

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE

TYPES AND STRUCTURE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on the premise that when speaker-hearers are involved in misunderstandings, they provide analysts of talk with valuable evidence of a process which is not normally amenable to direct investigation, namely, the process of 'successful communication'. A number of scholars, working independently from different disciplinary perspectives, have begun to investigate such evidence but there has been no systematic programme of research to determine either the structural characteristics of misunderstandings or the different types of misunderstandings which could occur in everyday interaction.

In order to facilitate such a programme, a corpus of one hundred misunderstandings was collected by the diary method. As a first step towards analysing the corpus a communication model was developed in order to account for the salient structural characteristics of misunderstandings. Four major integral components were identified which provide an important source of evidence for establishing (i) that a misunderstanding has occurred, (ii) the extent, course and outcome of a misunderstanding and (iii) the type of misunderstanding which has occurred. The components are both 'textual', such as utterances, and 'non-textual', such as understandings, and therefore enable the essential aspects of communication to be accommodated in the analysis.

The fact that nineteen different types of misunderstandings were identified indicates the complexity of the phenomenon. The "process" analysis of the corpus and of additional data, drawn from the work of other researchers, shows that speaker-hearers are able to negotiate understanding by means of a number of 'devices'. In detailing these 'devices' and the inter-relationship between them, it is suggested that

the correct use of 'devices' and the recognition of inappropriate responses are crucial communicative skills. The majority of misunderstandings are detected and resolved because speaker-hearers draw on these skills. Nevertheless, some misunderstandings are not resolved and these data emphasize how important it is that speaker-hearers utilize the resources available to them. By specifying what these resources might be, this thesis argues that successful communication requires highly complex, structured interaction in which the monitoring of understanding is of paramount importance.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is based upon an investigation of the phenomenon of 'misunderstandings' in conversations between native speaker-hearers of English. The aim of the thesis is to develop an analytic model which describes the structure of misunderstandings and to establish a typology which distinguishes between different types of misunderstandings, thereby contributing to our knowledge of how speaker-hearers communicate in everyday language use.

A misunderstanding occurs when a communication attempt is unsuccessful because what the speaker intends to express differs from what the hearer believes to have been expressed. It is distinct from both correct understanding, where what the hearer believes to have been expressed is equivalent to what the speaker intended to express, and non-understanding, where the hearer has no understanding of what the speaker intended to express. Correct understanding is more common than misunderstanding or non-understanding but on a number of occasions such correct understanding is the consequence of careful negotiation between speaker-hearers who seek or offer clarification of what has been intended, said, heard or understood and who indicate or acknowledge problems in their communication attempts.

Misunderstanding is sufficiently common for it not to be treated as an extraordinary occurrence by participants, who often recognize that a misunderstanding has occurred in their conversation and who are able to resolve it. Such a resolved misunderstanding may well become a source of amusement and/or something to be recounted to others who were not participants.¹ This is not always the case, however, and participants' failure to recognize that a misunderstanding has occurred sometimes results in hostility or confusion (Gumperz, 1982; Milroy, 1984).

Misunderstandings are therefore a feature of conversation which affect the content and direction of the conversations in which they occur and which affect the behaviour and attitudes of the participants. As such,

they warrant study in line with other features of conversation, such as 'side sequences' (Jefferson, 1972), 'openings' (Schegloff, 1968) or 'closings' (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). However, misunderstandings, unlike these sequential features, involve the negotiation of understanding. During the course of a misunderstanding participants often query and explain their utterances, thereby offering the analyst a means by which speaker intention and hearer understanding can be examined. If evidence can be provided of the ways in which speaker-hearers undertake communication, it becomes possible to analyse communication without total recourse to the analyst's intuitive interpretation of what speakers and hearers are doing when they communicate.

The difficulty of gaining access to the cognitive processes of speakers and hearers, in terms of their intentions and understandings respectively, has impeded communication study. Direct observation is impossible. As Labov & Fanshel comment :

" In general, we must admit that we are not inside the patient's mind, and we need all the help that we can muster in order to see what he understands by his expressions and what he intends others to understand "

(Labov & Fanshel, 1977:120).

The "help that we can muster" comes from a number of sources : participants can provide commentaries, their utterances and the responses to them can be used as a basis for inferring what was going on, paralinguistic cues can indicate participants' attitudes and so on (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Kreckel, 1981; McGregor, 1983, 1984, 1985). Analytic decisions on the interpretation of these utterances and cues may rest with the analyst and although his intuition may be supported or supplemented by textual evidence, his interpretation of the data may be only one of several possible interpretations (cf. Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Gumperz, 1982). If one examines an exchange of utterances from the individual perspectives of each of the different participants, one may find that what the speaker intends of his utterance

may not be what the hearer understands of it and this may differ again from what an overhearer or analyst understands of it. A sound basis for interpreting utterances, intentions and understandings is provided by conversations which include participants' explanations of what was intended or what understood. These explanations are an intrinsic part of the conversation in which they are expressed and are likely to reflect the appropriate intentions and understandings of the participants more accurately than retrospective commentaries which might be unconsciously altered after consideration of the conversation. Such explanations are often found during misunderstandings.

The use of examples of miscommunication as a step towards studying communication has previously been proposed (Zaefferer, 1977; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Stubbs, 1983). Discussing theoretical methodology, Stubbs makes the following suggestion :

" Rather than attempt to capture directly how people communicate, the researcher can concentrate on the problematic aspects of communication situations - points, for example, at which the communication breaks down or encounters difficulties. By looking at what happens when people fail to get the message across, at why this happens and at what speakers do in order to reinstate the normal smooth flow of interaction, one can gain insight into the routine structures of behaviour "

(Stubbs, 1983:241).

This thesis seeks to provide such insight through the analysis of the structure of misunderstandings. In referring to "speakers", Stubbs may well be talking about "speaker-hearers". In this thesis, it is axiomatic that participants in the roles of both speaker and hearer strive to "reinstate the normal smooth flow of interaction". The hearer's role is given explicit prominence since it is the hearer who misunderstands and it is the hearer who listens to utterances based on or deriving from that misunderstanding before becoming the speaker who produces a resolving utterance (see Grimshaw's (1980) plea for according the hearer more attention).

Previous studies of misunderstandings have been undertaken from a number of different disciplinary perspectives. Primarily sociolinguistic in orientation, these studies have variously focussed (i) on inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal misunderstandings (Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; Varonis & Gass, 1985), (ii) on interpretive procedures and participant roles (Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 1984) and (iii) on sequencing (Jefferson, 1972). In addition, a theoretical pragmatic study of how particular understandings, including misunderstandings, are reached (Zaefferer, 1977) and a discourse analysis model which is applied to a misunderstanding amongst other data (Burton, 1981) have been undertaken. These studies support the contention that the study of misunderstandings can offer insight into communicative behaviour in that they make it clear that participants do interactive work to resolve misunderstandings, are affected by misunderstandings and draw upon numerous sources of knowledge when communicating.

There has been no detailed analysis of the structure of misunderstandings in general although the structures of individual misunderstandings have been considered. In the absence of any systematic corpus-based analysis, examples of misunderstandings tend to be discussed on an ad hoc basis. This thesis attempts to identify the structural characteristics of misunderstandings and to provide a system of reference to misunderstandings. The analysis and classification of misunderstandings should indicate the scope of what is involved when misunderstandings occur. Classification is not mere listing; rather, "a classification of a set of objects is a system of reference for the objects together with rules for referring them to it" (Carvell & Svartvik, 1969:29). The devising of a system of reference for the components of misunderstandings should be of use in subsequent work on the phenomenon and should provide insight into communicative processes which are not directly observable.

The analysis of misunderstandings is subject to the problems which beset the analysis of any spoken discourse, such as data collection, determining relevant context and background knowledge, accounting for multi-functional utterances and accounting for cohesion and coherence in the discourse (see Coulthard, 1977; Stubbs, 1983; Brown & Yule, 1983 for discussion of these and other problems). An analysis of misunderstandings has to overcome the fundamental problem of handling both observable features, such as utterances, and features which cannot be observed, such as intentions and understandings. The analysis must therefore amalgamate 'textual' components, that is, components which are present in the transcribed text, and 'non-textual' components, that is, components which are not present in the transcribed text and which must be determined by consideration of the text. Utterances, paralinguistic cues and actions are textual components while intentions and understandings are non-textual components. Participants' understandings may change during the conversation and the analysis must account for such change. It cannot present a static view of discourse with the participants appearing to be mere catalysts who have produced the discourse; the analysis must preserve the dynamism of interaction and must account for the participants as the positive creators of that interaction.

Thus, in order to examine the structure of misunderstandings and to typologize them it is necessary to devise an analytic system. The prime concern of this thesis is the devising and application of such a system. Subsequently, the findings of the analysis and the typology will be used to show how participants undertake communication and how they negotiate understanding so that their communication attempts are successful.

The thesis is organized in the following way :

The first three chapters are concerned with establishing a methodology and a corpus. In Chapter I previous work on misunderstandings is discussed

and the context in which the research discussed in this thesis has been undertaken is established. Chapter II considers the problems of data collection and details the corpus on which this research is based. Chapter III discusses the problems of describing communicative behaviour, referring in particular to speaker's intention and hearer's understanding, and proposes a model of communication which incorporates these elements.

Chapters IV, V, VI, VII and VIII are concerned with the analysis of the corpus. The analytic methodology is outlined in Chapter IV. This methodology draws on the proposed model of communication and enables the utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features produced during a misunderstanding to be described. Two types of components are identified: (i) textual components, which can be checked against the text, such as utterances, and (ii) non-textual components which are recovered after consideration of the textual components, such as participants' understandings.

Two primary textual components are identified: (i) origin, the utterance which is misunderstood and (ii) manifestation, the utterance which is based on or derives from the misunderstanding and manifests it in the conversation. These components are discussed and illustrated from the corpus in Chapter V.

The utterances and features other than the origin and the manifestation during a misunderstanding constitute the secondary textual components, devices. Thirty devices are identified; they resolve or fail to resolve the misunderstanding. Each device is described and illustrated from the corpus in Chapter VI.

The non-textual component which is identified is the state of realization of each participant, that is, whether or not each participant realizes, or is aware that, the misunderstanding has occurred. Each participant's state of realization determines how he understands the conversation and

it therefore plays an important role in determining the structure of a misunderstanding. Realization is discussed in Chapter VII, in which evidence for it and the ways by which it is effected are discussed.

Chapter VIII discusses the structural sequences found in the corpus. Basic and diversified structures are identified, both of which can be expanded and interactively expanded.

As a consequence of the analysis, a typology of misunderstandings is proposed in Chapter IX. This typology is based on participants' states of realization and it distinguishes nineteen types in the corpus.

In order to test the adequacy of the analytic and typological methods, additional data are analysed and typologized in Chapter X. The data are drawn from the work of other researchers who have examined miscommunication. It is found that the model adequately handles the analysis of misunderstanding but that the typology requires revision. This revision involves presentation rather than criteria and it is easily accomplished.

The analysis and typology of the corpus and additional data demonstrates that participants have the facility to detect and resolve misunderstandings. The specific range of devices which are available to them constitute a crucial facet of their communicative skills. The majority of misunderstandings are successfully dealt with but there are a number which are not realized or resolved. In these instances, participants have failed to use devices successfully, which suggests that participants communicate from their own perspectives and that if they are not able to consider how others are interpreting the conversation, their communication attempts may not succeed. The interactive negotiation which participants undertake can be highly complex and is indicative of a communicative procedure which participants can choose to adopt and execute in order to accomplish successful communication.

CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF 'MISUNDERSTANDING'

1. INTRODUCTION

Miscommunication has been investigated from various disciplinary perspectives: ethnomethodological (Jefferson, 1972), sociolinguistic (Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 1980, 1982), linguistic/ sociolinguistic, specifically relating to inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal miscommunication (Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; Varonis & Gass, 1985) and pragmatic (Zaefferer, 1977). The hypothesis which underlies much research on miscommunication is that study of instances of miscommunication might yield insight into what happens when they do not occur, that is, when there is no breakdown in communication. Zaefferer (1977:329), writing in terms of "understanding", in a theoretical pragmatic context, argues that the study of "misfunctions" gives more insight into a system than the study of "examples of perfect functioning" and similarly Gumperz & Tannen (1979) comment that

" by studying what has gone wrong when communication breaks down, we seek to understand a process that goes unnoticed when it is successful "

(Gumperz & Tannen, 1979:329).

The hypothesis is not new. In sciences concerned with systems in which internal mechanism or structure is not directly observable it is common to concentrate on the output of these systems, particularly on defective output, as a means of determining how the systems are constructed and how they function.

It is debatable whether a study of miscommunication in order to shed light on understanding is a feasible practice. Two particular problems impede such a study. Firstly, understanding is an unobservable process; Lyons (1977:731) calls understanding a "cognitive act". It may well be that the process of misunderstanding is as opaque as that of understanding. The cause of a misunderstanding might seem apparent, such as lexical or

referential ambiguity, but the actual cognitive process by which the misunderstanding was made remains unobservable. Secondly, misunderstanding is not the converse of understanding. A misunderstanding is an understanding which happens to be incorrect and is distinct from non-understanding, where an utterance is not understood at all.

Psychological research into the effects of ambiguity on sentence processing (e.g. Mackay, 1966; Foss, 1970; Carey et. al., 1970; Bever et. al., 1973) demonstrates that tasks involving ambiguous sentences take longer to complete or are completed less successfully than tasks involving unambiguous sentences. When the subjects performing the experiments make errors in understanding sentences these errors are judged to be failures by the subjects because of processing difficulties caused by ambiguity or because of idiosyncratic responses by the subjects. The adoption of a simple polar model of understanding means that misunderstandings are seen as failure, like non-understanding, without there being any importance attached to the implications of such a failure, that is, the fact that it is understanding, which happens to be incorrect. Similarly, in discussions on the definition and testing of language comprehension (Freedle & Carroll, 1972), reference to misunderstanding, as opposed to understanding and non-understanding, is minimal.

Understanding is not absolute but admits degree, so that in partially understanding an utterance one might actually understand it sufficiently correctly to know what the speaker intended his utterance to mean. Alternatively a partial understanding might result in the hearer misunderstanding an utterance, if the part which he has failed to understand correctly has been misunderstood rather than not understood at all. Garrett (1974), in presenting hypotheses about the order of sentence processing, offers a characterization of comprehension which allows that partial understanding is frequently sufficient and he acknowledges that comprehension errors occur.

Attempts to quantify understanding have been unsuccessful on the whole. Mistler-Lachman (1972:614) argues that measurement of comprehension has not been successfully achieved and that the various attempts to do so "are comparable only if one presupposes a unitary form of comprehension - a specific and fixed goal, as it were, achievement of which can be fixed like a fifty-yard dash".

It is possible that the quantification of understanding can most profitably be attempted through the study of conversations in which understanding is discussed and negotiated, that is, in conversations in which misunderstandings occur. The quantification of understanding could be achieved by an assessment of the correlation between what the speaker intends and what the hearer understands of the speaker's utterance. If the speaker makes one or more attempts to amend the hearer's understanding it can be assumed that the hearer has not understood correctly and that he is guided towards a correct understanding. The utterances which the speaker and the hearer exchange during this guiding process provide evidence for the analyst of how correct understanding is reached.

Although the study of misunderstandings is unlikely to add insight into the cognitive process of understanding, it is the contention of this thesis that the study of misunderstandings can add insight into the communicative process whereby a speaker endeavours to ensure that a hearer shares his understanding of an utterance produced by that speaker. This thesis focusses on the structure of misunderstandings as a means by which the communicative process may be studied. In the following section previous work on misunderstandings is reviewed and it will be seen that to date there has been no systematic investigation of the structure of misunderstandings. In Section 3 the definition of misunderstanding which is adopted in this thesis is discussed.

2. TREATMENT OF 'MISUNDERSTANDING'

The study of defective output has been successfully undertaken by researchers working on speech error data (e.g. the papers in Fromkin, 1973, 1980 which detail mistakes made by language users and discuss the implications for theories of language structure and processing). According to Fromkin (1973:44) speech error data "provide us with a 'window' into linguistic mental processes" and this is borne out by the relationships drawn between performance errors and conjectured language processing procedures, which offer interesting models of how a language user's 'competence' might be structured. The language user is mostly taken to be a speaker rather than a hearer.

Speech perception is not entirely neglected. Goldstein (1980) discusses bias and asymmetry in speech perception and proposes that listeners make use of bias to narrow down alternative hypotheses when processing a signal, arguing (1980:259) that "Errors in perception are simply hypotheses that happened to be incorrect". Since it is currently impossible to verify whether or not language users do make subconscious choices between various possible interpretations of what they hear, such an argument is necessarily inconclusive.

Nevertheless, the argument for choice has been put forward in respect of misunderstanding by Zaefferer (1977). He explains interpretation as being a choice of readings, explanations for which can be provided by decision analysis; a misunderstanding is therefore an incorrect reading choice. The assumptions regarding the pay-off matrix in the decision analysis are presumably made on the basis of the analyst's intuition and could therefore vary considerably depending on which analyst establishes them. Furthermore, decision analysis cannot explain why a particular interpretation is made but can merely indicate possible reasoning which

the hearer might have undertaken in order to arrive at the particular interpretation he made. Decision analysis is also favoured by Davidson (1974, 1975) but while his argument for the importance of belief in the interpretation of utterances is valid, his view that decision analysis offers an acceptable means of accounting for the beliefs of speakers and hearers is less convincing.

Decision analysis cannot substantiate the claim that speech interpretation error is caused by incorrect choice. Though unverifiable, it remains possible to attribute perception error to incorrect choice because perception and interpretation are very different processes.

Garnes & Bond (1980), discussing the appropriateness of using error data to shed light on speech perception amongst other linguistic phenomena, consider the behaviour of listeners when confronted with anomalous sentences in experiments :

" When listeners cannot make sense of what they hear, their typical reaction is to question the reader, 'Did you say ___?' There are, however, different kinds of data that show that hearers may instead attempt to reinterpret what they hear and actually attempt to process their misperceptions "

(Garnes & Bond, 1980:232).

Whether or not the lexical switch from 'listener' to 'hearer' is intentional, it indicates the difference between perception of a signal and the subsequent processing, that is, understanding of it.

This distinction between perception and understanding is vitally important and failure to appreciate it can result in over-simplification of what is happening, particularly in respect of errors. Celce-Murcia (1980) discusses the causes of some misperceptions and she goes on to attribute misunderstandings to these misperceptions but her scope remains limited to speech perception rather than understanding and thus she fails to attach any importance to the difference between possible factors in

'slips of the ear' in her list of causes of misperceptions (1980:207).

For example, factor (1), "Phonological misperception of consonant and vowel segments", is very different from factor (7), "Misperception based on the listener's current preoccupations". It is quite possible that the hearer in (7) could have perceived the signal correctly but because of his current preoccupations he does not understand it as the speaker intended it to be understood.

Misperception may cause or contribute to a misunderstanding but not vice versa since perception precedes understanding. Misperception and misunderstanding do not necessarily co-occur. Misperception is a hearing problem or a problem in the processing of a signal once it is heard while misunderstanding is a problem in the interpretation of that signal. As with errors in production, perception errors can be matched against the correct expression. Thus it is possible to distinguish between correct and incorrect production as evidenced by, for example, "weak and feeble → feak and weeble" (Fromkin, 1973:15) and between correct and incorrect perception, provided that a listener reports a misperception correctly, such as "speaker produced fuel flask, listener perceived field glasses" (Browman, 1980:213).

One might assume that the hearer would not understand the utterance containing the phrase 'fuel flask', given the incongruity of what was actually perceived, 'field glasses'. However, the hearer could achieve an understanding of the misperceived utterance if ambiguity or contextual or situational support made the misperception comprehensible.² In such a case, however, the hearer correctly understands what he has heard; he has not, however, correctly understood what the speaker actually uttered nor what the speaker intended. Distinction between understanding and misunderstanding is thus less easily drawn than distinction between perception and misperception.

Failure to hear correctly could be a contributory factor in the occurrence

of a misunderstanding but the two errors should be treated separately. A misunderstanding may occur when a participant has incorrectly heard either some part or the whole of an utterance. If this mishearing is realized and acknowledged and a clarification or repeat is sought, by the use of such formulae as "Pardon?", "What did you say?", "I didn't catch that" and so on, it is not a misunderstanding. If the person who misheard the utterance interprets that mishearing, believing it to be correct, and continues the conversation under this belief, it is a misunderstanding. Mishearing can thus result in misunderstanding. Goffman (1976:296) makes a structural distinction between the two which gives the impression that they are not connected :

" The structural difference between an unhearing and a misunderstanding is to be found in terms of how the difficulty gets corrected. With unhearings the recipient signals there is trouble; with misunderstandings, the speaker "

Even if a hearer has failed to hear an entire utterance he may believe he knows what the utterance expressed and he may respond accordingly. The correction or signalling of the trouble depends on whether the speaker or the hearer realize that it has happened and depending on the progress of the conversation could be done by either speaker or hearer. Goffman's example of a misunderstanding could well be due to mishearing :

" Doctor :: Have you had a history of cardiac arrest
in your family?
Patient : We never had no trouble with the police "
(Goffman, 1976:295, from Shuy).

The misunderstanding here could be caused by the patient's unfamiliarity with medical terminology but it could equally well be caused by mishearing, that is, failing to hear "cardiac".

Grimshaw (1980) uses the term 'mishearing' for failing to understand correctly, called 'misunderstanding' in this thesis. The term 'Misunderstanding' is reserved for anti-understanding by Grimshaw (1980:36); anti-understanding

occurs when, having understood an utterance correctly, one chooses to respond as though it had not been understood correctly, which is intentionally misunderstanding. Grimshaw discusses a taxonomy of outcomes of communicative events which provides the following outcomes : nonhearing, understood as intended, non (or partial or ambiguous) understanding, mishearing and Misunderstanding (that is, intentional misunderstanding). The criteria which distinguish mishearing (that is, misunderstanding) from the others are firstly that the hearer is confident of having correctly heard and interpreted the speaker's utterance and secondly, that the hearer has the linguistic capacity to understand the utterance correctly, that is, should know the meaning of the constituents and so on. Grimshaw has difficulty in determining the outcomes for some of his data : "Five and six represent cases of partial understanding ... that shade off into mishearing. Both could also be read as Misunderstanding" (1980:49). "Five" and "six" are constructed data and therefore lack situation, context, intention and so on, all of which might guide the analyst.

In a subsequent paper, Grimshaw (1982) subjects an episode of naturally occurring conversation in which he is a participant to an adaptation of Labov & Fanshel's (1977) comprehensive discourse analysis. In addition, he elicits comments from one of the two other participants. In spite of the extra resources upon which he draws (his own ethnographic knowledge, his participation, commentary from another participant), Grimshaw is not able to determine exactly what the episode is "about" and which communicative outcome ensues. He nevertheless makes some instructive observations (1982:20) : (i) that "those involved appeared to be talking at cross-purposes",⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ that at least two of the participants were not aware that there was any problem in understanding, (iii) that the "impasse" was not resolved and (iv) that "even minimal 'sense' could be made out of the exchange only by recourse to deeper and deeper examination of a number of contextual

dimensions" (1982:20). Thus participants are not themselves troubled by a miscommunication which subsequently cannot be understood, even with the benefit of hindsight.

Grimshaw provides a very detailed analysis of the episode but he acknowledges that his analysis has limitations :

" The expansions in the appended text are tentative and the characterizations of interactional moves even more subject to challenge. It is not clear, in short, that an analyst can confidently claim to understand either "what has been said" or "what was done" in the colloquy (of the participants) "

(Grimshaw, 1982:22).

The fact that the analysis cannot explain the datum is one major problem.

The fact that Grimshaw is unable to place the communicative nonsuccess within his taxonomy is another :

" None of the participants in this episode has Misunderstood. Neither have they, however, understood as intended, partially understood, or misheard - misread (as I use those terms) "

(Grimshaw, 1982:23).

Grimshaw is quick to point out the shortcomings of his taxonomy (imprecise, nonexclusive, nonexhaustive, abstract) but suggests that attempts to refine the taxonomy and to analyse discourse so that there are no competing interpretations should develop successfully as comparative testing and validation become available.

Grimshaw's distinctions between partial understanding, mishearing and Misunderstanding seem difficult to apply. It is possible that he has tried to be too specific. By assigning indeterminate illocutionary force and different levels of knowledge to partial or nonunderstanding and problems with signals and defeasibilities such as shortcomings in capacity or attention to mishearings ('misunderstandings' in this thesis), he focusses on the cause rather than the outcome. It might be easier to distinguish between the

different types of miscommunication if one were to focus instead on whether the hearer suspects nonsuccess, knows nonsuccess is the outcome or does not know that nonsuccess is the outcome; indeed, one of the criteria for mishearing (misunderstanding) is that the hearer believes he has correctly heard and interpreted the utterance. This erroneous belief may be in respect of an utterance of indeterminate illocutionary force which Grimshaw seems to restrict to partial or nonunderstanding.

Grimshaw's attempts to deal with communicative nonsuccess and to analyse an actual example of nonsuccess, together with his forthrightness about the difficulties he encounters are praiseworthy. To offset the fact that in spite of detailed analysis he cannot resolve to his own satisfaction the overall problem of "what is going on", he is able to establish (i) that participants may gradually become aware of nonsuccess, (ii) that not all participants may necessarily become aware of nonsuccess and (iii) that the resolving of nonsuccess is often a complex task which may be subject to considerations such as the importance which participants attach to the conversation and so on.

* The work of the ethnomethodologists is primarily concerned with patterns in the organization of conversation and with specific sequences within conversation. Jefferson (1972), dealing with the issue of whether or not participants resolve misunderstandings, investigates the procedures by which participants handle errors in conversations. Jefferson argues that the sequences which she isolates have an orderliness which suggests that they are rule-governed. One of the "side sequences" which she details (1972:304) is a 'misapprehension sequence' in which "there is a statement of sorts, a misapprehension of sorts and a clarification of sorts : (s) - (m)-(c)". The option to clarify is the clarifier's when it is he who shows the (m) has occurred, the (m) being open to other interpretations, and is the

(m)-speaker's when the (m)-speaker shows that (s) needs to be clarified, thus obliging the (s)-speaker to clarify his utterance. These two options refer to different conversational problems for the participants : the first is a misunderstanding in the sense used in this thesis, a failure to understand an utterance correctly ; the second is a request for clarification or a signal that something in (s) is not correct or cannot be interpreted, which effectively enables the participants to avoid a potential misunderstanding.

Adjacency between the three utterances, (s) - (m) - (c), is implied and indeed if they were not adjacent the notion of 'side sequence' would be lost because the metatopic it constitutes would be integrated with the overall topic. However, the hearer's response which manifests his misunderstanding of the speaker's utterance could occur several utterances and/ or speaker turns after the original misunderstood utterance ; clarification could follow at an indeterminate number of utterances and speaker turns later. This clarification could be undertaken by more than one participant and could extend through more than one utterance and/ or turn. The extent of a misunderstanding could thus be potentially greater and more complex than (s) - (m) - (c).

Jefferson does not intend the three parts of her 'misapprehension sequence' to be definitive and she names them "for convenience", the names being "a way to handle them readily" (1972:304). This is unfortunate because by not defining "misapprehension" she risks talking about different, though related, phenomena as one phenomenon ; 'misunderstanding', 'misapprehension' and 'no comprehension' are used inter-changeably. Having difficulty in understanding an utterance differs from incorrectly understanding an utterance which also differs from not having any understanding of an utterance, although all three are communication problems which participants have the

capacity to resolve and all three may well involve sequences within the conversation.

In subsequent work on errors and their repair (Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977) only production errors are discussed, such as the use of the wrong word, the inability to identify a referent, the inability to express a proposition clearly and so on. These are inevitably recognized as errors by the speaker, who corrects himself, or by the hearer, who expresses his difficulty in making sense by a question or by otherwise drawing attention to the 'trouble source'; in other words, a misunderstanding is avoided because the hearer is aware that he is having trouble with the utterance expressed by the speaker. The adjacency between 'trouble source' and repair or request for repair is unlikely to be found in misunderstandings where the hearer's utterance which manifests his misunderstanding separates what is misunderstood, the 'trouble source', from the repair of any error in it or problem caused by it. The utterance by the hearer which manifests his misunderstanding of the speaker's utterance could also be considered a 'trouble source' as it is an inappropriate response to the speaker's utterance. When the 'trouble source' is the hearer's utterance it could be repaired in the next utterance but presumably only rarely by the hearer himself. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks's (1977) argument that self-correction predominates over other-correction is unlikely to be borne out by instances where 'self', the hearer, does not know he has made an error without being given some indication of this by 'other', the speaker.

Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977) distinguish between 'initiation' and 'outcome' of repair, discussing techniques by which initiation draws attention to the error and prompts a repair of it. In misunderstandings, the error could also be the initiation in that the inappropriacy of the hearer's response could initiate repair without additional comments.

Alternatively, the exchange of utterances subsequent to the hearer's utterance could be the initiation, ranging from the question/exclamation "What?" to an elaboration of the response during the course of which the misunderstanding becomes apparent. Outcome of production errors is restricted to success or failure but in errors of understanding a number of outcomes are concurrently possible. If the misunderstanding is corrected for two out of three participants the outcome is both a success and a failure.

The sociolinguist Schwartz (1977) is similarly concerned with the sequencing of misunderstandings and also with the ways in which misunderstandings are detected and resolved. Schwartz, however, offers a definition of misunderstanding which raises a number of questions: "By 'misunderstanding' I mean an interpretive error that is discovered by its maker at least two utterances after it is made" (1977, in 1978:3). This definition raises a number of questions which Schwartz fails to answer. Is the 'maker' of a misunderstanding the one whose utterance is misunderstood or the one who misunderstands it? In what way is it 'discovered' - is it the realization that it has occurred or is it the admission of its occurrence in the conversation? When is 'two utterances after it is made'? When, indeed, is a misunderstanding made - after the utterance has been expressed or simultaneously on hearing it? Why should 'two utterances' be significant?

As a result of limiting himself to one datum, Schwartz can claim that 'utterance', 'reply' and 'correction' follow successively and that a misunderstanding is discovered in a certain order, namely, by the speaker first and then by the hearer when the speaker corrects him. This order need not necessarily be the only one: it is quite possible that a hearer realizes that he has misunderstood an utterance before the speaker of that utterance realizes the misunderstanding has occurred. The hearer may have realized the misunderstanding's occurrence in the light of utterances subsequent to the one misunderstood, in which case the sequence of utterance,

reply and correction is broken by other utterances.

Schwartz indicates that failure to share an interpretation of an utterance is not necessarily a misunderstanding, thereby adding another dimension to the problem of distinguishing between misunderstanding and other interpretation problems. He makes the interesting observation that there is a communicative skill in dealing with a misunderstanding as a misunderstanding :

" A hearer interpreting a remark's meaning differently than its producer, and the hearer showing the producer this, doth not, by itself, a misunderstanding make. Conversationalists may not treat this as a technical or linguistic difficulty, but as a political, moral, or psychological one ... Treating something as a misunderstanding, then, is as much an interpretive accomplishment of speaker-hearers as treating something as a joke or story "

(Schwartz, 1977, in Schwartz, 1978:19).

Schwartz's theoretical discussion of misunderstanding indicates what is involved in this interpretive accomplishment in respect of one misunderstanding only. By extensively commenting on the three utterances which comprise his datum and by drawing on other examples he discusses the procedures which the participants undertake in order to detect the misunderstanding and to resolve it. The commentary is specific to the one datum and does not conclusively support the theoretical arguments which Schwartz puts forward.

The idea that treating a conversation phenomenon such as misunderstanding as an interpretive accomplishment is supported by the work of researchers of inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal misunderstandings (Gumperz, 1982; Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Milroy & McTear, 1983; Varonis & Gass, 1985). The data in these studies are drawn from actual conversations and are subjected to detailed interpretation.

Gumperz (1982) and Gumperz & Tannen (1979) investigate discourse strategies by using data from actual conversations in which communication is not successful. The object of their research is to determine the

sociocultural knowledge which speaker-hearers draw on in conversation. The miscommunications which they discuss all "involve mistaken judgements of others' conversational intent" (Gumperz & Tannen, 1979:321). These judgements tend to be attitudinal and are mostly due to inter-cultural differences between speakers and hearers. The fact that the judgements are mistaken is detected retrospectively by the participants and by commentators. Gumperz & Tannen (1979) are not primarily concerned with understanding; they investigate the causes of miscommunication and the sociocultural and linguistic knowledge which would enable each type of miscommunication to be avoided.

Milroy (1984) and Milroy & McTear (1983) are similarly concerned with the causes and consequences of breakdowns in communication. Their examples are drawn from speaker-hearers who have different dialectal backgrounds because the "internal grammars" of such speaker-hearers are assumed to differ, thus enabling the role of "linguistic knowledge in comprehension" to be assessed (Milroy, 1984:7-8).

The following specification of miscommunication is given : "A miscommunication may be said to take place when there is a mismatch between the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation" (Milroy, 1984:8). The speaker's intention is not limited to any one utterance and the miscommunication can therefore presumably be in respect of a larger part of the conversation than one particular utterance or in respect of what could be called social motives rather than intended propositions. The consequences of the misunderstandings discussed are primarily attitudinal.

The question of how breakdowns in communication are rectified is not pursued. Milroy (1984) does, however, make a distinction between "misunderstandings", which involve differences in speaker-hearers' semantic analyses of an utterance and which do not interrupt the conversation's

flow, and "Communicative breakdown", which happens when participants are aware that "something has gone wrong" in the conversation. This distinction is important in terms of the structure of misunderstandings since Milroy's "misunderstandings" are not separate entities within conversation whereas her "communicative breakdowns" are.

'From both an applied linguistic and sociolinguistic viewpoint, Varonis & Gass (1985) discuss miscommunication between native and non-native speakers. They argue that in addition to having different language systems, a lack of shared belief space can cause communication problems. They suggest seven ways in which participants can behave after there has been a lack of understanding and they illustrate each of these with actual data. The seven ways in which participants can behave are as follows :

- " 1. Immediate recognition of problem but no comment.
2. Immediate recognition of problem and makes comment.
3. Later recognition of problem but no comment.
4. Later recognition of problem and makes comment.
5. Recognition after conversation but no comment.
6. Recognition after conversation and makes comment.
7. No recognition. "

(Varonis & Gass, 1985:328).

These provide a valuable guide to the possible outcomes of misunderstanding but the distinction between "immediately" and "later" is not clearly drawn. From the examples given, "immediate" recognition of a communication problem is made when the next speaker produces an utterance which comments on or corrects the problem and which is adjacent to the utterance which has manifested the problem. "Later" recognition is made when the next speaker pauses before producing his comment or correction; in the example of "later" recognition, the correcting utterance is similarly adjacent to the utterance which has manifested the problem. It is possible that within a conversation a comment or correction could occur "later" in the sense that a number of other utterances and/or speaker turns elapse between the utterance which manifests the problem and the correction of it.

Varonis & Gass (1985) analyse an "extended misunderstanding" between a native and a non-native speaker in a telephone service encounter. Their analysis considers the participants' beliefs about the conversation, the differences between their goals and the correlation between the confidence of each participant in his/her interpretation and the correctness/incorrectness of that interpretation. Although a "heuristic" for explaining participants' confidence in their interpretations is offered, there is no explicit account of how the analyst assesses participants' beliefs and goals, nor of how confidence in interpretation is actually determined and corroborated. Not all the utterances in the datum are given accuracy/confidence coding; two are given the code "NC" ("Not coded"), perhaps because they are deemed incidental to the miscommunication. The datum is very complex, with one participant changing goals five times and the other misunderstanding eleven times. Varonis & Gass make a number of important points as a result of their analysis : (i) native speakers and non-native speakers have particular problems in communicating, (ii) conversing in accordance with the Co-Operative Principle and turn-taking conventions does not necessarily result in understanding, (iii) participants use "negotiation routines in which one interlocutor indicates difficulty with the interpretation of another's utterance" (1985:341) and (iv) when meaning is not negotiated between native and non-native speakers their conversation is prone to problems.

Zaefferer (1977), from a theoretical pragmatic viewpoint, focusses on the cause of misunderstanding. He offers a formal definition which incorporates context, the environment in which the utterance is situated :

" A person I has misunderstood or has an incorrect understanding (with respect to language L) of some sound event SE in context C if and only if there are states of affairs SA^1 , C^1 such that

- (1) SE has occurred
- (2) C holds
- (3) SA holds because SE counts in C as bringing about SA (according to L),

- (4) I believes (i) that (1),
 (ii) that C^1 holds,
 (iii) that SA^1 holds because SE
 counts in C^1 as bringing about
 SA^1 (according to L), and
 (5) SA is not the same as SA^1 "

(Zaefferer, 1977:331-2).

According to this definition a misunderstanding occurs when a hearer, ('I'), has an incorrect belief about the context in which an utterance is expressed. A particular state of affairs automatically holds if it is brought about by a sound event in a particular context. A hearer could not therefore misunderstand a sound event if he believed the context to be the context which actually obtained at the time of the sound event. 'Context' is not explained, although the burden of the definition rests on it. One has to assume that it refers to constraints which restrict an utterance to a particular meaning in a particular spatio-temporal location. It seems possible that a hearer can correctly believe what context holds but nevertheless misunderstand an utterance.

In the one other work relating to misunderstanding which is cited in the Introduction to this thesis, (Burton, 1981), an example of misunderstanding is subjected to discourse analysis but there is no discussion of the datum as a misunderstanding. The analysis is discussed below in Chapter III in which methods of discourse analysis are considered.

A number of points emerge from the studies of misunderstandings discussed above : (i) misunderstandings tend to display a particular sequence, viz. the misunderstood utterance is followed by an utterance based on the misunderstanding which is followed by a correction of the misunderstanding (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), (ii) misunderstandings tend to be resolved immediately and if they are not then they tend not to be resolved at all (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), (iii) if misunderstandings are not resolved then the consequences may be hostility or confusion (Gumperz & Tannen, 1979; Milroy, 1984; Varonis & Gass, 1985),

(iv) misunderstandings may not be noticed by participants at the time of the conversation in which they occur (Grimshaw, 1982; Varonis & Gass, 1985) and (v) the detecting and resolving of misunderstandings are communicative skills (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977; Grimshaw, 1982; Varonis & Gass, 1985).

These points support the contention that misunderstandings warrant detailed study. A systematic corpus-based approach is adopted in this thesis in order to detail the structure and to determine the types of misunderstandings. The typology presented in Chapter IX of this thesis is not the first typology of misunderstandings. Zaefferer's (1977) typology is determined by cause while Grimshaw (1980; 1982) gives a typology of the outcomes of communicative nonsuccesses, of which one type is misunderstanding in the sense used in this thesis, that is, failure to understand correctly.

The main problem in using cause as a typological criterion (Zaefferer, 1977) is that isolation of the cause of a misunderstanding may be dependent on the analyst's intuition. Participants may discuss their misunderstandings and may explain why they believe they occurred but they do not always do so. Zaefferer discusses the levels of interpretation at which misunderstandings occur (phonological, syntactical, semantical and situational); in effect, these levels are linked to the causes of each misunderstanding. Zaefferer stresses that the typology is idealized and theoretical and he comments of his potential types "Whether all of them may actually occur depends partly on the way the used notions are made precise" (1977:335). A typology which is empirical and data-based ought to be able to specify which types occur. The "notions" should necessarily be precise because they emanate from analysis of actual data. Rather than developing Zaefferer's work by empirically examining the causes of misunderstandings, this thesis addresses itself to the structure of misunderstandings.

The starting point for a corpus-based study of misunderstandings is the determination of what constitutes a misunderstanding and what criteria will be applied in respect of the inclusion of data in a corpus. The following section outlines such criteria and provides a definition of misunderstanding which is adopted hereafter.

3. A DEFINITION OF MISUNDERSTANDING

A first distinction is made between linguistic and non-linguistic misunderstandings. This thesis requires language to be involved, as opposed to a misunderstanding in which language is not involved.³ Distinction can then be made between misunderstandings involving spoken and written language. The misunderstandings with which this thesis is concerned are specifically those which involve spoken language.

The corpus is limited to conversation between native speakers of English who have little or no dialectal variation.⁴ This is in contrast with the work of, for example, Milroy (1984) or Varonis & Gass (1985), which focusses on cross-dialectal and inter-ethnic misunderstandings, that is, those between speaker-hearers whose "internal grammars are different in some specifiable way" (Milroy, 1984:7). Interaction between such participants, as between native and foreign participants, is usually marked. Misunderstandings between such participants could be due to syntactic, semantic and cultural errors as a result of incomplete knowledge of each other's language or dialect and environment. Misunderstandings also occur between participants who share languages and dialects and whose "internal grammars" may be presumed to be very similar; it is to these misunderstandings that this thesis is addressed.

A requirement of the corpus is that at least two participants must be involved, a speaker and a hearer. Zaefferer (1977) does not impose such

a restriction, arguing that a person can misunderstand his own utterance :

" it is quite possible for a person to misunderstand his own utterance. This may be due either to wrong beliefs about the language he is using (if he knows only a little Italian, he may think, having just uttered 'Fa caldo!' that he has stated that it is cold, whereas he has stated that it is hot), or to his not noticing a misperformance on his side "

(Zaefferer, 1977:332).

This argument is of dubious validity. The speaker understands his utterance but fails to appreciate that he has not expressed it correctly. An incorrect assumption by a speaker about his utterance is not a misunderstanding of it.

In this thesis a misunderstanding occurs when a hearer, H, incorrectly understands a proposition expressed by a speaker, S, in an utterance in interactive conversation where S and H are native speakers (the term 'proposition' is discussed below in Chapter III). It is further required that the hearer manifests his incorrect understanding in an utterance in the conversation subsequent to the misunderstood utterance of the speaker. This requirement is essential because without such an utterance by the hearer, there is no evidence that a misunderstanding has occurred, although subsequent utterances might suggest its occurrence. The requirement also rules out data in which the hearer thinks he might have misunderstood or is aware of a possible problem in the understanding of the utterance ; rather than believing his understanding is correct, the hearer queries the utterance or his understanding of it and thus avoids a potential misunderstanding.

Intentional misunderstandings by the hearer, for joke purposes, exploit the phenomenon of misunderstandings and exhibit the same structure. Intentional misunderstandings are not, therefore, excluded from the corpus.

Misunderstandings of arguments and concepts are not included in the

corpus. Negotiation of the understanding of ideas differs from negotiation of the understanding of the propositions expressed in utterances ; one can correctly understand the proposition expressed in an utterance without understanding the idea which that proposition is intended to communicate. If this were not so, education, for example, would be a more straightforward process. Away from the classroom environment, however, it is not always easy to detect conceptual misunderstandings. The following tape-recorded dialogue was rejected from the corpus after much consideration. After the death of a great scholar, A and B are talking about the number of clever, worthy people who die :

- (1) A: The wrong ones survive I sometimes think
 (2) B: Well there must be a fair number of wrong ones yes
 (3.1) A: No I mean I sometimes think it's worse than that
 .2) : That it's in the nature of things that the wrong ones survive
 (4.1) B: Mmm
 .2) : I'm not that superstitious
 (5.1) A: Oh no I it's not superstition
 .2) : It's just something I'm attributing to the nature of wrong of wrongness as it were
 / pause /
 .3) : That the ones who have the spare capacity to invest too much effort in self-preservation are the ones who may not be the highest creators

Initially it appears that B misunderstands what A means by "wrong ones" in (1). A then tries to explain what he means. B interprets this explanation as "superstitious" but A denies that superstition is what he means. In fact, the participants are working towards understanding one another's views on an idea and each also appears to be working out his own view on the matter as the interaction proceeds. The interaction exemplifies a particularly esoteric problem of understanding and is not a straightforward misunderstanding of a proposition.

The following chapter discusses the problems of data collection and details the composition of the corpus on which the remainder of the thesis is based.

CHAPTER II

THE CORPUS

1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter established what constitutes a misunderstanding for the purposes of this thesis. The next stage of this study of misunderstandings is the assembling of a corpus but this is by no means a straightforward process. The collection of data drawn from conversation is notoriously difficult (Labov, 1972; Stubbs, 1983). In the following section the problems of collecting data of conversation in general and of misunderstandings in particular are discussed.

Having succeeded in collecting sufficient data, one has to decide how to handle it since methods invariably influence findings. Transcription procedures influence data (Ochs, 1979; Stubbs, 1983) and the analytic method which one adopts or devises moulds one's conclusions (cf. the different approaches to and results of discourse analysis). Section 3 of this chapter details the composition of the corpus and indicates the ways in which the data are subsequently handled.

2. PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION

The adoption of a data-based approach to the investigation of a linguistic phenomenon confronts one with the problems of how best to collect data and from what source. Labov's 'Observer's Paradox' clearly depicts the dilemma facing linguists :

" the aim of linguistic research in the community must be to find out how people talk when they are not being systematically observed; yet we can only obtain these data by systematic observation "

(Labov, 1972:209).

Labov finds acceptable solutions to this paradox by recording peer-group interaction and by recording interviews with diversions to make

the participants forget that the interview is taking place. These solutions are probably sufficient for Labov since his interest is in forms of vernacular speech rather than the ways in which the participants interact. The problem of systematic observation is less easily bypassed when the focus of study is the nature of interaction because the behaviour of participants is as crucial as the composition of their utterances.

The recording of participants' speech and behaviour during conversation necessitates optimally receptive microphones and video cameras but these devices can constrain participants and restrict movement. Crystal & Davy (1969:96) point out that people behave differently when being recorded, having a cyclic pattern of forgetting and remembering about the microphone, which consequently affects their speech. Their data is therefore obtained by surreptitious recording but they admit that this method requires complex technical preparation and thus cannot be used frequently. The use of surreptitious recording equipment poses problems not only in terms of technical preparation but also on moral grounds. Fear of contrived overhearing is not limited to participants with confidential secrets. Many participants feel worried or threatened by the discovery that an apparently ephemeral, private conversation has in fact been preserved and can be played back any number of times to any listener.

Kreckel (1981) obtained extensive data from the B.B.C. film, The Family, for which a sound and camera crew lived with a family prior to recording their conversations and activities. This ostensibly enabled family members to become acclimatized to the presence of recording personnel and equipment. It is impossible to be certain

that such acclimatization did in fact happen and that the participants behaved wholly naturally.

In spite of spontaneous informal conversation being ever-present much of it tends to remain inaccessible to linguists. The problems in collecting data from conversations result in linguists having recourse to alternative interactions, such as classroom discourse (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975) and the therapy sessions favoured by the ethnomethodologists. The peer-group interaction which emerges from these sessions is questionably 'natural'; it certainly cannot be reckoned informal conversation. Those people being counselled must surely be constrained by the situation and by the expectation that they should overtly reveal their emotions, while the therapists are limited in the contribution they can make to the interaction; in psychotherapy the therapist cannot advise or give judgement (Labov & Fanshel, 1977:30-5).

In a description of the ELIZA man-machine natural language interaction program, Weizenbaum (1966) explains the choice of setting and his explanation sounds a cautionary note about the appropriacy of using any psychiatric setting as a source of linguistic data :

" This mode of conversation was chosen because the psychiatric interview is one of the few examples of categorized dyadic natural language communication in which one of the participating pairs is free to assume the pose of knowing almost nothing of the real world. If, for example, one were to tell a psychiatrist 'I went for a long boat ride' and he responded 'Tell me about boats' one would not assume that he knew nothing about boats, but that he had some purpose in so directing the subsequent conversation "

(Weizenbaum, 1966:42).

Because of this setting, ELIZA is able to generate reasonably convincing communication without having any understanding of what is received or generated. Contrived communication need not be limited to psychiatric

environments. Any interview, therapy or similar setting, including the classroom, is likely to include an element of one participant having a role distinct from the others in that he has the responsibility for motivating and directing the conversation. Interaction in a pre-ordained setting between participants who have elected or have been required to attend must be marked and therefore inappropriate data to be counted as informal conversation.

When one wishes to obtain data of a particular phenomenon in conversation rather than simply conversation itself, one faces the additional problem of having to collect considerably more material. If it is something frequently encountered, such as speaker-switch nonfluency (Ferguson, 1975), any recorded stretch of conversation is likely to yield sufficient data. If, as in this thesis, the phenomenon is misunderstandings, the occurrence of which cannot be predicted, there is no guarantee that a carefully set-up session of recording informal conversation will yield a single example.

A precedent for collecting chance data which cannot be anticipated has been set by the speech error researchers, the majority of whom have adopted the diary method. Fromkin (1971) details her data corpus of over six hundred speech errors collected by herself, colleagues and friends and where possible she has tried, by dint of questioning, to determine what the speaker had been thinking of saying. The advantage of the diary method is its immediacy; the person providing the data can be questioned as soon as the utterance or error has been made. Fromkin refers to the pioneer of speech error research, Meringer, and the amount of background information which he collected for every error encountered :

" In true Teutonic style, he also included the birthdate of the speaker, the educational background, the time of day, the state of health and tiredness, the rate of speech etc. Sturtevant reports that Meringer became the most unpopular man at the University of Vienna "

(Fromkin, 1971, in Fromkin, 1973:216).

Data of misunderstandings with such detailed background information could not be collected as easily as data of speech errors because a number of utterances by at least two speaker-hearers would have to be written down, rather than one discrete error, and the possibly relevant background information would be increased proportionately. The linguist's intrusion into the conversation would be even more irritating to the participants than Meringer's intrusions (but cf. Milroy, 1984 for successful data collection of misunderstandings by the diary method).

The linguist's intrusion can call into doubt the reliability of the data. MacKay (1980) warns against the selectivity of data which might have been influenced by theoretical bias. Adoption of the diary method means that one collects the data which one hears but there is a tendency to hear only what one is seeking. This warning is less pertinent to the collection of misunderstandings than it is to that of speech errors because in much of the data the participants themselves refer to the fact that a misunderstanding has occurred, which alerts one to note down what has been said.

Defence against criticism of the reliability of diary-recorded transcription is less easy. An interaction is longer and more complex than a speech error. Memory recall of utterances is far from perfect, (see discussion in Clark & Clark, 1977), paralinguistic features might not be noticed (Abercrombie, 1968) and intonational features cannot be accurately recorded (see Pellowe, 1980; Pellowe & Jones, 1978;)

McGregor, 1982 for discussions of variability of non-segmental phonological systems and the problems of 'interpreting' them, even under optimal conditions; see also Labov & Fanshel, 1977 for the problem of interpretation of paralinguistic cues).

A specific problem in the collection of data of misunderstandings is that the beginning of a misunderstanding can only be determined retrospectively and it is not always possible to retrace the conversation back to the utterance which was misunderstood. The potential extent of a misunderstanding is illustrated by an exchange encountered at the L.A.G.B. conference held in London (November, 1977) ⁵. Although the exchange was not recorded it was possible to determine what had happened because a number of people were concentrating on the paper being delivered and on the subsequent questions which related to it. Together they were able to recall what had been said.

Ruth Kempson had delivered very quickly and tersely a paper on "Presupposition, Opacity and Negation". Approximately three minutes after the commencement of question time, Yorick Wilks made a comment with which Kempson agreed. Wilks repeated the comment and the general audience impression was that he was being rather slow and that Kempson could not understand him. This impression was sustained for several moments until Wilks apparently had the situation explained to him by a member of the audience. Following this explanation, Wilks stated "That was a misunderstanding". What had been misunderstood? In retrospect it turned out to be something which Kempson had said during her paper.

The problem, which arose approximately half way through the paper, concerned a discussion of entailment: " 'John is looking for a red car' — John is looking for a unique member of the class of things

which are cars and are red and might be his own; John is looking for any member of the class of cars which are red. The first reading entails the second: if you are looking for a unique member of the class then you are looking for a member of the class". After the remainder of the paper had been delivered, several questions were raised and answered and then the following dialogue took place :

Wilks : It seems to me you're using the word 'entailment' in a very odd way, not in the commonsense or normal way because the truth of one statement isn't entailed by the truth of the other, they're not mutually entailing

Kempson : No

Wilks : - repeats first comment -

Audience: / murmur /

Kempson : / inaudible /

Wilks : That was a misunderstanding

Wilks apparently understood Kempson as having talked about mutual entailment of truth whereas she had talked of one entailment of factuality. He maintained this misunderstanding throughout the remainder of the paper and the initial questions and answers before he expressed an utterance based on the misunderstanding, that is, he expressed his opinion that Kempson had used 'entailment' in an odd way.

Kempson then misunderstood Wilks's utterance; she agreed with him by contradiction that the two statements were not mutually entailing whereas he had sought an explanation from her of her use of what he considered to be wrongly used 'mutual entailment'. In addition, Wilks's repeat of his comment was the product of a misunderstanding of Kempson's "No"; the repetition suggested that he thought Kempson had not properly heard or understood his comment, whereas actually she had agreed with his comment. There was no way of knowing exactly how the misunderstanding was resolved, apart from the presumed clarification given by a member.

of the audience. After Wilks admitted to there having been a misunderstanding, Kempson moved on to another question.

This short exchange is remarkably complex and the extent of the misunderstanding is considerable. Misunderstandings of this duration can only be accurately collected by tape recorder. The Wilks-Kempson datum was excluded from the corpus because it proved to be a misunderstanding of a sentence in an academic paper rather than of an utterance in conversation; also, the conference environment is marked and does not provide appropriate data. Nevertheless, the example serves to illustrate the possible extent of a misunderstanding and highlights the problem of collecting data of misunderstandings.

3. COMPOSITION OF THE CORPUS

Initially, in an attempt to collect data, surreptitious recording was carried out in a family home, a student flat and a university room, where a wide range of conversations took place between various different participants. The number of misunderstandings to emerge from these recordings was low and was not satisfactorily productive in proportion to the time spent listening for them on tape. Concurrent with the time spent recording conversations, misunderstandings were encountered in conversations in which I participated or which I overheard. These misunderstandings often occurred in settings which were not conducive to recording, such as in shops, on buses, in short exchanges when outside and so on. It seemed foolish to ignore these misunderstandings while persisting in recording and listening to non-productive conversations.

Consequently, in view of the negligible amount of data to emerge

from tape recordings, (4% of the corpus), the diary method was adopted, following the precedent set by Fromkin's (1971) collection of speech errors and Milroy's (1984) collection of misunderstandings. Whenever possible the assistance of the participants was enlisted, but only when the misunderstanding had ended as a topic in the conversation.

The major shortcomings of the diary method, outlined above, were minimized as much as possible. The problem of recall was alleviated to some extent because where possible the participants' corroboration of what was said produced a transcription as close to the original as possible. Significant features, both paralinguistic and intonational, were noted and it is reasonable to assume that those which were not noted, of which there must have been many, were not seen as significant by participants after the misunderstanding and therefore were unlikely to have played much part during the interaction containing the misunderstanding. When the transcription could not be agreed upon, the data was discarded.

Data which could not be transcribed without eliciting the help of participants prior to the misunderstanding's ceasing to be the topic was also discarded. Without such a policy, the intrusion of the analyst could distort the structure of a misunderstanding. If, for example, the analyst requested that the participants re-traced their utterances because they appeared to be having difficulty in understanding one another, they might realize that the source of the difficulty was a misunderstanding. In such an example, it would never be known how the participants would have resolved the difficulty had they not been prompted. Data in which the analyst intruded was therefore rejected.

The corpus consists of one hundred misunderstandings and is comprised as follows : four tape recorded misunderstandings, in one of

which I am a participant; nine misunderstandings reported to me by people who knew of my interest in the phenomenon; five misunderstandings in which I was a participant, the extent of my participation varying from being the one to explain what was said in the case of a mishearing to being one of several whose laughter alerted the speaker/hearer to the fact that an error had been made; fifteen misunderstandings which I overheard; thirty misunderstandings in which an utterance of mine was misunderstood; and thirty-seven misunderstandings in which I misunderstood someone's utterance.

The data, with analysis, is presented in Appendix 1. Each datum is numbered according to its type; full details of the typology are given in Chapter IX.

Though every participant is a speaker-hearer (see Goffman, 1979 and Goodwin, 1981 for discussion of the role of speaker-hearers and the adequacy of the term) it is convenient to refer to the person whose utterance is misunderstood as S, the speaker, and the person who misunderstands S's utterance as H, the hearer. Any other participants are O^1 , O^2 , O^3 , O^n , depending on how many are involved. The sex of the participants is given, together with relevant background information. Proper names are changed, except in data in which the name is a contributory factor to the misunderstanding. Anonymity is preserved as far as possible. Any reference made to S, H or O in the text is given as (S), (H) or (O) rather than actual names to avoid confusion.

It was not always possible to obtain permission to use data. Two ladies on a bus, for instance, would scarcely have been pleased to learn that their conversation had been overheard. Since books on eavesdropping (e.g. Rees, 1981) make no apology for commercial

exploitation of overheard conversations without acknowledgement, similar material is used in this thesis.

Transcription is orthographic to enable data from the different sources of tape-recorded, reported and personally collected material to be presented comparably. Although intonational features are not included, emphatic stress is indicated by capital letters and when the utterance is a question or exclamation, conventional punctuation indicates this, as in "WHICH is the hardest?" (A22). Emphatic stress is given because it gives prominence to particular words or parts of words, and is therefore a significant factor in the structure of the misunderstanding.

In order to give a clear picture of what types of utterances are misunderstood and what types of utterances are produced which manifest misunderstandings, distinction is drawn between statements, questions, requests, commands and exclamations. Although utterances cannot be equated with sentences (Crystal, 1980) and the relationship between utterances and sentences is very complex (Crystal & Davy, 1969; Levinson, 1983), the 'major/minor' and 'complete/incomplete' distinctions made of sentences by Crystal & Davy (1969:45) is adopted in respect of utterances which are statements. An utterance which is grammatically well-formed, allowing for the hesitations and repetitions of actual speech, is characterized as 'statement' while an elliptical utterance, such as "Only partly on" (A1) is characterized as 'minor statement'. An utterance which fails to be grammatically well-formed because only part of it is expressed, such as "I'm becoming much more susceptible to" (K85), is characterized as 'incomplete statement'; this differs from 'minor statement' in that it is truncated rather than elliptical.

Utterances which are questions are characterized as 'wh-question',

such as "Where do you do this?" (B54), 'polar question', that is, those taking yes / no answers, such as "Are you with her?" (C64), and 'phatic question'. 'Phatic question' is an adaptation of Malinowski's (1930) introduction of the term 'phatic communion' to describe the social function of expressions in contrast with their conveyance of meanings ; 'phatic question' thus characterizes an utterance which is a question and which introduces a topic, such as "Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight?" (M89).

The utterances "Yes" and "No" could be characterized as 'affirmation' and 'negation' or 'denial' but in the interests of clarity, the form of each is taken to be optimally descriptive and such utterances are characterized as 'Yes' and 'No' respectively. If "Yes" constitutes the beginning of a statement in an utterance, that utterance is characterized as 'Yes + statement', (A2), and if "No" precedes a statement, similarly that utterance is characterized as 'No + statement', (B53).

The analysis of misunderstandings which is presented in this thesis is based on the ways in which participants refer to the proposition expressed in the misunderstood utterance, the proposition which is understood to have been expressed, the utterance itself and the utterance which manifests the misunderstanding and which is based on or derives from that misunderstanding. In order that these ways may be characterized, everyday, non-technical words are adopted. Thus utterances may be completed, repeated, emphasized, amplified, explained, queried and refuted and propositions may be explained, queried and refuted. These terms are explained and illustrated in Chapter IV.

A final distinction made in this thesis is that between paralinguistic and extralinguistic behaviour. Paralinguistic behaviour, such as laughter or facial expression, is communicatively expressive, that is, it can contribute to the communication of a proposition, whereas extralinguistic behaviour,

such as a particular action, has no intended role in communication. Action is here taken to be positional, such as joining another speaker, rather than attitudinal, such as shaking a fist; such attitudinal action would be deemed paralinguistic behaviour because it would be communicatively expressive.

While it is relatively easy to characterize individual utterances, it is less easy to characterize the ways in which participants produce and receive utterances so as to interact and communicate. Chapter III addresses the problem of how to analyse misunderstandings so that the structural characteristics can be determined. The analysis of misunderstandings requires consideration of the communicative process and in Chapter III various approaches to the communicative process are discussed.

CHAPTER III

MODELLING THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to analyse a misunderstanding one needs to be able to refer to (i) what the speaker intends, (ii) what utterance he produces, (iii) what utterance the hearer perceives and decodes and (iv) what the hearer understands has been expressed. These four factors are important because in a misunderstanding there is disparity between (i) and (iv) and this disparity is the result of problems in either (ii) or (iii) or both. Studies of communication, which have been primarily theoretical, have discussed these four factors (e.g. Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Cherry, 1957; Miller, 1951, 1967; Halliday, 1973; Widdowson, 1980). In focussing on the linear relationship between the four factors, researchers have tended to ignore the outcome of communication attempts, that is, (iv), what the hearer understands has been expressed. This outcome is of particular importance in the analysis of misunderstandings because the outcome is what distinguishes a misunderstanding from correct understanding or non-understanding.

Section 2 of this chapter outlines some approaches to modelling the communicative process and Section 3 discusses in more detail some of the methods by which conversation has been analysed and also discusses the problems which the analyst has to overcome. It is apparent that any analysis of the communicative process ought to account for intentions, utterances and understandings and a model of communication which provides for these crucial factors is proposed in Section 4. By drawing on this model, misunderstandings may be analysed.

2. APPROACHES TO MODELLING THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS

Lyons (1977) discusses a typical model of communication which provides the following sequence :

" The message originated by X is encoded by the transmitter into a signal. That signal is sent over a particular communication channel to the receiver. The receiver decodes the signal into a message and passes the message on to Y "

(Lyons, 1977:37).

This sequence is applicable to any form of message transference. In spoken communication X is both message originator and transmitter, that is, a speaker, while Y is both receiver and message recipient, that is, a hearer. The signal is an utterance or a paralinguistic feature such as a laugh or a gesture or a combination of utterance and paralinguistic feature. The channel is speech or kinetic activity or both. The message is whatever the speaker intends to express.

Lyons's model is necessarily idealized. In it there is no disparity between what the speaker intends to express and what utterance he produces, no interference, acoustic or physical, to distort the channel and no disparity between what the speaker intends and what the hearer understands. Such idealization is necessary in order to establish what is meant by 'communication' but it cannot be maintained if one wishes to examine how speakers and hearers undertake communication. A study of misunderstandings essentially requires consideration of the very disparities which idealized communication models are able to omit. The outcome, incidental to a model which illustrates the components of communication, is crucial to the analysis of misunderstandings.

Grimshaw (1980), in his taxonomy of communicative events, chooses to adopt ideal speaker-hearers, thus excluding conversational resources and all the interferences which accompany them, yet discusses the emotional and behavioural responses of the speaker. The speaker can ignore the nonsuccess or can look for its source and attempt to clarify it by "reformulations, repetition of the initial utterance (frequently with increased amplitude) or verbal exploration of the sources of difficulty" (1980:63) in addition

to other responses such as laughter, anger or withdrawal from the interaction. These responses are the substance of conversation between actual rather than ideal speaker-hearers. Though wishing to limit the scope of his argument at the outset, Grimshaw nevertheless has to draw on actual features rather than idealized concepts in order to discuss communicative outcomes.

Varonis & Gass (1985) specify five communicative outcomes in their heuristic for coding variation in a hearer's interpretation of a speaker's utterance (1985:333-335) : (i) there is "perfect symmetry between intended and received message", represented as "X — X", (ii) the hearer receives the intended message but is not confident about his interpretation, represented as "X — X¹", (iii) the hearer incorrectly interprets the utterance but believes it has been correctly interpreted, represented as "X — Y" ('misunderstanding' in this thesis), (iv) the hearer incorrectly interprets the utterance but is not confident about his interpretation, represented as "X — Y¹" and (v) the hearer has little or no confidence in his interpretation, represented as "X — ∅". Hearers' beliefs about their interpretations of utterances, which are incorporated in Varonis & Gass's heuristic, are crucial in communication. If, for example, one correctly understands an utterance but believes one has misunderstood it, one proceeds in the conversation as though a misunderstanding has occurred although in fact it has not. Conversations are thus influenced by beliefs about communicative outcomes as well as by actual outcomes.

The outcome of a communication attempt tends to be considered in respect of a single utterance. Conversation, however, consists of more than single utterances. The essence of conversation is that its participants take turns to produce utterances, most of which are responses to previous utterances or initiators of subsequent utterances (Sacks et. al., 1974; Goffman, 1976). In addition to the outcome of a single utterance communication

attempt, therefore, there is a communicative outcome to a series of utterances.

Speaker-hearers are potentially able to organize their conversations so as to maximize the likelihood of successful communication. They can orient themselves to one another, can display attentiveness and reactions, can monitor understandings, can query utterances, can draw on conversational sequences for specific purposes such as opening and closing conversations and so on (Goodwin, 1981; Argyle, 1978; Yngve, 1970; Duncan, 1972, 1974; Jefferson, 1972; Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Because speaker-hearers are able to explain or re-phrase utterances to which the outcome appears unsuccessful they are often ultimately able to achieve a successful outcome.

Both speakers and hearers in a conversation are positive, active contributors. The choice of words, syntactic structure, prosodic and paralinguistic features of an utterance which is intended to express any proposition is in the speaker's control. The constitution of the utterance, together with auditory, contextual, pragmatic and cognitive elements all affect the hearer's understanding of that utterance. The roles of speaker and hearer are continually alternating as each produces utterances which the other seeks to understand. Conversation thus consists of dynamic interaction.

The difficulty of analysing discourse satisfactorily has long been recognized by the many researchers who have approached the problem in various ways and with various aims (e.g. Harris, 1952; Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Van Dijk, 1977; Schenkein, 1978c; Stubbs, 1983; Brown & Yule, 1983). Two alternative approaches are clearly detailed by Widdowson :

" One can on the one hand, deal with instances of discourse from the point of view of the third person analyst; that is to say, one can treat discourse in detachment from its instantiation, after the event, as a product. On the other hand, one can deal with discourse from the point of view of the participants caught, as it were, in the act; that is to say, one can treat discourse as a process " (Widdowson, 1979:70-71).

Coulthard & Brazil (1979:3), specifically referring to Schegloff, feel that the ethnomethodologists treat conversation as "an accomplished product rather than a developing process", a view endorsed by Widdowson (1979:71). Sinclair, Coulthard and Brazil's analyses of classroom interaction emerge as systematized sequences of products rather than analyses of the processes undertaken by the participants in the discourse.

It is difficult to imagine how such processes can be analysed except by concentration on sequencing and Widdowson himself wonders if process analysis can be accomplished. He claims that it should be able to "yield information about how the participants see the discourse at a particular point in its development and what controls their options at this point" (1979:71). Rather than confirm the unlikelihood of achieving a process analysis, this aim actually suggests an approach not usually undertaken for the obvious reason that the material tends not to be open to observation and therefore not open to analysis, that is, concentration on "how participants see the discourse". Determining how participants see the discourse can be done by eliciting their opinions as to what is happening in a discourse in which they have participated or which they have overheard (c.f. Kreckel, 1981; McGregor, 1983, 1984) but although the information yielded by such elicitation is important and makes substantial contributions to an appreciation of how discourse is negotiated and interpreted, shedding light on the behaviour and reasoning of the participants, the opinions are either retrospective or those of a third party and in no way affect the developing discourse.

In conversations in which the participants discuss their utterances and monitor the success or non-success of their communication attempts it is possible to determine how they "see the discourse" because the discourse itself contains discussion of how the participants are "seeing the discourse": what they intended, what they said, what they heard and what they understood. Since instances of miscommunication such as misunderstandings often include such discussion and monitoring, it is possible that an analysis of misunderstandings can be a process analysis.

3. ANALYSING CONVERSATION

In discussions of conversation it should be possible to refer to (i) speaker meaning, (ii) utterance meaning and (iii) hearer meaning. This tri-partite view is necessary in order to account for the variation in meaning which can occur. In respect of a single utterance, the speaker might intend to express a, his utterance, owing to an error in encoding or production, might express b and the hearer might understand it as expressing c.

This variability makes it difficult to refer to what an utterance 'means' or to what is 'meant' by an utterance. Hurford & Heasley's (1983:269) definition of utterance meaning is standard in linguistics: "UTTERANCE MEANING is what a speaker means when he makes an utterance in a particular situation". Utterance meaning is thus distinct from sentence meaning, which is constant regardless of context, situation or speaker intention. Hurford & Heasley's definition is too limiting in the context of communication. It cannot allow for the fact that what a speaker means may not be what he expresses in the event that he produces his utterance incorrectly or produces an utterance which does not aptly express what he intends. In Kjolseth's (1972) discussion of whether utterances have intractable meanings or whether

they change on each occasion of use, an utterance of Katz's is cited :
 "Whatever I said on that occasion, what I meant was ..." (1972:51). The
 utterance had not expressed what the speaker had intended to express.
 The meaning of that utterance was not, therefore, what the speaker meant.

The standard definition of utterance meaning also cannot allow for
 the fact that if the hearer has misunderstood the utterance, then the
 utterance meaning for that hearer differs from what the speaker intended so
 that there are two meanings in respect of the one utterance. In terms of
 communication, therefore, some other means of reference is required.

Simpson (1979) sees the difficulty of accounting for utterance meaning.
 In considering what is involved when one regards the meaning of an utterance
 as the function fulfilled by the utterance he raises the problem of how
 'function' is to be understood :

" Is it the intention of the speaker or is it the reaction
 of the hearer? If it is the intention of the speaker,
 then the problem of eliciting intentions arises; if it
 is the reaction of the hearer, then misunderstanding on
 his part may lead to a situation in which the reaction
 is not the one intended. This would require us to say
 that the speaker had no control over the meaning of his
 utterance. And indeed it is often the case that an
 intended meaning is misunderstood "

(Simpson, 1979:182).

It is a fact of communication that the speaker cannot control the meaning
 of his utterance once it has been expressed. The hearer can often be
 directed in such a way that he correctly understands the speaker's intended
 meaning but the meaning which the hearer attributes to the utterance is
 ultimately in his control alone.

In the work of, for example, Grice, Searle and Strawson on what it is
 for an utterance to have meaning for both speaker and hearer, it is agreed
 that essentially the hearer must know (recognize) the speaker's intention

in making the utterance before it can be said to have meaning for him, the hearer. The detailing of the definition which expresses this tenet differs and develops throughout the various work on the subject but Grice's unmodified definition (1969) gives a general indication of the way intention is considered necessary to the speaker's 'meaning' something of an utterance :

" "U meant something by uttering x" is true iff,
 for some audience A, U uttered x intending
 1. A to produce a particular response r
 2. A to think (recognize) that U intends 1.
 3. A to fulfil 1. on the basis of his fulfilment of 2. "
 (Grice, 1969:151).

If x is a question U would have meant something by that question as long as he intended A to produce a particular response, such as an answer to that question, A having recognized that U intended an answer to be provided and having done so knowing that U intended this.

If, however, "particular response" is interpreted differently, as a response so particular it has to be a specific answer rather than any answer, a different situation emerges. U may have intended A to produce a particular response, intended A to recognize this and to produce the particular response on the basis of such recognition but A's response could be based on a different interpretation of the question; the expected particular response would not have been forthcoming and therefore something else would have been meant by uttering x, something not intended by U but which could be taken to be the meaning of x should U choose not to make the misunderstanding known in the conversation, assuming he realizes it has occurred. The 'something' meant by U, the speaker, needs to be precisely specified, as does the response of A, the hearer, rather than being theoretically conceptualized.

Searle's (1969:47) interpretation of response is different. He argues that "the effect" on the hearer is not a belief or response, it consists

simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker". In most instances, a speaker will intend his utterance to be understood and additionally will very often intend that a response be provided by the hearer, in the form of another utterance or an action; the hearer's response depends on what the speaker intends his utterance to mean and on the hearer's understanding of both intention and utterance. The conjunction of recognition of intention and understanding of utterance need not be fully achieved in every instance; one or the other can occur, as noted by Bierwisch in his distinction between linguistic and communicative skills :

" language and communication (or more generally : social interaction) are based on different systems of knowledge. Under certain conditions you may therefore understand very well what someone wants to communicate without understanding what he says, and you may in other cases understand what someone says without understanding what he wishes to communicate "

(Bierwisch, 1980:3).

Different levels of understanding can apply to different circumstances so that, for example, the intention might be to pass the time of day in phatic communion, or to find out if the hearer knows something, or to require the hearer to do something. Greetings will usually be exchanged without the hearer needing to ponder on why the speaker greeted him; recognition of the intention to greet is sufficient. The hearer might tell the speaker that he knows something without being aware that the speaker's intention was to elicit this information, and indeed may yield the information without being aware that he has done so. He might perform the action which the speaker wished him to perform without knowing of that wish. This action might be in response to an indirect speech act but in such an act it is assumed that the hearer recognizes the speaker's intention in expressing an utterance with two illocutionary forces, such recognition generally stemming from application of Grice's "Cooperative Principle"

(1974:45), as Searle explains :

" In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inferences on the part of the hearer "

(Searle, 1975:60-61).

One can imagine a scenario in which, late at night, A, wishing B to go home to enable A to get to bed, says "I've had a very busy day". There are two intentions behind this utterance : (i) A intends B to realize that he should go and (ii) A intends to inform B that he has had a busy day. The intention to inform B about the busy day is a strategem by which A seeks to have B realize that he should go. It is quite possible that B will fail to recognize A's intention that he should leave and instead will only realize A's intention to inform him about the day. The consequence of such understanding could be that B proceeds to quiz A on his day or, still worse, elaborate on how busy his own day has been.

It is thus possible that multiple intentions underlie an utterance. The variability which such multiplicity of intention can bestow on utterances is augmented by the fact that they may have different meanings dependent on participants' understandings of them. Taken to extremes, one could have a speaker following Humpty Dumpty's creed of using a word which means what he chooses it to mean (Carroll, 1939:196) while the hearer hears a word and has it mean what he chooses it to mean. According to Coulthard (1977), discourse analysts are prepared to adopt hearer meaning, arguing that :

" the illocutionary force of an utterance is what it is taken to be by the listener rather than what it is intended to be by the speaker on the grounds that neither listener nor analyst can ever be sure of the speaker's intention because it is never available for examination, but the listener's interpretation is evident in his response and it is this which determines the progress of the interaction "

(Coulthard, 1977:19).

Because of the explanations of speaker's intention which are to be found when misunderstandings occur, intention becomes available for examination.

Moore & Carling (1982) offer a different view of meaning. They argue that the "container view" of meaning, that is, "the view that language somehow contains its meaning and speaks for itself" (1982:154) is ill-founded. They propose instead an "epiphenomenalist" view :

" From the epiphenomenalist perspective, language acts as a locating medium enabling one individual to cause another to gain access to knowledge, or to draw inferences from knowledge that he already has. On this view of language, meaning does not inhere in utterances but emerges from them "

(Moore & Carling, 1982:162).

In an analysis of conversation one needs to be able to refer to both inherent and emergent meaning and also to incipient meaning, that is, to utterance meaning, hearer meaning and speaker meaning.

By making provision for these three meanings in respect of one utterance one need not stumble over the fact that there is no exact meaning to an utterance (Goffman, 1976). Speaker-hearers are rarely troubled by this fact because, as Goffman points out, speaker-hearers presume on a "mutual understanding" :

" Commonly a speaker cannot explicate with precision what he meant to get across, and on these occasions if hearers think they know precisely, they will likely be at least a little off "

(Goffman, 1976:261).

Precision of expression and understanding is unlikely to prevail in conversation but nevertheless on occasions a speaker will endeavour, often strenuously, to make his exact meaning known to the hearer and the hearer has to work towards understanding this meaning. This interactive effort is noted by Downes (1977:95), who comments "What is 'meant', then, except for ritualized exchanges, will have to be worked towards, explicated,

and negotiated by participants in ongoing conversations". McGregor (1982) also holds that meaning is something which participants negotiate but for him there is no 'stable core of meaning'. Agreement with this contention depends on one's interpretation of 'stable'; the proposition which the speaker intends to express is stable for him and the proposition which the hearer believes has been expressed is stable for him. Though they may differ, both speaker meaning and hearer meaning are briefly absolute. Each has a stable core of meaning until they are refined in the light of prior and subsequent utterances. Consequently there can be several stable cores of meaning to any one utterance, albeit briefly in the moments of expressing and understanding. Interactive negotiation may then be required to match these different meanings.

In descriptions of discourse, emphasis tends to be on the functional, that is, on what the utterances are doing, rather than on what they are expressing. This emphasis emanates from Austin's (1962) observations on the actions performed by words and utterances. Analysis which focusses on what words and utterances do can be found in theoretical grammar (e.g. Ross, 1970; Sadock, 1974), in the originally philosophical discipline of speech act theory (e.g. Searle, 1969; Cole & Morgan, 1975) and in work on discourse and conversation. Because little attention is paid to what is expressed and to the interactive work done by speaker-hearers in order that they may successfully communicate, one receives the impression that conversation is neatly organized and that its organization is super-imposed on speaker-hearers rather than emanating from them and being engineered by them.

Thus one finds sequencing described by generalized function terms, or "transparent labels" according to Coulthard & Brazil (1979:2), who are critical of the ethnomethodologists' descriptions, such as "Appeal,

Processing Pass, Conference Pass, Acknowledgement" (Jefferson & Schenkein, 1978:162). Coulthard & Brazil, however, adopt a very similar approach in describing ostensibly basic units of interaction as the exchanges "eliciting, directing and inferring" (1979:26). Neither group of researchers appears to feel any need or desire to account for what is being "appealed", "processed", "elicited", "directed" and so on.

Similarly, Kreckel (1981) investigates the transmission of messages, a process which, one imagines, would necessitate consideration of the meaning of those messages. Her experiments in understanding and interpretation, however, which require the assignment of metapragmatic categories to data by participants and non-participants to the conversations which constitute the data, are limited to communicative acts such as "asserting, describing, inferring, rejecting" and so on (1981:136). Information is not provided on what is being "asserted", what "described", "inferred" or "rejected". It is not enough for a hearer to know that a speaker is performing any of these acts; to understand, he must also know what proposition the act expresses.

Accounting for the function of utterances without regard to meaning has important limitations. An utterance can count as a promise if it satisfies a number of conditions relating to promises (Searle, 1969:54ff.); what is promised is not taken into account except insofar as whether the speaker is entitled to make that promise. While the hearer can recognize that a promise is being made, he might have a different understanding of what is being promised than the speaker intended.

Without consideration of what is being expressed in an utterance, difficulties in analysis may not be solved. One such problem in Sinclair & Coulthard's (1975) analysis is the problem of deciding when an act is

an "informative" and when a "comment", the function of which is "to exemplify, expand, justify, provide additional information" (1975:42). Sinclair & Coulthard acknowledge the difficulty in distinguishing between the two but feel that in the teaching situation "informative" is signalled paralinguistically. Subsequently, Coulthard (1981:13) decides that the difference between the two cannot be properly distinguished until considerably more work has been done in establishing the relationship between discourse units and their lexico-grammatical realisations, in other words, in relating what is said to how it is expressed.

Burton (1981:67) argues that secondary distinctions need to be made and divides "informative" and "comment" into sub-categories, with "additive, adversative and causal" items comprising "informative" and "repeat, restate and qualifying" items comprising "comment". This division, however, still does not solve the problem of distinguishing between "informative" and "comment". One datum which she analyses is of particular interest in that it happens to be a misunderstanding :

	<u>Challenging</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Opening</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Supporting</u>	<u>Act</u>
	<u>Move</u>		<u>Move</u>		<u>Move</u>	
		1	A : I'm going to do some weeding	inf		
				2	B : Yes please	ack
3	A : What					
RE-OPENING		4	B : Yes please			
B-OPENING		5	A : You don't listen to anything I say	inf		
6	B : I thought you said you were going to pour some drinks					inf

	<u>Challenging</u>	<u>Act</u>
	<u>Move</u>	
7	A : No I said I'm going to do some weeding	inf " "

(Burton, 1981:79).

The 'challenging move' (3) is reckoned one in which the speaker "may ask for more information concerning the semantic relations that obtain between the referents in the discourse topic"(1981:72, following Keenan & Schieffelin, 1976). "What", however, could be classed as one of other possible challenges, such as asking for a repetition of the utterance or for clarification of information on the identification of objects, persons and ideas. "What" could equally well be an exclamation of surprise, which presumably could also count as a challenge. "Yes please" in (4) could be a supporting move rather than a re-opening move if "What" is a request for a repeat, with the implication that the utterance (2) is inappropriate.

The following utterance, "You don't listen to anything I say", is an 'informative' but could equally well be an 'accusation', the function of which is "to request an apology or a surrogate excuse" (1981:77). This utterance does provide information but it is information particular to the conversation and could be an 'accusation' that B has not been paying attention and also a signal of this lack of attention. The subsequent utterances are 'informative' but again the information given is crucially related to the conversation rather than to anything extrinsic and global. The act 'metastatement' is limited to referring to the structure, speaker-turn and so on of the following discourse but it would be profitable to allow 'metastatements' to refer to prior discourse as well.

Burton's interest is in analysing the structure of discourse, determining its constituents according to a rank scale. The problems of classification to which her analysis falls prey could be avoided by use of evidence from the participants as to how the utterances should be interpreted. Since there are occasions when speaker-hearers monitor and discuss their utterances, it would be useful to be able to draw on these monitorings and discussions explicitly in analysis (a development of Hoenigswald's (1966) advocacy of the usefulness of folk linguistic evidence).

The ethnomethodologists (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, Schenkein) investigate the organization of conversation. Their procedure is to trace patterns in numerous conversations by considering the way participants themselves organize their conversations. The result of their investigations is primarily the isolation of various sequences (e.g. Schegloff, 1968 on "conversational openings"; Pomerantz, 1978 on "compliment responses"; Schenkein, 1978b on "identity-rich puzzles").

The role of sequencing in the process of understanding is discussed by Schegloff & Sacks (1973, in Turner, 1974). They discuss the effect of two utterances produced by two different speakers, that is, speaker and hearer, showing that the second utterance displays the hearer's understanding and acceptance of or disagreement with the first utterance. The relevance of this to the realization that a misunderstanding has occurred is noted :

" inspection of a second by a first can allow the first speaker to see that while the second thought he understood, indeed he misunderstood "

(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, in Turner, 1974:240).

This relationship between two utterances is discussed with particular reference to the closing of a conversation which can only be achieved if the two utterances are adjacent.. Applied across a wider spectrum of conversation their thesis remains tenable but for the insistence on adjacency :

" It is then through the use of adjacent positioning that appreciations, failures, correctings, et cetera can be themselves understandably attempted. Whenever there is reason to have the appreciation of some implicativeness made attendable, 'next utterance' is the proper place to do this, and a two utterance sequence can be employed as a means for doing and checking some intendedly sequentially interactive occurrence in a way that a one utterance sequence can not "

(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, in Turner, 1974:240).

Obviously there would be no feedback if only one utterance was expressed and while the second utterance should be adjacent to effect closing, there is no essential need for such adjacency during conversation. It would be more efficacious in alerting the speaker to the hearer's reception of his utterance if it followed that utterance, but unless a topic change diverts attention it is likely that any subsequent utterance by the hearer would be related by the speaker to his initial one. Requiring adjacency pairing as a means to understanding implies little intelligence on the part of speaker-hearers.

Schegloff (1977) stresses the constraint enforced by the first part on the second in an adjacency pair, pointing out that the sequential organization of conversation is essential to the process of understanding; again, the emphasis is on the second pair part being evidence of understanding, or lack thereof, of the first. His concern is with the ambiguities which arise in conversation and specifically with whether or not an utterance is a question. His belief that in general participants are not troubled by ambiguity because their conversation is geared to what they do and do not know and that ambiguity tends to be "an overhearer's problem" (1977:99) is unlikely to be borne out by data of misunderstandings because "ratified participants" (the term used by Goffman, 1976) appear to fall foul of ambiguities which to overhearers and analysts look obvious and easily discernible.

Goffman (1976) rejects adjacency pairs or dialogic chaining as being too limiting, preferring to draw attention to the way each utterance is a response to a prior one, linked by various thematic and systematized means to other utterances and to factors extrinsic to the immediate conversational environment. He recognizes the importance of the entire conversation rather than close attention to any one abstracted sequence of utterances, which is a promising step towards developing a satisfactory methodology for studying misunderstandings. Similarly, his model for talk has much to recommend it :

" a sequence of response moves with each in the series carving out its own reference, and each incorporating a variable balance of function in regard to statement-reply properties "

(Goffman, 1976:293).

Adoption of such a model would free one from the limitations of paired sequences in which varying numbers of embedded sequences might be found.

Sequences can be readily identified if the utterances which comprise sequences have specific functions, such as greeting-greeting, question-answer, farewell-farewell. Not all utterances have such definite functions. Within a conversation, after the greetings and before the farewells, participants may discuss a number of topics. Their utterances cannot always be divided into such sequences as question-answer, suggestion-comment, puzzle-solution and so on. Any one utterance could simultaneously be question/suggestion/puzzle; the response to it could simultaneously be answer/comment/solution.

A further problem with sequencing is that sequences ought to have specific beginnings and endings (but cf. Levinson's (1983) discussion of potential second parts in sequencing and the notion of "conditional relevance"). Misunderstandings are unlikely always to be neatly packaged. If the

participants never become aware that a misunderstanding has occurred there will be no completion of a sequence but there will be numerous embeddings within that open-ended sequence. Sequencing, therefore, does not seem to be a promising analytic method in respect of misunderstandings.

The comprehensive discourse analysis of Labov & Fanshel (1977) is a successful attempt to link conventional discourse analysis, that is, analysis of how utterances are linked and how conversations are structured, with the intentions of the speakers and the understandings of the hearers. They make use of surface-level information such as syntactic structure, prosodic and paralinguistic cues, background information and commentary by the participants. They seek to identify recurrent communications, for which they use the term 'proposition', and to describe how the participants interact. They use actual text and provide an extremely detailed analysis of the text. Although criticism can be levelled at them for the lack of corroboration of their interpretations by both participants (the therapist comments on the text but the patient does not) and also by those referred to in the text (Cicourel, 1980; Corsaro, 1981) they nevertheless produce an analysis which succeeds in handling discourse and its concomitant background influences. However, their analysis is so detailed that it would take considerable time to apply. Referring to the study of conversation they comment (1977:27) "It is not enough to understand the conversation; it must in some way be reduced to general principles that will make other conversations easier and quicker to analyse and report". Ease and quickness do not appear to be the characteristics of their microanalysis and while it may prove to be the case that no thorough discourse analysis can be a contraction of its text, Labov & Fanshel's method is too complex a model to apply to misunderstandings. Since data of misunderstandings are drawn from a number of conversations, it would be difficult to amass all the

sociological information upon which Labov and Fanshel draw for their analysis.

In preference to complex microanalysis and also to the isolation of sequences as analytic methods, an attempt is made in this thesis to develop Goffman's view of conversation :

" a sustained strip or tract of referencings, each referencing tending to bear, but often deviously, some retrospectively perceivable connection to the immediately prior one "

(Goffman, 1976:309).

Instead of an immediately prior utterance, the conversation is described in terms of its referencing back to the utterance which has been misunderstood or away from that utterance when topics are developed or new ones taken up.

The term 'topic' is not used in Hockett's sense (1958:201), making distinction between 'topic' and 'comment' in the same way that subject was traditionally distinguished from predicate. In this thesis it is not a grammatical term but instead is a general term for what the conversation, in part or in whole, might be said to be about. While it is agreed that this is notoriously difficult to determine (McGregor, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) there is nevertheless a strong folk-linguistic conviction that at the time a conversation is taking place its participants are talking about 'something' or a series of 'somethings'; each 'something' is a 'topic' in this thesis (see Brown & Yule, 1983:68ff. for a clear discussion of "discourse topic" and "speaker's topic").

A 'proposition', what a speaker intends to express in an utterance, is identified within the topic. A proposition is a particular 'something' contributed by an individual as a part of the whole 'something', the topic, which is being talked about. The term 'proposition' is more usually used

in respect of sentences and is usually deemed subject to a true-false distinction. Lyons (1977:38), for example, describes propositions thus : "... propositions are expressed by sentences (and contained in utterances) and may be either true or false", while Hurford & Heasley (1983:19) define it as follows : " A PROPOSITION is that part of the meaning of the utterance of a declarative sentence which describes some state of affairs". If a speaker asks a question he is questioning the truth of the proposition ; if he issues a command he attempts to alter the truth of the proposition by demanding that some element to the proposition be changed.

In this thesis, however, a proposition is neither true nor false. It can be a statement, question or command. In, for example, the utterance "I wonder what she's selling it for" (A5 in the corpus of data) the proposition is that the speaker is curious about how much "she" is asking for "it" (a car) and that the speaker would like to know this amount. The facts that the speaker "wonders" and that "she" is selling her car are not propositions ; the combination of the two in the utterance is the proposition. Additionally, in this thesis 'proposition' is not restricted to factual usage ; it can have descriptive, expressive or social use (Lyons, 1977). The term 'proposition' is used in this general sense so that reference can be made to what the speaker intends to express and what the hearer believes to have been expressed. The true-false distinction is irrelevant and the requirement that a proposition applies only to a declarative utterance is too limiting. Freed from these restrictions it is possible to attribute 'proposition' to whatever the speaker intends to express and 'received proposition' to whatever the hearer believes to have been expressed.

The analysis presented in this thesis is based on what participants do with the propositions which they have expressed, when these have been

misunderstood. It thus differs from the ethnomethodologists' work and from more conventional discourse analysis. The adoption of the proposition as the central unit of analysis has been mooted in respect of child language discourse (Ochs, Schieffelin & Platt, 1979) while other proposition-based analyses of texts are directed towards investigation of memory-representation and the comprehension of text rather than investigation of understanding and communication (see Stubbs, 1983:213-4 and Brown & Yule, 1983:107ff. for discussions of proposition-based analyses of texts). Because the term 'proposition' is not used in its formal sense in this thesis, the system of analysis presented here, though based on propositions, differs from analyses of texts based on the constituent propositions of the sentences contained therein.

Research on conversation has not been confined to its structure and ways of analysing it. There has also been some consideration of the way conversation can be successfully understood. While there is no absolute blueprint for the procedures adopted by participants, Grice's 'conversational maxims' (1975:45-7) are frequently referred to as being probable guiding principles. Grice also establishes a "Cooperative Principle" :

" Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged "

(Grice, 1975:45).

Grice simplifies the co-operation between participants by concentrating on the positive contribution to communication made by apparent failures to observe this principle, these apparent failures in fact producing conversational implicatures. A participant can exploit the conversational maxims which Grice details (1975:45-7) for the purpose of producing a conversational implicature ; on the other hand, the participant might not be exploiting a maxim but might instead have failed to fulfil a maxim

because he has failed to hear an utterance correctly or having heard it correctly he has nevertheless misunderstood it. Such a participant might believe he is observing the Cooperative Principle whereas in fact he cannot do so because the utterance to which he responds is not the one produced by the speaker.

The Cooperative Principle is counter-productive as an aid to understanding once a misunderstanding has occurred. If a speaker assumes the Cooperative Principle has been observed by a hearer, and such an assumption is likely, he will not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred because he will assume that the hearer has a valid conversational reason for producing an utterance which appears to change the topic or which fails to fulfil some other maxim. The speaker would then attempt to determine what has been conversationally implicated in the response to his utterance, an attempt which is certain to fail. The Cooperative Principle depends on mutual understanding, the very thing it is intended to facilitate, yet it can hamper correct understanding.

The assumption that an "accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange" (Grice, 1975:45) can be absolutely determined by one participant ignores the fact that conversation is dynamic and that "purposes" and "directions" are changeable according to how they are understood. Grice's maxims focus on the utterance produced so that an active role is played by the speaker, who constructs the optimal utterance in which to express his proposition, while the hearer more passively assumes that the utterance is in compliance with the maxims and bases his understanding on that compliance. However, a hearer is not a replica of a speaker and what may be informative, true, relevant and perspicacious for the speaker may not be for the hearer. The achievement of mutual understanding requires each to make allowances for the other's individual characteristics and beliefs,

whether or not these are known or assumed.

Failure to communicate successfully is not necessarily because the speaker's utterance has not been as informative, true, relevant or perspicacious as it might have been, according to some absolute, ideal criteria, but because the hearer does not wholly share the speaker's beliefs about these qualities, understanding instead some other information, truth, relevance or perspicacity from the utterance. The fact that each speaker-hearer is a separate individual with a different belief can pose a more potential threat to successful communication than the conventional 'performance' interferences such as acoustic distortion, hesitation which affects clarity and so on.

It is apparent from the body of research on conversation that the dynamism of interaction is difficult to reflect in an analysis and that although intentions and understandings are intrinsic to the communicative process, they cannot easily be accommodated in analyses of conversation. In an attempt to incorporate intention and understanding into an analysis of misunderstanding, a model of communication is proposed in the following section. This model details possible outcomes to communication attempts and relates these outcomes to what the speaker intended to communicate. The model draws on Lyons's (1977:37) model for its structure in that it contains the following elements : sender, message, signal, message, receiver. In addition, it specifies outcomes in a similar way to the outcomes proposed by Varonis & Gass (1985:333-335). The proposed model does not incorporate the hearer's confidence in his understanding of the utterance although this is implied because both understanding and misunderstanding are confident beliefs while non-understanding is either a confident belief in a lack of understanding or a doubt in the understanding which means that there is no conclusive understanding achieved. The model makes clear whether or not there is variation between what is intended and what understood.

4. A PROPOSED MODEL OF COMMUNICATION

In this thesis 'S' and 'H' are specifically a speaker and a hearer who respectively are misunderstood and misunderstand. In the model of communication a speaker is characterized as 'A' and a hearer as 'B'; the model is not limited to communication which results in misunderstanding and therefore A becomes S and B becomes H only in particular instances.

When A communicates a proposition to B there are three possible outcomes to the communication : B can (a) understand, that is, correctly comprehend what proposition A endeavours to communicate; or (b) non-understand, that is, fail to comprehend any proposition at all; or (c) misunderstand, that is, fail to comprehend correctly the proposition which A endeavours to communicate and instead comprehend a different, incorrect proposition.

The proposition, p , is expressed in an utterance, x . The constitution of x as an apt expression of p is A's responsibility. Optimally, x will be as clear an expression of p as possible, complying with the grammar of the language and with numerous pragmatic constraints. If A expresses p in an apt x and utters x so that it can clearly be heard, the success of the communication depends on how B receives both x and p , that is, how he hears and interprets x and what proposition he understands it as expressing. The interpretation of x is the decoding of its constituents; one can comprehend x correctly without necessarily comprehending p correctly.

B's reception of x is x^r . B's reception of p is p^r . x^r and p^r are unlikely to match x and p exactly. What B hears, the received utterance, x^r , will be an approximation of x and what B understands, the

received proposition, p^r , will similarly be an approximation of p . Close approximation is sufficient to count as equivalence, that is, correct hearing and understanding.

The model of communication details the various ways by which the three possible outcomes of communication are achieved :

A expresses proposition p in utterance x :

For B : (a) understanding

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{(i)} & x^r = x & \text{(ii)} & x^r \neq x & \text{(iii)} & x^r = \emptyset \\ & p^r = p & & p^r = p & & p^r = p \end{array}$$

(b) non-understanding

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{(iv)} & x^r = x & \text{(v)} & x^r \neq x & \text{(vi)} & x^r = \emptyset \\ & p^r = \emptyset & & p^r = \emptyset & & p^r = \emptyset \end{array}$$

(c) misunderstanding

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{(vii)} & x^r = x & \text{(viii)} & x^r \neq x & \text{(ix)} & x^r = \emptyset \\ & p^r \neq p & & p^r \neq p & & p^r \neq p \end{array}$$

(a) Understanding When the outcome of communication is understanding, B receives the proposition which A intended him to receive.

In the first instance of understanding, (i) $x^r = x$, $p^r = p$, x^r is equivalent to x ; B correctly hears and interprets the utterance produced by A. p^r is equivalent to p ; B correctly understands the proposition intended by A.

In (ii), $x^r \neq x$, $p^r = p$, B fails either to hear or to interpret correctly the utterance produced by A but correctly understands the proposition intended by A. The faulty reception of x^r can be due to mishearing or to an incorrect interpretation of the utterance. One frequently encounters the claim 'I don't understand what you are saying but I know what you mean'. Neither mishearing nor utterance interpretation error by B need preclude correct understanding of the

proposition expressed in that utterance.

In (iii), $x^r = \emptyset$, $p^r = p$, B does not receive any utterance at all but nevertheless correctly understands the proposition. In a crowded bar, for example, one might not hear what is said but one can correctly understand that one is being offered a drink.

(b) Non-understanding When the outcome of communication is non-understanding B does not receive any proposition at all.

In the first instance of non-understanding, (iv) $x^r = x$, $p^r = \emptyset$, the utterance is received correctly but no proposition is received. Examples of such non-understanding are common in teaching sessions where a pupil correctly hears what the teacher has said and decodes that utterance correctly but has no understanding of it whatsoever, such as the following mathematical joke which frequently results in non-understanding : Question: If two Witches of Agncsi revolved about their asymptotes and then lay beside a hyperboloid in one sheet, would there be a perfect union? Answer: It depends on their eccentricities, ⁶.

In (v), $x^r \neq x$, $p^r = \emptyset$, the utterance is incorrectly heard or decoded and because of the mishearing or incorrect decoding no proposition is received.

In (vi), $x^r = \emptyset$, $p^r = \emptyset$, no utterance is received and no proposition is received. In a crowded bar this could be an offer of a drink by A which B cannot hear and cannot understand.

(c) Misunderstanding When the outcome of communication is misunderstanding, B (H) receives a proposition which is not the proposition A (S) intended him to receive.

In the first instance of misunderstanding, (vii) $x^r = x$, $p^r \neq p$, the utterance is correctly received but the proposition which B (H) receives is incorrect. This is illustrated by the following datum from the corpus, :A5 :

- | | | |
|-------|----|--|
| (1) | S: | I wonder what she's selling it for |
| (2) | H: | Going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini |
| (3.1) | S: | No that's not what I mean |
| .2) | : | I mean how much is she selling it for |

(1) is x . It is ambiguous and can be correctly interpreted in two ways. The proposition which A (S) intends to express in x , however, is one of the two possible interpretations. B (H) fails to receive this proposition, receives the other and misunderstands.

In (viii), $x^r \neq x$, $p^r \neq p$, neither utterance nor proposition are correctly received. B (H) hears or interprets x incorrectly and understands p incorrectly, as in the following datum, B54 :

- | | | |
|-----|------|-----------------------------|
| (1) | S: | Where do you do this? |
| (2) | H: | To make the crops grow |
| (3) | S,O: | / laugh / |
| (4) | O: | (S) said WHERE do you do it |

A (S) and B (H) are discussing morris dancing. "Where" in (1) is misheard as 'why' and therefore the proposition is misunderstood.

In (ix), $x^r = \emptyset$, $p^r \neq p$, no utterance is received and the proposition which is received is incorrect. In a crowded bar, for example, this could be the understanding of an utterance which has not been heard, as an offer of a drink where actually A (S) is saying that he is going.

Specification of how x^r and p^r relate to x and p results in the communicative outcome of any one utterance. The immediate outcome of a misunderstanding of an utterance is specified as ' $\neq p$ '. Conversations consist of more than single utterances and the eventual outcome of a misunderstanding may be the consequence of a series of utterances exchanged by S, H and any other participants O^1, O^2, O^n . Thus the communicative outcome may develop from ' $p^r \neq p$ ' to ' $p^r = p$ ' by means of a series of utterances. The model of communication provides the means by which these utterances and their contribution to the development and resolution of a misunderstanding may be analysed. Chapter IV outlines the analytic method which draws on the communication model and which is subsequently applied to the corpus of data in order to determine the structural characteristics of misunderstandings.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY FOR ESTABLISHING

THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter III it was argued that an analysis of conversation ought to be able to reflect the dynamism of interaction. Additionally, it was suggested that an analysis of conversation should not exclude consideration of the meaning of utterances nor the contingent issues of what the speaker intends to express and what the hearer understands to have been expressed. The analytic method adopted in this thesis seeks to meet these requirements by detailing the ways in which participants refer to the proposition expressed in the misunderstood utterance, the proposition which is understood to have been expressed, the utterance itself and the utterance which manifests the misunderstanding and which is based on or derives from that misunderstanding.

Drawing on the model of communication proposed in Chapter III, the corpus of misunderstandings can be analysed by attending to the ways in which participants refer (i) to p , the proposition which S intends to express in an utterance, (ii) to x , the utterance which S produces, (iii) to x^r , the utterance which H hears and decodes, (iv) to p^r , the proposition which H believes to have been expressed and (v) to the utterance by H which is based on H's p^r . This last utterance would be the next x in a sequence of utterances in the communicative process but in order to simplify the analysis x is restricted to the utterance by S which H misunderstands. This enables subsequent utterances which relate to x to be analysed in terms of their relationship to x .

2. AN OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

In Chapter I a misunderstanding was defined as occurring when H incorrectly understands a proposition expressed by S in an utterance and subsequently manifests this incorrect understanding in an utterance. It

follows from this definition that a misunderstanding must contain at least two utterances : (i) the utterance by S which is misunderstood and (ii) the utterance by H which is based on this misunderstanding. The analysis of misunderstandings commences with the identification of these two utterances, which are termed origin and manifestation respectively.

A misunderstanding probably contains utterances in addition to the origin and the manifestation and many of these utterances will relate to the misunderstanding, developing it, resolving it or failing to resolve it. These utterances, which may include paralinguistic features such as laughter, are termed devices and constitute the means by which participants deal with misunderstandings. The term device is adopted in preference to 'strategy' (Brown & Levinson, 1978) because 'strategy' implies conscious application whereas a device may be used without the participant being aware of its use.

Origin, manifestation and devices constitute the textual components of a misunderstanding. They are produced by the participants and can be checked against a transcribed record of what was said. A misunderstanding also contains non-textual components which the analyst can only recover after consideration of the textual components and, if available, retrospective commentary by the participants. The non-textual components are the speaker's intention, p , which can be recovered by assessment of the origin and of subsequent devices, and the hearer's understanding, p^r , which can be recovered by assessment of the manifestation and of subsequent devices. The other non-textual component which can be identified is the particular understanding which participants have in respect of the misunderstanding, namely, whether or not each participant is aware that the misunderstanding has occurred, termed state of realization. Identification of each participant's state of realization provides a key to the interpretation of the conversation

since, for example, if S realizes and H does not realize a misunderstanding has occurred, H will have a different understanding of the origin utterance to S, who will know that H has this different understanding.

A misunderstanding consists of a number of utterances and it occurs within a conversation which usually contains additional prior and subsequent utterances. A misunderstanding originates with the origin utterance and it closes when it has ceased to be the topic of conversation. After a misunderstanding has closed, participants either return to the topic raised in the origin, having agreed what that topic is intended to be, or they take up a new topic. If participants do not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred, that misunderstanding closes when the topic raised in the origin, which remains misunderstood, is no longer the topic of conversation. Thus, if participants are aware that a misunderstanding has occurred, that misunderstanding closes when it has been resolved whereas if they do not realize it has occurred, thereby continuing to have different understandings of the origin, that misunderstanding closes when a new topic is raised. For such participants the misunderstanding continues throughout the conversation but generally ceases to affect understandings of subsequent topics.

The analysis of a misunderstanding therefore follows the following procedure : (i) identify origin and manifestation, (ii) identify devices between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding and (iii) identify the participants' states of realization. The following sections discuss this procedure, step by step.

3. ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION

The origin is the point in the conversation at which the misunderstanding originates. It is misleading to think of the origin as the

'beginning' of a misunderstanding because only the analyst can perceive that the misunderstanding 'began' at the origin. The participants might be aware of the origin retrospectively but the misunderstanding 'begins' for them at the point in the conversation when they realize that it has occurred ; such realization can happen at a different time in the conversation for each participant. Prior to the realization that a misunderstanding has occurred each participant believes that correct understanding obtains.

An utterance by S only becomes an origin if H subsequently produces an utterance based on his misunderstanding of S's utterance. This utterance by H is termed manifestation: it manifests the misunderstanding in the conversation. The ambiguous notion of 'beginning' could also be applied to manifestation because the conversation following the manifestation is influenced by or centres on the misunderstanding. A misunderstanding therefore does not 'begin' at any point in the conversation but rather it originates in one utterance and is manifested in another.

Origin and manifestation occur in a strict sequential order but it must be stressed that H is not under any obligation to provide a manifestation. When H responds to a question he is often obliged or expected to provide an answer ; he is under no such obligation or expectation to provide a manifestation of any misunderstanding he might have made of that question and though he will very likely do so he will not be aware that his utterance is a manifestation. The fact that a question has been misunderstood is of no consequence to the sequential organization which conventionally expects an answer to be provided to a question, unless the force of the utterance as a question has been misunderstood and the reply fails to take the form of a recognizable answer. Unless a manifestation is provided the misunderstood question is not an origin. The sequencing

of origin and manifestation is a structure imposed on the conversation by the analyst and has no immediate part in a speaker-hearer's folk-linguistic awareness, although in a post hoc sense S and/or H might be aware of the roles of the two utterances.

Identification of the origin depends on the identification of the manifestation. Identification of the manifestation is made in the light of its inappropriacy as a response to the origin. Since a manifestation is the product of an incorrect understanding of the origin it is a response to a different proposition than the one which S intended to express in his utterance. Consequently, the manifestation is likely to lack coherence. In the following example, extracted from B53, the manifestation is not an appropriate response to the origin :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Are you Manx? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: No, eh, I'm divorced actually |

H misunderstands S's question in (1) as meaning 'Are you married?' and her reply is to this question rather than the one actually asked by S, "Are you Manx?". The inappropriacy of (2) in response to (1) enables both S and the analyst to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred.

The manifestation in the example is a direct one because it is a recognizably inappropriate response to the origin. An indirect manifestation is one which is an apparently appropriate response to the origin and which therefore cannot be recognized as being a manifestation without further utterances to elaborate it. The manifestation is indirect in the following datum, A48 :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: I've only got one side of it |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Why? |
| (3) | | S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other |
| (4) | | H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono |
| (5) | | S: No I meant only one side of the album |

S and H are listening to a tape which S made of H's record. H's response to the origin with the wh-question "Why?", in (2), is an appropriate response and S answers the question in (3) without being aware that a misunderstanding has occurred. Had H, who knows that the record is in stereo, asked a more specific question, such as 'Didn't you record it properly?' or 'Is your music centre broken?' , S might have realized that a misunderstanding had occurred. Instead, H becomes aware of this in the light of S's response in (3) , which is an answer to a different question ('Why (have you only got one side of the record) ?') and responds in (4) with an explanation of what she thought S intended to express in the origin. This explanation enables both S and the analyst to realize that the misunderstanding has occurred and it further enables the analyst to locate the indirect manifestation at (2). Without subsequent utterances to elaborate it, such as occur in this datum, an indirect manifestation can only be identified if H subsequently becomes aware that he has misunderstood the origin and reports the misunderstanding to the analyst.

The analysis of a misunderstanding thus commences with the identification of the origin and the manifestation ; in the case of indirect manifestations other utterances must be examined. These utterances are devices.

4. DEVICES

The manifestation is one utterance between the origin and the close of a misunderstanding. A variable number of other utterances are also to be found between the origin and the close. In A48 above, the misunderstanding consists of five utterances : (1) and (2) are the origin and the manifestation respectively, while (3), (4) and (5) are additional utterances. These additional utterances are devices. Devices chiefly consist of utterances which relate to the origin and what S intends it to express, to

to the manifestation and what H has misunderstood the origin as expressing and to the fact that S's and H's understandings are or might be at variance. Devices pertain to a misunderstanding in a variety of ways : they can refer specifically to the misunderstanding, can express propositions which elaborate the origin or the manifestation, can query S's intention or H's understanding, can signal or acknowledge error and so on. Devices can also be extralinguistic features such as actions undertaken by the participants which have some bearing on the misunderstanding.

Use of the various devices contributes to the development and potential or actual resolution of misunderstandings. In A48 S's answer in (3) as to why she only has one side of the record, as opposed to the anticipated answer as to why she recorded the record in mono, enables H to realize that she has misunderstood (1). H's subsequent explanation then enables S to realize that the misunderstanding has occurred and prompts an explanation by S of what she intended to express in the origin. These three utterances each constitute particular devices, explained and illustrated below, and they enable the misunderstanding to be fully resolved.

The model of communication is used to analyse the structure of misunderstandings. x corresponds with the origin, the utterance which is misunderstood. x^r corresponds with what H hears and decodes. p corresponds with what proposition S intends to express in his origin utterance. p^r corresponds with H's understanding of that origin; p^r is often revealed in direct manifestations.

Although every utterance is an x and every proposition expressed therein is a p , in this thesis x is restricted to the origin utterance and p to the proposition expressed in that origin. It is thus possible to specify a number of utterances other than the origin and the manifestation by referring them back to x and p in terms of their function relating to x

and p , and to x^r and p^r in terms of their function relating to x^r and p^r . Thus, an utterance which explains the origin is specified as 'x explained' in that it explains what was said while an utterance which explains what S intended to express in the origin is specified 'p explained' in that it explains what was meant, such as "...I meant only one side of the album" (A48). Similarly, an utterance which explains what the origin was heard or decoded as is specified as ' x^r explained' in that it explains what utterance H heard and decoded, while an utterance which explains what the origin was understood as is specified ' p^r explained' in that it explains what proposition H believed to have been expressed in x , such as "...I thought you meant it was in mono" (A48).

Function specifications such as 'p explained' and ' x^r explained' are devices, the use of which enables participants to develop and resolve misunderstandings. Various devices are available to participants, including a number which relate to x , p , x^r and p^r . x may be 'completed', 'repeated', 'emphasized', 'amplified', 'explained', 'queried' or 'refuted'; p , x^r and p^r may be 'explained', 'queried' or 'refuted'. These terms are used in a specific technical sense which usually but not invariably corresponds with the everyday non-technical sense of the word. 'Amplification', for example, does not detail increased volume but rather an elaboration or the provision of additional information.

The model of communication shows the outcome of a misunderstanding as ' $\neq p$ ': the proposition which S intends to communicate is not the proposition which H understands to have been communicated. A number of devices relate to ' $\neq p$ ': if there is an awareness that something is not right in the conversation, participants can draw attention to this by 'signalling' an error in p^r and they can 'acknowledge' such an error, while if they realize a misunderstanding has occurred they can draw attention

to this by 'signalling' a misunderstanding and they can 'acknowledge' the occurrence of a misunderstanding.

Since x and p are restricted to the origin, any utterance which develops or changes the topic of the origin cannot be specified as another x which expresses another p , unless it in turn is misunderstood. Therefore, any utterance which expresses another proposition between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding is specified as 'y'. Utterances which express new propositions after the close of the misunderstanding are specified as 'z' utterances; these do not contribute to the development or resolution of the misunderstanding although they may relate to the origin in that, for example, they provide an answer to a question posed in the origin.

The devices outlined thus far are related to x , p , p^r and x^r , an error in p^r and the misunderstanding itself or are 'y' or 'z' utterances which are distinct from x and p . Other utterances may be related to the manifestation. Such utterances cannot be dealt with in terms of x , p , x^r and p^r yet would need to be specified as distinct from 'y' and 'z' utterances because they would be pertinent to the manifestation rather than being utterances which raise new topics or which develop that of the origin. In order to accommodate such utterances in the analytic system, the function specifications of utterances in relation to x , p^r , p and p^r are also applied to utterances which relate to the manifestation. The manifestation can thus be 'completed', 'repeated', 'emphasized', 'amplified', 'explained', 'queried' and 'refuted'. It is important to bear in mind that these devices are in terms of the utterance which is the manifestation rather than the proposition which that utterance expresses; devices relating to the proposition expressed in the manifestation are in terms of p^r .

An additional device which is not related to the model of communication

and is not an utterance is the extralinguistic device of 'action'. Positional or other moves may be important contributions to a misunderstanding and must therefore be incorporated in the analysis.

The following list details the devices which constitute the various utterances to be found in misunderstandings. As will be seen in Chapter VI below, not all these devices are used in the corpus. Each device is exemplified by relating it to the origin and manifestation of an actual misunderstanding. A5 :

ORIGIN	S: I wonder what she's selling it for
MANIF.	H: Going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini

(a) Devices which relate to x x^r , p and p^r :

1. x completed : "It for" (if the origin had been interrupted, such as 'I wonder what she's selling')
2. x repeated : "I wonder what she's selling it for"
3. x emphasized : "I wonder WHAT she's selling it for"
4. x amplified : "I wonder how much she's selling it for"
5. x explained : "I said I wonder what she's selling it for"
6. x queried : "Did you say I wonder what she's selling it for?"
7. x refuted : "You didn't say I wonder what she's selling it for"
8. x^r explained : "I thought you said I wonder why she's selling it"
9. x^r queried : "Did you think I said I wonder why she's selling it?"
10. x^r refuted : "I didn't say I wonder why she's selling 'it'"
11. p explained : "I meant how much is she selling it for"
12. p queried : "Did you mean you wonder how much she's selling it for?"
13. p refuted : "You can't mean you wonder how much she's selling it for"
14. p^r explained : "I thought you meant why is she selling it"
15. p^r queried : "Did you think I meant why is she selling it?"
16. p^r refuted : "I didn't mean why is she selling it"

(b) Devices which relate to the misunderstanding or to an error in p^r :

17. p^r error signal : "What?" or "Pardon?"
18. p^r error acknowledgement : "Sorry" (assuming the p^r error acknowledgement stems, for example, from from an objection to the snideness of the manifestation's comment on the social pretensions of the seller)
19. misunderstanding signal : "We're at cross purposes"
20. misunderstanding acknowledgement : "Oh, I get you now"

(c) Devices which involve utterances which express new propositions and which relate to the manifestation :

21. y : "I might be able to afford it"
22. manifestation completed : "Of her bashed mini" (if the manifestation had been interrupted after "Going up in the world getting rid"
23. manifestation repeated : "Going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini"
24. manifestation emphasized : "GOING UP in the world GETTING RID of her bashed mini"
25. manifestation amplified : "Improving her status by getting rid of her battered old mini"
26. manifestation explained : "I said going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini"
27. manifestation queried : "Did you say going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini?"
28. manifestation refuted : "You didn't say going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini"
29. z : "You don't want to buy that old thing" (after the misunderstanding has been resolved)

(d) Devices which involve extralinguistic activity :

30. action : Looking at the advertisement for the car (to see the price)

These devices would vary depending on whether they were used by S or H but the examples indicate the nature of each device.

Having identified origin, manifestation and devices it becomes possible to determine each participant's state of realization.

5. STATES OF REALIZATION

Every participant must either realize or fail to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred. States of realization are thus pertinent to every misunderstanding. When a misunderstanding has occurred, participants' understandings of the conversation depend on their state of realization. Thus S could realize but H could fail to realize that a misunderstanding had occurred and they would therefore understand the conversation differently. A misunderstanding in which these states of realization obtained would differ from one in which both participants realized and would differ again from one in which neither realized.

It is possible to determine which states of realization obtain by examining the devices used between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding. If, for example, S has realized a misunderstanding has occurred he might attempt to ensure that H also realizes, that is, attempt to effect realization. If S uses explicit devices such as 'p^r refuted' and 'p explained', that is, "No I didn't mean ..." and "I meant ...", it is probable that S has realized and is attempting to effect realization for H. H, in response, might use a device such as 'misunderstanding acknowledgement' or 'p^r explained', that is, "Oh!" and "I thought you meant ..." which could make it apparent that H has realized the misunderstanding has occurred.

States of realization can also be determined by eliciting retrospective commentary from the participants. Additionally if a participant reports a misunderstanding then that participant has realized that the misunderstanding has occurred.

The analyst should attempt to determine the point in the conversation .

at which realization is effected for each participant since the state of realization governs the options open to participants.

Realization is subject to binary classification because in every misunderstanding '+ realization' or '- realization' must obtain for every participant. However, it is not always possible to be certain of all participants' states of realization because of insufficient textual evidence or lack of retrospective commentary and therefore provision must be made for those data in which there is uncertainty. When textual evidence suggests that '+ realization' or '- realization' obtains but when there is no confirmation of this '? + realization' or '? - realization' are deemed to obtain. When there is neither textual evidence nor retrospective commentary '? realization' is deemed to obtain.

6. SUMMARY AND SAMPLE ANALYSES

A misunderstanding is composed of both textual and non-textual components. The textual components can be checked against a transcription of what was said and done during a misunderstanding; they are utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features. The non-textual components are the participants' intentions and understandings and can only be determined by examination of the textual components and/or by corroboration from the participants.

The textual components can be divided into two: primary and secondary. The origin, the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H, and the manifestation, the utterance by H which is based on or derives from his misunderstanding of the origin, are both primary components in that they are essential to a misunderstanding as it is defined in this thesis. All remaining utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features are devices and are secondary components in that they are optional to a misunderstanding as defined in this thesis.

The non-textual component which is incorporated in the analysis is the state of realization which obtains for each participant, that is, whether or not each participant is aware that the misunderstanding has occurred. This component serves to mark the point in the conversation at which beliefs about the origin and therefore any subsequent utterances change. Realization marks the extent of the misunderstanding in two ways : (i) from the origin to '+ realization' and (ii) from '+ realization' to the close. Prior to realization the participant is not aware of the misunderstanding and after '+ realization' the participant can elect to resolve or conceal the misunderstanding until it closes.

The corpus in Appendix 1 is analysed in accordance with the method described in this chapter. Each datum includes a commentary which specifies (i) the source, (ii) p, the proposition intended by S, (iii) p^r, the proposition H believes to have been expressed, (iv) S's state of realization and how it has been effected (if it is '+ realization'), (v) H's state of realization and how effected, (vi) O's state of realization and how effected and (vii) whether or not the transcription was confirmed by the participants. This commentary serves to explain the misunderstanding since to know what p, p^r, 'S realization' and 'H realization' are is to understand the course of the misunderstanding.

The following two examples illustrate the analysis.

- (a) A5. S, (f), and H, (f), are discussing a friend who is selling her car
- | | | | | |
|-------|---------------------------|----|--|-----------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | I wonder what she's selling it for | |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | Going up in the world getting rid of her bashed mini | |
| (3.1) | p ^r ref. prt1. | S: | No that's not what I mean | + S real. |
| .2) | p exp. | : | I mean how much is she selling it for | |
| | | | | + H real. |
| .3) | z | : | I'll have to remember to tell it to Claire for her misunderstandings | |

Source : Reported by S
 p = I wonder how much she's selling her car for
 p^r = I wonder why she's selling her car
 S real. = '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response giving
 price of car.
 H real. = '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & p exp.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

S in (1) muses on how much her friend wants for her car but H believes she is musing on why the friend is selling the car and in (2) suggests why the car is for sale. Thus, (1) is the origin and (2) is the manifestation. S realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred because (2) is not an appropriate response to (1); this inappropriacy is deemed 'cognitive' because the manifestation is not what S has anticipated (the ways in which manifestations may be inappropriate are discussed in Chapter VII). S then sets about alerting H to the misunderstanding. She effects '+ H realization' by using 'p^r ref. prtl.' in (3.1) and 'p exp.' in (3.2). In (3.1) she refutes H's understanding of (1); this refutation is 'partial' because it does not specify H's p^r but uses instead a pronoun. In (3.2) S explains what p she intended to express. These devices effect '+ H realization'. There is no textual evidence for H's state of realization but it was confirmed when the two discussed the misunderstanding and recorded it. The utterance (3.3) is produced after the misunderstanding has closed, that is, the two participants have realized the misunderstanding has occurred and have dealt with it successfully. It is therefore a 'z' utterance.

(b) A48. S, (f), and H, (f), are listening to a tape which S has made of H's record.

- (1) ORIGIN S: I've only got one side of it
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: Why?
 (3) y S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other
 _____ + H real.
 (4) p^r exp. H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p^r ref. prtl. S: No I meant only one side of the album
 & p exp.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = I've only got one side of the record
 p^r = I've only got one channel (i.e. it's in mono)
 S real. : '+ S real.' effected by H's 'p^r exp.', explaining the
 misunderstanding.
 H real. : '+ H real.' effected by S 'y' utterance, giving reason
 for having one side of the record.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

S in (1) comments that she only has one side of "it", meaning the record. H believes that S is commenting that she only has one channel, that is, that she has recorded the record in mono, and in (2) she asks "Why?". (2) is thus an indirect manifestation. It is not an inappropriate response to the origin and it is only because S produces, in (3), a 'y' utterance which explains what is on the other side of the tape that the misunderstanding can be detected by the analyst. The 'y' utterance effects '+ H real.' and H then explains what she thought was intended. This use of 'p^r exp.' in (4) effects '+ S real.'. S partially refutes p^r by saying "No" to H's p^r and explaining p in (5).

Applying this analytic methodology it is possible to analyse the corpus. The following three chapters discuss the results of this analysis. The primary textual components, origin and manifestation, are discussed in Chapter V, the secondary textual components, devices, are discussed in Chapter VI and the non-textual component, realization, is discussed in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER V

PRIMARY TEXTUAL COMPONENTS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS :

ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION

1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter IV it was explained that the analysis of misunderstandings commences with the identification of two essential utterances : (i) the origin, the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H and (ii) the manifestation, the utterance by H which is based on his misunderstanding of the origin. These two utterances constitute the two primary textual components of misunderstandings.

This chapter discusses the origins and manifestations which have been found in the corpus. Section 1 concentrates on the types of origins which occur, Section 2 on the types of manifestations and Section 3 on the relationship between origins and manifestations.

2. ORIGIN

The origin is the utterance by S which is misunderstood by H. The misunderstanding might be of one or more words in an utterance which is otherwise understood correctly or of an entire utterance but the term origin is applied to the entire utterance rather than to individual words. The proposition which the entire utterance expresses is misunderstood even if only one word in that utterance is actually misunderstood.

An origin may extend over more than one utterance in a speaker turn, as in the following example, A6 :

- | | | |
|-------|--------|--|
| (1) | | H: That's six pence |
| | | S - takes three 2p pieces from her purse - |
| (2.1) | ORIGIN | S: I thought they'd be more |
| .2) | ORIGIN | : They're so big |
| (3) | MANIF. | H: It's six pence a sheet regardless of size |
| (4.1) | | S: I meant the money |
| .2) | | : It looks as if it should be more valuable than it is |

S an Australian. is paying for some photocopying.⁷ The two utterances

(2.1) and (2.2) express related propositions, both of which are misunderstood and both are deemed origins.

The following misunderstanding, K85, also has two origins :

- | | | | |
|-------|--------|----|--|
| (1.1) | | : | Hell ! |
| .2) | ORIGIN | : | My nerve ends must be getting nearer the surface |
| | | | / pause / |
| | | H | - goes to kitchen - |
| .3) | ORIGIN | S: | I'm becoming much more susceptible to |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | Little niggles |
| (3) | | S: | Heat and cold |

S is in the kitchen, H, initially, in the adjoining room. The second origin is an incompleated statement and the manifestation is an incorrect completion of this statement, based on a misunderstanding of "nerve ends" in the first origin. This first origin is the primary one and it might not be feasible to call the second one an origin at all since H understands it correctly as far as it goes in contrast with the first which is misunderstood. However, H interrupts and incorrectly completes (1.3) and would not have done so had she not also misunderstood it, carrying over her misunderstanding of (1.2).

The majority of origins are statements, polar questions and wh-questions but other utterance types are open to being misunderstood. (See Section 4 below for a Table detailing the correlation between origin utterance types and manifestation utterance types).

The origin is interrogative in 43% of the corpus and of these the illocutionary force is misunderstood in only two data. In A22 the origin is understood as a minor statement in which "which" is a relative pronoun rather than as a question in which "which" is an interrogative pronoun, as S intends. In Q98 a wh-question is understood as a request :

- (1) ORIGIN S: How's Johnny Walker?
 (2) MANIF. H: Get him some more whisky

H incorrectly assumes that the question in (1) is an indirect speech act which has the force of a request. In the other data in which the origin is interrogative H correctly understands that the origin is a question but misunderstands the proposition expressed therein.

In three data (K83, M89 and M91) the origin is a phatic question. The person asking the question is not interested in that question being answered but wishes to secure the hearer's interest and attention in the topic raised by the question, as a prelude to either speaker or hearer continuing the topic. The origin in the following example, M89, is a phatic question :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight?
 (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes
 .2) : Poor Anne
 .3) : She was going off to do the washing
 (3.1) SS: Aaah
 .2) : Did she say that Anne phoned ME?

S asks H if she has been told that Anne, H's daughter, has phoned S; S is in fact telling H that the phone call took place as a prelude to talking about Anne. H correctly understands (1) as a phatic question in that she takes up the topic of Anne but she misunderstands the proposition that the phone call was to S, not to herself; S was not aware that Anne had phoned S.

H correctly understands the illocutionary force of the three origins which are requests (A19, B56 and L87) and that of the one origin which is a command (A18). In A18 the command "Take your paper bin" is misheard as 'Take your paper in' and the manifestation is a query as to which paper S is referring.

The illocutionary force of the origin is misunderstood in one other datum, A7. In A7 a minor statement is understood as a request or command :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|---|
| (1) | | O: That's the sort of thing they do at the Crescent |
| (2) | | H: What? |
| (3) | ORIGIN | S: Seances |
| (4) | MANIF. | H: Say what? |

H does not understand that (3) is intended to explain that seances are the sort of thing "they" do at the Crescent. She understands it to be a request or command for her to 'say ances' which she assumes is a test of pronunciation since the Crescent is a private school which she attended. Her manifestation is a question which seeks to clarify what she is supposed to be 'saying'.

3. MANIFESTATION

The manifestation is the utterance by H which is based on or derives from H's misunderstanding of the origin and is a response to that origin. The manifestation provides evidence, both to participants and analyst, that a misunderstanding has occurred.

Manifestations may be direct or indirect. A direct manifestation is a recognizably inappropriate response to the origin whereas an indirect manifestation is an apparently appropriate response which cannot be recognized as a manifestation without further utterances to elaborate it or retrospective awareness by H.

When the indirect manifestation is a question such as "Why?" (as in A48) S's response tends to alert H to the misunderstanding, because the response answers a different question to the one H intends. When, however, the origin is a polar question and the indirect manifestation is simply "Yes" or "No" the topic may change and neither participant may realize the misunderstanding. In data such as the following, A42, however, the topic is

continued and thus the misunderstanding is realized :

- | | | | |
|-------|-------------|----|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | Are you having your tea and going? |
| (2) | IND. MANIF. | H: | No |
| (3) | | S: | I thought you were going at quarter to four |
| (4.1) | | H: | Oh my tea |
| .2) | | : | I thought you meant my eat tea |
| .3) | | : | Yes |

S and H are colleagues ; H is going to a dental appointment at four o'clock and office tea is consumed at half past three. S may well have anticipated the answer "Yes" to her question, hence her reluctance to accept H's negative answer without further comment.

The indirect manifestation can be extremely indirect, as the following datum, K86, illustrates :

- | | | | |
|-------|-------------|----|--|
| (1.1) | ORIGIN | S: | Bob's doing a foreigner in Surby for somebody |
| .2) | | : | The brother-in-law came over and he doesn't speak any English so Bob was in a mess |
| .3) | | : | He got him to the pub but the guy kept talking German |
| .4) | | : | James knows a bit so they managed |
| (2) | IND. MANIF. | H: | How's his marriage? |
| (3) | | S: | Which one? |
| (4) | | H: | The second |
| (5) | | S: | She's going into the Jane in a couple of days time |
| (6) | 2nd MANIF. | H: | Well what about the one in Surby? |
| (7) | | S: | No it's only a foreigner |
| (8) | | H: | But .. oh God |

Relevant background information is that Bob, a builder, has been married twice, "Surby" is a village, "the Jane" is the local maternity hospital ; S, Bob and James are all friends and are all known to H, who is S's sister. To understand the misunderstanding, it must be appreciated that "doing a foreigner" is Manx idiom for 'moonlighting', that is, performing one's trade in one's own time for private employment rather than as part of one's job. H knows this expression but sordidly misunderstands it as meaning

'having an affair with a foreigner'. Rather than inquire into the morality of the presumed affair, H tries to draw S into commenting by asking after Bob's marriage, since the matter-of-fact narrative in (1.1 - 1.4) gives H the impression that S does not find the situation^{odd} while H finds it bizarre, particularly that Bob is having this affair "for somebody". S duly answers the indirect manifestation but not to H's satisfaction since unbeknown to her he does not understand her reason in so questioning him. S, not surprisingly, makes no connection between Bob's building job in Surby for somebody with a German brother-in-law and Bob's second, happy and imminently productive marriage. H utters a second manifestation in (6), using a different wh-question which has the same intention as the first. The reply in (7) cannot be as patriotic and chauvenistic as it seems to be and H is forced to re-interpret "foreigner", eventually realizing that she has misunderstood (1.1). (8) is an admission of problems in understanding but after "oh God" H re-interprets the conversation and realizes the misunderstanding. S does not realize it since H makes no further comment. The indirect manifestation in (2) is unrelated to the topic of the origin and therefore precludes realization; S later fails to heed the inappropriacy of the second direct manifestation.

A second manifestation tends to be a re-phrasing of the first, especially when the first is indirect. Manifestations can also be repeated. In B60 two participants both misunderstand the origin and both utter manifestations. The second H is deemed to be O because he is a third participant who misunderstands with H and who expresses a manifestation subsequent to H's :

- | | | |
|-----|-------------|---------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Is Freud still alive ? |
| (2) | IND. MANIF. | H: No of course not |
| (3) | IND. MANIF. | O: No |
| (4) | | H: He died ages ago didn't he ? |
| (5) | | S: Not Freud the man |
| (6) | | H: Uh ? |
| (7) | | S: Freud the idea |

The two manifestations are virtually the same, the first being more emphatic.

Manifestations, like origins, are not restricted to single utterances. The greatest number of utterances which comprise a manifestation is four, not because of a particular complexity in the manifestation but because the utterances are short statements with one short question. The datum, B52, begins as follows :

- | | | | |
|-------|-------------|----|------------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | By the way, what's Darrel wearing? |
| (2.1) | IND. MANIF. | H: | I don't know |
| .2) | MANIF. | : | I know Eddy Waring |
| .3) | MANIF. | : | Darrel Waring? |
| .4) | MANIF. | : | Never heard of him |

S and her husband are going with H to an informal sing-song at which H's husband, Darrel, is to play the organ. H's four utterances could be construed as thinking aloud; H is trying to work out who "Darrel Waring" is, on the assumption that he is someone of note about whose profession or claim to fame she is being asked. The four utterances all manifest her misunderstanding of (1).

A manifestation may be an incomplete statement. The success of the joke in the intentional misunderstanding in A38, for example, depends on the fact that the manifestation is not completed but rather remains suggestive :

- | | | | |
|-------|--------|----|-------------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | How far do you go with your dates? |
| (2.1) | | H: | / laugh / |
| .2) | MANIF. | : | Well, usually |
| (3) | | S: | No, how many have you got arranged? |

S is trying to organize a planning case to be heard as soon as possible and is asking H how far in advance he has arranged dates for the meetings at which cases are heard.

When H interrupts the origin, his manifestation may be an incorrect completion of that origin, as in K85. When an incorrect completion is the manifestation H is not limited to that one utterance. In A23 H develops the topic which she incorrectly understands to have been begun by S, that of taking over Clive Dixon's cottage, whereas S is talking about taking over Clive Derwent's cottage :

- | | | | |
|-------|--------|----|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | Of course when Clive finishes his work you could always |
| (2.1) | MANIF. | H: | Persuade the sister-in-law to get out |
| .2) | | : | / laugh / |
| .3) | | : | Yes |
| .4) | | : | But one of the reasons I turned it down, well, took my name off the list really |
| .5) | | : | I think his sister-in-law was always going to get it |
| .6) | | : | But one of the things I didn't like was the road |
| .7) | | : | One bend worried me |
| .8) | | : | It was really sharp and the road fell away |
| (3.1) | | S: | I think we've, eh, gone astray here a little |
| .2) | | : | I was thinking of Clive Derwent |
| (4.1) | | H: | Oh, not Clive Dixon |
| .2) | | : | Sorry |

The two Clives work in the same office as S and H; Clive Derwent is on secondment and is living in a rented cottage while Clive Dixon is a permanent employee whose sister-in-law has recently moved into a rented cottage which H, looking for somewhere to rent, had inspected previously. In this datum the manifestation, an incorrect completion of the origin, is enlarged upon in a number of utterances which are related to that manifestation but are not additional manifestations. Distinguishing between related utterances and multiple manifestations is not easy except in the case of adjacent indirect and direct manifestations. There seems, however, to be a difference between the development of the topic in the manifestation in A23 above and in the two statements which comprise the manifestation in the following datum, C62 :

- (1) S: There's no-one upstairs
- (2) H: Oh isn't there
- comes back downstairs -
- (3) S: They won't be back till two o'clock
- (4.1) H: Oh
.2) : Perhaps you can help me
.3) : I've got a problem with my typewriter
- S - shakes head -
- (5) ORIGIN S: Can't deal with it
- (6.1) MANIF. H: But I bought it here
.2) MANIF. : It's under guarantee
- (7.1) S: I don't have anything to do with them
.2) : I'm down here

H is taking her typewriter to be repaired. The premises in which the conversation takes place are divided into retail stationery on the ground floor and typewriter sales and servicing on the first floor. S is on the ground floor and H is starting to go upstairs when the conversation begins. H understands the origin as meaning that the shop, that is, the whole business, cannot deal with repairing her typewriter and her manifestation of two statements, which in effect complain that the shop ought to deal with it, is based on that misunderstanding. The two statements are closely linked rather than the second being a related development of the first.

79% of the manifestations in the corpus are direct while 9% are indirect. 8% are one indirect and one direct, 3% are two indirect and 1% is one indirect and three direct manifestations. The majority of manifestations are statements, with and without an initial "Yes" or "No" but, as with origins, other utterance types comprise manifestations.

When the manifestation is a question it is important to be certain that the question is a consequence of having misunderstood the origin and is not a query of the origin because H is doubtful about his

understanding of that origin. In this latter case a potential misunderstanding is likely to be resolved before it occurs (but cf. D71 in which the origin is queried and S's response to this query precedes the manifestation; the potential misunderstanding is thus not resolved and duly occurs). A manifestation which is a question can be the product of some difficulty which H has with the origin, having misunderstood it. This difficulty is illustrated by the following datum, A7 :

- (3) ORIGIN S: Seances
 (4) MANIF. H: Say what?

The manifestation does not query H's understanding of the origin. It seeks to elicit clarification of a word in the origin which H, because of the misunderstanding, hears as 'ances'.

4. ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATION

The interdependence of origin and manifestation is such that discussion of one component frequently requires reference to the other. This section discusses the relationship between the two components.

Origins and manifestations are not confined to particular utterance types. The correlation of origin utterance types and manifestation utterance types is detailed in the following Table :

11	statement	-	statement
8	statement	-	wh-question
8	wh-question	-	minor statement
5	wh-question	-	statement
4	statement	-	polar question
4	polar question	-	statement
4	polar question	-	No + statement
3	statement	-	exclamation
3	two statements	--	statement
3	minor statement	-	statement
3	polar question	-	Yes + statement
2	polar question	-	minor statement

2 polar question - No + minor statement
 1 statement - two statements
 1 statement - minor statement
 1 statement - Yes + statement
 1 statement - No + statement
 1 statement - Mm, minor statement
 1 statement - polar question / exclamation
 1 statement - wh-question; wh-question
 1 statement, incomplete statement - minor statement
 1 statement, polar question - minor statement, statement
 1 statement / wh-question - minor statement
 1 incomplete statement - minor statement
 1 minor statement - two statements
 1 minor statement - Yes + statement
 1 minor statement - Yes + statement, statement
 1 minor statement - No + minor statement
 1 minor statement - wh-question
 1 Yes + statement - Yes + statement
 1 polar question - two statements
 1 polar question - Yes
 1 polar question - No
 1 polar question - Yes, minor statement
 1 polar question - No, statement
 1 polar question - No + minor statement
 1 polar question - No + minor statement, No
 1 two polar questions - statement
 1 wh-question - incomplete statement
 1 wh-question - minor statement, statement
 1 wh-question - statement, polar question
 1 wh-question - three statements, polar question
 1 wh-question - No + incomplete statement
 1 wh-question - No + minor statement
 1 wh-question - command
 1 request - Yes + minor statement
 1 request - Yes; polar question
 1 request and statement - statement
 1 request / polar question - No + statement
 1 phatic question -- Yes
 1 phatic question - No + statement
 1 phatic question - exclamation
 1 command - wh-question

The correlation indicates that the constraint on manifestations by origins is no more than the constraint imposed on any utterance by the utterance to which it is a response.

Origins which are questions are followed by manifestations which are statements, some of which are preceded by "Yes" or "No", or are simply "Yes" or "No". The one exception is Q98 in which the origin is a wh-question and the manifestation is a command. Origins which are

statements are followed by manifestations which are statements, some of which are preceded by "Yes" or "No", questions and exclamations. There are various manifestation utterance types in response to origins which are phatic questions and requests.

Origin utterance types thus do not markedly constrain manifestation utterance types. The relationship between origin and manifestation is often marked instead by the lack of topic cohesion between them. A manifestation is a response to an origin and it develops the topic raised in that origin. Because a manifestation is the product of a misunderstanding, that is, because it is an utterance based on an incorrect understanding of the origin, it is often an inappropriate response. A manifestation can be inappropriate in a number of ways, often concurrently.

A manifestation is 'socially' inappropriate when it conflicts with social norms which are pertinent at the time the utterance is expressed. The social norms are in respect of the role and status of participants, the conventions of the spatio-temporal setting in which the conversation is situated and so on. 'Social inappropriacy' is a feature of the manifestation in the following datum, E72 :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Have you done? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Yes I've done |

The location is a pub in which H is a barmaid. She has been talking to some customers about what she did before working as a barmaid, viz. a degree, and what she will be doing when she leaves the job, viz. research. She understands the origin to refer to her having finished her degree, whereas S is actually asking her if she has finished talking, with the implication that he wishes to be served. H fails to respond in her role as barmaid and instead responds as an equal participant in the

conversation. The manifestation is thus 'socially inappropriate' (cf. Sacks, 1972).

In instances of 'linguistic inappropriacy' linguistic features such as the syntax of the manifestation are not cohesive with the origin.

'Linguistic inappropriacy' is illustrated in the following datum, A9 :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Is it wool? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Very |

S has commented that she likes H's jumper. H understands the origin to be an inquiry as to whether the jumper is warm. The manifestation "Very" is an intensifier and in accordance with grammatical conventions should not be applied to something which does not admit degree. It is thus 'linguistically inappropriate' to apply it to "wool".

In instances of 'pragmatic inappropriacy' the manifestation is not in accord with extralinguistic features, such as background knowledge, which obtain at the time. 'Pragmatic inappropriacy' can be seen in the following datum, A4 :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|---|
| (1) | | H: When we live in Alston I shall get my meat for the freezer from Blackett's |
| (2) | ORIGIN | S: Yes you want to chat Graham up |
| (3) | MANIF. | H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl
/ pause / |
| (4) | | S: No, Graham Blackett not Graham Richards |

Graham (Blackett) in (2) is a butcher; Graham Richards is a farmer.

The manifestation is 'pragmatically inappropriate' because butchers, in the cause of their profession at any rate, do not have any use for cowgirls.

A manifestation is 'cognitively inappropriate' when it is not what S expects. The following datum, A1, illustrates 'cognitive inappropriacy' :

- (1) H: I did that the other day just a little
 (2) ORIGIN S: How far?
 (3) MANIF. H: Only partly on
 (4) S: How far did you travel?

S and H are talking about leaving car handbrakes on when driving. S expects the response to her question in (1) to be in terms of distance travelled, either in miles or in terms of one place to another. H's manifestation relates to the mechanical amount the handbrake was on, which is not what S expects to be told; the manifestation is thus 'cognitively inappropriate'.

An indirect manifestation is characterized as an apparently appropriate response to an origin but it is not invariably appropriate. An indirect manifestation must be 'linguistically appropriate' but can be 'socially, pragmatically or cognitively inappropriate'. The indirect manifestation in the following datum, A42, is 'linguistically appropriate' but 'cognitively inappropriate' :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Are you having your tea and going?
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: No
 (3) S: I thought you were going at quarter to four
 (4.1) H: Oh my tea
 .2) : I thought you meant my eat tea

S is inquiring whether H is going to have her regular afternoon cup of tea before going to an appointment. H understands "tea" to refer to her evening meal. Since S thinks that H is going to her appointment "at quarter to four", after the regular time for tea, H's manifestation is contrary to her expectation of it.

Given the inter-dependence of origins and manifestations, it is not surprising that identification of the two components is occasionally difficult. This difficulty is illustrated by the following datum, A26 :

- (1) S: What's this?
 (2.1) H: Scheherezade
 .2 : Rimsky-Korsakov
 (3) ORIGIN S: Ah, thousand and one nights woman
 (4) MANIF. H: No, man
 (5) S: No, it was a woman
 (6) H: Rimsky-Korsakov was a man
 (7) S: Scheherezade was a woman
 (8) H: She was but he wasn't

S and H are listening to a record. (3) was initially considered as a possible manifestation of a misunderstanding of (2.2), this being what is explained in (6). However, after further consideration, the origin has been located at (3), to which (4) is the manifestation. S is elaborating on (2.1), "Scheherezade", but H incorrectly understands (3) to be an elaboration of (2.2). "Rimsky-Korsakov", and corrects the sex which she believes S is attributing to Rimsky-Korsakov. S assumes that the referent of her origin and H's manifestation is the same, that is, Scheherezade, and consequently in (5) refutes H's manifestation, indicating that H has attributed the wrong sex to Scheherezade.

In this datum the misunderstanding is 'compounded'. S does not know that the referent of the manifestation differs from that of the origin and therefore misunderstands the manifestation. In a sense the manifestation, (4) becomes a second origin and the next utterance, (5), becomes a second manifestation. However, the misunderstanding originates in (3) and is manifested in (4) and this misunderstanding is 'compounded' rather than a second, different misunderstanding's having occurred. It is misleading to treat 'compounds' as separate misunderstandings because they are crucially related to the initial misunderstandings from which they develop. Realization of the initial misunderstanding should automatically result in realization of 'compounds'. 'Compounds' are part of the structure of a misunderstanding rather than separate misunderstandings.

Data which have been overheard cannot always be verified and in such data it can be difficult to locate the origin and the manifestation as in the following example, N92 :

(1.1)	ORIGIN	S: I can't drink whisky at all
.2)	ORIGIN	: Can you?
(2.1)	MANIF.	H: Oh beer and whisky .. the lot
.2)	MANIF.	: They'll drink anything, those men
(3.1)		S: Yes, but I can't drink whisky
.2)		: Do you like it?
(4)		H: / indistinct /
(5)		S: Terrible stuff

The conversation takes place between two men in a pub. H has been talking about oilmen drinking heavily.

The datum is analysed in such a way that H misunderstands both S's statement about his own dislike of whisky and his polar question to H regarding H's ability to drink whisky. H instead relates the statement and the question to his original topic of the oilmen. It is possible, however, that the roles of S and H are wrongly attributed. H in (2.1) could answer S's question and then in (2.2) revert to the topic of the oilmen. If this is the case, the roles of S and H are reversed: (2.2) is the origin and (3.1 3.2) are the manifestations as follows :

(2.2)	ORIGIN	S: They'll drink anything those men
(3.1)	MANIF.	H: Yes but I can't drink whisky
.2)	MANIF.	: Do you like it?
(4)		S: / indistinct /
(5)		H: Terrible stuff

In this analysis H fails to understand that his question has been answered and that another statement about the oilmen has been expressed. He thus erroneously realizes that a misunderstanding has occurred, that is, assumes a misunderstanding to have occurred when in fact it has not done so.

There is no way of confirming which utterance was actually misunderstood but as the first analysis seems the more likely it is the one adopted here. It should be borne in mind, however, that an alternative analysis is possible.

The problem of alternative analysis is encountered more frequently when identifying the devices used in the corpus. The devices used in the corpus are discussed in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI

SECONDARY TEXTUAL COMPONENT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS :

DEVICES

1. INTRODUCTION

The utterances between the origin and the close of the misunderstanding constitute the secondary textual components of a misunderstanding and are termed devices. This chapter discusses and illustrates the devices found in the corpus.

Participants develop and resolve misunderstandings by the use of devices. Devices are divided into four categories according to what they relate to : (a) devices which relate to the production and reception of the origin and to the intention and understanding of the proposition expressed therein; (b) devices which relate to the misunderstanding and to the awareness of an error in the conversation; (c) devices which involve utterances expressing propositions other than that of the origin including utterances which relate to the manifestation; (d) devices which relate to extralinguistic activity.

Devices have a number of important features. They need not be 'complete'. Some are 'partial' in that they are elliptical utterances, often using pro-forms, while others are 'incomplete' in that they are begun but not finished. When one utterance constitutes one device, that device is deemed 'separate'. When one utterance constitutes two or more devices, those devices are deemed 'combined'. When two or more utterances in a participant-turn each constitute devices, those devices are deemed 'sequential'.

'Glossing' occurs in a device when a participant comments on the production or reception of x , p , x^r and p^r , as in "I said ...", "I thought you meant ..." and so on. By the use of 'glossing' a participant intends it to be recognized that he is effecting realization, drawing attention to an error, explaining a misunderstanding and so on. Without

such 'glossing' a device may be less successful in fulfilling its intended purpose.

The devices encountered in the corpus are presented below according to their category. Abbreviations, such as 'p exp.' for 'p explained', are initially given in brackets and thereafter are used in the text.

In order to distinguish between specific devices, such as 'p explained', together with features of devices, such as 'separate' and the function they fulfil, such as 'explanation', only devices and their features are apostrophized: 'p explained', a 'separate' device, explains p. It should be borne in mind that function terms such as explanation and amplification are used in a technical sense.

Each device is defined and illustrated in Section 2. In Section 3 the correlation between devices and users is discussed.

2. DEVICES

(a) Devices which relate to the production and reception of the origin and to the intention and understanding of the proposition expressed therein.

1. 'x completed' ('x comp.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 2 (both by S)

'x comp.' occurs when S's origin has been interrupted before S has finished uttering it and a participant goes on to complete the origin after the interruption. In the corpus the interruption is by the manifestation but it would be possible for another utterance to interrupt the origin and for H, perhaps not hearing the completion or perhaps not understanding any or all of the origin correctly, to express a manifestation

subsequent to the utterance which interrupted the origin or subsequent to the completion of that origin.

In K83 S completes x without heeding the interruption by the manifestation :

- | | | |
|-----|---------|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Did you read in the Clarion this week a fellow called Connan ran away with all the prizes at the Flower Show |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Really ! |
| (3) | x comp. | S: In a wheel chair |

S has been talking about someone paralysed in an accident. H understands "ran away with" as 'stole' rather than 'won' and her manifestation is an exclamation that anyone would steal Flower Show prizes. When x is completed she has more information to add to her p^r and as this information is incompatible with her understanding of the origin, she re-interprets x and thus realizes the misunderstanding.

In the other example, K85, H's manifestation also interrupts the origin :

- | | | |
|-------|---------|--|
| (1.3) | ORIGIN | S: I'm becoming much more susceptible to |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Little niggles |
| (3) | x comp. | S: Heat and cold |

In this datum, (2) is a completion of x by H. Because H has misunderstood the origin the completion is incorrect and rather than being the device 'x comp.' it is a manifestation. S then uses 'x comp.' in (3).

2. 'x repeated' ('x rpt.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 13 (all by S).

'x rpt.' occurs when either the entire origin or a part of it is repeated, which draws attention to the utterance, often to the specific

item which has been misunderstood. It offers H another attempt at correct understanding and can alert him to the fact that his first understanding was incorrect.

x is 'partially' repeated in the following example, A43 :

- (1) ORIGIN S: They've band concerts here
- (2) IND. MANIF. H: Why ?
- (3) x rpt. prt1. S: Band concerts

When reporting the misunderstanding S commented that after the indirect manifestation he asked himself 'What have I said wrongly that (H) couldn't give me an answer?', aware that H's response was inappropriate. He repeats the topic items of the origin in an attempt to elicit an appropriate response or to prompt an explanation of the manifestation.

x is 'partially' repeated in eight out of the thirteen examples in which the device is used. In seven of these examples the lexical item is repeated :

A43	They've band concerts here	→	Band concerts
D71	Who deals with Appeals ?	→	Appeal
F73	Have you had a funeral ?	→	A funeral
K84	Tim and Harry were going to the air races with Steven Jackson	→	Ayr
O95	She came up to ask if she could record R.T.	→	R.T.
P97	Get my mail	→	Mail
Q98	How's Johnny Walker ?	→	Johnny Walker

Of these 'partial' repeats, A43, K84 and O95 are in response to the manifestation questions "Why?", "Where?" and "Your what?" respectively.

In K84, "Ayr races" has been misunderstood as 'air races', hence "Where?" is a manifestation rather than a request for a repeat of the place name.

In the other four, x is 'partially' repeated as a consequence of the manifestation and subsequent utterances.

In one other example of 'x rpt. prt1.', B61, the salient parts of the origin are repeated, the addressee and referent having been correctly understood :

B61 (H), where does Tom Wade live? → Where does he live?

In A10 x is repeated and this device combines with a 'partial' refutation of p^r :

- (1) H: One of the courses at the wedding reception was salmon caught by the bridegroom's father a few days before
- (2) ORIGIN S: Poached?
- (3) MANIF. H: I can't remember how it was cooked
- (4) p^r ref. prt1. & x rpt. S: No, poached

The repetition of x 'combined' with a refutation of p^r together cause H to re-interpret the homonym "poached" without requiring any further direction in understanding what was meant by the origin.

One datum, M90, has two origin utterances. The second is repeated while the first is re-phrased after the manifestation. Re-phrasing is discussed below as the device 'x amplified'. M90 is as follows :

- (1.1) ORIGIN¹ S: Would you change character?
 .2) ORIGIN² : Would you be more ruthless?
- (2) MANIF. H: I would make Raphael and Michelangelo try to make them both realize there's a place for both .
- (3.1) x^1 ampl. S: Would you have a character change in yourself?
 .2) x^2 rpt. : Would you be more ruthless?

S and H are talking about going back in the past and living in another country. Distinction is drawn between the first origin utterance, x^1 , (1.1), and the second, x^2 , (1.2). x^2 is an elaboration of x^1 , suggesting one character change open to H. x^2 can be repeated after the manifestation without additional explanation because the preceding amplification of x^1

makes it clear that the question refers to changing one's own character rather than changing the characters of other people.

The misunderstanding in 096 was transcribed by H and the origin cannot be verified. H had heard only part of the origin and therefore only this part could be transcribed :

- | | | |
|-----|----------|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: / indistinct / ... lunchtime |
| | action | H - pats stomach - |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: So it is |
| (3) | ? x rpt. | S: They only allow you to work lunchtime ? |

The device 'x rpt.', in (3), can only be assumed. It is possible that S is not repeating the origin but is amplifying it or producing a different utterance altogether, an utterance which coincides with the origin only in the final word.

Devices which can only be assumed are preceded by '?'.
 .

3. 'x emphasized' ('x emph.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 6 (5 by S, 1 by O).

'x emph.' occurs when all or part of x is emphasized. The device is always 'combined', usually with 'x rpt.' but also with 'x exp.' ; to emphasize any part of x one must repeat it, either straightforwardly as a repeat or else in an explanation which includes a repeat. Emphasis tends to be placed on the part of the utterance which is misunderstood, drawing attention to the misunderstanding. x is repeated and the verb is emphasized in the following example, B52 :

- | | | |
|-------|------------------|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: By the way, what's Darrel wearing ? |
| (2.1) | IND./MANIF. | H: I don't know |
| .2) | MANIF. | : I know Eddy Waring |
| .3) | MANIF. | : Darrel Waring ? |
| .4) | | : Never heard of him |
| (3) | | S,O: / laugh / |
| (4) | x rpt. & x emph. | S: What IS Darrel wearing ? |

The verb was given no prominence in the origin. It could be argued that "What's" is amplified to "What is".. However, no additional word is involved as the change amends conventional conversational ellipsis. Amplification therefore does not occur. The 'combined' devices, 'x rpt. & x emph.' effect realization for H who presumably re-interprets the origin. Emphasis on the verb might not have been sufficient since it gives little direction in understanding and S might well have gone on to provide an amplification such as 'What clothes is he wearing?' to ensure that '+ H real.' is effected. Emphasis alone, however, is sufficient.

In the following example, A22, 'x rpt. & x emph.' are preceded by an explanation in which the force of the origin is explained :

- (1.1) H: I've done the A.I. and the psychology part
 .2) : Now I'm doing the linguistic side of it
- (2) ORIGIN S: Which is the hardest?
- (3) MANIF. H: No it's not actually .. no it's
- (4.1) S: / laugh /
 .2) : I meant a question
- .3)x rpt.& x emph. : WHICH is the hardest?

Emphasis is placed on the pronoun to stress the fact that the origin is a question rather a relative clause.

In B54 emphasis is 'combined' with an explanation of x :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Where do you do this?
- (2) MANIF. H: To make the crops grow
- (3) B,O: / laugh /
- (4) x exp.& x emph. O: (S) said WHERE do you do it

The emphasis on "where" draws attention to it and makes H aware that he has misheard the origin as 'Why'.

4. 'x amplified' ('x ampl.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 19 (18 by S, 1 by O)

'x ampl.' occurs when there is a change or addition made to x.

The device amends ellipsis, provides additional information or re-phrases the origin. Its proposition is linked to that of the origin and it does not constitute a different utterance with a new proposition.

In some examples in which the origin is re-phrased, items are changed so that the referent can be more clearly identified :

A15	What are we playing?	→	What match is it?
A18	Take your paper bin	→	Your wastie bin
A38	How far do you go with your dates?	→	No, how many have you got arranged?
D70	Was it quite a lot?	→	How much was there?

These examples illustrate the closeness between x and its amplification.

The third example, A38, 'combines' 'x ampl.' with a 'partial' refutation.

'x ampl.' remedies problems caused by substitution and ellipsis.

Origins are augmented by lexical items and pronouns and, as in the first example, by a verb :

A1	How far?	→	How far did you travel?
A21	Which one do you want?	→	No, which application?
C62	Can't deal with it	→	I don't have anything to do with them
E72	Have you done?	→	Have you done talking? Have you done working?
M89	Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight?	→	Did she say that Anne phoned ME?

The last example, M89, is an amplification which involves the addition of a pronoun, which is emphasized, and a change of lexical item from 'rang' to 'phoned'.

The amplification can be minimal when "but", "and", "as well" and so on are added to a repeat of the origin. In the following example, B56, x is 'partially' repeated with an amplification by "but" :

B56 Can I have two egg salad → But I owe you two
rolls and I owe you two

The amplification apparently serves as a hesitant protest about the manifestation, re-directing H's attention to what was expressed in the origin. Examples such as this one are not classed as 'x rpt.' because 'x ampl.' generally includes a 'partial' repeat of x, with additions and amendments.

In examples in which a misunderstanding cannot be said to have definitely occurred, the amplification of x is the only clue to indicate that a misunderstanding may have occurred :

N92 I can't drink whisky at all → Yes but I can't drink
whisky
Can you ? → Do you like it ?
N93 I've heard they're having → And they're having trouble
trouble with the flat roofs with those flat roofs as well

The amplification by "And" and "as well" in N93 suggests that S is expressing the same utterance as she did in the origin but wishes to relate it cohesively to the conversation rather than baldly repeat it. It is possible that H was changing the topic in talking about flats but S presumably imagines that H has misunderstood her and she tries to express her proposition about the flat roofs and tries to ensure that it is correctly received, without necessarily effecting '+ H real.'. More strongly in N92, S stresses his inability to drink whisky regardless of what H might say. To make sure that H receives the proposition correctly he asks his elliptical polar question in full.

A different type of lexical item change is evident in the following

example in which a person's name is expressed more formally :

Q98 How's Johnny Walker? → Walker, J.R.

It is not known whether S realizes this misunderstanding but if he does he presumably tries to distinguish the person "Johnny Walker" from the whisky 'Johnny Walker' by giving the official school version of Johnny Walker's name. If S does not realize that H has misunderstood "Johnny Walker" as whisky he could re-name Johnny Walker so that H has a different name to recall, in the light of his patent failure to respond appropriately to the familiar version of the name.

In one example a syntactic change is made to ensure that H understands correctly :

M90 Would you change character? → Would you have a character change in yourself?

The amplification makes it clearer that "character" is one's own personality rather than another person. S does this by changing "change" from a verb to a noun phrase.

An attempt at using 'x ampl.' can be seen in the following example in which S tries to re-phrase the origin but becomes muddled:

A31 What do they do? → No no ehm what

"No no ehm what" could be seen as an 'incomplete' repeat 'combined' with a 'partial' refutation of p^R because there is no amplification of x; instead, x is contracted. However, the intention is to amplify rather than repeat and the attempt is categorized as ' p^R ref. prtl. & x ampl. incmp.', 'incmp.' being the abbreviation for 'incomplete'. (' p^R ref.', the refutation of p^R , is discussed below). In A31 S's inability to re-phrase the origin is later overcome by an explanation of what was meant;

this explanation comprises 'glossing' and a re-phrasing of the origin, "I meant what do they serve".

In the one example of O's use of the device, B58, the origin is re-phrased to make it more specific :

B58 Did you have anything to eat → Did you have any tea?

In order to do this, O has to know what S intended to express in his origin.

5. 'x explained' ('x exp.)

Number of times used in the corpus : 10 (8 by S, 2 by O).

'x exp.' occurs when what is said in the origin, as opposed to what is meant, is explained. 'x exp.' can embrace 'x rpt.' and can be 'combined' with 'x emph.'. It usually contains 'glossing'. S explains what was said in the following examples :

- A9 I said wool not warm
- A30 I said scales
- B51 (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off not SHALL
I take my shoes off
- B53 I asked you are you MANX
- M91 I said did I hear a nice sound

In A9 and B51 'x exp.' is 'combined' with 'x^r refuted' and in B51 and B53 it is 'combined' with 'x emph.'.

x is explained by O in two examples :

- B54 (S) said WHERE do youjdo it
- B57 She said that he got fed up

In B54 'x exp.' is 'combined' with 'x emph.'.

x can be 'partially' explained by agreement with a question about x, as in A50 :

(7.2) H: Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday?

(8) x exp. prtl. S: Yeah

S's confirmation that she asked H if she was born on a Friday is tantamount to explaining what was said and is therefore categorized as 'x exp. prtl.'.

When O explains x to H, as in B54, "(S) said WHERE do you do it", the explanation is of O's x^R . However, if O's x^R is equivalent to S's x, the explanation is classed as being of x. The distinction of x^R is thus reserved for H.

In addition to explaining what was said in the origin, 'x exp.' can apply to any explanation of why x was phrased the way it was as an expression of p. In B57 S explains why the lexical item "stay" was used to express "visit" :

(1) ORIGIN S: Are you going to stay in Newcastle?
 (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: No
 .2) MANIF. : I'll be in Edinburgh
 (3.1) S: Yes
 .2) : I didn't mean stay in Newcastle I meant visit Newcastle
 (4) O: Well why didn't you say that?
 (5.1) x exp. S: Well we LIVE here but we're going to STAY in Carlisle

The emphasis in (5.1) contrasts the two lexical items and is not an inclusion of 'x emph.' in the explanation. The explanation is a justification for using "stay" in its eighth sense in the O. E. D., "To reside or sojourn in a place for a longer period; to sojourn or put up with a person as his guest", as opposed to what H and O understand it as, namely its fourth sense, "To remain in a place or in others' company (as opposed to going on or going away)".

6. 'x queried' ('x qued.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 6 (5 by H, 1 by O).

'x qued.' occurs when an inquiry is made of x. It is usually used by H who has become aware that his interpretation does not accord with what S is saying and who wishes to check that he heard x correctly. It can be 'incomplete', as in B60 :

- (4) x qued. incmp. H: Didn't you say
 (5) x exp. O: She said that he got fed up

O interrupts H's query of x, presumably aware that H is having difficulty making sense of the conversation and possibly realizing the misunderstanding which has caused this difficulty.

'x qued.' may be prompted by what could be thought of as dawning '+ H real.', as in A50, in which H queries x and checks a different x^r against x than her initial x^r. H has said that she was born on the 13th :

- (2.2) ORIGIN S: Was it on a Friday as well?
 (3.1) IND. MANIF. H: I don't know
 .2) IND. MANIF. : I don't remember
 (4.1) S: Ah hah
 .2) : I was born on a Wednesday
 (5) H: I was born on a Sunday
 (6) S: Mmm
 / pause /
 (7.1) H: Oh
 .2) x qued. : Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday?
 (8) S: Yeah
 (9) H: I thought you asked me if it was frightening

Prior to S's neutral reaction in (6) to H's statement in (5), giving the day she was born, H has little reason to think that there is anything adrift in the conversation, in spite of S's earlier neutral response in (4.1). S admitted later that she had not really been sure what H was

talking about in her indirect manifestations. After S's "Mmm" in (6), H appears to re-interpret the origin. She becomes aware that she could have misunderstood it and asks S if x was "I was born on a Friday". x greatly differs from x^r which is explained in (9), that is, "if it was frightening".

Similarly, but less explicitly, in B61 H uses 'x qued.', having become aware that something has gone wrong in the conversation :

- (1) ORIGIN S: (H), where does Tom Wade live?
 (2) O^1 : Port Erin (spoken quietly)
 (3.1) MANIF. H: He thinks about a month
 S, O^1, O^2 : / look astonished /
 .2) x qued. prt1. H: Is that what you said?

Because x is not reproduced but is referred to by the pronoun "that", the device 'x qued.' is deemed 'partial'. It is a request for a repeat, or explanation of x.

In B57 O uses 'x qued. prt1.' by asking "Well why didn't you say that?". O wishes to know why p was not expressed in x as clearly as it might have been and therefore why x was uttered the way it was.

7. 'x refuted' ('x ref.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'x ref.' occurs when what has been said in the origin is refuted. It is thus an erroneous denial of what was said in the origin.

8. ' x^r explained' (x^r exp.)

Number of times used in the corpus : 12 (10 by H, 2 by O).

' x^r exp.' occurs when an explanation is given of what was thought

to have been said in the origin, as opposed to what was actually said.

The following examples include 'glossing' :

- A18 I thought you said take your paper in
- A46 I thought you said what have you got that hat on for
- A50 I thought you asked me if it was frightening
- B60 I thought you said he got the fed .. up
- B61 Oh I thought you said when does he leave
- L87 I thought you said you wanted them photocopied

In A47 H answers S's ' x^R qued.' with "Yes, you said 'Will you excuse me if I go up to bed'". This utterance happens to be ' x exp.' since it is exactly what was said in x . However, H is explaining what he heard and therefore the device used is ' x^R exp.'; x^R coincides with x in this instance.

Similarly, in A28 ' x^R exp.' is also an explanation of x . H's use of ' x^R exp.' here can be seen as a justification for her having misunderstood the origin :

- | | | |
|-------|------------|---------------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: We can get fuel now |
| (2.1) | MANIF. | H: We'd better get it on the way back |
| .2) | | : It's twenty past eleven now |
| (3) | | S: I mean on the way back |
| (4) | x^R exp. | H: You said we can get it now |
| (5) | | S: I meant on the way back |

By explaining to S what she said in x , which corresponds with x^R , H complains that this does not correlate with the explanation of the proposition given by S in (3). In (4), the explanation of x^R , H is in effect refuting (3): S may have meant "on the way back" but that was not what she said; what she said, according to H who has heard it correctly, was "we can get it now".

In G75 H 'partially' explains x^R by endeavouring to explain its

source in the conversation, firstly in response to S's 'x^r qued.' of "Who mentioned zeppelins?", by uttering "You just did, didn't you?". 'x^r exp.' is here 'combined' with 'x qued.'. O also uses 'x^r exp.' when he attributes the "zeppelins" reference to H: "You did". H's second use of 'x^r exp. prtl.', "I know, but only because I thought (S) did", is in response to being told that he himself mentioned "zeppelins". If H had explained x^r 'completely' by explaining that he heard the origin as 'It's supposed to be like a sort of zeppelin', instead of "A sort of zephyr", the misunderstanding might well have been realized. However, this is not the outcome because H's 'partial' explanation seeks to trace the context of x^r rather than identifying what x^r is.

The device 'x^r exp.' tends to explain what was understood, p^r, as well as x^r because if x^r is something other than x, p^r is accordingly the understanding of that incorrect x^r. This is not the case in examples like A28 and A47 because in these examples x^r is equivalent to x; x is a poor expression of p.

9. 'x^r queried' ('x^r qued.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 2 (2 by S)

'x^r qued.' makes inquiry of the received origin. In A47 S attempts to determine if H heard x correctly since H's manifestation is inappropriate :

- | | | |
|-----|----------------------|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Will you excuse me if I go up to bed? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: No, not at all |
| | | / pause / |
| (3) | x ^r qued. | S: Did you hear what I said? |

In answering this query H realizes that he has misunderstood the origin; although he heard it correctly he only understands it correctly in repeating

it back to S in response to her query.

In the lengthy datum, G75, S uses 'x^r qued.' :

(2) ORIGIN S: It's supposed to be like a sort of
a zephyr

.....

(9) manif. rpt. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic

(10) x^r qued. S: Who mentioned zeppelins?

In (10) S queries x^r in an attempt to locate the source in the conversation of the topic raised by the manifestation.

10. 'x^r refuted' ('x^r ref.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 6 (5 by S, 1 by O).

'x^r ref.' occurs when the received utterance is refuted. In three examples in the corpus the use of 'complete' 'x^r ref.' shows that S has realized the misunderstanding has occurred, since to refute x^r 'completely' is to know what H heard the origin as :

A9 I said wool not warm

B51 (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off not SHALL
I take my shoes off

B53 Not MARRIED

In A9 and B51 'x^r ref.' is 'combined' with 'x exp.'.

In G75 x^r is 'partially' refuted by both S and O. Both deny that S has uttered x^r :

(10) S: Who mentioned zeppelins?

(11) H: You just did, didn't you?

(12) x^r ref. prt1. S: No

.....

(16) x^r ref. prt1. O: No, you started that one
& x^r exp.

(17) x^r ref. prt1. S: No, I'm afraid not (H)

S and O attribute x^R to H but do not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred because of a mishearing so that x^R is not equivalent to x.

11. 'p explained' ('p exp.)

Number of times used in the corpus : 50 (48 by S, 2 by O).

'p exp.' occurs when the proposition is explained, that is, when what S intends the origin to express is explained. 'Glossing' is present in nineteen 'complete' explanations, such as :

A8 S: I meant as in your dream
 A31 S: I meant what do they serve
 A33 S: I meant the music

'Partial' explanations occur when reference is made back to a preceding utterance, as in D66 :

(1) ORIGIN S: He killed himself, didn't he?
 (2) MANIF. H: No the plane killed him
 (3.1) p exp. prtl. S: Same thing
 .2) p exp. prtl. : That was what I meant

S and H are talking about a man who used to fly a gyrocopter ; the man was killed when the gyrocopter crashed. In (3.1, 3.2) p is 'partially' explained in that what S meant by "He killed himself" is that "the plane killed him", that is, the plane crash resulted in his death. To make sense of S's 'partial' explanations, which refer back to H's manifestation, H has to appreciate that S did not mean that the man committed suicide.

In A45 S 'partially' explains p by referring, with 'glossing', to H's manifestation and continuation of the topic as an explanation of the origin:

(2.1) MANIF. H: I wish I was like that
 .2) : I can't get into mine
 (3.1) p exp. prtl. S: No nor can I
 .2) p exp. prtl. : That's what I mean

S and O attribute x^F to H but do not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred because of a mishearing so that x^F is not equivalent to x .

11. 'p explained' ('p exp.)

Number of times used in the corpus : 50 (48 by S, 2 by O).

'p exp.' occurs when the proposition is explained, that is, when what S intends the origin to express is explained. 'Glossing' is present in nineteen 'complete' explanations, such as :

A8 S: I meant as in your dream
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In A45 S 'partially' explains p by referring, with 'glossing', to H's manifestation and continuation of the topic as an explanation of the origin:

(2.1) MANIF. H: I wish I was like that
 .2) : I can't get into mine
 (3.1) p exp. prt1. S: No nor can I
 .2) p exp. prt1. : That's what I mean

This 'partial' explanation is later supplemented by a 'complete' explanation which has no 'glossing' :

(5) p exp. S: I'm fat so I sit here to remind me

'p exp.' can be 'incomplete' rather than 'partial' in that it can be begun but not finished. In All the explanation need not be 'completed' because another utterance answers the manifestation question and this answer, together with the 'incomplete' 'p exp.' is sufficient to effect '+ H real.' :

(1.2) ORIGIN S: I just have to address the envelope
and then we're away

(2) MANIF. H: Where are you going?

(3.1) S: Nowhere

.2) p exp. incmp. : I just meant

(4) H: Oh

'p exp.' is 'incomplete' because S decides not to bother to explain p to H on the assumption that realization has been effected. In D68 S 'partially' refutes H's p^r and then begins to explain p but does not bother to 'complete' the explanation beyond 'glossing' that an explanation is being used :

(1) ORIGIN S: Wonder why she didn't stay with the
others (i.e. other girls)

(2) MANIF. H: They were all playing pool (i.e. boys)

(3) p^r ref. prt. S: No I meant oh never mind
& p exp. incmp.

(4) H: Perhaps there was no room in the car

S is telling H about a girl who talked to him at a stag night while her boyfriend was playing pool with the other boys and after the other girls had left the party for their own gathering. The 'combined' 'p^r ref. prt. & p exp. incmp.' may effect '+ H real.' because in (4) H offers an appropriate explanation for the girl's not having stayed

with the other girls, which he failed to do in his manifestation.

A 'partial' explanation referring to O's 'incomplete' explanation of her own p^R , which she believes to be a misunderstanding, can be seen in J80 :

- (1) O: I wouldn't mind being ill
 (2) ORIGIN S: It's not very nice
 (3.1) MANIF. H: That's a very nice one (i.e. cough medicine)
 .2) : I had it when I was ill
 (4) p^R exp. incmp. O: Oh I thought you meant
 (5) p exp. prt1. S: Yes I did

The ellipsis is remarkable. S uses a very 'partial' 'p exp.' in confirming O's 'incomplete' ' p^R exp.' yet it is sufficient to effect '+ O real.'. S avoids having to explain p to H, for whom the misunderstanding remains unrealized.

When O explains p to H, as in B56, "No he means two rolls", the explanation is of O's p^R but because O's p^R is equivalent to S's p, the explanation is classed as being of p. The distinction of p^R is reserved for H. An exception is made in the above datum, J80, in that p^R is not reserved for H's understanding of the origin. O retains p^R because of her belief that her p^R is incorrect, a belief which in fact is erroneous. Other than manifesting her misunderstanding, H never refers to her own p^R in the datum and therefore ' p^R exp. incmp.' is deemed to be used on this occasion by O.

'p exp.' can identify the referent of the origin, with or without 'glossing' :

- A3 S: I meant the glasses (as opposed to the drip mats)
 A6 S: I meant the money (" " " " photocopying)
 B55 S: The appointment (" " " " time spent waiting for new glasses)

B59 S: Freud the idea (as opposed to Freud the man)
 D67 S: I am (" " " you, i.e. H)

The success of one 'p exp.' which identifies the referent, "I meant the door", in A2, is ironic because the intended referent is the car door and H has misunderstood the referent as the garage door, which she has just closed, jamming its stiff bolt across before getting in the car and closing the car door :

(1) ORIGIN S: Are you sure it's shut ?
 (2) MANIF. H: Yes I jammed it
 (3) p exp. S: I meant the door

Since H knows that she has satisfied S that the garage door is shut, she correctly understands the referent in the explanation to be the car door.

'p exp.' often 'combines' with a 'complete' or 'partial' refutation of p^R , particularly when the explanation involves the identification of the referent :

A13 S: No, the picnic (as opposed to food mixers)
 A16 S: No, the record (" " " the cello)
 A32 S: Not those cards, the playing cards
 A39 S: No no, the cat (as opposed to the kettle)
 B56 O: No he means two rolls (" " " two pence)

'p exp.' can provide an explanation of the force of the origin, as in A22, "I meant a question", as opposed to the relative clause which H understands the origin to be.

'p exp.' must sometimes be used more than once to effect '+ H real.' In A26, where the misunderstanding is caused by different referents being attributed to origin and manifestation, S 'partially' refutes p^R and explains p, "No, it was a woman". This does not provide sufficient

identification of the referent and in response to H's explanation of p^r , "Rimsky-Korsakov was a man", which makes clear the referent of the manifestation, S explains p more thoroughly, "Scheherezade was a woman".

As well as explaining the proposition, 'p exp.' can explain the reason for expressing p, as in D70 :

- | | | | |
|-------|---------|----|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | Was it quite a lot ? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | No she's just gone down to do some photocopies for me |
| (3.1) | | S: | Yes |
| .2) | x ampl. | : | How much was there ? |
| (4) | | H: | Just five pages |
| (5) | p exp. | S: | It's only because I'm waiting to go and do some xeroxing too |

S is waiting to go and use a photocopying machine which she knows is being used by someone else to copy some material for H. S has elicited an appropriate reply to her origin question by using the device 'x ampl.' in (3.2). In (5) she explains why she asked the question. This type of 'p exp.' need not be essential to H's receiving the correct p^r , nor need it be essential to effecting '+ H real.'. It does, however, provide additional information which can aid correct reception and realization.

Similarly in F73 S explains why he asked H if he had had a funeral by uttering "Oh I thought you'd gone to one", although here there is little additional information about the reason for having expressed the proposition. The explanation is 'partial' because it uses the pro-form "one" rather than 'a funeral'. A subsequent utterance, "But you're wearing a black tie", classed as the device 'y' (discussed below), supplements the particular explanation of p though in fact the misunderstanding remains unrealized.

'p exp.' is 'partial' when it consists of an agreement with a query about p, as in P97 :

- (7) p qued. H: This morning's mail
 (8.1) p exp. prtl. S: Yeah

In H77 S attempts to explain p but does this very ineffectually. It is debatable whether the device used in (3) is 'p exp. prtl.' or 'y', an utterance other than the origin or the manifestation which expresses a new or related proposition :

- (1) ORIGIN S: How much is it?
 (2) MANIF. H: It's usually 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ p
 (3) p exp. prtl. S: Big ones little ones
 (4) H: What?

S asks in (1) what size an unfamiliarly shaped milk carton is. "Big ones little ones" is classified as 'p exp. prtl.' because it is intended as an attempt to explain p. Because of the ellipsis it is an ineffectual 'p exp. prtl.' and it fails to effect '+ H real.'. When there is a divergence between what a participant intends a device to be and what that device is understood as being, the device is classified in respect of its user's intention rather than its outcome.

12. 'p queried' ('p qued.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 6 (4 by H, 2 by O).

'p qued.' occurs when enquiry is made of the proposition, that is, when what the origin is intended to express is questioned. The device can alert S to the misunderstanding and it can show that H is becoming aware that p^r might be incorrect and therefore wishes to check what S meant by his utterance. It can include 'glossing' or can simply be a phrase :

- A20 H: Oh you mean the one here
 A37 H: Oh you mean how long on for
 P97 H: This morning's mail

'p qued.' can be used by O who may also endeavour to find out what p is supposed to be, as in L87 in which O asks S "You want a print-out from the reader?" and "The microfilms", in order to determine the referent and to ascertain exactly what S is asking for.

13. 'p refuted' ('p ref.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'p ref.' occurs when the proposition which S intends to express in the origin is refuted.

14. 'p^r explained' ('p exp.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 16 (2 by S, 13 by H, 1 by O).

'p^r exp.' occurs when the received proposition is explained, that is, when an explanation is given of what H understands the proposition to mean. It constitutes an explanation of the manifestation. In eleven out of the sixteen examples in the corpus 'glossing' is present, as in the following examples :

- A21 H: I thought you meant which list
 A41 H: I thought you meant the things in the cheesecake
 A44 H: Oh I thought you meant the paper
 A48 H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono

These examples are all uttered by H after '+ H real.'.

H can also use 'p^r exp.' prior to realization, as in A26, "Rimsky-Korsakov was a man". This utterance identifies the referent of the manifestation and thus explains p^r. H's utterance in A30, "You don't

normally have stairs in a bathroom" explains H's attitude of surprise in response to S's 'p^r qued.' which was concerned with H's surprise at the origin. H's explanation of the reason for her surprise also explains her p^r.

The device 'p^r exp.' is almost entirely used by H but it is used by S in two data.: One of these is A33 :

- | | | | |
|-------|---------------------|----|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | Sounds like Focus |
| (2.1) | MANIF. | H: | Yeah I've been meaning to get it fixed
for days |
| .2) | | : | The picture's been lousy for some time
/ pause / |
| (3.1) | | S: | What the hell are you talking about?
/ pause / |
| .2) | p ^r exp. | : | Ah, you're talking about the television |
| .3) | | : | I meant the music |

S and H are listening to a record while watching television on vision only. S has to determine the referent of the manifestation and apparently succeeds in doing this before H has worked out what problem S has had with his manifestation. H, of course, assumes his manifestation is an appropriate response to the origin and does not immediately realize that he has misunderstood the origin.

Rather than use the device 'p^r exp.' it can be implied when another device is used. In A43, after S and H have realized the misunderstanding, S uses 'z', an utterance expressing a new proposition after the close of a misunderstanding; this 'z' utterance implies 'p^r exp.' :

- | | | | |
|-------|---------------------------------|------|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | They've band concerts here |
| (2) | IND. MANIF. | H: | Why? |
| (3) | | S: | Band concerts |
| (4) | | S,H: | / laugh / |
| (5.1) | z
(p ^r exp. imp.) | S: | Isn't it funny that there's no way you can
distinguish between B, A, N, D and
B, A, N, N, E, D? |
| .2) | | : | Both are right |

S has appreciated the cause of the misunderstanding and in talking about this cause he implies an explanation of p^r .

15. 'p^r queried' ('p^r qued.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 4 (3 by S, 1 by H).

'p^r qued.' makes enquiry of the received proposition, that is, it questions how H has understood the origin. 'p^r qued.' can be specific after the misunderstanding has been realized by both S and H, as in A49, "What on earth did you think I meant by ladder?". It can also be a general question, prior to realization, which tries to make sense of H's p^r , as in A33, "What the hell are you talking about?".

'p^r qued.' can relate to H's attitude in uttering the manifestation as well as to the manifestation itself. In A30 H's manifestation, an exclamation, is uttered in a decidedly surprised tone and it is this which S queries :

- | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|----|-------------------------|
| (2.2) | ORIGIN | S: | It's got scales in it |
| (3) | MANIF. | H: | In the bathroom! |
| (4) | p ^r qued. | S: | Why is that surprising? |

'p^r qued.' can be used by H, checking on his understanding of the origin, as in A34 :

- | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|----|---|
| (4) | p ^r qued. | H: | You mean without that string attached about the bottom points |
| (5.1) | | S: | No I mean kind of promoted posts |

16. 'p^r refuted' ('p^r ref.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 35 (30 by S, 2 by H, 3 by O).

'p^r ref.' refutes the received proposition, that is, points out by denial that H's understanding of the origin is incorrect.

'p^r ref.' can be 'complete', as in the following examples :

- A19 S: Drawer, not door
 A32 S: Not those cards, the playing cards
 B57 S: I didn't mean stay in Newcastle
 B59 S: Not Freud the man

or can be 'partial', as in the following examples :

- A10 S: No, poached
 A13 S: No, the picnic
 A14 S: No, time
 A21 S: No, which application?

In all but two of these examples, (B57, B59), 'p^r ref.' is 'combined' with another device, either 'p exp.', 'x ampl.' or 'x rpt.'. B57 includes 'glossing'.

'p^r ref. prt1.' is usually accomplished by "No, ..." but it is also the device used when reference is made to a previous utterance, as in A5:

- (2) MANIF. H: Going up in the world gettin g rid
 of her bashed mini
 (3.1) p^r ref. prt1. S: No that's not what I mean

It might seem that such a refutation is 'complete' rather than 'partial' because it is very clear that the manifestation is being refuted. However, adjacency between the manifestation and the refutation might not always obtain and it is possible that 'that's not what I mean/ meant' could be uttered at a distance from the manifestation, in which case the referent is not necessarily obvious and the refutation accordingly would not be 'complete'. It is possible that H might not understand that a refutation adjacent to his manifestation actually refers to that manifestation and although such a failure to appreciate cohesive linking might often seem unlikely, all refutations which are not 'complete' and explicit are deemed 'partial'.

'p^r ref.' can be accomplished by implication, as in A15 in which S confirms the proposition in the manifestation :

- (1) ORIGIN S: What are we playing?
 (2) MANIF. H: Tennis
 (3.1) p^r ref. (imp.) S: I KNOW stupid girl
 .2) : What match is it?

Since S knows that tennis is being played she interprets the manifestation as stating the obvious and by making this known to H, (3.1), her utterance is tantamount to refuting p^r. H has to appreciate that S would not ask a question to which she knows the answer and that therefore H's p^r, manifested as the answer to the question, is incorrect.

"No" is not always a refutation of p^r or of x^r. If the manifestation is a polar question, "No" could be S's answer to it, as in B60 :

- (2.1) MANIF. H: He got the polis?
 .2) : The police?
 (3.1) S: No
 .2) : I drove off

In this example S is answering the question and does not realize that a misunderstanding has occurred.

(b) Devices which relate to the misunderstanding and to the awareness of an error in the conversation.

17. 'p^r error signalled' ('p^r err. sig.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 22 (7 by S, 12 by H, 3 by O).

'p^r err. sig.' alerts/other participants to the fact that there is something amiss in the conversation. Every direct manifestation signals an error in p^r since its inappropriacy can alert participants to the error in H's understanding. A manifestation, however, is an essential primary component of a misunderstanding rather than a device, an optional

secondary component, and it is therefore not categorized as the device 'p^r err. sig.'.

'p^r err. sig.' tends to be an expression of puzzlement or a non-specific query, as in the following examples :

G75 S: Pardon
 A49, H77 S: What ?
 D71, A49 H: What ?
 B59 H: Uh ?
 A50, P97 S: Mmm
 A50 S: Ah hah
 K86 H: But .. oh God

The device can be accomplished by paralinguistic means, as in B61, 'S, 0 : / look astonished /' and by intonational means, as in A30, "In the BATHroom!", expressed in a surprised tone by H. "In the BATHroom!" is a manifestation but it is the tone in which it is uttered which signals the error rather than the proposition expressed in it.

An utterance which constitutes another device can also signal an error, as in A41 :

(2) ORIGIN S: What else did you put in ?
 (3) MANIF. H: Cottage cheese ehm
 (4)y & p^r err. sig. S: Oh, mince
 (5.1) H: Oh in the FREEZER
 .2) : I thought you meant the things in
 the cheesecake

S answers her own origin question in (4) and this alerts H to the error of her interpretation. It effects '+ H real.'. A different referent to that which H understands of the origin is identified in (4); S has not realized that H has misunderstood the origin and the identification of a different referent is not a conscious attempt by S to effect '+ H real.'. The device is therefore 'p^r err. sig.' rather than the

signalling of a misunderstanding. The device is 'combined' with 'y'.

The 'incomplete' 'p^r exp.' by O in J80 is also 'p^r err. sig.'. By uttering "Oh I thought you meant" O raises in the conversation the possibility that a different interpretation can be made of the origin. This 'p^r exp. incmp.' signals an error, although in fact O's interpretation is correct. H does not pick up the signal and does not re-interpret the origin.

18. 'p^r error acknowledgement' ('p^r err. ack.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 2 (both by H).

'p^r err. ack.' occurs when a participant acknowledges or otherwise admits to having made an error in understanding the origin without being aware that the error is actually a misunderstanding. The device can be seen in L87 when towards the end of the conversation S explains p and refutes p^r so that H knows a mistake has been made in the conversation. When H explains x^r she still does not realize that she has misunderstood S's request in the origin; she feels that S has not expressed herself clearly and that S is now refuting her own utterance :

- | | | | |
|--------|--------------------------|----|---|
| (10.1) | p exp. | S: | I want to look at them |
| .2) | p ^r ref. | : | I don't want a copy |
| (11.1) | p ^r err. ack. | H: | Oh sorry |
| .2) | x ^r exp. | : | I thought you said you wanted them
photocopied |

Subsequently '+ H real.' is effected and H duly acknowledges the misunderstanding.

H's state of realization is not known in M91 and therefore H's utterance "Oh" is either 'p^r err. ack.' or an acknowledgement of the misunderstanding

19. 'misunderstanding signal' ('mus. sig.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 19 (12 by S, 2 by H, 5 by O.

'mus. sig.' is used by a participant who realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred and alerts the others to this occurrence. Use of this device does not necessarily ensure that the other participants realize the misunderstanding; one or more participants could fail to recognize the signal and for them the misunderstanding would remain unrealized.

'mus. sig.' is chiefly accomplished by "/ laugh /", as in A7, A22 and B52. When the misunderstanding is an intentional one "/ laugh /" may be in advance of or concurrent with the manifestation as a 'mus. sig.', as in A36 and A38.

"No" can be a 'mus. sig.' as well as being 'p^r ref. prtl.', as in A20 and B55. "Yes" can be a 'mus. sig.' when it carries the implication of 'I know that', as in B57.

'p exp. incmp. & p^r ref. prtl.' in D68, "No I meant oh never mind", is also 'mus. sig.'. It seems to be an effective signal since it is followed by an appropriate response by H to the origin.

The polite utterance in A23, "I think we've eh gone astray here a little" is a 'mus. sig.'.

20. 'misunderstanding acknowledgement' ('mus. ack.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 97 (12 by S, 75 by H, 10 by O.

'mus. ack.' occurs when a participant acknowledges or admits to a misunderstanding's having occurred. The device can only be used

after realization. It provides textual evidence for realization.

'mus. ack.' can be accomplished by short expressions, interjections and laughter, such as by H in the following examples :

A11, A16, A25, B60 : Oh
 B54, B61, K85 : / laugh /

Apologies can acknowledge misunderstandings :

A8 : Oh sorry
 Ah yes
 Yes
 A21, A24 : Oh sorry
 / laugh /

The device can include reference to p :

A7 : Oh seances
 / laugh /
 A34 : Oh readerships
 A41 : Oh, in the FREEZER

The device can 'combine' with other devices such as 'p qued.' and 'p^r ref.', as in the following examples :

A20 : Oh you mean the one here
 A23 : Oh not Clive Dixon
 Sorry
 A40 : Ah not the kazi

S and O also use 'mus. ack.', usually accomplished by "/ laugh /". In J79 S and O acknowledge the misunderstanding by "/ exchange glances /". This description is an amorphous label for the quizzical and then rueful and amused expressions on the faces of S and O, expressions which cannot be precisely formulated yet which at the time were definite acknowledgements of the misunderstanding's having occurred, confirmed by S and O after the conversation had ended.

In the majority of the data it is easy to identify 'mus. ack.' but

in some data the utterances could be 'p^r err.ack.', 'mus. ack.' or 'y'. When the states of realization cannot be verified it cannot be known whether an utterance acknowledges an error or a misunderstanding, as in M91, cited above in respect of '? p^r err. ack.', and as in D69 :

- | | | | |
|-------|-------------|----|----------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | It went down very quickly |
| (2.1) | IND. MANIF. | H: | Did it? |
| .2) | IND. MANIF. | : | I don't know |
| (3) | | S: | Well the sea was flat calm today |
| (4.1) | | H: | Oh yes |
| .2) | | : | Mmm |
| .3) | ? mus. ack. | : | Oh |
| .4) | ? mus. ack. | : | Oh |
| .5) | ? mus. ack. | : | Yes |

S and H have talked about a boat sinking locally and about the bad weather the previous day and the resulting rough seas. In the origin S is talking about the state of the sea. "Oh yes" in (4.1) is a response to the statement in (3) and it is expressed in a tone which suggests that the sea's being flat calm is very obvious; it is 'y' (discussed below). Subsequent to this assertive agreement, H becomes hesitant. His utterances give the impression that he has re-interpreted the origin in the light of S's utterance in (3) and that he realizes he has misunderstood the referent as the boat rather than the sea. The hesitant agreement "Mmm", (4.2), is classed, like (4.1), as 'y'. "Oh", "Oh" and "Yes" in (4.3 - 4.5) are assumed to be 'mus. ack.' and are classified as '? mus. ack.'.

In D70, S's 'p exp.' details her reason for having asked the question in the origin. H responds neutrally to this explanation :

- | | | | |
|-----|-------------|----|---|
| (5) | p exp. | S: | It's only because I'm waiting
to go and do some xeroxing too |
| (6) | ? mus. ack. | H: | Ah |

"Ah", in (6), could be a 'y' utterance, a response to the statement in (5) but it is more likely to be 'mus. ack.' in view of the 'p^r err. sig.'

'x ampl.' and 'p exp.' which precede it.

(c) Devices which relate to utterances which express new propositions and to utterances which relate to the manifestation.

21. 'y' ('y')

Number of times used in the corpus : 118 (57 by S, 47 by H, 14 by O).

'y' is the production of another utterance which is topically related to x or to the manifestation but which is not an amplification of x and is not any other of the devices. 'y' utterances are additional x utterances which express additional propositions but for the purposes of this thesis x is limited to the origin and p is solely the proposition which has been misunderstood so that additional utterances are all termed 'y', provided that they are produced prior to realization. This provision is important because a number of utterances can be encountered both in the development of the misunderstanding and also beyond its resolution and it would be misleading to categorize all such utterances as 'y'.

While 'y' can be any utterance it is often cohesively linked. For example, it can be an answer to an indirect manifestation, as in A48, "H: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other side", or an answer to the origin question, as in A46, "S: That's what you're doing with that water".

'y' can be an elaboration of the manifestation, as in B59, "H: He died ages ago didn't he?" or A33, "H: The picture's been lousy for some time".

'y' can be used by S, H and O. Any contribution to the topic or

topics of the origin and manifestation constitutes 'y' and therefore data which comprise several utterances and speaker-turns from origin to realization tend to contain 'y', as in A46, C64, F73, K86 and L87.

22. 'manifestation completed' ('manif. comp.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'manif. comp.' occurs when the manifestation, having been interrupted, is completed.

23. 'manifestation repeated' ('manif. rpt.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 4 (all by H).

'manif. rpt.' is a repeat of the manifestation and is distinct from a second manifestation. It is found in B56, B60, E72 and G75. In B60 the repeat is 'partial'; the lexical item is standardized and repeated in the former and the affirmation is repeated in the latter :

B60	He got the polis	→	The police
E72	Yes I've done	→	Yes

In B56 an affirmation is added :

B56	That's thirty	→	Yes, that's thirty
-----	---------------	---	--------------------

In G75 the repeat is exact :

G75	Zeppelins aren't romantic	→	Zeppelins aren't romantic
-----	---------------------------	---	---------------------------

24. 'manifestation emphasized' ('manif. emph.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'manif. emph.' occurs when the manifestation, in part or in whole, is emphasized. This device would only be used in combination with a

repeat or explanation of the manifestation. Emphasis placed on the manifestation itself is not a device.

25. 'manifestation amplified' ('manif. ampl.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 3 (all by H).

'manif. ampl.' occurs when there is a change or addition made to the manifestation. The device amends ellipsis, provides additional information or re-phrases the manifestation. Its proposition is closely linked to the manifestation and it does not constitute a different utterance which has a new, though possibly related, proposition (such an utterance would be 'y').

H amplifies her manifestation twice in A32 :

- | | | | |
|-------|--------------|----|---|
| (1.2) | ORIGIN | S: | I wonder where the cards are |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | On that table behind you |
| | | S | - looks at table - |
| (3) | | S: | They're not |
| (4) | manif. ampl. | H: | Yes they are |
| | | S | - looks at table - |
| (5) | | S: | They're not |
| (6) | manif. ampl. | H: | Yes they're under the camera, behind
the light bulbs |

In (4) H re-affirms what she said in the manifestation and in (6) she adds further information, specifying where on the table the cards are. The device effects '+ S real.' since it guides S to the cards and enables S to appreciate that S and H are talking about different sets of cards.

In K86 H's amplification adds information to the manifestation :

K86 How's his marriage → The second

This amplification is in response to a query by S.

26. 'manifestation explained' ('manif. exp.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'manif. exp.' occurs when what was said in the manifestation is explained.

27. 'manifestation queried' ('manif. qued.')

Number of times used in the corpus : 1 (by S).

'manif. qued.' occurs when enquiry is made of the manifestation.
In K86 S seeks more information than H provides in her manifestation :

- (2) IND. MANIF. H: How's his marriage
- (3) manif. qued. S: Which one?
- (4) manif. ampl. H: The second

The information which H provides in response to S's 'manif. qued.' enables S to answer the question posed in the manifestation, though not to realize the misunderstanding.

28. 'manifestation refuted' ('manif. ref.')

Number of times used in the corpus : \emptyset .

'manif. ref.' occurs when what is said in the manifestation is refuted.

29. 'z' ('z')

Number of times used in the corpus : 49 (15 by S, 27 by H, 7 by O).

It has been stated above that 'y' utterances are additional utterances which relate to the topics of origin and manifestation and which precede realization. In some data, additional utterances also follow realization and although these utterances are not relevant to

the misunderstanding they are part of the conversations from which the data are drawn. These utterances are 'z' utterances. They do not play any part in the resolution of a misunderstanding but they can make a contribution to the conversation by their cohesive links.

'z' can answer the origin question, as in A22, "H: The A.I. was the hardest" or A13, "H: Oh nothing, it's all arranged". It can include 'glossing', as in A47, "S: I thought you were doing one of your jokes because you often do".

'z' can develop the misunderstanding, either by teasing as in A24, "H: We're not in your social - we don't aim for the peerage", or by taking up the misunderstood topic, as in B61, "O: I didn't know he was leaving". In B53 four 'z' utterances are produced :

- (6.2) z H: No I'm not
 (7.1) z O¹: Are you divorced?
 .2) z : No I come from Staffordshire actually
 (8) z S,H,O^{1,2}: / laugh /

In (6.2) H answers the origin question, "Are you Manx?", to which her manifestation had been "No, eh, I'm divorced actually". O¹ then parodies the misunderstanding by reversing it and all the participants laugh at this parody. Each of these utterances constitutes 'z'.

(d) Devices which relate to extralinguistic activity

22. 'action' ('action')

'action' is any movement, activity, inspection and so on by participants which contributes to the development of a misunderstanding. It is not linguistic and usually has no intentional communicative function but it does aid communication by allowing, for instance, the identification

of referents, and is thus instrumental in the development of misunderstandings.

In A44 'action' enables the referent of the origin to be identified :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------------------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Is there anything in that, (H) ? |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Not particularly |
| | action | S - drinks from can - |
| (4) | | H: Oh I thought you meant the paper |

S is reading a newspaper ; an opened can of juice is on his desk. H assumes the origin refers to his newspaper, in which he has found little of interest. When, in response to his manifestation, S uses 'action' by picking up the can and drinking from it, he realizes his misunderstanding.

'action' which is used after realization is the non-linguistic equivalent of the device 'z' and is termed 'z-action', as in E72, " - picks up glasses - ".

'action' which is used prior to the origin, as in A6, " - takes three 2p pieces from her purse - " is not noted. Some 'actions' which are used between the origin and Realization are not noted as devices if they have no influence on the misunderstanding. These tend to be positional 'actions', such as turning to look at a participant, as in L87, or going to the room where S or H is, as in K85. In this latter type the 'action' would of course be noted if by joining the other participant one sees the referent or otherwise receives further information as a consequence of having used the 'action'.

These thirty devices constitute the secondary textual component of misunderstandings. Section 3 discusses which participants use the devices.

3. CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVICES AND PARTICIPANTS

When the devices were listed in Chapter IV it was assumed that each device was potentially open to each participant. After consideration of the corpus, it is apparent that some devices are used exclusively by particular participants, as follows :

S : 'x comp.' (2)
 'x rpt.' (13)
 'x^r qued.' (2)
 'manif. qued.' (1)

H : 'p^r err. ack.' (2)
 'manif. rpt.' (4)
 'manif. ampl.' (3)

In addition, a number of devices are used predominantly but not exclusively by each participant, as follows :

S & H : 'p^r qued.' (S:3, H:1)

S & O : 'x emph.' (S:5, O:1)
 'x ampl.' (S:18, O:1)
 'x exp.' (S:8, O:2)
 'x^r ref.' (S:5, O:1)
 'p exp.' (S:48, O:2)

H & O : 'x qued.' (H:4, O:1)
 'x^r exp.' (H:10, O:2)
 'p qued.' (H:4, O:2)

S, H & O : 'p^r exp.' (S:2, H:13, O:1)
 'p^r ref.' (S:30, H:2, O:3)
 'p^r err. sig.' (S:7, H:12, O:3)
 'mus. sig.' (S:12, H:2, O:5)
 'mus. ack.' (S:12, H:75, O:10)
 'y' (S:57, H:47, O:14)

In assessing the correlation between devices and participants, O's use of devices can be discounted because O supports either S or H in the use of each particular device according to whether O shares S's or H's understanding of the origin. If one then also discounts uses which are less than half the maximum number of uses, on the grounds that the greater number represents the predominant use, the devices can be allocated to S and H, as follows :

<u>S</u>	<u>H</u>
x comp.	x qued.
x rpt.	x ^r exp.
x emph.	p qued.
x ampl.	p ^r exp.
x exp.	p ^r err. sig.
x ^r qued.	p ^r err. ack.
x ^r ref.	mus. ack.
p exp.	y
p ^r qued.	manif. rpt.
p ^r ref.	manif. ampl.
p ^r err. sig.	action
mus. sig,	
y	
manif. qued.	
action	

S thus predominantly uses devices which involve clarification of x and of p, which question x^r and p^r, which indicate that x^r and p^r are wrong, which question the manifestation and which signal the misunderstanding. H, on the other hand, predominantly uses devices which clarify x^r, p^r and the manifestation, which question x and p, and which acknowledge the misunderstanding or an error in p^r. Devices common to both S and H are the signalling of an error in p^r, 'y' utterances and 'action'.

One would expect S to clarify what he said and what he intended to

express and to question what H heard and understood and one would expect H to clarify what he heard and understood and to question what S said and intended. Each knows his own understanding and does not know the other's. One would also expect S to signal the misunderstanding and H to acknowledge it because S is more usually the first to realize and H is the one for whom realization is effected by various devices. S and H both signal errors in p^r . S tends to encounter difficulties understanding the manifestation while H's difficulties are with the origin; prior to realization, subsequent utterances can prompt them to signal an error in p^r . H also uses ' p^r err. sig.' prior to his manifestation in intentional misunderstandings.

'y' and 'action' are not closely linked with the misunderstanding and therefore it is not surprising that both are used by S and by H.

'z' is not included in this correlation because the number of 'z' utterances in the corpus is somewhat arbitrary; all utterances which follow realization are 'z' utterances, except for those which constitute other devices, and therefore the number of 'z' utterances depends on the recording of the datum and at which point this ceases.

Devices, like origin and manifestation, are textual components. The non-textual component of realization is discussed and illustrated in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER VII

NON - TEXTUAL COMPONENT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS :

REALIZATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Realization is the awareness of whether or not a misunderstanding has occurred. Because it is non-textual, that is, it cannot be checked against a transcription of what was said, identification of it is dependent on the analyst's interpretation of the textual components (origin, manifestation, devices) and on commentaries provided by participants. Although it is not tangible in the way that utterances are, it is an integral part of all misunderstandings; in every misunderstanding a particular state of realization obtains for each participant. The state of realization specifies whether or not a participant is aware that a misunderstanding has occurred.

Before realization a participant's state of realization is '- real.'; when he realizes a misunderstanding has occurred his state of realization becomes '+ real.'. Such a change crucially alters his understanding of the conversation. For S, '+ real.' means that he is aware that H has misunderstood his origin and also, in those instances in which '+ real.' does not obtain until one or more utterances after the manifestation, that his own belief about H's manifestation has been incorrect. For H, '+ real.' means that he is aware that he has misunderstood the origin and that S intended to express a different proposition to the one H believed had been expressed.

States of realization may differ for each participant. The states of realization which obtain in, for example, H76, are '+ S real. - H real.'. In this misunderstanding S realizes and H fails to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred. They therefore leave the conversation with differing beliefs about what has been expressed in the origin.

Realization tends to be effected at different times for each participant and the order in which it is effected is important. If, for example, H realizes prior to H, S has the option of effecting '+ H real.' and correcting H's misunderstanding of the origin. In such an instance S is aware both of what he intended the origin to express and of what H has misunderstood it as expressing, while H has only one understanding, which, unbeknown to him, is incorrect. Conversely, H might realize in advance of S and might wish to amend his manifestation and to effect '+ S real.'. The particular understandings which participants have of the origin, and therefore of the conversation, are not necessarily constant; the identification of states of realization accounts for the fact that what each utterance expresses is not necessarily what each participant believes it expresses.

Assessing whether or not participants have realized that a misunderstanding has occurred seems like Twaddell's "fire in a wooden stove" (Twaddell, 1935, in Joos, 1957:57) in that it requires the analyst to make judgement of participants' thinking processes (c.f. Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Grimshaw, 1982). One analyst's interpretation of what is happening in a misunderstanding might differ from another's. Although the analyst is not a participant in a dynamic conversation, he has to understand what the participants are expressing in their utterances. Just as H can fail to understand correctly, so the analyst cannot guarantee to interpret correctly the participants' utterances, intentions, beliefs and misunderstandings (c.f. McGregor, 1985).

However, there is often evidence to guide the analyst. The conversation which he seeks to interpret is no longer dynamic but has become a static text. The analyst has the advantage of being able to relate prior and

subsequent utterances to the one he is interpreting. In many data, therefore, the analyst can be reasonably certain what utterances were intended to express and what they were understood as having expressed. In presenting the communication model in Chapter III it was argued that approximation counted as sufficient understanding and there is no reason why this cannot be equally true of the analyst's understanding of utterances.

Assessing whether or not realization has been effected is dependent on the analyst's interpretation of utterances. If the assumption that an analyst can understand utterances is correct, then the further assumption that his understanding of utterances can be used to assess states of realization ought also be correct. However, provision must be made for those data in which the states of realization cannot be confirmed or cannot be assessed at all. The possible states of realization which can obtain in misunderstandings are therefore as follows : '+ S,H,O real.' and '- S,H,O, real.' when the states are confirmed ; '? + S,H,O,real.' and '? - S,H,O real.' when the states are assumed but not confirmed ; '? S,H,O real.' when the states cannot even be assumed.

The investigation of realization raises the fundamental problem of how an analyst can assess participants' states of realization. This problem is discussed in the following section. Once the analyst has acquired evidence for the states of realization it becomes possible to determine how participants effect realization for each other, that is, how they resolve misunderstandings. The final section of the chapter discusses the means by which participants effect realization.

2. EVIDENCE FOR REALIZATION

Evidence for realization is provided by two sources : (i) textual evidence which is drawn from the conversation in which the misunderstanding occurred and (ii) retrospective evidence which is drawn from participants' commentaries after the misunderstanding has closed.

A major source of textual evidence is provided by those devices which relate to p, p^r and to the misunderstanding itself. An explanation of p^r such as "Oh I thought you meant it was in mono" (A48) makes it clear to both S and the analyst that what H thought the origin expressed differs from what it was intended to express. Appreciation by H of this difference between p and p^r means that she realizes that a misunderstanding has occurred. The various expressions which constitute 'mus. ack.' also indicate that realization has been effected, such as "Ah" in A19, "Oh" in B60 and, followed 'sequentially' by 'p^r exp.' in A42 :

Oh my tea
I thought you meant my eat tea

'p^r ref.' 'combined' with 'mus. ack.' also indicates '+ H real.' as in "Oh not Clive Dixon" (A23). These devices indicate that '+ H real.' has been effected.

Devices used by S enable one to assess that '+ S real.' obtains. S must have realized a misunderstanding has occurred if he effects '+ H real.' by the use of 'p exp.' and 'p^r ref.', as in the following example :

A5 No that's not what I mean
 I mean how much is she selling it for

If S refutes p^r and explains p he must have realized H's misunderstanding. Similarly, if S effects '+ H real.' by the use of 'x exp.' and 'x^r ref.' he must have realized that H misunderstood the origin because he had

misheard it, as in the following example :

B53 Not MARRIED
 I asked you are you MANX

Textual evidence is also provided by the nature of responses to the manifestation and to utterances seeking a different response to the origin than that provided by the manifestation. In D65, for example, S uses 'x ampl.' since the manifestation apparently does not provide an appropriate response to the origin :

- | | | | |
|-----|---------|--|-------------------|
| (1) | | H: He offered Alan Oates a job on the spot | |
| (2) | ORIGIN | S: Where, at Abu Dhabi ? | |
| (3) | MANIF. | H: No, at Ronaldsway | |
| | | | _____ + S real. |
| (4) | x ampl. | S: Where was the job ? | |
| | | | _____ ? + H real. |
| (5) | y / z | H: Abu Dhabi | |

S re-phrases (2) and makes it clear that she wishes to know the location of the job, as opposed to the location in which the conversation took place; this indicates that S has realized H's misunderstanding. S, as analyst, confirmed this realization. It is possible that 'x ampl.' effects '+ H real.' since H responds appropriately in (5) but this cannot be confirmed.

In C63 S uses 'y' in response to the origin, commenting further on the topic of the origin, a meal which S and H will be attending. This effects '+ H real.' :

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------|--|-------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: This is going to be a very funny meal | |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Yes but it's nice | |
| (3) | y | S: Well George will be all right | |
| | | | _____ + H real. |
| (4) | mus. ack. | H: Oh that meal | |
| | | | _____ ? + S real. |

possible to discuss the misunderstanding with S).

In some examples participants are not able to confirm their own states of realization. In S100 both S and H were unable to decide if they had or had not realized the misunderstanding had occurred, though both admitted to being aware that the conversation was problematical :

- | | | |
|-----|--------|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: There's coffee again now |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: Have you been off coffee then? |
| (3) | y | S: There hasn't been any for some time |

S and H are in a common room for which coffee is normally provided. For the previous few weeks there has been no coffee, only some atrocious tea; S and H had discussed this situation at the time. S, asked after the conversation ended, could not understand why H had expressed the manifestation and wondered if she had phrased her origin utterance badly. H said that she had not been listening properly.

The inability of participants to know whether or not they have realized that a misunderstanding has occurred is surprising but in the three data in which ('? real.' obtains and the participants subsequently discussed the misunderstanding, '+ real.' or '- real.' could not be confirmed ('? H real.' in M90, '? S real.' in O95 and '? S real. ? H real.' in S100). These data would have been classified as '- real.' but the participants were very reluctant to confirm that realization was definitely not effected.

Another source of retrospective evidence is the fact that if a misunderstanding is reported to the analyst by a participant, that participant must have realized that the misunderstanding has occurred. If his state of realization was '- real.' he could not report the misunderstanding (e.g. S in B56). If he realized after the misunderstanding

closed then he knows that his stæ of realization was '- real.'.

The various sources of textual and retrospective evidence indicate the states of realization which obtain. Locating precisely the stages at which realization is effected is not always easy. In the following example, B56, O might realize after (3); she definitely realizes after (4) :

- | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Can I have two egg salad rolls and
I owe you two | |
| | | H - gives S two rolls - | |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: That's thirty | |
| (3) | x ampl. | S: But I owe you two | _____ ? + O real. |
| (4) | manif. rpt. | H: Yes, that's thirty | _____ + O real. |
| (5) | p ^r _{&} p ^{exp} _{ref.} prt1. | O: No he means two rolls | _____ + S, H real. |

S is buying rolls and is paying for two rolls he bought from O on the previous day. It is possible that O realizes that S means 'two rolls' rather than 'two pence' after (3) but there is no evidence of '+ O real.' until after (4), to which O responds with an explanation of the origin and a refutation of H's p^r, thereby demonstrating that her state of realization is '+ O real.'. The marker '? + O real.' after (3) indicates the possibility of O's having realized at this stage.

It is apparent that participants are able to effect realization for each other by seeking responses other than those which have been forthcoming or by responding to utterances in inappropriate ways or by using devices. These means are discussed in Section 3.

3. HOW REALIZATION IS EFFECTED

An important means by which realization is effected is the recognition of the inappropriacy of the manifestation, as in the following datum, A9 :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Is it wool?
 (2) MANIF. H: Very
 _____ + S real.
 (3) x exp. & S: I said wool not warm
 x^r ref. _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) z : Yes I think so

S has commented that she likes H's jumper. H does not express 'warm' in her manifestation yet S correctly understands that this is what H has understood of the origin, that is, H has misheard "wool" as 'warm'. The 'linguistic inappropriacy' of the intensifier, "Very", effects '+ S real.' and enables S to conjecture exactly how H has misunderstood the origin; it is more appropriate to apply "Very" to 'warm' than to "wool" and, additionally, 'warm' is initially phonologically similar to "wool".

Realization is effected by S's recognition of the 'pragmatic inappropriacy' of the manifestation in the following datum, A4 :

- (1) H: When we live in Alston I shall get my
 meat for the freezer from Blackett's
 (2) ORIGIN S: Yes you want to chat Graham up
 (3) MANIF. H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl
 / pause /
 (4) _____ + S real.
 (4) p^r ref. & S: No, Graham Blackett not Graham Richards
 _____ + H real.

Graham (Blackett) in (2) is a butcher; Graham Richards in (4) is a farmer. The commentaries retrospectively provided by S and H for this datum make their intentions clear and in respect of (4) demonstrate the effort which S has to make in order to realize the misunderstanding and resolve it. In uttering (2) S is thinking "Graham rather than any other Blackett" while H reported of (1) that "as I said that about

Blacketts I was thinking that maybe Graham Richards would sell me a heifer cheaply". Not knowing that one of the Blacketts is called Graham, she understands the origin as a slight shift in topic from dead meat to live meat, this being the shift her own thoughts have made. Her manifestation then gives expression to a development of the thought and S has somehow to relate the manifestation to his origin in order to understand it since it is 'pragmatically inappropriate'. The explanation which he subsequently gave of his reasoning is very detailed :

" How should Graham Blackett, a butcher of some repute, need in any ordinary sense of the word, a cowgirl? The only Graham I know who might need a cowgirl is Graham Richards, farmer, up the road, therefore she thought when I said Graham, meaning Graham Blackett, I was intending, contrastively, another family, i.e. not Blackett, rather than what it did mean, which was a specified name of the same family "

S needs to have recourse to pragmatic knowledge of the respective roles of the two professions and to personal knowledge of the two men having the same forename. This knowledge enables him to recognize that the manifestation is inappropriate; consideration of the manifestation's 'pragmatic inappropriacy' effects '+ S real.'.

In order to realize that a misunderstanding has occurred, a participant must often recognize that the topic has been shifted or changed. When H misunderstands the origin as a result of attributing a different referent to it than the one intended by S, the referent of the manifestation will differ from that of the origin. S then has to try and relate the manifestation to his origin and, if he cannot, to determine what is meant by the manifestation. This situation is illustrated by the following datum, A33 :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Sounds like Focus
- (2.1) MANIF. H: Yeah I've been meaning to get it fixed
for days
- .2) y : The picture's been lousy for some time
/ pause /
- (3.1) p^r qued. S: What the hell are you talking about?
/ pause /
- .2) p^r exp. : Ah you're talking about the television
+ S real.
- .3) p exp. : I meant the music
+ H real.

S and H are listening to a record while watching television on vision only. S recognizes that the manifestation is 'cognitively inappropriate' in that it has nothing to do with the music and S would anticipate a response relating to the music. The following utterance, (2.2), adds to this 'inappropriacy' while also giving extra information likely to identify the referent of the manifestation. Eventually S successfully identifies the referent and understands the topic change by H. Complex consideration of the 'inappropriacy' of the manifestation effects '+ S real.'

In all these examples of recognition of the 'inappropriacy' of manifestations, realization has been effected for S. S then effects '+ H real.' by informing H what the origin was intended to express. This is achieved by the use of devices.

The efficacy of a device in effecting realization varies considerably because devices are used either 'separately', in 'combination' or in 'sequence' and they are further influenced by the order in which they are used. The structure of a misunderstanding thus affects its outcome. The structure of a misunderstanding comprises ORIGIN + MANIFESTATION + STATES OF REALIZATION + (devices), that is, the primary textual components, the non-textual component and the secondary textual component. The ways in which these components inter-relate are discussed in Chapter VIII, the final section of which focusses further on realization.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUCTURE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

1. INTRODUCTION

The primary textual components of a misunderstanding, origin and manifestation, and the non-textual component, realization, constitute the essential structure: what is misunderstood, what evidence there is of the misunderstanding and what awareness participants have of whether or not the misunderstanding has occurred. The secondary textual component, the devices, constitutes the ways in which participants develop and resolve or fail to resolve misunderstandings.

The combination of textual and non-textual components constitutes the structure of a misunderstanding, as follows: ORIGIN + MANIFESTATION + STATES OF REALIZATION (+ devices). Use of devices is optional. The order in which the components occur is variable. Only the origin has a fixed position. It is always the first component; all the other components are a consequence of the origin and they therefore must follow it.

The basic structure of a misunderstanding consists of the following sequence:

ORIGIN → MANIF. → + S real. → S device → + H real. (→ H device)

In this sequence the manifestation is adjacent to the origin; S realizes the misunderstanding has occurred as a result of recognizing the inappropriacy of the manifestation; S uses one device; this device effects '+ H real.'; H may or may not use a device subsequent to his realization. This sequence is deemed the basic structure of a misunderstanding because the misunderstanding occurs and is resolved in the most expedient way, that is, the least effort required by participants to ensure that each realizes the misunderstanding has occurred. The

misunderstanding does not continue to be the topic of the conversation beyond H's optional device.

There are two essential requirements of the basic structure. The first is that origin and manifestation must be adjacent. The second is the order in which realization is effected : '+ S real.' must precede '+ H real.'. Provided that these requirements are met, the basic structure can be expanded by the use of more than one device and interactively expanded by the use of devices which S and H use interactively. Thus, for example, S and H can each use devices between the manifestation and the effecting of '+ S real.', between the effecting of '+ S real.' and of '+ H real.' and subsequent to the effecting of '+ H real.'.

41% of the misunderstandings in the corpus exhibit basic structure. In the remaining 59% the structure is diversified. The basic structure of a misunderstanding can be diversified in four ways : (i) the origin and the manifestation are not adjacent ; (ii) '+ S real.' does not precede '+ H real.' ; (iii) the participant O makes an individual contribution which alters the sequencing of basic structure ; and (iv) realization is not effected for any or all participants. Diversified structure, like basic structure, can be expanded and interactively expanded.

The structure of a misunderstanding is wholly dependent on its participants and the ways in which they interact. In the basic structure the manifestation follows the origin, S recognizes the inappropriacy of the manifestation and realizes that H has misunderstood the origin ; he then uses a device to effect '+ H real.'. This is not a blueprint which S and H must follow ; it is a description of what happens when

S and H interact in one particular way. They might very well interact differently. One or both might produce utterances between the origin and the manifestation, S might not recognize the inappropriacy of the manifestation until a number of devices have been used, or, having realized the misunderstanding has occurred might choose not to effect '+ H real.' or might attempt to do so by using a device which H fails to interpret correctly and so on.

The structure of a misunderstanding is the yardstick of its complexity. A misunderstanding which contains interactive expansion is more complex than one which does not and a misunderstanding which has a diversified structure is more complex than one which has basic structure. Section 2 of this chapter discusses and exemplifies basic and diversified structure.

States of realization and the points in the sequences at which realization is effected crucially influence the structure of misunderstandings. Section 3 of this chapter discusses the role of realization in the structure of misunderstandings.

2. BASIC AND DIVERSIFIED STRUCTURE

The basic structure of a misunderstanding consists of the following sequence :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → + S real. → S device → + H real. (→ H device)

In this sequence S realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred as soon as he hears the manifestation. He then effects '+ H real.' by using one device. H then realizes that the misunderstanding has occurred and may, if he wishes, use a device. The basic structure is exhibited in A3 :

manifestation :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Could you fasten that drawer properly
- (2) IND. MANIF. H: Yes right
 action H - holds door handle -
 _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref. & p exp. S: Drawer not door
 _____ + H real.
- (4) mus. ack. H: Ah

The basic structure of this misunderstanding is expanded in two ways:

- (i) H uses a device between her manifestation and the effecting of '+ S real.'; and (ii) S uses a 'combined' device, 'p^r ref. & p exp.', between the effecting of '+ S real.' and '+ H real.'.

Expansion occurs when more than one device is used in a participant-turn, including the use of a device by H after his manifestation in the same participant-turn. Interactive expansion occurs when devices are used in a sequence of participant-turns rather than in a single participant-turn. A misunderstanding which has basic structure with interactive expansion is exemplified by A30, which exhibits the following structure :

ORIGIN → MANIF. & H device (p^r err. sig.) → S device (p^r qued.)
 → H device (p^r exp.) → + S real. → S device (x exp.) → + H real.

If the sequencing of components in a misunderstanding differs from the sequence exhibited in basic structure, the structure of that misunderstanding is diversified. The structure of a misunderstanding can be diversified in four ways, each of which is discussed below :

- (i) When the origin and the manifestation are not adjacent the structure is diversified. Expansion or interactive expansion can separate the origin and the manifestation. If a misunderstanding contains two or more origins and/or two or more manifestations its structure is not necessarily diversified; it is only diversified if

a device is used between the components, as in A45, which exhibits the following initial structure :

ORIGIN, ORIGIN → S device (y) → MANIF.

The structure is expanded by 'y' and this device separates the origin and the manifestation. The fact that there are two origins does not affect the datum's structure because the two origins are adjacent.

In the following datum, A49, interactive expansion separates the origin from the manifestation :

ORIGIN → H device (p^r err. sig.) → S device (y) → MANIF.

The structure of A49 is thus diversified.

(ii) When '+ S real.' does not precede '+ H real.', the structure of the misunderstanding is diversified. For example, '+ H real.' precedes '+ S real.' in A46. The structure of this datum is diversified with considerable interactive expansion :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → S device (y) → H device (y) → S device (y)
 → H device (action) → S device (y) → H device (y) → S device (y)
 → + H real. → H devices (y, x^r exp.) → + S real. → H device
 (mus. ack.)

When the misunderstanding is intentional '+ H real.' always precedes '+ S real.' and additionally, '+ H real.' always precedes the manifestation. The structure of an intentional misunderstanding is therefore invariably diversified. The following datum, A36, exemplifies the diversified structure of an intentional misunderstanding :

ORIGIN → + H real. → H device (mus. sig.), MANIF.
 → + S real. → S device (mus. ack.)

The structure of a misunderstanding in which S and H realize at the same time that a misunderstanding has occurred is also diversified, as

in A43, which exhibits interactive expansion :

ORIGIN → IND. MANIF. → S device (x rpt. prtl.) → + S, H real.
 → S, H device (mus. ack.) → S device (p^x exp. imp.)

(iii) When the participant O makes an individual contribution, the sequencing of the basic structure is altered and the structure of such a misunderstanding is diversified. O is present in 19% of the corpus and his presence involves both an additional state of realization and the potential use of devices by an additional participant. When more than one O participant is involved the number of states of realization and the number of potential devices is further increased.

When O does not make an individual contribution but simply reinforces the signalling and/or acknowledgement of a misunderstanding at the same time and by the same device as S or H, the structure of that misunderstanding is basic. In addition, '+ O real.' must be effected at the same time as either '+ S real.' or '+ H real.'. Thus the structure of B52, for example, is basic with interactive expansion :

ORIGIN → MANIF., MANIF., MANIF., MANIF. → + S, O real.
 → S, O device (mus. sig.) → S device (x rpt. & x emph.)
 → + H real. → S, O device (mus. ack.) → H device (mus. ack.)

The four adjacent manifestations effect '+ S, O real.' and O uses the same devices at the same time as S. In the following example, B51, O is linked with H rather than S; '+ O real.' is effected at the same time as '+ H real.' and O uses the same device at the same time as both S and H. The structure is therefore basic with expansion :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → + S real. → S device (x exp. & x emph. & x^r ref.) → + H, O real. → S, H, O device (mus. ack.)

These instances of basic structure in which O makes no individual contribution are in contrast with instances in which O does make an

individual contribution and thereby influences the development of the misunderstanding. In B56, for example, O realizes in advance of S and H and uses a device to effect '+ S, H real.'. The structure of B56 is therefore diversified with interactive expansion :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → S device (x ampl.) → ? + O real. → H device
(manif. rpt.) → + O real. → O device (p^r ref. prt1. & p exp.)
+ S, H real.

The structure is diversified in this datum because O makes an individual contribution.

(iv) When realization is not effected for any or all participants, the structure of that misunderstanding is diversified. A participant's state of realization is always '- real.' until realization is effected. Rather than having a discrete place in the structural sequence like other components, '- real.' extends over the sequence after the origin and up to '+ real.' being effected. When '+ real.' is not effected '- real.' continues to be the state of realization which obtains. Consequently the structural sequence of any misunderstanding in which realization is not effected lacks a primary component. It should be noted that it is only the sequence which lacks the primary component, state of realization; the structure does not lack it, in that '- real.' obtains, extending over the sequence.

Diversified structure is exhibited in those misunderstandings in which any of the following states of realization obtain : '- S/H/O real.', '? - S/H/O real.' and '? S/H/O real.'. For example, the structure of H77 is diversified because H does not realize that the misunderstanding has occurred :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → + S real. → S device (p exp. prt1.)
→ H device (p^r err. sig.)

When the state of realization is not known and cannot be assumed '? real.' obtains. The structure of misunderstandings in which '? real.' obtains for all participants resembles that of misunderstandings in which '- real.' obtains for all participants in that no '+ real.' appears in the sequence. In S100 both S's and H's states of realization are unknown and the diversified structure is as follows :

ORIGIN → MANIF. → S device (y)

This structure resembles that of G74 :

ORIGIN → IND. MANIF. → S devices (y & p^r err. sig., y)
→ 0 devices (y, y, y) → S device (y) → 0 device (y)

The difference is that G74 contains interactive expansion but both data fail to contain a state of realization in their structural sequences.

The sequencing of devices within the various structures varies from datum to datum so there is little constraint on what should be used and in what order. 'Mus. ack.' is usually the last in any sequence in which it is used but it is occasionally followed by 'p^r exp.' (A49) or 'x^r exp.' (B61) by H. Devices which relate to x tend not to be used in sequences containing devices which relate to p (but cf. A22, B58, D70, F73, M91 and P97). Explanations and repeats tend to follow queries.

The positioning of components and the choice of which devices constitute the secondary components in every misunderstanding are dependent on participants and their states of realization. If '+ real.' obtains for a participant that participant understands both what is intended and what has been misunderstood. Such knowledge enables him to use devices or to choose not to use particular devices. Without such knowledge a participant is limited in the devices he can use. The important role of realization is discussed in the following section.

3. REALIZATION

Realization has a crucial role in the structure of misunderstandings. Each participant's state of realization governs his understanding of the origin and of the conversation and therefore influences the development of the misunderstanding.

Prior to the effecting of realization, each participant believes that there is only one understanding of the origin, namely, the understanding which each participant himself has : S believes that H's p^r is equivalent to p, H believes his p^r is equivalent to p and O believes both his p^r and H's p^r are equivalent to p. When '+ real.' is effected for a participant, that participant becomes aware that his belief is unfounded and that p^r is not equivalent to p.

The order in which realization is effected determines the subsequent structure of a misunderstanding. If S realizes first he has three options : (i) he can effect '+ H/O real.', as in A5; (ii) he can conceal the misunderstanding but endeavour to ensure that H's p^r is equivalent to p, as in M90; or (iii) he can conceal the misunderstanding and allow the topic raised in his origin to be changed, as in I78. If H realizes first he has two options : (i) he can effect '+ S/O real.' and thereby admit to the misunderstanding, as in A41; or (ii) he can conceal the misunderstanding, as in K82. With both these options H can then respond appropriately to the origin. When a misunderstanding is intentional H realizes before any other participant and produces a manifestation for joke purposes. The subsequent development in this instance depends on the other participants' states of realization; H's realization initiates the manifestation rather than devices. If O realizes first, he has two options : (i) he can

effect '+ S/H real.', as in B56; or (ii) he can conceal the misunderstanding. There is no example in the corpus of O's concealment of a misunderstanding although in L87 O realizes first and effects '+ H real.' but not '+ S real.'.

The structure of a misunderstanding is influenced by realization even when realization is not effected. In G75 the participants are aware of a problem in the conversation but in spite of the complex discussion of the conversation none of the participants realize that a misunderstanding, which stems from H's having misheard the origin, has occurred :

- (1.1) O¹: He blew up my nose and he gave me a headache
 .2) : It was nasty
- (2) ORIGIN S: It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr
- (3) y O¹: Well he was a phhhhh
- (4) y S: A gale
- (5) y O²: Is that supposed to be romantic?
- (6) y S: It gets dogs going I believe
- (7) MANIF. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic
- (8) p^r err. sig. S: Pardon
- (9) manif. rpt. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic
- (10) x^r qued. S: Who mentioned zeppelins?
- (11) x^r exp. prtl. H: You just did, didn't you?
 & x^r qued.
- (12) x^r ref. prtl. S: No
- (13) y O¹: This is one of those conversations
- (14) x^r exp. prtl. O²: You did
- (15) x^r exp. prtl. H: I know, but only because I thought (S) did
 & p^r err. sig.
- (16) x^r ref. prtl. O²: No, you started that one
 & x^r exp.
- (17) x^r ref. prtl. S: No, I'm afraid not (H)
- (18) y O³: They could be thought extremely phallic
- (19) y S: What can?
- (20) y H: Phallic?
- (21) y O¹: Zeppelins
- (22) y S: Zeppelins
- (23) y O¹: Oh those big things that go like that
 - extends arms wide -

O^1 and O^2 each use 'y' once and S uses 'y' twice between the origin and the manifestation. The manifestation relates the misheard word, "zeppelin", to the quality attributed to the correct word, "zephyr", in the origin by O and S in their utterances. The manifestation is inappropriate and out of context so S uses 'p^r err. sig.', to which H uses 'manif. rpt.'. From this point onwards, seven out of the next eight utterances involve attempts to relate the inappropriate manifestation to the conversation. S queries the source of x^r in the conversation, H 'partially' explains it, S 'partially' refutes it. O^1 then uses 'y'; her comment, "This is one of those conversations", recognizes that a problem exists but makes no contribution to any possible resolution. O^2 then 'partially' explains x^r again, in terms of explaining the place of the utterance in the conversation. H agrees with this explanation, using ' x^r exp. prtl.'. Again, the 'partial' explanation is of why he expressed his manifestation, "because I thought (S) did", which is also 'p^r err. sig.'. The signal is not taken up because S knows she did not utter anything about "zeppelins"; consequently she 'partially' refutes x^r , following O^2 's use of the same device. H's device could have been taken up more usefully if S had asked for further details of when she was supposed to have mentioned "zeppelins", but neither she nor O^2 do anything other than refute H's x^r . Subsequent utterances take up the topic of "zeppelins" and the misunderstanding remains unrealized for all participants.

Were it not for the fact that the datum was tape-recorded, the misunderstanding would never have been discovered. Only after listening to the tape a number of times was "zephyr" heard and the connection made between that and the misheard "zeppelin". If the participants had concentrated on what H heard, x^r , rather than on when in the conversation he claimed to have heard x^r , and from whom, they

might have realized that the misunderstanding had occurred. Failure to realize results in a sequence of devices relating to the conversation which then gives way to a change of topic. The structure of the misunderstanding would have been very different if H had explained that he heard S say 'It's supposed to be like a sort of zeppelin'; such an explanation may very well have effected realization, in which case the conversation would have proceeded without further difficulty. Instead, owing to the ineffectual use of devices, realization is never effected and part of the conversation is directed to attempts to make sense of the manifestation.

G74 is another datum in which '- real.' obtains for all the participants. This datum is particularly interesting because two of the participants discuss in some detail a potential misunderstanding which is averted because the potential H does not manifest it and instead realizes it after using 'p^r err. sig.'. This participant becomes O in the later, actual misunderstanding. The conversation begins with a request by S which H answers and which O wrongly believes is addressed to himself :

- | | | |
|-------|----|---|
| (1) | S: | Can I just borrow (O) for a few minutes |
| (2) | H: | Yeah sure |
| (3) | S: | I'll not be a tic |
| (4.1) | O: | What? |
| .2) | : | What? |
| .3) | : | Oh you were talking to (H) then were you? |
| (5) | S: | No I was just broaching the subject |
| (6) | H: | A question of ownership |
| (7) | S: | That's right, yeah |

O later explains how he understood (1) :

- | | | |
|--------|----|---|
| (11.3) | O: | I thought thought you were going to go on |
| .4) | : | Can I just borrow (O) for a minute such and such is what I thought you were going to do so you eh |

S and O then discuss the reason why O 'misunderstood' S's request in (1). Being linguists, the two use terminology with which H, a non-linguist, is not likely to be familiar :

- (14) S: You're just so used to me having dysphasic
 (15) O: No the tonicity tonicity was wrong
 (16) S: Dysphasic syntax
 (17.1) O: Can I just BORrow
 .2) : You had the tonic on borrow, right?
 .3) : You should have had the tonic on (O)
 (18.1) S: Can I just BORrow (O) for a minute
 .2) : That's what I said
 .3) : Can I just BORrow (O) for a minute
 (19.1) O: Yeah right
 .2) : What you should have said was can I just borrow (O) for a minute

At this stage of the conversation the actual misunderstanding occurs. S, perhaps in defence of his apparently incorrect tonicity, appeals to H :

- (20) ORIGIN S: Did you understand it?
 (21) IND. MANIF. H: No not a word
 (22.1) y & p^r err.sig. S: That's right that's why you said yes
 .2) y : Great

"it" in (20) refers to the request in (1), which H did understand; evidence of his correct understanding of the request is displayed in his response "Yeah sure" in (2) and in his observation in (6), "A question of ownership". H, however, understands the referent of "it" to be the lengthy discussion on the intonation of the request and on why O had 'misunderstood' this request; he has not understood this discussion and he answers accordingly. S does not realize that H has misunderstood the origin; judging by (22.1) S assumes that H did understand "it" and he anticipates the answer 'yes' to his question. His use of 'y & p^r err. sig.; y' expresses the fact that H has already given evidence of understanding "it" by responding to that original question with "yes". S's origin might be motivated by a wish to defend

his initial utterance and the manner in which he expressed it; the question was understood by the addressee and therefore the lengthy discussion which deliberates on what was wrong with the way it was expressed ought to reflect on O's abilities as a hearer rather than on S's as a speaker. S's response to the manifestation is one of protest, which is probably due to his having anticipated a different answer to the origin. This protest acts as a 'p^r err. sig.' but H does not take up the signal; a response from him is not required and he ceases to play any further part in the conversation. H has not understood the discussion on tonicity and because he has not said 'yes' to any part of it he ought to realize that he has misunderstood the referent of the origin. Had S used 'p^r qued.' by asking, for example, 'Why did you answer yes if you didn't understand it?' H would have been obliged to answer and realization would probably have been effected.

Thus in both these data, G75 and G74, the state of realization which obtains for all participants is '- real.'. In G75 the participants attempt to solve a problem in the conversation without appreciating that the problem is a misunderstanding. The states of realization influence the utterances which follow the origin and the manifestation: the devices used are limited to queries and explanations of x and x^r and to 'y', utterances which develop the topic. In G74 the participants are not really aware of a problem in the conversation. S and O jokingly attribute the inappropriacy of the manifestation to the fact that being a teacher is affecting H. The states of realization result in a series of 'y' utterances after one 'combined' 'y & p^r err. sig.'. In both data the conversation ends with S and O (O¹, O² and O³ in G75) having a different understanding of the origin than H.

In other data participants are aware of a problem in the conversation and successfully resolve that problem by using devices which ultimately effect '+ real.' for one or more participants. The structure of L87 is diversified with considerable interactive expansion. The interactive use of eight different devices in the datum illustrates how much effort can be required of participants before the origin is correctly understood :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Could I have a photocopy of these wills please
/ pause /
- (2) IND. MANIF. ¹ H: Yes
- (3) y S: Now then, the yellow cards are Episcopal wills and the pink ones with yellow stripes are as well I assume
/ pause /
- (4) y H: Eh
- (5.1) y S: You're new aren't you?
.2) y : Well I'm sure they are
.3) y : They probably ran out of yellow cards
.4) y : These are the ones I want
.5) y : If you can give me a piece of scrap paper I'll write them out for you and you can think about them
- (6.1) y H: Thanks
- gets paper and gives it to S -
/ pause /
- turns to O -
- .2) MANIF. ² : Can we do photocopies of wills?
- (7.1) y O: Yes, well, print-outs
- turns to S -
- .2) p qued. : You want a print-out from the reader?
- (8) p^r ref. prt1. S: No
& p^r err. sig.
- (9) y O: That's how we copy wills
- (10.1) p exp. S: I want to look at them
.2) p^r ref. : I don't want a copy
- (11.1) p^r err. ack. H: Oh sorry
.2) x^r exp. : I thought you said you wanted them photocopied
- (12) p exp. S: I want to look at the photocopies you have
----- + O real.
- (13) p qued. O: The microfilms
- (14) p exp. prt1. S: Yes
----- + H real.
- (15.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
.2) mus. ack. : I see
.3) mus. ack. : Sorry

The conversation takes place in a Reference Library in which H has just started working. The original manuscripts of wills are not issued to the public; instead, microfilms of the wills are issued for consultation. One type of will, Episcopalian, are indexed on yellow cards and also on pink cards with yellow stripes, while another type are indexed on white cards; H does not know about this procedure. O is a colleague of H's and though his job is not concerned with the issuing of material he knows considerably more about it than H does. Microfilms can be copied by being printed out from a particular microfilm-reader, as opposed to ordinary photocopying.

The misunderstanding is that H does not understand correctly what S is requesting because S does not use the correct words for what she wants. H adopts S's terminology but applies her own meaning to it in her second manifestation; the subsequent utterances are all concerned with correcting this semantic anomaly. O uses 'y' in (7.1) and glosses "photocopies" as "print-outs". He uses 'p qued.' and asks S if this, that is, "a print-out", is what she wants. It is not what she wants and S therefore uses 'p^r ref. prtl. & p^r err. sig.'; these devices put the onus back on O to find out what is required. O uses 'y', an utterance which describes how wills are copied. This 'y' utterance gives S tangible material on which to work. She uses 'sequential' 'p exp., p^r ref.' to establish what she does and does not want. H acknowledges the error in her p^r and explains x^r. At this stage H still does not realize that the misunderstanding has occurred and instead thinks that S has changed her mind about what she wants. S uses 'p exp.' again, still with the troublesome word "photocopies". O then realizes the misunderstanding has occurred and uses 'p qued.', incorporating the correct word "microfilms". S responds to this with 'p exp. prtl.', confirming that the microfilms are what she wants.

'+ H real.' is at last effected; H uses 'mus. ack.'

Because none of the participants realize for some time that H has misunderstood S's origin, they all have problems in communicating. S endeavours to be issued with particular material, H endeavours to find out if what she believes S wants can be issued and O endeavours to ascertain exactly what S wants. The three participants all contribute to the development of the misunderstanding and it is O, who is best acquainted with the topic under discussion, who is the first to realize that H has misunderstood "photocopies" as 'photocopying' rather than "microfilms". O's realization enables him to effect '+ H real.'. Once H has realized, there is no need to effect '+ S real.' because H is in a position to issue the appropriate material. Eight different devices are used, several more than once, before the misunderstanding is resolved.

The efficacy of a device, that is, the ability of a device to effect realization, thus varies according to how it is used and how it is interpreted. No device is absolute: it cannot be claimed, for example, that 'p exp.' will invariably effect realization. As L87 demonstrates, 'p exp.' may not be a clear explanation of p. Even when S's 'p exp.' is apparently an unequivocal explanation of p, as in A5, its efficacy is dependent on H's ability to understand it correctly no less than when it is an 'incomplete' 'p exp.', as in D68, or a poor expression of 'p exp.', as in H77. The efficacy of every device depends on its recipient, just as the understanding of the origin does.

Devices may be 'combined' and 'sequential' and may be used in interactive expansion; it is therefore possible that they cumulatively effect realization. In misunderstandings in which a number of devices are

used the device which ultimately effects realization may do so as a consequence of the devices which have preceded it. Determining which device effects realization is not always straightforward, even when not many devices are used in a conversation. In A25, for example, the manifestation effects '+ S real.'; S then uses 'p exp.' which is followed by H's use of 'action' before H realizes and duly acknowledges the misunderstanding. S is looking at a paper :

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------|----|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | I'd better see what's on |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | I'd quite like to watch Rhoda at nine o'clock |
| | | | _____ + S real. |
| (3) | p exp. | S: | I meant the Millennium |
| | action | H | - looks at paper and sees it is a local one giving list of Millennium celebration events - |
| | | | _____ + H real. |
| (4) | mus. ack. | H: | Oh |

The explanation given by S might or might not have been sufficient to effect '+ H real.'. H uses 'action' by looking at what S is reading and this, together with S's explanation, effects realization. It is impossible to know whether 'p exp.' alone would have effected realization.

The device 'y' is particularly variable in its efficacy. It can support the misunderstanding or can effect realization. In R99 both S and O use 'y'; S's 'y' might have supported the misunderstanding had O's 'y' not followed it :

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------|----|---|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | Stephen appeared before me the other week |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | What, for speeding? |
| | | | _____ ? + O real. |
| (3) | y | S: | No, it was a domestic case |
| | | | _____ ? + O real. |
| (4) | y | O: | He's a solicitor |
| | | | _____ + H real. |
| (5) | mus. ack. | H: | Oh, he was representing someone |

S is a magistrate; Stephen, an acquaintance of S, H and O, is a lawyer. If O had not used 'y' in (4), adding relevant information to the origin, H may well have inquired into the state of Stephen's marriage, in the light of S's 'y' utterance in (3). It is likely that such an inquiry would ultimately have effected realization.

The confusion which use of the 'y' device can cause is clearly illustrated in C64. H misunderstands the origin and from then until H's use of 'mus. ack.' the conversation proceeds at 'cross purposes' :

- | | | |
|-------|-------------|--|
| (1) | | H: Twelve please |
| (2) | ORIGIN | S: Are you with her? |
| (3) | IND. MANIF. | H: Yes |
| | | / pause / |
| | action | S - holds up three 5p pieces (part of 25p given by "her", the other woman) - |
| (4) | y | S: That's for two |
| (5) | y | H: She gave you 25p |
| (6) | y | S: Yes that's right |
| | | / pause / |
| (7.1) | y | H: Twelve please |
| | | _____ + H real. |
| .2) | mus. ack. | : Oh she was with that man |
| .3) | z | : She paid for them |
| .4) | z | : I'm paying for myself |
| | | _____ ? + S real. |

H gets on a bus with two friends, a man and a woman. The woman pays the fares for the man and herself, leaving H to pay her own fare. The two go through to sit down and H offers S, the bus driver, her fare.

H misunderstands the origin as a straightforward inquiry into whether she is travelling with "her", which she is, rather than correctly understanding it as meaning travelling with "her" in terms of the fare already paid, which she is not. Her answer to the question, the indirect manifestation "Yes", causes S to assume that one fare has

been paid by the other woman to include H and he tries to explain this to H by using 'sequential' devices 'action, y'. H further misunderstands this as being a complaint that the fare paid was insufficient and her own 'y' utterance points out that more money was paid than the amount held up by S, which of course S knows and duly confirms in a 'y' utterance. H then tries to ignore the conversation and to start it again with a 'y' utterance which repeats her utterance which preceded the origin, that is, a request for a 12p fare. She then realizes the misunderstanding and acknowledges it, making it clear that the other woman was with the man and had paid for him. It is assumed that S also realizes at this stage of the conversation but his state of realization cannot be verified.

'Compounding' occurs because of the failure of both S and H to realize the misunderstanding for some time. Use of the device 'y' in this datum complicates the interaction rather than helping to resolve the misunderstanding. H misunderstands the first 'y', in (4), which is itself the product of S's misunderstanding of the indirect manifestation, and from then on the misunderstanding becomes increasingly complicated. There is no obvious reason for the effecting of '+ H real.'. Having elected to start the conversation again H presumably re-interprets the utterances already exchanged and suddenly understands what S was asking in the origin. H resolves this misunderstanding in spite of the devices rather than because of them, although the proliferation of 'y' utterances eventually makes H aware that there is a problem in her understanding of the conversation.

'Compounding' also occurs in D71. This datum highlights the fact that the effecting of realization is not necessarily straightforward given the range of devices at the participants' disposal :

- (1) ORIGIN S: Who deals with Appeals ?
- (2) x qued. H: Peel ?
- (3) x exp. prtl. S: Yeah
- (4) MANIF. H: David
- _____ + S real.
- (5) x rpt. prtl. S: APPEAL
& x emph. _____ ? + H real.
- (6.1) ? y/ mus. ack. H: Oh
- _____ ? + H real.
- .2) ? p^r err. sig. : What ?
action H - sees bundle of papers -
- _____ ? + H real.
- .3) z H: Oh they're mine

S and H are civil servants ; H deals with "Appeals" in the department while David works in a separate branch of the department and is the area inspector for the town, "Peel". S has a bundle of papers which relate to "Appeals" and is looking for the right person to give them to.

H is not sure that he has heard the origin correctly and he uses 'x qued.' to check it. Because he has misheard the origin it is actually x^r which he expresses although he assumes it to be x, an assumption then borne out by S who uses 'x exp. prtl.' by confirming H's query, having in turn misheard it himself. H then answers the origin question with a manifestation which effects '+ S real.'. S then uses 'x rpt. prtl. & x emph.', which ought to effect '+ H real.'. H, however, appears not to be closely attending. His "Oh" is as likely to be a neutral comment, a 'y' utterance, as a 'mus. ack.' and his "What?" seems to be 'p^r err. sig.' in that he does not appear to understand what is happening in the conversation. He then uses 'action' by seeing the papers which S is endeavouring to return to the right person and he answers the origin question correctly by claiming the papers as his. It is assumed that by this stage he has realized the

misunderstanding but this cannot be verified.

The incorrect explanation of x guarantees the manifestation. Had S heard "Peel" correctly and had he explained x as "Appeal" the misunderstanding would have been avoided. The misunderstanding would have been extended much longer in the conversation were it not for the fact that David's job is very different from the clerical staff's work in handling appeals. This job distinction is what effects '+ S real.'; had, for example, another David worked in the office the conversation would have closed with the misunderstanding remaining unrealized and S would have taken the papers to the other David, who would have rejected them and sent him back to H. Because the only David in the office is the inspector responsible for Peel, S realizes the misunderstanding. Situational information can thus play a large part in the resolution of a misunderstanding.

Which devices are most frequently used and which devices are the most efficacious? Appendix 2 gives details of the number of times S, H and O each use the various devices. Additionally, the number of devices which immediately precede realization and which therefore contribute strongly if not totally to the effecting of realization are detailed; the efficacy of devices used 'separately' rather than in 'combination' is also detailed. It is thus possible to compare the relative efficacy of devices although there are two major shortcomings to such a comparison : (i) realization is often effected cumulatively throughout a conversation and the identification of a particular device which has effected it is therefore not always accurate; (ii) the smallness of the corpus means that any comparison can only be indicative rather than conclusive. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to indicate the relative frequency and efficacy of devices.

The most efficacious device used 'separately' by S is 'x comp.', which effects realization on each occasion it is used. However, its 100% success rate cannot be fairly compared with other devices because it is used only in data in which the origin is interrupted and is therefore much more specific than other devices. Additionally, it is only used twice in the corpus and two uses provide insufficient evidence from which to claim total efficacy in comparison with other devices which are used more frequently.

The most frequent device used by S is 'y'. It is used 57 times and is efficacious on 21% of the occasions when it is used. The disparity between its frequency of use and its efficacy is explained by the diversity of its potential contributions to conversations, as illustrated by R99 and C64.

The second most frequent device used by S is 'p exp.', which is used 48 times. S effects realization by 'p exp.' more often than by any other device; the device is efficacious on 67% of occasions of use. It is often combined with 'p^r ref.', either 'partial' or 'complete'. Used 'separately', 'p exp.' is efficacious on 46% occasions of use. 'p^r ref.', however, is not efficacious at all when used 'separately'. It is primarily a complementary device, supporting the other devices with which it is used.

'x ampl.' and 'x rpt.' are efficacious on 44% and 69% of occasions of use respectively. Giving H another chance to hear the origin or giving him additional information are by no means sufficient to effect realization.

In respect of the devices which H uses to effect realization, manifestations are included in the statistics. A manifestation is

not a device because it is a primary component rather than a secondary one. However, it is included in Appendix 2 because it is an utterance which can effect realization. H is rarely aware that his manifestation is effecting realization because he only realizes himself prior to the manifestation in intentional misunderstandings. H's manifestation effects realization 61 times, which is 53% of occasions of use.

The device most frequently used by H is 'mus. ack.', which is used 75 times. As one would expect, 'mus. ack.' is rarely efficacious (5% of occasions of use) because it is usually the last device in a sequence and follows '+ real.' for all participants. It is therefore only efficacious when H realizes in advance of S and in acknowledging the misunderstanding happens to effect '+ S real.'

The next most frequently used device is 'y', which is used 47 times and is efficacious on 25% of occasions of use. H's most efficacious device is 'p^r exp.' (69% of occasions of use) but this device is only used 13 times.

The devices used by O rarely effect realization. Those devices which are efficacious, 'x exp.', 'p exp.', 'y' and 'x ampl.', with 'p^r ref.' used in 'combination' with other devices, are in keeping with the efficacious devices used by S.

The frequency of use and the efficacy of devices are governed by the way participants use and understand them. Misunderstandings have basic or diversified structures; the structure of each misunderstanding is created by its participants. The establishment of a typology of misunderstandings must accommodate the variability which arises out of this creativity. The following chapter presents and discusses one possible typology of misunderstandings.

CHAPTER IX

A TYPOLOGY OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the types of misunderstandings which occur in the corpus.

A typology of any phenomenon must be applicable to all examples of that phenomenon and must be capable of distinguishing between different types of examples. The determination of the criterion which differentiates types is therefore very important.

The collection of a corpus for this thesis required a fundamental typology of what counted as a misunderstanding and what did not. Distinction was made between linguistic and non-linguistic misunderstandings, between misunderstandings which involved native speakers and those which involved non-native speakers, between general and marked conversational settings and between misunderstandings which contained both origins and manifestations and those which did not. The former distinctions in each case together identify what counts as a misunderstanding in this thesis. Having collected and analysed a corpus, an attempt is now made to develop a typology which refines the preliminary distinctions so that the similarities and differences between the one hundred misunderstandings in the corpus can be determined.

Several factors are potential criteria for refining the fundamental typology: (i) H's intentionality; (ii) Cause; (iii) Structure; and (iv) Outcome. These potential criteria are discussed below; (i) to (iii) are rejected and (iv) is adopted as the criterion for the typology.

(i) H's intentionality The distinction of whether or not a misunderstanding is intentional divides those misunderstandings in which $p^r \neq p$,

a non-intentional misunderstanding, from those in which $p^r = p$ but H pretends that $p^r \neq p$, an intentional misunderstanding. According to this criterion, the corpus is divided into five types which are intentional, nine which are not and one which is possibly intentional. The implication is that the five are similar to each other and different from the ninety-four, which in turn are similar to each other; the one possibly intentional misunderstanding would have characteristics of the two types. This distinction is not borne out by the corpus, in which the main difference between intentional and non-intentional misunderstandings is that '+ H real.' always precedes the manifestation and '+ S real.' in intentional misunderstandings whereas it only occasionally precedes '+ S real.' in non-intentional misunderstandings. All the misunderstandings in the corpus, be they intentional or non-intentional, exhibit differences in structure and outcome.

Therefore, one can note whether or not a misunderstanding is intentional but the criterion of H's intentionality is not a sufficient criterion for a typology.

(ii) Cause It is possible that different causes of misunderstandings will distinguish different types. Distinction can be made between misunderstandings in which the cause is attributable to S, those in which it is attributable to H and those in which it is attributable to S and H. The problem with a distinction of this kind is how to attribute causes to participants. If, for example, S expresses the proposition p in an x utterance which is ambiguous, is the cause of a subsequent misunderstanding S's ambiguous x, H's failure to disambiguate x correctly or a combination of the two?

The causes of misunderstandings can be determined without necessarily

attributing them to participants, but this does not skirt the problem of multiple causes. It is not easy to isolate a primary cause from a number of contributory causes. Contextual and situational influences lend weight to the misunderstanding of an utterance which, were it produced in another conversation, might not be misunderstood. If that utterance were syntactically ambiguous or contained a homonym, the cause would be that ambiguity or homonym; equal importance, however, would have to be accorded to the surrounding utterances or environment in which the conversation took place. Thus a sliding scale of pertinence of causes would be required; such a scale could only be based on the analyst's intuition and would therefore be too subjective to provide a satisfactory criterion for a typology.

(iii) Structure Since all misunderstandings have a structure which is composed of primary and secondary components in various combinations, the criterion of structure seems promising. Distinction between basic and diversified structure, made in Chapter VII, separates 41% from 59% of the corpus. Further refinement is possible if expansion and interactive expansion, the number of devices used and the order in which all the components occur are taken into account. However, the variability which would emerge would be too extensive to make structure a feasible criterion. Categories for each of the possible orders and structural contents would be numerous and diverse and could increase with each new datum encountered. These reasons therefore preclude the adoption of structure as a criterion which can be easily applied to all data and which differentiates between data.

(iv) Outcome The communication model gives three possible outcomes to misunderstandings: $x^r = x, p^r \neq p$; $x^r \neq x, p^r \neq p$; $x^r = \emptyset, p^r \neq p$. The states of realization develop these outcomes so

that the outcome for each participant is distinguished; the states of realization specify whether or not each participant is aware that $p^r \neq p$. States of realization are applicable to all misunderstandings and differentiate the outcome of each in terms of how participants understand the conversation in which the misunderstanding occurs.

There are a finite number of states of realization: '+ S/H/O real.', '- S/H/O real.', '? + S/H/O real.', '? - S/H/O real.' and '? S/H/O real.'. The criterion which is adopted in the typology developed in this thesis is therefore the states of realization which obtain.

The typology is presented in the following section. Section 3 of this chapter discusses the analysis and the typology in which it culminates; several problems are discussed and the findings are examined.

2. THE TYPOLOGY

The states of realization specify whether or not each participant is aware that a misunderstanding has occurred. Before realization is effected, a participant's state of realization is '- real.'; when he realizes that a misunderstanding has occurred, his state of realization is '+ real.'. Realization is subject to binary classification because '+ real.' or '- real.' must obtain in every misunderstanding. However, because the analyst cannot always be certain or cannot even assume whether or not realization has been effected, the states of realization '? + real.' and '? - real.' are deemed to obtain when the analyst is not certain and '? real.' when the analyst cannot even assume.

The state of realization which obtains in every misunderstanding is initially '- real.'. After the origin in intentional misunderstandings

'+ H real.' obtains. In non-intentional misunderstandings '- real.' obtains until after the manifestation at least and often after utterances subsequent to the manifestation. The states of realization which characterize a misunderstanding are those which obtain at the close of the misunderstanding, that is, in realized ones when the fact of the misunderstanding and in unrealized ones when the topic raised in the origin cease to be the topic of conversation. If both or all participants' states of realization are not '+ real.' or '? + real.' they have different understandings of at least the origin and possibly of more of the conversation.

Types of misunderstandings are differentiated by the states of realization which obtain. For example, in one type both S and H realize and are therefore aware that H's p^r was initially not equivalent to S's p but that by the close of the misunderstanding H's p^r is equivalent to p (e.g. A1). In another type '+ S real.' and '- H real.' obtain: S is aware that H's p^r is not equivalent to his p while H is not aware of this; H thus understands the conversation differently to S, who, unlike H, is aware that H's understanding differs from his (e.g. H76). In another type neither participant realizes so that not only do they understand the origin differently but also they do not know that they have different understandings of that origin; their conversation proceeds with these different understandings (e.g. F73). Interestingly, H reported that he did eventually realize the misunderstanding in F73 some time after the conversation had ended; the state of realization which characterizes the datum is nevertheless '- S real. - H real.' since that was the state which obtained when the misunderstanding closed.

The following table details the types of misunderstandings in

the corpus. The types are listed alphabetically according to which states of realization obtain. The quantity of data in each type and the corpus number of each datum are given :

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>STATES OF REALIZATION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
A	+ S real. + H real.	50	A1 - 50
B	+ S real. + H real. + O real.	11	B51 - 61
C	? + S real. + H real.	3	C62 - 64
D	+ S real. ? + H real.	7	D65 - 71
E	? + S real. + H real. ? + O real.	1	E72
F	- S real. - H real.	1	F73
G	- S real. - H real. - O real.	2	G74 - 75
H	+ S real. - H real.	2	H76 - 77
I	? + S real. - H real.	1	I78
J	+ S real. - H real. + O real.	2	J79 - 80
K	- S real. + H real.	6	K81 - 86
L	? - S real. + H real. + O real.	1	L87
M	+ S real. ? H real.	4	M88 - 91
N	? + S real. ? H real.	2	N92 - 93
O	? S real. + H real.	3	O94 - 96
P	? S real. ? + H real.	1	P97
Q	? S real. + H real. + O real.	1	Q98
R	? S real. + H real. ? + O real.	1	R99
S	? S real. ? H real.	1	S100

The analysed data are presented in Appendix 1 according to their types. The order of presentation within each type which contains more than one datum depends on the structure of each datum. Misunderstandings which have basic structure are followed by those which have basic structure with expansion and then by those which have basic structure with interactive expansion. Next come the misunderstandings which have diversified structure, followed in turn by those which have diversified structure first with expansion and then by those with interactive expansion. Ordering within these distinctions is determined by the

number of different devices used ; data containing fewer devices precede data containing a greater number of different devices.

This system of ordering the data shows the increasing complexity of misunderstandings within types. Although the typology differentiates misunderstandings irrespective of their structure, the states of realization which obtain are a product of the structure. In a 'Type A' misunderstanding which has basic structure, '+ S real. + H real.' will have been effected more simply, that is, by recognition of the inappropriacy of the manifestation and by the use of one device, than in a 'Type A' misunderstanding which has diversified structure with interactive expansion. In both misunderstandings the outcome is ultimately that both participants realize the misunderstanding has occurred, in contrast with two other misunderstandings, for example, which might respectively resemble the two 'Type A' misunderstandings in terms of structure, apart from the effecting of realization, but which have different outcomes.

Types A - S characterize the misunderstandings in the corpus. The typology can be extended to cover all potential combinations which are not encountered in the corpus, such as '? + S real. ? - H real.' or '- S real. - H real. + O real.'. Since O is present in only 19% of the corpus, potential combinations will chiefly be those which include O.

The misunderstandings in 61% of the corpus are realized and a further 11% are assumed to be realized by both or all participants. The majority of misunderstandings are therefore realized; most participants are able to detect and resolve misunderstandings which occur in their conversations. Nevertheless, there remain a substantial

number of misunderstandings which participants fail to deal with wholly successfully. 3% are not realized by either or all participants and 12% are, or are assumed to be, realized by one but not both or all participants. In the remaining 13% one or more states of realization are unknown. A number of conversations thus proceed in which at least one participant has, or may have, an incorrect belief about at least one utterance, the origin, and in some cases about the utterances subsequent to that origin insofar as they pertain to the incorrect p^r .

Participants can thus leave a conversation without being aware that their understandings of what has been expressed differ from co-participants' understandings. However, they may subsequently become aware that their understandings have differed. H realizes the misunderstanding in F73 some time after the conversation has ended. Such post-conversation realization shows that some participants work on understanding utterances after it has ceased to be necessary to do so. The language user seems to worry about failures and errors in understanding and to ponder on them afterwards until they are resolved, even though resolution can make no difference to the closed conversation.

In the corpus, S realizes before H in 74% and H before S in 22% of those misunderstandings in which '+ real.' is known or assumed for all participants⁸. One would expect S to realize before H in such a high proportion of the data because S knows what proposition he intends to express and he has H's manifestation to guide his understanding of what H's p^r might be; H only has his incorrect p^r until further utterances indicate that his p^r differs from S's p.

When H realizes before S, H has the option of concealing the misunderstanding. In A41, A42 and A44 '+ H real.' is effected by a

device used by S after the manifestation, S not having realized that a misunderstanding has occurred; in all these data H elects to effect '+ S real.'. In the 'Type K' data, those in which '- S real. + H real.' obtains, H chooses not to effect '+ S real.'. In two of the six data of this type, the manifestation interrupts the origin and on S's completion of the origin H realizes the misunderstanding and does not draw it to S's attention, though in K85 H acknowledges the misunderstanding by laughter, an acknowledgement which is not recognized as such by S.

Regardless of whether or not correct understanding is essential, as it is, for example, when S seeks an answer to a particular question, S has a tendency to ensure that p and p^r are equivalent and that '+ H real.' obtains. 'Type H' misunderstandings, those in which '+ S real. - H real.' obtains, are in marked contrast to this tendency. In H76 S allows the conversation to close after the manifestation, opting to let the misunderstanding be sustained rather than effect '+ H real.'. In H77 S realizes after the manifestation and uses an ineffectual 'p exp. prt1.' which prompts 'p^r err. sig.' by H. Irrespective of any response by H, S succeeds in finding out the answer to her origin question and drops the topic rather than explain p more thoroughly; H's response has become redundant.

In the two 'Type J' misunderstandings, those in which '+ S real. - H real. + O real.' obtains, both S and O elect to leave the misunderstanding unrealized by H. In J79 O uses 'p^r ref. prt1.' and 'mus. sig.' and both S and O use 'mus. ack.' but H neither picks up the signal nor registers the acknowledgement and the topic is changed. Neither S nor O make any concerted effort to effect '+ H real.'; when H does not respond to the partial refutation and signal S and O acknowledge

the misunderstanding between themselves and the topic is changed.

Of the eleven 'Type B' misunderstandings, those in which '+ S real. + H real. + O real.' obtains, O is linked with S in six of the data (B52, B53, B54, B55, B58, B61), with H in two (B51, B57) and separately in advance of both S and H in one (B56). In one datum O either realizes ahead of S and H or is linked with S (B60). In the final datum (B59), O becomes H^2 because he produces a manifestation. This datum should technically be a 'Type A' misunderstanding because the states of realization which obtain are '+ S real. + H^1 , H^2 real.'. However, it is included in 'Type B' because H^2 is a third participant in the way that O is. H^2 is an O who misunderstands with H but who expresses a manifestation, unlike other O participants who misunderstand but remain silent. S effects realization for both H^1 and H^2 at the same time.

Because they are dependent on the way participants use and understand them, devices are not automatically efficacious, but is there any correlation between particular devices and particular types? The tables in Appendix 3 show all the devices used by S, H and O in each datum, grouped in types. The tables also show the order in which devices are used and specify the device which immediately precedes the effecting of realization.

The majority of 'p exp.' devices are used in 'Type A', frequently with 'p^r ref.'. 'y' is used in many of the types from 'Type C' to 'Type S'. When realization is not effected or not immediately effected, other utterances develop the topic of the origin or manifestation and some of these 'y' utterances effect or contribute to the effecting of realization.

As one would expect, 'mus. ack.' is predominantly used in 'Type A' and 'Type B' misunderstandings, those in which both or all participants realize the misunderstanding has occurred.

When the outcome of the communication is ' $x^r = x, p^r \neq p$ ' the device used is more likely to relate to p and when it is ' $x^r \neq x, p^r \neq p$ ' the device used is more likely to relate to x . Participants thus tend to recognize a mishearing as the cause of a misunderstanding and they correct that mishearing; the correction then enables H to discover what p was intended to be.

Although the corpus has been successfully analysed and typologized, there is no guarantee that the methods will be equally successful when applied to data from other sources. Consequently, in order to test the adequacy of the methods, data from other research on misunderstandings are analysed and typologized in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO ADDITIONAL DATA

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to test the adequacy of the analytic and typological methods, seven misunderstandings cited by other researchers are analysed and typologized in accordance with the model described in this thesis. These data derive from different sources (constructed and actual; native / non-native participants; native / native participants) and the emphasis in the original discussions has variously been on discourse structure and on the causes and consequences of misunderstandings rather than specifically being on the structure of the misunderstanding. It is hoped that the model will be able to handle these disparate data and thus be demonstrably applicable to a wider range of misunderstandings than those of the corpus.

The data which are analysed and typologized in this chapter are as follows : (i) an actual misunderstanding discussed by Schwartz (1977) in his sociolinguistic characterization of how speaker-hearers are able to deal with misunderstandings, (ii) a constructed misunderstanding cited by Zaefferer (1977) in his theoretical pragmatic discussion of reading choices and decision analysis, (iii) an actual misunderstanding discussed by Jefferson (1972) in her ethnomethodological work on 'side sequences', (iv) an actual misunderstanding discussed by Milroy (1984) in her work on inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal communication breakdowns, (v) an actual misunderstanding analysed by Burton (1981) in her work on discourse analysis, (vi) an actual miscommunication, believed to be a misunderstanding, analysed by Grimshaw (1982) in his work on comprehensive discourse analysis and (vii) an actual misunderstanding analysed by Varonis & Gass, (1985) in their discussion of native / non-native communication difficulties. The data are analysed in this order because they become increasingly more complex.

2. ANALYSIS AND TYPOLOGY OF ADDITIONAL DATA

(i) Schwartz (1977; in 1978:3)

Schwartz's "interpretive method" yields an elaborate commentary on the three utterances which constitute his example of a misunderstanding. The commentary is supported by additional data but is specific to the example given so that the cause of that misunderstanding, the roles of the participants and the content of the utterances are detailed. Schwartz's description of what is happening in the conversation accords with the following analysis :

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: Did you hear what's happening to the
mail strike ? | |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: No, what ? | _____ + S real. |
| (3) | p ^r ref. prtl.
& p exp. | S: No, I'm asking you | _____ + H real. |

The manifestation is 'cognitively inappropriate' in that it fails to provide an informative answer to the origin question and is instead a response to a phatic question. Recognition of this inappropriacy effects '+ S real.' and S then partially refutes H's p^r and explains p, that is, he points out that he was asking H rather than uttering a phatic question serving as a preliminary introduction to informing H about the mail strike. S's use of these 'combined' devices effects '+ H real.'. The misunderstanding is Type A ('+ S real. + H real.') and has basic structure with expansion.

(ii) Zaefferer (1977:338)

The datum which Zaefferer discusses is constructed and serves to illustrate the use of decision analysis to explain and predict a particular reading choice, that is, explain and predict why a particular understanding

is reached. The discussion, wholly theoretical, centres on cause and there is no consideration of the possible constituents of a misunderstanding. Although the datum is constructed, it is possible to analyse its structure, as follows :

- | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|----|--|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | There are even fishes that nurse their young |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | You're kidding me ! |
| (3.1) | y | S: | No |
| .2) | p ^r qued. | : | Why ? |
| (4) | p ^r exp. | H: | Fishes aren't mammals |
| | | | _____ ? + S real. |
| (5) | p exp. | S: | But of course, dolphins for instance |
| | | | _____ ? + H real. |

The origin is a statement about aquatic creatures. H misunderstands "fishes" to refer to the biological notion of 'fish', viz. a vertebrate with cold blood which breathes through gills and lives in water, and his manifestation is an exclamation that S is kidding him. S denies this and then uses 'p^r qued.' in order to find out why H believes he is being kidded. H explains his p^r by pointing out that 'fish' is not mammalian and presumably this effects '+ S real.'. S then uses 'p exp.' and cites an example of what he includes in the class of 'fish'. This presumably effects '+ H real.'. The misunderstanding is of a type not encountered in the corpus, '? + S real. ? + H real.', and it has basic structure with interactive expansion.

According to Zaefferer, "we can state that the outcome of B's interpretation of A's utterance of (1) is a reading which implies that by uttering (1) A was kidding B, while the correct reading implies that A was not" (1977:339). In other words, p is a serious statement while in p^r the statement is a joke or a tease. In fact, it seems that the misunderstanding is not about the seriousness of (1) but is about what

"fishes" refer to; H seems to treat (1) as a joke because he cannot reconcile his p^r with the actual world. The task of providing an explanation for how a misunderstanding occurred is not easy because it depends on the analyst's interpretation of the datum and this datum makes the problem particularly apparent: as it has been constructed, one would not expect it to be open to any interpretations other than those which Zaefferer intends it to illustrate, yet other interpretations remain possible.

(iii) Jefferson (1972:331)

Jefferson's datum is from a tape recorded therapy session and is cited by her as an example of a 'misapprehension sequence'. She analyses the datum as (4) statement, (5.1,5.2) misapprehension and (6) clarification (1972:304):

- | | | | | |
|-------|------------------------------|----|---|---------------------------|
| (1) | | H: | Daddy almost beat me up! | |
| (2) | | O: | Good | |
| (3) | | H: | "Yuh c'n have it if yuh wannit. Damn kid"
mhh | |
| (4) | ORIGIN | S: | Are you serious or are you - kidding? | |
| (5.1) | IND. MANIF. | H: | No I'm serious | |
| .2) | MANIF. | : | He said I could have the room if I wanted
it, he didn't kid me | |
| | | | | _____ + S real. |
| (6) | p^r ref. prtl.
& p exp. | S: | No I mean uh about beating you up | |
| | | | | _____ + H, ? + O
real. |
| (7) | y / z | O: | How dry I am | (sung) |
| (8.1) | mus. ack. / z | H: | Oh no | |
| .2) | mus. ack. | : | / laugh / | |
| .3) | z | : | He just said ah | |
| (9) | z | O: | I heard a real smutty joke | |
| (10) | z | H: | I don't care, if you wannit you can have it | |

In the origin question S wishes to know if H is serious or kidding about whether his father almost beat him up. H misunderstands this and believes

that S is asking if he is serious or kidding about his father's allowing him to have a particular room. His response in (5.1) is an indirect manifestation because it answers the origin appropriately and gives no evidence of any misunderstanding of that origin. H follows the indirect manifestation with a direct manifestation, explaining what his father said to him, using a reported speech version of the utterance he had attributed to his father in (3). Recognition of the 'cognitive inappropriacy' of this manifestation effects '+ S real.' and S then uses the 'combined' devices 'p^r ref. prtl. & p epx.' to effect '+ H real.'. Since O is present in the conversation '+ O real.' is presumably effected also, but at no time does O produce an utterance which relates to the misunderstanding and there is therefore no confirmation of his state of realization.

H in (8.1) either acknowledges the misunderstanding or uses a 'z' utterance and answers the implied question 'Did your father beat you up?'. He does acknowledge the misunderstanding by laughter in (8.2) and then uses a 'z' utterance in (8.3), continued in (10) after O's unconnected interruption, explaining again what his father said.

The misunderstanding is probably Type B ('+ S real. + H real. + O real.') but because of the difficulty of confirming O's state of realization it might be a type not yet encountered in the corpus : '+ S real. + H real. ? + O real.'. Its structure is basic with interactive expansion, though the only interactive expansion is O's utterance in (7) which has no coherence with the preceding or following utterances.

(iv) (iv) Milroy (1984:21)

Milroy's datum is an actual diary-recorded cross-dialectal misunderstanding. S is a S.W. Donegal native while H and O both speak

standard English :

- (1) ORIGIN S: How long are youse here ?
- (2) MANIF. H: Till after Easter
 p^r err. sig. S - looks puzzled -
 / pause /
 _____ + O real.
- (3) y O: We came on Sunday
 _____ ? + H real.
- (4) ? mus. ack. & y S: Ah, youse're here a while then
 _____ ? + H real.

H and O interpret the origin as 'How long will you be here for?' but S intends it to express 'How long have you been here for?'. Consequently the manifestation is 'cognitively and linguistically' inappropriate for S but not for H, O and any analyst unfamiliar with Hiberno-English dialect. S's use of 'p^r err. sig.', achieved by looking puzzled, apparently forces O to re-consider the conversation and this effects '+ O real.', confirmed by Milroy: "The breakdown was, after a time lag, noticed and repaired. It is by no means certain that a linguistically unsophisticated speaker such as A (both B and C were linguists) could have located the breakdown and effected the repair" (1984:21). Though the breakdown is repaired in the sense that O provides an appropriate response to the origin in (3), it is not certain if this 'y' utterance effects '+ S real.' or '+ H real.', although it is likely that '+ H real.' has been effected. Consequently, it is not possible to specify "Ah" as 'mus. ack.' or as part of the 'y' utterance which follows it. The type is once again a new one : '? S real. ? + H real. + O real.' and it has diversified structure with interactive expansion.

(v) Burton (1981:79)

The datum from Burton's corpus was discussed in Chapter III, together with her analysis of it. In accordance with the model discussed in

this thesis, the datum is analysed as follows :

- | | | | | |
|-----|---|----|--|-------------------|
| (1) | ORIGIN | S: | I'm going to do some weeding | |
| (2) | MANIF. | H: | Yes please | |
| (3) | p ^r err. sig. | S: | What | |
| (4) | manif. rpt. | H: | Yes please | _____ ? + S real. |
| (5) | p ^r err. sig.
/ mus. sig. | S: | You don't listen to anything I say | _____ ? + H real. |
| (6) | x ^r exp. | H: | I thought you said you were going to
pour some drinks | _____ + S real. |
| (7) | x ^r ref. prt1.
& x exp. | S: | No I said I'm going to do some
weeding | _____ + H real. |

The precise location of '+ S real.' and '+ H real.' cannot be determined. It is possible that S realizes after the manifestation is repeated but rather than realizing the misunderstanding he may simply be aware that the manifestation is not appropriate. Depending on whether or not S does realize, he uses either 'p^r err. sig.' or 'mus. sig.', which might effect '+ H real.' or might make H aware that he has made a mistake in the conversation. S certainly realizes the misunderstanding on hearing H's explanation of what he heard the utterance to be and H certainly realizes after S has 'partially' refuted this and has explained what was actually said. The misunderstanding belongs to 'Type A' ('+ S real. + H real.') and its structure is diversified with interactive expansion.

(vi) Grimshaw (1982:41-47)

Grimshaw subjects his tape-recorded datum to comprehensive discourse analysis. He believes that it is a form of miscommunication but cannot place it in his taxonomy of miscommunications. He is the participant O, but his participation does not help him to analyse the datum:
"As a participant, I did not, apparently, know 'what was going on'.

As an analyst I believe something was going on - I still don't know exactly what was" (1982:37). Analysis of the datum as a misunderstanding in the sense used in this thesis is made in the light of Grimshaw's description of the datum in terms of paralinguistic cues, kinesic cues, expansion and interactional cues, together with the retrospective commentaries of S and O. The transcription is slightly altered in that it no longer details the portions of utterances which overlap with each other :

- (1) ORIGIN S: To what extent are these, the THREE theories that she selected, TRULY representative of THEORIES in this area ?
- IND. MANIF. H: - nods head -
- (2) manif. ampl. S: They are indeed
- (3) y incmp. O: That's it that's it
- (4) MANIF. H: Yeah yeah no more theories
- (5) p^r err. sig. & p^r qued. S: Oh, they are THE theories? (surprised)
- (6) y incmp. O: That's about it I mean
- (7) manif.rpt.prtl. / manif. ampl. H: Yeah yeah they are the
- (8) x ampl. S: They are not REALLY representative then
- (9.1) y H: Uh, well, they there are there are variations there are variations on theories uh but I don't know of any MAJOR contender
- .2) y : There may be bi I don't know of ANYTHING, that looks much different from the things she has looked at in the dissertation
- .3) y : I mean there's nothing
- (10) y incmp. O: Ah, well, there
- (11.1) x ampl. / y S: / indistinct / a sample of one in each
- .2) y : O.K.
- (12.1) y O: Yuh
- .2) y incmp. : No, WELL EXCEPT for the case that
- (13) x ampl. / y incmp. S: So NOBODY nobody would attack her on THAT ground then if she
- (14) y H: No
- (15.1) y O: Oh no I don't think so
- .2) y : I THINK the ONLY thing that would be substantially different would be a REAL social STRUCTURALIST who would say you

DON'T have to worry about CONDITIONS,
 what you have to do is FIND the LOCATION of
 these people in the social STRUCTURE and THEN
 you'll FIND out how they're going to
 BEHAVE without having to get into their
 heads at ALL and and that hasn't been tested
 uh except in VERY gross kinds of ways with
 MACRO data, which is generally not been
 very satisfactory yeah

(16.1)	y	S:	Hm hm
.2)	y	:	Hm hm
(17.1)	y	H:	Right
.2)	y	:	Spillerman's stuff

In (1), according to Grimshaw, S wishes to check the representativeness of the theories selected by the candidate whose dissertation is under discussion. S herself subsequently commented that she wanted to check that the candidate would not be attacked on the grounds of insufficient coverage of the appropriate theories. H's response, a nod of the head, is an indirect manifestation because although it apparently expresses agreement that the theories are representative, it actually confirms that the coverage of theories in the dissertation is exhaustive and that no other theories warrant attention; this interpretation of the head nod is made in view of Grimshaw's discussion and in view of H's subsequent utterances. This is the first example encountered of a paralinguistic feature constituting a primary textual component.

S's response in (2) to the indirect manifestation appears to be a confirmation of p^r which S believes to be equivalent to p. It is analysed as the device 'manif. ampl.' because it amplifies the head nod. It should be remembered that because S has not realized the misunderstanding her amplification of the manifestation 'compounds' the misunderstanding since what she is amplifying is not what she believes she is amplifying.

O's comment in (3) is a 'y' utterance and is 'incomplete'. H in (4) produces a manifestation, augmenting his earlier indirect manifestation

and S's amplification of that by stating that there are no more theories. Grimshaw reports that S "sounds some what surprised" in (5) and this surprised tone is 'p^r err. sig.'. Her signal could have been taken up had either H or O asked why she should be surprised at the fact that there were no other theories to be covered. S in (5) is checking what was expressed in the manifestation and the utterance therefore constitutes the 'combined' devices 'p^r err. sig. & p^r qued.'. O produces another 'incomplete' 'y' utterance in response to the query and H then in (7) either 'partially' repeats the manifestation or produces an 'incomplete' amplification of it. Rather than wait for H's answer S interrupts and reverts to her origin question again, using 'x ampl.'. In this amplification the question becomes weighted in that it is no longer 'To what extent ...?' but has become 'They are not ...?'.

In response to this amplification, H produces three 'y' utterances. He explains that there are no other theories of any importance which pertain to what is covered in the dissertation although there are variations on these theories. O makes another attempt to enter the conversation with an 'incomplete' 'y' utterance and then in (11.1) S produces an utterance, the first part of which is indistinct and cannot be recovered. This utterance is either another attempt to amplify the origin or is a separate 'y' utterance. S follows this in (11.2) with a 'y' utterance, "O.K.", in which she apparently expresses acceptance of the responses to her origin and therefore satisfaction that the dissertation has covered the relevant theories. O produces two 'y' utterances, the second of which is 'incomplete'. The first expresses agreement, with the conversation presumably, and the second offers an exception which is later elaborated upon.

S in (13) produces an utterance which is either a 'y' utterance,

introducing the proposition that the candidate would not be attacked on the grounds of insufficient coverage, or is an amplification of x if one takes the origin to include the proposition that S wishes to be sure that the candidate has dealt with representative theories and would not be open to attack, as she claims in subsequent, retrospective commentary. Making a decision about which of these two devices is being used requires consideration of the nature of the proposition expressed in the origin. Does the proposition which S expresses in (1) cover this matter of the candidate's vulnerability as well as the question of representativeness? Since S claims her reason in asking the question was to ascertain the candidate's likelihood of being later attacked, it does seem a part of the proposition and therefore the device used in (13) would be 'x ampl.'. However, the commentary was retrospective and it cannot be guaranteed that S did have such a complex proposition to express in (1) in the first instance. 'y' therefore remains a possible alternative device.

The misunderstanding is a type not encountered in the corpus :
'- S real. - H real. - O real.' and it has diversified structure with interactive expansion.

(vii) Varonis & Gass (1985:332-333)

Varonis & Gass (1985) discuss miscommunication between native and non-native speakers. They discuss an extensive example of miscommunication, a service telephone encounter between a non-native speaker who, for E.S.L. purposes, has been detailed to enquire about the cost of a television, and a native speaker who works in a television repair shop. Varonis & Gass (1985:327) argue that analysis of native/ non-native conversations "must minimally invoke notions of correct interpretation, confidence in interpretation, goals of a conversation, shared beliefs,

and linguistic as well as cultural systems". They state whether most, though not all, utterances are correctly or incorrectly interpreted and whether the participants are or are not confident about their interpretations. They describe the conversation and indicate that the native speaker changes goals five times while the non-native speaker misunderstands eleven times.

The model discussed in this thesis handles the conversation as follows :

- | | | | |
|--------|---------------------------|----|---|
| (1) | | H: | Hello |
| (2.1) | | S: | Hello |
| .2) | ORIGIN | : | Could you tell me about the price and size of Sylvania colour TV ? |
| (3) | p ^r err. sig. | H: | Pardon |
| (4) | x rpt. | S: | Could you tell me about the price and size of Sylvania TV ... color ? |
| (5.1) | p qued. | H: | What did you want ? |
| .2) | p qued. | : | A service call ? |
| (6.1) | x ampl. | S: | Seventeen inch |
| .2) | p ^r err. sig. | : | Hunh ? |
| (7.1) | p qued. | H: | What did you want ? |
| .2) | p qued. | : | A service call, or how much to repair a TV ? |
| (8.1) | p exp. prtl. | S: | Yeah |
| .2) | p exp. prtl. | : | Eh TV color |
| (9) | IND. MANIF. ¹ | H: | Seventeen inch |
| (10) | y | S: | O.K. |
| | | | / pause / |
| (11) | IND. MANIF. ² | H: | Well is it a portable ? |
| (12) | y | S: | M hm |
| (13.1) | IND. MANIF. ³ | H: | What make is it ? |
| | | | / pause / |
| .2) | manif. ³ ampl. | : | What is the brand name of the TV ? |
| (14) | y | S: | Ah, Sony please |
| (15) | y | H: | We don't work on Sony's |
| (16.1) | y | S: | Sss |
| .2) | y | : | Or Sylvania |
| (17) | y | H: | Sylvania |
| (18) | y | S: | Un hunh |
| (19) | y | H: | Uh Sylvania, O.K. that's American made |
| (20.1) | y | S: | Uh hunh |
| .2) | y | : | O.K. |

- (21.1) y H: All right
 .2) y : Uhh, portables have to be brought in
- (22) y S: M hm
- (23) y H: And there's no way I can tell you how much it'll cost until he looks at it
- (24) y S: M hm
- (25) y H: And it's a twelve fifty deposit
- (26) y S: O.K.
- (27) y H: And if he can fix it, that applies to labor, and if he can't he keeps the twelve fifty for his time and effort
- (28) y S: M hm
- (29.1) IND. MANIF.⁴ H: How old of a TV?
 .2) manif.⁴ ampl. : Do you know offhand?
- (30.1) y S: O.K.
 .2) x ampl. : Nineteen inch?
- (31.1) manif.⁴ rpt. H: How old of a TV is it?
 .2) manif.⁴ ampl. : Is it a very old one or only a couple of years old?
- (32.1) y S: Ooooooh
 .2) y : So-so
 / pause /
 .3) manif. qued. : Umm, about how old?
- (33) MANIF.⁵ H: The only thing you can do is bring it in, you know, and let him look at it 'n go from there
 / long pause /
- (34) x ampl. S: New television please
 / clears throat /
 _____ ? + H real.
- (35) ? mus. ack. & H: Oh, you wanna know / long pause / how
 p qued. much a new television is?
- (36) p exp. & ORIGIN² S: Yeah I wan' buy one please
 / pause /
- (37) p² qued. H: Do we wanna buy one?
- (38) p² exp. prt1. S: Uh huh
 / long pause /
 _____ - H real.
- (39) p² qued. H: Is it a Sylvania?
- (40) p^{1,2} exp.prtl. S: Sylvania TV color
 / long pause /
- (41.1) MANIF.⁶ H: Well, even you know even if we buy 'em
 (of ORIGIN²) we don't - we don't give much more 'n twenty-five dollars for 'em
 .2) y : Cause time we fix 'em up and resell 'm we can't get more 'n -

- (42) y S: M hm
- (43) y H: Hundred dollars out of 'em time we
put our time'n parts in it
- (44) p^r qued. S: Is it the ... seventeen inch?
/ long pause /
- (45.1) y H: Well I'd - you know the only thing I
can tell you to do is you'd have to come
to the shop, I'm on the extension at home
- .2) y : The shop's closed
- (46.1) y S: Mm
.2)x ampl.& ORIGIN³ : Nineteen inch? .. you don't have?
/ short pause /
- (47) p³ qued. H: Do we have a nineteen inch?
- (48) p³ exp. prt1. S: Yeah
- (49) MANIF. ⁷
(of ORIGIN³) H: No, I've got a seventeen inch new RCA
- (50.1) y S: O.K.
.2) y : Thank you
.3 y : Bye
- (51) y H: Mbye
- (52) y S: M hm

This datum is more complex than any hitherto analysed. It is considerably longer and it contains material such as back-channelling which tends to be omitted from diary-recorded data.

Although the non-native speaker is the one who has difficulty in understanding the native speaker, it is the native speaker who misunderstands the non-native speaker's utterance (2.2). This is the origin and failure to resolve this initial misunderstanding results in multiple 'compounding'. The origin is the consequence of S's having made a mistake in phoning a repair shop rather than a retail shop.

In response to the origin H uses 'p^r err. sig.' which prompts a repeat of the origin by S. In response to this repeat, H uses 'p qued.' twice in an attempt to determine what S is requesting. S answers the questions by an amplification of x, detailing a television size. S then in (6.2) says "Hunh?". This is taken to be 'p^r err. sig.' because

it raises doubt about what H is saying. In (7.1) and (7.2) H uses 'p qued.', again in an attempt to determine what S is requesting. By answering "Yeah" to these questions S uses 'p exp. prtl.' since he acquiesces to the interpretations raised by H. However, the 'partial' explanation does not help H because she has offered two possible interpretations (neither of which happen to be correct) and S has made no distinction between them, acquiescing to them both. The misunderstanding is 'compounded' by "Yeah" since S has misunderstood (7.2), having failed to realize that H has misunderstood (2.2). S uses another 'p exp. prtl.' and specifies "TV color" but this does not establish p either.

At this stage in the conversation, (9), H produces an indirect manifestation. Wishing to determine the nature of the problem with S's television she attempts to identify the size of the television. This indirect manifestation is the first of several. S responds to it with a 'y' utterance, "O. K.", which is an inappropriate response; because of the 'compounding' S believes H is offering a seventeen inch set whereas H is trying to determine if S's set is 'seventeen inch'. H is attempting to elicit details about the set ~~she~~ she thinks S wants to be repaired. In (11) H produces a second indirect manifestation, asking S if his television is portable. Again S responds with an inappropriate 'y' utterance. H then produces a third indirect manifestation, querying the brand of S's television. When no response is forthcoming, H amplifies this third indirect manifestation; "make" is changed to "brand name of the TV".

Following this 'manif.³ ampl.', S and H exchange 'y' utterances, from (14) to (28), discussing brands of television and H's procedure for dealing with television repairs, a procedure which S presumably does not understand but with which he appears to agree, given his back-

channelling and neutral responses. In (29.1) H produces her fourth indirect manifestation, inquiring about the age of the television, and in (29.2) H produces an amplification of this. Again, S responds with a 'y' utterance, "O.K.", which is followed by an amplification of x, the origin. This amplification is the specification of the size of television which is what S wishes to know about. H responds with a repeat of her fourth manifestation and a further amplification of this manifestation. Again S produces 'y' utterances which are inappropriate because they are neutral responses which fail to answer H's questions. After a pause, in (32.3), S queries the fourth manifestation, wishing to know the age of the television about which he believes H is talking. The 'compounding' is very complex and neither participant is able to understand the other's utterances correctly.

At this stage, (33), H produces her fifth manifestation, which is direct. She makes it clear that S will have to bring his television in for the man to look at, thus manifesting in the conversation the fact that she has misunderstood S's origin requesting price and size details for televisions. After a long pause, S amplifies x, presumably deciding like H in C64 in the corpus, to ignore the confusing conversation and start again. He asks specifically for "New television please". This may affect '+ H real.' because in (35) H seems to acknowledge the misunderstanding and to query p: "Oh, you wanna know /long pause/ how much a new television is?". S responds to this with 'p exp.' so that at this stage the misunderstanding ought to be resolved since both S and H appear to know what S intended of his origin.

However, in addition to being 'p exp.', (36) is a second origin. H fails to understand the explanation correctly and queries the p it

expresses. In (38) S agrees with the interpretation which H queries and therefore uses 'p² exp. prt1.'. A further query by H and a further 'partial' explanation by S are then followed by H's seventh manifestation. It is this utterance, (41.1), which makes "Yeah I wan' buy one please", (36), an origin. In the initial origin, (2.2), S's p is a request for information about the price and size of a Sylvania colour television. H's p^r is that S's request is for information about the price and details regarding televisions servicing or repairing. In (36) S explains this p but H misunderstands the explanation and her p^r is that S wishes to know if the shop will buy a television. This is a second misunderstanding rather than 'compounding' because it is not a consequence of the initial misunderstanding in way that, for example, S's "O.K." in (10) 'compounds' H's misunderstanding, manifested in "Seventeen inch" in (9). Failure to realize H's misunderstanding means that S cannot correctly understand H's utterances and hence the misunderstanding is 'compounded'. When S explains that he wants to buy a television, however, H misunderstands his request and sets in motion an exchange of utterances relating to the new proposition of television purchasing. After three 'y' utterances S uses 'p^r qued.', endeavouring to relate what H is talking about to what he wants.

H is presumably aware that there is a lack of communication and she suggests in (45.1) and (45.2) that S should visit the shop to sort out the problem, pointing out that she is speaking to him from her home. S, however, continues to try to express his proposition and uses 'x ampl.' in (46.2), "Nineteen inch? .. you don't have?". This utterance is also a third origin because subsequently, in (49), H produces another manifestation explaining what set she herself has. After the origin in (46.2) H queries the proposition expressed therein

and S 'partially' explains it by confirming H's interpretation. H then produces the seventh manifestation, "No, I've got a seventeen inch new RCA". H's p^r here is that S wishes to know which TV set H personally has and she manifests this misunderstanding in detailing her set. Following this, the conversation is brought to an end.

This analysis differs from Varonis & Gass's because the participants do not realize the misunderstanding, whereas Varonis & Gass give the impression that H does become aware of what S intends. In other respects, however, the analyses correspond with each other :

" First, she believes Carlos wants information about getting a TV serviced. Then, she understands that he is interested in a new TV. However, when she tests her hypothesis, she misinterprets his response and understands that he has a TV that he wants to sell her. After a seemingly incongruous remark on the part of Carlos, she appears to abandon her goal of helping him completely. Finally, she realizes that he is interested in buying a new TV, but before that conversation can proceed, Carlos ends it "

(Varonis & Gass, 1985:340).

Varonis & Gass believe that H eventually becomes aware that S wishes to buy a television. The analysis above suggests that a further misunderstanding occurs because H believes that S is asking about H's own television. Without eliciting commentary from the participants it is not possible to determine which interpretation is correct. It is possible, however, to present alternative analyses, such as 'y/MANIF.⁷' for (49).

The analysis presented above shows how negotiation is undertaken by the participants. Eleven different devices are used a total of sixty-two times, there are three origins and seven manifestations. It is clear from this that no matter how much interactive negotiation is undertaken by participants, use of devices does not necessarily resolve ^{some misunderstanding} some misunderstanding. It is possible that excessive use of devices such as is displayed in

this datum characterizes conversations between native and non-native speakers. Certainly, the two use devices which in other conversations would be likely to effect '+ real.'. Indeed, '? + H real.' seems to be effected after (34), an amplification of x by S. H appears to acknowledge the misunderstanding and to query p and S explains p so that H should realize the misunderstanding. Because H misunderstands S's explanation, H's realization is cancelled and she reverts to the state of '- H real.'. This progress from '+ real.' to '- real.' has not been encountered in the corpus. It can only happen, one would assume, when the person who realizes then misunderstands further, thereby changing beliefs about the preceding conversation. The ultimate outcome of the data is '- S real. - H real.', according to the analysis above, 'Type F'.

The analysis developed in this thesis is able to handle the datum but the 'y' device may need to be modified so that there is a distinction between utterances expressing propositions and utterances which constitute back-channelling.

3. DISCUSSION

The fact that the 'y' device may not be specific enough is only problematic in respect of the Varonis & Gass datum but it nevertheless warrants revision. An additional device of 'back channelling' could be incorporated into the model, although there could be problems distinguishing between 'back channelling' and agreement with or confirmation of x, x^R , p and p^R .

Apart from the lack of precision in the 'y' device the analytic model is able to handle all the data. The typology, however, is less adequate because out of the seven data, four new types have been

encountered. Each of these types is within the framework established by the typology and can be included. However, the number of types could potentially become so large that the typology would cease to distinguish between misunderstandings in an economic and clear way.

The typology must therefore be revised so as to preserve the overall distinction between states of realization in a hierarchical system, which subsequently details the various states of realization of each participant. The difference, for example, between '+ S real. + H real.' and '+ S real. + H real. + O real.' is simply that in the latter a third participant was involved; the states of realization are '+ real.' for all participants in both instances.

In the revised typology there are four main distinctions :

- | | | |
|-----|-------------|---|
| I | '+ real.' | Data in which all participants <u>realize</u> or are assumed to <u>realize</u> that the misunderstanding has occurred (thus including '? + real.'), |
| II | '- real.' | Data in which all participants fail to <u>realize</u> the misunderstanding has occurred (thus including '? - real.'), |
| III | '+/- real.' | Data in which one or more participants <u>realize</u> and one or more participants fails to <u>realize</u> (including '? + real.' and '? - real.'), |
| IV | '? real.' | Data in which the <u>state of realization</u> of one or more participants cannot be assumed. |

Within these four types provision is subsequently made for each participant's individual state of realization, according to the following scheme :

	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>e</u>
S/H/O ¹ /O ⁿ	+ real.	- real.	? + real.	? - real.	? real.

Typologizing a misunderstanding is first made according to what combination of states of realization obtain : I, II, III or IV. Each individual state of realization is then characterized by the appropriate

letter : a, b, c, d or e. The order of this characterization is fixed as follows : S, then H, then O^1 , then O^2 through to O^n . After the last participant's state of realization has been detailed, a point indicates the end.

The revised system is applied to the original typology as follows :

I aa.	A1 - A50
I aaa.	B51 - B52. B54 - B 56, B58 - B60
I aaaa.	B53, B57, B61
I ca.	C62 - C64
I ac.	D65 - D71
I cac.	E72
II bb.	F73
II ddd.	G74
II dddd.	G75
III ab.	H76 - H77
III cb.	I78
III aba.	J79 - J80
III ba.	K81 - K86
III daa.	L87
IV ae.	M88 - M91
IV ce.	N92 - N93
IV ea.	O94 - O96
IV ec.	P97
IV eaa.	Q98
IV eac.	R99
IV ee.	S100

The additional data are typologized as follows :

I aa.	Schwartz, Burton
I aac.	Jefferson
I cc.	Zaefferer
II bb.	Varonis & Gass
II bbb.	Grimshaw
IV eca.	Milroy

This revised typology can be applied to an infinite number of data and because it is more systematic than the original typology it should be easy to apply and to interpret.

Fourteen data are 'Type IV'. This type exists because the analyst cannot always confirm states of realization and cannot always assume them. The data in 'Type IV' would have been placed in other types had there been confirmation provided by the participants. Thus the model is accurate for 87% of the data while the remaining 13% are assembled together. The model should therefore be replicable and is comprehensive in that it makes structured allowances for data which cannot be confirmed.

The theoretical implications of this research are discussed in Chapter XI, in which conclusions are ^{also} drawn.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the early chapters of this thesis it was argued that the study of communication has been hampered because the processes by which speaker-hearers communicate cannot easily be examined. The speaker's intentions and the hearer's understandings are not accessible to the analyst except by post hoc deduction and therefore researchers such as Zaefferer (1977), Gumperz & Tannen (1979) and Stubbs (1983) have argued that by investigating what happens in miscommunication it should be possible to discover the processes which enable speaker-hearers to accomplish successful communication. This approach is developed here in respect of misunderstandings, which constitute one type of miscommunication.

'Misunderstanding' has been defined as a phenomenon in conversation between native speaker-hearers which occurs when a proposition expressed by S in an utterance is incorrectly understood by H, who subsequently produces an utterance which is based on or derives from this incorrect understanding. The major premise of this thesis is that when speaker-hearers are involved in misunderstandings they provide evidence of how they undertake communication because in order to detect and resolve misunderstandings speaker-hearers monitor one another's intentions, utterances and understandings and they negotiate interactively to ensure that they manage to communicate successfully. Thus, by studying the behaviour of participants during misunderstandings, insight into participants' communicative behaviour can be provided.

In order to facilitate such a study, an analytic system was devised which was capable of describing the structure of misunderstandings. This analysis was then used to establish a typology which could distinguish between different types of misunderstandings. Given the lack of any previous systematic analysis of misunderstandings, a corpus of one hundred data was assembled. This corpus was collected

from diary-recorded and tape-recorded sources, as detailed in Chapter II. A corpus-based approach ensures that one's findings are more likely to be representative of the phenomenon although they cannot be exhaustive.

A systematic analysis of the corpus has demonstrated the possibility of determining the salient structural characteristics of misunderstandings thereby enabling the analyst to investigate how participants behave when their attempts to communicate are not, initially at least, successful.

The analysis was based on a model of communication, discussed in Chapter III, which was developed from theoretical models of the kind outlined by Lyons (1977). The model specified the following sequence :

Speaker's proposition (p) → utterance produced by
speaker (x) → utterance received (that is, heard and
decoded) by hearer (x^r) → proposition received (that is,
understood) by hearer (p^r)

The analytic method, which is outlined in Chapter IV, is based on the ways in which participants refer to p, x, x^r and p^r , as well as to the possibility or fact of an error or misunderstanding in the conversation. The analysis thus features the amalgamation of textual and non-textual components as major sources of evidence for how participants deal with misunderstandings in the interactive context of everyday discourse. Textual components, that is, the utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features, can be checked against a transcription of what was said and done. Non-textual components, that is, intentions and understandings, can only be recovered by the analyst after consideration of the textual components. Since intentions and understandings are as pertinent to communication as utterances, it is important that an analysis of structure should incorporate them : non-textual components crucially determine the textual components and are therefore as much a part of the structure as the textual components.

Misunderstandings were shown to consist of a number of components which are inter-related. Two primary textual components were identified: (i) the origin, that is, the utterance by S which is misunderstood and (ii) the manifestation, that is, the utterance by H which is based on or derives from his misunderstanding of the origin. These components were discussed in Chapter V. The manifestation gives the analyst an indication of what H's p^r , that is, understanding of the origin, might be.

Some indication of what H's p^r might be was provided by the secondary textual component, termed devices. Devices are the various utterances, paralinguistic and extralinguistic features which constitute the remaining substance of the misunderstanding. Thirty devices have been identified in this thesis and of these thirty, twenty-five have been found in the corpus. The thirty devices, which are discussed and illustrated in Chapter VI, are as follows: x , the origin utterance, can be (1) 'completed', (2) 'repeated', (3) 'emphasized', (4) 'amplified', (5) 'explained', (6) 'queried' and (7) 'refuted'; x^r , what the hearer understands and decodes, can be (8) 'explained', (9) 'queried' and (10) 'refuted'; p , what the speaker intends to express, can be (11) 'explained', (12) 'queried', and (13) 'refuted'; p^r , what the hearer understands to have been expressed, can be (14) 'explained', (15) 'queried' and (16) 'refuted'; an error in understanding can be (17) 'signalled' and (18) 'acknowledged'; the misunderstanding can be (19) 'signalled' and (20) 'acknowledged'; an utterance expressing another proposition can be produced (21) before participants are aware of the misunderstanding; the manifestation can be (22) 'completed', (23) 'repeated', (24) 'emphasized', (25) 'amplified', (26) 'explained', (27) 'queried' and (28) 'refuted'; an utterance expressing another proposition can be produced (29) after participants have become aware of the misunderstanding; a participant might undertake (30) 'action'. The devices which constitute the secondary textual

component cover the range of conversational behaviour in respect of misunderstandings. Of these, (13), (22), (24), (26) and (28) are not in the corpus.

One non-textual component was argued to be essential to a misunderstanding. This component concerns each participant's state of realization, as discussed in Chapter VII. The state of realization details each participant's awareness or lack of awareness of the misunderstanding's occurrence. The following states of realization were identified: '+ S real., + H real., + O real., ? + S real., ? + H real., ? + O real., - S real., - H real., - O real., ? - S real., ? - H real., ? - O real., ? S real., ? H real. and ? O real.'. These states appeared in a number of combinations, such as '? S real. + H real. ? + O real.' (TypeR).

These components were shown to combine to form a misunderstanding as follows : ORIGIN → MANIFESTATION → STATES OF REALIZATION → (devices). The first three are essential while the last is optional, although at least one device is usually present in a misunderstanding. The components follow a number of sequences, always commencing with the origin : a basic sequence which could be expanded or interactively expanded and a diversified sequence which could also be expanded and interactively expanded. These sequences are detailed in Chapter VIII.

The analysis is a "process analysis", which, as Widdowson points out (1979:71), should be able to "yield information about how participants see the discourse at a particular point in its development and what controls their options at this point". The participants' own explanations in their discussions of what they intended and what they understood provide information about how they see the discourse (cf. Gumperz (1982) on the importance of employing participant judges). The states of

realization also indicate how participants see the discourse and they control the options open to participants. The options open to a participant can be construed as the devices available to him.

In the light of the information provided by the analysis of the structural characteristics of the misunderstandings in the corpus, a typology was presented in Chapter IX. The typology was based on the states of realization which obtain in each misunderstanding and it enabled the analyst to distinguish nineteen types of misunderstanding. Since a corpus-based analysis is representative rather than exhaustive, additional data were analysed and typologized in Chapter X, in order to test the adequacy of the model. The typology was found to be descriptively adequate for the corpus but when the additional data were typologized revision proved necessary because the number of types became too large and therefore the typology became unwieldy. By preserving fundamental distinctions between '+ real., - real. + / - real. and ? real.' and by detailing individual participants' states of realization as a secondary consideration, all data could be typologized by the method adopted.

The additional data tested in Chapter X were drawn from the research of other linguists, sociolinguists and pragmaticists concerned with misunderstandings, whose work has tended to discuss individual examples which pertain to their particular interests, such as sequencing and participant roles (Jefferson, 1972; Schwartz, 1977), inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal miscommunication (Milroy, 1984; Varonis & Gass, 1985), causes (Zaefferer, 1977; Schwartz, 1977) and discourse analysis (Burton, 1981; Grimshaw, 1982). This work has lacked the kind of systematic approach which this thesis seeks to develop.

Jefferson (1972) and Schwartz (1977), for example, both discuss

a sequence which corresponds with the basic sequence identified in this thesis; the misunderstood utterance is followed by an utterance based on the misunderstanding which is followed by a correction. Analysis of the corpus has shown that this is only one of a number of possible sequences, which become increasingly more complex. Jefferson and Schwartz have also pointed out that misunderstandings tend to be resolved immediately and if they are not, then they tend not to be resolved at all. Examination of the corpus has confirmed that this tendency is only true in some instances and that a number of misunderstandings are not resolved immediately but after several utterances and/or participant turns. Jefferson (1972), Schwartz (1977) Grimshaw (1982) and Varonis & Gass (1985) all argue that the detecting and resolving of misunderstandings are communicative skills. This thesis has attempted to detail these skills and to show how participants employ them.

Although the meaning of an utterance is not constant and inviolable, S, at the time of producing an utterance, intends it to express a specific proposition and will often ensure that the proposition which H receives is as close to this as possible. If this were not the case there would be fewer devices used and fewer efforts to effect realization. The various devices used by participants in a misunderstanding demonstrate that participants work to ensure that p^r matches p when they are aware or suspect that this matching is not the case. The many examples of refutation of p^r , 'complete' or 'partial', and explanation of p , as in "No, I meant ..." highlight this. For the S who uses these 'combined' devices the communication of a specific proposition is at stake and he wishes H to understand it as correctly as possible and to be aware that his understanding, his p^r , is incorrect. H, too, will often explain what he understood the origin to mean. Between these two distinct

understandings, p and p^R , can lie a number of utterances which eventually effect realization in many instances and thus resolve the misunderstanding.

In view of the interactive efforts which they make, participants seem to wish to be understood correctly. Their apparent conviction that the 'right meaning' is, initially at least, communicated suggests that a particular meaning is, initially at least, intended of an utterance. Close approximation is considered to be sufficient in negotiating the understanding of the received utterance, which means that the intended meaning becomes diffused. One person's understanding of an utterance, composed of lexical items syntactically linked and uttered with particular prosodic and paralinguistic features, does not replicate exactly another's understanding of that same utterance but both parties are satisfied that close approximation counts as understanding.

The fact that origin utterances are open to potentially several possible understandings, one of which is taken up by H, supports the contention put forward by John Pellowe (discussion and correspondence) that the meaning of an utterance is often determined by the hearer rather than the speaker. Thus in A1 H understands "How far" to refer to degree of engagement of hand-brake rather than degree of distance and in A42 H understands "tea" as "eat tea", a meal, rather than a cup of tea. The speaker, however, is often reluctant to concede the hearer's meaning to him. In A1 S knows that H has not understood the intended meaning, receiving instead an incorrect p^R , and she therefore amplifies the origin to be sure that the intended meaning rather than H's understanding is the one which obtains. In A42 S does not know that H has determined a different meaning for the origin than the one intended but by producing an utterance contributing another proposition, arising out of surprise at the manifestation, the intended meaning of "tea" is appreciated by H.

Thus, although a hearer may be able to determine the meaning of an utterance, when the speaker is aware that the hearer's determination is astray, he will, by the use of devices, attempt to impose his intended meaning.

The devices used by participants in the corpus and additional data demonstrate that speaker-hearers have numerous resources for negotiating correct understanding but the many types, differentiated by participants' states of realization, make it clear that these numerous resources are not necessarily sufficient. The cause of a misunderstanding, the linguistic and cognitive limitations of and constraints on participants, the content and illocutionary force of each utterance produced and the textual and situational influences on each utterance all play significant roles in the outcome of each misunderstanding.

Social reasons such as apathy, embarrassment or reluctance to cause embarrassment explain the lack of realization in some of the partially unrealized data. In others and in the fully unrealized data, the means by which realization could have been effected are inadequate. Realization that a misunderstanding has occurred is effected by recognition of the inappropriacy of responses and by the use of devices to draw attention to such inappropriacy. In order to detect linguistic, pragmatic social and cognitive inappropriacy, participants draw on the knowledge which they have built up as speaker-hearers in a real world; such knowledge includes language, spatial and temporal awareness and a vast amount of multifarious information relating to people, conventions, facts and suchlike. In addition to this knowledge, cognitive factors such as belief and anticipation influence participants. The variables which are pertinent to understanding are thus considerable and it is not surprising that utterances are misunderstood and that participants do not

always realize that misunderstandings have occurred.

Participants use a number of devices but there is no guarantee that any particular device will successfully effect realization. Success is dependent on one participant's use of words, that is, choice of device, clarity of expression and so on, and also on the other participant's understanding of the devices used. A misunderstanding occurs because the origin utterance has not been understood correctly but the process of understanding is not limited to that one utterance: every utterance has to be understood and every utterance is potentially open to being understood, misunderstood or not understood at all.

There is no automatic neat sequence by which one participant responds to the other's utterance in accordance with various linguistic and pragmatic rules; this can and usually does happen but it is always possible for one participant, H, to misunderstand and to produce an utterance which he believes is appropriate but which is not. When, as in A33, the misunderstanding occurs because a referent is wrongly identified, the elliptical origin which contains a homonym leaves H with more than one interpretive option. The fact that S produces such an origin utterance contradicts the commonly held assumption that a speaker takes care in the production of his utterance so that it will be understood. Prince (1981:224) calls this care "the tailoring of an utterance by a sender to meet the particular assumed needs of the intended receiver". The comment in the origin of A33, "Sounds like Focus", is not tailored to meet H's needs and in addition it contradicts the assumption that an utterance at the start of a conversation identifies its referent. This assumption tends to limit problems of referent identification to subsequent utterances (Chafe, 1976:32) but S can actually treat an item as 'given' from the start of the conversation simply because he knows

what he intends and he does not consider the fact that H may not necessarily know this too. H can often work out the referent so that no misunderstanding occurs, just as S can often work out the referent of the manifestation with only the contradiction between that and the origin to guide him. Each assumes the other will understand and on many occasions consideration of assumptions only begins when it appears that some of error has been made. (

Speakers do not always make allowances for hearers. They do not invariably undertake 'information packaging'; because the information is clear to them they assume it is similarly clear to the hearer. Hearers, on the other hand, do not always heed speakers. H might not fully pay attention to S's utterance, thereby failing to satisfy the basic condition of attending to an utterance in order that a conversation is not void (see, for example, Searle's "normal input and output conditions" (1969:57) and Keenan & Schieffelin's "Prerequisites for establishing a discourse topic" (1976:349)). H may not have paid attention but there are occasions when he will nevertheless respond to what he has heard or assumes he has heard. In A17 and S100 H is not attending but nevertheless responds and because S's utterance has not been properly heeded H's response is a manifestation, a misunderstanding having occurred. In A17 the misunderstanding is explained away as "I'm not with it today". It is a feature of conversation that participants are not always fully cognizant with the utterances to which they respond; responses are frequently produced in preference to remaining silent, requesting clarification, repeats or suchlike. What is remarkable is the capacity of participants to monitor utterances, to realize that misunderstandings have occurred and to resolve a great many of them.

The detection of the inappropriacy of a response is a crucial communicative skill (c.f. Gumperz's work for practical applications). It is obvious that anticipation is a major factor in communication since inappropriacy constitutes a response other than the one which is expected in view of preceding utterances, surroundings, participants and so on. Lyons points out that speaker-hearers are able to disambiguate utterances but that the assumptions on which such disambiguation might rest are not known :

" we cannot as semanticists neglect the fact that the speaker can assume, and normally does so unconsciously, that particular lexemes will be interpreted by the addressee in one sense rather than another by virtue of the subject-matter of the utterance in question and previous utterances in the conversation. So far, however, little progress has been made in giving a theoretically satisfying account of this phenomenon "

(Lyons, 1977:582-3).

The phenomenon is, however, more complex than Lyons presents it as being, because on the evidence of the corpus the speaker is often able to detect when the addressee has failed to interpret the utterance in its intended sense so that he both appreciates that his assumption that H would correctly understand his utterance has been wrong and he realizes H has misunderstood that utterance ; on several occasions S also correctly assumes what H's incorrect understanding has been. By using devices S is often able to ensure that H does eventually interpret the utterance in its intended sense, but successful resolution of a misunderstanding depends on how well H understands the devices.

Conversational implicature, proposed as a means by which participants correctly understand certain non-literal utterances, is not a sufficient explanation of how these utterances are understood. Such understanding is dependent on a participant's ability to understand correctly. In

K84, for example, H produces a conversational implicature as a consequence of having misunderstood the origin. Because S has not realized that a misunderstanding has occurred, he fails to understand the implicature and instead understands the literal meaning of the utterance.

Communication is undoubtedly a highly complex process and while there are the means to achieve a successful outcome, success ultimately depends on the participants who employ these means. One participant must choose the particular device or devices most likely, in his opinion, to effect realization and the other must correctly understand the devices. Both must be alert to the possibility that errors have been made and are continuing to be made. This problem would seem to be particularly pertinent in native/non-native communication, which was not included in the corpus but was in the additional data. The participants' failure to use and correctly understand devices which could have resolved the misunderstanding and its multiple 'compounding' sets the Varonis & Gass (1985) datum apart and it may well be the case that misunderstandings between participants from different linguistic backgrounds exhibit a larger number of ill-used devices.

This thesis has attempted to establish the salient structural characteristics of misunderstandings and has done so by means of a corpus-based analysis with the corpus being limited to misunderstandings between native speakers. It would be interesting to analyse a further corpus of less restricted data so that inter-ethnic and inter-dialectal misunderstandings could be examined and compared. Additionally, misunderstandings between participants from different socio-economic backgrounds and misunderstandings in different settings, such as telephone conversations, committees, interviews and so on, could be examined. It is probable that differences in the structural sequencing

will characterize misunderstandings in these different settings and between more diverse participants, rather than the emergence of new devices. The relative frequency of misunderstandings in particular settings and between particular participants could also be assessed.

One of the major problems with research of this kind is that one must be wary of undue reliance on intuition and unsubstantiated assumptions by the analyst. p , p^r and states of realization in this thesis are all derived from the analyst's intuitive interpretation which is usually supported by explanations provided by the utterances themselves or by retrospective commentary. The analysis makes provision for alternative interpretations when the analyst cannot be certain that his assumptions are correct.

The analysis presented in this thesis indicates how complex misunderstandings can be and consequently how much interactive effort can be required of participants in order that misunderstandings can be resolved. Communication crucially involves the negotiation of what is intended and what understood; participants draw on a specific range of devices to undertake this negotiation. The fact that they do not always succeed emphasizes the inherent difficulty of communication: each participant is an individual who speaks and hears from his own perspective. Successful communication thus ultimately depends on each individual's ability to take into account how the other individual may be interpreting the conversation. This facility to negotiate interactively is clearly a crucial social skill and future research might usefully focus on this particular facet of communicative behaviour as a means to a better understanding of how speaker-hearers use language.

FOOTNOTES

1. (Introduction, p. 1) : e.g. the following letter by J. H. Pugh of Birmingham, published in The Sunday Express, 20th May, 1984:
 "We have friends who visit us from time to time or we visit them. When we do they pick us up as we have no car. Our phone rang one evening and it was our friend who asked 'Would you like to visit us this evening? If so, we will be over in 20 minutes.' We had our coats on and were ready to leave when they arrived, looking puzzled. 'Are you going out then?' they said. It transpired that their phone message had really been 'Would you like two visitors this evening?' We had a good laugh and settled down."

2. (Chapter I., p. 13) : Scenarios can always be provided in support of linguistic claims. Here, the utterance 'Pass the fuel flask please' could be misperceived as 'Pass the field glasses please' and could be understood if, for example, a Land Rover, in which a spare can of fuel was carried, had stopped because it was low on fuel; an interesting view could be ahead, in which case 'field glasses' might conceivably be requested.

3. (Chapter I., p. 27) : An example of a non-linguistic misunderstanding is as follows : a queue of people are at a bus stop where buses which follow different routes stop; a bus draws up; the people at the front of the queue get on but those in the middle are waiting for a different bus so they continue standing; those at the end of the queue want to get on the bus but in waiting their turn in the queue they miss the bus, not realizing that it is now their turn to board that bus. They have misunderstood the situation; language is not involved.

4. (Chapter I., p. 27) : The following misunderstanding between A, a native English speaker, and B, an Egyptian, was reported to me by the English speaker :
 - (1) A: What does Martin do?
 - (2) B: Something to do with zebras
 - (3) A: Oh zebra crossings
 - (4) B: Yes, something to do with genetics
 A associated "zebras" with traffic and thought that (2) was a joke about town planning. B does not make the connection with traffic, not having made the joke which A credits her with, and interprets "zebra crossings" as the genetic crossing of zebras, which is presumably along the lines of what Martin, presumably a zoologist or geneticist, does. It is possible that this misunderstanding could have occurred between two native speakers but as it did not it is not included in the corpus.

5. (Chapter II, p. 35) : I am indebted to Ruth Kempson and Yorick Wilks for their permission to cite this misunderstanding.

6. (Chapter IV, p. 69) : I am indebted to R. M. McHarrie who devised this mathematical joke. The joke involves the following geometric terms : A Witch of Agnesi is a type of curve; an asymptote is a type of line which a curve approaches; a hyperboloid in one sheet is a three dimensional shape; eccentricity describes the characteristics of certain curves.

7. (Chapter V, p. 88) : Whether a native Australian English speaker is strictly eligible to be reckoned a native English speaker is a moot point. The misunderstanding would not have occurred between two speaker-hearers who shared the same cultural and therefore coinage system since the misunderstanding is of the referent of "They're so big" and two native speakers would not say that of the 2p piece. However, linguistic differences are not involved as they are in the "zebras" example, cited in Footnote 4, and the datum is included in the corpus.

8. (Chapter IX, p. 190) : The remaining percentages are those data in which S and H realize at the same time and those in which O realizes before S and H.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1CORPUS OF ANALYSED DATA

The corpus of analysed data is presented in accordance with the typology described in Chapter IX (see page 188).

Typographical Conventions

(1):	:	single utterance in one participant-turn
(1.1, .2, .n):	:	several utterances in one participant-turn
(S), (H), (O)	:	reference by name to S, H, O
?	:	signifies utterance is a question
!	:	signifies utterance is an exclamation
,	:	signifies slight pause within utterance
..	:	signifies longer pause within utterance
CAPITAL LETTERS	:	signifies emphatic stress
(<u>S</u>), (<u>H</u>), (<u>O</u>)	:	signifies emphatic stress on names of S, H, O
/	/	marker of pauses between utterances and of paralinguistic features such as / laugh /
-	-	marker of extralinguistic features such as - goes into room -

TYPE A : + S real. + H real.Basic Structure

A1. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about leaving car handbrakes on when driving.

- (1) H: I did that the other day just a little
 (2) ORIGIN S: How far?
 (3) MANIF. H: Only partly on _____ + S real.
 (4) x ampl. S: How far did you travel? _____ + H real.
 (5) z H: Baldwin to Douglas

Source: S = C.E.H.-J.

p = How far did you travel with your handbrake on?

p^r = How far on was your handbrake?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response giving distance.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x ampl.', as evidenced by appropriate response in (5).

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A2. H, (f), has just closed the garage door, jamming the stiff bolt across, prior to getting in the car, with S, (f), and closing the car door.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Are you sure it's shut?
 (2) MANIF. H: Yes I jammed it _____ + S real.
 (3) p exp. S: I meant the door _____ + H real.
 (4) z-action H - opens car door and slams it shut -
 z S: You just had to push the lock down to check

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p : Are you sure the car door is shut?

p^r : Are you sure the garage door is shut?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of pragmatic inappropriacy of (2), (car doors are not "jammed" shut), as evidenced by S 'p exp.'.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected S 'p exp.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription

A3. S, (f); H, (f), is putting drip mats under wine glasses on a table.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Nice, aren't they?
 (2) MANIF. H: Well they're useful _____ + S real.
 (3) p exp. S: I meant the glasses _____ + H real.
 (4) mus. ack. H: Oh yes

- Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = These glasses are nice, aren't they?
 p^r = These drip mats are nice, aren't they?
 S real.: '+S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response on aesthetic merit of glasses.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp.', as evidenced by H 'mus.ack.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

Basic Structure with Expansion

- A4. S, (m); H, (f); Graham Blackett is a butcher, Graham Richards is a farmer.
- (1) H: When we live in Alston I shall get my meat for the freezer from Blackett's
- (2) ORIGIN S: Yes you want to chat Graham up
- (3) MANIF. H: Yeah I'm sure he needs a cowgirl
 / pause / _____ + S real.
- (4) p^r ref. & p exp. S: No, Graham Blackett not Graham Richards
 _____ + H real.

- Source : Reported by S and H.
 p = Yes you want to chat up Graham Blackett, the butcher.
 p^r = Yes you want to chat up Graham Richards, the farmer.
 S real.: '+SS real.' effected by recognition of pragmatic inappropriacy of (3), (butchers do not usually need cowgirls while farmers might), as evidenced by S 'p^r ref. & p exp.'.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. & p exp.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.
 S and H provided the following commentary :

- By S after (2) : "Graham rather than any other Blackett"
 By H after (3) : "As I said that about Blackett's I was thinking that maybe Graham Richards would sell me a heifer cheaply"
 By S before (4): "How should Graham Blackett, a butcher of some repute, need in any ordinary sense of the word, a cowgirl. The only Graham I know who might need a cowgirl is Graham Richards, farmer, up the road, therefore she thought when I said Graham, meaning Graham Blackett, I was intending, contrastively, another family, i.e. not Blackett, rather than what it did mean, which was a specified member of the same family"
 After (4) : "On discussion, H did not know that Graham Blackett, butcher, was called Graham"

A5. S, (f), and H, (f), are discussing a friend who is selling her car.

- (1) ORIGIN S: I wonder what she's selling it for
 (2) MANIF. H: Going up in the world getting rid of
 her bashed mini
 _____ + S real.
 (3.1) p^r ref prt1. S: No that's not what I mean
 .2) p exp. : I mean how much is she selling it for
 _____ + H real.
 .3) z : I'll have to remember that to tell it
 to Claire for her misunderstandings

Source : Reported by S

p = I wonder how much she's selling her car for

p^r = I wonder why she's selling her car

S real.: '+S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response giving price of car.

H real.: '+H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prt1., p exp.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A6. S, (f), an Australian, is paying H, (f), for some photocopying.

- (1) H. That's six pence
 S - takes three 2p pieces from her purse -
 (2.1) ORIGIN S: I thought they'd be more
 .2) ORIGIN : They're so big
 (3) MANIF. H: It's six pence a sheet regardless of size
 _____ + S real
 (4.1) p exp. S: I meant the money
 .2) p exp. : It looks as if it should be more valuable
 than it is
 _____ + H real.
 (5.1) mus.ack. H: Ah
 .2) z : That's true of all money these days

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = I thought the 2p coins would be worth more because they are so big

p^r = I thought the photocopies would cost more because the sheets of paper are so big

S real.: '+S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3), as evidenced by S 'p exp., p exp'; anticipated response relating to coinage.

H real.: '+H real.' effected by S 'p exp.'

A7. O and S, (f), have been talking about seances carried out at the school which S and H, (f), attended, the Crescent; H joins them.

- (1) O: That's the sort of thing they do at
the Crescent
- (2) H: What ?
- (3) ORIGIN S: Seances
- (4) MANIF. H: Say what ?
_____ + S real.
- (5) mus. sig. S: / laugh /
_____ + H real.
- (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh seances
.2) mus. ack. : / laugh /

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Seances (are the sort of thing they do at the Crescent)

p^r = Say ances (as a test of pronunciation)

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (4); anticipated response commenting on seances.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'mus.sig.', as evidenced by H 'mus.ack.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A8. S, (f), has been telling H, (f), about how much photocopying needs to be done; 'dying blondie' refers to a man with blonde hair; H has dreamed about this man having collapsed in the reading room.

- (1) ORIGIN S: And your dying blondie has a couple as well
- (2) MANIF. H: Do you think he does?
/ pause /
_____ + S real.
- (3) p exp. S: I meant as in your dream
_____ + H real.
- (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry
.2) mus. ack. : Ah yes
.3) mus. ack. : Yes

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = The blonde man, whose death you dreamed about, has requested a couple of pages of xeroxing as well

p^r = The blonde man who dyes his hair has requested a couple of pages of xeroxing as well

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive and linguistic inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response commenting on xeroxes; substitution word "does" not appropriate for man dying or for requesting xeroxes.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp', as evidenced by H 'mus.ack., mus.ack., mus.ack.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

- A9. S, (f), has commented that she likes H's, (f), jumper
- (1) ORIGIN S: Is it wool?
- (2) MANIF. H: Very
 _____ + S real.
- (3) x exp. & S: I said wool not warm
 x^r ref. _____ + H real.
- (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) z : Yes I think so

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Is the jumper made of wool?

p^r = Is the jumper warm?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of linguistic inappropriacy of (2) (inappropriate to apply intensifier to something which does not admit degree).

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x exp. & x^r ref.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

- A10. H, (f), is telling S, (m), about a wedding she has been to.
- (1) H: One of the courses at the wedding reception was salmon caught by the bridegroom's father a few days before
- (2) ORIGIN S: Poached?
- (3) MANIF. H: I can't remember how it was cooked
 _____ + S real.
- (4) p^r ref.prtl. S: No, poached
 & x rpt. _____ + H real.
- (5) mus. ack. H: Oh

Source : H = C.E.H.-J

p = Was the salmon caught by poachers?

p^r = Was the salmon cooked by poaching?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3) ; anticipated response giving details of how salmon was caught.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prt. & x rpt.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

- A11. H, (f), is doing a crossword : S, (f), has borrowed her pen to fill in an application form.
- (1.1) S: You can have your pen in a minute
 .2) ORIGIN : I just have to address the envelope and then we're away
- (2) MANIF. H: Where are you going?
 _____ + S real.
- (3.1) y S: Nowhere
 .2) p exp.incmp. : I just meant
 _____ + H real.
- (4) mus. ack. H: Oh

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = I just have to address the envelope and then the application is ready to be set in motion
 p^r = I just have to address the envelope and then I'm away somewhere i.e. going out
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response relating to application.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y' response to (2) and S 'p exp. incmp.', as evidenced by H 'mus. ack.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A12. S, (f), is in the lounge, having watched on television a film which has just finished ; H, (f), has just gone into the adjoining kitchen.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Do you want anything (H)?
 (2) MANIF. H: I'm just getting my milk
 _____ + S real.
 (3) p^r ref. prtl. S: No, I meant on
 & p exp. _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) z : No thanks

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Do you want anything on television?
 p^r = Do you want anything from the kitchen?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response relating to television programme.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & p exp.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A13. S, (f), and H, (m), have been discussing (i) types of food mixers, S being about to buy one, and then (ii) a forthcoming picnic planned by H ; the conversation is briefly interrupted while S serves customers.

- (1) ORIGIN S: What shall I get then?
 (2) MANIF. H: Well I think Kenwood are pretty good
 _____ + S real.
 (3) p^r ref. prtl. S: No, the picnic
 & p exp _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) z : Oh nothing, it's all organized

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = What shall I get for the picnic?
 p^r = What mixer shall I get?
 S real.: '+S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy : anticipated response requesting food or drink items.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. '& p exp'. as evidenced by H 'mus. ack.' and appropriate response in (4.2).
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A14. S, (f) : H, (f), is consulting the newspaper to see what television programmes are on for the remainder of the evening.

- (1) S: What's the film?
 (2.1) H: Limelight
 .2) : Claire Bloom and Charlie Chaplin
 (3) ORIGIN. S: Must be late
 (4.1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes it is
 .2) MANIF. : It was the last one before he died
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p^r ref.prtl. S: No, time
 & p exp. _____ + H real.
 (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) mus. ack : /laugh/

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = The film must be on television late in the evening
 p^r = The film must have been made late in Charlie Chaplin's career
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy ; anticipated response giving time of film.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & p exp', as evidenced by H 'mus. ack., mus. ack.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A15. H, (f), joins S, (f), from an adjoining room where the television is; a tennis match is being broadcast.

- (1) ORIGIN S: What are we playing?
 (2) MANIF. H: Tennis
 _____ + S real.
 (3.1) mus. sig. S: I KNOW stupid girl
 (p^r ref. impl)
 .2) x ampl. : What match is it?
 _____ + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = What tennis match is on television?
 p^r = What game is on television?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy; anticipated response detailing the opponents in a tennis match.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'mus. sig.' ('p^r ref. implied'), 'x ampl.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A16. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about Dvorjak's music.

- (1) S: Have you head his cello concerto?
 (2) H: No
 (3.1) S: It's very nice
 .2) ORIGIN : I've been playing it a lot in the last few weeks
 (4) MANIF. H: You can play the cello!
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p^r ref.prtl. S: No, the record
 & p exp. _____ + H real.
 (6) mus. ack. H: Oh

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = I've been playing the record of Dvorjak's cello concerto a lot in the last few weeks
 p^r = I've been playing Dvorjak's cello concerto on the cello a lot in the last few weeks
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy; anticipated response relating to Dvorjak, not to S and a cello.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prt1. & p exp', as evidenced by H 'mus. ack.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A17. H, (f); S, (f), has commented on the fact that her office typewriter has stuck and has then attended to customers who have received a letter from her; she then returns to her desk.

- (1) ORIGIN S: It's alarming when that happens
 (2.1) IND. MANIF. H; Mm
 .2) MANIF, : When it sticks
 _____ + S real.
 (3) p^r ref. prt1. S: No, when people come in with a letter
 & p exp. you've written to them
 _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh that
 .2) z : Yes
 .3) z : I'm not with it today

Source : S= C.E.H.-J.
 p = It's alarming when customers produce a letter
 which you've written to them
 p^r = It's alarming when the typewriter sticks
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response
 relating to customers and letters.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & p exp.'
 as evidenced by H 'mus. ack.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A18. S, (f) ; H, (f).

- (1) ORIGIN S: Take your paper bin
 (2) MANIF. H: Which paper?
 _____ + S real.
 (3) x ampl. S: Your wastie bin
 _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) x^r exp. : I thought you said take your paper in

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Take your paper bin
 p^r = Take your paper in
 S real.: ' + S real' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2); anticipated action or
 reference to bin.
 H real.: ' + H real.' effected by S 'x ampl.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A19. H, (f), has gone into S's, (f), bedroom to say goodnight
 and is about to go out again.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Could you fasten that drawer properly
 (2) IND.MANIF. H: Yes right
 action H - holds door handle -
 _____ + S real.
 (3) p^r ref. & p exp. S: Drawer not door
 _____ + H real.
 (4) mus. ack. H: Ah
 z-action H - closes drawer -
 (5.1) z S: Thanks darling
 .2) z : I'm a fussy drawers

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Could you fasten that drawer properly
 p^r = Could you fasten that door properly
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'action', indicating
 incorrect referent identification by H.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. & p exp.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A20. H, (f), is visiting from Edinburgh, travelling on a student rail fare ; friends of S's, (f), are organizing a day trip to Edinburgh from Newcastle, where the conversation takes place.

- (1.1) ORIGIN S: That day trip to Edinburgh's really good
 .2) ORIGIN : It's under a pound
- (2) MANIF. H: Oh so that's why he asked me if I was
 coming back last night _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref. prtl. S: No
 & mus. sig. _____ + H real.
- (4) p qued. H: Oh you mean the one here
 & mus. ack.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p : That university day trip to Edinburgh is really good.
 It's under a pound

p^r : The British Rail day trip fare to Edinburgh is
 really good. It's under a pound

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by cognitive and pragmatic
 inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response
 relating to university trip; the trip is in the
 future and nothing to do with H's journey on the
 previous day.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & mus. sig.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A21. S, (f), and Martin both have lists recording decisions on
 planning applications; H, (m), who is speaking to someone
 on the telephone, has been asked about a particular decision.

- (1) H: (S), have you got the list?
- (2.1) S: I've got Martin's
 .2) ORIGIN : Which one do you want?
- (3.1) MANIF. H: Either
 .2) MANIF. : I don't mind
 _____ + S real.
- (4) p^r ref. prtl. S: No, which application?
 & x ampl. _____ + H real.
- (5.1) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry
 .2) mus. ack. : / laugh /
 .3) p^r exp. : I thought you meant which list

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Which application on the list do you want?

p^r = Which list do you want?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 and pragmatic inappropriacy of (3.1, 3.2);
 anticipated response giving application number;
 applications are dealt with singly.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & x ampl.'
 as evidenced by H 'mus. ack., mus. ack., p^r exp.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A22. S, (f), has asked H, (m), about his research.

- (1.1) H: I've done the A.I. and the psychology part
 .2) : Now I'm doing the linguistics side of it
- (2) ORIGIN S: Which is the hardest?
- (3) MANIF. H: No it's not actually .. no it's
 _____ + S real
- (4.1) mus. sig. S: / laugh /
 .2) p exp. : I meant a question
 .3) x rpt.&x emph. : WHICH is the hardest?
 _____ + H real.
- (5.1) mus. ack. H: / laugh /
 .2) mus. ack. : There you are .. a misunderstanding
- (6) mus. ack. S: Mmm
- (7) z H: The A.I. was the hardest

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Which is the hardest - A.I., psychology or linguistics?

p^r = (...linguistics) which is the hardest

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive and linguistic inappropriacy of (3); anticipated response naming one of the three subjects; referent assumed which cannot be recovered from (2)

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'mus. sig., p exp., x rpt. & emph.', as evidenced by H 'mus. ack., mus. ack.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A23. Clive Dixon and Clive Derwent work in the same office as S, (m), and H, (f); Clive Derwent is on secondment and is living in a rented cottage while Clive Dixon is a permanent employee, whose sister-in-law has recently moved into a rented cottage which H, looking for somewhere to rent, had inspected previously.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Of course when Clive finishes his work you could always
- (2.1) MANIF. H: Persuade the sister-in-law to get out
 .2) y : / laugh /
 .3) y : Yes
 .4) y : But one of the reasons I turned it down, well, took my name off the list really
 .5) y : I think his sister-in-law was always going to get it
 .6) y : But one of the things I didn't like was the road
 .7) y : One bend worried me
 .8) y : It was really sharp and the road fell away
 _____ + S real.
- (3.1) mus. sig. S: I think we've, eh, gone astray here a little
 .2) p exp. : I was thinking of Clive Derwent
 _____ + H real.
- (4.1) mus. ack. & H: Oh, not Clive Dixon
 p^r ref.
 .2) mus. ack. : Sorry
 (5) z S: Because you were interested in his cottage once, weren't you?
 (6) z H: Yes

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = When Clive Derwent finishes his secondment work
 you could always (take over his cottage)
 p^r = When Clive Dixon finishes his work on his
 sister-in-law's cottage you could always (take
 over the cottage after getting rid of her)
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2.1) and the subsequent 7 'y'
 utterances; anticipated response relating to
 Clive Derwent and his cottage.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'mus. sig., p exp.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

Basic Structure with Interactive Expansion

- A24. S, (m), and H, (f), are talking about a photograph of a
 castle in a book of castles.
- (1) S: I've been to that one
- (2) H: Which?
- (3.1) S: Richmond
 .2) ORIGIN : One of my brother's former girlfriends
 lived there
- (4) MANIF. H: Golly!
 (tone = p^r err.
 sig.) _____ + S real.
- (5) p exp S: In the town
 _____ + H real.
- (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) mus. ack. : Sorry
 .3) mus. ack. : / laugh /
- (7.1) mus. ack. S: / laugh /
 .2) z : We're not in your social
 .3) z : We don't aim for the peerage

Source : H = C.E.H.-J
 p = One of my brother's former girlfriends lived in
 Richmond.
 p^r = One of my brother's former girlfriends lived in
 Richmond Castle
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (4); exclamation of surprise
 not anticipated.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A27. S, (m), has asked H, (f), what she and her flat-mate do in the evenings; O is sitting with S and H.

- (1) H: We get in and sit by the fire all night
S - looks at O who is lighting a cigarette -
- (2) ORIGIN S: That's a bad habit
- (3) MANIF. H: I know but it's a nice one
_____ + S real.
action S - points to cigarette -
_____ + H real.
- (5) p^r exp.incmp. H: I thought you meant
- (6) mus. ack. S: / laugh /

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Smoking is a bad habit

p^r = Getting in and sitting by the fire all night is a bad habit.

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3); anticipated response by O rather than H

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'action', indicating referent of (2).

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A28. S, (f), and H, (f), are going off to do 'Meals on Wheels'; they also intend going out in the car later in the afternoon.

- (1) ORIGIN S: We can get fuel now
- (2.1) MANIF. H: We'd better get it on the way back
.2) y : It's twenty past eleven now
_____ + S real.
- (3) p exp S: I mean on the way back
_____ + H real.
- (4) x^r exp. H: You said we can get it now
- (5) p exp. S: I meant on the way back

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p : We can get fuel now while we're out this morning

p^r : We can get fuel now on the way to doing Meals on Wheels.

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.1); anticipated response agreeing with proposal rather than having same proposal put forward as an alternative.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp.'

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A29. S, (f), and H, (m), are eating mini-Easter eggs several weeks after Easter.

- (1) ORIGIN S: They've spoilt them really
- (2.1) MANIF. H: By having them all the year round
 .2) y : That's just what I was thinking yesterday
 _____ + S real
- (3.1) y S: Yes though these are probably old stock
 .2) p^r ref.prtl. : No, what I meant was that they eh the
 & p exp. wrappers are all colours, blue, red and green
- .3) y : They used to be just one colour and it
 was fun trying to get the blue one
 _____ + H real.
- (4) mus. ack. H: Oh

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = They've spoiled them by having multi-coloured wrappers

p^r = They've spoiled them by selling them all the year round

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.1); anticipated response asking why they were spoiled.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prt. & p exp., y'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A30. S, (f), and H, (f), having just moved into new accommodation, are discussing the bathroom.

- (1) H: It looks like it's a big bathroom
- (2.1) S: Yes it is
 .2) ORIGIN : It's got scales in it
- (3) MANIF. H: In the bathroom!
 (tone = p^r err. sig.)
- (4) p^r qued. S: Why is that surprising?
- (5) p^r exp. H: You don't normally have stairs in bathrooms
 _____ + S real.
- (6.1) x exp. S: I said scales
 _____ + H real.
- .2) z : Fool!

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = The bathroom has scales in it

p^r = The bathroom has stairs in it

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'p^r exp.'.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x exp.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A31. S, (f), and H, (f), are talking about lunch in the Chaplaincy, whither they are headed.

- (1) ORIGIN S: What do they do?
- (2) MANIF. H: You just go in and get what you want
 _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref.prtl. S: No no ehm what
 & x ampl.incmp.
- (4) p^r err. sig. H: What what
- (5) p. exp. S: I meant what do they serve
 _____ + H real.
- (6.1) z H: Soup, hot pies, rolls, yogourt
 .2) z : That sort of thing
- (7) z S: Oh good

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = What do they serve?

p^r = What is the procedure for eating?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response giving type of food served.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A32. Having moved house, S, (f), has received some G.P.O. change of address cards; she has just fetched playing cards to play with H, (f).

- (1.1) S: I suppose I'd better write those cards, those change of whatsits cards
 / pause /
- .2) ORIGIN : I wonder where the cards are
- (2) MANIF. H: On that table behind you
- action S - looks at table -
- (3) y S: They're not
- (4) manif. ampl. H: Yes they are
- action S: - looks at table -
- (5) y S: They're not
- (6) manif. ampl. H: Yes they're under the camera, behind the light bulbs
 _____ + S real.
- (7) p^r ref. & p exp. S: Not those cards, the playing cards
 _____ + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = I wonder where the playing cards are
 p^r = I wonder where the change of address cards are
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected after exchange of
 contradictory 'y' utterances and 'manif.
 amps.', the last of which details the location
 of the cards.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. & P exp.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

A33.

S, (m), and H, (m), are listening to a record while
 watching television on vision only; 'Focus' are a
 pop group.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Sounds like Focus
 (2.1) MANIF. H: Yeah I've been meaning to get it
 fixed for days
 .2) y : The picture's been lousy for some
 time
 / pause /
 (3.1) p^r qued. S: What the hell are you talking about?
 / pause /
 _____ + S real.
 .2) p^r exp. : Ah you're talking about the television
 .3) p exp. : I meant the music
 _____ + H real.

Source : Reported by S
 p = The record sounds like the group Focus
 p^r = It sounds like the focus adjustment is a
 problem with the television.
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected after consideration of
 (2.1, 2.2) and recognition of their cognitive
 inappropriacy; anticipated response relating
 to the music.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r exp., p exp.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

- A34. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about the lack of university jobs
- (1) ORIGIN S: It's amazing how few kind of senior posts are advertized isn't it .. I mean
- (2.1) IND MANIF. H: Well there aren't any
 .2) y : That's the .. that's why the whole thing's got clogged up
- (3) y S: Yeah
- (4) p^r qued. H: You mean without that string attached about the bottom points
 _____ + S real.
- (5.1) p^r ref. prt1. S: No I mean kind of promoted posts
 & p exp.
 .2) y incmp. : I mean those
 _____ + H real.
- (6) mus. ack. H: Oh readerships
- (7) z S: Are done internally rather than
- (8) z H: Yeah, well I think again it's probably this expense thing you know

Source : Tape recorded

p = It's amazing how few senior lectureship posts are advertized

p^r = It's amazing how few posts are advertized which don't stipulate bottom points on the scale.

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'p^r qued.'

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prt1. & p exp.'

Diversified Structure with Expansion

- A35. ? Intentional
 S, (f) ; H, (m).
- (1) ORIGIN S: What is V.A.T?
 _____ ? + H real.
 (if intentional)
- (2) MANIF. H: Value Added Tax
 _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref. prt1. S: No I mean what is it?
 & p exp. _____ + H real.
- (4) z H: Eight per cent

Source : Overheard
 p = How much is V.A.T.?
 p^r = What do the initials V.A.T. stand for?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response giving percentage figure.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref. prtl. & p exp., or '+ H real.' precedes () if intentional.

A36. Intentional
 S, (f) ; H, (m).

- (1.1) O: There's no such thing as a one parent family
 .2) : Jesus is the only example
 (2) H: There's some doubt about that
 (3) ORIGIN S: My grandmother swears she was raped by a Roman soldier
 _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. sig. H: / laugh /
 .2) MANIF. : Your grandmother must be living in the past
 _____ S real.
 (5) mus. ack. S: / laugh /

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = My grandmother swears Mary was raped by a Roman soldier
 p^r = My grandmother swears she was raped by a Roman soldier
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (4.2); anticipated response relating to Mary rather than grandmother.
 H real.: '+ H real.' precedes (4.1, 4.2)
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A37. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about a play; H is urging S to go and see it.

- (1) H: It's very short
 (2) ORIGIN S: How long is it on?
 (3.1) MANIF. H: It finishes about ten to ten
 .2) y : Plenty of time for a drink
 / pause / _____ + S, H real.
 .3) p qued. & mus. ack. : Oh you mean how long on for

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = How much longer does the play run for?
 p^r = How long is the play from start to finish?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of
 cognitive inappropriacy of (3.1, 3.2) ;
 anticipated response giving number of days
 or weeks.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected after re-consideration
 of (2).
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

A38.

Intentional

S, (m), is trying to organize a planning case to be heard
 as soon as possible ; H, (m), organizes the agenda for
 the meetings at which cases are heard.

- (1) ORIGIN S: How far do you go with your dates?
 _____ + H real.
- (2.1) mus. sig. H: / laugh /
 .2) MANIF. : Well, usually
 _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref. prt1. S: No, how many have you got arranged?
 & x ampl.

Source : Overheard
 p = How far ahead have you got dates for meetings
 arranged?
 p^r = How far do you go with the girls you date?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2.2) ; anticipated response
 giving calendar date.
 H real.: '+ H real.' precedes (2.1, 2.2)

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

A39.

Intentional

S, (f), is in one room in her flat; H, (f), visiting,
 is in the adjoining kitchen, together with a stray cat.

- (1) H: Shall I put the kettle on?
- (2.1) S: Mmm
 .2) ORIGIN : Where is it?
 _____ + H real.
- (3) MANIF. H: On the tray
 _____ + S real.
- (4) p^r ref. prt1. S: No no, the cat
 & p exp.
- (5) mus. ack. H: I know

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Where is the cat?
 p^r = Where is the kettle?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3) ; anticipated response giving details of where in the kitchen the cat might be (aware that kettle is on small tray)
 H real.: '+ H real.' precedes (3).
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A40.

Intentional
 H, (m) ; H, (m), wants to leave his briefcase in a secure place rather than carry it round with him all day.

- (1) ORIGIN S: There isn't a cloakroom round here
 that works
 _____ + H real.
- (2) MANIF. H: Oh the gents is flooded is it?
 _____ + S real.
- (3) p^r ref. prtl. S: NO I MEANT a cloakroom for putting
 & p exp. things in
- (4) p^r ref. & H: Ah not the kazi
 mus. ack.
- (5.1) z S: Kazi?
 .2) z : I'd have said lavvy

Source : Reported by S & H
 p = There isn't a manned cloakroom here for leaving things
 p^r = There isn't a 'Gents' round here that works
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated response relating to cloakrooms and security.
 H real.: '+ H real.' precedes (2).
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A41.

H, (f), has been telling S, (f), what food she has cooked for the freezer, viz. mince and cheesecake; they then talk about what type of cheesecake has been made.

- (1) H: I could have done quicker ones but I
 wanted to do the rich one
- (2) ORIGIN S: What else did you put in?
- (3) MANIF. H: Cottage cheese ehm
- (4)y & p^r err.sig. S: Oh, mince
 _____ + H real.
- (5.1) mus. ack. H: Oh, in the FREEZER
 .2) p^r exp. : I thought you meant the things in the
 cheesecake
 _____ + S real.

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = What else did you put in the freezer?
 p^r = What else did you put in the cheesecake?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'mus. ack., p^r exp.'
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y & p^r err. sig.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

A42. S, (f), and H, (f), are colleagues; H is going to a dental appointment at 4 o'clock; office tea is consumed at half past three.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Are you having your tea and going?
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: No
 (3) y S: I thought you were going at quarter to four
 _____ + H real.
 (4.1) mus. ack. H: Oh my tea
 .2) p^r exp. : I thought you meant my eat tea
 _____ + S real.
 .3) z : Yes

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Are you having your cup of tea and then going?
 p^r = Are you having your tea (evening meal) and then going?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'mus. ack., p^r exp.'
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

A43. S, (m), and H, (f), are at a cafe and are discussing how derelict it has become, S pointing out that the cost of the thatched roof must preclude further development.

- (1) ORIGIN S: They've band concerts here
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: Why?
 (3) x rpt. prtl. S: Band concerts
 _____ + S, H real.
 (4) mus. ack. S,H: / laugh /
 (5.1) z S: Isn't it funny that there's no way you
 (p^r exp.impl.) can distinguish between B, A, N, D and
 B, A, N, N, E, D?
 .2) z : Both are right

Source : Reported by S and H
 p = They have band concerts here
 p^r = They have banned concerts here
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of
 cognitive inappropriacy of (2) ; anticipated
 response relating to band concerts.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected after reconsideration
 following S 'x rpt. prtl.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.
 The following additional commentary was
 provided:
 By S after (2) : "What have I said that (H)
 couldn't give me an answer?"

A44. S, (m) ; H, (M), is reading a newspaper ; an opened can
 of juice is on his desk.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Is there anything in that (H)?
 (2) MANIF. H: Not particularly
 action S - drinks from can -
 _____ + H real.
 (4) mus. ack. & H: Oh I thought you meant the paper
 p^r exp. _____ + S real.

Source : Overheard
 p = Is there anything left in that can?
 p^r = Is there anything in that paper?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'mus. ack. & p^r exp.'.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'action'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

A45. H, (f) ; S's (f), husband is working abroad; the chair
 is one which particularly sags when one sits in it.

- (1.1) ORIGIN S: I always sit in this chair because it
 makes me feel fat
 - sits in chair -
 .2) ORIGIN : My skirts won't go round me
 .3) y : I'm tranquilized by the loss .. absence
 of my husband
 (2.1) MANIF. H: I wish I was like that
 .2) y : I can't get into mine
 _____ ? + S real.
 (3.1) y S: No nor can I
 .2) p exp. prtl. : That's what I mean
 _____ ? + H real.
 (4) p^r exp. H: Oh I thought you'd lost weight so your
 & mus. ack. skirts wouldn't fit
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p exp. S: I'm fat so I sit here to remind me
 _____ + H real.

Source : H + C.E.H.-J.
 p = I always sit in this chair because it reminds me I'm fat. My skirts won't go around me.
 p^r = I always sit in this chair because it makes me feel fat. My kilted skirts won't go around me.
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected (i)? by cognitive inappropriacy of (2.1) & S 'y'; anticipated response relating to weight problem or absence of husband; (ii) by H 'p^r exp. & mus. ack.'
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected (i)? by S 'y, p exp. prtl.'; (ii) by S 'p exp.'.

A46.

S, (f), and H, (f), are in a bathroom; water is running into the bath for S and there is water in the wash basin.

- (1) ORIGIN S: What have you got that water in there for?
 (2) MANIF. H: To keep my hair wet
 (3) y S: Oh
 (4) y H: I blow dry it you see
 (5.1) y S: Mmm
 / pause /
 action H - washes face in wash basin -
 .2) y S: But you're washing your face
 (6) y H: Yes
 (7) y S: That's what you're doing with that water
 _____ + H real.
 (8.1) y H: Oh yes
 .2) x^r exp. : I thought you said what have you got that
 hat on for
 _____ + S real.
 .3) mus. ack. : How silly

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = What have you got that water in there for?
 p^r = What have you got that hat on for?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'x^r exp.' subsequent to H 'action' and exchange of 'y' utterances.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y' utterances.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A47. S, (f), is H's, (m), wife; it is 10 p.m. on a Saturday night.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Will you excuse me if I go up to bed?
 (2) MANIF. H: No, not at all
 / pause /
 (3) x^r qued. S: Did you hear what I said?
 (4.1) x^r exp. H: Yes, you said will you excuse me if I
 go up to bed
 / pause /
 _____ + H real.
 .2) mus. ack. : Oh
 .3) p^r exp. : I knew what you said and I knew you meant
 do you mind and I said no not at all.
 _____ + S real.
 (5) z S: I thought you were doing one of your
 jokes because you often do

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Will you excuse me if I go up to bed?

p^r = Do you mind if I go up to bed?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'p^r exp.'.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by H 'x^r exp.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A48. S, (f), and H, (f), are listening to a tape which S has made of H's record.

- (1) ORIGIN S: I've only got one side of it
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: Why?
 (3) y S: Because I've got Peer Gynt on the other
 _____ + H real.
 (4) p^r exp. & mus. ack. H: Oh I thought you meant it was in mono
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p^r ref. prtl. & p exp. S: No I meant only one side of the album

Source : Reported by S.

p = I've only got one side of the record

p^r = I've only got one channel (i.e. it is in mono)

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'p^r exp. & mus. ack.'.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y' elaborating the
origin

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A49. S, (f), and H, (f), share accommodation and are sitting in H's room; the rooms are high-ceilinged; 'he' is the landlord, who lives below them.

- (1.1) S: I don't know how we change the bulb
 .2) ORIGIN : Hope he's got a ladder
- (2) p^r err. sig. H: What?
- (3) y S: For when the bulb goes
- (4) MANIF. H: It's got a little hole at the top
- (5) p^r err. sig. S: What?
- (6) y H: To change the bulb
 _____ + S real.
- (7) p exp. S: I mean a ladder to get up to the bulb
 _____ + H real.
- (8) mus. ack. H: Oh
- (9) mus. ack. S,H: / laugh /
- (10) p^r qued. S: What on earth did you think I meant
 by ladder?
- (11.1) p^r exp. H: Well, like a ladder in tights
 .2) p^r exp. : I thought you meant pull it apart

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Hope he's got a ladder (so we can get up to the bulb)

p^r = Hope he's got a ladder so we can get the bulb out

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'y' elaborating the
manifestation.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp.'

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

A50. S, (f), and H, (f), are discussing birthstones and Zodiac signs.

- (1.1) H: I was born on the 13th
 .2) : I quite like that
- (2.1) S: Yeah
 .2) ORIGIN : Was it on a Friday as well?
- (3.1) IND. MANIF. H: I don't know
 .2) IND. MANIF. : I don't remember
- (4.1) p^r err. sig. S: Ah hah
 .2) y : I was born on a Wednesday
- (5) y H: I was born on a Sunday
- (6) p^r err. sig. S: Mmm
 / pause /
 _____ + H real.
- (7.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) x qued. : Did you ask me if I was born on a Friday?
- (8) x exp. prt1. S: Yeah
- (9) x^r exp. H: I thought you asked me if it was frightening
 _____ + S real.
- (10) mus. ack. S: / laugh /

Source : H + C.E.H.-J.
 p = Was your birthday a Friday as well as being the 13th?
 p^r = Was your birthday frightening?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'x^r exp.'.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected after reconsideration of
 conversation & S's neutral responses.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.
 S admitted that she had not really been sure what
 H was talking about in (3.1, 3.2).

TYPE B : + S real. + H real. + O real.

Basic Structure with Expansion

- B51. In H's, (f), house after an evening out, H puts a footstool
 in front of S's, (f), chair, for her greater comfort.
- (1) ORIGIN S: Can I take my shoes off?
- (2) MANIF. H: No no of course you needn't take your
 shoes off
 _____ + S real.
- (3) x exp. & x emph. S: (H) dear, I said CAN I take my shoes off
 & x^r ref. not SHALL I take my shoes off
 _____ + H, O real.
- (4) mus. ack. S,H,O: / laugh /

Source : Reported by S
 p = Do you mind if I take my shoes off?
 p^r = Should I take my shoes off?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of linguistic
 and cognitive inappropriacy of (2); incohesion
 of the adjacent modal auxiliaries "can" and "need";
 anticipated permission to remove shoes rather
 than permission not to remove them.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x exp. & emph. & x^r ref.'
 O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of
 transcription.

Basic Structure with Interactive Expansion

B 52. S, (f), and her husband are going with H, (f), to an informal sing-song at which H's husband, Darrel, is to play the organ.

- (1) ORIGIN S: By the way what's Darrel wearing?
 (4.1) IND.MANIF. H: I don't know
 .2) MANIF. : I know Eddy Waring
 .3) MANIF. : Darrel Waring?
 .4) MANIF. : Never heard of him
 _____ + S, O real.
- (3) mus. sig. S,O: / laugh /
 (4) x rpt.&x emph. S: What IS Darrel wearing?
 _____ + H real.
- (5) mus. ack. S,O: / laugh /
 (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) mus. ack. : / laugh /

Source : O = C.E.H.-J.

p = What is Darrel wearing?

p^r = What is Darrel Waring (i.e. what does he do?)

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4); anticipated response detailing clothes.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x rpt. & x emph.'.

O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

B53. S, (f); H, (f), escorted by O¹, (m), to a dinner party in the Isle of Man, has not met the others, S and O², (m), before.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Are you Manx?
 (2) MANIF. H: No, eh, I'm divorced actually
 _____ + S, O¹, O² real.
- (3) mus. sig. S, O^{1,2} : / laugh /
 (4.1) x^r ref. S: Not MARRIED
 .2) x exp. & x emph. : I asked you are you MANX
 _____ + H real.
- (5) mus. ack. S, O^{1,2} : / laugh /
 (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh, eh, sorry
 .2) z : No I'm not
 (7.1) z O¹: Are you divorced?
 .2) z : No I come from Staffordshire actually
 (8) z S, H, O^{1,2} : / laugh /

Source : O² = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Are you Manx?
 p^r = Are you married?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response detailing nationality.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x^r ref, x exp. & x emph.'
 O¹ real.: '+ O¹ real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 O² real.: '+ O² real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

B54. S, (f), H, (m), and O, (f), are talking about morris-dancing, which H does.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Where do you do this?
 (2) MANIF. H: To make the crops grow
 _____ + S, O real.
 (3) mus. sig. S,O: / laugh /
 (4) x exp. & x emph. O: (S) said WHERE do you do it
 _____ + H real.
 (5.1) mus. ack. H: / laugh /
 .2) z : In a tin hut in Greeba

Source : O = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Where do you do morris dancing?
 p^r = Why do you do morris dancing?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response detailing a place.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'x exp. & x emph.'
 O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

B55. S, (f), is about to collect mid-morning drinks for her colleagues and is consulting H, (f), and O, (f), as to how many are required.

- (1.1) S: I wonder if Helen will be back in time
 .2) : She's gone to get her eyes tested
 .3) : It was at 10 o'clock
 .4) : Should I get her tea?
- (2) H: I noticed she didn't have her glasses on today
- (3) S: I think she's trying to get used to not wearing them for when they're away getting new lenses
- (4) H: Oh yes
- (5) ORIGIN S: Have you any idea how long it takes?
- (6.1) IND. MANIF. H: I don't know
 .2) MANIF. : It's about two to three weeks isn't it?
 _____ + S, O real.
- (7) p^r ref. prtl. S: No
 & mus. sig.
- (8) p exp O: The appointment
 _____ + H real.
- (9) mus. ack. H: Oh, the appointment
- (10) z O: I could drink my coffee and rinse my flask and then we could store Helen's tea in it

Source: S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Have you any idea how long it takes to have your eyes tested?

p^r = Have you any idea how long it takes to receive a new pair of glasses?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (6.2); anticipated response detailing time in minutes.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'p exp'.

O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

B56. S, (m), goes into a baker's shop to buy two egg salad rolls and to pay for two rolls owing from the previous day; H, (f), serves him; O, (f), served him the previous day.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Can I have two egg salad rolls and I owe you two
- H - gives him two rolls -
- (2) MANIF. H: That's thirty
- (3) x ampl. S: But I owe you two (hesitantly)
- _____ ? + O real.
- (4) manif. rpt. H: Yes, that's thirty
- _____ + O real.
- (5) p^r ref. prt1. O: No he means two rolls
- & p exp _____ + S, H real.

Source : Reported by S

p = Can I have two egg salad rolls and I owe you for two rolls from yesterday

p^r = Can I have two egg salad rolls and I owe you two pence from yesterday

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by O 'p^r ref. prt1. & p exp.'

H real.: '+ H real.' effected as per '+ S real.'

O real.: '+ O real.' effected by recognition of pragmatic inappropriacy of (2) and (4); thirty pence is not the price of four rolls.

S reported that the transaction was then completed satisfactorily and that all participants realized.

B57. H, (f), has lived in Newcastle and is now going to live in Edinburgh; S, (f), and her daughters, O¹ and O² are H's friends and are about to go on holiday to Carlisle; O¹ will continue to live in the flat she formerly shared with H in Newcastle.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Are you going to stay in Newcastle?
- (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: No
- .2) MANIF. : I'll be in Edinburgh
- _____ + S real.
- (3.1) mus. sig. S: Yes
- .2) p^r ref. : I didn't mean stay in Newcastle
- .3) p exp. : I meant visit Newcastle
- _____ + H, O¹, O² rea:
- (4) x qued. prt1.O¹ : Well why didn't you say that?
- (5.1) x exp. S: Well we live here but we're going to stay in Carlisle
- .2) z : It's a funny word, stay
- (6) z O²: In French it would be rester a, I think.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p : Are you going to visit Newcastle?
 p^r : Are you going to stay on living in Newcastle?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response relating to possible visits rather than response stating fact already known by S.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p^r ref., p exp.'.
 O¹real.: '+ O¹ real.' effected as per '+ H real.'.
 O²real.: '+ O² real.' effected as per '+ H real.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

B58.

S, (f), has been babysitting for S, (m), and O, (f) ; she had to rush from her job to babysit on time; On S and O's return, the conversation has been about the earlier rush.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Did you have anything to eat?
 (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes thanks
 .2) MANIF. : Chocolate limes, biscuits and biscuits
 _____ + S, O real.
 (3) p^r ref. prtl. O: No
 & mus. sig.
 (4) p exp. S: I meant before you came
 (5) x ampl. O: Did you have any tea?
 _____ + H real.
 (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) z : Yes
 .3) z : Yes I rushed through the house collecting clothes and tea and then out again

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Did you have anything to eat before you came?
 p^r = Did you have anything to eat while you were here?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response relating to proper meal rather than snacks in their house.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'x ampl.'.
 O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'

B59. S, (m); H, (f); O, (m); (n.b. O = H²).

- (1) ORIGIN S: Is Freud still alive?
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: No of course not
 (3) IND. MANIF. O: No
 (4) y H: He died ages ago didn't he?
 _____ + S real.
 (5) p^r ref S: Not Freud the man
 (6) p^r err. sig. H: Uh?
 (7) p exp. S: Freud the idea
 _____ + H, O real.
 (8) mus. ack. H: Oh
 (9.1) mus. ack. O: Oh
 .2) mus. ack. : / laugh /

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Are Freud's theories still being cited?

p^r = Is Freud still alive?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'y' referring to
 Freud the man rather than the theories.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'p exp'.

O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ H real.'

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

B60. S, (f), is telling H, (m), and O, (m), about having hit a car in a car park and her subsequent argument with the driver.

- (1) ORIGIN S: ... and then he got fed up
 (2.1) MANIF. H: He got the polis?
 / pause /
 .2) manif. rpt. : The police?
 prt1.
 (3.1) y S: No
 .2) y : I drove off
 (4) x qued.incmp. H: Didn't you say
 _____ ? + O real.
 (5) x exp. O: She said that he got fed up
 _____ + H real.
 (6.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) x^r exp. : I thought you said he got the fed .. up
 _____ + S, O real.

Source : Overheard by C.E.H.-J.
 p = And then he got fed up
 p^r = And then he got the fed (police) up
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'x^r exp.'.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'x exp.'.
 O real.: '+ O real.' effected (i)? by recognition of
 cognitive inappropriacy of (2.1, 2.2);
 anticipated response relating to driver's
 having had enough of the argument rather
 than police who have not been mentioned;
 (ii) by H 'x^r exp.'.

B61. S, (f), H, (f), O¹, (f), and O², (m), are colleagues;
 another colleague, Tom Wade, will shortly be leaving
 for a promoted post in another department.

- (1) ORIGIN S: (H), where does Tom Wade live?
 (2) y O¹: Port Erin (quietly)
 (3.1) MANIF. H: He thinks about a month
 p^r err. sig. O^{1,2} : / look astonished /
 .2) x qued. prtl. H: Is that what you said?
 _____ ? + S, O real.
 (4) x rpt. prtl. S: Where does he live?
 _____ + H real.
 (5.1) mus. ack. H: / laugh /
 .2) x^r exp. : Oh I thought you said when does he leave
 _____ + S, O¹, O², real,
 (6) mus. ack. S,H,O^{1,2} : / laugh /
 (7) z O² : I didn't know he was leaving

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Where does Tom Wade live?
 p^r = When does Tom Wade live?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected (i)? recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (3.1); anticipated response
 relating to place and H 'x qued prtl.' indicates
 possible mishearing; (ii) by H 'x^r exp.'.
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x rpt. prtl.'.
 O¹real.: '+ O¹ real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 O²real.: '+ O² real.' effected as per '+ S real.'.

TYPE C : ? + S real. + H real.Basic Structure with Expansion

- C62. S, (f), is a shop assistant; H, (f), is taking her typewriter to be repaired; the premises in which the conversation takes place are divided into retail stationery on the ground floor and typewriter sales and servicing on the 1st floor; S is on the ground floor and H is starting to go upstairs when the conversation begins.
- (1) S: There's no-one upstairs
- (2) H: Oh isn't there
H - comes back downstairs -
- (3) S: They won't be back till 2 o'clock
- (4.1) H: Oh
.2) : Perhaps you can help me
.3) : I've got a problem with my typewriter
- (5) ORIGIN S: / shakes head /
S: Can't deal with it
- (6.1) MANIF. H: But I bought it here
.2) MANIF. : It's under guarantee
_____ ? + S real.
- (7.1) x ampl. S: I don't have anything to do with them
.2) y : I'm down here
_____ + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
p = I can't deal with it (it's not my department)
p^r = The shop can't deal with it.
S real.: '? + S real.' effected by recognition of pragmatic inappropriacy of (6.1, 6.2); irrespective of guarantee, the retail department cannot deal with repairs.
H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x ampl., y'.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

- C63. S, (f), and H, (f), are going to have an evening meal with a bizarre range of people, including George; S has just finished her lunch, a strange assortment of food, while H is still eating hers.
- (1) ORIGIN S: This is going to be a very funny meal
- (2) MANIF. H: Yes but it's nice
- (3) y S: Well George will be all right
_____ + H real.
- (4) mus. ack. H: Oh that meal
_____ ? + S real.

TYPE D : + S real. ? + H real.

Basic Structure

- D65. H, (m), is telling S, (f), about the director of an airport at Abu Dhabi who has been visiting the airport at Ronaldsway, where H and Alan Oates both work.
- (1) H: He offered Alan Oates a job on the spot
- (2) ORIGIN S: Where, at Abu Dhabi?
- (3) MANIF. H: No, at Ronaldsway _____ + S real.
- (4) x ampl. S: Where was the job? _____ ? + H real.
- (5) y/z H: Abu Dhabi

Source : Overheard

p = Where was the job, was it at Abu Dhabi?

p^r = Where was he when he offered Alan Oates the job?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response detailing place other than Ronaldsway.

H real.: ' ? + H real.' probably effected by S 'x ampl.' Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription with S.

Basic Structure with Expansion

- D66. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about a man who used to fly a gyrocopter ; the man was killed when the gyrocopter crashed.
- (1) ORIGIN S: He killed himself didn't he?
- (2) MANIF. H: No the plane killed him _____ + S real.
- (3.1) p exp. prt1. S: Same thing
- .2) p exp. prt1. : That was what I meant _____ ? + H real.

Source : Overheard
 p = He was killed when he was flying his gyrocopter,
 was'nt he?
 p^r = He killed himself, didn't he? (i.e. committed
 suicide)
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response
 confirming and developing p rather than denying
 it and then re-stating it.
 H real.: ' ? + H real.' probably effected by S 'p exp.
 prtl., p exp. prtl.'
 Partly confirmed in subsequent disoussion of
 transcription with S.

D67. S, (f), is in O's room, having just played squash against
 O's wife; prior to the game S was also in O's room when
 H, (m), was there; S has won the game; H walks into the
 room.

- (1) ORIGIN S: The conquering hero returns
 (2) MANIF. H: Why am I a conquering hero?
 _____ + S real.
 (3.1) p^r ref. prtl. S: You aren't
 .2) p exp : I am
 _____ ? + H real.

Commentary by participant is as follows :
 By S after (1) : "I'm back, after winning"

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = The conquering hero (S) returns (I'm back after
 winning)
 p^r = The conquering hero (H) returns
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive
 inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response
 relating to S as conquering hero and his squash
 game, rather than H as conquering hero
 H real.: ' ? + H real.' probably effected by S 'p^r ref.
 prtl. & p exp.'.

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = The sea went down quickly
 p^r = The boat went down quickly
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by change between H's assertiveness in (4), uttered as though (3) was very obvious, and lack of knowledge in (2.1, 2.2) plus hesitant '? mus. ack.' utterances.
 H real.: '? + H real.' probably effected by reconsideration of conversation after S 'y'.

D70.

S, (f), is waiting to go and use a photocopying machine which she knows is being used by O, (f), to copy some material for H, (f); O could have been getting H a number of books and manuscripts which might have been heavy, thus warranting assistance from her colleague, S.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Was it quite a lot?
 (2) MANIF. H: No she's just gone down to do some photocopies for me
 _____ + S real.
 (3.1) mus. sig. S: Yes
 .2) x ampl. : How much was there?
 _____ ? + H real.
 (4) y H: Just five pages
 (5) p exp. S: It's only because I'm waiting to go and do some xeroxing too
 _____ ? + H real.
 (6) ? mus. ack. H: Ah

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Did you ask her for quite a lot of xeroxing?
 p^r = Did you ask her for quite a lot of material?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response detailing amount of xeroxing rather than fact of xeroxing, which S knows.
 H real.: '? + H real.' probably effected by S 'mus.sig., x ampl.' or by S 'p exp.'.

D71.

S, (m), and H, (m), are civil servants; H deals with 'Appeals' in the department while David is the area inspector for the town, Peel, and works in a separate branch of the department; S has a bundle of papers relating to 'Appeals' and is looking for the right person to give them to.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Who deals with Appeals?
 (2) x qued. H: Peel?
 (3) x exp. prtl. S: Yeah
 (4) MANIF. H: David
 _____ + S real.
 (5) x rpt. prtl. S: APPEAL
 & x emph. _____ ? + H real.
 (6.1) ? y/mus. ack. H: Oh
 _____ ? + H real.
 .2) ? p^r err. sig. : What?
 action H - sees bundle of papers -
 _____ ? + H real.
 .3) ? mus. ack & H: Oh they're mine
 y/z

Source : Overheard

p = Who deals with Appeals?

p^r = Who deals with Peel?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of pragmatic inappropriacy; S knows that David deals with Peel and not with Appeals.

H real.: ' ? + H real.' probably effected by S 'x rpt. prtl. & x emph.' or by reconsideration of conversation after (6.1) or by H 'action'. Partly confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription with S.

TYPE E : ? + S real. + H real. ? + O real

Basic Structure with Interactive Expansion

- E72. H, (f), is working as a barmaid; S, (m), and O, (m, f), are customers in the pub; they have been talking to H about what she did prior to barmaiding, viz. a degree, and what she hopes to do later.
- (1) ORIGIN S: Have you done?
- (2) MANIF. H: Yes I've done
- (3.1) x ampl. S: Have you done talking?
 .2) x ampl. : Have you done working?
- (4) manif. rpt. H: Yes
 prtl. _____ ? + S, ? + O real.
- (5) mus. sig. S,O: / laugh /
- (6) y S: Are you ready to serve us?
 _____ + H real.
- (7) mus. ack. H: Oh sorry
 z-action H - picks up empty glasses to get drinks -

Commentary by participant is as follows :

- By H after (2) : "Finished my degree ... pleased"
 By H after (4) : "What? Puzzled"
 By H after (7) : "Embarrassed"

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Have you finished talking/working (Are you ready to serve us?)

p^r = Have you finished your degree?

S real.: ' ? + S real.' probably effected by cognitive and social inappropriacy of (2) and (4); anticipated service; H responds as fellow customer rather than as barmaid.

H real.: ' + H real.' effected by S 'y'

O real.: ' ? + O real.' probably effected as per '? + S real.'

TYPE F : - Sreal. - H real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

F73. H, (m), dashing to the shops, meets S, (m), on his side of the road.

- (1) H: I can't stop because I want to catch the shops, but how are you ?
- (2.1) S: Oh alright
- .2) ORIGIN : Have you had a funeral ?
- (3) MANIF. H: No but I feel as if I have
- (4) p exp. prtl S: Oh I thought you'd gone to one
- (5) p^r err. sig. H: What ?
- (6) x rpt. prtl. S: A funeral
- (7) y H: No I haven't been to a funeral
- (8) y S: But you're wearing a black tie
- (9) y H: Oh I always wear a black tie
- (10) y S: Oh

Source : Reported by H

p = Have you had a funeral ?

p^r = Have you had flu ?

S real.: - S real., as evidenced by 'y' utterances relating to topic of x, confirmed by H

H real.: - H real., confirmed by H

H provided the following commentary :

By H after (2.2) : "Have you had the flu ?"

By H as an afterthought, having subsequently realized the misunderstanding after the conversation ended :

"On reflection I suddenly realized that it all started because I was wearing a white shirt; I always do wear a black tie but rarely with a white shirt"

TYPE G : ? - S real. ? - H real. ? - O real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

G74. O, (m), and H, (m), are in O's room; S, (m), enters the room; O is S's supervisor.

- (1) S: Can I borrow (O) for a few minutes
- (2) H: Yeah sure
- (3) S: I'll not be a tic
- (4.1) O: What ?
- .2) : What ?
- .3) : Oh you were talking to (H) then were you ?
- (5) S: No I was just broaching the subject

/ continued ...

G74 ... continued /

- (6) H: A question of ownership
- (7) S: That's right, yeah
- (8) O: But you were saying to (H) can I just borrow (O) for a minute
- (9) H: There's nothing wrong with that
- (10) S: You weren't paying any attention
- (11.1) O: I misinterpreted that
 .2) : Can I just borrow (O) for a minute
 .3) : I thought you were going to go on
 .4) : Can I just borrow (O) for a minute such and such is what I thought you were going to do so you eh
- (12) S: I thought that it would be in the department and strolled out of the library for a copy of the relevant
- (13) O: That's right, you've got you you you've got the necessary yeah you've got the
- (14) S: You're just so used to me having dysphasic
- (15) O: No the tonicity tonicity was wrong
- (16) S: Dysphasic syntax
- (17.1) O: Can I just BORrow
 .2) : You had the tonic on borrow, right?
 .3) : You should have had the tonic on (O)
- (18.1) S: Can I just BORrow (O) for a minute
 .2) : That's what I said
 .3) : Can I just BORrow (O) for a minute
- (19.1) O: Yeah right
 .2) : What you should have said was can I just borrow (O) for a minute
- (20) ORIGIN S: Did you understand it?
- (21) IND. MANIF. H: No not a word
- (22.1) y & p^r err. sig. S: That's right that's why you said yes
 .2) y : Great
- (23.1) y O: Well that's just total rot
 .2) y : / laugh /
 .3) y : But he's just been teaching at school for a year or two
- (24) y S: It hasn't left its mark yet
- (25) y O: It has if you say yes to anything

Source : Tape recorder

p = Did you understand my question?

p^r = Did you understand the discussion on tonicity?S real.: '? - S real.', as evidenced by S 'y & p^r err. sig.'.

H real.: '? - H real.', as evidenced by lack of further comment

O real.: '? - O real.', as evidenced by O 'y' utterances

- G75. S, (f), H, (m), O¹, (f), O², (f) and O³, (m) are friends
- (1.1) O¹: He blew up my nose and he gave me a headache
 .2) : It was nasty
- (2) ORIGIN S: It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr
 (3) y O¹: WWell he was a phhhhh
 (4) y S: A gale
 (5) y O²: Is that supposed to be romantic?
 (6) y S: It gets dogs going I believe
 (7) MANIF. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic
 (8) p^r err. sig. S: Pardon
 (9) manif. rpt. H: Zeppelins aren't romantic
 (10) x^r qued. S: Who mentioned zeppelins?
 (11) x^r exp. prtl. H: You just did, didn't you?
 & x qued.
 (12) x^r rpt. prtl. S: No
 (13) y O¹: This is one of those conversations
 (14) x^r exp. prtl. O²: You did
 (15) x^r exp. prtl. H: I know, but only because I thought (S) did
 & p^r err. sig.
 (16) x^r ref. prtl. O²: No, you started that one
 & x^r exp.
 (17) x^r ref. prtl. S: No I'm afraid not (H)
 (18) y O³: They could be thought extremely phallic
 (19) y S: What can?
 (20) y H: Phallic?
 (21) y O¹: Zeppelins
 (22) y OS: Zeppelins
 (23) y O¹: Oh those big things that go like that
 - extends arms wide -

Source: Tape recorder (O² = C.E.H.-J.)

p = It's supposed to be like a sort of a zephyr

p^r = It's supposed to be like a sort of a zeppelin

S real.: '? - S real.', as evidenced by devices relating only to
 the source of the misunderstanding in the conversation

H real.: '? - H real.', as per '? - D real.'

O¹ real.: '? - O¹ real.', as per '? - S real.'

O² real.: as per O¹

O³ real.: as per O¹

TYPE H : + S real. - H real.

Diversified Structure

H76. S, (f), is H's, (m), wife; H has been to Douglas, a town twelve miles from their home, on airport business but has been unable to conclude the business.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Oh, do you have to go into Douglas again tomorrow?
 (2) MANIF. H: Yes but it's all right, we're going in the airport car
 _____ + S real.

Source : Overheard

p = Oh do you have to go into Douglas again tomorrow (poor old you having to go and hang around again)

p^r = Oh do you have to go into Douglas again tomorrow? (having to pay for the fuel for the journey)

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating to business tedium

H real.: '- H real.', as evidenced by conversation ending Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription with S.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

H77. In H's, (f), local shop, S, (f), a visitor, is buying a carton of milk which is an unfamiliar shape to her

- (1) ORIGIN S: How much is it?
 (2) MANIF. H: It's usually ten and a half p
 _____ + S real.
 (3) p exp prtl. S: Big ones, little ones
 (4) p^r err. sig. H: What?

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = How much is contained in this carton?

p^r = How much does this carton cost?

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating to size

H real.: '- H real.', as evidenced by H 'p^r err. sig.'. Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

TYPE I : ? + S real. - H real.

Diversified Structure with Expansion

I78. S, (f), is describing her holiday in Edinburgh; H, (f), lives in Dundee, S in the Isle of Man.

- (1.1) ORIGIN S: I love walking around cities
 .2) y : It's the best way to see them
 (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: That's like me
 .2) MANIF. : I love cities
 .3) y : I don't really like the country
 _____ ? + S real.
 (3) y S: The country's all right if you're not isolated

Source : Overheard
 p = I love walking around cities
 p^r = I love cities
 S real.: '? + S real.', probably effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response relating to sightseeing techniques
 H real.: '- H real.', as evidenced by 'y' utterances
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription with S ('+ S real.' could not be confirmed).

TYPE J : + S real. - H real. + O real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

J79. S, (f), is talking to friends, H, (m) and (O, (f), about their son and his new accountancy firm, headed by Roy Brown

- (1.1) S: It's good that they accept him as he is
 .2) : They get the best out of him
 (2.1) H: Well they're all young you see
 .2) : There isn't an old one there
 (3) O: There's just one
 (4) ORIGIN S: They could be young and stuffy
 (5.1) MANIF. H: When I met Roy Brown he was well dressed
 and smart and anything but stuffy
 .2) y : He was all set for a session but he had
 to go and play squash
 _____ + S, O real.
 (6) p^r ref. prtl. O: No
 & mus. sig.
 mus. ack. S,O: - exchange glances -

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = They could be young and stuffy
 p^r = They are young and stuffy
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (5.1, 5.2); anticipated response relating to hypothetical character, not actual.
 H real.: '- H real.', as evidenced by lack of further utterances.
 O real.: '+ O real.' as per '+ S real.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription

J80. S, (f), who is ill, is with H, (f), and O, (f); as O speaks, S is about to dose herself with cough medicine.

- (1) O: I wouldn't mind being ill
 (2) ORIGIN S: It's not very nice
 (3.1) MANIF. H: That's a very nice one
 .2) y : I had it when I was ill
 _____ + S real.
 (4) p^r exp. incmp. O: Oh I thought you meant
 & p^r err. sig.
 (5) p exp. prtl. S: Yes I did
 _____ + O real.

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = It's not very nice being ill
 p^r = This cough medicine isn't very nice
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3.1, 3.2); anticipated response relating to illness not cough medicine
 H real.: '- H real.', as evidenced by lack of further utterances.
 O real.: '+ O real.', as per '+ S real.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

TYPE K : - S real. + H real.

Diversified Structure

K81. Intentional
 H, (f), is S's, (m) daughter; Molly is a late-middle-aged cleaner where S works.

- (1.1) S: I was talking to Molly
 .2) ORIGIN : She's in the Brownies or Cubs
 _____ + H real.
 (2) MANIF. H: Bit old isn't she?
 (3) y S: They couldn't get anyone else

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = She's a leader in the Brownies or Cubs
 p^r = She's a member of the Brownies or Cubs
 S real.: '- S real.', as evidenced by S 'y'
 H real.: '+ H real.' precedes manifestation.

K82. S, (m), is an accountant, brother to H, (f); Eddie is the licensee of the Colly Green Hotel; 'foreigner' is Manx idiom for moonlighting, i.e. performing one's trade in one's own time rather than as part of one's job.

- (1) ORIGIN S: I'm doing a foreigner at the moment so that takes up most of my time
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: How foreign?
 (3) y S: Well, for Eddie at the Colly Green
 _____ + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = I'm doing a foreigner at the moment so that takes up most of my time
 p^r = I'm having an affair with a foreign girl so that takes up most of my time
 S real.: '- S real.', as evidenced by S 'y'.
 H real.: '+ H real.', effected by S 'y'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

K83. S, (f), has been talking to H, (f), about someone paralysed in an accident several years previously.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Did you read in the Clarion this week a fellow called Connan ran away with all the prizes at the Flower Show
 (2) MANIF. H: Really!
 (3) x comp. S: In a wheelchair
 _____ + H real.

K86. S, (m), Bob and James are all friends known to H, (f), who is S's sister; 'doing a foreigner' is Manx idiom for moonlighting, i.e. performing one's trade in one's own time rather than as part of one's job; Bob, a builder, has been married twice; Surby is a village, 'the Jane' is the local maternity hospital.

- (1.1) ORIGIN S: Bob's doing a foreigner in Surby for somebody
 .2) y : The brother-in-law came over and he doesn't speak any English so Bob was in a mess
 .3) y : He got him to the pub but the guy kept talking German
 .4) y : James knows a bit so they managed
 (2) IND. MANIF. H: How's his marriage?
 (3) manif. qued. S: Which one?
 (4) manif. ampl. H: The second
 (5) y S: She's going into the Jane in a couple of days time
 (6) 2nd MANIF. H: Well what about the one in Surby?
 (7) y S: No it's only a foreigner
 (8) p^r err. sig. H: But .. oh God
-
- + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Bob's doing a foreigner (a job) in Surby for somebody
 p^r = Bob's having an affair with a foreign girl in Surby for somebody

S real.: '- S real.', as evidenced by S 'y' utterances

H real.: '+ H real.' effected after re-consideration of conversation.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

TYPE L : ? - S real. + H real. + O real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

L87. H, (f), has just started working in a Reference Library; S, (f), is a customer; the original manuscripts of wills are not issued to the public; instead, microfilms of the wills are issued; Episcopalian wills are indexed on yellow cards and on pink cards with yellow stripes while another type of will is indexed on white cards; H does not know about this procedure but O, (m), who works in a different department of the Library, does; microfilms can be copied by being printed out from a particular microfilm-reader, as opposed to ordinary photocopying.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Could I have a photocopy of these wills please
 / pause /
 (2) IND. MANIF.¹ H: Yes
 (3) y S: Now then, the yellow cards are Episcopal wills and the pink ones with yellow stripes are as well I assume

/ continued ...

L87 ... continued /

- (4) y H: Eh
- (5.1) y S: You're new aren't you?
 .2) y : Well I'm sure they are
 .3) y : They probably ran out of yellow cards
 .4) y : These are the ones I want
 .5) y : If you can give me a piece of scrap paper
 I'll write them out for you and you can think
 about them
- (6.1) y H: Thanks
 - gets paper and gives it to S -
 / pause /
 - turns to O -
 .2) MANIF.² : Can we do photocopies of wills?
- (7.1) y O: Yes, well, print-outs
 - turns to S -
 .2) p qued. : You want a print-out from the reader?
- (8) p^r ref. prt1. S: No
 & p^r err. sig.
- (9) y O: That's how we copy wills
- (10.1) p_r exp. S: I want to look at them
 .2) p^r ref. : I don't want a copy
- (11.1) p^r err. ack. H: Oh sorry
 .2) x^r exp. : I thought you said you wanted them photocopied
- (12) p exp. S: I want to look at the photocopies you have
 _____ + O real.
- (13) p qued. O: The microfilms
- (14) p exp. prt1. S: Yes
 _____ + H real.
- (15.1) mus. ack. H: Oh
 .2) mus. ack. : I see
 .3) mus. ack. : Sorry

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Can I have the photocopies (microfilms) of these wills
 please (to look at)

p^r = Can I have a photocopy of these wills please (to take
 home)

S real.: '? - S real.', as evidenced by S utterances and the
 fact that, being new, H may not understand, rather
 than misunderstand, the request.

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'p qued.' and S 'p exp.prt.'.

O real.: '+ O real.' effected by S 'p exp.'.

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription
 with O.

TYPE M : + S real. ? H real.

Diversified Structure with Expansion

M88. H, (f), is telling S, (f), about Elaine; when Linda's Fellowship expired, she received more research money from a fund previously held by Eileen.

- (1) ORIGIN S: She wasn't the Elaine that Linda got the money from?
- (2.1) y H: No that's Eileen
- .2) MANIF. : Linda didn't get the money FROM her
_____ + S real.
- (3.1) r y S: No I know
- .2) p^r ref. prtl. : I didn't mean that

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = She wasn't the Elaine that had the grant before Linda

p^r = She wasn't the Elaine that Linda got the money from

S real.: '+S real.' effected by recognition that 'FROM' for H means 'gave to' rather than 'held before'

H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence)

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

M89. Anne is H's, (f.), daughter and is a friend of S, (g); Anne lives in England while both S and H live in the Isle of Man.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Did Mum say that Anne rang tonight
- (2.1) IND. MANIF. H: Yes (happy)
- .2) y : Poor Anne
- .3) y : She was going off to do the washing
- (3.1) y S: Aaah
_____ + S real.
- .2) x ampl. : Did she say that Anne phoned ME?
- (4.1) y H: No
- .2) y : Oh how nice ...

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.

p = Did Mum say that Anne rang (me) tonight

p^r = Did Mum say that Anne rang (you) tonight

S real.: '+ S real.' effected by H 'y', giving information Anne had not told S.

H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence).

M90. S, (f), and H, (m), are talking about going back in the past and living in another country.

- (1.1) ORIGIN¹ S: Would you change character?
- .2) ORIGIN² : Would you be more ruthless?
- (2) MANIF. H: I would make Raphael and Michelangelo try to make them realize there's a place for both of them
_____ + S real.
- (3.1) x¹ ampl. S: Would you have a character change in yourself?
- .2) x² rpt. : Would you be more ruthless
- (4) y H: No I don't think so

Source : S = C.E.H.-J.
 p = Would you change your character? Would you be more ruthless?
 p^r = Would you change any characters (as a prince)? Would you be ruthless to others?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2); anticipated response relating to H's character, not other people.
 H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence)
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.
 H could not confirm his own state of realization.

M91. S, (f), and H, (m), are in a room adjoining the kitchen in which their daughter and neice are beginning to wash dishes; Jon is S and H's son and lives in his own home.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Do I hear a nice sound?
 (2.1) MANIF. H: No it's your daughter and your neice
 / pause /
 .2) p^r exp. & : (S) thought she heard Jon
 p^r err. sig. _____ + S real.
 (3.1) p^r ref. prt1.S: No I didn't
 .2) x exp. : I said did I hear a nice sound
 (4) ? mus. ack./ H: Oh
 p^r err. ack.

Source : Overheard
 p = Do I hear a nice sound (dishes being done)?
 p^r = Do I hear a nice sound (my son)?
 S real.: '+ S real.' effected by S 'p^r exp. & p^r err. sig.'
 H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence)

TYPE N : ? + S real. ? H real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

N92. S, (m); H, (m), has been talking about oilmen drinking a lot.

- (1.1) ORIGIN¹₂ S: I can't drink whisky
 .2) ORIGIN² : Can you?
 (2.1) MANIF. H: Oh beer and whisky .. the lot
 .2) MANIF. : They'll drink anything, those men
 _____ ? + S real.
 (3.1) x¹₂ ampl. S: Yes, but I can't drink whisky
 .2) x² ampl. : Do you like it?
 (4) - H: / indistinct /
 (5) y S: Terrible stuff

Source : Overheard
 p = I can't drink whisky. Can you?
 p^r = I can't drink whisky. Do they (oilmen)?
 S real.: '? + S real.' probably effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (2.2); anticipated response relating to H's own drinking habits.
 H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence)

N93. S, (f), and H, (f), are on a bus which is passing a new housing estate, still partly under construction.

- (1.1) H: I don't like these new houses they're building
 .2) : They get cracks in them
- (2) ORIGIN S: I've heard that they're having trouble with the flat roofs
- (3.1) MANIF. H: Oh I'd never live in a flat
 .2) y : I hate them
 _____ ? + S real.
- (4.1) y S: Do you?
 .2) x ampl. : And they're having trouble with those flat roofs as well
- (5) y H: Are they?

Source : Overheard

p = I've heard that they're having trouble with the flat roofs

p^r = I've heard that they're having trouble with the flats (?)

S real.: '? + S real.' probably effected by recognition of cognitive inappropriacy of (3.1); anticipated response relating to building or roofs.

H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence).

TYPE 0 : ? S real. + H real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

094. H, (f), is both long- and short-sighted and often wears her glasses to see the blackboard at lectures and then takes them off to write notes; S, (m), has commented on this in the past; the lecturer always writes a complicated list of the contents of her lecture before commencing.

- H - gets out glasses case -
- (1) ORIGIN S: Here we go again
- (2) MANIF. H: No I don't think I need them today
- (3) y S: The crazy table contents of the lecture
 _____ + H real.

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.

p = Here we go again - she's writing up her list

p^r = Here we go again - putting your glasses on and off

S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence).

H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'y'.

095. S, (m), works in Air Traffic Control and is describing his day at an Air Rally to his wife, H; 'R.T.' is 'Radio Telephone'.

- (1.1) S: There was a woman going round with a tape recorder who had official on her badge
 .2) ORIGIN : She came up to ask if she could record R.T.
- (2) MANIF. H: Your what?
- (3) x rpt. prt1. S: R.T.
 _____ + H real.
- (4.1) mus. ack. H: / laugh /
 .2) mus. ack. : Oh

Source : Reported by S and H
 p = She came up to ask if she could record R.T.
 p^r = She came up to ask if she could record our tea
 S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence)
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x rpt. prtl.'.
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.
 S could not confirm his state of realization.

096. S, (m), is a customer in a pub; H, (f), is a new barmaid who has hitherto only worked at lunchtimes but is about to work in the evenings as well

- (1) ORIGIN S: / indistinct / ... lunchtime
 action H - pats stomach -
 (2) MANIF. H: So it is
 (3) ? x rpt. S: They only allow you to work lunchtimes?
 _____ + H real.
 (4) y H: Yes, well, I'm working tonight
 (5) y S: Oh are you?

Source : H = C.E.H.-J.
 p = (They only allow you to work) lunchtimes? (?)
 p^r = It's nearly lunchtime
 S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence)
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S '? x rpt.'.

TYPE P : ? S real. ? + H real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

P97. H, (m), opens his office door and sees S, (m), whose office is on the same floor, about to go upstairs; department mail is kept upstairs.

- (1) H: Hi (S)
 (2) ORIGIN S: / indistinct / .. get my mail
 (3) MANIF. H: Oh there won't be any
 (4) p^r err. sig. S: Mmm
 _____ ? + H real.
 (5) p qued. H: Oh this morning's
 (6) x rpt. prtl. S: Mail
 (7) p qued. H: This morning's mail
 (8.1) p exp. prtl. S: Yeah
 .2) y : I haven't been in this morning
 (9.1) z H: No
 .2) z : There wasn't much interesting
 .3) z : You need some aubergine money

Source : Tape recorder
 p = (I'm going up to) get my mail
 p^r = (I'm going up to) get my mail from 2nd post
 S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence)
 H real.: '? + H real.' probably effected by neutral response of S 'p^r err. sig.'.

TYPE Q : ? S real. + H real. + O real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

Q98. S, (m), and H, (m), were at school together; H is in contact with fellow 'Old Boys' from the Liverpool area, while S is Secretary to the 'Old Boys Association' but has little personal contact; the conversation takes place towards the end of H's party; O, (m, f).

- (1) ORIGIN S: How's Johnny Walker ?
 (2) MANIF. H: Get him some more whisky
 (3) x rpt. prt1. S: Johnny Walker
 (4) p^r err. sig. H: Mmm
 (5) x ampl. S: Walker, J.R.
 _____ + H, O real.
 (6) mus. ack. H: Oh
 (7) mus. ack. S,O: / laugh /
 (8) z H: Rather sad, actually

Source : O = C.E.H.-J.
 p = How's Johnny Walker ?
 p^r = Is there any more Johnny Walker whisky left ?
 S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence)
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by S 'x ampl.'
 O real.: '+ O real.' effected as per '+ S real.'
 Confirmed in subsequent discussion with H.

TYPE R : ? S real. + H real. ? + O real.

Diversified Structure with Interactive Expansion

R99. S, (m), is a Magistrate; H, (m) and O, (f), are his son and daughter; H lives away from home; Stephen is a family friend.

- (1) ORIGIN S: Stephen appeared before me the other week
 (2) MANIF. H: What, for speeding ?
 _____ ? + O real.
 (3) y S: No it was a domestic case
 _____ ? + O real.
 (4) y O: He's a solicitor
 _____ + H real.
 (5) mus. ack. H: Oh he was representing someone

Source : Overheard
 p = Stephen appeared before me the other week (representing someone)
 p^r = Stephen appeared before me the other week (as a defendant)
 S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence)
 H real.: '+ H real.' effected by O 'y'.
 O real.: '? + O real.' probably effected by recognition that manifestation treats Stephen as defendant, or by S 'y'.

TYPE S : ? S real. ? H real.

Diversified Structure

S100. S, (f), and H, (f), are in a common room for which coffee is normally provided; for the previous four weeks there has been no coffee, only some atrocious tea; this situation was discussed by S and H at the time it began.

- (1) ORIGIN S: There's coffee again now
 (2) MANIF. H: Have you been off coffee then?
 (3) y S: There hasn't been any for some time

Source : Overheard

p = There's coffee again now after a spell without any

p' = I'm drinking coffee again now

S real.: '? S real.' (no evidence).

H real.: '? H real.' (no evidence).

Confirmed in subsequent discussion of transcription.

S and H could not confirm their states of realization;
 both admitted the conversation was problematic.

S and H provided the following commentaries:

By S after (2) : "Why has she said that?"

By H after the conversation had ended :

"I wasn't listening properly".


APPENDIX 2RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DEVICES

1. By S 2. By H 3. By O

The following Tables indicate the efficacy of devices in relation to the number of times they are used (see Chapter VIII, pages 180-2). Where the use of a device cannot be confirmed, such as '? mus. ack.', it is here counted as having been used rather than being omitted altogether.

Key

: number of times a device is used




: number of times a device effects realization



: number of times a device effects realization when used 'separately'


1. RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DEVICES USED BY S




Number
of Times
Used

Devices

2. RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DEVICES USED BY H



3. RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DEVICES USED BY O



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