John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Ideas, 1830 - 1870.

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Chapter Seven

I

The Moral Ideals

This chapter will continue the survey of Grote's ethical writings by reference to his analysis and scheme of the moral ideals. The next chapter will examine his criticisms of the mode of utilitarian argument dominant at the time. Interesting and important elements of Grote's work on moral value and evaluation, on the genesis of virtue and various virtues such as benevolence, honour and on the formation and evolution of character will have to be omitted in deference to the central theory of moral knowledge and of the correct theory of moral life.

It may help to summarize briefly the key analytic points in Grote's moral theory that we have met so far and to anticipate what is to come in this chapter. Grote, we have seen is opposed to ethical naturalism. Ethics is the study of what ought to be and not what is. In addition he is opposed to any kind of ethical reductionism. Secondly, Grote is clear that the nature and content of our ethical ideals are knowable, knowable through the ordinary thinking process and independent of the need for revelation, purely rational intuitions, of the types posited by the rationalists and Schelling, or any other assumptions or beliefs not normally involved in ordinary thinking and knowledge. Thirdly, Grote considers the moral ideals to be imaginative judgements, of facts expressible in statements, that are flanked by psychological, social and legal facts below and ontologically higher facts above. While abstract in character the ideals can be explained by relating them to these lower and higher facts.

What we will now see is that fourthly, the moral ideals are products or emanations of our human nature. Happiness is an ideal that grows from the sentient side of our nature, Right from the active side of our nature, and the Good from our fundamental propensity to want. All other ideals are sub ideals of these three primary ideals, all of which have independent value. Fifthly, Grote neither accepts nor rejects consequential or teleological ethics on one side nor the non-consequential, axiological, deontic or intuitionistic ethics on the other. Moral ideals, values and actions are valued or binding both for the purposes they serve, in particular the promotion of good (rather than happiness) and for elements within themselves, independent of consequences, because they are the right things to be done. Sixthly, Grote posits not one final end or ideal in relation to which all the other ideals are subordinated as means or parts, but suggests that moral life involves a plurality of ideals all of which are different yet related, ordered but often in conflict, and each of independent value. Finally, Grote considered that this analysis provides a sound base from which a comprehensive and effective attack on utilitarian ethics can be launched. These last four points can now be elaborated and appraised.

Firstly, how do the moral ideals relate to man's nature? The argument presented is complicated but its outline is very simple. The moral and political ideals are from one side an image or reflection of ontologically higher facts which which are the real objects of our existence. They are on the other side our guesses at what we feel ought to be to make coherent and satisfactory what is in the world. The ideals are the aims and purposes we posit to satisfy the want that is basic to our nature, they are the telos or goals of thought and action, the fulfilment of which would dampen the fires of want. The ideals however, are really only abridgements or clear statements of

what we know more intimately through our moral feelings, opinions and observations of our shared moral life and rules of conduct. The ideals, as Grote says, are midway between these lower moral facts and the ontologically higher facts revealed by our wants and should not be detached from either. Terms like right and good do not refer to natural qualities, nor to qualities of non natural objects but are 'descriptive adjectives applicable to actions' or various kinds of feelings (1876, 240). We should remember this when considering the following definition and scheme of the moral ideals.

One final piece of advice on method is given by Grote at the outset in the form of two maxims: His advice is

> 'that by converting one ideal into another, or interpreting one by another, we make no step, and get no further forward in knowledge: the other, that where we do advance in knowledge by *fixing* an ideal, or converting it into something partaking of fact, observation and experience, we must bear in mind that it loses its ideal character...' (1876, 38).

Grote is hinting that there are a plurality of moral ideals. that must be kept distinct, and that moral reductionism is in the end fallacious. We can show how the facts of life suggest, relate to or help fix our ideals but we cannot explain, ideals in naturalistic language. In intellectual life the two great ideals striven for are the truth and knowledge. In practical life there are three distinct major ideals and several sub ideals that involve one or other major ideal in its application to one or other particular aspect of practical social life. The three major ideals are the counter-notions of the two sides of human nature, our sentient and active selves, and the parent of each want. The ideal that corresponds and responds to our sentient self is happiness (eudaemonia) or 'what we desire'. The ideal that corresponds to our active nature is the right (the summum faciendum) or 'what I should do' that which 'should be done'. The ideal that responds to our basic want is the good (the summum bonum)

'the desirable' or 'what we should desire'.

All primary ideals are grounded in our actual natures, and our actual experiences and practices, yet all three entail imperative claims. All three ideals have value and imperativeness independent of what mere experience tells us. The ideal corresponds to but transcends and realizes the actual. It is to illustrate and support this claim that Grote devotes several chapters of the *Treatise* but especially chapter three. We may explore the ideals of happiness and the right within the context of the two sciences of Eudaemonics and Aretaics and then tackle the good and the sub ideals.

II

Happiness and Eudaemonics

Eudaemonics may, Grote insists, be studied in a non ideal manner, studying types of pain and pleasure, their sources and their effects on human behaviour such he calls 'hedonics'. But eudaemonics, and utilitarianism in particular, has usually been, or become in its development, 'exceedingly ideal'. Human beings in everyday life conclude from observation that certain events cause pain or pleasure, that we ought to have pleasure or avoid pain, or that we ought to promote the happiness of others or not inflict pain upon them. In so doing they enter into the realm of the purely moral, the ideal and the imperative. Most forms of utilitarianism have indeed been ideal though Bentham fails to recognise the move from reference to the actual to reference to the ideal according to Grote, and Mill is inconsistent, on occasions appearing to attempt the reduction of the ideal to a factual statement about personal psychology and preferences. Ideal utilitarianism, in choosing as its ideal the imperative claim that we ought to promote happiness, appears to John Grote to be founding itself, on an intuition, on an a priori

judgement, an argument previously made by Herbert Spencer and Spencer 1851, 22-23; later made famous be Grote's student Henry Sidgwick in *'The Methods of Ethics'*, (Grote 1876,20; Spencer 1851, 22-23; Sidgwick 1907, 373-390, 418-422). Grote wishes to explore the arguments for treating happiness as an ideal and to evaluate its rational claim to be the ultimate moral ideal, to be the summum bonum.

Happiness in its non ideal form is merely a succession of pleasurable sensations, but in its ideal form it is far more general. In the hands of Aristotle and his followers, happiness was so general as to be consistent with the ideal of the good; Happiness meant 'all that man wants', the 'ultimately desirable' or the 'ideally perfect human state' (Grote 1870, 74-75, 330-331, 353; 1876, xi, 39). But once we try to define happiness, to conceive it, to give it form and meaning, to fix it, then it loses its imperative power, its self-evidence, and its general appeal (Grote 1876, 40). In addition when we ask if we want or ought to have happiness in one of these narrower senses, such as a surfeit of pleasures over pains for the sentient self, then 'it is misleading to say all that man wants is happiness. He wants much else besides' (Grote 1870, 330-331). Specific accounts of happiness usually work from mans capacity to experience pleasure and pain, to be sentient. Happiness is the ideal that is suggested by the feeling of want (felt want), the absence of something actually desired. But he notes later that some forms of happiness, such as gratification, arise from the pure satisfaction of want as a fact, ever when sentient experience may be denied (Grote 1876, 283-284).

Working from a partial account of human nature, a partial account of mind and of body (stressing only the sensory nerves), happiness turns out to be only a limited ideal, that does not account of all our wants, aims or our values. That human beings do not always act to

produce happiness in a specific sense is regularly argued by Grote and he notes that when the utilitarian is confronted with these cases he then shifts to widen his notion of happiness to embrace the other ideals as parts of or means to happiness. Such a move Grote considers illegitimate because if taken to an extreme the argument for utilitarianism becomes a truism or tautology, we ought to do what we ought to do. If the argument is not taken so far the evidence of support for alternative moral theories is effective (1870, 64-69; 1876, 195). Much of the issue of the imperativeness of happiness itself and of such counter ideals as the good, the right and the just then reverts to an argument about the meaning of the word happiness.

Here Grote is most interesting. Happiness turns out to be indefinable or 'flies all description' (Grote 1876, 298-299). The key reason is not just that people do experience different sensations from the same stimuli, nor that we cannot enter into the sensations of others, but that people mean different things by the word (Grote 1870, 267-269). This is evident when we look at maxims of or for happiness such as 'happiness lies in contentment' for Grote notes that the opposite is equally true, that 'happiness lies in effort', in striving, in encouraging desires even when success eludes us. Grote proposes a new subject of Amphilology to discuss the many-sidedness and absolute indefinability of this and similar concepts (Grote 1876, 300; 1870, 26-28; 38-43, 327,331,347). Likewise as happiness cannot be adequately defined, nor a common meaning produced, neither can happiness be adequately quantified or calculated (Grote 1870 230 ; 1876, 229-237, 299, 309-310). Problems of how and to what extent we can distinguish the quantity of pleasures as distinct from the qualities is another burdensome task for the utilitarian (Grote 1876, 45-57).

Happiness then, can be an ideal in moral discourse. It can refer

either to the ultimate end of life as with Aristotle, the summum bonum, or as with John Mill and the Philosophical Radicals, to something more specific, the ideal state of satisfaction of a sentient being. Even in this latter sense, happiness is a worthy and imperative ideal. But being partial, reflecting only one side of a many-sided nature, the ideal of happiness in whatever form it takes, must take its place alongside others which are not only independently valuable and imperative, but which are more valuable, more imperative and ultimately more comprehensive and absolute (Grote 1870, 257-258; 1876, 39).

Much of Grote's discussion of happiness and his objections to its being taken as the sovereign or only ideal, can be left for the discussion of his critique of utilitarianism, but two major novelties can be pointed to here. The first is Grote's attempt to found an observational science of happiness on grounds independent of those of Bentham. This first appears in Chapter XII of the *Treatise*. Grote identifies three kinds of pleasure (and happiness), (1) those of well-feeling (or welfare) produced by satisfaction or contentment, (2) those of active pleasure, pleasures of disturbance, (3) those of gratification, the pleasures associated with achieving after activity (disturbance) what we want (Grote 1876, 275-326). Grote notes that these pleasure rise in a scale of value, passive and undisturbed pleasure, being less compelling than the pleasures of doing and then both falling short of achievement. He also notes that we could experience pure 'gratification' even if our entire sensory system was defunct. Not even all pleasures are purely sensory (ibid, 283).

Samuel Alexander was later attracted by Grote's distinction between pleasures of gratification and of enjoyment but would not go so far as allowing feelings of gratification if all the other sensations (organic sensations) connected with eating were destroyed

(Alexander 1889, 215). Grote notes the near impossibility of developing a 'comparative hedonometry' as suggested by Paley and Bentham and ends the chapter by expressing the 'universal fallacy of experience' lying at the heart of any attempted source of pleasure. It arises

> 'where we conclude the degree in which pleasure *does* please, from the degree in which it *has* pleased. For by 'does please', we really mean, not that, as a fact, it pleases now, or at such a time, or any number of times, but that 'it is its nature to please:' the universality of the proposition is something not given by experience' (Grote 1876, 289).

This is one version, but an important version, of the fallacy of induction. The second novelty is to argue that, except in the abstract philosophy of Aristotle and the Utilitarians, nobody practically treats happiness as an end. In Chapter XIII Grote argues that human motives are numerous and complex, and the objects and purposes arrived at are similarly pluralistic. Happiness is not what we aim at as the end result of action, it is a by product of living, of doing things, including doing our duty, or just performing a task well. As Grote puts it,

> 'The error of modern utilitarianism as to happiness seems to me to arise from an imperfect notion of the manner in which happiness, deserving to be called such, belongs to life in general' (ibid 292).

Here Grote, without quoting any authority, sides with Carlyle on the issue of work and launches a measured but effective attack on the assumptions of laissez-faire political economics. Adam Smith, Bentham and Mills considered pleasure to be the only possible rationale for work.

> 'and that labour is (so far as it goes) a pain or evil undergone for the sake of it' (ibid 294).

On this assumption Grote considers that few people would ever get off their chairs, let above build a 'high economical civilization'. Working from assertions about man's active, wanting and creative

nature Grote concludes that,

> 'There exists in man an impulse to the exercise of his faculties, or so far to *labour*, as well as to enjoyment, and a capacity of rational improvement which suggests to him that it is better to exercise these faculties in the production of what will be useful and enjoyed than in savage pursuits like war' (ibid 295).

Happiness may lie in working, not just as a result of work. John Ruskin, William Morris and Thomas Carlyle were to make such a gospel of work and such a critique of political economy famous in mid Victorian Britain.

Grote concentrates on other critiques of the laissez faire view in regard to its assumptions about happiness. Firstly, political economy to operate efficiently and logically must never create total happiness and extinguish all want but continually 'make men feel new wants, that is, to put an end to their contentment: content is stagnation' (Grote 1876, 301). Grote does not take up the Stoic and aesthethic ideals of contentment as his goal with its recommendation that we can improve happiness by reducing subjective wants as an alternative to capitalist logic. Rather he stresses that to satisfy man's whole nature more effort must be attributed to identifying and satisfying the essentially moral wants and desires, while appreciating activity or labour also as valuable in itself as well as valuable in the terms of its products or the satisfaction of wants (use value). Grote produces a critique of the limited perspective of the classical economist, which mirrors later ideas about 'conspicuous consumption'.

> 'The moral philosopher is in fact as much concerned to encourage *desires* and aspirations, as the political economist to encourage *wants*. The helplessness, listlessness, undesiringness, which characterizes the moral being of so many, is exactly analogous to the economical condition of well-satisfied, *unwanting* barbarians. Few people desire anything of themselves: they copy their neighbours, desire something, wealth for instance, simply because everyone else does' (ibid 303-304).

Two other logical prerequisites for capitalism worry Grote.

Firstly, the demand that men consider themselves as 'individuals', who will only 'work for themselves' and not for other's good,. This encourages conflict and competitiveness between people;. Secondly, the belief that poverty is a necessity to motivate individual activity and appears to be a necessary concomitant to capitalist society (Grote 1870 197, 326).

Next, Grote recognizes the massive imbalance and asymmetry between want and need on one side, and wealth distribution on the other, and he notes that, 'the happiness of the society is measured by the degree to which they do so balance' (ibid 337). To the values of his age and class Grote notes that the encouragement of self dependency is a *good* thing, because

> 'The common life is thus the better for all the self-interested industry and talent which makes the fortune of individuals',

But like several other of his Cambridge contemporaries, he felt a moral disgust at this process and recommended some form of Christian Socialism based on 'mutual help' (ibid 336). Happiness was not to be regarded as the only end possessing moral value in society; neither could happiness be explained or reduced to considerations of the sensory experience of pleasure and pain. To allow an economic system to operate unrestrained in the pursuit of these goals will not satisfy man's nature, his aspirations and wants. Modern capitalist society and modern political economy were viewed as a new kind of barbarianism, and wealth a goal beckoning man and society to their peril.

III

The Right and Aretaics

Aretaics is the science of virtue which arises from the active element in our nature and its ontological underpinning in the fact of want, the fact that we want to do something as much as we want to feel

something. The restlessness or ennui associated with the want of something meaningful or purposeful to do is not satisfied by sentient pleasures but only by actions that fulfill or achieve the ends set. The ultimate end of our active self is found in those events and actions which we ought to do, must or should do, the practically and concretely imperative, the ultimately imperative, the summum faciendum (Grote 1876, 34-36). We can explore these by looking at what we mean or what is entailed when we make moral statements. In everyday life Grote considers that

> 'the question in regard to the conduct of our life', is not so much what *shall* I do, simply, as what *should* I do, involving a presumption, or, if you like to call it so, an *a priori* belief, on our part, which we may variously express, as by saying, that there exists in such a manner as matter of abstract thought can exist, a course of life which is adapted for us, which belongs to us, which there is reason we should choose:... This ideal course of conduct is that which I shall give the name of 'rightness''(Grote 1876,34).

The ideal of the good refers to the more general ideal of 'what is ultimately desirable, and so answers the even more general question, 'what shall I aim at? The ideal of the right is firstly more specific. It asks, what particular actions should I do? Secondly, the right is more imperative, instead of 'shall I do', or what 'would I find desirable', it refers to a categorical imperative or what 'I should, must or ought to do? Thirdly, as already stated, the right is more immediate to us, it arises earlier in our thinking, it is more natural to us to ask the specific and more concrete question, then the more general and abstract questions answered by happiness and the good.

The ideal of right was to the Greeks the Summum Faciendum, that which must be done. As Laird noted, Grote placed this ideal above the good and all other moral ideals and this put him in the same school as Hegel before ,and Sir David Ross later (Laird 1926 ix-x; 1935 169, 265, 310). The right is the deedworthy, the good is the choiceworthy,

the former is the first ideal (1876, 35, 103).

Grote is here engaging in some very sophisticated linguistic distinctions and definitions that contribute to the building of a complete system and scale of moral ideals. This sort of enterprise may seem very alien to modern ethics with its concentration on everyday usage, meanings and with practical problem solving. But Grote did not ignore these later concerns altogether his distinction reflect ordinary language usage and its postulates. Grote recognised the value of ordinary language analysis and applied it to the notions of right and wrong can be seen through examination of On Glossary (1874, 162-169).

He aimed additionally to solve by clarification two of the biggest problems areas of nineteenth century ethics. Firstly, the question of whether the moral ideals of right, good, duty, justice, virtue, benevolence and others have a moral value independent of their felicific consequences. Secondly, to adjudicate between the four great philosophical claims for sovereign status being made for various ideals of the time, happiness claimed by the utilitarians, duty by the deontologists the right claimed by the Kantian and Hegelian idealists, and self realization, self improvement or self-perfection claimed by the emergent English idealists.

Grote is going to argue for the independent value of the three primary ideals of the right, the good and happiness and their derivative values, the useful, the natural, the just, fair, virtuous and benevolent. But he prioritises, along with Hegel, the cause of the right, and its two daughters, duty or objective right, and virtue or subjective right. Self improvement, we will see is a universal feature of all moral ideals and actions and is hence a general everyday moral imperative. Self realisation is not a specific ideal it is the general imperative of all moral and political conduct. The

narrow ideal of perfection or love of excellence is a sub-idea of virtue and not of major moral significance.

In his attempt to produce such a scheme of independent morality, William Whewell had incurred John Stuart Mill's wrath. On right, Mill noted that Whewell was either trapped in a vicious circle of defining 'right' as 'what we must do' and 'what we must do' as 'right', or else escapes into the Hobbesist trap of identifying both right and duty in terms of the established law of the day (Mill 1965a, 196-199). On occasions Grote seems close to the former error defining right as that which is 'choiceworthy, fit proper, desirable' and on occasions simply as 'what we should do' (1870, 134-5; 1876, 35-37). But Grote recognised the error involved here and considered that his own formulation avoided both tautology and insignificance (1870, 134-135; 1876, 195-196). This was because right in his formulation involved a strict prescription that specific duties be performed and did not rest on the general identification of right with being generally good, preferable or desirable. Right involved a categorical imperative and not an imperative contingent or dependent upon felicific consequences (1870, 119-133, 192-195). Secondly, Grote relates right both to the ideal and to its embodiment in everyday and actual practice, language and opinion. Right is embodied in custom and guides it; custom contains the results of past practice, language and social controversy as well as the result of intellectual speculation and debate. Right is the actual and the ideal.

Referring as it does to that which is specific, imperative and immediate to us, that which is right should be more easily located in regard to the lower moral facts, and so in fact it is to Grote. Right is the general descriptive term used to cover all cases where an action is imperative and such occasions are always associated with a feeling that the action must be performed or foregone. But right has

no necessary connection with feelings of pleasure or happiness in the short term at least. Doing the right may involve self sacrifice. Secondly right and promotive of happiness are not synonymous as utilitarians generally argue. Grote deals with this primarily in the *Examination* but the argument reappears in the *Treatise* (Grote 1870, 100-112, 135-138, 206-207, 267-272; 1876 78-80, 292). He argues that the word right etymologically has no reference to happiness, and on the other hand that it carries a different meaning in both general use and in dictionaries. The very existence of a vocabulary for discussing right is indicative to Grote that it refers to something other than 'productive of happiness' otherwise the language of the former would have collapsed into that of the latter (1870, 267-268). In the absence of such a collapse how are we to know that right means conducive to happiness? Finally on this theme, Grote argues that while it may be morally virtuous to promote happiness it is neither a duty nor necessarily right to promote happiness (1876,83). Certainly an acts moral value does not come necessarily from their conduciveness to happiness (1870, 120).

A third similar feeling of lower fact is that of conscience. Conscience to Grote is not however a faculty, but a feeling of sensitiveness that accompanies choices or actions, which have reference to social conventions,. religious, moral or legal laws. Conscience is both self-condemnation and an 'imagination of the judgement of others condemning us' also for the non-performance of specific and imperative actions (1870, 170). It is 'the idea of it law opinion and right] within us...' (1876, 156-165, 338). This we will see is very similar to Maurice's theory of concience which was to emerge from these Cambridge lectures of the late 1860's (Maurice 1872). The feeling then does not make the act right, but the facts to which it pertains, i.e. that public opinion, moral convention, or the

law demands an action from us (1876, 126-127). It is the same with the feeling of fairness. The feeling is a useful corollary of the choice to do what is right or just. The feeling however does not constitute what is right, and what is right may be so even in the face of a feeling of fairness (1876, 216-217).

At the next level we encounter that which is useful or beneficial. This often indicates what has moral value but not necessary. When we describe an action as right 'we add something to the notion of its being useful' (1876, 80). We are however on stronger ground when we reach the level of custom, common opinion and habit. Grote, as Pucelle notes, sometimes treats custom and opinion as a constraint on morality, but more usually as an incarnation of ideals. It represents 'a general level and mean of morality' or 'corresponds to a minimum made to be exceeded' (Pucelle 1955, 17-86). Lasson jokes at Grote's expense of his typically English attitudes

> 'He clearly perceives the inability of the form of law to express morals actions, but as a positive regulator for the guidance of particular individuals he returns to the father-confessor, in the guise of the general climate of opinion; and is an authentically English manner, 'respectability' in maintained as to be the basis of morality. The moral ideals are presented, but he makes no attempt to distinguish Right from custom or morality' (Lasson, 1876, 53).

Lasson is however wrong on this last point. Grote clearly sees that,

> 'To a certain extent, the notion of right or moral conduct which presents itself to the mind is that it is acting as others do, according to the general feeling, custom, or opinion.' (1876,419).

Etymologically he also notes the two words, the 'accustomed' and the 'right' 'were very closely associated'. But as with the above instances the fact of a sensation or feeling (in this case of public opinion or custom recommending an act) may indicate, but not necessarily determine, that that act is right. In fact Chapter XVIII

on the 'Relation of Individual to Custom' is devoted to showing the limits to custom's ability to chart the right in a detailed fashion.

The main analysis of Grote's theory of custom will be left for the chapter on Social and Political Theory but here we can note the central difference between custom and right. Firstly, Grote notes that there are two arguments to be considered, the first that 'custom witnesses to rightness' the second, that custom 'constitutes' right. Against the first argument is adduced evidence that in most societies, and even in Christianity, custom is often rightly treated as 'the witness to the wrong, not to the right'. Against the second Grote recognizes opposition 'on the ground that morality or rightness is just *not* in the customary or commanded, but in the individual and free. Determination from without and self determination from within are not the same, but opposite. We make our own rightness: (1876, 420-421). The feelings appropriate to command arguments are those of a belief in an 'independent rightness', the feelings attached to the right is a belief in 'ones self', it is an assertion of freedom. In both cases the 'conscientious' person is to consider sacrifice of individual judgement of right to custom and opinion, but

> 'the person who does not preserve his individuality of thought against it is a traitor to it' (1876, 423)

Grote considers that individual judgement and custom need only rarely conflict. Right is what we choose whether, customary or not, but custom is a useful 'guide'. Anyway

> 'The individual asserts his judgement, not in exception or opposition to the general judgement, but independently of it'.

We are now at the gates of Grote's theory of liberty which I shall leave to the next Chapter, but we can note here Grote's commitment to the idea that, without freedom of choice , even a legally right act has no moral value (1876, 459). His general principle for balancing freedom and custom is,

'that each individual will do well to respect general opinion, but must not be afraid to differ from it, sometimes, because, in the particular instance, he thinks it wrong, sometimes, because he thinks it interfering and importunate' (1876, 431 ....On this issue see Grote 1900, 271-283).

The strength of custom then is only as a guide and not a determinant of right. Right is a primary ideal and right acts are unconditionally imperative. Obedience to custom, or respectability, is only a subsidiary virtue and is only ever conditionally imperative. Customs, we shall see have great moral social and historical significance to Grote being, (as they were to Burke) the embodiment of 'a vast result of human intelligence and effort' which 'represents a kind of mean temperature of earthly virtue, slowly we hope rising, and such as may be raised this gradually by human effort', (1870, 357-358). Custom and tradition to Grote, like Oakeshott later, is neither ignorant nor blind, but full of the embodied wisdom of past generations. Attention must be given both to the maintenance and defence of custom in so far as it embodies social concepts of right, and equally to the reform of custom is so far as it does not. Practical and philosophical idealism are methods for reforming and upgrading custom and opinion to make them purer embodiments of right.

Above custom in the scale of moral knowledge is awareness of law and the feeling that the law ought to be obeyed. This raises the question of whether right involves merely obeying the law? This argument was not tackled in depth by Grote and his analysis can wait until later but broadly his answer is similar to that on custom. Law generally is the embodiment of the will, reason and choices of individuals in society. In one respect it is the abridgement or rationalization of custom, to use Oakeshottian and Weberian terms respectively, and in another Hegelian sense it is a 'definite and complete expression of a public spirit' and an embodiment of the

standards of an age (1876, 236, 396). In this sense law is 'analogous to usage and custom' in respect both to the relationship with right and to its general character (1870, 139-140). Law hence in its attempt to modify the feelings and preferences of citizens, in determining the natural conduct between them in regard to rights and duties, and in embodying the rightful authority of the citizenry can be said to be a witness to right (1876; 88-93, 222-239, 502-504; 1870, 140-158). But Grote, firstly, recognized that the law may not for various reasons embody this opinion, wisdom and custom of the age, a view expressed not only in the two moral texts but also in the essays on Lushington's judgement and the critique of the New Educational Code (Grote 1876, 213-217; 1862a; 1862b). Secondly, Grote recognized that law itself needed to be reformed to reflect public standards of right (1870, 42; 1876, 228, 234). Thirdly, Grote considered the Hobbist theories that right was constituted by law and the right can be reduced to might, to be largely mistaken (1876,90-96, 420; 1874, 162-6; 167-168; 1870, 158,339).

Finally, and crucially, while Grote considered philosophy, like law and custom to be an attempt to fix the content of right, he also considered the ideal to be a pale reflection of a higher fact, of a universal non historical right and moral law (1876, 361-363; 1901,317). This idea he inherited not only from Plato but also from the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth, Clarke and Price, from the Stoics and especially Cicero and more recently from William Whewell. It had been attacked by Mill in his famous critique of Whewells moral philosophy (Mill 1965a, 196-199). Grote says that it is a higher moral law that codifies right, that it is a product of imagination and is ideally as, against actually imperative upon us. (1870, 206-207). The higher moral law has two forms, the moral law and God's 'general government' of all intelligent beings (1876 221, 224 237-239,

516-519; 1870, 82-83). It is known to us through the 'common feelings of human nature', through conscience which may reflect guilty knowledge of the breach of the actual or the ideal law, or through our intelligence, reason, volition or thought (1870, 3, 155; 1876, 190-193, 139-140; 222 237; 516-519). The moral law is ideally imperative

> 'first of all, from a sympathy with it, a perception of the truth and meaning... next, from the feeling how important it is that there should be general law of human observance...; and finally, from the dread of punishment. (1870, 206-207).

The moral ideal of right then inhabits a realm between the lower facts of feelings, opinions, customs and laws and the higher facts, 'an ideal or imagination'. The notion of 'the right' or that which should be done, and other kindred notions, belong to, and imply

> 'a middle region between fact of observation or experience on the one side, and poetry, sentimentalism, the region of beauty and sublimity, on the other' (1876, 362).

In another place Grote writes that

> 'If we want to express anything so abstract as the ideally right, we must do it through the medium of some metaphor (as it is frequently called) or, more properly, through the medium of something different from it, nearer to us, and less abstract' (1876, 153).

We have seen above that the device chosen was the analogy of the right with the true, the point being that neither may yet be known absolutely, but that the assumption or belief that some absolute standards do exist or can be reached is a presupposition of our life, our thought and our activity. But there is no logical reason 'to hinder its attainment' (1876, 387). Grote considered that the very notion of rightness 'suggest to us one thing right as to be done, as against wrong, or not to be done...' but in practice the matter of recognition and choice is complicated and hence

> 'Rightness and goodness of action is not a thing which can be decided absolutely' and hence it is

'its being under the circumstances the best, that makes it the absolutely right for the doer at that time' (1876, 122-123).

Short of Platonic knowledge of the ideas of good and right, Grote, like Aristotle hovered between advocating the best possible and the best practical as the everyday guide to public virtue.

IV

The Good

In the *Examination* of 1863, Grote made a clear distinction between two kinds of moral theory, 'the morality of duty and rightness' and 'the morality of consequences' (1870, 192-193). The ideal of the good, or the summum bonum is the ultimate ideal of consequential morality, while the right is the ultimate ideal of the morality of duty or aretaics. But it is happiness, the particular, one sided and derivative ideal, which is usually treated as the ideal par excellence of consequential morality as expressed in the theory of utilitarianism. To facilitate the detachment of the good from the eudaemonic, Grote treats it is an ontological ideal rather then an epistemological ideal, one based upon our existential view of human nature. While this sensive side of our nature is realised in the ideal of happiness, and the active side in right, good realizes and satisfies our real being as signified by our real wants (1876,22-25). This can be represented in a simple diagram.



Fig 1: The Primary Ideals

The strategy here seems to be like that of a prime minister elevating a difficult colleague to the upper chamber of parliament where he can do less harm, so leaving the issues and forces less muddied and confused. The real battle between the two moralities of the day, intuitionism and utilitariarism was between the proponents of right and happiness as the ultimate ideals. The notion of the good was a vague and troublesome colleague which challenged occasionally for allegiance, which confused adherents of both parties and which offered little in the way of either philosophical or practical help. To elevate the good above right and happiness, to the status of titular monarch, to the ephemeral status of the end of all life, the 'reason of being', left the right, like the prime minister as sovereign. However the analogy is not quite right for Grote's overriding aim was not victory for intuitionists and independent morality over their rivals but the reconciliation of the conflict through the eclectic procedure of unity into a coherent whole, the partial truths of each system. The good, as an ideal, is elevated not to be exiled but to allow for a peaceful reconciliation or accommodation below as it were a Constitutional balance between Monarch, Prime Minister and Parliament. As Grote argues

> 'There is no kind of *necessary* contradiction between the morality of consequences... and even the highest and most intuitive doctrine of an absolute distinction between right and wrong. In fact, for a true morality we want the doctrine of consequences, considered in this light, to aid us against arbitrary distinctions between right and wrong...' (1876, 79-80).

The 'good' is the most elevated of ideals to Grote, but takes a secondary role to 'right' in everyday life because it is less specific and concrete and less immediately imperative. Ultimately what we want is 'what should be', 'what is choiceworthy', and 'desirable' (1876, 34-35, 103, 122-3, 182-3). As Grote puts it, and De Burgh and Laird agree, the good is the 'to be won' not 'the to be done', it may be the

ultimate ideal but not the immediately and practically imperative (1876, 83; De Burgh 1938, 44-45; Laird 1926 ix-x; 1935, 169, 265, 310). The good is what it is 'well should be' rather than what 'must be' or 'is' (1901, 296-299). To call something good is of course to recommend or prescribe the act or thing or feeling but not to insist that it is a categorical imperative. Similarly to say something is good is to say that it is desirable in the sense of capable of, worthy of or even ought to be desired. But to say something is right or is a duty is to say much more, it is to imply that it ought to be done and vice versa.

> 'Hence we have no business to say, that because a thing is desirable for us, therefore it is what we ought to do' (1876, 82).

Finally, with right, and its sub-ideal of duty we find that we are less free in our choices, we are in fact bound to some extent to do something for some other person or people. When right says we ought' or 'should' do something duty says we 'must' (1876, 83-85). The use of good only advises us it does not categorically prescribe.

Starting from the Aristotelian theory of teleology, the good is the ultimate telos or purposes of life. The starting point, the sign and instigator of the good is want. Want, if we remember, is a fact of our being. It is a sign of incompleteness of being and a call for something as yet non existent to come into being. Man as an active creature has powers, as a sensive creature he has feelings of want and satisfaction of want, but want itself is a 'call for the exercise of their powers' to human beings. It is man's general nature as 'wanting' which suggests the ideal of perfect realization and fulfillment of our being, the summum bonum, or the good (1876, 24). The good is simply the telos of all life, as Aristotle described it, and the 'reason for being' as Plato had summized. It has general and not particular application (Sidgwick 1907, 3-4, 105-106, 109-113).

That the 'good' and 'want' are logically and conceptually related has more recently been affirmed by Elizabeth Anscombe, using the analogy of the relationship between truth and judgement with good and want. Her conclusion is that

> 'Goodness is ascribed to wanting in virtue of the goodness (not the actualisation) of what is wanted, whereas truth is ascribed immediately to judgements, and in virtue of what actually *is* the case. But again, the notion of 'good' that has to be introduced into an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but of what the agent conceives to be good; what the agent wants would have to be characterisable as good by him, if we may suppose him not to be impeded inarticulateness' (Anscombe 1963, 76). For elaboration see (Hudson 1970, 317-320).

But little note was taken at the time or since of Grote's suggestive analysis. Both Thomas Hill Green and Bernard Bosanquet use the want and good hypothesis in later works but Grote's own work in this area seem to have had little pronounced influence (Green 1884, 90-119, Bosanquet 1918, 46-63).

Proceeding in Platonic language the ideal of good is the moral equivalent of the intellectual ideal of 'seeing things as they are' or seeing 'reality' or 'real being' (1876, 66). Using Platonic assumptions of there being a reason for everything in the world, Grote concurs that

> 'the good is the *reason* of being, that which, in the contemplation of being, we look for, that to which we look *through* being, that which being suggests to us...' (1876, 66).

The good is the end of reasonable action, and good is the reason for being, good presumes, as it did for the Greeks a reason in the world and a unity (Nettleship 1963, 221-229). As with right there is an analogy of good with truth, or at least that one side of truth which presumes an objective universal standard of reality.

As with right the good is rarely known clearly and absolutely. Certainly it cannot be explained in terms of or reduced to another ideal and as we shall see later, certainly not happiness (1870, 119-122). As good is the Supreme ideal, it is sensible to speak of

pleasure, happiness, honour, generosity, usefulness, justice and even right as good; but not valuable because good, and not good because productive of happiness, justice or honour (1870, 121; Bosanquet 1918, 50-51). Supremacy to Grote does not entail sovereignty, the value of secondary ideals are not derived from the superior ideals. The good is rather the first ideal amongst equals. Experience cannot help us define the good for as Grote summarizes 'experience may tell us what man desires, but no possible experience can tell us what goodness is, or as I have expressed it, what man *should* do' (1870, 84). Nor is good revealed to us by divine revelation or simple a priori intuition, though Grote adheres to the belief that 'God is Good' and considers good like all other moral ideals to have value independent of felicific consequences (1870, 79-81). The Good is known as are all ideals through the ordinary knowing process discussed in chapter five above. Its character, shape and content emerge by a process of distinction as reflective mind distinguishes and clarifies the confused world of immediate sensory and conscious experiences. Climbing the scaled knowledge of the good requires an application of the imagination, the rational scrutiny of a priori assumptions or postulates of existing conclusions and practices, an attempt to make all this coherent in a final stage of judgement and theorising and of checking this knowledge of the ideals and higher facts against the lower facts of our sensations and feelings the realities of the social world and the relational facts of our existence. Knowledge of the good, like all moral knowledge is an intellectual voyage of discovery.

One way to recognize a good action to Grote is that it appears fit, choiceworthy or proper. This may seem to attach goodness to acts and not to actors at the first sight but not on closer examination. The action that is fit or proper for us is one that suits or fits the facts of the situation, our social position, and our intellectual

assessment of what this entails. As we shall see in the next chapter this is built upon a sound relational theory of morality and society derived from Henry Maine and later to gain prominence in the work of F.H. Bradley. Another helpful guide is to look at the issue of whether actions are for the self or others. Grote is clear and largely consistent here arguing against Bentham and Sidgwick that the only actions of moral concern are for others. His moral position is one of unremitting support for moral altruism, self realization and the ethics of self sacrifice.

> 'Broadly, setting aside the very large mass of action in life which must, from the nature of things, be devoted to the care of ourselves, and which I have said, we may call of no moral account, action *beyond* this may be considered good if for the benefit of others; not good if for our own benefit when it might be for theirs; not good if for the injury of others; good or meritorious if for our own loss, rather than theirs' (1876, 242)

It will be seen that action for the self that does not detract from action for others may be moral if it promotes moral self realization or self-perfection, and may be moral where apparently selfish actions, such seeking as self advancement at work, can be shown to have rewards for a wider group of others, as might be the case when self help relieves others of the burden of looking after the actor. In true Victorian fashion he writes

> 'It is better to labour himself, which does them good too, than to cease from labouring. The common life is thus the better for the self-interested industry and talent which makes the fortune of individuals' (1876, 336).

In both cases society at large are moral gainers from the self orientated acts, the acts have other regarding elements that make then moral. Pure self sacrifice or moralistic self denial Grote like Hume sees as amoral (1876, 312-3).

Some arguments, very typical of later English idealist moral and political philosophy, emerge in this context. Firstly, Grote argues that the self of significance in moral life is not an individual or

private self but a social self. As we have seen this results from shared experience, shared activity and a shared identity premised upon participation in a common language. Man we have seen is from the first a social being 'he lives from the first in community, and has in reality no independence in his happiness...'. Even self subsistence requires that we secure 'a place in the general system of mutual help'. Hence

> 'We may say that the good of human life is the purpose or end of human action; but we must not interpret this to mean, that the good of his own life is the purpose or end of the action of the individual. Life is lived by man in conjunction: society is a part of human nature. Rational personality makes each individual independent, so far as self-determination and responisbility go; but want and the power of mutual help bind them together: and answering to this objective fact is the subjective fact of sympathy' (1876, 335).

After noting the debilitatory effect to individuals, and society in promoting the good arising from the fact that,

> 'there is a vast amount of wealth and power, and a vast amount of want and need over against them: and these two sides do not as they should correspond and fit together...'

Grote gets to the central points. The reason or logic of society's organization should be to meet and satisfy all human wants, from the physical to the moral, and to this effect,

> 'The essence of morality consists to a great extent, in our being able, in such of our actions as can be free, to take it from ourselves and to give it to others' (1876,337).

There are then four moral duties that can and do lead to the promotion of the morally good, or common good, firstly, to take care of our selves, secondly, to take care and develop our moral selves, thirdly, to do no wrong and finally 'the indefinite and higher one to do all the good that we can'. All, including the first two, are however duties to others and not the self.

> 'Care for ourselves to a certain extent is necessary for being able to do anything for others. Want of care for ourselves is simply laying upon others the burden for caring for us. Care for ourselves or what is apparently so, is often, as we have seen,

indirectly a care and provision for others. But care for ourselves to the prejudice of care for others is selfishness, one great root, as we have seen, of immorality and evil' (1876, 338).

On the great social issue of the day, the morality or not of laissez faire capitalist development, Grote then seems decided in favour of moral reformism. In so far as the motivations and effects are selfish, capitalism is an evil. In so far as they are altruistic, in so far as the motives and practices really serve to promote the well being and moral development of others, capitalism is a moral good. That the economic system fails to match wealth and power to obvious human want and need is a moral scandal and an economic failure, a theme to which we will return in the next chapter. Grote's reformism however stops, as does Green's, at the point where some believed that man could be made good by public action, such as by law or education. Grote's view is that good is a feature of actions, and the motives or habits that give rise to action are not the sole source of the goodness concerned. A good action may be performed without a moral motive or even with a less than virtuous motive (1876, 456-463). The goodness of motives and habits are questions of virtue and character respectively. But as regards to good,

'The real reason for doing them is first and foremost objective, on their own account, not subjective, on account of any effect they may have on us' (1876, 458).

Compulsion, whether by law or education, fails to be moral however not because the acts may be performed for the wrong motive, a feature of both Kantian and Greenian ethics, but because the choices were not free and gave no scope for the exercise of moral judgement and the development of moral excellence, perfection or self realization (1876, 121-123). This takes us back to Grote's theory of education as facilitating the self development of intellectual potential. He writes

'It is not our nature to be virtuous, it is our nature to learn virtue; and to learn virtue rather than vice, in the same way in which (though in fact sight itself is a matter of learning just as virtue is) it is our nature to learn to see things rightly, rather than wrongly and different from what they are' (1876, 460).

Good, Perfection and Self Realization

At this point we may take up a point raised by Carritt in his famous book *The Theory of Morals* (Carritt 1928, 44-48). Carritt was one of a number of philosophers in the first three decades of the twentieth century whose preference for epistemological realism and intuitionism led then to examine and analyze Grote's *Treatise on the Moral Ideals* and the *Exploratio Philosophica*. The group included apart from Carritt, John Laird, Samuel Alexander, W.G. De Burgh, C.D. Broad, Roy Sellars and George Davies Hicks (Laird 1926,IX-X; 1935, 169, 268, 310; Alexander 1906, 157-168, 218, 244; De Burgh 1938, 44-45, 70, 54 1927, 44, 227; Broad 1930, 12; 1952, 54; Sellers 1920, 257-259; Hicks 1938, 124). The attraction was, apart from Grote's general independence from the schools of philosophy of the day, a general acceptance or belief in an objective external world of things and values, that could be known by some cognitive process. But the group generally ignores Grote's idealist epistemology and ontology in which the objective world is one of objective mind and knowing is a process of human mind meeting the mind embodied in the objective world.

Laird and De Burgh both congratulate Grote for his clear distinctions between the right, the good, the optimific, and the obligatory, and his argument for the independent and objectively moral status of the moral ideals. Carritt argues generally that while in the *Treatise*

'The manner is dry, the analysis of fundamental ideas is admirably searching'.

Carritt objects to two arguments he claims to find in the *Treatise*. Firstly, that Grote advocates as the ultimate good the pursuit of the perfection of self or others, and secondly, that he treats the rightness and goodness of actions as completely independent of consequences good simply for their self sacrifice or for self reduction (Carritt 1928, 44-46; 53-56). The second argument has already been dealt with. Grote does often express the claim that morality is to do with self sacrifice, but he considered self sacrifice to be good only when it promoted and was conducive to the common good (Sidgwick also rejects perfection as the ideal, 1907, 7-11, 492-495).

Consequences as well as motives and obedience to rules have moral value. Next, the passage quoted by Carritt which suggests that an action without useful consequences could still be morally right or good needs to be qualified by the context. Grote is not saying that consequences of acts are morally neutral or irrelevant, and he specifically denies this point on several occasions. His point is that while consequences may on occasions be relevant and actions should in general be useful the goodness that arises from doing ones duty, being just, generous or whatever are always of value. Consequences alone are not the determinants of moral value and they must take their place as a criteria of moral value alongside the rightness, goodness, dutifulness, justness and whatever of actions (1870, 74-76, 121-122 1876, 68-81). In the language of aretaics and eudaemonics he writes that moral action 'should be done' firstly, and secondly be 'useful'. Usefulness covers only a 'portion' of what is morally right or good (1870, 119-125). Grote only speaks of the value of non-felicific activity in purely hypothetical terms and with the admission that his hypothesis is an abstraction (Grote 1870, 110-111).

To the major point the simple reply is that while Grote does treat the pursuit of perfection, self cultivation, or moral excellence, as he calls it, as a worthy moral activity and ideal, this is only a secondary moral ideal derivative from the right (1876 341, 356; 1870, 113). Only in the most general sense as a quality of 'living well' is it part of the ultimate ideal (Grote 1870,109-113). In addition he does not, as we have seen already, condone moral meddling in the lives of others to promote their perfection as suggested by Carritt, and in one place particularly condemns the aims and means of this practice (1876, 426-4). In the same chapter he reiterates the point that while morality involves social self development, that this is only 'exceptionally, the business of life' and certainly not a justification for regular social interference (1876, 428-432).

In addition in the chapter devoted to the intellectual elements of virtue, Grote specifically notes that there are two forms to the moral principle of benevolence, a sense of duty and a love of excellence. The latter is only one part of benevolence, and benevolence only one aspect of moral rightness and goodness, the motivational or subjective element, which takes second place to objective considerations (1876, 71, 139-144, 148-161). Finally Grote could as easily be described as a deontologist as a perfectionist. On numerous occasions Grote considers moral life in terms of obeying the law, love of and doing ones duty (objective) and the love of and striving for excellence or virtue (1876, 105, 340). The latter is only the most abstract of the three moral maxims all of which are related and related to right and good. Grote's answer to Carritt can be found in a lengthy quotations from the *Examination*

> 'A more and exclusive morality of utility may thus, it appears to me, exist with just the same degree of truth and advantages as a

more and exclusive morality of self-command, self-cultivation,and generosity... if either claims to occupy the whole field, and to represent the whole fact as to human morality, it is so far false and wrong' (1870, 122-123).

Grote did however set great store by the notion of social self realization or as he called it self improvement, and to moral excellence and progress, and he devoted chapters to this in both the *Treatise* and the *Examination*. At a general level Grote wished to challenge the positivist and utilitarian theorist's claims to be the 'philosophy of progress', and to explain that the idealist element in all philosophies, and idealism in particular, make the best claim for this title. While his theory of progress can be left for discussion until chapter nine his general idea of moral progress may help here. Two ideas of progress are rejected by Grote. First the idea implicit in evolutionary theory of the 'Zoocosm', the idea of a universal progress of nature, and the simple positivist historical idea of an inevitable progress of civilization accompanying the progress of scientific knowledge (1865, xvii; 1870, 173, 279-316, 359-360; 1901, 231).

In their place Grote provides a moral and historical theory of progress through self improvement. In this, progress is not naturally, divinely or historically determined, neither inevitable nor impossible. Progress, by which he means, the intellectual, moral and economic improvement of man, if it exists at all 'does not come of itself' but 'is the result of human effort'. Man makes efforts after his ideals and to satisfy wants and in so doing may succeed in producing his own improvement and 'will not improve unless he does' (1870, 284). Grote in fact, as we shall see, was not optimistic about the realities or prospects of human progress, prefering to muse over the 'sort of general level to which man in society attains' (1876, 398). Science, and material progress represent no mark nor guarantee

of real progress, and human elevation in some areas has been matched by descent to barbarism in others (1870, 334-335; 1876, 496-499). But still Grote did hold in a typically idealist fashion that the

> 'work and business of the collective human race, it seems to me, is self improvement; for the sake of the glory of God, if we take a religious view, for its own sake, if we do not' (1870, 351)

and this point is echoed in the *Treatise* (1876, 355-357). But is self improvement or perfection an independent ideal? The pursuit of excellence or honour most certainly is, according to Grote, but self improvement or perfection is treated rather as a characteristic feature attaching to the pursuit and achievement of the moral ideals as a whole and not a separate ideal

> 'What then is improvement? The utilitarian answers that it is increase in human happiness, and therefore utilitarianism is the true morality of progress and affords the only real test of progress. But important as it is the utilitarian consideration of conduciveness to happiness, it is not the only one which we must take into account. Man is in a better state (by which I mean a state more ideally to be desired for him), if he is happier, for one thing; but besides this, if he desires worthy objects and more worthily employs his powers, if he is more faithful, more fair, more mindful of services rendered him, more kind and more loving' (1870, 316).

In general then, Carritt's claims about the general character of Grote's philosophy, as one of moral perfectionism, seem misjudged, and if he is, like Green a proponent of social self realization, it is like Green, within the context of the realization of all the ideals of moral life, and especially the right and the good. In addition we may remember that this talk of want and the good, about self development and self realization, want, purposes and flourishing re-emerged several decades later (Hudson 1970, 317-320; Warnock 1967, 52-70).

V

The Sub-Ideals

We may now look at the scheme for the sub-ideals of morality, but saving detailed discussions of both duty, justice and equality for the next chapter on social and political theory.

Very simply each of the primary ideals discussed above have, according to Grote, some related sub-ideals. Each sub-ideal is a concept that is considered by human beings to embrace a crucial aspect of their everyday lives and practices - the lower facts, and which they assume in their actions and practices to have at least some reason, purpose or objective quality - some reference to the higher facts. The sub ideals are elements of the primary ideal characterized by or mixed with some fundamental feeling, fact of life or some practice or institution in society. The number of possible sub-ideals, Grote claims, which people

> 'may form as to the conduct of their life is of course endless' (1876, 37).

But he charts the next tier of major ideals - all of which are nearer to the lower psychological, social and historical facts.

In simple order of appearance above, happiness the third ideal has one major sub ideal, the pleasurable, the ideal of ethical hedonists as against utilitarians. The right or the primary ideal has as its sub-ideals, subjective virtue, objective duty and justice including fairness (1870, 103-106; 1876, 37, 85, 339, 342, 439). Virtue in turn has as sub-ideals, conscientiousness or love of duty, perfection or love of excellence, and others like generosity and benevolence (1870, 110-113; 1876 37-39, 341). Duty in its turn has one even more concrete versions or sub ideal, the natural ideal, the belief that there are some universal actions and feelings appropriate to the nature of all human beings or all natural life (1876, 36).

Finally the second ideal in term of morals, but the first in terms of logic, the good or the summum bonum, has only one major sub-ideal specified, the useful with its sub versions of useful to self and useful to others (1876, 68-69, 103, 106). This can be represented by a diagram.



Fig II: Grote's Scheme of the Moral Ideals

Pleasure as such is a limited ideal that appeals because of our close proximity to the every day sensations of pleasure or pain experienced in life. As an ideal however it is formulated as a maxim that we ought to pursue pleasure and we ought to avoid pain, with the egoistic and altruistic versions. As we shall see Grote considered this primary ideal of hedonism to have few practical or philosophical merits.

Virtue is the subjective ideal of the right and is given massive coverage in both the *Treatise* and the *Examination*, being analyzed with a skill and dexterity lost to modern participants in the conversation of moral philosophy (1876, 20). Virtue differs from duty in terms of subjectivity, its having more freedom and its being higher in terms of worthiness because there is an

> 'outgoing of it beyond what moral necessity, ... prompts; a free moral resolution to apply the extended reason and view,... to the benefits of others' (Grote 1870, 99: see also 1876, 339).

Indeed in the *Examination* Grote treats this mixture of freedom and the intention of acting for the happiness of others as the essential

features explaining the moral value of virtue. 'The very idea of virtue, (or say philanthropy) the very mention of the word, implies a supposition of acting for the happiness of others.... It is a freely chosen 'moral overflow of our nature' and 'It is just because, as many would tell us, no man can be *required* to act otherwise than for his own happiness, that it is virtue to do so' (Grote 1870, 99).

As a result of this freedom of choice on virtue, there is a prerequisite for rational decision making, for rational self-government in the moral actor, and for a capacity to exercise the will (1870, 111). Alongside freedom the other key characteristic of virtue is its upward tendency or 'aspiringness', and hence the usual metaphor that is applied to virtue is high or low (1870, 111-114; 1876, 343-345, 358-359). But this is only a vague notion and generally whereas the performance of duty may be more or less measured by the gap between a valid claim and an action, virtue is to be judged above by 'purpose, the principle and the motive' (1870, 99-100). No real measure is possible, for if with virtue there are no absolute requirements, no particular imperatives or rules of conduct demanded, as there is with duty, there can be no calculation of the level of virtue reached. As Grote so eloquently puts it, after speaking of the freedom and self sacrifice marked by virtue,

> 'And to speak of rules and measures of anything which has this origin seems absurd. The frame of mind which would lead to the consideration how has it ought to go, would, one would think, have precluded the existence of it at all' (Grote 1870, 99)

So while right and duty are specific, particular, imperative and hence measurable in terms of performance and achievement, virtue is non specific, general, superogatory and not measurable either by fixed standards or ideas of performance.

But in the *Treatise* Grote asks us to accept that virtue has an 'understood meaning, that virtue is a fact in the world, that

> some men practise it, and others understand the practice: I shall consider what, as a matter of fact, men do think or feel about this other fact, virtue' (1976 104-105)

Then, as with duty, justice and other ideals he starts with the experiental facts, works upwards through feelings, dispositions, thoughts and public practices towards the ideal and then onwards to the ontological reality. The study here he calls 'experimental or observational aretaics. The three experiences , senses or feelings that first acquaint us with virtue are, a feeling of benevolence, a sense of duty and a love of excellence. Indeed he writes

> 'Virtue is benevolence more or less stimulated by and regulated by the accompanying senses of duty and love of excellence'.

These three senses however are active, they indicate purpose or ideals and higher facts. In addition they involve a Kantian type concern to put oneself in the position of others and vice versa. The purpose is the good of others, the only true moral purpose. The key consideration is to put oneself in the position of others (1876, 105). Any consideration other than the good of others is amoral (1870, 100-101; 1876, 105, 116, 135, 204-206). Self-regarding action to Grote is morally neutral, unless it has the effect of relieving others of pain or promoting their well being. Incidentally at this point Grote introduces an old Socratic argument that troubled Leslie Stephen, F.H. Bradley and A. Bain later, that man by nature has no ill will, he can never knowingly do wrong. This is the reverse side of the claim to a universal attribution of good-will or benevolence to all human beings (1876, 106-107, 187, 240-257, 261, 314, 459-461; Bradley 1883, 415, Bain 1883, 60-65, 562). The claim amounts to the rather tautological logical argument that apparent ill-will is a mistaken good-will, so envy is mistaken admiration for another mixed with a personal feeling of personal abhorrence or failure. Misabsorbed or mishandled want may lead to envy and jealousy and so on

(112-113). The argument applied to history had been rejected by Grote's friend Fenton Hort in 1856.

> 'While the aweful fact of sin is staring you in the face you cannot weave theorise for the future that will hold water, except by the German dodge of reforming sin into a less kind of necessary good, which is the devil' (Hort, 1896, 326).

Grote was later to get support from Bradley and Bosanquet on the case for the absence of pure malevolence in human nature, they defended him from Bain's evidence for pure ill will concerning satire, teasing and voyeurism surrounding punishment. Individuals he argues, may suffer pleasure or pain from doing or watching malevolent actions, and hence malevolence is as natural as benevolence to mankind (Bosanquet 1918, 88-125). Bradley expresses his support for the 'excellent remarks made by Mr Stephen and Professor Grote,...' and argues in their support that humans have natural empathy with the pain of others and a similar 'feeling of wrong'. Wrong doing arises, Bradley conceives, either from misidentification of what is right, or from a desire to promote justice following reforms to the logic of comedy and voyeurism. Bradley, the famed cat hunter of Oxford, goes so far as to concede that even a cat cannot be credited with

> 'a knowledge of the pain it inflicts, or with the idea of prolonging life to lengthen torture. Add the desire for play to the appetite for slaughter, and all is explained' (Bradley 1883, 415-416).

This capacity for virtuous action, and incapacity for malevolence reflects both Grote's Christian belief in the rightness and innate moral order of the universe and his basic theory of human nature and ontology that considers mans want to indicate and to be satisfied only in the morally good or right. In fact all virtuous feeling though indicating right, are only subjective 'signs' of what is objectively right independent of these suggestions (Grote 1876, 241, 458). Subjective virtuous feelings are not by themselves the central concern of ethics

> 'Virtues, vices, feelings, dispositions, habits, all these are abstractions; men or character, ie men as concerns their moral beings, are the realities which in ethics we have to do with' (Grote 1876, 474).

Similarly Grote objects to the idea that virtue is merely a product of education and gets its value from its wide public acceptance and functional attributes. To argue the former is equivalent to considering knowledge to be a chance accident of sense data experience, and truth to be a product of relative experience (Grote 1870, 208-209, 1876). Virtue is learnt but it is not this which gives it its meaning and value (1876, 459-463, 471). To argue the latter is to mistake a valuable by product of moral activity for its real purpose. Still at the level of sentiments or feelings Grote goes further and warns us elsewhere about the mistake of misassociating moral dispositions with moral truths. This error, that led to the school of 'Moral Sense, and Moral Sentiments' philosophy associated with Butler, distracted moral philosophy from the explanation of moral reality and moral knowledge proper (1870, 195, 199-206, 261-264; 1876, 118-120, 140-142, 163-164, 343-345).

Virtuous moral feeling, Grote argues, can be divided into two sorts, those that are natural or permanent, and those that are occasional (1876, 110-114). The latter depend on the relationship we have with others, either by circumstance or position.

> 'All human kindly affection is discriminative, that is it attaches itself to some individuals in distinction from others' (1876,131).

There may be general natural feelings but virtues are always particular to a practice (1876, 131-134). Social relational facts we see here affect our subjective moral dispositions, later we shall see how crucial they are in indicating and determining the moral ideals and facts of life. But now we can see that the moral feelings and sentiments imply higher social facts, those of relationship which in

turn indicate to us the nature and content of our duties (Grote 1870, 145; 1876, 110, 114). A contemporary defence of this identification of virtue with a social practice see (MacIntyre 1981, 174-181; Bernstein 1986, 121-127).

The moral value of virtuous activity is judged, as I've said, by several criteria according to Grote, by

'purposes, the principle, and the motive' (Grote 1870, 99).

The same point that there is a plurality of sources of moral value appears later in the same book (1870,119-122). As we shall see later he was utterly opposed to the reduction of virtue to happiness and considered Mill to be in a state of considerable confusion when he tried to argue that the value of virtue lay in its being both a 'means' to happiness and as an end in itself (Mill 1910, 33-35, Grote 1870, 125-128). Mill fares no better with duty, justice or any other moral ideals (Grote 1870, 105-108). As the effect or outcome is of secondary importance to Grote then measurement of virtue is technically impossible. Again where purpose is of moral consideration it must cover the well being of others, either in the form of usefulness or generosity (1876, 116). The principles of virtue are again numerous, and Grote deals with several, concentrating or those of freedom, self control, aspiringness and transcendence of happines (1876 135-165, 340, 342-345, 358-359). But three dominate and infact become almost sub-ideals of virtue, conscientiousness, indicated by conscience; perfectionism or love of excellence; and dutifulness or love of duty (1876, 37-39, 103, 139-165; 1870 113). These ideals we shall look at shortly, only noting here that they are not good in themselves but only in relation to purposes and the realization of what is entailed in moral relationships and what is objectively right.

Finally on virtue Grote compares his position to that of Aristotle (1876, 448-449, 459); Plato, the Stoics and the Medieval

Church (123-125), Hobbes (459), and Butler (140, 163). In practice he decries tables of virtues in favour of a hoped for reconciliation of the dictates of reason, feeling and objective right, in the form of the general 'standard of our country and age' (Grote 1876, 395). (Though a table can be found of vices (1876, 244-257)). History to Grote is a great distiller of right and virtue. Like Burke, for Grote time is a test, the base level of customary sediment contains great wisdom and virtue, which after generations becomes the sea-level, the high plateau and even the mountainous goals of virtue and right. Hence one metaphor used is that virtue is a high plateau of achievement rather than the seashore of life (1876, 400), but in another he considers it to be a 'mean level' (1876, 396). Another scale is introduced which recommends as a base level of virtue, 'doing one's duty'; as a mean, 'conforming to the social standard of our country and age'; and a higher level of exemplary and superogatory action. But he concludes that

> 'with almost all, respect for the ordinary level of virtue is the precondition of higher virtue: our highest mountains will rise from a high table-land, not from a low sea-shore' (1876, 400).

We must return to this idea of everyday customary standards and practices as a guide to right in the next chapter.

The sub ideals of virtue, conscientiousness, or love of duty and love of excellence need not be given an extended examination. But on the first it should be noted that Grote held conscience to be the general name given to the capacity for being conscientious. Conscience is the idea of right, as embodied in law and duty, within us (1876, 193, 338). Conscience is not a unique God-given faculty nor simply a product of education and socialization, but is a feeling in which the social moral self reminds itself of its duty or what is worthy or expected. Conscience is a kind of 'moral memory' but the content is a reflection again of our society, its practices and

ideals, especially its legal and moral laws (1876, 140, 164, 188-193; 1870, 170). Conscience is only an indicator of right and should not be followed slavishly. It is part of our moral imagination in which we try in a quasi legal sense, alternative dispositions and potential actions.

Love of excellence is again valuable as a disposition but is not a good in itself, and for this reason Carritt's suggestion that Grote, advocates moral perfectionism is mistaken (Carritt, 1928 vii, 46,). Excellence has little value if not attributed to performance of a service to others and for the purpose of realizing right. Like Hume, Grote had no time for the monkish, the priggish, or the purely aesthetic life, out of step with the social context. Grote's chapter on the 'Genesis of Virtue: Its Intellectual Elements, Principle' links conscientiousness and excellence together with a discussion of man's 'sociality', the reality of his 'co-sentience', his 'co-activity', and above all his 'co-intelligence' (Grote 1876, 148-150). Co-agreement in moral judgements he likens to that in purely cognitive judgements between observers that, for instance, a tree is green. Through joining subjects' judgements or thinking rightly, we try to ascertain what is right or is there, right thinking. The active equivalent is acting rightly in an attempt to realize the ideal of right activity in a social context. This is perfectionism (1876, 148). Courage and honour are two examples of this love of excellence and desire for perfection. Grote is anxious to look both ways, firstly, to uphold their value and novelty, and secondly, to warn of their dangers and possible corruptions arising from the rivalry they engender. In the end love of excellence demands a socially informed self respect, which turns into rules of conduct we freely impose upon ourselves (1876, 158-162).

The other sub-ideals of right, justice and duty I shall leave for

chapter nine on social and political theory. Both however lie between the lower facts, the feeling and dispositions of fairness and obligation, the embodied social facts of our relationships and legal positions, and the higher facts they all signify and indicate - absolute right. As with the other ideals we must examine all levels but as absolute right is so hard to grasp except by imagery and in the imagination, our best guide we shall see will be the embodiment of absolute right in the objective standards of the age, in customs, roles, offices and above all laws. Grote produces in 1864 the sort of theory of duty that is to surface with such power in 1872 is the chapter 'My Station and its Duties' in *Ethical Studies* written by F.H.Bradley. But with him the inspiration was the relational social theory and the historical theory of the Liberal Anglican historians.

The one sub-ideal of duty, the natural, can however detain us. The word natural as used in both everyday and specific philosophical contexts is a persuader word, it serves to legitimate that to which it is a predicate. The word has numerous meanings, as an opposite to the divine, to the conventional, to the artificial as well as to the generally undesirable. But in the nineteenth century, claims to natural dispositions, feelings and actions were legion especially amongst romantic writers such as Bronte, Carlyle, Wordsworth and Coleridge. Grote cuts through the confusions to harness the natural for a singular purpose - to refer to a universal ideal as against the normally specific and relational ideals that we encounter in life. If the norm is that 'that which is virtuousfor us, our duty, right and good is defined by our position or place in the relational social order', there is little place left for the universal or for the human motive in general. The ideal of the natural is simply what we all as human beings owe to each other, not as citizens, relatives, employees or friends, but as human beings relating to other human beings (1876,

36). Natural law and natural right, to Grote, are generally abstractions which arise from the attempt to transcend our social nature and to define this general human state of being with others (1876 221, 237-238). Grote is generally silent on this ideal, a reflection of his low estimation of its importance.

Finally, we come to the ideal of the good and its sub-ideal, the useful. It is tempting to see this derivation as a mischievous and calculated philosophical insult and challenge to the utilitarians for whom utility, in the form of happiness, is the ultimate ideal, and a moral equivalent or synonym for the right and the good. Now utility is not only a sub-ideal, but a sub-ideal of the good and not even happiness. Grote's argument for this classification and derivation is linked to the whole moral system and is indeed a fundamental part of it (Grote 1876, 34,51, 68-81, 103, 116). His argument is that a morally good act is one that is useful in the most general sense, (and in more specific senses productive of happiness and even pleasure). Usefulness, happiness and pleasure also usually indicate or signify the morally valuable, and in fact actually do so in practice. Yet it is not because moral acts are useful, or productive of happiness or pleasure alone, that they are right or good. Grote is here taking the first but not the second step in the defence of utilitarianism later found in G.E. Moore's, *Ethics* (Moore 1966, 44-45). Rather it is because the useful is productive of good (or perhaps even happiness and right) that it is morally valuable (Grote 1870, 79-84, 119-133; 1876, 68-81). The laissez faire capitalist system is efficient at producing satisfactions for felt wants and is useful. But the virtue of its usefulness lies in its production of good, or what is the same thing, the satisfaction of real want. This reverses the utilitarian moralists order of priority and their moral logic, it is one basis for the challenge to utilitarianism and capitalism.

VI

The Origins of Moral Value

Grote raises the whole issue of the origin of all moral value in Chapter VI of the *Treatise*. His argument is that moral value arises in part from the purposes indicated and served by moral actions and in part by considerations more intrinsic to the actor and the motives and feelings from which he or she acts. With the former the ultimate purpose is not utility or even happiness in a narrow sense but includes to Grote realization of moral purpose as a whole, including the good and the right. That independently valued moral qualities are also useful or productive of happiness is to Grote nothing unexpected or exceptional and he argues that it is not this production that alone gives them value. With the latter, we encounter a difficult, and highly contentious argument which takes us close to the intuitionist arguments that Grote had encountered at Cambridge. However I hope to show that Grote's final position on moral value falls short of a commitment to intuitionism and is comparable with an idealist ethical theory. For Grote moral value lies not only in the consequences served but in obedience to rules and principles (objective right) and purity of motive and intention (subjective right). His ethical theory is thus an eclectic mixing of Millian utilitarianism, Kantian and Hegelian idealism, of considerations of consequences, duty and motive.

Two important points then need to be understood before we proceed. Firstly, as suggested above, moral value derives from both consequences and non consequential sources, and secondly, Grote's system of the moral ideals is largely a descriptive scheme and not a deductive moral system as is the case with utilitarianism. The argument that consequences, and in particular both the usefulness and felicific consequences of actions, account for only part of the moral

value of actions appeared in an unsystematic form in the *Examination* of 1862 (Grote 1870, 121-126). While the argument was meant to reconcile intuitionist and utilitarian claims for the origin of moral values, in practice Grote recognised that his claims would be seen as a direct challenge to the dominant utilitarian creed and hence wisely resisted the temptation to publish until a clearer case could be made for his own position.

> Among the different characters which an action may have, it seems clear that its being good as *honourable* or *generous*, good as *right* (the nature of which goodness I shall speak of in a moment in treating of duty), good as *useful*, are different ideas:....(Grote 1870, 121-122).

In Chapter Six of the *Treatise* Grote writes

> 'the utilitarian view of morals may be said to be that which considers actions to be of value in the universe, in the last resort, solely in respect of their usefulness i.e. productiveness of good, however the meaning of the word 'good' maybe afterwards determined' (Grote 1876, 69-70).

Grote notes that usefulness is one genuine source of moral value, but adds at this stage only the value that attaches to worthiness of motive,

> 'there are two kinds of moral value, one corresponding to each of those ideals; the value of usefulness or result, and the value of worthiness of feeling (so we will at present call it) which has gone towards the result or been expended for it'...(Grote 1876, 72).

Motives are of two sorts virtuous or deontic, superogatory or imperative, optional or bound, and hence aretaic value divides into that which follows from benevolent motive (virtue) and that from obedience to moral commands (duty) (ibid, 76-78).

These latter he calls aretaic worth or merit.. Now concentration by intuitionists and Kantians on the aretaic argument has according to Grote sometimes distracted further attention from the consequential. Adherence to usefulness as a major source of moral value is legitimate but does not and need not imply a submission to utilitarian accounts of useful. For a start as we have seen the useful implies the good,

not happiness. Secondly, moral use or purpose refers to the variety of ideals realized, not the purely prudential results of an action which Grote considered to be of not only little, but to be of no moral consequence (Grote 1870, 121-124 1876, 70-21). Thirdly, as we shall see, any attempt to measure happiness, usefulness or pleasurable outcomes of actions is doomed to failure, for both logical and practical reasons.

But what about the argument for some non consequential value to moral acts, what is the aretaic merit or worth of an action? The argument as it appears in the quotation above looks as if it is to be a species of the action theory viz that actions are to be judged by a) reasons given for them, the motives of the actor his purposes, and b) the principle or rules upon which he or she operates. Indeed elsewhere this argument is stated though not widely elaborated (Grote 1870, 100). Desirableness of the end and worthiness of motive intention and principle upon which one acts, together account for moral goodness (1870, 131-133). If this was Grote's only alternative argument for source of value to consequences his position would be little different to that of Green later (Thompson 1887, xi). But Grote has some major supportive arguments. Moral value he argues is to be judged in regard to four circumstances or issues

> 'it is in the mutual play of these four considerations, viz, the promotion of happiness, the foregoing of happiness, thought of ourselves, thought of others, that the circumstances of moral action lie' (Grote 1876, 71).

As we have seen the first and third are only of moral consideration, that is of moral value if the happiness is for others and not merely ourselves. Actions that merely promote happiness, or worse still, happiness for ourselves are of 'imperfect moral value'. Independent moral value is something to do with the other two elements, the foregoing of happiness for the good of others. The argument that not

causing pain to others was a premiss of aretaic value was encountered earlier and this new formulation can be seen as the reverse side of the coin. In both versions what we are directed to in moral acts is not only the consequences but the dual considertion that one could and should (1) sacrifice oneself (2) for the good of others (not just their happiness). The point being made is that moral value lies in being virtuous, doing ones duty or doing what is right or demanded of us by law, (even when this fails to produce happiness for others or oneself) because of the element of self sacrifice and the benevolent motive behind the act. In both cases the choices are moral not prudential. In addition in both cases we act or desist from acting in consideration of other ideals than happiness, usefulness or pleasure. In both cases we do what it is fit or proper we do, what is right rather than what is merely useful or practical.

The moral value of this self sacrifice or doing of what is fit or proper arises from the relationship it has to the active side of our nature. Life, is as much about doing as it is about feeling, it is about using our unique powers to realise our unique wants as creatures,

> 'but the action, ie the employment of the power, is good in itself, as well as in its result for the supply of the want which makes its usefulness' (1876, 72).

Doing, or trying to do, that which helps others or is simply our duty is valuable independently of the actual consequences. Put bluntly Grote seems to be saying that the exertion of effort after moral goals or in conformity to rules, like doing our duty is valuable in itself. In the *Examination* he puts it as follows

> 'We may express this if we like it by saying that there is enjoyment in the action itself: but if we do, we must give up the idea of the character or value of actions being measured only by the end' (Grote 1870, 108).

Moral value lies in struggling to find out what we should do and

doing it irrespective of considerations of personal happiness, (Thompson 1884, xxxix; Grote 1870, 110- 112). This is the true aretaic worth of the action and

> 'there is no free action, I shall call it, or real action, without the readiness to forego happiness and the disposition to transcend self' (1876, 73).

He adds

> 'if it is useful, it has the double value: if its fails of being useful, or, through error of view, goes wrong in this particular, it may have its own value, and the question whether it has depends on other considerations than those of usefulness' (1876, 73-74).

In an interesting metaphor Grote describes moral life as 'a mutual action of moral beings for each other's happiness' but 'only an interchange not, like commercial interchanges, with a desire of getting as much as possible for oneself' (1876, 75). One must prize happiness and place 'a very high estimation of the value of life so far as the other is concerned'. But so far Grote's argument looks lame and could be largely accommodated by an altruistic utilitarian like Mill who considered the happiness of others rather than the self to be of ultimate moral significance. Similarly after reading Grote's critique of the monkish virtues of self abnegation for no ultimate purpose we might find it odd to find him here placing great stress on self sacrifice. Only in the idea that moral value may lie in conformity to rules and principles and in realizing moral purposes other than happiness and utility, namely the right, the good, the obligatory, just and the virtuous, do we have a major contrast to the altruistic utilitarian.

But Grote goes beyond this in another attempt to explain aretaic value. Human motive is above all free and aspiring, human beings freely seek to improve themselves. In the *Examination* he had stated the point clearly.

> 'Upon the whole, it may perhaps be considered that there are two chief sources from which virtuous action derives its moral value independently of its consequences: one of these is connected with the free will of man, the other with his aspiringness or upward moral tendency' (Grote 1870, 111).

Three terms are used to describe this. The desire for the 'high', lofty or meritorious; 'effort' to rise up to this aspiration, and the desire for the 'elevation of character' (See also Grote 1870, 112-115). While recognizing 'love of excellence' or 'perfectionism' to be a sub-ideal of the right, Grote here elevates it into the ideal that best explains the aretaic value of acts. Moral value we have seen lies in the usefulness of outcomes, but independently it lies in doing an act; doing it for a moral purpose (a) for others not self, (b) to realize good and right as well as happiness; being prepared to make self sacrifices and to be generous to others; and in trying to excel, to aspire to realize oneself as a moral being. But in this last point Grote is close to Green and Bradley, for self sacrifice and self realization are being considered as both a universal part and vital element in all of our moral lives (Grote 1876, 76-78).

We should remember here what was argued about human nature in Chapter Six. One side is dominated by feelings, another side by impulse to action. One side is individual another social. One side is emotional, the other rational. One side is fixed in nature or habit, another is open to improvement by education or self direction or elevation. Grote's point seems to be that actions gain moral value as they pass from being impulsive or reflexive to being reflective and freely chosen, as they pass from being individual to being social, from being emotional to being rational, from being natural and habitual to being socialized and rationally chosen. Moral value lies in part in rising above what we are, just as intellectual value lies in progressing beyond what is unknown, believed or partially known to what is known, known for certain, or known to be true. In this widest

sense social self realization or improvement is the one universal feature of all our moral ideals (Grote 1870, 308-308). It has the status to Grote of being the secular equivalent of setting before us 'the glory of God' as the object of all human action , 'the work and business of the collective human race' (Grote, 1870, 333-334, 351). But this presentation is unsatisfactory if we mean by self realization perfection for now a sub ideal, already highly qualified in terms of moral value, seems to be confused with that most general of element which bestows moral value on all acts and to all the other moral ideals. Grote seems on occasions near to conflating perfection, excellence, progress, self improvement and self realization.

In the end Grote's central chapter on moral value is inconclusive and unclear. The unfinished nature of the manuscript may account for this but I think not. Grote needed to engage the proponents of ethical intuitionism and idealism in critical debate but he has only given us an eclectic rehash. We are left wondering why a pure motive or conformity to a rule or principle gives moral value to an act. The argument that 'sacrifice has been made', 'the good of others promoted' and 'moral improvement achieved' seems somewhat circular. But Grote was working on the problem at the time of his death. Mayor records a 217 page manuscript entitled 'Honestarianism and Utilitarianism' finished on June 5, 1866 (Grote 1900,xi). 'Honestarianism' chosen in preference to 'dulcedinarianism', was to be a science of 'the worthy or honourable' and was to be the 'antithesis' of utilitarianism, a landmark in the production of a coherent synthesis (Grote 1870, 222-223; 1876, 21-22, 58). With this manuscript we may be in a better position to judge the coherence of Grote's own theory of moral values.

What is left of interest in this chapter are some suggestions from his own ethical theory that account for moral value. Firstly,

the re-affirmation of ideals and purposes of moral value other than pleasure, happiness and usefulness (1870 258-259). Secondly, the reassertion that man's nature is as much fulfilled in acting and doing as in sensing and feeling. Thirdly, the claim that the effort to do or act is of value even when the results are not. Fourthly, the assertion, which is compatible with Mill's version of utilitarianism, that happiness in general (or the good for others not the self) is the only happiness of moral value. Fifthly, the argument that the other side of moral value to usefulness, is being worthy, that is being done from a worthy feeling or motive. Sixthly, Grote argues that some moral value arises from an act being freely chosen by an actor, that it is his or her act, an act of moral self disclosure. Seventhly, the argument that the ultimate and universal mark of moral value is social self realization, self development, improvement or progress as he variously described the point has some value. Finally, but of ultimate importance, Grote returns to the idea of some actions being fit or proper for us to do. Moral value lies in doing what we ought to do, what it is right

> 'we should do, not because we conceive it to be the action which will be most for our own happiness, though constantly with the concomitant feeling (or as I have expressed it, faith and trust) that it will be so'. (Grote 1876, 78-79).

A quotation from the *Examination* may reinforce these later points. After denying that a selfish act is wrong because it fails to promote happiness, he gives the right answer,

> 'But the reason why it is wrong is because action natural *in this manner* is not the action proper for you, and so far as you fail to feel that it is not, you feel on the other hand that you are not what you should be. You are conscious: you are free: you see what wants doing, and you feel yourself more or less able to do it: you are not bound like animals to the care of *your own* existence, by restriction of consciousness and consequent want of freedom: you can enter into the worth of others and their capacity for enjoyment as well as your own: you have impulse to action and power for it: and you *must* surely feel yourself more a man, feel that you *live* more, in proportion as you can spread

your action beyond your own benefit to embrace theirs' (1870, 101).

In brief, Grote is asserting that when describing moral actions

'in calling it right and proper we add, something to the notion of it being useful...' (1876, 80)

This extra something is pluralistic but it means that actions themselves have value independent of consequences. This extra something we can glean from the rest of Grote's system but ultimately it refers also to the higher facts presumed or postulated every time we use moral language. When we call an act right or wrong what is postulated or assumed is that there is a standard available, even if not yet known clearly or agreed upon. Moral discourse presumes not just rules but ultimate standards. Moral value lies as much in doing our best to conform to these imaginary standards as in promoting useful consequences, and the imagined standards or moral laws are more knowable than the useful consequences of actions.

We can now elaborate the second argument, that Grote's systems of the moral ideals is descriptive and classifactory not prescriptive and deductive. There are, according to John Grote, three primary ideals and a host of secondary ideals. All the primary ideals have a distinctive origin, a distinctive character and level of imperativeness. The primary ideals and secondary ideals do not get their character or imperativeness from any one primary ideal under which they are classified. To think so would be to mistake Grote's intentions in classsifying the ideals. His system is merely a typology, a classificatory system, not a derivatory system and certainly not a deductive system from one single primary ideal or value. Hence pleasure does not get its value as an ideal because if realised it promotes happiness, and duty, virtue and justice do not get their value because they promote right. Rather pleasure is related to happiness because both reflect our sentient nature.

Virtue, justice and duty are classified under right, because they are each, like right, immediate, practical and imperative and because they are all generated from the active side of our nature, from our desire 'to do' rather than to 'feel'.

Grote's classificatory system then is fundamentally different from that of the utilitarians for whom there is only one primary ideal of ultimate value and all the secondary ideals deriving their value because they promote or lead to the primary ideal. Justice, virtue and duty are good because they are part of, or are, a means to happiness and for no independent reason. Their value is dependent upon consequences, as Whewell put it, wheras the values of the various ideals in Whewell's and Grote's own scheme are independent of consequences or any other primary ideal.

We can now summarise the argument produced so far, before turning to Grote's critique of utilitarianism and a conclusion on the nature of his own position or ethical issues in philosophy. We should briefly note Grote's conclusion on the value of the moral ideals. This formally appears in Chapter Six of the *Treatise* but evidence of its assumption lies throughout his moral writings. Moral activity we have seen is occasioned not only by the presence of sentient or felt want, but by want as a fact of our being, and the human experience of restlessness and the urge to do and achieve things. Moral realization can therefore only partly be found in happiness and its sub ideals, it desires, and achieves realization also in doing what is right and ultimately in achieving what is good. In the end the summum bonum, the ultimate end is the good, but the primary and practical end or goal and arena for self realization is in doing the right, in virtuous, just and obligatory activity. Some areas of our moral life may be concerned with the pursuit and production of happiness, but others, often the most immediate and significant, are concerned with

the right and the good. Like Laird, Carritt, Ross and others of the later intuitionists, Grote considered these primary ideals to be each of independent value. Like Hegel before him Right was the primary ideal, the good something more abstract and general, and happiness of much less significance.

The moral value of the ideals cannot be determined by either observation and induction or by intuition and deduction. The ideals lie between a realm known by observations of experience and a higher realm only indicated by our reason and imagination. Identification of the content of our ideals and the comparative value we attach to them is in a large part a product of experience, education and social practice. But the whole of our moral life, like the whole of our intellectual life is premised upon, presumes and postulates beliefs. But what is crucial here is that these beliefs are not intuitions, in the sense indicated by Schneewind, that is a religious belief we just have to accept or reject. Nor is it an intuition in the alternative sense of an a priori insight.

The belief is only an intuition if we give it the very different sense implied H.L.A.Hart, Phillipa Foot, Peter Winch and Michael Oakeshott later, that is a presupposition, presumption or postulate of everyday thought, language and practice (Hart 1970; Foot 1967, Winch 1970, Oakeshott 1980). Intellectual life to Grote presumes that there is a truth to be known, which even if not yet known is actually used as a criteria for the making of judgements. Moral and practical life for its part presupposes that there is something that is right to be done independently of what is actually done or even actually wanted, and this, even when not clearly known or agreed upon, acts as a rule or standard for actual life. The higher beliefs are practical postulates, and may also be seen as religious beliefs and ontological realities indicated by our experience, our objective rights and

duties, and signified by the content of the ideals our imaginations have fixed, altered and re-fixed over the ages and through our lives. Grote did not want his readers to rely on religious belief alone as the foundation of knowledge (Grote 1870, 102, 115, 201, 214-220, 308, 333, 349, 356; 1876, 65, 111, 342, 356-7, 374-5, 377, 393, 462, 469-70, 484; 1901, 38-40, 58, 72). Nor did he ask for submission to a priori axioms or principles, known by intuition. Moral ideals, like intellectual truths, are created in the process of thinking and acting. They are struggled towards, groped after, constantly being refined in the imagination.

This intellectual process is primordially social, our thinking is social thinking our intelligence is a co-intelligence, our ideals are social ideals, our duties, rights and virtues are fundamentally social. Intellectual truth we saw is a social agreement, and so is the morally right and good. The historical and practical discoveries of man have been distilled into customs, traditions and habits of opinion and practice, and codified, as we shall see into laws, duties and rights. What is real in moral life is a rough indicator therefore of what is rational and what is for that time an agreement on what is right.

That we are free is another postulate of moral and practical life and the characteristic of moral, as distinct from legal activity is that individuals decide for themselves within the confines of the social discourse and practice. Grote's patient attention to the perplexities of moral decision making is explained not by subjectivist and individualist assumptions, but by the existential realization that moral life presupposes active, choosing individuals, working with other similar beings and within a society at any time exhibiting a moral vocabulary and a moral practice. Moral thought and activity to Grote is participation in a pre-existing practice, its maintenance

reproduction and its modification. Each effort of the moral imagination he considers to be an effort to contribute to moral discourse and knowledge. Each individual decision, like each society's ethical system, is a contribution to the human endeavour to fix, and at the same time to grope for, the right.

Moral value for each ideal depends upon several considerations not one. Yet alternatively there is no system of morality, of the sort posited by Whewell, that nicely locates each ideal in a settled order (Grote 1876, 238-239, 394; Sidgwick 1963,99). As with all knowledge, growth is a faltering process or gradual clarification via distinction and judgement. That our creative knowledge will recognize and realize a picture or puzzle coming out, or a mind meeting our mind is a conclusion Grote comes to, but he refuses to clarify, delineate or settle this order. Moral knowledge is for humans to create, but moral reality is posited as what we may also discover. What we can say for certain is that there is a world of unique and unconditional moral statements about what ought to be, as distinct from what is, and that these can be understood and known as well as challenged, argued about and refined. Each ideal captures some aspect of our moral nature, our moral existence and our moral experience.

In his generally unappreciative review of the *Treatise*, Henry Sidgwick discusses in detail only two points, the first Grote's distinction between pleasures of 'disturbance' and 'undisturbance', and Grote's refusal to answer the key questions concerning the nature, of the desirable, the unconditional ought (Sidgwick 1877,242-243). He quotes Grote as positing the right questions about relationship between the ideals but concludes that he fails to give them a proper answer. He quote Grote as follows,

> 'The desirable, or the 'to be desired', is a much more complicated notion. Has it, or has it not, the former ideal

> mixed with it? Is the 'to be desired; in any way that which 'ought' to be desired? or is it 'the desired' with appeal to human feeling and human history? or is it 'the reasonably desired' pointing to some other ideal still for its interpretation' (Grote 1876, 35).

But Grote did indeed answer these questions. The good or the desirable is too general for practical moral life and needs the right or 'should do' to activate and direct it. The 'good' implies 'ought' but the choice is free while that of right is categorical. The desirable cannot be reduced to either what is actually or, psychologically desired or what we are taught to desire. Finally, the desirable does point to the ought to be desired, the right as the primary, ultimate or absolute ideal, and our moral knowledge indicates this. Grote did relate the ideals, he did set them in order and priority and carefully explains their similarities and differences.

But Grote's system is only a schema and not a deductive system in which all the ideals are derived from one sovereign end or ideal in a fashion required by Mill and Sidgwick. This was intentional and not an oversight on Grote's part, he differed on this substantive philosophical point not only with Mill and Sidgwick but with Whewell as well. The ideals, both primary and secondary do not get their value and meaning from one superior ideal, certainly not happiness. Rather each has a unique value and place in a complex scheme. Each of the three primary moral ideals has a distinctive character according to Grote. Firstly they differ as to their bases, between, sentience, want and activity, secondly they differ in degree of abstraction, lessening in abstraction as we move from the good, to happiness and to right, and finally they differ in degree of imperativeness. Happiness we saw is merely 'what we desire', the good is what is the 'desirable' or 'what we should desire', while the right is 'what I should do', what 'should be done', carrying practical prescriptive connotations, being unconditioned and imperative. The secondary ideals like

justice, virtue and duty are derivative from the primary ideals but even then not in the sense in which justice and virtue are derivative from happiness in utilitarian ethics. Justice and virtue are good to utilitarians only as part or a means to happiness. To Grote they are unique ideals, with their own meaning, principles and carrying their own entailments. They are classified under right only because they fit under the catagories of being active ideals, being concrete and practical and being highly imperative.

VII

Grote and Intuitionism

The above painstaking elaboration of Grote's theory of the moral ideals serves three specific purposes, one to show how unique are his insights, two to reveal the base from which he attacks utilitarianism, and three, to show how different are his ideals to those of the intuitionists. We might elaborate this last point before looking at the critique of utilitarianism ,leaving the case for Grote's originality until the conclusions to this thesis. Intuitionism was not one doctrine but a name given to a collection of ethical and epistemological doctrines that became popular in European thought from the seventeenth century. Epistemological intuitionsts in Britain tended to adopt either of two positions, either that many truths are known a priori (Whewell), a derivative of Cartesian Logic, or that our knowledge is based on immediate rather than mediate experience (Reid, Stewart, Hamilton). Grote we have seen rejected suppositions concerning pure a priori knowledge. A priori axioms are cases of reflective knowledge not intuition. Knowledge of judgement emerges from knowledge of acquaintance and is separable only in degree on a scale. Secondly, while Grote like Ferrier considered immediate

experience and knowledge to be the basis or kernel of all knowledge, he saw it both as unclear, unformed and indistinct knowledge, and considered that judgement and reflection was needed to convert it into knowledge per se. There is certainly no immediate or direct a priori knowledge.

Grote conformed to neither of the above modes of intuitional epistemology, his position was, as I have argued, essentially idealist. Grote indicates his distance from intuitionism on several occasions, as when he notes that intuitionism has many forms and then adds 'though what these who use the word mean by it, is rather their business than mine' (Grote 1870, 47). Statements of opposition to intuitionist epistemology are easy to find in the *Exploratio* (Grote 1865, 22; 1876, 47,57). Intuititionism is described as an 'abstraction' based on the mistaking of our feeling of certainty about a thing for knowledge of its independent existence (Grote 1900, 100-101). Its adherents usually mistake immediate experience for cognitive judgements, often running together these original 'feelings' with the claim that what they indicate are necessary truths (Grote 1865, 122, 216; 1900, 154-155). Whewell in particular is attacked for both defending 'necessary truths' and setting them up in an antithesis to ordinary or 'contingent truths' (Grote 1865 216-220; 235-237). More specifically Grote rejects the need for 'pre-Baconian assumptions' as necessary to ground all knowledge, and while he subscribes to Kantian categories as preconditions for knowledge he portrays these as emerging within the cognitive process and not prior to experience (Grote 1865, 106-124; 1876, 154-161; 1900, 217-219, 297,307, 315-318).

In ethics the question of Grote's intuitionism is more pertinent as recently two of the most important contributors to the study of Victorian Cambridge, Sheldon Rothblatt and Jerome B Schneewind have

labelled Grote as an ethical intuitionist, and other writers have left this interpretation unchallenged (Schneewind 1974, 1977; Rothblatt 1968). Ethical intuitionists may take up one or more of several basic positions, which are not necessarily compatible. These are that (1) there is a human faculty which facilitates direct apprehension of moral ideals and virtues, (2) that these are intuitively known without reference to experience or to the calculation consequences. (3) that there are some moral truths or axioms that are self evident, necessary and a priori, (4) that there are a plurality of distinct and independent moral ideals all of which have unique moral value, (5) that our ordinary common sense beliefs or immediate moral judgements are a reliable guide to these ideals, and (6) that these ideals refer to an independent and universal moral reality and order independent of our particular personal and social experiences. Other moral positions are also often confused with this as I indicated earlier, arguments for a unique moral sense, from conscience, moral causistry and theology and even moral idealism.

John Grote associates himself with few of these positions, and where he does, he does not do so from an intuitionist epistemology, nor from intuitionist assumptions about a unique moral faculty, moral sense, conscience reliable immediate insights, common sense, or divine revelation. On the last, Scheenwind notes that Grote's philosophy takes him

> 'to a point at which we feel a need for the truths religion alone can give' (Schneewind 1977, 119).

But Grote repeatedly rejects any help for his arguments that may come from religion and asserts and re-asserts that he rests his case on grounds that philosophy alone can produce and defended. We must not for instance base our knowledge on either Descartes' assumption of God's consciousness, or Berkeleys' idea that God's mind makes our

consciousness of the world possible. Philosophically we must work only from the supposition of our own consciousness (Grote 1900, 35-42, 71). Again Grote was both a philosopher and a deeply religious thinker. The activities were different but complementary. Religion and philosophy were different but the truths they discover were compatible. Philosophy is human thought but Grote had faith that it was compatible with the thought and mind of God. Human mind should not be constrained by belief in faith for this reason. In particular Grote's belief in a harmonious moral order, equivalent to the belief in an ordered physical universe is not grounded upon religious faith or revelation for Grote, but is, as I have argued, presented as a postulate of all moral and intellectual thought and practice, an assumption without which the practices of science and philosophy or one side, and moral and political life would be impossible (Grote 1870, 348-9). This is a case of what Albert Weale was later to call 'reflexive theory' not theology or intuitionism (Weale 1983, 17-18).

Grote's moral position also differs significantly from that of William Whewell, for whom dependent or utilitarian morality is separated from independent morality and rejected as totally inadequate. To Grote, as we shall see, the morality of consequences or dependent morality has moral meaning and value, as does the claim that moral ideals have some value independent of consequences. Mill and Whewell are presented by Grote as each grasping one part of the truth, utilitarianism and intuitionism are abstract or partial systems. The truth is that moral value lies in part in consequences and in part in an independent sphere of worth.

John Grote is diametrically opposed to the first three propositions of intuitionism noted above. There is no unique moral sense or moral faculty; all moral knowledge requires some element of both experience and reason or reflection; and there are no purely

necessary or a priori moral truths of the kind posited by Whewell (Grote 1870, 195, 199-206; 1876, Ch V, V1,XV; 1865, 30-32; 1900, 304-305).

There is some agreement between Grote and those of the intuitionists who agree with 4,5, and 6 above, but 4 is compatible with other moral philosophies as well as intuitionism ie idealism; 5 is turned by Grote into the simple claim that our customary opinions distil and embody both individual historical and social reason; and 6 is supported using an objective and absolutist idealist not an intuitionist or theological ontology. Grote's absolute moral facts are in principle knowable (unlike those of Hamilton and Mansel,) are knowable by ordinary intelligence without need for intuition and/or revelation (as with Whewell) and require a massive, and as yet unsatisfactory, operation of the imagination, beloved of idealist philosophers from Coleridge to Hegel. Grote was clear that there is some truth in the empiricist claim that all knowledge is contingent upon experience and acquired by induction. So too there is some truth in the opposed claim that all knowledge comes from the mind and can be reached by a deductive procedure (Grote 1865, 1870 170, ch XVII 1876 57). The ideas that moral knowledge is either grounded on experience or on intuition he sees as not only false but a false dichotomy, the utilitarian/intuitionist controversy he considers to be a source of wonder for the grandeur of its irrelevance and misconception (Grote 1870 56-57 275; 1876 74-76, 79,). Both Mill and Whewell were guilty of abstraction and hence ultimately irrelevance, taking one part of the truth, one side of the case and expounding it as the totality of truth (1876, 54-56).

Even the concept of intuition is a source of confusion according to Grote arising from the existence of a plurality of uses which are often confused together (1865 22; 1870, 260-278; 1876, 47; 1900

217-219). To help shortcut the argument Grote coins the term intuitivist and intuitivism to describe the narrow position of the Whewellians and to exclude from consideration all of these other doctrines that Mill had so incorrectly labelled as intuitionist. Mayor and later Leslie Stephen recognise the originality of this formulation as it allows us, as Grote puts it, to separate what Mill confounds, intuitionism proper, the school of moral sentiments; the school of duty; the rational and juristic moral schools; and the idealists (Grote 1870, 261). Grote specifically separates the subjective schools of moral sense and moral sentiments which Bentham once labelled and attacked as intuitionists, from the rational intuitionists who work on the premise of some 'simple and native intellectual vision' (Grote 1870, 262). The former view Grote notes was as inductive as utilitarianism, relying as it did on psychological evidence of our senses and feelings (1870, 261-264). The latter schools are truly intuitionists in sharing some a priori beliefs about moral reality though Grote notes with obvious delight that if the utilitarian principle of morality is not purely psychological it is a priori and deductive, a point to which we will return (1870, 268-269, 275-277; 1876, 79). Grote concedes that in terms of some uses of intuition he can subscribe to the theory, but not all and then on close examination these are the ones that are compatible with ethical idealism. But on the central point about a belief a some 'simple and native intellectual vision' in both epistemology and ethics, Grote must be excluded from subscription. The only native vision is the immediate experience that needs judgement for elaboration. In the end he treats both sides of the epistemological and moral controversy of the age with disdain, keeps aloof, and looks for a solution partly in linguistic disarmament, in an eclectic unification and more completely in an idealist synthesis (1865, 30-32; 1876, 47, 48-53, 57, 120;

1900, 168-170, 180).

Contemporary opinion was divided on Grote's affiliation to intuitionism. The *Westminster Review* were not confident but hazarded that

> 'his mode of speculating bears strong resemblances to that of the Intuitive Moralists' (Westminster Review 1870, 42).

John Llewelyn Davis, in a better position in Grote's own college to know, wrote

> 'Mr Grote is hardly an 'intuitive' moralist, of the school opposed to Mr Mill: if one were to remark that it is difficult to say *what* he is, that is an impression which he would have been very willing to produce' (Llewelyn Davis 1870, 92).

Davis comments that while Grote's position is nearer to that of the utilitarians than the intuitionists, the uniqueness of Grote's view lies in his founding duty and virtue on a 'doctrine of relations'. This observation, as we shall see in the next chapter is correct, but since this doctrine is most readily associated with F.H.Bradley and idealist ethics in the nineteenth century this must tempt us to classify Grote's ethics like his epistemology, as fundamentally idealist. But both Grote's editor J.B. Mayor and his student Sidgwick also resisted the temptation to label Grote, though whether from inability, lack of judgement or good sense remains to be argued. For now I feel Mayor's claim that Grote was an eclectic, and Sidgwick's observation that Grote not only had no system, but unsystematically produced 'a collection of sketches' without order or coherence must be treated with suspicion. Grote in my view was not a dogmatic idealist. He was not a utilitarian and shared only a few opinions with intuitionists which were also compatible with idealism. Grote's philosophy is genuine first order philosophy, an original voice in the philosophical conversation, working from within an intuitionist dialogue but struggling towards a position recognizable, as and sometimes self consciously called, idealist.

Circumstantial evidence for the intuitionist interpretation comes from two quarters, firstly, the Cambridge context and secondly the popularity of Grote's epistemology and moral philosophy with later intuitionists. But in Chapter I argued that the Cambridge context contained both idealist and an intuitionist currents of thought, a point well make by Cannon (Cannon 1964). Grote I will argue had more in common with the former group. The second argument has some basis as Grote's work is not only used but used appreciatively by Henry Calderwood, T.R Birks, F.D.Maurice and E.F.Carritt all of whom could be identified as intuitionists. The case would be stronger if a case could be made for treating twentieth century realism as a modified version of intuitionism, on the grounds that both theories argued for a direct or immediate cognition of reality, uncluttered and undetermined by both sensory experience and reflective judgement.

Unfortunately neither case is convincing. Calderwood and Birks' usage is highly selective, neither identify Grote as an intuitionist and generally treat him as an interesting oddity. A case for F.D. Maurice as an idealist will be made later. Carritt's support is highly qualified and indeed hostile on occasions. Finally, while many realists such as Alexander, Laird, Broad, Robinson, Sellars, Perry and Davies Hicks have used Grote, the differences between realism and intuitionism are more significant than the similarities. If a strong case is to be made for Grote as an intuitionist it must turn on predominantly internal textual evidence and to this we will return again later in chapter ten. But one unexpected source of support for the idealist interpretation of Grote comes from J.B.Schweeind himself. While on most occasions he identifies Grote as an 'intuitionist', and a 'moralist' in one place he agrees that on several crucial beliefs, and arguments

> 'His development of them anticipated in many ways the absolute idealism of the generation after him' (Schneewind 1968a, 393).

One last circumstantial point may complete this argument for now. During the first three decades of the twentieth century three major moral philosophers all produced new intuitionist arguments that sound in retrospect very Grotian, G.E. Moore, H.A. Pritchard and David Ross. As William Hudson writes

> 'These writers contended that actions, as well as consequences, can have intrinsic value. They can be in themselves right or wrong, obligatory or otherwise, such as it is our duty to do, or to refrain from doing' (Hudson 1980,93)

To Pritchard and Ross, as with Grote and Bradley earlier and Searle and Foot later, many moral imperatives or conclusions follow from statements about situations, descriptions of moral facts about relationships, because moral conclusions are embodied in statements about them and in the facts they pertain to. That I ought to promote the welfare of my children is not justified by the consequences but by statements about the facts of my relationship with them, my wife and the wider community. The actions of caring for children are morally right, and are obligatory independently of references to consequences. This argument, later associated with neo intuitionists, but originally associated with Bradley, is at the heart of John Grote's social theory and his account of duty.

Chapter Eight

Grote's Critique of Mill's Utilitarian Moral Philosophy

I

The voyage we have charted began in 1862 when Grote, after sending the manuscripts for the *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* to the printers changed his mind and determined instead to state the moral and then the epistemological and ontological foundations upon which his critique of utilitarian philosophy was founded. These foundations have now been revealed to contain an essentially idealist epistemology that supports an eclectic moral system, which links a firm belief in a plurality of independent and objective moral ideals (right, good, happiness, virtue, justice, duty, the natural, the useful, the pleasant), to an idealist epistemology stressing the role of moral imagination, a relational social and historical theory stressing the positive or sociologically factual basis to our ideals, and to an observational study of our sensations, feelings and moral psychology. In such work Grote could have claimed, like his mentor Whewell, to have provided not just a criticism but a viable alternative to the whole philosophical system of Mill and the Philosophical Radicals. Indeed he could claim to have sketched the outlines for an original moral philosophy in Britain, a native British idealism. But at this point the critique of utilitarianism needs to be spelt out and its implications examined.

The *Examination* is perhaps the most widely known about and read of Grote's published works and there is recent evidence of an informed recognition of its merits. One of the best scholars of Victorian intellectual history has written that

> 'John Grote's *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1870, is a tough-minded and difficult criticism, well worth study'

and later that

> 'John Grote's *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1870, (is) probably the most meticulous philosophical scrutiny' (Schneewind 1965, 348; 1969, xiv).

As we shall see in the final chapter, I diverge from Schneewind in the general characterization of Grote's moral philosophy as 'completely consonant' with that of Whewell and the other 'Cantabrigians', and of the specific identification of him as an 'intuitionist' (Schneewind 1974, 387-389; 1977, 117-121). But I concur with the general judgement of the

> 'quality' of Grote's mind being, 'acute, probing, rather narrow and technical, keen to find flaws and mistakes'

and I note that as early as 1965 Schneewind had recognized and attached some significance to Grote's writing (Schneewind 1976, 35-54; 1977, 121; 1965, 31-32). A more recent and more sustained assessment of the *Examination* can be found, by Anthony Quinton in his *Utilitarian Ethics* which complement his interesting comments on Grote's epistemology already noted above (Quinton 1973, 82-87; 1971, 21). Quinton's appraisal is fair and scrupulous, treating Grote with the seriousness he has far too long been denied, and he produces an argument that takes us to the heart of the philosophical debate over utilitarianism. This also supports the judgement of another of Mill's recent editors, that the *Examination* is both 'penetrating and subtle' (Acton 1973, XIII).

However the nineteenth century responses to the *Examination* were more impressive both for their quality and quantity, which makes it surprising that more research did not take place into the author's own philosophical position. Two long reviews appeared by Henry Sidgwick in 1871, one each in the *Cambridge University Reporter* and *The Academy*

(Sidgwick 1871a, 182-183; 1871b, 197-198). In 1870 a rigorous and complimentary sixteen page review appeared in the *Contemporary Review* written by a Trinity fellow and a Christian Socialist John Llewelyn Davis (Llewelyn Davies 1870, 81-96). Finally an anonymous reviewer produced a detailed fourteen page review on behalf of the Philosophical Radicals for the *Westminster Review* (Westminster Review 1871, 41-53). Lengthy commentaries on Grote's criticisms appeared later in two of the books of T.R.Birks, the successor to Frederick Maurice in the Knightbridge Chair at Cambridge (Birks 1873, 1874), and in several other popular textbooks (Calderwood 1874; 1895; Edgworth 1877, 25, 33, 39, 50-51). An especially appreciative review of Grote's criticisms which also endeavour to explain the positive position from which it is launched can be found in J.R.Thompson's *Dictionary of Philosophy* which has been widely used since, supplemented by a more recent review in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* by Jerome B.Schneewind (Thompson 1887, xxxix - xi; 357, 397-398, 433; Edwards and Pap 1967, 392-393). But the most telling assessments come from a close allie of the Philosophical Radicals, Alexander Bain. In his essays and books on Mill, Bain speaking from first hand knowledge of all parties to the dispute and of George Grote and Mill in particular wrote,

> `By far the best hostile criticism of *Utilitarianism* that I am acquainted with is the posthumous volume of Prof. John Grote. It will there be seen what havoc an acute, yet candid and respectful opponent, can make of his theories of happiness. Many of those strictures I consider unanswerable. Prof. Grote also makes the most of Mill's somewhat exaggerated moral strain, and his affectation of holding happiness in contempt; "doing without it" if need be' (Bain 1880, 92; 1882, 115).

The *Examination* remained a key text for the Cambridge moral science tripos until 1891 and was recommended to Oxford students as late as 1878 by A.M.Stedman as `able, but written in an exceedingly dry style' (Stedman 1872, 258, 307). It would have been hard for any

of the moral science students at Oxbridge from 1870 to the end of the century to have avoided contact with this potent academic offering of John Grote.

My intentions have to be limited in this section to providing a summary of Grote's major objections to John Stuart Mill's essay on 'Utilitarianism' of 1862. The scope and detail of the criticisms and evaluation of utilitarianism of Mill and of Grote themselves warrant a full length study but the general historical and descriptive character of this thesis precludes detailed critical evaluation, and the desire to reconstruct John Grote's own positive contribution to philosophy make reconstruction of his negative critiques of alternative positions of secondary importance. Two other preliminaries will also have to be foregone and made amends for by reference to alternative sources. The first is a detailed account of John Stuart Mill's own ethical philosophy and the second is a historical survey of the debate and the criticisms made of both Mills work and that of his utilitarian predecessors especially David Hume, William Paley, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, Malthus and Ricardo, and George Grote. The first is well provided for in the texts by Alan Ryan, H.J.McClosky, and R.T. Halliday and others, though for our purposes the short survey I find most authoritative is that by Jerome B. Schneewind in his introduction to *Mill's Ethical Writings* (Ryan 1970, 1974; McClosky 1971; Halliday 1976; Schneewind 1965) (1). The second is still not adequately covered beyond the point of the James Mill, Bentham and Macaulay debate of 1830 covered by Jack Lively and John Rees (Lively and Rees 1978). A series of older histories cover major contributions from the utilitarians with little regard to the contributions of opponents and the ensuing debates (Halevy, 1952; Stephen 1900 ; Albee 1957; Plamenatz 1958). The text that comes nearest to reconstructing the debate over utilitarianism is part one of

Schneewind's book *Sidgwicks Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* which can usefully be supplemented by other essays by himself, A.J.M.Milne, S.Rothblatt, and more significantly A.Quinton (Schneewind 1977, 1976, 1965, 1970, 1974; Milne 1967; Rothblatt 1968; Quinton 1973).(2). Finally, wherever arguments for an ethical position have already been adduced above I will state positions here without elaboration or repetition. The philosophical positions on most issues in the *Treatise* and the *Examination* are almost identical and references to both have been used when elaborating Grote's own ethical theory.

There are two starting points for an adequate account of Grote's *Examination*, the text itself and the context. The context of major significance was the one assumed by Mill and his supporters and many of their opponents, that is the paradigm of a final battle to establish the correct methods and an ultimate principle for the moral sciences. More immediately the context is the debate that looked like a battle between the Cantabridgians and the Philosophical Radicals already spoken of above. The controversy between the two forces was of long standing, and the banners for each party had been handed down and held high by eminent champions on each side. On the side of the Radicals were the figures noted above though forefathers were regularly appropriated, including Thomas Hobbes, Richard Cumberland, Francis Hutchinson, John Gray and several Frenchmen including the Marquis de Condercet and Claude Adrien Helvetius. Frederick Maurice's successor to the Knightbridge Chair, the dour Thomas Rawlinson Birks saw the Cambridge line and pedigree as including 'Bacon, Milton, Clarke, More, Cudworth, Hartley, Rutherford, Waterland, Paley, Coleridge, Whewell, Grote and Maurice' (Birks 1874, 181). But Birks considered that

> 'It is natural for me to avoid ground they have too lately traversed and to begin with the ethical controversy, of which Cambridge and Westminster have been the two immediate centres during the last eighty or ninety years' (1874, 1).

The Cambridge debaters he studied were Adam Sedgwick, William Whewell, John Grote and Frederick Maurice and he provides the following historical and philosophical insights,

> 'A posthumous *Examination*, by Prof. Grote, of Mill's Utilitarianism, appeared in 1870, and is like a closing act in this long continued controversy, which began with the appearance of Prof. Sedgwick's *Discourse*, forty years ago. There is a striking contrast between its beginning and its close. That brief *Discourse* was marked by eloquence and fervour, high and noble instincts, vivacity and brilliance of thought, but verges, in part, on the looseness which often attends strong feeling and impassioned declamation. The *Examination* is conspicuous for searching analysis, comprehensiveness, and candour, and bears more resemblance, as composed shortly before the author's death, to the calm and quiet beauty of a sunset sky. The first attempts to cut boldly through the knots of ethical controversy with a keen and polished blade, like Excalibur, that sparkles and flashes in the sunlight. The last seeks to untie them partially, and thus to retain unbroken and uninjured, with a cautious and gentle hand, the whole tangled and complex strain of rival moral principles and apparently conflicting ethical theories' (Birks 1874, 12-13).

Despite the florid language and Birks dating errors, (the four year error between the date of composition and the authors death), the major insight is valid. John Grote did try to cut through the old controversy, he did try to bring about its termination and that through an act of eclectic reconciliation, and he did so as Quinton puts it, in a 'consistently gracious tone' that was to contrast with the 'abusiveness of most of Mill's critics' (Quinton 1973, 83).

All three points are worth reinforcing. Firstly Grote proceeds with little or no reference to old controversies and old controversialists. Sedgwick's *Discourses* and Whewell's criticisms of utilitarianism in both his *Lectures* and the *Elements* are studiously avoided. Grote was intent on providing a fair and rigorous philosophical appraisal of Mill's essay at a time when he hoped the dust of battle had settled. He intended to keep his criticism

primarily philosophical and he reduces arguments about and from the positions of theology and personal criticism to an absolute minimum, though both allies and enemies seemed intent on restoring them (Llewelyn Davies 1871, 93-96; Westminster Review 1871, 53). In addition it might be noted that Grote eschews the most conventional of all methods for debunking utilitarianism, the reductio ad absurdio, the taking of practical examples that seem bound to lead the utilitarian into inconstistency or to force him to reject or denounce every moral opinion. The otherwise hostile reviewer for the *Westminster* complements Grote for using this device only once and for using reliable historical information and not hypothetical argument (Westminster Review 42, 54; Grote 1870, 316-318). The absence of antagonistic and hostile criticism of the person is also a characteristic of the *Examination* noted by the same reviewer, and many others including Quinton and Birks Llewelyn Davies writes,

> 'Professor Grote is never carried by controversial warmth into unfairness. He is always courteous and gentle, always anxious to correct dogmatism in himself, as in others, by appeals to the complexity and mysteriousness of the world with which moralists have to deal. And, in the same spirit of reverence for the actual truth of things, he takes pains to be accurate in expression as in thought. His style, though involved and cumbrous, is that of a thinker who realises distinctly what he means, and endeavours to convey his meaning in terms which shall not be liable to be misunderstood' (Llewelyn Davies 1871, 83).

All this is unsurprising, Grote had publicly stated his own objection to unfair and personalized literary criticisms in an early essay and he had personally witnessed the terrible effects of Mill's barbs on Whewell and Sedgwick and the assaults from his Cambridge colleagues on both John Mill and his own brother. John Grote complains of the 'harshness of dispute', and he adds that

> 'The "odium ethicum" is even more unreasonable than the odium theologicum', (Grote 1870, 9).

and calls for a 'jus belli' and a 'cessation' of hostilities. Alexander Bain wrote of the response to Mill's essays on Whewell and

Sedgwick that

> 'John Grote thought that in this and in the 'Sedgwick' article, Mill indulged in a severity that was unusual in his treatment of opponents. I could not for my part, discover the difference. Yet it is no wonder, as he (Mill) told me once, that he avoided meeting Whewell in person, although he had opportunities of being introduced to him' (Bain 1880, 83-84).

Whewell for one overcame his personal hurt in a letter to Mill of 1865 and John himself placated his brother after the attack by Richard Shilleto on his *History of Greece* (Romily 1855, Vol22, 88(b); 1862, Vol31,142; Grote 1851). Unfortunately what Grote hoped would be seen as a quality recommending his work was seen by some, especially Sidgwick as a negative value. Grote's patient criticisms, his eclectic method, his unwillingness to impose a deductive or purely inductive system were interpreted by the latter as 'perplexing prolixity', 'sudden small cavil', 'lax syncretism', 'languid oscillation between different principles', 'lack of appreciation of systems', 'no system' and even 'unsystematic thought' (Sidgwick 1871a 1871b). Grote's careful style however as I have argued was indicative of what was to become the distinctively Cambridge style of philosophy.

Finally in writing the *Examination* Grote was trying to perform a task later to be repeated with differing degrees of popular acclaim by Henry Sidgwick and George E. Moore, the tasks of reconciling, harmonizing ahd synthesising the ethical theories of utilitarianism and intuitionism (Sidgwick 1907, XV-XXI; Moore 1903, 1912; Grote 1870 122-124, 177-178; Hudson 1980, 24-45, 74-104). The nature of Grote's reconciliation we will come to later, but we must take seriously the claims that he was anxious to avoid argument from a fixed position, that he aimed neither to defend an existing or to promote a new philosophical school. Rather be desired to reconcile a plurality of first principles into a syncretic philosophical harmony (Grote 1870, 112).

II

The level of understanding of Mill's text, and support for the arguments, motives and style of Mill's philosophy surprised the reviewer for the *Westminster*. He recognised correctly that Grote was 'deeply impressed' by Mills ethical writing, he recognized that Grote saw

> 'not only that happiness is the necessary result of all right action and virtuous action, but that in the abstract it is the only proper end; goodness and justice, though stated to be independent of happiness, being nevertheless wholly employed about its production'(Westminster Review 1871, 42).

Indeed this author and other reviewers note that Grote, especially in his appendix to Chapter IV of the *Examination* on 'The Utilitarianism Which is Common to all Moral Philosophy', agreed that this ethical philosophy had purchase on moral truth. Grote's level of agreement with utilitarianism however went well beyond this, and well beyond that conceded by any other of its external critics. Briefly stated Grote's agreements with 'old' utilitarianism ethics are as follows:-

(1) a) All reasonable action is aimed at some good (1870, 66, 301, 80), (b) Consequences of action are a primary source of moral value (ibid, 30-31, 58-59).

(2) a) By good is meant someones enjoyment or satisfaction (1879, 80),(b) All action ought to be useful in some sense.

(3) Happiness defined as eudaemonia, the generally desirable end of life, living well, the good life is the summum bonum, but only with the truth of a tautology or truism (1870, 31, 58, 64-65, 69, 72-73 106).

(4) Happiness, whether defined as above, or as welfare or simple pleasure and absence of pain is an ideal of great moral value, a primary ideal (ibid 32, 123).

(5) All actions should, in so far as is possible and desirable, promote happiness (ibid 68, 74-51, 177-8).

(6) 'Virtue or right action is the great source of human happiness' as are all their elements such as benevolence, honour, courage, justice and duty (1870, 1).

(7) Psychologically happiness and even pleasure are desired by everybody (ibid, 107).

(8) There is a great need for a closer study of happiness and pleasure, an 'observational eudaemonics' that would study such things as elements of both and the human capacities for them (1870,236-237 ;1876, 14,275).

(9) A scientific study of pleasures and pains, including the measuring and comparing of pleasures is hypothetically possible and may in some cases be useful in practical life, this could be called the study of hedonics or hedonology. (1870, XXI, 180-182, 345; 1876, 14) (3).

(10) There is much room for reform and improvement both in personal and social life, and many social rules and institutions could do with reform. Utilitarian analysis could be useful in the context of this exercise. It may help promote improvement and progress (1870, ChXVI-XX).

(11) Old utilitarianism does not necessarily lead to

a) a godless society (1870, 238-9, 256-7)

b) consequences conceived as immoral by either religious or conventional social criteria

c) impracticability.

d) dangerous social and political consequences.

As well as sympathising so heartily with the old utilitarian ethics Grote was also readily aware of how far John Stuart Mill had gone in revising and modifying the old utilitarian ethics. While commentators argue over the extent and implication of Mill's critique of Epicurianism and Bentham and of his modifications to the utilitarian philosophy, almost all consider these modifications to be central and extensive, at least on occasions during his life (Birks 1874, 12-14; Stephen 1900, 304-308; Albee 1901, 204-209; 262-267; Plamenatz 1958, 123-124, 134, 144; Schneewind 1965, 17-27; Britton 1969, 46-50; McCloskey 1971, 56-58; Ryan 1974, 101-103, 105, 110-111; Quinton 1978, 38-39; Halliday 1976, 32-40, 60-64;).

Albee's view is the most moderate claiming that in Mill's essay

'we find little that is strictly new, but much to confirm us in the opinion that the partial divergence from the Utilitarian method, which had been so noticeable in some of Mill's previous ethical writings, was not a matter of chance...' (Albee 1901, 265).

Plamenatz goes to the other extreme arguing that

'There is not much left of Benthamite Utilitarianism when John Stuart Mill has completed his defence of it. What is left, is strictly speaking, not utilitarianism at all, but a kind of naturalistic ethics that it would be misleading to call a variety of hedonism' (Plamenatz 1958, 144).

Schneewind supports Mill's own version of what he had done, published in Mill's *Autobiography*, namely that the essay on 'Utilitarianism' was

'A reworking of utilitarian moral philosophy, showing how it could overcome objections and incorporate the main positive views of its critics, was an essential part of his (Mills) programme' (Schneewind 1977, 166).

John Grote believed the modifications were fundamental and extensive, that they were a response to external criticisms, that they were made by importing ideas from alien systems and then pretending the new elements were a natural and normal part of, and were compatible with old utilitarianism. They were also a major improvement on the old system. 'Neo-utilitarianism' as Grote calls Mill's revised version of the 'old utilitarianism' doctrine, in its attempt to remedy defects in the latter, produces some novel arguments and elements. Anthony Quinton argues that Grote considered Mill's essay to have been a 'radical departure' from old utilitarianism in two ways, by revising the definition of happiness to include the quality and quantity distinction, and in providing the new account of the moral motives which stress sociality and sympathy (Quinton, 1973 86-87). The *Westminster Review* state three modifications noted by Grote, the introduction of the quality and quantity distinction, the desertion of assumptions of universal selfishness in favour of universal sociality, altruism and the urge to promote the general happiness, and the new weight given by Mill to the validity and

practical value of traditional moral rules. Grote in fact considered Mill to have modified old utilitarianism in many ways the most central of which are as follows:-

(1) Mill widens his definition of utilitarianism happiness and pleasure to ensure that they are not a synonym for hedonism, or the desire for physical pleasure and the absence of pain (Grote 1870, 16, 17-20).

(2) The new definition incorporates qualitative differences in pleasures and allows less of the latter to take priority over more of the quantitatively measured pleasures. Aesthetic and spiritual pleasures are incorporated into the account of happiness (Grote, 1870, 20, 145-58).

(3) Mill makes it plain that the happiness to be aimed at by individuals and the government is not that of the self but the general happiness of all or universal happiness (Grote, 1870, 16, 123-124; 274)

(4) Both in the above and in his psychological and ethnological studies, Mill is seen to transform utilitarianism from being egoistic, as it was in its 'old' formulation, to being both 'ideal' and 'altruistic' (Grote 1870, 3-6; 175-179; 1876, 78-80).

(5) Mill is praised for modifying the theory of associational psychology explicit in the works of Bentham and James Mill to allow new springs of action to be basic to man's nature and others to be so ingrained by habit that human nature would be unidentifiable without them, e g sympathy, love of excellence, self improvement, love of virtue (Grote 1870, 16, 21-22,234).

(6) Mill deprioritizes the external sanctions of penalty and education, and stresses against Bentham the crucial role of internal sanctions e.g.sympathy and conscience. This is an advance inthe theory of obligation (Grote 1870, 21-22,

(7) The 'old utilitarian' theory of justice had been modified by introducing new and refined standards by Mill namely impartiality, disinterestedness and egalitarianism, though support for the latter has to be qualified (Grote 1870, 148-159).

(8) Mill is recognized as having moved a great deal to allow some moral value as well as practical value to be given to conventional moral rules, or his theory of the role of secondary moral rules (Grote, 1870, 22-24).

(9) Mill is seen to have improved the old Epicurian system by introducing elements from both Stoicism and Christianity (Grote 1870, 24-25, 62,63, 77-78).

(10) Mill's style rises above that of the 'practical', and the 'business like' reformer that was Bentham. There is in him

> 'the spirit of a genuine philosopher distrusting considerably both of these (old utilitarianism and positivism), and extending much beyond them, but endeavouring to make the best of them, and importing into them much that is alien to themselves' (Grote 1870, 11).

Now this last point leads to the most pervasive criticism to abound in the *Examination*. Grote considers that Mill has bought these improvements at a high cost, including the desertion of many positions inimical to the old utilitarian ethics. Mill's essay is an attempted eclectic mixing which produces a system that is incoherent, and in which some important questions are missed and others wrongly answered (Grote 1870, 15-17). Mill's whole Chapter II on the meaning of utilitarianism is presented as a case of a 'pseudo' refuting description', defending utilitarianism by radically altering its definition. The new system was philosophically flawed but above all it was 'heterodox', 'alien' and 'incompatible' with the old, and especially, Benthamite utilitarianism.

> 'Deeply impressed with the writer's ethical work, he has been led to inquire whether such ideas and sentiments as are there expressed are the proper outcome of Utilitarianism as defined by his predecessors, and the great aim of the work now before us is to show that they are not, but that Mr. Mill, whilst believing himself to be a Utilitarian, is too good for his creed, and unconsciously argues against the school he seeks to support' (Westminster 1871, 42).

> 'His general thesis is this: the Utilitarian Philosophy, Qua a philosophy, owes its success to the recognition and incorporation of other elements than those which its formal statement includes' (1871, 43).

> 'Grote considers Mr Mill to be heterodox to his school...' (1871, 53).

Plamenatz by implication then, is siding with Grote, on the issue of the extent of John Mill's modifications to old utilitarian ethics. While considering the case for Mill's proof being 'naturalistic', Grote sides with Sidgwick and Rashdall later, in believing its character to still remain 'ideal'. Some of these points are recognized by the *Westminster's* reviewer

We can spell out the general argument of the *Examination* as follows (1) 'old utilitarianism', by which Grote meant the philosophy represented by 'Paley and Bentham', had a partial grasp of the truths of morality, (2) Mill's 'neo utilitarianism' is an improvement upon and makes up for some defects in the old utilitarian philosophy noted both by John Mill himself in earlier essays and in the essay of 1862, (3) these improvements are bought by importing elements from other alien moral systems, and while the new system is an improvement it is both (4) 'heterodox' and incompatible with 'old utilitarianism' and is (5) still fatally flawed, being partial and abstract (1870, 29); superfluous (avoiding central problems) (1870, 28); incoherent (the new and old elements are incompatible) (1870, 150-151); and still dogmatic (1870, 7-9, 232, 245-249); and hence (6) suggestions for remedying these defects as well as arguments pointing them out need to be made so that they can be transcended and a better eclectic system provided.

We can now turn our attention to the fourth, fifth and sixth points above and concentrate upon the two texts concerned. Although Grote is not totally happy with any of Mill's improvements to the old utilitarian system, he is not content simply to point out heterodoxy or to repeat old arguments, but rather enters into a long and complex critical engagement with Mill's essay. The *Examination* can be said to have a three part structure to fulfil this endeavour, firstly chapter one to nine provide a detailed exposition and critique of Mill's text, the second part from chapters ten to fourteen examines Mill's methods and the utilitarian psychology generally, the third part, from chapters fifteen to twenty one, provide a placing of Mill's ethics in its wider philosophical and historical context, dealing as it does with its development, and its claims to be practical, scientific and

above all a morality of progress. Grote states his own primary substantive and particular purposes to be

> 'to show that, though virtue or right action is the great source of human happiness, still the fact that it is so does not of itself constitute its virtue, or explain what we mean when we use that term' (Grote 1870, 1).

He argues that besides this he has two secondary purposes, one to show that any sort of moral or social improvement can be attained only by defining, making imperative and acting upon moral ideals and second to show that ethical reductionism is bound to fail (Grote 1879, 1-4): the other is to show that utilitarian ethics can never 'settle the question, *whose* happiness it is that we are to try and produce...'(Grote 1870, 4-5). In short utilitarianism has an inadequate theory of virtue and duty. My own structure will be to examine Grote's charges that Mill's revisions to utilitarianism fail to make that system satisfactory, leaving to one side the arguments against the utilitarian claims that their system is practical, scientific and progressive. We shall save our judgement on whether Grote proves his case for the 'heterodoxy' of Mill's version of utilitarianism until we have examined these other arguments. These arguments can be taken roughly in the order they appear in the *Examinations*. Section III a) arguments about happiness and pleasure, including the elements of pleasure, the quality and quantity distinction b) arguments concerning the proof of the utilitarian first principle c)arguments about the distribution of happiness, and the principles of virtue, duty and justice. Section IV will contain a short summary of Grote's critique of Mill's methods as preached and practiced in 'Utilitarianism'.

III

Part One

a) Happiness

The questions relating to the meaning, character, psychological structure, means to and value of happiness were the first major issues Grote confronted in the *Examination* and Grote's arguments on this score are seen by both Quinton and the reviewer for the *Westminster* as the central ones. Grote's arguments are however more complex than either of the above imagine. Firstly, Grote wishes to establish from the start that moral philosophy is the study of what we ought to do and not what we do or desire to do. He insists that we must always separate the ideal element in moral questions from the positive and actual to separate 'idealism' as he calls it from moral 'positivism' (Grote, 1870, 1-4). In all utilitarian arguments to date, but especially in Mill's essay, the two have become confused

> 'Utilitarianism endeavours to a great extent to take a middle place, as to moral science, between positivism and idealism, (if we use the latter term to express the assumption of an ideal or something beyond experience). Professing to keep to fact and observation, it understands by the name of "happiness" something which it (really) not only shows that men try to gain, but assumes it is desirable they should. This therefore is with it an ideal...' (Grote 1980, 3).

Whether the confusion is in fact a fallacy we shall explore when examining Mill's 'proof of utility', Grote is however anxious to show that all moral philosophies,

> 'to have any value, must begin with assuming that there is something imperative upon us to do, or desirable for us to do; must begin, that is, with an ideal: if it does not make this assumption, its real course is the exceedingly unphilosophical one of beginning with describing what man *does* do, and then, by degrees and unauthorizedly, altering its language and speaking of this as what he *should* do or *ought* to do' (Grote 1870, 3-4).

Either way Mill's ethics exhibit a system which has the 'merits, if merits they are to be so called, of neither' positivism nor idealism,

being neither truly scientific nor being philosophical, being neither truly inductive nor deductive, a posteriori or a priori. Mill's system is, in short, incoherent.

Grote, as we shall see, considers Mill to be closer to idealism than positivism. He treats happiness as what we ought to pursue in life, not just what we do pursue, and Grote considers it unlikely that someone as astute as Mill would commit what Moore later calls the naturalistic fallacy (Grote 1870,64, 175-180). However by importing idealistic elements, and in particular by admitting not only one fundamental 'a priori' intuition, but many, he deserts the positivist and Benthamite utilitarian ground. The fundamental intuitions imported by Mill into utilitarianism are that a) man 'ought' to regulate his conduct to promote happiness, b) that happiness has 'qualities' as well as 'quantities'; c) that man has a fundamental desire to promote social well-being and hence that the 'general happiness' is what we ought to desire, and d) that virtue is a part of happiness and e) that a just distribution is one that is disinterested, impartial and egalitarian (Grote 1870, a)1-4, 46,177-182, 267-273, b)19-21, 35-36, 49-52, c) 21-24, 62-63, 69-72, 98, 274; d) 99-100, 125-126; e) 93-100,188, 191, 273-274). Grote recognises that Mill admits that first principles are not capable of proof but he notes that on all the above issues Mill smuggles value judgements into otherwise descriptive or empirical propositions or arguments, and gives the impressions that the value judgements he has made above have some legitimate empirical grounding.

One small cavil I have with Quinton can be mentioned here. He recognises that Mill 'hovers' between idealist and positivist conceptions of happiness, but then he writes

> 'In fact, I think it is fairly clear that Mill takes happiness to be the former: *actual* or realized happiness, in other words, as

against (perhaps mistakenly) expected happiness' (Quinton 1973, 85).

In fact this is a conflation of ideal with actual or realized happiness, and positivist with expected happiness, when the two sets of conceptions or dichotomies are very different.

We have seen already that Grote considered happiness to be a possible and desirable moral ideal, but it was only one amongst a plurality of ideals, all of which derive their value from several sources including their felicific consequences (Grote 1870, 31, 109-119, 125-127, 177-178, 258-259). Grote argues throughout the *Examination* that Mill assumes, but does not admit explicitly, the existence of these other primary ideals and sources of moral value.(4) Mill's system is also considered to fail because it appears to take only happiness as ideal, reducing virtue, duty, perfection, justice and good and right to the status of means to it or parts of it. Mill's system is hence accused of being partial, abstract, one sided and reductionist (Grote 1870, 29, 31, 69, 72, 105-110, 176-178). While happiness is expected to attend the performance of right, good, just and virtuous acts, Grote's point is also that Mill still fails to see that it is not this phenomenon on which alone gives them moral value his argument is 'back to front' (Grote 1870, 107-116; 192-193). The wide variety of moral terms in use are evidence to Grote of the plurality of ideals in moral reality. In addition they allow moral arguments to take place and for reasons to be given for preferring or recommending particular courses of action (Grote 1870, 268-9; Sidgwick 1979, 181-182). Sidgwick notes that Grote's identification of this problem of obtaining an adequate account of 'ought' and of the plurality of moral notions 'was the first full discussion of it to be published'.

Grote we have seen accuses Mill of defending utilitarianism by

regularly redefining the concepts of `happiness' and `utilitarianism' and of adopting which ever meaning allows defence of the theory in each particular argument. Grote accuses Mill of using the term utilitarianism in five different senses during his essay. Mill uses the term to refer to 1) universal utilitarianism or the universal agreement of all philosophers that happiness ought to be produced by actions, 2) philosophical utilitarianism which argues that only the production of happiness gives moral value to acts; 3) old utilitarianism which is unideal, hedonistic and egotistical (4)neo-utilitarianism, the use of the term to refer to a reformed system that transcends the limitations of (2) and (3) and adds other alien elements eg qualities of pleasure; and 5) practical or reforming utilitarianism referring to the practice rather than the philosophy of the Philosophical Radicals (Grote 1870, 58-61). Happiness is sometimes defined as 1) quantifiable pleasure and absence of pain; 2) on other occasions it is extended to cover what is qualitatively more worthy 3) on yet other occasions it is a general state of contentment or welfare, and 4) finally it indictes a purely ideal futuristic state, a synonym for right or the good or summum bonum (Grote 1870, 31-32, 74-75, 350-352). The Greek and Aristotelian notions of happiness as living well and the later Epicurian, Benthamite and Millian views are compared and contrasted (1870, 347-347). The objection is not just that Mill is inconsistent but that he is misleading.

> `We came round in this respect to what I have said before, namely that though, if we are to give a meaning to the term happiness, we may mean by it all that man wants, yet if we suppose the word happiness to have an independent meaning of its own, it is morally misleading to say that all that man wants is happiness' (Grote 1870, 330-331).

Either way there is a problem, if happiness is synonymous with right and good, then Mill's famous formulation that

> 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness'

is little more than a tautology. If happiness means something else, namely pleasure and the absence of pain, then we have an argument that is neither self evidently true or true by empirical observation and induction (Grote 1870, 267-268; Sidgwick 1977, 181-182).

The question of the definition of happiness i.e is happiness the actually desired or the ideally desirable, (that which ought to be desired), as we shall see, is crucial to the argument in the proof proposed by Mill.

Chapter One of the *Examination* is however not devoted to any of the above tasks but to a discussion of the elements that go into that general state called happiness, or 'What does happiness consist in?' The general argument here is that Mill's arguments are superfluous. That is, Mill tries to defend happiness as the ultimate ideal from the objection that it

> 'cannot furnish a proper role of human conduct on account of the imperfect manner in which, after all, happiness can be understood and described' (Grote 1870, 27).
>
> But instead of tackling the problem he merely shifts between different definitions of happiness. Hence,
>
> 'I have called utilitarianism, in what follows, superficial because instead of facing the real questions, it rests so much on mere prudentialisms' (Grote 1870, 28).

That is Mill tells us about several means to happiness, he tells us to prefer contentment to agitation, and spiritual to physical pleasures, he stresses mental cultivation, and the pleasures of virtue and benevolence. But he does not tell us what is or what constitutes happiness (Grote, 1870, 36-37). In addition Mill's procedure here is just one more example of the common practice in the history of moral philosophy;

> 'in which philosophers with a certain degree of confusion as to whether they were giving the *meaning* of 'should be', or describing the kind of conduct (as distinguished from other conduct) to which the term was applicable have explained 'well' or 'should be' in the phrase which I have given' (Grote 1870, 350).

Mill, we are told, confuses the explanatory philosophical role with the prescriptive practical endeavour.

Grote shows how hopelessly narrow is the view of human nature posited by Mill and the utilitarians. He points out the many sided and complex character of human natures, the existence of contradictory traits and elements (for which the study of Amphilology is invented), Grote notes the two truths that happiness lies in contentment, and yet also in right dissatisfaction and the desire to strive for the satisfaction of want (Grote 1870, 40-41). Mill's descriptions of the sort of circumstances that might make happiness attainable in real life are no substitute for an adequate definition of happiness, an account of the true elements of happiness, and of the problems involved in grasping this Protean entity (Mill 1910, 11-15; Grote 1870, 40-44). Grote writes

> 'the attempt to grasp action in one summary view is like trying to grasp water or to grasp Proteus - we only change the place and form of the difficulty' (Grote 1870, 163).

Grote himself provides both here and in the *Treatise* some valuable insights into the human moral psyche and the human condition, stressing above all else the insecurity of human happiness in the face of the vicissitudes of life, and the apparent paradox that as happiness is so hard to envisage, and so elusive to grasp in practice, it is best achieved by pursuing other goals (Grote 1870 55-56, 316-317, 327). Human happiness was the likely by-product of just doing what we want and what we ought and must do, it is an expected by-product of everyday acting, thinking and being in the world. Attempts to calculate rationally how we can achieve the nebulous state of

happiness are therefore not only likely to prove impossible but may well turn out to be counterproductive(1870, 229-230, 236-7). This argument in fact reflects the central `anti-rationalistic' character of Grote's moral thinking. Like Oakeshott later he considers that

> `The mass of human life consists of action or behaviour not aimed at an end or fixed by a rule, but resulting from our general manner of thinking and acting (Grote 1870, 131).

States of happiness and of pleasure Grote also considers to be hard to measure and ultimately noncommensurable and incomparable. Grote is also concerned that as a reforming system utilitarianism is `Janus faced' allowing endlessly different moral rules and other means to happiness to be advocated none of which can guarantee to satisfy the end idealized (Grote 1870 284-285).

Grote recognizes that it is natural for man to want happiness and he notes that it is equally true that we want the happiness of others, we want the good and the right which are 'other' related. As he puts it

> `Human nature is to a certain degree utilitarian itself, but it is a very bad disciple of utilitarian philosophy' (Grote 1870, 332).

The false psychology arising from Mill's associationalism also comes in for regular attack, on the grounds that Mill seems to consider that education, habit and external manipulation are the basis for creating both personal behaviour and that of whole groups (Grote 1870, 168-169, 206-208,). One other point is of interest here in separating Whewell and Grote. In opposition to the utilitarians Whewell had set up the faculty of reason as the psychological guide to the right and the good. Mill had correctly objected to this and so too does Grote. Reason he considers to have no agreed meaning, it variously refers to a faculty, a way of thinking and to a purposeful account of an action. Reason is ambiguous and hence gives little authority (Grote 1870, 186-190). Just as Butler's psychology of conscience is destroyed by

denial that man had such a distinct faculty, so Whewell's psychology of ethics is similarly destroyed. The key argument is that just as conscience is only of value when it indicates to us what is imperative or right, so reason is right only when it indicates the right or the good,

> 'it is not reason itself, but the information, so to call it, of which it is the organ, which is the force really acting upon us; that it has no authority at all as *reason*, but simply as right reason' (Grote 1870, 190).

The point being that while pure education and socialization cannot account for our discovery of moral values as the utilitarians suggested, nor can immediate rational a priori insight. We need to know how to gain moral knowledge.

> 'But what ethics ought somehow to tell us, is how reason should apply to the information it possesses, in order to be able to judge what should be done' (Grote 1870, 190).

As is usual, Grote ends the argument by attempting to reconcile the ethics of consequence to the ethics of rule and reason, which also allows him to suggest a reconciliation between Mill and Kant of a type later popularized by Sidgwick (Grote 1870, 125-133, 191-195, 275-277; Sidgwick 1963, XVII-XXI). As we have seen above the moral value of an act lies in its 'desirableness of end' and in its 'worthiness of principle or motive' measured by its motive, the effort expended and its conformity to a rule of right (Grote 1870, 132).

b) The Quality and Quantity Distinction

The introduction into utilitarianism of differences in kind between pleasures by John Mill is usually explained by his need to respond to those critics of the doctrine who saw it as a 'pig philosophy', that sets its ideal too low at the level of physically quantifiable pleasures, and therefore underestimates the more lofty pleasures and values of aestheticism, spiritualism, culture and learning. The argument adduced by Mill is that even Epicurians placed mental

pleasures over sensation, and that it is

> 'quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others' (Mill 1910, 7).

that a small quantity of higher pleasures may be more desirable than a large quantity of lower pleasures, the criteria being the test of 'preference' by a person 'competently acquainted with both', Intensity and duration and the other quantitative scales are not alone the major criteria for measuring pleasures.

The arguments launched against Mill by Grote are astute and generally accurate. Firstly the introduction of this distinction is novel, and it is unwitting evidence that Mill recognizes the original defect of utilitarian ethics, (as pointed out by Whewell) (Grote 1870, 15, 19-20). Secondly Mill equivocates on the distinction causing further confusion in the reader's mind. After stating clearly that the differences are in kind, he retreats to suggest that 'higher' rather than 'lower' is the same thing as 'more' rather than 'less'

> 'He endeavours to mend the old utilitarianism by adding quality of pleasure to quantity, but immediately neutralizes this by saying in effect this quality is quantity estimated in a different manner, namely, not by definite analysis, which was Bentham's method, but by human experience and testimony without such analysis' (Grote 1870, 47).

If the neutralization is effective then the old criticism of utilitarianism on this issue are valid, if the qualitative novelty stands then Mill's position is heterodox. This heterodoxy has two bases, firstly Mill has produced a new intuition and a criteria of worth or value, and secondly he has undermined Bentham's whole scheme and scale of pleasures, and along with that all possibility of objective arithmetic measurement and comparison (Grote 1870, 46-47, 49, 52, 53-54).

The incompatibility of the new distinction with the old is positively asserted (Grote 1870,47,50,). Next we have to consider

Mill's criteria for evaluating quantity and for comparing amounts of both, the argument from 'preferability' or 'relative preferability' as Grote calls it. Grote's first objection is that Mill does not tell us whether the evidence given by the competent authority is *testimony* in a legalistic sense or *opinion* (Grote 870, 47). The first is descriptive, the second involves an estimation of worth with the implication that a reason could be given why the preference was preferred. This begs the question of what this worth is and what reasons would be considered relevant. Secondly Grote argues that qualities of pleasure may only be compared if we 'not only introduce Stoic elements, but migrate bodily to Stoicism' (Grote 1870, 53). Thirdly Grote rejects the analogy of an expert judging two pleasures with a scientist, say a chemist, judging two fluids. Judging pleasures is far more complicated, pleasures are always mixed with 'something from ourselves', they are subjective rather than objective, and in addition pleasures are interwoven with each other and with other elements in our physical and moral lives (Grote 1870, 53-55). Again all human beings have their own experience or scale of preferences, even the competent judge, and his scale may not be compatible with that of other people. Agreed scales of pleasure seem to be a hypothetical and practical absurdity.

> 'I cannot understand a happiness for everybody, after we have gone beyond our universal wants of meat, drink, and shelter, and till we arrive at a sphere where pleasures may be of a temper and nature which at present we cannot enter into. I cannot understand a general scale of pleasures, in which so many marks will be given to drunkenness, so many to love of the fine arts, so many to something else, according to the experience of those who have tried more than one of them' (Grote 1870, 55).

And even if a comparative science was practical it would still not have any moral implications (Grote 1870, 345).

The comparison of the happiness of whole societies is as impossible as the comparison of the pleasures of individuals. So

> 'If he finds a Turkish happiness in quiescence and inertia, opium and the sight of dancing girls, I cannot see who is to gainsay him: nor can I see how Mr Mill's test of comparison, the judgement of intelligent people who have tried different alleged kinds of happiness, is ever to be applied' (Grote 1870, 317-318).

Grote himself suggests a much better democratic option, 'the general suffrage' as the criteria for evaluating and measuring preferences for a whole society (Grote, 1870, 56). But in a small appendix to Chapter IV, not intended for publication, Grote is also seen to add a third possible criteria of worth other than quantity and quality, and a third criteria to add to comparative preferability by an expert, and the general suffrage. This is the 'high' and 'low' scale of 'divine happiness' using the Creator as the judge of preference. But the argument is not developed and it serves only to point out that other intuitional criteria in addition to quality may be added (Grote 1870, 83).

That these criticisms hit home is evidenced in the *Westminster Review* critique which admits that Grote's chapter contains 'many good remarks'. However the reviewer defends Mill with two unsupported assertions, one that

> 'Mill does not postulate such unanalyzable differences of quality as being necessary to the justification of the standard of utility...'

and the other that Mill's differences are likely to be accountable for in terms of 'differences of the accompanying mental states'. The reviewer concludes that there is no incompatibility between the qualitative distinction and utilitarianism generally and Bentham's version in particular (Westminster Review, 1871, 43-44). While admitting Grote's arguments against scientific measurement and compatibility have 'much real force' the optimistic reviewer retreats to the last stronghold the claim that

'though the work is a delicate one, no one doubts its possibility even now in its principal features' (Westminster Review, 1871, 44).

Sidgwick in his two reviews is more positive. The *Cambridge University Reporter's* review states that Grote's criticisms are 'entirely destructive of Mill's system as he expounds it', and the second states that Grote puts the 'dilemma more clearly' than Lecky; adding the point that if Mill prefers pleasures because 'higher', 'better' or more 'dignified' his position is no different to that of some of his opponents, including the school of moral sense (Sidgwick 1871a, 183; 1871b, 197). Llewelyn Davies is happy to repeat Grote's criticism leaving appraisal to his readers, while Quinton correctly describes Grote's critique as 'neat' and Mill's arguments as 'unfortunate' (Quinton 1973, 84). Together Grote's arguments against Mill on the distinction are in my judgement decisive and written as they were in 1861 as Mill's essays in the *Fraser's Magazine* were published it seems his arguments were original and uninfluenced by other reviews, though several did appear during the latter part of that year.(5) The general thrust of the criticism, that Mill is in a double bind, in philosophical trouble whichever way his distinction about quality and quantity is interpreted, has become commonplace through reproduction by Sidgwick and Moore (Sidgwick 1907, 129; Moore 1903, 78).

c) <u>The Proof</u>

Contemporary scholars are no more agreed on what Mill was doing in his famous Chapter Five of *Utilitarianism* than the first generation of its critics. Nor are Mill's own statements of his intentions absolutely clear and unequivocable. What we can assert with some confidence is that Mill was trying to show that his version of utilitarianism was superior to the alternative intuitionist philosophies of the day by showing that some sort of argument and evidence could be produced to

support the claims to priority of the greatest happiness principle. The intuitionist philosophies on the other hand lacked in his view any kind of reasoned support, relying on self evidence for authority, and in addition they asserted the value of several unprovable principles while the utilitarians asserted only one. Perhaps the only point of recent agreement we can start with is that made by Schneewind, that in providing some sort of reasoned support for the utilitarian first principle 'A greater mare's nest has seldom been constructed' (Sidgwick 1965, 31).

My procedure is to explain Grote's analysis of Mill's proof passing only the minimal amount of adjudicatory comment. The thrust of my own assessment is largely historical, and I limit myself here to noting the originality of Grote's arguments, their re-appearance later and their centrality to a continuing debate. The five versions of utilitarianism that Grote finds in Mill's essay are expounded at the beginning of Grote's Chapter before the analysis proper begins, presumably to show how difficult proof would be to Mill. Which version of utilitarianism is he is trying to prove valid? Mill's own neo-utilitarian version had according to Grote injected at least two alien elements into traditional utilitarian arguments, that man is a social creature with naturally social sentiments, and that he desires not his own but the 'general, or social good' (Grote 1870, 60-63). Mill will need therefore to demonstrate in any kind of proof not only that mankind ought to act to promote 'happiness' but the 'general happiness', and to show that this is as natural or more natural than the desire to promote one's own. Mill has raised his own highjump bar by redefining the utilitarian philosophy. In passing, Grote notes that Mill in fact uses words like social and general as legitimatory or persuader words, or 'moralizing' words as Grote actually calls them. Grote suspects that Mill still believed the doctrine which

considered social motives and altruistic feelings to be secondary results of education, training and habit, but had put a gloss on this by using the language of 'societarianism' (Grote 1870, 60-63).

One preliminary precedes the central part of the chapter. Mill's own conditions for a proof are spelled out, with the author recognizing that this was not a 'proof in the ordinary meaning of the word', that in fact 'the subject does not admit of it, but that while the proof given may appear to be 'obvious', it was really a matter 'to be decided' on the 'evidence' which 'must be impartially consulted'. This leads Grote to worry about what is to come because,

> 'I seem to trace in it the same proceeding on the part of Mr Mill to which I have drawn attention in the case of quality of happiness: the desire namely to put that upon the ground of experience and observation what does not belong to it, and while taking account of an ideal, to attempt to build it, from the first, upon the positive, which will bear no such structure' (Grote 1870, 64).

The unholy figment is the conflation of fact and value positions and arguments, what Moore is later to label the 'naturalistic fallacy'. But Grote does not rush to argue that Mill actually commits this error. Rather after pointing out the nature of the error, he shows how Mill by equivocating on the meaning of such words as happiness, pleasure, desire and desirable presents a veneer of consistency and coherence. But as with the argument on quality above, Mill is also shown to be in a double bind. Either he does try to provide an empirical, and inductive proof by reducing 'the ought to be desired' to the 'is desired', thereby committing a major logical blunder, or else his argument in the proof is not a real proof, in the conventional scientific sense of proof. If the latter is the case, Mill's utilitarianism is either based on an intuition, making it no better than any other intuitionist doctrine, or upon an 'a priori' statement, a mere tautology, providing an artificial proof that depends for its effect on forcing the usual meanings of happiness,

pleasure, desire and two uses of desirable into conformity by mere definition.

That Mill did commit the naturalistic fallacy in his proof that happiness is the sole end of moral value is at first scoffed at by Grote.

> 'But surely he cannot mean that it is solved by laying down, as a supposed fact of observation, that what men really desire is that which is pleasant to them' (Grote 1870, 64)

And we must remember that Grote has recognized Mill's separation of an art and a science of morality and his denial that 'first principles' can be proved, the first in the *Exploratio* and the second above (Grote 1865, 196; 1870, 63).

Yet in this chapter and elsewhere, Grote gets close to implying that Mill did mean to prove that we could reduce an ought statement to some empirical statement about what people desire and find pleasant, and that, vice versa, ought statements can be induced from observations of an empirically testable kind.

> 'Such inductiveness therefore as there is in utilitarianism, and which distinguishes it from other systems whose method is intuitive, must consist in the fact that the supposed proof of the utilitarian principles (that right action is that which is conducive to happiness) is a proof by way of observation, not by way of *a priori* judgement: and also in the fact, that our idea of what is happiness is a matter of observation', (Grote 1870, 261)

Earlier he had written

> 'And Mr Mill must also remember that, in his proof of utilitarianism, he does not at all prove it in the sense and to the extent which he would here give to it. For happiness *there* is considered as identical with 'the desirable', and this, however when *moralized* (in Mr Mill's language) it may include whatever is desired by all or any...' (Grote 1870, 87).

Yet this is not Grote's argument at this point. Rather he tells us what Mill would need to do if he was to give a real proof of the utilitarian maxim. Then he tells us what Mill does prove, and simply shows how far short of the former the latter falls. To argue his case Mill

> 'has to prove that 'happiness', as the ideal *summum bonum* of man, is the one thing which ought to regulate his conduct (as he calls it, the sole criterion of morality)...' (Grote 1870, 64)

and later,

> 'Mr Mill in his proof of the utilitarian principle seems to me only to prove (if he does prove it) that as a matter of experience what people desire is the desirable or happiness: not the utilitarian principle as he gives it, that the action which it is right people should do is that which tends to happiness. The principle involves an ideal, to which the proof does not even address itself' (Grote 1870, 270).

This account of Grote's position squares with that given by Sidgwick in his first review of the *Examination*. Here he says that Mill did not attempt a proof of the moral first principle, only a proof that people desire happiness, circumstantial evidence perhaps that at least happiness could be the ideal, and even the only ideal purpose (Warnock 1960, 22-23). Grote felt however that there was enough circumstantial evidence to support the claim of other things to be capable or worthy of being desired, (that is the right and the good, neither of which are in actual usage synonymous with happiness). So even this secondary form of proof would and does fail, a point we will come to again later. Without using the term, Grote still seems to be arguing that while tempted to commit the naturalist fallacy Mill held back, but in so doing he produced an invalid argument, and 'proving what is not the precise conclusion which we are called upon to prove', we have a case of 'ignoratio elenchi' (Joseph 1916, 590). This interpretation is supported by Grote's own summary account of his argument given in Chapter X.

> 'The reader will remember how in Mr Mill's papers, after right action had been defined as action conducive to happiness, it comes out by degrees, when it cannot be helped, that the happiness meant must have been that which the supposed proof will not apply to, - happiness morally determined, or into which there enter, for the determination of it, considerations extraneous to happiness, namely, virtue and duty' (Grote 1870, 161-162).

The reference to the argument that other ideals than happiness

are capable and worthy of desire as well as are regularly observed to be desired, is turned into the basis of another central criticism. Mill tells us that the question of the ultimate foundation of morals is identical with the question of the summum bonum, the ultimate purpose of life and action. Grote firstly, considers this to beg the question of what is the true foundation of morality. Secondly, he argues that the true foundation may equally be the 'summum jus' or the 'summum faciendum', the 'something to be done'.

> 'It may be expressed roughly by saying, that the thing which suggests itself to us as of importance, may either be to find our happiness, or to find our proper work' (Grote 1870, 67).

Later, after the intrusion of an argument about the possibility of God having put rules, order and intention into our existing moral world, Grote adds

> 'This is the idea of action being right and wrong, as distinguished from the idea of it as better or worse, more or less desirable. This is the idea of the *summum jus*, the *facien dum*, the notion of *duty*, under which the moral question may in some circumstances present itself to us, rather than in the idea of the *summum bonum*, the *acquirendum*, the notion of happiness'(Grote 1870, 67).

Here Grote's argument of the *Treatise*, that morality has a deontological as well as a teleological basis is foreshadowed, along with the claim that right and duty have independent moral value, equal if not superior to that of the good and happiness.

Other arguments flow, as Sidgwick notes, in a rather disorganized and repetitious manner. Firstly, if Mill is out to prove 'what are the things man desires' he has no need 'to show us that he desires the desirable'. Secondly, Mill equivocates on the meaning of 'desirable', between meaning the 'actually desired' and 'the ideally desirable, the summum bonum' (Grote 1870, 65). This may be called the 'fallacy of conflation' arising from Mill's practice of building on equivocations in the meaning of words. To this an apparently original insight is added by the editor in a note;

`The analogy by which Mill supports his argument here deserves attention though it has not been noticed by Prof. Grote. He says (Mill 1862, 51) 'The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it. In like manner the sole evidence it is possible to produce that any thing is desirable is that people do actually desire it'. But by *visible* and *audible* we mean capable of being seen and heard, and in this case the argument holds good, if an object is seen, it must have had the capacity of being seen; the latter proposition is merely a restatement of a part of the former. But the word *desirable* does not mean capable of being desired, but deserving to be desired, and in the argument, 'an object is desired therefore it is desirable', the latter proposition gives a new statement quite independent of that which was contained in the former' (Mayor, in Grote 1870, 65-66).

This argument was implied by Grote's comment on equivocation but was made explicit by Mayor and has now become a standard move in the debate on Mill's proof (6).

Next Grote in the middle of repeating the argument about the summum faciendum above introduces the insight that Mill's proof appears to work and be simple because

`the various terms here used, independently of the following them out into details and particulars, may be considered as all meaning the same thing' (Grote 1870,68).

The point that there is equivocation on the term happiness is turned into a charge of inconsistency later, noted especially in the different uses between Chapters II and IV of *Utilitarianism*. In the former, Mill

`follows the Epicureans in developing the idea of happiness into definite, measurable, describable pleasure, to be tested by experience'.

while in the latter happiness is widened to incorporate love of virtue and justice as its parts (Grote 1870, 72-72). A similar point is repeated later. If by happiness we mean the desirable then it is the summum bonum, if alternatively we change the judgement and mean by happiness only pleasure, something particular not general, the argument fails (Grote 1870, 74-75). This repeats the point that Mill's argument often appear to be simple and persuasive, to be

arguments not tautologies, but the appearance is achieved by equivocation and conflation.

Three other crucial arguments can be produced to further this review of Grote's critique of the proof. (1)First is that concerning the fallacy of composition, (2) the failure of the proof in regard to whose happiness, and (3) what sort of happines is to be promoted. As a preliminary Grote asks what follows if we admit Mill's proof that happiness was the solely desired end of our actions? Very little, according to Grote until Mill adds the `moralizing' or legitimatory term 'general'. We may consider Mill to show that the sole end is happiness but he nowhere proves that this ought to be the end and Grote wonders in addition where the natural sociability of men comes from in a philosophy that traditionally asserts that

> `the natural desire is not of *the general* happiness in the first instance, till social feelings and moral feelings have had time to work...' (Grote 1870, 70).

He also wonders whether it is true that people do really want to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number rather than the maximization of their own happiness. But the first problem is that of the general happiness, can the general happiness be considered equivalent to the aggregate of individual happinesses? Grote considers Mill's argument that

> `Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons'

fails dismally, coming to grief as it does on the age old problem of the irreconcilability of particulars and universals (Grote 1870, 70-72). Grote's presentation of the dilemma is that Mill's formulation fails to show

> `in the same natural manner in which a man's happiness is an end to him, the aggregate happiness is an end to *each individual* of the aggregate' (Grote 1870, 70-71),

and that an 'aggregate can act'. Mayor puts the problem more clearly and with better logic as follows,

> 'Mr Mill's argument is really an instance of the 'fallacy of composition', in which the word all is used at one time distributively, at another time collectively. Thus: each human being A, B, C, etc. naturally desires his own happiness; but A, B, C, etc. make up all human beings, and the happiness of A, B, C, etc. makes up the happiness of all human beings' (Mayor, in Grote 1870, 70)

At this point Mayor expands on Grote's own brilliant insight contained in his implicit analogy of utilitarianism and classical economics. This is the argument that 'The Happiness of Societies' in ethics is equivalent to 'The Wealth of Nations' in political economy (Grote 1870, 242-245). Historically a case can be made for considering utilitarianism to be the equivalent of Adam Smith's formulation of classical economics, with general happiness replacing wealth as the end. In utilitarianism marginal utility is measured by excesses of pleasure rather than profit, and self interest and the common good are created by sympathy and manipulation not by the 'hidden hand. As Mayor notes

> 'The fact is, this is an attempt on the part of the utilitarians to extend to morality the principle, true under certain limitations in political economy, that the public wealth is best promoted by each man's aiming at his own private wealth and occupying himself exclusively with that' (Mayor, in Grote 1870, 70).

By analogy both arguments are open to similar objections, including the marxist jibe that they are ideological, justifications not explanations of moral and economic behaviour respectively.

But Mill fails to give any convincing reason why a utilitarian should not argue that it is 'my happiness that is the good to *me*, it is *not* the general happiness that is so...' (Grote 1870, 72; Llewelyn Davies 1871, 86). According to Grote the problem is precisely that many people do prefer their own happiness and need to have good reasons for preferring the greatest happiness for the greatest number

and Mill fails to provide such a convincing case. However Grote produces one rather weak argument. It is that if all an actor has to do prove his actions are right is to prove that his actions, 'do actually produce happiness of some kind to somebody', it will be an 'ill wind which blows nobody any good'. The argument misses the significance of Mill stressing the 'general happiness' and the 'greatest amount' rather than 'some happiness' for 'somebody' (Grote 1870, 74). Grote is on firmer ground when he insists that when speaking of morality

> 'we must speak of general or social happiness to make certain we do not mean merely our own' (Grote 1870, 76).

In Grote's view Mill merely 'moralizes' a selfish doctrine by adding these epithets that have no convincing reasons to be there that can be found in the essay as presented. And so he finishes his examination of the 'proof'.

The review of Grote's arguments in the *Westminster* is extremely thorough, recognizing in brief most of the key points above. But whereas Schneewind later recognizes that

> 'Grote is aware, unlike some later critics, that Mill does not mean to give a logically conclusive proof'

the review here interprets Grote as accusing Mill of the naturalistic fallacy and produces a stereotyped defence, showing that Mill did not lapse into the fallacy, and that the nature of the proof was really to show only that because mankind generally did desire happiness that happiness was a highly probable candidate for being accepted as the summum bonum (Schneewind 1977, 185; Westminster Review 1871, 51-52). Sidgwick like Schneewind rightly considered Grote to have desisted from the accusation of naturalism, and Quinton's silence, I presume, implies that he too recognized this crucial point in the argument (Sidgwick 1871a, 183; Quinton 1973, 86). Personally I agree with Schneewind's judgement on this issue with the qualification that Grote

noticed the implicit tendency of any utilitarian doctrine to place its obvious intuitional first principle upon strong sociological and psychological observational foundations, a tendency made more pressing, when the advocates were claiming both to refute the 'a priori', 'intuitional' and 'deductive' ethics of their opponents, and to embrace for themselves in a legitimatory posture 'a posteriori', 'experiential' and 'inductive' supports.

d) Whose happiness, virtue, duty, and justice

Here Grote's charge is that Mill fails to give us convincing accounts of how to distribute our actions in regard to others, what are and why we should do our duties and be virtuous. Before examining his arguments we can just remind ourselves of the following points. Grote does not consider that Mill has given adequate grounds for adding the epithet 'general' to happiness in the formulation of the greatest happiness principle (Grote 1870, 76, 85-86). Secondly he does not consider that Mill has proved that the aggregation of individuals' happiness is the same thing as the general happiness. Finally he has expressed the same sort of reservation as Sidgwick, that sociability and the socially altruistic motives of the Stoics are imported by Mill into a system that normally requires, as with Bentham, that interests of the self and others, individual and society are balanced artificially by education or legislation. This importation is incompatible with the old system (Sidgwick 1971b, 198). On the first point the *Westminster Review* considers not only Mill but Bentham to have prescribed the general happiness as both the motive of individuals and the purpose of moral conduct (Westminster Review, 1871, 45). On the second the reviewer remains silent, but on the third he is supportive. Mill is heterodox in that he insists on a basic and natural sentiment or instinct towards social behaviour where

Bentham relied only upon education, reward and punishment. The reviewer however rightly notes that David Hume also posited the existence of a basic benevolent sentiment alongside his otherwise utilitarian account of human psychology Westminster Review, 1871, 46). Llewelyn Davies supports Grote when he asks the rhetorical questions,

> 'Is not the social bond the more important part of the foundation of Mr Mill's ethics? Has not the Stoical or Christian cuckoo extruded the Epicurean sparrow? The ideal though you drive it out with a fork, will insist on returning' (Llewelyn Davies, 1871, 87).

The central issue now is not whether man is a social being, or desires the general happiness, but how in practical life he is to determine his actions. Is he simply to do that which he personally believe will conform to his own happiness or to the greatest happiness of all? Must he obey traditional directives or contemporary calculations? Must he apply the principle directly to acts or to intermediary secondary moral rules? Must we treat all persons equally according to a principle of impartiality or must special social relationships be allowed to direct preferences? But we can tackle only two issues in depth here, touching on the others in passing. These are 'whose' and 'what sort' of happiness is to be promoted for an action to be right. On the first issue Grote's position is that Mill does not advise us how we are to know how to distribute our actions (and happiness) between contending parties in the world (Grote 1870, 4-5). Mill tells us to maximize happiness but gives little coherent guidance on how this can be achieved. Nor does he tell us specifically what sort of pleasures or happiness to distribute (Grote 1870, 84). This, according to Grote, is a massive failure, another case of Mill's arguments missing the questions and being superfluous, for these issues are two of the most important in all of philosophical discourse on morality. To make good the failure Grote asserts that

Mill would need to inject more intuitive elements alien to utilitarianism. And indeed this to some extent Mill does in his arguments in the essay under review.

On the former issue we can detect three key issues

> 'The most important point in regard to this distribution is the question as between our own happiness and that of others, the question between selfishness and benevolence: the next in importance is the question of special claim upon us, or the question between justice and both benevolence and selfishness' (Grote 1870, 88).

In between we shall then take the other question of importance, the question of when our actions are already bound and when moral choice operates, or if we like the questions of duty and virtue, which Grote sees as sub questions of the first (Grote 1870, 98).

The central theme of Grote's criticism of Mill's argument on these issues is that he avoids the questions and parades superfluous arguments about other issues. In particular the utilitarian's argument, including Mill's

> 'may be considered an attempt to shift the question from this ground back to the ground of the production of more or less of happiness. It tries to blind its eyes to the fact that it must assume *some* principle of distribution for the happiness, and when if does assume such, it seems to avoid as much as possible giving a reason for it' (Grote 1870, 88).

We have seen how central these issues are to Grote, he says in the introduction to the *Examination*

> 'that the most important points of moral difficulty arise not in reference to the question about actions, whether they are useful or not, but in reference to the question, <u>who</u> it is, in the conflict of various interests in life, that they are useful to' (Grote 1870, 4).

Put in another vocabulary the key questions in morality are not what is useful but what ought we to do, what is right and proper for us to do, in short, what makes an action right, proper or appropriate, either at the level of being bound or obliged, or at the level of being freely imperative, or virtuous. As I have already argued Grote considers that Mill does not set these issues out clearly and he does

not tackle them directly (Grote 1870, 88, 93). His usual tactic is merely to refer his audience back to the argument for promoting `the general happiness' or 'maximizing' happiness, generally hence avoiding the issues (Grote 1870, 86). This addition of general we have seen is an unwarranted and unjustified addition, a new intuition, and one that is anyway unjustified as it is fallaciously reduced to the aggregate of the happiness of all separately (Grote 1870, 274).

The point that Mill needs a criteria of distribution more specific than `Maximize happiness' is pushed home by Grote in the following rhetorical argument,

> `I do not see why a person should not be acting on this principle (the G.H.P) who acted entirely for his own happiness, with the *bona fide* idea that he *could* do more for his own happiness than for that of others, he was really in this way most increasing the entire stock' (Grote 1870, 88-89).

This would not do for Grote as we know that he considered action arising solely from consideration concerning only the self to be not immoral but amoral, nothing to do with morality. In this case the actor did not consider others. He only considers maximizing the total amount of happiness in the world (though he could have escaped Grote's condemnation if he had agreed that he could but help others by looking after himself). So Grote's objection must be that morality only comes into effect when we do act so as to actually promote the happiness of others. What we need according to Grote is either some extra principle, ideal, standard or rule to judge practical questions of distribution by, or some other explanation as to why people act according to certain regular social rules. Grote's own answer is predictable, there are other moral ideals independent of happiness which explain how we are to act, or in Grote's language, how we are to distribute our actions. As with Kant and Hegel these are the ideals of `right' and `duty' plus the sub-ideals of 'virtue' and 'justice' (Grote 1870, 274-275). The particularity of distribution Grote

considered to be based of the facts of our position within social relationships, or as Bradley is to put it later the relation of 'My Station and Its Duties' (Grote 1870, 96-100; Bradley 1876, 145-192; Llewelyn Davis 1871, 92-93). Human beings are fundamentally social, social in existence, thought, word and deed. Our ideals of right, duty, virtue and justice are to a large measure an abstract account of the imperatives that our everyday social relationships entail for us plus the feelings that are associated with these relationships e.g love of children. Our ideals 'fit' the actual circumstances of our lives. The ideals though imaginative are also shadows of the higher facts, the absolute standards of right, duty, virtue and justice Grote presumed were the elements of moral reality (Grote 1870, 178-179). Feelings, relations and ideals were therefore relative to our society and our social imaginations but they were also guesses at the moral truth. All this will be explained in detail in the next chapter on social and moral political theory when discussing Grote's relational social theory, his accounts of duty, justice and law.

Now believing as they did in the existence of only one source of moral value, and one moral ideal, to guide our actions the utilitarians could not entertain Grote's view. Duty, virtue, justice and right had to be explained in terms of happiness and particular moral rules had to be explained as secondary rules derived from the ultimate principle. Operating with an individualistic theory and a social anthropology based on desire and fear, might tempered by education and manipulation, they had a problem defining both social feelings, and the existence and imperative status of traditional social rules. Mill overcame the problem of explaining the everyday social norms and values that direct our actions by reference partly to force of habit and education and partly to the social nature of man, plus the existence of some strong social sentiments or internal

sanctions for wrongdoing. To make up for the lack of a particular criteria of justice Mill intuitively imports some alien help, the concepts of 'impartiality', 'disinterestedness' and 'equality' all of which in addition Grote considers to be confused and inadequate to account for what we think, do and feel we ought to do. We may take two points. (1) Mill's discussions of impartiality, disinterestedness and equality. (2) the status and function of the secondary ideals of right, duty, justice and virtue, and the reliance of distribution on secondary rules.

(1) The first argument Grote objects to in Mill's account of distribution is the importation of the idea of impartiality following from Mill's claim that,

> 'As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitariamism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator' (Mill 1910, 16).

This idea suggests to Grote 'a revolution' in our moral thinking. Now instead of the old 'Ptolomaic' morality which sees ourselves at the centre of the moral universe, as in Benthamite utilitariansm, we get a kind of rational or 'Copernican' system where reason tells us that we are each a unit in a greater system with no special place, without special ties or purposes (Grote 1870, 93-94). Grote's own starting point is neither of these but with society and social relationships.

> 'But all this must begin with the notion of ourselves, and of something, whatever it is, which makes *us* what *we* are, and with the notion of others as differing among themselves, and with certain things which make *them* what *they* are:...' (Grote 1870, 94).

Mill and his colleagues in short saw society as an aggregate of separate but similar units, while Grote saw it as 'an organization of dissimilar members' (Grote 1870, 95). When it came to distribution of our actions then Mill has to produce an argument about equal considerations, impartiality and disinterestedness while Grote sees

that while these may on occasions be moral, it is a more usual moral criteria to be partial, interested and to treat people differently according to their special rights, their entitlements and deserts.

In addition Grote makes the marvellously simple point that impartiality and disinterestedness have meaning only in the contexts where partiality and preference are not appropriate. They are not distinct and separate ethical concepts but are relative to particular occasions and appropriate uses within moral vocabulary.

> 'Impartiality and disinterestedness are negative terms, which have no meaning except on the supposition of temptation to partiality and of possible interestedness in the first instance: they are gaurds and corrections and cannot be given as original principles' (Grote 1870, 94).

Next, these principles ignore the reality that we are often bound to show preference according to the unique positions of parties to one another in a relationship.

> 'Because a judge is impartial, it does not follow that he will divide the thing in dispute equally between the parties. Impartiality between parties means, the not allowing any consideration to contribute to the judgement formed which ought not to do so',

or as he says, impartiality does not mean really giving

> '*no* preference, but the giving no *undue* preference: and we still have the meaning of 'ought' and 'due' to settle (Grote 1870, 94-95).

'Impartiality' and 'equity' Grote considers to be fundamently legal concepts that have been imported into moral language to express the undesirabality of 'undue preference'. To take the concept as fundamental, not as qualifications to 'justifiable preference' is to misunderstand language and to let a subsidiary qualification or tail wag a primarily legal dog .

Religious appeal is made by Mill in his quoting the golden rule to 'treat thy neighbour as thyself' but Grote takes issue with Mill's interpretation of this maxim. Jesus did not intend that we showed no discrimination between deserving and undeserving cases, duty bound and

free situations. Jesus did not mean

> 'Love your father and your neighbour, your benefactor and your neighbour, alike; yet this is in fact what the principle of 'every body counting for one' leads to' (Grote 1870, 95).

So Grote comes to the firm conclusion, based on the legal and relational theory to be examined later, that

> 'if we are to answer the question, *whose* happiness we are to promote? we must answer it by saying, not the happiness of all alike, ourselves taking share with the rest, but the happiness (if we are so to describe it) of each one with whom we have to do, according to the moral relation is which we stand to him' (Grote 1870, 96).

We are in brief to find out what claims are validly made upon us by the existence of a relationship, say becoming a father. We are then to act to satisfy these claims (or as we call it) we do our duty. On other occasions our relationships do not bind us but people still want or request things from us. When we consider such requests are valid we distribute our actions in their favour, which is called being virtuous.

Without wishing to enter too closely Grote's theories of obligation and justice we may still pick up his other worry about Mill and Bentham's use of 'equality' and the idea of 'arithmetic equality' in particular, in which we are exhorted to treat all other men alike, as equal units, for the consideration of the distribution of happiness. Grote is not here objecting to the idea of equal respect for all human beings, he indeed applauds Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' and writes that indeed

> 'in some respects all people are to be treated alike by us, *as men*' (Grote 1870, 340),

But if by equality we mean something other than 'equal respect ' or 'equal consideration', and move to 'equal amounts to receive' then Grote feels we have a principle neither morally or practically acceptable nor philosophically valid, nor one that has 'anything to do with utilitarianism' (Grote 1870, 335-336). Indeed the importation of

the ideas of 'impartiality' and 'equal claims' or 'rights' are 'a priori' intuitions (Grote 1870, 274; Llewelyn Davies 1871, 88-89). The impracticality lies in the fact that we are all so dissimilar in so many ways. Continual levelling of differences may also produce the opposite of progress (1870, 334-336, 341). The immorality lies in treating unlike cases alike or equally and indeed

> 'it has been no less generally recognized that in some respects they are to be treated differently, *as this or that man* bearing a particular relation to us' (Grote 1870, 340).

The philosophical invalidity arises from several considerations, starting with the most general, which is that

> 'when the word *equal* is used in regard to them (men), it is used generally with very little meaning' (Grote 1870, 336).

Strictly the term has an arithmetical usage, but arithmetical measurement and comparisons are not regularly appropriate to human beings with all their differences exhibited. But Bentham and Mill extend the usages without specifying, defining, or separating them. Other considerations are the mistaken assumption about society being a collection or aggregate of similar units, the idea that we relate to each other as units without what Grote calls 'special ties', and the failure to consider that these ties and the relationships they involve, entail that unequal consideration of claims and unequal distributions are to be made. Most of these objections would however be superfluous if Mill was, when speaking of equality, only referring to the simple point that we are to consider each person as equally capable of feeling and worthy of having their happiness considered when distributions are to be made. But then such a claim would, if validated, only support Grote's objection that Mill does not have a well worked out theory of distribution (Llewelyn Davies 1871, 88-89).

(2) The Status of Virtue, Duty and Justice as secondary moral rules, given to them by Mill, detain Grote for several chapters.

Llewelyn Davies argues in his review that Grote overlooked the role of secondary moral rules in Mill's system. Mill required only that our everyday rules and laws be checked for conformity with the greatest happiness.

> 'But when it has been concluded on such grounds that a certain action is right, its rightness is a law, on Utilitarian principles, to the individual agent. He is not bound or expected to have the results of the action consciously in view' (Llewelyn Davies 187, 87)

The *Westminster Review* also makes a similar point about the utilitarians as a whole, including Mill,

> 'According to their reiterated statements, it does not supercede moral rules, it tests their worth. So far from nullifying the common duties, it postulates them as its logical deductions. That everybody should invariably seek the universal happiness would be the very worst way to secure that end. This requires, on the contrary, that a system of special duties, varying with the circumstances of the objects and their relations to ourselves, should be prescribed by society...' (Westminster Review 1871, 47)

Now both these reviewers in considering Mill to be a rule utilitarian beg the central question of whether Mill was an act or a rule utilitarian. That is did he consider that each individual act should be judged individually by direct appeal to the happiness principle, or did he feel that individual acts should be judged against moral rules and only the moral rules be adjudicated by appeal to the first principle. The debate still rages and fortunately my discussion and Grote's do not hinge upon its settlement (7). Grote is more interested in two questions; firstly are duties, virtues and the precepts of justice only secondary moral rules backed by internal and external sanctions, and secondly are duties, virtues and the precepts of justice to be considered as logical deductions from the utilitarian principle? His answer to both is in the negative.

Duty, virtue and justice to Grote are ideals, valuable in their own right. We judge an act good as we do a good cricketer, not by

reference to one quality but by several in conjunction. As he puts it neatly,

> 'Of these ideas then, virtue, duty, usefulness or conduciveness to happiness, I do not see the least how one can be resolved into another. They are various qualities of those actions which, speaking loosely, we call good, right, morally valuable: we have no reason that I can see, to say that their goodness or rightness *consists* in one of these more than in another: if we wish to test their goodness or rightness, we cannot take one of these qualities to the exclusion of the others, but must take them, according to circumstances in conjunction' (Grote 1870, 162).

Each ideal has rules which govern the application of its principles to practice and each has feeling and sentiments associated with obedience, or disobedience to these rules and the performance of virtuous acts, such as sympathy, conscience, the love of duty and virtue, and the feeling of fairness or unfairness. But Grote is clear that a) duty, virtue and justice do not get their imperative status as a logical deduction from the happiness principle, b) that the rules of each are valid in relationship to their own primary ideal and not to happiness, c) that the feelings associated with the performance and non performance of moral acts are only 'signs' or 'indications' that the acts are right, not the 'determinants of', 'motives towards' nor 'sanction of' the rules. This being the case Mill's arguments about duty, virtue and justice are to be treated as suspect. His repeated entreaties that utilitarian ethics does not challenge or undermine conventional ethical standards can be given only with partial acceptance, and his views on internal sanctions and sentiments are to be rejected.

<u>Virtue</u>

Five separate chapters are devoted to a) above,i.e. that the principles and rules of virtue, duty and justice are not dependent upon the happiness principle. These are Chapter VI 'On the real goodnes of virtue', Chapter VII, on the 'Utilitarians view of the goodness of virtue', Chapter VIII on 'Duty and the utilitarian

sanctions', Chapter IX on 'Duty and the utilitarian justice', and Chapter X on 'The moral sentiment in its relation to happiness, virtue and duty'. My summary can be brief as the central arguments can be anticipated from what has been written in this and the previous chapter. We may take virtue first, then duty and leave justice until the next chapter.

Virtue, we know has its origins in our freedom to choose to help others and make self sacrifices. It is a part of right, the faciendum, that is it is judged not by its purposes done, its usefulness or productiveness of happiness but by its being in conformity to some standard or rule, by the effort of will, and the motive. Chapter VI was a first draft of the theory of moral value to be found in Chapter VI of the *Treatise*. Chapter VI of the *Examination* indeed starts with the statement of intention that

> 'it will be my business in this chapter to show especially in regard of *virtue*, that its goodness or valuableness is not given to it simply by its conduciveness to happiness but has other sources independent of this' (Grote 1870, 105).

He then adds in a precise statement that utilitarianism is

> 'the supposing that, whatever praiseworthiness or excellence there may be in virtue, whatever bindingness in duty, whatever indispensableness in society, whatever nobleness in self-devotion, whatever delightfulness in sympathy; all this depends in the last resort upon the maxim, that one action is better or more valuable than another, more to be chosen than another, preferable to another, on this principle only, that it is more conducive to some happiness' (Grote 1870, 105-106).

Chapter VII of the *Examination* starts with the argument that while 'conduciveness to happiness' is one source of moral value, it does not cover the 'whole ground' and that there are 'other original and primary' sources. Secondly we have the argument that

> 'value for actions as conducive to *general* happiness is as much a secondary and derived principle (if either are to be called so) as value for actions in their character as virtuous or generous' (Grote 1870, 121)

In other words right, just or virtuous action may or may not be

productive of happiness in life, but the value we attach to happiness may itself be derived exclusively from its association with virtue and right. Mill has not proved his case on the matter. The next argument refers to the oddity of Mill's claim that virtue is 'a part' of happiness and not just to be valued as a 'means' to its realization. Mill does not make his position clear on this, nor as to whether virtue is to be valued independently of the happiness it produces (Grote 1870, 125-127).

Duty

The theory of obligation in Grote will be tackled later, here I shall refer only to his objection to the utilitarian argument that the nature, content and value of duty and duties derives from their conduciveness to the production of happiness. This is covered in Chapter VII of the *Examination* (Grote 1870, 134-147), in which Grote is in devastating form. Firstly he notes that the Millian maxim of duty is to do what is right but that this is reduced to doing what is desirable or what we ought to do.

> 'The maxim however thus stated will probably appear insignificant and a mere identical proposition: right and 'what we ought to do', mean the same thing' (Grote 1870, 134).

But Mill means by the word 'right' sometimes a reference to specific duties, and at other times to the general duty that we produce happiness. Mill hence does not prove what we ought to do, on particular occasions only that we ought to produce the general happiness, though his equivocation on the words 'right' and 'duty' allow us to gain a false impression of comprehensivity.

Secondly Mill shifts his ground from proving that duty is derived from happiness to proving that duty is merely a feeling, sentiment or sanction, an 'inducement' to encourage social activity (Grote 1870, 136-13). Grote objects that this is an invalid move, as well as giving a false account of the relationships between feelings, moral

facts and the moral ideals of duty and right. Thirdly Grote makes the key point that Mill not only accounts for why we should do our duty in the general (if he proves even that) and not in the particular but he wrongly reverses the priority of general to particular duty (Grote 1870, 253).

> 'And duty binds us, not in the first in the general (namely, to promote the general happiness), and in the particular only as a consequence of this; but first in the particular, duty in general being an expression for the whole of such particular duty' (Grote 1870, 96).

The point is, Mill does not help us to discover 'what is my duty', except in the most general terms. Like Bradley's criticism of Kant, Grote is accusing Mill of providing a merely formal account without any content or application. Like McPherson later he criticises the practice of trying to account for obedience in general and not in specific terms and cases (McPherson 1967, 50-58).

The over reliance on sentiments and sanctions to explain duty is also a criticism Grote makes of Mill. Grote as we have seen treats feelings and sentiments as lower facts that indicate what is right or our duty. Hence the feeling of being bound is only an attachment to the practice and reality of being bound, (the experience of it), it is not itself the source of value, nor a spring of action. The fact we must always consider is 'whether we are bound' in terms of our relationships, whether they be economic, political, social or moral. The moral feelings only reflect the facts in the same way that our sensations of a tree reflect the judgement that the tree exists as a fact.

> 'It is not the feeling which binds or obliges us, but it is the state of facts of which we are thus made aware through the feeling' (Grote 1870, 145).

But this leads to a larger point. Just as Mill tries but fails to adequately explain what are our duties and why we do obey he also fails to explain satisfactorily why we ought to obey. His theory is

utilitarian - we ought to obey because by so doing we will help produce the greatest happiness. We do obey as a result of habit, education, the manipulation of external sanctions and the presence of some internal sanctions. Grote provides a unique and a highly persuasive critique and alternative to these two propositions. Grote's points are as follows, firstly the existence of duties is not the outcome of social pressures or the result of pursuit of happiness, it is rather to be seen as a precondition of social, legal and political existence (Grote 1870, 275, 151). The whole notion of an association of individuals implies the recognition of rights, claims and the performance of duties. Next a duty is not an artificial construct whose imperativeness depends upon its purposes being realized, it is a historical construct, which usually pre-exists ourselves and which we find conditions our lives.

> 'In reality man is born into a complicated scene, and before he is conscious or a free agent, he is hampered round with all sorts of circumstances, which, in a different point of view, make a large portion of his powers not his own, but variously *due*' (Grote, 1873, 145).

Thirdly we obey not just because of sanctions or because we feel we should, nor just because we expect to gain happiness by obeying on this occasion or by conforming to the practice of obedience, but because we both recognize the 'right 'of the duty or law and possibly recognize its 'reason' and its logic (Grote 1870, 139-140, 142-4, 146). But more of all this later.

The idea that socially conditioned feelings towards virtue, duty and justice, and against selfishness, disobedience and unfairness can in any way explain why we ought to obey is treated with particular derision as it was later by F.H.Bradley (Bradley 1876, 111-113). Grote had raised the point earlier in the *Examination* that Mill's treatment of ordinary social feelings as the ultimate sanctions of morality was an instance of his departure from old or Benthamite

utilitarianism (Mill 1910, ChIII, 24-32). The point there was two fold, firstly that Mill adds to Bentham's list of sentiments the basic social sentiment. The second was that he treated this alongside other internal sentiments e.g sympathy and conscience, as internal sanctions, and that he treated these as of more effect in determining obedience than the external sanctions (Grote 1870, 21-22,138). Both needed the theory of sanctions because they disliked language in the morally imperative mood. Grote points out that Bentham advocated expunging the term 'ought' from the moral vocabulary, while Mill sought to explain its origins and effects on a psychological rather than a philosophical basis (Grote 1870, 136). 'Why ought I' is converted into 'What inducements are there' in Mill's moral vocabulary.

Conceptual problems are the first that detain Grote on the theory of sanctions in Chapter VIII. After pointing out that sanction to Mill means 'inducement' and quibbling over the separation of internal from external sanctions, Grote notes the intrusion of an essentially legal concept of sanctions into Mill's moral discourse. The usage involves a legal analogy but the analogy does not hold good in Mill's argument. In law a sanction is an appeal to fear, a threatened or real punishment, but Mill applies it equally and wrongly to include 'appeals to hope, namely promises or bribes'. This as Grote points out 'is an entire misuse of language' (Grote 1870, 141). Worse still Bentham and Mill have the wrong idea of law, that it is obeyed primarily out of fear, that obedience has to be induced. So when the ideas of law are applied to morals the mistake is also transferred (Grote 1870, 140). Obligation is reduced to inducement. Now fear, constraint and compulsion are 'very real' features of law and duty to Grote but they are 'subsidiary' to others, especially 'consent', the 'recognition of right' or of legitimacy, and the recognition that there

is some 'reason' in or behind the law or the duty required. Once again utilitarianism gives a partial or abstract view of reality not a complete or coherent view (Grote 1870, 142, 206-207).

To push home the point Grote discusses the case of the duty to keep promises. Paley explains that the reason for keeping one's word is 'because you will be fearfully punished if not'. Mill and Bentham answer the question by appeal to 'the vast advantages to society of general trustfulness' Grote considers both answers to be partial, and to reflect only subsidiary features of obligation. The answer he gives should wet our appetite for the next chapter, both for its simplicity, its novelty and for the echo it has of the contemporary arguments of those philosophical anthropologists who have discussed obligation in terms of the practice and its preconditions rather than its experience and its effects. We must keep promises according to Grote, for the reasons we must tell the truth, because the practices are pre-conditions for social existence, because without the duty to keep promises and tell the truth the practices would not be workable for nobody would accept a promise or believe what was being said. The acceptance of rights and duties rests in the end on trust.

> 'But I apprehend that the real answer, which is *felt* in the minds of those who feel simply and well, is: 'I feel that I must speak the truth because I know that I am trusted: I feel that trust reposed in me calls for trustfulness from me, and calls with a voice which I cannot stifle or disobey: it is the person who trusts me to whom in the first instance I am under the obligation of truthfulness, an obligation under which he by his trust lays me, which so far makes me not free, and binds my action' (Grote 1870, 143).

Later Grote adds that in addition to the duty being a condition of my relationship to the other person, it is also a condition of my relationship to society, and hence

> 'truth is a duty to society'

Duty then arises from the facts of our relationships with others. Indeed duty is a precondition of relationships existing in the first

place, for one could not relate to another in any other way than one of conflict unless one accepted and recognized duties and rights, things owed and claimed. These are particular in the first instance but always exist in a social context. Duties are known to us by knowledge of these facts not just through our feelings. In addition obligation stems from recognition of right and reason in our duties not just from sanctions or other inducements. Put briefly

> 'The notion of duty carries with it that it is *claimable* by the party, and then *enforcable* by the superior authority backing him or coming into his place' (Grote 1870, 145).

Close acquaintance with Robert Leslie Ellis, well trained in jurisprudence, was perhaps equipping Grote for his engagement with the legally minded Benthamites. To complete the discussion on sanctions we may refer briefly to Grote's rebuttal of Mill's account of conscience. To Mill it is 'a pain attendant on violation of duty' which arises from association via either education or fear engendered by experience. Conscience is no special faculty to Grote and he goes out of his way to reject Butler's explanations. Indeed he recognizes that conscience and other moral feelings, emotions and sentiments, such as shame, honour, sympathy and kindness,

> 'are very far from being infallible guides: their suggestions, though pretty sure to be in the main right, are very likely to be in many details wrong; reason must halt after them in the best way it can to correct and examine them' (Grote 1870, 167, 168).

But while distancing himself from the moral sense, sentiments and common sense schools because they made too much of conscience, Grote felt the utilitarian theory was deficient in the other direction by reducing conscience to a mere sanction and in providing for it a purely relativist account. Education and experience of sanction upon non performance of duty do mould our conscience and behaviour, but in a more serious way both are exercised in realizing our human potential and our social nature (Grote 1870, 207-213). On human potential he

writes

> 'The saying that conscience or the moral sentiment in man is a result of education, seems to me like saying that flying in birds is a result of education, because it does not appear to be done all at once, but there is a process of learning on the part of the young, and as it would appear, of instruction and aid on the part of the older ones' (Grote 1870, 169).

On our social natures he reiterates his point that conscience is both individual and social, that we imagine and judge for ourselves on right and wrong, but that as our 'mind' and our 'condition' is social, this individual act is itself social. The judgement we reach is not social in the sense of resulting from social pressure, sanction or socialization, but is social in the sense of mediated by a social language, experience, practice, a social mind and imagination. Conscience is both an 'imagination of the judgement of others 'condemning us', and a 'self-condemnation' (Grote 1870, 169-170).

Conscience indeed is analogous to the feeling of guilt in regard to the breach of law. The feeling may accompany the breach of the law and may in part reflect one's fear of the consequences. With duty the law is only an imagined moral law and the feeling is as much to do with the recognition that the moral law has been broken and ought to have been obeyed as it is a recognition of impending consequences (Grote 1870, 164-166).

Justice

As we shall see in the next chapter, John Grote develops in the *Treatise* and *Examination* a positive ethical and political theory labelled 'Jural Ethics'. The main lines of this are that the meaning of, nature, character and decision making concerning right and wrong in the moral and political spheres, are analogous to those operating in the legal sphere. In many ways Benthamite and Millian utilitarianism worked with the some analogy but understanding law in the way they did, the analogy produced vastly different accounts of

duty and justice. Because law to the utilitarians was a body of publicly sanctioned rules, the latter providing the unique character of legal as distinct from conventional rules, so duty and justice became sets of conventional moral rules deriving their obedience primarily by being sanctioned. Because laws are supposed to gain their moral value or right from their beneficial consequences to society, the rules of duty and justice gain their moral value from their general social utility. Grote has little to say against the six rules of justice Mill ennumerates at the beginning of his chapter on 'Utilitarianism: How Connected with Justice'. Indeed, he notes both how right Mill is in describing these rules and that the account given is close to that of the 'jural ethics' which, 'I have given as in my view the right account', of law and duty and their relationship (Grote 1870, 150). The gap lies however where, instead of using the language of 'right' 'rights and dues', Mill speaks of consequential and 'reasonable expectations' to explain the source of obligation and right, and that Mill considers that it is force and a special kind of sentiment of unfairness that explains actual obedience, while Grote stresses other things, including 'consent' and the 'recognition of right' to be operative. As usual Mill has made his neo-utilitarian account sound convincing by 'the old plan' of 'modifying and adding' to the old theory,

> '"to save appearances" by accumulating cycle on epicycle where the fault is in an original wrong supposition...' (Grote 1870, 151).

The wrong supposition is most evident in Mill's etymological account of Justice or Justum. We are reminded that etymology is not a reliable guide in moral reasoning, a lesson preached in 'On Glossology', and then given a case in point. Mill supports his contention that 'the general idea of justice is the idea of legal constraint' or compelled conformity to law by insisting that

originally Justum was 'a form of jussum, that which has been ordered'. The author, supported by Mayor insists on other possible derivations, and supports the tie between justum and jus which refers to 'a set of regulations as to mutual rights, an order of private rights and property' (Grote 1870, 153-154). But the wrong supposition about law is seen most obviously in Mill's historical account of the growth of law, and in the odd introduction by Mill of ideal rules under which the utilitarian must operate outside the law and as a vantage point for its criticism. How can a positive legal theorist like Mill, following in the tradition of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, all supporting a 'command theory' of law, possibly equate an ideal law theory needed to explain duty and justice, with the positive law theory used elsewhere? Grote himself considers duty to be covered by an 'ideal moral law' but he can explain this in terms of his idealist epistemology and moral theory. But such ideal moral laws are 'alien to' and 'incompatible' with genuine utilitarianism (Grote 1870, 156-158). Further hints of heterodoxy in Mill's theory of justice are also found by Grote in the phrase that Mill once uses that justice stands for 'certain utilities which are vastly more absolute and imperative than others' (Mill 1910, 60). What are the criteria for these utilities being more absolute and imperative? Are they differences in kind or quality or merely differences in quantity? If the former, then Mill has introduced another a priori and intuitional element into the now ragbag system of utilitarian ethics (Grote 1870, 149).

Finally there is a point about the status of secondary moral rules. Mill and his defenders, such as the reviewer for the *Westminster*, and Llewelyn Davis on this point, considered that the regular criticism of utilitarian ethics, that it 'advocated' expediency and undervalued the place of conventional moral rules,

especially those of duty and justice, was unfair. Mill, they argue, recognized fully the value of conventional moral rules, he demanded regular obedience to them and considered as his difference to Grote and other opponents that all such moral rules derived their imperativeness and value from their ultimate capacity to produce social benefits (Mill 1910, 18, 21-24; Llewelyn Davies 1871, 87; Westminster Review 1871, 47,53). Grote recognized Mill's advance on Bentham on this point noting also how Mill considers custom to embody lessons from history, but he complains a) that the advance is a novel addition and not a reiteration of something all utilitarians had agreed with, and b) that in addition this respect for rules is in conflict with the traditional form of act utilitarianism (Grote 1870, 22-24). But in addition Grote still considered Mill to be mistaken in treating the 'rules of right action' as witnessed in the rules of virtue, duty and justice as deriving their value from their felicific outcomes (Grote 1870, 237). Nothing to the utilitarian can be absolutely right, just or my duty. All right is relative, everything has to be tested not by time on the one side or by the other moral ideals in conjunction but by utility alone. This new form of 'reforming utilitarianism', Grote finds quite unacceptable (Grote 1870, 227-232).

We may summarize this section with a question from Grote which contains his general argument that Mill's defence of utilitarianism involves a 'moralizing' or 'idealizing' of the old positivist and hedonistic doctrine, to such an extent that the question that remains is whether neo utilitarianism is still utilitarianism or a novel and heterodox moral theory. Mill's procedure in the essay can be summarized as follows according to Grote;

> 'The first step is the supposing an ideal at all, and this at once removes ethics from the category of the simply positive or

> inductive sciences, to which no such supposition belongs. The next is the giving for content, or filling up, to this ideal the imagination of a happiness beyond our own, the happiness of others or the general happiness. Then, when we imagine the world of moral beings with their various claims and their various feelings, we come to idealize both the happiness and the generality of it: we imagine not only a desirable manner of life, which we may call happiness, but a desirable kind of happiness, however we may name it; and also a desirable distribution of the happiness, or relation of the happiness of one individual to another' (Grote 1870, 178-179).

IV

On Method

An outline criticism of moral positivism was provided in part three of Chapter VII above. There Grote's arguments about the proper and improper relationships between descriptive and prescriptive, empirical and normative statements, and between various forms of positivism and idealism were discussed. Grote we will remember reacted against the belief that moral and political activity could be explained adequately from positivist assumptions and observational evidence. In addition he noted with disdain the common practice of many positivists of smuggling moral terms, assumptions and methods into their arguments while claiming for them the purity and authority of empirical and scientific method. The result of so doing he saw as anything from being trifling and nugatory, to being illogical and perhaps morally and practically dangerous. We have now seen that not only moral philosophy but all intellectual study presupposes beliefs and even ideals. All intellectual knowledge, including science involves the belief in an ordered world and the possibility of true knowledge about it; all moral philosophers presume a belief in a right order and the possibility of a knowledge of that. Chapters XI to XIV and XVII of the *Examination* explores these points with special regard to utilitarian moral and political philosophy and finds it

wanting.

To Grote's claim that utilitarianism must, if it is to be a philosophy, assume at least one ideal element, an intuitive principle, and hence could not possibly fulfill the claim to be purely scientific or positive, the *Westminster Review's* reply was that the argument is a case of ignoratio elenchi

> 'since they (utilitarians) have never overlooked the fact that Ethics concerns itself with an Ideal of action, but have advocated their principle as the worthiest of Ideals' (Westminster Review 1871, 83).

This admission itself was a milestone in the debate on utilitarian ethics and became a premise for the next development in Sidgwick's *Methods*. John Grote did much to wring this admission from utilitarians, who despite disclaimers by apologists, had repeatedly claimed for their system the character of being observational, inductive and a posteriori, in short, scientific.

In brief the arguments of the above chapters are as follows. It is an essential characteristic of all practical life that there is something given and something absent, that we feel ought or ought not to be. The former we call the positive, the latter the ideal. The study of the former is positivism, and the latter idealism. A life pursuing what we do want is called prudential, that pursuing the ideal is called moral. The moral life is characterized by the attempt to reconcile the is and the ought, the given and the imagined, the positive and the ideal. Moral philosophy is to study these ideals and this process,

> 'Man in virtue of his free-will, reason, and imagination, forms an ideal of his action: what moral philosophy seeks to find and to recommend, as the guide of individual action, is the best ideal for the action of the human race' (Grote 1870, 172).

Unfortunately the history of moral philosophy has witnessed attempts by various schools to subsume the ideal under one notion only; sometimes as in the ancient world it was virtue; to the Romans and

others it has been duty, now to the utilitarians it has been happiness. Science cannot adjudicate between these claims, nor prove one correct. Plato had once wrongly set science on a purely ideal basis but now positivism has equally wrongly operated on the opposite premise (Grote 1870, 179).

One fundamental reason why a science of ethics is impossible is that man has free will. If we are free to choose our ideals and our actions then no explanatory laws or predictive method can operate. Free will again is not an ideal or even an hypothesis, it is a postulate of practical life,

> 'Our free will is at least an assumption which we must always make, as we do that of the reality of our being and of the external world about us' (Grote 1870, 180).

This point is crucial and refers us to Grote's philosophy of the world of practice. Practice is conditioned by the gulf between past, present and future, and between that which is and which ought to be. In the world of science and physiology necessity may reign but in the practical world we never know what will be or what ought to be, we are always forced to choose what to think, to follow and to do.

> 'This kind of necessity, like every kind of it supposed a reference to our action, must always remain extraneous to practice, and the science of the direction of our action must exist unaffected by it.'

Such sciences as hedonics and other psychologies of moral behaviour as those of conscience, reason and moral sense are useful in filling out our moral ideals and in checking rampant imagination and unwarranted idealistic enthusiasms. But they cannot serve as a substitute for idealist moral philosophy (Grote 1870, 178).

The assumption of most utilitarians was that a study of psychology would support their philosophical claims but Grote disputes this through the examination of three other forms of moral psychology, the conscience theory of Bishop Butler, the moral psychology of reason

which I presume Grote attributed to Whewell, and that of judgement attributed to Aristotle and by implication to Kant (Grote 1870, 185-191). While weak on psychology Chapter XII allows Grote to argue for the compatibility of Kantian 'morality rule' and Millian 'morality of consequence' (an argument that appears again in Sidgwick later) and to distance himself from a morality of 'moral sense' (Grote 1870, 190-195).

If psychology offers only a subsidiary role in the analysis of moral imperatives how can idealism or the study of the higher facts help? Chapter XIII tackles this question and provides the answers,namely that idealism allows the study of the ontologically 'higher facts' and the 'postulates' of moral practice, and secondly that it facilitates the study of our aspirations and ideals directly. Grote writes of his terminology,

> 'I have called 'idealism', by way of an exceedingly general name; and I hope what I mean by it will be judged by the explanations I have given of it, and by a reference to the ancient philosophical uses of the term 'idea', and not by reference to its various uses in modern times' (Grote 1870, 201).

Having hopefully avoided condemnation by association Grote now makes his key point that as with all ideas, the idea of 'should be'

> 'has reference to something as being or existing, to a reality which we may conceive more real - real in a higher sense - than anything which our senses perceive'.

Our moral imagination may be over or under active, yet it not only

> 'sets before us ideal natures superior to our own, but it sets before us an ideal moral society' (Grote 1870, 206).

The principles and rules of this ideal moral society are 'ideally imperative upon us', in the same way that 'obedience to the laws of the human society, in which we live is actually so'. On this point Grote makes a unique point, for while it had been regularly argued that in morality 'ought implies can', the point is made here that 'can implies ought', for in idealistic morality,

'Whatever of good we *can* be, we *ought* to be' (Grote 1870, 204).

Idealist philosophy could be undermined if it could be shown that both the form and content of our moral ideals is the product not just of psychological processes but of education generally. The case for this is explored and rejected on the grounds that many of our moral beliefs and practices are constituents or postulates of our moral existence and not just results or products of it. Grote outlines the argument that the moral practices of moral responsibility, obedience and doing one's duty, are to be seen

> 'in its less developed form a main *constituent* of the formation of societies',

and not

> 'as in its more developed it is a *result* of them' (Grote 1870, 210-211).

In short the very existence and practice of society assumes obedience, doing one's duty and taking responsibility for one's own actions. These postulates are the framework of our moral reality which idealism is to flesh out in its philosophy.

Idealist philosophy is however not alone in parading knowledge of the moral imperative, religion too has this as one of its aims. Chapter XIV briefly assesses this point and the relationship between the two engagements. Religion, Grote argues, starts with beliefs and revelations, philosophy with reason and the imagination. Life may be studied from either side, but while the two explanations may be consistent they should for logical reasons be kept separate, it

> 'is good that moral philosophy should exist as a science or manner of thought separately from religion, though not properly independently of it, or at least not in a form inconsistent with true views of it' (Grote 1870, 215).

Independent study of these subjects may be vital for knowledge but in practice

> 'religion cannot exist at all, in any influential form without incorporating a vast mass of thought which belongs properly to moral philosophy',

while 'moral philosophy however, if it is good and earnest, yearns after religion' for its realization or completion' (Grote 1870, 215).

We come then to the vital Chapter XVII 'On the Scientific Character or Method of Utilitarianism' (Grote 1870, 260-278). The argument is straightforward, Mill mistakenly counterposes 'inductive' and 'intuitive' methods while the opposite of 'inductive is 'deductive'. Next under the heading of intuitive morality Mill confuses the essentially 'a posteriori' and inductive schools of the moral sentiments and senses and the essentially deductive 'a priori' schools of common sense reason. The claim that the intuitive schools all use 'a priori' and 'deductive' methods is therefore rejected, as is the claim that 'utilitarianism' is the unique school of the 'a posterori' and of 'inductive' methods. This last claim becomes the issue for a rigorous analysis during which Grote states in the clearest terms that utilitarianism can be shown to be and to use the methods of intuitionism and deduction as well as experience observation and induction. Mill and the utilitarians in fact rest their whole system on an intuition, an 'a priori' or supposedly self evident proposition that 'action is right as it is promotive of happiness, wrong as it is the reverse'. They then deduce the nature, form, content and above all the value of the subsidiary ideals, rules and principles from the primary ideal or principle. Far from being solely inductive utilitarianism turns out to be one of the most systematically deductive of all moral philosophies. Far from resting on grounds of observation it rests on a single intuition, a single a priori proposition.

In addition the attempted proof is in fact superfluous, proving not that we ought to pursue happiness but that happiness is capable of

being desired, and regularly is, in practical life (Grote 1870, 270).

Mills own first principle is as 'a priori' as Kant's categorical imperative but is less persuasive. While a non idealist version of utilitarianism could be developed Grote considers Mill to have set a trend away from this towards 'ideal-utilitarianism', the realization of which we find can in the works of Henry Sidgwick, G.E.Moore and Hastings Rashdall. But not content with one 'a priori' axiom, Mill in fact injects more as his essay develops concerning the quality of pleasures and the distribution of happiness. So in conclusion

> 'The fault of utilitarianism therefore in respect of method consists, according to my view, in its professing and pretending to have a method which it has not and which, if it had, it could not use...' (Grote 1870, 277).

V

Conclusions on the Examination

Five points can be made in summary. (1) The case against both old and neo-utilitarian philosophies by Grote is well aimed at their central assumptions and claims. His own critique is not therefore superfluous. (2) John Grote, unlike many of the other critics, did Mill the service of reading his text thoroughly and sympathetically. We find few purely polemical and moralistic arguments such as the claim that the doctrine is 'godless' or that it 'legitimates immorality'. (3) The *Examination* does pick up most of the novelties found in Mill's essay, except the modified account of the place and value of secondary moral rules, and (4) Grote explains the extent to which these novelties alter the character of the old utilitarian doctrine. But does he prove the case for heterodoxy?

My assessment is that he did, to the extent that a) few

utilitarians before Mill had admitted the intuitive status of their first principle, b) nor had they considered differences in qualities of pleasures. Thirdly c) Mill had injected the alien premise about the fundamental sociability of man, and d) those new features of the distributive theory, impartiality, disinterestedness and equality of right of consideration. The case for the heterodoxy of Mill's support for the 'general happiness' I find less well made, since it is true that Bentham had hinted at equality of consideration in his own writings.

But Grote's value as a critic does not lie just in his case for heterodoxy in Mill's short essay (5). Both philosophically and historically we may judge many of Grote's arguments to be novel and even original, to be generally well made, to be as Bain indicated regularly 'valid' and as Acton puts it 'penetrating and subtle' (Acton 1973, xiii). Compared with his other books we have some evidence to suggest that the *Examination* was more widely read outside Cambridge and we have circumstantial evidence that many of his arguments, especially those about the intuitive basis to utilitarianism and the implicit dangers of the conflation of fact and value arguments were well received. They certainly seem to reappear in popular books later, the critique of utilitarian theories of duty in Bradley's *Ethical Studies* of 1876, the insistence on the intuitional basis of utilitarianism in Henry Sidgwick's '*Methods of Ethics*' of 1874, and the development of ideal utilitarianism in G.E.Moore, and Hastings Rashdall (Bradley 1876; Sidgwick 1874: Moore 1903, 1912; Hastings Rashdall 1907).

Chapter Nine

Jural Ethics:

Social and Political Theory

We have now discovered how epistemology relates to ethics, and how knowledge relates to morality. The right, good, just, virtuous and, obligatory are known of and about in a manner analogous to the way we know the physical and intellectual worlds. That is, we acquire knowledge of each through an ascending system of revisions of our first immediate feelings or intuitions of the self and not self under the impact of further experience, thought, discussion, reflection and judgement, collectively but loosely, called reason. Through this process we arrive at sets of propositions or judgements we consider to be true or right. These principles, rules and ideals we take as the standards and framework for further intellectual and moral reasoning until their further modification by the same process. Yet these standards and frameworks, while being subjectively and socially arrived at through experience thought and discussion, are not to be considered as totally subjective and relative forcing us into intellectual and moral scepticism, but are to be seen as uniquely human attempts to grasp an objective, absolute and unchanging intellectual and moral reality: the absolute. Moral thought, like intellectual thought, is a development towards sunlight through an intellectual, moral and political struggle for self knowledge, self realization and there embodiment in practical reality. This proposal is not to be seen as based on revelation nor solely upon faith, but is a rationally supportable belief, or presupposition, deeply embedded in our ordinary language, thought, action and practices. The suppositions of the absolutely right and the true underpin all

intellectual and moral discourse.

Moral knowledge we now know is an ascent from primary sensations (pleasure and pain) and feelings (for example a troubled conscience), to psychological dispositions and character traits (for example love of self), on to embodied cultural feelings and judgements recorded in habits, customs and everyday social relationships. Our knowledge of these is codified into knowable rules and principles, which are inturn rationalized into moral and political ideals such as those of duty, virtue, and happiness. These ideals however are midway between the lower facts and the ontologically higher facts contained in what Grote calls the moral law, the absolute principles of the right and the good which are much harder to know (Grote 1876: 393-394).

This intellectual and moral ascent can be shown diagramatically.



Fig I: The Scale of Intellectual and Moral knowledge and the Disciplines for there analysis.

From this basis, which is essentially idealist in character, Grote launched his critique of not only utilitarianism and intuitionism as abstractions grasping only a part of the truth, but also common sense and moral sense ethical theory. From the same base he built the outlines of a consistent social and political theory, unfinished in the manuscripts now available but indicative of a well thought out position, to rival that of the Philosophical Radicals and other political theorists. In the last chapter we also learnt that our feelings, habits, customary beliefs and imaginations tell us that there are a number of moral ideals worthy of realization and that their individual value cannot be deduced from the ultimate priority of any one. The moral value of each action rests upon two considerations: of its result, consequences - purposes or utility and its worthiness or merit (Grote 1876, 103-105).

The highest ideal is the right but that depends upon its role of specifying clearly what is imperative upon us, not upon considerations of religion or of intuition. Good and happiness differ from right in that the former tell us what is choiceworthy, what we may desire to do or may find desirable in a non prescriptive and non imperative sense, while the right tells us what we ought to do, should or must do. The right takes priority because while what we ought to do implies and embraces what we may desire or what is choiceworthy, what is choiceworthy does not contain or imply what we ought or must do (Grote 1876, 82-84). Most of our moral ideals are aspects of the right including virtue, duty and justice. Virtue is supererogatory, it operates where the specificity of duty terminates. Duty we must perform,virtue is desirable but optional; duty is more binding, explicit and governed by social and legal rules; duty is also binding in the sense of being owed to both second and third parties and by being sanctioned by the latter acting for society. Breach of duty is

analogous to the breach of laws, there are rules or orders of duty analogous to rules and codes in the positive law.

We have now come to the subject of this chapter, a reconstruction of Grote's own social and political philosophy, a philosophy that he at one place calls 'Jural Ethics' (Grote 1870, 150; 1876; 85, 88, 96, 221). In this system the philosophy of right, or aretaics, is seen in essentially legal terms and imagery. The right, in brief, is analogous to the legal; moral right, duty, justice and virtue are considered to be explicable by analogy with the law; moral behaviour is governed by an imaginary moral law just as legal relations are governed by positive law, moral relations are to be understood by analogy with legal relations.

Such an analogy was not unique in the history of philosophy. The Judaic ethic is based on the idea of God's law, his command and sanction. Natural law theory operates on the analogy of ethics and positive law. Other modern explanations of morality by Hobbes, Grotius, Bentham and to some extent William Whewell also related morality to positive law. What is original and interesting in this case is not the use of the analogy by itself, but the notion of law used in the argument. In an analogy something that is hard to understand and explain is elaborated and elucidated by reference to something which is already known about and understood, the unfamiliar is understood by being related to the familiar. So a new kind of state or political entity in seventeenth century England was made familiar to citizens by being explained as like a 'family' (Filmer), like a business contract (Locke) or like a 'mutual protection society' (Hobbes). What is vital however in an attempted analogy, is not only that the referent is similar to the referred to in crucial ways but that the referent is itself correctly understood in the first place.

John Grote's contention is that no account of law and legal

relations so far devised correctly accounts for the true nature, character and authority of law, hence the former attempts at analogy go disastrously wrong. Only by elaborating the true nature, character and authority of law can jural ethics explain moral conduct. But a second point is of great interest here. Oddly enough political philosophy and jurisprudence, the attempts to explain political and legal rules, sanctions, authority, and obligation for Grote, become preconditions, like the study of epistemology, for understanding both the study of ethics and the operations of moral life. Political philosophy is welded into the whole system, as are ethics, epistemology and ontology.

But the notion of jural ethics is not the only component of Grote's theory needed to explain his moral, social and political theory. There is both a sociology or social theory and a historical theory hinted at above. Grote, faithful to his aim of showing how empirical evidence or study of the lower facts may be made compatible with the study of ethics and the higher facts, latched onto and developed one of the most exciting and potentially fruitful of Victorian social theories, the theory of relations or Relational Theory. Society in this view, is to be understood as a network of relationships between individuals who in some respects are similar and in many other respects different. Our relationships are sometimes chosen, as in marriage, and sometimes imposed upon us, as in the case of our birth into a particular family or state. Some are open to negotiation for example friendship, others are determined by law or social convention for example marriage. Either way the particulars of our relationships define and circumscribe our duties, our obligations, or rights and our deserts as F.H.Bradley was to argue in his famous essay in *Ethical Studies* of 1876. The facts of our relationships whether socially or individually defined or conditioned are what our

ideals aim to explain, rationalise and idealize. Our state's laws, our particular duties and rights, our social conventions, practices and institutions are embodiments of both these facts and the ideals of right.

A third and vital component we must explore is Grote's account of historical development, his theory of progress and contingency. Relational theory itself had a theory of dynamics. If relationships were changing through time then so would our moral psychology, institutions, ideals and moral knowledge. Maine in *Ancient Law* of 1861 had argued for one revolutionary change in the process of modernization, the replacement of societies whose essential relationships were based upon status to those based upon contract. But how and why were relationships changing, was there any pattern of historical change? Sceptical as he was about positivistic and deterministic accounts of history and progress in particular, and while condemning the method of 'running to history' to solve political and moral problems, Grote was also an idealist influenced by romantic notions of the development of the spirit of a society, the uniqueness of national culture and institutions, the conscious rational development of society and civilization, an idea of the crisis of society and the role of the individual as well as society in meeting its challenge (Barnes 1963, 179-190).

Near at hand he found two alternatives to the German historical school, the French positivists, and the English rationalist, positivist, and radical historians. The latter included Macaulay and the whig historians and the Liberal Anglicans. While waning in popularity in the 1850's, the Liberal Anglicans can in retrospect be seen to have been 'marching on the highroad of history proper, not wandering among the byways of pseudo - history' in the period between 1820 and 1860 (Forbes 1952, 152). Impressed especially by the liberal

Anglicans in Cambridge, including Julius Hare and Connop Thirlwall, whom Klaus Dockhorn considered to be two of the few historians in Britain at the time working under the influence of the German 'historical movement', Grote developed from 1850 an interesting version of the theory. Adapting and evolving the assumptions and assertions of the 'Comparative Method' he, alongside his former Cambridge colleagues Henry Sumner Maine and Frederick Denison Maurice, produced a non-deterministic account of historical change comparable and analogous with his arguments for the individual and social construction of knowledge and morality.

The goal is now social and self development but its achievement is not guaranteed by any laws of progressive development. In a Burkian and Hegelian fashion Grote argues that the maintenance and practice of everyday manners of thinking and behaviour,that is custom and tradition, represent a very high level of moral achievement already. But threatened on all sides by rationalism and empiricism, by dogmatism and scepticism, by new scientific discoveries and wilting faith, by the realities of laissez faire capitalism, with its attendant dissolution of traditional social ties and its production of massive inequalities of wealth and power, Grote saw the need for reform and change. Only free and rational human beings could be agents of change. God has a design only dimly and disputedly known to man. But Grote argues in a deistic manner verging on humanism that it is the sole responsibility of men to understand the world, to struggle for knowledge of right and wrong, and to design and implement changes in the world that would lead to its improvement. Progress is not and cannot be guaranteed. Utopian enthusiasm and rationalistic reform may set progress in reverse. Political and moral reform should be the pragmatic activity of slowly modifying the world to bring it closer to our individual and social ideals of what ought to be.

Of Grote's actual political preferences and allegiances we know little, we get glimpses of these and his proposals for reform only in throw-away examples and comments. His relatively closed social life at Cambridge, his preoccupations with the life of mind, his natural and intellectual reluctance to embrace dogmatic creeds or causes, all worked against his development of a prescriptive political theory. But we know enough to recognize the position he took as one of a moderate reformer, a Trinity style liberal eschewing both Whig pomposity and radical enthusiasm. He was an advocate of self help who would not stand aside when circumstance revealed the impossibility of its application, whose views and actions resemble those of the Christian Socialists of the day, several of whom were associated with his Cambridge, including, F.D.Maurice, John Llewellyn Davies and Charles Kingsley. Grote was a respecter of custom and tradition who was unwilling to embrace either conservatism or the rationalistic theories or reform proposals of Benthamites, Comptians, St Simonians, and other radicals. He was a moral and political idealist in both the practical and philosophical uses of that term.

In this chapter I develop an analysis of politics, law and ethics by building up from (1) Grote's theory of human nature, to his (2) theory of society, (3) social relations and institutions. I will continue with (4) Grote's specific account of law and Jural Ethics, the application of the analysis of law to a) obligation, b) truth telling and c) justice, and then study (5) Grote's account of political activity, the role of government and war. We can then turn to (6) Grote's diagnostic and prescriptive political theory, with special reference to a) mass society and democracy, b) freedom and c) property, capitalism and social welfare. We can turn to analyse (7) Grote's theories of history and historical method before concluding (8) with his theory of historical change and

development and his critique of progress theory. At all times I will cross refer to the four key components or elements of Grote's political philosophy, his jural ethics, relational social theory, the Liberal Anglican idea of history, and his proposals for moderate political reform.

The whole analysis will be prefaced with a brief account of the published critical assessments, or rather non-assessments, of Grote's social and political theory, and, an account of the teaching of politics in the university between 1830 and 1860, a period not well covered in the existing literature of college and curriculum development. My approach will mix together for the first time a textual reconstruction of Grote's ideas alongside a contextual account of their origins. I intend this both as a heuristic device and as a preparation for the final task of my thesis, that of linking all the elements in Grote's philosophy into a whole system and locating him both in his own age and in the history of modern philosophy, a task which I shall attempt in the final chapter and in the conclusions.

This plan will also help realize the more general aims of the whole thesis. It is part of my argument that Cambridge University in this period housed a nascent idealist movement, which, while being intellectual in character carried implications for practice. In particular I will argue that Grote's social and political theory was not just a negative reaction to the utilitarian theories dominating at the time but was a positive and original formulation, that built on several academic theories and movements of the previous forty years in Cambridge, which have themselves only been rediscovered in recent years. In brief, Grote's social and political theory both is a part of his wider philosophical system and of a set of loosely related developments in philosophy, history, anthropology, jurisprudence, philology and theology developing in Cambridge during the period

from 1820 to 1870. Both developments I argue, are idealistic in character, and bear comparison with the early ethical writings of F.H.Bradley and T.H.Green.

Finally I wish to show that this philosophy of society and politics provided us with a very significant insight not only into Cambridge thought and culture but into wider developments in the Victorian world. Just as utilitarian, evangelical, radical and socialist political theories tell us about the contexts in which they were spawned and vice versa, so the Grotian and wider Cambridge view encapsulates another life and mind of a small but significant section of Victorian society experiencing the challenges of rapid change. What is most interesting however is that the response is not just ideological, in the sense of abridging and legitimating a sectional interest, but is genuinely philosophical and historical. Lacking sectarian charms, polemical advocacy, and intuitive popular appeal, Grote's theory failed to be recognized let alone be popularly received. Though the wider movements had their effect and were realized in varying degree elsewhere in nineteenth century thought, the unique and attractive theory has been lost to modern scholarship. But first some preliminary analysis of the context.

I Reception

Enough should now have been said above to support the case that Grote had both a constructive moral theory as well as an original and powerful epistemology and ontology upon which it was based. Hisorical accident rather than personal design largely accounts for the relative popularity of the epistemological work when compared with the moral philosophy. But another oddity in the story is the almost complete lack of recognition of the existence of a social and political theory in Grote's writing by his contemporary and subsequent commentators.

Of the reviewers of the *Examination* only John Llewelyn Davies made a note of the relational social theory that underpins the theory of law, politics and obligation in Grote's writings. After stating accurately that Grote is hardly an 'intuitive' moralist he noted;

> 'He is so moderate and hesitating in his own pretensions, whilst making it his chief business to moderate the pretensions of the Utilitarians, that he fails to give emphasis enough on his own convictions. But I gather on the whole from the chapter on 'Duty and the Utilitarian Sanctions', that Mr Grote makes the bindingness of Duty to consist in the claims which others have upon us in virtue of their relations to us. He is nearer to Mr Mill than he is to the 'intuitive' moralists; but his doctrine of *relations* as imposing duties upon us, differs from Mr. Mills doctrine that the unity of the human race makes us all responsible for seeking each the happiness of all. Duty, as answering to relations, rests rather, as Mr Grote observes, on *differences* amongst men than upon their absolute equality. And it varies in stringency according to the closeness and character of the relations' (Llewelyn Davies 1870, 92-93).

In the reviews of the *Treatise*, which contains several chapters on right,duty, law, justice and war as well as elements expanding on man's social nature and on the presupposition of practice and action, there are again no specific references. Among later summaries and surveys only Pucelle and Thompson say anything of significance the former referring to Grote's theory of custom and tradition as embodying the spirit of a society, and the latter briefly noting correctly that Grote's own moral philosophy could be called 'Jural', which involves

> 'looking at ethics as a system of rules or laws. In this sense duty may be regarded as an idealization of law' (Thompson 1887, 433).

MacDonald in his book says nothing about any of these three important aspects of Grote's philosophy and the extended review by Whitmore, Cunningham, and Schneewind do nothing to make up for the omission.

II <u>Teaching and Talking Politics</u>

In one sense, we should not be surprised by the lack of interest in or even recognition of a social and political theory in Grote's

writings. Political and social issues were important not only to Grote but to many other representatives of the two schools of Cambridge philosophy up to 1860. However the formal structure and compulsory reading for the moral sciences were very narrow up to then and would encourage both insiders and outsiders to place little stress upon political and social issues. Discussions of contemporary, political and social issues, had to be conducted within the straight-jacket of the Regulations for the Moral Sciences, Classics and Law Tripos and their attendant list of Books agreed for study. Creative tutors could and did run rings around the regulations, but politics entered more genuinely by extrapolating from set texts and classical authorities to their modern equivalents. Discussions of democratic Athens and republican Rome, Pericles, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero could be turned into vehicles for the discussion of democracy in contemporary Europe, as could the otherwise tame looking histories of Guizot and Hallam. Bentham on laws, Kant and Fichte on ethics and Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and J.S.Mill on political economy also provided Trojan heroes, if they were ever needed, after 1860.

Commentators both inside and outside the university from Mill, to Ingleby and Sidgwick had noted the mathematical and scientific bent of Cambridge philosophy up to 1860 complimented by studies of the classical authorities, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, and one or two modern authorities, including Locke, Butler,Paley and Whewell. But even here there were opportunities to touch on philosophy and politics. Indeed in 1833 when Grote graduated his colleagues only touched on philosophy in classics papers on the 'Evidence of Christianity' 'Aristotle's Ethics Book 6' the 'Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion', 'Philosophy of Mind' and two papers on 'Moral and Political Philosophy' (2). But later papers covered a reasonably wide

area though Locke and Paley loomed large. Students sitting their examinations in 1837 would have touched on politics and philosophy in papers on 'Paley Natural theology', 'Butler on Human Nature' and 'Stewart on Active and Moral Powers', 'Aristotle's' Politics', 'Paley' and 'Locke on Human Nature'.

The key philosophers touched on, in the 1837 fellowship examinations Grote sat, were Locke, Brown, Berkely, Stewart, Butler, Paley, Cicero and Aristotle. Political issues covered only about one third of the questions set, and economic and social issues were hardly represented at all. Between 1848, when the Senate agreed on an honours course in Moral Sciences for students who had already graduated in other tripos, and 1855 when Grote took the Chair in Philosophy, Whewell's personal impact and his books were predominant. There were two separate papers on Whewell's 'Elements of Morality' and about one third of the questions covered within them were of a political character. Separate papers in Political Economy, Modern History, General Jurisprudence and and the Laws of England were added to Mental and Moral Philosophy in the 1848 reform.

The reformed Tripos of 1860 did allow a deeper and wider study of political and social issues as Sidgwick, Rothblatt and more recently Collini have argued (Rothblatt 1968; Sidgwick 1870, 1876; Collini 1985, 344-347). Being allowed to sit for the tripos for the first time, undergraduates found themselves faced with examinations in Moral Philosophy, Mental Philosophy and Logic, Modern History, Political Economy and General Jurisprudence. The key modern texts for the former were by Dugald Stewart, Paley, Whewell, Kant and Fichte, and by Descartes, Locke, Reid, Kant, Cousins and Hamilton for mental philosophy. On 'History and Political Philosophy' students had to read Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Guizot, Hallam and 'Brougham's Political Philosophy', and Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, J.S.Mill, Mc

Culloch, Jones, Carey and Chavallier for 'Political Economy'. Bentham was covered under 'Jurisprudence'. Little change occured as a result of the modifications of 1867 except the removal of the papers on 'History' and 'Jurisprudence'. But from this time onwards the professionalization of teaching in both philosophy and politics developed rapidly under Sidgwick's guidance and politics especially came out into the open as an independent and respected course of study (Winstanley 1940, 1946; Collini 1985, 341-363; Cambridge University Calendar 1870).

The examination papers in fact provide a better guide to what was actually taught and discussed at the time than either the formal syllabus and the booklists. Both in the areas of politics and philosophy there are surprises. Questions were regularly set on the political issues of rights, justice, law, obligation, theories of the state, the origins of private property, on the political philosophy papers between 1860 and 1867. On the mental philosophy papers for undergraduates and fellows the questions were even more revealing as they regularly contained questions on German idealist philosophers before the period when convention agrees these subjects were popular. In the Trinity fellowship examinations of 1860 a question appeared on the epistemologies of 'Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel', the latter three reappearing on the paper for 1864. Questions on Fichte's moral philosophy appear twice in the same year for the fellowship examinations at St John's, set presumably by Grote's colleague and tutor in moral sciences at that College Joseph Bickersteth Mayor. The St John's fellowship examinations of 1864 also had questions on consent theory, divine right, prescriptive and expediency theories of authority, the origins of the feudal system, on checks and balances, two questions on Montesquieu and one on liberty. When put alongside Roby's advocacy of Vico and Hegel for the tripos in

1860, this evidence suggests an interest in and knowledge of both political philosophy and German idealistic thought by at least Grote and his two moral science equally tutors at the time, a knowledge demanded equally of all fellowship candidates of Trinity and St John's and to a lesser extent of undergraduates. We should also keep in mind that H. J. Roby was along with Grote, Henry Maine, and Robert Ellis, deeply interested in Roman law and was later to produce definitive works in this area (Roby 1886, 1913).

Teaching itself we are told by Stephen and others was not regarded as an important activity for professors, formal tuition being left to the poorly paid and overworked college tutors of the day and the highly paid private tutors like Shilleto, who were masters in the arts of cramming (Stephen 1865). To some extent the moral science students during Grote's tenure of office were lucky. Firstly, he took teaching seriously, and as against the practices of several professors, including Charles Kingsley the Regius Professor of Modern History who taught spasmodically, he lectured every week of every term on all days except Wednesdays (Cambridge Papers E.A.17). Secondly, Grote was aided by several excellent college moral science tutors, all to have illustrious careers, including H.J.Roby and Henry Sidgwick at Trinity College, J.B.Mayor followed by Isaac Todhurter at St John's, Leslie Stephens at Trinity Hall, and John Venn at Caius. Thirdly, teaching was aided at the time by excellent libraries but especially in the colleges supplemented by useful personal collections. Fourthly, the teaching groups were small but contained some students to challenge the tutors including F.J.A.Hort, later Professor of Divinity, R.L.Ellis, and J.B.Pearson. Fifthly, Grote's professional colleagues included challenging and influential teachers such as the Professor of Political Economy Henry Fawcett, Sir James Stephen followed by Charles Kingsley in the Chair of Modern History, and Henry

Maine Regius Professor of Civil Law between 1847 and 1854, a year prior to Grote's election.

Political and social debate could also be expected within the context of Trinity social life where many influential liberals of the day as well as christian socialists could be relied upon to direct conversation. Cambridge also had its intellectual and debating societies, some of which like the Apostles and the Grote society regularly turned their attention to social and political issues. Participation in politics was rarer but not unheard of. Trinity had amongst its fellows who stood for parliamentary seats as liberals in this period or later, J.Westlake, H.J.Roby, J.Rigby, with Robert Leslie Ellis, Grote's close friend as a prospective candidate for Bath. St John's College had L.H.Courtney, Trinity Hall has Henry Fawcett and Professor James F.Stephens was a successful candidate at Harwich in 1865 (Harvie 1976, 269-271). When we add to this the number of fellows who became heavily involved in the legal profession, the upper echelons of the civil service, in journalism, particularly the *Saturday Review* and in doing good deeds amongst the working masses of London, Cambridge and some northern cities we come up with a picture of a college and a university far more politically and socially aware, informed and active than may have been suspected. This was the cultural ambience in which Grote's political and social theory was conceived.

III

Social and Political Theory

(1) The theory of human nature

Political theories usually make assumptions about the nature of man and society as well as knowledge and reality. In Chapter Seven of this thesis considerable attention was given to Grote's theory of

human nature which may usefully be noted before proceeding with this chapter. Grote paradoxically describes man's nature as having no nature, meaning by this that what we individually and collectively exhibit as dispositions, habits, and behaviour patterns, we have learnt and have socially learnt at a particular time. Human nature is hence contingent. Basic instincts common to all men are few and are morally trivial. On top of these are built layers of character, habit, customary behaviour or our 'second nature' until we reach an outer layer of the perfectly freely chosen self. What we call dispositional 'human nature' is generally the 'mean level' of human achievement in the society to which we belong or of those others with whom we are acquainted. One point is certain, that human nature is complex, many sided and in a state of development and transition. The production of simplistic keys such as those provided in the utilitarian and Darwinian theories are to be rejected as partial, and a composite eclectic account is to be put in its place. The key aspects are that man is both a sentient and an active being, who needs both to feel and satisfy his felt want, and act, do and achieve to satisfy his existential wants. The existence of time, space and want explain the next central feature of human nature and the human condition. Human life is riven by the gap between what is and what ought to be, and by what has been; what is and what will be; what is here and what is there but wanted here. Life is a relentless and fruitless effort to close these gaps by activity, fruitless because new wants always arise. Human nature therefore exhibits restlessness, dissatisfaction or ennui, as well as idealism, desire for improvement and perfection.

Other elements are more or less existentially common to all human beings. First we are imaginative creatures who posit a world different to what is and set our plans to realise these ideals. Next

we are fundamentally free in the sense of being able and unavoidably compelled to choose our actions in life. Finally we are not individual, but social beings. While choice and will are always personal, the whole context of choice, our language, our thinking, our willing and our acting is social in character. Man is 'social to the bottom of his mind'. This theory of man we saw was expressivist, it involved an idea of the unfolding of human nature from what was achieved to its ideals through self development. The theory of action is qualitative, activity developing in man and through history from what is immediate and unreflective to what is mediate and reflective. Mind and action have a capacity for self development towards rational self understanding and rational action and, as we shall see political history reveals a development from society being organized by force, to society based on authority to rule given by consent and reason. Dispositionally Grote is clear that we are neither essentially selfish nor altruistic, fearful or optimistic, truthful or liars, fair or inequitable, sociable or reclusive in our behaviour. Hobbes' advocacy of the universality of human fear of one another Grote sees is only as true as the claim for a universal love of all men for another embedded in the theory of stoicism, christianity and socialism (Grote 1876, 126). All such dispositions we learn in the practice of life while experiencing and interacting with others, as he once put it 'we are not by nature virtuous, but learn virtue'. One, and only one disposition, he argues to be provided to all human beings, an assertion for which he was taken to task by Bain and defended by Bradley, that mankind is never knowingly evil, that there is a natural benevolence in mankind, that wrong action and non virtues though and action are products of mistake not will or design (Grote 1876, 471-4). Envy hence is mistaken respect for the success of others; over competitiveness is an overblown desire to do well.

(2) Society

The argument that man is a social being is at the heart of John Grote's whole philosophy. While popularly espoused by several, but not all, of the positivist sociologists, some of the romantics, eclectics and idealists, this proposition challenged the basic premise of all empiricists and phenomenalists, as well as the classical political economists and utilitarians, that man is a individualistic being, a separate human atom, a construct of a unique sensory experience, the inhabiter of an inescapably private world, and a self concerned rational actor. Yet Grote's proposition is more fully and adequately grounded than the arguments of most other social theorists. In Chapter Seven I reproduced his metaphysical case for social man. Briefly, his argument was that the individual presupposes society, that society is a historical and logical precondition for the development of the individual. Social constructs pre-exist in time the production of each individual, for example the existence of the social institution of language. Communication is the precondition of the development of the individual. Language is social and with it we all speak, write and think. Individual thought is riddled with social constructions and social meanings - it is in fact social (Grote 1865, 154). Willing and acting, it follows, are socially conditioned, as are the production of our ideals or plans in life. Indeed even our feelings and sensations are socially defined by the language used to portray them. Our whole body and our conscious life then is not private but public, thought and consciousness are not a personal retreat from public discourse not an inescapable cell as suggested by Hume, but are, as with Wittgenstein, public domains. Bodily feelings and sensations, as well as appearances are socially constructed.

Societal man we saw in Chapter Five undergoes a unique cognitive

development in life. Our first unique experience of self is challenged by recognition of the not self, including others. The others provides some of the tools for intellectual activity, for knowledge of self, and they provide words and language, experience and practice, guidance and education, rules and ideals. Our cognitive development from immediacy to mediacy, from knowledge of acquaintance to judgement is a shared social development. Our experience of naming, recognizing, describing, understanding, and explaining is imbued with social categories and is social in its very nature. Intellectual ideals such as truth, knowledge and certainty and intellectual constructs such as mathematical tables and scientific laws are products of social thought, reflection, argument and debate. And so too are our moral ideals, the right, the good, happiness, virtue and our knowledge of what are the virtues and our rights and what is our duty. Hence Grote's original and definitive conclusion that when we think we do so generally, both for and with a general intelligence. In thinking we are in a

> 'communion of thought with all who think on the same subject.... And we verify our thought accordingly ' (Grote 1876, 62).

In another place he goes further in a Hegelian and Whewellian direction arguing that

> 'we each one of us learn, and the human race learns, and between the two processes there must be some, and may be a very great, analogy' (Grote 1865, 203).

The argument is not a modified form of empiricism or a proto form of behavioural modification or socialization theory. It is logical and anthropological. The external social environment does not press in on the helpless individual prey making of it what it wills, the self being a quasi accident of the environment which determines our entire nature and consciousness. Nor, on the other hand, does a fixed and innate social nature work its way out as in Stoicism and some other

forms of rationalism. Firstly, education in the narrow sense of deliberate inculcation of social beliefs is but a small part of education in the widest sense of acquiring social skills, habits and beliefs in the practice of everyday life (Grote 1876, 442). Secondly,

> 'no creature, man or other, can be educated in anything except what it is in their nature to be educated in' (Grote 1876, 423).

Education brings out, develops the fundamental capacities and then trains, directs and occasionally reforms our natures. Man differs from animals in being able in the long run to 'make his own customs and social habits' (Grote 1876, 433). Indeed whatever may be innate to mankind 'his actual life is sure very greatly to form and modify' (Grote 1876, 439). In true eclectic and typically Grotian fashion he sums up the nature/nurture debate with the following:

> 'I do not think it is possible to draw any definite line of demarcation between what is congenital and what is the result of education. There may be a part of that which is individual to the born human creature which comes from some spiritual source, distinct from the parents: of that I say nothing; in any case we cannot distinguish it. Again, what comes from the maternal communication, influence and tenderness, when all is as yet merely plastic and unformed. And so the process goes on: where the congenital individually ceases, and where education begins, we cannot say' (Grote 1876, 439).

Mankind's social nature then is not innate nor simply a product of circumstance and nature. Rather our nature is educable and education is a process of transforming what is

> 'immediate, instinctive, impulsive thinking, feeling and acting, which life begins with, by the circumstances of the individual social life' (Grote 1876, 442).

In line with idealist expressivist theory, education develops what is immediate (not innate) into self consciousness. But full development and coherence is only gained with the re-establishment of spontaneity. So the real result of education on man is the 'formation of character' where the learned becomes 'habit in the widest sense', an

'immediate and almost voluntary performance of the action without preparatory consciousness' (Grote 1876, 442).

In one lovely analogy Grote likens our habitual character and our moral knowledge to the way the 'accomplished pianist touches the keys' compared with a beginner. In another double analogy Grote likens the development of character, to that of the growth of knowledge and of them both to the growth of a tree. What starts in the seed grows only if the circumstances are right. What we are 'depends upon a thousand circumstances in the past' but in the end, we end up with something familiar, and reasonably perpetual. Moral and political knowledge becomes habitual, encased in custom but the custom is alive and itself grows (Grote 1876, 443-444). Individual habit and social customs are our 'second nature' and both are involved more by 'companionship and society' than formal education in primary socialization (Grote 1876, 464-465). Once again a theme common to Burke, the romantics and Hegel before, and Oakeshott later, emerges:- the significance of custom, habit and tradition for social life, and the indication of its rational as well as practical properties. Custom here appears as tradition does later to Oakeshott, to be as 'blind as a bat.' To this we will shortly return.

We must not be misled into thinking that being a social being somehow detracts from being an individual, that the mountain of social ties threatens self development and personal freedom, or that growing individuality threatens society, social structure and social development. Grote as we shall see later prized variety in human nature, the development of individual character and attributes and individual effort as much as most mid-Victorians, distrusting in turn passive conformity, regimentation, the growth of mass culture and the general levelling down of social classes. But his real concern with regard to society and the individual was to stress their total

inseparability, and alternatively their almost complete interdependence. The argument is again both logical and anthropological. Our being a self, developing a personality and a will of our own presumes not only language but others including parents, and family. Anthropologically, we find ourselves born into a pre existing society and here

> 'Life is lived by men in conjunction: society is a part of human nature' (Grote 1876, 335).

The notion of 'self' is subjected to scrutiny and found to be 'difficult to define and limit'. The individual self lives mentally and physically 'in community, and has in reality no independence...'. But equally 'rational personality makes each individual independent, so far as self-determination and responsibility go'. What binds us together apart from language, thought and a common social space and world is 'want and the power of mutual help' and social 'sympathy' (Grote 1876, 335). Individual and society are two sides of the same coin and are interrelated at all levels from language to mutual economic support, defence of rights and territory. Education, family, custom, habit, moral rules, laws and political institutions are not threats to the growth of individuals but preconditions for their development. Against Rousseau, Grote even defends civilization, for while it generates

> 'a great degree of imitation and fashion, which at first sight renders the aspect of civilized society, as to individual characters, more unvaried and monotonous than we imagine that of uncivilized to be. This impression however is superficial in more than one way. It is not so much that variety of character is really lessened in civilization, but that it is rendered less conspicuous than it would otherwise be by the restraint and mannerism which civilization generates in many classes'(Grote 1876, 467).

(3) Relational Social Theory

We can now begin to unravel Grote's own theory of society. However in the absence of any essay, text or even chapter devoted to

this, the theory will be like a patchwork quilt and difficult for the reader to locate without one further preliminary. The social theory, of which John Grote's is an example, is itself relatively unexplored and understood today. A short reconstruction exercise is then needed in advance of further textual analysis. Social theory was at a relatively unadvanced stage in Britain between 1830 and 1866. Various options existed including utilitarian and empiricist atomistic theory building on the individualism of Hobbes; remnants of various consent and contract theories, various forms of social prescription theories derived from Burke and Hume, some historical development theories such as the positivisms of Comte and St Simone and Montesquieu. Less popularly known were the new idealistic organic and developmental social theories and the 'ricorsi' of Vico. Social theory however underpinned many studies in the classics where ideas of Greek and Roman social development were applied to the present, and in jurisprudence where writers as widely opposed as Savigny and John Austin built models of law and legal development on social assumptions. The latter two influences, plus references to Burke and romantic notions of organic society, were the backcloth for Cambridge social theory at this time, though as I have hinted already Vico was beginning to be read and taken seriously.

Relational social theory was unique. Its fundamental assumption is analogous to the epistemological argument that knowledge is relational, that it is a relationship between thought and things, mind and matter. This idea, was espoused by Grote in the *Exploratio* of 1865.

> 'And more than this, knowledge not only is a relation, but is *of* relations or related things: that, of which or about which the knowledge is, must be constituted somehow, must have particularity and character, involving relations to other things, or qualities have relations to each other, in order for knowledge to be possible of it or about it' (Grote 1865, 62).

The theory of knowledge as internal relations was developed both on the later idealists such as Bradley and Joachim and by Marx himself if Bertrand Ollman's interpretation is to be believed (Bradley 1876, Ollman 1976). The fundamental anthropological axiom is that society is neither an aggregation or collection of separate individuals, nor an organic collectivity or thing, but a conglomeration of relationships between social individuals. Both for knowledge and society

> 'We have no business to isolate any one thing in the universe from other things which have relation to it, and to suppose it other than it is' (Grote 1876, 61).

We are what we are as individuals by virtue of the relations we have to the social and physical world around us, society is only a term used to describe the totality of these relationships. It is an 'organization' of individuals in terms of varying terms or conditions called relationships. The most general categories covering these relationships are the social and natural, the political and legal, and the general.

> 'By moral relations and moral society, as distinguished from political, I understand men as stronger and weaker, benefactors and benefited, trusters and trusted, or linked together in the moral relations similar to these, besides the natural relations, as of family, which partially coincide with these; lastly, supposing there is no other relation, as linked together in any case by the general relation of human brotherhood' (Grote 1872, 96).

By political relationships Grote considers men related as ruler and ruled, governor and governed, legislator and citizen. Economic relationships are between employer and employed, rich and poor, owners and not owners.

The next vital aspect of relational theory concerns the nature of the elements related in all human relationships. The stress is not on sameness or even similarity but difference.

> 'In some respects, society, whether moral or political, may be considered an aggregation of similar units; but in far more important respects it is an organization of dissimilar members' (Grote 1870, 95).

Later human society is described as 'a society of *unlikeness*' and it is this which differentiates social systems as human organizations from natural entities like the groupings of animals (Grote 1870, 336). The differences of significance are not noted as being of sex or colour, but age, familial relationship, office, and country. But above all men differ from animals in two crucial ways which force them into political relationships, differences in 'interests' and 'opinions' (Grote 1876, 490). Of the former the most important interests are family and property (Grote 1876, 226). Conflicts within these spheres are matched by those of opinion, such as those over right and wrong, just and unjust, and over questions of morality, virtue and religion. The human production of wants and ideals, of needs and visions of ideal societies, roles, relationships, and affections creates entirely new areas for conflict and difference.

As against contract and organic theories this model emphasises the complexity rather than the simplicity of society, social relations and social behaviour (Grote 1870, 145). Positivism, and the new sociologies impose artificial simplifications by suggesting variously that only relationships of ownership, class, family, power or knowledge predominate. The truth is that society is a mass of different kinds of relationships between an almost infinite variety of individuals and the only major simplifying factor is that through time these relationships have been institutionalised into offices and officers, practices and institutions. Hence the institutionalized roles and offices of mother and father, neighbour and friend, subject and citizen, doctor and teacher, lawyer and politician have evolved. Alongside these where permanent relationships have been codified or

forcibly brought into existence by rules or laws we have institutions (Grote 1876, 227). The normal role of social and legal rules and order with regard to individuals is 'to bring out and to regulate their differences' including those of property or power (Grote 1872, 339). But on occasions society, via the law, may decide to put us into certain relationships it considers right and then to extract and expect appropriate responses. The balance is a matter of history and circumstance but as a general rule

> 'It is the purpose of society, not more to bring us into relations with others, than to preserve our individuality against the overbearing and oppression of others' (Grote 1870, 340).

Now the significance of this argument is that it was a part of a new sociology originating at Cambridge in the three decades 1840-1870. I shall call it relational theory, and associate it primarily with Henry Maine, Frederick Maurice and John Grote. To Grote human relationships are facts, but facts which entailed moral conclusions, obligations and rights. Relationships are at the point of transfer between the lower end higher facts, the positive and the ideal, and between those things conducive respectively to positivist, empiricist and inductive method on the one side, and idealist and deductive method on the other side. Relational theory then is at the heart of John Grote's moral and political philosophy, in a way reminiscent of Bradley's chapter on 'My Station and its Duties', and the arguments for moral entailment by John Searle and Richard Norman (Bradley 1872, 145-186; Searle 1964, 43-58; Norman 1971, 105-107). Later Grote pushes home his argument. Society, its relationships, offices, institutions and practices pre-exist each individual. We are born into this complicated scene or 'web' of relationships as he calls it (Grote 1876, 376). We act and interact within them, and act to maintain and occasionally to change them according to our individual or collective wills. But these relationships do not determine our

actions, nor are they merely results of such powerful incentives and sanctions that disobedience is unlikely, as utilitarians think. Rather the facts of our relationships have moral implications for our conduct. For instance the fact that I am a father signifies a specific relationship to my wife or child and entails the idea that I ought to protect and care for them both. I can as a father determine whether I ought to maintain my family by looking at my position in a web of relationships and checking the moral rules and ideals of conduct considered appropriate for my place on the matrix (Grote 1870, 146).

Facts concerning our place in a concrete network of relationships will not provide us with either the notion of ought or duty nor a principle, rule or ideal of conduct. For this ideal we need what Grote calls a 'moral law' or ideal law. Kant provided us, not with an ideal law with a multiplicity of rules and principles of application, but with a single categorical imperative, a golden rule an ultimate rational principle. This principle was formal and as Bradley and others argued it lacked content and even meaning (Grote 1876, 200-204). Grote recognised this defect in idealist Kantian (and I suspect Whewellian) ethics and compensated with the argument that our actual relationships supply the necessary content.

> 'The fact, i.e the relation, or relative position, as a matter of fact, does not give the notion of duty, but, supposing this to exist in general, it supplies the application and the particularity of it' (Grote 1876, 212).

The fact of our relationships 'fixes the *particulars* of duty' and indeed

> 'the description of the duty owed, is, in many cases, little more than the same thing as describing the fact of the relation' (Grote 1876, 212).

We have now arrived at the position later made famous by Bradley that my actual duties are laid down by my various stations or roles in

life. Grote's theory is really presentable as 'My Offices and its Duties'. Derived mostly from the practice of Roman law and morality where 'officia' are legal duties plus 'tasks incidental to a man's status in the community', and prompted by Cicero and his 'De Officiis', the theory was novel for the time but of great pedigree (Grote 1876, 92; de Burgh 1928, 63; Cicero 1913).

> 'The simple particularity of our duty, as regulating the distribution of our action among possible objects of it, is what is expressed by the term officium: a table of our officia, such as we have in the Church Catechism is the answer to the question 'What is thy duty towards thy neighbour?' is in reality an exhaustive, though summary, scheme of the entire regulation of our moral action, as complete as would be furnished by a knowledge of the particulars of the happiness of others, and by a table of the different kinds of conduct promotive of it' (Grote 1870, 146).

Claims as well as dues are distributed by a table of our officia and so, as we shall see shortly, are our actions in regard to justice, equality and the law. But let us look briefly at the web of relationships binding us. At the most universal level

> 'we stand in some relation to everybody: in the relation of fellow-men...' (Grote 1870, 146).

We are related as members of the human race and Grote is convinced, as are all christians and humanists, that the mere fact imposes general duties upon us. Truthfulness, paying our debts and keeping promises are examples of general rights and obligations we expect in relationships between anybody (Grote 1870, 142-144). More specifically we are members of societies and states and the relationships here bind us more directly under social norms and positive laws. Even more specifically we are members of social groups such as families, and here the relationship not the feeling obliges us

> 'Let us leave out of account family affection, i.e as a reason why we should care more for kindred than for others: I think the simple existence of the family relation, as a matter of fact, is a sufficient reason why preference should be given to kindred over others' (Grote 1876, 211).

Familial relationships and their relative duties seem to be taken by Grote as central and as a model for all other relationships. Grote adds that once in a family

> 'our action, as useful, is engaged as it were to them, before we have right to general disposal of it; and also that the nature of our action towards or for them is determined by the nature of the relation: it is different according as they are parents, according as they are children, according to what they are' (Grote 1876, 217).

Apart from general and familial relationships there are also 'relations of occasion', those not fixed or permanent like membership of a state or family, but open to choice and change such as friendship. Friendship imposes definite obligations just as being a benefactor gives us certain rights but these are operative only so long as the relationship lasts and no longer. Generally Grote treats these transitory relationships as less morally binding and indeed a source of complication, 'mischief and a vast deal of vice' (Grote 1876, 134).

In general the golden rule is that for every social relationship there is an appropriate set of rules of conduct, or rights and duties, claims and dues, expectations and bonds. The key guide is 'the *fact* of the relative position of the parties', and few other philosophical principles exist or are needed to explain this further.

> 'And we may say in general that of all this duty there are different degrees of stringency, imperativeness, or enforcableness, forming roughly a scale. Roughly only, because there are different *manners* in which one and another duty is owed, rendering it difficult to bring them into measurement together. Gratitude for instance is a duty of fairness or justice, and in this way far more imperative than any call upon us for the simple duty of kindness however urgent: and yet in definiteness and therefore in this respect in stringency, it is a duty far beneath the simple duties of exact justice, as honesty' (Grote 1870, 146-147).

One guideline is that we must not show undue preference for either our particular or our general duties. Nepotism exaggerates special family claims and general benevolence ignores those with special claims upon

us (Grote 1876, 217-219). Another is that duties are mutual and duties are correlative, duty being 'a scheme of recognized relation mutual *dueness* between parties' (Grote 1870, 151). Yet another is that we must never let definite mutual duty be dissolved away into a general duty to mankind as does Mill in his essay of 1861 (Grote 1870, 96, 253).

Here we may add a detail that likens Grote's formulation of this theory of morality to Bradley's. Bradley does not really deal with the case where duties attached to stations come into conflict, to him it is a practical not a theoretical matter (Bradley 1872, 225-227). Grote notices that our 'duties may be contradictory and conflicting' (Grote 1876, 246). He notes how painful and confusing such conflicts as that between duty and truthfulness may be but he too sticks to his theory and refuses to go outside for a criteria of adjudication. Each society ranks duties in its tables of officia or in moral conventions and each individual has to consult this when deciding. There are no easy answers because the hierarchy of duties is rarely written down or even agreed.

> 'When such cases arise, they are real conflicts... Each case must stand on its merits' (Grote 1876, 256-257).

We may now remember Grote's objection to Mill's theory of the sanctions to morality in which the feeling of love of children or of duty, or fear of social approbation are taken to account for the performance of much virtuous and obligatory conduct. Feelings to Grote may indicate that something is virtuous or a duty but it does not account for it or give a sufficient reason for acting. Just as in experience our sensations indicate but do not guarantee objectivity or the truth so in morality. Our feelings are only guesses or guides to the facts at two levels, the facts of our relationships and the higher facts the objective truth. Either way

'the feelings of obligation, like the feelings which make us aware of the external world, is a feeling which we understand as representing facts independent of us. It is not the feelings which binds or obliges us, but it is the state of facts of which we are thus made aware through the feeling' (Grote 1870, 144-145; see also 1876, 368-369).

Of course moral feelings are powerful and often do direct our actions, but Grote is objecting here not only to Mill but to all kinds of moral sense theory including theories of the moral sentiments used by Adam Smith and Hume, and theories of the conscience as used by Butler (Grote 1876, 126, 394). He advocates an 'objective' as against a 'subjective' account of obligation (Grote 1876, 457). In addition he is exempting himself from having to give much weight to theories of moral behaviourism, for if feelings as such are not the major determinant of duty and indeed virtue, then just how and in what direction our socialization has developed is of little relevance (Grote 1870, 210).

What our moral feelings indicate may or may not be the facts, we may mis-perceive or mis-feel. I may feel my duty to my student or my colleague is more important than my duty to my wife and children, but I would be wrong to do so. A perusal of the facts will show that family obligations are prior logically and historically, that in addition being more particular (or relative) they are more binding, and that indeed society having considered this to be the case has enshrined the obligation to family in positive law. I may feel inclined to refuse payment of that part of my taxes used to support causes to which I may morally object but the facts are that I am a member of this society, a citizen of this state and am therefore not only morally but politically and legally obliged.

To demand further justifications or reasons why I should obey, such as that sought by utilitarians that doing one's duty will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number is as irrelevant as

relying purely upon feelings. Being a member of a society involves as a precondition that many of our actions are governed by rules and are variously due. Society would be impossible without this practice

> 'that, if men are to associate together, they must recognise mutual duty' (Grote 1870, 274).

We all have the capacity to choose and act as we wish,

> 'But in reality man is born into a complicated scene, and before he is conscious or a free agent, he is hampered round with all sorts of circumstances, which, in a different point of view, make a large portion of his powers not his own, but variously *due*' (Grote 1870, 145).

This point is made in regard to virtue and right action in the first sentence of the *Examination* and is repeated with regard to duty specifically on several other occasions. The practice of performing one's duties may well and probably will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number but its doing so does not constitute its value or 'explain what we mean when we use that term'. Duty is not specified by resort purely to feelings, or to consequences though both are relevant secondary factors in recognizing what are duties and in evaluating them (Grote 1870, 189-194). What does specify our duties and provide the imperative value we shall soon come to, but for now we might just recognize what this second argument entails. We should not look for reasons for doing our duty where no further reasons are needed. That we are bound by the relationships within which we find ourselves, most of which are unavoidable and which are themselves preconditions for social existence, is highly suggestive of that deontological argument of H.A.Pritchard on moral obligations and Thomas McPherson on political obligation later (Pritchard 1949; McPherson 1967).

Two other Cantabridgians, Henry Sumner Maine and Frederick Denison Maurice espoused this theory during the decades of the 1840's to the 1870's. Maine, the famous author of *Ancient Law* had entered

Pembroke College Cambridge in 1840 and had been a member of the 'Apostles' before graduating in classics in 1842. Unwilling to take a B.D to qualify for a fellowship he waited for a tutorship until 1845. However even then he had to emigrate to Trinity Hall, the radical college of Henry Fawcett and Leslie Stephen. By 1847 Maine was the Regius Professor of Law which he held until 1854, though he still felt himself qualified to publish on essay on Roman law, alongside Grote, in *Cambridge Essays* of 1856. Little detail is known of Maine's early education but John Burrow convincingly argues that

> 'The germination of *Ancient Law* thus lies somewhere in the decade 1843-53. These, then, the years 1843-53, are crucial years in the development of Maine as a social theorist' (Burrow, 1970, 140).

Relational theory was hardly commented upon directly by Maine's in his work though it is implied in both his use of the Comparative Method and his famous anthropological thesis of the movement from power based relations in pre civilized societies, to status based relations in pre modern, to contract based relations in modern societies. Above all it underpins his espousal of the Patriarchal Theory of Law as against the natural law theory of Blackstone, the General Will theory of Rousseau, the Contrast theory of Hobbes, the Command theory of Bentham and the historical theory of Montesquieu (Maine 1917, 67-72; 1886, 181-209; 1890, 192-228). Patriarchal theory, which considers family and kinship relationships to be the central social relationship determining all else and specially laws in ancient world was not new. Maine claims it first occurred in Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* and it had been espoused more recently by Bastion Georg Niebuhr (Maine 1890, 196-197). But its development at Cambridge and its later publication in 1861 was novel especially as it was tied to the historical theory, later made famous by Durkheim, Fustal de Coulanges and Tonnies, that

'the *unit* of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern society the individual' (Maine 1917, 74).

Put more directly we get the historical thesis that

'The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place' (ibid, 99).

Hence

'the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from *Status to Contract* (ibid 100).

The movement we know had not been accomplished without trauma, but some societies had never progressed remaining status based and patriarchal including the contemporary society of India he later studies for further evidence. Maine himself considered the movement to be fraught with dangers many of which surface in his polemical diatribe against equal political rights in voting in *Popular Government* (Maine 1885) (3).

It is most unlikely that Grote and Maine would have avoided each other so absolutely between 1840 and 1856 that some common concerns would not emerge. Anyway they both shared the Cambridge interest in Niebuhr and the common Cambridge background in the classics and philology. The study of Roman Law was rapidly gaining ground in Cambridge under the influence of Kemble, and Robert Leslie Ellis was Trinity's local expert, who advised Whewell in 1846 on the references to Roman Law and practices in his *Elements*. Family relationships we have seen are close to the core of Grote's social theory and in his early essay or ancient naming systems he had spoken of the effect of the erosion of kinship ties. As we shall see both in terms of the comparative method and diagnosis of the present condition Maine and Grote shared views, especially deploring the erosion of customary and traditional relations by rationalisation and the degeneration of social relationships generally into arenas for individual competition

and selfishness. A general rise in the philosophies of utilitarianism and moral scepticism, plus the emergence of scientific rationalism are the intellectual accompaniments and indicators of this development. To Maine and to Grote rationalisation of custom, tradition, law and constitution on the basis of these new 'a priori' theories and principles, was understood as the siren calling Victorian society to its doom. As we shall see while both were liberally minded and in fact politically liberal at the time both were conservative in philosophical orientation.

But we can see the same concerns in the work of F.D.Maurice.

In his preface to *Social Morality*, Maurice admits the link between his own and Henry Maine"swork on the point of relational basis of law and morality.

> 'I can scarcely express how great is my delight that an eminent lawyer should find himself obliged simply by his legal studies to abandon the atomic theory of Society and to accept the fact of Family existence as its starting point ' (Maurice 1869).

The theory had been developed earlier by Maurice in his book *The Kingdom of Christ*, indeed it has a pedigree going back at least to Savigny and Niebuhr and before them to Giambattista Vico (Maurice 1958, I, 195, 227-231; Rothblatt 1968, 157-158). *Social Morality* provided the crucial development that took the theory beyond conceptions of morality and law. Family ties are here understood as the basic relationship from which develops not only clan and tribe, the 'Nation' and 'State' but also the 'Universal Empire' and 'Humanity'. On the basis of the relational and especially the patriarchal version of the theory, Maurice felt confident not only in dismissing utilitarian, but also proto-marxist theories of society and the state, a position that he persistently pursued as a member of the Christian Socialist movement.

'What I have tried to say in the lectures is that the reorganisers of society and the conservators of society are at war because they start from the same vicious premises; because they tacitly assume land, goods, money, labour, some objects of possession, to be the basis of society, and therefore wish to begin by changing or maintaining the conditions of that possession; whereas, the true radical reform and radical conservation must go much deeper and say: "Human relations not only should lie, but do lie beneath all these, and when you substitute - upon one pretext or another - property relations for these, you destroy our English Life and English Constitution, you introduce hopeless anarchy."'(Maurice 1885, II, 114).

After his election to the Knightbridge Chair after Grote's death, Maurice produced an inaugural lecture which praised Grote's contribution to philosophy, and then he gave and published a set of lectures on *The Conscience* which both reflect Grote's own views on the subject and use a relational theory as well. Both reveal a crude form of idealism, recognisable despite the fact that the choice of subject matter might have forced the writer back into rationalism or intuitionism. In the first lecture, Maurice recommends the philosophic method of 'Egoism' outlined by John Grote in 'Exploratio Philosophica Part I', as the proper starting point for students in philosophy. The method involves the perusal of problems from the assertion of 'I', 'self' or 'ego', and taking as true only that which is satisfactory for thought in relation to the thought of others. Maurice recommends the adoption of Grote's method in ethics and then uses the life and writings of the German idealist Johan Gottlieb Fichte as the model philosopher for his students (Maurice 1872).

The succeeding lectures are a kind of mental autopsy of ideas on conscience that challenge the contemporary diagnosis given by Bentham, Bain and Whewell. The final judgement given, strikes an interesting balance between the role of individual ego and social station in the formation of moral ideas which, like Grote's view on ethics, is remarkably similar to that of the later Oxford idealists. Conscience is the simple assertion of my self and my existence, it is my

judgement as to whom or what I am related and hence obliged. It is not a faculty, a product of reason, a divine insight nor a simple product of socialisation, but an expression of my own self as it responds to actual relations between other people and institutions in society. The advice given is to

> 'dwell upon this fact - that we are in an order; that relations abide whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that the Conscience in each of us affirms 'I am in this order, I ought to act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they please'' (Maurice 1872, 49).

Conscience is the supreme free will prescribing for oneself the duties appropriate to one's particular social relationships and roles.

Without doubt Grote used relational theory in the 1850s and the 1860s but it is too early to say just how the theory originated and just who influenced whom at Cambridge. Signs of relational theory appear in the work of another Trinity Hall scholar James Fitzjames Stephen the author of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and in a number of later Cambridge anthropologists including D and J.F.McLennan in their *The Patriarchal Theory* (Stephen 1873; McLennan 1885; Barker 1947, 140-160; Burrow 1970, 230-234). We must however also note the point made by Whewell on relational theory. At one place Whewell actually states that

> 'There belongs to each man the *Duties of his Station*. Our Duties, so far as they regard our special Relations to particular persons, may be termed *Relative* Duties' (Whewell 1845, I, 171-172; II, 180).

As easy as it would be to make Whewell the key to the development of the theory it would be wrong to do so. For Whewell there are three sources of duty, God's law, reason and most important of all 'the internal Spring of Action; that is an Affection which binds together Father and Son', in the case of a family. Social relations and circumstances 'Manifest' and 'signify' our duties but they are based upon the internal springs of affection as the subsequent chapters

indicate (Whewell 1845, I, 173-309). Grote, Maine and Maurice all deny an innate moral sense or intuition giving us our duties, but to Whewell

> 'All acts relative to other men in order to be moral must proceed from an internal Spring of Affection...' (Whewell 1847, I, 172).

The phrase however may be one source of the idea that gave rise to the theory.

(4) Jural Ethics and Law

Later we must return to Grote's social theory and especially his use of the comparative method and of assumptions in the Liberal Anglican idea of history, but now we must build on Grote's relational theory to rediscover his legal and political theory of ethics, or Jural Ethics, as he once called it. Our rights and obligations and even our criteria of justice, equity and preference we have seen are based on the relationships we have with others. Our feelings, lower on the scale of morality, indicate the facts of our relative position, so that love of a parent for a child or of a citizen for a state does not make our duty but indicates the fact that we are children or citizens born into an pre-existing institutional framework. However as noted above to have such a theory that rises above positivism and which avoids reductionism we need an account of the rules or laws which supply the direction and imperative value to each role, office or relationship. Grote we know held rules and roles to both predate our birth, and to be a precondition for social existence but we need an account of the rule basis to ethics. And in addition we need to know ultimately why we must obey the rules and do our duty. The answers are supplied in both the *Treatise* and the *Examination* in the the analogy of law and duty.

The difference between jural and non jural ethics depends on two things, firstly, whether the theory explains duty in terms of a network

of particular relationships, each entailing claims and ties, rights and duties between individuals and groups, or whether the theory attempts to provide a universal theory of general duties as with Mill's account of obligation or natural law theory (Grote 1876, 96). Secondly it rests on the idea that in ethics as in law and politics, actions are governed by rules and laws, or by expediency or some abstract principle such as Kant's 'Golden Rule'. In the jural analogy, as Alexander puts it, we look 'at ethics as a system of rules or laws' (Alexander, 1887, 433). What holds, for a legal system with its subjects, its rules, its authority, its reason, power and means of enforcement, also holds according to Grote to a social and moral system. Customary social rules governing everyday social relationships and moral rules governing more specific social relationships are analogous to legal rules. One of the reasons for obedience to moral rules Grote will have to argue is that in ethics there is an unwritten ideal 'moral law', embodied specifically in our customs and everyday opinions, which operates like the legal norms of a society, and that we obey the moral law and customary codes for roughly the same reasons that we obey the law. In addition he needs to show how both customary moral and legal rules embody the subjective feelings, and realizes the needs of their subjects, that they codify existing relationships, that they embody our human ideals and to some extent at least embrace the objective and absolute moral standards that it is our aim to discover.

As I have argued already any successful analogy has as its precondition an adequate account of the thing claimed to be known about which is to throw light upon the relatively unknown. In this case the precondition for understanding the moral law is to understand the positive law and relations as they are called by Grote, and to work towards duty.

'Before it can be applied to any extent, there is quite a different set of considerations upon which we have to enter. We have to consider man as existing, as in fact they always do exist, in certain relations to each other more complicated and more definite than those which we have as yet considered: they are what are called positive as distinct from moral relations, and the system of them is what is called positive law. I shall call them jural relations. The law of duty has to be applied to the conduct of men to each other, in reference to these relations; to take cognisance both of the manner of the formation of the relations, and of men's conduct in them. These will form the subject of our next chapter' (Grote 1876, 221).

Unfortunately this next chapter was never written (according to Mayor) and the deficiency is made up for by utilizing a manuscript from elsewhere and adding Grote's notes for the chapter proposed. Together with this 'Appendix on the Distribution of Action in References to Existing Law' we can read Chapter VII of the *Treatise* on 'Duty' and various parts of the *Examination* which refer to the same theory. I shall take the chapter on Duty as the model for this discussion.

This crucial chapter begins with Grote's reminding us that doing something because it is better for us to do it, because we like to do it, because we desire it or even because we believe it to be good, is not the same thing as doing it because we ought to do it. Duty is an aspect of right which deals with what we ought or must do. While we are free to choose, a duty is still imperative upon us,

'I feel I *must* do it, I feel I have no choice' (Grote 1876, 84)

To the extent that we feel unfree, the ideal of right

'takes to us the form of an ideal law or rule, or, as it is commonly called, *duty* (ibid, 85).

Now duty as an ideal law is analogous to the positive law in the first instance in four ways, firstly, it is distinct and explicit, for instance, pay your taxes; secondly, duty like law considers only falling short of its rules not transcending them; thirdly, it involves giving up our actions to others; and finally, it considers a third party as an 'enforcing power' (ibid 85-86). Moral law then

operates like the ordinary law, first, its dictates are known and laid down in custom and everyday social norms and rules; such as keep your promises; second, virtue is supererogatory but duty like law only expects obedience; third, all duties are owed to someone or somebody who has a claim against us, that is, has rights (ibid, 223); and fourth, in morality as with law another body analogous to the state, in this case society, adjudicates and enforces claims and dues.

This presumes a particular account of law. The definition given is that,

> 'Law is (a) the determination of the mutual conduct of a number of agents with conflicting interests (by (b) some sufficient power, possessing also authority so to determine it), (c) inview of the advantage of each and of all' (Grote 1876, 88, also 223).

Each of the three elements (a-c) of this sentence is a part of a coherent definition of law, but various elements have been taken by different philosophers and ages as adequate by themselves. Each age, where the analogy of law and duty has been applied, has therefore produced misunderstanding of duty arising from a misunderstanding of law. The first example taken is of Greek conceptions of law and morality. For them law is a+c, mutual agreements for the common advantage with considerations of (b) sufficient power and authority being passed over (88-89). This very idealistic and 'noble' view produced an account of duty which saw it as the

> 'great law which the members of the moral universe, if we may so speak, impose upon themselves:... Duty in this view is public spirit, public spirit not for a nation but for the moral or sentient universe' (ibid, 98-99).

Historically this ignores conflicting theories of law prevailing in ancient Greece and seems to build on a coincidence of Plato's ideal laws as witnessed in the *Statesman* and some Stoic notion of universal law. The idea of customary law is down-graded as are later codifications by such reformers as Pericles. However the general point is illuminating.

Roman law provides the second example. The Romans subordinated section (c), pushing to the background considerations of personal and public advantage, stressing determination of mutual conduct, and stressing authority rather than power as the operating condition. Roman lawyers tend to consider a political community as a group 'in virtue of a superior authority regulating its arrangements' (89). Their law while practical in content was ideal in form, for their law set standards of conduct for individuals in various positions and relations. Law to the Romans was a codification of a mass of rules appropriate to its citizens. The legal relations were called *jura*, the whole law, *jus* (95). This rather idealized theory ignored not only the power that made the law but seems to ignore questions of interests. When applied to duty by analogy we get the idea of duty as submission to authority or right and the rules thereby made. Power and interest are disregarded (99).

Hobbes provides Grote with his third paradigm of law and hence duty. His view dictates that

> 'we dismiss, as visionary and ideal, the notion of *authority*, and attend only to the very practical or concrete notion of *power*' (ibid 89).

Grote is right to recognize the downgrading of authority in Hobbes and in recognizing that Hobbes sees no 'reason suggesting the law', but he is wrong in adding that Hobbes overlooks authority completely and ignores 'any advantage aimed at by' the law. Without such an individual advantage it seems that Hobbes natural man would never be induced to leave the state of nature. Yet if there is a general stress on 'arbitrary power' behind the law in a theory Grote notes that by analogy, moral law and duty become seen themselves as

> 'a yoke imposed by the Deity (Paley), or by society and public opinion (some Socratic interlocutors and several philosophers in later times), or by arbitrary power in general' (Hobbes) (ibid 99).

Obedience is explained by fear not by respect for right, reason or self interest.

We come finally to Bentham, Mill and Austin and the 'absolute legislative view'. According to Grote this is largely the Hobbesian view with the general addition that power is 'exercised honestly for the supposed advantage of each and for all subject to the force' (90). The Philosophical Radicals are lumped with Hobbes as considering law to be 'command' of those with the power of enforcement rather than as an 'order' supported by some 'agreement with it' by the citizens. Duty in this view is analogously seen as submission to a command, not a moral law, backed by sanctions, not respect for right or approval, combined with a general recognition that if mutually performed duty will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number (99). Deficient as it is in failing to recognize authority, the source of right behind the law, and in underestimating the level of willing compliance to law based on recognition of this right and of the reason in the law, the theory does have an element of tenability to Grote. But so do they all, for the various suppositions about law and duty discussed above all belong to law and duty as such,

> 'all the special views which I gave of it seemed to me partial, the proper general definition including them all... If we are to give a complete account of it, I think we must unite all the above' (ibid 100).

In practice however while Grote happily concedes that, 'there must be (by definition) sufficient power to enforce the law', and ideally some common advantage to all citizens, his stress lies upon the Roman, Stoical and jural view. In particular his eclectic view of law stressed the law as (1) the formal prescription of mutual action according to the relations in which human beings find themselves in a state, (2) made by a proper authority, (3) for the reconciliation of conflict. Downgraded are (4) commands by a superior force,

(5) backed by sanctions or punishments (6) and of the idea of law being legitimated as for the common good. Scholars of Roman Law, political thought and of Cicero in particular will recognize the historical foundations of Grote's theory here. His respect for Cicero had been referred to by Sidgwick, who called this stoic Grote's favourite philosopher. Passing praise for Hooker, Grote's notion of duties in terms of officia, his humanism, the notion of social man, his moral earnestness, the notion of right reason, and respect for reason and the moral law generally, reinforce the connection (Grote 1870, 157; Allen 1961, 184-198; Hunt 1954). We may usefully expand on these first two points before returning to duty.

(1) That law codifies or formalizes relationships already existing in society is a recurrent theme in Grote as it is in Henry Maine later. Law 'recognizes that people relate in certain sorts of circumstances in unison or conflict, classifies them, and prescribes' how they should act. Law in brief

> 'finds, or puts (it matters not to our present purpose which term we use) individuals in certain relations one towards another: and it prescribes mutual action according to these relations' (Grote 1876, 94).

Put in terms of the purpose of law he writes later

> 'The purpose of law is to regulate individual action, but the manner in which this is done, in all actual law which is in other than its rudest stage, is not by mere isolated injunction, but is by the recognition of individuals as in various relations to each other, or by the placing them in such relations, with certain things which each must do and which each may claim; and then saying to individuals, If you do anything inconsistent with, or offending against, these arrangements, you incur such and such a penalty' (ibid 223).

Building on relational theory we now have the idea that society is premissed upon and codifies relationships between members, regulated by certain rules, and that law is the formal authoritative and positive mode of fixing and enforcing those that the society considers most crucial (Grote 1876, 223). Law is primarily about ordering what

is already unofficially ordered in custom (225, 232, 401). Law is a 'definite and exact form' of customs (404). Grote notices that the Greek for right originally meant 'the accustomed' and remained closely connected with it (419). Law formally recognizes the customary and existing, it is 'the name of a recognized system of right and duties, the reason and force of which is in themselves' (Grote 1870, 155). Law is essentially,

> 'regulation, order, distribution, arrangement, and that the enforcement of this order by denunciations of penalty or sanctions upon the individuals subject to the law is, though real, only a secondary or subsidiary portion of law' (Grote 1870, 154).

The point is made in another fashion when Grote repeats the assertion that as law only rarely 'puts' people in certain relations rather than 'finds them there', so law is rarely 'enacted' or established as a result of deliberate policy. Rather like Maine, Dicey and Maitland later

> 'Law grows of itself, like language, and passes from one state to another. Much of it begins in the form of custom: and, of the great and important parts of it, there are few which, as a matter of fact, have even been established as the result of previous deliberate discussion' (Grote 1876, 224-225).

Briefly the usual historical process is the establishment of a practice over time, recognition of its utility, imitation and assent to it as customarily right. Legislation is not a rationalistic process of considering ends and drafting rules for them but is a response to what is 'previously existing' in the form of 'defence and attack', so that

> 'What has been deliberate has been sometimes repeal or alteration of the great principles, but more generally various development and modification, with addition of smaller accompaniments' (ibid 225).

All this justifies Grote's claim that 'political society, in many things, legislates for itself' (231). Law, the family, property and other 'cardinal social institutions' are like language, ie customs made

definite in rules and refined by criticism and invention, but pre-existing the practices of reform, rational scrutiny and even discussion of purpose (Barker 1947, 154). Using reflexive theory once again he completes the analogy of law and language,

> 'Deliberation or previous discussion as to the establishment of cardinal institutions of this kind would have been impossible, in the same way as a previous discussion, on the part of any number of men, whether they should adopt the practice of language: the possibility of orderly organization for the previous discussion involves the existence of the institution' (Grote 1876, 225).

(2) Considerations of authority loom large in Grote's account of law. In the *Examination* he had attacked Mill for his statement that 'penal sanction is the essence of law; Mill only qualifying this with the phrase that the compulsion must be 'rightful'. For Grote, a command is 'arbitrary' and a sanction 'simple violence' unless both are 'rightful', that is made by and enforced by a group themselves 'bound by the law to its subjects as they to it' (Grote 1870, 152). Law is distinguished from command, and threats, and punishment from sanctions by being under the 'guardianship' of rightful authority (140). In the *Treatise* the argument is repeated and used against Epicurians, Hobbesians and Utilitarians writing on law. But Grote adds four crucial points. Firstly, authority entails respect for and 'recognition' by those expected to obey, and the provision of 'sufficient power' to support the authority in cases of conflict (Grote 1876, 223-224, 91). Like Hume, Grote argues that authority usually starts with 'accidental' and 'bare power', the 'struggle between two parties, in which the weaker has yielded'. But

> 'Sociality or political life has been the gradual conversion of this state of things into one of mutual understanding and consideration: bare power has become authority by the prevalence of the feeling on the one side that obedience to it is a duty, and on the other that the exercise of it is not meant for private benefit, but for the benefit of all' (ibid 224).

Thirdly, the authority provides a 'reason' why the power should be obeyed, that a law is rightly fully authorized is a sufficient reason for obedience (89; 1870 151,152). Finally, law usually embodies some reason for its existence even if it is immediate and customary and not self consciously recognized. Put very strongly, law is the 'public reason of a society', containing as it does the wisdom of time embodied in custom, plus the trial and error, imitation and reconsideration involved in enactment (Grote 1870, 155). In true romantic fashion Grote adds later that, 'The laws of a nation are a more or less definite and complete expression of public spirit', and then adds in summary that the law

> 'thus generated derives its authority from public opinion, its sanctions are public approval and disapproval, and they are very powerful' (Grote 1876, 236).

Grote is no natural law theorist. Reason may be embodied in the law but;

> 'It is not the reason of the law, but the fact that it is the law, that is looked to' (Grote 1870, 155).

(6) That law reconciles conflict I will turn to later, and we have already seen in Chapter VIII and above that neither command by the powerful, nor sanction by punishment are by themselves operative conditions for law (Grote 1876, 93-94, 176, 471-473, 501, 504, 509). What then about production of the common good? As with virtue and duty, so with law, Grote argues that while their practice may promote the common good, it is not this which constitutes their justice, duty or legality. We are reminded that only when we keep in mind that

> 'historically, much of law has never had an express purpose, we may say that the purpose of law is the public utility, and that law is good in proportion to its utility, that no law which we are certain is useful can be unjust' (Grote 1876, 225).

Utility is only one criteria for evaluating a law. Grote's advice on sound legislation is that a law must be in conformity with 'custom',

that is be 'natural' and that it must be 'useful' and 'just' (Grote 1876, 225-233). Support for the family and property illustrate the first; and legal support for publicly provided education and the observance of Sundays as a day of rest illustrate the second. In a mood reminiscent of Green and in opposition to Spencer's 'nightwatchman theory' of the state Grote writes,

> 'A society is a partnership not only for the purposes of police *i.e.* for the mutual protection of property, but also for the purposes of helping the common progress, and for the aid which the members may give each other in all which makes human nature better. The law is the action of the society in doing this' (Grote 1876, 232-233).

Law is most certainly compatible with the promotion of happiness. Finally, the positive law is seen to be ideal both in practice and in aspiration. In practice law like custom is the 'mean level' of 'human society' which represents 'a very high standard of moral attainment to the individual' (Grote 1876, 396). In addition the positive law sets standards that citizens are not to fall below even if law, unlike virtue, does not demand that they are surpassed, and these standards are ideals to most citizens.

Finally, the actual law is an attempt by human beings to 'fix' the ideal moral law, of which as Grote says

> 'the actual law of our country is a partial representative' (Grote 1876, 338).

This point is crucial for understanding Grote's whole political theory. Far from being a pessimist, depressed about the condition of man and society under the weight of a rigorous Calvinist upbringing he conceived idealism in practice as well as theory. Like Burke and Hegel before him Grote considered custom and its legal codification as

> 'a kind of mean temperature of earthly virtue, slowly we hope rising, and as such as may be raised thus gradually by human effort' (Grote 1870, 357).

This is not just a moralist passing observation but the conclusion of

a serious theory of action and history. Firstly, at a practical level the customary is itself the return to immediacy of what was once self consciously struggled and achieved for ideals. Law and custom, like our character, grow by

> 'the change of consciousness and sensibility, as promptings of action, into an immediate and almost involuntary performance of the action without preparatory consciousness' (Grote 1876, 442).

But this immediacy and apparent involuntariness must not be mistaken for lack of intelligence or wisdom.

> 'Human civilized custom (in which I include opinion and legislation) is a vast mass of result of human intelligence and effort at improvement, which continually puts to shame, and has to maintain itself against, a large number of individuals who have not risen to its level' (Grote 1870, 358).

Custom and hence law, in fact demand self conscious perusal and even individual challenge if their embodiment of intelligence evolves and is to be kept up to date. Grote did not demand blind obedience but active respect and recognition for the value of custom and law, and he considered that

> 'the person who does not preserve his individuality of thought against it (opinion and custom) is a traitor to it' (Grote 1876, 423).

Custom, general opinion and law are both our own judgements and

> 'the putting together of a number of individually conscientious judgements, each affecting perhaps and affected by others, but each having its own root' (ibid 422-423).

In a phrase reminiscent of Hegel's aphorism that 'the real is the rational and the rational the real' Grote writes of the actual course of development of human moral and political thought,

> 'These minds may have been mistaken, and so may we be; but when we are thinking out in particular what it is best man should become, we may reasonably, to a certain extent, associate our judgement with theirs, and conclude that, to <u>this</u> extent, what man <u>has</u> become represents what its best he should become and what it was in his ideal nature to become' (ibid, 394-395).

And hence

> 'In looking back thus to the past development of man we see that the ideally good does, to a certain extent, produce itself in the actual or existing' (ibid, 395).

We can now spell out the analogy involved in jural ethics more clearly. Duty, rights and justice all operate as if there was a moral law equivalent to the positive law, which sets the rules of right conduct. The moral law may be expressed as a formal principle such as Kant's 'golden rule', but Grote goes deeper and shows that the moral law is not only ideal but actual, embodied that is in custom, opinion and law and reflected in our feelings and sentiments. Duty is an ideal 'which we do not luxuriate in', we immediately relate it both to the higher and lower facts (Grote 1876, 368-369). Custom, opinion, law and codes of duty in turn embody the implication of our being related to one another in key ways (Grote 1876, 221,393-394). Above the actual law is the ideal law, our codes of duty, our *officia*, and an ideal law, the equivalent of the Roman *jus* (Grote 1876, 221). 'Obedience to the actual law is looked upon as the lower limit of moral duty,...' (238). Above this is the higher fact, the belief posited in our imagination and apparently posited in the practice of moral conduct and language that there is an objective law or set of standards that our opinion, law and philosophising is a groping towards and an attempt to fix (101, 338-339, 517-519). This is the moral law or if we are christians, God's law or commandments, and if we are believers in the brotherhood of mankind, such as the Stoics, it is the 'jus gentium or jus naturale' of the Roman law (Grote 1876, 221,236-237). Our imagination sets before us this ideal moral law and a vision of 'an ideal moral society'

> 'It is thus that right conduct is *ideally* imperative upon us, just as obedience to the laws of the human society in which we live is *actually* so' (Grote 1870, 206).

The feeling of moral wrong Grote claims to be an offshoot of positive law applied to breaches of our moral law, at all the levels from custom, duty and the ideal code (338). Guilty knowledge or conscience are the feelings associated with breach of this 'ideal moral law' (139-140). In moral life our feelings and 'sympathy follows duty'. The pleasurable feelings of being dutiful and the painful feelings accompanying my non performance reflect the facts of the existence of a law of duty (Grote 1870, 97). Duty, rights and justice we have seen are analogous to law being embodied in definite norms, in being negative not positive, in being owed to some specific other person with a right (neither duty or law being general), and in being adjudicated and enforced by a third party, by society in the case of duty (Grote 1870, 96-97). Now we can add that the six points enumerated about law are also appropriate to duty.

Firstly, our rights and duties and even just conduct is prescribed by our relationships, our *officia*. Duty is conduct appropriate to our stations in society (Grote 1870, 145-146). The moral law of duty codifies or fixes what is entailed in our relationships, duty being

> 'a scheme of recognized relation or mutual *dueness* between parties' (ibid 151).

Duty like law is only prescribed action considered appropriate to our particular relations, so

> 'The description of the duty owed, is, in many cases, little more than the same thing as describing the fact of the relation' (Grote 1876, 212).

The attendant feeling is that our relationships demand something is 'due from us', which indicate that the action 'belongs to us' to do (Grote 1870, 142).

Secondly, something is only our duty and a right when authoritative, that is validated by an appropriate authority (Grote 1870, 145, 151-152). The appropriate authoritative body on duty is society,

rather than the state. Thirdly, duty, rights and justice prescribe conduct where conflict exists between parties. Like law they are authoritative allocations or distributions of actions between human beings (Grote 1870, 151-152).

Of the last and less significant features of law and duty Grote says more in order to show his disagreement with the utilitarians and Hobbesists. Duty does seem like a command and we often may feel bound or constrained by it (Grote 1876, 84-85). However duty, while being a set of rules, leaves us totally free to act. As with law, while telling us that if we transgress penalties will follow, morality leaves us free to transgress or not. Duty involves this apparantly contradictory fact and feeling of being thoroughly free and yet being bound or obliged. Grote's reconciliation is in the Kantian idea that duty and freedom are not only compatible, but that dutiful action realizes our absolute freedom, it being a law we freely impose upon ourselves (Grote 1870, 111,166, 152, 155, 212, 353; 1876, 84). Performance of duty involves greater constraint than being virtuous but even with duty 'we give the law to ourselves' (Grote 1870, 147). Using a further neat logical argument he writes of the incompatibility of command and moral theories of law and duty. If law and duty are just what are commanded how can Mill and Austin speak of 'laws which ought to exist'? Law is either what is actually commanded, or that which ought to be commanded, which has an ideal element. How can one speak as a command theorist of a law that 'ought to be 'as well as 'has been' or 'is' or 'could be'? Indeed

> 'If the notion of 'command' goes before 'that which ought to be', where is the command in virtues of which the laws which ought to be, ought to be? Mr Mill tries to rise above this Hobbesianism, and no wonder he should: but I do not think that logically he can' (Grote 1870, 158).

Fifthly, while non performance of duties, like non conformity to the law, may lead to sanctions or punishment Grote is clear that it is

not this sanction by itself or even primarily that distinguishes or characterizes duty. The argument that the force of duty resides in sanctions is as false as the view that sanctions explain conformity to law. Firstly, it ignores the difference between 'enforced obedience' and chosen conformity to a duty. Secondly,it ignores the difference between explaining the actual feelings that may 'induce obedience' and giving the reason why we ought to obey (Grote 1870, 139-141). Thirdly, the argument fails to separate teleological considerations of the consequences following disobedience, the recognition of reason behind and in the duty (ibid 142), and considerations of past and present relationships (ibid 144). Fourthly, it ignores the prior historical consideration of the rightness or authority of the duty (ibid 152). Finally, it is not production of the common good or happiness that alone justifies law, as we have seen already, and the same is true of duty, the arguments for which appeared in the previous chapter. To Grote the existence of sanctions, being commanded and constrained, and producing the general welfare are not the essence of law but only 'a part of the notion of it', and that a subsidary part (ibid,152).

The last feature of law mentioned, that it reflects and presents an ideal, embodied in social values customs and social norms, we can now apply to duty, right and justice. These three to Grote set a high standard of conduct to govern human relationships even outside the law. In their crude form our ordinary optional moral norms, the 'moral mean', represent a standard we should not denigrate as too low nor despair as too high. Duty, or *officium* a collective name for our *officia*, are the products of generations of human beings, their intelligence, thought, argument choice and will. Doing ones duty is not moral perfection, perfection requires being virtuous as well, but duty and obedience to law are all that can be expected. To realize the three basic general duties governing all social relationships

would be a great moral achievement for a society and its members, to be responsible for ourselves thereby relieving others of the worry; to do no wrong and obey the law; to do all the good we can (Grote 1876, 337).

a) The Question of Obligation

For many philosophers the question of ethics is the question of obligation; why should we obey? Grote disagreed and saw rather that this question, though important, was only one perennial issue in ethics. Others are 'why be virtuous', 'why be good' and 'what makes our actions morally valuable?' For this reason he refused to prioritize a philosophy of Deontics, and even refused to isolate it as a science alongside aretaics and eudaemonics (Grote 1876, 102). However he did tackle this important question and his answers and strategy are interesting. Moral and political obligation will be taken together because Grote considers these issues and solutions to be analogous. Why we should obey the moral law is answered by reference to why we should obey the positive law. Moral obligation is analogous to political and legal obligation if not exactly the same sort of thing.

Interest in Grote's account of obligation is aroused by three arguments, apart from the law and morality analogy. Firstly, Grote, like Pritchard and McPherson later, argues that no general justifications of duty can be given or in fact need to be given (Pritchard 1968, McPherson 1967). With Pritchard he seems to say that we need not seek further justification of what is already implicit and entailed in our language and practices (Pritchard 1912). With McPherson he argues that duty being a collective term for particular and relative duties, can only by justified by reference to particular cases and relations in society or the state. Secondly, Grote, like

Bradley and McPherson argues that the word duty entails the idea that we ought to obey, and the fact that a relationship entails a duty implies and means that we ought to perform it. (Bradley 1876, 132-133; McPherson 1967, 63-68). Grote indeed argued a relational theory of duty in 1861 and had it published two years before Bradley's famous formulation of 1876. Thirdly, it is argued by Grote, as by McPherson later, that if further reasons for obedience in addition to a description of what the words duty and obligation mean, and what is entailed by our position in a particular relationship, we have to formulate an eclectic answer (McPherson 1867, 52-54). These points of Grote's can be taken in order.

The term duty implies that an action 'ought' to be performed. This is a basic premis of Grote's whole moral philosophy. Duty carries in itself both the idea of being claimable by a party and enforceable upon us (Grote 1870, 96, 134, 145, 187). In addition he argues that the fact of something being a duty entails the idea that it ought to be done without further need for reasons. This argument appears on several occasions but is most explicit in this comment on Nelson's famous speech on the eve of the Battle of Trafalgar

> ''England expects every man to do his duty' is what we may call a noble truism. The idea of duty in those to whom this was addressed was - what England expected of them, and that was complete self-devotion of each in his particular assigned place and office' (Grote 1870, 166).

That duties are specific not general, and that therefore only specific reasons can be given for performing a duty appears on several occasions (Grote 1879, 253). After recognizing that in various relations individuals have claims upon us he writes:

> 'And duty binds us, not first in the general (namely, to promote the general happiness), (sic) and in the particular only as a consequence of this; but first in the particular, duty in general being an expression for the whole of such particular duty. The particularity of duty and its felt stringency or urgency go together. Failure in duty is an injury to the person

> towards whom we fail, and it is in this , not the diminution of the happiness of society or of happiness in general, which makes the point of the wrongness of it' (Grote 1870, 96-97).

As stated earlier Grote considers all duties arise from particular relations with others, 'all duty may be called relative', and hence no general arguments such as those of Hobbes, Paley and Mill are of consequence (Grote 1876, 97-97). To ask for general reasons why we ought to do our duty is a redundant exercise, as all duty is relative so all questions and answers should concern the details of particular social relations.

On the question of what would constitute an adequate account of obligation Grote differs from Hobbes, Bentham and Mill in two areas, the answer to the question of why we *do* in fact obey, the reasons given; and the question of why we *should* obey, the moral question. On the former he writes that the real reasons why most people do obey legal and moral norms is not hope of reward, nor fear of sanctions, nor because they are forced to. The real reasons are first 'because I choose it' (Grote 1870, 137). The second reason a person may actually give is that I feel 'I must do it, because it is my business, it is what falls or belongs to me to do...' (ibid 138, 142). Thirdly, those who obey may say that they sympathise with the reason or purpose of the law, and so

> 'Setting aside certain exceptional cases, the manner of action of the law upon the minds of the intelligent mass of those subjected to it is by more or less of consent to it, that is, to the reason of it' (ibid 139; and 142, 155; and 1876, 100-101).

Fourthly, both in regard to law and moral norms, many people obey because they recognize the authority or right of the law and the authority of its source (Grote 1870, 134-136, 140, 151-152).

However the real question concerns the issue of why we ought to obey not why we do. Here Grote's reference is to the moral facts and sociological facts of our position in regard to other parties, i.e.

as parents, children, husbands, wives, tutors and students. The first moral fact is our language. The term obligation or promise entails the idea of obedience, performance, and of being bound. So to the notion of being a husband, tutor or father carries the idea of being bound to care for one's wife, students or children. Secondly there is a sociological fact, membership of a social group i.e. being a parent entails the acceptance of mutual claims and dues. Duty arises from these relations not as a consequence of anticipated benefits but as a precondition of association (145-146). The third moral fact is our belief in an objective moral law analogous to the positive law. Societies and groups are premissed on beliefs that certain things are right and others wrong, some good and some bad. While disagreement remains in and between societies a reflexive fact is that all assume some things are right and ought to be done. The belief in a moral law is not a religious hypothesis, as Schneewind suggests, but a rational deduction from rational practices. If there is a moral law, then this carries with it, as does positive law, the notion that it ought to be obeyed, if we additionally accept the analogy in jural ethics.

But Grote, like Macpherson later, does go on to consider additional general reasons why we obey, apart from those embedded in our language, our practices and our relations. He looks at certain post-facto and subsidiary rather than implicit and essential reasons. His answer is eclectic stressing a large number of reasons all of which fit harmoniously in a coherent explanation. Generally, and abridging what I have said above, we ought to obey because doing so will probably produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, a) because it produces the specific happiness of those with specific and legitimate claims upon us, b) because doing our duty conforms with the moral law and our standards of right, c) because obedience is expected of us and society relies on mutual respect and performance of

expectations, d) because there is usually some sensible reason behind and in a law or duty, law and duty being 'public reason', e) because duties and laws have some authority, f) because in one sense at least we consent to the law and duty, that its re-enactment constitutes consent (ibid, 154-155) and g) because finally,we are induced to do so by our education, by imitation and by the existence of social and legal sanctions. Whereas most theories of obligation 'are designed not to supplement each other but to exclude each other' as McPherson puts it, Grote's general theory is wide enough to catch everything going, but at its relational heart is specific and flexible enough to account for most particular cases (McPherson 1969, 51-54).

b) <u>Telling the Truth</u>

One example of the theory at work may help to explain its operation, the case of the obligation to tell the truth. We might start with the question of what is the truth which we are obliged or not to tell. This question is tackled in *'On Glossology'* where Grote, rejecting Horne Tooke's etymological methods asserts that the meaning of the word corresponds to its usage in everyday language. Historically he rejects Tooke's claim that it derived from 'trowed' to trust or believe, preferring instead derivations from trusted. In everyday parlance the truth is what we trust to be the case. Repeating what he does on other occasions Grote derives intellectual usage from moral useage, and so

> 'the reader should observe that the real force of the dianoematism, so far as we seek the meaning there, is *moral*; truth - that which may be *trusted*, that which one man *trusts* another about' (Grote 1874, II, 166-168).

Elsewhere the numerous meanings of the word truth as a reference to knowledge are distinguished, criticized and reconciled. Grote argues that while truth may be used to mean 'correspondence of a thought to a thing', 'clarity and distinctness of view' and 'inconceivability of

the opposite' or 'applicability to action', in the end in epistemological terms truth is most usually taken to mean 'a coherent or complete view of something' or 'reasonable conceivability', or 'the communion of intelligences' on a matter. The objective use of truth as 'right thing' which suggests thought follows facts, is contrasted to 'thinking rightly' which suggests truth is conceptual and propositioned.

On the issue of the truth of the meaning of a statement Grote is unequivocal. The truth lies in the use of the words and what the user intended them to mean not what the words actually say as if there was some essential meaning to the words (Grote 1874, 166-168). As he puts it in the *Treatise*

> 'Truth is not in the words, but in what the words mean. The value for the truth, and the value for the words which contain the truth, are two entirely different feelings' (Grote 1876, 268).

Turning to the moral issue of why we ought to tell the truth, we get several interesting answers. First and foremost there is the reference to the nature of social relations generally, and of the specific relations in which we find ourselves. After complaining that both Paley and the Utilitarians answer the question by reference to the fearful divine and social punishments we will receive for lying, and the rewards for truth telling, Grote writes,

> "But I apprehend that the real answer, which is *felt* in the minds of those who feel simply and well is: 'I feel that I must speak the truth because I know that I am trusted: I feel that trust reposed in me calls for truthfullness from me, and calls with a voice which I cannot stifle or disobey: it is the person who trusts me to whom in the first instance I am under an obligation of truthfullness, an obligation under which he by his trust lays me, which so far makes me not free, and binds my action'"(Grote 1870, 143).

Note the three reasons given by Grote here for telling the truth: (1) I am trusted, (2) I feel or recognize that by being trusted I am obliged, (3) that a second party who trusts me has a claim or right

to my veracity, therefore I ought to obey. Truthtelling in brief is explained in terms of the pathology of a relationship between two parties the key phenomenon of which is trust between persons.

We may go on to see that truthtelling may be an obligation to specific parties in the first instance but that in the second instance because we live in societies of fellow members our obligation to truthtelling 'is a duty to society' (143-144). This does not make truth telling a general duty in need of general justifications, it is only a general term or phrase referring to a collection of specific duties to other specific persons or fellow citizens. Truth telling is not justified because it promotes, if followed as a rule, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but because in each case I am trusted and that means that I ought not to betray that trust. Truth telling does in fact promote the general welfare but that is a coincidental matter, perhaps a necessary but not a sufficient reason for justifying truth telling as a duty.

But why should we not betray trusts? Is it because to do so would itself promote social unhappiness? This answer would take us into the utilitarian fold and Grote refuses to be drawn there. The reason why we should not betray trusts is that the trusting person has a claim or a right belonging to him or herself which they have over us by virtue of the relationship to us (Grote 1876, 247-248). Ordinary language and ordinary social intercourse make us indebted to one another in many instances, and one such indebtedness is to be as trustworthy as the trust that is invested in us demands (250). As Searle puts it later, ordinary language (or semantics) involves both regulative and constitutive rules. The first are descriptive, the second are regulatory. The speech act itself and its 'constitutive rules involve obligations, commitments and responsibilities' (Searle in Foot 1967, 113).

How for Grote does this arise? Firstly, by simply being a fellow user of a common language. In language we convey some part of our thoughts and intentions to others and in one sense language could not exist unless there was a presupposition of trust in the use of words (Grote 1876, 251). Hence

> 'Truthfulness as a duty rests thus in the first instance upon two pillars conjunctly, the one the consideration that speech evidently exists as a means for community of thought among men; the other, when it appears, as we have seen, that this community cannot be, and (as men are) had better not be, complete, the consideration that we have a trust reposed in us by the person desiring information, which we may easily violate, and which, the more easily we may violate it, calls upon our conscience the more imperatively not to do so' (ibid 253-254).

This argument appears later in the work of Peter Winch and Alistair MacIntyre for whom trust and truthfulness are similarly prerequisites for any viable social interaction or form of life (Winch 1958, 1970; MacIntyre 1967, 1981). Grote states once that 'speaking the truth' is a 'universal' custom or one of a number of 'manners of thought, feeling and action, which are to some extent general' (403-404). In language strikingly similar to Oakeshott's these 'general ways of thinking, judging and acting, the general arrangements, the institutions...' are elaborated and held up as the most important preparations for a good society (ibid, 404-432).

A second argument goes further in exploring the pathology of social relationships in regard to truth. Any kind of language or social exchange, that is not intended to deceive or which is accidentally meaningless, involves two parties having specific attitudes to one another (219-220). Firstly on the one side truthfulness is 'faithfulness... to the communication by speech from mind to mind'. But there must also be 'the correlative faithfulness from the other side' or a 'truthfulness or disposition to give credit and believe' (253). Because these are postulates of the operation of ordinary language, as well as moral, political and legal action,

'Offence on either of these sides is treason, in various degrees, against the great bond of human society' (ibid, 253).

Lying, deception, equivocation, misleading people and many other departures from openness and truthfulness in language is then as serious as betraying our country to the enemy because like military treason it cuts away at a fundamental presupposition of social existence, i.e. trust between members of a social group. That this produces unhappiness is a peripheral truth and consequence when set alongside this logical and anthropological argument about the presuppositions of social existence. The empirical fact that all societies do exhibit a massive amount of mutual confidence and trust supports the general logical and moral proposition that it must and ought to, if we extrapolate to society from the following:

'The degree of mutual confidence which must exist, and does exist, in order to the carrying on of complicated commercial transactions, might well astonish the unprepared spectator. This mutual confidence, and mutual justifying of such confidence, is in fact the basis of all civilization: society is founded on mutual truth' (ibid, 266).

Finally, a third argument considers self respect, personal autonomy and social credibility. Our words and our actions are a 'sign' of our character and our identity. Our statements and actions are in the final analysis our own, and express our motives. A member of a society who is trusted can interact with fellow beings. That person not trusted, because of lack of veracity, 'is without the greatest guarantee of virtue' and credibility (ibid 254-255). Truthfulness is then a precondition for having self respect and social status, and while we can and sometimes must depart from absolute veracity, when for instance our duties may conflict in times of war, we should normally observe the duty of truthfulness.

What if after all this argument we ask Grote, why should I perform those things claimed against me, why should I satisfy the

rights of those with claims against me to tell the truth? Is he obliged to say, that this practice will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number? The answer is 'no' again. The real reason why I should satisfy others'claims against me, why I should do my duty, for example tell truth, is that the institution of, practice of, respect for rights and performance of duties are preconditions for all social, moral, political and legal intercourse. Any person not seeing the strength of this argument can only have it all explained to them again through an account of the logic and practice of social life, or what Winch and Wittgensten call, 'forms of life'. No other reasons can be given or need to be given in answer to the question, and the basal premises are not about the teleological consequences of actions but the nomocratic preconditions for social practice. Mill explains the meaning and practice of rights and duties in terms of utility plus some natural sentiments but Grote refuses to do so (Mill 1964, 50). Once again utilitarian moral, political and legal thinking is met with an argument of astonishing profundity and effect. Arguments of a similar character are used to defend the practices of promisekeeping and fair and just distribution of action.

c) Justice

The reader may well have recognized once again the all pervasive presence of jural ethics in the above analysis. The reasons for truth telling in language, social, moral and political life are analogous to the reasons actually given for truthtelling in the legal system as the 'Appendix on Justice and Truthfulness' ably illustrates (Grote 1876, 262-274). Now we have already seen why Grote diverged from the utilitarian account of justice, in rejecting its general claims (1) that justice is morally good solely because it promotes the general welfare (Grote 1870, 146), (2) in its assertion that justice

is merely a sanction of utility, a force, a rule or principle to ensure social welfare, (3) in his rejection of the idea that the key principles of justice are impartiality, disinterestedness and equality (in the general sense of the term), and (4) in his refusal to see the feeling of love of justice and detestation of unfairness as the essence of justice and the reason for its moral popularity (ibid Chapter Eight). As we rebuild his own account of justice we shall see once again how the analogy of morality and law underpins the argument.

There is no systematic theory of justice presented in any one part of Grote's corpus, like his ideas on duty, virtue, good and right the main essentials and details appear in various places. My reconstruction therefore is something of a patchwork quilt with all the defects involved in this product. The main concern of Grote was to explicate the place of justice as a moral ideal in relationship to the other ideals; and to show as with duty, that justice is to be understood in relationship to both the actual, the lower facts of social and legal relations and the feeling below them, and the ideal, the higher facts, the ideal moral law of which justice is a part.

In Chapter VIII we saw that justice was an aspect of the primary ideal of the right. So far we have discussed other sub-ideals of the right, virtue and duty and much of the *Treatise* is devoted to relating these three ideals. In Chapter III we find in a single sentence a hint to the content of his whole theory

> 'The fair, or just, is an ideal formed by mixing the first, or what ought to be done, with an observational view of the conflicting interests, and various interrelations of men' (Grote 1876, 37).

The key elements are the notion of justice as an ideal, and as an aspect of right, arising from actual conflicts and relations between human beings. Ideal and the actual, moral and sociological and psychological concerns are brought together in one eclectic theory.

That justice has ideal elements was encountered in the *Examination*. There Mill was seen to have produced an inaccurate etymology, history and philosophy, of justice. One element of this was the idea that at some stage in history it was recognized that often 'men make bad laws;, that they were not conducive to maximum utility. Accordingly they devised, according to Mill, ideal laws, and gradually injustice came to be only

> 'violations of such laws as *ought* to exist, including such as ought to exist, but do not; and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be law' (Mill 1964, 44).

Grote approves of the idea that justice is an ideal that posits an ideal law but objects to Mill's account on three grounds. Firstly, he objects to the idea that utility alone brought about the development from law to morality. In Grote's view respect for rights, and duties also had an effect. Secondly, Grote saw that Mills' move only 'moralized' abitrary commands, suggesting the idea of justice as only the legitimation of force. Thirdly, Grote noted the logical incompatability of a theory of law and justice based on command with one based on moral ideals (Grote 1870, 156-158). Justice in fact is an ideal which relates to the actual, at three levels,

> (1) That to which applies particular and express human law, with its definite authority and penalties.
>
> (2) That to which applies general and unformalized human law, i.e. universal, public, or (more or less) general opinion.
>
> (3) That to which applies conscience, imagination representing to us a more general and higher opinion or judgement still, viz. that of all possible intelligence and moral beings, to which our intelligence and moral judgement, so far as they are true and right, must be conformable' (Grote 1876, 222).

Injustice therefore can be a breach of the law, a breach of customary moral rules regarding distribution of our actions, or a breach of an ideal moral law. In each case injustice is actually a breach of a positive law or is analogous to this. Like duty, justice is to be

considered under the law and through methods of and under the exploratory system of jural ethics.

As with all examples under jural ethics, actions are to be judged in the particular not the general. General rules such as 'treat thy neighbour as thyself' or the Kantian versus 'do not act towards anybody without the thought, what you would like if you were in his place and he in yours' can be formulated as rules of thumb, but justice like duty is a term that covers a multiplicity of claims and dues arising from particular relationships with others (200-203, 209-221). Not to do so, as is the case with utilitarianism is to court confusion and practical disaster. Not only are general rules such as those of proportional justice, pure impartiality and equality confused but as we shall see, if applied in moral, political or legal practice would produce the rationalisation and ruination of civilized social life.

Justice, like its neighbour duty, is concerned with the distribution of action, with doing, not with the end of action or feeling. It deals, accordingly to Grote, with that part of the distribution of action between parties that concerns whether they have 'benefited or injured us, or we have benefited or injured him' and with the reward of benefit and redress of injury (213). Two considerations affect us in this area, one utility, and the other conflict. Justice is divided between justice as utility and justice as fairness between conflicting parties. Both the public good and fairness to individuals must be considered in every case (213-214). Like Kant, Grote considers injustice as a kind of nomocratic settlement of conflict between individuals or parties over interests or merit, in which some party has 'gained an advantage' that was not deserved (214-215). The feeling associated with the fact of unwarranted advantage is that of unfairness, resentment and a desire

for revenge, the feelings associated with warranted advantage are love of fairness or justice, the desire to correct inequalities is the 'love of right', But in all cases the feelings only indicate the fact of injustice or justice, they are not the fact nor the reason why people are just, as both Mill and members of the moral sense and sentiments schools supposed.

How are justice, fairness and equality to be defined? The first answer is historical and philosophical, that is, like the idea of wrong the idea of rights, justice, fairness and equality derive from original legal usage. 'Wrong' refers to the original legal position of a person in breach of the law and the term 'rights' was introduced in later jural language to express the circumstances of the party to whom duty was owed, signifying the same as claim, call, due (223). Like Maine and Ritchie later, rights are seen as arising from the codification of Roman law after its demise in the Middle Ages, it is not existent prior to this (95-97). Rights and duties in this historical account were and still are correlative terms and positions. Similarly, equality derives from legal equity ,and the social and economic usage is an elaboration of the earlier and more practical demand of early reformers for 'equality before the law' (Grote 1870, 340). Justice originally arose, as Mill argues in Chapter IV of *Utilitarianism*, in the language and practice of law and has come to be applied to human custom and the imaginary and ideal moral law (ibid, 222-223). In terms of the old Greek battle as to whether law arose from justice (morals) or morals from law, Grote sides with the latter, but though he argues that justice in the most abstract of legal conceptions he would have seen this as more or less compatible with the idea of it as the most legal of all virtues.

As we saw in Chapter One Grote placed little value on the use of etymological methods for clarifying the meaning of words but stung by

Mills's derivation of *justum* (the right and just) from *jussum* (the ordered) and by implication of*jus* (law) from *jubeo* (command) he marshalled a now quite famous rebuke (Mill 1964, 43-44). Mill had needed such a derivation to add support to his utilitarian account of law as the command of those with force enough to guarantee obedience and had gone to an early defendant of radical utilitarians, Horne Tooke for his authority. Firstly, Grote notes that the ordered in *jussum* might refer to commanded but could and probably did refer to the idea of ordering as classifying and arranging. In this case justice relates to an ordered system of rules for distributing actions, rewards and burdens, not to the practice of obeying commands: Secondly, Grote objects to 'saying that *justum* is a form of *jussum*', on the grounds that there is no more reason why we should deduce *jus* (law) 'from *jubeo* or *jussum*, than *jussum* from this' (Grote 1870 153-154). The two Trinity and St. John's moral science tutors, Mayor and Roby, adjudicated on the issue and found for Grote,

> 'Jubeo is in fact derived by one of the most eminent of living etymologists from *jus habeo*, and *jus* is supposed to be connected with the root *ju*, to bind...' and again,
>
> '*Justus* is of course derived immediately from *jus*, like *onustus*, *scelustus*, from *onus*, *scelus*' (ibid, 153-154).

The effect here is to derive justice from law, and to see *jus* (law) as not the ordered or commanded but as a system of laws, a set of regulations as to mutual rights and duties, an order of private rights and property.

This leads us to the heart of the issue for Grote. Mill and Bentham had argued, in part correctly, that ethical discourse and practice is related to legal discourse and practice. However, because they had the wrong view of law in the first place they ended up with the wrong views of duty and now justice. Moral and political justice is correctly seen as distribution according to an ideal law with law

meaning a set of rules governing the actions of individuals, for mutual advantage, made by a sufficient authority and backed by legitimate power. To be just an act must be authoritatively backed and for the mutual governance of agents in social relationships for their mutual good. Justice, like law obtains obedience to its dictates not because of sanctions but because of respect for right, recognition of the reason in the rule or principle,and because tacit or explicit assent is given,not simply for considerations of advantage or fear of sanctions. Arbitrary commands were not historically or politically 'moralized' before becoming just, nor did natural human sentiments of self regard and resentment have to be further 'socialized' into sanctions for justice as a practice to operate (Grote 1870, 144, 152-157). Justice, like law, contains an implicit reference to ought,it has an imperative quality in its origins, usage and practice.

An explanation of the relationships that the rules of justice, like duty, codify will help us decide which acts are just. As we have seen our social existence dictates that we find ourselves in the society of others, related to them in various ways. Our deserts like our dues arise from the facts of these relationships, and are morally justified on the same grounds, that is, they are preconditions for membership of the society (Grote 1870, 144; 1876, 210-217). Grote writes that the facts of our relations define justice. The case

> 'is the same thing as what I have already spoken of under the name of duty' (ibid, 212).

In the case of the family he writes that for the distribution of benefits and burdens, even if we ignore parental feelings

> 'I think the simple existence of the family relation, as a fact, is a sufficient reason why preference should be given to kindred over others' (ibid, 211).

Now at heart social relationships embody not identity but also

difference. Relationships such as those between parent and child, employer and employed, truster and trusted involve us being in different positions in the relationship. In addition we are all individuals, unique selves, with our own dispositions, needs, reason and ideals. Justice then is generally about distributing amongst unequals in many morally relevant respects, and hence what is demanded is not so much impartiality, disinterestedness, or arithmetic equality of share but partiality, interestedness and due preference (Grote 1870, 93-97, 150; 336; 1876, 262-274).

Two golden rules are given for justice, fairness and equality. First is a formal or presumptuous rule

> 'all individuals who may be the objects of our action, are, as a matter of course, to be treated equally or similarly, except so far as reason may appear for preferring of some to others' (Grote 1876, 211, also 218-219).

This is the relevant role of equity or impartiality. If various parties are in a similar position in a relationship to ourselves we are to treat them alike as Aristotle originally indicated. However if people hold different positions in a relationship they are to be treated differently. Hence the second general rule is that

> 'Our conduct to different people should be regulated, in other words, our care for them apportioned, on three principles combined: proper preference, proper fairness, or absence of preference; and proper particularity' (ibid 217).

An example may help here. The golden rule of equity or fairness is to treat all alike and to abstain from any undue preference as say amongst my children. However, if one is more needy than the other or one more meritorious these may be taken as reasons for preferential treatment for a particular child in this particular instance. The crux of justice is in fact the giving of due preference and the witholding of undue preference in the distribution of rewards and burdens, according to the nature and facts of the relationships in which we are involved. As Grote put it

'Justice consists in making preferences where they should be made, and carefully abstaining from making them where they should not be made' (ibid, 262).

In this sense, because impartiality does not take note of differences and deserts, it can be said to be 'no respecter of persons' and that 'justice is drawn blind' (Grote 1876, 276).

The pervasive force behind all this seems to be Aristotle and Grote uses his categories to bolster up his own explanation. There are three types of ethical theory of justice. The account of where preferences are due is 'distributive justice', that of the restoring of equity or equality is 'corrective justice', while intermediate between the two is the account of impartiality or 'fairness' (262). Impartiality to Grote is the most general or abstract principle and is not a rule of practical significance except formally and as a check on undue preference. The other two studies are more concrete and concerned with the particulars of life, the former with distribution of rewards, the latter primarily with law and punishment, the distribution of burdens.

Grote's account of punishment is fully consistent with the above. Punishment is to be understood in legal terms as the public infliction of a pain where a law, or rule, established by an authority, has been transgressed (Grote 1870, 139-142; 1876, 262-3, 501-505, 509). The actor must have intended to commit the crime and to be responsible for his actions (1876, 471-3). Punishment with regard to justice has two roles, firstly, it is corrective in the sense of restoring equity in society and annihilating the criminal's advantage (262-263). Secondly, in making amends or repayment of debts to the person hurt and to society,

'punishment is in one way or another reparation' (ibid, 176, 262-263).

That punishment is against the act, the crime, and the actor, the criminal, should go without saying. Punishment is not and should not be for the feelings of the criminal, the victim or to placate the vengeful feelings of the public body (176). Finally, punishment may have some secondary qualities and advantages, for it may make some citizens feel better, it may promote public happiness, and it may cause the criminal's reformation or even promote future moral action (Grote 1870, 205-208; 1876, 450-451). But in general punishment is about the restoring of right, it is an absolute obligation on the state to offended parties, and it is a dictate of justice (Grote 1876, 262-263).

With both justice and punishment there are three spheres in which the concept operates, the legal, the moral and the general (245-247). The first deals with positive law, the second with the moral norms of a specific society and the third deals with the hypothetical laws that should govern all human relationships, as for instance with the principles in the Bible or in Kant's ethics. While each operates in a fashion analogous to the other we should not confuse them. Justice under law is not quite the same as justice in society, as no authorized public body exists to correct transgressions with the second. Again to equate something like the international law, the *Jus Gentium* or *Jus Naturale*, with the positive law of a state would be both a confusion and a potential cause of disaster (490-500). In addition, while as we have seen, it is normally our duty to obey the law and that in so doing we may promote legal justice, this may not necessarily be the case. Grote was too much of a Victorian respectable gentleman to develop a serious theory of political disobedience or injustice. But he recognized the problem of conscience and made the point on some occasions that performance of legal obligations may lead to a moral injustice. Law, in many ways is only the attempt to quantify, measure

and balance what we find abstractly contained in the moral ideal or moral law, and the achieved norms and standards found in custom and opinion (400-401). A case of the former would be where a legal contract was made under duress, where one party was being manipulated or even where the performance of the contract would do both or even one party to the contract no good (ibid 265-274). With the latter (opinion) Grote notices that while law and custom can usually be relied upon to be just, no person must ever

> 'abdicate his prerogative of judging them by his ideal of what they should be' (ibid 401).

What makes them just or unjust is not just the existence of the rules, nor the fact of approval by others. For a good citizen

> 'it is his *own* approval of it, and his recognizing the reasons of it, which makes it so. He neither despises others' opinion, nor blindly follows it' (ibid 401).

The same goes for states in conflict with one another. For while there is no positive law to keep states in order, and war is absurd, cruel, and immoral, Grote argues for the right and obligation of each state to judge for itself both the right, the just and the true. In the end both the individual and the state have both the right and duty to define justice for themselves and if necessary to defend it by action (500-503).

There is little of the radical in Grote but much of the moderate reformer in regard to the law, social injustice, moral rules and civilization as a whole. Like most of his contemporaries he felt it the duty of the state to defend in law the citizens' rights to private property. To do otherwise would be unjust (Grote 1870, 336-339; 1876, 225-229). But he fully recognized the gross inequalities of property and wealth in society and suggested moderate reform, and even compensation in the form of improved 'Poor Laws'. While his recommendation to the propertyless to emigrate seems defeatist and

complacent, his attack on the institution of slavery, the property of persons, was assertive and aware (Grote 1876, 228). Anti-slavery had long been a popular cause amongst Trinity Fellows, and Whewell even had a letter from his old adversary John Stuart Mill, in the last years of his life congratulating him on his long and consistent advocacy of abolition and the northern cause in the civil war (Mill 1865: Whewell, Add.Ms.a.209.48). Grote's objections were that negroes were human beings, and that,

> 'beings in whom consciousness, will, and reason exist, as they do in anything bearing the shape of man, have a right to be considered really men, and to live for their own benefit, not, compulsorily, for the benefit of others' (Grote 1870, 320).

Both in the *Treatise* and the *Examination* Grote makes a meal of the argument that a Georgia 'white-man-utilitarian' may justify slavery on utilitarian grounds (Grote 1870, 318-325; 1876, 409-411). This as the *Westminster Review* notes is the only case of Grote arguing from example against utilitarianism. But he also uses this against the slavery of women and the conquest and subjugation of foreign and backward races. In rhetorical style he asks

> 'Are the races of highest civilization doomed only to exterminate, with wretched accompaniment of vice and degradation, the weak uncivilized races like the North American and the Australian; to rule over and oppress the weak civilized races like the Hindus and Chinese, without entering into real association with them; and to live in an association which is worse than none, in the relation of master and slave, with the strong uncivilized races like the Negro'? (Grote 1870, 325).

One last point on property and the family can be made here. Neither institution is defended as either God given or as the product of utilitarian calculation either made at a time or historically. Both, to Grote, are cardinal institutions of society, and though the family like property

> 'is a thing which has never been historically instituted: the human race has never been without it. It is, historically, an universal custom, made definite, in various ways, by particular law' (Grote 1876, 225).

Like language and law, property and the family pre-exist our social life and are postulates of it. In the first of two Hegelian sounding phrases, Grote accounts for property as fundamental to human personality and language,

> 'The genetive case and possessive pronoun are as early in thought as the nominative case and the personal pronoun' (Grote 1870, 339).

The family for its part mediates between the self and others, the not-self and,

> 'As the body is, for sensiveness, at once a part of ourselves and the physical external world, being the medium between the two, so family stands between a man's self and the society, at once a part of both' (Grote 1876, 226).

(5) Politics and Government

Unlike his brother George and his friend Robert Leslie Ellis, the former involved with the Radicals and the latter with the Whigs, John Grote appears to have abstained from active politics outside of his college. Nor most certainly was he a political polemicistnor an ideologist, and even his prescriptive comments on politics are few and far between. Above all Grote was an academic and a philosopher, preoccupied with understanding and explaining moral and political practice not with practicing them. But we must not mistake such a position as one of a recluse or a cloistered university don of Stephen's characterization. Nor was Grote aloof from the economic and social problems of his society. Rather Grote felt that the relative calm of the 1860's had given the opportunity for serious reflection and analysis of these issues, and that a correct understanding of their character and structure was a precondition for further efforts in the way of improvement and reform. Practically as well as philosophically Grote was an idealist. He considered man, society and history capable of improvement and progress towards the realization of

their ideals and he was not averse to propounding liberal reforms. But reform and improvement could only be adequately appraised within the context of the correct theoretical understanding. Sheer enthusiasm, desire to do good, rationalist, religious and political faith would not make up for the lack of a correct philosophical and historical appraisal of the situation.

Positivism and utilitarianism in philosophy, the progressive historicism of Comte, Mill and Buckle in history were in fact impediments to practical reform. The 'claim of utilitarianism to be the morality of progress' and a 'practical philosophy were' not only spurious, but were in many ways the reverse of the truth (Grote 1870, Ch's VI; XVIII; XIX; XX). The rationalistic methods, analysis and prescriptions of those groups offered to Victorians a dangerous threat to society and the state as well as to general human progress. It would be unrealistic to claim that Grote provided a thorough analysis of political societies past and present, of the major political thinkers and theories and even more absurd to claim he added a worked out alternative. However as we have seen in his account of law, Grote was aware of the historical growth of both political institutions and ideas, and we can now see what contributions he made to building a philosophical and practical alternative to rationalism.

As we saw in Chapter VIII, for Grote human beings are wanting creatures and the effort to satisfy want and to achieve what we want is, alongside the social nature of our thinking and feeling, the starting point for a correct assessment of human action and practice. Practical life and existence is premissed on the ultimately unbridgable gap between what 'has been', 'is' and 'will be', and more importantly 'what is' and 'what ought to be' in the future.

Our wants indicate not only the satisfaction of the senses but of the mind also. This satisfaction can be achieved in the realization

of intellectual ideals, especially the true, and moral and political ideals. Of the latter, the right is of more significance than happiness and even the good. And the sub ideals of right that satisfy our moral and social want are virtue, duty and justice, realized via the meeting of social standards, rules and goals, set in custom, opinion and the law. Activity is the necessary response to this contradiction within existence, between the actual and the ideal but it is fraught with difficulties. What 'is' has been the outcome of 'what has been' but is now gone and is beyond our present control. What 'will be' is beyond present knowledge and what 'ought to be' is both hypothetical and a hypothetical imperative open to massive conflicts of opinion in our individual and collective imaginations.

Life may be a constant struggle to overcome want and to realize ideals while being in conflict with others,but we have some aids. The first is our human powers. These include our physical abilities our mental abilities, and our ability to cooperate together. Each power has its own resistance, gravity to the former, the unknown to the next and common rivalry to cooperation. But human beings are aspiring creatures, they create ideals in their imaginations and use their powers to realize them in practice. Human beings strive for social self realization and even perfection.

Experience and history distilled and embodied into opinion, custom, moral rules, law and ideals offer the second aid. Religion provides a third but as Grote argues, unless a man speaks with the voice of God he should not underrate experience. Practical life is seen to take place in the context of historically created institutions, practices, rules laws, knowledge and thought. Its progress is involved in maintaining what is best in this, which is most, and changing what is inadequate and unideal, to satisfy our wants and to create a world more in line with our ideas of how it

should be. Life and action are an engagement of adapting the actual to make up for its defects and to realize wants and to achieve something that better approximates to our ideals.

One recurring theme in Grote's theory of practice is that much of life is and must be devoted to maintaining what is and has been. As he argues against Mill,

> 'The mass of human life consists of action or behaviour not aimed at an end or fixed by a rule, but resulting from our general manner of thinking and acting' (Grote 1870, 131).

Like Hegel and Burke he is fully alive to the fact that 'what is' is the fragile creation of many efforts at maintenance and change. The present and the actual is a product of 'the achieved dialectic of human conversation' in the past (Grote 1876, 505). Existing human nature, custom, opinions and law, as well as existing institutions of practices are a triumph neither to be undervalued, mocked, or lightly exchanged or surrendered (238-239, 395). Hence,

> 'The present mean level of human civilized morality, or ordinary respectability, represents a very high standard of moral attainment to the individual who instead of having been subjected to its discipline and education has been subjected to influences all the other way' (ibid 396).

What we have has been tried and tested by former generations, it has been argued about, disputed over, tried practically and its survival indicates some reason or rationality in itself (399). While the level to which custom embodies right may be argued over there is a definite relationship (422-423). We must test custom both in thought and practice by abstract standards, such as its naturalness, its effect on human happiness, by reference to whether it promotes human elevation and realizes our moral ideals of right and good (414-418). As we have seen we must also criticise and even act against everyday custom and practice and remain free and independent critics where necessary. But the normal state of affairs is one of conscious, free and willing recognition of the rightness, reason and practicality of custom,

opinion, practice, law, institutions.

But to go about this in the wrong way or to go too far is dangerous. Moral positivism is the going about this in the wrong way, applying scientific tests to the past, present and future, to ideals as well as reality where it is of no relevance. The consequences are moral relativism, scepticism and naturalism. Another equally wrong method is that of Whewell and his followers who seek to create a systematic morality in which moral rules, everyday opinion and practice can be codified into a set of regulative rules. Kant had pioneered this by providing his Categorical Imperative, Mill tried with the utilitarian principle, Whewell abridged conventional morality under the headings of several moral axioms considered to be ultimately self evident. For Grote

> 'Objective morality, or the rule and law of proper conduct and of a good life, is not anything which can be expressed in any sort of way in a code or system' (ibid 238).

With indirect reference to Whewells *Elements* and his *Lectures on Systematic Morality* of 1846 he recognizes the force of Mill's original criticism, that the conventional headings of the law provide an inadequate framework and anyway,

> 'are incomplete as an index of morality' (ibid, 238).

In reality practice involves an infinite number of relationships, governed by a mass of rules, and principles of great variety which cannot be resolved into a system. Both for everyday life and even for the astute philosopher,

> 'Practically, the book to which we each one of us have to refer, to discover, as to a particular line of conduct, whether it is right or wrong, is the general opinion of our age and time variously commented upon, interpreted, or criticised by the whole immediate circle in which we move, by the books which we have read, and by the view of life which our past or present circumstances have given to us' (ibid 238-239).

This last point the 'view of life' or 'form of life' has modern echoes is the moral theorizing of Wittgenstein, Winch, MacIntyre and

Bernstein. The earlier points suggest a critical philosophy in which moral judgement and reform arises from engaging in and thinking about civilizing and reforming an existing view of life. Moral philosophy gives 'us rational grounds' on which to criticize and compare moral practice, but we can not seek to rationalize moral practice under rules or principles or systematic codes without destroying it.

'Life cannot be lived by rule, or it is not life' (ibid 239). Practical morality and politics is the activity of engaging in and critically developing, maintaining and changing a viewpoint, a manner, and way of life common to a social group.

Undeniably there are dangers in holding on too closely to the actual and in breeding an attitude of quietism, apathy and conservatism. There are dangers too in the attitudes and practice of being dissatisfied with reality but being too cynical or sceptical to attempt its modification, which was the attitudes of Pascal, Montaigne and Rochfauld (Grote 1877). Equally dangerous is that idealism that leads to 'mere dreaming or castle building', to utopianism (Grote 1876, 393). An idealism that loses a grip on the actual or the practical is not helpful in theory or practice. For Grote, rationalism and positivism, apathy, cynicism and scepticism, blind obedience and utopian idealism are all inadequate responses to the practical world, both at the philosophical and the practical levels. In practice we need to grasp ideals that can practically be achieved and which will develop and fulfill individual and social want. Moral and political philosophy is to help by rationally scrutinizing and grasping with 'the inward eye' these ideals; to relate this to the actual, to the

> 'human condition and of human feeling, to see from the former how the ideal may be applied, to see from the latter, how others, like - constituted with ourselves, look upon it' (ibid 393).

It must then look at social development and history,

'because misdevelopment is possible, the particular plant we are studying might be a monster'.

Finally we should check this against the actual character and practice of human relationships and with the actual feeling and psychology of people (392-394).

We can now specify Grote's idea of politics more clearly. Politics and political society, as distinct from morality and moral society, sociality and society, is the formal and authoritative practice, or manner of behaviour, for maintaining and changing society and for reconciling conflicts within and about it. Politics both arbitrates conflicts between members and by legislation, and in practice codifies custom, opinion, relations and ideals. In so doing politics and the law are an expression of the 'public spirit and feeling' in a society (236). A useful starting point is Grote's account of conflict. Human beings differ in terms of wants as well as ideals, and may come into conflict over each of them in theory and practice. In a small chapter *On Discussion, Controversy, and War* , we find this explained in regard to politics. History, we are told, is 'a record of perpetual conflict', of which there are two sources, 'interest' and 'opinion'. Neither notion is defined though we are to conclude that the former concerns physical or material wants, while the other is concerned with moral and intellectual wants and ideals. The conflicts or contests to defend or promote our interests or opinions also reflect a basic 'principle of human nature', that of mutual rivalry, which arises from our active as against our sentient nature. We are not just combative to satisfy our senses, as Hobbes presumed, but to assert our wills and our selves (despite resistance), to be active and free, as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were arguing at the same time.

> 'Action is not action without some resistance to it, just as there could not be physical movement without some resistance. Action is a triumph of our will, and it is in the triumph, and in the amount of success against what is triumphed over, that we are conscious of ourselves, of our liberty and of our power' (ibid 488).

From childhood in pure playfulness to adult rivalries of all sorts there is then a dual drive, one to realize our interests and opinions, the other to exercise our will and freedom in action. This beautifully fits Grote's theory of action, ontology and human nature.

Grote differs from Hobbes and Mill in another crucial way, conflicts are not just individual but social, and more generally

> 'Instead of individually conflicting men, we have corporately conflicting parties' (ibid 488).

These may be of many types from families, to villages, to political parties, countries and nations. This is vital because not only does it change the unit of internal psychology to 'group ', but because

> 'the existence of man in families, orders separate governments, and other such divisions, with the various feelings arising therefrom, such as those of family partialities, of *esprit de corp*, of patriotism, are main agents for breaking down selfishness.....' (Grote 1870 337-338).

How does politics differentiate itself from moral discussion, resort to opinion, and war in the means of settlement of conflict? The answer in regard to conflicts within a society is the presence of authority, power and public reason.

> 'The conciliation of different interests, or, which is the same thing, the authoritative and forcible decision of conflicts of interest among the members of a community, is one main reason of civil government, and forms the subject of a large portion of law. Authority, power and reason, are the three things which go to to such decision' (Grote 1876, 490).

For this discussion the key words are 'authoritative' 'forcible' and 'reasonable'. We have seen this in the discussion of law that 'authority' and 'power' are very different and distinct. Authority involves right and is obeyed because of recognition or respect for right. Power on the other hand is a public ability to ensure

obedience without the need for respect or recognition. Reason in the law was what helped make it, what explains its utility and what also explain the normal state of mind of the subject, whose willing consent was given because the law and the practice were reasonable. Now in the context of politics Grote writes,

> 'Authority causes respect to the decision on the part of the well-disposed; power causes obedience on the part of all, however disposed; and reason makes it a decision not only apparently, but really, satisfactory and just. If authority and power are both wanting, their place may be supplied by the previous and subsequent consent of the parties, and the decision is then arbitration; but reason is of the essence of its satisfactoriness' (ibid 490).

Here we have an eclectic account of politics and the state which differentiates the former from social practice and the latter from society by three features. Society settles its conflict without formal authority, without sovereign power and more likely on the basis of habit rather than custom and law based on reason.

We can add to the distinction from other sources. A society is ordered according to social norms, embodied in custom, opinion, moral rules and ultimately in the moral law. A state or nation is governed by laws that abridge, codify and formalize this custom and opinion and the relationships they formalize. Politics is then about the maintenance, enforcement and modification by legislation of the positive law as distinct from the moral law. In addition the law and politics finds, records and places men in different relationships to those in which they find themselves in ordinary society. We relate not as fathers and children, employers and employees but as rulers and ruled and governors and citizens. The law usually only rationalises these but occasionally, as when an employer or citizen is forced to look after his workers or fellow citizens' welfare, we are put into a specific relationship and are told to act accordingly. Society cannot perform the last task, political society can.

Now if society and political society differ in terms of authority, power, reason, the law, relationships and the ability to force changes in them, how does one political society relate to other political societies? Here Grote is specific and his analysis explains why war arises and is so common. Between states there is no authority, no sovereign power, no common reason, no law, no binding social relationships to diminish self interest, and no capacity to negotiate and alter the relationship between the states, or to conciliate and arbitrate between them (Grote 1876, 490-491). But there are also differences, as the last point indicates, in the ways of reconciling conflicts between members of a society, citizens in a state and between states. Members of a social group reconcile conflict in several ways: by discussion and argument, by appeal to third parties such as friends and neighbours, by competition, economic or otherwise. In a state conflicts are settled more formally but differently according to whether the conflicts are of interest or opinion. The former are settled ultimately by appeal to an existing law, a struggle to get a law passed favouring your interest, or by appealing to an authority to arbitrate or conciliate, or use their power to enforce a decision. This stops what Grote calls 'private war'. In international politics this is impossible, there is no international law that is authoritative and enforceable.

> 'In conflicts of interest, between states, there is never any possibility of judicial decision except by consent and arbitration: in these cases then, if there is not agreement there must be either foregoing or war' (ibid 491).

Conflicts of opinion in a society are settled by debate and argument, and in a state by appeal to a third party, be it an arbitrator, a committee, or by voting. Conflicts of opinion cannot be settled by judicial decisions of a court. Yet in a society conflicts of opinion are not allowed to be taken as far as violence even if the difference

cannot be reconciled. In international politics there are no such constraints. No third parties exist and each party not only has the right but may also have the obligation to defend or promote its opinion, as well as its interests by war (495-496). Conflicts of opinion between states of this kind are usually over right, and, more specifically over justice and truth (492). But oddly enough for a priest and a humanist Grote did not lack political realism. 'War is a barbarism' but war may also be just.

> 'At the same time war and dispute are less evils than the acquiescence in injustice: the maintenance of truth and right is the all important thing among men, and however evil war may be, it is better that war should exist than that they should go unmaintained' (ibid 502).

Nowhere, as far as I know, does Grote define the state or elaborate in detail its functions other than those of maintenance, of order enforcement of law, legislation, arbitration and adjudication, the handling of international issues, defence and war mentioned above. Some ideas about nations are however given, and the term is used as a simple corollary for the state and not in its traditional sense as a derivation from 'natio'. Firstly, he notes that insofar as international law and conflict is concerned the basic units are 'nations'. The boundaries of nations are usually settled by war rather than negotiation, they are the outcome of the foregoing of some nations and the triumph of force of others in the past and present (496). Secondly, a nation has a citizenry of its own which are united by a distinctive set of bonds apart from law and force, the bonds of 'society' or in modern terms 'political identity', the 'common feelings' and 'manners of thought' and 'habits that unite them both to the state (497). At one place Grote likens the nation to an individual, in the sense that it acts as one body, that its members come to think alike and be intolerant of others (493, 498, 504). The fact that citizens in a nation do often 'think alike' is not however

altogether evil even though it may lead to patriotism and war, for the very same force binds individuals together, reduces selfishness and 'brings out' human potential in many areas. As in philosophical schools sectarianism brings both light and 'its dark shadow' (499).

Grote is certain that simple financial and economic interests are not enough to unite nations (497). But Grote notices another key factor, nations differ from individuals in this respect,

> 'that it has very definitely and decidedly duties to itself, i.e. that the ruling power has duties towards the subjects or individual members of the state' (ibid, 496).

Moral relations involve duties between people, and there are no duties to the self which are not ultimately for others. A states duty is however a duty to its citizens, and he adds with approval that there has been a

> 'growth of the feeling that government exists for the good of the governed' (ibid, 497).

War is the ostensible subject of this Chapter and Grote's main intention is not to debate politics or the state but to discuss the possibilities for reducing incidences of war. For definitional reasons he argues that

> 'Where there is conflict of interest without possibility of judicial decision, or with indisposition in the parties to resort to it, there is combat or war. By war we mean mutual violence which is more or less formal: in our present use indeed the term is limited to a combat between two individuals, with states for individuals' (ibid 491).

On the problem of how to diminish war Grote rejects four hypotheses. (1) that it can be achieved by 'the diminution of the independence of nations', or 'international arbitration', (2) by considerations of material and economic interests, (3) as a result of increased 'tolerance' and (4) Showing how 'absurd' and fruitless it is (ibid, 495-503). In the end war is seen as just another form of human conversation and controversy, akin to but not the same as political, religious, moral and intellectual controversy. The dialectic of,or

conversation of history and time has produced the present and will produce the future, and as in all conversation there is purpose and reason. In Hegelian terms he writes,

> 'In the controversy of the past, moral, philosophical, political, religious, we have the debate of reason, the thought of the world, that actual dialectic of human conversation and discussion, which has resulted in present opinion, and upon which whatever is accepted anywhere upon these must be conceived to rest' (Grote 1876,505).

Discussion and conversation should lead to truth in philosophy, and to right in politics and war, but in both areas the adversaries waste too much time on attack and rarely clarify their views or seek reconciliation. Usually,

> 'the truth, is merely a piece of intellectual force wasted in worthless quarrel, just as life and wealth are wasted in war' (ibid 506).

This and the mixed results of controversy, some good and some evil, are 'the history of human dialectic thought' from which Grote sees no escape in intellectual, moral, political or military terms in the future (507).

In practice then politics is defined as the attempt to 'conciliate' and 'arbitrate' on conflicts of interest and opinion where there is an authoritative body, with the power to enforce its laws and arbitrated decisions. Such a definition is deficient in that with arbitration and conciliation the parties are free to enter negotiations or not, to accept conciliation or not, to accept the judgement or not, and to accept the arbiter or conciliator or not, while in politics the state, the legislator, the government, its decisions, its power and its jurisdiction is not optional in regard to citizens. However we have seen that a political society differs in regard to power, authority and the ability to formally define and organize social relations.

In my view law is the heart of Grote's political thinking and

political philosophy. Politics is essentially the process of making and enforcing the law, it is public rather than private controversy, which results in the formal ordering of society under the state. Its precondition is not just conflict and separate interest and opinions nor grievances but sociality which to Grote is synonymous with 'political life' (Grote 1876, 224). This is another key concept to Grote and it refers to 'the reconciliation or putting together of different interests' and 'opinions' (428, 430). This separates sociality from gregariousness which is a natural attraction to members of the same species. Sociality involves difference, and humanly organized relationships. Like Aristotle, Grote argues that man is a rational and social animal, and while not calling him a political animal he makes it plain that his sociality and his imagination, his language and his ability to reconcile conflicts make the creation of a state or political society possible. Differences between human beings are for political reasons as important as their similarities and it is difference that makes the political and social unit distinct. Neither gregariousness nor equality (sameness), nor conformity or force are needed to have a social and political order amongst humans. Sociality, diversity, acceptance of basic rules and duties and rights, and acceptance of authority allow individuals to bind together in a political society.

(6) Diagnostic and Prescriptive Political Theory

For a thinker of the background and concerns of John Grote, the task of diagnosing his society and suggesting reforms was somewhat alien. Aware of the pitfalls in diagnosing and prescribing for theoretical argument put him on guard and made him a reluctant moralist, political and social critic. But Grote did have a view of his own, a political diagnosis of his age and a set of political preferences that appear in

his moral writings but most especially in the last chapters of the *Examination* . These concern (1) the growth of mass society; levelling and equality, (2) the defence of freedom; (3) a defence of private property, wealth and capitalism,tempered by a recognition of responsibility to the worker, the poor and the uneducated; (4) a desire to ensure that authority and obligation set the character of political relations rather than force, power and violence on the one side, and prudential considerations of self interest on the other.

(a) Mass society and democracy

Nineteenth century capitalist industrialization was bringing in its wake massive social political and intellectual changes on which Grote felt obliged to comment. Of central concern was the break down of difference, of uniqueness of individuality, that was a result of the growth of a mass society (Kornhauser 1960). Social relations we have seen lay at the heart of Grote's social and moral theory, they dictate what are our duties and rights. Justice and the law are to codify customary social relationships and roles and to reform them where necessary. Virtue is supererogatory, it starts where law and duty end but still reflects not only ideals to be pursued but real moral relationships to others. But what if traditional social relationships are breaking down in practice and being eroded in theory? What happens if demands for new kinds of relationships incompatible with the old and new kinds of duties, rights, justice and law incompatible with those of the past and present are advocated by reformers such as the Philosophical Radicals, including John's brother George?

Relationships to Grote are premissed upon differences between people. Father, mother and child are not equal in status, power and responsibility, but are united in the family. Friendship may be

between equals in status but the parties are distinct and unique. Work relationships, social academic, political and military relationships involve unique individuals organized into groups that embody and contain differences, and rights, duties and power arise in respect to them. Society, in brief, involves, differences and unlikeness as well as similarities and being alike in some crucial ways (Grote 1870, 336). Grote's fear is expressed in one neat sentence

> 'Now is the day of the masses; now we have done with special interests, special manners of thinking, special privileges; one common way of thinking makes us understand each other and act as one man' (Grote 1876, 428).

Now with the growing reality, ideology and theory of 'egalitarianism', all difference and uniqueness is being destroyed and it is now it is advocated 'all are alike, and that it is a grand thing to be a unit in a force or mass so vast and mighty as a civilized people' (Grote 1876,429). 'Whole nations' we are told 'have been subjected to this process of pulverizing' until it seems possible to see society not as an 'organization of dissimilar members' but 'an aggregation of similar units' (Grote 1870, 95, 337).

Most recently the pulverising process had been seen in modern France with the Revolution and its aftermath and Grote did not like the spectacle (340). But the process, which he calls 'egalitarianism', or the breaking down of differences, has been a long historical episode that some associate with Capitalism and some the development of civilization, including presumably Rousseau and even Henry Maine. Yet Grote concludes that,

> 'Little as the experience of the world and of the past may be able to teach us, it may at any rate teach us that such advantages of civilization as consists in breaking down privileges and class interests, and making men in *this* manner equal, has no tendency to produce in them that feeling of unity with others, which, as we should all agree with Mr Mill, would be so great an improvement in morality' (ibid 337).

The study of the process can be historical and it is generally a part of 'political science'.

The cement of civilized society is not to Grote, class nor gregariousness, not sameness, not force nor rationally organized prudentialism of the kind advocated by Bentham, but recognition and respect of mutual duties and rights between fellow members of a group. Special ties based on specific relationships are being replaced by prudentialism in practice and theory. Mill for instance is accused of advocating in utilitarianism 'the equality of men as a principle of morals' which neglected

> 'All idea of special ties and sympathies for that of an arithmetic aggregation, and certainty in this way allowed it to be supposed that our duty to each other, including ourselves, was to be measured out by a real education' (ibid 341).

This development Grote saw as taking us back towards 'barbarism' not forward to 'civilization'. While the philosophical underpinning to this critique is Grote's novel idea of society and his theory of duties and rights, the historical context was the collapse of the aristocratic class system and the rise of bourgeois society. At one place he notes that

> 'The restraints and mannerisms which aristocratical opinion carries with it are very likely to be weakened before the restraints and mannerisms of bourgeois opinion are prepared to take their place. The moral result of this may be good or may be bad. In the last century when something of the kind occurred in France, the result was bad: with us in England at the moment it may be otherwise' (Grote 1876, 426-427).

Aware of such a historical and contemporary development, and seeing much radical and utilitarian thinking as a bourgeois philosophy, attacking both aristocratic 'privilege' and 'culture', Grote felt obliged to adjudicate and moderate the debate. He formulates one key question

> 'Does egalitarianism (the modern *democracy* of M.de Tocqueville and others), by which I mean the feeling antagonistic to

> aristocracy and privilege, the looking upon men, and their looking upon themselves, as being all in the same position, with its accompaniments of using the same sort of language, wearing the same dress, etc. bring out individuality, or the opposite?' (ibid 428).

The answer is that 'egalitarianism acts both ways' but that its tendency to stifle individuality, difference and the desire for 'self cultivation and self-development' is dangerous and must be opposed. In a neat passage which also indicates Grote's idea of the 'ideal man', he writes of all classes

> 'Let a man be encouraged to be a something *as a man* besides what he is as a wheel in the great industrial machine. If the man holding the plough for two shillings a day can become the merchant writing at his desk and earning a hundred pounds a day, let him; in the meantime the energies of both are engrossed, and it requires an effort for either to be anything more than this work: good sense, force of character, imaginative feelings, vigour of mind seem to me quite as possible for the poor man as for the richer, if you can only get him to value them' (ibid 429).

The compromise proposed was that while the end of ancient privileges, monarchical despotism and unwarranted inequalities could happily be allowed to pass, the defence and promotion of individuality, difference, special ties and the system of rights and duties they supported was essential as a bulwark against mass society and what latter thinkers have called 'alienation' and 'anomie'. Mill we know, along with Arnold and others, feared the same pulverizing process and argued against it. But Grote's analysis is unique, based as it is on a relational theory of society, morals and politics not upon empiricist, individualistic or laissez faire ideas and presuppositions or upon aristocratic cultural aestheticism.

(b) Freedom

This brings us to political freedom and the boundaries that should be drawn between society, the state and the individual. Here the conclusions of the argument are quite similar to Mill's thesis in *On Liberty* and to bourgeois thought at the time generally, but once again

the arguments are different. Grote is opposed to what he calls 'the disposition to over meddling' and the growth of a 'tyranny of the majority' that replaces the 'tyranny of the opinion of our own rank or set' (ibid, 425-426). He wishes to promote individual liberty in thought and behaviour, but in one throw away comment he regrets the principle behind Mills *On Liberty*:

> 'Between what injures others and what does not, it is hard enough to draw the line even in regard to what is palpable and flagrant, and in the (comparatively) rough way which will do for the legislator and judge: if we are supposed to be really conscientious, it seems to me impossible' (ibid 431).

When in practice we demarcate between what is a public and private matter 'we can hardly do so on the principle that here we arrive at something which cannot affect others...' The line to be drawn rather depends on considerations of history, practice, circumstance and the balancing of interests, opinions and ideals. No simple principle such as the harm principle allows us to make hard and fast judgements on each case.

Preference for freedom arises from three considerations in Grote: that freedom of the will is a precondition of thought and moral action; that as human beings we feel free and wish to assert our freedom; and that only by so doing can society encourage its citizens towards 'self development' or what Green later calls 'self realization'. Mayor tells us that John Grote had, like his brother,

> 'an almost fanatical love of freedom of thought, even when it took a form with which he could not himself sympathize. His bias, if he had one, was always in favour of the unpopular side: i.e of the side, whichever it might be, which seemed in danger of being wrongly treated' (ibid xvii-xviii).

This love of freedom of thought he extended to the moral and political sphere as preconditions for the development of man and citizen, society and the state. Forced or manipulated adherence to the moral rules and common good of society, are by themselves of little or no value.

'The moral ideal is the union of full and free individual choice with public or social motive...' (Grote 1870, 354).

(c) Property, capitalism and social welfare

A defence of individual difference and intellectual, moral and political liberty are a likely corollary in nineteenth century Britain to a defence of private property and a laissez faire political economy, and so they were in John Grote's writings. The defences however are not based on utilitarian considerations, natural rights, nor entitlement theories of justice but upon historical, legal and logical claims about the nature of personal property , about liberty, rights and duties in society.

Private property we have seen, was considered by Grote to be a cardinal institution in society. Historically he was fully aware, like David Hume before him, that it originated in simple force, power and violence, or 'primeval abuse' (Grote 1870, 339; 1876,226-228). As societies advance, this abuse is regulated and legitimated by custom and law. The effect has been positive and negative. Negatively property has produced selfishness and massive inequalities in wealth which in turn have produced a propertyless class who usually live in poverty. On the positive side it has had several benefits. Firstly, property allows its owners 'power of action' and secondly, it has given human beings a sphere to develop difference and individuality (Grote 1870, 339-340). Thirdly, it has allowed for the massive commercial success of the capitalist political economy, with its resulting benefits. Indeed,

'so far as human experience goes, it seems as if a high economical civilization or a large population (which can only exist on the supposition either of this, or else of a very low level of material welfare on the part of the mass) cannot arise or be kept up without the full allowance of such inequality' (Grote 1876, 227).

Historically efforts at reform of the property system in the way of

greater equality, including common ownership,

> 'has always been as yet to paralyse commerce and industry (upon which the nation depends) and in this way to prevent the increase in property in general, while the existing property has only changed hands, without any greater equality than before being at all secured' (ibid 227).

The smashing of privilege in property and wealth are gained at great cost and with dubious benefits. But at the heart of the argument is an issue about human personality and freedom. Human beings need and like to own things, feel greater commitment towards their own property and make more strenuous exertions on private rather than public matters. In addition

> 'It is not only human selfishness but individual independence, which revolts against equalization' (ibid 227).

Grote sees the 'idea of community', the ideal 'that the stock of property might without injuring be held in common' as worthy of consideration, but in practice his estimate of human nature and of the practical necessities for the mass production of the means to a civilized life, made him consider the ideal to be one as yet unready for realization. While the pleasant life of abundance in a 'communistic settlement' or '*phalanstere*' may sound attractive it would not compensate for the lost liberty and diversity of life in a liberal political economy (Grote 1870, 247-248).

However, unlike Hume and Locke, Grote did not consider the state as being primarily an entity to defend private property. As he writes,

> 'A society is a partnership not only for the purpose of police, *i.e.* for the mutual protection of property, but also for the purpose of helping the common progress, and for the aid which the members may give each other is all which makes human nature better. The law is the action of the society in doing this' (ibid 232-233).

The state should intervene

> 'so far as it can act to improve public morality and the general character of the populations'

and Grote recommends that legislators keep this in mind. The law indeed should have both negative and positive roles,

> 'The law should be not *merely* a restraint, but a means of common action for good ' (ibid, 233).

The state can be the agency by which society can promote the welfare of its citizens, and Grote edges towards a notion of the enterprise State (Oakeshott 1980). This theme, popular later amongst the Oxford idealists, underpins not only Grote's critique of contemporary political economy and industrial society but his own reform proposals.

A competitive political economy has two major advantages. First, the opening up of an area for self development and second, the production of the common good by reducing individual dependence on others. To Grote, taking care of one's own interest was a social duty that relieved pressure on others to take care of us. The law should encourage such endeavour hence promoting the common good (336). However while a competitive laissez faire capitalist economy may be in reality an embodiment of personal freedom and an efficient economic system for the production of wealth and the common good,it also has its defects. Firstly, as we have seen, the inequalities in ownership and wealth produce both selfishness and poverty (Grote 1870; 326). Grote observed that

> 'In civilized society there is a vast amount of wealth and power, and a vast amount of want and need over against them: and these two sides do not as they should correspond and fit each other: the happiness of the society is measured by the degree in which they do so' (ibid 337).

The general prescription for this evil is 'more of public feeling'. But elsewhere he proposes that there is not an easy or simple diagnosis let alone solution to the problem (Grote 1870, 325-326). At a private and *ad hoc* level Grote and his Trinity colleagues gave generously towards alleviation of deprivation associated with unemployment as far afield as Lancashire (Grote MS 1862 a). Secondly,

he agrees that the community has an obligation to support the poor where there is 'unsupported destitution'. There is also

> 'a right in each individual to support at the hands of the community to this extent; it is a part of the common law of mankind' (ibid 228).

Thirdly he proposes emigration and occupation. Where all the soil and property is already appropriated

> 'It is competent for those who are born into a preoccupied land to repeat such movements into other lands' (ibid 229).

Apparently unaware of the contradiction between this proposal and his earlier statement of fears about the subjection of uncivilized races, and apparently unconcerned about imperialism and colonialization, he felt that nineteenth century emigration was just a part of a long historical process of population 'movements, emigrations, and occupations'.

Thirdly while Grote does not preach a gospel of work and self help of the kind found in Carlyle and Samuel Smiles, his whole philosophy of aretaics places stress on the necessity and inherent value of work and personal effort. The difference between the classical political economists and Grote lies in motives and the end anticipated by labour. To Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill the normal state for man was leisure, tranquillity and ease, work is only performed to gain some end, happiness, or to help avoid pain (Grote 1876, 293-2940). Grote, like Carlyle, saw work as a natural state not motivated solely by desire for happiness and material reward. Work can be fulfilling and can give full reign to our capacities, indeed work can be its own reward. More important than physical wants are our moral and intellectual wants and they call forth far more significant human actions, they stimulate creative work and activity (Grote 1870, 326-327). These active wants have been understimated by the classical political economists and give rise to a fourth point in

Grote's critique of capitalist industrial society. Capitalism fails to recog nize and allow for the satisfaction of other than economic wants and abilities. Like its theoretical companions the 'Wealth of Nations' and the 'Happiness of Societies', the 'industrial society 'of Herbert Spencer fails its citizens by providing inadequate ideals and opportunities for self realization (Grote 1870, 40-41, 242; 1876 294-295). For this evil the remedy is presented in the whole of the *Treatise*, an entreaty to recognize, believe in and act upon higher ideals than the satisfaction of sentient want and the sentient self through labour and consumption.

Finally there is one other proposal in Grote's various essays and books on a social provisions that ought to be made for the poor. Education was near the top of the list of his priorities as reference to *A Few Words on the New Educational Code* will reveal. But this education had to be other than that being propounded by the new industrialists and the utilitarians of the day. Usefulness and practicality are not to be the sole,or even the major criteria,of success,or the purpose of the exercise. Education is to allow persons to realise their individual potential and to serve the community (Grote 1856, 74-76). The criteria of judgement should be ability to think, argue and comprehend others, not learn, have learnt, or to be able to perform specialist tasks (ibid 113; 1871). Above all a non-professional and general education in thinking was good for all people, whether rich or poor, upper or lower class, young or old. All people were in need of, deserve and could benefit,according to Grote, from the gift of education. Hence 'the law should provide for the people' (Grote 1876,233).

(d) Power, Authority and Reason

History has few lessons to teach, according to Grote, but it does reveal some interesting developments. One piece of knowledge Grote

felt he had gained was that not only had property moved from a primeval abuse to a legitimate and rational institution but that generally,

> 'Sociality or political life has been the gradual conversion of this state of things into one of mutual understanding and consideration: bare power has become authority by the prevalance of the feeling on the one side that obedience to it is a duty, and on the other that the exercise of it is not for private benefit, but for the benefit of all' (Grote 1876, 224).

Much of power is the result of and the accident of history, it is as arbitrary as violence. Authority and reason both involve subjective recognition and assent, they are intentionally given and exercised, they allow an element of freedom not known in the exercise of power and violence. In addition Grote was anxious to show that authority was neither blind obedience, nor the result of training or education (460). Authority was a vast improvement upon power and violence because it involves free choice and because it replaced might by right. Unfortunately, as Weber was aware, rationalism was having a corrosive effect upon authority structures and Grote feared that power and manipulation would rush in where respect for authority was lost. Such a process was mirrored and accelerated in thought, especially in the philosophy of utilitarianism, the psychology of association, the epistemology of empiricism and the religion of positivism. Grote's hopes lay in defence of authority against power, the bolstering of morality against a world of interests, and the championing of human thought and reason against the irrationality of various determinisms and unknowables. Above all Grote hoped to reveal the high level of practical, rational and moral achievement that was represented in the law and custom of the day, and to advise against unwise efforts at radical reform.

Modern political society exhibited, to Grote, some dangerous tendencies, including the de-individualizing process, the growth of

mass society, the rationalization of customary and traditional bonds, the theoretical rationalization of law and political institutions advocated by Bentham and his followers, the growth of the meddling state on the one side and laissez faire apathy on the other, the undervaluing of fundamental beliefs, customary practices and institutions as well as such things as liberal education, the promotion of knowledge and moral ideals. His political position is itself eclectic. The first major element is liberal, in the sense of respect for the individual, a belief in rationality, a faith in the moral and practical effects of freedom, a love of education and the idea of perfectability of human nature. This liberalism is however different from that of the radical Whigs, associated with Macaulay and the politics associated with Mill and Bentham, for both rapid and rationalistic reform are rejected by Grote in favour of gradualism.

Grote was a reformer but one with a weather eye on history and practicality, rather in the fashion of Burke before him and Maine during his own lifetime (Pilling 1968,1970).On ideas his advocacy of freedom for the individual was also tempered with respect for existing ties and obligations to others, rights were not allowed to shroud his recognition of both responsibility and duty. Defence of private property and capitalist production did not blunt him to their defects and dangers and the need for the state to make amends. With a deep respect for history, practical achievement, human capacity and goodwill, Grote trod a slow and careful route towards a liberal state in which everyone had a chance to be a rational and autonomous actor, able to realize both themselves and society. Like Green and Bosanquet after him he argued that politics and the state were ultimately moral in aim but practical in character, the point of the practice was however to realize morality, the right, amongst a citizenry of free and rational individuals.

In several senses Grote was a conservative political thinker in the tradition of Burke and the later Maine. (Burrow 1970,156-15; see also 175-176). Man and society for Grote are creatures of time and history not artifact or nature. What exists is to some extent rational and is worth defending. As he says in true Burkein and Humeian fashion,

> 'what is in possession has already one great point and presumption in its favour' (Grote 1870, 228).

While ideals are vital they must not be allowed to divert us from maintenance of what is and what has authority. The job of politics is to make, adjudicate and enforce the rights and duties of citizens and to promote the common good. But this cannot be done by resort to simple plans, formulas and theories. Politics, like life, is a complex business, success in which presumes a traditional education and an understanding of history and practice.

Finally, Grote shares at least some political aspirations and orientations with the Christian Socialists. This movement was firmly embedded in Cambridge from the 1830's under the impact of Frederick Denison Maurice and later, his friends Charles Kingsley and John Llewelyn Davies. In his *Sermons* Grote speaks of the real brotherhood of man and the need for christians to live out the message of their faith. Like Maurice and Kingsley this fell short of calls to abolish private property and to end inequalities of wealth, but he shared with them the belief in the goodness of all men, the right of all to self fulfilment, the ultimate sociability of man and the role of the state in promoting social harmony and well being. Liberal in attitude, conservative in practice and socialist in belief Grote produced a reforming liberal theory which avoided the pitfalls of academic aloofness, liberal quietism, philanthropic paternalism and benevolent despotism. Full of moral feelings, idealism and benevolent concern,

Grote's emotion, faith and reason are still held in check by his desire for the truth and the practical nature of the concern. Faith was put in ordinary people rather than in elites, in his thinking, ordinary thinking and clear thinking rather than scientific or technical thought offered better guidance. Ordinary virtues were a good guide to the right and ordinary language was a good guide to the truth.

On the needs and the prescriptions for the age we have little direct advice but some indicators can be found to Grote's own preferences. Grote stresses 'Sociality', the knowledge and capacities associated with political life in a civilized society. In the *Treatise* he describes its premises as follows,

> 'The particulars of this sociality will be obedience to the laws, interest in the support and vindication of them, moderate, not revolutionary, effort at the improvement of them; together with a constant feeling how much the best system of law and custom must leave to be done by individual principle; and in this view watchfulness to supplement laws by respect for claims of all kinds; active benevolence to redress in some measure the inequalities of condition which law could not prevent, even if it aimed at doing so, and which it sometimes even increases; and to meet the vicissitudes, troubles, and difficulties of the less fortunate. That doing these things,... constitutes a sort of social law or moral standard' (Grote 1876, 398).

Earlier in a summary of one kind of practical idealism, a mixture of stoicism and christianity which typifies his own views, he writes of an ethic of

> 'reverence for law, respect for active and public life, value for sociality and in the other case, most detailed and careful recommendation of common duties...' (ibid 377).

For the individual we have seen respect for custom and duty, obedience to the law and effort to reform them all where necessary, are the key prescriptions. This is the Aristotelian medium applied to Britain in the 1860's (399). For man the social and political animal,

> 'Man's happiness may be much more truly described as lying in that society with his fellow men of which law and justice and mutual trust are the condition, and in the development of his own nature which is only possible in such society...' (Grote 1870, 317).

In summary, human society is a product of time, the experience, trial and error of which are embodied in wisdom, ordinary opinion, custom and law. The preconditions for a reasonable social existence are law, respect for rights, the fulfilment of duties, justice and mutual trust. From this base a properly moral and intellectual life can develop in which virtue and self realization are both possible and desirable. Right is not only the primary end or ideal of life, it is also its precondition. Happiness and the good are then made possible by the conditions set up by the provision for and pursuit of the right. For the individual the good life is the Aristotelian mean supplemented by virtuous effort after perfection. Ordinary opinion, ordinary custom, everyday institutions and practices represent a high level of achievement, the shore line from which assaults upon the high plateau of the moral and intellectual ideals can be launched. Ordinary morality, custom and practice like ordinary language are a good and reliable guide to the ideals. They must not be mocked, undermined, misused or departed from unless in exceptional circumstances.

Only Lasson amongst commentators grasped this central theme in Grote's work. He writes in the last paragraph, that Grote

> 'clearly perceives the inability of law to express the totality of moral action, but as a positive regulator for the guidance of particular individuals he returns to the father - confessor, in the guise of the general climate of opinion; and in an authentically English manner, 'respectability' is maintained to be the basis of morality' (Lasson 1878).

Accurate as the last comment is on the central place of respectability in much Victorian British thought, Lasson did conflate the place of opinion as a 'guide to' and as a 'basis' of morality. Opinion supplemented by custom and law are key indicators to morality according to Grote, but not its foundation. This lies in the ontological existence of want, the epistemological awareness of the

gap between self and not self, and the gap between what is and what ought to be which indicates our need to create and realize moral and political ideals. Undoubtedly Grote does conform quite well to what George Watson calls 'The English Ideology' and what Best calls the 'Dominant Ideology' of Victorian England, but to rest on this point would be to miss entirely the originality of his contribution to Victorian thought (Watson 1973; Best 1979, 279-286). Rationalisations and legitimations of various interests and groups abound in the literature of Victorian thought but Grote's work is not essentially of this character. He was a philosopher and a scholar, his account of morality, law and politics are founded on logical and metaphysical arguments of great vigour and consequence. Little is assumed, and little based on belief or prejudice in his writings. Few unstated assumptions lurk behind his defence of established tradition and custom. Grote in short was a philosopher and not an ideologist though his conclusions conform very closely to the details of the bourgeois ideology of Englishmen at the time.

(7) History and its Methods

Two related movements in the Cambridge of the day provided Grote with the historical method and social theory to develop such an account of human life and practice, the Liberal Anglican view of history, and the use of the Comparative Method.

This latter view was the main sociological plank of Cambridge Social Theory in the first seven decades of the nineteenth century supporting in its turn a complex moral and political philosophy hard to define as simply liberal, conservative or socialist. The key to understanding the theory, apart from the recognition of the development of an indigenous version of epistemological idealism, is the use by the Cambridge intellectuals of what was later to develop into the Comparative Historical method. This comparative method has

been recently defined as premissed on the idea that 'socio-cultural systems observable in the present have different degrees of resemblance to extinct culture', (Harris 1968,150). The hope was that from a study of simple societies past and present 'through testimony of three sorts - accounts by contemporary observers of civilizations less advanced than their own, the records which particular races have preserved concerning their primitive history and ancient law', an explanation of the socio-economic and political origins of 'modern social organizations' could be constructed (150-151). Hardly surprisingly most of the Cambridge classicists who applied the method came to agree with Maine that 'the effect of evidence derived from comparative jurisprudence is to establish the view of the primaeval condition of the human race which is known as the *Patriarchal Theory* (Maine 1861, 122).

The method originated in the methodological studies of the eighteenth century Scottish historians and English geologists, but received its major impetus from the assimilation of the ideas of the German historical school, and in particular, those of Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831). As a historian, Niebuhr became interested in the similarity of development in the ideas, language and laws of various societies, and in particular, he became entranced by the analogy of developments in Roman Law to those of Germany and Europe in recent history. The contemporary French and German attempts to codify their law he analysed in the context of the movement from family based to codified law in ancient Rome, and via the analogy he drew the attention of statesmen and lawyers to the dangerous results of abstract and rationalistic codification. The study of various legal and social systems convinced Niebuhr that the Hegelian procedure of trying to establish the direction of historical laws by metaphysics and dialectics was misguided. Though reality lay behind the flux of

actual events, it was only to be discovered by comparative historical analysis of various examples of laws, governments, cultures, religions and languages and not through complex application of dialectical method.

While another anti-Hegelian and friend of Niebuhr's at Berlin, Friedrick von Savigny, developed the comparative historical analysis of law and legal institutions, Niebuhr researched not only Roman law, discovering the lost Gaius Code in 1816, but also Roman political and moral ideas, publishing rediscovered tracts from Cicero and Livy in 1820, and developed comparable work on comparative philology.(4). While in Germany, Savigny and Von Ihering were widely held to be the originators of the historical school of jurisprudence, in Cambridge Niebuhr took the credit. Niebuhr was held to be 'God' and the teaching of history in the 1820's and 1830's became jokingly known as 'Niebuhrization', (Brookfield 1906, 8). Connop Thirlwall and Julius Hare were the first to translate Niebuhr's massive 'History of Rome'. Hare wrote a 'Vindication of Niebuhr' in 1829 in response to the attacks of Sir Henry Cornwall Lewis, a friend of George Grote, and an ally of the positivist school (Niebuhr 1827; Hare 1829). Thirlwall wrote a companion 'History of Greece' between 1835 and 1847 and at Oxford Matthew Arnold wrote another 'History of Rome' on similar comparative lines (Thirlwall 1835-1847; Arnold 1838-1843). In Germany Niebuhr was less widely read though both Karl Marx and Max Weber later found use for his writings on Roman History (Marx 1972;Weber 1891).

Comparative analysis was evident in several areas of mid-century Cambridge scholarship as well as in history and anthropology. Whewell has used the method to great effect in his work on the methods and history of the inductive sciences and Sedgwick used it in the history of geology. In an earlier section on Grote's theory of language and

philosophy reference was made to his use of the comparative method. It also appears in his accounts of law and progress. Grote is careful here and in the *Examination* to avoid making firm statements about the original condition of man and his development, but it is part of his whole theory to see, as does Maine, that as central human social relationships change so do our feelings, our institutions, our practices and even our ideas. He also shares the key argument of Niebuhr and Maine before and Weber and Oakeshott later that the growth of modernity has witnessed a rationalization of customary and traditional norms, values institutions and practices. In addition he shares the pessimistic conclusion that this amounts to a loss, and with Hegel and Oakeshott that this is a loss because custom and even ordinary opinion embody the morality of a society and much of its wisdom and reason. More positively Grote was confident that a comparative study of politics, jurisprudence and literature were a good guide to the actual development of man and potentialities for future self development. The comparative methods was never to be a social science, but the plurality of its methods offered, along with philosophy and religion, valuable guides to life.

Where else could Grote and even Henry Maine go to find a credible but non positivist account of history in Britain between 1840 and the mid-1860's? Under the guidance of Coleridge, Hare and Thirlwall, there developed at Cambridge what J.D.Forbes so accurately describes as the *Liberal Anglican Idea of History* best represented at Cambridge in the 1848 edition of the Second Series of Hare's *Guesses at Truth* (Forbes 1952; Hare 1827, 1848, Dockhorn 1949). Mill recognized this and asserted in 1840 that Coleridge, Maurice, Sterling and the 'Germano - Coleridgians', 'were the first (except a solitary thinker here and there) who inquired, with any comprehensiveness or depth, into the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society.' They

were the first to discover the three cultural prerequisites of social existence, education; loyalty and identity and were the first British thinkers to produce a genuine 'philosophy of history' (Mill 1965, 315). What the group learnt from Niebuhr and comparative analysis of societies was that 'all nations go through similar stages of development' (Forbes 1952, 15). And from Vico they learnt that the history of a society, state or civilisation revealed a series or sequence of cycles. The crude 'progress' and 'perfectability of men' theories of eighteenth century rationalists and modern positivists were to be rejected as unhistorical and unphilosophic, for while it is the nature of a cycle that one side is ascending or progressing, it is equally true that the other is descending or declining (Hare 1897, 313-339). They replaced the progress paradigm by the idea that historical development both reflected and was analogous to 'a gradual unfolding of all the faculties of men's intellectual and moral being' (Hare 1897, 334). From the further use of the analogies of society with individual, organic and natural life cycles, Hare was able to deduce that

> 'we may perceive that the progress of mankind is not in a straight line, uniform and unbroken. On the contrary it is subject to manifold vicissitudes, interpretations and delays: ever advancing on the whole, but often receding in one quarter, while it pushes forward in another ....'(Hare 1894, 339).

The crucial point of importance to the Liberal Anglicans however was that each society is unique in time and space and that while evidence of similar and recurring patterns of change could be observed within each, it was also true that societies, states and civilisation, like individuals, develop at different speeds and at different times, each responding to its own unique material, moral and intellectual capacities (Forbes 1952, 20-21). A science of history, and understanding of the laws of social change, though both desirable and plausible, would not give us a complete account of historical

development, for cycles follow each other endlessly, and each will be a unique response to a unique condition. Philosophy of history and comparative social analysis could provide generalizations about social change that might prove useful in analysis of particular unique societies. Its job was to aid history not to provide a science providing absolute laws of change of relevance to all societies past and present (Forbes, 1952, 39-62).

If we accept this summary of the central tenets of the Liberal Anglican view of history dominant in Cambridge in the 1840's, when Maine was a student at Trinity Hall and writing his lectures on 'Ancient Law' as Professor of Civil Law in the 1850's, then there is no need for us to labour the arguments, as Burrow does, with reference to the origins of Maine's use of the Comparative Historical Method (Burrow 1970, 132-178). Nor need we, like Burrow, posit a conflict between two sides of Maine's thought, one Germanic with an 'emphasis on the uniqueness of civilisation' and the other positivistic, elucidating 'general laws of social development', for within the Liberal Anglican view there was room for both (Burrow 1970, 163-164). Maine's use of the Comparative Historical method can be seen as a refinement of the prescriptions of Vico, Niebuhr, Savigny and Hare and the other Liberal Anglicans. If societies develop in cycles and according to regular patterns, then laws of change in and between societies are definable on the basis of both contemporary as well as past cross cultural studies. That is, at any time various societies would be at various stages of development, and the laws gained from the history of some societies may be used as a paradigm for the analysis of others. What was original about Maine was the empirical application of the comparative method to such a wide range of societies. This judgement is similarly true for the writings on the comparative politics of John Seeley and Henry Sidgwick, and on

comparative anthropology by Lubbock, McLennan and Frazer at Cambridge(5).

The recognised need for comparison in analysis was evident in many other areas of Cambridge study, not least in the fields of science where Whewell's work on methodology and Sedgwick's on geology used comparative techniques. Prior to Maine the historical method was used by Hare's colleagues, Thirlwall in his study of Greece and Kemble in his studies of philology and Mediaeval Europe. In the 1850's and 1860's it was in the field of philology that the method proved most fruitful in the writings of R.C.Trench, F.W.Farrar, J.W.Donaldson. Other leading luminaries J.B.Mayor, J.Lightfoot and F.J.A.Hort edited the Cambridge *'Journal of Philology'*. (See Chapter Three above). John Grote encouraged the development of Comparative Philology and constructed a highly suggestive framework of analysis in a series of essays *'On Glossology'*. In addition there are repeated attacks in his writings on positivist theories of history and progress once on the grounds of the 'existence of man in so many different states of development' (Grote 1870, 319; Burrow 1970,).

On the Liberal Anglican side Grote explains the analogy of moral and social with intellectual development and equates progress in one area with the other. On details Grote seems to differ with Hare and his colleagues, being less impressed with the idea of cycles in history and analogies of the life of civilisations with those of animals and other natural organisms including men themselves. But in other, more important regards his concerns coincide with theirs. History is not determined, except by human beings, and they are free. Progress is not natural nor necessary, though aspirations towards perfection and efforts toward progress characterise much of human life. Human nature is not fixed but can grow and change, with the autonomous self assisted by the wider culture, the language,

literature, law and opinion, inherited from the past and practised in the present.

Academic study can aid self development only on the peripheries but still in a useful way. A progressive political society was composed of free rational and autonomous social beings, who freely performed duties and willingly acted to realise claims and social ideals. Intellectual freedom and self development were a precondition for social and moral development. Positivism on the other side was corrosive and reactionary, utiliterianism was a new kind of barbarianism. Not surprising then, not only Grote but many of his Cambridge colleagues should raise their pens in protest. In the same decade that Grote attacked positivism and empiricism essays on them flowed from Whewell and lectures from Charles Kingsley (Whewell 1866; Kingsley 1880).As we have seen Grote's attack on utilitarianism was part of a larger Cambridge attack fired home by Sedgwick, Macauley, Whewell, Maurice, Birks and Sidgwick. We must shortly proceed to draw together this attack and summarize and analyse the contribution to Victorian thought of John Grote and his Cambridge Colleagues.

(8) Progress

One last and major question was popularly posed during the middle decades of the nineteenth century which engaged Grote's mind and will help us locate his intellectual and practical position, the relation of the present to the past, that is whether the present was an advance or a retreat, whether history as a whole and recent history in particular revealed progress. A belief in progress was very much a part of the intellectual baggage of eighteenth and nineteenth century European culture (Bury 1955; Becker 1932; Pollard 1968). (6).While it received philosophical expositions it was often only an assumed or believed element in a wider ideological formulation. John Grote felt few affiliations with that tradition known as the Enlightenment and

even less with its intellectual inheritors of the nineteenth century and so it is not surprising to find him opposed to the historical and sociological idea of progress, as distinct from the idea of moral improvement or idealism.

At heart this distinction involves the issues of freedom, of moral responsibility, of theories of practice and action, and of the ideal in practice. As Grote notes there are two general theories of progress that are antagonistic, one is the idea of progress as free; willed, attainment of ideal states, he calls improvement, and this he finds, though mistaken, to be of some value and coherent. The second idea of progress, the idea of a 'stream or course of human nature', independent of our choice and action, he decidedly rejects (Grote 1865, xvii; 1870, 280). The former view is called 'idealist' using the term in the older sense of aspiring to ideals, the latter view is called 'positivist', referring to its pseudo scientific character and is specifically associated with Augustus Comte and his science of sociology. In the *Exploratio* a third type of progress theory is added, the notion of advance. Advance, it seems, differs in being quantifiable and being able to be judged on a scale, while the first two ideas of progress are more general and more subjective (Grote 1900, 231-232).

Before proceeding, we may remind ourselves of the discussion of Positivism in section two of Chapter five above. Here Grote objected to this new school of thought on four grounds, firstly, it took scientific knowledge alone to be of ultimate value and meaning; secondly, it mistakenly applied scientific method to objects and experiences where the limited scope of science had no application; thirdly, it undermined other modes of study and finally it undermined the basic presuppositions of practice, free will, individual power and responsibility. In the *Exploratio* Grote had complained that the

positivists ran to history for evidence to prove not only that something had happened but what would and should happen in the future, thus committing a gross logical error. The *Examination* had been written as a critique of utilitarianism two years before but the seeds of this argument were still present. Grote saw, progress as a central belief not only of positivists but also of utilitarians, for whom it meant an increase in total human happiness and for whom positivist methods and calculations were advantageous means (Grote 1870, 316-317). Taking the epistemological and methodological issues as given, we can now see how the theory of progress unravels.

'Unideal' or positivist progress theories have several defects. Firstly, they usually confuse the three distinct notions of progress given above. Secondly, they presume a determined course of history which, even if we are not aware, progresses without our reason, choice or will. Thirdly, these theorists extrapolate inductively from what has been to what will be, they not only build a course of development in history but predict it will continue (281-283). Fourthly and fifthly,these theories deduce two invalid conclusions; that progress will take place and that we ought to assist its development (Grote 1870, 282, 300). Grote notes in fact that the unideal theorists have often confused their positivism with idealism to the extent of creating a 'religion capable of exciting enthusiasm', presumably a reference to the antics of B.P Enfantin and his disciples in France and Britain (283). That the inductive methods of sociology will fail to produce a science of progress is agreed. Grote recognizes that generally the future is to us 'entirely undivinable' and that even in science prediction and progress cannot be assumed (302-304). Indeed there is 'no real connection between positivism as such, and those anticipations of progress in which some positivists indulge' either in theory or practice (307). Three final criticisms remain. Firstly,

how can we judge from the existence of a change that 'what comes last is best' and that this is the best that could have happened (282, 301). Secondly, science cannot tell us about the ultimate origins, a '*vera causa*' of our development as a species, nor the force that keeps it in motion (360-361). Thirdly, while science as a subject does seem to have a recent history of progressive development itself, Grote rightly judges that this progress cannot be guaranteed for the future and that we cannot extrapolate from this intellectual to moral or political progress (303-307).

Idealist theories of progress have a different set of defects, but one they share, in the need for an agreed standard or a fixed point from which judgement of an advance or an improvement, or some progress could be made. Positivists set the base line in an uncivilised past and the pinnacle in some ideal of civilisation, run in terms of scientific rationality. Idealists generally set the base in some barbarian, or uncivilised state of affairs in the past and the pinnacle in some ideals of perfection, the content of which is widely disputed between themselves. Faced with dispute on the ideals, advocates usually resort to mere belief or dogmatism. Faced next with the impracticality of their ideals they usually compromise and bring the 'ideal very poorly down' so that the ideal turns out to be only a 'vain glorification of that which happens now to be' (283). Vain idealism and naive acceptance that the world is the best of all possible worlds are the counter sides of the idealist view of progress which Grote sought to avoid.

The two general conclusions that we can draw so far are, first, that progress is not 'natural', and second, that there is no agreed standard for judging progress. Other errors abound in the language of progress. For instance there are some fallacious or confusing analogies applied to progress and history whose conceptional appeals

blind many to their defects. The most dangerous is the analogy

> 'between the historical life of the human race and the life of the human individual...' (ibid, 288, 290-291, 299).

This analogy was used not only by enlightened historians such as Gibbon, but also by Comte, Mill, and Buckle for whom positivist knowledge was a sign of intellectual maturity, and a growing out of the adolescence of metaphysics and the childhood of theology. It was also used by several idealist historians and especially Hegel, though Grote does not make reference to this. Another defective analogy is the likening of intellectual and moral progress to the physical growth process (1865, xvii; 1870, 284). The fallacy lies in the reference to nature, for unlike the nature of a plant or animals, according to Grote, it is man's

> '*nature* to *make* his own nature, his own 'self, his own course of action''

Grote also warns us about mistaking simple and even perpetual change for progress. We should not judge progress by the criteria applied to 'the manager of a theatre' for whom novelty and change are in themselves good. Progress in fact can only be judged against an ideal standard, such as the true, and mere change far from being progressive may be counter-productive (Grote 1870,292). Indeed against some ideal criteria such as 'respect for human life' 'respecting moral ideals' and 'levelling differences' between human beings we may say that history has often witnessed regress, rather than improvement (290-291, 298-300, 323-325, 327-328, 340-341). Finally we must not mistakenly conclude from a general trend towards intellectual progress especially in the field of science, that progress has occurred in other areas such as morality, or even in other intellectual fields such as philosophy (296-298, 303-305).

Briefly, Grote considers the theory of progress to be unhistorical and even anti-philosophical. Its origins lie in the

early optimism offered by religion of salvation from earthly woes, and in the need to provide faith and hope in an age when scientific ideals and materialistic practice were undermining religious faith (ibid 279-280). Indeed Grote made the point that faith in progress was both a religion and a replacement for christianity well before John Morley made the same judgement famous (Grote 1876, 359; Morley 1917, I, 27). But for all its defects the idealist version of human progress can be rehabilitated as it was in Grote's own positive thinking on the subject. Progress may not 'come of itself', it may not be 'natural', 'determined', 'inevitable' or 'guaranteed', but it can be made, though only made by human effort, will and action, whether individual or social (Grote 1870, 284-286). Progress, for Grote, is a practical possibility if we mean by that advance towards ideals we set as human beings, and we understand by practice the free action of self determined human beings. We are progressive beings if we mean by that beings who can improve themselves and be improved by self education and free thought (Grote 1876; 354, 360). The end of moral and intellectual life we have already seen, was considered to be self-improvement (Grote 1870, 351). To achieve this we need to encourage clear thought, imagination, and a sense of freedom and desire for action (298-299).

At the end of our journey then we can see why after finishing the *Examination*, Grote felt obliged to return to his philosophical explorations. Real moral, social and political advance were premissed upon the development of intellectual abilities which were being widely denigrated in the latter years of his life. The *Exploratio* was not just a philosophical exercise to underpin the moral arguments, it was also a necessary preliminary, even a precondition, for the intellectual and moral self development of modern man. This comes out clearly when Grote hints at the correct analysis of progress. Human nature

according to Grote is far more diverse in time and space than had generally been recognized, as Burrow notes (Burrow 1970, 98). In addition human societies were at many 'different stages of development' (Grote 1870, 319). Denied revelation only a rigorous history of specific societies and comparative analysis of key elements in them could help detect any lines of progress. Amongst the latter we have quoted several potentially valuable areas of study, comparative philology called in the *Exploratio* 'the past history of all human race, both intellectual and moral or civil' (Grote 1865, xvii). Other subjects recommended include physiology, economics, and political science which deals with man's well being,

> 'the theory of legislation (which) treats of the detailed customs and laws which will best conduce to this; jurisprudence and historical politics, of the manner in which man has, in practice, judged of what he wanted, legislated for it, and governed himself; the history of literature, philosophy and science, of the manner in which man has thought, reasoned, and come to know; the history of civilization, of the manner in which he has struggled after, and partially succeeded in, progress or self-improvement' (ibid 313-314).

Such studies Grote sees as incapable of being reduced into one science but they can be correlated to help man reason with consistency, and find some common ground on which mind can meet with mind.

The result would come out this exercise would be true intellectual progress. What this amounts to in man is found in Grote's *Exploratio*, what we need is a rethinking with greater clarity and coherence, what had been thought before, a deepening rather than a widening of knowledge. It is neither aggregation of knowledge nor a spreading of learning that is needed but,

> 'It is intensification or, as I have called it, greater fulness and enrichment of the already existing, rather than such change as we can readily follow' (ibid 296).

There have been revolutions in our thought, as for instance in the Copernican rethink about the cosmos, but even this has now become orthodoxy.

The history of significance, is the history of our ideas about our world and ourselves, and man has

> 'in the course of his collective experience, been exploring the world of his own moral being; just as, physically, he has been coming to the knowledge of the globe he inhabits. Or, more accurately, he has been filling out and enriching the idea, which he has always more or less had, of something from what he is; which nevertheless he has always felt he might and ought to become' (ibid 296-297).

In brief we can see that Grote has the Hegelian idea of history as the unfolding of human intellect which is at the same time an attempt to comprehend divine mind or spirit. The history of consequence is the history of ideas, of human thought about itself and the world, and how they become embodied and communicated. If there is a correct analogy for history or progress it is with mans *actual* intellectual activity and development, and the *Exploratio* was to be the base, the known or familiar from which, and by which, history and progress are to be explained and understood.

Progress, if there is such a thing, is neither cyclical nor linear, it is rather the

> 'progress of intensification, keeping and exalting the old, not leaving it behind as done within' (ibid 297).

New moral as well as physical ideas are emerging which are not just different but are an improvement towards our ideals (294). Mere conservatism, the maintenance of old ideas and ideals blinds us to the need for new and fresh thought about and efforts towards truth and right (307). Our hope is to stimulate new thought, a rejuvenation in thinking and a stimulation to the imagination. As I quoted in Chapter four, Grote feared above all else that the modern world and modern thought would stifle imagination and he had an earnest desire to self development towards the ideal. His whole philosophy was his riposte and his effort for the progress of mankind. Human progress was premissed on the unfolding of the human mind and Grote was committed to help.

PART III

Chapter Ten

John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Ideas.

In the introduction to this thesis I proposed two sources of interest that John Grote should have for modern readers, first the power and rigour with which he deals with the essential questions puzzling mid-Victorian philosophers, and second his historical position in the context of the development of Victorian thought. It was not a major aim or intention of this particular work either to critically assess Grote's philosophy or its effects on later British thought. However to provide a context for analysing Grote I was obliged to reconstruct a picture of mid-Victorian thought and its emergence from the nineteenth century. Even more specifically I was obliged to reconstruct a picture of Cambridge philosophy and thought in the same period. But in this final synthesis I wish to draw together my picture of John Grote's philosophy and its Cambridge context to produce a revised picture of mid-Victorian thought. In a third appendix below, I will draw out the implications of this thesis both philosophically and historically, for later Cambridge and British thought. Future research and writing dedicated to this later task should reveal a most exciting and surprising lineage to the present from both the thought of Grote and the mid-century Cambridge Movement. Here I shall only sketch the barest outline of descent, a kind of check list for future research without any pretence at historical rigour. In line with the general aims of this thesis I shall usually refrain from providing detailed philosophical criticism of Grote, though I will make some general points in appraisal of the merits of his work. In short this chapter will survey the work of John Grote,

Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian thought to the 1870's with some additional indicators as to its later effects.

I

The Philosophy and Thought of John Grote.

Historically John Grote considered the decade of his philosophical maturity from 1855 to 1865, to be a watershed in British philosophy, thought, culture and society. Tensions that had arisen during the industrialisation process in areas of economics, politics and class had produced conflicts within the culture and philosophy of mid-Victorian Britain. Unfortunately, as we shall remind ourselves in the next section, this conflict had become institutionalised; the adversaries were battling from fixed positions without any apparent hope of, or desire for, compromise. In this controversy truth was being sacrificed, just as in the economic, social, political and moral battles the casualties were right and its hand maidens: duty, justice and virtue. Grote saw his task to be that of the moderator and mediator of the old controversies, the harmoniser of the old positions and the originator of a new eclectic, yet coherent philosophy that could transcend the old stalemates.

As a mediator he patiently sifts the essential points of agreement and disagreement between opposing camps. In methods, he synthesises the schools of observation, induction, and positivism of reason, deduction and philosophy. In epistemology he adjudicates between the old Cambridge rationalist tradition, intuitionism, common-sense philosophy, phenomenalism and pure materialism. In moral philosophy he bridges the divide between what Mill calls intuitionism and utilitarianism, between the a priori ethics of, for example Whewell and the a posteriori ethics of Bentham. In politics Grote tempers excessive enthusiasm for Whig and radical style liberalism,

orthodox conservatism and utopian socialism. His calls for reform and improvement are tempered by warnings of the dangers of political rationalism. Calls for more political freedom, public involvement and debate are set alongside fears about the dangers of excessive egalitarianism and democracy. Excesses and polarizations in the fields of religion, education, history and science are also moderated and mediated. The slide into scepticism and atheism, witnessed by his colleagues Aldis Wright, Henry Sidgwick, Leslie and James Fitzjames Stephen, were counselled against as were the evangelical enthusiasms, the dour Calvinist broodings and the fatalist submissions to the 'unknowable' of other religious contemporaries. In education we find Grote opposed equally to the apathy and aloofness of those opposing universal education; to those like the Philosophical Radicals who preferred rote learning for all at the lowest cost to the taxpayer; the new trend to technical and professional education that was to dominate twentieth century education; and to academic elitism, which maintained high standards at low cost by restricting provision to the middle and upper classes. On history, Grote is opposed both to positivist historicism on the one side and idealist ramblings about evolution or growth on the other, neither history as progress nor as perfection are allowed.

To reconcile and conciliate Grote uses the strategy and methods of the eclectic. Root out the truth and discard the error of each thinker and school of thought. Harmonize what is left. The results are striking. Positivism offers a unique clarification of the correct methods for studying phenomena but not man. Once mind and man are encountered then Vico's entreaty that we study mind with mind is embraced. Hence, while the logic of Bacon, Mill, Comte and Bain is praised in the areas of the physical sciences, Whewell's methods are recommended for the study of the history of scientific thought;

idealist and hermeneutic methods for the study of human constructs such as language, arguments, books, social and political institutions and practices. Science in short is made sovereign in its own small kingdom while its pretensions for expansion are rendered illegitimate. Philosophy, religion and history for their part are given kingdoms to reign over sui generis areas where their own languages and logics rule, where their own aims can be explored. Fear of invasion and subversion are rejected as paranoia. Grote had no fear that science, positivism and materialism would ever undermine philosophy, history and religion, and the more they tried the further into error and confusion they fell. Over fundamental epistemological issues Grote takes the original stance he has taken with issues of method. Mediation comes by requiring the opposed forces to retire to areas in which their assumptions and arguments are appropriate and to cease incursion into areas where their presence causes confusion. On his scale of Victorian philosophers Grote praises those at the extremes, precisely because they know how to behave in their own terrains. Hence Bain on physio-psychology and Ferrier in philosophy are praised, while those in between them, including Spencer and Mill close to Bain, and Hamilton and Whewell nearer to Ferrier, are condemned for lack of precision and demarcation in language and thought, for mis-phenomenalism on one side and notionalism on the other.

Over ethics the mediation is achieved again by giving distinctive and soveriegn territory to the major opposing forces. To the utilitarians, the moral sense and sentiment theorists, and the political economists, Grote concedes the science of the sentient self, eudaemonics. But to the intuitionists, the deontologists, to Kant and the romantics and idealists he gives aretaics, the new science of moral action, which builds on the active side of the self - on the fact of intellectual, aesthetic and moral want rather than felt want.

To the former the ideal of happiness is conceded as primary, to the latter the primary ideal is right. While consequentialist ethics dominates the former, non-consequentialism characterises the latter. As with epistemology and methods so in ethics the two poles are complementary, different but not incompatible, each unique and sui generis, but each incapable of providing what the other can give. The synthesis then is not to be in 'running together' these distinct disciplines, modes of analysis or view points, but in keeping them apart and yet in a harmonious relationship. Syncrety not synthesis then is the key. As later with Collingwood in *'Speculatum Mentis'* Oakeshott in *'Experience and its Modes'* and Croce in various texts, the transendance of confusion comes by demarcation, not conquest. The patient analysis of presuppositions (postulates), language, and argument and logical deduction are the negotiator's skills. His role is that of intellectual boundary commissioner.

A similar set of approaches work in history, and in the more practical areas of politics, education and religion. In the former Grote prefers the 'concrete study of history': staying close to the facts. But the facts are the conclusions of historians, not some primordial data, the historical equivalent of external objects or atomistic sense data. History is the study of a variety of sources, from things to ideas, modified in their presentation to us by the thought of others, which we shape into a coherent picture we believe to be the actual account of the past event. Positivist and idealist histories of progress are put firmly in their place, real history is of actual human beings, who freely act to realize their ideals at different times in different societies. In politics ideas of conservatism, liberalism, whiggism, reformism and utopianism are sieved for the truth each contains. From the former the chief residues are respect for custom, tradition, habit, opinion, existing

institutions and practices. From liberalism there survives a lasting respect for freedom in every sense, from freedom of thought and speech to political freedom. In addition there is a respect for individuality, moderate and rational reform, as well as a belief in the progressive effect of education, support for the institutions of the laissez-faire state and a defence of civil rights. From the Whigs and radicals little survives, only a deep concern with social welfare and the need for an enlightened political leadership. Opposition to the rise of bourgeois culture, institutions and interests unites Grote with the romantic conservatives like Coleridge and Carlyle and the christian socialists like Kingsley and Maurice. From them Grote retains a theory of man's basic sociability, a recognition of his real needs, and a belief in the responsibility of the state for citizens in need, and for the central provision of education and social welfare.

But Grote did not stop at moderation, mediation and arbitration.He not only returned to rejuvenate himself in past philosophies bringing back truths for his eclectic collection, but he provided proposals for an advance towards the truth. There is in Grote's corpus a constructive and positive philosophy, a proposal for a synthesis in philosophy that at least transcends the old dichotomies, and even a system, if we mean by that term not a plan, a method, a scheme of classification or a simple explanatory hypothesis and theory, but a full, coherent and connected view of some department of knowledge. In chapter four I explained Grote's intentions in philosophy as being to clarify his own thoughts, to provide the basis for truth, to expose error - particularly the errors of positivism, phenomenalism and utilitarianism, - to find a distinct place for science, history, philosophy and religion, and to prove a coherent picture of the intellectual world. His methods and approaches I explained were four-fold: first eclecticism; second, the patient analysis of

language with stress on ordinary language meanings; third, an existential analysis based on the exploration of the postulates or preconditions of being, acting, practice and thinking in the world, and finally, the development of idealism. Philosophy to Grote is a thinking and rethinking of those issues considered vital until the answers become clearer. Philosophy, if it advances, does so by increasing the 'intensity' of the analysis of what philosophers have previously explored; by rethinking until clarity appears, a pattern comes out and coherence is restored to the world of our ideas. Philosophy is only a developed form of ordinary thinking, it is the 'awakening of intelligence' to itself not just an external world or an undifferentiated world of everyday meaning. Imagination, reflection and knowledge by judgement are the calling cards of philosophy as they are of all thought, but concentrated on thought, being and doing themselves, and used with an intensity of a different order.

But the first major originality lay in the stress on the place of language in thought and the role of the study of language in philosophy's, scrutiny of thought. First, Grote places massive stress on language at the expense of sense experience and even cognitive activity. Thought is impossible and sense experience incomprehensible unless mediated by language. Language is the mother of thought - we think in it. Sense experience is a jumbled nonsense until judged and that means named and described and evaluated in words. Nominalism, and linguistic realism which relates words to things with opposing priority, are rejected as inadequate. Etymology that reduces meaning to past uses is similarly devastated. In its place Grote has a positive theory of language. Words mean what they are intended to mean by ordinary people in the ordinary contexts of usage in everyday life. Each word and its meaning implies the whole of a language and its complex of meanings. Each word and each language are themselves

social in origin and character, so that even thinking is a conversation. In philosophy as in ordinary language meaning and truth are to be gained from the careful elaboration of usage. Careful thought about the meaning of words and care in usage will allow a transcendence of the fruitless quarrels of the day. In addition there is in Grote the belief that in conversation, in argument and controversy, we have a dialectic of mankind about the true and the right, a dialectic of a time and through time or history. Language constructs meaning, but in its record, in the history of its products, in literature, poetry, religion, laws, customs, opinions, myths especially we have matter for understanding the present and our place in the dialectic of mankind (Grote 1865, 204-205, 241-245; 1876, 506-507). Both in theory and even more in practice, Grote's use of language analysis is ingenious and effective and is of immense historical significance.

The existential ontology and the resulting theory of practice in Grote's work is its next imposing feature, and at one stage this thesis was to be entitled *John Grote's Theory of Politics and Practice* reflecting its significance. To be in the world is to encounter certain existential conditions, the generality of which is called the 'human condition'. To be involves being a wanting being, with sensory wants being matched by intellectual and moral wants. Our wants are constantly being recreated and call forth action for their satisfaction. Action, the practice of every day life, is the attempt to placate our want, while thought placates the intelligence. But the gap between want and satisfaction is unbridgeable and worse still so are the gaps produced by time between what is and what will be, what is and what ought to be. Ideals of the future and of moral priorities within it, what ought to be,are as natural to life as consciousness of felt want. Life, action, thought and practice are predicated upon

want, time and the production of ideals, and cannot be understood properly without regard to them. We need above all a proper philosophy of practice as well as practices in society which will satisfy our actual and ideal wants, our felt and existential wants. These alone can realize and satisfy human need and purpose, but both involve the discovery, pursuit and attainment of the right ideals correctly understood. The *Treatise* performs the first task as an aid to Victorian society discovering and implementing the second. Facts and values may be separable in theory but not in Grote's idea of political practice. Philosophy theorizes practice with the hope that this may clarify muddles and direct attention to the true and the right.

But theoretically we have seen that Grote's positive philosophy appears in his self-conscious and often stated allegiance to philosophical idealism both in epistemology and ethics. The intellectual foundations written for the publication of the *Examination* projected in 1864 was called *'Idealism and Positivism'*, and the term idealism appears throughout all of his four major texts and obtains extensive elaboration. Idealism Grote saw as the only philosophy that could provide a coherent account of the world from the philosophical perspective (Grote 1865, 57-59). It alone had a starting point that did not need further logical underpinning - the existence of consciousness of being, which is feeling, seeming and being all as one, the existence of immediate experience. Second, such a philosophy alone allowed him to build a complete knowledge of the world which avoids relativism, scepticism, notionalism, the belief in things in themselves and unknowable absolutes. Knowledge grows by reflection upon what is 'given' in immediate consciousness, but while it differentiates what is united in the immediate, reflection and judgement do not, as they do in Kant and Bradley, render complete

knowledge impossible. Knowledge to Grote is a mixture of immediate knowledge of acquaintance and mediated knowledge of judgement and much else between. Third, as in most early forms of European idealism, knowledge is pictured as the unfolding of the implicit, the development of a seed or germ encapsulated in the given into full self consciousness. As he puts it in this oft quoted phrase:

> 'Advance of knowledge is essentially distinction, not aggregation. Each new particular of knowledge is not an addition to, but a newly observed part of, a previously conceived whole' (Grote 1900,299).

Likewise human nature is considered as a complete whole, capable of social and self development, a potential ready to be unfolded, realized or developed. Romantic and expressivist, it rejects materialistic assumptions or rather relegates them to near insignificance, in favours of the idea of a free, creative, active, social self, capable of making its own nature by imagination and willed struggle. Imagination is the fourth distinguishing trait in Grote's idealism. Epistemologically imagination is the vat of knowledge, it is what makes possible the development of what is implicit to mature judgement ,certainty and truth. We hypothesise, test, reorder, challenge and, in the end, fix our knowledge in the imagination. Knowledge is, in fact, described as the 'fixing' of vague imagination, it is imagination made 'self consistent'. For morality it is also vital, without it we could not have any rational or practical action because we could not imagine the future (Grote 1900,307-308,313). Without imagination we certainly could not conceive a world that ought to be, nor its contents and ideas. Moral practice and moral philosophy presuppose imagination, the imagining and fixing of ideals and actions to realize them.

In chapter four I took as my basic characterization of idealism Noel O'Sullivan's three criteria and added a fourth. Grote satisfies

all four. Firstly, both subject and object are bound together in all thought and experience to Grote; secondly, the self moves towards self recognition in the process of experience and gaining knowledge; thirdly, Grote denies cognitive and psychological individualism as well as social individualism or social atomism, asserting instead the social nature of language, thought, knowledge, and activity. But I added the insistence by idealists of cognitive and volitional freedom. Freedom to Grote is a postulate of all our thinking and acting, without which neither would make sense, for neither the search for truth nor for right would be possible. Pure moral activity as the free acceptance of social imperatives is only possible on the assumption of freedom according to Grote. This led, we saw, to a qualitative theory of action in which self-conscious free action like reflectional judgement evolves out of what is unreflecting or immediate. What we first do reflexively, customarily or immediately we explore in thought and imagination and alter by will. Moral thought and moral action, like their mental and political equivalents, are explorations of what is implicit in custom and practice until their real nature, character and purpose become explicit and clear. Self-conscious reflectional knowledge or truth, absolute knowledge of the moral ideals and of right in particular, and action to further self-development and self-realization are linked both by analogy and by the same epistemological processes. Finally we should remember one other usual feature of English idealist social and political philosophy, the idea that the real is the rational, that existing opinion, custom, tradition, institutions and practices embody the ideas and wisdom of a society. Grote, like Hegel before him and Bradley, Green, Bosanquet and Oakeshott afterwards, subscribed to this argument, perhaps the most distinctive feature of idealist ethics and politics.

But what sort of idealist is Grote? In chapters five and six transcendental, subjective, objective and absolute idealism were examined and Grote's idealism was argued to be absolute (Walsh 1985, 381-382). Grote considered that mind expresses itself and finds itself in objects; he posits an absolute reality and considers it knowable by finite mind. That absolute reality is both the totality of human reality and truth, and at the same time from the other side God. Does this conflict with the central thesis of Lauchlin D.MacDonald in his book *John Grote: A Critical Estimation of His Writings* (MacDonald 1966)? For MacDonald Grote is a 'personalist' and an 'idealist', he is a 'personalist idealist' (MacDonald 1966,118-121,188-208). MacDonald's arguments are rambling, often repetitious and sometimes contradictory but the two key claims are contained in the following quotation. Personalist idealism has a moral and a metaphysical claim.

> 'It should be noted also that Grote's idealism is personalistic. It is personalistic in two main senses. First, this personalistic idealism engages the whole person in aspiring after an objective or ideal, the *summum bonum*, which in Plato is *the Good* and in Aristotle *eudaemonia* or happiness akin to ecstasy. Second, this personalistic idealism is evident in the emphasis that Grote lays upon the 'philosophical' consciousness, or 'idea' side of his epistemology without which there is no *being* of any sort. All existence must be such for persons; there is no other existence' (MacDonald 1966,243).

On the first Grote does argue that human life is premissed upon want and involves the presentation of and attempt to realise ideals. That this takes account of the whole of the person is however doubtful as he recognises both that part of our nature is biological and that much of life is taken up with maintenance activities. Secondly, Grote's ideals are more numerous than the Good and Happiness, and he prioritizes the Right. Thirdly, it seems by this definition that Plato and Aristotle are personalist idealists, a claim that remains to be substantiated. Personalism is obviously being used here in a most

general fashion and not in a more limited technical sense. Almost all idealists, intuitionalists, moral sense theorists and even ideal utilitarians could qualify as personalist idealists by this definition, as all see man as aspiring after at least one ideal.

The second part of MacDonald's definition is similarly vague, being so broad as to embrace almost all empiricists as well as idealists, because all consider consciousness, the idea side to predominate, and consider being to be dependent upon subjective consciousness. Personalism is used only once by Grote and then as an equivalent for idealism generally,

> 'The idealism, personalism, or whatever it may be called, which lies at the root of all that I have said, is not simply a doctrine or opinion, but seems to me to have been my earliest philosophical feeling, and to have continued, if not so vivid, yet not less strong, ever since' (Grote 1865,146).

His intention is to show in a philosophical 'reminiscence' that not only does he believe that the logical starting point for epistemology is the unity of self and not self in immediate consciousness, but that both in childhood and early life we feel as if the world is our world, a feeling we lose as external life imposes its weight upon us. The point is that in adulthood we 'sink all our independent selfhood' in other things, institutions and people, the result being that the magic of childhood on which everything is seen from our own perspective is lost, and

> 'a kind of dullness which is superinduced over our disposition to higher thought by what the course of everybody's life is pretty certain to be' (ibid, 146).

By personalism in the context of the passage quoted Grote means to re-express what he describes elsewhere as 'egoism', 'thinking for oneself' and intellectual 'rejuvenation', the idea that the universe we explore is what it is for us, that we must start with our consciousness, explore it for ourselves, and to assist in this we must

return to that fundamental unity of knowing and being, self and not self implicit in our primitive consciousness.

Now in this sense Grote is sharing a thesis inherent not only in Hegel but in the whole German idealist movement - wider still in the European romantic movement and the aufklaerung or counter enlightenment. Grote's personalism is also shared by almost all later idealists and many other non idealist philosophers and even psychologists. Unfortunately, however, the term personalist has served other usages and meanings, many of which are highly technical and restricted, and most of which are of more recent origin. Two dangers exist then in defining Grote as a personalist idealist, The first that his very general statement about the logical point being immediate consciousness, and his preference for egoism and personal thought is conflated with one or more of the more technical uses. The second is that Grote's concerns of 1865 are muddled up with the concerns of the later personalists, namely Andrew Seth and the Oxford personalists from 1887 and the American personalists starting with Edgar Brightman in the 1920's. MacDonald's arguments flirt with both dangers, become muddled as a result and leave us confused as to the nature of the claim, let alone its substantiation. The same thing happens, as W.H.Werkmeister notes in his review of MacDonalds book, in the authors account's of 'Kantian idealism', 'epistemological monism' and 'pluralism'. Indeed confusion and even contradiction appear so regularly throughout the text that any attempt at clarification becomes too daunting and the results so dubious that it is hardly worth undertaking.(1) Werkmeister concludes his review as follows

> 'Unfortunately I am in no position to say who is more responsible for all the confusions - John Grote or Lauchlin MacDonald' (Werkmeister 1969,218).

My answer is that it is the latter, and that MacDonald's efforts generally have done a disservice to the recovery of Grote's

philosophy.

The list of family resemblances that make up personalism include the following: the only things that are real are persons or selves (Brightman 1925); all true being is personal (Brightman 1925); persons are ontologically fundamental (Flew 1979); personality, not nature or the absolute, contains reality (Sturt 1902); personality represents the highest value within the field of our experience (Copleston 1967); knowledge originates in consciousness within the self(MacDonald 1966); selves have value independent of God and the absolute (Seth 1887); God is a community of personalities or selves (Rashdall 1902); God is the primary manifestation of personality (Flew 1979); reality is spiritual, an expression of God's personality (Flewelling 1947); reality is a community of selves without God (McTaggart 1906). As these premises are woven together so we can have, according to MacDonald, monistic personalism (dominated by either oneself, one God or the community); pluralistic personalism (many personalities); theistic personalism (the personality is God's) or non-theistic personalism (McTaggart). MacDonald also separates 'epistemological personalism'; and 'metaphysical personalism' the first being concerned with the origins of knowledge in the self, the second with the origins of reality in the personality (MacDonald 1966,192-194).

MacDonald ignores the vast variety of often conflicting strands in personalism and in identifying Grote restricts himself almost entirely to the American tradition and then almost exclusively to Edgar Brightman(Schneewind 1968,171). In so doing he ignores a more fruitful line of descent through Grote's successors at Cambridge, James Ward, McTaggart Ellis and W.R.Sorley(Passmore 1966,75-84; Copleston 1967,267-283), and two other philosophers who quote Grote, Andrew Seth(Pringle Pattison) and Hastings Rashdall(Passmore

1966,72-75). Secondly, as Werkmeister points out the various categories and definitions are confusing and get confused together. Grote is described as a metaphysical personalist who sees individual personality alone as real, and as an epistemological personalist for whom only personality is fundamental, while he is also asserted to be a theistic personalist for whom God's personality is real and known! In addition Grote is considered to be both an 'epistemological monist' and a 'metaphysical pluralist'. In fact there are fundamental tensions between such views that are not tackled by MacDonald. We are not told how epistemology relates to metaphysics and ontology, nor how all three relate to ethics and theology in Grote's thought. Is the self self real or only Gods self? Can knowledge arise from one self or does it require a plurality of selves, or does it derive from God? How can Grote's supposed 'metaphysical personalism', the belief in one God, be compatible with 'metaphysical pluralism' where there is a plurality of realities?

In fact Grote is a personalist only in the sense of that term which he defines for himself. He was an epistemological personalist, along with Hegel, the romantics and many others, in treating our immediate consciousness as the basis for knowledge, but that tells us very little. He was a metaphysical personalist in the general sense of seeing reality as essentially spiritual, but so did absolute idealists. Grote was certainly a monist and not a pluralist in both epistemology and metaphysics but these categories cover his whole idealism, not narrow personalism. Finally, Grote tackles my second question above and produces a novel answer. For each of us our own consciousness is basic, but its creation and exploration requires social language - our self and our knowledge are communal. In coming to know, our personal minds meet or find the minds of others who have already defined, known or created things; one of these other minds is

our society's and another is God's. Grote's idealism then blends assertions about the primacy of self in knowing and willing, with a recognition of the role of a plurality of selves in a society, with a belief in the reality of the external world and its coherence, a belief in a knowable absolute as both the totality of truth and of Gods will. Luckily Grote did not have MacDonald's conceptual baggage to delay him, he could just explore his own theory and develop its own coherence. Grote is not confused or confusing here, but MacDonald certainly appears to be, as Werkmeister argues.

A similar and profitless debate concerns Grote's affiliation to realism. He is appreciatively quoted by several realists without ever being embraced as a member of that school. In the most general sense Grote is a realist if by that we mean a belief that there is an external world that can be known directly, and that qualities of it are carved out of this immediately known or given reality.(2) This for instance is the apparent point behind G.Dawes Hicks quotation from Grote (Hicks 1938,124).

> 'The advance of thought in my view, is the simultaneous development of the distinct conception of ourselves, or our personality, and the distinct conception of objects of thought as independent of us: and each conception brings out the other. By an object of thought, as distinctly conceived, we mean something standing off from, though connected with, our thinking, and we cannot mean this without a *co-conception*of ourselves, from which the other is relieved:' (Grote 1900, 146-147)

Other similar quotations stress Grote's belief in the reality of the external world and of its knowability in ordinary thought. Both realist beliefs are found in R.W.Sellers *Critical Realism*, and John Laird's *A Study of Realism* (Sellars 1920,257-259; Laird 1920,15). Each quotes Grote as follows,

> 'In my view, a thing is what it looks, and looks what it is: we can see it as it is, and it is as we see it' (Grote 1900,176).

But this is a one sided interpretation that ignores Grote's arguments that immediate consciousness, while of reality, is not fully fledged

knowledge about it, but needs more experience, reflection and mediate judgement to bring it out. It seems to confuse Grote's 'immediate awareness' with the 'direct intuition' of the realists. It also fails to recognise that absolute reality to Grote develops from the immediate by a process of 'distinctification' and then re-unification within a coherent world of ideas. However this one side of Grote's philosophy is as compatible with his idealism and his personalism (if that term is allowed) as it was in the thought of a later Trinity idealist,

> 'Ontologically I am an Idealist, since I believe that all that exists is spiritual. I am also, in one sense of the term, a Personal Idealist. For I believe that every part of the content of spirit falls within some self, and that no part of it falls within more than one self, that the only substances are selves, parts of selves and groups of selves. On the other hand, I should say that epistemologically I was a Realist. I should say that knowledge was a true belief, and I should say that a belief was true when, and only when, it stands in relation to correspondence to a fact...' (McTaggart 1934).

We may now pass to Grote's moral philosophy. Two insubstantial aspersions can be quickly rejected: one implicit in W.R.Sorley's classification of Grote along with Maurice under the heading of *Rational and Religious Philosophers*, and the other by James Ward who, in a private and unlocated letter called Grote a 'moralist'. Sorley does not justify the classification. It is undoubtedly true that Grote was deeply religious and that his belief in God not only complements but completes his philosophy. Nevertheless religious presuppositions are not amongst his fundamental philosophical assumptions, and he usually provides non religious arguments alongside religious ones. In the end the character of his work is more deeply philosophical than religious; he avoids, so far as is possible, discipline confusion and category mistakes. Schneewind, we saw ,twice got close to arguing that Grote's philosophy was premissed upon a religious assumption, that the world is an ordered whole, with purpose

and reason. But twice I have argued that a) this assumption was also founded upon a reflexive argument, that an ordered world is a postulate of all language and thought including the scientific and that b) the existence of reason and purpose in things and events is a compatible assumption embedded in all practical language and action. In addition, the reason and purpose and order found in the world Grote considers to be there from the sources of the individual mind social opinion and from God. He provides us with a non-religious option that few other idealists dared to provide, except McTaggart later.

The charge of being a moralist is harder to handle as we do not know exactly how Ward was using the term. However if it was used to mean a practical thinker who teaches and preaches practical morality the charge must be qualified if not rebutted.(King and Parekh 1968,156). Grote's moral philosophy is not primarily prescriptive but explanatory and analytic, his work is not legitimatory or ideological but critical and rational - in short, philosophical. The priest in Grote rarely appears in his philosophical works. Few if any moral prescriptions exist in either the *Treatise* or the *Examination*. The few that do, such as the claim that right entails obedience to the law and performance of duty, are always the result of long and detached philosophical analysis and not a search through subjective prejudices or feelings. Thirdly, and most importantly Grote explicitly, notes the dangers of moralism in philosophy and argues for its rejection. In the *Examination* he wrote of the attempt to make moral philosophy immediately practical as a 'philosophy of non-philosophy' which not only damages philosophy but usually leads to 'wild dreams and imaginations', something quite 'unpractical' (Grote 1870, 242-245). Philosophy is about critically testing assumptions and presuppositions and systematizing and methodizing the resulting conclusions, not creating practical guidelines, rules of thumb, practical principles or

even systematic codes of ethics. 'Moralistic' thought he separates from moral philosophy in that the former involves 'exemplar stories and advice to others'(Grote 1870,33-34). On this criterion he is no moralist.

Finally, in an interesting aside on moral criticism Grote discusses the merits and de-merits of three groups of 'moralists' and one group in particular called 'practicalists'. By moralists Grote means 'makers of maxims, essays and remarks' on human character. There are three types: 'theoretical moralists' both psychological and ontological; 'dialectic moralists' and 'critical moralists' (Grote 1876, 476-486). The 'practicalists' are generally more cynical, treating all men as 'fools or knaves'. Without going into detail Grote has in mind here moralists such as Pascal, Montaigne, Pope and La Rochefoucauld of old and probably Southey, Carlyle, Ruskin and other similar writers of his day. Moralists usually ignore the complexity of human nature in favour of prescription, and having

> 'shut their eyes to one of these sources or to the other, have in general gone on with a weary battle',

stressing mans fear, desire for power, happiness or somesuch other disposition (Grote 1876,125-126). Generally, 'moralists' and 'practicalists' work from abstractions about man's dispositional nature, one stressing its goodness, the other its cruelty (Grote 1876,462-463).

But at one level Grote is a moralist; he does study human character, he does analyse the psychology as well as the epistemology and ontology of morality, and he does pass an optimistic judgement on human moral character, fulfilling his own claim that

> 'we want a La Rochefoucauld of a converse kind, who would hunt out, not the root of bitterness in every good action, but of reason and excusableness in every bad...' (Grote 1876,486).

But generally these elements are a minor part in an otherwise

generally analytic corpus; the study of character is not a central element of his work, and many of the moralistic elements appear in appendices that were once only undergraduate lectures, that Mayor as editor chose to add. Grote generally kept his moralism in check in his own intentions and writing, Mayor pushed them forward, perhaps wishing to have Grote seen as a moralist and good Victorian as well as a philosopher.

If the nature of Grote's moral thought is philosophical not moralistic or religious, we can now turn to the only two remaining serious contenders to account for the character of his ethical and political writings, intuitionism and idealism. The debate over the first interpretation appears at the end of chapter seven and involves a qualified rebuttal of the former claim made in regard to both Grote's epistemology and his ethics. On top of the analytic arguments presented there we can add primary source evidence and witting testimony that Grote wished to distance himself from intuitionism, and that he set out deliberately to create both an idealist epistemology and ethics. Analytically Grote had noted the confusions inherent in the notion of intuition and the false dichotomy, kept in motion by Mill and Whewell, between intuitionism and individualism in logic and epistemology. Just as opponents of Spencer had falsely set up an antithesis between organic theory and individualism when the dichotomies should be organic and mechanistic, individual and collectivist, so Grote sees the true dichotomy to be between induction and deduction not induction and intuition as presented by Mill (Gray 1985; Grote 1870,260). Next he saw the dichotomy between the a priori and a posteriori, necessary and contingent moral truths as false and profitless (1870,269-270).(3) Similarly the distinctions between 'dependent' and 'independent' moralities, and 'consequential' and 'intuitional' moralities were false dichotomies (Grote

1876,79-80). Grote aimed to synthesise Whewells so-called 'fundamental antithesis' in his system, a system he called idealism (Grote 1900,152-159; 259-299; 321-324). In so doing he conceded some truth, but only a partial truth, to both phenomenalism and epistemological rationalism, to induction and deduction, to the a priori and the a posteriori, to intuitionism and utilitarianism. However Grote is responsible for misleading his readers on occasions for while in some places he calls himself an idealist on other occasions he seems to identify himself as an intuitionist, or intuitivist (Grote 1876, 20, 44-45). But on both occasions Grote is denying that utilitarian arguments from observation and induction 'can come in the place of first principles', that they can work without 'ideal' moral premises (ibid,18). Grote is denying the value of arguments from self evidence and observation and promotes instead an idealist moral epistemology which allows moral ideals to be known via the ordinary processes of experience, reason and judgement in which

> 'greater clearness of view, firmer hold in the mind of the principles it deals with, and happier expression of them'

take priority (Grote 1876, 151; and 45-46, 49). Being an eclectic in nature Grote's allegiance to intuitionism is qualified and his distance from the schools of intuitionism are occasionally stated.

> 'There are, I suppose, different forms of this intuitivism: though what those who use the word mean by it, is rather their business than mine' (ibid,47).

Unfortunately Schneewind and Rothblatt seem to have taken these concessions to partial truth as admissions of adherence to the full blown theory of intuitionism. But even here there is a qualification to be made, for in one of his early analyses of Grote Schneewind does admit a basic idealist character to Grote's thought (Schneewind 1967,393). It seems a pity that this early interpretation was dropped in favour of a retreat to Grote the intuitionist in later writings, a

retreat that is hard to explain. The only influence I can see is Schneewind's over riding concern to explain the Cambridge origins of Sidgwick's own philosophy. How could Grote's most illustrious disciple have failed to detect his mentor's idealism not only in his lectures, but also in his conversation and in his later books? How could it be that a man so lightly dismissed by Sidgwick as an eclectic, an immature thinker who could not make up his mind or devise a philosophic system, really have been one of the first originators of philosophical idealism in England? Sidgwick was right only if Grote was a typical Cambridge moralist of minor significance, which on most occasions Schneewind seems to conclude.

However one of Sidgwick's own definitions may allow us to exclude Grote from the intuitionalist label. To Sidgwick

> 'The fundamental assumption of this theory is that we have the power of seeing clearly, within a certain range, what actions are right and reasonable in themselves apart from their consequences (except such consequences as are included in the notion of the acts)' (Sidgwick 1877,176).

Grote, we know, considers that moral actions can be valued both for their consequences and their inherent moral worth (or their aretaic value), which lies in their self sacrifice, motive, and conformity to ideals and moral imperatives entailed in moral relationships. The consequences of value include happiness, the good and right, and above all self development. By Sidgwick's own definition then Grote transcends intuitionism and as we shall see, embraces moral idealism.

In another place Sidgwick provides a further definition of intuitionism and of three schools within it that, it could be claimed, embrace Grote's ethical arguments. There, intuitionism is described as that ethical argument

> 'which regards as the practically ultimate end of actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates of Duty unconditionally prescribed'(Sidgwick 1907,96).

Of its three forms the first or 'ultra intuitionism' stresses that these rules are immediately perceived (98-99). The second school or that of 'common sense' intuitionism,

> 'have presented the process of conscience as analogous to one of jural reasoning'(ibid, 100).

The third school of 'philosophical intuitionism' seeks to provide reasons and principles for the explanation and deduction of these moral rules of duty(ibid 102). John Grote, it could be argued, fits either the second or third of these categories for he does use the analogy of moral and legal rules in his jural ethics, and he does try to provide reasons for and explanations of both this procedure and of the imperativeness and content of our moral rules if not providing principles for deduction.

But Sidgwick's actual view which confirms that he considered Grote not to be an intuitionist appears in a passage just after the reference to jural reasoning. Sidgwick notes that in the jural analogy the moral rules may not be revealed by reason or intuition but may be 'communicated from some external authority', such as a sacred book,

> 'or perhaps the common opinion of the society to which they belong. In so far as this is the case we cannot strictly call their method Intuitional. They follow rules generally received, not intuitively apprehended' (Sidgwick 1907,101).

This indeed is Grote's view and that of Hegel before and Bradley after him. The rules of right can be arrived at inductively from observations and deductively from the truth, from right reason and the imagination. This is not intuitionism but idealism.

Idealist ethics embraces many strands of thought, some negative and other positive. For convenience I shall list them quoting the source after each.

a) Idealist ethics involves a general opposition to utilitarian ethics. A.J.M. Milne argues that this position is based on a

rejection of 1) social individualism, 2) a rejection of hedonism in favour of self realization, 3) a positive theory of freedom and 4) a rejection of the 'technical theory of government' all associated with utilitarianism (Milne 1967,320). John Grote satisfies all but the third of these criteria; he rejects social atomism and asserts man to be a social being, he roundly criticises hedonism and neo-utilitarianism, and he rebels against rationalism in thought and in social, legal and political practice. On freedom Grote both insists on the freedom of the will, and argues the liberal case for liberty from the over meddling of the state. His defence of state education and state-provided social welfare were however only pale shadows of the truly positive theory of freedom of the later idealists (Milne 1967, 323-328; Berlin 1969,118-172; Vincent and Plant 1984, 27-28).

b) Ethical naturalism in all its forms is rejected by ethical idealists, the starting point for Bradley and Green (Vincent and Plant 1984,18-21; Warnock 1966,1-2; Carré 1949,ch.14). John Grote attacks moral positivism and materialism, especially in the *Fxamination* and Book III of *Exploratio Philosophica* Part II. Moral naturalism cannot explain the existence or the nature of the world that ought to be, and can never tackle its content and imperatives. Naturalism is for ever cut off from the ought to be, from the discussion of moral ideals. More positively ethical idealism involves one or more of the following.

c) Idealism involves the assertion that the ultimate end of life, the purpose of moral conduct, is development of the self or person, where the person is regarded as a social self (Milne 1962,28-35; 56-59; Sorley 1921,288-292; Warnock 1966,2-10). Grote, we have seen, subscribes to both mental and moral life as the develpment of the self to full self knowledge, which is at the same time a

recognition of mind or reason in the world. In his advocacy of moral self development he is fully in line with the central core of later English idealism as reflected in the work of Green and Bradley.

d) There is also in idealism the recognition that morality involves the free activity of self-willed agents to realise the moral ideals or to do one's duty (Barker 1947,16-22; Vincent and Plant 1984,20-22; Schneewind 1977,405-406). This is a postulate of Grote's entire moral philosophy.

e) Post Kantian idealism argues that ethics must give content to the formal account of moral conduct, morality must be made concrete as is so illustrated in the relational theory of 'My Station and its Duties' (Warnock 1966,8-10; Milne 1962,61; Vincent and Plant 22-33; Richter 1964,212-215; Wollheim 1969,242-246). We have seen in chapter nine that Grote develops a proto Bradlian version of 'My Station and Its Duties' in his *Examination* and the *Treatise* written in 1862-4 and published in 1870 and 1876 respectively.

f) The notion that the moral person must be more than a good citizen who performs his duties. The moral person is someone who pursues the higher ideals of virtue, self-sacrifice, self-realization and even perfection (Wollheim 1969,246-8; Schneewind 1977,408-411; Milne 1962, 69-77; Richter 1964, 195-199). The central arguments of both the *Treatise* and the *Examination* satisfy this element in an account of ethical idealism and in fact Grote is extremely close to Bradley in Chapter 6 of *Ethical Studies* and to the whole enterprise of Green in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

g) To Kant and Hegel at least the ultimate ethical ideal was the right, not the good or happiness, and in this John Grote concurred. The right was less spoken about by later English idealists for whom the common good became the more popular notion for the political ideal.

h) Most, but not all, English idealists believed that their philosophy was not only compatible with Christianity, but provided its best vindication in an age of growing positivism, materialism and resulting atheism. The basic premise was that the self-development of the mind of the person was at the same time the recognition of the mind of God in the universe (Vincent and Plant 1984, 6-17; Richter 1964, 25-32,36-38,101-135; Copleston 1967,172; Passmore 1966,72-84;). We have seen how Grote's philosophy was not only compatible with religion but was in his view finally realized in the idea of God, his mind, purpose and order. Unlike Green, Grote avoids building this in as a major premise in his philosophy, rather it is an optional conclusion. In this sense Grote is one of the most refined of nineteenth century English idealists.

i) The English Idealists tended to treat duty, obligation, justice and the right as outcomes of human reason, embodied in custom and institutionalized in the state. To them fictions of natural law and rights were generally spurned, as well as the command theories of law, duty and the right of the Hobbesians and philosophical radicals. The state's job was to defend the freedom of the individual, to codify and uphold customary rights, to enforce legal duties, and to change laws in line with the real will or spirit of the society (Milne 1962, 124-164,237-245; Richter 1964,222-266; Barker 1947,22-69;). Once again Grote conforms to the general tenets of this thread of English idealism, despite the fact that his political writings are only a small part of his general corpus.

j) Next we can restate the point made earlier concerning the idealist's arguments that what is real is rational and now add to it the idea that what is real is ideal. Throughout his epistemological and ethical writings Grote insisted that all thought and action was

directed towards some ideal, and that all results of thought and action such as institutions, structures, practices, customs and traditions embodied some ideal. This theme, found earlier in Vico, Burke, Herder and Hegel, was restated with vigour and clarity by Grote and later by Bradley, Green, Bosanquet, Collingwood and Oakeshott.

k) English Idealism in the Victorian period was generally associated with either progressive liberalism or the romantic conservatism of Coleridge, Carlyle and Bradley. Grote's political theory, we have seen, was liberal with some christian socialist connotations associated with F.D.Maurice and Grote's Cambridge colleague Charles Kingsley. Grote almost certainly supported the Liberal Party, as did his friend Robert Leslie Ellis, and shared that reforming spirit associated with the Broad Church movement and Trinity College generally. His respect for tradition lines him up with Michael Oakeshott later.

Such a list could be extended and elaborated to provide more similarities and differences between schools of idealism in Victorian England and between John Grote and each of them but to little extra effect. By now the case for Grote's philosophical idealism should be taken as secure, spanning as it does the range from his own definition of himself, the identity of his thought with many central tenets of nineteenth century idealism, and the support of several authoritative secondary commentators. Of all these the late and almost hidden admission of Bernard Bosanquet, an undisputed Oxford Idealist, is the most potent.

> 'Mr Grote's position is peculiar. He does not treat by name any idealist philosophy later than Kant. But his highly original criticism lays down, in a characteristic terminology of his own, the fundamental doctrines of objective idealism' (Bosanquet 1902,128).

Next come the considered judgements of two philosophers and historians of idealism, James Seth and G.Watts Cunningham (Seth 1912; Cunningham

1933). Seth lists Grote as an absolutist idealist, while Cunningham goes so far as to write that

> 'John Grote, who was one of Green's contemporaries and who held the chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge from 1855 to his death in 1866, outlines an idealist argument which, though apparently independently conceived, is quite in the spirit of the Hegelian dialectic method. In fact in some of its details it is strikingly reminiscent of the earlier stages of consciousness as set forth in Hegel's remarkable "voyage of discovery", the *Phoenomenologie des Geistes*. So far as I am aware, Grote's is the earliest formulation of this type of argument to be found in British philosophy ..' (Cunningham 1933,65).(On Grote's relationship to Continental philsophy see Appendix III, 347-350).

After these two figures several other major commentators concur in the recognition of Grote's early creation of an idealist system, including Torgny Segerstedt, Rudolph Metz in early twentieth century England and Dr.Krohn from Germany (Sergestedt 1934,153; Metz 1938,245; Krohn 1872). Later the idealist nature of Grote's work is attested to by Edgar Brightman and Lauchlin D.MacDonald in America, Jean Pucelle, E.Gilson, and Jacques Chevalier in France, the historians John Passmore, Martin Walsh and Frederick Copleston, and in a slightly more authoritative philosophical form, by Anthony Quinton (Brightman 1925,1940; MacDonald 1966,188-231; Pucelle 1955,75-85,129; Gilson 1962,435; Chevalier 1966,96; Passmore 1966,53-54; Walsh 1985, 381-382; Copleston 1967,186-188; Quinton 1972,21). Jerome B.Schneewind did admit Grote's affiliation to idealism in his 1967 contribution on Grote to the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, and there is some grudging acknowledgement of Grote as a proto-idealist in Robbins' thesis on the *Reception of Hegel in England* (Schneewind 1967; Peter Robbins 1967, ChIII). The reference to Grote in Ueberweg also supports the case for Grote being an idealist (Ueberweg 1928,5,138).

A second tier of authorities imply Grote's close association with idealism without explicit statement of the fact. One group are idealists who express great sympathy or gratitude to Grote for his help. This group includes the Oxford Idealist, J.A.Smith and the

ex-Balliol man and student of Green's, the Prime Minister H.H.Asquith, who claimed that he used Ferrier and Grote to 'clear my own mind, in the post Kantian domain' he found himself in at Oxford (Smith 1925,229; Asquith 1928,19). Other such contextual support comes from the interest taken in Grote by Georg Lasson the German pastor who in re-editing Hegel's collected works did so much to re-excite study of Hegel and idealism in late nineteenth century Europe (Lasson 1878). Thomas Forsyth's analysis of *English Philosophy* written from the Scottish perspective, rarely uses the term idealism to describe the English current, but by associating Grote with Ferrier, Green and Bradley puts him in the English Idealist camp (Forsyth 1910,139-147). Later idealists who have expressed a strong interest in Grote include R.G.Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott (Collingwood 1961,209; Oakeshott 1962,162;MSS;). Another later idealist who owned Grote's books, one of which is heavily and interestingly annotated, was Ellis McTaggart, a fellow Trinity scholar whose birth name and family tree is Ellis, relating him indirectly to Grote's close friend Robert Leslie Ellis. Other idealists who have obviously read Grote and who quote elements of his work include W.R.Sorley, A.E.Taylor and J.S.Mackenzie, from Cambridge, Bernard Bosanquet, H.W.B.Joseph, F.H.Bradley and W.G.De Burgh from Oxford (Sorley 1921,264-265, 1921,193,198,204; 1884,195,206; Taylor 1932,58; Mackenzie 1924,130; Bosanquet 1902, 1927; Joseph 1916,55, 1935,66-68; Bradley 1935 , 136-137; De Burgh 1938,44-45,49,70; 1937,44,227).

But the establishment of John Grote as an early exponent of epistemological, metaphysical and ethical idealism does not exhaust John Grote's philosophical interest to us. By his own account Grote was not a prophet, he was opposed to sectarianism and he disclaimed the intention to found a new system of philosophy (Grote 1870, 9-10). Grote was a reconciler in philosophy, a careful and patient analyst,

unwilling to rush to judgement, careful with criticism and expression and unwilling to associate himself with old philosophical dogmas and disputes. The very titles of his essays and works reveal much about the writer, *Remarks on; On the...; A Few words on..; An Examination of; Exploratio Philosophica...; A Treatise on*. These were not just conventional titles, except perhaps in the use of *Examination*. They reveal Grote's intentions not to pretend to finish a debate but to add to the conversation, not to be dogmatic but to add humbly a few words or thoughts and to examine the ideas of others with a constructive interest. His style has been described as dreary and confusing, a positive barrier to the apprehension of his thought. However I find it the style of a patient and thoughtful philosopher unwilling to throw himself into half truths and commitments. The repetition in his thought is much to do with his belief that constant re-statement may ensure clarity and intensity of view. His coining of new words was to allow him to step out of old feuds and misunderstandings, as with the coining of intuitivism to explain modern rational as against moral sense intuitionism. Lack of time to edit properly, odd and even bad editing by Mayor, also explain much about the difficulty of the form.

But close reading reveals that Grote's works and meanings are far more clear and accessible than he has been given credit for. The preference for ordinary language and the use of ordinary language method, the rigour of linguistic clarification and conceptual argument, the striving after truth, the drive for clarity and coherence may prove difficult for the casual reader but reward anyone willing to go below the surface. His conversational, informal and even everyday style make his work both attractive and accessible for professional and non-professional philosophers alike. Dipping into Grote is an unlikely source of profit to the reader, who will better use his time engaging Grote's mind directly and in some depth. On the

rigour, quality and interest of Grote's philosophy, the judgement of Michael Oakeshott is of most relevance.

> 'What I like about Grote is that he was clearly a man of great intelligence, learning and imagination, grappling with old problems in a fresh manner and always very much more certain about what will not do than concerned to construct a doctrine of his own. He is an education in how to reflect much more than in how to put thoughts together to make a doctrine' (Oakeshott 1970, MSS).

These qualities, more than the methodological and textual similarities between Grote and Sidgwick, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, seem to have prompted Passmore's judgement that Grote was the first to exhibit that modern style of thought called the 'Cambridge Spirit' (Passmore 1966,54). Those readers utterly uninterested in idealism will still find much of value in John Grote's corpus.

Nor do the style and constructive philosophical ideas of Grote exhaust his interest to intellectual historians. His ideas on history, philology, psychology, religion, education, curriculum and college reform stand by themselves as important. In history Grote is remembered by Oakeshott for his separation of practical from real history on the grounds of closeness to and interest in the practical events in hand. His use of the comparative method in his philological writings and the moderate Liberal Anglicanism in his work on the history of ideas in the *Examination* are useful examples of how fruitful long forgotten theories can be. In philology Grote profferred his own positive theory, the 'use theory' of language, which was later to have an illustrious career, and his ideas on dating systems are of considerable contemporary interest. Religion did not loom large in Grote's publications though it did in his everyday life. His defence of the liberal rationalist authors of *Essays and Reviews*, his rejection of dreadful visions on a *Future State*, his humanistic and idealist idea of God, his pantheism and the loving and concerned spirit for the poor and needy revealed in his parish *Sermons* reveal

Grote as a member of that Broad Church movement of the time that did so much to keep religion in touch with a society undergoing industrialisation.

For psychology Grote performed the service of relieving it from metaphysical and philosophical baggage. His prescription was that psychology should become a sui generis subject, based on rigorous and materialistic studies of the brain and comparative anthropology, a study he called 'psycho-physiology'. Such a recommendation was applauded by J.Hunt of the Anthropological Society, was welcomed by Alexander Bain and was swiftly put into practice by one of Grote's Trinity philosophical successors, James Ward, in a number of famous articles and books. On education Grote stood firmly in favour of state and social influence and even control while holding out against the forces of bureaucratization, professionalization and technocracy that were massing at the time. Defending state aid to schools and opposing Lowe's system of payment by results, welcoming the Royal Commissions to Cambridge but fighting for old rights and privileges as well as liberal reforms, embracing some new subjects such as comparative philology, philosophy and history into the curriculum at Cambridge but rejecting professional and technical education per se, he must be remembered as an opponent of rationalism in education who pioneered gradual reforms, holding on to the best of the old and the new alike. His work is indeed a mixture of *Old Studies and the New.*

We may now pass on to Grote in his Cambridge context.

II

John Grote and Cambridge University (1830-1870)

In the introduction to this thesis I claimed that the interest of John Grote to contemporaries is not only as a thinker who tackled

philosophical problems in an original way, but also as one who 'filled a historical position which, when explained, makes more coherent the picture we have of Victorian intellectual history'. This section explains the revisions we must make to the conventional views of mid-century Cambridge thought, and of its relations to Oxford, Scotland and the Philosophical Radicals. The final appendix will examine the effects on our whole picture of the development of Victorian thought by suggesting some lines of influence and similarity between Grote and his predecessors and successors.

In the early chapters of this thesis I argued that the conventional view of mid-Victorian thought is that of 'a triumph of empiricism, positivism, and utilitarianism over a rump of rationalists, intuitionists and religiously minded metaphysicians', upset after 1870 by the arrival of an alien and damaging metaphysical import from Germany, Hegelian Idealism. Institutionally the dominant picture is of the English universities, and Cambridge in particular, as bastions of social privilege, religious dogma, and 'arid rationalism', moderated only by traditional reverence for the classics. In the hands of V.R.Mehta Oxford from 1850 to 1870 is absolved somewhat, and George Eden Davie has brilliantly redefined the power and originality of the Scottish Universities. But the picture of Cambridge before 1870 has gone little unchanged, despite the efforts of Rothblatt and Garland, and the universities as a whole are generally presented as becalmed while in London, Manchester and Birmingham intellectual ferment was producing not only the triumph of positivism but the institutionalisation of the new culture in the red brick universities. (On Sidgwick's Cambridge see below, 351-355)

What I intend to do now is to build on the alternative analysis of Susan Fay Cannon which I developed in chapter three on 'Intellectual Elites, Universities and Philosophy' to show that this

conventional picture must now be further revised. Such a revision would take account of the existence of an exciting movement in mid-Victorian Cambridge which worked from romantic and idealist premises to challenge and moderate the forces of positivism and materialism, atheism and utilitarianism which it was felt threatened the gradual progressive evolution of modern thought and society. The key is the 'Cambridge Network' discussed by Susan Fay Cannon with support from Noel Annan's article on 'The Intellectual Aristocracy', Duncan Forbes brilliant essay on *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History* and Charles R.Sanders book, *Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement*.

The Cambridge Network was, as the title suggests, a straggling conglomeration of personalities and movements centred on Cambridge and its college system in the period from 1830-1870. While its elements interacted there were two distinct nodes: the rationalists, mainly scientists, mathematicians, geologists and historians of science, such as Sir John Hershel, Clerk-Maxwell, Lord Thompson, Adam Sidgwick and William Whewell, and the more romantically and idealistically minded, including Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Julius Hare, Alfred Tennyson, Frederick Denison Maurice, J.W. Donaldson and Charles Kingsley. The general character of this second movement was romantic, Liberal Anglican in social theory, Broad Church in religion, and liberal or romantic conservative in politics, and it centred on Trinity and St John's colleges. In social and cultural terms Annan notes the connections between the families of the Mayors, Grotes Stephens Venns and Ellis, though the connection with others is easily made (Annan 1967, 257-258; 274-277)

The sources of the historical caricature of mid Victorian Cambridge is built rather unfairly on the first group, unfair because many of its members were brilliant and original researchers in their own areas, better scientists and logicians than Mill for instance, who

played a major role in the early college and curriculum reforms at Cambridge to 1850. William Whewell is especially unfairly treated by Mill, Leslie Stephen and Henry Sidgwick and the image of him as the arch rationalist and intuitionist, conservative and reactionary blinds us to the picture of a more complex and exciting intellectual and political figure whose early romantic and reforming activities are matched by a brilliantly novel approach to the history of science and to Kantian philosophy which closely associates him to idealism and Cambridge idealism in particular (Butts 1965; 1967,1968; Marcucci 1963; Schneewind 1968). Even Leslie Stephen noted Whewell's knowledge of and propensity to Anglicanize German thought. Speaking of Samuel Clarke, the 18th Cambridge metaphysician he writes,

> 'He somewhat resembles a more recent Cambridge philosopher, Dr.Whewell, and stands to Cartesians in the same sort of relation which Whewell occupied to modern German philosophers. In softening the foreign doctrines to suit English tastes, he succeeds in enervating them without making them substantially more reasonable' (Stephen 1927,119).

However it is to the successors of Whewell, to John Grote, Henry Maine, James Fitzjames Stepehn and whom to Frederick Denison Maurice, whom we can turn to find the development of the Cambridge idealist reaction to the positivism of the philosophical radicals and the Manchester networks, and the common-sense philosophy of Scotland. I have called this romantic, idealist, liberal tradition, the Cambridge Movement, though I do not wish to suggest by this anything more than a rather loose set of dispositions, attitude, methods and aims.

John Grote, we have seen, launched critiques of major positions, phenomenalism, positivism, materialism, common sense realism, intuitionism in epistemology and ethics and utilitarianism. He did so from an idealistic philosophical strong hold, inhabited not by German idealists later than Kant, but mainly by the spirits alive and dead of Cambridge philosophy, especially the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge,

Hare, Whewell and Maurice, plus his colleagues, Ellis, Venn and Mayor. From outside the key influence was that equally long forgotten founder of British idealism, James Frederick Ferrier. The result of Grote's reconstruction of philosophy was a corpus of work, then largely unpublished, which amounted to an early example of idealist philosophy.

The death of John Grote in 1866 when he was only just beginning to crystallise his ideas into a systematic form had contemporary significance for only a small group of thinkers with whom he was personally acquainted. Many of these were members of the philosophical society later known as the Grote Club. Though membership was open, the regular members included, apart from Grote, the logician and mathematician John Venn; the philosopher Henry Sidgwick, who learnt more from the experiences than he cared to admit; the literary editor and agnostic Aldis Wright; Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, a tutor in moral sciences at St.John's; and then, later, Grote's literary executor, John Mozley, a mathematician, and John Pearson, a mediaeval historian. The Grote Club continued under the guidance of Grote's successor, Frederick Denison Maurice, and gained the membership of two other important Cambridge intellectuals, Alfred Marshall the economist, and William Kingdom Clifford, the mathematician and philosopher (Sidgwick,A., 1906,134-137; Keynes 1937, 158-`60, 168; Stephen 1901, 5-6).

Historians of philosophy usually remember Maurice for his *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* which in its treatment of Kant, Fichte and Hegel was said by a leading idealist, J.H.Muirhead, to have symbolised 'an end to the soul-destroying method which preceding historians had adopted of epitomising (usually in a wholly unintelligent way) the philosophers of Kant's successors' (Muirhead 1965,159). As a philosopher, Maurice can best be understood as a direct descendent of

the Germano-Coleridgian movement once sustained by his friends, Sterling and Hare, but now dwindling in influence and kept alive at Cambridge only by himself and perhaps the theologians, John Llewellyn Davies and F.J.A.Hort.

Hort, later professor of Divinity, is in fact a most interesting source on Maurice's influence on mid-Victorian Cambridge. In letters to his friends in the 1850's he admits to giving himself to the study of Maurice, and even 'communism' as well as to theology. His regular advice to friends was to read Maurice and Kingsley (Hort 1896,I,129-144). Politically, Hort was close to both Grote and Maurice, as well as Maine, in politics calling himself a 'liberal conservative' who was willing at least to entertain a study of the merits of socialism (Hort 1896,I,130-144). In the end all three came to the same conclusion, that socialism, like philosophical radicalism, threatened to destroy the social fabric, recognising that society was a unity based on differences not upon the equality and impartiality spoken of by the socialists. Hort went to school with Joseph Mayor, helped him to edit Grote's *Examination*, and to publish his *On Glossology*. He also considered that Grote's friend Robert Leslie Ellis, 'knows more than any man living, and (is) amongst the deepest thinkers' (Hort I,309).

Maurice, as David Lindsay argues, must be accepted philosophically

> 'as an idealist if one is going to make any sense of his writing on either theology or politics' (Lindsay 1968, 13; Brose 1971, 15-27).

But he was primarily a theologian not a philosopher and he deferred to both the Broad Church and the Liberal Anglicans on some important issues (Brose 1971,238-253). In his dispute with Mansel he argued for a knowable as against an unknowable God just as Grote had argued for a knowable as against an unknowable absolute (ibid 258-259). The first

lectures, Maurice published after receiving the Chair at Cambridge under the title of *The Conscience*, revealed the development of a crude form of idealism, recognisable despite the fact that the choice of subject matter might have forced the writer back into rationalism or intuitionism (Maurice 1868). In the first lecture, Maurice recommends the philososophic method of 'Egoism' outlined by John Grote in *Exploratio Philosophica Part I*, as the proper starting point for students in philosophy. The method involves the perusal of problems from the assertion of 'I', 'self' or 'ego', and taking as true only that which is satisfactory for thought in relation to the thought of others. Maurice recommends the adoption of Grote's method in ethics and then uses the life and writings of the German idealist Johan Gottlieb Fichte as the model for his students.

The succeeding lectures are a kind of mental autopsy of ideas on conscience that challenge the contemporary diagnosis given by Bentham, Bain and Whewell. The final judgement strikes an interesting balance between the role of individual ego and social station in the formation of moral ideas which, like Grote's view on ethics, is remarkably similar to that of the later Oxford idealists. Conscience is the simple assertion of my self and my existence, it is my judgement as to whom or what I am related and hence obliged. It is not a faculty, a product of reason, a divine insight nor a simple product of socialisation, but an expression of my own self as it responds to actual relations between other people and institutions in society. The advice given is to

> 'dwell upon this fact - that we are in an order; that relations abide whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that Conscience in each of us affirms 'I am in this order, I ought to act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they please' (Maurice 1868,49).

Conscience is the supreme free will prescribing for oneself the duties appropriate to one's particular social relationships and roles.

The above argument, which understands definite social and, in particular, family relations as the main determinants of legal, political and, later, moral obligations, was the basis of Cambridge social and political theory, became widely popular and is linked clearly with the idealist ethics of the Oxford philosopher, F.H.Bradley. (See Chapter Nine, Section III part 3). Henry Maine whose book on *Ancient Law* was being recommended at Cambridge in 1863, uses the relational and patriarchal theory in all of his writings on law and ancient societies, but in *Ancient Law* he introduced the original sociological hypothesis that while ancient societies were organised legally, politically and morally on the basis of definite social relations, rights and duties accruing according to one's social 'Status', so in dynamic or progressive societies these ties break down to be replaced by those of individual agreement or 'Contract'. While respecting multilinear patterns of change, Maine insisted that

> 'the movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place' (Maine 1917,99).

Intermediate stages have seen the ascendency of relationships within the gentes, clans, tribes and the state but in general terms 'the <u>unit</u> of ancient society was the Family, of a modern society, the individual' (Maine 1917,74). The ancient law of Greece and Rome is understood as the codification of concrete family and kinship relationships. The development of Roman Law into the modern world is understood as the gradual modification of codes in response to concrete changes in kinship relations, partly by acts of legislation, but primarily by creating such legal fictions as the Natural Law and the Social Contract which would allow the accommodation of new individualistic and egalitarian relations within the law.

Maine attacks the political thought of Rousseau on the grounds

that it illogically applies legal fictions to the area of government. The idea of the primacy of pre-social individuals with natural rights within a natural law, shared by Locke, Hobbes and the Enlightenment, he understands as abstractions from a confused account of Roman Law. The confusion leads to the creation of another fiction, the Social Contract, to explain how societies and states came into being and yet another, that of the 'Sovereignty of the People', to explain their continued existence (Maine 1885, 154-157; 1917,181-182). The Historical theory of the Benthamites is rejected for ignoring 'what law has actually been at epochs remote from the particular period at which they had made their appearance' and for placing intentional commands and expediency before habit and custom in their development (Maine 1885,156; 1917,70). Maine supports the radical political thought of the Benthamites, George Grote, the two Mills, Molesworth and the two Austins and Roebuck, for its rejection of the ideas of contract, natural law and rights as fictions and fallacies. However the two premises the utilitarians put in their place as the principles for constitutional reform, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' and later the 'political authority of the greatest number', he rejects as equally absurd, a priori and dangerous (Maine 1885,165; 1917, 4-7; 69-71; Grote 1870, 357-361). The rationalization of custom, tradition, law and constitution on the basis of 'a priori' theories and principles, was understood by Maine and Grote as the siren calling Victorian society to its doom. Though politically liberal they tended therefore to remain conservative in orientation. Reform had to be gradual and an elaboration of existing practice not a radical replacement of it by alien entities.

John Grote, we saw, uses the wider theory of relations to attack empiricist, individualistic and utilitarian theories of society. Man is essentially a social being and concrete relations define his

existence (Grote 1870, 145). Society has no 'a priori' order, nor is its form fixed throughout history as in the writings of the Utilitarians. Society is a complex organisation of different, but related members, not an aggregation of similar units. Laws, duties and other moral obligations reflect the concrete relations in which men find themselves (Grote 1876, 212). Legal rights and duties differ only in that they might actually alter particular social relations (Grote 1876, 94). For Grote, as for Maine and James Fitzjames Stephen, law is normally an emanation from customary and traditional practice: politics, the activity of creating laws, is the elucidation, codification and occasionally, where necessary to overcome contradictions and incoherences, the alteration of existing social and civil relations. The idea of law as the result of purely rational calculation is rejected. We should not be surprised to find that James Fitzjames Stephen and Grote's friend Robert Leslie Ellis were themselves close friends (Stephen,L.1893, 93-101).

One surprising source of evidence that there was a distinctly Cambridge way of thinking at the time, opposed to the positivist utilitarian axis, comes paradoxically from one of the few representatives of the later group in Cambridge in the 1850's and and 1860's, Leslie Stephen. In the memoir of another Cambridge positivist, laissez faire liberal and utilitarian, Sir Henry Fawcett, Professor of Political Economy from 1863, recounts how the little coterie of positivists saw their situation in the university in the 1850's.

> 'The more 'sentimental' youth learnt Tennyson by heart, wept over *Jane Eyre*, and was beginning to appreciate Browning. If more seriously disposed he read *Sartor Resartus* and the *French Revolution*: he followed the teachings of Maurice and had some leaning to Christian Socialism. But the sterner utilitarians looked to Mill as their prophet. They repudiated Carlyle as a reactionary, and set down Maurice as muddle headed...' (Stephen 1885,23-24)

There is also unwitting testimony to the romantic pressure on the positivists in the university in the same book. We are told that Alexander Macmillan, the young publisher

> 'was often in our rooms, trying fruitlessly to stimulate Fawcett's interest in the writings of Carlyle, Maurice and Kingsley' (ibid 116).

Again Stephen admits that 'some of the younger men' in Fawcett's political economy classes considered Mill and Ricardo to be obsolete and demanded

> 'that a professor should have his eyes open to recent speculations in Germany and elsewhere' (ibid 125)

Finally Stephen recounts the conspiracy that led to Fawcett's narrow victory for election to the Chair of Political Economy in 1863 over Grote's close friend Joseph B.Mayor. Mayor was a product of the romantic wing of the Cambridge movement, a liberal and a cleric. Fawcett represented all that Mayor, Grote, Whewell and the now dwindling bunch of Coleridgians detested, a positivist, a laissez faire political economist and utilitarian, whose key reading was Mill's *Political Economy* and Buckle's *History of Civilization* (ibid 97-98). Mayor's 'character and abilities were all that could be desired...' according to Stephen, but the battle was about a lot more and became even 'a Church and political question' (ibid 121). In the end Fawcett won by ninety votes to eighty through the device of encouraging a third party to stand from Mayor's own college St.John's. Leonard H.Courtney's candidacy split the Trinity and St.John's phalanx (116-123). If Mayor had joined the line of descent of professors teaching on the moral science tripos, from Whewell to Grote and F.D.Maurice in philosophy and Charles Kingsley in history, the romantic idealist axis would have been almost complete. As it was Fawcett would later be joined by T.R.Birks and Henry Sidgwick in philosophy and J.Seeley in history forming a line of a very different

character in the 1870's and 1880's.

The strength in depth and breadth of the mid-Victorian Cambridge elite in its opposition to Westminster was evident inside and outside of the twin centres based on the scientific rationalism of Whewell and the idealism of Hare and Grote and Maurice. In the areas of history and literature the University produced some of the most prominent cultural propagandists of the age. Cambridge provided the best selling of all Victorian historians, Thomas Babington Macauley, and three other popular historical moralizers, Charles Kingsley, Sir James Stephen and Sir John Seeley, as well as the Liberal Anglicans. In the field of literature the impact of the Cambridge Apostles, Charles Kingsley and the three great Cambridge poets, Coleridge, Wordsworth and Tennyson, is well researched but their common link with Cambridge and more particularly with the Cambridge Network, has only recently been acknowledged (Cannon 1964). In Augustus de Morgan and John Venn the university provided two of the most influential logicians of the age, the twin founders of modern Symbolic Logic prior to the reformulations in the writings of another Cambridge philosopher, Bertrand Russell. All were opponents of utilitarianism and positivism (Morgan 1847; Venn 1866,1881,1889; Passmore 1966, 121-130).

The impact of Cambridge thinkers on religion was registered at a practical and an academic level and in both cases was far from being reactionary. Apart from the Broad Church movement Cambridge encouraged the most radical of all social movements within the Victorian Anglican Church. Christian Socialism, with its ties with the Labour and Trade Union movements, recruited three of its leading propagandists from the University: John Llewellyn Davies, Frederick Maurice and Charles Kingsley. Their message was that God's Kingdom on earth was for all men despite class distinctions, and that working men

should organize to fight for a fraternal and just society. For their pains the works of the last two were listed as 'Revolutionary Literature' in an 1851 edition of the *Quarterly Review*., and *The Times* printed accusations that the two advocated murder, abolition of private property and civil disobedience (Maurice.F. 1885,II, 71-74; Chadwick 1966-70,II, 69-71, 272-285, 439-459; Kitson Clark 1965, 307-313).

But at the academic level the impact of the Cambridge intellectuals was made first by the group of Liberal Anglicans around Hare and Thirlwall, who along with Arthur Stanley were labelled as 'Broad Churchmen'. In the period up to the mid 1860's all Fellows and most professors at Cambridge had to be ordained and as they were obliged to be interested in theology it was natural that they should understand it in philosophical, historical and rational scientific terms. Cambridge already had the potent model of Coleridge's theological writings on which to proceed, but Cambridge theologians were quick to absorb contemporary German writings and then to accommodate themselves to the new scientific discoveries of the age. Most centrally, Hare and Thirlwall were quick to accommodate Cambridge theology to the critical theology of Schleiermacher, Bunsen and Strauss, twenty years before these ideas were revealed with such dramatic effect with the publication of *Essays and Reviews* at Oxford in 1860. In fact, while Oxford was undergoing a slow change in the direction of High Churchism with Manning, Pusey and Keble, and in the case of Newman in the direction of Catholicism, Cambridge bathed in the light of critical theology and liberal rationalism. While Oxford needed its *Essays and Reviews* controversy to re-establish liberal theology, Cambridge remained unimpressed. Charles Kingsley described the Cambridge reaction to Arthur Stanley in a letter of February 1861.

'Cambridge lies in magnificent repose and shaking lazy ears stares at her more nervous sister and asks what it is all about.... There is little or nothing, says Cambridge, in that book which we have not all of us been through already. Doubts, denials, destruction - we have faced them till we are tired of them' (Kingsley,F.E., 1892,242).

Kingsley could only promise that Cambridge 'will see fair play for them, according to the forms of English law and public opinion', a promise fulfilled by John Grote's widely praised pamphlet criticising the conviction of two authors of the Essays on the grounds of heresy (Grote 1862a).

One Cambridge-trained theologian who found himself both in the courts and largely ostracized by his colleagues for his radical attitudes was Bishop John Colenso (Colenso 1862-1879; Chadwick 1966-70,II,90-97). His application of mathematical and critical techniques to scriptures seemed to many to suggest that the Old Testament was simply a book of 'fictions and forgeries'. John Seeley, using the critical approach, provided a humanistic and non-mystical interpretation of the life of Christ which produced a similar public furore (Seeley,1866, Gladstone,1868). However the mantle of the moderate liberal tradition was continued at Cambridge by the trio of Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort who did most to hold things together at a time of great confusion and difficulty. (Carpenter 1959; Moorman 1967, 380-397). In their roles as teachers, authors, bishops and activists in such movements as the Cooperative Society, the working Mens Colleges and the Christian Socialist Union these figures sought to reconcile the church to the discoveries of modern science and the demands imposed by industrialisation.

However, the old liberal consensus, hardly ruffled by the controversies of *Essays and Reviews* and Colenso, was eventually upset by the implications of the *Origins of the Species* for theology, and by the extension of democratic ideas and the franchise in politics.

After reading Huxley, Lyell and Darwin, arguing for the compatibility of evolution and belief in God, Charles Kingsley commented to Maurice that 'verily, God is great, or else there is no God at all' (Kingsley,F.E., 1892,253). But while Kingsley, Maurice, Grote, Hort, Lightfoot and Westcott simply widened their view of God's design to accommodate evolution, and attempted to save religion by placing it in a different domain of discourse to science, Whewell and Sedgwick plunged into reaction and Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall, James Ward and William Clifford followed Leslie Stephen and Aldis Wright into agnosticism (Chadwick,1966-70,II 23-35).

In college and university politics, Whewell and Sedgwick, great liberal reformers in their youth, reacted against government intervention and became anti-democratic reactionaries. The reformers who took their place, including John Grote, Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, H.J.Roby and Leslie Stephen, were soon overshadowed by the group around Sidgwick, but in the late fifties John Grote's proposals for the democratic reform of Trinity could still be labelled as 'revolutionary', 'hateful' 'and mischievious' (Winstanley 1940, 347; 1945,252). In a reply to Grote, the autocratic Master of Trinity, William Whewell, wrote 'when there is a question of power between sixty persons on one side and one on the other, to refer it to the whole body of sixty one, each having an equal vote, is a palpably absurd proceeding'(Whewell 1857, MSS). But by the 1870's the spread of democratic practices and the new liberalism of Gladstone proved too much for even those good old liberals who had supported John Morley and James Bryce in the *Saturday Review*. The Cambridge liberalism associated with Maine, Grote, Mayor, James Fitzjames Stephen in the 1860's gave way (Harvie 1976) and was replaced by an interesting form of analytic conservation associated most obviously with the later Maine, Fitzjames Stephen and Seeley. Indeed taking into account

Popular Government, (Henry Maine's tirade against democracy), *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity*, (James Fitzjames Stephens assault on J.S.Mill and liberalism), and John Seeley's *The Expansion of Europe* which propogated imperialism, we find these Cambridge intellectuals had espoused the most coherent development of a new sceptical and analytic conservative political theory in the late nineteenth century (Roach 1957, 59-60, 80-81).

So with this critique of political liberalism and democracy the whole spectrum of Cambridge opposition to the supposedly dominant, non-academic, elite of empiricists, positivists, utilitarians and radicals is complete, and the traditional view is evidently in need of modification. Such a non-academic and non-professional elite did certainly exist, as a reading of J.S.Mill's *Autobiography* or John Gross's *Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters* will illustrate, and their intellectual orientation was essentially positivist. But the domination of this elite was seriously challenged by various university elites throughout the century and especially as I have illustrated, by the network of persons and ideas centred on mid-Victorian Cambridge.

In place of the cultural sovereignty thesis, then, I suggest a dualistic paradigm mentioned in passing by A.Carré and Duncan Forbes (Carré 1949). Both institutionally and culturally the Victorian intelligentsia was divided into 'Two Worlds', each containing a plurality of definitely related sub-groups (Gibbins 1976). One world was inhabited by literary gentlemen, editors of journals, journalists, political activists and authors, roughly equivalent to Arnold's 'philistines', while the other was inhabited by university educated academics - Arnold's 'cultural elite', located as Gross suggests in the 'older universities', 'the learned professions and the more highly educated sections of the upper middle class' (Gross,1973,70). The

first group were predominantly positivists while the second were united in their opposition to this unholy doctrine. Each world had its own centre of gravity in regard to personalities, institutions and theories despite its pluralistic nature. Each gave a view of the world that was meant to be all-embracing and hence was engaged in polemical battles with its opponents, the most significant being J.S.Mill's controversy with Whewell on scientific methodology; the controversies over utilitarianism with Whewell, Sedgwick, Macauley, Grote and Bradley; and that between Hamilton, Grote, Ward, Green and Mill on empiricism.

In addition, each world had its own scheme for recruitment and training, with London University and University College recognized as the final institutionalization of that 'kind of unofficial university in London, with Mill as tutor and the venerable Professor Bentham in the background' which existed prior to the 1840's (Clarke M. 1962; Young,1953,67). Formal communications were essential via the *Fortnightly* and *Westminster Review* for London and the *Atheneum*, *Saturday*, *Edinburgh* and *Contemporary Review* for the university elites. Occasionally the personalities and views of the two worlds coincided, or as in the cases of John Morley and Leslie Stephen, members migrated to the opposite camp, but generally the inhabitants of each world remained distinct. What happened in the 1870's was not a 'Revolution' that suddenly transferred sovereignty to the university elite, but an equinox which saw the balance of idealism over positivism, academic over non-academic, lecture theatre over drawing room and debating society, tilted in favour of the universities (Heyck 1982, 155-189, 221-224).

The 'Two Worlds' metaphor can usefully be illustrated by comparing the careers of two mid Victorian intellectuals who, despite being brothers, came to be luminaries in the alternative elites: John

Grote at Cambridge and George Grote at London. John was a professional philosopher, a Knightbridge Professor, Senior Fellow at Trinity College and a moderate liberal reformer of the established order. George was an amateur historian and philosopher, professional banker, radical M.P. and an opponent of the existing power elite. John was a member of the university intelligentsia, an anti-positivist metaphysician and idealist, a defender of J.S.Mill's arch enemies, Whewell and Sedgwick, and an acquaintance of Sidgwick, Maurice, Venn, Kingsley and Maine. George Grote was a leading luminary in the opposing world, an empiricist and utilitarian, a close friend and defender of Bentham and J.S.Mill, a patron of Augustus Comte and an acquaintance of Spencer, Carlyle, Austin, Ricardo, Place, Brougham and Molesworth. John was a churchman and a university liberal, whose views were coloured by a deep respect for the value of history time and tradition, while George was an unbeliever, the author of *An Analysis of the Influence of Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Man*, a rationalist, a nationally known radical republican reformer and an opponent of the established 'sinister interests'. John was sceptical about laissez faire economics and social policy while George remained an ardent exponent. John was a romantic idealist while George was a rationalist, dedicated to creating a society run on rational principles.

Much more could be made here of the comparison between John and George Grote. One reason for doing so is methodological. How, if one accepts the contextual methodology of marxist intellectual historians, can one explain how two sons of the same family, class, and culture could end up being so far apart on fundamental philosophical and political beliefs? Marxists, I feel, would have difficulties that even subdivisions into factions of the bourgeois would not help overcome. Does the example give support to those like Richter,

Harvie, Cannon, Collini and Clarke who have turned attention to the study of local networks and elites? The best explanatory system for accounting for the differences between John and George seems to be the intellectual networks into which each become embroiled. George Grote was loyal to James Mill and Bentham until his death and even when John Mill showed signs of heterodoxy George stood firm (Thomas 1979, 406-438). Despite the influence of Ferrier and the eclectics John Grote remained a Cantabridgean.

Similarities do exist to moderate the sharp differences. Both were serious, earnest and disciplined scholars. Both thought that progress was an unlikely product of industrial society but backed education as its most likely producer (Clarke 1962,176-180). Both remained very high (though open) minded, believing it to be the duty as well as the right of all men to think out problems for themselves and provide individual answers. Both politically and philosophically both preferred Aristotle to Plato; both believed we could learn from the classics and treated Niebuhr as the father of modern historical scholarship. John expressed the close companionship but distinct intellectual background and interest between him and his brother on one occasion (Grote 1861,1). According to Bain they remained friendly until John's death but what letters remain reveal dealings of a purely administrative kind. George twice attempted to get John Mill to take regard of his brother's criticisms in the *Exploratio* and the *Examination* but to little effect. Mill wrote of the *Exploratio* to George in 1865

> 'I read Professor Grote's book carefully, but found speculations and criticisms much more vague and less tangible than I expected. Bain seemed to think the objection to Noumena was important, and mentioned notice, but, as I understood it, it amounts to little. It is very well to say, why suppose an unknowable entity as the substratum of everything knowable, but the truth seems to be that the Professor merely, with Reid and Hamilton, believes this unknowable entity to be the knowable. Altogether I could make no

use of the Exploratio for the improvement of my Logic and have merely touched upon it briefly in a note' (Mill 1972, Mineka and Lindlay III 1095-6).

John twice felt obliged to respond to his brother's ideas, once defending him from the attack of Richard Shilleto, and again in the *Exploratio* Part II where he referees a dispute between Grote and E.M.Cope on the interpretation of a passage from Protagoras and administers a slight rebuke to both (Grote 1900,261-283). John aided his brother on some academic matters and made sure that George's gift of the *History of Greece* was placed in the college library.(TCC., Whewell, Add.MS.C.88133; British Library, Add.MS. 47229, f.222). Cambridge even honoured George in John's lifetime, presenting him with an honorary LLD in 1861.

But in the end the differences dwarf the similarities. Associational psychology and empiricism do not fit happily alongside mataphysical and epistemological idealism; nor does atheism with christianity. In the year John produced his subtle attack on Mill in the*Exploratio*, John Stuart Mill paid tribute to George Grote's support and inspiration in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. While John devastated Comte's philosophy of science and history, George had earlier provided financial assistance to the sage in times of need. In the end history's judgement of George will lie between 'whigg historian' and 'Vulgar Materialist', the latter passed on him by John Ruskin (Cook and Wedderburn 1903-1912, XXXIV,586). Something far different will be the judgement passed on John Grote.

On one last point there is some similarity: both sought to institutionalize their thinking and their influence. John found a ready home in the church and Trinity College but George had to build his own. George entertained the Utilitarian Society in his banking office in Threadneedle Street, London in 1823 but soon his mind turned to bigger projects, and along with Lord Brougham, John Mill and Thomas

Hodgskin and others he helped to found and run the first University - now University College, - London. The colleges here were to be non-conformist if not atheist and there was to be no religious instruction allowed. George financed the Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Mind but with restrictions on payment if the holder was a cleric. He opposed a minister, the Reverend J.Hoppus, for the Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Mind in 1827, despite his being an independent. He resigned on this issue of the religious character of chairs in 1830, but returned in 1849 in time to ensure that he helped George Croom Robertson, John's D.N.B. biographer, to obtain the Chair of Logic over the Reverand James Martineau, an intuitionist and unitarian, in 1866. The brothers throughout three decades were pulling against each other and in the end their strenuous intellectual efforts may well have cancelled each other out. In these offspring from the same family, religious and class background, are embodied the central intellectual conflicts of the day, positivism versus romanticism, utilitarianism versus idealism, the old amateur intellectual elite versus the emerging professionals, the urban centres versus the old but reviving university towns.

Further study of the two men is likely to provide a fund of interesting information on Victorian intellectual and cultural life. Of course Cambridge was not alone in opposing the alien forces of London, Manchester and Birmingham, the forces of empiricism, positivism and materialism. Popularly, there was the wider romantic movement with its wings in the pre Raphaelite artists as well as in the musical support Mendelssohn and Liszt, and the writings of Ruskin, Carlyle and William Morris. At Oxford there was the religiously grounded Oxford Movement and in the 1860's the early efforts towards idealism of Mark Pattison, Edward Caird , Benjamin Jowett and T.H.Green, and there was also the Scottish cultural movement. The

comparison with Oxford can be tackled by responding to the conventional presentation of Oxford and Cambridge philosophy in V.R.Mehta's article 'The Origins of English Idealism in Relation to Oxford' (Mehta 1975,177-187).

Here the picture is of a sterile, rationalistic Cambridge dominated by the classics and mathematics. It is suggested that no German thinkers appeared in the teaching on the moral science tripos and that Kant's *Critique* failed to appear before 1870 (179). Both statements are false: Kant's *Critique* and his ethical writings did appear on the reading lists before 1865 and Fichte's *Popular Works* wee recommended at least on the reading list and in examinations from 1860 onwards (Mayor 1863,145-148). Mayor in his section of the *Students Guide to the University of Cambridge* on the moral science tripos recommends on ethics that

> 'Kant and Fichte should be left to the last: the *Metaphysics of Ethics* of the former has been translated into English by Semple, who has added some chapters from the *Practical Reason*. A history of modern German philosophy should be read along with these books' (Mayor 1863,147)

On mental philosophy he adds

> 'Kant should succeed to these. An analysis should be made of the *Critick of Pure Reason*, and Cousin's Commentary (contained in the fifth volume of his first series on Modern Philosophy) may be readily consulted'(ibid 148).

Kant's *Critique* is recommended in the German original, Chalybaus' history of German philosophy which is a close study of Fichte is advised and Cousins and Ferrier are recommended after 1866. This may make Cambridge more advanced in metaphysics and continental philosophy than Oxford in the same period. Only Ellis McTaggart satisfies Mehta as a Cambridge idealist and he concludes, missing completely even Leslie Stephen's point about the 'rationalist' character of Cambridge thought, that

'the overall tenor of Cambridge philosophy continued to be both empirical and positivist' (ibid,180).

Of the Cambridge Network Sedgwick and Whewell are quickly dismissed by Mehta. Whewell leant, we are told, 'towards the intuitionism of Kant'. Coleridge, Hare, Stanley and Maurice are held to have had not much 'echo in Cambridge, and whatever influence they had remained esoteric' (181). Grote is not discussed and Maurice dismissed, with the authority of Maurice's pupils, as a 'muddle-headed, futile and mystical thinker'. Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephens are allowed by Mehta to paint the picture of depression and sterility at Cambridge while Mark Pattison and Jowett portray a dynamic and potent Oxford (Mehta 179-180,184). The judgement of Henry Sidgwick in 1877 goes unchallenged

'Since the time of the Platonists the history of Cambridge shows no philosophical school or set, and scarcely any philosophical coterie: at least one observes no ideas or manners of thought going about the world which can be definitely traced to such a coterie'.

and that in the Moral Science Tripos

'the historical study of metaphysics is limited so as to exclude the post-Kantian developments in Germany' (Sidgwick 1877,244-245).

This picture we can now see is not altogether accurate, either at the level of philosophy or in the classics or university reform. In Whewell and Grote, and at a lower level in Coleridge, Hare and Maurice, Cambridge had a group of philosophers who commanded as much respect as the doyens of Oxford philosophy prior to 1870, including Dean Mansel, John Newman, Mark Pattison and the early Jowett. While after 1870, even under Sidgwick, Ward, Sorley and McTaggart, Cambridge thrives, it is equally true that Oxford, and Oxford idealism in particular blossoms. The dating is crucial. In the classics and history Cambridge had numerous scholars in the first rank prior to 1870, including Hare, Thirlwall and Kemble, and to these must be added

the glittering array of scientists, mathematicians and logicians. In university and curriculum reform, Whewell, Sedgwick and Thirlwall had given Cambridge an early start, and while they tired in the 1850 and 1860's the torch was taken up by John Grote, Joseph Edleston, John Westlake, Leslie Stephen, Roby and others before the period of rapid reforms after 1870. In many ways then Cambridge was in advance of Oxford prior to 1870, an advance that Sidgwick and his allies however were unable to sustain.

Two attempts to revive interest in Cambridge philosophy after 1820 have been made, one successful the other unsuccessful, but both deal with the period after 1870. Jerome Schneewind's account of Sidgwick's efforts is a superb piece of scholarship. But oddly it largely ignores the non-Sidgwickian strands in the rest of Cambridge philosophy. James Ward, John Venn, Ellis McTaggart, and W.R.Sorley are hardly touched upon, which Morell surprising as they might show Sidgwick to be somewhat of a loner in a university where ideas were moving in a different direction. In the second, C.J.Dewey has tried to argue that in Sidgwick, Marshall and Toynbee, Cambridge had in the last three decades of the nineteenth century its own 'Cambridge Idealism', characterized by a revulsion from utilitarianism and a subscription to social self-realization as the end of life and politics (Dewey 1974,63-78). Quite rightly this thesis has been savaged by Stephen Collini who has noted the odd definition of idealism, the false identification of Bradley and Sidgwick, and the mistaken accounting of the ideas of Sidgwick in particular as idealist by Dewey(Collini 1975, 171-177). Idealism of a sort does continue at Cambridge after the death of Maurice. James Ward has more sympathy with it than is often given credit and McTaggart, Sorley, Taylor and Mackenzie all have idealist credentials. But Sidgwick and Marshall had other concerns, and while both attended the Grote Society, and

knew Maurice well, it would be hard to identify them as followers of either and they are certainly not idealists. (See 351-8, 370-9).

Finally, we can turn briefly to Scottish philosophy and the Scottish Universities. If the Cantabridgeans had built a defence against the encroachments of the industrial cities, and launched sustained attacks on their citadels, especially empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism, how did they respond to Scotland? As we have seen in Whewell, Coleridge and Maurice, Cambridge found warriors willing to do battle. Davie records the effects of these attacks on morale in Scotland, and the retorts made (Davie 1961,253-338). Cambridge in fact had Trojan horses at Edinburgh in J.D.Forbes and Clark Maxwell, who brought the Cambridge ideas of Whewell and of a scientific education back to Scotland. In the end Scottish philosophy and culture after 1870 gave way to the alien currents of German and Oxbridge origins, but not without a fight. Two forces emerged in Scotland to oppose them: Evangelicals, who stuck with a modified form of common-sense intuitionism typified by James McCosh, whose *Intuitions of the Mind* was in Grote's private library, and the neo-Hamiltonians influenced by German idealism, French eclecticism and typified by James Frederick Ferrier. In the internal battle Ferrier lost chairs in philosophy at Edinburgh on two occasions and settled in exile at St Andrews. In the end the Evangelicals' victory was pyrrhic for the distinctive school of Scottish philosophy was soon to lose its integrity and influence.

But the loss for idealism was very great. Nascent and indigenous idealism in Scotland died the death it did at Cambridge when the writings, teaching, personal and political influence of Grote, Maurice and Ferrier came to an end. But while Cambridge rationalists had little link with either of the Scottish movements, Grote and Ferrier were in the same intellectual, if not cultural, camp, and had been

from the 1850's. In a letter of 1856, Ferrier had written to Whewell

> 'I am glad that Mr Grote has thought the *Institutes* worthy of contributing some materials. Whether a pro or a con view is to be taken of their opinion is of little consequence' (Ferrier 1856 MS).

These contributions did not emerge until 1865 but had been thought about for a long time before. Ferrier it seems had sparked off the idealist streak that ran through Grote's Cambridge education. The replies Grote wrote on Hamilton and Ferrier are remarkable evidence of the potency of Scottish philosophy in the period and its effect on Cambridge. If we add to this the realization by Segerstedt that Grote's work completes Scottish philosophy by reconciling the common-sense stress on direct apprehension of reality and Ferrier's idealistic stress on mind and its development to the absolute, we can see that Grote not only learnt from Scotland but paid his debt. London and the philosophical radicals, and Edinburgh and the Scottish schools of common sense and Hamiltonian idealism are the forces to and against which Cambridge and Grote responded. The works of Ferrier and Grote were forged in the resulting battles within British culture. That they were forged too soon to be recognized as potent weapons or machines of use is obvious, though the explanation of this is not, and we must return to this question later.

III

John Grote, Cambridge University and their place in Victorian Thought

If this argument above, and the specific account of the originality of the mid-Victorian intelligensia at Cambridge is accepted, then several important conclusions follow. Firstly a new theory of the history of Victorian universities is needed that attributes a new role in terms of intellectual developments to

Cambridge in the period between the demise of the Scottish universities and the flowering of Oxford in the later part of the century. Secondly, a revision is needed to the established theory of the origins of idealist philosophy in England. In this more attention needs to be given to the writings of John Grote and the movement which fostered the development of his particular brand of idealism and so also to another long-overlooked creator of indigenous British idealism, James Frederick Ferrier. Such a study should revise the assumption that the emergence of idealism was simply an accompaniment of the *'Reception of Hegel in England'*, which took place primarily at Oxford in the 1870's, and should attribute a new role to Cambridge academics of an earlier period.

Thirdly, a new analysis of the non-positivist origins of modern sociology, philosophy and anthropology, similar to that of J.D.Burrow on evolutionary theory, is needed that considers the contribution of other Victorian university intellectuals. In particular, more attention needs to be given to the idealistic philosophy, social theory, historiography, jurisprudence, relational theory and anthropology of the Cambridge and later Oxford idealists whose social theory was, in the view of Frederick Copleston, 'more in tune with the perceived needs of the time than the position defended by Herbert Spencer'(Copleston 1967,173). What is even more important, their writings should be recognised as more related to contemporary developments in sociological theory, philosophy, and political theory than anything provided by empiricists and positivists, the so-called 'Founding Fathers' of the modern social sciences. The similarity between Grote's idealism and contemporary phenomenology and hermeneutics is especially evident. In a narrower sense the political thought of Cambridge can be revised in one area. In the figures of Coleridge, Maurice, Maine, John Grote, J.F.Stephen and, later, Seeley,

Cambridge had a group of liberals whose respect for history turned them against both rationalism, utilitarianism and the laissez-faire society. After 1870 the survivors turn towards a new form of analytic and sceptical conservatism, the outcome of which is most interesting and worthy of study (Harvie 1976).

Fourthly, in the wider philosophical context we now have the evidence to speak of a non rationalist Cambridge Philosophical Tradition, or Movement, with an analytic and common sense approach and preoccupied with problems of the rationality of the natural and human world, running on through the Victorian era to link with modern 'Cambridge philosophy'. There is a basic line in Cambridge philosophy from the Cambridge Platonists to the Cambridge Network, and on to the recent philosophy of John Grote, James Ward, J.R.Sorley, Ellis McTaggart, Bertrand Russell, G.F.Stout, G.E.Moore, Alfred Whitehead, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott which could usefully be explored in greater depth. But in the mean time, to paraphrase a comment by John Passmore, we can safely assert that any university that can lay claim to the above 'need fear no accusations either of sterility or narrowness' (Passmore 1968,343).

But one central theme, if not the central theme, of this study has been that the interest and character of John Grote's thought would only be fully appreciated if the intellectual context of his thought was recovered. This has involved me in challenging several conventionally held tenets of modern intellectual history: that the universities, and Cambridge university in particular, had little to offer to modern philosophy prior to the 1870's; that during the period to 1870 Victorian philosophy saw the triumph of empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism over a rump of intuitionists and religious thinkers; and that knowledge about idealism was rare during this period, arriving when it did in the 1870's from Germany and in

Oxford University.

In place of this collection of theories I have argued that Edinburgh and Cambridge Universities housed and produced two valid philosophical and intellectual movements in the period up to 1870. The Cambridge movement in its two forms, those of Whewell and Sedgwick and of Coleridge, Hare, Grote and Maurice, launched a serious and sustained challenge to empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism, in the period. Philosophical idealism was known about and espoused quite widely in mid-Victorian Cambridge, in part from those with direct contact with German thought such as Hare and Coleridge, in part through acquaintance with secondary literature such as Chalybaus, Maurice, Lewes and Morell, and in part from indigenous British roots. The romantic idealist line of Sterling, Coleridge and Wordsworth, whose brother was Master of Trinity, Julius Hare, Kemble, many of the Apostles, Maurice and Whewell before 1850 was developed and refined by John Grote, Joseph B.Mayor, Fenton J.A.Hort, John Llewelyn Davies and others in the 1860's.

These threads of indigenous romanticism and a serious, though not deep, acquaintance with German romantic and idealist thought, were bound up with French eclecticism and the indigenous transcendental philosophy of Scotland, especially that of Sir William Hamilton and James Frederick Ferrier. In Cambridge between 1860 and 1866 John Grote bound these elements together to produce a comprehensive and coherent philosophical system that was idealist in character and which owed more to its immediate Cambridge context and to the thought of William Whewell, Sir William Hamilton and James Ferrier than to the close acquaintance with and interpretation of imported German metaphysics. In James Frederick Ferrier, Frederick Denison Maurice and John Grote, Britain had a trio of idealist philosophers of distinction before 1870. At Edinburgh, then St.Andrews, and in

Cambridge, Britain had a nascent idealist movement before 1870 and before the influence of Jowett and Pattison had inspired the publications of Caird, Green and Bradley in the 1870's.

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the preceding arguments would be repetitious and unrewarding at this point and my conclusions will only set out the outcome of the argument of this thesis. Firstly, we are to conclude that John Grote is not only an interesting figure in the history of philosophy but also a major voice in his own right in that conversation which is philosophy (Oakeshott 1962,197-247; Rorty 1980, 264, 389; Dallmayr 1984, Bernstein 1986). Historically, his interest is in being, along with Coleridge, Maurice and Ferrier, one of the first thinkers to produce an idealist philosophical system in nineteenth century Britain. Secondly, he is significant for his synthesis of eclectic method and idealist metaphysics, which allowed him to unite together the best elements from a variety of sources in his contemporary intellectual world. Grote, we may tentatively conclude, is a truly indigenous English idealist.

In his own right as a philosopher we have seen that he produced many arguments of great significance. Grote sets out to build his moral and political philosophy on a plurality of foundations, on epistemology, metaphysics, ontology and the theory of language. In the first he develops a distinctly English philosophy in which subject and object, immediate and mediate, a priori and a posteriori, knowledge of acquaintance and description, correspondence and coherence, are woven together in the idea of the development of knowledge out of primitive consciousness by a process of distinction and judgement. In so doing he not only holds together subject and object, thought and its objects but, as Heidegger did later, knowing, feeling and being. Moral and political ideals he takes to be knowable. The right, the just and the obligatory become clearer as we reflect on the customary, the traditional, and the immediate in

practice. They can be related to being - the higher - facts and to our everyday experience and reality - the lower facts. The actual or customary, to Grote, contains much of the ideal, and the real is in most cases rational. However empirical and normative statements are logically distinct as are the actual and the ideal the gaps between them are never and can never be in practice. Practical life is a struggle to close the gap between what has been, what is, and what ought to be, and hence reform and innovation are as important as maintenance of what we have already achieved for the good. In Grote we have a liberal reformer with the deepest respect, almost Burkian and Hegelian, for tradition, custom, everyday practice and institutions. An attractive figure like Arnold, in a world of rationalism and rapid change.

Our study of Grote has led us to reconstruct the intellectual contexts of both Victorian Britain and Cambridge and in so doing new pictures of them have emerged. Along with them a new and highly pluralistic paridigm of mid Victorian British philosophy has been constructed. Philosophy was not, as Mill considered, in the sad state of disrepair he describes in the early decades of the century and was not premissed upon the straightforward division between a priori and a posteriori, intuitionist and utilitarian systems. Rather, there were numerous schools of thought at work in British philosophy at the time and rebirth had begun much earlier than Mill's own identification. Cambridge, in particular, we found to be the home of an interesting and original intellectual movement which rivalled not only the Philosophical Radicals in London and the provincial Positivists but the Common Sense school in Edinburgh and proto idealists in mid century Oxford. In the warfare that went on on between them all, Cambridge accounted for itself well.

Victorian Cambridge inherited a rationalist, and idealist

tradition going back to the Cambridge Platonists and especially Samuel Clarke, of whose work Adam Sedgwick and William Whewell were the natural inheritors. In this sense Coleridge, Julius Hare and the Cambridge Apostles were not a suprising oddity in the intellectual history of Britain and Cambridge, but parts of its continuity. In William Whewell, Frederick Denison Maurice and John Grote the idealist movement at Cambridge received new impetus and direction, and with the first two, popularity and influence. The contemporary debate over the philosophical character of Whewell is far from over and in several recent works the claim that he was an idealist, based on his Kantianism, his idea of history and his general opposition to empiricism and positivism, has been powerfully and persuasively made and awaits proper adjudication (Marcucci 1963). However, while we await for such texts as Simon Schaffer's forthcoming collection of essays on Whewell for further help, we can more confidently conclude that Maurice and Grote were non-sectarian idealists, who shared a home with classicists, theologians, philologers,anthropologists, historians and lawyers with similar interests and sympathies.

In exploration of the loss of recognition of idealist Cambridge I have offered three explanations. Firstly, Mill and his colleagues had successfully popularized a view of Victorian philosophy within which an idealist movement had no place before 1870. Secondly, many in Victorian Cambridge, like Whewell and Sedgwick, more or less accepted this definition of themselves, and neither John Grote nor Maurice had the character or desire to popularize their own philosophical allegiances. Thirdly, the two most powerful figures of the next Cambridge generation, Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen, who had sympathies with positivism and utilitarianism, had an interest in confirming Mill's 'outsider' view of Cambridge. They confirmed the picture of a sterile, reactionary and rationalistic Cambridge

tradition of philosophy, and because of their popularity transmitted this intact to later Cambridge generations and the outside world.

But now, if we read Appendix III to this thesis we will see that not only was there a 'Cambridge Idealism' in mid Victorian Britain but that it blossomed later, after the winter of Birks. And then, not in the figures of Sidgwick and Marshall, as Dewey suggests, but in those of William Sorley, George Stout, John McTaggart Ellis, the early Bertrand Russell, John S. McKenzie and perhaps even James Ward, whose idealist credentials still have not been adequately tested. When we add to this line the other major Cambridge minds of the period sketched in Broad's essay *'The Local Historical Background of Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy'*:the logicians John Venn, Leslie Cliffe Ellis, John Keynes, William Johnson and John Maynard Keynes; the moral philosophers, including Henry Sidgwick and George Moore; the epistemologists and mathematicians Robert Leslie Ellis, William Kingdom Clifford, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead; and such originals as C.D.Broad, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott, we get a completely new insight into the Cambridge tradition of philosophy in the last two centuries (Broad 1966, 13-61).

In chapters two and three and in chapter ten above we encountered not only the Cambridge but also the national and even European context for this story. In Chapter two especially,the massive range, plurality and complexity of early Victorian philosophy was sketched out to present what amounts to a new picture of intellectual life at the time. Especially relevant are the conclusions, both that Mill's schools of Experience and Intuition were not unified but contained many groups with highly distinctive methods and theories, and that the label intuitionist was incorrectly used to embrace such diverse schools as the rationalists, the intuitionists, the moral sense and common sense movements, romantics and idealists. Of particular

relevance in my thesis is the role of the romantics in sustaining opposition to positivism and the role of the now forgotten French eclectics in providing at least Grote and Sidgwick with a new approach. We have also learned of a whole bevy of contemporary historians who brought German idealism second-hand to mid Victorian Britain.

My suspicion is that against these forces positivism, materialism, empiricism, evolutionism and utilitarianism had a hard and generally unsuccessful struggle. The anti-positivist schools at Edinburgh, Cambridge and Oxford before and after 1870 put up a largely successful defence against the erosion of traditionalism, romanticism, religion and national cultures which threw their opponents into even more exaggerated claims for success. However, it is clear that the picture of Victorian thought painted by J S Mill and reflected inside Cambridge by Sidgwick and Stephen has had a powerful grip on the minds of historians. This suggests that we could adopt an academic application of 'labelling theory' to intellectual history. The most powerful historians are the ones who get their labels and paradigms accepted not those whose methods, aims or arguments, are most coherent. Just as controlling an agenda is a key determinant of power in politics, so getting one's labels, definition of problems and priorities accepted is a key determinant of success in intellectual history (Lukes 1974). The dominant picture is now in need of de-construction.

However, my research has revealed at least two dichotomies that did emerge in Victorian intellectual life, which John Grote had already anticipated. The first was that the old dispute between the so called schools of induction and intuition would be transcended and the new battle lines would be drawn between 'Idealism and Positivism'. Secondly, Grote had spotted, and the Cambridge, Oxford and Edinburgh

of his day made concrete, the decline of the role of the amateur intellectual and of scholarship in British intellectual life, and the accordant rise of the professional. In 'Old Studies and New' Grote reacted to the professionalization of knowledge and opposed the modern demand that scholarship sucumb to society's demand for practical achievement. In their own texts Sir William Hamilton, Whewell, Ferrier, Sidgwick, Pattison and Jowett, aided by the Royal Commissioners, secured a professional monopolization of British intellectual and even cultural life for the late Victorian and twentieth century universities. But the price was that the ideals of pure scholarship, and of knowledge as an end in itself, were sacrificed, the compromise deal with the State being 'liberal education'. In this process, one general feature of what Michael Foucault sees as the trend to the professionalization of knowledge in the interests of power in the modern world, amateurs had to adapt or die, and so the last amateur remnants in London, Birmingham, Manchester and elsewhere in the big Victorian cities built their own institutions, the new redbrick universities and later the polytechnics (Foucault 1980). Thus we saw why Mill, George Grote and their colleagues founded the new University of London and fruitlessly directed it to wage war on the old universities, the church and the remnants of the sinister interests. John Grote was not the man to professionalize politics,economics, history and philosophy at Cambridge. He resisted the new ideology of pragmatism and left the task to his student friend Henry Sidgwick.

If this thesis has been successful we can draw four major conclusions. Firstly, in John Grote, Cambridge and Britain had a philosopher of the first order, who in his own distinctive fashion built a powerful idealist system from the indigenous materials of his own age and its intellectual inheritance. Secondly, that in the

University of Cambridge from the 1820's right through to the 1860's, England had an intellectual movement and a philosophical impetus of great range, power and penetration which is worthy of much greater respect and research. In addition, we may conclude that there was a Cambridge idealism between 1830 and 1920 which was as impressive as that of Oxford but not associated, as Dewey believes, with Sidgwick and Marshall. Finally, we must conclude with John Passmore that any university that can lay claim to the line of figures I have discussed 'need fear no accusation either of sterility or of narrowness' (Passmore 1966, 343). However, we must quote as evidence for this conclusion not only 'Moore, Russell, McTaggart and Whitehead, Ward and Stout' but also Coleridge, Julius Hare, William Whewell, John Grote, Frederick Denison Maurice, John Venn, Henry Maine, James Fitzjames and Leslie Stephen, Henry Sidgwick, W.R. Sorley, G.F.Stout, C.D.Broad, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott. Put in this context, Cambridge philosophy has an intellectual line of massive interest and satisfaction.

Much of the argument presented here has, however, only been indicative and much more research needs to be done to support and draw out the conclusions reached. On John Grote, more work needs to be done on his epistemology, his ethics and his theory of language. A new generation of research will begin if Grote's original manuscripts which have eluded me so far are recovered. Next, I feel there is room for a detailed critical appraisal of Grote's philosophy and its influences, and of John's relationship to his brother George. On the origins of Cambridge philosophy much more work needs to be done on the Cambridge Platonists, Clarke especially, and on Whewell, Ferrier, Robert Leslie Ellis, John Venn and many other Cambridge Network figures. But, of prime importance, we must give more attention to John Grote's theory of language. Mayor reported that Grote left one

volume of 422 pages and several other chapters and essays on the philosophy of language which he asked Mayor to publish under the title '*Miscellanea Philologica et Philosophica*' From the brief extracts in *Thought versus Learning* and *On Glossology* I conclude that Grote was struggling to develop an original and exciting theory of language with extremely modern connotations. The discovery and analysis of these manuscripts and a critical re-analysis of what we already have should take priority over all other ventures.

But after giving such advice, one last general conclusion must be made to moderate the general direction of this thesis. Being interesting in both a philosophical and a historical, context, Grote can still be read profitably for another fundamental reason, the reason given by Michael Oakeshott. John Grote is a lesson in how to reflect. Attacked as he has been for a dry and difficult style, we might come to Grote expecting the prophecy to be fulfilled. Yet in both his literary and conversational style, his persistent restatement of arguments, the use of analogy and metaphor, Grote's work offers an exciting and rewarding source of inspiration for all philosophers of whatever persuasion. John Grote is an education in how to think clearly.

Appendix I

The Grote Manuscripts

A complete list of the remaining John Grote MSS are published on pages X-XI of the *Exploratio Philosophica* Part II (Grote 1900). They are extensive covering epistemology, language, moral philosophy, social theory, history, literary and art criticism, religion, and pages on architecture. Other elements contain aphorisms, and note books, but not, I gather, letters. No trace of the original MSS has been found, despite extensive searches in the following libraries and archives, and consultation with named sources: no trace of the original MSS has been found.

Royal Commission Historical Manuscripts.

British Library (British Museum Library).

University Library, Cambridge.

Bodelian Library, Oxford.

National Library of Scotland.

Wren Library and Trinity College Library.

University of London Library.

King's College, London.

St. John's College Library Cambridge.

King's College, Cambridge.

Bristol University Library.

Clifton College Library, Bristol.

New College, Oxford.

Balliol College, Oxford.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

Cambridge University Press Archives.

Deighton; Bell and Co. Archives.

Andreas Mayor (Joseph Mayors grandson).

Robert Robson (Trinity College).

John Roach (University of Sheffield).

J.S. Boys - Smith.

Michael Oakeshott.

Bertrand Russell.

B. Acton.

Church Archives, Ely Cathedral.

The Library of Congress, Washington.

University of Michigan Library.

New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature.

In desperation a request for help was placed in *Notes and Queries* in March 1970 but to little effect. Many other searches of less obvious sources have been made with similar results. It is now hoped that, with the aimed for publication of this thesis, the manuscripts will come to light.

The last source of research was through the Literary Department of the Principal Probate Registry, Somerset House, London. The last will and testament of John Grote appointed Joseph Bickersteth Mayor as both Executor and Literary Executor. His library was given to Trinity College, and enough money was given to Mayor to publish at least some of his work. The last Will and Testament of Joseph Bickersteth Mayor is not very helpful. We know that he still had the Grote MSS in 1900 and still aimed to publish more. His executors were his wife, Grote's niece Alexandrina Jessie Mayor, and his sons, Robert John Grote Mayor and Henry Bickersteth Mayor,a master at Clifton College, Bristol. No mention is made of literary remains but the whole estate was given to his wife and their two sons and this would have included manuscripts. Mayor died at Queengate House, Kingston Hill, London. Robert John Grote Mayor the philosopher died at 26 Addison Avenue, Notting Hill, London, on 19th June 1947 but his own will was not helpful and his

executor was his wife Katherine Beatrice Mayor. As indicated, Robert Mayor's son Andreas was contacted but knew nothing of the whereabouts of the Grote MSS.

Appendix II

Methodology

This thesis has been written during a lull in the recent period of methodological debate, which has involved not only the history of ideas, but most especially political thought, sociology and literary theory. The excitement, novelty and value of these debates has been a source of inspiration for the task in hand and while what follows is far briefer than originally envisaged, because the story told has taken longer than envisaged, it indicates what was of value for and in the mind of the author. Many of the methodological issues and assumptions underpinning this thesis have already been elaborated in the introduction and will not be repeated in detail here. But generally five methodological sources have been threaded together in this work to create a methodological synthesis that builds on, and does not challenge, the traditional approach to the history of ideas in Britain.

The first is the 'historical' and 'hermeneutic' approach of R.G.Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott and Quentin Skinner, which in turn goes back to Max Weber, Dilthey, Croce and the European neo-idealist historians of earlier decades (Collingwood 1946; Oakeshott 1933, 1962, 1983; Skinner 1969, 1970, 1972, 1974; Weber 1922, 1949; Dilthey 1976; Croce 1960; Outwaite 1975, Antoni 1959; Hughes 1979; Rickman 1967). From this tradition I have applied what I learnt to be their key message, that the understanding of a text requires an examination of the mind of its author; its meaning lies, if anywhere, in his purposes, aims and intentions. Secondly, I gathered from them that, as authors are members of social groups who share a common language and perhaps a common culture, an author's intention needs to be placed in the social and cultural context of his time, and in a

tradition of thought through time. Thirdly, from his work of building on Collingwood and Oakeshott and applying later Wittgensteinian understanding, I learnt with Skinner that the linguistic context and conventions of groups were a key to reconstructing individual meaning, cultural and intellectual ideas and traditions of thought (Parekh and Berki 1973; Schochet 1974).

Hence while Chapters six to nine in this thesis have involved a great deal of traditional philosophical textual analysis, this has been made possible by a contextual reconstruction of the aims and intentions of John Grote in chapter five, of his contemporaries in chapter three and four and of the cultural and linguistic traditions they inherited in chapter two. My early conclusions were that a historical reconstruction was a precondition for a meaningful philosophical or rational reconstruction, and that the two exercises, though differant, were compatible. In this I have found support readily from Richard Rorty and John Yoltan (Rorty 1984, 49-75; Yoltan 1985, 571-578). Chapter ten then involved the reconstruction of the mid Victorian intellectual and cultural world; its identification of problems and issues; its sources of conflict, and its structures and institutions which give sense and meaning to John Grote's philosophical engagement.

Recent commentators on Skinner have confirmed me in the belief that his ideas are part of a longer continuity in modern European thought, not a break or revolution (Boucher 1981, 1983,). Despite tensions I consider his views on linguistic conventions to be coherent and generally compatible with Oakeshott's idea of the tracing of traditions (Lockyer 1979, Parekh and Berki 1973, Greenleaf 1964, Gunnell 1979). My approach has been: (1) to locate Grote's texts in the correct cultural and intellectual contexts, (2) to treat Cambridge and several other traditions of thought (and their institutional

organization) as the correct context for understanding Grote, (3) to locate and trace Grote's aims and intentions, and to recover (4) his picture and others' pictures of Victorian intellectual history.

Under point number four we encounter the results of the debate with T.S. Kuhn over 'paradigms' within intellectual history (Kuhn 1970, 1974; Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). As the debate has now subsided to the point where Kuhn can write with no reference to a paradigm we can benefit from the results. One aim of the thesis was to draw out several paradigms or intellectual pictures of the world of Victorian philosophy shared at the time, especially those by Mill, Stephen and Sidgwick, and, later, by historians such as Mehta, Roach and Robbins. After recovering lost paradigms, and critically assessing others and attacking in particular the traditional picture of a reactionary University of Cambridge in the mid nineteenth century I have endeavoured to sketch the outlines of a new picture or paradigm that makes good some of the revealed errors or omissions in the old. Such a procedure has revealed the wisdom of those hermeneutic scholars such as Gadamer, Ricour and Bleicher who stress the impossibility of an objective reading of a text. Readers of texts are embroiled in a circle of understanding that relates writer, reader and society, in a permanent conversation. We read texts and the past through lenses provided by others or as Rorty puts it, through mirrors (Rorty 1980, 357-394). But the conclusion of this discovery is not a descent into relativism but, as Rorty and Oakeshott argue, a redoubling of will to enter into the conversation that is philosophy, to seek to understand each voice and each conversationalist as best one can, and to converse with them. To add one's voice is the purpose of philosophy.

Thirdly, under point number two above, mention was made of the structural and institutional setting of ideas. In this area I have been impressed by the work of Sheldon Rothblatt and Martha Garland in

recovering the institutional structure and reform of Victorian Cambridge, of Christopher Harvie in his work on the links between local elites, and by Cannon and Annan on intellectual networks. I have tied this research in with the idea of professionalization as a modern process, and with the thesis of the bureaucratization of knowledge made famous by Weber and Foucault. That knowledge was increasingly being seen as a source of power, and that the organization of knowledge and, above all, its definition and control led to conflict in mid Victorian Britain, has been a theme in this thesis that has surfaced on several occasions. Mill and the Philosophical Radicals in London; Hamilton and, later, the Evangelicals at Edinburgh; Whewell and, later, Sidgwick at Cambridge; Pattison and, later, Green at Oxford were all vying to characterize, label, centralize, institutionalize and control knowledge in mid-Victorian Britain.

In understanding this I have kept in mind Foucault's notions of the archaeology and geneology of ideas, the process of first 'defamiliarizing' and then 'refamiliarizing' history, through critique and then recovery (Foucault 1970, 1972, 1980; Smart 1985; Poetzl 1983 ; Cousins and Hussain 1984). In many ways the typifications of Grote as original, interesting and yet uninfluential was a necessary part of the maintenance of the picture and interests of Mill, Hamilton and, even, Sidgwick and Stephen. Recovery of another picture of Grote was difficult and full of anomalies within the context of the accepted story. Hence, a precondition for understanding Grote was a 'defamiliarization' of the old view and the creation of an alternative view. However, despite the Foucaultian expectation that this exercise would reveal discontinuity in history or a rupture, the opposite has happened. The new picture actually fits better with what we know already than the old picture; the new one is more coherent and seems

less odd. Perhaps this experience may lead to a revision of the conclusion we expect from the Foucaultian method, even if the method can be productive of useful results. Genealogy and archaeology may be useful methods built on correct assumptions, but it does not follow that history is a process of discontinuity and ruptures.

A final, and more general, methodological debt can be paid to Le Roy Ladurie and to the French Annales Historians (Hughes 1966; Burke 1973, 1978; Iggers 1975; Stoianovich 1976; Stone 1979; Clark 1985). From Ladurie I received the example of how a lost world of ideas could be reconstructed from apparently dead and dusty tomes (Ladurie, 1978, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1981). In restoring the French eclectics and others to vision I hope to have breathed life back into people, texts and movements long ago consigned to the rubbish heap of history. From him I also discovered how to learn from apparently worthless sources, and even from those apparently antithetical to one's taste, by using them as unwitting testimony. Hence, just as medieval papal records of inquisitions give unwitting testimony to the existence of local heretical movements and suggest an alternative to a picture of a contemporary dominant ideology, so the very fact of Mill being so ruthless and preoccupied in his attacks on Cambridge and Edinburgh is unwitting testimony to their intellectual and cultural significance in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Appendix III

The Origins and Influence of the Thought of John Grote

What I wish to do here is to say something more about the early origins and later line of descent of John Grote's ideas. The first task was relevant to this thesis while the second is peripheral to its main task, and is tackled only because it may help the next generation of scholars to identify lines for profitable research. Neither section will be extended, the first because key references have been made already and the second because the task is not central to the engagement of this work.

i) Origins

True originality in philosophy, John Grote argued, was impossible. Philosophy is primarily a thinking and rethinking, again and again, by generation after generation of philosophers, about issues of fundamental intellectual concern. No generation can think entirely like its predecessor, just as no historian can see the campaigns of Alexander exactly like earlier historians, because evidence, methods, language, and pictures change (Grote 1865, 242-245). Again there are changes in contemporary cultural contexts to affect our views. Yet still the historian and philosopher, with even greater effort and intensity, struggle to make their questions more concise, their pictures and answers more coherent. Grote considered it the duty of a philosopher to enter into a conversation with philosophers past and present, to understand what they meant or mean, and to add a voice of his or her own. Philosophy is a conversation with the living and the dead, to answer with more clarity and coherence problems and questions

inherited from the past.

The line of descent of the minds that Grote engaged takes us from Plato to John Stuart Mill, but as in all conversations some minds and some voices attract more attention than others. So while mid-century Cambridge provides immediate background, and the arguments and debates between France, Scotland, London and Cambridge the general context for understanding Grote's ideas we must identify the minds, the voices, the problems, and the arguments which attracted and detained him. The first major influences were the Greeks, and especially Plato and Aristotle.

Trained as a classicist and training others in Greek philosophy Grote engaged both men's ideas in depth. In an early essay Grote writes that Plato

> 'was and has been perhaps, on the whole, the greatest stirrer of the human mind and elevator of human thoughts that among inspired writers the world has seen' (Grote 1861,56).

The real reason for this was that Plato tried with all the power of the Greek language to encounter, understand, describe and explain Being. In addition, for good or bad, he set philosophy on the road it was to take until first Hegel and then Heidegger objected, for instead of starting and finishing with existence or being Plato directed us to knowing (Grote 1900,88). Knowing and existence are the great 'co-notions', but existence must still be subordinated to knowing, because at the base knowing is all we have, knowing is the presupposition upon which we encounter being (Grote 1865,92). Plato, he tells us, therefore founded the problem of scepticism, and it is only going back to Plato and tackling this problem of the relationship of knowing and being that we can proceed to destroy, as we must, philosophical scepticism (Grote 1900,88). Yet, like Plato, Grote identifies Being or Reality with the 'Idea that is embodied in things' (Grote 1876;387). Along with Plato this idea is found in the 'meaning

or purpose' of things, and in the reason, purpose, aim or ideal of actions (387; 1900,300-301). The growth of knowledge is 'a correction of error' in the identification of this meaning, reason or purpose in things or actions with the belief that in the end we will gain a clear and coherent understanding of them (Grote 1865,112). For this reason Grote calls Plato an idealist, and because his ideal is not God he is called a 'philosophical' rather than a 'religious idealist' (Grote 1876,374; 1900,296).

But Grote hoped to heal the rift between knowing and being that Plato had established. Knowing and being to him are one and the same thing in our immediate awareness and consciousness of the world. Reflection and judgement cause a separation, but it is not an insoluble tension or breach as it was to Kant, Mill, Hamilton, Spencer, Mansel and later Bradley. Reflection only differentiates within a given whole and perfect judgemental knowledge only completes our acquaintance with consciousness and existence, seeming and being. Grote was convinced that an unrelenting study of nature, men and mind would produce a complete and coherent unison of knowing and being the Absolute. A realist belief in real facts, real objects, and a real universe in which we live would be united with an idealist epistemology and theory of action.

But other similarities abound. Grote at one stage, in describing knowing as our mind meeting the mind or purpose embodied in things or actions, likens knowledge to 'recognition' and on one occasion to 'remembrance' (Grote 1900,292). Like Plato, Grote considers knowledge to be a social, not an individual, product and in interpreting Plato on this point, differs from his brother George (Grote 1900,275). Twice Grote argues that Plato's way of studying matters on a larger and social rather than a smaller and individual scale is an advantageous philosophical device (Grote 1865,204; 1876,393). That

truth emerges by conversation with others, or dialectic, is advanced and practiced by John Grote, not only in the *Exploratio* but in the Platonic dialogue form in the *Discussion* of 1889 (Grote 1889; 1900,275). On ethical points two similarities are specifically referred to by Grote. Firstly, that in all moral questions the issue is always that of the interests or good of others and not of one-self, that justice for instance is a social not an individual matter (Grote 1870, 71-72). Secondly, like Plato, happiness is not the ultimate end of life but is a by-product of living the ideal or perfect life, the life in pursuit of the good (206).

But the empathy between Grote and Aristotle is even more pronounced, to the extent that Michael Oakeshott has called Grote an 'Aristotelian' (Oakeshott 1970,MS). Aristotle's ideas are said to be 'full of energy of thought, suggesting views in every direction, and scattering seeds of after speculation' (Grote 1900,5). Grote exhibits Aristotles' general style and feeling for things, his moderate tone, his preference for synthesis, his respect for ordinary language, ordinary men and ordinary moral conventions. Indeed he once wrote that Aristotle was the greatest example of a philosopher and scientist whose whole life was an exemplar for those who followed (Grote 1870,305). On epistemological themes Grote refers to Aristotle appreciatively on two topics. Firstly, just as Grote praised Plato for seeing the priority of the Idea so Aristotle has his method of teleology and his belief that the purpose a thing lies in its telos (Grote 1865,112). But in addition Grote learns that purpose presumes something which the aimed for seeks to replace, and from Aristotle he reformulated the notion of want (Grote 1876,21). Secondly, Grote praises Aristotle for doing more than most modern philosophers to avoid 'mis-psychology': or the confusion of logical language and thought with psychological and scientific language and thought, on the

one hand, and 'notionalism', or the attempt to realise logical notions, on the other. In fact before launching into a long list of modern philosophers of the human mind who commit such errors, Grote starts the *Exploratio* Part II with a brief and highly appreciative account of Aristotles' approach to psychology (Grote 1900,1-8). But if Aristotle is a model of how to avoid confusing philosophy and science, logic and psychology Grote learns more from his ethical writings.

An Aristotelian philosopher is also identified in part by his committment to a definite theory of human nature, a committment that Grote shared. In this theory man is an active creature and purposeful creature, who, in activity realises what is potential within him. Secondly, man is an imaginative creature able to conscience alternatives, many of which are moral in their nature. Finally man's purposes are numerous, there are many virtues and the summum bonum is the by-product of acting and living in accordance to these basic moral and political roles and principles.

In the field of ethics Grote concedes that Aristotle is 'the great master' (Grote 1870,110). Firstly, Aristotle adopted a viable method, studying both the actual and the ideal, using the methods of science and philosophy, but avoiding confusion between them (Grote 1876,141). For instance, while Aristotle argues that the summum bonum, the telos of life, is eudaemonia, he means by this not just the actual facts of 'faring well' and having pleasurable experiences, but 'living well' according to some ideal (Grote 1870, 347-348). Secondly, while Aristotle's view of the summum bonum is limited to eudaemonia or happiness, the concept is so wide and so inclusive of other ideals such as virtue and duty that it is acceptable. Aristotle saw that happiness included virtue and wisdom as ideals and did not treat them as derivatives. He considered happiness as a by product of

'living well', of doing our duty and being virtuous as ends in themselves. Happiness would not result from a life self-consciously devoted to its pursuit. It was rather a by-product of virtuous and dutiful moral and political practice(Grote 1870,110,347-348). Aristotle, then, was no simple consequentalist; rather like Grote he considered the 'worth of an action' as a separate matter of moral concern, and he considered happy consequences to be the by-product, not the immediate aim, of moral life (Grote 1870,110-111). Grote used Aristotle as a foil for developing his own theory of virtue and character (Grote 1876, 109, 119, 124, 241, 389, 399, 445-449, 459, 462). But in the end we can leave Aristotle's influence where I started, in Grote's appreciation of everyday standards, recognizing the morality and wisdom embodied in everyday custom Grote felt affinity with Burke and later thinkers on this matter but in the *Treatise* it is Aristotle to whom the debts are paid (Grote 1876,448-449).

But on the evidence of Sidgwick we can gather that Cicero was 'a favourite moralist of Mr Grote', in particular the Cicero of *De Officiis* (Sidgwick 1871b,197). Some evidence exists to support this view, if we relate Cicero to Stoicism in general and to his view of law and duty in particular. At the most general level Grote praises the Stoics for their kindly but single minded pursuit of moral goodness (Grote 1870,184). Their ideal, in the form of a universal moral law, he regarded as a noble ideal and he refers, on several occasions, to the coincidence of their idea of morality with that of Christianity. The Stoics, Cicero, Christians and Grote himself stress obedience to law and duty, charity and the pursuit of virtue and patience (Grote 1870,184; 1876,92, 374,377, 459,470). Grote claims that Cicero and Hooker later have the right notion of a lofty moral law to live by, and hence he recognises in them the analogy which

underpins his own jural ethics (Grote 1870,159). While to Stoics the moral law was a universal ideal that the actual law should seek to copy, they took a very practical view of how this could be achieved, and like them he saw that law should embody reason (Grote 1870,184). More obviously, Grote appreciated that Cicero and later stoics like Grotius were opposed to utilitarianism, and according to Mayor the last manuscript Grote wrote before his death was on the very Ciceronian topic of 'Honestarianism and Utilitarianism', a dialogue between the Roman ideal of honestius and that of happiness (Grote 1870,24; 1900,xi). Again we find Grote praising Cicero for what he too exhibited, the possession of a liberal tone and attitude (Grote 1870,42). Finally, there is the Stoic idea of the natural sociability of man and the notion of the cosmopolis, the universal brotherhood of mankind. Grote was unreserving in his praise of the Stoics for the former view and congratulated Mill for the concessions he made in its direction. On the latter he had reservations, seeing the natural unit as society not mankind, but as an ideal he saw the universalist doctrine as noble and compatible with Christianity.

This brings us to the next major influence on Grote, that of Christianity, as revealed by the testaments of his apostles. We must not underestimate the influence of Christianity on the formulation of Grote's ideas, for though like Plato he produces a philosophical idealism from non-religious assumptions a religious idealism is always present as an option, in fact the option that Grote wishes us to adopt to complete philosophical idealism. This applies equally to the theories of being, knowledge and morality. We can look for temporal or religious grounds for being, but they are in the end complementary, if different (Grote 1876,65). Knowledge can be seen as the meeting of our minds or of ours with God's (Grote 1900,292-293). In morality we must have ideals and these have to be accounted for, but moral

philosophy and religion are different 'manners of thought' and each has its own role to play in elaborating the moral world (Grote 1870,215; 1900,324). Religion works from revelations, it claims to be authoritative, it preaches and is more practical,its language is more metaphorical and its visions more vivid. Philosophy, even moral philosophy, relies on ordinary knowledge, it works from the self not back from God, it claims no authority except rational acceptance, it explains and does not preach, it elaborates practice rather than being practiced, it has a language and a picture of its own (Grote 1862,3-5; 1865, xiv-xvi, xxxviii, 39,58; 1870,102,115, 201,333, 342,351, 356-360; 1871, 13-17; 1876,65,111, 342, 355-357, 373-377, 389, 393,462; 1877,288; 1900, 38-40,72,88, 293-296, 324). W.G.de Burgh, for one, praises Grote for his separation of the approaches of philosophy and religion (de Burgh,1937) . But still, even in ethics the two are complementary and should go hand in hand in elaborating the ideals of life (Grote 1870,214-220; 1876,469-70).

Grote felt that on most occasions religion and the practice of morality ought to be kept seperate to avoid misunderstanding. Certainly, if religious views of divine providence undercut the preconditions of moral practice e.g. that we are free and reponsible moral agents, it should be banished back to its own terrain (Grote 1870, 357-360; 1877,288). In one beautiful passage, Grote argues that religion is a new 'temper' with which to apply the eternal moral truths discussed by all philosophers and embodied in our ordinary moral customs and practices (Grote 1876, 123-5; Lasson 1872).

What Grote learnt from Christianity can be stated simply. Firstly, God is one possible postulate of both knowing and being and is the ultimate hope of their reconciliation. Christianity offers, along with absolute idealism, a proposal for overcoming the problem bequeathed by Plato (Grote 1865, xlv). Secondly, Christianity offers

an answer complementary to that of Plato and Aristotle, as to the Idea or Telos, the reason, meaning or purpose of things and events. Now it is God's intelligence, meaning and purpose that is embodied in things and events, not just those of some impersonal force or the intelligence of man and society (Grote 1865,xlv-xlvi; 39,58;). But as Grote concedes, we must start and remain with ourselves when engaged in philosophy (Grote 1900,38-40). Thirdly, Grote had a lesson reinforced from Christianity: that as human beings we have free will, the ability to make choices and to act upon them; that we have intelligence, senses, reflective and creative powers to know and change the world. He learnt too that it was not only in our power to know and change the world but that we had a right and a duty to do so (Grote 1900,371). We should not fear knowledge in any form, not even science, because in having and gaining it, we exercise our free will, do our duty and discover God's truth. The biggest threat to both moral progress and Christianity was indeed the belief in an unknowable God of Mansel, or its temporal equivalent, the unknowable Absolute of Hamilton, Spencer and Mill and later Bradley, for it discourages free thought. Fourthly, from Christianity Grote learnt that our faith must not be based on revelation or blind trust in books or codes of duty, but on our beliefs in truth and right, of our knowledge of them, of our ability to act to gain knowledge and create a better society. In the end our higher beliefs are that we have an ordered, rational and purposeful world and existence, something we can never prove, but which is assumed in all our moral language and practice (Grote 1876,373,516-518).

In regard to his moral and political philosophy Christianity reinforced important aspects of his work. Man is a spiritual as well as a material being, he is active and creative not passive and obedient. Human beings are ideal forming, and in one place Grote

argues, like Feuerbach, that God is an 'ideal of perfection', an exemplar for moral conduct (Grote 1876, 351,356-357). Again religion and Grote's moral idealism teach self-improvement,

> 'And the work and business of the collective human race, it seems to me, is self-improvement; for the sake of the glory of God, if we take a religious view; for its own sake, if we do not' (Grote 1870,351; 1876,351,356-357; 1900,293).

Grote argues that Christianity therefore needs to be both 'reforming and conservative' teaching improvement but obedience to everyday moral rules, and indeed this equally describes his own views on moral and political reform (Grote 1870,358).

As far as both textual and contextual readings go it is hard to trace any specific influences from philosophers between Cicero and the modern period, though the idea of the separate but complementary spheres of religion and philosophy suggest the work of Thomas Aquinas, and indeed Mayor left a record of a ninety page manuscript on him (Grote 1900,x). Without the lost lectures on the history of philosophy it is hard to fill out any details prior to the seventeenth century, though two small references to the Renaissance and Reformation suggest that Grote was generally unimpressed by the level of intellectual advance in either (Grote 1877, 285-286). We do touch interesting ground however when we get to the seventeenth century, for here were some real revolutions in thought that were to shape the problems and battles of nineteenth century philosophy in general and Grote's in particular.

There are two key forces that Grote refers to from which we can learn. The first was the attempt to apply the Copernican revolution to philosophy in the hands of Hobbes and, later, Locke. This was associated with the new discovery of the inductive method by Bacon, studied so admirably by Robert Leslie Ellis. The second was the creation of rationalist philosophical doctrine and deductive logic by

Descartes in France, by Samuel Clarke and the Cambridge Platonists, in England and by Leibniz in Germany and Spinoza in Holland. Grote's debt to Descartes is immense, despite Grote's criticisms and even rejections of several parts of his method and argument. It is to Descartes that idealism owes its modern origins, by taking as its starting point the proposition that 'I' am conscious (Grote 1865,17-19). Grote indeed develops much of his thought by conversing with Descartes on the subject, on the truth and implications of his 'Cogito' (Grote 1865,22; 1900, 11-12,79,148-149, 166-170, 178-179).

Grote found a comparison of the methods of Bacon and Descartes instructive. Both provided truths, but each was an abstraction. As with comparisons of their ideas of contingent and necessary truths, of inductive and deductive logic, of observational and a priori tests of truth, Grote felt that the ideas of each were a half truth. Grote felt that century needed a third major figure to synchronize the two but had got instead a series of one-sided rationalists and empiricists. Locke's epistemology Grote sees as the model of mis-phenomenalism and noo-psychology, typifying the mistaken 'Philosophy of the Human Mind' that was to dog British thought down to Mill. Hobbes' moral and political philosophy detained Grote but there was little empathy between them, Hobbes' ideas on human nature, law and right being almost diametrically opposed to his. Oddly for his time Grote does not refer to Samuel Clarke, though the latter's ideas do show some points of resemblance. Like Clarke, Grote felt that one sign that a moral idea was right was that it 'fitted' the social facts and relations of things (Stephen 1927,I,119-125; Sorley 1921,155-158; Copleston 1966,5,157-161). But Grote did not want to identify himself too closely, as Whewell had done, with Clarke and the rationalist movement, as he wished to transcend them with idealism. The Clarke controversy with Hobbes was like the Whewell controversy with Mill, an

unlikely source of truth.

From eighteenth century philosophers the line of influence to Grote is clear. The line of thought against which his mind rebelled was typified by the materialists, the utilitarians and moral sense schools. He was less disenchanted with the Scottish School which, after all, did try to mediate between Bacon and Descartes, but while he learnt much on epistemology from Reid, Brown and Stewart his comments on them are generally negative and we see no response to their ethical writings. The key ideas they developed which remain embedded in Grote's concerns were that we could know the external world using everyday knowing processes, and that immediate consciousness held the key to this; and the idea of the creative active powers of mind as expressed by Reid and Stewart (Reid 1846-63, 1941; Stewart 1828, 1854). But the other eighteenth century influences were Berkeley, Hume and Kant on knowledge, Butler on ethics and Rousseau on idealism generally. Lauchlin D.MacDonald at one stage describes Grote as a 'Berkelian', basing his claim on four points, that both are subjectivistic, idealistic, personalistic and both regard God's mind to be embodied in things and reality (MacDonald 1966,194-196). Judgement on the accuracy of these claims depends on the meaning attached to each key term. Grote does start with self when describing knowledge but that does not mean that he is a subjective idealist. He is an idealist but he distances himself considerably from Berkeley on key issues, such as the separation of primary and secondary qualities, the reliance of our ideas on God's, the grounds and support for scepticism, relativism and the theory of vision (Grote 1865,4,108-109,114; 1876,63; 1900, 36-40,118-142,310). In particular Grote distances himself from the idea that the external world is only an 'immediate inspiration of the Deity' (Grote 1900,72).

David Hume attracted Grote's critical attention but inspired

little or no positive response, though in ethics and politics Hume's idea of 'prescriptive authority' has some echo in Grote's theory of custom and law. The connection with Kant is however certain and is attested to by Grote. But his influence is as much in terms of resistance as support, and Grote's Kant is mediated through the work of Whewell. Grote and Kant share a common approach to major philosophical problems, the analysis of the postulates or pre-conditions for thinking, judging, acting and talking. On epistemology Grote appreciates Kant's start with the 'manifold' of experience, but is opposed to Kant's argument that reflection prevents us from ever regaining knowledge of the 'thing in itself' (Grote 1865,60-67,74-75; 1876,382; 1900,157-158,202,246). The distinction between noumena and phenomena is rejected by Grote, a point that affected Mill's revision of his Logic (Grote 1865,181-183, 1900,178,198 ; Mill 1961, 39-40). Grote is attracted by Kant's solution to the problem of knowledge, which allows a place both to mind, with its constructive categories, and to the senses, but in the end finds it too simplistic. We cannot separate what the mind and the senses provide, experience is a whole from which mind discriminates (Grote 1900, 24-26,157-158). In particular, Kant's account of intuitions of space are considered defective (Grote 1865 74-8,109,114; 1900, 48,195).

On moral matters, Grote sides with Kant against Mill and utilitarianism but his own moral theory is vastly different to Kant's, neither stressing 'motive', nor proposing an ultimate 'golden rule' for providing the key to moral action (Grote 1870,116,193,275-6). In the end Grote departs from Kant's empty formulae and advocates a substantive relational theory of morality. Little need be said on Butler and Rousseau, but Grote did appreciate the former's attempt, like Kant's, to find a non-consequential ground for moral value, and

he appreciated that Rousseau set out to realize an ideal society from assumptions about human rationality and sociability.

In the nineteenth century the immediate context of Grote's thought, the battles between romantic and mechanistic thought, between the German-Coleridgians, the Scottish philosophers and the philosophical radicals, has been well rehearsed above. From amongst these groups Grote admits those who influenced him to be James Frederick Ferrier, John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain. The empiricists and phenomenalists he read and attacked included, as well as Mill, Herbert Spencer whom Grote seems to have preferred (Grote 1900,91-113).

From the Scottish school Grote admits debts to Hamilton and Ferrier, but it is to the last that the greatest of all debts needs to be paid. The *Institutes* had been published in 1854 and we know that in 1856 Whewell had told its author that John Grote intended writing a reply. While the published form had to wait until 1865 and it appears the two never met, it is in conversation with Ferrier's mind that I consider Grote formulated the specifics of his version of epistemological idealism(4). There is however an interesting reply to an anonymous critic named G. at the end of volume I of Ferrier's Works (Ferrier 1881). It is possible that Grote is the original critic as both the style and sense of the criticism are similar. On some important points Grote and Ferrier differ. Grote denigrates the pretence at system which Ferrier (and later McTaggart) imposes, using his rigorous deductive argument form. Grote rejects Ferrier's abhorrence of ordinary language, but generally Ferrier's view of knowledge is held to be correct (Grote 1865,53-82 ; 1900 164-165). Idealism is recognised as the character of Ferrier's thought and Grote says his ideas are 'suggestive' of the thought in his own book (Grote 1865,xxvi-xxvii). He absolves Ferrier from all charges of confusing

phenomenalism and philosophy and praises him for seeing that in regard to experience,

> 'It is the projection of *ourself* into this confusion which begins to generate order in it' (Grote 1865,57).

Most of the better authorities on Grote, but especially Segerstedt, Forsyth, Cunningham, Sorley, Seth, Copleston and Passmore, have noted the close similarity between the two and on this I concur. However, Grote is by far the better philosopher in terms of both expression and content, as Forsyth and Segerstedt note, and goes well beyond Ferrier in applying idealism to language, ethics, society, history and politics. Grote was indeed the figure described by Segerstedt who provides the final bookend to the problem of knowledge of Scottish philosophy. Where Ferrier failed to get support in his own country and retired to lick his wounds, Grote went on, and while no more successful in influencing future generations he completed a system and corpus of works that were more coherent and complete, and do more to answer the traditional problems of the British philosophy of mind than any other nineteenth century figure prior to T.H.Green.

At Cambridge, Grote learnt most from his old master Whewell, from Henry Maine, from his friend Robert Leslie Ellis and from the milieu associated with Hare, Maurice, the Liberal Anglicans and the Cambridge Network. From Maine, or along with Maine, Grote learnt the lesson that modern society emerges from a state of primitive sociability by a process of rationalization or abridgement of status and custom. In this process rules, laws and ideals are only the custodians or embodiments of traditional wisdom, and individuals are social beings and social products. Modern rational constitutional arrangements are here to be treated with suspicion, traditional institutions with respect(Bowle 1963, 248-257). From Whewell, Grote learnt a deep respect for the historical approach to ideas, for continental thought,

especially Kant, and for the rationalist and romantic line of opposition to empiricism, materialism, positivism, common sense philosophy and utilitarianism. Some interpreters even go so far as to argue that Whewell himself produced a synthesis that verged on idealism, though I feel Whewell's strident defense of the 'a priori' and of 'intuition'' are barriers to such a view (Marcucci 1963, Butts 1967). Rebelling as he did against the dogmatism of Whewell's approach and such theories as the 'fundamental antithesis' of philosophy, Grote decided on a more moderate and conciliatory approach. The battle with Scotland and London was not to be fought to a conclusion but solved by diplomacy, by the devices of removing linguistic confusions, synchronizing truths from each, and synthesising them into a new and coherent system. Yet Whewell was both a first rate historian of ideas and a powerful moral philosopher, as some recent studies have suggested (Butts 1965, ; Ducasse 1951; Blanche' 1935; Donagan 1977,452-459, 1977,17-25,194-200; Schneewind 1968). From him Grote learnt in ethics that there are some ideals and rules for morality that can be understood and known and valued independently of reference to consequences. But he was repelled by Whewell's pretence at making ethics into a system with certain a priori ethical axioms at its apex. Morality to Grote cannot be reduced to a system and pure a priori knowledge is no more possible in ethics than it is in science and epistemology.

How great then was the influence of continental philosophy after Kant on Grote? One source I suspect to be very influential, are the French eclectics. Grote refers to only one of them, Victor Cousin, but his work shows striking similarities to others, especially Maine de Biran. Cousin attracts Grote for his attack on Locke and the old mis phenomenalism, but at the heart it is the syncretic method of the eclectics and their attempt to mediate Kant and the Scottish school

that is likely to have been Cousin's main appeal. On ethics, a likely influence was Jouffroy. Lecture One of his *Introduction to Ethics* spells out some key elements of a relational theory and lecture two contains both some elements of a jural theory of ethics, of an analogy of moral with physical facts, and of a theory of human nature which the active self ascends from instinct, through will to self conscious reason(Jouffroy 1841,I., 24-62). Maine de Biran is not mentioned at all by Grote but a whole line of connections can be made. Firstly, de Biran's notion of human nature opposes a sentient and an active side. Secondly, man's active nature is founded on the resistance that man finds to his mind and his physical powers in the world. Will and action are to be seen primarily as attempts to overcome this resistance and to assert ourselves in the world, rather than to be seen as responses to sense data. In epistemology de Biran had a theory of 'l'aperception immediate', in which will is the key force in gaining knowledge from the original manifold of knowledge. Finally, while developing an appreciation of physio-psychology, de Biran insisted on a separation of science and philosophy, and doubted the former's ability to produce many useful results in the theory of mind. (Copleston 1975,ix,19-50; Alexander 1922,540-544; Brehier 1932,42-60).

But what of German romanticism and idealism? With the present level of knowledge of Grote's reading any answer is going to be inconclusive. Grote would certainly have been aware at second hand and by hearsay of the work of several major German counter-enlightenment scholars, especially Niebuhr, the German theologian Schleiermacher, Strauss, and the romantic poets and novelists. Closer to philosophy he had available several good secondary sources on German idealist philosophy as recorded in chapter three, and especially the texts of Chalybaus and Morell. Fichte, we

know, was available in part in translation in the 1850's and was placed as a set text for the moral science tripos. Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* were translated by J.Sibree in 1852 and his *Subjective Logic* by H.Slamon and J.Walton in 1855 (Hegel 1852; 1855). In addition, an excellent article on 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right' appeared in the Oxford companion volume to *Cambridge Essays* by T.Saunders in 1855, and Grote could hardly have avoided this (Saunders 1855). Schelling could have been approached via Coleridge, presuming, that is, that Grote did not read German.

Here we have a crucial issue, again hard to resolve. We have no direct evidence that John Grote read German but we do have some clues. Firstly, John's brother George was fluent in German, and Whewell and Hare most certainly shared this skill. John's writings contain several German words and phrases, many of which are handled with the confidence of one versed in its intricacies. For instance he uses 'kennen' and 'wissen' when referring to knowledge to 'Begriffe', 'Vorstellung', 'mitgedach', 'Anschauung', das Mannigfaltige', 'das Verworrene' and 'das Unbestimmte' (Grote 1865,60,103; 1900,145,147,157). In *On Glossology* Grote speaks of evidence gained by comparing some German and English words and refers to 'Wortbildung' and 'schlagen' (Grote 1874,178-179). Considering that from 1855 Julius Hare's library of over three thousand German books, 'by far the best in the country' was housed in the Wren Library at Trinity, a knowledge by Grote of German would have given him first hand access to all the major German idealists from Kant onwards (Hort 1896,I,308). However Grote mentions Schelling and Hegel only once, and Fichte not at all, so our argument must revert to looking at circumstantial evidence.

The main evidence for a connection with Fichte revolves around the regular use by Grote of the contrast of ego and non ego, a device

regularly used by Fichte. Next, Fichte heralded objective and absolute idealism by insisting that what the ego affirms in its basic act of consciousness it imposes upon the world. Non ego is a construct of ego and the so-called objective world embodies ego. Fichte's contrast of 'idealism' and 'dogmatism' finds an echo in Grote's contrast of philosophy and phenomenalism, as is his siding with the former. In ethics other similarities abound: Fichte stresses man as a free and active moral being who can and does create his moral world. In an ideally moral act a person both does his duty and follows his conscience; in a good society the two are allowed to coincide and the citizens can fulfill their 'moral vocation' (Adamson 1881; Copleston 1963,vii, 32-75;). But it is in Grote's connection with Hegel that the real interest lies.

As Cunningham notes there are remarkable similarities between Grote's *Exploratio* and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, and Grote's objective and absolute idealism is in general ways reminiscent of Hegel's philosophy. The idealist argument about the growth of knowledge, from a basic immediate intuition to full self-conscious knowledge, that connects Grote and Hegel was discussed in chapter five. The next major similarity is the common assertion of mind in the world and of knowledge as the meeting of our own and society's mind with that of God. That man as an active and free being puts meaning into, and constructs, his world is a shared argument of both as is the idea of morality as a realization of both self and society. Closer to moral and political ideas, Grote shares with Hegel the notion that the 'real is the rational', that the actual contains the ideal in an immanent form and that law and custom embody spirit. Much else could be said along these lines to connect Grote and Hegel, without taking us much further to resolve the question of Hegel's influence on Grote. We are left with an interesting pattern or

paradox for later historians to try and solve, for now it seems that either we have in John Grote an English idealist philosopher well versed in German idealism before the conventionally set date of 1870, or England had in John Grote, as Scotland did in James Frederick Ferrier, an indigenous idealist who thought his way to a position similar to Hegel's from within the problems and materials of contemporary British thought!

For myself I tend towards the latter, for while Grote whould have had some acquaintance with German idealist philosophers, we have his own testimony that the books discussed in the *Exploratio*

> 'are the books from which I have *learnt*' (Grote 1865, xxiii).

He added

> 'I leave the philosophy of other countries and the ancient foundations of all philosophy to others more competent and more acquainted with them than I':(ibid,xxv).

In addition John Grote was an eclectic, not a disciple of any one school.He prefered to learn philosophy in conversation not through reading books. His basic sources were the British philosophers of the human mind, from Locke to Mill, opposed by the rationalists and idealists from Clarke to Berkeley, from Reid to Whewell, and Hamilton to Ferrier, with only secondary association with German idealism after Kant as Bosanquet and Cunningham suggest. In addition if German idealism after Kant had a foothold in Victorian Cambridge it was that of Fichte not Hegel. Either way the 'Reception of Hegel' theory to explain the emergence of idealism in Victorian Britain seems flawed and in need of revision and modification. Grote's idealism was forged in the furnace of modern British philosophy from raw materials mined locally.

ii) <u>Influences</u>

The task of tracing John Grote's influence on later thinkers was not a

primary concern of this thesis but after coming so far it would seem a dereliction of duty to hold back from outlining briefly some possible lines for future research. Most suggestions here are hypotheses, not fully worked out arguments, but some have primary source evidence to support them and these can be given greater status. However, the form of presentation chosen is historical and I will show possible lines of connection under three headings: a) the period 1865 to 1880 when most of Grote's own contemporaries continued to live and write, b) the next generation from 1880 to 1900 and c) the period from 1900 to the present, the period of the real development of contemporary philosophy.

a) 1865-1880

As the obituaries to Grote testify, his work was known about by only a small circle at Cambridge at the time. This group included, apart from Mayor and Whewell, the logician John Venn, W.K.Clifford the philosopher, John Llewelyn Davies, Leslie Stephen and his brother James Fitzjames, Frederick Denison Maurice, Thomas Birks, F.J.Hort and above all Henry Sidgwick. None of them did much to popularize or explore Grote's work except Joseph Mayor, Hort and Henry Sidgwick. Of them all Sidgwick is the greatest paradox. In some senses Sidgwick is the natural inheritor of Grote's mission and ideas. He too set out to reconcile utilitarianism, Scottish common sense and intuitional philosophy. He too insisted that utilitarianism could only be coherent if it accepted a fundamental intuition, that we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In his final book, *Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations* , he also expresses and develops several of Grote's epistemological theories, especially the ideas that science, history and philosophy are different but compatible modes of thought, that philosophy must deal with the ideal

as well as the actual, that much psychology of mind rests on fundamental confusions, and that sociology has a valuable but discrete role to play, one very different to that of philosophy (Sidgwick 1902). In addition, we know that Sidgwick helped Mayor to edit both the *Examination* and the *Exploratio Part II*, and he reviewed two of Grote's central works.

But why did he insist, against the evidence produced both here and by Cannon and Annan, that there was no intellectual coterie at Cambridge in the first six decades of the nineteenth century? What reasons can be given for Sidgwick's lack of recognition of the Cambridge rationalist tradition from the Platonists to Clarke and down to Whewell? Why did he repeatedly insist that German ideas were cold-shouldered at Cambridge, when in Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Whewell and the moral science tripos we have contrary evidence? Why did Sidgwick, and Stephen, not recognise the romantic and idealist turn in John Grote's thought, when both circumstantial evidence of his respect for Ferrier and his explicit affiliation to idealism in the *Exploratio* supported this? Why did they both - Sidgwick and Stephen - ignore the consistent idealist thread from Coleridge to Whewell and on to Grote and Maurice, which was broken only by the appointment of Birks and later Sidgwick to the Knightbridge Chair? The answers are hazardous.

One hypothesis is simply that they were right and that the fertile minds of Annan, Cannon, Sanders, Forbes and myself have spun a web too fragile to sustain their claims. A second hypothesis is that they both lacked the insight to see the Cambridge of their day as anything more than the home of rationalism and reaction. A third hypothesis is that Sidgwick's 1876 essay was a disguised attack on Thomas Rawlinson Birks, under whose chairmanship philosophy in the Cambridge of the 1870's languished. A final hypothesis is more

complicated and contentious and perhaps more dubious as it suggests that neither of them wished to advertise the idealism of Cambridge. This hypothesis has five elements all worthy of further research.

Firstly, neither Sidgwick nor Stephen, for whom we owe thanks for the conventional inside picture of Victorian Cambridge, had any native youthful attachment to the subjective approach to philosophy. (5) We should remember here that it is to Leslie Stephen that we owe the castigation of Coleridge's idealist philosophy as a 'heap of fragments' and 'random disuasive hints', 'simply appropriated from Schelling' (Stephen 1900, II,373-374,380). While Grote stressed that his earliest feelings indicated mind, personality and thought to be the key to philosophy, Sidgwick and Stephen were attracted by Mill, positivism, Comte and utilitarianism. Neither was impressed by the anti-positivist and metaphysical tone of Cambridge philosophy which they thought was out of touch, uninspired and even reactionary. Secondly, both were antipathetic towards idealism and German thought, and would probably have considered that associating it with Cambridge would put their university in even worse repute than it was already. It was better for Cambridge to be painted as scientific, mathematical and intuitional in philosophy than to be cast as metaphysical and idealist. Sidgwick's general antipathy to idealism is nicely illustrated in a passage from Lewis Nettleship's 'Recollections'. Nettleship confirms Sidgwicks own recollection of a trip to Germany in 1862 in which T.H.Green and he renewed an old schoolboy friendship. Also in the party were Dakyns, Dicey, and Bryce. The entire group were fully devoted to absorbing German thought, with the 'exeption of Sidgwick who was studying Arabic' (Nettleship,N., MSBalliol; Nettleship, R.L., 1888, III).

Thirdly, Sidgwick saw himself as the future saviour of Cambridge philosophy and the likely architect of a new school or movement in the

university. In his picture of the past, present and future there was no place for alternative men of genius or novel philosophical movements. In particular, Sidgwick had no interest in promoting the work and reputations of Whewell and John Grote; his interest lay in playing down their contributions, especially to external audiences and in particular to his friends at Oxford University, including Thomas Hill Green. This last point provides a fourth strand to this argument. Sidgwick felt embarrassed by Cambridge philosophy prior to 1870 but after then he wished to see it steered in a direction set by himself and in competition to that of the Oxford of Jowett, Caird, Green and Bradley. It would have been of no help to Sidgwick in his effort to revive Cambridge philosophy in opposition to Oxford idealism to have idealist fellow travellers in his own university. A neutral label rather than a negative one would avoid hostages to fortune and a picture of a Cambridge steeped in classical, mathematical and scientific studies would suffice.

Finally, a close textual study reveals that Sidgwick learnt more from both Whewell and Grote than he was willing to admit, especially in the fields of ethics and the criticism of utilitarianism. To have praised Whewell and Grote too demonstratively would have deflected attention from his own originality. The novelty of the *Methods of Ethics* of 1874 is, as Sidgwick argues, in the rigorous analysis 'of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done' (Sidgwick 1907,V). In the more constructive context, however, we find Sidgwick developing, like Grote, an eclectic system, taking the best elements of common sense, intuitionist and utilitarian systems, and blending them into what is later called 'Ideal Utilitarianism'. Sidgwick, like Grote, asserts that utilitarianism can show that all men do seek pleasure but it needs the intuition that we 'ought to so seek it' before we can have a complete

theory (ibid,98). Jerome Schneewind argued in an early review

> 'Their ethical views show striking similarities on important issues, and even Sidgwick's epistemology, as revealed fairly clearly if not in detail in his posthumously published works, can be seen as showing Grote's influence. If one adds Whewell to the line of succession, an interesting continuity seems to become visible' (Schneewind 1968,172).

Personally I feel a moderate version of the final hypothesis is correct. Whether consciously or unconsciously Sidgwick played down his mentor's associations,interests, ideas, originality and significance, and by successfully attaching the label he did to mid-Victorian Cambridge he has hindered a true appreciation of its significance for over a century. It must be remembered that Sidgwick was more disenchanted in 1876 than he was at any time. Birks had obtained the Knightbridge Chair in 1872 and Sidgwick had to wait in anguish until 1883 to obtain satisfaction. The incumbent had in his youth been lauded at Trinity but after failure to get the chair in 1865 had pursued a profession in the church. His evangelical fervour, his moralistic style and his almost total lack of originality nearly put the seal of death on the moral science tripos during his stewardship, which was only to be revived in 1883. Birks himself paid lip service to Grote in several works but never notices his true originality. For himself, his significance is in restoring the Whewellian imprint on Cambridge philosophy for another decade, most especially in regard to religious rationalism. This conciliating attitude to science was most apparent in his 1858 lecture on 'Natural Science, The Handmaid of Revelation' (Birks 1858). According to Birks scientific discovery reveals the 'wonder' of God's creation which will help ripen religious faith' (ibid 43-44). Philosophy, like science, if studied in this spirit 'becomes truly the handmaid of Christian faith' (ibid,45). Life under Birks must have been an anguish for Sidgwick as well as for his students.

For his part, Maurice seems to have used Grote in two ways. Firstly, his relational theory in *Social Morality* is remarkably similar and in the lectures on *Conscience* the two's theories almost coincide. However, though Maurice pays great tribute to Grote in his inaugural lecture he would not have access to Grote's major works on ethics unless given sight of the manuscripts by Mayor, which is unlikely (Maurice,1866,Cam.d.866,15; 1868,7-21; 1870). One last member of the Grote Club is of interest as well: William Kingdon Clifford, who graduated in mathematics in 1867 and who wrote several important texts on philosophy (Clifford 1879,1885,1886). Clifford, it appears, was well versed in Kant, Spinoza and Fichte during the period from 1864, and Stephen records one long conversation with him on the subject of the Absolute (Clifford 1879,14-15,35,38-39). Stephen calls Clifford's position idealist while being anti-Hegelian, rather striking for the time (ibid 39-40,45: Stephen 1885). But despite this penchant for idealism Clifford is remembered most for his advocacy of psychological parallelism, the idea that physical and mental processes run along together in the cognitive process, and hence that an idealist philosophy a psycho-physiology can be parallel and equally fruitful enterprises. Neither study by itself would tell us all we needed to know, each would need the other to provide a complete picture. But equally neither should invade the terrain of the other or else confusion would reign. This theory, though different in many other ways, seems to be an interesting development of Grote's distinction between the parallel explanations of philosophy and phenomenalism. The key development is that while Grote sees only one process that could be studied and described from two sides, Clifford sees two parallel processes (Clifford 1879, I, 254-340; II, 31-80).

In addition, while being famous for pressing on towards a more

coherent phenomenalist line of explanation, Clifford noted two interesting features of the mind picked up by Grote. Firstly, while my consciousness is composed of 'mind stuff' or impressions from objects that may exist outside of me, Clifford argues that once mind gets a hold of it, it 'ejects' both form and meaning into the world. Mind, in other words, has an active and constructive role to play in knowing. Secondly, the mind's constructions are not individual but social. Through the history of a group the attempts at understanding and the production of 'ejects' has resulted in the evolution of a group or 'tribal mind', in which certain objects are 'social objects'. This idea, that thought is social and that objects in the external world are socially humanised, is very reminiscent of Grote's teaching, as is Clifford's use of the term 'recognition' to explain what happens when individuals come to know an object or 'ejects' of the minds of others (Merz 1938,121-124). But the parallel gets even closer when we look at the fragments of Clifford's ethical writings. Here he rejects methodological individualist assumptions and premises his arguments on the idea of a fundamental social or 'tribal self' (Clifford 1879,109-112; Metz 1938, 125-126). While not going as far as Durkheim and positing a 'collective consciousness' we get the idea of the social self in each of us appearing in our individual consciousness and actions. Ethics is a social not an individual matter, moral action is distinguished by the self sacrifice of the individual for the common good of the group. Clifford explicitly opposes his theory to utilitarianism, even when it is presented in a historical disguise. The end of Ethics is not the greatest happiness of the greatest number; rather, like Grote,

> 'A man must strive to be a better citizen, a better workman, a better son, husband or father' (Clifford 1879,121-130).

In this support for the theory of 'my station and its duties' we may

agree with Metz that the theories 'contain a notable contribution to an Idealist social ethics'. This, I believe, has some continuity with the work of John Grote, which both the Cambridge environment and the Grote Club connections would have fostered. William Kingdom Clifford's work is, I feel, one of the richest mines for profitable research on later developments of John Grote's thought. Unfortunately, both died young and before completing their work, and Leslie Stephen also had a hand in labelling both for good and for bad. Both, it seems to me, embraced the scientific advances of the day but refused to bow to the demands of positivists for an abandonment of metaphysics, non-utilitarian ethics and concrete history (Copleston 1966,135-136).

Outside Cambridge, Grote had little influence prior to 1880. In Avignon, Mill read Grote's *Examination* and wrote of it to Georg Braden in March 1872 but produced no reply (Mill 1972, IV,111). The *Exploratio* induced only minor revisions to the *Logic*, though I suspect more major changes were also made to Book six on the *Logic* of the social sciences than Mill admits. Alexander Bain, who was closer to Mill, saw the force of both the Exploratio and the *Examination* against his friend and forced a change in Mill's own attitudes on the subject (Bain 1882, 1904). Leslie Stephen, after he had left Cambridge, also recognised the power of John Grote's arguments against Mill. Of the *Exploratio* he wrote,

> 'This book is, I think, by far the most interesting contemporary discussion of Mill, Hamilton and Whewell. It was, unfortunately, desultory and unfinished, but it is full of acute criticism, and charmingly candid and modest. Mill's *Logic* is especially discussed in chapters viii and ix. Grote holds, and I think truely, that Mill's attempt to divide metaphysics from logic leads to real confusion, and especially to an untenable mode of conceiving the relation between 'things' and thoughts. I cannot discuss Grote's views; but the book is full of interesting suggestions, though the results are rather vague' (Stephen 1900,80).

A less known but most interesting metaphysician of the period also complimented Grote for the *Exploratio*. Shadworth Hollway Hodgson published four very original and astute works between 1865 and 1898 which reflect concerns close to the heart of John Grote. Hodgson, in *The Philosophy of Reflection*, refers to John Grote as the 'only philosopher' handling metaphysics properly in England in the middle decades of the century, and before even that Mayor had noticed the similarity of Hodgson and Grote on at least one key issue (Hodgson 1878,i,5; Grote 1876,54). Mayor writes

> 'On the view of Perception here given compare *Exploratio Philosophica* and Mr Shadworth Hodgson's *Space and Time*, and *Theory of Practice*'.

However,as Hodgson's work has been forgotten even more completely than Grote's, any claim for influence seems barren except in the context that both, as Forsyth noted, were working to develop a theory of experience which was central to the development of modern English philosophy (Forsyth 1910,145; 1904,408).

In Scotland, David Masson noted the existence of Grote's work in a second edition of *Recent British Philosophy* and John Vietch, in his analysis of Hamilton's philosophy, quotes Grote and refers to him as an 'astute metaphysician'(Vietch, 1882, 31; Masson 1877, 296). The intuitionist Henry Calderwood refers to Grote's *Examination* on several occasions in his *Handbook of Moral Philosophy* of 1872, and to the *Treatise* in *The Vocabulary of Philosophy*. (Calderwood 1872,76, 128,130; 1894, 8,109, 114,192, 242, 302;). In one reference the similarity between Bradley and Grote's priority of right over good is noted (Calderwood 1894,302). A similarly appreciative set of references appear also in another popular textbook of the period, *New and Old Methods of Ethics* by F.Y.Edgeworth from Oxford (Edgeworth 1877,25,33,50-51). In this the similarity of Grote to Sidgwick on some points is noted (ibid,39). In addition, as we have seen, the

implications of Grote's views on the need to separate science and philosophy, physio-psychology and the philosophy of the human mind were brought to the attention of the Anthropological Society in London in 1867 by J.Hunt(Hunt 1867,V,ccxvi). But most impressive of all prior to 1880 were the three reviews of the *Treatise* by Lasson, Krohn and Carrau. Each was longer, more rigorous and more recent than anything published in Britain at the time, and all three recognised the originality and power of Grote's thought. Grote was another case of a thinker being a prophet, in other than his own country (Carrau 1877; Krohn 1878; Lasson 1878).

b) 1880-1900

On the surface Grote's work seems to have had little influence between the first flush of the *Treatise* in 1876 and the publication of the *Exploratio Part II* in 1900. New editions of Masson and Calderwood came out; Grote had some appreciative references in J.R.Thompson's *'A Dictionary of Philosophy'*; and the Professor of Philosophy at London University, the early editor of *Mind* and author of a neat book on *Hobbes*, George Croom Robertson, wrote his detailed and appreciative reference to John Grote for Leslie Stephen's *Dictionary of National Bibliography* (Thompson 1887, xxxix,357,397,433; Robertson 1885). However I believe Grote's work was having an effect in two places on two separate groups. In Cambridge, three decades of students were exposed to the *Exploratio* and the *Examination* at various times as set reading for the moral science tripos. Several of them were to become famous philosophers in their own right, whose work bears remarkable similarities to that of John Grote. Henry Sidgwick contrived to produce editions of the *Methods* and his *History of Ethics*, as well as regular lectures during this period, with his ideas gaining increasing credence after his election to the Knightbridge Chair in 1883. But

several other products of the Cambridge moral science tripos were educated in philosophy during this period and later published work of relevance to this study. James Ward, who graduated in 1874 and was elected a fellow at Trinity in 1875; William R.Sorley, successful in 1882 and elected a fellow at Trinity in 1883; G.F.Stout, the third to get a first and who graduated in 1883 as a member of St.John's College; John Ellis McTaggart, another Trinity man who graduated in 1888 and was elected a fellow in 1891, J.S.Mackenzie from Trinity, who graduated in 1889 and was elected a fellow in 1890; Bertrand Russell, who graduated in 1894 and was elected a fellow at Trinity in 1895; and George E.Moore; who graduated in 1896 and was elected a fellow in 1898. While I shall leave discussion of their work to the discussion of the period after 1900, when most of it was published, the early origins and connections with Grote should be noted here.

Oxford University between 1870 and 1900 has been identified and labelled as the home of English Idealism. From its early origins in Jowett and Edward Caird, to its realization in Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, and to its development in D.G.Ritchie, H.H. Joachim and others the history and philosophical character of late Victorian Oxford has been regularly analysed. One source of dispute amongst commentators has been the level of Hegelian influence upon the key figures in the movement. (Vincent 1986, 7-10).Some observers, like Robbins, consider the Hegelian influence to be major, while others, like Richter, Metz, Passmore and Muirhead, consider it to be secondary. In the second hypothesis the argument is that the English Idealists were impressed by German ideas to the point of conversion, but that they had difficulty in reading and understanding them; that they recognised, as Metz says of Green, that what was needed was not 'refurbishing of foreign ideas' but a thinking it all through again, using English sources, conceptions, styles of argument and suiting the conclusions

to English circumstance, history and culture (Metz 1938,269-270; Seth 1912,344-345).

Such an interpretation has great merits when applied to Green and indeed to Ferrier, Grote and Jowett before him, and Bradley and Bosanquet after him. English idealism was less an import from Germany, even less a story of the 'Reception of Hegel in England' and more an indigenous product, inspired perhaps by foreign achievements earlier, but constructed by philosophers concerned primarily with the British tradition, using materials forged in British philosophy, and aimed at a British audience, government, clergy and larger society with their own peculiar culture and needs. This point is well made by Robin G.Collingwood in his Autobiography when commenting on the pedigree of his Oxford idealist predecessors,

> 'The philosophical tendencies common to this school were described by its contemporaries as Hegelianism. This title was repudiated by the school itself, and rightly. Their philosophy, so far as they had a single philosophy, was a continuation and criticism of the indigenous English and Scottish philosophies of the middle nineteenth century' (Collingwood 1944,16).

In this sense Green and Bradley were followers in the tradition of their predecessors, and especially Ferrier, Grote and Jowett, rather than followers of Stirling and Caird. The origin of Oxford idealism was as firmly based in Hobbes, Hume, Berkely, Mill, Reid, Hamilton, Ferrier, Mansel, Whewell and Grote as it was in Kant and Hegel, a point often made in detailed literature but not taken sufficient notice of in histories and surveys of Oxford and the late Victorian period.

Copleston gives equal weight to an indigenous British reaction to empiricism and utilitarianism; Muirhead considers the long Platonic tradition, revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth century by the Cambridge Platonists and rationalists, to be of primary importance (Copleston 1966,177-176; Muirhead 1965,13-16). John Passmore

sketches out the non-Hegelian origins of English Idealism and notes against the idea that Green was a 'neo-Hegelian', that 'it was the school of Caird, not Green, who stood firmly for Hegelian principles', a position reinforced by Bradley who wrote,

> 'Green was in my opinion no Hegelian and was in some respects anti-Hegelian even' (Passmore 1966,57).

Bradley himself, like Ferrier before him, repudiated the label of 'Hegelian' (ibid,60; Seth 1912,349-350). Collingwood saw Bradley's metaphysics as an indigenous reply to 'Mill's *Logic*, Bain's psychology and Mansel's metaphysics'. Richter, Green's best biographer, considers Green's youthful trips with Sidgwick to Germany in the early 1860's to be vitally important, but he notes that Green recognised that alien ideas would need Anglicanizing for domestic audiences (Richter 1964,87-91). Richter, in particular, notes that in religion Green drew from the Liberal Anglicans and Broad Church theologians with their connections with romanticism and christian socialism, and in particular he notes the influence of 'Coleridge, Dr Arnold, Carlyle, F.D.Maurice and Kingsley', rather than of Germany (Richter 1964, 47).

While all the early British idealists were influenced by Kant, it must be remembered that Kant was himself responding to Hume and other British philosophers and theories of the day, and that as I have shown, his own concerns were to some extent mirrored in the work of Reid and the Scottish philosophy. Finally, we ought to note the unwitting support for this general thesis given by James Stirling. Stirling forcefully argues that no scholars in Britain understood Hegel, and few even bothered to read him. The claim that German idealism was widely known about at the time was in his view spurious. While overstated, this view is testimony to support the thesis that if idealism was developed in Britain prior to the 1870's its origins lay

in the traditional concerns of English and Scottish philosophy, and of Cambridge and Edinburgh in particular (Stirling 1865; Seth 1912,341-343). A more historically accurate account of the origins of idealism in Britain must start there.

But there are some interesting connections to be explored between Edinburgh, Cambridge and Oxford at the time. Scholars such as Caird, Bosanquet and Alexander migrated between Oxford and Edinburgh, producing interesting cross fertilization of ideas, and through Sidgwick at least, Cambridge had a direct link with Oxford (Harvie 1976). Of primary source evidence we know only that Bradley had read Grote's *Treatise* by the 1880's and was siding with him against Alexander Bain. We know that Bosanquet had at least read the*Exploratio* Part II by 1902 and was praising its virtues (Bradley 1883; 1935, 135-137); Bosanquet 1902,128-130, 1927, 158). T.H.Green would definitely have known about Grote through his long friendship with Henry Sidgwick. But there are no direct references to Grote in Green or secondary source evidence that he had read or been influenced by Grote, and hence we must rely upon circumstantial and textual evidence. Despite major differences between the two there is evidence for considering the similarity and even connection between the works of John Grote and Thomas Hill Green. The first case for comparison was made by Forsyth when he wrote

> 'Like the work of Ferrier and Grote, and even more distinctly, Green's philosophy is of the character virtually involved in the procedure of English philosophy from its beginning - it is a critical philosophy, which sets out by inquiring not directly as to the nature of reality, but as to what is implied in the knowledge of reality, or in reality's being known'(Forsyth 1910,147).

The connections are even deeper than Forsyth indicates. Firstly, there are some biographical points. Both men were deeply religious and at the same time dedicated to philosophy; both were opposed to positivism, naturalism, empiricism and utilitarianism. Both died

young before completing major texts and relied for popularity on the efforts of their students. In the areas of metaphysics both were willing to explore idealist epistemology, ontology, and the relationship *between them*. They considered that there was no duality between knowledge and reality, only a unity (Green 1884, Sec.34). The source of this unity is consciousness, which holds subject and object together. Knowledge grows out of this unity, out of consciousness (ibid Sec.70). Green differs from Grote in one crucial way here: while Grote was able to show in his epistemology that there are non-theological premises and arguments to support this thesis, for knowledge starts in an undifferentiated whole called the immediate, which produces differentiated knowledge by reflection and judgement, with our consciousness putting mind into the objects of knowledge, Green, like Berkeley, has a single string bow. He posits a single eternal consciousness, that of God, in which our consciousnesses participate in experiencing and thinking. Grote considered the last idea to be an attractive possibility but he built his thesis on other than religious foundations.

However, in other essentials the theories are similar. Both start with experience, as defined in the complete or idealist sense. Both start with the subject and object relationship within experience. Experience is a concrete whole, not an aggregation of sense experiences, with knowledge dependent upon them. Knowledge grows from within experiences not from without, or from sense data from objects (Selsam 1938,96-100; Green 1884,Sec.36-37). Like Grote, Green however refused to be drawn into positing the unknowable 'thing in itself', or Bradley's later 'unknowable absolute' (Green ibid 38-42). Rejecting Hume's 'impressions', Mill's reality as 'a constant possibility of sensation' and Kant's 'thing in itself', Grote and Green see eye to eye, differing largely on the stress on God as the

only source of the unity of consciousness and reality, and Green's continued reliance on the argument of 'internal relations' (Green 1884,Secs.12-13; 26-30,34-37). If this argument about 'internal relations' was the sole criterion of an epistemology being called idealist, Grote's work would have to be re-considered. But it is not and in the end the epistemological concerns that unite Green and Grote are substantial (Copleston 1966,191-198; Passmore 1966,56-60; Metz 1938,268-278; Milne 1962,89-97; Forsyth 1910,147-155; Seth 1912,344-349).

In the field of ethics several similarities are striking. Both considered themselves anti-utilitarian and distanced themselves from other intuitionist philosophies. Both felt that their ethical ideas needed grounding in epistemology and metaphysics and produced prolegomena to ethics to show the links. In their prolegomena three features stand out: firstly, that in coming to know the ideals we are knowing in the same way that we do in all intellectual knowledge; secondly, that moral knowledge, like all other sorts, is social; and thirdly, that the metaphysical basis of all action, including the moral, is want (Green 1884, Secs85-114; Richter 1964,195-196). Next is the recognition that the other preconditions of being a moral person are the presence of free will and the capacity for action to satisfy our wants and realise our ideals. Moral beings are not animals and are not self-seeking, but are ideal-seeking beings for whom the well-being of others is central(Green 1884, Secs234-237). This again presumes that man is a future orientated being and that moral knowledge and decisions are teleological (Richter 1964, 196-197). Of the ideals Green argues that there are several, all of value in themselves, but the linking and overarching ideal, that indicates the realization of our want is 'self-realization' or 'perfection' (Milne 1962, 97-110). As with Grote life is seen to

progress towards this but progress cannot be guaranteed (Richter 1964, 198-199). Noticing the similarity here Jean Pucelle noted that both Green and Grote tried to explain how the ideal and the actual did relate and how they could in practice be brought closer together and he quotes Book IV of Green's *Prolegomena* as the continuence of Grote's task (Pucelle 1955. 84-85). He writes that Grote's mind can also be traced in Green's ideas on want and on the relation between the lower facts of sensations and the higher ideal and ontological facts (Pucelle 1955,83). But this is not all; Pucelle writes of Grote in his conclusions

> 'we find again in Green and E.Caird many of these views but set forth and ordered with incomparably greater skill; the cyclical action between the environment and the individual and progress through social activity to the incarnate morality beyond, and of individual inspiration, a dynamic value and fruitfulness of want and the hope for a union of nature and mind' (Pucelle 1955,86).

Where I disagree with Pucelle is on the next point. Green's work may be better ordered, but I do not agree that Grote's reconciliations were only 'empirical', that his idealism was only of 'intention' while Green's is complete. Grote, I have revealed, had a very complete and largely coherent idealist system, that linked together the key elements noted above, and in not <u>insisting</u> on a universal mind of God working in nature, but rather in positing it as one possibility, his synthesis is far better founded than that of Green.

Similarities of some interest also emerge when comparing the work of Francis Herbert Bradley and John Grote, though there is little primary source evidence of direct influence. Already I have argued about the similarity of some key themes in *Ethical Studies* (Bradley 1876). In this book, published six years after the *Examination* we find a thorough going defence of free will; a rigorous attack on utilitarian ethics in Essay III; the idea that the moral end in life is social self realization; the argument in Essay V that this is

achieved by accepting 'My Station and its Duties'; an argument that above duty morality demands the pursuit of higher ideals, in Essay VI on 'Ideal Morality'; and a defence of the idea that morality ultimately requires self-sacrifice rather than selfishness in Essay VII. So far, no other commentator has picked up these points, nor the significance of Bradley's defence of Grote's central hypothesis that evil is an error(Bradley 1883, 1935). But the points of similarity and contrast in the two metaphysics are even more remarkable. Bradley's whole system is founded on the same concerns as Grote: to explain the relationship between subject and object; experience, knowledge and reality, and to explain the course of knowledge to the true and the right. As I argued in chapter five, Bradley elaborates a theory of the development of knowledge out of immediate experience but differs from Grote in concluding that the unity of knowing and being and the grasping of the absolute truth is impossible, as what reflection distinguishes can never be reassembled coherently.(Bradley 1893; 1914, 157-191). However in a late essay on *Relations* Bradley reverts to a position very similar to that of Grote. There are, he argues, three levels of consciousness, but the third and highest, the absolute, unites the lowest level or immediate feeling and the intermediate level of judgement or reflection. The absolute can be known and can unite knowledge, and knowledge with being (Bradley 1835, vol.II). Finally in sharing the idea of truth as coherence the two can be seen to progress in thought together on another key issue.

With Bosanquet the connections are less pronounced though we do have his identification of Grote as an objective idealist. Grote wrote little on logic, which separates him from a major concern of Bradley and Bosanquet, and there is little in the *Philosophical Theory of the State* to attract comparative attention. Comparison is justified of the different roles they ascribe to philosophy and

science, and sociology and philosophy; there are some similarities in their theories of obligation; in the general agreement that the self is a social self, who realises itself only in social activity, and the point that the effort of life is in making the actual fit the ideal and not vice-versa (Bosanquet 1923). However there are more striking connections in the less famous collections of essays. Firstly, in the defence of idealist epistemology in *The Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects* and *Contemporary Philosophy*, and secondly, in some attacks on positivist psychology in *The Psychology of the Moral Self* and elsewhere.(Bosanquet 1913; 1924; 1897).

In all of these cases my aim is not to prove a connection with Grote but to suggest similarities which could be lines for future and more detailed research. Historically, I consider it highly likely that the Oxford idealists would have read John Grote's major essays, even if their friend Sidgwick, had not provided them with a good recommendation. However, what is of real interest to me are the similarities that emerge, even coincidentally, at the time between different individuals struggling from within similar philosophical traditions to solve traditional philosophical problems. Grote, Sidgwick, Green and Bradley are all very much English philosophers solving British problems, but from within two universities with very different traditions.

c) 1900 to the present

In 1900 John Grote's reputation received a mini-boost and between 1910 and 1934 several texts emerged that either described and evaluated his work or which built upon its central arguments. In the first category we have from within the Scottish philosophical tradition three major reviews that have already been extensively referred to. The first, and one of the best was by Thomas Forsyth from St.Andrews University

which locates Grote alongside Ferrier, Green and Bradley as the key figures in the development of mid Victorian English philosophy (Forsyth 1910,139-147). The second was by James Seth(the brother of Andrew(Seth) Pringle Pattison) who locates Grote in the idealist line as an 'Absolute Idealist' and relates him to Ferrier, Stirling, Caird, Green and Bradley (Seth 1912, 339-341). Finally, in 1934, a Danish scholar studying in Scotland, T.T.Segerstedt set out to write a history of *The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy* and discovered that John Grote was not only part of the story but the synthesiser who wrote the last chapter. In later works Segerstedt wrote on the general history of idealism in England but did little else to popularise Grote's work (Segerstedt 1934).

However it was from within the idealist movement itself that the most interesting developments took place. At Cambridge James Ward, a proto idealist, developed a scathing series of attacks, firstly, on positivist psychology of mind and secondly, on naturalism in all its forms. Ward was versed both in science and in German idealist philosophy (Broad 1957, 35). Ward had obviously read Grote and had committed his private views on him to Charles Whitmore in an untraced letter. The contextual evidence is all that we now have to go on, but the two sources which quote Grote on the knowledge of acquaintance and judgement, and *Naturalism and Agnosticism* have elements of Grote, in the patient and analytic style,the anti-naturalist contents and, as Passmore notes, on some points of detail (Ward 1885, 1919, 1915; Passmore 1966, 83;). William R.Sorley (1855-1935) was another original idealist with a Trinity College background. He was the only Cambridge contributor to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, dedicated to T.H.Green in 1883. Sorley wrote a neat review of Grote's work for his *A History of British Philosophy to 1900* (Sorley 1921b, 264-265). Grote is not associated with any school but Sorley makes two points of

great truth: that Grote strove to clear his own thought and thought generally on key topics and, a point I have reiterated in this thesis, that

> 'He did not seek reputation as a philosophical writer, and he has not gained it. His direct influence has been restricted to a limited number of other thinkers, through whom it has passed to wider circles without any definite trace of its origin' (Sorley 1921b,264).

In other words, Grote's influence as recorded in notes and references do not reflect his actual influence; while his ideas have had impact they were not always traced and attributed to their original author. Sorley's own publications were extensive. Like Grote, he set out to destroy *The Ethics of Naturalism* and its place to espouse the *The Moral Life and Moral Worth* and *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, (Sorley 1884; 1911; 1911,1921a). C.D.Broad considered Sorley to have little influence on Cambridge philosophy, despite his holding the Knightbridge Chair, but his ideas do show a continuity with earlier elements in the tradition, and Sorley quotes Grote twice in the *Ethics of Naturalism* (Sorley 1884, 195, 206). Like Broad and McTaggart he developed a version of what became known as 'personalist idealism', in which persons or selves are not only the source of all knowledge but also 'the bearers of value' (Copleston 1966, 281).

Somewhat closer to Ward, and in the idealist tradition at Cambridge, was George Frederick Stout(1860-1944). Stout's thought covered the fields of epistemology and ontology, where he wrote to unite thought and being. He wrote several texts on psychology which were distinctly anti-positivist and anti-phenomenalist and in later life he produced two texts of great interest to idealists, the Gifford lectures on *Mind and Matter* and *God and Nature* (Stout 1931, 1952). Both challenge the idea that idealism was dead by the 1920's for as Broad argues

> 'His doctrine is thus a very subtle and highly elaborate blend of realistic and idealistic elements, culminating in a peculiar form of philosophical theism' (Broad 1966, 42).

Certainly, as Passmore notes, Stout argued against Russell that experience was a concrete unity, and that objects are 'embodied mind' - two ideas close to John Grote's heart (Passmore 1966, 309-311).

Two other Cambridge philosophers of the period had an intimate acquaintance with Grote's metaphysics, which can be proved. John McTaggart Ellis and C.D.Broad himself. John McTaggart (1866-1925), really a member of the illustrious Ellis family, had, like Broad, a copy of the *Exploratio* in the private library he left to Trinity College. Tradition has it that he was the only major idealist at Cambridge during the period of its ascendency but we already have evidence to contradict this. He was, however, the most thorough, the most rigorous and definitely the most Hegelian of all the Cambridge idealists (McTaggart 1896, 1901, 1921-1927, 1934). McTaggart's view of his own position has already been quoted and related to Grote - both could be called in some general senses, 'idealists', 'personalists' and 'realists'. More significantly both were thorough metaphysicians and products of the Trinity College philosophical milieu. Idealism, a rigorous application of Hegelian dialectics and cosmology typify McTaggart's synthesis, but like the output of the whole Cambridge line his work had a real stamp of originality, of having been thought out from first principles and having been developed and refined over a life time. Like John Grote, McTaggart saw two sources of mind in the world, one the self and the other society, but unlike Grote, he saw no place for a divine mind. McTaggart's 'absolute' is the plurality of minds that make up society; the group is a substance with its own character and qualities. Knowledge and reality are both spiritual, and it is the mind of the self and society which go to make up reality (Copleston 1966, 270-277;

Passmore 1966, 75-81, Broad 1933-1938).

While remaining very much independent of all schools of thought Charles Durbar Broad (1887-1971) was clearly associated with McTaggart, editing some of his work and writing the most complete account of his system of idealism. There is a heavily annotated edition of John Grote's *Exploratio* in his private library, stored at Trinity College, and Broad refers to Grote on several occasions in his various works (1930, 12; 1966, 14; 1952; 54). Broad's own philosophical position is eclectic, taking the best from both the realist and idealist traditions and adding some of the common sense rigour he picked up from his colleague George Moore (Broad 1914, 1923, 1925, 1930; Schilpp 1939; Passmore 1966, 347-350). One last idealist of the early period is J.S.McKenzie of Trinity College and later Professor at University College, Cardiff who produced numerous texts of an idealist character but little originality in the early decades of this century (McKenzie 1893, 1902, 1917, 1918). A reference to Grote's use of the two kinds of knowledge distinction appears in *Flements of Constructive Philosophy* (Mackenzie 1917, 130). Little need be said but to suggest in summary that alongside Coleridge, Hare, Whewell, John Grote and Maurice we now have a much longer idealist line at Cambridge, which includes James Ward, William Sorley, G.F. Stout, John McTaggart, Ellis and J.S.Mackenzie at least, and perhaps Broad too. Idealism did not die at Trinity or Cambridge with Grote in 1866, but lived on for a long period thereafter.

Also at Cambridge are two other figures of major stature whom I consider to be connnected with John Grote in some way: Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore. Both were products of the Cambridge moral science tripos, and both would have been exposed at least to Grote's *Examination*. We know that Russell used the distinction between knowledge of acquaintance and judgement in his best seller,

The Problems of Philosophy, and we know that one of George Moore's closest friends at Cambridge was Joseph B. Mayor's son, Robert John Mayor. As the godson and true inheritor of the phenomenalist mantle from John Stuart Mill it is hardly likely that Russell would speak of Grote with admiration if he knew his work well, but in a personal letter late in his life Russell replied that he could not remember hearing of Grote in his early Cambridge days (Russell, 1969,M.S.). But we must remember that in his early days Russell (1872-1970) was convinced by the idealism of contemporary Cambridge and was always alive to the difficulties inherent in his sophisticated and modified form of phenomenalism. In style, in care for language, and in rigour of argument he resembles Grote and the later lineage, and in reacting to idealism, to the coherence theory of truth, and to the social and even state-orientated moral and political philosophy of the idealist he is unwittingly conversing with Grote and confirming the importance of idealism to him and the Cambridge of his day (Russell 1953, 1963, 1967). While it is completely beyond the scope of this thesis to say any more on the subject interested readers could well now re-acquaint themselves with the whole of the *Problems of Philosophy*, and especially the Chapters 4, 5, 11 and 12, as well as Chapter 10 of *Mysticism and Logic*.

The case of George E Moore (1873-1958) is far more complicated. A product of the same Cambridge milieu, it would be easy to rush to judge Moore as a direct receptor of the Grote - Sidgwick inheritence. As Passmore notes the key link lies in the 'spirit' of Moore and Cambridge's philosophy, the rigorous analysis, the great care for use of language, the faith in common sense and the dislike of joining or creating schools of thought. At the general analytic level three elements in Moore's thought meet those that John Grote bequeathed: firstly, the preference for ordinary language in philosophy, secondly,

a desire to synthesise utilitarianism and intuitionism in ethics, and the wish to preserve the best in the common sense realist tradition in epistemology while rejecting empiricism. In a more negative vein Moore was, like Russell, reacting to idealism and metaphysics in general, but he remained, like Grote, a devout anti-naturalist. But his assertion that our ordinary knowledge is quite good enough and that the world can be known directly harks back to Grote. The preference for 'ordinary language' is again reminiscent of Grote's attack on Ferrier and the idea that philosopers need to create their own pure and technical language. In ethics *'Principia Fthica'* is really a very modern version of the *Examination*, in which the old Grotian distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements is reaffirmed, and utilitarianism caught in the trap of being either intuitionist or a captive of the naturalistic fallacy (Moore 1903). In *Ethics* Moore is more conciliatory towards utilitarianism, rather like Sidgwick before, doing as much as he can to defend it by adding as little from intuitionism as was needed. Put alongside the idea that if we clarify our questions and our language many problems will just go away we have some remarkable affiliations with Moore and Sidgwick and Grote (Moore 1966; Warnock 1966, 11-29; Warnock M, 1960, 11-38; Passmore 1966, 54, 201-239).

Two other Cambridge philosophers will be taken as later inheritors of the Cambridge tradition and of some aspects of Grote's work, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Michael Oakeshott (1901-). The former was another in a long line of brilliant Trinity College philosophers and along with Russell, Moore and McTaggart the fourth leg of the table on which most contemporary British philosophers feast. There is no evidence that Wittgenstein, who came to Cambridge in 1912, ever read Grote, though it is possible that he did. But on several points the Cambridge line links them.

Firstly, there is Passmore's 'Cambridge Spirit'. Secondly, there are the similarities in theory of language, and in particular the argument that 'words mean what they are used to mean and are understood to mean by users in everyday language', which links Grote's *On Glossary* and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1953). Thirdly, there is the link provided by the argument that there is a latent idealism in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which if true links him to the Cambridge idealists from Coleridge to McTaggart and Sorley (Gellner 1973 ; Williams 1974; Malcolm 1982). Finally, there is the crucial argument of Wittgenstein that as language is social, so is meaning and with it thought. On all points the similarities may be pure coincidence, or could be based on conflating uses of such key words as 'use' and 'idealism'. On all points Wittgenstein could just as easily be related to other thinkers, and there is no evidence to link him directly with Grote, but the suggestion should remain to be explored by later researchers (Malcolm 1958, Pears 1971, Kenny 1973, Warnock 1969, 62-93; Passmore 1966, 424-465).

Michael Oakeshott studied and taught at Cambridge with short interruptions from 1923 until his appointment to the Chair of Political Science at the L.S.E. in 1951. Like R.G.Collingwood at Oxford, Oakeshott's studies and mind turned to the relationship between philosophy and history and then on to the relationship between philosophy and all other 'modes of experience', including science, poetry, religion and practice. In his first major publication *Experience and Its Modes* Oakeshott sketched out the precondition of each of these attempts to comprehend or encounter experience and to map out a role for philosophy in relationship to them (Oakeshott 1933). But it is to Chapter II on *Experience and Its Modes* that any researcher interested in the continuity of the Cambridge line should go. In chapter six I explored some of the similarities between Grote

and Oakeshott on the unity of immediate experience, the effect of reflection and judgement on the concrete whole of experience, and the interdependence of subject and object in experience and thought. Now we can note that Oakeshott argues that in 'experience a given world of ideas is transformed into a world which is more of a world, the criteria of achievement everywhere being one of coherence' (ibid 41). Like Grote, he considers that the growth of knowledge is one of 'distinction' within the 'concrete whole of experience', each judgement is'a newly observed part of, a previously conceived whole'; brought about by the mind's demand for coherence (Grote 1900, 299). Oakeshott discusses the impossibility of rigorously separating knowledge of acquaintance and judgement, as Grote formerly argued, and he rejects the notion of an unknowable reality (Oakeshott 1933, 48-54). In the end Oakeshott, like Grote, binds knowledge and reality together in experience, for reality is only experience and nothing but experience made coherent (ibid 54-61). Facts are products not postulates of this process and carved out of experience, by a process of discrimination. Again, there is a scale of knowledge with degrees of truth and reality (ibid 61-67).

What is real to both men is the complete and coherent whole of experience, any shortfall from which they call an abstraction. History, science, poetry, religion and practice are all abstractions to Oakeshott, all try to grasp the totality of reality but from presuppositions or postulates that will never allow that to be possible. Each 'mode of experience' or 'language' of analysis is a distinct manner of thought, with a language, logic, and purpose of its own. Each is as Grote believed, 'sui generis'. Like Grote, one of the biggest sources of error in reasoning is the confusion of the languages, logics and purposes of two or more manners of thought which should be kept distinct, or the taking of one as sovereign and the

reduction of its fellows to the role of slaves. To Oakeshott and Grote this is precisely what was happening in modern thought; the languages of history, philosophy and science were becoming hopelessly muddled, and both practice and science were making a takeover bid for the whole terrain of explanation (Oakeshott 1933; 1962, 1-36, 80-167, 197-247, 301-333; 1983, 45-96). Much else could be said here to suggest further lines of research, especially related to Grote's and Oakeshott's rejection of 'rationalism' or 'abridgement'; their basic idealism; the common Cambridge concern for clarity and rigour of argument; and the common respect for custom and tradition, for what we have as well as for what ought to be, but it would serve little further purpose. Michael Oakeshott is undoubtedly one of the most original and elegant writers of this century, who needed little else to help him think than a tradition. That tradition may be idealist as Greenleaf suspects, but it was not solely the idealism of Oxford, but of Hegel and Cambridge. It was also the tradition of English philosophy back to Hobbes, the reconstruction of whose ideas Oakeshott devoted so much of his time.

Michael Oakeshott read and was impressed by the thought of John Grote. He is the modern thinker whom we must thank for maintaining, wittingly or unwittingly , that tradition of thought, wittingly or unwittingly which has made the retrieval of John Grote's thought possible. In a letter of 1970 Oakeshott recounts buying the *Exploratio* in a second hand bookshop in Cambridge in the 1920's and being impressed by the author as 'a vastly interesting and remarkably independent thinker'. It is observed that

> 'Grote stands out as one of the most careful critics of utilitarianism, and there is so much in the *Moral Ideals* which is profound and original'.

But on the whole, Oakeshott considered that it was the *Exploratio* and its example of how to think which is of most benefit to later

philosophers (Oakeshott 1970). Michael Oakeshott possessed copies of both the *Treatise* and the *Examination* in the 1920's and was much impressed by them (Oakeshott 1985, MS).

At Cambridge the most recent intellectual inheritor of this line is Quentin Skinner, the Professor of Political Science. In early essays he eclectically pieced together the use theory of language, the interpretative notion of history developed by Collingwood and Oakeshott, and the concern for clarity and coherence embedded in the Cambridge tradition. Alongside Anthony Giddens, anti-positivism, respect for German and French metaphysics, for hermeneutics and action theory, the two, probably unwittingly, carry on a tradition at Cambridge that has now survived for over one hundred and fifty years (Skinner 1969, 1970, 1972(a), 1972(b), 1974; Giddens, 1976, 1977).

In Oxford during the first half of the twentieth century philosophical studies underwent a profound change, but it would be wrong to underestimate the level of continuity. The generation after that of 1870 to 1900 contained an assortment of figures interested in the traditional British problems of philosophy, and they answered them in often traditional ways. Of those whom we could call idealist, whose work either refers to or resembles Grote's, we must include A.E.Taylor, Hastings Rashdall, Samuel Alexander, H.W.B. Joseph, Edward de Burgh, J.A.Smith and R.G.Collingwood. Oddly enough, it was from Oxford, and New College in particular, that the request for a second part of the *Exploratio* was made in 1898 and another contemporary fellow, Anthony Quinton, has done much to inspire a re-reading of Grote. Of the signatories, to the request we only know of H.W.B.Joseph (1867-1943). Joseph refers to Grote's work twice in his various works but on all occasions, as in his enigmatic *Some Problems in Ethics*, a respect for the kind of style and issue discussed by the latter is present (Joseph 1916, 55n; 1935, 8;

1931). In his *Logic*, Joseph wrote that the *Exploratio* is by an 'author less known than he deserves to be'. In the *Problems* Joseph writes to distinguish and clarify the ideals of right and good, duty and freedom, in a vein similar to Grote. In taking up the issue of the difference between the primary ideals of right, good, and duty, Joseph is entering into an old debate but with new conversationalists. The most famous were H. Rashdall, H.A.Pritchard, W.D.Ross and E.F. Carritt. Only Rashdall amongst them was an idealist, the rest all returned to intuitionism to nourish themselves for the debate (Hudson 1983, 87-100).

Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) was another New College scholar and a likely signatory of the letter to Major. In his early essay on 'Personality, Human and Divine' in H. Sturt's *Personal Idealism* he set out the case for the personal idealism that was to sustain his thought and which identifies him to some extent with John Grote (Sturt 1902, 369-393). In the *Theory of Good and Evil* there is no direct reference to Grote but in the development of ideal utilitarianism, in the defence of self-realization and self sacrifice and in the attempt to link metaphysics and ethics, we have several Grotian themes developed (Rashdall 1907). Harold Pritchard (1871-1947), another New College product and later Professor of Moral Philosophy, went further than Joseph and Rashdall towards intuitionism and towards the separation of the primary moral ideals. For him right, good and duty were independent ideals which, along with their sub ideals, could be immediately recognized to be of value. In his famous essay *'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake'* we also get an argument from analogy between the theory of knowledge and the theory of morality, both of which share a source in the intuititional theory of immediate knowledge (Pritchard, 1968). What we ought to do, Pritchard, like Grote, considers to arise from our unreflecting consciousness and is

only brought out, clarified and rationalised by reflection. We do not need teleological or other justifications of morality; our duties are embedded in our everyday relations, practices and intuitions.

However in 'Duty and the Ignorance of Fact' Pritchard distances himself from the relational theory of Grote and Bradley. The recognition of duty is almost entirely a subjective and intuitional matter, not a recognition of facts entailed in our relationships (Pritchard 1968, 18-39). W.D.Ross held views roughly equivalent to Pritchard's on the key issues of ethics (Hudson 1967,1970; Warnock,M.1960, 39-55;). Ross considers *The Right and the Good* to be moral ideas of independent value and he considers it possible to find out what is right and good, both by examining what is entailed by moral situations, and by appeal to a plurality of ideals and the self-evident principles governing them (Ross,W. 1930). His whole enterprise of carefully distinguishing and relating the key ideals of right, duty, good and happiness is directly comparable to that of Grote in the *Treatise*. E.F.Carritt has argued in a similar vein but in at least one of his textbooks he has grappled directly with Grote's account of the ethical ideals, to some useful effect (Carritt, 1928; Secs 41-44, 52-52). John Grote is also mentioned in several texts by William George de Burgh (1866-1943), another Oxford graduate who praises Grote for distinguishing right, good and happiness; for introducing aretaics or a philosophy of activity into the philosophical conversation; and for separating philosophy and religious discourse. (de Burgh 1938, 44-45, 49,70; 1937, 44n, 227).

Two pioneers of 'new realism', Samuel Alexander and John Laird both Scotsmen with contacts at Oxbridge, also shared and recognized Grote's value in separating the moral ideals and in refusing to submit them all to the sovereign power of happiness. The latter studied briefly at Cambridge between 1911 and 1912 and came into contact with

Grote's corpus. John Laird (1887-1946) quotes Grote in four of his ethical texts on topics ranging from the independence of right, good and happiness, the notions of 'want' and 'egence', the value of a science of aretaics and the discussion of duty and conscience (Laird 1928, IX-XIV; 1929, 109; 1935, 169, 265; 1940, 256; 1965, 219). In epistemology, Laird supported John Grote's claim that we know what is the world directly - that we know that external objects exist, and he quotes Grote in a key chapter heading in his *A Study in Realism* (Laird 1920,15; 1924, 219). Similarly Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), one of Green's students at Balliol, moved gradually from idealism to realism in epistemology and intuitionism in ethics. In his *Moral Order and Progress*, originally of 1889, he quotes John Grote extensively on the difference between right and good, on duty and conscience and on character (Alexander 1906, 157-158; 215, 244). These quotations in turn seem to have effected an unlikely convert, the moral relativist and evolutionist E.A.Westermarck, who again quotes Grote on duty, conscience and character (Westermarck 1906, I, 149, 214;II, 113, 266; 1932, 224). Other Oxford realists who seem to use or quote Grote are G.D.Hicks and H.H.Price (Hicks 1938, 124, Price 1932, 1953). Price defends the idea of the 'given'; various types of knowledge of acquaintance, types of belief and the idea that knowing is a kind of 'recognition'.

But it was amongst Oxford's later idealists that a minor Grotian influence was nurtured. A.E.Taylor (1869-1945), an idealist of immense range and scholarship, covers just about all the topics touched on by Grote: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and the moral ideals (Taylor 1901, 1912). Only one reference is made to Grote, but its single existence reveals a link into the heart of Taylor's idealism - an appreciative reference to Grote's distinction between what the philosopher and the scientist takes as 'given' (Taylor 1932,

I, 58). In Taylor's *Metaphysics* we get a Grotian style argument that reality and experience are inseparable and that both are grounded in 'immediate experience'. The unity found in the immediate can be reproduced in conceptual thought, but the absolute also requires realization in a practical form, as the achievement of human purpose and will. Unlike Bradley, Taylor's argument that reality and the absolute are realizable in thought and practice coincides with that of Grote (Taylor 1912, 18-41, 50-75, 152-153). In ethics, Taylor engages in the conversation about the metaphysical foundations of morality and of the nature of the moral ideals. On the latter he departs from Grote and Bradley in seeing that self-realization and self-sacrifice are ultimately irreconcilable moral ideals.(Taylor 1901, 421-425).

Three later Oxford philosophers, all of whom have used Grote and one of whom has helped popularize his work, can be mentioned, J.A.Smith, R.G.Collingwood and A.Quinton. John Alexander Smith (1863-1939), was another Balliol idealist who eventually became Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. In a philosophical reminiscence published in 1925, revealingly entitled *'Philosophy as the Development of the Notion and Reality of Self Consciousness'* Smith noted Grote as a more significant mentor than Green, Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet. After saying how disappointed he had been with his Oxford predecessors and the English moralists generally, including Mill and Spencer he wrote

> 'Green and Bradley passed over my head, Kant alone seemed to afford a solid framework of ethical theory (but a framework only). I am bound here to refer to the works of John Grote, all of which greatly affected me; in them I found, not indeed, a system, but a clear grasp of fundamental principles illuminating a wealth of detail' (Smith 1925, 229).

Only Benedetto Croce receives recognition greater than Grote and that for his revelation that

> 'Reality (or, as I prefer to name it more concretely, the whole

and sole Real) is not stationary or immobile, but essentially in change or process' (Smith 1925, 235).

John Grote, like Bradley and Green, considered reality to be the concrete whole of experience, but unlike Hegel each of them had held back from any kind of historicism. By making history itself 'spiritual' Smith was able to add a dynamic to Grote's idea of a stable, but gradually emerging, reality. Whereas Grote's 'puzzle' is a 'picture coming out', to Smith and Croce the picture is still being painted. But much of Grote's metaphysics remains intact. Mind is active and creative in the knowing and acting processes, reality is spiritual, and hence active mind meets creative mind in the knowing process (Smith 1910, 1914).

Smith's successor in the Waynflete Chair was another metaphysician and close friend, who also resisted the new positivist, phenomenalist, and realist tides: Robin. G. Collingwood (1889-1943). Collingwood, like Smith, shared a deep affiliation to idealism, to Croce and to the idea that philosophical history offers us the best hope for explaining the complexities of human experience. In many ways Collingwood and Oakeshott are parallel figures in the Oxford and Cambridge of their day, for while both mapped out the perspectives or experience of aesthetics, religion, science, philosophy and history, both also considered the last two to be of the greatest explanatory value. In general terms Collingwood's detailed texts on *Philosophical Method*, *The Principle of Art*, *The Idea of Nature* and *The Idea of History* are fuller elaborations of the map he set out in *Speculum Mentis*, just as many of Oakeshott's later essays develop arguments about history, poetry, religion and practice discussed in *Experience and Its Modes* (Collingwood, 1924, 1933, 1938, 1940,1942, 1945, 1966). Collingwood knew of Grote and quotes him once in *The Idea of History* as a 'judicious critic' who tried to lead

philosophers out of the blind alley which was the traditional 'philosophy of the human mind' (Collingwood, 1966, 208).

But the associations are deeper, and include the careful separation of science, history and philosophy as different forms of experience, the role of philosophy being to elucidate the logic and role of each and to act as 'boundary commissioner' (Passmore 1966, 303). In this the main task was to unravel the presuppositions behind the operation of an explanation and to check for changes, developments, contradictions and confusions in and between them (Collingwood 1940). However, while each discipline has its own definition and criteria of truth the universalizing test is, as his colleague H.H.Joachim and John Grote argued, always coherence (Donagan 1962; Ayer 1982, 191-213). Reference to Anthony Quinton from New College Oxford is provided not as evidence of influence but rather as witness to his efforts to restore Grote to modern attention (Quinton 1958, 1967, 1982). Not only does he briefly analyse Grote's epistemology as a case of absolute idealism but he also gives a valuable survey of his critique of utilitarianism (Quinton 1972, 21; 1973, 83-87).

Apart from the two recent historical reviews from France by Pucelle and Chevalier the only remaining area of influence has been in North America. The first evidence of influence was admitted by William James in an article in *Mind* of 1885 and then in the first, but not in succeeding, editions of the *Principles of Psychology* (James, 1885; 1901, 221). Apart from later references to Grote's role in distinguishing knowledge of acquaintance and description, the next major American references can be found in the work of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953). As indicated by MacDonald, there is then a sustained course of references to Grote by others such as the realist, Roy Sellars, and Daniel Somner Robinson (Brightman 1925, 83; Sellars

1920, 257-259; Robinson 1930, 109). But the three key figures in America are George Watts Cunningham, Charles Whitmore and Lauchlin D. MacDonald.

Charles Whitmore is something of an enigma. He was a literary theorist, sometime Professor of Literature at the University of Michigan, and author of numerous texts including *The Supernatural in Tragedy* (1916), *The Nature of Tragedy* (1919), *A Definition of Lyric* (1918) and *Approaches to Literary Theory* (1929). Just how he came to show an interest in Grote is never revealed but his essay on *The Significance of John Grote* is readable, rigorous and generally accurate (Whitmore 1927, 307-337). Unfortunately, the review does not cover the minor writings or the *Examinations* in any detail. The moral works are covered very briefly and the author holds back from attempting either to locate or to characterize Grote's writing. But that is to be forgiven, for Whitmore properly notes that Grote wanted to avoid sectarian squabbles and his work is in many ways original. (Whitmore 1927, 336-337).

George Cunningham, the Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, was both insightful and brave in placing Grote at the beginning of *The Idealist Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* (Cunningham 1983, 63-77). An idealist himself, Cunningham writes with both sympathy and insight into Grote's mind, and his judgement that Grote's ideas while 'independently conceived' yet 'Hegelian' in spirit, alongside the judgement that they are 'the earliest formulation of this type of argument to be found in British philosophy' must be taken as authoritative (Cunningham 1933, 65).

But we must finish this survey of later references and influences with the one full length text on Grote by Lauchlin D.MacDonald (MacDonald 1966). On numerous occasions I have found it necessary, along with MacDonald's two reviewers, to criticize heavily his work,

for containing conceptual confusions, for reading contemporary American personalism back into John Grote, for being badly organized, for failing to locate key texts and for undervaluing Grote's moral and political philosophy. However, after saying all this, MacDonald must be congratulated for his courageous effort to analyze Grote's epistemology and for his recognition of its general idealist character. My strategy has been to avoid engaging MacDonald too often as this would break the flow of my own argument. Overall I have been little influenced by this book except in one crucial and negative way. Reading MacDonald revealed that, without a historical re-construction of the intellectual context within which Grote thought, any attempt to assess his intentions and significance would be bound to fail. Now the historical task has been completed I trust a more rigorous critical analysis and assessment of John Grote's influence can now be engaged.

Notes

In accordance with modern convention, to aid the reading of this thesis and to facilitate the use of word processing facilities the notes in this thesis have been reduced to a minimum and presentation left to the end of the thesis. Most references have been included in the main text as suggested by the *Modern Humanities Research Association* regulations *MHRA 1981 Style Book; 3rd edition, London.* Remaining notes refer to minor but interesting points of detail, to biographical details, and to reading where the number or length of references would interrupt the normal flow of the text.

Chapter I

1 Biographical details on John Grote are scarce. The main sources are the D.N.B article on him by G. Groom Robertson, and the Obituaries in the 'Gentleman's Magazine', 'The Times' and '*Church Gaurdian*' of August 1866. Additional information comes from the various introductions to John Grote's books written by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor. Unwitting evidence on Grote's childhood comes from various biographies of his brother, George Grote, written by his wife Harriet, his biographer for the *Encyclopaedia Britanica* and George Groom Robertson for the D.N.B. The excellent biography of George Grote by Michael L. Clarke is the best of the latter type of source (Clarke 1962), supported by the introduction to W. McIlwraith's *The Life and Writings of George Grote* (McIlwraith 1885).

2 Details of the development of the Moral Sciences Tropos at Cambridge can be found in Henry Sidgwick's article on 'Philosophy at Cambridge', in the books by Winstanley, Rothblatt, and

Garland; and in the article by Collini in *That Noble Science of Politics* (Sidgwick 1879 ; Winstanley 1940, 1945; Rothblatt 1968 ; Garland 1980 ; Collini, Winch, Burrows 1983, 339-363). Useful details can be found in the various editions of the *Students Guide to the University of Cambridge; from 1862-1893 (Mayor 1862).*

3 *MS. Anon., 1957 'Discussion of the Terms of Reference for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy', Cambridge Chronicle, 11th Dec. 1957, Cam. a. 500. 5.(167)*

4 *See the obituaries to John Grote in the Church Gaurdian and Gentleman's Magazine's (Anon. 1866 a, 1866b).*

5 *The study of philology at Oxford and Cambridge mirrored its development in Germany at the time. The key history apart from J. Burrow, 'The Uses of Philology in Victorian England'* is H. Pedersen, *Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century*, though it is weak on Cambridge (Burrow 1967, Pedersen 1931).

6 This lengthy section on Grote's work on language is included here for three reasons. Firstly, it fits with the plan of the chapter, to explain Grote's general literary output. Secondly, it raises one central and original feature of Grote's thinking, which throws light on most of his other work and hence needs to be understood early in the thesis. Thirdly, as most of the detail of Grote's philosophy are left until the historical preliminaries have been completed, it was considered to be a good strategy to reveal at least one aspect of the originality and significance of Grote's philosophy at an early stage. This section is intended, not only to set the context and enlighten but, to excite interest in the succeeding work.

7 For a good account of the early origins of German philology see Pedersen (1931); Muller (1891); Jespersen (1922). On its connections to German philosophy of the time, see Tenneman (1852); Chalybaus (1854), Flint (1971).

8 John Kemble (1807-1857) studied at Cambridge and under Jacob Grimm at Gottingen. He translated and interpreted several major medieval manuscripts (Kemble 1833-37; 1839-48; 1876). Richard Chenavix Trench (1807-1886) was a poet and theologian as well as a philologer and had a major impact on Trinity and Cambridge in Grote's day (Trench 1861). On both see C. Brookfield, *The Cambridge Apostles* (1906).

9 On the use of the comparative method in philology and anthropology see A.C. Hadden (1934); M. Harris (1968); M. Mullen (1891), Collini et al (1983, 209-246).

10 Christian Kaul Josias Bunsen (1791-1860) was a diplomat in Rome, Bern and London. He wrote extensively on the history of the church, theology and history, as well as philology (Bunsen, 1854; 1869; 1868-70). Barthold George Niebuhr (1776-1831) was a Danish born colleague of Bunsen, a historian and diplomat as well as a philologer. He pioneered the practice of the rigorous referencing of sources (Niebuhr 1827; 1852a; 1852b; 1870). Marx Muller popularized philology in England with a series of lectures, articles and books published in the second half of the nineteenth century the first collection of which appeared in 1861 (Muller 1891).

11 Farrar was elected as a fellow at Trinity in 1856 and Donaldson in 1835, two years before Grote's elevation.

12 Leslie Stephen records over forty references to the coinages of John Grote in the complete Oxford English Dictionary. Many of these words such as hedonics, intuitivism, unitary, relativism, personalism, felicific, phone and noem have entered in everyday language.

13 In a biographical note in the *Exploratio* Grote wrote, 'Myself, not owing much I think to any philosophical teaching... I owe almost all such interest as I take in philosophy to what is next best to teaching, if it is not better, to companionship' (Grote 1865, xxxv).

14 'Remarks on the Proposals of the Syndicate in reference to the Moral Science Tripos' (Grote 1860, Wren Library, LL 696. c. 127 18); 'Remarks on the proposal to Grant the Degree of B.A. to persons who have obtained honours in the Moral Science Tripos' (Mayor 1860, Wren Library, LL.696.c.117 28). More details can be found in Winstanley (1945 , 186-190).

15 'A Draft Scheme of the Examinations in Moral Sciences' (Grote 1860, Wren Library LL.696. c. 117 27). 'Remarks on Mr Grote's Proposals for Books for the Moral Sciences Tripos' (Whewell 1860, Wren Library, Whewell Papers Add. Mss. a. 62 61). 'Remarks on the Criticism of Whewell and Professor Grote on the list of Books which have been laid before the Board of Moral Sciences' (Roby 1860, Wren Library, LL.696.c. 127 17).

16 'A Few words on Statute XVIII of the New Body of Statutes sent under their seal by the Commissioners to the College' (Grote 1859a, Wren Library, MS.Adv.c. 16.57 29). 'Remarks on the Revised Code of Statutes' (Grote 1859b, C.U.L., Cam. a. 500.5

174). 'A letter to the Master and Seniors of Trinity College on the relation of fellows under the old and new statutes' (Grote 1863, Wren Library, LL.696. c. 127. 19). 'Remarks on College Reform' (Roby 1858, Wren Library, LL. 696. c. 1117[18]). 'Remarks on Mr Grote's Proposal to reduce the electorate for Masters and Seniors of Trinity College from eight to six' (Whewell 1857, Wren Library, Whewell Papers, Add. MS.a. 62 [61]).

17 Grote had become a senior fellow in 1854 as the result of an unfortunate incident recounted by Winstanley. In this an existing senior fellow and Regius Professor of Greek, W.H. Thompson had been removed from his post. Joseph Edleston, a radical liberal, had petitioned the Home Secretary, concerning the propriety of his election to and retention of both a Senior Fellowship and a Regius Chair (Winstanley 1940, 303-312). Grote himself supported reforms to the rules concerning election of Regius Professors in 1857 and Seniors and fellows in the next few years, becoming, particularly heavily involved in the latter, writing two printed flysheets on reform of the statutes in 1859 (Grote 1859a, 1859b). In May 1857 Grote was elected onto a Governing Body Committee set up to propose reforms to the whole college statutes, which went on to propose, according to Joseph Romilly, absolutely 'drastic changes' (Romily 1857; Winstanley 1949,343). Grote was a persistent critic of the College establishment and Romily once records after a long meeting, that Grote was 'infinitely tiresome' (Romilly 1853-1864, Diaries Ms. Cam. 6804-6842).

18 On this point Grote stayed loyal to Whewell's old dreams. The two had fallen out on most other matters by 1860, as the new, and

even more liberal professor challenged one after another of the Masters, once liberal but now, old and reactionary looking reforms of three decades earlier. Siding with the Commissioners and Edleston, Charles King and Wesflake, Grote engendered the sustained wrath of the aging master. As Winstanley notes, when Grote in 1857 proposed that 'there shall be an annual meeting of the Master and the whole body of the fellows on the Commemoration Day, with power of adjournment, and that any representative, petition or enactment to be made by the colleges of any time for ammendment of the existing statutes, proceed from that body', democracy was considered to have overlapped the bounds. Romily called the proposal hateful and mischievous, Sedgwick claimed that 'Such a measure would put in the hands of every fellow, soon after he was elected a torch, with the invitation to try its efficacy.' (Winstanley 1940, 343-348). Grote's proposal was carried twelve years later (Winstanley 1945, 252). On a related issue of the election of seniors and fellows Grote proposed that six of the senior fellows should constitute the appointment board and that they should be able to elect 'without the consent of the Master'. In a virulently worded reply the Master demanded for himself 'Such powers as may enable him to promote the well-being of the Body over which he presides' and adds 'When there is a question of power between sixty persons on one side and one on the other, to refer it to the whole body of sixty one, each person having an equal vote, is a palpably *absurd* proceeding' (Whewell Cam. c. 857, 15).

19 I must thank Dr Andrew Brereton of Northallerton for advice on these medical matters.

Chapter II

(1) Of the many texts on Foucault's approach to history the most useful are H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow *Michael Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982); Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, *Michael Foucault* (Cousins and Hussain, 1984); and Karlis Racevskis, *Michael Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect* (Racevskis, 1983). On Derida, deconstruction and recent French philosophy see Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Descombes, 1979); Christopher Norris *The Deconstructive Turn* (Norris 1983) and Robert Young *Untying the Text* (Young 1981).

(2) Other useful primary sources on the history of mid Victorian philosophy are Robert Blackey (1833, 1848); Sir James Mackingtosh (1830); Sir William Hamilton (1858-1860).

(3) The best historical accounts of British philosophy from 1800-1860 are by Seth (1912); Sorley (1921); Metz (1938); Copleston (1966); Passmore 1966; Brehier (1932, 1969) and Mandelbaum (1971).

(4) On the Philosophical Radicals read Halevy (1952), Stephen (1900), Plamenatz (1958), Thomas (1979).

(5) Ryan (1974, 111-113); McCloskey (1971, 56-64); Halliday (1976, 51-52,61-64); Schneewind (1965, 17-19).

(6) On the positivist view of history the most useful secondary texts are Mill 1961, Annan 1959; Simon 1963, Giddens, 1974, Buckley 1966.

(7) Whewell TCC Add MS. a.62 [61]

(8) For an interesting account of romantic political theory see Jonathan Mendilou (1986), *The Romantic Tradition in British Political Thought*, London.

(9) Henry Sidgwick defined three types of intuitionism, the perceptual or ultra intuitionism, dogmatic or common sense intuitionism and philosophical intuitionism (Sidgwick 1963, 100-104). He places the Scottish philosophers and Whewell in the second group, but both Schneewind and Donagan question whether Whewell should be with Sidgwick himself in the third (Donagan, 1977; Schneewind 1974).

(10) To my knowledge there is no text in English dedicated to the work of either the French Eclectics or to eclecticism as a wider movement.

(11) On British philosophy between 1650 and 1860 the best sources are Sidgewick (1967); Sorley 1921; Stephen (1927); Copleston (1959-1967); Raphael (1947, 1969), Carré (1949).

Chapter III

(1) The various lines of this wider Cambridge challenge to empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism will receive amplification in chapter ten section II.

(2) Julius Hare became a close friend of both Niebuhr and Bunsen the latter become his neighbour. 'Any attack on Luther, Neibuhr, Bunsen or Coleridge would have called forth his sword from its scabbard', (Augustus Hare 1872, 198).

(3) The main secondary sources for the idealist interpretation of Whewell are, Morell 1846, II, 238-247; Thilly 1914, 70, 513-514; Segerstedt 1934, 103-113; Ducasse 1951; Marcucci 1963; Butts 1967, 1968; Donogan 1977,447-465.

(4) A new collection of essays on Whewell which aims to re-assess his contribution to many areas of academic life is due for publication by O.U.P. in 1987 edited by Simon Schaffer

(Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge). It will contain an essay on 'The Cambridge Milieu' by Harvey Becker one by Gerd Buchdahl on 'Whewell against Mill', and 'Whewell's Legacy' by Joseph Agassi.

Chapter IV

(1) On existentialism see Mary Warnock's two books, (1967). *Existential Ethics*, London; (1970) *Existentialism*, London. For a recent introduction see T.L.S. Sprigge (1984) *Theories of Existence*, Harmondsworth. Grote's existential theory is discussed in chapter six below.

(2) For a discussion of succeeding thinkers who identify Grote as an idealist see Appendix III below.

(3) For useful recent accounts and typologies of idealism see Milne 1962, 11-25; O'Sullivan 1969, 47 ; Vesey 1982, 1-18; Sprigge 1963; 1984, 56-76: For further discussion see chapter ten, section one below.

(4) For other attempts in this direction, both discussed in Appendix III below; see also M. Oakeshott (1933) and R.G. Collingwood (1924).

(5) On mathematics and philosophy see Grote, (1865) xxvii; on history, (1856) xxviii-xxx; on psychology, (1865), 150-151; on religion, (1862); (1870), 214-220; on sociology, (1870) 310-313.

Chapter V

(1) Other references to the wrong psychology appear in Grote (1865, 73,192), Grote also tries, with some difficulty, to separate logic and psychology (1865, 151-153).

(2) In regard to epistemology Grote treats positivism and phenomenalism interchangeably (Grote 1865,1).

Chapter VI

(1) The enemies here appear to be certain Greeks, probably Plato, who considered imagination to deflect reason. For his part Grote insists that the distinction ordinarily made between reason and imagination is 'entirely fallacious' (Grote 1876,42).

(2) The establishment of the criterion for judging the adequacy of a moral axiom establishes a style to be used and made famous by Sidgwick later (Sidgwick 1963, 337-343). The four criteria he sets are, 1) clarity, 2) self evidence, 3) conformity with other truths, 4) supported by a 'consensus of experts'.

(3) A parallel chapter exists in the *Examination* (Grote 1870, 171-182).

(4) For elaboration of Grote's argument see (Grote 1870, 171-172, 180). For similar reflexive arguments see (Oakeshott 1975, 1-107; Ritchie 1893, 22-27; Hart 1955, 175-191).

(5) Grote left the details of this argument very unclear and even confused. Phenomenalists, Plato and Christians are said to believe in an objective world, but phenomenolists are said not to be committed to an objective moral order. Again many intuitionists and rationalists deny moral subjectivism and posit an objective moral order. Grote seems to be comparing 'objective' and 'subjective' idealists here rather than 'phenomenalists' and 'intuitionists'.

Chapter VII

(1) That Grote recognized the value of ordinary language analysis and applied it to the notions of right and wrong can be seen through examination of 'On Glossology' (Grote 1874, 162-169).

(2) On this issue see (Grote 1900, 271-283).

(3) For elaboration see (Hudson 1970, 317-320).

(4) A contempory defence of this identification of virtue with an existing social practice see (MacIntyre 1981, 174-181 ; Bernstein 1986, 121-127).

Chapter VIII

(1) The literature on Mill's utilitarianism is now too extensive to summarize adequately here. One useful collection and bibliography is in J.B.Schneewind's collection *Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Schneewind 1969). However the most helpful source for literature on Mill's Utilitarianism is the various volumes of *The Mill News Letter* edited by J.M.Robson, M.Laine and B.L.Kinzer and published by the University of Toronto Press. Each issue contains a section on 'Recent Publications' which is comprehensive.

(2) One recent text to locate the debate between the philosophical Radicals and the Whigs, especially the Scottish Whigs is by B.Fontana, *Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: the 'Edinburgh Review', 1802-1832* (Fontana, 1985). Another useful text is by S.Collini, D.Winch and J.W.Burrow , *That Noble Science of Politics* (Collini 1983).

(3) The Oxford English Dictionary attributes the coining of 'Hedonics: The Doctrine of pleasure, that part of ethics which treats of pleasure' to John Grote (Grote 1870, 181; 1876, 14).

Similarly the original coining of 'hedonology', the science of measuring human pleasure is attributed (Grote 1870, 345). Also attributed to Grote are 'felicific', 'felicificability', and 'felicificativeness' (1986, 33, 205).

(4) This argument appears most regularly and forcefully in chapters III, V and IX of Grote's *Examination* (Grote 1870).

(5) Other contemporary reviews of Mill's 1861 essay are in the *Saturday Review*, (12 Oct. 1861, 373-4); *Spectator* (5 Oct 1861, 1095); *Spectator* (19 Oct. 1861, 1144-6); *Spectator* (11 April 1863, 1868-9); *Macmillans Magazine* (viii, June 1963, 152-160).

(6) On this point see Moore's *Principia Ethica* (Moore 1903, 67-68); Everett Hall (Hall, in Schneewind 1969, 154-158); McCloskey (McCloskey 1971, 61-63); M.Warnock in (Schneewind 1969, 197-203).

(7) The twentieth century debate on act and rule utilitarianism can be located in the following J.D.Mabbott 'Interpretations of Mills Utilitarianism'; J.O.Urmson 'The Interpretations of utilitarianism'; J.Rawls 'Two Concepts of Rules', and J.J.C. Smart 'Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism' all in P.Foot (ed) 1967 *Theories of Ethics*, Oxford. Useful debates can be found in J.J.C. Smart and B.Williams, 1973 *Utilitarianism: For and Against*, Cambridge; J.Smith and E.Sosa 1974 *Mill's Utilitarianism: Critical Studies*, Belmont; D.Lyons 1965 *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism*, London.

Chapter IX

(1) The key texts on politics and philosophy within the Moral Science Tripos are Winstanley 1940, 1947; Sidgwick 1870, 1876; Ingleby 1870; Cannon 1964; Rothblatt 1968, 1976; Garland 1980; Roach 1959, Robson 1967, Collini 1985 .

(2) Copies of Syllabi for the Classics Tripos can be found in the Cambridge University Calenders, for various years located in the University Library and in Trinity College Library. Copies of Fellowship Examination papers can be found in various college libraries but the most helpful for philosophy and politics are the Trinity and St John's College papers. Details of periodic reforms to the Classics Tripos can be found in Winstanley 1940.

(3) For a useful critical review of Patriarchial Theory (though not Relational Theory) see Rosalind Coward 1983, Patriarchial Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations, London, pp 17-45.

(4) Barthold Georg Niebuhr was a Danish born historian and diplomat who spent most of his active years working in Germany and Britain. His work is not widely appreciated in modern British scholarship, though his *History of Rome* was a widely used model of historical research and analysis in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Like Savigny, Niebuhr was most popular amongst scholars associated with the romantic movement (Haddock 1980, 104-105).

(5) John R. Seeley (1834-1895) was a student and later fellow of Christs College Cambridge, a senior in classic and Professor of Latin at University College London from 1863 to 1869 before becoming Professor of Modern History at Cambridge (Seeley 1866, 1883, 1895). John F. McLennon (1827-1881) graduated at Cambridge in 1853 and was a fellow of Trinity College. He was in Cambridge

at the same time as Grote and Maine 1849-1857. (McLennon 1857, 1865, 1885; Burrow 1970, 230-235, 238-241).

(6) Bury 1955, *The Idea of Progress*, New York; Becker, K., 1932, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment*; New Haven; Pollard 1968, *The Idea of Progesss, Harmondsworth*.

Chapter X

(1) The remaining reasons for limiting my coverage of MacDonald's book are that his book fails to provide both a methodology and a historical context. The benefits likely to be derived from further study than that given in the Introduction above and here below, are judged not to justify the labour. Further points are made at the end of Appendix III below.

(2) Grote's position on this latter issue is close to that of G. E. Moore in his 'Refutation of Idealism' (Moore 1922). Both argue that idealists and some of their opponents get confused when they run together descriptions of the act of seeing and knowing with descriptions of the thing or object known.

(3) The deconstruction of false dichotomies is a trademark of the recent work of Richard Rorty. He uses the method to undermine, as does Grote, the distinction between 'necessary and contingent' (Rorty 1980, 169-170; Bernstein, 1986, 34-35).

(4) There is an interesting reply to an anonymous critic named G. at the end of Volume I of *Ferrier's Works*This could refer to Grote and an earlier reply to Ferrier as both the style and criticism suggest Grote's later work (Ferrier 1881).

(5) We should remember here that it is to Leslie Stephen that we owe the castigation of Coleridge's idealist philosophy as a 'heap of fragments' and 'random dissuasive hints', 'simply appropriated from Schelling (Stephen 1900, II, 373-374, 380).

Bibliographies

These bibliographies have the purposes of providing an up to date list of available works by John Grote, of works which make some reference to him, and of books of special value used in the preparation of this thesis. Many texts other than those referred to in the last section were used but considerations of space precludes their insertion.

All referencing has made use of the M.H.R.A. Style Book citation by the author-dating system (*M.H.R.A. Style Book, Notes for Authors, Editors and writers of Dissertations*, Third edition, edited by A.S. Maney and R.L. Smallwood, London, 1981, 40-42).

There are four bibliographies

Part I Works by John Grote, with additional reference to original publisher and locations of rare texts.

Part II a) Manuscripts by John Grote

b) Manuscripts refering to John Grote

Part III Books, articles and thesis that make reference to John Grote

Part IV Books, articles, reviews and thesis used in preparation of this thesis.

Enclosure I contains a copy of Mayor's account of the manuscripts remaining unpublished in 1900. An account of my unsuccessful search for these can be found in Appendix I to the main text above.

WORKS BY JOHN GROTE

[Square brackets denote where the rarer volumes can be found]

Grote, J., 1849 *Commemoration Sermon*, Cambridge. Deighton Bell & Co.

____ 1851 *Remarks on a pamphlet by Mr Shilleto entitled 'Thucydides or Grote''*, Cambridge: Deighton, Macmillan & Co., [Durham University Library].

____ 1854 'On the Dating of Ancient History', *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, I, 52-82 [Glasgow University Library].

____ 1855 'On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names'. *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, , II, 257-270 [Glasgow University Library]

____ 1856 'Old Studies and New'. *Cambridge Essays*, II, 74-114 London: John W. Parker & Son. [Durham University Library].

____ 1860 'Robert Leslie Ellis', *The Athenaeum*, 205-206.

____ 1861 *A few Words of Criticism a propos of the Saturday Review of April 20, 1861, Upon Dr. Whewell's Platonic Dialogues for English Readers*, Cambridge. Macmillan, 1-56 [University of Aberdeen Library].

____ 1862a *An Examination of some portions of Dr. Lushington's judgement in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v Williams, and Fendall v Wilson* (re. Essays and Reviews), Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co.. 1 -101 [University of Aberdeen Library].

____ 1862b *A few Words on the New Education Code*, Cambridge. Deighton Bell & Co. 1-48 [Bristol University Educational Department Library].

____ 1865 *Exploratio Philosophica. Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science*, Part I, Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co. (Republished in 1900 with Part II by Cambridge University Press).

____ 1867 'What is Materialism', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 15, 370-381.

____ 1870 *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* (edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor), Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co.

____ 1871a 'On a Future State', *The Contemporary Review*, 18, 133-140.

____ 1871b 'Thought versus Learning'. *Good Words*, 12, 818-823.

____ 1872a *Sermons by the Late Rev. J. Grote*, edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co. [Aberdeen University Library].

____ 1872b 'Memoir of (Robert) Leslie Ellis', *Contemporary Review*, 20, 56-71.

____ 1872c 'Papers on Glossology', *Journal of Philology*, 4, 55-66; 157-181 [Durham University Library].

____ 1874 'Papers on Glossology', *Journal of Philology*, 5, 153-182 [Durham University Library].

____ 1876 *A Treatise on the Moral Ideals*, (edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor), Cambridge. Deighton Bell & Co.

____ 1877 'Pascal and Montaigne', *Contemporary Review*, 30, 285-296.

____ 1889 'A Discussion between Professor Henry Sidgwick and the Late Professor John Grote on the Utilitarian Basis of Plato's Republic', *The Classical Review*, 3, 97-102.

____ 1900 *Exploratio Philosophica*, Part II (edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Part II MANUSCRIPTS

The surviving manuscripts on and about John Grote are of minor significance to understanding his philosophical ideas. However they contain useful historical evidence about his liberal, even radical role in college and university politics. There are six manuscript sources,

University Library Cambridge, abbreviated as C.U.L.

Trinity College Library (Wren Library), T.C.C.

Ellis Papers

Myers Papers

Whewell Papers

British Library, abbreviated as B.L. - (George Grote Collection)

Bodeleian Library, Oxford, abbreviated as Bodleian - (Bryce Collection)

Nottingham University Library, - (Marley Collection)

Balliol College Library (Green Papers)

MANUSCRIPTS, FLYSHEETS, CIRCULARS, PETITIONS

AND LETTERS CONCERNING JOHN GROTE.

Section a) MANUSCRIPTS BY JOHN GROTE.

____ 1850's 'Letters from John Grote to Charles Brinsley Marley (1829-1912) with regard to the health of Robert Leslie Ellis' Nottingham University Library, Marley MSS. 2602, 2604, 2606, 2824.

____ 1853 'Heavy annotations by John Grote to J.D. Morell's *Elements of Psychology*, Part I' in Grote's private copy housed at T.C.C. 268.c.85.12.

____ 1859a 'A Few Words on Statute XVIII of the New Body of Statutes sent under their seal by the Commissioners to the College, T.C.C, Wren Library, MS.,Adv.c.16.57[29].

____ 1859b 'Remarks on the Revised Code of Statutes', U.L.C., Cam. a. 500.5[174].

____ 1860a 'Remarks on the Proposals of the Syndicate in reference to the Moral Science Tripos', T.C.C, the Wren Library, and L.L. 696. c. 127[18], and L.L. 696. c. 174[13].

____ 1860b 'A Draft Scheme of the Examinations in Moral Sciences', T.C.C the Wren Library, L.L. 696. c. 117[27].

____ 1860c 'Letter to Henry Sidgwick concerning Trevelyan's failure obtain a Fellowship' Bodleian MS. James Bryce. 15. folio 275.

____ 1860d 'Letter to William Whewell on placing a gift of the '*History of Greece*' by George Grote in Trinity College Library, T.C.C., Wren Library, Whewell Papers, Add. MS. 88[133].

____ 1861 'Letter from George Grote to Lord Broughton enclosing a letter from John Grote about the Augustian Manuscripts', British Library, Add, MS. 47229, f. 226 and 228.

____ 1862a 'A request that the University of Cambridge send "immediate relief to the suffering work people of Lancashire and Cheshire.' C.U.L. Add. MS. 2717(4), 9.

____ 1862b 'Petition signed by John Grote demanding the appointment of a "Syndicate to report on the Examinations now required to be passed by Candidates for the Ordinary Degree and to recommend such alterations if any as may appear to them desirable', C.U.L. MS. 2717(4), 4.

____ 1863 'A Letter to the Master and Seniors of Trinity College on the relation of fellows under the old and new statutes', T.C.C. L.L. 696. c. 127.[19].

____ 1864 'Letters from John Grote to F.W.H. Myers on his candidature for the Moral Science Tripos' T.C.C. MSS. Myers M. 2.[80]

MANUSCRIPTS, FLYSHEETS, CIRCULARS, PETITIONS AND LETTERS CONCERNING JOHN GROTE.

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____ 1850's 'Letters from John Grote to Charles Brinsley Marley (1829-1912) with regard to the health of Robert Leslie Ellis' Nottingham University Library, Marley MSS. 2602, 2604, 2606, 2824.

____ 1853 'Heavy annotations by John Grote to J.D. Morell's *Elements of Psychology*, Part I' in Grote's private copy housed at T.C.C. 268.c.85.12.

____ 1859a 'A Few Words on Statute XVIII of the New Body of Statutes sent under their seal by the Commissioners to the College, T.C.C, Wren Library, MS.,Adv.c.16.57[29].

____ 1859b 'Remarks on the Revised Code of Statutes', U.L.C., Cam. a. 500.5[174].

____ 1860a 'Remarks on the Proposals of the Syndicate in reference to the Moral Science Tripos', T.C.C, the Wren Library, and L.L. 696. c. 127[18], and L.L. 696. c. 174[13].

____ 1860b 'A Draft Scheme of the Examinations in Moral Sciences', T.C.C the Wren Library, L.L. 696. c. 117[27].

____ 1860c 'Letter to Henry Sidgwick concerning Trevelyan's failure obtain a Fellowship' Bodleian MS. James Bryce. 15. folio 275.

____ 1860d 'Letter to William Whewell on placing a gift of the '*History of Greece*' by George Grote in Trinity College Library, T.C.C., Wren Library, Whewell Papers, Add. MS. 88[133].

____ 1861 'Letter from George Grote to Lord Broughton enclosing a letter from John Grote about the Augustian Manuscripts', British Library, Add, MS. 47229, f. 226 and 228.

____ 1862a 'A request that the University of Cambridge send "immediate relief to the suffering work people of Lancashire and Cheshire.' C.U.L. Add. MS. 2717(4), 9.

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Section b) <u>MANUSCRIPTS REFERING TO JOHN GROTE</u>

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Broad,C.D., 1900+ 'Heavy annotation to John Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica*, Part I, in Broad's own copy housed in T.C.C. (266. c. 85 184[1]).

____ Broad's copies of the *Examination* (267. c. 85. 72) and the *Treatise* (267. c. 85. 71).

Ellis,R.L., 1848 'Letter to W. Whewell recommending John Grote for the Chair of Modern History', T.C.C. Ellis Papers within the Whewell Papers.T.C.C. Whewell MS. R. 6. 13[11(1)].

____ (1853-1859) *Letters* in Marley Papers, University of Nottingham, MSS.

Ferrier,F,J., 1856 'Letter to William Whewell welcoming John Grote's proposed comments on the *Institutes of Metaphysics*' appended to the edition of this book in T.C.C. (267. c. 85. 61.).

Grote,G., 1861 'Letter from George Grote to Lord Broughton referring to a request that John Grote make enquiries about the Augustian manuscripts at Cambridge', British Library, Add. MS. 47229, f. 222.

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____ 1872 'Letter from J.S. Mill to Georg Brander which may refer to Grote's *Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy*, *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873*, edited by F.E. Mineka & D.N. Lindley, vol. XVI, Part IV (4/3/1872).

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____ 1985 'Letter to John Gibbins regarding 'John Grote' (2/12/85).

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.

THE First Part of the *Exploratio* appeared in 1865. In p. xxx of his Introduction the Author expresses a hope that the Second Part might be completed in a month or two. He mentions, as to be there discussed, the views of Prof. Bain, Mr Herbert Spencer (pp. 54, 70), J. D. Morell (p. xxi), Sir W. Hamilton (p. 87), and J. S. Mill (p. 166), with special reference to his *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.* He also speaks of dealing more at length with the Theory of Vision (p. 40); and concludes the book (p. 258) as follows: "The next chapter (or one soon to follow) will have reference principally to Mr Mill. In the other chapters I shall follow out the scheme indicated in the Introduction and discuss the remaining works there mentioned. I may add some others to them, and I hope to finish by putting the views here given in a clearer manner than I have been able to do in the course of the 'exploration,' in consequence of the additional hold upon them which, I trust, this may have given."

Unhappily, the Second Part was still unfinished at the time of the Author's death in August 1866, the 54th year of his age. He left to his literary executor a great mass of MSS. to be published or otherwise, as, and how, he might think fit. In the exercise of the discretion thus allowed to me, I brought out the *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* in 1870, explaining in the Preface my reasons for beginning with this

rather than with the Second Part of the *Exploratio.* The reasons there stated are (1) the very unfinished condition of the latter, (2) the fact that the Author attached more importance to his ethical than to his metaphysical writings, (3) the probability that a larger number of readers would be found for the easier and more popular subject.

The *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* was followed in 1876 by the *Moral Ideals*, to which allusion is made in the *Exploratio*, p. vii, in the words, "I determined to put together in an uncontroversial form what seemed to me to be the truth, in opposition to what I thought error."

Besides these treatises the following papers were published from time to time in the periodicals named below:

An article on Materialism (printed as chapters I and II of Book III in the present volume). *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1867.

On a Future State. *Contemporary Review*, 1871.

Thought versus Learning. *Good Words*, Dec., 1871.

Memoir of Leslie Ellis. *Cont. Rev.*, June, 1872.

Papers on Glossology. *Journal of Philology*, 1872 and 1874.

Montaigne and Pascal. *Cont. Rev.*, July, 1877.

Imaginary Conversation between Mr Grote and Socrates. *Classical Rev.*, March, 1889.

A small selection of Sermons was also published in 1872 by Messrs Deighton.

The very limited circulation attained by the three philosophical treatises gave little encouragement to publishing anything more of the same character; but every now and then I received letters asking what was being done about the continuation of the *Exploratio*; and early in 1898 Mr H. W. B. Joseph, Fellow of New College, Oxford, who had already written to me on the subject some three years before, made another appeal, stating that it was felt by many in Oxford that the publication of the Second Part of the *Exploratio* would be of service to the

cause of philosophy in England, and asking whether it would be possible for the MS. to be deposited for a time in one of the Oxford libraries, with a view to its being consulted by persons approved by the Librarian. I felt that I had no right to resist an appeal of this kind, which, coming, as it did, from members of the sister University after a lapse of 35 years, I believe to be almost unprecedented in the annals of philosophy, and in answer promised Mr Joseph that, if he could let me have a list of those who felt with him in the matter, I would forward it to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, offering to prepare the MS. for the Press if they would make a grant towards the expense of printing. The result was (1) a letter to me signed by twenty-three Oxford Graduates, almost all of them Fellows or ex-Fellows of Colleges, in which they expressed their desire that the book might be published, and (2) a most generous offer on the part of the Cambridge Press to defray the whole cost of publication.

I proceed now to give a short account of the papers which form the material of the present volume. In the first instance I had to deal with those which were evidently intended to be included in the 'rough notes' entitled *Exploratio Philosophica.* These make up some twenty parcels, with nothing to mark their intended order, and most of them without any title or heading. After repeated perusal I was able to some extent to make out the order in which the several parcels were written, and marked them accordingly with the letters of the Greek Alphabet; though it seemed desirable in some cases to adopt a different order for the final arrangement in chapters. Thus the 1st parcel, containing 65 pages, numbered 210 to 274 (amounting to about half the same number of the printed pages), seemed like a rough draft of what had already appeared in *Exploratio, Part I*: pp. 275—315 were missing, having probably been used as copy for the same: then came pp. 316—342, marked by me (*a*), which form a kind of introduction to two parcels, marked

by me (β) and (γ). These three parcels correspond to Chapters I, IX, X of the present volume. The parcel marked (δ), which contains 40 pages on the Psychology of Locke, Stewart, &c., and parcel (ϵ), containing 10 pages on Stewart's account of Perception, were used for Ch. II. Parcel marked (ζ), which is headed 'À propos of Cousin's Lectures on Locke, &c.,' contained 18 pages, and constitutes the present Ch. III. Parcel (η) contains 64 pages on Berkeley, and constitutes Ch. XII. Parcel (θ), containing 24 pages on Scepticism, is the present Ch. VIII. Three parcels (ι, κ, λ), entitled 'Impression, Imagination, Idea,' contain together 68 pages, and are now divided into Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII. Parcel (ν) on Sight, containing 6 pages, is the present Ch. XI. Parcel (π) entitled 'Aphorismi Finales' contains 17 pages, and is printed below on pp. 325 foll. Parcels μ, ξ, o, ρ, containing together about 30 pages, were omitted, as adding nothing new.

A second set of papers written a little later than the above, but dealing with the same subjects, were divided into two parcels, one of 113 pages entitled 'Self-self and Thought-self,' the other of 59 pages entitled 'Perception, etc.' These now make up Book II, to which I have given the general title 'Immediateness and Reflection,' and have divided it into eight chapters.

A third set of papers of about the same date bore the title 'What is Materialism?' They were divided into two parts, containing respectively 38 and 17 pages. These make up the three chapters of Book III. That which appears as the Fourth Book was written as a comment on Mr Cope's criticism of the view given in Grote's Plato of the argument in the Theaetetus. The MS. consists of 58 pages, and was written, as I learn from the Author's diary, between June 29 and July 2, 1866, that is less than two months before his death. It will be seen that I have divided it into three chapters, using the Protagorean maxim as the general heading. Though it was probably written without reference to the *Exploratio*, yet it contains an

allusion to Part I[1], and, I think, will be felt to be a fitting supplement to the preceding Books. Indeed, in my opinion, nothing in this volume is more characteristic of the Author, or likely to be of more value at the present time, than the remarks on the Right and Duty of Private Judgment contained in Ch. II.

The Fifth Book is taken from a series of papers headed 'Idealism and Positivism,' containing about 120 pages, which were originally intended to form an Appendix to the *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, but the Author, as is stated in *Exploratio*, p. vii, changed his mind, thinking it better 'to put together in an uncontroversial form the intellectual views on which the moral view rested.' As, however, there is much in this earlier draft which is not included in the First Part of the *Exploratio*, I have thought it well to append it to the Second Part, dividing it into three chapters. Of the 'Aphorismi Finales' I have already spoken. The 'Epilogue' was written, I fancy, before the publication of *Part I.*, and would no doubt have been considerably added to, if the Author had lived to complete *Part II.*

In reading the criticisms passed by the Author on the writings of other philosophers, it is important to remember his own account of the reasons which led him to give so much space to such criticism. "I care not in the least," he says[2], "to dispute what anyone says, except with a view of clearing up my own thoughts and those of others." "Let us suppose Mr Mill to be A, a character in a philosophical discussion, and if the actual Mr Mill has changed his views, or (which is exceedingly likely) I have misunderstood him, then let it not be supposed it is Mr Mill I am discussing with at all[3]." Again, speaking of his doubt as to the exact force of certain statements of Prof. Ferrier, he says[4], "When I say that I agree with him, I interpret him in my own way, and if anyone disputes that being his meaning, I have no care to maintain that it is.

[1] See below p. 272. [2] p. xxiii. [3] p. xxx. [4] p. 69.

What I say *then* is not applicable to *him*. I have observed on the inutility of lengthened controversy as to whether a philosopher means this or that. Let us see only how what it may be thought he means, helps the truth, and suggests thought in us."

It may be well for me to take this opportunity of giving some account of the remaining MSS. left by Prof. Grote. They were arranged by him in the following groups:

I. Four volumes containing about 900 pages. The earlier part consists mainly of lectures, or notes for lectures, on Moral Philosophy and the Relation between Thought and Action. Among the most important sections are the chapters marked N (='Noematism'), containing about 80 pages on the subject of 'Glossology,' or the changes in the meaning of words. Part of this has been printed (as mentioned above) in the *Journal of Philology*. There is much of interest also in the section marked S, containing 60 pages on the classification of the different kinds of History; in T, containing 70 pages on Practical Ethics; in V, containing 148 pages on Ethics and Religion; and in Z, containing 200 pages on Christian Ethics, with discussions on International Law and Casuistry.

II. Consists of one volume of 270 pages, containing lectures on Morality, Society, Progress, etc.

III. Comprises three volumes of Essays and Reviews, and contains about 800 pages. The most important sections here are 263 pages on Froude's *History of England*, 82 pages on Mansel, 30 on Temple's Essay, 30 on Goldwin Smith, together with papers treating of Dante (50 pages), St Gregory on Job (25 pages), Thomas Aquinas (90 pages), Mill on Sedgwick, Whewell, Bentham, etc. What is now published under the title *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* originally formed Vols. IV. and V. of this group.

IV. Comprises four volumes of about 1200 pages, bearing date 1861. It is made up of Notes, Essays and Lectures, and

includes articles on Bentham (50 pages), Pascal (55 pages), Channing (40 pages), Antoninus (20), Charles Lamb (18), Forster's *Great Rebellion* (20), Comte and Buckle (130), Plato's *Gorgias* (30), Place of the Individual in History (50), Law of Honour illustrated from Beaumont and Fletcher (20), etc.

V. One volume on Moral Philosophy, containing 317 pages, (apparently a preliminary sketch of *Moral Ideals*).

Series 3[1]. Two volumes of 590 pages on Morality and the History of Moral Philosophy.

Language. One volume of 422 pages, part of which has been already printed in the articles on Glossology, and in *Good Words* under the title 'Thought versus Learning.'

The Authorized Version, tracing its changes up to the present time, 138 pages (used by Dr Scrivener).

There are a number of smaller parcels on various subjects and a quantity of notes on Philology, on Architecture, on Ruskin, etc., together with note-books innumerable, touching on all conceivable topics, from the humblest incidents of village life to the highest flights of philosophical or religious meditation: some of these might supply material for an interesting collection of miscellaneous Aphorisms. Probably, however, it will be thought that his latest ethical writings have the first claim to be printed. These are 'Honestarianism and Utilitarianism,' of 217 pages, finished June 5, 1866; 'The two Πολιτεῖαι,' of 18 pages, and other shorter papers written in the same month.

To complete the general view of Prof. Grote's literary work, I will add a list of Pamphlets and Essays printed before the publication of the First Part of the *Exploratio.*

Commemoration Sermon preached in Trinity College Chapel Dec. 15, 1849. Deighton, 1849.

[1] Series 1 and 2 had been incorporated in the preceding groups with an altered title.

Remarks on a Pamphlet by Mr Shilleto entitled 'Thucydides or Grote.' Deighton, 1851.

A few Words on Criticism à propos of the Saturday Review. Deighton, 1861.

Examination of some portions of Dr Lushington's judgment in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v. Williams, and Fendall v. Wilson. Deighton, 1862.

Old Studies and New in *Cambridge Essays,* 1856.

On the Dating of Ancient History in *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,* vol. I. pp. 52—82. Camb. 1854.

On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names, Ib. vol. II. pp. 257—270. Camb. 1855.

A few Words on the New Education Code. Deighton, 1862.

It only remains for me to return my warmest thanks to Prof. Henry Sidgwick, who has gone through the proofs with the utmost care, and whose advice throughout has been of the greatest service to me; also to Mr H. W. B. Joseph, to whom the publication of this volume is really owing, and who has not only helped to revise the proofs, but has himself compiled the Index; lastly to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, who have shown, by their readiness to undertake the expenses of publication, that the name of John Grote is still not without honour in his old University.

P.S. The portrait of the Author which forms the frontispiece is a copy of a photograph taken when he was about 50 years old.

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE
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TELEPHONE 01-405 7686

HOUGHTON STREET, ALDWYCH
LONDON, W.C.2

4 February 1970

Dear Mr Gibbins,

Thank you for your letter. I also discovered Grote when I was an undergraduate, *Exploratio Philosophica I* ... in a Cambridge bookshop. And he appeared to me to be a vastly interesting & remarkably independent thinker. I never took any trouble to try to find out how he related to the Cambridge of his day — which is clearly something of a puzzle. And, of course, his Aristotelianism moved him out. Indeed, part of his interest seemed to be simply in fact that he was very much a 'loner'. But I am sure there is useful work to be done on him of the sort you are engaged upon. A very *English* philosophical writer — that is to say, neither Scottish nor Continental — & yet not connecting very obviously with any of the English traditions of philosophy, & a person who had his own version of any of the traditional doctrines with which he was in sympathy.

Now, about the MSS. I am sorry to say that I can't be of very much help to you here. If I were faced with the problem of finding anything that still remains, I think I would start with St John's College, Cambridge, where J. B. Mayor was. Perhaps you have done this & drawn a blank. If you haven't then I suggest that

you write to the Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith & ask him whether he can make any suggestion. He has recently retired from being Master of St John's, he is a philosopher & a very old friend of mine. If you do write to him, say that I suggested that you did so. Mayor is obviously the key to the situation, & there may even be somebody in St John's now who was personally acquainted with him & could give you a start on your enquiries. He was a great eccentric &, so far as I know, lived most of his life in St John's. And, from the short pieces from note-books etc which Mayor printed in the work of Grote he edited, it would seem that there might be something of real interest to be found.

Secondly, I must confess that I have never read anything *about* Grote, & I do not know of any philosophical writer who has written about him. I haven't the book by me, but there was a man who not so long ago wrote a book called *Phases in English Philosophical Thinking*, or some such title. His name was CARRÉ. And I take it that, even if he does not mention Grote he must have taken notice of him. Schneewind, whom you mention, I know is writing a book about Victorian philosophical thought which is to have a considerable treatment of Grote.

Your last question is difficult to answer. Grote stands out as one of the more careful critics of utilitarianism, & there is so much in the *Moral Ideas* which is profound & original. But on the whole

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I think what we may call his 'epistemology' is of the greatest interest. What I like about [illegible] is that he was clearly a man of great intelligence, learning and imagination, grappling with old problems in a fresh manner and always very much more certain about what he did not do than concerned to construct a doctrine of his own. He is an education in how to reflect much more than in how to put thoughts together to make a doctrine. Have you, by the way, come across an essay of his in a volume called Cambridge Essays, I forget the date, but a series of such volumes came out in the late '50s and early '60s — one a year.

Let me wish you the best of luck; and if you think I can give you any other help, please write again

Yours sincerely

Michael Oakeshott

(C)

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15 December, 1969.

John R. Gibbins, Esq.,
Department of Politics,
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne,
NE1 7RU.

Dear Mr. Gibbins,

Lord Russell asks me to thank you for your letter of December 10. He does not have any idea where the papers of John Grote might be. He also knows very little of Grote's work or of Mayor. He thinks that his father, Lord Amberley, had some correspondence with Grote's elder brother, George Grote, the historian, and that some of this may have survived in the Bertrand Russell archives at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. The Librarian there would be pleased to advise you about this and might be able to help your enquiries about John Grote and Mayor.

I am very sorry that this letter is not more helpful to you.

Yours sincerely,

Christopher Farley

Christopher Farley
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When telephoning, please ask for

John R. Gibbins

From: John R. Gibbins B.Sc M.A.
To: Internal and External Examiners
and Dr Tim Gray (Superviser)

Date: 16th March,1987.

Title: John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Ideas

The enclosed thesis has taken sixteen years to research and write. Its present form is set out in the synopsis, contents and introduction. It is designed both for submission as a doctoral degree and as a subsequent publication. The thesis has been produced on a word processer. However, the manuscript is still approximately 190,000 words in length (including the appendices) and this requires, in my view, some justification.

The justifications for presenting this thesis in its present form are as follows:-

1. The size of the task John Grote is a philosopher of immense interest and significance whose life and works have not yet received a comprehensive treatement. His corpus contains four major books plus eighteen other major publications. Grote wrote on a wide variety of subjects and disciplines and in addition the parts form a coherent whole or system, the form and character of which has eluded previous commentators. The analysis of only one subject or discipline area or one part of this system without the others would then be ineffective if the aim was to discover the meaning and significance of Grote's work. Several authorities with similar ambitions to my own have required a similar length to achieve the desired results, e.g. J.B. Schneewind, 1977 Sidgwicks Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, CUP (191,000 words): N. Kemp Smith, 1966 The Philosophy of David Hume Macmillan (205,000)

2. Methods and assumptions At one time this thesis only intended to provide an interpretation of Grote's philosophy. Once it was decided that methodologically this task could not be realised without an attendant analysis of contexts, its size and scope consequently increased. To allow for these interpretative and hermeneutic priorities the author has been at pains to reduce to the minimum the demands of two other possible aims, critical analysis and the assessment of influence, but the remaining manuscript is still lengthy.

3. The absence of reliable secondary texts A third major reason for the length and scope of this thesis lies in the absence of a large and reliable body of secondary texts on various aspects of Grote's work. There is only one booklength study of Grote and that is both analytically flawed and then orientated primarily to his epistemology (MacDonald, 1966). Most of the secondary texts on Grote are brief, fragmentary in terms of subject, and not linked by any argument or debate. So where most authors in intellectual history can confidently refer their readers to competent secondary sources that deal with special arguments of significance, this has here proved impossible. I have had to research, analyse and write up on every aspect of Grote's life, writings and his intellectual environment to arrive at a coherent synthesis.

4. The unavailability of primary sources The relative unavailability of primary sources has necessitated a higher than normal resort to textural quotations in this manuscript, several of which are lengthy. All of Grote's books are out of print and are available only in the longer established university and academic libraries. Several of the minor works have only one known location. In these circumstances frequent and sometimes lengthy quotation seems justified when in a normal thesis a simple footnote or reference may serve the purpose. The author hopes to edit some of Grote's major works in the near future to help solve this problem for future researchers. Finally, the length of many thesis' are disguised, as much of the material is contained in lengthy footnotes. This thesis is designed to reduce footnotes to the absolute minimum (only ten in most chapters) with all references and quotations contained in the main body of the thesis.

5. Originality and the challenge to established opinion In his book 'The Literary Thesis: A Guide to Research', George Watson correctly counsels against excessive ambition and length in a literary thesis, but he provides one convincing exception.

> 'Only conclusions which are profoundly contrary to established opinion need, on the whole, to be protected by a battery of all the evidence' (Watson 1970, 30).

The whole subject and various contentions of this thesis challenge conventional views about the significance of John Grote, the origins of idealism in Britain and the role of Cambridge University in nineteenth century thought and therefore require lengthy support and substantiation.

6. The recovery of contexts and sources. A final justification refers to the problem discovered when the author began to research the context within which Grote's though was to be located. Nineteenth century intellectual history was found to be only understood in fragments around certain classical thinkers and theories. Before recovering John Grote, the author had to recover William Whewell, Julius Hare, Frederick Maurice, Henry Maine, Thomas Birks and a mass of other writers, movements and theories - largely lost to twentieth century scholarship. These sources have been detailed and

written up in this thesis and a new paradigm for understanding Victorian ideas presented for the guidance of other scholars in chapters two , three and ten.

Finally I must make good an omission to the acknowledgements to this thesis. There I thanked Dr Gray, but did not acknowledge that he was the Supervisor of this project, nor that in this capacity, as in all others, his performance exceeded all my hopes.

John R. Gibbins

John R. Gibbins