.

If history is *what* we know about the societies which formed us, historiography is *how* we know this. And as a result of us looking back through modern eyes, historiography has inherent problems. As historian E.H. Carr writes:

> *'We can view the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he uses – words like democracy, empire, war, revolution – have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them.'*[17]

Carr does concede that there is a way around this: using original terminology. But this solution carries its own pitfalls:

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[15] I am grateful to Prof. Jakob Wisse, Chair of Latin at the School of Classics, Newcastle University, for his help with the grammar. *Tabulae Imperii* corresponds to *Maps of Empire/Power*, while the verb clause suggests change and development over time. It must be noted that *Tabula* can be translated as "map" or "picture" – the Romans apparently did not make a distinction. See O.A.W. Dilke, 'Itineraries and Geographical Maps in the Early and Late Roman Empires', chapter in J.B. Harley and David Woodward, *The History of Cartography Vol. I* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 252-257.

[16] L. G. Price, *The Story of Titles: How The King Became His Majesty* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1969), p. 42.

[17] E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 25.

'Ancient historians have taken to using words like polis *and* plebs *in the original, just in order to show that they have not fallen into this trap. This does not help them. They, too, live in the present, and cannot cheat themselves into the past by using unfamiliar or obsolete words, any more than they would become better Greek or Roman historians if they delivered their lectures in a* chlamys *or* toga*.'*[18]

This leaves us at an apparent impasse. We cannot use *empire*, as it is too wrapped up in modern associations – size, power, oppression, territory. Equally we cannot use *imperium*, as we are reading a Roman word through modern eyes. Perhaps we can avoid this modern gaze by reading primary sources to elucidate the meaning of *imperium*? This seems on the surface to be a suitable method, but it also has its own problems. In the words of Boyd Hill:

'Even when the sources tell us why the king did something, we would be foolish to take the statement at face value. Perhaps the chronicler had an axe to grind. Maybe he was simply currying favour. Or perhaps (worst of all) the king himself did not really understand his own motives any more than we can always understand our own.'[19]

We are still at the impasse. Previous scholars, seeking to understand the past in order to validate efforts at uniting Europe, have seen a vision of history which was 'distorted by rose-tinted spectacles',[20] seeing what they wanted to see rather than what actually existed. We cannot be sure what exactly the Romans meant, and neither could other scholars before us. Equally, we cannot simply read primary sources and declare that we have peered into the minds of the dead, when they themselves were undoubtedly just as confused about their own understandings of words as we are today. However, there is a potential solution to our problem.

While we cannot truly appreciate *what* earlier scholars meant by empire, nor explicitly *why* they used the word, we can see *how* they used it. It is these uses which lead us to the meaning of *imperium*. Not as it was *intended* by the Romans but as it has been *interpreted* since. Through document analysis we can see in what context the word was

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[18] Carr, *What is History?*, p. 25.
[19] Boyd Hill, *Medieval Monarchy in Action: The German Empire from Henry I to Henry IV* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 17.
[20] Heater, *Idea of European Unity*, p. 111.

deployed, which may reflect various meanings ascribed to it. This establishes our historiographical position. We are not arbitrarily connecting the European Union to the Roman Empire according to cherry-picked characteristics, nor are we lazily using modern concepts to examine the past, nor are we claiming to understand the intricate and ultimately unknowable meanings of concepts held by people two millennia in their graves. We are instead tracing the *perception* of empire since the Romans, analysing how the *use*, rather than the *meaning*, of empire has determined our understanding of the word. This research is thus located in the Nietzschean-Foucauldian tradition of political genealogy,[21] arguing that the present can only be understood by reference to the past from which it emerged. The consequence is that empire is not a static and unchanging category but an idea whose meaning shifts in different times and different places. This places the European Union in a situation analogous to the Early Middle Ages when, as Julia Smith argues, 'empire and emperors were often in the eye of the beholder'.[22]

1.2   Structure of the Thesis

Europe is no stranger to empire. Throughout our continent's history has run a trend of rulers and governments seeking to legitimise their ambitions and their very existence by referring back to the Roman state.[23] This phenomenon has spent much of its history as a popular one, and while the imagination of *imperium* has shifted in the last two centuries – uneasily balanced between the exemplar of order and a model for progressive states to emulate,[24] and the epitome of violence, discrimination, and atrocity which deserves, as Michael Cox asserts,

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[21] For seminal texts in this tradition which establish the utility and validity of political and philosophical genealogy, see: Friederich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo [trans. Walter Kaufmann]* (New York: Random House, 1989); Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980) *[passim]*; Colin Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2013); Rudi Visker, 'Michel Foucault, philosopher? A note on genealogy and archaeology', *Parrhesia* 5 (2009), pp. 9-18; Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia [orig. 1929]* (London: Routledge, 1960).
[22] Julia Smith, *Europe after Rome: A New Cultural History, 500-1000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 275.
[23] Andrew Erskine, *Roman Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 4-5; Heater, *Idea of European Unity*, pp. 1-60; Neville Morley, *Antiquity and Modernity* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 117-163; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 1-62.
[24] Jonathan Hart, *Comparing Empires: European Colonialism from Portugese Expansion to the Spanish-American War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 23-48.

to be abandoned to 'the marble and sepia pasts'[25] – the spectre of empire has remained prevalent in the imagination.

This is examined at length in our first substantial section. In Chapter Two a review of literature on the subject is critically interrogated, examining how various political scientists comprehend European empire. The consensus reached is that there *is* no consensus and that "empire" has become a term signifying almost anything the scholar wishes. The chapter subsequently argues that conceiving of empire as a category of state is insufficient. The investigation seeks to understand "empire" by returning to its linguistic roots in Republican Rome, using textual analysis to trace its etymological evolution into a word signifying legitimacy, sovereignty, duty, destiny, and superiority. This concept became the subject of an intense struggle for prestige between the powerful monarchs of Early Medieval Europe. In the subsequent political squabble the term "empire" emerged as a title signifying civilisation, sovereignty, legitimacy, duty, and destiny. The chapter then examines how this discourse is expressed and spread in symbols, and concludes that this is how we should interpret "empire" – not as a *reflection* of what a state *is* but a *representation* of what it *should be*, a discourse of superiority professed by those who deem themselves the guardians of civilisation. This latest manifestation of empire is the European Union.

In Chapter Three the focus turns to our second object of study – maps. As in Chapter Two, a spectrum of literature is drawn upon to establish an understanding, allowing us to reject the simplistic understanding of maps as tools which reflect the world. Like empire, maps do not *reflect* the world but *represent* our perceptions of it, and maps are not understood in scientific, neutral terms but are interpreted according to culturally-bound conventions. With the exception of extreme cases of cartographic manipulation, we mapreaders are not even aware of maps' power. This gives maps an authority which is almost never questioned, enabling even the subtlest political messages within them – even if they are not intended – to be accepted as truths. As such, this chapter argues that EU maps promote an imperial imagination through the novel phenomenon of *cartoimperialism* – the selective use of cartographic elements and styles to produce new territorialities and political imaginations wherein space and place become fused into a single concept defining what it means to be 'European', defined by an imagination of legitimacy, superiority, and destiny.[26]

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[25] Cox, 'The Empire's Back in Town', pp. 1-28.
[26] For an earlier version of the new theory of *cartoimperialism*, see Russell Foster, 'Tabula Imperii Europae: A Cartographic Approach to the Current Debate on the European Union as Empire', *Geopolitics* 18:2 (2013), pp. 371-402.

In Chapter Four we consider an appropriate methodology. Literature is drawn upon to establish maps not as reflections but as representations which are saturated with political messages. It is argued that maps' greatest power comes not from the specific visual language of their component parts but from such phenomena as where maps are placed, what politics they are visually associated with, what purpose they serve, and who their intended audiences are. Contrary to traditional studies of cartography which focus on the symbols of maps, our examination will focus more on maps' broader context and material nature, including such considerations as where EU maps are located, what other forms of visual language accompany and intersect them, and who sees the maps.

Chapter Five is the first analytical chapter, analysing a selection of maps produced by EU institutions in order to identify how such maps contain the imperial discourse of legitimacy, superiority, sovereignty, duty, and destiny. We examine European Union visual icons, including the flag, as maps in their own right, before examining more conventional cartographies. The chapter examines how the Union's maps appeal to an artificial imagination – an 'imagined community' – and employs techniques of 'banal nationalism' to propagate a discourse through its visual iconography. Importantly, it is argued that this is not a devious and deliberate scheme on the Union's part but that it is an inescapable consequence of relying on cartography to symbolise the new Europe.

In Chapter Six we focus on a medium in which European Union mapping reaches the pinnacle of cartoimperialism – the maps and visual iconography featured on the Union's continental currency. A broad selection of critical studies are examined in order to argue that currency is the most powerful vehicle for the transmission of political discourses, intentionally or not, and that the Union's choice of a single currency is itself a powerful discursive expression of empire. However, the apparently innocent maps on Euro coins and banknotes transform currency into the ultimate expression of empire within the Union, and all of Europe, by showing not what the Union *is* but what it *should be*.

Chapter Seven concludes our investigation. We argue that the European Union is not *an* empire; the European Union *is* empire.[27] It is the precise same expression of legitimacy, sovereignty, superiority, duty and destiny – reinforced by appealing to a manufactured history and an imagined community – which characterised the emergence of empire as a discourse in the tense international politics of Early Medieval Europe. The chapter also argues that this

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[27] While modern languages distinguish between empire, imperial, and imperialism, Latin does not always clearly distinguish between nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, particularly with legal terminology such as *imperium* (see page 42). The wording here reflects the Latin expression of *Imperium Europaeum* – Europe *as* empire, Europe *embodying* empire, Europe *possessing* empire, and Europe *exercising* empire. I am grateful to Prof. Jakob Wisse, Chair of Latin at the School of Classics and History, Newcastle University, for his insights.

study might be the beginning of a new research avenue into empire as a discourse, and the power of political maps. The findings of cartoimperialism in this thesis, it is argued, could serve as foundations for similar studies in the future.

1.3   Limits of the Project

To understand what this study is, it is also necessary to say what it is not. This is not a claim that "empire" is a taxonomy, a category into which we can slot certain political projects which we do not classify as nation-states, federations, and such. Neither is this an argument that the EU is an empire according to a prefabricated set of "imperial" characteristics or *a priori* assumptions. Instead the study examines the EU not as a *sui generis* brave new world, but instead as part of a political continuum whereby the Union is inextricable from its historical roots and predecessors. This is not a book of history and it makes no pretence to be, but the Union does not stand outside of time and we cannot understand empire and the Union without considering the historical contexts in which they emerged and developed. Our world did not suddenly appear from nowhere, and equally our civilisation is not the end point of some Whiggish teleology. We are part of a continuum whereby our present was created by the past, and whereby our present will create the future. The EU cannot be detached from Europe's history, and so a consideration of the macrohistorical context of the EU is essential.

As we shall see in Chapter Two, this is by no means the first study to claim that the European Union embodies empire, but it is unique in examining how the symbolism and political metanarratives woven into EU cartography proclaim an imagination of empire. As such, the first part of the study is an examination of the macrohistorical roots of empire, concluding with the assertion that empire is a discourse, and that this discourse is expressed in symbolic cartography. The second part of the study examines EU maps.

This too is nothing new. As Chapter Three demonstrates, politicised maps are not recent inventions. Their prototypes were drawn by nomadic hunter-gatherers who stalked woolly mammoths across the frozen tundras of the last Ice Age, and the viewers of the European Union's sleek, computer-created charts on the internet or in their purses use exactly the same mental mechanisms as Cro-Magnons huddling around their fires, gazing at the maps etched onto their cave walls with elk bones. This section demonstrates that the power of cartography is ontogenetic – not only is mapreading *learned* in the subconscious, it is *believed.*

Again, this is nothing new. The colossus of cartography J.B. Harley demonstrated this exact argument in the 1980s[28] – not to mention those presidents, priests, and Pharaohs who were well aware of the power of maps to persuade their people of a desirable political imagination.[29] What is unique in this thesis' approach is the merging of cartographic, iconographic, and semiographic theories to argue that EU maps are not neutral, value-free reflections of the real world, but that they are political texts inextricable from political imaginations embedded within Europeans' consciousness.

Importantly, this is not a study of the features and content of *every single* map produced by a pan-European institution, from the seating plan at the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the latest EU-sanctioned map uploaded to an EU website or printed in an EU pamphlet. Such an exhaustive study would require dozens of volumes and decades of research and, aside from being rather boring, would miss the point entirely. This thesis uniquely argues that EU maps *in general* engender a particular political imagination among the European public, *whether that imagination is intentional or not* (or both). An examination of EU maps' projections, scale, graticules, colours, symbols, and so forth would be insufficient. Instead the thesis examines EU maps specifically marketed towards three hundred million Europeans as holistic devices. Put briefly, this thesis examines the theory that maps as a whole inevitably express a European political ambition, rather than positivistically pigeonholing the Union or laboriously dissecting every chart produced for Brussels in the last sixty years.[30]

A broad variety of European symbols and icons exist, and some pioneering studies have already examined the various interpretations and meanings which can be elucidated from such symbols as the Union's anthem, motto, flag, and currency, alongside more peripheral or emergent symbols including architecture, fashion, cuisine, religion, and

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[28] For an exhaustive discussion see: J.B. Harley and David Woodward, *The History of Cartography Vols. I-III* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); see especially Volume I Chapter One, 'The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography'; Vol. I Chapter Two, Catherine Delano-Smith, 'Prehistoric Maps and the History of Cartography: An Introduction'; and Vol. I Chapter Three, G. Malcolm Lewis, 'The Origins of Cartography'. All volumes of the *History of Cartography* are now available free online courtesy of the University of Chicago Press: http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/HOC/HOC_V1/Volume1.html.

[29] Jeremy Black, *Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000); Black, *Maps and Politics* (London: Reaktion, 2000); Mark Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[30] Michael Greenhalgh argues the same case in his examination of how Roman artefacts were received in the medieval world: 'because intellectual history is wedded to ideas rather than objects, it does not necessarily help us with an investigation of *what* antiquities were available during the Middle Ages – but only with an explanation of *the new context given* to antique "traditions" and "influences"'. Like antiquities, this study is not concerned with listing *what* exists, but *how these artefacts create discourses*. Michael Greenhalgh, *The Survival of Roman Antiquities in the Middle Ages* (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 5 (emphasis added).

documents such as stamps and passports.[31] While these studies vary in the meanings ascribed to particular symbols, there are some key themes which remain constant, and applicable to this study. First is the acknowledgement that there is no universal meaning which can be attached to a symbol. Second is the focus not on the intentions of a symbol's creators, but the interpretations of its users. This is key for three reasons.

Firstly, European symbols – like those of any organisation – are only understandable in reference to others. This is a classic element of semiotics. The individual words in this sentence have meanings on their own, but an overall, holistic meaning can only be derived by placing each word in relation to the others in the sentence. It is precisely the same with symbols. As we will see later, a map is a meaningless mess unless we can establish meaning by cross-referencing it against other emblems. To appreciate the discourses embedded in maps, we must refer to other icons which intersect with and overlap maps – colours, flags, mottos, icons, and so forth.

Secondly, European Union symbols are not always deliberately created by a faraway elite in Brussels and Strasbourg. The European Union follows in the footsteps of the Soviet Union in soliciting public competitions for symbols, with the public (or a bureaucratic committee) choosing their favourites. The EU's flag, anthem, motto, currency, and other symbols were all chosen this way. Whether this is a matter of choosing a favourite, such as Beethoven's *Ode to Joy*, or picking the best of a bad bunch, as in the case of the name of the currency, is irrelevant. European symbols are overwhelmingly the result of mass involvement or were already in wide use before simply being given a stamp of approval by an EU body,[32] and symbolic systems of the EU *deliberately* created by political elites have been, on the whole, dismal failures.[33] Thus, the intentions of a symbol's creator are not only less important

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[31]Importantly, see: Johan Fornhäs, *Signifying Єurope* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Michael Wintle, *The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography Throughout the Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[32] Fornhäs, *Signifying Єurope*, pp. 103-112.

[33] Johan Fornhäs semiotically deconstructs a curious example. Partly in response to a popular Italian children's comic whose dastardly villain was named "Euroman", and partly to encourage European childrens' positive views of the Union and the coming single currency, in 1998 the European Commission sought to preach the values of the Union by commissioning artist Nicolas de Santis to create a superhero comic strip. Its main character – the blue-and-gold clad Nietzschean superman "Captain Euro" (whose catchprase is 'Merciful Minerva!') – is assisted by his rich, elitist sidekicks "Europa", "Pythagoras", and the Romanian wolf "Lupo" in using 'culture and logic - not violence - to take control' in various quests to defend the European Union and European culture. Such high-octane, edge-of-the-seat missions befitting a continent-defending superhero include: playing tennis, ensuring that museums remain open to the public, turning off taps to save water, and somewhat bizarrely, building sapient, chess-playing robots which are then inexplicably possessed by the souls of Ancient Greek philosophers who are somehow familiar with latest EU cultural policies. The comic series' master villain is (strangely) the *laissez-faire* capitalist "Dr D. Vider", who seeks 'to divide Europe and create his own empire'. Whether this is a criticism of *his own* or of *empire* is unclear. Curiously, the secret lairs of both Captain Euro and Dr D. Vider are inscribed with enormous maps 'representing a world without boundaries

than interpretation, but focusing on intention over interpretation might actually be counter-productive.

Thirdly, this thesis is based on the *a priori* assumption that the meanings of symbols and symbolic language matter to we, the public. It must be conceded that this could be a faulty premise. Perhaps symbols and icons do not matter, and thus this study would be completely pointless. This apparent impasse could only be proved or disproved by conducting interviews – and as a small selection of Europeans is not necessarily indicative of wider trends, let alone generational, political, cultural and geographical variations which could produce wildly different answers in different areas of Europe,[34] a definitive conclusion could only be arrived at by interviewing every one of the three hundred and thirty-two million citizens of the European Union who are exposed to EU emblems. Aside from the somewhat weighty data which this number of interviews would generate, participant research has not been conducted for reasons which are elaborated in Chapters Four and Five, including the ultimate problem of trying to determine whether peoples' thoughts are really their own, and whether people are *really* as influenced by emblems as they might claim in an interview. EU citizens cannot agree on the political connotations of Nazi and Soviet symbols, let alone share a universal interpretation of the power, significance, and meaning of the European Union's symbols. This suggests that symbols *do* matter to European Union citizens, and also points at another solution to this third problem – whether symbols really matter to people or not, political elites *believe* that they matter. Manufacturing EU pamphlets, EU websites, EU flags, EU holidays, EU competitions, and EU coffee mugs – all proudly emblazoned with

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where no country is favoured - or spared!'. The comics are not so much entertaining as painfully embarrassing, and the comic strip appears to have fizzled out after critics pointed out that the contrast between the snobbish, Aryan, irritatingly perfect *Übermensch* superheroes and the ethnic, pop-culture peddling, circus-owning villains was unsettlingly sinister. Existing issues can still be viewed at http://www.captaineuro.com/. Fornhäs semiotically deconstructs the discourse-laden comics in detail not simply because they are so terrible, but because they illustrate just how difficult it is, even with Europe's rich history, for EU bodies to manufacture a singly identity myth – one must emerge of its own accord, not be imposed from above. Fornhäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 27-36. As of 2013, Captain Euro has been joined by a new comic strip featuring 'Anna and Alex', two teenage vigilantes dedicated to overthrowing forgers of Euro banknotes. See: http://www.new-euro-banknotes.eu/press/pdfonline/ANNA_ALEX_EN/index.html. For an early discussion of the power of European media and material culture in promoting an EU identity, see Michael Wintle (ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe* (Avebury: Ashgate Publishing, 1996), pp. 1-9, 177-200.

[34] A foreshadowing of this is visible in EU citizens' attitudes to non-EU political symbols. During Germany's presidency of the EU in 2007, the German government proposed a bill which would ban the swastika across the European Union, but the bill was defeated after protests from the British Sikh and Hindu communities who still use the swastika as a religious icon. Further East a similar problem emerged with the symbolic relics of the USSR – despite prohibition of Soviet symbols in Poland and Lithuania, similar attempts to ban the hammer and sickle across the EU have been defeated by Western European MEPs after debates in the European Parliament, much to the chagrin of Eastern European EU members. 'Swastika ban left out of EU's racism law', *The Scotsman* 23 July 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/swastika-ban-left-out-of-eu-s-racism-law-1-680863; 'EU refuses to ban denial of communist crimes', *Russia Today* 23 December 2010, http://rt.com/politics/european-commission-communist-crimes/; 'New Polish law equates Communist and Nazi symbols', *Russia Today* 30 November 2009, http://rt.com/politics/poland-bans-communist-symbols/.

political symbols – is not cheap,[35] and political actors would not produce these symbols unless they believed that symbols really do influence people. Even if political symbols are completely ignored by Europeans (which, based on evidence of heated squabbles in the European Parliament over the visibility of Nazi and Soviet symbols in the Union, is unlikely in the extreme), the organisations which disseminate these symbols *believe* that symbols have power, and act upon that belief. The result is perhaps a self-fulfilling prophecy: elites believe that symbols matter to the masses, thus elites manufacture millions of symbols and market them to the populace who thus believe, on the basis of this bombardment, that symbols matter.

All of these three points will be examined in turn throughout the chapters of the thesis. We have established the structure, limits, and focus of the research project. Thus with José Barroso's description of European Empire as our starting point, we begin – with *empire*.

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[35] To cite one example: in 2011 the EU's borders agency, Frontex, spent €36,781.31 on gifts to be given out free at corporate conferences, emblazoned with the organisation's new logo. At this cost, disseminating visual identity is clearly deemed important by Union agencies. See: 'Annual list of law contracts (between 25,000 and 60,000 EUR) concluded by Frontex in 2011', available at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Contracts_awarded/Contracts_awarded_in_2011.pdf.

Chapter Two

All Roads Lead to Rome

'Only that which has no history is definable.'[36]

Friederich Nietzsche
On the Genealogy of Morals, II.13

Our quest for empire begins in what might at first be thought an unusual place. We commence not in the gleaming glass conference halls of the European Parliament, where elected officials applaud our Unity in Diversity. Nor in the conspiratorial corridors of Queen Victoria's Colonial Office, where bewhiskered bureaucrats dissect their maps and wipe out nations with the stroke of a pen, all in the apparent name of civilisation. Nor even in the treacherous marble rotunda of the Roman Senate, where plutocrats pontificate on the privileges of *patrocinium*, blissfully unaware that their dying Republic will soon be trampled beneath the heels of Julius Caesar's coming legions. Our story, the genesis and evolution of *empire*, begins in a rather more colourful place.

We find ourselves in a gaudy, over-decorated room in the Bucoleon Palace of Constantinople,[37] capital of the 'Byzantine' or Eastern Roman Empire, on a Saturday afternoon in the summer of 968 AD, where two high-ranking diplomats are engaged in a furious shouting-match over a word neither of them seems to quite understand. One man is the Frankish bishop, Liudprand of Cremona, on temporary secondment as ambassador from Otto I of the Holy Roman Empire. The other is the princely Leo Phokas, Master of Ceremonies for the court of Constantinople and brother of the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus II. The argument in the Bucoleon Palace that day was recorded in a long, sycophantic diary kept by Liudprand to show to his monarch back home, and it is worth investigating in full. For the episode casts light upon the very essence of that single, monumentally troublesome word over which our contemporary politicians, journalists, and scholars tirelessly replicate the same fierce argument of that angry afternoon in Constantinople.

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[36] Friederich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo [trans. Walter Kaufmann]* (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 62.
[37] John Rosser, *The A-Z of Byzantium* (Lanham, MA: Scarecrow Press, 2006), p. 177; Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 185; John Julius Norwich, *Byzantium: The Early Centuries* (London: Viking, 1988), p. 386.

'On the fourth of June we arrived at Constantinople, and after a miserable reception, meant as an insult to yourselves, we were given the most miserable and disgusting quarters. The palace where we were confined was certainly large and open, but it neither kept out the cold nor kept in the heat. Armed soldiers were set out to guard us and prevent my people from going out, and any others from coming in. This dwelling, only accessible to us who were shut inside it, was so far distant from the Emperor's residence that we were quite out of breath when we walked there – we did not ride. To add to our troubles, the Greek wine we found undrinkable because of the mixture in it of pitch, resin and plaster. The house itself had no water and we could not even buy any to quench our thirst. All this was a serious "Oh dear me!", but there was another "Oh dear me" even worse, and that was our warden, the man who provided us with our daily wants. If you were to seek another like him, you certainly would not find him on earth; you might perhaps in Hell. Like a raging torrent he poured upon us every calamity, every extortion, every expense, every grief and misery that he could invent. In our one hundred and twenty days not one passed without bringing to us groaning and lamentation.

On the fourth of June, as I said above, we arrived at Constantinople and waited with our horses in heavy rain outside the Carian Gate until five o'clock in the afternoon. At five o'clock [Emperor] Nicephorus ordered us to be admitted on foot, for he did not think us worthy to use the horses with which your clemency had provided us, and we were escorted to the aforesaid hateful, waterless, draughty stone house. On the sixth of June, which was the Saturday before Pentecost, I was brought before the Emperor's brother Leo, Marshal of the Court and Chancellor; and there we tired ourselves with a fierce argument over your imperial title. He called you not "emperor", which is Basileus *in his tongue, but – most insultingly –* Rex, *which is "king" in ours. I told him that the thing meant was the same though the word was different, and he then said that I had come not to make peace but to stir up strife. Finally he got up in a rage...'*[38]

Liudprand of Cremona
Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana I-II

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[38] John Julius Norwich, *A Short History of Byzantium* (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 193-194; F.A. Wright (trans.) *The Works of Liudprand of Cremona: Antapodosis, Liber de Rebus Gestis Ottonis, Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitina* (New York: EP Dutton & Co., 1930), pp. 235-236. Paolo Squatriti translates the *Relatio* with even greater vitriol than Wright. Paolo Squatriti, *The Complete Works of Liudprand of Cremona* (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

It would be difficult to disagree with the historian John Julius Norwich's assessment that more than a thousand years after his death, Liudprand still deserves some retrospective sympathy for his especially bad day.[39] But discounting for the moment a wry smile, let us consider how Liudprand's complaint reveals the essence of *empire*.

Upon arrival into the capital city of a Greek monarch who perceives himself to be God's hand-picked regent and equal of the Apostles,[40] and who looks down upon Western Europeans as presumptuous, conceited barbarians, Liudprand is, by his own admission, thirsty, cold, exhausted, far from home as he has travelled the breadth of the world known to tenth-century Europeans,[41] soaked to the bone after spending the whole day lingering pointlessly outside the city walls in a torrential downpour, incessantly harangued by the hellish concierge of his wretched accommodations, and when refreshment finally arrives it comes in the form of a wine cocktail that would make even the most courageous connoisseur think twice.[42] Yet what is most curious in Liudprand's litany of woe is that the gravest offence – in his own words 'most insultingly' – comes not from any of these physical hardships, but from a dispute over the correct form of address for his monarch.

This critical aspect is easily overlooked given the almost comical catalogue of doom which Liudprand subsequently records during his depressing sojourn in Constantinople.[43] But the initial spat between Liudprand and Leo, easily dismissed as just another example of the Byzantines' legendary belligerence over single words,[44] or merely one of many of the characteristic diplomatic squabbles sparked by Frankish swaggering and the Byzantines' self-anointed supremacy, is invaluably important.

Exasperated, Liudprand records that he and Leo argued to the point of exhaustion over how to refer to Liudprand's superior: the recently-crowned Otto I of the Holy Roman Empire, referred to in the West using the Latin word *Imperator*. This word had once

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[39] Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, p. 194.

[40] Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 48; Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, p. 151.

[41] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World* (London: Octopus, 2005), pp. 14-33; John Noble Wilford, *The Mapmakers: The Story of the Great Pioneers in Cartography – From Antiquity to the Space Age* (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 40-66; John Hessler, *A Renaissance Globemaker's Toolbox: Johannes Schöner and the Revolution of Modern Science 1475-1550* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2013).

[42] Liudprand probably regretted disparaging the wine. At his first state banquet with Nicephorus, the bishop records that the only drinks served were oil and 'an exceedingly bad *fish* liquor'. Wright, *Liudprand*, p. 241.

[43] The additional *fifty-four* chapters of Liudprand's diary are an increasingly bitter narrative of ghastly dinner parties, constant arguments with Nicephorus over trivial matters, and perpetual insults levelled at him by his concierge and haughty Byzantine courtiers. The account ends with a bankrupt and sickly Liudprand being expelled from Constantinople – but not before this servant of God has time to scrawl a remarkably rude poem about the Greeks all over a palace wall. Wright, *Liudprand*, p. 270.

[44] The Byzantines' rejection of the *filioque* – the inclusion of a single Latin word meaning "and from the Son (of God)" in the Nicene Creed – split the Eastern and Western churches in 1054 and continues to do so today. Rosser, *A-Z of Byzantium*, p. 155.

designated a military honour in the Roman Republic, but as we shall see later the term morphed into one of several titles bestowed upon Roman rulers in Late Antiquity. Meanwhile the monarch of Constantinople, Nicephorus II, also referring to himself as an emperor by using the approximate Greek term *Basileus*,[45] rejects Otto's equivalent title. When the Byzantine Chancellor refers to Otto as a lowly *rex* (king) rather than a full *Imperator*, Liudprand's vitriolic response is to claim that *Basileus* and *Imperator* have the same meaning despite being different words, and that he will not suffer to refer to his *Imperator* Otto as a mere *rex*.[46] The Chancellor, as Liudprand records, storms away in a huff, refusing to acknowledge Otto as an equal to Nicephorus who, as *Basileus* of Constantinople, is the rightful – and only – *Emperor* of the *Roman Empire*. This may appear little more than an amusing aside into the intricacies of difficult diplomacy between two equally unhelpful ambassadors, but in fact it illuminates the very nature of *empire*.

In their room at the Bucoleon Palace, Liudprand and Leo are squabbling over a single word. Although the two men are shouting at each other in Greek,[47] the word causing so much trouble is Latin. This is Otto's title of *Imperator*, a derivative of *imperium.* Liudprand and Leo's argument over the use of *Imperator* is not mere pettiness. The word *imperium* is the

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[45] In modern Greek 'emperor' is rendered 'αυτοκράτορας': 'autokrator'. But this is a relatively new word. In Ancient Greece, *basileus* had originally signified a Greek 'king' and was used to refer to Alexander the Great. Following Greece's conquest by Roman generals, who were referred to as *imperators*, the Greeks coined the word *autokrator* as a military equivalent of *imperator*, retaining its military connotations. Following Rome's adoption of an 'emperor' from Augustus onwards, Romanised Greeks (and Hellenised Romans, whose aristocratic and intellectual elite snobbishly scorned their own Latin culture and favoured antique-sounding Greek terms) abandoned *basileus* with its connotations of monarchy, and used the recently-invented word *autokrator* to designate the head of the Roman state. As the Romans officially shunned the concept of a king, *autokrator* acted as a convenient, vaguely democratic-sounding term for a head of state who was increasingly an absolute monarch in all but name. However in 626, the Byzantine monarch Heraclius signed a peace treaty with the Persian monarch Siroës, who styled himself *Basileus* in order to legitimise his reign by suggesting descent from Alexander the Great. Eager to assert his equality with his new Persian ally, disdainful of the pagan connotations of the languages spoken by the now-barbarian Western Europeans – to the extent of changing the official language of Byzantium from barely-understood Latin to everyday Greek – and influenced by Christianity's encouragement of monarchy over the flimsy façade of pagan Roman republicanism, Heraclius changed the title of the Byzantine monarch from *autokrator* back to *Basileus*. By the time of Liudprand's visit in 968 the word *autokrator* had been largely forgotten by the Byzantines, and Byzantine court protocol considered *Basileus* to be not only the equivalent of *Imperator*, but the only title a self-respecting Christian ruler should use. See Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, pp. 93-94, 97; Price, *The Story of Titles*, pp. 15, 33-34; Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World 33 BC – AD 337* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 613-616. On the origins of *Basileus*, Isidore of Seville (*Etymologiae* IX.iii.18) records that 'a king is called *Basileus* in Greek because like a pedestal's base (*basis*) he supports the people', helpfully noting that in the political correspondence of the Early Middle Ages, 'Tyrants (*tyrannus*) in Greek are the same as "kings" in Latin'. However, we must take Isidore's claims with a pinch of salt. Stephen Barney, W.J. Lewis, J.A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 201.

[46] A.P. Kazhdan argues that in Byzantine eyes, *rex* was the only legitimate title for a Western monarch as none of the petty warlords of Europe could legitimately claim the universal rule and divine mandate associated with *Imperator*. As Roman rule in the West had ended, universal rule remained the prerogative of the Byzantines, whose monarchs claimed direct descent from Caesar and Constantine and thus had the personal (and exclusive) approval of God to be styled *Basileus / Imperator*. A.P. Kazhdan (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 264.

[47] Wright, *Liudprand of Cremona*, p. 5.

root of our modern word *empire* and its equivalents in all contemporary Romance and Baltic languages:[48] the word over which modern scholars replicate Leo and Liudprand's shouting match. And disagreements over the use and even the validity of the word, more than a mere symptom of Byzantium's 'obsession with empty titles', [49] had long preceded Liudprand's arrival in Constantinople. Indeed the origin of our fluid word *empire*, and its existence as a discourse rather than a specific term, is found not in the writings and proclamations of classical Rome but yet again in the Early Middle Ages, spawning numerous episodes exacerbating the already tense international politics between Franks and Byzantines. To illustrate, let us examine a later extract from Liudprand's diary:

> *'To increase my calamities, on the day of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary*
> *the holy mother of God, an ill-omened embassy came from the apostolic and*
> *universal Pope John with a letter asking Nicephorus "the emperor of the*
> *Greeks" to conclude an alliance and firm friendship with his beloved and*
> *spiritual son Otto, "august emperor of the Romans". If you ask me how these*
> *words, and manner of address, which to the Greeks seem sinful audacity, did*
> *not cost the bearer his life and overwhelm it even before they were read, I*
> *cannot answer. On other points I have often shown a fine and copious flow of*
> *words; on this I am as dumb as a fish. The Greeks abused the sea, cursed the*
> *waves, and wondered exceedingly how they could have transported such an*
> *iniquity, and why the deep had not opened up to swallow the ship. "The*
> *audacity of it!" they cried, "to call the universal emperor of the Romans, the*
> *one and only Nicephorus, the great, the august, 'emperor of the Greeks'! And*

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[48] *Empire* (English, French), *Imperium* (Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Polish, Russian), *Imperio* (Spanish), *Império* (Portugese), *Impero* (Italian), *Imperija* (Lithuanian), *Impērija* (Latvian), *İmparatorluk* (Turkish). In Germanic languages, the proto-Indo-European word *reg* ("rich/wealthy", "to rule [through wealth]") is the origin of *Reich* (German), *Rijk* (Dutch), *Říše* (Czech). This Germanic word influenced *rex* and *regnum* (king, kingdom) in Latin, and *raja* in Sanskrit. The meaning of the proto-Indo-European word survives as *rich* and *rîche* in English and French, and *–ric* in English (as in *Bishopric*). T'amaz Gamqreliże Viacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov and Werner Winter, *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans: a reconstruction and historical analysis of a proto-language and a proto-culture* (Berlin: M. De Gruyter, 1995); translations of *imperium* provided by Google Translate, http://translate.google.co.uk/.
[49] Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 141-2, 185-7. However the Franks shared this preoccupation to a degree – Charlemagne's father Pepin III was proclaimed in 754 as *Patricius Romanorum*, "Protector of the Romans", a made-up title by Pope Stephen II who needed the Franks to protect him from his Italian enemies. Curiously, Pepin's own father Charles Martel, who in 732 had fought off an Islamic invasion of Western Europe and thus actually did protect Rome, was only offered the 'obsolete honorific title' of *consul*, which even the ceremony-obsessed Byzantines scorned and which Martel unsurprisingly refused. Rosser, *A-Z of Byzantium*, p. 99; Norwich, *The Popes*, pp. 50-51.

to style a poor barbaric creature 'emperor of the Romans!' O sky! O earth! O sea! What shall we do with these scoundrels?"'[50]

<div align="right">

Liudprand of Cremona
Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana XLVII

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As Liudprand records, the Byzantines of the tenth century were not exactly happy at treating the Frankish monarch as an equal to their own emperor, nor were they overjoyed at being expected to share the title *Emperor of Rome* with Otto, a man they saw as a primitive savage. To receive such a letter from 'a jumped-up barbarian chieftain ... now calling himself Emperor'[51] was not only a grotesque insult to the Byzantines but an affront to political and theological propriety. For it was Constantinople, not Rome, which was the continuation of "Rome". This is an invaluable point, so let us more closely examine this moment in the Bucoleon Palace.

The court of Constantinople is in a rage at the Pope's letter and as the nearest Western European within earshot, Liudprand is now being harangued by angry Byzantine courtiers. Following its abandonment as the Imperial capital centuries before and having been besieged and sacked a dozen times since by barbarians and Byzantines, the actual town of Rome is now 'a sad and distinctly seedy city, decimated by malaria and showing little trace of its former splendour',[52] inhabited – in the words of the Chief Eunuch of the Bucoleon Palace – by 'vile slaves, fishermen, confectioners, poulterers, bastards, plebeians, underlings', under a 'silly blockhead of a Pope'.[53] For, as the eunuch makes clear, 'the sacred Constantine transferred to this city [Constantinople] the imperial sceptre, the Senate, and all the Roman knighthood'.[54] This is crucial. "Rome" is not, in the Byzantines' eyes, the actual town. It is not even the bricks and mortar of Constantinople. Instead, it is Constantinople as inheritor of an *ideal*. For while the Italian city – in Byzantine eyes – was abandoned by Emperor Constantine and subsequently slid into a squatters' slum, it is Constantinople which continues the *ideal* of what Rome *used to be* before the glittering city of Severus and Seneca was laid

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[50] Wright, *The Works of Liudprand of Cremona*, p. 263.

[51] Norwich's description of Charlemagne. Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, p. 120.

[52] Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 12.

[53] A politically savvy diplomat renowned across Western Christendom for his ruthless careerism – even stealing the corpses of saints from neighbouring towns to install as relics in his own cathedral – Liudprand gives as good as he gets, tartly assuring Nicephorus that when Western Europeans wish to insult someone, they call the object of their derision a "Roman": "'We Lombards, Saxons, Franks, Lotharingians, Bavarians, Swabians and Burgundians, so despise these fellows that when we are angry with an enemy we can find nothing more insulting than – 'You Roman!' For us in the word Roman is comprehended every form of lowness, timidity, avarice, luxury, falsehood, and vice'". Wright, *Liudprand of Cremona*, pp. 242-243; Jon Sutherland, *Liudprand of Cremona, Bishop, Diplomat, Historian: Studies of the Man and his Age* (Spoleto: Centro Italiano de Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 1988), pp. 96-98.

[54] Wright, *Liudprand of Cremona,* p. 265.

low by the barbarian ancestors of Liudprand and Otto – who now dares call himself *emperor*. It was to Constantinople, the Byzantines believe, that Constantine the Great brought the best of "Rome", leaving the rest to rot in the dying West. And as they worship Jesus rather than Jupiter, the Byzantines represent not only what Rome *used to be*, but what Rome *should be*.[55]

The concept that "Rome" is a malleable idea rather than something fixed in a particular space and a particular time, is the very essence of *empire* as a discourse. The angry courtiers insulting Liudprand over Pope John's letter shed light on this distinction. *Empire –* for them *Imperium Romanorum –* exists not in space or time, but in the collective consciousness. It is a discourse: something which the classical Romans, aware of the cosmology of "Rome" as an ideal destined to rule the world, had been quite aware.[56] This is tricky, so in order to clarify the argument being made let us return again to the past. This time, to the very origin of *empire* as a discourse.

Our scene shifts from a Byzantine summer in 968 to an Italian winter over a century and a half earlier. It is shortly before noon on Christmas Day, 800 AD, and we find ourselves amidst a small huddle of bishops and nobles shivering in the gloomy Romanesque nave of the old St. Peter's Basilica, in the heart of Rome. At the altar, Pope Leo III is hiding a crown randomly rummaged from the Vatican's treasury[57] while mentally rehearsing a Latin translation of the Byzantine rite for proclaiming a new emperor, waiting to begin Mass. Meanwhile the ageing Frankish warlord Charlemagne, King of the Franks and conqueror of the largest single polity in Western Europe since the days of the Caesars, shuffles up the aisle to pray. The scene is recorded by four scholars: Charlemagne's friend Einhard (who may or may not have actually been there),[58] an anonymous scribe compiling the official Frankish records in the abbey of Lorsch, an equally anonymous scribe writing the official Papal records in Rome, and some eight decades later the Frankish chronicler Notker the Stammerer:

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[55] As Tom Holland makes clear, the Byzantines were fully aware of themselves as continuers of Rome. While we refer retrospectively to "Byzantines" and a "Byzantine Empire" (even modern Greek refers to the *Byzantiní Autokratoría*), the Byzantines themselves always, up until the fall of Constantinople on 29th May 1453, called themselves *Rhōmaiō*: "Romans". When referring to their own realm, the Byzantines used simply Ῥωμανία (Rome) or Βασιλεία Ῥωμαίων / *Basileia Rhōmaiōn* (Roman Kingdom/Empire/Reign). Holland, *Millennium*, pp. 37-38; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol.V*, Ch.LIII, p. 416. While the Byzantines did use the adjective *Byzantiní* ("Byzantine"), it referred specifically to people born in the downtown district of Constantinople which had once been the old Greek colony of *Byzántion*. I am grateful to the anonymous commentator at the 2013 conference of the Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles, who suggested that our modern phrase "Byzantine Empire" is like future historians referring to the British Empire as the "Cockney Kingdom".
[56] Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Thought: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 35-48.
[57] Robert Folz, *The Concept of Empire in Western Europe: from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century* (Frome: Edward Arnold, 1969), p. 145.
[58] Einhard and Notker the Stammerer, *Two Lives of Charlemagne [trans. David Ganz]* (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. ix-xv.

'Thus Charles [Charlemagne] travelled to Rome to restore the state of the Church, which was extremely disturbed, and he spent the whole winter there. It was at this time that he received the title of Emperor [Imperator] and Augustus. At first he disliked this so much that he said that he would not have entered the church that day, even though it was a great feast day, if he had known in advance of the Pope's plan. But he bore the animosity that the assumption of this title caused with great patience, for the Roman emperors [the Byzantines] were angry about it.'[59]

<div align="right">

Einhard
Vita Karoli, xxix

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'On the most holy day of Christmas, when the king [Charlemagne] rose from prayer in front of the shrine of blessed apostle Peter, to take part in the Mass, Pope Leo placed a crown on his head, and he was hailed by the whole Roman people: To the august Charles, crowned by God, the great and peaceful Imperator of the Romans, life and victory! After the acclamations the pope addressed him in the manner of the old imperators. The name of Patricius was now abandoned and he was called Imperator and Augustus.'[60]

<div align="right">

Anon.
Royal Frankish Annals, 801

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'Afterwards when the birthday of our Lord Jesus Christ arrived, they [the nobles and clergy] gathered again in St Peter's. Then with his own hands the venerable bountiful pontiff crowned him [Charlemagne] with a precious crown, and all the faithful Romans seeing how much he defended and how greatly he loved the holy Roman church and its vicar ... cried aloud with one accord: "To Charles, pious Augustus crowned by God, great and pacific Imperator, life and victory!" ... and by them all he was established as Imperator of the Romans.'[61]

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Anon.
Liber Pontificalis, II.xxiii

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[59] Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne (Vita Karoli)*, p. 38.
[60] *Carolingian Chronicles: Royal Frankish Annals and Nithard's Histories [trans. Bernhard Scholz and Barbara Rogers]* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1970).
[61] Raymond Davis, *The Lives of the Eighth-Century Popes (Liber Pontificalis): The Ancient Biographies of Nine Popes from AD 715 to AD 817* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1992), pp. 190-191.

'As Charles stayed in Rome for a few days for the sake of the army, the bishop of the apostolic see [the Pope] called together all who were able to come from the neighbouring districts and then, in their presence and in the presence of all the counts of the unconquered Charles [Charlemagne], he declared him to be Imperator and Defender of the Roman Church. Now Charles had no guess of what was coming; and, though he could not refuse what seemed to have been divinely preordained for him, nevertheless he received his new title with no show of thankfulness. For first he thought that the Greeks [the Byzantines] would be fired by greater envy than ever and would plan some harm against the kingdom of the Franks.' [62]

Notker the Stammerer
Gesta Karoli, xxvi

What is the relevance, it might be asked, of this moment when Pope Leo gave Charlemagne the apparently unexpected title *Imperator*?[63] The official records on both sides – the Royal Frankish Annals and the *Liber Pontificalis* – report the events of Christmas Day 800 in a very matter-of-fact way, with little commentary. The answer partly lies in the comments made by Einhard and Notker the Stammerer: the Byzantines were perturbed. Their indignation was not simply due to their sense of protocol being piqued,[64] but that in bestowing the title *Imperator* on Charlemagne and proclaiming *Imperium*, Pope Leo committed two acts.

The first was to publicly declare to Byzantium that the Franks were not those same barbarians who scavenged from the carcass of Rome in the twilight of Antiquity, but were now civilised possessors of equal (if not greater) prestige, dignity, privilege, legitimacy, and authority as the self-styled "Romans" (*Rhōmaiō*) in Constantinople. The subsequent tension explains why, one hundred and eighty-six years later, Liudprand of Cremona found himself an unwelcome guest in Constantinople, as ambassador from a Westerner who perceived himself to be the equal of the monarch in the East. The Pope's second act, though, was of infinitely greater importance. For on Christmas Day 800, Pope Leo manufactured an imaginary history and a self-anointed status of "civilisation", and insodoing unwittingly

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[62] Notker the Stammerer, *The Deeds of Charlemagne (Gesta Karoli)*, p. 77.
[63] R.H.C. Davies, *A History of Medieval Europe: From Constantine to Saint Louis* (Harlow: Longman, 1988). I am grateful to Dr. Matthew Gabriele, Virginia Tech, for explaining the grammatical distinction between *Imperator Romanum* (Emperor of Rome) and *Imperator Romanorum* (Emperor of the Romans).
[64] Matthias Becher, *Charlemagne* (London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 94.

created a discourse which, over the next twelve centuries, would evolve into the concept over which so much ink is angrily spilled today.

In St. Peter's in 800, the Bucoleon Palace in 968, and innumerable other episodes in which Franks, Byzantines, and the successors of both, competed for the privilege, legitimacy, authority, and prestige afforded by recognition as defenders of civilisation and order, the word causing so much tension remained the same. This was *imperium* – the *Imperium Romanum* which Constantinople's medieval rulers claimed to have inherited, in an unbroken chain, when Constantine the Great moved the capital and thus the essence of "Rome" from a dying West to the vigorous East, and the rival *Imperium Romanum* which Pope Leo resurrected in defiance of Constantinople. It is little wonder that, as Liudprand records, he and Prince Leo spent a whole day arguing over which word to use. For *imperium* is one of the most discussed yet ill-defined terms in politics.

We will return to the Franks and the Byzantines, and what their squabbles tell us about *empire*, in due course. But first it is necessary to examine how contemporary scholars still cannot agree on what *empire* is, and the consequences this has for academic research. Otherwise, like Liudprand in the Bucoleon Palace, despite our fine and copious flow of words we may find ourselves as dumb as a fish.

2.1   *'My empire is of the imagination'*[65]

So speaks Ayesha, the ruthless white queen of a mythical African realm in H. Rider Haggard's classic 1887 novel *She*. Aware that her coercive power over her populace is virtually nil, and that her hobby of dabbling in random atrocities is insufficient to control her brutalised people, Ayesha clings onto her crown not through *actual* power but the *image* of power. By encouraging a particular imagination among the population, she can manipulate her masses. Her power thus lies not in a *reflection* of actual rule, but in a *representation* of supreme sovereignty and legitimacy through connection to a fabricated past, and by peddling to her people an illusory history which justifies the present.

Europe is no stranger to illusory histories. Following the gradual fading-away of Caesar's Rome, the continent 'divided into so many independent and hostile states',[66] phantoms of *imperium* legitimising their own existence through overt connections back to a

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[65] H. Rider Haggard, *She* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 161.
[66] Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire [abridged by Antony Lentin and Brian Norman]* (London: Wordsworth, 1998), p. 15.

version of Rome which suited their imaginations. Nor has Europe only *been* empire, it has *had* "empire": a critical distinction.[67] The Age of Discovery took Europe's squabbles to the rest of the world, eventually carving up the Earth in a scramble for exploitable colonies to fuel rivalry at home. It is only in the last half-century, following the cataclysm of two world wars driven in part by aggressive ambitions among European states seeking to impose their version of order and legitimacy upon the landmass, that the continent has settled. Yet this is not to say that Europeans have abandoned *empire* in the murky mists of history.

In recent decades, academia, journalism, and popular commentary have seen a renaissance in discussions of political *empire*.[68] Much of this has been directed at the world's last surviving hyperpower and its geopolitical, cultural, and economic reach since the end of the Cold War.[69] The quantity of literature on modern post-Cold War *empire* suggests that the phenomenon is far from dead. We might not go as far as John Darwin in stating that *empire* remains alive to the extent that we live in Tamerlane's shadow,[70] but the point remains pertinent. We face not only the legacies of *empire*, but its continued existence in new incarnations.

Framing the European Union as *empire* has obvious implications because, as Stephen Howe unequivocally reminds us, *empire* and *imperialism* are 'inherently immoral or illegitimate' concepts in the politics of the modern world.[71] *Imperial* is an undesirable tag, one with connotations of monopolistic violence and unequal social relations, manifest as hierarchies of gender, race, religion, or class. It is understandable why governments deny the *imperial* label with such vehemence, and why the use of the term causes controversy when applied to the European Union. *Empire* is equally undesirable: a word invoking those political projects which 'ought to remain buried in the marble and sepia pasts'.[72] As Michael Ignatieff asserts, 'nobody likes empires'.[73] Yet this is far from an obituary of *empire*. Amongst the states seeking to establish and reinforce new identities in a world which is simultaneously undergoing globalisation and regionalisation, perhaps none are as unusual, and as difficult to categorise, as the European Union. This 'somewhat strange

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[67] Or at least if we consider overseas colonies to be *empire*. Geoffrey Hosking quoted in Charles Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendency and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 5.

[68] It is notable that in commerce and business, the original connotations of power, destiny, and supremacy ascribed to *imperium* (and the positive connotations of *empire*) still survive.

[69] John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000* (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 505-506; Barry Gills (ed.), *The Global Politics of Globalization: "Empire" vs. "Cosmopolis"* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

[70] Darwin, *Tamerlane's Shadow*.

[71] Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-8.

[72] Cox, 'The *Empire*'s Back in Town', p. 1.

[73] Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003), p. 11.

hermaphrodite'[74] exhibits the traits of many polities. It has features of a nation-state, indicators of a federation, and – as a growing body of International Relations theorists posit – characteristics of *empire*.

As a mere word, *empire* means different things to different scholars. It is both specific and vague, both *ad hoc* and established. This is both a strength and a weakness for the critical researcher. *Empire* is adaptable and can be seen in many geopolitical forms, but at the same time it is a vague and slippery portmanteau which eludes even the most basic of universal definitions. If we are to examine whether the European Union is *empire*, it is necessary first to examine just what we mean.

It is perhaps ironic that although the concept of single, exclusive sovereignty has existed in European intellectual thought since the Delian League of Classical Greece,[75] arriving at a definition for *empire* is the equivalent of untying the Gordian Knot. A cursory glance at academic literature from only the last decade reveals that *empire* defies all efforts to restrict it to a bounded definition – a pattern seemingly constant throughout intellectual history. Imaginations of *empire* are influenced by the historiography of chroniclers writing at their own time,[76] while public perceptions of *empire* oscillate over time between adoration and embarrassment – as perceptions of British colonialism in the last hundred years demonstrate.[77] In light of such erratic interpretations of what *empire* is and should be, an examination of its characteristics must proceed with intellectual caution.

What is *empire*? This question is asked by a broad spectrum of scholars, many of whose works[78] begin with the same inquiry in order to construct a plausible definition, a neat term which encompasses the core theories, concepts, and characteristics of the word within well-defined and clearly-delineated terminological borders. But it is not surprising that this approach – a conceptual hangover from the well-intentioned but misguided days of objective geography and positivist political science – is a 'notoriously ambivalent and highly contested

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[74] Volker Bornschier, 'European Processes and the State of the European Union', Paper presented at *"European Processes, Boundaries and Institutions"*, Third European Sociological Association Conference on *"Twentieth Century Europe: Inclusions/Exclusions*, University of Essex, 27-30 August 1997, p. 1.

[75] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War [trans. Martin Hammond]* (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2009), Book I, ch. 96, pp. 46-48.

[76] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vols. I-VI*; St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans [trans. Henry Bettenson]* (London and New York: Penguin, 2003).

[77] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2004).

[78] Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History [trans. Tom Conley]* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); James Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe [trans. Ciaran Cronin]* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007).

concept'.[79] Like its historical and theoretical cousins globalisation,[80] modernity,[81] and postcolonialism,[82] *empire* defies attempts to fix a standard definition.[83] As a word it means everything and nothing.[84] Stephen Howe acknowledges this tendency to understand *empire* only as one aspect of a broader project involving such terms as 'informal empire, sub-imperialism, cultural imperialism, internal colonialism, Postcolonialism, and many more'.[85] Yet to understand a word only by relating to similarly poorly-defined words, is equally unsatisfactory.

Literature on the nature of *empire* is vast, intersecting interdisciplinary links and creating chronological connections across the history of the humanities and social sciences. As such, a comprehensive survey of academic works discussing the nature of *empire* will not be presented. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, tackling this volume of academic literature is a labour worthy of Hercules. This is not to say that a thorough and rigorous review of the literature is impossible, but rather that a clear focus must be maintained on European understandings. The majority of academic discussions of modern *empire* – such as

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[79] Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael Watts, Sarah Whatmore (eds.), *The Dictionary of Human Geography: Fifth Edition* (Oxford and Malden, MA: 2009), pp. 308-311.

[80] Ibid., p. 471.

[81] Ibid., pp. 471-474.

[82] Ibid., pp. 561-562.

[83] For a recent discussion of *empire*'s many meanings, see: Ray Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 1-9; Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (eds.), *Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[84] Recent unusual academic uses of the word include: Elizabeth Heineman, *Before Porn Was Legal: The Erotica Empire of Beate Uhse* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Scott Hahn, *The Kingdom of God as Liturgical Empire: A Theological Commentary on 1-2 Chronicles* (Ada, MI: Baker Publishing, 2012); Emma Robertson, *Chocolate, Women and Empire: A Social and Cultural History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010); Edward Larson, *An Empire of Ice: Scott, Shackleton and the Heroic Age of Antarctic Science* (Newhaven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2011); Joshua Tallent, 'The Empire Fracks Back: The Case for Hydraulic Fracturing Strict Liability in New York', *Environmental Claims Journal* 25:1 (2013), pp. 43-49; Kathleen Kautzer, *The Underground Church: Nonviolent Resistance to the Vatican Empire* (Edinburgh: Haymarket Publishing, 2013); Craig Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Steed Davidson, *Empire and Exile: Postcolonial Readings of the Book of Jeremiah* (New York: Library of the Hebrew Bible, 2011); Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus, *The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery and Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Keith Denkler, 'John H. Woodbury and his 19th century cosmetic surgery empire', *Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology* 68:4 (2013), p. 219; Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); John Reid, *Forging a Fur Empire: Expeditions in the Snake River Country, 1809-1824* (New York: Arthur Clark Co., 2011); Birgit Neumann, 'The Empire of Things in Eighteenth-Century English Literature: Consumption of the Foreign and Imperial Self-Fashioning', *English Studies* 93:8 (2012), pp. 930-949; Steve Coll, *Private Empire: Exxonmobil and American Power* (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Lynn Claudy, 'TV's Future: The Broadcast Empire Strikes Back', *IEEE Spectrum* 49:12 (2012), pp. 52-58; Paul Koudounaris, *The Empire of Death: A Cultural History of Ossuaries and Charnel Houses* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2011); and a particularly intriguing use – John Stobart, 'An Empire of Goods? Groceries in Eighteenth-Century England', in Maki Umemura and Rika Fujioka (eds.), *Comparative Responses to Globalization: Experiences of British and Japanese Enterprises* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[85] Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 9.

those offered by Michael Ignatieff,[86] Bernard Porter,[87] Michael Cox,[88] and Simon Dalby[89] – focus on the United States, with only cursory mentions of Europe. Much of this literature is itself bound up in discussions of 'Might and Right' in military and diplomatic terminology,[90] while even recent polemics on historical *empire* cannot escape explicit connections with our own time.[91] We are not particularly interested in this vast literature as it has no connection to discussions of the European Union, whose military impotence and virtual absence of American-style jingoistic and self-righteous nationalism disqualify the EU from being considered *empire* under the criteria laid out by scholarly discussions of post-Cold War "American Empire".

Secondly, much of the literature on *empire* focuses, explicitly or implicitly, on empirical examples from human history. Europe certainly has no shortage of empirical *empire*, but only one case study is to be examined – the European Union. Attempts to link the European Union with historical themes and even specific polities will be examined, but only because these links are self-fulfilling prophecies. It is not necessary to sift through the countless examples of *empire* in order to construct an arbitrary and arguably pointless link between the contemporary European Union and one of the spectres of Europe's imperial past.

Thirdly, an exhaustive review of all the different thoughts on what *empire* is will not lead us towards our ultimate goal. It is not the intention here to construct a framework through which we can accuse the European Union of *empire*, pointing to the policies and actions of Brussels in search of an imperial agenda. This itself is not feasible for two reasons. One is that such an approach to *empire*, seeking to identify clear and unique characteristics, is fundamentally flawed. *Empire* defies categorisation – every crime laid at its feet,[92] and every imperial virtue praised by its supporters,[93] exists in the context of other forms of government from the city-states of monarchical Mesopotamia to the nation-states of the democratising,

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[86] Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*.
[87] Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
[88] Cox, 'The Empire's Back in Town', pp. 1-28.
[89] Simon Dalby, 'Regions, Strategies and Empire in the Global War on Terror', *Geopolitics* 12 (2007), pp. 586-606; 'Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics', *Geopolitics* 13 (2008), pp. 413-436; 'Warrior geopolitics: Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and The Kingdom of Heaven', *Political Geography* 27 (2008), pp. 439-455.
[90] Robert Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012).
[91] Richard Drayton, 'Imperial History and the Human Future', *History Workshop Journal Advance Access* (2012), pp. 1-17.
[92] Ibid.; Richard Drayton, 'Why do empires rise?' in Harriet Swain (ed.), *Big Questions in History* (London: Vintage, 2005).
[93] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic, 2004); *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (London: Allen Lane, 2004).

Digital Age world. Another is that, as Philip Pomper makes clear, 'states fulfilling the formal definitions of empire are not to be found'.[94] This is not to say that *empire* has vanished, but rather that the term *empire* is no longer a word which is triumphantly and publicly proclaimed. In order to understand Europe we must first – in light of the above – understand how different scholars interpret *empire* in a specifically European context.

    Empire, as the editors of the *Dictionary of Human Geography* suggest, is commonly understood in its classic sense as 'an extensive territory and polity, encompassing diverse lands and peoples, that is ruled, more or less directly and effectively, by a single person'.[95] This would appear to be a model answer, even allowing the editors to confidently assert that 'there have been over 70 empires in history – including those created by the Romans, Incas, Habsburgs and Ottomans, and by Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union'.[96] Notwithstanding that the Incas, Habsburgs, and Japan were not even aware of each others' existence, and that the Soviet Union defined itself as opposed to *empire*,[97] it is perhaps a stretch to imagine that the precise same form of political organisation (and legitimisation) has existed in complete isolation in different parts and eras of human history. It is thus unsurprising that an immediate qualifier is attached to the model answer: 'Empire has taken diverse forms and eludes a single meaning or definition'.[98] Yet this definition nevertheless points to a near-universal theme in defining *empire* – that it is, at its most basic level, a *specific* and *territorial* phenomenon.

    Empire means many things to many writers. Bernard Porter highlights this semantic difficulty by reminding us that not only the meaning, but the interpretation and perception, of *empire* and its semantic sibling *imperialism* has shifted significantly over time, with the result that identifying *empire* becomes a near-impossible task.[99] Much existing literature only exacerbates this problem, by stretching the definitions of the word until *empire* can mean anything we want it to.[100] While it is an ironic 'imperialism of categories'[101] to impose a single definition upon an extraordinarily complex collection – such as the aforementioned crowbarring of Inca, Habsburg, and Soviet political philosophies into a handy, "one-size-fits-all" definition of *empire* – some form of order is nevertheless necessary if we are to make

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[94] Philip Pomper, 'The History and Theory of *Empires*', *History and Theory, Theme Issue* 44 (2005), p. 6.
[95] Gregory et. al, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 189-190.
[96] Ibid., p. 189.
[97] Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 60; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Empire and Emancipation* (London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 186.
[98] Gregory et. al, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 190.
[99] Porter, *Empire and Superempire*, p. 2.
[100] Ibid., p. 3.
[101] Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World', *Perspectives on Politics* 3:1 (2005), pp. 5-12.

sense of this conceptual chaos. As such, the literature examined below is grouped into two categories based upon their fundamental answers as to what *empire* is. These are: *empire* as defined by characteristics, and *empire* as a historical phenomenon.

2.1.1   '*Murder, incest, and the wearing of expensive jewellery*'[102]

Treating *empire* as a phenomenon based upon its characteristics, is – as the above tongue-in-cheek definition offered by Peter Davidson suggests – far from satisfactory. The immediate problem is that a writer can define *empire* according to whatever characteristics they wish. This is a circular problem. In the absence of an agreed definition, scholars are forced to create their own, yet this only perpetuates the absence of an agreed definition. Attempting to break out of this loop by insisting on a single checklist of characteristics is even less satisfactory – for who is qualified to declare, *ex cathedra*, what does and does not count?

This brings us back to each definition being unique, united only in their diversity. In seeking to identify an imperial ontology, Charles Maier asserts that societies popularly termed *empire* share fundamental features, that 'no matter how they differ in culture and governance, they reveal many common characteristics'.[103] But scholars who identify *empire* as the expression of a particular combination of characteristics, rarely, if ever, agree on the nature of said features. In the absence of a more negotiable structure, these can be divided into *empire* as defined by size and diversity, and *empire* as defined by exclusive violence.

Perhaps the most common characteristic cited in identification of *empire* is the existence of what Howe describes as 'a large, composite, multi-ethnic or multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, divided between a dominant centre and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries'.[104] This combination, or an approximation thereof, forms the basis for a number of mainstream interpretations of *empire*. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande adopt such an approach, defining the EU as empire by ten characteristics ranging from asymmetrical political order through to emancipatory cosmopolitanism.[105] Yet as many subscribers to the characterisable camp acknowledge,[106] themes such as broad

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[102] Peter Davidson, *Atlas of Empires* (London: New Holland Publishers, 2011), p. 8.
[103] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 3.
[104] Howe, *Empire*, pp. 15-31.
[105] Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe [trans. Ciaran Cronin]* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), pp. 62-72.
[106] Leo Blanken, *Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

territorial holdings, territorial integrity or continuity, and the existence of a multi-cultural populace, can be applied to any number of polities – including nation-states and federations who vociferously deny any link to *empire*.[107]

Territorial integrity is an immediate problem. A.N. Wilson identifies this in relation to Britain's self-proclaimed declaration of *Empire* in 1876, wherein concern was raised that calling Britain's far-flung maritime colonies "empire" was invalid as *empire* was popularly interpreted as being territorially coherent.[108] Yet this does not dissuade scholarship from referring to the British "Empire". To again cite a more recent example, we might feel justified in following Ryszard Kapuściński by labelling the Soviet Union as *Empire*.[109] But for all the USSR's vast size and territorial coherence this is not enough to casually label it as such. The modern Russian Federation still comprises the vast majority of Soviet territory, still retains large multi-ethnic populations, and is still, with the exception of the Kaliningrad Oblast, territorially coherent. And yet the Kremlin does not term its governance *empire*. Neither, of course, did the Soviets. While modern scholars and contemporary commentators did, and do, refer to a Soviet Empire,[110] it is doubtful that any career-conscious commissar would describe their brave new world as *empire*.

As for *empire* as being characterisable purely by territorial size or ethnic diversity, where do we draw the line? While the question was raised by Dante in *De Monarchia*[111] and more recently by Yannis Stivachtis,[112] this is an obvious but overlooked question. There is no tipping-point at which annexing another square metre of land, or incorporating a few people who speak a vaguely different dialect, suddenly transforms a state into *empire*. This is illustrated by the coronation of Charlemagne: 'the imperial crown brought with it not a single new subject or soldier, nor an acre of new territory',[113] and is illustrated in reverse by the

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[107] The Council on Foreign Relations records that in response to a journalist's question on whether the USA was engaging in 'empire building' in Iraq, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld replied that 'We don't seek empires. We've never been imperialistic'. Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/american-imperialism-no-need-run-away-label/p5934.

[108] A.N. Wilson, *The Victorians* (London: Arrow, 2002), p. 391.

[109] Ryszard Kapuściński, *Imperium* (London: Granta, 2007).

[110] Dmitri Shlapentokh, 'Lev Gumilev: The Ideologist of the Soviet Empire', *History of European Ideas* 38:3 (2012), pp. 483-492; David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (London: Viking, 1993); Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Raymond Pearson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

[111] Dante Alighieri, *De Monarchia [trans. Herbert Schnieder and Dino Bigongiari* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949).

[112] Yannis Stivachtis, 'The English School and the Concept of "Empire": Theoretical and Practical/Political Implications', *Global Discourse* 3:1 (2013), pp. 41-48.

[113] Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 55.

decline of Byzantium which, from a Mediterranean-spanning superpower in the sixth century, had by 1400 shrunk to the city of Constantinople and a few square miles beyond the walls, inhabited by a dwindling handful of mercenaries and monks. Yet this does not dissuade scholars from clearly differentiating between Charlemagne's *Kingdom* and Charlemagne's *Empire*, and no scholar argues that Byzantium suddenly transformed from *empire* to petty fiefdom once it shrivelled to a certain size.

This concern over scale is also applicable to definitions of *empire* as an unequal relationship between 'core and periphery',[114] wherein a powerful hegemon controls its neighbours for the purpose of shameless extraction and pillage. The model is certainly a valid one and reveals much concerning connections and clashes between cultural, political, social, and economic forces, and it is certainly easy to see core-periphery relationships in historical polities wherein a definitive urban, ethnic, or class-based core – such as the city of Rome, Victorian Britons, or the lickspittles at Napoleon's court – conquered provinces, pillaged their underlings, and adopted the cultures of those they conquered.[115] But defining *empire* purely based on this system is equally tricky. Core-periphery inequality can be identified in all manner of political systems. It would be difficult to claim that medieval manorial feudalism, wherein a core manor extracted surplus from, and wielded power over, peripheral peasant farmsteads, was a form of *empire*. And if it were so, we are left with a definition of *empire* which is again too broad to be useful. Classifying core-periphery as *imperial* by virtue of a vast scale, as does Immanuel Wallerstein's *World-Empires* theory,[116] is again an invaluable insight but leaves us with the same question we identified above – where do we draw the line between *non-empire* and *empire*? If there is indeed a tipping-point, it is somewhere in the vast grey area between the two and identifying it is purely at the whim of the researcher, with no universal consensus.

Territorial size aside, another frequently-cited and apparently definitive characteristic of *empire* is violence. Maier, who goes so far as to assert that the foundation of *empire* is blood,[117] argues that 'the ambition of empire, its territorial agenda, and its problematic

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[114] Simon Dalby, 'Regions, Strategies and Empire in the Global War on Terror', *Geopolitics* 12:4 (2007), p. 586; József Böröcz and Mahua Sarkar, 'What is the EU?', *International Sociology* 20:2 (2005), pp. 153-156; Magal Gravier, 'The Next European Empire?', *European Societies* 11:5 (2009), pp. 627-647.

[115] Philip Dwyer and Alan Forrest (eds.), *Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 61-78, 185-202; Alistair Horne, *The Age of Napoleon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 2004), pp. 51-80.

[116] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

[117] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 20.

frontiers create an intimate and recurring bond with the recourse to force'.[118] Richard Drayton takes this to a more emphatic conclusion, arguing that *empire* is little more than 'the subordination of one community to a power that has the monopoly on legitimate violence within a frontier'.[119] This characteristic of monopolistic violence is perhaps applicable to some polities which have called themselves "empire", and is illustrated by those imaginations of the USA as an 'American Empire' reliant on its unparalleled military machine to wage a perpetual war on 'barbaric threats to civilization'[120]. But this characteristic is neither definitive of *empire* nor is it pertinent to the EU. Violence is by no means exclusive to *empire*.[121] It is arguable that the very nature of the State – *any* State – is that the State alone has the authority and legitimacy to perpetrate acts of violence against its populace.[122] Manifest violence is found in all manner of polities, while even structural violence is far from exclusive to the so-called *empires*.[123] And if there is one polity which does not appear to be built on blood, it is the European Union. Perhaps instead, the answer lies in *empire* as a historical phase.

2.1.2 *'The Last Gasp of a Moribund System'*[124]

Thus is the description given by Lenin in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, perceiving *imperialism* and *empire* to be a stage in an inevitable historical process. While the exact nature of the stage can be disputed, the idea that *empire* is a phenomenon (specific to time and space) is an established interpretation.

   Empire is, as John Darwin argues, frequently perceived as a recent historical phenomenon rooted in European territories and European attitudes, a Modern Age expression of economic avarice and systemised social prejudice in which the non-industrial world became subordinated to Europe's squabbling hegemonies in a quest for resources, power, and vainglorious pomp.[125] Building upon the distinction between *being* and *having empire*,

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[118] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 19.
[119] Drayton, 'Why do empires rise?', pp. 59-60.
[120] Dalby, 'Warrior geopolitics', p. 439.
[121] Russell Foster, 'Between these two kinds of death', *Global Discourse* 2:iii (2013), pp. 1-13.
[122] Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. .296-297296-297
[123] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research* 6:3 (1969), pp. 167-191.
[124] Vladimir Lenin , *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International, 1977).
[125] Darwin, *After Tamerlane*, p. 22. This is further compounded by Western scholars using the word *empire* to describe societies – such as the *Dictionary of Human Geography*'s Incas, Ottomans, and Japan – which emerged with little or no interference from Europeans. This point will be addressed later in the chapter.

Darwin acknowledges that appropriative *empire* – in which resources and peoples are extracted, usually violently, for the benefit of a static core – is perhaps understandable as a European invention of recent centuries. Similarly, a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of *empire* is historically based. While Marx himself had remarkably little to say on *empire*,[126] Lenin's hypothesis interprets *empire* and *imperialism* as the inevitable consequence of the capitalist mode of production and capitalism's quest for new markets.[127] Thus, *empire* in this sense emerges only at a particular period in the historical dialectic, as part of a unique and distinct merging of economy and geopolitics, and at a specific place and a particular moment in human history. Two problems emerge with this chronological approach of viewing *empire* as a time- and place-specific phenomenon.

First is the blurring of *empire* and *imperialism.* Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey remind us that the two may be related, but are distinguishable and not necessarily mutually inclusive.[128] It is possible – as human history demonstrates – for a state which scholars would not hesitate to call *empire* to reject an *imperial* policy of actively annexing territory and assimilating other populations. The self-styled, pre-capitalist *empire*s of Early Modern Europe, in particular the Holy Roman Empire, bear witness to *empire*'s ability to remain geopolitically fixed without trying to assimilate the world.[129] Simultaneously, it is equally possible for a "non-empire", for example an ethnically homogeneous nation-state, to pursue a foreign policy few would hesitate to dub *imperial*. Historical examples illustrate this. We could easily identify such a phenomenon in the rise of Venice, which, despite the city's miniscule size in comparison to the vast hegemons of mainland Europe and despite its equally tiny and ethnically near-identical population, pursued a highly aggressive *imperial* policy of expansion, extraction, and conquest throughout the Early Modern Period.[130] Similarly, the jingoistic colonisers of late nineteenth-century Europe – particularly Britain

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[126] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Empire and Emancipation* (London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 186.
[127] Tom Bottomore (ed.), *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 223; Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: a critical survey* (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 20.
[128] However in the absence of a more appropriate adjective, *imperial* is used herein purely as an adjective form of the noun *empire*. For a discussion of the differences between *empire*, *imperial*, and *imperialism*, see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: *Empire* and International Relations', *Millennium* 31:1 (2002), p. 111.
[129] While the Holy Roman Empire's borders were only officially demarcated under the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the Empire itself ceased to expand following the imperial *Reichstag* of 1495. This 'territorial absolutism' fixed the Empire in space. Subsequent territorial expansion was undertaken in the name of client kingdoms of the Empire – particularly Austria, and later Prussia – but this was not an official policy pursued by individual emperors in the name of the Empire itself. See Peter Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire 1495-1806* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 65-69. Similarly the Austrian (Austro-Hungarian after 1867) Empire of 1806-1919 made no attempt at expansion during its lifetime. Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, pp. 50, 55-60.
[130] John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (London: Penguin, 2003).

and France – demonstrated this tendency towards democratic, nationalistic *imperialism*:[131] the antithesis of *empire*'s purported polyculturalist assimilationism.[132] Without wishing to obfuscate the issue, it is therefore necessary in this understanding to separate *empire* and *imperialism* as *polity* and *policy*. The policy of *imperialism* can be, and has been, pursued by all manner of political figureheads from Pharaohs to Presidents. *Imperialism* does not necessarily occur alongside, nor is exclusive to, *empire*.

The second, related problem, is interpreting *empire* as the inevitable consequence of historical forces. We might concede that *imperialism* is a relatively recent by-product of capitalism. A term perhaps even more contested than *empire*, *imperialism* did not enter the modern lexicon until the early twentieth century[133] and its meaning, established by Lenin and Hobson, stressed economic forces.[134] It was not until Joseph Schumpeter that *imperialism* came to acquire a meaning of hard economic and military power, which even then was still bound up in the context of military power simply as a means to an economic, not geopolitical, end.[135]

But this monocausal approach does not fit, even in the late-Victorian heyday of *imperialism*. Jonathan Hart points out the spectrum of factors which contributed to *imperialist* expansion – the desire for prestige, *mission civilisatrice*, geopolitical rivalry, and the actions of individuals expanding *empire* without consulting their governments[136] – of which economic forces are only one factor.[137] Indeed, given the extraordinarily low levels of colonial trade and investment which characterised non-British Victorian imperialism,[138] the Marxist approach to viewing *empire* and imperialism as the product of commercial interests, is negligible. Furthermore, *empire* – in the understanding of a large, territorially-bound polity – far predates *imperialism* and indeed is older than any other form of organised society above the level of the Copper Age city-state.[139] We are forced to conclude that while *imperialism* may offer an invaluable tool for understanding relations in the age of capitalism, this deterministic, historical-phenomenological approach to understanding *empire* in the entirety of human history is not completely adequate.

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[131] Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2002), pp. 30-45.
[132] Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 10-12, 215.
[133] Howe, *Empire*, p. 8.
[134] Andrew Erskine, *Roman Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 4.
[135] Ibid., p. 4.
[136] Porch, *Wars of Empire*, pp. 189-195.
[137] Hart, *Comparing Empires*.
[138] Porch, *Wars of Empire*, pp. 36-38.
[139] Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*.

2.2 European Empire

As Maier points out, attempting to conclusively apply or reject the label *empire* to any polity on the basis of its characteristics inevitably traps the argument in a logical loop, whereby the conclusion compels readers to return to the definition offered at the beginning.[140] No single model which claims to define *empire* – be it through monopolistic access to violence, cultural heterogeneity, or geopolitical size – is either universal or satisfactory at distinguishing *empire* from a nation-state. Charles Porter sees the same problem when stating that *empire* 'is only a word. You can use it any way you like (so long as you make that definition clear)'.[141] This is *empire*'s greatest strength and most vulnerable weakness – the word is flexible and nuanced, but can so easily become vague or inappropriate. Ultimately it is as futile to establish a check-list of *imperial* characteristics as it is to construct links – and distinguish them from other political forms – between the purported *empire*s of Incas, Habsburgs, and Soviets.

It is neither necessary nor possible to examine the manifold ways in which *empire* has been interpreted even in recent years. Much contemporary discourse on *empire* surrounds the United States, which is not relevant to this thesis, while even in a specifically European context arguments are constructed upon the EU's policies. This is equally irrelevant here. However, a review of existing imaginations of European Empire and their 'different, fiercely contested meanings'[142] in relation to the EU. It is to this point that we turn.

2.2.1 Colonial Europe

We will examine theories of European Empire both chronologically and thematically, as this approach enables us to construct a logical approach leading towards the next section's discussion of *empire* as a discourse. This first segment therefore addresses the earliest reference to Europe as *empire* in the scholarly literature: József Böröcz's claim of neo-colonialism and economic *empire*.

Böröcz highlights the Union's Eastern Enlargement as the defining feature of European *empire*, a modern continuation of Western Europe's historical role as prime advocate of an imperial-colonial teleology.[143] Böröcz's argument that the Union considers

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[140] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 3.
[141] Porter, *Empire and Superempire*, p. 2.
[142] Howe, *Empire*, p. 9.
[143] Böröcz, *'Empire* and Coloniality'.

itself to be *the* Europe to the exclusion of non-EU Europe, and that the Union enforces this through a conscious policy of exclusion, is perhaps the dominant characteristic of this imperial model. Böröcz interprets the Union as an exclusionist polity which pursues a somewhat haphazard and *ad hoc* approach to *empire*, reflective of the on-the-spot nature of so much nineteenth-century European foreign policy.[144] Of particular relevance is the issue of whether Eastern Enlargement reflects not only an *imperialist* policy of territorial expansion, but whether this also reflects a desire to establish a visible boundary between the *empire* and the 'wild zones' beyond the eastern frontier. Furthermore, Böröcz's claim that the Union defines itself through a policy of 'inequality, marginalization, and exclusion'[145] relates not only to this issue of the external frontier, but also to Böröcz's own assertion that the European Union perceives itself to *be* Europe.

 Böröcz's theory is classically Leninist, and is ultimately defined by economic inequality:[146] namely that the Union expands in order to monopolise markets and impose its own economic hegemony on an area. Further, Böröcz's contention that the EU deliberately maintains the East in an economically inferior position in order to benefit the West, has strong Leninist connotations. It may be possible to imagine the Union as a specifically territorial manifestation of Hardt and Negri's *Empire*: an entity defined by economic rather than political force, and yet an *empire* in that it is territorially limited and seeks to expand its control for the benefit not of the whole, but a privileged group (i.e. the Western EU). This interpretation of European Empire contrasts with the next theme, that of neo-medievalism. Yet there is one significant similarity: inequality.

2.2.2 The Holy European Empire[147]

Jan Zielonka perceives the EU not as a conglomerate of dominant states pressuring their weaker neighbours, but rather as a 'neo-medieval' state built on a blurred and decentralised structure. In this imagination the EU is a system of inherent inequality, yet one in which all

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[144] Porch, *Wars of Empire*, pp. 106-158.
[145] Böröcz, '*Empire* and Coloniality'; József Böröcz and Mahua Sarkar, 'What is the EU?', *International Sociology* 20:2 (2005), pp. 37, 153-156.
[146] Ibid., p. 154.
[147] The official title of the Holy Roman Empire (800-1806), Europe's longest-lasting pancontinental state, was *Sacrum Imperium Romanorum* or *Heiliges Römisches Reich Teutscher Nation* (after 1512). Beck and Grande remind us of the danger of invoking the word *Reich* in relation to the EU, however the word is used here as a shorter version of the cumbersome *Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* or its abbreviation, and not to associate the EU with the 1933-1945 use of *Reich*. Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, p. 9.

members are equally unable to gain dominance.[148] In his discussion of the difficulties of establishing a homogenised European culture, centralised power, and pan-European institutions with defined roles and parameters – a goal made more difficult with the incorporation of Eastern European members – Zielonka thus equates the current EU with the medieval version of the Holy Roman Empire.

For Zielonka, the medieval *Reich* is the logical equivalent of the EU; a polity defined by 'multilevel governance… of concentric circles, fuzzy borders, and soft forms of external power [predating] the rise of nation states, democracy, and capitalism'.[149] Zielonka's Europe is defined by 'overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements, and multiple identities' co-existing in a single loose organisation.[150] This concept posits that the European Union is held together not through political coercion but through a sense of common identity as 'Europeans', enabling Zielonka to equate the pluralistic EU with the loose alliance of the pre-Westphalian Holy Roman Empire – two universalising entities which define themselves through contrast to a constructed and artificially enhanced Other, and which have multiple layers of relatively limited political or economic control organised in a decentralised structure.

These are bold claims which run in direct contrast to the theories of Böröcz and Beck and Grande, who perceive the Union as one of hard borders and an overt capitalist mission. We do not need to delve into Zielonka's policy-based critiques in order to assess the value of his argument, as this is neither relevant to the research nor necessary, as three critical concerns are raised immediately.[151]

Our first concern is the nature of the Holy Roman Empire, and particularly the late-medieval version with which Zielonka equates the EU.[152] As Peter Wilson makes clear, the Holy Roman Empire was a highly complex, frequently contradictory entity which went through many territorial and policy shifts.[153] Indeed for Thomas Blanning, 'the only way to approach [the HRE] is to love anomaly, as the Empire did not fit any recognized pattern'.[154]

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[148] Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-11.

[149] Ibid., p. 1.

[150] Ibid., p. 15.

[151] It must be stated that a critique of Zielonka is itself restricted by the relative lack of English-language scholarship on the *Sacrum Imperium Romanorum*. Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 3-4.

[152] It is necessary to establish a distinction between Early- and Late-Medieval. Not only did European societies experience significant social and economic developments between the pre- and post- 1350 period, but these were inherently qualitative rather than quantitative changes. Davies, *A History of Medieval Europe*, pp. 5-17.

[153] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 2-5.

[154] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 12.

This is crucial, as Zielonka does not specify historical parameters and it cannot be inferred just which particular permutation of the *Reich* he is examining,[155] and his version borders on a pastiche of different versions of the *Reich* which did not exist simultaneously.[156] This is not mere nitpicking: as Wilson reminds us, the Empire underwent drastic constitutional and territorial changes throughout its life, and especially between the Papal Bull of 1356 and the *Reichstag* of 1495.[157] Both of these dates fall within Zielonka's unclear timeframe, to say nothing of the other nine hundred years of the *Reich*'s existence. Zielonka is right to call the European Union an 'unidentified political object',[158] but it is not entirely satisfactory to equate the Union with a polity whose very nature was as confusing and contradictory to its own subjects[159] as it is to us.[160]

The second, related critique to be raised is the historiographic concern. Our interpretation, understanding, and knowledge of the *Reich* are tangled in a web of historiographical problems.[161] Zielonka interprets the Holy Roman Empire in a particular way, and ultimately arrives at a model of the *Reich* which is cobbled together from anachronistic characteristics and themes. And while it could be argued that it is the themes of the *Reich*, rather than the specifics which Zielonka wishes to examine, these themes themselves shifted substantially during the Empire's long and confused lifetime.[162]

The third critique is that Zielonka falls victim to the same desire for a checklist as Beck and Grande. His chapters make extensive use of comparative charts to contrast features of the 'Westphalian model' against the 'Neo-medieval model',[163] an admirable effort but one which is hampered by his model's foundations built upon an artificial and anachronistic

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[155] Zielonka's first and final chapters contain the most explicit links between the HRE and the EU. Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, pp. 1-20, 164-189.

[156] For example, in his first comparative chart between 'Westphalian superstate' and 'Neo-medieval empire', Zielonka describes some characteristics of *Empire* as 'soft border zones in flux' and 'divided sovereignty along different territorial lines'. Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 12. These are not only vague, but atemporal. The Holy Roman Empire did have soft border zones until the Golden Bull of 1356, but not afterwards. Likewise, the Empire also had sovereignty divided along distinct territorial lines, but only after the *Reichstags* of 1495 and 1519. See Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 40-42.

[157] The Golden Bull of 1356, intended to regulate the imperial electoral process, had the side-effect of establishing the territorial margins of the Empire and effectively prevented the *Reich* from expanding. While component states of the Holy Roman Empire were free to pursue their own territorial agendas, the Empire as a whole became fixed in space. The meeting of the Imperial Aulic Council, or *Reichstag*, in 1495 initiated an imperial reform movement which saw executive power shift significantly from the Emperor to the constituent princes – an early anticipation of the 1648 Westphalian peace accords. Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 20-21; James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire: Chronicon Edition* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871), pp. 261-273.

[158] Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, p. 4.

[159] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[160] Ibid., pp. 4-8.

[161] Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire Vol. I: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-1648* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 1-14.

[162] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 34-65.

[163] Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, pp. 12, 93, 120, 153.

model of the Empire, and a historiographic interpretation which does not take into account the remarkably complex, self-contradictory, and perpetually shifting political nature of the medieval *Reich*. Further, by constructing a model of the Holy Roman Empire against which he can compare the Union, Zielonka's thesis becomes caught up in a circular logic – the European Union is a neo-medieval *empire* simply because it fits the criteria of neo-medieval imperialism set out at the beginning.[164] This is precisely what Maier warns us of – that examining *empire* based upon its characteristics is perfectly acceptable if "*empire*" is defined at the outset, but that a definition of *empire* which relies on a checklist of characteristics will simply 'compel readers to return to the beginning' in an endless loop.[165]

However, this is not to say that Zielonka's model is without use. Reading Zielonka has obliged us to examine the nature of the Holy Roman Empire, and the imaginative discourses in which this unusual state remains wrapped.[166] This will be returned to later in the chapter. One such characteristic is the curious and self-contradictory status of European universalism. Holy Roman Emperors, as Wilson points out, were frequently guided by a concept of Universal Monarchy: a medieval Manifest Destiny of 'pan-European pretensions'[167] whereby the rulers of the *Reich* imagined that their sovereignty was, and should be, global.[168] Many *Kaisers* 'claim[ed] to represent the secular arm of a single Christian Europe ... with an assumed pre-eminence over all European rulers'; when combined with 'the empire's pan-European pretensions, and the fragmented nature of [its] sovereignty with its diffusion of political authority and overlapping jurisdictions', a curious similarity is drawn out.[169] A fundamental characteristic of the Empire was evidently its pretensions to European universality, with the executive office perceiving itself to be 'the direct continuation of the universal ideal of Rome'.[170] This hearkening back to Rome is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, it establishes discourse – this will be addressed later in the chapter. Secondly, it links Zielonka's model on a conceptual level with the next chronological imagination of European Empire – one which similarly identifies a continuation of an imperial discourse.

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[164] Zielonka, *Europe as Empire*, pp. 9-20. However it must be noted that Zielonka is well aware of 'The Uses and Abuses of Models'. Ibid., p. 14.

[165] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 3.

[166] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 4-8.

[167] Dante, *De Monarchia*, p. ix.

[168] Diplomatic documents record that by the twelfth century, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I (Barbarossa) was claiming universal jurisdiction not only over the Germans and Italians, but indeed *all* Europeans. See James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire: Chronicon Edition* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871), pp. 167-173. Peter Wilson notes that, partly in response to other European monarchs' angry reactions, by the Early Modern period *Kaisers* rarely claimed Universal Monarchy. Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 22, 38-39, 71.

[169] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[170] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 6.

2.2.3 Fortress Europe

It was identified above that a recurring theme in discussions of *empire* is expansion. Indeed for Edward Gibbon, expansion was critical to maintaining the stability of *empire* – and in the absence of either the motive or method to broaden imperial frontiers, *empire* will inevitably disintegrate.[171] In the context of the EU, it is certainly possible to see expansion. The Union has enlarged significantly and selectively in the last decade, absorbing new territories in Eastern and Southern Europe while consolidating its presence in existing member-states. Yet according to the interpretations of our first category, Europe pursues an external policy which is far more exclusionary than inviting. This is *Fortress Europe.*

Hartmut Behr perceives the Union as an entity embedded in nineteenth-century 'Standards of Civilization', whereby members of a civilized Core project their standards onto an 'unmodernised' Periphery. [172] This occurs, arguably, on both the internal level between EU members and also on an external level, between the Union and non-Union European states. Of particular interest is Behr's assertion that the Union's external frontier is continually strengthened while internal borders dissolve, establishing a 'Fortress Europe' of shared civilisation defined against the Eastern Other, and that the Union constitutes a Core with 'potential imperiality'[173] surrounded by and pushing outwards to absorb a Periphery of prospective members. In a continuation of what we have identified in Böröcz and Zielonka**,** the value of Behr's imperial image is not that it offers a conglomerate of quantifiable characteristics, but that it rests upon a discourse – in this case, 'Standards of Civilisation'.

Ernst Kantorowicz underlines the singularity inherent to the Holy Roman Empire: the notion that the laws and customs of the *Reich* – and *only* the *Reich*'s – were valid universally.[174] The concept that the Holy Roman Emperor was the one and only source of *necessitas, justitia,* and *providentia* – justice, truth, and destiny[175] – anointed by the grace of the Pope, became a defining feature of the Holy Roman Empire. We see the same pattern in the Union: the Union's laws and customs, and *only* those of the Union, are considered valid and universal. Behr's investigation of the European Union is indistinguishable from Kantorowicz's summary of the Holy Roman Empire – only the standards of the polity in

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[171] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol. I*, Ch.1, pp. 3-26.
[172] Hartmut Behr, 'The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations* 13:2 (2007), pp. 239-262.
[173] Herfried Münkler, *Empires: the logic of world domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 41.
[174] Ernst Kantorowicz in Frances Yates, *Astraea: the imperial theme in the sixteenth century* (London: Routledge, 1975), p. 6.
[175] Ibid., pp. 6-8.

question are considered valid. All others are deviant, and it is the Empire's duty and destiny to triumph over them.

These self-proclaimed standards do not exist in isolation but, as Behr points out, are grounded in a historical imagination of European norms.[176] These norms form a discourse traceable to an entity and an idea which not only forms a model of European Empire in its own right, but connects the discourses of Böröcz, Zielonka, and Behr, and forms a foundation for our ultimate understanding of *empire* as a discourse. This is the entity which later societies sought to emulate, in so doing creating the discourse of *empire*. This road leads back to Rome.

2.2.3 The Senate and People of Europe[177]

'The reader of any Latin text', asserts Niall Rudd, 'is likely to encounter some words which have no exact equivalent in English'.[178] There is perhaps no term of which this is more true than "empire".

Empire is an etymological evolution of the Latin term *imperium*, a sophisticated word with no exact equivalent in modern linguistics, and which is an ineffective translation of the Latin term. The Latin *imperium* is ultimately untranslatable as the many concepts encompassed by the word cannot be condensed into a single term. *Imperium* can be translated as: *a command, order or direction; the right of power or commanding authority; command; class; supreme power; sovereignty, sway, or dominion; chief command; military or civil command; government, governance or governing; rule; parental or spousal authority; office or magistracy; discipline, commander* (in rare form), *a particular instance of dominion attached to a population*, and *to give orders*.[179] All of these can exist in either the civilian or military form, in connection to the divine world or the natural world, and can mean one of these, or several – in any combination – at the same time.

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[176] Behr, 'The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule?', pp. 239-262.
[177] 'The Senate and People of Rome', or *SPQR*, was emblazoned on Roman legionary banners and civic monuments. Harriet Flower, *Roman Republics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science [trans. N.P. Milner]* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993).
[178] Cicero, *The Republic and the Laws [trans. Niall Rudd and Jonathan Powell]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. xxxiv.
[179] Rev. John White and Rev. J.E. Riddle, *A Latin-English Dictionary, 5th Edition* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1876), pp. 828-830; P.G.W. Glare (ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary: Fascicle IV* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 843-845.

Imperium is obviously a very complex term, and at first glance, this variation only intensifies the exasperating vagueness of the word. It is one problem to use a word whose meaning is debated, but it is quite a different problem altogether to rely upon a twenty-century-old loan word from a long-dead language, the terminological intricacies and subtle complexities of which have not survived two thousand years of linguistic evolution. What, then, can be done to enhance our understanding of the concept of *empire*?

The answer to this lies not only in the colossus of Roman political philosophy – Marcus Tullius Cicero – but the historiographic and political discourses in which *empire* has been interwoven since Cicero's day. The value of Cicero's writings is that they make a clear distinction between the subtleties contained within the concept and establish two distinguishable – and manageable – terms. And as Cicero was one of the few Roman scholars whose works survived in almost-complete form in Western Europe following the fall of Rome, his writings have profoundly influenced European thought.

In his works *In Verrum*[180] and *De Officiis*,[181] Cicero distinguishes two related yet theoretically separate ideas. These are the twin concepts of *imperium* and *patrocinium*. Both of these ideas are crucial to our understanding of *empire*, yet both have been neglected in discussions of the post-Roman concept of "empire".

In his polemics on the Roman state, Cicero speaks of two forms of *empire* – *imperium* and *patrocinium*. The first, *imperium*, Cicero defines as the 'power' / 'government' / 'rule' / 'sovereignty' of Rome – the *imperium populi Romani* necessary to establish Rome's 'dominance' / 'command' / 'government' over its non-Roman neighbours.[182] This use of *imperium* is characterised by hard force, which Cicero identified with the early stages of Rome's expansion. Clearly, this is a concept far too intricate to condense into the single (in)convenient word *empire*, not least because the very word *imperium* has conflicting meanings. And as J.S. Richardson highlights, *imperium* has very different meanings depending upon its *domi* (domestic governance) or *militiae* (provincial governance) contexts.[183] Such *imperium*, as Cicero identifies, is not solely brute force used for the nefarious purposes of conquest and brutal coercion to create a single hegemony, but rather a combination of different policies of control necessary for the establishment of what Cicero sees as the essence of *empire*: *patrocinium*.

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[180] *Against Verres* (II, 5) in Cicero, *On Government [trans. Michael Grant]* (London: Penguin Classics, 1993).
[181] *De Officiis* in Cicero, *The Republic and The Laws [trans. Niall Rudd and Jonathan Powell]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[182] Behr, *Theories of the International*, pp. 36-49; Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 5-6, 35.
[183] J.S. Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum: *Empire* and the Language of Power', *Journal of Roman Studies* 81:1 (1991), pp. 1-9.

Like *imperium*, *patrocinium* is a difficult word. *Patrocinium*, while difficult to translate, is somewhat easier to define. Behr places the word into its context as a distinct and manageable concept: 'an international commonwealth'[184] of shared interests and shared power, a *patrocinium orbis terrae*.[185] This is what Cicero defined as a 'government [which] could more accurately be called a protectorate of the world rather than an *empire*'.[186] This distinction between the two terms is critical – *patrocinium* is the end goal, the polity, while *imperium* is (one) means of reaching such a goal, the policy.

Thus we immediately see a conceptual distinction in Cicero's work between the two distinct, yet interwoven, aspects of *empire*. It is clear that the European Union does not pursue anything like the hard-power *imperium* which Cicero identifies as the defining characteristic of Rome's expansion. Equally, it is impossible to ignore the not-insignificant paternalistic attitude demonstrated by the Union's institutions. Behr, Böröcz, Zielonka, and Beck and Grande all acknowledge the paternalistic influence of the Union in that prospective applicants are required to remodel their political constitutions, legal frameworks, economic infrastructures, and social institutions to match those of the Union. The link to Cicero's *patrocinium* is unmistakeable.

It might be asserted at this point that the essence of *empire* has been identified.[187] *Empire*, when viewed through the conceptual lens of Cicero – whose works had such a significant influence upon medieval and Early Modern European thought – is a benign commonwealth defined by unequally shared power and shared sovereignty, under the paternalistic guidance of a core authority. We could cease our investigation here, and begin searching for these themes in the European Union. Yet in the same vein as the already-examined scholars of European Empire, using Cicero creates three problems.

First, Cicero spoke of Rome as a harmonising, universalising power whose self-anointed status of "superiority" justified expansion into neighbouring territories. Yet while Cicero believed that:

> *'our Senate is the harbour and refuge of kings, tribes, nations… [seeking] to obtain the highest praise from this one thing – the guarding of the interests of our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith.'*[188]

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[184] Behr, *History of Political Theory*, p. 36.
[185] S.E. Smethurst quoted in Behr, *History of Political Theory*, p. 45.
[186] Cicero, *On Moral Duties* II:8, quoted in Steel, *Rhetoric and Empire,* p. 193.
[187] Russell Foster, 'Tege Imperium! A defence of empire', *Global Discourse* 1:ii (2009), pp. 2-23.
[188] *On Moral Duties* in Cicero, *Selected Works [trans. Michael Grant]* (London: Penguin, 1960), pp. 157-211.

this did not sway his agreement with Cato's concrete conviction that 'the government of Rome [is] superior to that of all other states'.[189] Cicero's writings are not careful, considered treatises on the mechanisms and nature of Roman political power, but are courtroom speeches written to defend or accuse his fellow Senators during Rome's slide from a corrupt Republican plutocracy to a totalitarian military dictatorship – consequently his beliefs on the Roman state are highly emotive polemics on what Rome *should* be, rather than what it actually does. And as Andrew Dyck comments, Cicero did not always practice the high morals which he preached.[190] The result is that Cicero's writings are ambiguous, almost schizophrenic. Caroline Steel[191] highlights this ambivalence in his work, wherein a 'strange mixture of Roman paternalism, patriotic particularism, and philanthropic universalism'[192] leave Cicero's ultimate concept of *Imperium* an unresolved blur: at one moment Rome's *imperium* is benign and generous; the next, it is a harsh hegemon justifying the riposte which Tacitus puts in the mouth of the defeated rebel Calgacus: 'To plunder, slaughter, and rapine they falsely give the name "empire". They make a desolation and they call it "peace"'.[193]

Second, Cicero was a Roman, and – as we shall see – the Romans did not understand their world as a patchwork of neat, bordered countries on a map. Andrew Dyck identifies an inherent problem in the translation of Cicero's preference for *patrocinium*: this implies the supreme rule not of *imperium* (an abstract legal concept with limitless scope and power) but the *patronus* (a person or group of people acting in the role of a patron or parent, with limited scope and power). Cicero, like his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, viewed Rome not as a single state with borders and territories, but as a city which played the role of parent watching over its provincial children, intervening in local affairs only in emergencies. *Patrocinium* thus implies that the provincials' rights must be protected by the Roman parent – something Cicero clearly admires, even if not quite true – in contrast to *imperium*'s implication that Rome wields limitless and brutal power over its cringeing provincial subordinates. And in both *imperium* and *patrocinium*, the emphasis is on *social*, not *spatial*, relationships. This is very different to how we generally understand *empire* today.

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[189] Cicero, *The Republic* II.23, in Cicero, *The Republic and the Laws [trans. Niall Rudd and Jonathan Powell]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[190] Andrew Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero's De Officiis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 401; Nicole Methy, 'John Richardson, "The Language of Empire: Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD" [Review]', *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 9 (2009) *[Non paginé; in French]*. I am grateful to Prof. Jakob Wisse, Chair of Latin at the School of Classics, History and Archaeology, Newcastle University, for providing me with these texts and his interpretations.
[191] C.E.W. Steel, *Cicero, Rhetoric and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-6.
[192] Ibid., p. 15.
[193] Kelly, *The Roman Empire*, p. 22.

Third, it is not the purpose of this chapter to identify *empire* based upon a checklist of characteristics or parallels with any of human history's universalising polities. Turning to Cicero may be useful, but ultimately amounts to a little more than a list which is as unsatisfactory as any other.

We have now identified two distinct but related problems. The first is ontological – what is an *empire*? The second is an issue of epistemology – how can we know that first answer?

The first problem has been approached by numerous scholars who have sought to identify the characteristics of an *empire*. This broad interpretive strategy is sometimes frustrating but as Bernard Porter concedes, it is acceptable to interpret *empire* in any way we wish – so long as we make our definition clear.[194] This enables an initial separation of those scholars who use "empire" in a vague and undefined way, and those who at least offer a reasonable explanation of what is meant. Yet this is not wholly satisfactory. Literature belonging to the first group is overly vague, while the second category suffers from the perpetual problem of attempting to list characteristics. There is no single authority to set a definition, and we would face the unanswerable question of asking which of human history's infinitely broad polities and policies can, and which cannot, be considered *empire*. In the context of specifically European Empire, this problem is even more pronounced. For an analysis of what defines European Empire, what have we learned?

Firstly, we have identified that "*empire*" defies attempts at categorisation and while constructing a list of traits to define *empire* may be acceptable in isolated studies, it is wholly inappropriate for a study of the European Union as *empire*. We are not interested in only one view, and as has been seen, the existing conceptions of European Empire – those of Behr, Böröcz, Zielonka, Beck and Grande, and even interpretations based in Cicero[195] – do not tally together. If the EU *is* an *empire*, it cannot be the *empire* imagined by all of these writers. Böröcz and Zielonka are mutually exclusive; Cicero's universalism and Behr's exclusionism are diametrically opposed; Beck and Grande's lists of imperial traits seem arbitrary and incompatible with similar lists.

Secondly, we have identified that *empire* is a concept even more slippery than was first imagined. When does a state become *empire*? As has been argued, there is no clear

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[194] Porter, *Empire and Superempire*, p. 2.
[195] Russell Foster, 'Tabula Imperii Europae: A Cartographic Approach to the Current Debate on the European Union as Empire', *Geopolitics* 18:2 (2013), pp. 371-402; Russell Foster, 'The New Rome? Towards a Ciceronian Understanding of "European Empire"', *Bulletin of the Political Studies Association*, Spring 2010; Foster, 'Tege Imperium!'.

threshold. A state does not become imperial simply by acquiring a certain amount of territory, adopting a particular style of government, or applying selective policies. Yet it is frequently so interwoven with other forms of social ordering that *empire* becomes indistinguishable.

Faced with these seemingly unsatisfactory findings, we might be tempted to abandon this line of research and settle for what Stephen Maier acknowledges as the only universal characteristic of imperial study – creating an *ad hoc* definition of *empire* to act as a framework. This is not a bad approach. As Maier rightly reminds us, it is perfectly acceptable to construct a unique vision of *empire* which suits the study in question, because *empire* is such an elusive concept.[196] Yet this method is unfeasible here, as the existing interpretations of European Empire can be only roughly synthesised into an imperial framework which is at best an impromptu and unstable framework, at worst a weak conceptual strawman.

However, the preceding review has highlighted one avenue of research which remains as-yet unexplored, and a direction which can lead to a far more thorough understanding of what *empire* is. This avenue ties together the existing theories of European Empire based upon an unusual shared feature. This approach begins with the theory we examined last – Cicero's.

As has been seen, it would appear on the surface that Cicero cannot provide a solution to the lack of an imperial ontology, and that the foremost politician of *the* archetypal *empire* leaves us in just as much of a quandary as anyone else. This is problematic in itself, but another problem immediately emerges. Why should we adopt a Roman understanding, when Rome fell?

The answer is that Rome did not really fall. It survived as a martyr which has influenced Western political and intellectual life for fifteen centuries. Contrary to the dire content of history books from St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* to Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, the overwhelming majority of whom lamented the fiery fall of Rome to what St. Gildas termed the 'dark throngs of worms' from northern Europe,[197] the *idea* of Rome endured. While the multiple arguments on whether Rome collapsed or transformed need not concern us here, it is a fair summary to state that rather than falling victim to cataclysm, the Western Roman Empire merely fizzled out.[198] The deposition in 476 of the last *Imperator*, Romulus Augustulus, 'excited barely a ripple at the time',[199] as Roman government in the

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[196] Maier, *Among Empires*.
[197] Foster, '"Between these two kinds of death"', pp. 1-11.
[198] Adrian Goldsworthy, *How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009).
[199] Stephen Williams and Gerard Friell. *The Rome That Did Not Fall: The Survival of the East in the Fifth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 2.

West had effectively ceased long before. And crucially, although the West ended in 476 the East survived – and frequently prospered – for another thousand years. This requires a fundamental reappraisal, and there remains one invaluable inroad which a study of Cicero offers. While *imperium* in his own lifetime – and that of the Roman state itself – may not have referred to a method of state organisation, the word quickly came to stand for the archetypal "civilised" state, in spite of its original meanings. But returning to the origins of the term itself, is not as fruitful an avenue as might previously have been thought. As Andrew Erskine points out, our understandings of Roman ideology are determined to a significant degree not by what the Romans themselves thought, but how we perceive them. Our own understanding of Rome is so influenced by the international relations of our own time, by the experiences of *empire* that we have endured, that we cannot be certain just what the Roman system of *imperium* was.[200] This historiographic problem is nothing new, and was familiar at least as far back as Edward Gibbon's multi-faceted monumental study of the Roman state.[201] It is not easy to pick a path through this intellectual quagmire in which perceptions determine other perceptions.[202] Yet this reveals a curious aspect of *empire*.

Even returning to Cicero in search of the original meanings and implications of the word is insufficient. Cicero did not coin the words *imperium* and *patrocinium*, and even if he had, we cannot peer into his mind to extract the meaning he gave to them. Relying upon his surviving writings to construct a definition can only go so far as Cicero's own views on Rome and her hegemony fluctuated to a significant degree. As a man who oscillated between philanthropic paternalism and benign universalism, but also a rhetorical cocktail of scathing snobbery and fierce municipal patriotism,[203] Cicero's approach to patrocinial *empire* is confusingly muddled. Furthermore, attempting to peer back into the past to search for truth – or at least verisimilitude – is not a viable strategy. Our interpretations of the past are as contradictory, conjectural, and prone to personal bias as are our perceptions of the present or our forecasts for the future.

However this does not mean that nothing useful can be extracted from these findings. Quite the opposite. The problems identified in the preceding sections – the lack of academic consensus on *empire*, the ontological and epistemological dead-ends, the problem of shifting

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[200] Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 3-6; Neville Morley, *The Roman Empire: Roots of Imperialism* (London and New York: Pluto Press, 2010), pp. 1-13, 128-135.
[201] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, pp. vii-xv.
[202] Chris Jones, *Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Late-Medieval France* (Bruxelles: Brepols, 2007), p. 201.
[203] Cicero, *Defence Speeches [trans. D.H. Berry]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. xi-xxix.

meanings and individual interpretations are all evidence of *empire as a discourse*. And to appreciate the discourse of *empire* we return to where we began – Rome.

Rome's political and military infrastructure indeed ended, but the *ideal* of Rome – what it used to be, and what it continued to be in the East – endured and was emulated by the new Germanic peoples of Western Europe: Roman religion, Roman fashion, Roman language, and Roman *imperium*.[204] Or rather, what the new rulers of Europe imagined *imperium* to be. We thus return not to Rome as it existed in space and time, an Italian city and its hinterlands in the late Iron Age, but "Rome" as it existed in the imaginations of Greeks and Germans in the Early Middle Ages. This is the cornerstone of medieval historiography: the transference of power, better known as *translatio imperii*.

2.3   *TRANSLATIO IMPERII*

> *'Who may hear, without being upset, the question being debated among these learned fellows, whether the Roman* imperium *be in Rome? With the kingdoms of the Parthians, Persians and Medes located among the Parthians, Persians and Medes, are we then to believe that the* imperium *of the Romans will wander around? Who can stomach such vile stuff? Who would not rather heave it up from the very pit of his being? If the Roman* imperium *is not in Rome then where, I ask, is it?'*[205]

Petrarch
Liber Sine Nomine, Letter IV

The concept of *translatio imperii* is not to every scholar's taste. Petrarch's rhetorical rescript in *Liber Sine Nomine* is written as a condemnation of the by-then established idea that the civilising mission of Caesar and Augustus had been appropriated by newcomers. Writing the above passage in the autumn of 1352, the words of this fourteenth-century poet – his pride chafing from his friend's recent arrest by the authorities of the *Heiliges Reich*[206] – are not so dissimilar from Liudprand's diatribe nearly four centuries previously. For just as

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[204] Yitzhak Hen, *Roman Barbarians: The Royal Court and Culture in the Early Medieval West* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[205] Petrarch, *Liber Sine Nomine* IV, in Norman Zacour, *Petrarch's 'Book Without A Name'. A Translation of the Liber Sine Nomine* (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973), pp. 46-48; Frances Yates, *Astraea: the imperial theme in the sixteenth century* (London: Routledge, 1975), pp. 13-14.

[206] Zacour, *Book Without A Name*, pp. 44-45.

the Italian Liudprand had complained about *imperium* being appropriated by the Greeks, the Italian Petrarch complains about it being appropriated by the Germans. In his bitterness, Petrarch asks a rhetorical question to state that Roman *imperium* is still solely in Rome, despite what the Teutons claim. However, there is a problem.

When Petrarch was writing, his beloved Rome, abandoned even by the Papacy who had fled to Avignon, was 'a malarial, malodorous city known to be in the last stages of dilapidation and decay, perpetually torn apart by a corrupt aristocracy and a famously unpredictable rabble'[207] whose complete lack of power in the face of even the collapsing "Rome" of the Greeks and the stagnant "Rome" of the Germans[208] made the shabby, run-down Rome of Liudprand's day look positively attractive. This only makes Petrarch's sarcastic question even more pertinent for us. If *imperium* is really not in Rome, where is it? The answer, as we shall see here, is that *empire* exists purely in the mind.

We began this chapter by eavesdropping on Liudprand and Leo's angry argument over who, and what, may legitimately claim *imperium*. It appears on the surface that limited progress has been made towards answering this question. By analysing those imaginations of European Empire prevalent in academic writing, some useful themes have been drawn out, most notably the theme of inequality. But by rejecting historical phenomenalism and characteristics, the investigation has seemingly become bogged down in loose conceptions which are only vaguely related to one another. József Böröcz argues that a model of European Empire must begin with a minimalist concept,[209] and while Anthony Pagden is correct in stressing the limited utility of simple definitions for so broad a concept as *empire*,[210] a foundation is required. Have we come any closer to reaching this foundation? Can we identify European Empire? The answer is yes – albeit not by constructing a check-list of characteristics which render a state "imperial", but by identifying the issues which lead us to propose that *empire is a discourse.*

Discourse means different things to different scholars, but key features are shared. Discourses exist in language and are perpetually evolving: 'discourses are primarily instrumental devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings'.[211] Crucially, 'everyday attitudes and behaviour, along with *our perceptions of what we believe to be*

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[207] John Julius Norwich's description of Rome in Petrarch's time. Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 213.

[208] Byzantium by this point was a bankrupt rump state barely clinging on to Constantinople, while 'The [Western] Empire, even in Germany, had lost its strength and cohesion'. Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 186.

[209] Böröcz, '*Empire* and Coloniality', pp. 16-20.

[210] Pagden, 'Imperialism', p. 2.

[211] David Howarth, *Discourse* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), p. 3.

reality, are shaped and influenced by the discursive practices and interactions we engage in and are exposed or subjected to'.[212]

We can expand on this. David Campbell outlines two critical characteristics of discourse. Discourses are firstly heterogeneous, ' not the product of a single author or institution … they come to have a dominant form over time, but … they are constantly having to be reproduced'. Secondly, they are embedded 'in institutions, practices, and subject-positions'.[213] A political idea such as *empire* might thus be thought of not as a polity, but as 'a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced.'[214] – empire as a discourse.[215]

Imagining *empire* as discourse is not entirely novel. In his imagination of European Empire, Behr hints in this direction when briefly mentioning the ability of political agents to 'formulate a particular vision of the political world in order to act upon it',[216] while Erskine stresses that the *idea* of Rome is more powerful than the *truth* of Rome – regardless of the polity's actual nature.[217] And Richardson explores how, in all of its manifestations from 'Charlemagne to the Tsars, from British imperialism to Italian Fascism', the imaginative paraphernalia of the Romans 'have been essential elements in the self-expression of imperial power'.[218] This meme of replicating Rome is what Michael McCormick terms '*imitatio imperii*',[219] a common phenomenon in Early Medieval Europe in both West and East[220] which formed part of the emerging discourse of *translatio imperii*.

A state, a society, a civilisation, does not become *empire* when it reaches a geopolitical and social critical mass. There is no stage at which sufficient factors – size of territory, diversity of population, number of monarchs serving an "emperor" – fuse together into *empire*. Sargon of Akkad did not build Earth's first *empire* when he had conquered a

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[212] David Grant, Tom Keenoy and Cliff Oswick (eds.), *Discourse and Organization* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 2 (emphasis added).
[213] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 166-167.
[214] Ibid., p. 166.
[215] Judy Delin, *The Language of Everyday Life* (London: Sage, 2000); Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland (eds.), *The Discourse Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
[216] Behr, *Imperial Rule*, p. 249.
[217] Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 71-82.
[218] Richardson, *Imperium Romanum,* p. 1.
[219] Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: triumphal rulership in late antiquity, Byzantium, and the early medieval West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 10; Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities in the Middle Ages*, p. 223.
[220] Michael Greenhalgh argues that even the Byzantines felt the need to appropriate the past to legitimise the present – 'in response to the sack of 1204 … the Byzantines' "need to assert their Greek identity and reattach themselves to their ancient roots in the face of external threats" … could be traced to Emperors such as Theodosius I, Michael VIII or Heraclius, who were all "anxious to link their rule to an ancient and revered past"'. Greenhalgh, *Survival of Antiquities*, pp. 241-242.

particular number of neighbouring towns.[221] Instead it is through the invocation of the word "empire" in the discourses surrounding a polity or policy, which renders an entity imperial. To explain this tricky thought, let us return not specifically to Cicero, but more broadly to the Roman state.

As the archetypal *empire* – the state with which medieval,[222] Early Modern,[223] Victorian,[224] and even twentieth-century polities[225] attempted to link themselves – returning to Rome offers a potential solution to this quandary. Erskine asserts that 'no *empire* is the same, but all this makes Rome good to think with and shows too that imperialism often defies easy categorisation'.[226] This latter statement is patently true. The former claim – that Rome is a good model with which to examine *empire* – is accurate for the wrong reason. We have identified the manifold interpretations and uses of *imperium*, a word connoting much to do with the Roman state. Yet it is curious to note that the Romans themselves did not refer to their state using this word. It is this apparent piece of trivia which sheds light upon *empire* as a discourse, and as such a historical examination of this discursive development is warranted.

Imperium clearly appears in the original writings of such classical Roman writers as Cicero, Livy, Suetonius, and Tacitus. Unsurprisingly, as it is after all a Roman word. Yet its use by the Romans was markedly different from the many ways in which we use *empire*. Similarly, we must avoid the word *imperialism*. The Romans lacked such a word, and indeed the very concept.[227] Moreover, since its inception *imperialism* has been bound up in specific historical metanarratives such as those of Hobson, Lenin, and Schumpeter,[228] and questions of political morality to the point whereby it has become a catch-all portmanteau applied indiscriminately to any unsavoury political project.[229] We have already seen how Cicero sought to explain the term politically – we shall go a little further, to the very origins of the word.

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[221] Howe, *Empire*, p. 36.
[222] Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 17-20.
[223] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 12-41; Folz, *Medieval Empires*, pp. 155-162.
[224] Neville Morley, *Antiquity and Modernity* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 1-20.
[225] Atkinson and Cosgrove 'Urban Rhetoric', pp. 37-38.
[226] Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 5.
[227] Craig Champion (ed.), *Roman Imperialism: readings and sources* (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3; Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum'.
[228] Champion, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 3.
[229] Ibid.

2.3.1 'The Possession of the Supreme Power'

We begin with the proto-Indo-European verb *pera*, from which springs the early Latin word *imperare*, roughly translated as "to command" or "to order [something] to be done".[230] From *imperare* developed *imperator*, 'a Latin title of portentous ambiguity'[231] which is the ultimate root of our word *emperor* and its equivalents in most European languages. Yet its meaning today, as a formal rank in the hierarchy of monarchs and palace protocol, is very different to its original meaning as a military honorific.

The origin of *imperator* was well-known to contemporaries in both ancient Rome and medieval Europe. As the Byzantine chronicler John Zonaras wrote of Republican Rome:

> 'When any great victory worthy of a triumph had been won, the soldiers immediately hailed the general as *imperator*'.[232]

<div align="right">

John Zonaras
Historias VII.xxi

</div>

However the word appears to have been nuanced even as early as Republican Rome. Writing long before John Zonaras, Cassius Dio's third-century chronicle already recounted that:

> '[Julius Caesar] assumed the title of *imperator*. I do not here refer to the title which had occasionally been bestowed, in accordance with the ancient custom, upon generals in recognition of their victories ... but rather the title in its other use, which *signifies the possession of the supreme power*'.[233]

<div align="right">

Cassius Dio
Histories LII.xlii.iii

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And writing in medieval Spain some two centuries after the Western Roman Empire officially ended, Isidore of Seville records that:

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[230] R.E. Latham (ed.) *A Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* (London: British Academy, 1975), pp. 1245-1250.
[231] Holland, *Millennium*, p. 66.
[232] John Zonaras, *Epitome* 7.21. Cited in Champion, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 92.
[233] Cassius Dio, *Roman History [trans. Earnest Cary],* Book LII Ch. XLII, v. III, (London: William Heineman, 1917), p. 187 (emphasis added).

'For the Romans, the title *imperator* was at first given only to those on whom supremacy in military affairs was settled, and therefore the *imperatores* were so called from "commanding" (*imperare*) the army. But although generals held command for a long time with the title of *imperator*, the senate decreed that this was [to be] the name of Augustus Caesar only, and he would be distinguished by this title from other "kings" of nations. To this day the successive Caesars have employed this title'.[234]

Isidore of Seville
Etymologiae IX.iii.14

Imperator, then, was originally an adulatory and vague title. Many *imperators* existed in the Roman Republic, and under the lengthy military dictatorship of Sulla this military word acquired connotations of supreme military *and* political power. By the civil wars of the first century BC, the right to use the title was highly contested between military-political rivals.[235] By the time Rome staggered out from a half-century of civil wars, suicides, and assassinations which eliminated all other *Imperators* – Marius, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar, Marc Antony, Metellus Scipio, and Brutus – the only *Imperator* to survive in the now-highly militarised and politically centralised Roman world was Caesar's adopted son Octavian. When the remnant of the Roman Senate, eager to avoid another round of civil wars, named Octavian *Caesar* and *Augustus* and confirmed his personal monopoly on the title of *Imperator*, the word became a solitary title signifying supreme rule.[236] Following Augustus' death and the passing of his executive powers to his own adopted son Tiberius – and thence to Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and so forth – the title *Imperator* became, alongside *Dominus*,[237] *Augustus, Princeps,*[238] *Pontifex Maximus*, *Pater Patriae*,[239] and *Caesar*,[240] one

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[234] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* IX.iii.14 (parenthesised words in original).

[235] In *Roman Lives*, Plutarch demonstrates how the title and its connotations were contested between the generals Sulla and Pompey the Great, and the civilian Senate (*Life of Sulla*, Chs.xxx-xxxiv). By the time of Pompey's defeat by Caesar at Pharsalus, the word had acquired sufficient connotations of supreme power that Plutarch was able to draw a tragic poetic contrast between the first time a victorious Pompey had been hailed by his vast armies as *Imperator* (*Life of Pompey*, Ch.viii), and the fleeing, destitute Pompey being hailed as *Imperator* by his highest-ranked remaining loyalist – the skipper of a fishing boat. Plutarch, *Roman Lives [trans. Robin Waterfield]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[236] In the Preface to his monumental *Naturalis Historiae*, Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD) dedicates the work to the emperor Vespasian: 'Libros Naturalis Historiae, novicium Camenis Quiritium tuorum opus, natos apud me proxima fetura licentiore epistula narrare constitui tibi, iucundissime **Imperator; sit enim haec tui praefatio**, verissima' – 'This treatise on Natural History, a novel work in our literature, which I have just finished, I have taken the liberty of dedicating to you, most gracious **Imperator, an appellation peculiar to you**'. Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historiae [trans. R. Gibson]* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 1.

[237] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol I*, ch.13, p. 225.

[238] "First Speaker of the Senate", or "First Citizen". Under the Republic this was, like all magisterial posts, a temporary position; Octavian was awarded the Principate for life. Since Antiquity, historians have pointed to Octavian's concentration of power as the bridge between Republic and *Empire*. Yet in recent decades, historians

of several titles awarded by soldiers or Senators to signify the concentration of legislative, religious, military, and executive power in a single individual, totalling one hundred and forty-seven men between 27 BC and 476 AD who historians consider "Roman Emperors".[241] Thus the word acquired connotations of what Dio describes above as 'the possession of the supreme power': the supreme power of *imperium.*

Imperium also derives from *imperare.* The word originally designated an *imperator*'s command of a Roman military unit, 'and by extension, the geographical area where such a command would be obeyed'.[242] From this, the term evolved. Richardson identifies that as early as the second century AD, *imperium* had shifted in meaning from a word signifying the specific military authority wielded by certain individuals, to a word signifying the concept of authority itself – and the government apparatus with which it was associated.[243] Indeed for Cassius Dio, *imperium* had already acquired multiple meanings all at the same time.[244] But while *imperium* meant many things in the *context* of the state, at no point did *imperium* refer to the state itself.[245] It remained, like its associated terms *maiestas* and *auctoritas*,[246] one of several words signifying a particular form of political power bestowed by the Senate upon certain office-holders. To illustrate, let us consider a selection of passages from the original Cicero who, as a *novo homus* or "New Man", did not speak and write in Greek as did his rich, Greek-educated Roman peers, but instead in the everyday Latin of the Roman masses whose submission and support required the wielding of visible *imperium*:

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have stressed the far more numerous continuities than changes between the two apparent eras, with the Roman system of governance gradually evolving over the centuries and remaining, right up until the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a *de facto* Republic. Flower, *Roman Republics*, chs. 2-3; Kelly, *Roman Empire*, pp. 1-4; Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 1-5.

[239] Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, p. 616.

[240] Price, *Story of Titles*, pp. 22-25. Interestingly, the Byzantines seem to have used *Constantine* in the same way, making a personal name into a title just as the title *Imperator* became a personal name. Wright, *Liudprand of Cremona*, p. 266.

[241] This number does not include co-emperors, pretenders, or the ninety-four men and women who ruled simultaneously or singly from Constantinople between the *partitio imperii* of 395 AD and the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, pp. 384-387.

[242] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[243] Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum', p. 2.

[244] Ibid., pp. 3, 6.

[245] Erskine, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 16.

[246] Seager, *Pompey*, pp. 1-19. These words, which have morphed into *majesty* and *authority* respectively, also signified forms of political power wielded by Roman magistrates. Jill Harries, *Law and Empire in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 56-57, 128-129; Clifford Ando, *Law, Language and Empire in the Roman Tradition* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), pp. 67-75.

Latin	*English* [247]
'Verres post **imperium** constitutum primus **imperavit** ut ea pecunia omnis a civitatibus sibi adnumeraretur.'	'Verres, however, was the first man since **our rule** began, **to have ordered** that all funds should be counted out by the provincial communities'.
In Verrum II.V:lx	*Against Verres* 2.5.60
'M. Marius, loqueretur, ut negotium susciperes, ut, cum penes te **praetorium imperium** ac nomen esset.'	'The eloquent, high-ranking Marcus Marius, requested you to deal with the situation there. You possessed the **authority and position of governor**'.
In Verrum II.V:xl	*Against Verres* 2.5.40
'Illi aditum litoris Syracusanis ademerunt, tu **imperium maritimum** concessisti.'	'What they did was to debar the Syracusans from access to the coast, what you did was to allow them **complete control of the sea'**.
In Verrum II.V:lxxxv	*Against Verres* 2.5.75
'Atque ut vos una mente unaque voce dubitare vos negatis, sic modo decrevit senatus D. Brutum optime **de re publica** mereri, cum senatus auctoritatem **populique Romani libertatem imperiumque** defenderet.'	'And so does the Senate, which has just decreed that Decimus Brutus has performed a very great service to **the state**, by standing up for the authority of the Senate and **the freedom and imperium of the Roman people**'.
Phillipica IV:viii	*Phillipics* 4.8
'Itaque illud **patrocinium** orbis terrae verius quam **imperium** poterat nominari.'	'Therefore it might be said that we are the **patrocinium** of the world, rather than the **imperium**.'
De Officiis II:xxvi	*On Duties* 2.26

In these passages from Cicero we see that by the time of the civil wars of the first century BC, *imperium* already meant a wide variety of things. The last usage above, from *De Officiis*, is almost impossible to translate into a suitable word. This is only a selection but it is replicated in other classic Latin texts. Consider *imperium*'s meaning in the highly influential Vulgate Bible of St. Jerome:[248]

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[247] All English passages taken from Cicero, *Selected Works [trans. Michael Grant]* (London: Penguin, 1960). Latin texts courtesy of The Latin Library: http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cic.html.

[248] As the first full Latin Bible, the Vulgate of St. Jerome replaced the *Vedus Latina* (incomplete – and illegal – copies of Latin scriptures circulating in Rome) in the late fourth century, and was the only authorised Catholic version of the Bible until the Second Vatican Council in 1965. Its impact on European thought cannot be understated. The word *imperium* (or variations) appears in the Vulgate 51 times, from Genesis 41:14 to Revelation 1:6. In every case, it is used in the context of an order or a command, or to mean "power/strength".

Biblia Sacra Vulgata	*King James Version* [249]
'Feceruntque filii Israel ut eis mandatum fuerat quibus dedit Ioseph plaustra, **secundum Pharaonis imperium**: et cibaria in itinere.'	'And the children of Israel did so, and Joseph gave them waggons, **according to the commandment of Pharaoh**, and gave them provision for the way.'
Genesis XLV:xxi	Genesis 45:21
'Afferte Domino familiae populorum: afferte Domino **gloriam et imperium**.'	'Give unto the Lord, ye kindreds of the people: give unto the Lord **glory and strength**.'
I Paralipomenon XVI:xxviii	1 Chronicles 16:28
'**Ipsi imperium** in saecula saeculorum: Amen.'	'**To Him be glory and dominion** for ever and ever. Amen.'
I Petri V:xi	1 Peter 5:11 [250]

In all of these examples, secular and spiritual, we see the same pattern. The word *imperium* means many things in relation to power, command, and the state, but never "the State" itself. Harriet Flower goes further, and demonstrates that the Romans lacked the very concept of the "State", a modern imagination which would have been alien to the plebeians and patricians of Rome.[251] Instead the Romans used a variety of terms to signify the community formed from the city of Rome, its various classes, its vast hinterlands and provinces around the Mediterranean, and gradually coming to also signify the concept of government. As we see in Cicero's works above, what we would term "State" is rendered variously as *Res Publica* (or *de re publica*, referring to the general population),[252] *Communem Libertatem* (shared political community),[253] or *Senatus Populusque Romanorum* (the people as a whole represented by their political leadership). *Imperium Romanum* – or variations thereof – did exist as a phrase[254] but as Erskine points out, this referred

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The word *imperator* appears only twice (Est. 3:2, Dan. 6:7), in each case meaning an honorific title. *Biblia Sacra: Vulgatae Editionis* (Ratisbon: Pontificiae Commissionis Biblicae, 1929); www.biblegateway.com.

[249] Dozens (at least) of English-language Bible translations exist. The 1611 King James Version was not the first English translation, but has arguably been the most influential. The KJV was also published in a period when, as we shall see, the word *imperium* was rapidly shifting in meaning, hence its use here instead of a more modern version. With thanks to Rev. Dr. Yazeed Said, Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge.

[250] Note how in 1 Peter 5:11, as in Cicero's *De Officiis* II:xxvi above, *imperium* does not translate into a single, understandable English word.

[251] Flower, *Roman Republics*, pp. 117-134.

[252] In *Apocolocyntosis*, Seneca the Younger uses *rei publicae* to refer to the whole Roman world. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Apocolocyntosis Divi Clavdii: On the Pumpkinification of Claudius* in *The Satyricon [trans. John Patrick Sullivan]* (Hammondsworth, NY: Penguin, 1986).

[253] Used by Suetonius to describe Rome and her environs. See Flower, *Roman Republics*, p. 11 [footnote 4].

[254] J.S. Richardson highlights how the phrases *Imperium Romanorum* and *Romani imperii* also appear in the early-imperial era writings of Pliny the Elder and Tacitus. Richardson, *Imperium Romanum*, p. 1 [footnote 2]. However as Erskine points out, this did not refer to place but people. The evidence is in the words themselves:

linguistically to the concept of the collective power of the people as represented by the Senate (or emperor), rather than power as represented by a geographically bounded and abstract "state". This pseudo-democratic façade was maintained long after the aforementioned civil wars and Rome's transition to military dictatorship and *de facto* (if not *de jure*) absolute monarchy,[255] and even by Late Antiquity and the fracturing of the unified Roman state into a patchwork of squabbling fiefdoms, *imperium* still did not refer to the polity. Timothy McDermott highlights how even the late use of *imperium* by late Roman writers and the Church Fathers still referred to the *concept* of power (particularly normative power)[256] rather than power manifest as a specific, territorial polity with borders, bureaucrats, a shape on a map, a name, and all the other paraphernalia we moderns associate with a country.[257] The distinction here is between *spatial* politics and *social* politics. For the Romans, international relations did not consist of distinct shapes on a map – instead, international politics was always understood by Romans in terms of personal, social relationships between patron and client. Rome's *patrocinium* was thus understood by the Romans not as the relationship between borders and territory but as the (unequal) relationships of a family, with the Romans – and their Emperor, the *Pater Patriae* or *Father* – at the top, acting as provider, protector, and punisher of unruly children: the *peoples*, not the *places*, of Earth.[258]

Evidence of this is offered by Richardson, who demonstrates that in surviving texts the Romans viewed their world not in terms of bounded countries, but rather as networks of cities linked by conduits, with connections personified by local elites operating under Roman governors who, other than enforcing taxation and later the worship of the Emperor, had remarkably little involvement or interest in the day-to-day running of their provinces.[259] Even Roman frontiers, which we retrospectively view as fixed and definable borders fortified with walls and palisades, were in reality permeable membranes beyond which Roman control

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Romanorum and *Romani* mean "Romans". *Romanum* refers to "Rome" as a population. Only *Roma* means "Rome" as a geographical entity.

[255] Dio, *Roman History*, Book LIII, Ch. 17, pp. 235-236.

[256] St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans [trans. Henry Bettenson]* (London and New York: Penguin, 2003), pp. 846-8; Behr, *History of International Political Thought*, p. 60.

[257] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation [ed. Timothy McDermott]* (Notre Dame, IL: Christian Classics, 1991), pp. 3-5.

[258] Jakob Wisse, 'The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Works', in J.M. May (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 331-374.

[259] Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum'. This is supported by Roman cartography such as the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which depicts Rome's civilisation as towns (including non-Roman cities) connected by roads, rather than as bounded shapes on a map. Katherine Rawson points out that while the Romans made plenty of maps, these were almost all *itinerarii* – Roman A-Z maps which simply showed the route between one town and the next. Roman military officers used local guides rather than maps, no maps were made of rivers or seas, while 'their surveyors, the *gromatici*, were perhaps not … capable of the accurate, large-scale maps that would have been useful for military operations'. M.J. Ferrar, 'The Venerable Bede and the *Tabula Peutingeriana*', *The Cartographic Journal* 42:2 (2005), pp. 157-167; Katherine Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 259.

existed in different forms.[260] This interpretation would appear to be supported by their cartographic conventions, wherein there are no dividing lines between different societies.[261] Thus we see that the Romans, the archetypal imperialists, did not refer to their own realm as *an* imperium, but simply *as* imperium.

In *De Civitate Dei*, written some six decades before the end of the Roman West, St Augustine uses *imperium* to signify not merely the temporal power of the Roman government, but also spiritual power. In this sense, the word appears in the context of religion to signify the power of the church –a power associated with an exclusive and bounded territory beyond which godlessness reigned.[262] Hence as a way of describing Christendom, *imperium* became *affiliated*, but not *synonymous*, with a territorial area.[263] Holland writes that while other vestiges of Roman rule vanished outside Italy, *imperator* and *imperium* survived in Europe due to their connotations of conquest. The Franks who were later bestowed by Pope Leo with the status of *imperium* were warriors defined not by *pax*, *pontifex*, or *patrocinium* but by the savage reality of military combat.[264] Hence *imperator,* 'a Latin title of portentous ambiguity',[265] became the sole term employed in the West to signify supreme sovereignty both temporal and spiritual. This was not novel, as the Romans themselves had multiple levels of meaning for the word. Consider the explanation given by Gibbon in *Decline and Fall*:

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[260] Sarah Scott and Jane Webster, *Roman Imperialism and Provincial Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1-13.

[261] The *Tabula Peutingeriana*, a twelfth-century copy of a fourth-century *itinerarium* or road map, is, alongside the *Forma urbis Romae* and the instructions for drawing a map in Ptolemy's *Geographica*, both of which we will encouter in later chapters, one of only three classical Roman maps known to have survived to the present day. In the opinion of Matthew Gabriel, the *Tabula* was also prominently displayed at Louis the Pious' royal court as a visual expression of *imperium*. The *Tabula* depicts the whole known world from Scotland to China, with all known major settlements and roads between them (with distances) depicted. However there are no borders or frontiers, and nothing to distinguish Roman and non-Roman cities. Monica Smith places the *Tabula* in its historical context with other ancient maps, arguing that the Romans simply lacked the concept of signifying civilisations by drawing shapes on a map. The idea that power was held by people and not states – which Kantorowicz terms 'popular sovereignty' – survived into the Early Middle Ages and beyond – Charlemagne was *Rex Francorum* not *Rex Francia – King of the French*, not *King of France*. Monica Smith, 'Networks, Territories, and the Cartography of Ancient States', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95:4 (2005), pp. 832-849; Beau Riffenburgh, *The Men Who Mapped the World: The Treasures of Cartography* (London: Carlton, 2011), pp. 10-11.

[262] St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans [trans. Henry Bettenson]* (London and New York: Penguin, 2003), Book III.

[263] Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum', p. 6.

[264] Holland, *Millennium*, pp. 66-67.

[265] Ibid., p. 66.

'Those modest titles were laid aside [during the Classical era]; and, if they still distinguished their high station by the appellation of Emperor, or Imperator, *that word was understood in a new and more dignified sense*, and no longer denoted the general of the Roman armies, but the sovereign of the Roman world'.[266]

It was thus during the Classical period that *imperium* and *imperator* acquired an association with the head of state and thus the concept of supreme, exclusive rule,[267] and while it must be conceded that *Imperator* was merely one of several titles used to denote the inconsistent and vague office that we retrospectively term "Roman Emperor",[268] Susan Mattern highlights that *imperator* was the title most recorded on Classical Roman statues, monuments, and coins,[269] and it is reasonable to conclude that by the Early Middle Ages *imperator* and *imperium* were the words most closely associated with the classical Romans and the dignity of the imperial office.

Although the formal end of a single Roman state in the West came in the fifth century, *imperium* survived. We must bear in mind that from Augustus onwards, Rome was effectively a military dictatorship – it is not surprising that words associated with civilian power, such as *maiestas* and *auctoritas*, waned in favour of the military connotations of *imperium*. The *Imperator* derived his legitimacy not from divine favour but from his troops and military *imperium*: thus in Roman art and literature from Augustus onwards the Head of State increasingly appeared not as a statesman but a soldier, concerned not with *maiestas* and *auctoritas* but with the *imperium* required to fight off Rome's encroaching enemies.[270] By the time the last Western *Imperator* was deposed in 476, *imperium* had acquired at least some connotations of supreme power, sovereignty, and legitimacy.

This brings us back to St Peter's Basilica on Christmas morning, 800 AD. A host of speculations exist as to Leo's reasons for proclaiming *imperium* in this context. We are not

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[266] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol. I*, Ch.XIII, p. 225 (emphasis added).
[267] Gibbon identifies how, in the Principate (c.27 BC – 230 AD) under the *Princeps*, the terms *imperator*, *augustus*, and *caesar* (the latter two being an honorific title and a family name, respectively) became 'inseperably connected ... with the Imperial dignity' and were subsequently adopted by 'Romans, Greeks, Franks, and Germans'. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall* Vol.I, Ch.III, p. 60.
[268] Dio, *Roman History*, Book LIII Ch. XVII, v.VI, p. 237.
[269] Champion, *Roman Imperialism*, pp.186-7.
[270] Peter Stewart, *Statues in Roman Society: Representation and Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Paul Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus [trans. Alan Shapiro]* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

particularly concerned with trying to peer into the Pope's mind,[271] and we must be careful not to stray too far into the diplomatic delicacies of the Early Middle Ages. Our focus remains the European Union, not the fiefdoms of the Franks and the *Basileus* of Byzantium. There are, though, some essential points to consider when discussing the resuscitation of ancient titles.

The resurrection of *imperator* and *imperium* by Pope Leo was on the one hand not particularly important. The words had already existed for centuries, and if we believe Einhard and Notker, the coronation apparently passed with only peripheral acknowledgement from contemporary observers. And as we see from their chronicles, *imperator* was only one of multiple titles awarded to Charlemagne both in 800, and again in 812 following the Byzantines' gritted-teeth acknowledgement of his imperial title.[272] Yet Charlemagne's other pseudo-Classical titles – *Augustus*,[273] *Caesar*, *Patricius*, and the Greek approximations *Basileus*, *Autocrator*, and *Sebastocrator* – were short-lived. Notwithstanding scholarly disagreement as to just how long, and to what extent, Leo and Charlemagne had been planning an imperial coronation,[274] from Einhard's account it might be wondered why Charlemagne was officially reluctant to accept *imperium* in 800. Old Roman titles, whether deliberately resurrected in modified form or lingering on, half-forgotten, were common ceremonial characteristics.[275] Less than thirty years after the abdication of the last Western Emperor in Rome, the Eastern Emperor had named the Frankish warlord Clovis *consul*, a title which had been increasingly irrelevant under the classical Romans but was resurrected to denote power.[276] And half a century before Liudprand's journey, Charlemagne's father Pepin the Short had been bestowed with the new title *Patricius Romanorum* – "Protector of the Romans" – by Pope Stephen II.[277] Explaining the actions and reactions of Pope and *Imperator* is not our goal here, but it deserves mention as it is in the events of 799-800 that *empire* emerges.

First, why did the Pope proclaim *imperium* when it still existed in the East? Ernst Kantorowicz argues that in medieval eschatology, not only had Rome been merely *suspended* in the West rather than *ended* (hence Charlemagne was not the inheritor of a new *imperium*,

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[271] Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes, and Simon MacLean warn us about the 'veritable historical cottage industry dedicated to the issue' of Charlemagne's coronation. Costambeys et al., *The Carolingian World*, p. 161.
[272] Holland, *Millennium*, p. 37.
[273] From the adjective *augusta*, or "reverent". Dio, *Roman History* Book LIII.xvi, V.viii, p. 235.
[274] Collins, *Charlemagne*, pp. 146-147.
[275] Hen, *Roman Barbarians*, pp. 39, 62, 64, 73.
[276] Davidson, *Atlas of Empires*, p. 83.
[277] Charlemagne was not *Holy* Roman Emperor – that title was coined a century and a half later for Otto the Great, under whose instruction Liudprand made his journey. In his time, Charlemagne was considered a classical Roman Imperator and direct successor to Romulus Augustulus. Becher, *Charlemagne*, p. 83.

but merely a classical Roman emperor following a temporary interregnum), but also that an *Imperator* had to exist in order to unify Earth against the Devil – whose predicted imminent arrival was a cause of some not-inconsiderable concern among Europeans approaching the first millennium.[278] Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes, and Simon MacLean hint that Charlemagne, desperately in need of legitimacy as a Christian monarch following his failure to subjugate Moorish Spain and ward off the Vikings, and following his execution of thousands of Christian German prisoners – an act which had earned him the unflattering epithet 'Karl the Saxon-Slaughterer' throughout Europe[279] – instigated the procedure on his own, twisting the Pope's hand.[280] Similarly, Matthias Becher points to a variety of broader international incidents which contributed to the events of Christmas Day: the contemporary power vacuum in Italy following the Byzantines' defeat by the Lombards, the Lombards' defeat by the Franks, and the omnipresent threat to *imperium christiorum* of the new Islamic Caliphate, alongside the increasingly hostile relations between the Pope and the *Basileus*. It is even suggested that the Sultan of Baghdad, Harun al-Rashid, nudged Charlemagne and Leo towards *imperial* status as he desired a Christian monarch of equal rank to himself, other than the stubborn *Basileus*, with whom he could negotiate between Christendom and Caliphate.[281] Meanwhile John Julius Norwich suggests a more personal reason: hated by the powerful supporters of the previous Pope Hadrian, Pope Leo's unpopularity was such that he had been beaten unconscious in the streets of Rome and upon fleeing to the safety of Charlemagne's court in Paderborn, found himself indicted of various ecclesiastical crimes of which he could only be cleared by judgement from a higher temporal power – but 'who, after all, was qualified to pass judgement on the Vicar of Christ?'[282] Certainly not the reigning *Imperator/Basileus* in Constantinople, Empress Irene, whose Islamic-inspired iconoclasm against church property had rendered her deeply unpopular in the West, and furthermore because as a female, Irene was not acknowledged as sovereign under the Franks' Salic Law.[283] Hence, Norwich suggests, Leo proclaimed Charlemagne *Imperator* purely to secure personal protection, in exchange for bestowing legitimacy upon Charlemagne as *Imperator Christianorum*,[284] supreme sovereign of the Christians, with Byzantine anger a price worth paying. On one hand it is thus little wonder that the events of December 25th 800 are barely

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[278] Holland, *Millennium*, pp. 1-12; Le Goff, *The Medieval Imagination*, pp. 53, 67-77, 292-293.
[279] Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 148.
[280] Williams, *Emperor of the West*, pp. 80-81.
[281] Derek Wilson, *Charlemagne: The Great Adventure* (London: Hutchinson, 2005), pp. 79-80.
[282] Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 54.
[283] Becher, *Charlemagne*, pp. 81-97.
[284] *New Catholic Encyclopaedia Vol. III* (Detroit, MI: Thomson-Gale, 2003), p. 426.

even mentioned by Einhard, Notker the Stammerer, and the anonymous scribes of the *Liber Pontificalis* and the Royal Frankish Annals. Perhaps they too were a little confused on the import and meaning of the word.[285]

Second, why was Charlemagne was so anxious about being bestowed with the vague prestige of *imperium*? His apparent unease was possibly a literary convention of the time,[286] but if it was real, what did he have to fear? As the records of Charlemagne's advisor Alcuin demonstrate, Charlemagne was already an *Imperator* in all but name.[287] Legally he was already *Patricius Romanorum* (Protector of the Romans) and the faraway Byzantines – who had far more pressing problems than 'this boorish Frank in his ridiculously cross-gartered scarlet leggings, speaking an incomprehensible language and unable even to sign his name except by stencilling it through a plate'[288] – already recognised this title. For ceremonial occasions he already dressed, ate, and handed down ceremonial decrees in the manner of a *Basileus*.[289] Politically, Charlemagne had been throwing his weight around with the Byzantines and the Papacy for years,[290] and for the remainder of his reign was decidedly ambivalent about his imperial status.[291] He did not even bother to mention his *Imperial* title in the *Divisio Imperii*, the post-800 document planning how to divide the realm between his three sons,[292] and aside from a short proxy war between the Franks and Byzantines over their allies' control of southern Italy (not over the imperial title),[293] Charlemagne spent the remainder of his life pursuing fruitless alliances and marriage proposals with the Byzantines in hope of uniting West and East[294] rather than encouraging a rivalry with Byzantium.

Faced with these reasonings we might well conclude that Christmas Day 800 was nothing more than a ceremonial gesture. As supporting evidence Hywel Williams notes that, although it chafed him physically and politically, Charlemagne entered St Peter's Basilica already dressed in the costume of an ancient Roman nobleman and in spite of the cold was not wearing a hat – an opportunity for a swift crowning which is too convenient to be a

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[285] Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 11-29.
[286] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, Vol.V Ch.XLIX, p.124
[287] Wilson, *Charlemagne*, p. 78.
[288] Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, p. 120.
[289] Davis, *History of Medieval Europe*, p. 141.
[290] Becher, *Charlemagne*, pp. 89-92; Wilson, *Charlemagne*, p. 70.
[291] Costambeys et al., *The Carolingian World*, pp. 167-170.
[292] Ibid., pp. 168-170; Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 157.
[293] Becher, *Charlemagne*, p. 95.
[294] Alessandro Barbero, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Rosamund McKitterick, *History and Memory in the Carolingian World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); McKitterick, *Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

coincidence.[295] Charlemagne must have been perfectly aware of what was happening, and accepted *Imperium* for whatever reason(s) he and Leo had. It is therefore unsurprising to find that contemporary documents barely mention the day, as Frankish and Papal chroniclers evidently considered other events far more significant than a brief and barely-attended ceremony in which the Pope dusted off an old crown, plagiarised a Byzantine liturgy, and thus formalised what had in all likelihood been prearranged.

At this stage it might be wondered why we have bothered to unpick the international politics and personal careerism woven into the accounts of Einhard, Notker, and Alcuin. This is not a work of history and thus it might well be asked what relation, if any, there is between this trip down the historical rabbit-hole and the European Union. The answer is simple. Charlemagne, and perhaps Pope Leo, may not have particularly cared about a quick ceremony one morning. But the successors of both – the Popes, and the *Imperators* of East and West – demonstrated far more interest in the coming centuries. Where Charlemagne was apparently uninterested in his new job title, and Pope Leo perhaps nothing more than a political opportunist doing what was necessary in order to walk through the streets of Rome without being beaten up, Charlemagne's son and co-*imperator* Louis the Pious – a fierce, fervent zealot convinced that he had been chosen by God for some grand mission[296] – adopted the title with more than a degree of solemnity, sparking the centuries-long feud between the *Imperator* and the Pope which formed medieval history – which in turn influenced Europe's development. And as with his father, Louis' relationship with his title was again heavily influenced by international politics between Aachen and Constantinople.

This development occurred quickly. By 812 the international situation had changed significantly as no less than three *Basileis* – the usurper Irene, her own usurper Nicephorus I who was soon killed in battle against the Bulgars, and his short-lived son Stauricus – had held the throne of Constantinople since 800. As the fourth 'exceedingly weak'[297] and 'easily led'[298] monarch to occupy the throne in ten years, faced with Islamic invasions, metropolitan riots, a mutinous army and a rebellious civilian population clamouring for a more powerful military leader to protect them from the coming Bulgars,[299] the new *Basileus* Michael I sent ambassadors to Aachen to offer an insincere acknowledgement of Charlemagne as *Imperator*

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[295] Williams, *Emperor of the West*, p. 140.
[296] Folz, *Concept of Empire*, pp. 29-33.
[297] Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 153.
[298] Norwich, *History of Byzantium*, p. 125.
[299] Ibid., pp. 124-6.

of the West, with his son Louis as legitimate successor to the title.[300] The subsequent *Pax Nicephori* between Franks and Byzantines grudgingly recognised that the *Imperator* was now on an equal footing with the *Basileus*.[301] With official recognition from God's appointed vicegerent in Constantinople, the discourse of sovereignty and legitimacy hence gained a legitimacy of its own. Although tensions remained, both Franks and Byzantines were now "Romans": the ideal of a continued Roman *imperium* rather than its historical reality.

It is at this point that we see the discourse developing, morphing from a word casually invoked at the rigged ceremony in St Peter's, into a term suddenly fiercely contested by claimants to the supreme power. Under Louis the Pious, the discourse became a dynamic continuum over which the major powers of Europe were soon fiercely squabbling.

Matthew Gabriel points out that *Imperator* and *Imperium* were sparingly used in Charlemagne's lifetime, undoubtedly to avoid further antagonising the Byzantines and because the words' connotations of *Romanitas* (Roman-ness), with connotations of paganism, sloth and effeminacy,[302] was an awkward companion to the ardent Christianity and swaggering machismo of the Frankish knights whose support he needed.[303] Yet following Charlemagne's death in 814 Louis adopted the title with significant gravitas. Not only did he immediately change his title from the ambiguous *Imperator, Romanum gubernans imperium* ('*Imperator* governing the *imperium* of the Romans') to the much more direct *Imperator Romanorum* ('*Imperator* of the Romans'),[304] his *Ordinato Imperii* of 815 laid down specific rules and regulations for maintaining his realm as a single polity, in defiance of Frankish law which demanded that his possessions be divided equally between his sons.[305] It is unsurprising that Louis spent the rest of his reign mediating between his three quarrelling sons, and even less of a surprise that following Louis' death a cycle of fratricidal civil wars

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[300] It is no coincidence that around this time, the title of the Byzantine monarch changed from *Basileus* to *Basileus Rhomaion* – "Emperor of the Romans". Liudprand of Cremona is apparently justified in sneeringly naming his book on Frankish-Byzantine relations "*Antapodosis*" – "Tit for Tat". Wright, *Liudprand*, p. 25; Rosser, *A-Z of Byzantium*, p. 50.

[301] Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, pp. 125-126.

[302] Williams, *Charlemagne*, pp. 72-75.

[303] R.H.C. Davis makes a notable observation – Charlemagne, apparently uncomfortable with being titled a "Roman" lest his Frankish aristocrats mock him, had used the long-winded and politically evasive title *Carolus serenissimus augustus a Deo coronatus magnus pacificus imperator, Romanum gubernans imperium, qui et per misericordiam Dei rex Francorum atque Langobardorum* ("Charles, the Most Serene Augustus Crowned by God, Great and Pacific Imperator of the Romans Governing the Imperium of the Romans, Who is by the Grace of God King of the Franks and of the Lombards"). Louis, eager to emphasise his role as God's regent and apparently unconcerned with annoying the Byzantines, shortened this to simply *Imperator Romanum*, ruler of 'an *empire* which was an entity in itself, with one ruler, one people, and one law'. In response, Michael I of Byzantium – who was already handing out the *Basileus* title to Bulgars, Slavs, and Pechenegs in a desperate effort to buy off Byzantium's many enemies – changed his title from *Basileus* to *Basileus Rhomaion*. See Davis, *History of Medieval Europe*, pp. 147-148; Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 150.

[304] Davis, *History of Medieval Europe*, p. 149.

[305] Derek Wilson, *Charlemagne: The Great Adventure* (London: Hutchinson, 2005), pp. 92-93.

erupted. With the signing of the 843 Treaty of Verdun, Louis' son Lothair retained the title of *Imperator*, with *imperium* becoming officially invested in the rump state of East Francia. The impact of this upon the discourse was significant – with *imperium* now legally restricted to East Francia and its Germanic inhabitants, the Byzantines were extraordinarily reluctant to acknowledge the petty King of the Germans as *Imperator* of the entire West.

This is the context of the vignette at the Bucoleon Palace with which we began. The *Pax Nicephori* had become void by the time of Liudprand's journey in 968, as Charlemagne's *Imperium* had long since evaporated and claimants to the title in the West did not possess any legitimacy as *imperator* in Byzantine eyes.[306] It is unsurprising that the Byzantines would scorn Liudprand's demand that a German – castigated in contemporary writings as the same savages who had devastated classical Rome,[307] and now dared to call themselves "Romans" – be styled the same as the ruler of the temporarily rejuvenated East. But it is perhaps unsurprising that the descendants of Charlemagne, Louis, and Lothair would continue to demand recognition of the word. In a terse letter to the *Basileus*, Lothair's son Louis II asserts that:

'It is fitting that thou shouldst know that if we were not *imperators* of the Romans we should not be *imperators* of the Franks either. We have received this name and this title from the [classical] Romans, among whom the pinnacle of such great sublimity and such a distinguished appellation first shone with a brilliant light'[308]

Imperator Louis II
Letter to *Basileus* Basil I, c.855

Yet the official position at the court of Constantinople did not dull with time. A century after this letter, during Liudprand's visit, *Basileus* Nicephorus acidly asks Liudprand:

'The envoys of your *rex* Otto who were here before you last year promised me under oath – and the wording of the oath is extant – that they would never in any way cause scandal in our *imperium.* Do you want a greater scandal

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[306] Derek Baker (ed.), *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), pp. 33-35.
[307] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, IX.ii.92.
[308] Arnold, *Medieval Germany*, p. 87.

than that [Otto] should call himself *imperator* and claim for himself provinces belonging to us? Both these things are intolerable; and if both are insupportable, that especially is not to be borne, nay, not to be heard of, that he calls himself *imperator*'.[309]

Nicephorus Phokas
Relatio De Legatione Constantinopolitana XXV

It is clear here that the discourse has not merely survived, it has become far more significant than in 800. *Basileus* Irene had not cared about Charlemagne, and her successor Michael I lost nothing in sending a handful of ambassadors with an *imperial* title to smooth the ruffled feathers of such chroniclers as Widukind of Corvey, Hroswitha of Gandersheim, and Thietmar of Merseburg, who demanded that the monarch of the Germans be acknowledged as *Imperator* of the West.[310] This brings us back to the *Pax Nicephori*.

Signing the *Pax Nicephori* yet again illustrates the power of interpretation over intention. The treaty was simply typical Byzantine diplomacy – an inexpensive strategy of dangling a Roman-sounding bauble in front of potential enemies, thus keeping the Western barbarians quiet and allowing the Byzantines to focus on their endless wars with the Caliphate.[311] Yet from the letters above it is apparent that before long, both factions were taking the issue seriously. The prestige is clearly important in the letters between Louis II and Basil I, and was so significant a century later that Nicephorus II, for all his dislike of Liudprand and Otto I, subsequently offers an astonishing deal: if Otto drops the title *imperator*, Nicephorus offers to cede to Otto the whole of southern Italy, over which West and East had been squabbling for centuries. For Nicephorus to surrender strategic security, taxes, grain, and a draftable population – all desperately needed by a Byzantine government faced with perpetual war against its neighbours[312] – rather than publicly acknowledge the validity of a single word, points to the immense importance attached to the discourse which began in St. Peter's Basilica.

It is unlikely that we will ever know for what reason(s) Pope Leo resumed secular *imperium* in the West. Whether it was intended to be the founding of a single Christian polity to encompass the world, or an opportunist measure to quell rebellions against Charlemagne while simultaneously exonerating the Pope in a rigged ecclesiastical trial, is not particularly

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[309] Wright, *Liudprand*, p. 249.
[310] Benjamin Arnold, *Medieval Germany, 500-1300: A Political Interpretation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 84-88.
[311] Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2009).
[312] Ibid., pp. 1-16.

significant here.[313] What is of significance is not why Leo spoke the word, but what subsequently occurred: the transformation of *imperium* from a vague Roman military term into an even more vague, but malleable, expression of supreme, legitimate sovereignty, and an imagined community derived from an equally imagined history.

2.3.2   'Divers sundry old authentic histories'

'Rome, thy name is fatall in ruling countries.'[314]

John Speed
New Mappe of the Roman Empire, 1627

An unclear word to begin with, *imperium* by the Early Middle Ages had become even less precise, signifying a general conception of supreme power. And as we have seen, this status could be – and was – claimed by many. As Julia Smith argues, 'we should not think of "empire" only with reference to the two specific early medieval polities, Byzantine and (after 800) western, whose rulers were formally vested with the title of emperor. Far more than that, "empire" was a widely used term for a particular kind of successful kingdom.'[315] Doubtless, the appeal to medieval chroniclers and kings of linking themselves with Rome was simply too strong to resist – for Charlemagne and his descendants were not the only Europeans claiming to hold *imperium*.

Conceiving of *empire* as an evolving discourse is novel, but not entirely without precedent. The medieval concept of *translatio imperii* provides a framework upon which we may assemble an expanded theory. The idea of *empire* as a transitory concept – a status defined by civilisation, superiority, sovereignty, and legitimacy, a status which is not tied to any particular geopolitical construct but rather passes from one to another through time – is well-attested in medieval and even late Classical thought. In *De Civitate Dei*, St Augustine

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[313] It is perhaps revealing that events we retrospectively consider to be crucial in the formation of the *translatio imperii* went almost unnoticed at the time. Charlemagne's coronation in 800 received only fleeting mention. Similarly, the abdication of the last Western Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, on September 4th 476, and the sending of the imperial regalia to Zeno in Constantinople – an event later perceived as the death-knell of the Roman Empire – 'excited barely a ripple of interest at the time'. The *translatio* evolved slowly, half-consciously, only becoming visibly acknowledged once it was already firmly rooted in the European consciousness. Stephen Williams and Gerard Friell. *The Rome That Did Not Fall: The Survival of the East in the Fifth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 2.
[314] John Speed, *A Prospect of the Most Famous Parts of the World [London 1627]* (Amsterdam: Novus Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1966), p. 14.
[315] Smith, *Europe After Rome*, p. 276.

follows Eusebius of Caeserea, Orosius, and St Jerome in outlining Biblical eschatology:[316] he perceives Rome to be the natural successor to a sequence consisting of Alexander the Great, Persia, and Babylonia. For the scholars of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Rome was the inevitable successor: the fourth and final realm of civilisation outlined in the Book of Daniel whose existence was necessary for defence against the forces of the apparently imminent Apocalypse.[317] It established the discourse of *imperium* over which Leo and Liudprand, Franks and Byzantines, and West and East more broadly, were soon arguing furiously.

Imperium in the Early Middle Ages was not merely restricted to people rather than places, it was restricted to *one* person: the *Imperator*. Consider the letter written in 996 by Otto III to his grandmother, Adelaide, upon his coronation as *Imperator*:

> 'To Lady Adelaide, the always august *imperatrix*, Otto, by God's grace *imperator* augustus. Because following your prayers and desires the Divinity has conferred the rights of *imperium* upon me by fortunate succession, we adore the Divinity, indeed, and we render thanks to you.'[318]

<div style="text-align: right">

Otto III to Adelaide
Pavia, 996 AD

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Imperium by this point was thus still tied to an individual, as Roman *imperium* had been, but had acquired new characteristics. Firstly as we have seen, imperium embodied a tribal mentality whereby the *imperium* of the elected monarch was shared by the monarch's people – Charlemagne was *Rex Francorum* not *Rex Francia* – King of the Franks, not King of France; Lothair was castigated in Italian writings as *Imperator Germanorum*, not *Imperator Germania* – Emperor of the Germans, not Emperor of Germany. Secondly, Jacques Le Goff identifies that by the beginning of the second millennium, *imperium* had become conceptually separated from *sacerdotium*, a division which did not exist for the ancient Romans. While the latter concerned the realm of theology and spiritual power, the former acquired a distinctly temporal, political meaning – although still related, as the temporal and spiritual would have to be united to hold off the Antichrist. Furthermore, argues Roger Collins, as '*imperium* is a much more malleable concept than is the title *imperator* ... a

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[316] Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 484-485.
[317] Behr, *History of International Political Theory*, pp. 54-55; Le Goff, *Medieval Civilisation*, p. 171.
[318] Otto III, DO.III.196 in Boyd Hill, *Medieval Monarchy in Action: The German Empire from Henry I to Henry IV* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), pp. 173-174.

ruler could exercise *imperium*, in the sense of rule... without holding the title of emperor, which was a claim to a universal authority'.[319] The division into sacred and profane, Le Goff argues, helped defined the malleable idea of *imperium* as the *translatio imperii* in the Early and High Middle Ages; 'in profane history the theme was that of the transfer of power. The world in every age had one heart; the rest of the universe lived according to its rhythm and impulse alone'.[320] This concept, the *translatio imperii*, 'proceeded at a double level, that of power and civilisation'.[321] For medieval Europeans preoccupied with Caesar and Constantine, the *imperium* of Rome provided a perfect model to emulate. The idea that there had to be a supreme temporal power, and there could only be one, goes some way to explaining the Pope's actions on December 25th 800: *imperium*, the essence of being the heart of the world, was to be wrought from the seemingly ineffective Byzantines and invested in the West; in so doing publicly proclaiming the West as the realm of order, civilisation, legitimacy, and superiority by deliberate association with a manufactured past.

This is not a case of what E.H. Carr identified in Chapter One – presentism, whereby scholars impose anachronistic concepts upon the past. The concept of *translatio imperii*, and of *imperium* as a concept embodying certain ideals, clearly existed historically. This is evident from contemporary writings of political philosophy, most significantly Isidore of Seville's hugely influential *Etymologies* – the medieval scholar's 'concise guide to classical culture'[322] – in which Isidore asserts that 'other reigns and other kings are considered mere appendices of [Rome]'.[323] This 'nostalgia for Rome'[324] influenced the evolution of the discourse and the awareness of the self as the defender of civilisation. Thus by the Early Middle Ages, the words *imperium* and *imperator* were used in two ways: firstly 'to [neutrally] describe an exceptionally powerful ruler', and secondly 'as a "puff", to talk up the influence and prestige of kings' as successors of Caesar and Constantine.[325] In the former case, chroniclers such as the Venerable Bede and Isidore of Seville used *imperium* as a general descriptor of the actions and destiny of powerful monarchs, while in the latter case medieval writers including Otto of Freising, Chrétien of Troyes, and Richard of Bury adopted the words in order to justify the *Heiliges Reich*, the Kingdom of France, and the Kingdom of England, respectively, as the sole inheritor of Rome and the self-anointed defender of

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[319] Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 151.
[320] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, p. 171.
[321] Ibid., p. 51
[322] Smith, *Europe after Rome*, p. 273.
[323] Ibid.
[324] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, p. 51.
[325] Smith, *Europe After Rome*, p. 274.

civilisation – the heart to whose beat the rest of the world moved.[326] 'We are dwarves mounted on giants' shoulders', wrote Bernard of Chartres concerning the Kingdom of France, 'but we see further than they did'.[327] Contemporary scholars were well aware of the discourse of superiority that was *imperium*, as a proclamation not only of succession from Rome but of independence from, and equality to, the Holy Roman Empire. We need no Voltaire to remind us that the Western *Imperium* – 'this entity which called itself, and continues to call itself, the Holy Roman Empire, was, and is, neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.'[328] The realm proclaimed in 800 bore only a passing resemblance to classical Rome in terms geographical, liturgical, political, ecclesiastical, or indeed any other form. The only connection was the word used to describe it. Thus *imperium* was not only a diplomatic snub to the *Basileus* in Constantinople nor was it exclusively a pretext to hold a rigged Papal trial and fill Rome with armoured Franks. It was a deliberate hearkening back to an imagination of a Rome which never existed, but whose aura of sovereignty, legitimacy, community, and divine civilising mission, were now to be taken up again by a single power.[329]

Notwithstanding the medieval theory that the *Imperator* possessed supreme sovereign power over the other political figureheads of the world – including the Byzantine *Basileus* – and that he was the sole possessor of *Imperium* – exercising the rights of Universal Monarchy over the world[330] – other contemporary leaders deployed the word in order to justify their crowns. Thus among the fractured states of Saxon England, Æthelstan, Edgar, and Cnut[331] declared themselves *Imperators*. In Castile and Léon, Ordoño II, Alfonso III, and Ferdinand I adopted the imperial title to justify their emerging *Reconquista* against the Caliphate.[332] And even in Scotland, Ireland and far-distant Germany, which had never been drawn into the orbit of the Caesars, 'Oswald ... and Brian Boru were emperors in the opinion of the learned men of their times, in much the same way as Theoderic, Pippin of Herstal, and others'.[333] This is

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[326] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, pp. 171-172.

[327] Ibid., p. 173.

[328] 'Ce corps qui s'appelait et qui s'appelle encore le saint empire romain n'était en aucune manière ni saint, ni romain, ni empire' in Voltaire, *Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (IV)* ch.70 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2011), p. 41 [translation author's own].

[329] It must be acknowledged that not all historians interpret Leo's actions in this way. See Roger Collins, *Charlemagne*, p. 147.

[330] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, pp. 265-267.

[331] It is notable that Cnut, *de facto* ruler of England, Norway and Denmark and *de jure* ruler of Sweden, Scotland, Ireland, and Iceland, was coincidentally in Rome on pilgrimage at the time of Conrad II's coronation as Holy Roman Emperor. Julia Smith evidences how Cnut's letters record that the visual effect of witnessing the ceremony influenced Cnut's decision to adopt the imperial title. However as *imperium* at this time was still an honorific associated with particular deserving individuals, and as the Anglo-Saxon monarchy was elective rather than hereditary, the title did not pass to his successors. Smith, *Europe After Rome*, pp. 277-279.

[332] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization,* pp. 266-267.

[333] Smith, *Europe After Rome*, p. 275.

what Otto of Freising identified as '*auctoritas ad quam totius orbis spectat patrocinium* – an authority to which pertains the protection over the whole world'.[334] As demonstrated by the political pretensions of Saxon chieftains, Merovingian *majordomos*, Spanish princes and Byzantine eunuchs, 'the various barbarian kingdoms which succeeded the Roman empire in the West saw themselves as part of a Roman continuum'[335] – 'a continuum with many grey areas and overlaps'.[336]

 Imperium was clearly a discourse appropriated by persons other than the succession of Germans prostrating themselves before the Pontiff in the malarial miasma of medieval Rome. As demonstrated by Robert Dyson[337] and Hans Hummer,[338] this was in line with the medieval habit of using deliberately vague titles reflecting the vague nature and erratic pace of medieval governance:[339] titles which could be expanded or contracted at will to claim or deny responsibility, and which acted as general markers of prestige which could be passed from one courtier to another without bothersome legal issues over territory. By the High Middle Ages the word was already losing whatever specific and exclusive Roman imagination(s) had been ascribed to it by Pope Leo, and was morphing into a word implying *a more general imagination* of civilisation, sovereignty, legitimacy, and superiority.

 It is in the Humanist movement, spanning the nebulous transition from the Late Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period which we term "Renaissance",[340] that we see the flowering of the imperial discourse as a more general and transferable philosophy. Let us dwell for a moment on another moment. It is 1492, in a Europe already irrevocably changed by the Turks' conquest of Constantinople and about to be changed yet further as Columbus sails back east with reports of a New World, and the crumbling, stagnant *Reich*'s leading professor of classical rhetoric and pioneer of German Humanism,[341] the Imperial Laureate Conrad Celtis,[342] is addressing the faculty of the University of Ingolstadt at the heart of the *Heiliges Römisches Reich*:

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[334] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, p. 267.

[335] Hen, *Roman Barbarians*, p. 15.

[336] Ibid., p. 20.

[337] Robert Dyson, 'Medieval Rulers and Political Ideology', in Carol Lansing and Edward English (eds.), *A Companion to the Medieval World* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 357-358.

[338] Hans Hummer in Lansing and English (eds.), *Companion*, p. 38.

[339] Julia Smith, *Europe after Rome: A New Cultural History, 500-1000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 279.

[340] Although R.H.C. Davies makes a convincing argument for the end of the Middle Ages in the 1250s. See Davies, *History of Medieval Europe*, pp. 386-391.

[341] Jonathan Zophy (ed.), *The Holy Roman Empire: A Dictionary Handbook* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 63.

[342] Joachim Whaley and Jonathan Zophy argue that as the leading light of the German Humanist movement, Celtis' influence was wide-ranging beyond the *Reich*. See Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 109-110; Zophy, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 63.

'Noble men and lofty-minded youth, to whom because of the ancestral virtue and that unconquerable strength of Germany the imperium *of Italy has passed ... I exhort you to devote yourselves first of all to those studies which will render your minds more refined and cultured and summon you away from the way of the common herd to give yourselves over to higher pursuits. Hold before your eyes the true nobility of spirit remembering that you bring not credit but dishonour to our imperium if you neglect the study of letters ... Emulate, noble men, the ancient Roman nobility, which, after succeeding to the* imperium *of the Greeks, took over also all their wisdom and eloquence ... So you also having taken over the* imperium *of the Italians ought to reject shameful barbarism and become enthusiasts for the Roman arts. Remove that old infamy of the Germans in Greek, Latin, and Hebrew writers who ascribe to us drunkenness, inhumanity, cruelty, and every other evil approximating bestiality and immorality ... It should cause us shame, noble men, that certain modern historians ... should refer to our most famous princes merely as "the barbarians"...'*[343]

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Conrad Celtis, *Oratio*
Ingolstadt, August 31st 1492

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In his impassioned speech to the students and savants, Celtis appeals to a reinvigorated and illusory discourse. Germany is, in his fellow Humanists' eyes, casting off the manacles of the medieval monastic mind and seeking a new path – and for guidance they look to Rome. The stagnant and enfeebled *Heiliges Reich,* in Conrad's eyes, should seek a transcendence, moving beyond the connotations of the ancients who had disparaged the Germanics:

'The Germanic (*Germanicus*) nations are so called because they are immense (*immanis*) in body, and they are savage (*immanis*) tribes hardened by very severe cold ... The monstrosity of their barbarism gives a fearsome quality even to their names.'[344]

<div align="right">

Isidore of Seville
Etymologiae IX.ii.92

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[343] Cited in Toby Lester, *The Fourth Part of the World*, pp. 329-330. For a transcription of his *Oratio*, see Lewis Spitz, *Conrad Celtis: The German Arch-Humanist* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 26-31.

[344] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, IX.ii.97, p. 197. In fairness to Isidore, he casts similar aspersions upon *all* Europeans except Romans, Greeks, and his own Spaniards, claiming that all were named after various Greek or Latin words signifying violence and savagery. Thus for Isidore, only "Romans" possessed *imperium*. *Etymologiae*, IX.iii.1-135.

It is no coincidence that despite his own halting grammar and stammering diction, Celtis insists on stuttering to the faculty not in fluent German but in his rusty Latin.[345] For while Germanics such as Liudprand, Otto, and Charlemagne had once been looked down upon by the Italians and Greeks as the savage nemesis of civilisation and *imperium*, Celtis appropriates Roman traits to argue that the Germans ought now consider themselves to *be* civilisation, and the new manifestation of the old *imperium*. The Caesars and the Constantines are gone and the *translatio imperii* has been passed, argues Celtis, from Italy to Greece to Germany: from *Romani* to *Rhōmaiōn* to *Römisches*. This is the phenomenon which prompted Petrarch's protestations, and was the basis for the Byzantines' belittling of Liudprand. But now the *Reich* is, in Celtis' eyes, the sole and legitimate successor to Rome.[346] Crucially, Celtis urges, his fellow Holy Romans should look backwards to an imagined history, a legitimisation of the present by appropriating – and where necessary, stealing and doctoring – the relics of the past to enforce this claim.[347] Celtis is clearly aware that his world is very different from that of Caesar and Augustus, but the principle of a single upholder of civilisation remains.

However, a problem emerges. Even in the Early Middle Ages, petty princelings from Northumbria to Navarre had styled themselves *imperators*. This trend had accelerated by the time of Conrad von Celtis, for 'the idea of a *translatio imperii* was fundamental to the ethos of the *Reich*: the prestige of the emperor was immeasurably enhanced by the notion that he held supreme power inherited from the emperors in Rome'.[348] But while the rulers of medieval Europe had once been required to explicitly state their position in relation to the *Kaiser*, the Renaissance sees a change.[349] For all Conrad's insistence that the *translatio*

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[345] Spitz, *Conrad Celtis*, p. 26.

[346] Celtis' speech came at a time when Imperial literati and intelligentsia, their pride piqued by foreign encroachments on the Holy *Reich* and centuries of scathing insults from Italian writers, were embracing a sense of "German" nationhood over the universalism of the medieval *Reich*. It is no coincidence that twenty years later, Emperor Maximilian acknowledged the shift in public perception by changing the name of the *Reich* from *Sacrum Imperium Romanorum* to *Heiliges Römisches Reich **teutscher Nation***. Spitz, *Conrad Celtis*, p. 67.

[347] It is no coincidence that chroniclers of Charlemagne and his sons were appropriated by the German Humanists as evidence of an imagined, better, past. The aforementioned writings of Hroswitha of Gandersheim, from the tenth century, were discovered in the monastery of St. Emmaram in Regensburg, in 1493, by none other than Conrad Celtis – who stole the manuscript to have it mass-printed across the *Reich*. Similarly, the famous *Tabula Peutingeriana*, one of only three Roman maps to have survived to the present day, was discovered and stolen from the Colmar monastery by Celtis, and bequeathed to his friend Konrad Peutinger, who donated this symbol of Imperial might to Emperor Maximilian in Vienna – where it remains to this day. See Spitz, *Conrad Celtis*, pp. 41-43, 99; Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography Vol. I*, p. 238.

[348] Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 17-18.

[349] In his discussion of the ceremonies between Renaissance ambassadors, Jonathan Wright describes the ceremonial (and very public) one-upmanship between European ambassadors when at functions attended by an ambassador of the *Reich*. At one diplomatic function in London in 1661, the Swedish, French, and Spanish (representing the *Reich*) ambassadors had made plans to ensure that they would be first in line at a public procession, with the Swedes and French refusing to walk behind the Imperial ambassador as it would imply

imperii has passed the sceptre and civilising mission of Caesar exclusively to the Germans, and for all the German Humanists' invention of a mythical noble history to justify passing *imperium* from the decadent wastrels of Italy to the virtuous heroes of Conrad Celtis' nostalgic fantasies,[350] the logicians and literati of Nuremberg and Nördlingen – who embrace their own manufactured "history" to the extent of changing their German names to Roman-sounding gibberish[351] – are by no means alone in claiming that they are the new embodiment of *imperium*.

Our scene changes and we find ourselves, only a few decades later, in Henry VIII's palace at Richmond-upon-Thames in the spring of 1533. Eighty years have passed since the fall of Constantinople, and more than half a millennium has transpired since Liudprand argued with Prince Leo. *Imperium*, the imagination of power, authority, superiority, and legitimacy, has been appropriated by new self-anointed *imperators*. In the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, Vasily III calls himself *Caesar* and energetically promotes Philotheus of Pskov's description of Moscow as the 'Third Rome', claiming authority via his father Ivan III's marriage to the last Byzantine princess fleeing the fall of her ancient city,[352] and recent written recognition of his imperial title from the Holy Roman Emperor.[353] In Central Europe that same Holy Roman Emperor, *Caesar Augustus* Charles V, rules over his bloated *Heiliges Römisches Reich*, justifying his title through his coronation by the Pope[354] and his great-grandfather's purchase of the legal rights to the words *Imperium* and *Imperator* from the exiled, bankrupt nephew of the final Byzantine *Basileus* cut down in Constantinople.[355] And

their subordination to the *Reich*. The French ambassador was accompanied by 500 soldiers, the Spanish/Imperial ambassador by 2,000. In the parade the three ambassadors jostled for a place at the front, their bodyguards intervened, and in the ensuing scuffle each side's soldiers exchanged fire and several bystanders were killed – all because of the prestige associated with the *Imperial* title. Jonathan Wright, *The Ambassadors: From Ancient Greece to the Nation State* (London: HarperCollins, 2006), pp. 255-260.

[350] Spitz, *Conrad Celtis*, pp. 98-102.

[351] Ibid., pp. 49-50, 77.

[352] Donald Ostrowski, 'The growth of Muscovy (1462-1533)', in Maureen Perrie (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 221, 233.

[353] Folz, *Concept of Empire*, p. 54.

[354] The last *Kaiser* to be crowned by the Pope, Charles V was thus the last Holy Roman Emperor. All subsequent ones were technically "*Elected* Emperor of the Romans", not full "Emperor of the Romans". Harald Kleinschmidt, *Charles V: The World Emperor* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2004), p. 74. Lewis Spitz records that as a teenager, Charles V energetically performed in a play written by Conrad Celtis' friend Benedictus Chelidonius, playing the part of a young prince dedicated to building a noble Roman future for the *Reich*. Spitz, *Conrad Celtis*, pp. 79-80.

[355] Although Constantinople was conquered, and *Basileus* Constantine XI Palaiologos killed, on 29th May 1453, Byzantine governance limped on until May 1460 in the Despotate of Morea (southern Greece) under the emperor's brother Thomas Palaiologos, and until August 1461 as the Autocracy of Trebizond (northern Turkey) under the pretender David Komnenos. However, as they were not crowned by the Patriarch in Constantinople, neither man was legally considered *Basileus*. Komnenus and his children were executed by the Ottomans while Thomas Palaiologos and his family were forced into exile as hangers-on in Pope Pius II's retinue. Upon Thomas Palaiologos' death, his youngest son Manuel abnegated his claim to an imperial title, surrendering all claims to the throne on behalf of him and his children to the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for a pension and a house in

in that city, now the glittering jewel in the Caliphate's crown, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent has declared himself *Kaysar-i-Rûm* – Caesar of Rome.[356]

The actual town of Rome is now a derelict slum of squatters and shacks, 'its total population having shrunk ... hopelessly demoralised and in many cases half-starving',[357] overshadowed by the new merchant capitals of northern Europe and Mediterranean Asia, and is now utterly inconsequential.[358] Instead, three *Rome*s and three self-styled *Roman Emperors* now exist: a Catholic in Germany, an Orthodox in Russia, and a Muslim in Asia Minor. Yet this is apparently not enough, for in the capital of one of the petty little kingdoms surrounding the power-centres of the *Reich*, Spain and France,[359] Henry VIII formally breaks from the Church of Rome and justifies his protestation by asserting that he possesses the legitimacy, dignity, and supreme sovereignty bestowed only upon those who embody *imperium*:[360]

Constantinople. Thomas' eldest son Andreas, bankrupt in Rome, twice sold his Latinised title *Imperator Constantinopolitanus* to the invading Charles VIII of France (who died in 1498 without an heir, rendering the continuation of the imperial title legally dubious) and John II of Aragon (father of Ferdinand II, who unified Spain by marrying Isabella of Castile, who in turn were grandparents of Charles V). Meanwhile Thomas' sister Sophia Palaiologos, married off by the Pope to Ivan III in Moscow in vain hope of a joint Catholic-Orthodox crusade to liberate Constantinople, had passed her own semi-legal imperial status to the emerging Russians. John Julius Norwich traces the offshoot of Thomas Palaiologos' illegitimate son John, who fled to London and whose descendants, in turn fleeing the English Civil War, were recorded as late as 1679 in Barbados. The last claimant to the Roman imperial office, Godscall Palaeologus, disappears from historical records in London in 1693. It is currently unknown if the last Roman dynasty died with her. Byzantine legend, however, asserts that when the final world conflict between Christendom and the Antichrist begins, Constantine XI Palaiologos will return to lead the revived Roman Imperium. See Ostrowski, 'The growth of Muscovy', p. 233 in Perrie (ed.), *Cambridge History of Russia*; Rosser, *A-Z of Byzantium* pp. 210, 281-282, 400; Norwich, *Byzantium*, p. 446; Norwich, *Byzantium: The Decline and Fall* (London: Viking, 1995), pp. 446-448; A.P. Kazhdan, *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 606-607; David Nicol, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Byzantine Empire* (London: B.A. Seaby, 1991), pp. 32, 130; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, VI:lxviii, p. 974.

[356] Lord Patrick Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (London: Cape, 1977), p. 112.

[357] Norwich, *Popes*, p. 228.

[358] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol.VI*, Ch.LXXI.

[359] Despite being the most powerful nation in Europe, France's relationship with *imperium* was more complex. Charles VIII of France (1483-1490) purportedly purchased the rights to *imperium* from Andreas Palaiologos in order to justify Charles' attempted conquest of Italy (the French king's claim to be "Emperor of Constantinople" was still being recorded as late as 1532). French kings did not recognise the Holy Roman Emperor's self-styled superiority over mere kings, and although occasional kings such as Henri II (1547-1559) stressed their 'imperial pretensions in public imagery', the title *imperator* never seems to have caught on among French monarchs. David Potter suggests two reasons. Firstly, the French kings legitimised their power from *Rex Francorum* Charlemagne, rather than the ancient Romans. Second, as Jean du Tillet records of Charles IX, '[the title *imperator*] is not more eminent than that of king, which sounds better and sweeter'. David Potter, *A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation-State* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1995), pp. 32-33; Richard Scheller, 'Ensigns of Authority: French royal symbolism in the age of Louis XII', *Simiolus* 13 (1982), pp. 74-141.

[360] Price, *Story of Titles*, p. 67.

'Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles it is manifestly

declared and expressed that this realm of England is an empire, and so hath

been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and king having

the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same...'[361]

<div align="right">

Statute in Restraint of Appeals
Henry VIII, 1533

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Let us momentarily set aside the turbulent politics of Renaissance Europe and consider the evolution of the discourse. Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottomans styles himself *Kaysar*, Charles V of the *Heiliges Reich* is *Kaiser*, Vasily III of Muscovy is a *Czar*,[362] and now Henry VIII, while not claiming the title, declares that his realm is *empire*. Each man is a Caesar, an *Imperator* of his own making. But not one of these four men has more than the vaguest of connections to the broken-down Italian town in their contemporary sixteenth century, and none whatsoever to the metropolitan memory of Caesar, Cicero, and Cincinnatus. Instead, each man adopts the word as evidence of his self-anointed status as the defender of civilisation, the supreme order with authority over all other temporal rulers, the rightful inheritor of *imperium*.[363]

As we saw in the writings of Richard of Bury, Henry VIII was not the first Englishman to dabble with the imperial discourse. Nor would he be the last.[364] Yet it starkly

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[361] 24 Hen 8 c 12 (*Ecclesiastical Appeals Act 1532 / Statute in Restraint of Appeals*), His Majesty's Government, *The Statutes At Large: From the First Year of King Richard III to the Thirty-First Year of King Henry VIII, inclusive [Vol. IV]* (Cambridge: Joseph Bentham's University Press, 1763), pp. 257-261; Frances Yates, *Astraea: the imperial theme in the sixteenth century* (London: Routledge, 1975), p. 39.

[362] Maureen Perrie (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia: Vol. I, From Early Rus' to 1689* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia c.882-1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 43.

[363] It is around this time that the word *empire* begins to be applied to non-European societies. Jeremy Black records that among European explorers, 'there was the difficulty of discussing and conceptualizing what was poorly, if at all, understood outside the zone of interaction': as European diplomats were accustomed to defining their prestige by comparison to the *Reich*, placing their realms on a hierarchy with politically alien societies in Africa, Asia, and the New World created distinct diplomatic problems. As Black records, 'This pattern of interaction became more insistent as competition between European states spread into the overseas world, notably in commerce and colonization. As a result, foreign states were understood largely in terms of their alignments with rival European powers, as well as with the pattern of European politics'. Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion, 2010), pp. 50-52. Matthew Gabriel argues that many of the historical and recent non-European polities we call "empire" are a result of Victorian translations of foreign texts, using "empire" as a portmanteau word for powerful societies – precisely the same way as medieval scholars used the word *imperium*. Matthew Gabriel, *An Empire of Memory: The Legend of Charlemagne, the Franks, and Jerusalem before the First Crusade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. xi-xix.

[364] Following George III's quiet abandonment in 1801 of the title 'King of France' at Napoleon's insistence, and the recent incorporation of (Catholic) Ireland into the (Protestant) United Kingdom, at a cabinet meeting on 5th November 1801 a suggestion was raised that George III should adopt the title "Emperor of the British Isles". While the circumstances are unclear, the contemporary fear of a strong Papist presence in the otherwise Anglican government, and the perceived need for George to emphasise his equality with his ally the Holy Roman Emperor, to give Britain equal prestige in the Allies' negotiations with Napoleon's France, allow us to

illustrates how far the discourse of *imperium* has evolved. Like all who came before him, from Charlemagne and Constantine XI Palaiologos to Suleiman the Magnificent and Ivan III, Henry VIII is appealing to a history which is a blend of fact and fantasy,[365] a concocted community which never existed but which justifies his present-day actions. The appeal to imagination confers legitimacy upon his momentous decision to secede from Catholicism. He declares England to be not only a supreme sovereign – a superior partner in the caesaropapist[366] squabble that has upset the medieval union between church and state – but by extension the *sole* arbiter and authority of civilisation.

As we move yet closer to the present day, we see a similar pattern. Our scene changes again, this time to the interior of Notre-Dame de Paris on the morning of 2nd December 1804, to a ceremony both 'lavish and sumptuous, heavy with the symbolism of state authority and personal power'.[367] Against a backdrop of wobbly cardboard sets[368] and hastily-manufactured

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reasonably conclude that the title "Emperor" was purely a caesaropapist statement of legitimacy and supreme sovereignty over the Catholics, and a statement that George III shared equal rank with both the Pope and the Kaiser. This hypothesis is supported by the lead article of *The Times* on 6th November 1801 and by the memoirs of the-then British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, which both argue that the imperial title had been suggested by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York as an expression of legitimacy and supreme power. Ultimately, George refused the imperial title as he considered that the more modest "King of Great Britain" was more recognisable and thus would carry more weight than the foreign-sounding "Emperor of the British Isles" (the same reason Charles IX of France had rejected the title "Emperor of France"). *Cobbett's Parliamentary History* does not record any debate or even mention of the title in either House but curiously, the first parliamentary session of January 1801 following Ireland's incorporation into the United Kingdom, was opened as *'The Imperial Parliament'*. See Jeremy Black, *George III: America's Last King* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006) p. 379; A. Aspinall, *The Later Correspondence of George III: Vol. III 1798-1801* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 435 footnote 2; *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England from The Earliest Period to The Year 1803 [Vol. XXXV]* (London: T.G. Hansard, 1819), pp. 858-859; A.G. Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning* (London, 1831), pp. 361-2 ft. 3; *The Times*, 6th November 1801, p. 2 (latter two texts accessed and reproduced by kind permission of the Microfilms Collection, Newman Library, Virginia Technical Institute).

[365] Based on Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae*, the medieval chronicler Geoffrey of Monmouth records in his *Historia Regum Britanniae* (1136) that Britain had first been settled by the mythical Brutus (also "Britus" or "Britto"): a relative of the Trojan prince Aeneas and thus, according to Virgil's *Aeneid*, a distant ancestor of the legendary founders of Rome, Romulus and Remus (see Chapter Seven). Curiously, the idea of being founded by Trojan refugees (and thus being linked to Rome) was also claimed in ancient histories of the Franks, Scandinavians, and Normans. See Karen Jankulak, *Geoffrey of Monmouth: Writers of Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), pp. 37-40. While the Brutus story was a complete fantasy, it was apparently still believed at the time of Henry VIII as fiction became embellished with fact: Constantine the Great, the first Roman emperor to legalise Christianity and reunifier of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires in the early fourth century, had been born in Roman Britain and was proclaimed *Imperator* in York, apparently (by *translatio*) lending the imperial dignity (and legitimacy over Rome and her dominions) to Britain. As such, the Roman *fact* of Constantine and the Roman *fantasy* of Brutus/Brittus were blurred in Geoffrey of Monmouth's chronicles, which were later heavily referenced in Polydore Vergil's widely-read *Anglica Historia* (1513) and became one of those 'divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles' alluded to in the Statute in Restraint of Appeals, insisting that Henry was equal (or even superior), not subordinate, to the Pope. In the Tudor period, London was occasionally nicknamed 'New Troy'. See Roy Strong, *Coronation: from the 8th to the 21st century* (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), pp. 184-5; Yates, *Astraea*, p. 50.

[366] The combination of *imperium et sacerdotium* – temporal and spiritual supreme power – in one person ("Caesar-Pope"). *New Catholic Encyclopaedia Vol. II*, p. 851.

[367] Alan Forrest, *Napoleon* (London: Quercus, 2011), p. 167.

relics unconvincingly claimed to stretch back to Charlemagne,[369] in the presence of an angry Pope dragged against his will from the Vatican,[370] the erstwhile *Consul* of the French Revolution's *Res Publica*, Napoleon Bonaparte, places a Roman-style laurel wreath upon his own brow and proclaims himself *Empereur* of *L'Empire des Français*.[371] It is no coincidence that Napoleon's imperial coronation preceded his dismembering of the rival Holy Roman Empire two years later. This was a necessary formality, as according to the *translatio*, *imperium* was exclusive and the *Reich*, for centuries a personal possession of the House of Habsburg and now extinct in all but name,[372] was apparently no longer worthy of possessing *imperium*. Civilisation, sovereignty, and legitimacy, for Napoleon, were no longer upheld by the decadent and decaying monarchies of Europe, but were now found in the youthful and energetic Revolutionary Republic of France following in the footsteps of the ancient Roman Republic by throwing out its hated kings – and so too was Napoleon, in his mind, following in the footsteps of his hero Julius Caesar by rescuing the Republic from corruption and uniting it under a brutal military dictatorship.[373] Thus *imperium,* in Napoleon's mind, had passed back to the descendants of Charlemagne – the new civilisation of order, dignity, and legitimacy. Thus the situation in the French Senate in May 1804, declaring the *Empire*: 'the tribunes are drunk on history, explaining to themselves their present reality by construing odd visions of the past, extracting strange truths from it', summarised by one tribune who states that '"Nobody here can ignore – we've lived it too long – *the empire of words and the prestige of names*"'.[374]

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[368] The sets used for Bonaparte's coronation were borrowed from Parisian theatres, causing French wits to remark that the temporality of the setting would reflect the impermanence of Napoleon's *imperium.* See Alistair Horne, *Age of Napoleon* p. 39; Johnson, *Napoleon*, p. 82.

[369] Cronin, *Napoleon*, pp. 247-248; Johnson, *Napoleon*, p. 82. Lewis Goldsmith, an Austro-British double agent at Napoleon's court, records just how much these imaginary antiques meant to Napoleon. Bonaparte gave fabulously expensive gifts to nobles and academics who sent him artefacts claimed to be Charlemagne's, and when Napoleon visited the ruins of Charlemagne's capital at Aachen in 1804, he purchased large quantities of conveniently-discovered relics at ridiculous prices. When a German professor of antiquities, Richter, wrote to Napoleon to advise that he was being scammed with cheap fakes, Napoleon's response was to send five French secret policemen who woke the professor in the middle of the night, bundled him into a carriage which was driven to the opposite bank of the Rhine, and dumped him at the roadside – with orders to forever stay out of French territory on pain of death. Like the EU with Captain Euro, Napoleon's manufactured myth did not fool everyone. See Wright, *The Ambassadors*, pp. 76-77; Lewis Goldsmith, *Memoirs of the Court of St. Cloud: Being Secret Letters from a Gentleman at Paris to a Nobleman in London* (Boston: L.C. Page and Company, 1900), Letter 10, available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3899/3899-h/3899-h.htm.

[370] Horne, *Age of Napoleon*, pp. 37-38.

[371] As Vincent Cronin and Alan Schom highlight, Napoleon's coronation moment was immediately proceeded by a salutation of "*Vivat Imperator in Aeternum!*". The links with what he imagined Charlemagne and Rome to be could not be clearer. Vincent Cronin, *Napoleon* (London: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 252; Schom, *Napoleon*, pp. 348-9.

[372] Price, *Story of Titles*, p. 50.

[373] Paul Johnson, *Napoleon* (London: Phoenix, 2002), p. 32; Cronin, *Napoleon*, p. 171.

[374] Steven Englund, *Napoleon: A Political Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 231.

It is therefore no coincidence that Napoleon's coronation and subsequent *de facto* monarchy were saturated with symbols borrowed from the iconography of Classical Rome[375] and Carolingian France,[376] continuing the façade in later years by bestowing upon his son the title 'King of the Romans' (with accompanying iconography);[377] the traditional title for the first sons of Holy Roman Emperors.[378] In the trappings of his subsequent imperial household and imperial style across Europe, Napoleon was simply continuing the *translatio imperii*, declaring that he and France embodied *Imperator*[379] and *Imperium* respectively.[380] This discourse further evolved in France's Second Empire,[381] and prompted a 'sudden cultus of the imperial title' in European and Latin American countries in the latter half of the nineteenth century.[382]

Again our scene changes, this time to the despatch box of the House of Commons on 17th February 1876 where, to angry objections from Liberal MPs,[383] the wily leader of the Conservative Party, Benjamin Disraeli, is announcing to Parliament a bill which will grant Queen Victoria the unusual title of *Kaiser-i-Hind* – to be officially rendered in documents as *Indiae Imperatrix*[384] or *Empress of India*.[385]

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[375] Jaś Elsner, 'Inventing Imperium: texts and the propaganda of monuments in Augustan Rome', chapter in Jaś Elsner (ed.), *Art and Text in Roman Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 32-54.

[376] Cronin, *Napoleon*, pp. 247-8; Hibbert, *Wives and Women*, p. 134; Alan Schom, *Napoleon*, p. 347.

[377] Horne, *Age of Napoleon*, p. 84.

[378] Price, *Story of Titles*, p. 50.

[379] Napoleon always used the title *Empereur*, and *Imperator* was only ever officially used at the coronation. During his exile on St. Helena, Napoleon's title was the source of constant squabbling as his British jailers, following orders from Parliament, only recognised the title "General Bonaparte" and confiscated any gifts or letters which contained the Imperial title. When an Italian admirer of Napoleon wanted to send the *Empereur* a book, he tried to outfox the British by dedicating it to *Imperatori Napoleoni* – technically "General Napoleon" in classical Latin. However the British interpreted the words in more modern Latin as "Emperor Napoleon," and confiscated the book. McLynn, *Napoleon*, p. 644; Markham, *Napoleon*, p. 248.

[380] Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 71-72.

[381] Alistair Horne, *The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870-71* (London: Pan, 1990), pp. 14-34.

[382] Price, *Story of Titles*, p. 52.

[383] See the Hansard records of House of Commons (HC) and House of Lords (HL) debates for 1876: HC Deb 17 February 1876 vol 227, cols. 407-28; HC Deb 09 March 1876 vol 227, cols. 1719-60; HC Deb 13 March 1876 vol 227, cols. 1867-8; HC Deb 16 March 1876 vol 228, cols. 75-164; HC Deb 20 March 1876 vol 228, cols. 272-336; HC Deb 23 March 1876 vol 228, cols. 480-518; HC Deb 24 March 1876 vol 228, col. 563; HC Deb 30 March 1876 vol 228, cols. 821-75; HC Deb 03 April 1876 vol 228, cols. 1097-8; HL Deb 03 April 1876 vol 228, cols. 1039-95; HC Deb 27 April 1876 vol 228, cols. 1757-8; HC Deb 02 May 1876 vol 228, cols. 1982-5. All available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1876/.

[384] Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London: Phoenix, 2000), p. 140.

[385] Bernard Cohn discusses the quandary facing Disraeli: to create a title which would not only suggest a higher rank than the various royals in India, but which was sufficiently distinct from yet also sufficiently similar to the various foreign-inspired titles (*Raja*, *Amir*, *Padishah*) employed by the previous Mughal "emperors". This would suggest that the British monarch was not a foreign interloper but the natural successor to the Mughals – a form of linguistic *translatio*. Prof. Gottlieb Leitner of King's College London coined the title *Kaiser-i-Hind*, which sounded vaguely Sanskrit and had an aura of historical and oriental mystique. But with its combination of Germanic overtones, its implication of British rule over the entire subcontinent including non-British territories, and its complete lack of English words, the title failed to satisfy the English, antagonised the Indians, and its Germanic tones led to Queen Victoria being lampooned in the German press. A.N. Wilson, *The Victorians* (London: Arrow, 2003), pp. 391-392; Bernard Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India' in Eric

Disraeli's 'flashy stunt' – later announcing the passage of the Act on the steps of the Stock Exchange, in the rain, to a fanfare of trumpets from a hired brass band[386] – was not to everyone's taste. It 'struck ... many Liberals, as an inglorious, unnecessary, un-British aping of foreign autocracies',[387] and 'to some ... [Empress of India] was more suggestive of a pig or a railway engine than a constitutional monarch'.[388] And curiously, British elites in the early and mid-nineteenth century had been outright hostile towards imperial titles – even shunning the phrase "British Empire" – as *imperium* was too closely associated with Napoleonic tyranny and ancient Italian savagery towards the Britons.[389] Yet by the 1870s the discourse was clearly evolving further.

From records of the period we can infer that the choice of the title might have had as much to do with Disraeli seeking royal patronage of his own political career as with public prestige – similar to Pope Leo and Charlemagne – but the importance of prestige cannot be understated. As A.N. Wilson notes,[390] Disraeli's choice of title came not long after the erstwhile King of Prussia had become *Kaiser* of Germany, a new industrial and military superpower whose rapid rise was the cause of some not-inconsiderable worry to a Britain sliding into commercial complacency.[391] And with France having recently renounced *Empire* for Republic,[392] this left a lack of rivals against *Imperial* Germany. An *Imperial* Britain 'would be an Imperium...to rival the European *Dreikaiserbund*'.[393] This is ironic, as Wilson notes, considering that in 1876 Victoria's political power had never been lower while her unpopularity with the British public had never been higher.[394] Yet while the adoption of the imperial discourse had clear personal motivations on the part of Disraeli, and perhaps Victoria herself,[395] the issue of sovereignty, legitimacy, and supreme power remained clearly visible in the form of justifying British *Imperium*. Following the 1857 Indian Mutiny, British

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Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 184-185.

[386] Roberts, *Salisbury*, p. 140.

[387] Ibid., p. 140.

[388] Wilson, *The Victorians*, p. 391.

[389] Richard Hingley, *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen: The imperial origins of Roman archaeology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-27.

[390] Wilson, *Victorians*, pp. 391-2.

[391] Martin Daunton, *Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1700-1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[392] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Progress Publishers: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1986).

[393] 'Three Emperors' League'; the future Central Powers of the First World War. Wilson, *The Victorians*, p. 391

[394] Ibid.; Wilson, *Salisbury,* p. 140.

[395] It is notable that Victoria's daughter (also named Victoria), married off to Crown Prince-Imperial Frederick of Germany, would be crowned Empress upon her husband's accession to the German throne. This prompted concern in the royal court that *Queen* Victoria would then be outranked by her own daughter, *Empress* Victoria. Wilson, *Victorians*, pp. 391-2.

India had recently passed from control of the East India Company to direct crown control,[396] and in the absence of the Mughal *Padshah* or *Raja*[397] – the Company's puppet figurehead whose title was rendered in British newspapers as *Emperor*[398] – Disraeli clearly deemed it necessary to justify British rule over the many royal rulers on whose collaboration British rule would rely. This would require a powerful public statement of sovereignty and legitimacy. Victoria 'could scarcely be the empress of Britain, and although her government now had a toe-hold in most discovered corners of the planet, it would have been vainglorious to style herself empress of the world':[399] *Empress of India* solved these problems by elevating Victoria to an equal level with her growing rival in Berlin, expressed supreme sovereignty over her hundreds of millions of new subjects on the subcontinent, and made a powerful public statement to the world that British *Raj* was, in British minds, justified. Thus commenced a brief British fad for all things classically Roman,[400] and a short-lived tradition of the British monarch being styled as *Rex et Imperator/Imperatrix* – King and Emperor/Empress – in an unambiguous public statement of imperial Britain's self-appointed status as guardian and defender of civilisation.[401]

As our scene moves into the twentieth century and we witness Europe's stranglehold on the world beginning to crumble, two totalitarian tyrants seek to legitimise their hastily-constructed regimes by appropriating the symbolism, iconography, and visual and verbal language of Ancient Rome. By mimicking eagles, architecture, gestures, language, and the garish pomp of sinister ceremonies attempting to replicate the triumphs of Roman *Imperators* and medieval *Kaisers*, the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis,[402] slavishly mimicking

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[396] Cohn notes that the idea of creating an imperial title for the British monarch had been floating around since government takeover of India from the East India Company in 1858, but was never acted upon. The 1876 Royal Titles Act might have been genuinely influenced by Victoria's pride being piqued by the Germans' adoption of *imperium* – a petty game of one-upmanship no different to that between Liudprand and Leo. Cohn, 'Representing Authority', p. 184.

[397] Both titles were used for the Mughal head of state. The *Padshah* or *Padishah* claimed legitimacy as a descendent of Genghis Khan, a form of *translatio imperii* in India. The title was abolished following the 1857-58 Indian Mutiny. *Raja* was a more generic title roughly analogous to *king*. As noted earlier, *raja* has the same etymological root as *reich, rex*, and *reign*. Julian Spilsbury, *The Indian Mutiny* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007), pp. 35-37, 66-67.

[398] Mark Bryant, *Wars of Empire in Cartoons* (London: Grub Street, 2008).

[399] Wilson, *Victorians*, p. 391.

[400] John Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

[401] Martin Price, *Coins: An Illustrated Survey, 650 BC to the Present Day* (London and New York: Hamlyn, 1980); Wilson, *Victorians*, p. 391.

[402] Alexander Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture and the Legacy of Classical Antiquity* (University Park, PN: Pennsylvania University Press, 1990).

Mussolini's pantomime,[403] declare that they are the rightful and sole inheritors of supreme sovereignty, authority, legitimacy, and power – defined by their self-proclaimed superiority over all others. By the time Europeans emerged from the ashes of the subsequent Armageddon and began the mismanaged dissolution of their colonial conquests, the discourse of *empire* was no longer something to be admired but instead to be abhorred[404] – a pattern replicated in Europe's transatlantic offspring.

In the heady days of American liberty, Thomas Jefferson had described the fledgling United States as an 'empire of liberty'[405] as the USA had, in his mind, taken up the mantle of Republican Rome. This echo of Conrad Celtis' exhortations did not go unnoticed. As Hugh Henry Breckinridge, ardent opponent of Britain's *empire* in North America, wrote following the American Revolution:

> 'You are now citizens of a new empire: an empire, not the effect of chance, not hewn out by the sword; but formed from the skill of sages, and the design of wise men ... You have acquired superior strength; you are become a great people.' [406]

It may seem incongruous, perhaps even ridiculous, that a people so recently freed from the shackles of the British Empire would appropriate the word to describe their consciously anti-imperial project. Yet just as Europeans abandoned the term, so did the Europeans' offspring in the New World. Ronald Reagan's 1983 labelling of the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire',[407] and more recently Donald Rumsfeld's assertion that the United States is 'not about empire', as we earlier saw, reflect this.

In all of these historical vignettes, from the palace of Bucoleon to the press room of the White House, we see the same precise pattern. Empire, Emperor, Empress, *Imperium, Kaiser, Czar, Kaysar* – whether to be loved or hated – all are complete fabrications, yet all have a common root. The root is that Christmas morning when the Pontiff proclaimed

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[403] As is the case throughout the *translatio*, a grim fulfilment of Marx's retelling of Hegel: 'all facts ... of great importance in world history occur, as if it were, twice ... the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce'. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* in *Selected Works*, p. 96.

[404] Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1-12.

[405] Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic 1789-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[406] Maier, *Among Empires*, p. 1.

[407] Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), p. 128.

Imperium, setting in motion the subsequent evolution of the discourse. In the cases we have examined, all invocations of *imperium* seek the same things: to proclaim superiority over others, to confer legitimacy upon the present by appealing to an appropriated past, to construct an imagined community which justifies the present as a continuation of the ancient past, and ultimately to express history not as it *was* but *how it should have been*. The Rome which existed in the minds of medieval and modern monarchs was not the Rome which really existed, but the Rome which ought to have been, and which *had* to have been for their feudal fiefdoms and Enlightenment regimes to be bestowed with legitimacy.

This has continued since. From the early days of European expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, to the heyday of Europe's jingoistic imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, *empire* was a discourse to be admired. At the same time *empire* became embedded as a discourse of intellectual life – it is in the nineteenth century that we see historians naming the civilisations of the ancient world as "empires", imposing an imagination of order, strength, and dignity upon the past in precisely the same way as Pope Leo had done a thousand years previously.[408] The consequence of this was, as John

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[408] An argument can be made that "empire" has never existed outside of Europe and European thought. As we have seen, European ambassadors worked within a European framework – whereby kingdoms had to define their relationships with the Holy Roman Empire – when interacting with non-Europeans. With the mid-nineteenth century explosion in scholarly history, prompted by mass literacy, Rankean methods, a chauvanistic or paternalistic habit of comparing non-European societies to Europe, and a desire to link the present with an imagined past, previous or non-European political systems acquired the imperial title as an indicator of perceived strength, sovereignty, and dignity. Historian Eric Hobsbawm attributes this to the intellectual and political dominance of Europe and European traditions of thought from the sixteenth century onwards. As Europeans encountered the non-European world they inevitably interacted on the European basis with which they were familiar. Thus non-European words and complex political concepts, which cannot be easily translated into a single European word, were simply slotted into a convenient *lumpencategory* of "*Empires*": 中華帝國 became "*The Chinese Empire*"; گورکانیان became "*The Mughal Empire*"; 大日本帝國 became "*The Empire of Japan*", and so forth, a habit which has survived into the present and continues to colour our interpretation of the non-European past. Exactly the same happened as Europeans began to discover and write non-European history, always on a comparative basis to Europe. Thus the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia became the "Achaemenid *Empire*", Sargon of Akkad was written about as ruler of the "Akkadian *Empire*", and so forth. Even societies which did not think of themselves in spatial terms received such treatment. Thus the Zulus, who viewed their society as a network of *amabutho* and *amakhanda* family groups rather than a shape on a map, were reported in British newspapers as a "Zulu *Empire*"; Ancient Egypt, whose inhabitants had simply called their world '*km.t*' ("The Black", a reference to the Nile's diluvian soil), was termed by nineteenth-century archaeologists as the "Egyptian *Empire*". In all of these cases Europeans filled what Benedict Anderson calls 'empty time' with European ideas and Euroepan imaginations. This is a powerful consequence of the *translatio imperii*: there have been no "empires" outside of European history from 800 AD onwards – such "empires" have existed purely in European imagination and discourse. See: E.H. Carr, *What is History?* pp. 24-26; Richard Evans, *In Defence of History* (London: Granta, 1997), pp. 16-23, 191-223; Eric Hobsbawm, *On History* (London: Abacus, 1997), pp. 287-301; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 67-82; Balachandra Rajan and Elizabeth Sauer (eds.), *Imperialisms: Historical and Literary Investigations, 1500-1900* (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-72; John Laband, *Kingdom in Crisis: The Zulu Response to the British Invasion of 1879* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1992), pp. 18-24; Richard Gabriel, *Thutmose III: The Military Biography of Egypt's Greatest Warrior King* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 227-232; William Moran, *The Amarna Letters* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

Mackenzie argues, a mass mobilisation of the general public in support of *empire* as an ideal towards which the nation could collectively strive.[409] Examining the geographical, political, and historiographical literature on *empire*, we see an intellectual domino-effect taking place. Today we criticise what Michael Cox terms 'America's imperial temptation' based on our interpretations of Europe's imperial activity a century ago. Yet the imperialists of yesteryear were themselves influenced by a desire to link their order with that of the Romans and establish their rights against the universal pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire – an entity which was itself grounded in Pope Leo's desire to confer legitimacy and dignity upon his protector Charlemagne, by invoking an imagination of the past. *Empire* is, to use the terminology of Raimundas Lopata and Nortautas Statkus, more a practice of 'imperiography': *empire* does not exist externally, it is only created when we speak, write, and invoke the concept.[410]

Those who proclaim themselves to be the self-anointed guardians of civilisation are proclaiming *empire*; the laudatory announcement that *We are better than Them*, because *We* are a single, indivisible people, because *We* have formed a community which is greater than merely the sum of its parts, and because *We* have an authority and legitimacy which none may rightfully resist and which none can truly match. Many have claimed their lineage as descendants of Rome – *Rhōmaiō*, *Rûm*, *Römisches* – and thereby have perpetuated the *translatio imperii*: what Robert Folz describes as 'the fragmentation of the idea of empire'.[411] Yet as Jacques Le Goff reminds us, 'although it could be partial, the idea of *empire* was always connected to the idea of unity, however fragmentary'.[412] The idea that there was, and is, only one legitimate sovereign of the civilised world, whose duty and destiny it is to defend order against chaos, is what defines the discourse. It matters not that the Union does not consciously resuscitate the language of Rome, for the discourse has evolved beyond the need for clumsy, sledgehammered insistences peddled to the people. For centuries the *translatio* has been expressed in a far more subtle form.

University Press), pp. xxii-xxxiii; Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 1-2.
[409] John Mackenzie, *European empires and the people: Popular responses to imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), pp. 1-18, 229-234.
[410] Ed White, 'Early American Nations as Imagined Communities', *American Quarterly* 56:1 (2004), pp. 49-81.
[411] Folz, *Coronation of Charlemagne,* p. 228.
[412] Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization*, p. 267.

2.4   Crowning the King of Diamonds

'*A newly-born Government must dazzle and astonish.*
When it ceases to do that, it falls.'[413]

Napoleon Bonaparte
1800

Empire is clearly a discourse constituting, and bound up in, near-limitless power. This was recognised by the father of a relatively recent attempt at European unification – Napoleon Bonaparte. However, this discourse of supreme power needs to be expressed. Napoleon's above words in 1800, spoken to his skeptical secretary Bourienne, capture this requirement. As *consul* (another Roman word appropriated to lend a sense of legitimacy and civilisation to the present) of a bankrupt and besieged France and leader of the seventh French government in ten years, Napoleon perfectly understood the need to continually impress the people of his realm and powerful outsiders. A master of public propaganda based on overt connections to Charlemagne and Caesar,[414] expressed in public art, monuments, exhibitions and ceremonies, Napoleon sought to legitimise the Revolution and France's conquest of much of mainland Europe by expressing that his rule was not only right, but destined. It is thus little surprise that Napoleon went further than his monarchical predecessors[415] and contemporaries[416] by not merely invoking the image of Rome but its very name – in early 1804 the Senate declared, or was ordered to declare, Napoleon as *Empereur* of the *Empire des Français*.[417]

Napoleon's above words remain as true today as they were two centuries ago. Consciously or not, the *translatio imperii* must be communicated to people whose opinions matter. Yet it is not confined to the realms of writing and rhetoric. It exists, today, less in *verbal* language and more in *visual*.

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[413]*Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, b*y *Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourinenne, His Private Secretary [ed. R. W. Phipps Colonel, Late Royal Artillery, 1891. Original 1836]* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), Vol. I, Ch. XXVIII. Available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3567/3567-h/3567-h.htm.

[414] Richard Holmes, *The Napoleonic Wars Experience* (London: André Deutsch, 2006), pp. 10-23.

[415] James Leith, *The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France 1750-1799: A Study in the History of Ideas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

[416] Wayne Hanley, *The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796 to 1799* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2005).

[417] Note how, like *Imperium Romanorum*, this expresses popular sovereignty: *Empire of the French*, not *Empire of France*.

We saw earlier how in Early Medieval Europe, petty rulers adopted *imperator* 'as a "puff", to talk up [their] influence and prestige'.[418] This was also done visually. 'Imperial practices', asserts Julia Smith, 'provided a repertoire of inherited ways of presenting and enacting royal power for showy display and enhanced legitimacy: almost everywhere, kings avidly drew upon this stock of motifs, adding an imperial lustre to less grandiose realities'.[419] This 'imperial lustre' has taken a wide variety of forms. Charlemagne did not walk into St. Peter's in the scruffy Frankish travelling-clothes which he preferred, but in the antique tunic and purple cloak of an *Imperator*. Napoleon did not make up his coronation accessories on a whim: his throne was a copy of the Roman *Imperator*'s, his choice of bumblebees as a personal emblem was inspired by the Frankish Merovingians,[420] while Napoleon's ostentatious outfit was 'designed to recall the antique splendour of imperial Rome as well as to produce a sense of awe among onlookers':[421] an affair seen by Napoleon as a proud proclamation that he was the successor of Caesar and Charlemagne, but seen by critics as a farce whereby the pudgy, overdecorated *Empereur*[422] more closely 'resembled the King of Diamonds'[423] than a noble *Imperator*. Similarly the first *Kaiser* of late nineteenth-century Germany − whose coronation prompted Disraeli's *imperial* scheme − wore an imitation of the gaudy diadem used to crown Charlemagne[424] (a crown which, despite fooling the Habsburg dynasty and a more recent Austrian tyrant,[425] was an imitation only made several centuries after Charlemagne's death[426]) while medieval Holy Roman Emperors were crowned with 'a faithful copy of the crowns of the Byzantine emperors'.[427] Following Ivan III's marriage to Sophia Palaiologos, the Muscovian czars were crowned with genuine Byzantine headgear smuggled away during the fall of Constantinople,[428] while the Norman conquerors of Byzantine Sicily adopted the *Basileus*'s habit of eagle-embroidered shoes.[429] Even today the British monarch is still dressed, at coronation, in a copy of the Byzantine emperors' *colobium*

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[418] Smith, *Europe After Rome*, p. 274.
[419] Ibid., p. 276.
[420] Holmes, *Napoleonic Wars*, pp. 12-13.
[421] Forrest, *Napoleon*, p. 167.
[422] Christopher Hibbert cites the observation of the Comtesse de Boigne at Bonaparte's coronation, who opined that Napoleon's grand, gaudy ceremonial robes 'might have looked all right on the drawing board, but looked "terrible on the short, fat Napoleon".' Christopher Hibbert, *Napoleon: His Wives and Women* (London: HarperCollins, 2002), p. 134.
[423] Hibbert, *Wives and Women,* p. 130.
[424] Prince Michael of Greece, *Crown Jewels of Europe* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 53.
[425] Sidney Kirkpatrick, *Hitler's Holy Relics: A True Story of Nazi Plunder and the Race to Recover the Crown Jewels of the Holy Roman Empire* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011), pp. 52-53, 91.
[426] The 'Crown of Charlemagne' itself is loaded with religious and political symbolism, down to its octagonal shape representing the Aurelian Walls around Rome. Prince Michael, *Crown Jewels*, pp. 7-10, 26.
[427] Prince Michael, *Crown Jewels*, pp. 102-103.
[428] Ibid., pp. 134-5.
[429] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

sindonis and *supertunica*,[430] and as such it is hardly surprising to see a proliferation of statues and paintings of European monarchs from the Early Modern period onwards looking mildly ridiculous in archaic fancy dress,[431] wearing Roman laurel wreaths or the costumes of senators and *imperators* centuries after the Rome of the Caesars faded into historical memory. Meanwhile *Czars* and *Kaisers* of the Early Modern era unleashed a visual bombardment of paintings, statues, and ceremonies publicly associating themselves with the classical *Imperators*,[432] aped by Western Europeans desirous of expressing their legitimacy against the *Kaiser*, while across Eastern Europe royal coronations adopted clearly Byzantinesque rituals and artefacts to claim equality with the *Czar*.[433]

As Napoleon's above words suggest, this is perhaps more noticeable in emergent rather than established powers. New regimes must justify their rule to their populations, they must dazzle or fall, for without the support of political powerbrokers the sovereign cannot rule. For Ivan III and his 'pretensions of greatness',[434] struggling to fashion the Grand Duchy of Muscovy into a major power, 'his occasional use of the title "tsar", his marriage to the Byzantine princess Sofiia Palaeologa, and his employment of Byzantine-style seals and ceremonies, clothed those skeletal theories in grand symbols and imagery',[435] while even 'the warlords who established kingdoms within the provinces of the crumbling western Roman Empire had legitimized their position by eagerly appropriating symbols of Roman rule – portraits on coins, seals, dress, insignia of office, [and] flattering epithets'.[436]

This visual evolution, like its linguistic counterpart, is not new. It has been progressing since the Romans themselves. It is not by coincidence that the usurper of the deposer of the last Western *Imperator*, Theoderic, 'maintained himself and his court at Ravenna in imperial splendour', dressing, eating, entertaining, and minting coins like an *Imperator*,[437] nor was it concomitant that the Anglo-Saxon monarch Cnut styled himself an *Imperator* after being awed by the glittering coronation of Conrad II in St. Peter's. Not for nothing did Byzantine *Basileis* dazzle foreign legates with lavish ceremonies, permit private audiences with the holiest of relics, and make ambassadors and emissaries kneel before the

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[430] Ilse Hayden, *Symbol and Privilege: The Ritual Context of British Royalty* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1987), pp. 22-31.

[431] Joan Coutu, *Persuasion and Propaganda: Monuments and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

[432] Larry Silver, *Marketing Maximilian: The Visual Ideology of a Holy Roman Emperor* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[433] Michael S. Flier, 'Political ideas and rituals' in Maureen Perrie (ed.), *Cambridge History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 390.

[434] Ibid., pp. 397, 399-400.

[435] Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 258.

[436] Smith, *Europe After Rome*, p. 275.

[437] Hen, *Roman Barbarians*, pp. 31, 39, 54-65.

Throne of Solomon – a hydraulically-powered chair complete with roaring mechanical lions, which physically elevated God's self-appointed Vicegerent a couple of metres closer to Heaven.[438] Maximilian, Mussolini, and Napoleon were not simply careless with money when publicly excavating Roman and Frankish ruins and erecting Neoclassical monuments in their capitols, acting as anchors for convoluted ceremonies to which the powerbrokers of the day were invited or dragged. It is no coincidence that the Nazis plundered the Imperial Regalia of the Holy Roman Empire for their own ceremonies of *translatio imperii*, and attempted to hide their relics from the Allies for a future resurrection;[439] and in the same vein it is no coincidence that the European Union's most prestigious award, the modern equivalent of the *Légion d'honneur*, is named the *Charlemagne Prize*.[440] As with titles, many of these displays were connections to Charlemagne or Constantinople, and thence ultimately to Rome. The discourse of appealing to a fabricated history to legitimise the present – by despots, dictators, and democracies – is clearly visible in *verbal* language, but the power of the *visual* is unmatched. After all, 'empire had been cobbled together, now it had to be made to fuse: in other words, it had to be invented in the imaginations and mentalities of its elites'.[441]

This point requires illustration. As we saw earlier, Napoleon's declaration of *Empire* influenced European attitudes to the word throughout the late nineteenth century, even encouraging the British and the Germans – who had formed national identities on their opposition to *L'Empire des Français*[442] – to eventually appropriate the word to describe their own realms. As a man who so significantly influenced European attitudes to *empire*, we will let Napoleon illustrate his own insight on the need to 'dazzle and astonish' the people, by examining an example of visual *imperium*: the famous painting by Revolutionary and Imperial France's *de facto* chief propagandist – the 'art dictator of France', Jacques-Louis David[443] – of Napoleon's coronation in Notre-Dame:

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[438] The "Throne of Solomon" – one of the *magnaura* or *automata*, a collection of ancient mechanical devices in the Emperor's throne room – was hydraulic and was flanked by a pair of steam-powered lions, which emitted well-timed belches of fire and smoke if foreign dignitaries addressed the *basileus* in an inappropriate tone. All the *automata* seem to have been destroyed during the Venetians' sack of Constantinople in 1204. See A.P. Kazhdan (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium Vols I-III* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 235, 2038; John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 138-140.

[439] Kirkpatrick, *Hitler's Holy Relics*, pp. 1-25, 171-180, 175, 234-240.

[440] 'The Charlemagne Prize', at http://www.karlspreis.de/startseite.html *[in German]*.

[441] Costambeys et al., *The Carolingian World*, p. 160.

[442] Mackenzie (ed.), *European empires and the people*, pp. 158-194.

[443] Not only did David paint Napoleon as Consul and Emperor, he was both designer and choreographer of Napoleon's coronation. Also, the straight-armed salute which David believed had been performed by the Romans (based on his interpretation of scenes on Trajan's Column) appears in several of his paintings to express loyalty to a political cause. From these paintings, the salute was later picked up by the Italian Fascists and German Nazis (and the International Olympic Committee) to create a salute which linked their mass movements to an imagination of Rome. Vincent Cronin, *Napoleon* (London: HarperCollins, 1978), p. 41; Philip Dwyer, *Napoleon: The Path to Power 1769-1799* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 275, 482-484.

Fig. 2.1: *Coronation of Napoleon I* [444]

[444] *Sacre de l'empereur Napoléon Ier et couronnement de l'impératrice Joséphine dans la cathédrale Notre-Dame de Paris, le 2 décembre 1804*. Jacques-Louis David, 1805-1807. Oil on canvas. Musée du Louvre, Paris.

Where is *imperium* in this image? An immediate answer is that it is present in symbols, icons, and the purpose of the image itself. By examining a detail, we can analyse the image to discover that it is in fact saturated with political discourses:

Fig. **2.2**: *Coronation of Napoleon I* (detail)

The image is political on two levels. The first level is the *content* of the picture, which express political messages. Aside from the garish glitter, we notice several things about the content, characteristics common to forms of visual propaganda from Pharaonic friezes to Digital-Age snapshots. Firstly the state takes precedence: although many characters are present, everyone is looking at Napoleon, who is bathed in light. There is no question as to who is in charge at this moment, nor who embodies *imperium*. Secondly we see that the

chosen moment is not Napoleon crowning himself but crowning his wife, appearing not as a bloodthirsty conqueror but as a merciful statesman and a chivalrous husband.[445] As the image is frozen at this moment in time, Napoleon is depicted as *perpetually* in this state. This is a key characteristic of visual politics – the image is static and unchanging, its subject matter thus becoming eternal.

More explicit political symbols are replete. Napoleon is wearing a gold laurel wreath – originally a Roman honorific, reappropriated here as a symbol of supreme power,[446] while his gaudy costume is deliberately reminiscent of an ancient Roman toga. One of his lackeys on the right is holding a staff whose tip (upper left above the Pope) is topped with an Imperial Eagle – which overlays and is higher than the Pope, signifying temporal power over spiritual. Even the gesture being made towards Napoleon by the Pope, the 'Hand of Blessing',[447] is a political icon harking back to a Roman theme. The liturgical gesture is aimed at Napoleon and implies, despite the intensely poor relationship between Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII[448] – to the extent that the Pope did not really make the gesture, and instead Napoleon ordered David to include it in the painting – that Napoleon has divine approval. These various details all add together to imply that Bonaparte, and *only* Bonaparte, holds the supreme power of *imperium* over the world.

So much for the political discourses of the image's content. But there is second level of politics – *the image itself is a political discourse*. A gaudy painting of Napoleon would do little to legitimise his rule if it quietly gathered dust in a palace corridor. Neither would it be appropriate to paint what actually happened at the coronation – which was not solemn and sombre but instead a circus of interminable delays caused by a fussy Napoleon, incompetent planning, and vicious infighting between Napoleon's family.[449] We know that the painting is not meant to be a faithful reflection of what actually happened in Notre-Dame, with Jacques-Louis David doing the best he could to capture a moment in time in the days before photography. In truth, the painting is just as staged as a studio portrait, and includes details

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[445] Hibbert, *Wives and Women*, p. 130.

[446] To the ancient Greeks the laurel plant symbolised poetry and artistic talent, and laurel wreaths were given to popular poets (including Conrad Celtis in 1487, hence the title *Poet Laureate*, from *laurel*) and athletic victors. This latter use was picked up by the Romans, who used laurel wreaths to signify the military prowess of *imperators*. Suetonius records that the laurel wreath, meant only for occasional ceremonies, was worn constantly by Julius Caesar in an effort to hide his baldness. As a result Caesar was depicted in Roman art always wearing a laurel wreath, and thus the headwear came to represent neither poetry nor an alternative to a combover, but supreme sovereign power – an unusual trajectory of the *translatio imperii*. See *Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), p. 651; Suetonius, *History of the Twelve Caesars [trans. John Henry Freese]* (London and New York: Routledge, 1923), XLV.xxxi.

[447] *New Catholic Encyclopaedia Vols. I-XIV* (Detroit, MI: Thomson-Gale, 2003); VIII.646-650, X.855-857.

[448] Alan Forrest, *Napoleon* (London: Quercus, 2011), pp. 168-169, 254.

[449] Hibbert, *Wives and Women*, pp. 127-131.

which were not present at the actual event.[450] We also know that the painting was to be the government's official depiction of the coronation, intended not to gather dust in a private gallery but to be publicly displayed.[451] Even when not at an exhibition, the painting was intended to be a centrepiece shown off to foreign ambassadors, emissaries, and sovereigns who visited Napoleon[452] – an unambiguous statement that Napoleon, and *only* Napoleon, was the rightful supreme ruler of the continent. Instead of trying to *reflect* reality, the image thus *represents* a version of reality, glosses over the circus of 4th December 1804 with its wobbly cardboard, angry Pope, family feuds, and Napoleon's ridiculous appearance, in order to present a much more politically appealing imagination.

Collectively, these characteristics all add up. *The Coronation of Napoleon* is a historical snapshot which captures the power of visual *imperium*. France's elites are all shown gazing adoringly at Napoleon, who is not only dressed as an *Imperator* and has the blessing of God but is depicted as simultaneously powerful and merciful. And all is wrapped up in an aesthetically pleasing package designed to be seen by the elites and political powerbrokers of a world otherwise warring against Bonaparte. By publicly depicting Napoleon as the successor to Caesar in paintings, monuments, plays, and currency, his self-anointed supremacy over Europe is powerfully proclaimed to the people who mattered. As one successor to Napoleon's new-born government, the European Union too finds itself dazzling and astonishing those whose opinions matter.

However, there is a significant difference. Napoleon, Charlemagne, Henry VIII and Constantine Palaiologos were able only (or needed only) to dazzle the rich and powerful: counts and commanders-in-chief, ambassadors and archbishops. Hence the creation of royal courts with their convoluted ceremonies, visual displays, and the restriction of public involvement. But impressing only the rich and powerful of modern society, in the instant-access, on-demand, live-streaming, digitised democracy that is the European Union, is insufficient. Such overt visual connections to the past as *The Coronation of Napoleon* can no longer be restricted to crowned heads: the general public must be just as exposed to, and included in, this phenomenon.

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[450] In the alcove with the blue curtains, at the front, we see a lone woman watching and smiling. This is Napoleon's mother, Letizia. Yet Letizia, who hated Napoleon's wife Josephine and did not want to see *"La Puta" – The Whore* – crowned Empress, flatly refused to attend the ceremony. She appears for personal and political reasons: soothing Napoleon's ego while portraying him as an ordinary man. Hibbert, *Wives and Women*, pp. 128-129.

[451] Forrest, *Napoleon*, pp. 219, 232-234.

[452] Schom, *Napoleon*, pp. 65, 88, 423.

To a limited extent, public involvement by invoking an imagined past has always been a part of visual politics. Ritualistic and liturgical gestures, including genuflection,[453] the above Hand of Blessing, and the salute adopted by Fascists and Nazis, are relics of Roman actions (in the Papal case)[454] or as identified with Jacques-Louis David, interpretations of Roman art. The *fasces*, originally a bundle of sticks and an axe carried by early Roman magistrates to mete out corporal and capital punishment respectively, became a general symbol of Roman power during the days of the Republic and was adopted in more recent centuries by Revolutionary French and Americans, and Mussolini's Fascists, as a clear visual link connecting their version of Republic and justice to an imagined Roman precedent. It is easy to see the same phenomenon in architecture. We can take a leisurely stroll around any Western capital city today and see visual *imperium* everywhere. Ionic columns, friezed architraves, marble pediments and equestrian statues in pseudo-Roman costumes, decorating not Jovian temples but stock exchanges, state banks, the national museums in which we dutifully peer at those artefacts which connect us to an imagined national past,[455] and the meeting-halls of legislative assemblies assured that they are continuing the legacy of Rome. Even the names of these buildings – Senate, Capitol, Palace – are discursive, linguistic relics of the names given to the buildings and hills of Rome, adopted in order to confer legitimacy upon those Western states from the late eighteenth to mid-twentieth century's who perceived themselves to be the rightful guardians of civilisation.[456] And in these realms – public gestures, public art, public ceremonies, public iconography, public architecture, and public images – we the people become just as much a part of the *translatio* as any self-proclaimed *imperator* brooding on his throne. This is not mere coincidence, it is crucial: for public opinion is a powerful force.

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[453] Prostrating oneself before the Pope or a king. The *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* asserts that Christian genuflection is derived directly from the Roman practice – from Diocletian onwards – of prostrating oneself before the *Imperator*. Catholic University of America, *New Catholic Encyclopaedia Vol. VIII*, pp. 646-650.

[454] The three-fingered sign of benediction (Fig. 2.2) was originally a gesture favoured by orators and was used by ancient Roman artists as an early form of speech bubble, signifying that any accompanying text was not a mere inscription but was actually being spoken by the signified character. This influenced very early Christian art, and from these early Christian artworks came the practice of physically making the sign during Church blessings. Walter Lowrie demonstrates how early Christians, seeking to persuade Roman authorities and populations of Christianity's legitimacy, appropriated Roman symbols to express their relationship *with* Rome, not *against* it. Walter Lowrie, *Christian Art and Archaeology: being a handbook to the monuments of the early Church* (New York and London: Macmillan, 1901), pp. 193-4, 260 (with thanks to the library collection of the Great North Museum, Newcastle).

[455] Timothy Luke, *Museum Politics: Power Plays at the Exhibition* (Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

[456] Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities in the Middle Ages*, pp. 103-104.

2.4.1 'The Most Powerful of Forces'

'Public opinion is the most powerful of forces ... which like religion penetrates the most obscure recess, where administrative actions are ineffective; to misunderstand public opinion is as dangerous as to misunderstand moral principles.'[457]

<div align="right">

Prince von Metternich
1808

</div>

Thus wrote the colossus of early nineteenth-century international politics a mere two years after Francis von Habsburg, fearful that Napoleon would get himself elected to the office, legally renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor to become the mere *Austrian* Emperor. Andrew Wheatcroft draws attention to the crucial context of Metternich's words – in 1806 the long-ignored *Reich* had finally been dissolved but 'there was no provision in law for the Empire to be wound up, like some bankrupt business'.[458] A lot of ex-Imperial citizens lost jobs or commercial and political privileges while the new title '"Austrian Emperor" carried virtually no resonance or meaning in any part of the non-German-speaking provinces'.[459] It is therefore no surprise that the wily Metternich, now Chancellor to the new Austrian Emperor and faced with holding together a simultaneously new and antique absolute monarchy in an era of revolutionary republicanism, underscores the importance of gaining the masses' support.

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[457] Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Habsburgs: Embodying Empire* (London: Viking, 1995), p. 247; Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, Letter to Stadion. Paris, June 23rd 1808. *Memoirs of Prince Metternich Vol. V [orig. 1830]* (London: R. Bentley, 1880).

[458] Wheatcroft, *Habsburgs*, p. 246. James Bryce notes that the Imperial Deed of 6th August 1806, in which Francis I announced his abdication as Holy Roman Emperor and his new adoption of the title of Emperor of Austria, and which simultaneously freed his subjects from allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire (effectively dissolving the *Reich* out of fear that Napoleon could get himself elected to the office of *Kaiser*), was 'in no way remarkable, except for the ludicrous resemblance which its language suggests to the circular in which a tradesman, announcing the dissolution of an old partnership, solicits, and hopes by close attention to merit, a continuance of his customers' patronage to his business'. Two points are notable. First, George III of Great Britain (also Elector of Hanover) did not recognise the end of the HRE, and no formal document was produced in which the entire *Reich* was disbanded (individual states signed handover treaties from 1814-1816, but not the entire Imperium) and its powers transferred to new institutions – as Wheatcroft acknowledges. Second, the abdication of an individual ruler does not equal the end of the state he rules over nor of the office he holds. This was recognised by the Allies at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, who considered restoring the (legally still intact) *Reich* but abandoned the idea for strategic reasons. Thus in purely legal terms, the Holy Roman Empire perhaps still exists. It is finally notable that one vitriolic speaker in Vienna against a revival of the Holy Roman Empire was Claud-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, who harangued the Allies to abandon the *Reich* and instead institute the plan outlined in his pamphlet *The Reorganisation of the European Community*, one of many distant forerunners of the EU. See James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire: Chronicon Edition* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871), pp. 307-308; Jeremy Black, *European International Relations 1648-1815* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 238-239; Heater, *Idea of European Unity*, pp. 97-115; Wilson, *Charlemagne: The Great Adventure*, pp. 194-195.

[459] Wheatcroft, *Habsburgs*, p. 247.

For most of human history the opinions of we, the public, seem to have mattered little, with gaudy ceremonies and visual declarations of *imperium* seen only by elite powerbrokers – aristocrats, senior clergy, ambassadors, and incidentally by the metropolitan populace. Even when the general public were consulted, wielders of *imperium* were able to disseminate disingenuous dispatches[460] or fob off the populace with heroic pageants and hollow plebiscites,[461] and needlessly fiddle the figures to suggest implausibly overwhelming support.[462] But since the communications and literacy revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such trickery is not quite as easy. The citizens of today's European Union – if they so choose – are exposed to politics on a perpetual basis, with the ability to scrutinise every word emanating from Brussels and Strasbourg.

In times past it may have been possible to dazzle people with a 'flashy stunt'[463] – hydraulic thrones, cheap copies of Charlemagne's sword, even vast, self-congratulatory jubilees complete with newspaper coverage and millions of mass-produced souvenirs[464] – but this is no longer effective. Those who try to resurrect the ceremonial of the past are doomed. For Anthony Pagden, 'Victoria's coronation as "Empress of India" was the most fully elaborated attempt the modern world has ever witnessed to recreate the ancient Roman *imperium*'.[465] But one hundred and one years after Victoria, a much more obvious attempt occurred when the erstwhile President of the Central African Republic and disciple of his hero Napoleon, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, ordered his party to declare him *Empereur* before organising a garish coronation which made Napoleon's pantomime in Nôtre-Dame look almost dignified:

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[460] During his time as Austrian ambassador in Paris, Metternich records that Napoleon took 'extreme care ... to magnify the effect of his victories', ensuring that French newspapers gave excessive coverage to military victories. Whenever the French were defeated in battle, Napoleon ordered the news to be glossed over by reprinting old news articles on previous victories. Metternich, *Memoirs Vol. I*, pp. 71-72. Perhaps the most telling examples are Napoleon's *Bulletins*, battlefield propaganda written for publication in French and Allied newspapers. *Bulletin Twenty-Nine*, written during the nightmare of Napoleon's midwinter retreat from Moscow, admits some setbacks but instead of reporting on the half-million French and French-affiliated soldiers who died in Russia, paints a politically pleasing picture of a heroic French army vanquishing the Russians. Frank McLynn, *Napoleon* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1997), pp. 524-543.

[461] After the *coup d'etat* of 1851, when President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew) declared himself Napoleon III, a plebiscite was held to gauge public opinion – even though the results of the plebiscite had no legal bearing whatsoever. Horne, *The Fall of Paris*, pp. 20-26.

[462] When Napoleon was proclaimed *Empereur* by the Senate in May 1804, a national plebiscite was held in order to gauge public opinion on the title. Napoleon, unhappy with the already overwhelming support which the referendum showed, unashamedly doctored the results to such a degree that amongst some regiments of the army and regions of France, *100%* of people surveyed were claimed to voice undying support for the new Emperor. Dwyer and Forrest, *Napoleon and His Empire*, p. 16.

[463] Roberts, *Salisbury*, p. 140.

[464] Nayar Pramod, 'Empire Communications, Inc.: Nineteenth-Century Imperial Pageantry and the Politics of Display', *Journal of Creative Communications* 5:2 (2010), pp. 75-87; James Andrews, 'The Imperial Style: Rhetorical Depiction and Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee', *Western Journal of Communication* 64:1 (2000), pp. 53-77.

[465] Pagden, *Lords of All the World*, p. 9.

Fig. 2.3 – *Empereur* Jean-Bédel Bokassa, 1977[466]

We might understand Bokassa's desire to add an aura of legitimacy and community to his regime – rejecting the invented 'Africanisation' of Zaire's President Mobutu, and seeking to fill the vacuum of African prestige left by the fall of Haile Selassie's *empire* a few years earlier[467] – by declaring that he holds *imperium*. But we can only wince at the chosen medium for this expression.[468] Imperial coronations may have been awe-inspiring for Charlemagne and his successors, in the era of divine right and personal sovereignty.[469] Yet even by 1804 the format was deemed so pretentious that as we saw, Napoleon was publicly

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[466] Image retrieved from BBC News, '"Good old days" under Bokassa?', 2 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7803421.stm.

[467] Brian Titley, *Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), pp. 82-98; Peter York, *Dictators' Homes* (London: Atlantic, 2006), pp. 84-89; 116.

[468] Brian Titley records that despite generous invitations, no other Heads of State turned up for the elaborate and cripplingly expensive ceremony. Hiring the most expensive French sculptors, tailors, architects, painters, and caterers – and even a French opera composer who wrote a new national anthem declaring Central Africa to be the successor to Rome, Aachen, and Byzantium – the single day's event cost $22,000,000: at least a third of the Central African Republic's annual GDP. Bokassa was only able to pay for the ceremony by effectively blackmailing France into giving him a loan, hinting that he would otherwise cut off exports of uranium to French power stations. Bokassa's eagle throne, pictured above, itself cost $2,500,000. His crown, featuring a gold map of Africa and a (deceptively cheap) diamond in the shape of the continent, the same amount. Bokassa was also keenly aware of the need for mass visual media, lifting press restrictions and releasing journalists from prison in the hope that his coronation would be front-page news around the world. It was, but not for the reasons he wanted. Titley, *Dark Age*, pp. 82-98.

[469] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, pp. 65-68, 88-89, 329, 411.

ridiculed,[470] even by his own family.[471] By 1977, the format was deemed so absurd, so filled with 'obnoxious excesses' and 'clowning glory',[472] that Bokassa's imperial coronation prompted not merely ridicule but diagnoses of serious mental health problems. For all his clear awareness of the *translatio imperii* in visual and symbolic form, he was soon deposed.[473] Aside from domestic and international ridicule, there are two principal reasons why such overt visual displays of *imperium* are no longer effective: format and audience.

The established format of declaring *imperium* – triumphs, parades, and glitter – no longer works. It is true that once it did. To cite but one example, Symon of the Bulgars, scourge of the Byzantines, was bought off when the Byzantines, faced with a crushing defeat, staged a cheap ceremony to declare him *Basileus* of the Bulgars. Symon was so awed by the ritual that he fell to his knees before the *Basileus* of Constantinople and switched from bitter enemy to staunch ally.[474] But as Bokassa, Victoria, and Napoleon demonstrate, such days are past – we no longer exult Emperors, we excoriate them. This hints at the second reason for rejecting traditional forms of showcasing *imperium*: audience.

Physical manifestations of *imperium* just do not go far enough. One-off events such as coronations, military parades, processions of relics, or gaudy royal rituals – even televised[475] – are not seen by everyone, and only last a few hours at most. Material artefacts such as paintings and statues are a better option: as Charles V recognised, symbolic artworks, strategically placed around the palace, are a permanent and effective means of awing or intimidating ambassadors.[476] But today they gather dust in art galleries or still hang on palace walls, unseen by the public, while grandiose monuments squat in capital cities, seen only occasionally – if at all – at a distance on television and in magazines by the vast majority of the state's population. And in the twenty-first century, the handful of remaining royals in Europe entertain no aspirations to the Universal Monarchy of *imperators* and *basileis*, much less possess any degree of power or obligation beyond looking vaguely regal for the duration

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[470] Mark Bryant, *The Napoleonic Wars in Cartoons* (London: Grub Street, 2008), pp. 62-63; Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philp, *Napoleon and the Invasion of Britain* (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2003), pp. 120-128. For James Gillray's wry cartoon of the event, see: http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1353912&partId=1&people=25545&peoA=25545-1-9&page=1.
[471] Schom, *Napoleon*, pp. 333-352.
[472] Headlines in the leading newspapers of Kenya and Zambia the day after Bokassa's coronation. Titley, *Dark Age*, p. 97.
[473] Ibid., pp. 125-136.
[474] Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, pp. 168-169, 174-175.
[475] Roy Strong, *Coronation: from the 8th to the 21st century* (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), pp. 122-128.
[476] Harald Kleinschmidt, *Charles V: The World Emperor* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2004), pp. 41-43; Yates, *Astraea*, pp. 1-28.

of antique ceremonies which are far too restricted a medium to influence the politically powerful public.

For most of history this visual manifestation of *imperium* appears to have worked well, as powerbrokers were few and far between and could gain easy access to palaces and parades. But today, the sovereign is somewhat larger than a single human body – it is the entire population of a democratic state, constantly bombarded by visual media, and whose attention must be competed for.[477] Elite ceremonies no longer accomplish this. Gaudy costumes and eagle-motif banquets may have awed powerbrokers in the eras of Caesars and *Basileis*, but such ostentation today is ludicrous. To effectively convey the imagination of legitimacy and sovereignty, a wider visual language is required: one capable of reaching more people than a ceremony which, whether in St Peter's Basilica in 800 or on live planetwide broadcasts, is restricted in attendance and duration.[478] Something is needed which is more concrete, more ubiquitous, more *permanent*. Something which connects the viewer to the sovereign with a mere glance, something which transcends verbal language to unite the population as a whole, and something whose authority is apparently assured as a faithful reflection of reality. This something, as we shall shortly see, is the map.

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[477] Chandrika Kaul (ed.), *Media and the British Empire* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 1-20; Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1-13; James Ryan, *Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire* (London: Reaktion, 1997), pp. 11-28, 183-225; John Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 96-121, 147-173; Mackenzie, *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 113-140; Thomas August, *The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 53-70, 89-106.
[478] This idea was known to European colonisers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. See Jocelyn Hackforth-Jones and Mary Roberts (eds.), *Edges of Empire: Orientalism and Visual Culture* (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

> *'Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;*
> *they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under*
> *circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.*
> *The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the*
> *brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in ... creating*
> *something that has never yet existed ... they anxiously conjure up the spirits*
> *of the past to their service'.*[479]
>
> <div align="right">Karl Marx
The Eighteenth Brumaire</div>

Writing his caustic commentary on the events of 1851, wherein Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte swapped his presidency of the French Republic for the crown of an *Empereur*, Karl Marx touches upon the very essence of the *translatio imperii*. Nothing in our world exists outside of time. The civilisations that we build cannot be extracted from the context of the histories which formed them, and nowhere is this more true than the European Union. It is no coincidence that the Union is hard to define. It is what Jacques Delors terms an 'unidentified political object',[480] and what Volker Bornschier calls 'a somewhat strange hermaphrodite'.[481] The Union is built upon the political graves of dozens of previous attempts at unifying the European peoples under a single rule. For obvious reasons the bureaucrats of Brussels do not wish to be tarred with the *imperial* brush, but ultimately the Union is merely one more link in an ongoing *translatio* which began at the altar of St Peter's more than twelve centuries ago.

We have come quite a long way since that Saturday afternoon in 968 AD where we started. Let us briefly return to that room in the Bucoleon Palace, to eavesdrop once more upon Liudprand of Cremona and Leo Phokas.

John Julius Norwich believes that it would have cheered Liudprand up to know that more than a thousand years after his death, people were still reading his acerbic diary.[482] But equally Liudprand could listen in to today's discussions in despair that we are no closer to

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[479] Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire*, p. 96.
[480] Helen Drake, *Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 1.
[481] Volker Bornschier, 'European Processes and the State of the European Union', paper presented at *"European Processes, Boundaries and Institutions"*, Third European Sociological Association Conference on *"Twentieth Century Europe: Inclusions/Exclusions*, University of Essex, 27-30 August 1997.
[482] Norwich, *Short History of Byzantium*, p. 194.

understanding *empire* than he and Leo were. Or so it might seem. Modern scholars still tirelessly replicate the same fierce argument between Liudprand and Leo, perennially seeking to catalogue, classify, define and deny a most troublesome word. But conceiving of *empire* as a discourse demonstrates that all roads lead to Rome. Not the gritty, squalid, or banal Rome which existed in the historical reality of Caesar and Augustus,[483] but the dignified, indefatigable, supremely righteous Rome that existed only in the imaginations of the squabbling Popes, Patriarchs, *Basileis*, and *Kaisers* of European political history.

The European Union does not, of course, term itself a New Rome. The days of such bold public proclamations of the discourse are long gone, and if they are to return, they will not do so in the foreseeable future. The politicians and pundits of the European Union – José Barroso aside – categorically deny any association with *empire*. But the discourse is alive and well, indeed vigorous and growing stronger, within the Union. For it is in today's Union that we see the same act being played out all over again. The discourse of this imagined community has returned, defined by contrasting its apparently superior, self-adulatory civilisation against the barbarians beyond, appealing to an artificial history in which Europe was always *one*, legitimising the yearning for the power, prestige, and sovereignty. The Commissioners, Directors-General, and Members of Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg refrain from swaddling themselves in purple togas, avoid genuflecting before Pope or Patriarch to receive a crown, and turn down the opportunity to declare the President of the European Commission the new *Caesar Augustus*. But the dynamic discourse is as alive today in the hallways of the EU's institutions as it was in Napoleon's Nôtre-Dame, Henry VIII's Richmond Palace, Ivan III's Kremlin, Suleiman's Sublime Porte, Nicephorus' Bucoleon Palace, and St. Peter's Basilica. The *translatio imperii* is not quite extinct in verbal language, but it is dormant. For now, 'nobody likes empires'.[484] But in visual language it is alive and well: the graphic depiction of sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny. And this visual rhetoric is currently hidden in a peerlessly powerful vehicle for the propagation of the imperial imagination.

As the preceding pages demonstrate, attempts to identify *empire* using a checklist of political criteria fail to encapsulate what *empire is*, and are unable to distinguish *empire* from a multitude of competing geopolitical constructs. Attempting to examine *empire* as an ontology applicable across the world is unsatisfactory, as it has all the hallmarks of Victorian scholarship: an admirable but misguided quest based in grand theory, seeking universal

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[483] Kelly, *Roman Empire*; Sarah Scott and Jane Webster, *Roman Imperialism and Provincial Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[484] Cox, 'America's Imperial Temptation', p. 3.

patterns in the infinitely complex diversity of human societies, twinned with a nefarious agenda of legitimising contemporary policies by insisting that *empire* is a natural phenomenon.[485] But it evidently is not. What, then, is it?

First, we have identified that *empire* is a discourse. Rooted in a historiographic European nostalgia for an imagined past, a concept exported to the rest of the world and subsequently left to evolve into the rich diversity of postcolonial, neo-imperial, and similar methodological frameworks, *empire* remains rooted in a specifically European mixture of historiography and the longing for unity, dignity, and power which oscillates, in the collective European mind, between vigorous support and embarrassed guilt. In academia's search for the nature of *empire*, we may have been looking in the wrong place. Scholars of *empire*, treating it as a form of state organisation, frequently cite the phenomenon as traceable back to Sargon of Akkad.[486] There is perhaps a grain of truth in this, but for the wrong reason. Sargon's realm – like so many which followed it – indeed was *empire*, but only because we interpret it according to a discourse which has been embedded in European thought since the Early Middle Ages. In spite of the mission of historians,[487] political analysts,[488] and human geographers[489] to find a link between 'Incas, Habsburgs ... and Soviets', there is precious little to connect historical expressions of *empire*: even less if we bring in those regimes from non-European history who, as a relic of diplomats, explorers and cartographers of the European Age of Discovery, we call *empire*.

Second, we see that the discourse is of several components. Exclusive rule and the rejection of rivals, supreme sovereignty over a given area, a divine mission or manifest destiny, a dichotomy between civilised and savage and hence an open acknowledgement of inequality. It is an imagined expression of civilisation over barbarism. Hence it is a discourse which is not only inextricable from unequal dichotomous thinking – it *needs* inequality in order to exist. *Empire* as an imagination only works when there is something against which it can be contrasted and proclaimed to be superior. For Pope Leo, the counterpart of his self-serving *Imperium Romanorum* was the non-Christian world. For Charlemagne and his emulators through the centuries, the imagined mission of *empire* was to bring civilisation to

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[485] Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, pp. 1-39.
[486] Howe, *Empire*, p. 36.
[487] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic, 2004); *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (London: Allen Lane, 2004); 'The unconscious colossus: limits of (and alternatives to) American empire', *Daedalus* 134:2 (2005), pp. 18-34; *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2004).
[488] Herfried Münkler, *Empires: the logic of world domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Eric Voegelin, 'World-Empire and the Unity of Mankind', *International Affairs* 38:2 (1962), pp. 170-198.
[489] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 190.

the barbarians, to create order out of chaos. This dichotomous discourse is alive and well today, and as always this dualism must be maintained and publicly expressed. Indeed this is manifestly so in the case of the European Union, an entity which – as Behr, Böröcz, Beck and Grande, and Zielonka all recognise – has demonstrated its unwillingness to allow universal membership. The Union is not guilty of 'confounding [its] monarchy with the globe of the Earth,' as Edward Gibbon described Rome, but equally the Union is not so dissimilar from the classical Roman *imperium* in that Europe declines the applications of 'the fiercest barbarians ... refused the honour which they came to solicit, of being admitted into the rank of subjects'.[490] It might therefore be said that if there indeed is one universal characteristic of *empire*, it is open and freely acknowledged inequality.

Third, the discourse of *empire* relies upon manifestation and perpetuation in the material world. For Pope Leo, the hastily-fashioned crown and the borrowed word *Basileus* were enough, morphing over the millennia into the pompous materialism of coronations and coinage before reaching an apex in the early twentieth-century immersion of European societies in a perpetual flood of commodities, media, and social norms loudly proclaiming the imperial imagination.[491] But the age of personal sovereignty, with power invested in the body of king or *imperator*, is past. In the age of popular sovereignty, *imperium* is shared.

Michael Cox is arguably wrong in stating that *empire* 'belongs in the marble and sepia pasts'.[492] As a discourse, it is very much alive and well in material manifestations. Primary among these imperial channels is cartography. Maps are a vehicle for expressing discourses,[493] but they are also complex discourses in their own right. When these two traits are combined in pursuit of a political agenda, *cartoimperialism* is born. And as a defining characteristic of this discourse is that such themes are 'constantly having to be reproduced' due to their inability to remain static and uniform in the collective consciousness,[494] *empire* is constituted in a perpetual saturation of European society in European cartographies. The discourse of *empire* is founded on a *representation* of reality, not a *reflection* of it: and this is precisely what renders the vehicles of the discourse so powerful. For there is no more effective vehicle for the propagation of political propaganda – even unknowingly – than visual images. And there is no more effective visual image for the blurring of representation and reality than a map.

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490 Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol. I* ch.1, p. 8.
491 Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*. pp. 192-232.
492 Cox, 'America's Imperial Temptation', p. 1.
493 Mark Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
494 Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 167.

Chapter Three

Through the Looking-Glass

'In the palace is found a mirror which is of marvellous grandeur, the ascent to which consists of one hundred and twenty-five steps richly finished in porphyry, serpentine ... crystal, jasper, and sardonyx .... Up to this mirror climbs His Majesty, who sits down, and through it gains knowledge of all his realms, for this mirror allows him to view all faraway lands and peoples. Via this knowledge can preparations be made, and by the power of this device he can perfectly see and uncover the truth in all places, seeing wars and the forces of our enemies, and all over the world wherever we wish to wage war ... The mirror is guarded day and night by three thousand armed men, so it is not possible for this apparatus to be torn down or broken, nor is it possible for our enemies to use it. [495]

<div align="right">Extract from the Letter of Prester John
Europe, c.1165</div>

A few days after the canonisation of Charlemagne in 1165, scholars and theologians began circulating copies of a letter purporting to have been sent to the four most politically powerful, mutually suspicious figureheads in Europe – *Basileus* Manuel Komnenus, *Imperator* Frederick I 'Barbarossa', King Philip II of France, and Pope Alexander III – from 'Prester John', ruler of a Christian realm lost somewhere in the mystical Orient, asking advice on up-to-date Christian dogma. The letter was filled with smug rhetorical questions to Byzantine bishops alongside fawning praise for Western cardinals, underscoring the doctrinal differences between Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, and the *Letter* very helpfully appeared at the precise moment when Barbarossa needed the prestige of

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[495] The legend of a Christian monarch beyond traditional Eurasian Christendom appears as early as Ekkehart of Aura's *Chronicon Universale*, and the writings of Isidore of Seville. As with all legends, the story evolved over time and lingered on in European myth as late as the seventeenth century. The extract quoted here is from the Anglo-Norman rhyming version. See Robert Vitale, 'Edition and Study of the Letter of Prester John to the Emperor Manuel of Constantinople: the Anglo-Norman Rhymed Version', PhD thesis at University of Maryland, 1975 (reproduced by kind permission of the Newman Library, Virginia Technical Institute), pp. 103-105. Translation author's own. See: R. Kelham, *A Dictionary of the Norman or Old French Language* (Wakefield: Tabard Press, 1978 [orig. London: Edward Brooke, 1779]); Alan Hindley, Frederick Langley and Brian Levy (eds.), *Old French-English Dictionary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kenneth Urwin (ed.), *A Short Old French Dictionary for Students* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946). See also: Vsevolod Slessarev, *Prester John: The Letter and the Legend* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959), pp. 32-33. On the apparent predictions in the *Letter* of the Mongol invasions of Europe from 1241-44, a century after the text first appeared in Europe, see Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (Edinburgh: Pearson, 2005), p. 59; also Laurence Bergreen, *Marco Polo: from Venice to Xanadu* (London: Quercus, 2008), pp. 98-99.

Charlemagne's *imperium* to thaw the extraordinarily frosty relationship between the *Reich*, the Byzantines, and the Holy See[496] – which under the previous pro-French, anti-*Reich* pope had been building bridges with the *Basileus* while burning them with Barbarossa. It is perhaps unsurprising that the *Letter of Prester John*, with its emphatic anti-Byzantine and pro-Barbarossa discourses, should appear in Rome at such a convenient moment.

Notwithstanding its forged origins, the *Letter* pandered to Western tastes for the exotic by detailing a litany of geographical wonders and social marvels to dazzle medieval Europeans: fountains of youth, elixirs of life, luxuries beyond measure, soldiers more numerous than the stars, religious relics long thought lost by the Europeans, and assurances that innumerable monarchs of the faraway East bowed before Prester John's throne.[497] Perhaps foremost among these wonders was the king's fabled mirror.[498] This imaginative apparatus – a hybrid of cartography, clairvoyance, and medieval fantasy – was claimed to give Prester John the ability to see the entirety of his sprawling kingdom and all lands beyond. A God's-Eye perspective of every part of the world at a single glance. And all without having to leave the comfort of his own palace.

Despite the beliefs of earnest European scholars interpreting the *Letter* as true,[499] Prester John was a complete fabrication.[500] Sadly, so was his magical mirror. Yet the idea of

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[496] Relations between the HRE and the Holy See were by this point so poor that at the 1159 conclave to elect a successor to Pope Hadrian IV, pro- and anti-*Reich* cardinals tried to lock each other out of the meeting hall, a prospective pro-*Reich* candidate was physically wrestled from the papal throne and beaten up by a gang of anti-*Reich* bishops, two antipopes were simultaneously elected in different rooms, and Barbarossa even hired Saracen pirates to try and kidnap the anti-*Reich* Pope-Elect Alexander III en route to his papal coronation. Two years later, Barbarossa expressed his claim to sole *imperium* in a more direct manner – by sacking Rome. Evidently the imperial discourse was still deemed valuable enough for Barbarossa and his minions to devastate Rome and for bishops to beat up the Pope – just as Pope Leo III had been in 799, bringing Charlemagne to St. Peter's. It is notable that in the *Letter*, Prester John addresses *Basileus* Manuel, Pope Alexander, and King Philip of France using their formal titles – but he addresses Barbarossa alone as "my brother", tacitly legitimising Barbarossa's sole claim to *imperium*. Norwich, *The Popes*, pp. 140-144, 149-153.

[497] Toby Lester, *The Fourth Part of the World: The Epic Story of History's Greatest Map* (London: Profile Books, 2009), pp. 50-52; Paolo Novaresio, *The Explorers* (East Bridgewater, MA: White Star, 2002), pp. 46-51.

[498] Slessarev, *Prester John*, p. 37.

[499] Anne Latowsky argues that it is no coincidence the letter appeared only days after Charlemagne's canonisation, theorising that its intent was to publicly denigrate the Byzantines and simultaneously legitimise Barbarossa by linking him with Charlemagne. Latowsky concludes that the *Letter* was never intended to be taken seriously, but was instead a sarcastic snub to Byzantium as a public declaration that the *Reich*, and not the Byzantines, Holy See, French, or English (the previous Pope Hadrian IV, the only English pope, had encouraged Henry II of England to cut off relations with the *Reich*), held sole *imperium*. Despite this, the *Letter* seems to have quickly been believed to be genuine – the legend of Prester John lingered on in European minds well into the seventeenth century and searches for him triggered Portugese, Spanish, and Dutch expeditions to Africa and India. Prester John still appeared on maps of Ethiopia and East Africa into the late 1600s, and even makes an appearance in Shakespeare's *Much Ado about Nothing*. See Slessarov, *Prester John*, pp. 36-39, p. 55; Latowsky, *Emperor of the World,* pp. 179-183; Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map*, pp. 107-109. For Prester John on Wilhelm Blaeu's 1635 *Aethiopia Superior* map, see John Goss (ed.), *Blaeu's 'The Grand Atlas'*, (London: Studio Editions with the Royal Geographical Society, 1997), pp. 152-153. For Prester John on Abraham Ortelius' 1573 *Theatrum orbis Terrarum* map see R.A. Skelton, *Decorative Printed Maps of the 15th to 18th Centuries* (London: Spring Books, 1965), plate 17. Prester John also appears on the famous Waldseemüller Map of 1507 and Diogo

possessing a God's-Eye perspective on the world has been a quest of scholars and their ambitious, self-aggrandising political patrons since the dawn of civilisation. The closest that anyone has come, from the priests of nascent Mesopotamian kingdoms whose inhabitants were only just learning how to work metals,[501] to the engineers of the several thousand Geographical Information System satellites currently orbiting our planet,[502] is the map.

A map is not a mirror,[503] but in spite of the special nature of the map we continue to believe that simply by looking upon a chart, we are seeing a reflection of the world *as it really is*. But like the letter circulating in the courts and cloisters of twelfth-century Europe, this idea is pure fantasy.

Thus far we have examined one of the two core components of *cartoimperialism* – the concept of *empire* – and identified it as a discourse. Yet as we have seen, a political discourse is meaningless without a way of being communicated.[504] Maps communicate discourses but like so many of the artefacts, ceremonies, and paraphernalia which we encountered in the previous chapter, maps may end up communicating discourses wildly different from their creators' intentions.

Homen's sea atlas of 1565: see Ronald Tooley and Charles Bricker, *A History of Cartography: 2,500 Years of Mapmakers* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), pp. 160-162. By the time of Hermann Moll's *Africa* map in 1710, Prester John has disappeared: Roderick Barron, *Decorative Maps* (New York: Crescent Books, 1989), plate 33.

[500] Slessarev also concludes from the *Letter*'s veiled insults towards the Byzantines that it was written by a Catholic clergyman as a hoax – according to his theory, to inspire the failing Christian crusaders with hope of an allied intervention against the Saracens by Prester John's immense armies. Unsurprisingly, his troops did not turn up. Slessarev, *Prester John*, pp. 36-39, p. 55. Later versions of the *Letter* were retrospectively rewritten to predict the coming Mongols: Jackson, *The Mongols and the West,* pp. 48-49; Toby Lester, *Fourth Part of the World*, pp. 50-52. Over a hundred versions of the *Letter* existed in the late twelfth century alone. The mirror appears in several, but not all, versions of the *Letter*. The German version of the *Letter* makes brief reference to it: F. Zarncke "Der Presbyter Johannes", *Abhandlungen der König. Sächs. Geselschaft dew Wissenshaften, Phil. Hist. Klasse VII* (1879), pp. 827-1039, cited in Manuel João Ramos, *Essays in Christian Mythology: The Metamorphosis of Prester John* (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 2006), p. 30. Similar descriptions of the mirror are found in the French version, cited in Philippe d'Alcripe, *La Nouvelle Fabrique de Excellens Traits de Vérité; livre pour incitrer les resveurs tristes et merancoliques à vivre de plaisir, par Philippe d'Alcripe. Nouvelle Édition: Revue avec soin, et augmentée des 'Nouvelles de la terre de Prestre Jehan'* (Paris: Imprimerie de Guiraudet et Jouaust, 1853), pp. 210-211. Available at: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b187858;page=root;view=image;size=100;seq=235;num=210 (with thanks to the Newman Library, Virginia Tech).

[501] Vincent Virga, *Cartographia: Mapping Civilizations* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2007), pp. 9-10.

[502] According to NASA, some 4,000 active satellites are currently in service watching the planet's surface. Yet even this fails to capture the power of Prester John's mirror. See: http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/980202e.html; Russell Foster, 'Seeing Through God's Eyes? Astropolitik and Cartography', paper presented at the Royal Geographical Society annual conference, August 29th 2013.

[503] Curiously, "mirror" was a synonym for early maps such as Lucas Waghenaer's "The Mariner's Mirrour" of 1588. Charles Bricker, R.V. Tooley, and Gerald Crone, *Landmarks of Mapmaking: An Illustrated Survey of Maps and Mapmakers* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976), p. 16.

[504] Jeremy Crampton, 'Cartography: performative, participatory, political', *Progress in Human Geography* 33:6 (2009), pp. 840-848.

3.2   *'A ludicrously inept solution'*[505]

> *'Let none dare to attribute the shame*
> *Of misuse of projections to Mercator's name'.*[506]

Charles Deetz's and Oscar Adams' ditty on the Mercator projection hints towards a concern in cartography – the mapmaker's intentions. There are innumerable methods for propagating a discourse, and it could persuasively be argued that *all* artefacts are vehicles of political discourse. Arthur Berger is right to point out that we can go too far in unpicking political meanings where none exist,[507] but equally it would be naïve to suggest that objects exist outside of politics. As we saw in the previous chapter, even such apparently innocuous artefacts as Napoleon's costume, papal gestures, and the *fasces* icon, are vehicles for the expression of political ideals. Architecture and anthems convey discourses, but politics are also embedded in such banal objects as Coca-Cola cans,[508] carpets, cakes,[509] and cartography. And crucially, artefacts can convey politics which were never *implied* by their designers but are *inferred* by their users.[510]

A classic example from cartography illustrates this. Consider Figs 3.1 and 3.2:

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[505] Monmonier's description of the Peters projection. *Rhumb Lines*, p. 15.

[506] Cited in Ibid.

[507] Arthur Asa Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques* (London: Sage, 1991).

[508] Arthur Asa Berger, *What Objects Mean: An Introduction to Material Culture* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2009), pp. 145-152.

[509] In his discussion of the politics of ostentatious gift exchange among ambassadors (a political act designed to be seen), Jonathan Wright notes how 'presenting something that was particularly evocative of one's own culture was another shrewd strategy. The Ottoman rulers of Turkey looked to fragrant soaps and carpets, the Chinese to precious silks ... just as the burghers of Nuremberg favoured their city's humble, but much-coveted, *Lebkuchen* cakes'. Wright, *The Ambassadors*, p. 67.

[510] An example from Napoleon's life illustrates this. During his final exile on St. Helena, Bonaparte's miserable house and extreme boredom prompted him to take up gardening. When a sympathetic and similarly green-fingered Allied officer sent Napoleon some seeds to cultivate green and white beans, the British commandant, Sir Hudson Lowe, 'suspected that the different colours of the beans had a semiotic significance'. Suspicious that the white beans signified the new royal family in occupied France, and that they would be planted only to be deliberately overshadowed by the green beans which matched Napoleon's old imperial livery, Lowe confiscated the seeds. Politics does not exist only in paintings and parades – it can be perceived even in beans. McLynn, *Napoleon*, p. 644; Cronin, *Napoleon*, p. 420; Felix Markham, *Napoleon* (New York: New American Library, 1963), p. 248.

**Fig 3.1** – The Mercator Projection[511]

Fig. 3.2 – The Gall-Peters Projection[512]

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[511] Map retrieved from the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/acq/devpol/colloverviews/geography.html.
[512] Ibid.

Here we see two solutions to what Carl Friederich Gauss identified as an impossible task:[513] accurately transferring the distances and shapes of the curved, three-dimensional surface of Earth – with fidelity of distance, shape, and angles – to a flat, two-dimensional map. This is mathematically impossible and has been known since the Iron Age.[514] Thus from Claudius Ptolemy onwards, cartographers have developed a variety of mathematical projections to try and depict the world's surface as best as they can, but this can only be done by sacrificing some part of the planet's surface – shape, angles, or size.

Here we see two famous projections, by Gerardus Mercator and Arno Peters. The Peters projection (Fig. 3.2) is a direct 1970s response to Mercator's 1570s method and is arguably cartography's most famous controversy, involving politics which are viciously contested[515] but which were never intended by their creators.

Mercator's projection was developed for arguably apolitical reasons. Ancient and medieval mariners had hugged the coastline as they sailed along, referencing their position via landmarks on the shore.[516] But with increasing (and increasingly profitable) transoceanic deep-water voyages after 1492, new tools of navigation were needed for navigating the open sea. The Mercator projection was designed purely for this purpose – the map sacrifices an accurate depiction of the size of Earth's continents, instead maintaining accurate angles in a neat, mathematical way conducive to compass and sextant. Yet in recent centuries, the Mercator projection has received often vitriolic criticism[517] for this distortion of land, with critics arguing that by stretching the poles and shrinking the Equator, the projection makes Europe and North America look bigger – and thus more important – than Africa, South

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[513] Jerry Brotton, *A History of the World in Twelve Maps* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 11-12.

[514] Lloyd Brown, *The Story of Maps* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1949), pp. 67-70.

[515] Alan Henrikson quips that on the Peters projection, 'the landmasses are somewhat reminiscent of wet, ragged, long winter underwear hung out to dry on the Arctic Circle', while in Mark Monmonier's view 'Africa and South America look like land masses stretched into submission on a medieval torture rack'. Alan Henrikson, 'The Power and Politics of Maps' in George Demko and William Wood, *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 54; Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines*, pp. 15-16.

[516] Beau Riffenburgh, *The Men Who Mapped the World: The Treasures of Cartography* (London: Carlton, 2011), p. 18; Norwich, *History of Venice*, pp. 6-7; Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines*, p. 168; Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1993), p. 192.

[517] This is parodied by an episode of US drama series *The West Wing*, in which a delegation from the fictional "Organization of Cartographers for Social Equality" request that the White House 'aggressively support legislation that would make it compulsory to teach geography in schools using the Peters projection', before showing a confusing PowerPoint presentation about the apparent evils of the Mercator projection. The White House staff, unsurprisingly, are not impressed. *The West Wing*, Series 2 Episode 16, 'Somebody's Going to Emergency, Somebody's Going to Jail', NBC, 28 February 2001. The episode is commented upon by Mark Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines and Map Wars*, pp. 168, 204.

America, and southern Asia.[518] It is in this context that the (Gall-)Peters projection[519] has been championed, seeking to right the apparent wrongs of the Mercator projection.

Yet the Peters projection is even *more* political than the Mercator, and just as distorted – so much so that cartographer John Snyder sarcastically released another projection, partly a criticism of Peters and partly a cartographic in-joke, which like the Gall-Peters projection maintains the fidelity of continents' size and shape:

Fig. 3.3 – The Snyder Projection[520]

The Mercator projection was created in response to a perceived political discourse of aggressive imperialism, rampant racism, and triumphalist Westernism – a discourse which did not exist when it was created, but which has now become welded to the Mercator projection.[521] The result is that maps using either the Mercator or Gall-Peters projection become not direction-finders but political pawns.[522]

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[518] Denis Wood and Ward Kaiser, *Seeing Through Maps: Many Ways to See the World* (Amherst, MA: ODT Inc., 2001).

[519] Reverend James Gall created the exact same projection in 1855. It is unclear whether, in the 1970s, Peters knew this. Monmonier takes an extremely skeptical view – either Peters missed the literature, or he plagiarised Gall. *Rhumb Lines*, pp. 149-150.

[520] There are not many jokes in cartography, and this is about as good as they get. Image taken from Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines*, pp. 162-163.

[521] Mercator's eurocentrism does occasionally crop up in his work, as the quotation with which this thesis begins demonstrates. But there is equal evidence that his agenda – if indeed he had one, and if he was aware of it – was not malevolent but humanitarian, trying to save the lives of sailors who would otherwise be shipwrecked hundreds of miles off-course. Monmonier offers a fair argument: admittedly the Mercator projection 'helped naval commanders, merchant captains, and slave traders go about their business, but so did the caulking for their hulls, the timber for their masts, and the canvas for their sails'. If we must demonise the Mercator projection, then we must also demonise planks of wood. Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 174.

[522] The same applies to other public visual media. Atkinson and Cosgrove demonstrate how the Vittorio Emmanuel II monument in Rome, designed to commemorate the leader of Italy's *risorgimento*, became associated with a variety of political discourses. Ranging from national pride versus local resentment, to a symbol of wasteful government and a cornerstone of Mussolini's manufactured national memory, the monument has most recently has become a site of political disagreement over tourist revenue. While a nineteenth-century

The visual is a powerful means of communicating a broad variety of ideas both intentional and accidental, conscious or unrealised. In so polyglot a polity as the European Union it is perhaps unsurprising that a discourse is expressed through a medium which transcends boundaries of language and geography, a medium which is arguably more powerful than any other in persuading the participant observer that the message embedded within – the discourse – is true.

It was observed in the previous chapter that *empire* is an amorphous concept. In comparison, maps appear at first glance to be easier to work with. Maps are far older than the concept of *empire*, but maps are a much more concrete and functional collection of objects with apparently clear definitions and purposes. Given the proliferation of maps in contemporary Western society, it would appear that the core concepts of cartography have already been identified, allowing us to quickly move on to an analysis of European cartoimperialism.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reality is far from simple. The physical maps, whether paper or digital which we consult are merely the end product of a vast unseen network of neurolinguistics, semiotic persuasion, and political decisions both deliberate and unrealised. Maps are merely the tip of an immense theoretical iceberg. The power of semiotics, the role of mapmakers and mapreaders, and the mechanisms, technologies, and conventions through which people create and interpret maps, will be examined in later chapters. While it is essential to acknowledge that maps are merely one aspect of a complex, evolving,[523] and perpetually-occurring network of people,[524] technologies,[525] and discourses, we must first begin with a much more basic question.

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monument and a sleek EU map are not the same thing, the mechanism is exactly the same: a visual medium acquires connotations and characteristics which become far more important than those intended. David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove, 'Urban Rhetoric and Embodied Identities: City, Nation, and Empire at the Vittorio Emanuele II Monument in Rome, 1870-1945', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88:1 (1998), pp. 28-49.

[523] Chris Perkins 'Cartography: cultures of mapping, power in practice', *Progress in Human Geography*, 28:3 (2004), pp. 381-391.

[524] Mark Monmonier, 'Cartography: the multidisciplinary pluralism of cartographic art, geospatial technology, and empirical scholarship', *Progress in Human Geography* 3:3 (2007), pp. 371-379.

[525] Mark Monmonier, *Technological Transition in Cartography* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

3.3   Cartographies of Fiction

'What is a map?'[526]

This opening question to Christian Jacob's study of political mapping appears at first glance to be strange. Perhaps even unnecessary. Academic literature on maps is both diverse and vast, addressing a broad spectrum of issues pertaining to the power of maps,[527] the history of maps,[528] and the technologies of maps,[529] branching out into such emergent experimental studies as participatory mapping,[530] tactile mapping,[531] 'cartographies of performance'[532] and cartographic methodologies.[533] Yet throughout this rich and increasingly diversified literature, remarkably little is said about what a map *is.*

It is tempting to both begin and end with a neat, descriptive explanation of maps. For Douglas Gohm, 'by definition a map is a graphic statement of contour and direction',[534] while for Mark Monmonier, a map is 'a representation of all or a portion of the planet or some other vast environment: the typical map is graphic and includes discernible elements of scale, projection and symbolization'.[535]

On the surface, this appears to be a perfectly satisfactory answer. The map is a constructed, two-dimensional diagram designed to depict the world around us. It is a reflection of an external reality, a representation remains fixed and universal – remains "true" – regardless of how we individuals perceive that same world. Such a drawing exists for purely practical purposes allowing us, like Prester John, to gain a God's Eye view of the world which enables us to plan, predict, and understand our surroundings.

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[526] Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History [trans. Tom Conley]* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 1.

[527] Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (London: Routledge, 1993).

[528] J.B. Harley and David Woodward, *The History of Cartography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[529] Borden Dent, *Cartography: Thematic Map Design* (Dubuque, IA: W.M.C. Brown, 1996).

[530] Stefano di Gessa, 'Participatory Mapping as a Tool for Empowerment', *International Land Coalition* (2008). Available at: http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/legacy/legacypdf/08_ILC_Participatory_Mapping_Low.pdf?q=pdf/08_ILC_Participatory_Mapping_Low.pdf.

[531] Maps which are not looked at, but touched. Such maps are common among the Inuit of Greenland, who carve representations of the coastline into bones and then trace the coastal outline with their thumbs as they sail along. See: Chris Perkins, 'Cartography: progress in tactile mapping', *Progress in Human Geography* 26:4 (2002), pp. 521-530; John Rennie Short, *The World Through Maps* (New York: Firefly, 2003), p. 34.

[532] Jeremy Crampton, 'Cartography: performative, participatory, political', *Progress in Human Geography* 33:6 (2009), pp. 840-848.

[533] Alan MacEachren, *How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1995).

[534] Douglas Gohm, *Antique Maps of Europe, the Americas, the West Indies, Australasia, Africa, and the Orient* (London: Octopus, 1972), p. 6.

[535] Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael Watts, Sarah Whatmore (eds.), *The Dictionary of Human Geography Fifth Edition* (Oxford and Malden, MA: 2009), p. 434.

Furthermore, maps are omnipresent. As of the time of writing, we have mapped

nearly all physical space from the tips of the Himalayas to the solid iron ball at Earth's inner

core,[536] while aeroplane and satellite cameras have captured almost every square centimetre

of the planet's land surface.[537] We have mapped our solar system from the swirling surface of

the Sun to the frozen planetoids orbiting beyond Neptune.[538] We have mapped the structure

and composition of single atoms, and entire galaxies so far away their light began travelling

to us when our own Sun was still just a shapeless cloud of hydrogen.[539] We have mapped

continents and civilisations which rose and fell far in the past[540] and drawn cartographies of

the distant future[541] (and we have been drawing past and future worlds for a long time)[542] and

perhaps most significantly, we have drawn maps of worlds which exist entirely in our

imaginations. Our cartographic conquest of existence appears to be almost complete,

providing us with infinite realms conveniently packaged as handy, manipulable, mobile

maps.

Such an answer to our initial question *"What is a map?"* is reassuringly simple.

Certainly, in contrast to the complexity of defining *empire*, arriving at a definition of *map*

seems remarkably easy. So much so that the perception of maps as convenient two-

dimensional diagrams, designed to give readers a sense of space, is the foundation of so many

works on cartography.[543] Indeed, Robin Flowerdew and David Martin treat maps exclusively

as scientific objects, asserting that 'a map is a primary multipurpose tool … for exploring

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[536] Peter Whitfield, *The Image of the World: 20 Centuries of World Maps* (London: British Library, 2010), pp. 138-139.

[537] John Rennie Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography* (New York: Firefly, 2003), pp. 214-217.

[538] John Noble Wilford, *The Mapmakers: The Story of the Great Pioneers in Cartography – From Antiquity to the Space Age* (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 463-468.

[539] Brian Cox and Andrew Cohen, *Wonders of the Universe* (London: HarperCollins, 2011), pp. 29-31.

[540] Patrick O'Brien, (ed.), *Philip's Atlas of World History: From the Origins of Humanity to the Year 2000* (London: George Philip, 1999).

[541] Frank Jacobs, *Strange Maps: An Atlas of Cartographic Curiosities* (London: Viking, 2009), pp. 142-144.

[542] In his 1645 atlas of Great Britain, the Dutch cartographer Wilhelm Blaeu drew a map of the Heptarchy – the seven states which jostled against each other a thousand years earlier in the Anglo-Saxon British Isles. John Speed provided a similar map of the Anglo-Saxons in his 1612 *Theatre of the Empire of Great Brittaine*. See John Goss (ed.), *Blaeu's 'The Grand Atlas'*, (London: Studio Editions with the Royal Geographical Society, 1997), pp. 72-73; R.A. Skelton, *Decorative Printed Maps of the 15th to 18th Centuries* (London: Spring Books, 1965), plate 39. Richard Hingley convincingly demonstrates how Victorian cartographers deliberately drew maps of Roman Britain to connect the British present with an imaginary Roman past. Richard Hingley, 'Projecting Empire: The Mapping of Roman Britain', *Journal of Social Archaeology* 6:3 (2006), pp. 328-353.

[543] Most notable among these works are instructional textbooks teaching how to create maps. As such works are marketed towards surveyors and planners – who require more practical information on mathematics and Geographic Information Systems than abstract conceptions of theory and interpretation – it would be unfair to accuse instructive textbooks of starting from a faulty premise. Yet as Denis Wood points out, it is ironic that while (critical) cartographers continually point out the hidden subjective complexities of maps, the (practical) cartographers who make said maps continue to treat them as objective scientific reflections of the world. See Timothy Feeman, *Portraits of the Earth: A Mathematician Looks at Maps* (Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 2002); Phillip and Juliana Muehrcke, *Map Use: Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation* (Madison: JP Publications, 1998).

spatial variations'[544] while dismissing the artistic and political aspects of maps as a romantic relic of bygone days in which European explorers steered their ships towards the uncharted horizon.[545] With this in mind, we might boldly plunge straightaway into a critical, considered analysis of those charts churned out by the bodies of the European Union.

However, we are to be disappointed. Or perhaps excited. For it is unsurprising to discover that this neat, simple definition is an illusion. Immediately following his initial definition, Monmonier qualifies his statement to alert us that 'delineating the notion of *map* is hardly straightforward'.[546]

Maps are merely the tip of a complex network of interactive relationships and iterative processes between mapmaker, mapreader, map, and territory.[547] Maps exist as mental images, and as memories consciously recalled at appropriate moments. Even in the familiar form of a physical object that we can see and touch, maps can (and do) exist in so abstract and symbolic a form that they are impenetrable and ultimately baffling to a mapreader who is unfamiliar with the exotic content and the esoteric contexts of their creation and meaning. A cursory glance at any textbook of cartographic history will quickly reveal that among the immeasurably diverse range of human cultures, societies, and histories, maps are just as rich and varied in form, style, and purpose. This variety extends to the point where, to the untrained eye, an object or image which has no apparent connection whatsoever to space is in fact a sophisticated map. The sleek GIS charts with which Western publics are so familiar are merely one manifestation of mapping. As such, Jeremy Black is arguably correct in asserting that 'the one definition that simply will not do, therefore, is that a map is a representation of reality'.[548]

A partial cause of this confusion, as John Keates identifies, is that we of the twenty-first century are so saturated with these two-dimensional pictorial maps we are largely unaware of the processes which make the map what it is.[549] The map is simply one part of a complex thought process, and in order to analyse European Union maps we must understand this process. This is not intellectual hair-splitting. Just as it was necessary to understand the

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[544] Robin Flowerdew and David Martin, *Methods in Human Geography: a guide for students doing a research project* (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2005), p. 254.

[545] Ibid., p. 255.

[546] Gregory et. al, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 434.

[547] Vincent del Casino and Stephen Hanna, 'Beyond the 'Binaries': A Methodological Intervention for Interrogating Maps as Representational Practices', *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 4:1 (2006), pp. 34-56.

[548] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. 10.

[549] John Keates, *Understanding Maps* (London and New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 118-120.

processes which engender *empire*, it is necessary to understand the processes which engender *map*.

In his discussion of imperial maps, James Akerman[550] offers a starting-point. Recognising that the map is not merely an object, Akerman advances the issue by reminding us that maps are not always images and not always even physical.[551] Maps can be drawn, written, spoken, gestured, performed, or merely imagined. While most of these are intriguing avenues of cartographic and cartoimperial research, they are not relevant to a study of European Union cartographies, as the Union uses only visual maps. However, the latter strand is of use in establishing the map. The physical map can only be comprehended in the context of abstract thought, and thus it is not only possible but necessary to divide the two.

Maps can be categorised into two distinct yet overlapping facets. These are *Maps* and *Mapping*. Each of these categories is unique, yet the map does not sit neatly within any one. Rather, the categories blur, with the advantages and authorities of each variety merging into a unique form of power possessed by few – if any – other forms of data. By examining each of these categories in turn, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of what the map is, and how maps have such extraordinary power over us. While *Maps* are the physical objects with which we are all familiar, it is necessary to begin with *Mapping*.

3.2.1   *Mapping*

Mapping, put simply, is awareness of the immediate physical world around us.[552] It is a process of acquiring and mentally storing spatial information for future use, a dynamic process which is transient and constantly in action.[553] *Mapping* is ontogenetic, a piece of 'neurophysiological hardware'[554] which, like an essential computer programme, runs in the background of our subconscious mind without us even realising, allowing us to navigate and negotiate physical space in our everyday lives.[555] It is neither necessary nor possible here to delve into the rich and contested scientific literature on neurological theory, but equally it is

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[550] James Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 12.

[551] Ibid.

[552] Borden Dent, *Cartography: Thematic Map Design* (Dubuque, IA: W.M.C. Brown, 1996), pp. 4-5.

[553] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. 20.

[554] Alan MacEachren, *How Maps Work* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 63-66.

[555] Raymond Kulhavy and William Stock, 'How Cognitive Maps are Learned and Remembered', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 86:1 (1996), pp. 123-145.

impossible to understand how maps work – and why they are politically important – without an examination of how mental mapping works.

John Goss argues that while we are used to 'consulting history books or encyclopaedias to check the exact date of an item's discovery or invention',[556] *Mapping* and *Maps* defy this easy categorisation. Sifting through archives is not enough, and we have to dig a little deeper.

Archaeology reveals that humans have been making physical drawings of our surroundings since at least the Upper Palaeolithic Era, some 40,000 years ago.[557] While there is disagreement among scholars about where to draw the line between a picture and a "map",[558] John Rennie Short opines that maps can be dated from this period.[559] The very oldest maps appear to be star-charts or symbolic representations of the phases of human life, as are still made by pre-industrial indigenous peoples today.[560] But demonstrable maps of the physical world are at least 10,000 years old, far predating any form of writing. Consider Figs. 3.4 and 3.5 below:

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[556] Goss, *The Mapmaker's Art*, p. 17.

[557] J.B. Harley and David Woodward, *The History of Cartography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[558] The distinction seems to be a recent one, as the Romans did not consider maps and pictures to be different things. Their word *mappa* (the origin of our word *map*) means either "cloth" or the drawing *on* the cloth, while their word *tabula* means both "drawing" and "map". Given the ostentatious images which covered European maps until the twentieth century, the divide between maps and pictures is perhaps neither as clear nor as old as we might think. See O.A.W. Dilke, 'Itineraries and Geographical Maps in the Early and Late Roman Empires', chapter in Harley and Woodward (eds.), *The History of Cartography Vol. I*, pp. 234-257.

[559] John Rennie Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography* (Toronto, ON: Firefly Books, 2003), pp. 26-32.

[560] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Fig. 3.4 – Abauntz Map, Spain (c. 11,600 BC)[561]

[561] Discussed in Short, *World Through Maps*, pp. 26-31. Map retrieved from P. Utrilla, C. Mazo, M.C. Sopena, M. Martínez-Bea and R. Domingo, 'A palaeolithic map from 13,660 calBP: engraved stone blocks from the Late Magdalenian in Abauntz Cave (Navarra, Spain), *Journal of Human Evolution* 57:2 (2009), pp. 99-111, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047248409000839.

Fig. 3.5 – Map Rock, Idaho (c. 10,000 BC)[562]

Tony Campbell argues that 'it can be said, with forgivable exaggeration, that maps are as old and as broad as civilisation itself'.[563] As the above images demonstrate, the landscape around us has certainly been drawn for a long time. The Abauntz Map appears to show the environment around the cave in which it was carved, complete with landmarks such as flooded land and a river, and even gives the rough location of the cave-dwellers' next dinner. Meanwhile, John Rennie Short convincingly demonstrates that Fig. 3.5, Map Rock in Idaho, depicts the course of the Snake River with nearby mountains. So recognisable is the depiction that American pioneers in the nineteenth century, long before unpacking their theodolites and compasses to make a topographic survey, recognised it as a map – hence the name of the rock.[564] Yet these carvings did not suddenly appear one Stone Age night. They are merely the oldest known survivors, demonstrating already-established conventions of symbolism and representation which would be interpreted by their viewers. And crucially, maps such as these are evidence of a key aspect of cartography – maps are not standalone images, they are the product of mental processes which stretch *far* back through our evolutionary history.

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[562] Discussed in Jeremy Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth: 100 Maps that Changed the World* (Cincinnati, OH: David and Charles, 2006), pp. 11-15. Map retrieved from Short, *World Through Maps*, p. 31.
[563] Tony Campbell, *Early Maps* (New York: Abbeville, 1981), p. 7.
[564] Short, *World Through Maps*, pp. 30-31.

Jochen Smolka and Jan Hemmi demonstrate a crucial point[565] – all complex animals are capable of finding their way around their habitats, and storing spatial information for future reference.[566] *Mapping* is instinctive, having emerged among the amphibians which crawled from the primordial sludge far back in 'Deep Time'.[567] We do not merely discover and retain *Mapping* knowledge – because it is hardwired into our brains, we *trust* it. We have to. The Abauntz Map is a perfect illustration. The deer, bovids, and the ibex herds are spatially close to a river, because the river supports the animals' lives. The humans are spatially close to the ibex herds, because the animals in turn support the humans' lives. Both must perform *Mapping* to know where these resources are, for without *Mapping* they would starve to death. Our faith in *Mapping* may be just as hardwired as our ability to perform it.

As a consequence, *Mapping* exists at the level Sigmund Freud defines as the 'preconscious', a vague limbo between conscious and subconscious thought.[568] It overlaps both: we are occasionally aware of *Mapping*, but do not always need to think about it. An unfamiliar place or journey will cause us to consciously retrace our steps, consult signs and landmarks, and ask directions – but a routine journey in the house or along a familiar street does not require conscious thought. As inadvertent proof of this, Freud's notes from psychoanalysis sessions demonstrate that, even if Freud's interpretations raise a few eyebrows, we cannot deny that in dreams we perform the same basic *Mapping* functions as during the waking day.[569] Many dreams are set in familiar locations from real life which we can already navigate without having to think about it, and even when we find ourselves in dreams set in unknown landscapes, we can find our way around, consult landmarks, and move – just like in waking life. This may appear to be irrelevant, but the preconscious habitat of *Mapping* is crucial,[570] as the subsequent sections demonstrate, for understanding how maps communicate imperial imaginations. For it is through *Mapping*, argues Chris Perkins, that '*Maps* are called into being'.[571]

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[565] Jochen Smolka and Jan Hemmi, 'Topography of Vision and Behaviour', *Journal of Experimental Biology* 212:21 (2009), pp. 3522-3532.

[566] Emily Harris, Michael Beran and David Washburn, 'Odinal-List Integration for Symbolic, Arbitrary, and Analog Stimuli by Rhesus Macaques (*Macaca Mulatta*)', *Journal of General Psychology* 134:2 (2007), pp. 183-197.

[567] Smolka and Hemmi, 'Topography of Vision and Behaviour'; Martin Redfern, *The Earth: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 20-34.

[568] Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 113.

[569] Charles Rycroft, *The Innocence of Dreams* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 90-91.

[570] The connection between space and real life / dreams was recognised by the Ancient Greeks, Assyrians, Indians, Chinese, and Babylonians, with discussions appearing in Aristotle's *De Somniis*, Papyrus Chester Beatty III, the *Atharva Veda* and *Meng Shu* manuscripts of India and China, and the Ashurnasirpal tablet. See Aristotle, *On Dreams* in McKeon (ed.) *Basic Works of Aristotle*, and S.G.M. Lee and A.R. Mayes (eds.), *Dreams & Dreaming: Selected Readings* (London: Penguin, 1973), pp. 15-21.

[571] Chris Perkins, 'Exhibitionist Map Display', *Magnificent Maps: Maps in Context Academic Symposium*, British Library, London, 14 June 2010.

3.2.2 *Maps*

We perform *Mapping* on a daily basis. Every waking moment involves spatial awareness, and as Freud hints, *Mapping* keeps running even when our conscious minds shut down for the night. Equally, we are all capable of creating *Maps*. Lauren Myers and Lynn Liben point out how *Map*making is so common among young children that it may be an inherent ability resulting from *Mapping* being hardwired into our brains,[572] while Borden Dent acknowledges that as adults we continue to constantly create maps[573] (albeit usually gestured, spoken, written, or mentally planned rather than drawn. Of course, adults do draw actual physical depictions of the world on very rare occasions).[574] However, not all *Maps* are treated equally. Those produced by authorities – government, religious, military, and so forth – are almost always perceived by people to be more accurate, reliable, and trustworthy.[575]

While *Maps* vary in form and function, Daniel Dorling and David Fairburn point to one similar characteristic: they are all efforts to "go" somewhere, to 'reconcile interpretation and reality'.[576] This applies to all maps, from making drawings in the sand with a stick to scrolling through Google Earth. J.B. Harley reminds us that there are 'no binary oppositions between maps that are "true and false", "accurate and inaccurate", "objective and subjective", "literal and symbolic", or that are based on "scientific integrity" as opposed to "ideological distortion"'.[577] Consequently, all maps exist in a limbo between true and false.

In Monmonier's opinion, mapmakers may *try* to accurately represent the world as best they can, but ultimately, maps lie – even when they do not mean to. 'No map,' Monmonier claims, 'is a thoroughly objective, value-neutral device', and no map can tell the truth.[578] Moreover, there is no 'external reality' common to all viewers – as Hans-Georg Gadamer reminds us, each individual is constrained by their own personal perspectives and ultimately

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[572] Lauren Myers and Lynn Liben, 'The Role of Intentionality and Iconicity in Children's Developing Comprehension and Production of Cartographic Symbols', *Child Development* 79:3 (2008), pp. 668-684.

[573] Dent, *Cartography: Thematic Map Design*, pp. 3-6.

[574] Martin Norgate, 'Cutting Borders: Dissected Maps and the Origins of the Jigsaw Puzzle', *The Cartographic Journal* 44:4 (2007), pp. 342-350.

[575] In *How to Lie with Maps*, Monmonier identifies examples of the public accepting maps produced by commercial (pp. 58-70), municipal (pp. 71-86), government (pp. 87-112), military (pp. 113-122), and statistical (pp. 139-162) authorities, even when said maps are distorted, unrepresentative, or outright lies. Their acceptance of these maps, Monmonier concludes, is purely because they are affiliated with authority.

[576] Daniel Dorling and David Fairburn, *Mapping: Ways of Representing the World* (London: Longman, 1997), p. 7.

[577] J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 53.

[578] Mark Monmonier, *Drawing the Line: Tales of Maps and Cartocontroversy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), p. 7.

incapable of extracting themselves from their 'historically effected consciousness'.[579] Thus, a map cannot express a single truth. It can express a discourse which is similarly interpreted by viewers, but it is not "truth". Ultimately, mapmaking is the process of creating cartographies of fiction, which are accepted as fact.

Combined together, maps and mapping form what Black terms 'a dynamic information system' – the constant process of data acquisition, characterised by the static map image taking precedence over the perpetually-changing mental maps we create on a daily basis.[580] This faith has been known for at least two thousand years.[581] And as both John Pickles[582] and Matthew Edney[583] point out, *Mapping* is a process which does not end with the completion of a *Map* but which begins anew every time a *Map* is seen, assessed, and judged.

We have thus established three principles of cartographic faith. We trust *Maps* for three reasons – *biological*, *political*, and *educational*. Biologically, *Maps* are the result of *Mapping* which, as with all animals, has kept us fed and sheltered from predators since our ancestors crawled out of the sea.[584] We instinctively trust *Maps*, and only in cases of extreme manipulation or inaccuracy do we question them.[585] Politically, we have faith in maps which are produced by governments or professionals – we are more likely to trust an Ordnance

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[579] Robert Dostal, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 80-81.

[580] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. 131.

[581] O.A.W. Dilke points out that the Romans were aware of the distinction between *Maps* and *Mapping*. In *Epitome of Military Science* (III.vi), Vegetius exhorts Roman generals to carry properly-drawn, coloured-in maps of their local surroundings so that 'the commander who was setting out could choose his route not only with a mental map but with a constructed map to examine'. O.A.W. Dilke, 'Itineraries and Geographical Maps in the Early and Late Roman Empires', chapter in Harley and Woodward (eds.), *The History of Cartography Vol. I*, pp. 234-257; Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science III.vi [trans. N.P. Milner]* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993).

[582] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 66.

[583] Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map*, pp. 44-45.

[584] It is widely acknowledged among cartographers – and has been since the days of Claudius Ptolemy – that viewers instinctively trust maps, only questioning cartography in cases of extreme manipulation, glaringly obvious errors, or blaming maps as a handy scapegoat for poor personal navigation. The theory that people trust maps is powerful even if it is wrong: as argued on pages 10-14, the *belief* that people believe symbols is a self-fulfilling prophecy, as symbol-makers create their artefacts based upon the premise that people understand them. It is precisely the same with maps – cartographers trust their maps to be recognisable, and thus even if there really is not a mutually-reinforcing fidelity between mapmaker and mapreader, the *belief* that it exists perpetuates its existence. See Chapter Six for an expanded discussion of the mutually-reliant relationship between artefact, icon, and viewer. For an exhaustive discussion on the relationship between biology, psychology, the networks of social convention which reinforce agreed conventions of artefact interpretation, personal trust and quasi-religious faith, and hence the unique power of cartography, see: Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Vol. II* (New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 30; cited in, and also, James Corner, 'The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention', chapter in Denis Cosgrove (ed.), *Mappings* (London: Reaktion, 1999); J.B. Harley and David Woodward, *The History of Cartography Vols. I-III* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), especially Vol. I Chapter One, 'The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography'; Vol. I Chapter Two, Catherine Delano-Smith, 'Prehistoric Maps and the History of Cartography: An Introduction'; and Vol. I Chapter Three, G. Malcolm Lewis, 'The Origins of Cartography'. For an empirical investigation on faith in maps see MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 338-340, 433-458.

[585] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 49-57, 87-112.

Survey map than a child's scribble. Educationally, maps are everywhere and we are so exposed to the cartographic conquest of the universe that *Maps* become banal, almost boring, as they are so commonplace. We use *Maps* so many times each day, to navigate our way along train lines or to geographically place a story in our newspapers, that our faith in them is simply reinforced further, and we forget to question whether the map is right.

Having come suitably closer towards understanding a map – which overlaps the physical and mental realms, and can heavily influence viewers simply by being affiliated with a perceived authority – we can now explore recently-mentioned themes by asking a question which is as important as asking what a map is. This new direction asks what the link is between maps and *empire*.

3.3   Symbiosis

> *'In vain I strive and rail against those powers*
> *That mean t' invest me in a higher throne,*
> *As much too high for this disdainful earth.*
> *Give me a map; then let me see how much*
> *Is left for me to conquer all the world,*
> *That these, my boys, may finish all my wants.'*[586]

Tamburlaine the Great
V.iii

So laments Tamerlane, Great Khan of the Timurids, in the final scene of Christopher Marlowe's classic work. The purpose of Tamerlane's speech is purely dramatic, bemoaning his imminent death and his unfinished conquest of Earth. But the lines offer an insight into an acknowledged truth of cartography – politics and maps not only make each other,[587] but could not *exist* without one other. Without maps, *empire* is an illusion. Without *empire*, maps as we know them would not exist.

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[586] *The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
[587] J.B. Harley uses the same quote to open his essay *Maps, Knowledge and Power*. I am grateful to Dr. Nick Megoran, Newcastle University, for suggesting *Tamburlaine* before I had read Harley. *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 52.

This symbiosis between maps and politics has long been recognised among geographers generally and cartographers more specifically. Neil Smith,[588] David Livingstone,[589] Anne Godlewska,[590] Jeffers Lennox,[591] Christian Jacob,[592] and James Akerman[593] all point to there being a mutual reliance between the two phenomena of *empire* and maps. Cartographic historians point to the early nineteenth century as the dominant era of symbiosis. Identifying roots in the endless global wars between Napoleon and the European monarchies, they see the origins of overtly political mass cartography in the desire to remain one step ahead of one's enemy. Following Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the gradually industrialising powers of Europe turned to cartographers in pursuit of overseas trade, colonisation, and expansion at the expense of their rivals. This gave birth to the Victorian preoccupation with cartography during the height of self-appointed European and American *missions civilisatrices*.[594] It is true that political maps have existed for millennia, but it was the military, commercial, and scientific maps which emerged during the nineteenth century, which moved cartography out of the realm of a few elites and into the public arena, forming the genesis of new national cartographies enabling all citizens of a state to familiarise themselves with its shape, its frontiers, its neighbours, its ambitions, and its imaginations. And perhaps more importantly, it was in the nineteenth century that maps acquired, in the consciousness of populations increasingly exposed on a daily basis to geography classrooms and illustrated newspapers, the inherent trust which we still place in maps to this day.

Peter Barber and Tom Harper point out that the link between maps and *imperial* political projects was as familiar to Renaissance statesmen[595] as it was to Republican *imperators*[596] and Babylonian kings.[597] And while *empire* may be a discourse rooted in European imaginations of a shared Roman past, the symbiosis between cartography and political ambition is far from restricted to Europe. Virginia Aksan identifies the link in the

[588] Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).
[589] David Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992).
[590] Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (eds.), *Geography and Empire* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994).
[591] Jeffers Lennox, 'An Empire on Paper: The Founding of Halifax and Conceptions of Imperial Space, 1744-55', *The Canadian Historical Review* 88:3 (2007), pp. 373-412.
[592] Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History [trans. Tom Conley]* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 1-12.
[593] Akerman (ed.), *Imperial Map*, pp. 1-9.
[594] Jeremy Black, *Maps and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 51-80; Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*; Mackenzie, *Imperialism and Popular Culture*.
[595] Peter Barber and Tom Harper, *Magnificent Maps: Power, Propaganda and Art* (London: British Library, 2010), pp. 3-9.
[596] Ibid., pp. 7, 52.
[597] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. ix.

Ottoman state.[598] Mei-Ling Hsu points to its existence in pre-Han China,[599] while Alan Hodgkiss highlights the phenomenon in maps from pre-Columbian North America.[600] Contrary to being a mere blip in the development of European cartography, the concept of imperial mapping spreads across space and time.

The colossus of twentieth-century cartography, J.B. Harley, famously asserted that 'as much as guns and warships, maps have been the weapons of empire'.[601] This is a bold and contentious statement, particularly in an investigation of the European Union. The EU may have its detractors, but few commentators accuse the Union of sending out gunboats. Yet it is a claim with which many contemporary critical cartographers – including Mark Monmonier, Denis Wood, Jeremy Black, Peter Barber, Jeffers Lennox, Christian Jacob, and James Akerman – concur. Works of cartographic history stress the link between the two phenomena as self-evident, undeniable, unarguable. In the face of this apparently unanimous agreement, it must be asked just what this "imperial-cartographic symbiosis" is.

Unlike our novel concept of *cartoimperialism*, the link between *empire* and cartography is far from unique. It is possible to identify the link not only through the writings of critical cartographers, but through examples written on by cartographic theorists and map historians. Maps and politics have gone hand-in-hand for millennia. Physical maps have been a part of diverse civilisations since the last Ice Age, and politically, maps have been used to propagate discourses since recorded history began.[602] In search, then, of what Black terms 'a specifically imperial way of mapping',[603] demonstration is required. To avoid confusion with the modern maps examined in subsequent chapters, three historical examples will be considered here. These illustrate not only the age of the symbiosis, but the very characteristics still apparent in contemporary cartographies. These examples are: the coffin map of the Ancient Egyptian physician Gua, the Babylonian World Map, and the *Forma urbis Roma*:

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[598] Virginia Aksan, *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[599] Mei-Ling Hsu, 'The Han Maps and Early Chinese Cartography', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 68:1 (1978) pp. 45-60.

[600] Alan Hodgkiss, *Discovering Antique Maps* (Princes Risborough: Shire Publications, 2007); Phillip Allen, *The Atlas of Atlases* (London: Marshall Editions, 2005), pp. 9-11.

[601] J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 57.

[602] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, p. 4.

[603] Black, *Maps and History*, p. 76.

Fig. 3.6 – The coffin map of Gua (c. 1800 BC)[604]

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[604] Geraldine Pinch, *Egyptian Myth: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 55. Map retrieved from http://www.britishmuseum.org/images/ps234540_m.jpg.

Fig. 3.7 – The Babylon World Map, (c. 600 BC)[605]

Fig. 3.8 – *Forma urbis Romae* (c. 200 AD)[606]

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[606] Barber and Harper, *The Map Book*, pp. 22-23. The original *Formae Urbis Roma* was destroyed in the fifth century, recycled as building materials, and only partial fragments have been discovered since 1563. This

What do we see here? In Fig. 3.5 we see, in the coffin of the physician Gua, a handy map of the afterlife (the winding blue river is recognisable, alongside an adjacent path through Egypt's black soil) which Gua commissioned from priests in order to help his soul navigate the path to immortality, avoiding whatever eldritch horrors block his way to an eternity toiling for his gods.[607] Fig. 3.6, meanwhile, is the oldest surviving map of the entire world. The map, which puts Babylon at the centre of the known world, comes with a convenient cuneiform inscription helpfully reminding the reader that all peoples of the world bow before Babylon – or at least they should. Finally, Fig. 3.7 is a surviving fragment of the *Forma urbis Romae*, a gargantuan map of the entire city of Rome in almost obsessive detail – even showing staircases and individual pillars – which was hung on a wall of the Temple of Peace so high nobody could appreciate it.[608] At first glance, these examples are so different to each other, as well as to those maps produced in the contemporary West, that it may well be wondered why they warrant any examination whatsoever. We do not even need to refer to the myriad of works on the history of cartography to recognise that, like the glyphs carved onto rocks by hunter-gatherers, these glimpses of distant worlds are so different, and so bizarre, that at first glance they have no relation whatsoever to the sleek, scientific charts disseminated by a Digital-Age superstate.

Jeffers Lennox argues that historically, geopolities we would term "empires" were vague in both territory and population, deploying not maps of 'value-free geographic imagination' but rather 'imperially favourable geographic imaginations'.[609] This is a characteristic of the imperial-cartographic symbiosis, and one that is evident in the above examples. It is notable that the coffin map and clay tablet were made in societies which already had relatively "practical" Euclidean cartography designed for direction finding, administration and taxation, and even military planning.[610] But when mapping the entirety of their realm, a very different message is propagated. Even the Forum map, while seductively neutral in its accurate plotting of the city, performs the same trick purely due to its location and the purpose of its creation. The coffin map, clay tablet, and street plan demonstrate what

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fragment is one of 1,163 currently held at Stanford University's reconstruction project. See http://formaeurbis.stanford.edu/.
[607] Pinch, *Egyptian Myth*, p. 54.
[608] Barber, *The Map Book* pp. 22-23. Robert Cassanelli and Massimiliano David remark that while the *Forma* was too distant to be scrutinised, there was one map capable of being visually dissected in great detail by Roman generals, plutocrats, and powerbrokers – this map hung in the stairwell of the Senate House. Robert Cassanelli and Massimiliano David, *Ruins of Ancient Rome: The Drawings of French Architects Who Won the Prix de Rome, 1786-1924* (Los Angeles: J.P. Getty Museum, 2002), pp. 62-65.
[609] Jeffers Lennox, 'An Empire on Paper: The Founding of Halifax and the Conceptions of Imperial Space, 1744-55', *The Canadian Historical Review* 88:3 (2007), p. 373.
[610] Short, *World Through Maps*, pp. 38-41.

is arguably the fundamental element of the *empire*-cartography symbiosis: firstly that maps depict an imagination not simply of how the world *is*, but depict the world with a powerful political message that this is the way it *should be*; and additionally, maps do not merely *show* the world but *make* it. It is not sufficient to depict reality. Instead, "reality" and "representation" blur, and maps insist that a particular group – the sons and daughters of Amun-Ra, the King of Kings in Babylon, and the *patricians* and *plebeians* of the Eternal City – have both a right and a duty to impose their version of order and control upon the world.

These maps, though, are fundamental to understanding the relationship between *empire* – identified in the preceding chapter as a powerful imagination and discourse – and cartography. Since the emergence of definable polities during the Copper Age, cartography has coexisted alongside government.[611] As Monmonier acknowledges, the map is 'the perfect symbol of the state'.[612] By plotting physical features, marking the state with a bold and visible name, and drawing 'a heavy, distinct boundary around as much territory as you dare claim', the state becomes real.[613] Neil Smith goes even further in reminding us that 'geography ha[s] always been a handmaiden to the state, often in quite insalubrious ways',[614] and most particularly in the context of *empire*.[615] It does not even matter whether the places depicted are real or imaginary – by plotting the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Roman worldviews in a tangible form using recognisable symbols and recognisable visual language, these political imaginations become as "real" as a navigational map of the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Tiber.

This characteristic of territorial ambition connects strongly with what Jeremy Black terms the 'cartographic pretensions' of a polity.[616] As the collections assembled by Peter Barber,[617] and Ashley and Miles Baynton-Williams,[618] demonstrate, this has long been a characteristic of maps. It is additionally still very much alive today: as evidenced not only by the visually seductive cartographies collected by Frank Jacobs[619] but by the continuing deployment of maps in states' perpetual quest to dominate and control.[620] It is clear that maps and mapping practices pursued by "states" – including the European Union – have had, still

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[611] Jacob, *Sovereign Map*, pp. 18-19.
[612] Monmonier, *How to Lie With Maps*, p. 88.
[613] Ibid.
[614] Smith, *American Empire*, pp. xx-xxi.
[615] Ibid, p. xxi.
[616] Black, *Maps and Politics*, p. 19.
[617] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*.
[618] Ashley and Miles Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds: Maps from the Age of Discovery* (London: Quercus, 2008).
[619] Frank Jacobs, *Strange Maps: An Atlas of Cartographic Curiosities* (London: Viking, 2009).
[620] The 'Scramble for the Arctic' has prompted Durham University's *International Boundaries Research Units* to create a map of rival states' geopolitical claims to the Arctic: http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/.

have, and will continue to have, the power to persuade audiences that their distorted depictions of the world somehow reflect an external reality.

This is a critical element of cartoimperialism: the use of the map, and the careful deployment of the sophisticated subtleties of cartographic techniques, to portray a normative ambition which goes beyond actuality, instead merging reality and representation. Instead, the cartoimperial map depicts a polity's ambitions, desires, imagined past, and self-assured legitimacy as fact. In the case of the Union, a collective identity is arguably one desired goal. This is constantly reinforced by the deployment of maps, devices of fixing this nascent collective identity not with a shared culture, sovereign or set of social norms, but with a shared control, legitimacy, and ambition, which is expressed through the imperial discourse.

Let us return to the above three maps. As the earliest identifiable world map, it is not surprising to find that the Babylonian World Map frames the known world not in terms of direction-finding or exploitable resources as earlier, smaller-scale local maps of the ancient world generally had done[621] – what Harley terms 'Euclidean' maps[622] – but in political, *imperial* terms. By plotting Babylon as the centre of the world, a sacred space ringed by protective deities who shield civilisation from the savages beyond, a dichotomy is established of two mutually-exclusive groups defined not by ethnicity or nationality, but by association with the polity; a 'civilised' world and its 'barbaric' twin.

This is noticeable in other imperial maps. The coffin map juxtaposes topographic representations of the Nile alongside features of the spiritual realm and afterlife, framed within the concepts of *ma'at* (Order) and *isfet* (Chaos).[623] The consequence is a map which similarly blurs fact and fantasy, portraying the land not in a neutral, topographic manner but instead as an affirmation of the political obligation and moral duty of the collective civilisation to impose their version of control (*empire*) upon the surrounding world. Similarly, the *Formae urbis Roma,* a mammoth map of Rome centred upon the *Empire*'s cultural and governmental nucleus at the Capitoline Hill and the *imperium*'s symbolic heart at the emperor's Palatine residence, blurred fiction and fact in a bragging proclamation of Rome's ability and obligation to enforce control. The *Formae urbis Roma* proclaimed the power of a unified and unifying polity – conveniently ignoring the politically fractured, economically

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[621] Toby Lester, *The Fourth Part of the World: The Epic Story of History's Greatest Map* (London and New York: Profile Books, 2009), pp. 120-128.
[622] Harley, *New Nature of Maps*, p. 53.
[623] Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography*, pp. 43-46.

devastated, and civil war-torn reality of late third-century Rome[624] – in order to propagate an image of coherence in the face of disharmony and imperial integrity over local squabbling. Or, to draw a not-inaccurate parallel with the European Union's official motto: unity in diversity.

It is evident that these three examples, separated by time, space, and imagination, share a common similarity which demonstrates the symbiosis of *empire* and map – *they blur reality and imagination in pursuit of a specific political discourse.* This is the essence of cartoimperialism – a discourse of legitimacy, obligation, and control, manifest in a depiction of Order over Chaos which spreads a normative political message and encourages the imagination of a collective identity defined by "outsiders",[625] made plausible by being represented in topographic, geographic terms. This fusion of geography and politics, a 'human identity-hunger' as termed by Philip Pomper,[626] remains a strong force today.

Lennox draws attention to this key characteristic of the *empire*-map symbiosis as being the creation and display of cartographic knowledge fixing identity with land. Historically, this determined and continues to determine *imperial* interaction with others on the basis of whether or not they could be classified as fellow-citizens or outsiders.[627] This symbiotic characteristic is visible in non-European maps of similar geopolities legitimising their existence based upon an imagined discourse – 'certain designs and distortions were introduced on many maps in order to express ideological points of view'.[628] Imperial mapping is remarkable both in its longevity and its existence beyond the specifically European discourse of *empire*. Not even humanity's cartographic conquest of the world has eliminated this imperial approach to mapping. Grayson Perry, in his discussion of Earth's latest colonial squabble – navigational access and mineral rights at the North Pole in the "Scramble for the Arctic" – has generated controversial cartographies in which claimant nations stretch the truth, expressing their perceived legitimacy and obligation to impose their version of order, wrapped up in the apparently neutral language of maps.[629] Frank Jacobs is right to term these – and indeed all maps created in the imperial-cartographic context – as 'lies in the clothing of truth'.[630]

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[624] Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 1-7; Russell Foster, 'Between these two kinds of death', *Global Discourse* 2:iii (2013), pp. 1-11.

[625] Pinch, *Egyptian Myth*, p. 54.

[626] Philip Pomper, 'The History and Theory of Empires', *History and Theory* 44:4 (2005), p. 9.

[627] Lennox, 'An Empire on Paper', p. 373.

[628] Hsu, 'The Han Maps', p. 59.

[629] BBC, *Maps: Power, Plunder, and Propaganda*, Ep. 1 'Windows on the World', 28th April 2010.

[630] Jacobs, *Strange Maps*, p. 64.

Yet in fairness, as Monmonier repeatedly reminds us, *all* maps are lies. To a degree. There are some who disagree: sociologist Bruno Latour asserts that maps are neutral, that with maps 'there is nothing hidden or convoluted, no shadows, no 'double entendre'.[631] But even the notion of the map, something which offers us the ability to glance the world at once – the 'ecumenical eye'[632] akin to Prester John's mirror – is unrealistic. John Pickles posits that maps are ultimately incapable of providing a full representation of the world, due to basic principles of Cartesian Perspectivalism.[633] We cannot see the entire world at once, and a map *has* to misrepresent. A very simple test illustrates this.

Let us take a moment to glance up from this page, and look at our surroundings. What do we see? A room. Perhaps there is a window, and if we look out of the window, again we do not see anything which resembles cartography. If we are lucky enough to be reading this outdoors on a pleasant day and look around, we still do not see what maps show. Instead we look around and see a jumble of natural and artificial artefacts, all framed within the restricted vision of human eyes which offer a field of vision whose angle is narrow, whose range is restricted, and from a viewpoint which is usually only a few feet above the floor. Even if we look out of the window of a tall building, peer from the porthole of an aeroplane, or happen to glance down at the planet while performing a spacewalk,[634] we still do not see the world as maps show it. We do not see the world *reflected* in Prester John's mirror – we have to look at the world *represented* on a map.

Partly this is biological. Our vision is restricted by the bodies in which we live. Creatures with compound or turreted eyes can see substantially more than us, but we humans are restricted by the mechanism, shape, and housing of our eyes, neurons, and synapses, and by the electrical charges and chemical receptors in optical cord and brain which allow our eyes and brains to transform rays of light into vision.[635] The test we have just performed demonstrates this – we cannot even see the whole of the room we are currently in or even the whole of our bodies at once, let alone see the entire surface of the planet in a single glance. We are constrained by Cartesian Perspectivalism from which we cannot escape.

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[631] Cited in Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map*, p. 25.

[632] Roman cartographer Claudius Ptolemy refers to the "ecumenical eye" in his *Geographica* as the (in)ability to perceive the entire surface of the spherical globe at once. Berggren and Jones (eds.), *Ptolemy's Geography*.

[633] John Pickles, *A History of Spaces: Cartographic reason, mapping and the geo-coded world* (London: Routledge, 2004).

[634] Gwilym Eades, 'An Apollonian appreciation of Google Earth', *Geoforum* 41 (2010), pp. 671-673.

[635] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 53-63.

Michael Gibbons reminds us that 'there is no God's eye perspective'[636] whatsoever, and hence maps, as Monmonier believes, lie. Yet it might be going a little too far to say that maps *lie*. Mapmakers are not pursuing some devious conspiracy. But cartography has fundamental restrictions which require us to reconsider the nature of maps, not as Prester John's mirror *reflecting the world*, but rather as media which can do little more than *represent the world according to a particular discourse.*

3.4   Mapping Discourse

'In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographer Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.'[637]

<div align="right">

Jorge Luis Borges
On Exactitude in Science

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Jorge Luis Borges' satirical fiction is both entertaining and insightful. For of all the discourses constructed and perpetuated in human history, perhaps none is as powerful, as compelling, as the map. In so many discursive situations – political, religious, economic, environmental, military, medical, and so on – the most powerful evidence for an argument, and often the final decision-maker, is a map.[638]

Maps communicate knowledge in an unusual form, existing as images, texts, icons, vehicles of discourse, and discourses in their own right – all at the same time. They are

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[636] Michael Gibbons, 'Hermeneutics, Political Inquiry, and Practical Reason: An Evolving Challenge to Political Science', *American Political Science Review* 100:4 (2006), p. 567.
[637] Henrikson, 'Power and Politics of Maps', p. 68, footnote 34.
[638] Monmonier, *Drawing the Line*, pp. 1-3.

deliberate constructs which possess emotional and intellectual appeal,[639] and can potentially form a unique category of propaganda.[640] Trevor Barnes and James Duncan highlight the unarguable truth that 'pieces of the world … do not come with their own labels' and that as a consequence of the world being unable to represent itself, it must be represented using forms of human language, which humans will understand.[641] It is not possible for maps to accurately mirror our world, as each cartographer has a unique perception of reality: consequently, their products 'are inevitably stamped with [their] own particular set of local interests, standards, and so on'. Barnes and Duncan support this point vigorously, stating flatly that 'representations are not a mirror copy of some external reality'.[642] The consequence is that mapmakers all work, to some degree, within a realm of fiction, an alternative version of reality. Thus their plausible lies possess almost limitless power to persuade.

Clearly, maps have power. They can persuade governments and publics, they can deceive and deflect, they can win or lose battles, campaigns, and entire wars[643] through their knowledge claims, their representations, and their disseminations. Indeed for Catherine Delano-Smith, 'the map is the ultimate tool of knowledge' as it compresses the infinitely complex and physically imperceptible world into a neat data package which allows us to

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[639] Mark Monmonier and George Schnell, *Map Appreciation* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 4.

[640] Ibid., p. 32; Pickles, 'Texts, Hermeneutics, and Propaganda Maps', pp. 193-224.

[641] Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, *Writing Worlds: discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 2.

[642] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[643] While it would be a stretch to say that maps *alone* determine conflict, military history is replete with examples of cartographic confidence (or lack thereof) exacerbating a bad situation, from small skirmishes to international wars. A few examples illustrate this. During the United States' invasion of Grenada in 1981, US Navy SEALs were not issued with maps – when this was discovered at the last minute, they were issued with tourist maps purchased from a nearby petrol station. Unsurprisingly, maps showing popular restaurants did not locate the SEALs' military objectives, leading them to assault what was believed to be a command post but was in fact a hospital. On a larger scale, during the 1943 campaign at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia the Allies suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of inferior Axis forces because the Allied commander, General Fredenhall, never left his bunker, instead confident that he could see the entire campaign from his underground map table, placing his troops in positions which looked good on a map but were in reality hopelessly exposed to Axis artillery. A spectacular example of misplaced cartographic confidence concerns the French Army in 1870. Upon the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, the French War Ministry sought to bolster low morale in the French officer corps by only issuing commanders with maps of Germany, to encourage a belief that the war would be fought at a comfortable distance from home soil. The French Navy was unable to launch an amphibious invasion of Prussia as the Admiralty lacked charts of the North Sea, let alone the German *Wattenmeer* shore, while on land the entire war was fought on French, not German, soil. It hardly mattered anyway – the Ministry of War's maps of France were so outdated that French field marshals knew less about French terrain than did Prussian junior lieutenants. Cartographic hyperreality is not a parlour trick of Prester John and video-game designers – it can cost real lives. See Geoffrey Regan, *Great Military Blunders* (London: Macmillan, 2004), pp. 124-132; Saul David, *Military Blunders* (London: Robinson, 1997), pp. 350-353; Alastair Horne, *The Fall of Paris 1870* (London: Pan Macmillan, 1990), pp. 40, 42-43.

'scrutinise, control, and dominate' our environments.[644] As such, maps persuade and indoctrinate, stretch the truth and tell outright lies. Indeed 'maps,' as Jeremy Black and John Clark recognise, 'have the capacity to open worlds of reality and imagination; to depict, in their lines, points, and spaces, both hopes and fears, to urge the wanderings and wonderings of the human mind.'[645] It is often repeated by critical cartographers such as Black, Monmonier, Wood,[646] and Hodgkiss[647] that mapreaders automatically place complete trust in the veracity and authority of maps, accepting them as unerringly accurate, mirror-image reflections of the world we live in – realistic models of the broader world beyond that which our restricted biological vision is capable of perceiving.[648] 'At the root of [maps'] power', claims Monmonier, 'is our frequent unquestioning acceptance of cartographic messages.'[649]

Much has been written on the power of maps, and particularly in a European context. It was cartography which enabled Europeans to navigate the oceans, seize lands, wage wars, and control much of the world through their dominance of spatial knowledge. It is recognised that maps are powerful media through which discourses can be expressed. Of course, this in and of itself, does not make maps unique. Discourses are expressed using a broad spectrum of media – written language, spoken language, images, and performance, to name but a few of the most familiar. What makes maps so special?

The power of maps as discursive vehicles is that, as Denis Cosgrove points out, maps are the media which we, as individuals, question least and trust most.[650] This is arguably because the map, more than any other media, combines a subjective message with a format that is widely perceived to be objective. This is a knotty paradox, yet it can be explained using what is perhaps a surprising turn for critical cartography – postmodernism.

In the same passage in which he extols the virtues of cartography, Black qualifies his assertion of maps' benign potentials with a cautionary warning: 'the history of cartography … is indivisible from the history of grasping space, both imaginatively and in reality'.[651] Maps indeed have the ability to expand our vision and allow imaginations to roam unfettered, but at the same time maps have the capacity to exploit this ability in order to promote a view

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[644] British Library, *Magnificent Maps: 'Maps in Context' Academic Symposium*, British Library, London, 14 June 2010.
[645] John Clarke (ed.), *100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics or Cartography Throughout History* (New York: Sterling, 2005), p. 6.
[646] Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (London: Routledge, 1993).
[647] John Pickles, *A History of Spaces: Cartographic reason, mapping and the geo-coded world* (London: Routledge, 2004).
[648] Pickles, *History of Spaces*, pp. 16-19.
[649] Mark Monmonier, *Drawing the Line: Tales of Maps and Cartocontroversy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), p. 1.
[650] Denis Cosgrove, *Mappings* (London: Reaktion, 1999), pp. 22-24.
[651] Clark, *100 Maps*, pp. 6-7.

of the world that is not a reflection of reality, but rather an image of what the mapmaker *wants* their audience to see.

This exploitable characteristic of cartography is as old as maps themselves. From the above Iron-Age depictions of civilisations pursuing self-anointed missions of Order over Chaos[652] and medieval *mappaemundi* using Scripture to portray a sinful world teetering on the brink of Apocalypse,[653] to boastful Victorian maps annexing far-flung territories[654] and dishonest map projections falsely plotting the size (and associated strength) of rival states on the eve of world wars,[655] maps have been consciously constructed according to particular discourses in order to adhere to a predetermined political cause.

Lloyd Brown identified this exact trait among populations recently emerged from six years of cartographic bombardments by their own (and rival) news agencies and governments in the Second World War. When faced with a map produced by a state authority, the viewer will inevitably assign that particular image a greater authority and veracity than their mental image.[656] We turn to maps when we require spatial information, but when information is presented by different and possibly conflicting sources, we put our faith in that produced by an apparently more competent authority. Even if said authority has no cartographic expertise and only derives its status through connection to, or approval from, a government, we tend to believe it.[657]

This trend has been exacerbated by what Gillian Rose sees as the 'ocularcentric immersion' of contemporary Western culture.[658] Western societies are saturated with imagery, and the individual sees and processes hundreds of thousands of images every day.[659] Inevitably, the map becomes treated as just another image, and as Michael Peterson points out, this faith is reinforced because maps – especially internet maps which are omnipresent and easy to access – satisfy this collective need in modern society for information presented in a visual form.[660] Yet while the map becomes treated as a mere image, it acquires additional authority purely by dint of association with the state – including the European Union. This trusting attitude towards maps is important to the study of modern European cartography and warrants deeper examination.

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[652] Virga, *Cartographia*, pp. 9-11.
[653] Paul Harvey, *Medieval Maps* (London: British Library, 1991), pp. 2-12.
[654] Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds*, pp. 6-7.
[655] Phillip Allen, *The Atlas of Atlases* (London: Bounty Books, 2005), pp. 62-66.
[656] Lloyd Brown *The Story of Maps* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1949), pp. 9-14.
[657] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 337-339, 345-348.
[658] Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 14-18.
[659] Ibid.
[660] Michael Peterson, *Maps and the Internet* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005), p. 2.

Our collective cartographic naïveté is a consequence of what Derek Gregory terms 'cartophobia'.[661] As Gregory reminds us, cartophobia and 'cartographic anxiety' are high among the population.[662] This results in innate trust; and the reason for this unquestioning trust is, as Peter Goin argues, caused by 'a lack of graphicacy [graphical literacy]'.[663] We are trained to treat written sources with a healthy scepticism, yet with cartography we routinely accept the messages propagated by mapmakers as maps retain, as Alan Hodgkiss points out, the exalted (and incorrect) assumption that they accurately reflect the world.[664]

While this may begin as an individual characteristic, it is combined collectively. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, as Peter Barber explains, maps were the province almost exclusively of political, commercial, and religious elites.[665] Two of the three historical examples examined above were for private, not public, consumption, while the *Formae urbis Roma* was a rare example of public cartography not replicated until the Victorian era. And while other areas of the world experienced different epochal evolution to that of Europe, maps in civilisations as diverse as Japan,[666] India,[667] and the Islamic Caliphate[668] shared their European counterparts' restricted access. Public access to maps – and by extension, public deference to maps – is a societal relic of the explosion in literacy, commercial advertising, newspapers, and public education in the late nineteenth century.[669] Here, we see a phenomenon which explains much about the imperial-cartographic symbiosis.

It was identified in the previous section that our modern concept of cartography is largely the result of political, military, and commercial developments in the nineteenth century, without which cartography in Europe might well have remained the jealously-guarded realm of a small cabal of curio-collectors rather than becoming the nationalised and nationalising public projects which dominated nineteenth-century political geography.

As Black,[670] Hodgkiss,[671] and Allen[672] agree, it was large-scale war between European revolutionaries and reactionaries in the early nineteenth century which encouraged the growth of the artistic science of cartography, and played a significant role in crystallising

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[661] Derek Gregory, 'Geography and the Cartographic Anxiety', chapter in Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 62-64.
[662] Ibid., p. 70.
[663] Peter Goin, 'Visual Literacy', *The Geographical Review* 91:1-2 (2001), pp. 363-369.
[664] Alan Hodgkiss, *Discovering Antique Maps* (Princes Risborough: Shire Publications, 2007), pp. 16-18.
[665] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 1-8.
[666] Barber, *The Map Book*, pp. 168-169.
[667] Black, *Visions of the World*, pp. 18-19, 28.
[668] Riffenburgh, *Treasures of Cartography*, pp. 14-16.
[669] Black, *Maps and History*, pp. 75-80.
[670] Ibid.; Black, *Maps and Politics*.
[671] John Keates, *Understanding Maps* (London and New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 216-220.
[672] Allen, *Atlas of Atlases*, pp. iv-xi.

European ideas of nationhood – enabling the newly-educated publics of industrial societies to consume mass maps for the first time in human history. This is not merely historically interesting: it is essential to understanding the power that imperial maps had and, as we encountered previously on the current cartographic squabbling over the Arctic, this still exists. To better understand this phenomenon, we may turn to postmodernism.

3.4.1   Postmodern Mapping

Postmodernism is an amorphous term with highly contested definitions. The value and justification of these various approaches are not to be discussed here, but in the next chapter. This is not yet a discussion of methodology, and as such the focus here is on what postmodern theory can reveal about maps' existing in a limbo between fiction and fact – a trait which lends maps their perceived authority and acceptance by mapviewers. Suffice it here to say that postmodern approaches are familiar to critical cartographers. Here, a more restricted application of postmodern theory will be drawn upon to explain the imperial-cartographic symbiosis. We shall approach this through the assertion of Jean-François Lyotard that postmodernism is characterised by 'incredulity towards metanarratives'.[673]

The rejection of map metanarratives has been acknowledged by critical cartographers for some time. Alan MacEachren perceives the 'traditional metanarrative' of cartography as the approach to maps as objective, politically-neutral tools of scientific enquiry.[674] This is, as MacEachren points out, a fallacy. A map is more than a mere picture. It is a fusion of forms endowed with multiple layers of meaning, crossing boundaries of textual sources, images, and socio-political icons.[675] This, argue Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, places the map on the level of the text.[676] Maps' multifarious nature requires precisely the 'incredulity' towards the "objective scientific" tools that Lyotard hints at; and postmodernism offers a more useful framework through which to understand the mutually-reliant relationship between the abstract and subjective concept of *empire*, and the abstract subjectivity of maps.

Postmodernism is nothing new to cartography, and Barber and Harper highlight that the notion of cartographic positivist objectivity is a relatively recent phenomenon resulting

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[673] Gregory et. al, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 566-568.
[674] Alan MacEachren, *How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 10-11.
[675] Wood, *Power of Maps*, pp. 17-22.
[676] Barnes and Duncan, *Writing Worlds*, p. 5.

from the scientific approach to mapping in the European Age of Discovery.[677] Before this period maps were created, used, and acknowledged as art forms, visual histories, and imaginative icons. Similarly, the *methods* of postmodern enquiry have been established in critical cartography for quite some time.[678] Deconstruction of map symbols, marginalia,[679] production context, use: all of these are hallmarks of a postmodern approach to maps-as-texts which has been pursued for decades. Indeed, MacEachren begins his monumental work on cartography (which itself draws upon a wide variety of theoretical approaches) with what might be described as a lament at the preponderance of postmodernism in contemporary critical cartography.[680] One answer to this, drawing on the postmodern paradigm, is to be found in the work of Jean Baudrillard.

In his *Simulations*, Baudrillard sets out a thesis with curious connotations for cartography. For Baudrillard, contemporary Western society has become so infused with symbols and signs that reality and representation have fused into one. We do not live in reality but rather a simulation of reality that is composed of artificial and arbitrary symbols.[681] This alternate and imaginative reality is divisible into three sequential historical epochs. The first corresponds to the premodern period, in which the rarity and uniqueness of images and symbols resulted in their remaining simply representations. The second corresponds to the Industrial Revolution, wherein a surge in symbols and signs causes a blurring between reality and representation, as the representation becomes tailored to expectations rather than actuality. The final phase – the postmodern era, which Baudrillard argues we now inhabit – is characterised by a total merge of reality and representation whereby technological commercialism so detaches us from "reality", that our representations become utterly meaningless, and we are unable to distinguish between different imaginations.

This might seem a curious framework through which to view cartography and *empire*. We might go so far as to say that cartography has always been 'postmodern', in that what maps represent has never been "reality". Indeed, Gwilym Eades suggests that there is no means whatsoever whereby reality can be portrayed in a static medium – whether by Stone-

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[677] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 22-24.
[678] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 6-10.
[679] Dennis Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map: An Illustrated History of Map Elements and Embellishments* (New York: Sterling, 2012).
[680] In *How Maps Work*, MacEachren acknowledges the importance of deconstructive methods, but argues that these methods have become so dominant that other approaches are deemed 'irrelevant or inappropriate ... The directions pointed by these authors are refreshing, but their apparent insistence on a wholesale replacement of one limiting approach to cartography with another is not'. MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 10.
[681] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), pp. 1-37.

Age scratchings or by Google Earth[682] – as spatial "reality" is inherently subjective and perpetually changing. Instead, the utility of Baudrillard's thesis involves his 'Second Order' and 'Third Order' of time.

To illustrate, let us reconsider that for centuries, perhaps millennia, we have been making maps of fictional places.[683] This is crucial for two reasons. The first is that, as Monmonier stresses, it is largely irrelevant whether a map is factual or fictitious.[684] All maps are based upon the same principles and all use the same mechanisms to convey their meaning to us. A great many fictional maps exist – in the frontpapers of novels, hanging on the walls in galleries and museum exhibitions, consulted by characters on our television screens – and we can easily understand them. The second, related point to consider is that there is very little distinction between a map of a "real" place and a map of an imaginary realm. Monmonier summarises this in plain language – 'all maps lie'.[685]

Thus, Black and Baudrillard both point to the phenomenon of imperial mapping emerging under specific circumstances. Both are correct in pointing out that it was during the industrial nineteenth century that symbols – particularly maps – expanded at an exponential rate. Maps themselves did not change, in the sense that maps have always blurred reality and representation, but change occurred in that this very blurring expanded from the pre-industrial elite who used cartography, to entire national populations. Additionally, Baudrillard points out that this mass cartographic consumption occurred at a time when images and texts in general were blurring the boundaries between reality and fantasy, while Black points out that public-consumption maps acquired such authority in the collective mind precisely because they were released from an elite apparently – to the newly-educated populaces of industrial Europe – already so familiar with maps and the world as to be trustworthy sources regardless of the map's content. Thus maps became part of what Jean Baudrillard terms 'hyperreality'.

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[682] Denis Cosgrove, 'Contested Global Visions: *One-World, Whole-Earth,* and the Apollo Photographs, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84:2 (1994), pp. 270-294; Gwilym Eades, 'An Apollonian appreciation of Google Earth', *Geoforum* 41 (2010), pp. 671-673.

[683] Alessandro Scafi, 'Mapping the End: The Apocalypse in Medieval Cartography', *Literature and Theology* 26:4 (2012), pp. 400-416.

[684] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 184-186.

[685] Ibid.

3.4   Hyperreality

'All maps lie flat. Therefore, all flat maps lie'.[686]

Mark Monmonier is not alone in his skepticism of maps. Henrikson's above words are a criticism of map projections. It is true that maps do not portray the world as it appears to our limited biological vision, but we might be going a little too far, as Denis Wood opines on Monmonier,[687] in saying that maps *lie.* Maps do not make themselves, and to say that cartographers *lie* implies a deliberate, conscious, and malevolent act. There certainly have been deliberate lies in cartography,[688] but given that cartographers are incapable of reflecting an immense and infinitely complex world in a folded piece of paper or smartphone software, it is unfair to say that maps *lie*. It is fairer to say that maps are *hyperreal*.

It does not particularly matter whether a map is "real" (i.e.: showing part of the physical universe we live in) or "unreal". Our interpretative mechanism, and our faith in them, is the same. The result is that *real* and *unreal* merge in maps, ultimately creating an image, a tool, a representation, which is *hyperreal* – an unreality which looks real. This is tricky, thus consider the figures below:

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[686] Henrikson, 'Power and Politics of Maps', p. 50.

[687] In *The Power of Maps*, Denis Wood strongly critiques his rival Mark Monmonier. One example illustrates this: 'Mark Monmonier anxiously wrings his hands … what is this? It is the assurance (and arrogance) of the expert that *he knows better than you*'. Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1992), p. 192 [emphasis in original].

[688] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 87-112.

Fig 3.9 – Subway Map I[689]

Fig. 3.10 – Subway Map II[690]

[690] Image retreived from the *Grand Theft Auto* wiki:
http://images1.wikia.nocookie.net/__cb20130625023427/gtawiki/images/8/8f/Algonquin_only.png.

Fig. 3.11 – Russian City I[691]

Fig. 3.12 – Russian City II[692]

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[692] Image retrieved from *Half-Life 2* (United States: Valve Corporation, 2004).

Fig. 3.13 – *Mappamundi* I[693]

Fig. 3.14 – *Mappamundi* II[694]

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[694] Image retrieved from Clarke, *100 Maps*, p. 241.

Here, in descending order of "reality", we see how maps are reliant on a blend of fact and fiction which we read, and trust to be an accurate representation, ultimately rendering them a form of hyperreality.

Consider Figs 3.9 and 3.10, two subway maps of a densely-populated island. The first one is probably familiar – we can see from the language of the map that it is Manhattan Island in New York City. The second is similar: a facsimile of a long, narrow island with a subway network connecting it to other inhabited urban areas. It is not real, but a map of the fictional Algonquin Island – a parody of Manhattan – from the *Grand Theft Auto* video game franchise.[695] This parody place does not exist, but we can identify Fig. 3.9 as a subway map because of the visual language it uses: grid-plan, coloured train lines, and the simplified, clutter-free layout which is standard for urban transport maps.[696] The next two maps go one step further, deceiving us in exactly the same way. Fig 3.11 is recognisable as a street map, complete with building outlines, contrasting colours, and Cyrillic script. It is in fact part of an official map on the website of the US embassy in Moscow, designed as an aid for visitors. Now consider Fig 3.12. The colours, contours, and symbols are all reminiscent of the predecessor, and we could easily be forgiven for thinking that this map also depicts some Eastern European city. It is in fact a map of a nameless and completely fictional town, "City 17", from another popular video game franchise.[697] Yet we recognise this complete fiction as a map because of the language it uses. Finally we see how maps can take the blending of fiction and fact to its ultimate conclusion. Fig. 3.13 depicts the coastline of northeast Britain in the mid-sixteenth century, showing a rich palimpsest of place-names, rivers, stylised hills, and regions. Its companion, Fig. 3.14, has exactly the same place-names and features but it is not real – it is a map of *Middle-Earth*, the setting of J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*, and is a pure fantasy designed to look like an Early Modern map. All of these maps are hyperreal, on all three of Baudrillard's tiers.

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[695] This exact map is discussed by Simon Garfield, who encourages the cartographic power of video games over other forms of entertainment – 'an entire generation of potential television viewers and scale model builders were lost to a more modern way to spend their time and money ... and maps stealthily entered the lives of young people ... Would Ptolemy and Eratosthenes not have recognised it as a thing of wonder?'. Simon Garfield, *On the Map: Why the World Looks the Way it Does* (London: Profile Books, 2012), p. 409.

[696] Barber, *The Map Book*, pp. 320-321.

[697] A growing movement in cartography argues that as a consequence of the inhabited world being reduced to banality by sat-navs, mobile phones, and other handheld gadgets, video games are the new arena of creative cartography – what Simon Garfield terms 'the bold future of cartography'. Garfield, along with Chris Perkins and Jeremy Harwood, makes a convincing argument that video-game maps (along with the maps of traditional tabletop and board games, from seventeenth-century jigsaws to *Monopoly* and *Risk*), are every bit as insidious and seductive as the propaganda maps once commissioned by colonialists, Soviets, and Nazis. Garfield, *On the Map*, pp. 394-409; Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin and Chris Perkins, *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 167-188; Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth*, p. 183.

Baudrillard's conception of the hyperreal focuses on three tiers. At the first level, Baudrillard argues, we find counterfeits intended to look "real", 'the reflection of a profound reality'.[698] The subway map of Algonquin Island is on this tier: a counterfeit of Manhattan island, a reflection based on *specific* reality. At the second level of simulacra are mass-produced fakes which 'mask and denature a profound reality':[699] the internet map of Moscow is a relic of the mass mapping of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the map of City 17 tricks us into believing it is real because it is based upon the same coded language typical to mass-manufactured maps produced in industrial modernity. It is a reflection based on *general* reality (a city). Finally at Baudrillard's third order of simulacra we encounter a map which 'masks the *absence* of a profound reality': *Middle-Earth* is a complete fiction devoid of links to the world we inhabit, other than that it *looks* recognisable. It is a reflection of *a complete unreality*.[700] Yet because it is framed as a map, an object we are familiar with and trust, it acquires a reality of its own – a counterfactualism, a hyperreality.

All of these maps exist at a praxis where fact and fantasy merge as *counterfactualism*,[701] whose power has long been acknowledged in scholarship. Despite E. H. Carr's belief that counterfactualism is a frivolous parlour game, Robert Cowley argues that it enables us to question assumptions by eliminating 'hindsight bias'.[702] Hobsbawm agrees, arguing that our interpretation of the world is subject to a "cannot-see-the-wood-for-the-trees" phenomenon. In this phenomenon, hindsight bias and belief in *reflection* over *representation* become combined, and consequently we are unable to understand the methodologies and epistemologies of history and politics because we cannot extract ourselves from our predetermined biases and interpretations.[703] As an example, he argues that Marxist historians might best understand their *method* of understanding history by dabbling in a counterfactual realm in which the Soviet Union never existed: this removes squabbling about things which really happened, and allows historians to gain awareness of the prejudgements and processes which allow them to interpret the past, and about which they would otherwise

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[698] Richard Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 197.
[699] Ibid.
[700] We fortunately avoid the pinnacle of Baudrillard's *simulacra*, 'signs [which] bear no relation to any reality whatsoever'. Maps which bear no relation to the world do exist – as the collected art-world "maps" of Katherine Harmon demonstrate – but here we blur the definition of "map". Luckily the EU does not use such fringe or "experimental" cartography, so it need not concern us here. Horrocks and Jevtic, *Baudrillard for Beginners* p. 108; Katherine Harmon, *You Are Here: Personal Geographies and Other Maps of the Imagination* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004); Harmon, *The Map as Art: Contemporary Artists Explore Cartography* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2009).
[701] Clark, *100 Maps*, pp. 240-243.
[702] Robert Cowley (ed.), *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been* (New York: Berkley Books, 2000), pp. xi-xiii
[703] Hobsbawm, *On History*, pp. 106, 150-151.

be unaware.[704] We can do exactly the same with maps. By looking at maps of places which never existed, we can unpick the language we use to understand maps, and the discourses woven into them. Like maps, history books are not reflections of what "really" happened; they are only representations. Counterfactualism is just as useful for understanding the relationship between viewer and map, as it for the relationship between reader and book.

We can look at a map of Manhattan's subways, Moscow's streets, or the coastline of Northumbria and be vaguely aware that we are only looking at a representation, but we cannot truly become objective as there is still a strong implicit relationship between map and viewer. After all, there really *is* a real Manhattan, a real Moscow, a real Northumbria – thus we continue to believe that a map, *any* map, simply reflects some version of reality. It might well be argued that we can never be entirely objective. But by looking at a map of Algonquin Island, City 17, or Middle-Earth, we become aware of our *a priori* bias towards maps as being accurate depictions of "reality". Like a counterfactual narrative, all of these maps portray an alternative perspective on the "real" world, and like any decent tale in counterfactual history,[705] these maps are sufficiently plausible for us to believe them. Thus we can easily identify all of these figures as maps, not meaningless jumbles of shapes and colours, because they are framed in recognisable visual language following established rules of visual grammar. It is only when we are confronted with *fictional* maps that we realise the power of *factual* maps. We know what is being portrayed by a pseudo-medieval *mappamundi* of Tolkien's *Middle Earth*, we can navigate the subway system of a counterfactual conurbation, and we can sneak past Metropolice in the infested canals of City 17.[706] None of these places ever existed or ever will exist, yet we can understand maps of these places – just as we can understand Gua's map to the afterlife and the etchings in the Abauntz Cave – because the maps follow the established conventions of cartography, with which we are familiar. The result is that a complete fiction can be passed off as a map of a "real" place, because we interpret these maps of hyperreality using the same embedded and acquired processes we use to decipher maps of reality:[707] faith.

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[704] Hobsbawm, *On History*, pp. 322-329.
[705] Cowley, *What If?*, pp. xii-xiii.
[706] Adrian Weber, Bernhard Jenny, Matthias Wanner, Juliane Cron, Phillip Marty, and Lorenz Hurni, 'Cartography Meets Gaming: Navigating Globes, Block Diagrams and 2D Maps with Gamepads and Joysticks', *The Cartographic Journal* 47:1 (2010), pp. 92-100.
[707] An example would be the 'Vinland Map', a claimed Viking map which showed North America eight hundred years before Christopher Columbus. The map first appeared in the 1960s and, although later proved to be a complete (but skilful) forgery, caused great controversy and debate between cartographers and historians. See Clark, *100 Maps*, pp. 244-245; Short, *The World Through Maps*, pp. 210-211.

We earlier noted that the principle of faith in cartography, based on biological, political, and commercial premises, is well-established. Gregory's 'cartophobia', Pickles' 'lack of graphic literacy', and Henrikson's 'cartohypnosis' are relics of the nineteenth-century proliferation of government-sponsored cartography. We are so used to using maps that trust in them is perhaps innate. As Denis Cosgrove astutely points out, the major events of the late nineteenth, twentieth, and early twenty-first centuries which have involved even greater cartographic proliferation, are associated with authority.[708]

This element of authority is important and will be examined in-depth later. At present, it is necessary to acknowledge this phenomenon of carto-authority for two reasons. Firstly, such a source is what lends government-produced maps their privileged authoritative status, as viewers trust a map made by authorities to be accurate and reflective of reality on the ground.[709] Secondly, it is relevant to maps' spreading of authoritative discourses: as we see with the counterfactual maps here, maps do not *necessarily* reflect the world, or even attempt to, they can create a world of their own. To a degree, all maps are Baudrillard's *simulations* – mass-produced signs which are ultimately incapable of reflecting an external reality and thus create their own version, merging reality (reflecting a world, factual or fictional) and fantasy (representing that world) in what is ultimately both, and neither, reality and/nor fantasy. And because of our innate trust that maps are accurate, we trust maps to reflect/represent the world better than our own vision can. Any map is thus *hyperreal*.[710]

Baudrillard's contribution to understanding the power of maps is not without problems. Baudrillard himself, in the first lines of *Simulations*, dismisses cartography as being outside of hyperreality because, in his definition, hyperreality is something that is 'real without origin or reality'.[711] However as identified above, his theses are compatible with findings from the otherwise unrelated history of cartography: both postmodern theory and historical supposition point to the reasons for cartography's power to persuade. Yet this merging itself, does not stand alone. It is the underpinning of a field of cartographic study

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[708] Denis Cosgrove, *Mappings* (London: Reaktion, 1999), pp. 213-252.

[709] Virga, *Cartographia*, pp. i-iv.

[710] Chris Horrocks and Zoran Jevtic, *Baudrillard for Beginners* (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1997), pp. 103-112; Richard Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 95-97; Nicholas Zurbrugg (ed.), *Jean Baudrillard: Art and Artefact* (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 1-6; Timothy Luke, 'Aesthetic Production and Cultural Politics: Baudrillard and Contemporary Art', in Douglas Kellner (ed.), *Baudrillard: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 209-226. I am grateful to Prof. Tim Luke, Virginia Tech, for recommending Baudrillard.

[711] Baudrillard is predictably ambivalent about the relationship between map and world – see Baudrillard, *Simulations*, p. 2. However as Tim Luke demonstrates, the map is not as divorced from hyperreality as Baudrillard predicts – the map *is* hyperreality. Tim Luke, 'Aesthetic Production and Cultural Politics: Baudrillard and Contemporary Art', pp. 209-226.

essential to explaining why we trust maps, and the political projects woven so subtly into them. This field is cartographic reason.

Maps *have* to be hyperreal, as any attempt to faithfully reproduce *everything* in the spatial realm results in a map which, as with the aforementioned fictional map of the Empire recounted by Jorge Borges – the hyperreality of which Baudrillard is aware of[712] – is either incomprehensible or useless. But at the same time as they lie, maps tell a form of truth. Just as they have to *stretch* the truth in order to portray a world (which we cannot see all at once with our own eyes) in the form of a handy chart, they have to *tell* the truth in order for us to recognise what it is they are meant to depict. This is how the maps we examined above work. They all perform the same trick, blurring reflection and representation together in a visual language which *has* to be vaguely true, vaguely understandable, for it to work. It has to be *hyperreal*. As we shall see this is the crux of cartoimperial maps – *they merge political fantasy and political fact in a form we trust to be true.*

Indeed, Phillip and Juliana Muehrcke are justified in their assertion that 'so many perversions of reality are inherent in mapping that the result is best viewed as an intricate, controlled fiction'.[713] Yet despite maps' having to distort reality, and despite Black's reminder that 'the language of cartography requires careful reading,'[714] we the public retain our trust in maps' objectivity and veracity. As Gillian Rose posits, current Western culture is deeply ocularcentric, saturated with subjective visual images. Her reminder that images do not reflect reality but that they 'interpret the world... [and] display it in very particular ways'[715] is perhaps nowhere more true than in the context of the map. Yet maps share one defining characteristic with their visual relatives in that, like all visual technologies, they are 'totally constructed visual experiences'[716] deliberately constructed for the purpose of representing a particular aspect of the world – or at least, the world according to the cartographer – which the viewer instinctively trusts. And the cause of this innate trust is what John Pickles terms 'cartographic reason'.[717]

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[712] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations [trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman]* (New York: Seniotext(e), 1983).
[713] Phillip and Juliana Muehrcke, *Map Use: Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation* (Madison: JP Publications, 1998), p. 520.
[714] Clark, *100 Maps*, p. 9.
[715] Ibid., pp. 2-4.
[716] Rose, *Visual Methodologies*, p. 4.
[717] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 66-67.

Cartographic reason, as a theory, argues that maps embody a 'functional authority'[718] which readers subscribe to, thereby providing the map with immediate legitimation regardless of its content. Kristin Kopp offers a clarification by declaring that '[maps] are not texts whose legitimacy is to be questioned; they are instead rationalized products of the most modern technologies'.[719] The result, as Muehrcke and Muehrcke state, is that 'we tend to accept the information on maps without question'.[720]

However, the map cannot lie outright. As Barbara Piatti and Lorenz Hurni discuss in their analysis of the counterfactual cartographies of novels,[721] and as Lorenz Hurni and Gerrit Sell assess, maps must contain enough truth to be plausible or they simply do not work.[722] Indeed, the phenomenon requires no nefarious or devious agenda on the part of the mapmaker. Deliberate distortions may go unnoticed by all but a few 'carto-nerds',[723] but deliberate deviousness is rare. Instead, the phenomenon arises from the mapreaders themselves. We instinctively trust maps to be accurate and objective, particularly when affiliated with professional-sounding institutes or government bodies. Maps of the European Union do not require a sinister agenda to spread a discourse – as they are simply hyperreal.

Charts made according to an imperial-cartographic symbiosis are an expression of the discourse of *empire*: legitimacy, power, superiority, and destiny, all expressed in spatial terms. This was certainly the case with maps until the rapid expansion of public cartographies in the political, social, and cultural revolutions of nineteenth-century Europe. Yet their legacy is today's cartographic reason, cartohypnosis, cartocontroversy, and absence of graphicacy. Unlike their early-modern ancestors, visible only to the powerbrokers of the day in the private galleries of monarchs and emperors,[724] today's *empire*-map creations are bold public resuscitations of a politically-charged cartography extant since the coffin cartographies, clay tablets, and marble municipal maps of the ancient past. And this works through a cartographic reason which is so deeply rooted in the collective mind – publicly since the

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[718] Michael Heffernan, 'Geography, cartography and military intelligence: the Royal Geographical Society and the First World War', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 21 (1996), pp. 504-533.

[719] Kristin Kopp, 'Cartographic Claims: Colonial Mappings of Poland in German Territorial Revisionism', chapter in Gail Finney (ed.), *Visual Culture in Twentieth-Century Germany: Text as Spectacle* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 204.

[720] Muehrcke and Muehrcke, *Map Use*, p. 520.

[721] Lorenz Hurni and Barbara Piatti, 'Mapping the Ontologically Unreal – Counterfactual Spaces in Literature and Cartography', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), pp. 333-342.

[722] Lorenz Hurni and Gerrit Sell, 'Cartography and Architecture: Interplay between Reality and Fiction', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), pp. 323-332.

[723] See the British Cartographic Society's blog: http://bcsmaps.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/queen-elizabeth-i-minds-map.html.

[724] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 48-52.

Steam Age, and privately since the Bronze Age – that we do not extend to hyperreal maps the same wariness and scepticism that we regularly impose upon written texts.

Maps do not propagate imperial discourses through crude lies. Propaganda maps are easy to spot: even if we do not know to what extent they are lying, we at least know that they *are* lies – but through our own interpretation of hyperreality. The imperial discourse is constructed largely within our own minds as cartographic reason causes us to innately trust maps associated with authorities. From Babylon to Brussels, the discursive map which merges cartography with the imperial imagination, is able to convince its readers that it really *does* reflect reality. Meanwhile, its authoritative status – borrowed from centuries of cartographic reason and a subconsciously ingrained behavioural geography – gives the imperial map an unquestionable veracity and an aura that its political message is not a subjective representation, but rather an objective reflection of the world.

3.5   CONCLUSIONS

The legend of Prester John was never meant to be believed. Yet despite the naïveté of European diplomats who took the *Letter* at face value,[725] faith in Prester John faded among Europeans as explorers of the Age of Discovery gradually mapped the world, moving Prester John and his palace from Arabia to Ethiopia, India, Sri Lanka,[726] and in the late 1600s finally realising that his lost Christian kingdom in the mysterious East had in fact never existed. Yet while scholars long ago abandoned their quest for Prester John, the idea of his magical mirror – a device which allows us to view the whole of the "real world" in a single sweeping glance – retains a seductively powerful legacy.

Even as Vasco de Gama and Amerigo Vespucci discovered the world, as Abraham Ortelius and Gerardus Mercator drew proof that Prester John was simply medieval wishful thinking, the very act of mapping the world ensured that his magical mirror remained in our minds. As European cartographers abandoned their Scripturalist *T-and-O* maps in favour of neat Euclidean surveying[727] and Mercator's handy maritime projection,[728] the idea that maps could give a realistic God's-Eye glance of the world became cemented in the collective

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[725] Wintle, *The Image of Europe*, pp. 199, 203.

[726] Abraham Cresques, *Atlas Catalan [1375: trans. B.M. Charleston]* (Zürich: URS Graf Publishing, 1978), Panel 4b, p. 78.

[727] Dava Sobel, *Longitude: the true story of a lone genius who solved the greatest scientific problem of his time* (London: Fourth Estate, 1995), pp. 4-7.

[728] Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines and Map Wars*, pp. 212-215.

imagination. And as maps colonised newspapers, advertisements, and food labels[729] in the Age of Steam, entire populations came to accept any map associated with a perceived authority as a realistic reflection of the world. This continues in the Europe of today. Prester John's mirror never existed, and sadly it never will. But the idea of possessing such an ability, in today's ocularcentric, map-soaked society, is arguably stronger than ever before.

In their discussion of cartographic principles, John Matthews and David Herbert advise us that 'the *terrae incognitae* of early explorers have been replaced by those of the human mind.'[730] This, as the preceding arguments have sought to demonstrate, is arguably true. Our innate cartophobia and lack of graphicacy leave us lost in an unexplored realm of visual representations; a confusing conceptual desert in which we turn, as a consequence of cartographic reason, to authority-produced maps. These cartographies help lead us out of the mental *Terra Incognita*, but at the price of subconsciously accepting the inherent political discourses of maps as truth. As Sarah Bendall underlines, 'maps were, and still are, used as propaganda, and can exaggerate, suppress, or falsify information to create a particular impression.'[731] Yet while this occurs in every map and we can see this in fictional maps, we are unaware of its existence in "real" maps. Charts which merge the discourse of *empire* – the real and the unreal – are the pinnacle of Cartesian perspectivalist domination.[732] These hyperrealities endow the viewer with a sense of control and power, framed in a visual mechanism which we instinctively trust. This is the legacy of the imperial map which exists in today's European Union.

The map exists at a crossroads where a variety of disciplines intersect. Combining the characteristics of a reduced and generalised symbolic text and a diagrammatic technology presented in a picture-like visual image, the map exists as a praxis of literary, technological, symbological, and artistic conventions. The reassuring idea of the map as a neat, easily-defined concept is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an illusion. The map is many things at once, and its multiple simultaneous existence as a conscious, agent-created work of art, science, and literature, iconography makes it an ontology which is easily manipulated for the purposes of political propaganda. A historical analysis of cartography confirms the countless instances

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[729] In *The New Nature of Maps*, Harley describes how, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the combination of cheap chromolithographic printing and mass commercialism resulted in politically-charged maps appearing on such odd objects as the labels on tins of food, cigarette papers, train tickets, and even packets of cocaine. Harley, *New Nature of Maps*, pp. 79-81; Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 5-8.
[730] John Matthews and David Herbert, *Geography: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 20.
[731] Sarah Bendall in Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth*, p. 9.
[732] Pickles, *History of Spaces*, pp. 82-83.

when maps have been deliberately distorted or misused to advance a particular agenda: Black has a point in describing *cartography* as 'a Western knowledge system falsely claiming scientific precision and used to "appropriate" the rest of the world in the service of Western interests.'[733] He similarly warns us that maps grasp space, and Baudrillard verifies this. Maps are hyperreal, and they exist within the *simulacrum*[734] – the realm of simulated reality wherein maps are not 'false images, nor ... obscuring truth behind a facade, but as that which hides the truth's non-existence'.[735] By depicting not reality but an ideologically-determined imagination, these maps spread the imperial discourse. Maps of Babylon and Rome, the Egyptian afterlife and ibex herds near a Spanish cave at the end of the last ice age – these maps do not *portray* the world. They *make* it.[736]

The "unreal", symbiotic, cartoimperial map does not use a different cartographic language to any familiar street map or sat-nav. Far from it. Indeed, it is the very ability of the cartoimperial map to use this language to blend in, to masquerade, which gives it its unique power. It is to the methods by which maps grasp space, and the methodologies we will use to translate map language and identify the imperial imagination in the visual discourses of the European Union, that we now turn.

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[733] Clark, *100 Maps*, p. 13.

[734] Baudrillard uses the word to denote hyperreality, but in the Classical period the word *simulacrum* denoted a type of statue. In Roman society, a *statua* represented a human while a *simulacrum* depicted a deity, 'often elevated as a privileged image and the recipient of an active cult, *standing in for the absent deity*'. The original *simulacrum* was thus a simulacrum – an unreality (Roman gods) framed as a reality (human bodies). Peter Stewart, *Statues in Roman Society: Representation and Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 186 (emphasis added).

[735] Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, pp. 196-199; Rose, *Visual Methodologies*; Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 640-641.

[736] Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin and Chris Perkins, *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 189-219.

Chapter Four

Into the Mushroom Field

Capt. Blackadder:	*"Now, where the hell are we?"*
Lieut. George:	*"Well it's a bit difficult to say, Sir. According to the map, we appear to have crawled into an area marked with mushrooms."*
Capt. Blackadder:	*"What do those symbols denote?"*
Lieut. George:	*"Hmm. That we're in a field of mushrooms?"*
Capt. Blackadder:	*"Lieutenant, that is a military map. It is unlikely to list interesting flora and fungi! Look at the key and you'll discover that those mushrooms aren't for picking."*
Lieut. George:	*"Good Lord, you're quite right Sir. It says 'Mine'. So – these mushrooms must belong to the man who made the map!"*

Blackadder Goes Forth[737]

The characters of the popular 1980s British broadcast *Blackadder Goes Forth* frequently find themselves in bizarre scenarios, the above scene being one of many. Here, between the trenches of No Man's Land in the Great War, our heroes find themselves in a sticky situation due to the inability of the dim-witted Lieutenant George to read a map. Yet the scene is more than a piece of classic comedy. It is an apt demonstration of the tricky methodologies of interpreting cartography and its embedded discourses.

Amidst the mud of the Western Front, the bumbling Lieutenant George misinterprets the language of his hyperreal military map, confusing symbols which have two very different meanings in different areas of knowledge.[738] This cartographic blunder quickly results in the characters becoming trapped in a minefield, and all because of a misreading of the obscure and esoteric language of mapping.

Denis Wood is right in stating that we have all misread or misunderstood a map, as our interpretive methods are imperfect.[739] There are multiple reasons why we might read a

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[737] *Blackadder Goes Forth*, Episode 1, 'Captain Cook', BBC, 28 September 1989. An almost identical sketch (and the first known map joke) appears in Aristophanes' play *The Clouds* (c. 423 BC). During a debate between a somewhat dim pupil of the philosopher Strepsiades and a rival disciple of Socrates, the former looks at a map which shows the unnerving proximity of Sparta to Athens. The pupil of Strepsiades misinterprets the map and insists that Sparta is moved further away. The scene culminates in the arrival of Socrates, whose despair at the boy's idiocy provides the comedy. Virga, *Cartographia*, p. 16; Aristophanes, *The Clouds [trans. L. L. Forman]* (New York: American Book Company, 1915).
[738] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 113-122; Baynton-Williams, *Military Maps*.
[739] Wood, *The Power of Maps*, pp. 4-5.

map in a manner different to that intended by the cartographer, but perhaps foremost among these reasons is that we the public are largely untrained in the subtleties of semantics and semiotics in the context of cartographic language.

Cartography is a complex field which requires intense work for a mapreader to be able to understand what a map is, and what it is trying to depict. Yet despite this, the public retains a belief in cartographic objectivity, and through lack of graphicacy[740] and cartohypnosis[741] – and the implicit hyperreality of maps – adopts an attitude of passive consumption of maps without consideration of the complex discursive dynamics inherent to cartography. Thus we might forgive the Lieutenant his blunder, especially when we consider that conflicting readings of map language are not confined to confused travellers[742] or recycled comedy. Just as mistranslations and misinterpretations of spoken and written language can cause diplomatic incidents in the 'real' world, misreadings of map language can also hit national nerves – sometimes with serious political consequences.[743]

Maps matter, and not just to academics and art historians. In 2013 a furore developed over maps of the Holy Land in Israeli and Palestinian textbooks, with each side's school maps omitting the territory – and by extension, the sovereignty and even the *existence* – of the other.[744] Closer to Europe, tensions between Greece and Turkey over the latter's application to join the EU – almost leading to war in 1996 – resulted in each side focusing on maps of the Aegean which the opposing country included in the official documents submitted for EU arbitration.[745] Only after EU intervention were EU-approved maps, showing the European Union's determined frontier between Greece and Turkey, used to settle the dispute. Yet EU maps are not without their detractors.

In January 2011, a diplomatic disagreement emerged between the neighbouring republics of Estonia, a then-recent newcomer to the European Union, and the Russian

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[740] Peter Goin defines "graphicacy" as the visual counterpart to literacy; the ability to "read" images, particularly reading between the lines by critically evaluating the image rather than taking it at face value. We are good at doing this with speech and written text, can do it with limited success with images, but almost never do it with maps. Peter Goin, 'Visual Literacy', *The Geographical Review* 91:2 (2001), pp. 363-369.

[741] Mark Monmonier, 'Cartography: uncertainty, interventions, and dynamic display', *Progress in Human Geography* 30:3 (2006), pp. 373-381.

[742] Wood, *The Power of Maps*, pp. iv-v.

[743] Richard Scully, 'North Sea or German Ocean? The Anglo-German Cartographic Freemasonry, 1842-1914', *Imago Mundi* 62:1 (2010), pp. 46-62.

[744] Harriet Sherwood, 'Israeli and Palestinian textbooks omit borders', *The Guardian* 3 February 2013: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/04/israeli-palestinian-textbooks-borders.

[745] Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, *The Aegean Disputes*, Foreign Policy Institute working paper, 25 December 2012: http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/251202.pdf; Martin Pratt and Clive Schofield, 'The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea', *International Boundaries Research Unit: Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Spring 1999, pp. 62-69. I am grateful to Prof. Yannis Stivachtis, Virginia Tech, for bringing this dispute to my attention.

Federation. Following Estonia's accession to the Union, the euro currency replaced the *kroon* and in-keeping with European Central Bank policy, the reverse face of the new coins were to be decorated with an image chosen by Estonian authorities.[746] Choosing a design submitted to a national competition held the previous year, the government of Estonia selected as its reverse-face icon a map:

Fig 4.1 – Reverse face of Estonian euro coins, 2011[747]

This map of Estonia appears innocent enough. Yet mere days after the design was adopted, the Russian state news agency *Russia Today* reported diplomatic protests from the Kremlin, as Russian authorities complained about the chosen map having cartographically annexed Russian territory. Estonian – and thereby European Union – frontiers with Russia reflect a contested border ultimately reliant on contradictory and conflicting treaties between long-extinct governments in Riga, Moscow, and Berlin.[748] As of the time of writing, this unusual debate is still ongoing.

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[746] *EU Business*, 'Estonia picks map contours as reverse of euro coins by popular vote', 16 December 2004, http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/estonia/041215163316.arffvfzr.
[747] Image retrieved from: http://www.eurotribune.eu/index.default.php/?p=18844.
[748] *Russia Today*, 'Estonia's new euro coin "changes" border with Russia', 6 January 2011, http://rt.com/politics/estonia-russia-euro-coin/.

This is not an isolated incident. In 2010, the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras engaged in a bizarre game of diplomatic brinkmanship over their nations' borders – as depicted not on official state cartographies, but on Google Maps.[749] As the internet is by far the leading source for cartographic information[750] and Google Maps is by far the internet's cartographic leader, it is not difficult to imagine governments becoming concerned that so many people were viewing an incorrect frontier. This is nothing new – as we saw in the previous chapter, authorities have been drawing maps to suit their own political purposes since the Caesars. Yet in the Digital Age, an otherwise trivial incident becomes politicised as opponents compete to spread *their* version of cartographic "truth" to the potential billions logging on to the World-Wide Web.

We must also consider that it is not simply the language of maps itself which can lead to misunderstandings. As semiologist Arthur Berger reminds us, the location of an object is as much a part of its language as its text, graphics or colour. Just as speech or script can have different meanings based upon the context in which they are spoken or written, so can maps.[751]

The manipulation of maps to convey a particular political discourse is nothing new, as we saw in the earlier discussion of the *Forma urbis Romae*, the coffin map, and the Babylonian World Map. And cartographers draw our attention to this practice throughout mapmaking history, with the discourse of *empire* reaching a zenith in late-nineteenth century Europeans' cartographic colonisation of mass-manufactured commodities such as napkins, toys, and wine bottles.[752] Yet it is not enough to merely state that this is an ancient practice. In order to understand the imagination of *empire* in maps, we must ask *how* and *why* maps, and their makers, convey particular imaginations. The latter question will be addressed in the next chapter. Here, we will discuss *how* maps convey their messages to an audience, by establishing a deconstructive visual methodology for critically interrogating the EU's cartography based upon the above premises. Map language may appear either so obvious that it is not worth examining, or alternatively, so inscrutable that understanding it is a quest as

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[749] *The Guardian*, 'Google Nicaraguan map error threatens to escalate into regional dispute', 15 November 2010: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/nov/15/google-map-dispute-nicaragua.

[750] Michael Peterson, *Maps and the Internet* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005).

[751] Berger uses the hypothetical example of a Coca-Cola can in two different public forums. In a diner in small-town America, that object represents traditional values and patriotism. But in a canteen in North Korea, that same object would represent foreign aggression and decadence. This is an extreme example, but illustrates how seemingly innocuous objects can, depending on their location, communicate *very* different messages. See Berger, *What Objects Mean*, pp. 145-152.

[752] Mackenzie (ed.), *Propaganda and Empire*, pp. 15-39; Mackenzie (ed.), *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, pp. 192-231.

futile as searching for Prester John's magical mirror. Yet as MacEachren,[753] Monmonier,[754] and Wood[755] demonstrate, map language can be understood through categorisation. The three categories appropriate to cartographic language are semantics, semiotics, and location, and through these methods it is possible to decipher the nuanced language of maps to identify messages embedded within.[756] These embedded messages are discourses of power – including the discourse of *empire* – and thus assembling a framework for identifying them within map language is essential. But before we do this, it is necessary to examine precisely what map language is.

4.2   Tropes

> *'Cartography does not qualify as an aesthetic art form ... Unless a map bears strong fidelity to reality, the purpose of mapping will not be served'.*[757]

Arthur Robinson's above words, in instructional textbook on mapmaking, form a bold statement which is in-keeping with a handbook on constructing charts. Perhaps a little *too* bold. As we have seen, maps exist in the various degrees of hyperreality and simulation, and as Paul Laxton demonstrates, whose version of "reality" it is trying to depict is an altogether different problem.[758] Yet it must be acknowledged that a significant aspect of cartography is indeed the symbolisation mapmakers use in their quest to represent the world around us. This is the most obvious form of cartographic language – tropes.

Tropes, as David Barnes and James Duncan clarify, are simply the visual symbols we see when we look at a map and are the cartographic equivalent of phonemes or letters in spoken or written language.[759] Without delving too deeply into linguistic theory[760] it is

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[753] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 1-20.
[754] Monmonier, *How to Lie*, pp. 1-4.
[755] Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 95-142.
[756] Monmonier points out various motives for mapmakers deliberately lying with their maps. Bored cartographers and departmental in-jokes sometimes crop up in cartography, but as Monmonier points out the most frequent lies are those drawn for political propaganda or military misinformation, with the Soviet Union being by far the most prolific perpetrator. Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 87-112; 115-118.
[757] Arthur Robinson, *Elements of Cartography* (New York: Wiley, 1995), p. 317.
[758] Paul Laxton (ed.) in J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 14-15.
[759] Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, *Writing Worlds: discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 5.
[760] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 299-301.

appropriate to say that like verbal and textual language, the individual "words" or symbols of cartographic language have different functions, and are only comprehensible in relation to each other. Some are the equivalent of nouns and adjectives, signifying specific concepts. Others are more nuanced, collecting the whole into an understandable statement.

Much has been written on the ontology and origin of cartographic tropes – David Woodward's and J.B. Harley's multi-volume monument *The History of Cartography* offers a richly detailed interrogative narrative tracing the development of icons on the map.[761] And while we may cast a casual eye over the extinct, quaint icons of premodern Western cartography – stylised bumps on the Waldseemüller Map to represent hills,[762] little buildings on the *Tabula Peuteringiana* to indicate Roman towns,[763] and snarling monsters on the Hereford *mappamundi* to denote non-Christian lands[764] – the principle of such iconography is very much alive today. As MacEachren demonstrates, open any road atlas and we will be bombarded with a plethora of symbols, some actually resembling the things they are meant to denote (*pictorial*), some representing through stylised depictions (*associative*), and some entirely abstract (*arbitrary* or *geometric*).[765] While iconic tropes are a crucial area of cartographic study, they are not relevant to an examination of EU mapping purely because they are not to be found. We are no more likely to find a euro-coin map which depicts rivers and railways than we are to encounter a map on an EU pamphlet which warns us that *'Here be Dragons'*. However, a long evolutionary history has seen tropes morph and adapt over the millennia, and while many icons have not survived the evolutionary process, have entirely changed their meanings, or are simply not found on the maps of Brussels and Strasbourg, other tropic elements remain crucial.

Tropes are not merely the abstract or stylised icons which, like Lieutenant George's mushrooms, we must try and interpret to make sense of the map. Tropes are also the broader aspects or themes which are the foundation of said symbols. Let us return to the analogy of written language. Some elements perform the same function as nouns – for sake of argument, we will simply call these "tropes". Yet just as a random collection of words written on a page has no meaning without a unifying grammar, we cannot make sense of basic tropes without a broader theme to determine their meanings. Some tropes, then, have the function of forming a grammar through which we can make sense of the basics. We will call these broader ones "meta-tropes".

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[761] John Goss, *The Mapmaker's Art: A History of Cartography* (London: Studio Editions, 1993).
[762] Alan Hodgkiss, *Discovering Antique Maps* (Princes Risborough: Shire Publications, 2007).
[763] Barber, *The Map Book*, pp. 26-27; Riffenburgh, *Treasures of Cartography*, pp. 10-11.
[764] Ray Howgego, *The Book of Exploration* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2009), pp. 36-40.
[765] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 258-259.

The basic tropes consist of those icons for topographic and anthropographic features such as rivers and cities, and this visual paraphernalia is noticeably absent from EU maps. The meta-tropes, though, go beyond individual symbols. The first of these are spatial determinatives[766] (which, like linguistic determinatives, are symbols which allow the reader to understand the context of other symbols) such as the use of one shade or hue to signify one nation's territory, and the use of an alternate colour to signify someone else's. These will inevitably be separated by some sort of line. This may appear insignificant, but recall that such seemingly harmless depictions have recently caused diplomatic brinkmanship between Moscow and Riga, and between Costa Rica and Honduras. Also included are legends or labels – the use of written words to expressly denote something. These "signifiers" will be examined in greater detail below. And finally, tropes which remain as important to modern maps as to the cartographers of the Copper Age, are visual signifiers such as shapes and colours.[767] Maps are essentially a visual art form.[768] While maps – as was argued in the previous chapters – exist at a peculiar crossroads where language, image, function and aesthetics meet, they remain artefacts who spread a message in a specifically visual form.

Yet the map is more than a mere composite of aggregate linguistic components – it is equally powerful as a holistic device. Akerman reminds us that one of the most potent characteristics of a map is prominent display in order to communicate a grand visual message.[769] Thus an equally important aspect of any map, and especially so for an imperial map, is its location and intended purpose.[770]

4.3   Location

It is not merely the *contents* of a visual medium which are worthy of examination. As we saw with *The Coronation of Napoleon*, location and intended audience is equally crucial. Consider the two examples with which we began this chapter. The 2010 map which erroneously depicted the Costa Rican-Honduran border might have been completely overlooked had it appeared in a different context. Yet it appeared on Google Maps, and as the internet is the primary source for people seeking maps[771] (with Google Maps by far the

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[766] Arthur Robinson, *Elements of Cartography* (New York: Wiley, 1995).
[767] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 219.
[768] Kenneth Field, 'Editorial Preface: Art in C'art'ography', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), p. 287.
[769] Akerman, *The Imperial Map*, pp. 9-10.
[770] Ashley and Miles Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds: Maps from the Age of Discovery* (London: Quercus, 2008), p. 210.
[771] Michael Peterson, *Maps and the Internet* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005), pp. 6-8, 67-69, 151-152.

dominant provider in that dominant realm[772]), potentially millions of people could have been viewing that map each day. Similarly, the controversial depiction of the Estonian-Russian frontier could have gone unnoticed were it not for the fact that it graced the face of coins, which are not only powerful symbols of nationhood and identity[773] but on a more practical level pass through the fingers and beneath the eyes of tens of millions of Estonian and Union (but, significantly, not Russian) citizens each day.

When considering map language, then, we must be conscious of the power of what Denis Cosgrove terms 'The Public Gaze'.[774] This latter fundamental is the map's existence, boldly proclaimed and proudly displayed, within public space. This is a conscious act with the intention of appealing to the public's inherent scopophilia – the act of finding pleasure in viewing visual images which, as Freud asserts, is acquired subconsciously in childhood.[775] This power is as old as cartography itself. Maps which appear in public arenas must be comprehensible to a broad readership which, in the case of the Union, is distinctly polyglot. Thus, public maps are not only more simplified and understandable than the esoteric military, commercial, ecological, governmental, and transport maps of specialist users, but by dint of their association with a public body they are transformed into expressions of political discourse which have immense potential. As Tom Harper stresses, 'open air maps fulfil a symbolic function… [and] such messages are powerfully expressed. The street contains emotions for the government to harness, and political maps do this well.' [776]

'Maps,' states Sarah Bendall in her discussion of the cartographies of imperial China, 'were, and still are, used as propaganda, and can exaggerate, suppress, or falsify information to create a particular impression'.[777] While not intended as a sweeping statement of *all* maps, this is arguably true – as the following discussion evidences. The principle applies not only to public maps broadly, but cartoimperialism more specifically. Let us consider, as illustrations, a selection of public maps. These are the *Forma urbis Romae* which we first encountered in the previous chapter, *Leo Belgicus* from sixteenth-century Holland, the eighteenth-century *L'Empire d'Allemagne* map of the Holy Roman Empire, and the *Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineato*:

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[772] Michael Peterson, *International Perspectives on Maps and the Internet* (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008); Jerry Brotton, *A History of the World in Twelve Maps* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 405-436.
[773] Pauliina Raento, Anna Hämäläinen, Hanna Ikonen and Nella Mikkonen, 'Striking stories: a political geography of euro coinage', *Political Geography* 23:6 (2004), pp. 929-956.
[774] Cosgrove, *Mappings*, pp. 1-23.
[775] Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* (London: Sage, 2007), p.107.
[776] *Magnificent Maps* Exhibition, British Library, London, 2010. Display Boards: 'Maps as Art'; 'The Street'; 15 August 2010.
[777] Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth*, p. 9.

Fig. 4.2 – *Forma urbis Romae*[778]

Fig. 4.3 – *Leo Belgicus*[779]

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building materials, and only partial fragments have been discovered since 1563. This fragment is one of 1,163 currently held at Stanford University's reconstruction project. See Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 22-23; and Stanford University's project at http://formaeurbis.stanford.edu/.

[779] Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds*, p. 69.

Fig. 4.4 – *L'Empire d'Allemagne*[780]

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[780] While the title and text of the map are in French, this map is unequivocally German. After Holland's break from the *Reich* in the 1540s, Nuremberg became the centre of HRE mapmaking. However, local patronisation was limited. Douglas Gohm notes that 'Early cartographers, like any other section of the community, had to earn a living, either by direct selling or being patronized'. Therefore, market requirements must have influenced the finished product'. With German patronage so sparse, Dutch mapmakers bound to state secrecy, and French

Fig 4.5 – *Nova orbis terrarum delineatio*[781]

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mapmakers snobbishly ignored by the French elite, famous Nuremberg mapmakers such as Sebastian Münster, Matthäus Seutter, and Johann-Baptists Homänn made a living by taking commissions from other countries, especially by the eternally embattled French government with its insatiable demand for maps for taxation, defence, and invasion. It is also notable that by this time, French was the *lingua franca* for interactions between the rich and powerful of Europe, America, and the Ottoman world – while a map in German would be largely incomprehensible outside central Europe (and somewhat vulgar to the Francophonic elite of Germany), a map published in French could be read from Baltimore to Baghdad. See Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds*, pp. 60-61; Gohm, *Antique Maps*, pp. 8, 19-20; Claudius Ptolemy, *Geographia: Edition Sebastian Münster [Basle, 1540]* (Amsterdam: Novus Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1966), pp. viii-xv; Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 150-151.

[781] Designed in 1630 by another Nuremberger, Philipp Eckebrecht, the *Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineatio* was publicly published in Nuremberg with an unequivocal message. Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map*, pp. 25-27.

At first glance, there is nothing to connect a slab of marble and three ornate, ostentatious images of Early Modern imperial ambition, and their presence in a discussion of the methodology of twenty-first century Union cartography seems utterly unwarranted. Yet they are exemplars of how maps acquire a new dimension to their language based on *where they are displayed*.

The *Forma* map, as identified earlier, was commissioned in the third century by Emperor Severus to hang on a wall in the Roman Forum. Here, in the very heart of Rome in a space saturated with political, historical, and spiritual significance, the *Forma* did not simply show confused travellers which streets were where. As Barber states, the map was too high on the wall and too laden with gold decoration to be of any practical use.[782] Instead it boldly proclaimed the might and power of Rome to the hundreds of thousands who milled in the area. The *Forma* proclaimed the power of a unified and unifying polity, conveniently ignoring the reality of a Rome reeling in the political, military, economic, and social chaos of the Crisis of the Third Century[783] in order to propagate an image of coherence in the face of disharmony, integrity over squabbling, or, to draw a not-inaccurate parallel with the European Union's official motto, unity in diversity.[784]

In a mirror reversal, *Leo Belgicus* proclaims not collective coherence of *Empire* but national individualism against *Empire*. Commissioned by the Rotterdam *buerghers* in 1583 during the war for Dutch independence from the Holy Roman Empire, the map is not designed to show the topographical reality of the Netherlands. *Leo Belgicus*, the first in a mimetic sequence of Dutch maps portraying the Netherlands as a lion rampant, roaring defiantly eastwards towards its old German overseers, was commissioned in a large zoomorphic style and its copies prominently displayed in public buildings throughout the Netherlands so that its message of fierce independence, desired power, and ambitions could be seen by soon-to-be-independent Dutch and chastened Holy Romans alike.[785]

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[782] Barber, *The Map Book*, pp. 22-23.

[783] Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, pp. 1-7. While very few Roman maps have survived, we know that the Romans were aware of their visual power. Augustus commissioned huge public maps from Vipsanius Agrippa, while Republican temples were frequently adorned with maps. Katherine Rawson even suggests that 'maps of the world … may have been widely available' to the Romans. Yet Rawson concedes that 'The ancients may have been less able than ourselves to read maps easily'. Bricker et al., *Landmarks of Mapmaking*, p. 22; Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic*, pp. 258-259.

[784] European Union, *Europa Portal: The EU at a glance: The symbols of the EU*. Available at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm.

[785] In later versions of *Leo Belgicus*, the Dutch lion is entirely disembodied from the rest of Europe, instead appearing as a standalone state with no neighbours. The disconnected Netherlands becomes a *logotype*, a shape without borders, which as later chapters demonstrated is performed by Euro currency maps. Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds*, pp. 68-69.

It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that our third map is a partial reaction to this. Depicting the provinces of the *Heiliges Römisches Reich* in 1705, the map, again designed to be prominently displayed to powerbrokers in the political heart of the *de facto* capital of the Holy Roman Empire,[786] displays a sense of unity in diversity, of a collective identity as Imperial citizens defined by contrast to the non-Imperials beyond the frontier. The map itself is rather unremarkable, as its basic tropes are rather unimpressive. Yet its marginalia and its location belie an unequivocal imperial discourse, propagating a message of power and authority. Yet like the *Forma*, the imperial discourse communicated by this map is a poor reflection of historical reality.[787] Just as the *Forma* depicted as strong and unified a Roman *Empire* which was in reality crippled from civil wars and foreign incursions, the *L'Empire d'Allemagne* map utterly ignores the impotence and marginalisation of a Holy Roman Empire which had been increasingly irrelevant and ignored as component states pursued their own policies following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.[788] This is expressed in the fourth map, whose image of the *Reichsadler* clutching not only Germany but the entire planet is powerful enough – but it is even more powerful when we consider that at the time of publication, Nuremberg was the *de facto* capital for Imperial forces battling the Protestant League at the height of the devastating Thirty Years' War. Like other maps of the period this was not intended to gather dust on a shelf, but to be seen by the political elite in the corridors of power, 'glorifying the kingdom not the king',[789] while 'the allegory of the Emperor's mastery over the world is reinforced by the perfect symmetry of the design: the sense of equilibrium may be taken to represent peace, strength, justice, or any of the qualities that flow from good government'[790] – at the height of a war whose conclusion left the Holy Roman Empire little more than a hollow name.

By boastfully showing supreme sovereignty, legitimacy, exclusive rule, and the destiny of a defined community, these maps propagate the discourse of *empire*. And as we shall see, this is a fundamental of cartoimperialism which is very much alive and well in the Union. This map coincided with the rise of that same Humanism we encountered with

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[786] The HRE never had a single capital city and as sovereignty was enshrined in the physical body of the Emperor, the capital was wherever the Emperor happened to be. Through their dominance of the Imperial throne, the Habsburgs made Vienna the *de facto* administrative centre, but as the ancient Imperial insignia and key Imperial bureaucracies were in Nuremberg, that city became the *de facto* ceremonial heart of the Imperium from the late fifteenth century onwards. See Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 34-44.

[787] Note that the map portrays the Netherlands and Switzerland as imperial territories, in spite of those provinces having broken away in the sixteenth and thirteenth centuries respectively.

[788] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 52-55.

[789] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 70-71.

[790] Peter Whitfield, *The Image of the World: 20 Centuries of World Maps* (London: British Library, 2010), pp. 76-77.

Conrad Celtis: the movement of the Early Modern Period wherein German elites within the *Reich* sought to establish ethnic Germans as the rightful inheritors of Rome's *imperium*.[791] This led subsequently to the promotion of all things Germanically "civilised"; art, literature, theology – and cartography.[792] This passed, as we argued, through the *translatio imperii* until reaching today's inheritor of the discourse of *empire*.

These three maps are relevant and indeed crucial here. The basic tropes in the marginalia alone are worthy of critical examination – the gold-clad map of an economically devastated Imperium, the roaring lion representing a weak independent state, the snarling double-headed *Aquila Imperialis* clutching sword and sceptre in a vain effort to conceal the dying days of a moribund *Heiliges Römisches Reich* – yet these messages of what the polity portrayed *wants* to be are merely one aspect of cartographic tropes' ability to communicate a discourse of imagined power, imagined identity, and grand ambition: the hallmarks of the discourse of *empire*. Equally significant is the location of these maps, and indeed it might be argued that one of the most significant aspects of cartoimperialism is where the map is found. The *Forma Urbis Roma*, *Leo Belgicus*, *L'Empire d'Allemagne*, and *Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineatio* were not designed to gather dust in quiet studies. They were made with the explicit intention of being hung from walls where tens of thousands of eyes would see them on a regular basis, each time being assured that the polity they depicted was strong. As the Roman chronicler Livy so astutely noted nearly two millennia ago, '*empire* endures only so long as its subjects rejoice in it'.[793] By visually hammering home a message of unity, strength, legitimacy, and a collective identity to the largest possible number of viewers, the cartoimperial map uses (perhaps unintentionally) the language of tropes and locations to cause its viewers to rejoice: whether that map shimmers in the Roman Forum, glares from a city-hall entrance, or is stamped out by the European Central Bank.

What, then, is the connection between the *Forma*, *Leo Belgicus*, and the *Sacrum Imperium* maps with those of the European Union? The answer is in their language. Their vocabulary may change but the basic tropes of dichotomy and division remain, and can be understood through applied symbological theory. Second, and perhaps most significantly, is that cartoimperial maps are geographically unnecessary yet politically motivated, located within a heavily-trafficked area of public space: the Forum, the city hall, the coin, the website. This final aspect is crucial, and the deliberate placement of maps in heavily-

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[791] Lester, *Fourth Part of the World*, p. 329.
[792] Ibid., pp. 328-329.
[793] Anthony Pagden, 'Imperialism, liberalism and the quest for perpetual peace', *Daedalus* 134:2 (2005), pp. 46-58.

trafficked areas in order to pronounce their – and by extension their owners' – power is nothing new.[794] Jeremy Harwood asserts that 'while it cannot be claimed that maps alone formed ... empires, they played important parts in helping colonisation and in convincing those at home of the *legitimacy and enforceability* of their imperial claims'.[795]

We have identified, then, two primary aspects of cartographic language – tropes and location. In order to make sense of these areas of study a connecting theory is required, one which addresses the potential power of language. Chapter One argued that *empire* is a discourse, while Chapter Two outlined how maps are perhaps the perfect medium for expressing this discourse. The next logical step is to identify *how* this discourse is communicated, and the most appropriate tools for this are semantics and semiotics.

4.4   The Semantics and Semiotics of Map Language

> *'Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.*
> *What's Montague?*
> *What's in a name? That which we call a rose*
> *By any other name would smell as sweet!'*[796]

<div align="right">

Romeo and Juliet
II:1. 83-86

</div>

This Shakespearean snippet is perhaps the most widely-used opening to semiotics. As a field of study, semiotics deals with the relationships between the components of languages, seeking to understand how otherwise abstract symbols acquire a meaning in the minds of viewers, and how those meanings are communicated and perpetuated.[797] The object being studied remains constant regardless of the language used to study it – Romeo may be from the House of Montague, bitter rivals of her House of Capulet, but the man remains the man regardless of what collection of letters and sounds are used to denote him. Yet language itself, as Juliet mournfully muses, can affect our perception of the object and the message(s) it conveys.

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[794] Genevieve Carlton, 'Un Mapamondo in Portego: The Place of Maps in Seventeenth-Century Venetian Homes', *Magnificent Maps: Maps in Context Academic Symposium*, British Library, London, 14 June 2010.

[795] Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth*, p. 7 [emphasis added].

[796] *The Complete Works of Shakespeare* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1996), II.1.

[797] Paul Cobley and Litza Jansz, *Introducing Semiotics: A Graphic Guide* (Malta: Gutenberg Press, 2012).

In his analysis of these symbols and the discourses they communicate, Berger asserts that 'nothing has meaning in itself; an object's meaning always derives from the language and the network of relations in which it is embedded'.[798] Like any object, a map has no intrinsic meaning in and of itself – it is merely a hyperreal artefact which we must interpret. MacEachren aptly summarises this by stating that 'maps are as much a reflection of (or metaphor for) the culture that produces them as they are a representation of the earth or activities on it'.[799] Consider, for example, the three subsequent images:

Fig 4.6 – Polynesian stick-chart[800]

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[798]Berger, *What Objects Mean*, p. 45.
[799] Monmonier, *How Maps Work*, p. 10.
[800] Image retrieved from Harwood, *To The Ends of the Earth*, p. 116.

Fig 4.7 – *Dreamtime*[801]

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[801] Image retrieved from Black, *Visions of the World*, p. 19. Also see Harwood, *Ends of Earth*, pp. 120-121. John Goss refers to these by one native name – *Jukurrpa* maps – literally meaning "dingo dreaming". John Goss, *The Mapmaker's Art: A History of Cartography* (London: Studio Editions, 1993), p. 31.

Fig 4.8 – *Typus orbis terrarum*[802]

[802] Image retrieved from John Clarke (ed.), *100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout History* (New York: Sterling, 2005), p. 107.

Above, three artefacts are presented, and if we were to ask the question "Which one is a map?" we might be forgiven for stating that only the third qualifies. Yet all three are maps, and use a specific language to convey a message to their readers. The cartographic language they employ is hyperreal, and thus is understandable only within the context of the society in which the reader lives. Thus for the ancient Oceanian sailor, Fig. 4.6 is an easily-understandable map of ocean currents, wave and weather patterns, bird migration routes, and convenient islands.[803] For an Australian Aborigine, Fig. 4.7 accurately depicts the transitional back-and-forth relationship between the mutually interdependent realms of pre-life, life, and afterlife, coming full circle back to the beginning.[804] For an Early Modern European, Fig. 4.8 is a reasonable representation of the world known to contemporary sailors, framed within the navigationally handy Mercator Projection.[805] Yet each deployment of cartographic language, while understandable in its context, is baffling to outsiders. The *Leo Belgicus* and *Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineatio* are hyper-real, but understandable within the context of Western cartography. Yet outside of this framework, they are just daubs of colour. The Polynesian and Aboriginal maps here are incomprehensible jumbles to a person not immersed in the visual rhetoric of the map – as would be the European map to a non-European. How then, do we understand map language?

Semiotics offers a solution. Initially addressing the spoken elements of verbal languages and the graphic symbols of writing, semiotics has been applied to a broad spectrum of disciplines overlapping humanities and the natural and social sciences.[806] The origins of semiotics lie in positivist grand theories of Victorian linguistics, and an intellectual hangover continues to linger as a consequence of early semiologists' attempts to construct a grand theory – a 'queen of the interpretive sciences'[807] capable of explaining the totality of human existence. Thus, it may appear odd to apply semiotics to critical cartography. Yet the application of semiotics has advanced far beyond the linguistic philosophy of its nineteenth-century pioneers, Ferdinand de Saussure[808] and Charles Peirce.[809] Semiotics is used to analyse the components of other forms of language – whether the language is verbal, visual, performative, conscious or not – and has been accepted within the social sciences as a

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[803] Harwood, *To the Ends of the Earth*, pp. 116-118.
[804] Ibid., pp. 120-122; Clark, *100 Maps*, pp. 20-21; Laffon, *Mapping the World*, pp. 12-15; Black, *Visions of the World*, pp. 19-20.
[805] Allen, *Atlas of Atlases*, pp. 36-39.
[806] Berger, *What Objects Mean*, p. 4.
[807] Ibid., p. 5.
[808] Carol Sanders (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[809] Robert Almeder, *The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Critical Introduction* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980).

contested, debated, but nevertheless valid, approach to phenomena ranging from texts and images to architecture[810] and illness.[811] From its acceptance in other social science disciplines, it is evident that semiological analysis offers valuable insights to be made beyond the confines of its linguistic origins.

MacEachren flatly asserts that 'we cannot eliminate the cultural baggage inherent in any human artifact', urging mapmakers to consider the implications of their choices of cartographic language when making a map.[812] Certainly, these aspects exist. Wood argues that a map is a text which is 'read' and interpreted in a similar way to a written piece.[813] Cartographic language consists, like any visual language, of a complex interaction of what Ferdinand de Saussure termed *signifiers* (the symbols denoting a concept) and *signified* (the concept being denoted). For Saussure, these are bound together through a semantic 'grammar' which enables viewers to combine the various elements of the image into a coherent whole.[814] Semantic grammar can be confusing, so let us illustrate the argument with the *Blackadder* sketch with which we began.

Lieutenant George is holding a map of a minefield. The minefield is the *signified*, it is the entity whose existence the mapmaker is trying to communicate. The mapmaker has done this by using cartographic language, or tropes – namely the repetition of an abstract symbol which apparently looks like a mushroom. These mushrooms are the *signifiers*, they represent the mines in the *signified* minefield. As a minefield is defined by the presence of mines, the *signifiers* collectively represent the *signified* – the *signified* is the sum of its parts. Yet as the sketch unwittingly demonstrates, the *signifiers* have no inherent value in and of themselves, and instead are random symbols. Lacking knowledge in the structural language of maps, the Lieutenant confounds *signified* and *signifier*, ultimately leading his comrades into what he interprets as a field of actual mushrooms.

As Barber extensively discusses, map language is highly generalised and simplified in order to convey meanings to a broad readership.[815] And like the phonemes and graphemes of any spoken or written language, these stylised symbological signifiers cannot be understood in isolation. They only make sense in unity, and can only be comprehended when structured within a mutually-agreed grammatical convention. Evidently this is beyond the abilities of

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[810] Michael Flier, 'Political ideas and rituals' in Maureen Perrie (ed.), *Cambridge History of Russia Vol. I* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2006), p. 390.
[811] Berger, *What Objects Mean*, pp. 29-32.
[812] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 11.
[813] Wood, *The Power of Maps*, pp. 17-22.
[814] Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p.1; MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 213.
[815] Barber, *The Map Book*, pp. 76-77.

Lieutenant George, but appropriate tools are available to the critical cartographer. Map grammar is a holistic process uniting signs and signifiers, and 'since nothing has meaning in itself, the relationships that exist among signs (i.e. grammar), are crucial'.[816] And this grammar, as Charles Peirce argued, is of fundamental importance.[817] In his semiological theory, Peirce identified the grammar uniting three varieties of signs: the *iconic sign* that signifies meaning through metaphorical resemblance to something else; the *indexical sign* that signifies meaning through cause and effect; and the *symbolic sign* that signifies an abstract meaning which must be mutually agreed-upon, and learned. While maps do contain an element of iconic significance in that they (partially) resemble the 'real' world around us, this is not automatically inferable to us. Our limited vision prevents us from seeing the world all at once, thus maps must communicate knowledge only through mutually-agreed grammatical conventions *which must be learned*. These agreed conventions are vulnerable to deliberate manipulation, and this forms a fundamental basis for the power of imperial maps. Thus, of the three aspects of Peirce's semiological trichotomy, it is the symbolic sign which is of most relevance to cartographic semiotics. The mushrooms on the Lieutenant's map are not stylised depictions of actual landmines, nor are they representations of the effects of a detonation. Rather, like the vast majority of tropes, they are abstract representations whose meaning must be learned – and the only way they can be learned is through immersion in cartographic semiotics.

Semiotics, as defined by Flowerdew and Martin, 'is concerned with the way words, things, pictures and actions come to be "signs". That is to convey meanings in particular times and at particular places',[818] which only become understandable through a semiotic grammar. And as Berger[819] reminds us, the interpretive link between a sign and a signifier 'is based on associations we learn and then carry around with us'. These associations – the grammar of visual rhetoric – are acquired through the conscious replication of taught conventions. These conventions are learned in childhood,[820] and throughout life via the unconscious accumulation of personal experience.[821] When faced with a map, we fall back

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[816] Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques*, p. 12.
[817] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 213.
[818] Robin Flowerdew and David Martin, *Methods in Human Geography: a guide for students doing a research project* (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2005), p. 191.
[819] Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques*, p. 9.
[820] Alan MacEachren, 'The role of maps in spatial knowledge acquisition', *The Cartographic Journal* 28:1 (1991), pp. 152-162; Lauren Myers and Lynn Liben, 'The Role of Intentionality and Iconicity in Children's Developing Comprehension and Production of Cartographic Symbols', *Child Development* 79:3 (2008), pp. 668-684.
[821] Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth* (London: Dover Inc, 1946), pp. 1-23, 83-99; Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. I: Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

upon these consciously- and subconsciously-acquired visual understandings in order to read the messages communicated by the map's visual and symbolic language as 'maps are imbued with meaning by virtue of semiotic relationships'.[822]

In addition to semiotics, hermeneutics offers a solution; specifically Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of the 'effective historical consciousness'.[823] While the concept of infinite interpretability of a text lies at the heart of hermeneutics, Gadamer's development of the effective historical consciousness hypothesis merges with semiotics. According to Gadamer's hypothesis, we interpret a text (all things being 'texts') not in a potentially infinite number of ways, but rather through styles and conventions which are acquired throughout life and which are generalisable among the population.[824] Taking Gadamer's theories alongside those of modern semiologists, it is possible to approach maps through a "hermeneutic-semiotic" framework, as cartographic language is interpreted by mapreaders according to conventional grammar.

At this point, it might be wondered what relation any of this theoretical material has to cartoimperialism. As a concept focusing upon the means by which maps may engender an imagination of *empire* among their viewers, does cartoimperialism need an understanding of map semantics and cartographic semiotics? Arguably yes, as the grammar through which we subconsciously interpret maps is vulnerable, due to its hyperreal nature and the perceived authority of state cartography, to manipulation for political ends.

'Semiotics,' stated Umberto Eco in his discussion of semiology, 'is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie.'[825] In spoken and written discourse, lies work because they use the same semantics and conventions that we use to make truthful statements, and it can be extremely difficult to distinguish accuracy from misrepresentation when both use the same mechanisms of communication. Maps are far from exempt from this. Visual language is, like its spoken, written, and mental counterparts, based upon mutually-agreed conventions. And as Kress and van Leeuwen[826] highlight, our interpretations of visual language take place within an established framework. This framework can, in principle, be manipulated by the mapmaker in order to communicate the message that "the world looks like this", safe in the knowledge that such elements will be interpreted in a uniform manner framed through the visual rhetoric of cartographic semiotics.

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[822] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 213-214.
[823] Jean Grondin, *The Philosophy of Gadamer [trans. Kathryn Plant]* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1999), pp. 80-83.
[824] Ibid., pp. 40-57.
[825] Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques*, p. 10.
[826] Kress and van Leeuwen, *Grammar of Visual Design*, p. 3.

Indeed, this is precisely how maps work. But as Eco's statement suggests, this same language can be manipulated in order to communicate a false message which, due to the overwhelming faith we place in maps, is believable. And such application can be far from innocent.

As Umberto Eco points out, one essence of semiotics is that signs are as equally capable of deceiving as they are of revealing. This transpires through manipulation of a related semiological trope – metonymic elements. A metonym, as Berger[827] outlines, is a semiotic device which imbues a sign with meaning via association, similar to Peirce's *iconic sign*. This technique is an ancient one in cartography, in which elements or areas of the map are assigned a positive or negative value by associating them with desirable or reprehensible traits.[828] This is an arguably *imperial* act, as a false dichotomy is created between Self and Other, civilised and barbaric, order and chaos, defining which areas are which, and by metonymic association, which peoples are categorised into each. Frequently, this is achieved through synecdoche – a subcategory of metonym in which the part stands for the whole, or vice-versa. A simple example is cited by Fornäs who notes that the EU does not refer to its flag, anthem, motto, and so forth as "European *Union* flag", "European *Union* anthem", but as "European flag", "European anthem", and so forth.[829] This is an imperial act of 'cartographic pretension' as per Black's[830] definition, whereby polity and ambition become merged into a hyperreality, with the part (European Union) representing the whole (Europe). It is no different to the same synecdoches which we identified in the disconnected discourses of the *Forma urbis Romae*, *L'Empire d'Allemagne*, and *Nova Orbis Terrarum Delineatio*.

The concept that visual language can be manipulated in this way is neither new[831] nor unique to cartography. Black discusses historical instances at length,[832] while Kress and van Leeuwen highlight how critical discourse analysis has identified how 'apparently-neutral, purely informative discourses of newspaper reporting, government publications, social science reports, and so on, may in fact convey ideological attitudes just as much as discourses which more explicitly propagandize'.[833] Critical cartographers are right to stress the power that maps have, but a philosophical basis is required in order to validate these assertions.

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[827] Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques*, pp. 22-23.
[828] Tony Lestringant, *Mapping the Renaissance World : the geographical imagination in the age of discovery* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), pp. 113-114.
[829] Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, pp. 64-76.
[830] Jeremy Black, *Maps and Politics* (London: Reaktion, 2000), p. 19.
[831] Paul Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus [trans. Alan Shapiro]* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1988), pp. 1-5.
[832] Black, *Maps and History*.
[833] Kress and van Leeuwen, *Grammar of Visual Design*, p. 12.

Cartography indeed has power – particularly when associated with state projects or *empire* – and a semiological methodology enables us to better understand this power.

Semiology, though, is but one epistemological framework of use to the critical cartographer. The signs and signifiers of map language are not only interpreted as stylised symbols which represent geographic features. The language of cartography operates by appropriating symbols in order to be understood – a symbology which is wrapped up in its own web of interpretive connotations which are best approached through appropriate methods of reading map language.

4.4   Reading Map Language

'We live in a world of signs that lie and mislead,' claims Berger, 'and many of us spend a good deal of effort trying to determine whether or not we are being "conned".'[834] In everyday life, this is arguably so: yet not with cartography. Indeed, Bruno Latour goes so far as to comment that with maps, 'there is nothing hidden or convoluted, no shadows, no 'double entendre'.[835] But maps lie. They have to, as any attempt to faithfully reproduce *everything* in the spatial realm results in a map that is either incomprehensible or useless. Indeed, Muehrcke and Muehrcke are justified in their assertion that 'so many perversions of reality are inherent in mapping that the result is best viewed as an intricate, controlled fiction'.[836] Yet despite maps' having to distort reality, and despite Black's reminder that 'the language of cartography requires careful reading,'[837] the public – and geographers – retain trust in charts. The cause of this innate trust is what John Pickles terms 'cartographic reason'.[838]

Cartographic reason, as a theory, argues that maps embody a 'functional authority'[839] which readers subscribe to, thereby providing the map with immediate legitimation regardless of its content. Kristin Kopp offers a clarification by declaring that '[maps] are not texts whose legitimacy is to be questioned; they are instead rationalized products of the most modern

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[834] Berger, *Media Analysis Techniques*, p. 11.
[835] Akerman, *Imperial Map*, p. 25.
[836] Muehrcke and Muehrcke, *Map Use*, p. 520.
[837] Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. 9.
[838] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 66.
[839] Michael Heffernan, 'Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: the Royal Geographical Society and the First World War', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 21 (1996), pp. 504-533.

technologies'.[840] The result, as Muehrcke and Muehrcke state, is that 'we tend to accept the information on maps without question'.[841] Presuming that maps are neutral mirrors of nature, people retain an innate trust in them and the messages they propagate – and this cartographic reason is precisely what imperial maps capitalise upon in order to convince readers that the falsehoods contained within are in fact truths.

However, the map cannot lie outright. As Barbara Piatti and Lorenz Hurni[842] discuss in their analysis of the counterfactual cartographies of novels, and as Hurni and Gerrit Sell assess, maps must contain enough hyperreal truth to be plausible, or they simply do not work.[843] The consequences for the imperial map are that the politically-motivated chart must portray a plausible semi-reality. While all maps exist in a cartographic limbo between truth and lies, the imperial map distorts its representations sufficiently to become what Benedict Anderson terms 'the map-as-logo'[844] and what Johan Fornäs terms the 'logotype'.[845] And as Kopp argues, such a map is 'identified so strongly with a particular shape, the "logomap" is ... wholly detached from its geographic context'.[846] It becomes an imperial map not through its language, but through the very purpose of its creation, its ability to capitalise upon cartographic reason, and public graphic illiteracy to propagate a false vision.

Throughout history mapmakers and mapreaders have developed their own ways of interpreting the language within. Perhaps the most common has been to frame the otherwise impenetrable language has been to place map language within a more recognisable metanarrative. For precolonial Aborigines, maps of the landscape were framed within ancestral myths of nature and the *dreamtime* or mythical prehistory, with these spiritual memes of a multidirectional prelife-life-afterlife-prelife cycle helping the drawers and viewers of maps to understand their themes. For medieval Europeans, the metanarrative was Christianity, and subsequently medieval *mappaemundi* bristle with text, imagery, and interpretation based on good versus evil and Biblical narrative.[847] For Victorian colonists the metanarrative was progress and modernisation in the West's imperialist image, with

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[840] Richard Howells, *Visual Culture* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Kristin Kopp, 'Cartographic Claims: Colonial Mappings of Poland in German Territorial Revisionism', chapter in Gail Finney (ed.) *Visual Culture in Twentieth-Century Germany: Text as Spectacle* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 204.
[841] Muehrcke, *Map Use*, p. 520.
[842] Lorenz Hurni and Barbara Piatti, 'Mapping the Ontologically Unreal – Counterfactual Spaces in Literature and Cartography', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), pp. 333-342.
[843] Lorenz Hurni and Gerrit Sell, 'Cartography and Architecture: Interplay between Reality and Fiction', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), pp. 323-332.
[844] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 175.
[845] Fornäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 43-52.
[846] Kopp in Finney (ed.), *Visual Culture*, p. 204.
[847] Jerry Brotton, *A History of the World in Twelve Maps* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 82-114.

Victorian maps eagerly depicting the displacement, enslavement, or outright genocide of those who did not subscribe to the Western conquest and assimilation of the planet according to its own warped ideals.[848] Maps of the EU are no different in that they are interpreted through a metanarrative, a discourse, which helps us understand the subtleties of their language. And these metanarratives can be understood through a combination of the functional and lexical approaches.

4.4.1 The Functional Approach

There are multiple methodologies of maps, and in recent decades perhaps the most popular trend has been to interpret map language as objective, no more politically-biased than the entirely neutral mathematics, theodolites, and computers which enable their construction. This is what Harley called the 'culture of the technics',[849] and which MacEachren terms the 'Functional Approach'. It denotes a methodology of cartography which focuses on the visual symbols of maps and the cognitive processes which our brains utilise to process and understand the abstract language of cartography.[850] Certainly, this is the view encouraged by such cartographers as Judith Tyner, who insists that regardless of what they are depicting, whether toposphere, anthroposphere, or even noösphere,[851] maps remain 'neutral, value-free' reflections of the world around us. This approach to maps is reassuring in its connotations of neat scientific accuracy, and can appear an attractive alternative to the slow emergence of postmodern studies which have gradually crept – usually with fierce resistance from the cartographic *ancien regime* – into critical cartography since the 1990s.[852] Even Monmonier, arguably the most prolific writer of critical cartography today, hints at this; that 'while I may feel like a heretic to say it, too much has been written on the apparent meanings in maps.'[853] There is arguably some truth in this, yet in spite of the tentative appeal of a clinical, objectivist approach to cartography, maps simply cannot be understood in this way.

Scientific approaches to cartography are as numerous as maps themselves. Indeed, any respectable modern textbook on cartography will devote significant space to the

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[848] Simon Garfield, *On The Map: Why the World Looks the Way it Does* (London: Profile Books, 2012), p. 42.
[849] J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 151.
[850] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 244.
[851] Judith Tyner, *Introduction to Thematic Cartography* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 4.
[852] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 10-11.
[853] Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines and Map Wars*, p. 21.

mathematics and science of constructing reliable charts, while giving only cursory mention – if indeed any mention at all – to the philosophies underpinning maps.[854] By examining theoretical frameworks which offer insights into the philosophical and theoretical mechanics of mapping, but which are as-yet only gradually beginning to gain acceptance, this thesis seeks to examine not the mechanical nature of map creation, but the mechanisms by which we interpret maps.

Traditionally, the study of map language has been dominated by this objectivist offshoot of the same strain of 'scientification' that emerged in late-nineteenth century history[855] and early twentieth-century regional geographies.[856] Despite the advances of critical cartographers, there remains some scholarly dismissal of maps as 'peripheral and irrelevant',[857] purely objective technologies of scientific inquiry, or (in the case of imperial cartography) awkward relics of contemporary geography's imperial origins.[858] Consequently consigned to a 'dry and unfashionable' subset of geography,[859] cartography and cartographers have not yet escaped quantitative methods. Beyond critical cartography, in more general human geography, this trend is exacerbated. Perkins, indeed, draws attention to the multitude of ways in which academics 'take an atheoretical view of the map' with little or no consideration of the complex historical, social, and associative contexts of the map in question.[860] But as Trudy Suchan and Cynthia Brewer highlight, critical cartography has recently seen a methodological shift in which qualitative methods have gained – and continue to gain – popularity.[861] As the foci of the cartographic analyst are, as Suchan and Brewer assert, 'particular audiences, natural settings for research, and amplified explanation… hallmarks of qualitative research',[862] the functional approach is not entirely ideal.

For Ron Johnston, it is intellectually dishonest and methodologically dangerous to create a false dichotomy between 'the apparently mutually opposed techniques of quantitative and qualitative methods'.[863] The same can arguably be said for approaches. Neither exists in

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[854] Arthur Robinson, *Elements of Cartography* (New York: Wiley, 1995); Tyner, *Introduction to Thematic Cartography*; MacEachren, *How Maps Work.*

[855] Jo Tollebeek, ''Turn'd to Dust and Tears': Revisiting the Archive', *History and Theory* 43:2 (2004), pp. 237-248.

[856] R.J. Johnston, J.D. Sidaway, *Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography since 1945* (London: Hodder-Arnold, 2004), pp. 61-65.

[857] Chris Perkins, 'Cartography: cultures of mapping, power in practice', *Progress in Human Geography*, 28:3 (2004), pp. 381-391.

[858] Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (eds.), *Geography and Empire* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994).

[859] Perkins, 'Cartography: mapping theory', p. 381.

[860] Ibid., p. 384.

[861] Trudy Suchan and Cynthia Brewer, 'Qualitative Methods for Research on Mapmaking and Map Use', *Professional Geographer* 52:1 (2000), pp. 145-154.

[862] Ibid., p. 146.

[863] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 608.

isolation, and a purely objectivist approach is arguably neither possible nor desirable, particularly in a discipline already fraught with accusations of over-emphasis on philosophical and theoretical work lacking a foundation in the sort of raw data which characterises the critical cartographer's trade. A healthy skepticism of purely quantitative methods and objectivism is a hallmark of critical cartography,[864] and by applying the techniques of an analysis which considers not merely the objects and mechanisms of the map but also the power-relations and discourses which underpin cartography, the 'naïve empiricism'[865] of the functional approach can be avoided. Ultimately, the assessment of imperial cartography can only be properly realised through the application of a flexible, reflexive, and interrogative qualitative methodology. This is what MacEachren terms the 'Lexical Approach'.

4.4.2   The Lexical Approach

'If our goal', writes MacEachren, 'is to *make* effective maps, a functional approach to map representation offers a method of logical structuring of information. [But] if...we set for ourselves the broader goal of understanding *how maps work*, a functional approach alone...leaves us well short of that goal.'[866] MacEachren is not alone in suggesting an approach which acknowledges the role of non-scientific methods. Indeed, argues Geraldine Pratt, 'the discipline of geography has a long tradition of qualitative methods'.[867] Certainly, attempting to understand cartography without the use of the lexical approach is at best imprecise, at worst impossible.

The lexical approach 'bring[s] research closer to the problem-solving realms of mapmakers and map users.'[868] As the product of a complex, interactive, and subjective construction process, maps are part of the hermeneutic/interpretative path with its focus upon 'the reading of texts and literature to explore people's associations with and understanding of place'.[869] And as a qualitative method, the lexical approach ensures that we 'do not start out with the assumption that there is a pre-existing world that can be known, or measured, but

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[864] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 601.
[865] Matt Perry, 'Museums, Galleries, Heritage and Archives', HaSS *Introduction to Qualitative Methodologies* Module. Newcastle University, 8th February 2010.
[866] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, p. 310 [emphasis added].
[867] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 603-604.
[868] Ibid., p. 146.
[869] Melanie Limb and Claire Dwyer, *Qualitative Methodologies for Geographers* (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 4.

instead see the social world as something that is dynamic and changing, always being constructed through the intersection and connection of cultural, economic, social and political processes.'[870] This is arguably visible in the functional approach, but by adopting a lexical approach it is possible to construct a solution to a perennial problem of critical cartography: the absence of a unifying philosophical framework, or what Robina Mohammed describes as a 'tangled web of loose ends that needs to be woven into coherence'.[871]

Of course it must be asserted that qualitative methods, like any approach, are not without pitfalls. Limb and Dwyer underline of the criticism that conclusions arrived at through qualitative methods are 'gained from unrepresentative 'samples' or from carefully selected quotes'.[872] It is necessary to anticipate such critiques of this work, as the project is vulnerable to potential accusations of cartographic cherry-picking,[873] selecting only those maps which fit a pre-determined notion of cartoimperialism and thus triumphantly constructing a cartographic strawman to neatly illustrate cartoimperialism. This study avoids this by examining all European currency maps and a broad selection of those print and virtual maps which are most frequently encountered on EU websites – the primary port of call for individuals seeking information on the Union.[874] Yet as MacEachren identifies, part of the value of the lexical approach to hyperreality is that there is no right or wrong interpretation: there is merely the acknowledgement that multiple interpretations can and do exist. It is impossible to either conclusively prove or disprove that a map exhibits cartoimperialism (or indeed any discourse), yet the value remains in asserting that such a perception exists.

The value of a lexical approach to cartoimperialism is that, as a concept, it does not treat maps in isolation as mere ontological objects, focusing only upon their physical elements. Rather, this approach treats the map as merely one aspect of a multifarious network of relations and contexts in which the purpose, creation, revision, and reproduction of the map – all of which take place not in a neat, mechanistic sequential order, but rather in an almost chaotic tangle of reciprocal relationships and interactive feedback loops – are subject to innumerable perceptions and interpretations. It is what Monmonier terms 'carto-anthropology'[875] – the study of maps as institutionalised practises and processes, rather than

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[870] Limb and Dwyer, *Qualitative Methodologies*, p. 4.
[871] Ibid., pp. 12-13.
[872] Ibid.
[873] Ibid., p. 202.
[874] European Union External Action, 'A Guide for Americans: The European Union'. Delegation of the European Union to the United States, 2175 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20037. Available at: www.euintheus.org.
[875] Mark Monmonier, *Drawing the Line: Tales of Maps and Cartocontroversy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), p. 3.

mere objects. All of these stages are potential sites of manipulation to produce a desired result and desired interpretation among mapreaders.

In the search for European cartoimperialism, it must be borne in mind that an interpretation which perceives a discourse of *empire* is merely one among many. The map is entirely unobjective, and the methodology of semiological analysis, not to mention qualitative methods themselves, are inherently subjective processes. Cartoimperialism is one interpretation – we cannot perform what Donna Haraway terms 'the god-trick'[876] by staring through Prester John's mirror and seeing a single, accurate, reality – assuming that such a thing even exists. But by acknowledging the boundaries of a lexical approach to cartoimperialism, a plausible methodology can be justified. This methodology must, as has been argued thus far, be grounded in semiology. It may appear subjective in contrast to the apparently crisp, scientific (yet inaccurate) quantitative approaches which dominate so much cartographic thinking, but nevertheless contains, as Haraway identifies, 'the possibility of critical promise'.[877]

This is not to say, of course, that the functional approach is without merit. Without the functional approach we might run the risk of being lost in an infinity of interpretations which would, in theory, be equally valid. Yet without the lexical approach we would simply replicate the erroneous idea that maps are objective and reducible to mathematical and diagnostic processes. Combining the two offers an intriguing potential method. The lexical approach acknowledges that there are multiple interpretations of map language, yet the functional approach reminds us that these interpretations are not infinite – their validity is directly linked to the actual language.

As artefacts, maps combine the intellectual/analytical with the emotive and expressive;[878] each element of the map's unique language merging the semantics of map language and the connotations of location with the subconscious semiotics of a communicated discourse. Closely enmeshed with semiological analysis, as Rose highlights, is *auteur theory*. This approach assumes the premise that the intentions of an object's creator are paramount for our understanding of the object's meaning. In cartographic terms, this would mean that the intentions of the mapmaker are more important than the perceptions of the mapreader. A logical method, then, would be to interview the creator in order to ascertain

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[876] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 683.
[877] Ibid., p. 684.
[878] Ruth Watson, 'Mapping and Contemporary Art', *The Cartographic Journal* 46:4 (2009), pp. 293-307.

their intentions. This is a potentially interesting avenue of research, but for the purposes of this study it is a methodological dead-end. We will reject Auteur Theory for three reasons.

Firstly is the issue of practicality. While the makers of European *maps* are alive and contactable – and indeed have been contacted for the purposes of this study[879] – it is not merely charts which act as European maps. This will be expounded upon in Chapter Five, but we need think only back to the preceding chapter in which it was demonstrated that actual *maps* are only the tip of the *mapping* iceberg. As a lexical approach to EU maps must be grounded in intertextuality – the mutually supportive relationship between symbols which ultimately allows the reader to elicit meaning[880] – focusing only in the intentions of the mapmaker is focusing on only one aspect of a complex relationship between creator, viewer, and symbols. There are far more symbols which intersect with EU maps than merely the symbols of conventional cartography. Images and text which are official and unofficial representations of the Union – such as flags – are just as important in helping the mapreader to establish meaning. This is the argument which led Roland Barthes to declare the 'death of the author';[881] for the image can only be comprehended in its relation to other images and symbols which that same author did not create. Further, while the makers of Europe's current maps are alive and well the same cannot be said for the makers of other EU symbols, who were already men and women of advanced age during the nascence of Europe in the 1950s. Were we to apply auteur theory, we would only be able to speak with a handful of creators – and this would be inadequate.

Our second and related reason is hermeneutic. We *could* interview EU mapmakers and try to ascertain their intentions. Yet as we identified above, Gadamer reminds us that people may not be consciously aware of the influences upon them. We cannot peer into our own minds to deconstruct our own psyches, as so much of what forms our perception of the world lurks in the subconscious.[882] We might consider the example of Arsène Heitz, who in 1952 won the competition to design what is now the EU's flag. After thirty years of public interpretations which connected the twelve stars of the Union to Christian iconography,[883] in 1987 Heitz admitted that his twelve-star design was inspired by images of the Virgin Mary. We could leave our investigation there, and take as our premise that the flag is essentially a

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[879] Symon Porteous (2012), Email on behalf of LovellJohns Mapping Co., 5th November 2012.
[880] Rose, *Visual Methodologies*, pp. 151-154
[881] Ibid., p. 19.
[882] Dostal, Robert (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[883] Interpretations include Christ's crown of thorns, the "circle of stars" worn by the nameless mother of God in the Book of Revelation, and the medieval tradition of depicting the Virgin Mary with a halo of twelve gold stars. See Fornäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 128-144.

Catholic icon. But this example clearly highlights the shortcomings of auteur theory. Both Carlo Gialdino and Johan Fornäs note that there is absolutely no evidence to support Heitz's 1987 claim that his 1952 flag was inspired by Catholic iconography. Gialdino goes so far as to say that Heitz's 1987 admission is a 'trick of memory', arguing that the link between Mary and the European flag was entirely coincidental, and only after thirty years of constantly being asked about it did Heitz convince himself of a link which had never really existed. But where does this leave us? The immediate answer is: a dead-end. Arsène Heitz has long since passed away, and even if we could ask him, his *current* testimony is not necessarily a reflection of his intentions *at the time of creation*. Like everyone else, mapmakers and iconographers cannot detach themselves from their own 'effective historical consciousness', and such an approach would thus be incomplete.

The third justification is most significant: *intention is subordinate to interpretation.* As Jonathan Leib and Gerald and Roberta Webster set forth in their study of postbellum Confederate symbolism in the United States, 'the meaning[s] of these icons do not remain permanent throughout history but are continuously evolving'.[884] This is demonstrably true. A designer may create a symbol for a particular purpose, but once that symbol has been released into the public realm it rapidly and eternally evolves, to the point that appropriations or variations of it may bear little or no resemblance to the intention.[885] In such cases, the intentions of a symbol's designer become entirely peripheral.

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[884] Leib, Webster and Webster, 'Rebel with a cause?', p. 304.

[885] An example is provided by the traditional heraldic symbol for empire: the eagle. In 2007 the management of Barclays Bank removed their corporate logo, the Barclays eagle, from their British headquarters. The reason given was that symbolic eagles have Nazi connotations. Yet this *interpretation* was never the *intention* of those who first created symbolic eagles. As Pliny the Elder records, eagles had religious connotations of the power of Jupiter, and thus an eagle was one of five zoomorphic standards carried by early Roman Republican troops to seek divine favour in battle. If we believe Plutarch, the eagle ultimately became the sole emblem of the legions simply because the Republican *imperator* Gaius Marius, a superstitious man with a penchant for birds, believed that a childhood encounter with an eagle symbolised divine approval of his chequered career. The increasingly militarised Roman state after Augustus was awash with eagle symbols, while the Roman eagle was adopted in double-headed form by the Byzantines, and thence by the Russians after the Fall of Constantinople. In the West, Charlemagne adopted the eagle as a visual link to Rome, and later Napoleon chose to resurrect the eagle for his own *imperium* partly due to its association with Charlemagne. As a consequence of Charlemagne's choice the eagle historically symbolised the Holy Roman Empire and Germany: hence its adoption, as a form of visual legitimacy, by the Nazis from whom Barclays so eagerly wish to distance themselves. Thus if we were to use *auteur theory*, we would conclude that Barclays' management was unwarranted, as the eagle was never intended to represent Nazism. Yet this does not mean that the eagle is devoid of sinister modern connotations. Yet again, *intention is subordinate to interpretation.* Plutarch, *Life of Marius*, pp. xvii, xxxvi; Martin, *Medieval Russia*, p. 258; Cronin, *Napoleon*, p. 247; Lawrence Kritzman, *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past Volume III: Symbols [trans. Arthur Goldhammer]* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 92, 242-243, 418, 529-531; Arthur Fox-Davies, *A Complete Guide to Heraldry* (London and Edinburgh: T.C. and E.C. Jack Co., 1909). No original Roman eagles are known to have survived, thus all post-Roman eagles are based on artists' impressions or crudely-stamped coins from times of severe military and economic crisis, during which resource-strapped Roman numismatists stamped the coins with generic iconography. Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Service* III.v *[trans. N.P. Milner]* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), p. 69; M.C. Bishop and J.C.N. Coulson (eds.), *Roman Military Equipment: From the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome* (Oxford:

Just as *imperium* and *imperator* morphed over the millennia to signify different concepts to that which the words originally expressed, so too do the components of visual language evolve alongside verbal language. As such, they must be deconstructed.

4.5   Semiotic Deconstruction

While deconstruction has been broadly accepted by geographers,[886] this hallmark of postmodern methodology remains a mostly unwelcome *parvenu* among the methodological establishment. In what is arguably the introduction of deconstruction to cartography, Harley identifies two fundamental aspects of the method. First, as he makes clear, is that there is no single deconstructionist approach. The theories of Michel Foucault are often at odds with those of Jacques Derrida, as the former emphasises systems while Derrida consistently urges the dismantling of the same.[887] It is possible, as Harley argues, to occasionally merge different theories, but in-keeping with postmodernism itself there is no single approach which the study can offer. His second observation is that deconstruction makes no promises of finding a "truth" within cartography. There is no single interpretation of cartographic language and while it may be a stretch of the imagination to state that there is no right or wrong way of interpreting map language – Lieutenant George is evidently wrong in interpreting the mushroom-shaped symbols on his map as *actual* mushrooms – there are multiple interpretations which exist in a grey area between the two extremes. It is in this zone that cartoimperialism lies.

In his discussion of the power of maps, Alan Henrikson[888] identifies not only the three routes through which maps persuade – emblematic, synoptic, and hypnotic – but also places these cartographic conduits in a framework of semantic deconstruction. Henrikson[889] identifies the symbiotic relationship between the two: 'maps may be embedded in the discourse of politics and cartography, just as political symbols can be embedded in the language of maps.' And this is arguably accurate – as Berger[890] states, 'what we call a map is an example of a kind of language, symbols arranged in some kind of order'. These symbols

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Oxbow Books, 2006), pp. 113, 144, 226; 'Barclays remove "Nazi" eagle from headquarters', *The Daily Mail* 21 August 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-476712/Barclays-removes-Nazi-eagle-headquarters.html.
[886] J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 149-168.
[887] Harley, *New Nature of Mapping*, p. 152.
[888] Henrikson, 'Power and Politics of Maps', pp. 49-52.
[889] Ibid., p. 51.
[890] Berger, *What Objects Mean*, p. 195.

can serve political agendas which cannot be understood through a traditional focus only upon the component symbols of cartography. While maps can indeed be understood as generalised representations, the specific language of their semiotic parts is comprehensible only through a grammar of map semantics, and through semiology we can gain a greater understanding of the multi-layered, culturally conditioned interpretation process itself.

Harley stresses that 'deconstruction urges us to read between the lines of the map' and using tropes, 'discover that cartographic facts are only facts within a specific cultural perspective'.[891] There is, as he rightly states, a very significant human element to interpreting map language. The language, as has already been argued, has no meaning of its own accord, and must be interpreted according to conventions which we have already acquired. These conventions, as Alan Henrikson implies[892] and Mark Monmonier hints at,[893] are more appreciable when viewed through the lens of semiology.

4.6   CONCLUSIONS

We began this chapter with a light-hearted jest at a bumbling mapreader's cartographic illiteracy. Yet while viewers may laugh at Lieutenant George's lack of graphicacy, this scene is a potent commentary on the complexities of cartographic language. Lieutenant George has not simply elicited a giggle, he has exposed the very nature of maps. The map only works by distilling the world around us into an oversimplified and abstract representation – a hyperreality – which is interpreted in various ways and has the capacity to convey far more significant discourses than merely telling us *where things are*.

The map communicates its values through a sophisticated web of semiotic, psychological, and symbological channels which, while capturing our attention with dazzling displays, we may not even realise exist. As Monmonier asserts, 'therein lies much of the power of maps – enchanting displays divert attention from their authors' motives.'[894] These motives vary. From the *dreamtime* charts of Aboriginal tradition through medieval *mappaemundi* and the gaudy, propagandist cartographies of Early Modern Europe, through to the sleek, sophisticated cartographies of coins and websites whose very existence causes contemporary governments to clash, maps are unique artefacts. But they are all artefacts

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[891] Harley, *New Nature of Maps*, p. 153.
[892] Henrikson, *Power and Politics of Maps*.
[893] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 167-173.
[894] Monmonier, *Drawing the Line*, p. 297.

capable of being deconstructed through semiological and semantic methods. Novel methods are required in order to understand maps as discursive datasets understood and interpreted according to socially constructed conventions, and thereby justify the methodological considerations of cartoimperialism. Of course, the exact same methods cannot be applied universally, as basic tropes and meta-tropes are not consistent across time and space, instead varying from one society to another – an internet map of the Union would be as baffling to the sailors of Stone Age Oceania as their stick-charts are to our untrained eyes. Yet the concept of the methods remains universal, and with adjustment, the tools of semantics and semiotics, Functional and Lexical Approaches, and deconstruction, can be used to examine any chart – including the discursive, public, politically-charged maps of the Union. It is to these maps which we now turn.

Chapter Five

First Among Equals

"There are no ideals, however exalted in nature, which

can afford to do without a symbol."[895]

<div align="right">

Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
Paris, 16 July 1951

</div>

"Europe should have an Emblem, connected with its flag, to serve as an

instrument of propaganda – as the Soviet Star serves Bolshevism and the

Swastika served Hitlerism."[896]

<div align="right">

Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi
Memorandum of the European Parliamentary Union
Gstaatd, 27 July 1950

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In a Europe emerging from the ashes of an evil unification, two political pioneers of integration spoke the above words. Jacques Camille Paris, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, in a confidential memo of 16th July 1951 stresses the need for the emerging community to adopt a flag. And in a similar memo to the forerunner of today's European Parliament, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Pan-European Movement, calls for a single recognisable emblem, alongside the flag, to visually represent the not-too-distant ancestor of today's European Union. This emblem, it was envisaged, would act as a rallying-point to connect Western Europeans just as Soviet symbols did for their Eastern counterparts. History is replete with grim coincidences, and it is ironic that the European community chose to connect its people through symbols: symbols submitted to competitions, in exactly the same way that the National

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[895] Memorandum from the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe on the European flag (Strasbourg, 16 July 1951). Council of Europe. Memorandum of the Secretariat General on the European Flag, AS/RPP II (3) 2. Strasbourg: Consultative Assembly, Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Sub-Committee on Immunities, 16 July 1951. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_the_secretariat_general_of_the_council_of_europe_on_the_europe an_flag_strasbourg_16_july_1951-en-081673a8-1849-4930-a774-e23d0fbad413.htm.
[896] Memorandum from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi on the European flag (Gstaad, 27 July 1950). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe - Historical archives of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, F-67075 Strasbourg, Cedex. Available at: http://info.coe.int/archives/hist/flag/default.asp. Le drapeau - The Flag, 2191. The European Flag, Memorandum presented to the Council of Europe by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Pan-European Movement, Secretary General of the European Parliamentary Union. Gstaad: 27 July 1950. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_richard_coudenhove_kalergi_on_the_european_flag_gstaad_27_ju ly_1950-en-ad9469d5-d9cf-46ae-95e0-897f96f94195.html.

Socialists and the Communist Party – with their swastikas, *Reichsadler*,[897] stars, and hammers and sickles[898] – had symbolised their own peoples' pretensions of *imperium* through mass public iconography.

This European emblem, according to Council documents, never *officially* emerged. Creating a flag for Europe was difficult enough, let alone an accompanying abstract emblem.[899] But as this chapter will argue, the icon sought by Coudenhove-Kalergi has been unofficially established. An emblem which serves alongside the flag as a perhaps unwitting instrument of propaganda to visually represent not only the European *Union*, but *all* of Europe as a single civilisation. This emblem is the map.

As emblems of state power and political discourses, maps are icons. At this stage a terminological distinction must be made. *Symbols* or *emblems* are visual markers, or signifiers, which bear only peripheral resemblance to the signs they are meant to represent – like Lieutenant George's mushrooms. *Icons*, though, are visual signifiers which are sufficiently similar to that which they represent, that we can recognise it. The Christian cross

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[897] In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler describes seeing a communist rally in 1918 and explains how the power of its symbolism led him to commission his own emblems, according to his own warped version of history. He explains choosing the swastika and eagle emblems, and the flag colour scheme – all of which, predictably, he takes credit for – by rejecting existing flags, emblems, and colour schemes for their political connotations of democracy, monarchy, or communism. Historian Ian Kershaw notes that the emblems were in fact submitted to a competition from which Hitler simply chose the best of a bad bunch, and suggests that nearly all Nazi symbolism was shamelessly plagiarised directly from the Italian Fascists – barring the swastika which, with its paradoxical connotations of change and eternity, had been in circulation among fringe pan-European groups since the late 1800s. *Mein Kampf [tran. Ralph Manheim]* (London: Pimlico, 2001), pp. 448-453; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris* (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 192-193. While it is repugnant to cite the former text, the author agrees with the translator's note that 'It is vital that this "master of the inept, the undigested, the half-baked and the untrue" should be understood' [frontispiece]. Mussolini and Hitler, unfortunately, were as much a part of the *translatio imperii* as Charlemagne and Napoleon. On this point, see Gary Marks, 'Europe and its Empires: From Rome to the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50:1 (2012), pp. 1-20.

[898] The Soviet Union's hammer-and-sickle motif has more obscure origins, with official Soviet histories praising the politically convenient anonymity of whoever created it. The emblem is first recorded in Article 6.17.89 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic's 1918 constitution, suggesting that the image was already associated with Russian communism by 1918. However during the European 'Red Scare' of 1919, the hammer and sickle was almost unknown outside Russia – like the EU's emblems, it became a *synecdochal metonym* whereby one place (Russia/the EU) represented a larger imagined community. Despite the varied origins of the swastika and the anonymity of the hammer and sickle, both still carry substantial semiotic baggage. During Germany's presidency of the EU in 2007, the German government proposed a bill which would ban the swastika across the European Union, but the bill was defeated after protests from the British Sikh and Hindu communities who still use the swastika as a religious icon. Despite prohibition of Soviet symbols in Poland and Lithuania, similar attempts to ban the hammer and sickle across the EU have also been defeated, much to the chagrin of Eastern European EU members. Symbols are clearly not just of academic interest – they matter to people. Anthony Read, *The World on Fire: 1919 and the Battle with Bolshevism* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2008), pp. 25-50; 'Swastika ban left out of EU's racism law', *The Scotsman* 23 July 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/swastika-ban-left-out-of-eu-s-racism-law-1-680863; 'EU refuses to ban denial of communist crimes', *Russia Today* 23 December 2010, http://rt.com/politics/european-commission-communist-crimes/; 'New Polish law equates Communist and Nazi symbols', *Russia Today* 30 November 2009, http://rt.com/politics/poland-bans-communist-symbols/.

[899] The European flag: questions and answers (2005). European flag - questions and answers. 50th anniversary of the European flag. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: Council of Europe, [21.02.2006]. Available at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/events/2005-12-drapeau/questions_reponses.asp.

appropriated as a political emblem by Charlemagne acts as an example.[900] And as established in Chapter Four, iconography is the tool[901] via which we will examine EU maps.

As Jonathan Leib and Gerald and Roberta Webster state in support of the wishes of political pioneers of 1950s Europe, 'icons can act as centripetal forces binding a people together'.[902] This has long been recognised by political leaders, who from the Babylonians onwards have employed emblems to denote an identity. The idea has also been long-established in academia, as demonstrated by the dominance in such studies of Jean Gottman's original 1951 thesis on the phenomenon of 'common symbols [which are] used to help bind a group of people together within and to a territory'.[903] The field is established, but we will look further.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine European Union-produced maps in search of what the above two activists sought – an emblem of European unity – and posit that this symbol is not part of the map, but is the map itself. Yet it is not merely the map which represents the European Union as it is, but rather what it should be – and is destined to become. As the European Commission is responsible for administration and management of all European Union bodies other than the Council of Europe, (*Consilium*) this study will focus on the maps and accompanying symbolism of the Commission. These visual materials are produced according to the Commission's *Visual Identity Guidelines*.[904]

While iconographical studies of political emblems have historically been dominated by nations or ethnic and religious sub-groups within a nation,[905] this examination focuses on a supra- or meta-national entity. The Union perhaps does not have as great a visual presence as, for example, the governments of its component nation-states. We Europeans are still more likely to see our own country's flag or map than those of the Union. Yet whenever the Union manifests itself in visual space – the pamphlet, the street, the television broadcast, the internet – its symbols are everywhere. It is this proliferation, what Pauliina Raento and Stanley Brunn

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[900] Lettre d'Arsène Heitz à Filippo Caracciolo (Strasbourg, 5 janvier 1952). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/lettre_d_arsene_heitz_a_filippo_caracciolo_strasbourg_5_janvier_1952-fr-6b758d67-f606-4ac9-90fc-3339fe66a76c.html.
[901] Gregory et al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 363.
[902] Jonathan Leib, Gerald Webster and Roberta Webster, 'Rebel with a cause? Iconography and public memory in the Southern United States', *GeoJournal* 52 (2000), pp. 303-310.
[903] Ibid., p. 303.
[904] European Commission, 'Visual Identity Guidelines'. Directorate-General for Communication, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1040 Brussels (2011). Available at: http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/comm/visual_identity.
[905] Leib and Webster, 'Rebel with a cause?'; Daniel Corstange, 'Religion, Pluralism, and Iconography in the Public Sphere: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon', *World Politics* 64:1 (2012), pp. 116-160; Eric Worby, 'Maps, Names, and Ethnic Games: The Epistemology and Iconography of Colonial Power in Northwestern Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20:3 (1994), pp. 371-392.

term 'mundane omnipresence',[906] which gives these visual icons subtle yet significant political power.

In Chapter Four we rejected auteur theory as a method. Nevertheless it is useful to consider the origins of European Union cartography. As the founder of scholarly iconography, the medievalist Erwin Panofsky, outlines,[907] meaning can only be usefully elucidated from visual artefacts by cross-checking their provenance and the other artefacts alongside which they are displayed.[908] This does not particularly help the viewer to interpret a specific meaning from the image, but it does allow us to avoid the nihilistic pitfalls of assuming that *all* interpretations are equally valid. We will never identify a single, objective meaning in a map, as in any visual artefact: but we can at least eliminate unlikely assumptions. This is as true for EU cartography as it is for any visual medium.

Since the early 1990s, all maps used by the European Commission and its constituent institutions have been produced by a British commercial mapmaking company, Lowell Johns. Their 'Cartographic Framework' was awarded to the company by the European Commission as part of an open contract advertisement,[909] and the maps produced according to the *Visual Identity Guidelines*. As Lowell Johns specifies, their only obligations specific to mapmaking – as colour and font are predetermined by the *Visual Identity Guidelines* – were to ensure 'that correct and authenticated map representations, for example country borders, are depicted at a point in time'.[910] The *Visual Identity Guidelines* themselves are equally not part of some sinister scheme – EU graphic guidelines are composed by professional graphic designers, hired through public recruitment advertisements.[911] By applying Panofsky's framework we see clearly that, unlike maps deliberately distorted by scheming graphic artists in the Ministries of Information of yesteryear, EU maps are not part of a devious conspiracy to deceive the public. They admittedly promote a sort of lie, a hyperreality, but then so do *all* maps. Nevertheless, EU maps convey a political discourse. How can this apparent paradox be reconciled?

Part of the answer lies in Chapter Three's investigation of the nature of maps. No map is neutral. We cannot climb the marble stairs to Prester John's mirror and see a *reflection* of

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[906] Pauliina Raento and Stanley Brunn, 'Visualizing Finland: Postage Stamps as Political Messengers', *Geografiska Annaler* 87 (2005), pp. 145-163.

[907] Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History* (New York: Overlook Press, 1974), pp. 6-9.

[908] Black, *Maps and History*, pp. 103-132 ; Jacobs *Strange Maps*, pp. 58-67.

[909] Symon Porteous (2012), Email on behalf of LovellJohns Mapping Co., 5th November 2012.

[910] Porteous, LovellJohns.

[911] General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 'Notice of Vacancy CONS/AST/071' (2008). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/avis071_en.pdf.

the world – the best that we can hope for is to glance at a *representation*. Another part of the answer is that European Union cartography does not appear in isolation. As we similarly saw in Chapter Three, a map on its own, with no accompanying signifiers to help explain its meaning, is utterly meaningless. The Aboriginal *dreamtime* map, Polynesian stick-chart, and Renaissance navigational aid we encountered in Chapter Four are meaningless squiggles unless we can cross-reference them against other forms of symbolic language. And in the absence of a creator who can verbally translate for us the esoteric visual language of paints, colours, and compass roses, the maps must be accompanied by other forms of language to help confused viewers establish meaning. In the case of the Union, this language takes one of two forms: verbal or visual. Verbal language accompanying the map comes in the form of text specific to the map, such as an explanatory key, or surrounding prose on the Union. The visual language may feature a potentially infinite collection of pictures and graphics. Both the verbal and the visual marginalia are important to EU cartography – as they always have been for maps[912] – and can be examined by what we categorised in Chapter Four as *tropes* and *meta-tropes*.

In the context of Union maps the tropes are those of any map, and are quite simple. Colours, shapes, lettering and legends, and any other aspects of the visual lexicon which makes up cartographic language, can be analysed. However for various reasons which will shortly become apparent, this on its own is insufficient. Despite the efforts of cartographic scholars, colours,[913] shapes, and letters[914] can only elucidate so much meaning, and only for viewers whose 'cultural traditions [are] peculiar to a certain civilisation',[915] before any semblance of universal meaning is lost. And on their own, tropes – visual, verbal, audio, performative – are inherently meaningless. For clarification, let us consider an illustrative example provided by Panofsky.[916]

We are walking along the street when an approaching gentleman, with whom we are casually acquainted, catches our eye and lifts his hat. What, we subconsciously ask ourselves, is the significance of this gesture? As Panofsky explains, the tropes of the gesture are utterly meaningless beyond mere mechanical activity – the man has lifted his arm and performed a slight physical action by manually manipulating his headgear. This is what Panofsky terms

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[912] Beau Riffenburgh, *The Men Who Mapped the World: The Treasures of Cartography* (London: Carlton, 2011).
[913] Muercke and Muercke, *Map Use*.
[914] Mark Monmonier, *From Squaw Tit to Whorehouse Meadow: How Maps Name, Claim, and Inflame* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
[915] Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, p. 27.
[916] Ibid., pp. 3-8.

primary or *factual meaning* – the tropes that are detectable with our physical senses, and devoid of any universal meaning. Yet the gesture has a *secondary* or *conventional meaning* as well – in this case, Panofsky opines, the hat-lifting is a cultural relic of the European Middle Ages to signify recognition between two knights. Crucially, as Panofsky demonstrates, this implicit friendliness in the pedestrian's gesture is specific to a particular place and time – the West, and the modern age. 'Neither an Australian bushman nor an ancient Greek,' Panofsky writes, 'could be expected to realize that the lifting of a hat is not only a practical event with certain expressional connotations, but also a sign of politeness'.[917] This is what Atkinson and Cosgrove term 'polyvocality':[918] we apply our own hermeneutic conventions to try and elucidate meaning, and the result is what Panofsky finally describes as *intrinsic meaning*. At this stage of recognition, the *primary* and *secondary* meanings merge and allow us to see in the mere tropes an implied discourse. We acknowledge that the pedestrian is not simply adjusting his hat, but is making a polite gesture of greeting. The hat-tipping is the *signifier* which represents the *signified* concept – in this case, friendship. In response we lift our own hats, and everyone politely goes about their business. Yet the entire incident and its various formal exchanges have only been possible, as Panofsky writes, because of the complex web of surrounding, culturally-bound signifiers which have allowed both us and the gentleman to acknowledge that the act of adjusting our headgear is a symbol of friendship.[919]

The same phenomenon of elucidating meaning from surrounding signifiers, also applies to maps. Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the practical realm of EU cartography and Panofsky's Arcadian world where pedestrians are remarkably polite and everyone wears a smart hat, the tropes of the map are just as meaningless as the tropes of the pedestrian's gesture. As we saw with the Aboriginal, Polynesian, and Renaissance maps, the tropes of a map alone are insufficient to provide meaning or convey a discourse – whether said discourse is deliberately embedded or not. But like the pedestrian's gesture, the tropes of

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[917] Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, p. 4.

[918] David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove, 'Urban Rhetoric and Embodied Identities: City, Nation, and Empire at the Vittorio Emanuele II Monument in Rome, 1870-1945', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88:1 (1998), pp. 28-49.

[919] Panofsky's theories have, perhaps uniquely in scholarly history, been tested in the field. Following the Allied occupation of Nuremberg in 1945, appeals from local museum curators alerted the Allies to the Nazis' having hidden the Holy Roman Empire's regalia, which they had stolen from Vienna in 1938. The Allies appointed a Doctor of Art History, Lieutenant Walter Horn, to interrogate prisoners and investigate the treasury bunker in search of the missing relics. The supervisor of Lieut. Dr. Horn's PhD thesis had been none other than Erwin Panofsky. Using the semiotic and iconographic methods outlined in Panofsky's *History of Art*, Horn researched the semiotic context in which the regalia had been interpreted and used by the Nazis, and subsequently located the real treasures (in a hidden bunker built for Hitler's corpse to be enshrined alongside Frankish relics and the body of Barbarossa – arguably the most sinister tangent of the *translatio imperii*), safeguarded the relics from General Patton who wanted them removed to the USA, and finally had the regalia returned to Vienna – where they remain today. See: Kirkpatrick, *Hitler's Holy Relics*, pp. 13-17, 27-28, 153.

EU maps do not appear alone. They are displayed as part of an intricate assembly of icons and symbols which help to clarify each others' meaning. We apply our own hermeneutic principles to establish a meaning based on the surrounding signifiers. Thus we are able to recognise the hat-tipping as a salutation and not a mere musculoskeletal motion, thus we are able to see a tangle of lines and primary colours as a graphic representation of part of the world.

In the case of Union cartography, these surrounding elements are the *meta-tropes*, and it is they which are of greatest significance. Flags, pictures, texts, and locations appear alongside maps. Like the man doffing his hat to us in the street, these peripheral and linked signifiers construct new dimensions of meaning and significance.

As it is the *intrinsic meaning* of meta-tropes and not the *factual meanings* and subjective, culture-bound *conventional meanings* of the tropes which are of key importance, this chapter will not examine every map produced by the Union's component institutions. Neither will the study, like previous efforts,[920] catalogue and categorise EU maps into neat classifications. While this can be useful, it is ultimately inadequate. Part of the reasoning behind this selection is that the Union has a remarkably small number of maps for public consumption, and also partially as the Union's maps lack the gaudy visual palimpsests of the maps of yesteryear. Thus not only would a purely tropic analysis be short and rather dull, but more importantly such an approach would only focus on Panofsky's *primary* meaning. And as we have identified, both the *primary* and *secondary* meanings are crucial if we are to interpret a squiggle of lines and colours as a map of the Union. Similarly, we must treat the map not as the main component of our study, but as part of a complex whole. Instead, we will examine a selection of Union maps in their context as part of a broader network whose components, combined, convey a discourse.

We will examine both print-copy and digital maps used by the Union's institutions. Not only does cartography appear in both formats, but EU publications frequently appear in both media. As the European Commission's *Communication and Visibility Manual* makes clear, 'all material produced in paper form should also be made available in electronic form';[921] and also, as the Commission lethargically reminds readers, because 'A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the internet'.[922]

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[920] Russell Foster, 'Tabula Imperii Europae: A Cartographic Approach to the Current Debate on the European Union as Empire', *Geopolitics* 18:2 (2013), pp. 371-402.

[921] Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions (2010). European Commission: EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Bruxelles. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eropeaid, p. 19.

[922] European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council' *Enlargement Strategies and Main Challenges 2011-2012*. Brussels 12.10.2011. COM (2011) 666 final.

All of these maps are official products of the European Union and its institutions, and all appear on either physical or digital publications – or both – of the Union. Similarly, all of these maps appear as part of a network of signs and signifiers which collectively convey meaning. Like the man and his hat, the actual object in question – be it chart or cap – is only one component of a wider network which conveys a discourse. In the case of the pedestrian's hat, the discourse conveyed is affability. In the case of the Union's map, the discourse is *empire*. It is thus to the network of political discourses in which Union maps are presented that we initially turn.

5.1 'Flagging *empire* daily'[923]

'We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians.'[924]

Massimo d'Azeglio
1861

Thus spoke the first Prime Minister of a united Italy in 1861. Having corralled the various states of the Italian peninsula through war or diplomacy, and having expelled both the Austrian enemy and French allies, King Victor Emmanuel I's new government faced the prospect of governing a large and fractious population who had not been united as one since the Caesars, fourteen centuries earlier. The Italian elites' solution was simple – the mass manufacture of national icons. And while Italy's flag, anthem, coat of arms, and all the other paraphernalia of nationhood – national dress, national cuisine, national bird, national language – were modified from local customs, interpreted from the past to try and resurrect history, or simply plucked out of thin air in the 1860s, only sixty years later Mussolini's fascists treated these manufactured icons as sacred treasures to be defended to the death, handed down through the millennia from generations lost in the mists of time. This strange state of affairs was by no means exclusive to Italy. Precisely the same phenomenon occurred in European nations in the nineteenth century, as vague identities coalesced into uniform nationalities, across the world from the United States to the Republic of China – and now, a similar process is occurring in the European Union.

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf ; EPP Group in the European Parliament, 'EPP Group Press and Communication Service Graphic Charter' (2012). Available at: www.eppgroup.eu/graphicharter.
[923] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995), p. 93.
[924] Norwich, *The Popes*, p. 395.

Europe in the twenty-first century is post-national. Long-gone are the days when the waving of flags and the chanting of xenophobic hymns to accompany Europe's endless and savage wars were deemed not only acceptable, but mandatory, in public discourse. The theatrical props of national identity – flags, anthems, and parodies of Victorian ideas of traditional ethnic signifiers[925] – still exist. But instead of being waved daily they are now only occasionally dusted off for antique ceremonies, or to cheer our state's athletes at sporting events. But this does not render them any less powerful. Michael Billig describes such moments as 'rehearsals for the extraordinary times of crisis when the state calls upon its citizenry... to make ultimate sacrifices in the cause of nationhood'.[926] This may be a little alarmist, but whether Billig is justified in his assertion or not, one thing is clear. The Age of Nationalism, in Europe, is over.

It is not merely the apparently progressive and enlightened march of globalisation which has brought this about. As Europeans, our collective continental experience from 1914 to 1945 has left nationalism as, at best, an unpalatable remnant upsetting the self-proclaimed harmony of post-Modern Europe. Yet while the tools of national identity may appear today to be troublesome social deviants, released on parole for football matches and probationed on newspaper sports pages[927] until they are locked away again in our collective subconscious, this is an illusion.

'Nationalism', writes Billig in his study of identity formation, 'has seeped into the corners of our consciousness', reminding us that in the contemporary West, nationalism is popularly held to exist only on the spatially and socially distant peripheries of the community.[928] He reassures us that the kind of fierce, xenophobic nationalist rhetoric which still lurks beneath the thin veneer of Western civilisation is most triumphantly proclaimed by those furthest from the geographical and/or social "centre" – those members of the Self who are in greatest contact with the Other. In the apparently post-nationalist European Union, nationalism is consciously denied. It appears instead to be something not possessed by us, something found only among the barbarian Others. Yet as Billig demonstrates, this is not the case. Nationalism is just as readily visible in the apparently politically neutral "centre", albeit in a bland, banal, overlooked form. And the reason it is so overlooked is that it is forgotten.

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[925] Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland', in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, pp. 15-42; Hobsbawm, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', in ibid., pp. 263-308.
[926] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 11.
[927] Ibid., pp. 111-119; Mackenzie (ed.), *Propaganda and Empire*, pp. 67-95; Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, pp. 137-140.
[928] Ibid., pp. 5-12.

This act of collective forgetting is essential not only for understanding the power of EU maps, but for appreciating the nature of Europe's 'imagined community'. For as Benedict Anderson writes, it is the act of forgetting which allows a community to be formed in the public imagination. Collective forgetting is, for Anderson, just as important to forming a national identity as is the act of collectively remembering our history. Let us explore this further. We 'forget', to take Billig's and Anderson's view, two key points. Firstly, we forget that even in a nation-state we are not all one group, with one identity. Except for rallying to the national flag in periods of national emergency, such as the threat of invasion,[929] we do not think of ourselves as a single, indivisible nation every waking moment. Secondly, we forget that even post-1945, nationalism lurks in our collective consciousness.[930] This is precisely the case in the European Union. 'We Good Europeans'[931] of today do not wave EU flags at military parades, we refrain from loud public adulations wherein *We* proclaim ourselves better than *Them*, and our Europe-wide anthem does not even have lyrics,[932] let alone stanzas which we must diplomatically overlook or alter.[933] Yet the sense of community remains.

In his theory of the formation of nationhood, Anderson argues that the modern concept of the nation, and by extension nationalism, are not natural. For Anderson, the nation

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[929] H.F.B. Wheeler and A.M. Broadley argue that there was no identity as "British" until the Napoleonic Wars. Richard Hingley demonstrates that the word "British" was barely even used, with both natives and foreigners referring to the inhabitants of the British Isles with the catch-all word "English", and further demonstrates that the British press consistently depicted multiple ethnic and religious groups cohabiting the British Isles in much the same way as mainland Europe. It was only with the repeated threat of invasion by Napoleon that newspapers and cartoonists encouraged all the peoples of the British Isles to rally to a single identity as "British". Similarly, Mike Rapport demonstrates that "British", "German", and "Russian" identities emerged over local, regional, or religious identities in response to Napoleon's wars and French nationalism. See: H.F.B. Wheeler and A.M. Broadley, *Napoleon and the Invasion of England: The Story of the Great Terror [orig. 1908]* (Stroud: Nonsuch, 2007), pp. 7-28; Hingley, *Roman Officers*, pp. 1-27; Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philp, *Napoleon and the Invasion of Britain* (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2003); Robert and Isabella Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present* (London: Pimlico, 2007), pp. 245-255; Mike Rapport, *The Napoleonic Wars: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 102-119.
[930] Iain Boal, T. J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts, *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (London and New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 162-166.
[931] Stefan Elbe 'We Good Europeans…': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe' *Millennium* 30:2 (2001), pp. 259-283.
[932] "Paul Collowald: D'azur et de joie - Contribution à l'histoire du drapeau et de l'hymne de l'Europe" dans Revue d'Alsace (1999). Revue d'Alsace. 1999, n° 125. Colmar: Fédération des Sociétés d'Histoire et d'Archéologie d'Alsace. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/"paul_collowald_d_azur_et_de_joie_contribution_a_l_histoire_du_drapeau_et_de_l_hymne_de_l_europe"_dans_revue_d_alsace_1999-fr-4dae6d56-9d49-47ad-b408-81770cc1218d.html.
[933] Like maps, music evolves mimetically, being adapted and appropriated as the "habitat" changes. The fourth verse of the British national anthem, *God Save the Queen*, is quite anti-Scottish and has been prohibited from being sung since the late eighteenth century (when a unified "British" identity was forming against the threat of French invasion). Meanwhile the old Austrian hymn whose tune was adopted for the current German national anthem, *Deutschlandlied*, has had stanzas added, altered, or omitted at various points since 1870. The most violent and xenophobic European national anthem, France's *La Marseillaise*, has not once been altered since 1789. Curiously, both the British and the French claim to have created the tune of the British anthem, which was used with almost identical lyrics as an early royal or republican anthem in Imperial Russia, the USA, and the Holy Roman Empire. See Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *Invention of Tradition*, pp. 7-11, 266-277; Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, pp. 42-43.

'is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'.[934] Nationalism, as Ernst Gellner argues, does not *awaken* nations so much as *invent* them.[935] The result was the creation of 'imagined communities' assembled in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. And this nation exists, officially, as a unified and homogenous unit. The nation is an exclusive and bounded group with one language, one faith, one voice: a community wherein members speak, dress, worship, read, eat, behave, and *believe* in the same way.[936] Contrast is made not with each other but with the foreigner from beyond the frontier, the figure who behaves according to the different norms of their own nation. In the nation, then, there is room only for one community.

Anderson's discussion of how nations are imagined is pertinent to the European Union. Like nations, 'the members of [the Union] will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'.[937] And like the nation, we do not need to peer too deeply into EU philosophy to see that the Union is imagined as a community. We might very well argue that the Union is an imagined community, wherein maps act as visual ties connecting three hundred million inhabitants who do not personally know more than a tiny handful of fellow Europeans. Visual ties which establish a mental bridge between Europeans and allow them to see themselves as part of a single community. Europe, we might well argue, is an imagined nation – one whose visual cartographies can be assessed via the framework of Billig's 'banal nationalism'. But this suggests a problem.

Separating nation and *empire* is no easy task, particularly as nation and nationalism have 'proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse'.[938] Querying even further into the field, Gerald Webster gives a nuanced review of scholars' distinctions between nationalism and patriotism.[939] It comes as little surprise to discover that, like definitions of *empire*, there is limited academic consensus on the meaning of the terms, other than that some sort of difference exists. Even Anderson concedes that every community above the smallest village is 'imagined'.[940] However, by considering visual and verbal representations we can distinguish between the two.

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[934] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
[935] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms* (Lamden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 1-7, 19-37.
[936] Brian Jenkins and Spyros Sofos (eds.), *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-9, 285-287; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 90-101.
[937] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
[938] Ibid., p. 3.
[939] Gerald Webster, 'American Nationalism, the Flag, and the Invasion of Iraq', *The Geographical Review* 101:1 (2011), pp. 1-18.
[940] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 37-46.

Anderson identifies the concept of *nation* as a bounded and exclusive body of people apparently sharing common cultural facets distinguishable from their neighbours: a constructed concept which emerged from state formation during the printing[941] and gunpowder[942] revolutions of the Early Modern Period, and which coalesced into a critical mass – the "nation-state" – during the economic, social, and political revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[943] The 'nation' is new – an imagined sovereign community whose advocates triumphantly proclaim their ethnic antiquity,[944] blissfully or deliberately ignorant that their apparently ancient nation, as demonstrated by the Italians in 1861, is not even as old as the steam engine. Yet it is not the case that nations are new while *empire* is old. *Empire* as a discourse exists outside of both time and space. It is a concept not primarily concerned with history or territory but with that simple division of humanity into two categories – civilised and savage, right and wrong – and the self-assurance that it is *empire*'s duty and destiny to bring order, sovereignty, and legitimacy to the world. To illustrate, let us briefly reconsider Cicero:

> 'Our Senate is the harbour and refuge of kings, tribes, nations… [seeking] to obtain the highest praise from this one thing – the guarding of the interests of our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith. Our sovereignty might then be termed the patronage, rather than the imperium, of the world'.[945]

In his address, Cicero touches upon what is one of the defining characteristics of the discourse which would later emerge into what we now term *empire* – it is not ethnically based, nor is it exclusive. At least not permanently. "Roman" for the Romans was not an ethnic group, but a status as civilised people. We need only recall how the very words *Rome* and *Romans* were appropriated by later groups to validate this. The concept of Rome was open to all. It was not merely by personal whim that Caracalla bestowed Roman municipal citizenship upon the polyglot, polycultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic population of the *imperium* in 220 AD.[946] It was not out of nationalism that the peoples of a besieged and

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[941] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 67-82.
[942] Clive Ponting, *Gunpowder: An Explosive History From the Alchemists of China to the Battlefields of Europe* (London: Pimlico, 2006), pp. 163-177.
[943] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 4, 33-36.
[944] Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (London: J. Currey, 1992).
[945] *On Moral Duties* in Cicero, *Selected Works [trans. Michael Grant]* (London: Penguin, 1960), pp. 157-211.
[946] Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World 31 BC – AD 337* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 407-409.

beleaguered Britannia wrote to Rome begging for the legions to return and save those Romans still inhabiting the damp, foggy islands on the imperium's periphery.[947] And similarly it was no foolish philosophy that prompted the Byzantines to perceive themselves as God's select guardians, nor the Holy Romans to dream of Universal Monarchy. Nation is exclusive, but *empire* is open to all – if they are willing to accept subordination and probation.

Both nation and *empire* are imagined and assembled. Neither is natural. Yet each has a different form of legitimacy. The nation is legitimate, in the eyes of its adoring masses, as it is perceived to be natural – the sovereignty of a cultural or ethnic group which is imagined to stretch back into the mists of time. *Empire*, though, is very different. It is legitimate precisely because it is un-natural. *Empire* – as Cicero's speech suggests – has constructed itself to combat a chaotic nature, *empire* is the discourse of civilisation against the chaos of nature and savagery. The discourse of *empire*, then, freely concedes and even applauds its artificiality as it is the highest form of assembled, manufactured order whose inhabitants have united to pursue a common duty and destiny of safeguarding civilisation.

The European Union, as we have seen, fits three of Anderson's criteria – imagined, sovereign, and community. Yet there is a fourth aspect of nations, according to Anderson, which is not synonymous with the European Union. Anderson argues that the nation is imagined as having clear limits; 'no nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind.'[948] The discourse of nation, he argues, 'has finite, if elastic, boundaries'.[949] But the discourse of *empire* is quite different. As a discourse appealing to unity and superiority, *empire* – as a concept, not a territorial unit – has no fixed boundaries. A boundary does exist, but it is characterised by two phenomena not distinguishable in the nation-state. Firstly it is a boundary not between one ethnic group and its surrounding neighbours, but between a simplistic dichotomy – civilised and savage. This border may have a vague spatial connotation, as we saw with the Babylonian World Map and *Leo Belgicus* but it is inherently a frontier of the mind rather than of territory. Secondly; while the national frontier is fixed, in line with the perceived antiquity of the group within, the imperial frontier is perpetually shifting as the imperials promote their self-congratulatory version of order over chaos. The result is that the Union spreads its arms to encompass all – on condition. The Union has 'confounded its monarchy with the globe of the Earth',[950] and imagines itself as 'coterminous

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[947] Foster, '"Between these two kinds of death"', pp. 1-11.
[948] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.
[949] Ibid.
[950] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol I*, Ch. I, p. 21.

with mankind'[951] – to a point. The Union expands, but only to include those deemed sufficiently civilised.[952] We could easily imagine that Switzerland or Ukraine might one day take their seats in the European Parliament, but as illustrated by the Union's 1988 rejection of Morocco's membership application on the grounds that Morocco is not European,[953] the Union is not open to all. Europe is not fixed in time or space, but it is in terms of civilisation and superiority. It is fluid and flexible, inviting the kings, tribes, and nations of Europe to its harbour and refuge – on condition that they demonstrate equity and good faith by adopting Europe's standards. It is, in principle, nation-less.

In his speech, Cicero makes this clear. The Senate represents the *idea* of Rome, and as such it is the harbour of diverse peoples who are united not by their race, language, religion, or any other arbitrary characteristics, but by their belief that *they are superior and civilised*. They are the defenders of civilisation against the barbarians beyond – barbarians who are also not defined by any of our modern, Industrial-Age concepts such as race or nationality, but simply because they have been declared as such by the self-congratulatory society which perceives itself as the sole guardian of order. This is a crucial element, and has three aspects which must be considered. Firstly, the belief that *empire* transcends trivial social divisions to unite the civilised against the savage, is a key component of the *translatio imperii*. Secondly, it is an element which distinguishes nation and *empire* – both are artificial, imagined constructs, but for different reasons. And thirdly, as this chapter will subsequently argue, it is an element which is alive and well in modern European mapping.

Much of Anderson's theory concentrates on the development and/or imposition of single languages as forces to unify groups into "nations". In the Union, this is demonstrably not the case as the Union operates in six official languages. Yet there is a single language unifying its inhabitants, one which we examined in detail in Chapter Three – visual language. The Union itself acknowledges four official symbols – the flag, the anthem, the motto, and 'Europe Day'.[954] There are other, unofficial symbols, such as the epsilon.[955] Yet as shall be demonstrated, none of these are as powerful an emblem as the map.

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[951] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

[952] Behr, 'The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule?', pp. 239-262.

[953] Peter Davidson, *Atlas of Empires* (London and Cape Town: New Holland, 2011), pp. 224-229.

[954] European Union, *Europa Portal: The EU at a glance: The symbols of the EU*. Available at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm.

[955] Conclusions of the Fontainebleau European Council (25 and 26 June 1984). Bulletin of the European Communities. June 1984, No 6. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/conclusions_of_the_fontainebleau_european_council_25_and_26_june_1984-enba12c4fa-48d1-4e00-96cc-a19e4fa5c704.html.

As visual language, the Union's cartography and iconography are vehicles of discourses. And as such, they can be approached using Billig's 'banal nationalism'. We must be wary, though, of the subtle distinction. Icons of the nation stress sameness within the community, and exclusivity of those who are different. Superiority, where it exists, is proclaimed as the superiority of one ethnic group over another. Icons of *empire* stress a similar homogeneity/heterogeneity dichotomy, and the exclusion of those beyond, but for a different reason – not because one ethnic group is better than its neighbours, but because one community has come together and achieved a status of civilisation while its neighbours languish in savagery.

The Union is, as we have argued, post-national. Or as the manifestation of *empire,* we might think of it as meta-national. Yet as was stated above, nationalism is more than mere flag-waving at military parades. Public appeals to the imagined community, using visual icons, are everywhere. Billig describes this as 'banal nationalism'; the 'endemic condition' whereby 'daily, the nation is indicated, or "flagged", in the lives of its citizenry'.[956] The image he provides is highly suggestive in the case of the Union; 'the metonymic image of banal nationalism', argues Billig, 'is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building'.[957] Icons and images of the state and the constructed community lurk in the peripheries of our vision and consciousness, perpetually appearing yet not being acknowledged. They consequently lie so deep in our conscious minds that we cease to question, criticise, or even acknowledge them.

It might be argued at this point that, like 'imagined community', banal nationalism is an inappropriate concept within which to investigate the Union. Unlike its nineteenth- and twentieth-century ancestors, the Union does not promote aggressive nationalism. Similarly, such phenomena of banal nationalism as the cult of symbols are, in comparison to the zealous fanaticism of other nation-states generally and the United States in particular,[958] absent from the Union. Notwithstanding the Europhilic and Europhobic factions inherent to Union member-states, the Union is frequently overlooked.

Yet it is precisely this trait which renders power to the Union's visual emblems. Banal nationalism is not present exclusively in those nation-states established by Victorians.

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[956] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 6.
[957] Ibid., p. 8.
[958] Robert Schatz and Howard Lavine, 'Waving the Flag: National Symbolism, Social Identity, and Political Engagement', *Political Psychology* 28:3 (2007), pp. 329-355; Gerald Webster, 'American Nationalism, the Flag, and the Invasion of Iraq', *The Geographical Review* 101:1 (2011), pp. 1-18; Chris Sibley, William Hoverd and John Duckitt, 'What's in a Flag? Subliminal Exposure to New Zealand National Symbols and the Automatic Activation of Egalitarian Versus Dominance Values', *Journal of Social Psychology* 151:4 (2011), pp. 494-516.

Fanatical flag-cults may be consigned in Europe to extreme nationalists, but this does not render the power of symbols – visual, vexillographic, and cartographic – any less significant. As Chris Sibley, William Hoverd, and John Duckitt demonstrate in their study of New Zealand state iconography, national symbols 'automatically activate normative values for ingroup members, and this effect is not limited to nations with a high frequency of flag-display behaviour like the United States'.[959]

It is all too easy for us to forget the presence of Union icons. We do not – and cannot – sing the European Anthem, we do not salute the flag as the troops of EUROFOR march down boulevards and avenues, we do not pledge allegiance to the Union in classrooms and canteens. But its presence remains. Hanging limply outside public buildings are European flags, adorning the letterheads of Union stationery are maps. With the exception of occasional journalistic rants about Union icons,[960] we forget both their presence and their contents.

Forgetting occurs in EU maps, on both the tropic and meta-tropic levels. In terms of meta-tropes we forget – if we were even aware – that maps are not reflections of reality but merely representations of it; we forget that maps are not value-free constructs but are vehicles whose very nature prohibits them from conveying discourses. Tropically, we forget that the Union is not Europe and that Europe is not the Union, yet as shall be demonstrated below, the Union's cartographies create exactly this synecdoche whereby Union and continent become entwined, brushing non-EU Europe out of visibility and out of the collective memory.

The answer to our initial questions, on whether we can understand the Union as an imagined community wherein banal nationalism exists, rests in our understanding of the Union. The consequence is that at present, the Union defies classification. There are of course problems in interrogating the Union using established techniques, but as such apparently simple constructs as nation, state, and nation-state are equally contested and ill-defined, the same could be said of investigating any political organisation. Concepts of nation and nationalism may not be flawlessly appropriate in investigating the Union, but neither are they without issue in *any* political quest. Both nation and *empire*, as discourses, are justified by appropriating select elements from – or entirely fabricating – imagination. The past is used to legitimise the present; in the case of nations by appealing to an apparent antiquity specific to the ethnic group, and in *empire* by the antiquity of the group's rightful status as guardians of civilisation. This allows us to answer our earlier quandary. If the European Union is not a

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[959] Sibley et al., 'What's in a Flag?', pp. 494-516.
[960] Piers Fotiadis, *The Strange Power of Maps: How maps work politically and influence our understanding of the world*. MSc thesis in International Relations, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, 2009.

nation, can it be assessed using the tools and techniques of nationalism? The answer is yes. Both *empire* and nation are constructed, but their inhabitants perceive different imagined histories. It is this last characteristic which is crucial. Regardless of whether their advocates acknowledge or erase memory of their recent formation – the act of collective forgetting – both are constructed communities whose identity is formed by contrast to those beyond their frontier. Whether the frontier exists in space-time or the mind, is unimportant. A line is proclaimed, a community imagined, and the community unified by symbols. And just as Panofsky's iconography allows us to critically interrogate Union emblems, so too does Billig's 'banal nationalism' help us to understand the extraordinary power of EU maps.

Today's European Union is paradoxically proud of its lack of national pride.[961] Through our apparent transcendence beyond the old nation-states constructed by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europeans, we are assured that we should, and do, embrace a meta-identity beyond nations.[962] Yet in doing so, we have simply replicated the same phenomenon as Europeans of yesteryear. Just as Prussians, Saxons, and Würtemmbergers transcended their previous loyalties to emerge as *Germans*;[963] just as Venetians, Neapolitans, Modenans and Genoans abandoned archaic affiliations to become *Italians*;[964] old identities as Swedes and Spaniards, Poles and Portuguese are coalescing into a single new identity as *Europeans*. Since 1945 we have witnessed a gradual but evident coming-together of Europe which would be familiar to those of Bismarck's *reichsgründung*, Garibaldi's *risorgimento*, or Ben-Gurion's *kibbutz galuyot*. And liberally sprinkled amongst Europe's latest political primordial soup are emblems and maps suggesting to Europe's mobile, post-national, self-adulatory citizenry that *We* are better than *Them*.

Of course, this is not, and never was, a conscious and devious scheme by Europe's mapmakers. And despite the vigorous calls from some political figureheads in the Union to form a single identity, it would be inappropriate to point to some illusory "elite" and accuse them of manipulating our thoughts. Maps *can* be warped to suit political agendas, but this does not necessarily mean that they *are*. Yet this is a moot point, for no map is neutral.

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[961] Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe [trans. Ciaran Cronin]* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), pp. 4-5, 13-14, 131.
[962] Ibid.
[963] Thomas Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800–1866* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
[964] George Macauley Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand: May, 1860* (London: Longmans, 2001 [orig. 1909]), pp. 11-19, 316.

The choice of maps as bold images on Europe's new media has created an inescapable political problem. No map is neutral, and as we saw in Chapter Four, even those charts drawn simply to scientific specifications of graticules and gradients are saturated with political messages both subtle and gross. Raento and Brunn argue that it is precisely the mundanity of these emblems, couple with our individual perspectives, which imbue these images with power. Because of their mundane nature and because we see each image slightly differently, they argue, we *forget* that these icons are official, state-produced (or state-approved) icons saturated with the political messages which, conscious or not, all state-associated imagery contains.[965] Because we forget this, we are less aware of the political discourses embedded within. This is pertinent for any political emblem but as we have seen, the map is a special case – because we instinctively trust the map to be a mirror of reality. When this map appears within a visual spider's web of state-approved iconography, the act of forgetting is doubled. We forget that maps are not mirrors, and we forget that state-approved maps are, even with the best of intentions, inextricable from political discourse. They 'seek to unite and foster a common heritage and "an imagined community", raising heroic stories to visibility and erasing shameful ones'.[966] In Europe's maps, the heroic tale raised to visibility is that of unity, sovereignty, legitimacy and monopoly – *only* the Union has the right to rule Europe, and it is not merely the Union's right but indeed its destiny. Meanwhile the shameful stories – non-EU Europeans, the remnants of Soviet rule, the savages lurking in the wilderness beyond the self-anointed civilisation of the Union – are visually ignored. The power of a manufactured memory is visible in all of the Union's iconography, but is most visible in Europe's maps.

'Only if people believe that they have national identities,' writes Billig, 'will ... homelands, and the world of national homelands, be reproduced'.[967] This is what Billig calls *'deixis'*; a device continually placing the readers of public media as inhabiting a specific and exclusive homeland.[968] Deixis lies at the heart of Union cartography and its inherent discourses; the cartographic juxtaposition of people, civilisation and destiny. In his analysis of the visual iconography of newly-emergent states, Stanley Brunn identifies some curious phenomena. Such iconography invariably features 'important symbols, thereby strengthening

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[965] Pauliina Raento and Stanley Brunn, 'Visualizing Finland: Postage Stamps as Political Messengers', *Geografiska Annaler* 87 (2005), pp. 145-163.
[966] Ibid.
[967] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 8.
[968] Ibid., p. 11.

its expression of sovereignty',[969] and new polities frequently adorn their official visual materials with maps, 'including those saying "we are not part of the world" or "here we are and we want you to know it"'.[970] Deixis between map and symbol emerges, morphing into a political emblem. The consequence of official visual materials, such as cartographic icons, 'may not have the overt symbolic value and appeal of a flag, national anthem, national coat of arms, or monument, but they are subtle but important symbols'.[971] These symbols are the tropes and meta-tropes of Union cartographies.

We will not, as specified earlier, focus on the tropes of EU mapping. Yet we must acknowledge the components of cartography. Just as we cannot appreciate the symbolic gesture of Panofsky's hat-wearing pedestrian without understanding the actual objects and physical actions involved in his gesture, we cannot identify discourses in cartography without being aware of its basic elements.

5.2   European Tropes

At first glance we might consider that maps convey their meaning only through their tropes: or the sum thereof. Whether seeking spatial information or simply appreciating the artistry of cartography, we absorb their symbols, colours, and words, subconsciously assembling iconographic meaning from the tropes.

One of the first points we must consider is that the Union uses remarkably few maps. And alone, there is little which can be commented upon in the tropes of the Union's maps. To illustrate this, let us consider the figures below:

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[969] Stanley Brunn, 'Stamps as iconography: Celebrating the independence of new European and Central Asian states', *GeoJournal* 52 (2000), pp. 315-323.
[970] Ibid.
[971] Ibid.

Fig. 5.1 – *Europa* map I[972]

Fig. 5.2 – *Europa* map II[973]

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[973] Image retrieved from: http://europa.eu/abc/maps/index_en.htm.

Fig. 5.3 – *Europa* map III[974]

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[974] Image retrieved from: http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/europe-a-to-z/eu-symbols.htm.

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Fig. 5.4 – Ezilon map[975]

Fig. 5.5 – Bannerhead map[976]

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[975] Image retrieved from: http://www.ezilon.com/map_of_europe.htm.
[976] Image retrieved from *Visual Identity Guidelines*, p. 28.

Here we see several maps used by the Union's institutions. The first four are internet maps which appear on the Union's *europa* web portal and affiliated sites, facilitating understanding of the Union by presenting a pair of convenient, simple charts. Beneath we see a universal letterhead for European Commission documents and websites. Their tropes are simple, and quickly considered.

The first trope to investigate is script. In the uppermost two maps, place-names are rendered using the Latin alphabet, in local tongues. Thus Italy is *Italia*, Germany is *Deutschland*, and so forth. Most non-Union states are also named, again using the Latin alphabet. The only tropes worthy of comment are that some countries do not even warrant a name – and while Union states which use the Cyrillic or Hellenic alphabet are rendered as such, and a non-Union candidate country is rendered in its own Turkic script, Russian and Arab-speaking neighbours receive no such special labelling. Instead they are assigned Europeanised names rendered in Latin script. It must be conceded that whether mapmakers try to acknowledge local ethnographies or not, they run the risk of being accused of unflattering portrayals. Eric Worby points out that the use of local names and alphabets is both a colonial and postcolonial practice depending upon the perception of the viewer and the prevailing zeitgeist,[977] either emphasising the power of the colonised or the indigenous peoples. We could dissect this phenomenon indefinitely and not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion – as Barthes underlines regarding visual artefacts generally,[978] and as Monmonier expresses specifically to cartography,[979] we run the risk of reading meanings and intentions into the object which may not really be there. Yet we are able to identify one curious trope.

While members or prospective members of the Union receive special alphabetical treatment, those who are not even considered potential members are barely even acknowledged. We can clearly connect this to Anderson's theory of the collective act of forgetting, and what Raento terms 'raising heroic stories to visibility and erasing shameful ones'.[980] The Union is proudly proclaimed in bright colours, and its Unity in Diversity is alphabetically acknowledged for those deemed part of the collective civilisation, while the "shameful" tale of non-EU Europe is casually, almost lazily, overlooked. In this way, the Union is prominently displayed in a way that acknowledges the individuality of members but still categorises them as components of a larger supra-polity; a map which fully displays a realm of visually superior civilisation contrasted against the barbaric beyond.

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[977] Worby, 'Maps, Names, and Ethnic Games', pp. 371-392.
[978] Roland Barthes, *The Empire of Signs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
[979] Monmonier, *Rhumb Lines and Map Wars*, pp. 174-175.
[980] Raento and Brunn, 'Visualizing Finland', p. 145.

One penultimate trope is worthy of consideration. Cyprus, currently the subject of a geopolitical contest between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is depicted as a single state in defiance of Turkish claims. Yet we need not speculate as to a reason. Lowell Johns makes it clear that their cartographers must adhere to the Union's political principles[981] and in issues pertaining to Cyprus, the Union officially recognises the *de jure* complete sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire island – and expects the Republic of Turkey to defer to Union diplomacy.[982] In all others cases and in the letterhead, we see internationally-recognised borders. The letterhead, though, does not feature Africa – we will return to this in due course.

The final trope, and arguably the most visible in these maps, is colour. We live in an ocularcentric age, and EU citizens are exposed to an incessant daily bombardment of exciting images and bright colours in all mass media; including maps. Bright colours enliven icons and maps, catching our attention and rendering objects visually appealing.[983] Colour is, as Kress and van Leeuwen identify,[984] both a powerful signifier as well as a semiotic signifier in visual language – and especially so in cartography where it can become powerful discourse in its own right.[985] But despite its omnipresence, colour – as Monmonier argues – is 'a cartographic quagmire'.[986]

Philip and Juliana Muehrcke claim that 'colors … are often manipulated on maps to produce the desired psychological response'.[987] No support is given for this assertion, but it is reflective of much critical cartographic thinking on colour. Alongside Muehrcke and Muehrcke, Monmonier,[988] Wood,[989] and Virga[990] all devote space to discussions of how colour energises a map and makes it eye-catching – but with different conclusions about the connotations of colour. As Kress and van Leeuwensummarise, 'literature on the emotive meanings of colour is quite inconsistent'.[991] Thus, having spent most of cartographic history as a rare and expensive application only used for special purposes,[992] colour now dominates

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[981] Porteous, LowellJohns (2012).

[982] European Union, *Europa Portal: The EU at a glance: The Symbols of the EU*. Available at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm. It is also worth noting that the maps' southern cutoff is conveniently north of Damascus, releasing the Union from awkwardness of how to display Israel/Palestine.

[983] Ibid.; Jeremy Black, *Visions of the World: A History of Maps* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 2003), p. 100.

[984] Kress and van Leeuwen, *Visual Grammar*, pp. 6-7.

[985] Richard Howells, *Visual Culture* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), p. 18.

[986] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, p. 163.

[987] Muehrcke, *Map Use*, p. 529.

[988] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 163-173.

[989] Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 99-100; Denis Wood and Ward Kaiser, *Seeing Through Maps: Many Ways to See the World* (Amherst, MA: ODT Inc., 2001).

[990] Vincent Virga, *Cartographia: Mapping Civilizations* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007).

[991] Kress and van Leeuwen, *Visual Grammar*, p. 266.

[992] Black, *Visions of the World*, p. 100.

maps. Since the nineteenth- and twentieth century advent of mass mapping and chromolithography, colour has become an aspect of maps that viewers expect to see – and for good reason.[993] Charles Riley asserts that 'colours arrive charged with so much emotional and symbolic weight that they tend to overburden the thin barrier of demarcation between the viewer and the image'.[994] a phenomenon which Kress and van Leeuwen term 'the psychology of perception'.[995] This in itself is nothing new, as humans have been using public displays of bold colour to grab attention since recorded history began.[996] But as Monmonier states, 'little is known about the effects upon map users of a variety of subjective reactions to color'.[997] Despite the best efforts of anthropologists and commercial marketers, there is not even a universal consensus on how many colours exist,[998] let alone what association exists between colours and emotions; and it is ultimately futile to attempt to reach such a consensus. However, we can identify political discourses inherent in the trope.

As John Gage highlights, 'colour language has never been adequate to create symbolic associations'.[999] We will examine this in the context of cartography specifically, and iconographically. Consider Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 below:

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[993] Black, *Maps and Politics*, p. 50.
[994] Charles A. Riley III, *Color Codes: Modern Theories of Color in Philosophy, Painting and Architecture, Literature, Music, and Psychology* (Hanover, CO: University of New England Press, 1995), p. 317.
[995] Kress and van Leeuwen, *Visual Grammar*, p. 1.
[996] Leonard Cottrell, *Life Under the Pharaohs* (Sutton Publishing: Stroud, 1955), pp. 58-61, 175-184.
[997] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, p. 170.
[998] John Gage, 'Did Colors Signify? Symbolism in the Red', in *What Meaning had Colour in Early Societies?* Cambridge Archaeological Journal 9:1 (1991), p. 111.
[999] Gage, 'Did Colors Signify?', p. 110.

Fig 5.6 – *Europa* Map I[1000]

[1000] Image retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/projects/centres/index_en.htm.

Fig. 5.7 – *Europa* Map II[1001]

In the above maps, the cartographers at Lowell Johns have wheeled out colour, one of the big guns of what Monmonier terms 'a cartographic arsenal',[1002] in order to communicate a message. But what message?

Let us initially adopt Panofsky's *natural meaning*. What do we see? A hypsometric scheme of yellows and browns, a shade of blue or a greyish-white, and white. At this level of interpretation the colours have absolutely no meaning. They are purely biomechanical illusions: light from the Sun reflects from printed colours or electrophotonic pixels on a computer screen, with different coloured inks or pixels reflecting light at different wavelengths. These waves enter our eyes at different refractive indexes and our brains distinguish between these different frequencies of light to suggest colours.[1003] Like the

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[1001] Image retrieved from: http://europa.eu/abc/maps/index_en.htm.
[1002] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, pp. 107-110.
[1003] MacEachren, *How Maps Work*, pp. 51-67.

pedestrian lifting his hat, it is a purely physical phenomenon with no inherent meaning. Perhaps on the second level of *conventional meaning*, we might unpick some inherent message. Yet even on this level of associative themes,[1004] there is no consensus on the meanings of yellow, blue, and grey. Monmonier and Schnell assure us that yellow and brown invoke 'feelings of pleasure, happiness and comfort',[1005] but no supporting evidence or theory is provided. Blue is even more problematic. For Monmonier, the blue used for EU candidate states represents 'coldness, depression… and submissive faith';[1006] for Carolyn Anderson it conveys a sense of political authority,[1007] while for Muehrcke and Muehrcke the same hue elicits 'a sense of comfort'.[1008] As Panofsky reminds us in his hypothetical scenario, the pedestrian's lifting of his hat is culturally bound – an Australian bushman or an ancient Greek, to use Panofsky's words, would not understand it as a greeting even though we do; because the same action, image, or trope can have wildly different meanings in different cultures. We need only think back to the Polynesian stick-chart (Fig. 4.6) or the Babylonian world map (Fig. 3.7), to be reminded of how even the simplest tropes are perfectly comprehensible to one culture but baffling to another. This is clearly the case with colour. As John Gage makes clear,[1009] there simply is no universal theory of colour.[1010] In light of what MacEachren terms the 'cultural specificity of colour',[1011] there is little point in trying to unpick the unconscious associations of this trope.

Thus concludes our analysis of the tropes of Union maps. We have examined the maps' legends, their projections, their depictions of international frontiers, and their colours; and at this point, many a cartographic study would terminate. Yet this is merely an investigation on the level of Panofsky's *primary* or *factual meaning*. We can go one step further to the level of *secondary* or *conventional meaning*, and examine the maps in their context as visual artefacts bound up in a complex web of visual language, semantics, and iconography. And just as this level of meaning transforms the passing pedestrian's hat from a purely bio-mechanical movement into a friendly gesture of greeting, so too does an

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[1004] Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes In the Art of the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 6; Panofsky, *Meaning In the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History* (New York: Overlook Press, 1974).
[1005] Mark Monmonier and George Schnell, *Map Appreciation* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 529.
[1006] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, p. 171.
[1007] Carolyn Anderson, 'Constructing the Military Landscape: the Board of Ordnance Maps and Plans of Scotland, 1689-1755', *Magnificent Maps: Maps in Context Academic Symposium*, British Library, London, 14 June 2010.
[1008] Muehrcke and Muehrcke, *Map Use*, p. 529.
[1009] Gage, 'Did Colors Signify?', p. 311.
[1010] Edith Feisner, *Color Studies* (New York: Fairchild Publications, 2006), pp. 120-123, 126-127.
[1011] Alan MacEachren, *How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design* (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1995), p. 329.

iconographical analysis transform a collection of colours and lines into icons of *empire*. The conventional meaning is hiding in this rich tapestry of meta-tropes.

However, before examining the meta-tropes of the maps we must consider a meta-trope of cartography itself. As we identified in Chapter Three, 'maps' can take a wide variety of forms, including media which at first glance we might never consider maps. When we ask directions, we receive a verbal map. When we use Google Earth, we gaze upon a photographic map. And when we look at a flag or political emblem, we not only see a map but also a political vehicle which continually establishes Billig's deixis, merging people, place, civilisation, sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny into one. Before examining EU cartographies, then, we must first investigate the deixical nature of EU icons.

5.3   European Meta-Tropes

Existing studies of cartography and iconography – especially those in relation to the Union[1012] – operate according to tropes. To a degree, this is not only understandable but indeed essential as the aspects of an image are of great significance.[1013] But as argued in Chapter Three, maps are much more than a mere collection of graticules, gradients, and scales. They are complex syntheses of visual language, which must be read as texts. The *tropes* of European maps must of course be investigated, but these are of less significance than the *meta-tropes*. Where the maps are found, and what other texts (such as official symbols and writing) intersect with them, is of great importance.

Maps on EU websites do not appear in isolation. They are always depicted in relation to symbols and text. To understand the maps' discourses, we must consider them as part of a structure formed from various types of language.

The bodies of the European Union recognise a variety of official symbols. These are: the circle of twelve stars (which appears both on the EU flag, and as a separate symbol), the European anthem, and the European motto ("United in Diversity").[1014] For our purposes the

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[1012] Raento et al., 'Striking Stories: a political geography of euro coinage'.

[1013] Rose, *Visual Methodologies*; Paul Cobley and Litza Jansz, *Introducing Semiotics: A Graphic Guide* (London: Icon, 2010).

[1014] Resolution (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (11 April 2000). Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution (2000) 2 on the Council of Europe's information strategy (11 April 2000). [ON-LINE]. [Strasbourg]: Council of Europe, [06.10.2004]. Res(2000) 2. Available at: http://https://wcm.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=349269&Lang=en.

anthem of Europe – Ludwig van Beethoven's *Ode to Joy*[1015] – is of limited importance. Notwithstanding Billig's assertion that national anthems are powerful unifiers of the state – 'a prayer sung by people worshipping their country'[1016] – and other than its implicit tropes of equality in that the European anthem has no lyrics,[1017] the anthem is a symbol mostly absent from this study as, unlike maps or icons, it does not suddenly appear in the background whenever an inquisitive reader looks at a billboard, clicks a hyperlink to an EU website, or opens an official EU leaflet. Yet the other two symbols warrant examination in their context of cartography. These are: the flag of the European Union, and the visual language which accompanies official publications.

The power of images and icons is clearly of importance to the European Union, whose bodies and institutions issue rigid guidelines on "Visual Identity",[1018] strictly governing the use of images and icons harking back to the European flag, and whose meanings are emphatically asserted[1019] and which have to be clear, simple, and immediately recognisable. Consider as an example Figs 5.8 and 5.9:

[1015] Recommendation 994 (1984) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (3 October 1984). Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 994 (1984) on the future of European cooperation (General policy of the Council of Europe). [ON-LINE]. [Strasbourg]: Council of Europe, [30.01.2006]. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta84/EREC994.htm. Beethoven's 1824 tune corresponds to Friederich Schiller's 1788 poem, which for political reasons was adopted in 1972 as the European anthem. See Fornäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 149-204.

[1016] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 86.

[1017] Lettre de Marcelino Oreja à Carlo Ripa di Meana (Strasbourg, 26 février 1986). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe - Historical archives of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex. Le drapeau - The Flag, 2191. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/lettre_de_marcelino_oreja_a_carlo_ripa_di_meana_strasbourg_26_fevrier_1986-fr-2549b602-65ec-4f56-a1e2-32c989dcbd82.html.

[1018] Council of Europe, *One organisation, one logo: Visual Identity Standards Manual*. Available at: https://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/media/interface/publications/Visual_Id_Standards_MANUAL_March2009_extract.pdf.

[1019] To cite one example, the European Ombudsman, whose logo is a confusing geometric jumble of yellow and blue lines, states that the logo 'is designed to reach out to wide audiences', 'to be engaging, appropriate, and memorable', and that 'the blue and yellow colours are a reminder of the European flag, which corresponds to the boundaries within which we operate. The circular shape represents unity and consensus'. Clearly, the European Ombudsman is proud of its professionally-designed logo and insists that the logo is a benign symbol for all of Europe, not just the Union. See: European Ombudsman, 'The European Ombudsman's visual identity', http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/press/visualidentity.faces. Perhaps the best examples of public and professional European icons are found in the European Presidency, which rotates every six months between member nations. Beginning with the British in 1998, who unveiled a remarkably ugly icon (http://web.archive.org/web/20030731055100/http://presid.fco.gov.uk/aboutlogo) solicited in a public relations stunt, every European Presidency has chosen its own logo which is then unleashed in a six-month bombardment of merchandise and visual materials. The explanations given for many icons border on the absurd, combining pastel shades and abstract shapes reminiscent of a nursery classroom or a petrol station forecourt with political boilerplate on 'common values', 'togetherness', 'growth and development', 'progressive thinking', 'freedom', 'brotherhood', and 'civic solidarity'. All of these images are either commissioned from private artists, or chosen from entries to national competitions. Many Presidency logos have disappeared into the *terra incognitae* of the internet, but a (partial) database is maintained at http://www.jonworth.eu/presidency-logos-a-retrospective/.

Fig 5.8: Logo pre-2012   **Fig. 5.9**: Logo post-2012

Here we see the pre- and post-2012 logos adopted by the Union's border control agency, Frontex. In Frontex's words, the former image 'represents land border (green line), sea border (blue circle) and air border (background) linked by EU stars. There is also the self-explanatory inscription: Libertas, Securitas, Justitia'.[1020] However these abstract references to an imagined community in geographical terms, along with an imagined community in historical terms denoted by a collective Latin motto, were apparently inadequate expressions of unity. In 2012 the agency adopted a new logo which is 'easier to read and more cost-effective to reproduce, combining an image of interconnected bridges in different colours, representing – following the rationale of the old logo – the three different borders (air, land, sea), with Frontex displayed in a new font. The logo is endorsed by the European Union flag to underline that Frontex is an EU agency'.[1021] Irrespective of how we interpret the paradox of borders being replaced by bridges for a Frontex logo, this case is replicated in the visual guidelines of other Union bodies, which emphasise simple icons which can be instantly recognised as symbols of the Union.[1022]

[1020] The Frontex website was overhauled in late 2012, with the old logo and this explanation deleted. The image and text were taken from the old site prior to its renovation, and can still be seen at http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2010/01/03/the-meaning-of-the-frontex-logo/.

[1021] Frontex, *General Report 2012*. European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland, p. 27. Available at: www.frontex.europa.eu.

[1022] Council of Europe, *One organisation, one logo: Visual Identity Standards Manual*. Available at: https://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/media/interface/publications/Visual_Id_Standards_MANUAL_March2009_extract.pdf.

It is important to note that the Union's main icons and artefacts were not imposed from above, but rather were the product of public contests. The flag,[1023] anthem,[1024] and even the maps adorning Euro currency – which will be examined in the next chapter – were all selected by committees from entries into public contests.[1025] It is equally interesting to note that many entries borrowed heavily from the iconography of Charlemagne, as emblems of European universality and unity.[1026] This raises a critical point.

Alongside a legal disclaimer, the flag is only one of two EU symbols which must, by Council and Commission[1027] graphic guidelines, appear on *every* piece of Union-affiliated media or merchandise. We must thus consider the power of official Union symbolism in cartography.

5.3.1 Symbols of Empire

As we identified in Chapter Three, maps are merely one dialect within a rich visual language. And like other forms of visual language, they are only comprehensible within a framework of semantics and visual grammar embodying various other forms of visual representation. Significantly for our study, this includes political symbolism. It might be asked why a study

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[1023] Council of Europe, *One organisation, one logo: Visual Identity Standards Manual*.

[1024] Carlo Curti Gialdino, The Symbols of the European Union: the origin of the name 'euro'. CURTI GIALDINO, Carlo. I Simboli dell'Unione europea, Bandiera - Inno - Motto - Moneta - Giornata. Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato S.p.A., 2005. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/carlo_curti_gialdino_the_symbols_of_the_european_union_the_origin_of_the_name_euro-end8ed293c-e2b9-43d6-b4ec-94c03eb0a977.html; The symbols of the European Union — Full text. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_symbols_of_the_european_union_full_text-en-e135ba77-1bae-43d8-bcb7-e416be6bc590.html.

[1025] Political symbols are frequently organic (i.e: developed at the grassroots level, then picked up by elites) or solicited through competitions as a public relations sop, signifiying collective political involvement. Like the European Union, the Soviet Union's symbols – flag, anthem, public holidays, and designs for public buildings of epic scale – were all the result of public competitions to express the Soviets' own Unity in Diversity. For the 'dictatorial Eurovision song contest' which produced the Soviet anthem, see Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Phoenix, 2004), pp. 465-471; on the political connotations of Soviet iconography and images see Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004), pp. 543-545; on the importance of 'visual propaganda' in the Soviet Union, see Edvard Radzinsky, *Stalin [trans. H.T. Willetts]* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996), pp. 373-377. The EU chooses its visual emblems through a mixture of public competitions and professional commissions.

[1026] Lettre d'Arsène Heitz à Filippo Caracciolo (Strasbourg, 5 janvier 1952). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/lettre_d_arsene_heitz_a_filippo_caracciolo_strasbourg_5_janvier_1952-fr-6b758d67-f606-4ac9-90fc-3339fe66a76c.html.

[1027] Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions (2010). European Commission: EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Bruxelles. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eropeaid, p. 19.

of European Union maps is veering into vexillology, symbology, and iconography – apparently unrelated areas. The answer to this is twofold.

Firstly, symbols and icons are essential to understanding any maps. Maps are ultimately a form of image, and as Marina Bagnoli asserts, 'the meaning of images [is] clear only in relation to each other and to the world',[1028] and 'it is the interaction of the image with its surrounding that constructs meaning'.[1029] These operate, in the public sphere, on a collective level at which symbols are mutually recognised by the public. 'Symbols,' confirms Longina Jakubowska, 'evoke shared meanings, shared not because they are common to different groups, although they may be, but because they overlap and thus enable communication between them'.[1030] Thus maps do not appear alone, but with a host of intersecting and overlapping visual and verbal determinatives to help the viewer make sense of their implicit meaning. Indeed the *Visual Identity Guidelines* of the Union stress the importance of multiple interlinked symbolic, visual means of communication over writing, which reveals much about the power of accompanying marginalia.[1031]

A cursory glance at a European Union map in comparison to the cluttered cartographies of yesteryear, reveals a sharp difference. From the first reprintings of Claudius Ptolemy's rediscovered world map in the early fifteenth century[1032] through the emerging maps of the Age of Discovery[1033] and into the pompous, grandiose cartographic conquests of the late nineteenth century,[1034] modern Western maps were littered with jumbled imagery and a chaotic clutter of icons surrounding, surmounting, and intersecting the map in a baffling palimpsest of visual imagery. But the Union's maps are sleek, clear, and devoid of what Monmonier calls 'dysfunctional clutter'.[1035] Indeed the Union's own *Visual Identity Guidelines* stress the following:

[1028] Martina Bagnoli, 'L'Iconographie Médiévale by Jérôme Baschet, Paris: Gallimard, 2008 [Review]', *Association of Art Historians* (2011), pp. 1051-1053.
[1029] Ibid., p. 1052.
[1030] Longina Jakubowska, 'Political drama in Poland: The use of national symbols', *Anthropology Today* 6:4 (1990), pp. 10-13.
[1031] Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map*.
[1032] Philip Allen, *Atlas of Atlases* (London: Bounty Books, 2005), pp. 22-24.
[1033] Beau Riffenburgh, *The Men Who Mapped the World: The Treasures of Cartography* (London: Carlton, 2011).
[1034] Black, *Visions of the World*, pp. 68-97.
[1035] Mark Monmonier, 'Picturing Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science by Brian Baigrie (ed.) [Review]', *The Geographical Review* 87:3 (1997), pp. 425-427.

'Except for flat colour tints and drop shadows on the text (use sparingly – never use outlines), no other graphic effect is allowed in this visual identity. A limited use of visual elements is allowed to create a visual environment appropriate to the target audience of a given communication initiative. "Less is more" is the motto. It is important that covers, posters, and others are not cluttered with any superfluous elements.'[1036]

However, this does not mean that Union maps are apolitical, neutral, scientific cartographies. The maps themselves may be uncluttered and even the broader visual context in which they use may be sleek, modernist, and visually efficient; but they do not appear alone. Visual and textual messages accompany them.

The Union's internet maps come with convenient translations of the accompanying text, but text on the maps themselves is by necessity limited and multilingual. It is primarily through symbols – using the semantic and semiotic mechanisms which we explored in Chapter Four – that we make sense of the otherwise chaotic jumble of shapes and colours which are EU maps. Understanding their accompanying iconography is not only useful, but indeed essential.

Our second reason for studying European symbols is that they are not merely parts of maps, they *are* maps. And just as maps and icons convey discourses, they are discourses in themselves.[1037] Symbols which may bear no resemblance whatsoever to Earth's topography can nevertheless express spatial and political information. Let us consider an example. In the preceding chapter we encountered Lieutenant George and his military map. The mushroom-shaped symbols on it are mere *signifiers*, indicating a threat. These symbols are so neutral and devoid of emotional baggage that the hapless Lieutenant completely misinterprets their meaning. However, not all symbols are this abstract. If the Lieutenant's map had featured, for example, a British flag to denote its institute of origin, encourage conscious affiliation with the British Empire, or simply as a familiar, colourful image to cheer up its users in the trenches, then his map would contain an entirely different discourse. Unlike the frequently random symbols which make up map language, political symbols such as flags[1038] – or coats

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[1036] Council of Europe, *Visual Identity Guidlines*, p. 15.
[1037] Daniel Corstange, 'Religion, Pluralism, and Iconography in the Public Sphere: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon', *World Politics* 64:1 (2012), pp. 116-160.
[1038] Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, pp. 115-148.

of arms,[1039] portraits,[1040] even the lettering and typography, on which the European Union does have guidelines[1041] – are neither neutral nor value-free. Flags are recognised not only by the populations they represent but by wider international communities; and on maps they come with existing political connotations which reinforce the mapreader's faith in the map, and connote political control. The evolution of this theme is that the flag itself not only explains the map, it *becomes* the map.

5.3.2 Waving the Flag

'The EU flag constitutes the main element of the European visual identity.'[1042]

Flags are only one tool in an iconographic arsenal, but with the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, flags have evolved from the barely-beheld banners of barons and bishops in the Middle Ages, and the gaudy gonfalons and princely pennants on the battlefields of Early Modern monarchs, to the most visible and recognised emblems of a country.[1043] The quotes with which we began this chapter emphasised the quest, in a Europe rebuilding itself from its own apocalypse, for an emblem which would complement the European flag as a visible signifier of the European people.

As Billig discusses at length, flags are vital components of manufacturing the community.[1044] Europe is no exception. In Chapter Three we examined the multifarious nature of maps – maps can be gestured, performed, drawn, thought, or spoken. Icons of the community such as the anthem and the flag are kinds of map; delineating a community which, while abstract in the form of an icon or a song, corresponds to a parallel counterpart in space. Let us clarify this.

'Flags,' writes Gerald Webster, 'are symbolic containers that "condense a range of meanings and emotions pertaining to a group's perceived historical experience, real or

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[1039] Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map*, pp. 1-40; Hodgkiss, *Discovering Antique Maps*, pp. 10-21.
[1040] Portraits of people were almost universal on European maps from the Early Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. Such people might be real (sponsors, patrons, the cartographers who made the map, or representations of historical figures such as Ptolemy, Caesar, or Aristotle), generic representations of ethnic or national groups, or personifications of the continents – Europa, Asia, Africa, and Columbia. Inevitably, these female personifications of the other continents were shown kneeling before Europa, dressed as a universal queen. See Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map*, pp. 131-176; Wintle, *The Image of Europe*, 236-279.
[1041] *Visual Identity Guidelines*, pp. 20-24.
[1042] *Communication and Visibility Manual*, p. 31 [Annex 2].
[1043] Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, pp. 115-117.
[1044] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, pp. 39-43.

imagined cultural homogeneity, and efforts to define a similarity of outlook for the future"'.[1045] Similarly in his study, Sibley identifies 'the ability of the national flag to activate prescribed values ... not only in situations where peoples' attention is *explicitly* drawn to the national flag but also in conditions where people *are not necessarily aware* of recent exposure to the flag'.[1046] We see a clear link here to the concept of banal nationalism. Like the omnipresent flag 'hanging unnoticed on the public building',[1047] the EU flag appears alongside cartography. Thus a deixis is established; the flag and the map, both of which are spatial representations of the imagined community of the Union, become intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Both express where Europe is, and who is and is not considered "European".

This in itself is nothing new. Flags – religious, dynastic, and national – have long appeared on maps, performing the same function of associating, in the mapreader's mind, space and power, and is especially visible in maps of overseas territories claimed by a distant homeland.[1048] In this latter case, as Harley argues, the discourse of dominance and destiny is unavoidable – the territory represented is, by all apparent rights, the property of the state whose flag appears on or alongside the map.[1049] The flag acts as a symbol of sovereignty, offering an easily-recognisable symbol which assures the viewer – through an unquestioned cartographic medium – that the state is *right* to do this.[1050] The discourse represented is one of sovereign inequality; the essence of *empire*. In the case of the Union, not only does this discourse lurk in the visual rhetoric, but the ideology expressed by the flag becomes entwined with the map. To understand this, let us investigate the same tropes of the EU flag as the maps – colour, and iconography.

In his study of the iconography of Early Modern cartography, Toby Lester argues that certain political icons may be treated as "maps". To illustrate this Lester examines the *Reichsadler*, the double-headed eagle of the Holy Roman Empire, in its context as a symbol not only of the entire Empire but of the Empire's claim to Universal Monarchy over the world itself:

[1045] Webster, 'American Nationalism', p. 2.
[1046] Chris Sibley, William Hoverd and John Duckitt, 'What's in a Flag? Subliminal Exposure to New Zealand National Symbols and the Automatic Activation of Egalitarian Versus Dominance Values', *Journal of Social Psychology* 151:4 (2011), pp. 494-516 (emphasis added).
[1047] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 8.
[1048] Harley, *The New Nature of Maps*, p. 46.
[1049] Ibid.
[1050] Ibid., pp. 136-137.

Fig 5.10: *Reichsadler* (*Aquila Imperialis*) of the Holy Roman Empire[1051]

[1051] Image taken from Whitfield, *The Image of the World*, p. 77.

In the above image, the double-headed eagle – a symbol which Charlemagne had borrowed from medieval Byzantium wherein the two-headed bird had symbolised the *Basileus'* temporal and spiritual authority and Byzantium's claim to rule both the Eastern and Western Roman Empire – transcends the boundary between political symbol and map. There exists today a multitude of political emblems ranging from the abstract and symbolic to the recognisable and iconographic. Initially we might consider that the Imperial Eagle is little more than a symbol. Yet even without the map, the eagle's representation of the regions of the *Reich* transforms the eagle itself into a form of map. All maps, as we have argued, are representations rather than reflections. Here, the most significant component-states within the *Reich* are represented via their heraldry on the eagle's wings. Not all states, though, are included: at the time of the image's creation in 1510, hundreds of small, petty states made up the Holy Roman Empire.[1052] Representing this number is no mean feat. Instead, the eagle represents the entirety of the Empire through its portrayal of specific parts – it becomes what we have now identified as a synecdochal metonym; the use of a part to represent the whole. As Lester argues,[1053] the double eagle was such a recognisable symbol in Early Modern Europe, representing the Holy Roman Empire's sovereignty, that it became indelibly associated not merely with the legal territories of the *Reich* but with the Emperors' still-extant claims to European universality and Universal Monarchy. By selecting a political symbol to represent all the peoples of the *Sacrum Imperium*, framed within the visual symbology of a powerful crowned eagle looking to East and West, to the past and the future, and to the sacred and the profane, the symbol became a form of map even before it was explicitly stamped on cartographies of Germany,[1054] Europe,[1055] and even Earth[1056] later in the period. The same phenomenon occurs today. Lester describes the Imperial Eagle as 'visual shorthand for the Holy Roman Empire'.[1057] We might well consider that the flag of the Union performs the same function as shorthand for Europe:

[1052] Patrick O'Brien (ed.), *Philip's Atlas of World History: From the Origins of Humanity to the Year 2000* (London: George Philip, 1999), pp. 152-153.

[1053] Lester, *Fourth Part of the World*, pp. 362-365.

[1054] Baynton-Williams, *New Worlds*, pp. 60-61.

[1055] John Hessler, *The Naming of America: Martin Waldseemüller's 1507 World Map and the* Cosmographiae Introductio (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2008).

[1056] Lester, *Fourth Part of the World*, p. 364.

[1057] Ibid., p. 363.

Fig. 5.11: Flag of the European Union[1058]

Here, the discourse of legitimacy through superiority and universal sovereignty is less immediately obvious than in the gaudy zoomorphs of avian art, but the discourse is nevertheless prevalent. Firstly we will examine the tropes, starting with colour.

[1058] Image retrieved from *Europa Portal*: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.

5.3.2 Imperial Iconography

> *'Against the blue sky of the Western world, the stars represent the peoples of Europe in a circle, a symbol of unity. Their number shall be invariably set at twelve, the symbol of completeness and perfection.'*[1059]

<div align="right">Resolution (55) 32</div>

Thus proclaimed the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8th December 1955, in selecting a flag for the Union's ancestor. The symbol chosen was selected as unifying emblem for the Union, but on maps it becomes associated not only with the Union but with all of Europe. In its iconography we see a single symbol – a gold star – replicated to form a circle. This symbol itself is a map, and as such is no different to the Imperial Eagle as a symbol of unity, legitimacy, authority, and an appeal to imagination; this time deliberately associated also with perfection. The circle of stars is the most omnipresent symbol of the Union,[1060] and its significance is explained by the Union as:

> *"The European flag is the symbol not only of the European Union but also of Europe's unity and identity in a wider sense.*
> *The European flag consists of 12 golden stars in a circle on a blue background. The stars symbolise the ideals of **unity, solidarity and harmony** among the peoples of Europe.*
> *The number of stars has nothing to do with the number of member countries, though the circle is a symbol of unity."*[1061]

Similarly, the European Commission's question-and-answer guide on European symbols describes that:

[1059] Resolution (55) 32 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (8 December 1955). Documents of the Committee of Ministers 1955 - II (July - December, 1955) = Documents du Comité des Ministres 1955 II (Juillet - Décembre 1955). 1955. Strasbourg: Council of Europe = Conseil de l'Europe. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/resolution_55_32_of_the_committee_of_ministers_of_the_council_of_europe_8_decem ber_1955-en-cbb0826e-81ea-4209-8bfa-0a644c0817de.html.

[1060] As the circle of stars is used in other media than physical flags, the symbol is technically a *charge*. But for the purposes of this chapter, the word *flag* will be used to minimise confusion. See Arthur Fox-Davies, *A Complete Guide to Heraldry* (London: Elibron Classics, 2006 [orig. 1909]), pp. 176-80.

[1061] European Union, *Europa Portal: The EU at a glance: The symbols of the EU.* Available at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm.

> *"The design symbolises the peoples of Europe, with the circle representing their union. The number of stars never changes – it is always 12: **representing perfection and entirety**, like the twelve apostles, twelve months of the year, twelve signs of the zodiac"*[1062]

The discourse prevalent in this icon is clear – the symbol (which itself is a form of map) and the recognisable "map" come to represent all of Europe as one community – a community *which does not exist*. This is noted by Fornäs, who details that according to Union websites and literature, these artefacts are not listed as "the European *Union* flag", for example, but as "the European flag".[1063] This synecdoche is not merely of the European Union but of a larger imagined community whose creation is the apparent duty and destiny of the EU: the self-anointed guardian of civilisation whose obligation it is unite the continent in 'unity, solidarity and harmony', in a quest for 'perfection and entirety'. The message behind the flag is clear – the EU, and *only* the EU, must unify all under its hegemony. This is a manifest destiny which would have been recognisable to Charlemagne, Napoleon, or any of the men who took up the *translatio imperii* in a quest to remake Europe in their own image. Thus the flag itself is a synecdoche, a hyperreality. When combined with a map, this is amplified.

As with maps, the tropes here require consideration. Since the 1950s, blue has become the colour most associated with the Union, selected either for its apparent religious symbolism,[1064] perceived historical association with Europe,[1065] or as a representation of 'the blue sky of the Western world' – an emblem of freedom offset against that portion of Europe then imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain.[1066] This is indicative of a conscious desire to

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[1062] The European flag: questions and answers (2005). European flag - questions and answers. 50th anniversary of the European flag. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: Council of Europe, [21.02.2006]. Available at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/events/2005-12-drapeau/questions_reponses.asp (emphasis added).

[1063] Fornäs, *Signifying Єurope*, pp. 128-148.

[1064] Ibid., pp. 132-138.

[1065] Memorandum from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi on the European flag (Gstaad, 27 July 1950). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe - Historical archives of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, F-67075 Strasbourg, Cedex. Available at: http://info.coe.int/archives/hist/flag/default.asp; Le drapeau - The Flag, 2191. The European Flag, Memorandum presented to the Council of Europe by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Pan-European Movement, Secretary General of the European Parliamentary Union. Gstaad: 27 July 1950. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_richard_coudenhove_kalergi_on_the_european_flag_gstaad_27_july_1950-en-ad9469d5-d9cf-46ae-95e0-897f96f94195.html.

[1066] Resolution (55) 32 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (8 December 1955). Documents of the Committee of Ministers 1955 - II (July - December, 1955) = Documents du Comité des Ministres 1955 II (Juillet - Décembre 1955). 1955. Strasbourg: Council of Europe = Conseil de l'Europe. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/resolution_55_32_of_the_committee_of_ministers_of_the_council_of_europe_8_december_1955-en-cbb0826e-81ea-4209-8bfa-0a644c0817de.html.

establish a trope laden with meaning – in this case, appealing to freedom – but it is also a powerful indicator of how devoid of meaning individual tropes are. The politicians and heraldrists of 1950s Europe chose blue, but it is clear from the above reasonings that nobody quite knew why blue should be associated with Europe. As suggested by Robert Escarpit, blue may have been 'a bit bland'[1067] but was the only colour left which did not already have geopolitical connotations.[1068] In light of this, we ought not ascribe too many associations to the colour. The intentions of and influences upon the authors, which they themselves appear to have been unaware of, are irrelevant, as blue is now associated with the Union by virtue of sixty years of history. But while the trope alone is unimportant, the meta-trope of the flag itself is worth investigating in full. For while there may be almost no understanding of the relationship between colours and emotions, the link between flags and ideologies has been investigated.

The circle has long been a common symbol for unity, universality, eternity, and perfection.[1069] In adopting this symbol the Union is simply perpetuating a common visual trope throughout human history. Like other symbols of the Union, the flag was chosen from designs submitted to a public competition to express ideas of unity,[1070] and thus there is no apparent devious conspiracy. But as we have already identified, *intention* is subordinate to *interpretation* – including the official interpretation of the EU.

Of interest is the Union's own explanation for the flag. We might well expect a body such as the EU to select a symbol which expresses unity, solidarity, and indivisibility – hence the circle. Yet the Union consciously declares that the flag does not represent only the peoples of the EU, but *all* Europeans. This synecdoche is of great significance. The Imperial Eagle of the *Reich* depicted geographical parts of the Holy Roman Empire in order to represent the whole. Similarly, the European flag depicts the entirety of Europe, regardless of their Union status.[1071] However, the original design chosen was to be fifteen stars in order to represent the fifteen member-nations of the Council of Europe.[1072] When this design was

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[1067] "Un chant et un drapeau" dans Le Monde (14-15 mai 1950). Le Monde. dir. de publ. BEUVE-MÉRY, Hubert. 14-15.05.1950. Paris: Le Monde. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/"un_chant_et_un_drapeau"_dans_le_monde_14_15_mai_1950-fr-287557f1-edff-4735-a636-66398204f7a4.html.

[1068] Memorandum from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi on the European flag (Gstaad, 27 July 1950).

[1069] Lotte Brand Philip, *The Ghent Altarpiece and the Art of Jan van Eyck* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 86-94.

[1070] Camille Manné, *Projet d'un drapeau Européen*. Strasbourg, 23rd August 1949.

[1071] http://homepage.eircom.net/~seanjmurphy/chiefs/euroflagmemo.html.

[1072] The symbols of the European Union — Full text. Available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_symbols_of_the_european_union_full_text-en-e135ba77-1bae-43d8-bcb7-e416be6bc590.html.

rejected by West Germany,[1073] and the inclusion of a symbolic cross rejected by Turkey,[1074] the design was modified to reduce the number of stars to twelve. Thus the current flag does not represent states, but it evolved from a design which did. It is a synecdoche, a hyperreality, of all Europe. Like the *Reichsadler* of yesteryear, spreading its wings to encompass all of Christendom in disregard of those dozens of European states which ignored or fought against the Holy Roman Empire's self-anointed supremacy, the EU flag is an expression not of what *is* but what *should be*. In this case, as with the *Reich*, that all Europe should be contained within. In this representation rather than reflection of Europe, and this imagination of Europe's existence and destiny, the flag is invoking the discourse of *empire*.

The vexillological significance of the EU flag cannot be understated, yet as with the map we are not examining the flag in isolation. In many media the flag intersects with maps. What we see in this collision of map and flag is in essence no different from the *Reichsadler*. On the map of the Holy Roman Empire, the symbolism is clear – a snarling Imperial Eagle frames the map, proclaiming that all territories depicted therein fall under the exclusive sovereignty of the *Heiliges Reich*. Here, the gold stars perform precisely the same function even if that is not the intended consequence. Whether EU members or not, *all* Europeans are represented as belonging to the Union, with the Union visually proclaimed to be the sole authority, the sole possessor of legitimacy, and the sole body with the right and the duty to unify the continent under the self-proclaimed enlightenment of its own hegemony. The flag expresses that *imperium* is exclusive to the Union.

Early proposals for a European flag either drew upon existing vexillology and heraldic norms to suggest complex and gaudy flags, or appropriated historical banners – including those of Charlemagne and Constantine the Great – as emblems of European unity.[1075] Yet even though original designs bear little or no resemblance to the chosen flag, their goal was the same – to encapsulate unity in a single symbol.[1076] And this unity was not merely that of the Union, but *all* Europe; or at least "Europe" as defined by the bearers of the new *imperium*. As Harley identifies, the appearance of national flags on maps – especially maps depicting territories other than those directly administered by the state whose flag is depicted – is an unambiguous statement of power and possession; that that state, and *only* that

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[1073] Resolution (55) 32 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (8 December 1955).
[1074] Ibid.
[1075] Lettre d'Arsène Heitz à Filippo Caracciolo (Strasbourg, 5 janvier 1952). Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Europe. Available at:
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/lettre_d_arsene_heitz_a_filippo_caracciolo_strasbourg_5_janvier_1952-fr-6b758d67-f606-4ac9-90fc-3339fe66a76c.html.
[1076] Camille Manné, *Projet d'un drapeau Européen*. Strasbourg, 23rd August 1949.

state, has legitimate authority over the places and peoples depicted.[1077] Like the triumphant Imperial Eagle of yesteryear uniting noble houses, bishoprics, free cities, and entire kingdoms under one supreme sovereign, the emblem of the EU does not merely clarify maps: it *is* a map. It is a map whose dominant discourse expresses destiny, sovereignty, a quest for legitimacy, and an inequality between those whose duty it is to unify, and those whose duty it is to succumb.

'The country's flag', Webster writes, 'may be viewed daily by the country's citizens in repetitive fashion, creating a sense of nation and providing the cement needed to guard the nation or state against the centrifugal forces of dis-union'.[1078] Given the cult-like following which national flags have generated, and continue to spawn,[1079] it would be difficult to deny Webster's assertion. Yet the Union's flag goes beyond this, for it is not national but supra-national or even meta-national, representing neither a nation nor state fixed in time and space, but rather an ideology, a principle, an imagination which transcends time and place. We might argue that while the national flag, as Webster writes, cements an established group which has distinct boundaries in geography and history, the Union – or *imperial* – flag cements an idea. The idea of legitimacy, of destiny, of sovereignty over those who already belong and those who do not – yet.

The deixis of flag and map is a powerful imperial discourse, and the suggestiveness of the discourse is only increased with additional tropes. Flags express political ambitions[1080] – in this case, aspirations of the Union's self-anointed European universality.

In the Union, it must be borne in mind that Union iconography coexists alongside the established symbolism of member-states. We might well consider that this signifies a difference between *national* and *imperial* forms. In the nation, there is only one set of prescribed symbols – the flag, anthem, heraldry, and established paraphernalia of the state; unifying all members within the bounded territory. Regional and local variations may exist, but ultimately it is the national symbols to which allegiance is due, and around which citizens rally in times of crisis. In the Union, though, this is not the case. National emblems co-exist alongside the iconography of the Union, but they are not on equal terms. The symbols of the state are territorially bounded; those of the Union transcend territories and borders to appeal

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[1077] Harley, *New Nature of Maps*, pp. 47, 137, 187.
[1078] Gerald Webster, 'American Nationalism, the Flag, and the Invasion of Iraq', *The Geographical Review* 101:1 (2011), pp. 1-18.
[1079] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, pp. 2, 39-43.
[1080] Sergei Matjunin, 'The new flags as the iconographic symbols of the post-Soviet space', *GeoJournal* 52 (2000), pp. 311-313.

to a manufactured identity as *Europeans*, tolerating variance within, so long as the Union is visually acknowledged.

On maps of the Union, the EU's position is made quite clear. States and nations are plotted with their borders, with a single external frontier denoting the Union from the wilderness beyond. The visual discourse present is that all members of the Union are equal to each other, and equal in their superiority over the barbarians languishing in non-EU Europe. But the EU, on these maps, is not a peer. It is *primus inter pares*, first among equals: the only entity with the legitimacy to hold sovereignty over not only EU members but over *all* Europeans. Non-EU Europe, these maps declare, is not only uncivilised – it is illegitimate, and must be absorbed into the sole legitimate heir to the *translatio imperii*. Let us consider a manifestation of this discourse.

In the previous section we rejected the idea that there is any *natural meaning* to colour. We also argue that there is no *secondary meaning,* as there is no universal theory of colour. But iconographical theory can direct us to a more valuable meta-tropic assertion – the connotations of who is coloured in, and who is not. Let us reconsider the *Europa* maps:

Fig. 5.12 - *Europa* Map I[1081]

[1081] Image retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/projects/centres/index_en.htm.

Fig. 5.13 – *Europa* Map II[1082]

Again, these maps use bold colours to visibly separate the Union and the non-Union. On a conscious level, this is to be expected – any state map has to distinguish its territories from those of other states. But on Panofsky's *intrinsic* and *conventional* levels less concerned with functionality, the maps' use of bright colours for the Union and a drab, aesthetically unappealing tint for the surrounding 'blandmass'[1083] carries both positive and negative connotations. They are little different from the imperial maps of yesteryear in that 'this mapping helped to legitimize imperial expansion by making the world appear empty, or at least uncivilized, unless under European control'.[1084] It may seem to be a stretch of the imagination to state that the above use of colour subliminally engenders a sense of positive feelings towards the EU and a sense of disinterest, wariness, or even revulsion of the non-EU,

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[1082] Image retrieved from: http://europa.eu/abc/maps/index_en.htm.
[1083] Foster, 'Tabula Imperii Europae', p. 386.
[1084] Black, *Visions of the World*, p. 107.

but such use of colour has been used for centuries in cartography.[1085] We may not be consciously aware of the *conventional meaning* of colour in a cartographic context, but this does not mean that such a meaning does not exist.

It is noticeable how the effort to convey this imagined collective identity conveys what we have identified as a characteristic of *empire*; borders which draw a line not in space, but between *Us* and *Them,* civilised and savage . The Union's imagined community, composed of a coloured tint scheme,[1086] is contrasted against the stark, bland, uninviting 'non-Europe' beyond. But these are not the only two zones on the map. Candidate countries – Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia – appear in a different shade, which simultaneously separates these countries from the community but grudgingly acknowledges them as being hierarchically higher than the bland landmass surrounding the Union. They are in a form of cartographic probation – not quite European, but making sufficient progress on the road to attaining Europe's own vision of 'civilisation' to be picked out in a colour and thus presented to the mapreader as areas moving away from the barbarian realm and towards the self-anointed supremacy of the Union.

This issue of portraying prospective members as existing in a cartographic limbo between the imagined community and the barbarians continues in other internet maps. Conveying an imagination of collective identity is one of the core tenets of cartoimperialism, and the pursuit of a 'European' identity can be powerfully conveyed by simple cartographic tropes. Rather than acknowledging the EU's diverse unity, this genre of cartography emphasises homogeneity in the style of what Macaulay termed 'assimilationist imperialism';[1087] the absorption of new territories, cultures and identities into a single imagination of belonging to the single imagined community of Europe:

[1085] Clark, *100 Maps*, pp. 17-20. Colour can go even further – medieval *mappaemundi* such as the 1375 Catalan Atlas feature gold leaf to denote areas of political or mystical significance such as Rome, Constantinople, the Garden of Eden – and invariably the mapmaker's home town. Abraham Cresques, *Atlas Catalan [1375: trans. B.M. Charleston]* (Zürich: URS Graf Publishing, 1978).

[1086] Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps* pp. 171-172.

[1087] Kenneth Pomeranz, 'Empire and 'civilizing' missions, past and present', *Daedalus* 134:2 (2005) p. 3.

Fig. 5.14 - *Europa* Map I[1088]

Let us examine the *conventional meaning* of this map. The chart asserts 'ethnic
identities and territorial claims'[1089] through its depiction of a homogeneous and communal
Union, with a clear distinction between the implied collective identity of 'European' and the
separate identity beyond. This is a frontier emphasised again by colour and cartographic
inclusion. The community's frontier is very clearly marked through colour; a bright,
stimulating tone for the Union and a drab, unappealing hue for a non-Europe apparently too
uninteresting and unworthy of mention to even warrant place-names. This style of map
further emphasises the connection of territory and polity, and reveals the early stages of the

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[1088] Image retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/projects/centres/index_en.htm.
[1089] Frontiers can be expressed in surprising ways. Michael Walzer offers a scathing and somewhat bizarre
assessment of frontiers: 'the boundaries that exist at any moment in time are likely to be arbitrary, poorly drawn,
the products of ancient wars. The mapmakers are likely to have been ignorant, drunken, or corrupt'! Michael
Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 57.

map becoming not a geographical tool, but a political icon. Internal individuality is minimised, prospective members are again given a mere acknowledgement, and those areas not part of the Union are pushed further into the cartographic background. The emphasis of this category of map is overwhelmingly a focus on the imagined community, and the implied power of the bounded frontiers encompassing it.

Monica Smith highlights this common feature in imperial mapping of implying territorial control - the use of clear lines and careful colouring to 'convey the impression of comprehensive political entities having firm boundaries and uniform territorial control'[1090] when in reality, imperial authorities are unable to assert their power evenly across the polity. Fig. 5.14 is itself an example of what Smith terms the 'absolutist variety', a style of mapping wherein such simple tropes as colour and lines present a display not only of universal and absolute political control over a territory, but the existence of a single universal community within.[1091] A conceptual comparison can be easily drawn between these style of EU maps and maps of now-defunct *empires*; claiming a territory on paper by simply drawing a line around it and shading it in one colour does not mean that the polity has total power in that area.[1092]

In her study of ancient imperial cartography, Smith raises the point that such 'absolutist' mapping fails to portray the multiple stages of the polity's growth, expansion, and consolidation of acquired territories. Indeed, as she argues, the use of such cartography implies that from its early stages, the polity was methodically pursuing 'a kind of long-term manifest destiny' to reach a pre-determined frontier.[1093] It is perhaps unsurprising to discover that the Union employs precisely just a style alongside its other maps.

This process of cartographic expansion is more clearly seen in traditional maps which seek to portray chronological change in the limited frame of a single image. Fig. 5.15 provides an example:

[1090] Smith, *American Empire,* p. 832.
[1091] Ibid.
[1092] Despite this maps have retained their power to sway politicians by simply colouring in an area, adding a nametag, and insisting that it is an accurate representation of which polity holds sovereignty over that particular patch of the planet. See Neil Smith, *American Empire*, and Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2001), pp. 138-145.
[1093] Monica Smith, 'Networks, Territories, and the Cartography of Ancient States', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95:4 (2005), pp. 832-849.

Fig. 5.15: Mapping Manifest Destiny[1094]

Here, a single hue is used not only to clearly define a collective Union against a drab, homogeneous 'Other' beyond the frontier, but is also used to depict a pre-determined project of expansion. In older member-states of the Union, a heavy saturation of colour is used while different hues are used to depict newcomers absorbed in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. It is curious to note that Turkey, which remains a non-member, is depicted in the same colour as states which have now acceded to the Union; again, it is evident how desired states are identified and marked as such on the map as areas ripe for expansion, and remain so even if their accession to Europe is not as swift as anticipated, but remains 'an advance of the frontiers of civilisation'.[1095]

[1094] Image retrieved from: http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/europe-a-to-z/eu-symbols.htm.

[1095] Tom Bottomore (ed.), *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 147.

The theme continues in other charts of the Union which map chronological expansion through different colours. Fig. 5.16 demonstrates this, and also implies hegemony, by using a relief-map to depict the Union's core as higher than new members of the imagined community and non-Europeans:

Fig. 5.16: Mapping Hierarchies[1096]

In addition to the two significant tropes of hue and saturation depicting a homogeneous (yet hierarchical) polity contrasted against a monotone 'outside', a third related trope can be identified in these maps. Prospective members are clearly identified on the map, and through the use of graded hues and varied saturations to depict chronological expansion, the discourse of *empire* – destiny, duty, legitimacy, and sovereignty – is mapped. Here, only two types of states are coloured and thus contrasted against a drab non-EU landmass. First is the polity itself, displaying a dominant core. Second are newcomers, those recent members

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[1096] Image retrieved from: http://www.ezilon.com/map_of_europe.htm.

who, as in other maps, are subject to a form of imperial patronisation as they are made sufficiently 'civilised' to join their elders. Third to be depicted are prospective members, those states whose absorption into the Union is actively sought, and thus are deemed sufficiently 'civilised' to warrant their own eye-catching colour, but which have not yet been judged by the EU to be sufficiently similar to the Union to be depicted in a similar colour. It is arguable that in this style of map, the Union is making a clear statement of the territories into which it wishes to expand, but reminds the viewer that these territories are somehow 'not like' the Union – at least not yet. These are undeniably imperial meta-tropes. While the Union may proclaim that it is United in Diversity, such unity is only conferred on newcomers once they have been sufficiently Europeanised to fit the standards of those established Western members of the Union who form the aristocracy of the imagined community.

Finally, a significant sub-section of the genre is that of the animated interactive map – a cartographic interface which enables the viewer to see, on one map, the chronological expansion of the Union. It is not easy to replicate an animated map using the medium of a static page, and portraying different frames of the animated map defeats the purpose. Part of the hypnotic power of an animated map is its ability to move through time while remaining fixed in space (one frame). While the discussion of animated maps must subsequently be reserved for a more concentrated study on virtual cartography, the EU's one animated map deserves a mention as it unequivocally portrays Europe's self-declared duty and destiny to unify the continent:

Fig. 5.17: Three frames of the EU's animated map depicting the EU in 1995, 2004, and 2007[1097]

[1097] Image retrieved from: http://europa.eu/abc/history/animated_map/index_en.htm.

This example of targeting desired territories, assimilating them on a 'probationary' status expressed by the use of a different colour, and the subsequent assimilation of newcomers into a universalist polity, conveys a stark discourse. This animated map's overtones are evident – the Union is destined to unify *all* Europeans, and this manifest destiny is unarguable and unstoppable. The discourse embedded within is clear. Europe and the Union are synonymous, a metonymic synecdoche, and it is the destiny of the Union to spread its borders and embrace the peoples of Europe into the imagined community they have constructed; a community which declares that only *Our* way is legitimate, that only *We* are sovereign, and that the duty to unite is taken up by *Us*. There is no room for alternatives. There is only the Union, and those whose ultimate destiny is to take their rightful place as members of one imagined community. Yet the discourse does not exist alone. Another is embedded within maps as well; and this discourse is an apparent paradox.

Not all EU maps perform this same trick of establishing a hierarchy between Union members, candidate countries, and non-members. A curious paradox exists wherein official cartographies map not a dichotomous Europe split between civilised and savage, but a single Europe wherein the entire landmass becomes associated with the Union. It is on these maps that we see most clearly the hyperreal deixis between cartography, empire, and iconography.

One particularly curious map is found on the European Union's "404" page. In its official publications, the Council of Europe repeatedly refers to the wealth of EU information which can be found online.[1098] Yet one problem of this vast digital repository is that, from time to time, domain names change or internet addresses become lost in the *terra incognitae* of the world-wide web. When a page goes missing, the following error page appears:

[1098] European Union External Action, 'A Guide for Americans: The European Union'. Delegation of the European Union to the United States 2175 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20037. Available at: www.euintheus.org.

Fig. 5.18: "404"[1099]

In association with this, we will reconsider the standard full-width banner headline whose use is compulsory[1100] at the top of *all* displays, banners, brochures, press releases, leaflets, newsletters, and websites produced and maintained by the European Commission:[1101]

Fig. 5.19: Page banner for European Commission[1102]

[1099] Image retrieved from: www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp.
[1100] Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions (2010).
European Commission: EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Bruxelles. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eropeaid.
[1101] Ibid., pp. 33-40.

In these two maps, the paradoxical discourse is apparent. In contrast to the maps seen previously, which distinguished between civilised and savage, these maps conflate the Union and Europe by merging political place and geographical space, framed within the political iconography of the Union's flag. The discourse apparent in these maps is that the Union is Europe. Each makes a distinction – the upper image includes all of continental Europe alongside Council of Europe members Turkey and Russia, but stops there. The second image depicts Europe and western Russia, but Africa is absent. The implication is that these territories are destined to become members of the imagined communities; to join the Union as it is their ineluctable destiny.

Maps which merge Europe and the European Union are not confined to a deixis of map and flag. Other visual elements are included to hammer home a discourse that the Union is legitimate, and that the Union should be sovereign, because it is *good*. This is achieved through merging map, flag, and visual images.

The motto of the Union, as has been previously stated, is the paradoxical slogan 'United in Diversity', an expression of identity implying a collective identity which, while far from homogeneous, is bound by a shared contrast to the identity of those 'non-Europeans' living beyond the imperial frontier.[1103] This issue of diversity within the European Union highlights a significant aspect of imperial mapping; that of depicting a homogeneous interior. As Smith points out, 'states are not homogenous entities, and can be subdivided along … different planes'.[1104] This is perhaps even truer in the context of *empire*, which by definition are more culturally heterogeneous than nation-states. As Black points out, 'it is difficult to make a man-made construct such as the European Union seem natural',[1105] a claim which arguably applies to all imperial maps. How then, can this oxymoron of 'United in Diversity' be mapped?

As we saw in Chapter Two, the discourse of *empire* relies heavily on spectacle. And as we identified in Chapter Four, spectacle is prevalent in cartography. A cursory glance at historical maps of *empire* reflects the sort of pomp and pageantry on which *empire*s rely, manifest in maps. Long-gone are those maps decorated with national personifications and excessive decoration continually – and consciously – associating territory, *empire*, and

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[1102] Image retrieved from *Visual Identity Guidelines*, p. 28.
[1103] William Walters, 'Mapping Schengenland: denaturalizing the border', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20:4 (2002), pp. 561-580.
[1104] Smith, 'Networks, Territories, and the Cartography of Ancient States', p. 835.
[1105] Black, *Maps and Politics*, p. 144.

legitimacy in the mind of the reader.[1106] But the juxtaposition of cartography and political symbolism remains visible in European maps even without the gaudy marginalia typical of earlier styles. The admission that the connection is not so blatantly reinforced in Europe's maps as in its imperial predecessors does not detract from the continued link between space, place, duty, and imagined community.

One notable feature of the Union's maps is that they are free of 'dysfunctional clutter',[1107] ignoring elements such as scales, legends, and elaborate marginalia in order to emphasise the Union. Yet the deixis of map, icons, and visual imagery remains.

It is clear that the Union takes its emblems very seriously. According to the European Commission's *Visual Identity Guidelines*, the flag logo 'gives the European Commission a recognisable image... both serious and elegant',[1108] with the stark warning that 'It is absolutely prohibited to modify the logo in any way. There should be no reason to do so under any circumstances'.[1109] Yet while the logo of the flag remains prominent and untouched, it is not alone.

Images of people and their produce have long been a feature of cartography.[1110] Today, these images no longer appear *in* the maps but rather surrounding it, in a form of meta-marginalia whose icons, as has been the case for millennia, act as a form of visual determinative. Like the various gestures involved in the encounter with Panofsky's pedestrian, these elements combine to help the mapreader draw meaning from the map by visually associating certain parts with particular traits. On medieval *mappaemundi*, non-Europe was a land of savage peoples and unholy monsters;[1111] on Victorian cartography, colonies were synonymous with images of produce and plenty, the oppressed natives depicted as happy, servile underlings beneath their apparently benevolent occupiers.[1112] These images form part of what Ziegler calls 'persuasive cartography';[1113] images which accompany maps to determine their content and meaning. Union maps continue this trait as they do not appear alone, but alongside images of people. Invariably, these images show happy scenes. Consider Figs 5.20 and 5.21 below:

[1106] Lennox, 'An Empire on Paper', pp. 402-409.
[1107] Mark Monmonier, 'Picturing Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science', ed. Brian Baigrie [Review], *The Geographical Review* 87:3 (1997), p. 426.
[1108] *Visual Identity Guidelines*, p. 1
[1109] Ibid., p. 14.
[1110] Hodgkiss, *Discovering Antique Maps*; Dennis Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map: An Illustrated History of Map Elements and Embellishments* (New York: Sterling, 2012).
[1111] Garfield, *On the Map*, p. 42.
[1112] Peter Whitfield, *The Image of the World: 20 Centuries of World Maps* (London: British Library, 2010), pp. 118-129.
[1113] Pauliina Raento and Stanley Brunn, 'Visualizing Finland: Postage Stamps as Political Messengers', *Geografiska Annaler* 87 (2005), pp. 145-163.

Fig. 5.20: Imperial Federation[1114]

[1114] "Imperial Federation – Map of the World Showing the Extent of the British Empire in 1886", supplement in *The Graphic* 34, no. 869, July 24 1886. Courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago. See Akerman et al., *The Imperial Map*, plate 2.

**Fig. 5.21**: *Guide for Americans*[1115]

[1115] European Union External Action, 'A Guide for Americans: The European Union'. Delegation of the European Union to the United States 2175 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20037. Available at: www.euintheus.org.

At first glance examining only the tropes, these two images are only vaguely similar. Each combines a map with images of people, but there appears to be a clear distinction between the serious Steam-Age figures and the smiling Digital-Age assembly. One is a cluttered palimpsest of Victorian vainglory, the other is a sleek, digitised style. The maps were not even designed for the same purpose – the former is blatant propaganda for the British Imperial Federation, the latter is a handy guide to the European Union designed for citizens of the United States. It might be considered, then, that the two maps are inherently dissimilar. Yet meta-tropically they are much closer than we might consider, for each of these is 'perhaps less a map than an icon, for so rarely can a map have expressed a political philosophy so clearly'.[1116]

Each of the images shows a particular style of map. They depict the world as bland, empty, inhabited only by a single polity – the British Empire and the European Union respectively – which have frontiers against the outside world but no internal boundaries. Each map cartographically annexes parts of the world not belonging to the polity – note how Fig. 5.20 seizes part of Danish Greenland (and includes a convenient mini-map showing how much territory the Empire has acquired in the last century) – while Fig. 5.21 focuses on the British Isles and Scandinavia, with the inclusion of non-members Norway and Iceland. These tropes alone are worthy of comparative comment, yet it is the deixis of maps and icons which is most significant.

Firstly, we see in each map the appearance of the issuing polity's flag. Britannia, in a monument of visual arrogance, sits atop the globe while clutching a shield bearing the flag of the Union of Great Britain, her trident pointing to the British Isles.[1117] Like the spectators in *The Coronation of Napoleon*, all eyes are fixed on the *Imperator*. In the second image the now-familiar stars of the EU encircle the continent. It is worth noting that while the flag of the United States also appears, it does not overlap territory in the same way as the emblem of Europe. A hyper-real deixis is established – territory, and the flag as representative of the polity. The two become entwined, and a powerful discourse is projected: Earth belongs to Britain, and Europe belongs to the Union. At the same time a synecdoche is created – Britain *is* the world, and the Union *is* Europe. The maps become hyper-real. And the justification underpinning this discourse is reinforced by the second meta-trope: people.

In the British map, an imagined community is visually proclaimed. Under the watchful eyes of Britannia the peoples and races of the Empire – and by extension, the world

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[1116] Whitfield, *The Image of the World*, pp. 124-125.
[1117] Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map*, pp. 34-35, plate 2 (fig. 1.8).

– exist in apparent harmony, surrounded by a cornucopia of icons suggesting progress, plenty, and supreme power (note the redcoat with a rifle, holding the universal Victorian symbol of India – a tiger[1118] – on a very short chain). They are united in diversity: all are different, but all are members of an imagined community as subjects of Britannia who, by association with the visual images of peace and plenty, acquires a self-anointed legitimacy as *Imperatrix* of Earth. This theme is equally visible in the European Union image. Here the same phenomenon occurs – happy, smiling figures from a multitude of races,[1119] all encircled by the stars of the Union. The discourse here is indistinguishable from that of the British map. Like Britain's self-important assurance that it is uniting the disparate inhabitants of nineteenth-century Earth, the Union declares that it is legitimate, and that the Union *should* rule, because it is uniting the diverse peoples of twenty-first century Europe in happiness and harmony. Both appeal to an imagined community and both perform Anderson's act of collective forgetting.

The first map visually forgets the horrors of Victorian colonial conquest to insist that Britain's rule is righteous. It also visually forgets that the world is inhabited by other, bigger, rival powers to Britain. The second map, despite its cheerful appearance, does exactly the same. It forgets that not all Europeans live in the Union, and not all inhabitants of the Union live in happiness and prosperity. It forgets that not all Americans can come to the Union – or are welcome – and by including Norway and Iceland, it forgets that there is a Europe beyond the Union. The discourse in both maps insists that the community is good, it is peaceful, it is happy, that there are no dissenters, and most significantly, that there is no obstacle to the polity's apparent destiny to unite those it sees fit.

It might be argued at this stage that, like those cartographers who read into colours *intrinsic meanings* where none exist, perhaps we are seeing too much here. After all, not all maps of the Union feature pictures of people showing off their suspiciously perfect dentistry. Yet the deixis of map, icon, and images of harmony is not simply a meaning that we are imposing. It is considered by the Union itself. Consider Fig. 5.22, a page from the European Commission's *Visual Identity Guidelines:*

[1118] A familiar meme from British cartoons of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Bryant, *Wars of Empire in Cartoons*, pp. 40-49.
[1119] We might note that the figures are predominantly Caucasian, with the two non-white characters pushed to the very back. But, like Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon's green beans (see p. 107, footnote 510), we might be seeing too much here.

Fig. 5.22: *Visual Guidelines*[1120]

[1120]European Commission, 'Visual Identity Guidelines'. Directorate-General for Communication, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1040 Brussels (2011). Available at: European Union External Action, http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/comm/visual_identity.

What do we see here? Firstly, we see an intersection of landscapes, political symbolism, flags, and images – all framed within strict guidelines. Secondly, we see images; smiles, laughter, multiple cultures and multiple ethnicities, groups, and connections dominate the images. We see images of children laughing and dancing, pictures of snappily-dressed characters on the prow of a ship, Arcadian pastoral scenes and utopian technoscapes, and bridges stretching into infinity.[1121] The discourse proclaimed within is clear. The European Union is to be visually associated with peace, progress, and positive emotions – and with the map and flag included alongside these images in Union print media and on Union websites, the discourse is that the only polity to bring these benefits to Europe is the Union.

Yet it does not end here, as maps perform an additional trick. They give a sense of permanence, propagating the message that the political community it represents has always existed and that it always will. By their very nature, maps – even those interactive, pixellated pictures of the Digital Age which proudly boast of progress and absorption – are frozen at one point in time. Indeed this was one of the defining characteristics of ancient and medieval maps: the message that the world had always been a particular way and always would be – part of the imperial discourse. By selecting maps as the first and dominant image which their website visitors encounter, the commissions of the European Union are – perhaps unwittingly – propagating the message that the Union is eternal.

The merging of such elements of visual language with cartography publicly proclaims that the Union is a happy place. The continuation here of imperial themes is subtle, but nevertheless exists. The accompanying marginalia on the maps and visual artefacts of Byzantines and Holy Romans, Napoleonic French and Steam-Age Britons was rather more gaudy, pompous, and militaristic than that of the Union, but the message was the same. The visual images stressed that the polity depicted or represented within was something to aspire to – it was the sole holder of *imperium*, of the legitimacy and power to uphold the highest, self-anointed principles of civilisation. Whether that self-righteous, self-serving principle was the self-declared continuation of Rome in the *Reich*, the status of God's Byzantine regent on Earth, the defenders of *Les Droits de l'Homme*, the British bearers of *mission civilisatrice*, or the sole rightful guardian of Europe's post-national peace, is irrelevant. The visual language stresses that the polity is *right*, righteous, and rightful: it is legitimate, powerful, its people are united in superiority over all others as they, and *only* they, have attained the supreme status of civilisation, legitimacy, and sovereignty – *imperium*.

[1121] *Visual Identity Guidelines*, p. 15.

5.4 Conclusions

> *'[The] imperial project affected the everyday in ways that shaped what was "taken-for-granted" and thus was not necessarily a matter of conscious awareness or deliberation. With the exception of those in some official or quasi-official roles, for most people, empire was just "there" – out there. It was ordinary.'*[1122]

Thus write Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose on the visual presence of the British Empire in the daily lives of its inhabitants. For Hall and Rose, the Empire was best served by a banal presence: overt, grand displays of *imperium* drew praise and criticism from all corners, and one result of such public discourse was that the rights and wrongs of Britain's rule had to be deliberated. But if *imperium* was banal, idling passively in the background, it became so everyday, so natural, so *ordinary*, that the discourses of sovereignty and inequality were barely noticed, let alone criticised. And for Hall and Rose, the ultimate strength of banality lies in apparently mundane symbols.

'Symbols', opines Jakubowska, 'are by their nature ambiguous and general'.[1123] We saw this in the previous chapter in which Lieutenant George misread his map, and we saw it in the records of perplexed 1950s researchers seeking to identify a root meaning in the colours and emblems chosen for a unifying continental flag. It would be hard to deny that symbols, whose meaning and associations rapidly change once they are released into public discourse, can be ambiguous. We need only return to one of the quotes with which we began, Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi's call for a symbol to unify Europe's ideology in the same manner that the swastika was hijacked to signify an abhorrent pan-European ideology.

As Panofsky demonstrates, symbols alone do not carry any connotations whatsoever. The circle of stars, the swastika, the hammer and sickle, the cross or the crescent or *any* emblem conceivable, is nothing more than a geometric jumble of lines and angles which is entirely neutral to one who has never before encountered it.[1124] It is only through the

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[1122] Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose (eds.), *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 21-22.

[1123] Longina Jakubowska, 'Political drama in Poland: The use of national symbols', *Anthropology Today* 6:4 (1990), pp. 10-13.

[1124] Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes In the Art of the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 3-16. An example illustrates this. Writing at a time when Hitler was known only to Viennese tramps, Walter Lowrie describes the 'swastica' as a benign spiritual icon, claiming that it was among the most popular symbols in early Christian art as this 'mystic design of Oriental origin' had not been widely appropriated by the Romans, and thus was unique. Lowrie, *Christian Art and Archaeology*, p. 238.

interaction of multiple forms of visual, verbal, and textual language that we come to ascribe connotations. Like Panofsky's pedestrian, many forms of visual language are at work and while none of them have intrinsic meaning on their own, when combined they convey a meaning which we can elucidate.

Maps of the European Union perform precisely this function. Acting as the public site of a deixis in which territory, ideology, and imagination collide, the map, flag, and emblems of the Union fulfil the prophecy of Raento and Brunn that 'looking, seeing and knowing... become perilously intertwined'.[1125] Through cartography, a metonymic synecdoche appears wherein the Union and the European peoples become conflated. There is only one legitimate sovereign in Europe, these maps proclaim, its legitimacy assured by a manufactured memory cementing an emergent imagined community, its presence guaranteed through the banal nationalism of political symbolism so ubiquitous as to be almost invisible. We glance at charts, we gaze upon the flag, and a hyperreal mental map is formed: a map which declares that the Union is Europe, that Europe is the Union, and that it *should* be this way.

The creation of this European community, tied to a specific European homeland, is perhaps not a conscious project. It would be grotesquely unfair to accuse such cartographers as Lovell Johns of deviously pursuing a sinister, Machiavellian agenda whereby maps are manipulated to bring about the psychosocial critical mass which will give birth to a European identity – assuming that such a transubstantiation has not already happened. Indeed the Union's contracted mapmakers clearly establish that their agreement required simply the production of spatially and geopolitically accurate maps, not warped icons of propaganda.[1126] And yet the discourse remains embedded, regardless of intent. Like national monuments,[1127] maps function as a part of what David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove term 'memory theatre': those public displays of iconography and symbolism designed to convey 'official rhetoric' to the people through the process of banal nationalism.[1128]

What is of note is Billig's description of banal nationalism as being 'Janus-faced',[1129] a form of 'Jekyll and Hyde duality'.[1130] Nationalism in all forms, he argues, is both adored and abhorred in public discourse at the same time – and this is particularly evident in the

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[1125] Raento and Brunn, 'Visualizing Finland', p. 146.

[1126] Symon Porteous (2012), Email on behalf of LovellJohns Mapping Co. 5th November 2012.

[1127] Joan Coutu, *Persuasion and Propaganda: Monuments and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

[1128] Atkinson and Cosgrove 'Urban Rhetoric', p. 28.

[1129] The Roman god of transitions, Janus, was conventionally depicted in Roman art and literature as having two faces at once – one looking to the past, the other to the future. Nigel Rodgers, *Roman Empire* (London: Anness, 2006), pp. 420-421; *Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2001), p. 606.

[1130] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, pp. 6-7.

above maps. As European citizens we reject national identities as shameful relics of our belligerent and bloodstained histories; yet in the same instant we embrace an identity as Europeans, a Self contrasted against the Other beyond the new Iron Curtain separating self-congratulatory civilisation from the barbarians beyond. This almost schizophrenic perception of the world is most tellingly conveyed by the EU's cartographies. All at once the Union's maps proclaim harmony, inclusivity, and a benign ethos of comradely partnership between our nations – yet at the same time, the maps proclaim that while *We* are one, *They* are not. If we believe our maps, a dichotomy emerges. Europe 'seems to possess a reassuring normality',[1131] while the barbarians hammering at Europe's gates lack cohesion, lack civilisation, and even lack names. They are an alien, chaotic Other to be contrasted against the familiar, ordered Self of the Union.

The Union appropriates 'the anthem, national colours, and images of historic events'[1132] to unify the population. Yet what renders this act *imperial* rather than merely national is that the imagined community is unequal. It is unequal spatially between the established core and the *parvenu* peripheries. It is unequal temporally, between those who are already in the Union and those whose destiny is that they are yet to be absorbed. It is unequal ideologically, between those who may be deemed civilised, and those whose savagery is swept aside. However it is not simply actual flags which advertise the EU emblem. On a broad array of paraphernalia – from press releases and websites to bags, coffee mugs,[1133] umbrellas and t-shirts,[1134] the circle of stars appears. These 'banal maps', as Dudley Stamp theorised, 'can also be used – and have been used – as a subtle form of propaganda, especially in spreading knowledge worldwide of territorial claims'.[1135] This is achieved through the blending of cartography with 'important symbols and images,' which, as Stanley Brunn argues, 'provide identities, allegiances, and feelings of belonging with a nation and a state'.[1136] Chief amongst these is the flag, which becomes a synecdochal map: an emblem to

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[1131] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 7.
[1132] Jakubowska, 'Political Drama in Poland', p. 10.
[1133] *Visual Identity Guidelines*, p. 43. In 2011, Frontex alone spent €36,781.31 on corporate gifts – coffee cups, torches, USB flashdrives, metal accessories, leather goods, t-shirts, and 'Various' items – emblazoned with the new logo prior to its internet launch. Clearly, disseminating visual identity among elite decision makers before the public, is deemed important by Union agencies. Annual list of law contracts (between 25,000 and 60,000 EUR) concluded by Frontex in 2011. Available at:
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Contracts_awarded/Contracts_awarded_in_2011.pdf.
[1134] *Communication and Visibility Manual*, p. 40.
[1135] Bruce Davis, 'Maps on Postage Stamps as Propaganda', *The Cartographic Journal* 22 (1985), pp. 125-130.
[1136] Stanley Brunn, 'Stamps as iconography: Celebrating the independence of new European and Central Asian states', *GeoJournal* 52 (2000), pp. 315-323.

represent not only the Union but all Europe. The fact that not all Europeans are citizens of the Union is irrelevant – the map makes it clear that it is the Union's destiny to unite them all.

The use of maps-as-icons as part of the *imitatio imperii* is not new. Einhard describes three enormous dining tables owned by Charlemagne, inscribed (in ascending order of size and value) with maps of Constantinople, Rome, and the Universe.[1137] The use of the map as a banal artefact, one which embodies an expression of power, is evidently not a modern phenomenon. Precedent – be it the map on Charlemagne's dining tables, the *Reichsadler*, or the deixical, synecdochal, hyperreal maps of the British Empire – clearly exists. And it continues today. Like their ancestors, these maps express the discourse that this is not only how Europe *does* look, but how it *should* look.

A particular feature connecting all styles of Union cartography is that the EU's maps serve not as geographical tools but as political icons, objects largely devoid of scientific cartographic elements and instead emphasising community and collectivity. Ultimately the separate categories of map merge, through what Pomper terms 'convergent evolution'.[1138] Map, flag, and image combine with banality and imagined community; and this is not without precedent in cartography. Lennox highlights how the British *Empire*'s maps of Halifax evolved in stages, from reconnaissance maps of new and unexplored territories, into settler maps emphasizing the *empire*'s ownership of the territory, and finally mass maps which 'rallied imperial support… and influenced the British vision of space.'[1139] This progressive evolution is equally discernible in EU maps which have made an evolutionary leap from geography to politics, becoming graphic icons of power and possession, legitimacy and sovereignty, and an appeal to an imagined community which collectively forgets the less desirable aspects of its laudatory, self-adulatory project.

We return at the end to the quotes with which we began. In 1950 Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi stressed the need to adopt an emblem to represent Europe. His vision has been fulfilled, for Europe now has an emblem, one which fulfils the various *Visual Guidelines'* and *Visual Identity Manuals'* quest for a simple, instantly-recognisable symbol which viewers immediately associate with the Union. Not the epsilon. Not the circle of stars. Not even the blue banner. Europe's emblem is the map – the map which triumphantly proclaims that the Union *is* Europe, that Europe *is* the Union, and that the two are destined by

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[1137] Einhard, *Vita Karoli* XXXIX, pp. 43-44; Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: triumphal rulership in late antiquity, Byzantium, and the early medieval West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 364-365.

[1138] Philip Pomper, 'The History and Theory of Empires', *History and Theory* 44:4 (2005), pp. 1-27.

[1139] Lennox, 'Networks, Territories and the Cartography of Ancient States', p. 412.

history to become synonymous. The map declares the Union's legitimacy and sovereignty by appealing to a manufactured memory which exists outside of Europe's own history and indeed outside of space-time itself: the Union, via this cartography, is shown to be simultaneously eternal and temporal, motionless and in motion, territorial and de-spatial. Perhaps the Union would have been better served by adopting, in response to Coudenhove-Kalergi's appeal, the double-headed Imperial Aquila rather than the circle of stars. For the deixis of symbol and map is a public proclamation not only of the temporal and non-temporal, spatial and non-spatial universalism of the European Union, its universal and sole legitimacy over a manufactured community, but indeed of the precise nature of *imperium*.

The deixis of cartography and political icons, most notably the flag and the map, constructs a manufactured memory. Flags on maps reinforce visual impact by associating state and space in one indelible public image.[1140] As we have seen, this is held in the scholarly community to be a signifier of nations and nationalism. But the specific deixis of the Union's politicised maps constructs a unique form of deixis; maps which simultaneously proclaim that the Union has always existed, that it is not yet complete but it *will* be, and it *should* be. These maps exist outside of time and ultimately, outside of space, for they depict a Union which is simultaneously static and mobile, concurrently territorial and non-territorial. Thus like all maps, European Union cartographies in public space are not *reflections* of reality but *representations* of it. And they represent a specific view of how reality *should* be – one Europe united under one sole sovereign with legitimacy, whose viewers aspire to the imagined community constructed by the intersection of cartography, iconography, and images. They are deliberate appeals to a manufactured memory of a Europe which never existed, a Europe whose history is utterly erased and a new imagination assembled, a Europe whose savage antithesis is barely even acknowledged to be lurking beyond the bright, appealing visage of the Union.

This chapter has examined the various maps of the Union propagated through the new social and political fora of *Imperium Europaeum*. Like those maps which once adorned the Forum, the throne-room, and the gallery, the Union's cartographies dominate the new public spheres of the printed pamphlet and the virtual realm. Their existence and expression within these public spheres is no different to the crumbling remains of *empire*s past; they are deliberate invocations of power and legitimacy, authority and ambition. They show a European Union which is not one polity amongst others. They show the Union as *primus inter pares*, first among equals, the one and only rightful sovereign of Europe.

[1140] Bruce Davis, 'Maps on Postage Stamps as Propaganda', p. 127.

Yet these maps are not the ultimate expression of cartoimperialism. There is another realm of European cartography so prolific, so mundane, and so saturated with imperial ideology that more than three hundred and thirty million Europeans do not even notice cartoimperialism passing between their very fingers on a daily basis, every single transaction reinforcing the imagined community of the Union. It is to this realm that we penultimately turn.

Chapter Six

Render unto Caesar

"None of the cities should be allowed to have its own separate coinage or system of weights and measures; they should all be required to use ours."[1141]

Attributed to Julius Caesar
Cassius Dio, second century AD

"1. The European Central Bank shall have the exclusive right to authorize the issue of bank notes within the Community. The ECB and the national central banks may issue such notes. The bank notes issued by the ECB and the national central banks shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Community.

2. Member States may issue coins subject to approval by the ECB of the volume of the issue. The Council may, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c and after consulting the ECB, adopt measures to harmonize the denominations and technical specifications of all coins intended for circulation to the extent necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the Community."[1142]

Article 105/a of the Maastricht Treaty
February 1992

The former words attributed to Julius Caesar, chronicled by the Roman historian Cassius Dio in the heyday of *imperium*, and the latter text from the 1992 amendment to the Maastricht Treaty, were written almost eighteen centuries apart. Yet the message contained within both is exactly the same. In the above extracts, the central authorities of the dying Roman Republic and the nascent European Union establish specific rules for the minting and printing of state-mandated currency to replace existing systems. In doing so, both Rome and Brussels adopted a medium of exchange and propaganda which from its very inception has been among the most powerful – perhaps *the* most powerful – of vehicles for the transmission of political ambitions and imperial dreams. This vehicle is a single currency.

[1141] Cassius Dio, *Roman History [trans. Earnest Cary],* Book LII Ch. XLII, v. III, (London: William Heineman, 1917), p. 155; Christopher Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 56.
[1142] Text retreived from: http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtext.html.

Empire, as we have seen, may best be understood as the result of a political and conceptual critical mass born of the complex, squabbling international relations between Germans and Greeks in the Early Middle Ages. Maps, meanwhile, are among the most ancient non-biological means of communication between humans,[1143] and the most powerful discourses of politics. Chronologically, currency rests between the two. The little metallic discs which glide between our fingers each day are a phenomenon of the Bronze Age Mediterranean,[1144] while paper money only appeared in the West in the seventeenth century and was not widely accepted until the nineteenth.[1145] The appearance of maps on currency is even more recent and remarkably rare,[1146] a cartographic curiosity which, with the exception of modern euro (€) coins and banknotes, has had only a brief and fleeting history among forms of mapping. But as this chapter demonstrates, numismatics – the study of currency – offers what is arguably the most visible demonstration of cartoimperialism. For as Christopher Howgego declares, 'numismatics ... illuminates the exercise of power'.[1147]

We have established that maps are a critical component of constructing banal nationalism. Of the various technologies deployed – wittingly or unknowingly – in the construction of this artificial adhesive, maps have an unparalleled power. Yet they are not alone, and one technology of the state by which ideas of nationhood are encouraged, a technology frequently overlooked is currency.[1148] And in the case of the European Union, whose currency was designed specifically to be apolitical,[1149] that most political of vehicles boldly adorns objects which, every time they pass between citizens' fingers, contributes to the discursive construction of an imperial identity. The maps on EU currency thus require their own investigation to identify not only the aspects of banal nationalism promoted within,

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[1143] Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins postulates that while almost all higher organisms are capable of mental mapping, the physical act of *drawing* maps not only preceded written language, but the mental and physical creation of maps enabled human brains to develop beyond those of other animals. BBC, 'Why modern maps put everyone at the centre of the world', 12 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19908848.

[1144] Christopher Howgego points to the scholarly disagreement over the origin of coins in ancient Lydia or ancient Greece. Howgego, *Greek imperial countermarks: studies in the provincial coinage of the Roman Empire* (London: Royal Numismatic Society, 1985), pp. 1-2.

[1145] Jan Penrose, 'Designing the nation. Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state', *Political Geography* 30:8 (2011), pp. 429-440.

[1146] Virga, *Cartographia*, pp. 15-18.

[1147] C.J. Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 39.

[1148] Jan Penrose, ''Designing the nation. Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state', *Political Geography* 30:8 (2011), pp. 429-440.

[1149] Williams Wolters, 'The Euro: Old and new boundaries in the use of money', *Anthropology Today* 17:6 (2001), pp. 8-12.

but also the specific discourses pertaining to the use of currency. That currency is a powerful vehicle of discourse is already well-attested.[1150] Our study, therefore, turns to iconography.

At this point it might well be asked what fresh insights can be gleaned from a study of European currency. Groundbreaking research has already been performed on the iconography of euro coins and banknotes, and how such icons convey political messages both explicit and subtle.[1151] Peter Barber and Tom Harper acknowledge that maps on currency have been historically rare,[1152] as coins and notes have been overwhelmingly dominated with portraiture, images of monuments, or allegorical symbols of religion or politics.[1153] None of these appear (universally)[1154] on euro currency. In addition, despite a handful of pioneering papers there is a comparative lack of scholarly analyses on euro designs. This could be attributed to a variety of factors – the currency's youth, the decline in studies of material culture,[1155] and the relative apathy towards currency iconography in general. Even the United States dollar has received remarkably little attention, its iconographies (and by extension, those of other national currencies) instead generating interest mainly from pro- or anti-nationalists,[1156] art critics,[1157] and the recycled ramblings of paranoid conspiracy theorists.[1158] The dollar, though, is past its 1990s prime as the world's sole global currency. The euro is now traded more widely and more frequently than the US dollar, and even with prophecies of *Eurodämmerung*[1159] and the possible abandonment of the euro and its relegation to the footnotes of history, the importance of the euro's cartographic iconographies cannot be understated. What then is the value of interrogating its iconography?

[1150] Jan Penrose and Craig Cumming, 'Money talks: banknote iconography and symbolic constructions of Scotland', *Nations and Nationalism* 17:4 (2011), pp. 821-842.

[1151] Pauliina Raento, Anna Hämäläinen, Hanna Ikonen and Nella Mikkonen, 'Striking stories: a political geography of euro coinage', *Political Geography* 23:6 (2004), pp. 929-956.

[1152] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, pp. 96-97.

[1153] Martin Price, *Coins: An Illustrated Survey, 650 BC to the Present Day* (London and New York: Hamlyn, 1980), pp. 14-16.

[1154] The reverse faces of euro coins, which are selected by individual nations, do often use allegories, portraits, or images of architecture, flora or fauna. Raento et al., 'Striking stories'.

[1155] Helleiner, 'One People, One Money?', p. 1.

[1156] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *The Year of the Euro*, pp. 131-160.

[1157] Wintle, *The Image of Europe*, pp. 433-454.

[1158] Josh Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication: U.S. Paper Currency and the Iconography of Nationalism', *The Communication Review* 11 (2008), pp. 109-132; Robert Foster in Patricia Spyer, *Border Fetishisms: Material Objects in Unstable Spaces* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 81. Most numismatic conspiracy theories focus on the designs of the US dollar, whose iconography is claimed by conspiracists to represent anything from the Illuminati to 9/11 terrorism. However there is some fun for European conspiracy theorists, too. The European Commission statute which decrees that the Euro currency (whose designs, claims Walter Benjamin, 'ornament the facade of Hell') will henceforth be the sole means of buying and selling (a prophecy of Revelation 13:16-18) amongst new EU members, is document number 666! See European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council' *Enlargement Strategies and Main Challenges 2011-2012*. Brussels 12.10.2011. COM (2011) 666 final.

[1159] Paul Krugman, '*Eurodämmerung*', 13th May 2012, *New York Times*, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/eurodammerung-2/.

The answer to this question is twofold. The first, drawn from sociology, is that acceptable norms in public political discourse have shifted. Both Ronald Inglehart's modernisation theory and John Meyer's world society norms theory offer explanations. States which today utilise public iconography to boast of power or might – as Jacques Hymans notes[1160] – are quick to earn the ire of other countries and their own populations.[1161] As Inglehart's and Meyer's theories advocate, acceptable public norms in Western contexts transformed in the twentieth century, particularly in a Europe struggling to emerge from the ashes of two world wars triggered, in part, by precisely this sort of political posturing.[1162] Brash political statements are no longer the order of the day, and neither is a focus upon individual holders of political power.[1163] Instead, as Hymans identifies, twentieth-century European currency on both sides of the Iron Curtain quickly abandoned such designs in favour of apolitical portraits or bland depictions of nature.[1164] It was from this context that the euro emerged – a prevailing ethos of attempting to depict apolitical themes on currency. Hence the map. But, as we shall see, the noblest intentions cannot disentangle currency and its images from politicking; and no map is devoid of politics.

The second answer to the question rests in the discussion of *empire* recounted in Chapter One. In pursuit of an ontology, it was argued that *empire* is a discourse, an imagined link to a manufactured history. The symbolism of *empire* is ubiquitous, in fields ranging from architecture and vexillology to poetry and prose, with such imperial visual memes[1165] as we encountered in Chapter Two harking back to the imagination of a legitimate link with an artificial Rome. Yet the majority – perhaps all – of these media, from buildings to paintings, are geographically restricted. The majestic monuments of Georgian, Victorian, and modern-era Europeans – as grandiose and politically overt as they are – are all too often restricted to

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[1160] Jacques Hymans, 'East is East, and West is West? Currency iconography as nation-branding in the wider Europe', *Political Geography* 29 (2010), pp. 97-108.

[1161] Karen Strassler, 'The Face of Money: Currency, Crisis, and Remediation in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Cultural Anthropology* 24:1 (2009), pp. 68-103.

[1162] Matthias Kaelberer points to post-1945 imagery on *Deutschemarken* returning to pre-1870 and non-political images, to 'invoke a softer and non-confrontational national identity'. (p. 164) Europe does the same. Matthias Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity: symbols, power and the politics of the European monetary union', *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004), pp. 161-178.

[1163] Hymans, 'East is East', p. 98.

[1164] Ibid.

[1165] Richard Dawkins defines a 'meme' as a replicable idea which is passed around, and evolves, in the field of human interaction: 'Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation'. The imperial eagles which we encountered earlier are a political example, as is the *translatio* itself. And one of the realms of human interaction in which memes evolve (and which itself is a meme), is cartography. Meme theory is slowly gaining acceptance as a map methodology. Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 192-193; Peter Vujaković, 'Warning! Viral Memes Can Seriously Alter Your Worldview', *Maplines* Spring 2013, pp. 4-6.

capital cities, unseen to many members of the state. Portraits and paintings gather dust in private galleries while those in public exhibitions are only fleetingly glimpsed by a handful.[1166] Even in a Digital Age imperium with its television channels, websites, magazine covers and mass education, not all inhabitants will regularly encounter icons of the state. *Euronews*, the Union's *Europa* web portal, and the proliferation of pamphlets and political paraphernalia coming out of Brussels and Strasbourg are, to those who choose not to tune in, as distant to them as were the metropolitan monuments of the Emperor to a provincial plebeian in the Roman Empire. Yet there is one medium of propagating political discourse which, barring a relative lull – but not absence – in Europe from the fifth to thirteenth centuries,[1167] few Europeans have been able to do without since the Caesars conquered the continent. This medium is money.

As Simon Coupland states, 'coins ... convey an ideological message'[1168] and the importance of numismatic iconography to our understanding of cartoimperialism cannot be understated. Indeed, Hariklea Papageorgiadou-Bani highlights the lack of scholarly interest in the discourses of power which every day pass between our fingers; a relative absence which has been identified and lamented for decades.[1169] Such seemingly innocent images are possibly the most powerful conveyors of political – and by extension, imperial – imaginations and thus warrant a full study. In the previous chapter we examined the continuing historical importance of maps in the public sphere; in this case, in the context of maps in official European Union media.

It is not the intention of this chapter to perform an exhaustive critique of how money has been, and is, used to promote politics in different places and eras. Our focus remains the European Union and its maps. Yet we cannot even understand, let alone appreciate and analyse, the persuasive power of Europe's coinage cartographies without first investigating the roots of the phenomenon. Like *empire* itself, numismatic politics are the product of a long and complex evolution of different discourses; and just as an historical investigation suggested that the roots of "*empire*" are found in the international politics of Early Medieval

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[1166] Tim Luke, *Museum Politics: Power Plays at the Exhibition* (Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), pp. 65-81, 218-230.
[1167] Price, *Coins*, pp. xiii-xxvi, 21-34.
[1168] Simon Coupland, *Carolingian Coinage and the Vikings: studies on power and trade in the 9th century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 211.
[1169] Tomasz Polański, 'The Imperial Propaganda and Historical Tradition according to a Selection of Coins from the collection of Augustine Czartoryski', *Prace Archaeologiczne* 53 (1992), pp. 47-57.

Europe, so too does a numismatic study reveal the origins of explicitly "imperial" currency in precisely the same place and time.

This chapter begins with an investigation of numismatic theory before assessing the historical context of numismatic power. Like the discourse of *empire*, the discourse of imperial imagery did not appear overnight but is the product of centuries of intellectual evolution, and thus it is vital to understand its macrohistorical origins[1170] in order to appreciate the unique power of euro maps. Subsequently, using the methods established in Chapters Three and Four, the maps appearing on euro coins and banknotes will be interrogated in search not only of cartographic constructs and imperial imaginations, but the synthesis of elements which render euro coins and banknotes the very pinnacle of cartoimperialism. Thus we begin with an overview of the nature and importance of numismatics.

6.1   *In Europe We Trust*

In 1963 at the height of the First Cold War,[1171] numismatists at the United States Federal Reserve altered the motto of the US dollar to contrast Soviet atheism – changing the legend from *E Pluribus Unum*[1172] to *In God We Trust*.[1173] Notwithstanding the sociopolitical circus this triggered between America's endlessly squabbling theists and secularists, the motto is an interesting choice. For it is not in God that we the public place our numismatic trust, but in the state which issues these artefacts.

The act of creating a state currency is what Andrew Stewart terms a 'universalizing technique' to centre political power in a particular body, a political trick traceable to Alexander the Great and beyond.[1174] This technique only functions if we, the users of these otherwise worthless little discs and slips of paper, *believe* that they have value. This value is only constructed through trust, and such trust, as Josh Lauer argues, is created only by the issuing authority adorning currency with the symbols, icons, and emblems of the state. Such

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[1170] Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity', p. 162.

[1171] Robert McMahon, *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[1172] 'Out of many, one'. The phrase first appears in the writings of Publius Vergilius (Virgil), and was adopted not only for its connotations of unity but as another linguistic link connecting the newborn USA to Rome. Curiously the phrase was used by Virgil not to describe a noble project of political unity, but in *Moretum* ("Pesto") to describe the recipe for a salad dressing. *Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, p. 379.

[1173] Eric Helleiner, 'One Money, One People? Political Identity and the Euro', *TIPEC Working Paper* 01:6 (2006), pp. 1-31.

[1174] Andrew Stewart, *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), p. 93.

icons become runes of power, which the users of money revere with an almost religious faith as we collectively agree – and believe – that it is these pictures and patterns which trigger a transubstantiation of money from small, valueless trinkets, to holders of such economic power that these worthless objects can be exchanged for the very means of sustenance and existence, all backed up by the power of the state. It was not by coincidence that foreign, or privately- or regionally-issued currencies in nineteenth century polities were quickly phased out in favour of a single, state-approved format,[1175] for one of the byproducts of Western modernisation was the growing acceptance of currency issued *only* by the state. And just as currency only works by virtue of those magical symbols anointing it with the power of the state, so too can the state only engender the public's trust by peppering its coins and banknotes with easily- and universally-recognised icons of the supreme sovereign. It is not in *God* we trust to back up the socially-agreed value of the clinking discs and rustling papers in our purses and wallets; it is in the *State* that we trust – and it is in the recognisability of certain images that the state trusts. For as Sutherland notes, 'neat and well-chosen pictorial symbolism explained itself'.[1176]

While this usually goes unnoticed, it nevertheless occurs. Let us consider an example: one which most of us, at some point in our lives, will have experienced.

For whatever reason, we have arrived at an airport in some faraway land. One of the first things we do after collecting our luggage, as Simon Hawkins identifies,[1177] is to visit the *bureau de change* and exchange our familiar old banknotes for the cash of our temporary host. After leaving the *bureau* we gawk at the exotic and unfamiliar money in our hands, memorising the size, shape, colour, and value of each note and coin; scrutinising its exotic political symbols and complex iconographies offering a visual narrative of the state and its sovereign, history and inhabitants.[1178] We rarely, if ever, do this in our own countries. Yet overseas we take time to visually dissect the political icons stamped onto notes and coins. The simple reason is that, contrary to the ambitious aspirations of nineteenth-century bank managers,[1179] money is not something which is studied or queried by those whose fingers it regularly passes between. As Lauer highlights, 'physical circulating money is often taken for granted; it is ubiquitous and prosaic to the point of invisibility'.[1180] Wambui Mwangi explains

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[1175] Helleiner, *Making of National Money*, pp. 100-102, 163-185.

[1176] C.H.V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 BC – AD 68* (London: Methuen, 1951), p. 6.

[1177] Simon Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity: Currency and Constructing Cosmopolitans in Tunisia', *Identities: Global Studies in Power and Culture* 17 (2010), pp. 228-254.

[1178] Ibid., p. 228; Tim Unwin and Virginia Hewitt, 'Banknotes and national identity in central and eastern Europe', *Political Geography* 20:6 (2001) pp. 1005-1028.

[1179] Helleiner, 'One People, One Money?', pp. 4-5.

[1180] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 110.

this as the difference between *seeing* and *looking*; that cash 'is usually seen only incidentally in the process of being transacted, in other words "seen" as a matter or habit and not as the result of concentration.'[1181] Excepting our visit to the *bureau de change*, we generally do not study the images on money, including the euro. Yet this does not render the power of the currency any less significant. Indeed, the truth is quite the opposite. For it is in the everyday banality of the images passing between our fingers that power lies. Our religious faith in the value of cash is so strong that we do not need to examine each coin and note in a transaction – a brief glance for the purposes of some quick mental arithmetic is all that we deem necessary. Our trust in currency is total – and by extension, so is the trust of issuer and user in the icons adorning its surfaces. And there is no more effective vehicle of trust than the map.

The use of the map as a numismatic icon is old, but remarkably rare. Indeed prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999, maps on currency were very much the exception. Vincent Virga notes the use of crude cartographies on Ionian coins of the fourth century BC,[1182] but in the face of a cartographically illiterate public with infrequent access to coinage,[1183] such iconography remained virtually unheard-of. Barber and Harper discuss the somewhat broader use of maps on European Early Modern coins between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries; reminding us that such iconography was for purposes not practical, but political. Individual *Freie Reichsstädte* and sovereign *Herrschaftsgebiete*[1184] within the moribund, post-1648 *Heiliges Römisches Reich* minted such coins as 'civic pride could be expressed through a miniature town view' to declare sovereignty in the face of the impotent and increasingly ignored *Reich*,[1185] while larger-scale cartographies of regions, nations, or even the entire globe, served a dual purpose of commemorating voyages of exploration alongside expressing claims of possession or acquisitorial rights. However, these were designed for collection by an elite, rather than circulation among the populace. The proud political discourse proffered by them, while quite evident, was not one for public consumption.

Banknotes were even less prone to depict the country. With the exception of occasional national personifications pointing at their country's position on a globe,[1186] or

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[1181] Wambui Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency Design in Colonial Kenya', *Geopolitics* 7:1 (2002), pp. 31-62.
[1182] Vincent Virga, *Cartographia: Mapping Civilizations* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007), p. 16.
[1183] Price, *Coins*, pp. 8-20.
[1184] Imperial Free Cities and sovereign duchies, baroncies, and bishoprics – below the level of kingdom – within the Holy Roman Empire. Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 56-60; Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 12-25.
[1185] Barber and Harper, *Magnificent Maps*, p. 96.
[1186] Helleiner, *Making Money*, p. 105.

maps used to demonstrate the site of scientific events or achievements within a state,[1187] maps are almost invisible from notes. At first glance this is remarkable, considering that maps appeal to moneymakers' desire for complex images which deter forgers.[1188] The euro, though, not only features maps – it is emblazoned with cartography. Indeed, the only universal image amidst the otherwise varied iconography issued by the ECB, aside from the twelve gold stars of the Union,[1189] is a map. As we shall see, it is the one connecting icon, and the only icon recognisable to anyone who looks at it.

We might well be forgiven, then, for initially thinking that cash is politically neutral; a harmless assortment of paper quadrangles and small metal circles which nestle quietly in purses and pockets until we approach a shopkeeper or a customer approaches us, whereupon they disappear from our sight in a quick, apparently apolitical transaction which requires no more conscious thought than the basic addition and subtraction we learned before we could read and write. But this is not so. Numismatic theory emphasises to us that currency and its iconography are far from apolitical; indeed it is so highly politicised that we are no longer aware of its indissoluble associations with state, government, legitimacy, and the invocation of imaginary pasts to justify the present. The bits of folded paper in our wallets and the clinking discs in our purses are supreme emblems of state and sovereignty. As they are the exclusive monopoly of the state and as they circulate between the purchasing publics of Earth's one hundred and ninety-four sovereign states on a daily basis, coins and banknotes are, arguably, by far the most powerful vehicles for the expression of authority and ambition, power and propaganda. Coins are a powerful vehicle for the promotion of political messages[1190] but far more significantly, they are the *ideal* vehicle of cartoimperialism.

In her critical study of Scottish banknote iconography, Jan Penrose laments that 'scholars tend to evoke ill-defined notions of "the state", "the national elite" and/or some unspecified part of "the government" to explain who determines banknote iconography and how this is achieved'.[1191] This is a fair criticism and one which must be borne in mind when considering the European Union, whose government structures are still fluid and emergent. This brings us to the questions of who selected the map as the dominant feature of euro currency – and why – and how this might affect a cartoimperial interpretation of euro maps.

[1187] Unwin and Hewitt, 'Banknotes and national identity', p. 1023.
[1188] European Central Bank, 'Why new banknotes?', http://www.new-euro-banknotes.eu/Europa-Series/Why-new-banknotes.
[1189] Wintle, *Image of Europe*, pp. 435-443, Fornäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 115-145.
[1190] The coins of Alexander the Great, as Andrew Stewart points out, were just as much vehicles of political propaganda as they were mediums of economic exchange. Stewart, *Faces of Power*, pp. 160-161.
[1191] Penrose, 'Designing the Nation', p. 3.

The first question is readily answered by Robert Fishman and Anthony Messina, whose study of the manifold aspects of the euro outlines the selection process followed by European Central Bank directors in choosing the map as an icon.[1192] Significantly, the decision rested with one individual: Robert Kalina of the Austrian National Bank.[1193] This will be examined in greater detail throughout the chapter.

The second question is less directly answered, as a cartoimperial interpretation of EU maps would inevitably raise more than a few eyebrows in Brussels. The idea that European Bank directors and European cartographers are pursuing a deliberate policy of encouraging an identity based on legitimacy through association with a constructed past – the essence of *empire* – warrants similar caution.[1194] As Kalina himself specifies, the map was chosen for its apparent neutrality, and a single graphic artist commissioned to produce a suitable piece of seemingly bland, inoffensive cartography.[1195]

In the light of such an apparently innocent process, we must query why we are examining euro maps. Interrogating coin iconography, whether cartographic or not, is a field fraught with its own potential pitfalls. As Richard Reece suggests, 'there are all sorts of different ways of looking into this [iconographic interpretation]'[1196] and subsequently a purely tropic approach to coin maps – notwithstanding the invaluable foundation laid by other scholars' studies of tropes alone[1197] – does not go quite far enough. Joseph Galloy additionally argues in his study of the political iconography of South American currency, analysis of tropes alone – colour, shapes, and symbols – does not suffice.[1198] Similarly, we are not primarily concerned with the proliferation of local designs on the reverse of Euro coins. Our object of study is the cartography depicted on obverse faces of coins and notes, and it is not enough to merely examine the gradients, projections, and cartographic clutter of Euro coin-maps, as it is the meta-tropes which are of importance.

Of course, there are drawbacks to such an approach. One curious problem is that engaging with the makers of such icons may only further muddy the interpretive waters. Tonio Hölscher emphasises that visual language is not consciously devised, but instead

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[1192] Robert Fishman and Anthony Messina (eds.). *The Year of the Euro: The Cultural, Social, and Political Import of Europe's Common Currency* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), pp. 15-36.
[1193] Ibid., pp. 28-31.
[1194] Eric Helleiner, *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historial Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
[1195] Luc Lucyx of the Royal Belgian Mint. See Fishman and Messina, *Year of the Euro*, pp. 25-35.
[1196] Richard Reece, *The Coinage of Roman Britain* (Stroud: Tempus, 2002), p. 11.
[1197] Raento et al, 'Striking stories'; Hewitt and Unwin, 'Banknotes and national identity'.
[1198] Joseph Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism in Mexican and Central-American Currency', *Applied Semiotics / Sémiotique appliquée* 4:9 (2000), pp. 15-34.

emerges and evolves of its own accord,[1199] while the creation of a visual language is itself 'a largely unconscious process'.[1200] The *intention* of the designer becomes, as a consequence, negligible compared to the *interpretation* of the viewer. Penrose is right to remind us that it is inadequate to simply claim that maps are produced by a faceless state, but it is equally problematic to inquire of ECB directors, and the cartographers they commissioned, why they selected such designs; as such an approach will quickly flounder in the psychological morass that Gadamer terms the effective historical consciousness.

It may be perfectly possible to engage with the individuals responsible. We know that the directive for producing a map originated with Robert Kalina, in response to a committee choosing designs submitted as part of a public competition.[1201] And we know who drew the map in question: Luc Lucyx of the Royal Belgian Mint, a graphic artist rather than a cartographer.[1202] We need not fear Penrose's warning about creating a *lumpencategory* lazily called "the state". But the problems identified are only exacerbated.

In his study of ancient coins, Christopher Howgego laments the lack of evidence on who chose particular iconographies, and why. While there is evidence that deliberate political messages were occasionally propagated,[1203] the historical record is incomplete. In the absence of such records, the best that iconographers can do is make educated guesses based on cross-referencing against the few scraps of literature which, unlike their coinage cousins, have not aged well. In the case of the Union, nothing could be further from the truth. We are well aware of who chose and designed the coins. Yet as Gadamer's 'effective historical consciousness' reminds us, a direct approach of questioning Messrs. Kalina and Lucyx could easily be counter-productive. The relevant individuals might consider the influence of different reasons for selecting a map, rather than those subconscious issues and aspects of mapping, identified in Chapter Three, of which they may have been unaware. Penrose identifies this also, reminding us that 'banknote design can be arbitrary, *ad hoc,* inconsistent and highly personalized',[1204] and it is for this reason that she bemoans the 'limited and often tangenital insights into design processes' which characterise those studies whose focus, in

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[1199] Tonio Hölscher, *The Language of Images in Roman Art: Art as a Semantic System in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 2.
[1200] Ibid., p. 127.
[1201] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, pp. 24-35.
[1202] William Wolters, 'The Euro: Old and new boundaries in the use of money', *Anthropology Today* 17:6 (2001), pp. 8-12.
[1203] C.J. Howgego, *Greek imperial countermarks: studies in the provincial coinage of the Roman Empire* (London: Royal Numismatic Society, 1985), p. 71. Howgego points to Decimus Brutus, during the Roman Republic's last civil war, fashioning coins in order to promote a particular message. Cassius Dio, *Roman History*, XLVII.25, p. 3.
[1204] Penrose, 'Designing the nation', p. 436.

contrast to vague ideas of "the state", are 'too explicitly concerned with the individuals involved in creation and selection'.[1205] In visual language there are few, if any, definites, and it is a poor approach to assume that those who choose and create visual language are aware of all the reasoning behind their final decision.

Finally, and arguably most importantly, is the context of the euro's design process. Far from being a propaganda project imposed by what Penrose rightly discerns as a formless "state" or a vague "elite", designs for the euro were selected – not for the first time in numismatic history[1206] – from entries to a public competition.[1207] The creation of the continental currency was not part of a Machiavellian project wherein an amorphous group establishes propaganda, but a quasi-democratic structure. The result is what Fareed Zakaria termed 'Money for Mars';[1208] a currency whose iconography is so bland as to be, with the exception of the map, almost unrecognisable as European. While there is still a powerful political discourse inherent to the maps on EU currency, there is certainly no grandiose proclamation of superiority and inferiority such as the overt, divisive, and sometimes sinister images which adorned the national currencies of the past.[1209] Robert Kalina offers all the "insider knowledge" we need when he explains, that other competition entries were rejected by the ECB's selection board on grounds of political correctness,[1210] leaving the map as the most suitable image for expressing European togetherness. The ECB's directors chose a map on the presumption that it would be less overtly political than images tied to nation-states or previous attempts to unify Europe under one banner[1211] – and this reasoning is all that is required.

Yet as this chapter demonstrates, the selection of the map as the dominant icon of European currency is neither apolitical nor even neutral. Individually, currency and maps are two of the most powerful vehicles for the construction of political discourses. Combined, the result is that Europe's common currency becomes the site of cartographic control; the channelling of an emergent identity based upon imperial maps.

Not only is the Union's continental currency emblazoned with cartographies appealing to the imperial imagination – as this chapter shall argue – but money itself is a

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[1205] Penrose, 'Designing the nation' p. 435 (emphasis added).
[1206] The images on France's revolutionary *assignats* were selected from public competition. Helleiner, *Making Money*, pp. 101-102; Alistair Horne, *The French Revolution Experience* (London: Andre Deutsch, 2009), pp. 22-23.
[1207] Admittedly the designs received were all from professional banknote designers of national banknotes. Fishman and Messina, *Year of the Euro*, pp. 15-36; Wintle, *Image of Europe*, pp. 435-443.
[1208] Fishman and Messina, *Year of the Euro*, pp. 15-19.
[1209] Helleiner, *The Making of National Currencies*.
[1210] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, pp. 23-25.
[1211] European Central Bank, http://ecb.eu; Wolters, 'The Euro', pp. 9-11.

peerless vehicle for the promotion and encouragement of political imaginations which are, as Greirson argues, neither intended nor even realised by those who design currency.[1212] Since the Bronze Age, cash has been a political artefact as a tool of the state, and Europe's common currency, for all its noble intentions of political neutrality and the encouragement of themes of cohesion and peace among its users, cannot escape the tangled semiotic web of discourses and imaginations which have accompanied currency since the first metal discs were stamped out in a Lydian palace lost in the mists of time.[1213] The ECB's intentions may have been neutral, but the vehicle they chose is anything but.

The imagery of currency is of crucial importance to understanding the formation of Europe's emergent imperial imagination, but in contrast to the maps we examined in the preceding chapter, the maps on euros are not meant to be visual spectacles. 'Not all images', writes Mwangi in her analysis of the colonial currencies of imperial Britain, 'are meant to be looked at. Some, like those on banknotes, are only meant to be seen.'[1214] Currency images are not intended to be the focus of direct attention; a fact attested since at least the Roman period, if not earlier.[1215] And it is because currency images are not designed to be scrutinised that we can impart in infinity of interpretations upon them.[1216] That currency imagery can be interpreted in a variety of ways is attested by the case of Roman coinage, which since its very minting has been the subject of disagreements between handlers as to the messages contained within, and modern antiquarians are no more immune to these loud debates than the market-browsers of an Iron Age day in the Roman Forum.[1217] Indeed, given the infinite interpretability of images – regardless of the intentions of those who designed them – it could be argued that there is little point in analysing euro currency maps.

'The problem,' argues Richard Reece, 'as always with interpretation, is that [iconographic analysis] is a matter of thought, behaviour and concepts, none of which can be approached logically through material. You can sit and gaze at the material, commune with it, subject it to stringent statistical analyses, or absorb its vibrations, but none of these, or any other procedures, will lead logically to an interpretation. Once you have taken in what material there is, and where it is, you are free to fantasise; and your fantasies can only be

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[1212] Philip Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1999).
[1213] Eric Helleiner, *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present and Future of National Currencies* (London: Routledge, 1999); Thomas Figueira, *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 1-21, 41-42.
[1214] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', p. 31.
[1215] Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
[1216] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', p. 41.
[1217] Papageorgiadou-Bani, *Numismatic Iconography*, pp. 21-35, 39-40.

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proved wrong, they can never be proved right.'[1218] We identified in Chapter Three that check-list analyses would lead us nowhere: similarly, engaging on a personal level is similarly futile. A focus group on the meanings of euro cartographic iconographies would be an exercise in futility – whether the survey was of thirty Europeans or three hundred million, the variety of answers would remain the same. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is no universal consensus on the meanings of something as everyday as colour: it is wishful thinking to imagine that there is a universal law of map interpretation. In the face of this, what then is the purpose of interrogating currency maps?

The answer is that, as has been identified, maps are a uniquely powerful vehicle of political messages: messages which Sutherland is reluctant to term 'propaganda',[1219] but which remain political discourses regardless of what word we employ. Furthermore, the suggestion that currency maps are *seen* rather than *looked at* is no reason to discount a study. Indeed, the opposite is true. As vehicles of political discourses which are so prolific as to be physically handled by three hundred million Europeans every day; artefacts whose every passage between fingers creates an infinity of brief moments wherein two strangers are united as *Europeans* – moments whose increasing frequency leads inevitably to the critical mass of a *European* identity emerging – the maps on European currency are contributors to cartoimperialism. To commission a *Forma urbis Romae*, a *Leo Belgicus*, or a *L'Empire d'Allemand* and proudly place it in the Roman Forum, the town hall of Utrecht, or the lobby of the Nuremberg *Rathaus*, is to make a bold political statement, couched in visual language, seen by tens of thousands of eyes. But as we shall see, to commission a *denarius*, a *thaler*, or a *Napoleon* with a proud imperial portrait is to create an object which, due to its perpetual motion, reaches far more people than the public proclamation of identity on the walls of a state building can, and whose perpetual motion creates infinite, fleeting moments of political kinship between people who, biology aside, have nothing in common. Similarly, to commission a map of the European Union for a website or a pamphlet is to make a political statement which, even if it is unintentional, remains a political vehicle seen by countless eyes. But to commission a currency icon whose reproductions circulate every second from Porto to Poznan is, like the imperial currencies of yesteryear, to create moments of unity. And what better emblem of unity, what better icon to say who is one of the group – and who is *not* – than one whose perceived authority, on state-stamped objects, is unquestioned and accepted as gospel truth by its handlers, than the map?

[1218] Reece, *Coinage of Roman Britain*, p. 107.
[1219] C.H.V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 BC – AD 68* (London: Methuen, 1951); C.H.V. Sutherland, R.A.G. Carson and Harold Mattingley, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* (London: Spink, 1984).

It is evident that understanding the macrohistorical context within which currency-as-politics emerged is of inherently greater significance than shallow querying of the ECB's conscious choices. We turn now to understanding currency maps themselves.

The pre-eminent pioneer of semiotics, Georg Simmel, offers a critical insight into the importance of currency. While Simmel's study of over a century ago does not explicitly focus on the iconographies of money, it is his understanding of money as a form of social contract – which we examined above – which is enlightening. For Simmel, money is 'fundamentally a measure of social trust',[1220] a medium of exchange and communication in which we citizens of the state place an almost religious faith.[1221] We trust currency to have value, when it has none;[1222] we trust money as it is provided by the supreme authority of the state. And a consequence of this is that coins 'have basically two functions: (1) to identify coins to users ... and (2) to disseminate propaganda'.[1223] As currency is the sole prerogative of the state, and 'since coins circulate widely through the population, they can be used to provide an image of the ruler and express government policies'.[1224] This lends coins and banknotes a very powerful place in geopolitical iconography. Consequently, we trust the images on money to be as legitimate, powerful, and permanent as the institution which issued it – even though the images (and maps) on money are as devoid of verisimilitude as the metal discs and paper rectangles upon which they await interpretation.

The methods of semiotics and semantics for interpreting hyperreal visual language are already well-established in the field of numismatics.[1225] Mwangi's research points our inquiry in a direction which scholars of cartography frequently overlook; that is, the location and use of currency maps rather than their actual features. Or, to use terminology with which we are by now familiar, we will examine the meta-tropes of euro currency maps – such as their location, usage, and position within optical and tactile transactions[1226] – rather than examining the mere tropes of colour, gradient, and projection.

Like the cartographies of websites and pamphlets, maps on euro currency are easy to examine. Only seven denominations of euro banknote exist, and only eight denominations of coin. To further assist, the European Central Bank graciously maintains an easy-to-access

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[1220] Georg Simmel, *Philosophy of Money [orig. 1900]* (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), p. 61; Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 111.
[1221] Ibid.
[1222] Lauer argues that while coins have a degree of value based upon the precious metals they contain, paper money is intrinsically worthless. Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication' pp. 110-111 footnote 2.
[1223] Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage*, p. 23.
[1224] Ibid.
[1225] C.J. Howgego, *Greek imperial countermarks: studies in the provincial coinage of the Roman Empire* (London: Royal Numismatic Society, 1985), p. 75; Hölscher, *The Language of Images in Roman Art*.
[1226] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', p. 32.

website which gives helpful facsimiles of all of its currency. As in the preceding chapter, this enables us to search for what Gillian Rose describes as 'recurring themes and visual patterns'[1227] within this powerful discursive vehicle.

As physical objects, currency falls into the category of material culture. And as such, as Joseph Galloy recounts, currency 'has the potential to transform societies through concepts and ideologies'.[1228] This is due to the symbolic and transformative power of artefacts of material culture which, as Roland Barthes identified, 'have a substance of expression whose essence is not to signify; often, they are objects of everyday use, used by a society in a derivative way, to signify something'.[1229]

Existing studies of euro currency are, in relation to the paucity of texts on general numismatic iconography, somewhat prevalent. Several scholars have approached the images on euros as vehicles of messages both subtle and overt.[1230] Yet there remain two noticeable gaps. The first is that despite the relative attention given to euro symbolism, existing studies only briefly refer to cartography[1231] if at all. As we have identified in previous chapters, maps are a form of icon and a unique vehicle more powerful than, and distinct from, abstract symbols or other representational icons. They require specific analysis on their own basis. The second gap concerns the focus on tropes alone at the expense of meta-tropes.

The tropes of Europe's currency maps are of course significant and require critical investigation based upon their own merits, but the meta-tropes of *where* the maps are located is of equal, if not greater importance. Mwangi reminds us why; while the icons on currency share the same 'insubstantiality' of their paper and photonic counterparts on the Union's websites and literature, there is a subtle yet essential difference. The maps examined in the previous chapter are designed to be *looked at*, as evidenced by the richness of their tropes and saturation with eye-catching aesthetics. Yet the maps on currency, as is the case with all numismatic icons, are designed to be *seen*. They are devoid of specific tropes – especially since the currency change of 2007 – and their function, as Mwangi identifies, is to be seen without being looked at.

In addition, currency is a moving vehicle. It is true that virtual money is as, if not more, prolific than hard cash, but cash is still sufficiently important as a means of economic transaction that the Union felt it necessary to release a new series of coins and banknotes in

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[1227] Rose, *Visual Methodologies*, p. 155.
[1228] Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism', p. 15.
[1229] Roland Barthes in Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism', p. 15.
[1230] Wintle, *Image of Europe*, pp. 433-435; Fornäs, *Signifying Єurope*, pp. 205-250; Raento et. al, 'Striking stories'.
[1231] Fornäs, *Signifying Єurope*, p. 252.

May 2013.[1232] The maps on EU websites and literature are static, unmoving, unchanging. Like the proud public cartographies of yesteryear, examined in Chapters Three and Four, they are immobile emblems of permanence and authority designed to stand the test of time and be absorbed by the eyes of innumerable viewers. But coins and banknotes are constantly moving 'in and out of one's presence, in and out of one's touch, in and out of pockets, wallets, banks, cash drawers, mattresses and so forth'.[1233] The result is that the tiny, apparently unremarkable maps on Europe's hard cash are in perpetual motion. As Mwangi argues, this permanent movement creates its own politics. Constant circulation of cash not only means that the maps are passing in and out of Europeans' (and non-Europeans') vision and consciousnesses on a daily, if not hourly, basis; but also means that an imagined community is assembled.

Mwangi identifies cash exchanges as one of the few instances wherein two inhabitants within the same polity – who are otherwise strangers by virtue of infinite factors – momentarily exist in the same identity as citizens of the state.[1234] This occurs at the level of the nation-state, and the phenomenon has been remarked upon by numismatic and iconographic scholars (and cartographers)[1235] studying that heyday of identity-building, the nineteenth century. But in the case of the European Union it is supra-national. Just as the transaction of state-stamped currency between a Gaul and a Greek in a Roman market, or a Picardian and a Parisian in a Victorian café, helped form an identity as inhabitants of the same political community, the act of exchanging an EU banknote or EU coins between an Italian and an Irishman – or even two members of the same Eurozone country – creates a moment, a space, in which two otherwise different individuals are briefly part of the same pan-continental group. As the ECB itself phrases it, this creates the possibility that 'a French citizen can buy a hot dog in Berlin using a euro coin carrying the imprint of the King of Spain',[1236] cementing the concept of community. An identity begins to emerge, fluid and nascent, but quickly forming into a recognisable shape. The transactors in our hypothetical Roman market, the conjectural *fin de siècle* French café, and the ECB's imaginary *Bratwurst* stall on Unter den Linden, form a collective identity. For a brief moment they are not individuals – they are both subjects of the *Imperator* on the Palatine Hill, citizens of the *Republique Française*, or members of the continental community. Yet these moments, while brief, are not isolated. They occur with great regularity, each time allowing this momentary collectivity to emerge.

[1232] European Central Bank, http://www.new-euro-banknotes.eu/Europa-Series/Why-new-banknotes.
[1233] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', p. 35.
[1234] Ibid.
[1235] Black, *Maps and History*, pp. 51-80.
[1236] European Central Bank: http://ecb.eu.

Eric Helleiner postulates that in times past, 'policymakers recognised that exclusive and standardised coins and notes might provide an effective vehicle for their project of constructing and bolstering a sense of collective tradition and memory', as 'it was thought that territorial currencies might encourage identification with the nation-state at a deeper level.'[1237] At first glance, this is a very tempting proposition, which appears to be supported by historical evidence. Yet in spite of authoritative statements supporting this notion,[1238] we must be careful not to be seduced into the realm of unquestioned assumptions regarding agency and intent.[1239] As Jan Penrose is right to point out, numismatic scholars are too hasty in their presuppositions that currency is part of a deliberate propagandising project overseen by a Machiavellian agency such as "state", "elite", or "sovereign" – even though these terms are woefully vague.[1240] Similarly it must be borne in mind, as Howgego points out, that just because currency depicts political icons it is not necessarily the case that there is a *deliberate* and sustained policy of promoting propaganda in this way.[1241]

'Money', writes Simon Hawkins in his study of identity and banknotes, 'is too valuable to ignore'.[1242] In the case of the European Union, this is demonstrably true, and an investigation of its currency iconography is essential. The consequence is, as Philip Reece identifies, that 'the way forward is to ask questions rather than to accept statements'.[1243] In the murky realm of visual rhetoric, semantic iconographies, and cartographic interpretation, there are no right or wrong answers. Attempting to identify or impose the perceptions of the makers only exacerbates the problem. Yet while there may not be universal laws of cartography-as-iconography, themes can be identified and distinguished. In order to understand the Union's money maps, then, it is critical that we place coins as discourses of political imaginations, in the historical context from which they emerged. It is thus to macrohistory that we turn.

[1237] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 11.

[1238] Historian Eric Hobsbawm (cited in Helleiner, *Making Money*, p. 103) asserts that currency as a tool of identity-building was deliberately manipulated by monarchs in the face of domestic resistance to monarchical rule, to encourage a national rallying to the monarch. Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*.

[1239] It is admittedly true, as Helleiner's discussion of US Treasury officials in the Civil War underlines, that on occasion there was agency involved. Yet we must avoid a synecdoche. The fact that *some* currencies were deliberately created to encourage a sense of identity does not mean that *all* were. At least not consciously. Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, pp. 105-106.

[1240] Penrose, 'Designing the Nation'; Gerbert Hebbink and Marga Peeters, 'Notes and Communications: The Circulation of Euro Banknotes and Coins in the Netherlands', *De Economist* 147:1 (1999), pp. 73-82.

[1241] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, pp. 70-71.

[1242] Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity', p. 252.

[1243] Reece, *Coinage of Roman Britain*, p. 11.

6.2   The Priests and the Portrait

> *'Then the Pharisees went out and laid plans to trap Him in His*
>
> *words. They sent their disciples to Him along with the Herodians.*
>
> *"Teacher," they said, "we know that You are a man of integrity and*
>
> *that You teach the way of the LORD in accordance with the truth.*
>
> *You aren't swayed by others, because You pay no attention to*
>
> *who they are. Tell us then, what is Your opinion? Is it right to pay*
>
> *the tax to Caesar or not?"*
>
> *But Jesus, knowing their evil intent, said, "You hypocrites, why are*
>
> *you trying to trap Me? Show Me the coin used for paying the*
>
> *tax". They brought Him a denarius, and He asked them "Whose*
>
> *portrait is this? And whose inscription?"*
>
> *"Caesar's", they replied.*
>
> *Then He said to them, "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and*
>
> *render unto the LORD what is the LORD's".'*

Matthew 22:15-21 (NIV)

Since their inception in Bronze Age Anatolia, coins have been used for the promotion of political messages. In the above snippet of Scripture Christ uses the *denarius*, Rome's basic unit of currency, to illustrate a theosophical argument. Insodoing he inadvertently illustrates the long-recognised political power of currency.

The Pharisees give Christ a coin, and in answer to their question Christ points to the image of Caesar. But it is not *Julius* Caesar. It is Tiberius, whose title – a discourse which looks back to an imaginary past to justify the present – is "Caesar".[1244] The point Christ inadvertently makes is that the iconography on the coin does not represent a particular political figure but rather represents the entirety of the Roman state. The image of the emperor – Caesar – acts as a synecdoche for the state apparatus and an emblem of the *general sovereignty* of the Eternal City, not the restricted, *particular sovereignty* of a temporal emperor.[1245] This is of importance.

[1244] Cassius Dio, *Roman History*, Book LII Ch. XLII.iii, p. 194.

[1245] This is supported by Reece, who argues that by the period of the Late Empire with its coin adulteration and endless recycling, it was the general image of 'The Emperor', rather than any specific individual, which dominated iconography. The general political concept, and not the politician who embodied it, was transmitted through currency. Reece, *Coinage in Roman Britain*, pp. 27, 63.

Numismatic theory offers some invaluable insights into the role and impact of images on coins, which since their inception, have been used to communicate subtle political messages of power, legitimacy, and prestige – the *troika* of what we have termed *cartoimperialism* – and this is applied to Union currency as a prime area for the propagation of imperial discourses. This is particularly so in the context of metatropes, as Union currency circulates between the fingers of some 332,000,000 euro users every day:[1246] thus the location of these maps is of critical importance when considering the expression of *empire*.

Christ's remarks on the *denarius* are not a mere account of an episode one sultry day in Iron Age Judea. They provide an overview of the unique power of coin iconography; a power which has passed down through the ages to the maps now adorning the continental currency. As with the very discourse of *empire*, it is in the frosty relations between Germans and Greeks in the ninth century that *empire*'s expression in currency originates. But as with the discourse, it is essential to understand the manufactured past which is appropriated. In our quest to understand this vital aspect of European Empire, all roads once again lead to Rome.

6.2.1   The Eternal City

"It can now be taken for granted that in antiquity coins were one of the principal means by which central authority disseminated all kinds of messages. Their role as a substantial vehicle of propaganda attained its fullest flowering in the Roman period, when the imperial elite used them in every conceivable way, alongside literature and architecture, as an effective means of publicizing and articulating the official point of view about a variety of matters. The coinage was always under the absolute authority of the central imperial authority and subordinate to its purposes, notably to convey information in a subtle form to the citizenry of the entire Roman Empire."[1247]

Papageorgiadou-Bani's above assessment of the power of monetary iconography in antiquity is as true today as at the time of the Caesars. As Sutherland notes, 'coinage is the prerogative of the supreme authority of the state',[1248] and coins have always been conveyors of political messages. Christopher Ando's study of contemporary Roman documents

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[1246] European Central Bank: http://ecb.europa.eu/.
[1247] Hariklea Papageorgiadou-Bani, *The Numismatic Iconography of the Roman Colonies in Greece: local spirit and the expression of imperial policy* (Athens and Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 2004), p. 17.
[1248] Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, p. 1.

concludes that Romans themselves – whether *patricians* or *plebeians* – were perfectly aware that coins were vehicles of political discourse: even if that nature of those discourses was, and remains, contested.[1249]

It has been argued that the genesis of explicitly imperial coinage was the Early Middle Ages, as the squabbling courts at Constantinople and Aachen sought to legitimise their claim to the title of *Imperium Romanorum*, the defenders of civilisation. Philip Grierson points us to the legacy of Roman and Byzantine imaginations of power, and their impact upon iconography; while in his study of imperial numismatics, Christopher Howgego argues that 'the imperial coinage of Rome parades an imperial ideology in by far the most blatant and systematic way'.[1250] As scholars identify, Roman coins promoted clear imperial messages, establishing a precedent which continues to this day.

In his study of ancient polities, Howgego argues that more than military power, cultural dominance, or economic hegemony, it is the legal right to mint and distribute coins which defines state sovereignty, legitimacy, and power[1251] – and by extension, defines who is *not* considered legitimate through denial of the right to mint coins. One of the first acts of a newly-independent polity, besides producing such artefacts of manufactured modernity as flags, anthems, and all the associated paraphernalia of industrial nationalism, is to produce a currency. This is a remarkably universal phenomenon, visible as recently as the creation of the new South Sudanese Pound by the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan,[1252] and as far-distant as the coins shaped and stamped by Cilicians, Syrians, and Phoenicians following the withdrawal of Seleucid power in the first-century BC Levant.[1253] In its late 1990s creation of a continental currency, the European Union was simply following an ancient legacy of defining and asserting the uniqueness and independence of a new state, while simultaneously proclaiming unity and sovereignty through the replacement of local currencies with a single unit.

Yet just as it was the retrospective *imagination* of Rome, rather than the historical *reality* itself, which spawned the discourse of empire, so too was it the imagination of public legitimacy which spawned modern political numismatics. Seeking an overt connection to an imagined past is only one aspect of the phenomenon. And it was in Charlemagne's Europe

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[1249] Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 211-212.
[1250] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 39.
[1251] Ibid., pp. 40-41.
[1252] Government of South Sudan, *Official Portal of the Republic of South Sudan: Economy*, http://www.goss.org/.
[1253] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 41.

that the modern-day phenomenon of political currency emerged. As Kent highlights,[1254] the coinage of more modern *empire*s – from the Holy Romans and Napoleonic France to Victorian Britain and Fascist Italy – testifies to deliberate attempts to connect the imperial present with an imagined past.

'It is with the imagery of the world', asserts Howgego in his discussion of the iconography of legitimacy, 'often represented as a globe, that the right of the Romans to universal rule is most clearly expressed ... Rome had a mission and a right to rule.'[1255] As we have seen, the use of maps on coins was comparatively rare prior to the Modern period, and even today remains uncommon. Yet the Romans' use of such iconography as the *globus*,[1256] *globus cruciger*,[1257] and such inscriptions as *RESTITUTORI ORBIS TERRARUM* ,[1258] established a tradition which survives today, albeit marginally, of using territorial markers to signify legitimacy of rule. As Howgego identifies, 'the visual and verbal languages of imperial ideology were used (deliberately or not) to construct images of the emperor and *empire*,[1259] a phenomenon whose legacy has given currency its unrivalled power.

The maps displayed on euro coins continue this tradition in a more subtle form, while those on euro banknotes are blatant depictions of an imperial manifest destiny that would not be unrecognisable to the *triumviri monetales* of Rome.[1260] The maps of euro currency may not go quite as far as their distant Roman ancestors by depicting a figure, sword in hand, standing with her foot on the globe in a powerful personification of Rome's omnipotence,[1261] but the message proclaimed by euro notes is precisely the same. The boundaries of the imperium have been expanded, and the imperium is the sole legitimate sovereign of the assimilated and remaining territories.

Legitimacy is a powerful element of political iconography, particularly where the state is concerned. It comes as little surprise that it is also an ancient aspect. Grierson highlights the Byzantine approach whereby 'in order to assure the succession, emperors associated their sons with them as co-emperors, and the coinage was intended to advertise the dynasty'.[1262]

[1254] John Kent, *Roman Coins* (New York: H. N. Abrams, 1978), p. 8.
[1255] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 83.
[1256] The image of the world as a globe, often depicted being transferred from the Emperor to his successor. Ibid., p. 83.
[1257] A Christian variant on the *globus* or *orbis*: a spherical world topped by the Christian cross. See Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, XVIII.iii.1-iv.5, p. 361.
[1258] "Restorer of the World". Ando, *Imperial Ideology*, pp. 410-411.
[1259] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 77.
[1260] Ibid., p. 70.
[1261] Ibid., p. 83.
[1262] Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage*, p. 7.

This trait of depicting the body politic as a natural, unbroken succession became yet more significant during Byzantine iconoclasm; when coin portraits were reduced to an abstract, uniform depiction representing the *office* of emperor rather than the particular individual holding it.[1263] Thus the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy – emphasised through repetition of universally-recognisable symbols[1264] depicting the Byzantine *basileus* as God's vicegerent – were depicted via emblems encapsulating the *idea* of power and the *idea* of *empire* as a light against the non-Byzantine darkness. What is of particular interest is that such coins used recognisable symbols to perform what we identified in Chapter Four as a synecdochal metonym. Let us explore this further.

As identified, the apex of Byzantine iconoclasm in the eighth century – a period when lifelike images of God, saints, and the emperor were demolished as heretical – saw the emergence of a new style of coin iconography. The specific emperor was not depicted, but rather a *representation* of imperial power via a bland, "one-size-fits-all" silhouette of a generic ruler. Recalling the earlier discussion of synecdochal metonyms – a *phenomenon* whereby a part comes to represent the whole, and a *practice* wherein depictions of that part come to represent the whole – we clearly see a political synecdoche in Byzantine coinage which influenced political iconography for centuries to come, in the form of portraiture of the sovereign as representations of the body politic and the nation. And even today, some six centuries after Byzantium was consigned to the history books, the same political synecdoche occurs. The image of the sovereign – a part representing the national whole – no longer appears in human form. Yet it endures in a new, more powerful format. This is the map – a political part representing a continental whole, and vice-versa – an emblem sufficiently similar to a specific image for its viewers to recognise it, yet sufficiently abstract to convey political unrealities. Indeed the icon must be vaguely recognisable, for currency iconography functions according to what Karen Strassler terms 'mimetic verisimilitude';[1265] the public's ability to recognise symbols and icons in state-affiliated media as expressions of authority and assurance. The symbols are not only recognisable but deliberately so, for as Papageorgiadou-Bani asserts:

[1263] Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage*, pp. 8, 24.
[1264] Ibid., pp. 14-17.
[1265] Strassler, 'The Face of Money', p. 89.

'Deeply rooted in the consciousness of the rulers was the conviction that the symbolic means offered by the iconography of coins were sufficiently strong to communicate to the people messages that the central authority wished to convey – regardless of the actual impact enjoyed by ... inscriptions'[1266]

Bani's words could describe *imperial* iconography at any point in history. Of course, Papageorgiadou-Bani writes in specific relation to Greek colonies in the Roman *Empire*; but the sense that emblems can convey powerful messages in visual rather than verbal language which can transcend local interpretations and languages, remains true in the case of the Union. The message of Rome's currency was unity in an apparently globe-spanning civilisation. The message of the Union is, as we are by now familiar, being *"United in Diversity"* in the continental community. The most effective means of transcending local variations in polyglot, polycultural Europe is visual, and has been so since the days of Augustus and Nero.

On the surface, the modern euro bears only passing resemblance to the coins of yesteryear. There are no portraits of sovereigns, like those on imperial predecessors or even contemporary currencies used by non-Eurozone EU members. There are no adulatory religious images nor 'laudatory epithets'[1267] to aggrandise the ruler, and especially no images of violent aggression against neighbours.[1268] Indeed it would appear that there is nothing besides shape and function to connect modern Union currency with the coins of long-forgotten societies. Yet this benign perception is inaccurate. Just as the discourse of *empire* itself has evolved and transformed from the primordial politics of Franks and Byzantines; just as the function of maps has morphed and adapted to suit political and ideological purposes, so too is currency the product of a long and complex development saturated with inescapable political motivations and ideologies – a truth as valid in today's Union as it was at the apex of power wielded by Rome or Constantinople.

[1266] Papageorgiadou-Bani, *Numismatic Iconography of the Roman Colonies in Greece*, p. 32.

[1267] Philip Grierson and Christopher Nugent, *Studies in Numismatic Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 21.

[1268] Ibid., pp. 23-25.

6.2.2 The Continental Currency

Europe is no stranger to continental currencies. Under Bonaparte, Europeans traded gold *Napoleons* from Madrid to Moscow,[1269] while under the Caesars *denarii* passed between the fingers of Caledonians as much as Corinthians. At its military and political height before its post-1648 decline, the Holy Roman Empire's *thaler* was a universal, if unofficial, European currency.[1270] Yet of significant interest to this study is the obscure and mostly forgotten continental currency which followed in the wake of *empire*'s birth.

In Chapter Two we grappled with the concept of *empire*, ultimately arriving at the discourse's simultaneous evolution and genesis in the subtle, back-stabbing diplomacy between swaggering Franks and haughty Byzantines over a millennium ago. The apex of this discourse was that moment at the high altar of St Peter's when Pope Leo slipped an old crown scavenged from the coffers of the Vatican[1271] onto Charlemagne's brow and recited a borrowed Byzantine rite, thus proclaiming the *Rex Francorum* the new *Imperator Romanorum*. It comes as no surprise that one of the first acts of the new *Imperator* Charlemagne, the first *emperor* of the first manifestation of Western *empire*, was to issue a distinctly imperial currency.[1272]

Of course, this is not a study of historical numismatics. But nevertheless a critical examination of Charlemagne's currency is essential to our understanding of cartoimperialism in the modern-day successor to that new polity proclaimed twelve centuries ago.

Simon Coupland points us to the monetary changes resulting from the Carolingian Renaissance. There was, of course, nothing new about coinage in Charlemagne's realm prior to 800. Martin Price draws attention to Charlemagne's coinage reforms of 794, which set a universal standard for designs,[1273] some six years before the events of Christmas 800. What is curious is the sudden change in design in 812, following Constantinople's grudging acceptance of Charlemagne as Emperor of the West; as portrayed by Figs 6.1 and 6.2:

[1269] Cronin, *Napoleon*, p. 196.

[1270] John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Cassell, 2003), pp. 84-85.

[1271] Robert Folz, *The Concept of Empire in Western Europe: from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century* (Frome: Edward Arnold, 1969), p. 145.

[1272] Derek Heater records that the Comte de Saint-Simon's plan for European integration in the beginning of the nineteenth century would have involved a currency called *Charlemagnes*. Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, pp. 97-104.

[1273] Curiously, coins in Charlemagne's realm before 794 followed a similar pattern to the modern-day Euro. The obverse of the coins remained universal but the reverse featured a pattern chosen by local minters – precisely the same as Euro coins which feature one universal face, and one chosen by the minting nation. Price, *Coins: An Illustrated History*, p. 144.

Fig. 6.1 – Pre-812 coin[1274]   **Fig. 6.2** – Post-812 coin[1275]

It must be stressed that Figs 6.1 and 6.2 above are not two sides of the same coin. They are both obverse faces of two separate coins; one pre- and one post-812. Fig 6.1 is representative of many coins of the Early Middle Ages; an abstract design using a universally recognisable Christian icon – in this case, the Gothic cross – to express Christ's dominion of the world and unity under *Christ Pantocrator*, along with lettering expressing the King's sovereignty. Yet following Constantinople's reluctant recognition of Charlemagne's imperial title, as Fig 6.2 demonstrates, the iconography undergoes a radical change by appropriating a selective history to validate the present.[1276]

What, it might be asked, is explicitly *imperial* about this new currency? One face on a coin, to paraphrase Aristotle, does not *empire* make.[1277] The answer is twofold. The discourse of *empire* lurks in both the tropes and the meta-tropes, for it is not only in maps that we find these phenomena, but in all forms of visual language. Using a portrait of a ruler for the obverse face of a coin was certainly not new in 812 – as we discovered above, the Romans had done so centuries before while the Byzantines continued to emblazon their coins with

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[1274] Price, *Coins: An Illustrated History*, p. 144 (Fig. 637B).

[1275] Ibid., p. 145 (Fig. 638A).

[1276] It is worth noting, as Coupland does, that the change in iconography probably occured as late as 812, some twelve years after Charlemagne's imperial coronation. His explanation for this – that the new iconography was brought in only after the Byzantines grudgingly acknowledged Charlemagne as Western Emperor – tells us much about the complex relationships of the early ninth century which forged "*empire*" in the European consciousness. Coupland, *Carolingian Coinage and the Vikings*, p. 212; John Creighton, *Coins and Power in Late Iron Age Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-54.

[1277] "One swallow does not a summer make" Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* Book VI.1098. *The Basic Works of Aristotle [trans. Richard McKeon]* (New York: Modern Library Classics, 2001), p. 943.

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crude renderings of the reigning *basileus* or generic office-holder. What is significant about Charlemagne's adoption of the style is that it is a deliberate hearkening back to classical Rome, as Fig 6.3 shows:

Fig. 6.3 – Roman imperial *denarius*   **Fig. 6.4** – Frankish imperial *denarius*

The similarity here is striking, and as Coupland emphasises, quite deliberate.[1278] The tropes of the iconography – Charlemagne in profile, wearing an antiquated costume and the laurel wreath of the long-extinct Caesars – are a powerful expression of the imperial discourse. It is a deliberate, visual expression of a yearning for power, legitimacy, and authority by deliberately associating the present with an imagined and reconstructed past; and in doing so, visually insisting that the new *Imperium Romanum* in Gothic Europe was just as legitimate as the still-extant *Imperium Romanum* under the rulers of Constantinople. And we know that the Carolingians themselves were aware of the power of such images, as Roman coins appear in post-Roman artefacts[1279] while a cameo of Augustus holding an Imperial Aquila takes pride of place in the *Reichskreuz*, the grandiose crucifix placed on the altar at the coronations of subsequent Holy Roman Emperors.[1280] The coins are merely a continuation of this. By dressing the King of the Franks in classical costume and inscribing *KAROLUS IMP.AUG. – Charlemagne, Emperor and Augustus –* a clear visual connection is

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[1278] Coupland, *Carolingian Coinage and the Vikings*, pp. vii-ix, 211-229.
[1279] Michael Greenhalgh, *The Survival of Roman Antiquities in the Middle Ages* (London: Duckworth, 1989), p. 262.
[1280] Although not that of Charlemagne himself, who died a half-century before the cross was made. Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 231-232; Prince Michael of Greece, *Crown Jewels*.

made between a manufactured and appropriated history to legitimise an equally manufactured present. It is an appeal for legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the contemporary Byzantines by manufacturing a collective history to claim that the toiling peasants of Early Medieval Europe were *one* people, descendants of Rome. It is a deliberate appeal to the masses – who increasingly used actual coins alongside barter[1281] – and those beyond Charlemagne's *imperium*, particularly the stagnant society under the *basileus* in faraway Byzantium, in order to claim that the present was justified as it was a continuation of the past. Even though the shared spatiotemporal community of Charlemagne's united Europe was every bit as artificial as the metal disc on which it appeared. Nevertheless as Coupland states, 'in putting his stamp so firmly on the Frankish coinage, Charlemagne's people, rich and poor alike, cannot but have been impressed by the emperor's power and prestige.'[1282]

At this point we might wonder what, if any, connection there is between the archaeological finds of a defunct and obscure fiefdom of the first millennium, and the sleek, polished currency adopted by European states at the beginning of the third. The answer is hiding in the meta-tropes.

As is the case with the very discourse of *empire* and all its attendant paraphernalia, currency is as powerful a vehicle of political imagination today as it was millennia ago. And just as the discourse itself has evolved from Charlemagne, so too has the iconography which propagates that discourse. Consider Figs. 6.5 and 6.6 below, examples of currency from much later leaders who entertained aspirations of *Imperium Europaeum*:

[1281]Michael Greenhalgh notes that ancient Roman coins were used alongside contemporary currencies in medieval Europe and the Middle East, and were still circulating as legal tender in France as recently as the 1860s. Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 223-224.
[1282] Coupland, *Carolingian Coinage and the Vikings*, p. 227.

Fig. 6.5 – Silver *thaler* of Leopold I[1283]

Fig. 6.6 – *Napoleon*; coin of Emperor Napoleon I[1284]

The discourse of *empire* continues here, and the icon of the state's leaders – Leopold I of the Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon Bonaparte, appearing in Roman imperial dress (notably the laurel wreath with which Julius Caesar, and by extension, all *Imperators* were

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[1283] Price, *Coins: An Illustrated History*, p. 187 (Fig. 847A).
[1284] Ibid., p. 218 (Fig. 1035).

depicted) remained in European coinage until the last decades of the twentieth century.[1285] This trope, which Michelle Gannon calls the *iuxta morem Romanorum*,[1286] is merely one aspect. Like Charlemagne's coins, it is the meta-trope of depicting the reigning sovereign on the front of the coin, which is most powerful. As we discovered earlier, the only reason that currency functions as a medium of exchange is that we trust the sovereign to back up the constructed value of otherwise worthless little trinkets and scraps of paper. By imprinting the sovereign on the face of the coin – or banknote – this trust is reinforced. A trust that declares the current sovereign to be both legitimate and powerful; stretching back to Charlemagne's portrait as a means of visually insisting to the Holy Roman population that he, and his polity, were both legitimate and powerful. Indeed 'Charlemagne's ... coinage type, bearing the imperial portrait,' argues Coupland, 'is arguably ... ideologically the most important. Its purpose was undoubtedly to convey an image of imperial power and prestige, depicting Charlemagne as successor to the Roman emperors on whose coinage this type was modelled.'[1287]

Thus for the entirety of twelve centuries following the first imperial coin being stamped out in a forgotten Frankish mint, national currencies have strengthened the social contract between state and shopper, sovereign and subject, by imprinting their currency with a clear, and recognisable, image of the supreme sovereign's legitimacy, power, and in many cases, appeal to an imaginary imperial history.

Coupland notes that it was the success of Charlemagne's imperial iconography that prompted his successors – and ultimately, other European states and their own successors from the High Middle Ages to the present day – to adopt portraiture as the prime symbol of their coins.[1288] Even in societies which had lost all connection to Rome or had been enemies of it, as Anna Gannon and Anthea Harris point out, the use of imperial motifs on coins in order to deliberately associate themselves with an imagined Roman past[1289] or an imagined Byzantine present,[1290] was clear – even to the extent, as Gannon highlights, of relatively petty

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[1285] Price, *Coins: An Illustrated History*, p. 226. Indeed it is perhaps arguable that *all* portraiture on modern coins stems from Charlemagne – like the name "*empire*", this was a powerful symbol that other states adopted in order to establish their relationship with both the Holy Roman and classical Roman civilisations. Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 224-229.
[1286] "Facsimile of Rome". Anna Gannon, *The Iconography of Anglo-Saxon Coinage: sixth to eighth centuries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 184.
[1287] Coupland, *Carolingian Coinage and the Vikings*, p. 223.
[1288] Ibid.; Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 224-229.
[1289] Gannon, *The Iconography of Anglo-Saxon Coinage*, p. 23.
[1290] Ibid., p. 182; Anthea Harris, *Byzantium, Britain, and the West: The Archaeology of Cultural Identity AD 400-650* (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2003), colour plate 25.

contemporary rulers producing coins which suggested that they held more power than the *Imperator Romanorum*, Charlemagne.[1291]

Portraits of reigning monarchs impressed upon the people whose fingers and purses they passed through an image not only of the ruler but of the state and its power, legitimacy, and supremacy. Coins were, as they always have been and still are, extraordinarily powerful vehicles for promoting a political discourse; whether that discourse be the proclamation of legitimate *imperium*, the affirmation of God's rule on Earth, the claim to be the rightful inheritor of an ancient and imagined *Imperium Romanorum*, or brave gestures of petty kings claiming superiority over the new Caesar. What connects the diverse iconographies of Rome, Byzantium, and Early Medieval Europe, though, are the threefold themes with which we are by now familiar – legitimacy, power, and unity; and the *desire* for all three. These are the defining characteristics of the discourse of *empire* and the foundations of cartoimperialism. And as shall now be argued, these themes are very much alive and well in today's new *imperium*.

6.3   Blood of the Commonwealth

> *'Coinage may be seen as symbolic at two levels. The use of a single coinage throughout an empire (whether exclusively or not) is a symbol of cohesion and belonging, affirmed by constant use. It is part of the active definition of what it means to be a subject/citizen of the empire. At the second level, the typology of the coins may itself be symbolic. This is most obvious in the case of portraiture, which implies that the individual represented is in some way symbolic of the state.'*[1292]

We have now identified what Howgego's above quotation points to. Namely, that pan-European currencies – whether *Denarius, Thaler,* or *Napoleon* – are vehicles of political messages both subtle and brash, all proclaiming unity under a single spatiotemporal sovereign. But what is the connection to the contemporary currency issued by the latest pan-European hegemon? Charlemagne may be the father of European Empire, but we might well wonder what significance his coinage has today. The current continental currency – not the

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[1291] Harris, *Byzantium, Britain and the West*, pp. 186, 193.
[1292] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 43.

first, and undoubtedly not the last, in Europe – has a distinctly different iconography. With the exception of a handful of reverse faces minted by individual member-states – an ancient and almost universal practice which enables coinage to express 'both the unity of the [polity] as a whole and the parity of its constituent parts'[1293] – euro coins do not depict a person on their obverse side. The portrait of the sovereign has disappeared, to be replaced by the seemingly neutral image of a map. At least, so it might appear if we assess only the tropes while ignoring the meta-tropes. Let us examine this a little further.

On the surface, there is nothing connecting the coins of the European Central Bank to those of Roman, Byzantine, or Carolingian mints. All such historical coins made an explicit proclamation of state power enshrined in the body of the sovereign. While some euro coins do feature images of people, they are historical personages of cultural or intellectual interest, rather than holders of any kind of political *imperium*.[1294]

One answer lies in the Byzantine coins we examined above. In the *nomismata* of Byzantium, the image of the emperor changed from that of a specific reigning monarch to a generic emblem of the *office* of emperor. While this may have been no more than a hurried Byzantine response to the cycle of financial crises their embattled empire faced, the practice established a legacy of substituting a particular image for a general icon. It was for this reason in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that coins featuring a recently-deceased monarch remained legal tender – the bond of trust between state and user remained the *concept* of the sovereign, not the specific man or woman on the throne.[1295] The presumed *reflection* of reality, as with maps, is in truth merely a *representation*.

The representative symbol of the sovereign is analogous to the *Blackadder* sketch we examined in Chapter Four. The mushrooms on Lieutenant George's military map are not symbols of *real* mushrooms, they are representations of something distinctly less pleasant. Yet they sufficiently resemble a concept – a mushroom – for him to recognise the shape. Inglehart's modernisation theory provides a foundation for understanding this in relation to the euro – the makers of currency must ensure that the images on them can be interpreted and understood by their users.[1296] For the almost religious faith we have in our currency to work, we must trust it to be valid; and the most effective means of doing this is to emblazon the

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[1293] Robert Foster in Patricia Spyer, *Border Fetishisms: Material Objects in Unstable Spaces* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 71.
[1294] Raento et al., 'Striking stories'.
[1295] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historial Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
[1296] Jacques Hymans, 'The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective Identity', *European Journal of International Relations* 10:1 (2004), pp. 5-31; Hymans, 'East is East, and West is West? Currency iconography as nation-branding in the wider Europe', *Political Geography* 29 (2010), pp. 97-108.

currency with a picture of the supreme sovereign. Whether this is the *Princeps* of the world, the cross of Christ, or the Corsican artilleryman who imposed a new *imperium* across Europe, the principle remains the same – it must be *recognisable*. For 'currency', write Unwin and Hewitt, 'is one of the fundamental expressions of the sovereignty of any state'.[1297]

As Thomas Hobbes identified, 'Mony [is] the Bloud of a Common-wealth', the binding agent without which the commonwealth will disintegrate for want of trust in its sovereign.[1298] Even amidst a population otherwise stricken with cartohypnosis and graphic illiteracy, the map serves this purpose. We have been so bombarded with cartography in our ocularcentric present that, while we may not *understand* the map, we can *recognise* it. Thus the symbols of emperor and territory on imperial and euro coinage are sufficiently similar to that which they *represent*, rather than *reflect*, that the observer can elucidate their meaning – assuming of course, that the reader does not fall into the same synecdochal trap as Lieutenant George.

As Howgego reminds us, coins are a powerful symbol of identity, defining this by deliberate association with a collective idea of unity.[1299] In the case of historical coins this has been collective unification under a single sovereign body, while under the Union it is a collective idea of belonging to a bounded, bordered, exclusive community formed of *Europeans*; a people defined by a collective landmass. Charlemagne's numismatic legacy of returning to Rome was not simply to pass down a tradition of depicting the sovereign's face to emphasise the imagined legitimacy of his *imperium*. The tradition established was to represent the sovereign itself, the temporal body politic, in a single, instantly recognisable icon proclaiming power and legitimacy. For most of numismatic history the monarch's body, as Ernst Kantorowicz demonstrates, *was* the sovereign.[1300] But no longer.

In a decentralised government such as the EU, in which sovereignty is not held by a single physical body – regardless of whether that body is the representation of mere ceremonial or actual power – a portrait will not suffice. What is important is depicting the body politic. In the EU's case this is the European population. The idea that the new sovereign upon euro coins is the people rather than the ruler, or indeed the very notion that the euro is representing sovereignty in any way, might be thought excessively radical. Yet clear precedent exists.

[1297] Unwin and Hewitt, 'Banknotes and national identity', p. 1008.
[1298] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan [London, 1651]* (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 300.
[1299] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, p. 62.
[1300] Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 383-418.

In his monumental *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes equates state-produced money to the blood of the body politic, uniting and nourishing all parts of the sovereign – which itself is formed from the entirety of the state's society.[1301] Building upon this, Eric Hobsbawm demonstrates how the nineteenth century saw the transformation – sometimes gradual, sometimes rapid – of sovereignty in Europe from monarch to *demos*;[1302] the evolution from *personal sovereignty* to *popular sovereignty*. And as Eric Helleiner argues, this was not only reflected in European national currencies, but acknowledged by contemporary observers.[1303] 'Many of those committed to this new sense of "popular sovereignty"', as Helleiner argues, 'came to see territorial currency as an important tool that could help contribute to its realization'.[1304] At the time of Roman, Byzantine, or Carolingian hegemony, power was indeed expressed in the form of a single individual – the *Princeps* of Rome, the *Basileus* of Constantinople, and the *Imperator* of Aachen. The sovereign of Europe, though, is not a single physical body. Like Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the sovereign of Europe is a body politic; currently formed from a third of a billion individuals. This sovereign must be portrayed for our trust in scraps of paper and chunks of metal to be upheld. But depicting this number of humans on the face of a coin, is something of a challenge to even the most skilful of graphic artists.

For most of European history the visual emblem of power was the sovereign. But long-gone is the age when the European body politic was expressed in the physical bodies of individual Grand Dukes, Most Catholic Majesties, and Holy Roman Emperors. Since the Enlightenment, Europe has experienced a transference of sovereign power from a single individual to an impersonal multitude expressed through Assemblies, Parliaments, *Directoires* and *Bundestage*. Expressing sovereign power in the form of a single individual – even mythical personifications of Europa, Marianne, Britannia[1305] – is a difficult task. The consequence is that as sovereign power spreads further from the body of one person, creating a recognisable emblem to symbolise that power becomes increasingly difficult. The nationalist regimes of twentieth-century Europe sought abstract symbols pillaged from the mythologies and iconographies of whatever ancient, half-fantasised civilisations with which they wished to associate themselves, but as a consequence such abstract political symbols are no longer appropriate. Something with less sinister connotations is needed.

[1301] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 300; Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 117.

[1302] Eric Hobsbawm , *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848* (London: Abacus, 1962).

[1303] Helliener, *The Making of National Money*, pp. 116-117.

[1304] Ibid.

[1305] While such nationalist depictions are mostly confined to the nineteenth century, it is known that Roman coins sometimes depicted allegories and personifications of provinces. Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage*, p. 31.

Josh Lauer argues that in contrast to national currencies which continue to embody sovereign power in portraits, 'the faceless euro ... suggests the disavowal of national authority'.[1306] Yet in contrast to Lauer's argument, the euro continues to express authority; simply in a more subtle manner, and one far more appropriate for suggesting the power of the European Union than could be provided by a portrait. In the euro, sovereign power is once again expressed in a single, recognisable symbol which encapsulates the power, legitimacy, and authority of the new body politic.

The most effective way of depicting the new body politic, the sovereign populace, is the map. As the currency is only legal tender within the countries of the Eurozone, anyone using the coin is, at the moment of using it, somewhere on that map. Yet while the map encapsulates the nation, it simultaneously divides the emergent community from those who do not belong. The map can only portray the nation through separation and inherent superiority, and by appealing to an imagined past through which to legitimise its bold cartographic claims, cartoimperialism emerges on currency:

Fig. 6.7 – European Sovereign

Coins, argue Pauliina Raento and her associates, are the most effective transmitters of political messages. Unlike banknotes, coins are accessible to 'even the most marginalized citizens and small children'.[1307] And as artefacts embedded within political imaginations, the circulation of these artefacts within the public realm lends them an immediate political nature regardless of whether or not this was the intention of their producers. Indeed, the political

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[1306] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p.123.
[1307] Raento et al., 'Striking stories', p. 932.

implications of euro iconography were, as Hymans specifies, carefully considered[1308] and the result is a currency designed to be territorial yet deterritorial; one which tries to break with the conventions of currency design yet is constrained by the semiotic circumstances from which no public image can escape. And in a monument of political irony, the icon chosen to apolitically represent the European people – the map – is the most politicised icon in the visual lexicon.

Helleiner is right to lament the absence of scholarly studies of currency iconography and its relationship to collective identity,[1309] and offers rigorous accounts of how Victorian currencies helped foster such imagined communities. Yet curiously, Helleiner discounts the euro, stating that 'it would be difficult to argue ... that the imagery on the euro ... is meant to foster a strong sense of common European identity',[1310] and focusing on the apparent dominance of the reverse, national faces of coins as opposed to the obverse, common face. Yet while Helleiner is partially right to point out that euro currency is devoid 'of images of a common history, landscapes, or culture of the kind that is found on most national banknotes',[1311] it is precisely this bland ambiguity which affords euro iconography its imperial power. The landscape depicted is atemporal and spatially inaccurate – while also simultaneously collectivising and exclusionary – and a common history is not expressed, but alluded to in the depiction of a form of territoriality which includes, by the very fact that they are on euro currency, all Europeans who use euro coins. We might go so far as to argue that contrary to Helleiner's assertion, it is the reverse faces of euro coins, rather than the obverse, which are frequently vague. The majority have only peripheral, symbolic connections to the nation which produced them,[1312] and the very obscurity of unexplained icons on euro coins means that the dominant image is the one which is instantly recognisable, and the only universal icon to appear on every coin. By appearing on an everyday item, the map is visible to a potentially unlimited number of people for a potentially unlimited period of time. It is because of this omnipresence that coins are such an effective method – conscious or unrealised – of promoting political discourse. As currency itself is a fairly mundane, everyday item, it is especially suited to this sort of mundane promotion. Secondly, currency is much more of a 'concrete link to the EU'[1313] because unlike the flag, anthem, passports, or

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[1308] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, pp. 25-34.
[1309] Eric Helleiner, *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present and Future of National Currencies* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-18.
[1310] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 239.
[1311] Ibid., p. 239.
[1312] Raento et al., 'Striking stories'.
[1313] Ibid., p. 932.

the various other paraphernalia through which the Union manifests itself, currency is the most visible.

Prior to 1st May 2004, three types of map appeared on the obverse faces of Euro coins. The ECB's website describes these categories as '[1] the European Union before its enlargement on 1 May 2004, [2] a geographical image of Europe, [3] Europe in relation to Africa and Asia'.[1314] Figs 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate these three styles of map:

[1314] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html.

Fig. 6.8 – Contrasting images: pre-2007 (left) and post-2007 (right) Euros; common face (€2 and €1 coins)

Fig. 6.9 – Pre-2007 (left) and post-2007 (right) Euros; common face (50c, 20c, and 10c coins)

Fig. 6.10 – Common face of 5c, 2c and 1c coins, post-2000.[1315]

[1315] Figs. 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 retrieved from: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html.

As stated, it is the iconography's meta-tropes rather than the tropes, which primarily interest us. It is an acknowledged reality that with the exception of tourists idly staring at the currency of a new country, we generally do not examine currency iconography. In Mwangi's words, it is seen but not looked at. But here, the tropes of the maps require some detailed consideration as they reveal intriguing imperial imaginations.

In their study of the political iconography of Euro coins, Raento *et al* discuss in-depth the variety of symbols and images which appear on the obverse side of the coins – the side left for individual member-states to decorate with images of their own choosing – with some intriguing findings.[1316] But the most significant feature of coin cartography, arguably, is the domination of the map on the common face of euro coins. The map of Europe is immediately recognisable and, unlike a reading of the various national figures and images on the reverse sides of the coins, requires no esoteric knowledge on the part of the reader to understand what the image is. It is as universal an image of Europe as can be conceived; and one which links closely to the identity-territory symbiosis of *empire*s.

Significantly, neither the pre- nor post-reform maps depict only the countries of the European Monetary Union: those states in which the coins were, and remain, legal currency. On the pre-2007 reform coins we clearly see the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden; three members of the European Union but not of the Monetary Union. Following the 2007 reforms, not only does the common map continue to depict these three states but has included additional Union, non-Eurozone countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia. Of the Union's current twenty-six members, ten do not use the common currency; yet the coin maps clearly depict these states alongside EMU nations. The ECB's official explanation for this cartographic discrepancy is to 'symbolise the unity of the EU'.[1317] We could accept this at face value, as it is intended; or like Jacques Hymans, we could take a somewhat more cynical interpretation that the redesigned map is a deliberate intention to 'increase their [the EU's] legitimacy by using the currency to signal their embrace of values in tune with the "spirit of the times"'.[1318] For as Sutherland remarks, the

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[1316] The study by Raento et al. highlights unexplained phenomena relating to individual states' choice of symbols. Depictions of architecture or national monuments, for example, only appear on Euro coins issued by the old Axis powers; images of nature and wildlife appear exclusively on Scandinavian-issued coins; while the € symbol itself, conceived by the Central Bank as a symbol of European interconnectedness and Ancient Greek origins, curiously does not appear on any coins. The authors do not offer a hypothesis to explain these peculiar traits. Raento et al., 'Striking stories', pp. 145-163.

[1317] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/html/index.en.html.

[1318] Hymans, 'The Changing Color of Money', p. 6.

language of currency is allusive rather than specific.[1319] It is perhaps telling that the ECB explains that:

> '€2 and €1, 50, 20 and 10 cent show either the European Union before its enlargement on 1 May 2004 or, as of 1 January 2007, **a geographical image of Europe**.'[1320]

The ECB distinguishes, here, between a portrayal of the Union (notably, not the Eurozone) and 'a geographical image of Europe'. Africa is clearly absent from the map, providing some indication that the cartographic icon is merely meant to show the European states; but there is no distinction between EU Europe and its non-EU, yet "European", neighbours. A discourse is embedded within these lines. Encircled by the stars of the Union flag, criss-crossed by connecting lines, and emblazoned with *'EURO'*, the communication expressed here can be read as one of connectivity, inclusion, sovereign power over *all* of the European landmass regardless of the membership status of polities, and a conflation of space and place. The visual discourse is one of indissolubility and permanence. It is perhaps an irony that when Raento and her associates, prior to the 2007 reforms, asked whether future EU expansion would generate 'pressure to modify the cartography on the common sides of the coins',[1321] an answer would be quickly given in the form of ECB visual rhetoric. The post-2007 maps require no significant modification. They are permanent and immobile; any future European states acceding to the Union are already portrayed on the coins. Iceland and Turkey may require inclusion in the event that they join, but this would not necessitate a significant cartographic alteration like that of 2007: only a couple of quick outlines and a nudging of the map slightly further to the left of the coins.

The cartography on Europe's lowest-value (and physically smallest) coin is the only which has such features as a graticule, an oblique azimuthal projection,[1322] and crucially shows Europe as a physical landmass in relation to much of its continental neighbours Africa and Asia. Europe is of course at the centre of the projection, thus minimising distortion of the European landmass. It is noteworthy, however, that the appearance of something resembling

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[1319] Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, p. 184.
[1320] Text retrieved from: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html (emphasis added).
[1321] Raento et al., 'Striking stories', p. 952.
[1322] Also termed *Space Projection*: a style of map which shows part of Earth's mostly spherical shape, viewed from a perspective between the equator and one of the planet's poles. The same effect can be seen by simply looking at a globe. Less than half of the spherical surface is visible, and distortion is minimal at the centre while severe at the edges due to line-of-sight. See Monmonier and Schnell, *Map Appreciation*, pp. 17-18.

an actual map is confined to the lowest-value coin, at a scale so small as to be barely recognisable. But on coins larger in both value and size, the map becomes much more than a mere crude, six-millimetre rendering of Europe and its neighbours.

Perhaps the most striking feature of post-2007 maps is that not only do they portray a single, homogeneous Union, but they fuse space and place into one image. Three tropes stand out most visibly. First is the inclusion of the EU component-states Denmark and the United Kingdom – which do not use the Euro currency – alongside the members of the Eurozone, bypassing awkward questions from the mapreader as to why the Union as portrayed on the coins is not the same as the Union as portrayed in other media. Second is the inclusion of areas of Europe which are not part of the Union; the Balkans and Eastern Europe up to the Moscow Meridian (again, curiously, neither Iceland nor Turkey are included).[1323] Third is the absence of Africa, and fourth is the implied synergy between space (landmass) and place (the polity) through the depiction of the EU's twelve stars intersecting the continent. This change is even clearer in the 50c coins; the depiction of the Union's component states has been discarded in favour of an identical map of the European landmass as being *the* Europe. Raento suggests that this form of conflationary map between "Europe" and the EU is a deliberate quest to look into the future, to a time when EMU and EU will be one and the same.[1324]

Clearly, the maps produced by the EU are not simple direction-finders. Instead, the maps which dominate the Union's cartography are closer to pictures and artistic representations than scientific charts. They are representations of Europe. This phenomenon of maps as political icons is not new. John Pickles highlights the problem that while cartography and cartographic theory remain focused on approaching maps as images mirroring nature and reality, and the technical aspects of creating maps, relatively little attention is given to maps as icons of thought.[1325] And these discursive icons are not confined

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[1323] The exclusion of Turkey from currency cartography has not gone unnoticed. In 2007 Italian MEPs Marco Cappato and Marco Pannella protested in the European Parliament, querying why Russia, Ukraine, and the authoritarian, anti-EU state Belarus, were implicitly included on the map while Turkey was not. The ECB's spokeswoman, Amelia Torres, responded to the queries that: '"The idea was to have a new design that would be a more stylised design, rather than a true geographical representation of Europe, which admittedly is more difficult to represent on such a small surface."' This, as Cappato and Pannella responded, is a poor excuse. Nevertheless the ECB has not given any further response to the issue. See: 'New Euro Design Shortchanges Turkey', *New York Times*, September 26 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/world/europe/26briefs-turkey.html?_r=0; 'New euro coin stuffs Turkey', *The Register*, September 26 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2007/09/26/euro_coin_rumpus/; 'New Euro coin map excludes Turkey', *The Telegraph*, 12 April 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1564173/New-euro-coin-map-excludes-Turkey.html.

[1324] Raento et al., 'Striking stories', p. 936.

[1325] Trevor Barnes and James Duncan, *Writing Worlds: discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 193.

to the front. The tropes of the map on the coins' universal face, and even the meta-trope of its use, are not the only revealing aspects of the coins. Their reverse is every bit as imperial as the obverse.

In his examination of Roman coins, Howgego argues that with such infinite diversity of designs on the rear of coins, many of which appear to have been political dialogues between rivals and designed for the benefit of the political elite,[1326] it was only the obverse face – carrying the portrait of the sovereign – which would be understood by the vast majority of users. A similar phenomenon exists with euro coins.

Under ECB regulations, each member-state of the Eurozone is entitled to choose its own national design for the reverse of coins. The practical and theoretical limits of this chapter prohibit a comprehensive overview of *all* reverse images on euro coins,[1327] thus we shall consider a random sample. These are; the German *Bundesadler*, the Spanish King, and the Italian *Homo Vitruvianus*:

Fig. 6.11 – Reverse faces – Germany, Spain, Italy

At first glance, some – perhaps, depending on the viewer, all – of the reverse images of euros are recognisable. Famous monuments, persons of note, and a smattering of political emblems. Yet many, as Raento et al point out, are abstract or outright unrecognisable without an accompanying explanation which is not provided on the coin; there is no handy *KAROLUS IMP.AUG.* to tell us what the image is meant to be. The result is that, as with Roman or Byzantine imperial coinage, reverse designs on the euro may be recognisable to people from

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[1326] C.J. Howgego, *Greek imperial countermarks: studies in the provincial coinage of the Roman Empire* (London: Royal Numismatic Society, 1985), pp. 71-73.
[1327] The ECB maintains a comprehensive summary of all designs at http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/2euro/html/index.en.html.

the area in which they were minted but more broadly, are baffling to those not embedded within the specific situated knowledge of their cultural context. The outcome is the same as it has always been with imperial coinage – the only design universally recognised is that of the obverse face; the supreme sovereign:[1328]

Fig. 6.12 – United in Diversity

It is perhaps appropriate to consider that local variants on a common coin is far from a new phenomenon. Romans, Byzantines, and Carolingians[1329] performed precisely the same function of promoting what Howgego terms 'benevolent ideology of rule';[1330] the central authority allowing local imagery as a sop to regional identities – often entwined with more recognisable local emblems of power, from Thracian kings on local Roman coins[1331] to the *Bundesadler* on German-produced euros – thus encouraging the imagination of local and imperial power. As Papageorgiadou-Bani puts it, 'the native populations, when they got the chance, resurrected images from their glorious past in order to express their own ethnic pride'.[1332] While Papageorgiadou-Bani is speaking of Greek citizens under the Romans, her words are as accurate a description of ECB policy today.

[1328] Howgego, *Greek imperial countermarks: studies in the provincial coinage of the Roman Empire*, p. 74.
[1329] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, pp. 84-85.
[1330] Ibid., p. 84.
[1331] Ibid., p. 85.
[1332] Papageorgiadou-Bani, *Numismatic Iconography*, pp. 18-19.

What makes such local variation *imperial*, or if we will, *cartoimperial*, is that such local imaginations of power were, and are, only permitted on the rear of the universal, imperial image on the obverse face. The juxtaposition of local emblems of power and identity alongside that of the central authority are no more equal on euros than on *denarii* – the emblems of the *imperium* are dominant, thus demonstrating unequivocally the superiority and authority of the sovereign depicted on the front – whether it be *Imperator*, *Basileus*, *Kaiser*, or Union.

Alongside the obverse image of a unifying and unified central polity, it is perhaps this lack of uniformity among the reverse images of euro coins which define them as imperial. The coexistence of the collective and individual in coin iconography is a trait discernible from Roman currency: a reminder that while local identity exists and is benevolently protected by the *archon*, it is the collective polity as a whole which holds political supremacy over the locals. Individual communities may decorate their coins with their Brandenburg Gates, their Leonardos da Vinci, their marsh-birds in flight; but it is the map as icon – an *imperial* icon – which dominates the coins and ties all together in perpetuity.

The permanence – or rather, longevity – of these media is a curious area with implications for cartoimperialism. Galloy notes that metal coins are designed not only to spread throughout space, but also through time – the issuing authority creates objects designed to last for some time, with subsequently semi-permanent iconographies.[1333] This overlooked meta-trope is revealing – even in cases where their lettering or iconographies are unintelligible to those who use and preserve them, coins retain a powerful symbolic value.[1334] Indeed, the preservation of imperial coins is well-recorded as a means of legitimising the present by visibly connecting with an imagined past. Roman coins found their way into Byzantine tableware,[1335] while Byzantine coins appear as elements of the personal ornamentation of tribal chiefs and local kings as far away as Saxon England.[1336] In these and similar cases the purpose is evident: appropriating the symbols of a past (or present) seen as legitimate in order to justify the present. And in the case of imperial coins, the iconographies retain their power.

Certainly in the case of the euro, permanence and durability are factors to be considered. In the twelve years of the euro's existence, the obverse map designs have only been changed once. As Figs 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrated, this change was tropic rather than

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[1333] Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism', p. 16.
[1334] Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 223-229.
[1335] Rowena Loverance, *Byzantium* (London: British Museum, 1988), pp. 4-5.
[1336] Ibid., p. 35

meta-tropic in nature. The tropes of the maps changed, but the meta-trope of having a map of the EU as image of the sovereign remained.

What can we identify in these subtle changes? The first is obvious; the transition from a fragmented jigsaw map to a contiguous shape. The implication is that of unity; a coming-together of European states. The second is perhaps more revealing. Non-Eurozone countries are included on the map. The message promulgated here is quite different. On the post-2007 maps, the distinction between European Union and Eurozone disappears. A geopolitical synecdoche emerges as all the states of the Union are included, regardless of their currency of choice.

Coin cartography has evolved from depictions of the sovereign *holding* the map as a symbol of power and legitimacy, to merely the map itself as the same symbol. Minting coins with actual maps on them is a relatively recent practice, which Barber ascribes to the difficulty of producing such small maps, and the inevitability that the mostly illiterate, rural populations of pre-industrial societies would not have understood what they were looking at.[1337] As Grierson reminds us, part of the purpose of state-issued currency is spread a discourse of power and legitimacy,[1338] not abstract symbols which mean nothing to those who see them. Yet there is a precedent for abstract, spatial emblems of power. Byzantine coins occasionally depicted the imperial regalia, such as the crown and sceptre, without a corresponding emperor:[1339] a form of abstract symbolism. More significantly, late Roman and Byzantine currency sometimes hosted images of the *globus cruciger* – the orb of the Earth surmounted by a cross, to symbolise the emperor's right to rule and his mandate over the spatial realm, a trope carried on into medieval and Early Modern European coinage[1340] as a public celebration of the peace, prosperity, and victory of the polity.

In his discussion of Roman iconography, Sutherland writes that '[coins] would quickly tend to make most men reasonably familiar with the simpler conceptions in the political vocabulary of the Empire. Above all, *Pax* and *Victoria* [peace and victory] would be universally recognised'.[1341] The modern euro currency is, like its Roman forebears, as much a public celebration of *Pax* and *Victoria* as it is a medium of economic exchange. Its coins proudly proclaim a unified, borderless, peaceful Europe – including those who are not members of the Eurozone or even the Union – as defined by contrast to those deemed too

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[1337] Barber (ed.)*, Magnificent Maps*, pp. 96-97.
[1338] Grierson, *Byzantine Coinage*, p. 23.
[1339] Ibid., pp. 28-29.
[1340] Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 223-229.
[1341] Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, p. 175.

insignificant or barbaric to appear on the map. In so doing they preach a political propaganda which would be recognisable to the *scrinii a pecuniis*[1342] of Rome, Byzantium, and Aachen.

This returns us to the question of whether cartography is being deployed in order to foster a sense of collective identity. Notwithstanding the current debate between scholars as to whether or not this is a *deliberate* policy or to what *extent* it occurs,[1343] the consensus is that to some degree a sense of communal identity is fostered. The ECB's explanations for the imagery and cartography on their currency is very vocal, and their insistence that "unity" is the theme is at times a little desperate. The ECB's highly dubious explanation for national images on the reverse of coins pleads this case, claiming that Germany's choice of the Brandenburg Gate, France's selection of the national personification *Marianne*, and even Austria's national flower, the edelweiss, are not really relics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism, nationalism, or customs charges, but are in fact post-national expressions of the countries' dedication to European unity.[1344] Examining the coins here, the hypothesis that the ECB is urgently promoting the discourse of unity certainly appears to be true. The map alone is enough. As identified in Chapter Two, maps are extraordinarily powerful vehicles for promoting a vision of collective belonging (and by extension, exclusion), and the maps on these coins are no exception. Even if these maps do pass beneath three hundred million and thirty-two pairs of eyes each day without being remarked upon, the visual bombardment of a trusted vehicle – the map – on a trusted artefact – the coin – remains potent.

Yet the map is not alone on euro coins. As Raento argues, 'maps are among those few EU symbols that are systematically repeated in a plethora of EU-themed merchandise and

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[1342] The *Notitia Dignitatum*, a fourth-century reference guide listing every civilian and military office in the Western and Eastern Roman Empires, lists under the staff of the 'Count of Sacred Wealth', the office of *Primicerium scrinii a pecuniis* – a "Primary Scribe of Coinage". See Otto Seeck (ed.), *Notitia Dignitatum: Accedunt Notitia Urbis Constantinopolitanae et Laterculi Prouinciarum* (Berlin: Apud Weidmannos, 1886), p. 153, 'Oc. XI: Comes Sacrarum Largitionum' [trans. author's own].

[1343] Raento questions whether Europeans are aware of the process. Raento et al., 'Striking stories', pp. 929-956.

[1344] The European Central Bank's claims are curious. They claim of Germany's choice of design, the Brandenburg Gate, that 'the perspective of the design ... emphasises the opening of the gate, stressing the unification of Germany and Europe', even though the *Brandenburger Tor*, a triumphal arch built next to one of Berlin's actual customs gates, does not have, and has never had, doors. Regarding France's design, the national personification *Marianne*, the ECB claims that *Marianne* shows 'determined features that embody her desire for a sound and lasting Europe', despite *Marianne* first appearing as the personification of a violently xenophobic Revolutionary France. Most bizarrely, the ECB explains that Austria's choice, the edelweiss flower, is a symbolic 'duty to the environment and the part Austria is playing in the development of a Community environmental policy', although the flower began its symbolic life as a Romanticist icon of the apparent simplicity and purity of mountain life, later becoming an emblem for mountain troops in the Imperial Austrian Army. Another example of how *intention* is subordinate to *interpretation*. See Hymans, 'Changing Color'; Fornäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 212-222, 247-253.

events'.[1345] Alongside the map appear other icons which function as a form of semiotic determinative, clarifying the meaning of the visual "word" represented by the map. The stars of the European flag stress the link between territory, polity, and *demos*. The word *'EURO'* is both a semiotic signifier and a synecdochal place-name for the land which the map portrays. If we believe Carlo Gialdino's analysis of EU documents, the name *'euro'* was chosen at a meeting of European Heads of State in Madrid, in December 1995, for two reasons. Firstly the delegates squabbled so much over names – including backwards-looking names such as *florin*, *ducat*, and *solidus* – starting an argument between the British and French over medieval geopolitics – that there were very few options available. Secondly, according to the minutes of the meeting, the summit dragged on for so long that eventually the hungry statesmen simply settled on "euro" because they wanted to finish the meeting before the cafeteria closed for the day.[1346] But whether the name was selected due to careful deliberation, petty one-upmanship, or rumbling stomachs, is peripheral. What is important is that a name was chosen which not only bounded the currency to the entirety of the European continent, but a name which itself is a form of map.

Both of these tropes, the flag and the name, insist upon a sense of imagined community. Finally the epsilon symbol, €, is the invocation of an imagined common past. In the ECB's own words, the epsilon is 'harking back to Classical times and the cradle of European civilisation'.[1347] The insistence is clear – there is *one* Europe, with *one* common ancestry. This is a curious claim to make, given that such Union and Eurozone members as Sweden, Latvia, Britain, or Romania were somewhat distant from the orbit of Classical Greek civilisation. Appealing to this imagined collective identity is unequivocally imperial. It is the

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[1345] Raento, 'Striking stories', p. 935.

[1346] Each delegate seems to have pushed for a name from their own national language or history. Carlo Gialdino writes that in response to Jacques Chirac's insistence on the name *écu*, an argument broke out in which Helmut Kohl demanded to term the currency *euromark*, Felipe Gonzàles refused to drop *euro*, Romano Prodi argued for the name of the ancient Roman currency *solidus*, Wim Kok suggested *eurogulden*, and John Major insisted on *ducat* or *florin*, cross-border Italian currencies from the Middle Ages – leading to a squabble between John Major and Jacques Chirac over whether England or France had had political legitimacy over thirteenth-century Aquitaine. It seems that the EU's politicians are not so different to Liudprand of Cremona and Leo Phokas. Having whittled all options down to *euro* or *écu*, which only Chirac still demanded, it appears that the meeting's chairman, Jacques Santer, vetoed in favour of *euro* in order to close the meeting and dash to the dining-hall. See Carlo Curti Gialdino, *The Symbols of the European Union: the origin of the name 'euro'*. (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato S.p.A., 2005). The Union is no stranger to the occasional farce – in 2007, the BBC revealed that at the 1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome, which founded the distant ancestor of today's European Union, a problem with the printing press meant that the document signed by European leaders was nothing more than a front page and a sheet at the back for signatures, with every page in between completely blank. See: BBC, 'What really happened when the Treaty of Rome was signed 50 years ago', http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/ram/today1_rome20070324.ram.

[1347] European Central Bank: http://ecb.eu.

appropriation of an imagined past in an attempt to validate the present and the future, to forge a false link with a vision of *how it should have been*. Cartoimperialism saturates these maps.

We identified, in Chapter Two, how maps are merely one subset within visual grammar, and frequently operate in tandem with other forms of iconography and visual language. *Leo Belgicus* combines a map with the icon of a lion rampant, to express a powerful discourse. The maps of the Holy Roman Empire synthesise cartography with snarling *Reichsadler* to insist upon an imagined strength. These are merely two examples of what Benedict Anderson, as we saw, terms the act of forgetting. Forgetting that 1560s Holland was a weak and sickly newborn wracked by internecine strife, forgetting that the *Heiliges Reich* of the eighteenth century was the geopolitical laughing-stock of Europe. In these coin maps, iconography encourages us to forget – to forget that the Union is not as pan-continental as the maps make it appear to be, forget that in spite of elite protestations,[1348] Europe is not a single community. As Hymans wryly observes, the maps 'reflects the highly egalitarian idea that "Europe" is all around us',[1349] yet dictated and delineated by the map.

In the previous chapter's examination of EU maps, time and space were quite clearly marked. Whether static and unmoving, presenting an image of the Union as permanent and immobile, or whether bravely marching eastward in the quest to gobble up the relics of the Soviet Union, the spatial and temporal boundaries of the Union are clearly plotted and confidently proclaimed. Yet the maps on euro coins, since the 2007 reforms, are utterly non-temporal and almost non-spatial. There are no internal boundaries, no acknowledgement of other landmasses, no sense of Europe's expansion or its relationship with either space or time. There is simply an icon, a shape recognisable by a public at least sufficiently familiar with maps to understand what it is, an entity existing out of history and yet reliant on a constructed past represented by the accompanying, artificial imagery. It is the icon of a new and emergent nation, bounded and bordered; the emblem of an *empire* legitimised by its link with an artificial past. This is prevalent on the coins issued by the ECB. But the cartographic iconographies of Europe's banknotes are one step beyond these already-imperial icons.

[1348] Matthias Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity: symbols, power and the politics of the European monetary union', *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004), pp. 161-178; W.G. Wolters, 'The Euro: Old and new boundaries in the use of money', *Anthropology Today* 17:6 (2001), pp. 8-12.
[1349] Hymans, 'Changing Color,' p. 22.

6.4   Money for Mars

> *'A descriptive analysis of bank notes is needed. For nowhere more naïvely than in these documents does capitalism display itself in solemn earnest. The innocent cupids frolicking about numbers, the goddesses holding tablets of the law, the stalwart heroes sheathing their swords before monetary units, are a world of their own: ornamenting the façade of Hell.'*[1350]

<div align="right">Walter Benjamin</div>

The above words of German philosopher Walter Benjamin in 1936 may appear, at first glance, to be a little exaggerated, even alarmist, for a sober investigation into numismatic cartography. His words might seem even less relevant when we consider that euro banknotes are hardly the site of such ostentatious Victorian imagery as he describes. Yet despite this, the pressing need he identifies remains. Euro currency is adorned with imagery which is grandiose in its discursive implications, all entwined with and framed by the map. And although Benjamin identifies capitalism as the dominant metanarrative of banknotes, the neat lines and colourful versos of Brussels' banknotes convey a very different discourse – *empire*.

'Banknotes', states Barnaby Faull, 'are an advertisement for a country'.[1351] They encapsulate the nation's history, and governments – particularly those of European nations – treading careful paths in selecting which of their historical figures can and cannot appear on these advertisements of the nation. The currency commissioners of the European Union were keenly aware of this, testifies Kalina,[1352] and in order to avoid controversial figures not merely from current nations but *anyone* associated with Europe's quarrelsome past, euro banknotes appear, at first glance, to be the most apolitical produced by any issuing authority in history. Not a single human, animal, or even plant appears on euro banknotes, no images of real architecture or landscapes, no allegories of virtue and no personifications of the nation. The result is what journalist Fareed Zakaria calls 'Money for Mars': cash which is so unrelated to anything human, let alone specifically European, that the banknotes circulating

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[1350] Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction and Other Writings on Media [eds. Michael Jennings, Brigid Doherty, Thomas Levin; trans. Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Livingstone, Howard Eiland]* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008); Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communuication', p. 120.
[1351] BBC News, 'How to join the noteworthy', 7th November 2000. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1009901.stm.
[1352] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *The Year of the Euro*, pp. 28-31.

today in Europe look as though they were designed as low-budget props for a 1960s episode of *Star Trek*.[1353] Or indeed, might as well be from another planet.

While studies of the iconographies of coinage have been largely relegated to antiquarians, the imagery of banknotes has received, as Lauer outlines, even less attention.[1354] Indeed for Karen Barrett, paper money does not need 'visual charm or aesthetic appeal to help it sell. The effectiveness and worth of paper currency does not depend on visual presentation or rhetoric. Unlike advertisements or posters, paper money has no overt need to delight, amuse, or convince its audience'.[1355]

This is certainly a bold claim to make. As the few iconographic studies of coinage testify, the iconology of coins is an extraordinarily powerful discourse of politics. The even rarer studies of contemporary national banknotes also offer compelling arguments on the importance of imagery in the inclusion and exclusion of individuals, peoples, and entire regions.[1356] Frances Robertson asserts in her exhaustive study of Europeans' slow, grudging acceptance of paper money over metal coins in the nineteenth century, 'the authenticity of a banknote [depends] on the image printed upon it'.[1357] It is only through the symbols of the state stamped upon their surface that we accept these 'flimsies' – as Victorian Britons disparagingly termed banknotes[1358] – as legal currency. What, then, can be learned from the almost alien iconographies of the Union's banknotes?

The first consideration is that euro banknotes fall into the same category of material culture as coins. Mwangi is not restricting her study to coins when she argues that currency is *seen* but not *looked at*, and similarly in their studies of numismatic iconography, Galloy and Lauer do not dismiss paper currency as being iconologically unimportant. Second is the element of trust.

[1353] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *The Year of the Euro*, p. 16.
[1354] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 112.
[1355] Ibid.
[1356] Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism'; Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication'; Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant'.
[1357] Frances Robertson , 'The Aesthetics of Authenticity: Printed Banknotes as Industrial Currency', *Technology and Culture* 46 (2005), pp. 31-50.
[1358] Ibid., pp. 31-33.

6.4.1 Cash Value

> *'Money is no use unless it can get you what you need. The moment that you can't buy bread with it, iron becomes more valuable than gold. During the Russian campaign of 1812, soldiers passed by the paymasters' wagons abandoned along the road without touching a* centime *– because there wasn't any sort of bakery in the neighbourhood.'*[1359]

<div align="right">

Capt. Elzéar Blaze
Military Life under Napoleon

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The above memoirs of one of Napoleon's old officers highlights a fundamental characteristic of cash – it is completely worthless. As the starving soldiers retreating from Moscow in 1812 recognised, currency is merely a means of *representing* value, not *reflecting* some inherent wealth. The moment when there is nothing to buy, or the moment its users' faith in its value falters, currency is worthless.

Coins still retain a hypnotic value. Traditionally they had a marginal value in that they contained a quantity of precious metals deemed religiously significant by those societies using them – but this is no longer the case with today's 'token coins' made from alloys devoid of gold, silver, or platinum. [1360] Euro coins, for example, are made of various alloys of copper, nickel, and brass[1361] which, while retaining a marginal value in that the metals can be melted down and sold,[1362] do not amount to the value stamped on the coin's face. Banknotes are even less valuable than coins. With the exception – as demonstrated in Weimar Germany from 1922 to 1924 – of being used as fuel, handkerchiefs, or toilet paper,[1363] banknotes have no value whatsoever. A consequence of this, as Lauer identifies in his study of early European and American banknotes,[1364] is that paper money requires even more validation to enforce the implied contract between user and state. 'State money', comments Lauer, 'is

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[1359] John Elting (trans.), *Military Life under Napoleon: The Memoirs of Captain Elzéar Blaze [orig. 1837]* (Chicago: Emperor's Press, 1995), p. 55.

[1360] This is still reflected, though, in coins being graded by colour, imitating the precious metals gold, silver, and bronze. The reason for using precious metals appears to be a combination of religious connotations and practicality – as gold is difficult to extract and even more difficult to replicate (lead is the only metal close to gold's atomic mass), sovereigns were able to control gold currency with greater ease than iron or brass. See John Porteous, *Coins* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 7-14; M.M. Archibald and M.R. Cowell (eds.), *Metallurgy in Numismatics* (London: Royal Numismatics Society, 1993), pp. 1-7.

[1361] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/coins/common/html/index.en.html.

[1362] This is not a practice restricted to the melting of silver plate in antiquity. The global credit crunch has given rise to increasing incidents of low-value coins being melted for their copper content. BBC News, 'Mint warns against melting coins', 12 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4766897.stm.

[1363] John Hite and Chris Hinton, *Weimar and Nazi Germany,* (London: John Murray, 2000), pp. 44-49.

[1364] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', pp. 113-116.

characterized above all by its legal or administrative justification rather than any link to intrinsic value'.[1365] Thus as Robertson states, 'to accept the authenticity and value of flimsy [banknotes] required a continuous act of collective faith'.[1366] The purchasing public must *believe* in the value of the money, and this belief is only enabled via the presentation of the magical icons of the sovereign – icons which themselves must be believed.

Like early cartographers peppering their maps with political icons,[1367] early bankers 'embellished their intrinsically worthless paper notes with heraldic emblems, government insignia, and ornamental borders'[1368] to reinforce this link. The same still occurs in euro notes: the twelve stars of the Union appear. But a new trope has also emerged. As banknotes require additional validation, an icon is required which embodies the state, associates the note with said (presumably powerful and sovereign) state, and is unquestioned – the perfect assurance of the authority and value of a scrap of paper. This most trusted of icons is, of course, the map – and it is upon euro banknotes that we find the most imperial of maps. In the case of the European Union the requisite belief in the veracity of the map returns us to a phenomenon identified in Chapter Two. This is what we identified in Chapter Three as 'cartohypnosis'; the instinctive belief that the map is a true and accurate reflection of reality. It is no glib prophecy when Penrose warns us that 'banknote iconography is not always what it seems'.[1369] The maps of euro currency may fulfil their goal of expressing unity, but this unity is not the only message the maps suggest. The discourse of an imaginary past, appropriating the past to validate the present, is a powerful theme.

Euro banknotes, as the following seven figures demonstrate, are exemplars of this phenomenon. Juxtaposing the map of Europe alongside the twelve gold stars of the EU flag and a variety of fictional bridges and gates intended to express 'the European spirit of openness and cooperation',[1370] the maps on Euro banknotes similarly fuse territory and polity on an artefact which not only symbolises the Union and regularly passes through the hands of the majority of European citizens, but which reinforces even in the minds of non-EU recipients the notion that Europe as a space and Europe as a place are inextricably linked: a hyperreality in which Europe and EU are the same:

[1365] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 119.
[1366] Robertson, 'The Aesthetics of Authenticity', p. 49.
[1367] Dennis Reinhartz, *The Art of the Map: An Illustrated History of Map Elements and Embellishments* (New York: Sterling, 2012), pp. 1-40.
[1368] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 115.
[1369] Penrose and Cumming, 'Money talks', p. 839.
[1370] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.eu/euro/banknotes/html/index.en.html.

Fig. 6.13 – 5 euro banknote

Fig. 6.14 – 10 euro banknote

Fig. 6.15 – 20 euro banknote

Fig. 6.16 – 50 euro banknote

Fig. 6.17 – 100 euro banknote

Fig. 6.18 – 200 euro banknote

Fig. 6.19 – 500 euro banknote[1371]

[1371] Images retrieved from the European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/banknotes/html/index.en.html.

Simon Hawkins' study concludes that similarly to national currencies, the icons on euro banknotes are designed to encourage concepts of communication between Europeans, access to the Union, and the bridging of differences[1372] – a thesis supported by Kalina's words:

> *'The idea was to create a feeling of commonality, of belonging. I worked hard so that either an Italian or a Frenchman could look at the Gothic windows on the 20 and say "That could be here in France" or "That could be here in Italy". It was very difficult to make each universal.'*[1373]

Kalina specifies that the selection of unreal architecture is designed to appeal to all Europeans. Real monuments cannot appear. An image of the Eiffel Tower on currency, for example, would imply the perceived superiority of Paris over the rest of France, and France over the rest of the Union.[1374] It is simply *too* specific. The same would occur for any European edifice: indeed this is cited as a reason for the ECB's rejection of real-world architecture.[1375] An image of non-existent yet representative architecture, though, seemingly appeals to all inhabitants of the Union in a hyperreal map. It is what Helleiner describes as 'Europe ... all around us, yet nowhere in particular'.[1376] Yet a division remains.

The map may include the entire physical topography of the Western Eurasian landmass, but not all peoples of the Union are represented. As Figs. 6.13 - 6.19 demonstrate, Western and Southern Europeans are represented iconographically but the Union's Eastern newcomers are utterly absent. We have now identified that euro currency, through maps, spread an imagination of *empire*. We might be tempted to go one step further and argue, as does Mwangi, that the imperial image therein is specifically *colonial*.

In her study of the British *Empire*'s colonial currency, Mwangi argues that money is rendered "colonial" in its 'evocations of distance, of spatial separation, between metropole and colony'.[1377] Euro currency maps convey the ideology that all Europeans are part of the same metropole, but the images entwined with the map are exclusive of those areas of the

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[1372] Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity', pp. 250-251.
[1373] Robert Kalina, cited in Fishman and Messina (eds.), *The Year of the Euro*, pp. 28-29.
[1374] Ibid., *Year of the Euro*, p. 23.
[1375] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/banknotes/html/index.en.html.
[1376] Eric Helleiner, 'One Money, One People? Political Identity and the Euro', *TIPEC Working Paper* 01:6 (2006), pp. 1-31.
[1377] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', p. 34.

Union which were not part of the Union and did not, as Kaelberer alludes,[1378] experience the same historical epochs as Western and Southern Europe. The map may benignly embrace all Europeans, but a discourse of superiority and inferiority lurks within its images. As Helleiner identifies, the sanctioned messages propagated by euro iconography are 'transparency, represented by windows; and communication, cooperation, and a forward-looking spirit, represented by doors and bridges'.[1379] But the architectural styles represented are unreal. According to the ECB, the notes 'feature architectural styles from different periods in Europe's history'. In ascending order of value they are, Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, 'The Age of Iron and Glass', and the twentieth century.[1380] These correspond to an imaginary teleological development of Europe from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, High Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, and Modern eras, a progressive march towards destiny with the accompanying suggestion that *all* Europe experienced the same neat path of development at the same time. It is perhaps no coincidence that the bridges and gateways adorning these notes are a chronological account stretching back to an imagined beginning – Rome. But the discourse seen in these images is unequivocally imperial. It is the appropriation of an imagined past to validate the present. The imagination of history invoked here is clearly fabricated: history is not a teleological, progressive march towards a pre-defined, Whiggish goal, and not all areas of Europe experienced this neat transition from one period to another – if any did at all.

Kaelberer argues that the iconography 'deliberately constructs a common European historical memory'[1381] by appealing to common experiences in Europe's development from the decaying marble temples of Athens to the grim Khrushchevian apartment-blocks of the Eastern bloc. But this is simply not true. It is quite a stretch to claim that Sweden or Latvia were part of the same Classical world as Greece and Rome, equally problematic to visually proclaim that the eras depicted were single, homogenous affairs. The Industrial Revolution, to cite but one example, was spatially complex and temporally varied across the British archipelago upon which it began, let alone across the entire European landmass. Yet the discourse remains – the proclamation that *all* Europe has experienced the same history, that *all* Europe is the same, that *all* Europe stands in contrast to those beyond the collective – the Russians, the Turks, the North Africans[1382] – who did not share in this censored, sanitised, whitewashed version of a communal continental history which never existed, but nevertheless

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[1378] Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity', p. 170.
[1379] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, p. 23.
[1380] European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.int/euro/banknotes/html/index.en.html.
[1381] Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity', p. 170.
[1382] Ibid.

is assembled and appropriated to give the illusion of sovereign legitimacy. Entwined with the map, that icon of unity in diversity which is not to be questioned, the discourse these notes suggest is powerful indeed. All Europeans are equal, but Western Europeans are more equal than others. And Europe may be open, but only to those who adopt the imagined collective culture of the West.

Even the name of the currency – "euro" – warrants examination. 'The name of the currency', write Unwin and Hewitt, '[is] its salient feature'.[1383] "Euro" serves as a collective name appealing across the polity, but it does so by subordinating local and national identities in its appeal to an imagined common link of territory and ancestry as *Europeans*, and a continual implication that Europe is defined by clear ethnoterritorial boundaries – to the exclusion of those deemed unworthy of inclusion on the map. But as Barbero argues,[1384] "Europe" is itself a construct, a manufactured imagination stretching back to Charlemagne and possibly beyond. It is an imagination, the appeal to which hides not only in imaginary bridges and unreal maps; the very nomenclature of the currency appeals to and appropriates an artificial past – all for legitimacy.

It is notable, as Gustav Peebles argues, that in the special case of currency semiotics takes on another dimension; that of state control of identity formation. 'The state', argues Peebles, 'comes to control semiotic processes, in effect, appropriating an international sign of value held by its citizens (e.g. gold or silver) and replacing it with a *national* sign on value held by its citizenry (paper or token coins)'.[1385] The citizenry becomes bound to the state as well as to each other; a phenomenon which Peebles identifies as a case of the state colonising the future. The emergent national identity encouraged by the production and circulation of state-mandated money is an identity characterised by citizens within, and beneath, the state;[1386] in this case, an identity emerges of being *European*, under the *European Union*. The consequence is that, in Peebles' view, 'this paper money system in turn contributes to the production of spatiotemporal boundaries that mark the nation-state'.[1387] As citizens cannot use their cash beyond the boundaries of the issuing authority, money creates its own national boundaries. When that money is emblazoned with cartographic proclamations of who is, and

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[1383] Unwin and Hewitt, 'Banknotes and national identity in central and eastern Europe', p. 1005.
[1384] Alessandro Barbero, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
[1385] Gustav Peebles, 'Inverting the Panopticon: Money and the Nationalization of the Future', *Public Culture* 20:2 (2008), pp. 233-265 [emphasis added].
[1386] Ibid., p. 234.
[1387] Ibid.

is not, 'European' – including those Europeans who are not able to use the euro in their nations, and entirely discounting the landmass beyond the EU – a unique political discourse is created. This discourse proclaims who is and is not worthy of being considered 'European', the social, spatial, and spatiotemporal frontiers vigilantly patrolled by citizens whose concept of the community is created by cartography. This discourse is, ultimately, cartoimperial.

A significant aspect of money's authority is the language it uses. In his pioneering scholarship on 'imagined communities', Anderson argues that printed language is one of the core components of the construction of national identities.[1388] In the nineteenth century, it was the printing of vernacular national languages on banknotes which helped solidify the nation-state by subsuming all into the metropolitan identity.[1389] In the polyglot, ocularcentric European Union, it is printed visual language which performs precisely the same function. Money, and the icons enshrined upon its surfaces, not only standardise notions of economic value and the relationship between citizen and state – they homogenise thought by declaring the authority of the state. Money maps go one step further; they standardise thoughts of who is and is not a part of the collective society. And euro money maps take an additional step by declaring, through the medium of an unquestionable icon emblazoning a medium already regarded with semi-religious faith, who *should* and *should not* be part of the collective.

In the heyday of European integrationism, proponents of the euro argued that the euro would be a distinctly deterritorial currency, one to replace the factious and competing national currencies of the continent. Yet the euro has quickly evolved into a currency as distinctly territorial as any of its predecessors, if not more so. Earlier currencies may have depicted portraits of ruling or past sovereigns to create spatiotemporal boundaries within which the money could circulate; but the euro is the first currency to go one step further and actually *show* the borders in the form of a map. The creation of any currency, as Helleiner identifies, is a chaotic amalgam of 'intensely political processes',[1390] and although Helleiner argues that supra-national currencies are a distinct category from territorial equivalents,[1391] the euro is arguably no exception. By virtue of its false maps, the euro is arguably the most territorial and politicised currency yet created, and one which adopts precisely the same imperial discourses as its Byzantine, Frankish, Roman, and British antecedents. The euro and its maps are not a different category from other currencies: the euro is merely the most evolved form of an ancient means of publicly proclaiming the imagination of *empire*.

[1388] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 67-82; Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 120.
[1389] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 120.
[1390] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 2.
[1391] Ibid., p. 5.

In his study of the imagery of Tunisian banknote iconography, Hawkins makes a curious observation. In the aftermath of overtly nationalist or colonialist numismatic iconographies in European nations and their colonies, banks have turned to a 'juxtaposition of seemingly disparate images and genres ... in which multiple voices and perspectives highlight differences and discontinuities.'[1392] The result, he argues, is that banknotes appear as 'heteroglossic artifacts' designed to reflect the diversity of the populations they represent: the reality is that the identity they encourage is 'monoglossic and standardizing'.[1393] A single state identity is promoted, and the standardisation of iconography promotes a discourse of standardisation of the population. This is encouraged not only by the single, borderless, standardised map, but also by the icons with which it is combined.

The maps on euro currency are the ultimate stage in cartoimperialist evolution. They have long ceased to be simple geographical tools, and instead the common map depicting all of Europe regardless of countries' status in the Eurozone or the Union, has become the defining marker of what Europe is and what it is to be European. The 'European Identity' is inclusion within the collective populace of a polity pursuing Manifest Destiny as it seeks to expand according to the teleology of its own artificial history into all areas of the European landmass, appropriating the magical insignia of a constructed state and a constructed history to legitimise the present.

This is not a new phenomenon. The *mappaemundi* produced by medieval European cartographers, as David Woodward points out, were designed not only to depict topographical reality to the best of existing knowledge, but also to convey multiple levels of thought with the intention 'to provide illustrated histories or moralized, didactic displays in a geographical setting'.[1394] Like their medieval ancestors, modern maps of the Union pursue a normative aspiration; the portrayal of Europe in such a way as to emphasise Europe's self-perceived superiority over its savage neighbours. The EU's graphic icons continue to link reality with imagination, territory with identity; a worldview in which 'civilisation', progressing teleologically, is synonymous with the territorial landmass of Europe, while barbarism and chaos became inextricably associated with the barbarians lurking in the uncharted wilderness beyond, who did not share in Europe's apparent, artificial development. In such a respect, these maps of the Union are not only imperial, they are latter-day

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[1392] Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity', pp. 228-254.
[1393] Ibid.
[1394] David Woodward, 'Reality, Symbolism, Time, and Space in Medieval World Maps', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 75:4 (1985), p. 510.

mappaemundi imperialis. For they map not the European historical experience, but rather what it *ought to have been*. They are cartoimperial artefacts *par excellence*.

The polity of Europe and the landmass of Europe have become inextricably linked, reinforcing in the viewer's mind that the EU is Europe and that Europe is the EU. Ultimately, maps of the Union depict not the physical toposphere of Earth nor even the anthroposphere, the realm of human activities overlapping the planetary crust.[1395] Instead they map the noösphere – the realm of the human mind as conveyed in territorial terms.[1396] The link between territory and polity could not be more explicitly expressed through the EU's own cartographic icons; the anthropic, noöpic, imperial iconography of European Empire.

In his study of euro imagery, Helleiner claims that 'it would be difficult to argue that the imagery on the euro has been designed in a way that is meant to foster a strong sense of common European identity'.[1397] In contrast to the richly-decorated cash of yesteryear, the euro appears bland, even boring, with its pale colours, simple maps, and unfussy geometric patterns. It is little wonder that Zakaria terms it 'Money for Mars'.

Yet as Jacques Hymans argues, this is merely a change in style from modernist to postmodern currency – a historical rejection among late twentieth-century European numismatists of pompous imagery and national personification in favour of sleek, almost empty designs which invite the viewer to form their own individual impressions of their relationship to the polity.[1398]

Empire, as has been discussed, relies heavily on visual symbols, and the European Union is no exception. Indeed, the EU's own webpage offers a convenient guide to the symbols of the Union; its flag, anthem, and 'Europe Day', heralding these three elements of political discourse as its primary symbols.[1399] The map is consciously not included as a symbol. However, as the above discussions of the identity-polity-territory praxis demonstrate, the EU map is more a political symbol. It is part of 'the governmentalisation of culture'[1400] using what Ferdinand Braudel terms the basic 'structures of everyday life'.[1401]

[1395] John Matthews and David Herbert, *Geography: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 21-23.
[1396] Ibid., p. 25.
[1397] Helleiner, 'One Money, One People?', p. 6.
[1398] Hymans, 'Changing Color', pp. 19-22.
[1399] See *Europa Portal*: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/index_en.htm.
[1400] Clive Barnett, 'Culture, policy and subsidiarity in the European Union: from symbolic identity to the governmentalisation of culture', *Political Geography* 20:4 (2001), pp. 405-426.
[1401] Helleiner, 'One Money, One People?', p. 5.

Mwangi is arguably correct in her assertion that banknotes are merely *seen* rather than *looked at*, suggesting that the maps adorning euro currency are relatively inconsequential. Yet it is only through collective faith in the iconographies of money that we trust in its value, hence the yearning for legitimacy is a core component – if perhaps not always consciously realised – of collective currencies.[1402] The result is a cycle – we trust money because it is embossed with the symbols of the state, and we trust those symbols of the state because they are on sanctioned currency. Consequently the map of the European Union is both the supporting symbol of the state *and* the state-supported symbol of authenticity. Maps, as Monmonier reminds us, are perceived as artefacts not to be questioned. Nowhere is this more true than in the cartographies of European currency; maps so entangled in a complex web of materiality, iconology, and a quasi-religious faith that they become supremely authoritative emblems of Europe's authority, legitimacy, and geopolitical yearnings; the very essence of *empire*.

The iconography of the euro was designed to 'get something that captured what Europe was all about':[1403] a phenomenon which Hawkins identifies as the construction of 'an imagined homogeneous history'.[1404] The images chosen to represent Europe's past never existed. They are merely an imagination of what the past was, an appeal for legitimacy by connecting the present to an artificial history. This is what Benedict Anderson rightly describes as the act of 'forgetting' aspects of history, a crucial component in the manufacturing of identity – perhaps nowhere more so than among Europeans, whose nineteenth- and twentieth-century affairs oblige the Union to gloss over the darker chapters in our collective recent history. The maps-as-icons, and their affiliated images, on euro banknotes promote the precise discourse of *empire* which we encountered in Chapter One. Just as Pope Leo invoked an imagined past, a history which never existed, to grant legitimacy upon Charlemagne, euro currency invokes its own manmade backstory to justify the policies of the present, and the ambitions of the future, by appealing to a construct which legitimises its very existence. Yet while the Pope needed nothing more than a foraged crown and a Latin liturgy plagiarised from peeved Byzantines to legitimise his manufactured history of *Imperium Romanum* to the small crowd huddled against the draughts in St Peter's twelve centuries ago, the European Central Bank has achieved a great deal more. By appropriating the unquestioned medium of cartography, on the apparently infallible vehicle of state currency, the ECB can reach far, far more people across far greater lengths of time – all day,

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[1402] Hymans, 'East is East', p. 97.
[1403] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, p. 26.
[1404] Hymans, 'East is East', p. 97.

every day, for the foreseeable future – than those assembled for a few hours in a cathedral nave, to invoke an imagined history and thereby legitimise an emergent present. Money, as Hawkins justly concludes, is too valuable to ignore.[1405] Nowhere is this more so than in the case of European currency.

6.5   *RESTITUTORI ORBIS EUROPAEUM*

> *'Put simply, their iconographic language was more immediately intelligible to people ... Indeed, its stylised simplicity was the key to its effectiveness ... The rapid diffusion of imperial imagery in this form created a visual language whose very simplicity rendered it almost universally intelligible and universally flexible'.*[1406]

As we approach the end of the investigation, we might well assume that Clifford Ando's above words describe euro currency. Yet Ando is speaking not of euros, but of Roman *denarii*. The simple design of euros is merely one connection to their premodern predecessor; another, and far more potent, connection is that by assembling and then appropriating an artificial past and an artificial sense of community, euro coins are just as powerful vehicles of political thought as were the coins of the imperial past.

The intention of the euro currency's iconography, as its makers testify, was to promote a sense of collective belonging; a conscious and benevolent agenda pursued by well-meaning agents desirous of transcending the rivalries, squabbles, and conflicts which, for the millennia of recorded history up to 1945, characterised the peoples of Europe. But however well-meaning this project may have been during its conception, the reality is quite different.

The choice of *currency* as a vehicle for promoting political messages was problematic from its very inception because, as we have seen, coins have always been caught up in a complex web of political discourses and propaganda, while their very nature as artefacts of the state precludes their being detached from notions of sovereignty and legitimacy.

The maps on euro currency were intended to promote cohesion – and they have worked. They have achieved this by a conscious visual policy of imagined coherence and enforced exclusion. They promote the message that Europe's sovereign is, to one extent, its

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[1405] Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity', p. 252.
[1406] Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 212-214.

populace as expressed through the map; yet to greater extent they suggest that the rightful, legitimate sovereign of the landmass is the Union itself. And *only* the Union. This insistence is most noticeable on banknotes – while the maps on coins deliberately exclude non-Union Europe while simultaneously corralling non-Eurozone EU nations, the maps on banknotes proclaim that *all* Europe is to be imagined as one polity, one people, one civilisation under the hegemony of the Union. The placement of these maps on EU banknotes merely reinforces this visual assertion that it is the Union, and *only* the Union, which is the legitimate heir and rightful sovereign to the European continent and its inhabitants. Whether this is a deliberate or accidental gesture is a moot point, as it is the mere existence of these maps and the message they proclaim, which characterises European currency as cartoimperial. The themes we identified in the first chapter – a yearning for authority, legitimacy, and power, all bound up in the discourse of the state and the discourse of an imagined present – are clearly visible on the coins and notes minted and printed daily in Brussels.

*"This was intended not to portray the real physical appearance of Augustus ... but an Augustus whose physique embodied **a new political ideal**"*[1407]

Fig. 6.20 – *A new political ideal*

The net result is that the coinage of modern Europe is little different from that of the EU's long-departed forebears. Barbara Levick emphasised how the coins of Rome – and by extension, the coins of those polities which adopted the self-anointed status of Rome's descendant – 'can be seen to make up a composite portrait of the ruler as he liked to think of

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[1407] Papageorgiadou-Bani, *Numismatic Iconography*, p. 19, footnote 11; Fergus Millar and Erich Segal, *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

himself'.[1408] Minting and printing Euro currency which depicts a false cartography of the Union is indistinguishable from those coins which depicted weakling *imperators* as Alexandrine conquerors, Frankish chieftains as classical Romans, and Byzantine backstabbers as God's handpicked viceroys.[1409] The image of *desired* (and perhaps inevitable) sovereignty rather than *real* sovereignty is as alive and well in today's euros as it was in the eras of *denarii*, *nomismata*,[1410] and *thalers*; and it is this manufactured memory of legitimacy and unity, expressed through a map on objects rubbing against the fingers of a third of a billion humans each day, which renders Europe's currency the pinnacle of cartoimperialism.

It is difficult to deny the phenomenal power of numismatic iconography, no less so in contemporary Europe than in the *empire*s of ages past. Indeed, Howgego goes so far as to question whether, rather than *empire* defining currency, it is currency which defines *empire* – suggesting that the existence of a unified currency explicitly promoting visual messages of political unity across a vast and infinitely diverse population is what defines "*empire*" as opposed to *poleis* or *hegemonia*.[1411]

European Union currency is the apex of cartoimperialism, for its coins and notes combine the utmost authoritative expression of political discourse – the map – with what is arguably the most powerful state vehicle for transmitting ideologies – currency – in the most powerfully expressive forum – the public sphere. Together these three elements – maps, currency, and the public gaze – combine to transform European Union coins from mundane tools of transaction into icons of *imperium* as powerful as any Aquila.

What are we to make of this? It is true that we must avoid the pitfall identified some forty years ago by A.H.M. Jones, who warned that although coins 'were intended to be vehicles of propaganda... their importance can be exaggerated'.[1412] But while this caveat might have been true for the premodern world, in which coins circulated among uncaring elites and illiterate masses,[1413] in the modern world it would be hard to deny the political messages embedded in currency used daily by hundreds of millions of cartographically literate people within the European Union and beyond.

[1408] Polański, 'The Imperial Propaganda and Historical Tradition', p. 49.
[1409] Andrew Stewart, *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), footnotes 1116-1118; Price, *Coins: An Illustrated Survey*; Michael Grant, *The Collapse and Recovery of the Roman Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 13.
[1410] Price, *Coins: An Illustrated Survey*, p. 131.
[1411] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, pp. 60-61.
[1412] Polański, 'The Imperial Propaganda and Historical Tradition', p. 48.
[1413] Ibid.

Was there ever a realistic alternative to the map of Europe? Jacques Hymans wryly concludes that, had the euro been conceived in other eras, it would have looked quite different. But in the 1990s, following the shift in European *zeitgeist* towards postnational themes,[1414] this was not possible. Images of 'women lolling about in flowing robes' – notably the classical Greek *Europa*, the woman riding a bull[1415] – hearken back too far to those Victorian visuals of *empire* we now sweep, shame-faced, under the historical carpet.[1416] In spite of the antiquity of allegorical personifications of abstract concepts[1417] or geographical and geopolitical constructs, it would be difficult to conceive of *Europa* as embodying sovereignty. To the untrained eye, the image of a woman riding a bull might well appear all too abstract, esoteric, or frankly bizarre to symbolise the European Union. Furthermore, choosing a rape victim[1418] to represent the Union might have been a little insensitive. Unusually the European Central Bank ignored the implication, and in May 2013 the ECB indeed included *Europa* as an icon symbolising European integration – an even more emphatic visual statement that *all* Europe developed from one point in space and time.

Similarly, images of European flora and fauna were rejected[1419] while images of national figureheads of science or art – still very much the norm in non-Eurozone EU currencies – were considered by the ECB, but rejected for fear that obscure details of their personal lives might offend.[1420] Hence, in-keeping with the spirit of the times, the ECB selected *representations of reality* – a phenomenon which is the fundamental nature of *empire*, and the map. Unreal architecture and an unreal map; icons which, although artificial, are recognisable, and appeal to Europe's imagined common past.[1421] As a consequence cartoimperialism has colonised that most powerful of discursive vehicles. Since its inception by potentates and metallurgists in Bronze Age Anatolia, and since its formalisation by the

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[1414] Hymans, 'Changing Color', p. 19.

[1415] Before May 2013, *Europa* did appear on the reverse of Greek coins. The iconographic reforms of May 2013 resulted in *Europa* appearing as a watermark on all Euro banknotes. See: Raento et al., 'Striking stories', p. 949; 'Europa series of euro banknotes', *European Central Bank*, http://www.ecb.int/euro/banknotes/europa/html/index.en.html; and the European Central Bank's dedicated website at http://www.new-euro-banknotes.eu/.

[1416] Hymans, 'Changing Color', p. 20.

[1417] Lauer, 'Money as Mass Communication', p. 118.

[1418] According to the legend, *Europa* was abducted (and, depending on interpretation of the myth) raped by Zeus. It is unclear precisely when, or why, Europa became associated with the continent we now call Europe. Fornhäs, *Signifying €urope*, pp. 8-10, 37-42.

[1419] Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, p. 27.

[1420] Jacques Hymans describes how the Euro's iconographers rejected William Shakespeare for the apparent anti-Semitism of *The Merchant of Venice*, Miguel Cervantes as he might suggest favouritism towards Spain, Wolfgang Mozart because of his Freemasonry, and Leonardo da Vinci due to his purported homosexuality. Strange, for a polity which claims to be 'United in Diversity'. Hymans, 'Changing Color', p. 20; Hymans in Fishman and Messina (eds.), *Year of the Euro*, p. 27.

[1421] Kaelberer, 'The euro and European identity'; Hymans, 'Changing Color', p. 18.

restitutorii of Rome and the bureaucrats of Byzantium, currency has always been inextricably entangled with politics. We might even be justified in arguing that no matter what emblem the Union had selected for its currency, said icon would be inherently political. Yet the map is a unique case.

The era of explicit ideology in Europe may be consigned to the continent's troubled twentieth-century past, but the project of nation-building continues. The new nation is that loudly proclaimed by currency maps – the territory of *Europe*, populated by the nation of *Europe*, identified and boundaried by mass maps and subsequently inaccessible to those not included on the maps, while including by association those Europeans who are not members of the Eurozone, or even the Union itself.

Like the Union itself, the European identity is still being formed. Penrose opines that 'state involvement in considerations of iconography is most intensive when the state is *new* and its symbolic repertoire is first being devised, or when the state is in *crisis* or *transition*'.[1422] At present, the European Union is in all three stages. It – or at least, its currency – is new, in crisis, and in an unusual semi-permanent transition as the EU marches slowly eastwards towards an as-yet unspecified, but cartographically implied, frontier. But as studies of the power of currency iconographies from places and times as dissimilar and diverse as Ancient Rome,[1423] medieval Germany,[1424] colonial Africa,[1425] and industrial-age South America[1426] have demonstrated, the cartographic iconographies of contemporary Europe suggest that the Union is following the same precise pattern identifiable to the origins of *empire*, and beyond.

Penrose and Cumming further argue that variations in currency iconography 'reflect the different political contexts in which [coins and notes] were produced'.[1427] Mwangi's exploration of the evolution of Kenyan currency supports this,[1428] as does Howgego's examination of Byzantine currency.[1429] Currency iconography reflects the dominant political discourse of its day, whether said discourse be religion, colonialism, nationalism, or any of the myriad of political metanarratives found on currency. In the case of the EU, the discourse is perhaps less evident at first glance. The ages of *empire* and nationalism may be officially

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[1422] Penrose, 'Designing the Nation' p. 432 [emphasis added].

[1423] Andrew Erskine, *Roman Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 71-72, 166-167.

[1424] Price, *Coins: An Illustrated Survey*, pp. 142-178.

[1425] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant', pp. 31-62.

[1426] Galloy, 'Symbols of Identity and Nationalism', pp. 15-34.

[1427] Penrose and Cumming, 'Money talks', p. 821.

[1428] Mwangi, 'The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant'.

[1429] Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*; Peter Volz and Hans-Christian Jokisch, *Emblems of Eminence: German Renaissance Portrait Medals in the Age of Albrecht Dürer [trans. Andrew Jenkins]* (Stuttgart: Lübke and Wiedemann, 2008).

over in Europe, but their legacy is alive and well in the cartographic iconography of the currency. Overt iconographies of perceived superiority, division, hierarchy, and other aspects of unpalatable political projects whose ghosts still haunt Europe's history, are no longer acceptable in the public discourses of the Union. The discourse of today appears, on the surface, to be very different. The metanarrative of Digital Age Europe is peace, progress, and collectivity; *'United in Diversity'*, as the Union so proudly declares. The borderless map of the Union is the apparent ideal emblem of this perceived new age for the continent; a map which expresses unity, peace, and cohesion. But as we are by now aware, far more messages than those intended lurk within the gradients and graticules of cartography. None more so, than in those maps used as icons of the nation.

Are European currency maps nationalist? Given the preponderance of emperors, kings, and tyrants to use currency as vehicles for insisting upon the legitimacy, authority, and imagined succession of their dynasty, party, or ideology, we might be tempted to answer; yes. And this answer would be partially correct. Yet they are not merely *national*. As we identified in the preceding chapter, one of the hallmarks of the nation is the suppression of difference; the establishment of a single identity within the borders of the state. Yet in *empire*, multiple identities are tolerated, even encouraged; these identities are not geographical, but temporal. The imagined identity of the present coexists with the imagined identity of the past, a coexistence of history which, through its appropriation, legitimises the present. Euro coins perform precisely this function. By combining local icons with a single, universal map recognisable to all, multiple identities exist until the moment a coin or note is handed over – at which point we become simply *Europeans*, with an equally shared, equally imagined, equally invoked identity. The ability of money to cement a single identity is well-attested; from Romans and Franks to nineteenth-century Canadians, Germans and Italians seeking to foster a sense of unity in their newborn nations.[1430] The euro performs the same function, encouraging a single identity. Like earlier currencies, the euro seizes an artificial past with which to form a social solvent, encouraging isolation and the exclusion of those not considered part of the collective. Like a colonial power, the euro's maps annex territory in which the currency cannot be used, or which is not even part of the Union. It is this appropriation and annexation of time and space, in the quest for legitimacy, which renders the Union's common currency an imperial artefact, one whose power rests heavily on the phenomenon of cartoimperialism.

[1430] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, pp. 111-112.

Currency can be, and is, used to draw together disparate peoples by encouraging the formation of a single identity.[1431] In the case of the Union, this identity is not merely prefigurative – neatly replacing the nation-state with the Union – it is imperial.

Since their genesis, coins and banknotes have been the sole prerogative of the state. the appearance of maps on euro currency is inherently authoritative and the political messages of authority can in no way be extracted from this meta-trope; that no matter what the map depicts, its location is a public proclamation of power.

Legitimacy is an additional area of inquiry. Contemporary currency lacks any sort of value and it is only through the collective belief of its users in the currency's legitimacy, that it is able to function as a medium of exchange. We have no choice but to trust the currency – to trust it as a means of existence, and by extension – conscious or otherwise – to trust the iconographic paraphernalia which accompany and adorn the metal discs and paper slips nestling in our pockets. The maps on euro currency are hyper-real. They depict not merely the Eurozone, as on pre-2007 coin maps, and not even the entirety of the European Union but the *entire* landmass. The message promulgated herein in one of inherent legitimacy – the Union and its currency are trustworthy and legitimate as they represent the whole of the European Union's populace. They are stamped with the image of the sovereign – not an individual monarch, but the third of a billion humans who form the European *demos* – and it is this authority, this apparent legitimacy, which lends the cartographic currency its unparalleled power. The map is legitimate because it is approved by the state. The state is legitimate because it has a map. As Hawkins describes the phenomenon, 'the standardisation of the form of banknotes themselves leads to the images on the notes taking their meaning from the notes'.[1432] The message proclaimed by these mutually interdependent discourses is clear. *This* is Europe, and *this* is the one common bond spontaneously created when coins and notes change hands.

Finally, euros appeal to an imagination of the past. It is an irony that while the euro's designers selected bridges as a metaphor for bridging the differences between Europeans, the inescapable mechanisms of numismatics give these bridges a very different potential meaning. With the map, and the fake architecture, the bridges span the distance between an imaginary past, an artificial present, and an anticipated future. This has been a characteristic

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[1431] Clifford Ando draws attention to the use of coins inscribed with the Imperial portrait to encourage a single identity at ceremonies attended by otherwise unrelated peoples. C.H.V. Sutherland disagrees, arguing that the purpose of inscriptions on Roman coins was to continually bombard with propaganda the main users of coins – the army. Ando, *Imperial Ideology*, p. 233; C.H.V. Sutherland, *The Emperor and the Coinage: Julio-Claudian Studies* (London: Spink and Son, 1976).

[1432] Hawkins, 'National Symbols and National Identity', p. 250.

of currency for millennia.[1433] James Sidaway and Jane Pollard wryly observe that the Union ought to have chosen walls and barriers as accompanying icons to the map of *Fortress Europe*,[1434] yet the bridges are equally appropriate – for it is along these viaducts of the mind that the discourse of *empire* travels, appropriating an unreal past to legitimise an uncertain present.

If the euro does indeed crumble, it will not mark the end of the Union. Neither will it mark the last attempt to unify the European landmass under one currency. It will merely join the *denarius*, *nomisma*, *thaler*, and *Napoléon* – and form another precedent for whatever new currencies are concocted in the centuries and millennia of European history yet to occur – as another attempt at constructing an identity via currency iconography: an identity rendered imperial by its fabrication of a false history to justify the present, fated to be dissected and discussed in future scholarship on the historical precedents for whatever new currency is eventually touted across Europe.

6.6   CONCLUSIONS

At the end, we return to the two quotations with which we began. Is there a link between the words of Caesar, dictated in a gloomy Gaulish tent as his legions trudged across the continent over twenty centuries ago, and the bureaucratic grandstanding of EEC administrators in a Brussels office-block in those heady months following the fall of the Iron Curtain? The answer is yes.

On the surface there is nothing to connect the euro to its distant ancestors, an apparent discontinuity which leads one of numismatics' foremost scholars, Eric Helleiner, to declare that the euro is not designed to facilitate identity construction.[1435] But the reality is that, whether part of the Machiavellian plot of a self-anointed elite seeking to build a new nation or simply an honest desire to create a postmodern, neutral currency, the euro can do nothing *but* encourage the formation of an imagined identity – and an imperial one at that. The portraits of *Princeps*, *Imperators*, and *Kaisers* may have been consigned to history, but the euro cannot escape the macrohistorical context out of which it emerged. The maps proudly adorning   euro   coins   and   banknotes   have   become   what   Stewart   describes   as

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[1433] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 110.

[1434] Jane Pollard and James Sidaway, 'Editorial: Euroland – economic, cultural and political geographies', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 27:1 (2002), pp 7-10.

[1435] Eric Helleiner, 'One Money, One People? Political Identity and the Euro', *TIPEC Working Paper* 01:6 (2006), pp. 4-5.

'cryptoportraits':[1436] emblems of the state in the form of a recognisable figure. Remembering Chapter Four, we might well consider this a synecdochal metonym. Just as the ubiquitous, "one-size-fits-all" portraits adorning Roman, Byzantine, and Carolingian coins conveyed – as the Gospel of Matthew inadvertently illustrates – the *idea* of the state and its power rather than the individual ruler, so too does the map of the Union appropriate an artificial past to legitimise the present and justify the future, conveying the idea of collective, imperial, sovereignty.

Were Julius Caesar to peer through the looking-glass of an Iron Age oracle and see the coins currently clinking in pockets from Lisbon to Ljubljana, Limerick to Lemesos, he might not be particularly surprised. And nor ought we be surprised to find that, like the citizens of an extinct polity in the mists of history, every time a coin passes between European fingers we are rendering unto the modern Caesar: for euro currency has evolved into the ultimate expression of cartoimperialism.

[1436] Stewart, *Faces of Power*, p. 159.

Conclusions

A New Race of Pilgrims

'They persisted in the design of maintaining the dignity of the empire, without attempting to enlarge its limits. By every honourable expedient they invited the friendship of the barbarians; and they endeavoured to convince mankind that the Roman power, raised above the temptation of conquest, was actuated only by the love of order and justice. The Roman name was revered among the most remote nations of the Earth. The fiercest barbarians frequently submitted their difference to the arbitration of the emperor; and we are informed by a contemporary historian that he had seen ambassadors who were refused the honour which they came to solicit, of being admitted into the rank of subjects.'[1437]

Edward Gibbon,
Decline and Fall I.i

Writing in the late eighteenth century, Edward Gibbon asserted that under the first dynasty of emperors, the Antonines, Rome underwent a transition from an expanding realm of republican virtues and democratic, civilised liberties to a static, dogmatic fortress defined no longer by welcoming newcomers with open arms, but by warding outsiders off with legions, laws, and jealously-guarded frontiers. Yet – with the exception of enlarging its limits – his words might prove to be as accurate a description of the European Union today, as of a civilisation half-lost in the mists of time.

After five centuries of Republican expansion, Rome declared its final frontiers and from Hadrian's Edict of 117 AD onwards, ceased to expand. What had once been vague and temporary boundaries between the world already civilised by Rome, and the world yet to be incorporated, became static *limes* defined not by temporality but by permanence – earth parapets, wooden palisades, and stone walls.[1438] In doing so, Rome made a public declaration of where civilisation ended and barbarism began. What we see in today's European Union is precisely the same. The EU may lack the physical fortifications and professional garrisons which marked the self-imposed limit of Rome, but the principle of drawing a line and declaring it to be the boundary between civility and savagery remains. It is not on the ground that we should look for the public declarations of Europe's frontier. It is in the map.

[1437] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol. I*, p. 8.
[1438] Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 57-60.

Since its inception as the Coal and Steel Community in a continent fearfully emerging from the ashes of Armageddon, to an apparently welcoming polity opening its arms to the states wrestling out of Moscow's iron grip, the European collective has always been an expanding and morphing entity. And, as recent enlargements and continuing membership negotiations with non-EU states demonstrate, *Imperium Europaeum* has not yet reached its frontiers. But the Union is running out of places into which it can expand.

The Union has not yet decided where the final frontier lies – but it has started to identify that line. The European Union will not, unlike Rome, confound its monarchy with the globe of the earth. Europe is *very* much aware that there is a world sharing a peripheral border – a world which is to be held up as a dark mirror-image of Europe's self-anointed status as exemplar and guardian of civilisation. For on those hundreds of millions of little maps clinking between the fingers of its citizens, on those countless cartographies folded in wallets and purses, and those *Theatra Orbis Europaeum* boldly dominating the limitless spaces of the internet and print publications, the frontiers are already clear. The line between civilisation and savagery is protected not by fortifications but by ratifications, and that line is publicly declared by maps.

The EU seeks, in its own words, to unite a continent. And while the EU is yet to officially absorb the whole European landmass, its maps have already done so. Jeffers Lennox reminds us that conquering space on paper is every bit as powerful as absorbing territories in real geopolitics. The maps have been drawn, the new *provinciae* pronounced, and the gates locked against the barbarians. And acting as a unifying force for the whole project, *Imperium Europaeum* – wittingly or not – issues maps which proudly proclaim that it is inevitable, that it is good and that like the *Imperium* of the Early Middle Ages, *only* the Union has the legitimacy, authority, prestige and right of *empire*.

Frances Yates writes that one of the defining characteristics of international politics in European history was that the *Heiliges Reich* – which under previous emperors had maintained at least an illusion of universality and the rule of one *Dominus mundi*, one Lord of the World, uniting the disparate groups of humanity under the banner of a self-proclaimed civilisation – turned inwards.[1439] The change of name in 1512 from *Heiliges Römisches Reich* to *Heiliges Römisches Reich deutscher Nation* – the Holy Roman Empire *of the German Nation*[1440] – was a mere formality. The shift in Imperial philosophy from universalism to particularism – from an *Imperium* of the entire human race to *Imperium* possessed by

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[1439] Yates, *Astrea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 1-13.
[1440] Wilson, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 2; Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, p. xi.

Germans only – was perhaps a portent for what is beginning to emerge in the political philosophy of the European Union. Once an entity which entertained aspirations of universal union, the Union is now defining its ethnic, territorial, and philosophical frontiers by declaring its borders. The Romans abandoned their aspirations of *civitas orbis Terrarum* in order to fortify their frontiers, to draw an eternal line between civilised and savage. The Holy Romans set aside dreams of Universal Monarchy to become a distinctly German society. And now we Europeans increasingly renounce universalism through maps which proclaim not only that there remains a barbaric wilderness lurking beyond our frontiers and that it is our duty and destiny to encompass a new *civitas orbis Europaeum*, but also that we must unite against the barbarians who will not be drawn into our orbit simply because *They* are not like *Us*: while *We* must impose our norms upon those deemed worthy of admission, because *We* are the standard by which *They* will be measured.

These maps declare that the *translatio imperii* has taken a new step, one which medieval chroniclers would recognise. *Imperium* emerged with Rome, passed to the Greeks, thence to the Franks, and after the *interregnum* in which vying factions from Napoleonic French to Italian Fascists appropriated the claim to reinforce their self-anointed supremacy over Europe, that same *imperium* has passed to its new bearer; the new sole sovereign of the continent whose duty and destiny it is to unify all Europeans into one *imperium orbis Europaeum* – the European Union.

This thesis sought to address the question of what the European Union is. A number of conclusions have been reached.

First, we have demonstrated that *the European Union defies categorisation*. It combines features from a wide spectrum of forms of political organisation, but it cannot be neatly defined. Increasing academic and public discourse frames the European Union as empire, a word whose contested nature and ugly connotations generate debate. This warrants investigation.

Second, the thesis has established that *empire is a discourse*. Empire is neither a form of social and political organisation nor a method of governance. It is a deliberate harking back to an imagined history and an imagined sense of a collective civilisation, defined by open inequality and a contrast with barbarian outsiders. It emerged in Europe as a status of prestige in the Early Middle Ages, from whence it has evolved and been carried to the non-European world and non-European, pre-medieval history as a marker of supreme power. Empire's sovereignty is imagined to be exclusive and absolute, its legitimacy underpinned by

claiming descent from history, its exclusivity and inequality freely admitted – unlike nations – because of, and in turn justifying, a manifest destiny to unite an imagined community. This discourse, to be accepted, must be propagated to powerbrokers. While coronations and court ceremonials once fulfilled this task, the age of mass media and mechanical reproduction, popular sovereignty, and instant communications have altered the format. The new means of propagating the discourse is the mass visual image.

Third, we have established that *effective vehicles of discourse are maps*. Maps were once the near-exclusive preserve of priests and princes – but since the nineteenth century maps have been a part of everyday public communication. As part of our instinctive psyches and as tools which we consult on an almost daily basis, even without realising it, we believe that maps are reflections of reality. But they are not. Because of their inherently restricted nature, they are representations of a form of reality, distorting the world into synecdoches and hyper-realities. However, mapreaders tend to treat maps as apolitical mirrors of the world, assigning them an almost unquestioned faith.

Fourth, it has been argued that *maps must be deconstructed with semiotics*. Maps are a means of communicating information, and thus they are a form of visual language. There is merit in investigating the individual features of maps, but like individual spoken or written words, these features only make sense in the context of a broader visual grammar. The intentions of the map's creators are almost irrelevant because like any form of spoken, written, visual, or audio communication, original meanings evolve extremely quickly once maps have been released into public discourse.

Fifth, it has been demonstrated that *the EU's public maps convey political discourse.* All maps are hyperreal synecdoches, with EU maps substantially so. European Union maps combine with political iconography and aesthetically pleasing visual images to present an idealised imagination which blurs "European Union", "Europe", and "Europeans" into a hyperreal ideal. EU maps are inextricable from the macrohistorical roots of using maps to express supreme and exclusive sovereignty, legitimacy, destiny, and internal unity defined by contrast to a freely-acknowledged, unequal, hierarchy of insiders and outsiders. It does not matter what the maps are intended to show, as the very use of maps creates this division.

Sixth, it is argued that *EU currency maps are the ultimate expression of empire*. Maps on the EU's coins and banknotes combine maps' existing synecdoche, metonymic deixis, and public faith to depict not what the Union is, but what it should – and will – be. This is not reality but hyperreality. The essentially worthless nature of currency requires significant use of icons of power and statehood to encourage public trust, while the imagined value of cash

gives the icons depicted therein a degree of persuasive public perception. Both combine: maps validate the Euro and the Euro validates maps, portraying a European Union which wields supreme power, has exclusive sovereignty over the European continent, gains legitimacy as the apex of an imagined European history, and whose iconography unites all Europeans in an unequal spatio-temporal partnership while visually declaring the exclusion of those who will never be welcome in the hyperreal, synecdochal, imagined community of the European Union.

Thus the final conclusion to the thesis is that, simply, *the European Union is Empire.*

7.1 Towards the Horizon

We have encountered some colourful characters on our journey, from both fiction and fact. José Barroso and Julius Caesar, Liudprand of Cremona and Lieutenant George, Panofsky's pedestrian and Prester John. It is fitting that as we approach the end, we will take a final opportunity to peer over the shoulder of one of our familiar companions – Edward Gibbon, penning the penultimate paragraph to his *Decline and Fall* by the shores of Lake Lucerne on a June morning in 1787:

> *'The map, the description, the monuments of ancient Rome have been elucidated by the diligence of the antiquarian and the student; and the footsteps of heroes, the relics not of superstition but of empire, are devoutly visited by* **a new race of pilgrims** *from the remote, and once savage, countries of the North.'[1441]*

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Decline and Fall VI.lxxi

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The citizens of today's European Union, we barbarians of yesteryear from those once-savage countries of the North who schizophrenically 'looked up to the image of Rome'[1442] while simultaneously tearing down its monuments,[1443] are indeed standing amidst the relics of *empire*. The pull of the *translatio imperii*, the *transfer of Roman power*, is, as it was to Greeks and Germans, Byzantines and Britons, French and Fascists, too strong to resist. And

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[1441] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall Vol. VI*, p. 1048.
[1442] Williams and Friell, *The Rome That Did Not Fall*, p. 232.
[1443] Greenhalgh, *Survival of Roman Antiquities*, pp. 202-218.

the relics of *empire* amidst which we Europeans wander are, by their nature, relics of verbal and visual language. It is not in the glass and chrome of Strasbourg that we find *empire*. It is not exclusively in the proclamations and decrees of Brussels that the discourse of superiority, legitimacy, and power lies.[1444] It is in maps. Through their tropes and meta-tropes, their embedded suggestions and overt declarations, their placement and circulation, cartography continues and constructs *empire*. And as such this study raises many avenues for future research.

One question which certainly needs to be addressed is the extent to which EU currency maps influence childrens' relationships with politics and identity. The same might be done with maps and icons used in childrens' textbooks in the Union – assuming that the Union has any say in such things. Pioneering work has been published on the dynamic between children and political discourses,[1445] and with so much theory to build upon, an ethnographic empirical study among European children may reveal hidden consequences of political mundanity and "banal empire" on the next generation of European voters and visionaries.

There is scope for research beyond the Union and beyond official EU icons. Are perceptions of EU cartoimperialism and iconography different in non-EU European states? And to what extent do other realms of material culture – passports, driving licences, European Defence Force badges, and so forth – act as vehicles of cartoimperialism? Again, there is a substantial theoretical grounding in place for a broader material culture study beyond maps.

The European Union may be the first supranational organisation to issue a single currency which supersedes all previous systems within its own economic orbit, but it is doubtful that Europe will be the only body to do this. Even in the face of potential *eurodämmerung*, other regions are considering monetary union in the EU's image.[1446] Economist Paul Krugman terms this 'monomoney mania',[1447] a phenomenon spreading

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[1444] Hartmut Behr, 'The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations* 13:2 (2007), pp. 239-262.
[1445] For examples of theoretical groundwork, see: Stephen Heathorn, *For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender, Class, and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Jeffrey Richards, *Imperialism and Juvenile Literature* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989); John Springhall, *Youth, Empire, and Society* (London: Croom Hell, 1977); Kelly Boyd, *Manliness and the Boys' Story Paper in Britain: A Cultural History, 1855-1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); J.A. Mangan, *Benefits Bestowed?Education and British Imperialism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Joe Bristow, *Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man's World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
[1446] Helleiner, *The Making of National Money*, p. 219; Chee-Heong Quah, 'Is East Asia as Prepared as Eurozone for Monetary Union?', *Journal of Economics and Management* 13:3 (2012), pp. 471-488.
[1447] Ibid.

across the North American Free Trade Association, the Economic Community of West African States, Mercosur, East Asia, and the African Union. Understanding the political cartography and cartoimperialism inherent to Europe's money is merely the first step. It is only a matter of time before similar organisations institute their own collective currencies, connecting their fragile present to an imagined past as part of a yearning for legitimacy and authority. When that happens – which it will – the methods and techniques employed in this thesis could provide a useful template.

Similarly a study is required on whether, and to what extent, cartoimperialism exists in the states of the African Union. Modelling itself on the EU,[1448] the AU has adopted maps in its flag, coat of arms, and website iconography. As the maps in question depict the *entire* African continent despite not all African countries being in the AU,[1449] a very similar situation exists in both Europe and Africa. An analysis of the theory and impact of cartoimperialism in Africa is thus called for.

This study also calls for an examination of discourses of legitimacy in non-European history. How is the discourse publicly proclaimed in other powerful societies such as China, India, and the Islamic world? Like Europe, the civilisations in these areas cannot be divorced from their regional histories, and there is a potential to investigate whether there is a parallel of the *translatio imperii* outside of a specifically European, Christian, historical setting.

Finally, this study suggests the possibility of further discourse analysis in the European Union. EU studies remain dominated by policy analysis and political science, focusing on what the Union *creates* rather than what it *is*. Discourse is of course a matter of perception, but there is the possibility that discourse analysis in relation to the EU, from perspectives within and beyond the Union's borders, can be expanded.

The future of the EU is not something which a study can examine, but rather is a consideration which should be borne in mind by all studies. Timothy Luke asks where, in the modern world, *empire* goes to expand.[1450] The days of territorial annexation are over – almost – and the Union has no empty space left into which to expand.[1451] Instead the Union, through

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[1448] Samuel Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, *The African Union: Challenges of globalization, security, and governance* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 6-8, 35, 52-53.
[1449] Fornhäs, *Signifying Europe*, pp. 129-130, figs. 6.11-6.13.
[1450] Conversation with Tim Luke. Virginia Technical Institute, 22 March 2013.
[1451] The sole exception is the resource-rich North Pole where EU nations – backed up by Brussels – collectively compete with the United States, Russia, Norway, and Canada, in the 'Scramble for the Arctic'. Roger Howard, *The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources* (New York: Continuum, 2009); Charles Emmerson, *The Future History of the Arctic: How climate, resources and geopolitics are reshaping the North, and why it matters to the world* (London: Vintage, 2011); Geoff Hiscock, *Earth Wars: The Battle For*

its hyperreal, synecdochal, metonymic discourses, expands into non-spatial space. It expands not into the toposphere or anthroposphere but into the artificial, human-built noösphere – the realms of language, perception, and imagination. And the discourse which colonises these realms is not *nation* or *alliance* or *federation*, it is *empire*. The discourse of *empire* itself is a linguistic, imaginative construct. It was born of a Christmas morning more than twelve centuries ago to begin its evolution into the discourse with which we grapple today. *Empire*'s progeny, cartoimperialism, is just as much a construct. Formed from visual linguistics and couched in the grammar and rhetoric of cartographic semiotics and map semantics, the modern EU map is the creator and purveyor of *empire*. Via the ocularcentric bombardment of its mass-produced maps and by the millions of coins and banknotes circulating between European fingers, these new discourses of *empire* are as much relics of an imperial past as are the tumbled temples and shattered statues of Gibbons' memory – for, like such ruins, our modern artefacts cannot be disentangled from the political and geographic history which created them. Yet such maps are also so much more than mere relics. They are vibrant and powerful, spreading an imagination which is simultaneously old and new, each time a coin changes hand and each time a pair of eyes glances across a Union map: the imagination of superiority, sovereignty, legitimacy, and destiny which, like the double-headed eagle of *empire*, simultaneously looks to Europe's collective future and Europe's imagined history.

7.2 The Ghosts of History

In his epic poem *The Aeneid*, the first-century BC Roman poet Vergil[1452] created his own manufactured history for an audience of Romans who, having endured a century of civil wars and dictatorships which had transformed their ancient Republic into Augustus' personal possession, sought to understand their identity and destiny in a new world order.[1453] Vergil's poem recounts the adventures of the Trojan prince Aeneas who, leading his young son Ascanius[1454] and carrying his aged father Anchises on his back, escapes Troy with a rag-tag huddle of refugees fleeing the wrath of Agamemnon and Menelaus. They ultimately settle in

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Global Resources (London: Wiley, 2012); Michael Klare, *The Race For What's Left: The Global Scramble For The World's Last Resources* (London: Picador, 2013); Richard Sale and Eugene Potapov, *The Scramble for the Arctic: ownership, exploitation and conflict in the far north* (London: Frances Lincoln Ltd, 2010).
[1452] Or *Virgil*, from *Publius Vergilius Maro*. W.F. Jackson-Knight, *The Aeneid* (London: Penguin, 1956), p. 11.
[1453] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
[1454] Whose descendant fourteen generations later, Rhea Silvia, is impregnated by Mars and gives birth to the twins Romulus and Remus, founders of Rome. *Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, pp. 931-932.

Italy and found what, according to their myth, later becomes Rome. Like any good story the poem has many climactic moments, perhaps most tellingly when, following Anchises' death, Aeneas is given the gods' permission to visit his father's ghost in the Underworld. After a tearful reunion and having shown his son a parade of future Romans – phantoms of the ancient kings, the famous consuls and *imperators* of the Republic, and finally an overflowingly obsequious cameo by the spectre of Augustus himself – the ghost of Anchises makes to his son a perceptive prophecy:

> *'Others will cast more elegantly in bronze*
> > *Their breathing figures, I can well believe.*
> > *And bring more lifelike portraits out of marble;*
> > *Argue more eloquently, use the pointer*
> > *To trace the paths of heaven more accurately,*
> > *And foretell the rising stars.*
> *But you, Roman, remember by your* imperium *to rule*
> > *Earth's peoples – for your arts are to be these:*
> > *To pacify, to impose the rule of law,*
> > *To spare the conquered, and battle down the proud.'*[1455]

> *The Aeneid*
> VI.847-856

Anchises' prophecy has proved more accurate than even Vergil dared imagine. Where other peoples will devote themselves to sundry skills, the destiny of Rome is to establish its *imperium*. Rome has indeed pacified and imposed the rule of law.[1456] It has spared the conquered and battled down the proud.[1457] But this did not stop with Aeneas and Augustus, nor with the abdication of Romulus Augustulus in 476 nor the death of Constantine XI Palaiologos in 1453. Via the *translatio imperii* Rome has been variously situated not in a central Italian town but in places both real and imagined: in Constantinople and Aachen, in Nuremberg and Moscow, in Vienna, Paris, London, and Washington. Rome – whoever,

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[1455] '*tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento*' in the original. Vergil, *Aeneidos [ed. J. W. MacKail]* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 249-250. The translation here is compiled from: Kelly, *Roman Empire*, pp. 20-21; Robert Fagles, *The Aeneid* (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 210; W. F. Jackson Knight, *The Aeneid* (London: Penguin, 1956), pp. 172-173.

[1456] Hartmut Behr and Yannis Stivachtis (eds.), *Europe and the World: The EU in World Affairs (Special Issue of "Review of European Studies")* (Toronto: Canadian Center of Science and Education, 2013).

[1457] József Böröcz, 'Empire and Coloniality in the "Eastern Enlargement" of the European Union' in József Böröcz and Melinda Kovács (eds.) 'Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement', *Central Europe Review* (2001), pp. 1-305.

whenever, and wherever "Rome" might be – has existed in proclamations and decrees, coronations and parades; it lived on in literature, statuary, currency, and cartography. And as this thesis argues, Rome now finds itself in the office-blocks of Brussels. Rome has colonised the mind and, as Anchises prophesies, all those who have consciously or unconsciously been aware that they hold the mantle of *translatio* have sought to pacify and to impose their own *imperium*. This is as true for the European Union as it was for Vergil's Rome, and for *imperium* in the past, the present – and the future.

7.3   Charlemagne's Shadow

We have reached the end, and we complete our circumnavigation by returning to where we started – José Barroso, and his comment to the assembled journalists in 2007. The European Union as a non-imperial empire. Is this a fair description?

Perhaps it is. In his conclusion to *The Atlas of Empires*, Peter Davidson argues that with the dismantling of the European colonies and the death of the Soviet Union, only a faint spectre of *empire* remains, Anchises' phantom merely whispering in the courtrooms and corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg. 'The age of European imperialism is past,' Davidson writes, 'but it has left a ghost'.[1458] Judging by the dull reaction to Barroso's comment it appears that Davidson is right. *Empire* may be thought to still linger in Europe, but it is a fading memory soon to be consigned to oblivion. Yet if we were to make this conclusion, we could not be more wrong. What we see in the Union's cartography is quite the opposite.

Davidson is right, but for the wrong reason. There indeed is a political poltergeist in Europe. European Empire is a faint phantom, but it is not fading – it is *emerging*, returning once more to its birthplace. The discourse of *empire* is alive and well in the Union: as the period of accession and expansion draws to a close and the EU approaches its frontiers in space, time, and imagination, morphing from a Union of open arms to a fortress of perceptions, the discourse's appearance in powerful public media becomes ever-more apparent.

The days of formal European imperialism within and beyond Europe may, as Davidson suggests, be dead. Long-gone are those mariners who, in the name of *mission civilisatrice* or malevolence, consulted their Mercator maps, steered their ships towards the distant horizon, and planted flags on faraway beaches in the names of European kings. But

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[1458] Davidson, *Atlas of Empires*, p. 229.

Europe yet remains *imperial*. *Imperium* is made today not by Caesar's legions nor Napoleon's grenadiers, nor on rolling gundecks by merchants and militarists, but in comfortable conference rooms by councils and committees. And like the imperialism of yesteryear, this practice is reaching around the globe. Since the establishment of the Union, the ideal of creating a pan-national bloc with bounded geographic and demographic borders, has spread across the world. This is to be one legacy of the European Union, over which future scholars will pore and debate long after the Union has passed into history.

The European Union and its *imperium* will, one day, cease to exist. Whether this occurs next month or next millennium is not particularly important. History demonstrates that a unified Europe – which even the EU has not yet achieved, and perhaps never will – is only a temporary phase. Like the fiery death of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1453, the passing of the EU may be interpreted by contemporaries as an event so significant it alters the course of human history,[1459] or like the legal technicalities which ended the Western Roman Empire in 476, the EU might become so obsolete that its demise will 'excite barely a ripple of interest at the time'.[1460] Like Charlemagne's realm in 840, the EU might be woefully lamented by those who outlive it,[1461] or like the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the Union may be bid a good riddance by disgruntled inhabitants.[1462] The EU's epitaph will undoubtedly be a mixture of these. But regardless of how it ends, and how and by whom it is remembered, the European Union will live on as a new element of the *translatio imperii* – one more link in a continuum which stretches back in time past Napoleon, Charles V, and Charlemagne to Aeneas and Anchises in the Underworld, and which reaches beyond Brussels in the Digital Age to inevitable future attempts at unifying Europe – a *translatio imperii* which links all attempts past, present and prospective, to unify Europe under a single rule. It will not be at all surprising if, centuries in the future, new statesmen seeking to unite the Europeans look back to the European Union and try to legitimise their actions by publicly parading the symbols of the current Rome: the European motto, the European currency, the European flag, the European anthem, and the European map; appropriating that most unprecedented, yet most familiar, of contemporary political imaginations – *Tabulae Imperii Europaei:*
Mapping European Empire.

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[1460] Stephen Williams and Gerard Friell. *The Rome That Did Not Fall: The Survival of the East in the Fifth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 2.

[1461] Nithard, *Histories* II-X, in *Carolingian Chronicles: Royal Frankish Annals and Nithard's Histories [trans. Bernhard Scholz and Barbara Rogers]* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 142-174.

[1462] John Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation: the Holy Roman Empire as idea and reality, 1763-1806* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 279-282.

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